

Effects of Household debt on economic growth in South Africa

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92 ***ABSTRACT***

93 South Africa's household debt relative to GDP has risen rapidly over the past decade. There is
94 concern that high levels of household debt may decrease spending in the future and hence in
95 the long run slow down economic growth. Thus, this study investigates the impact of household
96 debt on growth in South Africa from 1987Q3 to 2022Q1. The research draws upon first-
97 generation theories which include the absolute income hypothesis, life cycle hypothesis, and
98 permanent income hypothesis, and second-generation theories which include the neo-
99 Kaleckian model, the Super multiplier model, and the Steindl model. The impact of this
100 relationship is assessed using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model, with a Toda-Yamamoto
101 modification for some regressions. It is discovered that household debt has a positive short-
102 term influence on economic growth, however, the influence is weak, and it decreases in the
103 long run. Types of household debt such as credit card debt have shown to have a positive and
104 strong influence on economic growth in South Africa from the short run to the long run,
105 however, mortgage debt has shown weak positive influence on economic growth from the short
106 run to the long run. The study found that the growth maximizing ratios for household debt to
107 GDP ratio is 70 percent. The growth maximising credit card debt level is ZAR 72 403, in
108 nominal terms and for mortgage debt is ZAR 5 980 000. The findings are expected to assist
109 policymakers such as central banks and government authorities in formulating relevant policies
110 to ensure economic sustainability through macro-prudential policy and strategies for household
111 debt management.

112 **Keywords:** Household debt; mortgage debt; credit card debt; consumer debt; GDP; growth

113 **JEL classification:** D14, E21, E32, E44, E51, G01, G5,

114

115

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

116 **1.0. Introduction**

117 The rise in household debt has increased substantially over the last few decades. Concerns have
118 been raised about the sustainability of household debt and how it influences the rate of
119 economic growth. This chapter presents the overview of debates about household debt and
120 growth. The research problem is outlined. The chapter includes the goals of the research and,
121 finally, the organization of the thesis is also outlined.

122 **1.1. Overview of debates about household debt and growth**

123 Household borrowing has increased considerably in many countries over the past two decades,
124 both in absolute and relative terms to household incomes. According to the IMF Global
125 Financial Stability Report (IMF, 2017: 53), this has raised concerns about the sustainability of
126 household debt as well as its effects on economic growth. The IMF (2017: 54) argues that
127 household debt and access to credit can help boost demand and build personal wealth, but high
128 indebtedness can also be a source of financial vulnerability and economic crisis. Debt allows
129 households to purchase goods and services now and repay gradually through higher anticipated
130 income. Long-term economic growth is facilitated by increased lending in the private sector.
131 Nevertheless, when a nation experiences sudden, severe negative shocks, large household debt
132 can lead to serious debt overhang issues. The IMF (2017: 54) states that high household debt
133 may be a source of financial vulnerability and lead to prolonged recessions, as the global
134 financial crisis has shown. The median household debt-to-GDP ratio among emerging market
135 economies increased from 15 percent in 2008 to 21 percent in 2016, and among advanced
136 economies, it increased from 52 percent to 63 percent over the same period. According to the
137 Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) South Africa's household debt-to-GDP ratio
138 increased from 39 percent in the first quarter of 2016 to 42 percent in the last quarter of 2021.

139 Pill and Pradhan (1997: 7) argue that household financial debt increased from the mid-1990s
140 and accelerated in the first years of the new millennium due to consumerism, financial
141 deregulation, and the liberalization of financial markets. Coletta (2019: 1185) states that after
142 the financial crisis, the Great Recession resulted in the stabilization or the reduction of
143 indebtedness in many countries. Nonetheless, in some financial systems, household debt
144 continued to increase. Rena and Msoni (2014: 21) argue that there were negative effects of the

145 global economic crisis in South Africa. This was mostly caused by capital flight, declines in
146 real foreign investment, and a decline in the demand and prices for export goods, particularly
147 mineral exports. Kereeditse and Mpundu (2021: 115) explain that there was a 47 percent
148 increase in private loans and advances to households from 2008 to 2015.



149 Theoretically, households borrow to fund their consumption as stated by the life-cycle theory
150 of consumption. Jian Xiao and Yao (2014: 46) state that although the traditional lifecycle
151 hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Modigliani, 1986) was developed to explain
152 savings behaviour, it has been extended to show that households have a life cycle debt
153 accumulation behaviour. Alter *et al.* (2018: 6) report that several studies have demonstrated the
154 influence of demographics and the distribution of income and debt on growth. Younger people
155 who expect their income to increase in the future would borrow more against it. Yilmazer and
156 DeVaney (2005: 287) contend that if income rises during working life and falls during
157 retirement, households will likely borrow when they are young, save during middle age, and
158 spend less during retirement. Yilmazer and DeVaney (2005: 287) explain that over the course
159 of a person's lifetime, consumers are likely to incur two major types of debt: mortgage debt,
160 which is typically carried for a period of 20 to 30 years, and consumer debt, which is the amount
161 owed on short- and intermediate-term loans. Consumer debt is further classified as installment
162 loans.

163 According to Daud *et al.* (2021: 163), borrowing for non-financial asset investments and
164 consumption smoothing may also be influenced by temporary income shocks. However,
165 households can also take on debt to accumulate assets and to invest for the financial stability
166 of their children. They further argue that by mobilizing capital as a source of economic growth,
167 debt will assist households in mitigating shocks and increase consumption, aggregate demand,
168 and economic growth. Consequently, this explains how debt and GDP growth are related.
169 Daud *et al.* (2021: 161) further investigate whether a tipping point of debt exists by using the
170 threshold method. It was shown that household debt has a negative effect on a nation's ability
171 to thrive economically. There is no magic threshold of debt since the relationship between debt
172 and growth is a monotonically non-increasing function. However, the IMF (2017: 63) notes
173 that, at low levels of debt to GDP, the negative medium-term association between GDP growth
174 and rising household debt is largely absent. The relationship between debt rises and future real
175 GDP growth is favourable at extremely low levels of household debt to GDP, less than 10
176 percent it becomes negative when household debt surpasses 30 percent of GDP.

177 Alter *et al.* (2018: 5) state that current research has focused on the debt-driven demand channel
178 of credit supply shocks for the business cycle. Growth is under pressure to decline when credit
179 supply tightens following a credit boom. In these models, as credit constraints are loosened,
180 households borrow more money to finance their spending. However, when credit constraints
181 eventually tighten, borrowers will have to deliver by cutting back on expenditure.

182 Mian *et al.* (2017) emphasize that when credit limits are loosened, households may rationally
183 borrow more than the socially optimal level. This is known as the debt-driven "consumption"
184 channel. They contend that the channel is distinctive and that it affects policies, especially
185 macroprudential policies. The finance-led growth model, a more comprehensive framework,
186 also explains this. According to Stockhammer (2011: 9), It contends that rising household debt,
187 enabled by asset and real estate price bubbles and financial engineering, drives growth. The
188 finance-led growth model (also known as debt-led growth) argues that the existence of a
189 thriving financial sector has growth-enhancing effects on the economy.

190 Dumitrescu *et al.* (2022: 3) argue that the main causes of South Africa's high household debt
191 include the high cost of repaying prior debt, the country's low savings rate, and a widespread
192 lack of financial education. South Africa's high household debt discourages people from
193 launching small enterprises, which has a detrimental effect on the well-being and growth of the
194 economy as a whole.



195

196 Figure 1.1: Panel A shows the ratio of debt to disposable income (SARB Annual Economic
 197 Report (SARB, 2012: 10)). Panel B and C show household debt and disposable income (Muneri
 198 and Kuhn (2023: 98))

199 Karambakuwa and Ncwadi (2021: 155) found that pandemics like HIV/AIDS and the most
 200 recent coronavirus pandemic, as well as natural calamities like droughts and floods, had made
 201 household debt in South Africa worse. They argue that having a lot of debt means paying high-
 202 interest rates and high principal repayments, which can make it harder for households to make
 203 ends meet. As a result, living standards decrease, which eventually lowers consumer spending
 204 and slows down economic growth. This is especially true considering that consumer
 205 expenditures account for more than 60 percent of South Africa's GDP. Karambakuwa and

206 Newwadi (2021: 155) state that South Africa has an extremely high household debt to disposable
207 income ratio, indicating excessive debt that lowers household welfare and eventually slows
208 economic growth. In addition, Business Tech (2022) states that the need for credit and the
209 ability to repay debt among South Africans have been significantly impacted by the country's
210 slow economic growth, high unemployment rate, and increasing inflation. Missed credit
211 repayments are linked to financial distress. Business Tech (2022) explains that prior to the
212 worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, data from First National Bank (FNB) published in 2019
213 revealed that middle-class South Africans significantly relied on debt, with some spending as
214 much as a quarter of their monthly salary on interest.

215 Lombardi *et al.* (2017: 6) state that household debt only has a short-term beneficial influence
216 on growth and consumption, but it is likely to have a negative effect in the long run. Moreover,
217 recessions are often longer and more profound when household debt levels are high; because
218 of the high costs of debt, policies to prevent excessive debt build-up are advised (OECD 2012).

219 The consumption-to-GDP ratio rises, imports of consumption goods rise, and GDP grows
220 during the household debt boom. However, Mian *et al.* (2017: 1755) claim that the increase is
221 only temporary, and the GDP declines thereafter. Thus, an increase in the household debt to
222 GDP ratio over three or four years in a particular nation indicates a downturn in economic
223 growth. In addition, the IMF (2017: 53) claims that increases in private sector credit, including
224 household debt, may raise the likelihood of a financial crisis and could lead to lower growth.

225 Prinsloo (2002: 73) established that in South Africa a clear inverse relationship between
226 household saving and borrowing can be discerned from the beginning of the 1980s. Growth in
227 household debt will thus result in a decrease in savings unless they are offset by as large or
228 greater growth in household assets. Therefore, as the utilization of consumer credit increases,
229 the saving of private households decreases over time. A rise in household net worth in relation
230 to disposable income coincided with these trends.

231 Odhiambo (2006: 61) postulates that South Africa has experienced significant transformations
232 since the financial liberalization began in the 1980s, including the emergence of several new
233 lending opportunities for the financial industry. According to Prinsloo (2002: 74), these
234 modifications allowed households to borrow more money relative to their income. This has led
235 to a reduced rate of household savings and simultaneous high level of household debt and a
236 rapid rise in credit outstanding. According to Moroke *et al.* (2014: 107), if households dissave,

237 they will be forced to go into debt to satisfy their consumption needs. Aron and Muellbauer
238 (2000: 16) state that a direct, positive effect on the rise of household debt could result from the
239 different facets of financial liberalization in South Africa, with, for example, more freely
240 available credit card loans, lower housing downpayments as a fraction of house values, and
241 housing equity loans more freely available to existing owners. The finance-led growth theory
242 explains the relationship between debt and growth.

243 Cox and Jappelli (1993), found that the desire for debt rose until the head of a household was
244 in their mid-thirties, at which point it began to fall. Younger individuals had the largest
245 difference between their desired and actual debt, suggesting that they were most likely to be
246 liquidity-constrained. Crook (2001: 83) discovered that there was a decrease in the demand for
247 overall debt (which includes credit cards, mortgages, home equity loans, and instalment debt)
248 among households led by people over 55.

249 Mian *et al.* (2017) examined 30 countries drawn from both advanced and emerging economies
250 and discovered a country's household-to-GDP ratio will increase during a three- to four-year
251 period then the economic growth will experience a decline. Daud *et al.* (2021) examined data
252 from 24 countries from 2008 to 2016 and found that the impact of household debt on a country's
253 economic growth is negative. Mutezo (2014) examined data from 1986-2013 and discovered
254 that higher household debt levels lead to higher consumption spending, and therefore growth
255 in South Africa. The issue comes up when the economy is going through a recession and
256 households are finding it difficult to manage their high debt levels. Adewale (2014) estimates
257 the impact of regulatory changes on South Africa's rate of consumption and ultimately its
258 economic growth from 2007-2012 and established that there is a strong positive relationship
259 between increasing credit consumption and economic growth in South Africa.

260 In conclusion, on average, rising household debt accelerates GDP in the short run but may give
261 rise to macroeconomic and financial stability risks in the medium run. Real GDP initially reacts
262 positively to increases in household debt, as do consumption, employment, and house prices.
263 However, in the long term, the dynamic relationship between household debt and GDP turns
264 negative.

265 **1.2. Research problem**

266 Although several studies have looked at household debt in South Africa, some focused-on
267 determinants (Abd Samad *et al.*, 2020), some on the effect of household debt on consumption
268 (Mutezo, 2014), and a few on the effect of household debt on growth (Lombardi *et al.*, 2017).
269 Even those who looked at the effect of household debt on growth did not disaggregate the debt
270 to explore whether different types of household debt have different effects on growth. Further,
271 the studies did not determine the growth-maximizing ratios of different types of household debt
272 to income. Therefore, the paper seeks to examine the effects of household debt on growth in
273 South Africa with the research question “how do disaggregated components of household debt,
274 specifically examining credit card debt and mortgage debt, impact economic growth in South
275 Africa, and to what extent do these individual forms of household indebtedness contribute
276 differently to key economic indicators and overall economic development in the country?” The
277 thesis sets out to fill a research gap by using disaggregated data (which includes the 2007-2009
278 global financial recession and the COVID-19 pandemic) on households because the literature
279 shows that credit card debt and mortgage debt have an impact on growth.

280 **1.3. Goals of the research**

281 The overall goal is to determine the effect of aggregate household debt on economic growth in
282 South Africa, more specifically: to determine the effect of specific household debt types on
283 economic growth in South Africa and estimate growth-maximizing thresholds of specific
284 household debt types.

285 **1.4. Organisation of the thesis**

286 After this introductory chapter, is chapter 2 which is the literature review, it incorporates the
287 theoretical review and the empirical review. The 3rd chapter reviews trends of household debt
288 variables in South Africa while chapter 4 presents the methodology chapter outlining the model
289 applied as well as defining variables. Chapter 5 presents the results and discussion and lastly,
290 chapter 6 presents policy implications and major conclusions.

291

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

292 **2.0. Introduction**

293 The total amount of money owed to financial institutions by all adults in a household, including
294 consumer debt and mortgage loans, is known as household debt. Dikko and Madi (2015: 2)
295 state that it is a debt or liability brought on by purchasing anything on credit against future
296 income. Abd Samad *et al.* (2020: 2) explain that household debt can also be defined as an
297 obligation or liability to pay interest or principal resulting from borrowing. Secured debt and
298 unsecured debt are the two main types of household debt. Secured debt is a debt procured by
299 an underlying asset, such as a mortgage. Abd Samad *et al.* (2020: 2) state that mortgage debt
300 is collateralized by real estate, such as homes or buildings. Unsecured debt, however, eliminates
301 the restriction that a creditor has a claim to the assets of a failing borrower. They further claim
302 that loans for motor vehicles, personal loans, and credit cards are some of the debtor's assets
303 that are exempt from the claim. Over time, household borrowing has risen substantially across
304 several nations. Concerns have been raised about the sustainability of household debt and how
305 it would influence the rate of economic growth.

306 This chapter presents the theoretical and empirical literature review on the effect of household
307 debt on growth. The theories used in this chapter are first-generation theories which include
308 the absolute income hypothesis, the life cycle hypothesis, and the permanent income
309 hypothesis, and the second-generation theories which include the neo-Kaleckian model, the
310 Super multiplier model, and the Steindl model. Household debt on growth and financial
311 liberalization in South Africa will also be addressed in this chapter.

312 **2.1. Theoretical review**

313 **2.1.1. First generation theories**

314 *a. The absolute income hypothesis*

315 Research on the aggregate consumption function began with Keynes's Absolute Income
316 Hypothesis (AIH) in the General Theory. Since then, consumption has been the subject of
317 countless theoretical and empirical studies. According to Arioğlu and Koray (2011: 299),
318 consumer expenditure accounts for 50–70 percent of consumption in the majority of global
319 economies. It follows that some of the most extensively researched subjects in macroeconomics

320 have been consumer expenditure and the consumption function. The fundamental theories of
321 consumption are the absolute income hypothesis by Keynes (1936), the permanent income
322 hypothesis by Friedman (1957), and the life cycle hypothesis by Modigliani (1954).

323 Keynes (1936) states that a consumer's consumption tends to expand along with income, but
324 not by the same amount. He proposed that income is the only factor influencing consumption
325 in his research on the link between income and consumption. Based on the Keynesian
326 consumption function, the AIH, aggregate consumption is a stable, but not necessarily linear,
327 function of disposable income,

$$328 \quad C_t = \alpha + \beta Y_t \quad (1)$$

329 where C_t and Y_t denote the (real values of) total personal consumption expenditure and total
330 disposable income, respectively at time t . β , the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is
331 constant and positive but less than unity, so that higher income leads to higher consumption.
332 The autonomous component of consumption, α , which has to be financed by borrowing or
333 earlier savings, is assumed to be small but positive.

334 Arioğlu and Koray (2011: 299) explain that the AIH has these important features: firstly, the
335 consumption expenditure increases or decreases with an increase or decrease in income but
336 non-proportionally. This non-proportional consumption function implies that in the short run
337 average propensity to consume (APC) is greater than the MPC, where $APC = \frac{C}{Y}$ and $MPC =$
338 $\frac{\Delta C}{\Delta Y}$. This is because in the short run autonomous consumption does not change with income but
339 over the long period horizon, as wealth and income increase, consumption also rises. They
340 explain that the marginal propensity to consume out of the long run income is closer to the
341 average propensity to consume. Secondly, as income rises, the proportion of it consumed falls:
342 $\frac{\partial APC}{\partial Y} < 0$, so the income elasticity of consumption defined as $\frac{MPC}{APC}$ would be less than unity.
343 Thirdly, the consumption function is stable both in the short run and long run.

344 Based on these specifications, in line with Keynesian theory, when contemplating the way a
345 consumer determines their consumption level, it entails factoring in their disposable income,
346 thereby encompassing their net income. Thus, the AIH states that real income (or real
347 disposable income) determines real consumption. In this case, it was expected that the
348 autonomous consumption would be positive and that the MPC would be constant and close to

349 1. Individuals use credit cards, mortgages, auto loans, cash advantages, or borrowing against
350 their future income to cover their present expenses. Pedrosa *et al.* (2023: 34) explain that higher
351 household autonomous consumption raises both household debt (through new loans needed to
352 finance it) and aggregate income. Increases in autonomous expenditure relative to earnings can
353 also contribute to low levels of savings in the economy.


354 *b. The life cycle hypothesis*

355 The maximization of utility from future consumption theory was formalized by Modigliani and
356 Brumberg (1954). They made the assumption that the primary reason for saving is to build up
357 funds for future expenses and to sustain consistent consumption in retirement. Franco
358 Modigliani, Richard Brumberg, and Albert Ando developed a theory of spending in the early
359 1950s. It was predicated on the notion that individuals make wise decisions about their
360 spending at every stage of life, constrained only by the resources at their disposal. Working
361 individuals may save for retirement and, more generally, adjust their spending habits to suit
362 their requirements at different ages, regardless of their income at each age, by building up and
363 running down assets.

364 The life cycle model places a strong emphasis on the necessity of saving while working to
365 finance retirement. The term "consumption smoothing" describes how individuals attempt to
366 maximize their lifelong quality of living by making sure that their spending and savings are
367 appropriately balanced over their various life stages. According to Lang'at (2018: 5), in order
368 to enjoy a greater quality of living, some households may decide to borrow and overspend
369 while putting off savings. This increase in debt causes business investment to become
370 profitable, which in turn spurs economic growth during the consumption smoothing phase.
371 Household debt occurs mostly due to consumption smoothing. Lang'at (2018: 5) explains that
372 households must reorganize their income flows throughout their whole lives to smooth
373 consumption in order to achieve maximum utility. This helps agents to smooth their
374 consumption when there is an unsteady and irregular income flow.

