

TOWARDS A DEVELOPED REGIONAL ORDER:
WHICH WAY FORWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA?

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS
(INTERNATIONAL STUDIES)

BY: LESLEY BLAAUW

SUPERVISOR: DR. PAUL BISCHOFF

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS/INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

RHODES UNIVERSITY

JANUARY 1997

MAN IS NOT BORN TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD, BUT TO SEARCH FOR THE STARTING POINT OF THE PROBLEM AND REMAIN WITHIN THE LIMITS OF WHAT HE CAN COMPREHEND: NOT ONLY OF WHAT HE CAN COMPREHEND, BUT ALSO OF WHAT HE CAN ACCOMPLISH. (GOETHE)

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MY GRANDPARENTS -
ANDREW AND FRANSINA BLAAUW

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My search for an understanding of the regional integration process in Southern Africa was undertaken in the context of mutual exchange, interchange and support. Not surprisingly therefore, I had engagements, exchanges and encouragement from various people who share my interests in the region. With this in mind, I firstly wish to thank Professor André du Pisani for allowing me to attend a conference on regional integration in Southern Africa in Zimbabwe in 1994. This conference stimulated my interests in the Southern African region. William Latimer and Louise Vincent also deserve a word of thanks for their insightful contributions and comments to the research proposal of this thesis. I also wish to express my utmost gratitude to Dr. Rok Ajulu who added sober realism to my viewpoints about international relations in general, and African international relations in particular.

Michael Thekiso whose computer I have used for typing this thesis also deserves a word of thanks and appreciation. A special word of thanks goes to my supervisor Dr. Paul Bischoff under whose supervision and guidance I have suffered with great joy. His encouragement, insight, kindness and patience, provided me with the much needed source of inspiration. To my family whose belief in my abilities at times defies my own self-comprehension, I remain immeasurably thankful. Lastly, to my friends who liberated my existence, when frustration and feelings of hopelessness resulted in momentarily sadness, I remain eternally grateful.

The financial assistance of the Centre for Science development (HSRC, South Africa) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the Centre for Science Development.

ABSTRACT

The regionalisation of politics on a global scale, can be seen as one of the defining features of contemporary international relations. Given this phenomenon, the tasks which confronted this thesis, was to consider the conditions and requirements necessary within the Southern African region to build an all-embracing developed regional order. The urgency with which the latter task should be undertaken, is premised on an increased realisation that the region, and indeed the continent as a whole, are becoming of lesser significance in international affairs. However, a number of impediments will have to be overcome, before the goal of a developed regional order can be achieved, which will contribute to lasting security in the region.

Foremost amongst many issues, is how to employ the approaches to integration, in attempting to explain how the goal of a developed order should be achieved. A second problem which this thesis was confronted with, relates to which organisation should be considered the best vehicle to drive the integration process forward- COMESA, SACU or SADC. The decision to take SADC as the organisation to drive the integration process forward, is premised on a number of factors. Amongst many, it qualifies in geographical terms as a region, the historical linkages of the countries of the region (based on their fight against apartheid, division of labour, etc.), serves as a basis for building a sense of community. Thirdly its institutions can be developed to achieve the goal of an all-embracing regional order. Lastly and most importantly, SADC realises that regional integration will remain unattainable without the involvement of the peoples of Southern Africa.

The identification of the organisation to drive the integration process forward, serves to bolster moves towards a maximalist order. However, significant changes in the structure and institutions of SADC is necessary, before it can be considered an all-embracing and developed regional order. Not surprisingly, therefore, we have witness a number of institutional changes to the SADC structures. Amongst many, the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security , the signing of the SADC Trade Facilitation Protocol, and the commitment to democracy and a human rights culture, are most significant and will, it is hoped, provide the

building-blocks for deeper integration in Southern Africa.

Apart from the above, which occur between and among the states of the region, steps are underway between and among the agents of civil society to work closely with each other, to establish a regional civil society. Most notably, the establishment of a media society for Southern Africa, the calls by COSATU for a Social Charter with a regional flavour, the establishment of environmental and human rights networks, and the support for the Gay and Lesbian Movement of Zimbabwe (GALZ), represent landmarks, in the search for a developed regional order.

However, the reluctance of the governments of the Southern African countries, to consult with the NGOs, before the adoption of the Organ Politics, clearly bears testimony to their present inability to take the necessary steps needed to move from a minimalist to a maximalist conception of regional organisation. The suggestion of this thesis is that the move-away from minimalism to maximalism can be facilitated by the development of a political centre around which both governments and NGO activities can be articulated, since both are primarily concerned with the security and welfare of the Southern African region.

Table of Contents

<i>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>ABSTRACT</i>	<i>v</i>
CHAPTER 1	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Conceptual Clarifications: Integration, Co-operation, Co-ordination and Civil Society	4
CHAPTER 2	7
2. INTEGRATION AND INTEGRATION THEORY	7
2.1 Introduction	7
2.2 Neo-Functionalist Theory	11
2.3 Transactionalist	13
2.4 Conclusion	16
CHAPTER 3	20
3. FROM PARIAH TO PARTICIPANT: WHAT ROLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA'S REGIONAL INTEGRATION?	20
3.1 Introduction	20
3.2 A Brief Historical Overview: Apartheid South Africa's Foreign Policy	21
3.3 Some Moribund Symptoms	24
3.4 The Maximalist Position	25
3.5 Conclusion	29

CHAPTER 4	32
4. INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS: <i>SACU, COMESA, AND SADC- AN ENQUIRY</i>	32
4.1 Introduction	32
4.2 The Southern African Customs Union- SACU	33
4.3 The common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	37
4.4 The Southern Africa Development Community-(SADC)	41
4.5 Conclusion	44
CHAPTER 5	48
5. TOWARD A DEVELOPED REGIONAL ORDER: THE WAY FORWARD	48
5.1 Introduction	48
5.2 institutional Evolution within SADC	49
5.3 informal Confidence-Building: People-to-People Relations	54
5.4 Conclusion	57
CHAPTER 6	59
6. CONCLUSION	59
CHAPTER 7	62
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	62
7.1 Books	62
7.2 Articles and Journals	67
7.3 Other Sources	71

CHAPTER 1

“ The community we are trying to build will only succeed if it finds its life and sustenance from the direct involvement of the region’s citizens and their institutions...” (Ketumile Masire)

1.1 Introduction

Contemporary international economic relations are characterised by two trends. On the one hand we are witnessing ever-increasing global integration, while at the same time there are efforts made towards building regional organisations and strengthening regional ties. The move towards globalisation is underpinned by the inescapability of multilateral trade liberalisation which saw the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 1 January 1995, after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Regional integration is reflected in moves towards a more integrated European Union (EU), the formation of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Furthermore, in Southern Africa¹, in the 1990’s, the formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to substitute the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), the establishment of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in place of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), and the restructuring of the Southern African Custom Union (SACU), bears testimony to the realisation that- even if only for sound economic reasons - a need for more regional co-operation and more developed forms of regional integration exists.

One central issue on the political level implicit in the current discussions about regional integration in Southern Africa, has to do with the possible contribution of South Africa to

¹ Southern Africa can be considered a region or sub-continent by virtue of it being a large geographical or politically independent part of a continent.

regional integration. On the economic level, the debate about South Africa's role is underpinned by two points of view towards regional co-operation- a minimalist and maximalist one. The former is premised on the assertion that the domestic imperatives of reconstruction and development should first and foremost supersede all regional development plans (Marais M. 1994:30; Mills G et al. 1994:231). Mills further contends that South Africa should solve her own economic problems since resource limitations do not allow the Republic to engage in costly regional enterprises (Mills in Mills et al, 1994:231). Dot Keet on the other hand, argues that such an approach to South Africa regional role is at best limited, and at worst disastrous. She contends that the development strategy of the Republic should be based "... upon a combined and balanced development of all the countries of the region." (1993:5) Moreover, civil society in South Africa can also play a considerable role in developing a political framework which provides for people-to-people co-operation at a regional level. The evolution of this framework will be instrumental in deciding the role to be played by South Africa in the search for a developed regional order².

Given the fact that the region not only has a shared history, but also shares regional economic infrastructure and common problems facing it, another source of regional order (security) are economic, social and political activities across the regions borders. Although the definition of regional organisation still refers, ostensibly, to inter-governmental relations, this thesis contends that the logic which underpins this narrow conception, is no longer sustainable, and hence the definition of regional organisation should be broadened. As a consequence, regional security, regional order, and regional organisation should revolve around (1) governments getting together (2) NGOs congregating (3) governments and NGOs finding each other to resolve issues around a regional centre, which will allow NGOs to constitute a regional civil society as

²Whilst there is a realisation that South Africa alone cannot sustain a regional order-other states and non-state actors in Southern Africa are needed the "democratic spirit" unleashed by the democratic election in South Africa has generated new sensitivity, which can be witnessed in the involvement of business, government of civil society and other agents defining their own agendas for the Southern Africa region. This thesis contends that the involvement of agents of civil society in defining the regional agenda, like COSATU in South Africa, will be critical in the determining the sustainability of a future regional order based on equity.

arguably is happening in the European Union (Willets. P, 1982).

However, an impediment to the achievement of the above-outlined goals, has to do with the current state of regional organisation in Southern Africa. The current state of regional organisation is not only characterised by an almost exclusive involvement of governments in this process, which consequently means that non-state actors are not accorded a sufficient role in the integrative process, it is further characterised by the existence of three regional organisations with divergent views on regional order and development. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) believes, *inter alia*, that regional improvements in infrastructure are necessary to encourage exchange within and beyond the region. However, recently SADC shows an increased preoccupation with establishing an all-embracing security regime. Moreover, as Maphanyane (1994) points out, there also seems to be a realisation that regional integration will remain a “distant dream” without the involvement of the people of the Southern African region. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), seeks to encourage free trade within Eastern and Southern Africa, whilst the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), is based on the maintenance of a regional tariff structure.

