

**Representing Conflict: An Analysis of *The Chronicle's* Coverage of the *Gukurahundi*
conflict in Zimbabwe between 1983 and 1986**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Arts Degree in
Journalism and Media Studies

Rhodes University

By

Phillip Santos

Supervisor: Professor Lynette Steenveld

October 2011

Acknowledgements

I am forever in the debt of my very critical, incisive, and insightful supervisor Professor Lynette Steenveld whose encyclopaedic knowledge of social theory, generous advice, and guidance gave me more than a fair share of epiphanic moments. I certainly would not have made it this far without the love and unstinting support of my dear wife Ellen, and daughter, Thandiswa. For unparalleled teamwork and dependable friendship, thank you Sharon. My friends Stanley, Jolly, Sthembiso, Ntombomzi and Carlyne, thank you for all the critical conversations and for keeping me sane throughout those tumultuous moments. I also owe particular debt of gratitude to the Journalism Department and UNESCO for enabling my studies at Rhodes University.

Abstract

This research is premised on the understanding that media texts are discourses and that all discourses are functional, that is, they refer to things, issues and events, in meaningful and goal oriented ways. Nine articles are analysed to explicate the sorts of discourses that were promoted by *The Chronicle* during the *Gukurahundi* conflict in Zimbabwe between 1982 and 1986. It is argued that discourses in the news media are shaped by the role(s), the type(s) of journalism assumed by such media, and by the political environment in which the news media operate. The interplay between the roles, types of journalism practised, and the effect the political environment has on news discourses is assessed within the context of conflictual situations. This is done using insights from the theoretical position of peace journalism and its critique of professional or mainstream journalism as promoting war/violence journalism. Using the case of *The Chronicle's* reportage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict in Zimbabwe, it is concluded that, in performing the collaborative role, state owned/controlled media assume characteristics of war/violence journalism. On the other hand, it is concluded that *The Chronicle* developed practices consistent with peace journalism when it both espoused the facilitative role and journalistic objectivity. These findings undermine the conventional view among proponents of peace journalism that in times of conflict, the news media should be interventionist in favour of peace and that they should abandon the journalistic norm of objectivity which they argue, promotes war/violence journalism.

Acronyms

CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CNN	Cable News Network
NWICO	New World Information and Communication Order
PF-ZAPU	Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union
RPPC	Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZAPU 2000	Zimbabwe African People's Union 2000
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary army
ZMMT	Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust

Contents

Acknowledgements	i
Abstract	ii
Acronyms	iii
1. Social Background and Context	1
Introduction	1
Context of Research	3
Nationalism and Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe	6
The Chronicle	9
Chapter Outlines	11
Conclusion	11
2. Theoretical Framework	12
Introduction	12
An Itinerary of Thought on the Normative View of Mainstream Media	13
Journalism Culture and Normative Roles of the Media	17
War or Peace Journalism	23
Conclusion	30
3. Methodology and Methods	31
Introduction	31
Methodological Considerations	31
Data Selection	33
Discourse Analysis	44
Conclusion	48
4. Analysis	49
Introduction	49
Why Argumentation	49
Story Analysis	52
Conclusion	71
5. Findings and Discussion	72
Introduction	72
Findings	72
Discussion	75
6. Conclusion	87
Summary	87
Conclusion	88
7. Bibliography	91
8. Appendix A	102
9. Appendix B	108

Chapter 1

Social Background and Context

Introduction

People's perceptions about social issues and events are influenced by many institutions such as the family, church, school, and the media, the object of this study. Although decades of media effects research have been inconclusive about the power of the media, my interest is driven by the desire "to understand the broader impact of the media, on what we think about, how we understand society and how we collectively think..." (Williams 2003:188). While more emphasis is now "on what people do with the media rather than on what the media do to them", I am still concerned with media effects in their "minimal or limited" form (Williams 2003:188). In this study, I analyse how *The Chronicle* covered one of Zimbabwe's most violent historical episodes, the *Gukurahundi* conflict in the Zimbabwean provinces of Midlands, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South between 1983 and 1986. I chose to focus on *The Chronicle* because it was and still is the only daily paper published in Matabeleland. I also chose to focus on *The Chronicle* because newspaper stories are mostly long enough to give explanation, interpretation and context. *The Chronicle* also has archived all issues published during the *Gukurahundi* conflict, thus making access to such stories easy. Lastly, I chose *The Chronicle* because the only other alternative, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), is tightly controlled by the government making access to any material on the topic very difficult if not impossible.

A number of contemporary developments from within and without the borders of Zimbabwe have driven me to embark on this study. Since independence "Zimbabwe struggled to develop into a united nation-state because of its negative legacy of racial and ethnic polarisation inherited from both colonialism and African nationalism" (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007:284). The 1980s conflict in Matabeleland and the Midlands seems to have magnified ethnic divisions in the country (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). Some developments in the contemporary political dispensation point to a simmering political and ethnic conflict, mainly pitting the Ndebele against Shona people (see Masunungure 2006:8; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007:286). There is a steady rise of reportage and heated debates about *Gukurahundi* on such websites as *newzimbabwe.com*, *youtube.com*, *thezimbabwean.co.uk*, and *bulawayo24.com*, among others. *The Zimbabwean's* website alone has more than 171 stories on the *Gukurahundi* conflict. *Youtube* carries about 24 videos

concerning the *Gukurahundi* conflict which receive quite a significant number of visitors. For example a video showing the passing out parade of the 5th Brigade (*Gukurahundi*) has to date (05 October 2011) received 63 432 comments since its posting in 2007; Ian Smith's interview on the conflict, 54 009 (posted in 2008); a video showing the exhumation of mass graves in Matabeleland, 22 174 comments (posted 2008); and Nkomo's interview in exile, 46 555 comments (posted 2007), and the list goes on. The political and ethnic interpretations of the conflict and the way forward seem to be the contentious issues in most of the comments accompanying stories reporting on one or another aspect of the *Gukurahundi*.

Of note also, is the rise of radical Ndebele particularism, driven by a desire to form, as some argue, "a separate Ndebele state along the lines of single tribe nations like Lesotho and Swaziland" (Masunungure 2006:8). In pursuit of this cause, a group which calls itself Mthwakazi Liberation Front (hereafter Mthwakazi) seeks to create a separate state called Umthwakazi Republic, carved out of the two Matabeleland provinces, Bulawayo, and the Midlands (Masunungure 2006:8). In what seems unconventional, Mthwakazi "offers no apologies for its use of a tribal framework to analyse Zimbabwe's present problems and its [sic] resolution" (Masunungure 2006:8). A less radical Ndebele pressure group, ZAPU 2000, driven by what it sees as the "marginalisation of the three provinces of Matabeleland South, Matabeleland North and Midlands...agitates for a Federal state in which provinces retain greater political and economic autonomy" (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007:287). Another definitive development was the police shut down of an art exhibition focused on the *Gukurahundi* conflict at the Bulawayo art gallery in March of 2010 (newzimbabwe.com: 2010). While the development sparked a wave of commentary on the internet as well as on radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe from outside locations, its significance is in showing the Zimbabwean government's reluctance to nurture open discussion on the conflict. Such reluctance was evident in 1997 at the funeral of PF-ZAPU leader Stephen Vuma, through the Zimbabwean President's criticism of the publication of a human rights report compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and the Legal Resources Foundation which he saw as "threatening the nation's unity" (Alexander *et al.* 2000:258). Alexander *et al.* point out that the president's comment implicitly suggests that it was the publication of their report, rather than the violence about which it was written, which would dangerously divide the nation (2000:258). The Zimbabwean government's reluctance to deal with the truth of events in the liberation struggle and the massacres of the 1980s is seen as

foundational to the violence that has come to be expected around election periods (see Eppel 2004:43-44). Such reluctance to foster open discussion on the *Gukurahundi* conflict has consequently engendered an argument about whether to bury the past or expose it, and also whether to choose reconciliation or confrontation (Werbner 1995:99).

Finally, one of the most significant contemporary developments was the 2009 pull out of PF-ZAPU from the Unity Accord signed between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF in 1987 to end *Gukurahundi*. The Zimbabwean President reacted to the Dumiso Dabengwa (a prominent PF-ZAPU leader with distinct liberation war credentials) led PF-ZAPU pullout from the Unity Accord, by referring to the new PF-ZAPU as “dissidents who should be castigated and dismissed with the contempt they deserve” (*Zimbabwe Standard* 2009). Viewed in the context that the *Gukurahundi* conflict of the 1980s was represented as a fight against what were viewed as dissidents (Masunungure 2006:5) and that the conflict is seen to have bolstered “a strong identification between ethnicity and political affiliation” (Alexander and McGregor 2003:123) the president’s comments can be argued to invoke the passions that eventually led to the *Gukurahundi* atrocities.

These contemporary developments point to discontent among the victims of the 1980s massacres over the government’s handling of the issue, simmering conflict expressed along both ethnic and political lines, and secessionist tendencies which have been a source of vicious conflicts in places like Chechnya, Kosovo and Biafra in Nigeria to name but a few. My interest is in investigating the media’s construction of conflictual situations within the context of peace or violence journalism. This study considers an investigation into *The Chronicle’s* construction of the 1980s conflict in Matabeleland as partly foundational to understanding the media’s contribution to shaping the contemporary political framework in Zimbabwe. Of interest as well is the impact such constructions might have had on the conflict in Matabeleland at the time, as this would help us understand the media’s agency in conflict.

Context of the Research

Zimbabwe’s history is one characterised by violent conflicts stretching from the pre-colonial era right up to the contemporary times (Eppel 2004:43). The country gained its independence in 1980 after a protracted war of liberation. Amid the euphoria of independence, another conflict flared up in the same year, this time not against the European settlers, but between indigenous Zimbabweans.

The events that led to post independence tensions emanated from the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)'s unilateral decision to register for elections separately as ZANU Patriotic Front in 1980 (Matshazi 2007). This move was contrary to the expectations raised at the Lancaster House conference that the Patriotic Front, an amalgam of both ZANU and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), "was going to fight the elections as the Patriotic Front" (Matshazi 2007:29-30), and not as separate parties. ZANU-PF went ahead to win the elections against the background that the party and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) had violated the ceasefire by keeping their forces in their operational areas to maintain the party's military and political dominance (Kriger 2005:4).

The first elections after independence revealed that "the areas of overwhelming support for ZANU-PF were in Mashonaland and other Shona speaking regions, and for PF-ZAPU were in Matabeleland" (Cliffe *et al.* 1980:58). ZAPU's wartime armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was "disgruntled by the election results, leading ZANLA to suspect they might attempt insurrection" (Meredith 2003:59). According to Eppel (2004:44), the "suspicion and distrust between ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA cadres during the process of integrating these armies and the Rhodesian army led to defections and caching of arms on both sides." The period between 1981 and 1982 saw the unfolding of a series of events that escalated the tension between ZANU-PF/ZANLA and PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA. The then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe accused ZIPRA/PF-ZAPU of hiding weapons for the purpose of overthrowing and taking over government (Meredith 2003:63). ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo was sacked from government and two former ZIPRA leaders Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku were arrested and tried for treason (Meredith 2003:64). This situation left ex-ZIPRA soldiers in the army feeling insecure resulting in some of them deserting (Meredith 2003). From these deserters emerged a group of about 300 ex-ZIPRAs who became "a loose association of dissidents responsible for crimes including murder, assault and destruction of property" (Eppel 2004:44).

The government responded to what it called the dissident threat by deploying a North Korean trained military unit (5th Brigade) named "*Gukurahundi*" by the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe (Meredith 2003:65-67). The term *Gukurahundi* means early spring rains which are taken to wash away rubbish (see Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000:191-192). However, other scholars have taken the word *Gukurahundi* to carry symbolic significance, meaning

instead, the annihilation of political opposition, mainly PF-ZAPU (see Sithole 1993) and Ndebele and Kalanga people, seen here as symbolically associated with the rubbish that has to be washed away (see Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000:191-192). The latter interpretation can also be understood in the context that the unit was constituted by ex-ZANLA forces that were mainly, if not exclusively, Shona speaking (Phimister 2008:198). Furthermore, the 5th Brigade has also been argued to have “justified its violence in explicitly tribal and political terms” (see Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000:192). Following the deployment of the 5th Brigade between early 1983 and late 1986 “... approximately 20 000 people lost their lives in Matabeleland, that is, the western part of Zimbabwe occupied mostly by Ndebele speakers” (Phimister 2008:199). The *Gukurahundi* conflict in Matabeleland ended with the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in 1987 (Auret 2009:95). It is this history that forms the background to the media research undertaken in this study. But, this massacre of mainly Ndebele speaking civilians is still the source of tension, lack of trust, and simmering conflict expressed along both ‘tribal’ and political lines (Eppel 2004; Phimister 2008), thereby necessitating a study which looks at the ways in which *The Chronicle*, the major daily newspaper in the region, constructed this conflict.

This study understands social conflict as that in which the parties involved are an aggregate of individuals such as groups, organisations, communities, and crowds, who in pursuit of their goals, use means which are likely to inflict damage, harm or injury (Oberschall 1978:291). Social conflict, Oberschall argues, “encompasses a broad range of social phenomena: class, racial, religious, and communal conflicts; riots, rebellions, revolutions, strikes and civil disorders; marches, demonstrations, protest gatherings, and the like” (1978:291). For a working definition of social conflict, this study draws on Coser who defines it as “a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals” (1967:232). If the *Gukurahundi* experience is viewed as having emerged from the conflict between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF or between dissidents and the government (see Meredith 2003:59, 65-67; Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000:192), it safely falls within the characterisation of conflict offered by Oberschall (1978) and Coser (1967). However, others have also argued that the dissident threat was a government creation designed to justify the one sided massacre of Ndebele people, civilian or not (Matshazi 2007),

leading others to further characterise the *Gukurahundi* episode as genocidal¹ (Genocide Watch 2010; Phimister 2008) suggesting, that it was not a conflict but a military operation embarked upon by the government deliberately to target PF-ZAPU members and by extension, the Ndebele ethnic group (Matshazi 2007). This should also be viewed against the background that the *Gukurahundi* experience was declared a genocide by the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) and *Genocide Watch*, an American based campaign against genocidal conflicts (Genocide Watch 2010). However, this study will take the *Gukurahundi* episode as a conflict as it also manifests elements referred to by Coser (1967) above. Furthermore, the study takes the position that genocide is also a violent manifestation of conflict (Hamelink 2008).

Nationalism and Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe

It is imperative also to consider the social dynamics around issues of identity in post-colonial Africa because the representation and social ways of understanding both nationalism and ethnicity perform political work. Such understandings are useful in making sense of the discourses in the media texts under study (*The Chronicle*) with reference to the *Gukurahundi* conflict. Present day African states are constructions shaped by the process of colonisation. Within these modern boundaries, are various ethnic groups who have over time been subsumed into a common identity, referred to as a nation. A nation can be understood as an entity that is:

...formed from one or more ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its own, it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of specific territory, comparable to that of biblical Israel and of other independent entities in a world thought of as one of nation-states. (Hastings 1997:3)

Commenting from a constructivist position, Hall argues that “a nation is not only a political entity but something which produces meanings – a system of cultural representation” and as such “people are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation

¹ The United Nations defines a genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

- (a) Killing members of a group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:10).

as represented in its national culture” (1992:292). From this, Hall (1992:292) posits: “a nation is a symbolic community and it is this which counts for its ‘power to generate a sense of identity and allegiance’” (Schwarz 1986:106; see also Anderson 1983). On the other hand, an:

...ethnicity is a group [sic] of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language. It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong sub-division with a loyalty of its own within established nations. (Hastings 1997:3)

The constructionist understanding of nationhood is juxtaposed with essentialism, a western understanding of identity which is premised on the idea “that identity exists as a universal and timeless core of the self which we all possess” (Barker 2000:166). Thus from the essentialist position there would be a fixed essence of femininity, masculinity, Asians, teenagers and all other social categories (Barker 2000:166). The perspectives on nationalism and ethnicity given above seem to suggest a contest between essentialised ethnic identities and constructed national identities in post-colonial Africa, hence the perceived need for nation building (see Masunungure 2006). The notion of nation building can be understood in the Weberian sense of a nation, in which he sees it “proper to expect from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups” (qtd. in Masunungure 2006:7).

Arguing in reference to post-colonial Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, Masunungure notes that “many countries inherited states without nations” (2006:3). Here the concept of state building “entails creating and strengthening the institutions necessary to support and promote long-term economic, social and political development” while nation building is the creation of a nation united in cultural diversity (Masunungure 2006:4). The blurred line between nation and state in post-colonial Africa can be understood from the position that “nationalism as a liberation struggle against colonial domination brought with it the identification of nation and state” as one thing (Werbner 1996:12). This identification of nation and state is seen by Werbner as a precursor to what he calls “quasi-nationalism”, which he sees as “a movement of ideas and practices that wins its often cruelly violent moments within the formation of the nation-state in the twentieth century” (Werbner 1996:12). He also argues that “the catastrophe of quasi-nationalism is that it can capture the might of the nation-state and bring authorised violence down ruthlessly against the people who seem to stand in the way of the nation being united and pure as one body” (Werbner 1996:13).

Thus, the conundrum facing most African states with a kaleidoscope of cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and other salient social identities is that of nation building (Masunungure 2006:3). The complexity around issues of identity formation in post-colonial Africa is captured by Werbner who says that “the story of ethnic difference in Africa threatens to overwhelm the larger debate about post-colonial identity politics across the continent” (1996:1). Werbner also notes that “ethnic identities are merely a small fraction of the many identities mobilised in the post-colonial politics of everyday life” (1996:1). The dilemmas of self definition revolve around such social categories as gender, race, ethnicity, nationality and from a post-modern perspective, the subject is conceptualised “as having no fixed, essential or permanent identity” (Hall 1992:277). Such identity constructions position people differently within a nation and between ethnic groups.

Modern Zimbabwe is argued to be by all definitions “...a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-racial country...” (Masunungure 2006:6). Contemporary social divisions in the country can be traced back to a pre-independent Zimbabwe which functioned as a bifurcated society with “two nations, one white and one black” and wherein ‘blacks’ “were divided ethnically between Ndebeles and Shonas and further sub-ethnic groups within the latter” (Masunungure 2006:4). The negative impact of Rhodesian colonialism on the post-independence nation building project was and still is that it:

...set into motion the politicisation of African ethnic identities by trying to construct and reconstruct people’s identities and by compartmentalising them in cultural and geographic terms. It also polarised and reinforced ethnic divisions among Africans, thereby deliberately preventing them from developing nationally integrated identities, by differentiating among them and favouring certain groups against others. (Chimhundu 1992 qtd. in Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007:278)²

Against this background, Masunungure argues that “one of the problems at independence was the contested and not yet fully resolved question of who constitutes the Zimbabwean polity or political community and which people should be members of that community” (2006:5). This historical background explains the contemporary political dynamics in the country about which Masunungure observes: “Zimbabwe’s politics is reflective of its multi-modal ethnic and cultural character” in which the most significant line of social and political cleavage is the ethnic polarisation between the majority Shona-oriented groups and the minority Ndebele-oriented ones (2006:5). The conundrum faced by present day Zimbabwe is that

² See also Ranger 1985.

“there is serious ethnic polarisation in the country and ethnicity remains one of the challenges to the survival of both the state and country” (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007:275). What makes it imperative to consider issues of nationalism and ethnicity in this research is the interaction of these two aspects with the historical event under study, the *Gukurahundi* conflict. Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni point to a number of social fractures in the Zimbabwean body politic traceable to the conflict. For example, they argue that “atrocities of this period have remained a bitter source of resentment among the country’s Ndebele population” and have “solidified the feeling of Ndebele-ness among the people of Matabeleland” thus leaving “many Ndebeles more aware of their differences with the Shona” in the process provoking “a radical form of Ndebele cultural nationalism and radical Ndebele politics” (Lindgren 2005) thus making national integration difficult to achieve (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007:286-287). The politics around issues of nationalism and ethnicity as well as the political and economic history of Zimbabwe and how these have been constructed by the media can help in making sense of the enduring tension between the country’s political and ethnic groupings as well as *The Chronicle’s* representations of this conflict.

The Chronicle

The Chronicle is one of ten publications owned by the Zimbabwe Newspapers (Zimpapers) media group whose main shareholder is the government of Zimbabwe (AfdeInfo: 2007). It is a daily paper located in the country’s second largest city, Bulawayo. A South African company, the Argus Press, owned the daily newspapers, the *Rhodesia Herald* and *The Chronicle*, and their Sunday equivalents, the *Mail* and the *News*, through its subsidiary, the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC), before Zimbabwe achieved independence (Windrich 1981:57). This group of papers had become the mainstream press following the banning of many other news publications by the Rhodesian government (Windrich 1981:57).³ They had been “tailored to serve the interests of a minority state” (Chuma 2004:122; Windrich 1981) that is the settler Rhodesian government. At independence, the new Zimbabwean government, with Nigerian aid, bought the Argus Press shares in the RPP and renamed it Zimbabwe Newspapers (1980) Ltd (Chuma 2004:124). This

³ Some of the publications banned by the RF led Rhodesian government in the 1960s include the following; *The African Daily News*, *Moto*, *Zimbabwe News*, *Zimbabwe Review*, *Umbowo*, *Central African Examiner* and *The Zimbabwe Times* (Saunders 1999).

new company was “to be operated by a trust, the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT), which was in principle autonomous, democratically constituted and tasked with transforming and rolling out the press” (Chuma 2004:124). The idea behind the creation of the ZMMT was that “the press should be free, non-partisan, mass-oriented, accessible and responsible for the national interest” (Chuma 2004:126; see also Saunders 1991; Ronning and Kupe 2000).

But not long after its establishment, the ZMMT soon ran into financial problems leading to its dependence on the government for funding (Chuma 2004:127) a situation which gave senior ZANU-PF politicians considerable influence in the appointment of staff to senior positions at Zimpapers (Saunders 1999:17). The encroachment of government and party influence at Zimpapers resulted in a conflict between editorial and journalistic independence on the one hand and the government and party’s (ZANU-PF) urge to control the press on the other (Ronning and Kupe 2000:160) resulting in the removal of non-compliant editors from their positions (Saunders 1999:20).⁴ This led some to argue that the government’s policy towards Zimpapers was characterised by “strong interference” and “continual frustration of independent-minded editors” (Saidi qtd. in Chuma 2004:128). The first post independence editor of *The Chronicle* was Tommy Sithole (1980-1982) who was in turn succeeded by Geoff Nyarota in 1983. Nyarota remained *The Chronicle*’s editor throughout the duration of the *Gukurahundi* conflict until 1989 when he was promoted to head office (Saunders 1999:17). In view of this, it can be argued that Geoff Nyarota’s survival as editor at *The Chronicle* between 1983 and 1989 was due to his compliance with government and party policies.

Upon the deployment of the 5th Brigade (*Gukurahundi*), the government also closed off media access to the affected areas, banning journalists from leaving Bulawayo, without permission (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace–CCJP 2007:80). Informed by this dimension to ownership and control at *The Chronicle* and the prevailing political situation in the country, this study analyses how the newspaper constructed the *Gukurahundi* conflict between 1983 and 1986.

⁴ For example *Herald* editor Farayi Munyuki was removed in 1983 for publishing a front page story criticising the Botswana government. Respected *Sunday Mail* editor Willie Musarurwa was also removed in 1984 for failing to follow informal government “guidelines” regarding news and commentary (Saunders 1999:20).

Chapter Outlines

This thesis consists of six chapters. This chapter provides the background to both the study's political context and the object of study, *The Chronicle*. I also discuss the concepts of nationalism and ethnicity as this helps us understand the socio-political factors at play in Zimbabwe's body politic as well as the influence of identity issues on the way newspapers represent conflict.

Chapter Two outlines the theoretical framework informing this study. The chapter also presents the contesting debates within and between the theoretical positions that frame this study.

Chapter Three presents the methodology used to gather and analyse the data for this study. It explains the epistemological position within which this research is conducted and outlines the methods of data gathering, sampling and analysis.

Chapters Four and Five present the findings and analysis of the research. These two chapters provide answers to the research question which forms the basis of this study. These answers will be made sense of through the lenses of the theories presented in Chapter Two.

Lastly, Chapter Six will summarise and conclude the research as well as recommend areas of further research required.

Conclusion

This chapter offered the contemporary socio-political developments which motivated the study and its socio-political background. The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework informing this study.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Introduction

As this research is concerned with the representation of the *Gukurahundi* by *The Chronicle*, this chapter provides theoretical frameworks for analysing the selected representations. The theoretical frameworks outlined here foreground significant factors that have a bearing on the nature of media representations.

This chapter draws on Hanitzsch's (2007) theorisation of journalistic practice to understand different media roles because understandings of journalistic practice shape media roles and subsequently journalistic representations. It further refers to the theory of political communication as a framework within which to explore and outline the nature of the relationship between politicians and journalists, because politicians have a significant bearing on journalists' coverage of political issues especially in conflict situations (see McNair 2007). However, the theory of political communication is only used to expand on some aspects of journalistic practice outlined by Hanitzsch (2007). The media are also, always, wittingly or unwittingly, expected to perform certain roles or tasks and these have come to be generalised in the Reithian formulation of informing, educating and entertaining (Zaffiro 1993:7). This chapter uses Christians *et al.* (2009) to outline the normative framework relevant for this study. While normative understandings are used to theorise how the media 'ought' to report on issues and events, the theory of political communication focuses our attention on the factors relating to how journalists actually report social issues (see Habermas 2006; Tehranian 2002:75). In other words, the two approaches (the normative approach and the theory of political communication), together, demonstrate the gap between the 'ought' and the 'is' in terms of how journalists go about their practice. Also as the practice of journalism is not a uniform and universally agreed upon phenomenon, this begs the question about how to locate and make sense of conflict reporting. From the different approaches to journalism outlined below, I discuss an ideal type of conflict reporting referred to by some as 'peace journalism' (Galtung 1986; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). Peace journalism provides an analytic framework within which to assess *The Chronicle's* coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict. These theories and concepts are essential to this study because they bring to the fore, and help us understand, factors which significantly shape the way journalists report issues and events, especially in situations of conflict.

An Itinerary of Thought on the Normative Views of Mainstream Media

An understanding of the normative roles of the media is necessary because it provides a backdrop against which to reference the actual performance of the media. Furthermore, possible ways of understanding journalistic representations can be linked to different kinds of media roles, journalistic forms, and journalistic practices. As some scholars argue, “each configuration of normative values [...] tends to be linked with the search for what good and just public communication consists of in a particular historical context” (Christians *et al.* 2009:20). It can be noted here, that this pursuit of “good” or “just” public communication seems prescriptive of ways of representing and also at the same time suggestive of ways of not representing. The normative, it is argued, refers to those actions or practices which are guided by some external ideal, and not necessarily by the potential for material reward or calculation of advantage, and may also at the same time imply “an element of association with others (relationships) and some form of accountability or willingness to be accountable” (McQuail 2006:49). However, different writings on the role of the media in society seem to point out that normative understandings are not universal but are shaped by different philosophical persuasions, political systems and postulations about media roles. For instance, in societies following pure libertarian principles, even the concept of media roles is treated as anathema because the media are seen as free to choose between performing and not performing any role (McQuail 2006:54; Christians *et al.* 2009:29; 121).

An itinerary of thinking about the normative roles of mainstream media, in society, can be traced back to the institution’s conception as a fourth estate, a label which cast the media as a “fourth power that provides counterbalances and checks on the executive, legislative, and judicial” branches of government (Willis 2010:15). This idea has also been understood to refer to the press’s mediation role between the government and public, and to the watchdog function (Willis 2010:15). Although the fourth estate understanding as normative still endures in the practice of journalism, it no longer receives the same standing as it did at the time that Edmund Burke spoke of the media’s role as such. The elaboration of the media’s social responsibility by America’s Commission on the Freedom of the Press in 1947, marked the genesis of its advocacy role (Janowitz 2000:623; see also Christians *et al.* 2009:5). This Commission, also known as the Hutchins Commission, criticised what it saw as the “absence of appropriate standards of press performance and the ineffectiveness of the mass media in solving the problems of a democratic society” (Janowitz 2000:623). It is on the basis of this

perceived need, that the idea of a socially responsible media was mooted. This was because commercial media were seen to have failed in performing their bigger social role. Partially informed by the work of the Hutchins Commission, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) published *Four Theories of the Press*, which introduced the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and soviet concepts of what the press should be and do (Christians *et al.* 2009:3). *Four Theories* provided a “reflection about the media’s role in society by suggesting that the press systems are linked to different political systems and philosophies” (Christians *et al.* 2009:4).

While this formulation provided impetus into thinking about the roles of the media in society, it has been criticised for its political and cultural bias, among other things (Christians *et al.* 2009:4). Many revisions and attempts to formulate alternative models within which to conceptualise the role of the media in society, both in Europe and the United States, followed on the heels of criticisms directed at the *Four Theories of the Press* (see Christians *et al.* 2009:5-14). One significant attempt at revising the role of the media in society occurred under the aegis of UNESCO in the 1970s through debates on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) (see Sparks 2007; Christians *et al.* 2009; Tomlinson 1991). Third World countries in particular, argued that *Four Theories* was not sufficiently open to “a whole range of value traditions and socio-political philosophies underlying public communication throughout the world” but instead viewed them as favouring the industrialised western powers (Christians *et al.* 2009:viii). The Third World countries also saw *Four Theories* as institutionalising and justifying the imbalances of the present global order of communication which was seen as privileging information flowing from the developed countries (Tomlinson 1991:16).

