

# **The Politics in and around Governance in the New Partnership for Africa's Development**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS

of

RHODES UNIVERSITY

By

**Jean Thierry Kevin Roussel**

**601R0486**

**Supervisor: Professor P.H. Bischoff**

December 2005

# **The Politics in around Governance in the New Partnership for African Development**

## **Abstract**

This study examines the prominence of the term governance and its use in multilateral organisations, in particular the New Partnership for African Development. It argues that the term governance is contentious and needs to be reviewed. This is in light of the elevation of governance as a requisite for development, which has come about through the development of NEPAD. This is primarily a study on the position of the state in multilateral regimes and how governance will affect the state and non-state actors. The politics in and around governance are therefore important in any assessment of African development as governance becomes a developmental necessity.

The African Renaissance and African Union have become ‘beacons of hope’ for Africa and these have been discussed here. We can see NEPAD as a historical development that fits into the African Renaissance. This has been a mechanism to ensure state survival and the states that drive NEPAD have played a significant role in providing legitimacy to Africa’s calls for development. This thesis attempts to explain the shift in developmental policy in that NEPAD has seemingly become the first African development strategy that has the support of the West. Through this thesis, we will examine the role that the Post Washington consensus has played in getting this phase of African development started. What becomes significant here is the way in which governance has been accepted as the gauge for support in development.

This study therefore aims to offer a means by which to analyse governance in multilateral organisations. As the term is contentious, three paradigms on governance will be provided in order to refine governance in such a way that it can be applied in analysis. This thesis shows that governance can be refined into corporatist, prebendal and conciliar forms. The form of governance that NEPAD will take has implications for the type of reconfiguration of the state brought about by governance.

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Table of Contents.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	v
List of Abbreviations.....	vi
Chapter 1 .....	1
1. Introduction and Overview .....	1
1.1 General Comment.....	1
1.2 Governance and Multilateralism.....	2
1.3 NEPAD and Civil Society.....	3
1.4 The African Renaissance and NEPAD as the great African hope.....	5
1.5 Demarcation and Relevance of the Research Theme .....	6
1.6 Research and Methodology .....	7
1.6.1 Methodological Aspects .....	7
1.6.2 Methodology and Literature.....	8
1.7 Structure of the Research.....	9
Chapter 2 .....	11
2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework.....	11
2.1 Paradigms on Governance:.....	11
2.1.1 Corporatism.....	13
2.1.1.1 Corporatism and Sovereignty .....	13
2.1.1.2 The historical roots of Corporatism in Africa.....	15
2.1.1.3 African Corporatism .....	16
2.1.2 Prebendalism .....	18
2.1.2.1 Theoretical underpinning of Prebendalism.....	18
2.1.2.2 Limiting Patronage .....	19
2.1.2.3 Prebendalism and Corporatism linkage .....	21
2.1.2.4 Kleptocracy: as an extreme form of Prebendalism .....	22
2.1.3 Conciliarity .....	23
2.1.3.1 Conciliarity: theoretical underpinnings.....	23
2.1.3.2 The religious dimension.....	25
2.2 Summary of Paradigms on Governance .....	26
2.3 Conclusion .....	27

<b>Chapter 3 .....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3. New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3.1 Background: .....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3.2 Plans preceding NEPAD.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>3.3 Development Paradigm contestation and the effects.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>3.4 From the Lagos Plan to NEPAD: the beginning .....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>3.5 MAP Plan places foreign actors first .....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>3.6 Mbeki sells MAP to Africa .....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>3.7 OMEGA Plan .....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>3.8 The Compact for African Recovery and it’s relation to NEPAD.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>3.9 African Union .....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>3.10 The role of the state in African Union.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>3.11 NEPAD and Governance.....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>3.12 Conclusion .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Chapter 4 .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>4. Governance Paradigm Hypothesis and Results.....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>4.1 Operationalising governance through the Paradigms.....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>4.2 Good Governance in NEPAD documentation.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>4.3 Economic Governance .....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>4.4 Political Governance .....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>4.5 Sampling Method .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>4.6 Results for Good Governance .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>4.6.1 Stage 1 Control Document .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>4.6.2 Stage 2 and 3: Instances of the use of Good Governance evaluated .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>4.6.3 Stage 4: Tables of Results.....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>4.6.4 Summary on Results for Good Governance.....</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>4.7 Results for Economic Governance .....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>4.7.1 Stage 2 and 3: Instances of the use of Economic Governance evaluated .....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>4.7.2 Stage 4: Results for Economic Governance.....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>4.7.3 Summary of results for Economic Governance .....</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>4.8 Results for Political Governance .....</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>4.8.1 Stage 2 and 3: Instances of the use of Political Governance evaluated.....</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>4.8.2 Stage 4: Results for Political Governance.....</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>4.8.3 Summary of Results for Political Governance .....</b>	<b>92</b>
<b>4.9 Governance of Africa?.....</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>4.10 Summary for all results .....</b>	<b>93</b>

<b>Chapter 5 .....</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>5. The African Peer Review Mechanism.....</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>5.1 APRM as a Corporate Performance Management System .....</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>5.2 The Structure of the APRM.....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>5.3 APRM and Governance .....</b>	<b>103</b>
<b>5.4 Conclusion .....</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>Chapter 6 .....</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>6.1 Summary and Conclusion .....</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>Chapter 7 .....</b>	<b>111</b>
<b>7.1 Appendix: List of NEPAD Documents analysed in Study .....</b>	<b>111</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>117</b>

## Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank God, who has provided me with health and wisdom which has enabled me to reach this stage of my academic career. I would like to thank my parents Sylvain and Marie-Claire who have provided me with all my needs throughout my life and their guidance has made me the person I am today. This thesis is a tribute to my parents' dedication in ensuring that I receive a first class education throughout my life and in particular at University even where these have been extremely expensive endeavours, to which their personal sacrifices, have not gone unnoticed. I also thank my sister Joelle for all her support.

I would like to thank Rhodes University for providing such an excellent department of Political and International Studies which has allowed me access to information that I could not have dreamed about. Throughout this study, I have received support from my colleagues in the department, with regards to sourcing information and generally being around in those times of crisis. I am indebted to all the teaching staff whose input at the departmental presentation has directed my study. In particular, Professor Vale for getting me in contact with Suzanne Dansereau whose input is appreciated. I would like to thank Odette Cumming who has not only been there as the secretary but also as a fellow student. My friends outside of the department have also been sources of support. David van den Bos, Niranjana Venkatesh, Carla September, Austin Robberts, Musha Neluheni and the residents of College House.

I would finally like to express a special thanks to Professor Paul-Henri Bischoff, my supervisor. I would not have been able to do this without you. The time and effort you have put into my study cannot be expressed in this acknowledgement and I hope that someday I will be able to be as valuable to you as you have been to me.

I declare that this thesis is my own work and use of ideas and quotes from any source have been adequately referenced. Any and all errors in this thesis are therefore my own.

## List of Abbreviations

AAF-SAP	African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programs
ADB	African Development Bank
APPER	Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AR	African Renaissance
AU	African Union
C	Conciliarity
CAR	Compact for African Recovery
Co	Corporatism
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
CSRA	Civil Service Reforms Act
DMS	Development Merchant System
G7	Group of 7
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution Policy
HSIC	Heads of State and Governments Implementation Committee (also referred to as the HSGIC)
IFI	International Financial Institution
JHSIGC	Joint Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MAP	Millennium Africa Recovery Programme
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIA	New African Initiative
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
P	Prebendalism
PoA	Plan of Action

SACBC	Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordinating Conference
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TA	Technical Assessments
TAHA	There are hundreds of alternatives
TINA	There is no alternative
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN-NADAF	United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa
UN-PAAERD	United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development
WCC	World Council of Churches

## Chapter 1

### 1. Introduction and Overview

#### 1.1 General Comment

Historically, the first use of governance in International Relations occurred in the 1980's through research on firms (corporate governance), and structural adjustment programmes and decentralisation projects promoted by the World Bank<sup>1</sup>. Since then the term governance has been extensively utilised to the extent that a simple 'Google' search of the word governance returns seventy two million (72 000 000) hits highlighting the prominence of the term. Furthermore, especially for this study, in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) documentation there are 734 occurrences in 100 documents<sup>2</sup>. This study will analyse NEPAD documentation and literature<sup>3</sup> on governance in order to assess the implications of the prominence of the term governance. The United Nations Development Program defines governance "as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels"<sup>4</sup>. This definition has wide reaching application for Africa.

With such an extensive appeal to governance, it would be easy to mistake the concept of governance as trite<sup>5</sup>. In reality the concept remains under-defined and undefined. The problem in defining governance has been that governance has shifted "from a narrow concern with government to a wide range of governance mechanisms which are concerned with the growing role of associations, different agencies, partnerships, regulated self-regulation, modes of regulation and the coordination of technologies of power"<sup>6</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.unesco.org/most/globalisation/Governance.htm> accessed on 30/06/05

The position of the World Bank was that "better governance is essential to economic recovery. Government had to possess the technical capacity to engage in complex negotiations with donors and to design or at least implement complex reform programmes.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.nepad.org>

<sup>3</sup> Academic and other sources e.g statements from civil society and African leaders.

<sup>4</sup> UNDP Good Governance and Sustainable development policy document.

<sup>5</sup> Beyond a definitional challenge considering most authors and the NEPAD documents in particular do not provide a single definition of governance.

<sup>6</sup> Moja: 1996:13

It is within that context that governance becomes a broadly defined term impossible to operationalise. We can then argue that governance as a concept is “slippery, highly contentious, and one whose province is also a contested terrain”<sup>7</sup>. This becomes problematic for studies on governance within NEPAD especially in light of Gelb’s view that “except for those states still mired in internal conflict, for which the establishing of peace and security is clearly the absolute priority, improving governance is the top developmental priority across Africa”<sup>8</sup>. Will NEPAD then really uplift the continent through Governance? In this sense what do we mean by governance? These are questions that will be explored in this thesis in chapter 3.

## **1.2 Governance and Multilateralism**

In July 2001 at the thirty seventh summit of the Organisation for African Unity the strategic framework for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was formally adopted<sup>9</sup>. With this action, as popularly portrayed in the media, African leaders set the continent on a course towards recovery. Apart from the media a significant amount of government propaganda went into the making of this representation.

Some have argued that the creation of NEPAD was not a consultative process; therefore as a consequence of this civil society has rejected the organisation. Prof K Abraham argues that “the NEPAD initiative was rushed and not participatory, giving the impression that the drivers of the initiative seemed interested in getting the support of the G8 and the International financial institutions rather than ensuring an African ownership of the initiative”<sup>10</sup>. He proceeds to argue that this perception can and has been changed so that NEPAD today can play its role. Civil Society actors such as Trevor Ngwane at the Anti-privatisation forum in 2002 duly noted that “No civic society, church, political party, parliament or democratic body was consulted in Africa when NEPAD was put together. Instead the first time we heard of it was when

---

<sup>7</sup> Amuwo: 2003:online source

<sup>8</sup> Gelb: 2002:3

<sup>9</sup> NEPAD: 2003:6

<sup>10</sup> Prof K Abraham (President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development) paper presented at the NEPAD South African Institute of Strategic Studies held in Pretoria.

Thabo Mbeki presented it in Davos at the World Economic Forum in January 2001 to the likes of George Soros”<sup>11</sup>.

NEPAD would claim that despite the initial lack of consultation in the forming of the body, the organisation has engaged with civil society since. In this argument NEPAD would in particular lay claim to the representation and significance of civil society through its governance mechanisms. As such we will, through this thesis, explore the politics in and around governance in NEPAD to validate this claim, primarily to discuss the overall feasibility and sustainability of the African recovery. Before we do this we must pose some questions in order to silence any critics who may still believe in the outright rejection of NEPAD by civil society<sup>12</sup>. It has become clear to all who believe in an African recovery, that the burgeoning African civil society is an important political actor as it represents a broad constituency and is a voice outside of the regimes in power<sup>13</sup>. The question therefore, is around the level and type of engagement between civil society and governments.

### **1.3 NEPAD and Civil Society**

How does NEPAD hope to achieve its goals if it lacks the mandate of civil society? The mandate of civil society is therefore not a simple matter of saying, we are in consultation but about the decision making and plan of actions that follows discussion. Can NEPAD conceive an African recovery that is mutually exclusive of civil society? This has been the case especially when civil society has attempted to increase its powers of oversight<sup>14</sup>. In this case the governments have attempted to steamroll and keep civil society out of the process of consultation or in the alternative provided for piecemeal compromises where civil society is heard and then ignored.

---

<sup>11</sup> Ngwane: 2002 Should African social movements support NEPAD

<sup>12</sup> It is important to note that even the drivers of NEPAD such as President Olusegun Obasanjo make reference to the critics of the organization. (The conference of solidarity with Africa, University of Notre Dame, U.S.A September 21 2003).

<sup>13</sup> Makumbe: 1998:306

<sup>14</sup> For some African leaders, civil society represents a minority voice that is often viewed to be meddling with the States sovereignty. The Global Policy Forum on the 25<sup>th</sup> of October 2005 notes President Mbeki’s attacks on the independence of non-governmental organizations in South. Smith T: 2005 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/2005/1025mbeki.htm>

In addition to this, we must also accept the premise of Leys that “state policy is becoming increasingly ‘market driven’, managing national politics in such a way as to adapt to the pressures of transnational market forces<sup>15</sup>. NEPAD may just be a response to international pressure and the way in which the organisation was formed should give us an indication of how much of NEPAD is actually an expression of African political will. NEPAD is an African initiative with a need to at least on the surface engage with civil society, this produces a complex set of politics. In addition if NEPAD’s governance mechanisms are true to the idea of engaging with civil society then this becomes an important point of study. The seeming lack of consultative processes in the formation of NEPAD may be a product of market driven strategies that do not require civil societies input<sup>16</sup>. Moja and Cloete have argued that “recent literature on governance asserts that “the state and civil society are mutually and recursively constituting sources of ideas about each other<sup>17</sup>. In such a conception the dichotomy between self regulation and state intervention, which is often made in the discussion on political order, becomes obsolete”<sup>18</sup>.

While a lack of viable consultative processes<sup>19</sup> exists between NEPAD and civil society, there have been some reservations to the success of the organisation by those who are consulted in the process. In an interview to the South African Broadcasting Corporation on the 12<sup>th</sup> of April 2002, George Soros called the NEPAD proposal a “skewed document” which while “worth the paper that it is written on. It is very much designed to meet the standards of the Washington Consensus. And therefore it's a very skewed document which I think could be improved on”<sup>20</sup>. The success or failure of NEPAD seems to lie in how it achieves good governance. Therefore the way in which governance is understood in the NEPAD becomes vitally important. This will be explored further in Chapter 2.

---

<sup>15</sup> Leys in Dansereau: 2005:32

<sup>16</sup> This would be a dangerous position, especially as states have declined, civil society has made up for the shortfalls.

<sup>17</sup> Watts: 1994:44

<sup>18</sup> Moja and Cloete: 1996:12

<sup>19</sup> Civil society actors don’t always get what they want, but as in all politics the compromise are reached. It is this process that is seemingly lacking as the proponents of NEPAD go along with their plan irrespective of the warnings of civil society.

<sup>20</sup> George Soros interview

#### **1.4 The African Renaissance and NEPAD as the great African hope.**

NEPAD has its roots in the notion of Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance<sup>21</sup> in this sense it is more than an organisation but supposedly the expression of the African peoples hope for the future. Thabo Mbeki, "before the crafting of NEPAD, made a ringing call for an 'African renaissance.' He also called the 21st century, 'an African century'. These calls and claims have made South Africa in general, and Mbeki in particular, the central focus for an African rejuvenation"<sup>22</sup>. It is supposed to embody the only hope for the continent, and this is almost always seen against the background of a continent in despair. NEPAD and President Mbeki's involvement with it is therefore the logical economic expression of the African Renaissance. To use an analogy, if the African Renaissance is a government, NEPAD is its Ministry of Finance and Receiver of Revenue.

NEPAD through its documents builds on the African Renaissance and understands the continent in deficit terms<sup>23</sup>. Throughout the documentation references are made to the need for the existence of the organisation. This is done by stressing the woes of the continent and providing NEPAD as a solution. Gelb a leading advisor on the process has noted that "if the NEPAD club succeeds it will act as a signaling device to investors and donors – domestic and foreign, private and public – to refine their risk assessments and reduce risk premia for club member countries"<sup>24</sup>. With this in mind the role of Mbeki, Obasanjo and Gaddafi is one that fits into not only the economic and political recovery but also a spiritual recovery of the continent, making an obvious appeal to divine or at least foreign intervention.

Like all positions where people are in need of saving, one obvious question arises. Saved from what? The continent is without a doubt in despair, civil wars, famine, HIV/AIDS, poverty, the list is endless. NEPAD as will be shown later on in this thesis

---

<sup>21</sup> The African Renaissance (AR) is an attempt to redefine the continent and express its position as a definitive global cultural, political and social entity. It is through the concept of the AR that Africans are meant to seek deliverance from their economic woes. The AR remains a powerful appeal to the expression of the significance of Africa to the World. Then Deputy President Mbeki speaks to the United Nations University on the 9<sup>th</sup> of April 1998 <http://www.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html>.

<sup>22</sup> Nabudere: 2000:49-50

<sup>23</sup> That is a continent in despair needing to be rescued.

<sup>24</sup> Gelb: 2002: 3 Global Insight Issue 19 The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): A Brief Overview

has placed governance on the agenda, as the means by which to take Africa out from the abyss. We will therefore be concerned with the forms governance<sup>25</sup> on the continent as expressed through NEPAD. The term Governance is often used in the context of political, economic, and good forms (political governance, economic governance and good governance). All of these appear in the NEPAD documents and are therefore important in this study to understand the politics in and around the use of the term governance. This study is an assessment of one hundred (100) NEPAD documents that can be downloaded from the organisations' website<sup>26</sup>. These range from the base documents that provide the legal treaties that constitute the body, to more practical policy documents and action plans<sup>27</sup>. These documents will be provided in the appendix.

NEPAD is a multilateral regime with states as members<sup>28</sup>. NEPAD as an attempt at a rebirth of the continent is involved with the transformation of these states in Africa, towards Good Governance. Munro argues that “even in the most abject cases of political chaos in Africa, some institutional form of political and administrative organisation exists which calls itself, and is recognised as, the state”<sup>29</sup>. Within this argument, the state exists as one of the few examples of a structure on the continent. NEPAD has provided a solid organisational structure<sup>30</sup> for these states. It attempts to redefine the economic landscape in Africa.

## **1.5 Demarcation and Relevance of the Research Theme**

This thesis will look at governance and its usefulness in NEPAD; this is to be done through an analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)<sup>31</sup> as an arm of NEPAD whose objective is the reconfiguration of the African state. The level of

---

<sup>25</sup> Good, Economic and Political

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.nepad.org>

<sup>27</sup> See list of documents

<sup>28</sup> NEPAD:2003: 6

<sup>29</sup> Munro: 1996:123

<sup>30</sup> At least in policy documents

<sup>31</sup> The APRM is the instrument for self-monitoring by the participating member governments within NEPAD with specific reference to political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. **(38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU: African Peer Review Mechanism).**

penetration that has led to the formation of NEPAD necessitates a discussion on the international context which NEPAD and APRM belong to. In this regard, the actors that are driving the NEPAD process are important. Furthermore, we need to understand NEPAD and APRM in the context of competing paradigms on development. Since independence there have been many calls for African Unity. These have largely failed as nationalist governments have been predisposed to protecting their sovereignty as part of their nation-building strategy. Along with this regional bodies have been unsuccessful at bringing about political integration<sup>32</sup>. This thesis will attempt to provide some insight into what this new region will look like by exploring the form of governance that is prominent in the NEPAD documentation. This thesis in applying the concept of governance to NEPAD, attempts to provide an operational definition of it to demonstrate its use as an analytical tool in the study of multilateral regime. This thesis will attempt to form a clear and concise way to understand governance through NEPAD and in doing so, attempts to provide clarity on use of the term governance in the field of International Relations studies.

## **1.6 Research and Methodology**

### **1.6.1 Methodological Aspects**

Methodology is concerned with the theoretical assumptions one makes within certain schools of thought on how to do research. This becomes a vital point of choice in the research. In other words, the methodology employed affects the criteria for validity set by the researcher in the study. Ramazanoglu defines methodology in social research as “concerned with procedures for making knowledge valid and authoritative<sup>33</sup>. In social science research there are two approaches to research which are quantitative and qualitative. Guba and Lincoln (2000) have provided a distinction of these two, through the lenses of the Cartesian Kantian Dyad<sup>34</sup> where Cartesian is equal to quantitative and Kantian is equal to qualitative research. Quantitative research is empirically based and finds its functions in the regulation of data

---

<sup>32</sup> For example the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) which transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was and remains unable to undermine the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), SADC has largely failed to bring about regional political integration.

<sup>33</sup> Ramazanoglu: 2002:9

<sup>34</sup> Guba and Lincoln: 2000:170

acquisition that is the validity of the research is inextricably linked to the how data is found. Qualitative research on the other hand is concerned with finding the meaning behind the data.

This thesis will provide qualitative research in the form of a contextual analysis of the word governance as it appears in NEPAD documentation. Therefore it is less open to a quantitative analysis as the data in this case is provided in NEPAD documentation to which we have no control. The meaning of the data is possible and this therefore requires a qualitative approach. As noted by Denzin (1994) “Qualitative research has to be read, not scanned; its meaning is in the reading”<sup>35</sup>. As this thesis is concerned with contextual analyses of text, a qualitative approach is the most appropriate one to follow.

An interpretivist methodology will be used in this thesis as it is based on the idea that “understanding is the basic way of existing for every human being”<sup>36</sup>. The reading of documents, from academic texts to the texts that define NEPAD itself, will provide the meaning or purpose of the regime. “The argumentation leads not to some absolute truth in the sense of a correspondence between theory and reality, but to intersubjectivity – albeit provisory and discretionary, never definitive or coercive”<sup>37</sup>. This is fundamental to this research where one cannot write about an absolute truth on governance in NEPAD. What can be done is to situate NEPAD in the contexts where it is defined in this case, through the 100 documents.

## **1.6.2 Methodology and Literature**

Apart from contextualising the term governance and its use in the field of Political Studies this study will include a literature review on the term governance. In current literature on NEPAD, much of the focus has been around the emergence of the regime and questions on the nature and scope of NEPAD have been raised. Due to the relatively recent creation of NEPAD, academic work on what the regime may become is still in a nascent form. However, even with this limited repertoire a gap exists in the literature around what type of governance process or processes will flow from NEPAD. The elevation of governance as a developmental priority in Africa is

---

<sup>35</sup> Denzin: 1994:517

<sup>36</sup> Alvesson: 2000:56

<sup>37</sup> Alvesson: 2000:59

therefore a topic that is open for discussion. This thesis draws on work encompassing many different methodologies and objectives in the greater body of critical thought on NEPAD. In addition to academic texts, this thesis will mainly explore NEPAD documentation related to governance. This will therefore be a multi-methodological literature review with a specific purpose to provide an objective work on governance by defining the concept, testing its validity and providing an analysis of the reconfiguration of states in Africa within NEPAD. This will be done with a wider view to assessing the APRM's behaviour.

