

A HISTORY OF THE QWATHI PEOPLE FROM
EARLIEST TIMES TO 1910

THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This is the first history of the Qwathi to appear. It relates all the events which have shaped the historical consciousness of the Qwathi people. The first chapter deals with the foundation of the Qwathi chiefdom by Mtshutshumbe and his followers who emigrated from EmaXesibeni to Thembuland before 1700. It also covers the development of the various Qwathi clans.

The reign of Fubu which is discussed in Chapter Two was characterised by warfare. The most important of these wars was the Qwathi-Thembu war of the beginning of the nineteenth century. Its importance lies in the fact that although the Qwathi were a small chiefdom, they were able to goad the Thembu nation into war, the results of which were indecisive, hence, in subsequent years, the Thembu were always cautious in their dealings with the Qwathi. Fubu's other wars, including those of the Mfecane, are also discussed.

Chapter Three deals mainly with the Qwathi-Thembu relations during the reign of Dalasile, Fubu's son. These were at first cordial but they became strained

when Ngangelizwe took over as Thembu king in 1863. Dalasile refused to involve the Qwathi people in Thembu conflicts with their enemies and he desired to pursue an independent line. In 1875, when Ngangelizwe accepted colonial control, Dalasile stood out against it but, under pressure from the agents of colonialism, he gave in.

The period from 1875 to 1880 was one of passive resistance to colonial control. This erupted into Dalasile's rebellion against the colony from 1880 to 1881. Chapter Six deals with the surrender, relocation and the introduction of a new system of control called the "Ward System". The ruling house was replaced by appointed headmen most of whom were drawn from non-Qwathi communities.

Chapter Seven deals with the rise and Fall of the Qwathi peasantry. The fall of the peasantry facilitated labour migracy which contributed to further deterioration of the Qwathi both economically and physically.

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PREFACE

Though not a Qwathi by birth, but a Thembu born and bred in Qwathiland, I became interested in the stories of the deeds of the Qwathi and also sympathised with the Qwathi people whom various government officials from the colonial period up to the days of Transkeian independence have regarded as savages, thieves, troublemakers, ungovernable and anti-government. I have been prompted by the desire to exonerate the Qwathi from some of these false accusations and generalisations.

Second, of all chiefdoms in Transkei, the Qwathi chiefdom has been sadly neglected by writers and researchers in spite of their heroic deeds in the past and their attempts to keep the anti-colonial spirit alive in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. I have felt that an attempt to write an account of the history of the Qwathi would be a valuable contribution not only for the Qwathi people but also for the entire African community as well.

This thesis is an attempt to reconstruct a history of the Qwathi people from earliest times to 1910. But before I embark on this, I want to put the readers on guard not to expect a history of the whole of the

Qwathi community. The thesis mainly deals about the Qwathi of Engcobo. It completely excludes the Qwathi of Hinana found in the district of Herschel and only touches on Stokwe Ndlela of Western Thembuland inasmuch as he is related to the main branch of the Qwathi of Engcobo and inasmuch as he was often involved in planning strategies with Dalasile, the chief of the Qwathi of Engcobo, during the conflicts with the Colonial government between 1877 and 1881.

Readers are also put on guard not to expect a full and comprehensive account of the Qwathi history in this thesis because of certain limitations beyond my control. Such limitations are the number of pages required for an M.A. Thesis, lack of source material especially in the social and economic fields. Missionary sources are sadly superficial and at times deceitful. They do not deal with all the social problems resulting from the interaction between the missionaries and the Qwathi. They merely highlight the achievements of the missionaries some of which are exaggerations.

Documents from Government Archives in Cape Town, Cory Library in Grahamstown have been used but even these display a lot of the bias and prejudice of government

officials against the Qwathi. However, with the use of oral and secondary sources which are also scanty, this problem of bias has been partially overcome. The problems of oral sources lie in the informants' insistence on the literal truth of their narratives, their lack of coherence and their attempts at exaggeration.

I also expect readers to disagree with the views expressed in this thesis wholly or partially. I expect some to say it is completely different from what we heard from our fathers. Others will, perhaps, say it is completely or partly biased. This is so because no historical account can reconstruct the past as it actually was. It can only record the impressions of a particular observer. This is so because a historian deals with a series of vanished events which is differently imagined in each succeeding generation. Our imagined picture of the actual event is always determined by two things: First, by the actual event itself in so far as we can know something about it, second by our present purposes, desires, prepossessions and prejudices all of which enter into the process of knowing it. The actual event contributes something to the imagined picture but the mind that holds the imagined picture

always contributes something too. It is a fact that the present influences our idea of the past and our idea of the past influences the present. We are accustomed to say "the present is the product of the past", and that is what is ordinarily meant by the historian's doctrine of "historical continuity". But it is only a half truth. It is equally true and no mere paradox that the past (our imagined picture of it) is the product of the present. We build our conceptions of history partly out of present needs and purposes. The past is a kind of screen upon which we project our vision of the future.

During my period of research I have also observed that research work is not the work of an individual working independently of other people. It involves many people without whose assistance research work is impossible. Out of many people who have helped me in one way or another the following deserve a special word of thanks: I would like to thank Dr Jeffrey Peires, my supervisor, for having encouraged me to undertake research work on any area in Transkei, for his patience in guiding me throughout the period of research and his assistance in getting a study leave for the purpose of research without which this work would not have been possible. A special word of

thanks goes to the Department of Education which made it possible for me to get a study leave with full pay working together with the Department of Finance. I can assure these two departments that they made a wise decision not for my benefit alone but also for benefit of the people of Transkei at large. To both departments, on behalf of the Qwathi people and myself, I am deeply grateful.

The staff of the Cory Library, Grahamstown also deserve a special word of thanks for their keen interest in my work, for their patience in getting me the available sources and their preparedness to get me even those not available, as did the staffs of Cape Archives, South African Library in Cape Town, the Research Library in the University of Cape Town and the Africana Research Library and Bureau of Research in the University of Transkei.

I would also like to thank the Qwathi sages who encouraged me to put into writing their history ~~and~~ for their patience and willingness to impart to me the information which many old people regard as their individual possession, a heritage from his forefather. The following are the Qwathi old men without whose assistance I could have scarcely started with my

research:- D.B.Mxutu of Nyanga location, T.Somdaka of Silo's location, Reverend A.Titus and D.Mazwembe of Tshapile's location and M.Xundu of Manzana location, all in the district of Engcobo. I cannot forget the work of the typist Miss Nozibele Bikitsha who has typed successive drafts of the manuscript and my friend and colleague, Mr A.M.Makaula who has helped me with discussions, suggestions and encouragement during times of despair.

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, whose patience, encouragement and moral support, throughout the period of research, have been a constant source of inspiration.

XESIBE GENEALOGY

SIBISIDE

DLEMINI

NYANJA

MPONDO (G.H.) MPONDOMISE XESIBE (QADI HOUSE)

NTOZABANTU

NDZUZA

MIYANA

BIMBI

NONDZABA

HLABE (QADI)

MTHETHO

MTSHUTSHUMBE

CHAPTER 1EARLY HISTORY OF THE QWATHI(a) From EmaXesibeni to Thembuland

Although the Qwathi are found in the heart of Thembuland, in the district of Engcobo, they are not Thembu but are more related to the Xesibe of Mt Ayliff and Mqanduli districts. Their place of origin is EmaXesibeni in the present district of Mt Ayliff. Both oral and written sources acknowledge this origin.¹

The first known great chief from whom the Xesibe reputedly came was Sibiside from whom Dlemini came and from Dlemini came Njanya. From Njanya came Xesibe in the Qadi House. Xesibe's son was Ntozabantu from whom Ndzuzza came and Ndzuzza begot Miyana. From

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1. C.R. Leadley-Brown, "A history of All Saints Parish" (All Saints, 1929), p.1-2.
 - . D.B. Mxutu, Interview with, 13/6/87, All Saints, Engcobo.
 - . PR 3664, 1 of 4, E.G. Sihele, "Ngobani abaThembu bevelaphi?"
 - . Cory Library Rhodes University p.10.
 - . J.H. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu (Johannesburg, 1930), p.349.
 - . E.J.C. Wagenaar, "A forgotten Frontier zone" Archives Year Book for South African History, 1982, p.73.
 - . M. Xundu, Interview with, 2/7/87, Manzana location Engcobo.

Miyana came Bimbi and from him Nondzaba. From the Qadi House of Nondzaba came Hlabe whose son was Mthetho. It was from Mthetho that the Qwathi came, through his son Mtshutshumbe.² (See geneology).

According to D.B. Mxutu, Mtshutshumbe was a brave young man whose acts of bravery reached the Thembu chief, Hlanga, across the Mbashe river, near the Ludwesa Forest along the coast of the present Willowvale district. This Thembu chief invited Mtshutshumbe to come to his assistance against his enemies. According to Mxutu it was in response to this invitation that Mtshutshumbe and his ibutho (group of followers) left EmaXesibeni.³

Leadley-Brown gives two traditions which seek to explain the reason for the departure from EmaXesibeni. The first is that the leader of this ibutho, whom he mistakenly identifies as Noni, in a fit of anger killed his father's sacred ox and then fled with a few followers. Another is that the leader and his followers, on a hunting expedition were guilty of breaking the hunting law, and afraid to return, they

2. Mxutu Interview, 13/6/87.

3. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

settled in a country inhabited by the San.⁴

J.H.Soga's account that the Qwathi left EmaXesibeni for Mpondoland and from Mpondoland to Thembuland because of the Mfecane⁵ can easily be ruled out on the ground that by the time the Mfecane wars broke out, the Qwathi had long been established in Thembuland.

Leadley-Brown and M. Xundu are mistaken with regard to the chief who led the Qwathi into Thembuland. Leadley-Brown says it was Noni and Xundu says it was Mndwane, son of Mtshutshumbe. The correct version is that of Mxutu as is proved by the Qwathi praise which goes:⁶

Inkomo zika Mtshutshumbe, ogqaz'indlel'-
ebhek'ebuNguni.

The cattle of Mtshutshumbe who paved the way to
Nguniland.

This without doubt points to Mtshutshumbe as the one who led his followers out of EmaXesibeni to Thembuland.

Insofar as the reasons for the departure from

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4. Leadley-Brown, "History of All Saints" pp.1-2.
 5. Soga, South Eastern Bantu, p.349.
 6. Mxutu, 13/6/1987.

EmaXesibeni it seems as if the invitation by Hlanga, the Thembu chief,⁷ was at a later stage than Mxutu puts it, because the Thembu chief in question was Hlanga after his defeat by his brother, Dlomo, at the battle of Msana. According to E.J.C. Wagenaar, this battle took place in 1680,⁸ by which date the Qwathi were already in Thembuland. But Mxutu's assertion that the Thembu King at the time of the arrival of the Qwathi was Mnguti, Hlanga's grandfather, seems acceptable.⁹ For the departure from EmaXesibeni either of the reasons put forward by Leadley-Brown seems convincing.¹⁰

This nation derived its name not from the name of a person who led them out of Emaxesibeni but from the name of Mtshutshumbe's white ox which was given to him after circumcision. When Mtshutshumbe left with his followers, he took with him his ox, named Qwathi, on which they carried their provisions. There must have been, of course, quite a reasonable number of cattle in their possession.¹¹

7. Ibid

8. Wagenaar "A Forgotten Frontier Zone", p.73.

9. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

10. Leadley-Brown, "History of All Saints," pp.1-2.

11. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

As they had no definite place to which they were travelling, the movement was slow. They occupied themselves along the way to Mthatha mouth by hunting. They took the route along the coast of what is now Western Pondoland until they reached Nomadolo, along the coast of the present district of Ngqeleni in the vicinity of Mthatha Mouth. That is where they camped for the first time after they had left EmaXesibeni. When asked by the people of the area to which chiefdom they belonged, they informed them that they belonged to the Qwathi chiefdom, naming the chiefdom after this ox. Since then they became known as the Qwathi.¹²

After a period of sojourn at Nomadolo, they crossed the Mthatha river and camped in the vicinity of Coffee Bay in the present district of Mqanduli in Thembuland which was under King Mnguti. This must have been about 1650. Mnguti, the Thembu king, welcomed them and gave them permission to settle in the area. The Qwathi were grateful to the Thembu king and they began, pastoral farming on a large scale. That is where Mtshutshumbe got married and his great son Mndwane was born. Mnguti did not live long after the

12. Ibid.

arrival of the Qwathi. On his death he was succeeded by his son, Nxego.¹³

In about 1670 Mtshutshumbe died and was succeeded by his son Mndwane. It so happened that in about 1680 the two sons of Nxego, Dlomo and Hlanga, became involved in a war of succession against each other. Hlanga was defeated. He fled across the Mbashe to the Ludwesa coast. Knowing the Xesibe to be skillful in war and in the art of making weapons, he invited the Qwathi to come to his assistance. They left the place with the intention of joining Hlanga but turned away before crossing the Mbashe river. It is not known what made them change their minds, but it is suspected that they were prevented from crossing the Mbashe by the Bomvana.¹⁴

Led by Mndwane they turned towards the Mthatha river, moved along it in the direction of the Baziya

mountains and camped at Mbolompo for a short time. They then moved on but when they reached Mgudu they

13. T. Somdaka, Interview with, 13/6/87, Silo Location, Engcobo.

14. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

turned towards Ngcebengwana or Tshebengwana Valley in the Gqaga Valley.¹⁵

It was from this area that they began to spread to Ndlunkulu and to Noni's hill, a hill overlooking Clarkebury, where Noni, one of the most important Qwathi chiefs, was born. Others began to spread westwards up to the Qumanco Valley. In the north they spread as far as the western side of the upper Mbashe and Maxongo's Hoek which is now part of the Elliot district.¹⁶

Apart from the San this whole area between the Mbashe and Qumanco rivers was uninhabited before the arrival of the Qwathi. It lay, however, within the area of jurisdiction then claimed by the Thembu kings. The Thembu king at this time was Dlomo, Mnguti's grandson whose capital was at Nyhwarha in the present district of Idutywa. On the eastern side of the Mbashe between Tabase and Baziya was a Thembu chief, Sebeni, one of Mnguti's sons, who reported the arrival of the Qwathi in the neighbourhood to king Dlomo.¹⁷

15. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
Xundu, 2/7/87.

16. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

17. Ibid.

Dlomo nursed some fears about the choice of the place of occupation and warned them that the place they had chosen had dense forests infested with wild animals and inhabited by brave, mischievous and dangerous San. But the Qwathi impressed by the beauty of the land with forests and grazing lands insisted on getting the land. They replied that they were not afraid of wild animals, after all they were hunters who were living on the meat of wild animals. They also showed no fear for the San.¹⁸

Dlomo accepted them and was happy to have them between the Thembu and the Mpondomise as they would serve as a buffer. In return the Qwathi were also thankful for having received the land and promised to give to the Thembu kings one hundred head of cattle annually. Although they occupied the land within the area of jurisdiction claimed by the Thembu kings, there was no attempt by the Thembu at assimilation and absorption. They enjoyed a large measure of independence. The Thembu merely took them as allies because they were powerful and proved to be of great help to the Thembu during the Mfecane.¹⁹

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

Ever since then, that is, the end of the seventeenth century the Qwathi people have been in occupation of the area between the Mbashe and Qumanco rivers. These boundaries have never changed except after the 1880 Rebellion, when the Western boundary was changed from Qumanco to the Mgwali river and the area between the Slang river and the sources of Mbashe river which is now part of the Elliot district was given to white farmers.²⁰

Average summer temperatures vary between 18c and 22c and winter temperatures are between 10c and 7c. In winter the Gulanoda and Drakensburg ranges are often covered with snow. Rain falls in summer. The average annual rain fall varies between 25 inches and 40 inches. This rainfall also feeds the four rivers of Qwathiland, namely Mbashe, Xuka, Mgwali and Qumanco and their tributaries.²¹

The country tends to be well wooded and mountainous with most of the indigenous forests and bushes covering the hills and their slopes. An article in

20. Ibid.

21. Transkei Department of Information and Foreign Affairs, Transkei, Johannesburg 1976, pp.12-15.

the Cape Monthly Magazine of 1874-75 describes this as follows:²²

A belt of hills formed almost a semi circle from North to West with a dark covering of thick bush.

Gardens, tended mostly by women, were usually carved out between the huts rivers and roads. These were shut off from animals by stones, mimosa and aloe trees. The rest of the land was given over to pasturage and hunting grounds. The main agricultural products are maize, kaffir corn, sorghum, tobacco and pumpkins but the land is better suited for stock farming.²³

Pasturage is suitable for both cattle, sheep and goats. The whole of Qwathiland falls almost within the belt of sweetveld with few patches of sourveld here and there especially in the low lying areas. In summer, cattle graze on the low-lying areas but in winter on the bushy mountainous areas where the grass is comparatively palatable because of moisture from

22. A.M. Robinson (ed.), Selected Articles (Cape Monthly Magazine), VRS New Series (1870-1876) Cape Town 1876.

23. G12-77 W.E. Stanford to Major Elliot (CMT) 4/1/77, p.86.

the mist which always covers the mountains and from the melting snow.²⁴

Some traces of coal were discovered by white settlers on the Gulanoda and Drakensberg ranges but mining of it was never developed because it was of a low grade and expensive to mine.²⁵

(a) Ntswayibana loses chieftainship

When Mndwane, the chief of the Qwathi, who led them into Qwathiland, died, he was succeeded by Ncobe and Ncobe was succeeded by his great son Nkovane. The reigns of the abovenamed chiefs must have been uneventful as nothing is known about them. According to D.B. Mxutu and T. Somdaka Ntswayibana was the great son of Nkovane and Noni was his younger brother²⁶ but according to D. Mazwembe and W.D. Cingo it was Dikela who was the great son of Nkovane and his sons were Ntswayibana and Noni.²⁷ Mxutu disputes this convincingly arguing that the descendants of Noni are not

24. Somdaka, 13/6/87.

25. G12-77 Stanford to Elliot 4/1/77, p.86.

26. Mxutu, 13/6/87; Somdaka, 13/6/87.

27. W.D. Cingo, Ibali LabaThembu, Emfundisweni Mission 1927, p.12.
Mazwembe, 16/7/87.

Dikela's, it is only the descendants of Ntswayibana who are of the Dikela clan and that when the Dikela are praised they are often referred to as "Dikela of Ntswayibana".²⁸

All oral informants agree that when Ntswayibana became the chief he always referred all cases to Noni, saying,²⁹

Attend to them my younger brother, I am still attending to the gardens.

He never presided over a single case. It was always Noni who did so on his behalf.³⁰

When Noni had established himself in his own homestead, he referred those who brought cases to him back to Ntswayibana who in reply said³¹

Preside over them my younger brother, your homestead is still mine.

The excuse of always attending to the gardens earned him and his descendants the name amaNdima, indima is a

28. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

29. Mazwembe, 16/7/87
 . Mxutu, 13/6/87
 . Somdaka, 13/6/87
 . Titus, 12/7/87
 . Xundu, 2/7/87

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

piece of ploughed land. It is a noun derived from the verb stem "-lima" to plough. In this way Noni got experience in the responsibilities of a chief and many people looked upon him as the real chief.³²

What puzzles one in the above story is what made Ntswayibana to be always attending to agricultural farming usually a female occupation, instead of pastoral farming, hunting or court cases. D.B. Mxutu is of the opinion that the term endimeni-attending to the gardens - was being used by Ntswayibana as an euphemistic term for attending to beer drinking.³³ Another version which is more acceptable and positive is that despite the division of labour which assigned to men pastoral farming, there was nothing preventing them from giving help to women in tilling the soil. As Ntswayibana was a diligent man, he felt more at home when doing some physical work rather than mere theoretical and mental work. He always felt that his services were needed more in the gardens than in the court yard as some of the gardens

32. Ibid.

33. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

were in rugged areas - izigxa, which needed stronger people to till than women.³⁴

Diligence on the part of some Qwathi men and their readiness to help the women in agricultural farming were also observed by Reverend Gordon of All Saints Mission who commented in his report of December 1860.³⁵

There is one thing I appreciate with the Qwathi men and this is that it is not the women alone who work but also the men bear a helping hand during the planting season.

The second reason for the reins of the government passing over to Noni was the failure of Ntswayibana to come to the assistane of Noni against Mphosiwe Sebeni, the grandson of Mnguti whose son had married Noni's daughter. All arrangements having been made, Noni instructed the bridal party leader not to give any gifts or presents should the brideprice fall short. When indeed the brideprice fell short the bridal party refused to give the gifts and Mphosiwe in anger insulted Noni in the hearing of his people, saying³⁶

34. Titus, 12/7/87

35. Mic 172, 9623/3, Reel 2 p.167, Reverend J.Gordon's Report, 31/12/1860. Cory Library.

36. Mazwembe, 16/7/87; Mxutu, 13/6/87; Somdaka, 13/6/87; Titus, 12/7/87 and Xundu, 2/7/87.

This blind man is silly and selfish, I cannot take instructions from a blind man.

This was a mocking allusion to Noni's squint.

On their arrival at home the bridal party reported the matter to Noni who took exception to the insult and reported the matter to his brother, Ntswayibana. But, in reply, Ntswayibana said that it was not he but Noni himself, who had been insulted. Thereupon, Noni mobilised his forces under the leadership of his sons who were, Mtshaba the great son and his younger brothers who were, Gcaleka, Sidindi, Njimbana, Mxhiya and Ntondo. In the meantime he informed the Thembu King Tato who allowed him to do as he liked about redressing his grievance. Mphosiwe was defeated and many of his cattle were captured. One hundred cattle were sent to King Tato to thank him for not having interfered and the rest filled Noni's kraals and those of his sons. Ntswayibana protested and demanded that the booty he brought to him as the chief of the Qwathi but Noni replied it was not he (Ntswayibana) who had been insulted but him (Noni). Ntswayibana made no further attempts to assert himself as the chief of the Qwathi, he continued with his usual routine of helping women in the gardens. Many of his councillors began to look upon Noni as the chief especially that in supporting Noni there was the

possibility of amassing wealth through his bravery and ability as a chief. In this manner chieftainship passed into Noni's house ever since and there was no attempt on the part of Dikela, Ntswayibana's son to claim back chieftainship. Up to now it is still in the hands of Noni's descendants.³⁷

(c) Qwathi Clans

But that power had shifted to Noni does not mean that the Dikela had been thrown away. Today some Dikela are heads of certain tribal authorities in Qwathiland, together with those of the Sidindi and Ntongo houses. The great house is that of Mtshaba, son of Noni.

Noni allocated his sons in the following manner:- Mtshaba was the great son. Mxhinya was attached to the great house to be a milker of the great house. Gcaleka (not to be confused with Gcaleka, the Xhosa chief) became ixhiba, the seed bearer should there be no son in the great house. The descendants of Gcaleka are found in the Western Thembuland. It is from this house that Stokwe Ndlela, one of the Western Thembu chiefs, who took part in Ninth Frontier War and

37. Ibid.

was killed in the 1880-1881 Rebellion, came.³⁸ It was at this house of Gcaleka that Noni died.³⁹

Ntondo was made Isilunga sikaNina - keeper of his mother. Njimbane died in the war against Mphosiwe Sebeni before allocation was made. It is doubtful if he could have been allocated had he survived, since the Qwathi at this time did not have Right hand houses. Sidindi was not allocated. In an attempt to secure the permanent survival of his house he asked his father to get another wife who would bear him brothers, who would be allocated under him. Mncancashe was the son from this house. Mncancashe's son was Mabunzi the first Qwathi to remain at work and never to come back home. The descendants of this house are at Ngcaca in Zwedala's location on the other side of the Tsomo River in the Lady Frere district.⁴⁰ The removal of the Gcaleka house to Western Thembuland must have been a blessing in disguise to the Sidindi house. The Sidindi house became the second in seniority. The status of Ntondo, the youngest son was somewhat raised when he was allocated as the keeper of his mother hence even

38. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

today some of the Tribal authorities are under the Ntondo.⁴¹

Today there are four senior clans in Qwathiland namely, ImiTshaba from whom Qwathi chiefs come, amaSidindi, amaDikela and amaNtondo. There are other clans which are minor and do not hold political positions. As a small nation all Qwathi clans are much closer to one another. It is perhaps this closeness, lack of discrimination and lack of pronounced jealousy and rivalry that the Qwathi have survived as a distinct group with its own national history in the heart of Thembuland.⁴²

There are two other important clans which have no chieftainship or headmanship but which are closely associated with the senior houses. ImiXhiya, as noted above, were allocated as milkers of the great house. Although they do not qualify for chieftainship, they occupy an important position in the Qwathi history both politically and socially. The descendants from Mxhiya are called amaKhombela. The second one is ImiNcayi named after Mncayi in the Qadi of the Great House of Lutshaba. They are more related to the

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

ImiTshaba than any other clans. They are found in the Gqaga Valley.⁴³

Attached to the Dikela clan are amaMvala who are accepted as Dikela because of a long history of closeness to the clan, though they are not Dikela by birth. The amaMvala were acting as herds for Ntswayibana and were gradually absorbed by the Dikela clan hence they are recognised as the Mvala of Dikela. The name -mvala comes from the verb stem -vala to close. This confirms that they were herds as it is the responsibility of the herds to close in the stock all evenings. The kraal gates those days were made up of loose poles which were made to cross each other at the gate held tight by the gate posts - amaxhanti to prevent the stock from moving out. These loose poles are called imivalo meaning things used to close.⁴⁴

Amabangula is another clan also closely related to the senior clans. This clan is named after Nobangula, Nkovane's sister. The name "Nobangula" denotes a feminine gender and is derived from the verb stem "-bangula" by prefixing "no". This verb stem means

43. Xundu, 12/7/87.

44. Titus, 2/7/87.

to pick up a thorn from somebody's feet. This woman must have been helping his father, the chief, by picking up thorns from his feet or she was absorbed into the house because of her helpfulness and was given the status of a princess. She gave birth outside marriage to two children, Bhose and Dumba - a girl and a boy who committed incest and gave birth to a boy. This shocked the Qwathi when it was revealed. The Xhosa word for revealing something openly is "daca" hence this boy was called "Mdaca" and the clan "imiDaca". From Nobangula, therefore, came the following clans:- amaBangula, amaDumba and imiDaca.⁴⁵

Another clan is that of amaBlangwe, they came from Ndzoloshe whose son was Blangwe. Blangwe's son was Thandabuzo. His children were Nqinayo and Nqilashe, a boy and a girl.⁴⁶

All the Qwathi clans date back from Mtshutshumbe's time or later and not earlier hence these clans are not found among the Xesibe. None of the Qwathi ever went back to EmaXesibeni after having settled in

45. Mazwembe, 16/7/87.

46. Xundu, 12/7/87

Qwathiland. Their customs are more Thembu than Xesibe.⁴⁷

Intermarriage does take place between some of the Qwathi clans. This is so because as the nation grows, each clan begins to develop as its own ancestors became independent of the other ancestors. The praise singers of chiefs and important leaders or councillors or heads of clans also begin to sing different praises for the sons of the same chief or head. This marks the beginning of a clan as followers of the young chiefs begin to call themselves after some of the praises. As the clan grows, ties of blood gradually disappear and are forgotten and ancestors cease to be common. Otherwise the Qwathi are exogamous.⁴⁸

For example Ntswayibana and Noni were brothers from the same father. Ntswayibana began to have his own line of succession known as "amaDikela" and Noni "imiTshaba", "amaSidindi", "imiXhiya" and "amaNtondo". The Dikela began to look at Ntswayibana as their ancestor not at Nkovane, Ntswayibana's father and the


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

descendants of Noni to Noni not to Nkovane. Hence the descendants of Noni do not intermarry and also those of Dikela do not intermarry. But the Dikela and the descendants of Noni do intermarry. The Blangwe also do marry the Nqinayo and the Ndzolo.⁴⁹

49. Ibid.

QWATHI GENEALOGY



From the above genealogy, it is clear that Mtshaba took over from Noni in about 1750. It was during his reign that the Right hand house and the qadi houses came into being. His sons were as follows:- Lutshaba and Baca in the great house, Khutshwa in the right hand house and Mncayi in the Qadi house. He was succeeded by his great son Lutshaba who unfortunately had no male issue. Fubu the eldest son of the right hand house succeeded Lutshaba in about 1780. Even today Fubu is the most famous and best known chief of the Qwathi people. This is because of his long period of reign and acts of bravery. He fought and almost warded off all the invaders during the Mfecane. His victims during his reign were such well known chiefs as Rharhabe of the Xhosa, Madzikane of the Bhaca, Matiwane of the Mpondomise. His children were Bhunxase, Nodukwe, Dalasile - greatson, Sigidi always known as Sigidi Fubu, Qhole, Ngcango and Danti from the right hand house.⁵⁰

50. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

CHAPTER 2EARLY QWATHI WARS 1782-1848(a) Qwathi - Rharhabe War 1782

One of the first important incidents of Fubu's reign was his defeat of the noted Xhosa chief, Rharhabe. It is surprising that such well known historians of the Xhosa as Peires and Milton have neglected to explain this event and have ascribed it simply to the "Thembu" without noticing the role played by Fubu and the Qwathi.¹

Unfortunately the matter is far from easy to explain as there are no fewer than ten sources and these contradict each other in many respects.²

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1. J.Milton, The Edges of War (Johannesburg, 1983), p.34.
 - . J.B.Peires, The House of Phalo (Johannesburg, 1981), p.50.
 2. Cingo, Ibali labaThembu, pp.12-14.
 - . W.D. Hammond-Tooke, The Tribes of Umtata (Pretoria, 1957), pp.37-38.
 - . Colonel J.Maclean (ed), Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs (Grahamstown, 1906), p.19.
 - . Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
 - . Milton, Edges of War, p.34.
 - . Mxutu, 13/6/87.
 - . Peires, Phalo, p.50.
 - . E.G.Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu bevelaphi?" pp.12-13.
 - . PR 3665 1 of 4, M.Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu" (Cory Library).

However, it is clear that at least two factors played a part in bringing about the clash. First it seems that Ndaba, the King of the Thembu, was held captive for some time by Rharhabe and was ill-treated by him until Fubu came to his assistance. Second, it seems that there was a dispute about the brideprice owed by a certain Thembu to Rharhabe. We must look more closely at each of these facts in turn.³

When Ndaba came of age, he married a Xhosa woman who either was Rharhabe's daughter or sister. Unfortunately the brideprice fell short. He sent a miserable hundred head of cattle. This was an insult to such a well-known chief of the Xhosa. He was determined to punish Ndaba.⁴

Meanwhile at home, all was not well. From the beginning Ndaba showed signs of weakness. His throne was challenged by his half brother "Ntlanzi". He also blundered by antagonising the Ndungwana because

. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, pp.131-132.
 . D.J.Potgieter (ed), The Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, Vol.9, (Cape Town, 1973), p.247.
 . Xundu, 12/7/87.

3. Ibid.

4. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, pp.131-132.

of the obsolete and notorious custom of sending for all the Ndungwana girls to go to his place. At the instigation of Ntlanzi the Ndungwana appealed to Rharhabe whose mother was a Ndungwana or a daughter of Ndungwana of the iQadi house of Dlomo. Embittered by the insult of the brideprice, Rharhabe accepted the invitation. Ndaba was defeated and fled to Gcalekaland. In his place Ntlanzi who had long wanted the reins of government acted as regent.⁵

Ndaba who was not a brave king, and did not have much following, must have been afraid of coming back to challenge Ntlanzi, the regent. He stayed in Gcalekaland long after the war had come to an end. Rharhabe who was not satisfied with the punishment meted out to Ndaba, tried a trick to get Ndaba to his Great Place. He pretended to be feeling guilty for the treatment given Ndaba and asked him to leave Gcalekaland and come to the Rharhabe Great Place for entertainment. Ndaba, who was not far-sighted, agreed. But the entertainment he got was of a different nature. He was tortured and ill-treated at the Rharhabe Great Place by being made to jump over

5. Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu" (N.P.N.)
 . Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu" (N.P.N.)

the spears and other sharp weapons, so that if he could not jump over them, they could hurt him.⁶

The news of the ill-treatment of the Thembu King displeased Fubu, the chief of the Qwathi, who was unhappy with the despotic powers of the Thembu regent, Ntlanzi. He secretly discussed the issue with Nkosiyana, one of the Thembu chiefs in the Mqanduli district, who was also unhappy about Ntlanzi's reign. They decided to rescue and reinstate Ndaba.⁷

Fubu led his forces to Rharhabeland. When they approached the Hoho Forests, he sent Ncobeni of the Bangula clan with a small force to go and inform Ndaba that he, Fubu, had come to his rescue.⁸ They found him in one of the huts from which he could not escape as the door was guarded. Ncobeni and his followers took the weapons with which the exit was closed and killed the guards and rescued Ndaba.⁹ Young men were

6. Cingo, Ibali labaThembu, pp.12-14.
 . Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".
 . Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
 . Mxutu, 13/6/87.
 . Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
 . Xundu, 12/7/87.

7. Cingo, Ibali labaThembu.
 . Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".

8. Mxutu, 13/6/87

9. Ibid.
 . Xundu, 12/7/87.

sent by Fubu to drive away all the cattle from the grazing lands as booty. Fubu and his forces helped Ndaba back to his place and built kraals for him which were filled with the Rharhabe cattle.¹⁰

When Rharhabe discovered that all his cattle had been taken away, he led his forces into Thembuland but Fubu would not allow him to cross Qwathiland. This led to the battle of Ngxogi in which the Rharhabe were beaten. Rharhabe, himself, fell in the battle, and in the battle of Luhewini, Rharhabe's Great son, Mlawu, also died. The Rharhabe were defeated by the Qwathi under Fubu. Ndaba was reinstated without any trouble as Ntlanzi did not show any resistance. He must have become afraid of Fubu and his Qwathi.¹¹

(b) Qwathi-Thembu War

Having successfully reinstated Ndaba, the Qwathi considered themselves to be real rulers of the Mbashe area.¹² When Ngubengcuka, the Great son of Ndaba, became the King about 1810, the tottering monarch had reached its lowest ebb. He had to work hard to unite

10. Ibid.

11. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

12. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?", p.19.

and strengthen the Thembu Nation during a most critical and challenging era, the era of the Mfecane wars. At this time, the Qwathi, the most powerful group in Thembuland had begun to look down upon the Thembu because of their weakness. The Qwathi must have been regretting the offer of hundred head of cattle which had become obligatory rather than voluntary. They tried by all means to provoke the Thembu into war as success in the war would relieve them of the burden.¹³

When Ngubengcuka ascended the throne, he had a hard task of proving to his neighbours and his subjects as to who was the real power in Thembuland.¹⁴ The build up of tension began when the Qwathi boys killed some calves of Thembu cattle. When the Thembu boys protested the Qwathi boys attacked them. The Qwathi boys had even coined an idiom, "chithi, chithi gxothisa buHala".¹⁵ This means that when you chase somebody make him run like a Hala (The Hala are the royal clan of the Thembu). Even men became involved in the conflicts. In such encounters the Hala were always defeated.