Out of these debates emerged propositions of a new kind of journalism referred to as “development journalism” which did not focus on politics only, but also on developmental issues (Ogan 1980:3; see also McQuail’s addition of Development Communication Theory [2000:155]). Developed countries criticised this form of journalism for its tendency to ally the media with government and at worst for exposing the media to abuse by repressive states (Ogan 1980:4). Other scholars propose alternative forms of journalism which are congruent with an advocacy or activist philosophy (Atton 2011:6), provide a critical voice against mainstream discourses and are representative of community level issues (see Fuchs 2010).

Another normative framework argued for by Rosen (1999), is informed by civic republicanism, whose thrust is that “only through public discourse, engaged debate and deliberation can citizens be reconnected to political processes and reaffirmed as part of a wider community or collective” (Cottle 2006:112).

The theory of political communication developed in the early 1990s as a result of the gaps in normative theorisation of the media’s role in society. It speaks to the disjuncture between Siebert *et al.*’s (1956) notion of the libertarian press as normative theory, the continuation of the fourth estate role, and actual political communication (see Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Habermas 2006). Political communication is here understood broadly to include purposeful communication by politicians and political actors, “communication addressed to these actors by non politicians such as voters and newspaper columnists”, and communication about political actors and “their activities, as contained in news reports, editorials, and other forms of media discussion of politics” (McNair 2007:4).

The political communication theory enables an assessment of the tension between “the ostensibly democratic ideals that the mass media are supposed to serve and the communication structures and practices that actually prevail” (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990:25). In democratic societies, it is argued, the media act as conduits for political communication originating from political actors outside media organisations themselves, and “senders of political messages constructed by journalists” and other media producers (McNair 2007:11).

According to Gurevitch and Blumler, in a democracy, the media are supposed to provide surveillance of the socio-political environment reporting developments likely to impinge, positively or negatively, on the welfare of citizens; facilitate dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between power holders (actual and prospective) and mass publics; provide mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised power; and among other things respect the audiences’ ability to make sense of their political environment (1990:25-26). The two scholars also cite asymmetrical relations between political communicators and audiences; political apathy among citizens; and the constraining relationship between the media and governing authorities as factors that limit the media’s ability to perform and provide a number of functions and services in a democratic political

system (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990:25-27). Theorisation on the normative role of the media did not remain trapped in the original cast amid all these criticisms. Revisions have been made taking into consideration insights from attempts at further normative theorisation, and critical theory.

The purpose of the discussion above is to locate contemporary notions of normative theory, and peace journalism in relation to it, because it is useful for the analysis of media texts selected for this study. Some of the latest significant work in this field is that by Carpentier (2005) who is concerned with journalistic identities, Hanitzsch (2007) with journalism culture, and Christians *et al.* (2009) who offer a revised approach to normative theories of the media.

For an analytic framework of different types of journalism, I use Hanitzsch (2007) because of his more detailed categories. I elaborate media roles using Christians *et al.* (2009) who are good on roles that are of interest to this study. Christians *et al.*'s (2009) formulation of the normative theories of the media provide a three-tier analytical model which enables analysis at a philosophical level (normative traditions), political level (models of democracy) and at the level of media roles (Christians *et al.* 2009:16). Their model is structured as follows:

Fig. 1

Philosophical Level <i>(Normative Traditions)</i>	Political <i>(Models of Democracy)</i>	Media <i>(Roles of Media)</i>
Corporatist	Administrative	Monitorial
Libertarian	Pluralist	Facilitative
Social Responsibility	Civic	Radical
Citizen participation	Direct	Collaborative

But they emphasise that each of these three levels has its own logic which does not transfer to others and that the different types of normative traditions, models of democracy and roles of media falling under each respective analytical level “should be seen as vehicles of analytical understanding rather than sets of fixed locations limiting actual phenomena” (Christians *et al.* 2009:16). This is because actual media roles held and practised by “media institutions or

individual communicators are typically composites of different and sometimes contradictory traditions” (Christians *et al.* 2009:17). The analytic framework of media roles that Christians *et al.* proffer, speak to important issues facing democratic societies in their contemporary political set up, relating to:

...the transparency of society and flow of information within it; the facilitating of social and political processes, especially the democratic system; the critical role of communications media that has to be fulfilled independently of vested interests and established institutions; and the collaboration or not, of media with authority. (2009:30)

This discussion on normative theories focuses on those roles that are of analytical value to the concerns of this study, namely the collaborative, monitorial, and facilitative roles (Christians *et al.* 2009). The monitorial and collaborative roles occupy polar positions in relation to each other and this contrast enables an assessment of representations in a government-controlled newspaper such as *The Chronicle*. The facilitative role provides the potential ideal typical normative frame for the practice of conflict reporting. Media roles or the roles for those working in the media encompass a description of their tasks and practices as well as broader purposes and obligations (Christians *et al.* 2009:29).

However, it is not enough to look at these normative roles without considering in detail the diversity of journalistic practice. To unpack the diversity of journalistic practice, I use Hanitzsch’s (2007) model or conception of ‘journalism culture’. It is only within such a model that media roles can be understood beyond abstractions, or rather can be matched with actual journalistic practice in its diversity and flux. This deconstructive work is the subject of the section below.

Journalism Culture and Normative Roles of the Media

There is no universally acceptable understanding of journalism but McNair offers a useful working definition:


Any authored text, in written, audio or visual form, which claims to be (i.e. is presented to its audience as) a truthful statement about, or record of, some hitherto unknown (new) feature of the actual, social world. (1998:4)

Journalistic practices are also spoken about and made sense of by those from within and without the profession in different ways (see Carpentier 2003:151). For this reason, it is necessary to explicate the various ways of looking at and making sense of the practice of

journalism. This enables an approximate characterisation of ‘conflict reporting’ within the various discourses around the roles, values, practice, and an epistemic self-understanding by journalism practitioners. In addition, this section also provides an analytical framework outlining the relations between kinds of journalism, normative roles and the sorts of representations these elements promote. This is because journalistic content is shaped by a variety of factors ranging from the social context, institutional influences, perceptions by those from within and without the media of its role in society, values and ethics adhered to by the media in constructing their stories *inter alia* (see Shoemaker and Reese 1996).

To capture this diverse understanding of journalism, Hanitzsch (2007) conceptualises journalism culture in terms of its institutional roles, epistemologies and ethical ideologies. He further divides these three analytical elements into 7 analytical dimensions of interventionism, power distance, market orientation, objectivism, empiricism, relativism, and idealism (2007:367).

Fig. 2 Hanitzsch’s framework for conceptualising journalism culture (2007:371)



This formulation helps to capture the cultural diversity of journalistic values and practices, and from these, carve out possible permutations of normative roles and the subsequent representations they are likely to promote. One of the reasons why Hanitzsch’s formulation is useful to this study is that it enables us to perceive journalistic values and practices both from within and outside their hegemonic construction. This is important because the hegemonic occupational ideology is generally embraced by journalists themselves and promoted as the norm (see Schudson 1978). It associates journalism with elements of public service, impartiality, neutrality, objectivity, fairness, autonomy, freedom, independence, immediacy, actuality, speed, a sense of ethics, validity and legitimacy, but cannot account for the

emergent forms that are not necessarily characteristic of this universalised hegemonic form (see Hanitzsch 2007:368).

According to Hanitzsch, journalism culture is manifest in the way journalists think and act and “can be defined as a particular set of ideas and practices by which journalists, consciously and unconsciously, legitimate their role in society and render their work meaningful for themselves and others” (2007:369). Journalism culture is thus “an arena in which diverse professional ideologies struggle over the dominant interpretation of journalism’s social function and identity” (Hanitzsch 2007:370). His model focuses on differences in journalistic value systems and practices because, as he argues, “by highlighting differences at the expense of similarities, the present approach seeks to provide an analytical grid to map diverse journalism cultures onto a set of universal dimensions of global variance” (Hanitzsch 2007:371).

In his model, Hanitzsch uses the dimension of ethical ideologies as a constituent of journalism culture to draw attention to “how journalists respond to ethical problems” (2007:378). Because moral values are “culture bound and far too specific to serve as a common denominator of the global variations in professional practice” (Hanitzsch 2007:378), he draws on the works of Keeble (2005) and Plaisance (2005) to come up with a model that enables an assessment of journalists’ responses to ethical problems. Hanitzsch points out that in making ethical decisions, journalists take into consideration the situation at hand and agreed upon ethical principles, but may also use unconventional practices of reporting in exceptional cases or to yield the best possible outcome (2007:379).

Hanitzsch also uses the element of epistemology to assess the extent to which journalism observes the dimension of objectivity and is guided by empiricism. A perspective on journalism that reifies objectivity advocates for a correspondence between what is said and what exists, absolute truth, and a separation of fact from values. On the other hand, views on journalism based on constructivism characterises news as selective and therefore requiring interpretation; does not believe in absolute truth; argues that journalism is a construction; and that news is a representation of the world (Hanitzsch 2007:376-377). Also, those media whose empiricist orientation is high, emphasise observation, measurement, evidence, experience and for them truth is substantiated by fact whereas those with a low empiricist

orientation stress the analytical justifications of truth claims, accentuate reason, ideas, values, opinion, commentary and analysis (Hanitzsch 2007:377-378).

Finally, and of particular relevance to this study, is his use of the element of institutional roles to characterise the practice of journalism by analysing the extent to which the media are socially committed and motivated as opposed to being detached (interventionism), are operating closer to the centres of power (power distance), and the extent to which they subordinate their goals to the logic of the market (market orientation) (Hanitzsch 2007:374). He sees those media that are interventionist as assuming an advocacy role as opposed to a detached, gatekeeper orientation taken by objective journalism (2007:371-372). Peace journalism, development journalism and civic or public journalism are seen as exemplifying the former, while the latter is exemplified by a professional form performing the informational function. Those media that operate closer to power centres are characterised as propagandist, defensive of authority and therefore loyal to the power centre, while those that operate at a distance from the power centre are seen as adversary, challenging those who wield power and playing fourth estate and watchdog roles (Hanitzsch 2007:373-374). Those media that are found operating closer to power centres can be argued to perform a collaborative role which Christians *et al.* (2009) expand on.

The collaborative role of the media is characterised by a very narrow distance between the media and powerful institutions such as the state. Christians *et al.* argue that, “collaboration characterises any number of relationships in which the media willingly, sometimes even enthusiastically, participate” (2009:196). The role deals at once with both the needs and expectations of the state as well as those of the press (Christians *et al.* 2009:197). The role’s democratic and normative value “depends on whether a public justification can be made for it” (Christians *et al.* 2009:197). While the media can collaborate with a range of ‘centres of power’ such as community activists, advertisers, its collaboration with the state is of central focus to this study because the “state can intervene in the affairs of journalism in ways that fundamentally alter the nature of everyday news” (Christians *et al.* 2009:197). The nature of this collaboration “represents an acknowledgment of the state’s interest to which the media accede either passively or unwittingly, reluctantly or wholeheartedly” (Christians *et al.* 2009:197). However for this collaborative role to assume normative qualities, the relationship between the media and the state should be “built on mutual trust and a shared commitment to

mutually agreeable means and ends”, an ideal which in reality remains a pipedream (Christians *et al.* 2009:198). For an analytical framework of the collaborative role, Christians *et al.* (2009) draw on Held’s (1995:160-162) categorisation of the conditions of collaboration. It is important to include this model for analytical purposes in this study as it provides tools to assess the relationship between media texts and the context within which they are constructed. Held categorises the conditions of collaboration under three main strands which include, collaboration as compliance, collaboration as acquiescence and collaboration as acceptance (1995:161). Compliant collaboration, Held argues, can result from coercion, apathy on the part of the media, and tradition justified on the basis of history and custom (1995:161). Acquiescent collaboration on the other hand results from pragmatic and instrumental considerations wherein such cooperation is inevitable and useful respectively (Held 1995:161). Lastly, the media accepts to collaborate for practical and normative reasons (Held 1995:161). The collaborative role is less celebrated in societies which cast the state in the role of a villain. However, Christians *et al.* also note that, “roles apply in particular instances and at particular times” and that “on any given day, most news media play multiple roles” (2009:217). These roles, they argue, can also manifest even in single stories (Christians *et al.* 2009:217).

In contrast, the function of those media that operate at a distance from the centre of power (Hanitzsch 2007:374) can be associated with Christians *et al.*’s (2009) formulation of the monitorial role. The monitorial role describes the mediation function of the media wherein “news media intervene between events and sources on the one hand and individual members of the public on the other” (Christians *et al.* 2009:139-140). The monitorial role’s relevance cuts across all democratic models, that is the ‘pluralist’, ‘administrative’, ‘civic’ and ‘direct’ systems, although its preference ranks the highest in pluralistic democracies (Christians *et al.* 2009:133). The term monitorial is defined as referring to “an organised scanning of the real world of people, conditions, and events, and of potentially relevant sources of information” and also the media’s evaluation and interpretation of these, “guided by the criteria of relevance, significance, and reigning normative frameworks for the public arena” (Christians *et al.* 2009:140). The model of professional journalism is largely expressed in this role (Christians *et al.* 2009:126). The practice of journalism in respect of this role is expected to observe such values as the separation of opinion and attitude from facts that can be supported by evidence (Christians *et al.* 2009:125-126). The scope of the monitorial role stretches from

merely channelling information to “carrying out a watchdog role on behalf of the public” (Christians *et al.* 2009:126). Journalistic practice within this role is expected to be objective, neutral, accountable to audiences, distant from the state’s power and to have some independence from economic interests (Christians *et al.* 2009:147-152). However, this role is not without its own shortcomings. Christians *et al.* identify claims to confidentiality and economic interest in protecting certain information, the commercial imperative in media operations, media obsession with ‘dramatic narrative’, compelling characters and personalities as some of the barriers to the performance of the monitorial role (2009:152-156; see also Wolfsfeld 2004:11-22).

In as far as market orientation goes, those media organisations that subordinate their goals to the logic of the market characterise their audiences as consumers and focus on what the audience wants, whereas those that have a low degree of subordination to market forces are mainly public interest driven, treating audiences as citizens and giving them what they should know (Hanitzsch 2007:374-375). However, the element of market orientation is not of significant analytical value in this research because the newspaper under study is state controlled, so its content is shaped more by political factors than market ones (see Chuma 2004). It is also pointed out that “the diverse and coexisting worlds of journalism” make it impossible for journalistic practice to be neatly classified across the various categories outlined in Hanitzsch’s model (2007:371).

The Facilitative Role

The facilitative role can be played by media placed midway in the continuum between adversarial and loyal media. This study argues that by performing the facilitative role, the media stand a better chance of reporting conflict in productive ways. In performing the facilitative role, “the media promote dialogue among their readers and viewers through communication that engages them and in which they actively participate” (Christians *et al.* 2009:158). In this role, the media take seriously citizen efforts to “clarify and resolve public problems” (Christians *et al.* 2009:158). The facilitative role of the media “is rooted in and promotes deliberative democracy” (Christians *et al.* 2009:158). It is argued that in this role, the media “facilitate the process of negotiation over the social, political, and cultural agenda” and through this process, create interactive dialogue between citizens wherein they can

engage with one another “on both practical matters and social division” (Christians *et al.* 2009:159). The media are also, in performing this role, expected to “raise social conflict from the plane of violence to the plane of panel discussion” (Commission on freedom of the Press 1947:23). The other thrust of the media in this role is to promote grassroots voices as opposed to elite voices (Christians *et al.* 2009:161). It is also suggested that the media should engage participants by “creating shared experiences and fostering mutual understanding” (Glasser 1991 qtd. in Christians *et al.* 2009:161). This role would fit with media that seek to promote public dialogue on pressing issues and events of the day.

The three media roles discussed here in the context of different types of journalism (Hanitzsch 2007) are useful for this study because the monitorial role offers the hegemonic normative understanding of professional journalistic practice (against which normative critiques are directed), while the collaborative role enables an assessment of normative positions available to a government owned newspaper like *The Chronicle* and the facilitative role proposes a potential normative reference for the practice of conflict reporting. This normative perspective challenges the hegemonic view that the monitorial role should be the ideal norm. These three roles are used to assess the sorts of media representations promoted by *The Chronicle* in its reportage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict.

War or Peace Journalism

Galtung (1986; 1998) defines peace journalism as an approach to conflict reporting which “concentrates on stories that highlight peace initiatives; tone down ethnic and religious differences, prevent further conflict, focus on the structure of society; and promote conflict resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation” (qtd. in Lee and Maslog 2005: 311-312). Peace journalism is understood in juxtaposition to ‘violence journalism’ which is argued to seek causes of conflict, and solutions to it on the battleground and focuses on who gets the upper hand in the war (Hanitzsch 2004:484). Hanitzsch further points out that violence journalism “is generally zero sum oriented, that is, one side wins and the other side loses” and that in this approach “news coverage only begins with the manifestation (outbreak) of violence and concentrates on its visible consequences, such as the dead, casualties and material damage” (2004:484). The differentiation between violence and peace journalism is constructed along Galtung’s (2006) hypothesis which uses categories such as conflict/violence, truth/propaganda, people/elite and solution/victory to characterise each of these two kinds of

journalism. According to Galtung's model, peace journalism is identifiable by its concern with conflict, truth, people and a solution in contrast to violence journalism's focus on violence, propaganda, elite people's voices and victory in the end.

The growth of studies on conflict reporting is predicated on the realisation that the number of conflicts in the world have steadily risen over the years from about 74 in 1945 to 249 in 2005 (Hanitzsch 2007:2), and that, in spite of the pledge by the international community to never allow the "barbarism" of the second world war to happen again "the world has known fewer than 40 days during which nowhere in the world was a war fought" (Hamelink 2008:77). Concern here is not in the mere increase in the number of conflicts but also on the role played by the media in these conflicts. Others indict the media's coverage of conflicts in developing countries on the basis that "disappearances, bombings, kidnappings and state violence in many countries, often unreported, claim thousands of times more victims than do well-publicised acts of anti-state and international terror" (Gerbner 1992:95). The growing momentum of scholarly interest in peace journalism is also against the back-drop that "in wartime, the media are not mere observers but are simultaneously the source of intelligence, a combatant, a weapon, a target, and battlefield" (Hackett 2007:48). For instance during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines, is argued to have "prepared, encouraged, and supported the genocide of the Tutsi people ..." (Frere 2007:79). In some instances commentators have credited the media with playing a positive role which has come to be known as the CNN effect following the channel's coverage of the first gulf war in 1991. The CNN effect is when the media's coverage of war:

...allegedly highlights political uncertainty and incompetence, accelerates the pace at which politicians must respond to crises, and creates expectations and emotions that may force governments, against their initial inclinations, to intervene (or disengage) in conflict situations. (Hackett 2007:47)

Lynch and McGoldrick also point out that reporting on war now constitutes a bigger responsibility because "modern wars are fought as much through the media as they are on the ground" (2005:ix). The arguments being raised by these scholars can be summed up through Hamelink's observation that:

...although there may be doubts about the media's peacemaking potential, it can be demonstrated that news media can make matters a lot worse and can certainly contribute to the escalation of group conflicts into mass killings. (2008:77)

Furthermore, the focus on peace journalism emanates from a discontent with the way traditional journalistic practices seem inherently to privilege war journalism (Galtung 2006:1; Lee 2009:258). Elements such as the commercial imperative in media operations, reliance on authority sources, or 'primary definers' (Hall *et al.* 1978), censorship, controls imposed by the military and a sense of nationalism and patriotism among journalists themselves, are also argued to drive the media into representing conflict within frames promoted by officialdom (Cottle 2006:83-84). Lee and Maslog also point out that "the news coverage of conflict, including the reporting about war is grounded in the notion of conflict as a news value" (2005:311). It is argued that ingredients such as "high tension", "drama" and a web of "complex main plots and sub-plots played out within traditional binary oppositions of aggressor and victim, winner and loser" make warfare "an epitome of a 'good story'" (Boyd-Barrett 2004:26; Wolfsfeld 2004:16) as they resonate with such news values as "conflict, violence, deviance and drama" (Cottle 2006:76; Galtung and Ruge 1973). Boyd-Barrett also points out that "insatiable audience appetites for news" in times of war attract advertisers who in turn create commercial opportunities for the media hence the media's preference for high drama and tension in conflict reporting (2004:26). According to McGoldrick and Lynch, the point of departure then, is to look at peace journalism as a new form of journalism which looks at how journalists could be part of the solution rather than part of the problem (2000:6). This involves thinking outside the hegemonic form of professional journalism and rethinking such aspects as objectivity and news sourcing. As there are many arguments both against and in favour of journalistic objectivity, and because journalistic objectivity directly or indirectly shapes media representations of social issues and events, it is necessary to expand discussion on this concept.

Objectivity is one of the most enduring principles in traditional journalism (Lichtenberg 1996:225; Schudson 1978). The range of debates on journalistic objectivity have been aptly captured in the observation that "some say that journalism is not objective; others that it cannot be objective; and still others that it should not be objective" (Lichtenberg 2000:238). Journalistic objectivity is understood by some as a value of fairness, an ethic of restraining one's biases, the idea that journalism cannot be the voice of any particular party or sect, and an "effort to report the facts without developing or at least without revealing an opinion about them" (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005:203; see also Calcutt and Hammond 2011:99; 116). Journalists subject their reports to objective controls such as the careful presentation of facts,

reliable and varied sources, expert opinion, supporting documentation, accurate quotations, and a fair representation of major viewpoints (Ward 1998:122; Hanitzsch 2004:488; see also Tuchman 1972). Kinds of journalism which incorporate the notion of objectivity fit with Christians *et al.*'s (2009) monitorial role. Within this role, journalists are mainly pre-occupied with the task of providing what is perceived as value free information by reporting on issues and events as they are. This form of journalism has also been identified by Hanitzsch (2007) as holding a hegemonic position.

But some scholars and advocates of peace journalism argue that objective journalism is problematic because "it removes any sort of moral content from the story and leaves only an empty spectacle" (Bell 1997 qtd. in McLaughlin 2002:155; Hackett 1989:10-11). Others dismiss the concept of objectivity altogether arguing instead that "news is not a mirror of reality" but rather a "representation of the world" and that these representations are selective (Schudson 2003:33; Hanitzsch 2004:488). Some also argue that "since knowledge is inevitably produced from within particular conceptual frameworks there can be no objectivity: there are only competing perspectives, none of them 'true'" (Calcutt and Hammond 2011:105). The constructionist position on objectivity can be used to support peace journalism in the sense that it argues for value judgment to filter into news stories as a matter of necessity. This kind of journalism can also be characterised as interventionist within Hanitzsch's model of journalistic culture (2007:373). It is a form of journalism that will not shy away from taking a position on controversial and moral issues. Peace journalism follows both an interventionist and constructionist logic because it takes an advocacy, interpretative approach (Hanitzsch 2007:373; Lee and Maslog 2005:311). However, there have also been strong arguments in favour of retaining journalistic objectivity. Calcutt and Hammond forcefully argue that if today's journalism is to function as a "forum for vigorous, open and critical debate, it is more commitment to objectivity that is required, not further deconstruction of the concept" (2011:113). They argue that an important critique of journalism is that which pertains to reconstruction because:

...uncritical continuation of 'critical thinking' will add little more to the understanding of journalism's past, still less to the prognosis for its future; moreover, it can only have a corrosive effect on the academy's relationship with media and society. (Calcutt and Hammond 2011:2)

Since peace journalism is very critical of the objectivity norm, it is argued to belong to what Cottle refers to as the 'corrective journalism' in that these forms of journalism:

...deliberately define and position themselves in opposition to established, traditional forms of journalism, challenging foundational news values, dominant agendas, privileged elite access and so called 'professional' journalistic practices. Their declared mission, based on critiques of actually existing media, is to redress the perceived deficiencies and distortions of mainstream news representations and better align journalism, *inter alia*, to projects of social responsibility, economic development, political participation and cultural democracy. (2006:100)

However, criticisms or debates on the efficacy of peace journalism revolve around the structure and agency problematic. Even in the face of arguments favouring peace journalism, other scholars question the novelty of this kind of journalism in the first instance arguing instead that:

...what is needed is the broadening and deepening of war and conflict reporting, not its universal replacement by an idealised view of the world as it should be, nor one that is representationally engineered to conform to a particular view of the 'peaceful society'. (Cottle 2006:103)

Cottle's (2006) argument for a "broadening and deepening" of the traditional model, or professional journalism, is preferred here in spite of arguments that objectivity and news values such as conflict, timeliness and negativity privilege violence journalism (Lee 2009:268).

The Structure and Agency Problematic: A Critique of Peace Journalism

The first problem with the conception of peace journalism promoted by Galtung, Lynch and McGoldrick is that "it tends to overestimate the influence journalists and the media have on political decisions" while at the same time treating the audience as a passive mass waiting to be enlightened by peace journalists (Hanitzsch 2007:1). The criticisms are predicated on the observation that the practice of peace journalism is not "a matter of individual leeway, and media structures and professional routines cannot be modified from the position of the individual journalist" (Hanitzsch 2007:1). Instead peace journalism should be promoted keeping in mind that journalists always operate in structured organizational and institutional environments that exert certain pressures on them (Tehrani 2002:75; Gurevitch and Blumler 1990:28-30; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). However, some argue that structural constraints should not be seen as completely determining because "journalism operates within a nexus of sometimes contradictory forces that may allow a scope for agency and

alternative practices, including those of peace journalism” (Hackett 2007:51). To appreciate the forces that have a bearing on the working environment of a journalist, Hackett (2007) uses Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model and Bourdieu’s conception of the media as a relatively autonomous institutional sphere articulating with relations of power, knowledge and production. Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model “traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalise dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public” (1988:2). Hackett also notes that Herman and Chomsky’s findings on news content resonate with the characteristics of war journalism especially in the portrayal “of ‘our’ side as moral and righteous and ‘them’ as evil and aggressive” (2007:50). He also uses the hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker and Reese 1996) to show the multi-level nature of factors influencing the practice of journalism. The model highlights the media workers’ daily work routines in the newsroom that structure journalists output independently of their personal backgrounds and values, the broader organisational imperatives of media institutions, extra media influences such as sources and advertising as well as the ideological and cultural context within which journalists practise, as the levels through which media content is shaped (Hackett 2007:50-51).

However, he also uses Bourdieu’s field theory to explain the degree of autonomy, and potential for agency in journalistic practice. Bourdieu’s field theory posits that regardless of the power dynamics among fields, these fields possess some autonomy from external pressures (Benson 2006:188). For Bourdieu (1998a:39), “a field ... obeys its own laws” and thus what happens in it “cannot be understood by looking only at external factors” (qtd. in Benson 2006:188) but also what happens from within those fields. Giddens also argues that while structures shape individual actions, individuals also, “routinely and for the most part without fuss – maintain a theoretical understanding of the grounds of their activity” (1984:5). He seems to thrust upon individual action significant levels of agency when he argues that such agency “concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently” (Giddens 1984:9). However, he also points to the symbiosis between individual agency and social structuring properties when he points out that:

...while the continued existence of large collectives or societies evidently does not depend upon the activities of any particular individual, such collectivities or societies

manifestly would cease to be if all the agents involved disappeared. (Giddens 1984:25)

Thus, it can be argued, human behaviour is not determined by structures alone but human agency also enables individuals to make choices. In the final analysis therefore, it can be argued that the efficacy and feasibility of peace journalism cannot be considered outside the concerns already raised by various approaches to the study of journalism, including media sociology, political economy and cultural studies.

Some scholars such as Hanitzsch (2007:3), criticise a “journalism of attachment” promoted by advocates of peace journalism. For him, the problem lies in that “journalists presume the power to identify victims and perpetrators” (Hanitzsch 2007:3). He uses the example of prisoners that were, and may still be held by the American government at Guantanamo Bay, to question the way perpetrators and victims are labelled (Hanitzsch 2007:3).⁵ Hanitzsch’s concern is the relative nature of defining who victims and perpetrators of violence are in any situation. However, if one is to consider the peace journalism premise that the ultimate goal is to reach a compromise between two foes (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005), then dichotomisation between victims and perpetrators may not pose a problem to practitioners of peace journalism as it is precisely its role to identify participants in conflict as a foundation upon which to build a constructive conversation (Lee 2009:262). Hanitzsch also criticises peace journalism’s criticism of war journalism as a distortion of reality. He points out instead that:

...every representation is biased, and any correspondence between the objective reality and its representation(s) is hardly possible. (Hanitzsch 2007:5)

His criticism implies that peace journalism, as a positioned journalistic practice constructs its own perception of reality in much the same way as violence journalism. The other criticism of peace journalism targets its positioning of the audience as passive. According to Hanitzsch, audiences are not always predisposed to preference for peace journalism and peace. On this note he advises that peace journalism must instead “look at fragmented and active audiences instead of a passive mass that needs to be enlightened by virtue of right and proper reporting” (2007:6). Cottle also argues in the same vein that in spite of:

⁵ In view of the questionable interrogation techniques used by the US army against prisoners stationed at Guantanamo, it became unclear as to who was the “perpetrator” and who was not between the mostly Muslim prisoners and their American captors. They were imprisoned in the post 9/11 era at the height of the “War on Terror”.