## **1.7 Structure of the Research**

It is important to provide an overview of the thesis title before we look at the structure of the research. With the use of governance being elevated as a developmental necessity, new relationships and indeed politics have emerged. While this thesis does not purport to limit the existence of NEPAD to one reason and this will be shown as we explore the genesis of the regime, NEPAD is undoubtedly a product of current political interest in 'governance'. This claim will be substantiated in chapter 3. The Politics in and around governance in NEPAD is therefore an exploration of the effects that governance concerns will have in defining the regime. This thesis is interested in the relations of power between those that drive the NEPAD process and those that are outside of that core. It is also important to note that actors outside of the regime may not be the only ones that are excluded. There are distinct tensions and powers at play within the regime itself.

In order to discuss the politics in and around governance in NEPAD, this thesis will provide five chapters to highlight the following: Chapter 1 consists of an introduction to the thesis and a general outline of the problem. Chapter 2 will provide a theoretical framework on governance based on the literature review which will assist with the operationalising of the term governance in NEPAD. A hypothesis will be provided which will be employed for the analysis of the NEPAD documentation. Three paradigms on governance that is corporatism, prebendalism and conciliarity will be applied in order to provide an analysis of how the term governance is used in the NEPAD documentation. The methods and methodology behind the thesis will be elaborated on and the hypothesis that will be tested in this thesis will be provided.

Chapter three will provide more on the genesis of NEPAD and its role. As a pre-emptory note on what NEPAD does, it would seem that through a process of regime making<sup>38</sup> states are seemingly entering a new phase of dialogue with the West or at least for the first time, sharing a common voice over their future. Chapter 4 will provide the results of the test of the hypothesis which will be provided in Chapter 2. It is important to note that this will be a test of the 100 documents listed at the start of this thesis. As such the test will cover NEPAD and with this the APRM. Chapter 5 will provide a detailed discussion on the role of the APRM as the governance mechanism of NEPAD.

The establishment of NEPAD raises a new scenario around the governance of the continent. Governance has gained prominence through its wide usage despite the multiplicity of meanings the term may cover. The specific focus of this study is to provide a literary review of academics texts on governance to formulate a more useful and operational application of the term that will allow academics to use it as a method of analysis on multilateral organisations. Therefore this thesis will cover texts that employ different research methods and methodology. The reason for doing this is to focus literary thought on the issue around Governance and apply them to NEPAD (as an example of a multilateral regime).

---

<sup>38</sup> NEPAD indirectly and directly supersedes national sovereignty and is a multilateral regime making device, where the states that are members are seen as part of the African development regime.

## Chapter 2

### 2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

#### 2.1 Paradigms on Governance:

In determining the use and usefulness of governance Edward Dommen in his article 'Paradigms of governance and exclusion' has provided three paradigms on governance, corporatism, prebendalism and conciliarity<sup>39</sup>. Applying these paradigms to how NEPAD promotes and affects governance provides us with scenarios to the 'Cui Bono' question of why African states<sup>40</sup> through NEPAD allowed themselves to open up to more penetration. In the alternative, it allows us to evaluate if NEPAD through its use of governance supports pre-existing forms of penetration. If NEPAD is to assist in the formation of an African region, this would run contrary to the idea of individual state sovereignty. Here NEPAD is part of the general phenomenon of the penetration of Africa and not a means by which to reduce penetration. NEPAD does however; potentially mark a new process in which the level of penetration has changed.

Multilateral regimes may be formed for the protection of state sovereignty in situations where without the existence of the regime, the survival of these states would be limited. Why has NEPAD pushed good governance as a means to secure the future for Africa? A state that is in decline from penetration and internal conflict<sup>41</sup> is able to secure its existence by entering into a larger organisation that effectively maintains the level of penetration without further challenging the existence of that state. In the case of internal conflict, leaders of a state who are unable to control their country, that is they have lost internal sovereignty are able to cede sovereignty of their state to the multilateral regime which then through a form of collective security guarantees the leaders position in their country. In the case of penetration, where

---

<sup>39</sup> Dommen: 1997: 485

<sup>40</sup> Accused of bad governance in the past by the World Bank.

<sup>41</sup> Any other factor that leads to state decline, for example shortage of forex, civil war *et al*

penetration weakens a state<sup>42</sup> joining a multilateral regime that encourages the same penetration can provide legitimacy and security for that state. Structural adjustment programs have been challenged in Africa but while there is opposition to the governments' compliance with these, the same adjustment done under the auspices of NEPAD are not challenged<sup>43</sup>. The type of regime that is promoted through NEPAD and the methods of governance that are to be adopted by the states should provide answers to why NEPAD has become concerned with governance for development. Here Dommen's three paradigms provide an analytical tool by which to assess the type of regime NEPAD is or promotes. The paradigms that have been provided by Dommen apply on the national and regional levels. However, we need to first address the level of analysis problem<sup>44</sup> in this thesis by looking at the different levels when applying Dommen's paradigms to the NEPAD documentation.

“The level of analysis problem is about how to identify and treat different types of location in which sources of explanation for observed phenomena can be found”<sup>45</sup>. In simpler terms, when we look at a problem, we need to consider the level at which it is being observed that is national and regional as the case may be in this study. In order to make a valid observation on phenomena, this research must remain conscious of the level at which the observation occurs. The actors involved in the politics in and around governance also cross two levels of analysis, the regional and national levels. Therefore this thesis will look at both the regional and national level in observing the regime and the actors in NEPAD.

In terms of the methodology, this thesis will assess the NEPAD documentation and evaluate how to represent uses of governance in the documents in terms of the paradigms on governance. In order to do this, the paradigms will be discussed with reference to NEPAD. Other literary sources will be included to provide some of the debates and contentions around the use governance and also the function of NEPAD

---

<sup>42</sup> For example structural adjustment reduces the power of state as social spending is cut down. This leads to a position where potentially the political opposition can gain support especially if essential services are not delivered (health care, policing).

<sup>43</sup> Chossudovsky <http://www.aidc.org.za/?q=book/view/121>

<sup>44</sup> Singer: 1961 As expressed from Waltz, Singer and Kaplan

<sup>45</sup> Buzan B in Booth : 1995:200

to further the analysis of NEPAD through the paradigms on governance. The three paradigms above will be used with reference to both the regional and national level.

The Governance Paradigm Hypothesis which will be tested in chapter 4 of this thesis is as follows.

1. Governance can be understood through different paradigms (corporatism, prebendalism and conciliarity)
2. The term governance in the NEPAD documentation can be analysed in terms of these three paradigms on governance.
3. The paradigm that is most prominent in the findings allows us to predict the form of governance regime that NEPAD<sup>46</sup> is likely to promote.

## **2.1.1 Corporatism**

### **2.1.1.1 Corporatism and Sovereignty**

The first paradigm that we will outline is Corporatism which may provide answers to why national sovereignty is seemingly being relaxed in the formation of a multilateral regime<sup>47</sup>. Schmitter's now classical re-conceptualisation of corporatism will be utilised in this discussion and modified where appropriate. In his seminal 1974 paper titled 'Still the century of Corporatism?' Schmitter defines corporatism as:

*“A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leader and articulation of demands and supports”<sup>48</sup>.*

---

<sup>46</sup> In itself and through the APRM

<sup>47</sup> NEPAD

<sup>48</sup> Schmitter: 1974:94

It is important to note that corporatism in itself has become a controversial concept and while we apply the concept in this thesis, this is limited to areas where it applies to Africa<sup>49</sup>. In applying this to NEPAD, the regime creates a representational monopoly firstly as the vehicle for Africa's development to Western interests and secondly, as a way of hierarchically ordering civil society and the state in Africa. At the same time "this style of governance is designed to reserve the lion's share of benefits for members of corporations, for insiders. A wide spectrum of arrangements shares that characteristic: corporatism is an extensive genus which includes many species of governance of the economy"<sup>50</sup>.

An example of a form of corporatist governance can be found in the Swiss Cartel model. "Up to the 1980s, the Swiss relied upon ... corporatism since most were beneficiaries of one or more cartels which were protected from competition. The private sector in Switzerland was therefore hierarchically transformed to introduce political processes that are normally considered to be in the realm of the public sector as a means of regulating representation. Corporatism in this sense represents the interests of members of the cartel in a model that regulates interactions and competition. These generated comfortable margins which could be shared out to widespread satisfaction, thereby compensating for the high prices and somewhat restricted choice which they incurred as customers of other cartels"<sup>51</sup>. This model is a form of inclusive corporatism and has largely succeeded in Switzerland due to the existence of the citizen state<sup>52</sup>. Furthermore, the Swiss model is effective in that a large number of people belong to one cartel or another, therefore as most people are members, they benefit from their participation.

In multilateral institutions, the corporatist model is a viable means to bring about development, if the leaders of the country are true representatives of their various states. The Swiss government is accountable and responsible to its citizens. The Swiss have not been divided by ethnic and/or religious conflict which allows for the competition within corporatism to be limited to economic activity. That is political contestation does not occur in the corporations under the guise of ethnicity or religion.

---

<sup>49</sup> Negash: 1991:65

<sup>50</sup> Dommen: 1997:487

<sup>51</sup> Dommen: 1997:488

<sup>52</sup> Where ethnic and religious background are meaningless

While the model of corporatism has been effective in forging development in Switzerland, the effect in Africa has been quite the opposite.

### **2.1.1.2 The historical roots of Corporatism in Africa**

In Africa the colonial system often fitted the description of corporatism<sup>53</sup>, and was only reluctantly adjusted at independence by a number of regimes in Africa<sup>54</sup>. In large part the corporatist model was maintained and only reversed to the extent that where previously the majority were formally excluded from the economy, the economy was now nominally opened to all. For example Virginia Knight on her analysis of (post independence) Zimbabwe argues that “At the outset, the government retained many of the regulations affecting business that it inherited from the Smith government. The white government had regulated the economy to create a wealthy white middle class. The black government used the same regulations to create a wealthy black middle class”<sup>55</sup>. The colonial corporatist method of rule was continued by the new elite. The leaders<sup>56</sup> largely maintained the social division of the colonial era.

In Africa, corporatism maintains a social hierarchy and only the elite that can afford to be members of corporations benefit. Therefore the majority are excluded from the system. This type of governance has become common in Africa and is exacerbated through ethnic and religious divisions. State corporatism is designed to exclude people who are from a different ethnic or religious background to the ruling elite.

NEPAD as a regime consisting of member states may bring into the multilateral organisation the problems of governance faced at the national level. By this we mean that state corporations may use the regime to compete for domination or they may form an alliance to rule Africa. This in turn means that the state corporations that exist will not be undermined but rather will transfer into the new region. The exclusion of the general population of Africa from the benefits of their respective countries is likely to influence the economic and policy interactions with NEPAD as the

---

<sup>53</sup> This was a form of exclusive corporatism, where membership to the corporation was limited to the colonists.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

<sup>55</sup> Knight: 1989:222-7

<sup>56</sup> Private and Public

multilateral regime. Will NEPAD create a standard of governance that will have general application on the continent which will overcome or reinforce state corporatism? An important question is whether we would see an inclusive or exclusive form of corporatism and the standard of governance it will set. Economic growth on the continent will not alleviate the plight of the African people as such through governance; more equitable social structures need to be forged. In this regard a corporatist model<sup>57</sup> would seem ill suited for Africa, as the systemic change in extending membership to the African corporation is historically limited in scope<sup>58</sup>.

### **2.1.1.3 African Corporatism**

In Africa exclusive Corporatist governance has been brought about through the colonial legacy. In response to this inclusive<sup>59</sup> corporatism centred on the economy, has been indirectly encouraged through the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programs<sup>60</sup>. However, governments or the ruling elites have benefited irrespective of the overall economic performance of their respective states<sup>61</sup>. With or without strong economies, elites are still able to form. While structural adjustment encourages good governance and democracy, it also encourages private enterprise which has made the public/private divide far less clear<sup>62</sup>. This leads to the creation of regimes where the leader is viewed as the state<sup>63</sup> where governance becomes largely irrelevant as the state serves an individual or a small coterie of followers. Shaheen Mozaffar has noted that some African states have been able to create “limited forms of corporatist linkages with specific domestic groups that directly or indirectly, stand to gain from state-mediated international largesse”<sup>64</sup>.

Exclusive Corporatism allows us to look at the politics of governance in Africa through the lenses of international regimes on indebtedness<sup>65</sup> and control which have

---

<sup>57</sup> The history of African corporatism suggests the continuation of exclusive regimes.

<sup>58</sup> Knight: 1989:222-7

<sup>59</sup> Political reform has been one of the conditionalities of Structural adjustment. The view was that more democracy = more development

<sup>60</sup> Political reforms and protection of minorities

<sup>61</sup> The middle class has not been considered as part of the elite, for this thesis.

<sup>62</sup> Some African leaders have found themselves caught up in corruption scandals involving their private companies.

<sup>63</sup> Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Obasanjo’s Nigeria, Museveni’s Uganda e.t.c

<sup>64</sup> Nyangoro: 1989:53

<sup>65</sup> Regimes of indebtedness are those where the state is functioning solely to repay debts. Bangura: 2000:772

diminished Africa's sovereignty. African leaders and their supporters, who have acquired the state, are not concerned with debt that the state pays, even when these debts are the result of their expropriation of the public exchequer. Some leaders were notorious in amassing fortunes that outstripped the debt owed by their countries. In some countries however leaders have been replaced by new elites so the threat of removal from power due to structural reforms has become a reality<sup>66</sup>. This has driven the concern for governance, which can also be seen as a concern for the survival of the elite against replacement.

In Africa some leaders may be willing to cede national sovereignty (which they have already lost or are losing) (to NEPAD) to prolong their period of leadership. A leader who is losing power and control at home, can through NEPAD, legitimise their regime allowing them to maintain the status quo<sup>67</sup>. National sovereignty or control over the state by leaders is therefore increased by virtue of participation in the multilateral regime, especially where an international organisation is concerned with providing security for the continued rule of particular elites. NEPAD in this model is therefore a regime that could reward its members the national leaders by limiting the space for viable opposition within its member states. Although in principle Western partners seem to be interested in increasing participatory democracy in Africa, the effects of non-compliance by members of NEPAD that are driving the process remain unknown. Historically exclusive corporatism which exists in Africa is largely elitist and not concerned with broadening the range of beneficiaries to African development. The strategies employed by the International Financial institutions are an example of mechanisms that have aided exclusive corporatism. These policies are not dissimilar to calls for open participation in NEPAD. Practice has shown that despite the talk of Western institutions and states, African leaders have been able to mould the development requirements of their partners to their own benefit.

In particular structural adjustment and globalisation provide a threat to elites but at the same time offer an avenue for them to legitimise their rule<sup>68</sup>. Is NEPAD then simply

---

<sup>66</sup> Uganda, Malawi, Republic of Congo *et.al*

<sup>67</sup> The first six signatories to African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>68</sup> States that have suffered economic hardship largely due to the failure of structural adjustment have struggled to remove elites from power as these rulers have gained international credibility and even

an economic plan borne out of need<sup>69</sup> or is it in the words of Richard Gibb a way of “managing globalisation”<sup>70</sup>? Most importantly, if NEPAD is a response to global structuring is this endogenous or imposed from outside and is the two types mutually exclusive?

It would seem that African countries have retained colonial corporatism (exclusive), as it benefits the few elites that rule and this has been enhanced by the decisions made by external actors such as the World Bank, to encourage the corporatist model. Although the World Bank in principle encourages inclusive corporatism, the blurring of the public/private divide and the consequences thereof, have promoted exclusive corporatism. The World Bank, through structural adjustment has allowed for the legitimating of exclusive corporatist models. African corporatism has a distinctly different application to that of the West and this raises some concerns, about whether or not NEPAD will become a multilateral corporation that benefits its members (the elites), where their own hold of power is otherwise being diminished.

## **2.1.2 Prebendalism**

### **2.1.2.1 Theoretical underpinning of Prebendalism**

Prebendalism occurs where 'State offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups'<sup>71</sup>. Prebendalism therefore is where governance serves patronage systems. “A number of authors have analysed its African manifestations in particular, but it has a long tradition embracing, for instance, the feudal system”<sup>72</sup>. The politics of who controls and has the power to distribute the benefits of development within states becomes important for this study. We can explore the prebendalism paradigm by seeking how the governance of NEPAD accrues benefits (in the form of aid etc.) and how NEPAD through its projects will

---

where these rulers international status has changed, it has remained difficult to replace them e.g. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

<sup>69</sup> To maintain the status quo for those in power

<sup>70</sup> Gibb: 2002:13

<sup>71</sup> Joseph: 1997: 489

<sup>72</sup> Dommen: 1997:488

promote, stabilise or discourage the existing forms of governance in African states<sup>73</sup>. If it promotes the current governance structures, then NEPAD benefits will only flow largely to elites. NEPAD could also stabilise governance by ensuring that elites that fear replacement are able to consolidate their position. Where NEPAD discourages prebendal states, there is an opportunity for a more equitable distribution of benefits.

In large part prebendalism has been considered a stable form of governance. In spite of this, many authors have noted problems with this type of governance. In defence of this Joseph has argued that “the paradigm consists of a complete cycle of appropriation and redistribution: the word 'and ' in Joseph's definition marks an essential characteristic of prebendalism, which is often described as predatory by analysts who ignore the fact the resources appropriated by the holders of power are redistributed to their clients”<sup>74</sup>.

### **2.1.2.2 Limiting Patronage**

The concern raised above on how NEPAD may develop a corporatist model<sup>75</sup> that is either inclusive or exclusive also applies to the Prebendal system. Will NEPAD serve to extend or limit a system of patronage prevalent at the national level? Will it lend itself to national elite manipulation? With the background of a politically changing landscape where democratisation is becoming a reality and presidentialism is giving way to constitutionalism<sup>76</sup>, there is scope for a change of the patronage system within states. This is however, undermined in Africa where political elites have manipulated ethnic divisions for their material gain<sup>77</sup>. NEPAD in its division of the continent into priority areas where money will be directed has the potential of forming new prebends. As state offices are formed into prebends, NEPAD through its priority areas may support some state prebends over others, or support state prebends over changing

---

<sup>73</sup> Infrastructural development while beneficial to all, especially more electricity and water are also domains where once privatized benefit the owners of the corporations that run these. NEPAD projects could be focused on projects that benefit the current leaders through their subsidiary companies.

<sup>74</sup> Dommen: 1997:489

<sup>75</sup> Projected onto African states, that may reconfigure according to the paradigms on governance.

<sup>76</sup> Neiryck: 1999:2-25

<sup>77</sup> The most stark consequence of this manipulation became evident in the Rwandan genocide, where the extreme ethnic divisions in that country led to conflict.

the patronage system. That is, the internal politics of member states may lead to tensions around why certain sectors of the state benefit from NEPAD over others.

The form of governance that NEPAD projects on the state is open to the manipulation of prebendal interests, where funding from the multilateral regime can be turned into material benefits for individuals and their kinship groups<sup>78</sup>. The formation of the APRM has led to an indication that old prebendal practices may persist. A group of Eminent Persons<sup>79</sup> has been created to make decisions on the governance credentials of the respective countries. They are tasked with visiting the countries and forming the APRM panel. While this group has been carefully selected to ensure the international community has faith in the African Peer Review process, the fact remains that NEPAD leaders have selected them to hold the power to decide on governance concerns for the whole continent. This reflects an elite consensus where NEPAD leaders have chosen seemingly respectable representatives to evaluate the governance of Africa. The elite select others from amongst themselves to make decisions for the whole<sup>80</sup>. This has become a problem for some civil society actors who in an official capacity feel excluded from the APR process<sup>81</sup>.

---

<sup>78</sup> This could be the case, where a prebend has formed over health care, as health receives special attention for NEPAD, this could increase patronage systems as the health care prebends grow in stature and power.

<sup>79</sup> Currently consisting of Ms Marie-Angelique Savane, Prof Adebayo Adedeji, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Dr Graca Machel, Mr Mourad Medelci, Dr Dorothy Njeuma and Dr Chris Stals  
<http://www.aprmnigeria.org/apanel.htm>

<sup>80</sup> The APR forum selects the Panel of Eminent Persons. The APR forums consists of members of HSGIC Heads of State and Governments Implementation Committee. In other words the heads of state, ruling elites select the Panel of Eminent Persons. Communique issued at the end of the First summit of the committee of participating heads of states and government in the African Peer Review Mechanism Forum, Kigali Rwanda 13 February 2004

<sup>81</sup> More detail on the structure of the APRM will be provided in Chapter 5 and we will explore this issue further.

### 2.1.2.3 Prebendalism and Corporatism linkage

The general opposition to Prebendalism comes from proponents of the Corporatist model. The argument here is that prebendal systems are not viewed as economically stable and have lower levels of investor confidence than corporatist models. Mbembe opposes this view as he believes that the two systems can co-exist. For Mbembe “Prebendalism and corporatism can co-exist in a single economy. For instance, if the employees of market-oriented enterprises or international organisations who earn their livings in a corporatist system come from a prebendal society, they are quite likely to redistribute a sizeable share of their income to their extended family, clan, or local community”<sup>82</sup>. There is evidence of this form of redistribution across Africa and this has been largely due to the colonial impact. The colonial powers, in particular Britain through indirect rule, encouraged tribalism<sup>83</sup>.

Tribalism in post independence Africa has been responsible for most of the strains on nation building that governments have faced. Initially nationalist movements had a wide network of support across ethnic division<sup>84</sup>; these alliances have been put under strain since. Only in a few examples such as Botswana since independence does the concept of a nation apply, where the majority of inhabitants belong to the same ethnic group. While ethnic division have posed major problems for development on the continent, the creation of antagonistic tribal systems, has encouraged prebendal behaviour where leaders have redistributed state wealth to their respective constituencies.

NEPAD proposes to forge a new African identity which would in turn widen the net of distribution. A problem exists for NEPAD, to define its support base. We have already noted civil society’s initial aversion to NEPAD. The way in which NEPAD was designed by the current political leadership on the continent<sup>85</sup> also highlights

---

<sup>82</sup> Dommen: 1997: 489

<sup>83</sup> As part of the divide and rule strategy, societies that has in effect lived close together, were divided and placed under the leadership of various chiefs who were subjects of the colonial masters. This led to the division between Tutsi and Hutu in the Great Lakes region (Hotel Rwanda).

<sup>84</sup> This was not always the case e.g Zimbabwe where a Shona and an Ndebele nationalist movement were formed.

<sup>85</sup> The APRM remains a voluntary process, possibly to ensure that leaders that choose to not change still have the choice to remain in NEPAD while continuing to hold power. This means that they don’t

penetration, where civil society actors have been excluded while foreign interests have been consulted<sup>86</sup>. The penetration of the African state has therefore led to African leaders continuing their old governance methods and the position where the elite do not consult the people of their countries.

#### **2.1.2.4 Kleptocracy: as an extreme form of Prebendalism**

The extreme of Prebendalism is Kleptocracy, where “whoever has the power to appropriate resources does so and keeps most, if not all... the number of other beneficiaries, if any, is particularly small”<sup>87</sup>. Here we can explore the idea of whether NEPAD encourages more governance without government and where states are reconfigured to a position where these may be subjected to external restructuring resulting in the further privatisation of government on the continent. It has been argued that “the traditional conception of governing arises from changes in the relationship between government and the private sector”<sup>88</sup>. It can also be argued that some of the African states are kleptocratic in nature, as leadership cults exist that exult the ruler. This is particular germane when African voting patterns are taken into consideration as parties in power tend to get re-elected either through the political will of the people who have so much respect in the leader that they choose to not vote them out or through vote rigging that is then not challenged for fear of the repercussions. Can NEPAD then create new benefits for the general population or is this a new face to old tyranny?