13. Xundu, 2/7/87.

14. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?", p.19.

15. Ibid.

Ngubengcuka sent repeatedly to Fubu, appealing to him to control his people and also complained about the killing of the calves of the Hala cows whilst grazing in the veld. But Fubu showed no interest in the matter. The Qwathi despite these appeals and warnings continued to provoke the Hala into war. It became clear that no amount of appeals, warnings and reasoning would deter the Qwathi from the behaviour, but only an appeal to arms would solve the problems.¹⁶

At last Ngubengcuka made a decision. He called upon the Thembu and the other loyal chiefs to make weapons in abundance and to prepare themselves for war, to teach the Qwathi a lesson. He appealed to his warriors to gather strength and courage and appealed to their patriotic spirit, making them see that the great nation was on fire. The Thembu warriors in tears, left the courtyard of the Great Place with one accord, determined to crush the Qwathi. A violent clash took place along the Gqaga valleys, with the sons of Ndaba and Lutshaba determined to fight for their lives. The Qwathi appeared to have been taken unawares and they began to retreat. The Hala pushed them over the valleys whilst the other Thembu warriors

16. Ibid.

drove away the cattle. But it seems as if the retreat of the Qwathi was a planned strategy to enable them to organise themselves afresh. Things became bad for the Hala. Ngubengcuka instructed his brother, Jumba to escape with the Qwathi cattle. He said.¹⁷

My brother, Jumba, get away with those cattle as fast as you can and leave me behind to try yet another blow on these Qwathi. But should you leave these cattle behind you will remain poor for the rest of your life.

Jumba with a few men drove the cattle away and crossed the Xuka river. As they crossed the river, the two titans met with a violent clash. Fubu pushed harder in his flank and the Hala opponents began to retreat. Some Hala, in a confused state, missed the Xuka drift and drowned in the deep water. What saved the Thembu was that Ngubengcuka, having realised the danger in which they were, crossed the river at full speed. With a handful of men he blocked the drift, thus men died in the battle of Xuka. The Qwathi paused to reorganise themselves.

17. Ibid.

During this pause one 'fire eating patriot' on the side of the Qwathi called¹⁸

Had the cattle ever been taken away whilst men were still alive, you cattle [men] of Lutshaba of Noni?

The Qwathi, with one accord, pushed forward in pursuit of the Hala who were already heading for the plains of Sithebe, near Clarkebury. As the Qwathi were pushing closer and closer, Ngubengcuka made eloquent appeals to his warriors to make a halt and face the enemy. To these appeals the Hala patriots responded valiantly. They doubly-redoubled their strokes upon the foe. The Qwathi forces gave in and the day was lost to the Thembu who pursued them, thus changing the Qwathi idiom to fit them. The Thembu victory was great.¹⁹

The war earned Ngubengcuka respect from both the Hala and the Qwathi. Fubu is reported to have commented²⁰

Yes, I am happy that this day has come to prove that indeed you are a man, because your father was a coward who failed to assist me to defend this country.

From Fubu's speech, it is clear that, even though defeated, he did not regard Ngubengcuka as his master

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

but as his partner who would assist him in defending the country. As equals or partners they would both defend the country from enemies.

In his speech after Fubu, Marhongo, a Qwathi councillor, made it clear that they desired to be freed from the burden of taxation which started as a voluntary contribution and also the war tax they were traditionally expected to pay. He was speaking as if he was not representing a defeated people but was speaking as if no one had won. The Qwathi speakers had not at all been humbled. In fact had the Qwathi warriors not pursued the Hala from Xuka to Sithebe, they could have won the day. If war had been resumed after the Sithebe battle the Thembu would not be certain of the result. This confidence on the part of the Qwathi speakers made Ngubengcuka to think wisely before saying anything or else his victory would be short lived.²¹

In his closing speech, Ngubengcuka spoke wisely. He agreed to abolish the tax and appealed to the Qwathi to cooperate with the Thembu especially in times of war. He also appealed to both the Thembu and the Qwathi that enmity between them should come to an end.

21. Ibid.

Ngubengcuka in his speech was not speaking from a height, as the master over the Qwathi but as an equal. He was afraid of antagonising the Qwathi at a time when the atmosphere was saturated with the rumours of war. He needed a powerful, reliable and friendly ally in order to ward off invaders. The two leaders, therefore, rounded up their discussions, fully assuring each other of cooperation on the basis of equality, hence throughout the Mfecane wars the Qwathi were always cooperative, genuinely assisting the Thembu against their enemies. Thus Ngubengcuka never managed or attempted to exert full authority over the Qwathi. Later events imply that the Qwathi retained their autonomous status.²²

(c) Qwathi-Bhaca War 1824

The nineteenth Century saw the beginning of turmoil and violence among the African chiefdoms in which the more powerful nations crushed, absorbed and pushed away the weaker ones and the weaker ones carried destruction to everything in front of them also absorbing the weaker peoples with the aim of building themselves into stronger nations to be able to challenge the bigger ones. These upheavals,

22. Ibid.

generally speaking, began in Zululand and from there spread to the South, West and North. The effects of such restlessness and violence were also felt in the independent chiefdoms of the area between the Kei and Mzimkhulu rivers. Thembuland, therefore, was no exception.²³

Madzikane the mighty chief of the Bhaca people, was the first of the leaders and devastators to set his foot in Thembuland towards the end of 1823. In an attempt to break out of the cramped conditions of Northern Mpondoland, Madzikane led a raid to the South into Thembu territory. Madzikane and his Bhaca warriors entered Thembuland through Qwathiland from the direction of Mpondomiseland and Gatberg district. The Qwathi, therefore, were the first to feel the edges of the Bhaca spears. Madzikane was believed to have magical, mysterious and occult powers which made him invisible when facing the enemy.²⁴

23. J.D.Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa (London, 1966), pp.168-182.

. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa (London, 1987), p.52.

24. A.M. Makaula, Interview with, 20/8/87 Grahams-town.

. Mazwembe, 16/7/87.

Besides the desire for a living space, Madzikane was attracted into Thembuland by the fertile land and abundant supply of cattle since Thembuland was far the the centres of conflict. When the Bhaca entered Qwathiland, they built their homesteads without consulting Fubu, the Chief of the Qwathi or Ngubengcuka, the King of the Thembu. Fubu warned him against this and gave him three days in which to remove from Qwathiland. To this Madzikane replied.²⁵

I am from Zululand and I will never be under any chief or king and if you tell me about war, that is my way of life, my weapons have been lying there unused. You have reminded me of my duty.

After three days, Fubu, having doctored his army, led it against the Bhaca. As the Qwathi forces were approaching, Madzikane called upon Jekwa, one of his chief councillors and said.²⁶

Chieftainship comes from God and that my time has come to an end.

He told Jekwa that he was going to die at the hands of the Qwathi. He then broke down the calabash in which he kept his medicines, which action symbolised the destruction of himself. Now that his life had come

25. Ibid.

26. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

to an end, there was no need to keep his charms which could not be shared with anyone even his sons. Hence after blessing his sons, Sonyangwe and Ncaphayi, he advised them to go to Faku who would give them land and chieftainship.²⁷

At that moment the Qwathi began to attack. Madzikane hid himself in the Gqutyini Forest. Taken by surprise and discouraged by Madzikane's words, that he was going to die, the Bhaca warriors offered no resistance but took to flight at once. They fled away in the direction of Mpondomiseland. The Qwathi hunted for Madzikane and when they saw him they attacked him but because his charms were still working in him he could not be killed with the Qwathi spears, though badly wounded. At last he said:²⁸

My days have come to an end, but you will not be able to kill me with your spears.

He then handed out his own spear, and before Fubu could intervene, a young man of the Gcina ethnic group had already grabbed the spear and dealt Madzikane a fatal blow. Having killed Madzikane, this young

27. Makaula, 20/8/87.
 . Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
 . Mxutu, 13/6/87.
 . Somdaka, 13/6/87.

28. Ibid.

Gcina is reported to have fainted and died out of excitement. Some say he had been affected by Madzikane's charms.²⁹ However, the Qwathi informants, explain that Fubu, who was opposed to a commoner killing a chief, who was not fighting, in a fit of anger ordered the young Gcina to be killed.³⁰

All the Bhaca fled into the direction of Eastern Mpondoland according to Madzikane's advice. Thus Fubu had succeeded in warding off the Mfecane invaders from entering Thembuland. The area which Madzikane and his followers had camped is, even today, known as Madzikane's location.³¹

(d) The Qwathi and the Ngwane of Matiwane 1828

As a result of the wars from Trans-Orangia, Matiwane of the Ngwane decided to remove to a safer country. But before they left, his followers made an attack on Moshoeshoe's position at Thaba Bosiu. The attack was made in July 1827. Though the Ngwane were more than a match for the Sotho in the open field, they did not

29. Makaula, 20/8/87.

30. Mazwembe, 16/7/87.
 . Mxutu, 13/6/87.

31. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
 . Ntshokweni, Interview with, 15/3/87, Cape Town.

succeed in storming the mountain. Decimated by large boulders and showers of spears hurled down from above, their ranks began to waver. They were routed by a Sotho charge. Matiwane was furious with his subordinates who had risked battle on such unfavourable terms and exposed the insecurity of his position. Only the strength of public opinion prevented him from putting the leaders of expedition to death. The Ngwane position in Trans-Orangia had become untenable and a second encounter with the Ndebele caused them to abandon the area and follow the route across the Orange which led to Thembuland.³²

The Qwathi-Thembu combined forces pushed the Ngwane back to Lesotho and on their way they suffered from severe dysentery. The plague was attributed to Ngubengcuka's diviners. Many people including his brother Pehle, opposed another attempt to enter Thembuland but Matiwane forced his way, they entered Qwathiland and he doctored his army. They came into a homestead where an intonjane ceremony was in progress. They massacred everybody in that homestead. The Qwathi tried to resist but were no match. Fubu withdrew his forces, promising to make another attempt in a few weeks, but once more he was defeated. He

32. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, pp.91-92.

then sent a word to Ngubengcuka, who appealed to the Gcaleka and the Colonial Government.³³

Lieutenant-Governor R. Bourke sent Colonel Henry Sommerset with a force of a thousand soldiers. Hintsa also sent a formidable force. The Ngwane who feared nothing in human form awaited, in confidence, the armies approaching them. They had complete trust in themselves but to their shock they found themselves face to face with something unknown to them which seemed at the time supernatural. They were familiar with the war, accustomed to famine and hardship but this day they met with what they had never met with before - the destructive power of artillery. The Ngwane tried to come to close quarters with their spears but in vain. Long before they could approach within charging distance they were shot down. A sound of thunder they heard, a cloud of smoke they saw but they did not know what killed them. They broke before the storm of shot and shell.³⁴

The battle of Mbolompo, 1828, put an end to the career of the Ngwane as a powerful invading group.

33. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu"? pp.18-19.

34. Ibid.
 . Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, p.92.

Most of the survivors, both Hlubi and Ngwane settled down among the Qwathi, Thembu and Xhosa in a subordinate capacity where they came to be part of the composite group known as the Mfengu.³⁵

(e) Qwathi-Thembu Alliance against the Sotho

In about 1830 Makhabane complained to his brother, Moshoeshoe, that he was poor and had no cattle. Moshoeshoe replied that she should take up arms and lead the way to Thembuland in order to get cattle since the Thembu were reported to be rich in cattle. When they reached Thembuland Makhabane pushed straight for Nyhwarha, Ngubengcuka's Great Place. Some of the forces were scattered over Qwathiland with the aim of getting all the cattle available. Makhabane having captured many of the cattle moved into the direction of Qwathiland. Ngubengcuka sent his forces to recover the cattle.³⁶

As they were climbing up the Luhewini mountain they were confronted by the Thembu and the Qwathi under Ngubengcuka and Fubu respectively. Overwhelmed by these reinforcements, Makhabane tried to escape but he

35. Ibid.

36. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.24 B.

thought again of the cattle and decided to resist. The Qwathi-Thembu combination was at an advantage in that they were using spears which they could throw at a distance while the Sotho were using battle axes. The Sotho fled into the Nduku Forest. Ngubengcuka appealed to his forces to drive the Sotho out of the forest away from the country.³⁷

One of the Thembu replied that they were short of weapons because they had used up all their spears. Ngubengcuka instructed them to get into the forest and get themselves knobkerries and sticks with which to fight. Thereupon the Qwathi and the Thembu with new weapons beat the Sotho out of the forest up the mountain. Makhabane was killed and left in the forest. The Sotho fled away.³⁸

The forest in which Makhabane died was named Nduku meaning a stick because it was from this forest that the Qwathi-Thembu forces got the sticks with which to drive the Sotho away. It was in the vicinity of this forest that Dalasile, the great son of Fubu, built his

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

homestead. Both Fubu and Ngubengcuka demonstrated in this invasion that "unity is strength".³⁹

(f) Fubu's hunting Party skirmished by the Gcaleka at Mntuntloni.

In one of his hunting expeditions, Fubu narrowly escaped death in the forest that was later called Mntuntloni. They were warned by the Qwathi women of the locality that the Gcaleka warriors from Hohita had surrounded the forest. These Gcaleka were after Fubu as they had heard much about his bravery. To save Fubu, the hunting party decided that one young man should be given Fubu's robe and asked to go out of the forest in the direction of Mgwalana, wielding his weapon by his left hand to emulate Fubu, and to hold his shield by his right hand. He was asked to run as fast as he could to draw away the Gcaleka. When indeed, the Gcaleka saw this man coming out of the forest at full speed and in the manner described above, they were certain it was Fubu, and they all pursued him since it would add fame to anyone who could kill Fubu. They overtook the young man at Mgwalana stream and killed him.⁴⁰

39. Ibid.

40. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

In the meantime, Fubu and his party came out of the forest in the opposite direction and took the road which leads to the direction of the present town of Cala without having been seen by his enemies. When the Gcaleka realised that they had killed the wrong person, they went back and once more surrounded the forest but they were afraid to get in. When nobody came out they gave up the siege.⁴¹ According to D.B.Mxutu, the name Mntuntloni for this forest and surrounding area, dates back to this incident. This was because the women who had raised the alarm did not see anybody coming out and still believed that he was still there and too shy to come out - Mntuntloni means a shy person.⁴²

(g) Qwathi-San War

Chief Mgudlwa, the great son of Jumba, the right hand son of Ndaba, who was the nephew (Mgudlwa) to the Qwathi by his mother who came from the house of Ntondo, the youngest son of Noni, fled to Qwathiland

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

and reported that his cattle had been captured by the San and asked Fubu for assistance.⁴³

When the Qwathi occupied the present Qwathiland they were warned against the dangerous San by Dlomo but they showed no fear of the San. The day had come for them to prove that they were superior to the San. To fight against the San needed a special skill since the San used poisoned arrows which were shot at a distance. Fubu and his Qwathi were aware of the danger of the poisoned arrows. In planning the war against the San they knew that they should take them by surprise and chase them at close quarters so that they should not have a chance to turn back and shoot their dangerous weapons. This the Qwathi successfully did.⁴⁴

Having taken them by surprise, they routed the San down the Mnyolo Valley to the vicinity of Clarkebury, from Clarkebury they pursued them further towards Thorha in the direction of Xonya. From there they were pursued up to the Ntunja mountain - Gatberg. The San swiftly ascended but the Qwathi on ascending were delayed by heavy storm and when it had cleared,

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

the San were nowhere to be seen but the Qwathi managed to recover the cattle which were given back to Mgudlwa.⁴⁵

(h) Qwathi-Mpondomise War (Matiwane)

As a result of the Mpondomise-Bhaca clashes, Myeki, the Mpondomise chief fled to Mpangele, a Gcina chief living in Cacadu in Western Thembuland. At this place, he and his followers, were now in the neighbourhood of the Thembu who had also run away, during the beginning of the reign of Mthikrakra, as a result of the Mpondo-Bhaca invasions of Thembuland Proper. Mthikrakra decided that they should move on to Rhoda in order to be as far away from Faku and Ncaphayi as possible. This took place in about 1838.⁴⁶

Cordial relations were established between the Thembu and the Mpondomise. There was mutual respect for one another as well as intermarriage. They even cooperated when thieves came unexpectedly.⁴⁷

45. Ibid.

46. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"

47. Ibid.

As Myeki was aging, he sent a message to Mthikrakra, the Thembu King, to tell him that his son, Matiwane, wanted to take over whilst he (Myeki) was still alive.

Mthikrakra asked Matiwane to wait until his father's death. Matiwane and his followers having given up went back to Mpondomiseland leaving Myeki behind with a handful of his supporters.⁴⁸

On the way, Matiwane, having seen the Qwathi cattle became jealous and greedy. There were also rumours that the Qwathi were about to leave for Lesotho because they were tired of fighting for the land that belonged to the Thembu who had some time ago deserted it. As a result of this greed Matiwane hunted for Qwathi cattle.⁴⁹

At the very hour of the removal of the Qwathi cattle by the Mpondomise, a battle ensued between them and the Qwathi. An easy victory was won by the Qwathi with the Mpondomise scattered all over during which confusion Matiwane was captured by the Qwathi. The Qwathi declared that according to their custom and tradition they could not kill a chief. Matiwane had to be released though wounded. Among the Qwathi

48. Ibid.

49. Mxutu, 13/6/87

there were Mpondomise who belonged to the Velelo clan, who said to the Qwathi,⁵⁰

You may go Qwathi and leave him with us, we are going to kill him because we are used to killing chiefs.

The Qwathi were just few paces away when the amaVelelo did what they regarded as their task, that of killing the chiefs. This is how Matiwane, Son of Myeki, met his end. Some of the Mpondomise claimed that the Qwathi killed Matiwane, but this was only an attempt to protect the Mpondomise who had committed the murder from the wrath of the Mpondomise chiefs.⁵¹

The period 1782 to 1848 was a period of difficulties for the Qwathi under Fubu because it was the period of wars. But Fubu successfully resisted the invasions throughout the period even to the extent of defending Thembuland which had remained vacant from 1838 to 1850 when the Thembu came back from Rhoda under the leadership of the regent, Joyi, after the death of Mthikrakra.⁵² But when the Thembu under Joyi returned, Fubu, who had kept the promise made at Mount Noni, that cooperation between the Qwathi and the

50. Ibid.

51. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

52. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"

Thembu, was too old to play any important political role. It remained with Dalasile, Fubu's great son, to keep it or break it.

CHAPTER 3QWATHI-THEMBU RELATIONS 1860-1875

Nothing is known about the beginning of the reign of Dalasile, the great son of Fubu, nor can any exact date be given for the death of Fubu or Dalasile's accession to the throne. From the missionary records, it is assumed that Dalasile must have begun to share power with his old father by 1859 because when the missionaries arrived in Qwathiland Fubu was very old and the missionaries were told that the final decision rested with Dalasile.¹

Stanford mistakenly assumed that Danti, Dalasile's older brother, but from the right hand house, was at one time a regent.² This stemmed out of the fact that Danti was a chief councillor and was living with his old father as Dalasile's homestead was about fifteen kilometres away from Fubu's. But that Danti was never a regent is confirmed by the missionary records as both Fubu and Danti showed reluctance to allocate land to the missionaries without the prior

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1. Mic 172/96723/3 Reel 2 p.617, Reverend J.Gordon's Report 31/12/1860, Cory Library.
 2. J.W.Macquarie (ed.), The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford. Vol.1 (VRS 39 Cape Town 1958), p.53.

approval of Dalasile who was at the time away after a runaway wife.³

Fubu's death must have occurred about 1860 and Dalasile can be assumed to have officially taken over in 1860 by which time he must have been about forty years. An article in the "Cape Monthly Magazine" (1870-1876) describes Dalasile in 1874 "as a good looking young man rather short in stature".⁴

(a) Qwathi-Thembu Alliance against Mditshwa 1860

The Thembu under Mthikrakra, having left Thembuland Proper during the Mfecane wars in about 1838, vast lands remained unoccupied. Mditshwa and his Mpondomise followers, as a result of the invasions on him by the Mpondo of Ndamase decided to settle in the unoccupied lands of Thembuland Proper.⁵

When the Thembu came back in about 1850, after the death of Mthikrakra, there were continuous isolated conflicts between them and the neighbouring Mpondo-

3. Gordon's Report 31/12/1860.

4. Robinson, Cape Monthly Magazine 1870-1876, p.173.

5. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.35.

mise. These started from beer-drinking parties until they erupted into a full scale war in 1860 between the Thembu under the regency of Joyi and the Mpondomise of Mditshwa in which the Thembu were defeated.⁶

Upon defeat, Joyi appealed to Dalasile of the Qwathi and Mgudlwa of the Jumba. Mgudlwa, at first, hesitated as he was afraid of putting himself in a difficult position since he and his old father, Jumba, were sharing the same boundary with the Mpondomise along the Tsitsa River. But when Dalasile promised him land in his country, he agreed to come to the assistance of Joyi.⁷

When the Qwathi and Jumba were ready, the war cry was raised. The combined Qwathi-Thembu forces soon burnt and destroyed the Mpondomise homesteads. The Mpondomise were scattered all over and were pushed and pursued from Zimbane, Ncise, Kambi, Qokolweni up to Mjika and the combined forces returned with a large booty. Since that day the Mpondomise of Mditshwa

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

established themselves in the present districts of Tsolo and Maclear (Gatberg).⁸

After the war Joyi thanked Dalasile and Mgudlwa by giving them a large number of cattle. Once more the Qwathi had successfully cooperated with the Thembu by assisting in warding off the Thembu enemy. This was an indication that Dalasile had not renounced the policy of "good neighbourliness" with the Thembu which had been pursued by Fubu in 1782 and was renewed after the Qwathi-Thembu war of the early 19th Century.⁹

(b) Dalasile gives land to Mgudlwa

At the beginning of the reign of Mthikrakra in 1838, Mgudlwa was living in Tabase in the present district of Umtata with his old father, Jumba, and his brother, Mdukiswa. After a dispute about seniority between Mgudlwa and Mdukiswa the matter was brought before Mthikrakra and councillors, by the young chiefs but their father, on account of ill-health did not attend. They were instructed to come with him the next time they should go to the great place and in the meantime Mgudlwa was appointed heir pending the decision.

8. Ibid.

9. Xundu, 2/7/87.

When they got home, they told Jumba about the decision. But Mgudlwa rather than put his father in an invidious position decided to leave for Qwathiland.

His father also decided to leave with him. Mdukiswa decided to remain behind.¹⁰

It so happened that, in the meantime, the Thembu under Mthikrakra were leaving for Rhoda, so they all moved. Mgudlwa and Jumba did not stay at Rhoda. They both left with the intention of settling in Qwathiland. Mgudlwa chose the Qumanco valley, whilst Jumba chose Mhlwazi above the mountains. But when Joyi, regent for Ngangelizwe, went back to Thembuland, they both moved and established themselves at Tsitsa.¹¹

When war broke out between Joyi and Mditshwa, Mgudlwa feared to join in the war on the side of Joyi because he was sharing the same boundary with the Mpondomise along the Tsitsa river. Dalasile promised him land in the Qumanco valley, the same land he had occupied before leaving for Tsitsa. This was part of Dalasile's land. But despite this, Dalasile did not intend extending his jurisdiction over Mgudlwa and his people. As a chief in his own right he preferred to

10. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"

11. Ibid.

give Mgudlwa land where he would rule as an independent chief. Even today the Jumba are still in occupation of the Qumanco valley which was extended to the Mgwali river after the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880-1881.¹²

(c) Dalasile's Relations with Ngangelizwe 1863-1875

Up to this time relations between the Qwathi and the Thembu were cordial. But after the accession of Ngangelizwe to the throne in 1863, the relations were strained. Dalasile began to lead his own way without much respect for Ngangelizwe. This, Dalasile showed as early as the installation of Ngangelizwe as the King of the Thembu, after initiation in 1863. He absented himself from the occasion which was attended by almost all the chiefs in Thembuland. This was an indication that Dalasile was determined to go it alone without any association with the new Thembu King.¹³

The reason for this estrangement was, perhaps, because of the apparent alliance with the British whom Dalasile did not trust. This alliance was shown by E.J. Warner's being chosen to induct Ngangelizwe.

12. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

13. Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".

Secondly, Dalasile must have been estranged from Ngangelizwe because of his (Ngangelizwe) upbringing and his subsequent behaviour. Ngangelizwe from earliest youth had been spoiled and flattered. Even as a boy he knew what it was to have despotic powers, his word was law and his temper had been allowed to run riot "without even semblance of restraint". This was too much for Dalasile to bear hence even at this early stage of Ngangelizwe's life, Dalasile showed reluctance to associate himself with him.¹⁴

After his installation, Ngangelizwe's imperious, cruel and tyrannical reign and the disgusting treatment of his many wives was such as to make "the coldest heart burn with indignation".¹⁵ This is why Dalasile did not come to the assistance of Ngangelizwe during the latter's conflicts with Sarhili, the King of the Xhosa, whose daughter he had married and subsequently ill-treated. These conflicts resulted from his ill-treatment of this wife and her female attendant.¹⁶

14. Robinson, Cape Monthly Magazine (1870-76) p.173.

15. Ibid.

16. W.T.Brownlee, The Reminiscences of a Transkeian (Pietermaritzburg, 1975) p.71.

. Macquarie, Reminiscences of Standord, p.52.

. V.M.Master, "Resistance to Colonial Control of Thembuland". (Unpublished M.A. Thesis U.C.T., 1966), P.10.

. Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu"

It was not possible for Dalasile to be enamoured to such a king as he was not a kind of a chief to accept being bullied. Moreover Dalasile's behaviour was in direct contrast to Ngangelizwe's. Dalasile has been described, in the Selected articles from the Cape Monthly Magazine (1870-1876), in 1874 "as a good-looking young man, with a fine clear countenance which inspired trust and respect."¹⁷

When Ngangelizwe realised that the Qwathi of Dalasile, who had been given land whereon to reside by his predecessors, were not submitting to his authority as he expected them to do, he decided to check their disobedient behaviour. To strengthen himself therefore, he encouraged other aliens to settle in his country. He specifically favoured and admitted the Zizi under their chief, Menziwa, and placed them on the east bank of the Mbashe. Without consulting Dalasile, he allowed a small community of European farmers to settle in the Slang River area which was supposed to be under the jurisdiction of Dalasile.

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- . Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
 - . PR 3670, A. Lennard, "A Brief History of Clarkebury", Cory Library.
 - . MS 14636, "Glimpses of History", Burton Papers, Cory Library.

17. Robinson, Cape Monthly Magazine (1870-76) p.173.

This so embittered Dalasile that he later complained to the magistrate, W.E.Stanford, that he had not been treated officially. Hence the Qwathi and the Vundle on the border continually raided the white farms.¹⁸

Ngangelizwe's attitude towards Dalasile must also be ascribed to jealousy as Dalasile's large community was daily increasing and becoming more powerful by additions from the ranks of the non-Qwathi communities, like the Gcina and to a certain extent the Mfengu and the Mpondomise. Ngangelizwe felt threatened by the growing power of Dalasile. In contrast to Ngangelizwe, Dalasile was powerful and fearless. Also in contrast to Ngangelizwe, Dalasile exercised tremendous influence over all his people. This without doubt made Ngangelizwe jealous and unhappy.¹⁹

Ngangelizwe's blunders in the 1870's estranged Dalasile and this estrangement weakened the Thembu since in all past wars the Thembu had been strengthened by the Qwathi. This weakness forced Ngangelizwe

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18. CMT 1/27, W.E.Stanford to Major H.Elliot (CMT), 14/3/77
 . Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.45.
19. Robinson, Cape Monthly Magazine (1870-76), pp.177-78.

to seek British protection in 1875 against his enemies. This further estranged Dalasile from Ngangelizwe as the Colonial Control of Thembuland was bound to affect Dalasile and the Qwathi.²⁰

In his letter to the Colonial Secretary in London dated the 16th of February 1874, the Secretary for Native Affairs, Charles Brownlee, explained that Dalasile though nominally subordinate to Ngangelizwe.²¹

is actually independent of him and has a great if not greater number of adherents than Ngangelizwe.

He also informed him about the disagreement between Ngangelizwe and Dalasile over the question of "British protection" which Ngangelizwe favoured and which Dalasile opposed as early as 1873 and that Dalasile's influence caused the failure of Ngangelizwe's proposals.²²

20. N.A.88, Major H.Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 2/8/83.

21. G 27-74, Secretary for Native Affairs to Colonial Secretary pp.125-129, 16/2/1874 p.137.

22. Ibid.

Dalasile and the Qwathi had a peculiar relationship with Ngangelizwe whom they acknowledged as a king, as owner of the land on which they lived. Yet while they did this, they in many respects acted as if they were separate and independent of him.²³

23. G 39-76, Probart's Report 31/12/1875 pp.21-22.

CHAPTER 4DALASILE'S PASSIVE RESISTENCE TO COLONIAL CONTROL 1875-80(a) Events leading to the British Control of Qwathiland 1872-1875

Ever since 1846 the Thembu of the Great House had been following a policy of alliance with the colonial government. This led to much colonial interference in Thembu politics especially in the 1870's during which period the Thembu were brought under colonial control.¹

The government had three reasons to interfere in Thembu politics. First it was to prop up their ally because Ngangelizwe was weak. According to Charles Brownlee Ngangelizwe had proved to be the weakest spot, too weak to withstand aggression and unnecessarily involved in quarrels with his neighbours. As a matter of policy the government felt it necessary to support him but his actions were regarded with disapproval.²

Second, it was to settle their border. Although the Colonial border officially stopped at the Kei River,

1. Master, "Resistance", p.1.

2. Ibid. pp.1-2.

there were colonial subjects like the Mfengu, living beyond the borders of the colony in Butterworth. This ambiguous situation needed to be resolved. These Mfengu would serve as a strong advanced post from which the colonial government could gradually extend their influence beyond the Kei and from which the Mpondo and the Gcaleka, the enemies of the Thembu might be overawed. The colonial government also felt that it was a matter of urgency that the border between the Thembu and the Gcaleka be settled as this would prevent serious clashes between the two nations.³

Third, the colonial government was prompted by the expansionist and "civilising" traditions going back to Dr Philip and Sir George Grey. They wanted to replace certain aspects of the lifestyle of the Africans, such as communal land tenure and traditional power of the chiefs with individual tenure, magistrates and public work programmes.⁴

All these purposes could most obviously be accommodated if the people of the Southern Transkei come under direct colonial control.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. pp.4-5.

As a result of the Gcaleka-Thembu war of 1873, Ngangelizwe offered to cede his country to the British Government. This was at a time when the Gcaleka had taken possession of the Thembu country: the ploughing season was passing and the Thembu of Ngangelizwe sought protection from the government. Not only was it obvious to the Thembu that a mere profession of loyalty to the government did not entitle them to protection or assistance but the prevalent opinion of the Thembu was that they had made enemies on account of their having remained faithful to the government.⁵

When Ngangelizwe proposed the acceptance of British Control to Dalasile in 1873, Dalasile opposed him.⁶ Ngangelizwe was in favour of this control because he hoped that he would be protected from his enemies but Dalasile, who had no enemies saw no reason for this.

It is not clear how well informed Dalasile was concerning the implications of Colonial rule, but according to M.Xundu, Ngangelizwe explained to him that

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5. Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.10.
 - . Master, "Resistance", p.5.
 - . M.W.Spicer, "The War of Ngcayechibi 1877-78" (Unpublished M.A.Thesis Rhodes University Cory Library, 1978), p.32.
 6. G 27-74 Secretary for Native Affairs to Colonial Secretary, 16/2/74, p.137.

this "protection" entailed the payment of hut tax which would increase the revenue for the payment of levies during the times of war. It also entailed the removal of councillors from the position of power and be replaced by izibonda - headmen. When Dalasile appeared to be confused as to what Ngangelizwe meant by izibonda, Ngangelizwe made an example of a sledge which is made up of two blocks of poles placed in a triangular position with the front parts joined together. On these blocks holes are drilled and on top of these blocks small poles are placed horizontally - amanqwa-nqwa - and holes are also made on these which enables one to fix small poles of the size of the holes to join and tighten the horizontal poles with the two blocks. These small poles affixed into these holes are called- izibonda. If isibonda (small pole) does not fit, it is sharpened to reduce its width so that it can fit the hole. If it is not tight nothing could be done about it, it is thrown away. "This is what a headman is" explained Ngangelizwe to Dalasile, "if a headman is found to be resistant he will be pressurised into submission or his power be broken and if found too weak for control he is dismissed and is replaced by another one who will satisfy the needs of the colonial government."⁷

7. Xundu, 2/7/87.

Dalasile told Ngangelizwe that his people would not accept this. Ngangelizwe appealed to him to go to his people and convince them of the advantages of colonial control. Dalasile left and never came back to report. This was a clear indication that Dalasile was opposed from the first, to British Control, and that Ngangelizwe and Dalasile had reached the parting of the ways.⁸

As a result of this opposition by Dalasile and the withdrawal of the Gcaleka from Thembuland, Ngangelizwe withdrew his offer to the colonial authorities. Later the Thembu were again to display this ambivalent attitude towards colonial control but on the next occasion their regrets followed after control had begun.⁹

Charles Brownlee, who had realised that Ngangelizwe's change of mind was because of opposition from non-Thembu elements, decided to assert colonial sovereignty over the land settled by the people who acknowledged the paramountcy of Ngangelizwe. This implies that the

8. Ibid.

9. G 27-74 Secretary for Native Affairs to Colonial Secretary, 16/2/74 p.139.
 . Master, "Resistance", p.5.

people who were pursuing an independent line like the Qwathi of Dalasile were to be left outside the colonial camp. But he wanted the Thembu to take the initiative.¹⁰

Brownlee believed that if the Thembu acquired support and protection of government they could, like the Sotho, place themselves under government and it would only be then that the government could consider them as British subjects. This means that Brownlee was not prepared to take up Thembu quarrels and defend them against their enemies. Whilst it was a government policy to defend the Thembu and keep them intact against their enemies, the Thembu could not as a matter of right claim it.¹¹

The conflict of 1873 was by no means solved as Ngangelizwe's temper led him to another brutal act in 1875 which led him into conflict with Sarhili. This was the murder of Nongxokozelo, Novili's female attendant. As a result of this and Mpondo inroads into Thembuland, the Thembu began to think of giving

10. N.A. 88 Secretary for Native Affairs to Elliot, 2/8/83, pp.125-129.

11. Master, "Resistance", p.5.

themselves up to the government. But the Qwathi were not yet affected.¹²

In dealing with the subjugation of the African chiefdoms by the colonial government, the role of the missionaries cannot be ignored. When the missionaries came into contact with the blacks, they were committed to the task of breaking down the traditional way of life of the Africans, in particular, the removal of the head of the nation or chiefdom, the king or the chief. Every effort had to be directed to this end.¹³ This was the so called "civilising" policy that had been followed by Dr Philip and Sir George Grey. V.M. Master in his unpublished thesis confirms that when he says,¹⁴

the missionaries were to indirectly aid in this policy.

