

Abstract

Traditional views on International Relations dominate regional analyses. These invariably emphasize the dominance of state and market forces in inter-state relations. Experiences and expectations of people are less prominent in these discourses, and the practices they foster. This thesis critically analyses the regional processes in West and southern Africa within the framework of Critical Theory. It argues that these processes are constrained by instability and the increasing legitimacy crises of the State. The thesis demonstrates that the State, through exclusive nationalist practices, hinder the growth of a cosmopolitan order, and it argues that neo-liberal regionalism is a contested phenomenon because of its exclusive nature. Finally, the thesis suggests steps needed to resolve the legitimacy crises and to build an inclusive regional order, based on cosmopolitan values.

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This project is dedicated to the memory of my mother, **Christina Ama Orleans Lindsay**.

Difficult though it may be to detect it, a certain polemical thread runs through any philosophical writing. He who philosophises is not at one with the previous and contemporary world's ways of thinking of things (Goethe in Rengger, 1995:77).

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

This study offers a comparative analysis of regionalism in southern and West Africa. The focus on region is informed, in part, by the fact that the region and its affairs have assumed renewed importance. This point is underscored by the term the “new regionalism” which is a multi-layered phenomenon (Fawcett, 1995:17). At one level, the resurgence of interest in the region is due to the demise of the Cold War. The region has become an important player in global security in a Post-Cold War world. In the bipolarized world of the Cold War, the maintenance of global security centred on the Super Powers. However, this rigid security architecture has given way to a flexible and decentralized global security framework. So, the United Nations (U.N.) now “sub-contracts” regional security to regional organizations. This development has given rise to a plethora of regional security arrangements today (see Henrikson, 1995; Fawcett, 1995:18). Indeed rampant civil conflicts, especially in Africa, which spill into neighboring states and eventually engulf a region, have provided the additional incentive for states in a set region to seek “collective management” of security problems (Hurrell, 1995:56). The region is also the site where other transnational issues such as environmental disasters (pollution, climate change or environmental degradation) can be effectively managed.

Furthermore, the renewed interest in the region is informed by the effects of economic globalization. Within the developing world in general and Africa in particular, there is a growing awareness of states’ vulnerabilities in the global economic processes. For these states, revitalizing regional co-operative structures is a vital instrument both to counter their vulnerability and promote development. Some analysts such as the “dependency” and “developmental” theorists regard the “new regionalism” as efforts by developing states or Third World countries to deepen co-operation with each other, in order to break the dependency mould that keeps them underdeveloped. Finally, the “new regionalism”

depicts the role of people, ideas and identity in the regional process. The region has, for instance, witnessed a proliferation of civil movements offering alternatives to the idea of regional order.

The label “new regionalism” can however be deceptive: a close scrutiny of the regional process, as we shall soon see from the literature review, suggests continuity rather than change. Regional analyses and practices are still set within the theory and practice of the mainstream paradigms, what Vale, Swatuk and Oden (2001:2) call the “neo-neo synthesis” which regards states and markets as dominant forces in inter-state relations. These discourses and practices are far removed from the experiences and expectations of most of the people living in designated “regions”. It has therefore become imperative to emphasize a “new thinking” (Booth, 1991:ix), “new agenda”, (Lawson, 2002a:3), new ways, new explanations and “visions” of the region (Vale, Swatuk and Oden, 2001:2). This research has been prompted by this necessity. It is a contribution to an emerging body of literature that aims at redirecting International Relations towards paths which are socially, politically and economically beneficial to people. We turn to examine the nature, scope and limitations of theory and practice of regionalism in the two regions.

Literature review:

Until the 1990s, regionalism in both southern and West Africa was both interventionist and development oriented. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), formed in 1975, adopted a protectionist integrative approach which was based on the European idea of an internal common market: the member states aspired toward forming a custom union by removing barriers to trade among themselves and erecting a common tariff wall against external trade. (Mayall, 1995:185). Conscious of their own development needs, the states in the region additionally initiated co-operative projects in transport and communication, energy, industry and agriculture. In contrast to the integrative approach in West Africa, regionalism in southern Africa took a more neo-

Functional form.¹ The erstwhile Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) adopted a sectoral approach to co-operation by collaborating in areas such as energy, agriculture, transport and communication. This decision was based on an assumption that the functional approach leads to both national and regional development. However, at the end of the last century the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) turned away from functionalism towards the free market approach, like ECOWAS, through the Free Trade Protocol in 1996, which was ratified in 2000 (Clapham et al., 2001; Gibb, 2002; Holden, 2001). As a result, both ECOWAS and SADC have accepted the neo-Liberal mantra that the free trade principles lead to mutual development. Although there are many studies on regionalism in the two regions and elsewhere, most of these are set within the mainstream or traditional theoretical framework. To these we now turn.

The main stream approaches to regionalism:

Most regional integrative studies draw upon the force of neo-Liberal economics and are oriented towards market integration (Onwuka and Shaw, 1989; Okolo and Wright, 1990; Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Tsie, 1996, 2001; 1996; Lavergne, 1997; Asante, 1998; Alden, 2000; Gibb, 2000, 2003; Clapham et al, 2001; Hentz, 2001; Page and Bilal, 2001; Meagher, 2003). For neo-Liberals market-oriented regionalism is the only credible, sensible, effective and universal solution to regional development issues. It is therefore not surprising that neo-Liberal analyses invariably adopt a “problem-solving” approach: they explain the causes or factors that militate against the achievement of market integration and show the steps which are required both to surmount the problems and to

¹ Neo-Functionalism as a form of regional co-operation is based on the notion that co-operation in one issue, area or sector will lead to co-operation in other areas. This is based on the neo-Functional “spill over” concept, which argues that problems arise as states co-operate in one sector which leads to further co-operation in other sectors to resolve problems. The neo-Functional approach assigns a greater role to supra-national institutions and the technocrats who serve within them in regional co-operation. It also depicts the role of transnational social forces in the integrative projects. The classic texts on neo-Functionalism are Ernest B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces* (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1958), pp.xv-xvi; and Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Calif.: UP, 1963); see also J. Tranholm Mikkelsen, “Neo-Functionalism, Obstinate or Obsolete? A Re-appraisal in the Light of the New Dynamics of E.C”, *Millennium, Journal of International Studies*, vol.20, no.1 (1991), pp 1-22.

set the region on a path to integration or development: these include a gamut of neo-Liberal prescriptions such as the removal of trade barriers, establishment of a liberal political climate, the protection of private property, promotion of private entrepreneurship, labour flexibility, tax incentives to attract investors and a reduced role of the state in the economy. We turn now to focus on the Realist/neo-Realist literature.

Realism and regionalism:

The conundrum is established by understanding that Realism and regional integration “sounds like an oxymoron” (Choi and Caporaso, 2002:486). For one thing, Realism or its variant, neo-Realism,² regard the international system as a “self-help” one (Griffiths, 1999:48). States relate to each other in a self-regarding or selfish way; they seek relative gains rather than pursuing absolute gains in their interaction with one another. From an ontological perspective, Realists view the terrain outside the sovereign state as anarchical -- there is no single authority to order sovereign states. In an anarchical world the central

² Realism, originally understood as the *raison d'état* or the national interest, can be traced to the political thought of Machiavelli and the international practice of the Renaissance Italian city-states. It was a historically conditioned phenomenon. The Realist practices of the states were responses to particular historical circumstances, events or institutions. Indeed, earlier so-called scholars of the Realist tradition like Edward Carr and Ludwig Delio understood Realism in a historical context. For these scholars realism was never an ahistorical framework of action. However by the Cold War period, a new version of Realism emerged. This was propagated by American scholars like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. Although this ideology was a response to the bipolarity of the Cold War, the theory is abstracted from this historical framework. Realists reify the international system and see a recurrent pattern of state behaviour. Realists like Hans Morgenthau understood and explained international outcomes by examining the behaviour of domestic orders. For Morgenthau, the “salient attributes of actors” – at the unit or state level – such as the principles of human nature, the concept of interest, which is defined as power, and the behaviour of statesmen are direct causes of international political events. Kenneth Waltz however rejected this reductionism. He argued that it was wrong for traditional realism to explain the whole (the global system) by using the parts (states). Waltz contends that it is rather the structure, the international system, that influences the behaviour of the units. This “discovery” gave birth to a new strand of Realism, neo-Realism. For Waltz, there are three basic principles which underline the international structure: (1) It is anarchical. This anarchy is informed by an Augustinian notion of “original sin” or the Hobbesian “perpetual and restless desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death”. (2) The international structure both influences and constrains states’ behaviour and action: the states are faced with a common task of securing themselves in a chaotic environment, however, the capability to do so varies. The powerful states perform this function better than the less powerful. (3) The international structure places a rational limit or constraint on states’ ability to pursue rival national interests because of the underlying checks and balances – the balance of power mechanism. For a critical account of the difference between realism and neo-Realism see Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders” in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neo-Realism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) pp. 111-116. For detail theoretical description of neo-Realism see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

task of every state is how to secure itself against others. This mission leads to the pursuit and struggle for power which, in Realist thinking, is a guarantee against insecurity (Waltz, 1979). This said, Realism/neo-Realism has something to say about why states co-operate. Realists argue that there are power and what they call “relative gain” calculations in any regionalist projects (Hurrell, 1995:48). For instance, many neo-Realists see the politics of regionalism as similar to the “politics of alliance formation” (Hurrell, 1995:47). In this sense, for Realists, regional co-operation – both economic and political – is influenced by external challenge. Let us examine how these ideas have been used to interpret regionalism in both southern and west Africa.

Scholars of southern African regionalism have observed that the now defunct regional organization, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1979, was designed to counter the threat and power of the regional hegemon, apartheid South Africa (Davies and O’Meara, 1985; Hurrell, 1995; Vale, 2001; Odén, 2001; du Pisani, 2001). It was intended to establish a balance of power in a region which was heavily in favour of a single and aggressive state. Economically, SADCC was intended to reduce the region’s dependence on South Africa, in particular, and the rest of the world in general.

Some analyses of regional integration and co-operation in West Africa implicitly mirror Realist interpretations. These show that Realism underlines both “macro”³ and “micro”⁴ regional integrative and co-operative schemes. At the macro level, analysts point out that Nigeria’s idea of forming a regional economic bloc, the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) was a move to counter the economic power and influence of France in the region (Mytelka, 1974; Ate, 1983; Bach, 1990; Page and Bilal, 2001). France, in turn, used the major states in the so-called Francophone Zone, Ivory Coast and Senegal, to stall the Nigerian plan, by forming a Francophone regional economic bloc, Communauté de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (C.E.A.O.) in 1973. At the micro level the

³ Macro denotes integrative arrangement at the regional level.

⁴ This is integration below the regional level and may involve two or more states.

Senegambian Confederation⁵ floundered because of Gambia's fears of Senegal's political and economic domination.

Similarly Realist dynamics underline the regionalist project in southern Africa. Some scholars suggest that there is a "growing competition" between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The former resents the power and influence of the latter in the region because it believes that South Africa has overtaken it as regional leader (du Pisani, 2001:212; see also Bischoff, 2002).

Realist integrative discourses show that states are also motivated by "relative-gains" calculations, and this explains why integrative schemes tend to be weak in Africa in general. What accounts for this weakness is that the redistribution mechanism that underpins the integrative scheme tends to be ineffective. The view is that without a redistribution framework the strongest economies will reap most of the benefits to the detriment of the poorer states: the economically dominant states will gain more from investment and trade than their weak neighbours. So, to prevent this, specific industries are invariably allocated to each member country and the compensatory mechanism or redistribution of revenue always favours the poorer states (Mayall, 1995:184). This mechanism has been successful in the European case, however, with the exception of the SACU,⁶ it has not worked in African regional integration projects. The decision to assign specific industries to states is never implemented and the relatively strong economies complain about the lack of equity in redistribution of revenue. In the absence of an

⁵ The confederation of Senegal and the Gambia was established in February 1982. Arnold Hughes argues that security was the immediate reason for its formation. The Gambian government wanted Senegalese protection, especially after a large-scale Senegalese military intervention put down an internal insurrection. Senegal, for her part, needed a union with the Gambia to prevent the formation of coalition of Senegalese dissidents, based in Guinea, Gambia, and the Casamance province of Senegal, in Gambia. However, the union collapsed in 1989 on account of irreconcilable "national interests". For a Realist account of the formation and collapse of the Senegambian Confederation see Arnold Hughes, "The Collapse of the Senegambian Confederation" in *Journal of Commonwealth Politics*, Vol.30, No.2 (July 1992), pp. 200-222.

⁶ The Southern African Custom Union (SACU) was established in 1910, and comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The strongest state, South Africa, has been able to maintain a revenue sharing formula which favours smaller states: they receive more from the revenue pool than South Africa. In spite of this, analysts point out that all members of SACU "have expressed varying levels of dissatisfaction with their receipts under the formula", which led to a renegotiation of the SACU agreement. See Merle Holden, "Is a Free Trade Agreement the Answer for Southern Africa? Insights from Development Economic Theory", in Vale et al. *Theory, Change and Southern Africa's Future* (New York: Praeger Publishers Ltd, 2001), pp. 152, 161.

effective and acceptable redistribution mechanism, the poorer states view integration as a device in the “wider economic and political interests of the strongest states” (ibid.:184). The weaker states also tend to resent it when industries from the strongest economies displace their local industries.

Indeed some Realist analyses suggest that, given the asymmetrical gains of integration, the smaller states will benefit more from “unilateral liberalization” than integrating with each other (Holden, 2001:152). This is one of the central arguments advanced by Merle Holden (2001). Holden, arguing from a development economic perspective, notes that the SADC Trade Protocol will “impose more cost than benefits”, especially on the smaller states in the region (ibid.:149). She explains the cost by stating that the dominant economy, South Africa, will benefit more from trade diversion⁷ than the others, there will be revenue redistribution from the poorer and weaker states to the dominant economy and deindustrialization in the smaller states as their industries are absorbed into “the core of the larger South African economy” (ibid.:151). In view of these asymmetrical gains, Holden suggests that it is better for the smaller states to liberalize their economies in relation to the rest of the world – a vertical integration – than to integrate with other states in the region. According to Holden, this unilateral integration will give states access to larger markets which will in turn lead to a more rapid economic growth (ibid.:152).

Other analysts, while not against the idea of integration, advocate selective integration. The Realist theorists and “experts” from dominant regional economies such as South Africa recommend free movement of capital and goods and advise their policy-makers against accepting free movement of labour (see Solomon, 2001). Their argument is that free movement of labour will lead to an influx of immigrant from the poor states to the relatively affluent states. It is clear from their position that they regard integration as a zero sum game in which states – dominant ones – seek benefits rather than costs.

⁷ Trade diversion occurs when member states in an integrative project forego buying cheaper goods from a third country in order to purchase similar goods, at a more expensive rate, from a member country.

Hegemonic theory and regionalism:

The Realist/neo-Realist version of hegemonic theory can also underline regionalist analyses. This holds that states with preponderant power in a region are able to influence other states towards regional co-operation. These states, also called hegemons, often initiate the drive to co-operation by providing material incentives – the public or collective goods (Hurrell, 1995; Odén, 2001). In West Africa, much has been written about the role of France – the *de facto* regional hegemon – in the integrative or co-operative literature (for detailed account of France's role see Ate, 1983; Asante, 1989, 1998; Inegbedion, 1994; Page and Bilal, 2001; Uche, 2001; Pascalon, 2004). These accounts suggest that the smaller states have been induced to seek accommodation with France in projects like security, defence and development. A security pact with France, for example, is a means for states to secure themselves both domestically and externally. France has also offered material incentives towards regional integration by setting up development funds, giving technical assistance, supporting a convertible currency⁸ and helping Francophone states pay off their external debts (Uche, 2001). Realist analyses also show that France's interest in co-operation is guided by perceived challenges from the external environment. At the time of independence of the Francophone states, France established security co-operation with Francophone states to seal them from Communist influence (Pascalon, 2004). Additionally, this boosted her image in global politics.

There is also a neo-mercantilist dimension to the French interest in regional integration: economic dominance in the Francophone zone neutralizes any effective challenge from other economic competitors (Schraeder, 2002). What happens in southern Africa?

Most of the literature on regional co-operation and integration in southern Africa takes the view that South Africa does not have the capacity or the intention to play a

⁸ Le franc des Colonies Françaises d'Afrique (CFA) is the common currency unit for all the Francophone West African states.

hegemonic role in the region. Bertil Odén, however, believes that South Africa does play a hegemonic role. He uses the idea of “neo-Liberal Institutionalism” or “modified structural realism” – as it is also known – which embodies the ideas of hegemonic stability theory to argue his case (Griffiths, 1999:188). In this version of the theory, hegemonic conditions are necessary to set up international co-operation, however they are not essential pre-requisites for maintaining it. For Robert Keohane (1984), the stability of a co-operative arrangement rests on the “functional utility” of “regimes” - - the latter are the principles, rules and norms to which states bind themselves in a given issue (Griffiths, 1999:188). Neo-Liberal Institutionalists argue that states, confronted by collaboration and co-ordination concerns arising from growing interdependence, are induced to seek international co-operation in order to solve common problems. So, acting in concert, states set up regimes to promote their long-term rational self-interest. For instance, regimes can reduce transaction costs because participating states are obliged to provide information about their preferences, behaviour and intentions. This reduces suspicion and induces states to co-operate with each other.

Bertil Odén draws on Snidal (1985) to describe the qualities of a benevolent hegemon. by asserting that South Africa plays a benevolent hegemonic or leadership role in “co-operative regionalization” in Southern Africa (Odén, 2001:174). South Africa’s economic, human, and institutional resources, which are superior to those of her neighbours, enable her to do this. For Odén, South Africa plays a leading role in the life of SADC Protocols – these he regards as forms of regime (ibid.:175). South Africa thus has a greater capacity to prepare the documents of the Protocols, implement their recommendations and provide resources to regional institutions (ibid.). According to Odén, South Africa exhibited this superiority in the development of the Protocol on Trade, on Water and on Energy (ibid.). Odén further points out, in line with the principles of hegemonic theory, that South Africa has a “dominant interest” in benevolent co-operation because of her own needs and vulnerabilities. For example, South Africa has an interest in regional water management because of her increasing reliance on external water supplies (see Swatuk, 2001; Vale, 2001, 2003). The Gauteng province, which is the industrial heartland of South Africa, relies on water from Lesotho’s Highlands Water

Scheme. We turn to consider some of the limitations of the mainstream approaches to regionalism.

These approaches to regionalism, especially Realism/neo-Realism, have very little to say about regionalization, and regional identity, awareness and consciousness. Substantively, the attitude of mainstream or traditional theorists is consistent with the positivist notion of subject/object separation: positivism is a scientific mode of acquiring knowledge. It adopts the methodology of natural sciences in explaining social phenomena and assumes that knowledge is testable, objective and independent of theoretical explanation (see Koo, 2003:60). Positivists claim that knowledge is not value laden, emotive or politically weighed because the speaker, subject or theorist independently and objectively describes what he/she observes – the social world. An intrinsic aspect of positivism is its claim to empiricist epistemology. Positivists assert that sensory experience -- or what is directly observed -- constitutes the only real and legitimate source of knowledge. So any statement or knowledge claim that does not conform to this standard cannot be true. In brief, positivism rests on the twin assumptions that true knowledge is what is independently and objectively observed. The traditional International Relations theories such as Realism, neo-Realism and neo-Liberalism all claim to rest on this positivist foundation.⁹ The so-called naturalness, rationality, certainty and legitimacy of the positivist framework provide the basis for the traditional theories to delineate what is sensible and credible to analyze, talk about or suggest (see Koo, 2003:64). This tendency has given rise to a set of canons about the roles of states, markets and systemic structures by Realists, neo-Liberals and neo-Realists respectively.

So, regional analyses in the traditional theoretical framework, for example, see the interests of states “as given element of the national interest”: they do not interrogate the interest behind regionalist projects (Cox, 1986:216). The reality, however, is different. Beneath the so-called universal, value-free, natural and objective thesis is an agenda that

⁹ For a discussion of positivism see David Campbell, “Recent Changes in Social Theory: Questions for International Relations”, in Richard Higgot, ed., *New Directions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives* (Canberra: Department of International Relations, 1988); see also Colin Wight, “Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002).

serves the interest of privileged groups. Realists talk about self-interested actors – states – but the identity of the “self” and the nature of the interest are never explained (Hurrell, 1995:53). The truth is the state-centric or Realist discourse on integration or co-operation is a tool of the dominant class. In other words, the “mythical” national interest is synonymous with the interest of a powerful group. Similarly the neo-liberal regional integrative approach, as this study will show in Chapter Six, corresponds with the agenda of a transnational business class (Cox, 1981). This form of integration does not lead to universal development or prosperity as claimed by neo-Liberals (Burchill, 1996).

Some analysts of the Dependency school share this view. They have argued that neo-liberal regionalism perpetuates unequal economic relations and underdevelopment (see Shaw, 1989, 1990). For them this form of regionalism reinforces the global division of labour into core (industrialized zones), semi-periphery (semi-industrialized areas) and the periphery (the poor zones which specialize in the production of primary commodities). The Dependency theorists hold that the semi-peripheral states, which are the dominant economies in the region, serve as intermediaries between the core and the peripheral zones and they benefit more from the regional project than those at the periphery. However, some believe that regionalism can be a vehicle for independent development of Third World (or developing regions) in order to mitigate the polarizing effects of globalization -- it should be a means to enhance inter-dependence among the Third World states. In short, they advocate a self-reliant form of regionalism. In its most radical form, the dependency theory on regionalism calls for a de-linkage from the global economy in order to break a dependency syndrome (Amin, 1999; see also Oruwari, 2005:161).

The Dependency approach forms part of the broad field of development regionalism. Björn Hettne defines development regionalism as an attempt by a “group of countries within a geographical region to increase the efficiency of the total regional economy and to improve its position in the world economy” (2001:104). In essence, it follows a mutual development path in order to reduce the “center-periphery tension” – arising out of unequal development – within a region (ibid.). To attain this goal, exponents of

development regionalism recommend intra-regional investment, exploitation of economic complementarities, development of the region's production structures, redistribution mechanism, and collective bargaining in international negotiations (Hettne, 2001:104; see also Hentz, 2001:195). For advocates of development regionalism, this approach can also help end a region's marginal status, and make it an effective competitor in the international economy. Some scholars of this approach emphasize the social dimension of regionalism. They believe that people are the end of development. So, the regionalist project needs to empower ordinary people in a region through people-centred projects (Oruwari, 2005:169). Yomi Oruwari, for instance, argues that this can be done through support for the informal regional economy (ibid.). There are however some weaknesses in these approaches.

The Dependency school position is short sighted because it advocates de-linkage from the international economy to break dependency, and thus fails to accept the integrated nature of the world economy and the role of social forces in its making (Cox, 1981). As a result, it misses the transformatory potential embedded in the international economic structure: some currents – like civil society – have the potential to bring about global economic change. This blindness results from the reification of international economic structure by the dependency or the world system theorists¹⁰ (Griffiths, 1999:202). Therefore, this approach does not have an “explicit normative element”, and does not provide “a guide to action”¹¹ (Hoffman, 1987:244). The state-oriented nature of development regionalism weakens its appeal. Critical Theorists know that state actors are not credible agents of people-centred development. They also argue that the state is not an asocial agent, it is

¹⁰ These theorists contend that the capitalist economy is the ordering principle underlying a single global structure, which is divided into core, semi-periphery and periphery zones. For these scholars the obstacles to development, especially in the periphery, are external, the results of the asymmetry within the global economy. So, these theorists argue that there cannot be an independent change in the position of the periphery states without a global or system wide transformation. For comprehensive accounts of this approach see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, in two volumes (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1976); *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); *World System Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1982); *Geo-Politics and Geo-Culture: Essays on Changing World System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also James Caporaso, “Introduction: Dependence and Dependency in Global System”, *International Organization*, 32, 1 (1978) and Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development* (Hassock, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977).

¹¹ This weakness makes it different from Critical Theory which maps out strategies for transformation of the existing order.

rather interest based. As we shall encounter in Chapter Six, the transnational social forces behind the regional economy have a vested interest in an asymmetrical economic relations.

The post-positivist turn:

By the mid 1980s other alternative and disparate theoretical voices began to assert themselves in a bid to challenge, unsettle, dispute, invade and threaten the dominant images of the discipline and their unproblematised or taken-for-granted foundations, truths, certainties, assumptions and histories (Koo, 2003). These new images in the discipline include Critical Theory, Constructivism, Post-Modernism and Feminism. Certainly most of these theories are not anti-science per se: what they argue is that science cannot not be the only criterion for the legitimation of knowledge. In fact some post-positivist theories accept positivism as a valid philosophy of science, but reject the use of science as a technical tool. For instance, Critical Theoreticians object to the scientific and technical rationalization of social life for the benefit of a dominant group, and Feminism deplores the use of scientific knowledge by the mainstream discipline of International Relations to legitimize male-centred assumptions (see Wight, 2002:33; see also Enloe, 1990; Habermas, 1988). This revolution in the field of International Relations has also paved the way for the region to be theorized from post-positivist perspectives which indeed represent attempts to break the monopoly of the traditional theories. This trend is discernible in southern Africa.

Some of these analyses take a Constructivist turn.¹² Fredrik Söderbaum (2001) identifies both states and non-state actors such as market, firms, business networks, people, and

¹² Constructivist analysis of international co-operation takes an eclectic format. Nicholas Onuf defines Constructivism as an International Relations theory that allows for a multi-theoretical analysis of inter-state co-operation. So Constructivism gives license to analysts to fit theories together. This approach is based on an assumption that structures are inter-subjective and are influenced by agency. Constructivists accept the Realist conception that states are egoistical and pursue relative gains. However, it does not regard this as a fixed essence of state behaviour. Similarly, Constructivists acknowledge the neo-Liberal Institutionalists' view that based on their own rational interest, states co-operate for mutual or absolute gains, but they do not treat co-operation as a given. Alexander Wendt, for example, asserts that social structures, institutions

non-governmental organizations as influential in the regional process. He argues that the southern African region is moving away from the “conflict-ridden and exploitative interdependence of the past ... [into a more] benign type of regionalism” (Söderbaum, 2001:117). He thus breaks away from the determinism of the traditional Realist rendition of inter-state relations, in which South Africa, as the regional hegemon, perpetuates unequal development. While not discounting a Realist interpretation, he suggests that there is an additional and mutually beneficial element which is built into the regional project. The past asymmetrical relations between South Africa and its neighbours are being corrected. Söderbaum argues that the investment from South Africa and South Africa’s reliance on her neighbours, in the provision of water and energy, are developments that will help to reduce regional polarization. This argument is simplistic and misleading. South African capital and investment in the region do not necessary lead to a reduction of asymmetrical development. The reality is rather that they reinforce unevenness. For instance, setting up a brewery in Zimbabwe or a supermarket in Mozambique often discourages the growth of local industries because they cannot compete with South Africa (see Lee, 2003). Other analysts have observed that South African Banks operating in neighbouring states only grant loans for trade and commercial purposes and not for industrial development (Hentz, 2001:199).

Significantly, the success of any regional integrative project rests on its benign impact on the livelihood of people. Söderbaum concedes that development projects tend to be “top-down”, “large scale” and capital intensive which favour transnational corporations. People are removed from the planning, identification and implementation processes in these projects (Söderbaum, 2001, see also Taylor and Söderbaum, 2003). Indeed, Söderbaum’s inter-subjective analysis of regionalism is commendable. It goes beyond both Realism and neo-Liberalism, however what is missing is a normative direction: a practical guide to an alternative regional order. This should have been a logical outcome,

and collective interest or identity formation are not “exogenously given”; they are rather “constructed by historically contingent” interactions: it is an inter-subjective relation in which ideational forces, institutions, states, shared norms, values, identities and conventions all play a role. For a full discussion of constructivist views on collective identity formation, see Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review*, 88/2 (June 1994); see also, for an account of Constructivist themes, Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making. Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

especially when he notes that people are removed from the regional project. This flaw in his approach generally extends to Constructivism: it is more an explanatory¹³ than normative¹⁴ based theory, which does not make Constructivism markedly different from the traditional positivist theories (see Adler, 2002:110).

Vale, Odén and Swatuk (2001) also take a constructivist direction in the analysis of regionalism in southern Africa. This turn takes the shape of inter-paradigmatic debate which is anchored in the belief that no single theory captures the complexity of the regional process. So, the southern African regional project is theorized or analyzed from multi-theoretical perspectives: Green, Development Economics, Liberal Institutionalism, Critical Feminist, Social Theoretical, Realist and Critical International Political. Justifying the inclusion of traditional theoretical perspectives, they argue, “it is virtually impossible [given the multiplicity of problems in southern Africa] ... to abandon problem-solving theory” (Vale et al., 2001:14). However, this acknowledgement ironically makes them “prisoners of ontology” (ibid.:21). It may be true that the southern African region is rife with socio-economic problems, this is the very reason that regional analysts need to reject problem-solving, positivist theorizing because, as they readily concede, it does not “get to the root of the problem” (ibid.:8).

In the same collection, Balefi Tsie (2001) and Anthony Leysens (2001) analyze regional integration from a Critical Theoretical perspective. Tsie writes from a critical political economic perspective, invoking the work of Karl Polanyi; and Leysens uses Robert Cox, however, the Coxian framework is not adequately utilized to examine the regional structures. He recommends this task as an agenda for future research. Both Tsie and Leysen critique the Realist, Statist and neo-Liberal directions of regional integration because these do not pursue “an emancipatory vision for humanity as a whole” (cited in Vale et al., 2001:9). However there is a certain degree of contradiction, ambiguity or “tension” in their analyses (ibid). Both accept the state as a means to realize their

¹³ An explanatory or positive theory describes or tells how things are or how the social world is.

¹⁴ Normative theory tells how things ought to be. See Chris Brown, “The Normative Framework of Post-Cold War International Relations”, in Stephanie Lawson (ed.), *The New Agenda for International Relations*, (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishers Inc, 2002) pp. 147-8.

emancipatory goals for the region. Tsie suggests that the embrace of democratic principles by most southern African states opens up space for people to press for change. The basic flaw in this is that it fails to address the class basis of the state; indeed, it reinforces it. Anthony Leysens suggests that the states in southern Africa need to redress issues of inequalities in order to forestall social upheaval in the region. But Critical Theorists know that the state itself perpetuates injustice and inequality; it is therefore incapable of solving the fundamental problems of the existing regional order. These ambiguities in their narratives are not adequately resolved. There is also a lack of detailed description of alternative and emancipatory projects.

Lisa Thompson (2001) surveys the feminist scholarship on International Relations and focuses on regionalism in southern Africa from what she calls a “critical feminist” perspective. Thompson distinguishes critical feminism from Critical Theory¹⁵ by emphasizing that critical feminism is primarily concerned with gender issues. However, she notes that critical feminism is also interested in general political and economic oppression and discrimination (ibid.:257). She critiques feminist perspectives like liberal feminism, Marxist feminism and socialist feminism for drawing heavily on “ontological”¹⁶ and “epistemological”¹⁷ postulations of mainstream theories. She laments

¹⁵ There is a discussion of the ideas, views, arguments or conceptual assumptions of Critical Theory in Chapter Two. Although Critical Theory has a long intellectual tradition stretching back to the Enlightenment and the thought of thinkers like Kant, Hegel and Marx, in modern times it is widely acknowledged that Critical Theory was originally developed by German thinkers such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse – known as the Frankfurt School – at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research. This institute was established in 1923 during the Weimer Republic and relocated to the United States during the Nazi regime, and returned to Frankfurt after the war. For this account of the history of Critical Theory see Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 16, No. 2), pp. 231. Generally, Critical Theory critiques the prevailing social order by exposing its tensions, contradictions, injustices and inequalities. It does so with the intent of identifying the normative possibilities of transforming the social order. It thus has an emancipatory focus.

¹⁶ This is derived from the noun ontology which in the classical sense is the theory of being. It deals with the nature of things, existence or the world around us as conceived by a particular theory.

¹⁷ It is the adjectival form of epistemology which comes from the Greek word *epistēmê* meaning knowledge. It is the philosophy of how we come to know what we know: it denotes the process by which theorists or subjects describe, understand, evaluate, validate or “give meaning to objects of reality”. For a detailed discussion of these concepts see Jim George, “International Relations and the Positivist Empiricist Theory of Knowledge: Implications for the Australian Discipline” in Richard Higgot, ed., *New Dimensions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives* (Canberra: Department of International Relations, ANU, 1988), pp 67-8; see also Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and

that these feminist perspectives do not question the fundamental assumptions that underline those dominant narratives (ibid.:243). The central theme of critical feminism is the deconstruction of “positivist dualism” and theories which serve particular interests. By positivist dualism she meant the dichotomies that remain central to Western thought such as light/dark, rationality/irrationality, public/private, polis/oikos. In these opposites, men are identified with the rational/public/polis and women with the irrational/private/oikos. For Thompson, this form of thought entrenches and legitimizes discriminatory, exclusionary and oppressive practices against marginalized groups, especially women.

Focusing on southern Africa, Thompson observes that security discourses and practices remain realist and state-centric (ibid.:257). The most important aspects of SADC are the political and military institutions, namely the Summit of Heads of state and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security respectively (ibid.:258). Thompson contends that the military dimension of SADC is “considered ... the most important institution ...” (ibid.). For her, the prioritization of political and military issues grossly undermines the development role of SADC: it trivializes the socio-economic dimension of security and fails to see the interconnection between political and economic security. She views these institutions as a reflection of a “gendered pattern of thought” and argues that the goal of critical feminism is to ensure that “feminine characteristics” come out of the “conceptual and analytical cold” to inform political, social and economic interactions among states (ibid.:257). Indeed the strength of Thompson’s critical feminism lies in its emancipatory direction which she situates in a feminized world based on caring. However the drawback is that she does not offer strategies for realizing such an order and she ends on a pessimistic note – she regards such a social world as a “distant ... ideal ... [because of] the dominance of realist meta-narratives in southern Africa” (ibid.).

Peter Vale (2003) employs Post-Modernism and Critical Theoretical -- the Frankfurt tradition -- ideas to examine security in Southern Africa. He takes both a normative and

Marysia Zalewski eds, *International Theory, Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 18.

empirical turn. In fact the work is set within the framework of “Critical Security Studies” which incorporate a range of post-positivist perspectives. He discusses South Africa’s security within the context of southern Africa and laments the continuous Realist interpretation and reinterpretation of security in South Africa. This Realist reading, Vale suggests, only serves particular interests such as the realist Security Institutes, the security forces and the policy community. To counter this dominance, Vale calls for a move away from the “Westphalian” sovereign state towards the constructing of communities that truly seek the welfare of people. He sees potential for new forms of community in the region’s multiple “life-world”: the inter-relations between families, clans, tribes, ethnic groups, religious groups, traders and others (Vale, 2003:172). He believes that it is important to rediscover and understand the *modus operandi* of these forms of community and argues that this can lead to a reordering of social life in southern Africa. Envisaging a post-Westphalian or a post-national community in southern Africa, he suggests that resources such as water, land and food can be used to build regional communities (Vale, 2003:74). Displaying a lack of faith in states, Vale comments that only “agency” outside the state can free the region from Realist security practices and bring into being caring communities. These agents include individuals, “grass-root democratic associations”, cross border protests and other politics of resistance (ibid.: 175).

Apart from Peter Vale (2003) there is no major work on regionalism in Africa from the Frankfurt tradition of Critical Theory. Yet there is the need for more work on Critical Theory to break the dominance of traditional theories on regionalism: these mainstream paradigms have had influence over policy for too long. As a result, this thesis is set within the Critical Theoretical tradition of the Frankfurt School. The choice is informed by a conviction that critical theory objectively analyzes the present social, political and economic predicament of our world, explains the reasons for this state of affairs, offers alternatives and provides a practical guide towards the making of a better social order.

Methodology:¹⁸

To realize these objectives, the thesis adopts “immanent critique” as its dominant methodological framework. This is an internal and rational criticism of the conceptual assumptions, practices and realities of prevailing social structures (see Calhoun, 1996:446). It has empirical and normative dimensions or a two-pronged analytical focus – a critical account of existing social structures, followed by a normative analysis of the forms of domination, marginalization, injustice and inequality embedded in social structures. This method also shows the “immanent trends towards the removal of socially-created constraints on human freedom”; in short it identifies possibilities of change (Devetak, 1996:157). In line with this framework, the thesis follows the methodological paths of Habermas, Cox, Linklater and other Critical Theorists. The study offers a critical explanation of social structures, exposes their injustices, inequalities, and contradictions and gives a practical guide for structural transformation. In a sense this thesis juxtaposes theory and practice by demonstrating that Critical Theory not only reflects the social world but also shows how its normative content can be applied in the real world.

This related point should also be emphasized: this thesis adopts a hermeneutic approach by analyzing the intersubjectivity of social structures and concepts. So practices, terms and concepts such as nationalism, state, sovereignty, security and integration are discursively analyzed. This work uses a comparative technique in the study of regionalism because it is often said that comparison is the only real method in the study of politics. One of the advantages of comparative analysis is that it delineates both

¹⁸ Colin Wight points out that there is a common tendency in International Relations scholarship for methodology and epistemology “to be conflated and confused”. They are closely related because both are concerned with how we come to know, however whereas epistemology involves the philosophy of how we come to know the social world, phenomena or reality, methodology involves the practice. Methodology takes a practical dimension by focusing on the specific ways or means that we can use to have a better understanding of the social world, phenomena or reality. See Colin Wight, “Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002) p.42.

contrast and similarity, the particular and the universal aspects of a subject. This helps us to map out particular and general trends in any process (Skocpol, 1979:36).

Finally, the research goes beyond International Relations by incorporating ideas from other academic fields such as sociology, history, historical sociology and geography. This approach is informed by the fact that International Relations is enriched by an interdisciplinary approach and that other disciplines have more insightful and “trenchant things to say about ... region[s] than IR or Political Science ever did” (Vale et al., 2001:14).

Regionalism as a discursive construct:

The thesis conceptualizes “regionalism” as a discursive concept which is subject to different interpretations and is multi-dimensional in form. Andrew Hurrell captures this discursivity with the view that “both region and regionalism are ambiguous terms. The terrain is contested and the debate on definitions has produced little consensus” (1995:38). Other definitions emphasize the same point: for Andrew Wyatt-Walter regionalism is an economic process which aims at increasing or enhancing trade interactions among states (2000:78). For some International Political Economic theorists, regionalism “concerns the ideas, identities and ideologies related to a regional project” (Lee, 2003:8). Björn Hettne regards regionalism as a multi-dimensional project which deals with economic, historical, cultural, environmental and security issues (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998; Söderbaum, 2001).

Returning to Andrew Hurrell, regionalism is a broad term referring to distinct phenomenon such as “regionalization”, “regional co-operation”, “regional awareness and identity”, “inter-state co-operation”, “regional integration” and “regional cohesion”. Each of these important ideas will be discussed in turn.

“Regionalization” is primarily the informal, multi-layered flows of ideas, trade and people across borders. At one level, it represents the network of alliances between firms,

business associations or organizations across borders in a set region. At another level, it depicts the migratory flows of people within a region and the activities of regional civil society. A “regionalization” process therefore leads to the emergence of new forms of identity and loyalty which form below and above the state. It can often undermine the monolithic character of the state and suggests that the state no longer controls individual or societal loyalties and identities. Indeed the regionalization process has intensified in contemporary times for a myriad of reasons.

“Regional (inter-state) co-operation” refers to the creation of formal institutions by states in a set region to meet external challenges, to co-ordinate common positions in international institutions, to promote common values or to resolve common problems. So, states in a set region collaborate or co-operate in technical fields such as energy, transport, communication, tourism, agriculture or resource development; they can also establish regimes to deal with common security problems.

“Regional integration” is a sub-category of “regional co-operation”; this discusses the decisions of states or governments to reduce or remove economic barriers in order to facilitate mutual exchange of goods, services, capital and people. “Regional awareness”, “identity” or “consciousness” is a shared perception of belonging to a region arising from common culture, history, language, tradition and religious beliefs. Like nationalism, the meaning of regional identity can be subject to definition and redefinition. These four processes “regionalization”, “regional co-operation”, “regional awareness and identity” and “regional integration” lead to a “cohesive and consolidated regional unit” (Hurrell, 1995:44). Andrew Hurrell described this moment in two ways. On the one hand, it depicts the context in which the region plays a “defining role” in the interactions between states, and the relations of the regional states with the rest of the world. The European Union (E.U.) is the classic example of a regional cohesive environment. On the other hand, “regional cohesion” emerges where the region becomes the “organizing basis” for policy formulation over a wide range of issues: problems are defined in regional terms. Predictably, regional cohesion presupposes the existence of a supranational structure

which has the capacity to shape regional policies and to enact rules, norms or regulations that bind member states.

Structure of the thesis:

The thesis critically compares the regional processes in both southern and West Africa within the framework of Critical Theory. It aims to show that these processes are hampered by political instability and legitimacy, identity and alienation crises of the state. It demonstrates that the crises of the state are largely the result of the practice of state sovereignty which rests on systems of domination and exclusion and engenders instability. This thesis critiques some of the dominant modes for resolving the crisis of the state within this regional context. The thesis demonstrates that exclusive nationalism hampers the emergence of a cosmopolitan order in the two regions with which this thesis is concerned. It discusses the actors, interests and beneficiaries behind neo-liberal regionalism and the forces oppose to it. The thesis suggests that an institutionalized dialogic process offers a credible path towards resolving the current crisis of the state, and the means to legitimize the regionalist projects.

Chapter Two contrasts orthodox views on themes central to this thesis with those of Critical Theory. The purpose is to show the normative basis and moral superiority of Critical Theory. Chapter Three presents the argument that the legitimacy crises of the state do not present the desired environment for regionalism because the state is said to be the bedrock of any regionalist project. The chapter points to the weaknesses in the liberal democratic and interventionist solutions to the crises of the state and rejects the argument that ethno-nationalist communities or pre-colonial political systems can be viable alternatives to the state. Essentially, these are problem-solving strategies which do not address the fundamental problem of the state. Chapter Four, through case studies, demonstrates that the dialectic of state sovereignty accounts for political instability. It shows that state sovereignty generates a cyclical pattern of domination, marginalization and resistance: ruling elites deploy state sovereignty to build up patrimonial structures, to

construct national identity and define political community, to monopolize the means of violence and to erect bureaucratic, legal, judiciary, legislative and security structures that serve their interests. The chapter concludes that the instability and legitimacy crises originate from the exclusionary practices embedded in sovereignty.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven examine aspects of regionalism in the two regions, southern and West Africa. The main thrust of Chapter Five is that nationalist practices in the two regions hamper the emergence of a cosmopolitan order or regional citizenship, especially because of nationalist effects on individuals – foreigners -- states and inter-state relations. It argues that exclusive nationalism is a statist project that serves particular interests. It sets the inclusive character of the colonial state against the rise of exclusive nationalism in the post-colonial state. This contrast helps to show that exclusive nationalism is an essential component of the modern state from which the post-colonial state originated. Chapter Five examines the principles which justify inclusion and exclusion from the moral boundaries of the state and offers philosophical and sociological arguments that undermine these. It closes by offering practical suggestions for a post-national community, and identifies social agents whose actions portray a nascent regional citizenry.

The ideas and visions of cosmopolitan thinkers like Immanuel Kant, E.H. Carr and Andrew Linklater largely constitute the thematic concerns of Chapter Five. What unites these scholars is that they share the idea of a society of humankind; they believe that the sovereign state is a limited moral agent, and share the view that there ought to be a just balance between particularistic and universalistic interests. These are central themes in Critical (international) Theory. So, it is apposite at this juncture to dwell briefly on their ideas on community.

Immanuel Kant's ideas on cosmopolitanism are regarded as an early manifestation of Critical International Theory (Devetak, 1996:155). Richard Devetak's observation is informed by Kant's advocacy of "revolutionism" which is the society of humankind, a "universal society of free individuals" and "kingdom of ends" (see also Linklater,

1990:159). Kant was concerned with developing a vision for a cosmopolitan order. He strongly criticized “particularistic life forms” such as the sovereign state and argued for the restructuring of international order to conform to the “principles of cosmopolitan justice” (Devetak, 1996:153,155). Kant’s view was shaped by a belief that neither the state nor the international society of states could bring about Universal Peace. Both the state and international society perpetuate injustice and inequality among people and societies (Linklater, 1997; see also Devetak, 2002:171). Kant attempts to strike a balance between Realism and universalism – national and universal interests – by acknowledging that the international system constrained state behaviour. However, he admonished states, especially the major ones, to strive for a balance between their national and universal interests; to seek universal justice by promoting the welfare of others. For Kant, then, universal peace, prosperity and progress hang on a balance between the national and the cosmopolitan interests.

E.H. Carr is widely regarded in traditional theoretical scholarship as one of the foremost champions of Realism. However, some Post-positivist thinkers, especially Critical Theorists like Robert Cox, Ken Booth and Andrew Linklater, hold that Carr espoused ideas which are central to critical theoretical thought (Dunn, 1998:23). In fact, all three writers borrow insights from Carr, “as building blocks for the reconstruction of a new stage in International Relations theory” (Dunn, 1998:23; see also Linklater, 1990, 1997). To understand the double movement in Carr’s *oeuvre*, it is necessary to revisit some of the ideas of the “English School” tradition of International Relations. The teleology of this school is summed up in three R’s: Realism, Rationalism¹⁹ and Revolutionism²⁰ or international anarchy, habitual intercourse and moral solidarity respectively (Griffiths, 1999:171). Put simply, this School believes that international thought and practice can be analyzed from these perspectives. The work of the English school, including that of Carr, invariably revolves around these interpretations of International Relations (Griffiths, 1999:171). Indeed this categorization of international thought and practice corresponds

¹⁹ Rationalism or habitual discourse as a concept refers to the practice of diplomacy, the existence of international law and other forms of international co-operation

²⁰ Revolutionism or moral community focuses on the community of humankind. See Griffiths op. cit., p.175.

with the Kantian notion that political thought should not be limited to political theory (the speculation on the relation between citizens and the state) and international theory (speculation on the relations between states) but it must also include the “cosmopolitical” which is the relations between humankind (Devetak, 2002:171).

Having traced the ideological moorings of Carr’s work, let us briefly examine how he employs these ideas and perspectives in his diagnosis of the problems of interstate relations and the prescriptions he offers. E.H. Carr gained his reputation as a Realist in his analysis of Post-World War international order in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. However, as Tim Dunne (1998) points out, there is a distinction between “Realism” as a theory of International Relations and Carr’s use of the term to dispute the universalistic claims which underlined the Post-World War I international order. Carr understood “Realism” in a historical sense; this shows in his interpretation of the real motives of the victorious powers. For Carr, the Post-War security architecture – maintaining peace through Collective Security -- and the liberal underpinnings of the new order were nothing more than a reflection of the national interests and morality of the victors of the time. He confirmed the historicism and contingency of Realism when he wrote: “what matters is that these supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time” (Carr, 1939:83). This would move Carr to assert that it was an illusion or utopian to think of a convergence of separate national interests. Revisionist states, like Japan, Germany, Italy and Russia did not share the universalistic claims of “utopianism” or liberal internationalism: they rejected liberal economics and its political principles before they descended into war (Dunne, 1998:29).

Carr is also not an orthodox Realist because he departs from its state centrism. He argues that the nation state is not an agent for social justice; it stands in opposition to it. This brings us to Carr’s twofold project for a post-national community. First, in *Nationalism and After*, he states that the nation state is incapable of providing economic and social security for its people. To resolve this, Carr recommends the establishment of transnational and regional organizations which are committed to social justice (Carr,

1945). Secondly, while acknowledging the existence and importance of the society of states, he was skeptical about its ability to promote social justice: he did not see this community as an acceptable architecture for world order. This doubt is rooted in his conviction that there is an inherent structural inequality in the international society which lacks a “solid moral foundation” (cited in Dunne, 1998:35). This revelation led Carr to argue for a cosmopolitical order, a post-national community which emphasizes human freedom, equality and justice. For Carr (and Critical Theorists) this order can only be brought about by the efforts of ordinary people (Carr, 1945:53; see also Linklater, 1997:337). However Like Kant, Carr does not completely turn his back on the state: his universalism accommodates “national loyalties” (Carr, 1945:67).

Like E.H. Carr, Andrew Linklater focuses on the importance of transcending the nation state. He regards the principles like the “social contract” that justifies the contraction of the state’s moral obligation and boundary as arbitrary, and deplors the division of people into separate sovereign states (Linklater, 1990). This is why he criticizes political theorists for defending the right of the sovereign state to limit its moral obligation to citizens. Andrew Linklater is primarily concerned with how human consciousness can be transformed to enable people think more compassionately about their moral duty to what he calls “foreigners” (Griffiths, 1999:139).

For Linklater a Critical Theory of International Relations has three agendas: Philosophical-Normative, Historical-Sociological and Practical (Linklater, 1990:136). The first focuses on the rationale behind the major principles of moral inclusion and exclusion in human affairs, such as state sovereignty, which justifies the practice of inclusion of citizens and exclusion of foreigners. It examines why the state is regarded as the “appropriate vision of community”. At the same time, Linklater offers a counter philosophical argument. The sociological dimension of Linklater’s project debunks the dominant notions of moral inclusion and exclusion. He asserts that human moral capacities are not given; they are contingent upon time and circumstances. So, in the sociological dimension of his agenda, Linklater is interested in how moral boundaries

contract and expand over time (Linklater, 1992:81).²¹ In pursuit of this objective, he suggests that we should go beyond the “inside of societies” to examine how people who are estranged from each other on the basis of nationality, race, gender or class have managed to identify possibilities, arising out of necessity, of establishing communities based on inclusivity, justice and equality (Linklater, 1996:166). He states, for instance, that the rise of capitalism and industrialization helped to foster interdependence which in turn facilitated the expansion of moral and cultural boundaries in Europe. Echoing Hedley Bull, Linklater observes that in the past, Europeans excluded non-Europeans from the international society on the ground that the so-called peoples from the Third World were “morally and politically deficient”²² (Linklater, 1992:81; see also Linklater, 1996: 105-6). However the Europeans were compelled to break down the exclusive barrier in response to Third World claims for justice.²³ In short, the sociological aspect examines the origins, reproduction and transformation of moral boundaries (see Linklater, 1992: 81; see also Devetak, 1996:165).

While Linklater remains committed to the enlargement of moral boundaries, he accepts that there is a political task ‘to strike a just balance between the “universal and the particular” in the construction of a moral community (Linklater, 1990:141). This leads us to Linklater’s third agenda: the practical or what he labels the “praexeological” (cited in Griffiths, 1999:142). It emphasizes the intervention strategies and the practical opportunities (or possibilities) of expanding moral obligation across territorial boundaries (Griffiths, 1999:142).

As we shall see, the methodology of Chapter Five largely follows Linklater’s agenda. The chapter examines the philosophical argument of the principles of inclusion and exclusion practiced by states, discusses the historical-sociological factors that undermine these and, in a “praexeological” (Linklater, 1992:78) turn, concludes by discussing the

²¹ Linklater points out that most state systems have had an ambivalent relation with moral universalization, simultaneously fostering it and also standing in its way.

²² This reasoning, for example, underlined the trusteeship system of the League of Nations and the United Nations. In this system, the West was given the responsibility of preparing the non-European people for admission into the society of States. See Linklater 1997, p. 105.

²³ This was expressed, at one level, through the nationalist revolt against colonialism: the colonial subjects wanted the sovereign right (as their colonial masters) to govern themselves and to be admitted into the international society.

possibilities and opportunities available for extending boundaries of moral obligation beyond the state in the two regions with which this thesis is concerned.

Chapters Six and Seven use the insights, ideas, arguments and views of Robert Cox on social or world orders to interpret the regional processes. Cox's writing exhibits a sustained critique of injustices and inequalities of the prevailing social order and assesses the immanent possibilities of change. He reveals that social orders are value-laden which is captured in his famous dictum: "theory is always *for* someone and *for* a purpose" (Cox, 1981:128). For Cox, values enter into every social enquiry, which leads to the question "what values and whose values" will prevail (see Griffiths, 1999:114). So, the choice of a particular value system invariably enfranchises and empowers certain social groups and, simultaneously, disempowers and disenfranchises others. More substantively, Cox focuses on the structural transformation of social or world orders: how they emerge, how they are reconstituted, and how they break down (Cox, 1981:135). His substantive argument, ideas and views on this subject have been greatly shaped by the writings of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi (see Devetak, 1996; see also Griffiths, 1999). Cox borrows concepts of production, hegemony,²⁴ social forces and the state from Gramsci and the "internationalized state"²⁵ from Polanyi in his analysis of global orders.

Gramsci's analysis of social orders at the state level is treated at length in the next chapter. It will therefore suffice, at this point, to state that Gramsci observes that the state imposes its governing ideology on the rest of society through the support and consent of civil society and the security apparatuses. These forces consent to, and propagate, the

²⁴ Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, refers to the material power, ideology and institutions which are deployed to "frame thought" and therefore "circumscribe action". See, for example, Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory", in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), p.160.

²⁵ The state tailors its policies, institutions and practices to the requirements and ideology of the capitalist global economy. Cox identifies three stages in which the state has been internationalized. The first was 1930: in this period the state strongly protected its population against the effects of the capitalist world economy. The second was when the Bretton Woods institutions were established: the state managed to maintain a balance between its obligations to the institutions of the world economy and its obligation to the domestic population. For instance, the state's economic policies were sensitive to the opinion of its citizens and the state also maintained a welfare system. The third stage coincided with Globalization, in which the national/international compromise has broken down. The state primarily serves the interest of "transnational institutions and the network of power that control the present global economy". See Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p.107.

ideology of the existing order because of the material benefits they derive from it. Gramsci notes the dialectic of civil society which also contains anti-hegemonic movements – the marginalized, disempowered and conscientious groups who struggle to transform the existing order. Deploying these ideas at the international level, Cox argues that global social structures have inter-subjective existence (Cox, 1986:244). This intersubjectivity, at one level, depicts synchronic and diachronic moments (see Mittelman, 1998:165). For Cox, the synchronic moment is the surface coherence and unity which is lent to the prevailing global order by an inter-state consensus, and significantly, the constellation of transnational social forces, institutions and material capabilities. There are however diachronic currents beneath. These are the tensions, contradictions, injustices and inequalities of the existing social order. So, Cox identifies neo-Liberalism (or what he calls “hyper-liberal globalizing capital”) as the governing ideology of the current global order (see Griffiths, 1999:118). This ideology is supported and propagated by a coalition of transnational forces which include the world economic institutions, states, international bureaucrats and a transnational corporate class. The tenets of this ideology are presented by its adherents as the only effective and universal solutions to socio-economic problems. For Cox, behind the façade of a universalistic agenda is the interest of a transnational class.

Cox then critically examines the diachronic currents of the global order and discusses the opportunities for transformation. The latter embodies his framework for action: what needs to be done to bring about change. He suggests that the agenda of Critical Theorists is to unmask the false perceptions – the normative claims – of the global order, or the “false consciousness” and to lead people to “true consciousness” – the reality of their existing condition. This is necessary because it will induce people to seek transformation. Cox suggests that the state will not be at the vanguard of a movement for change; it will not initiate it, because it plays a role in facilitating the interest of the existing global order.

So, he suggests that globalization “from above” must be countered with globalization “from below” (see Griffiths, 1999:118; see also Cox, 1999). This should take the form of

“multilateralism” which are the alliances and coalitions of a variety of “new social movements” operating at both the local and international levels. (Cox, 1994:162-3). Reflecting on alliances, coalitions and change, Cox believes the labour movement can play a pivotal role by mobilizing and forming alliances with a variety of new social movements.

The structure of Chapters Six and Seven follows Cox’s methodology. Chapter Six focuses on the integrative processes in southern and West Africa by using Cox’s framework of analysis. This discussion sets the stage for Chapter Seven which highlights the activities of different social forces, at the state and regional levels – and beyond – against the regional order. The chapter examines the rationales behind their discontent and assesses the prospects for change.

Chapter Eight deploys the ideas of Jürgen Habermas’s “communicative rationality” as a framework for resolution of legitimation crises at both the state and regional level. The choice of Habermas is significant for two reasons. First, he is one of the original proponents of Frankfurt School Critical Theory (see Dews, 1992) Secondly, although Habermas works at the state level, he continues to influence the agenda of critical international theorists. Critical international theorists seek a post-hegemonic, post-sovereign state order. They do so because these social arrangements rest on domination, injustice, inequality, marginalization and exclusion. As a result, Critical Theorists advocate a social order which is universal in its appeal: an order which is democratic, just, and promotes cosmopolitan principles. They are concerned with the evolution of more inclusive and less exclusive forms of political associations at all levels of government. This interest is expressed in Andrew Linklater’s view that “the principle of political life should be agreed, as far as possible by all” (Linklater, 1993:9). Critical Theorists argue that Habermas’s communicative theory -- his discourse ethics -- provides the right procedure for the rational, just and democratic organization of political life (see Devetak, 1996:172-3). Richard Devetak echoes this point in the assertion that discourse ethics are relevant “where there is politics” (ibid.:170).

Habermas's discourse theory is discussed fully in Chapter Eight. At this stage it is sufficient to state that "discourse ethics" stipulate that norms, institutions, policies and practices that underline social life must ideally be settled through a dialogic process (Dews, 1992:260). Habermas does not only provide a communicative theory, he also offers a practical application of his theory to politics or government. He suggests that a constitution with its raft of individual rights and freedom can form the basis for the institutionalization of discursive or deliberative forms of politics (Habermas, 1992:370). This is essentially a dialogic process between civil society and the political system. Indeed, Habermas's idea informs recent literature on deliberative or "discursive democracy", which he has helped to popularize (see Lessnoff, 1999:291; see also Barber, 2003; Baker, 2000; Held, 1992, 1996; Habermas, 1999:251). So, for example, writers like David Held, worried about the democratic deficit of global institutions, now insist on popular participation in the decision-making processes of these bodies. The central goal of Chapter Eight is to suggest that Habermasian discourse is the mechanism needed in both West and southern Africa to resolve the crises of legitimacy.

Thematically, the goal of the thesis can be summed up as follows:

- To show the normative superiority of Critical Theory to the traditional paradigms.
- To demonstrate that the political instability and legitimacy crises of the state do not present a conducive environment for a viable regional process.
- To argue that liberal interventionism, political liberalism, ethno-nationalism and pre-colonial political systems presented as means to resolve the crises of the state cannot be effective panaceas
- To show that state sovereignty is the root of the legitimation crisis.
- To argue that the sovereign state stifles the growth of a cosmopolitanism in the two regions.
- To demonstrate that the integrative project is interest based, which in turn elicits contestation from marginalized social forces.
- To suggest that the Habermasian discourse provides a guide to the realization of peace, prosperity and development for all the regions' people.

CHAPTER TWO

The Normative Dimension of Critical Theory

The purpose of theory is firstly, in ascertaining how the social, political and economic setting of our lives now is and in understanding why it is as it is; secondly, in working through for ourselves how we could coherently and justifiably wish that world to be or become; and thirdly in judging how far, and through what actions, and of what risk, we can realistically hope to move this world as it now stands towards the way we might excusably wish it to be (Dunn in Rengger, 1995:14).

Chris Brown identifies two categories of theory: the normative and the positive. He states that “the normative theory tells how things ought to be and the positive theory tells how things are” (2002a:147-8). He also uses critical theories (lower case) in reference to all approaches that are critical of positivist theory, and Critical Theory (capitalized) in its Frankfurt School setting (1994; see also Williams, 2005:137). Critical Theory is a normative theory which offers a rational critique of prevailing social and power relations, and institutions, and shows the immanent possibilities of transformation.

Although the original exponents of Critical Theory, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm and Jürgen Habermas, deployed their critique at the national level, particularly in Germany, their ideas have been found to be germane for the study of International Relations (Devetak, 1996; see also Held, 1980; Hoffman, 1987: 232). This can be gleaned from the body of work under the rubric of Critical International Theory and practised by writers like Robert Cox, Andrew Linklater, Mark Hoffman and

Ken Booth. So, Critical Theory in its expanded form offers the theoretical and conceptual tools which are relevant for the analyses of social and power relations, and institutions within the state and beyond. This Chapter discusses the normative dimension of Critical Theory. It does so through a discussion of selected themes which are relevant to the objectives of the thesis. It restates conventional notions or views on these themes, highlights their limitations, and offers alternative argument and agenda of Critical Theory. We turn first to a discussion on Enlightenment because its goals are central to Critical Theoretical thought.

The dialectic of Enlightenment:

Critical Theory is at one with postmodernism and other post-positivist discourses in deconstructing the ontological and epistemological claims of modernity²⁶. Critical Theory rejects the reification of values, practices, institutions and norms of modernity. Both Critical Theorists and postmodernists -- like Hegel and Weber -- see the dialectic of the Enlightenment project (Calhoun, 1996). The Enlightenment thinkers like Kant believe that reason could be deployed to produce an “enlightened and liberated humanity” and to bring about progress in science, technology, politics and the arts (Smart, 1996:409). They taught that development in science and technology was necessary to push back the frontier of ignorance and to tame nature. Science and technology could be harnessed to achieve high productivity, promote universal prosperity and eradicate poverty. For Kant and other Enlightenment writers, political practice would be oriented toward liberating people from all forms of oppression. Above all, the autonomy of the individual in all spheres of life was a central theme of the philosophy of Enlightenment.