The notion of regional organisation needs to take account of integration theory. So far the discussion around regional integration has taken little notice of a body of thought in international relations literature termed integration theory: notably, neo-functionalism and transactionalism. The neo-functionalist approach argues that with regional organisation “... politically significant elites (governmental and non-governmental) gradually... redefine... their interest in terms of a regional rather than purely national orientation.” (Hodges in Taylor; 1978:245; see also E Haas 1964 and 1976) The transactionalist approach seeks to probe “... what characteristics distinguish an organised and interdependent community from a random grouping of individuals, and what conditions are necessary to promote and maintain a sense of community among the population of a given region.” (ibid. p243; see also Keohane and Nye 1989; and Williams A. 1994) This sense of community as a key to driving the process of integration, requires the evolution of a regional civil society.

Given these theoretical approaches concern about ascertaining indicators for forms of

integration which incorporate the notion of community, this thesis will try to establish that these, based on common regional needs exist, and are necessary for the development of a full regional order. Following from this it will seek to demonstrate that the preconditions for regional integration are present. As such, this thesis will ascertain which organisation can be considered the best vehicle to drive the integration process forward, and is needed for the goals of achieving developed integration, and attempts to provide for deeper economic co-operation and integration (Maphanyane M. 1994:153).

With a view to achieve the above outlined goal, the status of all regional organisation and actors in it (e.g. SACU, SADC and COMESA) need to be assess (Ofstad in Oden B, 1993:210). Suggestions on a change of the structures to incorporate a higher level of participation which embraces a regional civil society in order to accommodate regional development, will be made. This stems from a realisation that civil society has played a minor role in the decision-making process regarding regional integration in Southern Africa, but has an important contribution to make.

1.2 Conceptual Clarifications: Integration, Co-operation, Co-ordination and Civil Society

The debate about the future of Southern Africa would be incomplete without proper conceptual clarification. It is essential at the outset, to clarify the concepts of integration, co-operation and co-ordination. Furthermore, an understanding of the concept civil society is necessary, albeit the definition refers to a national rather than a regional society. Defining the different terminologies are necessary, because the concepts integration, co-operation and co-ordination have often been used loosely and interchangeably in the Southern African debate (Davies, 1994:11-12)

Robert Davies defines economic integration- the prime purpose of regional integration as "... referring to a process in which the economies of individual states are merged (in whole or in

part) into a single regional entity.” It also “... refers to process in which a distinct entity- a regional economy or a regional market comes into existence and/or in which individual countries are drawn into it.” (1992:2; 1994:12) He goes on to argue that economic co-operation refers

“... to a range of situations in which individual states act together for mutual benefit... It includes... situations in which individual states share or make available to each other resources, technology or expertise, collaborate in joint projects or act together in external economic relations. Such co-operation... Davies points out... may or may not be undertaken with the aim of promoting economic integration.” (1992:2-3; 1994:12) Co-ordination differs notably from integration and co-operation in the sense that it “... refers to cases where policies, strategies or regulations are harmonised to bring them into line with those of partners, again in situations where this is seen to be of mutual benefit.” (Davies, R. 1994:12)

It is important to note, that economic integration should also be talked about in the context of political and social integration, rather than in purely economic terms. This is crucial since integration can historically only be measured by assessing the interplay among economic, social and political factors which contribute to establishing a transnational community that provides for people-to-people relations. Hence, economic, political and social factors are necessary to accomplish a deepening of a regional identity

The concept of civil society derives its intellectual credibility principally from Antonio Gramsci. It is well known that there are a myriad of definitions of civil society which are

sometimes used in an ambiguous manner by all, including Gramsci³. For the purpose of this thesis civil society is said to mean the: "... framework within which those without political authority live their lives- economic relationships, family and kinship structures, religious institutions and so on." (Robertson, D. 1992:69; see also Bayart in Chabal, P. 1986:111-116)

In the context of regional integration, civil society would include those within the wider Southern African community who relate across borders without access to political authority. These include amongst others, trade unions, churches, pressure groups. Hence, in conceptualising a regional civil society, we will have to broaden the concept of a civil society to extend beyond this narrow and national conception. The contention of this thesis is that a regional civil society in Southern Africa, can only come about through new ways of looking at integration theory.

³ Most definitions distinguish between state and society. However the validity of this distinction is questionable, since the state also constitutive of the society. Hence, civil society must be perceived of as a purely analytic concept which should include the state. This consequently obliterate the boundary which is so often drawn between state and society. For a contribution to this effect see Gellner E. 1991:498.

CHAPTER 2

2. INTEGRATION AND INTEGRATION THEORY.

“The source of... ideas is to be found not simply in the interests identified by regional state policy-making elites, but in the influences of an emerging regional community... engaged in the definition of regional identities, problems and putative policy proposals for the resolution of those problems.” (R. Higgot)

2.1 Introduction

It is well-recorded that the 1980's has been seen as the “lost development decade” for Africa (Cheru. F. 1992:1; Chazan et al. 1992:300). In addition to this, the 1990's, in which we have witnessed the restructuring of the post-Cold War globe- the regionalisation of international relations being a prime and certain feature- has been predicted as a decade in which the continent will increasingly become marginal. Says Fantu Cheru: “Africa will find itself even more vulnerable and isolated if it chooses (or is obliged) to remain a collection of fifty, small, competing exporters, dependent on... regional markets and by rationalizing existing resources... by establishing viable sub-regional economic integration schemes.” (1992:1) The debate about the regeneration of a continent that is increasingly being marginalised globally, places great emphasis on the establishment of economic co-operation and integration at sub-regional and regional levels.

It is clear from the above that the need for sub-regional and regional integration is informed by one important consideration- that Africa has no future without self-reliance. Self-reliance in this context refers “... to measures taken by developing countries to co-operate in reducing their economic dependence on industrialized countries. Such measures include the promotion of trade between.. and among... developing countries (referred to as South-South trade) and joint ventures in manufacturing, mining, and the provision of services... among other things.”

(Chazan. et al. 1992:276)

There are various agents claiming that integration in Africa should be pursued as a matter of urgency and with new vigour. The United Nations Action for Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD), The World Bank's Global Coalition for Africa, and The Organisation of African Unity's Lagos Plan of Action 1980, which was reformulated in 1990 as the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, all purport to have at aim the reversal of the fortunes experienced during the 1980's, by actively working towards the goals of collective self-reliance and co-operation (World Bank Report. 1989:193-194). These novel attempts at reversing the misfortunes of the last decade vividly reflects the state of current attempts at regional integration. Whilst attempts at the latter, has until recently been state and elite driven, there is a growing realisation that integration attempts has hitherto largely excluded the mass of the population. More than that, the discourse on integration still fails to "venture into the interior"⁴ - integration theory. Integration theory has until now not considered the masses.

The lack of an intellectual contribution in this area can be attributed to the fact that those concerned with integration theory, are perceived to have made only a minor contribution to the study of the actual integration attempts in general (HODGES in Taylor T 1978). Robert Davies posits that the failure to look at integration theory as integral to integration attempts in Africa is due to the perception that the approaches prescribed by these theories are not applicable to the Third world or Southern African states in principal (1992:5). What further compounds the problem is that integration is invariably conceptualised as having an economic underpinning. Due to the historical relationship of antagonism amongst states in Southern Africa, it would be required that political and social integration occur in tandem with economic integration. This would require an array of confidence building measures of which cultural exchanges and meetings among elites are two. It is crucial to determine how we can use integration theory to

⁴ This phrase was borrowed from Andre du Pisani's article "Venture into the interior: Continuity and change in South Africa's regional policy (1948-1991)."

achieve the aim of progressively developing an all-embracing regional order, which include both governmental and non-governmental organisations.

A study of integration is needed, firstly to assess whether the informal interdependence of economic and social problems (e.g. debt load, IMF structural adjustment programmes, drugs, migration etc.), are likely to serve as the bases for creating a collective response to these problems. Interdependence in this context can be said to mean: "... the process whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals,

groups, and societies that can have important consequences for the course of events." (Rosenau J. 1980:1) or alternatively it "... refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries and among actors in different countries... which results in... flows of money, goods, people and messages across international boundaries..." (Keohane R. and Nye J, 1977:8-9) Secondly, whether increased attempts at integration are likely to lead or foster a process of growing formalised interdependence in economic, political and social terms. Thirdly, we need to look at integration theory with a view to determine which matters remain the responsibility of member states, and which matters become the responsibility of the regional body.

Karl Deutsch writing in a European context conceptualises integration by alluding to it as a security community which explicitly aims at "... the attainment of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population." (cited in Nye. J, 1971:25) Ernst Haas on the other hand, defines integration "... as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." (ibid.) In refining his conception later, Haas claimed that integration refers "... exclusively to a process that links a given concrete international system with a dimly discernible future concrete system." (1964:29)

In regard to what brings about integration Charles Petland claims that: "Integration is brought

about by the interaction of political forces- interest groups, governments, international agencies- in pursuit of their own interest.” (1973:) Viotti and Kauppi purport that integration concerns itself “... with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new technologies for resolving conflict between themselves.” (1987:387) Mark van den Broek views integration largely in economic terms. Consequently he points out that when referring to integration, we are concerned with the ideal-type of economic integration models which need to be applied for successful integration (1994:53).

The differences in definitions, it will be pointed out, stems from an inability to decide on who is to drive the integration process forward: integrating elites, institutions created for this supra-national community, national bureaucracies, popular opinion or civil society. Notwithstanding these divergencies in conceptualising integration, there is some general agreement that the integration attempt results in changes of a particular status quo. Hence, in an all-embracing regional integration scenario, which not only results in governmental and non-governmental agencies playing a role in the integration process, but is also characterised by interdependence, the balance of power between and among actors within the integrative community, which preceded the integrative process will be altered considerably.