...peace journalism's laudable aims to give voice to the voiceless, hear the cries of the suffering and witness the human carnage wrought by war and other violent conflicts, images of human suffering...cannot be presumed to transcend the interests and ideologies of viewers and readers. (2006:103)

Hanitzsch (2007) also notes that not all conflicts are amenable to peace journalism. He gives an example of the Christian and Muslim conflict in Indonesia's province of Maluku in 1999 where Christian journalists could not report fairly about Muslims inasmuch as Muslims could not report fairly about Christians as this could threaten the lives of those journalists.

Again in agreement with Hanitzsch, Cottle also argues that:

...peaceful solutions' are not always available and nor are they necessarily always the least bloody means of dealing with oppressive states and regimes. If this is so, the news media cannot universally be charged with the responsibility of representationally portraying all conflicts as if they are amenable to peaceful solutions. (2006:104)

This study shares Cottle's position that instead of criticising mainstream professional journalism, what is needed is to identify, opportunities for the realisation of peace journalism through an expansion of "the range of views and voices, values and visions found in the news media", elements which are required for peaceful existence (2006:104).

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that different types of journalism, their relation to power centres and roles assumed by the news media, shape the way such media represent social issues especially in conflictual situations. It demonstrated the diversity of journalistic practice using Hanitzsch's (2007) conception of journalism culture. It has also shown that types of journalism can be matched with certain roles (Christians *et al.* 2009) and in turn that a combination of the two, shapes the manner in which the news media covers issues and events. An attempt was also made to locate peace journalism within this framework from both a normative perspective and in actually existing journalism practice. The chapter also argues that in spite of peace journalism's normative critique of mainstream media, an ideal method of covering non-violent and violent conflict may not reside in departing from professional journalism but in improving it. In the next chapter, I outline the research design used for this research.

Chapter 3

Methodology and Methods

Introduction

This study analyses how and why *The Chronicle* constructed the *Gukurahundi* conflict which took place in the Zimbabwean provinces of Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South and the Midlands between 1983 and 1986, in particular ways. It investigates the sorts of stories that *The Chronicle* told about the dissidents, the 5th Brigade and unity; and how they came to be told the way they were.⁶ The study is located within the qualitative epistemic understanding of research because of its constructionist positioning. Constructionism is rooted in the belief that “social phenomena are discursively constituted” and therefore, seeks to demonstrate “how things come to be as they are, that they could be different, and thereby that they can be changed” (Hammersley 2008:110). The focus here “is not on the methods through which social phenomena are constituted...but the constructed character of particular social phenomena that is highlighted” (Hammersley 2008:115). I will start with a brief discussion on two of the main methodological positions in research before narrowing to a discussion on the major issues in qualitative research which include sampling, generalisability, validity and reliability. Lastly I will discuss the methods of analysis before concluding the chapter.

Methodological Considerations

Generally speaking, the field of research operates within and between two main epistemological positions, that is the interpretive and the positivist traditions. The positivist approach is expressed through the quantitative research paradigm while the interpretive approach finds expression in qualitative research approaches. The positivist tradition is founded on the premise that the primary source of knowledge is in experience and observation, an adherence to a model of objectivity associated with natural sciences and subscription to a Humean conception of causality, seen as something that we infer from

⁶It is important to examine how these stories were told because labels such as dissidents, unity and the way the role of the 5th Brigade was told, are not innocent but products of discursive practices (See Arno 1984; Fairclough 2003; Alexander and McGregor 2003; Meredith 2003; Eppel 2004; Phimister 2008). However, focusing on archival material alone is not enough to capture the complexity, continuous and ever changing constructions of the *Gukurahundi* as a subject topic. The *Gukurahundi* narrative as an unresolved social issue continues to gain more constructions and qualitative interpretations, some of them influenced by leading journalists of the time who worked and operated within the regions of Matabeleland and Midlands. The study therefore, could have also benefitted more from an institutional analysis of *The Chronicle* and interviews with current and former journalists who worked for the newspaper at the time.

looking at the repeated co-occurrence or co-variation between observable variables (Babbie and Mouton 2001:27). Central to quantitative researchers also is their view that time and context-free generalisations are desirable and possible and that real causes of social scientific outcomes can be determined reliably and validly (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14). One of the main philosophical foundations of positivism is that “investigating the social and cultural world is no different, in principle, to investigating the natural world, and that the same basic procedures apply to both” (Deacon *et al.* 2007:3). It is this foundation with which the interpretive tradition, the framework for my research, differs. While positivism emphasises the similarities between the object of the natural and social sciences, the phenomenological tradition emphasises the differences between them (Babbie and Mouton 2001:28). This emphasis on differences permeates research designs within qualitative studies.

Qualitative Research

The interpretive tradition does not concern itself with establishing causal relations “but with exploring the ways that people make sense of their social worlds and how they express these understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and social rituals” (Deacon *et al.* 2007:5). Qualitative purists advocate the superiority of constructivism, idealism, relativism, humanism, hermeneutics and sometimes postmodernism (Deacon *et al.* 2007:6). For qualitative purists, multiple realities abound and therefore “time and context free generalisations are neither desirable nor possible” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14). However, those that do not subscribe to such purism argue for forms of generalisation that are appropriate to qualitative studies (Babbie and Mouton 2001; Lewis and Ritchie 2003:263-286). Data gathering methods most associated with qualitative research are participant observation, unstructured interviews and focus groups. Documents, as is the case with this research, are also a major source of data (Merriam 2002:13). According to Merriam, the strength of documents as a data source lies with the fact that they already exist in a situation and do not intrude upon or alter the setting in ways that the presence of an investigator might (2002:13). Qualitative research is conducted in the natural setting of social actors, emphasises the actors’ perspective, and is aimed at in-depth descriptions and understandings of actions and events. It is also concerned to understand social action in context, following an inductive research process which seeks to generate new hypotheses and theories with the researcher as the main instrument in the research process (Babbie and Mouton 2001:270).

Arguing against the reification of objectivity by quantitative researchers, interpretive researchers note that research can never be value free and that “it is impossible to differentiate fully causes and effects, that logic flows from specific to general and that knower and known cannot be separated because the subjective knower is the only source of reality” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14; see also Guba 1990). They also argue against the insistence by positivists on the existence of social facts in the world “waiting to be uncovered by the correct methodological procedures in their rational application” (Deacon *et al.* 2007:6). In contrast to this positivist understanding, “interpretive researchers insist that all social knowledge is co-produced out of the multiple encounters, conversations and arguments they have with the people they are studying” (Deacon *et al.* 2007:6).

Qualitative research has many strengths: its data is based on the participants’ own categories of meaning; it is useful for studying a limited number of cases in-depth and describing complex phenomena; it provides an understanding of people’s personal experiences of phenomena, it describes in rich detail, phenomena as they are situated and embedded in local contexts (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). Furthermore, it is noted that the researcher identifies contextual and setting factors as they relate to the phenomena of interest. Qualitative approaches are also responsive to local situations, conditions and stakeholders’ needs (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). It is within this broad epistemic positioning that the design for this study was constructed.

Data Selection

Purposive Sampling

Qualitative studies generally use non probability sampling techniques, that is, techniques which do not intend to constitute statistically representative samples, but instead use the characteristics of the population as the basis for selection (Ritchie *et al.* 2003:78; Silverman 2010:141). This kind of sampling is purpose driven and such purposes may range from a need to “ensure that all key constituencies of relevance to a subject matter are covered”, to ensuring some diversity in the sample “so that the impact of the characteristics concerned can be explored” (Ritchie *et al.* 2003:79). Decisions about the criteria used or to be used in purposive sampling are made early in the research and are mainly informed by “the principal aims of the study, existing knowledge or theories about the field of study, hypotheses that the research may want to explore or gaps in knowledge about the study population” (Ritchie *et*

al. 2003:80). However, purposive sampling should also be done in as systematic a way as possible, in the process establishing the grounds of this selection (Silverman 2010:141). Below is an account of how I arrived at the final sample of articles on which discourse analysis was conducted, using purposive sampling techniques.

The Chronicle has been publishing and archiving its issues since 1894. The period under study falls between 1983 and 1986, and consists of about 1152 issues. This volume of data presented me with various challenges. Choices about what to exclude and include for analysis had to be made keeping in mind the credibility and feasibility of the research. Stories that did not report directly on the *Gukurahundi* conflict were excluded from the outset.⁷ Nevertheless, such stories, it can be surmised, were a form of framing by omission; that is, by simply ignoring the conflict, *The Chronicle* excluded it from the discursive field. Such exclusion can be argued to have been part of a deliberate process of framing the conflict by the newspaper.

My first act of data selection was to focus on two major components of any newspaper, the front and editorial pages. The front page holds some significance for the study because it reflects on “the editorial instincts of newspaper ownership and staff, and also attempts to meet the needs and desires of readers and ultimately society” (Weldon 2008:2). The front page also sets the tone of the rest of the paper (Armstrong 1926:17; Weldon 2008:6). Weldon further characterises the front page as a “showcase”, as “prime editorial real estate” because it lobbies, gives the first impression, announces the personality, news values and writing styles of the paper’s leaders (2008:30). In this study therefore, the front page of *The Chronicle* is assumed, on the basis of the above, to reflect on the paper’s framing of the *Gukurahundi* conflict.

Also chosen for scrutiny is the editorial page because it is the “newspaper’s institutional voice (Stonecipher 1979:41). The importance of an editorial lies in the fact that it seeks to persuade and convince readers of the merits of a position “advocated by logical force” and emotion by a particular newspaper (Stonecipher 1979:50). Some scholars argue that the editorial creates a “distinctive voice for the newspaper that is otherwise buried under the conventions of objective journalism” (Fowler 1991:209), and that it is the measure of a

⁷ While some may argue that stories which did not report on the conflict, also communicated ideological or political positions as much as those that overtly referred to the conflict, I felt that such stories fell outside the scope of this study, which seeks to analyse the actual coverage of the conflict.

“newspaper’s position on political and social questions” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2008:70). From this it can be argued that the front page and the editorial page represent the definitive position of a newspaper on any issue.

While the front page is traditionally expected to feature hard news stories which are devoid of opinion (Weldon 2008:4), the editorial page is seen as the bearer of the opinions of the publishers, editorial policy or as representing the opinions of the senior editorial team (Stonecipher 1979:38; Weldon 2008:2). In fact, Stonecipher argues that, “the editorial which attempts to persuade, which attempts to influence, or which attempts to convert a reader to the point of view being expounded is the type dear to the editorialist’s heart” (1979:45). Therefore for a newspaper to maintain a modicum of credibility, some argue, it must separate its factual content from opinion (Rystrom 1983:112; Schudson 1978:6). However, this ideal may be stretched to the limit in cases involving government-owned newspapers such as *The Chronicle*.

A preliminary reading of the headlines and lead paragraphs of front page stories and editorials of *The Chronicle* from 1983 to 1986 was conducted in order to draw a sample for discourse analysis. It was conducted with the understanding that headlines are important because they summarise the gist of individual stories (Rafferty 2008:226), or the most important topic of the news item (van Dijk 1985:69). They enable readers to figure out what the story is about. Headlines thus tell a story in the form of a highly contracted précis. The lead, on the other hand, summarises the entire story, giving readers clues about whether they should read the rest of the story or not (Fedler 1984:77). A lead which summarises the whole story is especially common in hard news stories that use the inverted pyramid story structure which puts the most newsworthy information at the top with the rest following in order of diminishing importance (Scanlan 2000:153). For these reasons therefore, the headline and the story lead, provide the essence of a story and can therefore be used to assess the stories. This reading was conducted to tease out the most common themes as a second step in the sampling process.

Themes were chosen as a criterion of selection mainly because this study will largely focus on thematic structures in analysing the way *The Chronicle* covered the *Gukurahundi* conflict. They were also chosen because they “organise information from discourse at a rather high level of memory” and can be recalled much more readily (van Dijk 2007:386). Themes have

often been variously defined in terms of thematic analysis and not explicitly as a distinct concept (DeSantis and Ugarriza 2000:353). They have also been defined by others in cultural terms (Spradley 1979:186-187). The definition that is preferred in this research conceptualises a theme as a “position declared or implied, and usually controlling behaviour or stimulating activity, which is tacitly approved or openly promoted in a society” (Opler 1945:198). This definition implies that themes are a product of and can motivate social action, hence their importance to discourse analysis. The preliminary reading of the headlines and story leads revealed the following thematic trends around the *Gukurahundi* conflict: a concern with the “dissidents”, the “5th Brigade”, “Unity”, the “Army” and with stories that touched on security from within and without the borders of Zimbabwe. Stories that reported on general security issues focused on the rising tensions in South Africa and the MNR bandit situation in Mozambique and were therefore considered to be of peripheral importance, thus outside the scope of this study. Furthermore, stories that focused on the army in general were also excluded on the premise that the actions of a small unit of the army, the 5th Brigade, which reported directly to the then Prime Minister during the *Gukurahundi* conflict, were and remain a source of much contention (Eppel 2004:47; CCJP 1999). This study only focuses on those stories bordering on themes which emerged as interlinked and were the most significant numerically. These themes include the “Dissidents”, “the 5th “Brigade”, and “Unity”. It can be noted that the 5th Brigade received significantly low coverage and yet is included in the set of themes under focus. The reason is that the 5th Brigade is associated with the death of approximately 20 000 civilians in the provinces of Matabeleland, an issue which continues to be a source of tension between the minority Ndebele and the majority Shona ethnic groups (see Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; Masunungure 2006). The themes around the “dissidents”, the “5th Brigade”, and “unity” are also so intertwined that ignoring one may present an incomplete picture of the current political situation.

Fig.3 A summary of the thematic distribution of front page stories and editorials of *The Chronicle* from 1983-1986 (inclusively)

Theme	Front Page	Editorial
Dissident issue	259	80
5 th Brigade	24	8
Unity	49	41
Army	14	3
Security situation	48	17

Even after streamlining the sample to just the front and editorial pages, the number of articles remained significantly large for a qualitative study. I thus decided to select long stories because they give explanations. A story is one which contains more than six paragraphs (Harrower 2007:46). Long stories result from a journalist's attempt to answer the 'who, what, where, when, why, how and the so what' questions about an issue or event (Scanlan 2000:119-121; Fedler 1984:115). They also allow journalists "time and effort to investigate an issue or event more fully and thoughtfully, and to go beyond reporting of facts into providing analysis" (Lee 2009:265). As Harrower argues, "good journalism reports the news" while "great journalism explains it" especially by answering, in their stories, the questions, 'why' and 'why should we care' (2007:37)? Some scholars also point out that while a hard news story is summarised in the lead, journalists normally place the story's most important details in the second paragraph, with the rest of the paragraphs presenting "names, descriptions, quotations, conflicting view points, explanations, background data" (Fedler 1984:115). The subsequent details that Fedler points out as residing in the rest of the story are important because it is through them that connections with the social context can be made. That connection is also important because understanding the nature of communication is not "just some secondary matter at one remove from 'real life' ", but as Williams argues, "it is impossible to discuss communication or culture in our society without in the end coming to discuss power" (Williams 1961 qtd. in Eldridge and Eldridge 1994:98). Therefore, the significance of long stories is that through the provision of "context, background and analysis" they let readers understand why they should care about the news (Scanlan 2000:21).

Furthermore, the connection with context is important because “news cannot be studied or fairly judged apart from its environment because like all institutions, it is caught in the complex of our actual state of civilisation” (Ogden 1912:322; Preston 2009:111). At this stage of selection there were 169 long stories, which remained too many for a qualitative discourse analysis. I then excluded those whose copy was not complete, leaving 48.⁸


From the thematic distribution patterns (see table below) between 1983 and 1986, it was apparent that in 1983 the dissident issue was the most notable, with little reportage on unity and the 5th Brigade, comparatively speaking. The 5th Brigade was deployed on 26 January 1983 (Auret 2009). The 5th Brigade received the highest amount of coverage in 1984. In 1985, an election year, reportage on dissidents and the 5th Brigade fell from their 1984 levels, while coverage of unity doubled its 1984 level. The 5th Brigade was finally withdrawn towards the end of 1986. While there is a marginal drop in reportage on dissidents and the 5th Brigade in comparison to the previous year, 1986 recorded the highest number of articles reporting on unity. The editorial also followed the same patterns reflected by the front page (see Fig 4, for a detailed picture, see Appendix A).

Fig. 4 The following table shows distribution patterns of key themes on the front page stories and editorials between 1983 and 1986.

Year	Front Page			Editorial Page		
	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity
1983	118	9	10	35	3	10
1984	56	12	5	20	5	8
1985	44	2	16	17		9
1986	41	1	18	8		14

⁸ I excluded those whose copy was not complete either because the story overflowed to another page, or had been cut due to error in the process of making copies as well as those whose content repeated those stories that had been published earlier.

Fig.5 Front Page Thematic Distribution Trends between 1983 and 1986



At this stage, I decided to exclude editorials and focus on the front page because the front page is supposed to carry stories that are devoid of opinion and are presumably objective.⁹ This is particularly important in a government owned newspaper as readers are arguably more wary and less trusting of views in the editorial columns (Hampton 2008:482-483). It is therefore logical to focus on hard news stories because they are assumed to be trustworthy. However, some scholars argue that news items are always value laden although such values are “rarely explicit and must be found between the lines – in what actors and activities are reported or ignored, and in how they are described” (Gans 1980:39-40). Through their chosen angles, news stories point to what is desirable and implicitly at the same time to what is undesirable (Gans 1980:40). Focusing on the front page will make explicit what is hidden in the news.

Final Sample Thematic Distribution

The table and graph above (Fig 5) shows that dissidents received their highest coverage in 1983, the 5th Brigade in 1984 and unity in 1986. My choice of the final sample was guided by

⁹ For arguments on journalistic objectivity (see Tuchman 1972; Lichtenberg 2000; Schudson 2000; Schudson 1978).

these reportage patterns since purposively constituted samples are selected for their potential to enable “detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes and puzzles which the researcher wishes to study” (Ritchie *et al.* 2003:78). By focusing on those moments during which particular themes received the highest coverage, it is expected that deeper and nuanced analysis can be achieved because it is during these periods that such themes were either emphasised or fully developed. The differences and similarities in the patterns of coverage of these themes across the four years, is also expected to reveal their linkages. Such linkages will show the relationships between the nature of coverage and the politics of the day.

Stories in the final sample were chosen because of their length for reasons argued above, their relevance to the concerns of this research, and because these stories were published at a time when there was high focus on the respective themes under study.

Fig.6. Final Sample

Year	Dissidents	5th Brigade	Unity
1983	3		
1984		3	
1985			
1986			3

Generalisability in Qualitative Research

Generalisation refers to the extent to which findings in qualitative research or an account of a particular situation or population can be extended to other populations, times or settings (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:264; Maxwell 2002:52). Others refer to generalisation as ‘transferability’ (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Babbie and Mouton 2001:276) or ‘external validity’ (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:273). While some scholars posit that generalisation is not desirable in qualitative research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14; Babbie and Mouton 2001:274; Maxwell 2002:52) because of the approach’s “focus on the uniqueness of the cases they investigate” (Hammersley 2008:36), others argue that it is important to consider whether

research findings from a chosen sample can be relevant beyond the sample and context of research itself (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:263). The value of considering generalisation also lies in the fact that it enables the achievement of prediction (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:267).

I proceed on the premise that generalisability is a necessary and desirable component of qualitative research (Hammersley 2008). Lewis and Ritchie proffer a three-pronged typology of qualitative generalisation which includes representational, inferential and theoretical generalisation (2003:264). This research seeks to achieve inferential generalisation, wherein, the issue under study is generalised “from the context of the research study itself to other settings or contexts” (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:266). However, Lincoln and Guba caution that such inferences or transferability depends on “congruence between the ‘sending context’ within which the research is conducted, and the ‘receiving context’ to which it is to be applied” (Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 268; Lincoln and Guba 1985). This is achievable in this research because the study is being conducted within a single and relatively stable geographical, social and political context, wherein inferences will be drawn from the period under study (1983-1986), to explain contemporary political trends outlined in chapter one. Providing further comment on the utility of generalisation in qualitative research, Becker also posits that:

...generalisation in qualitative research usually takes place through the development of a theory that not only makes sense of the particular persons or situations studied, but also shows how the same process, in different situations, can lead to different results. (1990:240)

It is with this goal in mind that I proceeded with the study. In this case, I am concerned with understanding how elements of the *Gukurahundi* conflict were covered by *The Chronicle* then, as a basis upon which tensions in the contemporary political setup in Zimbabwe can be understood. Generalisation is inextricably linked to two other concepts in social research which are reliability and validity.

Validity

Validity is a crucial component of social research as it bestows legitimacy and credibility on the findings of a qualitative study (Maxwell 2002:37). It can be defined as pertaining to a “relationship between an account and something outside of that account, whether this something is construed as objective reality, the construction of actors, or a variety of other possible interpretations” (Maxwell 2002:41). It can also be understood to refer to the

“correctness or precision of a research reading” (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:273). Therefore a study can be said to be valid if “it represents accurately those features of the phenomena that it is intended to describe, explain or theorise” (Hammersley 1992:69; Lewis and Ritchie 2003:273). Qualitative studies which consistently fail to demonstrate validity will likely be counted as unreliable (Maxwell 2002:37). Validity and more specifically external validity, which is concerned with the extent to which findings of a study are applicable to other groups within the population (LeCompte and Goetz 1982) or to other contexts or settings (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Lewis and Ritchie 2003:273) is important because it is also linked to the ability to generalise (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:273).

Validity in qualitative research should be understood within the broader constructivist interpretation of reality. Whereas in quantitative studies the premise is that there is an objective reality (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14), and an absolute truth to be discovered (Kvale 1996:239), in qualitative research there is an acknowledgement that “there are multiple ways of knowing” as well as multiple truths (Kvale 1996:231). Therefore in qualitative studies:

...the quest for absolute, certain knowledge is replaced by a conception of defensible knowledge claims. Validation becomes the issue of choosing among competing falsifiable interpretations, of examining and providing arguments for the relative credibility of alternative knowledge claims. (Kvale 1996:240; see also Polkinghorne 1983)

Kvale proposes three main categories of qualitative validity and these include validity as a quality of craftsmanship, communicative validity and pragmatic validity (1996:241-252). Validity which is achieved through high quality craftsmanship consists of defensible knowledge claims, rigorous checking for bias, asking questions such as ‘what’ and ‘why’ ahead of ‘how’ and using a theoretical conception of what is being investigated to check if a method is investigating what it intends to investigate (Kvale 1996:241-244). Communicative validity on the other hand involves the constitution of valid knowledge through dialogical argument (Kvale 1996:245-247). Finally, pragmatic validation refers to a check on “whether a knowledge statement is accompanied by action or whether it instigates changes of action” (Kvale 1996:248). In this research, an attempt is made to accurately establish the relationship between the constructions in *The Chronicle* and the political context at the time of the *Gukurahundi* conflict in ways that help to understand contemporary political tensions in Zimbabwe. This has been achieved by explicitly outlining procedures followed to arrive at

the sample and the methods of analysis used to arrive at particular inferences outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. As Hammersley argues "...what is often stressed is the requirement that the process of inquiry follows an explicit set of procedures that are replicable by others" (Hammersley 2008:46).

Reliability

Reliability refers to the replicability of research findings in separate studies using the same or similar methods (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:270). However, it is understood differently by people who differ in their epistemological and ontological understanding of the social. Some authors "talk about the 'confirmability' of findings. Others talk in similar vein about the 'trustworthiness' (Glaser and Strauss 1967), the 'consistency' (Hammersley 1992; Robson 2002) or the 'dependability' (Lincoln and Guba 1985) of the evidence" (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:270-271). However, the extent to which replicability can occur in qualitative research is questionable and therefore often avoided (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:270). This is because in the constructionist understanding of social life, there is no single reality to be captured. Instead, qualitative researchers have adopted terms and concepts such as those given above which are seen as having "a resonance with the goals and values of qualitative research" (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:270).

Lewis and Ritchie propose ways of achieving reliability in qualitative research as having "a clear understanding of what features of qualitative data might be expected to be consistent, dependable or replicable", and also considering "whether the constructions placed on the data by the researcher have been consistently and rigorously derived" (2003:271). Reliability is important in qualitative research as well because it is the 'sturdiness' of a finding beyond the study sample which links it (reliability) to questions surrounding generalisation which in this case is sought at a historical level. Lewis and Ritchie suggest that reliability can be achieved in qualitative studies through thorough "internal checks on the quality of the data and its interpretation" as well as through the researcher's provision of "information about the research process" (2003:272). To a larger extent, a comprehensive outline of how I arrived at the operational sample has been given to allow for checks on the process, which in itself, speaks to the idea of building "defensible knowledge claims" (Kvale 1996:240, see also Polkinghorne 1983).

Discourse Analysis

For analytical tools I draw on the concept of framing as a framework for mapping patterns that show how the media reports conflictual situations. Framing is understood within the broader Foucauldian theorisation of discourse. Foucault's work has had a wide influence on the development of various theories that can be grouped as discourse theory (see Mills 2004). These theories share a common aim of carrying out critical research to "investigate and analyse power relations in society and to formulate normative perspectives from which a critique of such relations can be made with an eye on the possibilities of change" (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002:2). Various strands within discourse theory fall within the constructionist approach which is premised on the idea that physical things and actions "only take on meaning and become objects of knowledge within discourse" (Hall 1997:45). Foucault defined discourse as "a group of statements which provide a language of talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about a particular topic at a particular historical moment" (Hall 1997:44). His conception of discourse is more concerned with the analysis of knowledge, power and truth, than it is with meaning. He was concerned with showing how representation as a source for the production of social knowledge in a more open system is connected with social practices and questions of power (Hall 1997:42). For Foucault, "the most important structure of discourse is less its constituent parts but rather the function of exclusion" (Mills 2004:50). Therefore, important here, is an understanding of ways through which the media shape people's knowledge through processes of inclusion and exclusion.

Mills also defines discourse as "sets of sanctioned statements which have some institutionalised force, which means that they have a profound influence on the way that individuals act and think" (2004:55). A functionalist understanding of discourse on the other hand "assumes that language is used to mean something and to do something and that this 'meaning' and 'doing' are linked to the context of its usage" (Richardson 2007:24). Furthermore, discourses are historical and thus "can only be understood in relation to their context" (Richardson 2007:27). Thus concern with framing in the media, not least in situations of conflict, is premised on appreciating that discourse "is both constituted by, and ensures the reproduction of, the social system, through forms of selection, exclusion and domination" (Hook 2007:101; see also Young 1981). Foucault referred to external systems of exclusion which include "prohibition ... the discourse of those who are considered insane and therefore not rational ... and the division between knowledge which is perceived to be true

and that which is considered to be false” (Mills 2004:58-59). This Foucauldian understanding of systems of exclusion can be used to analyse and interpret the way news media construct frames that present other socio-political positions or issues favourably and others in ways that encourage their condemnation. Framing theory thus helps in understanding how a social and political context within which the media operate, frames and structures the language used by the media. In studying *The Chronicle's* coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict, the political work performed by discourses will be analysed in the context that:

...language is used to mean things and to do things that relate not only to the immediate context of speaker-text-audience but also to the wider socio-political, cultural and historical contexts which bound the communicative act. (Richardson 2007:25)

The point of departure therefore is the appreciation that “the discursive is a socially constructed reality...” (Mills 2004:45). Following on this, Foucault asserts that:

... discourse causes a narrowing of one's field of vision, to exclude a wide range of phenomena from being considered as real or as worthy of attention, or even as existing; thus, delimiting a field is the first stage in establishing a set of discursive practices. (qtd. in Mills 2004:46)

One of the many ways in which the media work to narrow and exclude a wide range of phenomena from being considered as worthy of attention is through framing. This study will use framing as a method of analysing whether *The Chronicle's* coverage of *Gukurahundi* falls within the tenets of peace journalism or war journalism. Before outlining this method and how it is used in this study, some deconstructive work on the concept of framing will be attempted next.

Framing

The Construction of News

For us to appreciate the active role of news in framing socio-cultural knowledge, it is necessary to recognise that news is not something tangible out there that good journalists know when they see it, but news exists “because journalists apply mutually agreed on work procedures to observe, interpret and represent occurrences in society” (Berkowitz 1997:xi). Berkowitz also asserts that we should discard the idea that news naturally contains values making some occurrences newsworthy and other occurrences not so, and instead consider that “values are human constructions that have evolved through an informal consensus among

journalists and others over time” (1997:xi). In other words stories in themselves do not contain intrinsic news values but are defined as such by journalistic practice. Lastly, the claim to objectivity by journalists which suggests that what they write is not a product of personal inclinations and beliefs should be taken into consideration, for news can never be value free since “social values are embedded in everyday activities and the ways that people manage them” (Berkowitz 1997:xi).

News framing is one way through which news media construct reality. Framing can be defined as a process of selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993:52). Others also understand a frame as “the central organising idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (Tankard *et al.* 1991 qtd. in Lee and Maslog 2005:313). The frames journalists use are “an invitation or an incentive to read a news story in a particular way” (Van Gorp 2007:63). Van Gorp’s insight points to an active process of persuasion in news reporting. This dimension of news reporting is useful to the analysis of conflict reporting within the context of peace journalism. It enables investigations on whether or not certain journalistic frames promote peace or war.