According to N. Majeke, the missionary came as a man of peace, he came as a "friend" but it was much later that the chiefs became aware of what was happening and put

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12. G 39-76, J.Ayliff & W.Wright Report to Secretary for Native Affairs 28/8/75, pp.2-5.
 . Master, "Resistance", p.12.
 . Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", pp.33-35.
13. N.Majeke, The Role of Missionaries in Conquest. (Johannesburg, 1956), p.25.
14. Master, "Resistance", p.12.

their finger on the fact that the missionary, constituted a danger to their position.¹⁵

The Missionary identified himself with the government but he was careful not to do so to the king or chief himself. He came as his "friend" who was willing to intercede with the government on behalf of the chief. He protested a great deal on behalf of his protegee. But the more the chief relied on the missionary, the more surely was he betrayed into the hands of the government.¹⁶

This is true of the role of Reverend Peter Hargreaves, the Methodist Missionary at Clarkebury and Reverend John Gordon of the Anglican Church at All Saints in the subjugation of the Thembu and Qwathi respectively. According to E.G.Sihele it was Peter Hargreaves who directly induced the Thembu to seek "protection" of the government and was responsible for drafting the terms. He reports Hargreaves to have said,¹⁷

Please remember we are at your service. You must say it is you who are asking to be put under the wing of the government. Otherwise Sarhili will occupy your land. The whole

15. Majeke, Missionaries, p.25.

16. Ibid.

17. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.53.

army [Bowker's police detachment] you see has come to your aid.

That Peter Hargreaves was in favour of the breaking of the power of Ngangelizwe and thus aiding the colonial officials in their "civilising" policies is seen in his not protesting against the deposition of Ngangelizwe after he had accepted colonial control,¹⁸ and in Dalasile's threat to invade Clarkebury should Clarkebury be used as a military base for the colonial forces on the eve of the Rebellion in 1880.¹⁹

The colonial government and Peter Hargreaves followed the line of policy put forward earlier by Dr Philip, namely to persuade the chiefs to accept "friendship" of the British Government, to accept its "protection", second, to subsidise the chief and pay him a fixed salary and thus making him a paid servant of the government.²⁰ This in fact is what was promised to Ngangelizwe when Hargreaves drafted his proposals for accepting colonial control.²¹

18. Master, "Resistance", p.17.

19. Lennard, "Clarkebury", pp.5-6.

20. Majeke, Missionaries, p.28.

21. N.A.88, Elliot to Under Secretary Native Affairs, 2/8/83, pp.123-28.

Another factor that facilitated the Colonial Control of Thembuland was the constant communication between Peter Hargreaves, the Colonial Government and the Military Commandant, J.H. Bowker. The role of Bowker in the subjugation of Thembuland is equally important. When tension broke out in Thembuland in 1875 as a result of the Gcaleka-Thembu conflict, Peter Hargreaves and W.Wright, resident with Ngangelizwe, communicated with the colonial government. The colonial government whose eyes had now been fixed on the colonial control of Thembuland sent Commandant J.H. Bowker, an exponent of a vigorously expansionist policy, at the head of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, into Thembuland on the pretext of settling Menziwa, a Zizi chief, who had been expelled by Ngangelizwe from Mtentu, when he declared that he would be neutral in the event of war between the Thembu and the Gcaleka.²²

The question of the annexation of Thembuland was first raised by Commandant Bowker. Whilst personally supervising the relocation of Menziwa, he concluded that only the annexation of Thembuland could bring permanent peace to the seriously troubled Transkei. He raised the matter with Brownlee, the Secretary for

22. Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", p.36.

Native Affairs, who then agreed after warning him that no pressure should be put to bear on the Thembu. As a result of the experiences of the difficulties with the Gcaleka and Mpondo, the Thembu proved receptive to the advances of Bowker and Hargreaves.²³

According to M.Mbutuma, Ngangelizwe was forced by his councillors to hand over his country to the British government as a result of the threatening attitude of Bowker. Bowker threatened to invade Ngangelizwe when he showed opposition to the resettlement of Menziwa in the neighbourhood of the Great Place.²⁴

Hargreaves appeared at the office of Bright, the Resident with Ngangelizwe, on the 28th of October 1875 to state that he had been deputed by the Thembu to submit certain proposals to the Resident for the consideration of the government. These proposals included amongst other things that Ngangelizwe and several clan heads be recognised as chiefs and that they should receive salaries. It was also proposed that no hut tax was to be paid until 1878 and that boundaries should remain undisturbed. Except for certain crimes and the right to appeal to certain

23. Ibid.

24. Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".

magistrates, the chiefs were to retain judicial authority over the people. Commandant Bowker was also at the time, in the office of the Resident.²⁵

In forwarding his report and the conditions to the Colonial authorities, Bowker stated that a large meeting had assembled on the 28th of October 1875 at which all chiefs, with the exception of Dalasile of the Qwathi, and Stokwe Tyali of the Vundle, were present. He further stated that all chiefs present were unanimous in giving themselves over to the government. He stated that he had given no reply beyond that the government was prepared "to meet them on liberal terms" and that nothing was said on the future status and power of the chiefs. Finally he recommended that Ngangelizwe be deposed because of his behaviour.²⁶

All the conditions were approved except the continued recognition of Ngangelizwe as the King of the Thembu. Bowker was also ordered to leave Dalasile and the others who were still opposed to do as they pleased. Whilst accepting the existence of chieftainship and

25. Master, "Resistance", p.13.
 . Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", p.37.

26. G39-76 J.H. Bowker to Under Secretary for Native Affairs 29/12/75, p.11.
 . F. Brownlee (ed.), The Transkei Native Territories: Historical Records (Lovedale 1923), p.31.

that the chiefs be salaried, the Secretary for Native Affairs expressed his wish that the arrangements could be made similar to those of Mfenguland where there were no chiefs.²⁷

Bowker having received this message, called a meeting on the 30th of October 1875 which was not well attended and informed the Thembu, present, that Ngangelizwe had been deposed. No protests were made at the meeting, which Bowker interpreted as assent to the deposition of Ngangelizwe. W.E. Stanford, the magistrate with Dalasile, later objected to the conclusion drawn that the silence of the Thembu at the meeting meant consent. Subsequent events were to prove that the Thembu were not at all pleased with the deposition of the King.²⁸

In a meeting of the 24th of December 1875, convened by S.A. Probart, M.L.A. for Graaf-Reinet, as a special commissioner to finalise the arrangements for the extension of British Rule over the Thembu of Ngangelizwe, protests were raised by the Thembu against the treatment of Ngangelizwe.

27. G39-76, Telegram from C. Brownlee (S.N.A.) to Bowker 30/30/75, pp.11-12.

28. Master, "Resistance", p.17.
B.C.293:A1, Stanford's Diary, Stanford to Mr Judge 11/9/26, pp.4-7.

The Thembu unanimously demanded assurance that Ngangelizwe would be reinstated. When Probart realised that the feelings of the chiefs were running high, he promised that good behaviour on the part of Ngangelizwe might result in his being allowed to resume his former position.²⁹

From the above it is clear that Ngangelizwe, having been surrounded and threatened by his enemies, also influenced by Reverend P. Hargreaves and pressurised by Bowker, handed himself and his people over to the government in the hope of "protection". It was too late when he realised that this "protection" meant loss of authority. Ngangelizwe and his people had now to accept and endure the heavy yoke of the colonial regime which undermined the traditional system of Thembu Government.³⁰

But it should also be noted that the independence of the other section of the Thembu was not to remain for long. It was only a temporary measure to give a chance

29. G39-76, Probart's Report, 24/12/1875, p.38.

30. N.A.88, Brownlee (SNA) to Elliot (CMT), 2/8/83, pp.125-129.

to the agents of the Colonial government to complete their plans with Ngangelizwe.

The extension of British Control over the portion of Thembuland under Ngangelizwe was a step towards the total subjugation of the whole of Thembuland Proper.³¹

(b) Qwathiland comes under British Control 1875

The absence of Dalasile from the meetings of the 28th October 1875 and of the 30th is not surprising. He had shown as early as 1873 that he was opposed to Colonial Control. This was another deliberate attempt to show both Ngangelizwe and the agents of Imperialism that he was opposed to colonial control. After the meeting of the 30th of October 1875, Wright, the Resident with Ngangelizwe, sent for Dalasile. On the 4th of December 1875, with a large number of his people, Dalasile arrived to hear that the rest of the chiefs and the people had offered themselves to the government and that the government insisted on knowing what he had to say on the subject. Dalasile arranged to call a meeting of his people.³²

31. Ibid.

32. CMT 1/39, W. Bright's Report, 4/11/1875, p.14.

In reporting back to the colonial officials, Dalasile made it clear that he had not harmed anyone nor committed any crime and therefore had no need to be taken over by the government as the Thembu had. No definite agreement was arrived at respecting a magistrate as none of the Qwathi spokesmen indicated they wished to surrender the control of the people to a magistrate.³³

The Qwathi under chief Dalasile came under government after much persuasion by Reverend J.Gordon, the Missionary of the Anglican Church at All Saints. Gordon offered to draft proposals on behalf of Dalasile. The missionary

... perceived that if people did not go under British rule of their own free wills (sic.), they would be taken over against their wills, and as moreover such a change would be beneficial to our mission work, put a stop to "witchcraft", smelling out, etc., I felt it my duty to advise the chiefs and tribe to agree to the change...³⁴

Pressure also came from Commandant Bowker and Probart, the special commissioner from Graaf-Reinet sent to

33. Ibid.

34. C.C. Saunders, "Annexation of Transkeian Territories": Archives Year Book for South African History (Pretoria, 1978), p.48.
 . Gordon's Report, 31/12/1875.
 . Master, "Resistance", p.5.

conclude the agreement for the cession of Thembuland since Charles Brownlee, the Secretary for Native Affairs was in England.

Dalasile having succumbed to this pressure, Gordon drafted the proposals for the acceptance of the British Control - (See Appendix III). These were publicly made known at the meeting of the 10th of December 1875 in which Bowker informed the Thembu of the coming of Probart and the approval by the government of the deposition of Ngangelizwe. But once more Dalasile was absent having been reported seriously ill.³⁵ Dalasile's absence must have been an attempt to avoid attending the meeting as he was opposed to British Control. To avoid embarrassment and to further demonstrate his lack of enthusiasm for Colonial Control he absented himself from the meeting.

Dalasile was embittered when he heard the news that Ngangelizwe had been deposed. He feared that what had happened to Ngangelizwe would happen to him should he accept British control, hence his determination to reject it. He led the chiefs, even those of Western Thembuland in protest against Ngangelizwe's deposition.

35. N.A.88, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 2/8/83, pp.123-124.
 . Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?" p.54.

This deposition had aroused a sense of justice, brotherhood and nationalism amongst the African chiefs, since this deposition was a threat to the traditional way of life. This made the chiefs suspicious of the government and its officials.³⁶

The Special Commissioner, S.A. Probart, arrived on the 17th of December 1875 to take over the annexation arrangements from Bowker. He had messages sent throughout Thembuland to all the chiefs and people to attend a public meeting at the seat of the Resident, at Mjanyana on the 24th of December 1875. All the chiefs, with the exception of Dalasile, attended. He only sent one or two minor chiefs to bring him the news of further developments to help him plan new strategies against Colonial Control. Ngangelizwe was present but remained quiet throughout the meeting apparently suspicious of Probart's intentions. Probart confirmed what Bowker had told them, that the country and the people had been taken over and that Ngangelizwe owing to his bad behaviour had been deposed.³⁷

36. Master, "Resistance", p.15.
 . BC 293:A1 Stanford to Judge, 11/9/76.

37. Brownlee, Transkei Native Territories, p.31.
 . Master, "Resistance", p.16.
 . G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.21.

As Dalasile was not present at the meeting, Probart who had realised that Dalasile's absence was a deliberate attempt to avoid committing himself, was determined to exercise patience in order to get him into the colonial net and once in, there would be no need for further patience. Probart thought it was best to convene a separate meeting at some central spot in Dalasile's country for the same purpose.³⁸

That a separate meeting was arranged for Dalasile hints at his independence of Ngangelizwe because had he been considered Ngangelizwe's subordinate he would automatically have become a British subject once Ngangelizwe had concluded his agreement.³⁹

The meeting with the Qwathi took place at All Saints, on the 31st of December 1875 and was well attended. Probart addressed the assembled chiefs and people much to the same effect as he had done at Ngangelizwe's meeting. He told them that their offer to come under government had been accepted. He then read the conditions under which they had asked to be accepted. He further explained that implicit obedience to the

38. Ibid.

39. N.A.88, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 2/8/83, pp.125-129.

orders of the government and respect for the decisions of the magistrate would be expected of the chiefs and people upon all occasions. He told them that in future no charges of witch-craft or "smelling out" would under any circumstances be allowed.⁴⁰

As regards certain allowances asked for senior man mentioned in the proposals, he explained that Bowker would communicate with the government and inform them of its decision. He concluded by asking the chief whether he and his people were of the same mind as to coming under government. Dalasile, before he could commit himself, asked for an hour in which to consult with his councillors.⁴¹

Upon resuming, Dalasile at first appeared desirous of withdrawing from the proposals. Probart had to use great pressure to persuade Dalasile to accept the conditions. Dalasile was unwilling to surrender his authority. He stated no less than fourteen times during the meeting with Probart that his interpretation of the proposals submitted through Reverend Gordon was that he was to have full control over his own people, although, individually, he had handed himself over to

40. G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/12/76, p.22.

41. Ibid.

the government and that if there was to be a magistrate, he and Dalasile would share power and discuss cases together. He also emphasised the difference between his case and that of Ngangelizwe.⁴²

Agreement only came at the end of the meeting after a second hour-long consultation of the Qwathi among themselves. They then said that they accepted Reverend Gordon's formulation of the conditions and Probart's interpretations of them with certain reservations. Even after this agreement, however, Dalasile had misgivings. He asked⁴³

Why is the government so anxious to take immediate control of my people, seeing that I have agreed to come under government and divide my authority?

But unfortunately, Dalasile was followed by a pro-government speaker, Mangele, a Gcina by a Qwathi woman, who was Dalasile's chief councillor, who claimed to be speaking for Dalasile. He said they would accept full governmental sovereignty. His expressions of full thanks so embarrassed Dalasile that he finally thanked Probart and apologised indirectly for his earlier statements. From then onwards Mangele became a

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

government supporter whose loyalty was to be exploited by Magistrate W.E. Stanford to the detriment of Dalasile and the Qwathi people.⁴⁴

According to Probart, the deciding factors in the Qwathi decision to come under government were government recognition that Dalasile came under government independently of Ngangelizwe, and Probart's threat that the government might not on any future occasion offer any equally favourable terms.⁴⁵

In his report, Probart stated that the submission of the chief had been brought about without any pressure and that he had given him an opportunity of withdrawing, if he chose. But by stating that what Dalasile was saying was not in accordance with the proposals originally made, and by threatening him that by virtue of Ngangelizwe having concluded his agreement, he, Dalasile, automatically became subject of the government, Probart certainly did not give Dalasile any option of withdrawal nor could he justify the claim that he had not put pressure on Dalasile. The presence of police at Probart's meeting must also

44. Ibid.
. Master, "Resistance", p.17.

45. G39-76 Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.22.

have influenced Dalasile's decision. Their presence was indeed intimidating.⁴⁶

Probart's report that the meeting was perfectly satisfactory as leading to a thorough understanding "was in view of Dalasile's expressed reluctance based less upon the realities of the situation than on wishful optimism."⁴⁷

He reported,⁴⁸

The results of the meeting were perfectly satisfactory as leading to a thorough understanding and clearing away all doubt and uncertainty either as to the wishes of the chief and people or the terms under which they agreed to come under government.

The perceptive eyes of Magistrate W.E. Stanford later discerned what Dalasile understood by his agreement to come under government.⁴⁹

For some time a struggle, quiet but hardly contested, went on to prevent the influence of the magistrate being felt - Dalasile very plainly intimated once, that

46. Ibid.

47. Master, "Resistance", p.17.

48. G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.22.

49. N.A.49, Stanford to Elliot, 4/6/79, pp.26 ff.

his impression of that officer's duty was that he should be the means to protect him from aggression and injustice from without but that he should not entirely interfere with his people.

From the onset Dalasile was opposed to "British Protection" - a nice way of deceiving African chiefs when their authority had been usurped by the white colonial power. He regretted having accepted the terms of cession because as it turned out, now his people could avoid bringing to him their complaints and refer them to the magistrate. This would have serious implications.

First, this would imply that the people would no longer be bound to their chief politically and the chief would easily lose his authority and control over the people. They would now respect the magistrate at the expense of the chief.

Second, the chief would lose a portion of income since much of his income came from the fines imposed by him in traditional court cases. This would now go to the government. A chief without material possession was certain to lose popularity and the respect of the

people. This had been demonstrated by the Qwathi when they deserted Ntswayibana and defected to Noni.⁵⁰

Third, this implied surrendering the land and the people to the white government. This was the worst crime Dalasile could think of. Hence he never went to claim his allowance of hundred pounds per annum offered by the government. He felt that this money

was a reward for his having sold his people and his father's land.⁵¹

That Dalasile was opposed to the Colonial government should not be interpreted as if he was anti-white. He was certainly not anti-white but anti-colonial in outlook. This becomes clear when one considers the fact that when the party of the magistrate escaped from Engcobo on the eve of the 1880 Rebellion, a Mrs Webb who had been left behind was not molested but taken care of by Dalasile and his people. Second, when the combined Qwathi-Thembu forces were to fight in Western Thembuland during the Rebellion of 1880, Dalasile warned a trader named Clarke, who was in command of

50. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

51. Ibid.

some government forces, to leave as they did not want to harm him.⁵²

In this manner Thembuland came under British Control. Probart suggested that the region be divided into four magisterial districts each to be under its own magistrate but all four to be under the chief magistrate for Thembuland. For the post of the chief magistrate, he recommended W. Wright at Mjanyana who "by his experience in the country, his knowledge of the natives and the respect in which he was held by them as well, suited for the position." He also suggested that the magistrates be placed over definite sections of the people rather than that their territorial boundaries be defined. Thus the magistrate with Dalasile was supposed to have jurisdiction over all Qwathi no matter where they resided.

The first of these districts was Mjanyana in the area under the jurisdiction of Silimela, Ngangelizwe's right hand son. It was to be under magistrate W. Wright who also acted as the Chief Magistrate for the whole of Thembuland. The second seat of magistracy was in Umtata under Ngangelizwe who was also the King of all

52. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 23/11/80.
 . J.W. Clarke, "Native Reminiscences" in S.A. Pamphlets Vol.23, pp.14-15.

the Thembu. The magistrate appointed for this district was Major Boyes who assumed duty in April 1876. The third district was Mqanduli which was dominated by the Thembu under Bacela, hence J.H. Scott was designated, on appointment, as the magistrate with Bacela. The fourth was the district of Engcobo, the site selected for the magistrate with Dalasile. In April 1876, W.E. Stanford was stationed there as magistrate.⁵³

Thus colonial control was formally asserted over the Qwathi in April 1876 when Stanford arrived. Dalasile's outright opposition to control had given way to a reluctant and hesitant acquiescence.⁵⁴

(c) A period of doubt and dismay 1876-1877

On his appointment, Stanford was instructed to proceed to Mjanyana to report to chief magistrate, Wright, for duty as "magistrate with Dalasile". Messengers were sent to Dalasile by the chief magistrate calling upon him to attend a meeting at All Saints Mission in which

53. Brownlee, The Transkei Native Territories, p.32.

54. Master, "Resistance", p.18.

the new magistrate would be introduced to him and his people.⁵⁵

On the day scheduled for the meeting, Wright, Stanford and W.G. Cumming, appointed as clerk in the new magistracy, rode to All Saints. On their way they halted at Danti's homestead. He, like his brother Dalasile, was opposed to Colonialism. He came forward and greeted Wright. Wright introduced him to Stanford, his new magistrate. Danti gave Stanford "a steadfast challenging look in which no sign of friendliness could be detected".⁵⁶ They left him and proceeded to All Saints.

Dalasile having received the message deliberately delayed meeting his magistrate in order to demonstrate his lack of interest in colonialism and his dissatisfaction at the loss of his authority. The day passed without his appearance. The chief magistrate, Wright, left before he arrived because he had other business to attend to and that he could not bear "to wait indefinitely the pleasure of Dalasile".⁵⁷

55. Macquire, Reminiscences, p.52.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

Stanford and Cumming were left to meet Dalasile on their own.

Dalasile did however observe the traditional customs with regard the welcoming of guests. Just as he did in 1874 during the visit of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Charles Brownlee, he sent Mangele, his chief councillor, who was pro-colonialism, to present the magistrate with an ox as just isidudu (porridge) for the magistrate. In the afternoon, Dalasile's people approached the mission gracefully singing their war songs and the bard rhythmically chanting his praises of the chief with allusion to the past history of the people. They scattered in a semi-circle near the church and waited for the arrival of the magistrate.⁵⁸

Stanford and Cumming came out in the company of Makasi, a pro-government headman from Glen Grey, who tried to reassure them when he realised that the magistrate was rather uneasy and without confidence. When they were seated, after a signal from the chief, the people saluted Stanford by his Xhosa praise name "Ah! Ndabeni"⁵⁹

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

Dalasile and his younger brother, Qhole, came forward to shake hands. The magistrate thereafter thanked the chief for his gift and expressed his regret that the chief magistrate had to go back without having been able to introduce them. He also outlined his duties as a magistrate and what was expected of the chief and his people. After questions based on the magistrate's address by Mangele and Matyobeni, two chief councillors, Dalasile spoke⁶⁰

I have agreed to come under government but I do not give myself over as Ngangelizwe has had to do through his fear of enemies. Nor do I appear with blood in my hands. These people are mine, they are sitting at my back. I, alone, come under the government. They remain on my back.

Dalasile, here, was stressing the fact that he was opposed to surrendering his authority over the people and handing them over to the colonial government. He wanted the magistrate only as a personal adviser, not somebody who would subject him and his people to the colonial government. He once more stressed the difference between his case and that of Ngangelizwe and protested that unlike Ngangelizwe he had no enemies to be protected from. In fact the only enemy Dalasile had was the colonial government itself which was claiming that it would give protection when in fact the

60. Ibid.

colonial government intended to take away his authority over his people.

He also expressed disappointment that Stanford had been appointed magistrate over chiefs Mgudlwa of the Jumba and Stokwe Tyali of the Vundle. He said⁶¹

I asked for a magistrate for myself ..., but why do I hear that Mgudlwa and Tyali are also placed under you. They are not my tribe, I do not wish to enter the same door together with them.

After some vague and unconvincing explanations by Stanford, Dalasile and his people left. Stanford remarked at this time that Dalasile had no love for the yoke which Ngangelizwe had placed on his neck.⁶²

The outstanding feature of the first year of control 1876 to 1877 was Qwathi doubt and dismay as they came to realise that they had lost their independence. The results of "protection" were bitter and distasteful. The Thembu under Ngangelizwe could have perhaps endured this high price for protection because it was brought about partly because of Ngangelizwe's blunders. But for the Qwathi people, who had no enemies from whom to

61. Ibid., p.55.

62. Ibid., p.56.

be protected, the results must have been heart-breaking and discouraging.⁶³

The Qwathi felt generally uneasy throughout the period as a result of the change of government from the sole rule of an independent chief to the "guidance" of an officer of the colonial government. From the beginning there was to be considerable suspicion regarding the intentions of the government towards them. Stanford found that the Qwathi were very suspicious and his actions were naturally watched. That such suspicions existed is not to be wondered at. It was a new thing for the Qwathi to be sent for anywhere but to the Great Place, hence for some time, they were reluctant to attend at the office when summoned.⁶⁴

Dalasilé's conduct had not been pleasing to the magistrate, although outwardly he appeared willing to obey the commands of the government. He rarely attended the office and evinced but slight interest in matters connected therewith.⁶⁵

63. G12-77, J. Scott (R.M. Mqanduli) Report, January, 1877.

64. G17-78, W.G. Cumming, Acting Magistrate to Elliot (CMT), 5/2/78, p.113.

65. Ibid.

In May 1877 there was considerable excitement amongst the Qwathi people over the reports that Mrs Elliot, the wife of the chief magistrate, had died of small pox. Dalasile used this occasion to further his political ends, as a result of which the Qwathi people, for a time, ceased to go to the office of the chief magistrate. On learning that Mrs Elliot was to be buried at All Saints station, Dalasile sent to Reverend Gordon objecting to the arrangement. He was assured by Gordon and subsequently by the magistrate that there would be no danger of infection in consequence.⁶⁶

Dalasile, who was not impressed by their assurances, held a meeting of his people and gave orders that all intercourse with the people of the mission station should cease and that no one should appear at the office of the Resident Magistrate if sent for and further, that spears should be used against policemen should they go to a Qwathi homestead. In this order, particular mention was made of those men of Qwathi nation who had made themselves useful to the magistrate, such as Mangele and one or two others. All business at the office with the Qwathi stopped at once

66. N.A.41, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 25/5/1877.

and hardly a Qwathi had been there since. At All Saints matters were in the same state.⁶⁷

Finding this, Stanford tried another trick. He thought it advisable to send messengers to all the chief councillors of chief Dalasile to attend to the office to tell them that there was no cause for alarm and that Dalasile was much to blame for the steps he was taking. These councillors betrayed Dalasile when they apparently sided with the magistrate. Sitonga of the Sidindi clan, in thanking the magistrate for his message assured him that if they were again called to the great place to attend a meeting and that he would advise the magistrate of the results.⁶⁸

In this meeting all pro-government councillors were present and the effects of the magistrate's communication with them was apparent in the fact that they combined and opposed their chief, Dalasile. Mangele and Sitonga told Dalasile that it would be wise to let the small pox matter drop. In this, Stanford had successfully used these minor chiefs as tools to offset Dalasile.⁶⁹

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

(d) The Ninth Frontier War 1877-1878

Tragic as the event might have been, that of being betrayed by his own senior men, Dalasile struggled persistently to win back his authority. The outbreak of the Ninth Frontier War between the government and the Gcaleka offered him an opportunity to test his authority over the people. It was also a test for Ngangelizwe to prove his loyalty and his promise that he would fight on the side of the colonial government. When the war broke out, the question arose, on whose side the Thembu would fight. Had their loyalty been won by the Colonial government or had its administration alienated them? At first, while matters were unsettled everywhere else with one of the hardest fights taking place in Gcalekaland, the Thembu were quiet and orderly. Stanford thought that neither Ngangelizwe nor Dalasile would attempt anything unless Sarhili, the Gcaleka King, gained some successes.⁷⁰

But the tone of Stanford's private letter, four days later to the chief magistrate was one of tension, alertness and some anxiety. He could obtain no

70. BC293:A1, Stanford to C. Levey (R.M. Southeyville) 2/9/77, p.37.

information for the rumour that Sarhili had been sending messages to Dalasile and Ngangelizwe. Excitement had been caused the previous day when some Hala turned out in force and started to move about and finally the Mfengu under Mendela, located ten kilometres from the magistracy, told Stanford that they noticed that their Qwathi and Jumba neighbours were unfriendly and that they feared an attack.⁷¹

Towards the end of September 1877, evidence about Qwathi participation on the Gcaleka side against the colony and the Mfengu was reported to Stanford. Dalasile was reported to have declared this allegiance openly and had received the women and cattle of Venge, a Gcaleka chief, and of Stokwe Ndlela of Western Thembuland for safety.⁷²

Cumming, the acting magistrate with Dalasile, on the 26th of September 1877, summoned Dalasile and asked him why he had accepted Stokwe Ndlela's stock as he was disaffected to the government. He also asked Dalasile about the purpose of a meeting at his Great Place. Dalasile denied any knowledge of Stokwe Ndlela's cattle being harboured in Qwathiland. In regard to the

71. B.C.293:A1, Stanford to Elliot 6/9/77.

72. N.A.43, Stanford to Elliot 25 & 26/9/77.

meeting, he told Cumming that it was customary for the Qwathi during the period of drought to assemble at the graves of the ancestors and "cry" for rain. Although Cumming knew that Dalasile was not telling the truth there was nothing he could do.⁷³

Two independent reports stated that Ngangelizwe, Dalasile and Mdukiswa, Mgudlwa's brother, would join the Gcaleka. Arthur Stanford, magistrate for Umtata, thought that, even if some remained loyal, the Thembu and the Qwathi would not render any assistance to the government. Elliot, the chief magistrate, held the more optimistic view that he would get a large force to attack Sarhili, the Gcaleka King. Walter Stanford of Engcobo revealed his opinion in a scribbled note at the back of Arthur's letter.⁷⁴

I agree with Arthur's views - none of my people are to be trusted.

After a fight at Bika on the 29th of September 1877 Major Elliot called upon the Thembu to take up arms on behalf of the government, but an ominous stillness followed. In the Engcobo district not a Qwathi stirred and the Qwathi police began to desert. About

73. CMT 1/27, W.G. Cumming to Elliot 26/9/77.

74. F(c)I Stanford Papers, A. Stanford to W.E. Stanford 24/9/77.

twenty Mfengu who had admitted their fears of an attack from Mgudlwa or Dalasile positively responded to Stanford's call to arms. In Umtata only the Mfengu responded but in Mqanduli almost all the Thembu volunteered. Ngangelizwe's role was crucial at the time. According to Stanford, Ngangelizwe opted to support Elliot being followed in this by practically all his minor chiefs and people despite their earlier attitude of hostility towards the government.⁷⁵

But according to Mbutuma, when the Gcaleka war broke out Elliot, fearing that the Thembu would not take part, secretly took Ngangelizwe away and when they were as far as Idutywa Reserve, he called upon the Thembu to come in as Ngangelizwe was already fighting, hence his loyal Thembu joined the war. Mgudlwa also followed Ngangelizwe and joined the government forces.⁷⁶

Dalasile hesitated and after expressing an unbounded loyalty to the government, he consulted his people and then intimated that he wished to "sit still" as he was not a fighting man. For disobeying this order he was fined a hundred head of cattle.⁷⁷

75. G17-78 Stanford's Report 15/2/78 pp.110-111.

76. Mbutuma, "Ibali labaThembu".

77. G17-78, Stanford's Report, 5/2/78, pp.110-111.

Stanford had no doubt that Dalasile, as a nationalist, was sympathetic towards Sarhili and his Gcaleka and that if he had had a favourable opportunity he would have shown his sympathy in an active form. Nevertheless he paid the fine.⁷⁸ Stokwe Tyali of the Vundle decided to follow Dalasile's example to "sit still" but later joined Mfanta of Western Thembuland in the rebellion of 1878 in which they were captured and sent to Robben Island. Stokwe Tyali's land, although part of Dalasile's land was divided into four portions.

One portion was given to capable black farmers, mostly Mfengu, another portion was given to Mpangele and his Gcina people. The right bank of the upper Mbashe was given to Mgudlwa and the left bank to Dalasile.⁷⁹

The ninth Frontier War proved that there was a lot the government had to do to secure peace in the territories as their control was still resented by many of the African chiefdoms. The Gcaleka had been crushed. Stokwe Tyali and Mfanta had been imprisoned but the spirit of resistance had not been destroyed. In

78. G17-78, Cumming's Report, 5/2/78, p.111.

79. N.A.43, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13/2/77.

. N.A.44, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs, 6/3/78.

Qwathiland it had become an underground movement ready to flare up when opportunity offered. It had proved that the Qwathi were still openly anti-colonial. Dalasile's decision "to sit still" was nothing else but defiance and a confirmation of what he said in 1875 that he had no enemies to be protected from. He was not prepared to make enemies with the Gcaleka in favour of the whites without provocation. The Ninth Frontier War also proved that Dalasile still held a wonderful influence and say over his people as none took up arms on the side of the government. Rather than scaring the Qwathi into submission, the Ninth Frontier War made the Qwathi more and more resistant, to Colonial Control.

This spirit of resistance to colonial control culminated in the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880-1881.⁸⁰

(e) A Period of Uneasy Peace 1878-1879

After the war there followed a period of uneasy peace characterised by tension and rumours of war. All was not quiet on the eastern frontier. It was for this reason that the new Secretary for Native Affairs, William Ayliff, visited the Transkei territories in

80. Master, "Resistance", p.55.

1878. Over a period of two months he visited all chiefdoms and to all he could hold out a trump card—the inevitable fate of men who went to war with the Cape Colony.⁸¹

On the 19th of September 1878, Ayliff addressed a meeting of the Qwathi at Engcobo magistracy. Charles Brownlee, Ayliff's predecessor, and Stanford were also present. Ayliff used this opportunity to introduce himself as Brownlee's successor, thus establishing personal contact with the Qwathi, a feature of Native administration during this period. He also explained that a change of personnel did not mean change of policy. The whole address was paternalistic.⁸²

The word of government is peace ... That is what your father, the government feels towards all children, all must feel that the government is their father but still a father who loves you and punishes those who are bad but will help those who do good.

