THEORY IN INTERPRETIVE PSYCHOLOGY

- WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PAUL RICOEUR'S INTERPRETATION OF FREUD.

THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The thesis aims to show that, while an interpretive psychology is not compatible with theory as it occurs in the predictive-causal explanation of the natural sciences, it is both possible and necessary to develop a concept of theory valid within an interpretive methodology. These claims are advanced in the course of an examination of Ricoeur's interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis. After examining some traditional ways in which phenomenological psychology has responded to the psychoanalytic challenge, the thesis presents an interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic approach which utilized theoretical constructions in a productive way, although distorted by Freud's natural-scientific self-understanding. Freud's causal-explanatory language and natural-scientific metatheory are shown to be significant inasmuch as they provide a vehicle for theory construction in psychoanalysis. However, since the theory is modeled on that of the natural sciences, it proves incompatible with the interpretive aspects of Freud's approach

We then establish a concept of theory and of causal analysis which is different to that of the natural sciences, and is compatible with, and indeed founded in, an interpretive approach to psychology. These concepts are then illustrated in the context of psychoanalysis. In the final chapter the advantages of the use of theory in interpretive psychology are discussed.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aims of the Thesis, with a Brief Historical Context

The origins of modern psychology are traditionally traced back to the establishment, by Wilhelm Wundt, in 1879 at the University of Leipzig, of a laboratory exclusively for the purposes of psychological research. This places the origins of modern psychology in a period in which the prestige of the natural sciences was reaching a peak. The success of the natural-scientific method was readily observable in the stream of new results in physics, chemistry, biology and the like, and the ideology of unlimited progress guided by scientific rationality grew daily as the credo of the new Enlightenment.

It is thus understandable that the task of psychologists was seen as the establishment of a genuinely scientific method, along the lines of the natural sciences. The search led in directions as diverse as the experientially-focused approach of the German "experimental psychologists" (such as Fechner, von Helmholtz, and Wundt himself), on the one hand, and the crude behaviourism of Watson and his school, on the other.

Different as they were, they shared a common concern for the establishment of a truly scientific method for psychology. This concern is crucial for psychology's own interpretation of its history: Bruno, for example, divides his book on the history of psychology into two sections, one on the "philosophical roots of modern psychology" (ending with Kant

and Herbart), and the other on the "scientific roots of modern psychology", beginning with Gustav Fechner (Bruno, 1972).

This approach has prospered in the Twentieth century, and has been characterized by two tendencies which seem to be significant. The first is the development of a more pragmatic form of "scientism" than the doctrinaire and programmatic approaches of the early days of modern psychology. Watson, for example, had sought to develop an entire research methodology on the one principle that observable behaviour was the true focus of a scientific psychology. In contrast, an examination of, for example, modern social psychology, reveals a more flexible approach: informed by a philosophy of science which holds only that theories need be in some way (and not necessarily immediately) testable, and not that all theoretical terms must be translatable into statements about observables (see Hyland, p.7 ff.), researchers in the sub-discipline employ a range of methods on a variety of subject-matters, as can easily be observed in any text-book.

The second significant tendency is the development of sub-disciplines whose domain is clearly accessible to the natural-scientific method, such as aspects of the psychology of perception, psychophysiology, theories of artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, etc.

As is well known, there rapidly developed alternatives to the scientific orthodoxy within psychology, alternatives

which saw the discipline as something inherently and necessarily different from the natural sciences. The most famous of these alternatives has been the American "humanistic psychology" movement, which first formalized itself in 1962 with the founding of the "Association for Humanistic Psychology", but there have been dissenting voices from the earliest days of scientific psychology. Thus the 19th-century German philosopher and historian, Wilhelm Dilthey, wrote:

> The human studies are distinguished from the sciences of nature, first of all in that the latter have for their objects facts which are presented to consciousness as from the outside, as phenomena given and in isolation, while the objects of the former are given originaliter from within as real and as a living continuum....We explain nature, we understand psychic life....It follows from this that the methods by means of which we study psychic life, history and society are very different from those which have led to the knowledge of nature.
> (Dilthey, 1977, p.27)

Dilthey's position is that the nature of the object of psychology, i.e. human existence (or "life"), is such as to render it inaccessible to scientific investigation along the lines of the methodology of the natural sciences. In Dilthey we see the seeds of what was to become the major justification of attempts to construct an alternative psychology: the claim that the nature of human existence is such as to render it inaccessible to a natural scientific methodology. Thus Maslow describes his break from the orthodoxy as follows:

> In the thirties I became interested in psychological problems, and found that they could not be answered or managed well by the classical scientific structure of the time... I was raising legitimate questions and had to invent another

> approach to psychological problems in order to deal with them.
>
> (Maslow, 1972, p.3)

And from a different tendency within the humanistic spectrum, Giorgi has written:

> Our position is that if the full range of experience and behaviour of man is to come under scientific scrutiny, then a different conception of scientific psychology will be necessary. To be sure, natural scientific psychology does yield legitimate data about aspects of man, but there is a serious question whether or not the aspects that are amenable to the natural-scientific conception reveal the humanness of man in an adequate way. It is this doubt, along with the evidence of every-day experience in the life-world, which leads us to seek another conception of psychology: one that will do justice both to the phenomenon of man as a person and to the practice of science.
>
> (Giorgi, 1970, p.2)

We take these quotations, spanning almost a century of criticism of scientific psychology, as revealing both a crucial and necessary aspect of the alternative, on the one hand, and at the same time a tendency towards a dichotomy which we believe to be premature and misleading. This is the dichotomy which places on one side the non-human world and links it to the natural-scientific method, and on the other side the human world, both existence itself and the products of that existence, which are held to lie inherently beyond the reach of the natural-scientific approach, and thus of the language of causation and laws. We believe this dichotomy to be misleading for the following reasons:

1. While some of the subject-matter of psychology may have been manifestly beyond the scope of the scientific approach in its positivistic, behaviouristic, and/or operationalistic phases, it is by no means clear that this

holds for all interpretations of natural-scientific methodology. We refer here to the "pragmatic shift" in modern scientific psychology, outlined earlier. The use, for example, of information-processing models in cognitive and perceptual psychology seems to allow for a psychology which adheres to a natural-scientific methodology involving the formulation of precise, testable hypotheses, and which seems eminently suited to its subject-matter.

2. Certain aspects of psychology are unquestionably suited to a natural-scientific approach, and it seems misleading to declare that these aspects are not "true" psychology. Examples here would include psycholinguistics and psychobiology, both vigorous fields of research which have clear and immediate psychological implications. This point is of lesser importance, since, as Sigmund Koch has recognized, psychology is by no means a "coherent field of scholarship" (Koch, 1969, p.14). Nevertheless it is worth noting that we must guard against legislating the content of psychology on the basis of abstract theoretical principles. The task of a philosophy of psychology must be carried out in dialogue with actual research practice in the field.

3. The dichotomy has dubious anthropological implications, or, more correctly, implications which need to be carefully examined rather than simply accepted as an obvious starting point. A common basis for the dichotomy is the claim that human beings are not subject to causal laws, and that the possibility of such laws is the sine qua non of

the natural-scientific methodology. Now perhaps it is true that human beings are not subject to causal laws in the way that, say, billiard-balls are, but this does not allow us to say that human beings are absolutely free. This claim is patently wrong, and, indeed, pernicious, and in fact few humanistically-orientated psychologists would wish to make this claim. However it is questionable whether the methods advanced by humanistic psychologists are indeed systematically capable of exposing the psychological restrictions on human freedom. As de Boer asks, "is it not the main task of psychology to trace the conduct mechanisms of the soul in fetters?" (de Boer, 1983, p.161). And if this is so then we must at least take seriously the claim that it is only in virtue of the natural-scientific aspects of the method employed by those followers of Freud and Marx who have been perhaps the most successful psychologists of the "soul in fetters" in our times, that their researches have yielded the fruits which they have. So perhaps there are uses for some aspects of natural-scientific methodology if we desire a critical psychology. At the very least we must ensure that we have learnt all we can from its good and bad points.

4. Most importantly for us, the dichotomy, in many ways important, has led to a premature rejection of certain elements of natural-scientific methodology which we believe are not specific to such methodology but rather are crucial pre-requisites for any systematic and empirical field of human knowledge. We refer here especially to the use of theory and of causal language. While an interpretive -

phenomenological psychology need not attempt to appropriate these in the forms in which they occur in the natural sciences, we believe that they can and should form an organic part of the methodology of psychology understood as a humanistic discipline, inasmuch as it wishes to be a productive and systematic empirical discipline investigating human existence.

We are now in a position to draw together some of the threads and spell out the context and aims of this essay.

In this essay we attempt to make a contribution to the development of a psychology informed by the principles of hermeneutic phenomenology, through an examination of psychoanalysis and certain aspects of Paul Ricoeur's interpretation of Freud. Before moving on to the topic of the relevance of psychoanalysis, I wish to make a few preparatory comments about the scope which I wish to claim for interpretive phenomenology within psychology, as well as about the precise claims which will be made in the thesis.

Our area of concern is that of the theory of personality, developmental psychology, social psychology, and similar areas within psychology. We therefore do not wish to claim that the methodological conclusions reached in this essay apply necessarily to all aspects of psychology. But we do claim that they apply to the above areas, and we believe that these content-areas are the central concerns of

psychology, or at least a substantial portion of the central concerns.

We believe that an adequate psychology (in those areas) must of necessity be informed by the principles of hermeneutic phenomenology. This is because we believe that the subject-matter must be based on experience as it is lived, and that this subject-matter necessarily raises questions of interpretation, thus requiring a phenomenological approach which has absorbed the lessons of hermeneutics (i.e. the science of interpretation).

We will refer in this essay to this type of psychology as "interpretive" psychology. We define interpretive psychology as that approach to psychology which recognizes that there is a distinctive form of explanation in psychology, namely that of understanding or <u>verstehen</u>, and that the methodology centrally involves the interpretation of existence or the products and "documents" of existence (e.g. cultural forms): a method which we would call "interpretive understanding". We prefer the term "interpretive psychology" to "phenomenological psychology" because we feel that this school has focused on descriptions of existence in too limited a fashion. In any case we believe that the major tradition from which such a psychology should draw is precisely that of the hermeneutic tradition: from Schleiermacher and von Humboldt, through Dilthey and Heidegger, to Gadamer, Ricoeur and Apel. These writers have been concerned with extending the methodology of textual interpretation to history, human existence, and

to psychology and the social studies in general. At the same time we do not wish to limit interpretive psychology to the specific forms of enquiry of the disciplines of textual interpretation: it is after all an approach to psychology, and must attempt to deal with the distinct problems of that discipline. For this reason we prefer the more general "interpretive psychology" to "hermeneutic psychology", which suggests a somewhat stronger link with the hermeneutic disciplines as such. Lastly we should note that we believe that interpretive psychology has a natural and close relationship with the Daseinsanalytical anthropology, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters. The essence of interpretive psychology, then, is that it strives after understanding, thematizes interpretation, and is open to all the resources compatible with this. Although, in explaining our choice of "interpretive psychology" as the most suitable description of the type of psychology which we wish to promote, we have distinguished it from certain other descriptions, this is somewhat artificial since they have more in common than they have differences. Thus what we have to say here is relevant to phenomenological psychology, hermeneutic psychology, many forms of humanistic psychology, and other related approaches.

We believe that many attempted humanistic methodologies have not been hermeneutically informed, and have therefore taken a naive and ultimately fatal approach to the question of the description of experience. The "description of experience as it is lived" is often set up as the goal of a humanistic

methodology, ignoring the possibility of conflicting interpretations arising.

Furthermore we believe that these humanistic approaches ignore the important question of the role played by causal language and by theory within scientific methodology. We shall be arguing in this essay that all disciplines which seek to advance empirical knowledge in a systematic fashion, and this must include any approach to psychology, require a theoretical component, and indeed some form of causal language. These must, however, not be borrowed from the natural sciences but must be developed specifically in the context of interpretive psychology. The possibility of indirect approaches for an interpretive psychology will be the starting point here. These will be some of the central themes of this essay.

1.2 Freud and Ricoeur

The issues raised in part one of this introduction are most clearly highlighted by the debate surrounding the status and nature of Freud's psychoanalytic approach. For this reason the essay will focus on psychoanalysis, and in particular on the attempts by phenomenologically inspired psychologists to deal with the problem of psychoanalysis. It should be noted here that we will not focus on psychoanalysis in the context of psychoanalytic therapy, but on psychoanalysis as a systematic interpretive psychology providing a generalized interpretation of human existence. The researches of Paul Ricoeur in this regard will be central, and we shall present

and evaluate his hermeneutic approach to psychoanalysis; an approach which, we shall argue, has crucial lessons for any adequate interpretive psychology.

Psychoanalysis, as presented by Freud, has always been a provocative challenge to any psychology which links itself to the phenomenological tradition. The fundamental question is that which confronts any attempted phenomenological (or humanistic) reading of Freud: what is the role, if any, of Freud's causal-explanatory language and scientistic metatheory if psychoanalysis is to be understood as a phenomenological endeavour? The phenomenological approach seeks an understanding of human action and experience, via an analysis whose language is that of reasons, perceptions, and choices. The focus is the description and interpretation of consciousness, and thus both the unity and the primacy of consciousness would seem to be necessary assumptions of this approach. The problem addressed by Ricoeur is how such an approach can be integrated with Freud's model of psychic energies, of causal mechanisms operating at a level more fundamental than, and often beyond, consciousness. Freud's theory seems to expose consciousness as divided, determined and secondary, and thus seems essentially inimical to the phenomenological project.