The prevalence of the concept of governance through NEPAD could be a new direction away from the leadership cult, which could establish true democracy on the continent. It could also be a way of cementing the current leadership’s rule, especially if NEPAD brings about the economic upliftment it claims to be interested in. There is a danger however, that NEPAD may amount to fostering or producing a new kleptocracy which will supplant national governments. Prebendalism governance

---

have to do anything to be in NEPAD unless they choose to do so. In addition to this South Africa is often criticized for its policy toward Zimbabwe, where President Mugabe is often honoured and not vilified by the South African government.

<sup>86</sup> This will be shown in Chapter 3 on the development of NEPAD

<sup>87</sup> Dommen: 1997:494

<sup>88</sup> Guy Peters: 1998:223

however, does offer an opportunity for the public realm to be strengthened within the region. A significant governance problem in Africa is the issue of the lack of capacity. Irrespective of whether state offices are appropriated or not, predendal governance could encourage capacity building and efficiency in the public sector<sup>89</sup>.

### **2.1.3 Conciliarity**

#### **2.1.3.1 Conciliarity: theoretical underpinnings**

The Conciliarity<sup>90</sup> paradigm is one that involves governance which “strives to be inclusive by inviting wide participation both in the making of decisions and in the distribution of benefits<sup>91</sup>. In this sense NEPAD<sup>92</sup> could be argued to be an attempt at recognising the role of popular participation in decision-making and governance. In order to do this, NEPAD would have to encourage civil society actors and other groups that represent as broad a constituency as possible to discuss and engage in debate over policy. This position recognises that individuals in a state have the power to make the state ungovernable if they choose to disobey the government and can even replace the rulers through revolution. Individuals are powerful; they do not need to be empowered by the state as they have collective ability to overthrow the government. Conciliarity does not mean that all decisions need to be passed through ordinary people, but that transparent and accountable avenues for discussion exist by which the voices of relevant actors can be heard. The consequence of the exclusion of these voices from participation encourages government to enter into dialogue with stake holders<sup>93</sup>.

Two types of conciliar governance can be distinguished. The first type is Utilitarian conciliarity, crystallised by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) in the phrase “The greatest

---

<sup>89</sup> For example, service delivery may increase as it is more profitable to those who benefit from the prebend.

<sup>90</sup> The term 'conciliar' in this sense has been given currency by the World Council of Churches (WCC), which uses it to describe processes which reach out to involve as wide a public as possible.

<sup>91</sup> Dommen: 1997:489-490

<sup>92</sup> Although NEPAD has does not out rightly make a noise about heritage, in fact it silently removes the colonial element of Africa's underdevelopment. The NEPAD projects and Mbeki's African Renaissance do make appeals to a better past.

<sup>93</sup> A problem arises around who the state considers to be a stake holder.

happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation”<sup>94</sup>. This form of governance requires that the state prioritises the greater good in its interactions with the people. Utilitarian conciliarity is dangerous as it may lead to a situation where the minority are ignored, the case of Zimbabwe would fall quite comfortably in this definition of governance. The demarcation and definition of the greater good becomes a problem as it may lead to a situation where the greater good equals the will of the majority.

In extreme cases this would mean that as long as everyone is consulted, major decisions can be made that may threaten the survival of the minority. For example, language rights have become an issue in Southern Africa. In Botswana, the San form a minority and as such their language is not an official language. This has wide implications on matters, such as the teaching of San languages in schools, which the state is not obligated to do. For NEPAD this would mean that certain states may be allowed to develop at quicker rates than others if it benefits the whole continent. For example, the Nile Basin initiative<sup>95</sup> which leads to employment and revenue from water in some states<sup>96</sup> also leads to a greater supply of water for any neighbouring countries.

The second type of conciliarity governance is the Gandhian/Rawlsian view. Gandhi visualised this in his statement “recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he gain anything by it? Will it restore him to a control over his own life and destiny”<sup>97</sup>? In this type of governance, the state must focus on the needs of the weakest as a gauge to ensure that everyone is able to achieve a dignified way of life. This view has an intellectual history in the work of Rawls<sup>98</sup> “and its roots can be traced back for more than 2,500 years to the origins of several of the world's great religions”<sup>99</sup>. Here the central premise that emerges is that those who rule should do so for the greater good or at least for God. In this belief the will of the majority is the

---

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Bentham 1789 *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*

<sup>95</sup> NEPAD Infrastructure Short Term Action Plan 2003 Review of implementation progress and the way forward.

<sup>96</sup> East Africa: Uganda, Kenya & Sudan

<sup>97</sup> Gandhi Foundation, Delhi, n.d

<sup>98</sup> J Rawls 1971 *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford)

<sup>99</sup> Dommen: 1997: 491

primary concern, but in order to ensure their security we need to protect the minority. This means that the majority are protected because everyone is protected.

### **2.1.3.2 The religious dimension**

It is important to note that major religions in Africa form the bulk of the active civil society<sup>100</sup>. Neville Gabriel the Director of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) Justice & Peace Department warned that “the process that gave rise to the current NEPAD document is seriously lacking because there has been no consultation with Africa's citizenry, without whose active participation there can be no real partnership and no real development”<sup>101</sup>. Catholics form a large minority in Africa and remain a strong religious force, being the biggest Christian religious denomination. If we are to look at the roots of the Gandhian/Rawlsian conciliarity governance, as being one formed by the big religions of the World, then the statement that Mr Gabriel made does not bode well for NEPADs conciliarity credentials. This statement is however, not sufficient in itself to denounce the possibility of this form of governance being adapted. Therefore the conciliarity paradigm remains open to analysis on African governance.

Historically African societies can be argued to have had consensual political systems which required that major decisions be made only after widespread consultations among the people”<sup>102</sup>. With this in mind NEPAD seemingly appeals to an emerging civil society on the continent. Munro argues that “those modern techniques that make the state appear to be a separate entity that somehow stands outside society” have not yet been fully institutionalised in Africa<sup>103</sup>. It can therefore be argued that NEPAD could be that step towards the institutionalisation of the ‘state outside of society’ with a wide inclusive notion of governance as the method. Can NEPAD include civil society in the making of the region? The paradigms on governance to be adapted for this thesis is summarised as follows in figure 1.

---

<sup>100</sup> Other civil society actors exist e.g NGO's, Think tanks and Interest groups

<sup>101</sup> Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference Media Release: Friday 1 March 2002

<sup>102</sup> Makumbe: 1998:306

<sup>103</sup> Munro: 1996:121

## 2.2 Summary of Paradigms on Governance

Figure 1.

<b>Summary of Paradigms on Governance</b>				
<b>Paradigms</b>	<b>Types</b>	<b>Main Actors</b>	<b>Nature</b>	<b>Examples</b>
<b>Corporatism</b>	<b>Inclusive</b>	<b>Corporations</b>	<b>Works in interest of corporation members</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Switzerland up to the 1980s</li> </ul>
	<b>Exclusive</b>	<b>State Corporations</b>	<b>Serves a legitimated patronage system</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Africa under colonialism</li> </ul>
<b>Prebendalism</b>	<b>Traditional</b>	<b>State offices that are considered to be Prebends</b>	<b>Serves Patronage Systems (elites)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States that have strongly defined tribal systems</li> <li>• Nigeria</li> </ul>
	<b>Kleptocracy (Extreme)</b>	<b>Leader in power (often extended to close family nepotism)</b>	<b>Predatory Views state as a tool of accumulation for the elite</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Zaire (Mobuto)</li> </ul>
<b>Conciliarity</b>	<b>Utilitarian (limited conciliarity)</b>	<b>Majority interests</b>	<b>Serves greater good</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States that have a distinct majority Zimbabwe</li> </ul>
	<b>Gandhian/Rawlsian</b>	<b>Wide grouping of all interested actors</b>	<b>Consensual Politics</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generally developed nations</li> <li>• United Kingdom</li> </ul>

## 2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has laid the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. Edward Dommen<sup>104</sup> has proposed three paradigms on governance. These have been outlined in this chapter under their respective headings corporatism, prebendalism and conciliarity. These paradigms that have been set out and will be used to assess the usage of the term governance in NEPAD. In other words what type of governance does NEPAD mostly exhibit and project and what effect will this have on state reconfiguration in the region making process?

The paradigm of corporatism sets up governance as a system to maximise the benefits of the members of the corporation. This form of governance had been effective in Switzerland due to the fact that originally there was wide redistribution within the cartels which offset the costs of high prices. Corporatism offers a market friendly form of governance and can be successful, if the members of the corporations benefit from a strong economy. This means that in countries where there is a generally strong economy and positive growth, corporatism will thrive. A distinction has been made between inclusive and exclusive forms of corporatism. Inclusive forms are able to succeed but exclusive forms as in Africa have not. This thesis will have to assess if NEPAD will employ a corporatist form of governance and whether this projects inclusive or exclusive corporatism. It is fair to say that within the context of the African economy which is in a perilous state, corporatism would initially seem inappropriate, but this remains to be seen.

Prebendalism is a system where certain groups (office holders) acquire the mechanisms of the state to improve their own wealth. A distinction has been made here between prebendalism and kleptocracy. The difference between the two types of prebendal systems lies in the degree of acquisition of the state. Kleptocracy is an extreme form of prebendalism where the mode of redistribution is smaller than in the traditional form. Kleptocracy is a predatory system where the leader turns the state into a money making tool for his/her own benefit. Under kleptocracy, office holders cannot acquire prebends without the support of the leader. Both forms though to

---

<sup>104</sup> Dommen: 1997:491

different degrees promote elites at the expense of the general population, although in Africa, due to tribalism this may sometimes have a wider scope of redistribution.

The conciliarity paradigm is a form of governance that seeks to reach consensus in decision making processes and attempts to encompass as many interested parties as possible. Two types of conciliarity have been offered here, that is utilitarian and Gandhian/Rawlsian conciliarity. Here again these types of governance have different degrees on consent-seeking strategies and these have been outlined above. With the theoretical and conceptual framework set out, we are able to turn to the development of NEPAD and the politics in and around governance in the organisation.

## Chapter 3

### 3. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

#### 3.1 Background:

The history of the formation of NEPAD is relevant in this attempt to decide which governance paradigm most readily applies to the organisation. As discussed earlier penetration is significant in this general discussion of which paradigm on governance we find in Africa. The way in which (in terms of governance) the multilateral regime applies to Africa provides us with answers to why states are seemingly limiting their sovereignty. Importantly, the formation of the body also holds answers to why the notion of governance has gained central prominence in NEPAD development strategies. We could pose the question why NEPAD<sup>105</sup> and why now? Notable scholars such as Adedeji<sup>106</sup> and Nabudere<sup>107</sup> have noted contesting paradigms on development amongst Africa's leaders and also contestation between African ideas on development against the West's ideas on development where the latter have usually dictated the result of what type of development has been pursued. While the OAU attempted to implement some development strategies, these have failed largely due to the lack of support from the West<sup>108</sup>. African development strategies have traditionally been heavily reliant on Western support and, as such, there have been very few examples of self sustaining indigenous development strategies.

This dependency on the West for development is also an example of the penetration of the state mentioned earlier. NEPAD, AU and AR are meant to change the fortune of Africa and NEPAD in particular is expected to succeed at development where previous strategies have failed. The AU on the other hand is concerned with the political reformation of the continent. It is within this context that NEPAD and AU attempt to be different to the previous strategies employed by African countries.

---

<sup>105</sup> In this sense, alternative strategies to development have been excluded through the existence of NEPAD.

<sup>106</sup> Adedeji who is one of the eminent persons in the African Peer Review Mechanism Panel. *Nepad Information Pack 1 : EISA 2002: 35-49*

<sup>107</sup> Anyang' Nyong'o: 2002:49

<sup>108</sup> These development strategies were not inline with penetration of the state as they were designed to increase self sufficiency.

Adedeji has noted that “while African leaders can be faulted in many ways, they have made a series of effort since the early 1970’s to craft their own indigenous development programs in the light of their own perceptions”<sup>109</sup>. NEPAD is about partnership and the choice in the name has a specific context that we must consider. “In the realm of international cooperation, the vogue-word is *partnership*. The word *cooperation* is no longer deemed adequate while *compact* is considered too strong because it implies making binding commitments”<sup>110</sup>. From the start then, NEPAD is not about the strongest type of commitments, but about building a relationship with the West. The concept of partnership conveys a relationship involving “joint effort, joint responsibility but this does not always result or bring about binding commitments”<sup>111</sup>. The term new partnership highlights the fact that Africa has been in an old partnership that was not beneficial to the continent. NEPAD therefore is not an attempt to break away from the global system but in fact a way to be more competitive in the so-called age of globalisation<sup>112</sup>.

### 3.2 Plans preceding NEPAD

The processes that brought about NEPAD can be discussed by way of making mention of African development programmes that have preceded the current strategy. Five landmark strategies have existed in the period of the 1980’s to 1990’s. These are:

1. “The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic development of Africa, 1980-2000 and the Final Act of Lagos 1980 (LPA).
2. Africa’s Priority Program for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) which was later converted into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s economic recovery and development (United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development UN-PAAERD 1986).

---

<sup>109</sup> Adedeji: 2002:3

<sup>110</sup> Adedeji: 2002:12

<sup>111</sup> Adedeji: 2002:12

<sup>112</sup> Authors such as Hirst: 1997, Teeple; 1995, Germain: 2000 and others have questioned if globalization is real or a myth. It is in the context of these challenges to globalization that this thesis must consider the development of NEPAD to so-called globalization.

3. The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programs AAF-SAP 1989; and
4. The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990)
5. The UN New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s (United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa UN-NADAF 1991)”<sup>113</sup>

All of these strategies shared a common goal with NEPAD in terms of attempting to transform the politico-economic landscape of Africa. African leaders have noted the effects of penetration which undermine their ability to govern<sup>114</sup> prior to NEPAD and have attempted to bring about development by contributing to the above programmes. Paradigms on governance in this thesis are a means by which to explore what level of penetration leaders are willing to accept and if in fact this is only being done for their own survival.

Adedeji notes some of the above previous development strategies failed largely due to the lack of outside support and in some cases direct opposition from foreign parties. The dependency of African development to foreign investment and the penetration of the state are responsible for these failures. African states have not been able to successfully promote development from within.

*“Unfortunately, all of these were opposed, undermined and jettisoned by the Bretton Woods institutions and Africans were thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about their future” ... “Every attempt that has been made by Africans to forge their future and to craft their own indigenous development strategies and policies has been pooh-poohed by the international financial institutions with the support, or at least the connivance, of the donor community”<sup>115</sup>.*

---

<sup>113</sup> Adedeji: 2002:3

<sup>114</sup> Irrespective of whether they govern poorly or properly

<sup>115</sup> Adedeji: 2002:4

The donor communities' reluctance to support earlier<sup>116</sup> strategies has meant that African countries have been unable to guarantee investment for development on the continent. This however, does not mean that African leaders are not responsible for the lack of development as most of them had only half-heartedly taken on the responsibility for development<sup>117</sup>. NEPAD therefore seems to be a change from this, in that Africans are being tasked with securing their own development by the West as long as this new phase of development is implemented in partnership with the West.

It is important to note that until the establishment of NEPAD “lacking the resources and the will to soldier on self-reliantly, they (African leaders) abandoned their own strategies, including the two– United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development and United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa which were crafted jointly with the international community under the aegis of the United Nations”<sup>118</sup>. While it is true to say the international community is guilty of stifling African development, even in cases where there has been consensus on the way in which development should take place, African states lacked the ability to see these projects through.

### **3.3 Development Paradigm contestation and the effects**

The development merchant system (DMS)<sup>119</sup> which was the method by which financial institutions and donor countries encouraged the opening up of markets lead to contestation between African and Western ideas on development of the African continent. Under the DMS “foreign-crafted economic reform policies have been turned into a new kind of special goods which are largely and quickly financed by the

---

<sup>116</sup> Pre NEPAD

<sup>117</sup> Mistry: 2005:665

<sup>118</sup> Adedeji: 2002:4

<sup>119</sup> Prof Mbaya Kankwenda coined the term Development Merchant System which he argues has “its own ‘institutions, structures, operational mechanisms for opening up markets, development of customer loyalty and business expansion’ (Onimode: 2004:3) In practice the DMS is a “two-gap model which gave foreign capital and foreign aid a central place in the development process...and... was inspired by the outstanding success of the Marshall Plan in bringing about the economic reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II” (Adedeji: 2002:6). Unfortunately, this model is appropriate only to developed industrialised market economies, not to under-developed, backward and traditional economies.

operators of the DMS, regardless of the negative impact of such policies on the African economies and politics”<sup>120</sup>. Kankwenda has strongly stated that “African governments are obliged to conform to the norms, whims and caprices of the DMS...needless to add that the overarching objective of the DMS is for the African canoe to be firmly tied to the North’s neo-liberal ship on the waters of globalisation”<sup>121</sup>. The DMS has been a way of streamlining African development to the needs of the West; this is evident in the way that structural adjustment has been implemented on the continent.

It is also important to note that despite the Post Washington consensus<sup>122</sup> which notes that Western imposed development strategies in Africa were wholly inadequate<sup>123</sup>, African countries are still being encouraged to tow a neo-liberal line. This contradiction has been quite stark when the neo-liberal calls for democracy and good governance have been made by the World Bank<sup>124</sup>. The World Bank has fought running battles with governments that were supposed to be democratising in Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria and Ghana<sup>125</sup>.

Claude Ake has argued that this contestation between the African development and DMS paradigms has had a profound effect on the lack of economic growth on the continent. He stated “without doubt, sustainable development in Africa will not begin until this struggle over development paradigms, strategies and agendas is resolved in favour of its people”<sup>126</sup>. Will NEPAD then offer a compromise to end the development paradigm battle? If it is to do this then, it will necessarily need to be more in line with the position of the West while at the same time attempting to create benefits in favour of the African people where this has not happened in the past. Without a doubt, NEPAD has been received well by the donor community and the Bretton Woods institutions since its publication in 2001.

---

<sup>120</sup> Adedeji: 2002:4

<sup>121</sup> Kankwenda: 2000:4

<sup>122</sup> Mosley: 1996:1459

<sup>123</sup> Bill Clinton endorsed this change of tag during his African tour when he declared, as a great act of contrition, ‘we were wrong’. (Nabudere: 2002:84)

<sup>124</sup> Berg Report

<sup>125</sup> Nabudere: 2002:84

<sup>126</sup> Ake: 1996:4

This raises some primary questions about why this is the case. Is it because NEPAD is in line with the DMS, or has the Post Washington consensus brought about a paradigm shift on the part of the West? In order to start answering this question we need to note that in spite of “favourable population to natural resources ratio, the generous and even indiscriminate incentives for foreign private enterprise and in spite of adherence to orthodox theories and prescriptions, neither high rates of growth nor of diversification nor an increasing measure of self-reliance and socio-economic dynamism has been within the reach of African countries”<sup>127</sup>. What is significant in this analysis on the failure of development on the continent is that African countries had complied with the dictates of the International financial institutions (IFI’s). Where Western support was not forthcoming, African states have simply abandoned the development strategy of that time. NEPAD in no way seems to change this position as it does not challenge Western presumption on African development<sup>128</sup>. The extent to which NEPAD is likely to succeed however depends largely on how far the West’s position has changed on African development.

### **3.4 From the Lagos Plan to NEPAD: the beginning**

The lack of economic development on the continent<sup>129</sup> led to calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that could be geared towards global economic development and remove the status quo of Africa’s indiscriminate trading position. The NIEO is an issue that has been raised by all third world countries including African countries. The shift to the NIEO was confirmed “when the African Heads of States and Governments met in Monrovia in July 1979 to discuss and examine the economic problems facing the continent and to take a stand on what was needed to address these problems”<sup>130</sup>. They decided the next phase of development would need to accommodate the NIEO. Prior to this the Economic Commission for Africa<sup>131</sup> came out in 1976, with its first landmark document entitled the ‘*Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa*’ which was the intellectual and theoretical foundation upon which the ‘*Monrovia Strategy*’

---

<sup>127</sup> Adedeji: 2002:5

<sup>128</sup> The DMS has seemingly changed its approach to opening up countries to the market by following a line that is in principle similar to the African development strategies of the 1980’s and 1990’s.

<sup>129</sup> Originally in the 1970’s


<sup>130</sup> Anyang’ Nyong’o: 2002:23

<sup>131</sup> A United Nations commission to deal with African development

(1979) and ‘*The Lagos Plan Action*’ and the ‘*Final Act of Lagos*’ (1980) were subsequently built.

This plan consisted of some fundamental principles which included the promotion of “self-reliance, self-sustenance, citizen-centred development processes, and democratisation of the development process”<sup>132</sup>. Making moves in line with this the heads of states and governments charged the “OAU Secretary General and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to come up with a plan to put in place these objectives”<sup>133</sup>. An extraordinary session of the Heads of States and Governments of the O.A.U was scheduled for July 1980 to be held in Lagos. It was at this meeting that the leaders of Africa adopted the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos<sup>134</sup>. Consensus was reached on the adoption of the Lagos Plan. Under this plan “they would take concrete steps to realise national and collective self-reliance in the economic and social domains faced by the New International Economic Order (NIEO)”<sup>135</sup>. At this point governance was not raised as an essential prerequisite for development. The following is a timeline of significant events that led to the Lagos Plan (figure 2).

**Figure 2.**



As stated earlier the Lagos Plan was not well received by the IFI’s. “The World Bank criticised the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) for not giving enough room to the private

<sup>132</sup> Adedeji in Anyang’ Nyong’o: 2002:viii

<sup>133</sup> Anyang’ Nyong’o: 2002:23

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

<sup>135</sup> Organization of African Unity. 1981. Preamble , *The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa*. OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

sector. It further took the LPA to task for not conceding to the reforms necessary in the public sector to stimulate economic growth”<sup>136</sup>. This criticism led to the World Bank compiling its own report on Africa, the infamous Berg Report<sup>137</sup>. “The Berg Report delivered a judgement that put the African state and African bureaucracies in the dock”<sup>138</sup>. A strong argument was made that African development could not proceed while the African state remained corrupt and mismanaged. The Bank’s perspective in this respect was to question the possibility of development without governance in Africa. In the final analysis the Berg Report, put it simply in arguing that accelerated development on the continent was impossible without good governance.

The effect of the Berg Report was to undermine African development strategies such as the Lagos Plan of Action throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s. The Berg report advocated a neo-liberal line which led to conditionality on aid. African countries could no longer receive aid without taking steps towards reforms that would allow aid to benefit the state as a whole. This is in light of the corrupt nature of the African state where development aid has not been used effectively and has been distributed unevenly to benefit elites. There are other factors that led to the lack of development; these include unfavourable terms of trade, lack of good governance and the dependency of African development on Western funding<sup>139</sup>. The need to create a working development strategy due to the failures noted above led to two plans emerging which would eventually become NEPAD. The first of these was the Omega Plan presented by President Wade of Senegal to the France–African Summit in January 2001<sup>140</sup>. The second plan, the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) was conceived by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and supported by Presidents Bouteflika and Obasanjo of Algeria and Nigeria respectively.

---

<sup>136</sup> Anyang’ Nyong’o: 2002:24

<sup>137</sup> World Bank. 1981. Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA. The report cited poor governance and the lack of private enterprise as significant obstacles to development in Africa. This report led to the creation of structural adjustment programs which would lead to devaluation of currencies, limited social spending and the promotion of privatisation.