375 Deaton (2005: 1) explains that young individuals save money, so they have money to spend
376 when they are older and are unable or do not want to work. According to the life-cycle narrative,
377 the nation's wealth is distributed as follows: the very young have less money, middle-aged
378 persons have more, and peak wealth is attained right before retirement. Retirees sell off their
379 possessions as they approach old age to fund their retirement and cover housing, entertainment,

380 and food expenses. The young, who are still in the accumulation phase of the cycle, take up the
 381 assets that the elderly discard. Deaton (2005) further explains that there will be net positive
 382 savings as a result of population expansion since there are more young people than old and
 383 more individuals saving than spending. This means that the overall amount of money that the
 384 elderly save will be less than the total amount that the young save. Similar to that, the surplus
 385 savings of the middle-aged people absorb the debt of the young, resulting in net positive
 386 savings. Economic growth, like population expansion, produces positive savings, the stronger
 387 the growth, the higher the saving rate. If earnings are increasing, young people will be saving
 388 more than the elderly are dissaving. In actuality, the rate of increase of total income is what
 389 matters for saving, regardless of population growth or per capita income growth.



390

391 Figure 2.1: Life cycle hypothesis graph

392 Figure 2.1 illustrates how people save between the ages of 20 and 65. As a student, it is rational
 393 to borrow to fund education. After that, you start investing for your retirement and pay off your
 394 student loans during your working years. You can sustain comparable income levels after
 395 retirement due to the savings made throughout working years. It implies that income will rise
 396 while a person is working and subsequently decline after they retire.

397 An important assumption of this model is that the period of retirement is fixed: the allocation
 398 of lifetime consumption between working and retirement years can be altered by changes in

399 wealth, wage rates, or other variables, but the allocation of the years between work and
400 retirement remains unchanged. Feldstein (1976: 77) argued that the assumption of a fixed
401 retirement period conflicts with observed behavior and has unintentionally caused some
402 important evidence to be incorrectly interpreted as conflicting with the basic notion of rational
403 life cycle saving. In 1900, only 37 percent of men over age 65 were retired; by 1971, this had
404 doubled to 74 percent in America. It is appropriate therefore to extend the life cycle model to
405 make the period of retirement endogenous.

406 Although the traditional lifecycle hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Modigliani,
407 1986) was developed to explain savings behavior, the theory has been extended to show that
408 households have a life cycle debt accumulation behavior. Yilmazer and DeVaney (2005: 287)
409 explain the life cycle hypothesis of savings and proposes that a household's consumption and
410 savings correspond to its stage in life, with consumption being a linear function of existing
411 cash and the discounted worth of future income. Households often borrow when they are
412 young, save throughout middle age, and spend less during retirement because they assume that
413 income will rise during working years and decrease during retirement.

414 The age of the head of the household is anticipated to have a significant influence on the total
415 amount of debt that households keep, even though other factors are likely to influence
416 consumption and saving. Yilmazer and DeVaney (2005: 287) further explain that there is a
417 likelihood that the age of the head of the household will also have a significant influence on
418 the number of various debt types. Consumer debt, which is the amount owed on short- and
419 medium-term loans, and mortgage debt, which is typically held for a period of 20 to 30 years,
420 are the two main forms of debt that consumers are expected to accrue over their lifetime. Credit
421 card debt and installment loans are two more types of consumer debt. As a result, the many
422 forms of debt that households have are linked to how their needs change throughout a lifetime.
423 For instance, most households take on installment debt for the purchase of a car before they
424 purchase a house or borrow money for their children's college education. Hence, households
425 tend to accumulate more debt while they are young leading to an increase in economic growth
426 through productivity of goods and services to meet the needs of the young people.

427 Furthermore, households might not be able to borrow as much as they would want when they
428 are first starting in the workforce and have a low income. This is especially true for the choice
429 to buy a home, which is the biggest expense a household makes. Debelle (2004: 51) maintains
430 that financial institutions often do not lend the full value of the home being acquired, meaning

431 that the household must make a down payment. Younger households must therefore rent while
432 setting money down for a down payment. Liquidity restrictions loosen when people's salaries
433 and savings increase, enabling them to borrow the substantial amount needed to buy a home.
434 This adds to the hump-shaped trend that many nations observe in household debt and property
435 ownership over time.

436 The life-cycle income hypothesis has served as an important theoretical framework to study
437 household saving/dissaving behavior. According to Baek and Hong (2004: 361), debt is
438 dissaving. Dissaving and saving indicate a consumer's preference for current consumption over
439 future consumption, for which the marginal substitution rate is mostly influenced by the
440 consumer's desire to balance out fluctuations in their income to align with their preferred time
441 path of consumption. In contrast to older people nearing retirement age, who start to spend
442 from their savings, younger people are often anticipated to have more debt in relation to their
443 income level and to progressively accumulate positive net worth in the Middle Ages.
444 According to Deaton (2005: 1), economic expansion leads to positive savings because younger
445 people save more than older people do while incomes are rising. The faster the growth, the
446 greater the saving rate.

447 *c. The permanent income hypothesis*

448 The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) was developed by Friedman (1957) to explain how
449 and why consumption is affected by expectations for the future. The model is based on Irving
450 Fisher's hypothesis, which states households borrow because they have insufficient earnings to
451 finance their consumption. Friedman explains that households spend money at a level
452 consistent with their expected long-term average income. According to Gerlach-Kristen (2014:
453 511) and Lang'at (2018: 5) households will only save if their current income exceeds the
454 expected level of permanent income, and they will borrow if their income falls short of the
455 anticipated level of consumption.

456 Friedman (1957) divided the current measured earnings or the actual income into two
457 categories - transitory income (y_t) and permanent income (y_p). Hence, $y = y_p + y_t$. The transitory
458 component has an expected value of 0, reflecting the assumption that future transitory losses
459 offset the transitory gains over time. As a result, observed income levels (y) are equal to y_p .
460 Finally, according to PIH, consumption expenditure is proportional to y_p , i.e., $C = ky_p$, where
461 'k' is a constant representing the average propensity to consume or APC and marginal

462 propensity to consume or MPC. This implies that changes in consumer behaviour are not
463 predictable and depend on individual expectations.

464 The implications on economic policy are that, unless workers modify their expectations about
465 their future incomes, even a rise in income in the economy influenced by economic policies
466 may not translate into higher consumer spending. The main insight of the model is that
467 households' smooth consumption levels during their lifespan. On the other hand, this model
468 considers the supply of money to be fully elastic and concentrates on the demand-side factors
469 that influence household borrowing. Households have limited resources, and how much they
470 borrow depends largely on how the lending market is structured.

471 The PIH states that a household's consumption should be determined by its permanent income,
472 or what it anticipates earning in a steady state, and should not respond to temporary income
473 fluctuations. Households may, however, occasionally have lower consumption than their fixed
474 income. The first of these is credit constraints. If a household sees a decline in income and is
475 unable to obtain a loan from a bank (either because the bank believes the borrower is not a
476 good risk or because the bank is having difficulties with attempting to reduce its loan book)
477 consumption drops with actual income.

478 The PIH states that households who experience a temporary decrease in income will take out
479 loans to cover their present expenses, with the intention of repaying the debt when income
480 levels rise. According to Chotewattanakul *et al.* (2019: 2) this kind of consumption smoothing
481 stabilizes demand and, consequently, the economy as a whole. Barba and Pivetti (2009: 119)
482 claim that households will often take out loans to cover current expenses at times when their
483 income is lower than average for their lifetime. The goal is to pay back the loans when income
484 rises above normal for their lifetime. Borrowing for non-financial asset investments and
485 consumption smoothing may also be impacted by temporary income shocks. On the other hand,
486 according to Daud *et al.* (2021: 163), households also take on debt to accumulate assets, and
487 debt-taking is also prompted by a household's desire to make investments for the benefit of
488 their children's financial stability. They further established that using debt to smooth
489 consumption leads to an increase in aggregate demand and hence growth. Thus, describing the
490 link between debt and GDP growth may be relevant. IMF (2017: 63) notes that at low levels of
491 debt to GDP, the negative medium-term connection between GDP growth and rising household
492 debt is absent. The relationship between increases in debt and future real GDP growth is

493 favourable while household indebtedness is below 10 percent of GDP; it becomes negative
494 when household indebtedness surpasses 30 percent of GDP.

495 The Permanent Income Hypothesis by Friedman (1957), and the Life-Cycle Hypothesis by
496 Modigliani (1954), explain household indebtedness and assert that people may accumulate
497 wealth by saving money, investing it for long-term growth, and spending less than they earn.
498 Japelli (2005: 173) claims that the difference between LCH and Friedman's PIH concerns the
499 length of the planning period. For Friedman, this period is endless, therefore individuals save
500 money for both themselves and their future generations. In the Modigliani-Brumberg version
501 of the LCH, the planning period is finite. In some cases, PIH and LCH share similar predictions
502 about individual behavior; for instance, according to both theories transitory income shocks
503 (transitory taxes and rebates) and capital gains or losses can be expected to have small effects
504 on consumption. However, the LCH has some unique implications concerning both individual
505 and aggregate saving rates that diverge significantly from the infinite horizon version of the
506 model. Abd Samad *et al.* (2020: 975) postulate that LCH and PIH emphasize that households
507 take out loans when earnings are lower than expected and view debt as a tool for a person's
508 stable life cycle consumption. Here, income and consumption may be used to explain
509 household debt.

510 In summary, the theories offer various viewpoints on how debt may impact consumption, which
511 in turn impacts economic growth. The Absolute Income Hypothesis places a strong emphasis
512 on how debt affects current consumption and aggregate demand. The Permanent Income
513 Hypothesis focuses on individuals' expectations and their willingness to smooth consumption
514 in the face of debt. The Life Cycle Hypothesis highlights the interplay between debt,
515 investments, and consumption patterns over an individual's life span. The extent to which debt
516 affects economic growth depends on factors such as the level of debt, the stability of income,
517 and individual perceptions of future income and financial stability.

518 **2.1.2. Second generation theories**

519 *a. Neo-Kaleckian model*

520 The post-Keynesian growth school is adhered to by neo-Kaleckian growth economists. Joan
521 Robinson's contributions to the area serve as the foundation for the field. Robinson argues that,

522 in the typical Keynesian way, demand drives growth. Using a neo-Kaleckian growth model,
523 Rees (2014: 40) discovered that debt servicing is detrimental to growth in an economy.

524 Avritzer (2020: 68) derives the neo-Kaleckian growth model and turned to its long-run
525 equilibrium properties, emphasizing on the model's financial sustainability implications from
526 the standpoint of working households. Avritzer (2020: 68) finds that the model necessitates the
527 worker household to accrue debt over time rather than wealth to achieve positive rates of
528 economic growth. Second, the dynamics of the model cause households to accumulate debt
529 levels that are unsustainable for them financially when positive but moderate rates of economic
530 growth occur since the cost of debt servicing surpasses incomes. Therefore, the consumption
531 pattern of economic growth that is fuelled by household debt creates an internal dynamic that
532 ultimately results in financial instability.

533 A traditional neo-Kaleckian model of growth and distribution is supplemented by Setterfield
534 and Kim (2016: 31) with a model of the household sector in which working households borrow
535 to finance a portion of their total consumption expenditures because they aspire to match the
536 consumption standards of rentier households. According to Setterfield and Kim (2016: 32), the
537 model illustrates the significant impact that working households' debt servicing practices have
538 on the features of a growth regime. Secondly, it shows how important it may be to redistribute
539 income away from working households to make an otherwise steady (and seemingly well-
540 performing) growth regime unsustainable financially. Lastly, it shows that a growth regime's
541 financial sustainability is dependent precisely on whom working households aspire to be like
542 when formulating their consumption goals.

543 In a neo-Kaleckian model developed by Serra (2023: 175), households can borrow to consume
544 or invest in human capital. According to this approach, debt service payments are sustainable
545 if they don't interfere with the increase in household income. Serra (2023: 175) adjusts the
546 model and examines the short and long-term economic impacts of various measures, including
547 interest rate decrease and the cancellation of student loans. This is the first research to examine
548 household borrowing from a demand-led macro-modeling viewpoint for two distinct purposes:
549 consumption and the accumulation of human capital. Serra (2023: 175) discovers that: (i)
550 household debt is sustainable over the long term, and debt servicing is compatible with
551 consumption levels above 90 percent of household income; (ii) new borrowing stimulates
552 economic activity in the short term, while debt servicing reduces aggregate demand by shifting
553 income to a class with a lower marginal propensity to consume; and (iii) while initiatives like

554 decreasing interest rates on household borrowing and changing the eligibility requirements for
555 student loan forgiveness have long-term effects, student loan cancellation has short-term
556 economic benefits.

557 Hein (2012: 14) argues that The Kaleckian distribution and growth model, which allows debt-
558 financed consumption by workers' households, is the result of finance-dominated capitalism
559 and neo-liberalism, which led to redistribution at the expense of labor income and weakened
560 animal spirits of the firm sector with regard to real investment. When discussing the impacts
561 of finance-dominated capitalism, most models in the Kaleckian and Mynskian traditions have
562 concentrated on the significance of corporate debt for the business cycle and long-term growth,
563 or the role of outside finance, including stock owned by rentiers. On the other hand, modeling
564 strategies centered on household debt have also been suggested. According to Hein (2012: 14),
565 a multiplier-accelerator business cycle model incorporates the contradictory macroeconomic
566 effects of household debt for consumption. Specifically, debt from households' transfers
567 purchasing power from high-income households with a low marginal propensity to consume
568 to low-income households with a high propensity to consume, boosting aggregate demand.
569 However, if purchasing power is redistributed in the other way, then debt interest payments
570 become a burden on both aggregate demand and growth.

571 In addition to worker households' debt dynamics, Parui (2023: 446) integrates distributional
572 dynamics into a stock-flow consistent neo-Kaleckian macro-model to investigate the long-term
573 dynamic stability of the economy. In the medium and long term, debt-ridden demand and
574 growth regimes are feasible, but so are wage-led and profit-led regimes. Parui (2023: 446) finds
575 that the relationship between distributional dynamics and debt might cause economic
576 instability.

577 *b. Super multiplier model*

578 Pedrosa *et al.* (2023: 1) state that autonomous demand drives growth in Super multiplier
579 models, and revenue stimulates firm investment, which ultimately satisfies the capital stock
580 adjustment principle. According to Brochier and Freitas (2019: 2), autonomous expenditures
581 are those expenditures that are not directly connected to the circular flow of income in the
582 Super multiplier literature. A stock-flow consistent (SFC) Super multiplier model with two
583 sources of debt-financed autonomous demand (government and household consumption) is
584 developed because the financial aspect of these models needs further development. This model

585 emphasizes the interaction between households, firms, and government indebtedness and
586 growth. Pedrosa *et al.* (2023: 1) investigate, primarily over the long term, (a) autonomous
587 demand growth and composition impacts over debt-to-output ratios and (b) the model's stability
588 criteria and their relationship to real and financial variables. They find that: (i) the model
589 generates scenarios of financial instability, and (ii) government spending might stabilize
590 household debt. Policymakers should reconsider the role of fiscal policy and concentrate on its
591 ability to stabilize household debt.

592 Super multiplier growth models often illustrate the exogenously determined autonomous
593 component of demand that propels growth. In their Super Multiplier Growth Model, Avritzer
594 and Brochier (2022: 29) postulated that household credit-financed consumption is the
595 independent driver of growth, given that it is partly dictated by the potential financial burden
596 that loans may place on household consumption. The findings indicate that growth is positively
597 impacted by the distribution of income, but financial factors, including interest rates and
598 household sensitivity to debt, have a negative effect. This was made feasible by merging a
599 demand-led growth model, in which autonomous spending driven by growth is financed by
600 household credit; however, this credit-financed consumption is not exogenous, since it is
601 partially explained by households' responses to their debt burden.

602 The two most dominant demand-led growth models in heterodox literature at the moment are
603 the Supermultiplier model and the neo-Kaleckian model. Brochier and Freitas (2023: 1)
604 compare stock-flow consistent (SFC) versions of extended classical neo-Kaleckian and
605 Supermultiplier models that address the debt buildup of households and/or enterprises. The
606 comparison has two objectives: (i) to assess the variations in the debt accumulation process
607 across these models as a result of their unique closures; (ii) to offer an instructional resource
608 for comprehending the fundamental characteristics of every model when addressing
609 comparable problems. For both models, the relationship between debt ratios, demand, and
610 growth is comparable in the short run. The Minskyan debt regime is the only regime that is
611 economically feasible for the firms' sector over the long term in the Super multiplier model. As
612 for the household sector, while growing debt-to-income ratios may occur sometimes, the
613 paradox of debt is a characteristic of the standard Super multiplier model. According to the
614 neo-Kaleckian model, a company's leverage ratio might be pro- or anti-cyclical; in the case of
615 households, the lack of the debt dilemma appears to be the most likely outcome.

616 *c. Steindl model*

617 To analyze the effects of monopolistic power emerging in capitalist economies, Steindl (1952)
618 developed a model of maturity and stagnation. This model demonstrated how the expansion of
619 large enterprises may lower aggregate demand, lower capacity utilization, and ultimately slow
620 down the rate of growth. In order to account for consumer borrowing, Dutt (2006: 339) employs
621 a Steindlian model of growth and income distribution. It demonstrates how consumer
622 borrowing may raise demand and, in the short term, enhance growth prospects. Longer-term
623 impacts of rising consumer borrowing are ambiguous, because, by increasing consumer debt,
624 it redistributes income towards the rich who have a lower propensity to consume out of
625 financial income thereby, possibly dampening growth and aggregate demand despite the
626 increase brought on by borrowing. According to Dutt (2006: 339), while financial factors such
627 as rising interest rates as a result of increased borrowing may contribute to the problem, they
628 are not necessary. The issue is more likely to arise when there is weak demand for autonomous
629 investment, or when borrowing-induced increases in consumption are most required to counter
630 tendencies towards stagnation.

631 **2.2. Empirical literature review**

632 **2.2.1. Household debt and economic growth**

633 Household borrowing has increased significantly in several countries during the past 20 years,
634 both in absolute terms and relative to household earnings. Concerns have been expressed
635 regarding the sustainability of household debt as well as how it may affect economic expansion.
636 According to the IMF (2017: 54), household debt and credit availability can drive demand and
637 increase personal wealth, but high levels of debt can also be a cause of financial vulnerability
638 and economic crises. Debt enables people to buy goods and services now and pay them off
639 over time with increased (expected) income. Increased private-sector credit promotes economic
640 growth over the long run. However, over time, high household debt can result in substantial
641 debt overhang problems when a nation experiences strong negative shocks suddenly. The IMF
642 (2017: 54) states that the experience of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic
643 resulted in highly indebted households defaulting on debt and many loans turning into bad debt
644 and non-performing loans, resulting in systemic financial instability. In advanced nations, the
645 median household debt-to-GDP ratio climbed from 52 to 63 percent during the same period,
646 whereas it increased from 15 to 21 percent in emerging market economies between 2008 and

647 2016. According to FRED data, the household debt-to-GDP ratio in South Africa climbed from
648 39 percent in the first quarter of 2016 to 42 percent in the final quarter of 2021.

649 Financial deregulation and the liberalization of financial markets all contributed to a surge in
650 household debt that started in the mid-1990s and intensified in the early years of the new
651 millennium. Coletta (2019: 1185) states that the Great Recession that followed the financial
652 crisis led to the stabilization or decrease of debt in several nations. Nonetheless, several
653 financial systems saw a rise in household debt. Kereeditse and Mpundu (2021: 115) explain
654 that there was a 47 percent increase in private loans and advances to households from 2008 to
655 2015 in South Africa.

656 Households have been able to borrow more money as their wealth has increased. Orhangazi
657 and Ozgur (2015: 3) state that the banking sector's credit-to-deposit ratios rose, and household
658 debt ratios quickly increased, leading to a buildup of many financial fragilities in the economy.
659 Oren and Blyth (2019: 611) claim that credit cards, bank loans, and overdrafts led to a
660 significant expansion of household debt. South Africa's high household debt discourages
661 people from launching small enterprises, which has a detrimental effect on the well-being and
662 growth of the economy.