About two hundred Qwathi had assembled, Dalasile being absent. Although Ayliff thanked the Qwathi for having come only one percent had attended because out of about Twenty Thousand Qwathi only two hundred had attended. The absence of Dalasile and ninety nine percent of his

81. G43-79, Secretary for Native Affairs Report, 1878, pp.3-4.

82. Ibid.

people could be seen as continuation of resistance to colonial control. The meeting once more revealed that despite the efforts of the magistrate to get the Qwathi on their side, Dalasile still held sway over the majority of his people.

Despite the apparent unhappiness at the absence of Dalasile, Ayliff was careful enough not to attack the Qwathi in his speech for their neutrality during the war but rather seemed anxious to conciliate them. But no amount of conciliation in his address removed the tension that hung over the Transkeian territories and in particular, Qwathiland.

That Dalasile was not happy with the colonial government was shown by his not withdrawing his allowance of hundred pounds per annum - a full proof of passive resistance to colonial control. Some senior Qwathi chiefs also followed the example by not claiming their allowance due to them. Only one councillor claimed the allowance. This was Mangele, a Gcina who had always been used by Stanford against Dalasile, to promote colonialism. From the onset, Mangele expressed his preparedness to receive it. In

recommending him for the claim Stanford described Manglele as⁸³

deserving of every consideration for not only has he shown himself loyal to government but from the influence which he possessed in the nation.

But this influence is doubtful because had he been so influential, he could have influenced the Qwathi during the Ninth Frontier War to take up arms on the side of the government and he could have prevented the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880-1881. This influence must have been sectional not national.

But Manglele had to pay for this subsidy. Stanford exploited this loyalty to the government and tried to use him to foil Dalasile's movements. Stanford had successfully taught Manglele how nice the fruits of betraying his own chief were.⁸⁴ (List of chiefs entitled to subsidy see appendix V).

(f) Judicial Conditions

Another cause for dissatisfaction was the fact that it was becoming more and more clear that the magistrates

83. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 17/5/79.

84. Ibid.

were taking over the judicial powers of the chiefs. There were conflicting interpretations of this state of affairs. Some, including Charles Brownlee, agreed that in customary law, people could choose whether to take their cases to the chief or to the King.⁸⁵ This view is not wholly correct in that according to custom one was expected to take the case first to the councillor. The councillor could then take it to the chief and the chief could take it to the King. Only when the councillor was unpopular or had failed were cases taken to the chief without him having been consulted. In Qwathiland there was no room for appeal beyond Chief Dalasile as he and his predecessors did not recognise the supremacy of the Thembu Kings in either internal or external affairs. The final decision rested with him and his councillors at his Great Place.⁸⁶ Even Reverend Peter Hargreaves, the Methodist Missionary at Clarkebury, had told Probart that the chiefs expected the cases to go to them first before they could be referred to the magistrate. In other words, the magistrate could serve only as courts of appeal.⁸⁷

85. B.C.293: DI, Stanford to Charles Brownlee, 3/5/77.

86. Xundu, 2/7/87.

87. DI, Stanford to Charles Brownlee, 3/5/77.

This view was unpopular with the colonial government as it wanted to discourage certain customary laws. If they could serve as courts of appeal only, they would not have a direct interference with the customary laws.

That many supported the first view was because they saw in it the possibility of influence and winning over the confidence of the Africans. Dalasile was of the opinion that the magistrate and himself would share power and discuss cases together.⁸⁸ Walter Stanford thought that there was not enough definition of the subject. Whatever the case may be, in February 1877 one of grievances of the Qwathi was that cases went to the magistrate which should be settled by the chief.⁸⁹

Brownlee's solution to this problem was that it was inadvisable for the officials to seek for cases against chiefs regarding matters in their own communities, but to give heed to only such as were officially brought to their notice. He further pointed out that the reins could not be tightened up⁹⁰

until the present excitement (Ninth Frontier War) has passed over and when our position is better understood and more appreciated.

88. G39-76, Probart's Report, 16/2/76, p.21.

89. DI, Stanford to Brownlee, 3/5/77.

90. Ibid.

To this end he thought it desirable that their decisions should not appear unnecessarily severe and fines for criminal cases should not appear to have been made for the purpose of attaining revenue. He further advised the the magistrate that⁹¹

the object which should never be lost sight of is to convince the people that their [white] administration of the law is more just and merciful than their [African] own, otherwise the effect would drive the people to their chiefs.

From the advice of Brownlee above, it is clear that had it not been for the tension that existed in 1877, he might have allowed the magistrate to go out and seek for cases against chiefs. Having given this advice he never bothered to check if the magistrates were following it. For example Stanford, hearing of a murder case by a Qwathi of Mntuntloni, proceeded to the scene of murder before chief Dalasile could take any action,⁹² and when "Dalasile", younger son of Sarhili was involved in a gunpowder explosion in Qwathiland during the ninth frontier war Stanford went to the scene before Dalasile, chief of the Qwathi, could take

91. N.A.843, Stanford to W.Wright (CMT), 4/10/76.

92. N.A.42, Stanford to Elliot, 26/7/77.

up the case, only to accuse him of having been aware of all the circumstances.⁹³

When Stanford realised that all cases were being sent to the chief, he stipulated certain types of cases which were common in Qwathiland such as adultery, witchcraft, theft and faction fights which should be sent to him for adjudication and those to be dealt with by their chief which happened to be more trivial.

But to bluff the magistrate, the Qwathi people began to refer trivial cases to him of which he later complained, accusing them of litigation.⁹⁴

Stanford boasted that, within two years, the people began to gain confidence in the magistrates and began to refer cases to them, leaving the chiefs with no cases.⁹⁵ This is highly questionable in that if they had had so much confidence in the magistrates what made them take up arms against the colony in 1880?

93. CMT 1/27 Stanford to Elliot, 24/7/78.
 . G47-78, Stanford's Report, 15/2/78, p.114.

94. G17-78 Cumming to Stanford (Acting CMT), 29/1/78, p.113.
 . G33-79 J.W. Morris (Acting R.M.) to Elliot, 6/1/79, p.87.

95. CMT 1/27 Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/78.

If Dalasile had fallen for this scheme and allowed the people to send their cases to the magistrate he could have been deprived of income derived from fines imposed on his subjects. Without these fines he could have been poor and could have lost his dignity and authority as a chief. But Dalasile was determined to fight against this usurpation of his judicial authority, hence his enmity with Stanford, the magistrate. The 1880 Rebellion must be seen against the background of the attempt by Dalasile to fight against the usurpation of his judicial powers, hence the mock trial in the court by Dalasile after Stanford had escaped on the eve of the rebellion.⁹⁶

In his annual report for 1876, Stanford reported that at the beginning, the judicial work was light but as time went on it increased.⁹⁷ This was so, perhaps, because the Qwathi were reluctant to bring their cases to the magistrate until the magistrate stipulated that certain cases could not be dealt with by the chief, thereby forcing the people to refer important cases to him. Or, perhaps, if it is true that when the whites

96. N.A.54, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 27/11/79.

. CMT 1/27 Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs, 23/11/80.

97. G12-77 Stanford to Wright, 4/1/77, p.88.

took over there were few cases, it means that they were responsible for the escalation of crime in these territories, in particular Qwathiland.

Most of the cases resulted from theft. Much discontent had been shown by the Qwathi on the subject of the Spoor system especially by those Qwathi on the border.

They had no right to trace their stock into the white farms whereas the Dutch farmers traced their stock into Qwathiland and even took the stock that did not belong to them but to the Qwathi, accompanied by the police from the border districts. This, even according to chief Magistrate, H.Elliott, "was not first class legislation".⁹⁸

According to Mxutu and Xundu cattle thieving was unknown in Qwathiland before colonial control. They maintain that when the Qwathi wanted cattle they would declare war on another nation and would take cattle as booty. Cattle thieving from the whites should not be taken as theft in the true sense of the word but should be viewed against the background of "social banditry", as the aim was not to steal but to rob in retaliation for the wrongs done by the whites and their government. For example C.E. Warner, in his report to the chief

98. N.A.88 Elliott to Secretary for Native Affairs, 5/4/80.

magistrate, cited an incident in which a number of the Qwathi from Engcobo entered the white farm in the present district of Elliot, and drove a large number of cattle and sheep belonging to some Dutch farmers and when arrested they protested that they did not consider it was stealing but only "capturing stock from the enemies of their king!"⁹⁹

Just before the outbreak of the Rebellion the people of Mpangele, Mgudlwa and Dalasile in the upper parts of the district of Engcobo entered the farms of the Dutch farmers and captured all the cattle they could find. This was a challenge to the white community and the colonial government and the beginning of the 1880-1881 Rebellion.¹⁰⁰

99. CMT 3/91, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 31/12/1901.

100. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs, 23/11/80.

CHAPTER 5THE QWATHI REBELLION 1880-1881(a) Dalasile's grievances against Colonial rule

From the previous chapter it is clear that the latter half of the seventies was a period of tension and uneasiness in Qwathiland in which the Qwathi showed resistance to colonial control. This passive resistance paved the way for the path of blood that followed in 1880-1881.¹

The causes of the rebellion go back to 1875 when Qwathiland was brought under British Control to which Dalasile was opposed. From the onset it became clear that British control meant surrendering his authority over his people to the magistrate. He regarded this as unfair and unjust since he had troubled no one and therefore had no enemies to be protected from. But in the face of pressure from Bowker and Probart he had no alternative but to reluctantly accede to British Control. This reluctance was shown by his refusal to withdraw his annual allowance and by his "sitting still" during the Ninth Frontier War of 1877-1878.

1. Brownlee, Transkei Native Territories, p.36.

This passive resistance to Colonial Control culminated in the 1880 Rebellion.²

The ninth Frontier war also contributed to the outbreak of the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880 - because as a result of Dalasile's neutrality, that is, his refusal to assist the colonial government when called upon to do so, he was fined one hundred head of cattle. This led to the resentment and frustration on the part of the Qwathi people. Dalasile saw in this a threat to the economy of the country since his people economically depended on cattle. He viewed this as a provocation by the whites and as a kind of exploitation on the part of the government which could only be redressed by resorting to war against the colonial government, hence the rebellion of 1880.³

The census of 1879 could also be counted as another reason for Dalasile's rebellion as it contributed largely to the tension that existed in Qwathiland. There was reluctance on the part of the Qwathi to allow their stock to be counted. Some asked⁴

2. G39-76, Probart's Report, 6/2/76, p.21.
. CMT 1/27, Cumming to Elliot, 15/2/78.

3. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

4. Ibid.
. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.

whether it was usual when the census of a white population was taken to count their money.

The Qwathi regarded their stock as a form of money and when it was to be counted they became suspicious that attempts were being made to reduce it.

Enumerators met with resistance as they had at the time of the first census of 1876. Danti, Dalasile's brother and chief councillor, openly refused to allow Reverend Green of All Saints and his team to conduct a census in his homestead and the team was asked by the magistrate to pass to other homesteads and leave Danti alone.⁵

Sub-chiefs, Mangele of the Gcina, a nephew of Dalasile, and Sitonga of the Sidindi clan, who had already shown that they were colonial government supporters, stood out against their chief, Dalasile, and accepted the census without any questions. They distinguished themselves by their zeal in supporting the promotion of the measure politically and they assisted the enumerators in the registration of the people and property.⁶

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

It so happened that during this period messages had been passing from Mditshwa to Dalasile and Ngangelizwe about a planned rising against the whites. After Dalasile had received such message, he went to Ngangelizwe, ostensibly to consult him on the census taking. When he returned he informed Stanford that he had no objection to the census being taken and that he intended to call his people together to explain to them fully the nature of it. As Stanford knew this was a pretext to discuss Mditshwa's message he ordered Dalasile not to hold it, saying, that the census had already been explained to the people. Despite this the meeting was held.⁷

When Stanford asked Dalasile why he had disobeyed, Dalasile pretended to apologise and explained that the messengers to summon the meeting had left before his instructions reached them. Dalasile also argued on behalf of Danti, who had at first refused to register his homestead, saying that at the time Danti refused to give information to the enumerators, he (Dalasile) had not informed him of the final decision of the people. Both Dalasile and Danti were only reprimanded since the officials could not take harsh measures because of the circumstances of the country. But tension in

7. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.

Qwathiland between the Qwathi and the magistrate remained.⁸

The tension that had always hung over Engcobo was worsened by the demand that the hut tax be paid in 1879. The imposition of hut tax and the deterioration of economic conditions were further causes of unrest in Qwathiland during this period. The hut tax was generally regarded as unfair because the government did not build the huts, neither did they provide the material. Why, therefore, should the government tax the people upon their labour and the natural products of their own land?⁹

Dalasila requested that the collection of hut tax be deferred for another year - 1880 - on the grounds that his people were poor and had been hard pressed by droughts, but Stanford rejected this and demanded immediate payment of the tax, telling him, that the rest of the Thembu chiefs and people were willing to pay it and that he and the Qwathi should also do so.¹⁰

8. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 2/9/79.
 . N.A.52, Elliot to Stanford, 5/9/79.

9. G20-81, Elliot's Report, 31/02/80, p.79.
 . N.A.51, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs, 10/9/79, p.103.

10. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 3/11/79.

To get the tax paid without delay, Stanford persuaded his most obedient sub-chiefs to bring the hut tax from their areas without regard to the position of Dalasile. In this way Mangele, Sitonga and the All Saints residents were induced to pay. Chief Sandile of the Ntondo consented to come but hesitated on the day fixed for him and sent to say his wife was very ill and he could not leave her.¹¹

The support rendered the magistrate by Mangele and Sitonga and other pro-government elements had been valuable to Stanford and by weakening Dalasile's leadership he forced him into submission. Once more Stanford had successfully used the minor chiefs against their chief, Dalasile, as he had done during the small pox excitement and census question, thus completely undermining Dalasile's authority. Much odium was cast by Dalasile and the rest of the Qwathi people upon those who had paid the tax and the magistrate felt that it would be necessary to support them against any attempt of Dalasile to punish them for their disobedience.¹²

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

(b) Increased external pressures

The years 1877 to 1880 were years of concerted effort by black nations throughout the sub-continent to throw off the yoke of colonialism. The Zulu successes at the battle of Isandlwana against the British forces shattered the idea of British invincibility and encouraged other nations like the Qwathi and Western Thembu to challenge the authority of the colonial government.¹³ The Pedi of Sekukuni were also involved in war against the Zuid Afrikasche Republiek in 1876-1877¹⁴ and against the Imperial forces in 1878-1879.¹⁵ The same period between 1876 and 1879 was also a period of unrest in Griqualand West.¹⁶ From 1877 to 1880 Moorosi of the Phuthi rebelled against the imposition of colonial system of direct rule in Lesotho.¹⁷ Even nearer was the ninth Frontier war of 1877-78 in which the Gcaleka fought against the British forces. In

13. J.Guy, The destruction of the Zulu Kingdom (Ravan Press, 1982), pp.52-53.

. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 3/11/79.

14. P. Delius, The land belongs to us (Ravan Press, 1983), pp.182-216.

15. Ibid.

16. K. Shillington, The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana 1870-1900 (Pretoria, 1985), pp.61-83.

17. S.B. Burman, Chiefdom Politics and Alien Law: Basutoland under Cape Rule 1871-1884 (), pp.108-131.

this war the Qwathi, despite being called to arms by the government remained neutral which was an indication of passive resistance on the part of the Qwathi.¹⁸

In his address to the Cape Parliament in 1878 High Commissioner, Frere, warned the members of Parliament about this resistance to colonialism but he wondered where to turn attention first.¹⁹ Colonial officials tended to blame these uprisings on conspiracies in order to evade the blame for their own bad policies.²⁰

As a defence measure and as a means of greater control, the Peace Preservation act known as the Disarmament Act was passed in 1878 - Act No.8 of 1878. As this was to be applied in Lesotho first, it was rumoured that Letsie, the Southern Sotho King, had sent messengers south of the Drakensburg to say that Disarmament was a question affecting all black nations in South Africa and if other chiefs stood aloof while the Sotho were being disarmed their turn would follow.²¹

18. Spicer, "Ngcayechibi", pp.33-35.

19. Master, "Resistance", p.55.

20. Brownlee, Transkei Native Territories, p.36.
 . D2, Stanford to Elliot, 26/8/1878.

21. N.A.45, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 11/12/78.

As Thembuland had not yet been annexed to the Colony, the Disarmament Act was not legally applicable to them. The Thembu were, therefore, asked to voluntarily surrender their arms. A.B.C. Levey, the magistrate at Southeyville, made a blunder of collecting guns from homestead to homestead in the company of a threatening force. Despite Levey's threats to stop his pay and refuse to recognise him as a chief, Stokwe Ndlela, one of the Western Thembu chiefs, refused to surrender his arms.

When Major H. Elliot, the chief magistrate met Matanzima, Matanzima protested against the Disarmament Act which appeared strange to him as he had never fought against the government or done any harm. When Elliot met Gecelo and Ndlela at Xalanga, the two chiefs brought forth a list of grievances amongst which was the question of disarmament. Elliot told them that the fear was that they might use them against the government. This was an admission that the colonial authorities feared them when they were armed. This gave the chiefs confidence and made them more reluctant to disarm. Those who surrendered, only surrendered useless and obsolete guns and hid the effective ones.²²

22. Master, "Resistance", pp.5-9.

The Qwathi believed that, as soon as they were disarmed, the government would seize their property, a fear which was further stimulated by the census taking of 1879. Other rumours suggested that the government intended to limit men to one wife each and send their children to the colony to be educated and girls to be sent apart as wives to the soldiers with a view to raising a future army to keep them in subjection. It was also said that the government intended to allow them to keep only a limited number of cattle, that their country was to be taken from them and their wives and children were to be seized and conveyed to the Western Province and enslaved. Thus disarmament was associated with dispossession and slavery, and the census that followed in 1879 led the Qwathi to reject both disarmament and the census itself as it would reveal the number of people and domestic animals in a homestead to help eliminating them.

The Act, as Matanzima complained, did not differentiate between friend and foe. All had to disarm. Even Chief Magistrate Elliot complained privately to the Secretary for Native Affairs that the Disarmament Act showed treachery and ingratitude to those people who

had assisted the government in the Ninth Frontier War so much so²³

that they now feel that the time is arriving when the black man must stand up for his land and rights or become a slave of the white man.

The act indeed was unnecessary, even from the viewpoint of a white official, it did more harm than good.

Another cause for concern in the Transkei generally was the question of the abolition of chieftainship. It should be remembered how protests were raised in 1875 by both the Thembu and Non-Thembu people against the deposition of Ngangelizwe. Even Dalasile of the Qwathi, despite his refusal to accept Ngangelizwe's suzerainty over the Qwathi, was one of the leading chiefs who protested against the deposition. He saw a threat in the deposition of Ngangelizwe, that all who had accepted British Control would be deposed and he feared that he would be the next.²⁴

The office of chieftainship was highly venerated by the Africans. The king or chief was far more than a judicial and executive head of the people. He was the

23. N.A.55, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 23/12/79.

24. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

symbol of their unity and exclusiveness and the embodiment of their essential values. It was an institution created and supported by the people. Whenever measures were taken to relieve the chiefs of "a power they glory in" it resulted in disaffection. When the Sotho realised in the 1870's that their chiefs were ignored in public affairs, they became disaffected to the government. The deposition of Sandile, the Rharhabe chief, which led to the Eighth Frontier War in 1850 and the deposition of Ngangelizwe in 1875 are also significant examples.

It was also because of this threat that messages passed from chief to chief in the late seventies to the effect that the "white people are taking away our native chieftainship and shall we submit without throwing an assegai? Let the word of the chiefs be heard."²⁵ When this message reached Dalasile from Mditshwa, the Mpondomise chief, he went to Ngangelizwe on the pretext of going to find out about the census whilst in actual fact he went to find out if Ngangelizwe was prepared to fight or not against the colonial government.²⁶

25. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.

26. Ibid.

Stanford concluded that the 1880 Rebellion was simply an attempt by chiefs to regain independence, though he admitted that it was as much a war of the people as it was a war of the chiefs. Levey agreed with this view that the cause of the rebellion of the chiefs in Thembuland and elsewhere appeared to have one source—"Kaffir chieftainship against civilised government."²⁷

(c) "The Road to War"

The tyranny of the colonial government threw the chiefs headlong against it. Throughout Transkei there was a growing opposition to the magistrates. This opposition to the magistrates as agents of colonialism culminated in the murder of Hope, the magistrate of Qumbu in 1880 by chief Mhlontlo of the Mpondomise.²⁸

In Western Thembuland, Matanzima and Stokwe Ndlela, having clashed with Levey over a number of issues, including disarmament, contemplated his forced ejection from Southeyville. They communicated with Dalasile, who encouraged them and suggested that Stokwe Ndlela, in preparation for the war, should start sending cattle

27. Master, "Resistance", p.74.

28. Macquire, Reminiscences, pp.116-118.

to Qwathiland in small herds as he had done during the Gcaleka war. He also advised them that should they be challenged by a white force in their attempt to drive Levey away they should fall back into the forests of Qwathiland. In November 1879, Matanzima and Stokwe approached their subjects about this but unfortunately their councillors and people refused to support the move. But this did not end the resistance movement in Western Thembuland or Dalasile's influence.²⁹

At the same time a peaceful attempt was made to get rid of the hated magistrates by petitioning the Secretary for Native Affairs for the removal of A.H. Stanford and W.E. Stanford of Umtata and Engcobo respectively. The Thembu complained that these two brothers did not care to take an interest in the people and that their feelings against the Thembu and the Qwathi were negative. For peace sake they asked for their removal. The petition was a failure. The Secretary for Native Affairs, contrary to the request of the petitioners, sent the petition to Elliot. When Elliot received this petition he convened a meeting of the Thembu and the Qwathi and directed W.E. Stanford to chair it and get the grievances of the Thembu and the Qwathi. The attendance at this meeting makes one

29. B.C.293: AI, Stanford to Elliot, 23/12/79.

suspicious that only pro-government chiefs and people were invited to attend. Dalasile and Ngangelizwe were absent. Prominent amongst those who were present were pro-government chiefs like Mgudlwa and Mangele who spoke on behalf of the people. They denied any knowledge of the petition and stated that they wanted the magistrate to remain. It appears that the whole meeting was a propaganda exercise to destroy any evidence of opposition to and dissatisfaction with the magistrates. But the Qwathi Rebellion of 1880 proved that Stanford's report was not a true reflection of the spirit of the Thembu-Qwathi support of these two magistrates.³⁰

The protests against these magistrates should not be taken as emanating out of personal dislike for individual magistrates but should rather be seen as a challenge to colonial control. The government refusal to remove the magistrates so frustrated the Qwathi that they were prepared to resort to war. Thus the news of the murder of Hope by Mhlontlo, the chief of the Mpondomise, in October 1880 inspired the rebellion of Dalasile in the following month. His main purpose was

30. N.A,54, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 27/11/79.

to kill Stanford, destroy the magistracy and end colonial rule in Qwathiland.³¹

That the rebellion was aimed at the magistrates was confirmed by Stanford who pointed out that Mhlontlo's word at the death of Hope was³²

I am not fighting traders or missionaries I am at war with the magistrates only. If we kill all the magistrates no man of that class will venture among us again but we shall want traders and missionaries.

Elliot agreed that the Africans had planned to kill all government officials in their countries. He said³³

I was sure that all nearly all the native tribes in and around this territory were making a strenuous effort to combine and throw off the rule of the white man.

(d) Dalasilé's Campaign

The rebellion having broken out in the Mpondomise country, Dalasilé visited Ngangelizwe for the purpose of preparing a joint uprising. He informed him that

31. Macquarie, Reminiscences pp.116-118.

32. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Secretary Native Affairs, 23/11/80.

33. N.A.66, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 8/3/81.

he was ready to take action. In reply Ngangelizwe said³⁴

No Dala [Dalasile] withdraw from this for it is often said that the white man fires from a distance and a man is killed, we shall be destroyed completely.

This was a blow to Dalasile who had strained every nerve in 1875-76 protesting against Ngangelizwe's deposition. Having been restored to power, Ngangelizwe seemed to have forgotten the black man's struggle to throw off the rule of the white man. His deposition must have taught him a lesson that the white man could not be challenged, hence as early as 1877, during the Ninth Frontier war, he fought on the side of the government. After the 1875 experience, Ngangelizwe decided to give up the struggle. He now wanted to live peacefully in his homestead. When the message from Mditshwa was delivered to him he said to his men³⁵

Show me a chief who after fighting the English has been able to build his homestead in his own country.

34. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

35. BC293:AI, Stanford to Elliot, 25/8/79.

But Dalasile could not be scared neither could he be deterred. He pointed out,³⁶

It is dangerous to withdraw when the warriors have been doctored, they become like hungry lions capable of devouring anything. If I stop them, they can destroy me because when doctored the medicine must be given a chance to work.

When Dalasile came back from Ngangelizwe he called upon Gqabhu, the chief commander of the Qwathi forces to summon all the Qwathi forces, fully armed to the Great Place for the final ceremony before going to war and to divide them into columns. The first column was made up of ImiNcayi, the cobweb sweepers. The second column was a column of the Dikela. This was followed by the Sidindi. The fourth was made up of the Ntondo. ImiXhinya belonged to the fifth column. The sixth and the last column was made up of the forces from the Great Place - ImiTshaba.³⁷

On the 27th of October the first column was sent to waylay Stanford at Mhlophekazi. The Qwathi knew that the magistrate was at Clarkebury and they assumed that he would return by the Mhlophekazi to Nkondlo route. Unfortunately for the plans, Stanford decided to

36. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

37. Xundu, 2/7/87.

contact Major Boyes, the magistrate of Mjanyana on his way back from Clarkebury, and therefore, instead of taking the road which leads to Mhlophekazi, he took the Mjanyana road which leads to Engcobo via Manzana, thus completely avoiding the Qwathi who tried to waylay him at Mhlophekazi.³⁸

The Qwathi then planned to ambush Stanford at the magistracy, but owing to the incomplete walls of the fortress Stanford decided to abandon the station and to escape to Dordrecht. He was escorted by his police force which included Langa, Dalasile's great son. But when they were at Zadungeni Langa decided to go back to join Dalasile in the rebellion rather than betray his father and the cause of the Qwathi people. He feared that he would be taken as a collaborator and a coward by the Qwathi. Stanford appealed to him in vain, promising him anything and warning him that the rebellion would end with a Qwathi defeat. But Langa having made his decision, could not be dissuaded. He left Stanford and his company in a desperate state and he joined his fellowmen.³⁹

38. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Secretary for Native Affairs, 23/11/80.

39. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

When the Qwathi arrived at Engcobo, they found the magistracy deserted and expressive of triumph, Dalasile play-acted a mock "trial" in the court room, deriding the magistrate's judicial authority,⁴⁰ and thereafter burnt the offices, court room and the residency.

Dalasile feared that the Clarkebury mission might be used as a military centre by the English troops and therefore sent a message to Reverend Hargreaves, the missionary, that he was on his way to the mission station to burn it and that he should leave with all the white people who had taken refuge on the station. In reply Hargreaves said.⁴¹

Tell Dalasile that I did not come here at his invitation and I am not going away at his bidding.

As this was a mere threat which was not part of the planned campaign, Dalasile did not send any force to Clarkebury.

On the 29th of October, Dalasile was joined at Engcobo by the Western Thembu chiefs such as Stokwe Ndlela, Gecelo, Mbambonduna and Siqungathi. They decided to

40. Saunders, "Annexation of Transkeian Territories", p.93.
 . CMT 1/27, Stanford to Secretary Native Affairs, 23/11/80.

41. Lennard, "Clarkebury", pp.5-6.

launch an attack on Western Thembuland and Mfenguland first. That these chiefs decided on a joint action makes it impossible to distinguish between the Qwathi and the Thembu since they were fighting side by side. For this reason it will be fitting to use the term, "rebels" instead of "Qwathi".

The rebels crossed the Mgwali river, marched through Beyele to Ncorha where they fought against white forces that had been stationed at the shop known as

"Dlinkobe". The white forces were defeated and the shop was burnt down. It was in the battle of Ncorha that the commander of the white forces, Blakeway, fell and more than thirty Mfengu were killed.⁴²

Having defeated the white and Mfengu forces, the rebels retired to the Ngqwarhu hills but did not attack in the morning. The white forces had moved their camp to Ngqwarhu trading station as it was made of stone which would provide fortification for them.⁴³

The rebel chiefs already mentioned sent a messenger to the camp to ask for J.W. Clarke, a trader at Qumanco,

42. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"
Xundu, 2/7/87.

43. Xundu, 2/7/87.
Clarke, Native Reminiscences, pp.14-15.

who responded despite warnings by other whites. When he arrived Dalasile asked what he was doing there and Clarke told them that he had been ordered to take charge of the Mfengu and white volunteers and to look after the border. Dalasile then ordered him to leave that day as they did not want to harm him. Clarke told them that it would be impossible for him to leave that day but on the following day he would be going to join his family at Ngqamakwe. Gecelo assured him that they would not attack the camp whilst he was there and told him that if by morning he was still there they would send a messenger to tell him their decision. It was the intention of the rebels to attack the camp first but since they did not want to harm Clarke, the trader, they decided to postpone it. This was a clear indication that the rebels were not at war with the traders but at war with the colonial agents.⁴⁴

When Clarke had left the camp, the rebels attacked it and the Mfengu and white volunteers were chased away. Seven Mfengu were killed and Mbulawa their chief was stabbed in the thigh. The rest escaped across the Tsomo river. The rebels once more retired to the Ngqwarhu hills.⁴⁵

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid p.16.

On the 11th of November 1880 Captain Von Linsingen arrived with the "Kaffarian Mounted Volunteers" and took charge of the camp at Snodgrass shop. Two more Mfengu contingents arrived from Butterworth. On the following day while von Linsingen and his troops were marching towards Makhwababa and W.T. Brownlee, the commander of the Mfengu levies, was moving to the camp at Gqogqorha Poort, the rebels came down the hills in force. The engagement took place at Ngqwarhu kopies and the combined white and Mfengu forces were repulsed. The rebels pushed them beyond Snodgrass shop which they looted and destroyed.

The battle of Ngqwarhu having been won by the rebels, they pushed Brownlee's force towards Gqogqorha and then turned towards von Linsingen's force which was trapped in the Xaba flats. He ordered his men to save themselves by running away.⁴⁶ One of the troopers was hurled down and his horse galloped away. He tried to run on foot, crying. von Linsingen, in trying to come to his assistance had his leg broken by his horse which had been shot down by the rebels. His son, despite

46. Brownlee, Reminiscences of a Transkeian, p.72.

warning by his father to run away, tried to help them but they were all killed by the rebels.⁴⁷

The Mfengu camp at Xaba flats was also attacked. Fifty-seven Mfengu were killed and many were wounded. The rebels got a large number of rifles and horses. They pursued the enemy up to Gqogqorha in the Tsomo district. When they came headlong against Colonel J. Maclean's force which had been sent by Captain Blyth to go to the assistance of the Mfengu and white volunteers. With superior weapons and fresh Maclean's force pushed the already exhausted rebels towards Ngqwarhu hills. With few casualties, the rebels took flight towards Engcobo driving a large number of cattle which were then hidden in the Qebe, Gqaga and Gulandoda forests on the North Eastern side of Engcobo. They left them to the care of few armed herds and pushed towards Maxongo's Hoek.⁴⁸

At Maxongo's Hoek the rebels linked up with Mgudiwa's great son, Langa, who had decided to fight against the

47. Ibid.

. Ms 14611, Colonel L.H. Baile, "A brief history of the Kaffarian Rifles" - East London Daily Dispatch, Cory Library.

48. Brownlee, Reminiscences of a Transkeian, p.77.

. Clarke, Native Reminiscences, p.18.

. Xundu, 2/7/87.

wishes of his family and Mpangele of the Gcina. The combined rebel forces were under the command of their chiefs, Dalasile of the Qwathi, Gecelo of the Gcina from Xalanga, Mpangele of the Gcina of Maxongo's Hoek, Langa of the Jumba and Sifuba from Tsomo Valley. They began to plan strategies for the expected attack of the colonial forces.⁴⁹

Maxongo's Hoek seemed to be of strategic advantage to the rebels because of the natural terrain of the rugged areas, caves, hills and forests which favoured the rebels. Had the rebels been well equipped they might have defeated the colonial forces. Some of them did have guns but they were of a poor quality, and the others were armed only with African weapons. On the other hand, the colonial forces were made up of white volunteers, the Cape Mounted Riflemen and the Mfengu levies. Queen Victoria had also offered the Cape Colony Imperial troops through Lord Kimberly.⁵⁰

The five rebel chiefs and their followers spotted a huge cave which could be used as a natural fortress. The entrance of the cave was partly covered by a big stone which would protect the rebels from direct fire

49. Xundu, 2/7/87.

50. Saunders, "Annexation", p.95.

from the colonial forces. Because of the rugged nature of the area with steep valleys and hills the colonial forces had to rest their horses. The rebels captured some of the horses and pulled them inside the cave for further protection from direct fire. With this cave strategy the rebels provoked fighting. They pressed hard on Captain W. Chalmers, the commander of the police force and Captain Hulley of the Rovers, a force of white volunteers, who retreated before the rebels. When the rebels realised that some reinforcements were coming up, they retreated towards the cave.

