SECURITY COMMUNITY BUILDING? AN ASSESSMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-APARTHEID ERA

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ABSTRACT

The thesis traces Southern African security dimensions from the Cold War and the period of apartheid in South Africa to the post-apartheid era. It makes an attempt to investigate the prospects of Southern Africa becoming a security community and the processes and practices underlying these efforts. Using the constructivist theory approach to international relations, the thesis argues that the preoccupation with principles of sovereignty and non-interference, a lack of political will and the absence of common values that could help SADC institute binding rules and decision-making are the main blocks that prevent the region from asserting itself as a security community. All these militate against the idea of mutual accountability among SADC member states and have a negative impact on the institutional and functional capacity of SADC. This also prevents SADC from dealing with the emerging non-military human security threats in the region. In consideration of this, the thesis argues that the idea of security community building in Southern Africa remains not only a regional issue, but also requires the involvement of extra-regional actors.

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DEDICATION

To my family

ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASAS	Association of Southern African States
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
FLS	Frontline States
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
LLA	Lesotho Liberation Army
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
OPDSC	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Coordinating Conference
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SSC	State Security Council
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
US	United States
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic- Front
PF-ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union Patriotic-Front

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s, the Southern African region emerged from prolonged conflict related to apartheid destabilisation and the Cold War (Matlosa, 2001: 393), both of which played a fundamental role as defining features of security in the region. The collapse of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa represented a dramatic change for the regional security situation (Matlosa, 2001: 393). There was a great expectation that this epoch would bring about a period of sustained stability and development at national and regional levels (Nathan, 2004: 2). While Southern Africa had constituted an 'overlay' before 1974[1], a 'security complex'[2] before 1990 and a 'security regime'[3] between 1990 and 1994, the prospects after 1994 when South Africa became a democracy essentially offered an opportunity for the region to become integrated and assert itself as a 'security community'[4].

The advent of democracy in South Africa was followed by the dissolution of the Frontline States[5] and the establishment of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics Defence and Security[6] (OPDS) as the regional security architecture. With these developments, the region reached the margins of a security community (Bischoff, 2001: 277). The most interesting and important dimension was South Africa's change of foreign policy from being a regional aggressor to that of a democratic state at peace with its neighbours and its willingness to acquire the membership of SADC (Bischoff, 2001: 277). South Africa's part in the establishment of the OPDS as a security institutional arrangement within SADC, was further intended to mitigate conflicts and improve cooperation at the regional level. As a result, the OPDS became a symbol of the ambitious effort on the part of SADC to put together national political institutions and harmonise their values at both security and political levels (Ngoma, 2003: 19). This marked an incremental step towards propelling the region by way of mechanisms for the resolution of conflict towards achieving pacific sets of relations.

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[1] An overlay involves the direct presence of outside powers in the region, which is "strong enough to influence the normal operations of security dynamics among the local states" (Buzan, 1991: 198).

[2] Buzan et al. define a security complex as "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan et al, 1998: 12).

[3] Jervis defines a security regime as those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate. In this regard states will benefit by setting up rules and institutions to control the competition among them (Jervis, 1982: 357-358).

[4] Security community is a concept coined by Deutsch to define a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. States within a security community attain a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and are integrated to the point that they entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler, 1998: 7).

[5] Frontline States was established in 1976 as a loose military coalition of Southern African states, namely Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Zimbabwe joined the coalition after independence (Jaster, 1985: 88) in 1980.

[6] On 28 June 1996 the Southern African Heads of State and Government established a security organ, formerly named Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). This sub-regional Organ alluded to the structure of SADC's security arrangements and was intended to deal with the prevention of conflicts through preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacekeeping. It was also supposed to institutionalise 'new security thinking' in its organisational structures and activities (Neethling, 2004: 1).

According to Adler and Barnett, the notion of a security community amounts to the compatibility of core values drawn from common institutions and mutual openness, identity and loyalty, integrated to the extent that states entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 7). In this context, integration means the achievement of a sense of security and of institutions strong and pervasive enough to guarantee dependable expectations of peaceful change (Deutsch, 1957: 3). This framework of analysis is of value in assessing the process of a security community building in Southern Africa.

In Southern Africa, the major assumption is that the achievement of a security community can engender trust and common values among member states. Europe, for example, is held up as the region where a developed security community exists such that political, economic and security motivations have been intertwined in the evolution of European regional integration (Wallace, 1994: 9). The region is integrated in the sense that states possess the capacity for self-government in which the people are the final source and proper beneficiary of the governing authority. States have thus developed efficient political institutions, a solid economic base, a considerable degree of national unity and the ability to defend each other militarily (Jackson and Sorensen, 1996: 23, Sorensen, 1997: 258). While states essentially have the monopoly over the means of violence, their military is turned outwards rather than inwards in defence against external enemies. Domestic law and order is based above all on popular support. The control of the population goes along with the expansion of the civil and political rights of citizenship (Sorensen, 1997: 258). Because of their shared domestic norms and identities, states do not perceive each other as threats.

Despite the potential signals after 1994, empirically this cohesive and integrative strategy among states in Europe still eludes Southern Africa.

Over the last 10 years, the Southern African Development Community has ever more lagged behind in its ability to deal with broad security issues. Instead, the institutional process of building security in the context of building integration among its members remains a prolonged and incremental one (Bischoff, 2001: 276). SADC "is characterised by the state-centric approach to cooperation, little identification or participation, the persistence of national concerns over regional perspectives and lack of a means to commit to regional integration" (Bischoff, 2001: 276). This condition has been exacerbated by the fact that states' institutions and civil societies are accordingly weak and state power is, in the main, concentrated in the executive with loyalty directed toward the leading figure of the regime. Unlike in Europe, "armed forces are not concerned with creation of domestic order or protection of the population in general". Instead, they are instruments in the hands of a ruler used to coerce or threaten the opponents (Sorensen, 1997: 260).

In contrast to SADC, the European Union (EU) regards common norms as the foundation rather than the outcome of institutionalised political and security cooperation. For example, "Central and Eastern European states would consequently not gain admission to the EU on the grounds that they might thereby come to accept democratic norms; they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these norms" (Nathan, 2004: 16). In the light of this consideration, one can reasonably assume that the focus on states rather than democratic process within SADC, produces a different scenario altogether.

With the above in mind, Southern Africa should not to lose track of the broader conception of security implied by the notion of a security community. While SADC's level of cooperation remains exclusively inter-governmental (Neethling, 2004: 2), one of the challenges facing the Southern African region under the auspices of SADC is to go beyond this state-centredness (Soderbaun, 2001: 110), since this preoccupation impedes the region from becoming a security community.

To transcend a state-centred approach to security in Southern Africa, a constructivist[7] approach may best assist in the interrogation of regional security policies. It can help frame "issues that could perhaps lead towards a reconstituted understanding of Southern Africa" (Swatuk and Vale, 2001:34-35), one beyond state-centrism. Viewed in this context, a constructivist approach to security community building offers an alternative conception which stands in stark contrast to the state-centric, neo-realist paradigm. It should be pointed out that by suggesting a new security structure for the region, one does not downplay state security, but rather suggests a more holistic approach that seeks to advance the notion of human security that takes people as referent objects of security. Human security is defined as a "shift in perspective or reorientation that takes people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on security of territories or governments" (Axworthy as quoted in Handingam, 2000: 155). Taking this broader constructivist approach to security into account, the intention here is to map out what is needed in Southern Africa to build a true security community.

The objective of the thesis is to attempt to investigate the prospects of the region becoming a security community using a constructivist framework as a frame of reference. As such, Adler and Barnett's analytical framework for studying the emergence of security communities organised around three 'tiers' is used. These tiers centre on the precipitating conditions, process variables and structural variables, mutual trust and collective identity (Adler, and Barnett, 1998: 17). The thesis tries to assess Adler's criteria for the development of security communities and uses these to analyse the prospects and practices at play which could lead the SADC region at the threshold of a security community. Security communities require a liberal democratic environment characterised by a "significant economic interdependence and political pluralism" (Acharya, 1998: 198). Writes Adler, "members of...security communities hold dependable expectations of peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, but because they share liberal democratic values and allow their societies to become interdependent...democratic values, in turn, facilitate the creation of civil societies...which also promote community bonds and common identity and trust" (Adler quoted in Acharya, 1998: 198-199). Taking this into consideration, it is difficult to grapple with what SADC has become or is trying to do, unless we entrench this understanding in the concept of a security community (Adler, 1998: 119).

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[7] Wendt proposes constructivism to emphasise the social construction of identities and interests. The main concern here is the sociological issue bracketed by neo-realists and neo-liberals namely the issue of identity- and interest formation (Wendt, 1992: 397).

In the light of this, some writers from different scholarly persuasions have already written about the notion of a security community in Southern Africa. These include Ngoma (2003), (2004) and (2005), van Schalkwyk (2005), Booth and Vale (1995) Nathan (2004) Neethling (2004) and Zacarias (1998) who are cited in various parts of the thesis. As such, the study intends to add to the broader enquiry into debates regarding a security community building paradigm in the region. The term Southern Africa denotes countries under the Southern African Development Community[8] (SADC). The study will cover the period from the early 1970s to the present.

The thesis is therefore structured as follows: Chapter One is the introductory part, which sets up a framework for approaching regional security using a constructivist theory of international relations. It seeks to propose a conceptual security architecture that accommodates an alternative set of regional interactions.

Chapter Two covers different theoretical approaches in an attempt to examine different perspectives that account for the absence of war in international relations. These include realism, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism.

Chapter Three explores the evolution of security in Southern Africa during the Cold War and the apartheid era. It brings to the fore the role played by the South Africa's apartheid regime to influence the regional security architecture through economic inducements and destabilisation. The chapter also tries to explore the response by the FLS, which culminated in the formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADCC). The chapter ends by assessing the replacement of SADCC by the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

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[8] SADC was formed in 1992 under the Treaty of Windhoek to replace the SADCC which was established in 1980 by the he majority-ruled Southern African states to promote economic development in Southern Africa and reduce economic dependence on Apartheid South Africa (Zacarias, 1998: 51). Countries in the SADC include Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Chapter Four focuses on the processes and prospects for the SADC region to become a security community, the institutional framework that these processes require, the diplomatic arrangements that culminated in the idea of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), the formation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and problems that paralysed its functional and institutional capacity. It also looks at the subsequent restructuring of the OPDS into the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC).

Chapter Five makes an attempt to suggest a human security paradigm as part of a new security agenda for Southern Africa. Chapter Six forms the conclusion of the thesis drawn from the findings in the research.

2. 0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

2.1 The concept of security

To understand the concept of security and its value to Southern Africa, it is important to begin by painting a picture of the conceptions of security in international relations. Buzan argues that "security is an essentially contested concept" that includes several notable disagreements which indeed make it difficult to determine what is to be secured essentially (Buzan, 1991: 15). As used conceptually in international relations literature, the concept of security is based on two key realist assumptions: one that threats to state security primarily arise from outside its borders, and two, that these threats are mostly, if not entirely military in character, and generally need a military response if the security of the state is to be safeguarded (Ayoob, 1991: 261).

However, a multiplicity of theoretical challenges to the realist paradigm brought about new definitions and prescriptions of security (Tickner, 1995: 178). Prominent among them is Ullman's fundamental liberal challenge to realist orthodoxy. Ullman argued for the trade-off between security and other values such as liberty. According to him "defining national security merely in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality". For Ullman, this causes states to prioritise military threats ignoring other more harmful dangers thus reducing their total security (Ullman, 1983: 29-133).

Buzan also offers an extensive re-examination of security from a neo-realist perspective that attempts to transcend the military state-centred conception to include non-military dimensions (Tickner, 1995: 185). These include political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions[9], which are mutually reinforcing and inextricably intertwined (Buzan, 1991: 19). Despite his expansion on the definition and use of security, Buzan does not rule out anarchy in the international system and does not believe the mere elimination of anarchy is the answer to the security dilemma (Tickner, 1995: 185). The concept of a security dilemma presupposes that in the course of providing their own security, measured by the accumulation of arms, states automatically stimulate the insecurity of others (Frederking, 2000: viii, Dunne, 1997: 117).

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[9] Buzan argues that political security is concerned with the organisational stability of states, their system of government and ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security relates to access to resources, finance and markets needed to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (Buzan, 1991: 19-20).

For Southern Africa, the application of these realist conceptions of regional security still creates "major conceptual problems" (Ayoob, 1991: 263). This is so because three major features of the concept of security as developed in the Western literature of international relations, including its external orientation, and its deep-seated linkage with systemic security and its binding ties with the two former East-West blocs are mostly not applicable (Ayoob, 1991: 263) in the Southern Africa context. In many respects, therefore, security in Southern Africa should be looked at from a point of view that differs to some extent from that of the Western literature[10] of international relations (Ayoob, 1991: 265).

To assist in our understanding of security in Southern Africa, Booth moves beyond Buzan's neo-realist conception and takes a critical position to argue that security should be viewed in the broader context of the subjugation of human rights, ethnic and religious rivalries, economic collapse and so on. He argues that failure to address these issues can provoke dangerous instability at the domestic level which, in turn, can aggravate tensions that lead to violence. As a result, Booth views security through the lens of emancipation and argues, "Emancipation is the freeing of people from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, education, political oppression..." (Booth, 1991: 319). In other words, Booth assumes that "human visions of security must start with individuals" (Tickner, 1995:189). The appropriateness and fit of Booth's perspective to regional security in Southern Africa will be explored more fully later, but on the face of it, it seems that Booth's definition of security addresses most of the current security problems in Southern Africa. It is indeed viewed as the most appropriate for building sustainable peace in a region emerging from violent conflict.

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[10] The major assumption is that security in the context of Southern Africa "does not simply only refer to military dimensions, as often assumed in the Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole range of range of dimensions of state's existence which are already taken care of in a more-developed states, especially those of the West". This include the search for secure systems of food, health money and trade (Anzar and Moon quoted in Ayoob, 1991: 259).

2.2 Theoretical Perspectives Accounting for the Absence of War in International Relations

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa provoked the re-examination of security policies in the Southern African region. For policy-makers in the region, the era created a far-reaching challenge to revisit the region's security architecture. The dynamics at play demonstrated that cooperation as opposed to competition held the key to a sustainable peace that could help transform the region in the direction of a security community. It is against this background that the study seeks to examine some of the prominent, but contending theories of international security.

These theories, including realism, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism each produce a number of distinct accounts to explain the absence of war in the realm of international relations. Each begins its analysis from a particular assumption (Rosamond, 2000: 7-169). In doing so, they highlight the approaches in which Southern African policy-makers understand the region and mould their responses to pressing global, regional and national issues (Cilliers and Solomon, 1996: 1).

2.2.1 *Realism*[11]

The realists recognise that in the world of inevitable clashes of national interests, the only way to reduce such clashes and achieve cooperation is to guarantee the existence of a rough balance of power between states (Burchill, 1996: 71). The balance of power theory presupposes stability among states. It is the principal mechanism that checks the abuse of political and military predominance by powerful states (Dunne, 1997: 117). As such, cooperation between states is guaranteed by the formation of alliances[12]. For realists, alliances are intended to balance the power of stronger states against the weaker states. States form alliances because they are not "sufficiently strong to feel secure against a possible combination of opposing states" (Smith cited in Morgenthau, 1967:164). Within the alliance, the distribution of the benefits of cooperation reflects a complete mutuality (Morgenthau, 1967: 178). According to the balance of power theory, cooperative undertakings such as political-military alliances constitute self-help systems (Waltz as cited in Keohane, 1984: 62). Waltz defines a self-help system as a system in which "both central authority and collective security are absent" (Wendt, 1992: 292). As such, acts of cooperation result from the understanding that mutual interests are sufficient to allow states to overcome their suspicions of one another (Keohane, 1984). In this environment, a dominant state exercises its power to create and enforce institutional rules to sustain cooperation between states (Reus-Smit, 2001: 210; Keohane, 1984: 7).

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[11] Realism is generally regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in international relations. Proponents of realism as an intellectual tool of thought range from classical to modern realists. Classical realists include Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, while modern realists are Carr and Morgenthau. Generally, all these argue that international politics are driven by the struggle for power, which is rooted in human nature. Moral issues such as justice and law have no place in the corridors of power, as such states should accept and adapt to changing power political configurations in world politics (Dunne, 1997: 113).

[12] The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is regarded as one the most consistent alliances to emerge after the Second World War to counterbalance the perceived Soviet threat. As McCalla puts it,

According to the realist school of thought, states' existence is dependent on the competition for power and security (Linklater, 1996: 93). The core objective of all states is survival. The major assumption is that no state can be relied upon to guarantee the survival (Dunne, 1997: 118-119) of other states. In consequence, realists assume that issues in world politics are led by questions of military security in which the "high politics" of military security dominates the "low politics" of economic and social affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24). By emphasising the military power and security of states as the most important, realists subordinate non-military issues to military ones.

As a result, the approach does not accommodate sustainable cooperation and offers little value for conceptualising peace in Southern Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War. Viewed in this context, realist theory is not sufficient for directing change towards a security community after 1994. In fact, "the very idea of a security community is profoundly subversive to the entire realist tradition" since it challenges the realist "belief in the necessity and inevitability of war" (Acharya, 1998: 200). As a consequence, the next section assesses what the neo-realist offers in terms of sustainable security for the region.

"NATO contributed to a greater sense of Western European security and unity...in response to the Soviet threat" (McCalla, 1996: 448).

2.2.2 *Neo-realism*[13]

While neo-realists see issues of physical security as producing motivations for cooperation in the international system, they are also doubtful that cooperation between states in the international system is capable of mitigating anarchy. Instead, they see anarchy as the key determining feature in the distribution of power and material capabilities, measured in terms of the accumulation of arms (Smith, 1995: 23; Wendt, 1995: 73; Sorensen, 1997: 254). They stress the centrality of relative gains for decision-makers when dealing with international cooperation (Smith, 1995: 23). But, states are unlikely to cooperate if one state gains more from that cooperation. This is because relative gains prevent them from gaining capabilities in terms of the accumulation of arms over others. As such, Buzan uses the concept of a security complex to explain this pattern of relations between states in the region. According to him, such patterns relate both to the distribution of power and historical relations of friendship and enmity among states. Here, states' interdependence with one another is often characterised by fear, rivalry and the mutual perceptions of threat (Buzan, 1998: 12).

Neo-realists do not regard distribution of power as an end in itself; instead they regard it as a useful means by which states attain a level of security. In this frame of analysis, states run the risk of having too little or too much of it. This results in a security dilemma in international relations, which occurs in the environment of mutual mistrust and suspicions between states. "In such conditions, a feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels these units to compete for ever more power in order to find more security" (Hertz, as quoted in Frederking, 2000: 2). As a result, insecure states realise their security through self-help. This is environment in which states cannot take for granted that others will come to their defence and that "those who do not help themselves...will lay themselves open to dangers" (Waltz 1979: 118). Any state that endeavours to attain complete security leaves all others in a system insecure, thereby providing a powerful incentive for an arms race and the balance of power (Dunne, 1997: 117).

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[13] The emergence of neo-realism in the 1970s came as a response to criticisms levelled against traditional realism's rejection of economic forces (Burchill, 1996: 83). Waltz is regarded of one of the key proponents of neo-realism. What he termed neo-realism or structural realism essentially served as both a critique and the theoretical appraisal of realism "which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics" (Burchill, 1996: 83). As a critique, neo-realism rejects the realist notion of human nature as a driving force behind state actions and argues for a structure as "a new level of inquiry" in the international realm (Waltz, 1990: 32). This structure is constituted by anarchy and distribution of material capabilities measured in the accumulation of arms (Wendt, 1995: 73, Sorensen, 1997: 254). As a theoretical appraisal, neo-realism does not discount struggle for power in the international system. Instead, it offers a different interpretation of the structure as the unit of analysis (Waltz, 1990: 32).

On the other hand, Buzan offers a refined version of neo-realism by stressing the multi-sectoral dimension of security that defines security not only in terms of the internal security of the state, but also in terms of political, economic, environmental and societal dimensions (Buzan, 1991: 19). Despite this broadened analysis, Buzan's security is still rooted in a framework (Tickner, 1995: 186) of anarchy. He argues, "A system of sovereign states is by definition politically structured as anarchy...anarchy is thus a decentralised form of political order" (Buzan, 1991: 19-21).

While the neo-realist intellectual tool of thought can be used to analyse the Southern African security situation during the Cold War and the apartheid era where the organising principle of cooperation revolved around anarchy, it offers little value as a vehicle for the achievement of sustainable security in Southern Africa after 1994. The theory is pessimistic about the creation of structures by group of states to ensure a stable peace among them (Ngoma, 2005: 16). While neo-realists see the "sources of change in world politics as shifts, often violent, in the distribution of power", this stands in stark contrast to the idea of a security community that represents the possibility of change being an essentially peaceful process (Acharya, 1998: 200). In fact, neo-realists view multilateral institutions such as SADC as holding a "false promise" for building a new foundation for security structures (Mearsheimer, 1994: 7). As such, SADC, as an institution that encourages cooperative relationships between states in the region defies the neo-realist premise (Ngoma, 2005: 16).

2.2.3 *Neo-liberal institutionalism*[14]

Neo-liberal institutionalists express optimism that cooperation and interdependence can exist under anarchy through the use of economic resources, and strongly believe that regimes and institutions can be established to define the meaning of state action (Keohane, 1989: 11). Krasner defines international regimes "as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner, 1982: 185). As Keohane puts it, "Regimes contribute to cooperation... by changing the context within which states make decisions". This makes it possible for governments to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with one another (Keohane, 1984: 13). In fact, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that patterns of cooperation and disagreement can be understood only in the context of institutions that help define to the meaning and importance of state action (Keohane, 1989: 2-11). As such, prevailing institutional arrangements can affect state actions by influencing (Rosamond, 2000: 142) "the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; the ability of governments to monitor others' compliance and to implement their own commitments" (Keohane, 1989: 2).

Neo-liberal institutionalists assert that states will enter into cooperative relations despite the fact that other states could gain more from that cooperation (Dunne, 1997: 159). As Risse notes, in "international relations neo-liberal institutionalism or... regime analysis has convincingly shown that cooperation under anarchy is possible and that self-interested actors can achieve stable and enduring cooperation and overcome collective dilemmas" (Risse, 2000: 3-4). For example, in a security regime, states still consider each other as potential threats but, have made cooperative arrangements to reassure each other and reduce these threats (Buzan, 1998: 12). In other words, regimes enable the dynamics of the system to limit the freedom of its units; as a result their behaviour and the outcomes of their behaviour become predictable (Keohane, 1989: 8).

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[14] Neo-liberal institutionalits place more emphasis on subjects such as the impact of institutions on state action and about the causes of institutional change. According to neo-liberal institutionalists, the actors must have some mutual interest that brings potential gains from their cooperation (Keohane, 1989: 2). Keohane makes a clear distinction between neo-liberal institutionalism and the concept of liberalism by identifying liberalism as a belief to superiority of markets to state regulation of economy or a belief in the value of individual freedom (Keohane, 1989: 10).