A standard response has been that the causal-explanatory aspect of Freud's theory, and the concommitant theory of the unconscious, were simply artifacts of the mechanistic scientific world-view of the time, and thus could be safely

discarded. Charles Rycroft is one who has advanced this thesis:

> Freud's aim was to establish a "scientific psychology", and he hoped to be able to do so by applying to psychology the same principles of causality as were in his time considered valid in physics and chemistry. As a young man his own teachers in physiology had held that it was inadmissable to explain the working of the human body by reference to principles other than those which could be derived from physics and chemistry, and as a result they rejected all vitalistic biological theories.... If, he (Freud) argued, all mental activity is the result of unconscious mental forces which are instinctual, biological and physical in origin, then human psychology could be formulated in terms of the interacting of forces which were in principle quantifiable, without recourse to any vital mental integrating agency, and psychology would become a natural science like physics. However the principle of psychic determinism remains an assumption, and one which Freud made out of scientific faith rather than evidence.
>
> (Rycroft, p. 12)

Certainly Rycroft is correct with regard to the scientific zeitgeist, and to Freud's attempt to construct a psychology in accordance with what he percieved as basic scientific principles. Furthermore, as we shall see, phenomenology did dialogue with psychoanalysis to the enrichment of both approaches. Phenomenology in particular is by no means closed to the incorporation of certain key psychoanalytic components, and we shall see how it can be said to have developed a depth component in response to the Freudian challenge. Nevertheless, although incorporating some aspects of psychoanalysis, the phenomenological approach has failed in two crucial ways with regard to psychoanalysis:

1. It has not incorporated, and in its current forms cannot incorporate, certain central features of psychoanalysis. For Ricoeur the causal language is a

crucial aspect of psychoanalysis, both because of its methodological implications and because it reveals a crucial aspect of human existence;

2. It has not been informed by the hermeneutic tradition, and has not methodologically incorporated the problem of interpretation.

The merit of Ricoeur's work on Freud is that, unlike many other "assessments" of Freud's work, he takes very seriously the Freudian corpus and does not attempt his philosophical interpretation without first carefully examining the role which, for example, Freud's causal framework plays in the psychoanalytic system. In this regard Ricoeur will not accept that the causal language can simply be discarded and the essence of psychoanalysis still be retained. He writes:

> How can the economic explanation be involved in an interpretation dealing with meanings; and conversely, how can interpretation be an aspect of the economic explanation? It is easier to fall back on a disjunction: either an explanation in terms of energy, or an understanding in terms of phenomenology. It must be recognized, however, that Freudianism exists only on the basis of its refusal of that disjunction?
>
> (Ricoeur, 1970, p.11)

Thus by following Ricoeur we shall gain some insight into the function of causal-explanatory language in one of the most powerful and influential interpretative systems of modern times. This will enable us to formulate more clearly the challenge posed to a phenomenological psychology, and perhaps see some way towards a possible solution. For Ricoeur the solution lies in a self-consciously hermeneutic approach making use of all the resources available from the

long history of that discipline, and in a recognition of the possibility of an indirect hermeneutics. We shall explore this and investigate the possibilities of the use of theory and of causal language within an interpretive psychology. We shall show that this provides a useful explanation of the significance of the Freudian "mixed discourse", and other aspects of psychoanalytic explanation. In addition, it highlights the possibility and importance of developing a theoretical component (which would include the use of causal language) in interpretive psychology.

We turn now to an examination of the phenomenological response to Freud.

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2. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO FREUD

In this chapter we will examine those aspects of the phenomenological response to Freud which we see as most important for our purposes, and which we shall be using in chapters to come. We are in no way purporting to give even an overview of the full range of phenomenological responses to Freud, a topic which lies beyond the scope of this essay. We will see that in the attempt to incorporate Freudian ideas into the phenomenological psychological tradition, various phenomenological theorists have shown that the approach possesses resources which can take it beyond the image of an approach locked into naive notions of rationality, consciousness, and free - will. We believe, and will attempt to show in the chapters to come, that the resources discussed here provide a base on which to build a more vigorous phenomenological, or interpretive, psychology. After a brief introductory section we will examine these resources under the headings of anthropological and methodological resources.

Some psychologists who claim to be in the humanistic tradition have been actively hostile to Freudian concepts. An excellent example of the approach of some of these "humanistic" psychologists is Raymond Gale, in his book Who Are You: The Psychology of Being Yourself:

> In the past, man as a living system has been characterized by the somewhat negativistic behaviourist and psychoanalytic models as basically evil, irrational, and incapable of assuming the freedom and the responsibility for making significant choices in his life. Hence these approaches viewed man's basic nature as mechanistic

> and deterministic, and felt that his evil and irrationalistic tendencies must be controlled by societal forces if he were to learn and develop properly. Since we are concerned not with the "truth" of yesterday's assessment of man's nature but with a more positive view of man in the "here and now" era of third-force psychology, we shall present the humanistic and existential models of man without further consideration of the behaviouristic or the psychoanalytical assumptions concerning the human design.
>
> (Gale, 1974, p.8)

This approach was typical of many in the American humanistic psychology movement, and was one of its major shortcomings. However, there are many in the broad phenomenological tradition who have looked more closely at Freud, and have attempted to incorporate some of Freud's insights into their own work. The phenomenological psychologist faces two serious challenges in attempting to dialogue with Freud:

1. He or she must formulate the Freudian concepts in such a way as to fit in with a phenomenological anthropology and methodology; and

2. This formulation must be as effective as Freud's formulation in terms of its ability to explain, and/or contribute to our understanding of, the human condition. (Most writers would wish to add that it must be as therapeutically effective as Freudian psychoanalysis, or at least that it must be true to the conditions of psychoanalytic therapy. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, we will be avoiding this aspect of psychoanalysis to concentrate on its significance as a general interpretative approach, with special reference to its implications with regard to social and developmental psychology).

Does phenomenology have the theoretical resources which would allow it to assimilate at least some of the essential concepts of Freud's psychoanalytic approach? For some major phenomenological thinkers this has proven impossible: they have seen the differences between phenomenology and psychoanalysis as too deep to allow for any reconciliation. One example would be Sartre, for whom the existential-phenomenological approach and Freud's notions of the unconscious and of psychic determinism clash head-on. For Sartre, who wishes to extend free will and responsibility to all aspects of existence, the unconscious cannot operate in the way in which Freud would have us believe; rather what happens is that we choose to ignore certain aspects of our existence, and to deny any responsibility towards them. Sartre presents a popular conception of the approach of phenomenological psychology: an emphasis on free will and responsibility in the face of all evidence to the contrary. But Sartre's position is not the only logical formulation of the phenomenological position. What we will try to show in the next few pages is that the phenomenological approach as developed by Husserl and especially Heidegger, and as transferred to psychology by Medard Boss, provides an anthropology which is far more receptive to Freud's ideas. And at the same time we shall draw on another theoretical tradition, that is, on the work of Flew, Mischel and others on the nature and scope of rational explanation with regard to human action, to further advance the phenomenological appropriation of Freud.

2.1 Anthropological Considerations

An excellent starting point can be found in the work of Husserl himself, in particular in his distinction between an "intentionality of acts" and a "functioning intentionality" (Hougaard, p. 43). The "intentionality of acts" is the conscious intentionality of which Sartre writes, and it is indeed characterized by free will and responsibility. But the "functioning intentionality" is very different; it can be described as the "passive constitution" of the lived-world. This provides scope for an initial phenomenological limiting of consciousness:

> Intentionality as functioning - the steady passing anonymous synthesis - can no longer be characterized as an affair exclusively, or even primarily, attached to an active, constituting, "I". Neither can it be tied to consciousness in a narrow sense.
>
> (Hougaard, p.44)

For example, the early family dynamics which shape a person's later relationships cannot necessarily be appropriated as such by the person in question. That is why therapy cannot proceed as a simple process of attaining rational insight which then resolves the problem. Therapy is indeed "work" because the aquired structures which have developed need to be restructured, since they lie beyond the "intentionality of acts", i.e. they cannot be altered by mere exercise of the will. Hougaard concludes by showing the possibilities which the concept of funtioning intentionality opens up with regard to the dialogue with psychoanalysis:

> With the doctrine of functioning intentionality, consciousness seems reduced to a less prominent place in Husserl's phenomenology. Also according

> to Husserl there are moments when the "I" is not foremost a free and conscious "I", but is governed by a "dark underground". Although Husserlian phenomenology has not thematized the problems occupying Freud, it seems open for the results of psychoanalysis.
>
> (Hougaard, p.45)

The conclusion is perhaps premature on Hougaard's part, and we will in the next chapter examine Ricoeur's criticisms of such a claim. Nevertheless it is clear here that phenomenology can move very significantly towards Freud, and need not be trapped in a naive attitude towards the primacy of consciousness. It will be Ricoeur's claim, however, that the "wounding" of consciousness which psychoanalysis requires, is ultimately beyond the potential of the weapons of orthodox phenomenology. First, however, we will examine some more of the weapons at the disposal of the phenomenological psychologist.

The second useful concept which I wish to discuss is Heidegger's characterization of the nature of human being as that of "being-in-the-world". Ontologically, the nature of human existence is not that of a self existing in subjective isolation, which then out of this primary isolation enters into some relationship with a real world "out there"; rather, being-in-the-world is the primordial given. The self is founded on the world-relations and not the other way around. Now the significance of this primordiality of the world-relations is that it allows us to introduce a concept of what we will call "situated freedom", which I think is the central anthropological concept in a phenomenological appropriation of Freud. In the phenomenological quest to remain true to experience as it is lived, the

phenomenological psychologist must give an important place to free will and choice, and in this he or she would seem to undermine the core of Freud's discoveries. But here we can now point out that that which chooses is not some free-floating subjectivity which creates its own meanings and chooses its attitudes towards the things of its world, rather it is in its nature inextricably linked to those things. Thus any decision or choice is between alternatives which come supplied with meaning, a meaning which cannot be discarded by an act of will. No amount of reasoning or will-power can make the world of a paranoid personality seem less deceitful or less suspicious: that is the way it appears. Human freedom of choice is thus a situated freedom, in that it is choice in a world towards which we stand inextricably in a relation of caring, and it is a world in which the structures and content (including the attitudinal and emotional content) is not of our choosing.

We have shown how we can achieve a phenomenological limiting, or undermining, of freedom, and replace a naive conception of human freedom with one which can make some sense of Freud's determinism. However, it must be emphasized that the concept of "situated freedom" does not involve a historical dimension in the way in which Freudian psychic determinism does ("history is destiny"). For phenomenologists, an understanding of the phenomena of a person's world is sufficient for an understanding of that person. Put another way, if we have fully explicated the meanings and structures of a person's existence, then their

actions will become understandable. There is no need to go back into the past in search of unconscious "causes": the answer lies in the present world of the person.

However, it is, for the phenomenologist as much as the psychoanalyst, an important question as to how the structures of a person's world come to be as they are. This is so for a number of reasons:

1. The phenomena and their inter-relations are not transparent to the subject, nor manifest to the therapist. The correct interpretation can eventually, perhaps, be arrived at through lengthy and intense interaction, but also through a historical understanding of the influential events of that person's life.

2. A historical understanding is necessary for the development of, for example, phenomenologically-inspired developmental and social psychologies.

But the important point here is that, for the phenomenological psychologists, in their enquiry into the life-history they find, not the causes of later actions, but the origins of the structure of the lived-world of the subject, which shapes his or her actions.

Does this formulation, however, capture the dynamism of Freud's psychic forces? Jacoby, for one, thinks that it does not, and cannot. For Jacoby, the phenomenological appropriation of Freud attempts to reduce the unconscious to what Freud termed the pre-conscious, and in so doing discards the dynamic, driving unconscious, the unconscious

as impersonal force which is the essence of Freud's position (see Jacoby, 1975). We will return to this criticism in chapter three, as it is posed by Ricoeur ; for now, we will move on to look at one of the most sophisticated formulations of psychoanalytic theory by a phenomenologist (more specifically a Daseinsanalytical psychologist), that of Medard Boss. In Boss we find some attempt to deal with the Jacobian type of criticism.

As we have seen Dasein, or existence, is founded on the totality of the world-relations. However, this is very much a preparatory statement in the process of developing a Daseinsanalytical psychology: the crucial questions arise when we ask how the person stands towards the phenomena of his or her world, which world-relations are owned and which denied, and which are taken as being within the self-system and which are not. I do not here wish to take up the question of what exactly is understood by the self in Daseinsanalytical terms. It should, however, be clear that the notion of the self will be of an ontologically secondary entity: it will not be a kind of physical or mental stuff, but more like a system. In any case the relevant point here can be put very simply: a person can take up (within limits) differing attitudes towards the relationships which make up his or her existence; in particular a person can either accept (own) or reject (deny) a particular relationship. We cannot by an act of will cease to fear authority figures, say, but we can choose how we relate to that fear. And crucially, denying an aspect of our existence does not mean

that it goes away: it remains a part of that existence and continues to exert an influence. Indeed as Boss points out, "it is precisely when an individual defends himself against his becoming aware of a certain world-relationship that he is contained in it all the more and adheres to what he defends himself against" (Boss, p.97). This type of denial Boss refers to as "neurotic avoidance". For Boss, then, there are two ways in which the phenomenologist can understand the notion of the unconscious:

1. As hiddenness: The unconscious as hiddenness refers to the depth component of experience: that the phenomena are not transparent but translucent or even opaque. We do not necessarily know how the structures of our lived-worlds have come to be as they are, nor is the correct interpretation obvious. Phenomena can have more than one meaning, and one phenomenon may be affected by many aspects of our past. This interpretation of the unconscious is functionally close to Freud's notion of the pre-conscious.

2. As neurotic avoidance: As discussed above, aspects of our existence which we deny, avoid, ignore, etc., but which of course remain to exert an influence, which is magnified and distorted by the denial.