Hodges asserts that the integration process invariably aims at “... a merger of separate institutions and communities, usually within a specific geographic region, into a larger unit.” (cited in Taylor, 1978:242) Additionally, the promotion of economic interdependence is seen to enhance the process necessary for the promotion of a regional division of labour conducive to integration. Two approaches suggest that the promotion of peaceful co-operation and the reduction of conflict between contending actors in a specific region is at the heart of integration attempts. These approaches, as was already alluded to, can be discerned: as being Neo-functional and Transactionalist⁵. The former as was pointed out above, considers the

⁵ Whilst the author is aware that in some discussions on regional integration theory, references is sometimes made to the models of integration (such as by Ostergaard T, cited in Oden B, 1993:29-38) as part of integration theory, this thesis will

integration process to be primarily driven by governing and other elites, whereas the latter approach accords a substantial role to people (integrative community) in the integrative process. This thesis considers Neo-functionalism to be of importance to the goal of establishing a sustainable, all-embracing regional order, since it aids the regionalisation of non-state actors⁶.

2.2 Neo-Functionalist Theory

This approach concerns itself with processes "... in which supranational institutions possessing binding decision-making power emerge from a convergence of self-interest on the part of various significant groups in society." (Taylor T;1978:243) The main actors involved in the integration process are not governments, but integrationist technocrats and various interest groups. The redefinition of interest in regional as opposed to national terms according to Hodges (1978), results from the perception that these supranational institutions can best serve the pragmatic interest of elites. It is therefore clear self-interest shapes the perception on integration.

Hodges (1978) contends that by redefining elite interests in regional as opposed to national terms, supranational institutions become perceived as the best way of satisfying their pragmatic interests. He further postulates that these elites will only commit themselves to supranationalism, when they perceive their interest as best serves by the extension and competence of these supranational institutions. How are decisions about integration made

preclude these models in the discussion on the afore-mentioned theory. Suffice it to note modes or models concern themselves with (1) market integration (Comesa, EU, lately SADC); (2) project integration (sectorally based projects, e.g. SADC-fisheries and marine resources and; (3) development integration (with synchronized policies e.g. on Aids, migration and the environment)

⁶ Ibbo Mandaza rightly observes: " That Southern Africa has in general enjoyed such a healthy state of inter-state interaction...which he argues can...be attributed to those heads of states and governments concerned. The contribution of these founders of the Front-line States/SADC will remain invaluable in the history of the sub-region" (1995:25). This level of political solidarity is also evident in NGOs, most notably the trade unions.

according to this approach ? This process of decision-making gives considerable importance to the process of collective decision-making which influence governmental and non-governmental elites. Preference is given to incremental decision-making. The latter enables decision-makers to implement the technique whereby, they will make a decision regarding which sector to integrate based on the success of one functional field to another such field. Furthermore such sector by sector integration minimises the problem of cost and benefit distribution among member states. It will also circumvent the problems inherent in the ceding of powers from the national level to supranational institutions level (ibid.). It will clearly indicate which responsibilities remain with the national institutions, and which ones become the responsibility of the regional body.

Another concept of concern to Neo-functionalists and of relevance to our argument about integration relates to the incrementalist decision-making process, is the concept of spill-over. This involves the move-away by the integrating governmental and non-governmental elites from less controversial issue areas to more political issue areas (Hodges cited in Taylor T, 1978). Tom Ostergaard argues that "... integration in functional areas simultaneously results in various political spill-over effects." (cited in Oden B, 1993:40) What happens is that interest groups and political parties in principle free government decision-makers to make integrative decisions by making it politically legitimate to make regional, rather than nationally focused decisions. This occurs against a background rooted in the realisation that public opinion has grown in importance (the globalisation of values) for the integration process because "... elites must convince their domestic audiences that the benefits of further integration are worth the costs." (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993:508) Ultimately this changing regional scenario results in deliberate attempts by technocrats to promote "... increased integration on the basis of ideologically motivated projections and political possibilities." (ibid.) Moreover, integration around functional needs in areas such as health and welfare, trade and production, and transportation may accelerate and legitimise the integrative process among the grassroots, which constitute the "crucial mass" of the integrative community.

Whilst the Neo-functionalist concede that non-governmental elites should play a crucial role in the integration process, it insist that integration fundamentally should bring about "... a society of states... conscious of certain common interests and common values, ... in the sense that they

conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” (Bull H, 1977:13) Hence “Integration... alters interstate power relations... from the point of view of governments, it breaks the power of vested interests, introducing new dynamics.” (Corbey D, 1995:267) However, this argument is not only applicable in the realm of interstate relationships, but its corollary should also be true in state-society relations. This assertion is premised on the understanding that the deeper the process of integration, the more likely the process of a conflation of the interests between interest groups and governments and between society and society in the region.

The neo-functional approach is of value to the extent that it acknowledges: “ The existence of regions is preceded by the existence of region-builders, political actors [governmental and non-governmental elites] who, as part of some political project, imagine a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region, and disseminate this identity to others .” (Nemann I, 1994:58)

This approach, however, is static to the extent that it fails to view the evolving community as the forum for responding to the changing global economic and political challenges. The Neo-functionalists fail to accord a role to the grassroots or civil society. It is for this reason that it is instructive to look at the Transactionalist, because they seek to broaden our understanding of the role of civil society in integration. As such they contribute considerably to strengthening my argument that civil society does play an active role in regional integration.

2.3 Transactionalist

This approach ascertains the transactions between people as an indicator of their attitudes towards each other (Hodges in Taylor T, 1978). Attitude and the subsequent interaction amongst actors and agents, is influenced by the perception of mutual dependence (refer to Keohane and Nye’s (1989) definition of interdependence) among actors of the integrating community. Implicit in this is the idea that the process of integration, and the success thereof is driven not only by the integrating elites, but the momentum of the integrative process ultimately

depends on the contributions of ordinary people engaged in transnational activities or communication- people- to- people relations. It is true that asymmetries in dependence are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in dealing with one another. Keohane and Nye affirm this when they charge that: “ Less dependent actors can often use their interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues.” (1989:11) However, this might not prove to be an easy undertaking because of the concept of sensitivity. Sensitivity refers not only to: “... the volume of flows across borders but also... to... the costly effects of changes in transactions on the societies or governments.” (Keohane and Nye, 1977:12) Of importance to the integrating community is the costly impact or effect which a change in policy of one country has on another.

The fact that sensitivity plays such an important role in the integrative process, resulted in Viotti and Kauppi to conclude that: “Transnational interaction not controlled by central foreign-policy organs of government... and are... no longer ignored. To the contrary they... are ... regarded as often being of crucial importance to the integration process.” (1989:386) The costly effects or impact brought about by sensitivity,

necessitates the process of policy integration, which concerns itself with critical outcomes that affect peoples lives (ibid.). Furthermore, this approach argues that an increase in the intensity of communication (brought about by transnational communication- the idea of a global village), will similarly result in an increase in a sense of community. The latter is enhanced organically through a process that Martin refers to as the globalisation of civil society (1994:650; see also Shaw, 1994:172). This sense of community is crucial, if not decisive, to the integration process, since it is expected to support the creation of institutions and procedures necessary to ensure peaceful change. It will further “... create broad or narrow limits for legitimacy of the integrationist process.” (Nye 1971:33)

There are two main patterns of communication that characterise any emergent community, including Southern Africa. Hodges identifies them as “... high volume of transactions within the region over a wide range of economic, political and social activities, and an increasing divergence between the volume and range of transactions within the putative community and

transactions between the region and the outside world.” (cited in Taylor, 1978:245) This sense of community is further enhanced by community building efforts in the past, which require that we measure the changes in the intensity and scope of transactions between a given group of actors, in order to assess the growth of a sense of community in a given region (see Nye 1971:30-33).

Thus, it could be argued that the most important variable according to the transactionalist concerns itself with the process of social integration. Social integration the Transactionalist argue, will bring about a “... web of relations between non-governmental units... which in turn will result in a... transnational society.” (Nye, 1971:33) Thus it is correct to conclude that an increase in, or the deepening of, the process of social integration leads to the creation or expression of common values (a concern with the environment- Green Peace, human rights- Amnesty International). A concern with environmental degradation led to the idea of sustainable development. The latter concern which is increasingly being globalised (due to amongst others, the increase in the intensity of communication) not only contributes to facilitate interaction between and among civil societies in the North and South, but it is also instrumental in narrowing the gap between the rural and urban divide in the developing countries. Moreover, by increasing the general transactions (mass social integration), we are in fact deepening the integration process. In concluding, we could argue that regional developments elsewhere, and the increase importance of civil society in global politics (see Shaw, 1994), necessitates a scrupulous appraisal of this approach.

The shift in international dynamics on the global political economic level (manifested by the regionalisation of politics on a global level), reinforces the urgency of a successful regional pact for Southern Africa. Charles Petland contends that “In the age of the end of ideology, the competitive pursuit of individual and group interests according to certain 'rules of the game', is the basic dynamic of economic and political development.” (1973:110) Lastly it is positive to note, and conclude with Timothy Shaw, who rightly points out that the “... transactionalist alliance of elites, corporations and classes will continue, with profound implications for regional development.” (1989:105)

2.4 Conclusion

It seems appropriate, therefore, that after having explicated the core concerns of both theories to pose the question: What do these approaches contain, that might be instructive in our understanding of regional integration in the developing world in general, and Southern Africa in particular? Whilst these approaches have formed an integral part of the integration attempts in the North, it is questionable whether the postulate of Ostergaard that these approaches are not transferable to African countries due to the absence of what he terms: "... modern associational pluralism, i.e. functionally specific, universalistic, achievement-oriented groups, such as interest groups and political parties" (cited in Oden B. 1992:41) is valid.