Modernity shares the “ideas [of] the ... Enlightenment” (ibid.). Science and technology, in modern times, have been used to increase global production and wealth. Economic

²⁶ Modernity in broad terms expresses the notion that the world runs by unchangeable laws that are knowable and can be utilized to advance the human condition. It expresses the idea that all truth claims can be judged true or false; that the world out there can be objectively studied, and that scientific method can be used to study both the natural and social worlds. The traditional International Relations theories are founded on modernist assumptions.

liberalism with its emphasis on individual entrepreneurial spirit is seen as a rational means to universal prosperity. In the political domain, both political liberalism and “historical materialism” claimed to fulfill the emancipatory dream of the Enlightenment (George, 1993:216). But there is a negative side to the Enlightenment or the modernist project: contrary to the claims of economic liberalism, growth in productivity and wealth has not led to universal prosperity and the elimination of poverty. What is evident is the wealth of some individuals while too many people continue to live in abject poverty. The modern celebration of individualism has also produced “fragmented pieces of the social whole” (Calhoun, 1996: 440). It undermines the communal basis of society.

Critics of modernity have observed that advancements in science and technology have also made possible the production of weapons of mass destruction (George, 1993:216, Smart, 1996). They point to the lethal effect of the atomic bomb which was used to kill millions of people at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during World War II. The first rumbling against political liberalism was the 1968 “revolution”, an anti-systemic movement led by young people. One of the reasons for the revolt was the disillusionment with “parliamentary [political] liberalism” (Smart, 1996:406). The youth, especially in Europe, felt betrayed by the social democratic governments that emerged after 1945 (Wallerstein, 1991:69). They resented the failure of the political system to protect society from the effects of capitalism (ibid). Currently popular forces regard the resurgence of political liberalism as an elitist project. The emancipatory goal of historical materialism was dealt a severe blow by the oppressive practices of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China (Smart, 1996:406). Finally, the rationality of Enlightenment or modernity was also discredited by the Holocaust: reason, in the form of technology, made possible the production of the gas chamber which in turn led to the near extinction of Jews in World War II.

This ambiguity of Enlightenment – modernity – has produced a Nietzschean nihilism (George, 1993), the sense that there are no “certainties, no more assured foundations arising out of a transcendental order” and a celebration of relativism in the postmodern paradigm (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:187). It retains a sense of mistrust for meta- or grand

narratives – like the traditional or modern discourses – which believe in a “future to be accomplished”, and a “universal idea to be realized” (Smith, 1996:405). For postmodernists, the modernist project is severely undermined by its own contradictions or paradoxes (Smart, 1996:422). This pessimism has led to a post modernist celebration of relativism that there is, in the absence of any transcendental ethical or normative order, a plurality of perspectives, traditions and philosophical orientations (ibid.).

One of the things that distinguish Critical Theory from postmodernism is that the pessimism and anti-enlightenment flavour evidently strong in postmodern discourse is markedly absent in Critical Theory. Horkheimer and Adorno (1972:597) point out that Critical Theoretical practice is a means of “salvaging the Enlightenment” while Habermas suggests that Critical Theory aims “to seek a reconciliation of modernity which has fallen apart”, (cited in Dews, 1992:245). The aim of Critical Theory is to realize the unfinished potential of the project of Enlightenment (Calhoun, 1996:455). Critical Theory thus shares the Hegelian view that reason, which has produced the “fragmented pieces of the social whole”, the tensions and contradictions of modern social life, could also be used to transform modern society (ibid.: 446).

This rational process takes the form of an “immanent critique”, which is an internal criticism of the conceptual assumptions, practices and realities of modernity (ibid.). Beyond criticism, the process reveals the “unrecognized possibilities” – within modernity – for transforming modern social life. This *teleos* of Critical Theory gives it a distinctive edge over postmodernism; this is its normative foundation (Rengger, 1985; Devetak, 1996; Linklater, 1990; Held, 1980; Cox, 1981; 1983; 1987; 1999; George, 1993). Jürgen Habermas, for instance, regards his discourse theory as a “normative foundation for critical theory” (Dews, 1992: 92; Habermas, 1987). His communicative project, as we shall soon see, is anchored in the principles of justice, accountability, equality, democracy and the pursuit of the good life for all. The modern world, Habermas and others concede, is prosperous but the unfinished task is how to achieve universal prosperity, to wit, to harness global wealth for the service of humanity (Dews, 1992; Held, 1980).

However, the normative position of Critical Theory has attracted criticism from postmodernists and other critics (Rengger, 1985). Critics regard Critical Theory as the same as the other meta- or grand theories, such as Marxism, Realism or Liberalism, which are perceived as overly deterministic, essentialist, universalistic and totalizing paradigms. But these labels do not accurately describe Critical Theory. Critical Theory neither reifies theoretical postulates nor ascribes permanence to social structures as traditional theories do (Cox, 1981; Ashley, 1987; Linklater, 1990; Mittelman, 1998; Rengger, 1995; Calhoun, 1996). Critical Theory rather calls traditional assumptions into question, as we shall soon see.

Problematising the subject/object divide in traditional accounts:

Substantively, Critical Theory rejects the notion that the subject or theorists can be separated from the phenomenon under study and objectively describes it. This traditional distinction is illusive because the process of theorization is never neutral; it is perspectival (Calhoun, 1996:437). The world out there is perceived and given form by the intellectual traditions, cultural practices and values inherent in the theorist's social milieu. So, theory is thus historically and spatially bound. This view suggests that the theoretical project, the quest to understand social relations, is never complete: theory building is a cumulative process; each theoretical work adds to the existing body of knowledge and forms the basis for further theoretical speculations. Conceived this way, every theory is subject to re-examination or modification in an ever-changing social context (Cox, 1986:217; Calhoun, 1996).

This interpretation of theory is in contradistinction with modernist or positivist perspectives, which are presented as timeless, universal and neutral. Their theoretical postulations are written, to borrow a phrase from Calhoun (1990:437), from the "umpire's chair". The following imagery by Kafka is a fit description of the positivist or the traditional theorist:

He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from the origin. The second blocks the road ahead. He gives battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him in his fight with the second, for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he draws him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but he himself as well, and who really knows his intentions? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment – and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet – he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other (Arendt quoted in Calhoun 1996: 437).

But this position, as the nocturnal imagery suggests, leads him nowhere. Modern values, beliefs, theoretical perspectives, institutions, values, traditions and discourses are passed off characteristically as universal truth or the natural order of things. They are perceived as immutable. For instance, the dominant theoretical paradigms in International Relations, to wit, Realism and Liberalism, legitimize and reify the present social, political and economic structures. The reification tends to foreclose alternative readings; it also explains the problem solving nature of conventional theoretical thought and practice. This, we shall immediately see.

The problem-solving character of conventional theory:

Robert Cox argues that problem-solving theories accept the prevailing social-political power relations, and institutions as their framework of action. So, they focus on finding solutions to particular problems or troubles emanating from this order (1986:208-11). This is intended to smooth its functioning.

Whereas problem solving or conventional theory concentrates on finding solutions to parts of the existing order, Critical Theory focuses on the whole order because it does not regard this order as natural. Critical Theory stands outside the dominant socio-political order to determine whether it is changing and contemplates how the existing social structures came into being. It does so through the technique of genealogy by setting itself the historical task of excavating and understanding the causes and modus operandi of the prevailing social order. The object of this exercise is to situate prevailing power relations and institutions within a temporal and spatial setting, denying them of their universalistic pretensions (ibid.:208).

To show that the social order is not fixed but changing, Critical Theorists point to the dialectic of assumed coherent, ahistorical and reified structures (Held, 1980; Cox 1981; Mittelman, 1998). They regard social structures as being in a state of constant evolution. What explains this evolution is the dual “personalities” of social structures which are the surface coherence and the underlying tension – like the Freudian concept of “split personality”. Robert Cox referred to these opposites as the synchronic and diachronic moments respectively (see Mittelman, 1993). This internal tension can lead to social transformation: the last section of this chapter elaborates on this process.

Critical Theorists engage in rational critique of the existing order by highlighting its limitations, contradictions, its injustices and its inequalities, and identifying possibilities of change. This explains why Max Horkheimer says:

Philosophy [Critical Theory] confronts the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual principles, in order to criticize the relation between the two [ideas and reality] and thus transcend them (Horkheimer, 1947:182).

Theodore Adorno similarly expressed that the teleology of Critical Theory is to explode “bourgeois thought from inside” and to burst “idealism open from within” (cited in Calhoun, 1996:447).

Furthermore, despite its claim to be value-free, problem-solving theory is indeed value-bound because it accepts the prevailing order as its framework of action. Additionally, it is interest-driven. It is aimed at safeguarding class, national or statist interests.²⁷ This brings us to instrumental rationalism of modernity.

Interest behind instrumental rationality:

Modernity has been adept at employing technical-rational means to achieve its specific ends. We have seen that modern scientific and technological methods have been used to expand production and wealth. However, the gains of these have largely accrued to powerful social forces. The “value-free methodology of science and technology” which constitutes man’s interaction with nature has been adopted to resolve socio-economic problems and to ensure growth and profit (Bernstein, 1995:403). So, for instance, basic social amenities and services are privatized as a strategy to revamp the economy. This objectification and marketization of society has been spearheaded by a coalition of state and capital – what Habermas refers to as “power” and “money” respectively (cited in Dews, 1992:117). But the commodification of society destroys the “social safety nets” that hold society together; it undermines the communal foundation of society, as we shall see in Chapter Seven (ibid.:154). For example, modern mass productivity depletes the biosphere upon which the continuous survival and livelihood of humanity depend (Cox, 1999). There are other side effects of this instrumental rationalism which are regarded as “collateral damage” or unavoidable “social consequences” (Bauman and Tester, 2001:152). An essential aspect of instrumental rationality of modernity is bureaucracy to which we now turn.

²⁷ Realists, for instance, reify the world order in order to offer technical or practical solutions that favour the interests of states rather than people.

The bureaucracy:

The bureaucrat is said to have the relevant technical knowledge and expertise to deal with the complexities of modern social life (Held, 1980; Allison, 1969; 1971). Traditional theory of organizational and bureaucratic process posits that bureaucrats follow standard operating procedure (SOP) and employ effective and rational means to achieve specific social objectives (Braybrook et al., 1963; Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1968; Allison, 1969, 1971; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971; Steinbruner, 1974). Indeed policy-makers, governments, corporations, and other large-scale organizations rely on the recommendations of bureaucrats in the formulation of their decisions. Furthermore, bureaucrats formulate and implement policy.

In addition to the technical knowledge of the bureaucrat, Max Weber and other modern organizational and bureaucratic theorists considered bureaucrats as objective and impersonal agents who worked for the general interest of society (Held, 1980; Haralambos and Heald, 1984). Their view is informed by a notion that the bureaucrat in executing tasks only follows interest-free technical knowledge, rules and procedures. Critical theorists hold a different opinion about bureaucracy. The bureaucrat is portrayed as an agent of powerful social groups and the prevailing social order in Critical Theoretical analyses (this is shown in Chapter Seven). Herbert Marcuse wrote that, "... the ... bureaucracy fosters a delusive harmony between the special and the common interest" (quoted in Held, 1980:68).

In addition, bureaucracy suppresses reflexivity of society. Max Weber wrote that although bureaucracy was an invaluable aspect of modern life, it stifled creative thinking. This was why he described a bureaucracy as an iron cage (Held, 1980). Weber's concern can be interpreted at two levels. First, the special skill of the individual bureaucrat restricts him/her to routinely execute a particular task in the bureaucratic chain using standard operating procedure. Secondly, it may also mean that the reflexivity and

autonomy of society is trapped in a bureaucratic cage. This latter interpretation forms the basis of critique of bureaucratic rationality by Critical Theorists like Habermas.

Jürgen Habermas argues that the increasing bureaucratization of modern society “depoliticizes” it and robs society of its normative and rational core (Habermas in Dews, 1992:14). Habermas’s belief is that society rests on an inter-subjective rationality: societal values, norms, principles and practices are formed by dialogue and mutual consent. This inter-subjectivity is however undermined by excessive bureaucratization of society.

Critical Theory does not deplore the use of rational means to solve societal problems; however it rejects the rationalization of society for the benefit of a particular social group. Herbert Marcuse forcefully articulated this position when he wrote that the modern concept of rationality masks “a concept of fate” which “generalizes the blindness of a society which reproduces itself behind the back of individuals, of a society in which the law of domination appears as objective technological law” (cited in Held, 1980:66). As a result, Critical Theory recommends communicative rationality as a counter to instrumental rationalism.

Communicative rationality:

For Jürgen Habermas, the rational basis of society is anchored in language. The principles of self-determination, justice, consensus, autonomy and equality are embedded in “communicative practice” (cited in Dews, 1992:227). Habermas regards this communicative rationality as morally and ethically superior to instrumental rationality. The relevance of Habermas’s communicative theory will be discussed in Chapter 8. It will suffice at this stage to state Habermas’s position that discourse is oriented towards communicative rationality because it embodies the principles of truth, justice, mutual understanding, equality and democracy. Discourse, for Habermas, creates a communicative community in which dialogic partners rigorously discuss problematic

normative, truth and value claims (Dews, 1992:260). Communicative subjects participate in discourse as equals; every participant has the right to present his/her opinion and counter the claims of others. However, the affirmation or negation of views, claims or opinions of participants is based on the force of the “better argument” (ibid.). Habermas’s contention is that dialogue fosters consensus because the accepted opinions, views and claims are the rational will of the communicative community.

On this basis, Habermas and other Critical Theorists advance the point that the ethics of discourse ought to underline modern political practice (Habermas, 1987, 1992; Devetak, 1996). Along with other Critical Theoreticians, Habermas further argues that the legitimacy of political norms, values, institutions and practices rests on discourse, and further believes that civil society ought to be involved in this discursive process. For Critical Theorists, the institutionalization of discourse will help remove the democratic deficit that overlays current social structures; it will ensure that the interests of the entire society rather than particular groups prevail (Dews, 1992; Devetak, 1996). This leads us to a discussion on community. Both Political and International Relations theories grapple with the question of community at both domestic and international levels. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate within the discipline of International Relations about the limit of the moral community. The next section examines the Realist and Rationalist views on community, and sets Critical Theoretical notions of community against these ideas.

The Realist perspective:

The Realist tradition posits that there is no community beyond the “water’s edge” (Ashley, 1987:404). The implication of this position, albeit contestable, is that the state’s moral obligation is primarily restricted to its territorial boundaries. For Realists there is no such thing as a universal moral code that obligates the state to extend the good life reserved for its citizens to outsiders.

The intellectual tradition behind this position stretches from the views of such classical philosophers as Hobbes, Rousseau and Machiavelli to contemporary thinkers like

Morgenthau, Rawls and Waltz. For Hobbes, whereas the individual at the state level has escaped from the “state of nature” because of the existence of a centralized authority (Leviathan), the international environment is in a “state of nature”. Here, states, like individuals prior to the existence of state, war against each other for selfish gains. Modern Realism, as noted in Chapter One, also reflects this position by arguing that the international system is anarchic because it is made up of sovereign states that will not submit to any external authority. According to Kenneth Waltz, the anarchical nature of the international environment conditions states, especially the powerful ones, to maximize power as a means to curb the aggressive propensity of each other. The outcome is international order or stability. For Waltz, the international environment is also a “self-help” system in which states use their power to pursue relative gains rather than altruistic goals (Waltz, 1979). So, for Realists the self-interest of states and the anarchic condition of the international environment does not allow for greater international co-operation²⁸ or the pursuit of cosmopolitan goals (Linklater, 1992:85).

The Rationalist view:²⁹

Indeed the Realist ontological framings only serve to limit states to pursue selfish “national interest” at the international level and to contract their moral boundaries. In

²⁸ This argument runs counter to the liberal view that states learn to move away from strategic interaction or antagonistic behaviour towards co-operation. Liberals argue that increasing web of interconnection between states in areas such as trade, finance, security and environment compel states to give up their egoism to co-operate for mutual gains.

²⁹ Rationalism is originally associated with Grotius and Vattel. The central Grotian idea is that there is solidarity among states towards the enforcement of law. In recent times Rationalist thought has been expressed through thinkers like Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and John Vincent. Rationalism is multi-dimensional: some of the Rationalist ideas favour Realism while others are inclined towards cosmopolitan ideas or values. However it does not reconcile itself to either position. This explains why it is referred as the *via media* between Realism and Revolutionism or cosmopolitan mode of thought. It affirms the importance of security and the central role of states in its making. While accepting the Realist ontological view, it rejects its notion of perpetual anarchy. Instead, Rationalists see the existence of international order established by a society of states. Rationalism expresses a limited progressivist idea of global politics by arguing that international order can lead to law, justice and prosperity. It however places international order above justice and expresses caution and skepticism about the development of a fully fledged cosmopolitan order. For Rationalist it is naïve to think that there can be a simple moral solution to global problems. For a full discussion of the rationalist position see for example, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1977); see also Martin Wight, *Systems of State* (Leicester, 1997); and Linklater (1996).

contrast to the dogmatism of Realism, which sees the international terrain as irreversibly anarchical, “Rationalism”, to borrow Martin Wight’s term, recognizes the capacity of international society to advance towards a more rational world (Suganami, 2005:42). Rationalists reject the neo-Realist view that international stability and order are the unintended consequence of anarchy. International order, for Rationalists, is the result of shared common values and interests between states, and the willingness of states to be bound by rules and norms that regulate their interactions, and the institutions which underpin the international system (Bull, 1977:13). These institutions include the Sovereign State, the Balance of Power, International Law, Diplomacy, the Concert of Great Powers, and Inter-governmental Organizations (ibid.:71-3). For instance, the collaboration among the dominant states – the Concert of Great Powers – to promote order is based on a common interest, and the diplomatic practice enables states to have regular communication with each other. In a nutshell, the rules, interests, values and institutions point to the existence of an international community or society.

In a further disagreement with Realists, Rationalists point to the existence of a nascent moral or ethical community beyond the state (see Linklater, 1990:151). They refer to the “collective action of states to improve the social and economic conditions of poorer members of the world society” (ibid.); the practice of international humanitarian intervention, the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the commitment to a “planetary good” as evidence of cosmopolitan objectives of the international society (Hurrell, 1995:139; see also Devetak, 2002; Lawson, 2002a; Bellamy, 2005:290-4). For instance:

- International Humanitarian Laws sanction the prosecution of state and military personnel, who commit crimes against humanity³⁰ and give the international society the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the state on humanitarian grounds.³¹

³⁰ The Geneva Convention of 1949 categorizes acts of genocide, killing of non-combatants in war, and other forms of inhuman treatment of both civilians and prisoners of war as crimes against humanity.

³¹ In the course of the 1990s Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides for the use of military force in cases where international peace and security is threatened, was expanded to allow for humanitarian

- Rights like freedom of conscience, speech, press, thought, movement, and the right to seek asylum for persons qua human beings are entrenched in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (Held, 2002:314).
- Global institutions, initiatives, regimes and treaties exist to address problems like global warming, ozone depletion, the pollution of oceans and rivers and nuclear risks (Held, 2002:139).

Rationalists draw attention to these initiatives as practical examples of the international community's commitment to universal morality.

These two paradigms – Realism and Rationalism – represent two of the dominant images of International Relations, with Rationalism avowing the existence of nascent global ethical community and Realism largely disavowing it (Linklater, 1986; 1990, 1992; Ashley, 1987). Critical Theory, however, critiques both positions. We turn first to Realism and draws on E.H. Carr's work to show that the Realist claim, that the state's ethical or moral duty is not co-extensive with the rest of humanity, has negative effects on individuals, states and state-state relations

E.H. Carr and exclusive nationalism:

E.H. Carr's work provides sufficient basis for a critique of the Realist position that the national interest -- or the nation -- is the limit of the moral community. Although Carr is widely labeled as a Realist, his work could be read from a Critical Theoretical perspective. In *Nationalism and After* (1945), Carr advocates for social justice, equality, and most importantly, cosmopolitan ethics. He seeks the welfare of ordinary men and

intervention in cases of genocide or mass killing. For an expanded definition of the Geneva Convention, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, "Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics", in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 567.

women across state boundaries. For Andrew Linklater (1997), Carr's work depicts a *double movement* missed by those of the Realist tradition. His scorn for idealism – international liberalism – is balanced by his disillusionment with the *sterility, barrenness* and dangers inherent in unqualified Realism. This position led Carr to search for a post-national political organization and community (Carr, 1945; Linklater, 1997).

E.H. Carr (1945) advanced the thesis that the “socialization of the state” – the incorporation of the working class into the political and economic life of the state – in the 19th century set in motion the totalizing project of state building. Democratization gave unchecked powers to the state to administer and to regulate the socio-economic life of society. The regulatory hand of the state in the economy did not only mean the introduction of social legislation to ameliorate the dire effects of the market on society, it also meant the repatriation of the immigrant labour force and the closing of national boundaries against the free movement of people and goods; the creation of homogeneous communities, and the construction of a restrictive national identity. These regulations were formulated to meet labour unions' demands for standardized wages and jobs. However, as states repatriated immigrant workers and closed off their national borders, they imposed economic and other costs on these foreigners and other states. The policy of exclusive nationalism closed off the avenue of escape for the “unemployed”, the enterprising and the discontented in other states (Carr, 1945:22). This measure therefore deepened social strife in affected states. Carr argued that the democratization of the state, economic nationalism, and the increase in the number of nation-states “found expression in two world wars” in the first half of the 20th century (Carr, 1945:26).

E.H. Carr contrasted the exclusive nationalism of the 19th century with the monarchical and middle class societies that preceded this era to buttress his argument that nationalist practice engenders instability. For Carr, the monarchical and bourgeois orders recognized international boundaries and their moral obligations towards others. The bourgeois societies, based on free trade principles, recognized the free movement of people and goods because their own interests rested on these tenets. The absolute monarch honoured

international obligations, such as treaty obligations, without much reflection on national commitments. These social orders were therefore relatively peaceful.

Indeed, Carr's analysis of exclusive nationalism and its dire consequences have enormous relevance for the present time. Nation-states continue to practice exclusive nationalism which impacts adversely on individuals, states and inter-state relations. As we shall see in Chapter Five, exclusive nationalist practices stifle the growth of a cosmopolitan ethos or regional citizenship and identity formation. The next section critically examines the Rationalist views on international community.

Rationalism's transnational moral community: a critique

Indeed, the Rationalist claims are morally superior to Realists notions of community. However, the ability of an international society to promote cosmopolitan values or universal moral community is severely constrained by the following factors:

- The very nature of an international society – a society of states – inhibits the realization of its cosmopolitan intentions. The interests of the international society do not necessarily converge with that of ordinary men and women across state boundaries. This view is substantiated by the widespread criticism and protest against the democratic deficit that overlay institutions of global “governance”. As states pool their sovereignty over the international space, they remove it from public scrutiny, accountability and participation (Wendt, 1994).
- States, particularly the dominant ones, do not seek universal goals in these institutions; they pursue class-oriented interests (see Strange, 1996:162; Gill, 1997; Held and McGrew, 2002:46). This also applies to the international institutions and the bureaucrats who serve within them (Strange, 1996:162).
- The international community privileges order over human welfare. This explains why the international community is prompt to use military means to maintain the global order, and indifferent or slow in its response to human tragedies such as genocide, poverty, malnutrition, and famine (Williams, 2005:149). In fact states

tend to be very selective in intervening in such tragedies; it is often motivated by selfish national interest³² (Wheeler and Bellamy, 2005:558).

- The cosmopolitan initiatives of the international society do not “curtail” sovereignty. While espousing cosmopolitan values and intentions, they also affirm, entrench and accommodate sovereign rights of states. These are invariably built into articles and statutes of international agreements which undermine cosmopolitan intentions and objectives (Held, 2002:316).
- Despite the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most governments continue to violate people’s rights to speech, movement and association, and remain unaccountable to citizens.
- The universalism of international politics is one sided: the cosmopolitan notions and ideas of self-determination, autonomy, rights and obligations are restricted to the political domain. These are means to check excesses of political power. However, the international society has not extended, in a systematic way, these universal rights, obligations, ideas and notions to the economic sphere. So, economic or corporate power remains unchecked resulting in rising economic inequalities.
- There is a disjuncture between cosmopolitan intents of the international community and their application. The United Nations often lacks the institutional,

³² Why did the international community, especially the major states, fail for a very long time to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda? The obvious answer is that Rwanda was not of any special interest to these states. The US, represented by the Clinton administration, until recently refused to acknowledge the genocide in Rwanda. The US used this policy as a pretext for not intervening in the Rwandan crisis. As we shall see from the following cases, intervention is often motivated more by self-interest of states rather than on humanitarian grounds: The French government, under the authorization of the Security Council, eventually intervened in the Rwanda Crisis in July 1994. However, this did not prevent the genocide. Discounting the French government claim that its intervention was based on humanitarian rationale, Wheeler and Bellamy show that national self-interest was behind the French intervention. According these scholars, the French government, for twenty years, supported the Hutu government in Rwanda: French troops backed the Hutu government when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attempted to take over the country in 1990 and 1993. Wheeler and Bellamy believe France intervened to restore its credibility in Africa and, more importantly, the Mitterrand regime in France was afraid that an RPF victory “in French-speaking Rwanda would result in the country coming under the influence of Anglophones” (ibid.:565). The US after failing to present a convincing argument that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, provided humanitarian rationales for the war. President Bush in justifying the war told the media that “we’re working to free the Iraqi people ... slowly, but surely, the grip of terror around the throats of the Iraqi people is being loosened”; Tony Blair, for his part, justified the war on the grounds that “Iraq was a better place without Saddam”. However some political commentators argue that the intervention was motivated more by strategic and political goals than humanitarian concerns; they argue that although there was human rights abuse in Iraq under Saddam, it was not on a genocidal proportion (ibid.:573).

financial and power resources to realize its objectives. It is also partial in its enforcement of rules that undergird cosmopolitan arrangements, and as Paul Williams has pointed out, the dominant states, the “Great Powers”, are the “most persistent violators of the norm of ... international law” (2005:149).³³

This brings us to a discussion of the post-national project of Critical Theory. It focuses on the Critical Theoretical idea of a post-national community and examines the agents, potentials, possibilities and opportunities for a cosmopolitan order by drawing on the insights of E.H. Carr, Immanuel Kant and Andrew Linklater.

The nature of the post-national:

We have seen that both Realism and Rationalism are limited moral agencies. In the light of this, Critical International Theorists advocate an international community of humankind, a cosmopolitan order. To realize this objective, E.H. Carr (1945) suggests that state policies should cater for the interest of both citizens and outsiders – the accent is on people, humanity. Carr even called for a national policy:

...in which the British government will begin to take into account the welfare of Lütte or Dusseldorf or Lodz as well as the welfare of Oldham or Jarrow” (Linklater, 1997:335).

Similarly, in one breath, Immanuel Kant recognized the constraints the international environment places on the state’s ability to pursue altruistic goals. In another breath, however, he conceded that global peace, progress and prosperity rested on universal justice. For this reason, Kant admonished states, particularly the dominant ones, to be responsible for the welfare of other people (Linklater, 1997).

³³ For instance the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a violation of international law: it did not fit into any of the circumstances within which a state has the right to attack another state.

In pursuit of a cosmopolitan order, Kant argued that political thought should not be limited to political theory (speculation on the relations between citizens and the state) and international theory (speculation on the relations between states). It must include what Richard Devetak (2002:171) referred to as the “cosmopolitical”, which is speculation on the relations between humans outside of state boundaries. Kant made this suggestion because he believed that Republicanism – the democratic state – and Federalism – the union of democratic states or the society of states – would not necessarily bring about universal peace. Mertens (1996:333) in agreement with Kant, explained that the:

conception of a cosmopolitan right is introduced because the requirements of republicanism and federalism are not a sufficient basis on which to define completely just relations between human beings.

So, Kantian cosmopolitanism calls for rights and obligations that transcend national boundaries. We turn now to agents, potentials, possibilities and opportunities for a post-national community.

E.H. Carr observed that the “state managers”, as he called them, would not initiate a post-nationalist project because of the power and influence they gain from exclusive nationalist practices (Carr, 1945:53). For Carr, Linklater, Booth, Vale, Held and others, ordinary citizens across national boundaries are the ones to work for a post national community. This explains why, Carr, with ordinary people in mind, wrote that:

Transnational harm[s] confront national communities with the question whether they can best secure, indeed, only secure social and other rights by bringing the inhabitants of, for an example, Dusseldorf and Lisse and Jarrow and Oldham together in a wider political association (quoted in Linklater, 1997:337).

Indeed, Carr’s wish for a transnational citizenry is being fulfilled today. Critical Theorists now point to a nascent global citizenry (see Held, 1996; Linklater, 1997; Held and

McGrew, 2002;). Andrew Linklater (1997), in particular, argues that the trans-territorial effects of ecological disasters, wars and economic globalization have produced this phenomenon. These transnational problems, what Linklater labels “transnational harm”, dissolve the citizen/stranger, alien/foreign, self/other, inside/outside, domestic/external dichotomies (1997:337). Because civil conflicts and ecological problems spill across national borders, members from different national communities realize that they have a moral obligation towards each other by coming together, outside the state framework, to find solutions to transnational dangers. The side-effects of economic globalization, especially on local communities, have also provided the impetus for people across state boundaries to form alliances and coalitions which challenge neo-liberal global practices and most importantly, to fight for the democratization of institutions of global governance (Held and McGrew, 2002).

Andrew Linklater (1997) suggests that these transnational coalitions hold prospects for a cosmopolitan order. One of the reasons for this optimism is that there is a growing awareness by members of different societies of their responsibility towards each other. This transnational consciousness suggests the desire of people to extend the moral boundaries of their political communities. In time, this practice will curtail the habit of national governments to use their authority to create “national communities” that exclude “aliens” (ibid.:337). The democratization of global institutions will also help put the focus on the interests and welfare of people because this process will restore the “legal, political, social and cultural rights” of people “within local, national and supra-national political communities” (ibid.:337). People will use these rights to demand the eradication of social, political and economic inequalities (ibid.:338).

We have argued in this section that:

- Both the state and the international society are limited moral communities. The state, for example, perpetuates exclusionary practices.
- There is the need for multiple sites of ethico-political communities at the local, national, sub-national, regional and global levels.
- The state as a political community must be transcended.



- Nationalist and particularistic interests invariably create inter-state conflicts while the pursuit of cosmopolitan ethics fosters universal peace.
- There ought to be a right balance between the commitment to the nation-states, the society of states and the society of humankind.
- There is a rising transnational agency outside the state committed to a cosmopolitan order, and there are potentials, possibilities and opportunities to bring this order into being.

These ideas largely inform the subject of Chapter Five. In the next section, we examine the Critical Theoretical perspectives on two concepts, ideas and practices which are central to this thesis – state and sovereignty. Indeed the “state” and “sovereignty” are inter-related concepts. Sovereignty, for instance, derives its force and meaning in a state; it is exercised within the confines of the state. We turn first to the state. The purpose is to show the contrast between conventional notions, ideas and claims of the state with those of Critical Theory.

The state: ³⁴

Traditional International Relations theories, such as Realism, argue that the state is a unitary or cohesive entity (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971; Morgenthau, 1978). Traditional theorists claim that the state is the embodiment of the national will; in other words, the state plays an asocial role; serving the interests of all its members. This assumption has given rise to the traditional dogma that the state is a unitary actor which represents, through its statesmen, bureaucrats and institutions, an indivisible notion called the national interest. This view presupposes that state-servants, like bureaucrats, draw a line between their public and private interests and that state structures are purposively neutral. Robert Cox captured this positivist and unitary notion of the state when he

³⁴ Hall and Ikenberry offer a composite definition of state. First the state comprises institutions which govern society. One of these institutions is the means of violence and coercion. Secondly, the state is a geographically bounded space, and finally it has monopoly over rulemaking. See John A. Hall and John Ikenberry, *The State* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989) p.1-2.

expressed that, for the traditional theorists “a state is a state is a state” (cited in Hoffman 1987: 239).

Disputing the traditional claim, Robert Cox (1981) points out that contemporary theoretical developments within the fields of International Relations and Political Theory have cast doubt on the asocial, public, unitary or cohesive images of the state. Theories of bureaucratic politics show the conflicting claims, advocacies, preferences and positions among government agencies, departments and institutions over domestic and foreign policy issues. At the international level, Keohane and Nye (1989), amongst others, emphasize the complex inter-linkages and solidarity between bureaucratic institutions across national boundaries whose interests sometimes conflict with the national interest thesis. Other scholars have also shown that there is an emerging tendency for units below the state to act in their own best interest (Mingus, 2003:6). This phenomenon is discernible in countries like the United States, China, Canada, Belgium and South Africa³⁵ where federating units, provinces and regions conduct their own international relations (Cornelissen, 2006:129; Lecours, 2002:12; Scholte, 2001:24; see also Lipschutz, 2001:179).

In Africa too, the state is going through legitimacy crises because of its narrow social foundation. The state is generally perceived as clientilistic and patrimonial which alienates the great majority of the citizenry (Chazan, 1988).

Whereas Realism and other traditional theoretical perspectives hold that the state has a fixed form, Critical Theorists disagree. Robert Cox (1981) shows the historical, representational and spatial specificity of the state. Cox contends, for example, that state

³⁵ KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Western Cape provinces in South Africa have economic partnership agreements and other forms of relationships with other cities and countries. For instance, the Western Cape is in partnership with, Amsterdam in Germany, Kwazulu-Natal with Chicago, USA, and Gauteng with Bavaria in Germany. However, their interests sometimes conflict with those of the national state. For example, the position of authorities in the three provinces was different from the national government's policy on HIV/AIDS and the provision of care and medication to HIV sufferers. They “entered into agreement” with big “pharmaceutical companies for the provision of free medication”, see Cornelissen op cit., pp. 134-135.

forms vary according to space and time. He draws on Karl Polanyi's work to prove this point. Karl Polanyi (1957) shows that a configuration of social forces at different historical junctures shapes the form of the state. He recounts that the industrialized states in Europe before 1930 adopted a laissez-faire economic approach that suited the liberal-minded class. This class constituted a very powerful social force because of their power and influence over state policy. The state used its legal, administrative and security resources to support the ideology of the middle class. However, by the 1930s, the state had to intervene on behalf of the working class to ameliorate the social effects of the market. So, if laissez-faire suggested a state on the side of capital, embedded liberalism or the interventionist state suggested a state on the side of the socially vulnerable.

However, from the 1970s onwards, the free market liberal economy of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman, which was discredited in the 1930s, has once again become fashionable in the guise of neo-liberal economics. As a result, the state now represents the interests of transnational capital. Once again, the state, to use Lassalle's phrase, has become "veilleur de nuit" – night watchman (cited in Hoare and Smith, 1971:261,263). It deploys its legal, administrative, bureaucratic and security structures to safeguard the neo-liberal economic order and the interests of the social and political forces behind it. This has a special resonance in Africa where the state no longer uses its institutional structures and coercive force to intervene on behalf of the vulnerable – the poor, marginalized and weak. So, the state is a contested site, with competing social forces contending with each other to mould it in their image. Sovereignty is a source of this contestation, a subject we now consider.

Sovereignty:

Sovereignty is indeed a complex and interesting subject which has generated much analysis. There is a multiplicity of views, opinions, arguments, notions, claims and counter claims about this concept and its practice. Some analysts argue about the loss or dilution of sovereignty while others dwell on the reconfiguration of state sovereignty. Some even regard it as "a myth" or "a fiction" (Hinsley, 1986:2-3). This section does not

intend to discuss the full range of arguments around this term. For the purpose of this thesis, it will focus on the dialectic of sovereignty – its tensions.

Sovereignty has internal and external dimensions. In its internal conceptualization, the term expresses “the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community”(ibid.:1). The “sovereign”, which is the state in modern context, has supreme decision-making and enforcement authority over territory and population. Internal sovereignty suggests a hierarchical relation between the “sovereign” and subordinates. “Domestic sovereignty” is a precondition for recognition by the international community (Miller, 1986). External sovereignty however, refers to the formal equality between states. As authoritative actors, states relate to each other on equal terms. Richard Falk captures this relation by expressing that each state is sovereign, “a law unto itself” in the international society (2001:790). Kenneth Waltz echoes this view by stating that “none ...[of the states]... is entitled to command, none is required to obey” (1979:88). Sovereignty thus invests absolute power and authority on those in charge of the state. This leads us to consider the values, interests and tensions within sovereignty.

An essential characteristic of sovereignty is its spatial and historical specificity. Francis Hinsley points out that sovereignty:

is a concept which men in certain circumstances have applied – a quality they have attributed or a claim they have counterposed – to the political power which they or other men were exercising (Hinsley, 1986:1).

Richard Falk (2001:789) corroborates this assertion suggesting that:

The very centrality of sovereignty ensures its contested character. In each setting, meanings are attributed to sovereignty that accord with the interpreter’s project. There is no neutral ground when it comes to sovereignty.

A number of deductions can be drawn from these views. They show that the locus of supreme authority in the idea of sovereignty is never fixed; that sovereignty is historically contingent; that its interpretation is value- and interest-laden and that it has an internal tension. Briefly tracing the history of sovereignty illustrates these points.

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 conceptualized the modern state³⁶. The religious wars that preceded the treaty undermined both the feudal order and the authority of the Church. Europe, as a collection of feudal orders or city-states, was united by a common allegiance to the church, represented by the Pope, and a common set of Christian principles, norms, values, institutions and practices. The Pope held the supreme authority over the princes and kings (Hinsley, 1986). But in a protest against the supreme authority of the Pope, “Westphalia” changed the locus of sovereignty from church towards state authority vested in princes and kings.

While this move shifted authority, it was not uncontested in theory or practice. So, whereas Hobbes, as a monarchist, conferred supreme authority on the monarch, Locke, as a liberal, deplored the unaccountable or unchecked power that Hobbes and other monarchists had invested on the supreme ruler. Locke offered a formula of shared sovereignty – somewhat of a contradiction – between the state and civil society as a substitution for unbridled power. Rousseau, as a populist, in a radical turn, located sovereignty in the nation, society or the people, what may be referred to as *popular sovereignty*.

In essence, sovereignty is constructed, written or spoken about in ways that accommodate specific powerful interest and values. The work of Hobbes and other Monarchists helped affirm and create the absolute monarchical orders, the period of *despotic enlightenment*. In this period, the political community became synonymous with the monarch which was objectified in the words of Louis XIV: “*L'état c'est moi*” (I am the state): that the French nation “resided wholly in the person of the King” (Carr, 1945:2; see also Manning,

³⁶ This Treaty ended the Thirty Years War in Europe between 1618-1648. By this Treaty, the European Powers, represented at this time by princes and kings, agreed to end their antagonism and to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing political boundaries.

1976). The Lockean brand of sovereignty restricted power and the participation in government to propertied men or the middle class. Rousseau's popular sovereignty found its concrete manifestation in the excesses of the French Revolution of 1789 and a *Reign of Terror* perpetrated in the name of the people. In reality the members of the *Third Estate*, the Middle Class, had absolute control over institutions and people. This leads us to the dialectic or tension in sovereignty. Since sovereignty is interest-based, it empowers and disempowers, enfranchises and disenfranchises. Sovereignty centralizes political authority and decision-making in the state. This power, as we shall discover in Chapter Four, has been used to create social, political and economic barriers. The resulting marginalization gives rise to contestation which can culminate in social and political conflicts, especially in Africa.

Sovereignty, in theory and in practice, negates the idea of freedom, justice, plurality, accountability and dialogue (Camilleri and Falk, 1992). Given this condition, Critical Theorists call for the end of the sovereign state. To be sure, this is not a call for the dissolution of the state; it aims rather at ending the centralizing, totalizing and exclusive practices of state sovereignty and the insecurity it engenders (Linklater, 1998). For Critical Theorists the path to transcending the sovereign states is through Habermas's discourse ethics (Linklater, 1993:9; Devetak, 1996:172). Chapter Eight demonstrates that discourse theory has the capacity to transform the sovereign state and concomitantly to resolve the legitimation crises of the state. We turn now to security, which is another vital theme of this thesis. A regionalist project without a secured environment can be a futile endeavour. The search for security has become very important, especially in the African context where the state is in a state of crisis. One manifestation of this crisis, as we shall see in the next chapter, is armed conflicts. This section will discuss security within the context of Critical Security paradigm.

Critical security studies:

There are two senses of critical security studies. On one hand, the term refers to all approaches that are critical of "prevailing realist inspired orthodoxy within security

studies” (Williams, 2005:36, see also, Wyn Jones:1999:ix, Chris Brown, 1994). This generic version is labeled critical security studies (lower case). On the other, it denotes a specific or distinct project which is committed to an emancipatory theory and practice of security. This version is marked as Critical Security Studies – CSS (capitalized) because of its association with the Frankfurt School Critical Theory. Ken Booths conceptualizes CSS as:

both a theoretical commitment and a political orientation. As a theoretical commitment it embraces a set of ideas engaging in a critical and permanent exploration of the ontology, epistemology and praxis of security, community and emancipation in world politics. As a political orientation it is informed by the aim of enhancing security through emancipatory politics and networks of community at all levels, including the potential community of communities – common humanity (cited in Williams, 2005:137).

This section of the Chapter takes its direction from Booth’s conceptualization of CSS. It first discusses the orthodox or mainstream views, ideas, notions and practices of security and highlights their limitations and the interests behind them. It then focuses on the Critical Security project by indicating what it is, and by discussing its alternative agenda and how this can be attained.

The traditional security thinking:

Ole Wæver, writing within the traditional security framework, defines the politics of security or securitization as a “speech act” (cited in Williams, 2005:143; see also Wæver, 1995). This is an inter-subjective process of decision-making undertaken by policy-makers or highly placed officials to determine what constitutes a security issue. In a collaborative work, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:5) suggest that to count as a security issue, a “securitizing actor” must portray an issue as an existential threat to a

referent object. An existential threat effectively creates a sense of urgency and provokes the sentiment that “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant [because we will not be here or we will not be free to deal with it in our own way]” (ibid.; see also Williams, 2005:143). The securitizing actor, having successfully portrayed an issue as an existential threat, wins a specific audience that accepts the claim that this threat requires “emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998:5). Ole Wæver puts the point this way: “by uttering security, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (1995:55). The issue is no longer open to discussion, debate or the normal “haggling of politics”; it is dealt with, as a matter of urgency and survival, by “top leaders” before other issues are considered (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998:29). A good example, in the present time, of a successful act of securitization is the US war on terrorism after 9/11³⁷.

This traditional mode of securitization has always been biased towards the state and international order, informed by Realism. In the conventional reading of security, the existential threat often takes the form of an external threat to the security of the state. Given this, the state’s primary interest or function is to take counter measures to protect its boundaries, institutions and citizens. Hans Morgenthau affirms this view:

The national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and of its institutions. National security, then, is the

³⁷ The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 provided the justification for the US war on terror. The Bush administration managed to present these attacks to the US public as an existential threat. The Republican administration has used this to justify emergency measures against terrorism such as clamping down on civil liberties, tapping phones of US citizens; and establishing a detention center in “Guantanamo Bay” for suspected terrorists, and, in the process, violating international law. Within the US there is little or no room for debate, dissent or criticism of the dominant discourse on the war on terrorism. It is regarded as a form of betrayal or unpatriotic to question the US government’s policy on terror. See Lee Koo, *Reform and Resistance: Critical Approaches to Security and Security Studies* (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2003), pp. 271, 279.

irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power without compromise.³⁸

Other conclusions can be drawn from the traditional or Realist concept of security. First, military power is the end of security: to maximize military power is to be secured. Secondly, security is provided at the expense of the external other, which gives rise to dichotomous binaries such as us/them, domestic affairs/foreign affairs, self/other, internal/external in mainstream security discourses. As stated earlier, the other referent object of traditional security is international order or the inter-state system. Its importance is reflected in orthodox practices and principles like “collective security”, “alliance formation”, “balance of power politics” or “strategic security”. The salience of international order in security thinking in recent times can be seen in the collective military responses to the civil war in Yugoslavia, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and other regional and international conflicts. These interventions have been justified on grounds of safeguarding state sovereignty and international stability (*West Africa*, 1990; Hoffman, 1992; Lapham, 1992; Post, 1992; Booth and Smith, 1995; Anning, 1999; Bischoff, 2002; Vale, 2003).

Furthermore, in the traditional security context, the views, perceptions and histories of “security elites” such as diplomats, statesmen, policy-makers, legislators, bureaucrats, top military officials, defense analysts or experts both in and outside government, and others, provide the “raw materials” for understanding world politics or security issues (Lipschutz, 2000:53; see also, Williams, 2005:141). We now consider the limitations of traditional security.

A critique of the traditional approach:

Critical Theorists view the continuous privileging, by traditional discourses and practices, of the state over people in security matters as an indication of a deep-seated ignorance of

³⁸ See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 542.

the ambiguities embedding the modern concept of state or state sovereignty. The notion that the state is the ultimate guarantor of the internal and external security of its citizens is unsettled by the reality that the state can be a threat to individual security. Barry Buzan, (1991:364) highlighted this paradox:

The security of the individual is locked into an unbreakable paradox, in which it is partly dependent on, and partly threatened by the state.

This sentiment is echoed by Ken Booth: “to countless millions of people in the world it is their own state ... that is the primary security threat” (1991:318). Andrew Linklater (1990), focusing on the Third World in general and Africa in particular, establishes that the state does violence to its own citizens, through political oppression, violation of human rights and persecution of minority groups.

Ken Booth counters the mainstream view that the “External Enemy” is the primary security threat by pointing out that,

for the most part ... the threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of the nations across the world derive primarily not from a neighbour’s army but from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease (ibid.).

Furthermore, in a powerful metaphor, Booth debunked the premise upon which the state is viewed as the primary referent object of security. He asked whether it was more rational to spend more funds and energy to secure the shelter – the state – or to spend more funds and energy on the sheltered – members of the state. For, much as it is important to secure or rehabilitate the house, what should be of prime concern is the security and welfare of those who reside in the state (1991:320). To use another

metaphor, the state is the eggshell that protects the yolk and the white of the egg – the citizens. It is therefore illogical to make the state the end of security.

Moreover, the selective nature of traditional security practice is grossly inadequate. As pointed out, existential threats are dealt with in isolation. This problem solving approach gives rise to routine or ritualized responses to perceived threats to global, regional and state security. So, for example, when a state is on the verge of disintegration, as a result of internal armed conflict, the primary and immediate goal of regional governments or the international society is how to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state (see Rosenau, 2002:26). Chapter Three discusses this practice. By contrast, proponents of Critical Security Studies argue that there is a complex history behind threats to the state or the international order. Kenneth Boulding clarifies this point: “everything has multiple causes ... the attempt to identify the sole cause of anything is doomed to frustration” (1979:47). Jim George, in turn, rejects the standard operating procedures of traditional security by pointing to the complexity of security phenomena:

The traditional discourses of international relations continue to reduce highly complex historico-political phenomena to narrowly focused ahistorical rituals of thought and action, dominant in the era of imperialist power politics and four decades of the balance of terror (1993:197).

The problem solving approach thus fails to address the socio-political, cultural and economic tensions inherent in domestic and international systems. It glosses over existing inequalities and injustices – the structural violence that underpins an international system (Galtung, 1980; Wallensteen, 1988; Booth and Smith, 1995). These problems invariably promote state, regional and international insecurities. We turn to examine the interests behind the Realist security discourse and practice.

Robert Cox's famous expression: "theory is always *for* someone and *for* a purpose" helps us to understand the persistent Realist readings of security (1981:128). It suggests that Realist security constructs, far from being objective, natural and value-free, serves particular interests. Jim George (1993: 228), echoing Klein, picks up this theme and explicitly shows that when:

strategy and security are read in representational terms and located in their discursive context, the detached, techno-rationalist "naturalness" of such analysis dissolves into a modernist framework of pseudo-scientific privileging which in power politics, was/is designed to preserve both American leadership over Western Alliance and the hegemony of Western multilateral trading arrangement throughout the Atlantic core and the Third World periphery.

This statement, read within the context of contemporary security practice, portrays a narrow agenda meant to serve statist and neo-liberal economic interests.

Similarly, Booth and Vale, reflecting on security practice in southern Africa opined:

The definition of the primary security referent(s) in southern Africa is not a value-free, objective matter of "describing the world as it is" – as it has been falsely characterized in traditional realist theory. It is, as the region's history so tragically shows, a profoundly political act (1997:335).

In view of these limitations, Critical Security Studies offer an alternative agenda to which we now turn.

Re-visioning security:

Whereas traditional security thought and practice emphasizes power as the end of security, proponents of Critical Security Studies regard emancipation as the goal of security. For Booth, “security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin” (1991:319). He defines security as “the absence of threats”, and emancipation as the condition in which individuals and groups are free from those physical and human imposed conditions or constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do (ibid.). Booth lists the threat of war, poverty, poor education and political oppression as some of the constraints. By redefining security, scholars of Critical Security abandon power and order as the basis of security for a humanistic one. They regard individuals, groups, society or human beings as the ultimate referent object(s) of security. Critical Security Studies prioritize the experiences of all those who are made insecure by the current world order such as the voiceless, the unrepresented, the poor and the powerless (Williams, 2005:141, see also Tickner, 1995; Wyn Jones, 1995). It seeks to “represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug” (Said, 1994:9).

Booth and other proponents of Critical Security Studies regard emancipation or security, as communal in orientation. This view is encapsulated in Booth’s statement: “I am not truly free until everyone is free [or secured]” (1991:322). This is substantiated by the fact that those made insecure by a social order can react violently against it. Smith (1997:15) emphasizes this point:

When a privileged elite defends its too large share of too few resources a link is created between poverty, inequality and the abuse of human rights. People ... choose between accepting gross injustice and securing a fairer share by violent means. As conflict unfolds, the political leaders that emerge often find that the easiest way of mobilizing support is on ethnic basis. Thus do the various causes of conflict weave in and out. War will only end, if, when, and where its causes are removed.

Significantly, the universal notion of security collapses the us/them, domestic/foreign, self/other, identity/difference divide of mainstream security, and aims at community building.

In contradistinction to a problem solving approach, Critical Security scholars advocate a holistic or comprehensive view of security. Of course orthodox theoreticians have begun to analyze security beyond the traditional referent -- the state. So, under the rubric of "human security", security analysis now includes military, economic, health, political, social, environment and gender issues (Thomas, 1987; Linklater, 1990; Buzan, 1991; Mathews, 1991; Tickner, 1995; Mutimer, 1999). The expanded meaning of security is also acknowledged by both domestic and international policy-framers. James Wolfensohn (the former president of the World Bank), addressing the United Nations Security Council meeting on HIV/AIDS, admonished that:

When we think about security, we need to think beyond battalions and borders. We need to think about human security, about winning a different war, the fight against poverty (*World Bank News Release*, 2000).

Michel Camdessus, former Managing Director of the IMF, similarly asserted:

Poverty is the ultimate systemic threat facing humanity. The widening gaps between rich and poor nations... are... potentially socially explosive (UNCTAD X, 2000).

In spite of this expanded notion of security, in practice, security continues to revolve around the state (Buzan, 1991; Mutimer, 1992). There is in reality "little actual new thinking" about the concept of security within the mainstream paradigms (Booth, 1991:317). Additionally, when human security and development are considered, the policies are crafted by a coalition of governments (especially powerful governments), relevant international institutions and multinational corporations and consultancies. These

policies are set within the framework of liberal ideology (Sinclair, 1994; Gill, 1995; Beder, 1997).

Given this condition, proponents of Critical Security continue to draw attention to the need for an integrative approach to security. For Booth, the security process should involve the integration of peace with strategic concerns, national with universal security, “top down” with “bottom up” security issues like underdevelopment, poverty and oppression. In sum, the process of security or emancipation involves the harmonization of the “theories of the good life” with “theories of survival” (Booth, 1991:322).

Indeed Booth’s and other Critical Security Theorists’ reconceptualization of security process mirrors Habermas’s discourse theory or communicative rationality. At the heart of true security or emancipation is a democratic ethos – the principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and justice. This implies that individuals, groups or people have the right to participate in the formulation of decisions about security issues that impinge on their lives, and the freedom to affirm or disagree with prevailing security practices and structures. This takes us to the practical orientation of Critical Security Studies.

What is to be done? : a guide to action:

Returning to Booth’s definition of Critical Security Studies, we note that it has a political orientation. It emphasizes emancipatory politics by identifying strategies or reformist steps toward the construction of a better world. Critical Security scholars do not have faith in the ability of governments or states to provide security for people. Hedley Bull, for instance, believes that “governments engage in a conspiracy of silence... about the rights and duties of their respective citizens, to ensure their own co-existence” (1977: 308). So for Booth, the “implementation of an emancipatory strategy is ... to a greater or lesser extent, in the hands of all those who want it to be – the embryonic global civil society” (1991:326). This explains why, proponents of Critical Security Studies recommend that Critical Theoretical intellectuals should help in the development of counter-hegemonic politics. This can be done by identifying and supporting the struggles

of emancipatory social movements and organizations which are committed to a “global community” or cosmopolitan prospects (Booth, 1991:326, see also Wyn Jones, 1999:6). This takes us to Critical Theoretical perspectives on politics of emancipation. The discussion here takes a neo-Gramscian turn; it focuses on the dialectic of civil society and highlights the potentials and challenges before anti-hegemonic forces in their quest for social transformation

Emancipatory politics:

Conventionally, civil society comprises political, cultural and social organizations which have not been “established or mandated by the state or created as part of the institutionalized political system of the state” (Lipschutz, 2001:172). It mediates between society and the state, and its relation with the state can be co-operative or confrontational (Azarya, 1994:88-9). However, Critical Theorists like Cox and Habermas see civil society as a discursive construct (see Cox, 1999). In this conceptualization, the meaning and function of civil society are contingent upon time and space. For instance, in the 18th century, civil society was part of the decision-making process. It comprised private individuals like craftsmen, landed gentry, nobles and commoners who met in salons, parliaments and other public spaces to discuss affairs of state; their opinions invariably shaped public policy (see Calhoun, 1996:453). In modern times, however the public sphere – the opinion generating space – has become the domain of bureaucrats, credentialed experts and “interest group elites” (ibid.:454).

More significant is the “double movement” in civil society. Antonio Gramsci was the first to note this dialectic in his analysis of 19th century Italian political society. In this interpretation, there are two sets of forces within civil society -- one supports the state and its hegemonic ideology, the other opposes the social order. So, for Gramsci, the state is civil society plus political society. In a theory of hegemony, Gramsci contends that the state imposes its governing ideology on the rest of society because of the support and

consent of sections of civil society. Gramsci wrote of this coalition of civil society and political society in these terms:

In the East, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks ... (cited in Hoare and Smith, 1971:238).

In this setting, “civil society” comprises the dominant class, church, educators, the bureaucracy, the security force, the media, the capitalist class and the epistemic community. This “historic bloc” propagates the hegemonic ideology of the state (Cox, 1999:12). So, for instance, the education system indoctrinates the masses in the ideology of the state which is tailored to the interests of the dominant class (Cox, 1983). Similarly, the media and the intellectual community which are attached to the state also serve as a propaganda tool.

Robert Cox adopts Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and civil society in his analysis of international political economy (see Cox, 1981; 1983; 1987; 1999). He suggests a constellation of transnational forces that supports a neo-liberal global order. This includes states, especially the dominant ones, a transnational capitalist class, local skilled professionals or managers of enterprises that are linked to the international production system. Other players include policy-makers, the neo-liberal epistemic community and international bureaucrats associated with multilateral institutions. For Cox, the supporting structures of this hegemonic order are three-dimensional: a legitimating ideology, organizational/institutional structures and material capabilities. Neo-liberalism is the ideology at the base of the international economic system. The institutional structures of the global order are the various institutions of global “governance” and the subordinate institutions at the national and regional levels. Bureaucrats within these institutions “evolve policy guidelines and propagate the ideology” of the existing order (Cox, 1981;

see also Cox, 1999; Mittelman, 1993). Their material capabilities include the wealth, the techno-scientific instruments for mass productivity and the military power of the existing global order. How does this order function in practice?

There are institutional mechanisms such as corporatism which bring the state, capital and labour together to discuss economic, trade, investment and labour issues within the broad framework of the hegemonic socio-economic order. This institutional arrangement gives labour a stake – albeit superficial – in the policy formulation process. Out of this, organized labour also reaps investment opportunities and other concessions while grievances are resolved through agreement on wage increases and other material compensations.

At the international level, the institutions of hegemonic order, along with the dominant states and development related non-governmental organizations, give financial and technical support for development projects in the poor or peripheral regions (Cox, 1981:83). In addition, trade concessions from the north to the south are granted: these *charitable acts* are designed to reduce discontent – particularly from the peripheral states – against the prevailing global order. Cox argues that although the coercive or military arm of the order remains in the background as deterrent, it can be deployed against forces that have the potential to disrupt the smooth functioning of the prevailing order. “There is an enforcement potential in the material power relations underlying any structure, in that the strong can clobber the weak if they think it necessary” (Cox, 1981:137).

So, as Cox and other Critical Theorists have shown, beneath the surface unity and coherence of the hegemonic structure are the diachronic currents: tensions and contradictions which flow from inequalities and injustice of the prevailing order (see Mittelman, 1993:76). These elements can generate counter-hegemonic social forces (Cox, 1981); they are diachronic moments and highlight the opportunities and possibilities of transforming the existing social order (Mittelman, 1998:72). Feminists, labour unionists, environmentalists, national capitalists, pacifists, community workers, the poor, the socially marginalized, the unemployed, the poor states and organic intellectuals: these are

possible counter-hegemonic forces (Cox, 1999; see also Devetak, 1996; Saul, 2003). Cox assigns a pivotal role in a process of transformation to organic intellectuals, which makes it necessary to discuss their historical role.

Organic intellectuals as catalysts of change:

Robert Cox, following Gramsci, contends that material conditions are not sufficient reason to bring people to a self-realization of their existing situation; social transformation is not a spontaneous affair. Rather, the ideas, the views and the opinions of organic intellectuals, directed at exposing the unnaturalness of the existing order, can help members of society to fully understand their existing condition; they effectively mobilize self-conscious social groups on a long-term basis. Gramsci calls this a “war of position” in a quest for a new social order founded on higher moral principles than the prevailing social order (Cox, 1999:16).

Similarly, Habermas and Gibson, drawing on Freud, conceived of the Critical Theorist as a catalyst for social transformation and emancipation (see Held, 1980; Gibson, 1986). The psychoanalyst guides the individual to apprehend the causes of psychosis by reconstructing the past. Knowledge of the past is therapeutic because it leads the individual to understand the pathology. Like the individual, society is fraught with tensions and contradictions. The task of the Critical Theorist, as an organic intellectual, is to assist members of society to fully understand the causes of their existing condition. In other words, the Critical Theorists must unmask the unnaturalness, the historicity and contradictions of the existing social order (Held, 1980; Gibson, 1986; Mann, 1993; Cox, 1999).

Michael Mann (1993) regards the role of thinkers, writers and theorists of the 18th and 19th century Europe as organic intellectuals. He suggests that the emotional and ideational force of the writings and practices of these intellectuals helped to produce social

transformation, like the switch from monarchical sovereignty to popular sovereignty. Their work therefore accounted for the social upheavals which ultimately transformed European society. Robert Cox (1999) identifies the leadership of labour unions, environmentalists, social activists for the poor, the homeless and the unemployed, the feminist movement, promoters of self-help community organizations, peace movements and anti-globalization movements as part of the contemporary organic intellectual community. Today organic intellectuals have the task of presenting a nuanced critique of the hegemonic order and of mobilizing and developing linkages among social forces at the local, national, regional and transnational levels.

However the challenges in the way of efforts to bring about an alternative social order are immense for these reasons. First, there is the task of deconstructing the myth that there is no alternative to the prevailing neo-liberal global order. Robert Cox admonishes:

This contemporary deity will have to be deconstructed to make way for an alternative vision of a world economy regulated in the interest of social equity and non-violent resolution of conflict (1999:27).

This must include a drive to move society away from a “space oriented and synchronic mode of thinking to a predominantly time oriented and diachronic mode of thinking” (Cox, 1999:27). The former refers to the process in which problem-solving mechanisms are used to meet the demands of opposing social forces while the latter suggests a systematic challenge of neo-liberal structures. Further, intellectuals organically linked to the countermovement must think through ideas that can lead to universal happiness.

Secondly, the anti-hegemonic movement is not cohesive. It comprises a number of agendas: environmentalists concentrate on ecological issues, feminists on women and the landless movement on land. Thirdly, there are adversarial relations between professional and skilled labour who are integrated into the global economy on one hand and the semi-

skilled or precarious labour force on the other. Manual workers in the core states, whose jobs are threatened by global competition, resent workers in new industrializing countries and immigrants from poor countries for taking their jobs. In addition, the clamour of indigenous people for land and control of resources can clash with the interests of miners and foresters. Unskilled workers in environmentally destructive industries differ with environmentalists who advocate against these industrial practices.

Finally, the task of mobilizing people for social change becomes difficult in environments where there is a pervasive apathy and alienation. The public tends to lose faith in the political process. This has happened in Africa. The people easily become prey to extreme forces like religious fundamentalists and authoritarian populists (Cox, 1999). So, organic intellectuals, both activists and theorists, face a daunting task to devise relevant strategies that can help remove constraints and set society on the path toward a feasible and desirable alternative future (Cox; 1999; Baker, 2000; Cheru, 2000).