We have so far discussed a number of ways in which phenomenological anthropology might be made more accommodating to Freud's findings, and we have seen that phenomenology has a number of resources which enable it to make use of Freud, a process which has obviously enriched the phenomenological psychology developed in dialogue with Freud. We will now move on to an examination of some

attempts at the incorporation of Freud along more methodological, as opposed to anthropological, lines.

2.2. Methodological Considerations

Here we will be examining a very different type of attempt to deal with the problems posed by Freud. The theorists to be discussed fall into the tradition of British analytic philosophy, and their special concern has been the explanation of human action. We believe that their analyses of psychoanalytic explanation reveal a number of important resources for the phenomenological appropriation of Freud. Their attempts have generally taken the form of re-formulating Freud so as to include his work within a type of explanation which is variously described as "intentional explanation", "rational explanation", or "explanation in terms of rules." All of these can, of course, be linked to the methodology of Verstehen, or understanding.

Broadly speaking "rational explanation", which is the term we shall use initially, is the attempt to explain an action by showing that, given that certain descriptions apply to the actor, the action was in some sense rational. The descriptions would be of the form "X believes that...", or "X intends that...", or "X desires that...". Now it is mistaken to adopt too narrow a version of rationality here, as Dray, for example, does when he says that "the goal of such explanation is to show that that which was done was the thing to have done for the reasons given, rather than merely the thing that is done on such occasions, perhaps in

accordance with certain laws" (Dray, 1964, p.124). Clearly such an approach would rule out explaining most of the subject-matter of clinical psychology, and much of other areas as well. This interpretation seems to require that the agent be both fully self-conscious with regard to his or her motives, and secondly impeccably rational. This is often used as a criticism of rational explanation by those preferring a causal-explanatory approach. But the principle of rationality need not be understood in such a superficial way: rational understanding can be used to explain actions which would naively be labelled as manifestly irrational.

This point can be clarified by looking at Dray's formulation of the Weberian concept of the "ladder of understanding". According to this system, in the human sciences we always begin by looking for a rational explanation, initially in the narrow sense. The first step then is the attempt at rational explanation as outlined above. If X is washing his hands, and we can see that his hands are dirty and that he intends to eat a meal afterwards, then we require no further explanation; the enquiry stops there. However, if no explanation is possible at this level, then we begin to move "down" the ladder, by attempting to understand the action in the actor's terms. We begin by suspending our knowledge of the situation which the actor does not possess, and accepting that which he or she believes to be true. If the action remains inexplicable, we must suspend, as well as our knowledge, our values, and replace them with those of the actor. In other words we try to enter fully into the world

of the actor, and not until this has been done can we say that the attempt at rational explanation has failed. It will be obvious now that what can be explained by "rational explanation" would include some bizarre and seemingly irrational behaviours. It is this extension of the scope of rational explanation which has led some to claim that Freud can be interpreted within the paradigm of rational explanation; in fact, Freud can be seen as a thinker who brought many aspects of existence, which had been thought to be utterly beyond rational explanation, into its ambit (examples would range from unusual dreams to phobias, hysterical paralyses, and psychopraxes). Freud taught us to see that symptoms have meaning, and are understandable, in terms of the lived-world and life-history of the patient, according to this interpretation.

Anthony Flew has developed this interpretation of Freud, and his version runs as follows:

> If you are prepared so to extend such notions as motives, intention, purpose, wish and desire, that it becomes proper to speak of motives and so forth which are not known to, and the behaviour resulting from which is not under the immediate control of, the person who harbours them, then you can interpret (and even guide), far more of human behaviour in terms of concepts of this sort than any sophisticated adult had previously realized.
>
> (Flew, quoted in Reagan, p.149)

Now it should be clear that Flew has significantly extended the position which we had arrived at, i.e. that one can understand seemingly irrational aspects of a person's existence by a thorough understanding of that person's world. Flew is presenting the case for the legitimate use of concepts which are normally accepted as explanations only

if recognized as such by the subject (perhaps after a little reflection). I will argue that Flew's position needs to be re-phrased, and that certain distinctions must be drawn, but that it is essentially a sound position, arguing for the acceptance of certain types of explanation as a legitimate form of rational explanation.

A good starting-point here can be found in Theodore Mischel's reply to Peter Alexander's critique of the conceptualization of Freudian psychoanalysis as a system of rational explanation. The argument centres around Freud's example of "a woman, who is very anxious to have children, always reading "storks" instead of "stocks" ". Here Freud gives her irrational behaviour a rational context by claiming that her desire for children explains the misreading. Alexander, however, rejects the use of the term "rational" in describing this type of explanation. Reading "storks" for "stocks", he argues, can in no way further her aim of having children, and she knows it. Here Alexander is combining two types of criticism of Freud's example. The first is related to the "narrow" form of rational explanation which we looked at earlier, where rational is an evaluative term corresponding to a certain shared value system and the technically efficient means of achieving those ends. In this sense the woman's behaviour cannot be described as rational. Secondly, we have the claim that the woman herself knows her action is irrational; since she herself presumably realizes that her misreadings can in no way further her desired goal of having children,

how can this possibly count as a rational explanation, since she would deny it. This second criticism strikes at the essence of Flew's position. It is worth looking closely at Mischel's reply:

> But what is this woman doing? She no more imagines that in reading "storks" for "stocks" she will produce children, than Freud imagines that in reading "antiquities" on reading every shop sign that shows the slightest resemblance to the word, he will turn a shop which does not sell antiquities into one that does. What the woman does, unaware that that is what she is doing, is to find in "stocks" an opportunity for mentioning "storks". Why does she do that? Because she wants to.
>
> ....To explain that the woman mentions the stork because she wants children, is not to cite the internal cause of an external effect; it is to re-describe what she is doing in such a way as to make it clear to someone who has not yet understood what she is doing in seizing opportunities to talk about the stork.
>
> (Mischel, p. 323)

Mischel makes a number of points here which are crucial to the re-formulation of Flew which I believe to be required in order to arrive at a satisfactory "deep" version of rational explanation. I will take the essential points individually and expand on them:

1. Freud's explanation should not be equated with any attempt to show that the woman's action is "really" rational in some consensually acceptable way. For this reason, the fact that her actions cannot rationally improve her chances of having children is irrelevant here.

2. "The woman reads "storks" for "stocks" because she wants to." This seemingly innocuous claim is an important one for our purposes because it links in with some of the points made in the anthropological section above, notably the assertion that the explanation of a subject's actions is

entirely contained in interpretations of their present life-world. Thus given that, as is widely acknowledged, perception is an active process shaped by the perceiver's desires, fears, etc., it is a sufficient explanation of the woman's behaviour if we say that she did so because she wanted to. We may go into her life-history to explain why she has the desires which she does, and why thinking of a stork is significant in terms of those desires. I think that these aspects of the explanation are clear: the point is that we are not giving them the status of causal factors, but only as aspects of a straightforward history of how the woman's life-world came to have the form and content which it does, and it is only this form and content which plays a primary role in our explanation.

3. The explanation is essentially a re-description. This point is not adequately theorized by Flew in the quotation given. We are not imputing a new motive, unknown to the woman, in quite the way in which Flew describes it. The woman knows quite well that the notion of storks is related to children, and that it is in this relation that the desirability of the misreading lies. She may not, however, present the same interpretation as Freud does, but the status of the Freudian interpretation is not jeopardized by this. The Freudian interpretation may allow her to understand more fully what she is doing, but it will not be telling her that she has feelings which she does not have, or vice versa. Rather it will be clarifying the nature and interrelations of those feelings which she does have. The re-description facilitates this process of clarification.

What we have arrived at here is perhaps misleadingly described as "rational explanation", given the many superficial interpretations of this methodological approach. It would be most accurately described as a version of the Verstehen or understanding approach to explanation in the social sciences, a version which does not sell itself short by using limited notions of experience and of rational explanation. The main thrust of our argument here is that the way in which the term "rational explanation" is used by some theorists is not always such that it can be equated with the full scope of the understanding approach. What Freud has shown, if interpreted in accordance with the points set out above, is that we can also understand in the case of "unacceptable" values, seemingly faulty reasoning, and irrational behaviour.

We have looked at two aspects of the attempt by phenomenology to encounter and incorporate Freud, the anthropological and methodological aspects. Within those broad categories we have looked at the work of the Daseinsanalytical school and certain analytic philosophers, such as Flew, respectively. These are not of course the only attempts which have been made from within the phenomenological or "action theory" perspectives, but they seem to me to be the most significant for our purposes. Certainly Ricoeur regards very highly the work of Flew, and sees it as almost, but not quite, equivalent to his position. It is this "not quite" which we must now go on to examine. We have outlined a number of very significant ways

in which the phenomenological perspective has incorporated important aspects of Freud. This in itself has been a major advance for phenomenological psychology, although it has by no means been made use of by all such psychologists. But the question of whether the "depth" phenomenology which we have outlined in this chapter is a valid interpretation of Freud remains to be answered. Many do not believe that it is, including Ricoeur. It is thus imperative that we move on to an examination of Ricoeur's thorough and rigorous "reading" of Freud, and investigate the ways in which he believes a phenomenological psychology must necessarily fall short of a full appropriation of Freud.

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3. THE LIMITING OF PHENOMENOLOGY: RICOEUR'S READING OF FREUD

In this chapter we shall examine the important ways in which Freudian psychoanalysis challenges any attempted phenomenological psychology; even, seemingly, if it makes use of the resources outlined in the previous chapter. There are, of course, many claims in the vast body of Freud's writings which are incompatible with the phenomenological approach in psychology, and we will make no attempt to catalogue these. Indeed this would have no bearing on our aim here, which is to highlight those aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis which seem to play a crucial, perhaps indispensable, role therein, and which seem to contradict the basic assumptions of the phenomenological method. We hope in the following chapters to show that the correct use of theory, understood in relation to psychology as an interpretive science, allows a phenomenologically - orientated psychology to meet many of the challenges posed by the success of the psychoanalytic method. Thus in this chapter we confine our discussion to those aspects of psychoanalysis which seem relevant to the development of a human science of psychology.

This chapter consists of two subsections. In the first subsection, entitled "Ricoeur's Reading of Freud", we will follow the interpretation of Freud presented by Ricoeur in his book Freud and Philosophy : An Essay on Interpretation.

This work represents perhaps the most sympathetic analysis of Freud by a philosopher in the hermeneutic tradition. Unlike many commentators in this tradition, Ricoeur takes very seriously those causal - explanatory aspects which pose the greatest difficulty for a phenomenological - hermeneutic appropriation of Freud. In the second subsection, entitled "The Limiting of Phenomenology", we will review the central challenges posed by our discussion of Ricoeur's "reading" of psychoanalysis.

3.1 Ricoeur's Reading of Freud

In Freud and Philosophy Ricoeur devotes some 285 pages of what he calls his "reading" of Freud to a close analysis of Freud's writings. This analysis in itself contains a number of important ideas for any psychologist interested in psychoanalysis. We cannot, however, go into the details of Ricoeur's reading of Freud: what we shall do here is to present some important aspects of Ricoeur's analysis and consider their implications for a phenomenologically - based psychology.

Part of Ricoeur's aim in examining Freud is to show that the Freudian concepts cannot be detached from their hermeneutic context, and thus that the various attempts to turn psychoanalysis into some sort of natural science are doomed to failure. Ricoeur does this partially by showing the shortcomings and inherent contradictions of such attempts

(e.g. Nagel's), but also by showing precisely the way in which all of Freud's writings reveal some sort of implicit interpretative component (a component whose size and centrality increases with time: virtually excluded from the "Project for a Scientific Psychology", becoming more evident in The Interpretation of Dreams, and dominating Beyond the Pleasure Principle). Although we shall use some of Ricoeur's arguments with regard to this question in other contexts, we shall not consider here the issue of whether psychoanalysis can be formulated as a natural science, for the following reasons:

1. None of the attempts to formulate psychoanalysis as a natural science have shown any signs of being successful schools of psychology in their own right; and

2. The aim of this essay is to investigate the lessons of psycho-analysis for an interpretive psychology. The attempts to formulate psychoanalysis as a natural science simply make any dialogue between psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychology impossible.

We will therefore examine Ricoeur's analysis of the relationship between Freud's hermeneutic aspects and his causal-explanatory aspects, the latter being most evident in Freud's metapsychology.

As has been mentioned the "Project for a Scientific Psychology", the first major theoretical work of Freud's, contains a sustained attempt to exclude any notion of

interpretation in favour of a system which is entirely objectivistic and mechanistic. What is immediately most striking about the Project is its attempt to give an anatomical content to Freud's theories, and in general to base these theories in the neurophysiology of the time. This particular project was never to be attempted again by Freud, and for this reason the Project is often looked upon as something of an aberrant curiousity in Freud's intellectual history. So it is in part, but it also contains the essence of much which was to remain important in Freud's work.

Ricoeur isolates two basic principles which underlie Freud's theoretical structure at this point, and which will continue to do so. They are the "quantitative hypothesis" and the "principle of constancy". By the first we mean the idea that what is essential to an understanding of human psychology is the notion of quantity, a homogenous quantity, although one which is never defined. It is linked, of course, to natural scientific concepts of energy and change, but unlike these concepts the Freudian "quantity" is not tied to any numerical laws, indeed it is never measured. It is, however, spoken of as being large or small, discharging, filling, increasing, etc. It is clear therefore that the quantitative hypothesis is not merely a natural science homologue but a principle which guides Freud's thinking about the human psyche, and it guides his thinking, claims Ricoeur, in ways which are central to the

psychoanalytic project.