The Method of Frame analysis

Discourse can be structurally viewed in two ways, the local and the global (van Dijk 2007:376). The local structure of discourse refers “to sentences and immediate sentence connections” and the global structure refers to “larger segments of a discourse or the discourse as a whole” (van Dijk 2007:376). These larger sections of a discourse are usually described in terms of such notions as ‘topic’ or ‘theme’ (van Dijk 2007:378). This is an important level at which to analyse media texts because “macrostructures have been shown not only to organise information from discourse at a rather higher level in memory, but also to be recalled much more readily than local micro-propositions” (van Dijk 2007:386). Of note also is that macro-structural textual analysis enables “explicit definition of main topics or themes in messages, even for those cases where these macrostructures are not specifically expressed in surface structures, that is in titles, leads, or thematical words and sentences” (van Dijk 2007:387). Within the broader framework of frame analysis is thematic analysis

which fits with the macro-analysis of discourse referred to above. Thematic analysis involves “identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke 2006:79). Arguing for a need to look at themes as part of frame analysis, Pan and Kosicki point out that themes:

...function as framing devices because they are recognisable and thus can be experienced, can be conceptualised into concrete elements of a discourse, can be arranged or manipulated by newsmakers, and can be communicated in the transportation sense of communications. (1993:59)

Themes can therefore be used by journalists as tools in “constructing news discourse as well as psychological stimuli for audiences to process” and thus “they make a frame communicable through the news media” (Pan and Kosicki 1993:59). Pan and Kosicki identify categories into which framing devices in discourse can be placed and these include “syntactical structure, script structure, thematic structure and rhetorical structure” (1993:59). Deacon *et al.* also point to the importance of textual frame analysis saying, “without an identification of the frames in media texts and discourse, there would be no antecedent or consequent social processes to examine” (2007:163). They also raise several practical questions that framing researchers face in the course of their investigations. These questions are concerned with the identification and definition of “influential thematic units which are described as frames” (Deacon *et al.* 2007:163). Such questions arise because of “the conceptual inconsistencies in the way researchers define frames” (Deacon *et al.* 2007:163). Previous work using frame analysis as a research method can be placed in both the quantitative and qualitative research camps. Much of studies on peace journalism such as that by Lee and Maslog (2005) used quantitative techniques albeit within the scope of frame analysis.

However, quantitative techniques are not sacrosanct in frame analysis as is shown by Deacon *et al.* (2007:164) who point out that “others have favoured more qualitative and micro-discursive approaches that draw directly on discourse analysis and critical linguistics” (examples given include, Johnston 1995; Skillington 1997; Durham 1998). This study will use frame analysis by focusing on the themes and rhetoric in *The Chronicle's* stories that reported on the *Gukurahundi* conflict between 1983 and 1986. To this end, I use van Dijk’s (2007) insights to explicate the themes operating in the sample stories and Richardson (2007) for a close reading of the texts.

Conclusion

The chapter has located this research within the qualitative research paradigm, outlined the research design and the analytical framework for the study. The following chapter analyses the discourses and discursive techniques arising from *The Chronicle's* coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict.

Chapter 4

Analysis

Introduction

In this chapter I analyse 9 articles selected for this research from the population under study. In approaching this analysis my aim is to find out what sort of stories *The Chronicle* told about the dissidents, the 5th Brigade and unity, three elements which comprise the selected thematic trends of the period under study (see chapter 3). Through an examination of the kind(s) of journalism as well as the subsequent role(s) assumed, and the rhetoric or argumentation promoted by *The Chronicle* in its coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict, I explicate the sort of discourses that operated in these selected stories. These elements are assessed within the framework of peace journalism with the intention of establishing whether the rhetoric or forms of argumentation deployed, the role(s) assumed, and the form(s) of journalism practised by *The Chronicle* promoted or privileged discourses that could escalate or de-escalate the conflict in the next chapter.

Why Argumentation

Newspaper stories as forms of discourse are not simple narratives, but also perform some interpretive work. The instrumentality of this interpretive work can be made sense of in terms of van Dijk's characterisation of news discourse along the dimensions of functionality, meaningfulness, and goal directedness (2007:377-378). If discourses are taken as textual constructions in a specific social context, then they must be seen as "indications about characteristics of the speaker (e.g. intentions, wishes, moods), the relations between speaker and hearer (e.g. confidence, intimacy, power), and the type of social situation (e.g. a court trial, a school lesson, a birthday party), thus their functionality" (van Dijk 2007:377).

The meaningfulness criterion of discourse arises not only from the fact that "sequences of sentences have meaning, but also that they are 'about' something: they refer to (real or imagined) facts and to components of facts, such as objects, persons, properties, actions, or events" (van Dijk 2007:378). Such meaningfulness is achieved through some kind of unity "which is usually described in terms of local and global coherence" (van Dijk 2007:378). Local coherence refers to the meaningful relationship between subsequent sentences and clauses which should at the same time be referring to facts that are causally related or expressing related propositions (van Dijk 2007:378). On the other hand, global coherence is

described in terms of semantic macrostructures such as 'themes' or 'topics'. Thus "a fragment of a discourse or a whole discourse is considered to be globally coherent if a topic (represented by a macro-proposition) can be derived from such a fragment" (van Dijk 2007:378).

Lastly, the criterion of goal directedness is premised on the idea that "a meaningful discourse is uttered, first of all, in order to perform a social act, that is, a speech act. In turn, such an act is not performed in a vacuum, but has a reason, some concrete purpose" (van Dijk 2007:378). Thus, the fact that news discourses always carry meaning, are functional, and are directed at meeting certain goals or performing social acts points to their purposive constructedness. It is therefore necessary to explicate the discourses and the discursive techniques utilised by the journalists before any research on the effects of such discourses can be carried out. The thrust of this research is precisely to show the discourses that operated in stories told about the *Gukurahundi* conflict by *The Chronicle*.

News stories are discourses in their own right (van Dijk 2007:379) and therefore should be studied as a social practice performed to achieve those purposes to which van Dijk refers above. In analysing the stories told by *The Chronicle*, I am going to show the sorts of arguments made in respect of the three themes which form the focal point of this study. Argumentation is used to advance a mental, social or political point of view, defend one's own point of view or attack that of someone else (Richardson 2007:155). It is defined as a facility that is:

...aimed at resolving a difference of opinion, occurs in a particular material context, and is realised through the participants offering arguments which they believe support their standpoint and which are aimed at exerting an influence on the opinions, attitudes and even behaviour of others. (Richardson 2007:156)

Richardson also uses Aristotle's theory of rhetoric as a framework to analyse processes of argumentation. Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (1355b:27-28). He also emphasises that rhetoric is a political facility which does not only work to succeed "in persuading, but rather to discover the persuasive facts in each case" (1355b:10-11) for the purpose of convincing an audience with the consequence of provoking them into "an immediate or future course of action" (Richardson 2007:156).

Aristotle's rhetoric is divided into three categories: forensic or legal rhetoric; epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric; and deliberative or political rhetoric (Richardson 2007:157). Forensic rhetoric (concerned with the past) covers arguments that either defend or condemn someone's past actions, while epideictic rhetoric (concerned with the present) aims at proving that something or someone is worthy of admiration or disapproval, and finally deliberative rhetoric (concerned with the future) is used to urge the audience to do or dissuade them from doing, something based on the "expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action" (Richardson 2007:157). Acceptance is premised on the grounds that the proposed actions will do good, while rejection is premised on a perceived bad outcome (Aristotle 1358b:22-24). Therefore, news stories can be divided between those that discuss the rightness or wrongness of past actions, someone's probity and improbity, and the desirability or undesirability of future actions (see Richardson 2007:158). However, it is possible for a single story to use two or all of the above mentioned varieties of rhetoric at the same time.

Richardson also points out that "at the heart of rhetorical argumentation is the mode of persuasion" which encapsulates the strategy that the arguer takes in persuading the audience (2007:159; Aristotle 1353a:13-14). There are three modes of persuasion available to an arguer: persuading an audience through the character of the arguer (*ethotic argument*), wherein someone of good character, expertise or experiential knowledge is seen as standing a good chance of convincing an audience (Richardson 2007:159).

The second mode of persuasion uses a *pathotic* argument which uses emotion implicitly or explicitly as a persuasive tool. *Pathotic* arguments can anger people, instil in them fear, pity or even calm them down (Richardson 2007:160). The emotional state that is sought by the arguer is aimed at making his or her argument more acceptable.

Lastly, an arguer can use an argument supported by evidence and reasoning (logic) to convince readers or listeners. Logical arguments can either follow a deductive or inductive approach. As Richardson points out, deductive arguments assert something "in a number of statements, and from these statements there follows a valid conclusion" (2007:161). Conversely, an inductive argument is one in which "specific cases are drawn upon to support a general conclusion" (Richardson 2007:162). This can be done by using symptomatic arguments which are based on relations of concomitance, association or connection where an individual example "is taken to illustrate a wider pattern of trend" (Richardson 2007:162).

Inductive arguments can also take the form of a comparison or analogy, and they can be powerful in cases where such comparisons “are successfully adjusted to match the audience’s ideological and political commitments” (Richardson 2007:163). Lastly, inductive arguments can also be constructed by establishing causal relations or outcomes (Richardson 2007:164). However, Richardson also points out that an argument is qualified on the basis of its reasonableness (see Richardson 2007:165-170). Drawing on these ideas, I will proceed with an analysis of 9 stories below.

Story Analysis¹⁰

Theme 1: Dissidents

Story 1 Headline: Peasants back Govt. war on dissidents [Appendix B1]

Broadly speaking this story is framed within the deliberative form of rhetoric, but simultaneously also draws on the forensic form. Deliberative rhetoric promotes behaviour adjustment as a premise for some future outcome. In other words, it argues for the desirability or undesirability of future actions (see Richardson 2007). For instance, the alleged peasants’ tolerance of dissidents is argued to have negative consequences for their social development and peace. To make this argument the reporter uses forensic rhetoric which is concerned with past actions, to give context to the main argument of the story.

The story’s headline suggests that peasants in general (and not just those from Tsholotsho) back the “government’s war on dissidents”. It is only in the lead paragraph that readers are informed that the story is referring to peasants from the district of Tsholotsho and that the main event of the story centres on Matabeleland North’s Under-Secretary for Development Jacob Mudenda’s tour of the district. The headline implies that their support for the “war” is spontaneous and not influenced by the ways in which they were addressed rhetorically. By foregrounding the peasants’ purported support for the “government’s war against dissidents”, the headline, ironically, suggests that the war is “the government’s” rather than “the nation’s”.

The headline and lead paragraph suggest that the nub of the story is the expression of support for the “government’s war on dissidents” by peasants. To set up the argument, the story starts

¹⁰ For all the stories, see appendices B1-9.

by referring to acts of banditry and destruction of “government construction equipment” worth \$2 million as the premise for the rest of the argument [2].¹¹ It is on this premise that Mudenda makes a call for peasants to “play a greater role in assisting the Government onslaught against dissidents” [3]. The story uses inductive arguments to establish causal relations that are in turn used to persuade the readers to support the government’s war on dissidents in more or less the same way that the peasants were persuaded by the under-secretary. The reporter quotes the under-secretary to argue that social development and peace in Matabeleland North are factors contingent upon victory over dissidents, and that this victory is achievable through the peasants’ cooperation with law enforcement officers. The reporter reinforces this point by quoting Mudenda to stress the consequences of failing to render such cooperation. In paragraph 5 the readers are reminded that the peasants’ tolerance for dissidents “contributed to the destruction of their own social and economic gains” [5]. This statement is used to reinforce the argument for peasants to support the government’s war on dissidents through its implication that failure to do so makes the peasants complicit in the destruction of their own social and economic gains. This has a potential double-barrelled effect of casting dissidents as “bad” and government as “good”, as well as aligning the government’s objectives with the social and economic needs of the peasants. In this way, it is suggested that the peasants’ social and economic misfortune is directly linked to the successful activities of the dissidents, and thus their tolerance of the dissidents is ironically responsible for their own economic hardships (they are the cause of their own misery).

Paragraphs 6 and 7 promote the frame that the government is responsive to the problems of all Zimbabweans. These paragraphs also argue that in other places facing the same problems as Tsholotsho and benefiting from the same development programme, development infrastructure was not destroyed nor were workers threatened. This frame implicates the Tsholotsho peasants in such destructive activities and obliterates any difference between the peasants and armed “dissidents”. This point is also reinforced by reference to the peasants’ call for government help, which in the context of the response by government, suggests that what was happening in Tsholotsho was a case of a dog biting the hand that feeds it [6-12]. The reporter describes the peasants’ responses in only two paragraphs. The peasants are thus denied the prominence that Mudenda has been privileged with. They are not named or quoted directly except in cases where they reinforce the major theme of the story which is that they

¹¹ The numbers in square brackets indicate paragraphs in the stories found in Appendix B.

support the government's war on dissidents. Any attribution to the peasants which does not reinforce the main theme is accompanied by such discrediting phrases as "they alleged" [14], "one peasant claimed" [15] and "the man called for" [17].

In paragraph 19 the reporter refers to another meeting at which peasants are said to have been singing songs that encouraged Zimbabwean people to work together as one nation. Some of them were said to have worn T-shirts with "Peace-Zimbabwe-Unity" inscribed on them. These references speak to the broader political issues that pre-occupied the government at the time, namely, a desire for a peaceful country united behind the government of day. In paragraphs 20 and 21, the frame of a benevolent government is invoked by reference to trucks carrying drought relief to the province under military escort. The reporter also quotes Mudenda, who explains how costly it is for the government to employ soldiers' as a protective force on the roads, fields and in work places [22]. He (Mudenda) is quoted as saying that the money used to keep security details in communities to provide protection could have been spent on development projects [23]. This statement serves two purposes: to reinforce the image of a caring and benevolent government, and as a reminder to the peasants that channelling such money to development is not possible until they support the government's war on dissidents by both reporting the presence of dissidents and not tolerating their presence.

Quotations and references that are given favourable phrasing and prominence in one way or the other work to support the main theme: that the peasants should support the government's war on dissidents. The reporter uses Mudenda's arguments to show that those who do not support the "war" also consequently do not support development, and are thus causing the government to spend on security rather than on development. Furthermore, Tsholotsho is presented as a district facing problems that are faced by the rest of the country. This implies that by tolerating the presence of dissidents, and acts of sabotage, Tsholotsho peasants are also derailing development activities in other locations. The dangers of this line of argument are apparent. By implication, the story associates the "tolerant peasants" with dissidents. It encourages the readers to see the peasants and the dissidents as one. The information that exonerates peasants is hidden deep in the story starting from paragraph 14. Readers who do not read the story to the end may be left with the impression that indeed Tsholotsho peasants are working in cahoots with the dissidents. Even in the event that someone reads the story through to the end, the counter arguments that peasants give are presented in a language that

encourages the reader to treat them with suspicion. The arguments also subsequently promote the impression that whatever action the government takes both against the peasants and the dissidents, violent or not, is for the greater good of the country. The story's goal is to both mobilise support for the "government's war on dissidents" and demobilise support for the "dissidents". It is also meant to categorise the intentions of the government and those of the dissidents and peasants who tolerate them, respectively into good and bad, so that the future actions of either party are assessed through that lens.

Story 2 Headline: Return to the Fold PM Tells Dissidents, "Peace is Vital for Development"
[Appendix B2]

The story's discourse operates at two levels, the reporter's construction at one level and the quotations pulled out from the Prime Minister's speech at another. The reporter uses the Prime Minister's speech exclusively to frame his/her story around the major theme of "dissidents". The dissident theme is however related to other sub-themes such as peace, unity, development, and the national interest. The headline sets up the inter-relationships between these themes in its call for dissidents to "return to the fold" as "peace is vital for development". By calling for dissidents to "return to the fold", the headline suggests that at some point, those people accused of involvement in dissident activity were once part of the development drive that the post independent nation had embarked on, before choosing to go against consensual national goals. The call for them to return is made in the context of an argued relationship between the achievement of peace and development. In other words, the argument is that Zimbabwe is not developing because there is no peace, and that there is no peace because of dissident activity. This sets up the dissidents not only as enemies of the state, but the people in general as their activities run contrary to the desires of the populace, which can be wholly described in terms of development. Thus, the dissidents are framed as existing outside the "fold", and a threat to both national development and national interests. In this way, the government's view of the dissidents is aligned with those of the general populace so that any subsequent actions taken by government against the dissidents can be seen as serving the national interest.

In the body of the story, the reporter draws on the Prime Minister's speech to scaffold the argument that is setup in the headline. The reporter uses deliberative rhetoric concurrently with the ethotic (persuading an audience through the character of the arguer) and logetic

(argument supported by evidence and reasoning) modes of persuasion. Framing the story solely through the Prime Minister's speech, the reporter identifies the "drought" and the dissident rebellion as the two issues that were causing the government great concern [5-6]. However, more emphasis is put on dissident activity because it is a 'man made' problem, in contrast to the drought which is "no one's fault" [7]. Dissident activity is framed as malignant because dissidents wanted to topple "a majority government of the people under the banner of ZANU-PF" [8] so that they can "install PF-ZAPU into power by force" [6], and had in "many cases ... halted badly needed development projects" [7], were "double dealing" [12] and their activities did not "reflect the wishes of the people" [15]. Furthermore, dissident activities are framed as associated with PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesian Front's refusal to reciprocate the hand of friendship extended by the ZANU-PF government after winning the 1980 elections [10-11]. This kind of framing performs two functions: it casts the then ZANU-PF led government as benevolent and well intentioned, and conversely PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesian Front as malignant forces in the post independent Zimbabwean body politic. Furthermore, by associating PF-ZAPU with the Rhodesian Front the reporter seeks to distance the readers from PF-ZAPU.

Having set up the ZANU-PF led government as benevolent and PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesian Front as malignant, the reporter then uses the Prime Minister's speech to argue that "any action the government took against dissidents was in the national interest" [16]. It can be argued that the reporter adopts the frames outlined above to justify the actions that the government was already taking against the dissidents.¹² The frame of a benevolent ZANU-PF led government is further promoted in later paragraphs which argue that instead of banning PF-ZAPU, the government preferred to engage peace loving members of that party as a means of establishing unity [18], and that the government provided community facilities "irrespective of tribal, political or racial affiliation of the people concerned" [21]. The first part of the previous sentence assumes that PF-ZAPU is associated with dissident activity, as if it is not necessary to qualify the link between dissidents and PF-ZAPU, thus reinforcing the malignant label already placed on PF-ZAPU. The last three paragraphs are only remotely related to the discussion of the conflict, but they also work to bolster the frame of a

¹² The 5th Brigade was already active in Matabeleland North after its deployment in January of 1983 (see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 2007).

benevolent government concerned with the welfare of its citizens, by providing education and paying the educators fairly [22-24].

Story 3 Headline: ZAPU 'has given Govt Plans to Eliminate Dissidents' [Appendix B3]

PF-ZAPU, which was associated with dissident activity in the previous articles, is the main focus of this article. The main theme of the article is yet again the “dissident problem” and the only source for the story, is PF-ZAPU acting-president Josiah Chinamano. The sub-themes that run through this article are the elimination of armed banditry, unity, ZAPU leadership and government projects, albeit from an oppositional position. The reporter here foregrounds Chinamano’s acknowledgement that “armed banditry was the major problem that confronted the Government” [2]. However, the fact that this acknowledgement comes from the leadership of the opposition gives credence to the arguments given by government representatives in the previous articles. The reporter framed the story in such a way that even an oppositional source could reinforce the dominant frame established in other stories: namely that the dissident problem is a major national problem. The oppositional dimension manifests in Chinamano’s denial of PF-ZAPU’s connection to dissidents and his distancing of the party from culpability in solving the problem [4]. While this part of the story undermines the claims made in the second story that PF-ZAPU was connected to dissident activities, its value may lie not in establishing or not the connection between PF-ZAPU and the dissidents, but in the affirmation that dissident activities are indeed a major problem.

Again this argument holds value to the reporter in that it justifies the actions that the government was taking against the “dissidents”. It was important to establish such legitimacy because the operations of the 5th Brigade were increasingly being criticised following reports of atrocities against civilians in its areas of operation (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 2007). The reporter’s argument therefore is framed to legitimate government action against “dissidents”. This legitimating work is also manifest through the reporter’s use of the following quote: “But like all good Zimbabweans we are prepared to help the Government in bringing down dissidents” [4]. The quote implies that those fighting the dissidents are good, and those supporting them are bad. This frame has been shown to exist in both the first and second stories. This dynamic does not work in favour of PF-ZAPU in spite of the fact that this story is mainly attributed to the party’s acting-president because PF-ZAPU did not enjoy sustained positive coverage in the government-owned newspaper.

The second sub-theme running in the story is that of unity. For PF-ZAPU, unity is not only necessary but should also be forged at grassroots level [7]. However, the reporter also ironically includes Chinamano's criticism of ZANU-PF's concept of unity, which as he (Chinamano) says "was that everyone must become its member" [8]. The reporter here uses irony, which as a rhetorical device "underscores the duality of language by questioning, opposing, or contradicting the obvious or common-sensical meaning of a text" (Glasser and Ettema 1993:324), to expose the difference in interpreting unity between the ZANU-PF led government and PF-ZAPU. While the reporter seems to be downplaying the interpretation given by PF-ZAPU's acting president through the use of the word "claimed" [8], s/he indirectly points to the existence of an alternative way of interpreting the concept of unity. In other words, the reporter uses a language of fact to construct a discourse of morality thereby opening up the concept of unity to different conceptions from that promoted by ZANU-PF.

The reporter also uses irony to redeem the negative image associated with PF-ZAPU within the dominant frame. S/he promotes an image of PF-ZAPU's internal political system as democratic and humble [10-16]. For instance, the party's acting-president is submitting the fate of his leadership to members of his party, noting that he "was prepared to step down if his party was not satisfied that he should act during Dr. Nkomo's absence" [12] and that he "would be willing to give way to anybody who was prepared to take over as acting president until such a time when Dr. Nkomo returned home" [14]. The reporter also presents PF-ZAPU as a party that transcends ethnic divisions by showing that although the party is mainly associated with Ndebele people; it had in fact chosen a Shona person (Chinamano) to act as president [16]. The reporter's excursion into the internal politics of PF-ZAPU provides a counter-narrative to the "malignant image" constructed in the stories analysed above. The reporter also frames the PF-ZAPU leader as a magnanimous individual who is not consumed by hatred, who appreciates the positive achievements by government, even if it is the same government that is persecuting his party.¹³ While the story may sound at face value as if it is reinforcing the frame of a benevolent government, the reporter uses irony to construct a different image of PF-ZAPU, and to show the unfair tactics used by the ruling party's (ZANU-PF) to get its way. This is manifested in the nature of the unity that ZANU-PF seeks.

¹³ See paragraphs 17 and 18.

Theme 2: The 5th Brigade

Story 1 Headline: Nkomo, Smith 'seek to destroy morale' [Appendix B4]

The reporter uses an epideictic rhetoric laced with a pathotic mode of persuasion (argument which uses emotion implicitly or explicitly as a persuasive tool) to promote the dominant frame which comes out in the headline's assertion that "Nkomo and Smith seek to destroy morale". It is epideictic in the sense that the dominant frame seeks a condemnation of both Nkomo and Smith who are reported to be seeking to destroy the morale of the security forces. The pathotic mode of persuasion manifests in the reporter's promotion of the negative epithets and anecdotes that ZANU-PF members of parliament use to chide both Nkomo and Smith. The pathotic mode of persuasion is used here to encourage readers to at best trivialise the concerns that the two (Nkomo and Smith) are raising or at worst, get angry at them for demoralising the security forces. This strategy might have been motivated by the fact that the security forces were still enjoying a popular impression because of the success of the armed struggle in ousting the colonial government led by Ian Smith. Furthermore, as some argue, in post-colonial African countries:

...national feelings of communal identity, pride and patriotism, as well as historical parallels and past myths, are all summoned through the genre of war reporting and these generally seek to position 'Us' in opposition to 'Them', and do so in symbolically and rhetorically affective ways. (Cottle 2010:77)

The story's main theme concerns the security forces' (5th Brigade) operations in the Matabeleland provinces of Zimbabwe. The dominant frame positions PF-ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo and Republican Front leader Ian Smith as "trying to lower the morale of the security forces while boosting that of the dissidents" [1]. An alternative frame would have instead promoted Nkomo's concerns that security forces were committing atrocities in Matabeleland [2].

The dominant frame is promoted by the reporter's over-reliance on government sources such as Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Eddison Zvobgo and Minister of National Supplies Enos Nkala as well as using the doubt - casting "claimed" when attributing Nkomo. For instance, the reporter writes: "He *claimed* six people had been killed by security forces in Kezi and buried in a shallow grave..." [3] and that "Dr Nkomo *claimed* that since the curfew was imposed six weeks ago, several children had collapsed and others had died because of lack of food in the area" [4] and finally he is described as having been told to shut up by the

deputy speaker as he “kept pounding his leather armrest, shouting ... [10]. This kind of framing casts doubt on Nkomo’s “claims” which are associated with cantankerous behaviour (illustrated by reference to continuous pounding and shouting) coming from a man who leads a party that is itself associated [7 and also see story 2 under dissidents theme] with dissident activity.

In contrast, the dominant frame is given a high modality (Richardson 2007) privilege. The reporter firmly attributes those characters operating within the dominant frame as when Zvodgo’s accusation that: “... the nation should not forget that Dr Nkomo had now assumed a new role—that of ‘publicity secretary for dissidents’” [7] and that “He (Dr Nkomo) wants to use this house so that dissidents can hear that he still speaks on their behalf” [7] are presented in ways that do not encourage the reader to question the statements. This is in spite of the fact that such an unsubstantiated statement is the premise upon which the reporter is framing Nkomo and Smith as destroying morale among security forces while boosting that of dissidents. Instead, the reporter gives Zvodgo’s statement unquestionable credibility by foregrounding his mandate thus: “Cde Zvodgo who is the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, said...” [7], which frames him as a member of the in-group through the use of the title ‘Cde’ and also as an authoritative figure (a positive epideictic argument) who does not ‘claim’ but ‘says’ things and therefore can be trusted. Paragraph 11 reinforces the main frame that Nkomo’s concerns work to demoralise the security forces while boosting the morale of the dissidents in that the concerns were to be “dealt with ‘blow by blow’ by the Security Ministers” [11] at a later date as they were not in the house. The metaphor of ‘blows’, frames Nkomo’s concerns as a threat that should not only be dealt with by security ministers, but should also be dealt with ‘blow by blow’. It is a language of physical violence adapted from the sport of boxing. Therefore this story is also framed in such a way that it promotes government action against dissidents as legitimate and good, and anything that seeks to undermine this action as a threat and bad.

The rest of the story draws on Nkala’s narration of his conversation with Nkomo prior to the parliamentary sitting. The reporter uses Nkala’s story to frame Nkomo as a liar [15], as impulsive and a cheat [16], a tribalist [19] and driven by personal ambition ahead of national concerns [22]. These argumentative strategies are consistent with an epideictic rhetoric, which in this case is deployed to encourage disapproval of Nkomo’s concerns and conversely approval of the security forces’ action in the Matabeleland provinces.

Story 2 Headline: President hits at Church for Allegations on 'atrocities' [Appendix B5]

This story deploys a complex matrix of arguments framed through a deliberative rhetoric with occasional use of the pathetic mode of persuasion. The main theme, around which other smaller themes revolve, is that concerning atrocities committed by the army. Articulated to this theme are other sub themes such as the protection of citizens, dissidents, national interest and majority representation, economic independence in the third world, the social role of the church and the economic status of post-colonial African countries.

In this story, the reporter also promotes the frame of a benevolent government acting against a malignant renegade group of bandits. The reporter again is totally dependent on one official source, the President Canaan Banana. This shapes the story's discourse into two levels; the reporter's construction, and embedded within that construction, the president's construction. The subject of the story is the institution of the Church in Zimbabwe. The reporter privileges the president's criticism of the Church for highlighting the atrocities allegedly carried out by the army in its operational areas. The president's argument, which also frames the reporter's argument, is that care should be taken in criticising the actions of a government whose mandate is sanctioned by a majority vote, in whose interest it (government) is acting. The argument frames the government and citizens as the in-group and the dissidents as an out-group whose actions threaten the welfare and values of the in-group.

By foregrounding the legitimacy of the government's actions, the reporter implicitly suggests a complicit relationship between the Church and the dissidents. This casts the church not only as acting against the wishes of the people, but also as bolstering the cause of the dissidents. To buttress this argument, the reporter draws on the president's speech to show the legitimacy of the government and its actions. This argument is set up in the second paragraph in which the reporter quotes the president: "... the Government has both a legitimate duty and moral responsibility to ensure the safety of all citizens ... and therefore it can never be Government policy to send the national army into Matabeleland to exterminate the Ndebele people" [2]. The reporter juxtaposes the frame of a benevolent government constructed in paragraph two against the frame of malignancy associated with the dissidents which comes out in the third paragraph. Here s/he quotes the president who contrasts the action of the government with those of the dissidents when he says "... the Government could not support or tolerate those bent on terrorising innocent and unarmed civilians" [3].