663 South African households face higher levels of debt to sustain consumption and living
664 necessities. Karambakuwa and Ncwadi (2021: 155) assessed the determinants of household
665 debt in South Africa and found that in South Africa based on the PIH, the ratio of household
666 debt to disposable income is quite high averaging 52.62 percent from 1969 until 2022,
667 indicating over-indebtedness that lowers household welfare and eventually lowers economic
668 growth. In addition, Mian *et al.* (2017: 1755) tested the relationship between household debt
669 and growth in business cycles in a panel of 30 countries from 1960 to 2012 and found that an
670 increase in a country's household debt to GDP ratio during a three- to four-year period forecasts
671 a drop in that nation's future economic growth. They explained this relationship by using the
672 PIH theory stating that a reason for household debt to expand today is anticipation of higher
673 income tomorrow.

674 Some scholars argue on the short-term and long-term impact of household debt on growth, for
675 example, Lombardi *et al.* (2017: 6) state that due to the high costs of debt, efforts to avoid
676 excessive debt build-up are advocated since recessions are frequently longer and more severe
677 when household debt levels are high. They investigated the impact of household debt levels on

678 growth using data on 54 economies from 1990-2015 and found that an increase in the
679 household debt-to-GDP ratio boosts consumption and GDP growth in the short run but tends
680 to lower GDP growth in the long run. The consumption-to-GDP ratio rises, consumer goods
681 imports increase, and GDP enjoys a boost during the boom in household debt. However, the
682 increase is temporary, and GDP thereafter declines. The basic hypothesis is that if the
683 permanent income hypothesis is correct, the correlation between past increases in debt and
684 consumption growth should be positive because additional borrowing is motivated by higher
685 expected permanent income.

686 High levels of debt lead to high interest rates and principal repayments, which may make it
687 harder for households to meet their living expenses. As a result, the standard of life declines,
688 which in turn lowers consumer spending and eventually slows economic growth. This is
689 especially true given that consumption expenditure accounts for more than 60 percent of South
690 Africa's GDP. The IMF (2017: 53) claims that increases in private sector credit, including
691 household debt, may raise the likelihood of a financial crisis and could lead to lower growth.
692 In addition, Business Tech (2022) states that the need for credit and the ability to repay debt
693 among South Africans have been significantly impacted by the country's slow economic
694 growth, high unemployment rate, and increasing inflation. Missed credit repayments are linked
695 to financial distress and increase the vulnerability of households to economic shocks. Business
696 Tech (2022) explains that prior to the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, data from First National
697 Bank (FNB) published in 2019 revealed that middle-class South Africans significantly relied
698 on debt, with some spending as much as a quarter of their monthly salary on interest.

699 Household debt could be seen as a source of growth. According to Cynamon and Fazzari (2013)
700 rising household debt levels contributed to and supported economic growth in a manner
701 comparable to that which business debt had previously only done. A successful market for
702 mortgage-backed securities, stable employment income, a legal environment allowing
703 mortgage interest to be tax deductible, a stable low-interest rate environment, and social norms
704 that view debt as a typical financing method for consumption are all requirements for stable
705 levels of household debt. Leclaire (2021: 9) states that the stability of household debt as a
706 stabilizing economic and financial component is not assured because many of the latter are
707 easily disreputable.

708 Household debt in South Africa has led to effects on household consumption, household
709 investment, and income. Daud *et al.* (2021: 161) use the threshold approach to further

710 investigate if there is a debt tipping point. There was no magic threshold of debt discovered
711 since the link between debt and growth is a monotonically non-increasing function. They use
712 the PIH and LCH to explain these relationships which postulate that that households smooth
713 their consumption by borrowing. Daud *et al.* (2021) examined data from 24 countries from
714 2008 to 2016 and found that the impact of household debt on a country's economic growth is
715 negative.

716 Authors such as Kereeditse and Mpundu (2021: 115) suggest that several macroeconomic
717 factors, including the low-interest rate environment, rise in unsecured lending and associated
718 increases in household debt, excessive state expenditure, and a significant current account
719 deficit, may lead South Africa into a debt crisis if they are not properly controlled. Kereeditse
720 and Mpundu (2021: 115) claim that depending on significant variables including the extent of
721 creditors' legal protection, the effect of household debt on growth differs among nations.
722 Kereeditse and Mpundu (2021) analyzed household indebtedness in South Africa from 2005Q1
723 to 2019Q4. From the findings, it was concluded that there was a positive insignificant
724 relationship between household debt and consumption. The LCH was used to explain this
725 relationship by stating that households apply to credit markets because they want to have steady
726 living conditions over the years.

727 Excessive interest rates and principal repayments caused by excessive debt load may make it
728 harder for households to afford living expenditures. As a result, the standard of living declines,
729 which in turn lowers consumer spending and eventually slows economic growth. This is
730 especially true given that consumer expenditures account for more than 60 percent of South
731 Africa's GDP. The levels of household indebtedness as compared to the income levels are high.
732 Karambakuwa and Ncwadi (2021: 155) claim that in South Africa, the ratio of household debt
733 to disposable income, which indicates over-indebtedness and lowers household welfare and,
734 eventually, economic growth, is quite high. The high levels of household debt may also be a
735 factor in the wealth gap, given that those who have more debt may find it more difficult to
736 accumulate assets and wealth than those who have less debt or none. This might increase South
737 Africa's already-existing income and wealth inequality, which could have long-term effects on
738 the country's economic growth and social cohesion.

739 Household debt has created long-term implications for South Africa. Barba and Pivetti (2008:
740 114) maintain that the real challenge is whether it is possible to manage the long-term

741 shortcomings of a growing household debt stock, which can significantly negatively influence
742 the overall savings rate while stimulating demand and activity.

743 Continuously monitoring the trends of household debt in South Africa is a step in the right
744 direction for governments. Moroke (2014: 749) explains that forecasting household debt for
745 South Africa is of importance to policymakers. It becomes challenging for policymakers to
746 develop feasible policies without appropriate and reliable forecasts. With accurate projections
747 generated, it may be simple for the relevant authorities to design and devise effective plans to
748 address household debt in the country, and with the use of an appropriate modeling approach,
749 forecasting accuracy of household debt in the country may be enhanced.

750 Macroeconomic policies are an essential element in preventing disproportionate economic
751 activity reductions during episodes of household deleveraging. For instance, monetary easing
752 may significantly lower mortgage payments and stop household defaults in nations where
753 mortgage interest rates are frequently variable. The same is true for fiscal transfers to
754 households made through social safety nets, which can boost household income and improve
755 their ability to pay off debt. Leigh *et al.* (2012: 91) argue that self-reinforcing cycles of growing
756 defaults, falling house prices, and lower aggregate demand can be prevented with the use of
757 such automatic transfers. However, macroeconomic stimulation has its limitations. High levels
758 of public debt may limit the potential for deficit-financed transfers, and the zero lower bound
759 on nominal interest rates could prevent sufficient rate cuts.

760 There are two more approaches to addressing the issue of household debt: tighter
761 macroprudential measures or tighter mortgage interest deduction. Over time, macroprudential
762 policies reduce the amount of debt in the economy, which lowers both borrowers' interest costs
763 and lenders' interest revenue. According to Finocchiaro *et al.* (2016: 57), these policies lead to
764 a transfer of wealth from debt-free to indebted households, or from lenders to borrowers. Since
765 their interest income would be smaller, lenders will cut back on their consumption of products,
766 housing services, and leisure activities. Borrowers, on the other hand, can boost their
767 consumption of products and leisure time.

768 Government intervention is necessary when the levels of household debt are too high.
769 According to Leigh *et al.* (2012: 91), at a relatively low fiscal cost, government interventions
770 aimed at lowering household debt levels relative to assets and debt service levels relative to
771 repayment capacity can significantly offset the detrimental impacts of household deleveraging

772 on economic activity. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012: 1505) claim that deleveraging is the
773 sudden downward revision of views about the maximum amount of debt that a household
774 should have. This revision pushes highly indebted households to drastically cut back on their
775 expenditure, which can lead to major problems with macroeconomic management. The number
776 of household defaults and foreclosures can be greatly reduced by bold and well-designed
777 household debt restructuring initiatives. These initiatives assist in preventing self-reinforcing
778 cycles of declining housing prices and decreased aggregate demand.

779 The Keynesian era saw a large rise in household debt. Sparkes and Wood (2021: 611) argue
780 household debt has played a significant role in the political economy of Britain. From the 1950s
781 to the 1960s, rising household debt and homeownership demand helped the Conservatives win
782 electoral support at the expense of traditional "Old Labour" values. Sparkes and Wood (2021:
783 611) explain that Wilson's Labor Party aimed to oppose by accepting Keynesian principles and
784 emphasizing programs that increased access to mortgage loans and homeownership. According
785 to Sparkes and Wood (2021: 598), Britain is a prime example of a financialized economy that,
786 starting in the 1980s, built systems of household debt to fuel economic expansion. The
787 Keynesian era managed debt carefully hence debt led to economic growth. Similar trends are
788 seen in the U.S. economy between the 1980s and 2007, home equity borrowing is responsible
789 for roughly half of the rise in U.S. housing debt. Bartscher *et al.* (2020: 1) state that American
790 household debt has doubled in relation to income since 1950 and has increased fourfold since
791 the financial crisis of 2008. The household debt-to-income ratio increased from 30 percent at
792 the end of World War II to a peak of close to 120 percent in 2010.

793 In the US, relatively costly borrowing methods like credit card debt are widely used. According
794 to Zabai (2017: 16), despite the sharp increase in credit card use and debt, in 1998 credit card
795 debt made up just 3.8 percent of all household debt. Throughout the 1990s, a larger spectrum
796 of social groups began to utilize credit cards. Lacoviello (2008: 933) states that gross household
797 debt increased from 66 percent to 113 percent of disposable personal income between 1981
798 and 2003, outpacing actual economic growth throughout the 1980s after remaining relatively
799 steady during the 1960s and 1970s. The progressive growth over time of frequently used
800 metrics of financial sector imbalances has coincided with the increase in debt. For instance, the
801 household debt service ratio increased from 0.106 in 1983 to 0.132 in 2003 (an estimate of the
802 ratio of debt payments to disposable personal income). Lacoviello (2008: 933) postulates that
803 although consumer debt has increased more than home mortgage debt, both have contributed

804 to the rise in family debt. In the early period, consumer debt averaged around 20 percent of
805 available personal income, and it increased to roughly 25 percent in the latter period. The ratio
806 of mortgage debt to disposable income increased to nearly 75 percent in the late 1990s from
807 40 percent from 1960 to 1980.

808 In developing countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, regulators have made an effort to
809 manage excessive household debt. Nonetheless, it has been shown that the greatest household
810 debt levels in Asia are found in Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, and Singapore. According to
811 Zakaria *et al.* (2017: 518), indicators of household debt in Malaysia are on the rise, raising
812 questions about whether this development might endanger both economic stability and
813 household welfare. It is alarming that the household debt to GDP ratio rose from 68.8 percent
814 in 2006 to 76 percent in 2010 to 84.4 percent in 2016. Chotewattanakul *et al.* (2019: 3) explain
815 that following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, loans from financial institutions have been
816 more concentrated in the household sector. Bank Negara Malaysia has taken into account the
817 effects of raising the policy interest rate on household debt servicing capacity and consumption.
818 In Thailand, household debt increased rapidly between 2009 and 2013, with outstanding loans
819 from the formal financial sector by households nearly doubling from 5.1 trillion Baht at the
820 end of 2008 to 9.8 trillion Baht at the end of 2013. This increase in household debt coincided
821 with a low growth in consumption, as the household debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 52.4
822 percent in 2008 to 76.3 percent by 2013.

823 The Chinese economy is also affected by household debt. Canakci (2021: 653) argues that the
824 rise in household debt in China is a result of the financial sector's gradual expansion in the late
825 1990s and again in the late 2000s following the global financial crisis, which experienced much
826 faster growth, with debt rising to nearly \$5.7 trillion and representing nearly 30 percent of
827 Chinese GDP, respectively. Indeed, the main driver of cumulative credit growth in China at the
828 start of 2018 was household debt, which had increased by more than 30 percent.

829 South Africa records a very high debt level. Meniago *et al.* (2013: 482) maintain that from 74.8
830 percent in the fourth quarter of 2011 to 74.7 percent in the first quarter of 2012, the ratio of
831 household debt to disposable income progressively fell. According to Meniago *et al.* (2013:
832 482), despite what is perceived as a slow decrease, this number is still extremely high, and such
833 high levels of household debt may have a negative impact on the economy. In South Africa,
834 the household sector's level of debt has recently mounted new heights accounting for 40.7
835 percent of the country's nominal GDP as of December 2022. Kereeditse and Mpundu (2021:


836 115) explain that there has been an increase from R 10, 033, 98 million in 2008 to R 14, 750,
837 94 million in 2015 in private loans and advances to households. The banking sector is by far
838 the most important source of credit to households.

839 The rapid rise in household debt over the past 20 years has been a global phenomenon that has
840 affected Australia as well. According to Zabai (2017: 45), the majority of debt in many
841 countries is held by households in the top quintiles of income and wealth distribution. In
842 Australia, households in the highest income quintiles often have debt-to-income ratios that are
843 noticeably greater than those in the lowest quintiles (for instance, in 2014, the top two quintiles
844 had debt-to-income ratios of approximately 200 percent while the bottom two had ratios of
845 about 50 percent). In Canada, the top two quintiles, for example, hold roughly 50 percent of
846 total mortgage debt. Meng and Siriwardana (2013: 80) maintain that Australia's total household
847 debt rose from A\$187 billion in 1990 to A\$905 billion in 2005. Despite the gearing ratio (total
848 liabilities as a proportion of total assets) being just 18.6 percent in 2005, the debt-income ratio
849 increased significantly from 70.6 percent in 1990 to 162.8 percent in that year as a result of a
850 sharp rise in total assets. To pay off their debt alone, the typical Australian household would
851 need to labor for more than 1.5 years. The following are some types of household debt and
852 their effects on growth:

853 *a. Mortgage debt and economic growth*

854 Mortgage provision has been one of the principal drivers of growth in the financial sector, and
855 most household debt takes the form of mortgage debt. Wood and Stockhammer (2023: 2) state
856 that bank lending has been primarily reoriented away from profitable investment towards
857 lending to homeowners in the form of mortgage credit as a result of the significant returns on
858 retail mortgage products. Wood and Stockhammer (2023: 2) discover that house prices are a
859 major determinant of household debt, and household debt contributes to economic growth
860 (refer to Figure 2.2). They explain that rising house prices facilitate growth in economies via
861 the use of equity-release mortgages in the short run. Stockhammer and Wildauer (2017: 2)
862 agree with the notion that rising real estate prices are another explanation for rising household
863 debt as most household debt is mortgage debt. They discover that if house prices rise and
864 household sector wealth surpasses the desired ratio, households would either take on debt or
865 consume the "excess wealth" if they were unable to sell their assets. If people are unwilling to
866 wait to buy a home, the rising cost of residential real estate relative to disposable income will
867 force them to take out larger mortgages. Economic growth is accelerated as a result of this.

868 Moore and Stockhammer (2018) also find that house prices have an effect on household debt.
 869 They investigate whether effects differ in boom-and-bust phases of the debt and house price
 870 cycles. They discovered that the most robust macroeconomic determinant of household debt is
 871 real residential house prices and that the phase of the debt and house price cycles plays a role
 872 in household debt accumulation. The consumption-oriented explanation of household debt
 873 accumulation is derived from the LCH. Moore and Stockhammer (2018: 550) claim that house
 874 prices fuel the build-up of household debt because they loosen credit restrictions through the
 875 collateral impact and increase household indebtedness through the wealth effect. Because of
 876 their increasing wealth, households may not be credit-constrained but instead boost their
 877 spending. This can be done by borrowing through mortgage equity withdrawals.



878

879 Figure 2.2: Theoretical overview of the macroeconomic effects of house prices and household
 880 debt (Wood and Stockhammer (2023: 4))

881 Mortgage debt arises when households buy houses through a bank loan, using the same
 882 property as collateral. According to Prinsloo (2002: 66) one feature of such loans is that, in
 883 most circumstances, the mortgagees will need to pay off a specific portion of the property's
 884 purchase price before the mortgagor releases the remaining portion of the purchase money. The
 885 size of the loan is often determined by the borrower's annual income and the value of the
 886 collateral. Although shorter repayment terms can be agreed upon, the loan is typically repaid
 887 over a 20–30-year period. Cox and Jappelli (1993) investigate the effect of borrowing

888 constraints on consumer debt and found that the desire for debt increased until the household
889 head reached the mid-thirties and then it declined. Crook (2001: 83) discovered that households
890 headed by an individual over age 55 had a reduced demand for total debt (defined as mortgages,
891 home equity loans, credit cards, and installment debt). Cox and Jappelli (1993) and Crook
892 (2001) explained these relationships based on the LCH. De Gregorio (1996: 64) investigates
893 the relationship between borrowing constraints and growth for OECD and developing countries
894 and found that borrowing constraints will reduce time devoted to formal education and growth
895 and loans to households can only increase economic growth if it is used to invest in their human
896 capital and/or microenterprises. Mortgage debt increased from 20 percent to 50 percent from
897 1990 to 2011 in a variety of nations, pushing total domestic bank debt from around 80 percent
898 of GDP to over 120 percent. This relationship is emphasized in the LCH.

899 Many economists such as Kohl (2018) and Tunc and Yavas (2017) claim that the 2007 financial
900 crisis, often known as the US subprime mortgage crisis and the greatest financial disaster since
901 the Great Depression of the 1930s, led to an increase in mortgage debt. According to Kohl
902 (2018: 178), during the Global Financial Crisis, households in many countries experienced
903 high levels of mortgage debt, challenges with housing affordability, and high property prices,
904 as well as stagnant or declining homeownership rates. By the middle of 2008, the crisis'
905 contagious consequences had reached several parts of the world, including South Africa,
906 Germany, Japan, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Tunc and Yavas (2017: 712) investigate the
907 relationship between mortgage debt and savings in the US from 1987 to 2013. They found that
908 mortgage payments have a substantial negative impact on saving rates and argue that in the
909 United States, the proportion of house mortgage debt to GDP climbed from 30 percent in the
910 1980s to more than 75 percent by 2009. They explained this relationship by using the LCH
911 which states that increased mortgage debt could be associated with improved ability of
912 borrowers to smooth their consumption over their life cycles.

913 The housing boom of the 2000s resulted in the growth of mortgage debt. According to Foote *et*
914 *al.* (2021: 230), the total amount of mortgage debt on the liabilities side of household balance
915 sheets quadrupled between 2001 and 2007, rising from \$5.3 trillion to \$10.6 trillion. Bhutta
916 (2015: 284) claims that several factors, including equity extraction, an increase in the purchase
917 of second homes and investment properties, and an increase in first-time homebuying by more
918 marginal borrowers because of a credit expansion that may have been partially government-
919 induced, may have contributed to the accumulation of mortgage debt during the housing boom.

920 At the highest level, mortgage inflows come from customers who rack up debt quickly, while
921 outflows come from consumers who pay it off quickly.

922 The debt-to-income ratio significantly increased because mortgage debt considerably expanded
923 more quickly than income in the 2000s. Due to this increase and its disproportionate
924 involvement in the foreclosure and financial crisis, many people think that the expansion of
925 subprime mortgages was the main reason for the increase in debt. Foote *et al.* (2021: 230)
926 maintain that subprime lenders provided financing for individuals who were ineligible for so-
927 called prime loans. Low levels of liquid wealth, prior defaults, insufficient income compared
928 to mortgage payments, and sometimes a combination of all three were ineligible reasons.
929 Between 2001 and 2007, subprime lending expanded by over 550 percent or more than five
930 times as quickly as the market, going from accounting for less than 2.5 percent of total
931 mortgage debt to more than 8.4 percent.