There is one law, quasi-numerical, which the quantitative hypothesis does obey, and this is the "principle of constancy". The principle of constancy claims that the overall level of quantity (tension) tends towards zero in the system, or at least as close to zero as is possible. A rise in the amount of quantity is linked to tension and unpleasure, and a decrease (or discharge), to pleasure.

The two principles of quantity and constancy are the basis of what might be called the Freudian energetics or economics. However the exact form in which they occur in the Project is rapidly discarded:

> Finally, the theory of constancy and its anatomical translation furnish little support to the edifice; when the "Project", barely drafted, succumbs to doubt, only the clinical observations on the neuroses will stand firm....However one should not conclude from this... that the constancy principle and the quantitative hypothesis are liquidated along with the pseudo- anatomical translation. Affects will continue to be treated as displaceable or bound "quantities" joined to ideas, and the notion of cathesis will remain closely linked with this strange quantity which is never measured.
>
> (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 85)

At this stage it is important to get a preliminary grasp of what this linkage between the quantitative hypothesis and the development of psychoanalysis might consist of. Essentially, the quantitative hypothesis continues to provide for Freud a systematization which guides his thinking about psychology, and, more specifically, his

thinking about the psychology of his patients. The quantitative hypothesis occurs, I wish to argue, at the confluence of a number of factors which will produce the distinctively psychoanalytic project. Firstly, it is, of course, a result of Freud's admiration for the method of the natural sciences, and his desire to follow that method in psychology. As such, in its manifestation in the Project, it proves untenable. But, secondly, the quantitative hypothesis is not entirely inappropriate to the psychological reality of Freud's patients, influenced by the repressed but ever - present sexuality which dominated and distorted their lives. The relevance of quasi - quantitative metaphors such as "discharge", "tension", and so forth, is obvious here, and for this reason this way of thinking continues to produce for Freud important and innovative results. These first two factors, contingent and contextual as they are, combine to produce the third factor: the development of psychoanalysis as a systematic psychology. This is the ultimate significance of the quantitative hypothesis : it begins a process of theory - construction which aims to introduce connectedness and meaning into a psychic system which seems at first to be quite the opposite.

The system as it appears in the Project fails in part because it attempts to separate the theory entirely from its hermeneutic context: "That which cuts explanation off from any work of deciphering, from any reading of symptoms and

signs, is the pretension of making a quantitative psychology of desire" (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 82). The theory, of course, is derived largely from the clinical context and the lessons of that clinical experience, and there the question of interpretation was paramount. The separation of the theory from the methodology of its context of discovery puts the Project on a road which rapidly peters out. But Freud was too great a psychologist to continue to follow a path so clearly barren, although many have subsequently attempted to push psychoanalysis back that way. Instead we see him move towards a greater and greater thematization of the hermeneutic aspects of psychoanalysis. Nowhere is this move so noticeable as in his greatest work, The Interpretation of Dreams.

Ricoeur sees two changes which are immediately noticeable between the Project and The Interpretation of Dreams. The first is that the psychical apparatus developed in the latter work functions without reference to anatomy, to the elaborate neuronal systems laboriously worked out in the Project. Instead it is a purely psychic apparatus, although a psychic apparatus of a distinctive kind. Secondly "the schema of the psychical apparatus oscillates between a real representation, as was the machine of the "Project", and a figurative representation, as will be the later schemata of the topography" (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 87). These two changes reflect what will be for our purposes the most significant shifts in Freud's conception of psycho-analysis. The shift

from the anatomical to the psychical is of course a pre-requisite of the development of a genuinely psychoanalytic method: a method where, for example, fantasy exists on an equal footing with the physical. At the same time the shift makes possible a genuine dialogue with hermeneutics, although this is not guaranteed by the shift to the psychical as such (as Dilthey had by then already shown). But Freud's understanding of the psychical is too closely tied to his clinical experience, and his own insightful analysis, to ever become the sort of mechanistic psychic chemistry as occurs, for example, in the psychology of Titchener and his school. The second shift discussed above is crucial in this respect, although it is still at a fairly implicit stage of development in The Interpretation of Dreams. Essentially, we see that the explicitly psychological theory to which Freud moves after discarding the unhappy neuro - anatomy of the Project is not a sort of mental chemistry in which mental elements interact in some spiritual version of the mechanistic natural science of the day. Such an option would have been inimical to the essence of Freudianism and would also have made a hermeneutic reading of Freud improbable. Instead the theoretical language which Freud develops is a figurative one: the concepts employed are more like metaphors in the service of interpretation than the concepts employed by the natural sciences could ever be. We do not wish to claim here that Freudian concepts are best understood as metaphors (we will deal with the status of Freudian concepts in chapter 4).

Our point is simply that the psychological concepts employed by Freud during and subsequently to the Interpretation are not such concepts as would contradict a hermeneutic reading. In the development of Freud's thought this figurative understanding develops more clearly into what might be called a "psychology of figures", where the psychic "container" becomes a sort of stage where the psychic drama unfolds as a clash between various roles, images, fantasies and principles. This begins to show itself especially when the first topography (conscious, pre - conscious, and unconscious) is replaced by the second (ego, super - ego, id), where we have the introduction of distinct quasi - personae into the psychic system and into the form of explanation.

For Ricoeur these two shifts are important in themselves, but also reflect a deeper shift which is of primary importance for the development of our argument. This is that from the Project to the Interpretation a change occurs in the relation of the topographic - economic systematic explanation to the theme of interpretation. In the Project the interpretation of symptoms in the clinical situation was the context of discovery which lay behind the systematic explanation, and which guided the construction of that system, but it was in no way part of that system in any thematic way. However in the Interpretation the systematic explanation is subordinated:

> (The systematic explanation is placed) at the end of a process of work whose own rules have been

> elaborated; the express aim of the explanation is to present a schematic transcription of what goes on in the dream-work that is accessible only in and through the work of interpretation. The explanation is, therefore, explicitly subordinated to interpretation.
>
> (Ricoeur, 1970; p. 88)

We see that in the Interpretation the hermeneutic context has become central to the self-understanding of the method, a move reflected already in the choice of title. We would follow up this crucial insight of Ricoeur's by pointing out that the theoretical concepts employed by Freud are coming to be increasingly understood as concepts in the service of interpretation. This occurs in the process described above in which they are cast adrift from their anatomical moorings and become increasingly figurative, or metaphorical. We will examine later what the possible status of such concepts can be (to call them metaphorical is inadequate), but here it is sufficient that we note that Freudian theory straddles two conceptual worlds. Couched in the causal - explanatory language of the natural sciences, and embedded in a system which pays consciousness little respect, they are nevertheless clearly employed in the service of the interpretation of that consciousness. Inasmuch as the explanatory concepts, then, are subordinated to interpretation, we find that we have entered a stage where the psychoanalytic self - understanding would seem to allow a dialogue with other interpretive approaches.

It is precisely here, however, that Ricoeur would caution us not to move too quickly, for psychoanalysis has entered the

hermeneutic domain in a way which challenges the very basis of the hermeneutic self-understanding. The task of psychoanalytic interpretation is conceived in a very different way from that in which orthodox hermeneutics conceives its tasks. This traditional hermeneutics was derived largely from the interpretation of religious texts, and was characterized by the following features:

1. A belief that the symbol is in some way a "bearer of truth";

2. A descriptive approach as opposed to any explanation (especially any "explaining away" of the symbol);

3. A commitment on the part of the interpreter to the message of the symbol;

4. An approach in which interpretation is seen as the restoration of (lost or hidden) meaning.

(taken from: Ihde, p.141)

Now Freud's approach in the Interpretation makes possible the legitimate raising of hermeneutic questions, but the Freudian hermeneutic domain bears little relation to that outlined immediately above. Freud enters the hermeneutic domain essentially by his claim that dreams have meaning, and in fact goes so far on some occasions as to compare the work of dream interpretation to that of the interpretation of a literary text, or the relation between the manifest and latent meanings of a dream as similar to the relation between two texts. However for Freud this comparison, while illuminating in moving away from "irrationalist" theories of dream interpretation (i.e. that dreams are just cognitive

"noise" with little significance), is also dangerous if it suggests that psychoanalytic interpretation is no more than ordinary interpretation of texts. For Freud, psychoanalytic interpretation requires, in order to arrive at the latent meaning, precisely those energetic - economic explanatory tools which orthodox hermeneutics must necessarily reject if it is to uphold the four points mentioned above. As Ricoeur puts it:

> It is impossible to achieve the first task of interpretation - viz to discover the thoughts, ideas or wishes that are "fulfilled" in a disguised way - without considering the mechanisms which constitute the dream-work and bring about the "transposition" or "distortion" of the dream-thoughts into the manifest content.
>
> (Ricoeur, 1970. p.89)

The Freudian claim here is that no interrogation of the manifest content of the dream can in itself reveal the latent content of the dream : to do this one must refer to the system, to the theoretical mechanisms which alone can explain the "real" content of the dream. (The same argument, of course, can be extended beyond the realm of the dream - world to all aspects of human existence, although the exact nature of the mechanisms change). We believe that this claim is not a coherent one, or, more correctly, that it is only in its incoherent form that it poses an insurmountable challenge to the phenomenological approach. To claim that a dream is not interpretable in terms of the structures of the dreamer's existence, or lived - world, seems to place the dream beyond that existence, which is patently absurd. It must be remembered here that we will

bring to our interpretation of the dream all the resources discussed in the previous chapter. We would further argue that there is ample evidence in phenomenological psychology of the sort of dream - analysis to which we are referring. However, we wish to leave these arguments for now. In the following chapter we will see how the adoption of the theoretical turn enables an interpretive psychology to meet all of the serious challenges posed by Freud. For now, we have before us the task of attempting to dialogue with Freud at his most challenging, and to do so we must be careful of premature attacks and dismissals. In order to understand fully why Ricoeur believes that psychoanalysis is not reducible to orthodox hermeneutics, or even a "deep" version thereof, we must examine his claim that psychoanalysis is irreducably a mixed discourse, in which both the hermeneutic and the causal - explanatory components are necessary.

A useful example to begin with here is Freud's notion of "censorship", which unites the language of orthodox interpretation with the language of economics and energetics. Ricoeur has drawn out the central issue here accurately:

> On the one hand , censorship manifests itself at the level of a text on which it imposes blanks, word-substitutions, softened expressions, allusions, tricks of arrangement - with suspect or subversive items being displaced or hidden in harmless, out-of-the-way spots; on the other hand censorship is the expression of a power, more precisely a political power, which works against the opposition by striking at its right of expression. In the idea of censorship the two systems of language are very closely interwoven: censorship alters a text only when it represses a

> force, and it represses a forbidden force only by disturbing the expression of that force.
> (Ricoeur, 1970, p.92)

This is, for Ricoeur, precisely the distinctive feature of the concepts and theoretical terms employed in psychoanalytic discourse. On the one hand, they make sense within a hermeneutic context, and can be read as a language of interpretation unfortunately distorted by a scientistic metatheory. On the other hand their causal - energetic aspects seem essential to Freudianism.

We have seen how the motive-cause tension in psychoanalysis has provoked many attempted solutions, and that these solutions have regularly tried to collapse one of these aspects of Freudianism into the other. But we have also seen how in The Interpretation of Dreams these two aspects are intertwined, and how in key concepts such as censorship they seem to be combined. It is because Ricoeur believes that both aspects are always (or nearly always) present in Freud , and that neither can be discarded, that he chooses to describe Freudian psychoanalysis as a "mixed discourse". Now it is crucially important to understand exactly what Ricoeur is claiming here, and on what he bases his claims. He is not claiming that simply because Freud uses both types of language any interpretation of Freud must take both into account. The fact that Freud did not speak a "pure" interpretive language might be explained by his scientific pretensions and the spirit of the times, as Rycroft and others have claimed. Ricoeur is claiming more than a simple

statement of empirical fact about the content of Freud's writings: he is claiming that the two aspects are both necessary components of certain key Freudian concepts (such as censorship), and indeed that both are essential to the Freudian approach as a whole. The scope, complexity and essential nature of psychoanalysis all seem to resist any simple reduction:

> It surely seems that the combination, in psychoanalysis, of a procedure of detection (not to say a detective method), of a technique aimed at producing behavioural changes, and of theoretical propositions, must exclude this kind of radical clarification.
>
> (Ricoeur,1970, p. 361)

Thus far we have presented two aspects of Ricoeur's argument: the first being that Freud's writings consist of both an interpretive and a causal-explanatory component, and the second that both components are essential to Freudian psychoanalysis. An important question not yet adressed is whether there is some methodological or anthropological foundation for this combination of components, or whether the combinations merely reflect some pragmatic eclecticism on Freud's part. The systematic nature of Freud's thought makes this alternative highly unlikely. One common approach is to claim that the answer lies in the distinctive features of the therapeutic situation, where, perhaps, the combination of causal and interpretive discourse plays some essential role. Ricoeur has argued such a position in his essay "The Question of Proof in Freud's Psychoanalytic Writings" (1981). We cannot pursue this approach here, inasmuch as we are not concerned in this essay with arriving

at a correct interpretation of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, but at drawing from the general psychoanalytic approach certain lessons for the development of an interpretive psychology, especially in the fields of developmental and social psychology. However, in Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur takes another approach to the question of the foundations of the legitimacy of Freud's mixed discourse. Here he claims that the mixed discourse is rooted in a fundamental reality of human existence:

> The reading I propose considers Freudian discourse to be a mixed discourse. It intermingles questions of meaning (the meaning of dreams, symptoms, culture, etc.), and questions of force (cathexis, economic accounting, conflict, repression, etc). I allow here that this mixed discourse is not equivocal but is appropriate to the reality which it wishes to take into account, namely the binding of force and meaning into a semantics of desire.
> (Ricoeur, 1969, p. 160)

Anyone familiar with the psychoanalytic tradition will have some concrete idea of what Ricoeur means by the semantics of desire, or at least to which phenomena he refers. They are the subject-matter of Freud's writing, ranging from the mundane to the bizarre: the glass of water which cannot be drunk, the words which cannot be said, the actions which must be repeated endlessly, the phenomena which evoke a senseless dread or inexplicable desire. In all these examples we see that the appearance of the world, and the subject's own interpretation of that world, is distorted to such an extent and in such a way as to seemingly put it beyond the reach of ordinary interpretation, and to suggest explanations in terms of force and of causality. But if we seek to spell out exactly what is meant by such phrases as

"the binding of force and meaning into a semantics of desire" we find ourselves involved in a complex task. The issue of the ontological foundations which could support some notion of human existence legitimately described both by a motive language and by a causal language has been a stumbling-block in the path of many attempts to develop a critical psychology based on psychoanalysis. De Boer, for example, advocates the use of a causal-nomothetic approach which produces a law-like system of "quasi-causes", which then "thaw" in the process of emancipatory self-reflection in therapy. The process of "thawing" is described as follows: "that which is viewed as a determined phenomenon in the language-game of empirical-analytical science is transposed to another linguistic framework - that of human interaction" (de Boer, p. 128). This description of the therapeutic process seems hopelessly inadequate, as do the concepts of "quasi-causes" and "thawing", apart from being quite probably theoretically incoherent. Although we shall in later chapters be developing especially the methodological aspects of Ricoeur's hermeneutic approach, we shall nevertheless take some time now to look a little more closely at the notion of the "semantics of desire".