This statement also suggests that the Church's allegation (see story entitled *President Hits at Church for Allegations on Atrocities-Appendix B5*) that the army are committing atrocities, is tantamount to condoning and tolerating the activities of the dissidents who are "terrorising innocent and unarmed civilians", while at the same time criticising a government that would not allow such terrorism to happen [3]. The death of civilians in the conflict is glossed over in passive language when the president says "... it was unfortunate innocent civilians found themselves caught in crossfire between security forces and dissidents" [4]. This sentence deletes the agents of violence, exonerating them from responsibility for civilian deaths and naturalises the circumstances in which the civilians find themselves. The original frame of a benevolent government is re-invoked in the next paragraph to excuse the army from deliberate complicity in the deaths of civilians by bringing the reader's attention back to the malignant dissident threat. To this end, the reporter quotes the president as saying "this is indeed a tragic situation but it is only the result of a deeper problem – the problem brought about by those who unlawfully took arms to destabilise our hard won peace and tranquillity" [5]. Thus the actions of the army are indirectly framed as "lawful" and those of the dissidents as unlawful. Paragraph [6] draws on the pathetic mode of persuasion. The reporter uses the president's speech to sway readers' emotions against the dissidents by foregrounding the effect of dissident actions, over those of the army, on the civilian population of Matabeleland. In the paragraph the president argues: "What was my Government expected to do? To be seized by an overwhelming fit of inertia and paralysis, and simply fold its arms and abandon the people of Matabeleland to the dissidents to butcher, rape and maim at will?" [6]. The statement appeals to the emotions by both labelling government inactivity as "paralysis" and equivalent to abandoning civilians facing a ruthless foe involved in heinous crimes of "butchering", "raping" and "maiming" civilians. This is an apparent counter-narrative to the concerns brought up by the Church.

Having framed the security forces' activities as lawful, directed at protecting citizens, "protecting our hard won peace and tranquillity" [5], and sanctioned by a government with "legitimate duty and moral responsibility" [2], the dissidents' cause and the Church's objection to atrocities being committed by the army become, by implication, unlawful [5], a threat to peace and tranquillity and the Church's position, immoral. In addition to an implicit association of the Church's criticism to dissident activity, its (Church) morality or immorality is related to struggles against colonialism, and neo-colonialism. In this regard, the Church is

encouraged to “help in trying to achieve economic and social independence in Third World countries ... to help in effecting changes in the interests of the poor, the hungry and the oppressed” [10]. This argument reinforces the frame of a benevolent government (already established above), and the Church is presented as criticising a government that has already fought oppression and is protecting its citizens. This makes the Church’s criticism sound disingenuous. Instead of criticising the army without “proof and substantiated evidence” [9], the Church, it is argued, should “continue to support the heroic efforts of the people of those countries who were trying to eradicate colonialism and the repugnant system of apartheid” [11]. By so doing, the argument implies, the Church will retain its moral authority. The reporter realises that the same argument can be used to justify the Church’s criticism of actions taken by leaders of post-colonial states and uses a quotation from the president’s speech to suggest an alternative role for the Church in post-colonial milieux: that of helping independent African states to “attain economic and social independence” [13]. This prescription gives room for the reporter to turn the Church’s criticism on its head using the frame of neo-colonial struggle as the new site of struggle, a site where the Church should play a role, rather than criticising post-colonial governments. The last four paragraphs [15-18] cast Western oriented Churches as un-African and therefore as lacking the moral standing to question African values as they are alien to them. This frame can also blunt the critical edge of the Church in future.

Story 3 Headline: Atrocities: Reporters Find no Evidence [Appendix B6]

The main theme of the story, are the allegations of atrocities committed by the army in Matabeleland. This theme is intertwined with that of the dissident ‘menace’. The reporter uses an epideictic form of rhetoric to dismiss the allegations by questioning the credibility of those sources supporting the allegations, and at the same time promoting a sense of credibility for those sources used to cast doubt on the allegations. Furthermore, the reporter provides a counter-narrative to the allegations against army atrocities by giving more examples of dissident activities, a framing tactic which works on the one hand to justify the activities of the army, and on the other, to dismiss the criticisms offered by the reporters. The two major operating frames are that there was a failure to establish evidence by local and international journalists to prove allegations of massive atrocities by the National Army, and that the National Army is instead legitimately engaged in a campaign to rid Matabeleland South of dissidents.

Foregrounding of the journalists' failure to establish evidence proving atrocities/genocide in spite of being "allowed to go to any place in the province and speak to people of their choice" [2] is meant to deal a heavy blow to those discourses in the international media which promoted the genocide story (see Phimister 2008). The "two mounds" [3] that were brought to the journalists' attention in Kezi are the only site which stood to keep the atrocities/genocide thesis alive, and for this reason they became a site of argumentative struggle. The reporter discredits the story behind the two graves by casting doubt on accounts given by alternative sources (Chief Philisi Sithole and Cde Albert Mdluli). The two mounds, the reporter writes "...were allegedly graves of six civilians ..." who "had been shot by security forces" [3]. The use of the word *allegedly* reduces the Chief's account to a questionable allegation whose merit is further eroded in the next paragraph wherein the reporter makes the reader aware that the most senior people in both the army (General Rex Nhongo) and the police (Commissioner Wiridzayi Nguruve) were willing to dig the mounds only to be stopped by Mdluli whom the reporter says "...*thought* the soldiers had removed the bodies and burned them" [5] something that he could tell by a broken twig. This frame discounts Mdluli's account as merely a *thought* and not a fact. The reporter's inclusion of the twig in Mdluli's account seeks to trivialise it and encourage readers to disregard the exhumation account as far-fetched.

The reporter also uses Dr. Tsimba's (Director of Information) dismissal of villagers gathered at Father Gabriel's home to frame the allegations of atrocities as a fabrication. The reporter uses the incident to make the government official look more honest than the journalists themselves, noting that Peter Godwin, a *Sunday Times* reporter "had secretly organised" [7] the villagers' availability to give evidence while the government was encouraging the journalists to "... interview people that had been randomly selected" [8]. This allows the reporter to frame Godwin who had authored an article "... on alleged massive atrocities on civilians" [7] as untrustworthy, which at the same time frames the government as trustworthy.

Furthermore, the reporter uses the Chief, Mdluli and other peasants' failure to report atrocities to either the police or Minister Enos Nkala to question the sincerity of their convictions. The reporter reinforces the frame of "failure to establish evidence" by quoting Dr Tsimba who declares that "the trip had proved that all allegations of brutality by the army on a massive scale were false" [11] because "the two alleged graves in which six people are

allegedly buried according to evidence of a *half serious man purporting* to be the father of one of the dead, certainly cannot be equated to genocide of 30 000 people ...” [12].

The other significant frame in the story provides a counter-narrative that redeems the actions of the army which is accused of committing atrocities. *The Chronicle* reporter constructs the counter narrative in two ways: on the one hand, s/he uses sources whose social standing makes them appear more credible and on the other, s/he outlines dissident activities in ways that highlight a sense of futile brutality. The sources that the reporter draws on in constructing the counter-narrative include a priest, a nurse in charge, a teacher, a doctor and an agricultural consultant. These titles are mentioned to foreground their potential credibility in contrast to those who were giving evidence to support the atrocities theme. Instead of *claiming*, these sources (in favour of the dominant frame) gave “detailed” accounts of how the dissidents had robbed, stripped and insulted school children and targeted people who supported the government [13-14], and burnt two girls [15]. While both the nurse and the doctor admitted that they had treated people who “claimed” they had been beaten by soldiers, the reporter casts doubt on those claims, by noting that the nurse and the doctor did not, in their personal capacities have evidence to prove the claims and that “such reports were hearsay” [21]. The reporter uses the teacher who says “The army has been very co-operative...” to construct an image which contrasts sharply with that associated with an army that commits atrocities.

However, in the final analysis it should be noted that the reporter down plays the effect the presence of both ordinary soldiers and senior officers like Rex Nhongo and Nguruve might have had on the civilians’ ability to express themselves freely. Furthermore, the report does not deny that civilians might have died, but rather denies that there were atrocities or genocide on a *massive* scale [22]. It would have been difficult for the reporters to establish the evidence over a day in a vast province like Matabeleland South.

Theme 3: Unity

Story 1 Headline: PM Renews Unity Call: New ZAPU and Zanu (PF) strategy to bring nation together. [Appendix B7]

The reporter uses a combination of the deliberative rhetoric as well as the pathotic and ethotic forms of argumentation. The deliberative strand is constructed through the logetic mode of persuasion to promote the frame that unity is an important goal to pursue. The ethotic form is used to give credence to the call for unity. In this regard, the Prime Minister’s person

becomes central to the qualification of the argument in favour of unity. The main theme of the story is that the time to finalise the unity exercise "... completely, satisfactorily and effectively" [1] has come. This renewed sense of urgency is also hinted at in the headline which suggests that PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF have a new strategy to bring the nation together. The ethotic argument is also set up in the headline "PM Renews Unity Call". The credence of the call weighs heavily on its association with the Prime Minister. For the argument in favour of unity to gain credibility by association with the Prime Minister, the reporter highlights those factors that give the Prime Minister qualities of magnanimity, wisdom, experience, selflessness, in short, describing him as a man of/for the people whose intentions are intertwined with those of the ordinary person. That the Prime Minister "... was speaking at a reception hosted *in his honour* after he had been declared a *Freeman of Bulawayo*" [2], was "addressing the *enthusiastic guests*" [3], "... walked around the hall shaking hands and talking to the people" [3], and that he only agreed to be at the reception on condition that "... he would meet not only party members, but people from all walks of life in Bulawayo [4], constructs a picture of someone who can be trusted by people from all walks of life.

In this story, PF-ZAPU's role in the liberation struggle is fore-grounded contrary to earlier tendencies to frame PF-ZAPU as a party that seeks to frustrate development and destabilise the security situation through its purported association with dissidents. The significance of PF-ZAPU to the peace process is set up in the headline [New ZAPU, ZANU (PF) strategy to bring nation together] wherein the two parties are presented as peers pursuing the same benevolent goal of uniting people. The reporter uses the Prime Minister's quotes to frame both parties as having a lot in common: "...many young people from all tribes and regions had died for one objective, to liberate Zimbabwe: and many others had been disabled for the same reason" [5], "...we redeemed Zimbabwe..." [6], "we might not have agreed in terms of the political entity and mode of struggle we envisaged...but the objective was to build a free Zimbabwe out of an oppressed one" [7]. These references are used by the reporter as the premise upon which the responsibility for forging a unity agreement is placed on both PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF, and subsequently on their followers.

The reporter also uses the Prime Minister's speech to argue that failing to forge unity now would be tantamount to leaving the "... future generation with the *ugly legacy* of having failed to unite the people of Zimbabwe" [8]. This line performs both a pathetic and

deliberative argumentative function. It is pathetic in the sense that something that is “ugly” conjures bad feelings and is not desirable and therefore is likely to be rejected by the readers. The readers are therefore led to read the processes aimed at establishing unity in good light and those that undermine the achievement of unity as undesirable and therefore deserving of condemnation (see Wolfsfeld 2004:28). It is deliberative in the sense that it approves of behaviour that encourages a desirable legacy (a united Zimbabwe), as opposed to the ugly legacy which is constructed as synonymous with failure to forge unity.

Unity is framed as the overarching objective since “there was always inherent political conflict in a multiparty state...” [9]. This frame performs two functions. On the one hand it makes the *Gukurahundi* conflict look inevitable, an offshoot of an inherent quality in multiparty states and therefore no one’s responsibility. On the other, it implicitly proposes unity as the only alternative available to these two major parties. The argument being made is that since multiparty states are characterised by inherent conflicts, which, as had already happened in Zimbabwe, can translate “...themselves into violence...” [11], unity is the only buffer against such inherent conflict. The reporter also uses the Prime Minister’s flashback into history to put an aura of tradition to the concept of unity [12]. Coupling the concept of unity with history and its efficacy in eliminating the “inherent” conflict that comes with multi-partyism in post-colonial Zimbabwe frames those who question or frustrate the achievement of unity as enemies of not only the state, peace and development, but also as promoters of violence. In this way, unity is framed as a noble idea which is intrinsically required in healthy multi-party political systems. The Prime Minister’s appeal to grassroots level members to “...to work towards the *ultimate* goal of unity” [18], builds on the main ethotic argument in the story that he is a magnanimous man to whom people should listen because he values their contribution to national development.

The reporter uses the last two paragraphs to re-affirm the case for unity as argued in the body of the story that both PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF find the achievement of unity of prime importance. The reporter’s choice to include Joshua Nkomo’s comments performs a pathetic argumentative function because of Nkomo’s stature both in ZAPU and the Matabeleland provinces in general. Nkomo is also used in turn to affirm the pathetic value of the Prime Minister’s statements about which he comments, “it was really wonderful to hear it from a man in his position” [22].

Story 2 Headline: Dabengwa Freed: Four Others Released to 'Facilitate Unity'

[Appendix B8]

The story is constructed using a deliberative rhetoric which in turn employs an inductive-logical argument. This deliberative rhetoric is manifest in the main theme of the story that political detainees had been released to facilitate unity. Consistent with deliberative rhetoric, their release is predicated on their future actions wherein facilitation of unity is prescribed in contrast to a proscription of those actions that may be deemed a threat to the security of the nation. The main theme is constructed in ways that promote the frame of a benevolent government acting generously towards a malignant group of people for the greater good of the nation. This construction does not dissociate Dabengwa and other PF-ZAPU detainees from dissident activity. Instead, it reinforces that association, as seen in some of the comments made by Home Affairs Minister Enos Nkala: "The release of these detainees is aimed at facilitating the attainment of national unity and lasting peace in the country" [2], "it is hoped that they will bring about peaceful conditions in Matabeleland..." [3], and that "...the government sincerely hoped that these people would refrain from committing acts of espionage, sabotage, banditry and destabilisation..." [16].

Ironically, PF-ZAPU president Joshua Nkomo's comment that "the government's gesture was a good sign" [7] also presupposes that the government's goodwill, (seen through the release of prisoners) is being extended to people who otherwise did not deserve it. In paragraphs 10 and 12, PF-ZAPU Information and Publicity Secretary John Nkomo emphasises that "it was wrong to connect the release of the detainees to the unity talks..." [10] as that "...would imply that they were being held to ransom, which is not the case" [12]. This is used by the reporter to suggest that the intentions of the government in releasing the prisoners were noble (as unity was not the ransom for release). Also, Nkomo's quotation does not question the association between the detainees (who included Dabengwa, a senior PF-ZAPU member) and dissident activity which reinforces the frame of a benevolent government. The frame promotes the Manichean dichotomy which casts the government in a good role and the dissidents in a bad one. Dabengwa's significance to the achievement of unity is framed both negatively and positively. On the one hand the journalist provides the reader with Dabengwa's distinct war credentials [5] but also counterpoints this glossy image using quotations that also associate him with the dissident activities in Matabeleland [16].

The detainees' association with dissident activities is reinforced in the last paragraph when Nkala explains the conditions of their release thus: "...they had assured the Government that they would not engage in activities for which they were detained, and that they would try wherever possible to end dissident activities in Matabeleland" [26]. Nkala's explanation suggests that the detainees' association with dissidents is unquestionable, hence the excuse for their release (that they help end dissident activities in Matabeleland).

Story 3 Headline: Unity within Our Grasp [Appendix B9]

The journalist deploys deliberative rhetoric to make a case for the desirability of unity. The headline suggests that unity is something that has been eluding Zimbabweans but was now "within our grasp". Broadly speaking, the main theme of the story is unity, but more specifically that it is now "...within grasp and should not be allowed to slip away..." [1]. The rest of the story is constructed within the frames that unity has been eluding the nation and that its desirability and achievement is indispensable since it is linked to the country's development, defence and security, peace, and to the success of anti-colonial struggles still going on in the region. The reporter's construction of the story is shaped by a single source, Canaan Banana. Banana uses the metaphor of soccer to frame the achievement of unity as something that the nation is hoping and waiting for. He places the responsibility for the achievement of unity or the failure thereof on both PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF, noting that the two parties "... had dribbled past a number of obstacles..." and "...are now facing an empty goal" [3]. The allusion that they are now facing an empty goal implies that any failure to achieve unity, that is to "...shoot wide" [3], would rest squarely with the Prime Minister and PF-ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo. The implication is that such failure would also be equal to failing Zimbabweans who "...were on their toes just waiting to applaud a well placed shot" [4].

This kind of framing encourages readers not only to think of the achievement of unity as every Zimbabwean's goal, but also that there is no other option, that failure to achieve unity will attract "jeering" [4] in contrast to "cheer" [4]. The frame which promotes unity as the only desirable outcome is also reinforced by Banana who says that the unity which is in our grasp "...will only slip away at our own peril" [5] and when he advises the leaders that when taking the shot "...they must lean forward and not backwards" [6]. The metaphor of "backward leaning" suggests lack of commitment as opposed to leaning forward.

The argument in favour of unity is also developed by articulating it with other national goals. For instance, the achievement of unity is described as something that would "...deal a shattering blow" to enemies from within and without Zimbabwe [7], and "...improve the climate for development and accelerate progress in all parts of the country" [7]. This argument aligns overarching national goals with the achievement of unity such that the achievement of these goals is framed as impossible without unity. The strength of the Zimbabwean nation, which is argued to be contingent upon unity, is also framed within broader political struggles in the Southern African region. For instance, the reporter, through Banana, argues that "...a strong Zimbabwe will be of tremendous benefit to the struggling masses in South Africa, Namibia and the whole of the sub-region" [9]. This frame implicitly aligns those seen as frustrating the process of achieving unity with colonial forces suppressing the people of both South Africa and Namibia. This kind of association makes it easy to condemn dissenting voices as they would have been framed as retrogressive and as agents of oppressive political systems.

The reporter also aligns the achievement of unity with the aspirations of the ordinary person by drawing on Banana's understanding of development (which has already been associated with peace and unity), about which he says "true development can only come when all the people of Zimbabwe have had their standard of living improved". The journalist's inclusion of Banana's comments on the release of political detainees (mainly PF-ZAPU members) reinforces the frame that unity is the ultimate goal if the country is to achieve peace and development. This is shown in Banana's explanation of their release: "...once the government is satisfied that detainees were no longer a threat to the security of the state, it was only too glad to set them free so they could make a positive contribution to society" [12]. However, the story takes an ironic twist when Banana asks about the situation in South Africa: "what kind of cowardice is that? What kind of war is that – war against kids?" [14]. What is ironic here is that these same questions could have been posed at him about the *Gukurahundi* conflict. The reporter may have been trying to show the ambiguity of, and inconsistency in, Banana's moral judgements.

What makes Banana's comments even more ironic is what he recommends in the case of South Africa: "if people are genuine about sanctions, they should not window-dress or impose cosmetic measures because this is an insult to the people of South Africa" [17]. This is ironic because the operations of the 5th Brigade were even more brutal (Catholic

Commission for Justice and Peace 2007). What then would Banana recommend as punishment without insulting those affected?

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a close reading of the sample articles using Richardson's (2007) rendering of the Aristotlean conception of rhetoric and van Dijk's (2007) macro-structural approach to discourse analysis. Using these tools the chapter showed that *The Chronicle* predominantly promoted discourses which favoured the government's framing of the conflict. I will discuss the implications of this in the following chapter.

Chapter 5

Findings and Discussion

Introduction

Having established the discourses promoted by *The Chronicle's* journalists in the previous chapter, I now discuss what those discourses say about the role(s) assumed, and the form(s) of journalism practised by the paper in its coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict and in turn assess these elements in terms of peace journalism.

Findings

The sample stories show that *The Chronicle* journalists were heavily dependent on elite government sources. The general sourcing patterns are shown in the table below (Fig 7). Those ordinary sources that were used to reinforce frames constructed by government officials are indicated as “favourable” and those who gave “counter narratives” to official frames are indicated as “unfavourable”.

Fig.7

Theme	Source			
	Government Elite	Opposition Elite	Ordinary [Favourable]	Ordinary [Unfavourable]
Dissidents	2	1		1
5 th Brigade	5	2	5	2
Unity	3	3		
Total	10	6	5	3

This general pattern shows that the journalists were largely dependent on elite sources and more specifically those holding office in government. Journalists used single sources from government in three stories as opposed to only one from the oppositional perspective (PF-ZAPU. Oppositional voices incorporated in stories falling within the ‘dissidents’ and ‘5th

Brigade' thematic strands were presented in ways that sought to reinforce the main theme of that story and marginalise, if not cast as pariah, those voices that ran parallel to the main theme. However, in their construction of these stories journalists used more compliant rather than oppositional voices, except within the 'unity' thematic strand.

All the 9 articles used labels and definitions that privileged the government's interpretation of the conflict. The very words upon which the analytical thematic strands of this analysis are built derive from labels constructed by the government and adopted by *The Chronicle* without much questioning. The labels force us to think about the conflict in terms of who the government considers 'dissidents', 'security forces', and what it considers 'unity'. To a larger extent the stories do not provide the oppositional interpretation of these labels. The most forceful oppositional reading of these labels is manifest only in PF-ZAPU acting-president's questioning of the government's interpretation of 'unity' in an article headlined (*ZAPU 'has given Govt plans to eliminate dissidents - appendix B3*), and Nkomo and Smith's criticism of the manner in which the security forces were operating in Matabeleland (*Nkomo, Smith 'seek to destroy morale - appendix B4*). By privileging the government's narrative of the conflict, by extension the newspaper also privileged ZANU-PF as a party against other political groups, especially at the expense of PF-ZAPU.

The reporters used demonising language to construct the "other". The elite government sources used across the 9 stories used negative epithets when characterising the 'other'. Common among these is their reference to 'bandits', 'those bent on terrorising innocent and unarmed civilians', 'armed banditry', 'dissidents', those who commit acts of 'sabotage', 'espionage', 'destabilisation' and 'banditry'. On the other hand, the 5th Brigade is described in terms that associate it with the role of a public protector. For instance, it is never referred to as the 5th Brigade but 'security forces' or 'the National Army'. This construction identifies it with a state institution (Army) whose actions are normally associated with providing security for the citizenry. Using the label 5th Brigade would have carried undertones of a renegade militia operating outside state structures.

Stories that concern 'dissidents' and the '5th Brigade' are also constructed in ways that do not attempt to achieve one of the defining ethics of professional journalism, namely, objectivity. The ideology of professional journalism aspires to a commitment to truthfulness, reporting factually accurate information, an even-handed presentation of different viewpoints also

referred to as neutrality (balance and fairness), emotional detachment and a separation of fact from comment (Calcutt and Hammond 2011:98; Schudson 1978:6). The stories did not meet the truthfulness tenet in the sense that the reporters either ignored the excesses of the 5th Brigade or took a deliberate position to either deny or excuse such excesses (see stories entitled *President Hits at Church for Allegations on Atrocities - appendix B5; Atrocities: Reporters find no Evidence - appendix B6*). An absence of accounts referring to the excesses of the 5th Brigade constitutes an inaccuracy of fact by omission (see Lee 2010:69). Furthermore, the reporters did not attempt to give an even-handed presentation of the different viewpoints at play in the interpretation of the conflict. Instead, the viewpoint of the government was given privileged status. Alternative viewpoints were either left out or marginalised by association with what was constructed as undesirable, the dissidents. While the journalists did not actually offer their own opinions, it has been argued that:

...by choosing whom to interview and which quotes to use...journalists convey their own opinions or angle on the story while avoiding any explicit editorialising...to protect the journalist (and, by extension, the news organisation) against charges of bias. (Calcutt and Hammond 2011:99; see also Tuchman 1972)

In this sense therefore, the journalists actively promoted their own opinions through their choice of sources and quotations. This process of actively constructing one's opinion through the marshalling of sources and quotes can be demonstrated by assessing how *The Chronicle* journalists constructed stories falling within the 'unity' thematic strand. The idea is to show that such construction is a product of an active process and that chosen frames were not the only narrative/interpretive way(s) available to the journalists.

Those stories whose main theme was 'unity' were constructed in a slightly different way from those whose themes were 'dissidents' and 'the 5th Brigade'. The reporters did not use negative epithets directly against PF-ZAPU. They did not emphasise a link between PF-ZAPU and the dissidents as was the case with stories foregrounding the other two themes (dissidents and the 5th brigade). Instead PF-ZAPU's role in the liberation struggle was foregrounded in ways that create a brotherly association between the party and ZANU-PF. However, even though the reporters would seek the view of the opposition on the issue at hand, the 'primary definers' remained those in government. Furthermore, the amount of space afforded oppositional voices, even in cases where they seem to agree with the dominant framing, is very small in comparison to that afforded the story's protagonist who is usually a government official.

Discussion

Journalistic Practice and Media Roles

There are many factors which shape how the media represent social issues and events (Archetti 2010:25). Of concern here is the interplay between the media and political environment, and journalistic representations. It has been argued that “the political and professional context for news stories” about peace or war “has a major impact on how they are written” (Wolfsfeld 2004:25). While the political environment “...determines what is culturally resonant”, the professional context or media environment, defined as “the aggregate of professional beliefs, values, and routines that journalists employ in the construction of news stories...establishes what is considered professionally worthy” (Wolfsfeld 2004:38-39). Such definitions, Wolfsfeld argues are time and culture bound, resulting in variations in “the role of the media in political processes” (Wolfsfeld 2004: 39). In this section, I reflect on the discourses and discursive practices employed by *The Chronicle* in its reportage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict (see Chapter 4) to assess what these tell us about the normative role(s) of the media (Christians *et al.* 2009) and type of journalism(s) (Hanitzsch 2007), assumed by the paper at the time, and how these reflect on their contemporary political environment. This enables us to think about how the media’s performance of certain types of roles or journalism practice and the political environment in which they operate, promote or fail to promote certain discourses. Together, these dynamics are assessed within the broader debates on peace journalism.

Role played by *The Chronicle*

In thinking about the role that *The Chronicle* assumed in its reportage of the *Gukurahundi*, a good starting point would be to position the paper somewhere within Hanitzsch’s (2007) framework for conceptualising journalism culture. *The Chronicle* belongs to *Zimpapers*, a company in which the Zimbabwean government has a 51 percent control stake (AfdeInfo: 2007), a dimension which places the paper closer to the political power centre (Hanitzsch 2007). The narrow distance between *The Chronicle* and the power centre (Zimbabwean government) casts the newspaper in a potentially loyal role, as opposed to offering an adversarial kind of journalism “that openly challenges the powers that be” (Hanitzsch 2007:373). Loyalist media institutions are argued to “...be defensive of authorities, routinely engaging in self-censorship, and serving as mouthpiece of the government or the party”

(Hanitzsch 2007:374). Judging by the paper's sourcing patterns, it can be argued that *The Chronicle* was performing a collaborative role, which as Christians *et al.* argue, "...represents an acknowledgment of the state's interest – to which the media accede either passively or unwittingly, reluctantly or wholeheartedly – in participating in the choices journalists make and the coverage they provide" (2009:197). Such collaboration ranges "from coercion to full acceptance of the particular arrangements and outcomes that collaboration implies" (Christians *et al.* 2009:198). The nature of *The Chronicle's* collaboration is a matter of debate but to help think through the problem, we can draw on Held's (1995) conceptualisation of the conditions of collaboration. He argues that collaboration can be compliant, acquiescent and can also be characterised by acceptance (Held 1995:160-162).

The patterns of sourcing, angles taken on issues by journalists, language used and frames deployed in the stories analysed in the previous chapter, point out that *The Chronicle* was operating closer to the political power centre, was loyal, and therefore assumed the collaborative role across the three conditions that Held (1995) provides. The government's majority stake in *The Chronicle* might have induced some form of overt control, also justified on the basis of history (which could have forced the paper to be compliant). The newspaper's journalists may also have acquiesced because such collaboration was inevitable, since it is argued that under such circumstances "journalists avoid coercion and accept their fate" (Held 1995:161). It may also have been the case that journalists at *The Chronicle* willingly accepted collaboration or rather, actively collaborated with the political centre.¹⁴ It is difficult to single out one condition to explain *The Chronicle's* condition(s) of collaboration as all the three conditions seem plausible enough to explain its collaborative role. But it can be argued that *The Chronicle's* proximity to the political power centre explains why it constructed its stories within frames defined by government officials. It cannot be argued that the newspaper performed the monitorial role because it did not overtly challenge the political centre's interpretation of the conflict.

However, the construction of sample stories within the 'unity' thematic strand shows consistency with the facilitative role. The reporters, taking a cue from the elite politicians, (especially government officials), tone down their invective against both PF-ZAPU and the 'dissidents'. They also actively seek commentary from the opposition, albeit at a less

¹⁴ This could only be established by interviews with the journalists, which were beyond the scope of this study.

prominent level in comparison to that afforded government officials. These two dimensions are consistent with the facilitative role, through which, it is argued, the media engages citizens in their effort to “clarify and resolve public problems...facilitate the process of negotiation over the social, political and cultural agenda...raise social conflict from the plane of violence to the plane of panel discussion” (Christians *et al.* 2009:158-160). But despite this, the newspaper cannot be said to have performed the facilitative role completely because the stories do not reflect that reporters were committed to an even-handed representation of different viewpoints. Instead the viewpoints of government officials were privileged over others which were only accommodated to the extent that they were in sync with the dominant frame.

War/Violence Journalism or Peace Journalism

Peace journalism, as has already been established in Chapter 2, is a normative critique of the mainstream understanding and practice of journalism which some argue promotes violence (see Cottle 2006; Lee 2009; Galtung 1998). Peace journalism is premised on a prior recognition and acknowledgement of the endemic and structural nature of conflicts. From this, it seeks to identify and promote constructive responses that prevent the escalation of conflict to the plane of violence (Cottle 2006:101). Below I assess *The Chronicle's* representation of the *Gukurahundi* conflict using three salient indicators of peace journalism: “...the avoidance of demonising language, a non-partisan approach, and a multi-party orientation” (Lee 2009:261).