The experience of colonialism⁷ in Southern Africa endowed the region with a distinctive historical character and culture. It is exactly the opposition to foreign domination which saw the rise of civil society in the different countries and across boundaries. In Southern Africa the popular force with immediate potential is organised labour (the case of Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) and the trade union in Zimbabwe being a prime example). Admittedly opposition to colonial rule, does not suggest that there was a convergence of interest among the agents of civil society (i.e. churches, intellectuals etc.). It is, however, beyond the ambient of this thesis to discuss the agendas of the different agents of civil society. What is noteworthy, however, is that opposition to the governing elite did not wither away with the end of colonialism. The political divide between civil society and the state remains part of the post-colonial landscape. This continued perpetuation of the state-society divide results, according to Michael Bratton from the inability of the state to:

"... fill all the available political space with organisations of its own making and could only defensively pre-empt the entry of private citizens into the civic realm.... Alternatively...

⁷ Michael Bratton contends that even in pre-colonial Africa civil society existed. Says Bratton: "While many pre-colonial cultures in Africa may have lacked skills, they certainly did not lack civil societies, in the broad sense of a bevy of institutions for protecting collective interests." (1989:412)

voluntary associations proved too strong to be subordinated and survived as an alternative institutional framework to officialdom.” (1989:412)

The neo-functionalist with its “great expectations” that integration should bring about “a society of states” does not pay heed to the fact that the African state was rendered weak by the economic crises of the 1970’s and 1980’s and the impact of structural adjustment programmes (SAPS), inter alia. This weakening of the state consequently resulted Carol Thompson to conclude that “... weak states make it easier for the popular classes to organise on their own. No longer waiting for the state to provide them with a role in the development of their country, co-operatives, women’s organisations and unions have begun to organise on a regional basis.” (1992:140) In Southern Africa a dialectic is brought about by this form of regional co-operation and mobilisation which can or does not only unleash popular forces, but also is potentially capable of transforming states. The strikes in Mozambique and Zambia and the land take-overs in Zimbabwe and Mozambique aptly substantiate my proposition. Moreover, the role of the well organised South African Unions in the fight for majority rule can never be downplayed.

The transactionalist approach seems to suggest that the deepening of the process of regional integration depends on among others, economic growth and interdependence, which will bring about a sense of community. The latter will be enhanced by already existing community building efforts of the past, and the increasingly important role that civil society will have to play in transnational relations. Thus the challenge which the transactionalist approach posed, demands that we move the intellectual discourse on the role that civil society has to play from a national level to a regional level, and to recast the debate explicitly in regional terms. However, before engaging this debate we are confronted with a different challenge: that is, how to ascertain the inadequacies within present attempts at regional organisation, that is to lay the foundation for the achievement of the ultimate goal, of a developed regional order.

Ultimately, the neo-functionalist theory is instructive here in the sense that it accords a crucial role to the state in regional integrative endeavours. However, it falls short of allocating a role to civil society in the integrative process (a characteristic of regional organisations operating in the Southern African region). This against the background of the increasing importance of civil

society in transnational relations. What further compounds the neo-functionalist predicament is the fact that the globe has become increasingly interdependent. Hence interaction among actors will transcend boundaries, and includes different types of actors.

The importance of the notion of interdependence to our understanding of integration theory is embedded in the “vacuum” that it filled during the 1970’s, when an impasse in integration theory was witnessed. What crystallised then, was the replacement of integration theory by the theory of interdependence. Due to the fact that the transnationalisation of politics and indeed international relations, required that states collaborate to solve problems which transcends their boundaries (notably drugs, environmental degradation, migration, etc.) interdependence can be seen to have been important in effects. The search for transnational solutions to transnational problems, produces increased interdependence between and among states. James Rosenau’s (1980) postulates that because of this integrative process, societies become increasingly dependent on each other. The consequences of which requires a refocussing “... on interactions among non-governmental entities as well as on relations among and between states and non-governmental entities.” (1980:2)

One can conclude that the usefulness of interdependence theory is to be found in its ability to transcend the impasse of focusing on elite integration only. It further provides us with some rich insights into the evolution of transactionalism. The latter contributes to broadening the scope of integration theory and is useful to this thesis in that it recognises that the grassroots have a tremendous contribution to make to the integrative process. Thus, the contention of this thesis is that the development of a maximalist regional order, hinges on determining the interdependence between and amongst national bureaucracies, elites, civil society and the grassroots.

In the final analysis it can be said that integration theory is useful to this thesis in so far as it has reminded us that interdependence does indeed exist in the region. Furthermore, the neo-functionalist and transactionalist theory are helpful in providing some insights into which role is to be played by the regional elites and civil societies. Moreover, integration theory accords roles to both governments and the grassroots. Additionally, it reminds us that the evolution of a sense of community is contingent on a number of factors of which geographical location is one.

CHAPTER 3

3. FROM PARIAH TO PARTICIPANT: WHAT ROLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA'S REGIONAL INTEGRATION?

“The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” (Antonio Gramsci)

3.1 Introduction

The concern of the superpowers with power politics on a global scale which predates the post-Cold War world, is increasingly being overtaken by a concern with economic might, wealth and welfare. In addition to this, issues such as migration, drugs and environmental degradation, inter alia, have become increasingly transnational in nature. Due to this change in the global scenario: “South Africa’s foreign relations should now, it is believed, be shaped by a whole range of factors and issues....” (Mills in Mills et al. 1995:1).

The democratic election of April 1994 in South Africa generated feelings of achievements, expectations and opportunities. Most importantly, it has enabled the democratic Republic to chart for itself a role and place in the international community. South Africa seems to experience considerable difficulty “graduating” from pariah to participant in regional and international affairs. Considerable sensitivity regarding South Africa’s participation in regional endeavours exists. This heightened sensitivity is manifested in the divergent views and opinions inside and outside South Africa, about the democratic Republic’s role in international affairs.

The current involvement of both civil society and the government in the process of formulating a regional agenda for the new democracy, presupposes that South Africa has a critical role to

play in driving regional integration forward (Scott in Mills et al, 1995:199). However, the transitional character of the state and society after 1994, considerably complicates this task⁸. Whilst there is a general and objective realisation that South Africa needs Southern Africa, the role to be played by the South African economy and civil society in the regional integration process is informed by two divergent views on South Africa's role in regional organisation- a minimalist and maximalist one. More critically, it seems that the historical tradition of foreign policy formulation continues to impact heavily on foreign policy making, and as a result foreign policy is more concerned with domestic, state driven imperatives.

Historically, South Africa's economic relations with her neighbours, were based on narrow economic interests⁹ There exists a danger that the policy of economic minimalism vis-à-vis the region, preach by some scholars in the democratic Republic may have lasting consequence for both South Africa and her neighbours. The argument here is that South Africa can only make a successful contribution to regional endeavours if she manages to transform the erstwhile "imperial state"- to borrow a phrase from Roger Southall (1992)- in a manner consistent with regional trends and transformation which is geared towards greater democratic participation.

3.2 A Brief Historical Overview: Apartheid South Africa's Foreign Policy

In order for us to grasp the "painful birth" being experienced by the democratic state casting about for a new foreign policy, it is instructive to ascertain the historical background that informed or was critical to foreign policy formulation in the recent past. Moreover, the prospects for realising closer regional economic relations based on equity, cannot be assessed

⁸ It is, however, noteworthy to point out that the charting of a regional role for South Africa should involve a variety of stake holders. A Department of Foreign Affairs Discussion Document acknowledges this. States the Document: " On the domestic front, civil society, local authorities, special interest groups and many others have some role to play in enabling the Department of Affairs to give the government comprehensive, well considered and practical advice." (1996:19)

⁹ This type of relations between South Africa and her neighbours, are clear in the SACU arrangement.

without taking account of the historical and present pattern of economic relations between South Africa and the region.

The vehement opposition with which South Africa's apartheid policy and the hegemonic approach to regional integration were greeted in the past, manifested itself in the provision of military training facilities and financial aid to Southern Africa's liberation movements. Sam Nolutshungu concludes that: "Opposition to South African apartheid thus gave African unity a definite, and among Africans an apparently uncontroversial, purpose which functioned both as the moral and mental basis of unity and at the same time a pragmatic expedient to facilitate the organisation of inter-governmental co-operation in black Africa."¹⁰ (1975:260)

The opposition towards South Africa's regional policies was based on the perception that relations between the apartheid Republic and the rest of the region were based on inequity. An example which bears testimony to the asymmetrical nature of relations between apartheid South Africa and her neighbours, is encapsulated in the 1969 agreement between South Africa on the one hand, and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, on the other hand. Nolutshungu (1975) argues that this agreement was a reflection of the asymmetries in economic power¹¹. South Africa derived more benefits from SACU than other member countries¹².

South Africa also tried to draw in other neighbouring countries by restructuring its regional economic relations. To secure Southern Africa as her "sphere of influence", an ambitious

¹⁰ South Africa's and military coercion, provided the "glue" that kept the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) together, and the "superglue" that kept the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) together.

¹¹ Robert Davies (et. al.) convincingly argue that SACU: "Far from promoting greater integration among member states, the past thirty years has, in fact, seen a loosening of ties among SACU member countries." (1993:50)

¹² Writing on South African-Southern Africa relations, Andre du Pisani comments that: The pattern of capitalist accumulation and development which evolved over the past century,...was concentrated in South Africa, with the economies of most of the countries functioning to service South Africa." (in G Mills, 1994:57)

scheme or vision was encapsulated in the idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS)¹³ postulated by P.W. Botha in 1979. Robert Davies opines that this policy of economic and military destabilisation had: "... the effect of impeding efforts by the rest of the region to reduce dependence on South Africa and diversify their economies." (1993:19)

It would serve the democratic Republic well to note that destabilisation produced its own contradictions. Robert Davies (et. al.) point out that in the economic sphere, the protectionist measures implemented to boost South Africa's exports, impacted on the capacity of the regional states to import and secure foreign investment. It further made South Africa's reliance on regional resources, most notably water and electricity more evident.