<sup>138</sup> Anyang’ Nyong’o: 2002:24

<sup>139</sup> African countries found it increasingly difficult to feed themselves, once cash crops were encouraged, farming for day to day food supplies had decreased.

<sup>140</sup> Nabudere: 2002:54

These new plans were responsive to neo-liberalism which as has been shown above was undergoing a shift away<sup>141</sup> from the idea of placing conditionality on aid and development. “The Omega Plan which together with the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) suggested that the management and administration of the African initiative should be entrusted to a board of directors comprising debtor and creditor representatives”<sup>142</sup>. Seemingly African leaders were willing to give up their sovereignty in economic matters in the belief that a Western managed development strategy would be beneficial to Africa. These plans introduced governance as a fundamental requirement for future development. This was a logical progression in the formation of NEPAD as the leaders of Africa were willing to accept that they did not have the governance capacity to bring about development. They were therefore ready to cede the management of the development of the continent and at the same time attempt to increase good governance in their own countries. The OMEGA and MAP plans eventually became the foundations of NEPAD. It is this process of the merging of these two plans that is of significance to understanding the concept of governance in NEPAD.

In spite of these fundamental shifts, the popularity of Lagos Plan remains, to the extent that African leaders in charge of NEPAD (implementation and development) “have been arguing that its fundamentals are not different from those of the LPA, that NEPAD provides the framework for pursuing Africa’s indigenous development agenda as against the prescription usually foisted by the DMS”<sup>143</sup>. This shows that the proponents of NEPAD have had to sell this project on a previously accepted plan. To reiterate this “seven of the LPA’s thirteen chapters focus on Africa’s regional strategic sectors—food and agriculture, industry, human resources, transport and communications environmental protection, science and technology, gender etc”<sup>144</sup> have been identified as the primary interests of NEPAD. “NEPAD sees them as constituting the nexus for the provision of essential regional public goods”<sup>145</sup>. We must therefore accept that NEPAD has in principle been built on the LPA strategy

---

<sup>141</sup> This was formalised in President Clintons statement above.

<sup>142</sup> Adedeji: 2002:8

<sup>143</sup> Adedeji: 2002:10

<sup>144</sup> Adedeji: 2002:15

<sup>145</sup> Ibid

and any differences between the two plans should explain the changes in the new development strategies. A pivotal difference in the two strategies is the elevation of governance as a prerequisite for development. The politics in and around governance that emerge are therefore a result of an attempt to revive principles behind the Lagos Plan of Action.

### **3.5 MAP Plan places foreign actors first**

In order to understand NEPAD, it is important to look at the plans that led to NEPAD and the process that brought this about. We will start with MAP as this was the plan conceived by Mbeki<sup>146</sup>. “MAP was a detailed project for the economic and social revival of Africa involving a constructive partnership between Africa and the developed world. The initiative sought to reposition the continent in terms of global economic relations that were continuing to unravel”<sup>147</sup>. MAP was therefore going to avoid the mistakes of previous development strategies to ensure that the project was successful and not suffer from the problems of lack of support from donor agencies and IFI’s. Mbeki embarked on visiting the leaders of the world before he wrote MAP to make sure this would happen. From the start then, MAP differed from what we have called indigenous development strategies in that, Mbeki sought legitimisation of the plan from foreign donors first. We need to consider Professor Abraham’s point of contention that NEPAD was seen to be more interested in receiving the support of international actors over civil society and non state actors within Africa. This can be traced to President Mbeki’s actions around trying to gain and broaden support for MAP from the World.

On the 28th January 2001 in his report to the *ANC Today* after his first briefing to the World Economic Forum in Davos Mbeki went to great lengths to explain the consultative processes that were embarked on before writing MAP. The following is his statement which is quoted in full to emphasis the importance that Mbeki put on the process.

---

<sup>146</sup> Mbeki’s leadership lies in the fact that as part of his conception of African renaissance, he tried to critically reassess African performance since its independence in the 1960s. The starting point was a critical examination of Africa’s post independence experience and an acceptance that things had to be done differently if Africa was to achieve meaningful socio-economic progress. (Nabudere: 2000:51)

<sup>147</sup> Nabudere: 2000:50

*“During the year 2000, we spent sometime meeting the political leadership of the developed world—the North. Accordingly, in May we met Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton in London and Washington DC, respectively. We also met the then Governor George W. Bush in Austin, Texas. In June, we were part of the Berlin meeting on progressive governance. ... In the same month, we visited to participate in and addressed the meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers. Again in June, we addressed the meeting of the European Council held in Portugal, which was attended by all heads of government of the EU. In July, together with presidents Obasanjo and Bouteflika, we met heads of state and governments of G-7 in Tokyo, and had the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions with the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori. While in Tokyo, we also met the President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn. Later, in Pretoria, we also held discussions with the Managing Director of the IMF, Horst Kohler. In September, we addressed the UN Millennium Summit and had an opportunity to meet President Putin of Russia, among others. Before this, we had also interacted with the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who committed the UN to cooperate with us as we worked on MAP”<sup>148</sup>*

All these meetings were deemed indispensable to the formation of a development strategy that could work for Africa. Two things emerge from Mr Mbeki’s statements; the first is the mention of the Berlin meeting on progressive governance which suggests that the notion of governance would emerge as a factor in African development. Considering that this strategy of meeting with the various stakeholders led to the exclusion of the rest of Africa in the planning of MAP. Mbeki had made a choice on where he would attempt to gain support for his development strategy. The division between Francophone and Anglophone Africa becomes clear from this, as the French did not play a significant role in the formation of MAP. The choice of the Berlin meeting highlights the fact that any future plan of action would necessarily consider the issue of governance. The second important fact that emerges from this document is that while MAP led to a consultative process with the West, there seems

---

<sup>148</sup> Mbeki, T. 2001. Africa’s people central to success of recovery programme. In: *ANC Today*, 2nd February 2001.

to have been a lack of consultation with African leaders, with the exception of the G7 meeting where Obasanjo and Bouteflika are mentioned. Mbeki was therefore engaging with the West in Africa's behalf without a specific mandate to do so.

Later on in the *ANC today* report Mbeki states

*“We intend to brief all African Heads of State over the next few months. Our aim is to be as inclusive as possible. Thereafter substantive consultations with the leaders of the developed countries and multilateral institutions would take place. ... The implementation of the plan will commence as soon as briefings have been completed and commitments made by a critical number of African countries. ... Countries that are not ready will be welcome to join later”<sup>149</sup>.*

Through this statement we can see that leaders of Africa were not consulted in the process of drafting MAP and that Mbeki realised that some countries would not be ready to join. There is also a general lack of clarity on what would constitute “a critical number of African countries”<sup>150</sup>. This created a clear problem since the plan was not as inclusive of Africa as previous development strategies had been. It has been argued that the lack of consultation meant that MAP was an entirely Mbeki affair<sup>151</sup>. In fact the project was only brought to the other African leaders once the MAP program had already been accepted by the West. Mbeki wrote in the same report in the *ANC Today* that “it was only at the OAU Summit in Lome, Togo, that African Heads of State and Governments had agreed that Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa should prepare the draft document and circulate it among these Heads of State”<sup>152</sup>.

This highlights the fact that although the principles guiding the MAP had been established, Mbeki legitimised the process after the fact and was able to then claim that MAP was a truly African document. Mbeki went on further to state that “we have to work to guarantee that the process of renewal represented by MAP is genuinely based among the people and is not merely a programme of action for governments

---

<sup>149</sup> Ibid

<sup>150</sup> Ibid

<sup>151</sup> Nabudere: 2002:52

<sup>152</sup> Ibid

only”<sup>153</sup>. This statement seems to be simple rhetoric considering the relative exclusion of African people from the formation of MAP. The plan was sold to the African people only once President Mbeki could ensure that it would be accepted outside of the continent. This does become a problem when one considers the fact that the DMS had failed Africa in the past. There is some level of suspicion about foreign involvement in African development as noted by civil society actors<sup>154</sup> and other non-state actors. The validity of President Mbeki’s statement on bringing African people on board the MAP plan and consequently NEPAD has become contentious. A particular criticism of the process that led to MAP has been made by civil societies who do not see a change in attitude of the African leaders<sup>155</sup>. If NEPAD is about governance, it is notable that old African leadership strategies towards civil society have not changed and it is fair to say that the old governance methods generally employed by Africa’s leaders remained prominent in this process<sup>156</sup>.

### **3.6 Mbeki sells MAP to Africa**

In Mbeki’s defence, the problem of a lack of consultation did not go unnoticed and attempts to rectify this occurred after the fact. This can however, be seen as disingenuous as Mbeki was driving the process from the start without the African people. In spite of this Mbeki took a two-pronged approach to get consensus for his programme from African leaders<sup>157</sup>. “The first was to bring the more strategic African leaders aboard. Participation was to be open to all African countries, which were prepared and ready to commit themselves to the underlying principles guiding the plan at a later stage” and the second approach was “to engage those African states, which Mbeki considered ‘weak’ by trying to strengthen their capacity of governance and implementation”<sup>158</sup>. Both of these strategies were aimed at getting African leaders behind the plan and therefore lacked a genuine commitment to governance<sup>159</sup>.

---

<sup>153</sup> Nabudere: 2002:53

<sup>154</sup> Ngwane and Abrahams

<sup>155</sup> Mbeki’s approach, like that of the older generation of leaders was, to think, plan and negotiate with the donors before bringing civil society in to agree to any plan (Nabudere: 2002:53).

<sup>156</sup> If NEPAD was really concerned with governance then we would have expected some level of consensus seeking for the establishment of the plan. This was not the case.

<sup>157</sup> Civil society was not included in Mbeki’s attempt to get consensus for the program

<sup>158</sup> Nabudere: 2002:53

<sup>159</sup> As pushed by IFI’s

Mbeki noted two major problems that needed to be tackled with. The first was to provide a reason for why MAP was necessary. Mbeki argued that “the continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation process and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its people constituted a serious threat to global social stability”<sup>160</sup>. The second and equally important problem is governance. Here Mbeki argued that a simultaneous program to bring about sound governance was necessary within the context of marginalisation within globalisation.

### **3.7 OMEGA Plan**

At about the same time that Mbeki had embarked on creating MAP, President Abdoulaye Wade announced his Omega Plan for Africa. This plan identified the need to develop physical capital and human capital as the key prerequisites for sustained and balanced growth and argues for investment needs in priority sectors to be brought under the purview of a single international authority”<sup>161</sup>. The OMEGA and MAP had the same outcome for Africa’s development and only differed on certain points as to how to bring these about. In general OMEGA, was a more inward looking plan<sup>162</sup> in contrast to MAP which was based on dependency similar to the five strategies introduced earlier in this chapter. Both plans put an emphasis on Africans taking charge for the development of the continent. However, OMEGA was designed in a manner that the management of the continent should become the domain of the states involved in the plan for the mutual benefit of all of Africa.

OMEGA was formerly launched in June 2001 at the International Conference of Economists on the Omega Plan. This highlights the fact that President Mbeki had not consulted other African leaders, or else President Wade’s plan would not have been formerly proposed while MAP was being planned. The creation of the two plans also highlights the effects of colonialism in that Wade’s plan involved Francophone Africa while Mbeki was largely involved with English speaking Africa’s development.

---

<sup>160</sup> Mbeki, T. 2001. Africa’s people central to success of recovery programme. In: *ANC Today*, 2nd February 2001.

<sup>161</sup> Nabudere: 2002:54

<sup>162</sup> The OMEGA plan was designed to incorporate the views of all African leaders. The name itself was chosen to indicate that the plan was not final as OMEGA is relatively anonymous. It differs to MAP on the point of governance and also seeks in particular to reduce the African debt problem through special drawing rights for Africa (The OMEGA PLAN document September 2001).

While the two plans lay claim to being African irrespective of this division, it is notable that the foreign actors involved in the each of the plans are different<sup>163</sup> which raises the question of which Africa were these leaders concerned with. The OMEGA plan did not account for English speaking Africa. The claims to the Africanness of the development strategies can be said to be rhetorical during the MAP and OMEGA creation. This thesis has spent a considerable section on MAP because Mbeki has been the driving force of NEPAD while Wade has taken a backseat in the multilateral regime. The heavyweights of NEPAD are Nigeria and South Africa<sup>164</sup>. The emergence of OMEGA was not ideal for Mbeki's plan and "after some time, efforts were made to merge the two initiatives. This was done and the merged document was referred to as the New African Initiative (NIA)"<sup>165</sup>.

### **3.8 The Compact for African Recovery and it's relation to NEPAD**

In the merging of the two documents, the Economic Commission for Africa and its 'Compact for African recovery'<sup>166</sup> (CAR) became very important<sup>167</sup>. While the Compact for Africa was being developed, it became apparent that OMEGA and MAP were being devised. Again this highlights the lack of consultative processes within Africa in the formation of the latest African development strategies. This also seems to show that Western views on African development are divided. Each of the three strategies received different foreign support and the level of overlap between the supporters was nominal. While this would normally have been a problem as the three threads could have split the continents development strategies<sup>168</sup>, all three plans had the same outcome in mind. CAR became important in combining the OMEGA and MAP as it had more legitimacy and was more consultative than the other two plans<sup>169</sup>. Furthermore "the compact engendered the propositions of MAP and Omega with

---

<sup>163</sup> OMEGA includes 2 French economists in stage 1 of the plan while no special privilege is given to the French in MAP. (OMEGA plan and MAP documents).

<sup>164</sup> Nabudere: 2002:55

<sup>165</sup> Ibid

<sup>166</sup> "A little known document" (Nabudere: 2002:54) The idea of developing the compact emanated from a speech made by the Executive Secretary of ECA, Mr. K.Y. Amoako, to the Eighth Session of the ECA Conference of African Ministers of Finance held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2000.


<sup>167</sup> This was confirmed in 2005 in an interview with Dr M Rupiya, who met the drafters of NEPAD, two members of the ECA.

<sup>168</sup> This is not an inherent problem, but the creation of NEPAD has shown that IFI's and countries of the West prefer to deal with the idea of Africa as a monolith. It can be argued that the existence of three development strategies would have undermined investment and aid.

<sup>169</sup> The ECA was a United Nations commission and as such had a wider mandate.

good governance as the pivot from which enhanced partnerships with the donors was to be envisioned”<sup>170</sup>. The CAR was used to merge OMEGA and MAP into the NIA (which would later become NEPAD). The following diagram shows the stages of development to NEPAD.

**Figure 3.**



The NIA was quickly transformed into NEPAD<sup>171</sup>; this was largely due to certain countries taking their commitments to the NIA very seriously. Amongst these was Nigeria which became the front runner for NEPAD. “The Implementing Committee of the African Heads of States, presided over by President Obasanjo of Nigeria, who later chaired the Committee, began to effect the implementation of NEPAD on October 23, 2001”<sup>172</sup>. Unlike previous development strategies the focus of NEPAD was not on aid but on increased investments on the continent. This turn about in African development strategy was seen as a positive move and one inextricably linked

<sup>170</sup> Nabudere: 2002:55

<sup>171</sup> When it was formally adopted by the OAU in July 2001

<sup>172</sup> Nabudere: 2002:57

to the emergence of a new type of leadership on the continent<sup>173</sup>. In a speech in 2001 Obasanjo set out that the implementation of NEPAD needed to move forward as it would succeed under “the prevailing environment in Africa which was marked by, among other things, the emergence of a leadership... that is committed to economic renaissance of the continent, as encapsulated in the New African Initiative programme”<sup>174</sup>.

The creation of the committee of NEPAD played a fundamental role in establishing the parameters of the organisation. The Committee approved a number of mechanisms for the implementation of NEPAD. “These included the adoption of the revised New African Initiative Document—NEPAD—dated October 2001” of which the English version was adopted as original text<sup>175</sup>. This committee also formally adopted the name NEPAD. The committee decided on the governing structure of the organisation.

*“A detailed Organogram reflecting this structure was also adopted, which is as follows:*

*a. The Implementation Committee, with President Obasanjo as Chairman and Presidents A. Bouteflika and A. Wade as Vice Chairmen, who will meet once every four months. It also reaffirmed its composition, in accordance with the decision of the Lusaka Summit of the OAU in July 2001.*

*b. The Co-ordinating NEPAD secretariat, with a very small staff, to be located in Pretoria, South Africa.*

*c. The Steering Committee, which was charged with the task of developing a strategic plan for marketing NEPAD at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels. This was with the aim of mobilising domestic support and facilitating private–public sector partnership in Africa as well as enhancing international partnership. The Steering Committee is also to continue preparations for the proposed conference on Financing NEPAD in Dakar, Senegal, in January 2002.*

---

<sup>173</sup> This was a particularly telling time with leaders such as Obasanjo, Museveni, Mbeki and others standing as beacons of hope on the dark continent. This new breed of leadership was seen as different to the old political forces and the progressive realization of democracy on the continent seemed possible. Today this has been questioned in light of debates around third terms for Presidents.

<sup>174</sup> Nabudere: 2002:57

<sup>175</sup> Ibid

*d. The Task Teams/Lead Agencies to urgently identify and prepare specific implementable projects and programmes, which are to be the responsibility of specific organisations such as the OAU/AU, UNECA, African Development Bank (ADB) etc. These were to be as follows:*

- i. Capacity Building on Peace and Security—OAU*
- ii. Economic and Corporate Governance—UNECA*
- iii. Infrastructure—ADB*
- iv. Central Bank and Financial Standards—ADB*
- v. Agriculture and Market Access—OAU”<sup>176</sup>.*

This structure became the founding mechanism of NEPAD. We will now turn our attention to the African Union and its NEPAD relationship.

### **3.9 African Union**

The African Union (AU) was established by the Constitutive Act of the OAU Charter and the Abuja treaty which established the African Economic Community in 2000<sup>177</sup>. The sponsors of the AU perceived it to be the “most pre-eminent initiative, which has emanated from Africa since independence”<sup>178</sup> and in this sense the AU supersedes all other partnership initiatives. This necessarily required that regional blocs that enjoy relationships with foreign countries should streamline their interactions with the international community through the African Union. The primary purpose of the AU was to “accelerate the process of implementing the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980”<sup>179</sup>.

The NEPAD initiative as the timeline suggests, came about in 2001, one year after the constitutive act was passed. The constitutive Act mentions the Lagos Plan of Action and is designed to form the sectors mentioned earlier. While these sectors as envisioned in the LPA have also become part of the NEPAD, there is no mention of

---

<sup>176</sup> Nabudere: 2002:57-58

<sup>177</sup> Nabudere: 2002:58

<sup>178</sup> Ibid

<sup>179</sup> Adedeji: 2002:15

NEPAD itself in the constitutive Act as it had not been rewritten to accommodate NEPAD. There are also hardly any references to the constitutive act in NEPAD<sup>180</sup>. It is true to say that NEPAD and the AU are therefore distinct organisations<sup>181</sup>. However, the development of NEPAD and the AU as bodies that have emerged from the dissolution of the OAU, has led to a situation where the two are in effect related. Scholars like Adedeji argue that this may be the case now but the two in future would be able to split once they have been completely established<sup>182</sup>. We can understand this relationship in terms of Pan Africanism. “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development—NEPAD—is a product of the continuing search by African people and their leaders to create pan-African structures that can lead to the social and economic transformation of the continent in a rapidly globalising world”<sup>183</sup>. Therefore NEPAD and the AU have a similar purpose in mind, and that is to unify the continent. This raises some questions on the existence of the state system in Africa and what NEPAD hopes to achieve. If NEPAD is really about an economic integration of Africa and the African Union about the political integration of the continent, can states continue to survive? The acceptance of NEPAD by African leaders has the potential to solidify the powers of leaders who rule states that are otherwise in decline. In order to prove this, the paradigms of governance will be tested using the hypothesis in chapter 2. This causes a contradiction if the point for NEPAD is to create a Union of African states<sup>184</sup>.

### **3.10 The role of the state in African Union**

So far in this chapter we have seen that NEPAD was brought about without a wide reaching consultation with the African people and has been interested in gaining outside support. The final product of the plans for recovery was imposed on the other leaders of Africa. The issue of development on the continent has raised some debate on the choice of paradigm for development. We need to consider the question of governance within of the AU to understand the role of the state in the organisation. A

---

<sup>180</sup> Adedeji: 2002:16

<sup>181</sup> This is especially true as their structures overlap. For example the NEPAD is made up of an implementation committee and a secretariat which are independent of the AU’s governing structures.

<sup>182</sup> Adedeji: 2002:16

<sup>183</sup> Ibid

<sup>184</sup> The formation of One continental state similar to the plans behind the European Union.

successful economic integration of the continent through NEPAD necessitates the limiting of national sovereignty; the AU as an effect of penetration may lead to the limiting of national sovereignty which may be a catalyst for political integration<sup>185</sup>.

There has been a demand for alternative strategies to development other than the one espoused by NEPAD. “Joseph Stiglitz, added his voice to those voices that have demanded the need for alternatives in the development agenda. In his speech entitled: ‘Towards a new paradigm in development strategies: Policies and processes’, Stiglitz pointed to the two-pronged approach to governance”<sup>186</sup>.

Stiglitz argues that there can be no growth in states without public governance and at the same time good corporate governance is essential for growth<sup>187</sup>. Through NEPAD the State in Africa is being told to democratise for better investment and aid. Historically there are alternatives to this position, where democracy has not been a prerequisite for investment and development. “There are historical examples such as Germany after unification and Japan after the Meiji Revolution where good governance prevailed during the drive towards industrialisation but with no democracy”<sup>188</sup>. In Africa this has long been the view that justified the large amount of funding to undemocratic regimes during the Cold War. The difference between Africa and the other examples is that bad governance has been linked to the lack of democracy and states that are democratic have fared better in Africa<sup>189</sup>. This position is however, no longer acceptable in a Post Cold War World, and it has been largely accepted that the state in Africa needs to undergo some changes for development to occur. Democracy is without a doubt a prerequisite for economic development and the creation of good governance in Africa.

NEPAD removes the focus on the failure of economic policies that were imposed on Africa during the 1980’s and 1990’s and places the blame on the state for bad governance. While this is a particular economic issue, it also highlights the lack of

---

<sup>185</sup> This has certainly been the case for the European Union which transformed from previous economic arrangements of which the European Economic Community was the predecessor to the current organization.

<sup>186</sup> Nabudere: 2002:69

<sup>187</sup> Ibid

<sup>188</sup> Mafeje: 2002:86

<sup>189</sup> Mauritius and Botswana

political development on the continent which is the domain of the African Union. The three paradigms on governance that have been provided in this thesis become extremely important in understanding what form the state may take in the future in Africa. This will be discussed in the testing of the hypothesis. “Democratic governance<sup>190</sup> implies, over and above technical efficiency and probity, regular interaction between government and civil society and free participation by the latter through its institutions and popular organs”<sup>191</sup>.

In order to pursue this point we need to look at how NEPAD treats the problem of governance. If NEPAD chooses to change the governance structures of its member states, then this will mean a weakening of sovereignty on the continent, if NEPAD is to continue with its programs within the same conditions of governance on the continent the opposite can be said, that the organisation will become a forum for promoting African sovereignty.