To draw away some of the colonial forces about twenty five to thirty rebels took an opposite direction, while the rest retreated to the cave. The plan worked well as the colonial forces were forced to halt in confusion, half of them stopping to face the few rebels who had taken the opposite direction. By the time the colonial forces discovered the cave, the rebels were already inside and ready to fire. The colonial forces tried to attack the cave in vain. The rebels fought back from the cave as fast as they could.⁵¹

After a good deal of firing, the reinforced colonial forces made an effort to come closer to the entrance against fire from the rebels. Komani, a black

51. BC 293: A3, Stanford's Report, 10/12/80.

policeman on the side of the colonial forces was shot down while trying to creep up to the stone. Another trooper was stabbed by a spear and wounded. About the same time one of the Frontier Armed Mounted Police received a bullet in the brain from the rebels and died immediately.⁵²

Unable to face the rebels, the colonials decided to shoot at the horses in order to locate the rebel position. During this wild shooting chief Sifuba and a few men were shot but the colonials in the face of heavy fire gave up the struggle and marched away in order to draw the rebels out of the cave. Lieutenant Baird who was the last to leave received a shot from the rebels and died immediately.⁵³

The battle of the cave had been decisively won by the rebels. When they left the cave, they encountered the white forces near Mpangele's homestead. The rebels immediately took shelter in the huts and kraals and fired from within. When the colonial forces realised that they were at a disadvantage, they retreated in order to draw the rebels out. When they were at a distance the rebels went out led by Langa Mgudlwa.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

They rushed for the hill on their left but unfortunately the colonial forces took control of it before the rebels. Langa was shot on the thigh but kept on encouraging and cheering his fellow rebels who had first to drive away the colonial forces before they could attend to Langa. At the advice of Ncwashu and Mdalana, Langa's councillors, they rushed directly at the colonial forces at full force with the aim of using their spears as they were running out of ammunition. Indeed, the rebels rushed at their enemy, stabbed them at close quarters. After a short encounter, the colonial forces retreated. They were pursued up and down the hill and across the river.⁵⁴

The rebels having gained another victory, removed Langa Mgudlwa to Didwayo Forest in the Upper Mbashe area and the bullet was taken out of his thigh and was left there with a few men to recover. Three of his men plotted against him and killed him as they did not like his despotic attitude and stubbornness.⁵⁵

From the North the battles shifted to Zadungeni on the South East of Maxongo's Hoek above the Gulandonda ranges. When the rebels saw the whites preparing for

54. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu?"

55. Ibid.

an attack they charged in full force. The colonial forces thought that they were in retreat and never realised that they were charging at them. They were taken by surprise and were forced to retreat. But having managed to regroup themselves they charged at the rebels and in a violent clash the rebels began to give in. They were now completely exhausted and almost weaponless, having used up not only their ammunition, but even most of their spears. They were forced to flee for safety into the Gulandoda and Gqaga Forests with the colonial forces at their heels. This marked the end of the rebellion with the rebel forces defeated.⁵⁶

Some isolated battles were fought in the Gulandoda and Gqaga valleys during which the rebels were routed. The colonial forces began to hunt for rebels' stock in the forests meeting with little resistance. All the chiefs were reported to have hidden themselves in the Mbashe valley and forests. The colonial forces captured and drove away into the colony about 16 000 cattle and about 5 000 sheep and goats. The death toll was high on both sides.⁵⁷ The defeated Qwathi in frustration and disappointment killed Gqabhu, their

56. Ibid.

57. BC 293: A3, Stanford's Report, 10/2/80.

chief commander. They held him responsible for the defeat although he was in fact not responsible.⁵⁸

All in all the campaign lasted for five months, from October 1880 to February 1881. From the above it is clear that the combined rebel forces in fact won victory after victory, through high motivation, strong numbers and clever use of natural features such as caves and forests. They were not defeated in the battle but by the superior resources of the colonialists.

Besides superior resources, the colonialists broke down the power of the rebels by capturing all their stock, about 16 000 cattle and 5 000 sheep and goats. They caused the rebels to starve during the period of the war which led them to fail to resist. Even their gardens which were ready for reaping which could have been used to ward off starvation were reaped by the colonial government thus rendering the rebels unable to continue the war. Had the rebels been well equipped like⁵⁹ the colonial forces the scales of the rebellion might have been tipped in their favour.

58. Xundu, 2/7/87.

59. BC 293: A5, Stanford's Notes 17/12/81 - 19/12/81.

CHAPTER 6THE AFTERMATH(a) Unconditional Surrender

The defeated rebels were required to surrender unconditionally. They were not only to give themselves up but also their arms and stock. There was very little stock to surrender since most of their cattle and sheep had already been captured. Government officials, were, however, worried about the arms situation, since most of the rebels surrendered without arms saying that their arms had been confiscated by other magistrates or by the colonial forces. But the officials feared that they might have handed over their weapons to the rebels who had not yet surrendered.¹

This unconditional surrender, therefore, meant not only rendering these rebels defenceless but also poor and submissive. They emerged from the war helpless and homeless with their homesteads burnt down, their gardens reaped and their cattle captured. This was a bitter lesson to those who took part in the rebellion.²

1. BC 293: A5, Stanford Notes, 17/2/81 - 19/2/81.

2. Ibid.

The Gcina chiefs were the first to surrender and were followed by the Jumba. The Qwathi and some other Thembu chiefs were the last.³

On the 6th of February 1881, Satana, a councillor of Dalasile, and several other Qwathi surrendered. On surrender, Satana stated that Dalasile, Siqungathi and Nyamankulu were in the Ngele Forests. Dalasile was afraid to surrender because he thought that he would be severely punished by the government or, perhaps, sent to Robben Island like Stokwe Tyali and Mfanta after the 1878 rebellion. The Qwathi, who surrendered, did so without having consulted their chief whose whereabouts were unknown except for the rumours that he was hiding at Ngele Forests. Sigidi Fubu, a brother and councillor of Dalasile, and other councillors were reported to be still hiding in the Didwayo Forests. Satana also informed Commandant B. Frost that the Gulandoda Valleys and Forests had been reoccupied by the Qwathi rebels, some of whom wanted to surrender but fear of the consequences still deterred them.⁴

On the 7th of February, Skota and Mgongxo, two other councillors of Dalasile, came in stating that Mata,

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

Dalasile's mother, had sent them to state that she wished to surrender with a portion of Dalasile's people but denied any knowledge of Dalasile's whereabouts. The patrol, which was sent to search for him and other rebels at Ngele, did not get them, neither did they find any trace of him in the Qutuba Valley Forests. During the same patrol, some rebels came out of the forests and faced the patrol. After some shots from both sides, the rebels gave up with one rebel dead and one wounded on the colonial side. On the 11th of February, Ntabankulu, Dalasile's younger son with six councillors, surrendered. Dalasile was alleged to have fled to Bomvanaland.⁵

Meanwhile at All Saints, a policeman, named Thomas Ntshacile Poswayo, one of the policeman who escorted Stanford to Dordrecht on the eve of the rebellion and the one who warned Stanford about Dalasile's preparations for the rebellion, was entrusted with the task of receiving surrendering rebels. He had a large number of men, women and children who had come in. It was in March 1881 when Stanfrod returned to Engcobo. One of the first things he did was to take some of the rebels to the residency and showed them the overgrown state of weeds in the garden and walks and instructed them to

5. Ibid.

clear it before they could be relocated. Dalasile's whereabouts were still unknown.⁶

The Qwathi continued to surrender in small numbers but bringing only arms of an inferior class. The officials of the colonial government were suspicious that the best weapons had been exchanged with those of the men still in the bush. They were afraid that the chiefs, in hiding, were planning to resume hostilities as no chief of any influence had surrendered. This means that the defeat of the rebels in 1881 did not mean the end of tension. Elliot's cup of distrust was overflowing. One of his assumptions was that government was still not desired by the Africans generally.⁷

The role of government officials after the rebellion was still to a large extent military, for not only were dissident elements still at large, but Elliot's fears of a United African Front continued from the end of the war until 1885 when Thembuland was annexed.⁸

6. Ibid.

7. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot 1/3 and 11/3/81.
. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82, p.51.

8. BC 293: A7, Stanford's Notes, 30/1/82.

Mangele, Stanford's favourite minor chief and colonial collaborator, was reported to be in Major Boyes' territory. He was afraid to come back to Qwathiland because he did not take part in the war. He and Mgudlwa had taken refuge there. When Stanford returned he urged them to come back as he needed the assistance of loyal leaders.⁹

It was in April that some other minor chiefs, Ngce-ngane, Venu and Ntwangu with other rebels from all parts of the country surrendered.¹⁰ On the first of June, Stanford received messages from Qwathi chiefs, Sandile of the Ntongo in Mnyolo and Sitonga of the Sidindi in Qutubeni, asking for peace. Both these chiefs had once been Stanford's favourites. In Stanford's opinion they were amongst the least guilty of the rebels and he, therefore, thought it would be advisable to allow them to come in.¹¹

On the 5th of June Stanford received information that Dalasile intended to return to the bush in the neighbourhood of his country as he was now reported to be either in Bomvanaland or the Idutywa Reserve.

9. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 11/3/81.

10. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 19/4/81.

11. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 1/6/81.

Others believed that he was in Ludwesa Forest in Gcalekaland.¹²

On the 8th of December 1881, Qhole, Dalasile's brother, called at the magistrate's office to report that Dalasile was asking to be allowed to surrender. After some delay the secretary for Native Affairs ordered Stanford to promise Dalasile that if he would surrender his punishment would not be greater than that adjudged to Mditshwa which was three years imprisonment.¹³ Dalasile was not yet prepared to surrender under the conditions.¹⁴

As Dalasile was known to be hiding in the coastal forests, his name became linked with that of Sarhili, the King of the Gcaleka Xhosa, who had been hiding in the same neighbourhood ever since the end of the Ninth Frontier War in 1878. Since the Gun War was still in progress, Sarhili and Dalasile were rumoured to be plotting joint action with Lerotholi, the Sotho leader. The rumours proved to be completely unfounded but they

12. BC 293: A5, Stanford to Elliot, 5/6/81.

13. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 10/12/81.

. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 11/1/82.

. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 16/1/82.

14. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 2/2/82.

kept the magistrate's suspicions of Dalasile running high.¹⁵

On the 5th of November 1883 Stanford reported that Langa Dalasile, the great son of chief Dalasile, had surrendered. In his defence, Stanford stated that both Langa and Dalasile had treated the Europeans who fell into their hands during the war with remarkably kindness. He pointed out that, as there were legal difficulties in the way of Langa being tried for rebellion, he might if government felt so disposed be allowed to reside at the place of Qhole, his uncle.¹⁶

It was only in October 1884 that Dalasile sent a message that he wished to surrender. Stanford replied that, in matters of this kind, messages were unsatisfactory and that he had best come himself and say what he wished.¹⁷ Thomas Ntshacile Poswayo, the head policeman went to fetch Dalasile but at first, Dalasile refused, expressing his fears that he, like Mfanta and Stokwe Tyali, would be sent to Robben Island. Poswayo

15. CMT 1/28, L. Farrant (ARM) Report, 1/8/82.
 . CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 20/7/82.
 . BC 293: D7, Stanford to Elliot, 30/1/82.

16. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 5/11/83.

17. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 8/10/84.

assured him that he would never be sent there.¹⁸ When Dalasile finally arrived at the office on the 28th of October 1884, Stanford informed him again that his punishment would not exceed that of Mditshwa - three years imprisonment. But he further promised Dalasile that the government might take this period of three years in which he was abroad as the period of imprisonment, and that he might be instructed to remain for the same period as a prisoner at large where the magistrate had placed his sons and brother apart from the Qwathi people.¹⁹

In his favour Stanford admitted that Dalasile's cause in 1880-1881 was excusable because he had never willingly accepted white supremacy from the onset. He said²⁰

I saw no great blame in his joining the insurrectionary chiefs.

He further admitted that Dalasile was never a cruel chief but a kind hearted chief. He pointed out:²¹

Let it count to him for his righteousness

18. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

19. BC 293: B34, Stanford to Elliot, 28/10/84.

20. Macquirie, Reminiscences, p.185.

21. Ibid.

that he had shown kindness to Mrs Webb and children when in his power.

It was for these considerations that Dalasile was never imprisoned. Finally, Stanford expressed his feelings that Dalasile's return to the district would not bring any trouble, "and experience proved that my view was the right one."²²

(b) Relocation Schemes

When the Qwathi rebels surrendered, they were relocated between Mbashe and Qumanco rivers below the Gulandoda mountains. None of them were settled above the Gulandoda mountains. This left the territory between the Gulandoda and the Drakensburg ranges, which included Maxongo's Hoek, which was originally Stokwe Tyali's land, but had been given to the Gcina chief, Mpangele, after Stokwe's rebellion in 1878, with the exception of the portion that had been given to the "good" Mfengu and loyal Thembu, vacant. Since Mpangele had joined with Dalasile and other rebels, he, too, had to vacate the area.²³

22. Ibid.

23. G66-83, Instructions to Thembuland Settlement Commission, p.VIII.

The existence of such a large, rich and vacant tract of land tempted destitute white farmers from the colony to move in. They were determined to take possession of the country and overcome all resistance. The white "squatters" justified their conduct with the claim that the farms in the colony had been worked out and that there was insufficient pasturage. They argued that the country had been cleared by the colonial volunteers and as such should be reallocated by the government for the general benefit of the burghers especially those in need like themselves.

So, though they had not taken part in the war, they expected, that as suffering "children" of the government, to share in the victory.²⁴

On the other hand, Ngangelizwe, fearing that the victorious colony would appropriate his land, proposed to the Native laws and Customs Commission that the Thembu should have title acknowledging their right to hold the land occupied by them.²⁵ He stated that he did not want his country to be given to strangers. He feared that if there were vacant lands people with

24. Ibid.

25. G4-83, Question 7800, p.444.
. G47-82, Vol I, part II, Interview with Ngangelizwe by SNA, 14/11/81, pp.83-84.

money in their hands might come and take them. He also reminded the commission that the conditions of 1875 had stipulated that the lands should be untouched.²⁶ A similar request had been made to the government through the chief magistrate but no reply was ever received. He further reminded the commission that during all wars with the colonial government he had remained loyal to it.²⁷

The plea was repeated directly to J.W. Sauer, the secretary for Native Affairs, in November 1881. Sauer told Ngangelizwe and his followers that they need not have any fear of dispossession if they remained loyal.

Ngangelizwe, then, asked that some of his people be settled on the lands laid empty by the dispersal of the Qwathi rebels. He did not wish his country to be laid in farms but kept under the old system. He would be satisfied if the government would allow him to fill up the land forfeited by Dalasile with loyal Thembu. Such was Ngangelizwe's distrust of colonial intentions with regard to Thembuland that he asked for a document securing it to himself and his people. He wanted such a document in his possession as he did not know what

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

might happen after Elliot, the chief magistrate, left.²⁸

This rich and vacant land also attracted the Mfengu of Peddie and those in the Transkei territories. Stanford the magistrate was opposed to giving the land to the Peddie Mfengu and proposed that their claims and applications should take second place behind his own local favourite Mfengu. He argued that the latter had rendered good service to the government in every war since 1846. He also was opposed to the allocation of this portion of the country to the white "squatters" whose claims he considered exorbitant. He suggested that the vacant land be surveyed into farms with a government headman appointed over each. Distribution of government lands and pastures would be made by the senior headman of each of them.²⁹

In a letter to the chief magistrate of Thembuland dated 3rd August 1882, J.W. Sauer, the Secretary for Native Affairs, instructed him to open negotiations with Ngangelizwe to secure his cooperation regarding the

28. Ibid.
 . Xundu, 2/7/87.

29. N.A.68, Stanford's Report, 11/6/81, p.169.
 . G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82, pp.62-64.
 . Master, "Resistance", p.94.

disposal of the vacant land. He pointed out that if arrangements could be made, it was proposed to settle European farmers in Maxongo's Hoek and Black farmers in the other portions of Dalasile's country. The Thembu might be settled in portions not intended for European occupation. He also presumed that a money payment either in one sum or annually to Ngangelizwe would be the best mode of compensating him. He said that it should be pointed out that, Dalasile, by having gone into rebellion, had forfeited his land. This meant that a large part of the vacant land which Stanford had recommended for the Mfengu and loyal Thembu had to be reserved for white settlement.³⁰

Initially, Sauer, the Secretary for Native Affairs, was unwilling to grant the white "squatters" free land in Dalasile's old country. He wanted land already occupied by the white "squatters", to be put up for sale. But political pressure from the Afrikaner Bond led to the appointment of two Bondsmen, van Rensberg and Joubert, as additional commissioners who adopted a strongly pro-squatter line.³¹

30. N.A.78, Secretary for Native Affairs to Elliot, 3/8/82.

31. Master, "Resistance", pp.92-93.
 . G66-83, Instructions to Thembuland Settlement Commission, p.VIII.
 . N.A.77, Marginal Note by Sauer, 22/7/82, p.225.
 . N.A.79, Stanford to Elliot, 10/8/82.

As a result of the increase in the number of white "squatters" who had now taken possession of land with Africans upon it, as well as vacant tracts, disputes arose between the squatters and African Farmers.³² The African farmers raided the stock of the squatters. Hardly a night passed without cases of depredations and looting. The stock so captured were either sent to the forests and valleys of Qwathiland for safe keeping or slaughtered. This was certainly not thieving, it was a form of rural protest of the peasant farmers in whose lands the squatters had encroached. They were reacting to the conditions that threatened them. The rugged nature of the territory prevented the white farmers from retrieving their stock easily.

Stanford thought that the old border warfare might have started afresh if the government had not pressurised Ngangelizwe to cede the land already in the hands of the squatters. Once more the Africans lost because the government successfully put pressure to bear on Ngangelizwe to obey its will.³³

. BC 293: D7, Stanford's Notes, 8/8/82 - 9/8/82..

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

The present day districts of Elliot and Indwe, formerly part of Thembuland, were defined, beacons off and ceded to the government of the colony. Ngangelizwe did at least make it clear that, while he consented to the government taking over, confiscation should not be extended south of the line. He feared that should the boundary be extended, the Qwathi would not only lose some more territory but excessive overcrowding of the rest of Thembuland would be the result.³⁴

Sauer, the Secretary for Native Affairs, approved of the cession and the squatters were allowed a free land in the vacant territory. Not only the Qwathi but also the Mfengu, who had been the allies of the government ever since 1846 lost. It should have dawned on the Mfengu that once the war had been won by the whites, their assistance no longer counted. For example in 1878 the Mfengu faced disarmament despite their having been traditional allies of the government and now in 1881-1882 they lost the opportunity to get land in Qwathiland. This must have taught them that fighting for the white government was of no advantage and benefit to the Africans but only to the whites no matter how much help they had given.

34. G8-83, Stanford's Report, 31/12/82, pp.163-168.
. Master, "Resistance", p.97.

In the same letter of 3rd August 1882, J.W. Sauer instructed Elliot, the chief magistrate, to locate the surrendered rebels in places he thought would ensure proper supervision. They were to be located regardless of ethnic differences and no authority other than that of the magistrate was to be exercised. Elliot carried out these instructions in the Engcobo district with the assistance of W. Stanford, the Resident Magistrate. Temporary locations were made between the Mbashe and Qumanco rivers.³⁵ An inducement for the surrender of the Qwathi was that they were relocated in the district to which they belonged and that gardens would be apportioned for them for their maintenance, as they were without stock.³⁶

The country, below the Gulandoda range of mountains and eastward of Engcobo to the Mbashe river, was given to the surrendered Qwathi rebels.³⁷ On surrender, Dalasile with the members of his family was located in the Manzana location, not very far from the magistracy, it being considered that better supervision could

35. N.A.78, Sauer to Elliot, 3/8/82.

36. N.A.74, Elliot to Sauer, 20/2/82, p.23.

37. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82.
. A52-82, Stanford to Elliot, 11/7/82.

be exercised with regard to him.³⁸ The settlement of Dalasile in this location was a temporary measure because it was feared that his proximity to the magistracy was dangerous and risky. Hence he was later relocated at Qota about twenty five kilometres to the South East of Engcobo.³⁹

As compensation for the loss of Mhlwazi location, known as "Jumbasvelt", confiscated for European settlement, Mgudlwa, the loyal Jumba chief, was given land between the Qumanco and Mgwali rivers, land formerly occupied by the Mfengu chief, Mendela, who had been placed there by Dalasile. Before the war Mendela was cooperating with the magistrate and Stanford had relied on him for support during the rebellion. But Mendela and his people did not turn out and so he fell into disfavour. He was now removed with his people to the eastern side of the Mgwali river.⁴⁰

Mcobololo, another Mfengu chief, who had proved to be loyal, was relocated in his former location between

38. Ibid.

39. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
 . Xundu, 2/7/87.

40. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82, p.52.
 . A52-82, Stanford to Elliot, 11/7/82.
 . G8-83, Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/82.

Xuka and the Mbashe rivers as the ploughing season was drawing near.⁴¹

Within a radius of six kilometres from Engcobo, Blacks of certified good character and industrious habits, among them, the Mfengu and loyal Thembu, were located.

The idea behind this scheme was that, in the event of another outbreak, there would be a population in the immediate neighbourhood of the magistracy whose loyalty could be depended upon.⁴²

(c) Headmanship and the Ward System

(i) Dalasile loses chieftainship

The defeat of the Qwathi in the war had serious repercussions not only on the question of land but also on the question of chieftainship. The war put an end to Qwathi chieftainship for a period of twenty one years, for it was only in 1902 that chief headmanship

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

was bestowed on Langa, the great son of Dalasile. When Langa surrendered in November 1883, he was given clearly to understand that should he make any attempt to exercise chieftainship amongst the Qwathi it would result in his removal from the country.⁴³

When Dalasile surrendered in October 1884 he was told in no uncertain terms that the rebellion had put an end to chieftainship and that he would be treated as a commoner. Stanford warned Dalasile to keep himself out of all national matters in which his people would like him involved. This sealed the fate of ever becoming chief once more. Thomas Poswayo, the former chief policeman, seems to have assumed the role of senior headman and advisor to Stanford. In support of his magistrate, Poswayo reminded Dalasile about Stanford's intercourse with him, warning him about his behaviour and the dangers of opposing the government. He told Dalasile that the magistrate was not responsible for the position in which Dalasile found himself, but he, himself, was responsible.⁴⁴ All this time Dalasile was quiet and sullenly heeded these warnings. But he was determined to defy the orders of the "usurpers" and of the "elevated" Mfengu police headman who was now

43. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 5/11/83.

44. BC 293: A9, Stanford to Elliot, 1/11/84.

behaving as a chief over him. It was for this reason that in January 1885 Stanford sent Dalasile a sharp message about his behaviour, pointing out that he had not been keeping himself as quiet as he should have done. Dalasile's attitude towards Thomas Poswayo, who, according to Stanford, had been "kindness itself to his family and himself,"⁴⁵ did not meet with Stanford's approval. It is, however, difficult to see how deposition and deprivation of authority on the part of Dalasile by the magistrate with the help of Poswayo could be seen as "kindness".

That Dalasile was a determined nationalist and a chief in his own right is shown by his unwillingness to succumb to the forces of colonialism. Stanford himself was disillusioned, for he had expected Dalasile to be submissive, hence his complaint that⁴⁶

Since his return from the bush, his behaviour has not been all that I could wish for. It is a difficult question to decide what measure should be meted out to these native chiefs when they surrender. If banished from the country, the punishment appears disproportionate to the officer considering that some excuse can be found for fighting the government and yet when leniently dealt with they soon begin to gasp at power again.

45. Ibid., 7/2/85.

46. BC 293: A10, Stanford's Notes, 7/3/86.

But Stanford was making a mistake to think that the loss of chieftainship was a lesser punishment than banishment. In fact it was the worst punishment for a chief to lose his position of power and authority over his people. Demotion from the position of a chief was most humiliating especially when Dalasile's commoners, like Poswayo, were to wield authority over him. Stanford's assertion that Dalasile had been dealt with leniently is devoid of truth and shows lack of understanding of "the veneration with which the office is held."⁴⁷ After all, Stanford had not tasted the bitterness and frustration of demotion. Were he to be demoted to a rank of a clerk and his clerk to be promoted as his magistrate he would see how bitter the humiliation would be.

Dalasile was overwhelmed with joy when Stanford announced his transfer on promotion to Kokstand since he and other Thembu's dream of the removal of the Stanfords were on the point of being realised. But on being questioned by Stanford about this, he denied being mixed up in any way with the agitation then going on in Thembuland. This agitation was a protest against the division of Thembuland into several

47. M. Fortes and E. Evans-Priteland, African Political Systems, (London, 1940), p.53.

magistracies and an attempt by Nehemia Tile to bring about a union of Thembuland under the chief magistrate alone, with all other magistrates withdrawn.⁴⁸

The deposition of Dalasile was a blow to African resistance in general in that throughout the Transkei territories, Dalasile was recognised as a nationalist who had shown preparedness to fight the forces of colonialism with all the means available. With his power as chief curtailed, his loss of health, and new system of headmanship, Dalasile was unable to revive the spirit of resistance in Qwathiland. His death in 1895 as a result of small pox,⁴⁹ marked an end to resistance movements in Qwathiland. Even when Langa, his great son was given chief headmanship in 1902⁵⁰ he did nothing to revive the spirit of resistance against colonialism. Langa failed to put Qwathiland in the vanguard of resistance movements in the first decade of the Twentieth Century as Dalasile had done in the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century.

Dalasile's tragedy was that, however, scrupulous he might have been in his relations with whites, the

48. BC 293: A10, Stanford's Notes, 19/6/86.

49. CMT 3/87, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 18/5/95.

50. CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 19/9/1902.

exercising of an independent line by him in Thembuland was inimical to the trend of colonial policy, which was not only to maintain British influence throughout the territories but also to gradually extend British control over the area in a "civilising" mission.

(ii) Introduction of the Ward System and Headmanship

After the defeat of the Qwathi, Stanford lost no time in abolishing Qwathi chieftainship and the house of Dalasile that had given him enormous problems. He wholeheartedly supported the introduction of the ward system which was the division of the magisterial district into wards known as locations each of which was to be under a headman.⁵¹

Vast lands under the control of the chief and his councillors were divided into small units under a headman who was usually a senior man from the locally dominant lineage.⁵² The magistrates thought it wise to fill in the ward with people of the same lineage with a senior man being appointed as a head for easy

51. W. Beinart and C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa (Johannesburg, 1987), p.7.

52. Ibid. p.7.

control.⁵³ As will be seen later this method was not without its problems.

The ward system was a new feature of government control after the wars. It was most easily adopted in the district of Engcobo where the only remaining chief, Mgudlwa, was loyal to the government.⁵⁴

The most important aim of headmanship was to help undermine the authority of the chiefs, especially those like Dalasile, who aspired to independence. That is to say the introduction of headmanship was brought about to promote the interests of the colonial government not the interests of the people. By getting on their side the loyal and influential men, the colonial government hoped to win the struggle against African Nationalism whose tide was running stronger than before. The headmen, therefore, were to become puppets of the colonial government whose aim was to break the powers of the chief and the traditional way of life.⁵⁵ Thus to be a headman was to be a servant of the government and not to be a chief or a true representative of the people.

53. Ibid.

54. N.A.91, Stanford to Elliot, 11/12/83.

55. BC 293: D8, Stanford Notes, 30/4/83.

This system of "Indirect Rule" stemmed initially from the Cape's unwillingness to admit the Transkei into full colonial system of administration and representation. Subsequently it was shaped by segregationist policies which froze areas densely occupied by Africans as reserves and also by the resistance of Transkei communities to absorption in the colonial frame work.⁵⁶

Many of the appointed headmen felt exalted and were ready to undertake the troublesome duties of headmanship. The position carried great social prestige and was much sought after. Though not very highly paid, it offered opportunities for bribery which was another means of exploiting the people. The duties of a headman were onerous, if they were fully utilised by the magistrates. They were forced to carry out lawful orders of the magistrates or chief magistrate directly or indirectly communicated.⁵⁷

They are continually harassed by requests from the office to trace and bring in natives under their control for official business at the office.

56. Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles, p.7.

57. A.G McLoughlin, " The Transkeian System of Native Administration", Unpublished M.A. Thesis 1936, p.83.

Derelection of duty exposed the headman not only to administrative action but to penalties as provided, for example, under the noxious weeds proclamation and Land Proclamation as well as Native administration act. "In spite of all its hardship and danger the post is attractive and tends to become hereditary in some families."⁵⁸

Besides allowances due to headman, diligent headmen received rewards for arresting thieves, recovering stolen stock and stopping faction fights. Because of his skills, as a former policeman, Headman Poswayo became the greatest shareholder in the fines imposed on the thieves and fighters he had detected.⁵⁹

Headman Mntonintshi of Sitoleni location who had traced the spoor of stolen stock to Kupiso's homestead, arrested Kupiso and sent him to the office with the sheep. He was given twenty shillings as a reward for his conduct. The chief magistrate, recommending this to the secretary for Native Affairs, stated,⁶⁰

I think encouragement in the shape of rewards

58. Ibid.

59. N.A.181, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 1/2/96.

60. N.A.95, W.Stanford to Elliot, 17/6/84.

. N.A.96, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 18/6/84.

to headmen and others would be attended with beneficial results.

To make the position of a headman further attractive, A.H. Stanford, the Resident Magistrate for Engcobo, applied for an increase of allowance for deserving headmen, in 1892. In Qwathiland he recommended Thomas Poswayo, Langa Dalasile and headman Mcaphukiso.⁶¹

As servants and "children" of the colonial government, the headmen were subject to punishment should they fail in their duties. The most common form of punishment was deposition or dismissal. One example of this was the deposition of headman Tshongweni who had encouraged a faction fight between his men and headman Sitoza's. He was instantly dismissed and his son Tayiboso was appointed in his place.⁶²

Another example of misconduct which often led to deposition was conviction in a court of law. One example of this was headman Zonyana of Gqaga who was convicted at the circuit court at Cala for contravening Section 22, Act No.35 of 1893 and was sentenced to pay

61. CMT 3/87, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 10/6/92.
 . N.A.180, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 2/1/96.
 . N.A.194, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 12/9/96.

62. CMT 3/87 C.J. Warner to Elliot, 20/9/95.

a fine of £15 or four months imprisonment. He was deposed and Mkutwana was recommended to succeed him. His sons were ignored.⁶³ Ngcengane, who was implicated in a theft case, was also dismissed.⁶⁴

Another headman who became the victim of colonial measures was headman Rasmeni Gemane of Gqobonco who was accused of having failed to report the arrival of suspected stolen sheep at Mangoloti's homestead but instead bought two of them.⁶⁵

But had Rasmeni Gemane known, as headman, that Mangoloti had stolen such a flock of sheep, he would not have bought them but would have asked for them free of charge so as to keep quiet. That he bought two was an indication of innocence.

The magistrate expected the headmen to play the role of detectives but unfortunately he failed to train them. Perhaps it was for this reason that Stanford encouraged some of his policemen to take up headmanship. These were: Thomas Poswayo, Phillip Poswayo, George Jama-

63. CMT 3/89, Warner to Elliot, 10/5/97.

64. Ibid.

65. CMT 3/91, L.G. Levey to Elliot, 18/4/1901.

ngile, Mfundisi, Vetu Gcanga, Langa Dalasile and Lwana.⁶⁶

The question of succession to headmanship posed another problem which was very confusing to the Qwathi people. It was purely colonial rather than traditional. Under headmanship it did not follow automatically that if one was the great son or next of kin one would become the successor. Headmanship as a colonial institution, was not based on blood relationship, but was based on whether the incumbent would best serve the interests of the colonial government. In order to be appointed as headman one had to have the interests of the colonial government at heart. No man who did not obey the dictates of colonialism would ever be allowed to succeed to headmanship as it was feared he would "poison" the people of his ward.⁶⁷

This became clear when Sitonga, of the Sidindi clan of Qutubeni, one of Stanford's favourite chiefs died, C.J. Warner, the magistrate recommended one Qhoshisa, a resident of the ward, who was Sitonga's distant cousin. This led to unrest at Qutubeni. A deputation led by one Mfundisi, Sitonga's nephew drew up a petition to

66. N.A.181, C.J. Warner to ELLIOT, 1/2/96.

67. CMT 3/88, Warner to Elliot, 5/11/96.

the chief magistrate in which the people of Qutubeni complained about this appointment. They pointed out that Mqwakumbana, the right hand son of Sitonga who according to custom had to act as regent during the minority of Nqwiliso, Sitonga's great son, had been ignored.⁶⁸

The petitioners felt that there was no valid reason for the appointment of an outsider. They asked the chief magistrate to withdraw the appointment of Qhoshisa. If Mqwakumbana was unfit they would rather have Mfundisi, Sitonga's nephew. But despite the fact that Qhoshisa was only a distant cousin, the word of the magistrate prevailed. The magistrate tried to convince the chief magistrate that the relationship was not as distant as the petitioners imagined. He claimed that Qhoshisa's father was the son of the "iQadi" of Sitonga's father's mother, an argument which even those skilled in Qwathi custom found it hard to follow.⁶⁹

It was almost the same problem at Ntibane Drift. When headman Matiso died, his son was not recommended on the ground that "he does not bear a good character."⁷⁰

68. CMT 3/89 Warner to Elliot, 11/1/97.

69. Ibid.

70. N.A.251, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 19/11/1899.

When the magistrate had no confidence in anybody in the ward, rather than appointing an unsuitable person he would prefer that adjacent wards be amalgamated even against the wishes of the people so that the two wards could be under one headman in whom the magistrate had confidence. This was the case when Rasmeni Kombela of Nqancule resigned. His ward was amalgamated with that of Singumeni under headman Dolophini. The people of Nqancule objected to this, demanding that one of them be appointed as headman, but the magistrate would not accede to their demands on the ground that there was no one fit for appointment.⁷¹

(iii) Opposition: The Headman System

It is a mistake to think that all headmen were in favour of this system. Some of the headmen were minor chiefs in Dalasile's time, who had been in control of large sections. They protested when their lands were to be subdivided into wards. This reduction meant that their sphere of influence would be reduced, which meant fewer followers and limited sources of income. The smaller the land was, the fewer the gardens and the

71. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to ELLIOT, 21/11/1903.

smaller they became. This reduction, therefore, put a limit to the power and indirect income of headmen.

