

# **An Appraisal and Critique of Land Redistribution Approaches in South Africa**

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## **Abstract**

This paper is in response to the PLAAS Land Conference held in February 2019 which aimed at discovering an alternative to how to solve the land question. The conference came at a time where land and agrarian reform re-emerged in South African socio-policy discussion. After twenty-five years of democracy the three land reform programmes have failed to restructure apartheid's economic segregation, exclusionary land ownership patterns and to restore dignity to poor black South Africans. This study offers a detailed examination of the discourse of South African land reform, specifically the redistribution component with a focus on the land redistribution approaches presented at the PLAAS conference. Ultimately, the study puts forward a synthesized land redistribution approach as a hybrid solution to the land and agrarian crisis.

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Praise be to my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ!! *Morena, mponele tsohle. Kea o tshepa, wena feela. O! ntate ntsamaise hle, Tshepo yaka e ho wena. Wena, Jehova ya renang. O tseba se ke se hlokang. Amen*

## Acronyms

ABP	Area Based Planning
AgriSETA	Agriculture Sector Education Training Authority
COPAC	Cooperative and Policy Alternative Centre
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development & Land Reform
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
LRAD	Land Reform for Agricultural Development
NDP	National Development Plan
PLAAS	Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies
PLAS	Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SLAG	Settlement Land Acquisition Grant

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# Chapter 1

## 1. Orientation and Problem Statement

### 1.1 Introduction

South African land redistribution is in disarray. The land redistribution policy failures have preserved the territorial and institutional separation of master and colonial subject in post-colonial South Africa. The racial imbalances in land access and the natural resources it supports perpetuates the social, political and economic domination of black South Africans. This calls for deliberate policy amendments to tackle the growing land and agrarian crisis.

### 1.2 Background and Rationale of the Study

This study seeks to appraise and critique the three approaches to land distribution in South Africa, as presented at the PLAAS Land Distribution Conference held at the University of the Western Cape on the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> of February 2019. The conference was jointly organized by the University of the Western Cape, University of Fort Hare and the Rhodes University's Sociology Department.

The three alternative approaches to land redistribution presented at the conference ranged from a market assisted, decentralised fast track approach proposed by Nick Vink and Johann Kirsten of Stellenbosch University, a radical solidarity economy approach presented by Mazibuko Jara of *Ntinga Ntaba kaNdoda*, a rural movement based in the Eastern Cape, and lastly a smallholder focused approach put forward by Michael Aliber of the University of Fort Hare.

Twenty-five years of democracy in South Africa have seen some remarkable achievements in addressing the debilitating racial inequality that was orchestrated by the apartheid system. However, land and agriculture remain critically important across the country, even as the rate of modernization begins to increase, the achievements of the rate of land distribution to black communities has been painfully slow (Sihlobo & Kersten, 2018: 13). Orthodoxies and implicitly colonial land policy

practices have been preserved in democratic South Africa. An example of this is the preservation of state bifurcation through the implementation of the Communal Land Rights Act, which strengthened the power that traditional authorities have on the land, consequently diminishing the land rights of rural citizens (Claassens & Cousins, 2009: 49). Moreover, the Communal Land Rights Act perpetuates the subjugation of women, who under traditional authority “could not legally own land, as permission to occupy land certificates are usually granted to male heads of households” (Kahn, 2007: 14).

The effects of the 1894 Glen Grey Act and the 1913 Native Land Act are still felt in present times, as 67 percent of black South Africans still live on congested, marginal and unproductive land areas (Boudreaux, 2010: 15). In these areas, poverty, infant mortality, and illiteracy are often prevalent. Furthermore, South Africa's unequal land access is also partly responsible for the astronomical unemployment rate in the country. Land redistribution thus has the potential to restructure society so as to produce social and economic development (Hall, 2009: 12).

The land redistribution process has been disappointing, to say the least. Its transformation from Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) to the Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD), then the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) has yielded a dismal eight percent land reallocation (Atuahene, 2011: 122). The predicament becomes bleaker upon further assessment. Of the few beneficiaries of land through redistribution, inadequate post-settlement support has been provided, and in some cases none whatsoever (Masoka, 2014: 25). Moreover, state capture has permeated into the realm of land redistribution, with state officials colluding with agribusinesses to benefit and exploit lands intended for land reform beneficiaries. (Hall & Kepe, 2017: 127) It is in this context and with the recent election of a new president, that the PLAAS conference was initiated, to assess what has been achieved and to bring new ideas to the land distribution crisis.

As mentioned above, three papers, representing three distinct approaches to land reform and redistribution, in particular, were presented at the conference. The authors of these papers were tasked with answering the following five questions

1. Who should benefit from land distribution in rural South Africa?
2. How should land for redistribution be identified, acquired and transferred?
3. What kinds of rights should beneficiaries hold on distributed land?
4. What kinds of support systems should be provided to beneficiaries?
5. What are the desired outcomes of such redistribution?

Michael Aliber's small-holder focused approach is geared towards the empowerment of the rural poor. Aliber (2019) argues that the key limitation of the land distribution project is its bias towards large scale projects, whereby large amounts of land are allocated to a few beneficiaries. This focus is centred towards fashioning a class of black commercial farmers, which are subsequently going to have the potential to challenge the dominance of white commercial farmers (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2011: 189).

This trajectory in land redistribution is however in contradiction with the desires of the black population. According to Hall (2014a), 48 percent of black people who expressed an interest in owning land indicated that they only want access to one hectare or less. This has fuelled the critique that the land redistribution programme has paid more attention to the number of hectares transferred and the amount spent rather than the socio-economic impact on beneficiaries (Boudreaux, 2009). Aliber thus postulates a livelihoods perspective to land redistribution, which prioritizes how different people in different places live. This could be significant since knowledge and power are intimately intertwined in determining the outcomes of development programmes such as land distribution (Scoones, 2009: 18). A livelihoods perspective validates contextual knowledge that the rural poor possess, consequently empowering them to have control over the direction of their own development.

The tendency of land redistribution to focus on large scale commercial farming derives from the Eurocentric assumption that this type of farming is better and more productive than small scale farming (Hebinck *et al.*, 2011: 232). Consequently, decontextualized agrarian principles have been used to create generic solutions to

agrarian problems (Hall, 2009: 33). In light of this, it is small wonder that the land distribution agenda is incompatible and out of sync with the needs and desires of black people at grass-root levels. The small-holder focused approach thus focuses on the activities and skills that rural people possess (Aliber, 2019: 3), rather than patronizing prescriptions of what they should doing. As Timmermans (2004) argues the smallholder focused approach is more in line with the needs of people in rural areas since it allows for production for the home, income, bartering, brewing of maize beer and supplementary animal capital, in ways that prove that small scale farming is not inefficient nor backwards.

On the other hand, the second paper, the decentralized fast-tracked market assisted approach proposed by Vink and Kirsten (2019) is centred on stimulating a more coherent and functional support base for farmers in rural areas. This assertion is based on the realization that rural farmers have not been granted sufficient post-settlement support. Land reform is more than redistributing land, but more importantly, it is about improving the livelihoods of the previously disadvantaged, which can only be achieved by providing ancillary land support (Masoka, 2014). A decentralised approach is premised on modernisation theory, as such the approach prioritizes the pulling-back of state authority in the land redistribution process.

Vink and Kirsten (2019) envision a more accountable land distribution approach which will be centred on the creation of District or Local Land Management Committees that will transfer authority from higher government to local government. This will help preserve fiscal revenue while simultaneously inviting the private sector to play a more active role in land redistribution. According to Nhlabathi and Van Rensburg (2018: 9), 67 percent of South African land is not directly owned by individuals, but rather under the possession of private sector organizations such as community organizations and companies. This approach thus embraces different sources of land to addresses the different demands for land.

A decentralized approach to land redistribution will require the institutionalization of two fast-track processes: land depository and land reform fund (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 5). This is a highly reflexive process, relying on national

participation, whereby current landowners will be called upon to donate land and their time and expertise voluntarily to those in need. Specific checks and post-settlement will be placed to ensure that the donated land is productively used (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 6). For example, the assessment of the level of skill the land-recipient has, as well as periodic production evaluations. Implicitly, these activities will be coordinated by the then established various District Land-Management Committees, rather than the state, as history has proven it can be inefficient and engenders corruption (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 6). According to this approach, the goal of land redistribution is to unlock the economic growth and employment opportunities and to create a dynamic rural economy as opposed to state-dependency.

Conversely, the paper by Mazibuko Jara, based on a radical solidarity economy problematizes the economic structure on which land reform is implemented. Capitalism enforces a culture of cutthroat competition, isolation and a single global monoculture, which prioritizes profit above all (Miller, 2010: 144). Jara's (2019) land distribution model combines dynamics of a transformative political economy framework, effective policy solutions and mass power, which are geared towards sustainable development rather than economic revenue. Consequently, the solidarity approach is a hegemonic alternative that prioritizes the needs of people at the lower end of the economic spectrum in synthesizing an emancipatory utopian possibility for all (Vishwas, 2014: 13). This is not to say that radical solidarity is a prescriptive model, rather it is located outside the neoliberal global development apparatus (Miller, 2010: 150), and premised on improving the lives of those who carry the brunt of the agrarian crisis. Thus, Jara (2019) argues that land redistribution cannot be resolved within the confines of current economic and agricultural systems. If we are to rectify South Africa's land crisis, the underlying patterns of investment and employment processes have to be changed.

The radical solidarity approach goes beyond the need to deracialize land ownership, it seeks to restore the power disparity in decision making, unilateral policy-making schemes and anthropocentric relations with the environment. It is not concerned with a racial swop in land ownership, rather it seeks to empower the

aspirant rural farmer, helping him/her make livelihoods, and secure employment (Jara, 2019: 9). In contrast to the decentralized fast-track approach, the radical solidarity approach invites the state to play a more active role in land redistribution processes. The state should thus fulfil the role of a consultant, that negotiates with self-organizing beneficiaries, negotiates with courts where necessary (to facilitate pro-poor verdicts, openness and transparency and importantly redress universal food sovereignty) (Vishwas, 2014; Jara, 2019).

### 1.3 Goals of the Research

- The main goal of the research is to critically analyse post-1994 land redistribution policy and implementation and to identify aspects that have been successful, and which have failed; in so doing identifying a way forward to a more successful land redistribution project. This will be achieved by answering the five questions outlined above, by:
  - Setting out and analysing the South African Constitution and White paper on land reform, SLAG, LRAD and PLAS redistribution policies, against a background of RDP (Mandela), GEAR (Mbeki), State/elite capture (Zuma);
  - Providing an appraisal and critique of the three approaches presented at the Land Redistribution conference held at UWC and outlined above, namely the market-led, small-holder, and radical solidarity approach;
  - Elaborating what aspects of the selected approaches will be more appropriate and effective in addressing landlessness and stimulating development for the landless majority than the previous land redistribution strategies.

### 1.4 Research Methodology


This research project is going to utilize a documentary research method, which refers to the analysis of documents that contain information about a phenomenon we wish to study (Ahmed, 2010: 2), in this case, land distribution. A documentary

research method is used in investigating and categorizing physical sources of information, most commonly written documents, in both the public and private domain (Mogalakwe, 2006: 224). There are multiple advantages to the use of the documentary research method, but the most important one is that it saves time since data is already readily available (Ahmed, 2010: 8). Furthermore, this data collection method is non-reactive (Magalakwe, 2006: 224), the documents are prepared without the knowledge that they will be a part of this thesis. Thus, the documents are free from bias deriving from investigator-effect.

The three approaches are going to be analysed as to:

1. Satisfying constitutional obligations
2. Meeting the land reform objectives as listed in the 1997 White paper on land reform.
3. Diligence in following the lessons derived from local and international land reform programmes
4. Answering the five conference questions as listed above

The methodology will roughly resemble the diagram below



Ethics approval was granted by the Rhodes University ethics committee.

## 1.5 Chapter Synopsis

The mini-dissertation is structured into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the context of the study. This includes the orientation, problem statement, objectives of the study as well as the data analysis procedure. Chapter two gives a review of African and global experiences of land redistribution. Additionally, the chapter discusses in detail the achievements and faults committed in the course of South African land redistribution to date. Chapter three contains the appraisal and critique of the three land redistribution approaches presented at the PLAAS land

redistribution conference. Chapter four provides an integrated policy recommendation which comprises elements which could potentially stimulate development. Chapter five, concludes the study and makes recommendations to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform for resolving the land crisis.

## 1.6 Conclusion

This chapter serves as a general orientation of the research study. The chapter unpacked the study objectives, data collection procedure as well as the demarcation of chapters. The next chapter presents a review of international and local experience of land redistribution.

## Chapter 2

### 2. Literature Review on International and Local Land Redistribution.

#### 2.1 Introduction

The implementation of a successful land reform policy has been on the agenda of the South African government since its democratization in 1994. Unfortunately, the goal of establishing equitable land access has been fraught with difficulty. The chapter is an overview of global trends in land reform and the South African land redistribution achievements and failures thus far.

#### 2.2 The History of Dispossession in South Africa

The rationale, design, implementation and outcome of land reform processes are areas of intense academic, policy and development discourse the world over. Land reform is not a simple response to claims resulting from former colonial dispossession, rather land reform is also about justice and resources on the land, which provides economic, socio-cultural and environmental goods and services that add to human wellbeing (Hebinck & Shackleton, 2001: 8). Thus, South Africa's prevailing disparities in land ownership and access further exacerbate racial inequalities in household wealth, health and poverty status. Land not only serves as a source of income, security and status for the non-landowning rural poor but also a foundation for broader rural development and political stability (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 764). Therefore, it is logical to assume that the disparity in land ownership is responsible for stunted development of the nation's rural poor and the country's economic instability.

Globally, poverty is largely a rural phenomenon, of the 1.2 billion people in the world living in extreme poverty, approximately three-quarters live in rural areas (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014: 24). South Africa is no exception, 57 percent of those who are poor live in rural areas, while 77 percent of the rural population is poor (Hall, 2009: 18). Furthermore, poverty in the country is a racialized phenomenon, with the

majority of the poor being black. This racial-stratification is a relic left behind by the Glen Grey Act of 1894 and the 1913 Native Land Act. These Acts laid the foundation for South Africa's dualistic agrarian structure, which consists of the destitution and underdevelopment in the ex-Bantustans and the successful capitalist farms in the white countryside (Anseeuw & Alden, 2010: 54)

White areas during apartheid were regions of wealth within the country. However, the comfort and opulence enjoyed by whites was dependent on black economic participation, otherwise, the whole system would have collapsed. The legislation of the Glen Grey Act and the Native Land Act were the South African solution to the native question and the labour question that colonial settlers were confronted with in their conquest for acquiring political control over another country and the domination and exploitation of natives. (Mamdani, 1996: 26). The Glen Grey Act enforced the radical proletarianization of South African's native population (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 37). This was in response to the discovery of minerals in the country and the subsequent demand for cheap labour. The Native Land Act, on the other hand, cemented the hegemonic domination of the black population, by restricting its movements and land access (Mamdani, 1996: 102). These Acts were deliberately orchestrated to undermine black agriculture, cementing dependency and supremacy of white settlers (Cohert, 2015: 15). The Acts resulted in high population densities, the demise of viable agricultural activities and chronic underdevelopment in the homelands. At the height of apartheid, whites who made up only 17 percent of the population, claimed 86 percent of the land, while the rest of the population only had access to 14 percent of the country's land surface (Callimanopulos, 1984).

Two decades have passed since the democratization of South Africa, yet the effects of these two policies have not been completely erased. According to Kahn (2007: 28), two-thirds of the nation's land is still owned by the white minority, with the majority of black people occupying marginal unproductive land. Unequal land ownership also translates into the unequal distribution of national resources. For instance, more than half of South Africa's domestic water consumption is absorbed by the largely white, affluent suburbs (Cock, 2012: 49). Meanwhile, pre-paid meters are

installed in many South African townships, excluding the black population from accessing water and electricity (Vorster, 2019: 17). The daily lives of poor black citizens are plagued with difficulty especially since restrictions have been placed on the most basic of needs. Land reform is thus necessary to decrease the widening gap between the haves and the have nots and to increase black citizens quality of life.

## 2.3 Land Reform Experiences from Africa and Internationally

Many countries have had to implement some sort of land reform to establish relative socio-economic equality and counteract the impacts of colonialism. South Africa was only liberated in the early 1990s, therefore its land reform projects were launched much later compared to other land reform projects in Asia and other African countries. Subsequently, a consensus was reached that the South African land reform programme should not repeat the land reform mistakes committed elsewhere (Sehlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 5). Rather it should appropriate elements from successful international land reform strategies, taking care to contextualize them to fit the contours of our country. According to Dr Theo de Jager, president of the World Farmers Association, there are four elements countries with successful land redistribution had in common (News 24, 2018). These are:

### 2.3.1 Land Acquisition

Firstly, these countries negotiated a buy-in from those who stand to lose in the process of land reform (News 24, 2018). Therefore the South African state should provide reasonable compensation to private landowners whose land is taken for distribution. Failure to pay reasonable compensation virtually guarantees that landlords will evade the law, cause the law to be rescinded, and lead to a national economic recession (Posterman & Hanstad, 2006: 781). Insight from the Zimbabwean land reform experiences shows us how the notion of expropriation without compensation is a bad idea (Sehlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 6). Compensation legitimizes land reform, by promoting the land right of current landowners, thereby protecting the livelihoods of the poor from sinking into depression as a result of economic decline (AgriSA, 2018: 4). The implementation of a successful land redistribution policy which

includes compensation can, therefore, assist in reducing social unrest and socioeconomic instability (Nelson Mandela Foundation, 2018).