### **3.11 NEPAD and Governance**

The Compact for African Recovery which was used as a platform to merge the OMEGA and MAP into NEPAD noted that “the quality of governance is critical for poverty reduction because poor governance leads to a vicious circle of impoverishment, conflict and capital flight...it adds: ‘in a globalising economy international capital seeks secure, rule governed, countries’ for investment”<sup>192</sup>. Good governance therefore became a fundamental element of NEPAD. That is good governance can be seen as a key element in allowing Africa to participate beneficially in the global economy<sup>193</sup>. Furthermore good governance can be understood to constitute a redistribution function that will provide an opportunity for the economic empowerment of ordinary Africans. The Implementation Committee of NEPAD agreed that African leaders should “set up parameters for good governance to guide

---

<sup>190</sup> The type of governance that NEPAD pushes for Africa

<sup>191</sup> Mafeje: 2002:86

<sup>192</sup> Nabudere: 2002:55

<sup>193</sup> Kempe: 2003:4

their activities at both the political and economic levels”<sup>194</sup>. This was the basis upon which the African Peer Review Mechanism would be created<sup>195</sup>.

This requirement of good governance has been carried into NEPAD from the CAR and MAP. The issue of governance which was raised by MAP attached “the need for reform of the structures of international governance to the issue of the need by developing countries in return committing themselves to conditions of peace, stability and good governance”<sup>196</sup>. In light of the calls for a NIEO, Africa made a commitment to sort out its internal problems in order for the International community to make changes to their relationship to Africa. This position on the role governance<sup>197</sup> is to play in participation in the global economy is however, not beyond contestation. Nabudere is critical of this position on inclusion in World Trade as he argues Africa’s “marginalisation does not lie in its being excluded from the global economy, but in being the most exploited in that global economy”<sup>198</sup>.

While this argument has its merits, NEPAD chose to direct its attention to transforming the African identity so that it stops being marginalised in the global economy. There is an element of NEPAD that runs contrary to this, in that Mbeki noted that Africa’s inability to include itself in the globalisation process is a major stumbling block for development. This is seemingly contradictory as Africa can only be one or the other, it cannot be marginalised in a global economy to which it is supposedly not participating in. This position can be reconciled to mean that in the limited participation that Africa is involved in the global economy, the continent is marginalised. If this is the case the increase in participation does not necessarily mean a decrease in marginalisation. The two need to be separated, so that we see governance as a means for further participation in the global economy, and the marginalisation of Africa as a problem for countries that promote unfavourable terms of trade. While the two are linked, this distinction has to be made in order to

---

<sup>194</sup> Nabudere: 2002:58

<sup>195</sup> The need for a means to evaluate the governance capacities of countries has become a NEPAD project although it tends to ask questions about the political sphere which transcends the mandate of NEPAD as an institution involved with the economic development of the continent.

<sup>196</sup> Nabudere: 2002:66

<sup>197</sup> Nyerere: 1998:online source

<sup>198</sup> Nabudere: 2002:64

understand the importance of governance as a concept in the economic development strategies Africa will employ.

It is important to note that the concept of governance that has been reached as a compromise between African leaders and the West in NEPAD is a call for democratic governance; this becomes pivotal when we consider that those making these requests are not themselves democratic<sup>199</sup>. In fact the imposition of democratic governance on the African people who have not been consulted in the process of making NEPAD is itself undemocratic. In this sense the need for governance can be reduced only to the point where governance becomes a means to an end<sup>200</sup>. NEPAD therefore has not been critical enough and has not called for the “dismantling of those structures of economic and political relations between the North and the South that made African sustainable development almost impossible”<sup>201</sup>. Placing the requirement of governance in African development strategy hides the fact that global economic governance of Africa is complicit in the failures of the state in Africa.

There has also been some outright disgruntlement with the position of governance as a prerequisite for development. Some Heads of State have questioned the right of the developing partners to demand “good governance as a basis for economic cooperation with Africa. President Benjamin Mkapa<sup>202</sup> of Tanzania was one such leader who attacked governance on the grounds that it was an infringement on sovereignty. In a strong statement against governance Mkapa said “when development aid or loans are made conditional to certain domestic decisions regarding political, economic, or social systems, is this a breach of the United Nations Charter (on sovereignty), or is it not”<sup>203</sup>. Another problem with NEPAD is the fact that Africa is encourages a monolithic view of Africa. An example of this is a lack of investment on the

---

<sup>199</sup> This relates to the African leaders and IFI’s in particular the World Trade Organisation (WTO) manipulations in Doha showed, these powers are not prepared to democratise the international economic order. (Nabudere: 2002:66)

<sup>200</sup> Democracy is not a prerequisite but an effect of good governance, of which good governance is pursued solely for the economic benefits of participation in the global economy.

<sup>201</sup> Nabudere: 2002:67

<sup>202</sup> Addressing participants in a four-day symposium organised by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation in Kampala on April 11 2002, on peace and conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region.

<sup>203</sup> Nabudere: 2002:67

continent, due to the tyrannical rule of Presidents like Robert Mugabe. This is especially true every time there is an election in that country<sup>204</sup>.

Other prominent politicians such as Gadio of Senegal<sup>205</sup> expressed impatience with Western critics of Africa: “How can the Senegalese people, the Malian people be held accountable for what happened in Zimbabwe”<sup>206</sup>? The establishment of NEPAD and the requirement of governance have meant that the continent must have good governance so that all the countries can benefit. In other words, the West can legitimately refuse aid and investment if Africa does not comply with their view on governance. Africa is therefore faced with no alternative<sup>207</sup> because of the path its leaders have taken. Margaret Thatcher had devised a dictum called TINA—There Is No Alternative during her time as Prime Minister of England, Professor Yash Tandon once retorted to her dictum with his own dictum: TAHA—There Are Hundreds of Alternatives<sup>208</sup> which in the context of NEPAD is most definitely not true. It is unfortunate that Mrs Thatcher’s dictum seems to bear more truth in the globalised world which is increasingly being directed by a select few<sup>209</sup>. Although other strategies for development may exist, NEPAD has taken us on this course and no end seems to be in sight.

### **3.12 Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an in depth analysis of the formation of NEPAD from the Lagos Plan, through OMEGA, MAP, CAR and the NIA. We have shown that the processes that formed the body, in themselves can be seen to be undemocratic and this raises concern around the implications of the elevation of governance as a developmental necessity. Through the history of the formation of NEPAD we can see that there are divisions in Africa which became clear when two strategies were formulated at about the same time. Although Wade and Mbeki assumed popular

---

<sup>204</sup> The South African Rand has lost value to the US Dollar during Zimbabwean elections, although the two countries economic performances are not necessarily intertwined.

<sup>205</sup> Foreign Minister

<sup>206</sup> Nabudere: 2002:68

<sup>207</sup> States are unable to exercise economic sovereignty as the requirements of good governance dictate a standard by which they need to comply.

<sup>208</sup> Tandon, Y. 2002. NEPAD and conflict resolution in Africa in the light of September Eleven. Presented at the Nyerere Foundation Symposium on Great Lakes Region, Kampala, 8–10 April 2002.

<sup>209</sup> An example of this would be Blair and Bush and their war on Iraq

support from the leadership of the continent, neither could legitimately claim to be the voice of the continent. As such, both Presidents had used a mandate they did not have to devise a strategy for the continent. The issue of the penetration of the African state has been raised to forward an argument that NEPAD and governance are results of the effect of penetration.

Notions of governance within the IFI's, donor countries and amongst the African leadership are not clearly defined and whether or not this leads to development in Africa is questionable. The emergence of Governance as a prerequisite for investment and development has been outlined and the importance of the role of the African Union and NEPAD in relation to governance has been shown. The type of governance that NEPAD will employ is unknown. However, we can see that NEPAD is not designed to change the governance of the continent. In a way NEPAD is a working model of previous development strategies in particular the LPA. While previous strategies failed largely due to the lack of support and the dependence on the West, NEPAD hopes to change this position. This does not however, mean a change in the leadership of the continent.

This new partnership with the West may have come about from a shift in Western ideas on how African development should proceed, which has led to support for what have been called indigenous African development strategies. A major problem with this is that NEPAD seems to have increased or at the least formalised the power of the West to dictate the terms of development on the continent. In spite of this we are concerned whether a multilateral regime such as NEPAD, through the notion of governance will lead to state reconfiguration. This chapter has highlighted the problems that the concept of governance raises in the African context and shows the need to understand the concept of governance with the paradigms provided in Chapter 1 and 2. We will now test the hypothesis in chapter 2 by way of analysing 100 selected NEPAD documents in order to provide proof of the paradigm of governance that best explains NEPAD. In doing this, we hope to provide some insight into the politics in and around governance and show if state reconfiguration will occur.

## Chapter 4

### 4. Governance Paradigm Hypothesis and Results

#### 4.1 Operationalising governance through the Paradigms

This chapter will provide the results of the test of the hypothesis. The hypothesis as outlined in chapter 2 is reproduced here for reference.

#### Governance Paradigm Hypothesis

1. Governance can be understood through different paradigms (corporatism, prebendalism and conciliarity) and possibly others.
2. The term governance in the NEPAD documentation can be analysed in terms of these three paradigms on governance.
3. The paradigm that is most prominent in the findings allows us to predict the form of governance regime that NEPAD<sup>210</sup> is likely to promote.

We will now turn our attention to the usage of governance in the NEPAD documents to assess how NEPAD will work in practice. The documents selected here represent all the documents that are accessible on the NEPAD website. As such, this is only a selective representation of NEPAD. It is a representation of what the multilateral regime uses to advertise itself. These documents also form what can be termed NEPAD policy in that these are representation of the organisations structures<sup>211</sup> that have been agreed upon by members of NEPAD.

In Chapter 1 we noted that the word governance takes on the following permutations good, political and economic. Bearing in mind the paradigms on governance we will explore each of these individually. These markers good, political and economic have been used to separate the occurrences of the word governance in this test, in order to recognise the differences in the use of the term governance. As this is a contextual analysis of the usage of the term governance, it becomes important to note that good,

---

<sup>210</sup> In itself and through the APRM

<sup>211</sup> Which include the APRM

economic and political governance may provide different results in terms of the paradigm on governance that applies.

#### **4.2 Good Governance in NEPAD documentation.**

This analysis of NEPAD will apply the hypothesis which has been formulated from the literature review on governance. This also forms a literary review of the NEPAD documentation. We can explore the concept of good governance within the context of good political and good economic governance. Good governance also offers a viable point of study on its own. This is due to the fact that in practice good governance has become an abstract term used in its own right which denotes the interactions of both neo-liberal approaches to the economy and the decline of the nation state or at the very least the increase in individual interests within states. Evidence of this trend can be found in the NEPAD documents as will be shown in this analysis when we apply the paradigms to the policy.

In terms of economic governance Knack argues that “Good governance-in the form of institutions that establish a predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced set of rules for investors-is crucial for the sustained and rapid growth in per capita incomes of poor countries (e.g., North 1990; Knack and Keefer 1995; Keefer and Knack 1997; Clague et al. 1999)”<sup>212</sup>. Here governance refers to the managing of institutions that encourage investment. Others such as McAuslan writing on Africa believe that good governance can be contrasted to economic governance. McAuslan argued that “many states are making progress in good governance and marketed economic reforms and should continue to be supported, and that others will make progress if support is forthcoming...only a minority are beyond hope”<sup>213</sup>. It is important to note that a distinction is made here between good governance and economic reforms.

Although NEPAD has tasked African countries with bringing about good governance to encourage economic development, the two are mutually exclusive. The raising of governance as a prerequisite for development is therefore one that can be questioned as economic reform is possible outside of political reform if we are to agree with

---

<sup>212</sup> Knack: 2001:316

<sup>213</sup> McAuslan: 1996:170

McAuslan. However, NEPAD holds the concept of good governance as fundamental to ensuring this development strategy is a success. In 1996 McAuslan believed some African countries were beyond hope and this is something that must remain in the background of this thesis as it indicates a turning point as the period 1990-1996 was one where most writers were optimistic about the whole world<sup>214</sup>. If the African renaissance and NEPAD as a project of this is about hope then, McAuslan<sup>215</sup> has to be proved wrong by the African elites that are driving NEPAD.

### 4.3 Economic Governance

Tickell et al (1995) writing on regional development in the North West of England has noted a dual process in economic governance. “On one level, this features a movement within the public sector to ‘go private’ via urban regeneration ‘partnerships’, and, on the other, the private sector ‘going public’, largely through the formation of ‘centrally configured’ representational forms”<sup>216</sup>. Economic governance therefore can refer to situations where a compromise is made between private and public institutions in their overlapping relations. In NEPAD this is particularly germane as where calls for economic reforms, have lead to a drive towards privatisation and the private sector is being called on board in the leadership of the continent. In this regard private companies are being tasked with providing the much needed investment on the continent<sup>217</sup>.

Economic governance has been subsumed within neo-liberal discourses that have in effect made the concept of economic governance synonymous with good neo-liberal economic policies<sup>218</sup>. Hirst has noted that an alternative view of economic governance can be found. He argues that in the past “national policies were possible only because of and within the constraints of an effective system of supranational economic governance”<sup>219</sup>. There are 87 instances of the Economic governance in the 100 documents that are being analysed. We are concerned with state reconfiguration and

---

<sup>214</sup> Including Africa

<sup>215</sup> And others.

<sup>216</sup> Tickell: 1995:247—72

<sup>217</sup> Privatisation however, can lead to elite manipulation where leaders who have the finances can purchase a public enterprise that is marked for privatisation.

<sup>218</sup> Ellis notes that “economic governance” can be achieved through a viable “competitive price system rather than by direct authority of the state” (Ellis: 1998:556)

<sup>219</sup> Hirst: 1997:413

in line with Kankwendas' position, will assume the premise that neo-liberal discourse on governance is prevalent in African development strategies and NEPAD in particular.

#### 4.4 Political Governance

Stephen Kobrin has argued that the relative ease of capital flow in the digital age raises some concerns on the state of political governance<sup>220</sup>. Electronic cash (the move towards floating currencies<sup>221</sup>) has led to a situation where large sums of money flow around the world. These movements of capital are hardly subjected to national borders or sovereignty. It is in this context that we can understand phenomena such as the weakening of the Rand in times of the Zimbabwean elections. Kobrin asks “whether territorial sovereignty will continue to be viable as the primary basis for economic and political governance as we enter the 21st century”,<sup>222</sup>? The question of political governance and its relationship to economics is therefore important. If Kobrin is right economic and political governance may lead to a reconfiguration of the state, if the concept of territorial sovereignty loses its viability. States in this sense will exist by virtue of the economic sustainability which is dynamic and cannot rely on the static concept of inherent sovereignty. This leads back to the discussions on penetration. The loss of political and economic sovereignty would necessarily promote penetration of the state.

In terms of NEPAD, promises of political reform are essentially geared towards the economic goal of increasing investment. NEPAD seeks to promote the view that Africa is willing to cede sovereignty in order to compete in a global economy. At the same time, NEPAD is attempting to dictate the terms of this limiting of sovereignty on its member states through the concept of governance. We must therefore be careful in noting this link throughout the exploration on political governance. The paradigm of governance that NEPAD projects will allow us to predict the level at which NEPAD is willing to direct African states into giving up sovereignty. Corporatist and

---

<sup>220</sup> Kobrin: 1997:65-70

<sup>221</sup> Prior to floating currencies, most currencies were tied to the gold standard. This kept the value of a country currency stable to the amount of Gold that country has in reserves. Post the Oil crisis and Vietnam War, the major currencies moved off the Gold standard and are now determined by laws of supply and demand.

<sup>222</sup> Kobrin: 1997:77

Prebendal governance would support increasing penetration if it leads to economic benefits for the elite. The conciliarity paradigm on the other hand does not lend itself to the increment of penetration, as non-state actors are responsible to a wider group of individuals who may seek control over their own lives.

#### **4.5 Sampling Method**

We will now turn to the assessment of the use of governance in NEPAD<sup>223</sup> through the paradigms in chapter 2 in order to test the governance paradigm hypothesis. While the documents may be nothing more than policy documents, this is how NEPAD sells itself to its partners and the African people. The method of sampling will include a surface assessment of text. The context in which the term governance is used will be provided and assessed. In doing this for good, political and economic governance, reasons will be provided as to why the particular text falls into one or the other paradigm. It must be noted that certain usages of the governance may fit into more than one paradigm.


In line with point 1 of the hypothesis which is governance can be explained in different paradigms, a rating will be given to denote which paradigm best explains the use of the term in the document. Where there are multiple forms of a particular paradigm for example Corporatism, the African form of that paradigm will be used. Therefore, the use of the term will be provided and it will be rated (Co=corporatism, P=prebendalism and C=conciliarity) depending on which paradigm the statement fits. In order to provide a valid sample the Summary of Action Plans<sup>224</sup> document has been selected and the method employed in applying the paradigms will be applied throughout for the other 99 documents. This document has been selected as it is the most encompassing of all the documents in that it reflects most of the policy and plans that are contained in the other documents. The following diagram illustrates the method used in sampling.

---

<sup>223</sup> 100 documents found on [www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org). These include references to the APRM.

<sup>224</sup> NEPAD summary of Action Plans

**Figure 4 Sampling method**



Stage 2 and 3 are repeated for all the occurrences of governance in the particular document. Once all the documents are assessed a table will be drawn up indicating the name of the document and how many of times each paradigm applies respectively. That is how many times the word is used in a corporatist, prebendal or conciliarity mode. We will start with good governance.

## **4.6 Results for Good Governance**

### **4.6.1 Stage 1 Control Document**

In all the NEPAD documentation there are 143 occurrences of the term good governance<sup>225</sup>. The control document we will look at is “a summary of NEPAD action plans” where the term good governance is used 10 times. The occurrences will be numbered in the explanation of the method employed. Each use of the term governance will be evaluated through the four stage sampling process.

### **4.6.2 Stage 2 and 3: Instances of the use of Good Governance evaluated**

#### **1. Stage 2**

<sup>225</sup> 100 documents found on <http://www.nepad.org>

- **Article 3** of the preamble of the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance states

*“In reviewing the report of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee and considering the way forward, we were also mindful of the fact that, over the years, successive Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U) Summits have taken decisions aimed at ensuring stability, peace and security, promoting closer economic integration, ending unconstitutional changes of government, supporting human rights and upholding the rule of law and **good governance**”<sup>226</sup>.*

Here NEPAD sets up good governance within a historical context. If we are to look at this statement uncritically, article 3 maintains that good governance has been carried over from the Organisation of African Union into NEPAD<sup>227</sup>. The claims made here is that African multilateral organisations in the form of the O.A.U were concerned with the issue of good governance. This would mean that good governance is not a new concept which NEPAD has brought about. This is true to the extent that governances concerns existed before NEPAD; however, the elevation of governance to a development necessity is a particular result of NEPAD.

### **Stage 3 Which paradigm explains the usage of the term.**

The way in which the statement is made here leans on a corporatist or conciliarity mode. While this statement may be rhetorical, the reference to the O.A.U disposition to governance allows us to consider the paradigms in relation to this text. In doing so we have to ask which paradigm explains governance in the O.A.U.? This statement is corporatist in that the O.A.U was an organisation designed to benefit its members. This transpired in reality to a club of the leaders in Africa. The O.A.U has been faulted for its promotion of state sovereignty which undermined its ability to intervene in countries for the benefit of ordinary citizens when there was bad

---

<sup>226</sup> Nepad Summary of Action Plans

<sup>227</sup> The historical evolution of the OAU to NEPAD will be discussed in Chapter 4

governance<sup>228</sup>. At the same time the O.A.U was a conciliary organisation, as consensus was drawn from its membership even if that was limited to the leaders<sup>229</sup>. In the context of African leadership methods which ignored civil society, the O.A.U did seek consensus of those deemed important for their discussions.

Therefore this text can be explained through the corporatist and conciliarity paradigm **(Co + C)**.

## 2. Stage 2

The next occurrence of good governance in the control document is as follows.

- **Article 5** reads

*“Africa faces grave challenges and the most urgent of these are the eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development, in particular, through democracy and **good governance**. It is to the achievement of these twin objectives that the NEPAD process is principally directed”<sup>230</sup>.*

## Stage 3

Here the text uses good governance as a mechanism for economic development. It is important to note from this statement that democracy and good governance are set up as twin objectives of the NEPAD process as a whole. This text can be best explained in the conciliarity paradigm as poverty eradication is about changing the position of a large amount of people. This cannot be corporatist or prebendal as there is an indiscriminate appeal to poverty reduction across the lines of kinship or membership to NEPAD. The idea of fostering socio-economic development should encourage participation with civil society. **(C)**

---

<sup>228</sup> For example the O.A.U was silent on corruption and kleptocracy which have been to the detriment of ordinary Africans.

<sup>229</sup> Irrespective of their regimes at home, some leaders did express the wider concerns of their citizens in the O.A.U.

<sup>230</sup> Nepad Summary of Action Plans

### 3. Stage 2

- **Article 9**

*“We are determined to increase our efforts in restoring stability, peace and security in the African continent. These are essential conditions for sustainable development, alongside democracy, **good governance**, human rights, social development, and the protection of the environment and sound economic management”<sup>231</sup>.*

### Stage 3

In this article, restoring stability, peace and security are viewed as conditions for the creation of good governance. Therefore there seems to be a dual role between good governance and security. This raises some interesting questions on security especially in light of the choice of using the idea of restoring order to the continent. This fits the corporatist paradigm as it seems to support the leaderships of the continent. In some cases of insecurity the will of the people is not obvious<sup>232</sup>. The idea of restoring peace is therefore one that encourages the status quo and the position of ruling elites. This can stifle democratisation if NEPAD is concerned about stopping conflict in the interests of governance where conflict can be the first step in removing despotic rulers and bringing democracy. This text also fits the prebendal paradigm as the reference to economic management brings about the potential for new prebends to form. **(Co + P)**

### 4. Stage 2

- **Article 11**

*“Women have a central role to play in Africa’s efforts at democracy, **good***

---

<sup>231</sup> Ibid

<sup>232</sup> Democratic Republic of Congo

*governance and economic reconstruction*”<sup>233</sup>.

### **Stage 3**

The specific mention of women here brings about a special interest group<sup>234</sup> and the involvement of women if this becomes a reality will be a broadening of the groups that are participating in leading Africa. Therefore this would fit into the conciliarity paradigm (C)

### **5. Stage 2**

- **Article 13**

*“Enforce strict adherence to the position of the African Union (AU) on unconstitutional changes of government and other decisions of our continental organization aimed at promoting democracy, **good governance**, peace and security”*<sup>235</sup>.

### **Stage 3.**

In this strong statement on the promotion of democratic processes, the documentation argues that stronger adherence to the constitution of the Africa Union will bring about good governance. This is corporatist in that the African Union has emerged out of the O.A.U and has not evolved past the old problem of being a club of leaders. It is also conciliar for reasons expressed in the first sample (Co + C)

### **6 & 7. Stage 2**

- **Article 14**

*“In support of **Good Governance** we have agreed to:*

---

<sup>233</sup> Nepad Summary of Action Plans

<sup>234</sup> Africa is often accused of being starkly patriarchal and this mention of women, attempts to raise awareness on the position of women.