The sample stories show that *The Chronicle's* coverage of the conflict was different across the thematic trends identified in Chapter 3. The ‘dissidents’ and ‘5th Brigade’ thematic strands show a pronounced ethnocentric construction. It is argued that ethnocentric media constructions of parties in any conflict “...provide graphic descriptions of the other side’s brutality and our people’s suffering”, and at the same time “claims about our own acts of aggression and the other’s suffering are either ignored, underplayed, or discounted” (Wolfsfeld 2004:23). Such constructions are accompanied by language which demonises the form and actions of the ‘other’ on the one hand, and on the other, justifies and legitimates the actions of those in whose favour the media are speaking.

Dissidents

By referring to the other players in the conflict as 'dissidents' and 'bandits', *The Chronicle* creates a dynamic which pits one party against the other, the good and the bad, and the legitimate and the illegitimate. The subsequent effect of this construction is the use of words that describe or even prescribe actions deemed 'appropriate' against the 'out-group'. For instance, in the story headlined "*Peasants Back Govt. War on Dissidents*" (appendix B1) the reporter encourages the continuation of violence by promoting Mudenda's call for "peasants to play a greater role in assisting the Government onslaught against dissidents" [3], discouraging them from "tolerating the presence of dissidents" [5], and lastly by suggesting that the peasants had "said they would no longer tolerate the presence of people bent on destroying progress" [25]. In another story headlined "*ZAPU Has Given Govt Plans to Eliminate Dissidents*" (appendix B3), the reporter uses phrases that promote an escalation of conflict. S/he writes of "plans to eliminate dissidents" [Headline], suggests "armed banditry" [2] as the major problem confronted by government, and points to PF-ZAPU's readiness "to help the Government in bringing down dissidents" [4], and its (PF-ZAPU) support for government in the attempt "to eliminate dissidents" [5]. The most aggressive tone is manifest in the story headlined "*Return to the Fold, PM Tells Dissidents*" (appendix B2). The reporter promotes a war frame through the use of aggressive phrases abstracted from the Prime Minister's speech. For instance, s/he quotes the Prime Minister saying "the government would meet force with brutal force if the bandits continued trying to topple the Government" [4]. The dissidents are described as involved in a "rebellion" which "sought to install PF-ZAPU into power by force" [6]. The war frame is bolstered by the inclusion of a quotation which describes the government's answer to the dissident problem as that of redoubling "its determination to crush them..." [13]. This suggests that stories within the 'dissident' thematic strand failed on the peace journalism indicator of avoiding demonising language. The constructions also promote an escalation of conflict as they do not even suggest the need to establish dialogue with the so called dissidents, but instead emphasise confrontation.

5th Brigade

Stories in this thematic strand frame the conflict in terms of a fight from which should emerge a winner and a loser, which is typical of violence/war journalism (Cottle 2006:101). The reporters promote the government frame which casts the dissidents not only as an arch

enemy of government, but also by association, of the nation at large. The story entitled "*President Hits at Church for Allegations on Atrocities*" (appendix B5) does not leave room for a possibility of pursuing peaceful ways of dealing with the dissidents. It emphasises an irreconcilable rift between the government and dissidents. For instance, the reporter uses Banana to point out that "the government could not support or tolerate those bent on terrorising innocent and unarmed civilians" [3], that the dissidents were destabilising "our hard won peace and tranquillity" [5], and that the government had to intervene militarily because it couldn't "abandon the people of Matabeleland to the dissidents to butcher, rape and maim at will" [6]. What makes this kind of framing incompatible with peace journalism is the emphasis on differences rather than commonalities (Lee 2009:262). To begin with, the argument that the government could not tolerate dissident activity or abandon the people of Matabeleland to dissidents rules out consideration for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Furthermore, the story's association of the 'dissidents' with violent activities such as destabilising "hard won peace and tranquillity" and butchering, raping and maiming rhetorically justifies and promotes violent action against them (see Gerbner 1992). In another story entitled "*Nkomo, Smith Seek to Destroy Morale*" (appendix B4) Nkomo and Smith's criticism of the operations of security forces in Matabeleland is described as destroying the morale of security forces while boosting that of dissidents. The frame reinforces the distinctions between the forces at play in the conflict in ways that do not seek to locate a common ground from which peace initiatives can be developed.

Unity

The unity thematic strand reports are the closest to the tenets of peace journalism. In all the stories in this category, there is recognition that all parties have a role to play in achieving peace. In a story entitled "*Prime Minister Renews Unity Call*" (appendix B7) there is a recognition that Zimbabwe's independence came about because of sacrifices by "...many young people from all tribes and regions" [5], that the two major revolutionary parties ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU may not "...have agreed in terms of the political entity" [7] but shared the same objective of liberating Zimbabwe, that "there was always conflict in multiparty" [9] states, and that the parties involved in the conflict "...must work out a positive path..." [15]. Such framing encourages parties involved in the conflict to reflect on their commonalities in order to develop strategies for peace. It makes everyone a stakeholder in the goal of achieving peace and also points to the ironic nature of the *Gukurahundi* conflict, in the sense that

former liberation war partners were now fighting each other. In another story entitled "*Unity Within our Grasp*" (appendix B9), the reporter uses an active approach deliberately positioned in favour of peace. S/he draws on Banana's comments to promote peace. For instance the achievement of unity which is at the same time promoted as synonymous with the achievement of peace is presented as the desirable outcome [6] and the way forward [6]. Unlike stories within the 'dissident' and '5th Brigade' strands, stories within the 'unity' strand do not link PF-ZAPU to the dissidents, but instead emphasise the party's role in achieving independence, thus raising its profile and making it a credible partner with a stake in development processes. The peace frame in the story under review is also manifest in the reporter's inclusion of the government's conciliatory tone towards political prisoners. The president is quoted saying "it is important that those who made mistakes yesterday be given, today and tomorrow, the opportunity to redress those mistakes" [13]. This sub-theme is the main frame of another story headlined "*Dabengwa Freed: Four Others Released to Facilitate Unity*" (appendix B8). However, the fact that all the stories do not suggest the need to engage the 'dissidents' in both negotiating a peaceful end to the conflict or in the unity talks, makes them fall short of the multiparty indicator for peace journalism.

Peace Journalism and the Facilitative Role: Multi-Partyism or Interventionism

There are two major approaches to peace journalism: interventionism and multi-partyism. An interventionist approach is informed by the belief that peace journalism includes:

...taking a preventive advocacy stance—for example, editorials, and columns urging reconciliation and focusing on common ground rather than on vengeance, retaliation, and differences—and emphasising the invisible effects of violence. (Lee 2009:262)

The interventionist approach is invoked and acceptable "in so far as that intervention allows the inclusion of a journalist's values and participation in community's dialogue, consensus building, civic transformation, and a commitment to social justice" (Lee 2009:269). The interventionist approach critiques established, traditional, mainstream forms of journalism, challenging "...foundational news values, dominant agendas, privileged elite access and so called 'professional' journalistic practices" (Cottle 2006:100). Interventionist forms of journalism such as peace journalism do not stay apart from the flow of events, as does the neutral and disinterested observer, but participates, intervenes, and gets involved to promote change (Hanitzsch 2007:373). This approach explicitly points to journalistic values such as objectivity and the news media's pre-occupation with conflict as privileging war/violent

frames (Lee 2009:259). On the other hand, a multiparty orientation to peace journalism is characterised by "...an avoidance of good-bad labels, a non-partisan approach, a multi-party orientation, and an avoidance of demonising language" (Lee 2009:268). This approach has been criticised for its consistency with norms and values of mainstream journalism such as objectivity which have been consistently argued to privilege violence journalism (Lee 2009:268).

It has been argued above that the sample stories within the 'unity' strand are a close approximation of peace journalism in the sense that the reporters tended to use toned down language, focused on the common ground, and promoted unity as a desirable outcome. The stories however, did not overtly criticise the violence that was perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. The only violence that was condemned was that by 'dissidents' and not the security forces. For this reason it can be argued that to the extent that *The Chronicle* met some of the principles of peace journalism, it did so from a multi-party approach. This means that in terms of Hanitzsch's (2007) model of conceptualising journalism culture, the paper's approximation of peace journalism cannot be characterised as interventionist, but rather corresponds to a form of journalism whose epistemological positioning espouses the objectivity credo. Journalistic practices that are largely informed by the objectivity dogma, subsequently correspond with a multi-party approach to peace journalism since as Lee argues, "...an avoidance of good-bad labels, a non-partisan approach, a multi-party orientation, and an avoidance of demonising language" are both less interventionist and extensions of the objectivity credo (Lee 2009:268).

The multiparty approach to peace journalism is best positioned to perform the facilitative role. In their performance of the facilitative role, the media "promote a mosaic of diverse cultures and worldviews" and in so doing the media become accountable to the widely shared moral frameworks that orient the society in which they operate and give it meaning (Christians *et al.* 2009:159). They also "facilitate the process of negotiation over the social, political, and cultural agenda" through deliberation which is open to a "wide range of evidence, respectful of different views, rational in weighing available data and willing to consider alternative possibilities" (Christians *et al.* 2009:159; Macedo 1999:58). In the context of social conflict, which is a major component of any political system (Christians *et al.* 2009:159), the media's performance of the facilitative role is expected to "raise social conflict from the plane of violence to the plane of discussion" (Commission on Freedom of

the Press 1947:23). The importance of the media's potential in raising social conflict from the plane of violence to that of discussion, is manifest in the consistent desire to find ways of using the media to "...establish solidarity among strangers" in much theorisation on the public sphere (Garnham 2007:203; see also Habermas 2006).

From the nature of the discourses outlined in chapter 4 and above in this chapter, it can be argued that *The Chronicle's* representation of the 'dissidents' and the '5th Brigade' were shaped by the newspaper's proximity and loyalty to the power centre (see Hanitzsch 2007), its performance of the collaborative role (see Christians *et al.* 2009), and the influence of politicians on the its editorial decisions (see McNair 2007; Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Habermas 2006; Wolfsfeld 2004). The representations were predominantly constructed within the frame of war/violence journalism. As noted in chapter 2, war/violence journalism representations are characterised by "...an identification with one or the home side of the war; military triumphalist language; an action orientation; and a superficial narrative with little context, background, or historical perspective" (Lee 2009:260). Sample stories within the strands of 'dissidents' and '5th Brigade' show that the government and military units deployed in Matabeleland were constructed as good, as the home side, and the 'in-group'. Their actions were not only constructed as legitimate, but were also aligned with the socio-political and economic aspirations of the Zimbabwean citizenry. On the other hand, 'dissidents' were constructed as bad, and a threat to national security and the welfare of the citizenry at large. This bifurcated construction of the players in the *Gukurahundi* conflict did, at the level of rhetoric, potentially encourage violence in the sense that the questionable actions of the security forces were rhetorically obscured in the name of national interest, and the subsequent emphasis on 'dissident' violence justified violent action against them. The manner in which the conflict and the players in that conflict were represented is significant because, as was argued in chapter 4, newspaper discourses and the rhetoric within them are always oriented to achieving real social outcomes (see van Dijk 2007; Richardson 2007). However, the newspaper's representations of the 'unity' theme show a partial paradigmatic shift from war/violence journalism, to peace journalism. The shift was partial because the reporters retained the word 'dissidents' in their stories and some of their sources such as former president Canaan Banana spoke of "the dissident element in the south..." as a hindrance to the achievement of peace. Such labels were the basis upon which the conflict had developed in the first place, and their continued usage left open the possibility of a

violent response. Worse still, the representation of discourses of unity did not meet the multi-party principle required by forms of peace journalism which are not interventionist, as they totally excluded the voice of the 'dissidents' themselves. Notwithstanding this, sample stories within the unity strand show a shift from performing a blatant collaborative role to performing a facilitative role, a shift away from the power centre to a more accommodating form of journalism guided by the norm of journalistic objectivity, and a shift from war/violence journalism to peace journalism. This can be explained using Wolfsfeld's postulation that "...changes in the political environment lead to changes in media performance that lead to further changes in the political environment" (2004:31). The shifts in *The Chronicle's* tone can be argued to have been guided by the political processes that were dominant at the time, which as shown by the thematic trends, shifted from justifying military presence in Matabeleland to promoting unity and peace. However, this argument does not strip the media of its own agency in constituting the political environment. Wolfsfeld's postulation does leave room for the media to constitute the political environment, although questions remain about the relationship of influence between the politicians and the media. In other words, does the model follow a politics-media-politics cycle, or a media-politics-media cycle? Worse still, it can be asked whether these possible cycles are contingent on actually existing situations both in the media or political environment and/or cultural spaces defined along specific temporal or spatial planes.

In broad terms, the sample stories show that *The Chronicle's* discourses on the conflict were centred around three major themes, 'dissidents', '5th Brigade' and 'unity' whose prominence in terms of coverage shifted over the 6 years under study. The 'dissidents' and '5th Brigade' thematic trends were characterised by a war/violence journalism framing, and the 'unity' theme shifted towards peace journalism. The pattern suggests that the collaborative role can easily promote discourses that correspond with war journalism and that the facilitative role promotes a passive form of peace journalism characterised by a multi-party orientation couched within the norm of journalistic objectivity. In the next section I discuss the patterns outlined above from the perspective of political communication.

Peace Journalism *qua* Political Communication

As was argued in chapter 2, the realisation of peace journalism cannot be thought outside the structure and agency problematic. The structure and agency problematic is centred on the

political communication understanding that in thinking about the achievement of peace journalism, it must be appreciated that the media cannot be sealed from the “wider force field of politics and culture much less disembedded from the economic structures and logics that drive its performance” (Cottle 2006:103; see also Gurevitch and Blumler 1990). Cottle also argues that conflictual situations “position journalists and their professional claims concerning the public’s right to know at odds with state and military efforts to curb and control the flow of information” (Cottle 2006:77). This tension, he argues, reveals “the bases of power under-lying state media interactions more generally (Cottle 2006:77). The shifts in *The Chronicle’s* discourses on the *Gukurahundi* conflict, their nature notwithstanding, show the influence of political players, especially those in government, on *The Chronicle’s* content. These shifts in discourses, the nature of media roles and journalistic forms assumed by *The Chronicle* can be understood in terms of Wolfsfeld’s hypothesis on the relationship between the media and politics that “...most changes in the tone and content of news coverage reflect the shifts in the political process” (2004:25-26). The combative tone manifest in sample stories within the ‘dissidents’ and ‘5th Brigade’ thematic strands reflect the political divisions among the politicians themselves (ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU). He draws on Entman to elaborate this argument:

When leaders are able to generate a high level of political support in favour of peace, the press has little problem coming along for the ride. When elites are divided, on the other hand, the internal conflict itself becomes a major part of the story. (Wolfsfeld 2004:26; Entman 2004)

The shift towards a peace journalism frame in stories within the ‘unity’ thematic strand reflects the developing consensus on the need for peace, which at the time was promoted as achievable through the attainment of unity between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU. This shift in discourse can be understood in two ways proposed by Wolfsfeld (2004). On the one hand, he argues that “the greater the level of elite consensus in support of a peace process, the more likely the news media will play a positive role in that process”, and on the other he argues that the greater the extent of shared media by conflicting parties, “the more likely it is that the news media will play a constructive role in a peace process” (Wolfsfeld 2004:26; 42). As was shown in chapter 3, the discourse of unity gained momentum in 1985 and 1986. At the time, both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU leaders were promoting the attainment of unity which was also expected to lead to peace (see story entitled *PM Renews Unity Call-appendix B7*, wherein Nkomo and Mugabe agree on the need for unity). So, in a way, there was political

consensus on the desirability of unity, and by extension, peace. Furthermore, both political groups were dependent on the same media, although ZANU-PF enjoyed more privileged coverage. It can be argued therefore that the nature of, and shifts in, discourses promoted by *The Chronicle* during the conflict are consistent with the theoretical propositions within the political communication paradigm referred to above. The argument by political communication theorists that media content is significantly influenced by both powerful political and economic interests positions the media closer to both political and commercial power centres in Hanitzsch's (2007) conception of journalism culture which implicitly suggests that the media follow political processes, rather than influence them. The question that remains is whether the media actually just follow political processes, or whether they also help to constitute them. In other words, do the media *re-present* or represent issues and events? If we are to treat representations in the news media as discourses (see van Dijk 2007:379), then the argument that the "discursive practice reproduces or changes other dimensions of social practice just as other social dimensions shape the discursive dimension" (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002:19) is instructive to the problematic of media influence on political processes. To elaborate on this, it is also necessary to examine the form of journalism that accompanied the shift in *The Chronicle's* coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict.

Journalistic Objectivity and Peace Journalism

Peace journalism is premised on a normative critique of mainstream or professional journalism (Cottle 2006:100). Those who argue in favour of peace journalism, see journalistic objectivity and news values such as conflict, as bases for war/violence news frames (Lee 2009:259). Journalistic objectivity has also been argued to mute "reportage of the brutality of war, and the suffering of victims, helping to turn war into a watchable spectacle rather than an insufferable obscenity" because of its "respect for the prevailing social standards of decency and good taste" (Hackett 1989:10-11). They argue instead, for a form of journalism positioned in favour of peace. However, another school of thought seeks to retrieve journalistic objectivity from the dustbins of normative critics and rework it to promote peace. They argue that, in abandoning the goal of objectivity, 'corrective journalism' such as peace journalism "tend to get their evidence mixed up with their emotions [...] seeing what they want to see rather than reporting all that is there" (Calcutt and Hammond 2011:116; Hume

1997:5). Cottle forcefully argues against the “corrective journalism’s” abandonment of journalistic objectivity, noting:

...what is needed is a broadening and deepening of war and conflict reporting, not its universal replacement by an idealised view of the world as it should be, nor one that is representationally engineered to conform to a particular view of the ‘peaceful society’. (Cottle 2006:103)

If journalistic objectivity is to be understood as a commitment to truthfulness, neutrality (fairness and balance), an even-handed handling of different view points, emotional detachment (Calcutt and Hammond 2011:98), then *The Chronicle’s* construction of stories within the ‘unity’ thematic strand can be argued to have been a fair commitment to the objectivity criteria. The significance of this point is that, comparatively speaking, the paper’s representation of the ‘unity’ thematic strand was the closest to peace journalism and was at the same time consistent with the ethos of journalistic objectivity. This suggests that the more *The Chronicle* espoused the ethos of journalistic objectivity, the more it moved towards the values promoted by peace journalism. Thus in general terms, shifts in *The Chronicle’s* tone in its representation of the *Gukurahundi* conflict show that the more it incorporated the criteria of journalistic objectivity into its reports, the more it moved towards a multi-party approach to peace journalism. This scenario points to a more complex picture than can be appreciated at face value. It implies that the very criterion (objectivity) upon which proponents of peace journalism criticise mainstream journalism, is a source of hope for the promotion of peace frames. At the same time, if the media retain the criterion of objectivity, it may not be necessary to talk in terms of an alternative such as peace journalism, but rather an improvement of mainstream journalism (see Cottle 2006:104; Calcutt and Hammond 2011:116-117). In support of this argument, Cottle points out:

The communicative complexities of actually existing journalism, however, are rarely acknowledged much less empirically pursued and analysed in generalising critiques [...] This is an oversight because they may well contain important seeds of hope for the advocates of peace journalism and others interested in expanding the range of views and voices, values and visions found in the news media and which are required for peaceful co-existence. (Cottle 2006:104)

This research has partially demonstrated that the objectivity credo, arguments from the perspective of political communication notwithstanding, brought *The Chronicle* closer to practising peace journalism. A conclusion to the thesis is provided in the next chapter.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Summary

This research analysed *The Chronicle's* coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict which affected people from the provinces of Matabeleland North and South, as well as parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe between 1982 and 1986. Chapter one provides the socio-political background to this study. It establishes both the political history that culminated in the *Gukurahundi* conflict and the contemporary political developments that continue to be shaped by that historical experience and which in essence necessitated this study. In addition, the chapter argues that in view of resurgent active discussions about the *Gukurahundi* conflict in various media, traditional or otherwise, it is also important to go back and analyse the nature of the discourses that prevailed in the media at the time of the conflict. Specific focus was placed on *The Chronicle*, a government controlled daily newspaper published in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second largest city and regional capital of the two provinces of Matabeleland.

The premise for concern with the media's coverage of conflict is set out in chapter two. The chapter argues that the media has the potential to contribute actively, through either the use of legitimating or de-legitimizing language, to the escalation or de-escalation of conflict (see Hamelink 2008). It also argues that media representations are complex phenomena shaped by various factors which include the role(s) and types of journalism assumed by the media, as well as the political environment in which they find themselves. It is also argued that the types of journalism or journalistic practices and media role(s) assumed by a media outlet promote particular discourses that can potentially escalate social conflict to the plane of violence, or result in peaceful resolution. Using insights from the perspectives of political communication, normative theories of the media, journalism culture, peace journalism and their critiques, the chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the analysis of *The Chronicle's* representation of the *Gukurahundi* conflict.

The research's ontological and epistemological positioning is couched in constructivist philosophy. It proceeds from the position that discourses are constituted by social processes in as much as they constitute such processes (Hall 1997; Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). Such positioning located the study within the qualitative research paradigm as outlined in chapter three. In addition to locating the research within qualitative research, the chapter also outlines

the research procedure or design used to arrive at the interpretations offered in Chapters 4 and 5. The chapter also identifies van Dijk's (2007) approach to analysing macro-structures of discourse such as themes and frames as the broad analytical framework for the study, and, Richardson (2007) as useful for the close reading of the sample stories.

Using the analytical tools provided by van Dijk (2007) and Richardson (2007), chapter 4 explicates the discourses promoted, and the discursive techniques used by *The Chronicle* during the *Gukurahundi* conflict. The chapter shows that the newspaper's discourses, which were centred on the three main thematic trends, 'dissidents', '5th Brigade' and 'unity', largely framed the actions of the government and its interpretations of the political environment favourably. On the other hand, the dissidents, and to a greater extent PF-ZAPU, were not only framed in bad light, but as the enemy both of the government and by extension the people. It is also shown that PF-ZAPU was partially framed positively in stories whose main theme was 'unity'.

The previous chapter discussed how the role(s), type(s) of journalism assumed by *The Chronicle* during the conflict, and the political environment in which it was operating, shaped its representation of the conflict. The nature of the newspaper's representations was then discussed in the context of the arguments on peace journalism in particular, and the practice of journalism in general.

Conclusion

The evidence and analysis presented in chapter 4, show that news stories or representations in the news media, particularly those published by *The Chronicle* during the *Gukurahundi* conflict, were not innocent discourses. It is shown that discourses promoted by *The Chronicle* at the time tell us something about the intentions, wishes, and the mood of both the paper and the government; about the government's relations with the citizenry and other political players at the time; and about the then prevailing political situation (van Dijk 2007:377-378). The chapter also shows that those discourses were aimed at interpreting the political environment so that it could be rendered meaningful in particular ways by the paper's readers. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that such discourses were speech acts - uttered to perform a social act, with a concrete purpose in that particular social context (see Austin 1962).

The interpretations promoted in stories whose themes were ‘dissidents’ and ‘5th Brigade’ cast the government’s enemies as the villains who threatened national development, peace and unity. Conversely, the government was constructed as benevolent and acting in the national interest. However, stories that focused on the theme of ‘unity’ constructed the opposition party (PF-ZAPU) as a peer to the ruling party and worthy of recognition. These discourses were shown to have been constructed using techniques of argumentation (Richardson 2007) to show the ‘wrongness’ of dissident activities as opposed to the ‘rightness’ of government actions, the probity of government officials as opposed to the improbity of ‘dissidents’ and by association PF-ZAPU, and lastly the undesirability of continued support for dissidents as opposed to the desirability of support for both the government and the national army (5th Brigade). It is demonstrated that these discourses were aimed at justifying the army’s presence and actions in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands, as well as mobilising the nation to support the ‘government’s war against dissidents’. By extension, the discourses also promoted the condemnation and intolerance of ‘dissidents’ and PF-ZAPU by readers. The chapter also shows that the discourses in *The Chronicle* worked ideologically to establish and sustain ZANU-PF’s political dominance by presenting the government (led by ZANU-PF) and the party as just, and worthy of support, by obscuring the relations of power at play, by promoting an interpretation of unity that secured the dominance of ZANU-PF, by constructing the ‘dissidents’ as an enemy of both ZANU-PF and oppositional forces, and by presenting the legitimacy of a ZANU-PF-led government as unquestionable (see Thompson 1990).

In Chapter 5, I argue that the discourses promoted, and discursive practices employed by *The Chronicle* show us that stories in the thematic strands of ‘dissidents’ and the ‘5th Brigade’ are consistent with the collaborative role of the media and those in the ‘unity’ thematic strand with the facilitative role (Christians *et al.* 2009). Those stories that suggest a collaborative role also show a close relationship between the newspaper and government which subsequently also suggests that the collaborative role was assumed either wittingly or unwittingly, or across Held’s conditions of collaboration: compliance, acquiescence and acceptance (1995:160-162). Stories that suggest *The Chronicle* was performing the collaborative role (dissident and 5th Brigade themes) also exhibit characteristics of war/violence journalism, while those that suggest it was performing a facilitative role (‘unity’) exhibit characteristics of peace journalism (see Galtung 1986; Galtung 1998; Lee

2009; Lee and Maslog 2005; Cottle 2006). I also argue that the case of *The Chronicle's* reportage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict shows that stories that did not espouse the norm of journalistic objectivity ('dissidents' and '5th Brigade' thematic strands) exhibited characteristics of war/violence journalism, while those that espoused some aspects of journalistic objectivity exhibited characteristics of peace journalism. I also demonstrate, in sympathy with Wolfsfeld's (2004) arguments, that there is a relationship between political processes and media representations, although it is not easy to pin point the direction or force of influence.

In the final analysis therefore, *The Chronicle's* coverage of the *Gukurahundi* conflict shows that in performing the collaborative role, abandoning the objectivity norm, and working too close to the power centre, the paper assumed characteristics consistent with war/violence journalism. Conversely, in performing the facilitative role, espousing journalistic objectivity, and by allowing multiple voices expression, the paper oscillated towards peace journalism. An in-depth institutional analysis might be a useful way of taking this research further.

Bibliography

AfdeInfo. 2007. Zimpapers-Newspaper Publishing. Retrieved 20 October 2010 from http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_58882.html

Alexander, J., McGregor, J. and Ranger, T. 2000. *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland*. Harare: Weaver.

Alexander, J. and McGregor, J. 2003. Democracy, Development and Political Conflict: Rural Institutions in Matabeleland North after Independence. In Ranger, T. (Ed.) *The Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Althusser, L. 1994. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. In Storey, J. (Ed.) *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Archetti, C. 2010. *Explaining News: National Politics and Journalistic Cultures in Global Context*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Aristotle. 1962. *Poetics*. (trans. James Hutton). New York: W.W. Norton.

Aristotle. 1984. Rhetoric. (trans. W. Rhys Roberts) In Barnes, J. (Ed.) *The Complete Works of Aristotle. Vol. 2*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Armstrong, O. K. 1926. Beginnings of the Modern Newspaper: A Comparative Study of St. Louis Dailies from 1875-1925. *University of Missouri Bulletin*, 27(5): 17.

Arno, A. 1984. Communication, Conflict, and Storylines: The News Media as Actors in a Cultural Context. In Arno, A. and Dissanayake, W. (Eds.) *The News Media in National and International Conflict*. London: Westview.

Atton, C. 2003. What is Alternative Journalism? *Journalism*, 4(3): 267-272.

Atton, C. 2011. Approaching Alternative Media: Theory and Methodology. Retrieved 21 May 2011 from citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.108.

Auret, M. 2009. *From Liberator to Dictator: An Insider's Account of Robert Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont: Davidphilip.

Austin, J. L. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2001. *The Practice of Social Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barker, C. 2000. *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice*. London: Sage.

Becker, H. S. 1990. Generalising from Case Studies. In Eisner, E.W. and Peshkin, A. (Eds.) *Qualitative Research in Education: The Continuing Debate*. New York: Teachers College Press.

- Bell, M. 1997. TV News: How Far Should We Go? *British Journalism Review*, 8(1): 7-16.
- Benson, R. 2006. News Media as a "Journalistic Field": What Bourdieu Adds to New Institutionalism, and Vice-Versa. *Political Communication*, 23(2): 187-202.
- Berkowitz, D. 1997. Overview: Why a Social Meanings of News Perspective. In Berkowitz, D. (Ed.) *Social Meanings of News: A Text Reader*. London: Sage
- Blumler, J. G. and Gurevitch, M. 1998. The Political Effects of Communication. In Gurevitch, M. et al. (Eds.) *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, P. 1998. *On Television*. (trans. by Ferguson, P. P.) New York: New Press.
- Boyd-Barrett, O. 2004. Understanding: The Second Casualty. In Allan, S. and Zelizer, B. (Eds.) *Reporting War*. London: Routledge.
- Braun, V. and Clarke, V. 2006. Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2): 77-101.
- Bryman, A. 1988. *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*. London: Routledge.
- Calcutt, A and Hammond, P. 2011. *Journalism Studies: A Critical Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Carpentier, N. 2003. Journalism, Media and Democracy. In Cammaerts, B. and Carpentier, N. (Eds.) *Reclaiming the Media: Communication Rights and Democratic Media Roles*. Portland: Intellect Books.
- Carpentier, N. 2005. Identity, Contingency and Rigidity: The (Counter-) Hegemonic Constructions of the Media Professional. *Journalism*, 6(2): 199-219.
- Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. 2007. *Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
- Chalk, F. And Jonassohn, K. 1990. The Conceptual Framework. In Chalk, F and Jonassohn, K. (Eds.) *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Chimhundu, H. 1992. Early Missionaries and the Ethnolinguistic Factor During the 'Invention of Tribalism' in Zimbabwe. *Journal of African History*, 33(1):87-109.
- Christians, C. G. et al. 2009. *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Chuma, W. 2004. Liberating or Limiting the Public Sphere: Media Policy and the Zimbabwe Transition 1980-2004. In Raftopoulos, B. and Savage, T. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Harare: Weaver.