Additionally, compensation can also come in the form of a state-loan, granting landowners purchasing power to goods within any market (Tilley, 2007: 56). This secures the viability of the country's economy, by preserving its fiscal value and agricultural export revenues, while still granting landowners access to their financial reimbursement. Furthermore, land is an exchangeable commodity, this approach emphasises the right to private ownership as a fundamental feature of a free and open society (Voster, 2019: 2). Implicitly, the protection of property rights is an integral component of a democracy. Therefore, the execution of expropriation without compensation would result in the reproduction of a second phase of property rights violation in South Africa.

### 2.3.2 Beneficiary Selection

Secondly, the establishment of successful land reform requires well-marked beneficiary selection criteria (News 24, 2018). Many countries that initially conducted collectivized land reforms recalibrated to second-generation reforms, which dissolved collective farms into family-sized units and introduced market-oriented land systems (Wegren, 1998: 138). Thus, decollectivization instituted the household as the unit for land redistribution. The most drastic of second-generation land reforms, China's household responsibility system, resulted in the advancement of the livelihoods of over 210 million farm households (Vendryes, 2010: 89). The household allocation of land could, therefore, be used as a tool to improve the livelihoods of poor landless South Africans. This strategy shifts the unit of power for economic decision making back to the family unit, thereby creating an opportunity for reducing the prevailing inequalities in the distribution of resources, wealth, power and social status.

### 2.3.3 Land Transfer

The third element, centres on the administration of land in ensuring the maximised use of redistributed land (News 24, 2018). Land reform experiences from across South Asia (Japan, Korea, China and the Philippines) shows that land reforms that embrace beneficiaries choice of mode for agricultural organization are much more

likely to be successful (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 785; Sharma & Jha, 2016). Beneficiaries should be allowed to carve their own development trajectory as respectable members of society. Granting beneficiaries small-plots of land contributes towards increasing the autonomy and independence of disenfranchised citizens. Land redistribution ought to empower people's environmental rights (Aliber *et al.*, 2009: 135). The ability to use the land for one's own productive needs, rather than through measures imposed from a higher authority, upholds democracy and integration with the environment. Karl Polanyi was one of the first social theorists to substitute nature/environment with land (Cock, 2007: 28). This discourse has two different inflexions on land reform. On the one hand, it underpins the African nationalist project that emphasizes the need to rectify the injustices of colonial land theft, and on the other hand, it legitimatizes ownership of land as an important identity maker (Vorster, 2019: 6). Land redistribution should, therefore, be regarded as a development venture geared for reconnecting the landless poor back into the mainstream of the South African community, thereby legitimizing their position in society. Implicitly, increasing the autonomous use of redistributed land will fulfil environmental obligations of land reform and the need to restore dignity, as stipulated in the 1997 white paper on land policy.

Most beneficiaries are inclined to create individual family farms, well at least initially, in order to maximize autonomy that might otherwise be stifled in communal farming (Wegren, 1998: 127). In retrospect of international reforms, small-scale farming can produce substantial benefits to land reform beneficiaries (Scoones, 2009: 172). Agricultural labourers in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan who received one to ten hectares of farmland, found themselves considerably better off in terms of income, family nutrition and social status (Isan, 2018: 749). However, these countries have a tropical biome characteristic with loads of rainfall and irrigated soil (Johnston & Kilby: 1975: 120). In contrast, South Africa's climatic envelope is rather dry, droughts and soil depletion are an annual challenge in some parts of the country (Driver *et al.*, 2011: 32). Therefore, the adoption of a small-holder approach to South African land redistribution should provide ancillary support aimed at maximizing the productive

capacity of the redistributed farms in consolidation with the context of the country's climatic conditions.

A focus on small-holder land redistribution might lead to decreases in agricultural production as a result of the drastic change in agrarian land ownership. However, in the long-run land reform could increase agricultural production that results from the improvements in the socio-economic position of the beneficiaries (Timmermans, 2004: 33). This was evident in the industrialization and development of the Asian tigers, which were simultaneously able to secure food sovereignty, poverty reduction and economic growth. According to Iscan (2018: 736) what was crucial about these cases, is that the land reform was undertaken without priority given to economic productivity in the farming sector. Rather their main objective was for the government to gain popular support and facilitate democracy (Johnston & Kilby, 1975: 168). South African land redistribution should follow the same course and focus on empowering black people over financial accrument.

Closer to home, Zimbabwe's implementation of smallholder focused land redistribution provides valuable lessons about the socio-economic benefits that arise from strengthening small-holders productive capacity. During the six years from 1979 to 1985, a rapid expansion of Zimbabwean maize smallholders occurred, which translated to a triple increase in maize production and profit (Lahiff & Cousins, 2005: 129). Therefore, the South African land redistribution agenda emphasis on achieving economic growth through large-scale commercial farming is misplaced. This is not to say that land reform should not contribute towards economic growth, rather that the other three pillars of land reform are equally as important, if not more so. If poverty is not alleviated, then the injustices of the past cannot be readdressed, therefore national reconciliation will not occur. An important question with regards to economic growth in the South African land reform agenda, is economic growth for who? As it presently stands, land reform has managed to benefit state officials and agribusinesses, with the benefits failing to trickle down to the poor (Nelson Mandela Foundation, 2018).

### 2.3.4 Smallholder vs Large-Scale Agriculture

The narrative of large-scale agriculture being more productive is hardly ever challenged on mainstream information platforms in capitalist societies. The agricultural field like any other social field has agents that dominate and control the movement of resources. Implicitly, agricultural business and large commercial farms control the operationalization of the agricultural field (Cousins, 2007: 228). Consequently, information propagated about the field is manipulated in favour of these agribusinesses and the commercial agricultural sector. The narrative of large-scale agriculture being more productive is only half of the story, crop variety is seldom interrogated in productive discussions. Production on large farms tends to be monoculture, producing the highest yield of a single crop (Rosset, 2000: 79).

On the other hand, small-scale farming generally permits polyculture and intercropping (Ngcoya & Kumarakulasingam, 2017: 483). Small-scale farming is not reliant on the segregation and the neat arrangement of crops in rows which reduces planning surface area. Therefore, small-scale farms can produce a remarkable amount of crop diversity. (Plews-Ogan *et al.*, 2017). Furthermore, the combination and rotation of crops on small farms replenish soil fertility (Rosset, 2000: 79). Small-scale farming is more environmentally sustainable because it is self-sustaining and does not rely on the heavy use of fertilizer. Therefore, granting beneficiaries small-scale farms can be more impactful to poor citizens as they would be able to farm for a variety of crops on the same plot of land. Thereby, reducing their dependency on social grants for securing their nutritional needs.

The majority of poor South Africans rely on social grants as their main source of income (Ngcoya & Kumarakulasingam, 2017; Cousins, 2011). The success enjoyed by large scale commercial farms does not translate into socioeconomic development for rural towns and communities (Plews-Ogan *et al.*, 2017). Consequently, poor South Africans have been left with structural constraints that undermine their livelihoods. Hence, most of the poor have no alternative but to live on government handouts. The broad-based accumulation and development associated with small-scale farming could potentially improve the lives of poor landless South Africans.

On the other hand, mechanization and globalization reduce the number of local people employed by large commercial farms. The income earned from commercial agriculture is drained off to larger cities to support distant enterprises (Rosset, 2000: 79). The reason behind stagnant development in rural areas is that the commercial agricultural enterprises are not investing in developing local communities. This results in underdevelopment and food insecurity, as domestic food production falls in the face of cheap imports and land previously used to grow food is placed into the production of export crops for distant markets (Cousins, 2011: 91).

In South Africa, this has resulted in people depending on money/income rather than the land to feed themselves. Agriculture as a percentage of gross “domestic product has decreased over the past four decades, currently contributing around 2.4 percent” (Aneeuw *et al.*, 2015: 44). Consequently, the raging unemployment rate, decrease in wages and increase in food prices is driving many into hunger (COPAC, 2018: 13). An alternative to this deprivation is to adopt a smallholder orientated reform. Asian countries have demonstrated that fostering smallholders can generate revenue which is then pumped into the local community to build schools, clinics and promote food sovereignty (Iskan, 2018: 736)

Additionally, the management of land to ensure the success of redistributed farms rests on beneficiary selection. Some of the world's most successful land redistribution programmes implemented clear and principled criterion for beneficiary selection (News 24, 2018). It is unfortunate that the constitution only states that land reform should be redistributed to disadvantaged citizens on an equal basis without prescribing any categorization of reform beneficiaries. Awarding respect to the history of South Africa, Sihlobo and Kirsten (2018: 18) have drafted an all-encompassing beneficiary selection criterion that should be incorporated in land reform policy. The criterion is relevant because it prioritizes victimized and disempowered people. This is aimed at addressing the injustices of the past and empowering citizens. The second criteria beneficiaries should fulfil is being poor. Which should enable the rural poor to construct a multiple of livelihoods, employment opportunities and improve their nutrition (Scoones, 2009: 233).

Lastly, the beneficiaries should be active participants in the selection processes of beneficiaries for land redistribution (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 18). Experience from countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea participants that were invested in the selection process had a greater and more sustained agricultural output (Johnston & Kilby, 1975: 155). We should not assume that every poor citizen wants access to agricultural land, such assumptions will lead to tensions with regards to productivity and accountability. Furthermore, it is important to understand how land reform may impact women differently than men. Beneficiary selection should take into cognisance the intra-household allocations of rights that may threaten the women's access to land (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 784). One way of strengthening women's land rights is to ensure that any land redistributed through land reform is jointly titled in the names of both husband and wife (Lin, 2008: 118). Protecting women's land rights also secures infants nutritional status, since most babies are likely to remain with their mothers in the event of a divorce or eviction.

Individuals that desire to own large commercial farms should be selected using a different selection criterion. Commercial farm beneficiaries should still be required to independently sign up for selection. Furthermore, aspirant commercial farmers should be expected to disclose their financial net worth, show managerial skills and entrepreneurial skills while also demonstrating farming experience (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014: 260). The operation of a commercial farm is financially taxing (Rosset, 2000: 77). Commercial agriculture is a resource-intensive industry, as such new farmers have a high probability of failure. Hence, there is a universal consensus for a scrupulous selection procedure for large-scale agriculture applicants. Furthermore, the redistribution of large holdings reduces the number of potential beneficiaries (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 783). Therefore, financial capital serves as a strong predictor for success and justification for the exclusion of small-scale beneficiaries.

Additionally, the requirement for aspirant commercial farmers to possess farming experience and an understanding of the farming environment, could ensure the productive and sustainable use of redistributed land (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 20). South Africa has nine biomes with varying climatic envelopes, ensuring a range of

patterns in temperature and rainfall across the country (Driver *et al.*, 2011: 42). The experience will enable commercial farmers to make profitable financial judgments and in matching climatic conditions with harvest choices. Likewise, managerial aptitude is a major factor influencing the success of commercial farming ventures (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 20). Commercial farming requires beneficiaries to be well acquainted with managing employees, finances and navigating the market through accessing value chains.

### 2.3.5 Land Rights and Settlement Support

The last element towards successful land redistribution is the implementation of a special financing mechanism to assist beneficiaries to become profitable farmers (News 24, 2018). This relates to the security of tenure and access to adequate post-settlement support. The endowment of a framework that allows households or individuals to obtain and possess secure rights is crucial for the sustainability of land reform (Kleinbooi, 2010: 7). The evolutionary theory of land rights is a neo-classical paradigm which takes on a linear progression. Its basic premise is that socio-economic changes, for instance, population growth, technological advancement, and commercialisation result in increased pressures on land (Peters, 2009: 1319).

Hence, over time, a general shift from communal tenure regimes to more individualised forms of property ownership has occurred in Africa. Communal land rights are heavily bureaucratized and thus stand in the way of commercialization and economic development (Peters, 2009: 1322). The growing competition and economic monetarization of land demands that land redistribution allocates security of tenure to its beneficiaries in order to incorporate them in the distribution of wealth. Therefore, the state should actively promote private land ownership. Land access and land ownership do not translate to equal socioeconomic participation, with key privileges enjoyed by those who are allocated the latter. Accordingly, Bromley and Cernea (1989: 14) succinctly summarises the advantages of allocating secure tenure:

- “Secure land tenure stimulates more efficient land-use, by increasing tenure security and providing incentives to invest in the longer-term management and productivity of the land”.

- “Secure land tenure provides farmers with a title that can be offered as collateral to banks, improving farmers access to credit, and allowing them to invest in land improvements. In urban areas, land registration also allows owners to use land as collateral for loans and safeguards their investment in housing”.

The need for land redistribution to offer adequate post-settlement support cannot be overstated. Even the most experienced farmers find themselves needing some sort of assistance to cope with agricultural demands. This support is packaged in the form of infrastructure, agricultural input (fertilizer, seeds, pesticides), and access to loans, which cumulatively facilitate the success of land reform (Mabuza, 2016:14). In developing countries, institutions responsible for administering land tend to be poorly coordinated and often have a reputation for being ineffective and rife with corruption (Cook, 2004: 37). For example, the institutional disorganization of Zimbabwe's Fast-Tracked Programme compromised the role of resettlement managers, resulting in financial and infrastructural paucities in land redistribution farms (Scoones *et al.*, 2011: 15). Intermittent settlement support stifled effective agricultural productivity and the consolidation of community development in Zimbabwe.

Conversely, countries such as Brazil, Mozambique and the Philippines have adopted decentralized land reform and settlement support programmes (Tilley, 2007: 49). Decentralization facilitated the provision of settlement support by bypassing unethical party connections, kin-based linkages, and relations between government and traditional authorities (Kleinbooi, 2010: 18). This strategy has the potential to make an impact on the livelihoods of poor South Africans because it incorporates settlement support as an integral component of the land reform while simultaneously preventing bureaucratization and elite capture.

## 2.4 Land Reform in South Africa

The democratic South African state responded to the disparity in land ownership between white and black citizens, by implementing a land reform policy which rests on three legs; land restitution, land tenure and land redistribution

(Hendricks, 2001: 290). These three legs make up the balanced stool of South African land reform, which are constructed to bring about more equitable distribution of land ownership (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 14). According to Roodt (2001: 366), "land restitution refers to the restoration of right, goods, property or monetary compensation for the wrong one did against another" during apartheid. Land restitution processes are aimed at recompense and stimulating economic growth, as such restitution processes involve negotiations with dispossessed black South Africans lobbying to regain their land. On the other hand, the land tenure reform objective is to define and institutionalise every existing mode of land tenure, making it possible to confer well-defined and equal rights to various landowners and occupants (Anseeuw *et al.*, 2015: 15). For it is insufficient to only reallocate land to the formally dispossessed, without strengthening the security of their land possession, in a manner which prevents unlawful evictions (Helliker & Murisa, 2011: 32). Lastly, land redistribution, which is the focus of this paper, refers to the state's attempts to broaden access to land to disenfranchised black citizens (Hendricks, 2001: 294). This is achieved by acquiring land and then transferring it to targeted individuals and communities. This category includes a large number of black South Africans who want access to land but simply cannot afford it, due to the structural boundaries that curbed their economic and social progression.

South African land reform is aimed at rectifying the disenfranchisement and segregation that occurred during apartheid (de Villiers, 2003: 39). This could simultaneously facilitate an increase in crop production and improved nutrition for poor households in the country (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 770). Implicitly, food security is an effective barrier to structural inequality. Children who are malnourished experience stunted growth, which then impairs the child's academic capacity before he/she even enters the classroom. Poor nutrition in the early stages of development is associated with the substandard academic performance of pupils in rural areas, their narrowed opportunities and relatively poor health outcomes (Hall, 2009: 39). Thus, the universal benefit of land reform is its propensity to be a ladder out of structural poverty and acting as a foundation for sustained and inclusive economic growth (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 770). One way the South African land reform attempts

to achieve this is by enabling the poor to participate in agriculture. However for this to be realized, land reform has been faced with problems, such as access to credit, assistance with tapping into value-chains and a commitment to training the selected beneficiaries. (Lahiff, 2011: 67).