The advent of the 1990's produced its own "new world order" for Southern Africa. The states in the region began to progressively lower, their political barriers towards South Africa. Most significantly, this change in attitude and perception, marked an era of "new beginnings" for Southern Africa and the integration process.

Moreover, the change in government brought about by the April 1994 democratic election, enhanced the optimism for real integration expressed by the continent as a whole. It was expected that a democratic Republic would be led by a transformed state, whose foreign policy was going to be based on democratic participation and other precepts (i.e. equitable development on the regional sphere). Much however, needs to be done in the foreign policy domain to give effect to such euphoric perceptions and views. Towards that end, a look at the different views which inform the current debate about South Africa's role or perception in regional integration, is important.

¹³ The establishment of CONSAS was indicative of the fact that apartheid was on the defensive. Whilst CONSAS as an element of destabilisation was predominantly military, it has an economic component, was used to achieve strategic aims- amongst many other to oppose SADC. Needless to add, such restructuring was ostensibly aimed at developing a new hegemonic alliance for the apartheid Republic.

3.3 Some Moribund Symptoms

The prospects for realising the potential benefits arising from people-to-people regional relations cannot be assessed without looking at the current debate in South Africa about her role in regional integration, which is couched in the minimalist and maximalist positions. The logic which underpins such an enquiry, has to do with the divergence in views which have to be taken into account when considering Southern Africa's regional relations with South Africa. On the one hand, we have the South African state- Southern African state dimension (predominantly in the economic sphere), whilst on the other hand we have the historical links (i.e. the liberation struggle) amongst the different civil societies in Southern Africa (predominantly the political orbit).

The minimalist approach uncritically accepts the realist contention that the national interest (especially its economic and political dimensions) of the country should be pursued by first and foremost engaging the rich Northern countries. Aziz Pahad, the Deputy

Foreign Minister contends that South Africa's long-term reputation depends on strengthening economic links with Western States to produce the investment and trade essential to promote growth. Pahad further claims that: "Our European policy is essentially an outward projection of South Africa's domestic imperatives- economic and social." (in J. Spence, 1995:27) Chris Landsberg on the other hand claims that:

" South Africa will have to base her foreign policy on domestic goals and needs, and avoid overextending itself in regional and international affairs at the expense of grappling successfully with complex economic problems at home." (1994:71). This implies a regional policy with a strong "inward-looking" bias.

Such sentiments are reminiscent of the viewpoints expressed by the ancien apartheid regime. Moreover, it dismisses the notion of a "missionary role" for South Africa, which , it is hoped by some, will result in the revival of the economic prospects of the region in particular, and the

continent in general.

Needless to say, the minimalist approach may not be in the interest of all states and people of the region. This conclusion is supported by Richard Higgart's assertion that: "Interdependence and globalisation... has complicated the earlier, realist derived definitions of "national interests" by acknowledging the salience of the economic welfare function in international politics." (in Higgot et al. 1993:291) Hence, it is critical for South Africa to realise that she needs the region as much as the region needs her, if only for the purpose of performing her own welfare function. Not suprisingly therefore, we have a counter-debate in South Africa which recognises this reality.

3.4 The Maximalist Position

Carol Thompson (1992) points, with admirable clarity to the fact that South Africa needs the continent and the region as much as they need her. As a cogent illustration of this, Thompson maintains that the industrialisation of South Africa's major cities depends on the regional water resources. She also charges that the Republic will become more dependent on regional electricity. Furthermore, she points out that "... South African manufactures are not competitive in the international market, so a viable and prosperous region is necessary as the first market for South African goods"¹⁴. (1992:134; Cockroft in Baker et al, 1993:231; Mandela 1993:91)

Robert Davies points out that considerable overlap exists between manufactured and exported products of the Republic and imports of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. By "opening-up" its markets South Africa "... could facilitate a significant re-organisation of production and trade patterns, in which not only would South African goods

¹⁴ Not suprisingly therefore, the figures provided by Jakkie Cilliers (1996) bears testimony to the above assertion. He points out that 70% of South Africa's exports goes to the SADC region. This he points out, represents an increase of 25% from 1993 to 1994.

compete with goods imported from outside the region, but a range of producers and industries would begin to find riches in a broad regional market.” (in Baker et al,(1993:219) Towards this end, it would be vital for a future foreign policy framework to reflect a concern with a more integrated regional economy.

Moreover, a future foreign policy framework concerned with developing a more integrated regional economy, might also considerably contribute to alleviating the chronic unemployment problem by: “... the development and extension of regional networks for transport and communication, water management and power generations Such networks would benefit not only regional integration, but create desperately needed employment opportunities within the region.” (Young T, 1991:239)

All in all, a foreign policy with a focus on regionalism intends to be beneficial for both South and Southern Africa. Mills and Bayham contend that for the former “... it would provide ready access not only to regional markets, but most probably also to those in the EEC through the Lomé Convention¹⁵.” Whilst for the latter “... access to South African finance and expertise would assist their economies which have suffered from both ravages of mismanagement and the years of regional destabilisation.” (1990:186)

Rok Ajulu in making his contribution to the reasons why South Africa’s foreign policy should reflect values which embrace maximalism - a concern with the development of both the country and the continent - postulates that “South Africa’s ambitions globally may very well be realised through recognition of its regional weight, a strengthening of that position, and using that as an effective bargaining instrument internationally.” (in Landsberg C. et al, 1995:51) Ajulu proceeds to strengthen this argument by proposing that the realisation of South Africa’s

¹⁵ This statement has been overtaken by South Africa's current negotiations for a free trade agreement with the European Union, because she should not join Lome. Regarding this arrangement, Gregg Mills reminds us that: "SADC officials realise that the SA-EU free trade area has serious ramifications for their attempts to stave-off extra-regional market integration." (Sunday Independence, 18 August 1996)

international agenda can be realised in three ways. He firstly suggests that since the Republic is inextricably linked to the regional economy, she will have difficulty solving her domestic problems "... until the idea of a regional economy is seriously rethought, and close attention is given to issues surrounding migrant labour, energy supply, water, etc." (ibid.)

Ajulu goes on to point out that the well-developed industrial base of the Republic, coupled with its infrastructure and growing information technology sector, will need a market for its produce, which are considered to be sub-standard in Western terms. The huge regional and continental market "... could serve as a basis for Africa's economic resuscitation." (ibid.) Ajulu concludes. Lastly he reminds us that the democratisation and indeed the take-over of the reigns of power by the African National Congress was facilitated by the boundless intervention of the people of this continent. Hence, South Africa has a moral responsibility towards the continent.

What is necessary, and indeed required, is to pay attention to Peter Vale's warning that "There are hard choices to be made in Southern Africa: these are not to be found within the narrow discourse of orthodox realism but within the emerging global contours that are to be found beyond the nation state." (1995:10).

To counter the possible consequences of a minimalist approach towards a regional foreign policy, a political framework which allows for, and actively engages in, attempting to build a civil society to participate in the formulation of policy both on a domestic and regional basis. Carol Thompson puts forward the suggestion that: "Because of its history, balance and equity are the first goals of growth for Southern Africa, not ones to be left to "trickle down" in later years. South Africa, for example, needs a viable and prospering Mozambique for its own growth; the self-interest of a free South Africa is to assist Mozambique, not destroy it. "Development integration"¹⁶ will require the energies of all in Southern Africa- states, business

¹⁶ Balefi Tsie (1996) suggest that development integration, the prime concern of SADC, requires "...creating appropriate institutions and mechanisms to ensure that variable geometry does not undermine its objective of equity, balance and mutual benefit." (1996:86)

and civil organizations.” (1992:143)

Historically, the agent within South Africa’s civil society with a coherent regional agenda to enhance the above-mentioned goal, is the trade union movement.- The Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU). COSATU is not only assertive in demanding that the national agenda receives priority- it also seeks to play an active role in regional development through the Social Charter for Southern Africa¹⁷. Realising that so far attempts at regional integration remain the exclusive domain of state structures, and a lack of political commitment by states in the region, invariably results in the breakdown of such enterprises, civil society will have to be included in regional endeavours in order for them to stand a greater chance of success. In this regard, as Nkulu claims: “... the initiative of the trade union movement in the region to draft a social charter for the protection of the fundamental rights of workers is instructive. Apart from insisting on the right to strike and to collective bargaining in all regional states, this charter also emphasis the need for trade union involvement in decision-making processes at all levels and for the prevention of “social dumping” through scrupulous relocation of industries within the region.” (1993:18) Hence, the states of Southern Africa could, with the aid of civil society develop policies which will not only have a national dimension, but also address these at a regional level.

Ultimately, all the states in Southern Africa need as a matter of urgency to consider, and indeed engage in the process of institutional development and reform with a view to establishing a developed regional order which provides for democratic participation at both the domestic and regional levels¹⁸.

¹⁷ More recently at Cosatu's International Policy Conference, the trade union resolved to: "...play a more meaningful role in the economic development of the region and the negotiation of trade agreements. In addition to this, it was resolved that: Cosatu should develop strong bi-laterals with federations in the region, and affiliates should establish strong, structural, sectoral relation with their regional counterparts." (1995:5)

¹⁸ The suggestion in this regard is, that a culture of democratic participation on a domestic level need to evolve, which will have "spill over effects" on a regional level. Needless to say, the resistance of the Zimbabwean government to let the

3.5 Conclusion

So in the final analysis what are the regional options open to the democratic Republic which will impact positively on the regions development and security?. It is positive to note that debate about democracy and the economy is informed by a varying degree of opinions. Ostensibly the debate about the involvement of the state and civil society in the building of democracy, the involvement of the economy and the evolution of people-to-people relations is couched in the concern with social reconstruction and development in South Africa. Mfundo Nkuhlu (1993) charges that due to the afore-mentioned, the state and civil society are active in spheres of democracy and social reconstruction. It is not suprising then, that the main actors concern with democracy and the economy are the government, the private sector, and other actors of civil society, notably COSATU. Whilst there are divergent views on how to address the inequities of the past there is generic agreement that whatever the direction to be taken, the decisions made should reflect values associated with an open society¹⁹. The primary ingredients of the latter society are a free market and democratic principles. Fundamentally, the argument of the open society camp is premised, in the words of Roger Southall on "... the assumption that growth will only follow democracy..." (1994:127)

Gay Society of Zimbabwe (GALZ) establish links with the South African Gay Society, undermines attempts at building a democratic culture.