932 The level of mortgage debt will have a significant impact on a home's investment, household
933 wealth, and household consumption. Since national saving and investment rates are closely
934 related, a low saving rate limits the amount of investment the economy can make. It is therefore
935 not unexpected that economists and decision-makers are worried about the welfare
936 consequences of government measures that relax the conditions for house loan eligibility.
937 According to Bezemer *et al.* (2016: 652) a high mortgage-to-GDP ratio might hinder rather
938 than accelerate growth and household credit - the majority of which is in the form of mortgages
939 - has little impact on economic expansion. A high mortgage-to-GDP ratio might inhibit growth.
940 High amounts of private debt might be implied, as well as a decrease in investment and
941 innovation as well as volatility, financial fragility, and crises. In agreement, Sassi and Gasmi
942 (2014: 227) explain that the loan-to-value ratio for mortgages, which measures household
943 credit, has a negative correlation with the rise of the GDP per capita.

944 According to Lacoviello (2008: 933), the ratio of mortgage debt to disposable personal income
945 (which includes home equity lines of credit and loans) was on average 40 percent from 1960
946 to 1980 and increased to nearly 75 percent in the late 1990s in the U.S. Mortgages are typically
947 the topic of discourse when talking about household debt. Mortgages are without a doubt the
948 largest debt arrangement that most households will ever sign. According to Johnston *et al.*
949 (2021: 848), mortgages account for the majority of household debt in European and OECD
950 nations, except for post-communist states where the housing stock was substantially privatized
951 before the emergence of a thriving mortgage market. In most OECD nations, long-term home

952 loans make up between 80 percent and 90 percent of total household liabilities. Johnston *et al.*
953 (2021: 848) claim that mortgages still make up 68 percent of all household debt in the United
954 States, where student loan debt represents the greatest portion of non-mortgage household
955 borrowing (about 10 percent of the total). As a result, when household debt is discussed, it is
956 primarily referred to as borrowing used to finance the purchase of a home. Indeed, there are
957 notable co-movements between household debt and mortgage debt. Chmelar (2013: 4) argues
958 between 1995 and 2007, the stock of household debt in the European Union (EU) increased by
959 approximately three times, but in nations where real estate prices rose significantly, like Ireland
960 or Spain, the debt increased by as much as six times.

961 *b. Consumer debt and economic growth*

962 Households take on debt to cover necessary expenses or keep up with their peers' relative
963 consumption levels. Li *et al.* (2016: 159) investigate the effect of credit constraints on South
964 China's consumption. They discovered that easing credit restrictions enhances rural
965 households' consumption expenditures in developing nations. They use the PIH and LCH to
966 explain this relationship which states that by intertemporal resource allocation, households can
967 reduce their consumption expenditures over their lifetime. Li *et al.* (2016: 164) argue that
968 consumption raises the standard of living for households and boosts the effectiveness of
969 economic growth.

970 Higher consumption levels result in increases in consumption spending. Mutezo (2014)
971 examined data from 1986-2013 and discovered that higher household debt levels lead to higher
972 consumption spending, and therefore growth in South Africa. The concern arises during a
973 recessionary period in the economy when households struggle to contain these high debt levels.
974 Adewale (2014) examined data from 2007-2012 and established that there is a strong
975 relationship between increasing credit consumption and economic growth in South Africa. The
976 PIH and LCH were used to explain the relationship between household debt and consumption.
977 Asteriou and Spanos (2022: 134) investigate how the credit to private sector affects the impact
978 of household debt on economic growth from 1995 to 2018. It was found that household debt-
979 to-GDP ratios exceeding 63 percent had a negative effect on economic growth and that
980 household debt was more vulnerable to pressure when the credit supply-to-GDP ratio exceeded
981 70 percent and when the ratio goes beyond 90 percent the pressure becomes higher. Dutt (2006:
982 339) employs a Steindlian model of growth and income distribution to incorporate borrowing
983 by consumers. It demonstrates how consumer borrowing may raise demand and, in the short

984 term, enhance growth prospects. The long-term impacts of rising consumer borrowing remain
985 ambiguous, because, by increasing consumer debt, it redistributes income towards the rich who
986 have a higher propensity to save, thereby possibly depressing aggregate demand and growth
987 despite the borrowing-induced expansion.

988 Households in the South African economy have rising consumer debt. Chatterjee *et al.* (2020:
989 30) established that in the third quarter of 2019, 28 percent of all consumer credit products in
990 South Africa were unsecured debts. Using the LCH to explain these relationships they found
991 that consumers aged 18 to 24 had a default rate as high as 20 percent during the same time
992 frame. These figures clearly show that a significant portion of the South African population is
993 heavily leveraged, taking out consumer loans without any corresponding assets to back them,
994 which results in a by-default negative net worth. According to the IMF (2017: 53), economic
995 growth benefits start to decline when aggregate leverage is high.

996 Increasing household debt has been linked to modifications in the way that society provides
997 fundamental services including housing, health, education, and transportation. According to
998 Moore and Stockhammer (2018: 552), private provision has replaced social provision to the
999 extent that it has decreased or failed to grow, mediated through finance. Since housing, health,
1000 education, and transportation are important welfare expenditures that are a part of basic
1001 household spending, decreasing welfare spending in these areas leads to household borrowing
1002 which in turn leads to increased productivity in the economy. Moore and Stockhammer (2018:
1003 552) argue that when not funded by the state, household spending on these areas comes into
1004 the basic consumption basket of households and is hence a component of households' battle to
1005 sustain consumption standards.

1006 Households with high debt levels may spend most of their income on debt repayments. Taydas
1007 and Peksen (2012: 278) claim that household debt can stimulate economic growth by increasing
1008 consumption and demand for goods and services, however, when households have high levels
1009 of debt, a significant portion of their income goes towards servicing their debt obligations, such
1010 as loan repayments and interest payments. This reduces their disposable income available for
1011 consumption. As a result, consumer spending may decrease, which can negatively impact
1012 overall demand in the economy. Rees (2014: 40), found that debt servicing has proven to be
1013 detrimental to growth in an economy using a neo-Kaleckian growth model. Serra (2023: 175)
1014 builds a neo-Kaleckian model in which households can borrow to either consume or invest in
1015 human capital. In this model, household debt is sustainable if the debt servicing is compatible

1016 with household income growth. According to Serra (2023: 175), household debt can be
1017 sustained over time, and debt servicing is compatible with consumption levels above 90 percent
1018 of household income. In the short term, new borrowing stimulates economic activity, but debt
1019 servicing lowers aggregate demand by shifting income to a class with a lower marginal
1020 propensity to consume, reducing aggregate demand.

1021 Consumer spending trends are frequently monitored by marketing managers and public
1022 policymakers regularly. Even insignificant changes in consumer spending may have a
1023 significant impact on the status of a lot of firms and industries as well as the economy as a
1024 whole. Fornell (2010: 28) maintains that neither the government nor particular businesses want
1025 consumer spending to decline (except for an overheated economy), and economic policy is
1026 made to strike a balance between current spending and savings/investments to allow for future
1027 expenditure.

1028 Consumer debt has increased considerably in many countries for many decades now. Salisbury
1029 (2014: 49) claims that total outstanding consumer credit totalled \$2.84 trillion in June 2013,
1030 with \$852 billion of that from revolving credit in the U.S. According to Brown *et al.* (2015:
1031 175), U.S. consumer debt grew at an unprecedented rate, during the 2000s. Dutt (2006: 342)
1032 states that, since the late 1980s, the ratio of personal disposable income to consumer debt
1033 (excluding house mortgages) has climbed in Canada, France, and Germany, while remaining
1034 about constant in Japan and slightly declining in the UK. Dutt (2006: 342) explains that
1035 although hard time-series data are difficult to come by semi-industrialized nations like India
1036 have seen rises in consumer debt as credit card use has increased. Cavalletti *et al.* (2020: 747)
1037 postulate that household usage of consumer debt in Italy is still relatively low when compared
1038 to other European nations. However, during the 2000s, this type of debt has shown particularly
1039 high growth trends, except for a downturn caused by the financial crisis between 2010 and
1040 2015.

1041 The falling wages theory states that households with lower wage earnings borrow money to
1042 preserve path-dependent, outdated consumption norms. Barba and Pivetti (2009) claim that the
1043 theory of falling wages is consistent with popular post-Keynesian consumption models, such
1044 as the neo-Kaleckian and supermultiplier growth models. These models state that autonomous
1045 expenditures are those expenditures that are not directly connected to the circular flow of
1046 income. According to Barba and Pivetti (2009), these models suggest that in the event of an
1047 economic shock, individuals who are badly impacted will be forced to take on debt to sustain

1048 autonomous consumption, which is defined as the purchases that consumers are obligated to
1049 make even when they have no disposable income. This results in an increase in the production
1050 of goods and services in the economy to meet the consumption needs of consumers. This is
1051 explained by the AIH which states that higher household autonomous consumption raises both
1052 household debt (through new loans needed to finance it) and aggregate income.

1053 *c. Credit card debt and economic growth*

1054 One of the main sources of household debt is credit card debt, where the interest rate and credit
1055 limitations are based on the borrower's credit card usage. Kim *et al.* (2018: 437) argue that this
1056 type of debt is unsecured and solely dependent on the borrower's credit, unlike a mortgage.
1057 According to Lin *et al.* (2019: 546), credit card use has grown rapidly in developing countries
1058 such as China with the number of credit cards in circulation increasing from 3 million in 2003
1059 to 285 million in 2011. From 2010 to 2011 alone, total consumer credit card transactions
1060 increased swiftly by 47.95 per cent, from \$718.65 billion to \$1.06 trillion. Policymakers are
1061 concerned because credit card debt has increased faster than disposable income in households.
1062 Credit cards come with several advantages for customers. According to Lin *et al.* (2019: 546),
1063 these include having an accurate record of purchases, less need to carry cash, and proof of
1064 creditworthiness in the past. The increasing usage of credit cards, however, also raises the risk
1065 of many card debt issues.

1066 Credit cards have become an essential tool for financing purchases. Ekici and Dunn (2010:
1067 455) investigate the relationship between credit card debt and consumption using household-
1068 level data based on the PIH and LCH. They found that increasing credit card debt used to
1069 finance consumption is typically viewed as a positive economic stimulus. However, high
1070 amounts of debt raise the possibility that future spending may be restrained, which would
1071 eventually hinder the productivity of the economy. Ekici and Dunn (2010: 458) state that
1072 determinants like the location, age, or gender of the cardholder may have an impact on factors
1073 like payment delinquency rates. Credit card debt has a considerable and detrimental impact on
1074 the rise of both total consumption and total outlays. About 75 percent of American households
1075 carry at least one credit card, and 58 percent of those using cards do so with debt. The Federal
1076 Reserve Board estimates that the current US revolving debt, primarily credit card balances, is
1077 above \$800 billion. This shows a 600 percent rise in such debt over the last two decades.

1078 The rise in credit card usage and debt has impacted several countries around the world. Kim *et*
1079 *al.* (2018: 437) explain that in 2002, an unprecedented credit card crisis occurred in South
1080 Korea. Due to the competition among credit card firms, more people with bad credit were able
1081 to obtain credit cards. In 2002, 623 trillion South Korean won (KRW) (\$485 billion) were spent
1082 on purchases and cash advances made using credit cards. The problem finally caused 4 million
1083 borrowers to fall behind on their payments. As a result, by 2004, 357 trillion KRW (\$277
1084 billion) had been spent on credit cards. The recent financial crisis in the United States and South
1085 Korea's credit card problem are quite comparable. In the second quarter of 2013, household
1086 debt surpassed 1 quadrillion KRW (\$778 billion), while in 2014, credit card use surpassed 564
1087 trillion KRW (\$439 billion). An increase in credit card usage is also seen in New Zealand.
1088 Lie *et al.* (2010: 399) established that there are 2.1 million VISA cards and 900,000 MasterCard
1089 in use in New Zealand, with total credit card debt owed nationally over the past decade from
1090 NZ\$1.7 billion in September 1997 to NZ\$5.2 billion in October 2008. Personal credit card debt
1091 has risen to NZ\$8 billion in 2022. Ardington *et al.* (2004: 18) explain that from the period 1995
1092 to 2000 in South Africa, there was an increase in furniture loans, bank overdrafts, and credit
1093 cards from the poorest households in the category R0-R5000. Lie *et al.* (2010: 400) argue that
1094 the use of credit cards is rising, as is the total amount of credit card debt. Credit cards (and
1095 credit card symbols) act as “spending-facilitating stimuli,” and, as such, can affect the
1096 purchasing behavior of consumers.

1097 **2.2.2. Financial liberalization in South Africa**

1098 Household savings and household borrowing in South Africa have a clear inverse relationship.
1099 Prinsloo (2002: 73) established that household savings and borrowing can be discerned from
1100 the beginning of the 1980s. If household assets do not increase in a manner that is equal to or
1101 greater than their credit commitments, then a drop in household savings will result. Therefore,
1102 as the utilization of consumer credit increases, the saving of private households decreases over
1103 time. Alongside these changes, households' net worth as a percentage of their personal
1104 disposable increased.

1105 South Africa's low domestic saving rates could hinder investment-driven development in the
1106 medium run. Aron and Muellbauer (2000) emphasize the role of substantial financial
1107 liberalization in South Africa based on the PIH and LCH. They claim that the net savings ratio
1108 declined from 8 percent to 1 percent between the early 1980s and the late 1990s, ranking poorly
1109 in comparison to rates in similar emerging-market economies like Chile. In the 1990s, real

1110 interest rates were extremely high, especially following the currency crisis of 1996 - 1998 when
1111 real growth was severely depressed. The drop in South Africa's domestic saving rate is mostly
1112 attributable to the declining government saving rate from the early 1980s.

1113 The low savings rate among South African households showed negative effects on the growth
1114 of the economy. Precious and Asrat (2014: 184) explored the determinants of household
1115 savings in South Africa over the period 1990 to 2011 based on the PIH and LCH. Net household
1116 savings as a proportion of GDP typically ranged from 1.63 percent in the 1990s to 0.35 percent
1117 on average between 2000 and 2005. Net household savings as a share of GDP continued to fall
1118 between the years 2006 and 2008, averaging -0.63 percent, before modestly rising to an average
1119 of -0.20 percent from 2009 to 2011. It has been suggested that several factors contributed to
1120 households' low saving rates in the 1990s.

1121 The drop in the saving rate in the 1990s was attributed to a combination of factors including
1122 slow economic development, increased tax, and real interest costs, and reduced per capita
1123 income. Even while household saving rates were high from 1998 to 2005, dissaving was also
1124 prevalent at a significant rate. Precious and Asrat (2014: 184) explain that the consequences of
1125 financial liberalization on reducing household savings were exacerbated by growing household
1126 wealth because of rising asset values, notably housing prices, and the drop in interest rates
1127 starting in 1998. They further state that in 2002, the South African government came under fire
1128 for not encouraging savings, with economists claiming that the government was unfairly taxing
1129 high earners, which in turn had a negative impact on household savings since high earners
1130 account for most household savings in South Africa.

1131 Financial liberalization had a significant impact on household borrowing and its effects on the
1132 economy. Odhiambo (2006) emphasized the role of financial liberalization and savings in
1133 South Africa based on the LCH. The author postulates that since the start of financial
1134 liberalization in 1980, South Africa has undergone a lot of changes, such as several new
1135 financing options for the financial sector. Prinsloo (2002: 74) maintained that due to these
1136 modifications, household borrowing as a percentage of income increased. This has influenced
1137 a swift rise in credit outstanding and the correspondingly high level of household debt, which
1138 has led to a slower pace of household savings. According to Moroke *et al.* (2014: 107), if
1139 households don't save, they'll have to borrow money to satisfy their consumption needs.

1140 The widespread financial liberalization in South Africa is especially intriguing for two reasons.
1141 Firstly, South Africa's low saving rates, particularly in the private and public sectors, are a sign
1142 of the country's enduring systemic weakness, which in the 1990s was manifested in high real
1143 interest rates and reliance on inflows of capital. Secondly, despite the financial liberalization
1144 process, real house prices in South Africa have decreased almost consistently since 1984, as a
1145 result, households have more disposable income to spend on consumption, hence, financial
1146 liberalization has directly affected consumption which then results in an increase in
1147 productivity of goods and services in the economy. According to Aron and Muellbauer (2000:
1148 16), the various aspects of financial liberalization in South Africa could have a direct, beneficial
1149 impact on household debt, with, for example, more freely available credit card loans, lower
1150 down payments as a percentage of house values, and more freely available housing equity loans
1151 to existing owners.

1152 The level of interest rates has a significant effect on household borrowing. Mutezo (2014: 75)
1153 claims that since 2001, a substantial decrease in interest rates occurred. This resulted in a
1154 decrease in mortgage loan interest payments, which make up the majority of household debt-
1155 service payments in South Africa. According to Azzouza (2021: 29), the decline in interest rates
1156 could have been a result of the dot com bubble in 2001 where a recession in global trade
1157 occurred affecting economic sectors around the world and leading to a state of economic
1158 recession. In a study of South African households between 1980 and 2005, Aron, Muellbauer,
1159 and Prinsloo (2007) discover a favorable correlation between the real interest rate on borrowing
1160 and the debt-to-income ratio. According to Mutezo (2014: 75), South Africa's debt service ratio
1161 decreased by 6 percent because of a decrease in interest rates between 2003 and 2005.
1162 According to Aron and Muellbauer (2013), the amount of credit accessible by all sectors
1163 increased rapidly until 2006 before declining following the interest rate shock to the same low
1164 levels that prevailed before 2004.

1165 The financial crisis has had major impacts on the levels of household borrowing and the growth
1166 of the South African economy. Moroke *et al.* (2014: 107) argue that with stock markets falling,
1167 financial institutions collapsing, and governments forced to intervene with bailouts while
1168 focused on regulatory reform, the 2007–2009 crisis had a significant impact on economies.
1169 South Africa's GDP decline was 15.3 percent in 2009 and the debt-to-disposable income ratio
1170 was over 82 percent, but it fell to 75.6 percent in the first quarter of 2013. High levels of
1171 household debt are due to a lack of a comprehensive savings culture among people. This

1172 problem was caused by financial illiteracy on the part of the consumers who spend almost all
1173 their income leaving little if nothing for their savings and investments.

1174 **2.3. Conclusion**

1175 Household debt has increased significantly in several countries over the last few decades. This
1176 chapter investigates the effect of household debt on economic growth in South Africa using
1177 first-generation theories; the absolute income hypothesis, the life cycle hypothesis, the
1178 permanent income hypothesis, and second-generation theories; the neo-Kalekian model, Super
1179 multiplier model and the Steindl model to explain the behavior of household debt and growth
1180 overtime. Mortgage provision has been one of the principal drivers of growth in the financial
1181 sector, and most household debt takes the form of mortgage debt. Authors such as Moore and
1182 Stockhammer (2018), Stockhammer and Wildauer (2017), and Wood and Stockhammer (2023)
1183 discover that house prices fuel the build-up of household debt because they loosen credit
1184 restrictions through the collateral impact and increase household indebtedness through the
1185 wealth effect. Because of their increasing wealth, households may not be credit-constrained but
1186 instead boost their spending. This can be done by borrowing through mortgage equity
1187 withdrawals. Hence, they find that house prices are a major determinant of household debt, and
1188 household debt contributes to economic growth. However, Bezemer *et al.* (2016) and Sassi and
1189 Gasmi (2014) discover that a high mortgage-to-GDP ratio might hinder rather than accelerate
1190 growth and household credit - the majority of which is in the form of mortgages - has little
1191 impact on economic expansion. Authors such as Adewale (2014), Dutt (2006), Mutezo (2014),
1192 and Taydas and Peksen (2012) found that strong relationship between increasing credit
1193 consumption and economic growth. They discovered that higher household debt levels lead to
1194 higher consumption spending, and therefore growth. However, Dutt (2006) states that in the
1195 long run, the effects of increasing consumer borrowing are ambiguous because, increasing
1196 consumer debt, redistributes income toward the rich who have a higher propensity to save,
1197 thereby possibly depressing aggregate demand and growth despite the borrowing-induced
1198 expansion. Ekici and Dunn (2010: 455) investigated the relationship between credit card debt
1199 and consumption using household-level data and found that increasing credit card debt used to
1200 finance consumption is typically viewed as a positive economic stimulus. However, high
1201 amounts of debt raise the possibility that future spending may be restrained, which would
1202 eventually hinder the productivity of the economy. Authors such as Abd Samad *et al.* (2020)

1203 and Lombardi *et al.* (2017) state that household debt has a short-term positive effect on growth
1204 but is detrimental to growth in the long run.