South African land reform debates are reaching tipping points, with more recent proposals on expropriation without compensation a red herring. In December 2017 the country's ruling party claimed to be in negotiations leading up to a constitutional amendment of section 25, to make provision for land expropriation without compensation (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 3). The proposal for such a constitutional amendment ignores the importance of property rights and their contribution to a stable financial and economic system (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 770). The notion of expropriation without compensation is fictitious. Should the government seize private property for free, someone, somewhere within the economy will have to pay for it, whether directly through losses in current and future job opportunities or indirectly through the protraction of the economy (AgriSA, 2018: 12). This could possibly lead to the massive economic decline and the erosion of the Rand's purchasing power.

The African National Congress (ANC) need only look to South Africa's northern neighbour, Zimbabwe, to be enlightened about how the effects of expropriation without compensation erode opportunities for both current and future generations (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 3). Although, the importance of land reform is well understood, hasty decisions which may impact on the livelihoods of future generations should be avoided. Implicitly, even though there is a great need to suture the deep wounds left behind by past land disposessions, uncalculated decisions may undo the progress the country has made so far.

#### 2.4.1 Settlement Land Acquisition Grant

The 1994 ANC election manifesto declared that the land reform programme will be the central driving force for rural development (Van Zyl *et al.*, 1996: 123). Therefore, land redistribution was drafted to be demand-driven and focused on supplying residential and productive land to the poorest section of the population.

The land distribution programme was ushered in by the Mandela's government, to improve livelihoods and quality of life to the previously disadvantaged, through the acquisition of commercial farmlands (Jacobs *et al.*, 2003: 5). Redistribution of land also fell within the agenda of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which set out to transfer 30 percent of agricultural land to poor black South Africans within five years (Kahn, 2007: 28). In line with global trends of incorporating international donors in the drafting stages of land reform policies, the decision to redistribute 30 percent of land was made in collaboration with the World Bank (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 26). Land redistribution at the time took on a more populist orientation, emphasising human rights, citizenship as well as gender and racial equity principles. This would be the script of the first incarnation of the South African redistribution programme.

This program was launched as the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which provided a R16 000 grant to selected beneficiaries to purchase land (Borras, 2003: 371). The particular mechanism for land acquisition was to be market assisted, under negotiation with exiting landowners, which is now understood as the willing-seller and willing-buyer arrangement (de Villiers, 2003: 130). This arrangement was informed by the neoliberal premise on free and fair markets, whereby both parties benefit from trade. Furthermore, SLAG was a community-based programme, instilled in such a manner that beneficiaries had to pool in their efforts and resources to work on the project collectively (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 14). Communal farming was propagated as a nation-forming project, to suture the nation from the fractions caused by apartheid. Consequently, beneficiaries were required to pool their funds to enable them to collectively acquire larger farms from viable sellers (Kahn, 2007: 29). In this way, the government gave favour to food security and means of existence in a country where the inequality of resource distribution is extreme and where the links between black populations and commercially oriented farming had been historically eradicated (Aneeuw *et al.*, 2015: 15)

The profile of these beneficiaries was defined as the landless, labour tenants, farm workers, women and the rural poor, who earned less than R 1 500 per month

(Van Zyl *et al*, 1996: 130). Beneficiaries had to submit payslips and a list of assets during the selection process to ensure that they fall below the means assessment. Conversely, SLAG differed from international land redistribution programs. SLAG's implementation of willing-seller, willing-buyer approach, required beneficiaries themselves (with state money), to independently liaise with willing sellers to procure land (Borras, 2003: 378). This was rather unusual, international land reforms generally centred the state in processes of land acquisition. In contrast, SLAG beneficiaries were solely responsible for the land acquisition phase of redistribution. Therefore, the role of the state, was that of a vigilant facilitator; approving and supplying the grants and planning for land use. As a result of which, SLAG was ineffective at reaching the goals of land redistribution, by 1999 less one percent of commercial farmland had been made available to black South Africans (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 34).

SLAG had severe limitations. Its over-reliance on market forces reduced the constitutional obligation to carry-through land redistribution since landowners were under no compulsion to sell their property (Roodt, 2001: 310). Moreover, the grant was too small to entice many owners to sell (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 31). Landowners are aware of the appreciating value of land, consequently, they are reluctant to sell their asset at a cut-rate as this will translate into a loss on their side. Secondly, beneficiaries were not provided sufficient post-settlement support in the form of seeds, fertilizers and access to markets, consequently, the production was not profitable (Masoka, 2014: 28). Post-settlement support is a common feature among all successful land reform projects. Therefore it is no wonder that SLAG farms which were redistributed without support inevitably failed.

Thirdly, SLAG's means assessment excluded black emergent farmers, who could potentially diversify the South African commercial agrarian sector (Cousins, 2007: 225). Aspirant black commercial farmers usually form part of the working/middle-class, therefore they were too wealthy to be considered for selection into land redistribution. SLAG indirectly propagated the notion that black people can only prosper under communal and subsistence farming (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 42). Communal farming has connotations of being inferior, therefore, the allocation of

collectivized land perpetuates the racist notion that black people do not have the intellectual capacity to run a commercial agricultural enterprise. Moreover, the white paper on South African land policy (1997) stipulates that land reform should respond to the multiple land needs of citizens. As such, aspirant commercial farmers ought to be included in land reform, to challenge colonially formed schema which regards black people as naturally inferior to whites.

Fourthly, SLAG did not fulfil its duty of prioritizing the empowerment of women (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 84). Acquiring land in groups did not have any lasting impact on women land rights, patriarchy constructs men as the heads of households, thus they assume sole ownership of household assets. Therefore, the redistribution of land through SLAG resulted in women land rights being challenged and subsequently passed down patrilineally (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 8). This was a major faux pas, SLAG failed to fulfil gender equality and the prioritization of women's land rights, as stipulated in the Constitution and the white paper on land policy.

Furthermore, the SLAG grant was insufficient to encourage individual ownership. Consequently, resulting in what scholars such as Jacobs et al. (2003: 18) dub a rent-a-crowd-syndrome, whereby names were added to land redistribution applications to accumulate grant funding. This resulted in conflict in two ways. On the one hand, it compounded tensions between beneficiaries over the distribution of responsibilities and resources on the farm (de Villiers, 2003: 130). Beneficiaries had to delegate farming duties and negotiate the distributions of profit, which in some cases lead to violent disputes (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 28). On the other hand, SLAG beneficiaries were registered on the same national database as applications for a housing subsidy, therefore people who were registered for SLAG without prior consent nor intent in farming, would not be eligible to receive housing subsidy (Jacobs *et al.*, 2003: 56).

In addition, the SLAG programme was the state's response to its constitutional obligation to grant citizens land (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 32). Constitutional obligations encapsulate the global franchise of human rights. However, the universalization of human rights presents developing countries with policy contradictions. On the one hand, the post-apartheid government's land policy upholds democracy, formal

equality before the eyes of the law (Hendricks, 2001: 299), which was instrumental for the liberation of South Africa. On the other hand, the canonization of human rights perpetuates material inequality through the protection of private property (Hendricks, 2001: 230). In other words, the universalization of the Bill of Rights maintains structural inequality in land access and ownership between whites and blacks rather than a breakdown from the past land-stratification. In point of fact, secure land tenure should not be problematized, the root of the problem with SLAG was the allocation communal land, administrative callousness which hampered people from receiving housing subsidies and the absence of settlement support

#### 2.4.2 Land Reform for Agricultural Development

To address SLAG's shortcomings, a revised policy was adopted in 2001, ushered in by the new Minister of Land and Agriculture Thoko Didiza, the programme was called Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) (Roodt, 2019: 1). LRAD was primarily intended to create a class of black commercial farmers, the so-called emerging black farmer (Kue & Kirsten, 2013: 350). This new class of commercial farmers were envisioned as up-coming competitors to the white farmers, in terms of production and land ownership. Subsequently, four projects could be supported by LRAD: "food safety net projects with agricultural production primarily for subsistence purposes: share equity schemes, commercial agricultural production and agriculture in communal areas" (Jacobs *et al.*, 2003: 14). In contrast to SLAG, these four projects provided grants to individuals rather than households or communities, with a maximum of 10 people permitted per project (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 210). Restricting the number of beneficiaries assigned to each project was a strategy deployed to bypass the conflicts that arose in SLAG's communal farms. Individual grants have a greater propensity to stimulate independent enterprise among black farmers since it allows for individual risk assessments and sole agricultural planning. Implicitly, the replacement of SLAG with LRAD follows the global experience of collectivized land reform programmes leading to failure (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 775). The approximation to global social progress and development is thus,

responsible for the transition from SLAGs collectivization to LRAD decollectivized land reform.

LRAD provided a sliding grant of R20 0000 to R100 000 per individual (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 210). The value of the grant fluctuated between beneficiaries, depending on the level of contribution that applicants themselves could make (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 48). This skewed LRAD in favour of beneficiaries who were well-off, as they would get more support. Implicitly South African land redistribution had taken a turn to exclusively focus on the black middle class and working class, abandoning the previous pro-poor orientation. The requirement for beneficiaries to make financial contributions was the government's response to the production failures that occurred during the operation of SLAG (de Villiers, 2003: 170). This orientation operated under the assumption that if beneficiaries contributed their own capital, they would be more committed to the success of their farming enterprise.

Furthermore, the implementation of LRAD changed the impetus behind land redistribution in the country (James, 2010: 234), from focusing on sustaining multiple livelihoods, to prioritizing commercial agriculture. The shift towards an agrarian discourse marginalized the majority of rural farmers (Kepe & Hall, 2017: 21), thereby making rural development dependent on the success of commercial agriculture. This policy change was in contradiction with the white paper on land policy (1997) which prioritizes the promotion of multiple livelihoods.

The implementation of LRAD was generally divided into two phases. Namely, the transfer of land titles, which was the responsibility of the Department of Land Affairs, and post-settlement support, which was offered by the Provincial Departments of Agriculture (DLA, 2001: 4). Beneficiaries were expected first apply at the Department of Land Affairs for the grant, then approach their provincial agricultural departments once they have purchased a farm. Access to LRAD grants was contingent to beneficiaries developing a business plan and drafting agreement letter for land sale with a willing seller (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 288). These documents were safety measure taken by the government, to ensure that beneficiaries had adequate capacity for commercial farming. Moreover, these business-plans were

expected to include the documented value of the proposed land from a professional land-valuer, a list of beneficiaries and their contribution and evidence of their contributions in the form of audits of assets and draft loan agreements (Mabuza, 2016: 32).

In contrast to SLAG, LRAD incorporated gender-mainstreaming into land reform policy. Implicitly, LRAD prioritized the need to challenge gender disparities in land ownership, especially in rural areas where assets are patrilineal (passed through the male line) (Cousins, 2011: 37). The inheritance of land through patrilineal descent, excludes women from land ownership, thus reinforcing gender inequality, particularly among divorced women and single mothers. This corresponds with the feminist challenge of tribal authority structures, which obstructs the achievement of gender equality with regards to land ownership. (Lin, 2008: 111). Establishing gender equality in South African land ownership is of crucial importance since research proved that about 60 percent of all South African households are female-headed (Goebel, 2015: 87). Implicitly, increased emphasis on gender equality in land ownership is likely to have an economic ripple effect on other social spheres, such as poverty reduction, promoting food sovereignty and fostering national equality. Women bear the brunt of child-rearing and poverty, thus an improvement in their socio-economic status through land redistribution will have a positive effect on multiple agents and sectors with the country.

The discourse of land redistribution is not immune to socio-political influences. In many aspects, LRAD mirrors Thabo Mbeki's class agenda, with which he attempted to integrate South Africa's dualistic economic structure (Cousins, 2007, 229). Consequently, LRAD embraced a more neoliberal and paternalistic approach, which demanded public-private partnerships and the productive use of redistributed land that accorded with the commercial farming models (James, 2010: 232). The South African economy was, therefore, likened to a coin, with one side accommodating the modern industrial, agricultural and financial sector, and the opposite side comprising of the poverty and underdevelopment of the third world economy. LRAD therefore,

constructed black commercial farmers as connecting bridges employed to link the two economies.

However, according to Hebinck, *et al.* (2011: 18) this type of land reform orientation lacked the radical restructuring that would challenge imperialist stereotypes about small scale farming. As such LRAD perpetuated the idea that commercial agriculture is the only viable model of agriculture, and that successful small-scale farming can only be a scaled-down version of profit-maximizing commercial farms (Cousins, 2007, 225). LRAD further entrenched the misconceptions of small-scale farming being inefficient and unproductive, hence, subsistence farming was not prioritized in its implementation. Consequently, the land redistribution agenda under Mbeki's reign transitioned into a programme equipped for the de-racialization of the South African commercial farming sector (Hall, 2009: 24). This shift in policy undermined the need to tackle spatial apartheid, the geographical separation of blacks from whites, which underpin the formation of the three evils; poverty, inequality and unemployment. South African land reform needs to go beyond the need to validate black agricultural enterprises, but also tackle national inequality, and fulfilling poor citizens' rights to development.

LRAD's conversion of land distribution into agrarian reform, turning beneficiaries into farmers was aligned with the government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR). The GEAR programme was introduced to redistributing wealth, through the creation of employment (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 52). Land redistribution under the GEAR programme was thus, implemented to facilitate the creation of black commercial farmers, who would subsequently increase employment opportunities leading to economic growth (Cousins, 2007, 230). An augmented motivation to increase the number of black agricultural employers, clashed with the goals of the RDP programme, as such the programme was phased out altogether (James, 2010: 226). Accordingly, LRAD changed the profile of land redistribution beneficiaries from the landless and rural South African to well-resourced black personnel, who are motivated to become commercial farmers. Therefore, during this phase of South African land redistribution, beneficiaries were

expected to have the resources to identify suitable farms and purchase it (with state's money) and also have the financial capacity to develop it (Hebinck, *et al*, 2011: 225).

Unfortunately, the economic growth envisioned for implementing LRAD, failed to materialise. Although LRAD increased the number of hectares transferred to beneficiaries, the number of beneficiaries had decreased (Pienaar, 2014: 168). The decline in the number of beneficiaries resulted from the prescription of land redistribution beneficiaries being exclusive to the black middle-class. The beneficiary selection criteria excluded poor black South Africans, especially those in rural areas. Moreover, LRAD beneficiaries incurred high levels of debt arising from the costs of maintaining farms. In the same breath, some beneficiaries took up loans to leverage higher grants from the Department of Land Affairs to buy farms (de Villiers, 2003: 170). Beneficiaries landed themselves in debt because they were therefore obligated to make monthly repayment for their bank loans, while still tending to the everyday needs of their farms. Furthermore, the state did not legislate any land-farm subsidy for beneficiaries, many farms were beyond beneficiaries' financial range (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 48). As with most goods on the market; the cheaper the price, the lower the quality of the property, thus, some beneficiaries settled for dilapidated farms, as they were more affordable. Additionally, LRAD was based on the market-based approach, therefore the state could not interfere in the pricing of these farms nor was there any structure to evaluate the quality of the farm (de Villiers, 2003: 172). In many cases, farms of suitable size and quality were either too expensive or far from the area where applicants reside, moreover, there was a fair chance that beneficiaries could be duped into buying dilapidated farms (Barras, 2003: 386).

There is a big difference between land and farms, it requires a trained eye to evaluate the productive value of a farm, (Cousins, 2007, 225). Generally, most people do not have the skill to properly assess the productive capacity of the land, and acquiring a professional land-valuer can be expensive. The losses incurred in purchasing debilitated farmland is further exacerbated by the fact that farmland on its own is roughly 10 percent of the total value of farm operation (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 24). The other 90 percent is made up of moveable assets such as machinery, seeds,

fencing and staff, the absence of adequate post-settlement, meant that beneficiaries had to pay for moveable assets out of their own pockets. These were costs that had to be covered by people who had limited resources, and who could not rely on the increased participation to carry the burden of the load due to restriction of partner's on-farm (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 49). Therefore, beneficiaries sought more bank loans to keep the ship afloat. Unfortunately, it led to straight to bankruptcy for most LRAD farmers.