Of course, objections to the ward system should also be seen against the background of whether the headman himself was in the good books of the magistrate or not. These two, at times, went together. If the headman found himself in trouble with the magistrate he would be opposed to the colonial system, and if the magistrate found himself undermined and opposed by a certain headman, he would try and make things difficult for that headman.⁷²

Beinart and Bundy see the problem as resulting from the changes in the patterns of early collaboration and resistance. As an example, they point out that after the 1881 rebellions the loyals received new locations and were promoted to headmanship whereas the rebels had their land confiscated and their chiefs removed. But they also observed that some of the most bitter black opponents of the government in the post rebellion period were from loyalist communities of formerly progressive peasants who had had their expectations

72. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

shattered. Former allies found themselves jettisoned, then no longer favoured.⁷³

This was true of Mendela, a Mfengu chief, who was admitted to Qwathiland in 1876 before Stanford arrived. As a Mfengu Mendela had been favoured by the magistrate at the expense of the Qwathi. Because he was regarded as a progressive and loyal chief, Stanford had expected him to come to his assistance when Dalasile rebelled. But Mendela declined to help Stanford, and as a result, he fell into disfavour, hence his removal from the Western side of the Mgwali river to the eastern side to give more land to Mgudlwa.⁷⁴ Mendela was also arrested for allegedly practising witchcraft.⁷⁵ Stanford even denied that he had ever been a chief before hence his division of his land into small wards and offering him one of these. Stanford argued that when Mendela was received by Dalasile he was never recognised as a chief neither were there any Mfengu with him. He claimed that this information came from Qhole, Dalasile's brother and Ntabankulu, Dalasile's

73. Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, p.10.

74. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/81.

75. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 1/12/83.

youngest son, who were rebels during the Qwathi rebellion.⁷⁶

But whether this was true or not, the fact remains, Stanford had elevated Mendela to a position of a chief at the beginning of his administration. He was always speaking of "Mendela" and "Mendela's people" or "Mendela's Fingoes", but now Mendela is said to have had no followers and no "kraals". If Mendela had no followers, how could he have relied on him during the war? Even during the period of relocation he spoke of having to remove "Mendela and his people" to the eastern side of the Mgwali river. The truth is, Mendela, having failed to come to the assistance of Stanford, was sure to suffer political revenge. As in Dalasile's case, Stanford tried to convince all the other headmen that Mendela was a nuisance. For example in a meeting with the chief magistrate, Mangele, who had always been used to undermine Dalasile's authority, stood up to inform the chief magistrate of the sorrow of their magistrate being troubled by Mendela.⁷⁷

76. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 5/11/83.

77. CMT 1/30, Minutes of the Meeting, 4/8/85.

The following are the wards into which Mandela's land east of the Mgwali river was divided:- Ntozini's Ward, Kangela's Ward, Mlunguza's Ward, Tsham's Ward and Nobatana's Ward, known as "Ward 2", which was originally offered to Mandela.⁷⁸ Mandela refused to accept headmanship over this ward. This brought him into conflict with the magistrate. In frustration Mandela left for East Griqualand and when he came back a frustrated man he defied the orders to leave Ward 2, over which Nobatana had been appointed headman. Having been reprimanded, he succumbed to the forces of colonialism. He was allowed to remain in that Ward on condition he was to accept the position of a commoner with no aspiration to headmanship.⁷⁹ The days of friendship were now over and in the words of Beinart and Bundy,⁸⁰

the currency of client-patron transactions had deteriorated and was increasingly being replaced by the harder coin of court based and bureaucratic magisterial authority.

78. Macquirie, Reminiscences, p.177.

79. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 1/12/83.
 . CMT 1/30, Stanford to Elliot, 18/12/84.
 . CMT 1/31, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 8/2/89.
 . CMT 3/86, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 14/7/94.
 . CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 20/3/96.

80. Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles, p.10.

The headmen also faced opposition from the people over whom they had been appointed because many Qwathi resented such easy extension of colonialism to their midst. The headmen amongst other things were called upon to urgently eradicate burweed and thistle-thorn prevalent in the upper parts of Engcobo. The people tried to get the headmen into trouble with the magistrate by refusing to obey the orders. They knew that the headmen had been seriously warned that failure to get these weeds eradicated would lead to severe punishment. Many headmen complained that,⁸¹

... the people refuse to assist them hoping perhaps to get headmen into trouble and perhaps to secure dismissal.

(iv) Land Disputes

The ward system was also a source of trouble in Qwathiland in that it led to many disputes about land between neighbours and also between homestead heads and the headman himself. This occurred because some of the headmen, through favouratism placed their friends in communal land like grazing lands or allocated people from other parts of the country at the expense of the members of the ward. At the same time, it should be

81. CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 9/4/97.

noted that jealousy played a role in these disputes. The system was responsible for this in that when the system was introduced the government thought it would be wise to divide the land according to lineages so that members of the same lineage would be more or less in the same ward under the head of the lineage. The government was not aware of family jealousies when the people of the same lineage were put together.⁸²

Admission of foreigners into the ward of a single lineage was another cause of quarrel. This often led to disputes especially about stock trespass and gardens. Lack of definite boundaries between wards also led to some disputes. The people whose homesteads were on the boundaries were always in conflict with each other where beacons had been ignored.⁸³ This was so because with the breaking up of the land into wards the settlements became closer to each other than before.

As a result of these disputes many people suffered as they had to lose their huts, already built or parts of their cultivated gardens. Worst of all such disputes involved quite a number of wards in faction fights.

82. Mxutu, 13/6/83.

83. Ibid.

For example a faction fight occurred between Vetu Gcanga's people and the Hala of Mgwali over the question of the grazing grounds.⁸⁴

A case of jealousy and revenge came up at Mntuntloni in the ward of Flepise who refused to allow Nyakatya, a forest guard, to occupy land he had purchased from a resident who had moved out. The headman pointed out that he had refused permission for Nyakatya to reside there even before he had bought the land. Nyakatya as an educated man solicited the services of A. Champion, an attorney of Cala, who advised him to buy the land. The headman was determined not to yield whilst Nyakatya on the other hand felt that he would not be defeated by an illiterate headman. Champion, acting on behalf of Nyakatya argued⁸⁵

The only reason for the headman's objection is that Nyakatya has carried out his duties as a forest guard too strictly to suit the views of the natives of the part.

There were many other cases of dispute which emanated from the ward system. This seems to indicate that the ward system did not work as well as its architects pretended it had. And in all these disputes the

84. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 23/3/97.

85. CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 17/1/99.

headmen as servants of the colonial government were never seen to be on the wrong. They were always protected because the colonial government did not want to accept blame for the failure of the system.

(d) Judicial Conditions

From the reports of the resident magistrates of Engcobo between 1882 and 1910, it appears that there was a gradual decrease in criminal cases but an increase in civil cases. The decrease in criminal cases could be attributed to greater control measures such as the system of headmanship. Fear of dismissal and subsequent humiliation made the headmen work hard in preventing stock theft and detecting crime. They proved more efficient than policemen. In his annual report for 1896, C.J. Warner, resident magistrate, commented that he would even prefer the headmen to policemen who had no incentive to make them energetic in the performance of their duties since there were no prospects of promotion.⁸⁶

But the period after the rebellion was not without its judicial problems. The very judicial status of Thembuland itself was open to question since the

86. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 4/1/97.

territory had not been legally annexed and Leonard the Cape Attorney-General, was of the opinion that even after 1881 the chiefs were still independent rulers in the eyes of the law. This uncertainty was only ended by Proclamation 13 of 1882 of Sir Hercules Robinson which stipulated that the laws then in force in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope should then be the laws in force and to be observed within Thembuland except as specially otherwise provided in that proclamation.⁸⁷

Colonial law could not be applied unchanged to Thembuland. One problem that arose was the sentence of death in murder cases. The Chief Magistrate gave three reasons for his opposition to it. First, the death sentence for murder was a punishment unknown to African customs, they called it "second murder".⁸⁸ Second, in view of the political unrest after the war it was not considered that it was opportune to introduce capital punishment. Third, the opinion of the Native Laws and Customs Commission of 1883 was against it.⁸⁹

87. Master, "Resistance", pp.82-83.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

Under customary law with its simple punishment of confiscation of property, murders and crime were less common than under the colonial system. One example was the case in which Salman of Mntuntloni was convicted of the murder of Nobinza, his wife. But instead of the death sentence which he would have been given in the colony, he was sentenced to a flogging and confiscation of his property.⁹⁰

Another case was that of the death of an insane man in Sipango's ward, who had been a source of trouble and annoyance to the people of his homestead. Although these facts did not justify his death by foul means, in the opinion of the Africans it diminished the "viciousness of the crime".⁹¹

This seems to indicate that African traditional law was more "civilised" in that the European legal systems that later made insanity as a mitigating factor in passing sentence in criminal cases developed from this African legal system.⁹²

90. CMT 1/27, C. Brownlee (SNA) to Elliot (CMT), 28/8/77.

91. Master, "Resistance", p.84.

92. Ibid.

Another question was the problem of dividing a fine between the magistrate and the chief. The chief used to get half or a considerable portion of the fine when cases had been adjudicated according to African customs. But according to Proclamation 13 of 1882 this system was changed. The Proclamation provided that all fines were to go to the government with the exception of a portion not exceeding one half which the magistrate had the power to award to the person giving information which led to the discovery and conviction of the offender. The chiefs began to protest against this new law. Elliot, the Chief Magistrate, tried to explain that in matters of that nature neither the magistrate nor he had discretionary power, as they had to act under clearly defined instructions. In his communication with Sauer, the Secretary for Native Affairs, Elliot noted that should the whole or even half of the fines imposed on the territory be awarded to the chiefs, it would amount to a considerable reduction of revenue. Sauer ruled that the regulations had to be obeyed.⁹³

The government's decision to keep assault fines for itself led to public protest by Stokwe Tyali on behalf of Dalasile, in 1877 which and was one of the causes of

93. Ibid.

the 1880 rebellion.⁹⁴ The Qwathi also objected to the colonial court procedure in force, which if no proof beyond reasonable doubt, that a man had committed theft, could be set free. According to African law, failure to account satisfactorily for stock found in one's possession was sufficient evidence against one.⁹⁵

Again, in civil cases, headmen might sit as assessors and, in these, Stanford also allowed them to examine and state their opinions but when the law agents appeared and the procedure became colonial in form, the services of headmen were redundant for they became confused with "objections", "exceptions" and other technicalities which they did not understand.⁹⁶

Another point of clear divergence between African procedure and the colonial legal procedure was the question of costs. Under colonial law the losing party paid costs, with the Africans the costs were paid out of the value of the thing in dispute and if after judgement nothing of value passed from one party to another, there were no costs.⁹⁷

94. CMT 1/27, Elliot to Stanford, 21/9/76.

95. G3-84, Stanford's Report for 1883, p.51.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

This could be illustrated by the following example: A Mfengu man travelling with a wagon, had some difficulties in crossing a stream, the oxen left the road and caused some damage to a mealie field. The owner of the field, a Qwathi, came rushing down with some others from his homestead and a quarrel began at once. The Mfengu offered some payment which was considered inadequate by the indignant Qwathi and words began to run high. Just then, someone called out to them not to fight but to go to the magistrate. The judgement happened to be the amount the Mfengu had offered and the Qwathi had rejected. This meant that the Qwathi had lost the case. As a loser he had to pay the costs. It was where the trouble began because the Qwathi could not understand why he was called upon to pay having come to his "father", the magistrate to ask for advice. He asked⁹⁸

And now you say, I must pay. Is this a fine for coming to you and because I did not fight and beat a Mfengu? If I had beaten him then you could have fined him?

No explanation could convince him. He again asked⁹⁹

What is this money for? Are you not our magistrate sent to us ... to listen to all our complaints and tell us when we do right

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

and wrong? and now I must pay a fine for
coming to you? How is it?

The direct result of enforcing colonial rules was that the number of cases brought to the magistrate diminished at once "which means so much authority and influence thrown back to the chiefs".¹⁰⁰

(e) Social Conditions

(i) Christianity and Education

Of missionary failure in Qwathiland there is no doubt. The adoption of stricter measures of control after the war and the extension of this control through the policy of "Indirect Rule", to Qwathiland by the system of headmanship did not help much to change the social conditions of the Qwathi. The chronicling of the increase of the number of schools or institutions established by the missionaries cannot be accepted as evidence of the growth of christianity. Even today the Qwathi cannot be generally referred to as a christian nation.¹⁰¹

100. Ibid.

101. D. Williams, "The Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony 1797-1853" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Witwatersrand, 1959), p.1.

From the list of headmen (see appendix vi) of Qwathiland it appears that some few headmen were drawn from Non-Qwathi clans, perhaps, in order to dilute anti-colonial feelings in Qwathiland. These were the headmen who tried to bring about social changes in their locations. They were Thomas Poswayo, Vetu Gcanga, the former policemen, who played a part in the escape of Stanford on the eve of the rebellion. By accepting christianity they were trying to help promote colonialism in Qwathiland. What also helped to bring about acceptance of christianity in their locations was the fact that their locations were heterogeneous hence some social changes.¹⁰²

To further the aims of colonialism, Poswayo opened up a school for the sons of chiefs and headmen and paid a teacher himself, in his farm at Cengcu. He also occasionally taught in the school and helped here and there. This school aimed at making young men "good headmen" from a colonial point of view. It was supported by both the magistrate and Reverend T.W. Green of All Saints who supervised it. It was here that some Qwathi boys came into contact with Chris-

102. S.Green, First Hundred Years, 1873-1973 (Umtata, 1974), p.40.
 . Titus, 16/7/89.

tianity. But it is doubtful if this brought about any significant changes in the social conditions of the Qwathi.¹⁰³

Another headman who tried to bring about social changes in his location was also a non-Qwathi by birth. This was Hlakula who became a headman over a heterogeneous portion of Qutubeni location. He had worked for farmers for a long time and acquired Christianity from his employers which he tried to impart to his subjects as a chief. S. Green describes him as "a real uplifting influence in more ways than one".¹⁰⁴

Another person who accepted Christianity was Klaas Titus, a Qwathi, who was a catechist and a shoemaker, who founded "one of the largest and most faithful families". Even his influence could only be confined to his family. He came into contact with Christianity not in Qwathiland but in St Marks under the influence of missionaries.¹⁰⁵

103. Ibid.

104. Leadly Brown, All Saints Parish, p.12.
 . Green, First Hundred Years, p.42.

105. Ibid.

Few of the Qwathi of Engcobo, even after the rebellion showed any inclination to accept Christianity and to change the social conditions under which they lived. Even Sitonga, a Sidindi chief at Qutubeni, who was prepared to cooperate with both the missionaries and the magistrate was disobeyed by his people, hence Reverend Green's comment, "but his people are not heartily with him."¹⁰⁶ Mangele, a loyal minor chief, who was used by Stanford against Dalasile on a number of occasions, did not show any cooperation when it came to christianity and education. Reverend, T.W. Green said of him.¹⁰⁷

He puts me off with one excuse after another when he is pressed into activity for the education of his people.

In the same report Reverend Green commented that the Qwathi were as "indifferent as ever to education and religion".¹⁰⁸

What embittered even those Qwathi who were inclined to accept white civilization was the fact that they were

106. Ibid.

107. CMT 1/28, Reverend T.W. Green to W. Stanford, 19/12/82.

108. Ibid.

also required to help build the schools and to pay the teachers. Reverend Green reported¹⁰⁹

They will accept schools if the classrooms are built for them and teachers sent free of expense.

In his report for 1885, dated 8th January 1886, A.H. Stanford, the magistrate, stated that progress amongst the "heathen natives" was very slow. Few if any availed themselves for education.¹¹⁰

C.J. Warner in his report to the chief magistrate in 1896 pointed out that a few individuals had built square houses and enclosed their gardens in which they had planted trees. These did wear European clothing but they wore them when away from their homesteads.

The bulk of the Africans, he reported "are as barbarous, ignorant and superstitious as they were ten or fifteen years ago."¹¹¹ Instances had also come under the magistrate's notice which showed that even "civilised" and educated Africans in Qwathiland were not free from a fear of witchcraft.¹¹²

109. Ibid.

110. CMT 1/31, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 8/1/86.

111. CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/1/96.

112. Ibid.

That by the end of the Nineteenth Century the impact of missionary work was still at a low ebb is evidenced by the reports of the magistrates between 1896 and 1899. For instance C.J.Warner, in his report for 1896, stated that the africans as a whole (of Engcobo) were not making progress towards "high civilisation". He reported¹¹³

The red people are very conservative and cling to the habits and customs of their forefathers.

He expressed doubts that even contact with the outside world in the labour markets had brought about any influence. He reported that the reds were very averse to having their children educated and did not hesitate to say that the reason was that educated children looked down upon their parents and disdained to perform the ordinary duties. He concluded the report by expressing his opinion that the influence of the chiefs "is, with some exceptions against the spread of Christianity and civilisation."¹¹⁴

Still in his report for 1898, C.J.Warner reported that the "red" who formed the bulk of the population "appear

113. CMT 3/89, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 14/1/97.

114. Ibid.

to be content to live on without any attempt to improve their surroundings"¹¹⁵ and C.E.Warner in 1899 commented that with regards to the social conditions of affairs "there is no remarkable progress to report upon, heathen practices still prevail."¹¹⁶

From the above, it is clear that even after the rebellion the Qwathi were still as conservative as ever. They were suspicious of the missionaries whom they associated with colonialism ever since Reverend J.Gordon successfully persuaded them "to sell their nationhood and independence" under the guise of "protection".¹¹⁷ It was only in 1902 when the District Council was established that some social changes began amongst the Qwathi.¹¹⁸

(ii) Health Services

With reference to health services there was not much activity and work for missionaries and officials of the colonial government. This was so because the Qwathi were always in good health. Under normal circumstan-

115. CMT 3/88, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 3/1/96.

116. Ibid.

117. CMT 3/89, C.J.Warner to Elliot, 14/1/97.

118. Ibid.

ces they remained healthy until an outbreak visited them. The only almost incurable disease that did much to reduce the number of the Qwathi population was war.

What helped the Qwathi against normal sickness was the availability of herbs from which herbalists and diviners made medicine for the treatment of certain diseases. As Qwathiland is a country of dense forests and mountain valleys there were plenty of these medicines.¹¹⁹

Another disadvantage of the colonial officials which tended to promote the use of traditional healing by diviners and herbalists was the absence of a district surgeon and this made it difficult for the whites to promote "civilised" healing. In his letter to the Chief Magistrate in 1882, W.E. Stanford, the Magistrate, complained that the absence of a district surgeon was retarding the work of introducing "civilised" health services and recommended that one district surgeon be appointed for both Mjanyana and Engcobo with headquarters at Clarkebury.¹²⁰

It was because of the absence of a district surgeon that on the 27th of August 1882, Stanford recommended

119. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

120. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82.

the following men to undertake the task of vaccinating in the district since the outbreak of small-pox needed preventive measures to be taken, Reverend Green, Mr Petric, a trader at Ngxogi, and Mr Clarke, a trader at Qumanco, and appealed to the government to vote an allowance for each of them.¹²¹ As a result of the absence of a district surgeon, still in 1883, Stanford recommended the appointment of Mr Million in the practice of Medicine pending the appointment of the District Surgeon. In his letter Stanford stated that Mr Million had given valuable advice and careful attention in several instances.

In areas such as Qwathiland, medical practice was not encouraging to young doctors because the Qwathi people had no confidence in European medicine. They preferred African medicine to European medicine. It was because of this that Doctor Woolby resigned as a district surgeon of the Engcobo and Mjanyana districts.

In his annual report for 1883, Stanford expressed his frustration at this resignation as he had hoped that Doctor Woolby would help destroy belief in witchcraft and break the power of the Qwathi diviners and herbalists. He therefore recommended that the government should offer £100 allowance per year as the

121. CMT 1/28, Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/82.

residents were also prepared to offer the same amount for the district surgeon who would be permanent and able to trace any disease to natural causes in order to break down the power of diviners.¹²²

The Transkei suffered repeated outbreaks of small pox which in 1884 was reported to have broken out eight miles from All Saints. This made it imperative that the whole area be quarantined. Of three hundred and ninety people under quarantine, ninety four were affected and of these twenty four died. At another area five miles from All Saints fifteen people were reported to have died. T.R.Merriman of All Saints, in his letter to the magistrate, recommended prevention of communication between homesteads.¹²³ In response, Stanford convened a meeting of the Qwathi people and induced them to accept vaccination. In the absence of the district surgeon, Stanford secured the services of Petric, a trader with some medical experience.¹²⁴ In 1885 there was another outbreak of small pox which started at Qutubeni. Four cases were reported and of these one died. Quarantine measures were adopted. The disadvantage of the quarantined people was that

122. CMT 1/29, Stanford to Elliot, 4/9/83.

123. G3-84, T.R. Merriman to Stanford, 9/1/84, p.129.

124. Ibid.

they were unable to provide grain for their families as they were not allowed to go about to obtain assistance from friends who were better off. They requested the government to make advances to enable them to obtain food and promised to retain grain after harvest.¹²⁵

Another outbreak was reported in 1895 at Langa's ward. Eight cases were reported in four homesteads which were discovered to be relatives of ex-chief Dalasile who had died of small pox. Other cases were reported throughout Qwathiland. James W. Weir, the new district surgeon complained that it was difficult to adopt any plan which would secure complete satisfaction and success as the Qwathi were frequently very slow in reporting cases and gave the excuse that they did not recognise the disease as small pox. Hence it spread to many locations. He recommended the appointment of a person who would go from homestead to homestead to vaccinate and report, superintending disinfection and quarantine. He believed that his services might also be useful in reporting the appearance of another epidemic such as typhus, malaria fever, whooping cough and measles.

125. CMT 1/30, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 15/10/85.

The District Surgeon, Dr Weir, also reported that the existing system of quarantining for small pox had been rendered ineffective in checking the spread of the disease because it had found its way into the district from other parts of the country, and second, it had been left to spread for some time before reported at the office. His suggestion was that every headman should be instructed to order all huts to be cleansed out and resmeared and that 100 lbs weight of each of chloride, lime and sulphur be forwarded from Cape Town for each district - Engcobo and Mjanyana and that the headmen be instructed to report immediately upon the appearance of the diseases in the districts.¹²⁶

Another outbreak was observed in 1899. C.E. Warner, the acting magistrate, in his report to the chief magistrate discouraged use of private vaccinations as the Qwathi were averse to vaccination by private people. He recommended that he be assisted by the chief constable who had had some experience in vaccinating. As a large number of children were born every year he recommended that an annual tour through the district be made by the district surgeon for vaccination.¹²⁷

126. CMT 3/87, J.W. Weir to C.J. Warner, 20/8/95.

127. CMT 3/90, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 20/9/99.

Very few cases of Leprosy were reported in Qwathiland those discovered were referred to Mjanyana Leper Asylum.¹²⁸ Another disease was typho-malarial fever, which was reported in Dolopini's ward at Sinqumeni, in September 1899 causing a considerable number of deaths.¹²⁹

Had it not been for the repeated outbreak of small pox in Qwathiland there could have been little or no need for a permanent district surgeon because seemingly it was only small pox which was not responding to traditional healing. Most of the diseases were easily healed by traditional means. A.H. Stanford confirmed this in his annual report of 1892 when he said¹³⁰

Very few cases of contagious diseases had been reported, where they occur they are usually treated successfully by native doctors.

128. N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.

129. Ibid.

130. N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.

CHAPTER 7ECONOMIC CONDITIONS(a) Rise and Fall of Qwathi Peasantry(i) From Subsistence Economy to Peasantry

When the Qwathi arrived in Thembuland during the second half of the Seventeenth Century, their activities were farming, both pastoral and agricultural, and hunting. For these activities to go on smoothly division of labour was necessary. Agricultural farming was in the hands of women and it was characterised by a low level of technology. The implements, in use, were wooden hoes and stone axes, as Qwathiland is mountainous and covered with indigenous forests. These were very unsophisticated and thus only subsistence farming could be expected. The main crops were maize, sorghum, kaffir corn and pumpkins. The women were also engaged in gathering and collecting wild food and dry branches of trees from the forests and dry cow dung in the grazing grounds for fuel. Harvest was also done by women since no means of transport was available.¹

1. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

But it should be noted that despite this division of labour there was nothing preventing men from giving a helping hand in agricultural farming. In fact, some Qwathi men, like Ntswayibana, liked to work in the gardens, helping women there. This was also observed by Reverend Gordon when he arrived as an Anglican Missionary in Qwathiland. In his report for 1860 he remarked that there was one thing he appreciated with the Qwathi men and this was that it was not the women alone who worked but also men bore a helping hand during the planting season.²

Division of labour engaged men in stock farming and hunting. The Qwathi proved to be very good hunters and often went for a week subsisting entirely on game which they procured and often returned laden with various kinds of game.³ From these kinds of game the Qwathi also got skins and hides from which to make clothes and mats. But hunting did not last long. The take over of the country by the colonial government with the forest regulations and hunting licences

2. Gordon's Report, 31/12/60.
. Titus, 12/7/87.

3. Ibid.

discouraged the Qwathi hunters, who then fell back to agricultural and pastoral farming.⁴

Stock farming was also in the hands of men as women were not allowed to come near cattle as it was believed that should cattle come into contact with women they would suffer from Umlaza (ritual impurity of women).⁵ Cattle loomed largely in a man's thought. They were his principal form of wealth, his most treasured possession and anything concerning them and their welfare focussed his attention. In his letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs, in 1904, C.A. King, the magistrate, reported,⁶

Cruelty to animals was a most uncommon occurrence among Africans. They are too fond of their stock to ill-treat them.

Cattle were the principal medium of exchange and the medium in which court fines were levied. They were also a means of keeping on good terms with the ancestral spirits and slaughtering was nominally

4. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

5. Mazwembe, 24/10/87.
Somdaka, 24/10/87.

6. CMT 3/93, King to Elliot, January 1904.

reserved for ceremonial activities whose importance was highlighted by the magnitude of a sacrifice.⁷

Sansom, in his description of cattle, says⁸

They are an equivalent of money. They are stores of value, standards of value and medium of exchange. They provide what Schreiner calls the "big notes" rather than "small change" in tribal transactions.

Amongst the Qwathi one could observe very rich and very poor men in terms of possession of cattle. Generally it was due to geographical conditions, one area being suitable for cattle farming and the other suitable for agricultural farming or not suitable for both. But at the same time there were differences even between individuals of the same locality. Some could get rich because of care for the cattle, of use of certain medicinal herbs for his cattle and of brideprice for his many daughters. But what was appreciable with the Qwathi was that the poor were taken care of by the rich, they were given cows for milk to keep for an indefinite period. In many instances the cows so loaned to the poor - inkomo yengoma - would be kept until it had given birth to another heifer which would

7. Somdaka, 24/10/87.

8. B. Sansom "Traditional economic systems" in W.D. Hammond-Tooke's The Bantu Speaking Peoples of South Africa (London, 1974), p.152.

enable the poor to build up his stock on that heifer. In other instances, this cow could be kept so long as the loaner still had something to keep him going but should he run short of cattle or cows, he was entitled to claim the cow so loaned to the poor, hence the Xhosa proverb "Inkom'enqoma yintseng'ibheka" meaning when one has been loaned a cow, he does not milk it with all the comfort, he tends to look up, down and around in the process of milking in case the owner has come to fetch it.⁹

Another gesture of kindness to the poor was to supply them freely with milk on a daily basis. When the Qwathi slaughtered a beast for consumption there were rules of distribution based on criteria for kinship and residential association. These hindered the use of milk and meat as commodities to be marketed.¹⁰

Oxen were often trained for races without riders, contests between them being one of the most favoured sports. They were also the means of securing wives. A person with many cattle was sure to have many people coming to stay in his homestead because it was where

9. Mxutu, 23/10/87.
Somdaka, 24/10/87.

10. Sanson, "Traditional Economic Systems", p.152.

they were sure of getting food, and was respected even in the social gatherings and political meetings. This means that economic viability earned one both an enhanced social and political status.¹¹

But it was not long before the Qwathi viewed their stock from an economic point. One of the factors contributing to this was the arrival of traders and missionaries with new values. During the last half of the nineteenth century, stock farming began to take a new meaning. Hence the Qwathi moved from a subsistence economy to peasant farming.¹²

The Qwathi began to barter their cattle for the manufactured goods, they were in need of. The main trade goods were blankets, firearms, agricultural implements and metal products, such as spears and knives. These barter transactions were not only between the Qwathi and traders, they were also between the Qwathi and colonial farmers, who needed draught animals since they had lost their stock through diseases such as lungsickness, redwater and east coast

11. Ibid.

12. C.Bundy, Rise and Fall of South African Peasantry (London, 1979), p.9 (I have used Bundy's interpretation of the term "peasantry").

fever. Both these groups, because of their needs, welcomed this economic interaction.¹³

Between 1860 and 1875 Dalasile was also able to derive considerable revenue from taxing trade and sites on which traders built their huts or houses and stores and shops at the rate of £6 per annum. In his native *Reminiscences*, Clarke wrote¹⁴

In those days trading licences were paid to the chiefs Mgudlwa and Dalasile the senior chiefs of Engcobo.

Trade in stock was the most common as cattle in Qwathiland were in abundance, not obtained from outside, as there was fear of outside diseases, but from within. The increase was therefore natural not as a result of imports. This is what Beinart also observed in Mpondoland.¹⁵

As a result of this exchange, imported textiles began to gradually replace the well tanned hides and skins of both wild and domestic animals which were used for

13. W. Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930 (Johannesburg 1982) pp.22-30.

. Clarke, Native Reminiscences, p.2.

14. Ibid.

15. Xundu, 23/10/87.

. Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland, pp.22-30.

clothing. These textiles diminished the time needed to prepare hides and skins and made more hides available for exports. As time went on, they became the socially accepted articles of dress for people at all levels of society.¹⁶

Imported agricultural implements in the 1870's rapidly displaced the wooden hoes and stone axes. This helped to improve agricultural farming. Of all the agricultural implements that revolutionised agricultural farming during this period, the introduction of the plough was a boon to the farmers. With it, the Qwathi subsistence farmers began to assume the status of peasant farmers as a result of greater production that arose from its use. In his letter to the chief magistrate Stanford reported¹⁷

By 1878 the use of the plough had become general.

This revolution in agriculture also changed the division of labour in that the introduction of a plough made it impossible for women to be responsible for agricultural farming. The use of cattle for pulling the plough in the fields led men to take over agricul-

16. Ibid.

17. G33-79, Stanford to Elliot, 6/1/79.

tural farming. Women, also to some extent ceased to collect harvests and firewood, oxen and wagons being used for the purpose. The cattle, the adoption of sledges, ploughs and wagons were intimately linked. With the oxen as draught animals, the Qwathi peasant farmers were not pinned down to selling to the nearest traders. If there were prospects of fair prices and fair profits from afar, the farmers would take their produce to that distance.¹⁸

In his report for 1895, C.J. Warner, the magistrate commented¹⁹

The plough has almost superseded the hoe as an implement for agriculture, the use of the latter being now confined to clearing the lands.

Most of these peasant farmers had found encouragement from missionaries who emphasised diligence and initiative as a result of which the Qwathi became prosperous farmers capable of cultivating almost all types of products. This is clear from Reverend Green's report to the magistrate. He wrote,²⁰

18. Xundu, 23/10/87.
 . Beinart, Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930, pp.22-30.

19. CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/1/96.

20. CMT 3/88, Reverend T.W. Green to Warner, 3/1/96.

These farmers cultivated five kinds of grain and irrigate extensively. Some have potatoes and other vegetables. Many have procured several kinds of fruit trees.

The surplus produce was sold to the traders, missionaries and sawyers. It was also to these black farmers that Reverend Green looked for the development of a school at Qutubeni.²¹

During the dry seasons the Qwathi peasants engaged in extensive irrigation. It was not a difficult work for them to lead water to the fields since Qwathiland is a mountainous country from which big rivers, like the Mbashe, Xuka, Mgwali and Qumanco, come. There were also numerous fountains from which water could be led to the fields. The following valleys were notable for the water furrows to the fields which were usually on the flats below the mountains:- Mntuntloni, Qutubeni, Sitoleni, Gqaga and Mnyolo valleys.²²

In his annual report for 1877, Stanford wrote²³

The water supply in this country is in abundance. Some of the people had taken out water courses and seem to appreciate the benefit derived therefrom.

21. Ibid.

22. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 4/11/1903.

23. G17-78, W. Stanford to Elliot, 29/1/1878.

As a result of this extensive irrigation, agricultural production increased and Qwathi farmers could sell without any danger of running short of supplies the following year. In his report for August 1893, A.H. Stanford commented,²⁴

The people with the exception of individuals have a sufficient supply of food to last them until the next harvest. They are selling their grain freely.

It is no exaggeration to say that these Qwathi peasant farmers even produced in some seasons more than the European farmers even in grains that were foreign to the Africans in these territories. This is clear from the 1885 report where A.H. Stanford recorded.²⁵

The growing of crops, maize, millet and pumpkins are in the most promising conditions and should the season continue as favourable as hitherto, one of the best harvests can be anticipated. Those who sowed oats and wheat have a fair yield. But the return has not been so good in the European Section.

It should also not be assumed that these peasant farmers were drawn only from the ranks of the loyals. They were also found amongst the supporters of their

24. N.A.41, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 26/8/1893.

25. BC 293: ES6, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 8/1/86.

chief, Dalasile, who rebelled in 1880. Hence Stanford reported²⁶

When the rebel gardens were reaped in May, hundreds of bags of corn were procured. These are over and above those now apportioned to the use of the surrendered people. The surplus can be used when needed in the district and also in the colony.