In summary, this chapter has pointed out that:

- In contrast to the traditional claim of the objectivity of theory building or knowledge, Critical Theory sees a connection between knowledge and interest.
- Traditional theory takes the existing social and political order as fixed which makes it problem solving in orientation. In contrast, Critical Theory sees a process of change in this order.
- Whereas instrumental rationality of modernity caters for specific interests, communicative rationality fosters justice and equality.
- Both the state and international society are limited moral agencies, and Critical Theory offers a possibility of a cosmopolitan order.
- Contrary to the traditional claim that the state is an asocial entity, it is interest based; it has pointed out that there is an internal tension in sovereignty which explains political instability and legitimacy crises of the state.
- Orthodox security discourse and practice privileges the security of the state and the stability of the international order over other concerns while Critical Security Studies regard human beings as the primary referent of security.

- Prevailing socio-political order has a surface unity and an underlying tension.
- The ultimate goal of Critical Theory is to seek a fulfillment of the Enlightenment project of universal peace, prosperity, freedom and progress.

The analyses in the ensuing chapters are largely grounded in these ideas and themes.

CHAPTER THREE

The State in Crisis

If the continental state system is to be fixed, its problems must be addressed holistically (Herbst, 2000:201).

Any discussion of regionalism in southern and West Africa must begin with an analysis of the condition of the state because the state remains an essential building block for the regional process – its cohesion, its integration and its development (Hurrell, 1995:67). Most states in Africa have been variously described as “weak” (Clapham, 1996; Rothchild’ 1987), “lame” (Sandbrook, 1985), “soft” (Herbst, 1996), “collapsing”, “failing”, “failed” (Swatuk, 2001), “retreating” (Strange, 1996), “fictive” (Callaghy, 1984) and “quasi” (Migdal, 1988).

These descriptions could be read in two ways. First, the African state is measured against the western state model. In this conceptualization, the state has absolute control over what goes on within its territorial space – legal, security, administrative, economic, political and social affairs. So, a strong state is one which has the capacity to perform these functions (Poggi, 1978; Badie and Birnbaum, 1983; Young, 1988; Migdal, 1988). However some analyses suggest that the state has ceded its authority to other actors while other accounts show that the state competes or shares its functions with internal and external forces (Reno, 1998; Francis, 1999; Dunn and Shaw, 2001; Strange, 1996). This leads to the second reading. The state faces a series of crises – internal legitimacy problems, armed conflicts and inter-state disputes. There is an irony here that we will encounter in the next chapter: the exercise of sovereignty engenders social cleavage which weakens the state; this in turn undermines regionalism. In this chapter, we shall discuss the nature of the crises, and show that the conventional or problem solving

approaches do not address the fundamental causes of the condition. This will give us entry to the next chapter.

The nature of the crisis:

States in the two regions face legitimation crises. Most people feel alienated or marginalized from the political and economic processes. This alienation can take the form of mass protests or public boycotts. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, civil society groups protest against excessive commercialization of social services and in some instances boycott payment of basic services. In Swaziland and Zimbabwe, the monopoly of political space and the brutal suppression of dissenting voices respectively, by the authoritarian regimes create social tensions which periodically break into social unrest. The legitimacy crisis can also take violent dimensions. Consider these examples in West Africa:

- Liberia experienced a period of civil conflict that lasted from 1990-2003.
- Sierra Leone was the next country to be affected by civil war; although the conflict has been resolved, there is growing concern that the country may slip back into conflict when the United Nations intervention force, UNAMSIL, leaves because the government is weak and corrupt.
- Guinea is under a dark political cloud: there is rising discontent against the Guinean government. Given this political tension, some analysts have predicted that the country may descend into civil chaos.
- The Senegalese government has not successfully contained the secessionist movement in the Casamance province (Essuman-Johnson, 2005:46).
- The governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have, since the 1980s, been battling against their minority Tuareg populations who feel marginalized (Olukoshi, 2001; Abramovici, 2004).
- Guinea Bissau is noted for armed rebellions. In June 1998, Senegal and Guinea sent troops into the country to help President Joao Bernardo Vierra to quell a

rebellion, however there was a bloodless coup on September 14, 2003 by the military.

- There was a coup d'état in July 2003 in the tiny island state of Sao Tome and Principe. The uneven redistribution of oil wealth seems to be at the heart of political conflict in this country. It took some heavy-handed diplomacy from Nigeria and some states in central Africa to induce the military to reinstate the President, Fradique de Meneses (*Integrated Regional Information Networks*, 31 December, 2002).
- Nigeria, the economic powerhouse of the region, has its own internal instability. Militant groups like the Oduduwa Peoples Congress (a Yoruba militant group), the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer force and the Ijaw Youth Council – these last three groups are all in the oil-producing region of Nigeria – have sprung up to challenge the government. Their objectives include greater autonomy and control of resources in their respective regions (*Mail and Guardian*, 23-29 September 2005, p.15; Ikelegbe, 2001; Watts, 2001). The goal of these militant groups conflicts with the monopolistic tendency of the Nigerian state and this conflict sometimes culminates in violent clashes between the state and armed groups. In fact, a low intensive civil conflict simmers in the Niger Delta between the Nigerian military and the militant groups. Additionally, the perennial religious wars between Muslims and Christians suggest that the government does not have firm control over its internal affairs.

Similarly in southern Africa legitimacy crises have led to armed conflicts in some states.³⁹ We take two examples:

- Lesotho descended into civil chaos in 1998, and South Africa with Zimbabwe and Botswana intervened to restore order (Vale, 2003). But as Rok Ajulu (2001) has pointed out, the Lesotho crisis is cyclical because each election year rekindles the civil strife as the political elites and the military jostle for power and wealth.

³⁹ Until the 1990s the legitimacy crisis in Mozambique led to a protracted and bloody civil conflict. Angola too, from the 1970s until the assassination of Jonas Savimbi, was embroiled in civil war. In South Africa, the Liberation movement engaged in an armed struggle against the illegitimate apartheid regime.

- The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has been described as the epicentre of instability in Africa, remains an active conflict zone. Following the Pretoria Agreement in 2002, a government of National Unity was formed. However, this has not brought peace to the country. There have been two unsuccessful coup attempts against the Kabila-led government, and there was a resurgence of fighting in the eastern province (*Mail and Guardian*, 11-17 June 2004, p.15). As we shall see in Chapter Four an essential reason for civil conflict in the DRC seems to be the marginalization of minority groups.

This domestic instability invariably assumes a regional dimension. Armed conflict in one state spills over into neighbouring states and engulfs a region (Clapham, 2001). So, the civil war in Liberia first spilled into Sierra Leone; the latter conflict in turn “precipitated instability in Guinea”; and now Cote d’Ivoire which has been an oasis of peace and stability has succumbed to the civil war contagion in West Africa (Wannenburg, 2005:9). In fact the Liberian civil war assumed a regional dimension from the 1990s. The Economic Community of West African States’ Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) initially intervened on behalf of the government in Monrovia while Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso tacitly backed Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (Clapham, 2001:12; see also Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998). The same is true of southern Africa. In the past, the apartheid state supported rebel movements in Mozambique and Angola, RENAMO and UNITA respectively. The conflict in South Africa itself assumed a regional dimension. States like Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe supported the liberation movements, providing bases for them while the apartheid regime carried out a destabilization campaign against neighbouring states. In more recent times, the armies of southern African states such as Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia supported the DRC government while Rwanda and Uganda backed the rebel factions (Bischoff, 2006:160).

An unstable environment is seldom conducive to meaningful regional co-operation, integration or development. The reason for this is clear. Any viable regionalist project depends on the flows of capital, goods and people; interrupting these signals a reversal.

Moreover, instability and legitimacy crises can compel governments to focus disproportionately on consolidating their authority rather than on regional issues. This point is discussed in Chapter Four. Even when attention is drawn to the region, the regional governments focus more on state and regional security than on developmental issues.

As Andrew Hurrell has suggested, the process of region building is also made difficult by interstate conflicts (1995:67). Take these examples:

- There are interstate conflicts over territory which call into question the legitimacy of national frontiers. For instance, in West Africa, there is a border dispute between Mali and Mauritania, and an emerging conflict in the east of Senegal near the border with Mali.
- Senegal accuses Gambia and Guinea Bissau of providing bases for Casamance rebels.
- The civil war in Côte d'Ivoire has produced unease between Côte d'Ivoire and her northern neighbours, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Côte d'Ivoire accuse them of supporting the rebels (*The Economist*, September 2004; *Integrated Regional Information Networks*, 11 September, 2003).

In southern Africa too, there is a border dispute between Namibia and Botswana over the Kasane Island in the Chobe River and a land dispute between Swaziland and South Africa over parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga provinces. As we shall encounter in Chapter Five, there are resource conflicts in both West and southern Africa.

These disputes undermine regional cohesion in two ways. First the disputes over territory and resources weaken the goodwill or co-operative spirit needed for the construction of a viable regionalist arrangement. Secondly, these conflicts highlight nationalist ambitions rather than regionalist ones. This brings us to this question: how can the legitimacy crisis be resolved? Some analysts contend that this can be done by reconstructing the state along ethno-nationalist lines. Others suggest that pre-colonial political systems offer a

useful guide for remolding the state. In a post-Cold War world, political liberalism has been advanced as a credible model for reordering the state, and liberal interventionism is the standard operating procedure for putting the state back together after it has been ravaged by civil conflict. The next section examines these views and practices. It will show that these are problem-solving approaches that cannot offer effective solutions to the crisis. We will discuss these in turn.

Ethno-nationalism⁴⁰

The option of ethno-nationalism as an alternative form of political community is partly influenced by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union into ethno-national components, and by the notion that state instability invariably assumes an ethnic dimension (and so the problem can be resolved once the state is reconstructed on ethnic lines). The argument runs that if European states could be reconstituted without major negative consequences, then the failed, failing or crisis-riddled African states could similarly be remoulded along ethno-nationalist lines. Christopher Clapham (2001:13) obliquely expresses this view:

In 1985, any analyst who had predicted the imminent disappearance of the Soviet Union would have been dismissed as crazy. Only 16 years later, it takes a real effort of imagination to recall that such a state ever existed, and a whole new collection of states – Belarus, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia – have taken on the appearance of normality. Human beings adapt with remarkable speed to changed circumstances, and Africans on much of the continent have proven extra-ordinarily adept at responding to upheavals far greater than those that have occurred in most of Europe. In time, it may well prove to be that the maintenance of the mythology of

⁴⁰The term refers to the aspiration of an ethnic group or a cultural community to possess its own state. What supposedly unites this community is a shared belief in real or putative descent. It is also claimed that this community is founded on a common tradition, values, customs, history or language. See Lars-Erik Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity", in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons op cit. p.411; see also A. Thompson, *An Introduction to African Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000) p.58.

defunct states amidst such upheavals in Africa but not in Europe, that turns out to be anomalous.

Christopher Clapham (2001:14-15), along with Herbst, (2000:269-270) and Malaquias (2001), demonstrates a preference for the ethno-nationalist project, especially in his recommendation for an alternative political community built around the “warlord” (warlordism is a variant of ethno-nationalism). The warlords, for Clapham, constitute viable agents of alternative political communities: he points out that the warlords have extensive military following and capacity; they are capable of warding off advances from their enemies and are able to maintain law and order. According to Clapham warlords epitomize the “big man” revered in African culture – they preside over strong and effective government because of their military power and the resources they control (2001:14). This view reflects the modern conflation of strong militaries with effective governments. Assis Malaquias (2001), in an attempt to show the external recognition of the “União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola”, UNITA, pointed out that this organization enjoyed external relations with states like the United States and South Africa. So, for writers like Clapham and Malaquias, shadow states created by the warlords have the requisite military, administrative, external support and recognition, and importantly, the resources needed to constitute an alternative political community. But history too, plays a role.

Christopher Clapham (2001) reaches back in order to compare warlords with warriors like Shaka by claiming that the warlords, like Shaka, could extend their influence and authority over diverse ethnic groups. There are limits to this historical analogy, however. Recent events, such as the killing of Jonas Savimbi, have debunked the notions of the efficiency of warlords. They are not as militarily invincible and effectively in control as they are made out to be. More importantly, these views about warlords do not take account of the elements of domination, power, coercion, intimidation and exploitation which underline the basic structure of warlordism. So, for instance, rebel leaders, often with the support of multi-national corporations, exploit resources in rebel-held areas for

selfish ends, while the authoritarian, coercive and exploitative practices of warlords elicit resistance, in turn, from disaffected social groups (see Reno, 1998).

The knotty political question is this: how substantively different is the warlord administered area from the state it rebels against? The answer is that it is not different at all: both perpetuate oppression, practise domination, deepen material inequalities and promote exclusionary practice. Whatever peace or stability those shadowy states potentially promote is just as shadowy and precarious as that of the sovereign state. This takes us back to the core assumptions of ethno-nationalism.

It is often argued that ethnic and cultural tensions account for the crisis of the modern state, especially the African state. In this sense, ethnic or cultural factors are portrayed in essentialist terms: they are regarded as fundamental to the various political upheavals in contemporary relations in Africa. So, this naturally leads to an assumption that restoring stability to the African state is contingent on the reconfiguration of the state system along ethnic or cultural lines. Moreover, many commentators on African affairs hold the view that these ethnic or cultural conflicts have their bases in colonialism. They regard the African state as an artificial creation which emerged out of the colonial past (Bentsi-Enchill, 1976; Potholm, 1976; Jackson and Rosberg, 1985; Young, 1988; Davidson, 1992, 1994; Tambiah, 1996; Malaquias, 2001; Clapham, 2001; Grovogui, 2001; Laakso and Olukoshi, 2001). For example, Bentsi-Enchill argued that:

The 19th century partition of Africa by the European colonial powers was not made with any attention to the boundaries of ... traditional polities.

The newly independent African states are in general, territorial composites and have inherent problems of domestic boundary demarcation and maintenance between the traditional polities and jurisdiction of which they are composed (1976:2).

On the same subject, Jackson and Rosberg wrote:

The boundaries of many countries, particularly but by no means exclusively French-speaking Africa, were arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers and were not encouraging frameworks of unified, legitimate and capable states (1985:46).

The common thread that runs through these and other related arguments is that the colonial state, which is a forerunner of the modern African state, was superimposed on diffused, localized and varied pre-colonial political units. These units included monarchical, dictatorial, democratic and theocratic forms of political community (Potholm, 1976; Malaquias, 2001). The incommensurability of these – the modern state and its pre-colonial political social form – explains the conflicts and crises that are inherent in the African state. Assis Malaquias seals the point thus:

tragically, however, the grafting of the Westphalian system onto Africa brought war and conflict, not peace and co-operation.... Worse still, the drawing of colonial borders neglected to take into account the national and ethnic divisions on the ground. The result was a continent with a relatively small number of mostly non-viable multi-national states (2001:15).

For proponents of ethno-nationalism, these wars and rebellions in African states are instances of disaffection with the state; they are the aspirations of ethnic groups to occupy autonomous political spaces. Assis Malaquias (2001), in an empirical turn, advances this point in his claim that UNITA as a political party was ethnic based – it was primarily a representative body for the Ovimbundu ethnic group in Angola. Other parties, such as the “Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola”, MPLA, were also ethnically based He explains:

the main rationale for creating UNITA was primarily ethnic. The Ovimbundu it represented believed that, as the major ethnic group in Angola, it was critical that they had their own “liberation movement” to

counterbalance the role and power of the movements representing the other two major ethnic groups. History has shown that the political project of these movements was not national but sub-national. In other words, beyond the rhetoric, they were primarily concerned with the aspirations of particular ethnic groups – Kikongo, Kimbundu, Ovimbundu – not the Angolan state (2001:18).

For Malaquias, UNITA's external relations with countries like U.S., Zaire (now DRC), South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Morocco were motivated by a desire to "represent identifiable national – defined as ethnic – aspirations" (2001:18).

Laakso and Olukoshi (2001), for their part, argue that the politicization of ethnicity should be interpreted as a proof of the reality and force of this identity. The primary allegiance of people is to kinship, ethnicity and culture. This sentiment is neatly captured in the writings of Samuel P. Huntington with his claim that:

People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity (Huntington, 1996:21).

These are regarded as primordial and fixed identities, bonds or loyalties which are stronger than those to the state. For defenders of ethno-nationalism, the ethnic, cultural or tribal unit is a more reliable moral community than the state. This community, it is claimed, is anchored in the principle of love, care and universal morality (Laakso and Olukoshi, 2001). Based on these and other reasons, exponents of ethno-nationalism believe that Africa's political woes can be resolved by reconfiguring the political community on the basis of ethnicity. We turn now to consider the flaws in the ethno-nationalist thesis by showing why it cannot address the fundamental causes of the crisis.

Critique of the ethno-nationalist discourse:

Ethnic identity as a basis for the reconstruction of the African state is riddled with pitfalls. It cannot constitute an effective and desirable alternative political unit or community to the state because, on close scrutiny, the ethno-nationalist discourse rests on untested assumptions.

Of course most rebel activities in both West and southern Africa, and the new phenomenon of multi-party (we shall return to the latter subject in the discussion on political liberalism) have an ethnic dimension. Superficially, the appeal of ethnicity appears to sustain these activities but the empirical evidence suggests a divergence between the ethnic rhetoric and the true intentions of rebels and political elites. The invocation of ethnic consciousness is often a carefully constructed plan of political entrepreneurs⁴¹. In a sense, it is a game played by political elites for the proverbial hearts and minds in the name of ethnicity. In an insightful moment, Ronnie Lipschutz referred to the invocation of ethnic, cultural and religious identities as “tools” used by the elites to grab both power and wealth (2001:111). This is so because, in Africa, the state is a contested terrain: whoever controls it, monopolizes its resources. So, political entrepreneurs can play upon ethnic sentiment to win support in their fight for the power and resources of the state.

This suggests why the ultimate goal of rebel leaders, notwithstanding the regional or ethnic basis of their movements, is to control or reform the state. Secession is usually not a preferred option. This outcome remains true of dissidents in states like the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Angola. Christopher Clapham attests:

⁴¹ Ronnie Lipschutz (2001:120), defines a political entrepreneur as one who is able to articulate in a coherent and plausible fashion, the structure of opportunity and constraints that face a specified group of people, as well as the potential cost of not acting together.

There has yet been astonishingly little attempt by aspirant and oppositional African politicians to articulate any alternative to the post-colonial state. Even the most destructive insurgent leaders – John Garang, Laurent Kabila, Jonas Savimbi, Charles Taylor – have claimed, sometimes plausibly, to be seeking to reform and re-establish existing states, rather than simply to dismember them. Where dismemberment has been the explicit goal, as in Eritrea and Somaliland, even Biafra, this has been based on the demand to re-establish former colonial jurisdiction rather than to carve out new ones (2001:10-11).

Moreover, the idea that ethnic identities, bonds or loyalties are fixed is false. These, as anthropologists would argue, are not static or ahistorical. They are rather contextual and contingent. The nature of the ethnic community is different today from what it was fifty, a hundred or five hundred years ago. Furthermore, the degree of attachment to it varies across time. Social relations are charted by both endogenous and exogenous influences. Indeed, long periods of socio-political and economic interactions between linguistically different people in a given state do create common bonds, common attachments and common commitments to a particular spatial ordering which we call the state. Put differently, the African state, over time, does manage to create a national consciousness, what Basil Davidson calls the “nationality principle” (1994:249). Faced with this, the imperative for people is often not to escape into ethnic enclaves: rather they yearn for a political community which is oriented towards common hopes, common aspirations, and the common interests of all members.

Furthermore, the assumption that an ethnically homogeneous political community is prone to be caring, loving and interest-free does not eradicate the possibility of disorder which is fueled by social injustices and material inequalities. An ethnically homogeneous political unit will be characterized by the same set of internal and external factors that plague the heterogeneous one. For instance, Somalia is a relatively homogeneous state

but it is still dogged by insecurities and social conflicts, while in southern Africa, the Kingdoms of both Swaziland and Lesotho are mono-ethnic societies. This uniformity, as we have noted, has not removed political and social strife in these places. The ethnic-nationalist discourse therefore exhibits an inadequate knowledge of modern social relations and the tensions, contradictions, conflicts and inequalities that underline them.

Like all forms of social ordering, ethno-nationalism erects boundaries of self/other, inside[r]/outside[r] us/them, rational/irrational, our[s]/their[s], foreign/alien. These dichotomous binaries engender violence and fear: the *othering* of what lies outside the ethnic space contracts its moral boundary. In consequence, the dichotomy legitimizes violence on outsiders. The outsider is the enemy against which the community protects itself (Said, 1978). In essence, the security of *self* is provided at the expense of the *other*. This explains the genocide in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.

Finally, from a spatial perspective, constructing national communities on ethnic lines in Africa is irrational and unfeasible: most states comprise many ethnic groups. For instance, Nigeria is said to have about 200 ethnic groups (Olukoshi, 2001). So, there will be no end in parceling out the geographical space of the state into ethnic spaces. Every identifiable ethnic political territory will contain a minority group, who on account of exclusionary practice from the dominant group will in time demand its own political space. There will come a time when there will be no space to divide.

In brief, this section has shown that:

- The ethno-nationalist argument is based on false premises.
- In contrast to the ethno-nationalist argument, both citizens and political entrepreneurs do not seek dissolution of the state, what they want is a reformed state.
- Political entrepreneurs use ethno-nationalism as a means to gain political power and wealth.

- Reconstructing the state on an ethnic basis does not remove systems of inequality, domination and marginalization.
- Ethno-nationalism thrives on dichotomies which engender violence.
- The ethno-nationalist project is spatially unfeasible.

As we have already noted, it is said that liberal democracy can bring peace and stability to the crisis riddled African state. In the next section, we will discuss the liberal (democratic) peace theory, assess the liberal democratic practice in the two regions, and determine whether it has the capacity to promote order.

The liberal democratic discourse and practice: a panacea for the crisis of the state?

After the end of the Cold War, most states in West and southern Africa adopted liberal democratic constitutions, as a result of pressures from popular movements, donor nations and the international financial institutions -- the IMF and the World Bank. The United States, in particular, has exerted pressure on regimes in West and southern Africa to adopt liberal democracy (Abrahamsen, 1997; Ake, 2000). For instance, the United States threatened to impose sanctions on the Nigerian government when President Ibrahim Babangida attempted to renege on his pledge to conduct presidential elections on June 12, 1993; in the event, he changed his mind. In Malawi, the suspension of an aid package of \$174m by donor nations compelled Kamuzu Banda, the late Malawian President, to hold a referendum on multi-party system and to accept the outcome of the referendum (Ake, 2000:129). Similar external influences contributed towards the adoption of liberal democracy by governments in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Zambia, Tanzania, Togo and Cameroon (ibid.).

Initially, the IMF and the World Bank seemed reluctant to impose democratic conditions on client states. This position was based on the premise that doing so would be in violation of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of clients. Publicly, certainly, for the IMF and the World Bank, their interest was limited to the promotion of sound macro-economic policies. However, they revised their policy of non-interference and

embraced the prevailing orthodoxy of a link between democracy and economic development. The belief is that liberal democracy makes the rulers accountable to the ruled. The former pursue policies that reflect collective interests rather than selfish ones. They do this in order to continue staying in power (Ake, 2000:77-8, see also Abrahamsen and Williams, 2002:317)). Additionally, political liberalism protects private property which -- for liberals -- help to facilitate accumulation, which is essential for economic growth and development.

Western interest in the African democratic project is ironic, especially when set against the Cold War. In that era, democracy was not a valued currency in the West's interaction with Africa, notwithstanding the lip service paid to it. Essentially, Cold War relationships rested on strategic calculations. The former United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, alluded to these interests:

During the long Cold War period policies toward Africa were often determined not by how they affected Africa but whether they brought advantage or disadvantage to Washington or Moscow. Thankfully we have moved beyond the point of adopting policies based on how they might affect shipping lanes next to Africa rather than the people in Africa (Christopher cited in Ake 2000:139).

So, the superpowers supported authoritarian regimes in Africa and elsewhere. For instance, in the 1980s, the United States gave military and financial assistance to leaders like Samuel Doe of Liberia, David Arap Moi of Kenya and Mobutu Sese Sekou of Zaire (Clapham, 1996 and Ake, 2000). In South Africa, the undemocratic apartheid regime was supported by Western powers under the pretext that the country was a bulwark against Communism. Why then were African states pressurized to adopt liberal democracy after the Cold War? What was the rationale behind it? The answer lies in the democratic peace theory or the liberal peace discourse, to which we now turn.

*The democratic peace theory*⁴²:

Theoretical interest in liberal democracy in the post Cold War world is anchored in the work of Kant, Rousseau, Schumpeter, Cobden and other classical liberals who argued that liberal democratic states are peaceful while authoritarian ones endanger international stability (Burchill, 1996). Immanuel Kant asserted that democratic or Republican states do not like wars because the rulers are constrained by a constitution. According to this the consent of the people must be secured before the state can go to war. The people, however, do not desire war because they bear its human and financial costs. In contrast to the pacifism of liberal states, both Kant and Schumpeter believed that autocratic states have a propensity for war. Schumpeter argued that authoritarian rulers in the 19th century delighted in waging war for personal gain. War expanded the national coffers because citizens were taxed in order to secure adequate funds for military campaigns (ibid.).

For both Kant and Rousseau, democratic or Republican states promote domestic harmony because they are based on self-government and self-legislation – the constitution is the expressed will of the citizens and the civil liberties enshrined in the constitution give people the right to participate in the affairs of state (Kant, 1970; Burchill, 1996; Devetak, 2002). So, for Kant and other classical liberals, the Republican state “was an essential building block of peaceful international order” (McGrew, 2002:270). Richard Cobden, for his part, claimed that free trade creates interdependence between people and states. This promotes peace because citizens and governments come to realize that war will impose more economic costs than benefits on them (McGrew, 2002:270).

Turning to the international level, Kant recommended the formation of a confederation of Republican states founded on shared commitment to interdependence, democracy, peace and prosperity. He argues that the success of this “select club” of liberal states can induce others to join by embracing its rules and norms (see ibid.). Kant further argues that the

⁴² This theory rests on a central proposition that democratic governments, free trade and international law promote global peace and order. These assumptions were first made by classical liberals and there is now a growing literature of democratic peace theory which tests the empirical validity of these classical liberal assumptions; see McGrew (2002: 276).

spread of liberalism and the deepening of global economic interdependence can culminate in the expansion of the liberal zone of peace.

Michael Doyle (1983), through empirical analysis, claimed to have discovered what Kant had proposed or wished for – a pacific union of liberal democratic states. Doyle discovered that “there is a predisposition against warfare between liberal states ... [that] a liberal zone of peace, a pacific union, has been maintained and has expanded despite numerous particular conflict of economic and strategic interests” (1983:213). Echoing Kant and other classical liberals, he suggests that this peace is the result of a restraining influence of a liberal constitution, the international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests. Conversely, Doyle and other democratic peace theorists following Kant, argue that non-liberal states are predisposed to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, especially the liberal ones. These states are in a sense “at war with their people” because they “lack internal legitimacy” (see Griffiths, 1999:66). Giving these conditions, liberal governments have the right to wage war against non-liberal states⁴³. In fact liberals or democratic peace theorists see this mission as an opportunity to expand the zone of peace.

This also explains why modern day liberals like Michael Doyle and Francis Fukuyama have suggested that the end of communism has presented an opportunity for liberal governments to extend the democratic space or the zone of peace beyond its Western core. For Francis Fukuyama (1989), the demise of communism is a vindication of the universalistic claims and eternal values of liberalism. According to Fukuyama and other modern liberals, exporting liberal democratic values will ensure domestic and international peace and prosperity. This background explains why African states were urged, and in some instances coerced, to adopt liberal democracy after the Cold War.

⁴³ This partly explains the US mission in Iraq. One of the reasons for the war against Iraq was that the Bush administration claimed that Saddam Hussein’s regime was undemocratic and autocratic. The invasion was perceived as a move to liberate the Iraqis by extending democracy to them, and eventually to the rest of the Arab Middle-East.

While a liberal zone of peace exists in the West, the peace or stability promised by liberal democracy in West and southern Africa and the rest of Africa, has proved to be an illusory quest. While most states in southern Africa have embraced liberal democracy it has not opened up space for viable forms of opposition to develop, and, more importantly, for people to directly participate in the affairs of the state. Although states like South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are nominally liberal democratic states, they are *de facto* one party states, and too much power is concentrated in the hands of the president (Southall, 2003a: 268). Furthermore none of these states has a strong opposition and the ruling regimes are often less accountable to the public. For example:

- The structure of the South African electoral system effectively takes away the monitoring function and power of the electorate. Parliamentarians are not directly elected by the people, rather they are appointed by the political parties (Southall, 2003a: 267).
- Zimbabwe represents a classic case of the futility of liberal democracy in southern Africa – authoritarianism co-exists with political liberalism. Elections are rigged, opponents are intimidated and harassed, and the regime is noted for its “contempt for the people” (Southall, 2003a: 268).
- In Namibia, as in South Africa, political parties select representatives to parliament.

Many writers have pointed out that liberal democracy is elitist, exclusionary and hegemonic (Zezeza, 1997; Mkandawire, 1999; Ake, 2000; Laakso and Olukoshi, 2001; Nkiwane, 2001; Good, 2002; Southall, 2003a). It is restricted to periodic elections. Roger Southall, following Kenneth Good, wrote:

Democracy in southern Africa is centred around electoralism, is otherwise fairly hollow, and does not, on the whole, make a lot of difference to ordinary people’s lives (Southall, 2003a:269).

So, Liberal democracy does not seem to promote popular participation in the affairs of the state. At the continental level, the late Claude Ake (2000) showed that when the democratic wave broke on the shores of Africa in the 1980s, the political elites used the idea for their own benefit. In countries like Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria, elites who were out of power used the ballot box to get back into power. In Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, incumbent elites exploited the democratic process to legitimise their rule and to further themselves: they established and controlled the electoral bodies, subverted the electoral rules and regulations and abused the election process (Adejumobi, 1998:41-42; Saxena, 2002: 80).

The pattern continues in the 21st century: liberal democracy continues to be an elitist project. The only visible role for the citizens, for the most part, is electing the political elites. Political liberalism, then, is a convenient framework through which the national elites compete with each other for political power and national resources. It is a mechanism therefore, that seeks the acquiescence of citizens to the social order.

Because the right to vote in an election is tied to citizenship, Liberal democracy disempowers and marginalizes others. To consolidate their power, ruling elites withdraw the citizenship of subaltern groups and other formidable political opponents, as will be seen in Chapter 5. This accentuates internal social conflict as excluded groups contest their marginalization from the political process. For instance, the ongoing civil crisis in Côte d'Ivoire was sparked by the denial of Ivorian citizenship and the right to vote to northern minority groups, largely because they were perceived as migrant communities (Herbst, 2000; Zeleza, 1997 and Bassett, 2003).

Roger Southall, echoing Good, shows the similarities between the intent of contemporary political liberalism and its 19th century counterpart:

Liberal democracy ... [in the 19th century] ... arose ... as a means of incorporating the masses into politics in an orderly way, not through "irrational", participatory interventions such as strike action, but in voting

for competing elites at periodic elections. The old democratic ideals of justice and equality were shorn-off as dangerously ideological, while Lockean beliefs in the rights of individual property ownership remained. Elitism accompanied by popular passivity came to characterize the main tendencies within the liberal form of democracy (2003a: 268).

Therefore, liberal democracy is a hegemonic project and closely associated with capitalism. It provides a legal environment within which neo-liberal economic principles can flourish. In effect, it perpetuates material inequality, social injustice and systematic exclusion of the majority of people from the domestic political process. Does it have the potential to bring order or stability to the states in West and southern Africa? Tandeka Nkiwane provides an answer:

The spread of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism has not resolved many of the contradictions in Africa, but has rather in many cases exacerbated internal socio-political struggles, externalized in a variety of forms.... On the African continent, the prospects for peace, arguably, have less to do with democracy in its liberal sense, and more to do with questions of socio-economic distribution, or a deepened understanding of democratic question (2001:286).

So, Liberal democracy is “choice-less” (Nkiwane, 2001:283) because it does not serve the interests of ordinary people; it removes them from participation in government (Mkandawire, 1999). As a result, people have little or no enthusiasm for the electoral process. This assessment directs scholarship and political practice to unravel the socio-political and economic complexities embedding state structures in West and southern Africa, and the rest of Africa. We turn now to liberal interventionism by describing the

process, showing the agenda behind it, and explaining why it cannot bring lasting peace and stability to the state.

Liberal Interventionism:

Many analysts argued that the polarization of the Cold War days has been replaced by a globalist mode of thinking: states are more willing now than in the past to co-operate with each other for political and economic stability (Brown, 2002a; Devetak, 2002; Lawson, 2002b). The *Agenda for Peace* by Boutros Boutros Ghali, former United Nations Secretary-General, which appeared in the last decade of the 20th century, called for the renewal of partnership between the U.N. and states – at both the regional and global level – in order to promote international security (Henrikson, 1995). The appeal was timely: it came just at the time the Cold War had ended. George H.W. Bush, the 41st President of the U.S., in the same period, sensed the dawn of a *New World Order* – a world in which liberal democratic states come together to fight against forces that threaten global security. This optimism sprang from the international solidarity against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 when the U.S. and her allies, with the backing of the U.N. Security Council and the goodwill of the international community, restored sovereignty to Kuwait (Falk, 2005:197).

The new order does not only mean – to retrieve the expression of E.H. Carr (1945:54) – “coming to the aid of an attacked country against its attacker”: it also means that the U.N. and the international society can intervene in civil conflicts, and especially in contexts where the state is on the verge of disintegration or where there is massive killing. They intervene to reconstruct the state on liberal democratic lines, to restore (or ensure) “democracy by force” (cited in Vale, 2003:131, see also Von Hippel, 2000). This process follows a standard operating procedure: once a truce has been secured, the U.N. mandated force intervenes to perform peace-keeping or peace-making functions; a brokered settlement is followed by the establishment of transitional government of national unity; the intervention force de-mobilizes ex-combatants who are rehabilitated

and reintegrated into the society; finally, the transitional government (assisted by the U.N.) conducts multi-party elections after which a new government is installed. This leads us to this question: how altruistic is this form of liberal interventionism? The Critical Theory at the base of this thesis directs us to examine the interests behind the discourse and practice of liberal interventionism. As we have noted, for Cox (1981), theory is always for someone and for a purpose. This explains why scholars of Critical Security Studies argue that the theory and practice of modern security serve particular purposes. The practice of collective security therefore aims to maintain the prevailing international order, and to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. How do we know this?

Integral to Critical Theory is the idea that the past is a useful guide to the present; therefore, historical antecedents help us to understand the essence of contemporary political practice. We draw on two examples: the Concert of Europe (Balance of Power) and the League of Nations. The primary objective of *Balance of Power* in 19th century Europe was to prevent major shifts in a geo-political map which was maintained by the “Great Powers” (Carr, 1945:40). To serve this end, the dominant states formed strategic alliances which were engineered to prevent any state from becoming too powerful and endangering the peace in Europe. The resulting order, however, chiefly enhanced the power and interests of the Great Powers at the expense of the aspirations and interests of peoples who were thrown together in the melting pot of empire (like the Austrian-Hungarian empire). The nationalist movement in the “Balkans” which was against the Austrian-Hungarian empire would lead to the collapse of the Concert of Europe and to the outbreak of the first World War (ibid.:17).

The League of Nations, which was established in 1919 after World War I, replaced the Balance of Power politics or the Concert of Europe. The League set out to promote liberal ideals such as self-determination or self-government, democracy and collective security. The first of these principles was self-determination, which “balance of power” had ignored. But the League of Nations was not altruistic, it was interest bound. The global “order” envisaged by the League of Nations reflected the values and interests of

the Allied Powers – the victorious nations of the First World War. In fact the principles that underlined the League of Nations were formulated by Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United States.

However, Japan, Germany and Italy, who were defeated in World War I, could not identify themselves with the search for new order. Germany lost territory and a huge war indemnity was placed on her by the victorious powers. In the end, the League of Nations crumbled under the weight of the national interest of states aggrieved by the terms of the post-war settlement; Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, and Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1936 without the expected intervention from the League of Nations. The inaction paved the way for more aggressive behaviour, especially from Germany: the result was World War II (Northedge, 1986).

This brief historical sketch suggests that status quo arrangements invariably safeguard the interests of powerful social forces. It requires different arrangements to address the fundamental socio-political issues embedding the social order. This background sets the scene for an analysis of contemporary collective security or liberal interventionist project. Liberal interventionism is primarily oriented toward the preservation of the sovereign state upon which discourses over regional and global security rest.

Notwithstanding the humanitarian undertones of Boutros Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, its primary point of reference is the sovereign state – the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state (Henrikson, 1995; Devetak, 2002; Lawson, 2002b). This is why David Campbell debunks the popular view that the sovereign state is undermined by liberal interventionism (Lawson, 2002b:213). For David Campbell, liberal or other intervention reinforces or revitalizes sovereignty. Put differently, the purpose of intervention is to restore state sovereignty that has been displaced by conflict or the collapse of the state. In addition, when states come together to intervene in civil conflicts, they reaffirm the sovereignty basis of the inter-state system (Campbell, 1995; Lawson, 2002b:213). James Rosenau (2002:26) fingers the sovereign and statist motive of intervention:

When an internal war ravages a society and leads to a collapse of the state, the unquestioned impulse in the halls of government everywhere is to rebuild the state.

An examination of the motives for ECOWAS/ECOMOG and extra-regional actors in the Liberian Civil War reveals concerns for the stability and sovereignty of the Liberian state and viability of the inter-state system in the region.

This explains why regional leaders, such as President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, Sir Dawda Jawara of the Gambia and President Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, perceived the Liberian civil conflict in 1989 as a recipe for regional instability, and as a threat to the survival of states in the region. Charles Taylor's insurrection in Liberia set a precedent in the region because it was the first civilian attempt to overthrow a military government in West Africa. (*West Africa*, 28 November- 2 December 1990; *New Africa*, October 1992). The thoughts of two presidents captured the mood of the regional leaders. Sir Dawda Jawara warned:

If Charles Taylor with the support of what I may call mercenaries from other countries of the sub-region were to come to power by force, one can imagine the implication it will have for sub-regional security (*West Africa*, 28 November-2 December, 1990).

President Lansana Kouyate, for his part, deplored the precedent being set by Charles Taylor: "Charles Taylor is a bad example. Civilians should not be encouraged to overthrow military regimes" (*New Africa*, October 1992:16).

In the end, military force was deployed to reconstruct the sovereign state of Liberia and to affirm the sovereignty of the regional inter-state system – the status quo. The intervention followed a regular liberal interventionist path: peacekeeping and peacemaking exercises, the establishment of a transitional government of national unity,

demobilization and rehabilitation of combatants and organizing of democratic elections. At the end of the process, Charles Taylor, a warlord, emerged as the President of Liberia in 1997. However, barely two years later, Liberia relapsed into civil war. In late 2003, the regional actors and extra-regional actors like the United States in partnership with the UN again began the ritualized responses to the Liberian question. ECOWAS and U.S. soldiers were deployed to keep the peace; a transitional government was installed; the process of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and re-integration was initiated and democratic elections were held in October 2005⁴⁴ (*The News* (Monrovia), April 7, 2004 and *UN News Service*, April 10, 2004).

Similar statist-oriented responses were employed in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau in West Africa, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lesotho in southern Africa. Despite these efforts, the regions are not stable. Côte d'Ivoire, as we have, noted is embroiled in civil conflict. The transitional structure in the DRC is uncertain because there have been two unsuccessful coup attempts and there is a resurgence of fighting in eastern Congo (*Mail and Guardian*, 11-17 June, 2004:15). There are growing fears in Sierra Leone that the state may revert to anarchy once the UN forces leave (*Africa Today*, October, 2005:35). The stability in Lesotho is tentative: elite struggles for the state resurface at every election year and ordinary people are already disenchanted with the government (Ajulu, 2002). So what is to be done? Certainly what is required is an integrative approach to the security question. In other words there ought to be a bridge between state security, concerns for regional/international order and human security. Over and above this, in determining what constitutes a security issue, priority must be given to human security. This calls for an agenda that aims at ensuring the good life for all, ending oppression and all forms of exclusion. To do this is to remove the sources of instability. However as Critical Security scholars have argued this can only be pursued by an extra-state agency – civil society. Both Chapter Seven and Eight discuss the role of civil society in social transformation.

⁴⁴ There is a new government which is headed by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Charles Taylor, who had been in exile in Nigeria, is now in Sierra Leone facing charges of war crimes because of his alleged involvement in the Sierra Leone Civil War. At the time of his arrest, the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, commented that the arrest and prosecution of Charles Taylor will serve as a deterrent to other war criminals. This comment has another intent: it serves as a warning to potential destabilizers of the regional status quo.

The search for the past:

Scholars like George Ayittey, Basil Davidson and Adebayo Adedeji lament Africa's preference for modern political institutions and values and point to pre-colonial social relations as a repository of peace and democracy (Zezeza, 1997; Ayittey, 1992; Davidson, 1992, 1994). They are kindred souls with nationalist-ideological thinkers like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Kenneth Kaunda, Modibo Keita, and other African ethno-philosophers and historians (Ochwada, 2005:106-7; Davidson, 1994:248); all believe that the search for viable political models that make for peace and stability must begin with the past.

Basil Davidson (1994:250) suggests that the legitimacy crisis of the state could be resolved if African states "devise modern, and therefore effective equivalents of those pre-colonial mechanisms and modes of self-organizations which have brought success to pre-colonial states". He draws examples of such successful pre-colonial political communities from West Africa and elsewhere. So according to Davidson, kingdoms like Ghana, Mali, Songhay and the Asante empires were efficiently governed (Davidson, 1994: 248). While there was peace and prosperity, and the principles of justice and accountability underlined community life, Davidson concedes that these kingdoms were "as oppressive of ordinary people as any other system of feudal or authoritarian government" (ibid:32-33). There was discrimination along class and gender lines: slaves, women and vassals were exploited and marginalized from the affairs of the political communities. Women had subordinate roles; they were confined to the home as mere caregivers and providers of labour on agricultural fields; they were denied ownership of land and equality with men, especially in paternalistic societies; and vassals were overburdened with royal duties (Davidson, 1994:32; see also Zezeza, 1997; Mama, 2001; Schatzberg, 2001).

But, echoing Ibn Battuta, the 14th century Moroccan historian, Davidson argues that this oppression or exploitation was a "necessary price" for the long period of security which

the people in these empires enjoyed (ibid.:32). There is, it must be noted, some contradiction in Davidson's view -- exploitation and oppression negate security. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, Critical Security Studies define security in terms of emancipation. For Critical Security scholars, security encompasses freedom from war and the threat of war, poverty, oppression, authoritarianism, inequality, injustice and other violations of human rights. As a result, there can never be peace or stability when there is oppression and exploitation.

So, Davidson and other advocates of pre-modern political systems failed to identify the social tensions and conflicts that result from the dominating, exclusionary and exploitative tendencies of pre-colonial political structures. Often, these very societal conflicts culminate in the reconfiguration of power relations. For example, historical records show that exploited and oppressed groups often struggled to alter the form of power relations (Zezeza, 1997). Marginalized provinces or vassals within empires either seceded or grew powerful, framing new political communities. In addition, the multiplicity and complexities of pre-colonial political orders like kingdoms, democracies, autocracies, theocracies and state-less societies make generalization about pre-colonial political systems extremely hazardous. Of course, there are useful lessons to be drawn from the African socio-political past. However, the primary task of scholars is to examine its social, political and economic contradictions and power relations. This will contribute towards finding solutions to the current problems of the African state (Ochwada, 2005:200).

This chapter has established that the instability and legitimation crisis of the state constrain the regional process. It has also demonstrated that recommending ethno-nationalism, appropriating pre-colonial socio-political forms, adopting liberal democracy and the practice of liberal interventionism will not necessarily bring stability or order to the state, because none of these approaches addresses the fundamental causes of insecurity, which include political oppression, inequalities, domination and exclusionary practices embedded in state structures. So, to address the crisis, there is the need to stand outside "Westphalia" – the sovereign state – in order to see clearly what needs to be done

to restore stability and legitimacy to the state. The next chapter takes a critical look at state sovereignty and its impact on state cohesion.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Role of Sovereignty in the Legitimacy Crisis of the State

In modern political societies men have often insisted that like sovereignty, the state itself is only a concept, a fiction of philosophers, a myth ... there is no such thing as the power of the state, only the power of individuals (Hinsley, 1986:2-3).

If the past is "dead" it dances, a lively corpse indeed, on new graves everywhere, almost every day in whatever kind of time (Isaacs, 1989:121).

To retrieve the expression of Francis Hinsley, the term sovereignty suggests that there is a "final and absolute authority in the political community" (1986:1). As we have already noted, the sovereign state emerged out of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Before this, the church, represented by the Pope, exercised authority over political communities in Europe ruled by kings and princes. Westphalia transferred sovereignty from the Church to the State giving it absolute control over what goes on within its territory (Poggi, 1978; Young, 1988; Miller, 1986; Walker, 1993; Mann, 2003). However, in recent times, the loss of sovereignty, especially in Africa, has been written about *ad nauseam*. This loss is often associated with the rise of neo-liberal economic globalization (Bowen, 1992; Plank, 1993; Simpson, 1993; Abrahamsen, 1997; Strange, 1996; Dunn, 1999; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2002). According to this thesis the state's monopoly over its affairs has steadily declined. One reason for this conclusion is that the state has surrendered its right to formulate economic policies to international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. It is further argued that the implementation of these policies by states explains, in part, the political instability and legitimacy crises of the state. Of course, there is a correlation between neo-liberalism and state crisis because neo-liberalism

undermines the social basis of the state. For instance the social protests and demands for democracy in the 1990s were reactions to the implementation of Structural Adjustment policies in the 1980s (Abrahamsen, 1997; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2002). But the loss of sovereignty hypothesis is problematic because of its inherent assumptions. It assumes that the state is a powerless and passive agent of neo-liberalism, and that the state does not have the ability to assert its authority and interest against the global economic institutions and other transnational neo-liberal actors. This interpretation also takes away the collaborative role of the state.⁴⁵ Contrary to these assumptions, empirical evidence suggests that some states did not fully implement the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) while others either stopped or suspended implementing SAPs often against the wishes of the IMF and the World Bank (Hutchful, 2002:220-223). This suggests that governments used their sovereignty to at once delegate policy-making authority to the external actors and to delegitimize the policies and other activities of these actors in order to safeguard their interests and political survival (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1997).

Furthermore, what is seen as a loss of state sovereignty is a reconfiguration of the role of the state. The state voluntarily surrenders its right to formulate economic policy to international bureaucrats while at the same time using its legislative, legal, security and administrative powers to enforce the same policy. For instance, in both West and southern Africa, governments enact laws which lower taxes, liberalize the labour market, protect private property and deregulate the financial market (Tsie, 1996).

Additionally, in the past, some states in Africa, used their monopoly over the decision-making process and the legitimate use of force to suppress opposition to neo-liberal policies. Ghana is always cited in IMF and World Bank narratives as one of the few countries that were consistent in the implementation of SAPs. However, what is conspicuously absent from this IMF/World Bank literature was the means employed to achieve this result. The ruling Provincial National Defence Council, PNDC, was

⁴⁵ As we shall see in Chapter Six, the elites in charge of the state form part of a transnational coalition that promotes neo-liberalism. They do so because of the benefits they derive from it. This essentially debunks the loss of sovereignty argument.

authoritarian, and managed to stifle all forms of opposition to its neo-liberal policies (Adu-Amankwah, 1990). So, the death knell of sovereignty may be premature in Africa. For, as Richard Falk (2001) rightly observes, in the Third World sovereign practices prevail. This leads to the main purpose of this chapter. It proposes that the dialectical nature of the state in West and southern Africa stems largely from its sovereign character. State sovereignty, to echo a point made in Chapter Two, generates a cyclical pattern of domination, exclusion and resistance. In practice, those in charge of the state, notwithstanding the time and the form of government,⁴⁶ deploy state sovereignty to build up patrimonial structures; construct national identity; draw boundaries and define political communities; monopolize the means of violence; and erect bureaucratic and security structures that serve the interest of elites and their external counterparts. Therefore, the ongoing instability and legitimacy crises in both West and southern Africa are the result of exclusionary practices embedded in sovereignty. Because the post-colonial state inherited some of the characteristics of its predecessor, our discussion begins with the colonial state.

The discriminatory basis of the colonial state:

The colonial state in Africa was exclusive and dominating. It rested on the binaries⁴⁷ of white/black, foreign/local, European culture/African culture, power/disempowerment, domination/resistance and subject/citizen (Young, 1988:37). After initial conquest, the search for the solution of the *Native Question* led Lord Lugard to formulate *Indirect Rule*. This was an administrative blueprint used by the British in their colonies which effectively sub-contracted the administration of the native areas to traditional authorities. Both the French and the Belgians ultimately adopted this administrative framework. The

⁴⁶ This chapter shows that colonizers, ruling elites of the immediate post-colonial period, military rulers, autocrats and democrats all practise domination and exclusion.

⁴⁷ Binaries draw, define and contrast extremes which help to hold options to the light. They also serve to justify exclusionary, discriminatory and oppressive practices. For a definition of binary see Peter Vale (2003:138); see also Lisa Thompson (2001:251). For instance, the Apartheid regime, which was based on segregation, perceived the indigenous Africans as savage, barbaric, primitive and violent. They used these characterizations to legitimize racial segregation and to deny Africans the rights and privileges enjoyed by the settler community. The members of this community were regarded as insiders while the Africans were seen as outsiders.

adoption of Indirect Rule produced a bifurcated colonial administrative structure, the local and the central states (Mamdani, 1996). We now turn to show that the two systems were based on exclusion and domination, serving the interests of local collaborators, the white expatriate community and the metropolitan countries. This in turn elicited resistance from marginalized groups which culminated in de-colonization.

The local state:

The local state corresponded to the tribal unit – what Mahmood Mamdani calls “decentralized despotism” (1996:52). Indirect Rule gave wide-ranging powers to the traditional leadership and allowed for the administration of tribal areas through native institutional structures. A local chief, subject only to the authority of a white district commissioner in the British colonies or the *commandant du cercle* in the French colonies, collected taxes, distributed land and administered justice in the so-called native courts. Furthermore, he offered advice to the colonial authorities and helped to recruit subjects to work in colonial plantations. This form of forced labour was common in French West Africa (Le Vine, 2004:48-49). Disobedience to traditional authority and edict was harshly dealt with by the central authority to ensure acquiescence to traditional leadership. The chief’s mandate was unchallenged and, as Mamdani (1996) has pointed out, the traditional chief used this unbridled power for his own personal gains. Mahmood Mamdani writing about the expansive powers of the chief says:

The authority of the chief thus fused in a single person all moments of power, judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative. This authority was a clenched fist, necessary because the chief stood at the intersection of the market economy and the nonmarket one.⁴⁸ The administrative justice and the administrative coercion that were the sum and substance of his authority lay behind a regime of extra-economic coercion, a regime that

⁴⁸ To repeat, one of the tasks of the traditional leadership was to recruit labourers to work in the cash economy. This practice often disrupted the indigenous mode of production and family life. For instance, men were compelled to leave home to work in plantations and mines.

breathed into a whole range of compulsions: forced labor, forced crops, forced sales, forced contributions, and forced removals (1996:23).

Within the resulting economic system, the old African merchant class collaborated with the colonial regime; indeed the colonial administration fostered the existing trade relations between this merchant class and European traders. So, there were merchant classes along the coast of West Africa and in Tanganyika (Tanzania) in southern Africa who played an intermediary role between European traders and the interior communities. In addition, the local commercial classes and traders from the Levant like the Lebanese, Indians and Syrians filled the interstices of the colonial economy (Hopkins, 1973; Isichei, 1977:241; Young, 1988; Bathily, 1994:58). These collaborators – the traditional authorities, the local commercial classes and others – helped lend legitimacy to colonial rule.

The central state:

The central colonial state in both West and southern Africa centred on the urban areas. Colonial Administrators and functionaries were drawn primarily from the white expatriate community, who were often imbued with Enlightenment principles. Unlike the local state then, which bred despotism based on customary and monopolistic practices, the centre was often marked by its civil or liberal practices. However civil liberties such as the right to citizenship, were restricted to the European population. Educated Africans and urban workers were excluded from the circle of rights. As a result, their situation was one of double exclusion: they neither fitted into the tribal setup nor were they accommodated at the central state. What emerged, therefore, was a colonial state which catered for particular local and foreign interests and largely neglected the indigenous population. In addition, the economic benefits of the colonial possessions accrued largely to the metropole. This was because advocates of colonialism had to convince a skeptical domestic public about the economic viability and benefits of the colonial enterprise. Jules

Harmond, an advocate of French imperialism, articulated the ideological and economic bases of colonialism when he wrote:

The colonies were made for the metropolis, for the many and varied advantages that the metropolis may draw from them, is evident: if colonies, the foundation of which nearly always costs the metropolis so much money and sacrifices and which exposes them to such great risks, were not made to serve those metropoles, they would have no *raison d'être*... (cited in Young, 1988:37).

Resistance to the colonial state:

We have already established in Chapter Two that whoever is in charge of the state exerts absolute authority over it. This exercise of sovereignty leads to domination marginalization and resistance. The narrow social bases of the colonial state, its “decentralized despotism”⁴⁹ – to use Mamdani’s words – and centralized marginalization provoked resistance both at the local and the central states. In French West and Equatorial Africa, there were about “thirty five major and minor uprisings between 1900 and 1921” (Suret-Canale, 1964). There were revolts at the local level such as the Hut Tax War of 1898 in Sierra Leone against the British, and the Maji-Maji (“water-water” in Kiswahili) resistance in Tanganyika -- now Tanzania -- against German domination (McGowan, 1999:242). The colonial subjects “resented the imposition of taxes and regular use of harsh methods to recruit labor”, especially in Francophone West Africa (Rotberg, 1965:296). The nationalist waves in both West and southern Africa, and elsewhere, spearheaded by the African intelligentsia or the nationalists, were therefore

⁴⁹ Some historians suggest that none of the chiefs in both British and French colonies (regarded as despots) had a legitimate right to rule. These scholars argue that there was no local regulatory check on them and that the chiefs only, by virtue of their expansive powers, invented laws and passed them off as traditional or customary. In French West Africa, the chiefs, known as the “Chefs du canton”, were the most hated fraction of the African collaborators. Appointed by the French, they were very loyal to the colonial regime, presiding over the forced labor and taxation system. For accounts of illegitimacy of traditional leadership see Said Adejumobi, “Identity, Citizenship and Conflict: The African Experience”, in W.A. Fawole and C. Ukeje (eds), *The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship, and Conflict*. Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005). p.26; see also Bathily (1994:58).

responses to the systematic exclusionary practices of the colonial state.⁵⁰ The cumulative demand for self-determination coupled with the mobilization of the marginalized urban working classes threatened the colonial state. This brings us to the de-colonization process: this transitional period is important because it shows an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of colonialism, and more importantly, the rise of a new political class which continued the practice of domination and exclusion.

The de-colonization process and the postcolonial state:

Two factors explain why “hegemony and legitimation took on new meanings” during the de-colonization process that followed World War II (Young, 1986:30). First, the status of the imperial powers like Britain and France was weakened by the war. France was occupied by Germany and Britain emerged out of the war with a “gravely weakened economy” and its Great Power status undermined (Isichei, 1977:278). Furthermore, the emerging powers wanted an end to colonialism in order to break the economic monopoly of the colonial powers over their colonies. These new powers therefore championed the right of colonized peoples to self-determination. In fact the war itself was fought “in the name of freedom, democracy and self-determination of nations” (ibid.:279). These factors compelled the colonialists to develop the colonial territories and prepare their subjects for self-government. Secondly, having embraced the idea of self-government, the colonial authorities then had to compete with the emerging nationalist leaders for the support of the colonial population. As a result, all of them stressed the imperatives for welfare and development. Indeed the colonial authorities needed this support in order to have effective control over the de-colonization process (Young, 1986:32). So from the 1950s onwards the colonial governments initiated welfare and development programmes by creating technical and specialized services, building schools and providing health services for Africans. For example, by independence 70% of children of school going age were enrolled in schools in the Belgian Congo (Stengers, 1974).

⁵⁰ In fact the right of the natives to become citizens underlined the struggles against colonialism. This is reflected in the political slogans of the nationalists such as “power to the people” and “equal rights for all” see Bathily, op. cit.

Informed by concerns for their legitimacy, the metropolitan countries started investing in colonial economies which helped bring some level of prosperity to the colonies.⁵¹ The financing of the colonial state which had depended on “transformation of African labor into state cash flow” was retrenched for other forms of local taxations like custom and import duties, tax levies on export crops and revenues from agricultural marketing boards (Young, 1986:33).

More significantly, the de-colonization process marked a shift of power from the traditional authorities to the nationalist leaders. The latter emerged, at this period, as the new collaborators. The “metropolitan power used its authority to relinquish its local prerogatives to ... [these]... collaborators” (Bathily, 1994:59). As a result, the nationalists dominated the transitional governments. The path to this dominance was through constitution making. Anxious to bequeath a liberal legacy, the metropolitan powers in collaboration with the nationalists adopted a liberal constitution as the basis of government. This enfranchised the colonial subjects who, in turn, used this right to vote the nationalists into government.

However, these transformations made in the *twilight* years of colonialism did little to alter the “more enduring autocratic and hegemonic impulses of the [colonial] state” (Young, 1986:34). Put another way, there was more continuity than change immediately after colonialism – the political elites, like their predecessors, abuse sovereignty for political and selfish ends. So, in both West and southern Africa, the ruling elites suppressed plural expression which was enshrined in the pre-independent constitutions: one party or *de facto* one party states were established in Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire in West Africa and Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Tanzania in southern Africa. The ruling elites justified their monopoly of political space on the pretext that multi-party politics run against the African tradition of government by consensus. They argued that pluralism on tribal and class lines accentuate social cleavages, and that what was needed

⁵¹ The British set up the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, and the French, the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development. See Isichei op cit. p.221.

was one political organization to unite the diverse ethnic groups. According to these leaders this unity was an essential pre-requisite for the immediate task of nation building and development (see Isichei, 1977:303); instead, however, patrimonial structures were established. In turn, this generated social discontent and alienation culminating in a cycle of violence. State sovereignty continues to generate political instability and legitimacy crises in both West and southern Africa, as we shall soon see.

We turn to consider the individual countries in order to illustrate the correlation between state sovereignty and the crisis of legitimacy. These states have been chosen because collectively they represent the different political systems and leadership styles existing in the regions. Swaziland is an absolute monarchical order; Lesotho has a Constitutional Monarch; in any definition, Zimbabwe is an autocratic state and Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo were governed by authoritarian regimes; both Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire are called "democratic" states. Notwithstanding these differences legitimacy crisis is a common feature. A further reason for this selection is that the crisis of legitimacy is more intense in these states than in the other states in the respective regions. Indeed some of the selected states, like Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, can be categorized as failed states (Zartman, 1995:7). Finally, the civil conflicts in almost all of these states impinge on the prospects for regionalism.

Zimbabwe:

We accused and condemned the previous white minority government for creating a police state and yet we exceed them when we create a military state. We accused former colonizers who used detention without trial as well as torture and yet do exactly what they did, if not worse. We accused whites of discrimination on grounds of colour yet we have discriminated on political and ethnic grounds (Joshua Nkomo cited in Kriger, 1995:153).

Zimbabwe's "Heroes Acre" is a fitting place to start any discussion of politics in that country. The burial ground for national heroes, it also commemorates the struggle for Zimbabwean independence, honours national heroes and symbolizes the unity of the nation:

[it]... arouses national consciousness, forges national unity and identity ... it is a symbol of the masses struggle for freedom that transcends tribalism, ethnocism, regionalism and racism (see *Ministry of Information*, 1996:3 and Werbner, 2001:76).

A closer reading shows that this is rhetorical. The reality is that the state uses the idea of sovereignty to perpetuate elitism, draw political boundaries that exclude citizens who are regarded as enemies (and thus become victims of state sponsored violence), reinforce the notion that the government is the sole representative of national unity, and to dominate the political process. We turn now to examine these observations.

For Richard Werbner (2001), Heroes Acre perpetuates exclusionary practices. He points out that in the 1980s members of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the ex-combatants of its military wing – the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) – were excluded from Heroes Acre because they were regarded as opponents of the ZANU-led government. Therefore, for Werbner, Heroes Acre is a social space for the ruling elites and their supporters. The Zimbabwe state uses the commemorative occasions at Heroes Acre to selectively bestow honours and rewards on surviving heroes or heirs of deceased heroes. Richard Werbner (2001) further suggests that the public, especially ex-combatants, are disenchanted with Heroes Acre and the commemorative activities around it because of its elitism. As a result, throughout the 1980s ex-combatants boycotted annual ceremonies at Heroes Acre erecting alternative shrines around the countries (ibid.:91).

Elitism, however, transcends Heroes Acre. For instance, war veterans constitute one of the elitist groups in Zimbabwe. In fact Kriger (2003) points out that the war veterans and the national army⁵² dominated post-colonial state construction in Zimbabwe. The War Veterans who were ex-combatants in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle did not seek integration into the national army. Nevertheless, they represent a powerful force in Zimbabwean politics and “extract resources from the state” (Maundeni, 2004:204). They form the core of state personnel, and are given preference in employment in the private, public and co-operative sectors (Kriger, 2003; see also Maundeni, 2004:204). These veterans and other cronies of the Mugabe regime benefited from the seizure of white farms.

