

**A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE *DAILY NATION* AND THE
STANDARD's NEWS COVERAGE OF THE 2007/2008 KENYAN ELECTIONS**

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the *Daily Nation* and *Standard*'s news coverage of Kenya's 2007/2008 general election and the unprecedented eruptions of violence which followed. This research responds to the question which came about as Kenyan print journalists and editors considered their role in possibly contributing to the violence, which took on an ethnic dimension. Vernacular radio has been fingered for having escalated longstanding ethnic tensions, but the role of the press has not been fully understood. In the aftermath of the violence, print journalists and editors met over a series of Round Table events in Nairobi to consider whether their conduct during the election could have encouraged violence. Although ten years have passed since this incidence, much of what happened within the Kenyan print media during and after the 2007/2008 general election remains unexplored and, largely, unexplained today.

Although the pre- and post-election phases spanned months, my research is confined to purposive samples from a four-week period from 3 December 2007 to 4 January 2008. These four weeks were selected as they are roughly representative of the three phases of the national election which are considered significant to this study, namely the pre-election phase, the election, and the post-election violence. The research is concerned with analysing and understanding the coverage in the two dailies, the *Daily Nation* and *Standard*, and comparing the discursive work of the two, particularly in relation to identity and ethnicity. This study draws on cultural studies, critical discourse analysis and normative theories of the media to inform the research project. The critical discourse analysis explores the discourses articulated during and after the election, with a particular focus on issues of identity, ethnicity and incitement. Through this process the study found that both publications avoided references to ethnicity, despite this being an important factor in Kenyan politics and voter behaviour. In analysing these issues the study found that while the publications might claim to attempt to avoid fuelling tensions by not reporting on ethnicity, the disavowal comprised a silence which positioned the press in a collaborative role, in which it colluded with a powerful Kenyan state. Although a significant amount of time has gone by since the 2007/2008 elections, this study still

considers the event significant in understanding the conduct of journalists during times of violence, and specifically for the future of journalism in Kenya.

DECLARATION

I, Sarah-Jane Bradfield, hereby declare that this research thesis is my own original work, that all reference sources have been accurately reported and acknowledged, and that this document has not previously, in its entirety or in part, been submitted to any University in order to obtain an academic qualification.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

1.1. Introduction

The Kenyan general elections of December 2007/2008 culminated in widespread eruptions of unprecedented violence which claimed the lives of 1300 people and displaced 600 000 others (Somerville 2011; Kagwanja and Southall 2009; Gibson and Long 2009). The news media, and vernacular radio in particular, were accused of having added fuel to the fire and exacerbating longstanding tensions by broadcasting inflammatory material, using hate speech, and stirring up fear and suspicion between ethnic groups (Somerville 2011). This research is concerned with the role of the press at this time, in particular its portrayal of the violence in the pre- and post-election phases.

The violence, which erupted in response to delays on the release of the presidential results, and later as a response to the disputed results, took on an ethnic dimension between the Luo and Kalenjin supporters of Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) leader Raila Odinga, and the Kikuyu supporters of Party of National Unity (PNU) Mwai Kibaki. Comparisons were made to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as the ensuing political and humanitarian catastrophe engulfed the country. Kenyan politicians accused one another of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Neighbouring countries Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern DRC, Congo, South Sudan, Somalia and Uganda faced economic paralysis as a result of their heavy economic reliance on Kenya, which had previously been known as an “island of peace” amongst its politically unstable neighbours (Abdi 2008).

In May 2010 I was invited to travel to Nairobi, Kenya, as part of a team from Rhodes University which was running a Conflict Sensitive Journalism workshop for journalists from Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. Here, Kenyan journalists were encouraged to explore their coverage of the conflict. At the time of the workshop, much had been written about the possible role the press played in fuelling existing tensions, and allegations of incitement had been made against broadcast media and online technologies in particular, who were accused of having “added fuel to the fire” through the use of hate speech and inflammatory broadcasting (Goldstein and Rotich 2008; Ismail and Deane 2008; Abdi 2008; Somerville 2011). The media were criticised by outsiders and by the

media themselves, who questioned their conduct during and after the election (Howard 2008).

Given this background, I was interested to hear the reflections of the Kenyan journalists, and specifically those working in print media, as the role of print media has yet to be fully understood (Somerville 2011; Gutierrez-Romero 2014; Wachanga 2011). Many journalists expressed regret at how they had reported on the violence, suggesting that perhaps they could have done more to promote peace (Somerville 2011). This reflection echoed much of the public and personal scrutiny that erupted across Kenya and beyond in considering the possible role that the news media, and press in particular, might have played in fuelling existing tensions (Somerville 2011). I was interested in the process of journalists questioning their reporting, especially given the possibility that their work contributed to escalating tensions. This event has been the catalyst for my interest in the relationship between news media and violence and peace journalism more generally.

1.2. Ethnicity

Kenyan politics has long been marred by ethnic tensions, with some scholars going so far as to suggest that ethnicity is a central feature of Kenyan politics, comprised of ethnic “coalitions of convenience and commitment” (Elischer 2008). With 42 ethnic groups comprising a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society, Kenya has a powerful legacy of ethnicity that consists of a confusion of ethnic, racial and political identities.

The proliferation of ethnic conflicts and tensions is so widespread that there is hardly an area in Kenya that has not been affected (Nyukuri 1997). Between them, Kibaki (PNU) and Odinga (ODM) had the backing of three of Kenya’s largest ethnic communities: Kibaki had the support of the Kikuyu (6.62 million or 21 percent of total population), and Odinga the Luo (4.04 million or 12 percent) and Kalenjin (4.96 million or 12 percent) (Elischer 2008). Each of the three former Kenyan presidents, Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki ascended to power through a strong coalition of two or more of the “political tribes” comprising the Kikuyu, Luyha, Luo and Kalenjin (Kagwanja and Southall 2013).

1.3. Land

Scholars (Rutten and Owuor 2009; Kamungi 2009) have argued that the land issue constitutes the major structural factor underlying ethnically driven electoral and political violence in Kenya. It has been described as a “highly charged issue that has shaken the foundations of the post-colonial ‘nation-building’ project” (Kagwanja and Southall 2009: 268-269). In essence, Kenyans were dispossessed of their land on the arrival of the settlers, who consolidated some of the most fertile areas into the White Highlands and restricted the mass of dispossessed African population to tribally defined areas (Kagwanja and Southall 2009; Nyukuri 1997). Kanyinga *et al* argues that land-related conflicts in Kenya have their roots in colonialism, which imposed alien land-tenure relations in Kenya and introduced conceptual, legal and sociological confusion in the traditional tenure systems then prevailing in traditional Kenyan society (2008).

Following World War II Kenya became a locus of resettlement of young, upper-class British officers, many of whom settled in the fertile areas of the Rift Valley, where they established large-scale coffee plantations which were mostly dependent on Kikuyu labour. On their arrival, the settlers set about establishing a settler friendly land policy and legislation through the 1902 First Crown Lands Ordinance, which legislated all unoccupied land be given to British aristocrats (Rutten and Owuor 2009). In addition, as in other colonial spaces the settlers implemented forced labour, the doubling of taxation, and the introduction of the *kipande* (identity card). By the 1930s approximately 30 000 settlers lived in the area and had secured their political voice due to their contribution to the market economy. Settlers were granted ownership of large tracts of land outside Nairobi, previously owned by the Kikuyu, and took ownership of some of the most fertile areas in the Rift Valley. Before the settlers’ arrival, the Rift Valley had been home to approximately one million Kikuyu, who had no land claims in European terms, and practised subsistence farming. Following the settlers’ arrival, a hut tax was introduced for local people, with the Kikuyu being afforded less and less access to land in exchange for their labour. As a result, many left their homes and ventured to the cities in search of work. Today, the Kikuyu are believed to account for the majority of people living in and around Nairobi.

When Kenya became a republic in December 1964, with Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, as its first president, the land issue was probably the most explosive issue on the independence agenda (Goldstein and Rotich 2008). Throughout Kenyatta's 1960s and 1970s terms, the government embarked on a process of Africanisation of the economy with land bought from white farmers being subdivided and made available to landless, unemployed and progressive farmers. Land tenure rights became a major sticking point in the 1960s among Kenyan government officials (Rutten and Owuour 2009) and constitutional amendments evolved into a critical issue for the Kenya African National Union (KANU) from the late 1960s, which failed to facilitate any sense of political democracy. Those affiliated with Kenyatta were able to use their preferential position for personal accumulation through businesses and land, establishing the minority Kikuyu as an elite group (Rutten and Owuour 2009; Kagwanja and Southall 2009). Kenyatta was accused of facilitating the movement of the Kikuyu from Central Province into the homelands of the Kalenjin and Maasai in the Rift Valley, and enabling the Kikuyu preferential treatment in government-financed settlement schemes for previously white-owned farms in the Rift Valley (Kagwanja and Southall 2009; Goldstein and Rotich 2008). However the Kikuyu are also believed to have settled in parts of the Rift Valley long before Kenyatta assumed power, reaching an estimated 150 000 by the late 1930s and constituting 26 percent of the total African population there (Kagwanja and Southall 2009). In addition, they acquired land in the Rift Valley, along with other ethnic groups the Luyha, Kisii, Kamba, Luo and Kalenjin, in the forms of British and World Bank settlement programmes, state-financed transfers of British owned land to Kenyan buyers across ethnic lines; and market transactions (Kagwanja and Southall 2009).

This continued under Daniel Arap Moi in 1978, who designed settlement schemes that distributed land to connected political elites ahead of those with historical ties to it. In addition, Moi targeted Kikuyu capital, which posed a threat to his political dominance, closing Kikuyu-owned banks and building his Kalenjin power base, which nurtured Kalenjin ethnic nationalism just as Kenyatta had done in relation to Kikuyu nationalism

(Rutten and Owuour 2009). By 1986, Moi had concentrated all government power under the control of the Kalenjin tribe and a few allies from minority groups.

In 1991 a combination of international pressure and internal dissent forced the government of President Moi to reintroduce multi-party politics that had been suspended by his predecessor, with the first multi-party elections being held in December 1992. Moi retained power, although the extent to which the elections were truly democratic has been widely debated (Wanyande *et al* 2003). By the next national election in 2002, Moi's attempt at appointing a successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya's first president for whom Moi had served as vice president, was met with resistance and gave rise to fragmentation within KANU. Members broke away and formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which comprised several political parties, led by Mwai Kibaki, Michael Wamalwa and Raila Odinga (Onyebadi 2008). Following a turbulent 24 years in office marred by political repression and violence, Moi was constitutionally barred from participating in the country's 2002 general elections as a result of the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1992, the first of this nature in the 27 years since liberation (Patel 2001). Later findings by non-governmental organisations (NGO's) including Amnesty International would implicate Moi in numerous cases of human rights violations, including allegations of torture at Nyayo House torture chambers (Kagwanja 2003). KANU was defeated in a landslide victory, bringing an end to Moi's 24-year term, which saw NARC come to power under the leadership of Kibaki. In his 2002 bid for the presidency, Kibaki foregrounded the redistribution of land as a cornerstone of his campaign. However, he failed to honour this promise, leading to a fall-out which gave rise to the formation of the PNU, which represented the largest ethnic group in Kenya, the Kikuyu, and others who favoured a strong centralised system (Gibson and Long 2009), and Odinga's ODM, which represented smaller ethnic groups that felt marginalised by the central government and sought constitutional reform (Gibson and Long 2009).

1.4. A brief overview of the 2007 elections

The political climate in which the 2007/2008 Kenyan elections took place has been described as ethnic and politically volatile, with Kenyans being more ethnically divided than ever before (Wachanga 2011; Kagwanja and Southall 2008). Having enjoyed a relatively high level of independence and freedom since transition to a democracy in 1991, the Kenyan media was poised to report on the elections (Onyebadi 2008). Kibaki is credited with having opened up the airwaves, relatively speaking, and encouraged media freedom, which had been heavily suppressed under previous regimes of Kenyatta and Moi (Rimbaud 2007). In the past, while the press was not as openly or heavily repressed as in other African states, journalists were not permitted to openly criticise government and apparently engaged in a large amount of self-censorship (Heath 1997).

The pre-election phase was characterised by an upsurge in intimidation, threats to candidates, hate speeches, distribution of hate leaflets, violence between rival groups and mob lynching of members of ethnic rivals. Incidences of violence occurred throughout the pre-election period in the political climate in which ethnic tensions had reached a “fever pitch” (Kagwanja and Southall 2009: 261).

By 2007 Kenyans were growing increasingly weary of Kibaki’s promises and sought constitutional reform, the cornerstone of Odinga’s campaign (Yamano *et al.* 2010). The 2007 elections were anticipated to be the closest since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991. Growing discontent with Kibaki’s increasingly centralised form of government and failure to follow through on areas of priority including free education, fighting corruption and addressing the land question set the stage for a tight vote, with the election being described as the most narrowly contested in Kenya (Kagwanja and Southall 2013; Klopp 2008). Among other issues, the land question formed the central axis of the 2007 campaign, as Kenyans belonging to minority ethnic groupings such as the Kalenjin, Luo and Luyha grew increasingly frustrated with Kibaki’s lack of action on land redress (Kagwanja and Southall 2009). Failure to honour his promise of decentralisation led to growing frustration and discontentment with Kibaki, who had foregrounded this in his 2002 bid for the presidency.

In the build-up to the election Odinga capitalised on the anger and disillusionment of many Kenyans, campaigning on a reformist, populist and anti-corruption platform that promised radical change, specifically the devolution of power, or *majimboism* (Klopp 2009). Growing discontent among smaller ethnic groups at the historically perceived Kikuyu dominance in key economic areas, including trade, banking, government, commercial farming and land ownership, was giving rise to a mobilisation of smaller ethnic groups behind the ODM's "forty-one-against-one" and "Kenya against the Kikuyu" campaign slogans (Kagwanja and Southall 2009: 267; Klopp 2008). The unofficial ODM strategy inherent in these slogans thus appeared to have an ethnic dimension. This is further evident in that ODM officials suggested Kibaki's ethnic group, the Kikuyu, were responsible for continuing the corrupt and exclusionary style of government that characterised much of Kibaki's first term in office (Klopp 2008). Odinga and his officials also suggested that the Kikuyu were responsible for historical injustices and ethnic privileging, specifically of land ownership, dating back to the years of Jomo Kenyatta, himself a Kikuyu (Klopp 2008).

Some estimates suggest as many as 600 Kenyans were killed in political violence in the three months ahead of voting day (Kagwanja and Southall 2009). It is notable that the violence was generally directed against the Kikuyu by a combination of Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin youths (Kagwanja and Southall 2009). According to Kagwanja and Southall (2013: 121), "the Kikuyu were identified as the enemy and described in the Kalenjin vernacular radio station KAAS FM as *madoadoo* (a Kiswahili word for stains or spots) translated in this specific context as spotted hyenas to be violently expelled from the Rift Valley". Much of the violence was committed along ethnic lines, and in ODM strongholds including Nairobi, the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Mombasa, and it has been argued it is plausible that ethnic tensions were a contributing factor (Nasongo, Achoka and Wamocha 2009). It has been argued that ethnic loyalty enabled and was rewarded by "access to and disposal of resources and patronage through which ethnic elites can remain in power" (Kamungi 2001: 3). Certainly Kenya has a history of political leaders privileging those belonging to certain (their) ethnic groups as evidenced by patterns of

political mobilisation, resource allocation and public service appointments along ethnic lines (Bratton and Kimenyi 1997; Orvis 2001; Apollos 2001; Kagwanja and Southall 2009; Elischer 2008; Mamdani 2001; Rutten and Owuor 2009; Yamano, Tanaka and Gitau 2010).

1.5. Origins of the press in Kenya

Compared to other African states, Kenya's press is relatively young. The country's first newspaper, the *East African Standard*, was started in 1902 as the weekly *African Standard* and remained the mouthpiece of the conservative settler population of East Africa for decades (Ainslie 1966). Until the sudden appearance of a dozen or more African newspapers just after World War II, Kenya had anything but an independent African press (Scotton 1975). In 1921 a few issues of a Swahili broadsheet, *Tangazo* were published by freedom fighter Harry Thuku, but it was discontinued when Thuku was jailed and his Asian printer went bankrupt. A Kikuyu language monthly, *Mwigwithania (Reconciler)* appeared sporadically in the 1920s and 1930s and was edited by Jomo Kenyatta, but was banned by the time of World War II (Scotton 1975). Indigenous newspapers were established all across the country following the war, some with circulations in the thousands. These publications expressed nationalist sentiments and racial discrimination, and are said to have unsettled British authorities (Scotton 1975). Through their newspapers, Kenyans attempted to resolve issues related to the economic, social and political conditions they were exposed to, with the question of European occupation of land belonging to Kenyans being the most important (Scotton 1975; Nzioka 2006).

British newspapers were launched during the 1940s and 1950s to try and counteract the growing influence of the indigenous press, but failed and were abandoned (Nzioka 2006). In a radical move the colonial government issued new laws allowing for the seizure of presses that were being used to print disloyal literature (Scotton 1975). After the consequent refusal by Asian printers to print African-owned newspapers, Kenyans resorted to using hand-operated presses. Consequently circulation dropped, and the publications were finally banned in October 1952 with the declaration of a state of

emergency and the banning of all independent African newspapers (Scotton 1975). Today the *Daily Nation* and the *Standard* (discussed further below) are the country's leading English daily newspapers, which control more than 70 percent of newspaper circulation in the country with a combined daily circulation of approximately 300 000 (Njogu 2009; Somerville 2011: 89; Onyebadi 2008: 3).

1.5.1. *The East African Standard*

According to various records the *East African Standard* was started in the coastal town of Mombasa by an Indian tradesman, A.M. Jeevanjee, under the title *African Standard*. Jeevanjee brought in the paper's first journalists from England (Nzioka 2006). The paper catered for an audience of civil servants and the business community, and was a strong supporter of Settler rule (Scotton 1975). Two years later Jeevanjee's paper was purchased by the English partnership of Mayer and Anderson who changed its name to *East African Standard*, which marked the beginning of the European press in Kenya. In 1910 the paper underwent two major changes: it followed the colonial government to Nairobi, which became the capital city and the country's commercial and financial hub, and introduced a daily edition on 24 May 1910 (Scotton 1975). Typically, the content of the paper largely included happenings in Britain and appealed to the settler audience, echoing the tone of other settler publications such as *Mombasa Mail* and *Nairobi*. In 1918 the East African Standard Limited was incorporated as a public company with shares listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The paper had sister newspapers in neighbouring Uganda and Tanzania, as well as a sister Swahili weekly, *Baraza*, which advocated African political activity (Nzioka 2006).

The Standard grew along with the colonial government, and was staffed by and published for Europeans (Ainslie 1966; Nzioka 2006). Change in the *Standard* to represent issues pertinent to African interests and worlds was painstakingly slow even after independence. Over the years the *Standard* changed hands repeatedly until Lonrho, a British firm with diverse investments in Africa, acquired it in 1967 along with the television channel KTN. In 1975 *The Standard* named its first black editor and changed its format from a broadsheet to a tabloid. When Lonrho sold the newspaper the first chairman of the new board was Mark Too, a close relation of former president Moi. Today the publication is

owned by a group of Kenyan businessmen and has since 2002 been viewed as an opposition newspaper, and part of the Moi family's business empire (Somerville 2011). Additionally, it is available on the internet. At one time this media house published a Kiswahili paper called *Baraza*. Besides the *Standard* and KTN, this media house also operates Radio Maisha which began broadcasting in 2010.

1.5.2. The *Daily Nation*

The appearance of the *Daily Nation* in 1960 presented the first real challenge to the dominance of the *Standard*. The *Daily Nation* and its sister paper, the *Sunday Nation*, are part of the non-government-controlled Nation Media Group (NMG), owned by the Aga Khan, leader of the Ismaili Islamic sect, who has extensive business interests in Kenya. The NMG is a publicly listed company with approximately 7500 shareholders. The NMG also publishes a Kiswahili edition of the English daily in the form of the vernacular copy *Taifa Leo*. *Taifa*, with a daily circulation of 35,000 is an abridged version of the *Nation*. The same reporters produce copy for both of the company's editions (Somerville 2011). Both of the NMG's publications, the *Daily Nation* and *Sunday Nation*, as well as its FM radio services are also available on the internet.

The *Nation* is generally regarded as relatively independent and balanced (Nzioka 2006; Somerville 2011). The *Daily Nation* has overtaken the *Standard* in terms of circulation figures and remains the largest selling newspaper in East Africa (Nzioka 2006).

1.6. Contemporary media landscape

Today Kenya has a higher literacy rate than many of its neighbours, with an average of above 70 percent, with some research suggesting levels as high as 85 percent (Somerville 2011: 89; Onyebadi 2008: 8). Consistent with this Kenya has an active news media, with four major daily newspapers, four weeklies and numerous radio and television stations (Nzioka 2006: 12). It is notable that radio is reckoned to be the most popular medium for attaining political information in Kenya, with 35.1 percent of Kenyans accessing political content from radio, followed by 27 percent from newspapers and 25.7 percent from television (Onyebadi 2008: 8).

The liberalisation of the media in Kenya post Kenyatta and Moi's rule happened at vastly different paces in broadcast and print, with unclear and undeveloped regulatory policies in the broadcast sector leaving it open to manipulation by politicians and investors who sought to consolidate ownership (Odhiambo 2002). The first private English language FM station, Capital FM, was licensed in 1996, followed by the proliferation of other English and Swahili language stations. A Kikuyu language station, Kameme FM became the first to break the state monopoly on local language broadcasting in 2000. As well as the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, it owns new vernacular stations such as Cooro FM, as well as some community broadcasters. These radio stations attracted large audiences, and by 2007 had 27 percent of the radio market, compared with 33 percent held by mainstream radios (Odhiambo 2002).

The early 1990s were characterised by a proliferation of new entrants into the print media sector. Hundreds of privately owned "alternative" publications sprung up in Nairobi and other towns. The publications were relatively restricted in their readership, focused mainly on political, religious and sexual content, and tended to highlight the political causes of the ethnic groups of their owners (Odhiambo, 2002). Two content analyses of these publications reveal an ethnic slanting of political stories, in which conflicts, public appointments, the management of crime and political debate was unnecessarily "tribe-tagged" (Barsito and Onditi 1998).

In a 2007 national survey conducted by American-based International Republican Institute (IRI), 83.7 percent of Kenyans believed their media to be free and accurate in carrying out their reports, while 80.6 percent also said they trust the media to fairly and accurately report on government (Onyebadi 2008). In a 2006 African Media Development Initiative Report by the BBC World Service Trust, it was suggested that Kenyan citizens had become increasingly reliant on the media for vital information, lending the news media more credibility "than almost any other source of information" (Abdi and Deane 2008: 3). Yet this contradicts the role attributed to the news media during the 2007 elections, in which the news media were thought to have contributed to

escalating tensions. Given this shift, a study of this nature with its focus on the relationship between the press coverage and Kenyan society in the post-election violence of 2007/8 is arguably of high relevance.

1.7. The news media and the 2007 elections

The Kenyan news media were considered relatively free to report on the 2007 election (Somerville 2011). In the aftermath of the post-election violence, they were not accused of inciting hatred, but rather of failing to prevent the dissemination of propaganda and violent rhetoric being shared by politicians (Somerville 2011). There were also allegations that the news media had “failed to live up to professional and ethical standards” (Abdi and Deane 2008: 2). Some journalists accused their colleagues of accepting and conveying paid-for hate material, speaking to a widespread suspicion that journalists were open to bribery and corruption during the elections. This gave rise to an unbalanced media environment in the aftermath of the elections, in which Kenyans were reportedly suspicious of mainstream media and preferred local vernacular outlets, which could perhaps suggest an awareness of the partisan nature (Somerville 2011).

During the crisis, social media emerged to play a crucial role in keeping Kenyans abreast of developments, particularly during the five-day government induced ban on all live broadcasting, providing a platform for alternative communication and engagement (Makinen and Kuira 2008). Information communication technologies (ICTs) are identified as playing an important role in coordinating action among Kenyans in three varying forms, namely the short message service (SMS) campaigns to promote violence, blogs to challenge mainstream media narratives, and online campaigns to promote awareness of human rights violations (Goldstein and Rotich 2008). Kenyans turned to their mobile phones to communicate employing SMS to communicate and circumvent the media ban and also, in January, send messages inciting ethnic hatred. One message read: “Fellow Kenyans, the Kikuyu’s have stolen our children’s future...we must deal with them in a way they understand...violence” (Goldstein and Rotich 2008: 4). In reaction, another stated: “No more innocent Kikuyu blood will be shed. We will slaughter them right here in the capital city. For justice, compile a list of Luo’s you know...we will give

you numbers to text this information,” (2008 Goldstein and Rotich 2008: 4). A total of 119 incidents of hate speech, circulated through email, SMS, photos and publications, were reported to the Kenya Human Rights Commission, including ethnic hatred, use of stereotypes, discrimination, incitement to violence and attacks on gender identity.

While some utilised the media for violent ends, there were instances of Kenyans using social media to draw attention to the conflict and uncover incidences of violence which otherwise would have gone unreported by the mainstream press. In response to the escalating violence and use of the news and social media for negative purposes, a group of Kenyans launched *Ushahidi*, an online platform aimed at drawing attention to the violence erupting around the country (Goldstein and Rotich 2008). I Have No Tribe, a site dedicated to facilitating constructive and unifying dialogue among Kenyans, was also launched following the escalation of violence, and featured anecdotes from Kenyans pondering the statement, I have no tribe...I am Kenyan (Goldstein and Rotich 2008).

1.8. Structure of the study

Chapter Two will establish the framework that informs this study. The framework comprises three strands. The first of these is cultural studies. This thesis investigates the discourses articulated in the election coverage in the press during Kenya’s 2007/2008 general election, and the subject positions they proposed. Consequently, the issue of representation is central to this analysis. To analyse the various representations that appeared in the newspapers requires a theoretical framework that incorporates representation, production, identity and culture and which also enables an understanding of the role the press plays in society. Cultural studies is an appropriate theoretical framework to inform this work both because of its multi-disciplinary approach and its conceptualising of representation and culture. Being concerned with issues of representation and identity and informed by the concept of power as productive and therefore as constitutive of subjects (Hall 1997: 1), this thesis draws on the circuit of culture and in particular will focus on the moment of representation and its relationship to production and identity.

The second strand of theory, journalism studies, is useful because it provides a link between representation and identity, and the roles of the press in democratic societies. Christians' (2009) formulation of the normative theories of the media provides a three-tier analytical model which enables analysis at a philosophical level (normative traditions), political level (models of democracy) and at the level of media roles (Christians 2009). Proposing four different roles the news media can play in democracy, including the collaborative, monitorial, facilitative and radical, Christians argues that the press always takes on "the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates" (2009:16). The collaborative, monitorial and facilitative roles are considered to be of specific relevance to this thesis as they most adequately draw on and reflect the roles played by the news media during times of elections in democratic societies. As far as I can confirm, while attempts have been made to understand the role the press played in relation to the violence, no similar study has been carried out in Kenya concerning this topic.

Chapter Three presents an account of the methodology that is employed in this study, critical discourse analysis (CDA). This study is located within qualitative epistemology due to its constructionist positioning. It seeks to analyse the discourses articulated in the news coverage of the 2007/2008 Kenyan elections as reported by the *Daily Nation* and the *Standard* in response to the suggestion that the violence, which has been described along ethnic lines, was spurred on by the news media (Somerville 2011). While the news media have been implicated in fuelling the tensions, the role of the press in this regard is not yet clear (Somerville 2011). It is therefore appropriate to examine the coverage and the discourses articulated, particularly in relation to issues of ethnicity and incitement. The research therefore seeks to investigate the coverage of the two English dailies and the subject positions they proposed, with a particular focus on ethnicity. A subtext to this which informs this study is whether the dominant discourses articulated can be said to have contributed to the escalation of post-election violence in their coverage of the country's 2007/2008 general elections. An eclectic approach draws on Fairclough's

three-dimensional model of CDA and narrative analysis (Todorov's narrative model, Proppian character functions and Levi-Strauss' binary oppositions).

Chapter Four comprises a detailed analysis of the chosen front-page news articles and editorials. Chapter Five presents the main findings of this research to argue that the two dailies' disavowal of context and ethnicity constitute silences which position them as collaborative with the Kenyan state.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This thesis employs a post-structuralist approach, specifically a constructionist approach as posited by Hall (1997), in which representation is understood to play a central role in meaning making. Recognising the public and social character of language, the constructionist approach operates from the premise that things in themselves do not contain meaning. It insists rather that “we don’t *mean*: we *construct* meaning” using representational systems of concepts and signs (Hall 1997: 25). Prioritising the symbolic practices and processes through which representation, meaning and language operate, this view maintains that the language system conveys meaning through representing ideas and concepts (Hall 1997: 25).

The conventional view used to be that ‘things’ exist in the material and natural world, that their material or natural characteristics are what determines or constitutes them, and that they have a perfectly clear meaning *outside* of how they are represented (Hall 1997: 5). In this view representation as a process is of secondary importance, which enters into the field only after things have been fully formed and their meaning constituted. Following the ‘cultural turn’ however, meaning is argued to be *produced/constructed*, rather than simply ‘found’. Thus, in the social constructionist approach, representation is conceived as entering into the very constitution of things, with culture being conceptualised as a primary or ‘constitutive’ process (Hall 1997: 6).

2.2. Cultural studies

Concerned with the generation and circulation of meanings in society, cultural studies in Britain developed in reaction to the dominant definition of “culture” advocated by proponents of cultural criticism (Murdock 1989). Cultural studies advocates a view of culture which incorporates “all the ways in which people make sense of their situation and express these understandings”, thereby retaining a focus on the “lived texts” of social rituals and social institutions (Murdock 1989: 38). Setting itself up in opposition to high culture and the notion of cultural elitism, cultural studies is concerned with culture as a

key concept for understanding features of contemporary society, conceptualising culture as a feature of the lived practices of everyday life, which should be understood in political terms (Dahlgren 1997: 52). From such a constructivist perspective people and social institutions in specific historical circumstances are involved in an interwoven process whereby culture is created, which in turn helps to produce and reproduce society (Dahlgren 1997: 50). Broadening its definition of culture to include the circulation of values and meaning, this approach incorporates notions of power relations in its view of 'truth', which it holds to not be determined solely by individuals, but as being located in "complex hierarchies and the identifications they mobilise" (Dahlgren 1997: 53). In this sense a key theme within cultural studies' concept of culture is of culture as bearer of social power (Dahlgren 1997). Thus, "culture, as a materialist category, embodied in social institutions and practices, shapes subjectivity and social relations. Social relations are 'always already' the embodiment of power relations" (Dahlgren 1997: 54).

Conceptualising of culture as a feature of the lived practices of everyday life, cultural studies provides a fresh take on culture as the bearer of social power (Dahlgren 1997). Culture, for Hall, is about "shared meanings" (Hall 1997: 2). Following the 'cultural turn' in the social and human sciences, culture has become viewed more as a process and set of practices, and is concerned with the production and exchange of meanings, the "giving and taking of meaning" between members of a society or group (Hall 1997: 2). Thus culture depends on its participants interpreting meaningfully what is happening around them (Purvis and Hunt 1993) and "making sense of the world in broadly similar ways" (Hall 1997: 2). Because things in and of themselves seldom have a fixed and unchanging meaning, it is the way we think and feel about them that gives them meaning. It is the frameworks of interpretation which individuals bring and how they represent things that give them meaning.

Meanings are circulated through interactions as well as through the mass media, global communication and complex technologies. Meanings organise and regulate our conduct and practices, helping to set the rules, norms and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed. In this way they are also what those who wish to govern and

regulate the conduct and ideas of others seek to structure and shape (Purvis and Hunt 1993; Morley 1998).

2.3. The “circuit of culture”

The “circuit of culture”, as advocated by du Gay (1997), incorporates a view of cultural meaning-making as a complex set of reciprocal processes and practices, as an ongoing process. Operating less as a transmission flow from producer to consumer and more like the model of a dialogue, meaning-making incorporates at least five major cultural processes for considering “how culture and power intertwine to create meaning” (Curtin and Gaither 2007: 37). These include representation, identity production, consumption and regulation (du Gay 1997). To study an object culturally, “one should at least explore how it is represented, what social identities are associated with it, how it is produced and consumed, and what mechanisms regulate its distribution and use” (du Gay 1997: 3).

2.4. Representation

Representation constitutes a key “moment” in the circuit (Hall 1997: 1). As Hall argues, (1997: 15) representation is an essential part of the process “by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture” as it connects meaning and language to culture (Hall 1997: 15). This process employs the use of language, signs and images which stand for or represent things (Hall 1997: 15). Two systems of representation are involved, including, firstly, a system by which all objects, people and events are correlated with a set of concepts or mental representations, equating to a shared conceptual map, and, secondly, language (Hall 1997: 18). The first enables individuals to give meaning to the world by constructing a set of correspondences or chain of equivalences between things and one’s conceptual map, while the second depends on constructing a set of correspondences between one’s conceptual map and a set of signs, organised into language which represent those concepts (Hall 1997: 19). The relation between “things”, concepts and signs lies at the heart of the production of

meaning in language, and it is in the process of representation that these elements are linked together (Hall 1997: 19).

2.5. Language

Central to culture and representation is language. Language is the medium through which we “make sense of things” and in which meaning is produced and exchanged (Hall 1997: 19). For Hall, “language is one of the ‘media’ through which thoughts, ideas and feelings are represented in a culture” (Hall 1997: 1). Meaning can only be shared through our common access to language. Thus language is key to meaning and culture and has always been regarded as “the key repository of cultural values and meanings” (Hall 1997: 1). Within a constructivist approach, language constitutes material objects and social practices as meaningful and intelligible; it also structures which meanings can or cannot be deployed under determinate circumstances by speaking subjects. To understand culture is to explore how meaning is produced through the signifying practices of language within material and institutional contexts (Hall 1997).

A central argument of cultural studies is that language is relational. Working from the premise that signs have no direct reference to an independent object world but generate meaning through their relationships to other signs organised syntagmatically and paradigmatically, it is argued that all cultural forms can be analysed ‘like a language’ . Although meaning is formally undecided and unfixed, in social practice it is regulated and temporarily stabilised into pragmatic narratives or discourses.