1205 An increase in household debt has a significant impact on economic growth, with higher levels
1206 of household debt being associated with either a positive or negative effect on the overall
1207 economic growth of a country. This hypothesis could be tested by collecting data, analyzing
1208 trends, and performing statistical analysis to determine the effect of specific household debt
1209 types on economic growth in South Africa and to estimate growth-maximizing thresholds of
1210 specific household debt types. Tighter macroprudential measures or tighter mortgage interest
1211 deductions are two approaches that could address the issue of household debt.

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CHAPTER 3: HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN SOUTH AFRICA

1225

1226 **3.0. Introduction**


1227 The South African household sector's level of debt has lately reached unprecedented levels,
1228 sparking attention to this statistic, and raising questions about its sustainability and the overall
1229 state of household finances in some quarters. This chapter provides an overview of recent
1230 changes in the aggregates of household debt and addresses the trends and changing composition
1231 of household debt in South Africa.

1232 **3.1. Trends of household debt variables**

1233 Household debt is often expressed as a ratio of the annualized disposable income of households.
1234 This ratio of household debt to disposable income is displayed in Figure 3.1. According to van
1235 den Heever (2006: 54) it will be noted that the household debt ratio fluctuated significantly
1236 during the 1970s, when credit ceilings were in place from the late 1960s to 1972, slowing the
1237 rate of increase in bank credit extension. As the ceilings were lifted in 1972, credit growth
1238 accelerated. However, at the same time, nominal disposable income increased sharply due to
1239 rising gold prices and accelerating inflation, which only decreased to single digits in the early
1240 1990s after reaching double digits in 1974. As a result, the household debt ratio increased
1241 moderately. van den Heever (2006: 54) claims that credit ceilings were once again enforced
1242 between 1976 and 1980, which slowed the rate of growth in bank credit extension. When they
1243 were abolished in September 1980, credit-hungry consumers streamed to the banks to apply
1244 for loans that had not been previously available. In the early 1980s, there was significant growth
1245 in household debt due to factors such as financial liberalization, low-interest rates, growing
1246 employment and income levels, and another gold boom that reduced the sensitivity to
1247 borrowers' creditworthiness.

1248 Households' appetite for debt was dampened by a sharp tightening of monetary policy and a
1249 decline in economic prospects after the household debt ratio rose sharply until the mid-1980s.
1250 van den Heever (2006: 54) explains that in 1984, the prime overdraft rate - which acts as a
1251 benchmark lending rate - was increased drastically to 25 percent annually. Economic sanctions
1252 were also placed on South Africa, damaging economic prospects and confidence. In this
1253 process, the debt ratio rapidly decreased.

1254 Black South Africans were able to acquire businesses and real estate in previously forbidden
1255 areas and to utilize the banking system, including its credit facilities, on a larger scale after
1256 discriminatory laws were lifted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bond (2012: 18) states that
1257 when banks and building societies participated in around 200,000 township housing mortgage
1258 bonds, the debt ratio began to rise again in the late 1980s.



1259

1260 Figure 3.1: Ratio of household debt to disposable income (van den Heever (2006: 55))

1261 According to van den Heever (2006: 54), the upward trend in the debt ratio continued until
1262 1996, leveling off as a tight monetary policy was maintained. However, following the 1998
1263 Asian financial crisis, interest rates shot up to all-time highs, with the prime overdraft rate
1264 rising as high as 25.5 percent annually. This resulted in decreased spending, a decline in real
1265 estate prices and activity, and stopped households' use of credit in its tracks. Even with interest
1266 rates falling significantly between 1999 and 2001, households were still reluctant to take on
1267 more debt. van den Heever (2006: 54) explains that a relatively mild tightening of interest rates
1268 in 2002 also had a role in the restrained rise of household debt. It was not until 2003 that the
1269 debt ratio began to rise once more due to a decrease in interest rates. Rising house prices
1270 reinforced the demand for and supply of mortgage finance, while the ready availability of such
1271 finance, alongside strong consumer confidence, contributed to rising house prices.

1272 The financial crisis of 2007–2009 emerged in the U.S. Moroke *et al.* (2014: 107) state that
1273 South Africa and the majority of developing nations were also negatively impacted by this
1274 crisis. According to the SARB Financial Stability Report (SARB, 2009: 22) the growth rates
1275 of household financial assets and net worth have been steadily declining, and they began to
1276 decrease in the third and fourth quarters of 2008. This may indicate that households may be
1277 liquidating part of their financial assets to reduce their debt during this period of financial strain.
1278 Large revaluation losses in household financial assets may have resulted from declining equity
1279 prices, which might have a detrimental effect on funded pension systems.

1280 Consumer confidence has been undermined and the outlook for consumption has been
1281 weakened by the financial market volatility and the increasingly noticeable economic
1282 slowdown. According to SARB (2009: 23), the gain in consumer confidence that occurred in
1283 the third quarter of 2008 was undone in the fourth quarter when the index point value dropped
1284 to -4. Consequently, consumer expenditure remained subdued. Despite lower borrowing prices
1285 in December 2008 and January 2009, banks and other licensed credit providers tightened their
1286 lending rules, making it harder for households to get credit. It also appears that households are
1287 reluctant to accumulate more debt. SARB (2009: 23) found that from the second quarter of
1288 2008, the annual growth rate of household credit has been declining, and as of January 2009,
1289 it was 8.4 percent. In the second half of 2008, there was a rise in the number of credit-active
1290 consumers, and 7,3 million (41,6 percent of credit-active consumers) had credit records that
1291 were impaired.



1292 The indebtedness of the household sector represents a potential channel of contagion through
1293 which an external shock can affect the financial system. According to the SARB (2009: 23),
1294 such a shock can take the form of a sharper or more prolonged slowdown in the economy. In
1295 the fourth quarter of 2008, the rate of increase in household debt on an annual basis decreased.
1296 During the same period, household debt increased slightly as a percentage of GDP and
1297 disposable income. Furthermore, there were slight increases in the financing costs of household
1298 debt (income gearing) and capital gearing over the same period, reflecting relatively high
1299 borrowing costs.

1300 According to SARB Annual Economic Report (SARB, 2012: 10) 2009 saw a fall in household
1301 real final consumption spending for the first time in 17 years. Thereafter, the household sector's
1302 consumption expenditure recovered, with growth rates of 3.7 percent in 2010 and 5.2 percent
1303 in 2011. Rather than being boosted by credit extension, household expenditure in 2011 was

1304 mostly financed by income growth. With an average nominal household debt of R1 317 billion
1305 in 2011, nominal household debt increased by 7.2 percent from 2010.

1306 SARB (2012: 10) explains that this rate of increase is, however, substantially lower than the
1307 average rate of increase of around 20 percent between 2003 and 2008 (see Figure 3.2 panel A).
1308 Nonetheless, since the fourth quarter of 2008, the increase in household debt has lagged behind
1309 the growth in disposable income for households. Thus, from an average of 78,2 percent in 2010
1310 to 75,9 percent in 2011 and 74,7 percent in the first quarter of 2012, the ratio of household debt
1311 to disposable income decreased.

1312 Muneri and Kuhn (2023: 98) state that the household debt-service cost to disposable income
1313 ratio, which displays the proportion of disposable income required annually to cover interest
1314 payments on existing debt, is a measure of a household's ability to pay back debt interest. (see
1315 Figure 3.2 panels B and C). The ratio indicates how much disposable income is diverted away
1316 from consumption expenditure to pay interest on current debt and indicates if households could,
1317 from a cash flow perspective, afford to sustain further debt to support final consumption
1318 expenditure.



1319


1320 Figure 3.2: Panel A shows the ratio of debt to disposable income (SARB Annual Economic
 1321 Report (SARB, 2012: 10)). Panel B and C show household debt and disposable income (Muneri
 1322 and Kuhn (2023: 98))

1323 The SARB Financial Stability Review (SARB, 2016: 20) explains that growth in household
 1324 debt moderated slightly to 5,6 percent year on year in the fourth quarter of 2015, but the low
 1325 growth in household income coupled with increasing interest rates have put more pressure on
 1326 household finances.

1327 Furthermore, households are especially susceptible to economic downturns, interest rate
 1328 shocks, and income shocks due to their ongoing high levels of debt. SARB (2016: 21) found
 1329 that the rise of overdrafts, advances, and general loans accelerated in the fourth quarter of 2015,


1330 accounting for 4,5 percent of the credit given to households. In the fourth quarter of 2015,
 1331 household mortgage advances increased by 4,4 percent year over year, from 3.8 percent. The
 1332 National Credit Regulator reports that there was a decline in the demand for credit as evidenced
 1333 by the 52,7 percent rejection rate by lenders in the third quarter of 2015, down from 56 percent
 1334 in the second quarter, and the 2,4 percent decline in credit applications during the same period.

1335 According to the SARB Financial Stability Review (SARB, 2019: 28) the rise in household
 1336 debt remained on its upward trend, rising from 5.9 percent in the first quarter of 2019 to 6.3
 1337 percent in the second (see Figure 3.3). Since the second quarter of 2017 (Figure 3.4), the growth
 1338 in credit granted to households has been steadily rising. It grew from 5.9 percent in the first
 1339 quarter of 2019 to 6.2 percent in the second quarter. The substantial rise in unsecured loans to
 1340 the residential sector is especially concerning. The majority of this expansion, according to
 1341 SARB (2019: 28), has been caused by an increase in the more expensive forms of credit (credit
 1342 cards, advances, and general loans), which may be a sign that households are becoming more
 1343 financially vulnerable. Steady debt growth increases household income, encourages spending,
 1344 and ultimately fosters economic growth. However, growing debt (particularly unsecured debt)
 1345 in an economy that is contracting, together with a slowdown in the rise of disposable income,
 1346 raises concerns about the sector’s ability to service its debt.



1347

1348 Figure 3.3: South African household debt (SARB Financial Stability Review (SARB, 2019:
 1349 28))




1351

1352 Figure 3.4: Composition of household credit (SARB Financial Stability Review (SARB, 2019:
1353 28))

1354 After a steep run-up during the lending boom of the mid-2000s, household debt peaked at close
1355 to 88 percent of annual disposable income in 2008. The SARB Financial Stability Review
1356 (2021: 5) explains that household debt as a percentage of income gradually decreased after the
1357 global financial crisis and the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, which was passed to promote a
1358 fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit. However, as a result of
1359 COVID-19, the debt ratio rose once again in 2020, reaching 75 percent by the end of the year.
1360 Although it is below its 2008 peak, household debt remains above the levels recorded before
1361 the mid-2000s and exceeds its long-term average of 70 percent of disposable income.

1362 Muneri and Kuhn (2023: 95) postulate that the amount of outstanding household debt in South
1363 Africa increased at an average annual rate of 5.2 percent between 2015 and 2022. As of the
1364 second quarter of 2023, the total outstanding balance was R2 783 billion, of which credit
1365 granted by the banking industry accounted for 75 percent and credit from non-bank entities for
1366 25 percent. The amounts payable to municipalities amount to 8.3 percent of non-bank debt.
1367 Mortgage advances, the single-largest credit category, accounted for 45.7 percent in the second


1368 quarter of 2023, with its contribution falling from 48.7 percent in the first quarter of 2015 due
 1369 to an increase in the relative exposure to other accounts payable and short-term loans.



1370

1371 Figure 3.5: Level and composition of household debt (Muneri and Kuhn (2023: 95))

1372 Figure 3.6 shows that the ratio of credit card debt to GDP has generally increased over the
 1373 years, indicating that acquiring credit card debt has become relatively easier. On the other hand,
 1374 the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP has also shown an increasing trend, suggesting that acquiring
 1375 mortgage debt has become more accessible as well. This data implies that both credit card and
 1376 mortgage debt have become easier to acquire over time, potentially reflecting changes in
 1377 lending practices, economic conditions, and consumer behaviour. It is important to note that
 1378 other factors such as interest rates, lending standards, and regulatory policies also play a
 1379 significant role in determining the difficulty and ease of acquiring these types of debt.



1380

1381 Figure 3.6: Comparison between credit card debt and mortgage debt as a ratio of GDP.

1382 **3.2. Conclusion**

1383 The household sector’s debt and debt-service cost statistics, together with related ratios to
 1384 disposable income, facilitate the analysis of household indebtedness in South Africa. The
 1385 domestic household sector remains vulnerable but resilient amid the challenging
 1386 macroeconomic environment. The impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the COVID-19
 1387 pandemic on economic activity, thus far, has had the largest detrimental impact on household
 1388 income and balance sheet positions. From a policy perspective, further work needs to be done
 1389 to understand the impact of household debt on the South African financial system, specifically
 1390 focusing on disaggregated household debt data to provide a complete picture of vulnerabilities
 1391 in the household sector.

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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

1396 **4.0. Introduction**

1397 Having examined, as part of the study's literature component, the effect of household debt on
1398 economic growth, the attention is now on the empirical aspects of the investigation of the nature
1399 of the relationship between household debt and economic growth. The overall goal is to
1400 determine the effect of household debt on economic growth in South Africa. More specifically,
1401 to determine the effect of specific household debt types on economic growth in South Africa,
1402 and to estimate growth-maximizing thresholds of specific household debt types. The chapter
1403 presents the methodology employed to investigate the effect of household debt on economic
1404 growth. The chapter includes the model specification and unit root tests, the empirical strategy
1405 which includes data sources and definitions and the research paradigm which includes research
1406 philosophy and research type. By thoroughly documenting the approach, the aim is to provide
1407 transparency and rigor in the research process, ensuring the reliability and validity of the
1408 findings.

1409 **4.1. Model specification and unit root tests**

1410 Firstly, this study employs the augmented Dicky–Fuller (ADF) test to check the stationarity of
1411 the variables. The null hypothesis is $H_0: \delta = 0$ which implies that the series contains a unit root,
1412 and the lag will be chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The ADF test
1413 equation may be estimated as follows:

$$1414 \quad \Delta Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \delta Y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i \Delta Y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

1415 The approach integrates the definition and estimate of a growth equation based on the growth
1416 and debt literature to evaluate the effect of household debt on growth, in accordance with both
1417 previous empirical results and the relevant economic theory which states that household debt
1418 can boost economic growth in the short run, however, in the medium term, high debt in the
1419 economy can make a recession deeper and longer.

1420 The ADF test incorporates lagged differences in the regression equation, allowing it to capture
1421 trends and serial correlation in data, which makes it suitable for a wide range of time series.
1422 The ADF test provides straightforward results, making it easy to interpret. The test statistic is
1423 compared to critical values to determine stationarity, simplifying the decision-making process.

1424 ADF is versatile and can handle different time trends, including linear and quadratic trends,
1425 providing flexibility in analysing various types of time series data.

1426 Alternatively, a Philips-Perron unit root test is performed to check the stationarity of the
1427 variables. The null hypothesis is $H_0: \delta = 0$ which implies that the series contains a unit root,
1428 The test is an extension of the Dickey-Fuller test and is designed to address some of its
1429 limitations. The Philips-Perron test equation may be estimated as follows:

$$1430 \quad \Delta Y_t = \alpha + \beta_t + \gamma Y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \delta_i \Delta Y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

1431 The Philips-Perron unit root test offers flexibility in handling various deterministic
1432 components, making it robust to serial correlation, less sensitive to model specification, and
1433 adept at detecting unit roots with improved power properties. Its capacity to accommodate
1434 structural breaks and handle heteroscedasticity makes it suitable for analysing data with
1435 evolving characteristics.

1436 According to Mian *et al.* (2017), the full dynamic relation between debt and GDP growth is
1437 most easily seen in a VAR specification with a VAR Granger causality/block exogeneity test,
1438 variance decomposition, and impulse responses from a Cholesky identification scheme. It is
1439 important to clarify from the outset that the VAR analysis is not meant to identify causal
1440 patterns.

1441 The study also employs a Toda-Yamamoto test for mortgage debt. The Toda-Yamamoto test
1442 verifies the existence of long-term equilibrium relationships between variables. It applies a
1443 standard VAR model while variables are in levels rather than first differences (unlike the
1444 Granger causality test) implying that the risk of wrongly identifying the order of integration of
1445 the series is minimized. According to Marire (2023: 4), a Toda-Yamamoto Vector
1446 Autoregressive (TY-VAR) model was developed so as to retain test statistics, ‘*t*’ and ‘*F*’, that
1447 follow standard distributions. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) show that when series in a system
1448 of equations are integrated of different orders, the ‘*t*’ and ‘*F*’ statistics follow non-standard
1449 distributions. To correct that problem, they devised an estimation procedure that essentially
1450 overfits the VAR. The TY-VAR system for net household savings was represented as:

$$1451 \quad \ln g d p p c_t = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \Pi_i \ln g d p p c_{t-i} + \sum_{j=n}^{d \max} \Pi_j \ln g d p p c_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \quad (3)$$

1452 In Equation (2), α is a constant, Π_i is an $n \times n$ matrix of coefficients, $\varepsilon_t \approx iid(0, \Omega)$, d_{max} is
1453 the maximum order of integration. If all the variables are integrated of the same order, the term
1454 $\sum_{j=n}^{d_{max}} \Pi_j \ln g d p p c$ is dropped and a standard VAR is modelled.

1455 According to Gujarati and Porter (2003: 788), the VAR model is easy to use; it eliminates the
1456 need to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous variables. In VAR, every variable is
1457 endogenous. The estimation is simple; that is, each equation may be estimated independently
1458 using the standard OLS method. It has desirable properties such as consistency, asymptotic
1459 normality, and asymptotic efficiency. In many instances, the forecasts produced by this
1460 approach exceed those produced by the more complex simultaneous-equation models.
1461 Alternatively, Method of Moments (MoM), and Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE)
1462 estimation methods could be used.

1463 There is a need to determine the growth-maximising debt level because it is crucial to keeping
1464 the economy stable and growing while avoiding the negative effects of high debt. Therefore, a
1465 quadratic regression is employed,

$$1466 \quad y = \alpha x^2 + \beta x + c \quad (4)$$

1467 where $\alpha \neq 0$. This regression will be run for each debt type. Household debt, credit card debt
1468 and mortgage debt.

1469 ***4.1.1 Diagnostic tests***

1470 Diagnostics tests such as normality tests, serial correlation tests, heteroscedasticity tests, and
1471 stability tests are carried out. Diagnostic tests determine if the VAR model fits the data and if
1472 the model's underlying assumptions are met. They help identify model misspecification,
1473 determine the optimal lag order, assess the quality of predictions, and offer insights into the
1474 relationships between variables. The diagnostic tests are performed because they identify both
1475 strengths and weaknesses of the models. Model diagnostics involve checking how well the
1476 model fits, if the model fits poorly, we consider changing the specification of the model.

1477 According to Gujarati and Porter (2003: 131) the normality test is done via Jarque–Bera (JB).
1478 The JB test of normality is an asymptotic, or large-sample, test. It is also based on the OLS
1479 residuals. This test first computes the skewness and kurtosis measures of the OLS residuals and
1480 uses the following test statistic:

1481
$$JB = \frac{n}{6} (S^2 + \frac{1}{4} (K - 3)^2) \tag{5}$$

1482 where n is the sample size, S is the sample skewness and K is the sample kurtosis. The null
 1483 hypothesis (H_0) of the Jarque-Bera test is that the data follows a normal distribution. If the
 1484 calculated JB test statistic is significantly different from zero, it suggests that the null
 1485 hypothesis should be rejected, indicating non-normality in the data.

1486 The Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test is a valuable tool in econometrics, combining the Breusch–
 1487 Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and the Godfrey test for serial correlation (Gujarati and Porter,
 1488 2003: 385). By assessing both issues simultaneously, the test helps researchers to identify and
 1489 address violations of key regression assumptions. Its benefits include improved diagnostic
 1490 information, robustness checks, model improvement, avoidance of biased inferences, enhanced
 1491 model validity, and compatibility with time series data. The test provides a comprehensive
 1492 evaluation of residuals, contributing to more reliable and accurate regression results. The
 1493 Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test statistic can be written as follows:

1494
$$\Theta = \frac{1}{2} (ESS) \tag{6}$$

1495 that is, Θ follows the chi-square distribution with $(m - 1)$ degrees of freedom.