Conceptually, neo-liberal institutionalism offers a limited understanding of sustainable peace and security for Southern Africa after 1994. Apart from its influence on cooperation and economic interdependence among states, the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective subscribes to the aspects of neo-realism "at least in so far as it accepts anarchy as a feature of international system" (Lawson, 2003: 82). In effect, the theory considers institutions as creatures of self-interested states that at most constrain choices and strategies. "Virtually ignored is the possibility that the effects of institutions reach deeper to the level of interests and identity" (Checkel, 1998: 328). The "exclusion of shared identities by peoples in the region leads the theory to discount the notion of a security community "(Ngoma, 2005: 17) in its analysis.

2.2.4 *Constructivism*

From the late 1980s onwards, a constructivist turn in international relations gathered momentum. Factors that prompted this momentum included the pessimistic responses of neo-realist and neo-liberal world views to the rapidly changing global order and the end of the Cold War (Reus-Smit, 1996: iii). This period ushered in renewed interest in the study of international relations. Subjects such as norms, ideas, and identity formation attained currency within the scholarship of the discipline. The attention has been a focus for a new and potentially fruitful theoretical undertaking which provides a direct challenge to existing international relations theories (Sterling-Folker, 2000: 97-98). The constructivists' contribution to the study on ideas in international relations comprises an emphasis on collective norms and understandings that make up the social identities of actors and define the basic rules of the game (Risse, 2000: 5). This enables cooperation between states to balance their behaviour and overcome these security dilemmas by establishing social networks (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 5-6).

First, constructivists assume that structures shape the behaviour of social and political actors, whether those be individuals or states. They contend that normative or ideational structures are as good as material structures (Reus-Smit, 2000: 217). Second, constructivists argue that understanding how non-material structures condition actors' identities provides valuable insights because identities inform interests, and in turn, actions (Reus-Smit, 2000: 217). As Wendt puts it, "identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the process of defining their situations" (Wendt, 1992: 398). Third, constructivists assume that agents and structures are mutually constitutive. Here, constructivists imply that while normative and ideational structures may well condition the identities and interests of actors, such structures would not exist outside the well-informed practices of such actors (Reus-Smit, 2001: 218). In that context human agents do not exist in parallel from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (Risse, 2000: 5).

In summary, while realism through its balance of power theory offers Southern Africa a conceptual understanding of security and cooperation during the period of the Cold War and that of apartheid system in South Africa, it cannot be used as a conceptual tool after 1994 because of its state-centred and militarist approach. Realists regard non-military issues such as economic and social affairs as secondary to state security (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24). By virtue of being preoccupied with the distribution of power and military capabilities, neo-realism stops short of making any significant positive contribution that strengthens the international "community between states and people" since "no importance is attached to the practical efforts of states to create new global norms" (Linklater, 1995: 256). While neo-liberal institutionalists offer some insight in terms of norms, regimes and institutions as forming an integral part of cooperative relations between states, their acceptance of anarchy is ultimately self-defeating and prevents them from providing a scenario of sustainable security cooperation in the region.

Because constructivism argues for the acknowledgement of social character in global politics whilst at the same time stressing the relevance of state identities and the sources of interests, it holds more conceptual clarity than others and can therefore most fully accommodate the notion a security community (Ngoma, 2005: 41). It thus holds substantial promise for understanding peace and cooperation in the region.

2.3 Conceptualising a Security Community

Unlike the neo-realist state-centric conception, constructivist security theory essentially addresses the idea of security communities that can be used to analyse the Southern African security situation. This creative idea was first developed by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s to describe the North Atlantic region (Lawson, 2003: 86). Deutsch called attention to the usefulness of shared understandings, norms and values that could develop among states (Lawson, 2003: 86). Considering the Deutschian intellectual outlook for security communities, it is important to look at the continued existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) even after the disappearance of the Cold War threat and then situate that understanding in the context of building a security community in Southern Africa. As for Southern Africa, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe had, as early as 1997, stated that he anticipated the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security developing "into a kind of North Atlantic Organisation Treaty for the region" (SouthScan, 1997: 258).

2.3.1 The Emergence of Security Communities

Adler and Barnett offer a holistic analytical framework for studying the emergence of security communities. This analytical framework explicitly situates them within the constructivist camp around which security communities are seen to evolve. The framework has been used to analyse how NATO evolved into a security community after the end of the Cold War, and this might help in analysing how SADC could follow a similar trend. The framework is essentially organised around three 'tiers'.

The first tier is made up of precipitating conditions that give confidence to states to acquaint themselves with each other's direction in order to coordinate their policies. This results from the change of threat perception to allow new interpretations of regional interaction (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 37-38). For example, the announcement in May 1990, by NATO's Military Committee that it no longer considered the Warsaw Pact as a threat to the Alliance is a case in point. This not only allowed NATO to confidently respond to changing strategic circumstances, it also gave confidence to its former adversaries to change their policies against NATO (McCalla, 1996: 449).

The second tier comprises two elements, structural elements and process elements. Whereas structural elements include power and knowledge, process elements incorporate transactions, international organisations and social learning (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 29), Adler and Barnett conceive of power and knowledge as structural holders of a security community. They understand power "as an authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the "we-feeling" and practices of states and conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 39). NATO's power in 1990 was no longer interpreted as a threat by its former Eastern bloc adversaries; instead it allowed such adversaries to enjoy security and other benefits potentially associated with the community by seeking its membership and aligning their policies in the direction of NATO (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 40). This was precisely a product of knowledge constituted by shared meanings and understandings between NATO and the former Eastern bloc states. By making membership possible under specified conditions, NATO gained influence over the process of domestic transformation in these states (Flynn and Farrel, 1999: 505). Hence in the process all actors learned to "identify with each other and saw themselves as "we" bound by certain norms" (Wendt, 1997: 390).

The strong and positive degree of mutual responsiveness between the first and the second tiers leads to the third tier, which entails the development of mutual trust and collective identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 29). For NATO, the easing of tensions as a result of the systemic process encouraged collective identity formation and the attendant transnational convergence of domestic values (Wendt, 1997: 390). This relationship was "responsible for the production of dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 29) in the region.

The evolution of (NATO) from the alliance[15] to a security community constitutes one of the most important developments in post-Cold War international security. Despite predictions of its disintegration from within by some neo-realist theorists, NATO has come out as, perhaps, the most dominant institution in contemporary security relations (McCall, 1996: 454, Williams and Neumann, 2000: 357). From a constructivist view, NATO's fragmentation was unlikely, because of the shared democratic norms of member states. Most importantly, member states did not perceive each other as threats with the demise of the Cold War (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 357). "While debates in the late 1980s often revolved around whether NATO would, could or should survive, they now centre around the implications of its centrality, and its current and possible future enlargement" (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 357).

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[15] Alliances historically have their roots in ongoing conflicts and have generally confined their actions to military coordination and defensive preparation. They are generally formed in response to and their cohesion largely depends on the intensity and duration of that threat and a major cause of their disintegration may be the reduction or disappearance of the external threat against which they were initially formed (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, quoted in McCalla, 1996: 450). "Neorealism then is the best place to start when considering alliance and alliance behaviour" (McCalla, 1996: 450)

The evolution of NATO has indeed become a central theme in a broader analysis of international security (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 358) and the emergence of security communities. This stands in stark contrast with the neo-realist scholars' claim that conceives of international institutions as holding out the false promise as new foundations for security structures, and of having minimal influence on state behaviour in upholding stability in the post-Cold War World (Mearsheimer, 1994: 7). Even neo-liberal institutionalist theorists dismiss these claims as "fallacies of logic of realism"[16] (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 40). To be sure, the persistence of NATO is indicative of the need for a deeper understanding of institutions and their ability to respond to changing strategic circumstances (McCalla, 1996: 446, Williams and Neumann, 2000: 357). Such an understanding would essentially provide a foundation for "concluding that international 'security communities' possess considerably more promise as a means of structuring security relations than neo-realism has traditionally allowed" (Adler, as cited in Williams and Neumann, 2000: 357). As a result, the concept of a security community appears to have attained currency in the contemporary world (Rosamond, 2000: 169).

In the light of these considerations, brought about by the persistence of NATO, policy-makers and scholars of international relations are evoking the language of a community to understand international politics. Equally important, many seasoned policy-makers and defence officials are marrying security to community in a new wave of emerging post-Cold War challenges to "conceptualise the possibility of peace". In many respects, therefore, security has become a condition and quality of communities wishing to dwell in pacific relations (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 4).

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[16] Prominent neorealists like Mearsheimer forecast the decline of NATO by claiming that it was the Soviet threat that held NATO together. Taking that offensive threat would mean the abandonment of the Continent by the United States resulting in the disintegration of defensive alliance (Mearsheimer as cited in Keohane and Martin, 1995: 40).

2.3.2 Security Community and Integration

Deutsch argues that "A security community is a group of people, which has become "integrated" through the attainment of a sense of a security, institutions and practices the result of which is dependable expectation of peaceful change (Deutsch, 1957: 3). Here, integration, which Deutsch embraced, constitutes one of the defining properties of a security community's dependable expectation of peaceful change. It crops up at any given moment when states rule out the possibility of war (Adler, and Barnett, 1998: 35). By implication, Deutsch integrates security with political and human aspects, thereby basing security on confidence and cooperation. This framework of analysis is important for Southern Africa since it elaborates the peaceful means of resolving disputes between states, the consolidation of democracy, and advancement human freedoms and rights (Leatherman cited in Adler, 1998: 132). As a result, integration is regarded as an important component for theorising security communities in the realm of international relations.

While the concept of a security community is viewed as part of integration theory and a formula for conceptualising regional peace, it should be mentioned that a group of states cannot be integrated into the regional grouping without giving up their identities (Hodges, 1978: 237) to a supranational community. Comprehensive integration requires states to surrender part of their sovereignty. Viewed in Adler and Barnett's three tier analytical framework for security communities, surrendering sovereignty requires favourable conditions that give confidence to states to align their policies with those of others (Adler, and Barnett, 1999: 29). The European Union (EU) serves as the best example of a supranational body to which member states have surrendered part of their sovereignty to institutions of the Union. Article J.1 of the Treaty of Maastricht that established the Union directs member states to ensure the conformity of their common national policies. To facilitate this, the EU had to develop "systemic structures and processes in the context of interaction" (Wendt, 1997: 390). Whereas structures include norms and common values and resources, the process includes the spread of democratic institutions, and the concern for human rights (Wendt, 1997: 390). These were accompanied by mutual trust and collective identity which are necessary conditions for community building and the dependable expectation of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 29). The development of mutual trust and collective identity in the EU region brought about closer economic and political cooperation in a region historically devastated by conflicts. Replacing national competition with cooperation and interdependence has lessoned acts of aggression and reciprocal retaliations (Burchill, 2001: 39). As a result, the expansion of transnational exchange coupled with the capacities of the Union to respond to the needs of those who exchange and the role of supranational rules shaped the resultant integration (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 4). With this in mind, one would reasonably assume that the EU has attained the level of a security community.

2.3.3 Security Community and Southern Africa

A security community is not only sought in the behaviour suggestive of the renunciation of military violence, it is also accompanied by "the existence of deeply entrenched habits for the peaceful resolution of conflicts" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 35). As Booth and Vale remind us, the historical setting in Southern Africa had been antagonistic to the growth of processes for peaceful resolution of conflicts for the reason that the regional community emerged out of wars of destabilisation. Today, the key lies in the development of a widespread agenda among states in the region and such an agenda "needs the support of powerful community-based agents across the region" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 290). With these considerations in mind, a region can then place itself on the path towards a security community.

2.3.4 Security Community Indicators

Adler suggests six enabling conditions or indicators necessary for building a security community, which are closely related to the three tier analytical framework. These can be used as measuring tools in the case of Southern Africa because of their ability to measure the degree to which social forces within the relevant states mobilise, thereby changing the perceptions of both decision-makers and societies about their security (Vucetic, 2001: 119). Non-state forces can play a part in raising people-centred discourse and this include three critical roles such as increasing the accountability of the security sector, demanding change in the regional security architecture, acting as a watchdog and providing technical input. This may serve as a source of pressure for states to soften up the notion of sovereignty and bring about a security community in the region.

First, Adler introduces the concept of cooperative security[17], which he refers to as a demilitarised form of security. He does so in order to integrate security with political and human dimensions. He does this by considering issues of human rights, democracy and the rule of law not only as domestic issues, but also the core subjects of international commitments (Adler, 1998: 132). For Southern Africa, the idea of cooperative security emerges as a comprehensive approach that holds a key for changing the regional security architecture. While the regional security agenda in the past was characterised by wars of destabilisation accompanied by geo-strategic Cold War rivalry, today such an agenda is characterised by internally based non-military threats. In a way, the need for cooperative security in the region is premised on the understanding that these threats could surely impinge on the safety, cohesion and stability of individuals, communities, societies and even countries. By implication, it is by no means clear that they constitute a security threat or problems of national security (Lipschutz, 1995: 6).

The Southern African region has not, as such, yet reached the level of cooperative security. Instead, the region can be characterised as a security regime because states are concerned with collective security in which they undertake "to join in common action against those which threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of others" (Evans and Newman, quoted in Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 193). In other words, Southern African states still exist "in the climate of anarchy" (Makoa, 2004:100).

In the second condition, states are expected to socialise and teach norms of conduct on the understanding that "what can bring them together are the norms and values they share" (McCalla, 1996: 464). These norms are internalised to the extent that different states picture themselves not as independent entities, but also as part of the broader community (Adler, 1998: 135). "Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations" (Krasner, 1982: 186). For instance, democratic regimes are based on political norms that call attention to regulated political competition through peaceful means (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 624). The best example of such regulatory mechanisms in Southern Africa is the SADC Parliamentary Forum[18], which has virtually been ignored.

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[17] By citing Leartherman, Adler defines cooperative security as a demilitarised form of security resulting from "imbuing security with political and human dimensions basing security on confidence and cooperation, the elaboration of peaceful means of dispute settlement between states, the consolidation of justice and democracy, in civil society and the advancement of human freedom and rights including the rights of the minority" (Leatherman as quoted in Adler, 1998: 132).

But, in general, Southern African states lack the ability to match their intentions with practice. This is a recipe for conflict in the region. Despite the adoption of the SADC Parliamentary Forum as a mechanism for the prevention of post-election conflict, political competition between parties has often been more violent, affected many people and dominated the thoughts of average persons in the street (Goyvaerts, 2000: 301). These conflicts are mostly resolved through violence and coercion. The post-election conflict in Lesotho in 1998, in which South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily and election-related violence in Zimbabwe in 2002 and in Malawi in 2004 are cases in point. While military intervention may be inevitable in election related violence, this may portray a negative image of political culture and political norms that a region transmits to its environment (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 625).

The third condition involves expectations of international legitimacy and the accountability norm as an essential security community building mechanisms. Here legitimacy is measured in terms of the level of democratisation, whereas the accountability norm renders states accountable to one another and to the entire community for what they do to their own citizens (Adler, 1998: 135). Democratisation creates a climate of confidence since it is generally believed that democracies do not fight each other as norms of compromise and cooperation prevent them from doing so (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 624). Mutual accountability exists in the environment of confidence based on trust, peaceful change and collective identity and replaces the notion of non-intervention (Adler, 1998: 135).

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[18] The provisions of Article 5 of the constitution of the SADC Parliamentary Forum among others call for the promotion of principles of human rights and democracy and the encouragement of good governance, transparency and accountability within the SADC region. The Forum also institutionalises and strengthens electoral processes to foster the integrity of elections.

In the case of Southern Africa, the preoccupation with principles of sovereignty and non-interference suggests that "states remain free agents acting on the basis of their own preferences" (Adler, 1998: 127). As such they are at liberty to specialise in the pursuit of "their own interests without concern for developing the means of maintaining their identity and preserving their security in the presence of others" (Waltz, 1979:104). In this view, states' internal affairs where gross human rights violations occur do not constitute a legitimate concern of the entire regional community (Adler, 1998: 127). Because SADC remains silent about non-democratic governments such as Swaziland and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, "there is no evidence to support the claim that states feel accountable to each other" (Vucetic, 2001: 124).

The fourth condition is the effective system of governance which considers constitutive norms and associated institutions and practices as a crude governance system. This is basically contingent upon compliance with transnational identity that creates and maintains public order (Adler, 1998: 134). The effective communication to advance transnational identity depends on institutions without which coordination of policies between states would be impossible. Institutions allow for governments to monitor each other's compliance and to implement their own commitments (Keohane, 1989: 5). While civil society actors play a significant role in this respect, the role of civil society is limited in the case of Southern Africa. The most fundamental locus of policy-making, implementation and monitoring in the region exclusively remains the preserve of governments.

The fifth condition is the concept of a cognitive region in which states accrue benefits by constructing a regional identity. This community building practice encourages people to imagine that their security and well-being are inextricably intertwined in the sense that shared understandings and common identities are not restricted by borders. "This gives a new meaning to the idea of sovereignty within a security community" and promotes a shared understanding that states should not consider the sense of being insecure only when their authority is subjected to challenge or their survival is endangered, but also when the basic understandings that constitute the community are violated (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 135).

However, issues of xenophobia in Southern Africa, particularly in Botswana and South Africa have worked against the idea of a cognitive region and agent states. In both countries foreigners from Southern Africa and other African countries have become targets for hostility and violence (Harris, 2002: 1). Despite the transition from the apartheid system to democratic governance, prejudice and violence continue to mark contemporary South Africa. At glance, it appears that the shift in political power has brought new practices and victims. "One such victim is a foreigner" (Harris, 2002: 1). "Contemporary public perceptions of xenophobia are echoed and influenced, largely through the press, by politicians and public officials". For example, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the then South African Minister of Home Affairs was quoted as saying "if we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme" (Harris, 2001: 49-50).

In Botswana, thousands of Zimbabwean immigrants have not been treated humanely as the government has introduced new border controls and harsh punishments, "while levels of xenophobia are on the rise across the country where it was virtually unknown" (Lefko-Everett, 2004: 1). It could be argued that the insistence on the sanctity of borders and centrality of state sovereignty lend much credence to these xenophobic practices and work against the idea of a mutual identity in the SADC region.

The abovementioned examples clearly demonstrate that mutual identification discourse is far from constituting extra-territorial relationships in Southern Africa. The concept of the 'we-feeling' suggested by the proponents of a security community does not apply in this context; instead notions of territoriality and sovereignty continue to define neighbours as the 'other'. While the era of global cooperation has brought with it a new set of responsibilities and obligations, such as human rights issues that lie well outside the parameters of traditional domestic constituency (Marden, 2001: 49), governments fear that the sanctity of sovereignty would be severely compromised if drawn into a supranational community such as SADC. In other words, the concept of sovereignty continues to characterise regional identity and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the intergovernmental level of interaction to incorporate civil society actors. In a sense, it also becomes difficult for regional civil society actors to expand the process of social learning throughout the region to develop shared meanings and understandings because for governments that may again amount to interference in the internal affairs of member states.

Finally, practices such as community building devices offer a means of tackling specific problems such as early warning, conflict prevention and protection of human rights (Adler, 1998: 135). These might serve as an institutionalising mechanism for a new way of collectively defining regional solutions thereby arriving at new vested interests. It could also be aimed at grounding regional security on collective regional identity. In Southern Africa, this can best be achieved through dialogue, negotiation and consent-seeking initiatives characterised by the notion of preventive diplomacy (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 136), as opposed to the gunboat diplomacy[19] which favours military interventions. While the SADC Treaty highlights the need for the peaceful settlement of disputes, democracy, peace and security, the reality confronting the region is that of military solutions to conflicts. This has been underscored by the adoption of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003. However, by embracing the principles of unfettered sovereignty and non-interference and excluding civil society actors from its functions, the pact reproduces the logic of neo-realism and stands in stark contrast to the idea of a security community. As Sukma persuasively argues, "a security community is not a Defence Pact or a military alliance. A security community does not prescribe member states to commit their resources in defence...it seeks the creation of conducive and cooperative environment within which conflict would not occur in the first place" (Sukma, 2003: 3). Hurrell concurs that a meaningful security community "cannot rest on...a stable balance of deterrent threats, nor on coming together in the face of external threat, all factors typically stressed by neo-realists" (Hurrell, 1998: 229).

2.3.5 The Position of Southern Africa in relation to Adler's Criteria for a Security Community Building

Taking Adler's six indicators for a security community building into consideration, Southern Africa does not meet any of the criteria. As a result, the region can reasonably be categorised as a security regime. This is the environment in which there is a mutual fear and mistrust among states generated by the accumulation of arms. Given that regimes and regime theory are basically ascribed to neo-realism in which state security is what really matters, the Southern African security situation clearly reflects this state of affairs. Governments are in the main concerned about state security and not so much about human security[20] (Matlosa, 2000: 40, Neethling, 2004: 2). In a security regime for example, "competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning usually continue" (Acharya, 1998: 201).

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[19] In gunboat diplomacy, conflicts are usually solved by the use of force through military action. This was the case with the resolution of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho in 1998.

There is a multiplicity of events which indeed characterises Southern Africa as a security regime and generates fear amongst some states. In 1996, for example, Namibia blamed Botswana for provoking a Southern African arms race by its purchases of expensive military planes and tanks from Canada, Germany and Britain considered as a "largest arms build-up in Southern Africa" of the post apartheid era. Another dimension of fear was generated by the Botswana Defence Force's cooperation with the US military in the areas of training, medical infrastructure and military equipment[21] (SouthScan, 1996: 191). As a sign of constant cooperation, Botswana continued to conduct a string of military exercises with the units of the US armed forces in 1999 (SouthScan, 1999: 126). As a result, Namibia sought to boost its own military power with Russian arms purchases and by signing military cooperation agreement that would similarly assist the Namibian Defence Force with training and equipment (SouthScan, 1996: 191).

Similarly, while Angola's military spending declined significantly in the early 1990s, by 1999, it reached the highest level of the decade and then declined in 2002. South Africa is the main exception with declining expenditure throughout the decade, which by 1999 was less than half of 1989 (Indicator, 2002: 3).

Another dimension has been added by the extent of rearmament in the region with Botswana and Zimbabwe increasing their defence expenditures between 2001 and

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[20] For the definition of human security see Chapters One and Five.

[21] In 1996, the BDF received aid from the US military which included, $450,000 for training of BDF officers in the US, provided Botswana with 10 ambulances and the construction of a dental clinic in Gaborone; US airforce offered BDF two surplus C-130 cargo planes (SouthScan, 1996: 191).

2002[22] (Ngoma, 2004: 419). The other SADC member states including Angola, South Africa and Namibia registered a decline of their defence expenditures in the same period[23]. The decrease in military spending is commendable because it reduces the possibility of war in the region. On the other hand, the increase in military expenditure generates a security dilemma since "reinforcing the security of one state through military build-up is likely to influence a corresponding decrease in the security of others...it establishes the psychological necessity for escalating arms races and intensifies general insecurities", as seen between Namibia and Botswana. It also increases the possibility that conflicts, which might otherwise have been solved peacefully, might escalate into armed conflicts (Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 193-194). As Nkiwane puts it, "...establishing large military forces within each of the individual states are not sustainable routes to regional security" (Nkiwane, 1995: 2). Moreover, this rearmament challenges the tenets of a security community where states in a security community rule out the possibility of war by not targeting each other militarily; and where states cease to allocate resources for building military capabilities (Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 194).