State domination of political space and identity construction:

The ruling regime’s dominance of political space and its branding of others as enemies began in the immediate post-independent period (Lamb, 2002; Sachikonye, 2002; Southall, 2003a). A pre-independent agreement stipulated the formation of a unified national army from the two guerilla forces, ZIPRA and the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the former Rhodesian army. The ZIPRA members were however marginalized because of their affiliation to ZAPU, which was then an opposition party. As a result, many of the ZIPRA soldiers deserted the national army and formed dissident groups in Matebeleland – the stronghold of ZAPU (Kriger, 1995:149). In response, the Zimbabwe state sponsored persecution against the people of Matebeleland between 1983-1987. President Mugabe said at the time:

When men and women provide food for dissidents, when we get there we eradicate them. We do not differentiate ...[between civilians and

⁵² The national army is largely a partisan institution. It is dominated by ex-members of ZANLA, which was the military wing of ZANU-PF (now the ruling party in Zimbabwe) in the liberation struggle. There is a close relation between the national army and the war veterans. These two forces have been used to unleash violence and other forms of atrocities on those the government considers enemies.

soldiers]... when we fight because we can't tell who is not [an enemy]
(*The Times*, (Harare) 27 April, 1983).

The *Guardian* of Zimbabwe expressed the dominating attitude of the regime thus:

The atrocities committed in Matebeleland and the Midlands in 1982-87 were part of a well-orchestrated campaign of terror directed by the state to impose its authority on what was perceived to be a politically recalcitrant region (May 9, 1997, p.6).

The government continues to show intolerance towards alternative political expressions by labeling citizens and groups – like the MDC – who oppose it as enemies of the nation, unZimbabweans and traitors in league with white farmers and British imperialists. The fight against this domestic opposition is regarded as the “Third Chimurenge” (Southall, 2003a: 261). In reference to the domestic opposition, Didymus Mutasa, ZANU-PF Secretary, declared: “We will be better off without six million people, with our own people who support the Liberation struggle” (ibid.).

In pursuit of this goal, the government through the army, war veterans and the youth wing of the ruling party, systematically carry out political cleansing of the population. Many young women were forced into camps operated by ZANU-PF youth and subjected to rape and “forced concubinage” (Southall, 2003a: 260, see also Lamb, 2002). Other supporters of the opposition party are tortured, harassed, intimidated, detained and brutalized during elections (Maundeni, 2004:204). In fact the army threatened to stage a coup if the opposition won the 2002 elections. In line with its policy of political cleansing, the government demolished informal structures in the urban centres after the March 2005 Parliamentary elections. The official reason was that the informal settlements harboured criminals, illegal immigrants and defaced the cities. However, there was a common belief that the clean up was a “bloody political game” because the

cities are opposition strongholds (*Mail and Guardian*, July, 1-7, 2005, p. 18). So it was a strategy to force people back to the rural areas where the ruling party has absolute control.

The other enemy is the white farming community whom the government accuses of being in cahoots with imperialist forces aiming to re-colonize Zimbabwe. Categorizing them as the “others” made it easier for their farms to be seized, and by August 2002, 2,900 white commercial farmers had been evicted from their farms (Maundeni, 2004:206).

Two events will serve to show how the ruling regime dominates the political process. First, a War Veterans Association was formed in the 1990s in reaction to poor implementation and misuse of the War Victim Fund. This fund was set up in the 1980s to pay financial compensation to ex-combatants. As a result, there were confrontations between this organization and the government. So, to placate them, the Mugabe regime, in complete disregard for the financial and economic health of the state and domestic opposition, offered the veterans larger compensations than had been agreed in the 1980s, and increased taxes to raise funds for the payments. The result was a massive devaluation of the Zimbabwean currency, which weakened from Z\$12 per US\$1 in 1997 to Z\$55 to US\$1 in 2001 (Sachikonye, 2002:14; Southall, 2003a).

Secondly, against public opinion, the government intervened in the civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo towards the end of the 1990s. This intervention cost the state US\$360 million a year. Of course there were the benefits of intervention like mineral concessions to the state. However only the ruling elites like the top brass of the army benefited from them. Because the Zimbabwean state dominates the political process, social convulsion is endemic in the country. For instance, there were popular protests against the two cases and their economic consequences. The protests culminated in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – the major opposition party in Zimbabwe (Werbner, 2001; Southall, 2003a). It was formed out of a broad coalition of business, the youth, unemployed, students and trade unions.

Swaziland:

As Swazis we find ourselves trapped in the oscillating cosmic drama. We are the tragic actors. But unlike animals that have no imaginative knowledge of their fate our great disadvantage is that we know where we are going – hurtling at great speed down the slippery slope without the voice to influence those in the vanguard. We are helpless and powerless, not any amount of shouting, not even sabotage or hostile graffiti will ever change the way we are ruled. We are a breed in a farm, we can only graze where we are driven, we shall be seen and never be heard (*Sunday Times of Swaziland*, October 25, 2000, p.17).

In Swaziland, a monarchical regime presides over a paternalistic political system which is reminiscent of the colonial era in every possible way. The monarch fits the Hobbesian image of an absolute ruler, the *Leviathan*, who embodies the sovereignty of the nation. The regime uses its sovereignty to construct a national identity that exhibits gross disdain for public opinion, dialogue, consensus and popular participation in government. This form of authoritarianism reproduces social tensions and conflicts which result in violence.

We have noted that the British divided their colonies into two: the local and central states. In Swaziland the local state was also referred to as the Swazi nation administered by the aristocracy and headed by the paramount chief (the King). In essence the monarchy exercised sovereignty over this political space. It used this power to seal off the rural areas from the political influence of the emerging nationalist movements (Bishoff, 1990). At pre-independent constitutional talks, the monarchy insisted that it alone was the only legitimate voice of the Swazi nation -- the King was the "...people's mouthpiece"

(Mzizi, 2002:173). There were, however, other political formations, like the Ngwane National Liberation Council (NNLC). The monarchy justified its position by conflating political pluralism with disunity. For the King, Sobhuza III, “there can be no peaceful progress without cooperation and unity of the people” (Kuper, 1978:29). This assertion was a re-echo of the argument used by earlier post-independent African ruling classes to suppress political opposition and establish one party states.

Abrogation of the liberal constitution and establishment of centralized despotism

In spite of aristocratic opposition to pluralism, the colonial government favoured a liberal constitutional framework as the basis of a post-colonial government in Swaziland.⁵³ The monarchy grudgingly conceded and formed its own political party – the Mbokodvo National Movement (MNM) to contest the pre-independent elections; it won all the seats. This victory is explained by the monarchy’s absolute control over the Swazi nation – the rural areas – and an alliance with the settler population in the urban centres (Kuper, 1978; Daniel and Vilane, 1986 and Bischoff, 1990; Matsebula, 2000). Despite the monarchy’s strong hostility towards the liberal constitution, there was no immediate imperative to tinker with it because there was no representative opposition party. However, parliamentary elections in 1973 changed the composition of the Legislative Assembly. The Ngwane National Liberation Movement won three seats in the largely working class constituencies of the Mpumulanga region (Kuper, 1978; Mzizi, 2002). Mainly migrant laborers, the electorate did not have strong loyalties to traditional authorities in the rural areas (Kuper, 1978). So, MNM had to share the parliamentary chamber with a vociferous opposition that represented a challenge to the historical dominance of the monarchy and to its claim to be embodiment of Swazi identity, and the only voice of the Swazi people.

The King’s response to this opposition was to abrogate the pre-independent liberal constitution on this pretext:

⁵³ Swaziland became an independent nation in 1968.

The constitution has permitted the importation into our country, of highly undesirable political practices alien to and incompatible with the way of life of our society, increasingly these elements engender hostility, bitterness and unrest in our peaceful society (*The King's Proclamation*, 12 April, 1973).

In a move reminiscent of the world of George Orwell's novel, *Animal Farm*, the proclamation was made at an inaugural ceremony of the Swaziland army. The Parliament was dissolved and, on the basis of the proclamation, the King ruled by decree. Since 1973, then, the monarchy has used its monopoly over all branches of government to construct identities that delegitimize alternative political communities, create internal *others* and suppress popular participation in the kingdom's affairs. Evidence of this is everywhere to be found.

In 1996, the King set up a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) to draw up a new constitution for the country. Against the demands of civil society for the convening of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, the King "handpicked the members of the commission ... and set its terms of reference" (*Swazi News*, December 2, 2000, p.6). For its part, the CRC only solicited opinions from individuals at the Tinkhundla centres – rural administrative units which remain aligned to the monarchy. The CRC did not allow civil society organizations to make submissions; the press was also banned from covering this exercise, and "there were heavy penalties for anyone who would ridicule the operations of the commission" (Mzizi, 2002:178). It was therefore seen as a "royal project designed to serve royal interests" rather than being a "people driven" initiative (*Swazi News*, December 2 2000, p.6).

The nature of representation and the supremacy of traditional authority:

Alternative political formations remain proscribed, in spite of their *de facto* existence. Their lack of status in Swaziland disqualifies them from participating in the decision-making and implementation process. The Parliament, whose members are drawn largely from the Tinkhundla centers, is subjected to traditional authority. In the absence of a multi-party framework, individual candidates can only contest parliamentary seats in their personal capacities. The selection system itself is discriminatory because those who are elected to Parliament are the approved candidates of local chiefs and are therefore supporters of the status quo. Furthermore, the monarchy's prerogative of appointing members to the Parliament and of approving pieces of legislation gives it broad control over the legislation process. There are 65 members in the Parliament, 10 of these members are appointed by the King, who also appoints 20 of the 30 members of the Senate. These appointees are largely drawn from the aristocratic class but members of the society who support the monarchy have also been appointed.

As a result, the Parliament is a marginal political institution; a "rubber stamp" which ratifies legislations crafted by the executive; it identifies more with the regime than with the larger Swazi society. A former parliamentarian reflected on its role in this way:

Those who understand Swazi politics ... say we don't have a dual system of governance ... [the modern and traditional systems, rather]... we have a paternal system of governance. So, in Siwati, as small boys, there are issues that we can deal with but serious issues are left to the elders to [take] action (*Times of Swaziland*, July 31, 2001, p.36.).

The power of traditional structures over that of Parliament has been shown, in recent times, by the removal of two parliamentary speakers on grounds of traditional improprieties⁵⁴ (*Times of Swaziland*, March-April 2004).

It continues into the executive where the Prime Minister is appointed by the King and the selection of the cabinet is made in consultation with the traditional authorities. This mechanism ensures that the executive remains firmly beholden to the interest of the monarchy rather than those of the wider society. In addition, both the monarch and local chiefs have the right to evict subjects from their land or homes. Evictions are codified in the Swaziland Administrative Order – a piece of legislation which is contested both by critics and political parties. The Order authorizes,

the Ngwenyama (the King) ... at any time ... to instruct the Minister for Home Affairs in writing to make an order containing such conditions as the Ngwenyama may consider appropriate for the removal of any person or any of his dependents living with him from one Swazi area to another Swazi area (*Sunday Times of Swaziland*, December 24, 2000, p.15).

Acting on the powers conferred by this Order, the King sanctioned the eviction of two chiefs, their families and supporters from their chiefdoms in order for the King's brother to be installed as chief (*Times of Swaziland*, September 8, 2000, p.7). The decision sparked off a national protest by civil society groups which did not persuade the regime to change its mind. Similar forms of despotism occur in the rural "communities" where chiefs have the right to evict subjects from the land at will.

⁵⁴ The first speaker was accused of stealing cow dung from a royal kraal. This act, according to Swazi custom, is inimical to the interest of the King. The second speaker was removed for "coveting" what belongs to the King.

Resistance:

The monarch's monopoly over the affairs of the state has generated a vibrant civil society which seeks an overthrow of the status quo. The church, business, labour unions, the youth, students, human rights organizations and political formations insist on being treated as citizens, rather than subjects, to use Mamdani's terminology. They are demanding full participation in national decision-making and in politics. This manifests itself in continuous social unrest, mass demonstration, students and workers' protests, and ongoing media criticism of the regime – a political crisis that occasionally results in violence (*Sunday Times of Swaziland*, 2 October, 2005).

Lesotho

Lesotho has been a dependent neo-colonial state presided over by authoritarian and parasitic non-hegemonic classes, which have consistently lacked the capacity to establish their legitimacy and produce some semblance of hegemonic ideology (Ajulu, 2002:51).

Lesotho has been dogged by political crisis from the pre-independent period to the present. This is characterized by a constant struggle amongst the political elites for control of the state and its resources. The result is a history of authoritarianism, coups, counter coups and other forms of civil unrest. The following narrative makes this point clear. The kingdom's independence in 1966 was preceded by political violence. The primary actors in this political drama were the then paramount Chief, Moshoeshe II, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) which was formed in 1952, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) established in 1959, and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) founded in

1962 (Weisfelder, 1967).⁵⁵ A power struggle followed the 1965 elections which were won by the BNP led by Leabua Jonathan, albeit with a narrow majority in Parliament. Moshoeshe II had been unhappy with the pre-independent constitution because it made him a ceremonial head of state, so he demanded greater powers, in fact, he wanted “ultimate authority in the fields of defence, external affairs and internal security” (Spence, 1968:52). The BCP, led by Ntsu Mokhele, shocked by the defeat at the polls, contested the results in the court. Faced with a common opponent, the BCP, MFP and the King formed an alliance to challenge the BNP government which culminated in political violence. The BNP government, in response, accused them of plotting a coup, and on this pretext, the BNP used its power and influence to place the King under house arrest and imprisoned the political leaders of BCP and the MFP. With this move, the Kingdom gained a “temporary measure of ... tranquility” (Weisfelder, 1967:13).

However after the ruling Basotho National Congress (BNP) annulled the result of the 1970 election won by the BCP, the BCP staged an unsuccessful coup in 1974. It subsequently went into exile in South Africa, where it formed an armed wing – the Lesotho Liberation Army – to resist the authoritarian regime. The BNP was subsequently ousted in a military coup in 1986. The political developments in South Africa in the 1990s and the democratic wave which swept across Africa combined to compel the ruling military regime to initiate democratic reforms. There were about 70 strikes by civil society organizations in Lesotho in the second half of the 1990s. These civil society organizations demanded the demilitarization of Lesotho politics and democracy. The military regime was eventually overthrown by junior army officers because of its halfhearted commitment to change and the ongoing demand by civil society groups for comprehensive reforms. As a result, there were democratic elections in 1993 which were won by the BCP. This victory was widely interpreted as a correction of an historical injustice: the BNP, it must be remembered, had denied the BCP the right to form the next

⁵⁵ The BCP was a nationalist anti-colonial organization and subscribed to a pan-Africanist ideology. It was also noted for its opposition to Apartheid South Africa. It drew its support from urban workers, intellectuals and the Protestant churches; it was against traditional authority. The BNP however was a conservative body which believed in the traditional way of life. It was supported by the chiefly class, the Catholic Church, women and the rural communities. The MFP was royalist in inclination, and was founded purposely to fight for more political powers for the monarch.

government in 1970. The BCP was however out of power in 1994 because the Lesotho monarch, Letsie III, at the instigation of the BNP, the minority royalist party – Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) – and some chiefs, suspended the constitution and dissolved the government. He further vested all legislative powers in himself and appointed an Interim Provisional Council to run the country until a committee was set up to organize fresh elections on a proportional representational basis.

However civil society groups in Lesotho and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) refused to legitimize the King's coup. The SADC issued an ultimatum to the King to dissolve the provisional council and to restore power to the BCP. The threat of economic sanctions by SADC forced the monarch to acquiesce to its demand. But Lesotho was again embroiled in political turmoil in 1998. The Lesotho Congress of Democrats (LCD), which had broken away from the BCP, won the majority of seats in the September 1998 election and was therefore constitutionally set to form a government. The BNP once again assembled its allies – the monarchy, the royalist party, MFP, and the security forces – to contest the electoral system. This led to mutinies in both the army and the police culminating in near anarchy in Lesotho. The LCD then appealed to the regional neighbours to intervene. SADC responded in a form of military intervention by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana, and managed to restore stability. This narrative leads us to ask this question: what fundamentally underlines the recurring political crisis? To answer this we need to look at the Lesotho state, to which we now turn.

The state as the cause of instability and legitimacy crisis:

At the heart of Lesotho's recurring political crisis is the status and nature of the state itself. Indeed the crises highlight the parochialism of the state, its monopoly over resource allocation and its place as a political community. In the absence of other avenues for accumulation of resources, the state with its monopoly over resource allocation has become a contested terrain for political elites; whoever controls the state

invariably monopolizes its resources. As a result, Lesotho's politics have been described as a zero-sum game (Hirschman, 1986; Hanlon, 1986; Southall and Petlane, 1993; Ajulu 2002; Southall, 2002, 2003b). When did it all begin? How has it unfolded?

The contours of the monopoly and exclusion of the modern Lesotho state emerged at the pre-independent period. As we have already encountered, the pre-independent constitution shifted the locus of sovereignty from the traditional leadership represented by the King to the people through the BNP government. This shift explains the political tension between Moshoeshe II, his supporters, and the BNP regime after the 1965 parliamentary elections; it continues to underline the political crisis in Lesotho.

The then BNP government filled the bureaucracy, the military, paramilitary, commercial and parastatal enterprises primarily with personnel from the ranks of the National Party in South Africa (Ajulu, 2002). Within the bureaucracy, the Chief Justice, Judges of the Appeal Court and the Electoral Officer were drawn from South Africa. The commissioned ranks in the army and the paramilitary structures were mostly South Africans. Until the early 1970s, the Lesotho National Development Corporation, which was set up largely with South African capital, recruited its personnel from the South African conglomerates, Anglo American and Rembrandt (Hanlon, 1986). These skewed recruitments were calculated to exclude the educated and commercial elite of BCP from the bureaucracy and to deny them participation in the economy. Relying on external personnel provided a temporary space for the regime to train its own cadres who eventually filled up the bureaucracy and the security apparatuses of the state.

By controlling the state, the BNP had monopoly over all institutions and affairs of the state. This monopoly explained the reluctance of the BNP to transfer power to the rival political party, the BCP, after it had won the majority of seats in the 1970 parliamentary elections. The BNP government used its monopoly over the legitimate means of violence – the army – to exclude the BCP from the political arena. This move in turn militarized the BCP, which waged a military campaign of resistance from exile in South Africa against the Lesotho government. The totalizing basis of the state was unaltered when the

military ousted the civilian BNP government in 1986. The military ruled the country until 1993 when the combined effects of the democratic transformations in South Africa and the democratic wave across the continent emboldened the oppressed social forces to demand a democratic social order. However the advent of liberal democracy did not alter the character of the state. The elites' struggle for the state has rather intensified because the state remains the primary avenue of accumulation. This leads us to the problem-solving approach to the Lesotho crisis. We will show that this approach cannot solve the legitimacy crisis.

Inadequacy of the problem-solving approach to Lesotho's crisis:

The regional power brokers, particularly the regional hegemon, South Africa, rationalize the Lesotho political crisis as essentially an electoral problem: the opposition parties, like the BNP, complained about the electoral system, the First Past the Post (FPTP), which denied them any significant representation in the Parliament. The September 1998 SADC intervention, which was an exercise to restore the sovereignty of the Lesotho state, afforded the regional actors the opportunity to fix the electoral problem and to restructure the security institutions. A mixed representational system which was partly FPTP and partly Proportional Representation (PR) was devised. This formula was used in the 2000 parliamentary elections which secured a significant number of seats for the opposition in Parliament.

Turning to security, the government, with the consent of SADC, restructured the state's security because of the continued loyalty of the army and the police to the opposition parties and the monarchy. How was it done? Members of the army and the police who mutinied in 1998 were prosecuted and imprisoned while others were retrenched from the army and the police force (Ambrose, 2000; Southall, 2003b). The government appointed new heads for the police and the Intelligence Service, and an elite unit, ostensibly loyal to the regime, was established within the army.

But these ritualized responses do not address the fundamental socio-political and economic issues confronting the Lesotho state. As Rok Ajulu (2002) has pointed out, electoral engineering does not remove the perennial struggle for the state and its resources. The opposition politicians would not necessarily resign themselves to the paltry benefits that membership in parliament brings. For Ajulu, the escalating conflict in the 1990s was due to the contraction of the economy and the lack of alternative means of accumulation. Furthermore – and this is important – the problem-solving method only focuses on the interest of political elites and on state security. These diverge from the interest and security of the marginalized population.

A critical observation of the restructuring of security also shows a pattern of continuity: the security system has been re-politicized which lays the foundation for the totalizing character of the state. Meanwhile, the sense of alienation that people feel toward the state runs deep because they are still not fully part of the political process. A survey conducted by the South Africa based Human Sciences Research Council and the Institute of Southern African Studies of the University of Lesotho revealed growing public disaffection with the political process. It showed that only 22% of respondents indicated they were satisfied with the general political situation in Lesotho and 58% reported they were dissatisfied. While 19% expressed trust for political parties, 64% were distrustful of them (Rule and Mapetla, 2000). This sense of alienation is a fodder for instability.

The Democratic Republic of Congo

The state is like the telephone in Zaire. It exists but does not work
(Kabamba, 1995:53)

It was shown in Chapter Three that the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo at a stage assumed a regional dimension. At the height of the conflict, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe favoured a militarist solution to the crisis; so, they intervened on the side of

the government while South Africa along with Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania preferred a diplomatic option (Bischoff, 2006:160). Therefore, the DRC conflict has had a negative effect on regional cohesion. Significantly, the conflict in the DRC has generated a lot of interest and work in the academic field. However, most of it focuses on the war economy and the role of actors like warlords, states and multinational corporations (Nzongolo-Ntaliya, 1987; *The Executive International Review*, 1997; *The Monitor*, May 24, 1997; *Sunday Monitor*, April 6, 1997; *New Vision*, April 2, 1999; Madgen, 2000; Naidoo, 2003). These narratives are replete with the wanton plunder of the resources of the state such as diamonds, gold, tin and copper. By contrast, scant attention has been paid to the practices of state sovereignty. The civil conflict is primarily the consequences of minority groups excluded from participating in the socio-political and economic affairs of the state. To understand the present conflict, we need to revisit the colonial past.⁵⁶

Sovereignty and Boundary Construction: Rationalizing the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

The drawing of boundaries is central to the idea of sovereignty, essentially because sovereignty derives its essence or force in a bounded space. It enables the “sovereign” to exercise legitimate authority over the affairs of a recognized boundary which is called the state. A recognized boundary also provides the state with international legal personality which guarantees its territorial inviolability (Vale, 2003:38). As a function of sovereignty, boundary construction further fosters binaries like inside/outside, citizen/alien and domestic/foreign. These binaries are very important because they help us to understand the Congolese crisis.

The colonial system in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, was, as in other colonies in the rest of Africa, based on domination and marginalization. The dual administrative structures – commonly called the “*Dual Mandate*” – produced the civic and the customary states. The government of the civic state rested on liberal laws with

⁵⁶ We draw extensively on Mamdani (2002), for the colonial account.

citizenship rights and obligations. These rights were restricted to the expatriate white communities, and the indigenous populations were classified as non-citizens (Mamdani, 2001). Civil identity in the central state was thus racialized.

The customary state was the tribal political administrative unit – the Native Authority. Each tribe or ethnic group had its own native authority administered through the customary laws and practices of the tribe. As a result, a myriad of Native Authorities, what Mamdani (2001:4) labeled a “federation of Bantustans”, dotted the rural landscape of Congo: here the tribe formed the basis of identity, and only autochthonous groups could have their own Native Authority. As was the practice in all other colonies, the traditional leadership in colonial Zaire had wide ranging powers and responsibilities: the power to confirm ethnic belonging, issue identity cards, oversee administration, allocate land and preside over traditional courts (Mamdani, 2001).

The groups that came to be doubly marginalized were the Banyarwandas, who were originally from Rwanda. They were neither citizens of the central state nor the customary state. Their ancestors migrated to Zaire after the colonial boundary had been set in 1885. The first batch came as migrant workers in 1936 and the second as refugees – mainly Tutsis – arrived in 1959 after the Rwandan social revolution⁵⁷. The Banyarwandas settled in the eastern province of Zaire (DRC). So, they were regarded as non-citizens and passed on this status to their descendants. Although the civic state was deracialized at the end of colonialism, the post-colonial state did not de-ethnicise the tribal state. Citizenship continued to be tied to the tribe. As a result the minority groups have been systematically marginalized from the affairs of the state since the colonial days. These examples show the extent of their marginal status:

⁵⁷ It was a Hutu revolt, encouraged by the Belgian colonial authority, against Tutsi monarchical rule. It led to the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy. As a result, more than 160,000 Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries including the Congo (see US Dept of State, Bureau of African Affairs, April 2006; see also <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/tqn/286/.html>).

- As non-indigenes they cannot establish their own Native Authorities at the provincial and local levels. So, they do not have the administrative capacity to meet their collective needs and aspirations (Wassenroot, 1998).
- They cannot own land which is a vital economic resource particularly in the rural areas; they can only rent it from tribal chiefs. As a result the land has become an exploitative and manipulative tool by which the traditional leaders control the non-indigenous and marginalized minority groups.
- They are denied the right to be represented by their own members in the provincial assembly.
- They pay tribute to the tribal leaders because of their subordinate status.

Socially, the Hutus among the Banyarwandas are more integrated into the Congolese society than the Tutsis – the Banyamulenges.⁵⁸ The Hutus have their own Native Authorities in some areas.

The social conditions of the Tutsis worsened because of their associations with the Tutsi-dominated rebel movement – the Rwandan Patriotic Front⁵⁹ (RPF) – and later with the Tutsi dominated government in Rwanda. Tutsi youths crossed the border with Uganda to join the rebel movement. The Mobutu regime used this as proof that the Banyamulenges were not Zaireans during a national identification campaign in the Kivu province of the country.⁶⁰

Fearing retribution from a Tutsi-led government, after the Rwandan genocide, about 2 million Hutus fled the country to the eastern province of the DRC where most

⁵⁸ The Tutsis identify themselves as Banyamulenge; Mulenge was their original place of settlement in Congo. Some analysts have suggested that the change of name from Banyarwanda to Banyamulenge was an attempt to shift the locus of citizenship from place of origin to one based on residence. Others, especially indigenous Congolese, argue that the change of name was a ploy to conceal their Rwandan identity.

⁵⁹ The RPF was founded by Rwandan exiles – mainly Tutsis – in Uganda in 1990. It blamed the Hutu-led government for failing to democratize and to resolve the issue of the 500,000 Tutsis refugees living in the diaspora. The RPF took control of the country in July 1994, after the Rwandan genocide (see *ibid.*)

⁶⁰ The national identification campaign resulted in a citizenship law of 1992. This law abrogated a previous law in 1972 which redrew the Congolese identity boundary to include the Rwandan migrant population that had settled in the Congo between 1936-1959 -- this did not change their social, economic and political conditions (see Wassenroot, 1998).

Banyamulenges – the Rwandan Tutsis – are located. Among the refugees were armed Hutu militias, the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR); most of the members of this group took part in the 1994 genocide (*New Statesman*, 8 May, 2006, p.27). These teamed up with the Congolese army to pillage and kill Tutsis.

Reaction to marginality:

The Banyarwandas, especially the Tutsi faction, have resisted marginalization since the colonial period. The Tutsis periodically rioted and protested against majority domination and exploitation, demanding, for instance, the right to establish their own Native Authorities, and the right to own land. This resistance continues in a post-colonial Congolese state. In 1987, the Tutsis in Kivu province boycotted the provincial elections and smashed ballot boxes for being excluded from contesting for provincial seats. The resistance of the Banyamulenges to the Congolese state found its fullest expression, first in the rebellion led by Laurent Kabila in 1997, and later the armed resistance against the Kabila regime. Tutsis, especially the youth, joined the Kabila-led rebel movement in 1998 against the Mobutu regime. The Kabila government's reluctance to extend citizenship to them inevitably led to the second rebellion by the Banyamulenges.⁶¹ The Pretoria Agreement⁶² in 2002 brought into being a "Government of National Unity". However barely a year after the agreement, so-called renegade forces, largely Tutsis, took up arms against what they regarded as the state's neglect of their interest (*Mail and Guardian*, 11-17 June 2004, p. 15). Indeed the eastern Congo remains a militarized zone (*NewStatesman*, 8 May 2006, p.27), which reflects the aspiration of the Tutsis to be treated as citizens in a polity they have always known as home. Yet they have been systematically denied this right by the practice of sovereignty and its boundary making.

⁶¹ This resulted in Tutsi control of areas like Uvira, Bukavu and Goma. It also secured administrative positions for Tutsis in the provisional administration in South Kivu.

⁶² This was an agreement between the DRC and the Rwandan governments. It led to the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory and the dismantling of the Hutu militia, the Interahamwe in eastern Congo, see Security Council Press Release, SC/7479, August 2002 (un.org/news/docs/2002/SC7479.doc.htm).

Nigeria:

Politics in Nigeria has become characteristically that of exclusion, marginalization, disadvantages that, in turn, intensifies social cleavages and powerlessness (Ikelegbe, 2005:71).

Nigeria's national interest can be described in three concentric circles: its domestic interests, its interests in the affairs of its immediate neighbours and its interests in the region (*News Watch*, 1990; Vogt, 1991; Adisa, 1993; May, 1998). So Nigeria's interests are intertwined with the fortunes of the states in West Africa. Although Nigeria's activities in the region have not always been altruistic, it cannot be denied that Nigeria has shown considerable leadership and enthusiasm in efforts at regional co-operation, integration, development and security. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established largely through the initiative of Nigeria. In the formative years of the regional organization, Nigeria offered economic incentives and other forms of concessions to the smaller states (Bach, 1983 and Adisa, 1993). As was seen in Chapter Three, West Africa in contemporary times has become notorious for its political instability – protracted civil conflicts which suck in neighbouring states. Nigeria, on account of its relative economic strength, has provided logistical, financial and military support to bring a measure of stability to countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. The viability of ECOWAS itself depends on the continuous participation of Nigeria in its activities. This is explained by its market size, economic potential and contributions to ECOWAS. For example, Nigeria's gross national product is 34.2% more than the 14 Francophone states and 29.19% larger than the twenty other states in the region. It contributes 32.8% of the ECOWAS budget, which is larger than any other member state (Inegbedion, 1994:238).

However, Nigeria's ability to be a meaningful rallying point for regional cohesion, development, co-operation and integration is severely constrained by its own internal instability, identity, legitimacy and economic crises. When the civil crisis in Guinea

Bissau broke, the new military regime which had taken over from Abacha turned down a request to send troops into Guinea Bissau. The unstated reason was that the soldiers were needed to ensure the stability of the regime. In his election campaign in 1999, General Olusegun Obasanjo vowed to pull out Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone and to reduce the Nigerian army's involvement in peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in the region (Ero, 1999). Because of its internal problems the Nigerian state has attracted comments such as "*endgame in Nigeria*", "*Nigeria inside the dismal tunnel*", "*This house has fallen*", "*Midnight in Nigeria*", "*Nigeria: Rivers of Oil*", and "*Trails of Blood*" (Lewis, 1994; Joseph, 1999; Maier, 2000; Sklar and Whitaker, 1995). The internal insecurities and legitimacy crises are therefore set to draw the state more inward than outward. What accounts for the Nigerian political crises? Certainly, they are generated by practices of the state, its centralizing and exclusionary tendencies to which we now turn.

The totalizing Nigerian state:

The dominant image that emerges out of Nigerian polity is that of an expansive state which leaves little room for real autonomy of its constituent parts – the federating units. The irony in this assessment is that Nigeria is a federal state, and by the very definition of federalism Nigeria ought to be an embodiment of decentralized state. However, what it presents is centralized federalism. Perhaps these litanies of the state's monopolies will help show its totalizing nature. It has monopoly over taxation, natural resources, service delivery, granting of status of state, appointment of state and federal government officials, allocation of funds and resources to state and infrastructural development. The federal state also takes about 50% of the national income.

The state is not only monopolistic it is also exclusionary. This is why Nigeria, like other states in Africa, has been described as a patrimonial and rentier state (Adesina, 1994; Bayart et al., 1999; Watts, 2001; Maier, 2000; Jega, 2000; Wiwa, 2000; Ukiwo, 2003). In fact the parochialism of the state dates back to the colonial period. The colonial state catered for the interests of the elites in the dominant ethnic groups – the Yorubas, Ibos

and the Hausas-Fulani and their colonial counterparts (Adesina, 1994). Protests against colonial administration were carried out by civil society groups from below, like the working class, and marginalized groups (ibid.). The character of the federal state as an instrument of accumulation has sharpened in contemporary Nigeria, especially with the decline of cash crops as the major foreign exchange earner and the pre-eminence of oil as the leading foreign exchange generator from the 1970s. Oil accounts for 80% of the government total revenue, and 90% of foreign exchange (Watts, 2001). The federal state manages to maintain its patrimonial relations through the oil rents it collects from the multi-national petroleum corporations. Jimi Adesina (1994) argues that the state has used its power and monopoly over resources to produce a *petty bourgeoisie* noted not for their dexterity and industrial skills but for their profligate spending and waste.

Elite struggles for federal state power:

The federal state as the dominant avenue of accumulation is naturally a site of acute contestation by political elites who find themselves out of power. These struggles are efforts to regain control of the state which invariably degenerates into political violence (Ukiwo, 2003; Ebojowah, 2000; Mustapha, 2000 and Ilesanmi, 2001). The proliferation of militia groups, the rampant ethno-religious clashes and religious fundamentalism, especially Islamic fundamentalism in the North, have been explained as manifestations of elite “restlessness for the spoils and power of the state” (Ukiwo, 2003:131). The vulnerability of the ordinary members of these groups is obvious: dispossessed, neglected and alienated they become convenient targets for mobilization around elite interests. Ukona Ukiwo wrote of the distrust and disillusionment of the Nigerian public for national institutions and representatives:

The majority of Nigerians do not believe that their representatives are concerned with their problems or work for their interest – trust has diminished in the National Assembly, the electoral authorities and local

government... A growing majority believes the government is not effectively handling the problems of inequality and more than half think that the gap between rich and poor has worsened under the current regime (2003: 131).

So the elites organize militia groups for electoral and other political gains. The ethno-religious clashes are elite strategies to reclaim political power. For instance, Islamic Fundamentalism in the north typified by *sharia* law is regarded as a tool to make the current government unpopular (Ebojowah, 2000; Mustapha, 2000; Ilesanmi, 2000). A chieftain in the north conceded:

The whole crisis is just a way to discredit President Obasanjo so that his second term dream, if any, would be jeopardized (Okiwo, 2003:126).

A similar set of domination, marginalization and elite struggles takes place at the state level. The state – like the federal state – is a vital resource. Osaghae (2002) has suggested that acquiring a state gives minority groups greater bargaining potential in federal affairs. It also gives them direct access to resource allocation and political representation at the federal level. So, political elites from minority groups clamour for states to counter domination by majority ethnic groups. This explains the proliferation of states since the emergence of the Nigerian state. The number of states rose from 12 to 36 between 1967 and 1996 (Osaghae, 2002:225). States are created to appease minority groups. However, this has not solved the nationality problem in Nigeria, it has rather escalated the demand for statehood because each state created produces marginalized minority group/s.

It must be noted that the elites' struggle for power is not a rejection of the state; it rather affirms the attraction of the state. So where do we situate the forces opposed to the imperial and discriminatory practices of the modern Nigerian state? To answer this question it is apposite to revisit the civil drama being enacted in what Michael Watts (2001:191) labels the "Lilliputian" territory of the Niger Delta.

Countering marginalization – the conflict in the Niger-delta:

The microcosmic drama here captures the contradictions and tensions of the Nigerian state. It is a narrative in which oil plays a pivotal role. The oil resource of Nigeria is primarily located in this region. Michael Watts (2001) notes that oil as a resource of modernity has inherent contradictions. It produces material and social expectations and raises issues of redistribution and equity. For Watts, oil is also a source of social tension and violence because it yields enormous wealth and influence to powerful domestic social groups and their external counterparts while consigning the vulnerable, weak, poor and dispossessed to a life of misery, underdevelopment and poverty. This is true of Nigeria. The oil wealth is shared among elites of dominant ethnic groups, military elites, bureaucrats at the federal and state levels, the business elites and multi-national oil corporations (Adesina, 1994; Obi, 2002; Watts, 2001).

Over the past three decades about US\$30 billion of oil revenue from this tiny territory has flowed into state coffers (Osaghae, 2002; Watts, 2001). Yet the peoples in the Niger Delta have been systematically denied a reasonable share of the oil proceeds. In the midst of oil wealth, these people are wracked by misery and deprivation. The Niger Delta has been identified as one of the “most backward in the country” (Watts, 2001:195). Few homes in Ogoniland, which is part of the Niger Delta, have electricity, and there is one doctor for 100,000 people. It has the highest rate of child mortality in the country. There is an 85% unemployment rate and 80% of the population is illiterate (Government Commission Report cited in Watts, 2000:195). However, six of the nation’s oil fields and half of Nigeria’s oil refineries are situated here (ibid.).

Here is another paradox. The multi-national petro-chemical corporations in the Niger Delta have deployed modernity’s instrumental rationality to extract petroleum in great quantity and to produce wealth for themselves and their local counterparts. The high oil productivity and profits have been achieved at the expense of the biosphere. There are constant gas flares, oil spillage, and emission of non-ozone friendly gases such as carbon

dioxide and methane and pollutants such as petroleum hydrocarbon. The cumulative effects of these emissions have been the steady destruction of plant life, farming and the pollution of rivers (*Rainforest Action Network*, 1997). The compensatory mechanisms that have been put in place by the multinational corporations (MNCs) to mitigate the harmful consequences of petroleum extraction have been criticized as inadequate and belated.

It is within the context of these paradoxes that new forms of counter-social movements have emerged in the Delta region. These movements against the prevailing order in Nigeria have popular appeal (*TIME*, 22 May, 2006, p.23). The members are predominantly ordinary citizens at the margins of power and privilege. They include workers, students, trade unionists, leftist politicians, environmentalists, the unemployed, youth and teachers (Osaghae, 2002). They seek an egalitarian, democratic and just state. There are also militant groups like the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (*The Economist*, February 25-March 3, 2005, p. 44; *Mail and Guardian*, 23-29 September, 2005, p.15). In response, the Nigerian government maintains a constant military presence in this region. However this “fire brigade” measure has not stopped the violence and other forms of protest (Okiwo, 2003:128). The government fails to understand the fundamental cause of civil unrests – the sovereign state conundrum.

Côte d’Ivoire:

For a long time the Ivory Coast was almost unique in West Africa in that it was an island of peace, stability and relative prosperity... In time the issue of who was and who was not an Ivoirien became a political issue (Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS quoted in *Sunday Times*, February 9, 2003, p.34).

Côte d'Ivoire plays a crucial role in regionalism in West Africa. Migrants from the region make up a quarter of its population (Basset, 2003; Woods, 2003; *Refugees International*, 6 May, 2003). Its relative peace and prosperity attracted people from the region, especially migrant workers from the Sahelian countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. These were mostly agricultural labourers who worked in the sprawling cocoa and coffee plantations. Their remittance supported households and economies of the Sahelian states. The Sahel states relied on Côte d'Ivoire's port facilities for their imports and exports. Mali, for example, as a landlocked state, depends on Côte d'Ivoire for 70% of its imports and exports (*Refugees International*, 6 May, 2003). There was also a significant amount of informal trading activity between Côte d'Ivoire and her immediate neighbours. This is why the ongoing civil conflict in Côte d'Ivoire represents a setback for Côte d'Ivoire's economy and regionalism in West Africa. A large number of the migrant population fled the country because of the xenophobic wave which followed the civil war: it is estimated that 400,000 "foreigners" have left the country. This includes 200,000 Burkinabes, 48,000 Malians, 70,000 Guineans and 44,000 Liberians (*Refugees International*, 6 May, 2003). The desertion of agricultural labourers is a significant loss to the economies of Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The influx of returnees also puts a strain on social and other services of the Sahelian and other states in the region. Crucially, the civil conflict undermines regionalization: it has considerably disrupted flows of people and trade.

A number of studies on recent politics and developments in Côte d'Ivoire situate the civil crisis in the identity politics of the state (Loucou, 1996; Niangouran-Bouah, 1996; Crook, 1997; Pompey, 1999; Toure, 2000; Woods, 2003; Bassett, 2003; *Refugees International*, 6 May 2003; *Oxfam*, 30 May, 2003). We turn to examine how the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, constructs an identity that marginalizes others, which in turn leads to political crisis.

In 1995, the government used its legislative power to construct a national identity which excluded “internal others”– subaltern groups; these were denied citizenship through the policy of *Ivoirite*. President Bedie, the former president of Côte d’Ivoire, described *Ivoirite* as “an original and fecund synthesis between our traditions and modernity” (Loucou, 1996:23). *Ivoirite* was a mishmash of culture, development and realism. The state described *Ivoirite* as a mechanism to preserve Ivoirien culture against the homogenizing influence of globalization, to ensure the economic development of the country, and significantly to foster a sense of nationalism which is capable of defending the nation against its enemies. The enemies, as events unfolded, were the “foreign” population and the minority ethnic groups from the north of the country who were regarded as a threat to the socio-economic balance of the nation (Bassett, 2003:12).

This exclusive national identity contrasted markedly with the integrative policy of the previous government – Houphouët Boigny’s regime. The contrast shows that national identity construction only serves political ends. In 1990, Houphouët Boigny extended the franchise to foreigners. This shrewd political gesture induced the migrant population to vote overwhelmingly to secure Houphouët Boigny another term in power. His inclusive nationalism served other ends. He was able to build patrimonial relations across the ethnic divide. This is why his party, the Parti Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), reflected a regional balance. Alasane Ouattara, from the north, served as prime minister in Houphouët Boigny’s last government (Clapham, 1985; Woods, 2003).

So what were the real motives behind *Ivoirite*? Woods (2003) and Crook (1997) suggest that the death of Houphouët Boigny opened up cracks in the ruling PDCI. There was a rift between the elite from the majority Baoule ethnic group which had historically dominated the party – both Houphouët Boigny and Konan Bedie were Baoules – and those from other ethnic and regional groups especially from the north. The antagonism was primarily between Konan Bedie and Alasane Ouattara. The former succeeded Houphouët Boigny as the new president but saw the latter as a potential challenger. Crook (1997:225) suggests:

The division within the PDCI finally came to a head with the formation of a new party, the Rassemblement de republicains (RDR) composed of a splinter group of PDCI Deputies led by Djeny Kobina of the pro-Ouattara reformist faction... According to the Bedie camp, the RDR in origin was nothing but a northern regional party with a sinister “Muslim” agenda likely to tear the country apart.

The other reason was land. There was again a contrast between Houphouet-Boigny’s approach to the land question and that of his successor. Houphouet Boigny defined citizenship in productive terms. This was encapsulated in the slogan “land belongs to those who make it produce” (Chauveau and Leonard, 1996:184). The basis of the relationship between citizenship and land was cocoa production. The cocoa boom between 1970 and 1980 provided the incentive for acquisition of more land for cocoa cultivation. The regime itself needed an expanded rent from indirect and direct taxes on commodity exports to dispense patronage and to obtain revenue for development projects (Woods, 2003:646). With this intent, the government relaxed land laws such as customary laws on land to facilitate easy access to cultivable land. As a result, both indigenous populations and migrants benefited from the land liberalization policy. For example, migrants acquired their own pieces of land through purchase or by exchanging labour for land. In consequence, there was an increase in demand for land, which was exacerbated in the late 1980s by the poor returns on commodity exports. To maximize profit farmers sought to increase their yield by acquiring more land. Land, in the end, became acutely scarce which in turn generated inter-group tensions and conflicts. These conflicts were more prominent between southern majority ethnic groups on one hand and migrants and northern groups on the other. The suitable land for the cocoa crop is located in the south.

It was within these socio-political and economic contexts that *Ivoirite* evolved. The state, abusing its sovereignty, defined national identity and citizenship around ancestry and birth. New electoral laws stipulated that only those born in Côte d’Ivoire, and those whose parents were also born in the country, were eligible to vote and run for office. This

piece of legislation disenfranchised migrants and most northerners. Significantly, this redefinition of citizenship was a tool to exclude the northern political elites from the political process – to prevent them from gaining national political power. Alasane Ouattara, a northerner, was disqualified from contesting the presidency in 1995 because the government alleged that his father was a Burkinabe.

The military regime that had overthrown the previous administration of Konan Bedie reneged on its promise to review the national identity and citizenship question. The military junta ironically reinforced *Ivoirite* and disqualified Alasane Ouattara and others from the north from running for the presidency in 2000. The outcome of the presidential election -- won by Robert Guei, the head of the military government -- was contested by the opposition. The supporters of Laurent Gbagbo – the current president of Côte d’Ivoire – staged an uprising against the military regime. Robert Guei fled the country, which paved the way for Laurent Gbagbo’s party, Ivorien Popular Front (FPI) to become the governing party. However the FPI government like its predecessors, retained the policy of *Ivoirite* and insisted that Alasane Ouattara was non-Ivoirien, notwithstanding a court ruling that he was an Ivorien. It is interesting therefore to note that the state, in the form of successive administrations, practised the politics of exclusion.

The state’s exclusive construction of national identity and citizenship reverberated around the country; it intensified xenophobic sentiments and other forms of social tensions. Migrants and northerners (southerners lumped both migrants and northerners in the south as foreigners) clashed with southerners as the indigenous southern population reclaimed land from them. Northerners came to identify the exclusion of Alasane Ouattara and other northern elites from the public sphere as a symbol of their marginalization. The resulting social strife, tension and conflict led to an aborted coup in 2002 and to an effective split of the country into two – the north and the south. The north is controlled by rebels and the south by the government.

So, in Côte d’Ivoire, the state monopoly over national identity construction contracted its economic, political and social spaces. Groups that found themselves at the margins of

these boundaries contested their exclusion which ultimately threw this state -- once deemed as *oasis of peace*, stability and prosperity -- into civil chaos. The narrow definition of citizenship -- based on exclusivity -- actively promoted by the ruling elites, whom Bassett (2003:12) referred to as the “ideologues”, has produced violent wave of xenophobia and inter-ethnic clashes.

Liberia

“The love of liberty brought us here” (the motto of the Americo-Liberians, founders of the modern Liberian state).

The Americo-Liberian Hegemony (1847-1980):

Liberia has been through two civil wars in recent times -- 1989-1996 and 1998-2003 -- with destabilizing effects on states like Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire (Vogt, 1991; Adisa, 1993; May, 1998; Reno, 1998; *Human Rights Watch*, June 20, 2003). Fodeh Sankoh, who had fought in the Liberian Civil conflict, began a rebel movement in Sierra Leone in 1991 and mercenaries from Liberia and Sierra Leone have been fighting in Côte d’Ivoire (Human Rights Watch, 20 June, 2003). The crisis in Liberia shows a cycle of domination, marginality and resistance that has dogged the state since its inception in 1847 by freed slaves from the United States -- the Americo-Liberians. The state was founded -- as its motto suggests -- so that those who had been oppressed and deprived of the rights of citizenship in the United States because of their race would enjoy the benefits of liberty in their ancestral homeland, Africa (Liebenow, 1987). However, the state progressively denied others these rights.

Between 1847-1980 the state deployed its sovereignty to monopolize the political space and to establish a patrimonial structure which benefited Americo-Liberian elites, assimilated tribal elites and external counterparts -- the expatriate business community (Reno, 1998; Liebenow, 1987). President William Tubman (1944-1971) promulgated

industrial and land laws that benefited the privileged sections of society. He deregulated the economy and changed the land tenure system in the tribal areas from communal to freehold titles. This produced results which were comparable to those of apartheid South Africa. There were massive land acquisitions by local elites and foreign corporations for production of cash crops, rubber, iron ore and timber. Some local elites acquired estates of about 20,000 acres at a paltry fee of 50 cents per acre. Dispossessed of their land, some people in the rural communities provided labour for the industrial estates while others migrated to the urban areas to swell the ranks of the unemployed (Liebenow, 1987; Sawyer, 1992; Reno, 1998). By 1980, the 20 largest logging concessions were owned by Americo-Liberian families; 4% of the population owned more than 60% of the national wealth and 75% of state revenue was shared among the expatriate business community and the domestic elites (Sawyer, 1992:252).

The rise of resistance movements and demise of Americo-Liberian hegemony:

There were dissenting voices against the status quo during the Tolbert administration (1971-1980) from lower class Americo-Liberians, professionals, intellectuals, students and social movements (such as the Movement for Justice in Africa). These groups demanded alternative political spaces, social justice and equity. The immediate cause of the demise of Americo-Liberian political authority was the increase in the price of rice – the staple food in Liberia – in 1979. The price of rice rose to \$30 per bag, which represented a 50% increase, while the average worker earned only \$80 a month. There were riots, and civil society organizations organized public strikes and other forms of protest against the regime. It was in this state of social ferment that in 1980 a putsch organized by non-commissioned ranks of the army, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, brought the Americo-Liberian rule to an end. The extent of the alienation of society from the “Americo-Liberian state” was visibly expressed by the popular support for the coup in spite of its bloody character. President Tolbert and his cohorts were killed in what became distastefully known as the beach party (Liebenow, 1987; Dunn and Tarr, 1988). The indigenous Liberians regarded the end of the Americo-Liberian era as the beginning of Liberia’s independence.

Doe's authoritarian regime:

The emancipatory moment – of equality, justice, dialogue, and democracy – was fleeting. The actions of the “new state” were marked more by continuity than change: they reinforced the particularities of the state. The Doe regime, as its predecessor, monopolized the political process and maintained the old loyalties – the relationships between the state and special interest groups both local and external. Doe presided over an elaborate patrimonial network. He depended on foreign enterprises, investors, the state-owned enterprises and the bureaucracy to build his patronage and maintain regime stability. Between 1980 and 1985 employment through patronage in the public service increased by 300% and public service salaries in 1985 accounted for 74% of public expenditure, which was an increase from 55% in 1979 (Dunn and Tarr, 1988). Doe diverted about \$300 million, especially from state owned corporations, for patronage pay-offs and personal profits in the 1980s (Harding, 1988). Doe, his associates and unscrupulous business people struck commercial deals at the expense of the economy (Reno, 1998). The government further sub-contracted state functions like collection of taxes and provision of social services to private enterprises.

Between 1980-1984 the government maintained a ban on party politics while it discreetly laid the foundation for its own party. It also used this period to map out the ideological direction of the state, which was an affirmation of neo-liberalism and rejection of socialism (Liebenow, 1987). When the ban on politics was lifted in 1984, the government used its monopoly over state institutions to contest and win the presidential elections. The opposition rejected the results as electoral fraud.

Resistance:

As in the past, the challenge to the regime came from students, academics, the church, the press, opposition political party, lawyers and leftist elements of the army. The opposition

parties boycotted the Legislative Assembly. The most serious challenge to the regime's legitimacy emanated from the leftist elements of the military led by Thomas Quiwonkpa, who was one of the members of the 1980 coup. Quiwonkpa was removed from the government in 1983 and subsequently fled into exile because of differences between him and Doe. Quiwonkpa favoured fundamental restructuring of the state and a return to civilian rule. Following the widespread disenchantment with the 1985 elections, the radical element of the army led by Thomas Quiwonkpa staged an unsuccessful coup against the Doe regime. Quiwonkpa was gruesomely killed – his mutilated body was publicly displayed, and the regime unleashed a reign of terror against members of his Tribe – the Gios (Kassim, 2005:179).

Other challenges:

The US effective disengagement from the state, the withdrawal of major multinational corporations from the economy, and the end of IMF and World Bank financial support undermined the economic and security bases of the state. Between 1983-1989 major multinational corporations in the mining and agro-forestry sectors of the economy pulled out of the country because of corruption and chaotic tax and investment climate (Reno, 1998). The United States ended its official financial support for the regime when a US sponsored auditing of the finances of the regime unearthed massive corruption by state officials. This was worsened by the regime's failure to pay \$7 million in arrears of a military loan from Washington (Reno, 1998:88). The IMF, which had kept the regime solvent, declared Liberia ineligible to use the special drawing rights and other resources of the Fund on account of the state's failure to service the \$70 million interest on its \$900 million international debts (Liebenow, 1987:307).

The rise of Charles Taylor:

These socio-political and economic challenges of the state provided the basis for the emergence of Charles Taylor's rebel movement in 1989, which effectively plunged the

state into a protracted civil conflict. The multi-ethnic composition of his movement indicated the scale of the legitimacy crisis of Samuel Doe's regime. However, Charles Taylor's rebel movement and the other dissident groups were not genuine attempts to bring about fundamental change, they were rather elite struggles for the state and its resources. These examples reinforce this point:

- Most of the leaders of the rebel organizations were former ministers or political allies of Doe. Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, once served in Doe's cabinet. He embezzled state funds and fled to the U.S. Doe had him arrested and imprisoned in the U.S. but Taylor avoided extradition by escaping from prison (*New African*, July, 1991, pp. 22-3; *African Concord*, 24 February, 1992; *We Yone*, 22 February, 1992, p.3).
- Prince Yormi Johnson, a former Taylor adviser, broke away from Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to form a splinter group, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).
- There were further elite struggles within the NPFL culminating in the formation of the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Committee (NPFL-CRC).
- The United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), which represented the first serious armed opposition to the NPFL in 1992, was headed by Alhaji Kromah, a former deputy minister of information in Doe's cabinet.
- Elites of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), largely from the Krahn tribe of Samuel Doe, formed a coalition with ULIMO – AFL-ULIMO – to pursue a common strategy against Charles Taylor's NPFL. General Roosevelt Johnson, the leader of the AFL faction of the coalition, was a former AFL officer, and a partner to this coalition,
- George Boley, the leader of the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a Krahn, was once Doe's education minister and presidential secretary (*Inquirer*, 25 July, 1995).

William Reno has suggested that the original motive of Charles Taylor was to capture the state from Doe and try: "to assemble his own patronage network with resources from his position as the head of a sovereign state" (1998:92). Indeed all the rebel groups used their military power to establish commercial networks and alliances in their respective areas of

jurisdiction. This explains the formation and counter formation of rebel organizations. The rebel groups fought each other for control of resources with the state as the ultimate prize.

Elite resistance to Charles Taylor's presidency:

The first phase of the civil conflict between 1989-1996 was brought to an end by a combined effort of ECOWAS and the international community. Charles Taylor became the new president of Liberia following the 1997 national elections but the government, like Doe's, was authoritarian and corrupt. So, in 1998 Liberia relapsed into civil war, and the elite struggle for the state, its power and resources re-commenced. The old forces that had fought against Charles Taylor and his NPFL group resurfaced, this time to challenge his monopoly of state power. There were two major rebel groups: the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Development (LURD) was launched in 1998 and a splinter group of LURD, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) was formed in 2003. In 2003, the same forces external to Liberia such as the ECOWAS, the United States and the United Nations negotiated a peace settlement and a Transitional Government of National Unity which accommodated the warlords and other political elites was established; national elections were held leading to a formation of a new government headed by Ellen Sir-Leaf Johnson. Will this bring peace and stability? Time will tell. What is however certain is that the old Americo-Liberian motto, "the love of liberty brought us here", remains a mirage for the majority of Liberians. Their thirst for a political community based on democracy, dialogue, equity and justice may once again be stifled by the totalizing privileges of a "new sovereign state". Yet its fundamental transformation is crucial for lasting stability in both Liberia and West Africa.

To summarise, the main argument in this chapter is that the practice of state sovereignty is inherently dialectical and conflictual. It generates a cycle of domination, exclusion and resistance. This chapter has demonstrated this pattern through analyses of three historical periods: the colonial, immediate post-colonial and the present. It has shown that the bifurcated colonial administrative system excluded natives (Africans) from the rights and

privileges of the central state while the local state rested on the despotism and domination of traditional elites. The immediate post-colonial state was, in turn, dominated by the nationalist leaders. Turning to the present, the chapter debunked the notion of loss of sovereignty, by arguing that states have used their sovereignty, for instance, to enforce neo-liberal policies. The chapter further demonstrated, through case studies, that those in charge of state have deployed state sovereignty to construct identity and boundary, dominate the political process and monopolize resources. These tendencies and practices of sovereignty explain the instability and legitimacy crises underlying each of the historical periods. This brings us to these questions: How might we end the political instability and legitimacy crises that sovereignty fosters? Is it time to retrench the sovereign state? We will answer these and many other questions in Chapter Eight.

CHAPTER FIVE

Nationalism and the Prospects for a Post-National community

Nationality, or ... nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind. To understand them properly, we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being” (Benedict Anderson, 1996:4).

Transnational harm ... invites the question whether the differences between citizens and aliens are morally relevant distinctions (Andrew Linklater, 1997:335-6).

As pointed out in Chapter One, this chapter largely mirrors Andrew Linklater’s agenda for Critical Theory of International Relations. It takes a philosophical-normative, historical-sociological and practical direction in attempt to address the question of nationalism⁶³ and post-national community in the two regions. To do this, the chapter covers five broad items. First, it begins with underlying assump

⁶³ The concept “nationalism” has many definitions and purposes. Anthony Smith defines it as an ideological movement that supports a people’s desire to become an independent nation like other nations; see Griffiths, op cit. p.271. For Ernest Gellner, nationalism is primarily “a political doctrine, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”. For this see Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Ethnicity”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002) p.411. In the European or modern sense, nationalism refers to self-determination, which is the right of each nation to live or possess its own state. Other scholars like Lars-Erik Cederman prefer a historical taxonomy of nationalism: they identify three types of nationalism: state-framed nationalism, unification nationalism, and separatist nationalism. State-framed nationalism refers to the process of nation building after a state has been established. Usually such a state consists of many nations or ethnic groupings, such as the post-colonial state in Africa. So, nationalism is used by the ruling elites to change the locus of people’s primary allegiance and identity from the tribe or ethnic unit to the state. Unification nationalism is the reverse of state-framed nationalism: state formation follows a cultural nation, as in the cases of Germany and Italy. Separatist nationalism is the process where a cultural group or a nation in a state breaks away to form its own state, as in the case of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the east-European states from the Soviet Union. See Cederman op cit. What these definitions and concepts of nationalism have in common is that nationalism is intertwined with the state. This chapter conceptualizes

tions of the bounded community – the nation, and shows the contrast between the permissive character of the colonial state and the rise of exclusive nationalism – the drawing of boundaries between insiders/outsideers – in the immediate post-colonial state. The second item isolates the interests and agenda of actors behind nationalist practices and discourses in the two regions. The third focuses on the effects of exclusionary practices on individuals, states and inter-state relations. The fourth critiques the notions of the bounded community: it focuses on the philosophical-normative, sociological and other factors that challenge the nationalist practices in the two regions. Finally the chapter puts forward some suggestions for a post-national community and identifies social agents whose actions reveal an emerging regional citizenry.

The bounded community:

What constitutes the limit of the moral community? Is the moral boundary co-terminous with the state? Does the state have the moral obligation to extend its ethical commitments to outsiders? Or is there a universal moral code that transcends the particular state or culture? Addressing these questions, some philosophers and political theorists justify the contraction of the state's moral boundary. They believe that there is no such thing as a universal morality. For these thinkers, what are regarded as universal moral codes are in reality the values or social norms of a particular culture. For them, moral codes vary from culture to culture which make them incommensurable. So, there are no "moral universals" to justify the expansion of the state's moral community (Linklater, 1990: 140). Social contractarians⁶⁴ such as Pufendorf and Vattel, for their part, acknowledge the existence of universal morality. However, they regard it as "imperfect" and "indeterminate" because such universal moral obligation is not easy to define. Additionally, it is difficult to demand or enforce such duty outside the state. This leads them to conclude that only the state can "create the realm of perfect obligation"

nationalism as a state-framed ideology, a political project or a tool used by the elites to justify the contraction of the state's moral and ethical boundaries, what E.H. Carr calls "exclusive nationalism". For this expression see Carr (1945:23).

⁶⁴ Social contractarians are political theorists who defend principles justifying the contraction of the state's moral boundaries.

(ibid.:141). Supporting this view, Hegel asserted that the state is the only political association that is capable of “institutionalizing and concretizing ethical universals” (ibid). This Hegelian notion echoes the claim of sociologists and philosophers such as Durkheim and Rosenquet that universalistic ethics or the “ideal of humanity [are best] served within the confines of a particular state” (ibid.).

Other thinkers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Hegel, Rousseau, Rawls and Waltzer argued that the state is a bounded community whose members are united by common culture, practices, values, beliefs, experiences, institutions, history, goals and identity (Linklater, 1997; Brown, 2002b). For Walzer, this community has the right to exclude outsiders in order to maintain its distinct identity (see Linklater, 1997:324). For Rousseau the idea of a community is that members enjoy rights and privileges which are not extended to outsiders (ibid.) and for Rawls, this bounded community rests on a contractual arrangement (Brown, 2002b.:178). The governors and the governed bind themselves to contractual rights and obligations for societal order, progress and prosperity. So, for instance, members pay taxes in return for police protection and social welfare benefits. This cooperative arrangement for mutual benefit does not exist at the international level because the conditions for its existence are absent. So for Rawls, it will be unfair to extend rights and privileges of members in such a community to outsiders because they are not party to the contract. On this ground, the state is justified in contracting its moral boundary. State behaviour in both southern and West Africa mirrors this form of nationalism. The state constructs boundaries that discriminate against others – like immigrants or non-citizens. These are regarded as threats to state security, and the social and economic welfare of citizens. This nationalism with its binary us/them, self/other, national/foreigner and citizen/non-citizen is a deviation from the colonial experience. Yet, as we shall see, colonialism helped nurture it.