¹⁹ Such a society according to Karl Popper is premised on a fundamental consensus about its purpose and values. More recently the idea of an open society can be compared to make a market place of opinion, where even the common values are open to debate. What underpins the existence of such a society is its institutional mechanisms. The latter normally is made up to a legal system and constitution conducive to the establishment of the open society. In South Africa, South Africa and to some extent Namibia are working towards the goal of an open society. Whilst tolerance and debate seem to be the crucial ingredients in South Africa, the courts in Namibia are playing a critical role in facilitating moves towards an open society. The idea of regional open society can take root through the establishment of a regional parliament. What would be requires as criteria for participation, amongst many others, are democratic governments and limited state power. (I am indebted to Ivor Sarikinsky for his insightful suggestions and explanations regarding the applicability of an open society in Southern Africa).

Whilst the debate about development and social reconstruction are couched in national parameters, there is a growing realisation that the debate should be regional to avoid the potential negative effects of a minimalist approach for both the Republic and the region. Not surprisingly then, those concerned with the implications of minimalist development, takes cognisance of the fact that regional relations will have to be constructed along new lines. It is therefore not surprising to note that influential scholars in South Africa are calling for regional relations based on equity (Davies. et al. 1991, Keet, D. 1993, Mills in Mills et al. 1995, Vale. P,1992) It is hoped that the debate in South Africa with such an outlook, will lead to greater multilateral dialogue- to borrow Higgot's phrase- with a regional flavour. This, it is hoped, will result: "... in the influences of an emerging regional community of like minded scholars and practitioners engaged in the definition of regional identities, problems and putative policy proposals for the resolution of these problems." (Higgot, R. 1994:369) gaining status and momentum.

On a governmental level, it is noteworthy to point out that South Africa has been instrumental in attempts to establish a common market. The expressed purpose of a common market is to establish a free trade bloc. In this regard, the suggestion is that a number of steps need to be taken by states to break down their protectionist barriers. Sven Lunsche argues that the establishment of a common market hinges on upon: "

- A gradual reduction and eventual elimination of import duties and other charges on goods originating in member states;
- Elimination of export duties on goods for export to other SADC members;
- Phasing out qualitative restrictions on imports from and exports to other member states;
- Prohibiting subsidies that distort or threaten competition." (1995:2)

All in all, it is hoped that the establishment of a common market will result in the complete

removal of restrictions on capital and labour among member states²⁰.

However, the existence in Southern Africa of three organisations with overlapping goals, at times remains an obstacle to the goal of establishing a developed regional order. Hence, we need to assess which of the three organisations is the best for South Africa to participate in and help to drive the integration process forward.

²⁰ On a different level, the call by Cosatu for the equalisation of regional wages and salaries might serve as a step in the right direction. This amongst many factors has consequences not only for the economic, political and social transformation of the democratic Republic, but may also provide us valuable insight into the regional scenario unfolding.

CHAPTER 4

4. INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS: SACU, COMESA, AND SADC- AN ENQUIRY

“In view of these several integration arrangements in Southern Africa, examination has started,... into the issues of possible duplication, competition and waste....” (M. Maphanyane)

4.1 Introduction

The search for a developed regional organisation in Southern Africa, is severely hampered by the low levels of integration which characterise the state of existing regional organisation- SACU, COMESA and SADC²¹. As pointed out above, the narrow scope and elitism of these regional organisations has resulted in the overall state of regional organisation being inadequate. This is because, it excludes the mass of the regional population from participating in regional endeavours. Furthermore, institutional weaknesses considerably compound the problems of developing a developed regional order. Therefore, it is necessary to look at them to point to conditions that will lead to higher levels of integration to produce a regional organisation that is all-embracing, involving national bureaucracies, intergovernmental elites and organised civil society. In short, a regional organisation with a maximalist approach or outlook. However, attempts at regional organisation has hitherto been all state endeavours which allow little mass participation and have so far given only little recognition to non-state actors. They are as such,

²¹ SACU comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. COMESA on the other hand is comprised Angola, Burundi, Comores, Djibouti, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The SADC membership include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

too narrow in scope: unable to drive forward a developed regional order²².

Given the goal of establishing a developed regional order, we need to investigate which of the present regional organisations is most likely to best drive the integration process forward: This will be done on the basis of a number of a number of criteria: the level of integration, institutionalisation and interdependence and whether there are provision for democracy which can cater for popular participation in the policy formulation of the organisation (e.g. in the provision for NGO's and women to participate).

4.2 The Southern African Customs Union- SACU

The Southern African Customs Union has been functioning since 1899. The present Southern African Customs Union Agreement came into force on March 1, 1970. In order to change the agreement which was considered an agreement among unequals- to borrow a phrase from James Cobbe- the agreement is still under re-negotiation since 1995²³. These developments notwithstanding, the objectives of SACU as outlined in its preamble remain, according to Umesh Kumar, the following:

- (a) " creation of a Common Customs Area;

²² Whilst this thesis is aware of the fact that regional organisation attempts are severely hindered by the dependence of SADC and COMESA on donor aid, it is beyond the orbit of this thesis to discuss the implications of this for regional integration and organisation, since this topic is well documented (Oden. B, 1993; Maphanyaane, 1994 and numerous others). It is instructive to note that the SADC Conference in Malawi (1995) recognised this impediment, and resolved to mobilise its resources through regional integration (Morna. C, 1995:65). This echoes the Windhoek Declaration of 1992, which in Article (25) states that: "SADC shall be responsible for the mobilisation of its own...resources required for the implementation of its programmes and projects."

²³ John Dludu (1996) points out that recent negotiations are concerned with the democratisation of the decision-making and finding alternatives to the sharing of revenue. Notwithstanding these attempts, SACU fails to be as all-inclusive as SADC, which includes the whole Southern Africa region in its regional integration efforts. in addition to this, Rob Davies points out that recent "... Custom Union negotiations... does not see enlargement as a matter on the agenda..."

- (b) Free interchange of goods and services between the member countries in the Common Customs Area;
- (c) Economic development of the Common Customs Areas as a whole, in particular, of the less advanced members of the Customs Union and the diversification of their economies;
- (d) Sharing equitable benefits among all member of the Customs Union. “ (Kumar, 1992:1)

The Common Customs Area established by SACU is considerably biased in favour of South Africa. With regards to the decision making structures, this dominance is reflected in amongst others, the article which relates “... to customs and excise duties... which... should be the same in member countries as are in force in South Africa from time to time.” (ibid. p2) With the free interchange of goods, the aim was to facilitate co-ordination and co-operation. The lack of mechanisms for resolving differences is most obvious when it comes to disputes in the economic, political and security spheres. Furthermore, the administration of SACU and its policy making apparatus are extremely undemocratic, since it only involves South Africa. Moreover, as Kamur points out: “ SACU provisions do not suspend or supersede any law of any member country.” (ibid. p6) What is obvious from the preceding, is that there is no democracy because of the inequality in decision-making structures, which in turn contributes to the inability to foster a sense of community.

The only institutional mechanism of SACU, is used by South Africa's to pursue her economic interests. James Cobbe argues that South Africa will only allow the BLNS countries to develop economically: “... if they fit into minor interstices in the South African industrial structures, so to speak, rather than being substantial disruption of the South African market in question.” (1980:331) Furthermore Kamur points out that the legal provisions with regards to economic development are ambiguous in that it allows South Africa “... to enact any kind of import control legislation it likes and pursue such economic objectives as are best suited to its economy at any time.” (1992:9) Consequently, SACU promotes an inequitable, lopsided economic interdependence.

With regards to revenue, the intentions were portrayed to be ostensibly good- to counter the negative effects of polarisation among member states. The results, however, indicate that South

Africa gains more revenue than other member states (see Cattaneo, N; 1990:44). Furthermore “.. some BLNS countries have suggested that the cost of trading with more expansive South African suppliers, which the arrangement imposes on the BLNS countries, rather than with cheaper international suppliers, now outweighs the compensation paid through the revenue-sharing formula.” (Davies, R; 1994:4)

Foremost amongst the disadvantages of SACU is that it offers a low level of integration. The effect is polarisation and compensation payments. Reliance by other member states on South Africa comes through the compensation formulae paid to the smaller member states. This money becomes part of their budgets. Consequently, SACU lacks equity which should be another integral aim of regional integration. Historically, therefore SACU has relied too heavily on the South African government. One of the consequences of this, among many others, was that this “polarisation deficit” was compensated for by the redistribution of Customs revenue. Davies (1993) points out that this arrangement will have to be eliminated because of South Africa’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (W.T.O), which has designed rules to that effect.

The development initiative of SACU clearly seeks to reinforce a relationship of economic interdependence which favours South Africa at the expense of fellow SACU members. Robert Davies adheres to this proposition by contending that for most of SACU’s existence, the tariff regime has been protectionist, geared towards encouraging import substitution industries in South Africa (1994:5; Hanlon, J; 1986:82-86).

With the exception of a Customs Union Commission, SACU has no other institutional mechanism. The main function of the Customs Union Commission, which meets once a year is to discuss matters of common concern and reports to their governments (elitists or top-down approach to integration). As was argued above, the bias in decision-making structures points to the fact that the institutionalisation within SACU is marked by the absence of democracy. Additionally, the use of consensus to resolve economic conflicts, might prove to be insufficient in a region where economic development, or rather the lack of it, has always been a contentious issue.