Although LRAD helped accomplish a few land reform goals, such as granting black farmers access into agricultural farming, its sustainability is disputable. Some of the land transferred has not succeeded in obtaining the desired levels of productivity, while others have not become operational at all (Mabuza, 2016: 9). What hindered the sustainability of these farms was that LRAD paid more attention to the number of hectares transferred and the amount spent on them, rather than the socioeconomic impact on beneficiaries (Kahn, 2007: 31). Placing focus on the operationalization of a state policy without consolidating how it will benefit people at the grass-root level, was the inescapable demise of LRAD. Ntsebeza and Hall (2007, 96) also highlight bureaucratic incompetence which occurred during the implementation of LRAD as a contributing factor to its failure. State officials perceived the acquisition (under the Department of Land Affairs) and settlement support (provided by Departments of Agriculture) as two separate processes resulting in poor integration and loss of resources in the two departments (Mabuza, 2016: 58). At ground level, this fragmentation delayed the department's proficiency to allocate loans and support to beneficiaries, which slowed down the pace of land redistribution

Access to land alone was insufficient to bring about socio-economic development. This highlights the necessity for human capital development in the form of farming education, extension services and other advisory services (Dlamini, 2016: 17). Farming is skilled labour, land reform beneficiaries need to be educated about efficient farming methods, preventing crop decay or infection and about agricultural trade. Moreover, land reform without guaranteeing beneficiaries access to support services is futile, the existence of post-settlement crystallizes land reform in a way that

the allocated land improves beneficiaries socioeconomic status (Mabuza, 2016). The National Department of Agriculture's recognition of the need for post-settlement support prompted the establishment of the Micro-Agricultural Financial Institution of South Africa (MAFISA), which provided loans to land reform beneficiaries. MAFISA is a state owned-scheme established to provide micro and retail agricultural financial services of up to R500, 000 person. (Kahn, 2007: 34). MAFISA worked in conjunction with AgriBEE, the agricultural component of the black economic empowerment, aimed at granting black emerging farmers access to agricultural opportunities (DLA, 2008: 4). Unfortunately, MAFISA became a liability which capitalized on the failure of land reform farms. The stipulated condition that recipients should pay back the loan (with interest), did nothing to improve the socioeconomic status of LRAD beneficiaries, thus it was discontinued in 2009 (Ranwedzi, 2013: 12). Merely distributing funds to beneficiaries does not guarantee the success of their farms, the state ought to educate its land reform beneficiaries on how to use post-settlement resources, for the support to be meaningful and enable successful farming enterprises

The government's emphasis on commercial agricultural as a panacea to all the country's problem was a mistake. The allocation of loans to people who are already experiencing financial strain serves only to feed the cycle of bankruptcy. As such LRAD beneficiaries could not live up to the expectation of being the cornerstone for black socioeconomic development. Consequently, Mbeki's conception of South Africa's dual economy was fiercely challenged, with scholars such as Cousins (2007:230) arguing that poverty is caused by structures of inequality within one economy that is already integrated, but in ways that disadvantage the majority. Therefore, upon the removal of Mbeki from office, LRAD was abandoned altogether by the year 2011.

#### 2.4.3 Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy

By 2006 experiments had begun on a new land reform programme that involved the systematic state-led purchase of the land (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 250). In 2011, a redefined third land reform programme was implemented under Jacob Zuma's government and become known as the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS)

(Roodt, 2019). In contrast to the previous two land redistribution approaches, PLAS restructured processes of land acquisition, land transfers into state functions. Parliaments portfolio committee on agriculture, forestry and fisheries, concurred that the beneficiaries of land distribution were accumulating losses and incurring debts as a result of bureaucratic intransigence and inadequate support to enable viable agricultural enterprise. (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 68). Therefore, a more centralised approach was implemented. This shift would enable the transfer of productive and arable land, which was not accessible under SLAG and LRAD.

Furthermore, PLAS was the state's solution to the growing concern about the dangers involved in the procurement process of land. The previous land redistribution strategies did not protect beneficiaries from biased land purchase contracts nor was a clear mechanism for determining the viability of their commercial enterprise implemented (DLA, 2006: 4). Consequently, PLAS strategy abandoned the willing buyer willing seller approach, which was the foundation of the previous land redistribution approaches, in favour of utilizing the just and equitable provision of section 25 (3) (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 60). In recent events, the equitable provision clause has been vehemently contested in favour of expropriation without compensation. This Constitutional amendment of section 25 would, in my opinion, devalue democracy and the protection of landowners land rights.

Furthermore, PLAS was charged with fulfilling the country's land redistribution goals which include; accelerating the rate of land redistribution, which had decreased during Mbeki's presidential tenure (Mabusa, 2014:29). Secondly, ensuring that the state could acquire land in the nodal areas and the identified agricultural corridors and other areas of high agricultural potential (DLA, 2006: 7). Prior to the implementation of PLAS, the South African land reform enterprise had failed to consider how the geographical location of redistributed farms influences access to profitable markets and in addressing larger socio-political issues such as rights to the city. Thirdly, PLAS aimed to improve the identification and selection of beneficiaries and the planning of which people would settle on the land (DLA, 2006: 7). This element was aimed at matching redistributed land with the needs of

beneficiaries, thereby ensuring that land redistribution does not restrict beneficiaries into a particular mode of production, in the same way that LRAD did. Lastly, PLAS was tasked with ensuring the maximized productive use of acquired land (Binswanger-Mkhize *et al.*, 2009: 108). However, as shown above, maximized agricultural production can only be achieved through the adequate provision of post-settlement support, which has eluded South African land reform thus far.

State-centred land acquisitions increased the pace and number of land purchases. According to Sehlobo and Kirsten (2018: 11) since the suspension of SLAG and LRAD, the state was able to acquire 2.2 million hectares of farmland, which is significantly higher than the hectares that beneficiaries were able to acquire independently. The state has a stronger financial capacity to purchase land, moreover, it can efficiently deploy land-evaluators, negotiate farm prices, which then leads to the increased pace in land acquisitions.

The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform declared that proactive land acquisition must be executed within the ambits of district judiciary (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014:257). Therefore, a land reform beneficiary selection mechanism was initiated and carried out by municipalities or/and local districts of agriculture (Dlamini, 2016: 24). These local governments are responsible for carrying out the third goal PLAS strategy; ensuring that the identified beneficiaries are allocated land that matches the needs their needs, by utilizing the needs-based approach. The implementation of the needs-based approach to South African land redistribution is geared towards empowering black commercial farmers while simultaneously improving the livelihoods of the poor (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 70). Furthermore, these local municipalities are responsible for the registration of beneficiaries for funding and settlement support (DLA, 2006: 9). However, Local governments are accountable to the central government in the national Department Rural Development and Land Reform, consequently, they were not obligated to fulfil their duty to the communities they were employed to serve.

Additionally, PLAS proposes that once beneficiary selection had been finalized, beneficiaries are expected to lease with an option to purchase (Binswanger-

Mkhize *et al.*, 2009: 108). The department leases the farms for a minimum of three years, after which the farm can be disposed of for sale to the same beneficiaries (Hall & Kepe, 2017: 124). The decision to dispose of the farm for sale is dependent on the productive performance of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, during the trial period, beneficiaries do not have full ownership of the farm, rather they are tenants, who are similarly expected to contribute six percent of the entire farm price as a rental fee (DLA, 2006: 6). The rental fee was constructed as a strategy to motivate the beneficiaries for agricultural success. Thus, failure of payment enables the government to regularly evict beneficiaries who failed to reach the farm productivity. According to Ranwedzi, (2013: 18) the desire to ensure productive use of farmland and the state's ability to remove failed farmers is central to the implementation of PLAS. The PLAS programme is operated similar to the factory line, beneficiaries who fail to uphold the terms of agreements, (either by payment defaults or failed crop production) are replaced by new land tenants.

On the other hand, beneficiaries that are able to comply with the conditions of their rental contract can purchase the farms, once the trial period expires (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 74). The state has set-up an additional incentive for beneficiary compliance by offering a 30 percent discount on the purchase price of the farm (DLA, 2006: 16). This provides financial relief for operationalization of farms, the discounted funds can then be used to patch-up other areas of the farm that needed extra support, promoting its sustainability. On a macro level, PLAS still operates within the structures of neoliberalism, the land is still purchased on the open market. The difference being that PLAS market purchases are state-driven (Hall & Kepe, 2017: 122). Which ensures land expropriated with compensation, thereby protecting the integrity and viability of the economy.

Unfortunately, many South African policies read perfectly well on paper, but their implementation tells a different story, PLAS is no exception to this. The most pronounced challenges to implementation of the PLAS strategy has been poor management of lease agreements and the subsequent abandonment of farms (Dlamini, 2016: 27). One of the failures of the policy is fragmentation. Communication

became the first issue in the operation of place, citizens were not adequately informed about the transition to a state-centred acquisition in a new state institution, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (Hebinck *et al.*, 2011: 229). Consequently, creating a barrier preventing people from mobilizing and participating in land reform. Secondly, the communication between the central government for land reform (the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform) and various district municipalities is poor and uncoordinated, resulting to mismanagement of lease agreements (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 70). Centralized governments seldom consolidate their decisions with the desires, local people, consequently multiple state incompetence's have been reported, especially with regards to the compatibility of farmland and the needs of beneficiaries (Dlamini, 2016: 86).

On the other hand, institutional fragmentation of land acquisition and land reallocation processes, have decreased the pace of national land redistribution. Global experience shows that the land reform processes ought to be executed swiftly, otherwise, a combination of excessive bureaucracy, centralization processes and legal challenges are likely to impede its operationalization (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014: 262).

Looking at land redistribution figures under the PLAS strategy it is evident that the bureaucratization of the land redistribution process has decreased the rate of the land redistribution. By 2011, only 5.43 percent of the 87 million hectares of agricultural lands had been transferred to previously disadvantaged populations in the framework of the country's restitution and redistribution programmes (Anseeuw *et al.*, 2015: 47). Moreover, Sihlobo & Kirsten (2018: 9) argue that although the state has acquired 2.2 million hectares, only 10 800 hectares have been redistributed to beneficiaries in the years 2017-2018. It would be valid to conclude that South African land redistribution has come to a halt, with the only activity taking place on the side of the state, through land purchase via PLAS. Thereby, confirming Johnston and Kilby's (1975: 33) argument that when central government acquires the land it is unlikely to redistribute title deeds to beneficiaries, suppressing the achievement of land redistribution goals.

In line with Johnston and Kilby's (1975: 33) argument on the state's reluctance to redistribute full-ownership of land, PLAS beneficiaries, do not own the land transferred to them, rather the land remains under the ownership of state (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 275). Possession is a socio-political experience. Property relations exist at the level of law and regulations, cultural norms and social values in organizing property rights and access to resources (Sikor & Lund, 2009: 7). Access is about the ability to benefit from resources, making it more encompassing than the property rights, which refer to legitimate social relation with the resource (Verdery, 1999: 63). However, in post-colonial development programmes, the disjuncture between mere access and property rights can undermine access. PLAS beneficiaries are denied the authority and power to use the land productively. PLAS land tenure cannot be legitimated by politico-legal institutions hence beneficiaries do not have access to credit (Du Toit, 2013: 18). Thereby, maintaining structural inequality by preventing the collateral use of land for socio-economic development and impeding on the ability of poor black citizen's ability to participate in the economy.

In the same breadth, merely granting land access is an inadequate means of restoring poor black people's dignity. Coutin (2000: 589) regards private property rights as an important pre-condition for human dignity. Tenant farming does not reinstate the colonially eroded sense of identity and unequal citizen membership experienced by poor South Africans. The central defining meaning of citizenship incorporates three substantive values; respect, responsibility and participation (Boniak, 2000: 482). PLAS beneficiaries are denied the authority, respect and socio-economic participation required in legitimizing the claim of South African citizenship and belonging. Therefore, for land reform to effectively liberate poor black South Africans from the shackles of systematic deprivation and inequality, it should provide secure land tenure. The allocation of secure tenure has the latent capacity to advance the political subjectivity of poor landless citizens. In other words, the distribution of secure land tenure will legitimate citizenship among poor black South Africans, caused by an augmented sense of responsibility and belonging, thereby fostering socio-economic development.

Moreover, securing the tenure of redistributed land can be beneficial, since it is common for governments in developing countries to be inefficient at providing financial services (Spio, 2008). This has certainly been the case in South African redistribution. The inadequacies in settlement support have prompted the implementation of the Recapitalization and Development Programme (RECAP) in 2009, to revitalize and develop unproductive land reform projects (DRDLR, 2011: 2). The implantation of RECAP resulted in a preliminary steady increase in production and employment rate in land reform farms (Mabuza, 2016). However, the success was short-lived. The transitions to PLAS introduced a changeover which substituted RECAP from reviving failed projects to becoming the sole source of post-settlement support (Hall, 2015). Due to resource limitation, RECAP alone cannot successfully support the productive capacity of existing and future land reform farms. Thus, the productivity and sustainability of RECAP is rapidly declining (Ntlou, 2016: 79). Elite capture and the successive shrinking of state resources inevitably eroded the effectivity of RECAP's five-year support programme (Ntlou, 2016: 82). The scale of this failure is compounded by the fact that PLAS beneficiaries could access credit. The allocation of insecure tenure made beneficiaries more reliant on the support from RECAP, the work overload has severely compromised the livelihoods of the poor. South African land reform, might have mastered the skill of acquiring redistribution land, either through purchase or expropriation. However, RECAP inconsistency and inadequacy in providing settlement support prevents beneficiaries from transforming allocated land into an income-producing asset.

The biggest issue facing South African land redistribution is state-centrality. Accountability is assigned to a higher authority, consequently, state officials do not have a shared responsibility towards advancing poor landless citizen. Furthermore, centrality excludes the larger population from the land reform discussions. Therefore, the legislation of state-organized land purchases made it easier for state officials to form an allegiance with agribusinesses to carry out unscrupulous land purchases (Hall & Kepe, 2017). These crooked dealings award state officials great financial gain while offering agribusinesses the opportunity to purchase land at a cheaper rate without consideration of poor South African.

The ignorance cast on people at lower levels enables officials to organise land purchases for an agribusiness, then conceal the corruption by registering a bogus benefactor on the database (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 18). Unfortunately, this culpable behaviour impedes the socio-economic development of the landless poor by preventing the allocation of land and restricting available resources for settlement support. In the same breath, entrenched corruption prevents the poor from effectively participating in the economy. Thereby inexorably entrapping landless citizens in colonially forged structural poverty and inequality.

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an outline of the history of South African land dispossession and systematic domination of blacks, and how that manifests into current socioeconomic inequalities. Furthermore, the chapter also oriented the reader on the three land redistribution approaches that have been implemented this far. The legacy of racial inequality in access and ownership of land is still preserved in democratic South Africa (Thompson & Tapela, 2019: 11). Land redistribution has failed to erase the historic economic and resource exclusion imposed on black South Africans. However, we have turned over new leaf, with the election of a new president into office. The change symbolizes a new beginning, an opportunity to revise and construct a new land redistribution policy. The next chapter will include an interrogation of the three approaches to land redistribution presented at the conference. The examination will also include an appraisal of the approaches viability against the global context of land reform lessons and those derived from local experiences. South Africa has maintained the tradition of implementing a new land reform policy following every change in the presidency.

## Chapter 3

### 3. Appraisal and critique of the three conference papers

#### 3.1 Introduction

We are at a crossroads. The currently implemented PLAS strategy is proving to be ineffective at establishing equitable land access in the country. This chapter is an analysis of the three land redistribution approaches, presented at the PLAAS land redistribution conference earlier this year. The analysis is conducted in pursuit of a viable policy solution to South Africa's land crisis. This chapter will first unpack the implications of implementing the Market-Assisted, Decentralized Fast-track Approach, followed by an appraisal of the Radical Solidarity Approach, then closing off with an assessment of the Small-holder Focused Approach to land redistribution.

#### 3.2 The Market-Assisted, Decentralized Fast-track Approach

Nick Vink and Johann Kirsten's (2019: 2) approach to land distribution is “grounded on the realization of the state's National Development Plan, which prioritizes the creation of agricultural employment, fostering over third of a million livelihood opportunities” particularly in rural areas and expanding opportunities for poor black people to enter into the upstream and downstream agribusiness sector. The attainment of the National Development Plan (NDP) is intimately tied to the national land redistribution project. The NDP is a mobilized national plan directed at stimulating the capabilities needed to transform the economy and society to combat national unemployment, inequality and poverty (Hebinck *et al.*, 2011: 25). Accordingly, Vink and Kirsten (2019) propose an adaptation of a market assisted and decentralized approach to land redistribution. Decentralization refers to several related policy reforms, in which central government agencies transfer rights and responsibilities to more localized institutions (Meinzen-Dick *et al.*, 2008: 1). A decentralized orientation to land redistribution is envisioned as the solution to evading corruption and elite capture that befell the PLAS programme. Subsequently,

Vink and Kirsten (2019: 2) argue for the establishment of decentralized district land management committees. These decentralised bodies are envisioned as localized administrative institutions charged with the responsibility of identifying and procuring land for redistribution, selection of beneficiaries, and securing settlement support (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 2). The impetus of this approach is to bring state functions closer to the people, which ideally should facilitate social cohesion, increase citizen participation, and accountability. The successful implementation of this approach hinges on the efficiency of the proposed regional committees.

International experience of decentralized land reforms supports Vink and Kirsten's (2019) proposal of decentralization in facilitating an increase in public participation, democratisation of the land reform decision-making process and expediting the supply of settlement support (Tilley, 2007; Bruce, 2014b). Unfortunately, Vink and Kirsten (2019) provide a vague demarcation for the decentralization process. Decentralization does not come easily nor is it cheap. Central government agencies tend to resist policy amendments that require them to let go of prerogatives and funding (Bruce, 2014a: 55). The absence of strict selection criteria for the district management committees leaves room for the appointment of corrupt government officials into the envisioned lower government structures. This could severely compromise the integrity of the decentralized committees and perpetuate elite capture and the exploitation of land reform resources. Protective measures ought to be taken to resist central government's retainment of power. Accordingly, a devaluation of real power over the distribution of productive resources is necessary to guaranty the success of local level authority (Dyzenhaus, 2018: 336). The administrative decentralization that Vink and Kirsten (2019) propose will not translate into any fundamental change because it maintains a real possibility of central jurisdiction and upward accountability within the decentralization.