2.6. Foucault and discourse

The paradigm of cultural studies is increasingly informed by Foucault’s notion of discourse. In his argument against structuralist theories of language that conceive of it as an autonomous rule governed system, Foucault (1972) focuses on the description and analysis of discourse and their effects under determinate material and historical conditions (Barker 2001). Discourse is understood as “a regulated way of speaking that defines and produces objects of knowledge, thereby governing the way topics are talked

about and practices conducted” (Barker 2001: 12). For Foucault, discourse constructs, defines and produces objects of knowledge in an intelligible way while at the same time excluding other ways of reasoning as unintelligible. Foucault explored how particular sets of ideas and practices have prevailed during particular historical periods by focusing on how discourse constructs the topic by governing instances and rules under which statements are combined and regulated to form and define a distinct field of knowledge/objects (Barker 2001). He considered how “madness”, “punishment” or “sexuality” have been conceptualised and spoken about at different points in history (Hall 1997: 45; Foucault 1990; Foucault 2012). Such statements give rise to certain kinds of knowledge about the concepts, with the terms only existing meaningfully within the discourses about them (Hall 1997: 45). In this view, discourse is the production of knowledge through language (Foucault 1990; Foucault 2012; Hall 1997).

For Foucault, meaning does not exist “naturally” but is subject to power relations which govern not only what can be said under determinate social and cultural conditions but also who can speak with authority, as well as when and where (Purvis and Hunt 1993; Barker 2001). Breaking from the Marxist theory of class interests and ideological ‘distortion’, Foucault re-conceived the link of power/knowledge (Hall 1997: 48). Instead of seeing power as functioning in a direct and repressive way, Foucault proposed that knowledge is always an effect of power and is also implicated in the circumstances in which knowledge is applied. For Foucault, that power is able to define what counts as knowledge or “truth” is more important than the question of “truth” (Hall 1997: 49). This contextual and historicised approach led to Foucault proposing the notion of the “regime of truth”, consisting of a discursive formation sustaining it, rather than an essential or absolute “truth”. Additionally, Foucault conceived of power as circulatory, and not simply as coming from a specific source such as the sovereign, the state or the ruling class (Foucault 1990; Foucault 2012). This implies that power relations permeate all levels of social existence and that all individuals are subject to it as power is exercised through a net-like organisation (Foucault 1990; Foucault 2012).

Thus, in this sense power is not hierarchical; it has a capillary action which permeates the body in how it is worn, felt and expressed, with subjects physically embodying what they regard to be “truth”. The body is the site of disciplinary practices which enables the development of subjects, as the practices are the result of specific historical discourses of medicine, science, crime, punishment and sexuality (Barker 2001). Thus discourse is understood as also embodied in physical subjects who exhibit meaning, for example in the professional attire and material practice of journalists, doctors and lawyers who embody what is perceived to be practices of professionalism in their ways of being in the world. The permeation of power into the body is facilitated by understandings and beliefs of “truth” and in the case of disciplines, notions of professionalism. In addition, if Foucault focused on the ‘objects of the discourse’ as identified above, he recognises that it also constitutes subjects of the discourse, such as journalists who subscribe to particular understandings of journalistic professionalism. In the case of the subject as produced through discourse within the discipline of journalism, journalistic practices in the newsroom are both the effect of and productive of themselves in terms of what counts as news. “Truth” and professionalism are both produced and reproduced inside the newsroom. The way journalists present and conduct themselves are embodiments of their understandings of what it means to be a journalist, which in effect is an articulation of what constitutes their “truth”. In this sense, power is not only negative, repressing what it seeks to control, but is also productive in how it “produces things, induces pleasure, forms of knowledge and produces discourse” (Hall 1997: 50; Foucault 1980). In this sense discourse is not a purely linguistic concept, but incorporates language (representation) and practice (material actions) (Hall 1997: 44).

Crucially Foucault insists on the historicity of discourse, knowledge and ‘truth’. A discourse is ‘true’ within a specific historical context (Hall 1997: 46; Foucault 1980). Focusing more on how knowledge is produced through discursive practices in specific institutional settings to regulate the conduct of others, Foucault provides useful ways of understanding the connections between subjectivity and the social order, as he unpacks the notion of a subject and illustrates how this is both constructed and affected by social practices.

Being deeply critical of the traditional conception of 'the subject', Foucault's work displaces the subject from the privileged Enlightenment position in relation to knowledge and meaning (Foucault 1980; Hall 1997: 55; Barker 2000). Instead of viewing the subject as an autonomous and stable entity, the 'core' of the self, Foucault proposes that it is discourse, not the subjects who enact it, which produces knowledge and thus the subject too (Hall 1997: 55). To this end for Foucault the subject is constituted within but is not determined by discourse (Hall 1997: 55; Foucault 1980). Hence, "this subject of discourse cannot be outside discourse, because it must be subjected to discourse" (Hall 1997: 55; Foucault 1980). The historicising of discourse in this sense is accompanied by a historicising of the subject.

Subjectivities involve how individuals are constituted as subjects through myriad social processes in relation to one another (Barker 2001). A subject, for Foucault (1977, 1979, 1980), is the product of power manifested in those subjected to it (Barker 2001). Power, as noted above, is not simply a negative mechanism of control but is also productive of the self. For example, the disciplinary power of schools, work organisations, prisons, hospitals, asylums and the discourses of sexuality produce subjectivity by bringing individuals into view (Barker 2001). And similarly journalists are brought into view through similar processes.

Although Foucault was concerned with hegemonic discourses at particular moments in time, such as capitalism and modernity, he argues that there is never a singular discourse at play; rather, there is always an element of contestation and of resisting discourses propagated by the plural subject. Subjects in this sense are not singular entities; rather they participate and negotiate in various, sometimes contesting discourses, in an array of ways. Thus, in the case of a study of the discourses of madness, punishment or sexuality, statements about the topics, the rules which prescribe certain ways of speaking about these topics and exclude other ways, the 'subjects' who personify the discourse, how the knowledge about the topic acquired authority or a sense of the 'truth', the practices

within institutions for dealing with the subjects and acknowledgement that a different discourse on the topic will arise, are necessary.

As a great deal of Foucault's work is concerned with the historical investigation of discipline and the production of subjects through "disciplinary" power, his work highlights the effects statements have on knowledge and rules which prescribe what is "sayable" or "thinkable" (Foucault 1980). Foucault's work shows how classificatory systems are essential to the process of normalisation, the distribution of categories around a central norm and thus to the production of a range of subjects (Barker 2001). Particular discourses or state of knowledge, termed the *episteme* by Foucault, may appear across a range of texts and in forms of conduct across society, which when referring to the same object and sharing a similar style, belong to the same discursive formation (Hall 1997: 44).

2.7. The roles of the news media in democratic societies

The relationship between the news media and democracy has been widely debated (Althaus 2012; McNair 2000; McCombs *et al* 1997; Golan and Wanta 2001; Kioussis, McDevitt and Wu 2005). In a democracy, the news media ideally provide surveillance of the socio-political environment reporting developments likely to affect the welfare of citizens, facilitate dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between power holders and mass publics, provide mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised power, and respect the audiences ability to make sense of their political environment (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990:25-26). Due to the focus on representation and identity, this thesis incorporates Christians' *Normative Theories of the Press* (2009) as productive in considering the functions of the news media and highlighting the significance of the news media in democratic societies. Unlike the positivist epistemology that underpins the "regime of objectivity" presumed in some approaches to journalism, this thesis ascribes to a view of the news media as active participants in the conflict cycle, and not a "detached, unobtrusive observer" (Hackett 2006: 2).

Ideas about the media's normative potential can be traced back to the notion of the fourth estate, which viewed the media as the fourth power that provides counterbalances and checks on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. An emphasis on the media's social responsibility by America's Commission on the Freedom of the Press (also known as the Hutchins Commission) in 1947 marked the beginning of its potential advocacy role, which developed out of increasing disillusionment with its inability to "solve the problems of a democratic society" (Christians 2009: 5).

Following these developments, and partially informed by the findings of the Hutchins Commission, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) published *Four Theories of the Press*, which provided a "reflection about the media's role in society by suggesting that the press systems are linked to different political systems and philosophies" (Christians 2009:4). Introducing the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and soviet concepts of what the press should be and do, *Four Theories* was widely considered a seminal piece of work in an area where there had not yet been a widely accepted account for the media's potential role in society. However, its historically and contextually based approach has been increasingly challenged for its seeming lack of relevance to contemporary society and for being constrained by the ideology and historical circumstances of its inception. Such critiques argue that *Four Theories* focused on normative theories which lack sufficient explanation as they are based on how things *should* be and do not necessarily relate to how things *are* (Christians 2009).

Major technological developments, largely a result of the 1980s discovery of the potential of international cable and satellite transmission, and the beginning of innovation in the use of computers for communication, have contributed to major shifts in the news media, which are unaccounted for in *Four Theories* (Christians 2009). In addition significant societal political-ideological shifts away from social responsibility in media governance towards deregulation and entrepreneurial growth, which gave rise to deregulation and privatisation becoming the driving forces in communications and media from the mid-1980s onward, have contributed to increased criticism of the relevance and applicability of *Four Theories* to contemporary society (Christians 2009).

These shifts have posed serious questions for communication researchers and educators which *Four Theories* has no longer able to answer. Developed in a Western setting and arguably assuming a linear approach to development, this approach has since been challenged and criticised for being invalid and ethnocentric (Christians 2009).

More recently, while a range of theories have been suggested over the years, including Western, third world, communist and developmental models in an attempt to encompass the changing global political landscape, the fundamental problem with many of these media models is their seemingly prescriptive nature – that is, they try to *prescribe* rather than to *describe* social phenomena (Christians 2009).

Steering clear of historicising their approach by rather providing different levels of generality, *Normative Theories* outlines various tendencies that can combine into many institutional forms then applied to types of historical-philosophical traditions and media roles (Christians 2009: 18). In attempting to answer the question, ‘why do the mass media appear in widely different forms and serve different purposes in different countries?’, the authors emphasise that each of the three levels has its own logic and that the different types of normative traditions, models of democracy and roles of media falling under each respective analytical level “should be seen as vehicles of analytical understanding rather than sets of fixed locations limiting actual phenomena” (Christians 2009:16). The media roles practised by “media institutions or individual communicators are typically composites of different and sometimes contradictory traditions” (Christians 2009: 17). Christians’ framework is significant in relation to the pressing issues facing democratic societies including:

... the critical role of communications media that has to be fulfilled independently of vested interests and established institutions; and the collaboration or not of media with authority. (2009:30)

Christians *et al.* argue that “collaboration characterises any number of relationships in which the media willingly, sometimes even enthusiastically, participate” (Christians 2009:197). While the media can collaborate with a range of ‘centres of power’ such as non-state actors and civil society organisations, its collaboration with the state is of

central focus to this study because the “state can intervene in the affairs of journalism in ways that fundamentally alter the nature of everyday news” (Christians 2009:197). According to the authors, for the collaborative role to exist, the relationship between the media and the state should be “built on mutual trust and a shared commitment to mutually agreeable means and ends” (Christians 2009:198). Drawing on Held’s (1995: 160-162) understanding of the conditions of collaboration, three main strands are emphasised including collaboration as compliance, as acquiescence and as acceptance (Santos 2012; Held 1995: 161). Compliant collaboration can result from coercion, apathy on the part of the media, and tradition justified on the basis of history and custom (Held 1995:161). Acquiescent collaboration on the other hand results from pragmatic and instrumental considerations wherein such cooperation is inevitable and useful respectively. Lastly, the media accepts to collaborate for practical and normative reasons.

The term monitorial is defined as referring to “an organised scanning of the real world of people, conditions, and events, and of potentially relevant sources of information” and also the media’s evaluation and interpretation of these, “guided by the criteria of relevance, significance, and reigning normative frameworks for the public arena” (Christians 2009: 140). Based on an understanding of an early model of mediation in which the news media intervene between events and sources on the one hand, and members of the public on the other, the monitorial role reflects much of the model of professional journalism and, in particular, the news media’s work during political campaigns and elections. Its potential contribution to the democratic political process rests on the notion of the monitorial citizen – individuals who actively seek information in order to participate in the democratic political process (Christians. 2009: 140). In their monitorial role, the news media act in conjunction with a body of social actors providing them with a resource essential to the practice of democracy, acting as a link between (government) policymakers and the public in roles such as informer and educator, advocate of policy and critic. This is of particular relevance during a political campaign and election period, as will be evidenced in the analysis of the role.

Historically the tension between ‘neutral’ mediation and active participation is evidenced in the monitorial role as journalists embark on their work. In line with notions

of journalistic professionalism which have developed over time, most ascribe to the role of neutral reporter in their capacity as informer, which is supported by values of 'objectivity'. With one of the criteria for selective monitoring being the wish to protect the public, the monitorial role overlaps somewhat with the press role of watchdog or guardian of the public interest, with monitorial activity extending into investigative reporting (Cottle 2006; Ettema and Glasser 1998; Thompson 2000). This role is not without its challenges, and Christians identifies claims to confidentiality and economic interest in protecting certain information, the commercial imperative in media operations, media obsession with 'dramatic narrative', compelling characters and personalities as some of the barriers to the performance of the monitorial role (Christians 2009:152-156).

The idea of the facilitative role is to provide information which enables citizens to lead a more actively engaged life which, by providing information and acting as a forum for public debate, enables the media to play a catalytic role in the facilitation of a public sphere (Christians 2009). The facilitative role is designed to "widen access and promote active citizenship by way of debate and participation" also fulfilling a crucial function during election time and thus forming part of the analysis (Christians 2009: 158). In performing the facilitative role, "the media promote dialogue among their readers and viewers through communication that engages them and in which they actively participate" (Christians 2009: 158). An example of this approach exists in public journalism and is concerned with incorporating readers and community members as participants in political processes such as those involved during a national election. Ideally, in their capacity as facilitators, the news media should incorporate grass roots sources rather than continue a preoccupation with elite sources, and provide a voice to those marginalised as a result of poverty, gender, ethnic or political tensions to enable their views and experiences to become part of mainstream public debate and to enable political (campaign) issues to reach them on the periphery of society. The radical role is not included here as it is not relevant to this body of research.

2.8. Reporting on elections

The news media's role during times of democratic elections has been argued to comprise one of its most significant functions (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Chyi and McCombs 2004; Kioussis and McCombs 2004; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). The news media define issues of importance on the public agenda through their reports on campaign activities, and their behaviour is intimately connected with the perceptions of political environments, the shaping of public agenda issues, and the casting of votes (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Tan and Weaver 2007; McCombs and Bell 1996). Typically, media involvement during elections spans three main areas including the function of political candidates' name recognition or reinforcement (Onyebadi 2008), the exposure of salient issues (Ghanem 1997) and highlighting candidates' characters and stances on issues.

With the increasing reach of the news media, particularly during election time, the lack of direct access to political candidates and a heavy reliance on media reports to inform them, voters are argued to rely increasingly on news coverage of the events and issues of election campaigns. As such, a successful media campaign is thought to have a large bearing on the outcome of the electioneering process. In relation to the USA, Patterson (1980: 3) argues:

Today's presidential campaign is essentially a mass media campaign. It is not that the mass media entirely determine what happens in the campaign... But it is no exaggeration to say that, for the large majority of voters, the campaign has little reality apart from its media version.

McCombs and Shaw's breakthrough study of the 1968 Chapel Hill, North Carolina presidential elections is often cited as the best example of investigating the potential role and influence of the news media during political campaigns and elections (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Finding correlations between issues highlighted by the news media and what undecided voters considered to be the main issues, McCombs and Shaw's study foreground the news media as a facilitator of a learning process, especially during elections (1972). Such processes are suggestive of the potential means of influence of the news on what issues or characteristics get covered, known as agenda-setting. Prosser and McCombs (1991: 149) argue:

Nowhere is the agenda-setting influence of the media more clearly or consistently shown than in the research on political campaigns. Studies indicate that news coverage of elections often influences what the public and candidates themselves come to view as the important issues of the campaign.

Agenda-setting offers an explanation of why information about certain issues, and not others, is made available to the public in democratic societies, how public opinion can be influenced, and why certain issues are addressed through policy actions while others are not. The central idea in agenda setting is that the media represent a powerful force in shaping what the public consider to be the principal issues of the day.

Limited by time and space, news organisations often have to select a handful of stories, leaving dozens of potential stories off the agenda, as news selection forms a central part of editorial practice. Defined as a set of issues that are communicated in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time, a news agenda reflects topical issues at a given time. An issue comprises a social problem, often conflictual, that receives media attention (McCombs 1997). That an issue always involves conflict of some kind means that agenda-setting is inherently a political process with attention given by the news media, the public and potential policymakers to some issues and not others (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 2). Operating largely through repetition, the news media define issues of importance on the public agenda via the cumulative effect of media messages about an issue. The process whereby such messages are selected and conveyed is known as framing, which according to McCombs involves the transmission of salience, in which the “news media influence the salience or prominence of that small number of issues that come to command public attention” (McCombs 1997: 433).

Described as “the central organising idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” media frames are thought to comprise a crucial part of the process through which issues gain prominence on the public/news agenda (Tankard 1991: 3). The perspectives and frames that journalists employ draw attention to certain attributes of the objects of news coverage, as well as to the objects themselves. Entman (1993: 52) argues that:

to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

Within the constructivist approach that this research is grounded in, framing plays an important role in the construction of meaning. These processes of meaning making involve constructions which are shaped by both the producers and consumers of news media. As such, framing research provides a potential link between production and reception processes and ideally examines how journalists employ frames in the construction of news stories, how the stories articulate the frames and how audience members interpret the frames by focusing on the ways in which frames organise news stories and other discourses by their patterns of selection, emphasis, interpretation and exclusion. Consequently, framing can be studied as a strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the discourse itself (Pan and Kosicki 1993: 57).

In considering the effects of framing within the political sphere, it is important to note that framing of issues and events does not develop in a political vacuum but has been suggested to be shaped by the sponsoring of multiple social actors, including politicians, social movements and organisations. Given the significance of resources during political campaigns, for example, framing contests often favour political elites (Gitlin 1980; Kellner 1990; Tuchman 1978).

A frame's ability to dominate news discourse depends on complex factors, including its sponsor's economic and cultural resources, its sponsor's knowledge of journalistic practices, the practices themselves, and the frame's resonance with broader political values. Because the distribution of political, economic, and cultural resources shapes frame sponsorship and framing contests, studying the construction of reality through framing should involve an examination of power.

2.9. The news media and conflict

The news media's coverage of conflict can have far-reaching implications for how individuals understand their place in the world. In increasingly modernised societies with ever increasing media reach, many millions of individuals around the world are completely reliant on evolutions in communication technologies which provide up to the minute updates during times of conflict. These technological evolutions are widely considered to have significantly altered the conduct of conflict, warfare, and conflict resolution (Robinson 2005). Compared to previous years, people today know much more and much sooner about developments in international relations.

In recent years it has become widely recognised that conflict coverage, whether intentionally or not, has its own significant impacts on conflicts themselves, and on the policy and politics surrounding them (Gilboa 2005). According to Hackett, "in wartime, the media are not mere observers but are simultaneously the source of intelligence, a combatant, a weapon, a target, and battlefield" (2006: 48). Lynch and McGoldrick also point out that reporting on war now constitutes a bigger responsibility because "modern wars are fought as much through the media as they are on the ground" (2005a: ix).

As suggested by the impact of *Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines* (RTL) and other vernacular radio stations in Rwanda during the unprecedented 1994 violence, the news media can incite people toward violence. In Kenya, many local radio stations have been implicated in fuelling the 2007/2008 post-election violence by broadcasting inflammatory songs and messages on vernacular radio stations. Journalist Mike Pflanz, reporting for the *British Daily Telegraph* and *Irish Independent* notes that there was growing evidence that "hate-filled broadcasts have poured fuel on the fire of Kenya's post-election killings and contributed to ethnic cleansing in certain areas" (Somerville 2011: 2). As these examples suggest, the news media can also play antidemocratic roles, contributing to democratic decay rather than peace-building by fuelling existing tensions through their coverage, taking sides, sowing fear and division, reinforcing prejudices, and spreading half-truths. This tendency is clearly articulated by Banda (cited in Rhodes Journalism Review 2008: 51):

History provides us with a multitude of examples that show the ability of journalists, from behind the shelter of their microphones or pens, to incite hatred, provoke violent mass movements, voluntarily manipulate information in the service of war-mongering strategies, and, more or less consciously or perversely, create the roots of deep divisions within society.

Given the antidemocratic roles played at the time by the news media in recent years, contemporary conflict reporting has come under increasing criticism mainly for its tendency for shallow reporting and sensationalism during times of conflict (Banda 2008; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005b). The founder of peace studies, Johan Galtung makes a distinction between war/violence journalism on the one hand, and peace/conflict journalism on the other with most journalism from conflict areas being presented as a battle between two combatants both after the same goal (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005b). In many cases the focus is predominantly on violent events, elite sources and zero-sum reporting.

That the news media have more often than not been thought to encourage conflict rather than quell it is no accident according to scholar Gadi Wolfsfeld (1997; 2004), who outlines four news values preferred by news organisations including immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism. Lee and Maslog (2005: 11) also point out that “the news coverage of conflict, including the reporting about war is grounded in the notion of conflict as a news value”.

Media coverage of conflicts is decided by various factors, most of which have nothing to do with humanitarian needs, for example geographic proximity to western countries, costs, logistics, legal requirements i.e. visas, risk to journalists, relevance to national interest and news attention cycles. Additionally, with so many on-going and potentially violent conflicts in the world today, it usually takes more than warnings from humanitarian nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to get the international media interested in simmering conflicts. “Since coverage of conflicts that might explode in violence is unlikely to boost ratings, these conflicts are usually ignored,” (Jakobsen 2000: 133). These values understandably make it challenging to use the news media for peace, as they usually tend toward favouring violence. Dramatic images of wide-spread human suffering are considered by many journalists and media houses to sell better than pictures

of United Nations troops quietly performing peace-keeping efforts. International news channels and newspapers pay minimal attention to the successes of preventive democracy, usually because these are invisible. “When preventive democracy succeeds nothing happens and this makes successes hard to find” (Jakobsen 2000: 133). Rather, “a trigger event such as an exodus of refugees or a massacre is usually required and the crisis must be photogenic and dramatic: a short bloody war is better than a drawn out stalemate” (Jakobsen 2000: 133).

2.10. War or peace journalism

History has shown that the news media can incite people towards violence (Bratic and Schirch 2007: 7; Kempf 2007). Today, the media’s impact on the escalation of conflict is more widely recognised than the media’s impact on peace-building. In an attempt to rethink journalism’s role in times of conflict, peace studies founding father Johan Galtung presented the idea of peace journalism in the 1970s (Cottle 2006; Lynch and McGoldrick 2000). Differentiating between journalism of the “low road” and “high road” Galtung describes the former as comprising a journalism which “sees a conflict as a battle, as a sports arena or gladiator circus” (2006: 4). The actors, or in the case of conflict, political parties involved, are usually reduced to two, and are “combatants in a struggle to impose their goals” (2006: 3). He suggests the reporting is modelled on that of a military command, including information on who advances, who capitulates short of their goals, with losses being counted in terms of numbers killed or wounded and material damage. This reporting, prevalent in the news media, encourages a zero-sum perspective and draws on sports reporting, in which “winning is not everything, it is the only thing” (2006: 3).

Working from the premise that the news media tend to report on conflict in ways that escalate tensions and contribute to a zero-sum portrayal of events, Galtung’s reconceptualisation of journalism offers an alternative: journalism as part of the solution rather than the problem (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2008). Breaking with traditional journalistic codes, peace journalism advocates a view of journalism as potential peace-maker and force for change (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007). Premised on the notion of conflict resolution as one of its recognised values which combines journalism with peace

as an external aim, peace journalism aims to promote conflict resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation, much like the facilitative role outlined above (Shinar 2007: 1).

For Galtung, the news media have a responsibility, particularly during times of conflict, to report in such a way as to encourage and facilitate peace-building (2006: 4; Blasi 2004). Noting that the media prepare, “consciously or unconsciously, the premises for a dramatic choice”, Galtung advocates a journalism of responsibility, in which journalists and editors make conscious choices for the promotion of peace-oriented content (2006: 4). For Lynch and McGoldrick, this means conscious choices on the part of the editorial staff, including journalists and editors, to report on news in ways that encourage nuanced understandings and non-violent responses to conflict (2005). One of the ways this is encouraged is through the inclusion of a range of sources, which encourage a multi-dimensional and nuanced view of conflict as a complex phenomenon involving a range of social actors and sometimes, a multiplicity of issues. Conventional conflict reporting can exacerbate the zero-sum game portrayal as it usually favours elite sources and limits the amount of sources to one or two. Peace journalism, by contrast, seeks to include a range of voices and preferably those on the ground, to enable as broad an understanding of the issue as possible. In practice, peace journalism is peace-oriented, truth-oriented, people-oriented and solution-oriented, while war journalism by comparison is war-oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented and victory-oriented (2006). As such, for Galtung the premise of peace journalism is to expand the conflict discourse to include “peaceful outcomes and processes, making peace perspectives visible” (2006: 4).

To be sure, peace journalism has received a fair amount of criticism, mainly for being a naïve form of realism and for failing to address the realities of daily news production cycles and demands (Dente Ross *et al.* 2011). Criticism wielded against peace journalism centres on the structural incompatibility of values of mainstream journalism, namely objectivity, neutrality and detachment. BBC correspondent David Loyn (2003) argued that peace journalism could compromise the integrity of journalists and their role as observers. “Our task is always to seek to find out what is going on, not carrying any other baggage. If there is conflict resolution we report on it in context. We do not engage in it.”

According to Wolfsfeld (1997: 67):

There is an inherent contradiction between the logic of a peace process and the professional demands of journalists. A peace process is complicated; journalists demand simplicity. A peace process takes time to unfold and develop; journalists demand immediate results. Most of a peace process is marked by dull, tedious negotiations; journalists require drama. A successful peace process leads to a reduction in tensions; journalists focus on conflict. Many of the significant developments within a peace process must take place in secret behind closed doors; journalists demand information and action.

This criticism extends to the extensive structural constraints journalists face on a daily basis including limited personnel, time and material resources, editorial procedures and hierarchies, textual constraints, availability of sources, access to information, heavy time pressure, limited resources and tight competition, embodying what Fawcett calls the “constraining nature of the news text... In order to make use of the ‘win-win’ frames in conflict, one needs to address the power of these discursive structures, as well as the power of the political and professional cultures within which journalists operate,” (2002: 221). To claim an alternate reality for journalists within this space is simply unfeasible, according to such scholars.

Some critics have gone so far as to suggest that the aspirations of peace journalism are simply those of “good” journalism, including giving sufficient background information to conflicts, to allow rivalling parties a voice, include a range of sources and report on the atrocities of war (Luostarinen 2002: 283). However, to simply dismiss these ideas would be to endorse business as usual. Given the extensive criticism of conventional reporting, it is perhaps helpful to have an alternative to consider.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS

3.1. Introduction

This thesis seeks to analyse the discourses articulated in the news coverage of the 2007/2008 Kenyan elections as reported by the *Daily Nation* and the *Standard*. It has been suggested that the violence, which has been described along ethnic lines, was spurred on by the news media (Somerville 2011). It is therefore appropriate to examine the coverage and the discourses articulated, particularly in relation to issues of ethnicity and identity. This chapter outlines the research design and approach underpinning this study by first outlining the research question, providing an overview of qualitative research methodology, describing the sampling used, outlining critical discourse analysis as the chosen method for this text-based study and giving a brief description of the analytic strategies used in the textual analysis.

3.2. The research question

The research question motivating this study is: how did the press coverage relate to the occurrence of violence in Kenya during and after the elections? To this end, I focused on the coverage of two newspapers and narrowed my research question to: how did the *Daily Nation* and *Standard* variously cover the elections? The subtext to this question which informs this study is to probe how the dominant discourses articulated the issues of ethnicity that underpinned the violence that occurred along ethnic lines. In other words, can the mainstream Kenyan press be said to have contributed to the escalation of post-election violence through their coverage of the country's 2007/2008 general elections or, alternatively what discursive work did they do in that context? This research incorporates the view that omission to address pressing issues must be understood as a consequence of processes of considered selection and construction on the part of the producers of the message. These questions are investigated by exploring the nature of the coverage in the *Daily Nation* and *Standard* drawing on qualitative methods as outlined below.

To explore this question, this research critically analyses the discourses articulated in the two English dailies, with a particular focus on issues of representation and identity. As

discussed in Chapter Two, this research is informed by the argument that the news media play a critical role in democratic societies, particularly during times of national elections and conflict. Therefore this analysis seeks to understand the ways in which the Kenyan news media reported on the elections and subsequent post-election violence with a view to understanding the role played by the press at this time as well as the subject positions proposed in the coverage. The two newspapers were chosen given their prominence as the leading English dailies in Kenya, and because they provide a platform for discourses to be analysed.

3.3. Qualitative methodology

Positioned within the poststructuralist understanding of the constructed nature of media representations, this analysis draws on qualitative research methods to explore the media coverage and the subject positions proposed in the Kenyan 2007/2008 general election and the ensuing post-election violence. Rooted in the belief that “social phenomena are discursively constituted”, constructionism enables a view of “how things come to be as they are, that they could be different, and thereby that they can be changed” (Hammersley 2008:110). This interpretive approach to social research is concerned with understanding people’s perspectives, lived experiences and engagement with meaning-making, while retaining a view of meaning as an ongoing creative process of producing and maintaining systems of meaning and value (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 28; Christians and Carey 1989: 356). Qualitative research relies on contextual understandings of social phenomena, requiring an understanding of the social, cultural and historical contexts that influence people’s lives (Bryman 1984; Babbie and Mouton 2001). Concerned with specific case studies such as the one under review in this analysis, qualitative research aims to provide in-depth descriptions and understandings of events in which phenomena are viewed holistically (Babbie and Mouton 2001).

3.4. Sampling

Concerned with the discourses articulated and the subject positions proposed in the coverage of the Kenyan 2007/2008 general election, this analysis draws on the news coverage in the weeks leading up to and immediately after the election. The time frame serves to delineate a specific ‘moment’ or case study in Kenya’s history, to provide a portal for exploring many related issues of representation, ethnicity, nationalism and conflict. The period under analysis, the six weeks that include the election campaigns, the vote and ensuing post-election violence, effectively enables a case study which allows for deeper understanding of the elements involved. Whereas the findings may not be generalisable given the specificity of the period under analysis, this analysis aims to add value to the understanding the role of the press in fuelling existing political tensions through their treatment of various ethnic, national and class-based identities, an area in which there has been minimal research.

Purposive sampling was employed in the selection of which articles and editorials to analyse for this research. The period under review comprises a total of 10 texts, consisting of front page news stories featured in the *Daily Nation* and the *Standard*, as well as editorials related to the elections. The sample includes four editorials from the *Daily Nation*, two editorials from the *Standard*, one front page news story from the *Daily Nation* and three front page news stories from the *Standard*. These articles are listed in Appendix 1-10. The range of articles covers the official start of the campaigns on 3 December 2007, and runs until 15 January 2008, when the post-election violence started to subside as a result of international peacekeepers’ interventions. Chapter Four comprises the 10 critical discourse analyses of a combination of editorials and front-page news articles from the *Daily Nation* and *Standard* which constitute this study. The texts for analysis comprise six editorials and four front-page news articles, and represent both publications equally, with five sourced from each newspaper. Specifically, this includes four editorials and one news article from the *Daily Nation*, and two editorials and three front-page news articles from the *Standard*. The news articles and editorials have been selected for they are concerned with key moments of the extended narrative of the

elections as narrated in these newspapers, during both the pre- and post-election periods and therefore form an appropriate sample of the way both titles covered the elections.

Within the six-week period, the purposively sampled articles for this analysis include:

	<i>Daily Nation</i>	<i>Standard</i>
1	<i>Daily Nation</i> . 2007. Nip poll violence in the bud at once. Dec 3:10. (editorial)	
2		<i>Standard</i> . 2007. Why a win is a must. Dec 7:1. (news)
3	<i>Daily Nation</i> . (2007) Violence: ECK should have acted sooner. Dec26:10. (editorial)	
4	<i>Daily Nation</i> . (2007) D-Day: You decide. It's not a war, it's only an election. Dec 27:1. (editorial)	
5		<i>Standard</i> . (2007) Your vote, your choice. Dec 27:1. (editorial)
6	<i>Daily Nation</i> . (2007) Chaos as Kibaki sworn in. Dec 31:1. (news)	
7		Ongiri, I. 2008. I acted under a lot of pressure, says Kivuitu. <i>Standard</i> . Jan 2:1. (news)
8	<i>Daily Nation</i> . (2008) Save our beloved country. Jan 3:1. (editorial)	
9		<i>Standard</i> . (2008) Save our beloved country. Jan 3:1. (editorial)
10	<i>Standard</i> . (2008) A slow start in search for peace. Jan 4:1. (news)	

Figure 1. Chronological list of articles and editorials that comprise the sample of this study.

3.5. Critical discourse analysis

Premised on the constructivist approach to representation and the role of the media discussed in Chapter Two, this thesis employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) to establish the discourses articulated in the *Daily Nation* and the *Standard* in relation to class, race and ethnicity (Purvis and Hunt 1993; Richardson 2007). The CDA draws on Fairclough's three dimensional model which includes textual analysis, an analysis of discursive practices and social analysis (Janks 1998; Richardson 2007). At the micro level of analysis this thesis employs linguistic strategies as outlined by Fairclough (Fairclough 1989; Richardson 2007) and Janks (1998) while at the macro level of analysis narrational and rhetorical tools, as advocated by Richardson (2007) and Silverstone (1999) are employed, thus enabling a holistic approach to the analysis.

As a textual approach, CDA links linguistic and social analysis to analyse the discourses being articulated (Wood and Kroger 2000; Richardson 2007). CDA is concerned with social problems, and retains a focus on the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures (Richardson 2007). Power relations are a central tenet of this approach, and CDA is concerned to analyse power within discourse and power over discourse (Richardson 2007). Society, culture and discourse are dialectically related and inextricably linked, as "society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same time constitute discourse" (Richardson 2007: 26). CDA implies that discourse, that is language in use, should be viewed as a form of social practice, a dialectical two-way relationship in which the discursive event shapes and is in turn shaped by situations, institutions and social structures (Fairclough and Wodak 2005). CDA is interpretative as, "critical analysis implies a systematic methodology and a relationship between the text and its social condition, ideologies and power-relations (Wodak 1996: 17). Consistent with Foucault's concern with historicity, discourses can only be understood in relation to their context, as they are historical.