Apart from the Namibia-Botswana issues, hopes for post-apartheid sustainable peace and security have been undermined by the continued level of instability in the region. These include human rights abuses in Zimbabwe; authoritarianism in Swaziland where political activities have been barred since 1973 (Maroleng, 2003: 46); civil war in the DRC where more than 2.25 million people have been forced to flee their homes, many of whom are beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies (Shah, 2003: 1). Despite causing the humanitarian crisis, the "conflict has also been the scene of serious divisive policy among the states in SADC", especially "between those who support military intervention and those who do not" (Ngoma, 2005: 4). It could be argued that the degree of rearmament together with the level of instability defy the Deutschian notion of a security community and serve as a clear testimony that Southern Africa is not yet "integrated" and its "institutions and practices are not strong enough" to guarantee "peaceful change" among its population (Deutsch, quoted in Ngoma, 2005: 8).

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[22] Between 2001 and 2002, Botswana increased its defence expenditure from US$184 million in 2001 to US$254 million in 2002, while Zimbabwe increased its defence expenditure from US$287 million in 2001 to US$637 million in 2002 (Ngoma, 2004: 419).

[23] Between 2001 and 2002, Angola decreased its defence expenditure from US$1458 billion in 2001 to US$946 billion in 2002, South Africa reduced defence expenditures registered US$1814 billion in 2001and US$1697 billion in 2002, while Namibia also decreased its defence expenditure from US$83 billion in 2001 to US79 billion in 2002 (Ngoma, 2004: 419).

2.5.6 The Role of Extra-Regional Actors in Boosting Regional Security in Southern Africa

Given the abovementioned situation, extra-regional actors such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the New Partnership for African Development's[24] (NEPAD) African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) can play part in raising people-centred security policy that may be a source of pressure for states. Ngoma concurs that the drive towards security arrangements in the region is not exclusively determined by dynamics within the region alone. Other actors also influence the future developments (Ngoma, 2004: 418) that may lead to the attainment of a security community.

Accordingly, the existence of such powerful actors who are able to project a sense of purpose offer the idea of progress and provide leadership around core issues (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 52). A number of examples, such the DRC conflict, clearly indicate that the failure of regional arrangements to come to grips with regional conflicts needs extra-regional actors. There are various reasons associated with these failures, ranging from "lack of resources skills and mechanisms, and inability to win the trust of parties to the conflict, to lack of regional solutions" (Zacarias, 1998: 58). For these reasons extra-regional actors can assume the role of brokers in a stalemate solution, as well as acting as arbiters. For instance, the UN arbiters such as the International Court of Justice amicably resolved the ensuing conflict between Botswana and Namibia in 1999 regarding the Sedudu/Kasakili island dispute (International Court of Justice, 1999). The significance of this is that the Court prevented an escalation of the crisis that would have otherwise developed into a full-scale conflict.

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[24] The New Partnership for African Development is claimed to be a holistic integrated strategy for the socio-economic development of Africa, a plan premised on the common vision and firm and shared conviction by African leaders to eradicate poverty and put their countries individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development, thereby participating actively in the world economy and body politic. The programme advocates peace, security and political democracy as a benchmark of sustainable development (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001:1).

Similarly, international donors such as the IMF and the World Bank have a significant role to play in the context of softening up state sovereignty, given that governments have their own agendas and preoccupations, which are for the most part antagonistic to civil society actors (Zacarias, 1998: 58). Building a security community in Southern Africa requires strong civil society actors who interact effectively with the state as well as an agenda that takes people into account. The role of international donors in reinforcing civil society is equally important as they could provide funds for organisations inclined towards promoting peace, security, human rights and community development (Zacarias, 1998: 58).

The NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism is also needed to soften the notion of sovereignty. According to Hope, the APRM is an Africa self-monitoring mechanism that involves a "systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states, designated institutions or by a combination of states and designated institutions". This is done with the ultimate goal of assisting reviewed states to improve their policy-making and espouse best practices that are in compliance with the established standards, principles, codes and other agreed commitments (Hope, 2002: 1). It "gives meaning to the practice of active socialisation and teaching of norms and provides members with knowledge necessary for imitation, that is, information and consultation about the workings of democracy and the rule of law" (Schimelfemig, quoted in Adler, 1998: 133). The APRM becomes appropriate in the Southern African context because it is a repository of the conditions for sustainable peace and security, economic and corporate governance, regional integration, capability and capacity to deliver public goods (Mokoena, 2003: 6). However, one ought not to lose the sight of the fact that APRM could be empowered to possess a supranational influence. At present, its institutional capacity is handicapped by the fact that it is voluntarily acceded to by member states. A question "that remains for southern Africa is whether the region can become a security community in any sense" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 290). The next chapter will make and attempt to bring this question into debate by placing the Southern African security dynamics in their historical context.

3. 0 EVOLUTION OF SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Understanding the Dynamics of Security in Southern Africa

It was mentioned in Chapter Two that neo-realism holds only little analytical value in plotting the Southern African security situation after 1994, particularly in terms of transforming the region into a security community. However, the neo-realist tool of thought is useful for analysing Southern African security dynamics before 1994. Between the 1970s and 1990s, Southern Africa was the scene of devastating conflicts "involving the white settler colonial regimes on the one hand and the majority-ruled states and liberation movements on the other" (Matlosa, 2001: 293). Among the most important factors was the South Africa's policy of regional aggression with a heavy dose of active superpower involvement (Matlosa, 2001: 293).

In many respects therefore, the impact of the Cold War, the apartheid regime in South Africa, colonialism and the nationalist driving force towards independence bestowed a condition which disregarded human security[25], with states being the primary security referents (Booth and Vale, 1995: 287). By and large, state security, as opposed to human security represented an integral part of the regional security architecture seeking to maintain Southern Africa at the centre of embattled geo-strategic gains. It meant the "daily threats to the lives and the well-being of most people" that led only to brutalism and regional disorder (Booth and Vale, 1995: 287-297, Booth, 1991: 318). These not withstanding, the period nurtured responses which held out hope for an eventual security community. It was marked by the formation of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which sought to merge security with development and effectively neutralised South Africa's effort to exercise control in economic, political and military spheres in the region. As such, it may be reasonably assumed that all these occurrences lend themselves to the neo-realist analysis.

Correspondingly, Buzan provides a holistic neo-realist analytical framework that can be used to understand the Southern African security dynamics before 1994. He utilises the concepts of overlay, a security complex and a security regime to explain both the hostile and friendly relations that exist between states in the region. First, an overlay defines a condition in which the presence of outside powers is strong enough to contain the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states. The best examples of an overlay in Southern Africa were the colonial and white minority governments in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South West Africa (Buzan, 1991: 209). These were regarded as buffer states between the apartheid regime in South Africa and the majority-ruled states in Africa.

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[25] For a broader definition of human security see Chapters One and Five.

Second, a security complex defines a group of states whose primary security concerns are closely interconnected to the extent that "their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan, 1991: 190). The key components that constitute the basic structure of a security complex are patterns of enmity and amity existing between states in the region, coupled with the distribution of power among the principal states (Buzan, 1991: 211). The former reflects non-cooperative relationships between states as a result of suspicion, fear and mistrust of one another, whereas the latter refers to evolving cooperation, which indicates the presence of trust (Snyder cited in Ngoma, 2005: 21). Given this situation, it could be argued that a security complex was the main feature of a regional security architecture in Southern Africa before the 1990s as a result of the "confrontation between and within South Africa and the Frontline black states" (Buzan, 1991: 205) of Southern Africa.

Third, in relation to a security regime, states still consider each other as potential threats, but have made cooperative arrangements to reassure each other and reduce these threats (Buzan, 1998: 12). Regimes are social structures which contribute to the accomplishment of certain functions accompanied by explicit organisational arrangements. These arrangements relate to the activities of members of a regime taking place exclusively outside the jurisdictional boundaries of sovereign states (Young, 1982: 277). Without discounting anarchy, security regimes also lend themselves to neo-liberal institutionalist analysis, in which states are optimistic that developing institutions can help actors to achieve sustainable cooperation and alleviate conflict (Risse, 2000: 3-4).

Taking these analytical concepts of an overlay, a security complex and a security regime into consideration, it is equally important to highlight that the changing political situation in Southern Africa after 1974 meant major shifts from one pattern of security arrangement to another occurred and decisively destabilised the existing South African regional policy. The collapse of the Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974 meant the break up of an overlay, thereby undermining South African regional policies sheltered under this arrangement. As a result of this break up, South Africa adopted aggressive policies towards its neighbours, exemplified by the invasion of Angola in 1975 (Johnson and Martin, 1986: xvii). In response to South Africa's aggressive policy, the Southern African states formed a coalition of Frontline States in 1976 (FLS) as a political and military alliance[26] to counteract the increasing security threat in the region (Jaster, 1985: 88). While the FLS trajectory seemed "consistent with the alliance formation" (Barnett, and Gause, 1998:), it appeared more resolved to resist the apartheid regime by establishing the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to promote economic development among its member states and reduce economic dependence on South Africa (Zacarias, 1998: 51).

These community building practices encouraged the majority-ruled Southern African states to imagine that their security and well-being was a collective endeavour based on "shared understandings and common identities" (Adler, 1998: 135). With the beginning of the majority-centred security architecture that linked security with development, "cooperative security became a real possibility in which confidence building measures became not only a means for providing a temporary solution to regional instability, but also a matter of shaping regional identity" (Adler, 1998: 127-128). It could be argued that these practices were aimed at propagating conditions that could help bring back peaceful coexistence and achieve a level of mutual trust that is "consistent with a security community" in the region (Adler, 128-129).

The formation of SADCC spelt out one of the earliest markers towards a decline of a security complex in Southern Africa. Of critical importance to the region was a dire need by SADCC member states for the attainment of a human-based security, but at the same time SADCC sought to neutralise the South African-led initiative, the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) which was aimed at incorporating Southern African states into the South African economic system (Centre For African Studies, 1980: 105). Other key markers towards the decline of a security complex were the intensity of cooperation among peoples of the region in the defeat of the rulers of apartheid and this was most impressively obvious in the military defeat of the armed forces of apartheid at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in 1988 (Campbell, 1997: 5). The South African military defeat was followed by the development of cordial relations between the US and the Soviet Union and the agreement on Namibian independence, which involved South Africa and Cuba in 1988. In terms of this agreement, South Africa cooperated in bringing about the UN-sponsored elections in 1989. The period was followed by the strategic withdrawal of the US and the Soviet Union from the region, which facilitated the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 123). This paved the way for the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the negotiated settlement in South Africa (Crocker, 1992: 485). The independence of Namibia and South Africa's negotiated settlement meant the decline of the regional security complex.

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[26] As McCalla puts it, alliances are generally formed in response to external threat and their cohesion largely depends on the intensity and duration of that threat. "The greater the threat or power to be balanced, the greater the cohesion of the alliance" (McCalla, 1996: 450-451).

The developments since the 1990s have brought Southern Africa to the threshold of a security community where regional states no longer expected or feared the use of force in their relations with each other (Bischoff, 2001: 277). The era marked a condition in which regional security was no longer perceived through South Africa's policy of aggression, but rather by confidence and cooperation geared towards the peaceful settlement of disputes (Adler, 1998: 132). "This was preceded and followed by democratic elections in Angola, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, which heralded a new era of political liberalisation" (Bischoff, 2001: 277).

3.2.1 Southern Africa as an Overlay and South Africa's Regional Policy before 1974

The evolutionary character of security in Southern African as both an overlay and a security complex is essentially interwoven with the role played by South Africa as the dominant military and economic power in the region. As Dzimba argues, it would be difficult to grapple with the evolutionary dynamics of security and development in the region without mentioning the central position of South Africa (Dzimba, 1998: 2). By all accounts, the South African apartheid regime acted as a centripetal force around which all forms of insecurity in Southern Africa revolved. In other words, South Africa became and remained the main "fulcrum" in the definition of regional security (Mandaza, 1986: 129).

Before 1974, the Southern African security situation may perhaps be explained in terms of an overlay. Two fundamental conditions underscore this explanation. First, in the early 1970s there were only a few independent Southern African states including Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia, which all had "so few capabilities" that their power projected "little, if at all" (Buzan, 1998: 12), against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The other reason for this was that Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland had close political ties with South Africa, "although the former changed its foreign policy stance towards the apartheid regime in the 1970s" (Matlosa, 2001: 298). In other words, interaction among these states was not cohesive enough to generate a local security complex. The second condition was the direct presence of the white colonial and minority regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. These regimes were "strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among local states" (Buzan et al, 1998: 12). Viewed in this context, the suppression made it easy for South Africa to enjoy unmatched domination in political, economic and military issues in the region.

The general feeling which saturated the domestic and foreign policy of Pretoria was its unswerving antagonism to the decolonisation process (Nolutshungu, 1975: 7). Pretoria's regional policy concern was an attempt to both prevent struggles against colonial regimes in the region and to isolate the national liberation struggle inside South Africa from potential support by neighbouring states (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 186). This was made possible by an overlay that prevented states in the region from effectively challenging the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Basically, the white minority community in South Africa was determined to maintain an overlay and fearful of, and opposed to the collapse of the colonial empires (Nolutshungu 1975: 6) in Mozambique, Rhodesia and Angola. The main fear of the collapse of these empires was that they might provide a preliminary momentum for the African nationalists within South Africa itself. The other expectation was that, with the collapse of these empires, the emerging African governments would be hostile to white South Africa (Nolutshungu, 1975: 7). As such, the apartheid regime was determined to support the existence of a number of buffer states that surrounded it. In the west was the Portuguese colony of Angola and the South African occupied territory of South West Africa. In the centre lay the settler-ruled British colony of Rhodesia while in the east was the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. South Africa's regional policy was, for the most part, aimed at strengthening these buffer states so that they could continue to serve as a protective shield for its survival (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 186). As a result, Pretoria provided these colonial white minority regimes with material assistance from the mid-1960s onwards. Pretoria's policies were basically aimed at creating an ideological and organisational environment that would be more favourable to the white minority regimes (Nolutshungu, 1975: 7).

Over and above consolidating relations with colonial and minority regimes, South Africa conceptualised what was known as an 'outward looking policy' in mid-1967 as a foreign policy objective, in an attempt to cultivate opportunities of cooperation and cordial relations with willing African states (Nolutshungu, 1975: 114). While the name given to this policy objective changed over time, its basic content remained reasonably constant (Leys and Tontensen, 1982: 65). For example, in the 1970s it was called détente or dialogue and incorporated offers of economic cooperation including trade and aid to African states as a reward to those who were more cooperative[27] (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 188; Jaster, 1985: 54).

The key idea behind the détente was to look for support from potential allies from within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), more specifically in the Southern African region (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 188). As a result, the South African government managed to solicit support in the West African region. It established relations with Ivory Coast, which in turn opposed the African policies toward South Africa in support of détente (Nolutshungu, 1975: 269). In Southern Africa, both the outward policies and détente had a minimal success, as Malawi became the only African state to agree with the policy exemplified by the establishment of diplomatic ties with Pretoria. The major black response to the outward policy was influenced by the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 in which 13 African states strongly opposed any compromise with the apartheid and called for the liberation of Southern Africa (Jaster, 1985: 54). The Lusaka Manifesto was the product of the deteriorating political situation in South Africa in the mid-1960s, the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith in Rhodesia and the ongoing refusal of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique to compromise. This manifesto was later approved by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) and committed states to support the liberation struggle until its logical conclusion (Matlosa, 2001: 399). The resolve to resist colonial regimes and apartheid dealt a mortal blow to both the outward the looking policy and détente, thereby undermining South Africa's policies in the region.

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[27] In 1968, South Africa established a five-million-rand fund for low interest loans to friendly African countries, as well as organising a technical assistance programme. South Africa renegotiated the Customs Union agreement with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1969, thereby giving the three smaller member states free access to the South African market and simultaneously making them more profoundly dependent on the dominant partner (Jaster, 1985: 54).

3.3 The Breaking Up of an Overlay, and the rise of a Security Complex in Southern Africa

The collapse of the Portuguese regime in 1974 constituted a major setback for South Africa. It culminated in the break up of an overlay under which apartheid South Africa had been sheltered and signified the formation of a security complex. The key feature defining the complex in the making was a high level of fear and suspicion felt mutually among the majority-ruled states and the apartheid regime. This served as a catalyst for many dramatic changes that transformed the security and political landscape in the Southern African region (Silke and Schrire, 1997: 4, Dzimba, 1998: 8). The most important changes were seen at the level of the regional power structure resulting from the independence of Mozambique and Angola. This posed a fundamental threat to South Africa's policy-makers and further deepened mutual mistrust in the region. The threat emanated from the installation of governments formed by liberation movements namely, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (Price, 1984: 11).

According to Chan, what exacerbated South Africa's fear was the fact that FRELIMO and MPLA were not only black-led, but had communist party structures which espoused the Marxist ideology. They had international communist support, which in the case of Angola included military support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. These countries became a symbol of a comprehensive challenge to South African ideology, policy and military superiority. The challenge was taken up in view of their success in integrating armed resistance, communistic structures and ideology (Chan, 1990: 25). What was more unsettling to South Africa was the fact that Mozambique and Angola occupied what South Africa regarded as strategic positions in the region. They both controlled coastlines immediately north of South African waters and above all both provided access to the sea for Southern African landlocked states (Chan, 1990: 25).

The independence of Angola and Mozambique shifted the regional balance of power away from South Africa, accordingly undermining its regional policies. The collapse of what had been buffer states also shook the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia that represented the third and last bastion of white minority rule in Southern Africa. The Smith regime was put under substantial pressure as a result of facilities made available by FRELIMO to the Rhodesian liberation movements: the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union- Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF). On the Angolan side, there was also another mounting pressure from the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) that was fighting for the independence of Namibia operating out of the southern part of the Angolan border area (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 188).

To counteract the growing wave of resistance in Southern Africa, the apartheid regime sought to cultivate Western support, particularly from the United States. At the same time, the US had economic, political and strategic interests in Southern Africa. To all intents and purposes, it was determined to cooperate with allies and friends to deter its adversary: the Soviet Union (Mandaza, 1986: 128). Bischoff argues that "during the course of the 1970s, the conflict in Southern Africa had been internationalised and the United States had, after 1975, come to play an increasingly important political and diplomatic role as regards apartheid South Africa" (Bischoff, 1990: 259). By and large, South Africa wanted to assert itself as a dominant partner of the West to consolidate and perpetuate its apartheid policies. Correspondingly, it portrayed itself as a natural guardian of Western interests in the region (Chan, 1990: 23). As a result, South Africa invaded Angola in 1975 and offered assistance to the Angolan National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) "insurgents with military supplies, logistical support, and backing in the field by its own forces" (Price, 1984: 18).

While military actions were conducted under the pretext of curbing SWAPO incursions and operations into the Namibian territory (Price, 1984: 18), in reality, they were primarily meant to keep out the MPLA, which had close ties to the Soviet Union after taking over power. In essence, these attempts did not succeed as the defeat and repulsion of South African troops in Angola in 1976 coupled with the anti-apartheid Soweto riots proved to be a turning point for the apartheid regime in South Africa (Matlosa, 2001: 401). By the end of 1976, the South African regional policy had completely collapsed and the apartheid regime faced an internal crisis (Johnson and Martin, 1986: xvii). This internal crisis marked the beginning of a considerable change in the regional security architecture. It indeed heralded a transitional phase between 1974 and 1979 that gave rise to the development of a regional security complex.

This transitional phase from an overlay to a security complex was highlighted by three fundamental events. The first one was the South Africa's invasion of Angola in 1975, the second one was the growing internal crises in South Africa itself and the brutal suppression of the Soweto uprisings in 1976, while the third one was the formulation of a Total Strategy as a new South African policy framework with its own economic, political and military implications (Johnson and Martin, 1986: xvii).

A completely new dimension to the complex was added when the Soviets and the Cubans intervened militarily in 1975 in support of the Angolan government (Crocker, 1994: 35). Henceforth, Southern African became a sphere of contestation of global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union motivated by ideological and military rivalries (Crocker, 1992: 410). It is this deteriorating security situation which consolidated the existence of a security complex. This can be traced by "how states' fears" shaped their "foreign policy and military behaviour" (Buzan, 1991: 192). Gutteridge writes, "These events...brought home to white leadership the need for a new strategy. The so-called total strategy which emerged rests on the twin pillars of maintaining security by conventional military means..." (Gutteridge, 1995: 2).

3.4 Southern Africa as a Security Complex and the Adoption of Total Strategy as a Policy Framework by the Apartheid South Africa

The adoption of Total Strategy by the South African government as its policy objective signified the escalation the level of insecurity in the region. The strategy was founded on two strategic objectives which involved a proactive and destructive part including 'techniques of persuasion' on the one hand, and techniques of coercion' on the other. The former involved offering assistance through aid and cooperation in the joint infrastructural projects to states willing to collaborate with South Africa (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 195). The most visible example of economic cooperation involved efforts to establish the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS)[28] initiative in 1978 (Ngoma, 2005: 90). The latter manifested itself through acts of destabilisation including punitive measures against states which were deemed uncooperative by the apartheid regime. These included surcharging export goods from neighbouring states; limiting or even banning imported labour from such states (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 195), as well as direct military action.

The strategy was transformed into state policy after P.W. Botha's ascendance to power in 1978. As a result, South African foreign policy issues were brought under the Committee of National Security, known as the State Security Council (SSC), dominated by military strategists. This covered a wide spectrum of internal and external activities of the government. Practically, the SSC's primary concern was the management of the total range of policy strategies of the state (Davies and O'Meara,

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[28] The Constellation of Southern African States was meant to lock Pretoria's neighbours more firmly into the South African economic system. This would increase Pretoria's influence over its neighbours, and thus prevent these states from assisting the South African liberation movements (Price, 1984: 15).

1985: 192-193). This involved the militarisation of the South African state and the emergence of the South African military as a major authoritative instrument in policy-making (Jaster, 1985: x). It meant the large-scale mobilisation of economic, political, ideological, socio-psychological, as well as military resources of the state against its perceived enemies (Davies and O'Meara, 1984: 69). It was indeed a "national reorientation aimed at survival" (Cutteridge, 1981: 18) of a white minority regime.

Pretoria was determined to replace the lost buffer states of formerly white minority ruled allies. These buffer states "had enhanced the stability of the white minority regimes, and by extrapolation enhanced the stability of South Africa" (Vale, 1990: 173). The strategy was held up by the apartheid state as a justifiable step to 'Total Onslaught' against South Africa. Total Onslaught was defined as a threat to the South African government not only arising from among its own black majority population, but also from the Soviet-led communist conspiracy through regional governments (Dzimba, 1998: 1). On the part of the Southern African majority ruled-states, this total strategy not only produced the a high level of human insecurity in the region, but also deepened cooperation through collective perceptions of identity based on the elaboration of peaceful means of dispute settlement between states (Adler, 1998: 132).