This shows that the new peasant class were not siding with the colonists, but despite their wealth and progressiveness were supporting their chief. That the Qwathi peasants took much interest in improving their lot was evidenced when, in Marh 1885, a meeting of the Qwathi of Manzana, All Saints and Mntuntloni locations was held to consider the advisability of forming an agricultural association with the object of improving the system of farming. Over eighty blacks joined the association readily. The following were the office-bearers:- Resident Magistrate as President, Phillip D. Poswayo, secretary and L. Farrant, clerk, as treasurer. Reverend Green and Messrs Clarke and Davis, traders, assisted the magistrate by advising the people and encouraging them in carrying out the project.²⁷

26. G33-82, Stanford to Elliot, 5/1/82.

27. CMT 1/30, W. Stanford to Elliot, 25/3/85.

The influence of the Qwathi peasant farmers spread to the neighbouring communities, such as the Hala and Mfengu, as a result of which in 1898 an agricultural society for the district was formed and by March 1898 membership was well over a hundred. The members of the society were anxious to grow wheat. They requested the magistrate to ascertain if the government could not fence their lands using poles from the undermacated forests set aside for use by Africans, on condition that only poles of unreserved timber be taken.²⁸

By the year 1903 the following were the principal crops raised in the districts:- maize, kaffir corn, beans, pumpkins, wheat, oat-hay and potatoes. The approximate yield was as follows: maize 50 000 bags, kaffircorn 30 000, beans 500 bags, pumpkins 100 000, wheat 200, oathay 60 000 bundles, potatoes 400 bags. As Engcobo was purely an African district not much wheat and hay were cultivated.²⁹

The changes taking place in the Qwathi system of production were becoming entrenched and irreversible. In order to maintain access to goods, which were

28. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to ELLIOT, 21/3/1898.

29. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 4/11/1903.

becoming essential for productive activities and which they could not make themselves, the Qwathi had to exchange their produce. Therefore, their productive activities became more oriented towards supplying external markets. The expansion of cultivation in addition to stock farming which had now comprised of not only cattle but sheep, goats and pigs, provided a more varied range of produce for exchange by the beginning of the twentieth century both pastoral and agricultural products found its way to the traders and through them to the colonial markets.³⁰

(ii) Decline of Qwathi Peasantry

The picture pointed above should not mislead readers to think that no difficulties were experienced by the Qwathi peasant farmers. On the contrary, there were many serious setbacks which drove most of the Qwathi peasant farmers onto the labour markets and into the colony and mines of the interior. Some of these setbacks were natural and others were man-made. The natural were those over which men had no control. The man-made referred to those caused by men, in particular the colonial government and its officials and traders.

30. Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930, p.28.
 . Xundu, 24/10/87.

(a) Natural Setbacks

Drought is one of the evils that drove agricultural and to a lesser extent pastoral farmers away from the rural areas to seek new opportunities in the cities and colonial farms. At such times they preferred the uncertainties of the cities to poverty at home. So threatening was the drought in 1877 that W.G. Cumming, the acting magistrate, reported,³¹

The prospects of the people as far as food is concerned are far from being hopeful.

It was perhaps this that forced some of the budding peasant farmers, in order to fight drought, to take out water leads into their fields.³²

The 1885 drought was so outstanding for its rages that it forced these farmers to seek work in the labour markets. It did not only affect the Qwathi peasant farmers but also the white farmers. It is estimated that the European section of the population of Engcobo lost about 10 000 cattle and 30 000 sheep. The

31. G17-78, W.G. Cumming to Elliot, 21/1/79, p.115.

32. G13-80, W. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/79.

drought of 1885 is referred to by the Xhosa as Isitwayi - an incurable horse disease.³³

Locusts also contributed to some of the Qwathi farmers giving up farming and to the exodus of 1896-97 to the labour markets. C.J. Warner in his letter dated 17th February 1896 reported.³⁴

The young mealie crops throughout have been destroyed by locusts and that no harvest can be looked for this year.

In his annual report for 1896 he again reported³⁵

Towards the close of the year, scarcity of food was manifested by a greater number of men than usual going to work and by an increase in the number of stock theft.

C.A. King, in his letter to the chief magistrate, made a request that he should, on behalf of the district of Engcobo, contact the government Bacteriologist on the subject of a species of locust which was becoming an increasing pest in the district and which did not appear to be amenable to the ordinary methods of treatment.³⁶

33. BC 293: E 56, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 18/1/86.

34. CMT 3/88, J.C. Warner to Elliot, 17/ /96.

35. CMT 3/89, J.C. Warner to Elliot, 1/12/1902.

36. CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 1/12/1902.

Cattle diseases also fall amongst the natural setbacks that contributed to the fall of Qwathi peasantry. Redwater, Lungsickness and Rinderpest were the most common of the cattle diseases in Qwathiland.

Redwater belongs to a group of diseases caused by "Babesia" in cattle, sheep, pigs and horses. These include Texas fever, Redwater Fever and Tick Fever. They are all characterised by fever and intra-vascular hemo-lysis causing a syndrome of anaemia, hemoglobinuria and hemoglobinuria and are transmitted by blood sucking ticks. The medical term for the disease is "Babesiosis."³⁷

From an economic point of view, Redwater is disastrous because of direct losses and the restriction of movement by quarantine laws. Death of cattle and a long period of convalescence entail loss of meat and milk production. Incidental costs of immunisation and treatment add to the economic burden created by the disease.³⁸

37. D.C. Blood and J.A. Henderson, Veterinary Medicine (London, 1968), p.562.

38. Ibid.

In cattle infections symptoms are characterised by an acute onset of high fever, anorexia, depression, weakness, cessation of rumination and a fall in milk yield. Respiratory and heart rates are increased and brick red conjunctival and mucous membranes soon change to extreme pallor of severe anaemia. In the terminal stage there is severe jaundice and the urine is dark red to brown in colour and produces a very stable froth. The febrile stage usually lasts for about a week and the total course about three weeks. Pregnant animals often abort. Animals that survive recover gradually from severe emaciation.³⁹

This disease contributed to a considerable reduction of cattle in Qwathiland in the second half of the nineteenth century. When it was reported in 1880, the Secretary for Native Affairs suggested that the infected cattle should be shot and that those which had not yet been affected should be removed until all danger had passed.⁴⁰ It broke out in Qwathiland at Bojane location and the beasts at the government kraal died.⁴¹

39. Ibid.

40. N.A. 56, W. Ayliff, Secretary for Native Affairs to Elliot, 22/1/80.

41. CMT 1/30, Stanford to Elliot, 20/4/85.

In his report for 1892, A.H. Stanford reported that Redwater no longer affected cattle bred in this district. It was only in 1903 that it made its appearance at Zadungeni location in Qwathiland but once this location and adjacent locations were quarantined, its spread was arrested.⁴² It appears that, although redwater was harmful, it was amenable to treatment like croton oil, quarantine measures and African herbs. The mortality rate could be put at five percent of the treated cattle.⁴³

Lungsickness also largely contributed to many farmers losing hope. Hence many decided to leave for labour markets. When it appeared in Vetu's homestead, in Manzana location, in 1883, quarantine measures were adopted and in 1895 notices appeared from the office, prohibiting the removal of the cattle from certain infected areas. This meant that, during the period of quarantine, trade was at a standstill, as cattle could not be removed. This not only affected stock farming, as exchange for agricultural implements depended on

42. N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.
. CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 14/5/1903.

43. CMT 3/87, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 20/5/1895.

pastoral products and the very agriculture depended on cattle.⁴⁴

On the 14th of July 1899, C.J. Warner reported that the infected herds were always grazing together with cattle not yet infected because two to three locations shared the same grazing land. This necessitated that, in terms of Section 11 of the Animal disease Act No.27 of 1893, all the locations with common grazing grounds be quarantined and the cattle prohibited from being removed to another area.⁴⁵

Another outbreak was reported at Gqobonco in Yawa's ward on the 16th of November 1899 and between this date and the 19th of February 1900 eight head of cattle had died but after eight weeks of quarantine it appeared to have subsided and quarantine restrictions were withdrawn.⁴⁶

From the above, it is clear that in order to fight lungsickness effectively, eight weeks of quarantine had to elapse. This was a period of inactivity in which

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. CMT 3/90, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 27/11/99 & 11/6/1900.

cattle could not be removed. When lungsickness broke out in summer or during the ploughing season the farmers of the affected locations would be sure to suffer the following year from starvation since no cultivation could be done if the gardens fell outside the quarantined zone. Not having been able to cultivate their lands, the peasant farmers had no alternative but to look for jobs outside the country.

When the outbreak of lungsickness occurred in 1907, inoculators were appointed to inoculate the infected cattle and to induce the owners of cattle liable to be infected to inoculate. The cattle so inoculated had first to be isolated. An Animal Disease Board was also set up with a view to define the boundaries of quarantine. The head of this board was to be a headman, who would see to it that there was cooperation between the board and the inoculators and between the people and the Board. By July 1907 there already were seventeen inoculators in the district of Engcobo as the disease was rapidly spreading.⁴⁷

On the 27th of January 1908, lungsickness broke out at Qutubeni in Hlakula's ward and Poswayo's. From there it spread to Ntantiso's and on the 14th of September it

47. I/ECO 5/1/1/1, Norton to Elliot, 31/12/1907.

had reached Nqwenani's ward, which is a big area, and by June 1910 it had spread as far as Ngqokoto. Innoculation and quarantine measures were brought about in cases where reports were made.⁴⁸ The spread was due to the reluctance of the Qwathi to report cases observed because of fear of quarantine measures and suspicion that innoculation was responsible for the death of their cattle.

Of all diseases of the Nineteenth Century, Rinderpest is the one that has most preoccupied the minds not only of the farmers and veterinary surgeons, but also of the writers of the Twentieth Century. That, this is so, is because the rinderpest of 1896-1897 was widespread and its impact on farmers of all races from Central Africa to the Cape was heavy. The disease led many well to do farmers both black and white to give up farming and flock into the labour markets in search for work. Rinderpest was sometimes referred to as "Masilingane" -let us be equal.⁴⁹

Rinderpest was an acute, highly contagious disease caused by a virus and characterised by high fever and

48. Ibid.

49. C. Van Onselen, "Reaction to Rinderpest in South Africa 1896-97" in the Journal of African History, vol.13, 1972.

focal, erosive lesions confined largely to the mucosa of the alimentary tract. The disease occurred in plague form and was highly fatal.⁵⁰

Historically, rinderpest has been among the most devastating of all cattle diseases. From Somaliland in 1889, where it first took root in Africa, it moved rapidly south, infecting game and cattle. By 1890, it was in Uganda. By 1892, it had already reached Zambia. In 1896, it made its appearance in Southern Rhodesia and, then, to Bechuanaland.⁵¹

Despite the campaign against the disease in Southern Africa, Rinderpest moved relentlessly southwards, and by November 1897, it was killing game at Rhodes Estate in Cape Town. Despite a warning issued, as early as 1892, the Cape government had taken few if any precautions against the spread of rinderpest.⁵²

Local and National rinderpest commissions were established to coordinate attempts to prevent the spread of the disease. Rinderpest necessitated a series of interstate conferences and even an interna-

50. Blood and Henderson, Veterinary Medicine, p.474.

51. Van Onselen, "Reaction", p.473.

52. Ibid. p.474.

tional one. With fencing at a cost of 90 per mile and compensation to be paid to owners of infected cattle that had been shot, it eventually cost the Cape government over million pounds.⁵³

Africans believed that rinderpest was the product of the white man's activities. Similarly whites, some of them in official positions, believed that it was spread by Africans. In practice, this highly contagious disease was very frequently spread by white farmers who were mobile, active in trade and apt to control their rinderpest stricken neighbours with little regard for the risks of contagion this involved. Whilst mistrust between black and white were mutual, the regulations to control the spread of the disease were applied with great vigour to Africans.⁵⁴

Authorities resorted to widespread use of disinfectants which were used on all travelling cattle. Only cattle belonging to the Africans were required to undergo complete dipping. The African travellers themselves were also dipped. This is clear from the explanation of the Transvaal Veterinary surgeon. He said⁵⁵

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p.480.

55. Ibid.

... every African from an infected area is dipped by us and everything he wears is washed and guards have strict orders to burn any milk, meat or cattle products found in his possession. After being washed he has to remain there until he is dry, when he gets a pass and he may go on.

The dipping procedure did not meet with African approval. Many africans objected to being dipped. The enforcement of these regulations, coupled with the suspicions already present, must have strained race relations and it is not surprising that whites made observations, such as, that "the usual friendly politeness of the native was changed to an attitude of semi contemptuous insolence".⁵⁶

Before the full impact of rinderpest made itself felt in Transkei and Mpondoland, the chief magistrate for the region reported⁵⁷

a spate of wild rumours and prophecies about the resurrection cases which pointed to the white man as being responsible for rinderpest.

Qwathiland as part of Southern Africa could not escape the disastrous effect of the outbreak of rinderpest.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

At first, the Qwathi cooperated with government officials. C.J. Warner, reported,⁵⁸

The people appear to be much impressed by the gravity of the situation. They have desired me to thank the government for the efforts which are being made to check the rinderpest and recognise the necessity for stringent measures being taken to cope with the plague.

In Qwathiland, rinderpest first made its appearance at Sentubi. From there it appeared in the Manzana location and then within two days, it was discovered at Zadungeni and Xuka but the authorities could not trace the origin of the infection.⁵⁹

On the 23rd of July 1897 the culture camp was made ready to receive cattle for furnishing bile for inoculation and one hundred and twenty two cattle were offered as culture animals. Twelve thousand one hundred and seven cattle were brought forward for inoculation and later three thousand nine hundred and eighty five were also inoculated by the same bile system.⁶⁰ According to the report, the mortality rate amongst the cattle inoculated for the first time was about twenty five percent. The reason put forward for

58. CMT 3/88, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 19/9/96.

59. CMT 3/89, Warner to Elliot, 23/12/97.

60. Ibid.

this was that these cattle were inoculated after instead of before the outbreak of the disease.⁶¹

The number of cattle inoculated with blood was two thousand two hundred and eighty seven. This inoculation with blood was not attended with good results and of cattle treated in this manner an average of between 30 to 40 percent were lost.⁶²

According to Warner's report no cattle treated with serum died until after the 30th of October 1897 when all inoculators had been discharged. Although inoculation, especially with bile, was relatively successful, the majority of cattle were not inoculated at all. Although the total number of cattle in, Engcobo district, was not given in Warner's report, Warner puts the overall mortality rate at between eighty five and ninety percent of the cattle in Engcobo district.⁶³

In addition to inoculation, quarantine measures were adopted at every infected centre but it became clear

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

that "the disease had obtained such a hold as to render any further quarantine useless."⁶⁴

That measures to fight rinderpest in Qwathiland had failed, cannot be disputed. The white officials ascribed this failure to the reluctance of the Qwathi to bring forward their cattle for inoculation. Of course many Qwathi after the second inoculation became reluctant as they came to realise that some of the inoculated cattle were dying. They became suspicious of the white inoculators. But this could not have been the sole cause of the death of so many cattle because even cattle belonging to the whites were dying in big numbers. Blood and Henderson, in their book "Veterinary Medicine", write that complete eradication of rinderpest would need sufficient veterinary personnel, suitable facilities and control of free moving animals. Such conditions were completely out of reach.⁶⁵ Ignorance of the officials as to the cause and best methods of curing the disease contributed to the disaster. Warner admitted⁶⁶

The efforts to trace the origin or infection in each case were fruitless.

64. Ibid.

65. Blood and Henderson, Veterinary Medicine, p.477.

66. CMT 3/89, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 23/12/97.

Rinderpest left the Qwathi peasant farmers completely paralysed. According to van Onselen, African losses should not be measured simply in terms of numbers, for amongst the cattle keeping this was far more than an economic blow. He wrote⁶⁷

For Africans, cattle formed not only a source of wealth but the pivotal point of a complex and interwoven social, political and economic system ... they constituted the real wealth of the people but the devastation of rinderpest also brought repercussions which stretched beyond that dimension.

(b) Man-Made Setbacks

The way the colonial officials treated the Qwathi during and after the war led many of the rebels to poverty. "War meant a sure road to pauperdom", on the part of the Qwathi. During and after the rebellion about 16 000 cattle and 5 000 sheep and goats were captured, leaving the Qwathi to start from scratch. This was a severe and serious setback which led many farmers to give up stock farming.⁶⁸ After the rebellion Qwathiland was sliced up in favour of the Dutch squatters with the result that those promising farmers, who had been dispossessed of land abandoned

67. Van Onselen, " ", p.484.

68. BC 293: A3-A5, Stanford to Elliot, 5/12/80.

farming and decided to look for work elsewhere in order to build new homesteads and buy some cattle to replace those that had been captured.⁶⁹

This resettlement also led to overcrowding since the people whose land had been taken had to be squeezed in other people's locations. The gardens and grazing lands became smaller and smaller. Many young men had to leave their country for work.⁷⁰ Ngangelizwe's view, when pressurised by his own people before the 1880 Rebellion to make a decision, was correct. He said⁷¹

... but before I join them they must show me a chief who after fighting the English has been able to build his kraal peacefully in his own country.

One of the systems by which the blacks were exploited by the traders was by the system of giving credit facilities to customers. Some of these customers could not even read and write. No receipts were issued when the customers had made some part payment. The customers were at the mercy of the creditors who easily raised the debt without the knowledge of the customer who would not be in a position to account for

69. BC 293: A5, Stanford to Elliot, 19/3/81.

70. Ibid.

71. BC 293:A1, Stanford to Elliot, 25/8/79.

the debt. If unable to pay the account, the debtor was taken to court where he would be forced to pay the whole amount in cash or in kind with interests. In many instances all the cattle or stock of the debtor were attached by the messengers of the court with a view to settle the account which in most cases had been raised to double or treble the original account.⁷² Of this exploitation, M.Xundu says⁷³

One would pay the instalments endlessly without finishing the account and the creditor would keep on adding what he called interest which was unintelligible to the customer.

The customers' stock and/or implements having been confiscated, the budding peasant farmers were rendered unable to perform their agricultural activities. Those owing cash had to accept recruitment, under the trader himself as a labour agent to enable the trader to get the amount so owed. This state of affairs led

72. N.A.58, Elliot to Resident Magistrate of Thembu-land, April 1880.

. Xundu, 2/7/87.

73. Xundu, 2/7/87.

the farmers who were in debt to abandon farming and sell their labour outside the country.⁷⁴

Many of the victims were saved, albeit too late, in 1880 by an unnumbered government notice issued by the chief magistrate. This notice put an end to the system of recovering book debts from Africans in the courts of law. This displeased many of the traders who felt that the chief magistrate was interfering with their trade and petitioned him to withdraw this notice.

These protests were a proof that the traders saw this circular as protection to the Africans and that they would lose the money they normally got from the customers when brought to the courts of law.⁷⁵

The spoor system also contributed to the poverty of the Qwathi and as a result contributed to the decline of the Qwathi peasantry. The spoor system was a system of tracing stray or stolen stock into another country by means of spoor or trails. The location in which the spoor of lost or stolen stock disappeared was collectively held responsible for compensation. The Qwathi pastoral farmers on the borders of the colony

74. N.A.58, Elliot to Resident Magistrate, April 1880.

75. Ibid.

were victims of this unfair and one sided law because when the colonial farmers on the borders, accompanied by colonial police, got into Qwathiland on the pretext of tracing stolen stock, they would drive away all the stock they could find in that particular location, thus enriching themselves at the expense of the Qwathi. What was unfair about this spoor law was that it was one sided. It favoured the white farmers more than the blacks. The blacks were not allowed to trace lost or stolen stock into the white areas. Only white farmers could trace the stock into black locations to the extent of even taking away the stock that did not belong to them. Much discontent was shown by the Qwathi on the subject.⁷⁶

Headman Ntozini of Gqutyini location, in Qwathiland, complained to Mr Griffiths who had called all the chiefs and headmen of Engcobo to ask them to vote for him, during the coming Cape elections, that the spoor law was not the same in Transkei territories as in the colony. He pointed out that if the stock was stolen or got astray from the Transkeian territories and traced across the border no one was held responsible and in fact no black was allowed to trace his stock

76. Ibid.
. Xundu, 2/7/87.

across the border, whereas if the spoor was traced into the territories from the colony, the people were collectively held responsible - excluding the white traders. He suggested that one uniform law should be applied.⁷⁷

It was because of such complaints that Elliot, the chief magistrate issued another unnumbered circular in 1880 on the spoor subject. This circular shattered the privileges of the whites in regard to the spoor system. Elliot stated⁷⁸

If to allow an European all advantages of Spoor law and be exempt from its liabilities was not class legislation.

Elliot observed that when the white man had sustained a loss at the hands of an African he would "demand the pound of flesh" to the last grain but when the reverse, would "resist to the utmost".

Elliot informed the magistrates and whites that the Spoor law would thereafter be obligatory upon all residents of the territory irrespective of colour. He further explained that it was undesirable that Africans

77. An article from Umtata Herald of 13/12/1887, South African Library, Cape Town.

78. N.A.58, Elliot to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 5/4/80.

should be allowed to suppose that the laws in force in this territory were intended to benefit Europeans only.⁷⁹ Although the circular saved many of the Qwathi from exploitation of this nature, many others had been robbed and had given up pastoral farming and left the country to look for jobs in the labour markets.

(b) Origins of Migratory Labour from Qwathiland

Minerals having been discovered in the interior of South Africa in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, the seeds for future South African Labour problems were sown. With the mineral discoveries there was a corresponding demand for labourers. The white governments began to look at the "reserves", that is, territories inhabited by the blacks as reservoirs for labourers, from where they could be drawn to work in the mines.

Earlier attempts at recruiting labourers did not meet with much success because the blacks were mostly economically self-sufficient. There was no urgent need for them to supplement their properties with cash incomes. That the Qwathi were not interested in going to work outside the country for cash was evident in

79. Ibid.

1879 when major Elliot, the chief magistrate, made enquiries from Stanford about the possibility of some blacks volunteering to go and work with the railways. In reply Stanford commented.⁸⁰

Very few natives if any would be available for service in the colony.

If by 1879 the Qwathi, by reason of their economic self-sufficiency, were reluctant to go to far off areas, what is it that made them to leave their homes later on in search of work outside their country? There were quite a number of factors that contributed to this exodus from Qwathiland to the Colony and mines. Some of these factors were natural such as drought, locusts and animal diseases already discussed above but for others the colonial government was responsible.

The introduction of the hut tax in Qwathiland in 1879 had a tendency to drive people out of the country to look for jobs in order to be able to pay it. This tax was a burden for those people who did not have property and whose means of subsistence were meagre. The Qwathi were informed that they would start paying this tax in 1879 in cash or in kind.⁸¹

80. CMT 1/27, Stanford to Elliot, 18/9/79.

81. N.A.60, Stanford to Elliot, 28/4/80.

Those families without stock of any kind but still had to pay the hut tax in cash, had now to find an annual income which could only be earned in the labour markets outside Qwathiland. They had to become regular workers in the farms of the colony or in the mines. In accordance with Section 49 of Proclamation 40 of 1885, those who were unable to pay this tax faced ejection from the land. Rather than being ejected from their land of birth, they chose to go out and work for this hut tax which was of not benefit to them.⁸²

Tremendous economic distress among the Qwathi, following the war, made them an easily procurable labour supply. All Qwathi were reduced to a state of "utter destitution, possessing literally nothing". The previous season had been an abundant one despite the war and the rebel lands had been reaped for the benefit of the surrendered rebels and the colonial subjects who had no land like the Dutch squatters in the upper parts of Qwathiland, at the instruction of the magistrate.⁸³

82. N.A.153, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 25/6/94.

83. N.A.66, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 8/3/81, p.42.

. G8-83 Elliot's Report for 1882, p.79.

During the war the colonial forces captured all the cattle belonging to the rebels as part of the booty. These were sold in the colony and helped increase the revenue of the colonial government. With their gardens having been reaped, their cattle having been captured, some of their land having been apportioned to the Dutch squatters and in some cases their homesteads having been burnt down, the Qwathi rebels had no alternative but to go out and work for a cash income on the mines and railways in order to pay hut tax, to replace their cattle and to build new homesteads.⁸⁴ Stanford also encouraged the Qwathi to proceed to the colony for the purpose of benefiting themselves and supplying a want that was seriously felt by the colonists. This was of course the wish of the government that the Africans in the territories be encouraged to go to the colony and sell their labour. The war, therefore, offered the government an opportunity to bring about the realisation of their dreams.⁸⁵

Reverend T.W. Green, the Anglican Missionary at All Saints, in Qwathiland, thought that advantage could be taken of the state of despair of the Qwathi after the

84. BC 293: A5, Stanford to Elliot, 19/3/81.

85. Ibid.

failure of the rebellion to employ them on road works and tree planting in their own country.⁸⁶

When Rhodes took over as Cape Prime Minister, he did not hesitate to reveal that he saw the future of the majority of African population as labourers.⁸⁷ The main essence of his policy was to divide the African population into two. On the one hand, he wanted a majority of landless labourers and on the other hand a minority of peasant title holders living in four acre plots, electing district councils. This he did by the introduction of the Glen Grey Act in August 1894, which at the beginning was widely welcomed by the African educated elite. The majority of the "Red Africans, were not as enthusiastic about the prospects of survey as the more educated class. They appeared far more concerned over the question of security of traditional communal tenure. The headmen throughout the territories expressed themselves in favour of certificates of occupation rather than survey. Nearly all were emphatic that any survey had to be on the basis of land currently ploughed. The fear of removal from land

86. G8-83, Green's Report to Stanford, January 1883.

87. T.J. Keegan "African Responses to the Implementation of the Glen Grey Policy", B.A. (Honours) Research Essay, (UCT, 1975), p.9.

already cultivated was strong and suspicion of individual title was wide spread.⁸⁸

Although the Glen Grey Act did not apply to Qwathiland at the beginning, it posed a threat to the Qwathi. There were two clauses that were most threatening. The first was the labour tax clause which in the district in which it had been enforced was levied on those who could not show that they had been out to work. To the whites the idea of a labour tax was a most appealing one and was seen as a means of "proletarianising" the African peasants. Rhodes defended himself that the bill had been introduced because the Africans "live about in sloth and laziness and never go to work". He said it was necessary to provide the Africans with "something to occupy their minds". This cynical attitude aroused heated feelings. It was vociferously denied that the Africans were idle.⁸⁹

The Qwathi saw it as a threat to their way of life. There were rumours that the heads of homesteads and widows were not exempted from the payment of labour tax. Having experienced hard times for the past three years as a result of crop failures and heavy losses of

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., p.11.

stock, the Qwathi feared that an additional taxation would press hard on them. This additional tax of ten shillings besides the hut tax brought about uneasiness.⁹⁰

Like other Africans the Qwathi condemned the tax as a "Black man's tax" which was tantamount to slavery. African objections to this clause were not unfounded. They pointed out that a good number of men "are too old to do rough work, a few are physically unfit for it and a very considerable number are very well off and quite able to save money from the income they have from sheep, cattle and lands". Then a good many more were young men who had worked long and who had no one to take charge of what stock they had and who therefore could not be away from home without loss in stock, a loss which would be greater than their pay, expenses deducted.⁹¹

Against the allegation of indolence,⁹² the Africans argued⁹³

90. CMT 3/86, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 1/3/95.

91. Unnamed informants quoted by J.B. Ross in F. Wilson and D. Perrot, Outlook of a Century 1870-1970, p.96.

92. CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/6/99.

93. Wilson and Perrot, Outlook, p.96.

We are not idle, and every year we are becoming more and more industrious. This law cannot be meant for our good. It is a labour law, it aims at increasing the white man's power over the black. For we are now to be driven to work even if we do not consider the pay good enough. In addition to this our masters' powers will be increased for we must stay with them in order to get a certificate that will exempt us from this law. Why does this law not apply to the whites as well as to us?

Conclusive or inconclusive as this argument may be, the labour tax certainly did more than anything else during this period to make Africans dread and distrust the government. Feelings against the labour tax had helped to stimulate opposition to the other parts of the act including land tenure and council system.⁹⁴

The second most threatening clause was the land tenure clause. This clause provided for a system of individual tenure under which title would be given to plots of land which could neither be alienated nor accumulated. This meant that only one son would have to inherit the land, others would be forced to go and look for work. The less attractive motive for the introduction of individual tenure was the desire for labour. It was felt that by permanently restricting

94. CMT 3/90, Warner to Elliot, 3/6/99.

the number of plots excess population would be forced into labour markets. The discovery of mineral wealth and upsurge in commercial farming led to the demand of cheap labour. This system of individual title would therefore bring about the realisation of this dream.⁹⁵

The Qwathi like other communities felt threatened by these two clauses. Hence in rejecting them, they rejected the whole act including the clause on District Council. In fact the District Council itself was an attempt to deprive the people of Transkeian territories of the Cape Franchise and to force them to accept an inferior body which would be under the leadership of headmen. The district council system could be said to have laid the foundations for the policy of separate development whose architects decided on the establishment of homelands, the first of which was Transkei. The District councils were accepted only after the two most disastrous clauses had been cancelled.⁹⁶

The District Council having been accepted and established in 1902, Langa Dalasile, the senior headman in Qwathiland, was selected to represent the district

95. Keegan, "African Responses", p.3.

96. Saunders, "Annexation", p.141.
 . CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 3/6/99.

in the General Council. As a member of the delegation selected from the General Council to go to Johannesburg to investigate the treatment of the blacks in the mines, he did a good job, as thorough investigation was done. This investigation report by Langa revealed three things, namely that labour agents were untrustworthy, second, that the treatment of the blacks in the labour markets was worse than what it was before the country was taken over by the British Government; and lastly, that the labourers were no longer getting satisfaction from the magistrates.⁹⁷

Employers and contractors used local agents to mobilise labour. These were, in most cases established traders, who provided a network of recruiting points throughout the territories and were keen to augment their incomes with capitation fees. They visited chiefs and headmen and asked them to recruit people for them. A trader, therefore, in order to get as many labourers as possible had to endear himself to the chiefs and headmen. It was, however, possible for the prospective labourers to leave the local recruiter and go and enter into contract with another agent in a far off location if that agent was in good terms with the headman or chief, or if he was trustworthy and

97. CMT 3/91, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.

considerate in his prices for advances. The most important labour agents who were traders in Engcobo were J.W. Clarke, who owned a shop at Qumanco, in Mgudlwa's country and a hotel in the village, both of which were labour recruiting centres, P. Coghlan at Cefane in Neti's location, O.C. Lang and H.C. Lang, company store, at Ngxogi, in Mhlontlo's location, W.W. Phillips at Mjanyana in Mgqunyana's location and J.M. Taylor at Ntibane Drift in Bilikana's location.⁹⁸

The private recruiters based in Engcobo village employed runners, often African or coloured men, who actually went from homestead to homestead persuading people to accept recruitment for labour markets. They also tempted them with advances. The runners received a commission for each worker that they channelled to an agent. It was not only the capitation fee, usually twenty to thirty shillings a worker but sometimes more, that led the traders to take to recruiting, but also the fact that the labourers would be forced to ask for advances in the form of cattle or groceries at inflated prices.⁹⁹

98. Xundu, 23/10/87.

99. Beinart, Political Economy, pp.56-57.
 . Xundu, 23/10/87.

(c) Migrant Labour System in Operation

As a result of the above factors people began to flock into the magistrate's offices to ask for passes that would allow them to go to the labour markets. But their way was made difficult by circular no.107B from the Secretary for Native Affairs that instructed all the magistrates, granting passes to Transkeian blacks, proceeding to the colony, to be careful to grant them permission to proceed only as far as the nearest seat of magistracy within the colony.¹⁰⁰

This made things difficult for the blacks who would spend a lot of time in such magistracies without being attended to, and some of them being sent back for technical errors in the pass, the difficulty being experienced in communicating with these foreign magistrates. They also could not negotiate for the best wages. These hardships tended to discourage these work seekers. They were not at all getting fair treatment from the magistrates hence the complaint by the labourers in Johannesburg in 1903, as reported by Langa. He reported,¹⁰¹

100. CMT 3/91, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.

101. CMT 3/91, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.

In my conversation with some of the labourers, I ascertained that the treatment now is worse than what it was before the country was under British rule and that they do not get satisfaction from the magistrates.

The pernicious system, whereby blacks were tempted into contracts by the inducement of an advance of cattle, representing sometimes as much as two-thirds or more of their whole contract wages was one of the evils of the system. The practice of making so large an advance was bad for the Africans and it led to endless abuses.¹⁰²

The system, by which the mines themselves took no responsibility for paying labourers more than ten shillings a month or so and the whole balance was paid by labour agencies, led to the creation of syndicates of labour agents. These syndicates of Labour agents purchased cattle to supply the workers with advances. This grew into a most lucrative business, for the syndicates bought cattle cheap and put them into contracts at exorbitant prices.¹⁰³ This in Qwathiland was not different from "Joyini Inkomo" as described by Beinart for the Mpondo.¹⁰⁴

102. Xundu, 23/10/87.

103. Ibid.

104. Beinart, Political Economy, p.56.

The cattle so advanced were a source of danger in the way of possible introduction of animal diseases into the Transkeian borders. Some of the unscrupulous cattle dealers would connive with the labour agents and deliberately sell them infected cattle cheaply to give over to the African as an advance.¹⁰⁵

The tragedy of the labourers lay in the fact that they loved cattle. They would accept a pre-arranged scheme if cattle were involved in the arrangements. The recruiters would therefore make recruitment attractive by offering cattle. Because of this love for cattle, it was difficult for them to realise that they were being exploited.¹⁰⁶

Another evil no better than the cattle advances was the credit system. Some of the prospective labourers did not take cattle advances but took groceries and clothes for the family, promising to pay either at the end of the contract or to pay in instalments whilst at work. In other cases if a customer had a big debt the trader would induce him to accept recruitment to enable him to

105. Xundu, 23/10/87.

106. Ibid.

recover the debt and would make arrangements for him.

M. Xundu says of these difficulties.¹⁰⁷

These were difficult times when one would pay endless instalments and the creditor would keep on adding what he called "interest" which was quite unintelligible to the Qwathi.

The Qwathi labourers were opposed to being recruited by the labour agents to certain labour markets. They preferred to make their own arrangements so that they could change unsuitable jobs for suitable ones. But if they left the territory under a previously arranged engagement it was not possible for them to break the contract or else they would be liable to some punishment. This is evident in a letter written by the Chief Magistrate to the Under Secretary for Native Affairs. He wrote¹⁰⁸

... and although the natives are willing to go to Johannesburg on their own account and make their own arrangements upon arrival there, they object to leave the territory under a previously arranged engagement, stating that in all cases where they have done so, on arrival at the mines, they are disposed as sheep, apparently for the benefit of the people who took them up.