Based on the premise that language use contributes to the reproduction of social life, and subsequently to the perpetuation of inequalities, CDA “seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships”, particularly those with an imbalance of power such as relationships of disempowerment, dominance and discrimination (Richardson 2007: 26). This also involves analysing them in relation to production, reproduction or contestation of social inequalities (Richardson 2007: 26) for CDA is primarily concerned with power relations and making visible the seemingly invisible power dynamics (Titscher and Jenner 2000: 151). To this end, “questions of power are of central interest” as “power and ideologies may have an effect on each of the contextual levels” of production, consumption and understanding of discourse (Titscher and Jenner 2000: 151).

Crucially, because “reality can never be reached outside of discourses”, it is discourse itself that has become the object for enquiry and analysis (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 21). Certain discourses are privileged over others, reinforcing some at the expense of others. As noted in Chapter Two, there are always a plurality of discourses in contestation to secure meaning, with some being given precedence over others and entrenching themselves as hegemonic discourses.

3.6. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model

Conceptualising CDA as the “analysis of relationships between concrete language use and the wider social cultural structures”, Fairclough’s approach provides an accessible method of undertaking CDA including the three dimensions of text, discursive practice and social practice (Fairclough 1999). In order to fully engage with and understand texts, Fairclough argues, it is necessary to analyse it at the level of its form and function, how it relates to processes of production and consumption, and lastly the relation of this to the broader social context in which the text exists (Fairclough 1999). Based on the idea that texts exist in relation to one another and in relation to the social context, this three-step approach, with its micro and macro-focus, enables an analysis of how discourse “relates to and is implicated in the (re)production of social relations – particularly unequal, iniquitous and/or discriminatory power relations” (Richardson 2007: 42). The model includes textual analysis, which involves the analysis of propositions, how they are

structured, combined and sequenced; analysis of discursive practices of production and reception such that the analysis shifts beyond merely textual analysis; and analysis of the text's "socio-cultural practice" or social environment within which it has been produced and consumed (Fairclough 1995: 57).

3.7. Textual analysis

Textual analysis involves analysis of the text itself and includes attention to micro-textual elements. Linguistic approaches foreground vocabulary, grammar, syntax and sentence coherence (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002), while multi-modality approaches include attention to the grammar of imagery too (Kress 1996). According to Fairclough (1995), one has to consider two major aspects when analysing texts, including the structuring of propositions (the representation of individuals and other social actors and the clauses representing actions, processes and events) and the combination and sequencing of propositions (concerning the organisation of the clauses into a structured whole) (Richardson 2007: 46). The latter constitutes the macro level of analysis and to interrogate the combination and sequencing of propositions, given to the larger narrative and/or arguments presented. At the macro-textual level, this analysis includes analytic strategies drawn from Cultural and Media Studies, specifically narrational analysis informed by the approaches of Propp, Todorov and Levi-Strauss. Rhetorical analysis explores what arguments are put forward by the newspapers particularly concerning identity and representation, and linguistic analysis (Richardson 2007: 47). The following section expands on the models of analysis employed in this research.

3.7.1. Models of narrative analysis

Todorov's narrative model

Todorov proposes that every narrative comprises five stages, which include a state of equilibrium; disruption of the equilibrium by an external force; recognition of the disruption; an attempt at restoring the initial equilibrium; and lastly, a return to an altered equilibrium (Wigston 2001). This model is useful in that it helps to uncover the

privileged position in that its portrayal of the initial equilibrium speaks to the discursive positioning of the narrative, and what it favours (Prinsloo 2009). Consequently, the framing of the disruption suggests what the narrator considers to be problematic (Prinsloo 2009).

Proppian character functions

Vladimir Propp developed an approach to studying narrative (specifically Russian folk tales) that has been embraced in studying media texts and productions. He identifies both narrative and character functions and it is the latter that becomes a model of seven broad character types. These functions are less concerned with the actions of the characters and more with what they do to enable the narrative's progression (Fiske 1987). These character types show the progression of the narrative structure, as explained by Todorov's stages, and are outlined in the table below:

Character type	Function
Hero	Embarks on a quest
Villain	Struggles against the hero
Donor	Prepares the hero or gives the hero some magical agent
(Magical) Helper	Helps the hero in the quest
Princess	Marries the hero, often sought for during the narrative
False hero	Perceived as good but emerges as bad
Dispatcher	Makes the lack known and send the hero off

Figure 2. Summary of Proppian character functions (Fiske 1987)

Levi-Strauss' binary oppositions

According to Levi-Strauss, story is comprised of oppositional pairs, which work to create meaning when placed in opposition to one another (Wigston 2001). Particular social orientations, attitudes and interests are privileged over others as one construction is privileged over the other (Prinsloo 2009). Lexical choices and referential strategies play a key role in the construction of binary oppositions. These are helpful in enabling the researcher to understand what constitutes the disruption, and other binaries in the form of character functions such as hero and villain.

3.7.2. Rhetorical analysis

Rhetorical theories of argumentation consider the role of the arguer, audience and argument in the effectiveness of argumentative discourse (Richardson 2007: 151). This is useful to this research as analysis of the arguments enables a focus on the ways rationalising takes place and what positions the coverage legitimates. All of these components interact with one another during argumentation and are premised on the idea that argumentation is active, social, and involves a joint process between participants (Richardson 2007: 151). The three varieties of rhetorical discourse include forensic, epideictic and deliberative rhetoric. Forensic rhetoric involves any type of argument in which an actor defends or indicts some past actions (Richardson 2007: 157). Through accusation or defence it focuses generally on the justice or injustice of actions committed (Richardson 2007: 157). Epideictic rhetoric is concerned with censoring or giving approval in the present (Richardson 2007: 157). This type of rhetoric is concerned with the character of actors, and focuses on encouraging admiration or dislike based on the nature of their actions (Richardson 2007: 157). Deliberative rhetoric is concerned with the desirability or disadvantage of a decision in the future (Richardson 2007: 157). It operates through inducement and dissuasion, usually regarding the advantageous and disadvantageous (Richardson 2007: 157).

3.7.3. Linguistic analytic tools

Lexical analysis

Lexical analysis is concerned with the choice and meaning of words (Janks 1997; Richardson 2007). Words articulate the value judgments of society (Richardson 2007). Examples of lexical choices include naming and referential strategies, which serve to describe an individual as one thing or another (Richardson 2007: 49). This “can serve many different psychological, social and political purposes” on behalf of the speakers or writers (Richardson 2007: 49).

Transitivity

Forming the base of representation, transitivity describes the relationships between actors of a narrative, with a focus on the roles they play in the narrative (Richardson 2007: 54). “The study of transitivity is concerned with how actions are represented; what kind of actions appear in a text, who does them and to whom are they done” (Richardson 2007: 54). The components considered then include participants, the process and circumstances associated with the process. This analytic strategy recognises that in constructing a text myriad selections are made, and that “every text which has been produced could have been produced differently” (Richardson 2007: 54).

Modality

Modality is concerned with judgments, comment and attitude in text and talk, and specifically the extent to which the speaker or writer is committed to the claim being made (Richardson 2007: 59). Modality usually takes the form of modal verbs and adverbs, and is expressed in two principal forms including truth and obligation modalities. These are of particular importance during elections, considering the importance at this time of what is being constructed as truth and what are the obligations presumed of citizenry.

Metaphor

Metaphor involves perceiving one thing in terms of another (Richardson 2007: 66). In relation to this analysis, identification of the metaphors deployed indicate the way in which the elections are constituted (often as a zero-sum game through war and sport metaphors as shall become evident).

3.8. Discursive practice

Discursive practice (the middle dimension of Fairclough's model) refers to the way language is used to produce and consume texts – to consider how texts shape and are shaped by social practice (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 69). In this view, language is understood to include all texts regardless of form (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). In a circular flow, the text also influences the production and consumption process, in that “those discourses and genres which are articulated together to produce a text, and which its receivers draw on in interpretation, have a particular linguistic structure that shapes both the production and consumption of the text” (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 69). Significant here is the context of journalism production in Kenya, as described in Chapter One.

Key concepts in Fairclough's approach include inter-textuality and interdiscursivity, which are premised on the idea of the text as interrelated with social practice, production and consumption (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 139). He contends that all texts draw on other meaning formations, and that a range of discourses exist at any one time.

Fairclough (1999) considers how different discourses are articulated, within and between texts, and how they reinforce dominant or hegemonic discourses (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 139). Dominant discourses serve to reinforce meaning across a range of texts, and it is this process which can contribute to social change, that Fairclough's interdiscursivity and inter-textuality provides an opportunity to unearth (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 169).

3.9. Sociocultural practice

An analysis of sociocultural practice involves both discursive and non-discursive elements (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 69). With the aim of exploring the links between language use and social practice, discourse analysis enables a consideration of whether dominant discourses reinforce or challenge the existing order of discourse. The order of discourse is comprised of relations between different discourses, such that they influence

and are influenced by one another, with dominant discourses wielding more social power. As noted above, it is Fairclough's contention that there are always counter-discourses circulating amongst those dominant ones, which challenge and contest the status-quo. The socio-cultural context in this study consists of the 2007 general elections in Kenya.

In relation to this approach and how it works within my study, it must be pointed out that the socio-cultural context has been established in Chapter One. The production aspect of discursive practice has similarly been outlined in the discussion of the news media in Kenya. What is not addressed here is the reception aspect of discursive practice as the focus here is a contextualised textual analysis. Certainly a reception analysis would be a valuable addition but is beyond the scope of this study.

3.10. Conclusion

My research aims to investigate the news coverage of the 2007/2008 general elections, with a specific focus on the representation of national and ethnic Kenyan identity. This is undertaken within a qualitative framework with critical discourse analysis as the method of choice to consider the discourses articulated in the two newspapers. The next chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the data selected for this research.

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSES

4.1. Introduction

Election campaigns constitute one of the most significant processes of a democratic society, providing the opportunity to scrutinise how the media engages with questions of democracy. An analysis of the newspaper coverage of a national election can produce unexpected findings and speak to the range of interwoven discourses articulated during this significant time within a democratic society. The value of focusing on “particular moments or occasions”, in this instance the 2007/2008 Kenyan general election, it has been suggested, lies in their “throw[ing] up [of] challenges to the way people imagine and construct themselves” (Prinsloo 2009: 81). Events such as the 2007 elections serve as catalysts for a range of discursive positions to be taken up and enacted in the news media. A close examination of the selected news articles and editorials from the election campaign and subsequent post-election violence serves to reveal discourses that are normalised and “so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us, that because of that we do not perceive them” (Davidson 1997: 2). Of particular interest to this analysis is how the coverage of the election in two selected English-language Kenyan newspapers understood and constructed various subject positions and identities in relation to ethnicity.

4.2. News coverage of the election campaign period

This chapter presents ten critical discourse analyses of both the 10 front-page news articles and editorials over a six-week period. These present a brief synopsis, followed by the analysis.

4.2.1. *Daily Nation*. 2007. Nip poll violence in the bud at once. Dec 3:10.

(Appendix 1, page 123)

Synopsis

Election-related violence is described in the opening paragraphs as having come to characterise the polls every five years, a result of “political disagreements” between supporters of opposing parties. This has occurred so far in Molo, Mt Elgon and Tana

river. According to the editorial, this has happened every election since 1992. A perceived lack of accountability on the part of those responsible is noted by the publication in the fourth and fifth paragraphs, which pose the question: why does the government not manage the unrest better so as to avoid outbreaks of violence during election time. One example is given in the sixth and seventh paragraphs, namely the lynching of a 17-year-old youth in Nairobi, allegedly for wearing a t-shirt that identified his political affiliation (which, it must be noted, remains unidentified in the editorial). The *Nation*'s efforts to increase awareness of the need for government to contain the violence by holding the perpetrators accountable is outlined in the eighth, ninth and tenth paragraphs, which calls on state security forces to pre-empt the unrest regardless of whether they stand to lose support by doing so.

Analysis

The editorial's headline, 'Nip poll violence in the bud at once' is a direct injunction to government, and this theme is carried through in the piece in which the *Nation* makes repeated calls to government to address the violence and hold those responsible to account. That 11 people lost their lives in one town over the past month is indicative of the violence. The *Daily Nation* recognises the violence, which in Todorov's terms comprises the disruption of the narrative, and identifies itself as working towards its containment. The publication establishes itself as credible and trustworthy, serving to establish a juxtaposition between its benevolent interest in the fate of Kenyans, and government's inefficiencies. The publication presents itself as committed to the cause of finding an end to the violence, qualifying its commitment by having "written endlessly" about the issue, suggesting its long-term commitment by "not tire[ing] [of] doing so again and again".

There is also an air of empathy and solidarity with ordinary Kenyans, as the publication presumes to speak on behalf of Kenyans. Clearly positioning itself as predominantly concerned with the fate of Kenyans, the editorial employs obligation modality, stating the government "must do its duty and arrest the situation whatever the cost", suggesting as imperative the extent to which it considers the action should be taken. Such descriptions

serve to establish the publication in the role of Proppian hero: it recognises the disruption (ongoing eruptions of violence) and acts to restore the equilibrium by flagging the unacceptable nature of the violence and calling on government to take action. It also recognises that “the family” in Propp’s terms are harmed in this process. This attitude and action are in line with those embodied in the monitorial role, described in Chapter Two, and accepted by many journalists as appropriate in a democratic order, particularly during elections.

Political authorities, or more specifically members of government, comprise the villain of the narrative as their lack of commitment to finding a lasting solution to the violence exacerbates the *Nation*’s efforts at trying to find a way forward. While the violence is perpetrated by political hopefuls, the government’s failure to “pre-empt such violence” poses obstacles to the *Nation*’s quest of quelling the violence by calling for increased accountability of the perpetrators.

The portrayal of the violence is curiously vague, described as having occurred in “one town”, between supporters of contending parties as “a well-trying and successful move to disenfranchise certain communities regarded as newcomers...by chasing them away”. References to the violence include a “fresh flare-up of the clashes”, “conflict”, “violence” (three times), “something ugly”, “death, arson and general destruction”, “mayhem”, “a situation like this”, “election violence” and “this intolerance”, but no further information about the nature of the violence or the identity of the perpetrators is provided. Such descriptions speak to an avoidance of context and an unwillingness to name the perpetrators. The avoidance of detail here is worth noting, and is arguably contradicted by the *Nation*’s self-proclaimed efforts to curb the violence. This lack of relevant information prevents citizens from obtaining the necessary information, an important possibility offered by the news media during times of elections, as noted by McCombs and Shaw (1972), discussed in Chapter Two.

In addition to the above descriptions of the violence, it is referred to as a “well-trying and successful move”, “the *intended* mayhem” (emphasis added) having happened repeatedly

“since...1992, then in 1997, and now”. Such descriptions suggest a degree of orchestration and organisation, implying that its recurrence is not a random phenomenon but rather a strategic objective on the part of a particular group. The editorial notes how “it has worked every time” to disenfranchise certain communities and yet has not been contained or meaningfully resolved. The group is not named however.

Whether the ongoing violence is a result of government inefficiency or something more sinister is then debated in the editorial, which employs an epideictic argument and censure of government to raise doubts in the audience’s minds as to the origins of the violence. With a focus on the current state of politics and unrest in the country, the editorial considers whether the administration “is so helpless” as to be “unable to pre-empt such violence”, responding instead in a “lacksadaisical[sic] manner” to the trouble spots. The unlikelihood is suggested in the rhetorical question, “Are Kenyans expected to believe that the administration is so helpless...?” These examples of censure discredit the government’s “security machinery” and “security organs” which are portrayed as ineffective and lacking, but the argument does not end there. Extending this portrayal of inefficiency, the editorial makes repeated calls for those perpetrating the violence to be held accountable, by “punishing them heavily” “whatever their station in life”. This suggests that a person’s position or office influences the degree to which one is held accountable, suggesting that accountability rather depends on one’s social standing. The use of the word “even” in the statement, “even if it means latching on to those suspected of formenting it” flags the presumption that those suspected of fuelling tensions are not being held accountable. It is reasonable to expect blanket accountability in a functioning democracy. Alongside the calls for increased government accountability, accusations of self-enrichment abound, as accountability appears to depend on political connections and there is the sinister suggestion that government’s failure to curb the violence may be a result of prioritising their own interests. In debating the reasons why the government has not acted sooner to root out the violence, the editorial appears to suggest that Kenyan authorities fail to address the root causes of violence, and more sinisterly, that they are serving their own interests or those of the politically powerful in doing so.

The final paragraph sets out to deal the final blow to the credibility of government and takes the inferences one step further by suggesting that should the reason for the failure to address and contain the violence be “because someone does not want to lose votes”, this would be “a very asinine attitude”. While the statement implies a certain level of dissatisfaction with government, it is interesting, given the content of the editorial, that this is the extent of the publication’s criticism. Throughout the editorial the *Nation*’s interest in the violence and frustration at government’s lack of initiative in curbing it is clear in the compromising and somewhat derogatory references to the state’s failure to contain the situation, yet the rephrase is to limit it to poor behaviour.

In this editorial the *Nation*, an independent publication, ostensibly plays the monitorial role, professing to having demonstrated their commitment to containing the violence. According to Christians (2009), in their monitorial role the news media act in conjunction with a body of social actors providing them with a resource essential to the practice of democracy, acting as a link between (government) policymakers and the public in roles such as informer and educator, advocate of policy and critic. However, there is no reference to the reasons for the violence, or its perpetrators. It is curious that no one is identified in the editorial. Despite the elections having played out along ethnic lines there is no mention of ethnic identities whatsoever. As such, there is no background or context presented to support the publication’s argument for government to play a more active role in preventing the violence. This vagueness can be understood to be reflecting the very behaviour it criticises in the editorial – complacency and an unwillingness to hold guilty parties to account. This presents very real challenges to their assertion as a monitorial entity, and would suggest a role more akin to collaboration.

4.2.2. *Standard*. 2007. Why a win is a must. Dec 7:1.

(Appendix 2, page 124)

Synopsis

Featuring full length photographs of the top presidential hopefuls, incumbent Mwai Kibaki of PNU, ODM leader Raila Odinga and ODM-Kenya leader Kalonzo Musyoka, all wearing suits and ties, alongside a diagram of “poll popularity”, this 28 paragraph

report is typical of a tabloid layout format and runs onto the second page under the headline “Battle takes shape”. The article provides an overview of the campaign period with a particular focus on the movements and strategies of the two leading candidates, Kibaki and Odinga. The single external source of information about the campaign strategies and movements of Kibaki and Odinga comes from Professor Macharia Munene, who is validated as authoritative by the description of him as an “international relations don”.

The first four paragraphs describe the campaign and convey a sense of urgency which comes to characterise the *Standard*’s overall coverage of the elections, through the metaphorical descriptors of the “high stakes game”, “presidential battle” and “propaganda war”. Paragraphs five to 13 give a brief summary of each candidate’s position and what each stands to lose should they fail in their bid to win the election. This theme is continued in paragraph seven which summarises Professor Munene’s account of the “predicament of the three”. It is unclear if or where Munene’s account ends, as paragraphs five to 20 describe, in vague terms, each candidate’s aims and objectives and their support base, interspersed with quotes from Munene. Paragraphs 20 to 24 reference the latest Steadman opinion poll ratings, which indicate that ODM leads with 43.7 percent with PNU in second place with 39.2 percent and ODM-Kenya in third with 15.1 percent. Paragraphs 25 to 27 briefly reference Kibaki and Odinga’s latest campaign promises and paragraph 28 comments on the financing of the campaigns, said to amount to billions of shillings, and refers to how PNU candidates have been giving handouts of Sh500 000. The final paragraph details claims by Odinga and Musyoka that PNU have planned to rig the election, a theme that will recur throughout the sustained election coverage narrative.

Analysis

The article has as its central figures the three presidential candidates Kibaki, Odinga and Musyoka who, understood in relation to Propp’s character functions, are all potential heroes whose quest is to secure the presidential seat. In the case of this analysis it is helpful to hold an understanding of the article as forming part of the overarching

narrative which will be incrementally narrated during the course of the remaining nine articles and editorials. This framework however enables only one of the candidates to effectively take up the mantle of the narrative hero and be identifiable as such while the others will consequently become identifiable as the false hero, as only one will succeed on the quest to secure the presidency. Within this framework, should the politicians win and thereby succeed in their quest, their respective strategies can be understood as Proppian magical agents that helps the hero to solve his task (Braun, undated). The magical agents deployed to secure the votes that will constitute them as heroes differ across the candidates: Odinga's strategy is to promise an overhaul of the constitution and the employment of 600 000 teachers; Kibaki pledges to raise teachers' salaries. There is no mention of Musyoka's strategy.

A close reading of the description of the campaigns reveals the economic dimension. They are described as "the most elaborate campaigns" and, extending the war metaphor, they are being funded through "the most well-oiled war chests of any election", costing "billions of shillings". Clearly financial backing plays an important role in any election, but it seems to be foregrounded here as playing the biggest role yet. In addition, when considering the support bases of the presidential candidates, Odinga "has the core pentagon team", and Kibaki "has a large team of cabinet ministers" behind him. Musyoka has the support of regions of Eastern Province and "20 MPs". These references suggest the widely acknowledged reality that financial support and backing plays a role in the campaign process. Odinga and Kibaki again are privileged and described as having stronger support than Musyoka. In addition, PNU party officials are said to "have received Sh500 000 and a vehicle for the campaigns", speaking to the financial incentives to participate in the campaigns. Interestingly, these descriptions of the financial aspect supersede any mention of tangible policy positions or the privileging of democratic processes, a noteworthy observation in relation to what forces are at play in so-called democratic elections.

This attention to financial support and incentives over any mention of democracy foregrounds the role money plays in presidential elections and calls into question whether

processes of democracy and transparency are of relevance in this context. While Odinga has mobilised around an effective campaign strategy and stands the best chance of his career, leading consistently in five Steadman perception polls, Kibaki is doing “everything” and “anything” to retain power, and is portrayed as having a powerful team of supporters with financial clout behind him. He is the only candidate mentioned to have given his team any financial incentive and reward for being on his team in order to avoid losing.

Odinga is the most referenced of the three candidates, with a total of 13 descriptors. These include the following: “Raila” (five), “Mr Odinga” (one), “a 1997 loser”, “2002 kingmaker”, and “now riding on the apex of his political career”. Odinga is constructed as being impelled by a great sense of urgency as he stands to suffer irreparable damage to his political career should he lose. As such, “time is running out” for Odinga who may never return to the “highest pinnacle” of his career should he lose his “best bet yet”. Odinga is portrayed primarily through material (“riding”, “packaged”, “marketed”), and verbal processes (“promised” and “claimed”). He is credited with packaging his campaign message in a “well-outlined pledge list”, marketing the campaign and promising an overhaul of the constitution. In this way Odinga is portrayed as efficient and reliable, having a structured plan and strategy and executing it effectively, with a proven track record of delivery. He is “riding on the apex of his political career” and is well-prepared for the challenge. He also repudiates his opponents as dishonourable by claiming that the government is planning to rig the election.

Kibaki is referenced 12 times with descriptions including “Kibaki” (eight), “President Kibaki” (one) and “the incumbent”. Like Odinga, Kibaki is portrayed predominantly in material and verbal processes. As with the portrayal of Odinga, there is an inherent urgency motivating Kibaki which, in this instance, is associated with the shame and humiliation he may suffer should he lose the election.

A consideration of the portrayal of what each candidate has to lose reveals curious trends. The sense of urgency with which Odinga is portrayed is linked to the “downturn” his

career would inevitably suffer should he lose. While Odinga's greatest concern, according to political analyst Professor Macharia Munene, is the effect the loss would have on his career, Kibaki's is humiliation and damage to his public image should he "go down in history" as the first Kenyan incumbent to lose the second term. While the campaign is a "do-or-die high octane battle" for Odinga, Kibaki is described as "aware" that according to Munene, it is "bad manners for a sitting president to lose", and he and his camp will do "everything" and "anything" to avoid the "painful experience" of losing power. As such, Kibaki's material processes differ in quality to Odinga's in that they are enacted from a sense of urgency to retain power and avoid damage to his public image.

Although considered one of the top three contenders for the presidency in the sustained narrative of the pre-election period, Musyoka receives considerably less attention in the article than do Odinga and Kibaki, with a total of six references, thereby endorsing Odinga and Kibaki's dominance. In terms of referential strategies Musyoka is referred to as "Mr Kalonzo Musyoka" (once) and by his first name "Kalonzo" (four times), flagging a similar trend in referential strategies to Odinga in that both candidates are referred to consistently by their first names, suggesting a difference in hierarchy between them and Kibaki, who is only referred to by his surname, flagging a more authoritative position (Richardson 2007). Furthermore, Musyoka is described predominantly in mental and verbal processes ("knows", "is determined", "made no secret" and "claimed"). The scarcity of material processes implies a lack of a proven track record of action, unsurprising as he was not mandated to establish or complete any projects in his role as head of ODM-Kenya. While Odinga stands to lose his last chance at being president and Kibaki risks taking a knock to his public image, there is little pressure on Musyoka to win. In fact, it is a win-win situation for Musyoka, as a good performance now "would put him in good stead for big things in future" and "put him in better position in future". This is acknowledged in the statement that there is "not too much pressure" on Musyoka and that "if he fails, Kalonzo could be back in 2012". As such, this establishes Odinga and Kibaki as the main contenders, with Musyoka playing a significantly smaller role and being granted less importance.

The contestation between the candidates is articulated by employing an extended war metaphor. As noted in chapter two the use of war metaphors is commonplace in election campaign reporting (Richardson 2007), and serves to set up a dramatic scene in which there can be only one winner. Drawing on Fairclough's understanding of metaphors as generally having been so naturalised within certain contexts that "they are no longer seen as such", "Why a win is a must" deploys several war and sport metaphors. Odinga, Kibaki and Musyoka are described as the "three top *combatants*" (emphasis added) involved in "the most hotly contested presidential *battle*" with "plenty to *fight* for" (emphasis added). "Battle" is referenced three times. The campaign is described as comprised of both a "propaganda *war*" and a "perception *war*", also deploying an "advertising *blitz*" in this "high-octane do-or-die *battle*" that promises to "go down to the wire". Together with other war-related metaphors the election is depicted here as a zero-sum game in which one candidate will win everything and the other lose everything. It is clear from the transitivity analysis that Odinga and Kibaki have the most to lose, albeit for different reasons, while Musyoka benefits by simply taking part. In addition to the extensive war metaphors the article reveals the use of (mixed) sports metaphors too (racing and boxing), including the election being described as a "high stakes game" (twice), "presidential race" and a "race" in which the "adrenaline kept rising" and the "presidential prize" is up for grabs. "Win" is used five times, and variations of "lose", "loss" or "losing" six times. In addition, the reference to the various opinion polls ratings suggests the progress of each candidate is being monitored by pollsters, flagging metaphors of horseracing and betting.

In its extensive use of war and sport metaphors and sense of urgency underpinning Odinga and Kibaki's desire(s) to win, "Why a win is a must" foregrounds a contest in which the (financially) strongest candidate with the most clout wins. The argument in this narrative is about why winning is imperative for Kibaki and Odinga personally, not what is best for the country. We are left with the impression of Odinga at the height of his political career and standing a decent shot at winning, given his consistent lead in five opinion polls, and Kibaki as financially powerful and capable of doing anything to retain power. It is significant that handing over power is described as "painful". This

description is consistent with the warring metaphor and establishes the tension inherent in the competitive electoral process.

Yet this act of handing over power forms the heart of the democratic process in which the public are given a voice and agency to choose their leader who is subject to the laws and regulations of democracy. That the top two candidates are “locked in a statistical dead-heat” in a zero sum game in which each stands to suffer irredeemable losses, framed within the absence of mentions of democracy speaks to the constructions of politics prevailing in Kenya.

Equally important to consider is what is omitted in this version. Extending the metaphor of a sports match as a frame in which to read the narrative, one can understand the article as comprising largely of a competition between Kibaki, Odinga and to a lesser degree Musyoka, which is largely of personal significance given what they stand to lose, rather than a case of national significance. The competition appears to be taking place outside of the allegations of rigging and corruption as well as the cases of violence that have occurred so far.

In addition to the silence on democracy, this article reflects the previous analysis’ disavowal of ethnicity and ethnic politics, with no mention of influence or support, despite this having been acknowledged to be at the very least a contributing factor in the elections and subsequent post-election violence (Somerville 2011). The only mention of geographical location from which ethnic affiliations can be deduced is of Musyoka having the support of areas of Eastern Province, inhabited by predominantly minority ethnic groups. There is a curious absence of description of Odinga’s “community” whose support he risks losing. This is curious considering that the elections were widely considered to have been decided along ethnic lines, and certainly in which the role of ethnic differences is thought to have played an important role in the eruption of post-election violence. By not identifying and acknowledging such issues, the *Standard* is implicitly denying them or condoning them, and distancing the leaders from the allegations and violence, as though they were in their own boxing ring and had nothing to

do with the build-up to the match. In terms of the role of the press during elections, this comprises the collaborative role, whereby the *Standard* condones the status quo by ultimately demonstrating an unwillingness to challenge it.

4.2.3. *Daily Nation*. 2007. Violence: ECK should have acted sooner. Dec 26:10.

(Appendix 3, page 126)

Synopsis

Featured in the *Daily Nation* on 26 December 2007, the day before the national elections, the editorial comprises nine paragraphs detailing the ongoing violence, claims of vote rigging and allegations of incitement by political officials which became a recurrent theme of the campaign period. The editorial begins by initially praising the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) for its role in fining perpetrators of poll violence.

The geographical location of the violence is noted in the second paragraph, along with vague references to assaults on politicians and their supporters. Descriptions of the orchestrators of the violence are equally vague – the publication notes that the “youths” allegedly perpetrating the violence have been hired by elite individuals, but no further descriptions are offered. Maintaining this elusive tone the publication calls for the rooting out of poll violence and calls for decisive action against the instigators of the violence. The fifth paragraph calls for the ECK to implement early detection mechanisms to avoid the repeat of such violence in future elections, with increased punitive measures. This call for better accountability is continued in the following two paragraphs to argue that the youths be heavily punished to send a message to potential instigators that no one is immune from the law and that the ECK and Attorney-General’s office should collaborate by increasing accountability mechanisms. The final paragraph includes a call to learn from the spate of violent outbreaks to avoid any repeats in future elections.

Analysis

As has been established in the two previous analyses, the election campaigns were by no means violence-free, having been marred by outbursts of violence for weeks before the

official campaigns started. Thus, the campaigns comprise the initial equilibrium of the narrative of the editorial, followed by the disruption of the eruption of violence in various constituencies, and the recognition of this disruption by the *Nation* which calls on the ECK to demonstrate increased accountability and implement early warning systems. The unobtained and desired altered state of equilibrium would occur if society learns from the mistakes and avoids repeats in future elections.

Todorov's five-stage model	Todorov's model applied to "Violence: ECK should have acted sooner"
A state of equilibrium	The election campaign
A disruption of that equilibrium by some action	Eruption of unprecedented violence allegedly orchestrated by powerful political officials
Recognition of the disruption	<i>Daily Nation</i> recognises the disruption
Attempts to restore the equilibrium	<i>Daily Nation</i> calls for increased accountability, punishment and establishment of early warning systems by the ECK and Attorney-General's office
A reinstatement of equilibrium	Ideally violence free elections (in future)

Figure 3. Todorov's model applied to Violence: ECK should have acted sooner (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:10).

Echoing the vague references of previous analyses, the politicians are unnamed in the editorial apart from a reference to "at least three candidates". They are involved in upsetting the equilibrium and disrupting attempts at the restoration of peace. They fulfil the role of the villains of the narrative as they are alleged to have been "fanning trouble" and have been fined by the ECK for their part in fuelling violence. From the statement made by the *Nation* that "the culprits should be barred from elections", one can deduce a link between the organisers of the violence and political officials. Reflecting the suggestion made by the *Nation* in "Nip poll violence in the bud at once" (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:10), the three candidates' involvement in the violence appears to be

representative of a wider trend for politicians to instigate violence by employing the services of supporters, in this case described as “youths”, to destabilise the political environment. As was suggested in the first analysis by the reference to powerful individuals who may be orchestrating the violence for their self-interest, there seem to be more instigators involved in the planning of the violence in the current analysis than just the unnamed politicians. The editorial refers to them, the “instigators of violence” and “those violating electoral rules”, as “criminals” and “culprits” comprising “well-placed” and “powerful individuals”.

A transitivity analysis makes explicit the editorial’s construction of the perpetrators. They are referenced through a combination of mental and material processes including “orchestrate”, “abet”, “plot”, “plan”, “mask” (mental) and “pay for” and “carry out” (material), portraying them as conspiratorial, scheming and financially powerful individuals colluding with youths to instigate chaos. Their ability to carry out their “nefarious designs” is due to their access to resources, which renders them powerful and effective.

Perpetrators of violence	Transitivity analysis
“orchestrate” (violence)	Material
“abet” (nefarious designs)	Material
“plot” (dangerous activities)	Mental
“plan” (nefarious designs)	Mental
“pay for” (nefarious designs)	Material
“carry out” (dangerous activities)	Material
“mask” (nefarious designs)	Material

Figure 4. A transitivity analysis of the perpetrators in “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:10).

Such references to the politicians serves to construct them as corrupt, influential and dishonourable and in so doing conveys the publication’s disapproval of these violent activities by employing censure (Richardson, 2007). Drawing on understandings of epideictic rhetoric as being intimately linked to the character of those referred, the *Nation* discredits the politicians while portraying itself as credible and trustworthy.

The youths who are allegedly “always” and “routinely” involved in executing the plans of the powerful elite comprise the helpers or villains’ henchmen (the Proppian helpers), who assist the villain in achieving the desired goal of “fanning trouble” and creating an environment of political instability and volatility. Although they are agents of violence, the editorial describes the youths as “mere hirelings” who on their own “do not have the capacity to plot and carry out dangerous activities” and are working for “well-placed individuals”, thus distinguishing between them and the politicians/perpetrators as the helpers and organisers of the violence, respectively.

The ECK is granted the role of the Proppian hero in its quest to restore peace. In so doing the ECK is tasked with the responsibility of restoring the equilibrium of a violence-free election by punishing the villains and helpers for their role in fuelling violence and collaborating with police and Attorney General’s office to implement early detection warning systems and accountability mechanisms. In the advice the *Nation* provides the ECK on how to restore peace and prevent future eruptions of electoral violence, the ECK can be understood to be on a quest to manage the violence and implement specific strategies to avoid a recurrence, thus constituting its quest.