1496 Stability is an important consideration when working with Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
 1497 models. Stability in the context of VAR models means that the processes are well-behaved and
 1498 that shocks to the system do not have explosive effects over time. The VAR stability tests
 1499 performed include the roots of the characteristic polynomial - the characteristic polynomial is
 1500 derived from the lag operator applied to the VAR model. All roots should lie inside the unit
 1501 circle for stability and the impulse response function - analysing the impulse response functions
 1502 can also provide insights into the stability of the VAR model. If the responses to shocks do not
 1503 explode over time, it is an indication of stability.

1504 **4.2. Empirical strategy**

1505 **4.2.1. Data sources and definitions**

1506 The key variables of the study are overall household debt, credit card debt, mortgage debt, and
 1507 economic growth. Following Abd Samad *et al.* (2020), Daud *et al.* (2021: 161), Kereeditse and
 1508 Mpundu (2021), Li *et al.* (2022), and Samad *et al.* (2022) among others, control variables in
 1509 the analysis include government spending and interest rates.

1510 The South African Reserve Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis were the sources
 1511 of data. The period of study is 1987Q3 to 2022Q1. The period is selected due to the availability
 1512 of data.

1513 The data sources and definitions are presented in Table 4.1. It is important to note a few
 1514 important definition conventions in this paper.

1515 Table 4.1: Data sources and definitions

Variable	Variable definition	Data source
GDP per capita (logGDPpc)	Utilized GDP per capita, defined as the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes, divided by mid-year population. Measured as log (GDPpc)	SARB
Household debt (hhd _t)	Ratio of household debt to disposable income, in percent.	SARB
Credit card debt(lncreditcrd _t)	Type of unsecured liability that is incurred through revolving credit card loans. Measured as log (credit card debt)	SARB
Mortgage debt(lnmortdebt _t)	A mortgage is a loan of money which you get from a bank or building society in order to buy a house. Measured as log (mortgage debt)	SARB
Interest rates (Irt _t)	Prime lending rate is an interest rate used by banks, usually the interest rate at which banks lend to customers with good credit.	Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
Government expenditure (gvtexp _t)	Government expenditure can be defined as the total sum of money a government uses to finance its activities and functions, in percent.	SARB

1516

1517 **4.2.2 Justification of variables**

1518 The dependent variable is GDP per capita which captures the level of economic development.
1519 It shows how the size of the economic pie is growing relative to the mouths that feed on it. So,
1520 finance-led growth policies envisage credit driving the size of the pie at a faster rate than
1521 demographic growth.

1522 The paper controls for several explanatory variables. Following authors such as Abd Samad *et*
1523 *al.* (2020), Asteriou *et al.* (2022), and Bezemer *et al.* (2016), household debt is examined to
1524 understand its relationship with economic growth. This is essential to the study because high
1525 levels of household debt can affect consumer spending, saving and investment patterns, and
1526 ultimately, economic growth. Government expenditure has an effect on growth and can
1527 indirectly influence household debt levels on economic growth, for instance, government
1528 expenditure on social programs can reduce household reliance on debt. According to Mian *et*
1529 *al.* (2017), interest rates are controlled for because they play a significant role in influencing
1530 household debt levels. Changes in interest rates can directly impact the borrowing behaviours
1531 of households, as well as impact investment and inflation which affect growth.

1532 **4.3. Research Paradigm**

1533 **4.3.1. Research Philosophy**

1534 The research philosophy used in this study is Positivism – which is commonly used in
1535 quantitative studies. Ryan (2018: 4) explains that positivists believe that there are facts that can
1536 be proven, the reality is the same for each person, and observation and measurement tell us
1537 what that reality is.

1538 According to Alharahsheh and Pius (2020: 41), finding visible and quantifiable facts or
1539 regularities is the main goal of the research. Additionally, the phenomena measured and
1540 observed will lead to the development of credible and meaningful data. The aim is to find a
1541 causal relationship between household debt and economic growth in South Africa.

1542 **4.3.2. Research type**

1543 A deductive (quantitative) research type is used, this tends to be confirmatory in approach.
1544 Soiferman (2010: 3) defines deduction as beginning with the general and ending with the
1545 specific. Deductive researchers “work from the ‘top-down’, from a theory to hypotheses to data

1546 to confirm or confute theory. In theory, a rise in household debt boosts growth in the short term
1547 but may give rise to macroeconomic and financial stability risks in the medium to long term.
1548 The objective is to investigate the effect of overall household debt and specific debt types on
1549 economic growth in South Africa and to identify the thresholds at which a given type of debt
1550 maximizes growth.

1551 **4.4. Conclusion**

1552 In conclusion, this methodology chapter has outlined the research methods employed in this
1553 study to address the research objectives of determining the effect of household debt on
1554 economic growth in South Africa and more specifically, to determine the effect of specific
1555 household debt types on economic growth in South Africa and to estimate growth-maximizing
1556 thresholds of specific household debt types. The chosen methods were carefully selected based
1557 on their alignment with the research questions and the nature of the phenomenon under
1558 investigation. This study uses publicly available data; thus, no ethical clearance was required.
1559 The methodology employed in this study provides a solid foundation for generating reliable
1560 and meaningful results. By adopting a rigorous and ethical approach to data collection, this
1561 research aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the effects of household debt
1562 on economic growth in South Africa.

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1570 5.0. Introduction

1571 In this chapter, the results of the effect of household debt on economic growth in South Africa
1572 are presented. The primary objective of this research is to, first, investigate the effect of overall
1573 household debt on economic growth in South Africa. Secondly, to determine the effect of
1574 specific household debt types on growth. Lastly, to identify the thresholds at which a given
1575 type of debt will maximize growth. Through data collection and analysis, valuable insights
1576 have been uncovered on the effects of household debt on economic growth in South Africa.

1577 In this chapter, scatter plots and trend analyses are carried out, followed by the interpretation
1578 of unit root results and VAR results. The results presented contribute to the existing body of
1579 knowledge in economics specifically in an African country because research on the effects of
1580 household debt on economic growth in African economies is lacking, therefore, offering
1581 insights that can inform future research and policy development is crucial.


1582 5.1. Descriptive analysis

1583 Figure 5.1 shows that there is a positive relationship between GDP per capita and household
1584 debt. The correlation is $(\sqrt{0.6747}) = 0.82$, which is strong. Gelb (2003: 30) states that from
1585 the mid-1970s, South Africa endured a period of crisis as political and economic issues
1586 intensified and ultimately brought about the country's democratic transition. In the first half of
1587 the 1980s, liberalization increased conflict, which was further heightened by economic
1588 problems following the rise in global interest rates and the 1981 collapse of the gold price. Gelb
1589 (2003: 30) explains that in 1985, international creditors forced capital outflows for debt
1590 repayment as a response to risk, which led to contractionary macroeconomic policies that
1591 guaranteed a current account surplus. GDP growth decreased as the crisis deepened, going from
1592 5.5 percent annually in the 1960s to 3.3 percent in the 1970s and 1.2 percent in the 1980s.
1593 According to Marire (2023: 59) up until the 1990s, the household debt to disposable income
1594 ratio, and the repo positively co-evolved. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, however, the
1595 connection changed, with the debt ratio increasing by around 20 percent and the repo rate
1596 decreasing by approximately 37 percent. A falling policy rate tends to cause households to
1597 accumulate more debt. Household savings fell significantly from the 2000s to the 2020s.

1598 A rise in household debt from the early 1990s to the 2000s could have been a result of the dot
1599 com bubble from mid-90s-2000/1 where a recession in global trade occurred affecting
1600 economic sectors around the world and led to an economic recession. According to Östensson
1601 (2012: 17), from 2002 to 2008, world commodity markets experienced a dramatic increase in
1602 demand and spectacular price rises. The rising commodity prices affect economic growth and
1603 employment, which affects household incomes and levels of borrowing, which further affect
1604 economic growth.


1605 Figure 5.2 reveals that the 2007-2009 financial crises influenced the household debt level in
1606 South Africa. The level of household indebtedness reached new heights. According to
1607 Kereeditse and Mpundu (2021: 116), credit from the banking sector in the form of loans and
1608 advances to households increased from R 10 million in 2008 to R 14.7 million in 2015.
1609 According to the IMF (2017: 54), the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in highly indebted
1610 households defaulting on debt and many loans turning into bad debt and non-performing loans,
1611 resulting in systemic financial instability. Household debt levels have decreased post-COVID
1612 due to lockdown measures being removed resulting in functioning economic activity.

1613



1614

1615 Figure 5.1: Scatter plots of household debt and GDP per capita



1616

1617 Figure 5.2: Household debt and GDP per capita

1618 **5.2. Results and analysis**

1619 The empirical analysis begins with a number of preliminaries, which involve the unit root test,
 1620 cointegration test, and Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) tests. All of
 1621 these tests support VAR selection with dependence on the conventional Cholesky ordering.
 1622 Before the empirical results are presented, the endogeneity problems in the estimation of the
 1623 household debt-growth relationship are discussed and a solution is proposed in the form of a
 1624 VAR framework. According to Benitez *et al.* (2016: 2), the endogeneity problem is often
 1625 ignored, and when not properly corrected it may generate errors in the estimation of coefficients
 1626 leading to non-correct results. Therefore, the endogeneity of household debt and economic
 1627 growth is taken into consideration when examining the relationship between them.

1628 **5.2.1 Unit root tests**

1629 An Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is performed to determine the stationarity of variables. The
 1630 null hypothesis states that the time series is not stationary. Therefore, if the test statistic is
 1631 significant at the 5 percent level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected, and it is
 1632 concluded that the time series is stationary in levels, otherwise, it has to be differenced (Gujarati
 1633 and Porter, 2009). The variables GDP per capita, household debt, credit card debt, interest rates,
 1634 and government expenditure, have a unit root problem, therefore they are non-stationary in
 1635 level terms but stationary in first difference terms as stated in Table 5.1, they are integrated of
 1636 order 1, however, mortgage debt is integrated of order 2.

1637 Alternatively, a Philips-Peron test is performed to determine the stationarity of variables. The
 1638 null hypothesis states that the time series is not stationary. Therefore, if the test statistic is
 1639 significant at the 5 percent level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected, and it is
 1640 concluded that the time series is stationary in levels, otherwise, it has to be differenced (Gujarati
 1641 and Porter, 2009). Credit card debt is stationary in level terms, it is integrated of order zero.
 1642 The variables GDP per capita, household debt, interest rates, and government expenditure, have
 1643 a unit root problem, therefore they are non-stationary in level terms but stationary in first
 1644 difference terms as stated in Table 5.1, they are integrated of order 1, however, mortgage debt
 1645 is integrated of order 2.

1646 A Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Scdmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root test is performed to determine the
 1647 absence of a unit root in mortgage debt. The null hypothesis states that mortgage debt is
 1648 stationary. At the 1 percent level of significance, it is concluded that the mortgage debt is
 1649 stationary after first difference.

1650 Table 5.1: Unit root results

Variable	Levels		1 st Difference		2 nd Difference		Order of integration
	Drift	Drift and Trend	Drift	Drift and Trend	Drift	Drift and Trend	
ADF unit root results							
lngdppc	-3.349**	1.0745	-3.020**	-4.771***			I (1)
Hhd	-1.576	-1.034	-14.788***	-14.857***			I (1)

Increditerd	-4.516***	-0.703	-11.808***	-13.441***			I (1)
Inmortdebt	-2.138	-1.625	-1.994	-2.682	-4.666***	-4.632***	I (2)
Irt	-1.396	-1.825	-9.572***	-9.592***			I (1)
gvtxp	-1.562	-2.462	-15.759***	-15.723***			I (1)
Philips-Peron unit root results							
lngdppc	-6.486***	-0.989	-14.365***	19.181***			I (1)
Hhd	-1.554	-1.423	-14.392***	-14.448***			I (1)
Increditerd	-2.880*	-6.105***					I (0)
Inmortdebt	-3.302**	-0.616	-2.467	-2.747	-12.152***	-12.136***	I (2)
Irt	-1.230	-1.713	-10.364***	-10.510***			I (1)
gvtxp	-1.947	-2.854	-19.483***	-20.260***			I (1)
Kpss unit root test							
Inmortdebt	1.453	0.309	0.705***	0.084***			I (1)

1651 * means $p < 0.10$; ** means $p < 0.05$ and *** means $p < 0.01$

1652 *5.2.2. Optimal debt thresholds*

1653 Table 5.2 presents results estimated from an OLS model to determine the thresholds of debt for
1654 household debt, credit card debt, and mortgage debt with respect to economic growth in South
1655 Africa. The results indicate that for household debt in South Africa, the estimated growth-
1656 maximising overall debt threshold is 70 percent of household disposable income (column (1)).
1657 The results indicate that for credit card debt in South Africa (column (2)), the estimated optimal
1658 threshold could be around ZAR72 403. The estimated optimal threshold for mortgage debt in

1659 South Africa for credit card debt is ZAR 5 980 000 (column (3)). The regression in (3) was
 1660 estimated in first difference since mortgage debt was found to be integrated of order two.

1661 According to Cecchetti *et al.* (2011: 1), household debt beyond 85 percent of GDP undermines
 1662 growth. Cecchetti *et al.* (2011: 1) state that high levels of household debt can cause bankruptcy
 1663 and financial damage to both households and financial institutions when funds are lent out to
 1664 people who are unable to service their debt and high debt levels can be unfavorable by
 1665 hindering output growth and increasing volatility. Arcand *et al.* (2015: 112) claim that financial
 1666 depth starts yielding negative returns when credit to the private sector reaches 82 percent of
 1667 GDP. Asteriou and Spanos (2022: 140) found that household debt-to-GDP-ratios higher than
 1668 63 percent have a detrimental impact on economic growth. When the credit supply-to-GDP
 1669 ratio is above 70 percent household debt is subject to increased pressure, and when the ratio is
 1670 over 90 percent the pressure becomes even higher.

1671 Table 5.2: Thresholds table

Ingdppc			
Constant	8.951*** (1.426)	-985.74*** (59.918)	20.432***
Model 1Hhd	0.532*** (0.048)		
Model 1.1 Hhdsq	-0.0038*** (0.00040)		
Model 2 Incredcrd		181.573*** (11.364)	
Model 2.1 Incredcrdsq		-8.114*** (0.539)	
Model 3 Inmortdebt			0.104

			(0.222)
Model lnmrtdbtsq	3.1		0.029*** (1.389)
R-squared	0.802	0.997	0.987
S.E. of regression	0.453	0.057	0.114
F-statistic	276.870***	21607.67***	5346.139***
Optimal threshold	70%	ZAR 72 403	ZAR 5 980 000

1672 Standard errors in (); * means $p < 0.10$; ** means $p < 0.05$ and *** means $p < 0.01$.

1673 5.2.3. VAR regression results

1674 a. VAR order lag structure

1675 The information criteria with the smallest number is used to determine the lag order. In Table
1676 5.3 the AIC is selected with 6 lags for VAR regression results with household debt.

1677 Table 5.3: VAR Lag order selection criteria for household debt

1678

Lag	LogL	LR	FPE	AIC	SC	HQ
0	-1023.641	NA	76.528	15.689	15.777	15.725
1	-172.233	1637.823	0.0002	2.935	3.374*	3.113
2	-155.292	31.555	0.0002	2.920	3.711	3.242
3	-135.381	35.870	0.0002	2.861	4.002	3.325
4	-105.368	52.236	0.0002	2.647	4.139	3.253
5	-61.217	74.147	0.0001	2.217	4.061	2.966*

6	-42.209	30.760*	0.0001*	2.171*	4.366	3.063
7	-29.859	19.233	0.0001	2.227	4.773	3.261

1679

1680 *indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each
1681 test at 5% level); FPE: Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz
1682 information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion

1683 The information criteria with the smallest number is used to determine the lag order. In Table
1684 5.4 the SC is selected with 1 lag VAR regression results with credit card debt. Table 5.4: VAR
1685 Lag order selection criteria for credit card debt

Lag	LogL	LR	FPE	AIC	SC	HQ
0	-107.479	NA	6.45e-05	1.702	1.790	1.738
1	614.320	1388.499	1.35e-09	-9.074	-8.635*	-8.895
2	630.331	29.822	1.35e-09	-9.074	-8.284	-8.753
3	661.335	55.853	1.07e-09	-9.303	-8.162	-8.839
4	730.072	119.635	4.82e-10	-10.108	-8.616	-9.502
5	759.277	49.046*	3.96e-10*	-10.310*	-8.466	-9.560*
6	766.864	12.279	4.54e-10	-10.181	-7.986	-9.289
7	777.673	16.833	4.96e-10	-10.102	-7.556	-9.067

1686 *indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each
1687 test at 5% level); FPE: Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz
1688 information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion

1689 The information criteria with the smallest number is used to determine the lag order. In Table
1690 5.5 the SC is selected with 2 lags VAR regression results with mortgage debt.

1691 Table 5.5: VAR Lag order selection criteria for mortgage debt

Lag	LogL	LR	FPE	AIC	SC	HQ
0	-492.175	NA	0.023	7.575	7.663	7.611
1	465.364	1841.984	1.31e-08	-6.799	-6.361	-6.621
2	593.942	239.487	2.35e-09	-8.518	-7.728*	-8.197*
3	609.979	28.892	2.35e-09	-8.519	-7.377	-8.055
4	635.718	44.797	2.03e-09	-8.667	-7.175	-8.061
5	660.522	41.657	1.79e-09*	-8.802*	-6.958	-8.053
6	676.194	25.361	1.81e-09	-8.797	-6.602	-7.905
7	682.204	9.359	2.13e-09	-8.644	-6.098	-7.610

1692 *indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each
1693 test at 5% level); FPE: Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz
1694 information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion

1695 **b. Overall household debt and economic growth**

1696 Table 5.6 presents the VAR regression results. The coefficient signs for household debt are
1697 mixed. The first lag coefficient of the household debt variable is positive. This means that the
1698 variable conforms to the permanent income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis which
1699 state that the household debt has a positive effect on growth through the smoothing of current
1700 consumption. Therefore, household debt has a positive effect on growth in the short term. The
1701 3rd lag is negative and significant at the 10 percent level of significance indicating that
1702 household debt has a negative effect on growth in the long term as stated by the Keynesian
1703 theory such as the neo-Kaleckian growth model. Hein (2012: 14) uses the neo-Kaleckian
1704 growth model and states that when household debt rises, purchasing power shifts from high-
1705 earning households with a low marginal propensity to consume to low-earning households with
1706 a high marginal propensity to consume. This initial boost in aggregate demand encourages
1707 consumption. However, over time, loan interest payments become a burden on growth and
1708 aggregate demand. According to Sparkes and Wood (2021: 611), household debt increased
1709 significantly during the Keynesian era. Several Conservative governments relaxed and

1710 restricted household debt in line with Keynesian economic ideas and the growing demand for
 1711 household debt.

1712 The coefficient signs for government expenditure are mixed, but the 5th lag coefficient, which
 1713 is negative, is significant at the 5 percent level of significance. Negative coefficients are much
 1714 larger. This suggests that in the long-term government expenditure has a negative effect on
 1715 growth as neoclassical theory states. The theory suggests that government spending should be
 1716 limited, and it emphasizes the importance of market efficiency and warns about potential
 1717 negative consequences of government intervention, such as crowding out and fiscal
 1718 irresponsibility. Connolly and Li (2016: 393) investigate the relationship between government
 1719 expenditure and growth and discover that government expenditure, specifically, social
 1720 spending has a negative effect on economic growth. Christie (2014: 196) discovered that
 1721 government expenditure over 33 percent of GDP has strong negative effects on growth.
 1722 However, Pedrosa *et al.* (2023: 1) use the Super multiplier model and find that government
 1723 expenditures may stabilize households' indebtedness.