3.4.1 The Constellation of Southern African States **(CONSAS)**

Although the CONSAS proposal was meant to promote a number of joint economic projects between South Africa and other regional states, it was not "founded on the compatibility of shared values of its members". In fact, apartheid heightened the existence of diverse values "between South Africa and its partners by discouraging political links, a greater mobility of people and the development of strong institutional relations. Political unity with the rest of Africa was contrary to the philosophy of apartheid" (Zacarias, 1998: 46). South Africa recognised four significant gains with regard to the constellation policy to legitimise its internal policies. First, it was envisaged that the formation of the constellation would use economic inducements of development to assimilate neighbouring states strongly into the South African economic system (Centre For African Studies, 1980: 105, Price, 1984: 12). Second, the constellation was to include independent Bantustans as members, and strengthen the apartheid state as a result of members' recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the South African homelands. Here, the intention was to give international legitimacy to South Africa's policy of separate development. Third, the constellation was also aimed at breaking African unity by dividing the countries of tropical Africa on the issue of their relations with Pretoria (Centre For African Studies, 1980: 105, Price, 1984: 12). This was aimed at weakening the coordination of support for black liberation movements. Finally, with African states strongly divided over the issue of South Africa, "Western countries and their international firms would find themselves under less pressure to show their opposition to minority rule in South Africa" (Price, 1984: 15). Seen in this way, the constellation was explicitly intended to consolidate the position of the white minority regime in South Africa.

The idea of CONSAS did not become feasible in part because the Southern African states "viewed it as a vehicle for intervention and assertion of South African regional hegemony" (Du Plessis, 1997: 23). In response, the FLS coordinated a more comprehensive politico-military strategy against South Africa, which effectively developed into consolidated and intense opposition to CONSAS. This neutralisation of CONSAS constituted a positive step along the way towards a security community building by establishing the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. In fact, "the first attempt at building a community of security, based on shared common principles, came with the creation of SADCC" (Zacarias, 1998: 46). While CONSAS was seen by Pretoria as a means for Africa to recognise the position of its homeland system, these developments only reduced it to a functional organisation between South Africa and the so-called independent homelands (Du Plessis, 1997: 23).

3.4.2 The Frontline States (FLS)

The FLS constituted one of the powerful opposition to the white minority rule in Southern Africa in the territories of Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa. Essentially, a group of Southern African states including Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia formed a coalition known as the Front-Line

States (FLS) in 1976 (Jaster, 1985: 88). The FLS represented a forum for discussion of political and military problems inherent among the newly independent states and liberation movements (Cilliers, as cited in Motlosa, 2001: 299). It constituted the region's loose military alliance opposing South Africa (Matlosa, 2001: 399). This was so because "South Africa was determined to keep at bay the winds of change that were sweeping through the continent by consciously attempting to destabilise neighbouring "liberated" states" (Nkiwane, 1995: 1). As such, the FLS was catalysed by a strong desire to unite the Southern Africa states in response to the apartheid threat.

Although lacking a common and cohesive ideology, the FLS was strongly united by the members' commitment to the process of decolonisation and their objection to the apartheid system (Matlosa, 2001: 399). The coalition sought to bring unity to liberation movements, and collectively engage as a group in regional security issues (Jaster, 1985: 88). As such, the key commitment to independence and majority rule for the remaining white dominated territories quickly became the single great unifying force within the coalition (Jaster, 1985: 89). It could be argued that with this sense of togetherness the FLS leaders were intent on creating a sense of a community that generates "cooperative relationships" based on collective identity (Ngoma, 2005: 42).

As mentioned above, the Frontline States established SADCC as a neutralising mechanism to counteract the ambitions of South Africa in the region. By merging security with development and generating a common identity to advocate "peaceful change", the FLS exhibited some characteristics of a security community. Given the similarities among the FLS member states "and their common security agenda, more progress in community building" became visible. In short, while Southern African leaders established the FLS "for statist purposes, its very existence has encouraged...greater mutual identification" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 162) at regional level and indeed highlighted certain features of the emergence of security communities.

3.4.3 The South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

The formation of the SADCC and neutralisation of CONSAS not only obstructed Pretoria's efforts to shape the pattern of regional relations, it also propelled South Africa to embark on the extensive campaign of destabilisation in the region. In that regard, destabilisation represented a decisive element in the general policy of Total Strategy (Dzimba, 1998: 1). "The creation of SADCC was founded on the principle of emancipation and equity, regarded by the leaders of Southern Africa as necessary condition to reduce conflict, and promote stability and prosperity" (Zacarias, 1998: 52). The SADCC became the important centre for political, diplomatic and economic relations between the region and the external world; it was able to uphold a strong sense of political solidarity among its members (Zacarias, 1998: 53).

SADCC recognised that the reduction of dependence on South Africa was the only way to interweave a fabric of regional cooperation and development (Masire, as cited in Green, 1981:183). It became apparent that "South Africa's economic and political hegemony in the region could no longer be taken as historical given" (Rich, 1994: 13). With the formation of the SADCC, the FLS provided a profound linkage between security and development. Born out of the Lusaka Declaration, the inauguration of SADCC endowed the post-independence Southern African states with their first platform for economic cooperation (le Pere and Tjonneland, 2005: 4). This cooperative undertaking was premised on four objectives. First, it was intended to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Second, it was aimed at promoting cooperation between the states in the region. Third, it was to mobilise resources in order to carry out national and international projects. Finally, it was to cooperate with aid organisations in order to secure technical and financial assistance (Leys and Tostensen, 1992: 53).

The SADCC project was not only a direct challenge to CONSAS, but it was also a challenge to one of the more immediately evolving objectives of South African regional policy. South Africa's intention to maintain and strengthen economic ties with states in the region was thwarted. Hence, the "establishment of SADCC and the accession to it of all the key target states of the constellation project represented an important defeat for South Africa's strategy" (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 197). With the formation of SADCC and the paralysis of CONSAS, South Africa was strategically disarmed; the only alternative left at its disposal was to resort to destabilisation tactics because economic incentives could not work.

3.4.4 Destabilisation - Human and Material costs

Following the neutralisation of CONSAS in the late 1970s, the South African strategists started the campaign of destabilisation "that left more than a million of the region's people dead and is estimated to have cost $62.42 million" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 286). The era obviously marked a high level of human insecurity in the region and the large-scale destruction of property. The most remarkable events were the acts of economic sabotage and the promotion of insurgency, which formed the core of human insecurity. The economic sabotage focussed on the targets such as bridges, dams, railways and the cost of this policy to the target states was very high (Green and Thompson, 1986: 251). The insurgency strategy started with the governments in Angola and Mozambique, through training, arming and supporting guerrilla groups in each country to carry out the work of destabilisation (Marishane, 1992: 2). For example, South Africa trained, directed and supplied the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola UNITA with weapons. While the insurgents inflicted heavy human costs, "the people who have lost their homes, who have been terrorised...who have been bereaved or left to care for the disabled family members...all this suffering is unaccounted for" (Nyerere, 1986: ix). While this era represented the height of a security complex in the region in which fear, enmity and mutual mistrust characterised relations between the white minority regime in South Africa and the black majority-ruled states, this level of human insecurity also spelt out the beginning of an unwavering endeavour to form a security community by creating a conscientious resistance against the regime.

The escalation of military action directed against uncooperative neighbouring states accompanied by the disregard for human life continued from 1981 onwards. For example, there were large-scale invasions of Angolan territories[29]; an attack against ANC residences in Matola near Maputo in Mozambique; a substantial increase in the level of activities by South African sponsored dissident[30] groups, namely the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) (Price 1984: 18-19, Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 198). South Africa also trained and armed the Super-ZAPU dissidents in Zimbabwe (Dzimba, 1998: 59), as well as dissidents to destabilise Zambia (Jaster, 1985: 146).

In its campaign of destabilisation, the South Africa's apartheid regime divided the Southern African states into three categories. The first included more conservative states which were perceived to be real or prospective collaborators, such as Malawi and Swaziland. The second consisted of those considered to be more vulnerable to pressure: Botswana and Lesotho; while the third comprised states whose political systems were seen to constitute the most fundamental challenge to South African capitalism (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 199) such as Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

As a form of incentive, the first category was rewarded for 'good behaviour', which involved the expansion of economic links with South Africa. Swaziland is regarded as the most outstanding example of this category. Because of its cooperation with South Africa, it was indeed rewarded with the construction of a railway line through Swazi territory linking the Eastern Transvaal with Richards Bay on the Natal Coast (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 199). The reason for this cooperative behaviour is not hard to fathom. Swaziland had entered into a secret security pact[31] with the apartheid regime by early 1982 (Bischoff, 1990: 430). States in the second and third categories were earmarked for intensified destabilisation because they had rejected cooperation with South Africa. These states included Lesotho, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana. Throughout 1982 and 1983, destabilisation was the most visible form of South Africa's aggression in the region (Geldenhuys, 1995: 49, Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 199). Despite, this calculated aggression; Southern African majority ruled "made some modest moves toward a deepening of interstate cooperation" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 163).

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[29] Operation Protea launched by the SADF on August 1981 constituted one of the massive invasions of southern Angola in which 11000 men were involved. After massive bombing raids on the main urban centres in Cunene province, three South African Armed columns entered the country and moved on the where they engaged the Angolan armed forces (Holness, 1986: 99).

[30] In this context, the term dissident is used to define groups who rebelled against established governments in Southern Africa. These groups were trained, armed and given financial support by the apartheid regime in South Africa and were used as instruments of destabilisation.

[31] This agreement allowed Pretoria to define security matters in its relations with Swaziland in the broadest possible terms. In that context, Swaziland acknowledged that both governments were threatened by international terrorism in all its manifestations that posed the real threat to the peace and security of the region. As a result, Swaziland agreed to undertake to combat terrorist insurgency and subversion on its own and together with states wherever possible (Bischoff, 1990: 430).

3.4.4.1 Lesotho

For Lesotho, there were two fundamental reasons for destabilisation. The first one was to force the government to crack down and expel refugees especially, African National Congress (ANC) members. Pretoria accused Lesotho of acting as a springboard from which the ANC military wing, *Umkonto we Sizwe* was launching its attacks on South Africa (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 145). Second, Pretoria wanted Lesotho to establish diplomatic relations with the Transkei Bantustan to give credence and legitimacy to its homeland policies. When the Lesotho government refused to accept these demands, there was a dramatic increase in acts of destabilisation in the form of armed action[32] by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) supported by South Africa (Ajulu and Cammack: 1986: 144-145).

In addition to using the LLA as a proxy force, the South African government also started to directly attack Lesotho. In December 1982, the South African Defence Force (SADF) launched a large-scale cross-border raid against members of the ANC in the capital, Maseru, killing 42 people: 12 Basotho and thirty ANC members, who included women and children (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 140, Matlosa, 2001: 85). In the same period, Lesotho was subjected to economic coercion in the form of restrictions of the movement of goods and people across its border with South Africa. Threats were also made to repatriate the Basotho migrant workers in South Africa, who constituted the largest single source of foreign exchange (Matlosa, 2001: 86).

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[32] The LLA embarked on the campaign of sabotage and assassinations and its main targets were tourism industry and government officials. According to Davies and O'Meara, the most conspicuous actions were explosions in the luxury Hilton Hotel in the capital Maseru in which several people were killed. There was also an attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan in a car bomb in August, 1983 (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 200).

In December 1985, South Africa launched another military raid in Maseru, killing 12 people who once again included ANC members and Lesotho citizens. This heightened focus on Lesotho was the result of that country's refusal to sign an Nkomati style non-aggression pact with South Africa and its increased ties with Eastern Bloc countries such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 146). This was followed by a total border blockade which precipitated the 1986 military coup that ousted Chief Leabua Jonathan. As it turned out, the military regime, headed by Major-General Metsing Lekhanya, "was to all intents and purposes a close ally of the Pretoria regime hence the signing of security pacts between two governments" (Matlosa, 2001: 86). With this in mind, one would argue that South African did achieve its goal of destabilising Lesotho.

3.4.4.2 Angola

Angola is endowed with considerable mineral wealth and economic potential; it is the state in the region whose economy was least dependent on South Africa. However, like many Southern African states, it was earmarked for destabilisation because of its anti-apartheid policies. Destabilisation brought about economic and human costs. Economic costs of war included acts of sabotage directed against oil pipelines, water and electricity. Over and above this, the sabotage of the Benguela railway negatively affected Angolan exports from the interior to the sea coast. The lucrative diamond industry was damaged by UNITA attacks directly backed by South Africa and agricultural activities were disrupted (Gunn, 1987: 59-60). Argues Holness, "the war disrupting agriculture and transport, also led to increased foreign exchange expenditure in food imports" (Holness, 1986: 100). On May 15 1986, at the meeting of aid donors in Luanda, the government reported that "about 600 000 people affected by hunger, diseases and malnutrition" (Gunn, 1987: 59-60). South Africa's prime objective was to undermine Angola's economic viability by repeatedly invading the southern provinces of Angola so that from the end of 1981 until the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987, the south of the country was occupied by the South African invading forces. Moreover, South Africa increased its support for UNITA with the object of forcing the MPLA government into negotiations (Johnson and Martin, 1986: 99).

3.4.4.3 Mozambique

In the case of Mozambique, Pretoria covertly sponsored RENAMO as the major instrument of destabilisation. The end of 1981 saw a substantial escalation of RENAMO attacks which caused extensive damage to property such as homes and facilities such as schools and health installations (Johnson and Martin 1986: 20). The country also experienced attacks from members of the SADF directed mainly against ANC supporters. The Matola raid was the most obvious in which South African troops crossed the border and shelled and destroyed the residences of the ANC, killing twelve of its members (Jaster, 1985: 107). There were also acts of sabotage against strategic installations, as well as disruption of economic activities against Mozambique. These included a partial economic boycott against the port of Maputo. It is argued that destabilisation tactics were aimed at weakening the economy in an effort to "reinforce propaganda offensive alleging that socialism equals economic chaos and deprivation" and also at disrupting the SADCC projects (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 202-203).

In 1984, Pretoria achieved its goal of destabilising Mozambique, dislodging it from the struggle through the signing of the Nkomati Accord[33]. According to Ngoma, the Accord brought some strains within the FLS alliance and was even dismissed by President Nyerere as "a resounding defeat" (Ngoma, 2005: 100). However, this did not deter other FLS members' in their resolve to resist apartheid. With the Accord, Maputo assured South Africa that it would stop allowing its territory to be used as a staging ground for South African liberation fighters. It also promised to banish them from the country in return for South Africa agreeing to end its support for RENAMO (Guelke, 1990: 245, Rich, 1994: 20). There was a hope that South Africa would honour the Accord and cease its acts of destabilisation (Gomes, 1984: 145). However, to some extent, sections of the defence establishment continued to support RENAMO after Nkomati (Rich, 1994: 20).

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[33] With the Nkomati Accord, Mozambique and apartheid South Africa, among other things committed themselves to refrain from being used as bases, or staging grounds by "another state, government foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten security of its inhabitants" (The Nkomati Accord in Johnson and Martin, 1986: 324)

3.4.4.4 Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, South Africa provided military support to Super-ZAPU dissidents operating from the Eastern Transvaal. Operations of dissidents were intended to cause political and economic damage to Zimbabwe. They uniquely targeted infrastructural and developmental projects including clinics, roads and railways (Dzimba, 1998: 59). These dissidents drew their support from the Matebeleland which is situated in the southwest of the country. In January 1993, the government dispatched a unit of the national army known as the Fifth Brigade to quell the rebellion. While the army tried to engage the dissidents militarily, there was also widespread killing of innocent people "akin to that inflicted to the people of Zimbabwe by the Rhodesian state" (Chiumbu, 1997: 1).

Moreover, in early 1983, in the aftermath of the sabotage of the Beira-Mutare oil pipeline Pretoria put in place a number of measures aimed at blocking oil imports to Zimbabwe (Davies and O' Meara, 1985: 204). While Zimbabwe did not support liberation movements in the same way as Mozambique and Angola by providing them with military facilities, and maintained close economic ties with South Africa, the crux of the matter is that Zimbabwe was basically hostile to apartheid. This claim was supported by its declaration of solidarity with the ANC and SWAPO (Geldenhuys, 1995: 55). In this context, the only conceivable objective for destabilising Zimbabwe was to "prevent it from becoming economically strong enough to reduce its economic ties with South Africa...and militarily strong enough not to be deterred by the Republic..." (Geldenhuys, 1995: 55).

3.4.4.5 Zambia

The apartheid regime in South Africa did not spare Zambia in its programme of destabilisation. Zambia was described as an outpost of subversion because of its support for liberation movements in South Africa (Jaster, 1985: 146). According to Jaster, the South African Defence White Paper of 1982 depicted Zambia as a Marxist state connected to the Soviet-inspired conspiracy against the apartheid government. These descriptions clearly put Zambia on the list of countries targeted for destabilisation. As a result, South Africa trained and armed Zambian dissident groups for this task. "The most sustaining form of aggression had been the laying of landmines, which in addition to causing loss of life and decline of agricultural production, had also deterred mining companies from prospecting in the area"(Jaster, 1985: 146). While South Africa inflicted human and material costs in the course of destabilising Zambia, this did deter Zambia from providing a safe haven for liberation movements.

3.2.4.6 Botswana

Botswana became the last victim of the campaign of aggression by South Africa against its neighbours. According to Johnson and Martin, from February 1985 to February 1989 there were 20 recorded direct attacks or acts of sabotage involving the SADF (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 101). In June 1985, for example South Africa launched a military raid into Botswana in which twelve people were killed. In this raid, South Africa "claimed the targets were certain 'key' activists of the control centre of the Transvaal sabotage organisation of the ANC" (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 151). The key reason for these attacks was to frighten and isolate the Botswana community from supporting South African freedom fighters and to put pressure on the government to expel them. While Botswana later agreed that its territory would not be "used as a launching pad against South Africa", it refused to sign a South African security pact reminiscent of the Nkomati Accord (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 151).

3.3 The Decline of the Security Complex in Southern Africa

According to Buzan, "security complexes...represent durable rather than permanent patterns" within a system (Buzan, 1991: 191). This explains why the changing security developments in Southern Africa also meant the end of a regional security complex. On the military front, the decline of a security complex in the region was the result of the massive battle at Cuito Cuanavale a small town in the remote south-eastern Angola. This became a symbol of a regional and continental resistance to South Africa's military might[34] (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 122). It was this change in the military equation in Southern African that promoted political consultations and multilateral agreements among its member states in an attempt to prevent violent conflict and develop a practice of peaceful settlement of disputes (Adler, 1998: 132). This change was facilitated by the fact that the Cold War was in its end phase. On the political front, the decline of a security complex led to the dramatic development of negotiations between the United States, Cuba, Angola and South Africa in late 1987 and early 1988. The negotiations also got support from the Soviet Union (Crocker, 1994: 43-44).

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[34] The contest between South Africa's aggression and the ability of Angola to defend itself resulted in severe casualties and loss of equipment on both sides but the heavily fortified town was held. This did not only serve as a moral boost for Angola, but it also disturbed the white public opinion in South Africa (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 122-123).

After a sequence of meetings held between Cuba, Angola, South Africa and the United States, the agreement was signed in New York in December 1988. These agreements centred on the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, and paved the way for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435[35] for a UN-sponsored transitional process to independence for Namibia. The agreement also covered the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, as well as the removal of ANC bases from the Angolan territory (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 123). The Soviet Union affirmed its support for an early settlement by publicly endorsing the New York agreement, thereby maintaining regular contacts with the United States (Crocker, 1994: 417). As Chester Crocker, the America Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs puts it, "once the settlement began to be implemented, the move toward Namibian independence and regional peace became irreversible...Namibia became independent on March, 21 1990" (Crocker, 1992: 485).

The dramatic changes in Angola and Namibia provided a fresh impetus for South Africa to consider a transition at home, abandon its apartheid policy and engage in negotiations with its liberation movements. There was a fresh opportunity in terms of recognising the reinterpretation of the old threat (Crocker, 1992: 492). The process was facilitated by the resignation of P. W. Botha and his replacement by a more moderate F. W. de Klerk in 1989. De Klerk initiated his first meeting with Mandela on 13 December 1989. At the meeting, Mandela brought forth a road map outlining a direction for negotiations. He emphasised that once the enabling environment for negotiations prevailed, the armed struggle would also be suspended (Schneindman, 1994: 159).

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[35] Resolution 435 was adopted by the Security Council at its 2087th meeting on 29 September 1978. it affirmed the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia. Its objective was the withdrawal of the South African illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations (Crocker, 1994: 495-499).

In addition, Mandela stressed "his openness to some form of power-sharing" (Schneinman, 1994: 160). Equally, De Klerk made a historic speech on 2 February 1990 that legalised the ANC and thirty other Black parties followed by the release of Mandela nine days later. In that regard, "both the government and the ANC leadership have recognised their mutual interdependence and the need for cooperation if South Africa was to end" (Schneinman, 1994: 160) its intractable racial conflict. It is this transition phase of the 1990s that dismantled the apartheid machinery and led South Africa to a new democratic dispensation in 1994. Hence, the attainment of black majority rule in South Africa represents a fundamental break with a past that has so long been characterised by insecurity for the people of Southern Africa (Mandaza, 1986: 120).

3.4 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 making use of the FLS and SADCC signalled a positive step in the changing character of regional security arrangements. The declaration accompanying the treaty of SADC identified common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations as constituting the important step towards freedom and social justice, peace and security (Zacarias, 1998: 47). SADC declared war and insecurity to be the enemies of economic progress and social welfare and as a precondition, the region needed to set up frameworks and mechanisms to reinforce regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and stability (Matlosa, 2000: 41). The formation of SADC marked the end of a security complex and transformed the region "from an anarchic sub-system of states to a single, larger actor within the system" (Buzan et al, 1998:12). This also transformed the power structure within the complex since South Africa was no long perceived as a threat by its neighbours. It may be argued that this lent the region to the neo-liberal institutionalist analysis, which does not actually discount anarchy, but is optimistic about cooperation through institutions.

The formation of SADC transformed the region into a security regime. In this context states essentially accrue benefits by setting up rules and institutions to control the competition among them (Jervis, 1982: 357-358). In a security regime environment, states engage in cooperative arrangements to reassure each other and reduce threats (Buzan, 1998: 12). At its inauguration SADC made a declaration that institutional arrangements were a preliminary requirement to guarantee political stability and mutual security as critical components of regional cooperation and integration (Nathan, 2004: 4). South Africa's accession to the body in 1994, completely transformed its regional security policy towards its neighbours away from confrontation to cooperation (Matlosa, 2001: 394).

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid reduced the external support for the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. This gave fresh momentum for positive conflict management efforts aimed at settling inter-state and intra-state disputes. To achieve these, the region needed to institutionalise a system of democratic governance and political stability based upon sustainable peace and security (Matlosa, 2000: 40). Most importantly, the end of apartheid in South Africa had "removed a major source of regional strife and created the possibility of an inclusive regional body" (Nathan, 2004: 4).

The SADC's main objectives centre on the achievement of development and economic growth, the alleviation of poverty and the advancement of the standard and the quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa. SADC also pledges to provide support to the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. The achievement of these objectives is to be realised through increased regional integration, building of democratic principles, equitable and sustainable development. SADC seeks to establish common economic, political, social values and systems by enhancing enterprises and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and guarantees of human rights and popular participation. SADC also affirms to maintain regional solidarity in order for the people of the region to live and work together in harmony (SADC Treaty 1992). Yet how these goals might best be achieved was left open to multiples of interpretations.