The *Nation* serves as the dispatcher of the hero – the wiser actor, it seems. While the *Nation* recognises that this responsibility falls to the ECK, they see fit to offer advice on what the ECK should do to resolve the disequilibrium and who to collaborate with. In this sense, the editor and the publication generally can also be understood in Proppian terms as the donor who provides advice. Statements such as “as we kept saying...”, “it has always been our *considered* view...” (emphasis added) and “we want to see a situation where...” position the publication as rational, credible and trustworthy, giving advice to the ECK (hero) on how to restore the equilibrium (quest of the hero). These references fulfil an important aspect involved in the construction of successful argumentation – it encourages a sense of itself as reliable and trustworthy, essential components in establishing a voice of credibility and authority (Richardson, 2007).

The *Nation* calls on the ECK to “put in place systems” and enforce “hard and fast” and “heavy” penalties to deter potential planners and prevent a recurrence of the violence. They propose an increase of fines of only Sh100 000 as this amounts to “mere pocket change” for some politicians fanning the violence. Within the framework of good governance, calling on the ECK to collaborate with police and the Attorney General’s office to “rein in those violating electoral rules”, the publication sets itself up as being concerned with the violence and its effects.

The use of praise and censure as strategies in constructing an argument involves the rhetor attempting to make the audience admire those referred to because of their goodness or dislike them because of their badness (Richardson 2007). The use of rhetorical strategies of praise and censure here establish a binary opposition between the publication, which is portrayed as rational, credible and trustworthy, and the politicians and powerful individuals involved in fuelling the violence. While employing censure in their references to the politicians and elite individuals, the *Nation* praises the ECK who “came out hard” on perpetrators of the violence, “albeit late in the day”. The publication describes the Sh100 000 as “paltry” but the principle of the fine as “laudable”.

Breaking with the first two analyses, the editorial concludes by posing a deliberative argument regarding the future of elections in Kenya by calling on all to learn from the experience and for the violence to serve as a “lasting lesson on how to manage violence-free electoral processes”. Self-constructed as rational and credible, the *Nation* presumes it “speaks” from a position of authority to advocate an avoidance of a repeat of the violence, thus acting in its monitorial capacity. The discursive work of the editorial is to imply a veneer of democracy, by acknowledging limitations of the state, and suggest that violence, in this case, is being orchestrated by the powerful elite. As with the first analysis “Nip poll violence in the bud at once” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:10), while a degree of misconduct is acknowledged in “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:10), the *Nation*’s condemnation is superficial as it does not provide the necessary information. It fails to make explicit who is responsible for the violence. In a similar vein to the first editorial, this narrative comprises a silence around

meaningful descriptions of the violence and its perpetrators and therefore ultimately lacks the necessary background and context to support its argument (against violence).

In addition to the reluctance to name the perpetrators involved, there is a lack of meaningful explanation and description of the violence itself. In equally vague terms as the first analysis, the publication refers to “several ugly incidents”, “campaign-related deaths”, “politicians beaten by intolerant rivals”, “dangerous activities”, “trouble”, “mayhem”, “violating electoral rules”, “breaking the rules” and “the situation”. “Violence” is mentioned eight times in the editorial. Despite these descriptors and two references to geographical locations (Rongo and Ugenya constituencies) the editorial does not provide further information about the nature of or reason for the violence, where it is occurring and who is involved (apart from the “perpetrators” and “youths”). These are interesting silences for a publication purporting to act in its monitorial capacity which would ideally provide this type of information to citizens especially during times of heated political activity.

The two references geographically locating the violence, specifically the “campaign-related deaths” are Rongo and Ugenya, located in Nyanza province in western Kenya, an area geographically associated with the Luo constituency and, being ODM’s Odinga’s ethnic group, an ODM stronghold. The towns are bordered by Luyha and Kisii ethnic groups, traditional supporters of ODM.

Continuing with the theme of silence surrounding the identities of the perpetrators and geographical location and nature of the violence, curious inferences can be drawn from a consideration of what the editorial suggests would be required to overcome the violence and restore peace. In a tone reminiscent of initial calls to government to find a lasting solution to ongoing violence made in the *Nation*’s 3 December 2007 editorial “Nip poll violence in the bud at once”, the editorial suggests that “...rooting out poll violence requires going beneath the masks and dealing directly and decisively with the instigators of violence”. The use of “masks” suggests a sort of veneer of democracy or electoral compliance, alluding to a facade of sorts. Perhaps an inference can be drawn that such

violations are not always dealt with “directly and decisively” given the publication’s emphasis on needing to manage and prevent further violence. Another inference involves the pressure on the ECK to implement early warning systems, which suggests that there is a lack of such mechanisms on the date of publication. This suggests that perhaps the electoral management systems are inadequate, as there appears to be little or no provision for managing such “electoral violations”.

By calling on the ECK to take responsibility for the restoration of peace and collaborate with the relevant authorities while giving them advice on what measures to take and strategies to implement, the *Nation* is demonstrating characteristics of the monitorial role in its capacity as the Proppian dispatcher and donor, one of the four potential roles played by the news media in democratic societies outlined in Chapter Two. It is noteworthy however that while the publication calls on the ECK to be accountable for the violence, it continues the earlier editorial’s refrain from explicitly naming any of the politicians or powerful individuals who have been fined for fuelling violence. As the tactic of naming and shaming can be employed as a useful strategy for warning potential suspects against certain behaviour, despite its numerous calls to the ECK it does not name any of the offenders, which constitutes a curious silence in the editorial that belies the monitorial role it appears to espouse. In the refusal to address these issues, the publication continues the theme of previous analyses in ultimately condoning government behaviour and collaborating with the status quo.

4.2.4. *Daily Nation*. 2007. D-Day, You Decide. Dec 27:1.

(Appendix 4, page 127)

Synopsis

Comprised of 18 paragraphs, the editorial consists of two sections under the subheadings, “It’s not a war, it’s only an election” and “Road to darkness”. The front-page features portrait photographs of the top three contenders – incumbent Mwai Kibaki of PNU, Raila Odinga of ODM and Kalonzo Musyoka of ODM-Kenya. All three men are photographed portrait-style wearing suits and ties.

The first section, “It’s not a war, it’s only an election”, consists of 12 paragraphs and adopts a patriotic tone. The time has come for Kenyans to choose their leaders, with the “great occasion” of the elections being used by the *Nation* to discuss five pieces of advice given by ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu for responsible behaviour (paragraph 2).

The first piece of advice calls on Kenyans to cast their ballot and not to risk wasting their vote, as outlined in the third paragraph. Paragraphs four to six stay with this theme: the “fate of Kenya and the quality of its government” rests with the estimated 14.2 million voters. Using their vote is construed here as “a measure of their patriotism”, their civic responsibility as the country “cannot be run well unless most of its citizens exercise good judgment” and vote “responsible and capable people” into office. Since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992 voter turnout has never exceeded 57 percent. The editorial described this election as a “fantastic opportunity” to change voting patterns “by giving political parties and candidates a “strong mandate to lead this great nation in peace and unity”.

The second piece of advice, which counsels Kenyans to be peaceful amidst the violent outbreaks in which several police officers have been killed, is outlined in the seventh and eighth paragraphs. The editorial stresses the desire for peace and cautions against sacrificing national security. That Kenyans act lawfully and demonstrate vigilance during this time is flagged as the third recommendation in paragraphs 9 and 10, while the fourth concerns voters having faith in their institutions and reporting any suspicions of rigging to the relevant authorities. It quotes ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu’s call to voters to uphold “what is right and fair” by “respecting each other as equals”.

The second half of the editorial, subtitled “Road to darkness” comprises the remaining six paragraphs and reiterates the subheading on the front page, “It’s not a war, it’s only an election”. Essentially this section addresses the final piece of advice to accept the results of the election. It approves of the electoral system with its various checks and balances such as checking that ballot boxes are empty before voting begins, recording serial numbers of ballot boxes, and locking the boxes (in paragraph 14). The aggrieved are advised to seek redress with the relevant authorities within the rule of law in paragraph

15, while the following paragraph introduces a curious new theme – that of modern technology and its potential to facilitate instant communication, which the editorial notes should be used for good, not ill. The paragraph ends with the statement suggestive of the allusion of a highly charged environment in which people can scarcely afford a bungled outcome. The final two paragraphs make an appeal for unity amongst Kenyans and validates Kenyans on patriotic grounds: their country is unparalleled by any in the East African region. It concludes with a call for Kenyans to be hopeful in the future.

Analysis

As is the convention of the editorial genre, it directly addresses its readers, presents its opinion and argues for particular conduct. In the quest to participate in and ensure a free and fair election, Kenyans comprise the hero of the editorial. Here, the *Nation* appeals to Kenyans to “keep the peace”, “make every effort”, “ensure peace and stability”, “act within the law”, “be fair and honest”, “watch the election carefully”, “be vigilant”, “be prepared to accept the results”, “exercise good judgment”, “put responsible and capable people in charge”, improve on “half-hearted” voter turnout and not approach the elections with the attitude of “victory at all costs”.

The citizen heroes are also cautioned (by the *Nation*) about the many challenges elections can pose. These include encountering vote rigging, intermittent violence, individuals acting unlawfully to advance their political parties and potential rejection of the election results. They are advised of what to do in such circumstances by the editor: suspected rigging should be *exposed* “by reporting it to the ECK, election monitors, observers and the agents of the various political party representatives”; to *contest* the results they should “*seek redress* in the courts of law by petitioning the results”. The editorial makes reference to various material processes, usually the actions of the hero, and warns Kenyans against “taking matters into their own hands” which would be “criminal and counter-productive”.

As with the previous analysis, “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:10), the publication again serves the Proppian character function of donor,

who prepares the hero, in this case Kenyan citizens, for their quest of voting and ensuring free and fair elections by providing them with ample advice on how to play their part in “upholding what is right and fair” and providing guidance on what to do should they feel aggrieved. Portrayed as an independent and credible authority, the ECK assists Kenyans with their quest of voting and ensuring free and fair elections by providing support and recourse should they need it. The ECK can be understood as the Proppian helper in the narrative as it is portrayed as a functioning electoral authority with the means to hold transgressors to account. Operating within a seemingly democratic voting system the ECK is described as legitimate and impartial, having implemented various checks and balances on the voting process including the option for parties to confirm ballot boxes are empty before voting starts, check and record serial numbers of boxes, seal boxes with own padlocks, and inspect and record serial numbers of ballot papers. The publication emphasises non-violence by suggesting that those who feel aggrieved by the results approach the courts with their complaints and report claims of rigging to the ECK. As such, the election is portrayed as taking place within a credible and transparent democratic system with the necessary checks and balances and means for redress. Despite its emphasis on the “formidably transparent” voting system and praise of the ECK’s accountability mechanisms, a consideration of the current political environment as it is described in the editorial versus what is being desired (in future) reveals interesting findings:

Now we have:	In the future we desire:
“tension”	“peace”
“outbreaks of violence”	“tranquillity”
“police killings”	“return to normalcy”
“suspected rigging”	“be lead in peace and unity”
“heat and anxiety”	“have a country to go back to”
“election fever”	“to get on with our lives”

Figure 5. An analysis of the binary oppositions in “D-Day, You Decide” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1)(Wigston 2001)

This analysis suggests a very different reality to the one described by the *Nation*, which portrays an ideal political environment with accountable public institutions, recourse for misconduct and frameworks of good governance. Such a representation, given its digression from the truth, is suggestive of an argument being made to try and reduce the potential violence, which is perhaps understandable given the publication's concerns, reflected in the warnings to Kenyans of the possible challenges of an election. These include vote rigging, violence, self-interest of powerful individuals and rejection of the results, with Kenyans being warned to "act within the law", "keep the peace" and "be prepared to accept the results". At the time of writing the elections were widely considered to be the most closely contested of Kenya's independent history, but such warnings could possibly serve to provide glimpses into the reality of Kenyan politics at the time, and the publication's very real fears of a bungled election and its consequences. The *Nation's* advice that "now is not the time to cry 'fire!' in a crowded theatre", is a recognition that tensions are already high at the time of writing; should the elections not be considered free and fair, it would be a "step on the road to darkness and death". One has to wonder why, given the "formidably transparent voting system", Kenyans would need such warnings from the *Nation*, unless this could be understood to comprise part of an argument against violence (for fear of the consequences).

As with previous analyses there is no further explanation offered for the "tension", "intermittent outbreaks of violence", police killings, allegations of rigging, the "heat and anxiety of the election campaign" and "election fever" and there is no description of who is perpetrating the violence. Rather a portrayal of Kenya as a successful, unified nation with the means to "look to the future with confidence", a form of deliberative argument, persists. In a similar vein to "Violence: ECK should have acted sooner" (*Daily Nation*, 26 December 2007), which calls on all to learn from the experience and for the violence to serve as a "lasting lesson on how to manage violence-free electoral processes".

Despite its repeated calls for calm and vague descriptions of violence, the *Nation* explains the violence, in which police officers were killed, once as likely being the result of people "presumably believing they were protecting the integrity of the elections and the rights of

the party they support”. This seems to recognise that the violence is the result of politically-motivated action aimed at protecting certain parties, although the publication fails to make this explicit. It in effect effaces the ongoing violence and police killings, which are referenced just once in the editorial in the seventh paragraph, contributing to the analyses’ silence on violence in an attempt to dissuade against this behaviour.

This argument is extended in the publication’s invocation of a unified Kenyan subject, referenced in relation to performing their civic duty of voting. In its appeals to Kenyans to monitor the elections and report any wrongdoings, the editorial breaks with previous portrayals and invocations of subjects and invokes a responsible, benevolent civic subject. In effect, the advice given to Kenyans invokes a particular subject who is peace-loving, law-abiding, vigilant, faithful in their institutions, fair and honest and accepting of the outcome. Tasked with “doing their civic duty” and “upholding what is right and fair”, Kenyans are constituted as rational subjects who are being expected to act with the country’s best (national) interests at heart. The signifier, “Kenyans”, is mentioned eight times. It is also relexicalised as “citizen(s)”, “our countrymen and women”, and “a people”, while Kenya is described as “the Republic of Kenya”, “the nation” and “this great nation”.

Unifying strategies abound in the editorial, extending the argument against violence, which is in effect premised on a rather misleading portrayal of a unified national Kenyan identity. Such examples include appeals to “our countrymen and women” and descriptions of Kenyans as tolerant and dynamic, having successfully created a thriving economy, unlike other east African countries. In addition, the *Nation* describes Kenyans as having seemingly “discovered the value of living in peace and working *together*”, having “*together* built a nation” with a “committed and productive workforce”. By validating “us” “Kenyans” in this way, anyone who acts outside of this construct becomes expurgated as the other.

The argument for a unified national Kenyan identity is personified in the act of voting. Described as an “opportunity to exercise a right denied billions”, “something very

precious”, as “civic duty and a measure of patriotism”, a “fantastic opportunity” and “critical to the stability of the nation”, the *Nation* attributes great patriotic and sentimental value to the act of voting, linking it to expressions of patriotism and invoking a national Kenyan identity.

The unifying strategies extend to the portrayal of Kenya’s ethnic identities, acknowledged for the first time here in this research. Kenyans are described as having successfully negotiated their “different tribes, different beliefs” for hundreds of years. While it is referenced in unifying terms, and only once, its presence is significant in that it represents the first acknowledgement in all the previous analyses of the ethnic dimension to Kenyan politics. Up until this point in the overarching narrative of the elections, ethnicity has remained unacknowledged. Its reference in this context extends the portrayal of Kenyans as a unified people, where ethnicity is considered of little importance in relation to national (Kenyan) identity.

Having established itself as a benevolent authority by offering advice to Kenyans on how best to approach the election and deal with any violence or contestations over the results the publication constructs itself as rational, credible and reliable, necessary elements in successful argumentation. In this capacity the *Nation* also speaks on behalf of Kenyans, presuming to be able to understand and represent their interests, with generalisations like “every Kenyan wants a country to go back to” and “we all want peace and tranquillity and to get on with our lives”. A powerful form of argumentation, inductive arguments such as the statements above work to reinforce an opinion, in this case that all Kenyans share the desire for a peaceful election. Although this could be a fair generalisation to make given the horrors of political violence witnessed during the election campaign and in the wake of the elections, it can scarcely be accurate considering how numerous Kenyans, fragmented along political and ethnic lines, certainly feel differently, as attested by the violence. The vague description of the violence reduces the complexity of Kenyan politics and extends the disavowal of ethnic politics that characterises previous analyses.

In its acknowledgment of the violence (disruption) and attempts to caution Kenyans against violence, the *Nation* can be understood as acting in its monitorial capacity, positioned within a framework of good governance and legitimacy. However, in negating the material reality and idealising the future, the publication presents a misleading account of politics in Kenya, and extends many of the themes of silence around violence, its perpetrators and ethnicity as previous analyses. While the publication purports to be acting with the best interests of Kenyans in mind, it once again falls short of providing an example of accountability and investigation, masquerading as a monitorial and facilitative role.

4.2.5. *Standard*. 2007. Your vote your choice. Dec 27:1.

(Appendix 5, page 129)

Synopsis

The editorial is accompanied by a photographic image of an orderly election queue with those in the front of the queue holding placards of photographs of the top three presidential candidates, Mwai Kibaki of the PNU, Raila Odinga of the ODM and Kalonzo Musyoka of ODM-Kenya. The front-page editorial is billed by a “message of peace” (all in capital letters) across the top of the page which reads “As we go to elect our leaders today, we appeal to you to rely on your inner voice to preserve harmony and security”. This focus on peace is significant given the context of the ongoing violence and anticipated closeness of the election.

The lengthy 33-paragraph editorial continues on page six of the publication under the headline “We are all responsible for a peaceful Election Day”. Page 6 similarly is dedicated to the elections and includes a photograph of ECK chairperson Samuel Kivuitu and a cartoon. The photograph presents Kivuitu wagging his finger in the manner of one instructing others. The cartoon by Kham portrays a woman casting her vote at the ballot box while five men wearing shorts, vests and boxing gloves lie sprawled on the ground, all a bit battered and bruised in the course of the contestation. The men’s shirts indicate four political affiliations: KPP, ODM-Kenya, ODM and “Others” and their facial features indicate that these are the respective party leaders. The fifth man, PNU leader Mwai

Kibaki, lies entangled between Kalonzo Musyoka and Raila Odinga. The speech bubble above the head of the woman, presumably metonymic for the Kenyan citizenry, reads, “Okay gentlemen, it’s now time for me to **decide!**”

The editorial is divided into three sections, the first comprising 11 paragraphs, the second comprising 16 paragraphs and the third comprising six paragraphs. The first section addresses the voters directly and polemically. It begins by proposing that the “most important candidate” in the general election does not feature on the ballot. This candidate, who will enable the voter to exercise their democratic right is identified as “PEACE”. Paragraphs 2 through to 4 outline what the editorial considers necessary to achieve this, reminding Kenyans that peace is the preferable outcome of the elections, and appealing to Kenyans to act within the law. Responsibility for this is given to voters. The editorial also cautions against divisiveness, against Kenyans becoming enemies with each other because they have different allegiances.

Paragraphs five to 11 dwell on peace: Kenyans should vote peacefully, wishing a good outcome for all involved, perhaps suggestive of a recognition that this might not be the case. Peaceful conditions are the prerequisite for Kenyans to exercise their right to choose their leaders. It moves to the issue of ethnicity and the necessity of harmonious coexistence. This polemic around peace moves to placing responsibility for harmony on Kenyan citizens and presumes that the elected leaders will make efforts to unite Kenyans.

The second section, beginning with paragraph 12 sums up its argument thus far: who wins the election depends on Kenyans. It moves to focus on the role of the election for the future and future generations. It does this by reminding the reader of the past. The role of the future government is identified as creating an “enabling environment” for Kenyans. Paragraph 19 onwards proposes a range of questions for voters’ reflection: which party sufficiently addresses the Kenyan dream; which presidential candidate has adequately addressed pertinent issues to enable exploitation of opportunities for the advancement of all Kenyans; which parliamentary candidate is able to mobilise the

citizenry; and which of the candidates running in the civic elections demonstrate respect for the local authorities in identifying development priorities.

In paragraph 24 paragraph the editorial uses these question to make four points. First, the importance of the election is construed here as centred on the issues of creating an enabling environment for broad improvement in the lives of Kenyans and the equitable distribution of the country's resources. Second, voters are informed that there are three elections happening on this day and reiterates that voters have an important role to play at civic, legislative and presidential levels. Third, the role of the voter in the democratic process which requires them to be actively engaged in their democratic processes. Finally, it argues against so-called "three-piece suit" voting whereby leaders are chosen with little consideration of their policies.

The last third of the editorial addresses the voter directly to remind him/her of their responsibility to vote. This responsibility is couched in terms of its global significance and turns to the role of the ECK. It proposes that the ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu should have ensured a free and fair electoral system by the day of voting. While the delivery of transparent elections depends on the ECK and the security apparatus, responsibility for transparency is also the duty of all Kenyans who should report rigging allegations to the media and the relevant authorities. The final paragraph of the editorial concludes by stating it is the responsibility of the ECK and police to ensure transparency in the day's election and to guarantee that it is free and fair.

Analysis

Similarities abound between the independent and pro-government publications' tone and content in their front-page editorials on voting day. Reminiscent of the *Nation's* "D-day, You decide" (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1), the *Standard's* "Your vote, your choice" (*Standard*. 2007. Dec 27:1) reiterates calls to Kenyans to shoulder the responsibility of

¹The "three-piece-suit" refers to the three concurrent elections, including civic, legislative and presidential.

voting and keeping the peace, invoking a moral subject amidst on-going corruption and violence.

In much the same way as the *Nation's* "D-day, You decide" (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1) the editorial is effectively a polemic that makes direct and repeated calls to Kenyans to shoulder the responsibility of voting to ensure a peaceful future for the country. It uses imperatives to do this: "you have to go and vote"; "you have to be an active participant in the way you are governed", and it invokes Kenyans to "exercise your democratic right to choose your leaders". The construction of voting as an obligation is flagged repeatedly too: "you, the voter, cannot escape this responsibility"; "you have a huge stake in deciding the future of your country"; "it is incumbent upon you to protect Kenya's nascent democracy..."; and "...you will exercise your constitutional and God-given right to choose your leaders". There is clearly a large task at hand, and Kenyans are charged with this duty for it presents the deliberative argument that "who becomes Kenya's next president is squarely in the hands of you, the voter".

Kenyans are addressed explicitly in their roles as voters, mentioning "you, as a voter" five times, as well as "you as the electorate" and "in your role as an elector". Kenyan citizens are referred to as "you" twenty six times and "your" is mentioned sixteen times. In contrast, they infrequently identify as fellow citizens for "our" is mentioned twice and "we" only once. The direct calls on Kenyan citizens to shoulder responsibility for the future of their country by voting, and by "voting wisely", construct Kenyan citizens in the Proppian character function of hero of the editorial narrative; they are being sent on a quest to ensuring a responsible outcome to the elections.

In Proppian terms the ECK and police fulfil the role of helper for their role is to ensure the rule of law and a peaceful election. The facilitation of a free and fair election is acknowledged to rest with the ECK and the police for, as the editorial notes, "...the entire world is banking on the integrity, impartiality and commitment to the democratic process of the ECK under the leadership of Mr Samuel Kivuitu". As helper, "Kivuitu and team should have ensured that the general election is free, fair and transparent" and "it is for

the ECK and police to ensure today's General Election is transparent, free and fair, and is seen to be so" and "the ECK and security apparatus must ensure delivery of these things".

The publication constitutes itself as a donor – of advice – to enable the collective citizen hero to achieve the quest identified. In "our considered opinion" the publication pleads "as a media house...appealing to all Kenyans" to "let us...ask you to ask yourself the following questions". These include which party most adequately addresses "the Kenyan dream", which candidate has addressed issues of "poverty, education, health, security, creation of wealth, equitable development and empowerment of people", which candidate is a "peoples person", mobilising *wananchi* (kiSwahili for citizens), and which civic candidate best understands the role of local authorities. According to the publication, "from these questions four important points emerge" including "the twin issues of the creation of an enabling environment to allow for the all-round improvement of the lot of all Kenyan people and the equitable distribution of the country's resources"; that three different elections, for civic authorities, parliamentary candidates and presidential candidates are happening on voting day; that "you, as a voter, have a role in the democratic process that goes beyond casting your ballot" by being an "active participant" in how "you are governed"; and encouraging Kenyans to think about the "manifestos, character, strengths and weaknesses of individual candidates".

That Kenya is presumed to be a harmonious nation is evident in statements which refer to "the *continued* harmonious co-existence of Kenya's varied races, ethnicities and religions..." (emphasis added), and calling on Kenyans to "*preserve* national harmony and security", both statements implying an existing and stable level of peace and calm. Other references are made to the "country's nationhood", "prosperity", and "nascent democracy", portraying Kenya as a flourishing democracy. This positive construction uses a forensic argument that invokes a particular past with reference to "the Kenyan dream" (twice) as "epitomised in the call of the immediate post-independence government for the eradication of ignorance, poverty and disease". The *Standard* invokes this construction of the past as inducement to "inform the present so that we may as a country decide how to grapple with the future". This leaches into the present for the same

government is credited as having given “every Kenyan inexhaustible opportunity for advancement in an atmosphere of ethnic, racial and religious harmony and co-existence”.

In the argument the editorial presents it constructs a particular account of Kenya. The construction of nation and nationhood are frequently flagged during elections. As such, the *Standard* portrays Kenya as a nation united, flagging harmonious ethnic coexistence and a fair and equitable distribution of resources as the bedrock on which the nation is united. National security, the instrument of the Kenyan state, is constituted benignly here as “pillars of the country’s nationhood and the prosperity that is engendered for the benefit of this and future generations”. This rhetoric deploys unification to invoke a sense of patriotism. While such strategies have their seduction, here it deliberately overlooks the documented ethnic tensions that have existed in Kenya since the advent of democracy along with the alleged privileging of certain ethnic groups over others since the 1960s. In addition, the “equitable distribution of the country’s resources” negates the history of unrest around land in Kenya, a topical issue in the 2007 election, which is also thought to have been allocated along ethnic lines.

This attempt at unifying extends to the publication’s treatment of the Kenyan subject, the main focus of this research. In addition to the summons to vote, Kenyans are counselled about their civic duty with the *Standard* moving to a courteous imperative as it asks Kenyans to “please remember” to “rely on their inner voices to preserve national harmony and security”. As such, the editorial shifts its attention from a civic duty to a moral call.

Kenyans themselves are constructed in two opposing ways in this editorial, which is significant given this study’s focus on identity. In their direct pleas to Kenyans the *Standard* goes beyond political awareness, in an address to a moral subject, appealing to conscience in protecting and upholding “the Kenyan dream” (mentioned twice), noting that Kenyans “have a role in the democratic process” and must “rely on their inner voices to preserve national harmony and security”, “vote for peace in your heart”, “...vote wisely...with your conscience” and “wish (peace) for your neighbour and pray for it to

prevail throughout the country”. Those who are compliant with the publication’s pleas are tasked with protecting “Kenya’s nascent democracy”, shielding it from those who would partake in “vote cheating and rigging”, and “those who would, in pursuit of personal and or vested interests, threaten to undermine it”. In contrast then to the moral subject, there exists the immoral one. Given the portrayal of Kenya as a unified nation, the question may well arise, who are these individuals who would threaten to rig, cheat and undermine Kenya’s democracy? In another plea, the *Standard* suggests that the elected leaders will be of no use if they have to “save the country from instability generated by today’s *plebiscite*” (emphasis added). If the “moral” Kenyans are unified, those who do not conform to this subject position are expurgated. Those who oppose the *Standard*’s pleas are presented as having “personal and vested interests”, threatening to “undermine” Kenyan democracy, and “plebiscite” – descriptions which stand in stark contrast to the united nation the article purports to portray.

Paradoxically, there are references to an underbelly which contradicts the portrayal of Kenya as a unified, harmonious nation ahead of the election. Statements such as, “*when* peace prevails you will be able to exercise constitutional and god-given right to choose leaders *of your own volition* and *without inducement or coercion*” (emphasis added), and “*when* there is peace and the country is united solidly...” (emphasis added) imply a level of unrest as the publication looks to a peaceful future. It implies that peace does not prevail and it gestures to the coercion and inducements that accompany these elections. While these are sedulously avoided here, reference has been made to individuals, described as the powerful elite, orchestrating violence out of self-interest (“Nip poll violence in the bud at once”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:10; “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:10).

In addition, while references to the “ethnic, racial and religious harmony and co-existence” imply unity among Kenyans, statements suggest otherwise: for example, “it will be natural for the leaders you choose today to move to unite the country behind them because elections divide people because they are called upon to make choices” and “the elected president...must unite and rally the people behind them”. Both statements reveal

an awareness of fragmentation and division among Kenyans ahead of the elections in spite of the attempt to paper over these cracks. The recognition that “elections divide people” in particular implies social dissolution at times of voting which must be repaired afterwards. One might consider why the publication deems it necessary to remind Kenyans of this if they are already coexisting in “continued” ethnic, racial and religious harmony. This acknowledgement of disharmony occurs right in the opening paragraphs when the *Standard* reminds Kenyans that “choosing one candidate over another does not mean that the person you did not vote for is your enemy”, and that “supporters of the person you did not vote for must remain your good friends, neighbours and countrymen and countrywomen”.

Far from the idyllic portrayal of Kenya it would prefer, the *Standard* is making use of deliberative argument to dissuade against particular conduct to avoid a state of disaster. In distinguishing between what the *Standard* tries to convey and the actual circumstances at the time of voting, it is helpful to consider what the *Standard* suggests is at stake for Kenyans if they do not vote and if the election does not go smoothly. According to the article, the future of Kenyans is inextricably linked to the outcome of the elections: “An even more important reason you should vote today is that this General Election is about Kenya’s future. By Kenya’s future we mean your future and the future of the children of your children.” Similarly, continued harmonious co-existence will be “for the benefit of this and future generations”. While this call is an emotive one in relation to the more distant future, the consequences of a botched election have more immediate consequences, suggested in the statement that newly elected leaders will be “of no use to Kenya” if they are preoccupied with “save[ing] the country from instability”. Such descriptions portray a nation on the brink, requiring peaceful interventions and unifying of its people, functions which the editorial attempts to fulfil.

In its disavowal of ethnic tensions (save for one brief mention), unrest about land ownership and government accountability, the publication pontificates, using ideal portrayals of Kenya and revealing that while issues of ethnicity, allocation of resources and government accountability are not acknowledged, they are implicit and crucial

aspects to the socio-political climate. While it appeals to Kenyans to make an informed decision when casting their vote, it provides no critical engagement of topical issues of the elections, opting instead for an idealised portrayal of Kenya and Kenyans in an attempt to dissuade against violence.

The fact that the publication does not discuss these issues which are widely acknowledged to be of crucial importance in politics in Kenya suggests an argument made by a pro-government publication, which evades criticising the current leaders or party leaders and implicitly supports the existing regime. Having overlooked these issues, the article appeals to unity among Kenyans at all costs, warning of the dire consequences that could befall all Kenyans if they do not follow through, thus portraying Kenya, the ECK and police in misleading ways. Understood in this way, the *Standard* does not fulfil the monitorial role it professes. Rather, given its evasion of key issues and misleading portrayal of Kenya, the publication here plays a collaborative role with the existing regime, implicitly condoning the existing regime.

4.2.6. *Daily Nation*. 2007. Chaos as Kibaki sworn in. Dec 31:1.

(Appendix 6, page 131)

Synopsis

The front page news report runs across the publication's first two pages and features subheadings, "Kivuitu declares PNU candidate winner of State House race"; "ODM says Raila is President-elect"; "Michuki [PNU's internal security minister] suspends live broadcasts"; and "Violence erupts" below the headline. There is also a note that full results of the election can be found on pages 2-9, 14, 15, 20, 21 and the back page. The page features two photographs – a blazing fire with billowing smoke is positioned to the left of the page anchored with a caption stating that it is a house in Mathare slums, Nairobi. To its right is an image of Chief Justice Evan Gicheru in full legal dress standing next to President Kibaki, holding what is presumably a Bible, during his swearing in ceremony. Kibaki appears to be reading from a lectern, as he looks down to read his cue and speaks into a microphone. Below this photograph there is a graphic of the

“Presidential results”, and passport-style photographs of Kibaki and Odinga alongside their final voting results: 4,584,721 (Kibaki) and 4,352,993 (Odinga).

The second page where the article is run under the headline, “President sworn in for second term amid violence in various towns” is positioned below the banner, “Kenya decides”, at the top of the page. The article includes a photograph of Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) Chairman Samuel Kivuitu addressing a press conference in Nairobi anchored with the caption, “He was to announce the official results for the presidential election but was disrupted after a commotion ensued”. Alongside the photograph there is another graphic documenting the declared election results and subsequent number of parliamentary seats of the 18 political parties.

The first four paragraphs of the article portray the precarious political environment in Kenya following the swearing in of incumbent President Kibaki, noting the unrest that erupted and both parties’ claims to legitimacy (and vote rigging in the case of the ODM). Paragraphs two and three document ODM leader Odinga’s supporters’ belief that Odinga is the winner. Paragraph four notes President Kibaki’s plea to Kenyans to accept the outcome of the polls.

The remainder of the article is structured under two subheadings, “Credible elections” and “Shouting match”. “Credible elections” begins with a direct quote from Kibaki in which he thanks the ECK, security agents, observers and all other players for facilitating free and fair elections. In contrast to this account, paragraphs 6 to 8 document the unprecedented suspension by government of all live broadcasts and the Media Council of Kenya’s moves to consider a response.

Paragraphs 9 to 13 detail ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu’s response in his address to the nation just ahead of announcing the presidential winner, which is not necessarily the type of response one might expect under the circumstances. He does obliquely acknowledge the contestation of the results and notes that while the ODM had raised a number of concerns regarding the results, the ECK could not resolve these in the manner suggested

by ODM. Paragraph 14 identifies the geographical locations of the violent outbursts as occurring in parts of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kilifi and Kakamega while in contrast Kibaki's PNU supporters were celebrating in Central Province and parts of Nairobi.