1724 The coefficient signs for interest rates are mixed. The negative coefficient signs state that a
 1725 decrease in interest rates results in an increase in growth as the neoclassical theory states. Lower
 1726 interest rates on loans, such as mortgages and car loans, can make borrowing more attractive
 1727 and lead to increased consumer spending. This can stimulate demand for goods and services
 1728 and support economic growth.

1729 Table 5.6: VAR regression results with Household debt

Variable	lngdppc	Hhd	Gvtexp	Irt
lngdppc(-1)	0.729*** (0.145) [5.020]	12.709 (11.040) [1.151]	0.851 (2.983) [0.285]	-4.339 (3.730) [-1.163]
lngdppc(-2)	-0.203 (0.164) [-1.234]	-2.252 (12.487) [-0.180]	5.428 (3.374) [1.609]	0.693 (4.219) [0.164]
lngdppc(-3)	0.091	-3.932	-1.752	1.005

	(0.117) [0.774]	(8.897) [-0.442]	(2.404) [-0.729]	(3.006) [0.334]
lngdppc(-4)	0.643*** (0.113) [5.714]	6.588 (8.554) [0.770]	1.076 (2.311) [0.465]	1.922 (2.890) [0.665]
lngdppc(-5)	-0.350** (0.152) [-2.301]	-25.371** (11.569) [-2.193]	-3.351 (3.126) [-1.072]	-0.085 (3.909) [-0.022]
lngdppc(-6)	0.074 (0.136) [0.539]	11.896 (10.369) [1.147]	-1.999 (2.801) [-0.714]	0.250 (3.504) [0.071]
Hhd(-1)	0.002 (0.002) [1.382]	0.743*** (0.129) [5.752]	-0.034 (0.035) [-0.961]	-0.006 (0.044) [-0.172]
Hhd(-2)	-0.001 (0.002) [-0.425]	0.164 (0.158) [1.041]	0.020 (0.043) [0.479]	0.011 (0.053) [0.197]
Hhd(-3)	-0.003* (0.002) [-1.758]	0.086 (0.145) [0.595]	0.025 (0.039) [0.639]	0.019 (0.049) [0.408]
Hhd(-4)	0.005** (0.002) [2.591]	0.146 (0.147) [0.995]	-0.0004 (0.040) [-0.009]	0.048 (0.049) [0.969]
Hhd(-5)	-0.002 (0.002) [-0.874]	-0.145 (0.155) [-0.935]	-0.025 (0.042) [-0.603]	0.008 (0.052) [0.154]

Hhd(-6)	-0.001 (0.002) [-0.818]	-0.067 (0.119) [-1.161]	0.027 (0.032) [0.834]	-0.059 (0.040) [-1.462]
Gvtexp(-1)	0.001 (0.006) [0.236]	-0.531 (0.457) [-1.161]	0.619** (0.124) [5.014]	-0.076 (0.155) [-0.492]
Gvtexp(-2)	-0.006 (0.007) [-0.778]	0.023 (0.551) [0.047]	0.279* (0.149) [1.878]	0.079 (0.186) [0.426]
Gvtexp(-3)	0.002 (0.007) [0.293]	0.286 (0.526) [0.543]	0.072 (0.142) [0.505]	0.035 (0.178) [0.195]
Gvtexp(-4)	0.013* (0.007) [1.889]	-0.209 (0.529) [-0.397]	-0.099 (0.143) [-0.692]	-0.023 (0.179) [-0.129]
Gvtexp(-5)	-0.018** (0.007) [-2.652]	0.060 (0.529) [0.113]	0.142 (0.143) [0.995]	-0.056 (0.179) [-0.313]
Gvtexp(-6)	0.008 (0.006) [1.325]	0.333 (0.446) [0.748]	-0.069 (0.121) [-0.574]	0.248 (0.151) [1.643]
Irt(-1)	-0.001 (0.004) [-0.401]	-0.073 (0.275) [-0.265]	0.027 (0.074) [0.361]	1.016 (0.093) [10.930]
Irt(-2)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.148 (0.397)	-0.081 (0.107)	-0.321 (0.134)

	[0.480]	[-0.374]	[-0.755]	[-2.394]
Irt(-3)	-0.006 (0.005) [-1.090]	-0.007 (0.408) [-0.016]	-0.049 (0.110) [-0.442]	0.032 (0.138) [0.231]
Irt(-4)	0.009 (0.005) [1.602]	0.041 (0.409) [0.101]	0.014 (0.110) [0.129]	0.098 (0.138) [0.707]
Irt(-5)	-0.006 (0.005) [-1.080]	-0.006 (0.402) [-0.014]	0.051 (0.109) [0.465]	-0.104 (0.136) [-0.769]
Irt(-6)	0.0006 (0.004) [0.147]	-0.185 (0.288) [-0.644]	0.092 (0.078) [1.184]	0.201 (0.097) [2.063]
Constant	0.516* (0.268) [1.928]	18.350 (20.366) [0.901]	-7.583 (5.502) [-1.378]	11.013 (6.881) [1.6000]
R-squared	0.999	0.975	0.879	0.970
Sum sq. residuals	0.064	370.999	27.080	42.355
S.E. equation	0.024	1.853	0.501	0.626
F-statistic	8316.350	177.906	32.975	143.124
Normality test	5811.945 {0.000}			
Heterosce test	494.605 {0.313}			


1730 Standard errors in (); t-statistics in []; p-values in {}

1731 **VAR stability test**

1732 The inverse roots of AR characteristics polynomial indicate that the estimated VAR is stable if
1733 all roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. If the VAR is not stable,
1734 certain results (such as impulse response standard errors) are not valid.

1735 Figure 5.3 indicates that the VAR for household and economic growth is stable because all
1736 roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle.

Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial



1737
1738 Figure 5.3: VAR stability for VAR regression results with Household debt

1739 **VAR Granger causality/ Block exogeneity test**

1740 The null hypothesis in Table 5.7 indicates that the independent variable does not granger cause
1741 the dependent variable. Therefore, it is concluded that at the 10 percent level of significance,
1742 household debt granger causes GDP per capita. However, government expenditure and interest
1743 rates do not granger causes GDP per capita. Overall, the variables significantly cause GDP per
1744 capita jointly, at the 1 percent level of significance. These results conform to the life cycle
1745 hypothesis and permanent income hypothesis which state that households borrow against their
1746 future income to smooth consumption.

1747 Table 5.7: VAR Granger causality results with household debt

Dependent Variable: lnGDPpc		
Excluded	Chi-sq	Prob.
HHD	11.481	0.075
GVTEXP	8.878	0.181
IRT	3.116	0.794
ALL	39.759	0.002

1748 *Variance decomposition*

1749 In Table 5.8, a shock in GDP per capita explains 40.54 percent of its own variance in the short
1750 run. The influence increases to 49.81 percent in the long run. This indicates that GDP per capita
1751 has a strong influence on predicting itself from the short run to the long run.

1752 The first period shows that a one standard deviation shock in household debt predicts 18.41
1753 percent of the variance of the log of GDP per capita. The influence of household debt on growth
1754 begins to decrease from the short run to the long run with 8.67 percent in the 10th period.
1755 Therefore, the influence of household debt on growth is strong in the short run and begins to
1756 decrease in the long run. Tunc and Kilinc (2023: 88), investigate the impact of household debt
1757 service burden on economic growth and discover that an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio
1758 improves the short-term economic position while depressing it in the medium to long term.
1759 Abd Samad *et al.* (2020: 547) explain over time, households become aware that their high debt-
1760 to-income ratio – which can be a result of either an interest rate shock or an income shock –
1761 makes it difficult to repay loans. As a result, they begin to reduce their spending, which
1762 eventually stunts economic growth. However, Serra (2023: 175) builds a neo-Kaleckian model
1763 in which households can borrow to either consume or invest in human capital and discovers
1764 that household debt is sustainable in the long run. This supports the findings of this paper.

1765 A one standard deviation shock in government expenditure predicts 40.8 percent of the variance
1766 of the log of GDP per capita. Government expenditure decreased to 39.16 percent in the 10th
1767 period. Therefore, the influence of government expenditure on growth is strong in the short run
1768 and stays the same in the long run. According to Moore and Stockhammer (2018: 548) rising
1769 household indebtedness is due to the rolling back of the welfare state. The reduction of welfare

1770 state spending and the age structure of the population drive household indebtedness, which
 1771 results in a decrease in household consumption leading to a decrease in productivity and
 1772 growth.

1773 A one standard deviation shock in interest rates predicts 0.24 percent of the variance of the log
 1774 of GDP per capita. Therefore, interest rates have a small influence on growth in the short run
 1775 but rise slightly in the long run.

1776 Table 5.8: Variance decomposition of $\ln ddpcc$ with household debt


	$\ln ddpcc$	Hhd	Gvtexp	Irt
1	40.542	18.414	40.799	0.244
2	45.644	15.487	38.680	0.189
3	46.015	14.362	39.447	0.176
4	43.119	14.329	41.596	0.956
5	49.229	13.132	36.815	0.824
6	50.194	11.111	37.992	0.704
7	49.726	10.192	39.343	0.739
8	48.011	9.849	40.080	2.061
9	49.384	9.448	38.915	2.253
10	49.805	8.668	39.164	2.363

1777 *Impulse response analysis*

1778 Figure 5.4 indicates that a one standard deviation shock in household debt will result in a
 1779 decrease in GDP per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to
 1780 household debt will have a negative response to GDP per capita in the long run. Mian *et al.*
 1781 (2017: 1765) investigate the relationship between household debt and GDP ratio. They discover
 1782 that the response of GDP to a shock to household debt boosts GDP in the short run, but it is
 1783 short-lived as GDP eventually declines in the long run.

1784 A one standard deviation shock given to government expenditure will result in a decrease in
 1785 GDP per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to government
 1786 expenditure will have a negative response to GDP per capita in the long run. Connolly and Li
 1787 (2016) and Christie (2014) discovered that government expenditure has a negative effect on
 1788 economic growth.

1789 A one standard deviation shock given to interest rates will result in a slight decrease in GDP
 1790 per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to interest rates will
 1791 have a negative response to GDP per capita in the long run.



1792

1793 Figure 5.4: VAR regression results with Household debt

1794 **b. Credit card debt and economic growth**

1795 Table 5.9 presents the VAR regression results. A 1 percent increase in credit card debt, increases
 1796 economic growth by 0.88 percent, other things being equal. The coefficient sign for credit card
 1797 debt is positive and significant at the 1 percent level of significance. This suggests that credit
 1798 card debt has a positive effect on economic growth. Ekici and Dunn (2010: 455) investigate
 1799 the relationship between credit card debt and consumption using household-level data based
 1800 on the permanent income hypothesis and life cycle hypothesis. They found that increasing
 1801 credit card debt used to finance consumption is typically viewed as a positive economic

1802 stimulus. However, high amounts of debt would eventually hinder the productivity of the
 1803 economy. Dutt (2006: 339) uses a Steindlian model of growth and shows that borrowing by
 1804 consumers can improve growth in the short run by increasing consumer demand. However, in
 1805 the longer run the effects of increasing consumer borrowing are ambiguous because, by
 1806 increasing consumer debt, it redistributes income towards the wealthier who have a higher
 1807 propensity to save, thereby possibly inhibiting aggregate demand and growth despite the
 1808 borrowing-induced expansion.

1809 The coefficient sign for government expenditure is positive. This suggests that in the short run
 1810 government expenditure has a positive effect on growth. This is in line with the Keynesian
 1811 theory which states that if government spending increases, all else held constant, output will
 1812 increase. Yasin (2011: 65) claims that government spending has a positive impact on economic
 1813 growth when it is on private investment spending and capital formation. However, the impact
 1814 turns negative in the long run. Aydin *et al.* (2016: 177) explain that government spending below
 1815 the threshold has a significant and negative impact on economic growth while spending above
 1816 the threshold has a significant and positive impact on growth revealing that the level of
 1817 government spending is important for economic expansion.

1818 The coefficient sign for interest rates is negative and significant at the 5 percent level of
 1819 significance. This suggests that the short-term interest rates have a positive effect on growth as
 1820 neoclassical theory states. Neoclassical theory states that rising interest rates increase the cost
 1821 of borrowing for investment and consumption. This reduces aggregate demand by reducing
 1822 investment and credit-financed consumption leading to a decrease in economic growth. Debelle
 1823 (2004: 58) claims that if there is a downward shift in the interest rate there is an incentive for
 1824 existing borrowers to renew their mortgages at the lower interest rate, thereby boosting the
 1825 amount of household income available for other purposes, most notably consumption, resulting
 1826 in an increase in productivity in the economy. Moore and Stockhammer (2018: 553) state the
 1827 short-term interest rate drives household indebtedness because the low short-term interbank
 1828 interest rate means cheap borrowing for banks, which is passed onto households in the form of
 1829 cheap borrowing, resulting in a temporary boost in GDP.

1830 Table 5.9: VAR regression results with credit card debt

	lngdppc	lncreditr	Gvtexp	Irt
--	---------	-----------	--------	-----

Ingdppc(-1)	0.896*** (0.039) [22.710]	0.018*** (0.005) [3.529]	-0.343 (0.670) [-0.512]	-1.480 (0.803) [-1.843]
Increditcrd(-1)	0.876*** (0.408) [2.144]	0.801*** (0.054) [14.868]	5.737 (6.942) [0.827]	10.637 (8.314) [1.279]
Gvtexp(-1)	0.0004 (0.003) [0.108]	0.0008* (0.0004) [1.903]	0.825*** (0.057) [14.427]	0.103 (0.068) [1.502]
Irt(-1)	-0.004** (0.002) [-2.249]	-0.0001 (0.0003) [0.476]	0.021 (0.034) [0.608]	0.856*** (0.040) [21.173]
Constant	-6.382** (3.241) [-1.969]	1.600*** (0.427) [3.745]	-48.444 (55.097) [-0.879]	-72.940 (65.993) [-1.105]
R-squared	0.999	0.998	0.837	0.964
Sum sq. residuals	0.130	0.002	37.556	53.879
S.E. equation	0.031	0.004	0.531	0.636
F-statistic	35165.90	1846.87	170.404	895.472
Normality test	890.134 {0.000}			
Heterosce test	153.392 {0.000}			
Serial corr test				
Lag 1	1.989			


	{0.016}
Lag 2	2.259
	{0.004}

1831 Standard errors in (); t-statistics in []; p-values in {}

1832 *VAR stability test*

1833 Figure 5.5 indicates that the VAR for credit card debt and economic growth is stable because
 1834 all roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. The results suffer from serial
 1835 correlation.

Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial



1836

1837 Figure 5.5: AR roots graph for VAR regression results with credit card debt

1838 *VAR Granger causality/ Block exogeneity test*

1839 The null hypothesis in Table 5.10 indicates that the independent variable does not granger cause
 1840 the dependent variable. Therefore, it is concluded that at the 5 percent level of significance
 1841 credit card debt and interest rates granger cause GDP per capita. However, government
 1842 expenditure does not granger causes GDP per capita. Overall, all the variables are jointly
 1843 significant, hence, they do granger causes GDP per capita at the 5 percent level of significance.

1844 Based on the life cycle theory and permanent income hypothesis credit card debt impacts
 1845 growth as it is used to finance consumption. According to Cynamon and Fazzari (2013), low
 1846 stable interest rates encourage borrowing for consumption purposes.

1847 Table 5.10: VAR Granger causality results with credit card debt

Dependent Variable: lnGDPpc		
Excluded	Chi-sq	Prob.
LNCREDCRD	4.598	0.032
GVTEXP	0.012	0.914
IRT	5.056	0.025
ALL	8.364	0.039

1848 *Variance decomposition*

1849 In Table 5.11, a shock in GDP per capita explains 70.07 percent of its own variance in the short
 1850 run. The influence decreases to 61.22 percent in the long run. This indicates that GDP per capita
 1851 has a strong influence on predicting itself in the short run and it starts to decrease in the long
 1852 run.

1853 A one standard deviation shock in credit card debt predicts 0.48 percent of the variance of the
 1854 log of GDP per capita. The influence of credit card debt on growth begins to increase from the
 1855 short run to the long run with 12.42 percent in the 10th period. Therefore, the influence of credit
 1856 card debt on growth is weak in the short run but is stronger in the long run. According to Lin *et*
 1857 *al.* (2019: 546), credit card use has grown rapidly in developing countries. This is because
 1858 credit cards come with several advantages for customers, such as having an accurate record of
 1859 purchases, less need to carry cash, and proof of creditworthiness in the past. Therefore, credit
 1860 card debt increases in the long run.

1861 In the first period, a one standard deviation shock in government expenditure predicts 27.93
 1862 percent of the variance of the log of GDP per capita. Government expenditure gradually
 1863 decreases to 23.52 percent in the 10th period. Therefore, the influence of government
 1864 expenditure on growth is strong in the short run but gradually decreases in the long run.

1865 A one standard deviation shock in interest rates predicts 1.52 percent of the variance of the log
 1866 of GDP per capita in the first period and gradually increases to 2.84 percent in the 10th period.
 1867 Therefore, interest rates have a small influence on growth in the short run but rise slightly in
 1868 the long run.

1869 Table 5.11: Variance decomposition of Inddppc with credit card debt


	lngdppc	Increditcrd	Gvtexp	Irt
1	70.073	0.475	27.933	1.519
2	69.341	1.969	27.793	0.897
3	68.228	3.766	27.326	0.679
4	66.994	5.561	26.711	0.733
5	65.781	7.204	26.059	0.956
6	64.654	8.637	25.430	1.278
7	63.638	9.856	24.854	1.652
8	62.733	10.877	24.342	2.048
9	61.931	11.724	23.898	2.448
10	61.219	12.423	23.518	2.840

1870 *Impulse response analysis*

1871 In Figure 5.6 a one standard deviation shock given to credit card debt will result in an increase
 1872 in GDP per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to credit card
 1873 debt will have a positive response to GDP per capita in the short run and long run. Adewale
 1874 (2014) examined data from 2007-2012 and established that there is a strong relationship
 1875 between increasing credit consumption and economic growth in South Africa. The PIH and
 1876 LCH were used to explain the relationship between household debt and consumption. Ekici
 1877 and Dunn (2010: 455) find that increasing credit card debt used to finance consumption is
 1878 typically viewed as a positive economic stimulus, even so, high debt levels can restrain future
 1879 spending, dampening growth. These results agree with economic theory.

1880 A one standard deviation shock or impulse given to government expenditure will result in a
 1881 decrease in GDP per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to
 1882 government expenditure will have a negative response to GDP per capita in the long run. Moore
 1883 and Stockhammer (2018: 552) argue that when not funded by the state, household spending on
 1884 housing, health, education, and transportation comes into the basic consumption basket of
 1885 households and is hence a component of households' battle to sustain consumption standards.
 1886 This results in a decrease in productivity and growth as households have less disposable
 1887 income.

1888 A one standard deviation shock given to interest rates will result In a slight decrease in GDP
 1889 per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to interest rates will
 1890 have a negative response to GDP per capita in the long run.



1891
 1892 Figure 5.6: VAR regression results with credit card debt

1893 **c. Mortgage debt and economic growth**

1894 Table 5.12 presents the VAR regression results. The coefficient sign for mortgage debt is
 1895 positive in the short run but is not significant. Ajisafe and Okunade (2020: 40) claim that when
 1896 households borrow to invest in real estate or start businesses, it can contribute to economic
 1897 growth by creating jobs, increasing productivity, and expanding the overall economy. Authors
 1898 such as Moore and Stockhammer (2018), Stockhammer and Wildauer (2017: 2), and Wood and

1899 Stockhammer (2023) discover that house prices fuel the build-up of household debt because
 1900 they loosen credit restrictions through the collateral impact and increase household
 1901 indebtedness through the wealth effect. Because of their increasing wealth, households may
 1902 not be credit-constrained but instead boost their spending. This can be done by borrowing
 1903 through mortgage equity withdrawals. Hence, they find that house prices are a major
 1904 determinant of household debt, and household debt contributes to economic growth. However,
 1905 Bezemer *et al.* (2016) and Sassi and Gasmi (2014) discovered that a high mortgage-to-GDP
 1906 ratio might hinder rather than accelerate growth which has little impact on economic
 1907 expansion.