Furthermore, even a renegotiated SACU provides for a security framework, which is imperative for a successful regional order. What then was the logic that underpinned the establishment of an obvious limited vehicle for regional integration?. Nikki Cattaneo contends that the Customs Union was nothing more than a political and security tool, and therefore appears to be of little importance to the economic well-being of its main beneficiary- South Africa²⁴. She points out that the: “ BLS [add to this Namibia] markets account for only 5% of the value of South African exports. The termination of the Customs Union would not necessarily disrupt trade with South Africa.” (1990:48)

In order for SACU to be relevant as a regional organisation, “... it needs to be reformed, reorganised and democratised, before it can serve as the basis for an equitable, deepening of relations among its present members. It needs, moreover, as an arrangement among a particular sub-set of countries, to operate within the broader regional framework which the SADC and the PTA would have a crucial role in shaping.” (Davies, 1994:10) So in the final analysis, we need to determine the advantages and disadvantages of SACU as a regional organisation. Clearly what counts in SACU’s favour is that it is an arrangement (although narrow, since it does not include the whole of Southern Africa) among people who know each other. Furthermore, the proximity of these states to each other not only creates linkages among them which can be used as building-blocks for a developed order, it also creates economic interdependence (one which deepens inequality amongst members).

However, even a renegotiated SACU does not provide for the involvement of people (civil society) or a security framework. As a result, the economic, political and security future of the region cannot be accommodated by SACU. This leads to the conclusion that full regional integration in South Africa, with an all-embracing and maximalist orientation, should be more than what the Customs Union can offer.

²⁴ This conclusion is succinctly supported by Carol Thompson who points out that: "SACU has survived mainly by force, not economic rationality, and has costs its poorer members dearly in long-term development, as well as short-term revenue." (1992:131)

4.3 The common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

The common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)²⁵ came into being to substitute the Preferential Trade Area (PTA)²⁶ in November 1993. Comesa was ostensibly geared or was the product of a regional desire "...to move to higher level of economic co-operation and integration." according to its Secretary General Bingu Wa Mutharika (1994:9) He further claims that the exploitation of regional resources through co-operation effort underscores this new vision. These aims and objectives will be achieved "... through the adoption of common policies and mechanisms that facilitate free movements of goods, persons, labour, capital and services and joint action in production, distribution and exchange." (ibid.)

Realising that its predecessor the PTA has been structurally and institutionally weak²⁷, Comesa aims and objectives further seeks to overcome this and ensure the growth of its member states. The growth requirements of its member states are seen as the following: "

- (a) to attain sustainable growth of the member states by promotion a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures;
- (b) to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption

²⁵ COMESA cannot be considered a region or sub-continent, since it clearly is not a geographically independent part of continent.

²⁶ The treaty establishing the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa States (PTA), was signed on 21 December 1981 as the first step towards higher forms of regional economic co-operation and integration. Yasmin Carrim points out the PTA was established to secure: "... trade liberation and facilitation, improvement of the productive sectors of agriculture and industry." (1994:1)

²⁷ Ofstad contends that the promotion of co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity (including trade, custom, industry, transport, communication, agriculture, natural resources and monetary affairs), which is aimed at uplifting the living standards of member countries and fostering closer relations among members, remains rhetoric. Moreover, "... there are hardly any trade links or even the infrastructural basis for such links between many of the member states of the PTA, particularly among these relatively further apart." (In Oden . B., 1993:201)

of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples, and to foster closer relations among its member states;

- (c) to co-operate in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, across border and domestic investment, including the joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for development;
- (d) to co-operate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among member states in order to enhance economic development in the region;
- (e) to co-operate in strengthening the relation between common market and the rest of the world and the adoption of common positions in international fora; and
- (f) to contribute towards the establishment, progress and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community." (ibid., pp10-11)

Development constraints which severely hinder the economic growth of member states are another core concern which Comesa seeks to eradicate. These constraints are the following:"

- structural weaknesses in industry and manufacturing, slow rate of accumulation of capital, insufficient availability of goods and services produced locally and the under-development nature of agriculture, especially food security;
- the inability to adjust and diversify economies from primary commodity dependence due to non-viability of national markets as investments entities, which has resulted in inadequate capital flight;
- lack of complementarity between production, trade and consumption both at the national and regional levels, thereby making our economies extroverted in orientation;
- secular decline in real terms of export earnings from principally primary commodity exports and the resulting monitoring external debt burdens;
- rapid increases in the prices of imported manufactured goods which has contributed to chronic balance of payments deficits; and
- restricted access of each nation to markets of industrialised countries, especially for manufactured and semi-finished products."(ibid. p12).

Comesa hopes to overcome the above-mentioned structural weaknesses by, firstly establishing a free trade area through the mechanism of trade liberalisation which will involve the "...free movement of goods and services produced within the Common Market and the removal of non-tariff barriers,"(ibid. p12; Davies, R; 1994:6). Secondly, it seeks to create a Customs Union which will involve no tariffs on products coming from the Common Market, whilst a common external tariff will be adopted on imports from non-Comesa countries. The third mechanism which Comesa employs to overcome these structural weaknesses concerns itself with the free movement of capital and finance. This will be aimed at establishing a common investment procedure, which in turn will create an investment climate more favourable "...for foreign direct investment, across border investment and domestic investment..." (Mathurika, 1994:12-13).

The establishment of a payment Union which will the final analysis lead to the establishment of a Comesa Monetary Union is the fourth method to be employed in an attempt to overcome the structural weaknesses confronting Comesa. Lastly in overcoming the latter weaknesses Comesa will seek to facilitate the free movement of people by providing "...common visa arrangements, including the right of establishment and eventually the right of settlement." (ibid. p13), within member states.

Notwithstanding the fact that SACU is a limited organisation or vehicle for regional integration²⁸, it clearly does not have the problem of COMESA- a lack of complementarity among member states. With regards to a lack of the complementarity among COMESA member states Ofstad opines "...that goods produced in the region are not those demanded within the region ..." (in Oden B, 1993:207). Resultantly the level of integration is unlikely to allow for the establishment of a free trade area.

Whilst it is true that the Comesa has been able to establish various institutions, amongst many others, The PTA/COMESA Investment Fund and The Reserve Fund (see Mathurika, B; 1994:6-

²⁸ SACU is limited and minimalist, since it only include five members off the Southern Africa sub-continent.

8; Carrim, Y; 1994:5-7) it is fair to argue that nowhere do these institutions provide for mass-based participation, a crucial precondition for the success of regional integration (along the lines of say, the non-governmental forum establishment in the Asia-Pacific). Regarding the institutional structures of Comesa Gavin Maasdorp Claims:

"...that Comesa will be a Common market in name only for a long time to come; in fact, it is unlikely that even a Customs Union can be established among all member states in the first years. This is because of the disparate nature of the groupings from the historical, political and economic point of view, and its resulting lack of cohesiveness."(1994:8)

In this regard, the reminder by Andre du Pisani is particularly useful. Predicts du Pisani:

"In the case of Southern... and Eastern... Africa levels of dependence, the asymmetrical nature of relations of power and the different resource endowments of various countries, would- for some time- work against economic and political integration characteristic of a Common Market." (in G. Maasdorp et al; 1992:184)

Foremost among the criticisms levelled against COMESA, is the above or lack of a regional identity. Due to the fact that the member countries of COMESA comes from different "regions" (Eastern and Southern Africa), it is difficult to envisage a situation where interdependence comes about. The disparate cultural, economic, political and social backgrounds of member states, inhibits the process of confidence-building and impedes the process of constructing a "self" premised on commonalties. This not only undermines attempts at building a sense of community, it also has lasting implications for the integrative process.

In looking at the institutional weaknesses of Comesa Schweikert posits that the organisation lacks a leading economy that could "...provide a market of adequate size of regional integration to produce sizeable dynamic gains." (1996:52) He further charges that the outward orientation of most member states, ensured that there was not any "open Market" and finance. He proceeds by pointing out that: 'Other partners have been concerned about their relative position in external markets than they have been about their medium-term gains from regional

integration."(ibid.)

Another point of concern, is the inability of COMESA to provide for a mechanism to resolve disputes of a political and security nature, COMESA only provides for a Court of Justice, which has the capacity to enforce and sanction members which fail to comply with treaty obligations. Ostensibly the Court of Justice "...has been established... to arbitrate... and... to provide interpretation of the Treaty." (Mutharika. B., 1994:18) Since the Treaty deals primarily with economic matters-more specifically trade matters- the resolutions of conflict of a political nature is not provided for²⁹.

COMESA which is clearly elite driven, lacks the sense of community and interdependence, and moreover, does not provide for people-to people relations crucial to the cause of a developed regional order. All in all, it preclude the political and security dimensions essential for attaining an all-embracing, maximalist regional order.

4.4 The Southern Africa Development Community-(SADC)

The initial goal of reducing dependence on the previous apartheid state, requires reformulation by SADC, due to the fact that the erstwhile pariah state and main destabiliser of the region, became a member of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The Southern African Development Community, was founded in August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. Article 5 of the SADC Treaty refers to the objectives of the Community. These objectives shall be to:

- (a) achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- (b) evolve common political values, systems and institutions;

²⁹ Hence one can assume that the solution to political problems are the concern of the Organisation of Africa Unity.

- (c) promote and defend peace and security;
- (d) Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of member states;
- (e) achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- (f) promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the region;
- (g) achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment;
- (h) strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.