Decentralization is far more complex than what Vink and Kirsten (2019) capture in their proposed land redistribution approach. For one, decentralization in rural South Africa will be more challenging, since traditional authorities enjoy hegemonic power in many of these areas. Consequently, customary administration

may undermine the land rights of marginalized groups in society. For example, in Rwanda, customary biases and patriarchy among local district authorities excluded women and subordinate groups from access to land (Bruce, 2014b, 92). Although Vink and Kirsten put forward the prioritization of marginalized groups (including women), they fail to explain how this will be executed and maintained by their proposed district management committees. Rural development does not exist outside of social forces, the prioritization of agribusiness and smallholder representation in the committees is insufficient. A more socially informed demarcation should be drafted regarding the composition of the committee' members; in terms of ethnic variety and the inclusion of women. Particularly in rural areas where customary authority may threaten marginalized people.

On the other hand, the market assisted, decentralized fast-track approach is quite ambivalent towards issues of accountability within its decentralization. Implementation of the approach (in its present state) could further threaten democracy and equality. According to Agrawal and Ribot (1999), the establishment of decentralization depends on the legislation of three elements: accountability, actors and power. Vink and Kirsten (2019) adequately spell out the role of actors and their power. In their case, the actors include the proposed members of the district management committees and land reform beneficiaries. They provide a pertinent description of the vested power that ought to be disposed to the committee members. This refers to the authority to independently (from central government) acquire land, assign beneficiaries and settle land disputes within their territorial jurisdiction (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 3). Empowering committee members is important because it strengthens the decentralized institution, protecting it from the influence of the central government (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999: 480). Sanctioned power within the decentralization empowers the committees to be able to reject exploitive systems derived from central government.

Decentralization is contingent on how accountable actors are to their constituents (Dyzenhaus, 2018: 333). As mentioned, Vink and Kirsten (2010) do not make provision for how the communities can hold their regional management

committees accountable for their actions. Rather the emphasis is on securing control over beneficiaries and avoiding state dependency syndrome, without a consolidation of how committee members will be held responsible for their actions. The decentralization of power to actors who are not accountable to their constituents or who are not responsible for themselves or superior authorities within the structure of government is unlikely to accomplish its goals (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 590). Implicitly, Vink and Kirsten's exclusion of district-level accountability underestimates the possibility of the maintenance of bonds between higher state officials and members of the proposed land management committees, which can enable corruption and elite capture within the bounds of decentralization. Thereby increasing national inequality in similar patterns with the implementation of PLAS.

Decentralisation consists of two elements: devolution and deconcentration. Accountability is the primary element which distinguishes devolution from deconcentration of power. Deconcentration refers to processes by which state agents of the central government are relocated and geographically dispersed to lower governance (Yuliani, 2004: 2). Such an orientation would result in the transfer of central government power to a local government jurisdiction, while still preserving a vertical hierarchy of accountability between the two (Meinzen-Dick *et al*, 2008: 23). Ultimately, there would be no real transfer of authority, rather a shift of responsibilities to a state body at a lower level. As it stands, with the market-assisted approach, decentralization proposes *deconcentration* rather than *devolution*. For devolution to occur, a transfer of authority from the central government needs to occur, whereby representatives committees are downwardly accountable (Yuliani, 2004: 3). Implicitly, Vink and Kirsten ought to revise their land distribution approach in a way that authority is experienced more horizontally, granting communities the power to keep the district management committees in check, thereby, creating a platform where community members can voice their dissatisfactions.

Establishing horizontal accountability can be done by (Meinzen-Dick *et al*, 2008: 23):

- Conducting committee elections

- Legislating processes of recall (of any unscrupulous committee members)
- The inclusion of community referenda about the performance of their committee
- Welcoming a third monitory party such as the media and NGOs and performance awards for the committees
- Running independent financial audits

Institutionalization of these control mechanisms will ensure that committee members are held responsible for their actions, in the same way that beneficiaries would be expected to hold up their end of the deal, thereby reducing the chances of the exploitation of resources.

### 3.2.1 Market Assistance

The implementation of the market-assisted, decentralized fast-track approach requires the institutionalization of two fast-track processes; a virtual land depository and land reform fund (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 7). The land depository is a packaged solution against centralised land acquisition process. Vink and Kirsten (2019: 10) recommend two options for the acquisition of land: the first option being a national call for the voluntary donation of land. In such cases, the regional management committees will be responsible for ensuring that the donated land is expropriated with compensation (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 7). Thereby, upholding the land rights of the current landowners and preventing economic decline that followed in countries that failed to compensate landowners.

Additionally, Vink and Kirsten (2019: 7) argue for the land to be allocated directly to beneficiaries without ever being a state asset. The district management committee will oversee the transfer of land rights to beneficiaries preventing elite capture and the stagnant land transferal that occurred in the implementation of PLAS. Furthermore, land donors will be expected to contribute their time and expertise through mentoring land redistribution beneficiaries (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 8). Vink and Kirsten (2019) have constructed a well-thought-out land redistribution approach,

one that has the potential to sustain itself, without heavy reliance on the market. The above-mentioned land reform bank will be essential in promoting the success of land redistribution. Financial restrictions are a recurring hurdle that obstructs the success of decentralized land reform. Decentralised institutions with deficient human and financial resources will not do better than central governance (Meinzen-Dick *et al*, 2008: 5). Therefore, the institutionalising the land reform bank will capacitate the smooth functioning of decentralized bodies. Implicitly, funds from the land reform bank can be withdrawn by the district land committees and distributed to beneficiaries to supplement the allocation of pre and post-settlement support. On the same note, Vink & Kirsten (2019) comprehend that it would be imprudent to base the provision of post-settlement support on the altruistic donations of commercial farmers and agribusinesses. To this effect, they recommend incentive use of tax relief to motivate people and agribusiness to donate money or their time and expertise to land reform (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 9). This strategy will potentially maintain a steady supply of agricultural mentors and raise funds for land redistribution, while also promoting participative land redistribution processes.

### 3.2.2 Incorporating Settlement Land

The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1996: 10) states that land redistribution should respond appropriately to the widely differing needs and aspirations of people for land, in both urban and rural areas. However, Vink and Kirsten (2019) prioritize the need for creating employment and fostering economic growth over people's immediate need for housing. Land reform should be compartmentalized to agrarian reform. Apartheid's land dispossession policies not only denied black South Africans ownership of arable farming land, however, they also alienated black people from metropolises. The location is in most cases a continuation of the apartheid spatial patterns. Although South Africa's cities have undergone significant changes, vulnerable populations are still concentrated on the periphery unable to fully benefit from the socio-economic advancement of the city (SACN: 2016: 15). This is a violation of rights, it is constitutionally enshrined that all citizens must have a sense of belonging spatially, socio-culturally and economically to

our cities (Dalton, 2012: 188). The journey towards restoring the dignity of poor black South Africans begins by increasing their capacity for self-defined economic participation. Therefore, imposing agriculture on beneficiaries excludes them from city-based socio-development and freedom. Land redistribution should incorporate settlement needs of poor black South Africans. This speaks to the need to empower poor black people's rights to the city and fulfilling the exercise of full citizenship.

### 3.2.3 Enabling Factors

The market assisted, the decentralized fast-tracked approach is in line with global land reform patterns which facilitated successful implementation in other parts of the world. Vink and Kirsten (2019:14) agree for the allocation of an individual or family-operated farms. Their proclivity towards household allocation correlates with the global transition to second-generation reform which prioritized the individual ownership of land (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 776). This land transfer strategy is aimed at preventing internal conflict, poor accountability and difficulties relating to the division of labour that occurred during the first phase of South African redistribution. Vink and Kirsten (2019) therefore grasp that the propositional correlation between secure land tenure and agricultural production is key to socio-economic development. The allocation of secure tenure will permit beneficiaries to use the property as collateral for leveraging working capital and finance to operate the farms (Lahiff, 2011: 67). On the same note, their proposition for allocating secure land rights is a progressive approach for increasing the inhibited productive capacity of beneficiaries under the PLAS programme.

Vink and Kirsten (2019) put forward potentially impactful ideas for the expansion of land available for redistribution. These include (Vink and Kirsten, 2019: 14).

- The inclusion of isolated land subdivided by national roads and provincial lines
- The procurement of owned but unoccupied arable land
- The acquisition of notarial linked land

The inclusion of these obscure and dormant lands could scale-up of the success of land redistribution by increasing production rates and the number of beneficiaries. However, this is dependent on the efficiency and management of the decentralised district land committees. Devolution of power and the establishment of downward accountability has to be implemented to avoid elite capture and exploitation of resources as seen in the PLAS programme.

The next section is an assessment of the radical solidarity economy approach.

### 3.3 Radical Solidarity Economy Approach

The radical solidarity economy approach is a nuanced take on land redistribution. It consolidates various existing social policies geared towards facilitating conditions for a broad-based accumulation from below. Accumulation from below refers to a range of processes that are necessary for the radical reconfiguration of the agrarian structure, by facilitating public participation and enabling people at the grass-root level to benefit from the agricultural sector (Cousins, 2011b: 101). Therefore, a participative policy orientation is packaged as the solution to elite capture and exclusionary neoliberal practices that have thwarted the achievement of land reform goals. The resurgence of liberal market ideology in the form of neoliberal global capitalism during the LRAD programme reduced the role of the state in protecting society against the side-effects of free markets (Vishwas, 2014: 18). The disembeddedness of the market from social relation entrenched structural inequality in health care, education, gender and nutrition. Therefore, calls for accumulation from below are geared towards the reintegration of the economy into social relations, in bringing about the equal distribution and consumption of resources. The advancement of an accumulation from below in South African rural development and land reform is fundamental in the promotion of national food sovereignty and rural entrepreneurship (Hall, 2011: 28).

The radical solidarity economy approach opposes the hegemonic positivist orientation to agriculture, specifically the prioritization of economic efficiency over the needs of the general public and environmental preservation. As an alternative,

Mazibuko Jara (2019) argues that South African land redistribution should adopt a sustainable development approach, one which aims to achieve the needs of today without compromising the livelihoods of future generations nor causing environmental degradation (Shiva, 2010: 231). The radical solidarity approach, therefore, echoes Drexhage and Murphy's (2010: 19) argument that developing countries are not faced with two separate crises, one environmental and the other social, but rather with one complex crisis which is both social and environmental. Consequently, strategies for a solution demand an integrated approach to combating poverty, restoring dignity to the excluded and at the same time protecting nature.

The radical solidarity economy approach is at one with the sustainable development paradigm, with both striving to achieve equality and reducing exploitation and curtailing anthropocentrism. The incorporation of sustainable development into land redistribution would help reform the location, quality and size of land that black South Africans have access to, while also challenging market exclusion and the reproduction of capitalist power relations including human-centric agriculture (that is exceptionization of human need over the needs of the environment). This follows deep ecology's philosophy of the natural world as a subtle balance of complex inter-relationships, which the existence of all organisms, (including humans) are dependent on (Devall & Sessions, 1985: 67). Implicitly, the radical solidarity economy approach opposes the dominant view that human beings are isolated and fundamentally separate from nature that exists in technocratic-industrial societies.

Sustainable land redistribution requires agricultural professionals to be willing and able to learn from farmers, supportive external institutions and above all it needs policies that upholds all these features (Pretty, 1995: 67). Hence, Jara (2019: 2) proposes for the Integrated Development Plan (IDP henceforth) to be the pioneering policy in the incorporation of sustainable development into South African land redistribution. The IDP is a constitutional and legal process required of all South African municipalities, to ensure close cooperation and integration between projects, programmes and activities both internally (between clusters and directors) and

externally (with other spheres of government) (Republic of South Africa, 2008). In other words, the IDP is a guideline for enhancing service delivery and development within the municipal jurisdiction. Apart from legal competence, the adoption of IDP leads to an array of advantages, which include (Rabothata, 2017: 3):

- Prioritization and allocation of scarce resources to areas of greater need
- Achieving sustainable development and growth
- Democratizing local government by ensuring full participation in the planning implementation and evaluation of programmes
- Providing access to development funding

Implicitly, Jara argues for the legislation of land redistribution into the ambit of municipal authority. Therefore the implementation of the radical solidarity economy approach would result in land redistribution processes occurring in a lower government institution. The municipal administration of land redistribution is likely to fail. Although the IDP has been legislated as a municipal requirement for 19 years now, it is yet to deliver optimum municipal functioning (Phago, 2009: 485). According to Mfene (2014) numerous South African municipalities are incapacitated thus fail to meet the needs of their residents. Ngcelwane's (2009) study of the performance of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, shows similar patterns. He notes that although the municipality set out IDP objectives with the communities, some service delivery targets were not achieved (Ngcelwane, 2009: 27), implying that communities requested services but did not receive them. How then are we to expect these municipalities to effectively identify land for redistribution, select beneficiaries, and provide settlement-support when they fail to fulfil their current mandate?

Furthermore, the exploitation of state resources is not restricted to higher government institutions. Imam *et al's.* (2019) study demonstrates how micro-level institutional corruption has crippled economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the transfer of land reform processes into municipal authority, irrespective of the IDP, would sustain present trends of corruption in South African land reform. Although the municipalities are constitutionally recognized as development

facilitators, much still needs to be done to improve their performance (Ngcelwane, 2009). As such, land redistribution is a far too arduous task to be relegated to South African municipalities in their present state.

### 3.3.1 Beneficiary Selection

In its stead, the radical solidarity approach promotes the integration of the economy through the pluralist process of distributing popular control of the means of production (Williams, 2014: 38). Hence, Jara (2019) puts forward an all-inclusive beneficiary selection framework, aimed at increasing the redistribution rate and consumption for land-hungry households and communities. The listed beneficiaries comprise of farmworkers, labour tenants, small farmers, the unemployed and even those who since been evicted from redistributed land (Jara, 2019: 3). In contrast to the market-assisted, decentralized, fast track approach, eligible land redistribution beneficiaries of the radical approach also encompass those who seek land for housing. Thus, the radical solidarity economy approach does not reduce land redistribution to mere agricultural reform. However, it seeks to empower poor landless South Africans to generate socio-cultural change. Implicitly, the approach recognizes that improving the livelihoods of South Africans should not be restricted to citizens that have an interest in farming. Therefore, the racial solidarity approach recognizes land redistribution's constitutional obligation to redress past injustice and improve household welfare (Republic of South Africa, 1997).

The racially-based land dispossession in South Africa severely altered the black household, generating migrant labour, rural isolation urban poverty which continues to be a prominent factor in the lives of many black South Africans. Although the past laws have been eradicated, the vestige of separation between opportunities for earning an income and the site for family life remain intact for many black South Africans (Makhusa & Richter, 2014: 983). Consequently, the endorsement for redistributing residential land in both rural and urban areas has the potential to restructure the black home as a space for both family life and for securing employment opportunities.

On the other hand, the radical solidarity economy does not support aspirant black commercial farmers (Jara, 2019: 3). Jara's pro-poor beneficiary criteria resemble that of SLAG, he falsely assumes that all aspirant commercial farmers have the resources to access land without state support. This negates the fact that most farmers need support especially in the early stages of farming and that the success that white commercial farmers reap presently is owed to the various categories of settlement support provided by the apartheid government (Lahiff, 2011: 67)

Furthermore, the White Paper on Land Reform (1997) and the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (2009) both include financially capable, aspirant black commercial farmers into their categories of land redistribution beneficiaries. As such, the radical solidarity economy approach should be restructured to include black aspirant commercial farmers. The selection of black commercial farmers should be conducted on separate selection criteria. Experience from LRAD taught us that the only beneficiaries expected to succeed from commercial agriculture are those with substantial amounts of capital. Therefore, the criteria for aspirant commercial farmers could be restricted to people with a considerable financial net worth, people who possess managerial skills and prior farming experience (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014: 260).

### 3.3.2 Land Acquisition

The radical solidarity economy approach is rather vague about how land will be acquired for land redistribution. Jara (2019) loosely discusses the imminent issue of expropriation without compensation, but he fails to give his stance on the matter. Negotiated buy-ins are important at sustaining the success of land redistribution. Experience has proved that compensation legitimizes land reform. According to Sehlobo & Kirsten (2018: 5) land that is expropriated without compensation is a debt paid for in socioeconomic livelihood decline. South African should glance over to its northern neighbour (Zimbabwe), to appreciate the economic recession, destitution and the eroded livelihoods that follow expropriation without compensation (Scoones *et al*, 2003: 7). Taking into account the economic recession that followed Zimbabwean land-grabs land reform, South Africa should be deterred from implementing a land

redistribution program that is ambiguous about protecting the property rights of current landowners. There is an inconsistency in how the radical solidarity economy approach emphasizes equality and sustainability yet fails to promote the protection of property rights of current landowners. The protection of current landowner's rights upholds legal egalitarianism and sustains land redistribution (Sehlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 5). Therefore, the approach needs to be restructured to rectify this imbalance by opposing the Constitutional amendment of Section 25.