At times Ricoeur defines the meaning of a semantics of desire in terms of instincts:

> At a certain point the question of force and the question of meaning coincide: that point is where instincts are indicated, are made manifest, are given in the psychical representative, that is, in something psychical that "stands for" them; all the

> derivatives in consciousness are merely transformations of this psychical representative, of this primal "standing for".
> (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 134)

Such dualistic formulations conceal problems which manifest themselves as soon as we make any attempt to draw the links between the biological realm of the instincts and their so - called "representatives" in consciousness. The massive theoretical difficulties faced by any theorist attempting to spell out the nature of the interaction of mind and body in the context of such a Cartesian dualism have resulted in the virtual absence of such theories in serious philosophizing in this century. Two landmarks in the destruction of this Cartesian tradition have been Heidegger's Being and Time and Ryle's The Nature of Mind. However the tradition continues to survive in many popular schools of psychology, especially amongst those attempting a Humanistic approach. Apart from the theoretical difficulties involved, it seems equally clear that the Cartesian view of the nature of human existence is simply wrong: we are not Cartesian subjects in solitary isolation from our worlds, nor does the relation of mind and body in the Cartesian picture in any way reflect the truth of human bodiliness, or embodiment. Such a version of the relationship between desire and meaning can therefore be safely rejected.

Despite the evidence of the previous quotation, Ricoeur is aware of such problems (although many others have not been), and is therefore at times concerned to describe the relation of desire to meaning in purely psychological terms.

It is this strand in Ricoeur's thought which Ihde draws on when he writes that the semantics of desire "announces that desire will appear in terms of a structure of meanings which in turn arise at the juncture of experience and expression, but which must be deciphered to be understood" (Ihde, p. 134). And Ricoeur himself:

> It is in deciphering the tricks of desire that the desire at the root of meaning and reflection is discovered. I cannot hypostatize this desire outside the process of interpretation: it always remains a being-interpreted. I have hints of it behind the enigmas of consciousness, but I cannot grasp it in itself without the danger of creating a mythology of instinctual forces, as sometimes happens in coarse conceptions of psychoanalysis.
> (Ricoeur, 1969, p. 21)

It is with this psychologized version of the concept of a semantics of desire that dialogue is possible for an interpretive psychology. I wish now to show that the Daseinsanalytical anthropology outlined in the previous chapter is cabable of absorbing such a concept; indeed, that it provides the true ground for such a claim, and further that the notion of a semantics of desire holds important lessons for a Daseinsanalytical psychology as we wish to develop it here.

In the quotation given above Ricoeur treads a narrow and difficult path. On the one hand he emphatically wants to avoid the danger of "creating a mythology of instinctual forces", and in order to do this he wishes to understand desire entirely within the process of interpretation. On

the other hand he speaks of "hints of it behind the enigmas of consciousness", and of desire as being at the "root" of meaning. Now we need at this stage to draw some clear dividing lines. Firstly, that desire lies beyond consciousness is not a problem for the interpretive approach unless it lies in some way beyond human experience as lived. For Freud it is clear that the basic libidinal principle does lie beyond experience, but this self - understanding on Freud's part is one which we have clearly rejected. On Ricoeur's interpretation of Freud it is not acceptable, and he wishes to theorize the Freudian desire within the psychological, but nevertheless in a way which resists a standard interpretive reading. Secondly it is not a problem for an interpretive approach if the person concerned does not acknowledge the Freudian interpretation: as shown in the previous chapter, an interpretive approach based on a Daseinsanalytical anthropology has no need to assume that the meanings of a person's life are transparent to that person. Is there therefore anything here which forces us to go beyond the approach exemplified in the previous chapter by Mischel's analysis of Freudian explanation, namely that if we fully understand the structures of a person's life-world and the stance they take towards it, we have all we need for an adequate analysis? Here we are fully aware that the life-history of a person may be such as to distort his or her existence to such an extent as to make understanding difficult, perhaps impossible. But that is because of the limits of human communication and imagination, not because

that existence is characterized by some ontologically different quality.

Heidegger's characterization of human existence as "being-in-the-world", or Dasein, is in fact in certain ways hospitable to the primary importance of desire in human existence. "Being-in-the-world" seems to us to be an accurate description of the psychological reality of what is otherwise described as "life", "consciousness" or "existence", but if it is to be taken up as the grounding for a psychology then the description must be fleshed out with the concrete particulars of the various world - relations. Following this lead we can see, for example, how a Daseinsanalytical psychologist could make perfect sense of the Freudian stress on early life experiences. For the child the mother - relation is all - consuming and definitive for its existence. Disruption, loss, or merely dis-satisfaction in this relationship can easily be understood to structure that child's world in such a way as to produce an adult personality characterized by repeated attempts to find satisfaction of some deep and probably unspeakable (for the person concerned) desire, to paint a picture common in the psychoanalytic literature.

We have thus far attempted to show that, unless we go beyond the psychological in an unacceptable way, there is nothing in the notion of the significance of desire which prevents a phenomenological or hermeneutic appropriation. I now wish

briefly to move in the opposite direction and point to some ways in which the notion of a semantics of desire can enrich the interpretive approach.

Let us consider the lived-world of a boy moving into adolescence. He finds the meaning structures of his world changing in ways which he cannot explain. Parts of his life which had seemed insignificant become charged with a vital significance and with powers to move and excite him. Other people become desirable in a new, sexual way. In these developments there are two important points which we wish to draw out. The first is that nothing which the boy will do or think or feel is beyond straightforward phenomenological understanding. There is nothing here which is like an extra - psychological force acting causally upon the boy : he is not sexually attracted to someone else because his sexual "instincts", once dormant, are now acting upon him; rather it is correct and sufficient simply to describe the way in which the other appears to him (as desirable, as sexually stimulating, etc). But secondly, a direct phenomenological approach in this instance will obviously be missing something. It will not be able to analyse the reasons for the changes in the lived - world, since no description or interpretation of his life-history will enable us to understand the changes. What we wish to point out here is that this does not mean that a phenomenological approach need remain silent here, or turn over the matter to a physiological discussion about hormones and similar, non-

psychological factors. A developmental theory such as Eriksen's is clearly an important psychological theory and it is a theory which, I would argue, is best understood within a hermeneutic context. But to do this it is crucial that such an approach recognize its possibilities with regard to the use of theoretical constructs which go beyond that which is directly reducible to lived - experience.

With this example we come to the end of our reading of Freud, and we will draw from this reading a number of crucial imperatives for the development of a vigorous and viable interpretive psychology. We have criticized those readings of Freud which have invoked mixed ontologies, and those which have called for the employment of both causal and interpretive explanation in the analysis of human existence. It is worth recalling here that our aim has been not to correctly theorize Freud, but to draw from the success of the Freudian approach that which is essential to the development of an adequate interpretive psychology. We have pointed here to the use of theoretical terms as an essential characteristic of the psychoanalytic approach, and we have suggested that in the use of theory an interpretive approach may be able to meet many of the challenges of psychoanalysis without doing violence to its essential nature. This is the task of the following chapter. But before we conclude here, I wish briefly to highlight those aspects of the Freudian approach which are seen by Ricoeur as presenting a serious challenge to interpretive

approaches.

3.2 The Limiting of Phenomenology

We conclude this chapter by reviewing those aspects of psychoanalysis which, for Ricoeur, according to his reading of Freud, cannot be dealt with by an interpretive phenomenology. In the previous section of this chapter we modified Ricoeur's reading in order to highlight those aspects which we will use in the discussion of the theoretical turn to be proposed. For now, however, it is necessary to restate what Ricoeur sees as the crucial challenges, on his own terms. We shall later be arguing that our proposal is a practical and coherent way of meeting, if not the letter, at least the spirit of these challenges.

We follow Ihde here in distinguishing three themes which arise in consideration of the shortcomings of phenomenology with regard to psychoanalysis. They are:

1.The psychoanalytic de-centering of meaning away from consciousness towards desire;

2.The indirect psychoanalytic method for exposing the disguises of desire and tracing its history;

3.The psychoanalytic "humiliation" of reflective philosophy.

We have said that these points expose the limitations of

phenomenology. However, we saw in chapter 2 that phenomenology can go some way towards meeting all three challenges. To highlight exactly where Ricoeur sees the unbridgeable gap as occurring, we need to look at each point somewhat more closely. In so doing we shall also begin the move towards the solution to be proposed in the following chapter.

Firstly, we have seen that phenomenology can move away from dealing only with a limited concept of consciousness, and can take as its domain the lived experience in all its depth, where meanings are hidden and have to be uncovered. But although this approach dislodges consciousness from its pre-eminence, it does not so much de-center consciousness as the centre of meaning as deepen, or widen, the scope of meaning with regard to the whole of existence. It certainly does not, as psychoanalysis does, postulate a new source of meaning entirely other than the subject, namely desire, which directs and distorts the experience of the subject. Psychoanalysis, in other words, "concedes the dispossession of immediate consciousness to the advantage of another agency of meaning, namely the emergence of desire" (Ricoeur, 1969, p.47). For Ricoeur it is precisely this dispossession of consciousness which phenomenology cannot incorporate into its method, since it is methodologically tied to a thematization of consciousness.

Secondly we shall look at the "humiliation" of reflective

philosophy. Once again we have seen how phenomenology, especially in its Heideggerian form, has challenged a naive faith in philosophical reflection carried out as non-hermeneutic introspection (as for example by Descartes). For Heidegger the primacy of the world suggests that self-reflection can take place only via the long and difficult path of reflection on the world of Dasein, by an interpretation of its signs. This is a position which Ricoeur accepts, of course, but if we follow the metaphor we can perhaps describe it as a "chastening" rather than a "humiliation". Ricoeur describes the effect of psychoanalysis on reflective philosophy as follows:

> What emerges...is a wounded cogito, which posits but does not possess itself, which understands its originary truth only in and by the confession of the inadequation, the illusion and the lie of existing consciousness.
>
> (Ricoeur, 1969, p.173)

Crucial here is the possibility of consciousness as a lie. Such a possibility raises serious problems for a phenomenological method, which can at best only restrict consciousness to a partiality, and the phenomena to distortions which nevertheless in some way contain the truth. Also important for the psychoanalytic "humiliation" of reflective philosophy is the psychoanalytic penetration of the subject, or rather the replacement of the subject (fixed and centred) by the Freudian ego, the "slave which serves three Masters", as a secondary structure whose function is mediation between forces whose principles are alien to it. The humiliation here lies in the undermining of the pure epistemological subject, and thus of the notion of

truth, which is now seen as a founded concept rooted in desire and effort. However, it is crucial to see that, for Ricoeur, this undermining of truth (and similarly of the autonomy of consciousness, or the subject, or the will) is not a destruction or reduction, but only a necessary humiliation which leaves truth still as an ideal, as a task to be accomplished. Thus the new method of reflective philosophy, of searching through the interpretations of the signs of humanity, is by no means a fruitless task: on the contrary it is a valid path to that self-knowledge which is always the goal of reflective philosophy.