Contestations over the legitimacy of the elections are documented in paragraphs fifteen to seventeen European Union chief election observer Alexander Graf Lambsdorff pronounced that the ECK had failed to establish the credibility of the tallying process. Paragraph 18 to 20 summarise the results in which only 231,728 votes separated Kibaki and Odinga. The ensuing violence discussed in paragraph 21 to 24 includes references to the violence.

The second sub-heading of the article, "Shouting match" introduces an encounter between politicians from ODM and PNU who argued over the final tally of votes for each candidate. First it references the night-long audit of results for Kajiado North and Molo constituencies on 30 December 2007. ODM secretary-general Anyang Nyong'o called on the ECK to make public the results of the audit report before announcing the winner of the election, as the ODM were insistent on a verification report being made public. Paragraphs thirty to thirty-four are confined to the unfolding of the announcement of the Presidential winner.

Analysis

Within the context of the overarching narrative this piece represents the explicit moment of disruption of the extended election narrative, as it documents the outbreak of violence across Nairobi and further afield in Kenya, as a response to delays in the announcement of the presidential winner, and then in protest to the results. The article is significant to this study as it provides a seemingly 'balanced' account of events as they unfolded, in line with journalistic imperatives. However, while appearing non-partisan, the article privileges certain individuals and political ideals over others.

First Kibaki is reported on. In the opening paragraphs Kibaki makes plain his construction of his victory as a result of a "credible" election. Unsurprisingly he is

supportive of those who have enabled his success. His account duly recognises the ECK, “security agents, observers and all other players” for “remaining committed to the conduct of honest, orderly and credible elections that have enabled the true verdict of the people to prevail”. In this sense he is portrayed by the *Nation* as a vilified leader. Having won the presidential seat, Kibaki can be understood as the Proppian hero of the narrative.

Kibaki’s claims to legitimacy are contested by ODM supporters, whose loss of the presidential seat positions their leader, Odinga ultimately as the false hero of the narrative. In Proppian terms the false hero sets out on a quest but fails. Having lost the election by a slim margin of 200 000 votes, Odinga has failed at his mission. But his loss is contested by his supporters, who are “ready to see him serve democratically”, and describe Odinga as “the legitimate president”.

ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu is the main voice of the piece and is quoted directly in four paragraphs, validating his position as the helper, as chairman of the ECK. The only other people quoted directly are Kibaki and European Union chief election observer Mr Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, suggesting the perceived importance of Kivuitu, and the organisation he heads, at this stage of events. He is afforded by far the most coverage in the piece.

The disruption of the narrative, that is the delay in the release of the results and contestation over the legitimacy of Kibaki’s victory, is dealt with in a curious fashion by the *Nation*. But there is no meaningful engagement with the current context and reasons for this. Rather, the piece contains an array of contesting opinions as to the legitimacy of the election, arguably justified as an attempt to portray a balanced view.

If the election was free and fair, it was not seen to be so, as documented in the numerous contestations throughout the piece. Perhaps in an effort to appear to provide a balanced account of events the publication acknowledges the various contestations, which include “riots and protests” in parts of Kenya; complaints from ODM leadership; a statement from ODM MP William Ntimama detailing the ODM’s plans to contest the results; a

statement from European Union chief election observer Alexander Graf in which he notes discrepancies and irregularities in the release of results; and is even acknowledged by ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu. A direct quote (paragraph twelve) by Kivuitu refers to the “mood” as “painful”. The publication does not provide context for this, but given the ODM officials’ numerous allegations of tampering and rigging in the hours leading up to the publication of this article, culminating in an audit of the results from certain constituencies, it is clearly a volatile political situation. However, the article makes no reference to the immediate context, which saw Kivuitu agree to an audit of the results already announced after facing pressure from ODM agents who pointed out that some results being announced by the ECK’s tallying centre differed from those announced at constituency level (International Crisis Group, 2008). During the audit, party agents agreed that the results of 44 constituencies already announced were untrustworthy, as they were not supported by proper legal documentation. Nineteen additional results were yet to be announced.

While the ECK is tasked with overseeing the election and ensuring its legitimacy, and is praised for doing so, references throughout the article point to the climate of political instability which work to discredit Kibaki’s rendering of the results and contradict the portrayal of the ECK as a credible institution. Suspicion delays the release of the results, which according to the article, gives rise to chaos and protests. But the publication does not engage meaningfully with the notions of suspicion and opposition. This information would provide greater context for ODM’s grievances, making a free and fair election seem increasingly unlikely. Its omission ultimately comprises a lack of information and evidence on behalf of the publication, which refers fleetingly to “this and other observed irregularities”. There is also an absence of critique of the unprecedented black-out of live media coverage by government and thus evidence of compliance by the newspaper with media censorship. No further explanation for the nature of “alarming materials” is provided. As such, the article notes the events of the day, which include a highly unusual media ban and heightened political unrest, largely due to suspicion over the legitimacy of the results, but provides no investigation or critical evaluation of these elements.

As with previous analyses, there is the problem that remains unnamed. One is left to presume that the unrest is politically-motivated, given the contested results and the ethnic support-bases of the respective parties, but there is no confirmation of this in the article. In keeping with the previous articles in this analysis, there is no mention of ethnic affiliation or indeed any information on who was involved in the violence, making the link to geographical location (and the deductions drawn from this) more pertinent. The naming of geographical locations provides an opportunity for analysis. The eruptions of violence are located in parts of Nairobi, Eldoret, Kericho, Kisumu, Mombasa, Kilifi and Kakamega. Eldoret, Kericho, Kisumu and Kakamega in the south west of the country featured prominently as violence hot spots in the 2007/2008 post-election violence, while Mombasa and Kilifi are located in Coastal Province on the south east and also saw outbursts of violence. One can only try to deduce, from these locations, which groups might have been involved. PNU's supporters, the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, who originate from the Central and Eastern Provinces are strongly represented in the Nairobi Area, Coast Province and the Rift Valley as a result of migration. ODM's ethnic constituencies are Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin, who originate from Nyanza and Western Provinces and the Rift Valley and are equally strongly represented in the major towns. ODM also has a significant following among the coastal Muslims and in North Eastern Province. The western belt is known to comprise a complex mix of ethnic groups including the Kalenjin, Luo, Luyha and Kisii and is considered an ODM stronghold interspersed with minority Kikuyu groups and PNU support bases, similar to the south east. While the article does not reflect on who the perpetrators of the violence are, this is the closest the researcher has come to deducing the ethnic affiliation of those involved in the violence based on where the violence was taking place. From this analysis it is not clear who the conflict was between, but it would appear that a mixture of ODM supporters including Kalenjin, Luo, Luyha and Kisii, and PNU supporters, Kikuyu, may have been involved.

In a sense, given the publication's acknowledgement of the contestations of the results, this might appear at first glance to provide a balanced account of events, but the structuring and framing employed suggests otherwise. Given the degree of contestation

and political climate of the time, it becomes highly unlikely that the elections were free and fair. However, while noting these issues, the publication fails to provide any critical engagement with them. Kibaki is quoted directly in support of the results, yet Odinga is absent, serving to establish Kibaki as the dominant source and lend credibility to his opinion. The selection of the subheading, “Credible elections” at the end of the fourth paragraph indicates the *Nation*’s position in support of the existing regime.

In the end, the legitimacy of Kibaki’s position, although fraught with contestation, is ultimately left unchallenged by the *Nation*, which recognises Kibaki as the winner of the elections and the legitimate president. By failing to provide context for the allegations of vote rigging the publication implicitly condones the results, ultimately failing to perform in the watchdog or monitorial capacity, and rather can be understood to be acting collaboratively with government in its portrayal of events and lack of critical insights into the reasons for the widespread unrest.

4.2.7. Ongiri, I. 2008. I acted under a lot of pressure, says Kivuitu. *Standard*. Jan 2:1. (Appendix 7, page 133)

Synopsis

The article, which carries the three-quarters of a page length large side portrait format photograph of Kivuitu looking to his left with his hand slightly covering his face, presents Kivuitu’s “damning admission” beneath the headline: “Asked whether Kibaki won election, Poll boss says: ‘I don’t know’”. He adds PNU and ODM-Kenya pushed him to release disputed results.” Three passport-style photographs of Kibaki, Odinga and Alexander Lambsdorff, the chief EU election observer, are positioned below along with a quote by each of them: “With elections behind us, it is time for healing and reconciliation among Kenyans” – Kibaki; “Kibaki must first step aside and publicly own up to the fact that he was not elected President” – Raila; “Presidential poll lacks credibility and an independent audit should be instituted to rectify things – Lambsdorff” (seemingly not a direct quote).

The article opens with Kivuitu’s admission that he announced the results of the presidential election under pressure. The announcement has had a dramatic impact on the

country as violence escalated following Kivuitu's statement. The credibility of the election is the focus of paragraphs three to five. Kivuitu admits to being unsure of who won the election, and taking the presidential election winner's certificate to State House in Nairobi under duress. On arriving at State House Kivuitu was surprised to find the Chief Justice Willy Mutunga (although he is not named personally in the article) there ready to swear in Kibaki. He further describes himself as having been pressurised and harassed to announce the results.

Paragraphs seven to eleven relate attempts by a number of ambassadors from European Union countries and Mr Maina Kiai of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights to address the complaints before announcing the results. Kivuitu admits to having considered resignation but decided against it to avoid being considered weak. He considers the contestation over the results of the utmost importance but he himself does not have the legal mandate to undertake such an investigation.

While individuals involved in coercing him are unnamed Kivuitu notes that the ECK was consulting with lawyers. Kivuitu's support for an external audit is referred to in paragraphs 13 to 16, one that would investigate the ECK's action too. Paragraphs 16 to 18 close the article with reference to an anticipated meeting of external electoral officers coming to Kenya, and an ECK house-keeping meeting which condemned the violence.

Analysis

This article, like the previous analysis, the *Nation's* "Chaos as Kibaki sworn in" (*Daily Nation*, 31 December 2007), responds to the moment of disruption: the country has been plunged into post-election violence "of a scale never witnessed before", spurred on by the initial claims of vote rigging and the six-hour delay in the release of results, and exacerbated by news of the result itself. While intermittent outbreaks of violence had plagued most of the election in its final stages, this marks the extended moment of major disruption within the overarching narrative as hundreds of people lost their lives overnight following Kivuitu's admissions.

In Proppian terms the ECK can be understood as the villain's helper within the context of a rigged election – causing harm to the members of the Kenyan “family”, having failed its quest to run a legitimate and peaceful election, a failure with dire consequences for the country as violence erupted across Kenya within hours of his admissions.

At a time when tensions were at their highest in the country, the article essentially comprises a verbatim account of Kivuitu's admissions with no further critical investigation of or explanation for his behaviour or the country-wide unrest. Kivuitu is the only speaking subject in the article, and is quoted directly seven times, positioning him as the main subject. He is described as “polls boss”, “Kivuitu” and “the embattled ECK chairman”, a continuation of the war metaphors that characterised much of the news coverage in the build-up to the election (“Why a win is a must”, *Standard*. 2007. Dec 7:1).

The *Standard* reports that Kivuitu admitted to acting “under a lot of pressure” and “does not know” if Kibaki won the elections”, statements which undermine the credibility of the institution that was publicly praised by both the *Nation* and *Standard* in the build-up to the election as being able to ensure the upholding of free and fair elections (“Violence: ECK should have acted sooner”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:10; “D-day, You decide”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1; “Your vote your choice”, *Standard*. 2007. Dec 27:1). The besieged chairman is quoted as saying he had considered resigning in the wake of the chaos, but decided against it “because I don't want people to say I'm a coward”. Here Kivuitu endorses himself as he implies that retaining his position is the courageous thing to do.

The *Standard* acknowledges the impact Kivuitu's admissions have had on the state of unrest in the country, noting Kivuitu's announcement precipitated the worst level of post-election violence the country has ever seen. However, it is interesting to note that it is the statement that is blamed and not the actions of the presidential party. The “magnitude” of Kivuitu's admission, “whose far-reaching implications are now being felt across the country” also created “the further dent in the credibility of the election”. However, the

publication stops there, failing to provide any further context or critical engagement with these issues.

In keeping with all previous analyses, very little information is given about the nature of the violence or who is involved. While references are made to the contested results as “fiercely contested” and the poll outcome as “disputed”, the nature, cause and perpetrators of the violence are again absent from this account. Kivuitu’s admission is considered the catalyst for the eruption of post-election violence, but not for why it should be so. It is referred to simply in broad terms and only once as “post-election violence” as a consequence of “national tension”. Tension presumes contesting factions and in reporting in liberal democracies it is anticipated that these would be named. Further evasion of the underlying reasons for the tension occurs in a refusal to name it: Kivuitu reifies the contestation of the results as “this matter” (twice) and “matters that arose from the poll results”. Kivuitu, presumably in a non-aligned position, admits to being harassed: he was “under pressure”, “under undue pressure”, “coerced”, “under alleged pressure to declare results”, “parallel pressure from a number of ambassadors”, and more specifically from “some PNU and ODM-Kenya leaders”. Party officials pressured him by “calling me frequently ... to announce the results immediately”. It is significant that the pressure comes from the declared victor and Odinga’s other contestor. It is also worth noting that Kivuitu’s acquiescence under pressure is not noted as cowardice by the *Standard*.

Notably Kivuitu “fell short of naming the individuals from the two parties – PNU and ODM-Kenya – who coerced him”, and no investigation is attempted by the *Standard*. Given that the *Standard* is known to be pro-government, perhaps their silence on who pressurised Kivuitu is not that surprising. Kivuitu appears to shoulder all responsibility for the chaos and violence, while being vindicated by the *Standard* in doing so. As such, the entire debacle has been explained away by one individual, with an emphasis on impartiality, a convenient portrayal by a pro-government publication.

The evasion of naming the relevant issues calls into question the role of the ECK during election time, and casts doubt over its efficacy or clout. In this way they are censured discursively in this article. Democratic societies have regulations to ensure a level of public accountability, particularly during election time, yet this article lays responsibility implicitly now at the feet of Kivuitu. Surely one would expect Kivuitu to name the individuals who pressurised him so, and one might expect the *Standard* to name the perpetrators of the violence or to enquire into this.

Despite the obvious challenges to Kivuitu and the ECK's credibility at this point, he makes several attempts to salvage an image of professionalism by referring to the ECK's commitment to act "within the law". Here the *Standard*'s portrayal of Kivuitu's statements seek to construct him as a man of conscience, appealing to the law in the midst of chaos and suggesting ways the ECK is complying. Kivuitu appears to be handing over responsibility to the legal fraternity. He is quoted as saying, "if...Raila is the President, so be it. If it is Kibaki, so be it." The *Standard*'s construction of Kivuitu tends to underplay any personal responsibility for the uncertainty as to the winner of the election: rather than implicate Kivuitu and the ECK as corrupt and compliant in the confusion, the article almost vindicates them as uninformed and impartial.

Kivuitu's explanation for announcing the results, amidst mounting allegations of malpractice, was "because the commission had no legal mandate to investigate complaints raised by the opposition immediately", giving the perception of the ECK as operating within a legal framework, or at least adhering to one. In the face of mounting cynicism, Kivuitu states that "this matter" should be "taken to court", adding that the commission was "consulting eminent lawyers" "so that its actions remain within the law". Such references presuppose, firstly, that the ECK is acting within its legal mandate and is committed to seeing this through, despite mounting evidence to the contrary; and secondly, that there is a functioning legal and judicial system in place, which appears increasingly unlikely as the reality of the elections becomes clearer.

While Kivuitu claims to be operating within a framework of legitimacy, governed by the rule of law, an assessment of the situation and his behaviour within it would suggest that unlawful behaviour abounds, and that when faced with the challenge of contested results, the ECK really has no authority to manage the situation, instead calling for external investigations to solve the dispute. The argument, yet again, is to construct the admissions of corruption and malpractice as removed from the current context. Kivuitu's admission and the *Standard's* portrayal of it seem to contradict the reality of the situation as it unfolds.

In a similar vein to previous analyses, along with a silence on the context for the violence and its perpetrators, there is no mention of ethnicity in the piece despite widespread perception that the violence had ethnic undertones. This evasive tone calls into question the role of journalism in this article – the lack of information appears to comprise a similar disavowal to that of Kivuitu. By failing to provide any critical engagement with Kivuitu's admissions and their implications, the *Standard* implicitly condones the existing regime, akin to a collaborative role.

4.2.8. *Daily Nation*. 2008. Save our beloved country. Jan 3:1.

(Appendix 8, page 135)

Synopsis

The front-page features the headline "Save our Beloved Country" with a pull quote beneath it that reads, "No grievance and no cause is worth the innocent blood of Kenyan children. The orgies of looting undermine the moral basis of the politicians' cause." It also refers to "full reports" on pages two to ten. Two large portrait-style photographs of PNU leader President Mwai Kibaki and ODM leader Raila Odinga are positioned side by side, both with stern gazes and furrowed brows, positioned as though they are engaged in a conversational deadlock. The 22-paragraph piece designated as "Comment" continues on the second page of the publication under the headline, "Save our beloved country from ruin", suggestive of a more democratic, rights-based approach.

The extent of the post-election violence is foregrounded in the opening four paragraphs of the editorial. In response to the chaos, the news media have agreed to confront the chaos and call for an end, referring to the publications' unprecedented synchronising of headlines.

The comment then focuses on the "Right to life" as indicated by the subheading. The precarious situation is described in paragraphs five to nine, with reference to the violence and calls for those in authority to respect the right to life. Despite the damage, the publication calls on political leadership to take its final opportunity to rescue the situation in paragraph 10, and help restore public confidence and safety.

Securing the safety of all Kenyans should be leaders' first priority, the publication notes in paragraph 12, as negotiations are unlikely to prove successful. The *Nation* calls on those with armies to put an end to the fighting and for leaders to involve themselves in peace-finding missions across the country. The publication makes suggestions on how the post-election violence can be handled and contained, including Kibaki and Odinga engaging immediately in negotiations to explore a power-sharing agreement, the creation of an interim government, the launch of a public inquiry into the conduct of the election, and overhaul of the ECK.

Analysis

The editorial's headline, in a similar refrain to Alan Paton's *Cry, the Beloved Country*², makes the *Nation*'s intention plain in the opening paragraphs – to join the Kenyan news media in being "forthright and united in confronting this bloodshed and disunity". In the absence of any meaningful action from their leaders, the publication recognises the disruption (violence) and addresses the chaos and violence that has claimed hundreds of lives so far and that is portrayed as a direct consequence of their leaders' behaviour. Here the *Nation* fulfils the role of the Proppian hero as it admonishes those causing the violence and attempts to restore a peaceful equilibrium. In line with this recognition, the editorial suggests ways of managing the crisis and facilitating negotiations toward a

²The intertextual reference is worth noting for its invocation of a nation in distress.

peaceful outcome, appealing to political leaders to take their “final opportunity...to pull the country back from the brink”. It makes recommendations – for leaders to find “middle-ground positions”, for Kibaki and Odinga to engage immediately in exploring a power-sharing agreement, consider the creation of an interim government, the launch of a public inquiry into the conduct of the election, and an ultimate overhaul of the ECK.

The editorial is explicit about who is responsible for “fanning the fires”, as it blames the leaders personally, for the first time holding them publicly accountable for their perceived role in the violence. Described as “the direct cause of this catastrophe”, the *Nation* refers to “political leaders on both sides”, “those in authority”, “the political leadership”, “hard-liners on both sides”, “those with armies...fanning the fires” and “leaders”. They are named personally in direct appeals made to “Mr Raila Odinga”, “Raila Odinga”, “Mr Odinga”, “Mr William Ruto”, “President Kibaki” (twice), and “Mr Kibaki” to intervene. This positions the leaders as the potential villains of the narrative, assisted by helpers (in this case, the leaders of armies). While this marks a significant change from earlier articles, it is still hedge-sitting as the *Nation* evades being specific and giving precise information, yet another act of a masquerade.

The villains are assisted by the villains’ helpers, in this case the leaders’ “armies of destruction”, “their supporters”, “Kenyans” who, “in the name of politics” and “on behalf of people whose lives of comfort and luxury are going on normally”, are destroying “their own economy, their homes and entire way of life”. The leaders’ actions are portrayed as costing Kenyans and the country dearly, although no details on who allegedly rigged and stole the election are provided. Kenya is described in the opening paragraph as a “burnt-out, smouldering ruin”, its economy at a standstill as a result of the violence. Kenya and “innocent Kenyans”, “many of them our children”, are the victims of the narrative in Proppian terms. They pay the price for politicians’ actions, with the “blood of Kenyan children” and the “cries of the 70 000”, being “slaughtered”, as “systematic killing of the innocent” sweeps the country. The publication extends the victimisation of Kenyans as their land is decimated, and serves to personify Kenya and emphasise the damage being inflicted on the land itself: Kenya as “beloved country”, “an

exhausted country”, “on the brink of civil war”, which “burn[s]”, and is a “burnt out smouldering ruin”.

The editorial makes bold statements as one in a position of authority, helping to construct an epideictic argument based on the portrayal of itself as honourable, trustworthy and committed to the cause: “there is no cause and no right more valuable than the right to life”, “no grievance and no cause is worth the innocent blood of Kenyan children”, “it **must** be a blind and deaf person who doesn’t hear the cries of...refugees”, “political leaders...**must** be told in no uncertain terms”, “it is only with the restoration of peace that reason will prevail”, “there can be no lasting peace without justice”, the “hard-line positions” taken by some political officials “are not very helpful at the moment”. The employment of obligation modality here (“must” (twice) and “will”) conveys the extent to which the *Nation* believes action must be taken to curb the violence. The statements also reflect a moral position assumed by the *Nation*, its authoritative tone explicit in the use of imperatives. Such statements suggest the publication to presume itself to be in a position of authority whereby it gives advice to Kenyans and political leaders about the state of the country and finding a (peaceful) way forward.

The authoritarian editorial articulates a patriotic discourse in its condemnation of the leaders. The publication presumes to speak on behalf of Kenyans, describing Kenya as “our beloved country”, referring to “our children” the victims of violence, and stating that politicians stand to lose credibility “in the eyes of Kenyans”. In its plea to the political leaders to overcome their differences and act to contain the violence, the *Nation* suggests that “Kenyans expect” and “they [Kenyans] expect” (twice) intervention from their leaders, thus purporting to share similar concerns and fear the further destruction of the country it shares with Kenyans. Inadvertently, such references censure the political leaders, comprising an epideictic argument in which the political elite are portrayed as dishonourable in contrast to the suffering inflicted on their citizens. The publication also sees itself as acting in a role of authority, as it admonishes Kenyans for their “unbelievable foolishness” in destroying “*their* economy”, “*their* homes” and “*their* entire way of life” (emphasis added). Thus in addition to being portrayed as victims,

Kenyans are also portrayed as unreasonable – destroying their own happiness and wellbeing is unthinkable.

The leaders are further represented as insensitive to their own people, as inappropriate leaders in their ways of excess. Their interests are somewhat trivialised by statements that “no cause is worth the innocent blood of Kenyans”, and “it must be a blind and deaf person who does not hear the cries” of Kenyan refugees. Such descriptions continue the frequent use of war metaphors as found in previous analyses (“Why a win is a must”, *Standard*. 2007. Dec 7:1). The use of censure serves to further discredit the politicians’ cause. The leaders are chastised by the publication for engaging in “tough talk, grand-standing and empty point-scoring” which the editorial notes, “is not getting the nation anywhere”. Democracies are about rule for the well-being of all, however there is a clear juxtaposition between the luxurious lifestyles of the leaders, with references made to the “comfort of their hotels and walled homes in Nairobi, whence they are conveyed in bullet-proof limousines”, and “whose lives of comfort and luxury are going on normally” and the reality of Kenyans. Theirs then is autocratic or despotic behaviour without concern for the public good. The publication appeals to leaders to “get out of their meeting rooms and into the countryside” where the violence is taking place, inferring that they are removed from the violence engulfing the country, seemingly unaffected. In stark contrast, Kenyans are living lives of poverty-stricken refugees, fearing for their safety and witnessing the “death and destruction” firsthand. These juxtapositions suggest the extent to which elite leaders are removed from the reality of the violence, while Kenyans pay the price for their leaders’ interests.

Such portrayals continue the theme, prevalent in previous analyses, of the politicians as powerful in the politically connected and financial sense, and as able to mobilise Kenyans for their cause (“Nip poll violence in the bud at once”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:10; “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:10). In these instances the publications appear to acknowledge that the politicians are capable of orchestrating the violence for their own ends, providing a noteworthy commentary on the discourse of power and privilege in Kenya at the time.

Apart from implicating the leaders as instigators of the violence, the editorial reflects similar trends of previous analyses, in its side-stepping any meaningful explanation for the cause of the violence. The violence itself is described as “orgies of looting, burning, rape and wanton, well-orchestrated blood-letting”, “systematic killing of the innocent”, “spread of disaffection” and “slaughter(ed)”. Yet the leaders’ “grievances” and “caus[es]” are the only explanation given, a curious disavowal of underlying causes for such a dramatic situation. In addition, while Kibaki, Odinga and Ruto are implicated personally for orchestrating the violence, there is also, in keeping with all previous analyses, no mention of who is perpetrating the violence apart from broad references to “armies of destruction” and “Kenyans”. This continues the theme of a disavowal of any ethnic dimension to the news coverage, a curious trend given the alleged ethnic nature of the violence. The reference to the leaders’ “supporters” as the instigators, given the ethnic support bases of the two camps, would suggest an ethnic dimension to the violence, but this is not mentioned. Instead, repeated calls to the national Kenyan identity are made throughout the editorial, including the mention of “Kenyans” seven times, reiterating similar unifying attempts in previous analyses (“D-day, You decide”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1; “Your vote, your choice”, *Standard*. 2007. Dec 27:1).

Thus while purporting to play a heroic role in recognising the destruction and calling for a peaceful outcome, in a sense presuming a facilitative role, the publication fails to make any meaningful contribution towards this. Instead the argument is to appeal to a unified national Kenyan identity, in the hopes that Kenyans will belie the reality of their ethnic differences and unite at such a time. Such discursive work by the *Nation*, while it appeals to peace and unity at a fragmented time, is misleading and constitutes a disavowal, once again, of pertinent issues. The reality of the current context is overlooked in favour of an argument for unity. While this may appear in line with the monitorial role of the press, the *Nation*’s negation of reality and context overshadow its calls for peace in this instance, reminiscent, instead, of a collaborative role.

4.2.9. *Standard*. 2008. Save our beloved country. Jan 3:1.

(Appendix 9, page 137)

Analysis

The article is placed alongside a large photograph of what appears to be the aftermath of violence and looting – shredded cardboard and debris from torched homes filling the streets. The image of a young man dressed in black pants, a white shirt and black shoes clutching a blanket with what could presumably be possessions or a baby is placed to the right of the article. The article begins beneath a box of headlines, each placed next to the image of a ballot box, which include “Violence: More people killed around the country and chaos continues”; “Nairobi: ODM says its rally set for today at Uhuru Park is on”; “Suit: Law Society says it will sue over rigged poll on behalf of Kenyans”; “Dialogue: Archbishop Tutu, South Africa poll officials arrive to mediate”.

The editorial consists of 24 paragraphs, including 13 bullet points, which provide information on the recommended “steps toward the realisation” of the publication’s suggested ways of surviving the crisis. The *Standard* states in its two opening paragraphs that Kenyans need to put the elections behind them. Calling on President Kibaki and Raila Odinga to engage in dialogue, agree to be active participants in finding a peaceful way forward and considering a power sharing agreement are considered crucial aspects to the country’s survival, as noted in paragraph two. Arguing that contestations over who won the election look set to continue if an alternative is not found, the *Standard* suggests Kenyans unite and find a way forward together.

The publication accordingly sets out six proposals (in six bulleted paragraphs) as an alternative to the current situation. These include calls for: acknowledgment of the challenge faced by all Kenyans as a result of the contested results; President Kibaki to address Kenyans; Odinga to drop preconditions for talks (which the publication notes he did the night before going to print); government to employ a negotiator to find a way forward; convene parliament and begin working on power sharing or transition

agreements; to define additional power sharing arrangements. The publication justifies these recommendations in paragraph 11, given the deadlock over the contested results.

The following seven paragraphs (12-18) document the deadlock: Kenya is polarised; the position of President is not vacant (Kibaki already having been sworn in); supporters of PNU and ODM disagree on who legitimately won the election; violence has claimed 300 lives so far; the aged, sick and children are innocent victims of the violence; and thousands have been displaced and thousands face starvation.

The *Standard* outlines its concerns what could happen if Kibaki and Odinga do not unite to save the country from ruin in paragraphs 19-24, noting that taking advantage of the situation would alienate either of them from their supporters. Instead, they should put the interest of the country above their own. The *Standard* proposes in paragraph 22 that neither Kibaki nor Odinga want to be responsible for Kenya's demise, adding in a last call for the leaders to act to save the country in the final paragraph.

Analysis

In essence, the editorial comprises a deliberative argument with the *Standard* appealing to politicians and Kenyans to "save the country from further anarchy". The future of Kenyans and their country is at stake, given that in the absence of political intervention "what seems certain is death and destruction will continue". Urgent action is required to save Kenya from demise, comprising an argument essentially about the future survival of East Africa's "island of peace".

The effects of the deliberative argument about the future of Kenya and familiar silence on who is perpetrating the violence is to reify the crisis while calling for Kenyans to contain it. In order to normalise this situation the publication recognises the disruption, takes a moral position and makes direct injunctions to politicians and Kenyans to resolve it. The disequilibrium (violence) is recognised by the *Standard* as a "crisis". It is described as "chaos" and "anarchy", which is accompanied by "death and destruction" with victims being "hunted down and killed". This is juxtaposed with its binary opposition,

“normalcy”, which is highlighted in the editorial’s opening paragraph as the desired state to which the country will return after the unprecedented eruption of violence.

A narrative analysis of the editorial reveals that the *Standard*, much like the *Daily Nation*’s edition of the same day, constructed itself as heroic as it recognises the disruption, in this case the escalating levels of violence, and acts to remedy the situation by calling for peace and unity among Kenyans and suggesting ways political leaders and Kenyans can move past the violence to a peaceful society again. The article does not discuss the results and the issues of vote-rigging though, essentially changing the line it took in the pre-election coverage, in which it advocated that Kenyans should decide.

Todorov’s 5 stage model	Todorov’s model applied to the <i>Standard</i>’s “Save our beloved country”
A state of equilibrium	Intermittent outbreaks of violence during election campaign
A disruption of that equilibrium by some action	Perpetrators of violence attack Kenyans killing 300 to date and displacing thousands
Recognition of the disruption	The <i>Standard</i> recognises the disruption
Attempts to restore the equilibrium	The <i>Standard</i> (and <i>Daily Nation</i>) synchronise headlines and call for peace and unity among Kenyans and leaders
A reinstatement of equilibrium	Ideally a violence free society

Figure 6. Todorov’s model applied to the *Standard*’s “Save our Beloved Country” (*Standard*. 2008. Jan 3:1).

Given the unprecedented violence at the time of going to print, and a perceived lack of direction and initiative from political leaders in finding a way forward, the publication takes it upon itself to point Kenyans in the direction of a peaceful outcome by proposing recommendations that, if followed, will “bring the chaos to an end”. In the absence of political leadership, the *Standard* self-constructs itself as hero, calling for action and

suggesting ways Kenyans can get through the “crisis” and “return to normalcy”. The editorial notes, “we are convinced” the current situation is unsustainable, and that “it is crystal clear to us” that politicians should not use the situation to their advantage. References to “we” are making these proposals, “we are calling upon the President and Raila...”, “we propose” and “we believe”, helps to establish itself as a voice of authority on the way to a peaceful future. As such, the *Standard* can be understood to fulfil the role of the Proppian hero as it recognises the disequilibrium (violence) and assumes the quest of restoring Kenya to a peaceful state through a combination of calls to peace, shaming and implicating politicians in the violence and attempts at unifying Kenyans.

In stark contrast to their leaders, the *Standard* is portrayed as honourable and as being motivated to act for the best outcome of Kenyans, an approach which has the effect of lending the publication credibility as it argues for the future of Kenya. In its calls to Kenyans to move beyond the violence the publication once more makes use of unifying strategies, including presuming to be able to speak on behalf of Kenyans with various references to “we”, “us” and “our” including “all of us, as a people and a country”, “we are faced with a serious challenge”, “we are nowhere near an answer”, “we need to move ahead with a solution”, “our political leaders”, “our beloved country” (twice) and “our dear country”. Such references serve to portray a sense of empathy and compassion with Kenyans, and establish the publication as one of them, able to convey the concerns and speak for them in times of crisis.

In Proppian terms the victims are recognised to be those who have lost their lives in the violence, specifically the “aged, sick and children” who had “absolutely no idea why they were being hunted down and killed”, in addition to the “thousands” who have been displaced and who face starvation.

In stark contrast, political leaders, the two mentioned by name in the article being President Kibaki and Raila Odinga, are referred to twice as “the protagonists”, a description that signifies them as actors in a fiction. Kibaki is mentioned five times, while Odinga is mentioned a total of four. Comprising the villains of the editorial, the political

leaders are appealed to directly by the *Standard* to engage in dialogue with one another and commit to playing an active role in finding a way forward for the country as a whole, summarising its pleas in the final paragraph by calling on Kibaki and Odinga to “act first and fast to save this our beloved country”.

The *Standard*’s argument about what needs to be done to save Kenya is substantiated by the editorial’s portrayal of the villains. Its recommendations that Kibaki and Odinga a) talk to one another, b) agree to take an active part in stopping the violence and c) find a way to share power or agree a transition arrangement, imply, within a reading of presupposition, that a) the leaders are not engaging in dialogue about the future of the country, b) have yet to demonstrate their commitment to finding a peaceful alternative to the violence and c) as a result, might not be interested in considering a power-sharing agreement. In its absence, the publication describes what they understand to be “demonstrated leadership” as “humility, care for the citizenry, selflessness and an ability and judgment to place the country’s interest above that of their ambitions or actualisation”. This then can be understood to imply what Kibaki and Odinga are not: they do not lead with purpose or the interests of the country at heart. As such, the leaders are censured for their passivity in finding a solution to the unprecedented violence, and for being motivated by self-interest rather than the well-being of millions of Kenyans. They are warned “not to make political capital out of this”, implying that they might, a moral judgment by the publication which infers the levels of their self-interest, and encouraged to “appeal to their inner conscience”, “show courage” and “free themselves from any vested interests or handlers acting as political advisers or strategists”.