### 3.3.3 Smallholder Focused

Capitalism aggressively encouraged states to prioritize economic growth over the social needs of its citizens, this has generated modules and wealth and power (Vishwas, 2014: 18). The solidarity economy is dedicated to challenging individualistic patterns of consumption and redistribution under capitalism (COPAC, 2014: 13). Thus, the radical solidarity economy approach is smallholder orientated, initiating broad-based accumulation patterns. Jara (2019: 8) proposes the allocation of varying amounts of small-plots for residential or farming purposes. The inclination towards smallholder upholds the approach's emphasis on environmentally friendly agriculture and equal participation in land redistribution while sustaining accumulation from below. This deep connection between society and the economy is aimed at ensuring that the economy does not develop autonomously from society in the way that we have seen with previous land redistribution programmes. Accordingly, the radical solidarity economy approach opposes the hegemonic propagation of large-scale commercial agriculture as the primary agent of development. Experience shows us that BEE type large-scale commercial agriculture tends to benefit the elite and preserve the highly unequal agrarian structure (Cousins, 2011b: 95). On the other hand, large scale agriculture is very competitive, resulting in desperate commercial farmers resorting to environmentally destructive practices which cause acid rain, soil erosion and food poisoning due to the excessive use of pesticides and fertilizers (Alufohai & Oyoboh, 2013: 11).

Jara (2019: 8) presents private titling as the vehicle for the empowerment of land reform beneficiaries. Secure land tenure anchors the land redistribution process from

drifting away from its purpose, of generating economic growth, reducing poverty and restoring the dignity of poor black South Africans. Private titling enables beneficiaries to access additional financial support from banks (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 283), which they can then use to supplement finances for both downstream and downstream production. Therefore, secure tenure allows beneficiaries to use the land as capital and commodity, thereby encouraging grass-roots economic development. In the same breath, the economic inclusion conveyed through the allocation of secure land tenure will empower landless South Africans to enjoy their full membership as citizens. The allocation of secure land rights allows beneficiaries to engage in respectable economic independence, thereby awarding the landless poor justice from historic disempowerment (Lister, 2010: 29). A correlation has been established between secure rights of tenure and socio-economic development. Granting beneficiaries secure land rights promotes an ideological sense of self-worth and belonging, brought by the pride of ownership, while also stimulating economic growth by motivating beneficiaries to work on the reallocated land (Iscan, 2018: 742).

#### 3.3.4 Land Allocation

Jara (2019) adequately unpacks his motivation for a smallholder focused land redistribution approach. He, however, fails to explain how it should be carried out. Merely stating that radical solidarity economy approach should adopt the Zimbabwean A1 and A2 land allocation scheme is insufficient. Land reform programmes that are not succinct about their implementation are likely to fall short on achieving their goals (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 781). Uncertainty in land redistribution approaches makes room for the mismanagement of resources thereby compromising the success of land reform. Consequently, Jara should provide more clarity on how A1 and A2 farms are going to be applied to the South African context, in terms of size and the beneficiary criteria. Furthermore, Jara should incorporate the various categories of smallholder into A1 and A2 scheme. Accordingly, Scoones *et al.* (2011: 3) defines Zimbabwean A1 farms as smaller self-contained farms, which are around one to three hectares, and A2 as slightly bigger farms that are capable of producing for commercial consumption, ranging from 15 to 20 hectares in size.

Conversely, in respect of South Africa's vagrant climatic conditions, the viability of farm size varies radically depending on the soil conditions and climatic zone, whether irrigation and infrastructure are available (Driver *et al.*, 2011: 42). Therefore, farm sizes ought to be distinctively tailored to the biome and climatic envelope of the land.

Therefore, following the land redistribution categories identified by the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (DRDLR, 2009) A1 farms could be reallocated to:

1. Landless households who seek land for subsistence purposes
2. Commercially ready subsistence farmers (these are producers who occasionally sell products for cash as a supplement to other sources of income)
3. Commercial smallholders, who regularly market surplus after their consumptive needs, but are constrained by lack of land and other resources.

On the other hand, A2 farms could be reallocated to:

1. Well-established black commercial farmers, who are already farming at a reasonable scale but are disadvantaged by location and other circumstances
2. Financially capable, aspirant black commercial farmers.

As stated above, two separate beneficiary selection criteria ought to be used in the selection process into either A1 or A2 farms. Additionally, the suggested selection framework is parallel to the diversified smallholder-led scenario that the radical solidarity approach aims to achieve. The implementation of a diversified smallholder-led scenario necessitates the incorporation commercial farmers into land redistribution approaches because commercial farming enhances the chances of the approach reaching the scenario's goal of nurturing over three million net livelihoods (Aliber *et al.*, 2009: 155).

### 3.3.5 Gender Division of Labour

Most of the efforts aimed at enhancing food and income security among farming households in Sub-Saharan Africa have focused more on increasing production and productivity (Lusiba, *et al.*, 2017: 1) However, less matching efforts

have been put on reducing the gender division of labour that undermines the gains of increased production and productivity. Gender issues are hardly addressed in the IDP documents and generally regarded as a luxury in the context of more basic challenges that face the municipality (Todes *et al.*, 2010: 364). A disjuncture subsists between state-policy at a high level of abstraction and the effective creation of a society that inserts women in a more sociologically supportive and progressive environment. Consequently, the radical solidarity economy approach needs to be more hands-on in tackling gender issues particularly the looming gender division of labour. Gender division is a patriarchal practice in which all work inside the home is either done by the women of the family or organised by them through domestic helpers (Lusiba *et al.*, 2017). Consequently, the radical solidarity economy approach may result in the burden of sustaining the small-scale farms being carried disproportionately by women.

Intra-household division of labour in terms of roles and responsibilities and gender dynamics are likely to influence the inclination of members of a household to perform critical tasks. For example, Handoko's (2013) study of coffee harvesting in the south of Indonesia shows that women were restricted to post-production tasks (drying, grinding storage, winnowing) that tethered them to the home, while men were responsible for planting and the trade of products. Furthermore, in some cases, the women reported that their husbands did not bring the proceeds home nor were they included in production decisions on the farms (Handoko, 2013: 144). Consequently, the gender division of labour increased gender inequality and compromised household food security.

Similar findings were found by Lusiba, *et al.* (2017) in eastern Uganda where the reproduction of gender inequalities through the construction of women as the bearers of post-production activities was responsible for the subjugation of women in agriculture. There is a fair chance that the exploitation of women could occur in South Africa as well, especially since the construction of men as breadwinners and heads of households is still rife in the country (Makhusha & Richter, 2014: 984). Therefore, gender mainstreaming is imperative in guaranteeing the success of social policies in patriarchal societies such as South Africa. The articulation of gender and development

approach as a means of bringing forth balanced and sustainable development can be achieved by (Handoko, 2013: 145):

- Making sure that both men and women receive information about gender issues and how they impact the outcomes of development programmes
- Educating communities about the dangers of gender stereotyping the roles of men and women
- Conducting gender training in all sectors of land reform

### 3.3.6 Agricultural Cooperatives

The transformative potential of the solidarity economy is in building a society in which its explicit goal is not the growth of economic capital but rather human development itself- the growth of human capacities (Jara, 2014: 235). The radical solidarity approach's endeavour towards an egalitarian society seeks to promote national food sovereignty and smallholder market share through the establishment of agricultural cooperatives (Jara, 2019: 11). "A cooperative is defined as an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise" (ICA, 1995: 2) Agricultural cooperatives have the potential of creating horizontal integration of agricultural capital and avenues for broad-based accumulation which has eluded land redistribution hitherto. The endorsement of neoliberal policies in land redistribution and agriculture have repressed the livelihoods of landless poor. Owing to this, inequality and persistent poverty is a common theme in democratic South Africa.

According to COPAC (2014: 4), the absence of popular food sovereignty has culminated in over 12 million South Africans going to bed hungry. Agricultural cooperatives increase member's capacity to obtain required agricultural inputs and provide consistent access to the market for commodities produced by isolated small farmers (Chambo, 2009: 3). Therefore, the incorporation of agricultural cooperatives to land redistribution can potentially lead to national food security by creating spaces

where beneficiaries can accumulate wealth on the periphery of the capitalist circuit of production.

Interconnected local food systems of this kind have already emerged in both rural and urban South Africa. For example, the Ivory Park campaign and the seed blessing ceremonies in rural KwaZulu-Natal both demonstrate the latent potential of agricultural solidarity in bolstering food security & democratic accumulation. The cooperatives created a platform where the small-scale producers can accumulate capital by avoiding transport and transactional costs incurred in the reliance on mainstream markets (Ngcoya & Kumarakulasingham, 2017: 488; Bennie, 2014). The pairing of land redistribution with agricultural cooperatives could potentially restructure the South African agriculture to the benefit of emerging smallholders instead of existing large-scale commercial farmers and agribusinesses. Thereby, revolutionizing and embedding land redistribution within the agrarian crisis to facilitate the redistribution of resources, creating economic opportunities and fulfilling citizen's right to food.

The next section is an appraisal of the smallholder focused approach.

### 3.4 Smallholder Focused Approach

South Africa's history and various state policies have reduced small-scale farming to a point where it contributes very little to the economy and the welfare and livelihoods of the poor. The global trend of deregulating commodity markets and the removal of state support to the agricultural sector since 1990 have significantly contributed to a climate that is exceptionally hostile to new entrants and existing smallholders (Lahiff & Cousins 2005: 121). Consequently, Michael Aliber (2019) puts forward a progressive multiple livelihoods perspective for poverty reduction and diversifying the agrarian structure. The smallholder focused approach aims to accomplish this goal by redistributing land for residential, small and large-scale farming (Aliber, 2019: 3).

This approach is systematically geared towards tapping into the productive potential of South Africa's smallholder agriculture. Accordingly, Aliber (2019)

proposes that 95 percent of land redistribution beneficiaries should be allocated small plots of land. Therefore, only five percent of land redistribution beneficiaries will be reallocated large commercial farms, shifting the focus from large commercial farming to small-scale farming. Aliber's (2019) inclination towards the smallholder is thus, aimed at challenging the hegemonic perception of small-scale farming as backwards and unproductive. This land redistribution rationale coincides with Hall's (2014a) argument that some land-hungry people would be content with one hectare of land. Furthermore, a smallholder orientated land redistribution elevates beneficiaries from mere recipients of development aid to participative agents (Iskan, 2018). Therefore, the smallholder focused approach has the potential of increasing beneficiaries' participation in land reform decision-making processes, thereby empowering their capacity for self-determination, and fostering economic inclusion.

Countries such as China, Japan and Zimbabwe have shown how smallholder focused land reform has the potential to underpin and revitalize systems of agricultural production, in tandem with a transformation of the agricultural sector in ways that promote economic development and reducing poverty (Rohrbach, 1998; Iskan, 2018; Scoones *et al.*, 2011). Experience from these countries shows that inclusive agricultural models such as the one Aliber proposes have yielded untold benefits through the absorption of labour and better household nutrition. Expediently, Lahiff and Cousins (2005: 121) contend that smallholder agriculture can thrive in a wide range of locations within South Africa; from deep within the former homeland, to townships and cities. This form of agricultural production is adaptable and prevalent throughout the country. Therefore, the combination of small-scale land redistribution and adequate settlement support has the potential to improve the socio-economic conditions of citizens in both rural and urban areas.

### 3.4.1 Beneficiary Selection

Aliber (2019) proposes the household as the unit for beneficiary selection. Empowering the household is geared towards granting beneficiaries the opportunity to generate capital and greater control over their lives. The allocated households will be able to make autonomous decisions regarding farm operations, and the

opportunity for self-determined economic participation, thereby promoting reflexive advancement from past injustices. However, household resource allocation does not occur in a vacuum. The success of household resource allocation depends on the dynamics of household decision-making processes (Doss, 1996: 1600). Aliber ignores the socially prescribed gender roles which assign primary responsibility for certain household activities to the husband and others to the wife. Unfortunately, when gender is not factored into policy, the default equilibrium of men being in control of resources and making autonomous financial decisions is established and maintained in many smallholder farms (Amadhila, 2016: 24). This is notably the case for women living in rural areas, where the state's reach is limited and allocation of land is governed by traditional institutions (Deininger, 2006: 8). Gender ambiguity in Aliber's proposed household allocation system is unlikely to lead to the expansion of women's opportunities or emancipate women from their current subordinate position.

The incongruity between government legislation and customary law results in gaps between formal and informal land systems. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the Traditional Courts Bill of 2008 still fails to adequately address the serious discrimination experienced by women in customary courts (Kleinbooi, 2010: 55). Consequently, land distribution policies should guarantee the secure allocation of land to single, separated, divorced and married women alike. Especially since African women carry the burden of the staggering unemployment rate and the rampant spread of HIV/ AIDS (Deininger, 2006: 10). Women are the backbone of many African families, successful land redistribution is inextricably linked with the advancement of women land rights. Moreover, how land rights are governed within the household or extended family affects the opportunities and experiences of younger members of the family. The study by Ngcoya and Kumarakulasingam (2017) and that of Plews *et al.* (2017) show that within the household and family, greater bargaining power among women normally translates to higher spending on nutrition, education and children's welfare.

On the other hand, the allocation of land rights should reduce the potential for conflict over land (Deininger, 2006: 9). Land rights act as a social safety net, protecting

households from being evicted from their land due to family disputes or bigotry in customary practices. Generally, women are the victims of these land disputes (Walker, 2003; Pheko, 2014). As such, public institutions responsible for administering rights to land ought to work hand in hand with customary institutions in adjudicating land rights and mechanisms for conflict resolution and enhancing the women land rights (Thompson & Tapela, 2019: 31). This partnership will promote the equal experience and protection of the benefits of acquiring secure tenure as proposed by the smallholder focused approach. Therefore, a smallholder focused approach should incorporate protective measures that counter patriarchy and traditional institutions strategies which debase women's land right. This can be implemented in two ways (Doss, 1996: 1605):

- The prevention of the dispossession of household land by husbands (through sale or transfer) without consent from the wives, through joint ownership of the land
- The establishment of a legal instrument that will maintain women's rights to land in the event of a spouse's death.

### 3.4.2 Land Rights

The propagation for secure land rights is a key enabling factor of the smallholder approach. The approach recommends that the proposed three types of beneficiaries receive secure rights of tenure (Aliber, 2019: 12). According to Kirk (1999: 13), land tenure policies which aim to restructure land ownership should consider socially determined factors such as population development, state legal order, economic and technological change as well as exogenous intervention resulting from colonialism. The smallholder approach proceeds on this path by proposing the legal recognition of land tenure rights, social legitimacy of the rights and the establishment of accessible land institutions. Aliber (2019) proposes a holistic approach to land tenure, he presents a land tenure framework which satisfies the needs of each respective land beneficiary (settlement, small-scale farmer or land large-scale farmer).

For settlement-orientated beneficiaries, secure land tenure will increase beneficiaries capacity to demand basic needs such as proper housing, education, health care and social security (Roodt, 2008: 3). Households with formal land rights have a stronger capacity to lobby for service delivery from the state than those without land rights. The grievances of people who reside in unregistered informal settlements are largely ignored by the state, thus they experience multiple deprivations due to restricted access to services and infrastructure (Thompson & Tapela, 2019; SERI, 2018). Therefore, the implementation of smallholder focused approach to South African land redistribution processes could potentially reduce the divide in access to basic services and poor standard of living in the country based on race, geography, gender and economic status.

Land tenure can be differentiated into two systems; labour organization system and system of land ownership (Kirk, 1999: 15). The later in this regard falls beyond the jurisdiction of the smallholder focused approach because the social policies cannot penetrate the household to legislate particular farm operation systems. On the other hand, the smallholder focused approach adequately defines the boundaries of its systems of land ownership. Systems of land ownership regulate the relationship people have with the land, specifically relating to the power of disposition land and the right to use the land (Kirk, 1999: 15). To this effect, Aliber (2019) recommends granting beneficiaries free-hold titles, which will fulfil the listed World Farmers Association element for ensuring farming success through secure tenure. The ability to draw on a formal registry for land ownership in gathering financial resources for farming promotes productive success. Land represents an ideal type of collateral (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 12; Sihlobo & Kerstin, 2018: 4). Since land is immovable and nearly indestructible over short periods of time, financial institutions are more inclined to grant loans to farmers with secure land rights. Farmers need money to secure sufficient and efficiently upstream and downstream production. Implicitly, the smallholder focused approach promotes agricultural success by reducing the chances of beneficiaries relying on micro-lending schemes, which rely on social pressure or the more costly type of collateral to ensure repayment.