The “fragility” of colonial boundaries:

There was no rigid differentiation between nationals and foreigners in colonial times. The colonialists regarded their colonies as homogeneous entities, and the distinction was based on division of labour. In both French West Africa and southern Africa, the colonizers demarcated their territories into industrial and labour zones (Skinner and Shack, 1979; Cordell et al., 1996; Reitzes, 1997; Vale, 2001; Niemann, 2001). The French created a federation across their West African territories with its headquarters at Dakar, Senegal, and promoted mobility of labour from the peripheries – Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger and Mali – to the core centres – Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Although the British did not establish a federation in their West Africa territories, they, like the French, established common institutions. The West African Currency Board (WACB) administered a common monetary area. There was the West African Airline, and the West African Cocoa Control Board (WACCB) which was a cocoa marketing agency. Others were the West African Cocoa Research Institute, the West African Institute for Oil Palm Research, the West African Examination Council and the West African Council for Medical Research. The colonial government also encouraged inter-colonial migration for trade and labour (Aluko, 1976; Olukoshi, 2001).

In southern Africa too, the British discouraged industrialization in colonies such as Swaziland, Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Bechuanaland (now Botswana) in order to facilitate mobility of labour to the mines in South Africa. Indeed, there was no border control between South Africa and these states until 1963 because it was felt that they would eventually be incorporated into the Union of South Africa (Crush and Ocho, 2001:146; see also Spence, 1968). However, the nationalist leaders of these territories were not in favour of incorporation, particularly because of South Africa’s apartheid policies (Spence, 1968; Mekenye, 2000). The British also created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which comprised Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in 1953 (Adam, 1962). One of the reasons for this was the complementarities which existed among these colonies: Southern Rhodesia was the industrial hub, Northern Rhodesia was the major source of capital on

account of its copper, and Nyasaland specialized in producing primary commodities such as tobacco, tea and cotton (Adam, 1962:43). There were common institutions and services for justice, commerce and external trade, civil service, defense, foreign affairs, transport and development (ibid.: 47). The High Commission Territories – Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana – also had joint institutions; and prominent among these institutions was the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS).

As a result of the relative mobility of people across colonial boundaries in the two regions, there were sizeable numbers of immigrants in the colonies, especially in prosperous areas like Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa and South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia in southern Africa. Onwuka (1978:199), in reference to West Africa, suggested that,

under the colonial regimes there were free movement of elites within the territories administered by each power. Many Sierra Leonean and Ghanaian lawyers, teachers, and civil servants served in Nigeria – always a large employer of external manpower by virtue of its extensiveness and population. Similarly many Dahomeyans helped to form the cadres of the erstwhile capital of OAF (the French West African Federation), Dakar. Further afield fishermen settled freely on the Bights of Biafra and Benin whilst in the North, pastoralists crossed unimpeded the colonial frontiers of all three powers as did of course petty traders.

The same professional mobility existed in southern Africa. For instance, when Swaziland was under the British High Commission, Zulu professionals moved from the Natal province in South Africa to take up “civil service employment in Mbabane, the capital city, and the peripheral urban areas” (Shack, 1979:14).

However de-colonization, the formation of modern independent states in West and southern Africa, as elsewhere, raised national consciousness and identity to a level which distinguished, for example, a Ghanaian from a Nigerian; a Zambian from a Malawian,⁶⁵ and in recent times a South African from a Zimbabwean. So in Anglo-West Africa, the inter-colonial structures crumbled away under the weight of nationalism. The newly independent states established their own currencies, airlines and other services, notwithstanding President Kwame Nkrumah's advocacy for pan-Africanism. It is indeed ironic that today the British West African states – Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria – wish to re-establish a common currency. The French West Africa Federation also broke up (Fanon, 1967:126). However the Francophone states have maintained common monetary and fiscal institutions and services primarily because of France's hegemonic presence (Uche, 2001). Similar developments occurred in southern Africa: the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland with all its shared institutions fell away and Lesotho nationalized its university faculties in 1975.

The “quasi-legal enfranchisement” and feeling of belonging that immigrants or non-citizens had enjoyed in the colonial days came to an end in the post-colonial state (Shack, 1979:6). The new governments expelled non-citizens. Dahomeyans, Togolese and Nigerians were expelled from Côte d'Ivoire in 1958, and from Niger in 1964. Ghanaians were driven out of Sierra Leone and Guinea in 1967. Nigerians were ordered out of Cameroon in 1967 and from Zaire in 1971. In 1969, Ghana ordered over a million West Africans, mainly Nigerians, out of the country. Malawi forced out Asians and Nigeria expelled millions of West Africans, many of them Ghanaians, in 1983 (Challenor, 1979; Shack, 1979; Brydon, 1985; Grivil, 1985; Aluko, 1985). The Zulu professionals in Swaziland were on the “verge of being repatriated to their traditional homeland in Natal” (Shack, 1979:14), Sudanese were deported from Senegal, and Congo (Brazzaville) expelled Senegalese (Fanon, 1967:126). How did colonialism contribute to the emergence of this exclusive national consciousness?

⁶⁵ In southern Africa, for instance, most of the post-colonial states adopted the modern notion of “insiders” and “outsiders” by formulating immigration laws to restrict the entry and settlement of non-citizens. See Peek (1998:39).

The role of the colonial state in the promotion of exclusive national identity:

Benedict Anderson (1996) points out that colonial practices like the taking of a census, drawing of maps and building of museums unconsciously facilitated the production of national identity. In addition to its immediate purpose of determining the number of people to be taxed, conscripted for military service and for forced labour, census was also an instrument to identify and label members of a given colonial space. As a result, the colonial subject from the Gold Coast became a Gold Coaster and from Northern Rhodesia became a Northern Rhodesian. The colonialists built museums and drew maps to show the physical extent, resources, artifacts and historical heritage of the colonies. These objects were seen in textbooks, photographs, posters and on official seals, which helped create a national identity in the minds of the colonial subjects – especially the educated elites (Anderson, 1996:175). It was an identity that excluded both the colonialists and other non-nationals. So, census, museums and maps “dialectically engendered the grammar of nationalism that eventually arose to combat” the colonial state (Anderson, 1996:xiv).

Furthermore, the establishment of federations in the colonial period did not diminish the importance of the federating units in the eyes of the indigenous elites. The white civil servant had a significant degree of mobility. His career path spanned the metropolis and the various colonies, and he could easily move up the professional ladder. But the only avenue which was opened to the educated African elites – with the exception of the Dahomeyan civil servants – was his own national administrative unit. There was a marked absence of a cadre of local professionals from the various units of the French West Africa Federation at Dakar – the headquarters. This development therefore worked to segment national rather than regional identity.

The spirit of nationalism has not been dampened by efforts towards regional integration in the two regions. The Economic Community of West African States adopted a Free Movement of Persons Protocol in 1979 to allow citizens of member states to visit (without visa for 90 days), work or stay in any state: however, “barriers” to free movement “continue to exist” (Rene, 2004:20). After many false starts, SADC adopted a Draft Protocol of Free Movement of Persons at Gaborone, Botswana, on August 16, 2005.⁶⁶ However, only four countries – South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Mozambique – have signed the protocol, and nine states must sign the document in order for it to come into force. Botswana has refused to sign because the protocol clashes with its *national interest* (ibid.). The West African experience suggests that when the SADC protocol becomes operational it will not bring the nationalist tendencies of states to an end. This brings us to this question: why does this nationalist attitude, this wall that separates citizen from non-citizen, continue to exist in the two regions?

Benedict Anderson (1996:6) defines a nation as an “imagined community”. For him, apart from the “primordial villages”, all other larger communities are imagined because a member of any of these larger communities may never get to know or meet most of the other “fellow members” (ibid.) This interpretation of the nation is corroborated by Gertrude Stein in her emphatic declaration, in reference to nationalism, that there is “no there there” (cited in ibid.:5). For Anderson, the *emptiness* of nationalism is also in its “philosophical poverty and even incoherence”; it has not been able to produce any “grand thinkers” (ibid.:7). Despite this, it cannot be denied that nationalism has a political force. To understand this “we need to consider ... how they have come into historical being” (ibid.:4). Nationalism is always intertwined with interest. For Anderson (1996:158-9) nationalism is “*something emanating from the state and serving the interests of the state first and foremost*”; it is a “*conscious and self protective policy*”, an “*official doctrine*” (italics added). Since the state is based on particularistic interests, it is apposite to ask: what actors are responsible for the continuity of these realist/nationalist assumptions? What interests do these perspectives serve? And what are the consequences of this nationalist agenda? Empirical evidence shows that national actors behind

⁶⁶ See www.mmegi.bw/2005August/wednesday24/550386539239.

nationalism include policy-makers, bureaucrats, labour elites, legislators, the intellectual community, the media, small-scale commercial elites and security officials. Let us consider the nationalist agenda of this class.

Nationalism as a political tool:

Citizenship is a very powerful tool of the modern state. The state grants, withdraws or denies it to the members of the political community for a multiplicity of reasons. The importance of citizenship in the modern state should not be underestimated. It is a vital “resource” at the disposal of the member of the national community (Linklater, 1997: 323). It gives him/her social, political and economic rights such as the right to vote, to run for public office, to seek employment and to have social welfare benefits. Ruling elites in both southern and West Africa – as elsewhere – use nationality to exclude others such as political opponents, minority groups and immigrants from the political process. Here are some examples.

Successive governments in Côte d’Ivoire disenfranchised minority groups and long-established immigrant communities from the north of the country and their political representatives on the pretext that these groups were citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (Woods, 2003). As we saw in Chapter 4, the Banyamulenges in the Democratic Republic of Congo were disqualified from running for office in provincial elections because they were regarded as Tutsis from Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001). The ruling regime in Swaziland in 1973 disqualified Thomas Bhekindlela – a member of the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Council (NNLC) – who had won a seat in the legislative Assembly of Swaziland. He was subsequently deported because the ruling monarchical regime labeled him a South African (Kuper, 1978). In 1980, Alhaji Shugaba, the majority leader in the Bornu State House of Assembly in Nigeria, was declared an alien and deported because his father was born in Chad during the colonial period (Herbst, 2000).⁶⁷

⁶⁷ In the end Shugaba managed to reclaim citizenship through the court because his mother was a Nigerian.

In May 1996, the Parliament of Zambia adopted a new constitution which disqualified Kenneth Kaunda, the President of Zambia from 1964-1991, from running for President. The ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) said he was a foreigner. His parents were migrant Malawian missionaries who had settled in Northern Rhodesia in the 1920s! Kaunda himself was born in Zambia (Herbst, 2000). In the late 1950s the Convention Peoples' Party led by Kwame Nkrumah promulgated a Nationality Act that empowered the new government to deport a number of *strangers*. Most of those deported were the politically active Yorubas – originally from Nigeria. They were members of the opposition party – the United Party led by Dr Kofi Busia (Sudarkasa, 1979). It did not matter that most of the deportees had been born in Ghana (*ibid.*).

Elites' appropriation of nationalism for self-protection and political power:

Nationalism is a political weapon or alibi for the ruling elites and other political entrepreneurs. It is, as Anderson (1996:158) said, a “self protective policy” of the ruling elites. For the ruling elites, it gives them political security from the public; and for other political entrepreneurs, it is a strategy to win national support and to capture the state. In states where non-citizens are expelled or brutalized, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, the deportations invariably coincided with economic hardships. Although these economic problems are due to some endogenous and exogenous factors, non-citizens become the scapegoats because of their vulnerability – their *otherness*. The aliens bear the blame while the real causes, such as corruption, inefficiency and patrimonialism, are ignored. Margaret Peil gave this as the motive for the Ghanaian expulsion order:

The return of politics under the Busia government posed many of the same problems as the previous civilian government, but the stagnation of the economy produced an additional handicap; the government needed a scapegoat for its troubles... corruption reappeared and disaffection began to spread. The government hoped that it could silence its critics by blaming all the country's ills on its alien residents (1979:132).

Similarly Roger Gravil wrote of Nigeria:

Mismanagement and corruption, in debated proportion, had Nigeria in the grip of a major crisis. In short, the time was ripe to start looking for scapegoats. Aliens were said to be displacing Nigerians from anything up to 1.5 million jobs, while their departure preparations accounted for the chronic scarcity of goods in the country. Whether they stayed or went they were to blame for the sufferings of Nigerians (1985:535).

As was seen in Chapter 4, in Côte d'Ivoire years of excessive demand for land for cocoa production finally produced an acute shortage of unexploited land (Woods, 2003). The scarcity of land generated social unrest and clashes between indigenous groups, mainly from the south against settler communities, who were northerners and immigrants. To contain the social pressures and their political consequences, the ruling regime sided with the indigenous community by invoking *Ivoirite* – discussed in Chapter 4. Other political entrepreneurs like Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivoirien Popular Front (FPI), the current President of Côte d'Ivoire, exploited the crisis for their own political ends. Gbagbo, for example, adopted an anti foreign stance.

What about South Africa? Crime has emerged as one of the formidable challenges of the post apartheid state: criminal activities such as gunrunning, drug trafficking, rape and armed robbery are rife in South Africa. The government is often criticized by both the public and its political opponents for its inability to effectively control crime. But state organs such as the bureaucrats of the Home Affairs Ministry, the police and other “crime experts” put the blame for the high rate of crime in the country on the rising number of illegal immigrants (*Mail and Guardian*, July 9-15, 2004; Danso and McDonald, 2001).

The association of criminality with immigrants dissolves the complexity of crime and diverts the public attention away from the state's inability to deal effectively with the real causes of crime. This in turn fuels xenophobic sentiments. It is not being suggested that migrants are not involved in crime: some may because there are deviants in every social group, but it is problematic to see criminality hugely in terms of migration. Besides, the charge that illegal immigrants are a drain on state resources and that they constrain the state's capacity to provide social services deflects attention from the possible causes such as the state's "implementation of bad policy" (*Mail and Guardian*, June, 7-13, 1996).

South Africa has its own political entrepreneurs too. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in South Africa comes across as an anti-immigrant party. Dr Mangosothu Buthelezi, the leader of this party, is noted for his anti-foreign sentiments. He vowed "to kick aliens out and keep the jobs at home for South Africans" when he was the Home Affairs Minister (Danso and McDonald, 2001:132). The Minister's anti-foreign position was interpreted as a shrewd political move designed to ingratiate him with the electorate (Crush and Oucho, 2001).

Economic interests behind nationalist sentiments:

The other aspect of nationalism is economic, and is championed by interest groups such as the small-scale commercial class, political entrepreneurs and labour union elites. Most immigrants according to the liberal view tend to "self-select": they possess a strong sense of individualism. It is an entrepreneurial spirit that contributes to the human capital stock upon which national wealth depends (Hollifield, 2000:165). But this entrepreneurial character, this *rugged individualism*, comes into conflict with the interests of the local commercial or business class. Members of this class complain that "foreigners" either monopolize or compete with them for local business opportunities. Usually this grievance is not directed against the expatriate owned multi-national corporations but the small trading and manufacturing firms run by African and Asian immigrants because they are

the source of competition (Peil, 1979:131). So the state either passes Indigenization Laws to edge out these entrepreneurs or it issues expulsion orders.

The Ghana Business (Promotion) Act of 1970 made it difficult for non-citizen small-scale entrepreneurs to operate, and Nigeria passed similar laws in 1974 (Peil, 1979:131). It is interesting to note that when the expulsion order was issued in Ghana, much interest was focused on the Nigerian, Lebanese and Indian small traders and manufacturers. These formed the bulk of the immigrant entrepreneurial class. The Ghanaian businessmen thought “their greatest competition” came from these groups and so “they sought to change the balance in favour of themselves” (ibid:13). There are similar laws in place in Swaziland that officially bar migrants from engaging in small-scale entrepreneurial activities such as retail, fast food, and hair salon businesses, largely because of complaints from the indigenous commercial class. Swaziland has recently raised the investment capital for foreigners, and this will make it impossible for most small-scale non-citizens to establish businesses. In South Africa, those operating in the informal and micro-enterprise sectors such as the South African Hawkers Organization want the government to pass legislation that will exclude foreigners from operating in these sectors (Peek, 1998:30).

The indigenous commercial farmers in the south of Côte d’Ivoire supported the state’s nationalist policy. This class was threatened by competition from migrant farmers from the north of the country and from neighbouring states. Dwayne Woods (2001) suggested that migrant labour became scarce on indigenous commercial farmlands in the south. There was a scarcity of this type of labour because long established foreign labourers managed to purchase their own farms in the south, and new migrants preferred working on farms owned by migrants from the north owing to the religious and cultural bonds between them.

In Zimbabwe, the major beneficiaries of the expropriation of white commercial farms are the ruling elite and others close to the regime like the War Veterans. Seized commercial farms are often distributed among the ruling elites (Sachikonye, 2002 and Moore, 2001).

It must be conceded that there is an imperative for redistribution of land in Zimbabwe because of historical injustices; however the motive for the seizure of white commercial farms is increasingly due to the state's perception of the white citizens as *aliens*. Their attachment to the state is regarded as tenuous. Besides, the expropriation of land to correct historical injustice is skewed toward the commercial interests of the ruling elites. The black peasantry has not been the beneficiary; they are, to use the expression of Moore (2001:258) "under the suzerainty of these new lords" (the new black elite commercial farmers).

The discrimination against African migrant entrepreneurs is in contrast with the cordial relation between the domestic elites and transnational corporations. The reason is that the local elites are in lucrative business partnerships with the expatriate corporate class. Then again, the state's patrimonial activities depend on rents from these businesses. But the small scale African entrepreneur is dispensable because he/she is perceived as a political liability to the "*national interest*".

Of course, in South Africa industrial and commercial magnates and labour leaders influence the state to adopt a pro-immigrant policy. The South African mining industrialists are behind South Africa's long-standing bilateral labour agreements with neighbouring states like Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland (Crush, 2001; Crush and Tshitereke, 2001). South African commercial farmers successfully lobbied the government to grant them permission to hire seasonal foreign farm workers from Lesotho and Zimbabwe (Crush and Tshitereke, 2001). The mining elite and the commercial farmers prefer foreign labour because it is cheap. The leadership of the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) in South Africa played a key role in the extending of citizenship to immigrants, particularly foreign miners.⁶⁸ The South African government extended what was termed "amnesties" (Peberdy, 2001:20) or citizenship to some categories of immigrants. The first set of citizenships, in 1995, were granted to contract workers – miners – who had lived in the country for ten years (*ibid.*). The second, in 1996, were

⁶⁸ NUM has a high percentage of migrant membership; see Peek *op. cit.* p. 42. This may have driven the organization to support the extension of citizenship to foreign migrant miners.

extended to undocumented immigrants from SADC who had been in the country for more than five years, and the third in 2000 were granted to ex-Mozambican refugees who had migrated to South Africa before 1992.

Indeed the granting of citizenship to members of the immigrant mining community shows that the state recognizes their importance in the economy. It also represents a break with the apartheid regime whose exclusionary practices denied these groups the right to be integrated into South African society. However, the amnesties should not be interpreted as significant moves to end exclusive nationalism in South Africa: they rather served nationalistic ends. Michael Neocosmos (1999) contended that the granting of citizenship to foreign mine workers was informed by nationalist considerations. The leadership of the National Union of Mine Workers, the “social democratic ideologues” in the government and neo-liberals favoured the termination of the migrant labour system (Neocosmos, 1999:287). For instance, Guy Mhone, then the Labour Department’s Chief Director of Market Policy, remarked: “more generally the suggestion is that the migrant labour system needs to be phased out because of its negative economic and social consequences” (*Business Day*, December 24, 1996). So the immigrants were granted citizenship in order to facilitate the “South Africanization” or the “internalization of the migrant labour system” (Neocosmos, 1999:288). It was meant to “gradually scrap the migrant labour system” (*ibid.*:309).

For Sally Peberdy (2001:20) the amnesties were discriminatory because they were only given to a specific category of immigrants rather than to the entire immigrant population. Other critics pointed out that the amnesties only legitimized the *de facto* citizenship status of those immigrants – these immigrants were already *de facto* citizens of South Africa. (Crush and Oucho, 2001). We turn now to the role of bureaucrats, media, the intellectual community and the security apparatus in the nationalist project in the two regions. We begin with examples from the past.

The nationalist discourse:

These actors – the bureaucrats, media, the nationalist intellectual community, policy makers and the security officials serve the cause of nationalism through their anti-immigrant discourses. For them, non-citizens are threats to the state. They argue that non-citizens take jobs from citizens; they bring diseases and create squalid conditions. They are also responsible for criminal activities and unfairly compete with citizens for welfare benefits. This competition puts a strain on the state's ability to provide social services for its citizens (Reitzes, 1997; Crush and Oucho, 2001; Peberdy, 2001). These stereotypes are invariably used by the state to justify exclusion or expulsion of non-citizens.

To give some examples, immigrants were expelled from Ghana in 1969 on the assumption that they were largely responsible for crime, inflation, loss of jobs and the strain on social services. The state produced dubious statistics suggesting that almost all the nation's criminals were foreigners (Peil, 1979:137). The Minister of Internal Affairs and top officials in his ministry recommended the repatriation of West African nationals from Nigeria in 1983. The policy-makers believed:

Immigrants perpetuate illegal syndicate activities, which include smuggling of goods across borders, and commit such crimes as prostitution, destitution and vagrancy (Onwuka, 1978:200).

The media in Nigeria focused on the health risks of immigrants:

What proof have we in Nigeria that aliens that are daily flocking into the country are free from pests and diseases prevalent in their home ecological system? (*New Nigerian*, February 7, 1981).

In recent times the government of Côte d'Ivoire labeled immigrants as threats to state security. The foreigners were accused of supporting the rebels who control the north of

the country (*The Economist*, October 5, 2002, p.46-47). The Ivoirian government also blamed foreigners for the economic crisis of the state (*Oxfam*, 30 May, 2003). The same images exist in southern Africa.

Bureaucrats from the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and the nationalist intellectual community have much leverage over South Africa's immigration policy. As we have seen, South Africa has just signed the SADC Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. However the South African government had previously rejected the document. Why was such a decision made? Crush and Oucho, (2001:155) observed that,

the South African response to the SADC Protocol was completely driven by the strong anti-immigration discourse of the department of Home Affairs, its senior white bureaucrats and its expert consultants.

These actors argued that free movement would increase the flow of immigrants into South Africa which would undermine the job security of South African citizens.⁶⁹ Another concern was that adopting the protocol would put enormous strain on social services because it would legitimize the status of the millions of illegal aliens already in the country. They further argued that free movement would heighten xenophobic sentiments which could lead to violence and antagonism towards non-South Africans. The expert consultants, however, recommended the free movement of goods and capital. This is not surprising because neo-liberal regionalism favours South Africa because of its economic strength in the region. The Ministry of Home Affairs delivered the *coup de grâce*: it advised the government to strengthen its capacities and resources in policing its borders against aliens and to flush out illegal non-residents (Crush and Oucho, 2001). Of course this recommendation was informed by the assumption, shared by the Home Affairs bureaucrats, that,

⁶⁹ See the 1995 Human Science Research Council's Report on Immigration section VII.

most immigrants... are people who take away citizens' jobs, they are a health risk and that they overpopulate the country (DHA quoted in Crush and Oucho, 2001:148).⁷⁰

This belief is also shared by other political elites and the South African media. Parliamentarians from all the political parties in South Africa labeled illegal immigrants as a “threat to the *Reconstruction and Development Programme*” and a drain on South Africa’s resources. The politicians believed that the immigrants were potential criminals, drug smugglers and murderers (*Mail and Guardian*, June 7-13, 1996). The media in South Africa reproduced these stereotypes (Danso and McDonald 1999:132).

The same perceptions exist in both Botswana and Swaziland. The Botswana government has consistently rejected the “SADC Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons” on the ground that it will lead to an “influx of unskilled workers and economic refugees”.⁷¹ Botswana security officials think that free movement will “escalate the free flow of crime”.⁷² The police in Swaziland have the same view of immigrants, mainly Mozambicans. Richard Levine (1999:1073) reports that the Swazi police link the influx of Mozambicans in Swaziland “to an increase in armed crime” and that “a sizeable unofficial population of Mozambicans has gathered in urban areas; these Mozambicans, many of whom are highly skilled workers, are perceived as a threat to the jobs of Swazi urban residents”. We now turn to look at the effects of nationalism on individuals, states and inter-state relations in the two regions. We turn first to the individual.

⁷⁰ These views mirror the apartheid past. The non-citizens – the natives – were described in similar terms: “Influx Control”, which stood at the core of apartheid, regulated the “flow” of the indigenous population into the white populated urban areas in order to check the spread of diseases, the depression of wages and the decline of property (see Vale, 2003:103).

⁷¹ See www.mmegi.bw/2005August/Wednesday24/550386539239.

⁷² Ibid.

Effects of nationalist practices on individuals:

The immigrant or the non-citizen is normally referred to as alien. Margaret Peil (1979) notes that the term alien is pejorative: it is used to describe something or someone one does not know or like. As an enemy and a stranger, the alien is a convenient scapegoat for the wrongs or mishaps of the state and a victim of violence and other forms of injustice. He/she is also the enemy against which the state protects itself. The state, together with its bureaucrats, politicians, experts and media, beats the drum of nationalism, which in turn elicits hatred in the masses and security personnel towards non-citizens.

Niara Sudarkasa (1979:142) pointed out that the Ghanaian public supported the state's expulsion order in 1969:

According to newspaper reports, commentaries, letters to the editor, and editorials, the Ghanaian populace was of the opinion that the expulsion of the non-Ghanaians was long overdue. It does not seem an overstatement to say that the expulsion of the African "alien", toward whom virtually all the unleashed aggression was directed, was heralded as a panacea for the amelioration of the economic plight of the "ordinary Ghanaian citizen". The anti-alien sentiment in the country was at such a pitch that shops and market stalls were looted, many people were physically assaulted, and lives were threatened.

There were reports of torture, murder, robbery, extortion and harassment of immigrants by the Nigerian security forces and the public (*Time Magazine*, 14 February, 1983; *Newsweek*, 14 February, 1983; Aluko, 1985:542; Brydon, 1985:572). *Jeune Afrique* described the Nigerian expulsion order as "an act of barbarism unparalleled in the world" (quoted in Aluko, 1985:542). The policy of *Ivoirite* in Côte d'Ivoire generated a frightening xenophobic backlash. *Refugees International* reported that: "Ivoirien civilians

and military ... harassed, threatened and in a few instances killed those designated foreigners” (*Refugees International* 6 May, 2003; see also *The Economist*, October 5, 2002, p. 47).

In Zaire, (now DRC) the Mobuto regime deployed the state’s army and Rwandan Hutu rebels encamped in the eastern Congo to terrorize and kill the Banyamulenges who were accused of supporting the Rwandan backed rebels led by Laurent Kabila (Mamdani, 2001). Indeed, there is a deep-seated hatred for the Banyamulenges by other Congolese. This animosity is expressed by a former member of the Mai Mai militia: “I have never regretted killing a Tutsi, after what I saw they had done to our country”.⁷³

South Africa also has its tales of violence against non-citizens. The post apartheid construction of identity is indeed a departure from the racialized identity of the apartheid regime. The apartheid government defined identity in terms of race. In this racial identification the whites were the citizens, and blacks and other peoples of colour were non-citizens. The post apartheid state, however, has an inclusive definition of citizenship. This is captured in Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s “rainbow nation” which is a collective identity blind to colour, race, gender, religion and ethnicity. Yet there is some sense in which the new South Africa identity shows continuity with the past. The new identity, as in the past, excludes non-citizens especially from the southern African region and other parts of Africa. These are enemies which the state and its citizens must marshal resources and energies to combat.

In South Africa, the security apparatuses and the public are essential role players in the state’s fight against “unwanted foreigners” (Klotz, 2006:75). A South African White Paper on immigration advocated for community vigilance against so called undocumented immigrants – African immigrants. This public role is captured in Buthelezi’s introductory comments to the Bill: “I would hope that they [citizens] would know that it is in their interests to report [illegal immigrants]”⁷⁴. It is hardly surprising,

⁷³ See *New Statesman* 8 May 2006, p. 27.

⁷⁴ Website: www.csvr.org.za/papers/papriv/htm.

therefore, that there is an active anti-foreign sentiment, which sometimes degenerates into brutality against non-citizens. Peter Vale recounted a heart-rending episode: a group of South Africans, on a train returning from an unemployment meeting, threw one Mozambican out of a moving train, and two other migrants, Senegalese, sensing danger climbed onto the roof of the train where they were electrocuted (2003:85).

There were violent clashes in Rustenburg (South Africa) between Xhosas (native South Africans) and Shangaans (who originated from Mozambique). A number of Shangaan houses were burnt and the Xhosas demanded that the Shangaans should be evicted from the settlement and deported. This incident shows a fundamental attitude of the South African public toward foreigners, regardless of the length of time of co-existence. These Mozambicans had been integrated into the state through the amnesty of 2000. However, their citizenship has not removed the disdain and hatred that these *first citizens* have for seemingly *second citizens*. This behaviour has been nurtured by an elite discourse that characterizes non-citizens as enemies, criminals, and morally bankrupt. It is this ideology that gives licence to security personnel to set vicious dogs on Mozambican illegal immigrants. It explains the establishment of a camp, “Lindela” – run by a private enterprise – where undocumented immigrants are kept, sometimes for months, while awaiting deportation. It has been reported that some female members of the ANC (the ruling party in South Africa) have invested in this “deportation centre for illegal immigrants” (*Mail and Guardian*, vol.13, No.5, February 1997).⁷⁵

Effects of nationalism on states:

Andrew Linklater (1997:327) echoing E.H Carr recounted that European states in the 19th century deported non-citizens and sealed off their borders against immigration to create economic space for their citizens. This “economic nationalism” closed off the avenue by which the enterprising had escaped economic hardships in their countries (ibid.). The

⁷⁵ The establishment of a deportation camp is an imitation from western countries like the United Kingdom. The rights of people kept in these facilities are blatantly infringed upon.

states also, by deporting immigrants, exported “costs’ to their home states (ibid.:329). There are similar effects of nationalist practices on states in the two regions. The effects, however, are more pronounced in West Africa than southern Africa.

In 1958 and 1964 Dahomeyan civil servants were deported from Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) and Niger respectively. Dahomeyans had been recruited in great numbers by the French as civil servants in the French West African colonies such as Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal. Other Dahomeyans expelled were small-scale traders. However at independence these Dahomeyans were expelled to create opportunities for the Ivoirean citizens (Fanon, 1967:125). They returned home and became an economic burden on their state. Their government did not have the capacity to easily absorb them into the state institutions, and these returnees swelled the ranks of the unemployed, fueling social restlessness and political instability (Challenor, 1979:82-3).

The expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana coincided with the civil war in Nigeria, 1967-1970. It therefore put additional socio-economic and security strains on a nation at war. Similarly the Nigerian expulsion order of 1983 affected the economies of West African states whose nationals were deported. The oil wealth of Nigeria in the 1970s attracted great numbers of West African citizens – skilled and non-skilled labour (Onwuka, 1978; Gravil, 1985; Aluko, 1985 and Brydon, 1985). The remittances of these migrant workers boosted the economies of West African states, so the deportation adversely affected their economies. Also, the deported unemployed mass of people placed a tremendous burden on their governments. For example, between 0.9- 1.2 million Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria, at a time when Ghana was in a state of economic decline and faced with ecological disasters such as drought (Brydon, 1985:570).

The on-going civil crisis in Côte d’Ivoire has dislocated thousands of migrants, closed off the avenue of escape from economic hardships and heightened the economic burden in the Sahelian states. The flight of immigrants, about 400,000, meant the end of remittances to households and their contribution to the national economies. When Côte d’Ivoire closed its border at the height of the civil conflict, in 2002, the closure placed

additional strain on the economies of the landlocked states – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It cut off access to the ports at Côte d'Ivoire which the Sahelian states rely on for their imports and exports. Mali, for instance, relies on Côte d'Ivoire for 70% of its imports and exports (*Refugees International*, 6 May, 2003, see also Ngoupande, 2003:40). Like Ghana and Nigeria in the past, the Sahelian states are saddled with the task of reintegrating the returned citizens into their societies. Burkina Faso needed about \$32 million for its re-integrative programme: to provide schools, health services and jobs for the repatriated (*Integrated Regional Information Networks*, 28 July 2003). These states do not have the capacity to meet the social needs of both the existing population and returnees. This situation creates the opportunity for social discontent and instability

Within southern Africa, South Africa has more non-residents than the other states because of its sheer economic size. Migrants move away from economically depressed and politically risky areas such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, so when immigrants are deported from South Africa they pose major economic challenges to these states.⁷⁶ In 1995, 157,084 non-residents were deported from South Africa: 131,689 of this number were repatriated to Mozambique and 17,549 to Zimbabwe (Johnston and Simbine, 1998:156). In reaction to the spate of deportation of its nationals, the Zimbabwean government appealed to South Africa “to slow down the repatriation of illegal immigrants” (Reitzes, 1997:19). What are the effects of nationalistic practices on inter-state relations?

Nationalism and regional disharmony:

As was observed in Chapter 2, the policies of “exclusive nationalism” (Carr, 1945:23) and its consequences like deportation, “popular hatred” and violence toward non-nationals create antagonism between states (Linklater, 1997:327). This invariably has negative effects on regional cohesion and identity.

⁷⁶ Migrant incomes support households, especially in the rural communities. Also foreign migrants, both legal and illegal, tend to invest in small-scale businesses in their home countries. For further discussion of migrant contribution to the household and state economies in southern Africa, see Peek, *op. cit.* p.34-35; see also Neocosmos, *op. cit.*

So when the government of Ghana issued its expulsion order in 1969, some politicians from Nigeria read it as “a bad start for Ghana’s new administration and for Nigeria-Ghana relations” (*West Africa*, 1970:25). The expulsion coincided with the civil war in Nigeria.⁷⁷ The official perception in Nigeria was that Ghana was sympathetic to the cause of the secessionists – the Ibos – because Ibos were granted refugee status while the Yorubas and other ethnic groups from Nigeria were deported (*West Africa*, January 3, 1970, p.25; Aluko, 1976:225-226). Politicians, state officials and the media in Nigeria interpreted the order as a strategy by Ghana to prolong the conflict by distracting the Nigerian government’s attention from the war. There was, however, no robust criticism or calls for retaliation from Nigeria – understandably, because of the constraints of the civil war. But this reticence changed at the end of the civil conflict in 1970. The Nigerian media demanded retaliatory responses against Ghana and advised the government to make Ghana pay for the assets left by Nigerians in Ghana and to compensate those expelled (*West Africa*, January 3, 1970, p. 25 and Aluko, 1976:255).

There was already hostility and mutual suspicion between Ghana and Nigeria before the Nigerian mass expulsion order in 1983. The Nigerian government disliked the populist regime in Ghana, headed by Flight-Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings. There was the fear that the populism in Ghana could spread to Nigeria. The revolutionary government in Ghana, for its part, believed that the Nigerian government was searching for an opportunity to overthrow it. As a result, between 1981-1983, there were low-level reciprocal harassments, detentions and expulsion of each other’s nationals (Aluko, 1985:549). It was therefore not surprising that Rawlings accused the Nigerian government of using the expulsion to smuggle trained political exiles into Ghana to overthrow the regime (Gravil, 1985:528).

The magnitude of the expulsion caused consternation among regional governments in West Africa and sullied the image of Nigeria as a region builder (Aluko, 1985). It

⁷⁷ The people of eastern Nigeria, the Ibos, seceded from the federal state resulting in a civil war between 1967-1970.

shattered the sense of community and goodwill that ECOWAS represented. The heads of state of Mali and Gabon, who were scheduled to meet with the Nigerian Head of State, Shehu Shagari, on February 11-14 and February 18 in 1983 respectively, cancelled their visits. The Liberian President, Samuel Doe, denounced the expulsion order.

Critics predicted that the expulsion of migrants, mainly West Africans, from Nigeria would rekindle nationalist feelings across West Africa. For them, this would make it difficult for member states to reach a consensus on “right of residence and establishment” which was the next stage of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol scheduled for 1984. Aluko (1985) contended that one of the fall-outs of the Nigerian quit order was that it strengthened the Economic Community of the Francophone states – the Communauté Economique Afrique d’Occidentale (CEAO) and fragmented ECOWAS. Indeed this could be interpreted as a loss of faith in ECOWAS because of the nationalist action of its leading member, Nigeria.

More recently, the relationship between Côte d’Ivoire and her neighbours was strained by the xenophobic attacks on non-citizens in Côte d’Ivoire. The Senegalese President “complained that a Burkinabe in Côte d’Ivoire could expect worse treatment than a black man in Europe” (*The Economist*, October 5, 2002, p.47). Ivoirien citizens, incensed at this remark, trashed Senegalese shops and roughed up their owners (*ibid.*). Mali and Burkina Faso broke off relations with Côte d’Ivoire. Burkina Faso, for example, insisted that restoring relations between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire would hinge on an end to the ill treatment of her nationals. Côte d’Ivoire had accused Burkina Faso of supporting the rebel movement from the north and backing the unsuccessful coup against the regime (*The Economist*, September 28, 2002, p.46).

The question that needs to be asked is this: why would Burkina Faso sponsor or aid the rebels? The plausible answer is that the policy of *Ivoirite* disenfranchised Burkinabes resident in Côte d’Ivoire. The policy gave license to government-sponsored militia groups and other citizens to evict nationals from Burkina Faso and other states from their farms, to burn their houses and loot their property, to kill and subject them to other forms

of cruelty in the land their blood and sweat had made prosperous. We turn now to southern Africa.

The effects of white nationalism and supremacy during the apartheid period severely destabilized the southern African region. The apartheid regime's construction of identity was based on double exclusion. Apartheid was fashioned within the crucible of political realism. The apartheid regime was possessed by a siege mentality; the internal enemy (the black disenfranchised majority) and the external enemy (the states within the region and beyond) were perceived as threats to the existence of the state. The regime gave battle to both. It "herded" off the internal enemies into "Bantustans" – in line with its nationalist and racist ideology – and violently suppressed their resistance to exclusion. Its attitude towards the external enemy, the regional other, was manifested in its policy of "total onslaught" between 1970 and 1980 (Vale, 2001, 2003; Daniel and Vilane, 1986). The apartheid government sponsored rebel activities in states like Angola and Mozambique and carried out military attacks and raids against neighbouring states – Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique. Peter Vale (2001) estimates that about 1 million people were killed in the region because of the destabilizing activities. South Africa's narrow nationalism and the violence it engendered across the region served largely to elicit regional hostility toward her. Other states in the region known as the Frontline States, namely Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, supported the black liberation movement and played a pivotal role in the campaign against apartheid. Some of these states provided military bases for the liberation movements. SADCC⁷⁸ itself was the result of the hostility between the regional neighbours and the apartheid regime.

Although hostility towards South Africa has receded because of the demise of apartheid, there is a lingering fear, very much evident in writings of some Critical Theorists in the region, of a possible resurgence of hostility towards post-apartheid South Africa, especially from the region's people. The explanation is that post-apartheid South Africa seems to have settled into the realist mould of its predecessor. The new regime constructs

⁷⁸ It was however too fragile to resist the pull of South Africa's economic weight.

national identity on the old lines – this time shorn of its racial content – that does violence to and excludes internal and external others. Post-apartheid South Africa does not know how to build a community that puts the region's people at the centre and this leaves a sense of disappointment expressed in the thought of this Mozambican:

There are many Mozambicans there who went back for Mandela, so we could have freedom of access to South Africa. Now they are not considering this. We voted because they said that our situation would improve, but we are still being arrested. We want to know why. Our government should do something about it, because many Mozambicans are dying unknown. Many are killed when they try to cross the border. They should try to do something for us. A person goes there and is arrested right away, but we voted. Our votes have no value (quoted in Johnston and Simbine, 1998:164).

Certainly, as Maxine Reitzes (1997:3) has observed, “xenophobic witch hunts destabilize communities, and adversely affect South Africa's relations with “foreigners” countries of origin”. This brings us to consider these questions: is exclusive nationalism practiced in the two regions justified? Are the underpinning assumptions of bounded community justified? And, as a corollary, what are the sociological and other factors that challenge these?

The philosophical-normative challenges to the self-images of the state:

It is indeed appropriate to ask whether it is just for the state to deny citizenship rights to immigrants who, along with their descendants, have contributed immensely to the political and economic development of the state. In Côte d'Ivoire, foreign migrants since the colonial period have provided labour on the coffee and cocoa plantations. These cash crops continue to provide the bulk of the nation's wealth. Côte d'Ivoire emerged as the leading world producer of cocoa in the 1990s. Immigrant communities in Ghana, like the Yorubas (originally from Nigeria), participated in the struggle for independence by

associating with pre-independent political parties (Peil, 1979; Sudarkasa, 1979). In the economic sphere, Burkinabes and Malians worked on the cocoa farms, the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy in the 1960s, and on construction sites and provided labour for menial tasks.

Is there any justice in the Zambian state constructing a national identity which prevents the founder and former president of Zambia from running for president on the premise that his parents were non-citizens? Or is it morally right to exclude from the national community people who have known no other home than the state of their birth because their forebears came after the colonial boundary had been drawn, as in the case of Banyarwanda in the DRC? The states stand guilty on all these counts and many others.

Significantly, excluding others from the state's political and moral boundaries is an infringement on the natural rights of man which include the right to life, freedom of speech, movement, association, and the right to own property. These rights are God-given, inalienable, universal, and have "supra-positive validity" (Habermas, 1999:189). By virtue of their divine status, these innate rights transcend the sovereign state. Kant points to the universal dimension of human rights when he refers to them as the "single original" right which belongs to every man by virtue of his humanity (ibid.:192). These rights are inalienable, in the sense that if one crosses his/her national boundary into another country, he/she still bears these rights. So, for example, both citizens and aliens have the equal right to express themselves politically and engage in economic activities. As Habermas has intimated, natural rights have supra-positive validity because they take the form of declaration exemplified by the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* of the French Revolution of 1789. This declarative form suggests that the inalienable rights are not at the "disposal of legislators"; they transcend the laws of the state (ibid.:189).

Today, these rights are enshrined in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" of 1948, which states in both southern and West Africa, and elsewhere, have ratified and embodied in their constitutions – the "Bill of Rights". As a result, the states are

juridically and morally bound to extend these rights to outsiders. The states therefore violate these rights when non-citizens are deported, brutalized, harassed, deprived of their earnings and property, held in detention camps without trial, and denied the fundamental right to freedom of trade and occupation (Reitzes, 1997:23).

Jürgen Habermas has noted that a strict or broad interpretation of the basic liberal rights which are presently enjoyed only by citizens show that these rights have a universal application. According to Habermas, these rights are addressed to persons *qua* human beings (in their capacity as human beings). This implies that the recipients of these rights are not only the citizens; they include every member of the human race. What this teaches is that the “legal status of ... aliens ... resemble[s] that of citizens” (Habermas, 1999:190).

The nationalist argument that the state constitutes a community whose members mutually benefit from a contractual arrangement is a myth. This assumption rests on a false premise – a realist one – that the state is an asocial being catering for the interest of all its citizens. However, the resources of the state are actually harnessed to service the interests of the elites. This explains – as we have seen in both southern and West Africa – the instability and legitimacy crises of the state. The idea of community is further undermined by the fact that the state’s exclusionary practices are not only restricted to outsiders but also affect *internal others* like minority groups, women, “subordinate classes” and political opponents (Linklater, 1997:325).

Exponents of exclusive nationalism or social contractarians also claim that members of a political community share common values, culture, objectives, experiences and histories. They use this so-called common identity to justify the citizen/alien, national/foreigner, internal/external and self/other dichotomies. But as Andrew Linklater (1997) and others have observed, identity is not fixed or unalterable: rather its meaning is constantly redefined (see also Gellner, 1983; Wendt, 1994; Thompson, 1995; Anderson, 1996; Held, 1996; Held and McGrew, 2002). Groups and individuals in a state tend to have multiple identities and loyalties within and beyond the state: clan, ethnic, local, national,

religious, international or religious. These identities sometimes clash with one another: there are, for instance, surviving transnational networks of ethnic, socio-cultural, religious, historical and linguistic relationships between communities across national boundaries in the two regions (Young, 1988; Nieman, 2001; Vale, 2001).

At the global level, the effects of neo-liberal globalization, environmental disasters, conflicts, and the democratic deficit that overlays global institutions have created a nascent transnational citizenship which is united in their common vulnerabilities, and committed to the promotion of universal ethics. There is a growing realization by “national communities” that they can only secure their social and other rights by “working together” to demand justice and accountability from national and supra-national institutions (Linklater, 1997:337). As we shall see in Chapter Seven, there are alliances of civil society organizations in West and southern Africa devoted to this task.

As we have noted, the defenders of the principles of moral inclusion and exclusion claimed that there is no such thing as universal morality because cultures are incommensurable: they possess their own distinct customary morality. For them, what appears as universal moral code is nothing more than the values and interest of a particular culture. However, as Linklater has argued, cultures are in reality not impermeable: their boundaries are porous, they interact and shape each other. Linklater uses the existence of a “diplomatic culture” as an instance of universal moral code. This diplomatic practice, which originated from the cosmopolitan culture of modernity, has now been “grafted onto most cultural systems”. Indeed states in the international system have all in principle and practice accepted this culture.

Andrew Linklater further argues that there are aspects of universal morality within so-called closed societies with their customary morality (Linklater, 1990:141). Echoing Habermas, Linklater states that an integral part of social learning in the moral sphere “involves the extension of the circle of persons who enjoy equal rights” (ibid.:142). This moral community is based on reciprocal relationship: a mutual recognition and respect for the rights of others. As a result, socialized persons are equipped with a universal sense

of justice or moral obligation in which each person regards every other person as “one of us... [and that] each person should stand in and answer for a stranger” (Habermas, 1999:29). This rationalization in the moral sphere leads the door to others which have previously been shut, and invariably to collective or political action to remove all systematic forms of exclusions based on nationality, race, gender and class (Linklater, 1990:142). We shall see in the last section of this chapter how civil society groups solidarized with each other across national boundaries in defence of justice and equality.

On the basis of these arguments, Critical Theorists like Andrew Linklater assert that the state does not exhaust the boundary of moral and political obligation. It is morally and legally obliged to remove forms of exclusion that impinge on the equal rights of outsiders to achieve or promote their own ends. However, Linklater also recognizes that there are “inner circles of obligations” which are not co-extensive with the rest of human race (ibid.). The task is to strike a balance between the particular and the universal. The contraction of moral and political boundaries in the two regions also shows a poor understanding of the historical, political, ecological and economic factors that unite the regions. To these we now turn.

Economic interdependence:

There are interdependent relationships in both southern and West Africa. Indeed the migratory flows across the regions are responses to this interdependence (Amanor, 1995; Cordell et al., 1996; Niemann, 2001; Tonah, 2003; Vale, 2003). Cordell et al. (1996:23) observed – in the context of West Africa – that,

men and women who settled new lands in the pre-colonial era did so for many of the same reasons that people moved in the colonial and independence periods.

What informs this continuity is the fundamental unity that characterizes the region. One of the factors that underpin this common destiny is economic disparity or interdependence in the region. So in the pre-colonial period, itinerant Muslim traders from the north of West Africa – the Sahel – exchanged their wares – gold and salt – for commodities like cola, which was a highly sought-after stimulant, from traders in the south of West Africa – the forest region (Cordell, 1977; Lovejoy, 1980). These northern merchants founded settlements and established commercial communities along their trading routes and, in some cases, integrated into the local communities. These trade links have intensified in modern day West Africa (Meagher, 2003). The same historical commercial linkages existed in southern Africa. Söderbaum and Taylor (2001:678) point out that there has been a “migratory and trading tradition” since “ancient times” within the micro-regional space comprising eastern part of South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland.

Colonialism also contributed to the interdependent economic relations between states in the two regions. Put differently, it helped create a unified economic zone to meet the demands of the global economy. The French established Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal as the industrial hubs of French West Africa and turned the other colonies, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, into labour reserves. Labourers from these areas migrated to Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal – a phenomenon which has survived to the present – to work in the plantations and industrial centres. And, as in South Africa,⁷⁹ the French colonial government aided the commercial farmers and forestry companies to establish a recruitment agency, the Syndicat Interprofessionnel pour l’Acheminement de la Main d’Oeuvre (SIAMO) to facilitate the supply of labour to the economic hubs (Ouedraogo, 1976:99). Within the same period there were parallel labour flows from the Sahel, especially Malians and Burkinabes, to the Gold Coast (Ghana) to work in the Cocoa plantations and the gold mines. The relative economic prosperity of Ghana in the 1960s attracted Southern Nigerians to migrate to the country (Aluko, 1976).

⁷⁹ The South African Chamber of Mines set up the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) to recruit mine labour across southern Africa. For the history and work of TEBA, see Jonathan Crush, Alan Jeeves and David Yudelman, *South Africa’s Labour Empire: A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines* (Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 213-214.

There was, however, a reversal of fortunes in the 1970s because of the effects of the international economy. Nigeria emerged as an economic haven for immigrants in West Africa in the 1980s. Commodity prices dropped, while there were dramatic increases in the price of crude oil in the 1970s. The oil boom served as an elixir for the Nigerian economy which made Nigeria the dream destination of immigrants between 1970-1980. In contemporary times Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire can be said to be the industrially advanced states attracting immigrants from the poorer states, especially the Sahelian states (Ricca, 1990; World Bank, 1990; Shaw, 1990)

The picture was much the same in southern Africa. As was pointed out, the British established a federation comprising Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) to exploit the complementarities between them. Northern and Southern Rhodesia attracted migrants from Nyasaland and elsewhere (Omer-Cooper, 1994; Niemann, 2001). South Africa, however, was the primary industrial centre of the region. This was a deliberate policy by the British colonizers. They constructed core-peripheral zones in southern Africa. The British colonizers, like their French counterparts in West Africa, divided their colonies into two zones. South Africa was the industrial zone while Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana were labour areas. There has not been any significant change in the regional development pattern in contemporary times. This explains why there are continuous migratory flows from other states in the region to South Africa. South Africa mines have had an uninterrupted supply of foreign mine labour from the beginning of the 20th century. Ecology and climate present another dimension of the unity and interdependence in each of the two regions. How?

The bio-climatic interdependence:

In the past the incidence of famine and drought forced communities to move from one area to another unimpeded by border. They moved from an ecologically depressed area to an environmentally friendly one. This was possible because of variations in climatic and

ecological conditions in different parts of the region. For example, one of the reasons for the Mfecane – the pre-colonial migratory flows in southern Africa – was ecological pressure (see Omer-Cooper, 1994; Thompson, 1995; Reitzes, 1997; Niemann, 2001). Matsebula (2000:92) also recounts that before the boundary between Swaziland and South Africa was set Boer farmers from the Transvaal used to migrate during the winter period to parts of Swaziland where the weather was still favourable for grazing and farming purposes. People continue to move for similar reasons.⁸⁰

In West Africa, the Sahel – the area covering Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania – has been prone to drought conditions for centuries with varying degrees of intensity. There were recurrent droughts between the 1960s and the early 1970s in the Sahel (Bernardet, 1986; Frantz, 1990; de Bruijn and van Dijk, 1994; Tonah, 2003). There is currently a severe drought in Niger and other Sahelian states. This condition has over the centuries produced both seasonal and permanent – depending on the severity and duration of the ecological condition – migration of pastoralists, the Fulani or the Fulbes, from the Sahelian region to the savannah areas of West Africa, where there are better pastoral conditions.

However, the ordering of the region into nation states has severely constrained this freedom of mobility. So, in both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire migrant Fulanis or Fulbes are deported or denied entry for the sake of national interest (for a detailed discussion, see Amanor, 1995; Tonah, 2003). It should be reiterated that this nationalist attitude of the states mirrors a poor understanding of the region and represents a missed opportunity to search for an alternative collective management of ecological migration. Also the prominence given to national management of environmental conditions shows gross ignorance of the bio-climatic interdependence within regions. Debailleul et al., (1998:279) observe that in West Africa:

⁸⁰ Southern Africa like the Sahel experiences intermittent drought. For example, the drought in southern Africa in 1992, 1994 and 1995 drastically affected agricultural activities especially in the rural communities. This in turn compelled people to migrate to different areas within the region, see Peek op. cit. p. 20.

It is now widely recognized that the thick belt of humid forest surrounding the Gulf of Guinea returns a major portion of its rainforest back into the atmosphere, this water vapour may account for up to 30% of the rain that eventually falls in the drier areas further north.

What this suggests is that an integrative approach to the problem of bio-climatic and ecological problems is required in West Africa. The states in the forest region, for instance, have to protect their forest to reduce arid conditions in the Sahel. But will this ever happen when there is rampant rape of the forest for timber by states like Côte d'Ivoire? (Woods, 2003).

The quest for better living conditions:

The restriction of the economic product to the socially powerful and connected, so evident in both regions, coupled with gross mismanagement of national wealth, creates a disconnection between the people and rulers. This alienation is sometimes expressed through political dissent, which may be either violent or peaceful (Chazan and Rothchild, 1988). However, others choose to express their discontent by quietly slipping across the border to the other side to look for better living conditions. Herbst (2000) suggests that the regions that invariably bear the full brunt of the state's failure to fulfill its side of the social contract are the rural areas, especially the borderlands: the areas lying close to international borders. The state fails to meet the developmental needs of these areas and concentrates on the urban centres where the threat to state security and survival is considered immediate because of the mobilizational skills of urban elites. So in these "out-backs" people's association with the state is very nominal and tenuous. People interact more with the communities across their national border, for proximity and socio-economic reasons, than with their own government. This relationship is reinforced by the historical, linguistic, tribal, cultural, religious ties that transcend national boundaries (we will return to these communities in the next section).

Political instability and persecution induce people to seek alternative habitation. In pre-colonial times, people fled from the tyranny of political leadership in both West and southern Africa. In colonial times chiefs, kings, emirs, sultans and sheiks, along with their subjects, fled to other security zones in the face of colonial conquest. Today, political insecurity at home forces people to seek refuge in other national spaces. In southern Africa, at different times, Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Congolese and South Africans have had to flee from their home countries to other safe spaces within the region because of political persecution. Similarly, civil conflicts and political persecution have induced Liberians, Sierra Leoneans and Ivoriens to flee to security zones in West Africa.

Indeed the ordinary peoples in the two regions, as elsewhere, have been more appreciative of this interdependence than their political leaders. The reason is that they are directly affected by the disparities. That is why the borders cannot hold them back: the borders remain porous. These examples will suffice to carry this point: a Mozambican held in a detention camp for illegal immigrants in South Africa defiantly asserted in an interview:

Even though I am here now, I will get back. I will violate the border and pass, because I don't have the necessary documents (Johnston and Simbine, 1998:164).

Lynne Brydon (1985) reported that by July 1983 there were rumours that some Ghanaians were returning to Nigeria after the expulsion order. This report seems plausible in the light of the response given by a returnee when asked whether she would like to go back to Nigeria:

I would like to go back to buy some cloths and some other things to help me for my nubility ceremony. I won't be there longer than six months. I will go to sell palm wine again. I used to make a profit of 30 naira every day (Brydon, 1985:582).

Nigerians expelled from Ghana also defied the borders to return to Ghana (Peil, 1979). Fulani pastoralists find alternative clandestine routes to re-enter Ghanaian and Ivoirian spaces (Tonah, 2003). Why?

The migratory practice of the pastoralists, the Fulani, in West Africa reflects one of the coping strategies of pastoralists towards environmental change. It is borne out of local knowledge formed over time. For these nomads, environmental change is not only human induced but also biophysical, which man has no control over (Anderson and Grove, 1987; Fairhead and Leach, 1996 and Basset and Crummey, 2003). This environmental knowledge is set in marked contrast with modern discourse on environmental change and conservation which views environmental change, its degradation, as primarily man made. The modern environmental narrative explains drought and desertification as the consequence of human activities like bush burning, over-grazing, over-cultivation and over-population, cutting and hunting (Glantz, 1994 and UNEP, 1992). This discourse of “degradation” or “declension” informed colonial policies on the environment and its preservation (Basset and Crummey, 2003:8). It continues to guide African states’ environmental policies, which are predominantly framed by international organizations like the World Bank, the United Nations and its specialized agency on the environment, UNEP, and donor agencies.

Of course the modernist framing of environmental degradation serves to rationalize modern “scientific” conservation strategies. But these strategies have not always been salutary. The colonial regimes of the French, the British and the Belgians adopted conservation policies that established game reserves, national parks and forest reserves. However this was in the main a discreet strategy to deny colonial subjects access to natural resources in order to cater for the interest of the settler communities. Thus, in South Africa, the Native Land Act of 1913 consigned the majority African population to 13% of the land in the Union. There was systematic exclusion of Africans from the land from the 1890s in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (Ranger, 1999). In 1910, the Germans in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) adopted a forest conservation policy in response

to demands from the settler communities (Basset and Crummey, 2003:14). The French passed a conservation decree in 1923 and the Belgians adopted one in 1924 (Ibo, 1993).

The dishonesty of modern conservation practices – past and present – comes through starkly in the nature of modern mass production and its effects: the prodigious use of natural resources, the technological and scientific methods of production and their effects on the biosphere. Importantly, the dominance of the modernist view serves to discount the imperative to make use of time tested and honoured strategies embedded in local knowledge, which transcend narrow national boundaries.

This chapter has demonstrated that exclusive nationalism speaks to the interest of power – state managers. It undermines the bonds or inter-relationships that have existed from pre-colonial times in the regions, and creates antagonism among states. Indeed, the existing interdependence suggests that solutions to problems like unemployment, lack of opportunities and immigration cannot be found in exclusive nationalism. These are structural problems which require a collective response to bridge the inequalities between states in the region and the disparities in the global economy. So, how might we build a post-national community of humankind in the two regions? To put the question differently, how do we end the “connection between nation and state”? (Linklater, 1997:331). Let us look at these suggestions.

Building a post-national community:

Some scholars have suggested that given the centuries of socio-cultural, labour and economic interactions among peoples in the regions, it is right to shift the basis of citizenship from the nation, birth or ancestry to the place of work and residence. In other words there is the need to shift the basis of citizenship from the national to the regional level (see Laakso and Olukoshi, 2001).

It has been noted in this chapter that there have been cross border religious, labour, ethnic, trade or economic ties from the pre-modern times to the present in both southern

and West Africa. These transnational social intercourse remains outside the regional interstate system with its rigid boundaries. Focusing on these transnational communities in southern Africa, Vale (2001, 2003) intimates that a close examination of their modes of interaction may yield vital information for regional communities based on cosmopolitan principles. In pursuit of a broader project, he suggests that the task for International Relations scholars and archaeologists is to unearth the past in order to understand why there were overlapping sovereignties, why the borders were porous before the ordering of the region into distinct sovereign entities, and why the region “hung together” or constituted a “littoral zone” (Vale, 2006:12). Vale believes that this exercise can help to map out alternative ways of ordering the region.

Hannington Ochwada (2005:202), focusing at the continental level, draws attention to the pre-colonial interactions among different social systems through intermarriages, short and long distance trade and other forms of relations at the social and political levels. For him, the task of historians is to investigate how the communities co-operated with each other in their attempt to create regional citizenship and the constraints they faced. For Ochwada, the lessons and knowledge drawn from this historical enquiry can serve as a guide towards construction of post-national citizenship, a cosmopolitan order, based on shared social, economic and political spaces or activities (ibid.).

Other analysts like Maxine Reitzes (1997), believe that political community can be enlarged by striking a balance between nationalism and internationalism (see also Linklater, 1997; Carr, 1945). For Reitzes, the underlying principles of the Universal Rights of Man place a moral obligation on the state to recognize the alien’s right to live and engage in private economic activity in the state, while restricting social and welfare benefits to citizens. She argued that most non-citizens engage in private economic activities and do not depend on the state for welfare benefits. Empirical evidence supports this assertion. Research in South Africa has shown that African immigrants are “willing” to pay for basic services like water, health care and education (Danso and McDonald, 2001:125). Indeed most immigrants do not aspire to citizenship. Their central goal is to earn income in order to remit to their families or to engage in entrepreneurial activities in

their home countries. This explains why the number of immigrants who took up the citizenship offer between 1994-2000 was less than officially anticipated (Crush and Oucho 2001). For instance, most miners from Lesotho did not take up South African citizenship for two main reasons. First, they did not want to lose their Lesotho citizenship, and second, they are attracted to South African mines because they are avenues for accumulating funds that could be invested back home (Neocosmos, 1999:289). So most immigrants are in the “country on a temporary basis” (Danso and McDonald, 2001:125). Reitzes’s suggestion for what amounts to a balance between “the universal and the particular” resonates with the thoughts of Carr and Linklater (Linklater, 1990:141). For them, expanding moral and political boundaries does not mean the end of “national loyalties” or obligations; rather it will mark “the beginning of the end of the destructive phase of nationalism” (see Carr, 1945:67; Linklater, 1997:331).

Alternatively, micro-regional spaces could serve as foundations for constructing transnational communities. Some of such social spaces are the transnational cultural, ethnic and linguistic communities which straddle state frontiers: these are normally referred to as the border communities (Wa Thiong’o, 2005:162). They constitute a shared community and predate the modern post-colonial state. For these groups, the line of demarcation is of less significance than the long surviving and “inviolable” relations of kith and kin (Chumbow, 2005:183). So, these relationships remain “the invisible boundary underneath the visible national boundaries” (ibid.). In view of this fact, the existence of these shared communities, some analysts have suggested a transmutation or transformation of the boundary of “demarcation and separation” to “a line of contact and co-operation ... [or] a line of inclusion” (ibid:184, see also Asiwaju, 1984; Phiri, 1984).

These communities could therefore be mobilized for co-operative projects in areas like tourism, transport and communication, health, education, agriculture and fishery, trade, energy, environmental conservation and other small and medium scale enterprises. Of course, both ECOWAS and SADC have embraced the micro-regional co-operation concept. The ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993, chapter 58, provides for transboundary co-operation (Asiwaju, 2002). However only Mali has so far enshrined the concept in her

constitution. The Malian government periodically holds seminars on cross-border co-operation (Diarrah, 2002). It is difficult to implement the outcomes of such seminars because other states have not been committed to the trans-border concept. In southern Africa, the Spatial Development Initiative is a neo-liberal project (see Söderbaum and Taylor, 2001). It does not integrate people or communities across national boundaries because community projects are not an integral aspect of it.