Such pleas have far-reaching implications for understandings of democracy and elections in Kenya, as Kibaki and Odinga are somewhat acknowledged to be driven by and acting out of self-interest and influenced by the interests of “handlers” and strategists. If this is true, the country cannot be said to be operating within a transparent, democratic system in which leaders act out of duty and interest to their citizenry and where those who do not comply suffer the legal consequences. The *Standard* acknowledges “the inflation of figures in a number of areas”, referring to allegations of vote rigging in the aftermath of

the disputed results, implying yet again that such allegations could likely be true, casting a further shadow on democratic processes in the country. If democratic processes were not duly followed, and the leaders are acknowledged to be acting largely out of self-interest at such a crucial time in the country's history, the nature of Kenya's democracy must be called into question.

"The situation prevailing in the country" is attributed to "the heightened political dispute" and "a serious challenge arising out of last week's contested...poll". Numerous references are made to the election, including the "fiercely contested, furiously disputed poll", the enduring argument about "who stole, and who did not steal the vote" and "whether or not the presidential ballot was flawed". Such references serve to reduce a potentially unfair national election to a case of petty theft. The criminal act of rigging and corruption is played down here. Instead, one is left to deduce that the violence is somehow linked to the election as this is not made explicit. It is noted to be a fierce or even furious contestation but along similar lines to previous analyses the editorial does not deal with the causes and context of the violence, but hedges. In addition there is no reference to who is perpetrating the widespread killings. The only suggestion of who is instigating the violence is made with reference to Kibaki and Odinga, who are twice referred to as "the protagonists", thus constituting a familiar silence around who is responsible for the violence as reflected in previous analyses in this thesis. The effect is to reify political warring and corruption as a crisis, requiring hands-on attention. In keeping with previous analyses, those who are the cause of the crisis are not named, yet the people must do work to resolve it.

The publication makes reference to failed states Somalia and Chad by way of argument by analogy and warning Kenyan leaders that if they do not help to "bring Kenya back from the brink" Kenya could be plunged into further "chaos and anarchy". This inductive argument suggests that leaders should do what they can to prevent "Kenya going the same way as Somalia, Chad or other African countries", by providing case studies of failure as warnings.

The editorial purports to present a way forward for Kenyans in the absence of any viable alternatives, but does so with no acknowledgement of the current context or accountability. A potentially rigged election is somewhat trivialised, and Kenyans are encouraged to accept the results as if they are of little consequence. The *Standard's* self-constructed role as hero lends credibility to its argument which in essence calls for Kenyans to unquestioningly accept the results, unite in their capacity as Kenyans, and move forward together to a peaceful future. Kibaki and Odinga are clearly implicated in the violence, but the publication once again avoids holding them to account in any meaningful sense. As is the case with the *Nation's* edition of the same day, the *Standard* purports to be the hero but ultimately fails, concurrently in its monitorial role as the press. Its evasion of critical issues and unwillingness to hold leaders to account constitutes a collaborative role, in which the *Standard* seemingly condones the questionable election and calls for Kenyans to accept the results.

4.2.10. *Standard*. 2008. A slow start in search for peace. Jan 4:1

(Appendix 10, page 139)

Synopsis

The story is set against a large photograph of crowds of people in a busy street, who are, according to the image's caption, allegedly protesting against the declaration of President Kibaki as winner of the contested poll, amid teargas as they try and make their way to Uhuru Park for an ODM rally. Beneath this main image are two smaller ones, of Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu giving a talk alongside Raila Odinga of the ODM, and a photograph of President Mwai Kibaki speaking at a podium with two microphones. Both Odinga and Kibaki are dressed in suits and wear stern expressions on their faces. A teaser is set alongside the story's text and reads, "Protests... ODM calls for another rally today after running battles as Kibaki tells aggrieved: Go to court."

The article comprises a total of 39 paragraphs, and runs into a double page spread on pages two and three of the edition, under the headline, "ODM calls for new rally today", set against photographs of police arresting demonstrators in Nairobi who wanted to march to Uhuru Park for an ODM rally, ODM leaders consulting in a group after being

blocked from attending the rally, a victim of violence breaking down in Nairobi, demonstrators barricading a road in Nairobi after being prevented from attending the march, Eldoret North MP-elect William Ruto addressing demonstrators in Nairobi, Kisumu Town West MP-elect Olago Aluoch leading demonstrators in Kisumu, and police officers removing a barricade in Mombasa.

Kibaki and Odinga's reactions to the escalating violence amid intensifying international attention to find a political solution to the violence are documented in the opening five paragraphs. The article documents Kibaki's statement in the vernacular during his first public appearance at a press conference since the violence began, that those who feel aggrieved should seek legal redress in the court of law. He claims that the violence was orchestrated by those with vested interests, and he insists on a precondition for considering a way forward, that is that the violence first be contained. Paragraph three moves to ODM leaders, who called off a public rally at Uhuru Park for the second time in a week. They intended to proceed on the day of going to print.

Paragraphs 7 to 10 focus on the possibility of a recount of the votes. Tutu, speaking at the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) in Nairobi, considered it unlikely given the "state of the records". Mounting international pressure on Kibaki and Odinga to address the unrest is noted in paragraphs 11 to 15, with reference to calls from international leaders, including then Senator Barrack Obama, Sierra Leone President Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, and the commitment of UN Secretary Kofi Annan and Ghanaian President and African Union (AU) chairman John Kuffuor to mediate. The escalating violence and locations in and around Nairobi are described in paragraphs 16 to 24, while paragraphs 25 to 34 describe the struggles of ODM supporters to unsuccessfully hold a demonstration rally at Uhuru Park. Other towns affected by the violence include Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Kakamega and Bungoma where teargas, gunfire and protests continue.

Analysis

The day after the *Nation* and *Standard*'s editorials call for unity among Kenyans, this news article sets out to provide an account of mounting dissent among supporters of opposition party ODM. However, the article's framing and use of argument belie its intended neutrality as it privileges Kibaki's defences of the allegations over any attempt to provide insight into the mounting violence. Once again the article reflects the common theme of silence on critical issues and a lack of context for current events.

In this report, the ODM leaders and supporters actively seek to overturn the election result considered fraudulent by engaging in a "peace demonstration" and seeking mediation with PNU officials. They come to inhabit the role of the hero in Proppian terms, as they lack embark on a quest, in this case, to overturn the results. ODM members Musali Mudavadi, William Ruto, Chari Ngilu and Joseph Nyagah were confronted by police on their way to the march, with Mudavadi quoted as saying, "Kenyans should not get tired as we press for our rights. We know it is not going to take one or two days but we shall endure to the very end," suggesting the extent of the dissatisfaction and level of commitment to attaining a fair result. Related to this, amidst mounting international calls for negotiations, ODM leader Odinga presents as willing to comply with a mediation process and meets with Archbishop Tutu, the evidence displayed in the form of a photograph on the front page of the newspaper. Tutu holds an authoritative and esteemed role for his role in truth and reconciliation and thus serves as ethotic support here for Odinga's position. Odinga is on record as telling international journalists that during his meeting with Tutu "his team had identified" former United Nations secretary General Kofi Annan, Tutu, and African Union chair and Ghanaian president John Kuffuor "to mediate". Such credible public figures endorse his as a moral quest and emphasise his willingness to engage in dialogue with Kibaki to seek an end to the violence.

Odinga's willingness to mediate is juxtaposed with Kibaki's refusal, thereby placing him and the PNU in Proppian terms as villain of the narrative: they are the impediment that the family members must confront to ensure mediation and reconciliation. Kibaki's unwillingness to negotiate is made evident in Tutu's address at the AACC in Nairobi, where he said he was "still unable to get an appointment with the Head of State", despite

having already met with Odinga, inferring an unwillingness on Kibaki's part to meet with the international mediator and engage in the process of seeking an alternative to the violence. Kibaki has declared his position, here rendered as inflexible, stubborn and irresponsible, having noted he "was open for dialogue but only after the violence had been contained". Despite his inflexibility, Kibaki portrays himself as acting within a system of good governance. His refusal to take responsibility for the violence is accompanied by placing blame on (he "pointed an accusing finger at...") his opponents, for having "vested political interests" and "orchestrat[ing] the violence". Thus Odinga's active engagement contrasts with Kibaki's passivity and his refusal to act until his precondition is met. Kibaki is further rendered as obstructive of peace by Odinga for "rejecting mediators who have offered to help"; his government similarly stands accused of "dragging its feet". This unwillingness to assume responsibility and take action towards an alternative comprise the obstacles the hero must overcome to realise his quest, in this case addressing the allegations of a rigged election and exploring a peaceful political solution.

The international actors calling for dialogue and reconciliation, including Tutu, Annan, Kuffuor, Obama and Kabbah comprise the Proppian donors of the narrative as they recognise the violence (disruption) and in "impassioned plea(s) for peace" give suggestions for how the violence can be quelled. Obama's direct plea to Kibaki and Odinga, that they should engage in dialogue and work to peacefully resolve the dispute, includes that they "call for calm...come together and...start a political process to address peacefully the controversies that divide them", suggestions that provide the leaders with information and encouragement on how to proceed. This speaks to a framing of the Kenyan leaders as unable to resolve their own problems, and needing the international assistance of established leaders to proceed.

Unlike previous analyses that do not provide a description of the violence and its perpetrators, this article explains the violence largely as a result of collisions between ODM supporters and police as the supporters attempt to participate in protest demonstrations in Nairobi. The framing here is interesting, as it hints at criminalising the

behaviour of the ODM supporters in its explicit descriptions about who is causing trouble – ODM supporters are described as “demonstrators trying to get into Uhuru Park”, “the charged supporters”, “party supporters”, “rioters”, “Pentagon members” and “leaders”. The “thousands of demonstrators” are described as making “all efforts to outwit riot police and get into Uhuru Park”, while images of Kenya’s early 1990s pro-democracy demonstrations are invoked in descriptions of the “thousands of demonstrators battling with police”. The focus on police includes descriptions such as “the height of confrontation between police and ODM leaders”, “police stopped Pentagon members marching to Uhuru Park” and “leaders engaged police in an exchange of words”. While the supporters are taking an active citizen role around an issue which they believe to be deeply important for democracy, the publication uses censure to undermine their efforts. Cheated out of an election victory by a rigged legal and judicial system, ODM leaders and supporters are protesting their right to participate freely in a democracy, a critical issue for which they are prepared to “endure to the very end”. On the contrary, the publication frames the violence largely as a result of the “rioters” who have to be contained by police. It is worth considering why the publication does not acknowledge the citizens’ rights to protest – that perhaps the police are infringing on the rights of citizens in this instance? It is also not clear why the citizens are not allowed to participate in the march.

Much attention is given to the plight of the police officers, describing what they did when faced with the civilians. “Police on horseback”, over 4000 police officers fought demonstrators and politicians”... “to keep them from Uhuru Park”. Curiously, there is a complete lack of interrogation as to the standpoint of the citizens. No sources are provided to represent the citizens’ concerns, comprising a nominalization and removal of agency witnessed in previous analyses. There is a lack of context and history here.

The post-election violence is constructed as very grave, having been described as “plunged into chaos”, “deadlock” and prospects of international mediation looking “bleak” conveying the extent of the situation. That there is international attention to the post-election violence in Kenya is further established and furthers this sense of gravity,

which further exonerates Odinga and censures Kibaki. This leads to an interesting reading of the state apparatus as those in power (Kibaki) are portrayed as supporting the existing regime, whereas Odinga and his supporters discredit it. Within the reading of this article, it is the former that is privileged, as Kibaki is positioned upfront in the text, quoted in the vernacular and making claims to a legitimate democratic system, suggesting that “any aggrieved party go to court and follow the law. In how the ODM supporters’ actions are criminalised, with no interrogation of their frustrations, the publication appears to support the status quo.

In keeping with previous analyses there is no mention of ethnicity in this article, extending the silence on ethnicity in the dailies. Instead there are two references from ODM leaders to “Kenyans”, perhaps unsurprising in a direct quote given that ODM supporters are known to be a mixture of minority ethnic groups. However, this does invoke a unified Kenyan identity. Similarly, the publication can be understood to be acting in a collaborative capacity, as it supports the existing regime by providing no meaningful interrogation of the issues raised by ODM supporters.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the ten articles selected to form part of the purposive sample selected for this research. These articles were selected to represent the discourses articulated in Kenya’s two largest dailies with a particular focus on issues of representation and identity in relation to ethnicity. Chapter Five considers the prominent discourses articulated in the *Daily Nation* and the *Standard* with a view of pulling together the main points that emerge from the analysis of the publications’ portrayals of the violence and representations of Kenyans.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

This research has focused on the *Daily Nation* and *Standard*'s news coverage of the 2007/2008 Kenyan election, with a particular focus on issues of ethnicity and representation of the Kenyan subject. The goal has been to investigate the coverage during this time with a view to considering whether this could have contributed to escalating tensions. That the news media had a role to play in the violence has been widely acknowledged, with radio being fingered as the main protagonist (Somerville 2011). The role of the press has until now remained unclear.

Since the unprecedented eruption of violence in 2008 numerous attempts have been made to try and understand the role the press played in potentially contributing to the escalation of violence. Frank Ojiambo, a member of the Editors Guild of Kenya, is quoted as having said: "When things collapsed, we media people looked the other way. We betrayed the millions of Kenyans who turned out to cast their votes. They looked up to us but they saw nothing ... Had we played our role as media, perhaps hundreds of people would not have died," (International Media Support, 2008). Given the extent of reflection in the wake of the post-election violence, it would seem that many journalists and editors were genuinely concerned about the role their work may have played in the conflict. The experience of hearing Kenyan journalists question their conduct during the 2007/2008 election had an impact on this researcher and prompted me to explore this topic in my research. Given the context of this research, it is worth considering how their coverage of the elections failed Kenyans, and what sort of reporting the editors and journalists could have conducted instead.

Ideally, the democratic press plays a critical role during times of elections, making information about the election available to citizens and informing their decision of who to vote for. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this work is to report accurately and straightforwardly. Unfortunately the reality is that much of the news coverage of elections presents a zero-sum game portrayal of events, in which one side stands to win

everything and the other lose everything, much like the metaphor of a sports match, with very little space being allocated to understanding the context and its nuances (Galtung 2006). It would be worthwhile exploring how the Kenyan journalists and editors feel they failed Kenyans in their coverage, as their reflections suggest an acknowledgement of the impact their evasion and lack of detail had on the precarious situation. In contrast to the majority of news coverage that incites towards violence, Galtung's peace journalism offers an alternative where news coverage can be part of the process of finding a peaceful outcome, facilitating an exploration of peaceful outcomes. In their disavowal of ethnicity and avoidance of meaningful context, Kenyan journalists essentially ignored the issues at hand and failed to provide meaningful context for the violence. This failure to challenge or confront powerful entities is worth exploring here given this research's focus on the role of the press in potentially fuelling the violence.

Chapter One provided context for the study in the form of a brief overview of issues relating to ethnicity and land in Kenya, an introduction to the 2007 political climate, an overview of the Kenyan press and an introduction to the news media and the 2007 elections.

In Chapter Two I presented a discussion of the various theoretical frameworks employed in this research, which include cultural studies, the circuit of culture, Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and roles of the news media in democratic societies, particularly during times of political elections. Importantly for this study, the constructivist approach understands all texts as positioned and doing discursive and ideological work. One of the effects of this work is to constitute subjects, which is relevant here in relation to ethnicity and nation. Journalism studies provides the framework that identifies the potential roles of the press in a democracy, which is particularly significant during times of political elections. These roles are worth considering in relation to the work of the press as it sets the agenda in terms of what to think about, such as the lack of reference to ethnicity, and frames this, in this case as ethnicity as unimportant and elections being about a war.

Chapter Three presents the research intention and outlines my qualitative research approach and methods, informed by Fairclough's approach to critical discourse analysis and his three-dimensional model. This enables me to investigate the discursive positioning and the subjects the various news texts propose in relation to the research focus.

In Chapter Four I conducted a critical discourse analysis of the ten articles selected for this study which span a six-week period beginning in the campaign period and ending during the post-election violence. This purposive sample is intended to be reasonably representative of the discourses articulated in the two English dailies within the time frame that began with intermittent violence and ends with unprecedented death and destruction.

In this final chapter I discuss the broad themes and discourses that were revealed in the analysis of the articles and editorials, with a particular focus on how the publications managed issues of ethnicity and identity.

5.2. Recurring themes and discourses

This research is concerned with the news coverage of the 2007/2008 Kenyan elections as reported in the *Daily Nation* and *Standard*. The following section outlines the main findings, beginning with a brief synopsis of the coverage as it unfolded.

The nature of the coverage shifts over the time span analysed. The publications' coverage also differs between them. The first articles analysed from the *Nation* and *Standard* do very different work and reflect their different approaches at this stage of the campaign period. Initially, the *Nation* acknowledges the ongoing violence during the campaign period, and calls for increased accountability of perpetrators ("Nip poll violence in the bud at once", *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:10). In contrast, the *Standard*'s lead news story four days later approaches the upcoming elections as a zero-sum game in which personal gain is more important than issues of democracy ("Why a win is a must", *Standard*. 2007.

Dec 7:1). Thus it is worthwhile noting the difference in the approaches of the publications in the build-up to the election.

In the first article analysed in this sample, the *Nation* makes repeated calls to government to contain the outbursts of violence during the pre-election phase, and hold guilty parties to account (“Nip poll violence in the bud at once”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:1). The *Nation* acknowledges the violence and demonstrates its commitment to finding an end to it by calling on those in positions of authority to contain it. The violence is referred to only in vague terms, and no information is provided as to who is perpetrating it, although it is suggested that it is being orchestrated for self-interest. Its headline is a direct injunction to government to bring those responsible for the violence to book, yet the *Nation* falls short of following through on this by failing to provide any meaningful engagement or context for the violence. Curiously, while the violence was believed to have taken on an ethnic dimension, no mention is made of ethnicity in the article. This silence is of interest to the researcher given this study’s focus on issues of identity and ethnicity.

In contrast to the *Nation*’s attempt at containment, the *Standard*, in their 7 December 2007 “Why a win is a must” edition adopts a somewhat cavalier tone in portraying the upcoming election as a competition between two rivals, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, in which personal gain is the greatest motivator and issues of democracy are almost incidental. The importance of financial backing and support is foregrounded and through the use of extended war metaphors, the *Standard* pits the two contestants against each other and considers the stakes for each man should they lose. There is no mention of the context within which the elections are taking place. The effect of the focus on the stakes of each individual is to position their contest outside of the current (violent) context. The silence around issues of ethnicity as reflected in the *Nation* is extended here, a somewhat surprising omission given the influence this is thought to have on politics in Kenya.

The *Nation*’s “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:1) continues along similar lines to the first article from the publication, with vague

references to the on-going violence and its perpetrators, while implying that those orchestrating the violence are in positions of authority. The *Nation* fails to directly address who is perpetrating the violence, rather making vague references to the instigators as corrupt, influential and dishonourable individuals. The *Nation* appears to take a stand against such behaviour by calling on the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) to contain the situation, however it fails to fulfil this expectation itself.

A noteworthy shift occurs in the articles of both publications on the 27 December 2007, respectively. Just three days ahead of voting day, the *Nation* and *Standard* appear to suddenly demonstrate an acknowledgement of the violence, and, recognising the extent of the threat, appear to address it by attempting to diffuse tensions, calling for Kenyans to unite in the face of tragedy and move forward together for the betterment of all. Up until now, the *Nation* appears to recognise the threat of the violence but warns against it in vague terms. The *Standard*'s first article negates this reality completely. This marks a dramatic change from the *Standard*'s coverage to date and the first appearance of extensive unifying strategies and pontification. The *Nation*'s more critical approach is intensified at this point, and also suggests a sudden appreciation for the stakes should the violence continue. The gravity of the situation being recognised, the publications engage in rhetoric, which resorts to nationalistic calls and the construction of themselves as the heroes of these quests. Through the idealising of Kenya and Kenyans at this point, the publications invoke a responsible, benevolent civic subject, and appeal to Kenyans to contain the situation at all costs. Until this point, the coverage has failed to mention any aspect of ethnicity. However, in its attempts to unify Kenyans at this volatile time, both the *Nation* and *Standard* make reference to the harmonious co-existence of Kenya's ethnic groups, and its tolerance of difference. Those who have an appreciation for Kenya's chequered ethnic past will know this to be a misleading portrayal at best.

In "D-day: You decide" (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1) the *Nation* makes direct appeals to Kenyans to vote and portrays the elections as taking place within a credible and transparent system. Continuing the theme of idealisation, the editorial argues against violence in so much as Kenya is portrayed here as the ideal country with the perfect

people. However, an analysis of the current context suggests a situation fraught with conflict. The editorial pontificates, presenting an idealised version of the Kenyan electoral system to discourage further violence and portraying Kenyans as tolerant of one another's ethnic affiliations. Like previous articles, it is equally vague on descriptions of the violence and its perpetrators, and appears to privilege a portrayal of Kenya as a nation united at this time.

In a similar way, the *Standard* continues this idealised version of Kenya to invoke a sense of patriotism among Kenyans, who are implored to vote as an act of patriotism. In "Your vote, your choice" (*Standard*. 2007. Dec 27:1) the *Standard* calls on Kenyans to unite amidst ongoing corruption and violence. This injunction is more forceful than the *Nation's*, addressing Kenyans explicitly in their role as voters. Another similarity between the two editorials is that the *Standard* also mentions ethnicity, the first mention of this topic in the *Standard* so far, and only the second in the research sample along with the *Nation's* "D-day: You decide" (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1). Importantly, ethnicity is flagged as having been harmoniously negotiated. Interestingly for this research, with its focus on identity, the editorial invokes two particular kinds of Kenyan identity: a moral identity, who heeds the editorial's calls to vote; and an immoral one, who might compromise the elections and is therefore expurgated as the other. These themes are extended and intensify in the next five analyses of the coverage, which continue calls for Kenyans to unite in the face of tragedy. The calls for unity do become progressively pressing, however, a dominant theme throughout the coverage is the problem that cannot be named. While calling for increased accountability, the publications negate any meaningful interrogation of the widespread allegations of misconduct and corruption, and instead invoke a unified moral subject and call for Kenyans to accept the results and move forward. Such efforts, while purporting to play a benevolent role, condone the status quo by failing to provide any meaningful context for the violence and explanation for its occurrence.

The eruptions of violence documented in the *Nation's* "Chaos as Kibaki sworn in" (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 31:1) mark the disruption of the overarching narrative of this research.

The article is significant to this study because it follows the theme of previous analyses from both the *Nation* and *Standard* in failing to provide any meaningful context for the current conflict. Once again, there is the problem that remains unnamed. Despite its attempts at a non-partisan account, the degree to which the publication fails to account for the violence ultimately condones Kibaki as the legitimate winner of the election, positioning it, as with previous analyses, in a collaborative role.

“I acted under a lot of pressure, says Kivuitu” (*Standard*. 2008. Jan 2:1) highlights perhaps most noticeably of all the articles so far, the *Standard*’s lack of investigation into the allegations of corruption and malpractice that characterised the 2007 election. Presenting a verbatim account of Kibaki’s admissions that he acted unlawfully by announcing incumbent Kibaki as the winner of the election, the article responds to the moment of disruption by once again idealising Kenya and framing the elections as having taken place within a structure of good governance. Once again, in a time of darkness, the publication idealises aspects of the Kenyan state, this time the electoral system, and overlooks the dire realities.

By 3 January 2008 both publications, to varying degrees, appear once again to have acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and escalating violence and set about doing what they can to contain it. In an unprecedented move the *Nation* and *Standard* synchronise their front-page headlines and make appeals to political leaders and Kenyans to bring the country back from the brink.

The *Nation* appears to be explicit about who is responsible for the violence and names leaders personally, the first occurrence of this in the sample to date, however nothing concrete is mentioned. Kibaki, Odinga and William Ruto are fingered as the instigators and the *Nation* makes direct appeals to them to intervene. Descriptions of the violence are more graphic than in previous articles, and Kenyans are named as the perpetrators. This is noteworthy for this research as this is the first time Kenyans are admonished for their role in the violence, being portrayed as unreasonable for participating in the destruction of lives and property. Here the *Nation* extends the *Standard*’s construction of the immoral

Kenyan as portrayed in “Your vote, your choice” (*Standard*. 2007. Dec 27:1) and goes a step further by addressing them directly in their foolishness. It also admonishes Kenyan leaders for living in excess when Kenyans are paying the price on the street, continuing this theme from previous analyses. Likewise, there is little attempt at providing a meaningful account of the violence, with only vague references to the ongoing chaos and a preference for the portrayal of unity.

The second version of “Save our beloved country” (*Standard*. 2008. Jan 3:1) extends the initial calls of the *Nation* for Kenyans to contain the situation, while implicating political leaders as the protagonists. Perhaps less severe in its condemnation of the leaders than the *Nation*, the *Standard* trivialises the allegations of malpractice and corruption by failing to investigate them adequately. Once again the violence is not explained sufficiently, with the reader having to deduce that it is linked to the contested election. While it purports to play a role in ending the violence, the *Standard* fails to provide any adequate context. The implications for Kenyans is to accept the outcome of the elections, whether they were rigged or not, and move forward for the sake of peace. This has interesting consequences for the type of person the editorial implores Kenyans to be – accepting of the contested, and most likely rigged, results.

This portrayal of the post-election violence as very grave is extended in the *Standard*’s “A slow start in search for peace” (*Standard*. 2008. Jan 4:1). Despite an attempt at a non-partisan account, the *Standard* privileges Kibaki and legitimates him, while criminalising the actions of ODM supporters embarking on demonstrations against the results. The familiar silence on ethnicity returns, along with further attempts at unification.

5.2.1 Lack of context and investigation

All 10 articles reflect a total lack of context and meaningful explanation for the violence. As the violence intensifies, references to it become increasingly vague, with both the *Nation* and *Standard* equally evading information on the causes and perpetrators, a trend that is juxtaposed by mounting calls for increased accountability of perpetrators. The *Nation*’s first three articles selected for analysis portray the violence in equally vague

terms, with references limited to “well-trying and successful move”, the “intended mayhem” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:10), “several ugly incidents”, “campaign-related deaths”, “dangerous activities”, “trouble”, “mayhem” and “the situation” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:1), and “tension”, “intermittent outbreaks of violence”, “heat and anxiety of the election campaign” and “election fever” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1).

In the first analysis the *Nation* criticises government for being inefficient, even raising doubts as to their involvement in the violence, but the extent of the criticism is to label their misconduct as comprising an “asinine attitude”. Thus while recognising the violence, the *Nation* fails to provide the context to support its argument for accountability. The coverage implies the involvement of corrupt, influential and dishonourable leaders, but fails to provide the necessary context to substantiate this and support its calls for accountability. The two analyses (“D-day: You decide”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1; “Your vote, your choice”, *Standard*. 2007. Dec 27:1) take this unwillingness to name the problem to new heights as they negate the reality of the violence altogether by conveying idealised portrayals of Kenya and invoking a moral national subject. It reappears in the *Nation*’s “Chaos as Kibaki sworn in” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 31:1) and the *Standard*’s “I acted under a lot of pressure, says Kivuitu” (*Standard*. 2008. Jan 2:1) where there is no interrogation of the unprecedented three-day ban on live broadcasting, and a complete lack of critical investigation into the widespread claims of rigging and corruption.

This lack of context and sense of history is prevalent throughout the sample, and evidenced in the lack of context of the *Nation*’s “Chaos as Kibaki sworn in” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 31:1) which responds to the moment of disruption in the overarching narrative. Reference is made to the climate of political instability and tense situation prevailing in Kenya, but there is no background provided for it. Besides references to the “orgies of looting, burning, rape, and wanton, well-orchestrated blood-letting”, “systematic killing of the innocent” and “slaughter”, the *Nation* does not attempt to provide any meaningful context for the violence enveloping the country by 3 January 2008 (“Save our beloved country”, *Daily Nation*. 2008. Jan 3:1).

The *Standard* is equally vague on descriptions of the violence, failing to mention it once in their “Your vote, your choice” (*Standard*, 27 December 2007: 1) edition and opting instead for a unified portrayal of Kenya at a time of deep crisis. This failure to critically engage with issues is prevalent in the *Standard*’s news article, “I acted under a lot of pressure” (*Standard*, 2 January 2008: 1) in which the publication acknowledges the problems of ECK boss Samuel Kivuitu’s admissions, but again fails to provide any context or investigation of the claims.

Initially, the perpetrators and instigators of the violence are overlooked as no one is identified for causing the trouble. The first mention comes in the *Nation*’s “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:1) which refers to the “perpetrators” and “youths”, understandably vague references given the extent of the violence. This is extended in the following day’s front page news story, “D-day: You decide” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1) which refers to “youths”, “criminals”, “culprits” and “well-placed and powerful individuals”. Importantly, this does shift as the violence intensifies, with both publications naming political leaders as the “direct cause of this catastrophe” (“Save our beloved country”, *Daily Nation*. 2008. Jan 3:1) and “protagonists” President Kibaki” and “Raila Odinga” (“Save our beloved country”, *Standard*. 2008. Jan 3:1). While Kibaki and Odinga are for the first time held publicly accountable for instigating the violence, there is still a silence around those involved in carrying it out on the streets.

The lack of context and background to the violence, as well as the silence around who is involved in carrying it out, constitutes an impenetrable silence around issues which might be expected to be included in coverage of such a time. That the publications do not explain the violence or identify its instigators speaks to their unwillingness to provide necessary information and hold perpetrators to account in a meaningful way.

5.2.2 *The problem that cannot be named*

That the violence is never meaningfully explained or contextualised establishes a silence in the articles and editorials which is compounded as the violence intensifies in the wake of the disputed results. This evasion of crucial information becomes more pronounced as the publications intensify calls for increased accountability of those perpetrating the violence. This is problematic as it becomes apparent that the publications are evading crucial issues. As such, as the violence intensifies, the coverage reflects more and more the problem that cannot be named.

This problem is reflected in the initial acknowledgment by the *Nation* in the first analysis that the violence is a result of a “well-tried and successful move” which has “worked every time” since 1992 (“Nip poll violence in the bud at once”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 3:1). Such references imply the orchestration of violence by those in positions of influence, a theme which emerges numerous times throughout the sample. The *Nation* again alludes to these forces in “Violence: ECK should have acted sooner” (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:1), where its argument is to persuade against violence by implicating certain individuals but without condemning the misconduct by providing the necessary information. They refer to the need to “go beneath the masks” and deal “directly and decisively with the instigators”, alluding to a veneer of sorts and continuing with the illusive references to underlying problems (“Violence: ECK should have acted sooner”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 26:1).

In the end, the publications fail to do any kind of meaningful analysis as espoused by Galtung’s peace journalism (2006). Had they been concerned with facilitative or investigative journalism they could have employed some of the strategies as advocated by peace journalism, such as including a range of sources in their articles, providing adequate context for the violence, including a range of actors and not simply reducing the elections to a zero-sum game between two “combatants”.

5.2.3 Disavowal of ethnicity

As noted in Chapter Three, omissions are as significant as inclusions when studying media texts. Apart from the two significant unifying references to ethnicity noted above, there is a curious silence on the ethnic dimension to the violence, comprising a complete disavowal of this topic. Despite ethnicity having been acknowledged to play a large role in political life in Kenya historically and currently, both the *Nation* and *Standard* fail to make any meaningful reference to ethnicity in terms of support and influence, save for a fleeting reference to ethnic unity and Odinga's "community" whose support he risks losing should he lose the election ("D-Day: You decide", *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1; "Why a win is a must", *Standard*. 2007. Dec 7:1). Given that the political climate of the time was fraught with ethnic divisions, having been acknowledged to have been the most ethnically divided in all Kenya's history at the time of going to the polls, one would expect explicit and purposeful reference to ethnicity (Kagwanja and Southall 2008; Klopp 2008). This disavowal of ethnicity is prevalent throughout the four-week period in the ways the publications report on the conflict. As discussed below, they failed to provide an account for the underlying causes and who it involves, omitting to mention ethnicity as a factor. This failure means that they failed to adequately inform the Kenyan citizenry.

5.2.4 The invocation of a national and moral subject

The invocation of a unified national Kenyan identity becomes apparent as the gravity of the situation becomes clearer. Both the *Nation* and *Standard* seek to disavow ethnicity in appealing to Kenyans to unite and move forward in their 27 December front-page editorials, "D-day: You decide" (*Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1) and "Your vote, your choice" (*Standard*. 2007. Dec 27:1). The dominant portrayal of Kenyans in these editorials is as a unified people with similar goals and aspirations to see peace return to their country. The closer they get to the elections, the more the publications invoke a national subject through means of unification, to the exclusion of the ethnic subject. It would appear that the publications attempt to construct a nation when the gravity of the situation is recognised. This emerges specifically on the day of the elections and in subsequent reports, when the violence escalates. Three significant portrayals of Kenyan

citizens are deployed in this discursive work: Kenyans as national subjects, Kenyans as moral subjects, and immoral Kenyans expurgated as the 'other'. At this time of political instability, the publications invoke and narrativise a national identity as a means to legitimate (Thompson 2000) their construction of nationhood, very important discursive work at a volatile time. It is worth bearing in mind that African countries historically have relied on national identity as a unifying force. When this is absent, they fall back onto ethnicity (Mamdani 2001).

The first reading, of Kenyans as a national subject, is prevalent in the synchronised headlines of 3 January 2008, in which both publications employ unifying strategies in the hopes that Kenyans will overcome ethnic divisions and unite at a time of crisis. The discursive work of both publications is to ignore the current context of violence and malpractice in favour of an argument for unity among Kenyans. Unifying strategies abound, with the *Nation* presuming to speak on behalf of Kenyans, describing Kenya as "our beloved country", referring to "our children" the victims of violence, and stating that politicians stand to lose credibility "in the eyes of Kenyans". Similarly, the *Standard* reifies the crisis while calling on Kenyans to unite to contain it. Through the use of "we", "us", "our", "all of us, as a people and a country", and "our dear country", the *Standard* overlooks the current context in favour of an argument for unity "which embraces individuals in a collective identity, irrespective of the differences and divisions that may separate them" (Thompson 2000: 64).