- Cliffe, L. *et al.* 1980. Nationalist Politics in Zimbabwe: The 1980 Elections and Beyond. *Review of African Political Economy*, 18(2): 44-67.
- Commission on the Freedom of Press. 1947. *A Free and Responsible Press*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Coser, L. A. 1967. *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Cottle, S. 2006. *Mediatized Conflict: Developments in Media and Conflict Studies*. Berkshire: Open University Press.
- Deacon, D. *et al.* 2007. *Researching Communications: A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis*. London: Hodder Education.
- DeSantis, L. and Ugarriza, D. N. 2000. The Concept of Theme as Used in Qualitative Nursing Research. *Western Journal of Nursing Research*, 22(3): 351-372.
- van Dijk, T. A. 1985. Structures of News in the Press. In van Dijk, T. A. (Ed.) *Discourse and Communication: New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media, Discourse and Communication*. New York: de Gruyter.
- van Dijk, T. A. 2001. Multidisciplinary CDA: A Plea for Diversity. In Wodak, R. And Meyer, M. (Eds.) *Methods of Discourse Analysis: Introducing Qualitative Methods*. London: Sage.
- van Dijk, T. A. 2007. *Discourse Analysis: Its Development and Application to the Structure of News*. London: Sage.
- van Dijk, T. A. 2007. Discourse Analysis: Its Development and Application to the Structure of News. In McQuail, D. *Mass Communication: Volume 3, Media Production and Content*. London: Sage.
- Durham, F. S. 1998. News Frames as Social Narratives: TWA Flight 800. *Journal of Communication*, 48(4): 100-117.
- Eldridge, J and Eldridge, L. 1994. *Raymond Williams: Making Connections*. London: Routledge.
- Entman, R. 1991. Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents. *Journal of Communication*, 41(4): 6-27.
- Entman, R. 1993. Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4): 51-58.
- Entman, R. 2004. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Eppel, S. 2004. 'Gukurahundi' The Need for Truth and Reparation. In Raftopoulos, B. and Savage, T. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Harare: Weaver.
- Fairclough, N. 2003. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge.

- Fedler, F. 1984. *Reporting for the Print Media. 3rd Edition*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Figdor, C. 2010. Objectivity in the News: Finding a Way Forward. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 25(1): 19-33*.
- Fowler, R. 1991. *Language in the News*. London: Routledge.
- Frere, M. S. 2007. *The Media and Conflicts in Central Africa*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Fuchs, C. 2010. Alternative Media as Critical Media. *European Journal of Social Theory, 13(2): 173-192*.
- Galtung, J. and Ruge, M. 1973. Structuring and Selecting News. In Cohen, S. and Young, J. (Eds.) *The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media*. London: Constable.
- Galtung, J. 1986. On Role of the Media in Worldwide Security and Peace. In Varis, T. (Ed.) *Peace and Communication*. San Jose: Universidad para La Paz.
- Galtung, J. 1998. Peace Journalism: What, Why, Who, How, When, Where. Paper Presented at a Workshop: *What are Journalists For?* 3-6 September, TRANSCEND, Taplow Court.
- Galtung, J. 2006. Peace Journalism as an Ethical Challenge. *GMJ: Mediterranean Edition, 1(2): 1-5*.
- Gans, H. J. 1980. *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*. New York: Vintage.
- Garnham, N. 2007. Habermas and the Public Sphere. *Global Media and Communication, 3(2): 201-214*.
- Genocide Watch. 2010. Genocide Watch Calls for Prosecution of Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe for Genocide. Retrieved 20 February 2012 from <http://www.genocidewatch.org/zimbabwe.html>
- Gerbner, G. 1992. Violence and Terror in and by the Media. In Raboy, M. and Dagenais, B. (Eds.) *Media, Crisis and Democracy: Mass Communication and the Disruption of Social Order*. London: Sage.
- Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A. L. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Glasser, T. L. 1991. Communication and the Cultivation of Citizenship. *Communication, 12(4): 235-248*.
- Glasser, T. L. and Ettema, J. S. 1993. When the Facts Don't Speak for Themselves: A Study of the Use of Irony in Daily Journalism. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 10(4): 322-338*.

Guba, E. G. 1990. The Alternative Paradigm Dialog. In Guba, E. G. (Ed.) *The Paradigm Dialog*. Newbury Park: Sage.

Gurevitch, M. and Blumler, J. G. 1990. Political Communication Systems and Democratic Values. In Lichtenberg, J. (Ed.) *Democracy and the Mass Media*. New York: Cambridge.

Habermas, J. 2006. Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research. *Communication Theory*, 16(4): 411-426.

Hackett, R. A. 1989. Spaces for Dissent: The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada. *Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the International Communication Association*, San Fransisco.

Hackett, R. A. 2006. Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing Structure and Agency in News Media. *Conflict and Communication Online*, 5(2): 1-21.

Hackett, R. A. 2007. Journalism versus Peace? Notes on a Problematic Relationship. *GMJ: Mediterranean Edition*, 2(1): 47-53.

Hall, S. et al. 1978. *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Hall, S. 1992. The Question of Cultural Identity. In Hall, S., Held, D. and McGrew, T. (Eds.) *Modernity and its Futures*. Oxford: The Open University.

Hall, S. 1997. The Work of Representation. In Hall, S. (Ed.) *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. London: Sage.

Hamelink, C. J. 2008. Media between Warmongers and Peacemakers. *Media, War and Conflict*, 1(1): 77-83.

Hammersley, M. 1992. *What's Wrong with Ethnography?* London: Sage.

Hammersely, M. 2008. Assessing Validity in Social Research. In Alasuutari, P., Bickman, L. and Brannen, J. (Eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Social Research Methods*. London: Sage.

Hammersley, M. 2008. *Questioning Qualitative Inquiry: Critical Essays*. London: Sage.

Hampton, M. 2008. The Objectivity Ideal and its Limitations in the 20th Century British Journalism. *Journalism Studies*, 9(4): 477-493.

Hanitzsch, T. 2004. Journalists as Peacekeeping Force? Peace Journalism and Mass Communication Theory. *Journalism Studies*, 5(4): 483-595.

Hanitzsch, T. 2007. Situating Peace Journalism in Journalism Studies: A Critical Appraisal. *Conflict and Communication online*, 6(2): 1-9.

Hanitzsch, T. 2007. Deconstructing Journalism Culture: Toward a Universal Theory. *Communication Theory*, 17(4): 367-385.

- Harrower, T. 2007. *Inside Reporting: A Practical Guide to the Craft of Journalism*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Hastings, A. 1997. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Held, D. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cornwall: Polity.
- Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. 1988. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Hill, G. 2003. *The Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown*. Cape Town: Zebra.
- Hook, D. 2007. *Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hume, M. 1997. *Whose War is it Anyway? The Dangers of the Journalism of Attachment*. London: Informinc.
- Janowitz, M. 2000. Professional Models in Journalism: The Gatekeeper and the Advocate. In Scammell, M. and Semetko, H. (Eds.) *The Media, Journalism and Democracy*. Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth.
- Johnson, R. B. and Onwuegbuzie, A. J. 2004. Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time has Come. *Educational Researcher*, 33(7): 13-26.
- Johnston, H. 1995. A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schema. In Johnston, H. and Klandermans, B. (Eds.) *Social Movements and Culture*. London: UCL.
- Keeble, R. 2005. Journalism Ethics: Towards an Orwellian Critique? In Allan, S. (Ed.) *Journalism: Critical Issues*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Kruger, N. 2005. Zanu (PF) Strategies in Elections, 1980-2000: Discourse and Coercion. *African Affairs*, 104 (414): 1-34.
- Kvale, S. 1996. *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*. London: Sage.
- LeCompte, M. D. and Goetz, J. 1982. Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Research. *Review Educational Research*, 52(1): 31-60.
- Lee, S. T. and Maslog, C. C. 2005. War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper Coverage of Conflicts. *Journal of Communication*, 55 (2): 311-329.
- Lee, S. T. 2009. Peace Journalism. In Wilkins, L. and Christians, C. G. (Eds.) *The Handbook of Mass Media Ethics*. London: Routledge.

- Lee, S. T. 2010. Truth Telling as a Journalistic Imperative. In McGlone, M. S. and Knapp, M. L. (Eds.) *The Interplay of Truth and Deception: New Agendas in Communication*. New York: Routledge.
- Lewis, J. and Ritchie, J. 2003. Generalising from Qualitative Research. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (Eds.) *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: Sage.
- Lichtenberg, J. 1996. In Defence of Objectivity Revisited. In Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (Eds.) *Mass Media and Society*. London: Arnold.
- Lichtenberg, J. 2000. In Defence of Objectivity Revisited. In Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (Eds.) *Mass Media and Society*. 3rd Edition. London: Arnold.
- Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, G. E. 1985. *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Beverley Hills: Sage.
- Lindgren, B. 2005. The Politics of Remembrance of Violence: Ethnicity and Gender at the Installation of a Female Chief in Zimbabwe. In Broch-Due, V. (Ed.) *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa*. New York: Routledge.
- Lynch, J. and McGoldrick, A. 2005. *Peace Journalism*. Gloucestershire: Hawthorn.
- Macedo, S. 1999. *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Masunungure, E. 2006. Nation Building, State Building and Power Configuration. Retrieved 18 November 2010 from <http://www.accord.org.za>.
- Matshazi, M. J. 2007. *Zimbabwe: With Robert Mugabe to the Brink of the Abyss*. University of Fort Hare.
- Maxwell, J. A. 2002. Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research. In Huberman, A. M. and Miles, M. B. (Eds.) *The Qualitative Researcher's Companion*. London: Sage.
- McGoldrick, A. and Lynch, J. 2000. What is Peace Journalism? *Activate, Winter 2000: 6-9*.
- McLaughlin, G. 2002. *The War Correspondent*. London: Pluto.
- McNair, B. 1998. *The Sociology of Journalism*. London: Edward Arnold.
- McNair, B. 2007. *An Introduction to Political Communication*. 4th Edition. London: Sage.
- McQuail, D. 1991. Mass Media in the Public Interest: Towards a Framework of Norms for Media Performance. In Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (Eds.) *Mass Media and Society*. London: Edward Arnold.
- McQuail, D. 2000. *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*. 4th Edition. London: Sage.
- McQuail, D. 2006. Media Roles in Society. In Carpentier, N. et al. (Eds.) *Researching Media, Democracy and Participation: The Intellectual Work of the 2006 European Media and Communication Doctoral Summer School*. Tartu: Tartu University Press.

- Meredith, M. 2003. *Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Merriam, S. B. 2002. Introduction to Qualitative Research. In Merriam, S. B. (Ed.) *Qualitative Research in Practice: Examples for Discussion and Analysis*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Mills, S. 2004. *Michel Foucault*. London: Routledge.
- Mills, S. 2004. *Discourse: The Critical Idiom*. New York: Routledge.
- Muzondidya, J. and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2007. Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 7(2): 275-297.
- Oberschall, A. 1978. Theories of Social Conflict. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 4: 291-315.
- Ogan, C. L. 1980. *Development Journalism/Communication: The Status of the Concept*. Boston: Educational Resources Information Center.
- Ogden, R. 1912. Journalism and Public Opinion: An Address before the American Political Science Association, December 1912. Proceedings IX, 194. In Graves, W. B. (Ed.) 1928. *Readings in Public Opinion: Its Formation and Control*. New York: D. Appleton.
- Opler, M. E. 1945. Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture. *American Journal of Sociology*, 51(3): 198-206.
- Pan, Z. and Kosicki, G. M. 1993. Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse. *Political Communication*, 10(1): 55-75.
- Phillips, L. and Jorgensen, M. W. 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage.
- Phimister, I. 2008. The Making and Meaning of the Massacres in Matabeleland. *Development Dialogue*, 50: 197-213.
- Plaisance, P. L. 2005. *An Assessment of Media Ethics Education: Course Content and the Values and Ethical Ideologies of Media Ethics Students*. 55th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association, New York.
- Polkinghorne, D. E. 1983. *Methodology for the Human Sciences*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Preston, P. 2009. 'The Cultural Air': Ideology, Discourse and Power. In Preston, P. (Ed.) *Making the News: Journalism and News Cultures in Europe*. New York: Routledge.
- Raboy, M. and Dagenais, B. 1992. Introduction: Media and the Politics of Crisis. In Raboy, M. and Dagenais, B. (Eds.) *Media, Crisis, and Democracy: Mass Communication and the Disruption of Social Order*. London: Sage.
- Rafferty, E. 2008. Headlines. In Franklin, B. (Ed.) *Pulling Newspapers Apart: Analysing Print Journalism*. London: Routledge.
- Ranger, T. O. 1985. *The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe*. Gweru: Mambo.

- Reese, S. D. 2003. Prologue – Framing Public Life: A Bridging Model for Media Research. In Reese, S. D. *et al.* (Eds.) *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Richardson, J. E. 2007. *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ritchie, J., Lewis, J. and Elam, G. 2003. Designing and Selecting Samples. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (Eds.) *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: Sage.
- Robson, C. 2002. *Real World Research. 2nd Edition*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ronning, H. and Kupe, T. 2000. The Dual Legacy of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Media and the State in Zimbabwe. In Curran, J. and Myung, J. P. (Eds.) *De-westernising Media Studies*. London: Routledge.
- Rosen, J. 1999. The Action of the Idea: Public Journalism in Built Form. In Glasser, T. (Ed.) *The Idea of Public Journalism*. New York: The Guilford.
- Rystrom, K. 1983. *The Why, Who and How of the Editorial Page*. New York: Random House.
- Saunders, R. 1991. *Information in the Interregnum: The Press, State and Civil Society in Struggles for Hegemony, Zimbabwe 1980-1990*. PhD Thesis, Carleton University.
- Saunders, R. 1999. *Dancing Out of Tune: A History of the Media in Zimbabwe*. Harare: The Open Society Institute.
- Scanlan, C. 2000. *Reporting and Writing: Basics for the 21st Century*. Orlando: Harcourt.
- Schaefer, C. D. 2006. The Effects of Escalation vs. De-escalation Oriented Conflict Coverage on the Evaluation of Military Measures. *Conflict and Communication Online*, 5(1): 1-17.
- Schudson, M. 1978. *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers*. New York: Basic.
- Schudson, M. 2000. The Sociology of News Production Revisited (Again). In Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (Eds.) *Mass Media and Society. 3rd Edition*. London: Arnold.
- Schudson, M. 2003. *The Sociology of News*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Schwarz, B. 1986. Conservatism, Nationalism and Imperialism. In Donald, J. and Hall, S. (Eds.) *Politics and Ideology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Shoemaker, P. J. and Reese, S. D. 1996. *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influence on Mass Media Content*. New York: Longman.

- Siebert, F. S. et al. 1956. *Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should be and Do*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Silverman, D. 2010. *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*. 3rd Edition. London: Sage.
- Sithole, M. 1993. Is Zimbabwe Poised on a Liberal Path? The State and Prospects of the Parties. *A Journal of Opinion*, 21(1):35-43.
- Skillington, T. 1997. Politics and the Struggle to Define: A Discourse Analysis of the Framing Strategies of Competing Actors in a "New" Participatory Forum. *British Journal of Sociology*, 48(3): 493-513.
- Sparks, C. 2007. *Globalisation, Development and the Mass Media*. London: Sage.
- Spradley, J. P. 1979. *The Ethnographic Interview*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Stonecipher, H. W. 1979. *Editorial and Persuasive Writing: Opinion Functions of the News Media*. New York: Hastings House.
- Tankard, J. et al. 1991. *Media Frames: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement*. Paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication annual convention, Boston, MA, August.
- Tehrani, M. 2002. Peace Journalism: Negotiating Global Media Ethics. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 7(2): 58-83.
- Thompson, J. B. 1990. *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Tomlinson, J. 1991. *Cultural Imperialism*. London: Pinter.
- Tuchman, G. 1972. Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity. *American Journal of Sociology*, 77(4): 660-679.
- Van Gorp, B. 2007. The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bridging Culture Back. *Journal of Communication*, 57(1): 60-78.
- Wahl-Jorgensen, K. 2008. Op-ed Pages. In Franklin, B. (Ed.) *Pulling Newspapers Apart: Analysing Print Journalism*. London: Routledge.
- Ward, S. J. 1998. An Answer to Martin Bell: Objectivity and Attachment in Journalism. *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 3(3): 121-125.
- Weldon, M. 2008. *Everyman News: The Changing American Front Page*. Columbia: University Of Missouri Press.
- Werbner, R. 1995. Human Rights and Moral Knowledge: Arguments of Accountability in Zimbabwe. In Strathern, M. (Ed.) *Shifting Contexts: Transformations in Anthropological Knowledge*. London: Routledge.

Werbner, R. 1996. Multiple Identities, Plural Arenas. In Werbner, R. and Ranger, T. (Eds.) *Post-Colonial Identities in Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Willis, J. 2010. *The Mind of a Journalist: How Reporters View Themselves, their World, and their Craft*. London: Sage.

Wolfsfeld, G. 1997a. *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfsfeld, G. 2004. *Media and the Path to Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, K. 2003. *Understanding Media Theory*. London: Arnold.

Williams, R. 1961. *Communications and Community*. London: Birmingham.

Windrich, E. 1981. *The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Censorship and Propaganda under Rhodesian Front Rule*. Gwelo: Mambo.

Young, R. 1981. Introduction to Foucault's 'The Order of Discourse'. In Young, R. (Ed.) *Untying the Text: A Post-structural Anthology*. Boston: Routledge.

Zaffiro, J. J. 1993. Mass Media, Politics and Society in Botswana: The 1990s and Beyond. *Africa Today*, 40(1): 7-25.

Online References

<http://www.newzimbabwe.com> [Type the word "Gukurahundi" in search box and press Enter]

http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Gukurahundi&aq=f

<http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/search/?for=gukurahundi&category=all>

http://www.bulawayo24.com/index-id-g_search.html?cx=partner-pub-9770496592056255%3A6659166855&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=UTF-8&q=Gukurahundi&sa=Search#1059

Appendix A

1. Thematic Distribution Trends – 1983
2. Thematic Distribution Trends – 1984
3. Thematic Distribution Trends – 1985
4. Thematic Distribution Trends – 1986
5. Final Sample Thematic Distribution.

1. Thematic Distribution trends for 1983

1983	Front Page			Editorial Page		
	Month	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity	Dissidents	5 th Brigade
January	15	1		4		
February	20	2		3	1	
March	9	3	3	2	1	2
April	14			8		1
May	7		3	3		
June	8			5		
July	11			5	1	2
August	10			1		2
September	4	1		1		
October	6		2			3
November	10	2	2	1		
December	4			2		

2. Thematic Distribution trends for 1984

1984	Front Page			Editorial Page		
	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity
January	2	3		3		
February	8			3		
March	4	2		3	2	
April	4	5		1		3
May	6	2		5	3	
June	8					
July						
August	7		1	1		
September	4		2			1
October	3		1			4
November	7		1	3		
December	3			1		

3. Thematic Distribution trends for 1985

1985	Front Page			Editorial Page		
	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity
January	4	1	3	1		
February	2	1				
March	6			2		
April	3		1	4		
May	2		1	1		1
June	6		1	1		1
July	5					1
August	5		3	4		
September	7		4	1		2
October	3		1	2		
November						
December	1		2	1		4

4. Thematic Distribution trends for 1986

1986	Front Page			Editorial Page		
	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity	Dissidents	5 th Brigade	Unity
January	7			3		
February	5					
March	3		2	2		1
April	1		1			2
May	3					2
June	1		1			
July	5		3	1		2
August	1	1	3	1		2
September	5		2			
October	1		1	1		2
November	4		2			
December	5		3			3

5. Final Sample Thematic Distribution.



Appendix B

Sample Stories from *The Chronicle*

Dissidents

1. Peasants back Govt. war on dissidents [17 January 1983]
2. Return to the fold PM tells Dissidents [02 July 1983]
3. ZAPU 'has given Govt plans to eliminate dissidents' [04 July 1983]

5th Brigade

4. Nkomo, Smith 'seek to destroy morale' [15 February 1984]
5. President hits at Church for allegations on 'atrocities' [08 May 1984]
6. Atrocities: Reporters find no evidence [11 May 1984]

Unity

7. PM renews unity call [25 July 1986]
8. Dabengwa freed [05 December 1986]
9. Unity within our grasp [19 December 1986]

Peasants back Govt. war on dissidents

Chronicle Reporter

1 PEASANTS in Tsholotsho have expressed their full support for the Government's fight against dissidents. This was revealed during a two-day tour of the dissident-weary district by the Under-Secretary for Development in Matabeleland North, Cde. Jacob Mudenda.



Dr. Dlamini

Hospital head is picked up

Chronicle Reporter

THE medical superintendent at Mpilo Hospital, Dr. J. C. Dlamini, a matron and two nursing sisters were picked up by police yesterday morning.

It was not immediately known why they were taken by the police.

A spokesman for Mpilo said two uniformed police officers arrived at the hospital between 9.30 and 10 a.m. and took Dr. Dlamini, the matron and two nursing sisters away.

2 Tsholotsho has experienced a number of acts of banditry including the recent destruction of Government construction equipment worth \$2 000 000.

3 Cde. Mudenda called upon the peasants to play a greater role in assisting the Government on a fight against dissidents.

4 "To maintain social development and peace in the area, you people must co-operate with the law enforcement officers by exposing the presence of dissidents," he said.

5 By tolerating the presence of dissidents, the peasantry contributed to the destruction of their own social and economic gains.

CLINICS

6 "It was you who sent the councillors to tell the Government that because of the prolonged drought you were hungry and thirsty, that you wanted pens and dips constructed for your dying livestock.

7 "You also wanted roads constructed in the area. And you wanted clinics and medical staff, schools and teachers," he said.

8 Cde. Mudenda said the Government responded to the requests by sending machinery, water and road engineers. School buildings and a clinic were started. Food was also sent through the drought relief programme.

9 "All this was done through the development programme that benefits all the people of Zimbabwe irrespective of their political affiliation," he said.

10 It was not the people of Tsholotsho only who were

affected by the drought and the effects of under development, but the whole country.

11 "What happened after the Government had sent the machinery, the experts and workers? The machinery was burnt and the workers threatened with death," he said.

12 "Who stands to lose from all this destruction?" Cde. Mudenda asked. "Should the Government leave you alone Workers and contractors are now afraid to move into Tsholotsho because they fear death and destruction of their property," he said.

13 There were loud murmurs of, "no, no, no", and the shaking of heads in disapproval when Cde. Mudenda asked his questions.

14 When the peasants took to the floor they alleged it had been difficult to distinguish between National Army soldiers and dissidents because they all wore the same camouflage uniforms.

15 One peasant claimed to Cde. Mudenda that none of the elected Members of Parliament or Ministers had ever come to the district wards to meet and talk to the people.

16 "They all end up in Tsholotsho administrative centre and yet we are the ones who carry the heaviest burden."

17 The man also called for Ministerial visits to wards and regular meeting with councillors.

18 Cde. Mudenda replied that the peasants should work in close consultation

with councillors and that the member-in-charge of the police should be notified if meetings were to be held. About Ministerial visits, he said he would take the matter up with the Government.

19 At one meeting the peasants sang in English saying "Let's all work together as one Zimbabwean Nation". At another, a woman wore a red T-shirt with the emblem "Peace — Zimbabwe — Unity".

20 Already in the dusty roads of Tsholotsho, villages are seeing drought relief trucks carrying grain and seed to be delivered to the peasants.

21 Police and army units escort the trucks and workers doing their jobs in the various areas.

PEACE

22 "But it is very costly. To keep police and soldiers in the fields, on the roads and at work places to protect people against dissident attacks," Cde. Mudenda said.

23 "If peace is maintained, that money could be used on development projects."

24 The peasants appeared to have assured Cde. Mudenda that they would work in full co-operation with the law enforcement officers because they wanted economic and social development of their wards.

25 They said they would no longer tolerate the presence of people bent on destroying progress. They had suffered enough, they told Cde. Mudenda.

RETURN TO THE FOLD PM TELLS DISSIDENTS 'Peace Vital for Development'

Chronicle Reporter

2/07/83

ality
nce
000,
or
he
for
he
be
s it
nce
or
one
in-
pe-
ect-
ion
any
sed
esi-
will
les
ing
ree-
Air
the
ms
im-
ba-
ate
im-
the
ick
the
de
not
ill
nt
nd
ne
rr.
th
id
nd
n-
A
io
rr
j-
rr
e
e
o

1 THE Prime Minister Cde Mugabe yesterday called on dissidents who have taken refuge in Botswana to return to Zimbabwe and join in the peaceful development of the country.

2 He was addressing a rally at Hwange Stadium at the end of a day-long tour of inspection of the mining town.

3 It was Cde Mugabe's first visit to Hwange in two years. He repeated the call for peace and unity he made in Lien, emphasising that without everyone's co-operation the task of national development would be more difficult.

4 The Prime Minister warned dissidents that the Government would meet force with brutal force if the bandits continued trying to topple the Government.

5 CONCERN

6 Dealing with developments of the past two years, Cde Mugabe said two of them continued to cause the Government great concern.

7 These were the rebellion by dissidents who sought to install PF-ZAPU into power by force and the drought that had swept the country for two seasons.

8 It was not anyone's fault, the Prime Minister said, that there was the drought. But the Government condemned dissidents for their activities which in many cases had halted badly needed development projects.

9 Cde Mugabe said Zimbabwe had a majority Government of the people under the banner of ZANU (PF).

10 After winning the 1980 elections, ZANU (PF) had invited PF-ZAPU and the then Rhodesian Front to join in a government of national unity.

11 This was a hand of friendship which the other parties had to reciprocate.

12 They had instead extended only one hand, while hiding the one that held a gun behind their back.

13 The Prime Minister said double-dealing by those concerned had touched the Government on its most

sensitive nerve, and was therefore completely unacceptable.

14 The Government's answer to the dissident problem was therefore to redouble its determination to crush them, and the Government had ample means to do it.

15 DOMINATED

16 If there were those who believed that the Government which was dominated by ZANU(PF) could be replaced by that of PF-ZAPU through the barrel of the gun, they must be reminded that they would not find his party wanting.

17 Cde Mugabe said the Government would never allow a situation to develop which did not reflect the wishes of the people.

18 It should be understood, therefore, that any action the Government took against dissidents was in the national interest.

19 The Government wanted to see absolute peace returning to Zimbabwe and it was satisfied that there were people in PF-ZAPU who shared this goal with the Government.

20 It was for this reason that the Government had not banned PF-ZAPU, to promote unity to build Zimbabwe. All Zimbabweans had a role to play to achieve this aspiration.

21 PAY RISE

22 Cde Mugabe said the people of Hwange, who formed a diversity of tribes, had demonstrated that Zimbabweans could work together for the common good.

23 For its part, the Government was always ready to promote this spirit of multi-co-operation in the service of the nation, the Prime Minister said.

24 When the Government provided community facilities

it did so irrespective of tribal, political or racial affiliation of the people concerned, and cited education as an example.

25 Cde Mugabe said the Government was looking into the question of a general pay rise for Zimbabweans, and an announcement might be made in a few weeks.

26 With the drought and other problems, the Government had not had an easy year but the Government would look into their grievances.

27 The Prime Minister urged the people to work hard and to continue sending money to their people in rural areas.

Ex-REF MP taximen for

A FORMER Member of Parliament in the rebel Rhodesian regime appeared at West London magistrate's court yesterday charged with taking taxi rides without the money to pay for them.

Ian Rees-Davies (36) of no fixed address, pleaded guilty to defrauding two taxi drivers of the equivalent of about Z\$126 by taking long rides around London on May 28 and 30 and then failing to pay for them, reports ARNOLD RAPHAEL from London.

Social inquiry reports were prepared and read by the magistrate, Mr Eric Crowther who said that they showed Rees-

Da
lic
Ju
Re
Dr
int
his
a
liv
in
la:
ho
bo
so
th
a
se
tw
off
re
pe
dr

ZAPU 'has given Govt plans to eliminate dissidents'

1 PF-ZAPU has put proposals to the Government aimed at eliminating the problems of armed banditry in Matabeleland, the party's acting president, Cde Josiah Chinamano, said yesterday.

2 Cde Chinamano, who was addressing a party meeting at Harare's Arcadia Community Hall, said armed banditry was the major problem that confronted the Government.

3 "I want to make it clear that PF-ZAPU does not support armed banditry and that armed banditry is not the making of PF-ZAPU.

4 "PF-ZAPU has no right or ability to stop that kind of dissidence. But like all good Zimbabweans we are prepared to help the Government in bringing down dissidents.

5 UNITY TALKS

5 "We have put forward plans and ideas to the Government so that dissidents can be eliminated. We say to the Government, we are with you in your attempts to eliminate dissidents."

6 He said it was wrong to assume that only the PF-ZAPU Ministers and Deputy Ministers were the people who supported the Government.

7 Cde Chinamano said it was necessary for ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU to forge unity together but "no unity will be forged at the top level without consulting you, the povo," he told party members.

8 Although Cde Chinamano told the party followers that he did not have anything to report to them on the unity talks, he claimed the ZANU (PF) concept of unity was that everyone must become its member.