In sum, the apartheid regime in South Africa, within the broad environment of the Cold War played a central role in shaping the Southern African security situation. While South Africa wanted to exert its domination in the region through trade and aid, the fall of the Portuguese regime drastically changed its foreign policy from cooperation to aggressiveness. This was characterised by the adoption of a Total Strategy as its policy framework that included the military destabilisation of the uncooperative governments in the region. However, the Total Strategy became less relevant with the end of the Cold War and the independence of Namibia. The most remarkable event, which constituted the break up of a complex, was the establishment of SADC. SADC clearly spelt out the relationship between security and development by stressing the importance of "human rights, democracy and the rule of law... peaceful settlement of disputes...achievement of growth and alleviation of poverty" (SADC Treaty, 1992). Given this situation, it may be argued that this development paved the way for the possibility of a security community in the region. The possibility of the region becoming a security community will be explored in the next chapter.

4.0 TOWARDS SECURITY COMMUNITY BUILDING? FROM THE WINDHOEK PROPOSALS TO THE ORGAN ON POLITICS DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION (OPDSC)

Using a neo-realist paradigm, the previous chapter made an attempt to examine the evolution of security in Southern Africa from an 'overlay' before 1974, through a 'security complex' in the late 1970s and to the 'security regime' of the 1990s. Emerging from the legacies of destruction and destabilisation unleashed by the apartheid military (Campbell, 1997: 4), the post-apartheid Southern Africa is marked by developments inclined to increase interdependence, sustainable peace and security among member states (Zacarias, 1997: 52). This chapter uses a constructivist security community paradigm to explore the implications of the SADC's efforts to adopt new forms of regional security cooperation, in an attempt to transform the region into a security community following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa. An understanding of security developments in Southern Africa carries great weight "when viewed through the security community paradigm" (Ngoma, 2005: 7). As such, the Declaration of the Treaty of SADC in 1992 represented an expression of confidence in which developments such as the independence of Namibia and the transition in South Africa were expected to take the region out of an era of conflict to one of a security community characterised by a climate of peace, security and stability (Cilliers, 1995:38).

Despite the changing regional environment, conflict and instability continued to characterise the Southern African states. Whilst the superpowers were retreating from the region, it became necessary for SADC to set up its own mechanisms for the prevention and management of conflicts (Matlosa, 2000: 39). In this set up, South Africa and Zimbabwe have been politically the most important states in the region; the fit of their roles will be explored later in this chapter. Nevertheless, the changing security situation in the region posed a tremendous challenge to SADC "to prove itself as an organisation not only worthy of its existence, but also relevance" (Sukma, 2003:1). The effort was facilitated by global developments where under Article 52 of the UN Charter[36], the delegation of responsibility for conflict management was being transferred from the United Nations to the regional and sub-regional levels (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 43). This posed a remarkable challenge to the regional "security arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community's Organ of Politics Defence and Security Cooperation" (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 43) to bring sustainable security and stability in the region, the major assumption being that the achievement of sustainable security might put Southern Africa on the margins of a security community.

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[36] Article 52 (1) of the UN Charter provides for the existence of regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters pertaining to "maintenance of international peace and security as a re appropriate for

Deutsch defines a security community as a condition in which "states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of a community, which, in turn creates the assurance that they will settle their disputes short of war" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 3). In other words, a security community is created by a mutual compatibility of values, the absence of competitive military build-up among the regional actors, a total absence of inter-state conflicts, strong institutional relations and practices which serve to reduce, prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and disorder and allow for greater mobility of people and exchange of ideas (Deutsch cited in Zacarias, 1998: 44, Sukma, 2003: 2). Vehicles for bringing about a security community are shared values, norms and symbols that in turn provide social identities across the region (Adler, and Barnett, 1998: 3).

Adler argues that security communities do not actually evolve impulsively; rather they are socially constructed by institutions (Adler, 1998: 119). For Southern Africa, the setting up of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) as the SADC's security arrangement and the subsequent formulation of the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) as an enabling instrument for the implementation of the Organ's objectives (SIPO, 2004: 6), epitomise an attempt of such socially constructed institutions that can be used as vehicles for setting the region on the path of security community building. In establishing whether the OPDSC is an appropriate vehicle for bringing about a security community, this chapter seeks to transcend the neo-realist approach to security and adopt a constructivist paradigm to identify conditions under which a security community is developing, but also being retarded in the region.

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regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations".

Security community building practices include strengthening civil society and changing peoples' beliefs (Adler, 1998: 120-121) by inculcating common norms and common values. As Adler argues, "the creation and nurturing of civil society...is a necessary condition for the construction of a security community" (Adler, 1998: 130). However, the concept of civil society is a subject of scholarly debate since there is a lack of theoretical clarity underlying it. For example, liberals argue that civil society advocates the rule of law and collectively limit the power of the state. By contrast, Marx perceives the state as subordinate to civil society, operating in the realm of economic relations (Shaw and MacLean, 2001: 171). On the other hand, Hegel conceives of civil society as consisting of simply the formal recognition of individuals as property holders and parties to contract but not sufficient ethical community. Hegel undermines the moral priority of civil society within the liberal tradition by understanding states as the form of higher association and the ultimate ethical community which should rule and guide the civil society (Baker, 2003: 5).

Despite these different theoretical perspectives, the study will adopt a constructivist approach which conceives of civil society as incorporating a plethora of interactions between states and civil society actors "on a large variety of technical, practical and normative subjects" to provide "purpose, meaning and direction to security relations" both at domestic and regional levels (Adler, 120: 121). Civil society integrates a wide range actors, such as academics, religious groups, media, and women's groups, trade unions, human rights groups and so on (International Peace Academy, 2000: 5). These actors can collectively limit the power of states at both domestic and regional levels by transforming their "strategic practices, both behavioural and rhetorical" to promote collective identities (Adler, 1998: 120).

In the Southern African context, these actors are needed for monitoring security policies made by states and bringing in input into decision-making at domestic and regional levels thereby giving greater purpose, meaning and direction to security relations (Adler, 1998: 120-121). It is against this background that the Windhoek workshop, which involved civil society actors, convened shortly after the establishment of SADC to deliberate on redefining regional security. This was a clear indication of embracing cooperative security to create a sense of a community based on mutual trust and collective identity responsible for the emergence of security communities.

4.1 Contending Approaches by Policy-Makers, the Windhoek Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Political Cooperation.

The key event of attempts for building a security community in the region was the establishment of SADC in 1992. Not only did it focus on economic development, but it also took considerable measures to promote security cooperation. For example, in 1993, SADC's "programme of action[37] recommended a strategy for advancing regional security including the adoption of a wider definition of security; the establishment of a forum for mediation and arbitration and reducing the level of military expenditure" (Zacarias, 1998: 48). In line with reducing the level of military expenditure was the promotion of arms control agreements, military transparency and cooperation[38]. In other words, SADC placed itself on a path that conforms to the idea of cooperative security[39] in an attempt to promote levels of confidence and cooperation, the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, consolidation of justice and democracy and advancement of human rights (Adler, 1998: 132). In a sense, this was geared towards redressing the legacies of the apartheid military and political destruction in the region.

The formulation of regional policy measures to enhance peace and security between 1992 and 1993 was driven by the SADC Secretariat. Thus, in 1993, the Secretariat prepared the Framework and Strategy document which called for the forging of political values grounded on democratic values, the creation of a non-militarist security order and the establishment of a procedure that would help states to avoid, manage, and resolve conflict. The document stressed a "need to address non-military sources of conflict and threats to human security, such as underdevelopment and abuse of human rights" (Nathan, 2004: 5). This policy was formulated at the time when Southern Africa was besieged by a variety of formidable problems for which no direct regional remedies were in sight. At a domestic level, these included an "absence of effective governance, internal political and ethnic conflict, unstable civil-military relations, a proliferation of small arms in private hands; a large number of demobilised soldiers who are destitute; chronic underdevelopment and attendant poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; countless refugees and displaced people"(Nathan, 1995: 2). Here civil society actors were needed to help states and the region stabilise events.

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[37] The SADC programme of action was driven by the Secretariat who formulated strategies for advancing the regional security agenda that sought to adopt a people-centred approach to security. After 1993, these recommendations were rejected by SADC member states because some of them were thought to be intrusive and would impinge in their sovereignty (Cilliers, 1995: 40).

[38] The programme advocated the existence of robust and legitimate political and civil institutions to oversee and manage stable civil military relations and interaction between state and civil society over the formulation and implementation of defence policy (Williams, 1998: 36).

[39] For the definition of cooperative security see Chapter Two.

In this context, the most important event in this period was the SADC's Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security held in Windhoek in July 1994. In recognition of the widening of security, the workshop sought to move beyond the confines of a state-centred conception and included academics, human rights activists, ministers, officials and parliamentarians (Campbell, 1997: 7, Nathan, 2004: 5) in its deliberations. The importance of the workshop was that it provided an opportunity for SADC to redefine the idea of security "so that the security and the well-being of the peoples remains the primary focus" (Campbell, 1997: 5). The workshop was a clear indicator for a project which foresaw an emerging security community in Southern Africa that would transform regional security architecture and bring about a new security agenda in the region previously bedevilled by violent conflict.

With the collapse of apartheid and the attendant accession of South Africa to SADC, the SADC Summit in August 1994 decided to "disband the Frontline States as an entity which had served as the effective political arm of SADCC...and replace it with the framework for political and security cooperation" (Bischoff, 2001: 281). The move was made possible by the fact that the internal political transformation in South Africa had essentially changed "that country's regional security policy away from confrontation towards cooperation with and accommodation of the security interests of its neighbours" (Matlosa, 2001: 394).

As a result, the Windhoek workshop proposed that the area of Conflict Resolution and Political Cooperation should, akin to other areas of SADC work divided into sectors, be turned into a 'Sector' whose responsibility should be given to one SADC member state (Cilliers, 1999: 1). The proposal included setting up the Protocol on Peace, Security and Political Cooperation, the establishment of the SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and the formation of an independent Human Rights Commission (Nathan, 2004: 5). The formation of an independent human rights commission was a clear sign of the region's departure from state-centred neo-realist security concerns and signalled a move towards a human security perspective. It was geared towards setting up regional standards and norms "applicable both within each state and throughout the community" (Adler, 1998: 132).

Following the resolutions and recommendations which transpired from the workshop, the proposal was deferred "to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers in Botswana where many of the intrusive potentially prescriptive recommendations that could infringe upon the sovereignty of member countries, were abandoned" (Cilliers, 1995: 40). The sector idea would have allowed for security and development to be treated jointly by providing a robust linkage between the two and formulating compatible policies. More importantly, the setting up of a sector recommended by the Windhoek workshop was rebuffed by the delegates who decided to establish a wing for conflict prevention and mediation (Cillers, 1995: 40). Unlike a sector, the wing was intended to be an independent entity from other sectors of SADC, which essentially separates security from development and prioritises state security matters over developmental issues. These two parallel ideas become a source of dispute among SADC member states and weakened the security approach envisioned by the SADC Secretariat.

The preoccupation with sovereignty meant that from SADC's creation, member states were not prepared to render themselves accountable to one another in their internal affairs. As such, it became difficult, if not impossible for them to align their policies with that of a community despite the fact that SADC aimed at "setting out the task of promoting regional peace and stability to strengthen the foundation for prosperous peaceful community" (Sukma, 2003: 2). As such, state-centredness towards peace in the region remained the preserve of governments with little involvement of civil society. As a result, the subsequent meetings of SADC, such as the one held in Harare in March 1995 saw non-state actors and civil society actors no longer invited to assist in deliberations regarding regional security (Nathan, 2004: 5). This implied that instead of "marching down the road of political unification" with the objective of harnessing coordination and cooperation, it appeared that the SADC states "discarded the idea of becoming a security community...from the onset" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 169).

To reinforce state-centredness in security, the delegates at the meeting held in Harare on 3 March 1995 proposed the formation of a new entity: The Association of Southern African States (ASAS). ASAS was proposed because "many states did not support the anti-militarist stance and the democratic norms espoused by the SADC Treaty" (Nathan, 2004: 6, Cilliers, 1995: 40). The rejection of the democratic norms espoused by the treaty was a great blow to the establishment of an effective system of governance in Southern Africa both domestically and regionally. This was a clear indication that the important tenets of a security community such as the compatibility of democratic values and social learning were not on the agenda of SADC member states. It opened up the way for allowing a non-democratic Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to join the SADC without "knowledge necessary for imitation...about the workings of democracy and the rule of law" (Schimmelfenning, quoted in Adler, 1998: 133). Not only did the SADC ignore its own prerequisites for membership it also flouted the objectives of its own treaty, which provides for the evolution of "common political values, systems and institutions" (SADC Treaty, 1992).

When ASAS was proposed as an alternative to a sector in pursuit of the decision by SADC Foreign Ministers on March 3 1995 to establish a wing (Cilliers, 1995: 40), the bulk of the Windhoek proposals had already been toned down. In this context, ASAS considerably reduced[40] the role of non-state actors. Moreover, in tinkering with the Windhoek proposals, ASAS was put forward amid two mindsets: the statists, led by Zimbabwe, who supported military resolutions of conflict and the liberals, led by South, Africa who favoured non-military preventive diplomacy. The bone of contention around these opposing sets of ideas appeared to stem from the legal interpretation of the SADC Treaty (Goncalves, 1997: 40).

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[40] While the ASAS document provided for peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion and enhancement of the development of democratic institutions and practices and observance of human rights, it does not mention any involvement of non-state and civil society actors in these. This means the implementation of the document remain the prerogative of governments to the exclusion of the civil society.

While South Africa emphasised preventive diplomacy towards conflict resolution, it did not rule out taking into account military security concerns. According to Selebi, South Africa's approach to the security of Southern Africa is founded on three pillars: national security, human security and environmental security (Selebi, 1999: 6). Like many other states promoting reforms in the post-Cold War period, South Africa had discarded the narrow neo-realist interpretation of security dominant during the Cold War in favour the liberal approach (Hammerstad, 2005: 7). This was marked by "considerable demilitarisation" and the "abandoning of nuclear deterrence" (Cawthra, 1999: 1). It was founded on the legacy of apartheid which, acted as a source of human insecurity not only in South Africa itself, but across the entire Southern Africa region.

Overall, South Africa believes that "conflict can never be resolved through violence, but only through negotiations and agreements" (Hammerstad, 2005: 18). These ideas conform to the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of the SADC Treaty[41]. It is these principles and objectives that "provide content to the intention to move to a common system of political values, systems and institutions – a commitment which has thus far been sadly lacking among a number of SADC member states" (Malan and Cilliers, 1997: 1). This not withstanding, Zimbabwe interpreted the South Africa's own policy framework as a product of "ideological institutions which were deployed to unleash disinformation and psychological warfare" during the apartheid era and "have been restructured as peace institutions" (Campbell, 1997: 4). Zimbabwe challenged South Africa's liberal stance because this did not go along with the conservative neo-realist approach it espouses. The approach favours a narrow neo-realist interpretation of security as the military defence of regimes against internal and external attack (Hammerstad, 2005: 18). From basic misunderstanding and disagreement, the idea of the SADC as community in a Deutschian sense increasingly became highly questionable. It was the articulation of these politico-ideological differences that "precipitated the current crisis in SADC political and security cooperation" (Malan and Cilliers, as quoted in Ngoma, 2005: 146).

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[41] Article 4 of the SADC Treaty provides for the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law and peaceful settlements of dispute, while Article 5 provides for the sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment.

These politico-ideological differences constituted a serious setback in terms of creating mutual trust and forging a collective identity considered central for the emergence of security communities. The most fundamental problem that arose was the fact that when ASAS was proposed, Ministers of Defence and Police and Intelligence communities were not consulted in the formulation of such proposals (Cilliers, 1995: 41). While ASAS was to be guided by the principles of the Windhoek document, it was nevertheless to be "confined to issues of preventive diplomacy, conflict management/resolution, peace, stability and peacekeeping" (Matlosa, 2000: 41) undertaken by state actors. The extent to which ASAS allowed for non-state actors and civil society participation was systematically diluted and hampered the SADC Secretariat project for redefining regional security.

As mentioned above, from its inception the SADC Secretariat was responsible for formulating the regional policy on security and produced a wide-ranging strategy for redefining regional security. The ASAS proposal disempowered the Secretariat by undermining its original strategy. In terms of its structure, ASAS was to function independently from the SADC Secretariat and report directly to the SADC Heads of State and Government (Southall 1996: 1). It was to integrate two sectors, one concerned with political affairs and the other with military security (Cillers, 1999: 1). From this perspective, it may be argued that it was the dislocation of these two sectors from SADC's socio-economic agenda, which brought about the ambiguity that besieged the ASAS structure's role and status vis-à-vis SADC. This lack of commonly shared vision rendered ASAS stillborn (Matlosa, 2001: 408). In the face of it, the Windhoek workshop proposals suffered a serious setback in the initial phase of SADC's effort to establish a regional security arrangement.

4.2 The Battle for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

In August 1995, at the SADC Summit held in Johannesburg, some delegates, especially from South Africa were uncomfortable with the name ASAS and the idea that such sensitive sector would be assigned to individual member state on a permanent basis (Cilliers, 1999: 1-2). As Campbell puts it, ASAS "idea was met with hostile reviews from the South African media, which questioned the basis of the sovereignty which would accompany this association" (Campbell, 1997: 7). The main worry about sovereignty was that it would not allow for the participation of civil society actors in regional security matters, especially the resolution of conflict. In fact, after its accession to SADC in 1994, South Africa had drawn itself closer to playing "an increasingly significant role in the re-orientation of the region towards peace-making" (Bischoff, 2001: 282).

Because of the differing views among SADC member states, the final communiqué issued in the Johannesburg meeting in August 1995 no longer mentioned ASAS by name. Instead, Foreign Ministers requested time for more consultations among themselves and with ministers responsible for defence and security (Cillers, 1999: 2). This request was considered on 18 January 1996, at the meeting in Gaborone of the SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. The succeeding press statements confirmed the recommendation of the SADC Summit's new support for "the establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security which, would allow more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive potentially explosive situations"(Quoted in Cillers, 1999: 2). The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) was formalised through a communiqué in Gaborone in 1996[42] with President Mugabe as its Chair (Matlosa, 2001: 410, Breytenbach, 2000: 86). What remained clear with the formation of the OPDS was that military and security considerations still defined regional security (Campbell, 1997: 8) thus detracting from the spirit of the SADC Treaty. It meant that the possibility that regional disputes would be solved through peaceful means drawing on non-state actors by the region was to be more rhetoric than reality.

Like ASAS before it, the OPDS functioned within the framework of SADC. While the OPDS incorporated most of the principles and objectives of ASAS, there were some notable differences. These included the promotion of the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security, development of collective security by concluding a mutual defence pact and developing close cooperation between police and security services in the region (SADC Communiqué cited in Ngoma, 2005: 281). Despite these progressive changes the OPDS was handicapped by the fact that it was a compromise that sought to reconcile the differing views between SADC Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Defence, State Security and Public Security. As such, its defence and security committee has "played the dominant role in the regional security...the interpretation would be therefore that military security takes precedence over a more development oriented agenda" (Ngoma, 2005: 148). This clearly indicates that the OPDS did not make allowance for non-state actor participation.

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[42] President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, in his capacity as a chairperson wrote a letter to his SADC counterparts dated 14 May 1996 declaring that the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) has been established (Cilliers, 1999: 2).

While the Windhoek proposals were quite specific regarding the connection between development and security, this idea was unfortunately left out in the core framework of the negotiations of the Organ. The principle was "diluted, ignored, and even completely rejected, during the critical periods leading to the establishment of the Organ inputs were not sought from academics, conflict management, human rights practitioners and organs of civil society" (Tsie, 1998: 4). By snubbing the inputs from across the broader cross-sections of the society, the extent to which the Organ provided for participation of non-state forces was to be limited. In other words, OPDS was not open to marrying security with development and instead favoured a statist position in which military interpretations of security predominated and as such crowded out non-state centred interpretations of conflict and conflict resolution. Whereas the SADC Treaty stresses a need for peaceful settlement of disputes, democracy, peace and security, the truth confronting the region is an emphasis on the military solution to conflicts. "This does not only undermine constructive and sustainable management of conflicts, but further weakens democratic governance and retards economic development" (Matlosa, 2000: 40).

In terms of its structure and its place in the SADC, the Organ was to function at the summit or heads of state level. This meant that SADC would have two summits and, presumably two goals, namely, politico-security and economic development or integration (Leysens and Thompson, 2001: 58). Breytenbach notes, "What actually happened was that SADC was split into two socio-economic and the security legs...for example, one head of state would be in charge of SADC and another in charge of the Organ" (Breytenbach, 2000: 86-88). This impeded the functional capacity of the organ thereby causing confusion among member states. Instead, of resolving conflict, the launching of the Organ created continual antagonistic and recriminatory debates around the security's body structure[43] as manifestations of strategic and political differences among member states (Nathan, 2004: 6). Given this situation, a sense of a community that requires "members of a community to support the creation of institutions and procedures which are capable of ensuring peaceful change" (Hodges, 1978: 244) was obstructed. This means that the constructivist notion of collective identity formation and the attendant transnational convergence of domestic values (Wendt, 1997: 390) which constitute the foundation for security community building were not considered.

By the second half of 1997, just about 15 months after its inception and at the time of the crisis in Lesotho and the DRC, the Organ continued to encounter problems on how to function effectively. It all revolved around the ambiguity about the position of the chair of the Organ, its functional independence, and operational procedures in regard to the resolution of conflict (Breytenbach, 2000: 85). This explains why on the emergence of new conflicts in Lesotho and the DRC, there was no structural mechanism to deal with them (Breytenbach, 2000: 89). For example, in September 1998, the Lesotho government requested assistance from South Africa to reinstate law and order following election related unrest. South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily, ostensibly under the auspices of SADC (Neethling, 2004: 7). However, the intervention was criticised since the OPDS had not been used and was not functioning at the time whilst, the SADC Treaty did not make allowance for the use of 'SADC troops' (Breytenbach, 2000: 92).

The most defining moment as regards to the disagreement amongst SADC member states was the outbreak of broad-based conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which had joined SADC in 1997. On 2 August 1998, rebel forces of

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[43] For South Africa, the gist of the argument was that the SADC Treaty did not provide for an independently constituted SADC Summit. South African's stance was seemingly not to dispute the idea of SADC chair for the Organ per se, both at heads of state level. Rather its major concern was the fact that "if the organ was to deal with political matters, the SADC summit would eventually play a secondary fiddle". South Africa argued that there was a need for a single integrated regional cooperation mechanism (Cilliers, 1999: 2). Accordingly, conflict management was too important to be the responsibility of a single member state (Neethling, 2000: 5). In response, Zimbabwe's contended that SADC was a donor-funded economic body and for that reason the Southern African region could not delegate its political and security responsibilities to it (Neethling, 2004: 5). As such, the Organ should operate independently from other SADC structures, which include the SADC Summit. For Zimbabwe, this would allow for an ad hoc flexible approach in response to unpredictable situations occurring in the region (Soderbaum, 2001: 107).

Congolese Rally for Democracy, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, instigated a revolt against the DRC government (Nathan, 2004: 12). Subsequently, the DRC government appealed to SADC for military and political assistance. Nathan writes, "On 8 August 1998 Zimbabwe convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of states from a number of African countries". At this meeting, South Africa was excluded as a chair of SADC, ostensibly because of strained relations between itself and Zimbabwe (Nathan, 2004: 12). The difference of opinion regarding the resolution of the DRC conflict demonstrates that SADC is not integrated as a community in a Deutschian sense.