The second reading, of the invocation of a moral subject, first emerges in the publications' front-page articles of the 27 December 2007 editions, three days before the election, titled "D-Day: You decide" (*Daily Nation*) and "Your vote your choice" (*Standard*), respectively. As the gravity of the election-related violence appears to be acknowledged by the publications, they appeal to Kenyans to "keep the peace", and "make every effort" to "ensure peace and stability", an epideictic strategy which praises Kenyans ("D-Day: You decide", *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1). By appealing to Kenyans to see through their civic duty of voting in the elections, the article invokes a responsible, benevolent civic subject who is peace-loving, law-abiding, fair and accepting

of the outcome of the election amidst ongoing violence and corruption. The act of voting is used here as a validation of their commitment to their country, with the publications taking an apparently democratic position and appealing to Kenyans to “uphold[ing] what is right and fair” and in so doing, constituting Kenyans as rational subjects (“D-Day: You decide”, *Daily Nation*. 2007. Dec 27:1). The *Standard* appeals to Kenyans to be guided by their conscience in protecting the “Kenyan dream”, and to “vote wisely...with your conscience”, and “vote with peace in your heart”. Such appeals infer a moral subject, and those who comply with this are tasked with protecting Kenya’s future. Curiously, this particular type of moral subject is inferred to be acquiescent of the outcome of the elections, and to unquestioningly accept the results for the betterment of all (“Save our beloved country”, *Standard*. 2008. Jan 3:1).

At the same time, those who do not conform to this moral subject position are expurgated as “the other”, portrayed as unreasonable for not wanting “to unite in the face of diversity” (Thompson 2000). This reading first emerges as a sub-text to the unification strategies employed by the *Standard* in its 27 December 2007 article, “Your vote, your choice” (*Standard*, 2007. Dec 27:1). Here, the publication invokes an immoral subject, described as “those who would, in pursuit of personal and or vested interests, threaten to undermine” the political regime by partaking in “vote cheating and rigging”. This is extended in the *Nation*’s “Save our beloved country” (*Daily Nation*. 2008. Jan 3:1) in which the publication portrays Kenyans as unreasonable for participating in the violence, admonishing Kenyans for their “unbelievable foolishness” to destroy “*their* economy”, “*their* homes” and “*their* entire way of life” (emphasis added). The “armies of destruction”, “their supporters”, “Kenyans” who, “in the name of politics” and “on behalf of people whose lives of comfort and luxury are going on normally”, are chastised for destroying “their own economy, their homes and entire way of life”.

5.2.5 *The roles of the press*

As the violence intensifies the publications make repeated and increasingly forceful calls to politicians to reign in their supporters and steer Kenyans toward peace and reconciliation. In so far as they appeal to leaders to act in the interests of Kenyans rather

than to further their self-interest, and call on Kenyans to unite in the face of the looming crisis and accept the results, the publications both purport to be acting in their monitorial capacity, as outlined in Chapter Two. However, given their failure to provide any meaningful context for the violence and its perpetrators, the publications fail to provide the information necessary for citizens to understand this activity. Kenyans are also not presented with the agenda of ethnic interests in the press, under the pretense that ethnicity is unimportant in this context. Given that agenda-setting is an inherently political process in that the news media give credence to some issues and not others, this suggests that the editors were making political decisions at this time (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 2).

The publications do not include any information from local sources, which could have provided some necessary information. As such, the press not only fail in their capacity as monitor, but are complicit in enabling the current political dispensation. Their unwillingness to address the causes of the violence and hold those involved to account comprise functions akin to the collaborative role, in which the news media are partisan and complicit with the elite in the country. This is a cynical use of their position as advisors and heroes when the publications fail to do any meaningful work in this regard. The articles reflect a total lack of investigative journalism.

In closing, it is worth considering, given the extent of reflection and the levels of regret expressed by journalists and editors in the wake of the violence, what they might have liked to achieve in their coverage.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Daily Nation. 2007. Nip poll violence in the bud at once. Dec 3:10.

10 | OPINION

DAILY NATION
Monday December 3, 2007

DAILY NATION

Nip poll violence in the bud at once

At least 11 people are reported to have died in Kuresoi in the last one month alone in a fresh flare-up of the clashes that have rocked the area after every five years, particularly during election campaign period. It is reported that this conflict has been fuelled, as it usually is in the larger Molo region, by political disagreements between those who would vie for office in one party, and other communities suspected to be sympathetic to another.

This violence is often seen as a well-trying and successful move to disenfranchise certain communities regarded as newcomers in the area by chasing them away, and it has worked every time since the first multiparty election in 1992, then in 1997, and now.

Given a situation like this, how come the authorities always seem to engage in fire-fighting tactics every time conflict breaks out? Could it be there never is any intelligence on the ground to inform the Provincial Administration that something ugly is in the offing?

Are Kenyans expected to believe that the administration is so helpless that death, arson and general destruction can be regularly visited on specific areas like Molo, Mt Elgon, Tana River and a few others without it getting wind of the intended mayhem?

Elsewhere in Nairobi, a 15-year-old was lynched in Kibera, presumably because he wore a T-shirt belonging to one of the contending parties.

Never mind that the boy was not old enough to vote. Never mind that he probably wore the T-shirt because he did not have too many other clean garments to wear. Just when will this intolerance end?

We in *Nation* have written endlessly about the need to contain election violence even if it means latching on to those suspected of fomenting it, whatever their station in life, and punishing them heavily, and we shall not tire doing so again and again.

However, in the end, the buck stops with the Government's security machinery, which seems to be unable to pre-empt such violence.

If the rather lackadaisical manner in which the security organs have reacted to the trouble spots is because someone does not want to lose votes, then it would be a very asinine attitude. One life lost due to politics is one life too many. The Government must do its duty and arrest the situation whatever the cost.

Big challenge for Kenya

This weekend, Kenya's Harambee Stars kick off their campaign for the East and Central Africa Senior Challenge Cup competition with a tie against hosts Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. The Senior Challenge Cup offers Kenya an opportunity to appease its followers in a year that they failed to qualify for the Africa Cup of Nations.

Kenyans have a right to demand a better performance from Harambee Stars when they compete in the regional tournament.

Kenya has for long been the dominant nation in the region, but due to a series of poor results, Harambee Stars have fallen behind Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan in world rankings. The Tanzania competition will thus be a chance for Kenya to redeem itself.

Coming at a time when the qualifiers for the 2010 World Cup are just about to kick off, the Senior Challenge Cup will offer an ideal training opportunity for Harambee players, who have been starved of international exposure for too long.

But the KFF and the Government must play their part by financing the team's preparations for the World Cup qualifiers after a rather half-hearted contribution in the run-up to last year's finals in Germany.

Coach Mulec has made it clear that it will be worthless for Kenya to participate in the qualifiers if there will be no money to assist the team's preparations.

Thus, the federation and the Government must work towards the common goal of helping Kenya to qualify. Victory in Tanzania will be the start of a long and potentially difficult road to South Africa 2010.

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40 Years and Counting...



THEY'RE PEOPLE TOO
RASNA WARAH

The slum-dwellers of Nairobi want to see real change

IN ALMOST EVERY COUNTRY, opposition politics tends to be concentrated in large cities. This is because levels of literacy, awareness and inequality tend to be higher in cities, and therefore it is in cities that levels of dissatisfaction with the status quo are most pronounced.

That is why politicians try so hard to appease their urban poor constituents in an election year. Slums become the sites of rallies and recruitment grounds for voters.

It is the season when idle slum youth find work — as rabble-rousers or disrupters of rallies. Many take on this work because it is the only one they can find.

Many become the main casualties of violence during elections. What they don't realise is that once the elections are over, and their candidate has won, party manifestos and visions launched during the election period will be forgotten and they will go back to where they came from — slums.

Fortunately, Nairobi's slum-dwellers — who comprise more than half the city's population — are fighting back with their own manifesto.

Developed through a series of meetings in eight constituencies in Nairobi, the People's Manifesto is a synthesis of the aspirations and views of people living in Nairobi's informal settlements.

The process leading to the development of the manifesto was spearheaded by three community-based organisations — the Nairobi People's Settlement Network, Mutungano wa Wazazi, and the Miss Kach Initiative (a youth group in Korocho).

The demands of the slum communities focus mainly on policy, legislation, and not surprisingly, land, security and infrastructure.

Among other things, the People's Manifesto calls for the enactment of a new constitution that promotes people's participation, the reduction of taxes on essential commodities, the provision of people's participation in the national

budgeting process, the establishment of a non-politicised youth fund, the development of a national slum upgrading policy, and the abolition of the shoot-to-kill culture among police.

They also want the development of infrastructure within slum settlements, and the establishment of a transport system that is free of exploitation.

A visit to a Nairobi slum is not a pleasant experience. Open sewers, filth and "flying toilets" create a stench that is so overwhelming, it lingers in one's nostrils for days afterwards.

Those of us who do not have the stomach to visit a Nairobi slum should see *Slum Survivors*, a new film produced by the UN's Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs that shows what abject urban poverty does to people.

Slum-dwellers want to see the change that all politicians are promising because their lives literally depend on it. They want free health and education. They want pedestrian pathways, roads and toilets. More importantly, they want the kinds of jobs and salaries that will allow them to move out of the slum.

THERE ARE NON-GOVERNMENTAL initiatives and individuals that are trying to improve living conditions in slums. But while these efforts must be commended, they are a drop in the vast ocean of challenges facing the average slum-dweller.

The ultimate responsibility of ensuring that slum-dwellers are not condemned to live like animals lies primarily with central and local governments, who have the kind of resources needed to build schools and hospitals on a large scale.

ANY VISIT TO A
NAIROBI SLUM IS
NOT A PLEASANT
EXPERIENCE

not with individuals or with charities. Central and local governments have the kind of power and resources that few non-governmental organisations have to make significant improvements in the lives of large numbers of people.

One toilet block may improve the lives of people living in a section of a slum, but real improvement in the lives of slum-dwellers will only occur when governments adopt policies and legislation that enable the poor to improve their livelihoods.

Unfortunately, many governments lack the political will to make this happen. In fact, efforts to improve slums are often hampered by none other than politicians.

Some erroneously believe that significant improvements in the living standards of a huge voting bloc could mean loss of votes in the next election (assuming that happier, better-off people tend not to vote). Others have a vested financial interest in slums — as landlords and political patrons.

Perhaps this is why the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has decided to bypass governments altogether and give direct support to NGOs working with slum communities.

Last week, the foundation pledged \$10 million to Slum/Shack Dwellers International, an alliance of NGOs that works with slum federations in several countries, including Kenya.

Funds from the grant will be used to support the activities of informal savings groups within slums to improve slum neighbourhoods.

A press release announcing the Gates foundation's decision aptly states that one of the reasons for this direct support is because "the urban poor are tired of waiting for governments to meet their needs".

Ms Warah is currently an editor with the UN. The views expressed here are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations (grasp@unhcr.org/kenya.com)

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Kibaki tells faiths not to take sides in elections

**TRICK MATHANGANI
EVELYN OOUTU**

IDENT Kibaki reached to faiths, urging the clergy to remain neutral and foster peace as the country edges to the General Election. President's plea came at a time when heads of different faiths have taken sides with political camps competing for power.

Kibaki, who was speaking at the funeral service of Nyeri Catholic Archbishop Nicodemus Kirima yesterday, urged religious groups to avoid partiality.

"I appeal to leaders of all faiths to rise above the political passions fuelled by competition," Kibaki told hundreds of faithful who attended the Mass at Ruring'u Stadium, Nyeri.

Kirima, who died two weeks ago from kidney complications, was later buried at 2.45pm in a tomb inside the Consolata Cathedral in Nyeri town.

Twenty-six bishops and archbishops from all over the country attended the Mass led by John Cardinal Njue.

The President warned that political temperatures would rise in the next three weeks, but urged Kenyans to prove to the world that they valued peace.

He reminded voters that although they supported different political camps, they would continue living together even after the elections. He asked for tolerance of different political views.

"Do not allow any individual or group to be discriminated against because they have different views in that locality," added the President. Some

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**PULSE!
HOW OUR
CREW GOT
A LIFE!**

MAKING THE DREAM
CALLED CREAM +
SMITTA'S LITERARY
BOOK + CAUGHT
OUT + MORE

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Why a win is a must

HIGH STAKES GAME: FOR KIBAKI, A LOSS WOULD MAKE HIM THE FIRST INCUMBENT TO DO SO; IF HE DOESN'T WIN, RAILA WILL HAVE MISSED HIS BEST BET YET; IF HE FAILS KALONZO COULD BE BACK IN 2012

BY STANDARD TEAM

FOR the three top combatants in the presidential race, the December 27 General Election is a high stakes game, with a bundle of compelling reasons informing their desire to win.

It is this that has seen the candidates go flat out in what will no doubt be the most hotly contested presidential battle since Kenya went multi-party in 1992.

Today, President Kibaki of PNU, ODM's Mr. Raila Odinga and ODM-Kenya's Mr. Kalonzo Musyoka plunged into the final 20 days, with plenty to fight for.

The campaigns have been spurred on by a propaganda war, advertising blitz, opinion poll ratings and campaigns funded through the most oiled campaign war chests of any

MOST POPULAR PARTY

ODM **43.7%**

PNU **39.2%**

ODM-K **15.1%**



**THE STANDARD
SPECIAL REPORT**

BOY

Page 3 column 1 ▶▶

Buy & sell NSE shares at Equity. 

ELECTION 2007

Battle takes shape

General Election will be the most hotly contested in Kenya's history

FROM PAGE 1

lection. For Kibaki, the incumbent, the presidential prize is seen by supporters as his to lose. Handing over power can be a painful experience, and his camp would do everything to avoid this.

For Raila, a 1997 loser, a 2002 digmancer and now riding on the apex of his political career, his race is a high octane, do-or-die battle. His supporters see this as his highest pinnacle to which he might not return should he miss the seat.

For Kalonzo, the spirited battle he has put on his sails is seen more as a build-up for a good result, which would put him in good stead for big things in future.

Prof. Macharia Munene, an international relations don, summed up the predicament of the three thus: "Kibaki is for a sitting President to lose. Time is running out for Raila, while there is not too much pressure for Kalonzo to win. He (Kalonzo) knows a good performance now will put him in a better position in future."

For Kibaki, if he were to lose, he would go down in history as the first sitting Kenyan President to lose at the ballot, having served only one term.

For Raila — who has consistently led in five Steadman opinion polls since September and locked in a statistical

dead-heat with Kibaki in the most recent — a loss could see his political career take a downturn.

"He also risks losing the support of his community that has been by him all this time," added Munene.

Kalonzo is determined to leave an impressive mark in his maiden shot at the presidency and, perhaps, have a bargaining chip if he does not triumph.

He has made no secret that he would be willing to enter into a coalition with whoever wins.

At the same time, the stakes for the lieutenants of the top guns, and who are vying for parliamentary seats, are as high since the loss for the flagbearer would confine the whole team to the opposition.

Kibaki has a large team of Cabinet ministers who will do anything to ensure he does not lead them to the opposition.

Raila has the core Pentagon team, which offers him the best ever chance of changing from the opposition benches.

For Kalonzo, an entire region of Eastern Province and about 20 MPs are hanging their hopes on him.

Kibaki has used every campaign stop to urge Kenyans to elect him on account of his development record.

Everywhere he has set foot, he has left a trail of new projects in the slogan, "Kazi len-delee".

Raila has packaged his cam-



President Kibaki pays his last respects to Archbishop Nicodemus Kirima at Rungu Stadium, Nyeri District, yesterday.

paign message in a well-outlined pledge list of what an ODM government would do if he wins.

His camp has marketed the campaign with the line that ODM stands for change, while Kibaki's PNU stands for the status quo.

Yesterday, the adrenaline kept latest index, ahead of Steadman Group's tomorrow.

According to Inditrac Harris, ODM is still the most popular party three weeks to polling day. ODM's popularity stands at 43.7 per cent, the pollster says.

PNU follows closely with 39.2 per cent, while ODM-Kenya is at 15.1 per cent.

The Steadman poll, which could be the last before the elections, is expected to be key in the perception war.

Each of the main candidates is set to enter a multi-pronged campaign mode. Kibaki's Finery will take him to areas he has not been to, running to the last day of the campaign.

Kibaki's latest pledge is raise teachers' salaries. Raila's teams have been detailed with his pledge lists for each region they visit.

Raila has promised a new constitution within six months and the employment of 60,000 teachers.

The parties are said to have set aside billions of shillings for elaborate campaigns. PNU parliamentary candidates have each received Sh500,000 and a vehicle for campaigns.

With the battle promising to go down to the wire, Raila and Kalonzo have claimed that the Government planned to rig the elections.

Be neutral, Kibaki tells faith groups

FROM PAGE 1

Church leaders have declared support for Kibaki, while a section of Muslims have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ODM presidential candidate, Mr. Raila Odinga. They have pledged to support his bid for State House.

The controversial MOU between Raila and the National Muslim Leaders Forum has drawn criticism from churches, which say it elevates Islam above other religions.

But Kibaki yesterday said faiths had a duty to speak the truth.

"The Church has a solid role to unite people of different backgrounds so that they can put aside their differences, i call on the Church to rise above tribal and racial differences during the campaigns," said Kibaki.

The President's visit to his Nyeri turf came two weeks after he endorsed candidates picked on his PNU party ticket, much to the chagrin of others running on fringe parties supporting him.

Kibaki has since appeared to back off from that stand, instead asking candidates in various parties to work together.

Yesterday, there was a sign of reconciliation among candidates with those in smaller parties allowed to sit in the presidential dais.

Nobel laureate, Prof Wangari Maathai, sat next to her bitter rival, Mr. FT Nyamyo, who beat her in the Tetu PNU nomination.

nations. She retreated to her Mazingira Green Party.

DP candidate for Tetu, Mr. DK Kimani, and Nyeri Town's candidates, Ms Esther Murugi Mathenge (PNU) and Mr Peter Mureithi (Mazingira), were also present.

Kirima, who was Nyeri archbishop since 1988, died at the Nairobi Hospital where he was undergoing treatment. He had been in and out of hospital since 2001 when he developed kidney failure.

In 2002, he underwent a kidney transplant in the US donated by his brother, Mr Peter Karithi.

He was buried next to his predecessor, Archbishop Caesar Gatirau, who died in February 1988.

According to the Catholic faith, bishops and archbishops are laid to rest in the Cathedral if they die in office.

Nakuru Bishop Peter Kairu performed the final rites in the Cathedral. Scores of faithful lined up to view the tomb.

Nine asked priests to unite in the face of Kirima's death, saying it should not spark competition among them.

The Pope's representative, Alain Paul Rebeurpain, who also attended the Mass, asked the Episcopal Conference and the clergy to help him recruit an archbishop to succeed Kirima in Nyeri.

In his message read by the secretary of the Kenya Episcopal Conference, Father Vincent Wambunji, the Pope termed Kirima's death a big loss to the Church.

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10 | OPINION

DAILY NATION

Violence: ECK should have acted sooner

The Electoral Commission came out hard on perpetrators of poll violence, albeit too late in the day. At least three candidates were each fined Sh100,000 on allegations of orchestrating or abetting violence, and although the penalty was paltry, the principle was laudable.

Several ugly incidents were witnessed during the month-long campaign, which officially ended on Monday. Campaign-related deaths were reported in Rongo and Ugenya constituencies, while in many other places, politicians and their supporters were beaten by intolerant rivals.

As we kept saying during the electioneering period, the youths who are always associated with violence are mere hirelings, working for well-placed individuals, who have the wherewithal to plan, pay for, and mask their nefarious designs. On their own, the youths do not have the capacity to plot and carry out those dangerous activities.

For this reason, it has always been our considered view that rooting out poll violence requires going beneath the masks and dealing directly and decisively with the instigators of violence.

This year's campaigns are now closed, but the lesson for the future is that ECK must put in place systems early in the day to deal with poll violence. The penalties should come fast and heavy to deter potential planners and perpetrators of violence.

It would be useful to raise penalty quite substantially because the Sh100,000 fine is pocket change to some of the politicians fanning trouble. If possible, the culprits should even be barred from elections altogether.

Besides, the youths who are routinely used to cause mayhem should also be heavily punished to send a strong message that they are not immune simply because they are working for powerful individuals.

Similarly, we want to see a situation where the police, the Attorney-General's office, and the ECK work together to rein in those violating electoral rules. The situation obtaining in which the main contenders kept blaming each other for breaking the rules only served to embolden the criminals.

Let this year's experience serve as a lasting lesson on how to manage violence-free electoral processes.

Somalia still burning

Soldiers from Burundi have started arriving in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, as part of the country's contribution to the African Union peacekeeping force for the troubled country.

One thousand seven hundred Burundi peacekeepers will join the Ugandan contingent of 1,500 which has been holed up in Mogadishu for some months.

But the number is still considerably short of the 8,000 peacekeepers the AU plans to deploy there.

Many African countries which had pledged support for the AU mission have been slow in living up to their commitments. So far only Uganda and Burundi have sent troops, but it appears there is little they can do in a situation where there is no peace to keep.

Even as the Burundi contingent was landing, Mogadishu was the scene of fierce fighting between insurgents and forces of the interim government backed by Ethiopian troops.

The international community has to face up to the fact that unless there is a force strong enough to enforce peace, everything else will be a mere gesture.

As long as the interim government depends on Ethiopian military power for survival, then the insurgents who have found a common cause against what they see as a foreign occupation, will not stop fighting.

The first step towards peace in Somalia should be the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, but they obviously will not quit if it means leaving the interim government to be easily overrun by insurgents.

The AU must place in Somalia a force large enough to contain the insurgents for the period it will take the government to build up its own capability.

WAR ON AIDS
S. CAMP & E. ZULU

We have little choice but to protect the next generation

DESPITE THE RECENT GOOD news that fewer people worldwide are infected with HIV than previously thought, HIV remains one of the major public health challenges of our time.

Even with life-saving drugs becoming available to more and more people, keeping people from being infected in the first place represents the only realistic way to curb the spread of HIV in the long haul.

And the most logical starting point for any prevention effort is young people — especially those who have yet to become sexually active.

That's hardly a new idea, and major initiatives to provide youth with the information, skills and resources to protect themselves from HIV have been underway for many years.

Now a major new study, conducted by the New York-based Guttmacher Institute and partners in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda, provides a ground-breaking perspective on the effectiveness of these efforts through adolescents' eyes.

The study, which was based on personal interviews with nearly 20,000 young people in four sub-Saharan countries, was released at the Fifth African Population Conference held early this month in Arusha, Tanzania.

So what did these young people tell us? We were tremendously encouraged by their positive and hopeful outlook on life. But their verdict on our collective attempts to help them safely transition to adulthood is sobering.

Adolescents in the four countries we studied — Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi

and Tanzania — told us that they often do a two-fold challenge for both developing country policymakers and their counterparts in industrialized countries (who help shape policies via foreign aid): First, they must strengthen and expand fragile education and health systems.

The second recommendation though, is hard for some people to swallow: Policymakers — and society at large — must acknowledge and openly discuss the role that sexuality plays in the lives of many adolescents.

Adolescents say that fear and embarrassment constitute the greatest barriers to their seeking information and health services. In many societies in Africa and elsewhere, sexual activity among young people prior to marriage, though common, remains stigmatized. Even talking about sex is often taboo.

FEARING THEY MAY BE PERCEIVED as promoting promiscuity, policymakers are reluctant to support improved sexual health information and services for young people. But failure to do so is self-defeating and, quite frankly, totally unacceptable.

The reality is that, by the age of 18, most teens have begun to have sex. Instead of being helped, they are often shamed into ignorance about their own sexuality — putting them at high risk of HIV infection or other negative outcomes, such as an unwanted pregnancy.

Again, let's listen to what adolescents say: They yearn for honest and reliable information and they strongly support sex education in schools. At most, however, only half of them get such sex education — ranging from 15 per cent in Burkina Faso to 52 per cent in Ghana.

Here's what needs to happen. Be not all adolescents stay in school, appropriate sex education should begin early in primary grades.

Developing effective out-of-school education programmes — especially in countries with low rates of school attendance and high drop out rates — is also critical.

The quality of sex education must improve — teachers, for example, better materials and training.

Industrialized countries have a important role to play. They should support developing countries' effort to promote a positive attitude and a comprehensive approach toward the sexual reproductive health of young people. Western European governments are taking this route, as should be commended for it.

In sharp contrast, the United States undermines such efforts, exporting to developing countries its rigid anti-until-marriage education program. Recipients of US HIV funds may have teens aged 15 and older with infrequent condom use, but cannot use funds to "promote or provide" sex education in most situations.

To be sure, the US has played a role in development assistance single largest donor in the fight against AIDS. But its emphasis on abstinence-only education has limited young people's access to health information and services that should stop.

It is imperative that African governments focus on the evidence in their domestic policies and programs. They must withstand pressure from external forces that try to impose

Appendix 4


Daily Nation. 2007. D-Day, You Decide. Dec 27:1.

ELECTION SPECIAL
Inside: 20-page pullout on 2007 poll

DAILY NATION

NAIROBI, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 2007

D-DAY
YOU DECIDE



Mr. Odinga **Mr. Kibaki** **Mr. Odinga**

It's not a war, it's only an election

It is a great day to be a citizen of the Republic of Kenya. Today Kenyans have the opportunity to exercise a right denied billions across the world: The right to freely choose their ruler. Today Kenyans in their millions will vote either to re-elect President

race. They will also be making a choice between the policies of the Orange Democratic Party, Party of National Unity, Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya and many other parties contesting parliamentary and civic elections.

On this great occasion, we would like to emphasise the ad-

vultu, and commend five things to all our countrymen and women.

First, ensure that you have cast your ballot. If you haven't been to a polling station yet, you risk wasting something very precious.

The fate of Kenya and the quality of its government

million voters across the nation. Doing their civic duty is a measure of their patriotism. The country cannot be run well unless most of its citizens exercise good judgment by putting responsible and capable people in charge of its affairs.

Since 1992, Kenyans have done this

DAILY NATION

Election: It's time for
Kenyans to decide

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

cent. Today is a fantastic opportunity to change that state of affairs; to give our political parties and candidates a strong mandate to lead this great nation in peace and unity.

Second, keep the peace. Today's election is being held amid tension and intermittent outbreaks of violence, in which several police officers have been killed. At the end of the election, whether one's party wins or loses, every Kenyan wants a country to go back to.

We all want peace and tranquillity to get on with our lives. It would be selling the country, and 36 million people, cheap to sacrifice it for one election. Every effort must be made by every Kenyan, leaders and agencies of law and order, to ensure that the country remains peaceful during and after the election.

Third, always act within the law. The people responsible for some of the violence presumably thought that they were protecting the integrity of the elections and the rights of the party they support.

It is a great thing for Kenyans to be vigilant. Indeed, they must watch the election carefully and they must do all they can to ensure that it is fair. But it is criminal and counter-productive to take the law into one's hands in matters that are so critical to the stability of the nation.

There comes a time for a people to have faith in the institutions they have created, in themselves and in their countrymen. This is such a time. The proper way of dealing with suspected rigging is to expose it by reporting it to the Electoral Commission of Kenya, election monitors, observers and the agents of the various political party representatives. Be vigilant, but work within the law.

Fourth, be fair and honest. In his message to Kenyans on Christmas day, ECK chairman Samuel Ki-yuitu said: "Although voters are entitled to a well-managed free and fair election, they have to play their part by contributing positively to the election by upholding what is right and fair and by respecting each other as equals."

Road to darkness

This is an election, not a war. Kenyans must not approach it with an attitude of victory at all costs, by all means. An election victory that is not won honestly and fairly is a step on the road to darkness and death.

Fifth, candidates must be prepared to accept the result of the election. In the heat and anxiety of the campaign, it is often forgotten that we have a formidably transparent voting system. It allows all political parties to confirm that the ballot boxes are empty before polling, to check and record the serial numbers of the ballot boxes, to seal the boxes with their own padlocks, to inspect and record the serial numbers of ballot papers.

An election is not a done deal until all the ballot papers are counted and the results made public by ECK. The result of the election must be accepted by all; those who believe they have been treated unfairly have the right to seek redress in the courts of law by petitioning the results.

The wonders of modern technology make it possible for people to communicate with each other instantly. Kenyans must realise and respect the power — for good and for evil — that modern communications places in their hands. Now is not the time to cry "fire!" in a crowded theatre.

Kenyans have lived together — different tribes, different beliefs — for hundreds of years. They have discovered the value of living in peace and working together. Together, they have built a nation which is second to none in the region, with a vibrant economy, a committed and a productive work force.

There is, therefore, cause to look to the future with confidence, to have faith in the wisdom of Kenyans and to be relatively sure that the election fever will soon be gone and the people will go back to their normal lives.


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D - day...

WHAT OTHERS SAY
CHARLES ONYANGO-OBBOParty chief Zuma, his merry
wives, and a racist brother

THERE IS OLD SCHOOL, there's the African Big Man... and then there's Comrade Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, who last week won the presidency of South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC).

The boisterous and populist leader's reputation took a beating last year when he was charged with raping an HIV-positive family friend. He was acquitted.

Having wrested the leadership of the ANC from Thabo Mbeki, unless he is convicted of corruption given that fresh charges are being brought against him, Zuma is all but assured of becoming South Africa's president in 2009.

With that prospect looming, far-sighted observers are already contemplating what *The Times* (London) called a "pressing problem". That is, which of Zuma's many wives, not to mention mistresses, would be the First Lady?

An "unashamed Zulu traditionalist" (according to *The Times*), Zuma is quite happy to admit publicly that he is a polygamist.

He has recognised at least 19 children from "four official" marriages and several girlfriends. Two children have been born to him since his acquittal in the rape trial.

Zuma still does like some of our more old-fashioned fathers used to do. He has a "village wife", Sizakele Khumalo. She is the presumed "No 1" and lives at his homestead in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. He has no children with her.

The "city wife" is Mantuli Zuma, who married the big man five years ago. They have two children. Then there was Kabe Zuma. They had five children. She committed suicide in 2000.

Diamini Zuma couldn't take his ways much longer. They divorced in 1998. They have four daughters. She is now Foreign minister and, not surprisingly, a Mbeki ally.

He has a true town wife in the person

he has two children. With a name like that, small wonder she works at a mobile phone company. *The Times* describes her as an elegant woman known for her designer outfits.

As with very many men, there is an old flame, Minah Shongwe, in the frame. She has a son with Zuma.

Comrade Zuma, by the way, is 65. Truly impressive that he still has so much energy at that age.

Less saucy, but by far more ironical than the Zuma story, is that of Dr James Watson. I don't think that there's a black person who reads newspapers who has forgotten that name.

In case you have, Dr Watson is that American Nobel prize-winning scientist who caused an international uproar a few months ago when he claimed that black Africans were less intelligent than whites.

HE WAS FORCED TO RESIGN AS HEAD of the research laboratory in New York where he worked after his controversial remarks.

Earlier this year, Dr Watson became only the second person to publish his fully sequenced genome on the Internet. According to *The Independent*, now an analysis of this genome has showed that Dr Watson has 16 times more genes of black origin than the average white European.

"This level is what you would expect in someone who had a great-grandfather who was African," said Karl Stefansson of Decode Genetics, whose company did the analysis. "It is very surprising to get this result for Jim."

ZUMA'S 65. TRULY
AMAZING THAT
HE STILL HAS SO

To cap it all, in addition to the 16 per cent of Dr Watson's genes which were identified as likely to have come from a black ancestor of African descent, another 9 per cent were likely to have come from an ancestor of Asian descent, the test indicated.

To be fair, Dr Watson subsequently withdrew his racist remarks and apologised, but he probably wouldn't have made them in the first place if he were armed with the facts of his African ancestry.

We have dwelt on two controversial men. Let us report about a few good men too. The chief of Sri Lanka Airlines is Mr Peter Hill, a Briton.

Mr Hill will shortly be on his way back to Britain, after losing his job at the carrier where he was chief executive for eight years.

He lost his job after the Sri Lankan government cancelled his work permit. Why, you might ask.

On December 13, Sri Lanka's President Mahinda Rajapaksa requested that the airline clear 35 seats for him and his entourage on a flight from London via the Maldives to Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka.

When word got to the airline management, Hill and his team literally walked the president's party to go and hang on the nearest control tower. Brave folks. The rest, as they say, is history. We need more of such plucky courage in Africa.

The other bunch of good fellows are the ones who make the traffic rules in the UK. Under new guidelines published last week, they are proposing a stiffer penalty of up to two years in prison for people using a mobile phone or an MP3 player while at the wheel. A bad law, according to my book.

But they have a worthwhile new proposal — that motorists who drive without a puddle and splash pedestrians be fined up to £2,500 (£330,000).

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MESSAGE OF PEACE: AS WE GO TO ELECT OUR LEADERS TODAY, WE APPEAL TO YOU TO RELY ON YOUR INNER VOICE TO PRESERVE HARMONY AND SECURITY



Your vote your choice

EDITOR'S COMMENT

THE most important candidate in today's General Election is not on the ballot. But it is this candidate who will enable you, the voter, to exercise your democratic right to choose your leaders and enable those leaders to govern. That candidate is PEACE.

Therefore, before you cast your vote for your preferred presidential, parliamentary and civic candidates, please remember that they will only be useful to you and Kenya when there is peace and the country is united solidly behind them.

As a media house we are appealing to all Kenyans to rely on their inner voices to preserve national harmony and security. We are also reminding those in charge of national security to ensure and guarantee public safety during and after the elections.

And you, the voter, cannot escape this responsibility. Choosing one candidate over another does not mean that the person you did not vote for is your enemy. Indeed, supporters of the person you did not vote for must remain your good friends, neighbours and

Page 6 column 1 ▶▶

ELECTION SPECIAL Inside
24-page pullout with focus on build-up and today's historic poll



COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS

THE STANDARD

OUTSTANDING EVERY DAY
Thursday, December 27, 2007

We are all responsible for a peaceful Election Day

From Page 1

countrymen and countrywomen.

Therefore, first vote for peace in your heart, wish it for your neighbour and then pray for it to prevail throughout the country during the voting and long after the results have been announced.

When peace prevails, then it is clear that you will exercise your constitutional and God-given right to choose your leaders — of your own volition and without inducement and or coercion.

The continued harmonious co-existence of Kenya's varied races, ethnicities and religions and our national security serve as pillars of the country's nationhood and the prosperity that is engendered for the benefit of this and future generations.

It is incumbent upon you to protect Kenya's nascent democracy and shield it from those who would, in pursuit of personal and or vested interests, threaten to undermine it.

The leaders you choose will be of no use to Kenya if their pre-occupation would be to save the country from instability that may be generated by today's plebiscite.

It will be natural for the leaders you choose today to move to unite the country behind them because elections divide people because they are called upon to make choices.

But the elected president and his team become the country's leaders and must unite and rally the people behind them.