Now the first two points we have dealt with here, namely the postulation of a new centre of meaning in desire, and the humiliation of reflective philosophy, call for the third point, at the same time as having been produced by it. By this we mean that it was the method adopted by Freud, coupled with his clinical insight, which produced that "wounding" of consciousness which has proved so succesful. However, the method adopted by Freud was described by him in a number of ways, and it is the task of a philosophical approach to Freud to reformulate that method so that it will remain as effective in the ways outlined immediately above. For Ricoeur the essential aspect of psychoanalytic method is that it is an indirect method, at least relative to consciousness. More specifically it can be described as an indirect hermeneutics. All hermeneutic systems have the same aim: that of providing an interpretation which can shed

light on the subject of interpretation. Most hermeneutics are direct, in the sense that they start their work with that which is to be explained. Thus the hermeneutic psychologist begins his or her interpretation of a particular existence with the phenomena as given in that existence, and from that starting-point may move relatively far away from the appearance, using the resources outlined in chapter two, in order to return eventually with an illuminating interpretation. Psychoanalysis differs fundamentally in its choice of starting point. Psychoanalysis, as we have seen, has many of the trappings of an orthodox hermeneutic approach, and it seems justified to describe it as a hermeneutic method. Its success (ignoring for the moment questions of the nature of success in therapy) is also evaluated in terms of the illumination of experience. But in its choice of starting-point psychoanalysis diverges: it starts not with the lived experience as it presents itself in the phenomena as given, but with a theory about the foundations of human existence and the historical genesis of the content of that existence. This does not, however, take psychoanalysis beyond the realms of hermeneutic psychology, since not only is its goal the same but also it does not go beyond existence (although it considers some aspects of existence to be unconscious), for it must be remembered that psychoanalysis, as Ricoeur sees it, does not go so far as to postulate any sort of quasi-biological explanation. When we say that the psychoanalytic approach recognizes a new centre

of meaning in desire we do not go beyond meaning or beyond existence: rather we recognize in existence a different guiding thread, an alien, driving principle. Psychoanalysis is an indirect method in that it goes directly into the history of that principle of desire. Phenomenology goes directly to consciousness, but only indirectly, or obliquely, to the "real history of desire". If the choice to go directly into the history of desire was a crucial part of the effectivity, of the explanatory power, of psychoanalysis, then we must ask how this can possibly relate to a hermeneutic phenomenology tied to the phenomena. Ricoeur, however, believes that the hermeneutic turn, for both psychoanalysis and phenomenology, provides a conceptualization of psychoanalysis which can dialogue with hermeneutic phenomenology, as two approaches to the one question of interpretation. We move on now to an examination of a possible theoretical - hermeneutical solution.

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4. THE POSSIBILITY OF THEORY AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS POSED BY FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS

In the previous chapters we have examined the ways in which a phenomenological psychology can approximate itself to psychoanalysis, as well as some of the ways in which it is suggested that any interpretive psychology falls short of the essence of psychoanalysis. We wish in this chapter to propose a solution to this problem, a solution which we believe has been ignored by the major schools of interpretive psychology. The proposed solution lies in the appropriation of theory by psychologies grounded in the methodology variously described as interpretive, phenomenological, hermeneutic, or "understanding", depending on which aspects are stressed. We believe such an appropriation is both possible and necessary for the development of a vigorous psychology which treats human existence as it is given, understands that questions of interpretive understanding are at the root of psychological explanations, and at the same time is capable of standing as an ordered, coherent and growing body of knowledge of the human condition. In this chapter we shall be concerned with demonstrating the possibility and status of theory in an interpretive psychology, with special reference to Freudian psychoanalysis as analyzed in the previous chapter.

Firstly we would like to make it clear that we will not be proposing here a reconciliation between an interpretive

approach and notions of theory as developed in the natural sciences. Instead we wish to investigate the possibility of a conception of theory specific to the human "sciences". We believe that a theoretical component is crucially necessary in many fields of knowledge, and not only in the natural sciences. One reason why this is so is that, as Popper has written, "knowledge begins with the tension between knowledge and ignorance: no problem without knowledge, no problem without ignorance" (quoted in Radnitsky, p. 25). Thus in psychology, as in all other disciplines, the approach is not one of simply gathering data (whether this is understood naturalistically or phenomenologically is not relevant), and then of extrapolating from this data. Rather our investigations are guided by theoretical concepts which give direction and significance to them. Before setting out a concept of the theoretical which we believe is usable in an interpretive psychology, we will briefly examine the tension which has existed between such approaches to psychology and those notions of theory which have been dominant during most of the modern history of "scientific" psychology.

Essential to the concept of theory which has influenced modern psychology is the notion of prediction. Valid theories, according to this very dominant model, are theories which enable one to predict a particular outcome given a finite set of initial conditions, thus making the theory genuinely testable. The theory must in fact be such

that the explanandum must follow deductively from the explanans (the set of initial conditions, plus the laws which make up the theory). Thus Hempel has written: "The explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans; for otherwise, the explanans would not constitute adequate grounds for the explanandum" (in Collin, p.83). The prime examples of these are the "covering-law" models of scientific explanations, which have been influential in psychological theorizing: the whole enterprise of behaviourism was precisely the search for such "laws".

Now it seems clear that no interpretive approach could sustain such a form of theorizing. Charles Taylor has outlined three main reasons for this:

1)The "open system" predicament: one cannot isolate individual human actions in anything like the required experimental manner;

2)No interpretive model can "achieve the degree of fine exactitude" of a science based on measurable data, and thus the predictions cannot be accurate enough to be testable;

3)There is no basis for any assumption that there are such things as universal laws in human existence. For one thing, humans are capable of reflecting on and changing their actions on the basis of information aquired, including psychological theories.

(taken from: Taylor, p.68)

Other formulations exist but the point is one which we shall not labour here. We will now move on to an investigation of a concept of the theoretical suited to phenomenological-

interpretive enquiry.

4.1 Collin's View of Theory in the Interpretive Social Disciplines

We will begin with the distinction introduced by Collin between "common-sense" knowledge and "theoretical" knowledge. Now in standard philosophy of science this gap is a major one. That which is specifically theoretical is that part of an explanation which makes use of reference to unobservables, and, as we have seen, scientific theory is necessarily part of a type of explanation whose validity is based on its predictive tightness and its methodical testability. There are thus scientific and non-scientific statements and there is no problem in distinguishing the two, and within the domain of scientific statements the distinction between the theoretical and the non-theoretical is equally unproblematic. However in the interpretive disciplines the gap between common-sense knowledge and theory is less clear. It is precisely the merit of Collin's work that he has investigated the relationship between the two and has developed a notion of the theoretical which is specific to the interpretive disciplines.

Firstly, Collin defines "common-sense knowledge" as follows:

> ...knowledge which the average person could establish or test for himself, given time and patience, without relying on any specialized

education or sophisticated techniques.
(Collin, p.58)

The use of "establish" rather than "possess" is in order to exclude all sorts of knowledge which could be obtained from casual reading. For example, knowledge about sub-atomic physics gained by a non-physicist through reading works of popular science does not qualify as common-sense knowledge. This does not mean that common-sense knowledge is in the ordinary run of things established or tested by its possessors, but they should in principle be capable of doing so. It should be noted that Collin's definition does not limit the scope of common-sense knowledge to that which is commonly possessed by the average person, but only to that which is in principle establishable "without relying on any specialized education or sophisticated technique". His definition is based not on the content of the knowledge possessed but on the methods by which it is established. Thus certain things known only to a few would in principle nevertheless qualify as common-sense knowledge, because of the ways in which they could be established. Now the question which we wish to pose is whether an interpretive psychology can produce knowledge of a sort which goes beyond such "common-sense" knowledge? This is not to say that common-sense knowledge is irrelevant. For example, an article which describes, interprets, and communicates the experience of, say, militant black youth in South Africa is clearly a significant psychological contribution, although it would fall into this category. The crux is rather that a discipline which has nothing more to offer than such

information is on perilous ground if it wishes to preserve its existence as an autonomous and productive academic discipline. For Collin it is crucial that interpretive disciplines develop a theoretical component, and it is to the possible nature of this theoretical component which we now turn.

Collin introduces the notion of theoreticity:

> Theoreticity is the major dimension in which scientific knowledge differs from, and surpasses, everyday knowledge.... It is the dimension measuring the integrative, organizing power of knowledge-systems, their power to compress information into an easily surveyable form....The distinguishing mark...lies in the greater generality and abstractedness of that knowledge.
> (Collin, p.60)

The point here becomes immediately clearer if we consider an instance of the theoretical taken from Freud. Now any one of Freud's individual case-studies are in themselves valuable, but it is clearly in the assimilation of his therapeutic experience into a number of key theoretical hypotheses that the particular power of the psychoanalytic approach lies. The hypothesis that seemingly chaotic symptoms and dream symbolism can be explained if understood as the result of "unconscious wish fulfillment" has tremendous power both to integrate and organize existing information and to generate and guide new research. Perhaps it might be objected here that such a generalized hypothesis is not really a theory. We concede of course that it has minimal predictive efficiency, but it is precisely our aim here to develop a concept of the

theoretical which is not tied to such natural-scientific requirements. It is certainly the case that theory for an interpretive psychology must be detached from any notions of predictability as found in the natural sciences. The point is just that we can nevertheless speak of the theoretical:

> Talk of "systematization" or "integration" is still in order in cases where a theory suggests a possible explanation of a certain phenomenon, but does not permit us to infer the occurrence of that phenomenon, whether deductively or inductively."
> (Collin, p.62)

Now it might seem that if a theory can do no better than to "suggest a possible explanation", it is unlikely to be of much value. However, outside of the experimental sciences where predictive precision is the essence of the method, there are numerous examples of such theories. Darwin's evolutionary theory, expressed in the notion that organic and behavioural aspects of natural species arose as a result of chance mutations and the pressure of natural selection, is an interesting example of such a theory which has little relation to predictive efficiency. Darwin's theory does nothing more than to suggest a particular line of investigation, and present a general scheme which organizes and structures a great deal of hitherto inexplicable data. Yet it is unquestionably a theory of tremendous power and importance.

It is important to note that we are concerned here with a pragmatic approach to the analysis of theory. That is to say, we are investigating the uses to which theory can be put, rather than the formal structure of theory. For

Collin, as we have seen, the essential use of all theory is its power to integrate and organize knowledge in a generalizable and parsimonious fashion. The particular methodologies, and indeed the various philosophies of science, can thus be seen as attempts to realize these goals in a particular field and with particular methods. Where measurement is possible, this is best achieved through the requirement of predictive efficiency and the associated deductive-nomological method, or some variant of it. But the impossibility of the application of this approach to the core areas of the human "sciences" does not mean that this field is exempt from the need to develop its own type of theory.

One claim which must be dealt with here is that theory in the interpretive disciplines can amount to no more than a typology, or categorization, of a particular set of phenomena, without explanatory power. But this is only so if we concede to the natural-scientific dogmatists their claim that the type of explanation of which the deductive-nomological method is an example is the only type of valid explanation. However such a position is quite unacceptable, especially to psychologists working within any version of the interpretive approaches. For Collin:

> Explanation enters the picture by virtue of the fact that knowledge which ranks high on the theoreticity scale is typically explanatory and provides deeper insight than everyday lore. By subsuming a broad range of diverse phenomena under a narrow set of abstract principles and concepts, a knowledge system high in theoreticity offers a more

> powerful explanation of such phenomena.
> (Collin, p.61)

The important point here is that we are not asking the question of how a theory in the interpretive disciplines can be explanatory in the natural-scientific manner. The explanatory mechanism here is ultimately understanding, not in the sense of empathizing with or re-living the experiences of the subject of enquiry, but meaning simply that a particular (interpretive) description enables us to "see" why the action in question made sense in terms of the lived experience of the subject (as dealt with in chapter two). It is in terms of this fundamental goal that we evaluate the need for theory and the possibility of theory in the interpretive disciplines. The claim being made by Collin is therefore that interpretations, or more correctly systems of interpretation, are better explanations to the extent that their theoretical content is greater.

One last point which we shall draw from Collin, before going on to fleshing out the scope of theory in the context of the analysis of Freud given in chapter three, concerns the question of causal relations in interpretive explanations. Now the question of the status of causal language in interpretive explanations has been a regular point of dispute between the hermeneutic/phenomenological and the critical schools in psychology and related studies. On the one hand the hermeneutically inclined have argued that to utilize causal explanations in psychology is to concede that the nature of human existence is equivalent to that of the

objects of the natural world, and, they have argued, we know this to be false. Psychology should thus utilize forms of explanation consistent with a thorough-going analysis of human existence as it is given (e.g. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein). In any case, they would argue, the very notion of causality makes no sense in the context of human existence (Merleau-Ponty). On the other hand the critical school, for a variety of reasons which we shall not go into here (some were dealt with in chapter three), wish to employ some hybrid of causal and interpretive approaches. Such amalgams have, in our opinion, not been particularly successful, and they have certainly had very little affect on psychological research practice. But we wish here nevertheless to advance some notion of a role for causality in an interpretive psychology, in such a way that does no violence to the basic Daseinsanalytical conception of human being.

It is clear that a certain tension exists in interpretive explanation around the notion of causality. On the one hand causal explanation seems to contradict the basic anthropological assumptions of this approach. On the other hand there are number of ways in which some use of the language of causality seems natural and necessary, and is common in so-called "common-sense" explanations. Let us consider some instances:

1) "His problems in dealing with authority figures were caused by his early relationship with his father";

2) "The high rate of suicide amongst Japanese is caused

by the intense competitiveness in that society";

3) "She acted in such an aggressive manner because she feels insecure in such situations".

Since interpretive approaches must take common-sense explanations seriously, we need to look at how we can make sense of such explanations within a framework based on a Daseinsanalytic anthropology and interpretive methodology. I will argue that in all three of the instances cited above there is a significant use of "cause" which can be appropriated within such a framework. One should note here that not all common-language uses of "cause" are significant for our purposes: sometimes "cause" is used in a straightforward purposive sense (e.g. "he cheated because he wanted to win" explains simply by citing the intention or purpose of the act), and at other times the use of "cause" is the result of an illegitimate natural-scientific metaphor. However I believe that the above examples are significant and cannot be lightly dismissed as linguistic abberations.