The empowering of communities across national boundaries to engage in co-operative projects has a number of advantages. It will help speed up the process of integration and regional identity building. It will give a boost to this process because of its multiplying effects. Every state in the two regions shares boundaries with a number of states. Nigeria shares borders with five states – Niger, Chad, Benin, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Asiwaju, 2002:6-7). South Africa shares boundaries with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. So, people-centered co-operative networks across state boundaries throughout each region invariably add up to a large pool, uniting people and resources. It will therefore have the power to eventually shift the locus of identity from the state to the region.

Another advantage is that it could reduce the litany of resource and territorial conflicts that plague the two regions. Despite bilateral, multilateral agreements, commissions and institutions which have been set up in southern Africa for resource management, there are inter-state conflicts over common resources such as rivers and lakes. What explains this is the nationalist or mutually exclusive claim for resources (which are often utilized for the benefits of powerful social forces). So, there is a long-standing feud between Namibia and Botswana over the Sedudu⁸¹ and Situnga Islands (Swain, 2004; Swatuk and Vale, 1999; *Mail and Guardian*, 27 April, 1999). Botswana has challenged Namibia's plan to extract 20 million cubic metres of water per year from the Okavango River, which flows through Angola, Namibia and Botswana. Botswana regards this intention as inimical to

⁸¹ This island is in the Chobe River. There were threats of military actions from both Namibia and Botswana, however in 1996 the two countries agreed to submit the case to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The Court ruled in favour of Botswana. For a detailed account of conflict over water resources in southern Africa, see Ashok Swain, *Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East* (London/New York: Routledge, 2004).

its national security (Swain, 2004). There is a dispute between Namibia and South Africa over the Orange River, over its mineral deposits and grazing rights along its banks (*Mail and Guardian*, 27 April, 1999). Tension exists between Zimbabwe and Zambia over the Zambezi River⁸² because of Zimbabwe's plan to extract water from the Zambezi to its Matebeleland province. The Shire River has been a source of conflict between Malawi and Mozambique. Swaziland is engaged in a long-standing dispute with South Africa over territories in parts of Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces in South Africa which Swaziland claims were unlawfully incorporated into South Africa during the colonial period (Matsebula, 2000).

West Africa also has its share of resource and territorial disputes. There is a maritime border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula.⁸³ There are territorial conflicts, which are sometimes violent, between Nigeria and Chad, Nigeria and Benin, Ghana and Togo, Mali and Burkina Faso, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Mauritania, and Guinea and Sierra Leone (Olukoshi, 2001). This brings us to an important question: how can a post-national community be made real? We have asked this because the "state managers" – the political elites – are not the ones to be at the "forefront" of a post-nationalist project (Linklater, 1997: 332). They have a vested interest in perpetuating exclusive nationalism. So who can make a cosmopolitan society possible in the two regions?

Andrew Linklater (1997:335) following Carr suggests that "transnational harm" erodes the value of national citizenship. It dissolves the citizen/alien dichotomy. This harm includes the effects of economic globalization, actions of social forces, environmental

⁸² The Zambezi River basin covers the territories of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

⁸³ The peninsula is currently part of the Cameroonian territory. It is rich in fishery resources, oil and gas reserves. The dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the peninsula was subject to international arbitration. On October 2002 the International Court of Justice ruled that the peninsula was to remain under the jurisdiction of Cameroon. Nigeria has not accepted the verdict. In fact realist interest lies at the heart of this conflict. For Nigeria, the peninsula offers a gateway to the Gulf of Guinea (the West and central African Coast). It provides a passage to the Calabar port in eastern Nigeria and is a strategic point to carry out surveillance on naval activities in the Gulf of Guinea. For resource conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon, see Francis Ikome, *The Inviolability of Africa's Colonial Boundaries: Lessons from the Cameroon-Nigeria Border Conflict* (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004).

disasters and conflicts. The adverse social effects of neo-liberalism have induced members of states to constitute themselves into a global citizenry to combat these negative tendencies. Social groups across states have formed coalitions to demand the democratization of global institutions which are presently responsible for neo-liberal policies. Environmental disasters – such as pollution and drought – and conflicts that spill across national boundaries have brought national communities together to search for common solutions. Citizens further enlarge the boundaries of their national community whenever they solicit the support of members of other states or international courts of law to seek redress to state violation of their civil rights. For Linklater, “these approaches offer a vision of multiethnic, transnational democracy in which the members of different societies come together to secure their legal, political, social and cultural rights within local, national and supra-national political communities” (1997:337). These processes are taking place in southern and West Africa. Let us look at some examples.

Labour organizations and other social groups in Swaziland use external actors as one of their strategies for fighting violation of labour and other civil rights in the country. The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) has formed an alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Whenever the need arises, COSATU supports the SFTU in its negotiations with the Swazi government over labour and other issues. In March 1998 and November 2000, members of COSATU blocked the flow of goods and services across the South Africa-Swaziland borders in order to force the government to resume negotiations with the trade unions (Levine, 1999:1072; *Times of Swaziland*, December 1, 2000, p.1). In November 6, 2000, COSATU facilitated a meeting of Swaziland trade unions, political parties and other civil society organizations in Nelspruit, South Africa, because the Swazi government had disallowed this meeting in the country (*Times of Swaziland* November 6, 2000, p.1).

COSATU, along with “leftist elements in the Anti-Privatization Forum and the Jubilee Movement” in South Africa, also supported Zimbabweans in their struggle against

authoritarianism⁸⁴. The opposition party – the Movement for Democratic Change, the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and other civil society organizations complained about the “badly skewed playing field” before the March 2005 elections (ibid.). The government closed down the country’s only independent media, so the opposition could not have access to the media. The regime redrew constituency boundaries; this gerrymandering eliminated several opposition constituencies and marginalized others. The register of voters was inflated and the Electoral Commission was not an independent body.⁸⁵ In spite of these “realities”, the SADC Observer Mission, a representative body of the regions’ government, declared that it was satisfied with the conditions for elections. A COSATU delegation, in solidarity with the ZCTU, made several unsuccessful attempts to enter Zimbabwe to assess the conditions and to “strategize with ZCTU”.⁸⁶ The Zimbabwean government refused the delegation entry. The South African government, for its part, pressurized COSATU to drop its threats to blockade the South Africa-Zimbabwe border.

The government of Swaziland has had a ban on political parties since 1973. Political associations and human rights groups argue that the ban violates the civil liberties of Swazis which are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They presented their case to the African Court of Human Rights and the court subsequently ruled in their favour.

In West Africa, decades of civil conflicts and their effects on national communities have produced a strong sense of common destiny among civil society groups. The West African Civil Society Forum, which was formed in 2003, emerged from this awareness. The security concerns of the civil society groups go beyond the state-centric agenda of ECOWAS. The civil society organizations emphasize human security. These social groups believe that the causes of insecurity are poverty, exclusionary practices of the state – such as identity and citizenship laws, the absence of participatory democracy, neo-liberal economics and environmental problems (*International Alert*, December, 2003).

⁸⁴ See www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/article/art10218m/.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

So, the West Africa Civil Society Forum seeks a partnership with ECOWAS to find appropriate solutions to the security question (Rene, 2004). As will be seen in Chapter 7, civil society organizations in each of the two regions work together to counter neo-liberal policies and to demand social justice and accountability from regional and global institutions.

These accounts show the efforts of people in the two regions to expand the boundaries of their moral and political communities. They represent steps to end the ability of governments to use nationalism to “eliminate rivals in the competition for human loyalty” and to “create national communities” which are “deeply exclusionary when dealing with subaltern groups and aliens” (Linklater, 1997:337). Significantly, they point to an emerging regional citizenry which believes in a Kantian “cosmopolitical” order that puts a premium on the interests of people (Devetak, 2002:17).

To sum up, we have argued that although there was no rigid differentiation between insider/outsider, national/foreigner, citizen/alien in the colonial era, colonialism helped to nurture the rise of exclusive nationalism in a post-colonial dispensation through practices like census taking, museum building and map making. Drawing empirical evidence from the past to the present, the chapter demonstrated that exclusive nationalism is characteristically a statist and elitist project engineered to serve political and economic ends. This practice however has adverse effects on individuals, states and regional harmony and cohesion. Countering the arguments which justify exclusive nationalism or the contraction of moral and political boundaries, the chapter argued that it is indeed unjust and irrational to exclude subaltern groups and political opponents from the national community, especially because of their contribution to the development of the state. It further showed that the exclusion of the *other* violates the natural rights of man which are set out in the UN Convention on Human Rights and enshrined in national constitutions. Focusing on the social contract assumptions, this chapter emphasized that the state fails to honour its contractual obligations to all its citizens culminating in a legitimacy crisis. The notion of a bounded community suggests the existence of fixed identity. However individuals, as this chapter has pointed out, have multiple identities

and loyalties within and beyond the state. In contrast to the view that cultures have distinct moral codes which are incommensurable, the chapter argued that they are rather permeable and interactive. Furthermore, as a result of social learning in the moral sphere, socialized beings come to have a sense of universal moral justice and obligation which can culminate in political action to remove forms of exclusion based on nationality, class or gender. This explains why, as we have encountered, social forces across national boundaries solidarized with each other against injustice and inequality. Making a case for a post-national order, the chapter demonstrated that exclusive nationalism portrays a poor understanding of the extant interdependent relations in the regions. While arguing for cosmopolitan order, the chapter also acknowledged that there are other obligations of the state which are not co-extensive with the rest of humanity. So, the task is to strike a harmonious balance between national and cosmopolitan obligations. Dwelling on the prospect for a post-national order, the chapter suggested that elites or the state managers are not the ones to initiate it; the potential bearers of a cosmopolitan order are the regions' people. The Chapter also offered some practical suggestions for building such an order in the two regions. This order must create its own *lebensraum* because the regional order – as we will see in Chapter 6 – caters for the interests of states and other transnational social forces.

CHAPTER SIX

The Neo-Liberal Regionalist Agenda in West and Southern Africa: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective

There is something that could be called a nascent global historic bloc consisting of the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government, and the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate the ideology of globalization (Cox, 1999:12).

Philosophy confronts the existent, in its historical context with the claim of its conceptual principles in order to criticize the relation between the two and thus transcend them (Horkheimer, 1947:182).

The regional integrative or co-operative projects in both West and southern Africa are preponderantly statist, and informed largely by Realist and Liberal theories. Both are premised on liberal free trade principles, and have the European Union as the source of their inspiration. Of course a glance at their objectives reveals slogans such as “*solidarity and self-reliance*”, “*functional or sectoral co-operation*” and “*inter-state development*”— these emphasize mutual development. Interstate co-operation seeks to address the developmental needs of member states and so reduces asymmetrical economic relationships. Indeed there have been inter-state co-operative projects in areas such as transport, road construction and energy development, but the primary focus is on market integration, a neo-liberal integrative project.

Since its inception in 1975, neo-liberal regionalism or free trade has been the primary objective of ECOWAS (Asante, 1989, 1998; Shaw, 1989, 1990). Tim Shaw (1989:132) points out that “ECOWAS is essentially an orthodox common market with some development content ... it seeks free trade in goods and peoples”. The same is true for SADC. At the end of the last century, SADC turned away from Functionalism towards a market integrative approach through the adoption of a Free Trade Protocol in 1996, which was ratified in 2000 (Clapham et al., 2001; Gibb, 2002). This occurred in the face of rhetoric, by policy-makers and bureaucrats, of a mutual or Functional approach to integration, which had been the guiding light of SADCC (see von Rooyen, 1994). At the time of its formation, the member states, worried by their common vulnerability and economic dependence on apartheid South Africa as well as their own developmental needs- emphasized functional co-operation. They decided to collectively develop their transport, energy, agricultural and economic sectors- the object was to promote mutual benefit (see Davies and O’Meara, 1985; von Rooyen, 1994).

Today, as we have noted, neo-liberal regionalism seems to be the paradigm that underpins co-operation and integration in both West and southern Africa: within the two regions, the primary objective of regional integration revealed by both policy and practice is the facilitation of free trade, regional trade liberalization or market integration between member states (Okolo and Wright, 1990; Shaw, 1990; Tsie, 1996, 2001; Lavergne, 1997; Asante, 1998; Clapham et al., 2001; Hentz, 2001; Page and Bilal, 2001; Uche, 2001; Gibb, 2002).

Deploying neo-Gramscian assumptions, first discussed in Chapter Two, this chapter explains the fixation of neo-liberal regionalism in both regions and offers a critique of this free trade liberalism (this critique will set the scene for a discussion of activities of counter social forces in Chapter Seven). To achieve this, it draws on a Coxian framework for the analysis of historical structures. To reiterate: Robert Cox utilizes Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, its organizing principles, in his analysis of global productive structures or what he calls international political economy. Gramsci showed that the state or the ruling elites at the national level impose a governing ideology on society because

of the consent and support the state receives from civil society. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the Gramscian usage of civil society in this context differs from the modern conceptualization of the term. For Gramsci, civil society is part of the state; it provides support for the state, and legitimizes its ideology. In the contemporary interpretation however, civil society is commonly perceived as a private sphere – it is independent of the state and maintains a critical attitude towards it. In the Gramscian sense, however, members of civil society that support the state include the dominant class, the bureaucracy, the church, the education system, the intelligentsia, the press, the military elites and others. Their consent is derived from the material incentives they receive from the political system and they thus further the ideology of the state. The coercive arm of the state, its armed forces, is an aspect of its material capabilities. It is used to maintain order and punish dissenters.

Robert Cox's interpretation of historical structures reveals a fusion or living relationship between national, regional and international orders – at the core of these is a unifying hegemonic ideology. So he speaks, for example, of the state or the national order as part of a global hegemonic order (Mittelman, 1998). This has an ideology, institutions, global civil society or what Cox prefers to call the "*hazy nebuleuse*" and the material capabilities to both provide incentives and ensure peace for the smooth running of the global order (Mittelman, 1998:79). These will be discussed in turn.

The (neo-) liberal ideology:

Protagonists of the liberal order see the post-Cold War period as the "liberal moment" (Fukuyama, 1989). The world, states and societies are increasingly subjected to liberal logic – the imperative of private property, supremacy of the individual, the rule of law, human rights, individual freedom, representative democracy, the primacy of market forces, the retrenchment of the role of state in the economy and other liberal values. For liberals, liberalism is a legitimate ideology for universal progress, prosperity and peace. It is made natural through the assertion that it represents the "end of history" (Fukuyama,

1989). Barber (2003) captures these same dispositions in three senses: anarchical, realist and minimalist.

Following John Hobbes, liberals hold that the individual is innately a free and selfish being – so the propensity for self-gratification and self-interest leads him/her to antagonism against others. The resulting anarchy moves society to search for harmony and order. This comes from a collective will embodied in the Hobbesian or Lockean Sovereign – the State in modern times. The Sovereign or the State lays down the laws that protect and sanction the selfish individual. In this fashion, the sovereign or the state is the embodiment of power -- this is a realist response to anarchy. So the role of the state is not to blunt the freedom and selfishness of the individual, but rather to facilitate, through laws and sanctions, the conditions for a harmonious realization of individual selfish ends or self-enhancement, wealth and progress. However, this liberal/realist disposition to power does not mean an unqualified acceptance of it. The Hobbesian *Leviathan* – the state – is circumscribed by the Lockean distribution of power or balance of power. This guarantees the individual's freedom against sovereign or state *tyranny*, or the abuse of power. The liberal's innate desire for freedom makes him/her advocate less state intervention in the economic life of the society. State power should only be used to lay down laws, rules, sanctions and regulations to promote an individual quest for material wealth.

As a corollary, liberals from Adam Smith (1723-90) to Milton Friedman (1912- 2006) have argued that the individual's dexterity in the market place, motivated by self-interest, is responsible for the creation of national wealth (Gélinas, 2003). Smith, and others after him, asserted that the individual entrepreneur in pursuit of his/her selfish interest in the economic arena is guided by an *invisible hand* that fosters a congruence of individual and societal interests. This is evident in the principle of *trickle down* – the enterprising spirit of the individual creates jobs for those less endowed with entrepreneurial skills and fosters national wealth for redistribution (Manning, 1976). So for Liberals, economic activities must be in private hands. They are the creators of national wealth, according to the liberal doctrine. The state's only credible or useful role is to protect individual

freedom and private property. Liberals plainly deplore state intervention in the economy and sanction the self-regulatory mechanism of the market, based on the laws of supply and demand (Gélinas, 2003).

An essential feature of this liberal doctrine is the concept of free trade. Following David Ricardo (1772-1823), the father of free trade, liberals have argued that the removal of barriers to trade between states ensures global prosperity, growth, peace and harmony (Burchill, 1996; Gélinas, 2003). Ricardo's law of Comparative Advantage posits that a state should specialize in the production of goods in which it has relative advantage. These could be produced more efficiently and traded for goods which are less efficiently produced. Global economic exchange, according to Ricardo and his disciples, promotes cheap global commodity prices, prosperity and mutual benefits. Economic Liberals like Kant, Ricardo, Cobden, Brighton and Rosecrance espouse the belief that free trade (or economic interdependence) engenders peace between nations. Against these, protectionism, autarky or mercantilism, Kant and others argue, breed animosity and conflict. As nations remove trade barriers, nationalistic ambitions are abandoned for cosmopolitan ones because trade interlinkages and common interests place obligations on nations to maintain harmonious inter-state relations. Rosecrance (1996) shows the appeal of inter-state trade in contemporary times through the assertion that global trade and commerce have become more appealing and lucrative than territorial conquest, and that the "trading state" is more prosperous than the mercantilist state (ibid.:46).

Especially with the end of the Cold War, liberal ideology and the assumptions that underpin it have assumed hegemonic status and universal applicability: nationally, regionally and globally (Strange, 1996). The next section of the chapter discusses the social forces and institutions behind the neo-liberal regionalism in the two regions. It then critically examines the specific interest that this form of orthodox regionalism serves.

The historic bloc:

Following Gramsci, Cox asserts that the hegemonic order is brought into being through reconfiguration of social forces in production relations (see Mittelman 1998; Cox 1983, 1987). They provide support and lend legitimacy to the hegemonic order: the present neo-liberal global order has gained increased acceptability in both national and regional circles in Africa. The principles underlining this particular global order are propagated by a “nascent historic bloc” – to retrieve the Gramscian label – that is transnational in scope (Cox, 1999:12). The regional mode of production cannot be divorced from the global economic system – it is an integral part of it: a “subset of the world economy” (Biel, 2000: 275). Robert Cox argues that the historic bloc is both less and greater than the state because of its international dimension (1981).

It is apposite at this point to ask this question: Which forces facilitate the neo-liberal doctrine in West and southern Africa and elsewhere? These include the dominant states in global politics such as the United States, Britain, France, the European Union and the major states in the two regions. The latter, Tim Shaw opts to label “the sub-imperial states” (1990). Other forces are the transnational or multi-national corporations; their local partners; skilled workers or professionals and trade unions integrated into the global economy; multilateral institutions (both regional and global) and the bureaucrats who serve within them; non-governmental organizations; the media and the neo-liberal epistemic community, such as think-tanks – research institutes and policy analysis centers. We turn now to discuss these individually.

The regional inter-governmental bodies:

Neo-Functionalist assumptions over the averred autonomy of regional bodies or institutions, especially the technocrats, are largely misplaced. (see Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991; Lavergne, 1998; Asante, 1998). Evidence suggests that decisions made in SADC and ECOWAS are statist rather than regionalist in nature (see Lavergne, 1997; Bischoff, 2002; Asante, 1998, Page and Bilal, 2001; Leysens, 2001 and Gibb, 2002). So, the decision-making process of both institutions operates around the “lowest common denominator” principle – they rely on compromises and consensus from member states. Though the ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 seeks to move towards the “majoritarian principle” in its decision-making, decisions are not binding on states that oppose them. At once, this diminishes the effectiveness of the “majoritarian principle” and reinforces the pre-eminent role of sovereignty.

At the apex of the decision-making hierarchy in both ECOWAS and SADC are, respectively, the Authority (effectively a council of Heads of State) and the Summit of Heads of State. The next tier in the policy-making structure comprises inter-ministerial bodies -- the Council of Ministers composed primarily of Foreign, Economic and Finance Ministers drawn from member states (Lavergne, 1997; Bischoff, 2002; Gibb, 2002). These set the agenda for discussion by the Heads of State and, significantly, make policy recommendations. They also supervise the implementation of regional projects and programmes (Bischoff, 2002). This structure of decision-making is fundamentally skewed towards state rather than regional priorities. Also, the inter-governmental nature of these institutions indicates that states retain the prerogative to make regional decisions – on political, economic, social, legislative and security issues.

The neo-liberal turn in regionalism suggests therefore that the Ministers of Finance, Trade and Economic Planning from member states with their “supporting team” of national technocrats and “external experts” meet at the regional level to drive the neo-liberal project. For instance, within SADC, the Council of Ministers is supported by a Standing Committee of Officials from member states to deliberate on regional economic

development matters (Bischoff, 2002:290). These policy-makers, bureaucrats and institutions are essentially extensions of institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and The World Trade Organization (Cox, 1981, 1987, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2002; Adar and Ajulu, 2002). They execute the neo-liberal policies fashioned out by the international bureaucrats.

Pivotal states in the two regions:

Some states within West and Southern Africa are ardent advocates of the neo-liberal regional project. These are the so-called pivotal states selected, on account of their economic position, by the dominant actors in the international system, to help drive neo-liberal regionalism (see Shaw and Onwuka, 1989; Biel, 2000). So states like Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana and South Africa are locations for propagating neo-liberal regional practice (Shaw, 1990; Hentz, 2001; Schraeder, 2002). What underscores their interest in the project is their relative economic position vis-à-vis their neighbours. They mostly remain the prime target for external capital and investment; they are the industrial and manufacturing hubs of their respective regions and they have a significant share of the sub-regional markets. For example, both Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal are primary industrial and manufacturing centres in French West Africa -- most French subsidiary companies are found in these states (see Shaw, 1989, 1990; Asante, 1989; Mytelka, 1974). In southern Africa, South Africa is the economic powerhouse. It controls a significant percentage of the regional market and enjoys the biggest portion of external capital and investment (Tsie, 1996; Cheru, 1997; Hentz, 2001, Schraeder, 2002,). Captured by neo-liberalism these states advocate NEPAD, which is an "extension of the ...neo-liberal agenda " (Nabudere, 2002:25; see also Alden, 2000; Swatuk, 2004). However, the forces behind this orthodoxy transcend both the state and regional boundaries – they include dominant states in the global system, such as the United States and France. Let us consider these in turn.

The United States:

We should be on the look out for states whose entry into the camp of market democracies may influence the future direction of an entire region. South Africa and Nigeria now hold that potential with regard to sub-Saharan Africa (Lake cited in Hentz, 2001:187).

The words of Anthony Lake, the former National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton, reflect the neo-liberal designs of the United States for regions in Africa. They suggest a support for neo-liberal economics and a desire to forge economic links with key states in Africa. As we have seen, these pivots steer their respective sub-regional spheres of influence towards neo-liberal orthodoxy, which may end in the continent's eventual and effective integration into a global economy dominated by neo-liberalism. Evidence for this directional goal abounds. For example, USAID emphasizes sub-regional integration in Africa which is characterized by free movement of goods, capital, labour, services and economies of scale (see Lavergne, 1997; *USAID/RCSA*, 1997:2; *USAID/RCSA*, 2002; Schraeder, 2002; Alden, 2003; Swatuk, 2004). Peter Schraeder (2002) points out that the real intention of the United States is to see the integration of the entire southern African market, a large market which will attract U.S. capital, investment and goods. This goal helps explain the ongoing series of negotiations for a U.S.-South Africa or US-SACU trade agreement. The SADC-US Donor Forum meets periodically to deliberate on the regionalist agenda for southern Africa. It is represented by U.S. business groups, state officials, SADC business community and policy-makers (Bischoff, 2002). This forum provides the US the opportunity to shape policy through its financial clout.

There are similar forums between U.S. and other states in the regions. One is the Bi-National Commissions, formed by U.S. and states considered market democracies – there are such commissions between U.S. and Nigeria, and U.S. and Angola. Washington also offers development aid, grants and trade concessions to African states such as the *Millennium Challenge Account*, the *African Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA) and the *Generalized System of Trade Preferences* (GSTP). These, like the consultative forums, have as their ultimate goal the desire to steer regions and, subsequently, the entire continent in the direction of neo-liberalism. It is noteworthy that beneficiaries of the Millennium Challenge Account, AGOA and the GSTP are states regarded as making progress toward economic and political liberalism (see Hentz, 2001; Swatuk, 2004).

France:

France's continuous attachment to its former colonies in West Africa has been extensively written up (see Mytelka, 1974, Ate, 1983; Bach, 1983, 1990; Adisa, 1993; Martin, 1995; Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998; Olukoshi, 2001; Uche, 2001; Page and Bilal, 2001; Le Vine, 2004). Before the beginning of the 1990s, France's affairs with the Francophone West African states included a wide range of co-operative programmes – security and defense, technical, cultural, monetary, economic and trade (Ate, 1983; Tarr, 1993 and Martin, 1995). However, in recent times, France has become a champion of neo-liberal regionalism in Francophone West Africa. France played a major role in the formation of the meso-regional integrative enterprise in Francophone West Africa – Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) or West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in 1994 (see Uche, 2001) and continues to do so through its participation and support for “negotiations, mediation and consensus” building in the integrative enterprise (Uche, 2001:4) Indeed, UEMOA, supported by France, is more integrative than ECOWAS (Page and Bilal, 2001).

France also established the *le franc des Colonies Françaises d'Afrique* (CFA) as the common currency for Francophone West Africa and made it convertible to the French Franc in the colonial period. The post-colonial Francophone West African States have maintained this colonial monetary arrangement. What has visibly changed is that, with the French franc out of circulation, the CFA is now convertible to the Euro. The use of a common currency facilitated the establishment of a common bank in 1962 (the Central Bank of African States (BCEAO), which issues bank notes and manages monetary policy. The existence of a common central bank and the use of a common currency make possible capital mobility as well as the harmonization of fiscal, monetary and trade policies. These measures give French and European businesses access to a wider sub-regional market. The next section focuses on extra-regional institutions that support the neo-liberal enterprise.

The European Union:

Nowadays the EU is an advocate of neo-liberal regionalism in the two regions and (see Lavergne and Daddieh, 1997; see also <http://www.nai.uu.se/newsfromnai/melberg.html>). Brussels uses WTO conventions on international free trade to advance a neo-liberal agenda. This mission is multi-fold. The first aim is to phase out the traditional non-reciprocal trade regime between the Afro-Caribbean and Pacific nations and the European Union -- the so-called Lome I, II, III and the Cotonou Agreement. These agreements give industrial goods from the ACP countries unrestricted access to the European market and set quotas for agricultural products. The second goal is to form WTO compliant economic partnerships with these states, and the third objective is to provide support and assistance to states within Africa to integrate their economies (Page and Bilal, 2001:1).

Signed in October 1999, the EU-SA Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement is an example of the EU's commitment to subject countries and regions in Africa to free trade principles Gibb, 2003 and *Business Times*, August 6, p.6 2000). The initial

preference of South Africa was non-reciprocal access to EU markets enjoyed by the other ACP countries. The EU objected to this concession, which it considered as a violation of the WTO conventions. Gibb (2003:890) writes of the EU's preference:

In constructing its argument against South Africa's full membership of Lome, the EU chose to prioritise the importance of WTO compatibility and the need for South Africa to integrate more fully into the world economy. (In particular, the Commission dismissed the Lome option as being incompatible with the EU's multilateral trading commitments.

Of course the South Africa-EU Free Trade Agreement is a prelude to EU-SADC trade relations. This is in line with the objective of the Cotonou Agreement. The agreement provides for Economic Regional Preference Agreements (REPAs) between the EU and sub-regions (Page and Bilal, 2001:1; Bertelsmann-Scott, 2003:311;). As a result, the European Union prefers to deal with existing regional organizations or groupings – it does so through existing forums between the EU and other regional organizations such as SADC, ECOWAS and UEMOA.

The IMF and the World Bank:

There has been a change, in recent times, in the policy of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank toward development in Africa. The IMF and the World Bank were against regional integration schemes in the 1980s, because the necessary conditions and structures for integration were absent. The IMF therefore favoured co-operation over integration and financed interstate co-operative projects -- a sectoral approach to regionalism (Lavergne, 1997). However, its preferred option was -- and still is -- a statist approach to development: This is exemplified in the IMF's advocacy for Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which are anchored in neo-liberal principles -- such as trade liberalization, privatization, retrenchment of the state's role in the economy, currency devaluation and reduction of public expenditure. As is all too familiar now,

these programmes were drawn up to facilitate effective integration into the global economy.

The IMF and World Bank's aversion to regional integration in Africa faded after the Cold War. This was not due to a loss of faith in unilateralism or a sudden burst of confidence in the efficacy of market integration in Africa. It was, however, premised on a notion that regional integration was not at variance with SAPs induced trade liberalization policies at the state level (Asante, 1998; Lavergne, 1997; Tsie, 2001). Trade liberalization opens up the state to extra-African economic interests and at the same time facilitates harmonization of economic policies across regions. As a result, rather than being conflictual, SAPs and trade liberalization are complimentary.

So, the World Bank now supports regional integrative schemes. It favours the "variable geometry" or "multi-speed" approach to neo-liberal regional integration, in which some states – especially the economically advanced ones -- take the lead in integrating their economies and are joined, at a later stage, by others (Tsie, 1996; Asante, 1998; Gibb, 2002). The World Bank has recommended such a strategy for Southern Africa (Asante, 1998).

The WTO:

The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995 as an inter-governmental body to oversee the deregulation of global trade -- free trade liberalism is its governing ideology (Burchill, 1996). The WTO enacts rules, regulations, policies and conventions on trade relations between states and formulates rules relating to activities of international corporations. So, the WTO, for example, has rules that protect industrial and intellectual property (Amin, 2002).

The WTO succeeded the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), which was constituted in 1949, to provide a forum for the regulation of global trade. GATT was the last of the immediate post World War global institutions, which were set up for collective

management of the global economy. Its *raison d'être* then, as now, was to be an antidote to the protectionist practices that had contributed to the outbreak of World War II (see Gélinas, 2003). The Victorious Powers, led by the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt, believed that managed international trade, founded on free trade, would contribute to global peace and prosperity. But there was no rigid enforcement of the GATT rules. For example, the United States, the then hegemon of the new global order, could afford to simultaneously open up its market to trade and adopt a benign attitude towards some protective or regulatory policies of Europe and Japan (Wallerstein, 1991).

However, by the 1970s, the US economic hegemony was on the wane, and Europe and Japan had emerged as potential rivals. This development set the stage for the “Trade Wars” in the 1970s and 1980s. The best example was the row over Japan’s protectionist policies (see Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). Therefore GATT, as an institutional mechanism for harmonizing market relations between states, was a partial success.

As a new global body, the WTO owes its position and authority to free trade thinking and practice of the increasing internationalization of factors of production. So, as we have already seen, the WTO’s trade principles are invoked in the formation of Free Trade Areas. The formations of REPAs, which are stipulated in the Cotonou Agreement, are based on WTO Conventions (Gibb, 2003; Bertelsman-Scott, 2002; Page and Bilal, 2001). In fact the EU explains its policy shift from Preferential Trade Schemes to Free Trade Arrangements as compliance with WTO provisions (Gibb, 2003).

The role of private capital:

As we have also seen, private capital has been accorded a pivotal role in regional integration. This accords with the neo-liberal direction of the global economy and marks a break with past practices in the two regions -- most projects in the past (as in the case of SADCC and ECOWAS) were inter-governmental in nature (Asante, 1998; Gibb, 2003). Both ECOWAS – its revised treaty of 1993 -- and SADC provide for private

participation, especially of the business community, in decision-making and in the implementation of projects (Bundu, 1997; Clapham et al., 2001). Söderbaum and Taylor (2001) and Tsie (1996, 2001) claim that states in southern Africa have become a “transmission belt ” for external private capital. The states enact liberal laws, rules and regulations and identify regional projects for investment by external capital.

Labour

The neo-liberal regionalist project receives support and legitimacy from organized labour integrated into the global economy – particularly the skilled components, professionals and executives with security of tenure (Cox, 1983, 1987; Shaw, 1990; Mittelman, 1993). Significantly, such a labour force is primarily located in the core areas of the regions. These areas have a disproportionate share of industrial and manufacturing sectors which are linked to international capital: Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and South Africa (see Shaw, 1989, 1990; Biel, 2000:277; Hentz, 2001; Lemon and Rogerson, 2002; Schraeder, 2002; Uche, 2001; Bond, 2003). There are corresponding institutions, or corporatist structures, that mediate between the interests of labour, state and capital. These also give organized labour, especially its leadership, an opportunity to participate in the policy-formulation process. For example, South African labour unions – through the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), which is a tripartite negotiating body of state labour and business – participated in SA/SACU -EU Free Trade Negotiations (see Bertelsman-Scott, 2002). So, corporatist arrangements, like these, are employed to secure the consent of organized labour for neo-liberal policies.

The news media:

Peter Wilkin (2001), in his analysis of the political economy of global communication, points to the ideological dimension of the global communication industry. For Wilkin, the controllers of the global communication industry are the “purveyors of pro-capitalist, pro-private enterprise values”; they support the “neo-liberal political economic model” (ibid.:119). So the media industry deploys “language in the service of power”. Governments, in core states tend to have a great fear of communication companies because of the influence they exercise. This power can be used to pressurize political actors or national governments to adopt neo-liberal economic policies that favour both the communication companies and other major capitalist institutions (ibid.:50). The capacity for the global communication industry to spread the neo-liberal economic agenda has been enhanced by mergers in the media industry. These serve to strategically reduce the number of communication companies. Bagdikian (1992:21) reports that between 1983 to early 1990, the number of media companies reduced from fifty to fewer than twenty. Media companies invariably have global reach. Rupert Murdoch’s *News Corporation* comprises “nine different media in six continents” (Herman and McChesney, 1997:72). As a result, the major media companies, mostly from the core states, have monopoly over the means of communication and they have used this to effectively “frame, represent, set agenda and select issues” that are biased towards the neo-liberal orthodoxy (Wilkin, 2001:119). The modern state has used the media to promote and legitimize its ideologies (Wilkin, 2001; see also Anderson, 1996).

Benedict Anderson (1996) shows that the print media has been crucial throughout history in the promotion of the idea of the nation – such as a national culture and a common history among people within the confines of an identifiable national boundary. The importance of the means of communication also induces states, particularly in developing countries, to exercise control over both print and electronic media. All states in Africa own television and radio stations. In fact until the 1990s governments were the sole proprietors of media in most African states. States use media to promote their policies

and ideologies by the media either supporting the state's neo-liberal economic policies or being uncritical of the effects of such policies.

The major supporters of the neo-liberal ideology are those with vertical linkages to capitalist business -- the neo-liberal corporate world and those whose profits come primarily through "accruing advertising revenue" (Wilkin, 2001:49). This relationship is common in both core and other states that have economies firmly integrated in the global economy. Wilkin (2001:49) reports that General Electric, an industrial enterprise in the United States, also has media holdings in the NBC, a major American news network. Similar relations exist in Africa, especially in South Africa. For example, Johnnic Company in South Africa, operating as Johnnic Communications, owns a number of widely circulated print media in the country -- the *Sunday Times*, *Sowetan* and the *Herald* (Eastern Province). Given these vertical linkages, it is expected that such corporations will use the media as instruments to promote their interests. In the 1990s the "corporate owned media" in South Africa, "amplified" the neo-liberal economic views of the business community, which invariably shaped the government's economic policies (see Marais, 1998:150). Also the private media, depending largely on corporate advertisements for profit, is unlikely to pursue an objective assessment of the global economic system, for fear of corporate boycott and loss of advertising revenue (Nyamnjoh, 2005:77).

The epistemic community:

Peter Hass (1992:3) defines an epistemic community as a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence on a particular issue. Their technical expertise and "authoritative claim to relevant knowledge", within a given discipline gives them influence over governments, states, international institutions and policy formation process -- where their ideas have a "systemic impact" (ibid.:17). Members of such an intellectual community have shared norms, beliefs and notions of validity. They apply their "expert knowledge" and professional competence to pursue a "set of common

practices” which are geared towards solving societal problems and “enhancing human welfare”. Haas, following Max Weber, asserts that the deference paid to “technical expertise” or the “knowledge elite” by decision-makers increases as modern society grows more and more complex and problems become increasingly technical in scope (ibid.:10-11).

Peter Hass (1992) further believes that members display an uncompromising attitude and are unlikely to change their positions for political reasons, in contrast to bureaucrats. They are driven by the desire to see their views “take root” (ibid:16) in society. This suggests that the intellectual community is both independent and autonomous. In practice, however, the values of the epistemic community cannot be divorced from the interest of dominant social forces. This understanding leads Critical Theorists to declare that “the turn to a group of elite specialists” in modern times represent the “first wave of the victory of instrumental reason over fundamental interests” (ibid: 24). We shall soon see this in this chapter.

The neo-liberal epistemic community:

The orthodox liberal ideology that thrives in ultra-liberal bastions such as the London School of Economics, in England, and the Chicago School of Economics, in the United States has assumed hegemonic status (Gélinas, 2003:108). Milton Friedman and his associates in the Chicago School are usually singled out as key exponents of ultra-liberal ideas and their views have attracted state bodies and international institutions. Jacques Gélinas (2003:110) describes Friedman as a “guru of ultra-liberalism” and one who “believes in the virtues of the market’s invisible hand, which makes the selfishness of large companies converge towards public interest”. The “Chicago Boys” – Friedman and his friends – travel throughout the world, especially the Third World, “to advise governments on the proper implementation of liberalism” (ibid.:110). Their neo-liberal ideas have been adopted by multilateral bodies such as the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and other regional organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC and the

European Union to “justify their decisions” (ibid.:110). There are corresponding ultra-liberal intellectual communities around the globe – in universities, think-tanks (research institutes and policy analysis centres), business schools and so on (Gélinas, 2003).

As a result, there is a transnational network of neo-liberalism which has become influential because the ideas they propagate converge with the interest of the dominant social forces. Globalization, which serves the interest of the dominant social classes, is a euphemism for neo-liberal internationalism. This is passionately espoused by the ultra-liberal intellectual communities. There are research institutions, academic communities and other policy-influencing units in West and southern Africa organically linked to the neo-liberal economic and social order. These are funded by business, donor nations, multilateral institutions and inter-governmental organizations and they produce work that legitimizes, clarifies and provides technical solutions for problems arising from the liberal system. The USAID, for example, supports research initiatives and regional capacity building in West Africa and beyond. It provides financial assistance for the Regional Integration Promotion Unit for West and Central Africa (CINERGIE) and research initiatives in free trade regionalism such as “monetary reforms, comparative advantage, formal and parallel trade flows and ways to eliminate trade barriers” in West Africa (Daddieh and Lavergne, 1997:116).

In both regions, the term *globalization* is a centralizing metaphor used by the neo-liberal intellectual community to understand and provide solutions to a myriad of social problems at the state and regional levels – collateral themes like regional security and political economy also take on neo-liberal trimmings in their analyses of social issues (for such analyses see Mills, 2000, 2004; Clapham et.al., 2001; Adar and Ajulu, 2002; Grobbelaar, 2004; Soko, 2004). For instance, regional security is seen as a prerequisite for the flourishing of a neo-liberal global market, for the transnational flows of investment, trade and capital to the two regions. Liberal buzzwords or phrases like “competitiveness”, “flexibility of the labour market”, “privatization”, “comparative advantage”, “enabling investment climate”, “good governance”, “accountability” and “removal of trade barriers” are commonplace in analyses of regional political economy.

They are said to make the region more attractive to capital and as a means to facilitate regional development. These discourses present neo-liberal internationalism as the “natural” and “sensible” choice available to states. The ideas of this intellectual *cabal*, and their domestic and external counterparts, inform policy in the two regions. The research institutes to which these intellectuals are affiliated are allied to big business. For example, the South African Institute of International Affairs, which is noted for its support of globalization and production of neo-liberal supporting literature, is sponsored by the South African mining interests (Vale, 2002: 587).

NGOs:

Missionary societies, the church, and other voluntary organizations were once regarded as agents of “ colonial philanthropy ” (Manji and O’coil, 2002:570); they took up the social responsibility the colonial state ignored, providing educational, health and other social services to Africans. These charitable acts, however, were palliatives – they could not redress the fundamental causes of native impoverishment; these were the results of injustice and inequities of the colonial order. This points us to the specific role of humanitarian organizations in the colonial project. Although today we might describe them as NGOs, they were agents of the colonial state. So, both religion and charity became instruments for social control. They were meant, respectively, to control the moral and “mental universe” of the colonized and secure his/her subordination to colonial authority (wa Thiong’o, 1986:16).

Charitable institutions – commonly referred to as developmental NGOs -- have proliferated in a post-Cold War Africa, and elsewhere. They operate at the sub-national, national and international levels, performing humanitarian and developmental functions by bringing relief to famine and drought stricken communities and war-torn countries, resettling displaced people; setting up development and conservation projects and delivering other social services. It must be recognized that these organizations engage in useful social duties, and some – the radical NGOs, for example – are critical of governments and the global order. But most developmental NGOs working in Africa

have, since the 1980s, been co-opted “by proponents of neo-liberalism” (Manji and O’Coil, 2002:582). As a result, they have “unwittingly” assumed the “missionary position” (ibid.:567). Official aid, grants and private donations are directed more to these organizations than they are to the state which is perceived as corrupt and inefficient (ibid.:529, see also Clapham, 1996). So, NGOs play a complimentary role to multilateral institutions. They are relied upon to provide social services to ameliorate the social costs of neo-liberal policies. Through this, they help entrench and expand neo-liberal hegemony. It is important to note that most of these NGOs define their mission in technical rather than political terms. So, they use their expertise for humanitarian purposes and pay no attention to the actual causes of social, political and economic crises, which are embedded in the dominant social order.

We have looked extensively at the various actors which support the neo-liberal ideology. This leads us to two pertinent questions: Whose interest do these actors serve? Or what interest or class is behind the project of neo-liberal regionalism? As pointed out in Chapter Two, Realists and other modern theorists ascribe a public persona to the state which is conceptualized as a cohesive entity. The state, in this view, seeks the socio-political, economic and security needs of every citizen (Morgenthau, 1978; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971; Poggi, 1978; Badie and Birnbaum, 1983) An assumed universal image leads to the claim -- represented especially by the realist paradigm within the field of international relations -- that leaders, bureaucrats and institutions, represent the national interest (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971; Morgenthau, 1978). A rational bureaucrat with technical skills and knowledge, follows rules and “standard operating procedures” to make policy recommendations and implement tasks and decisions in the national interest (see Allison, 1969, 1971; Held, 1980; Haralambos and Heald, 1984). As a result, the bureaucrat and the institution within which he serves are portrayed as objective, impersonal and rational.

These positivist images of the state, institutions and bureaucrats have been contested by new developments in international and political theory. So, theories of organizational or bureaucratic politics debunk the notion of the state as unitary actor. Many now argue that

there are conflicting claims, advocacies, preferences and positions between government institutions over domestic and foreign policy (see Allison, 1971; Milner, 1995). Keohane and Nye (1989) showed an elaborate web of benign inter-connections between national departments across state boundaries and a resulting congruity of interest that conflicts with an imagined “national interest”.⁸⁷ Critical theoretical discourses, for their part, emphasize the inter-subjectivity of state structures. This rests on an understanding that state forms vary across time and space (Cox, 1981, 1987, 1999; Burchill, 1996; Mittelman, 1993). So, social forces in different epochs shape the interests of the state and its institutions. This revelation suggests, contrary to the position of traditional theories, that the state is not an abstraction, a selfless or cohesive reality, rather its institutional structures are used to further the interests of particular social groups (Cox, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1999). This holds for multilateral institutions too (Cox, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1999; Burchill, 1996; Helleiner, 1991; Mittelman, 1993; Milner, 1995; Strange, 1996; Gill, 1997; Thomas, 2002; Held and McGrew, 2002:46; Gélinas, 2003). This explanation sets the stage for a discussion of the class agenda in regional institutions – to this we now turn.

The interests of regional bodies:

We have seen that the key institutions that drive the neo-liberal integration projects in the two regions are statist inclined. Therefore, they are interest bound. Heads of state use their collective sovereign power to make decisions that subject the region’s people to tenets of neo-liberal economics. The removal of barriers to trade and investment, enactment of anti-labour laws, protection of private property, privatization of national assets, tax incentives and a greater role for private capital are policies that facilitate the integration of the region into the global economy, and serve the interests of ruling elites and the business class. These groups – because of the clientilistic character of the state – benefit from transnational investment flows, especially in the extractive sectors of the economy, like gold, bauxite, petroleum, copper and diamonds. Legal regimes further

⁸⁷ It was noted in Chapter Two that there are also units below the state level such as cities, provinces and regions that conduct their own foreign policy. This practice sometimes conflicts with the “national interest” (see Cornelissen, 2006:134-135).

emphasize a partnership between states, business elites and multinational co-operations (Chazan and Rothchild, 1988; Schatz, 1991:187; Adesina, 1994; Hoogvelt, 1997).

The business class allied to transnational capital:

Although this entrepreneurial class is found in both peripheral and semi-peripheral states in the export economy, the major backers of regional integration are, however, the business classes in the semi-peripheral states. They operate in dominant economies in the semi-peripheral areas, which have industrial and manufacturing sectors favoured by external capital (Shaw, 1989; Schatz, 1991; Scholte, 1997; Falk, 1999; Biel, 2000; Hentz, 2001; Schraeder, 2002). The rest of the region serves as “niche market” for exploitation (see Biel, 2000:277). For the business class, market integration is a convenient and effective cover for the entrenchment of “relations of privilege and domination” (Falk, 1999:79).

The manufacturing and banking classes of South Africa favour neo-liberal integration because it offers financial advantages. Furthermore, it perpetuates South Africa’s near monopoly of the region and its markets. These classes have a “predatory mentality” (Hentz, 2001:199); they are against any formal efforts towards industrial development in other parts of the region (Cheru, 1997:222). Moreover, the South African Banking network only extends credits or loans for commerce rather than other investment purposes. The industrial class is antagonistic to competition from other states: the National Association of Automobile Manufactures of South Africa, for example, attempted to prevent Hyundai Motor Distributors from assembling cars in Botswana (see Hentz, 2001:199). Michael Matsebula and Vakashile Simelane (1996:57) suggested that “Essentially South Africa’s reaction when faced with the prospect of new competing industries setting up in the BLNS has been to protect its own, using almost any device”.

Fantu Cheru affirms this attitude suggesting that,

most of South Africa's business elites still preferred to treat the region as a hinterland from which to draw raw materials and migrant labour, and as a dumping ground for manufactured goods from South Africa (1997:222).

These commercial and industrial classes and their transnational counterparts control the South African economy. Therefore, they greatly determine South Africa's economic policy⁸⁸ in the region. This capacity is formalized in consultative forums such as the International Investment Council, a body comprising representatives of leading transnational corporations that advises the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, on economic policies; and the NEDLAC (Dlamini, 2004:175). The business class in the major states of West Africa also favours free trade form of regionalism. This is the issue to which we now turn.

Samuel Asante (1989:146) believes:

The bourgeoisie in the various West Africa countries, since it is in a position to benefit immediately and directly from the expanded markets resulting from the freeing of trade, has become an advocate of measures to establish a free trade area (1989:146).

This bourgeoisie class is found mainly in what the Dependency or World System theorists label as the *semi-peripheries*, *middle powers*, *sub-imperial* or the *growth points*

⁸⁸ The dominance of the neo-liberal business class on policy-formulation in post-apartheid South Africa dates back to the Mandela presidency. This class managed to steer the government away from an interventionist approach (Keynesian) to neo-liberalism. The balance of power was in their favour: the forces against neo-liberalism were weak, disunited, and marginalized. For instance, the mass democratic movement which had played a pivotal role in the anti-apartheid campaign disintegrated. In fact most members of its leadership were co-opted into government. The neo-liberal forces also used the National Economic Forum, now NEDLAC, to grant concessions to labour. In fact, this corporatist arrangement, as we encountered in Chapter Two, gives labour a stake, though superficial, in the economy through participation in the economic decision-making process and investment opportunities. Since 1995, organized labour in South Africa has established 20 Union investment companies and about 100 large-scale businesses. The neo-liberal class further presented themselves as champions of the poor by promising to support a comprehensive housing and public works project. For this class, this form of market intervention represents a redistribution of income, which was the ANC government's position. As a result, the Keynesian members of the ANC department of Economic Planning were marginalized. For account of organized labour's participation in the neo-liberal economy see Okechukwu Iheduru, "Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in post Apartheid South Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, 1, (2004) pp. 1-30; for a discussion of the rise of the neo-liberal forces see Cheru, *op cit.*, pp. 225-228.

in the region, viz Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire (Shaw, 1990, see also Cheru, 1997:219; Bond, 2004a). These have relatively developed economies when compared to other states in the region; they have a disproportionate concentration of foreign owned industry (see Asante, 1989:135). This condition is the result of economic history. The French demarcated their West African colonies into separate industrial and labour zones. Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire were the industrial and manufacturing centres of the region, while Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Mali were labour reserves (Skinner and Shack, 1979; Cordell et al., 1996). It is not surprising that today, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are economically more advanced than their Francophone neighbours. This also explains the phenomenon of labour migration from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. Nigeria attracts more investments from multi-national corporations because of its oil resource and market size.

Substantively, the leading states in West Africa have initiated regional and meso-regional integration schemes to advance the interest of their business classes. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal played key roles in the formation of Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) which was established in 1973 and was transformed into UEMOA (West African Monetary and Economic Union) in 1994 (Mytelka, 1974:309; Page and Bilal, 2001). Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal benefit more from economic integration than the peripheral members (Asante, 1989). The poorer states complain about this asymmetry, notwithstanding compensatory mechanisms that are built into the regional structure (Bach, 1983; see also Ukeje, 2005:145).

Nigeria was the force behind the establishment of ECOWAS – the Economic Community of West African States (Ate, 1983; Bach, 1983, 1990).⁸⁹ Nigeria's motives were political

⁸⁹ The then President of Nigeria, General Yakubu Gowon along with the former Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema is regarded as the one who conceived the idea of an economic community in West Africa which eventually brought into being ECOWAS. However, there is a class dimension to the formation of ECOWAS. Charles Ukeje (2005:145) proposes that the two heads of state were "prompted, unofficially, by prominent private sector operators who were members of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce". It can be speculated that the Nigerian members within this class were the trenchant advocates of market integration in West Africa. This conclusion is based on two factors. Firstly, we have seen that the Nigerian President was the main force behind the regional project; it is therefore plausible to state that Gowon was influenced by the Nigerian business class. Secondly, this class will push for market integration because of Nigeria's economic dominance in West Africa.

and economic, not altruistic. Nigeria sought to retrench the pre-eminent economic role of France in West Africa by proposing the notion of an economic union in 1973 (see Ate, 1983; Bach, 1983, 1990). Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal interpreted the move as a Nigerian strategy to dominate the region economically, and especially to gain a significant foothold in the Francophone sphere of influence. Aided by France, the CEAO was formed in 1973 as a countermove to Nigeria's plan of regional hegemony. ECOWAS was eventually formed in 1975 through compromises between Nigeria and the major states in French West Africa.

The following point needs to be reiterated: middle-powers in West Africa subject the region to neo-liberal policies in the interest of business elites and their external partners. The latter gain from expanded trade and therefore enthusiastically endorse the free trade liberalism that underpins the regional project.

The French and West African integration:

In the course of the civil war in Liberia between 1989-1998, *Le Figaro*, a French international news magazine, suggested that: "French private commercial infrastructure supports the NPFL and undermined ECOWAS by ambushing official Ivorien policy to its own end" (*Le Figaro*, 8 January, 1992).

At the beginning of the Liberian civil war, the Ivorien government was against the ECOWAS plan to send a peacekeeping force into Liberia (see Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998). The French government influenced this position and provided diplomatic support for Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) at the Security Council (*West Africa*, 1-7 October, 1990). France's stand reflected French transnational interests because French corporations were engaged in logging and mining activities in the area under the control of the NPFL (see Tarr, 1993; Reno, 1998:97).

So – as in the case of Liberia – France's commitment to economic integration in French West Africa is primarily informed by the interests of French transnational capital. France

regards this part of West Africa, and other Francophone states as “domaine reserve” – privileged realm (Schraeder, 2002:336). Since the colonial days French subsidiary companies have dominated the economies of these states, for example, French multinational corporations control 87.4% of Senegal’s economy and 80% of Cote d’Ivoire’s (Asante, 1989).

Analysis of integration efforts in French West Africa reveal that UEMOA – like SACU in southern Africa – has made more progress than ECOWAS (Page and Bilal, 2001; Uche, 2001). This is the result of French support. Indeed, UEMOA is an economic partnership between the Francophone states and France, a coordinating tool for French trade relations with West African states. Uche (2001:17) affirms:

Monetary integration in the region has been promoted by France not because it is interested in intra CFA Franc Zone trade. Rather, France is more interested in the economies of scale benefits that accrue to it by centralizing her control of these former West African colonies. For France, it makes better economic and political sense to negotiate with a central body rather than with several independent states.

The common administrative, fiscal, monetary and trade linkages which have been formalized in UEMOA have yielded enormous benefits to French transnational capital (Page and Bilal, 2001; Uche, 2001). These instruments have enhanced trade and investment flows from France to the French West African states.

The U.S. and the integrative process:

Since the post-World War II period, the U.S remains *numero uno* in the promotion of international free trade. This is explained by the emergence of the United States, post-World War II, with “preponderant power” to reshape the global economy in its interest

(Burchill, 1996:53; Wallerstein, 1991). Great Britain, the pre-war economic power, was weakened by the war. It was saddled with enormous war debt – owed primarily to the U.S. – and had to rebuild its economy. The post-World War international trade system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was constructed in the interest of the U.S. and her allies, and was the embedded neo-liberal direction of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" (see Gélinas, 2003).

So, the centrality of international free trade in U.S. post- World War external relations was the influence by U.S. multi-national corporations (MNCs); this reached its zenith with the emergence of the transnational corporations – TNCs (Burchill, 1990; Helleiner, 1991; Strange, 1996; Hentz, 2001; Schraeder, 2002; Gélinas, 2003:16; Swatuk, 2004). Jacque Gélinas (2003) pointed out that by the 1980s the best MNCs had transformed themselves – a process that began in the U.S. – into TNCs. Besides extending into other countries, the TNCs, as the name suggests, managed to free themselves from "national legal framework and governmental control" (Gélinas, 2003:16). This is explained by growing financial mobility, increase technological capacity and a revolution in communications. These put within reach better information and knowledge about states; this has enhanced their ability to shift capital and other productive structures across the globe (for further details see Strange, 1996; Gill, 1997; Lipschutz, 2001; Gélinas, 2003).

If the U.S. government "exercises its power" on behalf of U.S. transnational capital in the global trading system (see Strange, 1996:162), then what is the motivating factor behind U.S. promotion of free trade liberalism in West and particularly in southern Africa? Andrew Hurrell (1995) and others suggest that the U.S., following the WTO, believes that regional free trade helps speed up the process of economic integration across the globe.

The U.S. has not been as active as France in the integrative process in West Africa. It has neither supported nor provided assistance to UEMOA (Page and Bilal, 2001) it has, however, given financial aid to ECOWAS. This is explained by France's traditional hold on Francophone Africa which has entrenched its position. Occasionally, however, this

has been a source of friction between the U.S. and France (see Schraeder, 2002). Nonetheless, AGOA, GSTP, the Millennium Challenge Account and other U.S. grants and trade concessions present opportunities for U.S. transnational capital – over the long term – to gain greater access to West African markets (for a more elaborate account see Hentz, 2001; Schraeder, 2002).

The U.S. interests in southern Africa:

The U.S. is keenly interested in the economic integration of Southern Africa. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it is the attractiveness of South Africa which is regarded as an emerging market with a relatively advanced economy (Schraeder, 2002:335). Second, in contrast to French West Africa, where France is the de facto hegemon (see Uche, 2001), southern Africa does not have one (for more on this see Odén, 2001; see also Bischoff, 2002). Moreover, South Africa, the regional economic power, is a pliant agent of external capital. Therefore, the region is a fertile ground for the U.S., through South Africa, to influence the construction of a neo-liberal regional order. Peter Schraeder (2002:337) suggests an important U.S goal in southern Africa is to ensure that

South Africa's economy is closely "knitted" to those of the other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, thereby enhancing the rise of a regional market that would be more attractive to *USA investors and capable of absorbing greater levels of USA exports* (italics added).

The South Africa-U.S. Free Trade Area, the SA/US Bi-national agreement, the SADC-USA Donor Forum and other co-operative structures are vehicles to facilitate this process.

The class dimension of the European order:

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (2003), in a neo-Gramscian turn, brings fresh insights into the analysis of the European integrative project. He departs from the traditional perspectives which see states as the motor for the European socio-economic order or, following the neo-Functionalists, identify the energy of integration in the supra-national institutions and technocrats (for a detailed account of the neo-functional or supra-national approach see Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; see also Moravcsik, 1991 for an elaborate account of the intergovernmentalist perspective). In these narratives, the role of social forces is not given much attention.

In contrast to these views, van Apeldoorn (2003) argues that different transnational social forces vie with each other for control of the European order. He identifies these as the neo-Liberals or the Globalists, the neo-Mercantilists or the Europeanists, and the Social Democrats. The first, neo-Liberals or Globalists, are the transnational capitalists who champion the course of international free trade. The neo-Mercantilist or Europeanists, the second category, though transnational in their outlook, operate largely within the European market and therefore favour protectionist measures. The Social Democrats advocate interventionist policies such as social welfare programmes, labour rights and other social oriented measures (van Apeldoorn, 2003:158-149). The ideological battle, van Apeldoorn contends, is primarily between the two capitalist classes, the neo-liberal and neo-mercantilist. The Social Democrats – once their social policies are accommodated – accept the ideology of the dominant group. How do these dominant classes maintain their hegemonic hold on the European project?

The European Round Table of Industrialists – ERT, a policy influencing body – was formed in 1983 (ibid.:153) and comprises representatives from the major transnational corporations. Van Apeldoorn suggests that in the 1980s, the neo-Mercantilists outnumbered the Globalists and used their numerical strength to influence the direction of regional integration. As a result, the project took a neo-Mercantilist turn. There were special programmes and incentives to make European companies more globally

competitive, and a largely protected European market was stabilized⁹⁰. By the 1990s the Globalists had superseded the neo-Mercantilists. Two factors explain this. First, the Globalists gained control of the ERT. They used the body to criticize the neo-mercantilist policies which they blamed for the “*sclerosis of Europe*”, and pressed for neo-liberal reforms. Secondly, the emerging force of neo-liberal economic globalization enhanced their position. In the end, they won the ideological battle. Neo-liberal principles and practice “oriented towards the interest of globalising transnational capital” now underlined the European Order (ibid.:160-1).

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn’s class analysis sheds light on the European Union’s preference for trade liberalization in the two regions, and in other parts of Africa, which is a reflection of the influence and interests of his neo-Liberals or Globalists. The WTO Conventions certainly have played a role in the EU’s policy change towards the ACP countries, but the stronger motive is the growing power of the transnational class. This emphasizes the point that multilateral organizations like the WTO, IMF and World Bank are not impartial; they are interest bound. This understanding gives us entry into an analysis of forces behind them.

Interests of IMF, World Bank and WTO in regional integration:

As noted in Chapter Two, traditional theories of the bureaucratic and organizational processes argue that organizational inputs and outputs largely inform public decision-making and implementation (for background see Braybrook et al., 1963; Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1968; Allison, 1969, 1971; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971; Steinbruner, 1974). In this approach, bureaucrats are portrayed as objective players serving in value-free institutions and using technical expertise in a rational process. However, Critical Theorists differ with this view. They believe that power and interest

⁹⁰ Interestingly, in the 1980s, other regional blocs like ECOWAS aspired towards this model. For a detailed analysis of this view see Fawcett and Hurrell, (1995:184-185).

are embedded in institutions like the IMF, World Bank and the WTO (Cox, 1981, 1983; 1987, 1999; Burchill, 1996; Strange, 1996; Gill, 1997, 1998; Mittelman, 1998; Falk, 1999; Biel, 2000; Lipschutz, 2001; Held and McGrew, 2002; Lawson, 2002a; Thomas, 2002; Amin, 2002; Gélinas, 2003; Kofman and Youngs, 2003; Slater, 2003). Bureaucrats in these institutions cannot therefore be neutral players. For critical scholars, there are unequal power relations between states – major ones frame agendas and fashion outcomes. There is empirical evidence to support this view. The G7 countries and the rest of the European Union make up 57% of the votes in the IMF Executive Board (Thomas, 2002:121); the Managing Director of IMF is selected from a European State; and the President of the World Bank is always a U.S. citizen. So, behind the “soft velvet glove of ... worldly bureaucrats” is the power of U.S. and other dominant states which is exercised to advance the interest of transnational capital (Strange, 1996:162).