Because of the lack of unity among SADC member states, cooperative security practices that offer a means of dealing with security problems, such as conflict avoidance through preventive diplomacy, designed as the process of community building (Adler, 1998: 136) were ignored. The absence of these practices led to Zimbabwe's decision to deploy troops in the DRC, backed by Namibia and Angola. While the justification provided for the deployment of troops was the notion of a collective defence against the alleged invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda, the SADC Treaty did not provide for collective defence. Although another claim was that the deployment was authorised by the SADC Organ, the Organ itself was not effectively operational at the time (Nathan, 2004: 13). The conflict in the DRC effectively incapacitated diplomatic unity within the SADC and considerably marred future chances of deepened regional cooperation. In this respect, Ngoma assumes that "rather than a uniform drive towards a security community, the region appeared to take a disjointed one" (Ngoma, 2005: 160).

The emergence of the broad-based Congolese war and attempts to solve it illustrated the lack of coordinated response to conflict. As mentioned above, it was also a manifestation of politico-ideological divisions between South Africa and Zimbabwe with different values and priorities being pursued. In the one, camp there is a militarist block, dominated by Zimbabwe preferring military solution and on the other there are those who favour political and diplomatic options for conflict management dominated by South Africa (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 50). The South Africa's camp comprising Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, stood for a human security approach and conceived of the Organ as a platform "whose primary basis for multilateral cooperation and peacemaking would be political rather than military" (Nathan, 2004:

7). Zimbabwe's camp, comprising Angola and Namibia challenged South Africa's human security approach in the peace and security field (Hammerstad, 2005: 18), in favour of a mutual defence pact which prioritises military cooperation in response to conflict (Nathan, 2004: 7). These and other contentious issues demonstrated a deep-seated contestation of power, authority and influence, among member states (Matlosa, 2000: 40). It clearly shows that the region suffered from the low intensity of trust and collective identity, considered to be the entrenched pillars upon which security communities may emerge (Ngoma, 2005: 2). The fundamental difference centred on whether there was a relationship between the conception of security and development. These differences lie at the bottom of South Africa and Zimbabwe's policy orientations and became apparent in some of the broader strategic positions of their foreign policy formulation, conduct and practices (Rupiya, 2002: 2) during the Congolese war.

The signing the defence pact[44] in Luanda on 8 April 1999 between Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo exemplified the intrinsic divisions within SADC countries[45]. It worked against Adler and Barnett's first tier model for the emergence of security communities which, requires member states to coordinate their foreign policies as a confidence-building measure. Madanza persuasively argues that the pact stood in stark contrast to the position of South Africa on the subject of collective security in general, and the DRC in particular (Mandaza, 2001: 6). This clearly points towards a lack of policy coordination. According to Zimbabwe, it was "superfluous and hypocritical of South African government and its apologists to advocate a strict adherence to early warning and diplomatic solution to SADC conflicts" (Tapfumaneyi, quoted in Nathan, 2004: 17). To understand the policy issues of South Africa and Zimbabwe and how these influence the security situation in Southern African, it is important to look at each country's disposition separately.

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[44] The Pact provided for mutual military assistance between the four states; affirmed support for the Angolan government against the UNITA rebels; expressed the firmest support for the legitimate government of the DRC, while condemning Rwanda and Uganda for invading the DRC; and urged the other member countries of SADC to provide "political, diplomatic, and material" assistance to the Angolan government, while reminding SADC as a whole that the organization had adopted a resolution in September, 1998, declaring Savimbi a "war criminal"(Madaza, 2001: 6).

[45] The Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and DRC defence pact does not have any relations with the SADC mutual defence pact adopted in 2003. This was purely a military alliance between these three states which had nothing to do with SADC.

South Africa espouses a neo-liberal civil society-centred foreign policy that perceives security and development as being interwoven. With this policy, South Africa is not likely to deviate from the SADC Treaty[46]. Building on the aggressive legacy of the apartheid state, the South African foreign policy is founded on the conviction that the integrates of human rights, norms, solidarity, politics and development needs (Chhabra, 1997: 53) are part and parcel of security. For South Africa, the "most profound of all the choices relating to national security, is therefore, the trade off with liberty...two quite distinct values of human development" (Ullman, 1983: 131). This forms the basis of South African approach for resolution of conflict in the region.

Zimbabwe's foreign policy is underlined by a realist state-centred tendency that separates development from security. In the words of Keohane and Nye, the "high politics" of military security dominates the "low politics" of economic and social affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24). Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwe's foreign policy takes a divergent position from the SADC Treaty and considers it as counterproductive to any effort to "imprison the Organ in the SADC Treaty" (Nathan, 2004: 7). In terms of security, Zimbabwe prioritises "a definition that assumes the basic primacy of political variables in determining a degree of security that states and regimes enjoy" (Ayoob, 1991: 259). Such variables include values such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence. These values are suggestive of the fact that different types of vulnerability, including economic, social and ecological dimensions are only subsumed under this definition of security when they become sensitive "enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions or regime survival" (Ayoob, 1991: 259).

4.3 Restructuring the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

At the end of the 1990s, it became evident that the effectiveness of the OPDS as the regional security structure had been submerged by numerous institutional and political problems since its inception in 1996. This impasse compelled SADC leaders to find ways of restructuring the Organ (Neethling, 2004: 1). The purpose of a restructuring

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[46] Article of the SADC 4 Treaty directs member states to observe, democracy, human rights and the rule of law and peaceful settlement of disputes, while Article 5 provides for the achievement of development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.

process was to attend to the outstanding issues that had paralysed the Organ since its formation. The main issues of contention centred on different conceptions of security between the central players South Africa and Zimbabwe, who could not agree on the status of the Organ's Chairman, the position of its Summit and its place within SADC (Breytenbach, 2000: 89, Leysens and Thompson, 2001: 59). Potentially, this opened the window of opportunity for the SADC to rearrange itself and plant the "seeds of peaceful change" (Adler, 1998: 119) in its security structure to make it more accommodative to civil society actors.

Tsie reminds us that the fundamental point of departure for restructuring the OPDS was the July 1994 Windhoek proposals, particularly their recognition of the importance of "involving all the stakeholders in regional security and peace, not just the military, police and intelligence agencies" (Tsie, 1998: 4). However, the restructuring process was entirely an intergovernmental exercise. It was proposed at the extraordinary meeting of the SADC heads of state and government held in Maputo on 2 March 1998. As a result, the committee made up of the Presidents of Mozambique, Malawi and Namibia was mandated to look into ways of ending the SADC Organ standoff (Breytenbach, 2000: 89, Matlosa, 2001: 410, Leysens and Thompson, 2001: 59). The committee was expected to thoroughly examine the problem and prepare a report in the context of its findings (Matlosa, 2001: 410). The report came up with a number of recommendations; the most prominent among these were that the chairman of the SADC Summit should be the chairman of the Organ, and that the chair of SADC should rotate on the annual basis. But, for reasons not stipulated, heads of state and government did not approve these recommendations and most surprisingly the committee's report was not tabled either at Mauritius or the 1999 Maputo Summits (Matlosa, 2001: 410). Another review committee made up of Mozambique, Namibia, Malawi and Zimbabwe was established whose terms of reference[47] were approved by the Council of Ministers meeting in Mbabane, Swaziland, in February 2000. The progress report for this meeting was tabled at the

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[47] In preparation for the extraordinary ministerial meeting, a working session of officials from Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe assembled in Pretoria from 29 September to 1 October 1999 to prepare the terms of reference. These included the appropriate SADC Organ structure, refining the protocol, drafting the mutual defence pact, and the permanency of the Secretariat (Cilliers, 1999: 8).

Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia in August 2001; and the final report[48] was agreed at an extra-ordinary summit on 9 March 2001 (Landesberg, 2002: 9).

During the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Namibia on 9 March 2001, the proposals for the restructuring of the Organ were considered and an agreement was reached that the operations and functions of the Organ should be regulated by the Protocol on Politics Defence and Security. It was agreed that the integration of the Organ into SADC structures and coordination at the Summit level on the Troika basis reporting to the Chairperson of the Summit. The Summit also considered that the Chairperson of the Organ rotate annually (2001 SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit Communiqué). South Africa was also instrumental in influencing the restructuring of the OPDS by advancing a multilateral approach in resolving regional conflict. It hosted several inter-Congolese dialogues and peace summits, which commenced in 1999. By brokering peace and resolving conflict South Africa diplomatically outmanoeuvred the Zimbabwe militarist alliance and became instrumental in fostering new value systems and culture as far as regional institutions are concerned (Matheba, 2003: 27). The restructuring process was legitimised by the signing of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in Blantyre, Malawi, in 2001 (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 44). While the OPDSC seems to be more progressive than its predecessors, in terms of asserting the region as a security community, it is effectively paralysed by the affirmation of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.

4.4 The Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) Since 2001

With the reforms of 2001, SADC's leaders had clearly realised the importance of maintaining peace and security and promoting democratisation and democratic governance (Landesberg, 2002: 6). The OPDSC differs to some extent from the OPDS in that whereas the OPDS was established by a communiqué, the OPDSC was established by Protocol and has a constitution. The most important development was that OPDSC lost its former independence and formally became an integral part of

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[48] In April 2001, the review committee presented its report on the restructuring of SADC institutions. The key areas of focus were: the objectives and common agenda of SADC, strategic priorities, institutional reforms, management systems, resource mobilisation, admission of new members, implementation of reforms and cost estimates for the new SADC structure (Landesberg, 2002: 9).

SADC[49]. The significance of this is that it was incorporated into the socio-economic agenda of SADC. Another difference is that the OPDSC set up mechanisms for the implementation of its objectives such as the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ[50] (SIPO).

Article 10 (1) of the OPDSC Protocol recognises that "political, defence and security matters transcend national and regional boundaries" and encourages the significance of cooperating with non-state actors (Solomon, 2005: 3). In this context the OPDSC appears to be more progressive than its predecessors ASAS and OPDS for two reasons. First, it strengthens the notions of broader, expanded and integrated forms of regional security. This clearly indicates that security and development are no longer separated. Second, one member state will no longer misuse the Organ for national reasons as was noticed in the decision to intervene in the DRC (Solomon, 2005: 3). In this context SADC was expected to become more coordinated in structure and policy. As constructivists put it, there is a degree of reciprocity between the structure and policy in the sense that while structures shape the behaviour of social and political actors and provide valuable insights that inform their interests, such structures would not exist outside the well-informed practices of actors, that is policy-makers (Reus-Smit, 2001: 218).

The restructured OPDSC Protocol resolved some of the hotly disputed structural issues, such as the position of the Organ and its relationship with other institutions of SADC (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 47). It allowed for consultations in the decision making process between the Summit and the Troika[51] and directs the Organ to report directly to the Summit under the leadership of the Troika. The OPDSC Protocol also allows for non-state actors and civil society participation in so far as it pledges to cooperate with the actors in matters pertaining to regional security[52]. This seeks to provide a link with the developmental concerns of the SADC proper and has it resemble the making of a security community.

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[49] Article 3(1) of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation provides that the OPDSC is an institution of SADC and shall report to the Summit.

[50] Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ is a mechanism that provides general guidelines that spell out specific activities in accordance with the Protocol's objectives, and strategies for their realisation. It provides the way forward through appropriate strategies in the field of defence, politics, public security and state security. SIPO also provides an institutional framework for the day to day implementation of the activities of the Organ (The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 2004).

[51] As provided for in Article 3 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the Troika consists of the chairperson of the Organ, the incoming chairperson who also assumes the position of the deputy chairperson of the Organ and the outgoing chairperson.

In an attempt to implement the objectives of the OPDSC in 2001, the Summit instructed the Ministerial Committee of the OPDSC to develop the regional Strategic Indicative Plan (SIPO) that would address the strategic priorities in terms of operationalising the Organ. The core objective of SIPO revolves around creating "a peaceful and stable political and security environment within which the region will endeavour to realise its socio-economic objectives" (SADC Summit Final Communiqué, 2004: 1). This was finally approved by the Heads of State at the Summit held in Dar-es-Salaam in 2003 and officially launched in Mauritius in August 2004 (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 49). While SIPO intends to operate within the framework of four sectors including defence, politics, public security and state security, more emphasis will be put on the defence sector because it is the most prioritised of all the sectors. However, the implementation of the objective of OPDSC through SIPO seems difficult due to the affirmation of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the Protocol.

4.5 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO)

The SIPO aspires to function in accordance with Article 4 and Article 5 of the SADC Treaty[53]. It is the mechanism that seeks to inculcate the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; it also intends to strengthen common values and a common culture within SADC member states. As the preceding argument demonstrates, the intention of the OPDSC through SIPO is to promote trust and reciprocity among SADC member states not only by coordinating policies, but by ensuring their implementation. This opens the way for increasing institutional capacity that would provide effective management systems, resource mobilisation and institutional reforms directed to the areas of the objectives and the common agenda of SADC (Landsberg, 2002: 9). SIPO has also realised that resource mobilisation requires partnerships with extra-regional actors such as the World Bank, IMF, and UN to mention but a few, to cope with effective performance in the field of "peace support and humanitarian operations, disaster management and...building capacity in the area of preventive diplomacy peace and security" (SIPO, 2004: 6). These institutions play a part in creating security communities by attaching some conditionalities to the adherence to a particular system of political and economic management issues, which have impact on peace and security (Ngoma, 2005: 2).

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[52] Article 10 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation recognises that political, defence and security matters transcend national and regional boundaries as such "cooperation in these matters between State Parties and Non-state Parties and between states Parties and organisations other than SADC shall be accepted".

[53] Article 4 provides for the observance of "human rights, democracy and the rule of law as principles guiding its members. Article 5 (b) directs member states to "promote political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic legitimate and effective". Sub-section (c) of Article 5 provides for the consolidation, defence and maintenance of democracy, peace, security and stability (SADC Treaty, 1992).

With this in mind, there is a sense in which SIPO provides an avenue for non-state actors and civil society in matters relating to security and development. This paves the way for regional bodies such as SADC Parliamentary Forum which, also "promotes peace, security and stability...by supporting development of conflict resolution mechanisms"[54]. Taking this into account it may be assumed that, at least on paper, SIPO meets some of the criteria for security community building by promoting mutual trust and guaranteeing the dependable expectation of "peaceful change" (Deutsch, cited in Ngoma, 2005: 8).

To put its intentions into effect, SIPO requires an effective system of governance as a mechanism for intervention by SADC member states. Although SADC's leaders have restructured the OPDSC and created SIPO for the effective implementation of its objectives, they stopped short of empowering it in terms of binding "values, norms...the stuff regional community-building is made of" (Landesberg, 2002: 6). Adler uses the concept of an 'accountability norm' to account for this state of affairs and argues that a 'mutual accountability norm' replaces the norm of non-intervention (Adler, 1998: 2001). This means that the accountability norm permeates the boundaries of states. However, SIPO as a sub-structure of the OPDSC subscribes to the non-intervention norm. As a result, the partial surrender of sovereignty it advocates appears neither foreseeable nor sought-after. Under these circumstances it is difficult, if not impossible, for SIPO to translate its programmes into the reality.

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[54] Constitutions of the SADC parliamentary Forum, 2001.

On the political front, SIPO intends to promote political cooperation through the evolution of common political values (SIPO 2004: 18). However, this depends on the level of democratisation, since the process puts down political groundwork for increased transparency on which "more specific confidence building measures are built" (Hurrell, 1998: 244). SIPO is quite specific about this since the legal groundwork is laid down in the SADC Treaty and in the OPDSC Protocol. However, "the political will to fully implement these arrangements lags behind" (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 46). Political will requires a certain convergence of values serving as an important factor for binding an otherwise diverse group (Archarya, 1998: 207).

Despite the wave of democratisation that swept across Southern Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War with Namibia attaining independence in 1990, the advent of multi-party democracy in Zambia in 1991 and the first democratic elections in South Africa (Gasa, 2004: 8), the region still lags behind in terms of democratisation, with states limited to using general presidential elections and 'multipartyism'[55] as the only tools for measuring democratisation (Gasa, 2004: 9). While these are core features of democracy they are not sufficient in themselves. The key long-term requirement is the development of common values and standards that set up "a political foundation for increased transparency on which more specific confidence-building measures are built" (Hurrell, 1998: 244). Seen in this light, democratic norms support the creation of civil societies which also uphold community bonds and common identity and trust (Acharya, 1998: 199) that in turn engender the dependable expectations of peaceful change. This could help prevent the democratic process being tilted in favour of the ruling parties. Here, the SADC Parliamentary Forum can be of value if effectively utilised.

On the security front, SIPO aspires to operationalise the defence sector in collaboration with the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee[56] (ISDSC). Here, the prioritisation of the military approach to security is quite clear. The ISDSC as a military-oriented institutional operational arm for the OPDSC has provided an outlet and opportunity (Leysens and Thompson, 2003: 58) for state-centred security conception. The deliberations of security matters in the ISDSC is dominated by members of the security forces including the military, police and intelligence agencies, who are intrinsically suspicious of the participation of the civil society in regional security matters (Tsie, 1998: 5). Their main preoccupation in the conflict prevention and management revolves around the conduct of peace support operations through regional peacekeeping training. For example, a string of joint peace support exercises such as the exercise Blue Hungwe, Blue Crane and Tanzanite have been carried out (SIPO, 2004: 6).

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[55] South Africa is the only country in the Southern African region that has gone beyond elections and multipartyism, which are so far being used as the only measuring tools for democracy in the region. Politically, South Africa leads the way in the field of good governance, human rights and peaceful resolution of conflict. Botswana and Mauritius are the only other SADC countries following on the path of South Africa with a "relatively stable and well-functioning democratic system" (Hammerstad, 2005: 14).

[56] Established as a sub-structure of Frontline States, the ISDSC served as an advisory body and implemented decisions and resolutions of the FLS Summit meetings. When the FLS was disbanded the ISDSC was retained (Cilliers, 1999: 1).

With the ISDSC, SIPO seeks to operationalise the SADC Mutual Defence Pact[57] by promoting and disseminating the pact within member states' institutions. The aim is to develop a collective security capacity to respond to external military threats (SIPO, 2004: 27). Understood in this context, the pact clearly reproduces a neo-realist reading of security in Southern Africa with the perceived external threats acting as a catalyst for states' cooperation that usually serves as a tenet of realist theory of alliances (Acharya, 1998: 203). By extrapolation, the pact reduces all security matters in the region to an external threat while at the same time protecting member states from external criticism in terms of human rights abuses and political repression committed within states. It does so by directing member states to "respect one another's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and in particular observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of one another" (SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003: 3).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the end of the Cold War followed by the demise of the apartheid regime as a destabilising factor in the region meant the decline of the external catalysing threat. This is clearly supported by the existing literature, heavily neo-realist in orientation, that deals mostly with the alliances origins, membership and their successes in protecting member states, and which presupposes that alliances falter in the absence of the threat (McCalla, 1996). A typical example for Southern Africa is the dissolution of the Frontline States after the collapse of apartheid and the resultant democratic elections in South Africa. With the disappearance of an external threat in Southern Africa, the defence pact raises a number of questions. The most intriguing one is whether the idea of a defence pact "... stems from pervasive fears among ruling elite about their own stability" (Barnett and Gause III, 1998: 191). In reality, most insecurities and conflicts emanate from within states (Ayoob, 1991: 263). Here the role of SIPO is to propel the region towards a security community with its security perceptions geared towards addressing internal instabilities, conflict prevention and conflict management within the SADC grouping.

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[57] According to Article 2 the Pact its main function is to advance mutual cooperation in the areas of defence in security in the southern African region.

4.6 Evaluating the OPDSC's Prospects for Transforming the Region into a Security Community

The institutional restructuring of the OPDSC through SIPO requires a high level of commitment and trust as well as creating the environment favourable for its effective implementation. In most part, the effectiveness of policies largely depends on their implementation in which the intentions of the policy-maker are truly tested (Makoa, 2004: 72). From this viewpoint, it could be argued that while SADC is good at making inspiring policies and adopting impressive-sounding norms, it is weakened by its inability to ensure that outcomes and practices of such initiatives match their creation. Whereas norms such as democracy, governance, peace and security have attained currency in the SADC protocols and communiqués, efforts to realise them in practice stop short of meeting the challenge for creating an effective regional community (Ladesberg, 2002:4). Specifically, most SADC Protocols[58] including the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation are "still a declaration of intent" rather than reflective of objective conditions that could help transform the region into a security community (Sukma, 2003: 3).

In sum, SADC does not have a record of doing well in terms of implementing decisions, and reducing its inherent disparity between formulating and adopting norms and values and realising them in practice. This has often resulted in a failure to meet most of its impressive policy objectives (Landsberg, 2002: 2). While the establishment of SIPO is regarded as a positive effort to bring about a sustainable security in the region, it sadly lacks empirical content. Measured against Adler's enabling conditions elaborated in chapter 4, the environment in which SIPO is to operate does not provide a favourable climate. For example, there is a conflict between Adler's notion of the accountability norm which renders states accountable to one another for their actions, and the non-interference principle entrenched in the OPDSC Protocol. The non-interference norm does not allow for effectiveness and weakens states from connecting compliance with stated norms (Adler, 1998: 135). With the non-interference norm, the main preoccupation of SIPO still remains the military form of security in the region that prioritises the defence pact over other equally important issues such as economic and environmental security.

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[58] Article 2 (2) (c) of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation clearly provides for common evolution of political values and institutions while Article 5 of the SADC Treaty also seeks to promote common political value systems and other shared values transmitted through institutions which are democratic legitimate and effective.

The defence sector as such remains inherently state-centred and "dominated by orthodox military thinking" (Soderbaum, 2001: 109). It does not seem to bring any substantial progress in terms of propelling the region towards the level of a security community. Clearly, the main objective of this sector is to build a capacity for member states to anticipate and prevent conflict to promote national security and freedom of such states to exercise sovereignty and maintain order and stability (Makoa, 2003: 98). There are a number of reasons with which one can substantiate this assertion. One of those reasons is that the dynamics at play in the region do not lend credence to the possibility of foreign aggression. Despite the rhetoric of foreign aggression, the sense of insecurity that most states experience in Southern Africa originates within their boundaries rather than from outside (Ayoob, 1991: 263). The question that merits attention at this point is where, in the context of post-Cold War and post-apartheid Southern Africa, the external threat is meant to originate from (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 9). The issue of an external threat is merely intended as a diversion of focus away from elites' interests, whilst the main preoccupation within states remains basically "internal threats to the security of their structures and to regimes themselves" (Ayoob, 263). In general, the prospects for transforming the region into a security community therefore remain predicated upon softening the notion of sovereignty to allow for non-state actors in conflict resolution and conflict management.

5.0 HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY THINKING

Chapter Four discussed an attempt by the Southern African region to assert itself as a security community from the early 1990s up to the present. The Windhoek Workshop proposals served as a point of departure for merging regional security with development thereby bringing about processes and developments associated with human security. As a result, "more progress in community-building was expected" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 162). However, many of the obstacles to sustainable security and cooperation became quite recognisable and included "possessive sovereignty" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 182), a lack of compatibility of values, mutual trust, political will and weak institutions. SADC was indeed overwhelmed by a multitude of obstacles, which clearly paralysed its institutional and functional capacity. As such, the objective of this chapter is an attempt to promote the reorientation of its regional security architecture from one that is neo-realist in perspective towards one which adopts a constructivist agenda of human security and advocates the development of collective norms that make up the social identities of actors (Risse, 2000: 5) in the region.