In order to deal with them we need to examine a distinction drawn by Collin between full-blown causal explanations, on the one hand, and causal ties within interpretive explanation, on the other. For Collin, causal explanation is a type of explanation typical to the natural sciences and it has its own logic and associated methodologies. Crucial to this is that the entire explanatory force of a causal

explanation lies in the causal links which it draws:

> When we refer to something as a causal explanation, we are not merely saying that it is an explanation and that it involves causation: we are saying that it is explanation by causation, that it is precisely the demonstration of a causal tie that delivers the explanatory power, and further, that this is the sole source of such power.
>
> (Collin, p.108)

Distinct from this is interpretive explanation, whose logic and associated methodologies we have discussed earlier in this essay. Collin wishes to assert that, although our explanations of human actions and experience are interpretive, this does not rule out the use of causal ties within such explanation. Accordingly the occurence of causal ties in a particular explanation does not as such prevent the explanation from being of the type of interpretive understanding. What is decisive in this regard is the source from which the explanatory force of the explanation derives, and we would suggest in this regard the following: that an explanation involving causal ties can be consistent with the phenomenological-hermeneutic viewpoint as long as the causal aspects are not ends in themselves but are in the service of understanding, or, we might say, are subordinated to understanding. To make sense of this we must deal with one last clarificatory point. It is clear that if the notion of a cause is restricted to that of sufficient cause then our formulation encounters problems, for if the cause is a sufficient condition then any other explanation is redundant. We also find ourselves tied to precisely that form of psychological determinism which is incompatible with any phenomenological-existential

anthropology. However we believe, with Collin, that such a notion of causation is specific to the requirements of causal explanation proper (such as predictive efficiency). In common-sense explanations, and, we would argue, in interpretive explanations, the notion of cause needed is one closer to a necessary condition than a sufficient condition. Collin suggests the following formulation:

> The condition cited in the explanans must not only be necessary for the explanandum to occur, but must be one which makes the difference between the actual course of events and some, normally implicit, contrast case.
>
> (Collin, p.121)

With this notion of causality and of causal explanation it seems to me that we can clarify our common-sense references to causality in human existence and show how causal ties can be incorporated in an interpretive approach. We can offer, for example, the following glosses on the instances cited earlier:

1) Early experiences stand in a causal relationship to the structures and meanings of the adult's world. The way in which authority figures appear to the person in question is a causal result of that person's previous experience, in the sense of necessary and significant. But the earlier experiences are not the beginnings of causal chains which causally explain later actions. Rather, in investigating them and their effects on the person's lived-world, we improve our understanding of the actions of that person. This is the explanatory force involved. We wish to argue that it is correct to describe the relations in question as

causal, but we would maintain with Collin that this is not in conflict with the overall explanation which is by interpretive understanding.

2) Again, the social structure and value system of Japanese society is a necessary condition without which the suicide rate would not stand as it does. But an individual suicide is not explained causally by reference to the social conditions, but by understanding the existence of the person concerned.

3) Claiming a causal tie between feelings of inferiority and certain actions is somewhat different to the causal claims outlined in the two previous instances. Here the notion of inferiority (or of an inferiority complex) is theoretical in the pure sense of organizing and integrating a number of different interpretations of that person's existence. We maintain here that it is correct to speak of a causal tie, although only in the sense that the set of relationships interpreted as her "inferiority complex" is the set relevant to understanding, or making sense of, her actions. Again this is an example of causal ties employed in the service of understanding.

The notions of theory and of the possibility of causal ties which we have introduced are crucial to the development of the interpretive understanding approach in psychology, for reasons which have been alluded to but will be dealt with systematically in the following chapter. We will now move on, in the second part of this chapter, to look at the

implications of these ideas in a more concrete context, namely in the context of our reading of psychoanalysis.

4.2 The Concept of Theory in the Context of Freudian Psychoanalysis

In this section we will investigate a number of aspects of psychoanalysis read as an interpretive discipline, and we will claim that several distinctive features of psychoanalysis, including the use of causal-explanatory language, can be understood in terms of the concept of theory developed above, in a way which is entirely compatible with the real potential of Daseinsanalytical anthropology and interpretive methodology. We are not claiming here that the language of psychoanalysis is correct as it stands. For the most part it presents an illegitimate natural-scientific model of human existence. But what we will argue is that the successes of psychoanalysis were due to the combination of interpretive aspects and theoretical aspects, and that other interpretive psychologies can learn from this. We wish to argue that the correct understanding of theory in interpretive psychologies is that of integrative and organizing concepts utilized in the service of interpretive explanation, and including the possibility of causal ties subordinated to interpretive understanding. Psychoanalysis provides, we believe, an important example of such an approach, although in a distorted fashion. We hope in the remainder of this chapter to show how the notion of

theory outlined in 4.1 above provides a useful key to an understanding of the psychoanalytic approach.

We will take as our starting point a standard "critical" analysis of psychoanalysis, and show how our proposal differs. Let us begin, then, by considering Radnitsky's outline of what he calls the "psychoanalytic growth of knowledge":

1) The initial stage is a hermeneutic one, where understanding is achieved through what Radnitsky refers to as "good reason assays". We can also call this the stage of rational understanding, or the dialogical stage.

2) There are two cases in which the dialogical stage has to be abandoned:

a)For the purposes of checking any hypotheses arrived at in the first stage;

b)Where the attempt at rational understanding breaks down.

In the case of (b), Radnitsky believes that there is need for recourse to a quasi-naturalistic level:"the hermeneutic dialogue is temporarily, (and sometimes only partially), interrupted in favour of naturalistic methods of enquiry - a temporary distantiation and objectification" (Radnitsky, p. 44). Radnitsky refers to this recourse to the quasi-naturalistic as a "tacking", i.e. a sidewards move in order the better to move forward (towards understanding).

3) The return to the hermeneutic level takes place, not directly, but via "historical explanation". We will return

to this concept shortly. Here we give only Radnitsky's description:

> General hypotheses derived from psychoanalytic theory, idiodynamic laws, and singular hypotheses describing the analysands "antecedent conditions" in terms of the language of the naturalistic approach are utilized to produce the explanans. The explanandum is a singular hypothesis about the analysand...we call this explanatory pattern a "historical explanation" because the explanandum is a singular sentence and because it is a "good-reason explanation"....
>
> (Radnitsky, p.67)

Radnitsky has in the above process singled out a number of aspects of the psychoanalytic approach which we believe to be crucial for the development of a theoretically capable interpretive psychology. We will begin therefore by examining the above outline, highlighting the crucial points, and, most importantly, revising certain aspects which we find unacceptable and which hinder the appropriation of the important ideas by interpretive psychology.

For Radnitsky the dialogical framework is primary. It is the starting point and it is the point to which the explanation must return. This mirrors our emphasis on the centrality of interpretive understanding in interpretive psychology. However it must be made clear that for us it is not a question of a merger of interpretive and naturalistic methodologies, even if the centrality of the former is stressed. This is where our position differs from the critical theorists such as Habermas and de Boer, as well as Ricoeur in some of his writings. Explanation in the

interpretive disciplines is based on interpretive understanding, and we have argued that theory and reference to causal ties are compatible with, and can be contained within, such an approach. Both theory and causality are used in senses founded in the legitimate practice of interpretive psychology, and are compatible with the basic tenets of Daseinsanalytical anthropology.

A crucial distinction between our position and that of Radnitsky arises in the matter of the recourse to the "quasi-naturalistic" phase. We reject here both the contention that such a phase is based on some ontological foundation (i.e. on the ways in which human beings are like the objects of the natural sciences), and the contention that the methodological shift can be described as one in which "part of the meta-science of the natural sciences becomes applicable"(Radnitsky,p.45). What does become applicable, and what has always been applicable, is the methodology of rational enquiry, or to put it another way, the quest for additional problem-solving resources in a particular discipline. And here we wish to assert most fundamentally that the approach of interpretive understanding should not be restricted to direct methods (i.e. methods in which the lived experience of the subject is directly consulted, or as directly as the human condition makes possible). To say that the structures and meanings of the subject's world, and the relations in which the subject stands to that world, are our prime concern, is not to limit

our methodology to the direct description of that world. Let us consider again the question of the relation between early childhood experiences and features of adult existence. How does the interpretive oriented psychologist approach such questions? In our opinion, as discussed above, it is perfectly correct to speak of causal ties in this connection, provided we understand this in the sense of the notion of causality discussed above, and we understand the causal tie as being between the life-historical event (i.e. the event as experienced) and the relevant structures and meanings in the person's lived-world. Understanding how her life-history has shaped her world enables us to make sense of hitherto senseless actions. This is one example of how causal ties and Daseinsanalytical anthropology are compatible: the invocation of the causal ties poses no threat to the anthropology. The point is, however, that many of the questions which arise out of our reflection on ourselves and our societies, require precisely the type of investigation which cannot be carried out in a "direct" interpretive way. These questions are often posed in a causal language:"what are the effects of parenting style X?", "what are factors influencing resistance to social change?", "what are the psychological effects of military service?", etc. Phenomenologically oriented psychologists cannot afford to ignore such questions. They do so to the detriment both of their own approach to psychology, as well as the quality and truth of the research in question. What Radnitsky and the critical psychologists refer to as

"recourse to the quasi-natural" is nothing but the crucial step required of interpretive psychology, namely that it avails itself of all the methods of research required to answer the burning questions facing us today. We assert that the range of available methods consistent with an interpretive approach is larger than commonly supposed, and certainly larger than is commonly utilized. These methods provide necessary resources without which the interpretive psychologist is heavily restricted.

Another crucial distinction lies in the function of theory. The approaches of Radnitsky and others who have asserted the need for natural-scientific phases in interpretive methodology are mistaken, not only for the reasons outlined above, but because they exclude from their model the crucial role of theory in guiding, initiating and organizing research. Thus theory, although grounded in interpretive methodology, is not just a "phase" in interpretive research, preceded and succeeded by pure interpretive methods. Research at its best is a problem-solving activity, where the questions are posed by theoretical reflection. In the previous chapter, for example, we saw how the quantitative hypothesis and the principle of constancy, although heavily imbued with natural-scientific pre-conceptions and initially part of an entirely non-interpretive system, are the beginnings of what is essentially a theoretical framework which guides Freud's researches and suggests hypotheses and interpretations.

Our position suggests an important re-interpretation of the mixed discourse seen by Ricoeur as essential to Freudianism. For us the mixed discourse was "necessary" only insofar as it served as a vehicle for the construction of theory in psychoanalysis. We see psychoanalysis, with Ricoeur, as fundamentally a hermeneutic discipline, concerned in the final analysis with providing interpretations of existence at that time. And it is, of course, the significance and truth of these interpretations which is the ultimate test of any psychoanalytic hypothesis. But we would argue that the scientistic framework which Freud used enabled psychoanalysis to be characterized by a high degree of systematization and abstraction, and that this contributed significantly to the growth of psychoanalysis, and its importance as a field of knowledge. At the same time, of course, the natural-scientific cloak distorted the real essence of psychoanalysis and set the stage for much of the perverse debate about psychoanalysis as a science. Nevertheless the access to systematization and integration provided by the mixed discourse is, in our opinion, precisely the source of its importance. For Ricoeur "the idea of 'belonging to a system'...is the true psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious" (Ricoeur,1970, p.119). Now with Freud the "system" was of course interpreted as a causal system in the natural-scientific mode, and thus "belonging to a system" seemed to place the unconscious beyond interpretation. But since, as was seen in our reading of

Freud, Freud's analyses, apart from in the Project, were always intimately linked to questions of interpretation, we would do far better in attempting to understand Freudian psychoanalysis if we investigate how the "system" was able to contribute to understanding. It is our claim that the notion of theory developed above makes this possible.

Freud's investigations were precisely investigations into the meanings and structures of existence in his time. He developed a number of theoretical hypotheses which guided his interpretations, and the significance of all these can be couched in terms acceptable to the interpretive psychologist: the distortion of existence caused by the Victorian repression of the sexual; hypotheses concerning the relation of childhood experiences to adult existence, and the massive significance of these; as well as more general claims such as that of the centrality of conflict in human existence. Although these can be phrased in interpretive terms, and although it is crucial not to base them in a natural-scientific context, it is at the same time important to recognize their legitimacy as theoretical claims, since this is precisely where their significance lies. They must be allowed to be investigated in indirect ways (e.g. life-history studies, social-psychological analyses), and to function in theoretical roles: suggesting interpretations, guiding research, integrating diverse studies, etc.

Such a theoretical interpretation of Freud enables us to meet many of the challenges posed by the psychoanalytic approach for interpretive psychology. In particular we can attempt to meet the three challenges seen as crucial by Ricoeur and discussed above in 3.2. These were, firstly, the psychoanalytic de-centering of meaning away from consciousness and towards desire; secondly, the indirect psychoanalytic method for tracing the history of desire and exposing its disguises; and, thirdly, the psychoanalytic "humiliation" of reflective philosophy. For us the key issue here is that the indirect method, using theory and the notion of causality outlined above, is perfectly compatible with interpretive psychology. With these tools we can construct social and developmental psychologies which meet the essence of the challenges listed here. While an interpretive psychology cannot, and should not, accommodate radical versions of the de-centering thesis (we must remain within a Daseinsanalytically acceptable anthropology), the appropriation of theory allows the vigorous investigation of various "centers of meaning" in human existence, such as desire, but also other developmentally and socially structured aspects of human existence. The manner in which theory allows an adequate response to the challenges is not through legitimating Freud's anthropological prejudices, but rather through making possible the systematic and rigorous investigation of those aspects of human existence which make Freud's deterministic and objectivistic approach psychologically relevant. By providing interpretive

methodology with the resources to investigate social and life-historical unfreedom, instances of self-delusion (bad faith, false consciousness, etc), and other such psychological topics, we allow it to meet these challenges in the most important way possible: by demonstrating an ability to investigate those areas which have traditionally seemed to lie beyond interpretive approaches. Thus while we refuse ontological or anthropological solutions to the challenges posed, we believe that a theoretically able interpretive psychology can effectively remove the sting from such criticisms through the type and quality of research which it generates.