Reproducing hegemonic order:

Echoing Gramsci, Cox (1981:83) asserts that a hegemonic order has material capabilities. These reproduce, legitimize and stabilize the status quo. Such resources include institutional capacities, both human and material, technological capacity and instruments of coercion. At the vanguard are a corps of transnational bureaucrats who propagate the hegemonic norms and values. They are assisted by the media and intellectuals associated with the order. The material resources include the incentives and concessions given by institutions and like-minded actors to secure consent. These take the form of grants, aid, loans, development schemes and trade concessions. The other material capability is *hard power* – military force that can be employed against threats to the stability of the order. Robert Cox writes:

There is enforcement potential in the material power relations underlying any structure, in that the strong can clobber the weak if they think it necessary (1981:137).

We have seen that the world economy constitutes a hegemonic order; we have also learned in the same chapter that neo-liberal regionalism -- in both southern and West Africa -- is a component of this order. So, how is this order maintained in these two regions? The role of the media, and of intellectuals, in promoting neo-liberalism has been discussed in some detail. We discovered that globalization – neo-liberal internationalism – is the template in which regional problems and solutions are analyzed. The dogmatism of this approach to regionalism is summed up in the smug expression “There is no alternative” to globalization (Cox, 1999:27).

However, the normative force of this ideology is unable to produce acquiescence to the integrative enterprise. One reason for this is that the gains of integration are unevenly distributed through the region. Another reason is that most states are poor and cannot therefore bear the cost of integration. This is explained by the relatively weak position of regional states in the global economy – the asymmetrical economic exchanges between poor states and leading economies have put the former into debt. As a result, their governments are unable to pursue development programmes. This, in turn, is exacerbated by the rolling back of the public role of the state. So, financial, development and other forms of assistance are required to sustain interest in neo-liberal regional schemes. These are provided by institutions like the IMF, World Bank, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Co-operation (USAID), developmental NGOs, and major states such as U.S. and France also play a role (Lavergne, 1997; Bertelsman-Scott, 2002; Clapham et al., 2001; Page and Bilal, 2001; Uche, 2001; Bischoff, 2002; Gibb, 2002; Swatuk, 2004). We can see this in practice.

SADC – in a break with its predecessor, SADCC – relies primarily on external assistance for its integrative and co-operative projects (Bischoff, 2002); no single state has the capacity to provide incentives for co-operation. South Africa, the region’s strongest state, is too preoccupied with its own socio-economic pressures (see Cheru, 1997). The same condition obtains in West Africa. Nigeria, the regional hegemon has its own redistribution problems which generate continuous social upheavals (Watts, 2001).

As a result, France dispenses incentives for co-operation in regional integration. Take this example: between 1948-1994 France maintained a fixed parity between the CFA and the French Franc and the CFA was convertible to the French franc. France cancelled part of the debt of French West African states when the CFA was devalued in 1994. The French government has also set up a development fund for the Francophone zone and helps Francophone states to service their debts to the IMF (see Uche, 2001; Olukoshi, 2001; Page and Bilal, 2001).

In both regions, the IMF, World Bank, the E.U. USAID and development-oriented NGOs support co-operative projects in areas such as water, health, transport/communication, resource management, energy, tourism, nature conservation, agricultural and rural development (for a detail account see World Bank, 1989; Lavergne and Daddieh, 1997; Page and Bilal, 2001; Uche, 2001; Söderbaum and Taylor, 2001; Swatuk, 2001, 2004; Schraeder, 2002; Bertelsman-Scott, 2002). There are also funds and technical assistance which promote the idea of free trade (Lavergne, 1997). These however do not adequately address development needs, and the real causes of poverty, marginalization and inequalities. The latter factors explain political instability. To counter this, military force – the coercive arm of the order – is used. How? We turn now to the security architecture of the prevailing world order.

Projection of force:

The UN, through the Security Council, remains the “nerve-centre” of international decision-making on peace and security (Akindele, 1976:xii). However, chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UN to sub-contract the maintenance of security to regional organizations (Henrikson, 1995). These are regarded as “institutional forums of the first instance” (Wilcox, 1965:126) in dealing with regional or local disputes (Wilcox, 1965:126). So, in the Cold War period, continental organizations like the OAU, assumed

peacekeeping and peacemaking functions. In his *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary-General in the 1990s, broadened the definition of regional organizations qualified to be in partnership with the UN in the business of global peace and security. The relevant “associations or entities” included “treaty-based organizations”, “regional organizations for general mutual security and defense”, organizations for general regional development or co-operation and “groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue” (Henrikson, 1995:160). As a result, the UN and all these regional institutions are “parts of an assemblage of institutions” that at different levels and institutional capacities collectively work towards global peace and stability (ibid.:123).

Therefore, ECOWAS and SADC are involved in maintaining security. ECOWAS’s ad hoc intervention force, ECOMOG, in the name of liberal interventionism, intervened in civil conflicts in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1993) and Guinea Bissau (1999). Currently, ECOWAS has a peacekeeping force in Côte d’Ivoire, which is the epicentre of conflict in West Africa. South Africa, through SADC, intervened in Lesotho’s conflict in 1998 (for an elaborate account of ECOWAS interventionist missions in West Africa see Iweze, 1993; Inegbedion, 1994; Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998; Ero, 1999; Anning, 1999; for SADC in Lesotho see Southall, 2002; Bischoff, 2002; Vale 2003). This suggests that the Security Council “mandates” the major states – Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC – to lead regional peacemaking interventions; these deployments are geared toward preserving state sovereignty and regional stability which are necessary for the smooth functioning of the neo-liberal world economy (see George, 1993; Rosenau, 2002; Von Hippel, 2002; Vale, 2003).

The role of external actors in regional security:

It is important to emphasize that the cost of maintaining peace and stability at the regional level is largely borne by the major states in the world through the U.N. They exercise direct intervention when the magnitude of instability is beyond the control of regional organizations -- the U.K. in Sierra Leone, the U.N. in the DRC and France in

Côte d'Ivoire. Presently, France has 4,000 troops in Côte d'Ivoire; it cannot afford to allow this country to self-destruct given its economic and regional importance to France.

In southern or Western Africa, no single state has significant military and financial resources to guarantee security. So, ECOWAS 's interventions would have been dismal failures without logistical, financial, and technical assistance from the U.N., U.S., France and other major states and organizations (Iweze, 1993; Henrikson, 1995; Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998; Oro, 1999). This lack of capacity is also reflected in the absence of permanent security structures in the two regional bodies. While there are institutional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution in both ECOWAS and SADC, these mechanisms are fragile and ineffective (Anning, 1999; Bischoff, 2002).

The U.S.:

In the absence of effective structures for the maintenance of regional security, the US initiates and funds a number of projects around the continent. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) provided training, logistical and financial support for peacekeeping operations in Africa (Alden 2000:364). ACRI, however, has now been transformed or reorganized into ACOTA – Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance – which offers training in both peacekeeping and combat operations (Abramovici, 2004:688).

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme offers military training and education to military officers on the continent. Currently 44 African countries, including Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria, are part of this programme (Abramovici, 2004). Peter Schraeder (2002:364) indicates that the objective of the IMET programme in southern Africa is to produce “a cohort of officer corps” in the region that believes in democratic principles of governance and which is sympathetic to U.S.' interests in the region: this: “ constitutes the true essence ” of U.S.military involvement in southern Africa (ibid.). The US also has bi-annual military exercise with

SADC. Other major powers such as the U.K. are involved in joint military activities in the southern Africa region.

In recent times, under the pretext of combating international terrorism, the U.S has been involved in security in areas traditionally considered within the French sphere of influence. There is, for example, cooperation between the U.S. and the Sahelian states, this is called the Pan Sahelian Initiative (PSI), and its participants include Mali, Niger, Mauritania (all Francophone West African states), Algeria and Chad. The U.S. security concerns in this region are based on an assumption that the Sahel is “ the perfect location for ... al Qaeda ... to establish its training and recruitment camps ” (Keenan, 2004:695). These states are considered weak and poor and lack the resources to fight terrorism, international crime and smuggling. The U.S. military presence in the Sahel also neutralizes the threat to internal peace and stability which is posed by minority and marginalized groups, especially the Tuaregs. In both Mali and Niger, the Tuaregs rebelled against their governments in the first half of the 1990s because they were marginalized. These groups are falsely identified with terrorism. So, what is the real reason behind U.S. interests in the Sahel?

Primarily, the U.S. security interest resides in the strategic location of the Sahel which is “a buffer zone between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, between the oil fields of the north and those of the Gulf of Guinea” (Abramovici, 2004:685).

France

France’s security policy towards Africa -- especially the Francophone states -- has been cyclical: engagement, disengagement and re-engagement. The engagement phase could be categorized as France’s active involvement in the security of these states; a policy motivated by geo-political factors. France regarded them as its “square meadow” (privileged hunting ground)—to use a phrase from Zörgbibe (2003: 48). Possession of a

sphere of influence, also gave France a sense of importance in global politics; this was in line with her ambition to be a *third force* in world affairs. From 1960 until the end of the Cold War, France maintained defence cooperation with these states and set up military bases in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere. Routinely, French troops have been dispatched from these bases to quell armed rebellions elsewhere in West Africa.

In the 1990s, however, the French government pursued a disengagement policy. Rachel Utley (2002:131-4) lists a number of reasons for this change:

- The fall of the “Berlin Wall ” ended the communist threat to her interest in the region.
- France re-ordered its commitment to European and Transatlantic Security frameworks.
- There were calls for policy change in the wake of civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the genocide in Rwanda. The French government’s security support for the regimes in these countries could not prevent the civil wars.
- Internal developments made it difficult for the government to keep its military commitments in Africa. There were constitutional restrictions on the deployment of conscripts beyond France’s borders and the armed forces were reduced from 573,000 to 440,000 in 1996 – the army bore 35% of this cut.

From the mid 1990s, Lionel Jospin, the then socialist Prime Minister, defined France’s security policy in Africa as one which is “neither interference” nor “indifference” stressing that “ France’s role as policeman in Africa is over” (Pascallon, 2004.: 212). As a result, the French government wanted African states to take responsibility for their own security. But it also recognized that they were incapable of managing conflicts and that post-Cold War schisms posed an immediate threat to African states regional security and to French commercial interests. This interpretation compelled France to give logistical, diplomatic, financial and technical support for conflict management in Africa (ibid.: 213). It therefore initiated a regional peace keeping project -- RECAMP (Renforcement des

Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix/Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities). Like the Washington inspired ACRI and ACOTA, RECAMP is “designed” to provide training and equipment to enable African States to maintain peace and stability on the continent (Utley, 2002:140). Guided by a concern for regional security, France offered financial assistance to ECOWAS in the implementation of its moratorium on the manufacture, import and export of small arms and helped, logistically and financially, the ECOWAS peacekeeping force in Guinea-Bissau (ibid.:139).

With the return of the political right to power, led by Jacques Chirac in 2000, French security policy swung back to “engagement” which is centred on the idea of “accompanying without dictating” (Pascallon, 2004:215). This is a form of liberal interventionist policy in which France leads a multilateral force mandated by the UN, on the request of African states, to restore peace and stability in states where there has been *subversion of the status quo* -- threats to democratically and legally constituted governments, forced seizure of power, violation of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human rights (see ibid.:215). It was on these grounds that France sent troops to Cote d’Ivoire. We turn now to a critique of neo-liberal regionalism; this will provide a bridge to the next chapter.

Challenging the assumptions of neo-liberal regionalism:

Liberal order... represents a particular historical conjuncture of power, agency and systemic relations formed around the principles, practices, and institutions of liberal modernity. Its time horizon is not centuries, but decades (Latham, 1997:41).

In contemporary times, the liberal order is triumphantly proclaimed by so called liberal internationalists as the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989). Embedded in this assumption are a set of notions and fallacies. The view presupposes that the teleology of human

history is to reveal the liberal order in a *fullness of time*. It therefore sees the *liberal moment* as the natural and objective order for human development and progress. Liberal order is therefore privileged over all other orders. This has given rise to crusades to subject nations, cultures, regions and the world to the socio-political and economic tenets of neo-liberalism (Scholte, 1997; Amin, 2002 and Gélinas, 2003). However, this reification of neo-liberal ideology only serves to disinvest it of agency and temporality – the power relations, the coalition of interests – that undergird it and the fact that it is transient: a moment in history.

Karl Polanyi (1957) pointed out that neo-liberalism was the governing ideology in the 19th century. The interests of dominant liberal social forces informed socio-economic relations in that century. Made wealthy and powerful by the mercantilist policies of the states in the previous century, the manufacturing class demanded an unregulated economy because national wealth and prosperity rest on the promotion of free market principles (see Burchill, 1996; Gélinas, 2003). In these circumstances, the state, buoyed by the power and influence of these social forces, used its “administrative” and “bureaucratic” structures to “enforce laissez-faire capitalism” (Burchill, 1996:46). However, by the 1870s the ill-effects of unbridled liberalism had become all too obvious: poor working conditions, depressed wages, unemployment and health hazards (Burchill, 1996:47). These conditions of modern European society spawned a public anti-liberal backlash which demanded that the state legislations should “ameliorate the social effects of the self-regulating market” (ibid.:47). It marked a retreat of the free market economics and the emergence of a regulated liberalism, especially in economic affairs.

The brief history suggests that (neo-) liberalism’s claim to fulfill the Enlightenment project of universal progress and prosperity is unattainable. While neo-liberalism can produce wealth and prosperity, its benefits cannot be communally distributed. It is individualistic and, contrary to its ahistorical claim it is bound by time and space.

This chapter has shown that the neo-liberal regionalism in West and Southern Africa have been brought into being by a “conjuncture of power, agency and systemic

relations” (Latham, 1997:41). Put differently, the neo-liberal project is the result of the confluence of the increasing transnationalization of factors of production in the global economy and the influence and power of transnational capital class. At the local level the state, its ruling elite, and other dominant social forces play a supporting role. In addition, the dominant states in the world, the multilateral institutions, the bureaucrats who serve within them and other specialized bodies are integral to the success of neo-liberalism. Yet, contrary to the neo-liberal claim to universally endow its benefits, it has a polarizing effect across the world. It creates “new hierarchies, dependencies and power relations” between states and between members of society (Burchill, 1990:51). As we have discovered, the neo-liberal regionalist project favours the semi-peripheral states. As a result, it promotes unequal development, consigning the peripheries to a perpetual state of under-development. Within societies, individuals and groups that benefit from a neo-liberal order include those with the relevant managerial and technical skills which are required by the global economy (Cox, 1999). These groups are well remunerated, have job security and are located largely in the semi-peripheral areas. However, semi-skilled and “non core workforce” in the regions are vulnerable (Webster, 2004:6; see also Cox, 1999). They are increasingly found in the Export Processing Zones; they earn very low wages; and have no security of tenure because they lack the skills demanded by the international economy. Their condition is however better than the army of unemployed – the great majority – who have been declared redundant by the exigencies of a neo-liberal order.

Both ECOWAS and SADC emphasize the role of the private sector in their integrative projects (Tsie, 1996; Lavergne, 1997). As a result, they have accepted the liberal mantra that only through the dexterity of the individual can wealth be created and distributed in a society (Manning, 1976 and Gélinas, 2003). The state is regarded as a poor economic manager, therefore its interference in the market is resented by liberals. There is however a measure of dishonesty in the liberal aversion to state intervention in the economy: this is because the state uses its administrative, legal, bureaucratic and security apparatuses to facilitate capital accumulation (Polanyi, 1957; Habermas, 1988; Tsie, 1996:81-87; Amin, 2002:57; Gélinas, 2003:8; Cox, 1999:12; Burchill, 1996:44-5; Strange, 1996; Wilkinson

and Hughes, 2002; Held and McGrew, 2002). The state also creates other “appropriate material conditions” such as monetary and fiscal measures, provision of utility services, skilled labour and research facilities needed for liberal economic success (Tsie, 1996:87; see also Habermas, 1988). Also states, in bilateral or multilateral institutions, enter into agreements with each other to protect private property, secure resources, market and investment for capital (Burchill, 1990: 49 and Tsie, 1996:87 and Strange, 1996).

Indeed, there are pitfalls in the claim that private capital and enterprise facilitates regional progress. Economic development is a process; it entails a long-term commitment toward building productive structures such as training of labour or skills development and securing the necessary institutional and material capacities for industrial development. It also involves research in productive ventures that benefit people, ensures judicious use of natural resources and is benign to the environment (Gibson, 1986; Tsie, 1996; Cox, 1999). However the central motive of private capital, especially transnational capital, which has grown increasingly footloose, is the maximization of profit in the shortest possible time (Amin, 2003). So its imperative is self-interest rather than long-term development. Some examples suggest why this is so.

Transnational corporations invest primarily in capital-intensive projects in export oriented sectors with effective demand on the global market or in “parasitic forms of accumulation” such as import-export trade (Tsie, 1996:94; Söderbaum and Taylor, 2001:684). Most of these activities generate a limited number of jobs and the workers are invariably retrenched when profit margins are low. These activities also have deleterious effects on the environment. Nkoko (2000) reports that transnational corporations in the clothing and textile industries across southern Africa take advantage of liberal trade regimes to move from one country to another in search of cheaper labour and higher returns. This practice has increased the number of unemployed in countries like Swaziland and Lesotho. Söderbaum and Taylor (2001:675), discussing the Maputo Development Corridor, a cross-border initiative between South Africa’s Gauteng province and southern Mozambique, Maputo province, say:

The neo-liberal forces behind the Corridor's inception can only push for further privatization and the rolling back of state involvement.... Such strategies cast everything within a profit- seeking and "bankable" framework which allows very little space for tackling the social and ecological implications that the various projects engender.

So the developments associated with the MDC, such as the Maputo Iron and Steel Project and Mozal Aluminum Smelter, boost export earnings of transnational business interests and their regional counterparts (ibid.: 687). They are not "people-centred", they deplete vital resources such as water, and they degrade the environment (Soderbaum and Taylor, 2001:689). Finally, what about Free Trade?

The free trade fallacy:

History shows that states which advocate free trade liberalism invariably first erected protective walls to build powerful domestic industries that could subsequently compete for markets and investments beyond the state boundary. The British government adopted protective policies in the 19th century, the U.S. adopted a similar strategy in the latter part of the 19th century and Japan industrialized and became competitive behind trade barriers (Amin, 2003 and Gélinas, 2003). The same is true of South Africa, the dominant economic power in southern Africa and prime beneficiary of free trade regionalism. How was this achieved?

William Martin (1990) breaks with the dominant discourse on the industrialization of South Africa and division of labour in southern Africa. He does so in one essential way. In neo-liberal eyes, South Africa's leading position in the regional trade remains unproblematised: it is a simple tale of how South Africa "naturally" emerged as an industrial heartland of southern Africa. But Martin reveals that it was the result of a "rupture of a long standing regional relationships" (Martin, 1990:115). He shows that by the turn of the 20th century the entire region was, first, a zone of primary producers and second, a largely free trade area: free mobility of commodities, labour and capital. This

architecture was constructed by the British colonial government and inherited by the settler community. It was also a core-periphery relationship between Britain and southern Africa. However, South Africa managed to free itself from this relation during the inter-war years. Two events, Martin argues, supplied the imperatives to end it. Firstly, the period marked a drastic fall in primary products, including the price of gold, and secondly, it produced serious industrial strife in the country. To end South Africa's peripheral status in the global economy, the South African government 1924-1931 adopted pro-mercantilist policies. This was meant to develop the nascent home industries and put South Africa on the path to industrialization (ibid.:117). So the South African state supported key industries such as the first "integrated iron and steel plant" in Africa (ibid.). The South African government also put up tariff walls to create a home market for local products which were made from the "growing inter-sectoral linkages between agriculture, industry and mining" (ibid.:117).

The trade restrictions, backed by the power of the manufacturing and commercial classes, were directed both at Britain and other trading partners in the region such as Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Mozambique and the High Commission Territories – Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Swaziland. So by the 1930s South Africa had effectively closed off its market to imports and manufactures from the region and beyond. South Africa's industrialization drive was not matched by a corresponding increase in industrial activities in the rest of the region, including Southern Rhodesia. South Africa therefore emerged as the most industrialized state in the region. This development set the stage for the unequal trade relations between South Africa and her neighbours.

The principle of comparative advantage or economies of scale forms an integral part of the free trade liberal discourse. Policy-makers and liberal analysts usually point to its advantages in the market integration literature (Hurrell and Fawcett, 1995; Von Rooyen, 1998 and Lee, 2003). However, its effects are severely negative in regional environments where economies are at different levels of development with little or no complementarity in productive structures. There are low levels of economic development in most states in

the two regions we have considered. They specialize in the production of basic goods such as agriculture and primary commodities. These are less profitable commodities and remain less attractive to restless capital which is on the move in search of sound profits in the shortest possible period. So, in such environments, the growing differentiation in the values of specialized commodities means that applying the principle of comparative advantage only reinforces the debilitating effects of the current division of labour in the two regions. The result is impoverishment and discrimination (Burchill, 1990).

Yet this prognosis is bound to persist, as the states remain captive to neo-liberal interests. Specialization on neo-liberal lines stifles mutual regional development and free trade liberalism is “anti communal” (Burchill, 1990). One, its effect is polarizing in the regions; two, its benefits are endowed primarily on the dominant social forces allied to a neo-liberal global order and three, its logic and practice is based on selfishness. As a result, there have been trenchant criticisms of neo-liberal regionalism in the two regions. The next chapter focuses on social forces already at work in challenging the onslaught of the neo-liberal regionalist project. They seek to reconfigure the regions in directions that serve the interest of all.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Agents and Sites of Resistance: Challenges to Neo-Liberal Regionalism

History is viewed as a dialogue between past and present, offering alternative possibilities for the future. Such alternatives are not to be understood, however, in utopian terms: they are firmly grounded in the lived reality of our times, with its real constraints and opportunities. Thus, there is no "end" to history, nor indeed a teleology or eschatology that can explain its movement over time (Mittelman, 1998:76).

The old is dying, the new is being born (Gramsci cited in Gill, 1997:208).

We noted in Chapter Two that traditional theories regard the prevailing social-political order as interest free, legitimate and fixed. This position explains why they only focus on finding solutions to particular problems or troubles emanating from the existing order. In contrast, Critical Theory argues that the prevailing social order is interest laden (Chapter Six demonstrated this by showing that a constellation of transnational social forces are agents and beneficiaries of the neo-liberal regional order in both West and southern Africa). Furthermore, Critical Theory regards the existing order as neither natural nor permanent. Rather, there is what Craig Calhoun calls a "non-identity" (1996: 442). Like the Freudian split personality, there are tensions and contradictions beneath the surface unity of social relations which can culminate in social transformation (Held, 1980; Cox, 1981, 1987, 1999; Gibson, 1986; Ashley, 1987; George, 1993; Mittelman, 1998; Calhoun, 1995; Burchill, 1996; Devetak, 1996). For Critical Theorists, civil society is at the centre of the dialectic; the result is social change. Both Gramsci and Cox, as it has

already been noted conveyed this point. Antonio Gramsci intimates that “there is a dialectic inherent in civil society” (Cox, 1999:4, Held, 1980). He further believes that civil society is the architect of state forms. So he defines the state as the sum of political society and civil society. Gramsci captures this relation in a metaphorical reference to the state as an “outer ditch” and civil society as the “powerful system of fortresses and earthworks behind it” (cited in Hoare and Smith, 1971:238). Similarly Robert Cox views civil society as a “shaper” of historical orders and state forms (Cox, 1999:4). This belief is grounded in his apprehension of historical time in a dual sense (Mittelman, 1998:76). Echoing Braudel,⁹¹ Cox sees the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of history. On one hand, the synchronic time corresponds to the surface unity of a social order – as noted in Chapter 6. On the other hand, the diachronic moment points to the tensions and contradictions of the social order; the forces opposed to it and the possibilities of transformation (Mittelman, 1993:72). Following Robert Cox, this chapter will argue that there are simultaneous challenges to neo-liberal regionalism at the state, regional, continental and international level. It will examine the rationales behind this opposition, and analyze the constraints and opportunities for transformation. The starting point of this analysis is the state, because the process of change invariably begins here, where people directly experience the effects of the neo-liberal social order (Cox, 1981). The state is also the bedrock of regionalism, so a change in state form will impinge on the regional order.

Resistance at the state level:

The counter social agents here are, in their present constitution, “disparate forces” (see Saul, 2003:4, see also Post and Wright, 1989; Cox, 1999). They include feminists, environmentalists, anti-poverty movements, peace movements, the youth, students, professionals, the unemployed, the landless, labour unions, religious movements, human rights groups, minority groups, anti-corporate movements, culture movements, reformists within states and institutions, and national capitalists (George, 1993; Moody, 1997; Cox,

⁹¹ See Fernand Braudel, *On History*, translated by Sarah Matthews (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p. 78.

1999; Harrison, 2001; Saul, 2003; Edwards, 2004; Sachikonye, 2004). We will focus on some of these forces by examining the reasons behind their resistance.

Organized labour:

Some commentators on labour affairs assume that labour's relation with state and capital blunts its ability to challenge the dominant social order (see Waterman, 1975; Lipton, 1977; Habermas, 1987; Moody, 1997; Buhlungu, 2003; Edwards, 2004; Konings, 2004; Otobo, 2004). Other analysts argue that workers' grievances are "distributive demands" like wage increases and better working conditions (Edwards, 2004:115). These demands are addressed in legal and corporatist structures – forums for resolving capital-labour disputes. The workers invariably gain monetary compensation – wage increases – at the end of what Habermas (1987:356) opts to call the "juridification process" (see also Edwards, 2004:114). It is claimed in some labour analyses that the leaders of organized labour – the "labour aristocracy" (Konings, 2003:448) – are so committed to this bargaining process that they surely hold the lines of defence against the overthrowing of the hegemonic order (Moody, 1997).

Other writers have suggested that many labour unions in Africa are in partnership with states – ruling parties – or opposition parties. There are a number of such relations in southern Africa (see Buhlungu, 2003 for a detailed account of trade union alliance with states in Southern Africa; see also Vass, 2000; Sachikonye, 2001; Webster and Mosoetsa, 2001). The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions helped form the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) – the governing party – in 1991; the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) is affiliated to the ruling party, the South West Africa Peoples' Organization, SWAPO; the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe – an opposition party – was established out of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in 1999. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is in alliance with the African National Congress (ANC), the party in power. Similar alliances exist

between governments and trade unions in Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania (Tørres, 1998).

Labour leaders are sometimes co-opted into the political system. For instance, in South Africa, some ex-Union leaders, like Mbazima Chilowa, the premier of Gauteng province, are now in government. Based on these facts, some labour analysts conclude that labour cannot be an effective agent for change. But is it a fair assessment of labour?

Organized labour's other constituency:

Instead of viewing labour in “economically reductionist” and “ahistorical” terms (Adler, 1996:123), labour has ambivalent interactions with “money and power” – market and state respectively (Edwards, 2004:115). Most analyses of labour/market/state relations centre on interactions between labour bureaucrats on one hand, and state and capital on the other. These accounts give much power to labour leaders and discount the capacity of workers to act as a “self-conscious force”, and their ability to take “self interested action” (Adler, 1996:123). Indeed, they do have an adversarial relationship with the neo-liberal order: issues like job security, retrenchments, eroding social values, privatization, poor standard of living and other social concerns all suggest forms of this tension. These social problems and the pressures they engender place an obligation on the labour leadership to challenge the existing order and to press for alternative forms of development which are responsive to the needs and aspirations of society. For instance, organized labour in Nigeria contests the “prevailing notions of development” and the state’s “choice of policy instruments” (Otobo, 2004:13). For its part, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, COSATU, wants “clear alternatives to neo-liberalism” (Naidoo, 2004:191).

Labour has not only been concerned with “what we get” – like wage – demands but also with issues like poverty, democracy, justice, inequality, marginalization, unemployment, a declining standard of living and effects of structural adjustment policies (Edwards, 2004:128). In pursuit of these societal interests, labour movements have used their

economic leverage and organizational resources to mobilize other social groups against the existing order. Let us consider some examples.

Organized labour provided leadership in the mass protest movements for democracy and in resisting structural adjustment policies across sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s (Ake, 2000; Harrison, 2001; Cheru, 2002; Schraeder, 2002; Buhlungu, 2003; Otobo, 2004;). Examples of this include anti-Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) uprising in Zambia from 1985-1987, and in Nigeria in 1986-1989.

In both Ghana and Mozambique trade unions were active in massive protests against the imposition of neo-liberal Value Added Tax (VAT) which was recommended as a strategy to boost public revenue by the IMF and the World Bank (Harrison, 2001; Konings, 2003). Labour organizations in Nigeria mobilized sections of society such as the rural and urban poor, students and workers in the informal sectors to resist removal of subsidies on public utilities such as water, electricity, postal rates, telephones and petroleum (Otobo, 2004). Similarly, COSATU and other labour unions continue to be the “centre of public resistance”, as they did in the apartheid period (Adler, 1996:131).

Politically, labour unions have been key actors in struggles for change, especially in southern Africa. As we have noted, the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), provided organizational and logistical support to ensure the success of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) at the polls; this brought MMD to power in the 1990s (Harrison, 2001; Buhlungu, 2003). Organized labour also played a pivotal role in the formation of MDC, which is committed to change, and from the 1990s, the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) has led protest movements against authoritarianism in that country (Levine, 1999). So, in all these forms of struggle – for democracy, social justice and equity, regime change, participation in economic decision-making, job security and social safety nets – labour organizations are driven by a desire for social change. Could it be that labour’s participation in the institutions of the state and economy

– its relations with political and economic systems – constitute a “war of position”⁹² (Cox, 1999:16). Or is this engagement a ploy to provide labour a breathing space to strengthen its organizational potential and to build a coherent ideology? If so, then could this deepen its influence over policy, eventually nudging the state in the direction of change? In this strategy organized labour already has formidable allies in new social movements. We turn now to consider the activities of these forces.

The new social movements:

Jurgen Habermas (1981, 1987, 1991) noted that the key players in the process of change are essentially located at the “seam between system and life world”⁹³ (cited in Edwards, 2004:115). These social forces inhabit the “peripheral ground”⁹⁴ of the prevailing social order (Edwards, 2004:115); they are the ones “most opposed to the established order” – the neo-liberal one (Calhoun, 1996:450). According to Habermas, the demands of these social forces go beyond the distributive concerns of the modern labour movement and therefore their grievances cannot easily be contained through the *juridification* process. Their struggles are essentially against the “colonization” and “commodification” of social life which is now “strategically and purposively” channeled towards specific ends – neo-liberal in orientation (Edwards, 2004:115). Administrative, technical and rational instruments are used to achieve higher productivity, create wealth and reap profit for individuals reinforcing a “cosmopolitan upper class which has no more sense of community” (Bauman and Tester, 2001:152). These bureaucratic, rational and technical methods destroy the “societally woven and serviced safety nets” (ibid.:154). So the neo-liberal order counts among its effects, the immiseration of workers, retrenchment or unemployment, the “ever growing number of the impoverished”, destruction of the biosphere and inequities (ibid.:154). In fact, the neo-liberal agenda affects every facet of

⁹² This is a long-term strategy of self-conscious groups to build a powerful, cohesive and organized social force that is capable of effectively challenging the existing order and bringing about a social transformation, see Cox, op cit., p. 16.

⁹³ Habermas uses system to refer to structures like the state and the economy, and the life world broadly refers to the collective or communal principles and values of society.

⁹⁴ In one sense, these forces remain largely outside the influence of the state and the economy.

social life. As a result, social forces, both marginalized and conscientious, like the clergy, women, unemployed, students, the youth, educators, environmentalists, peasants, and the landless, have emerged to resist the excessive bureaucratization and marketization of social life. We turn now to examine the activities of some of these groups by focusing on the reasons for their resistance to neo-liberalism.

Educators and students:

Some critical social commentators have observed that the education sector, especially higher education, is subject to the imperatives of the market (Alubo, 2004; Chachage, 2004). So, courses and research agenda that reflect corporate interests are promoted while others, which are considered superfluous to the neo-liberal agenda, receive little or no funding. The number of academic and nonacademic staff is trimmed down for the sake of mythical high productivity and efficiency. Monbiot (2000:301) summed up this corporate agenda: “Business now stands as a guard dog at the gates of perception. Only enquiries which suit its needs are allowed to pass”. As a result, the state plays a “steering” or coordinating role between the universities and market interests (Chachage, 2004; Alubo, 2004). It uses its control over the Treasury to prescribe research agenda and teaching programmes that are biased towards “technical skills” required by the neo-liberal market (Alubo, 2004:88). An academician in South Africa expressed this intrusion of the state in these terms:

University autonomy is out of the window: universities are now essentially part of the Civil Service – branches of the Department of Education...Universities are now micro-managed by the government, for example, every course taught now has to be vetted and approved by central government (*The Witness*, South Africa, February 23, 2006, p.11).

Unfortunately, the regulation of universities and other centres of higher learning by the state and market robs them of their autonomy. The emphasis on technical skills, which is

the production of knowledge for the “market good”, invariably inhibits acquisition of critical skills – imparting of knowledge for “social good” (Alubo, 2004:88). This intrusion impinges on the social dimension of universities and other institutions of higher learning which traditionally are directed toward “social transformation and human emancipation” (Chachage, 2004:251).

As a result, there have been reactions against the increasing state and corporate control of institutes of higher learning. In November 1990, African intellectuals and other academics met in Uganda and produced the “Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and Social Responsibility”. This emphasized the right of people to “wholesome education”; it stressed the autonomy of higher learning institutions; it highlighted the responsibility of the state to give adequate financial support to higher educational institutes; and reinforced the duty of intellectual communities to join popular forces in their search for justice and emancipation (Chachage, 2004:252).

Academics, non-academic staff and students have protested against the privatization of university education, the poor working conditions of academics, scarce funding, and restricted access to university education. For example, in Nigeria there have been rampant strikes by university students against excessive commercialization of higher education (Alubo, 2004:283). The non-academic staff with no professional skills in turn resist privatization of municipal services.

The youth, the unemployed, casual workers and other marginalized groups are also disenchanted with the neo-liberal order. These groups participate in political demonstrations against lack of jobs, “waves of retrenchment”, “cut backs in social provision” and depressing wages (Harrison, 2001:392). The workers in the export processing zones receive very low wages and face a precarious existence. These are temporary jobs that depend on the mood of the market and the size of profit. In Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe,⁹⁵ for instance, garment factories run by expatriates have been

⁹⁵ In Zimbabwe, the relocation of clothing and textile industries led to the loss of 15,000 jobs, see Peek *op. cit.*

shut down because of low profits (Peek, 1998:19, see also Matlosa, 1996). The youth and unemployed, with no social security net to turn to, and apprehensive of never finding jobs, often join the ranks of malcontents.

Women:

Women's movements have arisen to challenge patriarchy and their disadvantageous position in a neo-liberal economy. Women make up a greater percentage of the labour force in the export processing zones. These are what Orr (2003:136) labeled the "feminized sectors" such as the clothing and textile, leather and footwear industries. These female workers receive appallingly low wages and work in very poor conditions: they have no health, training or maternity benefits. The capitalist system also benefits from patriarchy which categorizes women essentially as agents of reproduction (child bearers) and production (care-givers). Women engage in productive activities like subsistence farming as one of the care-giving roles and bear children who eventually make up the modern work force (Tickner, 1992; Thompson, 2001; Mama, 2001; Orr, 2003). These duties, however, are not considered work because they do not have "exchange value" in modern economic interactions (Thompson, 2001:249). This suggests that the modern capitalist system freely benefits from their labour.

As caregivers, women have been affected profoundly by neo-liberal policies such as retrenchments and a reduction in social services. They assume responsibility for the family when the male breadwinners are retrenched and social services are excessively commercialized; they take care of food, health and educational needs. In both southern and West Africa women perform dominant roles in food crop production, especially in rural communities, when the men leave home to find employment in the cash-crop and extractive sectors of the economy (Callaway, 1990). However women's access to good quality land is constrained by dictates of the neo-liberal market. They receive less assistance in food production because priority is given to export commodities: more land

is available for these cash crops than food production, and “scientific farming methods” are used to enhance the production of export commodities (Callaway, 1990:249). This bias ultimately undermines food security, and threatens the livelihood of women, families and communities.

The poor and other marginalized groups, for their part, resist growing commercialization of social amenities like water, electricity and telecommunication. The privatization of these services puts them beyond the means of ordinary people. This is why social movements in South Africa, made up mainly of poor people, protest hikes in water, electricity and telephone services and form task forces to restore these services when corporations, based on payment defaults, discontinue providing them (Desai, 2002). In a related fashion, civil society groups in Ghana have been campaigning against the government’s plan, which is favoured by the World Bank, to transfer the “management of the urban water system” to Multinational Corporations (*Daily Dispatch*, July 6, 2005, p.4).

Environmental movements:

The environment also has dissenting tales. Environmental movements have sprung up to offer challenges to the instrumental rationalism of capitalism which deploys modern technology for mass production, depletes natural resources and destroys the biosphere. There is an environmental twist to the grievances of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and other environmental organizations in the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Apart from redistribution concerns, these movements are reactions to environmental degradation. The petroleum extraction process by transnational corporations such as Shell and Chevron degrades and pollutes the environment. For instance, there are constant gas flares, oil spillage and release of threatening amounts of non-ozone friendly gases like carbon dioxide and methane and pollutants such as petroleum hydrocarbon (Osaghae, 1994; *Rainforest Action Network*, 1997; Watts, 2001; Harrison, 2001). These harmful emissions account for the destruction of aquatic and plant life, decline of farming activities, and pollution of rivers in the Niger Delta. In spite of

this, the multinational corporations have done little to mitigate these effects on the environment.

There are also environmental conflicts in southern Africa. In South Africa, civic movements resent the constructing of dams for corporate purposes at the expense of poor communities; in Zimbabwe, there is a rising consciousness in ordinary people that large-scale irrigation on commercial farms poses a threat to communities. This realization has produced tension between peasants and the industrialists. In Namibia, environmentalists and the Himbas, an indigenous group in Namibia, protested against a “major dam project, Epupa” (Bond, 2003:43-4).

For the landless, the rural poor, peasants and pastoralists, the neo-liberal order is extremely discriminatory because it deprives them of productive land. These groups, “dislocated by a powerful coalition of social forces” are confined to “marginal lands”. (Cheru, 2002:50). The dominant social forces are multinational corporations and their local counterparts who own plantations and specialize in primary commodity production.

Religious movements:

Religion is not only about a belief in a deity, it is also concerned with values like communal bonds, selflessness, love, care and empathy for the weak, vulnerable, poor, and the marginalized. However these values are being eroded by instrumentalism and individualism of a neo-liberal order. In consequence, religious movements, guided by an ideology – a “liberation theology”⁹⁶ – have emerged to defend these values (Falk and Camilleri, 1992:215). This ideology has brought together clergymen, NGOs, intellectuals, peasants and other marginalized groups in a common crusade against “instrumental rationality of the apparatus of domination” which is neo-liberalism (ibid.: 216). So, in

⁹⁶ It emphasizes the duty of the church to solidarize with all those who suffer marginality, especially the poor and other victims of society. This role is regarded as a theological imperative: by committing itself to the plight of the poor and marginalized, the church at the same time acknowledges the “universality of God’s love and his special identification with the suffering”. See Nico Koopman, *Churches, Democracy and the Public Sphere*, accessed from website: <http://www.sacc-ct.org.za/koopman.html>; for a comprehensive analysis of Liberation Theology, see Gustavo Gutiérrez, *Theologie van de Bevrijding* (Barn: Ten Have, 1974) ; see also E. Castro, *Freedom in Mission* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1985).

Senegal, the Marabouts, who are members of an Islamic order, “have transformed themselves into trade union leaders of a new sort” championing the interests of farmers (Chazan, 1988:135). In Northern Nigeria, Islamic movements deal with “capitalist penetration and social dislocation” (ibid.), and in South Africa, the South African Council of Churches along with COSATU and other NGOs campaigns against poverty and unemployment. They also advocate for a people’s budget and popular participation in economic decision-making processes⁹⁷. Further, in southern Africa, in pursuit of an alternative lifestyle, “churches have provided the settings for autochthonous groupings of the devout” (Chazan, 1988:135). We turn now to consider both the informal sector and the division within the capitalist class. The intent is to demonstrate that these also represent challenges to the existing order.

The informal sectors:

Indeed, the burgeoning parallel economy and informal settlements in both southern and West Africa are reactions to the retreat of the state which is in part a result of neo-liberal economics and in part the predatory nature of the state (Strange, 1996; Chazan and Rothchild, 1988). The informal settlements and most of the activities in the informal economy are illegal: they run against state laws, rules and regulations. Both are therefore concrete symbols of resistance against the established order – the neo-liberal order.

The anti-hegemonic fraction within the capitalist class:

To reiterate a point made in Chapter 6, the capitalist class is not a homogenous group. There are the “national capitalists” (Cox, 1981:148) and the comprador class (Asante, 1989; Chazan and Rothchild, 1988; Shaw, 1990; Adesina, 1994). A conflict of interest exists between them – historical, material and ideological (Cox, 1981, 1999; van Apeldoorn, 2003). For a detailed description of interests of the comprador class, see Chapter 6. This capitalist class is in alliance with the transnational class and supports free

⁹⁷ See website: <http://www.sacc.cr.org.za/campaign.html#big>.

trade liberalism. In contrast, the capitalists associated with the domestic economy, manufacturing primarily for the local market, tendentially advocate neo-mercantilist policies. These local entrepreneurs usually use the state as a “bulwark of an independent national economy” (Cox, 1981:148). They oppose free trade liberalism because it destroys domestic industries which cannot compete with the power and money of transnational capital. The interests of the national capitalists informed the “neo-mercantilist developmental state” in Africa between 1960-1980 (Mittelman, 1998:71). The state in this period had a ubiquitous presence in the economy, and protectionist policies underpinned both state and regional development. Today, transnational forces have managed to internationalize the state. However, the contest between the two classes continues. We turn at this point to Europe to illustrate the rivalry between the two capitalist classes. This move is necessary because, as we have seen, events in the European Union invariably impact on the two regions.

It was noted in Chapter 6 that there are two competing capitalist classes in the European Union. For Robert Cox (1999), the tension in the European Union is generated by the conflict of interest between the hyper-liberals, the Transnational Capitalist class, and the Social Democratic Capitalists. Cox’s hyper-liberals or Transnational Capitalists advocate for little state intervention in the economy, privatization, international trade liberalization and competitiveness in the global economy. The Social Democratic Capitalists oppose this hegemonic agenda; they seek a social order which promotes social equity. They believe that the “viability” and “legitimacy” of the economic order hinge on its acceptance by the “general population” (Cox, 1999:18). Van Apeldoorn (2003), however, situates the struggle for dominance over the European social order essentially between the neo-liberal transnational class (the globalists) and the neo-mercantilist class (Europeanists).

The French public’s rejection of the European constitutional treaty in a referendum, in May 2005, provides a glimpse of this conflict. Of course the French rejection shows the disconnection between the European public on one hand and the heads of state and the technocrats at Brussels on the other. It reveals nationalist sentiments against what is

perceived as the European Union's move towards a *super state* (*Financial Times*, 31 May 2005). More importantly, the French No vote points to the class conflict over the economic direction of the European Union. Most analysts suggested that the result reflected an opposition by social forces such as local industrialists, farmers, labour unions and social democrats to the neo-liberal turn of the European Order (*ibid.*:12). Quentin Peel saw it as a vote "to restrict competition, to limit the internal market and to restrain the movement of people and capital" and added, "to think it was a vote for tolerant, liberal and open Europe is fantasy" (2005:13). Mary Robinson, the former Irish President, commented that the French No vote reflected a "nostalgia for an era of stronger economic protectionism" and expressed the fear that Europe "might become more internal and fortress in its approach" (cited in *Financial Times*, 31 May 2005, p.4). For Wolfgang Munchau the No vote in France, and later in the Netherlands, crystallized the "conflict between supporters of the continental European social model and Anglo-Saxon capitalism" (ultra-liberalism) (2005:13). Such social forces in France regard the French "social model" of "collectivist agenda" as being under increasing threat by the neo-liberal economic reforms managed from Brussels (*ibid.*:13).

There are already signs of policy re-orientation in the French government with enormous implications for the European Union's future economic direction. In the aftermath of the French vote, the French President, Jacques Chirac, sacked his Prime Minister, Pierre Raffarin, and appointed Dominique De Villepin, the Interior Minister and known defender of the French social model, as the new Prime Minister (*Financial Times*, June 2, 2005, p.2). Nicolas Sarkozy, the new Interior Minister, in spite of his credentials as a "liberal" or "pro-free market politician" argued that France "must fight against delocalisation or against companies moving production abroad" (*Financial Times*, May 31, 2005, p.4). Chirac, the French President, accepted the French verdict and "vowed to defend his country's social model" against the "Anglo-Saxon way" in the European Union (unfettered neo-liberal market reforms) (*Financial Times*, June 2, 2005, p.2). Chirac had an ally in his battle against the Anglo-Saxon way, in the former President of the EU and Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jeane-Claude Juncker. In the aftermath of French and Dutch rejection of the European constitutional treaty, he said that: "the Union

should scrutinize all existing EU legislation in terms of its social consequences” (Munchau, 2005:13). Certainly, it is significant to watch this competition as it unfolds because of its obvious repercussion on integration in both southern and West Africa. The outcome of this contest will have enormous implications for the integrative projects in the two regions. We turn now to activities at the regional level.

Counter movements, agents and spaces at the regional level:

We can imagine regions not only as spatial constructs which facilitate the exploitation of the sub-continent; we can also imagine them as counterspaces, as sites of resistance to such processes ... to conceive of regions as spaces of rights represents a direct challenge to the hegemonic consensus on liberalism (Niemann 2001:75).

This epigraph sets the scene for a discussion of actions of anti-neo-liberal forces in the two regions. These activities take the form of migration, informal trading networks, disjuncture between periphery and semi-periphery interests, and activities of civil society organizations. We will consider these in turn.

Migration:

To start with, illegal migration subverts the notion of a bounded space – a space that shuts out external *others*. Furthermore, migration is a resistance to state regulation of migratory flows across boundaries (Nieman, 2001:74). It also points to a structural defect. A social order which no longer caters for the needs and interests of people compels them to disengage from it (Chazan and Rothchild, 1988). Migration is one of the

forms of disengagement. Skewed redistribution of resources and neo-liberal practices have produced an “unprecedented squeeze on popular livelihood” (Meagher, 2003:60). This condition drives – usually through unofficial channels – people to move from one state to another, where economic prospects seem to be better. So, Burkinabes, Malians, Nigeriens and others “flow” into Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Congolese and Swazis migrate to South Africa. These migrants create communities that defy the rigidity of state border control and essentially highlight the defects of the existing socio-economic order.

The trans-border informal economy:

This informal sector is broad. It comprises different categories of products and actors. Some traffic in drugs, diamonds and arms. These transactions across boundaries, especially in arms and diamonds, are the results of civil conflicts and rebel activities. There is illicit transborder trade in diamonds and arms in both southern and West Africa. A lot of small arms have found their way into the public domain due to past civil conflict in Mozambique, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and current crises in Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Guns from Mozambique are sold in South Africa and small arms are smuggled from Sierra Leone and Liberia into Côte d’Ivoire (Reno, 1998; Baptista-Lundin and Taylor, 2003; Meagher, 2003). Diamonds – the so-called “blood diamonds” – from rebel-held areas in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other former conflict areas like Sierra Leone and Liberia are illicitly sold. In southern Africa – especially the macro-regional space which comprises Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and South Africa – there are organized criminal syndicates who engage in cash heists, cross-border vehicle smuggling, trade in counterfeit money and stock theft (*Business Day*, 28 March 2000; Baptista-Lundin and Taylor, 2003:102).

These forms of cross-border activities, extremely criminal in scope and undesirable, must however be contrasted with other informal economic activities across the regions. These

represent “popular resistance” (Meagher, 2003:58) to failures of the state and the prevailing neo-liberal order (Chazan, 1988). The increase in unemployment, destruction of social safety nets and downsizing of the formal economy, which are the consequences of grim liberalism, have created extensive informal trading networks in both regions. Söderbaum and Taylor (2003:5) suggested that the Mozambican government’s rejection of the “old socialist experiment” and adoption of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s meant that the “old safety net provided by the state gradually disappeared”. So, with no social net to fall on, many Mozambicans, particularly women, have joined the informal regional trade, the *Mukhero*. This counter-regional economy persists in spite of the claims of neo-liberal policy-makers that liberalization will remove distortions in the regional market. For marginalized groups like women, the informal economy is an avenue of escape, a means to scrape some income.

There are regular, even daily, informal flows of goods across state boundaries. Mozambicans, Zimbabweans and other traders from neighbouring states buy goods like vegetables, sugar, fruits, clothes, soap, oil and small home appliances from South Africa or Swaziland and transport them to their respective countries (Niemann, 2001; Söderbaum and Taylor, 2003). Similar trade movements occur in West Africa. Traders purchase building materials, spare parts, textiles, soap, pomade, gasoline, plastic products and pharmaceuticals from Nigeria and sell them in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Togo and Benin (Chazan, 1988; Mas, 1993; Naudet, 1993).

There are actors who deal in contraband goods, in cash crop commodities such as cocoa, coffee and petroleum. These traders smuggle the commodities into neighbouring countries. This practice is common in West Africa. Cocoa in Ghana is illegally sold in Togo and other neighbouring states; and petroleum from Nigeria is smuggled into Benin, Togo and other countries (Chazan, 1988 and Meagher, 2003). Such informal trading activities are in some cases carried out with the connivance of state officials. The state is seen as an “arbiter of the distribution of rents from illicit activities (Meagher, 2003:67). As its avenues of accumulation dwindle because of its reduced role in the economy, the

state promotes the participation of certain groups in the informal economy as a means to “maintain loyalty” (ibid.:675).

The monetary and economic differences between states sustain this informal regional economy. Nigerian products are sold on the French West African markets for the convertible CFA franc (Meagher, 2003). Mozambicans and Zimbabwean traders are attracted to low priced South African goods which are not available in their countries (Baptista-Lundin and Taylor, 2003). Indeed these trading activities work against the neo-liberal regionalist enterprise. These social forces – traders – have no desire to see the dissolution of trade barriers because they earn income by exploiting disparities in monetary regimes, the “differential implementation of structural adjustment reforms” and other policies in the region (Meagher, 2003:67). As a result, “the trans-border traders have not tended to come out in favour of economic liberalization or regional integration” (ibid.).

Sometimes competition between trans-border trading networks provokes “recourse to various forms of informal protectionism rather than enduring commitment to liberalization” (ibid.:67). Local trading networks in Niger and Guinea denied rival trading groups from neighbouring countries access to their grain markets notwithstanding the “liberalization of grain markets” (ibid.:67). Therefore the existence of this trans-border informal trade constitutes a challenge to the hegemonic regional orders. The informal regional economy throws into sharp relief the contradictions embedded in the dominant neo-liberal order.

The disjuncture between semi-periphery and periphery interests:

Robert Cox suggests that counter-hegemonic forces could be a coalition of states, especially in the peripheral regions (Devetak, 1996:160). This is a reaction to their

disadvantageous position in the world economy. Cox (1981:151), Ashley (1987:428), Shaw (1990:113) and Marcuse (cited in Calhoun, 1996:450) identify the Third World, particularly, as a potential site of coalition and resistance. This is because, as Marcuse – like Sartre – wrote, most of the world’s poor, Fanon’s “wretched of the earth”, are located in this region (Calhoun, 1996:450). Here, the “horsemen of the apocalypse” of disease, famine, pestilence, death and poverty “stalk the earth” (Amin, 2002:157; see also Gill, 1997). A further classification could be made within this general category of the Third World. There are two blocs of state – what the World System theorists or the Dependency scholars characterize as the “peripheral” and “semi-peripheral” or “sub-imperial” in the terminology of neo-Marxists – in the global economic hierarchy (Bond, 2004a: 218; Shaw, 1990).

As noted in Chapter 6, these differences exist in the two regions. Powerful social forces in the semi-peripheral areas tend to be conservative. They favour “incorporation into the hegemonic world economy” and to “bargain for better deals” in the global economy (Cox, 1981:151). Their intermediary positions in this economic order give them advantage over the peripheral states. These semi-peripheral states also have, relatively, effective corporatist, welfare and legal institutions necessary for hegemonic stability. In contrast to the interests of semi-peripheries, which are “growth and dominance”, the peripheries, the poor states, seek development, which is only possible in a new regional order (Shaw, 1990:113).

There is little industrialization in these states. Agriculture and primary commodity production form the bases of their economies. However, these products have little value in global production relations. So, the peripheries present a world where people lead a subsistence lifestyle of extraordinary poverty and deprivation. There is massive unemployment and people “have no prospect of satisfying the needs that modernity has promoted” (Amin, 2002:150). Most people in these states are marginalized from the neo-liberal global economy and there are no significant social security systems in place. Therefore, the call for structural change is likely to be trenchant in these states. But as Cox, (1981: 151) pointed out the “state class” – the ruling elite – may not be the one to

initiate this transformation. States would be pushed from below by social forces who are the “most objectively disempowered by existing arrangements” (Calhoun, 1996:450). Where are these states located in the two regions?

In southern Africa, states like Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Malawi and Namibia could be labeled as peripheries. These states receive small benefit from a neo-liberal regional order. They are mainly agricultural or mono-commodity exporting countries. There is a growing sentiment – a result of the extreme economic polarity between them and South Africa – in these states that existing regional economic relations promote unequal development and underdevelopment, job losses and de-industrialization. For instance, there have been job cuts in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi because factories are forced to close when their markets are flooded with South African products. The national capitalists and other elites from these states complain about the asymmetrical development between South Africa and the other states (Lee, 2003:102). The Namibian Trade and Industry Minister, in an interview in 1997, lamented that South Africa’s economic activities hamper industrial development in the neighbouring states (Matanga, 2002:135). Government delegates from other countries at a southern Africa regional summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 2003 expressed concern that South Africa exports, which enjoy duty rebate, are “killing off other economies in the region” (Bond, 2004a:232).

Additionally, at a training workshop organized by the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF) for trade unions in southern Africa, the representatives who spoke against neo-liberal regionalism were unionists from relatively poor countries like Swaziland, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho. The general consensus among these participants was that the “decision to liberalize trade is suicidal and homicidal for a number of countries in the region” (Nkoko, 2000:31). The representatives complained that the decision to adopt neo-liberal regionalism shows a lack of concern for the different stages of economic development among member states, and concluded that only the “rich countries will benefit from liberalization” (ibid.:31). We have seen that this economic order is a dominating tool.

This is re-echoed by a representative from Zambia who noted that neo-liberal regionalism is only meant to “turn weak economies into a dumping place for the rich economies” (ibid.:31).

The horizontal polarization – asymmetrical economic relations – in West Africa is not as pronounced as in the case of southern Africa because of low levels of economic interactions between states in the region (Okolo and Wright, 1990; Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Page and Bilal, 2001 and Uche, 2001). Nevertheless the semi-peripheral states reap much benefit from the integrative project. This disparity is bound to widen as the regional economy becomes more and more liberalized.

The polarity is much more discernible at the vertical level, which is between the peripheries and the core states. For example, the neo-liberal integrative arrangement in French West Africa, in which France forms an integral part, only entrenches unequal development. French goods and services predominate, which undermines efforts at domestic industrialization. Lee (2003:38) and Uche (2001) assess this relationship and draw similar conclusions. The economic development of these states is simply not a priority of France. This pattern also exists at the broader global level – adopting trade liberalization measures opens up the door for the markets of the poor states in the region to be flooded with external products. In West Africa, previous Free Trade Areas at the meso-regional levels foundered because the peripheral states failed to co-operate in schemes that did not address their development needs (Okolo and Wright, 1990).

Unsurprisingly, therefore, in both southern and West Africa, the poor states are the strongest advocates for a regional order that is development based. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have shown more enthusiasm for ECOWAS Protocol on Cross-border Co-operation than their relatively affluent neighbours (Asiwaju, 2002). These poorer states have latched onto the cross border concept because it offers an avenue for empowering communities across borders. As a result of the inequalities of neo-liberal practice, the potential exists for the peripheral states within the two regions to be at the vanguard in the struggles for social change.

In this particular struggle the national capitalist class may form a coalition with the marginalized, workers, the poor, the unemployed and other discontented social forces to re-orient the states toward alternative regional order. This coalition for change may come to resemble the constellation of social forces behind the structural change in 1930 Europe. The clamour for a regulatory arm of the state in the economy was made not only by workers but also by the industrial and agricultural business classes affected by free market practices. For instance, in the 1930s a coalition of farmers, workers and the “small capitalist sector” made possible the emergence of social democracy like the “Swedish model” which is regarded as a “democratic and inclusive form of accumulation” (Gill, 1997:224). This takes us to regional civil society groups.

Counter social movement at the regional level:

Civil society activists in the two regions resent the neo-liberal turn of regional development for several reasons. They are convinced that the neo-liberal order only serves the interest of powerful social forces and are skeptical about the claimed benefits of free trade liberalism. What are certain about this form of regionalism are its negative effects on the livelihood of ordinary people – the marginalized and the poor. It reinforces gross disparity between individuals and states. Civil society organizations further discount the assumed mutual benefits of comparative advantage; it rather puts weak economies at a permanent disadvantage. These organizations deplore the excessive liberalization of social services like water, health, education, electricity and the minimalist state. So, these movements have been drawn to other options. They particularly advocate for a long-term development agenda which is geared toward human development. For them, this is possible in a political culture that recognizes public participation in decision-making, an order based on dialogue, consensus and social justice (for a detailed account of reasons for transnational opposition to neo-liberalism see among others Niemann, 2001; Held and McGrew, 2002; Gélinas, 2003; Saul, 2003; Bond, 2004).

In pursuit of these goals, the leaders of civil society groups have decided to educate, inform and sensitize the regions' people concerning the effects of a neo-liberal agenda. In West Africa, civil society groups met in Dakar, Senegal, in 2003, and resolved to let people know about the impact of regional and international policies on social developments (Sachikonye, 2004; *International Alert*, December, 2003). Social groups in southern Africa have adopted the same strategy. The SAHRINGON makes use of the web – the Internet – to disseminate information to various civil society groups, and to build up a network of various NGOs “as a counterpoint to state efforts in the region” (Niemann, 2001:77).

In 2001, members of social movements and organizations across southern Africa, the Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) held a workshop in Malawi and criticized “the international institutions promoting neo-liberal policies for globalization ... and call for their dismantling” (Bond, 2004b:113). SAPSN organized regional workshops to “generate analysis, establish positions, and coordinate campaigns against neo-liberalism” (ibid:117). This organization holds periodic workshops and sponsors campaigns within the region. It sponsored the Zimbabwean Coalition on Debt and Development; the Swaziland Campaign against Poverty and Economic Inequality; the Malawi Economic Justice Network; and peasant from Lesotho at the World Summit on Sustainable Development.

Surely, the networks, coalitions and interlinkages that these social movements construct at all levels, national and regional, have the potential to grow into a formidable counter force to “curtail, at the regional level, the tendencies of globalizing capital to exploit the differences between various places” (Niemann, 2001:76). This would eventually compel states to adopt a more universal form of regional development. For these movements, the international arena – extra regional environment – remains crucial for realizing an alternative socio-economic order. The neo-liberal programmes originate from inter-Governmental institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, the WTO and the G8 Summits (the seven most industrialized states plus Russia). Civil society groups therefore understand that any effective resistance to these policies requires building “simultaneous

belongings to overlapping communities” (Held and McGrew, 2002:112). It demands participating in global efforts to promote “humane governance” and democratic global institutions. This would counter the excessive “individualism” or the “rational self interest of neo-liberalism” and bureaucratization of social relations (ibid.). Let us examine the activities of these groups at the extra-regional level

Counter-communities at extra-regional levels:

Social groups like feminists, pacifists, members of co-operatives, unionists, landless movements, artists, grass root communities, dissident intellectuals, ecologists and religious movements have solidarized and formed coalitions with other social justice movements at the global level to “offset the power and influence of the predominantly market-oriented agencies” and the transnational social forces behind them (Held and McGrew, 2002:109).

These groups participate in the World Social Forum, an annual gathering of social movements at Porto Alegre, Brazil. This forum, to retrieve the expression of Gélinas, (2003:201), constitutes the “emergence of a global collective consciousness” which resists the destructive effects of a neo-liberal order. It believes in the possibility of an alternative global order. In this sense, “Porto Alegre” represents a global counter space, ideologically at variance with neo-liberalism. In 2002, the Forum focused its attention on *unfettered globalization*. It made recommendations for some forms of regulated global economy – limiting mobility of capital, improving corporate governance, protecting core labour standards and safeguarding the environment (Held and McGrew, 2002:115).

The global anti-hegemonic movement holds parallel meetings and demonstrates at G8 Summits, major UN conferences, meetings of transnational corporations, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. Civil society groups around the world held an alternative summit at the UN sponsored Conference on Environment and Development Summit at

Rio, Brazil “to search for an alternative to the globalization system”; this summit led to the emergence of the global civil society (Gélinas, 2003:193). At Seattle, in November 1999, where the WTO held an extra-ordinary conference, the Millennium Round of Trade Negotiations “designed to complete the world’s commodification”, these anti-systemic forces protested against the influence of transnational corporations on WTO agenda and free trade (Gélinas, 2003:201). They also protest at the “World Economic Forum” which is an annual gathering of the G8 and executives of the world’s prominent transnational corporations at the Swiss alpine resort town of Davos (Sachikonye, 2004:652). Of course, the co-existence of the two forums, the World Social Forum and the World Economic Forum, neatly portray the tension within the current hegemonic order.

In South Africa civil movements representing global civil society protested against the IMF/World Bank meeting at the August 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. The South African Municipal Workers Union played a catalytic role in the formation of a social, consumer and environmental transnational movement from Accra, Ghana, to Vancouver, Canada, against the excessive commodification and privatization of water. It led to a proposed World Water Treaty prohibiting profit-making from water. Civil society groups from the two regions have also been active on the continent.