<sup>235</sup> Nepad Summary of Action Plans

- *Adopt clear codes, standards and indicators of **good governance** at the national, sub-regional and continental levels;*
- *An accountable, efficient and effective civil service;*
- *Ensure the effective functioning of parliaments and other accountability institutions in our respective countries, including parliamentary committees and anti-corruption bodies; and*
- *Ensure the independence of the judicial system that will be able to prevent abuse of power and corruption”<sup>236</sup>.*

### **Stage 3**

This statement has elements of all the paradigms. The stance on corruption is a measure to promote conciliarity, while the adoption of codes is in line with a corporatist model, in the context of Africa this also promotes prebendalism in that codes are established at the three levels set out. This in effect means that prebendally governed countries have the power to define the codes that will bind them. (Co + P + C).

### **8. Stage 2**

- **Article 20**

*“We believe that poverty can only be effectively tackled through the promotion*

- *Democracy, **good governance**, peace and security;*
- *The development of human and physical resources;*
- *Gender equality;*
- *Openness to international trade and investment;*
- *Allocation of appropriate funds to social development and;*
- *Create new partnerships between government, the private sector, and with civil society”<sup>237</sup>.*

---

<sup>236</sup> Ibid

<sup>237</sup> Nepad Summary of Action Plans

### Stage 3

It is clear in article 20 that good governance is a priority area when dealing with the problem of poverty on the continent. This best fits the conciliarity paradigm. Here again the dual role between good governance and security emerges. Here peace and security is not about restoring order and so this is not corporatist. (C)

### 9. Stage 2

- **Country Specific Action Plans**

*“The centerpiece for facilitating progress in adopting financial banking standards under NEPAD is the proposed African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)<sup>238</sup>, the implementation of which could also be designed to incorporate the other above requirements for progress. The mechanism will help African countries identify constraints they face in implementing **good governance**, including the international financial standards and codes, and facilitate formulation of credible and action-oriented programs that can be implemented to address the constraints in collaboration with bilateral and multilateral donors and African regional institutions”<sup>239</sup>.*

### Stage 3

The African peer review mechanism is used here as a means to identify constraints on the achievement of good governance in Africa. The primary concern of this strategy is to make Africa more accessible to foreign funding. In answering the question does aid influence the quality of governance, Knack argues that “analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law”<sup>240</sup>. So while good governance is seen as an essential way to receive aid, conditionalities that follow from receiving aid, have been found to play a part in weakening governance.

---

<sup>238</sup> As discussed in chapter 4

<sup>239</sup> Nepad Summary of Action Plans

<sup>240</sup> Knack: 2001:316

This problem is one that NEPAD will have to face in the future. The position on the APRM fits best into a corporatist paradigm as members of the APRM club will benefit from this. The APRM therefore will be set up to distinguish members that have good governance in order to secure aid. (Co)

## 10. Stage 2

- **Financial arrangements**

*“this commitment to good governance is one value added by the NEPAD health programme”<sup>241</sup>.*

Under financial arrangements for NEPAD, there is a suggestion that good governance is a value added from the health programme. This is conciliar as it is about the provision of healthcare for all (C)

### 4.6.3 Stage 4: Tables of Results

**Figure 5.**

**Good Governance and NEPAD Summary of Action Plans document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	2	7

**Figure 6.**

**Good Governance and Action Plan for the Environment document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	1

<sup>241</sup> Nepad Summary of Action Plans

**Figure 7.**

**Good Governance and Infrastructure Short Term Action Plan document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	1	3

**Figure 8.**

**Good Governance and Summary of Main Recommendations document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
			1

**Figure 9.**

**Good Governance and Communiqué<sup>242</sup> HSIC document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	4	3	1

**Figure 10.**

**Good Governance and Communiqué<sup>243</sup> HSIC document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	2	1

**Figure 11.**

**Good Governance and Communiqué<sup>244</sup> HSGIC document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

<sup>242</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the second meeting of the Heads of state and government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Abuja, 26 March 2002

<sup>243</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the third meeting of the Heads of State and Government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Rome, Italy on 11 June 2002

<sup>244</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the sixth summit of the the Heads of State and Government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Abuja, Sunday, 09 March 2003

**Figure 12.**

**Good Governance and Communiqué<sup>245</sup> HSGIC document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 13.**

**Good Governance and Political Policy Background document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	2	1

**Figure 14.**

**Good Governance and APRM Master Questionnaire document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

**Figure 15.**

**Good Governance and Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	4	4

**Figure 16.**

**Good Governance and Democracy and Political Governance Initiative document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	6	1

<sup>245</sup> Communiqué Issued at the End of the Meeting of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State and Government on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Abuja, Nigeria, 23 October 2001

**Figure 17.**

**Good Governance and Communiqué<sup>246</sup> document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 18.**

**Good Governance and Communiqué<sup>247</sup> document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

**Figure 19.**

**Good Governance and the international policy conference successes in African Agriculture: Building for the future<sup>248</sup> document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	2	1

**Figure 20.**

**Good Governance and Economic and Corporate governance document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 21.**

**Good Governance and Development of an action plan for the environment initiative document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

<sup>246</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Ghana 24<sup>th</sup> -29<sup>th</sup> May 2004

<sup>247</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Mauritius 28<sup>th</sup> -30<sup>th</sup> June 2004

<sup>248</sup> 01-03 December 2003

**Figure 22.**

**Good Governance and Development of an action plan for the environment<sup>249</sup>  
initiative document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	2	4

**Figure 23.**

**Good Governance and Human Resource Development Programme NEPAD  
Health Strategy document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2		1

**Figure 24.**

**Good Governance and NEPAD Health Strategy document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	1	

**Figure 25.**

**Good Governance and Bridging the Infrastructure gap document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

**Figure 26.**

**Good Governance and Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Programme document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 27.**

**Good Governance and Energy technologies for Africa's sustainable development  
document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
			1

<sup>249</sup> Poverty and Environment

**Figure 28.**

**Good Governance and NEPAD action plan for environment**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	1	2

**Figure 29.**

**Good Governance and NEPAD Annual Report 2003-2004**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	8	4	5

**Figure 30.**

**Good Governance and Ministerial Conference on Resource Mobilisation <sup>250</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	2	

**Figure 31.**

**Good Governance and PROGRESS REPORT OF H.E. CHIEF OLUSEGUN OBASANJO<sup>251</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	2	1

**Figure 32.**

**Good Governance and Work in Progress Review Workshop<sup>252</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	7	3	6

<sup>250</sup> Ministerial Conference on Resource mobilisation mechanism for the implementation of the Action Plan of the NEPAD Environmental Initiative: Case of the Integrated Management of Marine and Coastal Resources (Dakar: 12 - 14 October 2004)

<sup>251</sup> Progress Report of H.E Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chairperson of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) to the second ordinary session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union.

<sup>252</sup> Kopanong Conference Center Benoni, South Africa 24-27 January 2002

**Figure 33.**

**Good Governance and G8 Summit<sup>253</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	7	4	1

**Figure 34.**

**Good Governance and Final Report<sup>254</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	1	1

**Figure 35.**

**Good Governance and Annual Report 2002**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	3	

**Figure 36.**

**Good Governance and 38th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU<sup>255</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
			1

**Figure 37.**

**Good Governance and Statement by Minister Dlamini Zuma on NEPAD<sup>256</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2		2

**Figure 38.**

<sup>253</sup> G-8 Summit: Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, Evian, 1 - 3 June 2003

<sup>254</sup> Final report : Workshop on Implementation of NEPAD Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 02-04 August 2002

<sup>255</sup> 38th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, 8 July 2002: Opening Statement by Mr Amara Essy, Secretary-General of the OAU

<sup>256</sup> Statement by Minister Dlamini Zuma on NEPAD and the African Union to the University of Iceland on Monday 23 September 2002

**Good Governance and Statement of the outgoing Chairperson of the Executive Council of Ministers of the African Union<sup>257</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 39.**

**Good Governance and Launch of the African Union<sup>258</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		2

**Figure 40.**

**Good Governance and NEPAD business round table<sup>259</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2		3

**Figure 41.**

**Good Governance and World Health Organisation<sup>260</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

**Figure 42.**

**Good Governance and NEPAD secretariat brainstorming session**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	2	1

**Figure 43.**

**Good Governance and South Africa and NEPAD<sup>261</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2		2

<sup>257</sup> Statement of the outgoing Chairperson of the Executive Council of Ministers of the African Union, H.E. Dr Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of South Africa.

<sup>258</sup> Launch of the African Union, 9 July 2002: Address by the chairperson of the AU, President Thabo Mbeki

<sup>259</sup> The role and significance of the APRM 6 August 2003

<sup>260</sup> Briefing of the World Health Organisation Committee for Africa on NEPAD Priority Actions Post the AU summit held in Maputo on 8-12 July 2003

<sup>261</sup> Stellenbosch 4 September 2003

**Figure 44.**

**Good Governance and Can Africa Claim the 21<sup>st</sup> century<sup>262</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	1

**Figure 45.**

**Good Governance and Africa's time has come<sup>263</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		2

**Figure 46.**

**Good Governance and Economic Outlook for Africa<sup>264</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

#### 4.6.4 Summary on Results for Good Governance

All of these tables show which paradigms are prominent in the use of Good Governance in the NEPAD documents. The overall numbers are as follows.

**Figure 47.**

**Good Governance in all documents**

<u>Paradigm</u>	<u>Corporatism</u>	<u>Prebendalism</u>	<u>Conciliarity</u>
	104	52	62

There is predominance towards the corporatist paradigm while the conciliarity and prebendal paradigms are also included. The paradigms on governance have in this case allowed us, to divide the way in which good governance is used within the NEPAD documentation. From this we can say that in terms of the identity that NEPAD is attempting to create for Africa, there is a call for corporatism.

<sup>262</sup> Wiseman Nkuhlu 26 June 2003

<sup>263</sup> Wiseman Nkuhlu Mandela Metropolitan University 22 October 2003

<sup>264</sup> Wiseman Nkuhlu Cape Town 25 September 2004

Development on the continent is being identified with the idea of a corporation which will have African people as its members. We have noted however, that African corporatism is an exclusive type of regime, which means that ordinary citizens are not included in the benefits accrued by the corporatist state. In testing the hypothesis, conciliarity also features relatively strongly. In terms of the forging of an African identity we can say that NEPAD projects a corporatist paradigm where consultation with non-state actors is encouraged. This is especially true as prebendal governance generally supports corporatism. When we add the occurrences of corporatism and prebendalism there is a stronger disposition to maintaining elite rule in Africa. NEPAD has in principle agreed to communicate with civil society but this does not mean that non-state actors will play a significant role in directing African development. Although there are 143 occurrences of the concept good governance, the way it has been used often crosses the paradigms as illustrated earlier which accounts for the overall numbers<sup>265</sup>.

## **4.7 Results for Economic Governance**

As with the section on good governance, a few examples will be discussed and then tables depicting the use of governance within the respective paradigms will be provided. The same control document will be used and stage 2 and 3 will be provided before we provide the results.

### **4.7.1 Stage 2 and 3: Instances of the use of Economic Governance evaluated**

In the Summary of Action Plans document the following is set out.

*“It is imperative that a systematic analysis of African economies be undertaken in order to identify supply-side constraints where they exist and develop appropriate measures to address them, particularly in the areas of transport and financial services, human capital, the small and medium*

---

<sup>265</sup> Which exceed 143

*enterprise environment, and institutions of economic governance (conflict management)*”<sup>266</sup>. (Co + P)

Looking at the context in which we find the term economic governance, this particular statement relates the concept to ‘conflict management’. Conflict in Africa can be understood within the corporatist and prebendal paradigms. On the corporatist paradigm, economic governance may be used as a way of prioritising conflict situations. Not all conflicts are identical, and which ones NEPAD will be involved in are therefore telling. Will this mean members of the APRM then get preference and aid in situations of conflict, or will conflict management fall within the ambit of the economic committee that the state is a member of? The answers to these questions can only be found in the actions NEPAD will take in future.

For now it will suffice to say that the use of governance in this context promotes a corporatist paradigm. This statement also promotes prebendal systems, as elites in power through economic reforms will be able to call on support from NEPAD, this in effect would solidify the position of certain ruling classes in Africa. The conciliarity paradigm is excluded in this statement as no mention is made on any level of consultation with stakeholders in conflict management. As civil society and other non-state actors are not behind the driving of economic governance, it is fair to say that conflict management will not from this statement be interested in their view. The control document only provides one use of the term economic governance. In order to show an example of a statement that covers all the paradigms we will provide stage 2 and 3 analysis one other document (The Summary of Main Recommendations<sup>267</sup>.

In the Summary of main recommendations<sup>268</sup> document, civil society’s position is noted as follows:

“Civil Society indicated their support for the NEPAD and noted that it could make crucial interventions in the health, agriculture, infrastructure,

---

<sup>266</sup> Summary of Action Plans

<sup>267</sup> Summary of Main Recommendations on the NEPAD Civil Society Forum on Building Stronger Partnerships with Civil Society, at Elmina, Ghana, March 25th-28th, 2003.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*

education and **economic governance** spheres to actualize the objectives of NEPAD”<sup>269</sup>.

According to this statement, civil society has highlighted the importance of good governance to actualise NEPAD’s goals. This statement fits into the conciliarity paradigm as it involves some form of consultation with a non-state actor. Furthermore, the document continues in this line in the following statement:

“The Forum noted that NEPAD is anchored on good governance and for the objectives to be achieved, it is imperative that Civil Society enjoins African governments to provide the kind of leadership that would create an enabling environment in the political and **economic governance** spheres to guarantee peace and stability as well as the removal of imposed barriers to effective trade”<sup>270</sup>.

This statement also encourages the conciliarity paradigm for the same reasons as the first statement on economic governance in the document.

#### 4.7.2 Stage 4: Results for Economic Governance

**Figure 48.**

**Economic Governance and Summary of Action Plans**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 49.**

**Economic Governance and Summary of Main Recommendations**<sup>271</sup>

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
			2

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>270</sup> Summary of Main Recommendations on the NEPAD Civil Society Forum on Building Stronger Partnerships with Civil Society, at Elmina, Ghana, March 25th-28th, 2003.

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid*

**Figure 50.**

**Economic Governance and Communiqué<sup>272</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 51.**

**Economic Governance and Communiqué<sup>273</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 52.**

**Economic Governance and MAP<sup>274</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 53.**

**Economic Governance and APRM<sup>275</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 54.**

**Economic Governance and Conditions for Sustainable development document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
			1

<sup>272</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the First summit of the committee of participating heads of states and government in the African Peer Review Mechanism Forum, Kigali Rwanda 13 February 2004

<sup>273</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the fifth summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Abuja, Sunday, 03 November 2002

<sup>274</sup> The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme A Market Access Action Plan for Africa Department of Trade & Industry, South Africa 31 May 2001

<sup>275</sup> APRM Organisation and Process

**Figure 55.**

**Economic Governance and APRM<sup>276</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	12	4	8

**Figure 56.**

**Economic Governance and Democracy and Political governance initiative**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

**Figure 57.**

**Economic Governance and APRM<sup>277</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 58.**

**Economic Governance and APRM<sup>278</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	2	3

**Figure 59.**

**Economic Governance and Peace and Security Initiative document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 60.**

**Economic Governance and APRM<sup>279</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

<sup>276</sup> Country self assessment for the African peer Review Mechanism

<sup>277</sup> APRM support mission to Kenya 26<sup>th</sup> -27<sup>th</sup> July 2004

<sup>278</sup> APRM Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators

<sup>279</sup> APRM support mission to Ghana 24<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> May 2004

**Figure 61.**

**Economic Governance and APRM<sup>280</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 62.**

**Economic Governance and Capital Flows Initiative document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	3	

**Figure 63.**

**Economic Governance and Skills development<sup>281</sup> document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 64.**

**Economic Governance and Comprehensive Africa<sup>282</sup> document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	1	1

**Figure 65.**

**Economic Governance and NEPAD<sup>283</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

<sup>280</sup> APRM support mission to Mauritius 28<sup>th</sup> to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2004

<sup>281</sup> Department of Labour South Africa 31 May 2001

<sup>282</sup> Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Program

<sup>283</sup> Annual report 2003-2004

**Figure 66.**

**Economic Governance and NEPAD<sup>284</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	12	10	

**Figure 67.**

**Economic Governance and Report<sup>285</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 68.**

**Economic Governance and Final Report<sup>286</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 69.**

**Economic Governance and NEPAD Annual Report<sup>287</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	7	7	1

**Figure 70.**

**Economic Governance and Opening Speech<sup>288</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

<sup>284</sup> Work in Progress review workshop

<sup>285</sup> Report of Heads of State Implementation Committee July-October 2002

<sup>286</sup> Final report : Workshop on Implementation of NEPAD Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 02-04 AUGUST 2002

<sup>287</sup> 2002

<sup>288</sup> Opening Statement by H.E. President TM Mbeki, Outgoing Chairperson of the African Union at the 2<sup>nd</sup> ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 10 July 2003, Maputo, Mozambique

**Figure 71.**

**Economic Governance and Statement by Minister<sup>289</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	2	

**Figure 72.**

**Economic Governance and AU<sup>290</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 73.**

**Economic Governance and NEPAD<sup>291</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	2	

**Figure 74.**

**Economic Governance and World Health Organisation<sup>292</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 75.**

**Economic Governance and Address<sup>293</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

<sup>289</sup> Statement by Minister Dlamini Zuma on NEPAD and the African Union to the University of Iceland on Monday 23 September 2002

<sup>290</sup> Statement on Behalf of the African Union to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the UN General Assembly for the Final Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) 25 SEPTEMBER 2002

<sup>291</sup> NEPAD dialogue: Focus on Africa

<sup>292</sup> Briefing of WHO regional committee for Africa on NEPAD priority actions post the AU Summit held in Maputo on 8<sup>th</sup> – 12<sup>th</sup> July 2003

<sup>293</sup> Wiseman Nkhulu address at the gala dinner of the economic society of South Africa.

**Figure 76.**

**Economic Governance and NEPAD<sup>294</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	3	1

**Figure 77.**

**Economic Governance and NEPAD/SASAKAWA<sup>295</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 78.**

**Economic Governance and Presentation<sup>296</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

### 4.7.3 Summary of results for Economic Governance

The following table shows the relationship between the use of the term 'Economic Governance' and the paradigms of governance that are being employed in all documents:

**Figure 79.**

**Economic Governance in all documents**

<b><u>Paradigm</u></b>	<b><u>Corporatism</u></b>	<b><u>Prebendalism</u></b>	<b><u>Conciliarity</u></b>
	<b>64</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>19</b>

<sup>294</sup> ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Development held in Johannesburg South Africa 19 October 2002

<sup>295</sup> NEPAD/SASAKAWA Africa Association (SAA) Workshop held at the Hilton Hotel, Sandton 18 November 2002

<sup>296</sup> Presentation to the WTO Committee on Trade and Development by Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, Chair of the NEPAD Secretariat

As with the term good governance, economic governance is used within the corporatist paradigm more than the other paradigms. What is notable is the relatively small use of a conciliarity paradigm when the term economic governance is used. This does not necessarily have to be the case, due to any inherent predisposition of economics to corporatism. The analysis of the NEPAD documents highlights the generally neo-liberal approach to the issue of economic governance as represented in the prominence of corporatism and prebendalism. Corporatism and Prebendalist governance ensure the continued dependency on the West at the expense of developing a more needs based approach to development. For example social spending on education is cut, although the rates of literacy are low in most African states. Although social spending may be cut down, the leads to greater efficiency and profitability in the state offices which benefits a corporatist and prebendal system. Spending less on social spending does not necessarily lead to tax cuts, which in turn means the state has the same amount of capital but spends less of it. This can then lead to increases in wealth for the elites that run the state and their followers. There is more support for this position as the documents containing the term ‘economic governance’ also use ‘macro-economic policy’ quite extensively<sup>297</sup>. We will now turn our attention to the use Political governance in the NEPAD documents.

## **4.8 Results for Political Governance**

### **4.8.1 Stage 2 and 3: Instances of the use of Political Governance evaluated**

In line with the method of analysis employed in this thesis so far, we will look at some examples of the use of political governance in NEPAD<sup>298</sup> before providing data on the rest of the documents.

The first instance of political governance that we will look at is in the Summary of NEPAD action Plans document.

#### *“SECTION I: PRECONDITIONS*

---

<sup>297</sup> 143 occurrences in the documents

<sup>298</sup> 100 documents

- *Political Governance Initiative*
- *Declaration on democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance*
- *African Peer Review Mechanism*<sup>299</sup>. **(P+Co)**.

Political governance is given prominence as the first precondition for the NEPAD body. In the context used here, political governance consists of the declaration on democracy<sup>300</sup> and the APRM. We have established that the APRM in allowing the member states to dictate the terms on which they are reviewed, may promote prebendalism, especially where the governance of that state is Prebendally orientated. The Corporatist paradigm is also represented in this statement, as the members of the APRM and signatories to the declaration on democracy<sup>301</sup> form a distinct corporate model that is entitled to the benefits the NEPAD accrues.

*“Accordingly, we the participating Heads of State and Government of the member states of the African Union have agreed to work together in policy and action in pursuit of the following objectives: -*

- *Democracy and Good Political Governance*
- *Economic and Corporate Governance*
- *Socio-Economic Development, and*
- *The implementation of an African Peer Review Mechanism*<sup>302</sup> **(Co + P)**

In this statement the ‘Heads of State and Government’ and member states are noted as the drivers of the NEPAD process in terms of directing policy and actions. The use of ‘accordingly’ at the top of this statement suggests that only these parties need agree on policy and actions. This statement therefore excludes civil society and lends itself to the corporatism paradigm. The APRM and declaration on democracy are also included here which also point to Corporatism and Prebendalism as in the last statement. Despite the mention of social development, this statement does not promote a conciliarity paradigm as the number of actors is limited to the state representatives.

---

<sup>299</sup> Summary of Action Plans

<sup>300</sup> Political, Economic and Corporate governance

<sup>301</sup> Ibid

<sup>302</sup> Summary of Action Plans

*“Democracy and Good **Political Governance***

*7. At the beginning of the new century and millennium, we reaffirm our commitment to the promotion of democracy and its core values in our respective countries. In particular, we undertake to work with renewed determination to enforce*

- The rule of law;*
- The equality of all citizens before the law and the liberty of the individual;*
- Individual and collective freedoms, including the right to form and join political parties and trade unions, in conformity with the constitution;*
- Equality of opportunity for all;*
- The inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office; and*
- Adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of effective parliaments”<sup>303</sup>. (C+Co)*

This statement can be understood within the conciliarity paradigm as the rights to form and join political parties and trade unions, are an affirmation of political interest aggregation. The rights of these bodies form the basis for relationships with the state with a conciliarity paradigm. The protection of the judiciary and parliament relate to the corporatism paradigm, as they promote democracy while at the same time placing an obligation on the state to protect the top structures.

**On the APRM**

*“Participation in the process will be open to all member states of the African Union. After adoption of the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance by the African Union, countries wishing to participate in the APRM will notify the Chairman of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. This will entail an undertaking to submit to periodic peer reviews, as well as to facilitate such reviews, and be guided by agreed parameters for good*

---

<sup>303</sup> Ibid

*political governance and good economic and corporate governance*”<sup>304</sup>.

**(Co + P)**

*“the Heads of State and Governments will ensure that the panel has expertise in the areas of **political governance**, macro-economic management, public financial management and corporate governance*”<sup>305</sup>.

**(Co + P)**

### **In term of Good Economic and Corporate governance**

*“The promotion and maintenance of good economic and corporate governance, ably complemented by good **political governance**, are necessary ingredients for achieving this goal*”<sup>306</sup>. **(Co)**

This statement is made in the context of making African states more competitive in a globalised world. This falls into a corporatist paradigm as members of NEPAD who follow the organisations policies on political governance are deemed to be worthy of more investment.