On the other hand, the smallholder focused approach endorses a protective land ownership system by restricting the sale and renting of reallocated land. Aliber (2019) recommends the legislation of a restriction on beneficiaries' title deeds, which determines a set period of time, roughly five to ten years before a farm can be eligible for resale. This tenure restriction should deter beneficiaries from perceiving land redistribution as quick money making-scheme rather view it as a legitimate socio-economic development and entrepreneurship opportunity. Land rights are multilectal constructs, the way they are constructed have an impact on the success of land redistribution programmes (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 284; Roodt, 2008: 6). Therefore, it is important to understand and regulate the perceptions and motivations of those who seek to participate in land redistribution in order to sustain the success of the programme.

### 3.4.3 Expenditure Increase


The processes of land transfer, land acquisition and settlement support as envisioned by Aliber (2019) will necessitate an increase in state expenditure on land redistribution. The smallholder focused approach proposes the allocation of small plots to 17 100 households for residential and small-scale farming (Aliber, 2019: 17). In contemplation of the pursuance of this goal, Aliber (2019) argues for the resurgence of Area Based Planning (ABP) as the administrative instrument for land redistribution. The ABP is a regional planning strategy intended to ensure municipal service delivery and community development (DRDLR, 2012). Accordingly, the objectives of the ABP are (Lahiff, & Cousins, 2009: 128):

- Initiating economic development
- Integrating land reform into provincial, district municipal development frameworks
- Increasing the sustainability of land reform projects
- Empowering communities to participate actively in the formation and implementation of land reform projects

An implementation of Area Based Planning could, therefore, act as a catalyst for land-related development and the inclusion of local communities in reform decisions. Experience from Africa and the rest of the world demonstrates the multiple benefits of inclusive agricultural development, which include labour absorption, better income distribution and improved household nutrition (Berstein, 2010: 48; Scoones 2009: 231). Thus, a participative orientation to development has the potential to impact the most vulnerable members in our society. Especially since some of the hungriest municipalities in South Africa are those with the largest density of households engaged in agriculture (Aliber, 2010: 14). Therefore, the incorporation of the ABP in land redistribution processes can potentially help ward off food insecurity and poverty.

The past the ten years have seen a decline in state expenditure on land reform (Cousins, 2015; Kirsten *et al.*, 2016). According to the National Treasury (2018) state expenditure on agriculture and rural development takes up only two percent of state expenditure (refer to chart 1 for a detailed demarcation). The current expenditure on rural development and land reform is insufficient to support the effective implementation of Area Based Planning. Although the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform supports the municipal implementation of ABP, many districts are unimpressed by it, perceiving it as another unfunded mandate that drains state resources (Kleinbooi, 2010: 54).

Subsequently, it is usually abandoned resulting in municipalities' failure to reach the socio-economic development goals. Implicitly, Area Based Planning is a resource-intensive sector planning strategy, successful implantation would require an expansion of administrative resources. Citizen's participation and involvement are proportional to the vigour that knowledge and information is disseminated to the public (Liebenberg & Pillay, 2000:29). Therefore, the benefits of community participation can only be sustained through an increase in municipal expenditure.



**1Data Source: National Treasury 2018**

At the same time, increased expenditure on rural development and land reform would enable the state to provide adequate post-settlement support. Aliber concurs with Kepe and Hall’s (2016) argument that land redistribution needs to go beyond the allocation of land and incorporate land redistribution with settlement support. The success and durability of the land redistribution projects rests on the efficient and consistent supply of post-settlement support (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 7).

To this end, Aliber (2019) proposes the development of SME-based tractor services. Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) have been instrumental in cementing socio-economic progress of developing countries (Oxfam, 2014). Agricultural SMEs are known for their potential to encourage entrepreneurship and introducing labour-intensive technology to obscure and marginalized communities. A comparative analysis of the Namibian agricultural sector and the trajectory of Chinese and Japanese land reform validate this contention. Amandhila’s (2016) study demonstrates how the financial constraints of Namibian agricultural SME’s are responsible for the country’s stunted agricultural growth. On the other hand, the introduction and the intensive promotion of agricultural SMEs in China and Japan

resulted in the agricultural and financial success of small-scale farming (Oxfam, 2014: 26). Implicitly, adequate government support of agricultural SME has great potential to contribute to the success of South African land redistribution. However, developing SME will require the South African government to invest more resources into land redistribution.

Additionally, Aliber (2019) proposes the vigorous promotion of micro-irrigation. Micro-irrigation, (also called localised irrigation, drip irrigation) has been the focus of attention for small-scale agriculture because of its low evaporation and deep percolation (Vico & Porporato, 2011: 267). Water from a tank is applied through perforated irrigation pipes near the root zone area of the crop (Phocaides, 2017: 24). Therefore, micro-irrigation is a more environmentally friendly water delivery system because it minimizes the loss of water through evaporation and runoff. Changes in irrigation management and water delivery methods may significantly increase the overall efficiency of irrigation and water productivity (Vico & Porporato, 2011: 261). However, the success of irrigation planning and water management is influenced by hydro-climatic conditions (Lamm & Trooien, 2003: 196). South Africa's rainfall intermittency and frequent dry spells could undermine the productive capacity of micro-irrigation systems. Particularly in the dryer regions of the country, such as the Nama Karoo and the Succulent Karoo.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the three land redistribution approaches presented at the PLAAS Land Conference. Although the approaches may have some flaws, they do provide compelling alternatives to the land and agrarian crisis. For this reason, the following chapter puts forward a detailed policy synthesis of the three approaches.

# Chapter 4

## 4. Policy Synthesis

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a synthesis of the three land redistribution approaches presented at the PLAAS conference. The integrated land redistribution approach is proffered as a hybrid alternative to effectively addressing and stimulating development for landless South Africans. To this end, the three land redistribution approaches collectively introduce four elements to the South African land redistribution programme; transparency, accountability, participation and accessibility. Incorporation of these elements can be an effective solution to the land crisis and in answering the five conference questions, which, to refresh our memory are:

1. Who should benefit from land distribution in rural South Africa?
2. How should land for redistribution be identified, acquired and transferred?
3. What kinds of rights should beneficiaries hold on distributed land?
4. What kinds of support systems should be provided to beneficiaries?
5. What are the desired outcomes of such redistribution?

### 4.2 Decentralized Land Acquisition

Post-apartheid South Africa has not invested enough resources in land administration. Consequently, the land redistribution process has been thwarted by weak governance and rampant corruption (Hall & Kepe, 2017). An adoption of Vink and Kirsten's (2019) decentralised land acquisition proposition can be an efficacious strategy in warding off elite capture and the exploitation of resources bedevilling the current land redistribution programme. The implementation of a decentralized land administration would require the establishment of local land management committees (Mazibuko, 2019). These local institutions will be charged with the responsibility of overseeing land redistribution. Their function would be to oversee

the process of identifying land and beneficiaries, as well as overseeing land allocation and the provision of settlement support.

Furthermore, these decentralized land management committees ought to be gender representative. Gender representation is important in the composition of the management committees. The presence of women has the potential to galvanize and promote democracy in land redistribution, in a manner that results in an impactful contribution to the lived experiences of women and their dependents.

Additionally, decentralization has the potential to counteract the central government's tentacles reaching and compromising the decisions made by the local land management committees. Protecting decentralization against central government's penetration requires a real devolution of power. Devolution will require the land committees to be democratically elected, they must be empowered to dismiss disreputable members, and the legislation of performance audits must be implemented (Meinzen-Dick *et al*, 2008: 23). Twenty-five years of stagnant land redistribution proves that the tenet of accountability has been compromised in democratic South Africa. Thus, systems for surveillance and monitoring are necessary to fortify the land committees' sense of responsibility towards their constituent communities.

Botswana's decentralized land administration is arguably the most successful land redistribution programme on the continent (Harvey & Chavunduka, 2003; Bruce, 2014). The South African land redistribution enterprise could, therefore, benefit from replicating some the strides taken by Botswana's land redistribution program. Comparable to South Africa, vast areas of Botswana's land is held under customary land tenure (Kleinbooi, 2010: 18). Consequently, decisive action had to be taken to prevent Botswana's traditional authorities from resisting the induction of the decentralized land boards, leading to traditional authorities being vested with the power to elect one or two people into the decentralised land councils - depending on the size of the council's jurisdiction (Harvey & Chavunduka, 2003: 14).

South African land administration could follow the same course and embrace traditional authority. The rationale behind the concession for traditional authority to elect a member for appointment into the land committees is the potential it has in sustaining the success of land redistribution on two accounts. On the one hand, it should prevent conflict. Actions that completely displace or exclude traditional authority in rural areas are usually met with severe contestation (Deininger, 2006: 237). Therefore, to avoid obstructive sabotage and violent disputes in rural areas (where tribal authorities exist), it is prudent to grant traditional authority partial oversight within the decentralized land committees. The goal is to prevent traditional authorities from monopolizing land administration, without alienating them from land redistribution processes.

The continual support from traditional authority has prospects of recruiting greater participation from rural citizens into the land redistribution enterprise. To a large extent, citizens residing in the former Bantustans still perceive traditional authority as legitimate authority, subsequently, customary leaders are in most cases the first entry-level to information (Kirsten *et al.*, 2016; Ngcoya & Kumarakulasingam, 2017). Thus, maintaining transparency and inclusivity in the land redistribution process in rural areas requires active cooperation of traditional authority. Post-apartheid South Africa has long-standing continuities and discontinuities with the past. Therefore, the execution of an impactful and democratic land redistribution policy ought to consolidate these contradictions.

Following Vink and Kirsten's (2019) guide for implementation of decentralized land redistribution, Area-based Planning should be employed as the administrative framework for land redistribution. The utilization of Area Based Planning (ABP) can exponentially assist the decentralised land committees in responding to the needs of their constituent communities. As decentralised government bodies, the proximity and embeddedness of the land committees place them in a stronger position to successfully implement ABP. Particularly with regards to the integration of land reform with larger social development programs, as well as the dissemination of information to communities (Lahiff & Cousins, 2009: 128). Area Based Planning could

enable the adaptive resettlement of beneficiaries by fulfilling their socio-economic rights, through the provision of proper housing, health care and education. Furthermore, the utilisation of ABP would aid in the promotion of transparency in the land redistribution process through the establishment of a bilateral communication channel. This channel can be used for the transmission of information about registration into land redistribution, land transfer and accessing settlement support.

The process of land acquisition is a polarizing discussion in South African land redistribution debates. The land expropriation debate resounds with a complex dissonance of the colonial history of dispossession and post-colonial analysis of poverty and unemployment converging to complicate the proper execution of land acquisition. The growing tension surrounding the amendment of Section 25 will culminate in either the expansion or deterioration of the livelihoods current and future generations due to the drastic transformation to landownership. While the assertion that the implementation of successful land redistribution cannot solely rely on the market is well accepted since it does not lead to the radical transformation of national resource distribution and consumption patterns (Vishwas, 2014: 21). However, owing to industrialization and capitalism, the land is an integral commodity which sustains the economic sovereignty of the country (Pretty, 1995: 87). Therefore, the execution of expropriation without compensation can easily result in the destabilization of the agricultural sector and subsequent food crisis, as observed in Zimbabwean and Venezuela's land reform (Voster, 2019: 4).

Capitalism is deeply embedded in the South African economy, financial defaults in one sector cannot be isolated from the rest of the economy (Sihlobo & Kerstin, 2018: 3). Therefore, aggressive property seizures of this kind, will ultimately erode the economy, exacerbate poverty and food insecurity, and reduce investments. The gravity of this matter is further compounded by South Africa's socio-environmental conditions; of regular droughts, changing weather, rising population and a high percentage of people living in the former homelands (Agri SA, 2018). Granted, there is a great need to redress the huge disparity in the distribution of land and wealth. However, addressing this imbalance will take generations, we cannot

expect to successfully undo over a hundred years of systematic white domination with one swift amendment.

Furthermore, the utilization of the just and equitable provision of section 23 (3) and legislation of state purchases under the PLAS programme has elicited an increase in the amount of land procured for redistribution (Sihlobo & Kerstin, 2018: 5). As such, it is reasonable to assume that the land acquisition processes are not responsible for South Africa's stagnant land redistribution. Therefore, there is no rationale for the proposal for radicalized land expropriations. Alternatively, land reform policy should rather focus on improving its concordance with the changes in population demographics. For example, the mounting rate of rural-urban migration and increasing tension among the urban-poor regarding their rights to the city. In consequence of this, Vink and Kirsten's (2019: 14) suggestion for the acquisition of land isolated by national roads and other boundaries, as well as acquiring unoccupied and notarial linked land should be incorporated into land redistribution policy. The geographical location of these plots makes them prime areas that could be utilised in redressing apartheid's spatial legacies and accommodating the growing demand for land in urban areas for residential and small-scale agricultural.

### 4.3 Decentralized Land transfer

The efficacy of land transfer has steadily declined since the implementation of the PLAS programme (Hall & Kepe, 2017). PLAS has maintained a preoccupation with the appropriation side of the land redistribution process, without consolidating the purchases with land transfers. The state's reluctance to reallocate land to beneficiaries has contributed to the fallacious perception that land redistribution has come to a complete halt. The growing frustration and deprivation have culminated with the radical calls for expropriation without compensation, as an instrument to speed up the process (Sihlobo & Kerstin, 2018).

However, an examination of the South African redistribution programme implemented this far, it is apparent that the cause of the lag in land redistribution is weak governance rather than the availability of land. Therefore, improving

governance and accountability through decentralization should speed up the pace of redistribution, without the need for land grabs. As previously mentioned, the governing principle for the proposed decentralised administration is the direct transfer of acquired land (Vink & Kirsten, 2019: 12). Accordingly, the various land management committees have to designate beneficiaries for targeted land prior to purchase. This will assure that the land is transferred to the selected beneficiaries immediately after acquisition. This will reduce the opportunity for elite capture and the exploitation of land redistribution processes.

South Africa's productive capacity lies fallow. The structural disempowerment of small-scale agriculture undermines the burgeoning of the agricultural sector (Lahiff & Cousins, 2005). Michael Aliber's (2019) presents a compelling smallholder focused land allocation scheme, which has the potential to spark national development. Disposition for the redistribution of land for settlement, small-scale and large-commercial farming responds to the aspirations of all land-hungry citizens. Thereby, avoiding exclusionary allocation patterns observed in previous land reform programmes. Furthermore, the explicit focus on the smallholder creates an alternative to the capitalist economy by creating popular control of the means of production through broad-based the redistribution of land (Jara, 2014: 231). This makes room for redressing the continued white ownership of most agricultural land, given the failure of the market-based land reform programmes in post-apartheid.

In the same breath, small-scale farming is generally a more productive instrument for rural development. In contrast to large-scale commercial farming, small-scale farming produces a larger crop diversity, is environmentally sustainable and promotes the development of and investment in local communities (Plews *et al.*, 2017; Rosset, 2000: 79). In addition, small-scale farming is feasible for the small groups of the working-class and professionals who have a keen interest in farming on a part-time basis (Cousins, 2007: 229). Thus, Small-scale farming has the potential to generate a high participation rate, leading to broad-based advancement of livelihoods. Moreover, the prioritization of the smallholder is in tune with Mazibuko Jara's (2019) proposal for challenging the South African agrarian structure through accumulation

from below by displacing the hegemonic dependence on commercial agriculture. Accordingly, accumulation from below will enhance the constructive social participation of landless citizens towards economic independence and contribute towards the development of marginal and rural communities.

#### 4.4 Inclusive Beneficiary Selection

The characteristics of the targeted beneficiaries typically come straight from the objectives of the redistribution programme (Binswanger *et al.*, 2009). Taking heed of the failures of SLAG's exclusive pro-poor orientation and LRAD's restrictive commercial agricultural beneficiary selection, a comprehensive beneficiary selection should be implemented. Michael Aliber's (2019) selection scheme is a potentially prosperous model for advancing a broad-based land redistribution. The smallholder approach promotes multiple livelihoods, though its wide-ranging beneficiary selection criteria which include: settlement orientated, small-scale farmer and commercial agricultural farmer (Aliber, 2019: 4) The operationalization of this selection scheme requires that two separate selection criteria be drawn for selection of beneficiaries for smallholders (residential and small-scale farming) and large-scale commercial agriculture. The decentralized land committees should conduct means test and review assets for the classification of beneficiaries into the three groups.