1908 The coefficient signs of government expenditure are negative. This means that the variable
 1909 does not conform to the Keynesian theory which states that government spending stimulates
 1910 economic growth, especially during economic downturns. However, the negative sign could be
 1911 a result of government expenditure being financed by accumulating excessive debt as it leads
 1912 to concerns about fiscal sustainability, higher interest rates, and crowding out of private
 1913 investments.

1914 The coefficient signs for interest rates are negative. This suggests that low-interest rates enable
 1915 consumers to spend at high rates relative to their income. Mutezo (2014: 75) states that the
 1916 reduction in interest rates both in nominal and real terms, contributes to a significant easing of
 1917 liquidity constraints on households thereby increasing consumption and productivity.

1918 Table 5.12: Toda-Yamamoto VAR regression results with mortgage debt

	lngdppc	lnmortdebt	Gvtexp	Irt
lngdppc(-1)	0.424*** (0.097) [4.371]	-0.051** (0.019) [-2.638]	1.118 (1.882) [0.594]	-4.349* (2.286) [-1.902]
lngdppc(-2)	-0.026 (0.098) [-0.271]	-0.044** (0.019) [2.309]	1.589 (1.893) [0.840]	1.230 (2.299) [0.535]
lnmortdebt (-1)	0.228 (0.406)	1.788*** (0.080)	-8.930 (7.870)	-20.481** (9.561)

	[0.563]	[22.321]	[-1.135]	[-2.142]
Inmortdebt (-2)	-0.231 (0.588) [-0.392]	-0.755 (0.116) [-6.503]	7.502 (11.405) [0.658]	27.677** (13.855) [1.998]
Gvtexp(-1)	-0.003 (0.005) [-0.487]	-0.003** (0.001) [-2.459]	0.589*** (0.106) [5.579]	-0.051 (0.128) [-0.395]
Gvtexp(-2)	-0.006 (0.006) [-1.081]	0.002 (0.002) [1.505]	0.271** (0.117) [2.321]	0.046 (0.142) [0.326]
Irt(-1)	-0.0008 (0.004) [-0.218]	-0.0007 (0.0007) [-0.957]	0.027 (0.072) [0.381]	1.050 (0.088) [11.982]
Irt(-2)	-0.001 (0.004) [-0.252]	-6.873 (0.0008) [-0.083]	-0.114 (0.082) [-1.398]	-0.320*** (0.099) [-3.234]
Constant	1.400*** (0.430) [3.260]	-0.201** (0.085) -2.373	-12.121 (8.332) [-1.455]	12.723 (10.123) [1.257]
lngppc(-4)	0.535 (0.082) [6.539]	0.024 (0.016) [1.496]	-1.638 (1.587) [-1.032]	2.764 (1.928) [1.434]
Inmortbebt(-4)	0.037 (0.207) [0.178]	-0.053 (0.041) [-1.293]	0.462 (4.009) [0.115]	-7.450 (4.870) [-1.530]
Gvtexp(-4)	0.012	1.212	-0.042	0.128


	(0.005) [2.496]	(0.0009) [0.013]	(0.090) [-0.464]	(0.109)
Irt(-4)	-0.0006 (0.003) [-0.231]	-0.0004 (0.0005) [-0.653]	0.041 (0.053) [0.772]	0.109 (0.064) [1.704]
R-squared	0.999	0.999	0.861	0.968
Sum sq. residuals	0.084	0.003	31.541	46.699
S.E. equation	0.026	0.005	0.509	0.619
F-statistic	15190.75	540107.6	62.905	303.374
Normality test	2327.716 {0.000}			
Heterosce test	357.393 {0.000}			

1919 Standard errors in (); t-statistics in []; p-values in {}

1920 *VAR stability test*

1921 Figure 5.7 indicates that the VAR for mortgage debt and economic growth is non-stationary
1922 because some roots have modulus greater than one and lie outside the unit circle. This could
1923 be due to the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Scdmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root test performed to determine
1924 the absence of a unit root in mortgage debt and the Toda-Yamamoto VAR is an overfitted
1925 model. Hence, the results for this regression are unstable so they might be misleading.

Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial



1926

1927 Figure 5.7: AR roots graph for VAR regression results with mortgage debt

1928 *VAR Granger causality/ Block exogeneity test*

1929 The null hypothesis in Table 5.13 indicates that the independent variable does not granger cause
 1930 the dependent variable. Therefore, it is concluded that mortgage debt, government expenditure
 1931 and interest rates do not granger causes GDP per capita. Overall, all the variables are not
 1932 significant, hence, they do not granger causes GDP per capita.

1933 Table 5.13: VAR Granger causality results with mortgage debt

Dependent Variable: lnGDPpc		
Excluded	Chi-sq	Prob.
LMORTDEBT	1,082	0.583
GVTEXP	03.199	0.202
IRT	0.501	0.778
ALL	9.162	0.165

1934 *Variance decomposition*

1935 In Table 5.14, a shock in GDP per capita explains 67.48 percent of its own variance in the short
 1936 run. The influence decreases to 51.33 percent in the long run. This indicates that GDP per capita
 1937 has a strong influence on predicting itself in the short run but it decreases in the long run.

1938 A one standard deviation shock in mortgage debt predicts 0.02 percent of the variance of the
 1939 log of GDP per capita. The influence of mortgage debt on growth begins to increase from the
 1940 short run to the long run with 5.17 percent in the 10th period. Therefore, the influence of
 1941 mortgage debt on growth is weak in the short run and begins to increase in the long run.
 1942 According to Bezemer *et al.* (2016: 652) a high mortgage-to-GDP ratio might hinder rather
 1943 than accelerate growth and household credit - the majority of which is in the form of mortgages
 1944 - has little impact on economic expansion. Sassi and Gasmi (2014: 227) explain that the loan-
 1945 to-value ratio for mortgages, which measures household credit, has a negative correlation with
 1946 the rise of the GDP per capita. Based on the life cycle and permanent income hypothesis, Crook
 1947 (2001: 83) discovered that households headed by an individual over age 55 had a reduced
 1948 demand for total debt (defined as mortgages, home equity loans, credit cards, and installment
 1949 debt).

1950 A one standard deviation shock in government expenditure predicts 31.77 percent of the
 1951 variance of the log of GDP per capita. Government expenditure gradually increased to 42.19
 1952 percent in the 10th period. Therefore, the influence of government expenditure on growth is
 1953 strong in the short run and gradually increases in the long run.

1954 A one standard deviation shock in interest rates predicts 0.73 percent of the variance of the log
 1955 of GDP per capita in the first period and gradually increases to 1.29 percent in the 10th period.
 1956 Therefore, interest rates have a small influence on growth in the short run but rise slightly in
 1957 the long run.

1958 Table 5.14: Variance decomposition of *lnddppc* with mortgage debt

	<i>lngdppc</i>	<i>lnmortdebt</i>	<i>Gvtexp</i>	<i>Irt</i>
1	67.481	0.020	31.765	0.734
2	65.746	0.141	33.486	0.627

3	61.843	0.404	36.997	0.755
4	58.968	0.876	39.056	1.099
5	56.759	1.526	40.452	1.263
6	55.139	2.254	41.338	1.268
7	53.906	2.980	41.875	1.238
8	52.924	3.686	42.155	1.235
9	52.092	4.398	42.249	1.261
10	51.333	5.174	42.199	1.294


1959 *Impulse response analysis*

1960 In Figure 5.8 a one standard deviation shock given to mortgage debt will result in an increase
1961 in GDP per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to mortgage
1962 debt will have a positive response to GDP per capita in the long run. Cox and Jappelli (1993)
1963 investigated the effect of borrowing constraints on consumer debt based on the life cycle
1964 hypothesis and found that the desire for debt increased until the household head reached the
1965 mid-thirties and then it declined. Prinsloo (2002) states that, in most circumstances, the size of
1966 the loan is often determined by the borrower's annual income and the value of the collateral.
1967 Although shorter repayment terms can be agreed upon, the loan is typically repaid over a 20–
1968 30-year period. Hence, mortgages will have a positive effect on growth in the long run if annual
1969 income increases simultaneously.

1970 A one standard deviation shock given to government expenditure will result in a decrease in
1971 GDP per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to government
1972 expenditure will have a negative response to GDP per capita in the long run.

1973 A one standard deviation shock given to interest rates will result in an unchanged response in
1974 GDP per capita by a maximum of 0.75 standard deviations. Therefore, a shock to interest rates
1975 will have a no response to GDP per capita in the short and long run.

1976



1977

1978 Figure 5.8: VAR regression results with mortgage debt

1979 5.3. Discussions and conclusions

1980 Household debt has risen in several countries over the last few decades. Increased private-
 1981 sector credit promotes economic growth over the long run. However, over time, high household
 1982 debt can result in substantial debt overhang problems when a nation experiences strong
 1983 negative shocks suddenly. Although household debt has a short-term positive impact on GDP
 1984 and consumption, it is likely to have a detrimental long-term impact on growth.

1985 Overall, the results show that household debt has a positive yet weak impact on economic
 1986 growth in South Africa. The VAR results with household debt indicate that household debt
 1987 stimulates growth in the short run but hinders productivity and growth in the long run. The
 1988 variance decomposition results indicate that the influence of household debt on growth begins
 1989 to decrease from the short run to the long run. Therefore, the results are in line with authors
 1990 such as Abd Samad *et al.* (2020), Hein (2012), Mian *et al.* (2017) Tunc and Kilinc (2023),
 1991 found that household debt boosts GDP in the short run, but it is short-lived as GDP eventually
 1992 declines in the long run.

1993 The different types of household debt represented by credit card debt and mortgage debt have
 1994 different impacts on economic growth in South Africa. Credit card debt has a strong positive
 1995 impact on economic growth. The VAR results with credit card debt indicate that credit card

1996 debt has a positive effect on growth from the short run to the long run. The variance
1997 decomposition results indicate that credit card debt has a small positive influence on growth in
1998 the short run and the influence gets stronger in the long run. Therefore, the results are in line
1999 with authors such as Adewale (2014) Dutt (2006), and Ekici and Dunn (2010) who found that
2000 increasing credit consumption can improve growth in the short run by increasing consumer
2001 demand and credit card debt used to finance consumption is typically viewed as a positive
2002 economic stimulus even so, high debt levels can restrain future spending, dampening growth.

2003 Mortgage debt has a weak positive impact on economic growth the influence increases in the
2004 long run. The VAR results with mortgage debt indicate that mortgage debt has a short-term
2005 positive effect on growth. The variance decomposition results show that the influence of
2006 mortgage debt on growth is weak from the short run to the long run. Therefore, the results are
2007 in line with authors such as Ajisafe and Okunade (2020), Prinsloo (2002), and Wood and
2008 Stockhammer (2023) who found that if households borrow to invest in real estate or start
2009 businesses, it can contribute to economic growth by creating jobs, increasing productivity, and
2010 expanding the overall economy. However, Bezemer *et al.* (2016) and Sassi and Gasmi (2014)
2011 discovered that a high mortgage-to-GDP ratio might hinder rather than accelerate growth which
2012 has little impact on economic expansion.

2013 The conclusion from the results is that household debt has a positive effect on economic growth
2014 in South Africa in the short run but is negative in the long run.

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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

2024 **6.1. Introduction**

2025 The main aim of this chapter is to provide a summary of the results and the policy
2026 recommendations of the results of this study. This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2
2027 provides a summary of the results, 6.3 discusses recommendations and 6.4 highlights an overall
2028 conclusion.

2029 **6.2. Summary of results**

2030 ***6.2.1. Household debt and growth***

2031 The overall objective is to determine the effect of aggregate household debt on economic
2032 growth in South Africa. The results show that household debt has a positive yet weak impact
2033 on economic growth in South Africa. The VAR results with household debt indicate that
2034 household debt stimulates growth in the short run but hinders productivity and growth in the
2035 long run. The variance decomposition results indicate that the influence of household debt on
2036 growth begins to decrease from the short run to the long run. Therefore, the results are in line
2037 with authors such as Abd Samad *et al.* (2020) and Lombardi *et al.* (2017) who state that growth
2038 has a short-term positive effect on growth but is detrimental to growth in the long run.

2039 ***6.2.2 Credit card debt and growth***

2040 The objective is to determine the effect of credit card debt on economic growth in South Africa.
2041 The different types of household debt represented by credit card debt and mortgage debt have
2042 different impacts on economic growth in South Africa. Credit card debt has a strong positive
2043 impact on economic growth. The VAR results with credit card debt indicate that credit card
2044 debt has a positive effect on growth from the short run to the long run. The variance
2045 decomposition results indicate that credit card debt has a small positive influence on growth in
2046 the short run and the influence gets stronger in the long run.

2047 ***6.2.2 Mortgage debt and growth***

2048 The objective is to determine the effect of mortgage debt on economic growth in South Africa.
2049 Mortgage debt has a weak positive impact on economic growth the influence increases in the
2050 long run. The VAR results with mortgage debt indicate that mortgage debt has a short-term

2051 positive effect on growth. The variance decomposition results show that the influence of
2052 mortgage debt on growth is weak from the short run to the long run.

2053 **6.3. Recommendations**

2054 South Africa must desist from following a finance led growth model given that the findings
2055 show that household debt has no long run effect on growth in the long term. The results indicate
2056 a significant relationship between household debt and growth. Therefore, it is recommended
2057 that policymakers monitor the household debt levels in South Africa. Continuously monitoring
2058 the trends of household debt in South Africa is a step in the right direction for governments.
2059 Forecasting household debt for South Africa is of importance to policymakers. It becomes
2060 challenging for policymakers to develop feasible policies without appropriate and reliable
2061 forecasts. With accurate projections generated, it may be simple for the relevant authorities to
2062 design and devise effective plans to address household debt in the country, and with the use of
2063 an appropriate modeling approach, forecasting accuracy of household debt in the country may
2064 be enhanced. First, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) can adopt interest rate policies
2065 that balance the short-term stimulus of low-interest rates with a long-term view. By carefully
2066 managing interest rates, the government can encourage borrowing for productive investments
2067 while discouraging excessive consumer debt. Second, implementing measures to enhance
2068 financial literacy and consumer protection can be crucial. This can include regulations that
2069 prevent predatory lending practices and encourage responsible borrowing. Moreover,
2070 educational programs can empower individuals to make informed financial decisions, reducing
2071 the risk of excessive debt accumulation. Third, the government can design policies to
2072 specifically encourage the use of household debt for productive investments, such as small
2073 business development, education, or housing. This can contribute to long-term economic
2074 growth and development. Fourth, acknowledging the varied impact of different types of debt,
2075 the government can consider implementing policies that differentiate between credit card debt
2076 and mortgage debt. For instance, measures to encourage responsible mortgage borrowing,
2077 which has a weak positive impact in the long run, might be prioritized over credit card debt.
2078 Fifth, redirecting household debt towards investments in infrastructure and development
2079 projects can provide a boost to both short-term and long-term economic growth. This could be
2080 achieved through public-private partnerships or government-led initiatives and lastly,
2081 establishing a robust system for monitoring and evaluating the impact of household debt on

2082 economic growth is essential. Regular assessments can help the government adjust its policies
2083 based on evolving economic conditions and emerging trends.

2084 **6.4. Conclusion**

2085 To conclude, household debt has a positive yet weak impact on economic growth in South
2086 Africa. Household debt stimulates growth in the short run but hinders productivity and growth
2087 in the long run. Credit card debt has a positive effect on growth from the short run to the long
2088 run. Mortgage debt has a weak positive impact on economic growth the influence increases in
2089 the long run. This study implies that it is important to strike a balance between encouraging
2090 economic activity through household debt and preventing the negative consequences
2091 associated with excessive debt levels. This requires a comprehensive and dynamic approach
2092 that considers both short-term and long-term economic goals.

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2389 Table A: summary of studies on the effect of household debt on economic growth in South
 2390 Africa

<i>Study</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Methodology</i>	<i>Country/s</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Findings</i>
Abd Samad <i>et al.</i> (2020)	Household debt and economic growth	1980-2018	Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDVC) estimator	43 countries	GDP per capita growth, GCF, population growth, human capital, inflation, household debt	The findings for the sample of panel data confirm that the household debt has detrimental effect on growth.
Adewale, (2014).	Financial Regulation, Credit Consumption And Economic Growth An Analysis Of The National Credit Act In South Africa	2007-2012	Unit root tests	SA	Mortgages granted, secured credit, short term credit, unsecured credit, inflation, interest rates	The findings are that an increase in credit consumption has precipitated an increase in economic growth.
Ajisafe and Okunade, (2020)	Finance-led-growth hypothesis and domestic investment in Nigeria.	1986-2017	ARDL and VECM Granger causality	Nigeria	GDP, financial sector development, domestic investment, government expenditure, real interest rates	The study finds that financial development and domestic investment have significant positive impacts on economic growth in Nigeria
Bezemer <i>et al.</i> (2016)	More mortgages, lower growth?	1990-2011	Generalised Method of Moment	46 countries	GDP per capita, total credit, nonfinancial sector, financial sector, nonfinancial credit, consumer credit, mortgage credit, financial business credit	The study finds positive growth effects for credit flows to nonfinancial business but not for mortgage and other asset market credit flows.

Daud <i>et al.</i> (2021)	Household debt and country economic growth: does a magic threshold exist?	2008-2016	Economic growth model	24 countries	GDP per capita, household debt, investment, population, trade	The study found that the impact of household debt on a country's economic growth is negative. Because the relationship between debt and growth is a monotonically non-increasing function, we do not find a magic threshold of debt.
Lombardi <i>et al.</i> (2017)	The real effects of household debt in the short and long run.	1990–2015	ARDL model	54 economies	Financial dev index, per-capita income, savings rate, schooling, dependency ratio, trade openness, legal protection for creditors, depth of credit info, tax rate, reliance USD, inflation, house price, population	Household debt boosts consumption and GDP growth in the short run, mostly within one year
Mian <i>et al.</i> (2017)	Household debt and business cycles worldwide	1960-2012	VAR model	30 countries	Household and nonfinancial firm debt to GDP, national accounts, unemployment, professional GDP forecasts, credit spreads, international trade	Countries with a household debt cycle more correlated with the global household debt cycle experience a sharper decline in growth after an increase in domestic household debt
Moore and Stockhammer (2018)	The drivers of household indebtedness reconsidered: An empirical evaluation of	1993-2011	ECMs	13 OECD countries	Household debt as a % of GDP, house prices, stock prices, wages, welfare, age	The results show that the most robust macroeconomic determinant of household debt is real residential

	competing arguments on the macroeconomic determinants of household indebtedness in OECD countries					house prices, and that the phase of the debt and house price cycles plays a role in household debt accumulation.
Mutezo (2014)	Household debt and consumption spending in South Africa: an ARDL-bounds testing approach	1986-2013	ARDL model	SA	Household debt, household disposable income, wealth, interest rate, consumer price index	The study discovered that higher household debt levels lead to higher consumption spending, and therefore growth in South Africa
Sassi and Gasmi (2014)	The effect of enterprise and household credit on economic growth: New evidence from European union countries	1995-2012	OLS and IV regression and GMM dynamic panel data model	27 European countries	GDP per capita, income per capita, household credit, enterprise credit, government consumption, total exports and imports, consumer price index	Our finding gives an explanation of the negative effect of aggregate credit measures on economic growth
Tunc and Kilinc (2023)	Household debt and economic growth: Debt service matters	1999-2019	MSV	17 countries	GDP, household debt, firm debt, household Debt Payment / Income, firm Debt Payment / Revenue, unemployment rate	The study finds that the debt service burden reduces economic growth over both the short and medium run.
Wood and Stockhammer (2023)	Bringing Household Finance Back In: House Prices and the Missing Macroeconomics of Comparative Political Economy.	1980-2019	ARDL model	18 countries	GDP, household debt, house prices, business debt	The finds show that household debt is determined by house price inflation, and that rising household debt contributes to GDP growth,

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