### **4.8.2 Stage 4: Results for Political Governance**

**Figure 80.**

**Political governance and Summary**<sup>307</sup>

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	6	3	1

**Figure 81.**

**Political governance and Infrastructure**<sup>308</sup>

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

<sup>304</sup> Summary of Action Plans

<sup>305</sup> Ibid

<sup>306</sup> Ibid

<sup>307</sup> Summary of Action Plans

<sup>308</sup> Infrastructure short term action plan

**Figure 82.**

**Political governance and Communiqué<sup>309</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 83.**

**Political governance and Communiqué<sup>310</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	2	

**Figure 84.**

**Political governance and Communiqué<sup>311</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 85.**

**Political governance and Communiqué<sup>312</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 86.**

**Political governance and African Peer Review Mechanism**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2	2	1

**Figure 87.**

**Political governance and African Peer Review Mechanism<sup>313</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		1

<sup>309</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the First summit of the committee of participating heads of states and government in the African Peer Review Mechanism Forum, Kigali Rwanda 13 February 2004

<sup>310</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the second meeting of the Heads of state and government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Abuja, 26 March 2002

<sup>311</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the third meeting of the Heads of State and government of the New Partnership for Africa's development (HSIC), Rome, Italy on 11 June 2002

<sup>312</sup> Communiqué issued at the end of the fifth summit of the Heads of state and government implementation committee (HSIC) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Abuja, 03 November 2002

<sup>313</sup> APRM Organisation and Process

**Figure 88.**

**Political governance and Conditions for sustainable development document**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	1	3

**Figure 89.**

**Political governance and APRM<sup>314</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	12	9	7

**Figure 90.**

**Political governance and NEPAD<sup>315</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	2		2

**Figure 91.**

**Political governance and Democracy<sup>316</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	3	1	3

**Figure 92.**

**Political governance and APRM<sup>317</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 93.**

**Political governance and APRM<sup>318</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

<sup>314</sup> Master questionnaire

<sup>315</sup> Declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance

<sup>316</sup> Democracy and Political governance initiative

<sup>317</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Mauritius 28<sup>th</sup> -30<sup>th</sup> June 2004

<sup>318</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Kenya 26<sup>th</sup> -27<sup>th</sup> July 2004

**Figure 94.**

**Political governance and APRM<sup>319</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 95.**

**Political governance and APRM<sup>320</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	8	9	5

**Figure 96.**

**Political governance and APRM<sup>321</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	1

**Figure 97.**

**Political governance and Capital Flows Initiative**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 98.**

**Political governance and Comprehensive Africa<sup>322</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	4	4	

<sup>319</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Uganda 13<sup>th</sup> -16<sup>th</sup> February 2005

<sup>320</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism: Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators

<sup>321</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Ghana 24<sup>th</sup> -29<sup>th</sup> May 2004

<sup>322</sup> Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Program

**Figure 99.**

**Political governance and Developing<sup>323</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	1

**Figure 100.**

**Political governance and NEPAD<sup>324</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1		

**Figure 101.**

**Political governance and NEPAD<sup>325</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	8	5	2

**Figure 102.**

**Political governance and NEPAD<sup>326</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

**Figure 103.**

**Political governance and NEPAD<sup>327</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	5	4	3

**Figure 104.**

**Political governance and Statement<sup>328</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

<sup>323</sup> Developing a science and technology strategic framework

<sup>324</sup> Annual report 2003-2004

<sup>325</sup> NEPAD: Work in Progress Review Workshop, Kopanong Conference Centre, Benoni 24-27 January 2002

<sup>326</sup> Report of Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee Report July-October 2002

<sup>327</sup> Annual Report 2002

<sup>328</sup> Statement on Behalf of the African Union to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the UN General Assembly for the Final Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) 25 SEPTEMBER 2002

**Figure 105.**

**Political governance and NEPAD<sup>329</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	1

**Figure 106.**

**Political governance and Presentation<sup>330</sup>**

Paradigm	Corporatism	Prebendalism	Conciliarity
	1	1	

### 4.8.3 Summary of Results for Political Governance

The following is the summary of all the occurrences of political governance and which paradigm they best represent.

**Figure 107**

**Political Governance in all documents**

<u>Paradigm</u>	<u>Corporatism</u>	<u>Prebendalism</u>	<u>Conciliarity</u>
	71	53	31

From the results above, the corporatist paradigm of governance is most prominent, followed by prebendalism and conciliarity in the use of political governance in the NEPAD documentation. As in the use of economic governance, conciliarity plays a nominal role. NEPAD seems to be projecting corporatist governance on its' member states. As African corporatism has proved to be exclusive, this lends to support for the continuation of elite rule on the continent. The corporatist state is largely concerned with development in specialised sectors of the economy. Prebendal states are also inclined to promote skewed development into areas where elites can benefit. This leads to the directing of investment and is a means to control where penetration occurs. For example, a director of a state enterprise may accept privatisation of this body, where he can keep his position. This in turn has repercussions on the ability of

<sup>329</sup> Stellenbosch on 4<sup>th</sup> September

<sup>330</sup> Presentation to the WTO Committee on Trade and Development by Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, Chair of the NEPAD Secretariat

the state to direct this enterprise but penetration is endorsed as it serves the elite at the expense of the public<sup>331</sup>.

NEPAD is building an identity of Africa that is ruled by elites. This seems to be acceptable to the West which may have 'misguided' faith in the new political leadership on the continent where constitutionalism has taken hold in some countries. This can be seen in the success of President Mbeki in getting the West's support for his MAP and later NEPAD. The stark difference between the figures of corporatism against conciliarity<sup>332</sup> indicates that the drivers of NEPAD<sup>333</sup> are not interested in making significant changes in political governance toward conciliation. The corporatism paradigm also highlights the fact that NEPAD is an economic program and not directed to political reformation.

#### **4.9 Governance of Africa?**

The analysis of governance in the NEPAD documentation provides patterns that aid an understanding of the organisation. The method employed in this thesis, has been to provide a critical view of policy documents to raise concerns over what the terms really mean. At this stage we can say that the use of the term governance in the NEPAD documentation can be viewed through the paradigms on governance that have been provided here. Furthermore, as a mechanism for understanding the organisation, the analysis of the policy documents provides useful insight into the nature of NEPAD.

#### **4.10 Summary for all results**

The overall figures are as follows:

---

<sup>331</sup> Privatised companies have generally charged more for their services than the state did. This is defended by the fact that they have increased efficiency and are able to deliver. Umgeni Water in Kwa-Zulu Natal is a prime example of this.

<sup>332</sup> More than double

<sup>333</sup> Or at least those drafting the documents

**Figure 108. Governance in all documents**

<u>Paradigm</u>	<u>Corporatism</u>	<u>Prebendalism</u>	<u>Conciliarity</u>
	<b>239</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>112</b>

From the results, we can say that NEPAD has a leaning towards the corporatist paradigm. It is also telling that the conciliarity paradigm is not that prominent within the making of policy. This supports the position of civil society which is sceptical about NEPAD on the grounds that the regime has not adequately consulted with them. In spite of this position, NEPAD is not entirely anti-civil society and in some cases is outwardly dependent on engagement in this sphere to reach the economic goals NEPAD hopes to achieve.

The real test for NEPAD is to see how much it can effectively bring about good governance and especially what kind of governance it will bring. The data suggests that NEPAD remains tied into neo-liberalism where corporatist governance is promoted. Furthermore Prebendal governance being quite close to corporatism is also neo-liberal friendly. In this context, this analysis of NEPAD documents shows that by using the paradigms on governance, we can show that African development is still directed by foreign influences. The politics in and around governance in NEPAD, are therefore unchanged from the position of development in the 1990's. With this, NEPAD is not a radical change and its prospects for success are limited to the relationship it maintains with its non-African partners. With this in mind we will proceed with an analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism in to discuss the role that the results of the paradigms on governance play in the practice.

## Chapter 5

### 5. The African Peer Review Mechanism

#### 5.1 APRM as a Corporate Performance Management System

In light of the results provided above on the governance paradigm that is most prominent in the NEPAD documentation we will explore the African Peer Review Mechanism in order to substantiate the claim that NEPAD projects corporatist governance. In this regard the governance paradigm as tested in Chapter 4 that NEPAD may project on African States becomes an important indicator in evaluating how the APRM seemingly provides a way by which Africa can have a say in how it governs itself. As there is predominance towards corporatism in the NEPAD documentation which also features prominently in the APRM documents the method for participation in terms of the demarcation of governance indicators may be more about compliance with the political economic expectations of the West and not really about an African identity. While NEPAD as shown above seems to be redefining the African identity, this seems to be following a pattern that encourages a particular identity which is investor and donor friendly. The corporatist paradigm of governance can be said to have the support of the West, as they have supported the idea of NEPAD. As NEPAD was brought about through a consultative process with the West, we can accept that they have agreed with corporatist governance as the means by which to bring about African development<sup>334</sup>. The idea that Africans are shaping APRM<sup>335</sup> is limited by corporatist governance and the elites that run Africa's corporatist states. In order to evaluate this, we will look at the structure of the APRM.

The APRM has been established ostensibly to provide a gauge of politico-economic reforms on the continent that will enhance the prospects for development in the region<sup>336</sup>. It is therefore concerned with evaluating the governance systems of African

---

<sup>334</sup> Political and Economic

<sup>335</sup> As it is a self evaluation

<sup>336</sup> Region in this sense, relates to Africa and the African Union in particular

states<sup>337</sup>. More importantly, it has a secondary function in that if it sees the governance of a state to be outside the terms it sets for development; it sets to redress and reform the governance structure of that state albeit in an advisory capacity. Although the process is voluntary, the APRM and benefits<sup>338</sup> of participation in the process allow NEPAD to dictate to African states, how they should govern themselves. The form of governance that NEPAD has promoted is in line with the process of structural adjustment as espoused by the World Bank and others. This idea is premised on the fact that, problems faced in Africa are directly related to structural inefficiencies. NEPAD is therefore concerned with promoting an identity of an Africa that is undergoing necessary structural change in order to succeed in its commitment to economic development. More importantly for this study the Peer Review Mechanism is derived from performance management (appraisals) systems as applied in the United States civil service<sup>339</sup>, which will be outlined here.

In the private and public spheres of many states, there has in recent times, been a proliferation of management systems designed to encourage growth and productivity. In much the same way that governance has become a prominent term, 'productivity' has also gained prominence in economic discourses of globalisation. Ammons and Rodriguez (1986) have noted the extensive literature available on performance appraisal as an indicator of the importance of these systems in the management of public and private organisations<sup>340</sup>. A corporate performance management system is a system designed to evaluate the performance of employees so as to gauge means by which to improve the performance of the organisation. This is usually done by determining the rate of pay of employees based on their job performance<sup>341</sup>.

A pivotal example of performance management in the public sphere can be found in the United States. The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978 brought about a plan to introduce merit pay into the civil service<sup>342</sup>. This meant that public servants

---

<sup>337</sup> The elevation of governance as a developmental necessity has led to NEPAD assuming the role of directing policy on governance as the bad governance in one state affects the whole continent's chances at acquiring development investment. This is due to the monolithic identity of Africa that the AU and NEPAD have created.

<sup>338</sup> Increasing levels of aid and investment from foreign partners

<sup>339</sup> Brudney: 1992: 157

<sup>340</sup> Ammons: 1986:460

<sup>341</sup> Ibid

<sup>342</sup> Brudney: 1992: 157

would be remunerated for their services at rate proportional to their performance. This is implicitly based on Vroom's expectancy theory (1964)<sup>343</sup>. "The theory posits that if individuals expect to receive a valued reward for high performance, they are more likely to strive for this level of performance than if there were no 'pay off'"<sup>344</sup>. The expectancy theory has been applied to performance in light of the greater call for productivity that we have seen in the era of globalization. It is meant as an incentive for higher productivity.

The APRM, as a vehicle for governance can be seen to be a performance management system, in that it is gauge of the governance performance of the states that are members. The "Ghanaian Ambassador to Nigeria, Lt. General Joshua Hamidu,(rtd), has described the African Peer Review Mechanism, a New Partnership for Africa's Development, (NEPAD) programme, as a veritable tool for self evaluation in Africa's journey towards good governance and durable democracy"<sup>345</sup>. While productivity in the strict sense of the term is not the main focal point in the APRM, the increase in economic performance expected from reforms can be likened to the merit pay system.

Before we proceed it is important to list countries that have acceded to the APRM through the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). As such the APRM process applies to these countries only. The countries that are members to the APRM can be seen in figure 109.

---

<sup>343</sup> Brudney: 1992: 159

<sup>344</sup> Pearce: 1983:315

<sup>345</sup> Adoba: 2005:online source

**Figure 109.**

**APRM countries**

Source: <http://www.nepad.org/2005/news/wmview.php?ArtID=15>

No.	Country	Date of Signature of MOU
1	Algeria	09 March 2003
2	Burkina Faso	09 March 2003
3	Republic of Congo	09 March 2003
4	Ethiopia	09 March 2003
5	Ghana	09 March 2003
6	Kenya	09 March 2003
7	Cameroon	03 April 2003
8	Gabon	14 April 2003
9	Mali	28 May 2003
10	Mauritius	09 March 2004
11	Mozambique	09 March 2004
12	Nigeria	09 March 2004
13	Rwanda	09 March 2004
14	Senegal	09 March 2004
15	South Africa	09 March 2004
16	Uganda	09 March 2004
17	Egypt	09 March 2004
18	Benin	31 March 2004
19	Malawi	08 July 2004
20	Lesotho	08 July 2004
21	Tanzania	08 July 2004
22	Angola	08 July 2004
23	Sierra Leone	08 July 2004

The APRM is formally a self evaluation of these states governance capacities, which if proved to meet with the expectations of donor countries will be an opening to greater flows of aid and investment. While Performance Management in the corporate world leads to more pay, the APRM is designed to increase the level of funds<sup>346</sup> available to a country. The performance of a state in relation to its ability to secure capital for development in the case of NEPAD countries is dependent on their eventual APRM status. We could say that as a performance management system the APRM brings about a system that allows for countries to obtain merit aid and

<sup>346</sup> Capital from aid and investments

investment. Whether or not this really happens, does remain to be seen as investment into Africa has not always followed the expectation<sup>347</sup>.

The common features found in corporate performance management and the APRM show that the idea of self evaluation in the public sphere is not entirely new. Donor countries and the International Financial Institutions have also been involved in the process of evaluating Africa's economic performance as a means of determining the level of funding that Africa receives. McAuslan in 1996 made an argument for a good governance audit in developing countries<sup>348</sup>, which is in principle similar to the APRM although this is limited due to the fact that APRM is a constituent part of NEPAD. McAuslan was concerned with Western countries wasting aid on despotic rulers and argued that donor countries need to assess who deserves aid<sup>349</sup>. This differs from APRM which is meant to be an African evaluation of African governance. "The idea of a "good governance" audit is particularly necessary in respect of the debt crisis. It can be argued that more aid and debt cancellation will become a reality if Africa is seen to get its house in order.

This has played a significant role in NEPAD and the African Renaissance attempts at transforming the identity of the continent to a more donor friendly image. Donor reluctance prior to NEPAD can be seen in the context of a broader distrust of the African leadership and their misuse of Aid<sup>350</sup>. Even the aid NGOs pressing most strongly for debt forgiveness recognize that it must come with conditionality but what has yet to be faced up to, at least publicly, is that the monitoring of conditionality will have to increase dramatically"<sup>351</sup>. Good governance has been pushed as a gauge for decisions on who receives aid and this must be considered in the study of the politics of governance as the power to filter aid is likely to be formalised by NEPAD. This would mean that NEPAD will be able to dictate policy to states and states that fail to comply could effectively be isolated from Investment and aid.

---

<sup>347</sup> For example, in sub-saharan Africa, Angola receives the largest amount of foreign direct investment despite the relative instability and lack of good governance and/or political reform, while South Africa, which has a stable democracy, receives a smaller amount of FDI than Angola.

<sup>348</sup> To encourage foreign investment

<sup>349</sup> McAuslan: 1996:175

<sup>350</sup> In Zimbabwe, as the media reports, humanitarian aid has been used as a means to coerce people into voting for ZANU PF by creating a state monopoly on resources. Mail and Guardian online 27<sup>th</sup> August 2005 9:11. There are other factors that have led to donor reluctance, the most important being the fact that there has been a global recession for most of the 1990's. However, African governance is cited as a major contributing factor to donor reluctance.

<sup>351</sup> McAuslan: 1996:175

The success of the APRM has the potential to undermine national sovereignty as the leaders in NEPAD could become the middlemen between donor aid and the countries. Multilateralism can therefore become a way to push a particular national governance paradigm on all states that belong to the regime<sup>352</sup>. For example South Africa through GEAR has shown its disposition to neo-liberal economic policy, and these are seemingly being imposed through NEPAD on states in Africa that do not necessarily agree with this position<sup>353</sup>. The APRM process leans towards a corporatist strategy since we can view the APRM as a corporate performance management system.

## 5.2 The Structure of the APRM

The current structure of the APRM finds its implementation from the adoption of the following documents at the 6<sup>th</sup> Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of the NEPAD, held on 9 March 2003.

*“(i) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the APRM [NEPAD JHSGIC J03-2003/APRM/MOU] which is the accession document for the APRM;*

*(ii) Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance [AHG/235(XXXVII) Annex I];*

*(iii) APRM base document [AWG/235(XXXVIII) AnnexIII];*

*(iv) APRM Organisation and Processes [NEPAD / HSGIC J03 -2003 JAPRM /Guideline/ O&P]*

*(v) Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the APRM [NEPAD JHSGIC / 03-2003 JAPRM / Guideline JOSCI]*

*(vi) Outline of the Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Assessments and the Country Review Visit [NEPAD J HSGIC/ 03-2003 / APRM / Guideline/ Outline]”*

---

<sup>352</sup> It is interesting to note South Africa's late accession to the APRM; exactly a year after the first MOU was signed. While South Africa is behind other African countries in the APR process, it can still be considered to have good governance as leaders of the West seem to have faith in President Mbeki. (G8 summit 2005, Africa was on the agenda).

<sup>353</sup> Previous development strategies did not comply with the DMS or neo-liberal plans at Structural adjustment.


While these documents provide a formal mechanism for the Peer Review, there are some problems that arise. “The primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of appropriate laws, policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration”<sup>354</sup>. These conditions are designed to bring about sustainable governance on the continent. However, the status quo with regards to political, economic and social governance on the continent are not undermined by the APRM as it remains voluntary and largely open to the individual countries deciding on what aspects they would like to have evaluated. “The African Peer Review Mechanism (“APRM”) foundation base document<sup>355</sup> defines the APRM as: “an instrument voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union as an African self monitoring mechanism.” As the APRM is a self evaluation, there is room for states to choose criteria that work for their purposes which in itself may undermine the relevance of the APRM. The following diagrams provide a step by step outline of the APRM process. There are four stages to the APRM process as follows.

---

<sup>354</sup> Guidelines for countries to prepare for and participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism. (NEPAD)


<sup>355</sup> AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 2

**Figure 110.** - Stage 1 of the APR process<sup>356</sup>



<sup>356</sup> Adapted from NEPAD Guidelines for countries to prepare for and participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism.

**Figure 111.** – Stage 2-4 of the APR Process<sup>357</sup>



These stages highlight the process of the APRM. The Technical Assessments are an important feature that determines if some countries are able to proceed with the APR. What is notable is that this is the point at which the Western partners have an important role to play. The technical assessment is the point at which ‘partner institutions’ can make a decision on the governance credentials of the country under review<sup>358</sup>. Only when the partners are satisfied with the program of action can a country advance to the next stage. Although the existence of a definitive mechanism for the evaluation of governance in Africa exists through these four stages, some discussion on how Governance will apply in the APRM is necessary.

### 5.3 APRM and Governance

The APRM is the overall governance evaluation mechanism of NEPAD. Corporatist governance treads finely on the political versus economic divide. NEPAD is therefore

<sup>357</sup> Adapted from NEPAD Guidelines for countries to prepare for and participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism.

<sup>358</sup> Technical assistance means an economist from one of the partner countries formulates a report on the governance structures of the country that is being reviewed.

transcending its purpose as a development or economic plan and may play a role in the political development of the continent. States whose governance is not predominantly corporatist will have to reconfigure in order to benefit from the APRM. The method employed in assessing countries is derived from a corporate appraisal system; this has also been proved in the results of the test on the use of governance in NEPAD documentation. The principles behind the APRM promote corporatism<sup>359</sup>.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the four stages behind the APR process. The voluntary nature and self assessment features of the APRM leave the process open to manipulation. States that are in decline may be involved with the process in order to prolong the leaderships in those countries. A country that passes the APR test will be able to claim that they have good governance, yet the actors involved in this assessment involve the state and NEPAD's Western Partners, while non-state actors have been excluded from the APRM<sup>360</sup>. The aversion to civil society involvement that was expressed in Chapter 1 shows that the APR process is not transparent. Vroom's expectancy theory was discussed in order to compare and contrast the APRM to corporate performance management systems (Appraisal). The governance paradigm hypothesis has verified the governance paradigm NEPAD is likely to project on African states. Corporatism and Prebendalism have featured prominently in this analysis which indicates that the African state may reconfigure as an effect of penetration. This reconfiguration will not however, lead to political reform and is likely to prolong the status-quo and not signal the decline of the state in Africa. It is probably for this reason that civil society and other non-state actors have been excluded from the APRM and the African development process. This highlights the fact that NEPAD is similar to previous development strategies and the reason it has been supported is due to a change in Western ideas on the development of Africa.

---

<sup>359</sup> Historically this has been manifested as exclusive corporatism

<sup>360</sup> The politics in and around governance in this sense are exclusionary and a continuation of the predominant form of corporatist governance experienced in Africa.

## Chapter 6

### 6.1 Summary and Conclusion

This thesis has presented the problems around the definition and the use of the term governance. The prominence and wide usage of the term governance, has led to a position where appeals have been and are being made to governance. Furthermore, with such a wide call for governance, the politico-economic agendas that drive the prominence of governance and the politics behind these have in general remained hidden. Governance regimes have appealed to divine intervention in order to legitimise economic strategies. The importance of the appeal to divine intervention lies in the need for Africa to produce a new identity for itself that will change Western perceptions and lead to increased aid and investment. As such, NEPAD and the politics in and around governance in the development strategy is based on increasing levels of capital flow for development through a process of branding Africa as a viable continent for economic activity.

This thesis has shown that the use of the term governance in itself remains undefined and under defined. This poses a problem for NEPAD. Unlike previous African development strategies, NEPAD has elevated the importance of governance in development policy. In this sense governance has become a requirement for development. The elevation of governance as a specific concern for development is one that has been shown through the discussion of the evolution of African strategies from Lagos to NEPAD. While this had led to promises for the success of NEPAD in contrast to previous strategies, the processes that brought about NEPAD have become problematic. In particular the exclusion of civil society from the planning and implementation of NEPAD has led to political contestation, which has led to the need for NEPAD to attempt to broaden its support base.