In a similar vein with SLAG's administration, the means test will ensure that only poor landless citizens are allocated residential land. While the review of assets is geared towards ensuring that aspirant commercial farmers possess the financial capacity to successfully operate a large agricultural enterprise. Furthermore, aspirant commercial farmers should demonstrate farming experience or possess managerial skills and entrepreneurial skills (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014: 260). The experiences from LARD beneficiaries prove that maintaining agricultural productivity and generating a surplus from large commercial agriculture does not come easy nor cheap (de Villiers, 2003; Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007). It requires tactful skill and financial reserves. Therefore, an exhaustive screening of all aspirant commercial farmers needs to be conducted. Implicitly, unsuccessful commercial agriculture applicants should automatically be considered for selection into small-scale farming. While the selection

of small-scale farmers should be opened to all citizens with a burning desire for farming.

## 4.5 Gender Mainstreaming

Reform programmes which framed the household as a unit for beneficiary selection have generally been able to maximize public participation (Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 782). Therefore, Aliber's (2019) proposition for allocating land to households will enable land redistribution to have a wider reach to include all members of society, particularly women. Development programmes which aim to increase women's access and control over economic resources have a positive effect on a range of development goals, including poverty reduction and economic growth (Maleko, 2018). However, sustaining these achievements requires deliberate actions that incorporate gender relations into land reform policy.

Women are often responsible for the welfare of the household. In spite of this, structures which restrict women's land rights still exist in post-apartheid South Africa (Kleinbooi, 2010: 54). Literature on the barriers to women's land rights tends to apply an isolated lens in understanding the complexities of female land tenure. For example, Kleinbooi (2010) Deininger (2004), and Plews *et al.* (2017) focus on patriarchal traditional authority as an impediment to women rights. On the other hand, Doss (1996) and Lusiba *et al.* (2017) emphasize patriarchal gender division of labour as a mechanism which devalues the development of women. However, land redistribution is a countrywide development programme, therefore, it needs to contextualize the grievances of women in both rural and urban South Africa.

The subjugation of women is a divided unitary whole (Crenshaw, 2010: 187), it manifests in multiple epistemologies. Therefore, the promotion of women's land rights (in both rural and urban areas) requires a more intersectional and overlapping land tenure framework. One which captures all the factors which erode women's rights, such as customary, formal, or religious discriminatory influences in household reallocation. Implicitly, land redistribution policy should take note of the ways by which household land allocation may impact women differently from men

(Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006: 784), by restricting men's structural capacity to violate women's land rights.

To this effect, the land committees should ensure that both men and women receive information about land redistribution processes. Additionally, joint tenure should be the default regime for both formal and non-formal household unions (Handoko, 2013). Furthermore, female-headed households should be pardoned and allowed to exclude estranged husbands and fathers on the title deed. These strategies will prevent women from being unlawfully evicted from redistributed land and patrilineal appropriation. In the same token, the established camaraderie with traditional authority can be instrumental in improving the experiences of women in rural areas. The elected land committees can help mend the gap between the security of women's land rights in urban and traditional areas. These strategies aim to sustain women's security of tenure and maintaining their economic participation in agriculture in the context of patriarchy and capitalism.

#### 4.6 Secure Land Tenure

The implementation of the PLAS programme brought a major regression in South African land redistribution. The programme devalued beneficiaries from landholders to labour tenants, depriving them of the right to private ownership and alienating beneficiaries from economic opportunities (Du Toit, 2013). Implicitly, PLAS has maintained the pervasive black experience, of being dispossessed, alienated and displaced. In multiple ways, denying beneficiaries land rights perpetuated the grievous violation of human rights. According to Kirk (1999: 20), the implementation of a meaningful land redistribution requires the allocation of secure rights. This proposition is echoed by all three land redistribution approaches presented at the PLAAS conference. Thus, rectifying the PLAS programme's blunder, the three categories of land redistribution ought to be allocated secure land tenure (Aliber, 2019: 4). Land rights are multidimensional constructs that determine the way the benefits of land use are distributed among various claimants. Subsequently, the allocation of secure land tenure is an advancement towards bolstering black South African's citizenship. A status that has since been weakened by the implementation of the 1894

Glen Grey Act and 1913 the Native Land Act, not to mention the plethora of discriminatory laws enacted under the Apartheid regime.

The lexicon of citizenship is about exclusion and belonging (Coutin, 2000). Policies of housing and education which accompany the redistribution of land are central features of social citizenship. The allocation of private ownership to settlement orientated beneficiaries maximizes their capacity to petition for obliged social services (Roodt, 2008: 8). Furthermore, land ownership affords people a space of rootedness and cradle for identity (Voster, 2019: 3). Thus, the allocation of secure tenure is momentum towards redressing black citizen's existential ambiguity of being theoretically South African, while pragmatically isolated from social and economic welfare associated with citizenship.

On the other hand, tenure security will increase black South Africans capacity to access, influence and engage with the economy. Economic independence is within the denotation of citizenship (Lister, 2010: 48). Redressing past injustices requires a building up of black citizen's sense of autonomy, self-realization and bargaining power in the broader economy. Consequently, small-scale and large-scale farming beneficiaries ought to be granted secure land tenure. Implicitly, land is a measurable commodity that is exchangeable and tradable (Agri SA, 2018). As such, the allocation of secure land tenure will empower beneficiaries to independently apply for bank loans (Sihlobo & Kirsten, 2018: 9). The restoration of dignity for poor black citizens will require the reinstitutionalization of personal agency. This autonomy should, however, be contained within the bounds of agricultural production. Beneficiaries should be at liberty to choose any agricultural system they fancy (Aliber et al., 2009: 135). However, a contractual restriction on their power to dispose of the land should be instigated (Aliber, 2019: 150). Protective measures have to be taken to protect and sustain rural development and land redistribution. Thus, redistributed land should only be eligible for sale or transfer after five to ten years of productive use.

## 4.7 Intensive Settlement Support

The extent to which land redistribution can make a significant contribution towards reducing poverty is dependent on its efficiency in providing pre and post-settlement support (Lopez & Vandes, 2000). Beneficiaries of land redistribution deal with all the challenges faced by existing farmers, while at the same time facing the extra impediment as a result of their lack of skills, inexperience and limited resource-base. Access to the land is an important first step, but it is not sufficient in and of itself to improve the livelihoods of the poor. Historical evidence from around the world suggests that the sustained advancement of land reform beneficiaries was completed with consistent settlement support (Deininger, 2004; Prosterman & Hanstad, 2006).

Settlement support has taken several forms in South African land redistribution process. Institutional fragmentation in the process of land acquisition and transfer has been an enduring impeding feature passed from one land redistribution programme to the next. This has sustained the rampant exploitation of state resources, which severely impaired the efficiency and quantity of settlement support (Ntlou, 2016; Hall & Kepe, 2017). The transparency and locality of the decentralised land committees will also help maintain and promote settlement support. On the one hand, their proximity will enable the land redistribution process to be more in tune and responsive to beneficiaries post-settlement needs. Additionally, the devolution of power has the potential of upholding the provision of settlement support, by protecting land reform institutions from elite capture and the exploitation of resources. Accordingly, a sliding fund for up-stream production (depending on the size of the farm) should be allocated. In favour of strengthening solidarity and accountability, budget transparency should be endorsed (Aliber, 2019: 14). Budget transparency refers to the extent and ease with which citizens can access information about and provide feedback on government revenues, allocations, and expenditures (Ladipo *et al.*, 2009: 24). The timely full disclosure of financial information to local farmers and their unions empowers people to scrutinize the adequacy of settlement support across different priorities as well as the probity of spending, thus reducing inefficiencies and corruption.

Furthermore, Vink and Kirsten's (2019) proposition for strengthening mentorship programmes should be incorporated into land redistribution. Agricultural mentorship programmes are agricultural extension services employed to expand land reform beneficiaries' agricultural knowledge and skillset (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014). An efficient means of reducing RECAP's load for providing settlement support is to bestow the land committees the power to liaise with agricultural organizations such as AgriSETA, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and the Department of Agriculture to directly secure mentors for their respective communities. This should remedy the backlog of settlement support applications caused by distance and the inaccessibility of RECAP, which resulted in the inadequate supply of mentors/strategic partners (Ntlou, 2016: 83). On the same note, the land committees should spearhead the revitalization and installation of micro-irrigation systems and the development of local agricultural SMEs. Successful implementation of tractor SME and irrigation systems (in regions with high precipitation) can expedite crop production by decreasing the time and energy used for ploughing, planting seeds and watering the fields (Oxfam, 2014: 27).

Conversely, the promotion of upstream production captures only half of the story for settlement support. What happens to the crops and animals when they leave the farm, their marketing, processing and distribution are equally important in ensuring beneficiaries can generate an income from their labour (Berstein, 2010: 29). The perishable nature of agriculture demands consistent access to markets. The 25 years of failed land reform and the market exclusion of the smallholder proves that accumulation from below cannot be supported by neoliberal economic policy. The deregulation and deliberalization of markets have boosted the power of shareholder-driven downstream players, such as distributors, processors and retailers (Lemaître & Helmsing, 2011: 755). Hence, Jara (2014: 237) argues that engineering a change in society and the economy, requires a reconfiguration of investments, land use and employment patterns. This transformative conception of power is underpinned by the implementation of successful market-driven cooperatives. Members of cooperatives can raise their income through an increased premium on the market through the cooperative, and the lower prices for the supplies purchased through

cooperatives (Ampaire *et al.*, 2013: 61). For most rural and poor people, agriculture is the main activity from which they derive their livelihood and serves as a source of income (Machete, 2004: 15). Thus, the promotion of agricultural cooperatives could potentially lead to the development and advancement of marginalized and disenfranchised members of our society.

The organization of direct agricultural markets would require the coordinated pooling of agricultural produce for communal market sales (Bennie, 2014: 251). Alternative forms of accumulation are possible under capitalism through the deliberate and purposeful construction of a popular economy that prioritizes the immediate needs of the people, while also encouraging systematic agrarian transformation. The embeddedness of these cooperatives sustains a relationship between farmers and markets which runs independently of conventional wholesale superstores (Jara, 2014: 238). Thus, cooperative markets could potentially alleviate poverty and food insecurity experienced in landless communities. In literature relating to rural development, agriculture is considered the best vehicle to reduce rural poverty and provides most of the employment in rural areas (Machete, 2004: 17). Therefore, incorporation of agricultural cooperatives to land reform has the potential of growth from agricultural productivity to other parts of the economy, thereby leading to rural development and reducing poverty (COPAC, 2014: 18). Implicitly, land redistribution beneficiaries will be able to participate in the economy through fair trade as suppliers, customers and employees in these cooperatives. The function of these cooperatives is to displace competitive and hostile neoliberal agricultural markets for new and fragile enterprises thereby providing a nurturing market environment for the development of new farmers.

## 4.8 Conclusion

The presented land redistribution policy carries an explicit emphasis on improving the lived experiences of landless poor South Africans. The policy is imbued with a transformative potential to increase downward accountability, enhance food sovereignty and promote smallholder agriculture in both rural and urban areas. The advantages of inclusivity and a bottom-up administration endorsed by this policy will

be felt in two ways. Firstly, the propensity for economic distribution, linked to work and income and imparting dignity on the lives of poor black South Africans. On the other hand, the social dimensions of the policy are symbolic advancement towards reinstating citizenship and a sense of belonging to poor South African's. Additionally, the policy resonates with elements of the solidarity economy, which form a sustainable development alternative to the agrarian crisis.

The next chapter will conclude the study by discussing how the chapters have operationalised the research objectives of the study. The chapter will close off by providing recommendations and identify challenges faced while conducting the study.

# Chapter 5

## 5. Conclusions

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter is a review of the study. The chapter re-examines the objectives that guided the study and summarizes the major findings related to each objective. Furthermore, the limitations of the study are identified, as well as recommendations for future research.

### 5.2 South African Land Redistribution

South African land and agrarian reforms were initiated after the transition to democracy in 1994. Subsequently, land reform policies were constructed to mirror the new egalitarian constitution which emphasized; gender, citizenship and racial equality principles. The first six years of land redistribution were conducted under the SLAG programme. Premised on the RDP's pro-poor orientation, SLAG failed to uphold gender and racial equality. The allocation of collectivized land devalued women rights, the allocated land was registered under the household without prioritizing women's tenure, thus, land evictions were common for women (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 15). On the other hand, SLAG maintained racial inequality by subjecting black citizens to the conflicts that accompany collectivized farming and restricting their economic participation to subsistence farming. SLAG therefore maintained colonial modes of inferior citizenship for black people.

The second leg of land redistribution was immersed in ideological globalization. Under the GEAR programme, the focus of land redistribution changed from rural development to building a class of black commercial farmers (Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007: 33). LRAD was constructed under the erroneous assumption that invigorating commercial agricultural results in economic development, and the redistribution of wealth and employment for the poor. Inevitably, LRAD failed to reach its objectives - the exclusion of land poor coupled with the fierce competition of capitalist global agro-food system undermined the programme leading to its

termination in 2011 (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 21). On the other hand, replicating the trajectory of international reforms centred on large-scale, market-based agriculture, LRAD perpetuated rural underdevelopment, food insecurity and structural poverty. Therefore, the implementation of LRAD resulted in the grievous violation of black citizen's rights to food, development and dignified existence.

In response to these challenges the willing buyer, willing seller approach was adapted, with the state itself becoming the purchaser of land for redistribution to beneficiaries without the transfer of title (Hall & Kepe, 2017: 123). However, the PLAS programme's leasehold model fails to address the gross racial inequalities in land ownership and in bringing justice to black South Africans for apartheid's land dispossessions. Furthermore, there is evidence of elite capture within the operationalization of PLAS, whereby, government officials collude with agribusinesses in promoting commercial production and financial gains for both parties (Sihlobo & Kerstin, 2018: 9). These unscrupulous dealings along with the state accumulation of land acquired for redistribution has significantly reduced the rate of land redistribution. Additionally, the few that are selected into the programme do not receive adequate settlement support, deficient farm inputs and market-exclusion are a common experience among PLAS beneficiaries (Ntlou, 2016; Vishwas, 2014: 21)

### 5.3 Summing-up the Three PLAAS Conference Approaches

The market assisted, decentralized approach puts forward a plausible alternative to rectifying national land inequality and poverty eradication. However, the ambiguity that exists with the operationalization of the proposed district management committees casts a cloud of uncertainty about its effectiveness. It is imperative that structures are put in place to ensure that local community members can hold the committee's members accountable for their actions. Especially since the success of this approach is dependent on how well the various district committees execute their land reform functions; (beneficiary selection, transferring land providing post-settlement support). Therefore, unscrupulous activities on the part of the local management committees will result in the resurgence of elite capture and corruption, delaying the achievement of national land reform.

The radical solidarity economy approach relies on a range of existing frameworks to bring about equitable land access and social justice. This approach presents a much-needed integration of sustainable development into the South African land reform policy. The thrust towards the accumulation from below through the expansion of smallholders and establishing a localized solidarity economy has a real potential for sustaining securing food sovereignty, creating employment and reducing rural poverty. However, the IDP is not a secure foundation to build on sustainable land redistribution, numerous studies prove how the IDP enables corruption, ignores gender issues and fails at meeting needs of municipal residents (Todes *et al.*, 2010; Ngcelwane, 2009; Phago, 2009; Mfene, 2014). Broad-based accumulation is likely to be thwarted should land redistribution be administrated under municipal authority.

The smallholder focused approach advances a multi-livelihoods perspective to the South African land redistribution enterprise. Global experiences of the smallholder orientated land redistribution have proven it to be a more sustainable and successful land redistribution framework (Iscan, 2018; Scoones *et al.*, 2011). However, a South African implementation of smallholder focused land redistribution should be carried out with careful analysis of local conditions of our communities, rather than abstract principles which do not fit the South African context. South African households are unified units. Patriarchy and colonial factors which resulted in the formation of the Bantustans have an impact on how resources are managed within the household. Women hold the key to sharply reducing hunger and increased sustaining development goals. Therefore, the smallholder focused approach needs to be restructured to promote both land access and gender equality.

## 5.4 A Composite Policy Alternative

The policy synthesis is presented as a possible solution to the land and agrarian crisis. It is a combination of the plausible features from the conference approaches and from elements from successful land reforms from across the world which stimulated socioeconomic development and poverty reduction. The policy responds to the multiple challenges encountered in the PLAS programme, which include insecure

tenure, elite capture and intermittent settlement support. To this effect, the approach propagates the allocation of secure land rights, to legitimate and restore black citizenship thereby allowing beneficiaries to attain equality in their economic participation. Decentralization is proposed as a strategy to lift land redistribution from the rut of exploitative patterns and elite capture. On the same note, the proximity of decentralized institutions must facilitate downward accountability, which could secure the continual supply of settlement support. Additionally, the promotion of small-scale agriculture and agricultural cooperatives has the potential to create spaces for the accumulation and development of people at grass-root level.

## 5.5 Limitation and Suggestions

Although the researcher applied critical reflexivity while conducting this study, the conclusions formed in this dissertation are inalienable from the biases and the subject experiences of the researcher. The study is thus open to alternative interpretations.

For future research purposes and in efforts to corroborate the policy synthesis, a pilot study investigating the practical implementation could be conducted to validate or disprove the efficiency of the presented policy framework.

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