9 "This is a non-starter. There are other ways of attaining unity. When we have something to report to you on the unity talks, we will do so."

10 Cde Chinamano said the party's president, Dr Joshua Nkomo now in Britain, left the country after reliable sources had informed him that his life was in danger.

11 But when Dr Nkomo left he did not say he was going to live in exile and die there.

12 Cde Chinamano said he was prepared to step down if his party was not satisfied that he should act during Dr Nkomo's absence.

13 "We could look for somebody to take over as acting president in the absence of Cde Nkomo within the PF-ZAPU central committee," he said.

14 He said he would be willing to give way to anybody who was prepared to take over as acting president until such a time when Dr Nkomo returned home.

15 WILLING

15 But so far, he said, the PF-ZAPU central committee was willing to have him act as the party's president in the absence of Dr Nkomo.

16 Cde Chinamano said the fact that the PF-ZAPU central committee was prepared to have him as acting president showed that there was no tribalism within the party.

17 He praised the Government in its efforts to train teachers saying that bringing in expatriate teachers should be a last measure.

18 He also commended the Government for the way it was handling the resettlement scheme but warned that the resettlement areas could become depleted of natural vegetation if measures were not taken to prevent the wanton destruction of trees. — Own Corr-Ziana.

Nkrumah's overthrow regretted

GHANA'S Minister of Culture and Tourism, Asiedu Yirenkyi has admitted that the overthrow of Ghana's first President, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, was a great mistake and a major setback for his country.

Speaking yesterday at the world conference of Journalists in Pyongyang, capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Cde Yirenkyi said the overthrow of Cde Nkrumah in 1966 was an event which made Ghana and "for that matter Africa and Africa's quest for unity, and progress suffer a major setback".

Despite this setback, he noted, the people of Ghana were once again on a course of a popular revolutionary process under the leadership of Flt-Lt Jerry Rawlings.

He criticised attempts by the Western Press to denigrate and defile his country's revolution "to misinform the world of events taking place in Ghana".

The Minister attributed Ghana's under-development largely to imperialism. — Ziana.

Gaddafi off

Libyan leader Cde Muammar Gaddafi left Morocco yesterday after a four-day "friendly working visit" that included a series of meetings with King Hassan II. It was the first visit to Morocco by Cde Gaddafi in 14 years. — Ziana-AP.

Nkomo, Smith 'seek to destroy morale'

THE leaders of PF-ZAPU and the Republican Front, Dr Joshua Nkomo and Mr Ian Smith, were angrily attacked in the House of Assembly yesterday by Government Ministers and backbenchers for trying to lower the morale of security forces while boosting that of dissidents.

Emotions ran high and tempers flared during the debate on the adjournment of the House, after Dr Nkomo made fresh allegations of atrocities committed by security forces in the curfew areas in Matabeleland South.

He claimed six people had been killed by security forces in Kezi and buried in a shallow grave because they had been accused of

failing to report the presence of dissidents in the area.

Dr Nkomo claimed that since the curfew was imposed about three weeks ago, several children had collapsed and others had died because of lack of food in the area.

The debate became more heated and rowdy as the RF leader, Mr Smith joined hands with Dr Nkomo in condemning the security forces and accusing them of failing to protect the interests of white farmers in Matabeleland.

The leader of the House, Cde Eddison Zvobgo accused the two of trying to lower the morale of the forces while boosting that of dissidents.

Cde Zvobgo who is the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, said the nation should not forget that Dr Nkomo had

now assumed a new role — that of "publicity secretary for dissidents" adding: "He wants to use this House so that dissidents can hear that he still speaks on their behalf."

As for Mr Smith, Cde Zvobgo did not understand why Mr Smith should want to continue to speak for the white community he no longer represented.

Returning to the PF-ZAPU leader, the Minister said "at some point, this Government will have to say enough is enough, regardless of what the size of the man is".

The PF-ZAPU leader who kept pounding his leather arm rest, shouting "you are liars" to Cabinet Ministers, was warned several times by the Deputy Speaker, Cde Bassopo Moyo, to be quiet, in what had become a rowdy debate.

Cde Zvobgo said he would not reply to most of the allegations made by Dr Nkomo as these would be dealt with "blow by blow" by Security Ministers, who were not in the House at the time.

The Minister of National Supplies, Cde Enos Nkala disclosed he had spoken to Dr Nkomo in Harare on Sunday after the PF-ZAPU leader telephoned him at his home.

"When I got to his house, Cde Nkomo told me his cousin had been taken by security forces from Bulawayo to Kezi and that he believed him to have been killed," he said.

Cde Nkala said the PF-ZAPU leader had then related to him a catalogue of cases of alleged atrocities which, he said were being committed by security forces in curfew areas of Matabeleland South.

"I told him of the Gumedede story that he is on record as having said Gumedede had been killed and that the story he was giving me could be the same as the Gumedede story," Cde Nkala said.

The Minister said he and Dr Nkomo had agreed to meet in Bulawayo this week so the PF-ZAPU leader could show him where the people allegedly murdered by the security forces had been buried, but he was surprised to hear Dr Nkomo raise the issue in the Assembly.

During their meeting Dr Nkomo had claimed a woman from Filabusi told him (Dr Nkomo) he (Cde Nkala) had shot and killed a young man who had asked him a question at a rally he addressed in the area.

"I told him he was happy he had not called for a Press conference and that I would convey reports of both incidences to the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence and Security," he added.


Cde Nkala accused Dr Nkomo of trying to champion the cause of the Ndebele. "I am as much a Ndebele as he is. The issue of Ndebeles is also of concern to me as it is to him, but he incites Ndebeles to rebel against the Government."

He regretted speaking in the manner he did "but it is necessary because there is need to cut Nkomo down to size".

"He has grown too big for himself. He has grown too big for the nation. He has grown too big for the Ndebeles."

Cde Nkala accused the PF-ZAPU leader of trying to divide the nation because of his personal ambitions which had not been fulfilled. — Zianna.

Parliament on Page 5.



Lobengula St: No more cars

Street which will be closed is that just outside the bus terminus where there was the greatest concentration of pedestrian traffic in the city, said City Roads Engineer, Mr Brian Louth.

The area had developed into a very dangerous

safeguard people walking across the road from being run over by cars.

In a warning to the public about the closure of Lobengula Street, the Town Clerk, Mr Ian Edmeades, asked motorists to take note of the closed section and adjust their routes.

Sun sends runners berserk

THE midday sun proved too much for runners in a Ugandan cross-country race last weekend — many went berserk in the heat and threw bottles at spectators or started fights with other runners.

Shortly after the starting gun went off, many of the 500 runners were

President hits at Church for allegations on 'atrocities'



ion
e:
ies
ed

if inquiry
is invited
from the
acts of the
secretary,
said in

an invited
tionnaires
ission or
instrative
their views

It started
ission had
with in-
over the
ing that
pic affect-

covered all
cal system
including
tax, taxa-
legal and
public ex-
provision
neral com-
s terms of

he public
only the
wanted.
board of
s had gone
respective

the com-
orn in last
would con-
in August.
full com-
pected to
ence from
luring their
to get a
ion of the

would meet
nber after
e would be
oral views.

he commis-
not idle in
s countries
materials on
s of their
ence which
d for their
Corr.

1 PRESIDENT Cde Banana yesterday criticised the Church for making allegations about army atrocities in Matabeleland South saying these were based on "gossip and hearsay picked from the streets".

2 He said in Gweru the Government has both a legitimate duty and moral responsibility to ensure the safety of all its citizens. It can therefore never be Government policy to send the national army into Matabeleland to exterminate the Ndebele people.

3 However, Cde Banana said, the Government could not support or tolerate those bent on terrorising innocent and unarmed civilians.

4 Officially opening the Southern African regional meeting of the World Council of Churches which is being attended by delegates from eight Southern African countries, Kenya, Liberia, the German Democratic Republic and Canada, Cde Banana said it was unfortunate innocent civilians found themselves caught in crossfire between security forces and dissidents.

5 "This is indeed a tragic situation but it is only the result of a deeper problem — the problem brought about by those who unlawfully took arms to destabilise our hard won peace and tranquillity.

6 "What was my Government expected to do? To be seized by an overwhelming fit of inertia and paralysis, and simply fold its arms and abandon the people of Matabeleland to the dissidents to butcher, rape and maim at will?"

7 Calling on the Church to work with the Government, he said the Church must not be shy to offer constructive criticism. But its condemnation of governments and predictions of dire consequences must not be based on hearsay and gossip picked up in the streets.

8 "Such unproven information is not something to preach sermons on from pulpits, or rush to the Press and create sensational news headlines.

9 "If the Church had to be constructive in its pronouncements it must in addition to conviction, have proof and substantiated evidence — especially if it must criticise elected governments."

10 Cde Banana said the Church should help in trying to achieve economic and social independence in Third World countries. To do this the Church had to help in effecting changes in the interests of the poor, the hungry and the oppressed.

11 In South Africa and Namibia the Church had to

continue to support the heroic efforts of the people of those countries who were trying to eradicate colonialism and the repugnant system of apartheid.

12 "The World Council of Churches stood by us in our hour of need. We hope it will not fail the people of Namibia and South Africa Zimbabwe, on its part, has no intention of kissing the face of apartheid," the President said.

13 In independent African states, the Church had to help these countries attain economic and social independence. Although these countries had won political independence, they were still battling legacies of the past such as meagre industrial infrastructure, underdeveloped and underutilised agricultural sectors, scarce foreign currency and an unfavourable climate of inequitable trading patterns.

COLONIAL

14 "We are painfully aware that whatever little development there was in our colonial past, it was deliberately geared to serve the interests of our former colonisers, and this has left behind a legacy in which our countries are permanently bound, in an inferior position, to the erstwhile colonial overlords," he said.

15 The President said the Church also had an urgent task to rebuild what it had unwittingly helped to destroy basically by portraying Christianity as synonymous with Western culture.

16 Because the Western culture was forced upon the people who had their own cultures this had resulted in a debased, distorted and superficial product which was neither African nor truly Western.

17 "What I am saying is simply this: Christianity is not synonymous to Western history, Western civilisation, Western culture or mythology," President Banana said.

18 "When a river flows through red soil, its water becomes red. If Christianity has to flow freely and permanently in Africa, its imagery, idiom and character must be African, and I make no apologies for that." — Midlands Reporter.

Indian fuel

INDIAN nuclear scientists have successfully produced an indigenous fuel for a fast-breeder test reactor nearing completion outside Madras, the head of India's atomic energy programme announced yesterday.

The fuel is a mix of plutonium and uranium carbide, the Atomic Energy Commission chairman, Mr Raja Ramanna said. — Ziana-AP.

Atrocities: Reporters Find no Evidence

Chronicle Reporter

1 A FULL day's intensive tour of Matabeleland South yesterday by about 50 local and foreign journalists failed to establish evidence of allegations of massive atrocities and massacres of civilians by members of the National Army who are currently engaged in a campaign to rid the area of dissidents.

2 The journalists had been allowed to go to any place in the province and speak to people of their choice. The army had only provided security for them.

3 At the end of the day the journalists were at Kezi shown two mounds of what were allegedly graves of six civilians, who, according to a local chief, Mr Phiso Sithole, had been shot by security forces.

4 Army commander, Gen Rex Nhongo, who together with Police Commissioner Witridzayi Nguruvu, had accompanied the journalists, offered to dig the alleged graves to check Mr Sithole's allegation.

5 But one of the villagers, Cde Albert Mdluli who had earlier claimed to be the father of one of the civilians buried there said he thought the soldiers had removed the bodies and burned them. Asked how he could tell he said a twig had "been broken."

6 Earlier when the team of journalists arrived at the home of Father Gabriel they saw a group of about 10 women and three men waiting. Father Gabriel, a Catholic priest, had been the original source of the allegations.

7 The Director of Information, Dr John Tsimba, who led the newsmen noted that the villagers had been secretly organised by one journalist, Mr Peter Godwin of The Sunday Times and the author of an article on alleged massive atrocities on civilians. Mr Godwin, who was present did not dispute Dr Tsimba's remarks.

8 "These people can hardly be said to be reliable witnesses because I would have thought the journalists would interview people that had been randomly selected," said Dr Tsimba.

FALSE

9 When the chief and the man who claimed to be father of one of the dead civilians were asked why they did not show this evidence to the Minister of National Supplies, Cde Enos Nkala, who had been in the area two weeks ago and had called on people to produce evidence, the father said he had been in Bulawayo.

10 They could not explain why none of the people at the rally addressed by Sen Nkala had not stood up to give the evidence. Neither could they explain why they had not reported the matter to the police. The father, however, claimed he had reported to the District Administrator.

11 Dr Tsimba said the trio had proved that allegations of brutality by the army on a massive scale were false.

12 "There certainly was no evidence of genocide. The

two alleged graves in which six people are allegedly buried according to evidence of a half serious man purporting to be the father of one of the dead, certainly cannot be equated to genocide of 30 000 people as reported by Mr Godwin," said Dr Tsimba.

13 Earlier, at Matopos Mission, a local priest, Rev Luke Sibanda (49), gave a detailed account of how five dissidents robbed him and the church overseer of money, a watch and other valuables.

14 "The dissidents then gathered schoolchildren, insulted them and ordered them to strip naked. They said they were the ZIPRAS and could shoot us because we were helping the Government," said Rev Sibanda.

15 The nurse-in-charge at the mission's hospital, Cde Selina Moyo, also gave details of two girls who had been burnt by dissidents after they refused to tell the bandits where the soldiers were.

TREATMENT

16 Cde Moyo also said a number of people had come for treatment resulting from beatings.

17 She said some of her patients had said they were beaten by National Army soldiers but she herself had no evidence of this.

18 A local schoolteacher, Mr Steve Newcomer, and an agricultural consultant, Mr William Stoesz, both said they had no evidence of alleged atrocities on civilians by the army.

19 "The army has been very co-operative and we operate normally," said Mr Newcomer.

20 At Mtshabazi Mission hospital, Dr Devue Boyd, indicated that he had treated upwards of 100 to 125 patients who alleged they had been beaten by soldiers for varied reasons like failing to report the presence of dissidents or breaking curfew regulations.

21 Asked about the alleged massacres Dr Boyd said such reports were hearsay

and he had no eyewitness evidence of it.

22 Speaking before the departure for Bulawayo, Dr Tsimba said the journalists had seen for themselves that contrary to overseas Press reports, Matabeleland South was not militarised and neither was there any conclusive evidence of allegations of atrocities or genocide on a massive scale.

See Page 7

An as
bullet
guns,
wh

THE 2
uniform
mentar
wayo, y

Namibia p talks in Lu set to sta

REPRESENTATIVES of Namibia's internal political parties arrived in Lusaka yesterday in a conciliatory mood for crucial talks on independence for their disputed territory.

"We are here to discuss independence for Namibia, but before we reach that stage we must talk about reconciliation," Mr Dirk Mudge, chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), told reporters at the airport.

The DTA is one of six components of the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) delegation to the talks, which are due to start in earnest today.

SWAPO has repeatedly said it will not talk with the MPC, which it accuses of being made up of puppets of Pretoria.

An MPC spokesman said another SWAPO rejection of talks would be a major setback. "We are looking for a peaceful solution to the problems of our country and therefore feel inclined to talk to any relevant party," he said.

Leaders of the 29 strong MPC group include Dawid Bezuidenhout of the Labour Party, Eben van Zijl of the National Party and Andreas Stipaanga of the

SWAPO
SWA
Sam Ni
nesday
would
ceasefir
war at
African
Namibi

Preto
not sig
has ne
SWAPO
"defenc

Mr
Ministe
Dlamini
Town;
talks "

Mr I
warned
gumano
Accord
but if
collaps
alone,
ed yer

The
AIM
ment
via
Tambi
- Z

Wife eloi

BRITISH newspapers have had a field day over a British runaway wife and her black Zimbabwean lover.

There have been detailed accounts in the Fleet Street tabloids this week of the affair between Margaret Bloor (49) and Mordcaai Mashonganyika (37), who flew secretly to Zimbabwe last January.

Mrs Bloor who is now penniless, now wants to

return home, and the husband whom she deserted, factory owner Jack Bloor, of High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire is trying to get her back.

Should she appeal to the British High Commission in Harare for help, they would advance the air fare as a loan, as is usual for British citizens stranded abroad, reports ARNOLD RAPHAEL from London.

The British authorities

woul
Mash
he is
forge
for d
Brita
He
one
stud
Brita
seem
mon
than
TV
blm.

PM Renews Unity Call: New ZAPU, ZANU (PF) strategy to bring nation together

THERE was thunderous applause at State House on Wednesday night when the Prime Minister, Cde Mugabe, said the time had come for ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU to conclude the unity exercise completely, satisfactorily and effectively.

Cde Mugabe, who is the first secretary and President of ZANU(PF), was speaking at a reception, hosted in his

By Lazarus Mhlanga

honour, after he had been declared a Freeman of Bulawayo.

Before addressing the enthusiastic guests, Cde Mugabe walked around the hall shaking hands and talking to the people.

The Prime Minister said that when it was suggested to him that, under the auspices of the ruling party, a reception be hosted to enable him to meet the people, he agreed on the understanding that he would meet not only

party members, but people from all walks of life in Bulawayo.

Cde Mugabe said many young people from all tribes and regions had died for one objective, to liberate Zimbabwe, and many others had been disabled for the same reason.

"We redeemed Zimbabwe and that redemption has enabled us to meet here today," he said.

"We might not have agreed in terms of the political entity and mode of the struggle that we envisaged," said Cde Mugabe, "but the objective was to build a free Zimbabwe out of an oppressed one."

There was a deafening "No" when the Prime Minister asked guests whether it was right for today's leadership to leave the future generation with the ugly legacy of having failed to unite the people of Zimbabwe.

There was always inherent political conflict in a multi-party state and Zimbabwe had experienced that in the past six years.

This period, he said, had demonstrated to the country some of the conflicts that could arise as a result of a multi-party system.

Some of the disagreements translated themselves into violence which resulted in the suffering of many.

NEW APPROACH

Cde Mugabe said that was why PF-ZAPU and ZANU (PF) had agreed to come into the country as the Patriotic Front and had agreed that the State they would create and the unitary system they would have would pursue a given ideological direction.

He said it was his party's intention, and he believed that it was PF-ZAPU's intention, that from now on the two parties would work out a new approach to unity.

The country has learnt sufficiently from the experiences of the past six years and from the experiences of other countries.

"We must work out a positive path that will unite our people and unite them permanently."

GRASSROOTS

The Prime Minister drew laughter when he referred to the Mayor, Cde Nick Mabodze as "our father who art in Bulawayo".

He said it was the task of the city fathers to unite the people of Bulawayo.

Cde Mugabe also appealed to ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU members at grassroot level to work towards the ultimate goal of unity.

"Do not leave the job to the top leadership. They are not the people, but the leaders of the people. Your will must be their will," he said.

There was spontaneous shouting and whistling when the Prime Minister lifted his glass and invited the guests to toast to unity and solidarity.

Commenting on Cde Mugabe's speech, the PF-ZAPU leader, Dr Joshua Nkomo, said yesterday he agreed with the Prime Minister, adding that their sentiments on the need to conclude unity talks were identical.

"The Prime Minister made a very good speech which says exactly how I feel. It was really wonderful to hear it from a man in his position," said Dr Nkomo.

Big ticket racket for the final?

RESERVED tickets for the Rothmans Shield soccer final between Highlanders and Dynamos at Barbourfields Stadium on Sunday have gone on the blackmarket in the City.

The tickets for the \$8 reserved seats — about 1 600 — went on sale in Bulawayo and Harare yesterday morning with 400 being sold in the capital and the rest in Bulawayo.

Special enclosure tickets at \$10 went on sale earlier in the week and all 300 were sold out within a day.

Three places — the Highlanders offices, ZIFA offices and a sports shop — were selling the \$8 tickets yesterday with each outlet handling about 400.

There were queues long before the outlets opened at 8 am yesterday and within an hour-and-a-half all tickets were sold out, with hundreds of disappointed fans leaving empty-handed.

What surprised the soccer fans was that at all the outlets bulk-buying was allowed with no restriction on the number of tickets an individual could buy.

At the ZIFA offices a man bought at least 50 tickets and

By Innocent Kurwa

another at the Highlanders offices, is understood to have bought 200 and used a cheque for payment.

A ZIFA worker said the man who he said, worked for an insurance company in the city, had telephoned on Wednesday afternoon and placed an order for 50 tickets.

"He said he and his friends had pooled their money together and asked him to buy the tickets. When he came in the morning we sold him the 50 tickets," said the ZIFA worker.

A worker at the Highlanders offices admitted that people had bought tickets in bulk. "Most were buying for friends they had left at work," he said.

When asked if anybody had bought 200 tickets and used a cheque for payment the worker refused to answer and referred all queries to club chairman Cde Ndumiso Gumede. However Cde Gumede could not be contacted for comment last night.

Just before midday The Chronicle received phone calls from disgruntled fans who

Continued on centre spread.

Intruders injure woman

Chronicle Reporter

A BULAWAYO woman is in hospital after intruders assaulted her and her husband at their Terrace home in the early hours of yesterday.

Mrs Frederica Sheldrake (69) is recovering from head wounds after a four-hour operation at Mpilo Hospital yesterday.

She and her husband, Mr Alfred Mathew Sheldrake (78) were the victims of an attack at 4 am when two intruders forced their way into their home. According to their son, Alfred, the assailants cut the telephone lines before the attack. The couple were awakened by their dogs and when Mr Sheldrake (sur) went to investigate, carrying a gun with him, the intruders burst in through the kitchen door.

They set upon Mr Sheldrake and in the ensuing scuffle one of the intruders was shot in the head.

When Mrs Sheldrake rushed to help her husband, she was hit on the head with a hammer.

The intruder fled leaving his partner.

The wounded attacker also received treatment at Mpilo.

Police declined to comment on the incident last night.

DABENGWA FREED: Four others released to 'facilitate unity'

HARARE — The former supreme commander of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army, Cde Dumiso Dabengwa, was released from detention yesterday.

Announcing the release of Cde Dabengwa, two former officers of the Central Intelligence Organisation, detained on charges of spying for South Africa and two others, the Minister of Home Affairs, Cde Enos Nkala, said: "The release of these detainees is aimed at facilitating the attainment of national unity and lasting peace in the country."

HOPED

"They have been released because it is hoped that they will help to bring about peaceful conditions in Matabeleland before the total integration of the two political parties (ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU)."

The other four detainees also released yesterday were Mr. Phillip Edward Hartlebury, Mr. Colin David Evans, Cde Dobani Nsingo and Cde Norman Zikhali.

Cde Dabengwa (47), who was head of military intelligence of ZIPRA, the military wing of Dr Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU party during the 15-year armed struggle against Mr Ian Smith's minority Rhodesian regime, was detained in 1983 shortly after being acquitted by the High Court on treason and possession of arms charges.

WELCOMED

Dr Nkomo yesterday welcomed the release of Cde Dabengwa, and four others saying it was a good omen for the unity talks between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU.

Dr Nkomo said the Government's gesture was a good sign and he was happy not only for Cde Dabengwa but

for the other ex-detainees.

"I think it is very important that everyone should be released so that we can all move forward together," the PF-ZAPU leader said.

"I am certain that anyone who is not yet released will be freed soon. We hope this will bring understanding among the people of Zimbabwe which will foster real unity, not the unity which is on the surface but unity that is meaningful."

The PF-ZAPU information and publicity secretary, Cde John Nkomo, however, said the release of the PF-ZAPU detainees should not be connected to the unity talks.

"It is wrong to connect the release of the detainees to the unity talks as the two issues are completely unconnected," said Cde Nkomo.

"The detainees were held before the unity talks started and to connect them with the talks would imply that they were being held to ransom, which is not the case," he said.

LONG OVERDUE

Cde Nkomo added that the release was long overdue.

Asked if the release of the detainees would create a conducive atmosphere for the success of the talks, he replied: "The necessary conducive atmosphere must be brought about by a combination of other factors as well."

Cde Nkomo was speaking at the house of Cde Dabengwa in Bulawayo where he had gone to visit Mrs Zodwa Dabengwa.

Mrs Dabengwa said she was happy to hear the news of her husband's release "but I cannot say much until I have seen him".

After announcing the release of the detainees Cde Nkala said the Government sincerely hoped that these people would refrain from committing acts of espionage, sabotage, banditry and destabilisation as the Government would "jealously guard after its hard-won independ-

ence and national sovereignty".

He said since his appointment about two years ago, a total of 214 detainees had been released, and only 31 remained.

"The ones that remain can hardly be described as people detained for political reason," said Cde Nkala adding that they had been recruited in South African mines and sent into Zimbabwe as spies and saboteurs.

DESTABILISATION

The Government felt that they should remain in detention because of the unfolding events of the policy of destabilisation by South Africa.

"Releasing them would be like putting explosives into the hands of your enemies. For the moment they should remain in detention," he said.

The Minister said the Government had appeals from Britain, the United States and other Western countries relating to the release of Mr Hartlebury and Mr Evans who were arrested on December 31, 1981 and had been in detention since January 28, 1983.

The two former CIO officers were detained under the Emergency Powers Regulations for contravening the Official Secrets Act and for illegal possession of arms of war.

"Because we want to create conditions of peace, we have taken the gamble to release these people (the ex-CIO officers) in the hope that they will not engage in the same activities in which they were engaged," said Cde Nkala.

OFF TO UK

He added that Mr Hartlebury and Mr Evans had been released to the British High Commission and that they were expected to leave for the United Kingdom last night.

Asked whether they had been declared undesirable, the Minister said the Government had not done so, but if that issue arose the Government would then have to decide on it.

Asked whether the detainees had been released under certain conditions, Cde Nkala said they had assured the Government that they would not engage in activities for which they were detained, and that they would try wherever possible to end dissident activities in Matabeleland. — Ziana.

Botswana train delayed

Chronicle Reporter

THE train from Botswana scheduled to arrive in Bulawayo at noon yesterday, was delayed by 10 hours, a spokesman for the National Railways of Zimbabwe said yesterday.

The delay was due to the washaways which were caused

by heavy rains in Botswana last week. By yesterday afternoon the train had not reached the Plumtree border town. It was expected to arrive in the city at 10 pm last night.

The washaways occurred at Malatwana, Pilane and Mahalapye.

Unity 'within our grasp'

1 HARARE — Unity between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU is within grasp and should not be allowed to slip away, President Banana said here yesterday.

2 In an interview, Cde Banana said ZANU(PF) has dribbled past a number of obstacles on the path to unity.

3 "PF-ZAPU has equally dribbled past a number of obstacles on the path to unity. I think both parties are now facing an empty goal. The ball is on the penalty spot, and I want to express the hope that the Prime Minister will not shoot wide and Cde Joshua Nkomo, as leader of PF-ZAPU, will not also shoot wide," said the President, an avid soccer fan.

4 Cde Banana said Zimbabweans were on their toes just waiting to applaud a well-placed shot. "I do hope there won't be any jeering and that we can all cheer." He said it was difficult to say when the unity talks would be successfully concluded. "What I can say is that unity is within grasp and will only slip away at our peril."

6 "My advice to the leaders is that when they take the shot, they must lean forward and not backwards," advised President Banana, saying when the two parties finally agreed to merge, the leaders should be committed to making the unity successful.

7 Once unity had been achieved, Zimbabwe would have dealt a shattering blow to its enemies both within and without the country. Unity would also improve the climate for development and accelerate progress in all parts of the country.

8 "True development can only come when all the people of Zimbabwe have

had their standard of living improved, but with disunity, particularly the dissident element in the south where we have seen malicious destruction of Government property, some sections of Zimbabwe will be denied the process of development.

9 "A united Zimbabwe is a strong Zimbabwe, and a strong Zimbabwe will be of tremendous benefit to the struggling masses in South Africa, Namibia and the whole of the sub-region," he said.

10 The President added that a strong Zimbabwe would be a tremendous asset because investors only invested in stable countries.

11 As Zimbabweans prepared to move into a new year, they should know that "now is the time to close ranks and unite for peace, progress and prosperity".

12 On the release of political detainees, President Banana said once the Government was satisfied that detainees were no longer a threat to the security of the State, it was only too glad to set them free so they could make a positive contribution to society.

13 "It is important that those who made mistakes yesterday be given, today and tomorrow, the opportunity to redress those mistakes," he said.

14 On the situation in Southern Africa, Cde Banana said he was flabbergasted that the Pretoria regime was now making war on children. "How can anybody with any conscience sink so low? What kind of cowardice is that? What kind of war is that — war against kids?"

15 What was happening in South Africa, he said, was the beginning of the end of the obnoxious system of apartheid.

16 The President said he was glad that the international community was becoming more and more aware of the need to contribute to end the sorry situation in South Africa.

17 "If people are genuine about sanctions, they should not window-dress or impose cosmetic measures because this is an insult to the people of South Africa," said President Banana. — Ziara.

PM hits out at dubious n'angas

HARARE — The Prime Minister, Cde Mugabe, yesterday severely criticised some traditional healers in various parts of the country for exploiting gullible people.

Addressing hundreds of Harare residents in Highfield at a graduation ceremony of about 50 community health promoters, Cde Mugabe encouraged the people to take their children to clinics and hospitals.

While there were some professional n'angas, said the Prime Minister, there was now a proliferation of dubious healers who were playing on people's beliefs to exploit them.

LATE FLASH

MAPUTO — South Africa plans to ship...