So who becomes Kenya's next President is squarely in the hands of you, the voter. Similarly, who the next Member of Parliament and councillor is a matter that rests with you as the electorate.

It is our considered opinion that you have to go and vote, not just because it is your constitutional right to choose your presidential, parliamentary and civic leaders every five years.

An even more important reason you should vote today is that this General Election is about Kenya's future.

By Kenya's future we mean your future and the future of the children of your children. However, while this election is not about the past, this past is important because it must inform the present so that we may as a country decide how to grapple with the future.

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The Kenyan dream was — and still is — epitomised in the call of the immediate post-independence government for the eradication of ignorance, poverty and disease.

The founding government also sought to give every Kenyan inexhaustible opportunity for advancement in an atmosphere of ethnic, racial and religious harmony and co-existence.

Of course, it was the business of government to create an enabling environment for the foregoing to thrive.

Let us therefore ask the following questions, nay, ask you to ask yourself the following questions before you cast your vote.

One, which party platform sufficiently addresses the Kenyan dream as espoused by the founding fathers and expanded on it to reflect and address the present and future desires of Kenya and Kenyans?

Two, which presidential candidate has adequately addressed the issues of poverty, education, health, security, creation of wealth, equitable development and empowerment of people to always exploit available opportunities for advancement of self, communities, regions and, ultimately, the country?

Three, which of the parliamentary candidates is a 'people person' and has shown a clear understanding of the role of a Member of Parliament, especially with regard to mobilising wananchi to embrace and rally around certain development ideas and to mobilise resources for their execution, while leading by example?

Four, of the civic candidates on the ballot, which one showed he/she best understood the role of local authorities as instruments of grassroots participation in identification of development priorities and mobilising resources for their execution?

From these questions four important points emerge. The first is that the choice you have to make today revolves around the twin issues of the creation of the enabling environment to allow for the all-round improvement of the lot of all of the Kenyan people and the equitable distribution of the country's resources.

The second is that you, as a voter, ought to know that there are three elections here and not one or two. To understand this simple fact is to know and understand

that in your role as an elector, you have a huge stake in deciding the future of your country from the grassroots (civic authorities) through the legislative process (Parliament) and all the way to the top (the Presidency).

The third point is that you, as a voter, have a role in the democratic process that goes beyond casting your ballot. You have to be an active participant in the way you are governed and in making decisions about governance and how resources are to be used.

The fourth is that unlike the three leading presidential candidates, we have no truck with the so-called 'three-piece suit' voting system where electors choose presidential, parliamentary and civic candidates from the same party without thinking about the manifestos, character, strengths or weaknesses of individual candidates.

Therefore, as you enter the polling booth, ballot paper in hand and as you mark it, remember that now that the politicians have spoken and now that the propaganda mills have ground to a halt, it is upon you to vote wisely, that is, with your conscience.

But to enable you to do that, the entire world is banking on the integrity, impartiality and commitment to the democratic process, of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) under the leadership of Mr Samuel Kivuitu.

The first thing Kivuitu and Company must have ensured by now is that the process of electing Kenya's next president, Parliament and local authorities — that is the entire General Election — is free, fair and transparent.

While the delivery of this rests with the ECK and the security apparatus, it is the duty of every citizen to report to these authorities — and the media — vote cheating and any moves aimed at rigging the General Election.

When a poll is free and fair and is seen to be so, it makes the post-election work of people and leaders much easier. It is easier for losers to accept the results and move on and allows the winners to be magnanimous in victory. The people are also keen to buy into the unifying moves of the new leadership.

It is for the ECK and police to ensure today's General Election is transparent, free and fair and be seen to be so.



Electoral Commission of Kenya Chairman, Mr Samuel Kivuitu.

Appendix 6

Daily Nation. 2007. Chaos as Kibaki sworn in. Dec 31:1.

45

LEADERS CALL FOR RESTRAINT
Business and religious leaders have called for calm in the wake of violence reported after ECK announced poll results. **PAGE 9**

ACCEPT RESULTS, SAY ENVOYS
The British and US ambassadors have asked contestants to accept the results of the just-concluded poll. **PAGE 15**

DAILY NATION

NAIROBI, MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 2007

GENERAL ELECTION

Chaos as Kibaki sworn in

■ Kivuitu declares PNU candidate winner of State House race ■ ODM says Raila is President-elect ■ Michuki suspends live broadcasts ■ Violence erupts

FULL RESULTS ON PAGES 2-9, 14, 15, 20, 21 AND BACK

Presidential results

4,584,721	MWAI KIBAKI
4,352,993	RAILA ODINGA

Right: Chief Justice Evan Gicheru with President Kibaki as he takes his oath of office for a second term at State House, Nairobi, yesterday. Above: A house goes up in smoke in Mathare slums, Nairobi, following the delay of the announcement of the presidential election results.

NEWS 2-9, BACK OPINION 10-11 LETTERS 12 WORLD 23-24

Ongiri, I. 2008. I acted under a lot of pressure, says Kivuitu. *Standard*. Jan 2:1.

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I acted under a lot of pressure, says Kivuitu

DAMNING ADMISSION: ASKED WHETHER KIBAKI WON ELECTION, POLLS BOSS SAYS: 'I DON'T KNOW'. HE ADDS PNU AND ODM-KENYA PUSHED HIM TO RELEASE DISPUTED RESULTS

BY ISAAC ONGIRI

MR Samuel Kivuitu last night made a damning admission that he announced results of the fiercely contested presidential election under pressure.

The announcement plunged the country into a post-election violence of a scale never witnessed before.

The magnitude of the Electoral Commission chairman's admission and the further dent on the credibility of the election was captured in his answer when asked if indeed President Kibaki won the elections: "I do not know whether Kibaki won the election".

Kivuitu continued with his stunning revelations when he said he took the presidential election winner's certificate to State House, Nairobi, after "some people threatened to collect it while I'm the one mandated by law to do so".

"I arrived at State House to take the certificate and I found the Chief Justice there, ready to swear-in Kibaki," Kivuitu said. On claims that he

Page 3 column 1

With elections behind us, it is time for healing and reconciliation among all Kenyans
— Kibaki

'Kibaki must first step aside and publicly own up to the fact that he was not elected President'
— Raila

Presidential poll lacks credibility and an independent audit should be instituted to rectify things.
— Lambsdorff

PROTESTS

Peace calls amid continued bloodletting

BY STANDARD TEAM

ANOTHER round of calls for peace was drowned under a new wave of bloodletting that left the country teetering on the edge of chaos.

(ODM) politicians calling for a ceasefire, a new standoff was unfolding.


A newly sworn-in President Kibaki and Mr Raila Odinga — who is strongly convinced

begins.

On its part, the United States has since withdrawn its congratulations for President Kibaki, with the State Department raising, what is described

top Kenyan election officials calling for an independent inquiry into the polls.

In an early sign of what could be a long-drawn battle, the Government continued with its







Raila sets terms as UK offers to mediate

FROM PAGE 1

only a day after it banned live broadcasts.

Yesterday, in his New Year message, British Prime minister, Mr Gordon Brown, telephoned Raila with an offer to intervene and end the chaos that has so far claimed over 300 lives.

Saying he accepted Britain's initiative, Raila, however gave his own terms.

"The first condition is that President Kibaki must first step aside and publicly own up to the fact that he was not elected President," Raila demanded.

RAILA INSISTED THURSDAY UHURU PARK RALLY WOULD GO ON DESPITE POLICE BAN

He added: "The second condition is that the negotiation must be done by mediators because I'm not willing to talk to him directly."

Raila said Brown was "deeply disturbed" by the post-election violence that has rocked parts of the country.

This came on a day the post-election violence that has rocked parts of the country took serious proportions when at least 30 children and 10 adults who had sought refuge in a church were burnt to death in acts of violence linked to protests against the President's re-election.

Deaths, destruction and fear reigned in many parts of the country as more than 100 people were killed yesterday alone, including a District Officer (DO), a National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) officer, a veteran Rift Valley politician.

Yesterday, the Internal Security ministry warned mobile phone subscribers that they risked prosecution if they sent or forwarded short text messages (SMS) that may cause public unrest, in what could be a move to shut down 21st century's most effective communication mode.


"The Ministry of Internal Security urges you to please desist from sending or forwarding any SMS that may cause public unrest. This may lead to your prosecution," a warning sent by Safaricom, read.

Last night, Mr Peter Arina, the Safaricom deputy managing director, confirmed that the mobile giant had received the order that it circulated to its subscribers, from the Internal Security ministry.

This came only hours after President Kibaki addressed the nation on State TV, outlining his expectations for a second and last term.

In his New Year message, Kibaki said: "This year, we are marking the New Year at a time when the country has just concluded a closely contested free and fair general election."

"With the elections behind us, it is now time for healing and reconciliation among all Kenyans. I ask all of us, and par-



A violence victim receives first aid from a Kenya Red Cross Society worker in Kibera, yesterday. The Society's Secretary-General, Mr Abass Gullet, said most clash-hit areas were inaccessible because of insecurity. He said his workers were also a target.

ticularly all leaders, to embrace a renewed spirit of national unity, respect for the democratic choice and maintain peace, law and order".

Added the Head of State: "Let us choose to live together in a true democratic spirit of tolerance and mutual respect, for that is the only way of ensuring that we forge ahead and open a new chapter of development and improvement of our social and economic circumstances".

The President then went on to state that his Government would also deal decisively with those who breach the peace by intensifying security across the country.

But positions appeared to

hardened, with ODM vowing it would go on with tomorrow's rally at Uhuru Park despite a Government ban.

"The meeting will go on as planned. We are going to lead a million Kenyans to the venue. The work of police is to provide security," Raila, who spoke even as the venue remained ringed by armed General Service Unit (GSU) personnel keeping round the clock vigil, declared.

Announcing the ban, Government Spokesman Dr Alfred Mutua yesterday said the police would clamp down on dissent.

"Before the General Election, the Police Commissioner announced the Government would not allow any public ral-

lies to be held by anybody after the elections. This decision is still in force and will be enforced until the current security situation normalises," Mutua said in a statement read to the Press at the KICC, Nairobi.

Police spokesman, Mr David Kiraithe, who was also present, said the police would not allow lawlessness in any part of the country.

He warned: "Law and order is supreme and violence does not create any environment for anyone to lead".

But Raila, who addressed an international news conference at Pentagon House accompanied by running mate Mr Musalia Mudavadi, Pentagon members Mr

William Ruto, Mr Joseph Nyagah and Mrs Charity Nguhi, together with ODM chairman, Mr Henry Kosgey and MPs-elect Mr Ominiga Magara and Mr Fred Ouma, said the party had rejected the police ban and would proceed to the venue.

"The OCPD has told us that due to insecurity, the meeting will not go on. But the law says that police are to be notified so that they can provide security," said Raila.

The Orange party also went on to state that it would today release what it described as "a comprehensive report" detailing how President Kibaki was rigged back into the office by the ECK.

Kivuitu admits results released under pressure

FROM PAGE 1

was under undue pressure to declare results, Kivuitu said: "Some PNU (Party of National Unity) and ODM-Kenya leaders put me under pressure by calling me frequently, asking me to announce the results immediately".

President Kibaki ran for re-election on a Party of National Unity ticket, while Mr Raila Museyoka made his bid on an ODM-Kenya ticket. Mr Raila Odinga, who has said he was robbed of victory, ran on an Orange Demo-

cratic Party ticket. In the wake of parallel pressure from a number of ambassadors from the European Union countries and Mr Maina Kimani of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights not to announce the results until complaints, which arose, were addressed.

"I had thought of resigning, but thought against it because I don't want people to say I'm a coward," he said. The embattled ECK chairman made the revelations shortly after meeting with 22 ECK commissioners. Yesterday, Kivuitu conceded that

with minimum delay to ease national tension.

"If this matter is finally taken to court, the ruling should be made urgently so that if it were decided that Raila is the President, so be it. If it is Kibaki, so be it," he added.

Kivuitu said he made the decision, whose far-reaching implications are now being felt across the country. He said he announced the results because the commission had no legal mandate to investigate complaints raised by the opposition immediately.

him to announce the disputed poll outcome, but went on to announce that the commission was consulting eminent lawyers over the best course of action "so that its actions remain within the law".

The EU observer team has discredited the poll results and urged for an independent audit. On his part, Kivuitu said he backed independent investigation into what may have happened, but added that this would be only if the law would provide for it. "We are culpable as a commission,"

ring local and international journalists, who had gathered at his Nairobi residence.

It has also emerged that some countries concerned with the poll outcome, like South Africa, had sent in their electoral officials to the country. Kivuitu said the officials would be arriving today "to look into the matter".

Yesterday, Kivuitu was in a meeting with his 22 commissioners, which he deplored Mr Kibuka Mwangi, described as "a house-keeping meeting". In a signed statement, the 22 com-



DAILY NATION

Save our beloved country from ruin

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

people, many of them our children, who are now refugees in their own country.

A final opportunity now presents itself for the political leadership to pull the country back from the brink and help restore the public confidence and sense of safety.

Tough talk, grand-standing and empty point-scoring is not getting the nation anywhere. The moment has come to isolate the hard-liners on both sides and to allow the voices of reason to be heard across the political divide.

Negotiations cannot take place, and probably drag on, as Kenyans are slaughtered and the country burns. The first objective, therefore, is to secure the safety of all Kenyans. Let those with armies call them back, let those fanning the fires stop them out so that an environment is created for constructive dialogue.

The priority now is for leaders — if at all they are interested in their own credibility and in saving the lives of Kenyans and the country as a whole — to get out of their meeting rooms and into the countryside and preach peace and patience to their supporters.

Kenyans expect to see Mr Raila Odinga leading a peace mission to Kondele and other troubled parts of Kisumu and Nyanza in general. They expect to see Mr William Ruto and Mr Henry Kosgey at the head of an effort in the Rift Valley, restoring peace and calm. They expect President Kibaki to come out and calm the passions in Dandora, Huruma and other volatile parts of Nairobi.

It is only with the restoration of peace that reason will prevail.

But there can be no lasting peace without justice. It is therefore important for President Kibaki and Orange Democratic Movement leader Raila Odinga to enter into immediate negotiations on the disputed elections and arrive at a solution that both sides can live with. The hard-line positions, such as demanding the President's immediate resignation or the refusal to accept questions raised over the presidential election results, are not very helpful at the moment.

More middle-ground positions that should be explored could include a power-sharing arrangement.

The second option is the creation of an interim government excluding both Mr Kibaki and Mr Odinga, and a time-table for fresh presidential elections under a reformed electoral process.

The question yet to be resolved is whether an exhausted country rearing a state of civil war can survive another presidential election.

After the restoration of peace and the reaching of a political agreement, the truth about what went on in this election needs to be established, publicised and used to strengthen our democratic institutions.

There is an urgent need for an open and thorough public inquiry to determine the veracity of rigging allegations which have been raised by ODM, PNU and international observers.

Equally, it would be utter madness to try and go to an election with the same discredited Electoral Commission and election procedures. The ECK must be overhauled, and the laws and procedures of counting, counting and tallying votes made tamper-proof. Kenya must be prepared to invest billions of shillings in technology and processes to guarantee the integrity of future elections.

President Biya for life?

Cameroon's President Paul Biya has been in power for 25 years, but he still has other intentions — to change the law so that he can continue in office indefinitely. Officially, he should step down in 2011, but he is unwilling to do so.

This is not the first time he is doing this. Back in 1994, he pushed for constitutional change that saw presidential terms extended from five to seven years.

But Mr Biya is not alone in such things. In neighbouring Uganda, President Museveni pushed through Parliament a constitutional amendment that removed a two-term limit for the presidency, setting the stage for a president-for-life scenario.

It's the same case in Zimbabwe, where President Robert Mugabe continues to rule without limit.

Kenya is going through its most turbulent political period ever because of election irregularities that saw President Kibaki retain his seat for a second term under extremely controversial circumstances. Such are the examples that continue to warn Africa the dubious distinction of a continent averse to democracy.

The continent cannot continue like this. President Biya and his ilk must respect the law and learn the sense of good governance, which, among others, puts limits on presidential terms.

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WHAT OTHERS SAY
CHARLES ONYANGO-OBBO

The politics and economics of post-election violence

THE VIOLENCE THAT HAS rocked Kenya following the disputed December 27 General Election is the worst the country has witnessed since the Mau Mau days, according to several analysts.

But is a rigged election of itself enough to cause such violence?

The best way to understand what has been happening in the past few days is to study the experience of other African countries that fell under the spell of violence after disputed polls. In East Africa, there is no better example than next-door Uganda.

There are thousands of Kenyans who have fled the violence who are encamped on the Uganda side of the border towns of Malaba and Busia. On Monday, a group of more than 100 "militants" moved further inland from the border in the town of Tororo.

Ugandans are surprised at the post-poll violence that has consumed parts of Kenya, as much as some Kenyans seem bewildered by it.

Perhaps, they shouldn't be. In December 1980, Uganda held a fraud-riddled election. It was the spark that sent President Yoweri Museveni to the bush in February 1981, to begin a guerrilla war in which anything up to 300,000 people were killed.

That experience didn't deter politicians from seeking future elections. In 2001 and 2006, Museveni is thought to have rigged victory at far greater levels than Milton Obote did in 1980. Yet, in spite of that, there was no mass armed insurrection like that which followed 1980.

Therefore, just because an election is "rigged" doesn't mean there will be violence.

The one difference between Uganda in 1980/81 and 2001/2006 is in the levels of poverty. In 1980, the poverty level

and came to power in January 1986. By 2001, the poverty level was down 38 per cent, and by 2006, had fallen further to about 35 per cent. Uganda today has the lowest poverty levels in the region.

Kenya, on the other hand, has only just brought its poverty level to 57 per cent, much higher than Uganda's. In Africa, then, we have seen that poverty levels are a good indicator of whether or not you are likely to have post-election violence.

In fact, that is true of other developing countries. In India, it used to be considered that something would be wrong if at least 1,000 people didn't die in election violence. As India grew richer, election-related violence too declined.

Therefore, the most critical action in Kenya that will prevent election violence is not election reform alone, but dramatic poverty reduction.

THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT factor for election violence is the timing: the point at which a disputed election happens.

In Uganda, General Idi Amin had been deposed in April 1979, ending one of the worst military dictatorships in the world. Uganda then entered a heady "optimism phase". The country was swept with a sense that things were going to get better.

If you plotted the path of developing nations on a graph, you would have an upward swing, the "optimism stage"; then a long flat period, the "business as usual" phase, and then for emerging economies, the graph would shoot up again — the "take off" stage.

For most of Africa, usually, after the

"business as usual stage", you have a drop — the "crisis" or "pessimism" phase.

Kenya, in the last years of Daniel arap Moi, when the economy was posting negative growth rates, was at the "crisis" stage.

In the "optimism phase", people tend to react violently if things seem to turn for the worse, because it is too soon and they still expect things to get better. If things go wrong in the "business as usual phase", which is where Uganda is now, they tend to be less agitated.

They again tend to react violently if an election is stolen in the "crisis stage" because they are desperate for change and cannot stand anything getting in the way.

In December 2002, Kenya entered its "optimism stage". In early 2003, a Gallup survey found that Kenyans were among the most optimistic people in the world about the future.

By election time this year, polls showed that a significant majority of Kenyans, even those who didn't approve of President Kibaki's record, still thought the country is far better off today than it was in 2002.

Therefore, if the election of 2002 had been rigged, there would have been an explosion because the country was desperate for change.

The dispute around the election of last week degenerated into violence for the opposite reason — Kenyans still expected that things should get better.

Ugandans are surprised about the violence for the same reason: They viewed post-Moi Kenya as a country on the upswing, and countries on that route don't have botched elections.

There are, of course, many historical demons that have informed the killings in the Rift Valley, but the parallels for these can be found in a far away land — Sierra Leone. So we shall travel there

KENYANS STILL EXPECTED THAT



COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS

THE STANDARD

OUTSTANDING EVERY DAY
Friday, January 3, 2008

Kibaki, Raila, save our dear country

From Page 1

solution that brings the chaos to an end. What, then, are the steps towards the realisation of these three tasks envisaged here?

- All of us, as a people and a country, with the leading parties in the lead, must agree that we are faced with a serious challenge arising out of last week's fiercely contested — and since then furiously disputed — poll.
- President Kibaki address the nation, making a strong, and heartfelt pitch for reconciliation and patriotism. He should point out clearly that the death and destruction and the heightened political dispute need to be stopped.
- Raila and ODM should follow the President's gesture by dropping preconditions for such talks — and which they deserve to be commended after they did so last night — chief among them being that the President resigns and declares that he did not win the presidential poll.
- Employ a reputable international arbiter, NOT to determine who won the presidential poll, but to work out a road-map that will bring Kenya back from the brink and a mutually acceptable proposition of sharing power.
- Convene Parliament urgently, swear-in members and create joint committees created to work on possible mechanisms or legal instruments — constitutional or otherwise — of sharing power or agreeing a transition arrangement.
- These instruments must define additional power-sharing arrangements, including Cabinet posts, to be reserved for the protagonists and set a time limit within which this should be achieved.

Why are we making these proposals? Because we are convinced the situation prevailing in the country makes it impossible for any of the protagonists to govern alone in a winner-take-all format. Here are the facts:

- Notwithstanding the inflation of figures in a number of areas, both ODM and PNU garnered 4 million plus votes in the presidential ballot, meaning the country is split right down the middle.
- The position of President is not vacant. Kibaki was declared President whether or not the presidential ballot was flawed.
- Supporters of PNU believe their man won the presidential poll fairly while ODM's believe their man legitimately won the poll and had it stolen from him.
- Tension and political temperatures have been at boiling point and violence has claimed nearly 300 lives.
- Most of the people who have lost their lives and property, especially the aged, sick and children, had absolutely no idea why they were being hunted down and killed.
- Thousands have been displaced and thousands face starvation, and there is no guarantee that the education of Kenya's children will continue.
- Kenya remains polarised and is increasingly coming to a standstill.

Seen against this background, it is crystal clear to us that none of our political leaders should make political capital out of this. If any of them tried, it would only make a bad situation worse and alienate him from the very people he seeks to lead.

This is why we are calling upon the President and Raila to demonstrate humanity, care for the country, selflessness and an ability and judgment to place the country's interest above that of their ambitions or accumulation.

Therefore, in order to ensure this demonstrated leadership, the two must show courage to free themselves from any vested interests and handover to their inner conscience to save this country from plunging further into anarchy.

Lastly, which could well be first, we are convinced that President Kibaki does not want to go down in history as the leader on whose watch Kenya went the way of Somalia, Chad or other African countries.

Similarly, we do not think Raila wants to be known as the man who, because he believed he was cheated out of a poll victory, helped plunge his motherland into chaos and anarchy.

But over and above all this, we believe the President and Raila must act first and fast to save this our beloved country.

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Okech Kendo *If Kalonzo is principled, as he says, he should refuse to join a post-election coalition*

The writer is The Standard Managing Editor, Quality and Production

LAST week, citizens were told to vote — a one-day affair, it was said. But today, thousands are homeless and many who still have houses are prisoners in them.

Young people are being killed in a country plunged into darkness. Ethnic animosity is being entrenched, unnecessarily. Mr Noah Walea alleges it is ethnic groups that largely voted for ODM's Mr Raila Odinga are killing those believed to have voted for PNU's President Kibaki. But how can he, who is in Muthaiga, understand the plight of citizens marooned in Kawangware?

Mr Raphael Tuju, a parliamentary loser, tells BBC the violence will be quelled in a day or two, and then things will be normal again. This impunity affirms *myungwe hana haki*. The country is traumatised; and wananchi are crying for leadership.

There are three parties to this electoral scandal: ODM, PNU/ODM-Kenya and Kenya.

While PNU leaders are insisting the violence will be quelled, the country is dying. Forty-four years of Uhuru could be lost; democratic gains of 15 years have been wiped out.

The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) had the responsibility to preside over free and fair elections, but it bungled by announcing disputed results. Now ECK chairman confesses he buckled under pressure from PNU and ODM-Kenya.

Faiths, especially the Church, had a chance to intervene when things started going wrong on Friday, but they did not. John Cardinal Njue is talking of dialogue, without naming the problem.

Mr Kalonzo Maspyaka, the

It is still possible to save the country

peacemaker, is culpable, too. He was in Mwingi when pressure was needed to impose responsibility on ECK. But Kivutu now names Kalonzo's ODM-Kenya one of the parties that forced him to announce disputed results.

Now Kalonzo wants to mediate, with Bethwel Kiplagat and Lazarus Sumbeiyu. Kiplagat was absent on Saturday as Sumbeiyu debated theories of peace making.

They should have put pressure on ECK to do what was right. This is what ignited the violence, across six of eight provinces.

But Kalonzo is blaming victims of impunity for escalation of mayhem. He is 'mediating', but it is also claimed he is eyeing a ministerial position, a step closer to the presidency. He is not the independent arbiter.

After Kalonzo fled with ODM-Kenya registration certificate, he wanted to be President,

knowing he stood no chance. Opinion polls told him as much. Perhaps, the ECK bungle and the mayhem were the 'miracle' he had promised.

As presidential candidate, Kalonzo ate into President Kibaki's territory even as he sliced the Orange Movement referendum vote. If Kalonzo had been with either party, there would be no alibi of a "tight race" to invite mischief.

For Kalonzo to eye a post-election coalition in the circumstances is bloodied. As a man of 'principle', he should not touch a coalition of blood.

Meanwhile, Kivutu is yet to resign in shame, even after compromising ECK's independence. This man had ample time to redeem his integrity and save the country. Now he must be watching from his mansion in Garden Estate, as poor Kenyans are killed in Kibera.

Kivutu knew what a disputed election result meant, but he played puppet. Four days after dressing up the 'presidential' elections, Kivutu is still in office, at a cost to you.

Kivutu has lost face because nobody was holding a gun to his head when he made the announcement. He blundered knowing the consequences. As if that isn't tragic enough, some ECK commissioners are calling for an investigation. Where were they when Kivutu was setting the country on fire?


All along the ECK chairman was told about plans to rig the election, but each time he denied it. He was told about parallel ballot papers, but he wondered how they would be introduced. Commissioner Jack Tunwa, who read some of the disputed results, is part of the mess.

But the resolution of the crisis is still within reach: The problem is the fraudulent 'top up' of presidential votes. Owning up for the national good is the solution, not force. People can be silenced, but that is not peace. There should be a re-tallying or even fresh presidential elections.

TWO weeks ago Justice Daniel Aganyanya sued Chief Justice Evan Gicheru for defamation. Then a week ago Aganyanya was promoted to the Court of Appeal. Aganyanya was among judges suspended after Justice Aaron Ringera reported to Gicheru that Aganyanya was among those whose conduct was questionable. A tribunal cleared Aganyanya.

Now, will he take the promotion or is Aganyanya still suing Gicheru?

kendo@eastandard.net





MAIN PICTURE: Kenyans protesting against the declaration of President Kibaki as the winner of the December 27 poll are engulfed in teargas yesterday as police block them from accessing Uhuru Park, the venue of a planned ODM rally in Nairobi.

RIGHT: Peace laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa addresses the Press as ODM leader Mr Raila Odinga watches at Pentagon House, Nairobi.

FAR RIGHT: President Kibaki addresses a press conference at State House, Nairobi, yesterday.

PICTURES: JACOB OTENO, COLLINS KIWETU AND GEORGE MUKALA



PROTESTS... ODM calls for another rally today after running battles as Kibaki tells aggrieved: Go to court

BY STANDARD TEAM

INTERNATIONAL efforts to find peace and a political solution to the crisis facing the country intensified yesterday, even as violent protests brought Nairobi and other major towns to a halt.

President Kibaki, whose declaration as winner of the December 27 hotly contested poll plunged the country into chaos, called a press conference and told any aggrieved

party to go to court.

And ODM, for the second time in a week, but quickly announced that it would proceed today at the same venue starting at 10am in order "to sustain the pressure and enable Kenyans get what is rightfully theirs".


President Kibaki, speaking at the first news conference since being sworn-in on Sunday, declared: "Yule hatatosheka ana haki ya kuenda kortini na kuwata sheria (Those who are not satisfied have the right to go to

court and follow the law)". The Head of State, who addressed local and international journalists at State House, Nairobi, pointed an accusing finger at his opponents, saying those with vested political interests orchestrated the violence that has paralysed the country.

Kibaki, however, said he was open for dialogue but only after the violence has been contained. He spoke moments after Nobel laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who

Page 2 column 1

NATIONAL NEWS



1. Police arrest demonstrators in Hurlingham, Nairobi, who wanted to march to Uhuru Park for an ODM rally, yesterday.
2. ODM leaders at Hurlingham after they were blocked from the venue of the rally the party had called.
3. A victim of violence breaks down in Mathare, Nairobi.
4. Determined demonstrators barricade Ngong Road after they were stopped from getting to Uhuru Park.
5. Eldoret North MP-elect, Mr William Ruto, addresses demonstrators in Hurlingham.



ODM calls for new

3



FROM PAGE 1

jettied into the country early yesterday to broker a deal between the warring factions, said he was still unable to get an appointment with the Head of State.

"There is no need to rally the presidential votes because it is not a worthwhile exercise owing to the state of the records," Ntini said at the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACO) in Westlands, Nairobi.

This was after Attorney-General, Mr. Amos Wako, called for a fresh tally of votes — a position earlier pushed by ODM — by an independent body to end the post-election chaos.

In a statement faxed to newrooms, the Government's chief legal adviser stated: "It is necessary, and here I agree with the Catholic Bishops and others, that a proper tally of the valid certificates returned and confirmed should be undertaken immediately and on a priority basis by an agreed and independent person or body."

The Government's chief legal adviser, who also spoke of a government of national unity as one of the possibilities that could break the deadlock, said only the courts could nullify the elections after the Electoral Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki the winner.

Meanwhile, prospects of an international mediation starting any time soon looked bleak when Raita and the ODM Pentagon met Tuthi early in the day yesterday, and accused Kibaki of rejecting mediators who have offered to help resolve the impasse over the presidential vote outcome.

The Lang'ata MP-elect told international journalists that his team had identified former United Nations secretary-general, Mr. Kofi Annan, South Africa's Thutu and Ghanaian President and African Union (AU) chairman, Mr. John Kufuor, to mediate but the Government was dragging its feet.

The Illinois Senator, Mr. Barack Obama, added his voice to growing international calls to Kibaki and Raita to dialogue and peacefully resolve the impasse.

"Now is a time for President Kibaki, opposition leader Odinga and all of Kenya's leaders to call for calm, to come together and to start a political process to address peacefully the controversies that divide them," Obama, who's of Kenyan descent and a presidential hopeful in the US elections, said.

Another impassioned plea for peace came from former Sierra Leone President, Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who led the Commonwealth observer team.

But yesterday, as the politicians dithered, Nairobi again soaked the brunt of the chaos as over 4,000 police officers fought demonstrators and politicians for the better part of the day to keep them from Uhuru Park, the venue of the one million-man rally.

It also emerged that so far, more than 300 people have lost their lives and close to 100,000 others displaced in various parts of the country.

Scenes not seen in Nairobi since the violent pro-democracy demonstrations of 1991 were replayed all morning and part of the afternoon, with thousands of demonstrators battling with police.

The chaos in Nairobi left at least people dead, according to police. The death toll kept going up in the country where election-related violence has persisted since St. Ignace, an AIC church built burnt down and the local law court partly razed as demonstrators partly razed as demonstrators efforts to oust the riot police and Uhuru Park.

Bursts of gunfire and explosion canisters were heard on Karen from early morning and on Ng where police on horseback, or others using water cannons for keep off the rioters.

Also choked in clouds of tear parts of Thika and Jijja roads.

The height of confrontation happened at the shopping Centre, where looted Pentagon members M Mudevari, Mr. William Butu, M Nguhi and Mr. Joseph Nyagah fled to Uhuru Park.

The leaders engaged police in exchange of words before the cancel the meeting.

"Kenya should not get tired press for our rights. We know ing to take one or two days but endure to the very end," Mudevari called on the Police Co Maj-Gen Hussein Ali, to respect and let Kenyans carry on with demonstration.

Nguhi engaged a senior police heated argument demanding that his officers were using force to the crowd.

Prof Anyang' Nyong'o pleaded

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STANDARD • FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 2008

3

NATIONAL NEWS



Kisumu Town West MP-elect, Mr Olago Aluoch (second right), leads demonstrators in Kisumu. He and Kisumu Town East MP, Mr Shakeel Shabir, were arrested for inciting the crowd



1. Police officers remove a detainee seen by protesters in Mombasa.

rally today

demonstrators to retreat, but the charged supporters would not hear any of it and started chanting for Ugeya MP-elect, Mr James Orendo, to come and lead them to Uhuru Park.

Some of the party supporters followed Nyagah towards Valley Road, where police lobbed teargas canisters to disperse them. Meanwhile, Uhuru Park was under siege all day as officers drawn from the regular administration and the GSU units sealed off all entrances.

They formed a human perimeter fence round the ground as other officers patroled the recreation ground on horseback.

The officers, armed with guns, wooden batons, teargas canisters and shields, arrived at the grounds as early as 5am.

German Ambassador Walter Lindner and the Head of the European Union Delegation, Mr Erick van der Linden, drove to Kibera to witness the events. Lindner said the German Foreign Affairs minister, Dr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, had spoken to Ralia and Foreign Affairs minister Raphael Tshibanga and urged that there should be no bloodshed because of the Uhuru Park rally issue.



Other towns and areas rocked by chaos included Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, Kuresoi, Nakuru, Kakamega and Bungoma.

In Kisumu, two MPs-elect — Kisumu Town West's Ogo Abuch and Kisumu Town East's Shaleel Shabbir — were arrested in connection with the protests but were later released. Violence rocked most parts of

Mombasa mainland as rowdy engaged hundreds of riot police. battles that saw one man shot on the head and scores injured.

Sounds of teargas, gunshots and burning tyres filled parts of Maweni, Kisumu, Bonbobi and Changamwe as GSU, AP and regular police battled crowds headed for Makadara grounds for a protest rally.

Protesters in Kuresoi burnt several houses at Karirika farm, as hundreds others flashed twigs placards at Kerenge, Olengurone and Kipagich trading centres.



The Mombasa Polytechnic
University College
A Centre of Excellence

POSTPONEMENT OF OPENING DAY

This is to inform all students of Mombasa Polytechnic University College that the opening date the college has been postponed until further notice.

You will be informed of the new opening date in due course through the mass media.

PRINCIPAL

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