107. Ibid.

108. N.A.113, Elliot to Under Secretary for Native Affairs, 27/3/90.

In reply to telegram no.273 of the 22nd December 1902, C.A. King stated¹⁰⁹

Large numbers go out to work and they are prepared to go on their account rather than through the medium of a labour agent.

This was also touched upon by Langa in his report as a member of the commission selected to investigate the complaints of the labourers. He reported¹¹⁰

... I learned that the natives have a strong objection to labour agents on the ground that they are forced to enter into contracts and that they do not receive the wages promised.

The Qwathi, in opting for their own arrangements, wanted only those jobs that paid high wages. They would not just go anywhere. For example they were aware that the mines and railways were paying high wages and farmers low wages. They argued that if they went on their own, they were at liberty to choose their own locality and make their own terms whereas there was no guarantee that the conditions and terms promised by the agent would be carried out. Hence C.A. King recommended that "the field be thrown open to all and that there should be no licensed agents."¹¹¹

109. CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 27/12/1902.

110. CMT 3/91, Langa's Report, 17/11/1903.

111. CMT 3/92, C.A. King to Elliot, 17/1/1903.

Only those Qwathi who wanted to work nearer home opted for work in the farms. In many instances the farmers employed the whole family and at the end of the month they would be given a sheep which was equivalent to five shillings. When they had accumulated many sheep they were induced to sell them back to the employer at two shillings and six pence. It was because of this that there was reluctance on the part of the Qwathi to look for jobs on the farms unless one wanted to work nearer home.¹¹²

A.H. Stanford in his report on Native labour in 1892 remarked.¹¹³

I have been unable to obtain any natives in this district [Engcobo] for service at a distance except to the railways and mines to which places they are tempted by the high rate of wages. As long as the natives can obtain high wages on the railway works and at the mining centres they will not be induced to accept service amongst the farmers at any great distance from their homes at the rate of wages farmers can offer.

At the beginning of the Twentieth Century some difficulties were experienced in regard to obtaining passes. Stern measures began to be adopted in the

112. Xundu, 23/10/87.

113. CMT 3/86, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 28/3/1892.
 . N.A.121, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 28/3/1892.

cities and other labour markets if a prospective labourer was found without a pass or not working. This was due to the number of blacks looking for work and their apparent competition with the "poor whites" in the labour markets especially in the semi- and unskilled jobs. This meant that many of the young men in 1903 and in 1904 had to remain at home for several months or even a year without getting a pass to allow him to go. This hardship was unbearable both to one who could not get a pass and the other who had managed to get it. What friends, who had passes did, was to send passes to their friends at home. But of those who had sent passes to friends, two men, Madopi and Blakfesi were arrested and each fined five pounds one shilling or one month imprisonment with hard labour.¹¹⁴

The following is a summary of passes issued in Engcobo between 1892 and 1901.

DATE	NO OF PASSES	DESTINATION
1892	879	Transvaal Gold fields
1892	349	Diamond fields
1892	338	Railway works
1892	2 078	Amongst Farmers
1892	<u>42</u>	To other Labour Markets
TOTAL	<u>3 676</u>	
1893	48	Railways & Works
1893	1 281	Gold fields

114. CMT 3/93, King to Elliot, 21/7/1903.

1893	177	Road works
1893	2 175	Farming
1893	207	General Service
TOTAL	<u>3 888</u>	
1894	68	Kimberly
1894	2 647	Johannesburg
1894	2 554	Cape Town
TOTAL	<u>5 269</u>	
1896	1 109	Cape Colony
1896	29	Kimberly
1896	485	Railways
1896	52	Orange Free State
1896	4 230	Transvaal
TOTAL	<u>5 905</u>	
1898	4 111	Cape Colony
1898	114	Kimberly
1898	3 283	Johannesburg
1898	15	Bechuanaland
1898	7	Rhodesia
TOTAL	<u>7 530</u>	
1899	60	Orange Free State
1899	1 610	Transvaal
1899	6	Kimberly
1899	3 026	Cape Colony
TOTAL	<u>4 702</u>	
1900	0	Transvaal
1900	0	Orange Free State
1900	0	Natal
1900	4 742	Cape Colony
TOTAL	<u>4 742</u>	
1901	3 394	Cape Colony
1901	162	Orange Free State
1901	2 000	Military
TOTAL	<u>5 556</u>	

From the statistics given above it is clear that a large number of labourers from Engcobo served as labourers in the Cape Colony. This was not because the Cape was paying higher wages but because the people wanted to work nearer home in the neighbouring farms of

Barkly East, Aliwal North, Queenstown, Tarkastad, Dordrecht, Albert, Wodehouse and Elliot. In some cases the number of passes issued was increased by the members of the family joining the breadwinner in that particular farm. With the farms both men and women were employed hence the number that went to the Cape Colony was higher. The high enrollment in Cape Farms could also be attributed to the difficulties with the magistrates and labour agents discussed above. The second place with higher numbers was Johannesburg. This was because of higher wages offered.

It will be noticed that in 1900 none went to the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal, because of the state of war which existed between the British and the Boers. This meant that the only way open was the Cape Colony. The schedule for 1901 shows a large number of people from Engcobo in the military. This was so because high wages were being offered. Hence after the war the Qwathi were reluctant to go in search of work outside because they knew they would get low wages as compared to the wages paid in the military. But the scarcity of food towards the end of 1902 drove the Qwathi into the labour markets.¹¹⁵

115. N.A.130, A.H. Stanfrod to Elliot, 31/12/92.
 . N.A.145, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 3/1/94.
 . CMT 3/87, C.J. Warner to Elliot, 8/12/94.

Another difficulty experienced by the labourers was the distance to the train terminus. For the Qwathi the nearest was at Indwe. They had to plod along, sore-footed, carrying their bundles on a blazing hot day, both to and from. C.A. King, the magistrate remarked.¹¹⁶

What a blessing then would a railway be to the native labourer and the country also.

They also complained against labour agents for promising them high wages which were not offered at the labour markets and their apparent connivance with the employers. They also complained of the ill-treatment from the Sotho and Tshangana Police in the labour markets of the interior.

The labourers also complained of the unsympathetic attitude of their employers who forced them to work even when they were ill and were not given proper care and treatment. Their friends were not even allowed to

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- . CMT 3/89, Warner to Elliot, 4/1/97.
 - . CMT 3/90, Warner to Elliot, 20/1/99.
 - . CMT 3/90, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 1/9/99.
 - . CMT 3/91, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 17/1/1900.
 - . CMT 3/91, G. Leary to Elliot, 13/12/1900.
 - . CMT 3/92, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 22/1/1902.
 - . CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 19/1/1903.

116. CMT 3/93, C.A. King to Elliot, 21/7/1903.

take those ill to their homes. Consequently quite a number of them died at the Rand for want of proper care and treatment.¹¹⁷

The following are just a few examples of the Qwathi who fell ill in the Rand and did not get proper care: Ntuluba who was working at the Langlaagte Deep was reported ill on the 18th of March 1909; Hokwana who was working for G.M. Company Aurorer West in Maraisburg was also reported ill on the 6th of April 1909; Josiah Ngcwayi, son of headman Ntozini of Gqutyini had his leg broken at Kimberly mines and had to be amputated; Sixenxe was injured by a fall of stone at Luipards Vlei mine on the 15th May 1909. The relatives of these wanted them to be released at once in order to receive better treatment. Some of these were not even compensated. This is evident from the letter of Norton, the Resident Magistrate to the unnamed "Protector of Natives" in Kimberly in connection with the position of Josiah Ngcwayi. He wrote¹¹⁸

Ntozini has been here today in connection with the matter and requests me to ascertain the intentions of the Company in whose service Josiah was injured, with respect to compensation.

117. CMT 3/93, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.

118. 1/ECO 5/1/1/26-27, Norton to Protector of Natives, 15/2/1909 and 15/5/1909.

The migrant labourers often became carriers of certain diseases such as tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. These were also linked intimately with labour. The labourer who had contracted tuberculosis in the labour markets, on his return home owing to the mode of life of the Africans according to which five or more persons would sleep head to head in a hut with little or no ventilation would spread it. When he went back to the Rand where they slept in compounds arranged on the ship's bunk principle, tier over tier in closest contact and of course their companions were liable to infection.¹¹⁹

Several problems arose as a result of death to labourers in the labour markets. One of the most important related to the question of deceased estates. The first problem was to trace the deceased's home. This was so because of the scarcity of information in regard to the particulars of the deceased. To solve this, C.E. Warner, the acting magistrate, suggested to the Native Commissioner that when taking particulars of the labourers, the employers should take the name of the headman not the name of the chief. With regard to

119. PR 14603, A.W. Burton Notebooks Volume 1-7: "British Kaffaria, Keiskama and Transkei", in A.W. Burton Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University.

residence such descriptions as Mbashe, Xuka, Mgwali, Qumanco were not sufficient as a number of headmen were located along these rivers. They should take the name of the ward.¹²⁰

The second problem was that of inheritance. The Africans were not making wills and this resulted in problems at death. Employers did not know to whom to send the money due to the deceased. At times there was a problem of locating the next of kin who sometimes was reported to have died or to have gone to work and his address unknown.¹²¹ The use of nicknames also cause some problems. It would become difficult to trace him. Also wrong spelling and use of assumed names to avoid using the real name for fear of not receiving a pass due to his not having paid taxes such as required by the magistrate, created problems.¹²²

Some blacks also complained that they were ill-treated by the "Poor whites" against whom they competed in the labour markets. These "Poor whites" hated the blacks who were proving to be their rivals in labour markets. The reason for this is that mine owners preferred to

120. 1/ECO 5/1/1/25, C.E. Warner to Elliot, 20/7/1907.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

employ a black man to a white in unskilled labour since, because of the low standard of living, the blacks were prepared to accept the low wages offered.¹²³

Graded pay was also a source of complaint for the labourers. At times contracts provided for payment by the number of inches drilled in a day and the ordinary minimum amount insisted upon was thirty six inches per working day for which the labour was paid two shillings - little enough in terms of the work involved. In some contracts there was a very unfair provision whereby if a labourer did not perform the minimum he got nothing at all. Even if he had drilled 35,99 inches there was no pro-rata wage at all. This arrangement seemed to be a most unjust one.¹²⁴

Another evil of the migratory labour system was that it led to some labourers remaining in the labour markets until death or until forced by his relatives and "home boys" to go home. One reason for this was that when this labourer from the rural areas got to the cities he found the way of life so attractive and easy that he felt it wise to remain there and enjoy himself without

123. CMT 3/93, Langa's Report, 7/11/1903.

124. H. Burton, "Glimpses".

even sending money home. This happiness and reluctance was sometimes caused by a labourer being attracted to one of the women living in the slums around the cities who would use up his money and would not allow him to go home.¹²⁵

Another reason for this reluctance to go home was fear of witchcraft at home. Many believed that they were being bewitched, and to remain in the labour markets was a safe way of escaping this. The demands of the magistrates and headmen at times so frustrated these labourers that they thought it best to remain in the labour markets. Thus they were escaping direct colonial control. Amongst the Qwathi there were a number of cases of the labourers who remained in the labour markets without ever thinking about going home and sending money. According to D.B. Mxutu, the first Qwathi to remain in the labour market until death was Mabunzi, Mncancashe's son.¹²⁶

The rise of the Qwathi peasantry during the second half of the Nineteenth Century transformed the Qwathi economy from subsistence farming to peasant farming. The wooden hoes and stone implements were gradually

125. Xundu, 23/10/87.

126. Mxutu, 13/6/87.

replaced by ploughs which led to scientific farming with prospects of surplus production. This surplus produce was now used for the purpose of profit as it was sold to the traders and markets. As a result of this, trade in Qwathiland developed. Surplus produce, skins and hides from domestic animals were now used as means of exchange for foreign goods. The hides and karols were replaced by blankets and clothes. But this peasant phase did not last long.

Artificial and natural disasters began to set in, thus contributing to the decline of Qwathi peasantry. These setbacks were responsible for the notorious and less attractive system known as migratory labour which contributed to further deterioration of the Qwathi both economically and physically. This made the Qwathi to slip from a position of an independent farmer to a position of a servant in the South African labour markets where he suffered the pangs of exploitation and disease.

CHAPTER 8CONCLUSION

The origin of the Qwathi has been traced to EmaXesibeni. Their arrival in Thembuland was most welcomed by the Thembu kings from Mnguti to Dlomo. Whilst maintaining their separate identity and autonomy they agreed to give to the Thembu kings one hundred head of cattle as thanks for allowing them to settle in Thembuland. This was a voluntary gesture of friendship which was not obligatory.¹ But as time went on this became more obligatory than voluntary which led the Qwathi under Fubu to resent it. The only way to be rid of this obligation was by provoking war against the Thembu. This worked well despite their defeat.² From then, on, they remained autonomous until the second enemy came. This second enemy, which the Qwathi faced, was the colonial government.³

The colonial administration asserted control because

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1. Mxutu, 13/6/87.
 2. Sihele, "Ngoobani abaThembu".
 3. Xundu, 16/7/87.

they wanted to destroy the customs of the Qwathi which they regarded as repugnant to more humane standards.⁴

This was resisted by the Qwathi from 1875 to 1880. During this five year period, the Qwathi resisted and challenged the colonial plans to destroy their traditional way of life replacing it by western civilisation. Amongst other things, the Qwathi challenged the attempts by the magistrate to "usurp" the judicial authority of the chief, the introduction of western ways of administration such as census taking, hut tax and spoor system.⁵

The assertion of colonial control over Qwathiland was due to Ngangelizwe's blunders and his subsequent loyalty to the government. It was not possible to leave Qwathiland as an independent island.⁶ Dala-sile's passive resistance to this control culminated in his rebellion of 1880 to 1881. So determined and motivated were the Qwathi and their allies in this rebellion that they won victory after victory. Had they had enough of modern weapons the war scales could

4. G4-83, Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/82, pp.163-168.

5. CMT 1/27, W.E. Stanford to Elliot, 27/8/79.

6. Master, "Resistance", p.5.

have been tipped in their favour. But due to lack of modern war equipment and starvation which resulted from their cattle having been captured and their gardens reaped, they lost.⁷

Despite the existence of loyals, the administrators were unable to break the traditional way of life of the Qwathi. No amount of magisterial influence prevented the Qwathi rebellion and even the involvement in it by those who professed loyalty such as Mangele, Sitonga and Sandile. Discussing what punishment was to be given to Dalasile, Stanford, the magistrate admitted⁸

I see nothing wrong in his joining the insurrectionary chiefs as he was from the onset opposed to colonial control.

The African uprisings between 1877 to 1880 scared the colonial government. But withdrawal was impossible since it would mean abandoning the Europeans and the "advancing native class". It would also mean the loss of Thembuland as the centre point between the Kei river and Natal, whence influence and control could be asserted over the rest of the communities. Chief

7. BC 293; A5, Stanford's Notes, 17/12/81-19/12/81.

8. Macquire, Reminiscences, p.185.

magistrate Elliot having experienced the Qwathi-Thembu resistance to alien control with armed force and by a rational expression of their grievances encouraged ventilation of grievances at public meetings so that the need to find expression with armed force would be minimised.⁹

The Qwathi having surrendered, part of their land above the Gulandoda ranges was confiscated and was given to white squatters from the colony despite suggestions by Stanford, who was unsympathetic to the squatters, that it should be given to the loyal Mfengu. This led to a shortage of land and overcrowding in the wards which led to many land disputes in Qwathiland.¹⁰

The ward system and headmanship helped to bring about a measure of control after the rebellion although some popular rural protests could be observed, such as Qwathi refusing to destroy thistle thorn and burweed in order to get the headmen in trouble.¹¹

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9. G2-85, Elliot's Report, 31/12/1884.
 10. CMT 3/90, C.J. Warner, 17/1/99.
 11. CMT 3/88, Warner to Elliot, 9/4/97.

In as far as social conditions were concerned there is no convincing evidence of the success of missionary endeavours in Qwathiland. Besides enumerating the number of schools established there seems to be no discernible influence of the missionaries on the Qwathi towards social change especially the acceptance of Christianity. Even today the Qwathi could not be said to be a Christian nation. Health services were also lacking. Continued absence of a medical doctor made it impossible for the Qwathi to abandon their belief in traditional healing by the use of herbs. A.H. Stanford confirmed this in his Annual Report of 1892.¹²

Very few cases of contagious diseases had been reported, where they occur are usually treated successfully by native doctors.

The Qwathi economy was promising at the beginning of the nineteenth Century. But during the last thirty years of the Century it was marred by both natural and man made setbacks as discussed in Chapter Seven. These setbacks resulted in the fall of the Qwathi peasantry. The fall of the Qwathi peasantry changed the self-sufficient rural areas into labour reservoirs from which the colonial farmers of the Cape, railways and mines drew labourers. The Qwathi peasant

12. N.A.130, A.H. Stanford to Elliot, 31/12/92.

farmers, all of a sudden, found themselves the "men of the two worlds". This contributed to their moral and physical degeneration.

APPENDIX IA: LIST OF PRINCIPAL INFORMANTS

It was in conversation with the following men that my own ideas on Qwathi political organisation were developed and clarified. Birth dates were given although in some cases not in full.

1. DAWETHI MAZWEMBE (b. 1-1-1910) (clan: Sidindi) acquired his knowledge of some of the amabali from Mxutu's father with whom he had an opportunity to live. He is resident in the heart of Qwathiland at Tshapile's location in Gqobonco. He is also a member of the Nkondlo Tribal Authority council.

2. DINGILE B. MXUTU (b. 18-1-1912) (Sidindi clan) is the son of Boma Mxutu whose father was Mtshangala, headman of Tsalabo + 1910. His father died in 1936 by which time D.B. Mxutu was 24 years fully grown up to be able to acquire full information about the past of his people. His inquisitive attitude was sharpened by his having trained as a teacher (L.P.) and subsequent matriculation by correspondence. He is a retired Post Office clerk. He is locally considered as the greatest oral authority. Mrs Joan Broster, the author of The Red Blanket Valley ack-

nowledges Mxutu as a local historian without whose assistance her work could not have been successful.

See p.193 of The Red Blanket Valley.

3. TARUNI SOMDAKA (b.1911) (clan: Dikela), in his early manhood, has been active in the Tribal authority work. He acquired knowledge of amabali from his Grandmother (paternal) and from his mother. As his home is near the road it was the resting place for the travellers especially chiefs from whom he also acquired the knowledge about the history of the various Transkeian chiefdoms. In about 1978 he was offered the headship of the Gqutyini Tribal authority but due to his age he declined the offer and recommended K. Gwarubana, also a Dikela, who accepted it. He is no longer active in the Tribal authority affairs even locally because "there is no truth there".

4. REVEREND A.M. TITUS (b. 22/9/1895) (clan: Dikela) trained first as a teacher and later as minister of religion for the Anglican church. He is the son of Klaas Titus who was closely associated with the St Marks Mission under Arch Deacon Waters, and subsequently came to All Saints as a catechist and a shoemaker in the Training school opened at All Saints.

A.M. Titus acquired most of his knowledge about the spread of christianity and education in Qwathiland from him and his experience as a teacher and a minister of religion in Qwathiland.

5. CRONJE MLAHLENI XUNDU (b. July 1902) (clan: Khombela of the house of Mxhiya) was born in Manzana location in Qwathiland. His father, as a councillor, inspired in him love for the history of his people. Although not educated, like Mxutu, he could be counted as one of the greatest authorities in Qwathi and Thembu history. In 1910 he was sent to Qumanco to stay in the homestead of Falo Mgudlwa, the righthand brother of Langa Mgudlwa the great son of Mgudlwa who died during the Rebellion of 1880-1881. He got most of his knowledge about the history of the Qwathi and the Thembu from the stories he heard whilst at Qumanco. When he came back he frequented the Tribal authority meetings whence later knowledge was acquired. He is the consultant in Qwathi history and still plays an important role in Tribal authority affairs as a prosecutor in the Luhewini Tribal Authority court.

APPENDIX IB: LIST OF BASIC AMABALI

Every well informed Qwathi knows something about the following amabali because they are common. This means that they have an idea about the past of their people.

1. The arrival of the Qwathi in Thembuland.
2. Ntswayibana's lack of interest in traditional cases which led to his losing chieftainship.
3. Conflict between Noni and Mphosiwe Sebeni.
4. Qwathi - Rharhabe war.
5. Qwathi - Bhaca war.
6. Qwathi - Mpondomise war (Matiwane).
7. Qwathi Rebellion.

APPENDIX IC: TWO SAMPLE TRADITIONS1. ORIGIN OF THE QWATHI: INTERVIEW WITH D.B. MXUTU,
ALL SAINTS MISSION, ENGCOBO DISTRICT, 13 JUNE 1987

The amaQwathi are the Xesibe. They originated from Xesibeland in the present district of Mt Ayliff. They are the descendants of Njanye whose great house sons were Mpondo and Mpondomise. The son of iQadi house was Xesibe whose son was Ntozabantu. Ntozabantu's son was Ndzuza and Ndzuza's son was Miyana. From Miyana came Bimbi and Nondzaba. From iQadi house of Nondzaba came Hlabe whose son was Mthetho. It was from this house that the Qwathi originated, through Mthetho's son Mtshutshumbe.

"Qwathi" is the name of the ox which was given to Mtshutshumbe after initiation school. As it was customary in those days, he called himself by the name of this ox. Mtshutshumbe broke away from his father with the intention of removing to Gcalekaland despite his father's opposition. He took with him his ox and his followers. They left Mzintlava and moved into the direction of Mthatha Mouth and they came to rest at Nomadolo in the present district of Ngqeleni along the coast. When asked to which chiefdom they

belonged they replied that they belonged to the Qwathi chiefdom naming themselves after Mtshutshumbe's ox. It is for this reason that the praise-singer used to say in praise of the Qwathi

Iinkomo zika Mtshutshumbe ogqaz'indlel'ebhek'ebuNguni. (Cattle of Mtshutshumbe who led the way to Nguniland).

From Nomadolo they moved into the direction of Mqanduli with the intention of crossing through Bomvanaland to Gcalekaland. They must have been prevented from doing so by wars and they changed their direction. They now moved along the Mthatha river and crossed Baziya mountains to Mgudu. From Mgudu they descended the Tshebengwana Valley up to Ndlunkulu and crossed Mbashe river and camped on a hill overlooking Clarkebury. This hill is known as Noni, named after Noni the right hand son of Nkovane.

They sent a word to Mnguti the king of the Thembu at the time to report their presence and to ask permission to occupy the area. The king was reluctant to allow them to occupy the area because of fear of the San raids and dangerous wild animals. But the Qwathi, impressed by the beauty of the land with beautiful valleys and forests told the chief that they could not leave that beautiful land to people

like the San who live in the caves and that wild animals were no source of fear to them but were source of meat. The king, thereupon, asked chief Sebeni who was living at Sigubudwini between Baziya and Tabase to go and live with the Qwathi, hence there are many Thembu of Ngxongo clan in Qwathiland. That is how the Qwathi came to occupy the land between Mbashe river in the east and Qumanco river in the west but later in about 1860 the Qumanco valley was given to Mgudlwa by Dalasile.

2. CHIEFLY TRADITION: INTERVIEW WITH T. SOMDAKA,
SILU LOCATION ENGCOCO 13/6/87.

Mtshutshumbe's son was Mndwane whose son was Ncobe. Ncobe's son was Nkovane. Nkovane's sons were Ntswayibana from the Great House, Noni from the Right hand house after whom the hill overlooking Clarkebury as named and Mfusi from a minor house (note that right hand house was not in existence then, the informant has been influenced by later events).

As the great son, of Ntswayibana was supposed to become the chief of the Qwathi after his father but he lost chieftainship to Noni. Tradition says that when cases were brought before Ntswayibana he would refer

them to Noni saying "Thetha mninawa, mna ndisaya endimeni" (Attend to them my younger brother I am still attending to the gardens). For this reason this house of Ntswayibana whose son was Dikela is called amaNdima. He never presided over a single case. It was always Noni who did so on his behalf. Even when Noni had established himself in his homestead, he referred those who brought cases to him back to Ntswayibana who in reply said "wathethe mninawa, usengowam nalowo mzi". (Preside over them my younger brother, your homestead is still mine).

In this way Noni got experience in the responsibilities of a chief and many people looked upon him as the real chief.

The second reason for the reins of the government passing over to Noni was the failure of Ntswayibana to come to the assistane of Noni against Mphosiwe Sebeni, the grand son of Mnguti whose son had married Noni's daughter. All arrangements having been made, Noni instructed the bridal party leader not to give any gifts or presents should the bride price fall short. When indeed the bride price fell short the bridal party refused to give gifts and as a result Mphosiwe

insulted Noni. The insult was a mocking allusion to Noni's squint.

When Noni received this news he sent to Ntswayibana his brother, but Ntswayibana replied that it not he who had been insulted but Noni. Noni mobilised his forces without the assistance of his brother. In the meantime he informed the Thembu king (He calls him Mnguti) who allowed him to do as he liked about redressing his grievance. One hundred head of cattle were sent to the king to thank him for not having interfered and the rest filled Noni's kraals and those of his sons. Ntswayibana protested and demanded that the booty be brought to him as the chief of the Qwathi but Noni replied it not he (Ntswayibana) but him (Noni) who had been insulted. Ntswayibana made no attempts to assert himself as the chief of the Qwathi. Many of his councillors began to look upon Noni as their chief hoping to benefit from their support of him.

Up to now it is still in the hands of Noni's descendants. Noni's great house son was Mtshaba, Mtshaba's son was Lutshaba but Lutshaba did not have a male issue in the great house. Fubu the right hand son was transferred to the great house. His great son

was Dalasile and Dalasile's son was Langa. Langa's great son was Mlilo and Mlilo's was Sakhela. Sakhela's son was Mzikayise. Zanengqele Dalasile is now regent for Mzikayise's son who is now pursuing his studies at the University of Transkei.

Hala

1. Clarkebury
2. Mhlophekazi
3. Didi
4. Nkwenkwana
5. Mbanga
6. Quluqu
7. Mjanyana
8. Tora
9. Mqonci
10. Ngqutura
11. Caba
12. Nxamagele
13. Cwecweni
14. Xonye
15. Debera
16. Mgwali
17. Egoso
18. Ngqaba

Qwathi cont.


61. Zabasa
62. Sinqumeni
63. Sitoleni
64. Upper Gqaka

MAP OF ENGCOBO DISTRICTJumba

19. Beyele
20. Qumanco
21. Elucwecwe
22. Lahlangubo
23. Gubenxa
24. Nkwenkwana

Qwathi

25. Mtuntloni
26. Gqutyini
27. Zadungeni
28. Mkanzi
29. Esikobeni
30. Manzana
31. Qutubeni
32. Kanye
33. Qebe
34. Tsalaba
35. All Saints
36. Xuka Drift
37. Eluhewini
38. Ngqokoto
40. Ngcacu
41. Maqanda
42. Xuka
43. Cefane
44. Engxogi
45. Caca
46. Msintsana
47. Madotyeni
48. Sentube
49. Lower Sitoleni
50. Upper Gqobonco
51. Lower Gqaka
52. Gqobonco Junction
53. Gqobonco
54. Nkondlo
55. Ntibane
56. Lower Bashee
- 56A. Bashee
57. Lower Mnyolo
58. Mnyolo
59. Mkonkoto
60. Mgudu



APPENDIX III: QWATHI PROPOSALS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF
BRITISH CONTROL

The following were the proposals drafted by Reverend John Gordon on behalf of the Qwathi.

1. Dalasile wishes it to be understood that he is not taken over by Government on account of misconducting himself and trusts that his good behaviour will be taken into consideration.
2. Dalasile hopes the Government will consent to grant a separate magistrate for his tribe.
3. Dalasile hopes the government will allow his tribe the country they have hitherto occupied without being mixed with other tribes.
4. Dalasile hopes that the hut tax will not come into force in his tribe for two years.
5. Dalasile hopes that the government will make him an allowance of not less than one hundred pounds per annum.

6. Dalasile hopes that the government will be pleased to make an annual allowance to his son and heir, Langa, and his brother Danti and to the five of the following leading men in Qwathi political affairs, namely, Singama, Sitonga, Sandile, Mangele and Matyobeni.

7. Dalasile hopes the government will confirm the grants of land made in his country (four in number) for the church of England missions.

8. Dalasile also begs that the government will strenuously prohibit the sale of brandy in his country.

APPENDIX IV: DUTIES OF HEADMEN

1. To distribute gardens
2. To settle small land disputes.
3. To arbitrate in civil cases arising in their wards.
4. To help in the collection of hut tax.
5. To suppress rioting and thieving.
6. To recover stolen property.
7. To report irregularities.
8. To maintain order in his ward.
9. To exercise general supervision over his ward and be at all times ready to assist the magistrate and carry out instructions.
10. To help in the birth and death registration.

11. To be the mouth piece of the government through whom the magistrate would disseminate information - to act as an unbroken link between the government and the people of the ward.

12. They were also required to attend at the office to assist in the hearing of more important cases and in civil cases to assist as assessors only when there was no attorney as it would be hard for them to understand what was meant by "objection", "point of procedure", "point of correction" and so on.

Footnote:- G3-84, W.E. Stanford to Elliot, p.76.

N.A.95, Elliot to Secretary for Native Affairs, 17/6/84.

J. Rose-Innes (USNA) to Resident

Magistrates: Circular No.1 of 1890

18/4/1890.

APPENDIX V: CHIEFS AND SUBSIDY

NAME OF A CHIEF	SUBSIDY	NUMBER OF	
		ARMED MEN	REMARK
Dalasile (Head Chief)	100	880	Not drawn
Danti (brother of Dalasile)	25	100	Not drawn
Langa (son of Dalasile)	20	-	Not drawn
Matyobeni (Senior Councillor)	12	-	Not drawn
Sitonga (sub-chief)	12	330	Not drawn
Sandile (sub-chief)	12	300	Not drawn
Singama (sub-chief)	12	390	Not drawn
Mangele (sub-chief)	12	130	Not drawn
Ntwangu (sub-chief)	-	280	No subsidy
Venu (sub-chief)	-	375	No subsidy
Ntabankulu (sub-chief)	-	160	No subsidy
Sigidi Fubu (sub-chief)	-	35	No subsidy
Vananda (sub-chief)	-	45	No subsidy
Yekiso (sub-chief)	-	100	No subsidy
Ngcengane (sub-chief)	-	40	No subsidy
Sigidi Ndlela (sub-chief)	-	80	No subsidy
Mzolisa (sub chief)	-	50	No subsidy
Ndyande (sub-chief)	-	15	No subsidy
Mendela (Mfengu)	-	75	No subsidy
Mcobololo (Mfengu)	-	50	No subsidy

APPENDIX VI: LIST OF HEADMEN IN QWATHILAND AS IN JUNE 1910

NO	NAME	TRIBE	LOCATION	NO	TRIBE OF PEOPLE
1	Bilikana (Headman)	Qwathi	Bashee	56	Qwathi
2	Dolophini (Headman)	Thembu	Sinqumeni	64	Gcina & Qwathi
3	Sigidi Fubu "	Qwathi	Ngcacu	41	Qwathi
4	Gemani Rasmeni	Thembu	Gqobonco	48	Qwathi
5	Gwadiso	Qwathi	Bashee	59	Qwathi
6	Hlakula	Thembu	Qutubeni	33	Qwathi, Thembu & Mfengu
7	Langa (Chief)	Qwathi	Nkondlo	55	Qwathi
8	Lumkwana (Headman)	Qwathi	Mnyolo	61	Qwathi
9	Magugwana	Mfengu	Sikhobeni	30	Mfengu
10	Matumbu	Qwathi	Gqobonco	58	Qwathi
11	Gwama	Mfengu	Cefane	44	Mfengu
12	Mgunundu	Qwathi	Sitoleni	65	Thembu & Qwathi
13	Miti	Mpondomise	Bashee	57	Qwathi & Mpondomise
14	Mkhohliwe	Qwathi	Mgudu	62	Qwathi
15	Mkutwana	Qwathi	Gqaga	66	Qwathi
16	Mqotyana	Qwathi	Gqaga	52	Qwathi
17	Mtshangala	Qwathi	Tsalabo	35	Qwathi
18	Mzolisa	Qwathi	Zabasa	63	Qwathi
19	Sigidi Ndlela	Thembu	Sentubi	49	Qwathi
20	Ngxukumashe & Manxiwa	Qwathi	Qebe	34	Qwathi
21	Njikiza	Qwathi	Luhewini	40	Qwathi
22	Nobatana	Baca	Mkanzi	29	Mfengu

NO	NAME	TRIBE	LOCATION	NO	TRIBE OF PEOPLE
23	Nonyusa	Qwathi	Gqobonco	54	Qwathi
24	Nqwiliso	Qwathi	Qutubeni	32	Qwathi
25	Nqwenani	Qwathi	Luhewini	38	Qwathi & Gcina
26	Ntaka	Qwathi	Ngxogi	45	Qwathi
27	Ntantiso	Thembu	Zadungeni	28	Qwathi & Thembu
28	Ntengo	Qwathi	Maqanda	92	Maqanda
29	Mntonintshi	Thembu	Sitobeni	50	Qwathi
30	Ntozini	Mfengu	Gqutyini	26	Mfengu
31	Poswayo T.	Mfengu	All Saints	36	Qwathi & Mfengu
32	Raleigh or Lali	Ngqika	Mntuntloni	25	Qwathi, Thembu & Mfengu
33	Sikundla	Qwathi	Caca	47	Qwathi
34	Silo	Thembu	Xuka	37	Qwathi
35	Sipango	Qwathi	Caca	46	Qwathi
36	Sitelo	Qwathi	Xuka	43	Qwathi
37	Sitoza	Qwathi	Bashee	51	Qwathi
38	Sondlo	Thembu	Gqutyini	27	Thembu & Mfengu
39	Tayiboso	Qwathi	Mnyolo	60	Qwathi
40	Vetu	Mpondomise	Manzana	31	Qwathi, Thembu, Mfengu & Mpondomise
41	Vetyu	Qwathi	Xuka	39	Qwathi
42	Yawa	Thembu	Gqobonco	53	Qwathi

A.G. MCLOUGHLIN

Confirmed by T. Somdaka of Silo's ward, Xuka Engcobo.

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