This indicates that currently NEPAD is driven by the elites that run the continent as a means to legitimise their rule by way of establishing a multilateral regime under the guise of economic region making. The exclusion of civil society and other non-state actors is a particular effect of exclusive corporatist governance which is prominent in

Africa. Elites in these countries do not see a need to consult with the citizens of their states. The general lack of true nation-states and/or citizen states has also meant that elites have formed along ethnic lines where social divisions in the state, almost invariably lead to these elites excluding the other groups. In Africa exclusive corporatist states are likely to be projected by NEPAD. Inclusive corporatism is not likely to emerge.

Governance as a developmental necessity has formalised penetration (through APRM) and the limiting of sovereignty in that African elites can no longer govern without hearing the voices of non-state actors. While these voices may be peripheral, conciliarity governance while nominal in the test results is a viable means by which to extend governance concerns to a wider network other than government. NEPAD through changing the identity of the continent has promoted a reconfiguration of the state that changes the level of penetration from the West. Penetration can be maximised in certain sectors if this benefits elites in control of these. The corporatist paradigm is the most prominent of the three shown in this thesis and an argument can be made that corporatist states are the most likely to maximise<sup>361</sup> penetration. Therefore the elevation of governance as a developmental necessity leads to an increase in the vulnerability of the African state to penetration as evidenced in the structure of the APRM.

We have also explored the formation of the organisation in order to provide some indications to whether and if so when political dissent has and does exist around the formation of NEPAD. Dissent has been two fold, the first being the division between Francophone and Anglophone Africa in the processes that concurrently brought about OMEGA and MAP. Although President Mbeki played the role of emissary for Africa to the West<sup>362</sup> in bringing about MAP, the simultaneous planning for OMEGA<sup>363</sup> highlights the lack of unity in African development at that time. The second point of contention exists around civil society which after the preliminary exclusion from NEPAD does not seem to have an important role to play in the new African identity

---

<sup>361</sup> By maximize, we mean gain economically and politically from penetration

<sup>362</sup> Anglo-Saxon States and Germany

<sup>363</sup> Supported by France

that NEPAD is projecting. This was shown in the hypothesis test where conciliarity was not as prominent as corporatism and prebendalism.

Despite these seeming divisions, the Francophone/Anglophone split has been reconciled in that all African countries have signed on to NEPAD. The Compact for African Recovery which was instrumental in merging MAP and OMEGA was able to appeal to both sides in the division between MAP and OMEGA. NEPAD has also been concerned with getting civil society aboard. In this regard, a civil society forum has been established. However, the manner in which certain African leaders have responded to the role of civil society in NEPAD remains a matter for concern.

In order further our understanding of the politics in and around governance, this thesis has primarily been a literature review with the specific objective of operationalising the usage of the term governance. It is in this context that the paradigms on governance have been applied in this thesis as a demonstration of the application of the theory. The Corporatist, Prebendal and Conciliarity paradigm on governance provide an avenue to assess what governance paradigm NEPAD will project on the African state and what the implications of this will be. Each paradigm has been outlined and for the purposes of application, each paradigm was viewed at the domestic and regional systems level. The following hypothesis has been tested.

#### Governance Paradigm Hypothesis

1. Governance can be understood through different paradigms (corporatism, prebendalism and conciliarity)
2. The term governance in the NEPAD documentation can be analysed in terms of these three paradigms on governance.
3. The paradigm that is most prominent in the findings allows us to predict the form of governance regime that NEPAD is likely to promote.

This thesis has successfully applied the paradigms to NEPAD documentation to show that corporatist governance is prominent in the use of the term governance in NEPAD documentation (239 out of 511). The results of the findings suggest that non-state actors will play a nominal role in this multilateral regime. Although some non-state

beneficiaries may benefit later from increased flows of aid through certification in the APRM, the corporatist governance paradigm will mean that non-state members will have to identify with corporatist regimes. If not, they are likely to only receive a small share of aid as the lions share will be distributed amongst members of the corporation. The APRM and NEPAD are therefore likely to continue to divide state and non-state actors.

In the final analysis, we find that NEPAD is not a dramatic change from previous African development strategies. By looking at the historical development of NEPAD, especially in understanding the economics behind it, we have shown that African development strategies have not shifted, but Western views on the success of African development strategies in the period of the post Washington consensus have changed, allowing for the formation and implementation of NEPAD. While governance is a tool of the West, it will not lead to a negative reconfiguration of states. NEPAD has the potential to safeguard national sovereignty and not the opposite. Prebendalism and Corporatism governance are easily manipulated by elites and those who hold political power and so the protection of individual serving state structures are likely to be protected by the regime under the guise of development. Therefore the position of the state will remain the same. This seems to be one way in which African states have successfully managed globalisation for themselves. NEPAD therefore may not be politically beneficial from the point of increasing public participation contrary to the belief that globalisation could bring about global democracy. This is necessarily dire for the prospects of real development on the continent when Western partners in principle see NEPAD as an opportunity to open up the political participation.

The African Union has also been discussed in this thesis in order to highlight the elevation of governance concerns on the African continent. The politics of NEPAD are currently uncomfortably overlapping with the mandate of the African Union and this may become a place of contestation in the future. NEPAD should in principle only be about economic development<sup>364</sup>. However, the requirements of governance lead to interference in the politics of states and this is an example of the penetration of

---

<sup>364</sup> This has been a point of contention. Some African leaders have called for NEPAD to be located in the structures of the African Union in Addis Ababa. South Africa has however, kept the NEPAD secretariat in South Africa against these calls. This indicates that there are divisions within NEPAD.

the African state. Through what should be an economic regime, NEPAD has exerted influence over the political sovereignty of African states. This is evident in the APRM which while voluntary, does force states to change their governance structures in order to increase aid.

However, a study on what the effects of the APRM will be is not conclusive. This thesis has noted the flaws in the APRM which leave it vulnerable to manipulation by the state. At the same time, the Western partners have a role to play in determining how the African state needs to reconfigure. Unless the two positions which are the states view of governance and the West view of governance for that state are complimentary, this may lead to political contestation and the undermining of the whole NEPAD project. As such, NEPAD has been criticised for its attempts to provide an African identity as that promotes the view of a monolithic Africa. The politics in and around governance in NEPAD have not changed from the position of development strategies in the 1990's. The identity of a unified Africa is therefore misleading. The success of NEPAD is limited to the relationship it maintains with its non-African partners.

The formation of a multilateral regime is about protecting the status quo with regard to maintaining the state system. Through seeming multilateralism and commitments to creating a greater regional body, states that lack sovereignty are able to increase their legitimacy. The ceding of sovereignty to the multilateral regime is therefore done with the end result of maintaining the current balance of power or the African corporatist state. NEPAD's political interference in the status quo has remained nominal and only through the African Peer Review Mechanism (which is voluntary) has real reform seemed likely. The prospects for success in the APRM are however, limited due to the potential for conflict between paradigms on governance between the West and the African states. State reconfiguration through NEPAD is therefore not a signal of the decline of the state in Africa but an indication of the revival of the power of Africa's' old elites in areas where they have been challenged.

The African Peer Review Mechanism has been discussed as a specific governance mechanism within NEPAD. In this way the APRM stands as a means of measuring the governance performances of individual states in order to enhance their economic

development possibilities. Countries that accede to the APRM (where governance remains a benchmark for developmental aid) stand to gain financially. This is especially true as foreign intervention has, through the technical assessments, been embedded in the APR process. In other words, the West still does not trust Africa to review itself.

The paradigms on governance have been put into application through a four stage process to assess which paradigm best explains NEPAD. In applying the theory to NEPAD, a hundred (100) NEPAD documents have been analysed and by reading the context in which the term governance is used, these have then been rated and tables have been provided on the results. This analysis has shown that NEPAD leans towards a corporatist paradigm over prebendal and conciliarity forms of governance. Prebendalism can overlap with corporatism. What this in the final analysis means is that the New Partnership is not really different from the Old Partnerships. The Western Partners are still able to dictate the development of Africa. Although NEPAD documents show predominance towards corporatism, there are some references that promote a conciliar form of governance which highlight the requirement that the state hear the voices of dissent (112 of 511). Whether or not, this is mere rhetoric remains to be seen.

Above all, what is clear is that paradigms on governance provide a means by which to analyse the use of governance in multilateral organisations. Through applying the paradigms of governance, this thesis has operationalised the definition of governance in NEPAD and thereby sought to show that the corporatist governance is being projected on states which are reconfiguring to the needs of the region (AU). In doing so the thesis has endeavoured to show the effects of the projection of corporatist governance which is the continuation of elite control over Africa which is not beneficial to economic development that can benefit all Africans. Through the formation of a multilateral regime tasked primarily to create a new partnership with the West, state corporatism is being projected onto the African state, including state and non-state actors.

## Chapter 7

### 7.1 Appendix: List of NEPAD Documents analysed in Study

All of these documents were downloaded from <http://www.nepad.org> on the 24<sup>th</sup> of March 2005 and represent all the files available for download on this date.

1. 38th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, 8 July 2002: Opening Statement by Mr Amara Essy, Secretary-General of the OAU
2. Action Plan for the Environment
3. Africa's time has come : Wiseman Nkuhlu Mandela Metropolitan University 22 October 2003
4. Annual Report 2002
5. APRM Base document
6. APRM Master Questionnaire
7. APRM Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators
8. APRM Organisation and Process
9. APRM support mission to Ghana 24<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> May 2004
10. APRM support mission to Kenya 26<sup>th</sup> -27<sup>th</sup> July 2004
11. APRM support mission to Mauritius 28<sup>th</sup> to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2004
12. Bridging the Infrastructure gap
13. Bridging the Infrastructure gap: All infrastructure sectors
14. Bridging the Infrastructure gap: Energy
15. Bridging the Infrastructure gap: Transport
16. Bridging the Infrastructure gap: Water and Sanitation
17. Briefing of the World Health Organisation Committee for Africa on NEPAD Priority Actions Post the AU summit held in Maputo on 8-12 July 2003
18. Briefing of WHO regional committee for Africa on NEPAD priority actions post the AU Summit held in Maputo on 8<sup>th</sup> – 12<sup>th</sup> July 2003

19. Can Africa Claim the 21<sup>st</sup> century Wiseman Nkuhlu 26 June 2003
20. Communique issued at the end of the third meeting of the Heads of State and Government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Rome, Italy on 11 June 2002
21. Communique issued at the end of the fifth summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Abuja, Sunday, 03 November 2002
22. Communique issued at the end of the First summit of the committee of participating heads of states and government in the African Peer Review Mechanism Forum, Kigali Rwanda 13 February 2004
23. Communiqué Issued at the End of the Meeting of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State and Government on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Abuja, Nigeria, 23 October 2001
24. Communiqué issued at the end of the second meeting of the Heads of state and government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Abuja, 26 March 2002
25. Communiqué issued at the end of the sixth summit of the he Heads of State and Government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Abuja, Sunday, 09 March 2003
26. Communiqué issued at the end of the tenth summit of the he Heads of State and Government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Abuja, Sunday, 09 March 2003
27. Communiqué issued at the end of the twelfth summit of the he Heads of State and Government implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (HSIC), Abuja, Sunday, 09 March 2003
28. Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Program
29. Conditions for Sustainable Development
30. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
31. Country self assessment for the African peer Review Mechanism
32. Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance
33. Democracy and Political Governance Initiative

34. Developing a science and technology strategic framework
35. Developing African Higher Education
36. Development of an action plan for the environment initiative
37. Development of an action plan for the environment initiative (Poverty and Environment)
38. Draft Programme brainstorming workshop on trade. Related Plan of Action Midrand, South Africa, 25. 27 November 2002
39. ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Development held in Johannesburg South Africa 19 October 2002
40. Economic and Corporate governance
41. Economic Outlook for Africa Wiseman Nkuhlu Cape Town 25 September 2004
42. Energy technologies for Africa's sustainable development
43. Environment Initiative: Africa Stockpiles Programme
44. Environment Initiative: Algiers Declaration for a Global Partnership on the environmental initiative of NEPAD. Algiers, Algeria 16 December 2003
45. Environment Initiative: Biotechnology and Sustainable Development in Africa
46. Environment Initiative: Combating Climate change in Africa
47. Environment Initiative: Combating Land degradation, Drought and Desertification
48. Environment Initiative: Conservation and Sustainable use of coastal, Marine and Freshwater resources
49. Environment Initiative: Conserving Africa's Wetlands
50. Environment Initiative: Forest Preservation
51. Environment Initiative: Health and Environment
52. Environment Initiative: NGO Consultation
53. Environment Initiative: Poverty and Environment
54. Environment Initiative: Prevention, Control and Management of Invasive Alien species
55. Final report : Workshop on Implementation of NEPAD Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 02-04 AUGUST 2002

- 56.** G-8 Summit: Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, Evian, 1 - 3 June 2003
- 57.** General Introduction to the NEPAD Health Strategy
- 58.** Human Resource Development Initiative including reversing the Brain Drain
- 59.** Human Resource Development Programme NEPAD Health Strategy
- 60.** Infrastructure Short Term Action Plan
- 61.** Invasive Alien Species: Working for Water Program
- 62.** Launch of the African Union, 9 July 2002: Address by the chairperson of the AU, President Thabo Mbeki
- 63.** MAP: Health and Communicable Diseases
- 64.** Market Access Initiative: Agriculture
- 65.** Market Access Initiative: Manufacturing
- 66.** Ministerial Conference on Resource Mobilisation
- 67.** Ministerial Conference on Resource mobilisation mechanism for the implementation of the Action Plan of the NEPAD Environmental Initiative: Case of the Integrated Management of Marine and Coastal Resources (Dakar: 12 - 14 October 2004)
- 68.** NEPAD action plan for environment
- 69.** NEPAD Annual Report 2003-2004
- 70.** NEPAD business round table: The role and significance of the APRM 6 August 2003
- 71.** NEPAD Health Strategy
- 72.** NEPAD Secretariat brainstorming session held at the International Livestock Research Institute (LIRI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 25-28 October 2003
- 73.** Nepad Summary of Action Plans Document 2001
- 74.** NEPAD Workshop on Market Access held at the Kopanong Conference Centre, Benoni, South Africa 25-27 November 2002
- 75.** NEPAD/SASAKAWA Africa Association (SAA) Workshop held at the Hilton Hotel, Sandton 18 November 2002
- 76.** NEPAD: Health Strategy Executive Summary

- 77.** NEPAD: Initial Programme of Action
- 78.** Opening Statement by H.E. President TM Mbeki, Outgoing Chairperson of the African Union at the 2<sup>nd</sup> ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 10 July 2003, Maputo, Mozambique
- 79.** Outline of the Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Assessments and the Country review visits
- 80.** Peace and Security Initiative document 2002
- 81.** Political Policy Background document 2001
- 82.** Presentation to the WTO Committee on Trade and Development by Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, Chair of the NEPAD Secretariat
- 83.** Progress Report of H.E Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chairperson of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) to the second ordinary session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union.
- 84.** Report of Heads of State Implementation Committee July-October 2002
- 85.** Skills Development Document, Department of Labour, South Africa 31 May 2001
- 86.** South Africa and NEPAD Stellenbosch 4 September 2003
- 87.** Statement by Minister Dlamini Zuma on NEPAD and the African Union to the University of Iceland on Monday 23 September 2002
- 88.** Statement of the outgoing Chairperson of the Executive Council of Ministers of the African Union, H.E. Dr Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of South Africa, African Union Summit, 6 July 2003
- 89.** Statement on Behalf of the African Union to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the UN General Assembly for the Final Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) 25 SEPTEMBER 2002<sup>1</sup> NEPAD dialogue: Focus on Africa

- 90.** Summary of issues arising from the deliberations of the NEPAD market access, industrialisation, intra-Africa trade, Production and Export diversification workshop
- 91.** Summary of Main Recommendations on the NEPAD Civil Society Forum on Building Stronger Partnerships with Civil Society, at Elmina, Ghana, March 25th-28th, 2003.
- 92.** The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Ghana 24th -29th May 2004
- 93.** The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Mauritius 28<sup>th</sup> -30<sup>th</sup> June 2004
- 94.** The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) support mission to Uganda 13<sup>th</sup> -16<sup>th</sup> February 2005
- 95.** The Capital Flows Initiative Document 2001
- 96.** The international policy conference successes in African Agriculture: Building for the future
- 97.** The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme A Market Access Action Plan for Africa Department of Trade & Industry, South Africa 31 May 2001
- 98.** Wiseman Nkhulu Address at the gala dinner of the economic society of South Africa, Vergelegen, South Africa Thursday 18 September 2003
- 99.** Work in Progress Review
- 100.** Work in Progress review workshop

## Bibliography

1. 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU: African Peer Review Mechanism
2. Abraham, K (President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development) paper presented at the NEPAD South African Institute of Strategic Studies held in Pretoria. [http://www.addis-eiipd.org/occasionalp\\_1\\_19.htm](http://www.addis-eiipd.org/occasionalp_1_19.htm)
3. Adedeji, A. 2002 “From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and from the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither Africa?” *Nepad Information Pack 1* (Johannesburg: EISA)
4. Adoba, I. 2005 “APRM, Veritable Tool for Good Governance – Envoy” *All Africa.com*
5. Alvesson, M and Skoldberg, K 2000 ‘On reflexive Interpretation’ in *Reflexive Methodology* (London: Sage).
6. Ammons, D N. 1986 “Performance Appraisal Practices for Upper Management in City Governments” *Public Administration Review* September/October 460-461
7. Amuwo, K. "Globalisation, NEPAD, and the Governance Question in Africa." *African Studies Quarterly* 6(3): <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v6/v6i3a4.htm>
8. Anyang’ Nyong’o, P. 2002 “Unity or Poverty: The Dilemmas of the process of independence in Africa since Independence” *NEPAD Information Pack 2* (Johannesburg: EISA)
9. Bangura, Y. in Nnoli, O. 2000 *Government and Politics in Africa- A reader* (Harare: AAPS Books)
10. Bentham, J 1789 *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*.

11. Brudney, J L. and Condrey, S E. 1992 “Performance-Based Managerial Pay in the Federal Government: Does Agency Matter?” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 2 (2) 157-174
12. Booth, K. and Smith, S. 1995. *International Relations Theory Today*. (Cornwall: Polity Press)
13. Chossudovsky, M. 1994 “Global impoverishment and the IMF-World Bank” *Lokayan Bulletin* 11(2)(3) 5-12 <http://www.aidc.org.za/?q=book/view/121>
14. Denzin, N. 1994 “The Practices and Politics of Interpretation” *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (London: Sage).
15. Dommen, E. 1997 “Paradigms of Governance and Exclusion” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(3) 485-494
16. Dunn, K. 2000 *State and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
17. Ellis, T. 1998 “Competition and welfare” *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 554 -565
18. Englebert, P. 2000 *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).
19. Gelb, S. 2002 “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development” *Global Insight*, Issue 19
20. Germain, R.D. 2000 *Globalisation and its critics* (London: Macmillan)
21. Gibb, R. 2002 *Charting a new course* (Johannesburg: SAIIA)

22. Guba, E and Lincoln 2000 “Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions and emerging confluences” *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (London: Sage).
23. Guidelines for countries to prepare for and participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism. (NEPAD document)
24. Guy Peters, B. 1998 “Governance without Government” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART* , 8(2) 223-243
25. Hirst, P. 1997 “The global economy: myths and reality” *International Affairs* 73(3) 409-425
26. Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. 1996 *Globalisation in question: The international political economy and the possibilities of governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
27. <http://psmortensen.dk/africa/africa.htm>Munro
28. <http://www.aprmnigeria.org/apanel.htm>
29. <http://www.nepad.org>
30. <http://www.nepad.org/2005/news/wmview.php?ArtID=15>
31. <http://www.unesco.org/most/globalisation/Governance.htm> accessed on 30/06/05
32. <http://www.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.htm>
33. Kankwenda, M. 2000 “Development Marabous or Development Merchants in Africa?”\_in Onimode, B et al. 2004 *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century—Looking Back to Move Forward: Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy* (London: Zed Books)

34. Kempe, R H. 2003 “The UNECA and Good Governance in Africa” Harvard International Development Conference Boston Massachusetts
35. Knight, V C. “Zimbabwe's Reluctant Transformation” *Current History*, May 1989, 222-227.
36. Mafeje, A. 2002 “Democratic Governance and new democracy in Africa: Agenda for the future” *NEPAD Information Pack 1* (Johannesburg: EISA)
37. Makumbe, J M. 1998 “Is there Civil Society in Africa” *International Affairs* 74 (2) 305-317
38. Mbeki, T. 2001 “Africa’s people central to success of recovery programme” In: *ANC Today*, 2nd February
39. Mistry, P S. 2005 “Reasons for sub-Saharan Africa’s development deficit that the commission for Africa did not consider” *African Affairs* 104(417) 665-678; doi:10.1093/afraf/adi084
40. Moja, T. and Cloete, N. 1996 “Transforming Higher Education in South Africa: A New Approach to Governance” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 24(1) 10-16
41. Mosley, P., Subasat, T. & Weeks, J. 1996 “Assessing Adjustment in Africa” *World Development* 23(9) 1459-1473
42. Munro, W A. 1996 “Power, Peasants and Political Development: Reconsidering State Construction in Africa” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 38(1) 112-148
43. Nabudere, D. 2002 “NEPAD: Historical Background and its Prospects” *NEPAD information Pack 1* (Johannesburg: EISA)
44. Neiryneck, K. 1999 *Constitutional Frameworks and Democratisation in Africa since Independence* MA thesis: Rhodes University 2-25

45. Nepad: Action Plan for the Environment Document October 2003
46. Negash, N. 1991 "Testing the usefulness of the Corporatism Model for Africa" *Africa Today* 38 (4) p65-69
47. Ngwane, T. 2002 "Should African social movements support NEPAD" Notes from a speech to the African Social Forum's African Seminar. World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Brazil, 2 February 2002
48. Nyangoro, J. and Shaw, T. 1989 *Corporatism in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice* (Boulder: Westview Press).
49. Nyerere, J 1998 <http://www.marxist.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1998/10/13.htm>
50. Obasanjo, O. 2003 "The conference of solidarity with Africa" University of Notre Dame, U.S.A September 21
51. Organization of African Unity. 1981. Preamble, *The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa*, OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
52. Pearce, J L. & Perry, J L. 1983 "Federal Merit Pay: A Longitudinal Analysis" *Public Administration Review* 43(4) 315-25
53. Ramazanoglu, C. and Holland, J. 2002 *Feminist Methodology, Challenges and Choices* (New York: Sage).
54. Rawls, J 1971 *A Theory of Justice* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge).
55. Singer, J D. 1961 "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" *World Politics*, 14(1)77-92

56. Smith, T. *et.al* 2005 “Mbeki's Attacks on NGOs Undermine Civil Society's Right and Duty to Criticise” <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/2005/1025mbeki.htm>
57. Soros, G. 2002 (SA Broadcasting Corporation interview)
58. Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference 2002 *Media Release*
59. Tandon, Y. 2002. “NEPAD and conflict resolution in Africa in the light of September Eleven” Presented at the Nyerere Foundation Symposium on Great Lakes Region, Kampala, 8–10 April.
60. Teeple, G 1995 *Globalisation and the decline of Social reform* (Toronto: Garamond Press).
61. Tickell, A. Peck, J. & Dicken, P. 1995 “The fragmented region: business, the state and economic development in north west England” in Rhodes, M. *The regions and the new Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press)
62. UNDP 1994. Good Governance and Sustainable development policy document.
63. Watts, R. 1994 “Government and Modernity” *Arena*, 2 144
64. Yalem, R. 1962 “Regionalism and World Order” *International Affairs*, 38(4) 460 -471