Social movements from the two regions form part of movements like the “African Peoples Consensus”, the Jubilee Movement and the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD). These movements want an end to trans-nationalization of the state, and the promotion of “greater regional co-operation”. They reject free trade liberalism, IMF/World Bank policies and favour cancellation of Africa’s debt. They seek participation in decision-making processes of the African Union.⁹⁸ For instance representatives of about 200 civil society groups across Africa converged on Maputo, Mozambique, during the African Union Summit in July 2003. At the end of a three-day meeting, they issued a declaration which called for civil society participation in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes for the advancement of development in Africa, and rejected IMF/World Bank policies

⁹⁸ See website: <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?>

because they impoverish people. The representatives deplored the privatization of basic social services – water, health and education – and demanded that NEPAD should not reflect IMF imposed Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs).

Members of the Jubilee Movement from the DRC, Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Cameroon, Zambia, Swaziland, Côte d'Ivoire and other countries met in Cape Town in June 2004, and declared their opposition to “the disguised structural adjustment programme through NEPAD” and demanded total “unconditional cancellation of Africa’s debt” (Bond, 2004c:610).

Looking back, we have argued that there are counter communities, spaces, forces, agents, and activities at the local and regional level and beyond which represent challenges to the neo-liberal order. These oppose the excessive commodification of social life and cherish communal bonds and obligations; reflect the contradictions of the prevailing neo-liberal order; yearn for social justice and equity; call for popular participation in decision-making processes; clamour for harmony between man and the environment; and demand the regulatory hand of the state. These are values and aspirations that stand in a tense relation with those of the existing order, with its emphasis on bureaucratic and instrumental rationality, individualism or rational self-interest. However, the ability of these counter forces to bring about transformation is fraught with difficulties: the next section analyses the constraints and challenges before these anti-hegemonic forces and the immanent opportunities for change.

There is yet to emerge a formidable, cohesive and sustainable counter social movement in both regions, as we shall immediately see. Civil society activities in the regions have been on an ad hoc basis. Civil society groups are mobilized when there is a crisis or for a particular event. What is however needed is a durable movement, one that can engage in a long-term struggle against the institutions and ideology of the prevailing neo-liberal order. This strategy can have a sustained impact on governments or states (see Cox, 1999:19). The weakness of these social forces can also be traced to their inability to participate fully in regional affairs. For instance, SADC has been reluctant to co-operate

with civil society organizations. Representatives of South African Human Rights NGOs (SAHRINGON) “have been shunned at official SADC meetings” and NGOs were not consulted during negotiations preceding the “launching of the SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security” (Niemann, 2001:71). By contrast, ECOWAS has shown a commitment to engage social groups, especially in security issues. However, analysts point out that civil society organizations in West Africa do not have the organizational and resource capacity to participate fully in regional affairs (Rene, 2004). (Chapter Eight takes up this issue of lack of representation and participation and shows how this can be addressed). We now turn to the issue of fragmentation in the anti-hegemonic movement.

The apparent multiplicity of agenda within counter social movements reveals a lack of cohesive ideology and interest. Each social movement usually concentrates on a particular issue which sometimes conflicts with the interests of the other (Cox, 1999). Feminist groups focus on women’s interests, ecologists on the environment, labour unions largely on workers, and the landless movement on the land.⁹⁹ Environmental groups that resist the rampant destruction of forest for timber or petroleum extraction are bound to clash with forestry and oil workers respectively; feminist groups countering exclusion from the workplace are regarded as a threat to the job security of male workers, especially “precarious” workers (*ibid.*). Citizens from semi-peripheral areas such as South Africa and Côte d’Ivoire are hostile toward migrants from the peripheries. These are regarded as threats to jobs and social security.

So the challenge is for the leadership within these movements to transcend their parochial interest and take joint action against neo-liberalism. Some scholars believe that the “commodification of everything ... provides the basis for a unifying agenda for a wide-scale movement for fundamental social change” (Bond, 2004a:233-4). In fact Patrick Bond sees the “decommodification” strategies and tactics adopted by marginalized groups against excessive commercialization of basic social services, especially in South

⁹⁹ Robert Cox observes that new social movements tend to concentrate on consumption issues such as poverty, homelessness and social services while labour concerns itself with production matters; Cox, *op cit.*, p.19. The other difference between these new social movements and labour is that the latter tend to have a loose organizational structure which facilitates popular participation in decision-making while labour has a hierarchical structure.

Africa, as potential threats to neo-liberal interests. For Bond, these strategies can lead to nationalization of industries and utilities, and more generous social policies (ibid.). There is also, to retrieve an earlier point, a possibility that a coalition of local industrialists, workers, unemployed, the poor and other discontented social forces will emerge in the peripheries to press their governments to seek a new regional order. This is feasible because of the existing asymmetry between the peripheries and the semi-peripheries, the inability of local entrepreneurs to compete with transnational capital, the pervasive poverty, unemployment and other forms of social dislocation thrown up by the neo-liberal order in these areas. In fact the French No Vote to the European Constitution Treaty lends credence to the possibility of such a coalition. We have noted that the French rejection of the Treaty reflected the opposition of local industrialists, farmers, labour unions and social democrats to the neo-liberal direction of the European order (Peel, 2005:13). The French government's decision to fight for the French social model within the E.U., and Jeane-Claude Juncker's – the former President of the European Union – remark that the E.U. should assess the social impact of its existing legislation all indicate the influence such a coalition can have on policy. Indeed, socializing neo-liberalism within the E.U. can have an impact on regionalism in both southern and West Africa.

The other challenge, especially for civil society leadership, is how to move away from a space-oriented and synchronic mode of thinking to a predominantly time-oriented mode of thinking¹⁰⁰ (Cox, 1999:27). At present, pro-hegemonic forces and institutions use problem-solving mechanisms to meet demands of opposing forces and deflect attention from a systematic attack on structures that ensure the persistence of neo-liberalism. These short-term concessions or what Fantu Cheru labels “accumulated victories here and there” slow the drive for a fundamental structural change (Cheru, 2002; see also, Cox, 1999:23). Two examples will suffice to carry this point:

¹⁰⁰ The former is problem-solving mindset in which specific social problems are solved within the framework of the neo-liberal order which take focus away from the broader structural problems while the latter refers to an antagonistic attitude towards the existing order, such as attacking the normative claims and the pathologies of the neo-liberal order, as well as thinking through alternatives.

First, as women's movements counter their marginalization from the public sphere – the socio-economic policy-making and implementation processes – their leaders are co-opted into the social order. It is now fashionable, in fact politically correct, to establish quotas for women in institutions of governance. Both ECOWAS and SADC have gender policies, which prescribe appointing or electing a given percentage of women into legislative and executive positions (Bischoff, 2002; Rene, 2004). For instance, the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development seeks to ensure that in 2005 “at least 30% of members of Parliament and ministers will be women” which will be a rise from existing levels of 15% and 12% respectively (see Bischoff, 2002:294). In South Africa a record number of women have been brought into the cabinet (the vice-president is a woman) and others are premiers in provinces. It is reported that both South Africa and Mozambique have attained the SADC 30% female representation in Parliament (*SAFM News Bulletin*, 8 August, 2005). Zimbabwe, notwithstanding the authoritarianism of the regime, now has a woman as a Vice President, and a woman serves as deputy speaker of Parliament in Swaziland, where there is entrenched patriarchy. The continental body, the African Union, has a woman as the speaker of the AU Parliament. This practice of gender equity is found in other states in the two regions.

Of course it is essential to incorporate women who have been marginalized on patriarchal (and other) grounds into the public sphere. However the selective inclusion, in practice, does not disturb the applecart of neo-liberalism. These women are absorbed into the status quo and at this point their interest is indistinguishable from that of the established order. It is rather at variance with that of ordinary women. Yet the system presents this form of inclusion as empowerment of women; this, indeed, is a powerful ploy to promote acquiescence!

Secondly, both ECOWAS and SADC set up regional parliaments after persistent calls to include the regions' people in the decision-making process¹⁰¹ (Bischoff, 2002; Rene, 2004). These organs are reputed to be the voices of the people, they are held up as

¹⁰¹ The ECOWAS Parliament was inaugurated in 2000 and the SADC parliamentary forum established in 1996.

mouthpiece of the regions' people. Are they? These organs do not have binding decision-making powers; they only have advisory roles. Significantly, these regional "parliamentarians" are part of the ruling establishment and their interests are therefore statist in orientation.

Moreover, to build a strong regional counter movement entails raising the consciousness of ordinary citizens in the two regions. Presently, there is indeed little regional consciousness among ordinary people in both regions. It is partly the result of rigid identity claims and exclusionary practices of the state. This practice constricts the spatial horizon of people and diminishes their ability to connect their own miseries and material conditions with others in similar situations across the regions. In essence, there is no intellectual understanding of the complex interdependence and the mutual vulnerabilities that exist in a region (Keohane and Nye, 1989). Put differently, these ordinary citizens lack the ideological tools to understand that the causes of regional under-development are the effects of practices of the hegemonic order.

Then there is the issue of apathy and cynicism. Many people in both regions, and other parts of Africa, have lost faith in the political process. Politics, at least in the classical sense, ought to be devoted to the pursuit of the common good (Bernstein, 1995). But in the African context politics is rather about intense competition by elite groups for state resources. The economic product of the state is shared between dominant social forces and external interests (Cox, 1999:24). The democratic wave that swept across Africa was essentially a reaction by popular forces to degenerative politics. The period marked attempts by marginalized groups to insert themselves into the realm of politics – public sphere – to be active participants in the political, social and economic decision-making and implementation processes (Ake, 2000). However, the hope that the emergence of democracy would end their marginalization was dashed. What they have is liberal democracy in the minimalist sense, in which people's participation in the democratic process is limited to periodic exercise of their franchise at the polls while their socio-

economic conditions remain unchanged!¹⁰² So, the disappointment which followed the 1990s struggle for democracy has produced in people a cynical attitude toward the redemptive power of struggle. So how can regional consciousness and interest in struggle be built? Or how can interest in civil society activities be resurrected?

Some analysts suggest that one way of doing this is for counter intellectuals to seek ways of fostering interaction, cooperation and solidarity among people from diverse national societies within each state in both regions (Blaauw, 2003:16). This chapter suggests that “African Liberation Day” institutionalized by the African Union to celebrate the liberation of the continent from colonialism, can be used to promote regional consciousness. In South Africa, for instance, “Africa Day” has emerged as a time to celebrate the different cultures, in the form of food, music, dance and dress, within the sub-region and beyond. However, it can go beyond this: the leadership of civil society groups can use the day to educate the region’s people about their common destiny, the structural problems at both the regional and international level that impact on their collective existence, and the importance of collective action. This awareness can help create a formidable regional public that can be mobilized for an alternative order. The “ECOWAS Day” in West Africa can serve a similar purpose.

Others emphasize the education of women. They argue that women, especially at the grass-root, across national boundaries share similar experiences and roles, in fact, they are the ones most adversely affected by the neo-liberal social order. So, educating women about the importance of participating in voluntary association can help in building a

¹⁰² Rita Abrahamsen described the democratic wave in the 1990s as a form of “passive revolution”. This term, in the Gramscian sense, refers to an incomplete transformation of society or an inability to replace the existing order, see Cox, op. cit., p.16. According to Abrahamsen, the ordinary people within the democratic movement wanted not just an end to the prevailing one-party systems in Africa, more importantly what they sought was direct participation in the socio-political and economic decision making processes. This as we have already seen, has not been achieved because liberal democracy remains an elitist project. Robert Cox gives other meanings of passive revolution. First, it refers to a stalemate in the battle between forces of change and the status quo; it describes a situation in which the counter-hegemonic force, though strong, is not strong enough to bring about change. Secondly, it describes the process where elites within the countermovement are co-opted by hegemonic forces. Finally it refers to emancipatory strategies which are idealistic because they do not reflect the material conditions of social groups involved in the struggle. So, passive revolution reflects some of the challenges before counter forces. On passive revolution see also Giovanni Arrighi, “Hegemony and Anti-systemic Movements”, *Impressum r/s*, policy paper 1. (2004), pp.1-4.

durable and strong civil society movement that is committed to change (Blaauw, 2003:16; see also Booth and Vale, 1995). We turn now to the challenges before labour, which as we have already seen plays a pivotal role in the quest for change.

Labour Unions usually find it difficult to mobilize workers across state boundaries against neo-liberal regionalism because of sovereign claims of state. Governments exhibit hostility to such regional mobilization (Buhlungu, 2003; Kraus, 1990). They regard it as “unwarranted” and “illegitimate” encroachment on their sovereignty (Kraus, 1990:263). Also differences in economic and political positions among member states and resource constraints of labour unions in both West and southern Africa make regional trade union mobilization a daunting task (Rene, 2004:26; Buhlungu, 2003, see also Kraus, 1990:265). We also noted in Chapter Six that there is a division within labour in both regions. These are those integrated into the global economy and predominantly located in the semi-peripheral states, and the precarious labor force with no security of tenure. Another challenge is the lack of sufficient information on regionalism among workers (Nkoko, 2000:32).

However, some of these constraints can be surmounted. There are already, especially in the Francophone West African states, common institutions and industrial relations laws which can facilitate transboundary trade union solidarity (Kraus, 1990). Furthermore, there are transnational companies in the banking, mining, retail, tourism, agriculture, transport, construction, and industrial sectors operating in both regions. Each of these corporations has branches in a number of states (Kraus, 1990:262; Hentz, 2001:199; Bond, 2004a:231; Miller, 2004:66; Webster, 2004:15). For instance, *Shoprite*¹⁰³ which is

¹⁰³ Shoprite, which is a South African retail conglomerate, has 14 branches across Africa. Darlene Miller points out that there is a wage differential between South African workers in this organization and foreign workers, who earn less than their South African counterparts. For Miller, this disparity was one of the reasons for a strike in Zambia by workers of this organization in 2002. Miller argues that this contradiction represents a strategic weakness in South African multinational corporations operating in the region. This weakness, she argues, can serve as a catalyst for trans-border solidarities, see Miller, op. cit. Indeed this process has already begun in southern Africa. There is the Southern African Mine Workers Federation which comprises national mining unions in eight countries. The National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) in South Africa played a pivotal role in the formation of this organization. It is a reaction to the impact of trade liberalization policies on this industry. The organization therefore aims at adopting a common regional approach to labour issues. Similarly, South African unions in the clothing and textile, metals and

a retail business based in South Africa has branches in most of the states in southern Africa (Webster, 2004). So, these extra-territorial economic activities can help labour unions to share information, establish links with each other, and develop common strategies and positions against neo-liberal regionalism and other industrial issues (Kraus, 1990:262). Other writers suggest that existing labour publications such as the *South African Labour Bulletin*, the *Shopsteward* published by COSATU, and the *Worker* published by the ZCTU can be used to disseminate information on neo-liberalism; this strategy can be supplemented with seminars. While doing all this, labour should continue with industrial action “as a means of defensive resistance against the further onslaught of globalization” (Cox, 1999:28). We now focus on the intellectual dimension of the challenge before the countermovement.

There is a pervasive pessimism towards the feasibility of an alternative order – what Stephen Gill refers to as the pessimism of the intellect (1997). This is a result of propaganda by neo-liberal forces like the mainstream media, neo-liberal intellectuals, policy makers, bureaucrats and institutions. These, particularly with the falling into disrepute of communism, present the neo-liberal doctrine as the only credible path to development and prosperity. This is reflected, as has been noted, in the expression “there is no alternative” (Cox, 1999:27). This slogan, which was first articulated by the former Prime Minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher, has become a powerful weapon to suppress reflexive thinking on alternative social relations. As a result, the intellectuals who dare say yes, another world is possible, are regarded as “idealists ...[and]... trouble makers” (Gélinas, 2003:184). This intellectual battle between thinkers and theorists organically linked to the countermovement and the defenders of the status quo, has its historical antecedents, to which we turn in order to demonstrate that there is a possibility of ideological victory for the counter hegemonic forces.

construction industries intend forging links with unions in the respective sectors across the region. Although the fundamental impetus for this regional collaboration seems to be the desire of the unions to fight for better employment conditions, job security and benefits for their members, such regional initiatives have the potential to develop into a movement against neo-liberal regionalism. For an account of labour union co-operation in southern Africa see for example, Peek op. cit. p. 43-44.

The emotive and ideational force of the writing, practices, views, opinions and ideas of intellectuals have accounted for socio-economic transformations at different epochs. Michael Mann (1993) suggests that the social ferment and the ultimate transformations that occurred in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries were results of the intellectual activities of those opposed to the existing order. The persuasive ideas of liberal writers and philosophers were instrumental in transforming absolute monarchical orders into more egalitarian societies. Jacques Gélinas also points out that the slave trade, which was an essential component of the international economy of the 18th century, came to an end through the arguments of the “Abolitionists” (Gélinas, 2003). In the 1930s, Keynesian thought, controlled capitalism, and state interventionist policies superseded the free market principles and practices propounded by Adam Smith and others. Going further back in time, teachings such as the power of reason of Enlightenment writers, like Kant, influenced the critical attitude towards religion and political authority of religious personages, which had formed the bases of medieval society (Turner, 1996). Some common threads run through all these historical episodes. First, the innovative ideas espoused by the intellectuals were at variance with the conventions, practices, doctrines and beliefs of the times. Second, there were ideological battles between those intellectuals who sought change and those who supported the status quo. Third, the new ideas prevailed leading to a transformation of society, because of relentless critique of the foundations of the prevailing order. Finally, socio-economic transformation occurred over a long period of time.

So monarchists clashed, on the level of ideas, with the intellectual supporters of the medieval order. They successfully argued that political authority, in this case the monarch, must be independent of religious authority. Their ideas gained much currency because the medieval order, its unity, was broken by the many religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, which led to the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (see Hinsley, 1986; Lipschutz, 2001). Westphalia brought an end to Christendom, the sovereignty of the Pope over Europe and the emergence of the sovereign states (the monarchical orders). Keynesian principles contended with entrenched discourse and practice of classical liberalism from the 18th century. By the 1930s Keynesianism had prevailed. The assault

on free market liberalism was enhanced by the known facts of uncontrolled market: unemployment, social dislocations, poor working conditions, economic deterioration, and so on (Carr, 1945; Burchill, 1996; Linklater, 1997; Gélinas, 2003).

The beliefs of Abolitionists conflicted with the entrenched views, interests and practices of slavery in the 18th century. Slave trade was an integral part of the socio-economic order of that era. Great Britain, which was then the dominant power, benefited immensely from the slave trade. Slave labour on the cotton plantations in the Americas produced cheap cotton, which fed the British textile industry – the “spearhead of its industrial revolution” (Gélinas, 2003:183). It propelled Britain into becoming a powerful textile-trading nation, eliminating its competitors (ibid.:183). Dahomey (now Benin) in West Africa built its economy in the 18th century around slave trade. It raided enemy territories for slaves and sold them in exchange for European merchandise (Hopkins, 1973). The elite of the time “approved and praised the established order”. The merchants who bought the slaves shipped into ports like Liverpool and Bordeaux and farmers who repurchased them to work on the plantations were at one with intellectual sympathizers in the thought that “they were accomplishing good deeds by rescuing blacks from their savagery ... to integrate them into Christian civilization and modernity (Gélinas, 2003:184). The Abolitionists and their supporters had to wage a “relentless war” against the industrial class that had benefited immensely from that “production and trade system”, and to “reverse a paradigm deeply rooted in the minds of their contemporaries by the preachers of the time” (ibid.). This process took well over a century!

Returning to the present, these past examples give hope to the future. However, there is work ahead of thinkers and scholars attached to the countermovement. As Robert Cox, following Gramsci, has pointed out, material conditions alone do not lead to a full understanding of the pathologies of the prevailing order; it is also not sufficient to move people to seek change (Cox, 1999). The task, therefore, is for these intellectuals to educate people in order to bring them to a state of consciousness. To accomplish this task, they will have to forge a closer relationship with the counter-hegemonic movement by participating in workshops, seminars, meeting, summits and other activities; they will

have to present a nuanced critique of the existing neo-liberal order; and, importantly, they must be able to develop and articulate ideas that can lead to universal progress, prosperity and happiness – to a better social, political and economic future (Lipschutz, 2001:176).

The tasks also include seeking out those within the current community of power – the statesmen, officials or bureaucrats in national, regional and global institutions of power – who exhibit some sensitivity toward the “social pathologies” thrown up by the current neo-liberal order (Bernstein, 1995:14). Drawing on the resource of power, Anthony Giddens reminded Critical Theorists not to “cede tradition to the conservatives”, which is the discourse and practice of power politics (cited in Ashley, 1987:428). What this means is that forming an alliance with and influencing these statesmen and officials, through the power of ideas,¹⁰⁴ may yield the power resources needed to shift the emphasis away from neo-liberalism to a “new direction”; it can help to bend the current community of power, the neo-liberal hegemonic community to a “new will” (Ashley, 1987:429). So, the organic intellectuals must heed the call of Richard Ashley that the work of the revolutionary “is not to repudiate this community of power politics, for the repudiation of realist power politics is the abnegation of revolutionary resource” (ibid.).

This opportunity exists: in South Africa, there are “visionaries” within government who see regional integration as a means to address “some of the enormous historical inequalities within and between the states of southern Africa”¹⁰⁵ (Cheru, 1997:220). We have already read of policy-makers in the peripheries in West Africa who favour co-operation that empowers people. At the global level, there are eminent bureaucrats and officials within the bastions of neo-liberalism, such as the IMF and the World Bank, who

¹⁰⁴ As we noted in Chapter One, theoretical ideas often shape policy. Currently the neo-liberal epistemic community has much influence over policy-makers. So, the challenge for counter intellectuals is to break the power of mainstream views on policy. This can be done through the production of more work that offers credible and feasible alternatives.

¹⁰⁵ The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was the economic policy of the Mandela Presidency (between 1994-1999), reflected the interests of these visionaries. RDP at the national level had people-centred aims; it equated economic progress with social equity and development. The RDP’s vision for southern Africa was in contra-distinction to the market-integrative approach. It aimed at breaking the apartheid and colonial economic geography of the region by addressing the economic imbalance between South Africa and her neighbours. RDP therefore emphasized mutual development. For the regional dimension of RDP, see Cheru 1997:235; see also for the RDP account, Barber (2004:76-77).

concede to the limitations of the bureaucratic and instrumental rationalism of a neo-liberal paradigm: James Wolfensohn, the erstwhile President of the World Bank, in an ironic twist, expressed the view that “no one has the monopoly on truth” and called for a debate on globalization and its effects (cited in Thomas, 2002:122). He remarked that the poor also have a role in determining the path to development. And Michel Camdessus, the former Managing Director of the IMF, acknowledged:

The markets can have major failures and that growth alone is not enough and can even be destructive of the natural environment and social and cultural goods...only the pursuit of high quality growth is worth the effort... growth that has the human person at its centre” (ibid.:123).

But at present those within these global institutions favour reforms within the broad framework of neo-liberalism. It is their wish to “broaden the ownership of liberalization policies to dampen opposition” (ibid:124). These policy-makers and bureaucrats – in view of their interests in social justice and equity – could be used to open up space for dialogue between those seeking change and supporters of the prevailing order. This discursive process will give legitimacy to state and regional structures.

So, what steps are required to bring dialogue into being? We will argue in Chapter Eight that Habermas’ communicative or discourse theory – first discussed in Chapter Two – offers a conceptual frame for attaining this objective.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

Only in an emancipated society, whose members' autonomy and responsibility have been realized, would communication have developed into the non-authoritarian and universally practiced dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego-identity and our idea of true consensus are always implicitly derived. To this extent, the truth of statements is based on anticipating the realization of the good life (Habermas in Bernstein, 1995:51).

Under certain circumstances civil society can acquire influence in the public sphere, have an effect on the parliamentary complex (and courts) through its own public opinions, and compel the political system to switch over to the official circulation of power (Habermas, 1992:373).

One of the central arguments of this thesis is that a lasting integration, co-operation and development in both southern and West Africa rests on state stability and cohesion. However achieving this remains one of the key challenges for states in the two regions. The thesis showed in Chapter 4 that state sovereignty explains the political instability; it is both absolutist and conflictual. Sovereignty gives the state monopoly over decision-making and control over national identity, political space, means of violence and resources. It is conflictual because it simultaneously concentrates power and benefits in powerful social forces to the exclusion of others. This situation produces instability, alienation and legitimacy crises.

This explanation of the crises of the state refutes the prevailing notions and solutions for the crises. As Chapter 3 has shown, ethno-nationalism advanced as one of the essential causes for state instability in Africa has many pitfalls. The arguments around it are weak and therefore cannot be the basis for the effective resolution of endemic instability in Africa. We have also noted that the introduction of democracy – liberal democracy – the practice of liberal interventionism and the argument to revert to pre-colonial political structures cannot be efficient solutions. Liberal democracy speaks to elite interests, liberal interventionism safeguards state sovereignty and the neo-liberal hegemonic order; and pre-colonial structures are too diverse and differentiated. Essentially, none of these means can provide a legitimate basis for stability because there are elements of domination and exclusion in them. Chapter Five argued that exclusive nationalism hampers the growth of a cosmopolitan order in the two regions.

The neo-liberal integrative projects in both regions are contentious. Adopting a neo-Gramscian approach, Chapter 6 pointed to the beneficiaries and interests behind the regional order and showed that the neo-liberal regionalism deepens tensions and asymmetric relations between states and social forces. As a result Chapter 7 focused on the various forms of resistance against this order.

So, how could these political conflicts, tensions, contradictions, fragmentations, alienation and legitimacy crises of the existing order be resolved? How might social cohesion, which is vital for both national and regional development, be achieved? How might we end the exclusionary practices of the state? This chapter submits that the conceptual frames of Jürgen Habermas's communication theory have a potent "countervailing tendency" against the "social disasters" and "alienation" inherent in modern practices in the two regions (Calhoun, 1996:454). According to Habermas, this discourse theory – what he labels communicative rationality – is a means "to seek a reconciliation of a modernity which has fallen apart" (Habermas cited in Dews, 1992:24). It is an attempt to "realize the unfinished potential of the project of enlightenment or modernity" – universal freedom, peace, progress and prosperity (Calhoun, 1996:455). This chapter discusses the conceptual assumptions of the communicative theory and

shows its relevance and practicability. We will then use the underlying principles of discourse theory to address the questions posed in this chapter. Jürgen Habermas's communicative project has been described as a "complex conjoining" of the 18th century public sphere and classical political practice (Bernstein, 1995:56). What was the nature of politics in these two periods? We turn first to the classical age.

The classical concept of politics and the 18th century public sphere:

Firstly, political praxis was pedagogical – a learning process. The individual, in interacting with other members of the political community, learned to harmonize his interest with that of the group. So politics was a meeting point between ego and alter ego. Secondly, the Greek polis was an "inter-subjective realm of communicative action, a space which made possible unconstrained "reciprocal speech" (1996:35). Citizens participated in political discourse as equals. Thirdly, political life was considered a virtuous endeavour because it was devoted to pursuing the general happiness of society. This was why the classical mind regarded, for example, economic enterprise, which was always for private gain, as an action with little substance. In the economic domain, society becomes an object – a means to a selfish end. This objectification reduces society to a level of man's interaction with nature. Finally, there was popular participation in political practice. Let us now look at the 18th century public sphere.

Political practice in this era had some similarities with that of the classical times (Dews, 1992; Bernstein, 1995; Calhoun, 1996). Social groups like craftsmen, landed gentry, nobles and commoners who had been "excluded from the then dominant institutions of government" (Bernstein, 1995:38) met in salons and parliaments to discuss affairs of state (Calhoun, 1996:453). They wanted the state to be "more open, accountable, and responsive to interests beyond those of the traditional elites" (Bernstein, 1995:38). The members truly constituted a communicative community in spite of their diverse background. They assembled as autonomous individuals and participated in debates, which were based on "rational argument and criticism", without constraints of privileges

or collective prejudices (Calhoun, 1996:453). Opinions formed by consensus invariably influenced public decisions (ibid.).

Habermas's linguistic turn:

For Jürgen Habermas the normative worlds of the Greek polis and the 18th century bourgeois public sphere are also encapsulated in human language. So he turned to the principles which underline the human communication process as standards for judging the validity of norms, values, policies and institutions that govern social relations (Dews, 1992:260). This linguistic turn, Habermas argued, was necessary for the relevance and integrity of Critical Theory (Frankfurt School). Habermas made this linguistic move against a background of pervasive pessimism within the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) exposed the tensions and contradictions of the modern capitalist system. However the Frankfurt theorists were disillusioned with the critical enterprise because they could not locate credible historical forces who could successfully bring about structural change. The proletariat could not be counted on because the modern capitalist system – as in Germany – through corporatist and welfarist structures or what Habermas now opts to call the “juridification” process had managed to neutralize potential conflict between labour and capital (Edwards, 2004:115). The student protest movements in the 1960s could not fill them with any sense of optimism because as Marcuse, for example, put it, there was not in the cause of the students a “standpoint from which to grasp the crisis of the social totality, the successor to the proletariat” (cited in Calhoun, 1995:450; see also Held, 1980; Dews, 1992). This despondency would drive Horkheimer to declare that: “a critical theory of society could only appear as an aimless intellectual game, half conceptual poetry, half impotent expression of states of mind” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972:209): a pessimism which resonated with the post-modernist assumption of the “collapse of any rationally-justified belief in the possibility of a better future” (Dews, 1992:27).

This intellectual fog was a result of a belief in a specific subject as the bearer of structural change. For example, in Marxist thought, the historical subject was identified as the

proletariat (Dews, 1992:12). Habermas shared this belief in his earlier work but identified this subject in the historical process as “the human species rather than a social class, such as the proletariat” (ibid.:12). With fresh insights, Habermas would walk out of this intellectual labyrinth. He moved away from the concept of “species-subject” – so central to Marxist thought – to a recognition that,

the bearers of evolution are rather societies and the acting subjects integrated into them; social evolution can be discerned in those structures that are replaced by more comprehensive structures in accordance with a pattern that is to be rationally reconstructed (Habermas in Dews, 1992:13).

The linguistic ideas of Toulmin, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Searle, Austin and others, aided Habermas to understand that this social evolution is explained by the “immanent rationality of linguistic inter-subjectivity which resists submission to the functional imperatives of economy and administration” (Dews, 1992:16, 253). Signaling the end – at least for him – of the search for normative and emancipatory direction of Critical Theory, he declared that he needed “the ideal speech situation in order to reconstruct the normative foundation of a Critical Theory” (cited in Dews, 1992:92). Let us focus on the basic assumptions of Habermas’s discourse theory.

The Habermasian communicative rationality:

Habermas suggests that there is an intrinsic rationality in human communicative interaction because “dialogic partners” enter into conversation on the basis of equality and bind themselves to some background consensus (Bernstein, 1995:51). First, the speech act – utterance – must be linguistically understandable. It must be in harmony with the “immanent aspect of language” such as grammatical/syntactical, semantic and contextual rules (ibid.). If a speaker’s words do not make sense – because of violation of a linguistic rule – the listener has the right to ask for clarification which could take the form of paraphrasing or rephrasing of the proposition. Second, there should be a

consistency between what the speaker says and does. So, disagreement results from a discrepancy between a speech act and external reality.¹⁰⁶ (Bernstein, 1995:49). The speaker can validate his claim – statement – by giving “empirical evidence”, by referring to an authority or by providing additional information (ibid., see also Held, 1980 and Pensky, 2004).

There could be a communication breakdown if the sincerity of the speaker is doubtful. This happens when the speaker lies to the listener or he/she (speaker) is in a state of self-deception and is not telling the listener what he/she truly believes. Here, the validity of the claim will depend on the willingness of the speaker to accept other demands, responsibilities and obligations to justify his claims. However, this validation process is fraught with uncertainties because it is difficult to restore trust once it breaks down. Lastly, a claim may be justified on the ground that it is in harmony with an “existing agreed norm” value or a “relevant precedent” (Bernstein, 1995:49).

Habermas makes a distinction between communicative *interaction* and *discourse*. He states that agreement is not always attained in the former, which may lead to the following scenarios: one, dialogic partners, especially dominant ones, will resort to manipulation to secure acquiescence of weak partners; two, communication may be broken and force applied; or three, interlocutors will step into a higher form of communication – a discourse. We now turn to the Habermasian discourse ethics or what he labels an ideal speech situation.

¹⁰⁶ To give a practical example, in the economic arena, proponents of neo-liberalism argue that private enterprise facilitates universal growth, development and prosperity. However empirical evidence shows that economic growth does not necessarily lead to development and universal prosperity. What is evident is the growing material inequality in society, mass unemployment and the growing impoverishment of people. So the reality of the neo-liberal “speech act” is contentious.

Discourse ethics:

For Habermas, participants in discourse move into a communicative community and rigorously *test* and *examine* normative, truth or value claims which have become *problematic*. He further states that this community is created when:

(a) all relevant voices are heard, (b) the best of all available arguments, given the present state of our knowledge, are accepted, and (c) only the non-coercive coercion of the better argument determines the affirmations and negations of the participants” (cited in Dews, 1992:260).

So the communicative community rests on foundations of rationality, consensus, equality, care, justice, fairness, democracy, autonomy and responsibility. The autonomy of participants in a discourse operates at different levels. Agents must have the unconstrained right to “initiate and perpetuate discourse on any issue”, and to question or defend any validity or normative claim (Bernstein, 1995:50). It is also based on the removal of forms of inhibition to discourse such as manipulations and the existence of one-sided binding norms (ibid.). A free environment makes “inner natures of agents transparent” because participants in a discourse honestly express both their individual and common needs, wants and interests (ibid.:53).

This communicative community promotes symmetrical relations among agents. It creates social and material conditions which make equal participation in discourse possible. Members are guided by a desire to seek consensus on validity of truth or normative claims (Held, 1980; Dews, 1992; Calhoun, 1995 and Bernstein, 1995). These ethics which are embedded in discourse are just, legitimate and rational. Our “humanity” Habermas insists, “rests” on discourse which he calls the “unavoidable fiction” (cited in Bernstein, 1995:50). So, for Habermas, normative, truth or value claims that deviate from these ethical standards are distorted, false or pseudo communications. They contain the

seeds of social strife much evident in modern social relations. To summarize, the Habermasian discourse:

- Provides the procedure for resolving social conflict in a just and impartial manner.
- Fosters justice, democracy and consensus building.
- Offers a means to resolve clashes of morality
- Promotes universalism because it emphasizes dialogue in which participation is open to all those affected by an issue. So it goes against the “grain of sovereign state” which is exclusionary and particularistic (Devetak, 1996:172).
- Aims at the emancipation of the species and the realization of the good life for all.
- Creates conditions for equal participation in discourse.

A response to critics:

There have been criticisms of Habermas’s communicative theory, especially from post-modernists. Some critics describe it as a meta-narrative and a “backward looking utopia” (Calhoun, 1995:434) which is oblivious of the “grubby reality of self interested conduct, self-serving institutions and political horse trading”, and the pressures and influences within the modern political system (Outhwaite, 1994:137). Others, under a Weberian influence, think that it is impracticable because of the complexity of issues in a modern world with large populations. For them, the public does not have the requisite organizational, intellectual and material resources needed to overcome these challenges (Held, 1996). This is why the public sphere remains the “province” of “bureaucrats, credentialed experts and interest groups elites” (Calhoun, 1996:434). Indeed the public sphere is driven by the interests of the state and market (Lessnoff, 1999:289).

Habermas’s discourse theory is not a fiction because it speaks to the innate aspirations and impulses of human societies which are embodied in Enlightenment ideals such as “self-determination” or “self-realization”, justice, freedom and “equality” (Dews, 1992:227; Pensky, 2004:49). These ideas are not, as Habermas asserts, “simply

abstractions, they are inserted into everyday communicative practice” (Habermas in Dews, 1992:227); they permeate every aspect of social life (Bernstein, 1995:57). As a result, societal norms, values and traditions are generated by consensus and “do not develop in automatic harmony or without challenge” (Outhwaite, 1994:8). Rather they “undergo continuous revision” – through dialogue and mutual understanding – once their normative contents have become problematic (Habermas, 1987:145). This explains why social agents bind themselves to social norms and values.

Furthermore, society is held together by an inter-subjective relation. The socialized individual emerges out of an innate belief in the common vulnerabilities which confront individuals in society. Jürgen Habermas writes:

As individuation advances ever further, the individual subject becomes more and more caught up in a network of reciprocal vulnerabilities and of openly revealed needs for protection (cited in Dews, 1992:38).

The individual comes to understand that his/her own identity and pursuit of self-preservation is only possible when he/she embraces those of others. So responsibility towards self automatically includes responsibility toward the larger group. This recognition leads to the pursuit of group interests, needs and wants. Again Habermas is insightful: “A person can constitute an inner centre only to the extent that he or she can find self-expression in communicatively generated interpersonal relations” (1987:346).

As a result, this social world – what Habermas refers to as the lifeworld¹⁰⁷ – is an “unfolding” of multiple selves (Pensky, 2004:55). These are the mutual interconnections between the objective norms, values and traditions, and group and individual identities. This is why people react to the increasing bureaucratization and marketization of society

¹⁰⁷ Habermas divides society into three separate domains: the administrative (the state), economy (market) and the lifeworld (social world). Habermas makes a fundamental distinction between the administrative and economic systems and the lifeworld. While the latter two domains adopt instrumental rational means to solve social problems the lifeworld is anchored in communicative rationality. It is also oriented towards collective goals; see Habermas 1988.

because this process undermines the communicative rationality of society (Dews, 1992:108).

Habermas's communicative theory is indeed not a meta-narrative or essentialist – as in the case of traditional discourses with their absolute or reified subjects. For instance, Habermas restricts discourse to situations where “norms and practices have already become problematic” (Bernstein, 1995:117). According to Habermas “without conflict of action in a specific situation ... it would be senseless to want to conduct a practical discourse” (1991:103). Moreover, in contrast with Marxism which views reproduction of history in strictly class terms (labour and capital), the theory does not provide “agents with an absolute transcendent perspective” (Bernstein, 1995:56).

Is the Habermasian discourse backward-looking? . Critics argue that the small size of the Athenian city-state made popular participation in affairs of the political community possible. But this is not feasible in a modern world of mass societies. Here is a counter argument. There is no unified or a single “civic community”, rather there are multiple publics (Delanty, 1999:76). The modern world reveals a diversity of issues like ecology, gender, age, class, culture, ethnicity and religion. Habermas limits participation in a discursive process to those affected by a particular contentious issue. He declares: “just those norms deserve to be valid that could meet with the approval of those potentially affected, in so far as the latter participate in rational discourse” (Habermas, 1987: 127). This brings us to other related questions. How might we ensure public participation in the complex affairs of modern society? How can we dissolve the complexities? How can people freely participate in a discursive process? Or how might the pressures and influences be eliminated from this process? Habermas's suggestion, as we have seen, is that the state ought to provide the necessary social and material conditions which will remove these limitations. To give an example, governments are obliged to provide relevant information on an issue for the public to form an enlightened opinion. This can be done through modes of communication like the internet, radio, newspapers, television, telephone and public meetings. We now come to a central question. Can the state and

other institutions of authority be compelled to institutionalize discourse? Habermas finds the answer in law; to this, we now turn.

Law and discourse:

The law is indeed dialectical. “On the one side, law is a normative system and on the other side social power distorts law” (Delanty, 1999:92; see also Pensky, 2004:57). It is, as a distorted system, a *steering mechanism* for achieving the objectives of powerful social forces. For Habermas, the law – in its normative dimension – has an internal relation with democracy (Delanty, 1999:92; Pensky, 2004:57). A constitution is an embodiment of this, because, it is a result of a discursive process. Thus, it is both compulsive and compelling. Citizens – governors and governed – see it as the self-expression or self-legislation of the community and willingly bind themselves to its force and demands. The other side of the normative aspect of law can be found in a liberal constitution. Bourgeois law has a raft of private or individual rights and freedoms – legal, civil, economic, social, environmental and political. So a space exists “for the extension and radicalization of existing rights” (Habermas, 1992:370).

Social forces can use these rights to demand institutionalization of discursive practices. These are interactive processes between the political system – executive, legislative and judiciary – and “the communications of ... public sphere (the terrain of civil society) rooted in the private centres of the lifeworld”. Habermas sees this relationship as vital because the public sphere, which is made up of civic movements, is an opinion forming space while the formal institutions – political system – make decisions. So the rationally formed public opinions ought to “point the use of administrative power in specific directions” (Habermas, 1992:300). These opinions should find their way into the formal institutions like the court, parliament and other formal institutions which become “sluices for the discursive rationalization of decisions of government and administration bound by law and statutes” (ibid.:364). This procedure ensures that the interests of forces of social solidarity which are formed in “widely differentiated autonomous public spheres” are

realized “in the medium of law against the two other mechanisms of social integration: money and administrative power” (ibid.:363).

The Habermasian discourse can be used to reorder social relations in both southern and West Africa. We saw in Chapter 4 that the identity, legitimacy, alienation and political crises in the two regions are explained by state sovereignty and its monopolies. We also observed in Chapter 7 that the neo-liberal order clashes with the communicative rationality of society – “its ethics of brotherhood” and discursivity (Habermas in Dews, 1992:112). Social life is increasingly *steered* by the *media* of “money” – economy – and “power” – state (Dews, 1992:117). The “value free methodology of science and technology” which forms the basis of human intercourse with the natural order is employed to provide a solution to socio-economic problems (Bernstein, 1995:40). This is seen in neo-liberal ritualized responses to economic crises – growth before redistribution and the rising commodification of social life (life world).

However, the excessive bureaucratic and strategic control of social life stifle its creative potential which is the ability to conceive of appropriate rational and new ways of solving social problems. The resulting depoliticization of society and the erosion of its normative core – its values – elicits, as we saw in Chapter 7, the “communal impulses” of social agents who rise in defence of social life being torn asunder by a neo-liberal modernity. This condition is heightened by the disjuncture between the truth claims of this social order and its external realities. As we saw in Chapter 7, the opposing realities to the neo-liberal claims of growth, development and universal prosperity are growing unemployment, poverty, underdevelopment and inequalities between individuals and societies. So how might we end the political violence and other forms of social unrest which state sovereignty engenders? Or how might we break the monopolies of state sovereignty? How do we address the dialectic of the regionalist project in the two regions? These pertinent questions require new responses because the old answers – the ritualized responses – no longer suffice. Where do we begin fashioning out a new social order – an inter-subjective, rational order in which both governors and governed, bureaucrats and ordinary citizens, experts and non-experts, employers and workers,

environmentalists and industrialists, peasants and large scale commercial farmers, minorities and dominant groups, state and civil society, “outsiders” and “insiders” initiate dialogic processes over contentious practices, norms, values, policies and institutions? This process begins with the establishment of a robust civil society which has the institutional capacity and power to influence public policy.

Restoring civil society to the public sphere:

The public sphere which has become the “province ... of bureaucrats, credentialed experts and interest group elites” is an opinion generating space (Calhoun, 1996:454). It is the domain of cultural, economic, domestic and significantly political interactions between private individuals and associations outside the direct control of state (Held, 1996:315; Habermas, 1992; Calhoun, 1996). The following questions deserve attention: How do we restore civil society to the public sphere. Is it possible to institutionalize discourse?

Most states in the two regions have adopted liberal constitutions which guarantee fundamental human rights. Social groups in the two regions have taken advantage of these rights to initiate, for example, legal litigations against their governments and transnational corporations. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) – an AIDS activist group in South Africa – took the government to the constitutional court – over the state’s refusal to make anti-retroviral drugs available to HIV sufferers. The court ruled in favour of TAC, instructing the government to provide these drugs. Still in South Africa, the Jubilee Movement asked the constitutional court to stop Barclays Bank from taking over ABSA (a major bank in South Africa) until it had paid reparation for “funding the apartheid regime”¹⁰⁸ (*Daily Dispatch*, July 6, 2005, p.5).

Similarly, social movements in West Africa have exercised their fundamental human rights by seeking compensation for transnational corporate activities which impact negatively on their social and environmental rights. Several communities in the Niger

¹⁰⁸ The Court subsequently ruled against the Jubilee Movement.

Delta – the oil-producing region of Nigeria – sued petroleum companies like Chevron and Shell in Nigeria, British and US courts. Their grievances centred on the adverse effects of oil exploration on the environment, their livelihood and health. The courts, in most cases, awarded financial compensation to the claimants. We have drawn these examples to show that it is possible for social forces in a liberal political climate to use their prevailing rights to demand institutionalization of discursive forms of governance. To bring this process into being, the state and other institutions of authority should be bound by a constitution with a bill of rights which guarantees popular participation in political and economic processes. These rights also include the provision of relevant social and material conditions which could help produce rational and objective outcomes. We now examine briefly some of these conditions.

People can participate constructively in a discursive process if they have access to relevant information, expert advice and adequate understanding of issues. This is important because only an enlightened public can form a rational opinion. Such provisions enhance the quality of “public discourse” and facilitate “openness and transparency” in public affairs (Coleman and Nathanson, 2003). So the various institutions of authority are obliged to provide the relevant information using the appropriate means and other forms of assistance to participants in discourse – the public – to enable them come to an enlightened opinion on issues. The opinions generated in these public spaces should, by law, permeate decisions of formal institutions. If they are not, the affected social groups have the legal right to seek redress from the relevant judiciary institutions. We now examine some avenues for public participation in affairs of the two regions¹⁰⁹: the internet, public holidays and meetings, conventions and summits, referendums and citizen jury.

The internet as a virtual community:

Coleman and Nathanson (2003) suggest that the new information and communication technology – the internet – is a vital resource for democratizing the European Union. It can help bring Europe’s people into the decision-making processes of the organization.

¹⁰⁹ Although the focus is largely on the region the suggestions are equally relevant at the state level.

For these scholars, the internet could be used as a “virtual public sphere” to facilitate a dialogic process between ordinary European citizens and regional policy-makers. The citizens would ask questions and express their interests, views and opinions in this social space. The policy-makers would be obliged to respond to citizens’ questions by, for example, explaining their actions and decisions, and embodying people’s interests in policies. This virtual community can be nurtured in both southern and West Africa. It addresses the problem of distance and scale and would help sustain the interest of the public in the affairs of the regions. How might a virtual community be formed in the two regions?

The internet is a communicative resource for both ECOWAS and SADC. These bodies have websites which focus on their objectives, programmes and events. In addition to these sites, others like chat rooms could be created and relevant information and explanation of regional policies and issues posted on these sites. This would generate conversation because the public would have the opportunity to put forward their views, opinions, ideas and questions which policy-makers should respond to. The resulting body of rational opinion, recommendations or views should then guide the formulation of policies.

Civil society groups could also create independent virtual social spaces and pass on their recommendations – reached through consensus – to the relevant institutions. SANGONET, for instance, which is a coalition of civil groups in South Africa, uses the internet to disseminate information to other civil society organizations in the region. This could be expanded into a regional public sphere. The opinions generated should be transmitted by a civil society unit established at the regional secretariat to the relevant formal institutions.

Besides the internet, special occasions like holidays provide platforms for public discourse on regional affairs. Indeed they present an opportunity for interchange of ideas between representatives of formal institutions and the public. Unlike SADC, ECOWAS has a public holiday which is usually spent in giving speeches on work of the

organization (Lavergne, 1997). However, it can also serve as an occasion for dialogue. Some member states of ECOWAS like Ghana and Nigeria have special ministries which deal with regional affairs. So officials from these institutions and the public could deliberate on regional issues on this day.

Conventions:

A convention or summit is either a formal or informal gathering. It brings together people from diverse social backgrounds to discuss pertinent issues affecting their lives. What is deliberated upon is either a single issue or a combination of issues like unemployment, the constitution, environment, land, housing energy, transport, communication, health and development. It therefore constitutes an appropriate public sphere for deliberating both national and regional affairs. David Runciman (2003) offers useful insights into how a regional convention of civil society could be constituted. He suggests that the various parliamentary constituencies in the states that make up the European Union could choose delegates outside the formal party system to deliberate on issues in a regional convention. For Runciman, these representatives would comprise citizens like journalists, dress-makers, footballers, clerics, lawyers and teachers rather than the normal politicians. Having access to the relevant information and a good understanding of issues, it is likely that these characters who represent no particular interest could initiate a discourse. Each participant would freely express his/her views, listen to others and be prepared to defend his/her own opinion against those of others. The consensual opinions reached at such conventions should then be embodied in policies.

In addition, civil society organizations in the two regions could have a summit before the annual inter-ministerial conferences which precede the Summits of Heads of State in the two regions. The views, opinions and suggestions from the civil society meeting, like those of the inter-ministerial conferences, should form the basis of decisions of the heads of state.

Dialogue and partnership:

Both SADC and ECOWAS have technical or specialized commissions that deal with specific regional issues like security, food and agriculture, poverty reduction, energy, environment, trade, natural resources, communication and tourism (Page and Bilal, 2001:5; Bischoff, 2002:290; Rene, 2004). Civil society representation from these issue areas could be invited to collaborate with the specialized bodies. This partnership would ensure that the interests and needs of the relevant public are articulated and catered for. Indeed ECOWAS has embraced the principle of dialogue and partnership between civil society organization and institutions of ECOWAS, particularly in matters of security (Rene, 2004:25). ECOWAS seeks to give civil society groups the opportunity to make oral presentations, circulate documents, present views to the Council of Ministers, and to engage with committees established by the council of ministers (ibid.). However, there is a lack of political will on the part of the region's government to truly institutionalize this process. Organizational and resource constraints usually hamper the capacity of civil society organizations to participate in regional affairs. So, there ought to be official commitment to social dialogue; and importantly, the governments in both regions should provide funds and establish the institutional mechanisms which will facilitate a meaningful participation of civil society in a dialogic process.

Referendum:

As a modern word, referendum dates back to the middle of the 19th century. It is usually spoken of as "referring back of a decision to the people" (Runciman, 2003:11). There are two categories of referendum: "initiative" and "plebiscitary" (ibid.). The former gives citizens an opportunity to "frame policy" and to veto or "repeal an already existing law which they don't like" (Held, 1996:322 and Runciman, 2003:11). This type of referendum takes place when a recommended percentage of an electorate signs a petition for a particular national issue to be put to vote. It is rarely practiced by states, although it

is used by a small number of states like the United States, Italy and Switzerland. Yet it represents an effective means of popular participation in policy-making process.

“Plebiscitary” referendums (Runciman, 2003:11) are so called because they are “consultative”(Held, 1996:323). This is the form used by most states and is normally related to “matters of constitutional change” (Runciman, 2003:11). Some scholars argue that this form of referendum is not very democratic. It is, for these scholars, essentially “high politics by other means” (ibid.). The politicians, political parties, policy-makers and bureaucrats solicit the opinion of the people through a plebiscitary referendum as a means to “rescue them from intractable disputes within or across political parties or to rubber stamp some especially high handed act of government by decree” (ibid.). In spite of this limitation, this type of referendum represents an attempt to inject a participatory moment into politics. There have been instances when the popular will expressed through such a referendum has been at variance with expectations of the politicians and ruling elites. For example, the people of Zimbabwe in a referendum in 2000 rejected the government’s wish to “expand the presidential powers” of Robert Mugabe to confiscate land from white farmers, rather than abiding by the “willing buyer willing seller” policy (Moore, 2001:255).

The European Union uses plebiscitary referendums to seek approval for its policies, recommendations and treaties. It is therefore a means of involving the European public in the affairs of the organization. Plebiscites were held in France and the Netherlands on a new European Constitutional Treaty. The French and the Dutch voted against the constitution.¹¹⁰ This opportunity however does not exist in either West or southern Africa. Regional protocols and treaties are ratified by national parliaments. The European example could be adopted in the two regions, which would give the regions’ people the opportunity to participate in the regional process. This would help reduce the excessive statist and bureaucratic control over the regionalist project.

¹¹⁰ This rejection compelled the European Union to suspend the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in the other member states. It became clear that other states were going to reject it.

Citizen jury:

Held (1992, 1996) and Barber (2003) suggest that popular participation in the political process can be promoted by institutionalizing citizen jury, especially at local and national levels. Citizen jury is a concept which is borrowed from the judicial system in countries like the United States. A brief description of this process will help illustrate its importance. In this legal procedure, the jurors selected to adjudicate cases are members of society who do not have technical knowledge of law. However, their verdicts are regarded as rational and legitimate because they are based on informed knowledge, relevant information and discursivity. How? Briefly, once the members of the jury have been selected, they are secluded from the rest of society. This is done to remove all possible forms of external influences and pressures. The jurors have access to relevant information on the case which includes evidence of witnesses, arguments and counter-arguments from both the defense and the prosecution teams. They deliberate at the end of the court proceedings and come out with a consensual opinion which is read out by the presiding judge as the verdict.

In the political process the citizen jury would be selected on class, gender, ethnic, professional and age lines to assess strengths and weaknesses of controversial policies and express opinions on issues like the environment, transport, social welfare and development. They will also have the mandate to raise and publicize issues. The citizen jury – like their “judicial” counterparts – would be ordinary members of society with no expert knowledge. To ensure a high quality of discourse the jury must have expert advice, adequate information and understanding of the agenda. This must be provided by the state and other institutions of authority. The opinions and recommendations of the jury should filter into decisions. This brings us to a pertinent question: What are the available resources social forces could use to legitimize their involvement in regional affairs?

Institutionalizing discursive practice:

Both ECOWAS and SADC recognize, in their treaties, the right of civil society to participate in their respective affairs (Rene, 2004:29). But – as we have seen – this is more of rhetoric than real because the regional process remains statist in orientation. However, this provision legally entitles civil society organizations to participate in regional affairs. They could also use this entitlement to demand institutions which reflect the interests of people. This must begin with the restructuring of the existing legislative and judiciary structures. These institutions are presently subordinated to the wishes or interests of governments. How? We turn first to the regional parliaments.

Both the ECOWAS parliament – inaugurated in 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria – and the SADC Parliamentary Forum – constituted in 1996, with its Secretariat in Windhoek, Namibia, have only advisory functions (Rene, 2004:14; Bischoff, 2002). In the absence of substantive legislative authority, the SADC Parliamentary Forum performs tasks like popularizing the work of SADC and dispatching electoral observers to monitor elections in member states (Bischoff, 2002:295). The ECOWAS parliament only makes recommendations on issues like “human rights ... social affairs” to the “appropriate community institutions” (Rene, 2004:14). ECOWAS – the Authority – intends to give the Parliament the power to make decisions on matters like regional economic development in future. What is certain, however, is that it would still reflect the interest of the status quo because the members are selected by “member state governments” (ibid.). Let us look at the function of the judicial institution.

ECOWAS has a Court of Justice (Lavergne, 1997; Rene, 2004:14) and the SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons provides for a regional tribunal (Lavergne, 1997; *SAFM, News Bulletin*, August, 2005). The heads of state – the Authority – appoint the judges who only adjudicate in disputes relating to treaty violations between states. The Court’s decision is not binding on states and citizens from member states have no

legal standing before the court (Rene, 2004:13). The Court only accepts cases brought by the state on behalf of its citizens. Indeed the Court is superfluous because the states do not use it: they prefer using diplomatic means to resolve disputes. The grievances of citizens, which are usually against the state, never get to the court. The role of the ECOWAS Court contrasts markedly with that of the European Court. European citizens can take legal action against their governments and the Court's decisions are binding on states. To reiterate, how can civil society organizations legitimize their involvement in regional affairs?

First, civil society groups in the two regions have to call for parliaments with legislative powers over regional issues. These institutions should in turn incorporate in their constitution the right of popular forces to participate in the legislative process. What form should this take? It has to be an interactive procedure in which the rational communications of the diverse public spheres (on environment, security and development) are represented in formal legislations. Second, civil organizations should press for strong and independent regional judiciary institutions like Human Rights Courts. These Courts or Tribunals would have the power to adjudicate cases between the formal institutions of authority and civil society and the authority to enforce their decisions. These institutions should also defend the right of civil society to participate in the regional process. We have seen that the prevailing orders in both southern and West Africa are sub-sets of the global order. So, there should be a corresponding institutionalization of discursive ethos at the global level. How can this be done?

Democratizing international institutions:

There is a "democratic deficit" in institutions of global governance because the global public is denied participation in their affairs (Falk and Strauss, 2001:213; see also Held, 1992; Linklater, 1997; Wendt, 1994; Lipschutz, 2001; Held and McGrew, 2002; Thomas, 2002). By contrast there is growing institutionalization of the participation of the international business community – the corporate world – in international affairs. There is

a formal relation between the “corporate community and the United Nations” what the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, calls a “partnership” (Falk and Strauss, 2001:215). The World Economic Forum (WEF) as an institutionalized framework brings together the world’s leading business personalities and the major international policy-makers to deliberate and make recommendations on global issues. The lack of public participation in global matters explains the “rising disaffection” of international civil society organizations with policies of multilateral institutions like the WTO, World Bank and the IMF (Falk and Strauss, 2001:212). To resolve the legitimacy crisis, these institutions need to adopt a new “modus operandi” (Held, 1992:33) anchored in principles of accountability, transparency, dialogue, and “impartial administration of law” (Held and McGrew, 2002:131). How can this be achieved? Global civil society groups should lobby members of the UN to enshrine in the UN constitution the fundamental human rights of global citizenry to take part in the decision-making processes of global institutions. Judicial institutions like the international court would be empowered to enforce these rights. Given the past diplomatic successes of international civil society, this should be possible. In the 1990s civil society groups built coalitions with “receptive states” to secure the convention banning landmines, the Kyoto global warming treaty and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Falk and Strauss, 2001:219).

What are the implications of institutionalized discourse in the two regions? To begin with, it would imply the end of state sovereignty. The state’s monopoly over decision-making processes would be broken because popular forces would acquire the right to participate in these processes. However this would not lead to a withering away of the state and other formal institutions of authority. Civil society would not have the power to govern itself or bring the entire society under its control. We have seen that in the procedural interaction between civil society and formal institutions the former only generates opinions for the latter to act on. Yet civil society organizations in both regions would have sufficient legal power to make the political system act responsibly and democratically. This would help release the public persona of the state; it would act for the general good of society. The state would be compelled to institute measures to reduce the capacity of private forces to distort the economic and political processes (Held, 1996;

Baker, 2000). It would be obliged to fairly redistribute wealth and resources and be responsive to both individual and communal interests.

Citizens in both regions would come to have significant leverage over the organizations and institutions which affect their lives. This would help correct the democratic deficit that overlays them. The regional institutions will be compelled to enact laws and promote programmes which cater for both private and communal interests. The SADC Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) which is currently driven by states and transnational capital would also be development focused. Community and people centred programmes could form an integral part of it. Similarly the present lack of enthusiasm among West African states to put into practice the trans-border co-operation concept would change. The region's people – especially affected communities – would advocate for such communal integrative projects. So, in both regions people would be mobilized to undertake ventures in areas like tourism, agriculture, resource conservation, transport and communication, trade, commerce and other forms of micro-enterprises.

We noted in Chapter Five that exclusive nationalist practices stifle the growth of a cosmopolitan order in both West and southern Africa. This chapter proposes that the ethical, rational and universalistic principles of discourse can help address the problem of exclusive nationalism. As we have seen, the Habermasian discourse stipulates that all those affected by a particular arrangement or issue have the right to participate in the dialogic process. However the state “restricts the capacity of outsiders¹¹¹ to participate in discourse to consider issues which concern them” (Linklater in Devetak, 1996:172). This explains why the rights of outsiders are easily violated. So discourse ethics can remove systematic forms of exclusion and promote cosmopolitan goals in the two regions: it will help end the restrictive “social bond” of the sovereign state and “secure the social bond of all with all” (Habermas in Devetak, 1996:172).

¹¹¹ Outsiders do not only refer to foreigners or aliens but also those within the jurisdiction of the sovereign states such as minority groups excluded from full participation in the national community.

This chapter has proposed that the democratic, consensual, rational and inclusivity of Habermas's discourse theory makes it an appropriate medium for resolving instability and legitimacy crises in West and southern Africa. It has shown that, rather than being utopian project discourse ethics reflect the human interest in self-determination, social justice and freedom, and that it can be applied in our contemporary world of mass society. This is because the theory limits participation in discourse to only those affected by a particular social arrangement or decision. It is also possible because there is no single civic community rather there are multiple publics and issues which reduce the size of communicative community. The chapter offered avenues through which the public can participate in the political process and suggested strategies that can be adopted by civil society groups to ensure the institutionalization of discursive practice. It argued that law provides the avenue for this process in which the rationally generated opinions of the public sphere inhabited by civil society find their way into official decisions. So, for instance, at the national level, civil society groups can use the liberal constitution with its raft of individual rights to call for institutionalization of discursive practice. At the regional level, civil society organization, through existing treaties and conventions which recognize people's participation in regional affairs, can demand that regional parliaments incorporate into their constitution the rights of civil society to participate in regional affairs. Similarly, global civil society can press the UN General Assembly to enshrine in its constitution the right of global citizenry to be a partner in global governance. The chapter further suggested that at all levels there should be independent judicial institutions with the power to enforce the institutionalization of discourse. It argued that an institutionalized dialogic process will ensure that the interests of state, market and people are all realized.

More broadly, we have juxtaposed, in this thesis, two contrasting worlds. One, which is in existence, rests on systematic domination and exclusion, producing instability and legitimacy crises. The other, not yet born, offered by Critical Theory seeks to reorder the regions in ways that will promote universal happiness, peace, prosperity and progress. These can never be achieved through the old, ritualized responses to societal problems. So, perhaps, it is fitting to end with these lines:

His face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress (Benjamin, 1973: 259).

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