5.1 Human security defined

In the SADC region, human security thinking should decidedly not be viewed through the lens of neo-realist foreign policies, but in the context of a constructivist approach that calls for common values and norms that can bring different state and non-state actors in the region together. The strength of the new security thinking framework is contingent upon the SADC's ability to institutionalise human security elements in its political and military decision-making. Hapson and Hay argue that there is a rising appreciation of the importance of human security in the areas of democratisation, peace-building, conflict prevention, refugees and migration and human rights promotion (Hapson and Hay, 2002: 3). They offer three distinct conceptions of human security that characterise current debates and thinking about the subject.

The first one is a natural rights law conception of human security; anchored in deep-seated liberal assumptions of basic individual rights associated with life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. A second view is humanitarian in the sense that it includes international efforts to expand and reinforce international law, especially in regard to genocide and war crimes and eliminates weapons that are dangerous to civilians and non-combatants. The third view proposes that human security should be broadly constructed to take account of economic, environmental, social and other forms of harms (Hapson and Hay, 2002: 4-5). All these different perspectives are of value and therefore relevant for redefining security in Southern Africa towards human security.

For the purpose of this study, human security is defined as a "shift in perspective or reorientation that takes people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on security of territories or governments" (Axworthy, as quoted in Handingam, 2000: 155). It is the approach that is for the most part concerned with addressing insecurities by placing the human subject at the core of its analytical focus. The United Nations Development Project (UNDP) coined the idea of human security in 1994. In doing so, the organisation moved away from the neo-realist traditional definition of security. Whereas this traditional definition of security meant the security of territories from external aggression or protection of national interests (Lawson, 2003: 90), excluded from this definition were the more primary concerns of ordinary people who desperately needed security in the conduct of their daily lives[59] (Lawson, 2003: 90). In this context, the UNDP has provided SADC as a development-centred organisation with a framework to move beyond the state-centred approach to security "towards a more coordinated, transparent, norm-based and institutionalised structure" (Soderbaum, 2001: 108). As a consequence, there is a need for SADC to reform its regional security structures to make them more accommodating of the idea of human security.

Selebi recognises the importance of the idea of human security in Southern Africa by arguing that viable, democratic and open nation states that are people-centred are fundamentally indispensable conditions for any effort to achieve sustainable security in the region (Selebi, 1999: 3). According to him, only such human rights-based nation states are capable both individually and collectively as a region of engaging the overwhelming challenges of sources of insecurity. Any attempt that addresses regional security on the basis of national security only, "without paying an adequate attention to human and environmental security, will fail to address the basic cause of conflicts and instability that afflict parts of the region. Only integrated and holistic treatment of these facets of...security is capable of ensuring long-term sustainable development, peace and security in southern Africa" (Selebi, 1999: 3).

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[59] As such, the UNDP offered the notion of human security an empirical content by encouraging states to redirect resources from military spending towards the development agenda (Axworthy, as cited in Hadingam, 2000: 155, Poku and Edge, 2001: 2) such as housing, education and social projects.

5.2 The Significance of the Human Security Agenda in Southern Africa

The significance of the human security agenda in Southern Africa goes along with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. With South Africa, which served as a source of insecurity in the region venturing, on a transition from a white minority regime to an inclusive constitutional democracy, a change of regional security structure became a necessity (Landesberg, 2002: 5). It was because of the search for a new security agenda and a more organised political and security community that regional states signed the Declaration of the Treaty of Windhoek in 1992 to establish SADC (Landesberg, 2002: 5). However, despite the incorporation of human dimensions of security in the SADC Treaty[60], member states have not carried out this broader reorientation for several reasons. Firstly, the preoccupation with state security continues to obscure the difference between the state, popular interests and diversity of values. Secondly, internal conflicts, intra-state and inter-state migration and environmental problems are not dealt with under the security policies and interests of nation-states (Poku and Graham, 2000: 9).

The application of this traditionally conditioned definition of the concept of security to the Southern African situation and its practical application through SADC ought to be transcended intellectually and practically. This is so because a sense of insecurity originates from within the boundaries of the states rather than from outside and pervades the region. Although this does not rule out the existence of external threats, the assumption is that "where external threats do exist they often attain salience primarily because of insecurities and conflicts that abound...within states" (Ayoob, 1991: 263). The conflict in the DRC after 1997 and its resultant spillover to the neighbouring countries, as well political instability in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998,

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[60] Article 4 of the SADC Treaty commits member states to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The observance of these principles is a necessary condition for the achievement of security and development in the region.

Malawi 2004, Zambia 1991, Swaziland from 1994 to the present and, more importantly, in Zimbabwe after 2000 bear a testimony to these insecurities. Despite the fact that these engender negative spillover, SADC is unable to address this paralysis.

Given the aforementioned situation, it is important to look at security in Southern Africa through "fresh eyes" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 285). To achieve these, embracing binding norms and common values is a preliminary requirement that can raise a regional profile in terms of emancipatory human security. A concept of emancipation means assigning a priority to the freedom of people as individuals or groups (Booth, 1991: 318-319). However, the proposed human security agenda does not ignore or downplay the continuing relevance of state security; it seeks to transform the regional security structure to find a trade-off between state security and other non-state forms of security.

The trade-off is needed because during the Cold War and apartheid destabilisation, realist security thinking accorded primacy to the military power and the preservation of the status quo, which brought about human insecurity and regional instability. As a replacement for these realist state-centred values informing regional security, a more secure foundation is human security, which amounts to "the pursuit of emancipation since it encourages focus on the people, justice and change" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 297). Booth and Vale see emancipation as one of the powerful forces of the twentieth century. They cite the end of apartheid as the most spectacular event in the history of Southern Africa for the reason that the oppressed majority in South Africa tirelessly worked with progressive international forces in search of its universal emancipation from racism (Booth and Vale, 1995: 297). It is this situation that brought Southern Africa to the threshold of a security community.

5.3 Non-Military Sources of Insecurity in Southern Africa

It was argued earlier in this chapter that security in the context of Southern Africa is not only related to military dimensions as is often assumed in the Western realist explanations, but to dimensions already taken care of in the West (Ayoob, 1991: 259). These include the persistent incidence of poverty, underdevelopment, ethnic strife, enforced population movements and environmental degradation that render the long term security of nation states in the region beyond reach (Selebi, 1999: 3). A critical examination of these non-military sources of security is discussed at length below.

5.3.1 Political Instability

Efforts to attain some level of human security in the region are hampered by continuing political instability. The region has experienced election-related disturbances between opposition parties and the ruling governments. As Matlosa persuasively argues, "this conflict adversely affects the democratic consolidation process, for it brings about the contested legitimacy and the credibility of the state and the acceptability of the rules of the game" (Matlosa, 2004: 4). In Zimbabwe, the conflict has occurred between the opposition MDC and the ruling ZANU-PF; in Malawi between Malawi Young Pioneers and the Muluzi government; in Mozambique between Renamo and the central government, in Zambia between the MMD and UNIP; in the DRC between government forces supported by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola and rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda; in Swaziland, the struggle for democracy has run up against a traditionally repressive monarchy; in Lesotho, the military involvement have been a continuing focus on internal politics for years (Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 199). In Angola, while the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi inspired hope for many Angolans, it is apparent that "necessary conditions for democratic elections are not yet in place" (Mashele, 2003: 18). "By the criteria listed above, it is therefore equally doubtful whether Southern Africa could constitute a security community" (Solomon, and Cilliers, 1997). Over and above, "it is important national coherence, consensus, political stability, and political unity exist within the different states, so that regional cooperation can be successfully conducted…"(Nkiwane, 1995: 3).

Despite the fact that multiparty elections are on the increase in the region, political instability has not been adequately addressed. In Zimbabwe, for example, the severity of human rights abuses has increased with the rise of a strong opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) after 2000. The situation has included direct and partisan involvement by formal state institutions including the army and the police (Human Rights Watch, 2001) in human rights abuses. Southern African states have been mere spectators in the political process while democratic values, human rights, and good governance were being manifestly subverted by a member state. This serves as a testimony that SADC is not prepared to institute sanctions against members who violate democratic values. Instead of responding to international disapproval of the situation in Zimbabwe, the ISDSC "expressed serious concern on the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some member states, especially Zimbabwe which has embarked on the agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty" (ISDSC Final Communiqué, 9 August, 2002). The situation shows that in the region democracy is purchased at the expense of maintaining a posture of unity and solidarity (Nathan, 2004: 3-4). It clearly attests to the preoccupation with state sovereignty and non-interference principles in the region. Nathan argues, "Far from remaining silent, SADC repeatedly expressed solidarity with the Zimbabwe government and condemned sanctions imposed on it by United States and European Union (EU)" (Nathan, 2004: 11).

Apart from Zimbabwe, human rights activists have further pressed SADC to take action against Swaziland's repressive monarchy. In Swaziland, the monarchy maintains control over public and private institutions, civil liberties are basically non-existent and civil society is severely restricted (Afrol News, 2001:1). Political opposition parties have been barred from operating since April 1973 when the late King Sobhuza II suspended the constitution (Maroleng, 2003: 2). Swaziland has effectively operated under a state of emergency since 1973. While SADC intervened diplomatically in 1996 to persuade the Swazi monarchy to push for new constitutional reforms, the situation has not yet changed (Southscan, 1996: 231). With the new draft constitution in place in 2002, the King still retains executive powers and controls the judiciary. Despite this diplomatic intervention, the Swazi government introduced a repressive internal security act in 2002 which provides for harsh penalties for anyone participating in political demonstrations (Maroleng, 2003: 3). All these conditions militate against the development of sustainable peace and security in Southern Africa.

In Mozambique, while the civil war ended in 1992 and culminated in democratic elections in 1994, there is still the degree of election-related political instability. For example in February 2000, RENAMO issued two ultimatums to the ruling FRELIMO government threatening to set up a separate government in the north in protest against the outcome of the elections. RENAMO's claim that the elections were rigged heightened the probability of violence (SouthScan, 2000: 20) and was indicative of the fact that democracy is not yet consolidated. In Angola, while the civil war was ended by the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002, the country is still grappling with the past. Since Savimbi's departure from the political arena, a far-reaching democratisation process has only hesitantly unfolded. Post-conflict Angola is faced with considerable challenges, including among others securing sustainable peace, democratising political life, resettling refugees, promoting national reconciliation, and the "demobilisation and resettlement of former UNITA and government forces" (Mashele, 2003: 18-19). Another important factor is the levelling of the playing field for future elections to avoid the repercussions of the 1992 elections, which witnessed the resurgence of war.

5.3.2 Mass Migration

Alongside political oppression, mass migration presents itself as a source of insecurity in Southern Africa because of the economic implications to the host state of the large immigrant population, which can be potentially devastating. The underlying economic implications include the deterioration of the natural resource base and its capacity to support the population of the host state (Poku and Graham, 2000: 20). In South Africa, for example, the problem of illegal immigrants does not only have economic implications, but it also has social ones (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 3). According to Booth and Vale "international experience shows that when cross-border migration develops a certain momentum new issues surface: drug-smuggling and unimpeded spread of small arms are major elements in a new and vibrant subculture of border economies in southern Africa" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 287). The escalation of crime and violence, prostitution, arms and drug-trafficking, car theft and armed robberies are increasingly connected to the rising number of illegal immigrants (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 3). Similarly, there are severe health risks associated with illegal immigrants, for instance the infection and control of pandemics such HIV/AIDS becomes almost impossible (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 3). Mass migration is also responsible for the high level of brain drain to South Africa from other SADC states. Logically, a brain drain has a range of damaging effects on country's already ailing economy. "Among these are the adverse effects on economic growth and the reduction country's capacity to develop as a 'knowledge society' and therefore compete effectively in the global economy. A brain drain also constitute a major loss of investment in terms of the education and training of its highly skilled professionals" http://www.hsrc.ac.za/media/2004/2/HRDFactSheet5.pdf

5.3.3 Food Security

In Southern Africa, few countries are capable of producing enough food to meet the demands of their populations. The region is therefore experiencing critical food insecurity as a result of widespread poverty, political instability, civil wars and poor economic management, as well as recurring droughts. For six countries combined together in the SADC region, including Lesotho Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, over 15 million people currently require food assistance (SADC FANR Vulnerability Assistance Committee, 2003: 2). Without doubt, this situation has impacted on regional security. Whenever poverty exists there is a "corresponding danger to humankind, exposing them to threats such as disease, unemployment and environmental degradation, while denying the access to benefits such as clean water, and adequate sanitation and health care, as well as basic education" (Handingam, 2000: 118).

The World Food Programme, the World Agricultural Organisation and the SADC have appealed to donor governments in the world to respond quickly with food aid donations to prevent the widespread hunger from developing into a humanitarian disaster (Thakalekoala, 2005: 3). The insufficient production of staple foods and other agricultural products has also aggravated food insecurity in the region. Lack of foreign exchange in the region and in Africa generally to redress the scarcity through commercial imports of grain is also a cause for major concern (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 4).

The abovementioned situation makes conditions for economic growth and development extremely unfavourable in Southern Africa. Ordinary people sustain their living by subsistence farming or through the informal sector of self-help production and exchange that make up the real economies of most countries in the region (Sorensen, 1997: 261). This human insecurity is in part associated with agricultural policies which often marginalise small scale farmers, since their access to resources such as credit, fertilizers and technical know-how is limited. The state of affairs is responsible for low productivity, persistent food shortages and attendant poverty (Discussion Document, 1998: 11). As a result, intra-regional trade in agricultural goods remains small and goes along with the poor performance in the agricultural sectors. In the absence of commercial farming in the region, the search for a long-term food security has to be counterbalanced by increasing imports of cereals and the provision of food aid. In essence, when food shortages overlap with mass migration, the result is the breakdown of the society (Booth and Vale, 1995: 296).

5.3.4 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

The dangers to human welfare and safety in Southern Africa are in most part worsened by the current economic conditions and by the policies of structural adjustment (McLean, 2001: 124). Structural Adjustment Programmes are loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for the poor countries in which "a credit depends on the degree to which the member state complies with the determined conditions" (Lensink, 1996: 79). These loans have worsened pre-existing situations of poverty and underdevelopment in Southern Africa. They have increased states' dependency on the richer nations, despite the claim that the programme will reduce poverty (Shah, 2005:1). While the SAP has been imposed on the pretext of ensuring debt repayment and economic restructuring, it required poor countries to withdraw from welfare and education programmes by reducing their spending on health, education and development (Shah, 2005: 1).

In Zambia, for example, the SAP was introduced in the 1990s to minimise "subsidies, currency devaluation, wage freezes and trade liberalisation". The key objective was to reduce the role of the government sector, "these policy prescriptions...did not hold in Zambia's case" (Berolsky, 2000: 96). Instead they brought about general economic depression and undermined the ability of governments to "create and maintain the conditions necessary for human security. Diversion of government funding from vital areas such as health and education...inevitably compromises the delivery of services focused on addressing fundamental human needs" (Hadingam, 2000: 118).

5.3.5 HIV/AIDS

Regional insecurity is also undermined by the high incidence of diseases. Alongside the commonly known diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and its consequences is a major cause for concern. According to Oxfam International, Southern Africa has the worst rate of HIV infection in the world, with an inescapable impact on children, on family structures and children's lives (Oxfam International, 2002: 2). The HIV/AIDS epidemic covers all areas of social economics and political life. The disease has devastated towns and villages and undermined fragile societies. The number of people who have contracted the disease in the region is estimated at "11.4 million, almost 30 per cent of global cases in a region that contains only 2 per cent of global population" (Apps, 2005: 2).

According to the SADC FANR Assessment Vulnerability Committee, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe are the most affected[61]. The pandemic affects the individual health as well as economic and social well-being of households, communities and nations. HIV/AIDS wipes out the productive labour force to the extent that, "most of the children have been forced to become heads of households as a result of the death of one or both of their parents...children are dropping out of school in large numbers in order to fend for themselves in the absence of their parents" (Thakalekoala, 2005: 2). Further costs are the "impoverishment of families, loss of human capital, drop in productivity, decline in savings and spending on education and increased expenditure on caring for children orphaned by the disease" (Landsberg, 2002: 7-8).

Oxfam also attributes the AIDS scourge to food security in Southern Africa by claiming that "the hunger currently experienced by millions across the region increases the likelihood of HIV infection...these include travelling to search for food and additional sources of income, migrating...and most lethally women exchanging sex for money or food. These actions facilitate the spread of HIV (Oxfam International, 2002: 2). "People weakened by HIV find it harder to access food, because they are often not strong enough to work or walk long distances to the market" (Oxfam International, 2002: 2). In this context the HIV/AIDS scourge in indeed a humanitarian disaster in Southern Africa.

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[61] According to SADC FANR Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 31 per cent of the population in Lesotho has contracted the disease, with Swaziland registering 33.1 per cent, Zimbabwe 33.7. While the report does not provide figures for Botswana, according to UNAIDS, its figure is estimated at 35.8 per cent.

5.3.6 Small Arms Proliferation

The availability and spread of small arms appears to be one of the key dynamics encouraging conflict, crime, human rights abuses and underdevelopment in Southern Africa (Gamba and Chachiua, 1999: 2). The small arms that have become tradable commodities in the region are mostly, if not entirely, inherited from the legacy of the Cold War and wars of liberation and South African apartheid destabilisation. With the end of these wars Southern Africa had been left with a huge number of weapons which "have kept social stability and human development hostage as they are used to fuel crime and violence" (Gamba and Chachiua, 1999: 2). As the region entered an era of relative peace with the end of the civil war in Angola in 2002, the problems related to small arms proliferation, of which the AK 47 assault rifle is an example attest to the level of insecurity in Southern Africa. Crimes by heavily armed assailants have increased since weapons are used for a variety of different purposes including murders, robberies, car hijacking and so on. On the other hand, the weapons help transform ethnic differences into ethnic conflict and political differences into political conflicts (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 5).

5.2.7 Livestock Rustling

Livestock rustling has been one of the major sources of insecurity in Southern Africa, especially between Lesotho and South Africa. However, since October 1994, it took on a new dimension that seriously strained relations between people along the border with the Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal (Moeletsi, 2000: 72). There are many causal factors surrounding this source of insecurity. Prominent among them has been the retrenchment of mineworkers from South African mines which caused a high rate of unemployment in Lesotho. Being unemployed means that these former mineworkers become prone to criminal activities of which stock theft is one visible manifestation. This problem has caused havoc along the borders of Lesotho and South Africa, "many times Basotho cattle rustlers cross into the neighbouring South African farms and steal cattle and other livestock and take them into Lesotho"(Thakalekoala, 2003: 2). This has often culminated in fierce clashes between citizens of South Africa and Lesotho that resulted in the burning down of several cattle posts on the Lesotho side of the border, accordingly straining good relations between the inhabitants along the border (Thakalekoala, 2003: 2).

In 1995, for example, the nature of livestock rustling assumed a new character and "became more marked by armed violent raids, abductions, murders and revenge attacks". On January 13 1996, about 40 Basotho men armed with R1 rifles raided a cattle post near New Gate in South Africa and stole 800 cattle; the South African National Defence Force intercepted them and killed three suspects during the exchange of fire. On the 23 January 1996, Basotho men armed with automatic firearms launched a cross border raid and captured 560 sheep, 70 cattle and 12 horses in the Tabase area. On South Africa's part, on 12 May 1996, about 300 South African men raided a village on the Lesotho side and took 100 cattle, 30 horses, 14 donkeys and 1000 goats and sheep (Moeletsi, 2000: 73). There is no doubt that these cross border crimes left many families who earn their livelihood from stock farming destitute. Therefore this made their lives vulnerable to other forms of insecurity such as poverty, unemployment and the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

5.2.8 Drug-Trafficking

Drug-trafficking in Southern Africa should be seen as a major challenge to human insecurity. This crime has been mostly noticeable with the end of apartheid and the expansion of international trade in the region. Many criminal gangs involving several nationalities operate in drug-trafficking and other forms of organised cross-border crime. Nigerian residents play a leading role and collaborate with local groups from other continents. Drug-trafficking goes hand in hand with other organised crime including large-scale smuggling of firearms and stolen vehicles and related money laundering. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/southern_africa_programme.pdf This directly or indirectly is a symbol of an economic gain for dangerous actors and economic resources generated from this organised crime are directly and deliberately used for destabilising the societies (Politi, 1997: 13).

5.4 Reforms in the Regional Security Architecture

Having assessed non-military sources of regional insecurity, there is a necessity for the expansion of regional security structures to accommodate human security needs. This should be made in such a manner that they match up with the developmental goals of the SADC proper. The regional security structures should take into account and be responsive to the achievement of development and economic growth, alleviation of poverty, enhancing "the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration" (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992). A first step is the achievement of peace, security and political democracy, which represent the preconditions for sustainable development and human security. The search for a human security, reforms in security architecture at the regional and domestic levels can be pursued through structures of governance based on cooperation, participation, accountability, transparency and the rule of law. The SADC Parliamentary Forum[62] represents this type of structure in the region. In the first instance, the reforms should by complemented by "promoting the establishment of democratic institutions, supporting free and fair elections and fostering the development of civil society" (Adler, 1998: 129). At least on paper, SADC has recognised this by establishing the Principles and Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections in the region adopted in Mauritius in 2004.

To consolidate SADC mechanisms such the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections, the reforms geared towards improving a regional security architecture should be made in such a way as to allow civil society to find recognition and acceptance for advancing human security. This largely depends on the political will emanating from member states, based on their democratic stance. By and large, a new understanding of security in the region warrants the approach that can effectively confront non-military threats mentioned above. However, the most difficult or challenging problem in the Southern African context is "how to balance traditional restrictive norms of national sovereignty and non-interference" with the evolving notion of cooperative security (Hammerstad, 2005: 7).

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[62] The SADC Parliamentary Forum is an autonomous regional institution of the Southern African Development Community which seeks to strengthen the implementation capacity of SADC by involving the representatives of peoples of the region. This includes involving Parliamentarians of member states in SADC activities in terms of Article 5 of the constitution. The SADC Parliamentary Forum delegation to elections consults with electoral stakeholders and other observers, and attends election-related meetings and rallies, observing the campaign, analysing media coverage of the electoral process, voting, counting, tabulation and announcement of results among other election-related activities.

Cooperative security permeates "domestic policies of sovereign states by holding them accountable to regional and international norms". According to the proponents of cooperative security, the restrictive neo-realist understanding of security should be balanced by the wide-ranging acceptance of the recognition for pursuing cooperative security to deal with the root causes of conflict. Similarly, the norm of sovereignty has to be complemented by the norms of human rights. Equally important is the fact that "the norm of non-interference should only apply when the states behave according to regional and international standards of decency"[63] (Hammerstad, 2005: 8).