We need to look briefly at the exact way in which the theoretical aspect translates into understanding. This is in our opinion generally a weakness in those approaches which suggest some sort of hybrid of interpretive understanding and causal explanation, where the exact nature of the mediation is hidden under some hypothetical "abstract human interest" such as Habermas' "interest in emancipation". We see no need for such moves, precisely because our definitions of the theoretical and of causality were such as to make them consistent with explanation by understanding. For example, the theoretical hypotheses which were ascribed to Freud earlier (concerning sexuality, early experiences, etc), play their theoretical role by suggesting interpretations, and are in no way on a seperate level which has to be linked to understanding. This follows

strictly from Collin's notion of the theoretical as being a dimension of interpretive explanation, and thus on a continuum with specific interpetations.

More problematic is the case where the theory involves causal language. In Radnitsky's version the link between the causal-explanatory and the dialogical phases is the process of "historical explanation", but his definition of this seems grossly inadequate. For Radnitsky it is essentially a process of applying general laws, hypotheses, etc, to a specific case with specific "antecedent conditions" where the result is a singular claim and in addition is a "good-reason explanation". Now Radnitsky is accounting for the fact that the type of explanation required is idiographic and not general, but although this is true it is trivial. No scientist, natural or human, would want to deny the need for an idiographic phase: all sciences require this. What must be explained, however, is how the causal links contribute to understanding. For Radnitsky this seems to lie in the dynamics of the therapeutic situation. Even if this was true, it would only be generalizable to other areas of psychology if they were grounded in the therapeutic situation (e.g. if they were informed by the logic of the "interest in emancipation"). However, such a move is not necessary. The causal links which we are proposing hold between any of a number of antecedents (such as life-historical events, early experiences, social institutions, changes in the lived-body

such as in adolescence), and the structures and meanings of the subject's world. With such knowledge we can understand a particular action or aspect of an individual existence, and we can see why it was to be expected. By freeing ourselves from the notion of cause as sufficient condition, we can speak of causal links in a way which is natural and useful, without committing ourselves to causal explanation and objectivistic and deterministic anthropologies.

Our definitions of theory and of causality have allowed us to present an analysis of Freudian psychoanalysis which has, we believe, a number of crucial advantages:

1) It accepts a reading of psychoanalysis as an interpretive psychology without any natural-scientific appendages;

2) In addition to this it provides an explanation of Freud's "mixed discourse" which indicates how such discourse could contribute to interpretation, without postulating any corresponding "mixed ontologies" or "mixed methodologies";

3) The methodological principles developed (the importance of theory, the possibility of causal language) are transferable to other aspects of interpretive psychology and are not dependent on some special feature of the psychoanalytic situation.

We hope then in this chapter to have outlined an approach to theory and causality which is entirely consistent with the logic of interpretive understanding. We hope further to have provided some justification of this in the context of

psychoanalysis, where the justification stems both from, on the one hand, concretizing some of the definitions and concepts introduced, and illustrating how they would work in practice, and, on the other, providing an accurate and fruitful analysis of Freudian psychoanalysis. In the following chapter we will continue this process by looking at the implications of the "theoretical turn" for interpretive psychology in general.

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5. THE ROLE OF THEORY IN AN INTERPRETIVE PSYCHOLOGY

The idea of the theoretical developed and illustrated in the previous chapter has a number of implications for the development of what we have called interpretive psychology. The central point of this essay is that an interpretive psychology need not restrict itself to direct interpretation of existence, but may utilize various indirect resources which are crucial to its success. For a variety of reasons approaches to psychology in the interpretive tradition have tended to focus on only one or at most a few forms of enquiry. This has already become evident even in the so-called hermeneutic turn in phenomenological psychology. Instead of the turn opening up resources for phenomenological psychology, it is often interpreted in a narrow linguistic way. Consider for example Titelman's paper,"Some Implications of Ricoeur's Conception of Hermeneutics for Phenomenological Psychology", based on Ricoeur's seminal "The Model of the Text", which is concerned with extending aspects of the analysis of texts to the analysis of action. Titelman concludes that the significant implications are largely to the effect that the method of analyzing protocols (written descriptions of experience) is the method of choice for a hermeneutically-orientated phenomenological psychology, seeing "the hermeneutic field - written discourse - as the medium par excellence for investigations in a psychology that seeks to be phenomenological"(Titelman, p.191). This is an absurdly

limited conclusion, and illustrates perfectly the inability to see the scope for new methods in the resources of the hermeneutic turn.

But for us the value of the turn towards other methodological paths in the interpretive approaches is crucial. Most specifically it is the use of theory, as discussed in the previous chapter, as the most significant aspect of the use of indirect methods, which has the most potential for the development of a vigorous and comprehensive interpretive psychology. The possibility of an interpretive psychology which can draw on theory and incorporate theoretical concepts is vitally important if we wish to develop a rigorous psychology with a methodology which is not just a copy of natural-scientific methodology. In opposing the latter, various humanistic psychologies have also thrown out the potential for theory-construction in their disciplines, associating theory with the causal-mechanistic explanation of the natural sciences. But we can also have theory in the service of interpretive understanding. Admittedly where this has occured it has usually been in the form of mixed discourse with little or no methodological integration. Much writing in the psychoanalytic school has utilized this duality: the goal of the work is clearly understanding, and not causal explanation, but such explanatory concepts and methods are used throughout. These works are, like Freud's, important and interesting, but they tend to fragment when subjected to

close methodological scrutiny. Are all their propositions testable? No. Are all their concepts phenomenologically grounded? No, again. They are then reduced by doctrinaire methodologists to one of the two sides of the motive/cause duality.

But Ricoeur has shown that this may well destroy the essence of the approach, and we have attempted to develop concepts of theory and of causality which are consistent with the methodological tenets of interpretive understanding. We thus have the possibility of an interpretive psychology which subjects itself ultimately, but not immediately and naively, to the test of phenomenological validity, but which is sufficiently indirect to allow, en route, the utilization of a variety of theoretical constructs. The advantages of the introduction of theory into an interpretive approach have been to some extent illustrated with regard to psychoanalysis. We will now examine these advantages with respect to psychology in general. The following seem to be the most important consequences.

1. Perhaps most importantly, it allows the development of a body of theory which guides future research programmes, and directs researchers to points of theoretical importance. The philosophy of science has shown conclusively that science does not operate in a quasi-inductive way, gathering data which it eventually formulates into laws. Instead for the most part of the course of "normal" science, there is a

body of theory which directs the research programme. The theory need not be homogenous, but it must exist. We believe that this applies not only to the sciences but to any discipline which seeks to contribute to the growth of knowledge, and this is surely a requirement of any approach to psychology. One would like to say that if a discipline expects aspirant researchers simply to pick out interesting topics and then seek merely to describe them as accurately as possible, that discipline will not flourish. So if phenomenological psychology, in making use of all the possibilities of the hermeneutic turn, develops a significant theoretical component, we can expect a more vigorous and integrated body of research. Research will be guided not only to points of general concern, or of practical concern, but also to points of theoretical concern. It is precisely the creation of theoretical problematics which allows the development of a systematic and rigorous body of knowledge in any field, including psychology.

2. The theoretical component makes possible an enriching dialogue with other approaches and with other, related, disciplines. Firstly, with regard to other approaches within psychology, we note that there are a multitude of various theories, constructed in accordance with various methodological and anthropological presuppositions. We see no reason why many of these cannot be suitably re-formulated and adopted,or at least

investigated, by hermeneutically orientated psychologists. Their contribution to our interpretive understanding of human existence would be the unifying factor, and would be the criterion by which they could stand or fall, or at least be meaningfully compared. Thus I would suggest here that such a desired unification of theory could take place only within a interpretive approach, but in order for such an approach to carry out this role, it would have to have available to it a suitable and valid conception of theory.

A pertinent example here would be in the field of developmental psychology, where various stage theories, such as those of Erikson and Freud, are easily incorporated within a theoretical - interpretive approach. Competing theories would be evaluated in terms of their contribution to our understanding of the child's existence, as it reveals itself in a variety of ways. Interpretations suggested by the theories could be checked through self-reports, subsequent behaviour, therapeutic interaction, and other relevant ways. But unless the various specific interpretations and localized theories are organized systematically, progress towards a generally accepted theory will be haphazard and slow. Here we see clearly the two poles of our theoretical - interpretive method: on the one hand an insistence on interpretive understanding as the only fundamental validator of interpretations and hypotheses, and on the other the importance of a developed theoretical aspect as a crucial ingredient of the method.

Similar points arise in the question of the relation between an interpretive psychology and related fields such as sociology, anthropology, etc. These fields are all theoretical in one way or another, and thus to dialogue with them, as is surely desirable, interpretive psychology must possess an understanding of theory which will allow it to relate to, for example, sociological theory, without the fear of the individual and of methodological individualism (necessary for psychology) being dissolved into social theory. We believe the notion of theory developed earlier would enable one at least to begin this process, a process already well under way in, for example, Giddens' work on structuration theory. This attempts to develop a general theory of the relation between social structure and individual action, and seems to me to preserve most of what an interpretive psychology would wish to preserve in terms of anthropology and methodology (see for example Giddens, 1979, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis).

3. The theoretical component is clearly indispensable for the development of adequate interpretive developmental and social psychologies. We have seen that interpretive psychology is, in a certain fundamental sense, tied to the individual and to the present: it holds that the actions (and existence in general) of a person can only be understood via an interpretation of that person's world, at

the moment of the action. Past events, and social structures, only influence current actions to the extent to which they have contributed to the structuring of that person's world. But there is no reason why an interpretive psychology cannot study that life-history, and the socio-culturally shaped aspects of that world. This much is generally recognized. But what is needed to develop an adequate psychology in the social and developmental fields is clearly a theoretically-informed interpretive psychology. These fields are explicitly indirect: although we end with concepts whose function is to deepen our understanding, we must proceed via the use of theories of social structure and models of development. Otherwise a phenomenological psychology in those fields will remain superficial and ultimately sterile. It is crucial therefore that interpretive psychology avail itself of the indirect methods required to investigate these important areas of psychology in an appropriate fashion. Here we believe that some suitable notion of causation is indispensable. To avoid such language would certainly be to hamstring one's investigations in an unfortunate and indeed unnatural way. We believe that the notion of causality developed earlier may show the way forward here.

4.<u>It reduces the extent of dependence on the self-perceptions of subjects, thus making a critical dimensional more likely</u>. We refer here to the necessary analysis of all those forces by which human existence is bound and

distorted, and which are not obvious to the self because they are part of the nature of the self (as structured by the lived-history of the person, especially early experiences), or else their existence is denied by the self. An interpretive psychology should not deny the need for such investigation, and it must therefore develop methods to carry out such investigations outside of the therapeutic situation, where the specific dynamics allow distinctive solutions to these problems. Theory is therefore important here. At the same time the use of theory should be understood in the context of interpretive explanation, and its use should not conceived in terms of the partial applicability of natural-scientific methodology.

5. A theoretical-interpretive psychology established along the lines suggested earlier would have available a range of resources to deal with the question of validity in interpretation. The question of validity has always vexed humanistically orientated psychologies: if a theory does not make measurable and testable predictions, then how can it ever be confirmed or rejected. If one recognizes that the theoretical aspects of an interpretive psychology are not as they would be in a natural science, but instead derive their functional status only from their role in the process of interpretation, then we see that the "testability" of interpretive theories will be by the standard of their success as interpretations. Here a second problem arises in the claim that one's choice of a particular

interpretative system is just a matter of subjective preference: a charge often levelled at humanistic psychologists. This criticism, however, has arisen largely because of the extent to which various phenomenological and other humanistic approaches have ignored the problem of interpretation, seeing their approach as essentially descriptive. But if the interpretive component is thematized as the methodological foundation of the approach, then that approach can draw on some very sophisticated methodological theory. This is because the question of the validity of interpretations, or of deciding between conflicting interpretations, has been subjected to lengthy analysis within the discipline of pure hermeneutics, that is, the interpretation of texts (originally religious texts). An interpretive psychology can draw on this tradition with regard to questions such as the degree of certainty of interpretation, the role of the intentions of the author/actor in determining the interpretation, the relative weight of internal coherence as opposed to depth of understanding achieved, and the interpretation of distorted or mutilated texts. Suffice to say for now that methodological rules exist which take the arbitration between rival interpretations beyond mere subjective caprice (see, e.g. Hirsch, 1974, Validity in Interpretation).

In addition the employment within an interpretive approach of a greater range of methods allows for what we can describe, following Radnitsky, as "checking". Apart from

the standard forms of hermeneutic validation mentioned above, hypotheses in interpretive psychology can be checked. Thus for example an interpretation of a particular action can be confirmed by an investigation of the life-history of the person in question. Similarly different interpretations may lead us to expect different outcomes in certain situations. Thus whichever outcome does emerge partially confirms one and disconfirms the other. The possibility of such checking should not be confused with the predictive method in the natural sciences. The method of checking cannot aspire to the certainty of the other method, nor should it, for we are not dealing with natural objects. But on the other hand the possibility of checking is real and necessary. There are regularities and consistencies in human existence, which is precisely why the results of the deductive-nomological approach in psychology are not entirely barren. But the important thing is to recognize that such regularities and consistencies are compatible with the potential of interpretive methodology and anthropology, and do not indicate a need for, nor the appropriateness of, natural scientific methodology. If this is done then the possibility of checking is a useful one for our approach.

In conclusion then, we have seen that what was necessary for a full phenomenological appropriation of Freud was a turn towards a properly interpretive approach. The resources which this turn made available, especially the loosening of

ties to immediate consciousness in favour of a more indirect method, thus establishing the possibility of theory construction, made possible the effective (i.e. theoretical) utilization of key psychoanalytic concepts, as well as freeing the potential of interpretive psychology for vigorous and systematic research in fields such as developmental and social psychology. This interpretive and theoretical turn, however, should not be seen as limited to the dialogue with psychoanalysis. Rather it is a method which, if thematically adopted, would benefit the development of the interpretive approach in all its areas of concern.

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