Involving the civil society actors in drafting and executing policy on security and development is important since these actors can play a major part in interacting with the state and non-state structures, especially on the issues relating to broader non-military security threats mentioned above (International Policy Academy, 2000: 6). They can help reinforce the activities of regional organisations whose cooperative security agenda includes practices such as election monitoring, and other institutions and offices aimed at building up member states' democracy, good governance and human rights (Hammerstad, 2005: 8). To achieve these, the Human Rights Commission proposal which was mooted in the Windhoek Workshop in July 1994 and which has since been virtually ignored should be implemented. Optimistically, the effective implementation of these reforms can move the region on the margins of a security community.

While civil society participation in the context of advancing human security in the region is important, there has been a little allowance for such actors. As stated in the preceding chapter, the OPDS visible operational preoccupation with rather narrowly conceived state-centric security clearly deviated from one of the provisions of the terms of reference of the Organ. These include "the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law and peaceful settlements of disputes by negotiation and mediation both of which provide avenues for the participation of non-state actors" (Bischoff, 2001: 283). It appears that the newly restructured OPDSC is also heading in this direction. While the Organ retains the abovementioned provisions in its Protocol, it is similarly handicapped by the affirmation of principles of sovereignty and non-interference. For example, these principles were used to bar the SADC Parliamentary Forum from monitoring the Zimbabwe March 2005 elections[64]. As argued by the South African government spokesperson Ronnie Mamoepa, "As far as the government is concerned, Zimbabwe has invited the national parliaments of SADC member states, which will allow for report backs to sovereign national parliaments post (after) the elections. On the other hand, the SADC parliamentary forum would have no fora to report back on its findings to" (Sapa, March 2005). Contrary to this statement, Article 3 of the SADC Parliamentary Forum stipulates that the forum is established in accordance of Article 9 (2) or Article 10 (6) of the SADC Treaty[65]. This act is therefore indicative of overruling some of the provisions of the Treaty and acting in a manner that defeats its spirit.

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[63] For SADC, these "community building practices" could play a key role in changing "strategic practices, both behavioural and rhetoric" and can also encourage the "development of collective identity" (Wendt, cited in Adler, 1998: 120). Moreover, this can contribute to shared understanding of SADC as a "region and to changing the way that peoples in the region collectively think about security" (Adler, 1998: 121).

The reforms aimed at achieving the necessary level of human security in the SADC region should transcend these symbiotic relationships between states and soften up the principle of absolute sovereignty. The SADC Parliamentary Forum contains elements of cooperative security as provided for in the SADC Treaty which are being effectively ignored by the SADC member states. For example, the forum pledges to

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[64] During the Zimbabwe March 2005 elections, South Africa declared that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum was not an official structure and had no legal standing to observe elections. Reacting to media inquiries about Zimbabwe's refusal to invite the Forum to observe the poll, the foreign affairs department said it wished to place on record that the Forum was not an official structure of the SADC. Mamoepa said the official SADC observer mission, led by South Africa's home affairs minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, was the only legitimate body. "The primary responsibility for the creation of a climate for free and fair elections rests with the people of Zimbabwe, acting through their independent electoral commission," he added" (Sapa cited in Zimbabwe Information Centre Archives, 2005).

[65] Article 9 (2) of the SADC Treaty provides for the establishment of other institutions deemed necessary by the SADC, while Article 10 (6) directs the Summit to decide on the creation of Commissions, other institutions, committees and organs as need arises.

"promote principles of human rights and democracy within the region", enhance "peace security and stability on the basis of collective responsibility by supporting the development of permanent conflict resolution mechanisms in the SADC region...encourage good governance, transparency, and accountability in the region and in the operation of SADC institutions", and "promote participation of non-governmental organisations, business and intellectual community" (The Constitution of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, 2003). It could therefore be argued that while the forum is practically being ignored, its provisions are in conformity with the SADC Treaty; hence questioning its relevance is by implication tantamount to questioning the relevance of the treaty.

Besides the SADC Parliamentary Forum, SADC has established mechanisms for guiding the conduct of elections in the region: the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. This is a highly commendable confidence-building measure aimed at inculcating mutual trust and reducing election-related conflict which have characterised the region. Among others, these principles advocate the "consolidation of citizens' participation in the decision-making processes and consolidation of democratic practices and institutions". These also include "freedom of association, political tolerance, and equal opportunity for political parties' access in the media, independent judiciary and impartiality of electoral institutions" (Principles and Guidelines Governing SADC Democratic Elections, 2004). Unfortunately, this has proven to be only a declaration of intent in the sense that, in practice, SADC countries "subsequently abstained from saying anything critical about the run up to and conduct of the March 2005 elections in Zimbabwe even though these elections breached each and every one of these principles" (Hammerstad, 2005: 9).

5.4.1 The Involvement of Extra-regional Actors in Southern African Security Reforms

Given the abovementioned situation and as a way of overcoming a stalemate, the role of extra-regional actors such as the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) come into play. They can help soften up the state to think in terms of regional priorities instead of protecting sovereignty, which is a key block to bringing about a security community in the region. These actors are important because most of them are sources of funds, which are often accompanied by conditionalities which exert pressure on governments to effect democratic changes. From the IMF and World Bank's points of view, governments that achieve agreed goals such as a good human rights record and governance and convincingly combat corruption receive more funds. These funds are normally channelled through civil society and non-state actors, who in turn promote peace, human rights and community developments (Hearn, 2000: 4). In the SADC region, these conditionalities are imperative for "furthering the rights and political participation of socially excluded groups" (Hearn, 2000: 4), such as non-state actors and civil society actors. It has often been argued that governments have their own agendas and preoccupations hostile to civil society to maintain their hold on power. With the conditionalities in place, donors can reconcile the government and civil society actors to improve the level of cooperative security. In this respect, civil society and non-state actors will be empowered so that they can interact better with the states and fulfil their role in the society (Zacarias, 1998: 58). In the area of governance, for example, many donors are assisting domestic and regional civil society actors in terms of "consolidating and deepening democracy, promoting participatory development, protecting human rights and promoting clean and accountable governance" (Smith et al, 2005: 26).

The UN helps in maintaining order and limiting conflicts since there has indeed been a failure on the part of regional arrangements to resolve conflicts such as the one in the DRC. The UN has been assisting in providing resource capacity such as financial and logistical support in the areas of conflict to reinforce regional security arrangements (Zacarias, 1998: 58). This provides conflict management training to the parties in conflict and the civil society and increases the capacity for dialogue, mediation and peace-building. Apart from the UN, the role of NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism is also important for reducing conflict. This monitoring mechanism allows states to work together and rise above shortcomings and weaknesses in their governance structure and practices. In this context, states are expected to evaluate their peers in a manner that will collectively elevate the bar on governance standards and performance. The aim of the mechanism is to foster stability, promote peace, security and democracy and uphold the rule of law (APRM, 2002: 1).

5.4.2 Reforms in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ.

Despite the involvement of extra-regional actors in the regional security reforms, the OPDSC and its implementation framework SIPO could be expanded in order to accommodate human security needs in the region. While Article 10 of the OPDSC provides for the participation of non-state parties in the activities of SADC, such participation is handicapped by the fact that it should not be "inconsistent with the objectives and other provisions of the Protocol" and "should not impede the Organ from fulfilling the obligations of the Treaty and the Protocol", and that "any agreement between the Organ and the non-state party "shall be subject to approval by the Summit" (The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 2001). The effect of these provisions is that the participation of civil society is expressly placed under the control of the SADC member states. It is difficult if not impossible for non-state actors to participate under these conditions for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Protocol affirms the "strict respect for sovereignty...and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states". Secondly, fulfilling the obligations under this protocol incorporates upholding the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Thirdly, the approval by the Summit is almost impossible in part because of the affirmation of the abovementioned principles where the decisions are taken by consensus. This means that one member state that does not allow for broad-based political participation such as Swaziland, or who does not have a good human rights record, such as Zimbabwe, can disapprove the participation of civil society actors. "This political insecurity and the presumption that civil society actors should be compliant servants of the government,...suggests a worrying propensity for centralisation of power and an increasingly intolerant form of political leadership" (Smith et al, 2005: 26).

Taking the abovementioned situation into account, the envisioned reforms to accommodate human security needs within the OPDSC require SADC to soften up the notion of sovereignty and replace the non-interference principle with the accountability norm. This will empower SIPO to effectively implement the objectives of the Organ held hostage by these principles. Whereas SIPO as an implementation framework of the Organ emphasises the need for democratic consolidation in the region, there should be a favourable climate to put this into practice. The favourable climate involves the necessary political will and resource capacity for carrying the SIPO project. Such measures become not only a means of providing a durable solution to regional security problems, but they also shape a common identity and mutual trust (Adler, 1998: 128). The achievement of these can result in combining security with political and human dimensions, such as the peaceful resolution of conflicts between and within states, consolidating justice and democracy and advancing human rights through cooperation and confidence (Adler, 1998: 132). They will allow states and citizens alike in the SADC region to feel that they are indeed part of a larger community and their security and development are mutually intertwined.

Through SIPO, SADC member states should also direct their efforts to improve health in the region, particularly in the area of HIV/AIDS, which is indeed becoming a source of human insecurity. This should be affected by a decrease in defence spending by SADC member states thereby diverting resources to programmes aimed at combating the disease. South Africa is the best example of a country in the region which has "undertaken one of the most systematic defence and security reviews" that "has led to considerable demilitarisation" and the abandoning of nuclear deterrence. This has also led to the reduction of defence spending by 60 per cent (Cawthra, 1999: 1). Other countries in the region should also follow this example. The HIV/AIDS pandemic clearly indicates that SADC needs political and security structures that go beyond simply managing traditional state-centred security challenges. "Instead, the challenge is also that of addressing issues of democratic governance, growing poverty and inequality" (Landsberg, 2002: 8). While the SIPO document is mostly concerned with operationalising military security provisions of the Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation, it also makes reference to human security issues such as HIV/AIDS, human rights, poverty, gender-based violence and governance issues. However, civil society actors have criticised the provisions of SIPO for being too elaborate on military security issues while stopping short of a clearly defined mechanism to deal with human security challenges effectively http://www.ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za. The reforms which are aimed at improving the regional security issues should be made in such a way that they address this deficiency.

Finally, a human security paradigm is a requirement for the Southern African region to attain the level of a security community. SADC member states should indeed prioritise non-military security threats which have adversely affected most people in the region. This is where the idea of a trade-off between state security and non-military values should come into the picture. Most of all SADC needs to overcome its structural problems such as the affirmation of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. These do not only require SADC member states to reinforce the existing structures, it also requires them to support these structures through their policies on the ground.

6.0 CONCLUSION

Using Adler and Barnett's three tier analytical framework for the emergence of security communities and Adler's criteria for security community building as measuring tools, the objective of the study, as stated in Chapter One, was to investigate whether the Southern African region can be seen to have become a security community in the post-apartheid era. To achieve this objective, the thesis has been informed by a constructivist theory framework and criteria that explain how norms, identities and interests change the behaviour of social and political actors in the SADC region. The constructivist paradigm challenges the anarchy-inspired theories of realism and neo-realism which exclusively "rely on the language of force" to account for cooperation between states. It offers an alternative explanation of what is possible (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 4, Hafterdon, 1991: 5) in Southern Africa in terms of security cooperation.

The study reveals that a realist tendency in the international relations of Southern Africa, amongst states and decision-makers, is responsible for paralysing the region. It is exemplified by the failure of ASAS and the dysfunctional separation of the chair of the OPDS from that of the SADC Summit which, resulted in the separation of the security function from SADC's socio-economic agenda. On the face of it, SADC gives little attention to political, institutional and social issues of human security and the construction of a security community that the Frontline States were able to promote through SADCC. This means that SADC member states are not able to show the kind of willingness and resolve that characterised cooperation amongst the Frontline States in the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s in terms of merging security with development.

Essentially, through SADCC, the Frontline States afforded post-independent Southern African governments a platform for economic cooperation in an attempt to marry security with development. "A second very important achievement was SADCC's role in fostering a regional identity and a common political outlook on important issues. The policy frameworks developed by SADCC were also important in policies and approaches in member states countries" (le Pere and Tjonneland, 2005: 4). These confidence-building practices were consistent with a security community. While a similar approach by SADC would ensure cohesion in dealing with regional security matters in the 1990s, the region lacks this cohesive approach.

The Frontline States' achievements were obscured by a myriad failures and inadequacies of SADC, which became increasingly manifest during the 1990s. From the mid-1990s, growing political divisions and the attendant mutual mistrust developed. The collapse of apartheid South Africa once the unifying external enemy, the incorporation of new members, such as the DRC, and "growing tensions between Zimbabwe and South Africa led to a situation where SADC effectively was divided into two camps in dealing with political and security issues. As a result, the OPDS became incapacitated and unable to work" (le Pere, 2005: 15). Generally, these failures were responsible for the deterioration of the level of security in Southern Africa.

Despite the changing security situation both at global and regional levels, with the collapse of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, levels of insecurity and instability continued to characterise states in Southern Africa. This has undermined human security in the region. Among the forces pushing in the direction of human insecurity were the resurgence of war in Angola; the territorial dispute between Botswana and Namibia; the outbreak of the broad-based war in the DRC and the subsequent increase in defence spending by some SADC member states such as Botswana and Zimbabwe. While Waever contends that a "security community is a non-war community" (Waever, 1998: 71), the fact that SADC member states have not completely abandoned "a Cold War perspective on the utility of military force as an instrument of foreign policy" (Nathan, 1995: 6) suggests a divergent position that subverts the idea of a security community.

Another dimension has been added by non-military sources of insecurity exemplified by intra-state political instability, mostly related to the outcome of elections. Incidences of political instability have occurred in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, in Zambia 1991, in Zimbabwe in 2000, 2002 and 2005, and in Malawi in 2004. Continuing aristocratic rule in Swaziland is also a cause for concern. Besides political instability, other equally important non-military sources of insecurity include mass migration, HIV/AIDS, food security, Structural Adjustment Programmes, small arms proliferation, livestock rustling and drug-trafficking. These factors show that the regional security structure needs to be transformed by bringing in non-state actors alongside state actors in order to find an acceptable trade-off between militaristic and non-state forms of security. In essence, long term security, peace and stability in the SADC region cannot be achieved without paying adequate attention to these issues (Selebi, 1998: 3). In other words, security in Southern Africa should be viewed in the broader context of "cooperation on both military and non-military policies" (Nkiwane, 1995: 2).

Apart from non-military dimensions of security, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference entrenched in SADC treaties and protocols continue to impede the process of building a security community in the region. The thesis has established a number of reasons to validate this claim. The SADC Treaty which was concluded in the period of emerging democracy in the early 1990s, insists on the principle of sovereign equality of states. Similarly, both ASAS and the OPDS affirmed the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Moreover, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation concluded in 2001 to resolve the OPDS stand-off, also affirms these principles, whilst the SADC Mutual Defence Pact also contains provisions for sovereignty and non-interference (Nathan, 2004: 19). These principles are indeed a block against bringing about a security community in the region. With these principles in place, it becomes obvious that the regional security arrangement "comprises independent political units (states) that have no central authority above them" (Mearsheimer, 1995: 10). Sovereignty in other words remains the key ideological value for states that should be protected at all costs "because there is no higher authority" ruling the states in the region. In other words, "there is no government above governments" (Claude, quoted in Mearsheimer, 1995: 10). Admittedly, the role of global political and economic conditionality regimes such as the World Bank and IMF is needed to help soften up SADC states to think in terms of regional priorities instead of protecting their sovereignty.

The role of political and economic conditionality regimes enters the picture in part because SADC as a supranational institution is not empowered to carry out this effort. In the face of this, one may reasonably assume that in Southern Africa "institutions have minimal influence on states' behaviour and thus hold a little promise for promoting stability" (Measheimer, 1995: 7) both at national and regional levels. As such, it "becomes difficult to think of a regional community if national communities are not integrated, or if political actors in a given states do not share the same outlook as the region" (Zacarias, 1998: 54).

The situation in Southern Africa gives the impression that institutions such as SADC basically remain reflections of the neo-realist notion of the "distribution of power...and are based on self-interested calculations...and have no independent effect on the behaviour of states" (Mearsheimer, 1995: 7). Viewed in this context, SADC intrinsically reflects a security regime. This is so because in the SADC region, national preferences override regional interests. The Zimbabwean alliance's intervention in the DRC attests to this argument. By all conditions, SADC demands a "realist reading and little else" (Barnett and Gause, 161: 1998). In the light of this account, it is difficult to suggest that the region is heading towards the achievement of a security community.

The study observed that the emergence of security communities is dependent upon liberal democratic politics founded on democratic values which in turn allow for the "creation of strong civil societies; these also promote community bonds and a common identity and trust amongst states at both national and regional levels" (Acharya, 1998: 199-202). This notwithstanding, in terms of policy and structure, there is a minimal involvement of civil society actors in the SADC region which blocks their participation in conflict resolution. This blockage emanates from the "entrenched mistrust of majority of governments towards independent voices and opinions of election experts and academics in general" (Matlosa, 2005: 17). It casts a shadow on the integrity of civil society, thereby undermining its credibility and legitimacy, whilst many have demonstrated commitment to democracy, good governance and human rights issues (Smith et al, 2005: 26). This clearly shows that the nature of democratisation in the region does not allow for the recognition of civil society actors either at local or regional levels. However, meaningful regional security structures need to have viable democratic and people-centred states in which non-state actors participate.

Taking the above into account, and using Adler and Barnett's key analytical concepts for the emergence of security communities, including mutual trust, collective identity and the dependable expectation of peaceful change, it is difficult to suggest that SADC is a security community or one that is in the making. The reason for this is that there is a low intensity of mutual trust in the region exemplified by reluctance of SADC member states to align their foreign policies with that of SADC as a supranational organisation. As a result, it may be argued that "statism and realism mark" most developments in SADC's security arrangements (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 182).

Having said the above, it is clear that the level of cooperative security and democratisation as a process have not been reached in Southern Africa. Although states have agreed to share democracy as a common norm, there is an uneven implementation of this aspiration. This has been demonstrated by the violation or manipulation of democratic norms espoused by the SADC Treaty and the OPDSC Protocol. These conditions militate against development because opposition forces and civil society actors are often not recognised.

While socialisation and the teaching of norms in the SADC region can persuade states to "live up to the standards and the norms of a community" (Adler, 1998: 133), there is a lack of political will to commit to binding norms and common values. For all intents and purposes, SADC membership is not conditional. Certainly, SADC does not use democratic norms as a precondition for admitting members or keeping them. As a result, it has members such the DRC and Swaziland who are inherently authoritarian. Equally tellingly, SADC is not structured in such a way that admission to the organisation is only open to states that uphold and respect the principles set out in the Treaty. Countries such as the DRC and Swaziland would not have been accepted "on the grounds that they might thereby come to accept democratic norms; they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these norms" (Nathan, 2004: 16). On these grounds countries as such Zimbabwe would have been suspended from SADC. Making membership possible under specific conditions would not only have constituted a powerful incentive for states that wished to join SADC, it would have also allowed SADC to "gain leverage over the process of domestic transformation in these states" (Flynn and Farrel, 1999: 505). Instead of doing this, SADC is ostensibly regressing.

In the case of expectations of legitimacy measured according to the democratic disposition of states, and the accountability norm that renders states accountable to one another in their internal affairs (Adler, 1998: 134), these have proven to be elusive in Southern Africa. Due to the absence of an accountability norm, guided democracies where the serving "regimes manipulate the democratic process meanwhile pretending to be highly democratic are standard in Southern Africa. In fact, many states in the region are caught between democracy and authoritarianism" (Struman, 2003: 26). This inefficient nature of democratic systems accompanied by the anxiety that these systems are not delivering socio-economic development logically challenges the relevance of SADC in terms of transforming the region into a security community.

Institutionally, SADC has succeeded in expanding regional security structures to accommodate human security issues by expanding political liberalisation. This is clearly manifest in the establishment of the SIPO, the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. However, their record of performance has not been impressive. In March 2005, for example, the Forum was barred from monitoring elections by SADC member state: Zimbabwe. Matlosa argues that "norms, values and standards to regulate behaviour of states have been introduced though there is a serious problem with enforcing them" (Landsberg, cited in Matlosa, 2005: 5). This institutional weakness has exposed a series of problems. One of these problems is the capacity and political will to implement policies. In other words, there is a lack of tangible policy implementation in the SADC region.

The March 2005 Zimbabwe elections are a clear testimony of a lack of policy implementation in the region. Obviously, the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections have "turned out to be a simple political solidarity pact among ruling parties and heads of state and government to attempt to legitimise even some of the overtly illegitimate electoral processes" (Matlosa, 2005: 17). Despite the fact that the SADC Treaty and the OPDSC Protocol provide for good governance, human rights and the rule of law, SADC has refrained from criticising dictatorial and non-democratic member states. Moreover, instead of supporting civil society, as provided for in the OPDSC protocol, governments are increasingly hostile to these actors. In this respect, civil society is viewed as part of the opposition not tolerated by governments. This militates against the promotion of peace, security and development and has negative impact on the process of security community building.

The question of whether SADC is a cognitive region that calls for states to construct regional identity and shared understanding not restricted by borders is highly debatable. Issues of xenophobia in Botswana and South Africa have worked against this idea in the region. South Africa, the strongest military and regional economy fears migration from the neighbouring and other African states and the fact that its resources may be strained. This fear has been marked by the level of xenophobic practices which have saturated its social and political sectors (Zacarias, 1998: 51).

To attain the level of a security community, in the face of a non-existent external threat, SADC should indeed begin to reduce its focus on the military nature of security. It should build structures for a more united region that supports security and stability. Argues Ogata, "if to be secure means freedom from fear of being killed, persecuted or abused; free from the abject poverty that brings indignity and self-contempt; free to make choices - then a majority of people…" (Ogata, quoted in Hadingham, 2000: 116) in the region do not live in security. This clearly illustrates that security and stability do not lie exclusively in the military dimension; accordingly, any attempt at regional security that seeks to guarantee state security only, without paying adequate attention to the human dimensions of security will fail to attend to the root causes of conflicts and instability that have badly affected parts of the region (Selebi, 1999: 3). "The shift from traditional conception of security that focuses on military power and balance of capabilities" to one focusing on issues of societal instability could be one of the most remarkable transformations in regional security in the 21st century. Dangers confronting regional security are less likely to emanate from planned aggression against the territories of SADC member states "but rather from adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties" (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 370).

Finally, constructivism has been found to be a fertile theoretical perspective that holds the key to transforming the region into a security community. In the course of using a constructivist theory of international relations to investigate whether the prospects and practices at play in Southern Africa can move the region to the margins of being a security community, the study has established that the tenets of this theory are not being fully utilised in the SADC region. There is a prevalence of state security concerns when it comes to the design and operation of regional security architecture. As a result, the region can still be considered as a security regime which lends itself to a neo-realist analysis.

However, SADC's failure to become a security community need not be seen as an end in itself since there is still the possibility to project a more peaceful future for the region. The future of SADC appears to be open and the sparks that will produce indispensable impulses for a prosperous SADC stem from its "foundational values as a development community". The advancement of this idea depends on the political leadership of its members, the extent to which democratic pluralism becomes ingrained both at national and regional levels and the emergence of a strong partnership between member states and civil society and non-state actors which can collectively drive the SADC project (le Pere and Tjonneland, 2005: 47). The achievement of the above may at least, move the region to the threshold of becoming a security community.

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