The central objective of SADC is said to aim at intensifying co-operation among Southern Africa countries. With the view to integration, the following objectives were formulated:

- "deeper economic co-operation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross border investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of production, goods and services across national borders;
- common economic, political, social values and systems, enhancing enterprise competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and the alleviation of poverty;
- strength regional solidarity peace and security in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony." (Maphanyane, M; 1994: viii)

Paul Bischoff (1995) contends that the aims and objectives of SADC, unlike its predecessor, allow for higher levels of integration. The historical linkages among SADC countries, clearly endows it with a level of integration which is more profound than that of SACU and COMESA. Bischoff outlines the objectives of SADC to encompass the following: "... to create a framework for regional integration. It aims at harmonising the foreign and economic policies of member states in order to bring enduring security to the region as a whole." (1995:109) Robin Birchall on the other hand, argues that whereas the SADC was politically motivated, to counter

apartheid, SADC is ostensibly development focus. It is noteworthy that the Windhoek Declaration echoes the calls by the Lusaka Declaration that "...the people of the region would decide upon the content of their co-operation; plan, direct and also pay for its implementation." (Gonclaves, 1993:23; Maphanye, M; 1994:14)

The SADC institutional structures are allocated amongst member countries. Maphanye argues that the logic for this is to be found in an attempt "...to avoid the creation of large unwieldy bureaucracy,...as opposed to excessive centralisation...which has weakened regional integration efforts in Africa." (1994:72) The institutions of SADC (which Maphanye, M; comprehensively describes on pp 73-76) are supposed to be among the driving forces behind integration "...the establishment of new regional institutions had to be based on the existence of a sufficient workload of concrete programmes. In economic parlance, the institutions could only be established if the benefit to member states exceeded the cost of establishing them." (ibid. p71). Birchall points out that SADC "... clear institutional structures aimed at promoting regional development and trade, is its greatest strength." (1995:2) Additionally, the division of structures and functions among member states, allows for a clear regional division of labour.

Whilst the history of migrant labour and the aid provided by the different countries to the liberation struggles of countries in the region can be considered milestones in fostering a sense of community, people-to people relations has been conspicuously neglected by SADC. It is acknowledged that SADCC in its first ten years of existence has been predominantly government driven. Simba Makoni (1991) envisaged an increase in the involvement of the people of the region in their development. He also reminds that the "... SADCC accountants, banks, museums, women, youth... organisations have been the ...initiatives of the peoples of this region." (1991:12) however, SADC has often criticised as suffering "... from a too-heavy reliance on the export of raw materials to the industrial world, dependence on world markets prices for its exports, slow growth of trade numbers, and the effect of external debt and the imposition of structural adjustment programmes to the North." (Gonclaves, 1993:24)

4.5 Conclusion

In the final analysis the question that we have posed, which remains unanswered is: Which of the three organisations is the best drive the integration process forward? By way of conclusion it will be demonstrated that SACU, COMESA and SADC are different organisations with regards to their history, structure, development strategy and performances. This with a view to determine which organisation is likely to best fulfil the role of an all-embracing order, necessary for the development of the Southern Africa region in terms of the following: 1) economic interdependence 2) geographical location 3) people-to people integration.

SACU is the oldest organisation in the region, but has the lowest level of institutionalisation. What can be borrowed from SACU regarding its development strategy by a future regional organisation, is that SACU provides for duty-free movement of goods and services between member countries and also for a common external tariff against the rest of the world. Moreover, it goes beyond a pure customs union in that it includes excise duties as well. This approach to regionalism is, however, self-defeating given transnational trends, where "open regionalism" - to use Fedotov's phrase - is a requirement. Open regionalism which is in congruence with the World Trade Organisation's provisions on international trade, provides for a region "... in which barriers to trade, investment and technology transfers would be removed more and more vigorously." (Fedotov, 1992:66)

The compensatory mechanism of the organisation, and the hegemonic or dominant role of South Africa in the institutions and decision-making structures of SACU, clearly speaks volumes of the inequity which exists within the organisation³⁰. Its membership which only includes five of the states of the region, renders it incapable of performing the functions of an all-inclusive regional order, which must provide for closer co-operation between and among

³⁰ John Weeks verifies the above assertion by pointing out that: "The role of SACU developed in a broader context of South Africa patron-client relations, in which provision of migrant labour by these small countries had been considerably more important than commodity trade."(1996:106)

governmental and non-governmental units - a maximalist regional order. This led Gavin Maasdorp to conclude that SACU has not played much attention to calls for deeper geo-political cohesion and integration in Africa. Needless to add, developed regionalism should be more than what SACU can offer.

COMESA on the other hand, has higher levels of institutionalisation although it was established much later than SACU³¹. It is worth noting however, that despite the differences in historical, political and economic nations, COMESA still views itself as a cohesive whole, but it has been shown that the illusion of cohesiveness is nowhere more clear than in the economic orientation of member states. Some members, it was pointed out, are more concerned about their position in external markets than with regional integration. Consequently the goal of establishing a customs union or a free trade area remains elusive. Furthermore the preoccupation with economically integrating economies divergent not only economically, but also historical and politically, neglects an important consideration of an all-embracing regional regime- political integration.

Confidence-building in the security realm constitute a crucial ingredient of political integration. With this in mind Jack Spence suggests that: in the Southern African case, what essential is the prior establishment of a new security regime to deal with threats which the sovereign state is ill-equipped to handle: drugs, arms, smuggling, enforced migration, environmental degradation. Only when a region is tolerably secure can serious work of integration get under way." (1995:27) COMESA which lacks a clear regional identity in economic and geographic terms, will have difficulty fulfilling this important consideration or precondition for establishing a developed regional order.

Lastly COMESA's narrow elitist approach which invariably precludes popular participation- an important feature of regional organisation and integration attempts elsewhere- adds to its

³¹ SACU has been functioning since 1899, whereas the PTA was established on 21 December 1981.

weaknesses. All in all, one can embrace Reginald Green's argument that the: "PTA (COMESA)... in legal form, development strategy, institutional structure and personnel was an import to Southern Africa, whereas SADCC was and is a domestic/regional product." (In J Pickett and H Slinger, 1990:123) The search for a maximalist approach to regionalism, requires economic development based on equity, political integration, and clear regional identity, inter alia. Comesa member states are more concerned with their own economic well-being, political integration does not form part of COMESA's agenda, and most importantly, COMESA lacks a regional identity in economic and geographic terms. Hence, COMESA as a vehicle the integration process in the Southern Africa region forward remains highly inappropriate.

SADCC which was substituted by SADC, has evolved progressively in the sense that it provides for higher levels of integration. The latter essentially means that an embrative SADC now seeks to integrate the economic, political and social spheres its regional endeavours. Furthermore its institutions which attempt to harmonise the foreign and domestic policies of the SADC countries (confidence-building), will contribute to bringing peace to the region. Furthermore, the historical links of member states (exemplified by migrant labourers, the regional division of labour based on the mining economy, shared infrastructure, etc.) will enable the process of confidence-building to proceed faster than within the COMESA framework. Given this historical linkages, the regional division of labour which centres around migrant labour has created economic and commercial links which can serve as the basis of economic integration.

The security problematique, which is part of the confidence-building process, is encapsulated in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security³². The latter ostensibly is being employed as a vehicle to ensure the security of the region³³. Given the fact that the Front-line grouping was

³² This organ was established to substitute the Association of Southern African States, which initially was supposed to be the security organ of SADC.

³³ The SADC organs first security "assignment" was to provide more initiative and play a more active role in the Angolan peace process.

seen as the security and political vehicle of SADCC³⁴, it has, because of the existence of the historical ties of conflict resolution, become the building block of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, which seeks to perform the similar function, as will be pointed below. Moreover, what makes SADC the favourite to drive the process of regional integration in South Africa forward towards a maximalist scenario is, it at least makes provision for the involvement of the grassroots in the integrative process. In short, SADC conforms to Hodges's definition of a community. Indeed, what we are witnessing in Southern Africa are increased economic, political and social activities among SADC member states³⁵. Regarding the economic orbit, Gavin Maasdorp contends that SADC's institutional framework for sectoral co-operation "... has hardly been effective..." (1994:34). Notwithstanding these difficulties, SADC's concern with economic, political and security integration, conforms peculiarly to the requirements of an all-embracing, maximalist regional order necessary to drive the integration process forward.

³⁴ The co-operation on security issues among SADCC members was ostensibly a response to apartheid South Africa. This led Carol Thompson to conclude that: "Regional economic cooperation was based on concrete political alliances, with Angolans, Namibians, Tanzanians, Mozambicans and Zimbabweans dying together to check apartheid destabilization." (1992:129) Co-operation on security issues among SADC members, on the other hand, is geared towards conflict resolution in the region (e.g. the Lesotho crisis and calls for democracy in Swaziland).

³⁵ Most significantly, in the economic domain, the moves to establish a common market, represent a pointer in the right direction. In the political realm, the increased activism shown by the trade unions and the gay and lesbian societies, coupled with the establishment of democratic regimes in the Southern Africa region, clearly bears testimony to the potential that exist to establish a Southern Africa community or at least a political centre. Furthermore, there is a realisation that social problems are increasingly becoming transnational, as opposed to national. Not surprisingly, therefore, the calls for synchronised policies to deal with problems such as AIDS, the environment and migration (Beattie and Rispel, 1994; Keet, 1994) encapsulated in the development integration theory- are now endorsed by SADC. Lastly and most critically, the sense of community in the SADC region, can be enhanced considerably by the historical linkages in Southern Africa- the liberation struggle and the Front-line being prime examples.

CHAPTER 5

5. TOWARD A DEVELOPED REGIONAL ORDER: THE WAY FORWARD

"... we shall not loose heart, no matter which turn history takes, but we shall not allow history to take a turn without our participation.../" (Lenin)

5.1 Introduction

The regionalisation of politics on a global scale in the 1990's, has made it imperative for Southern Africa to develop its institutions and relations amongst the citizens of the region favourable to fostering the goal of an all-embracing regional order. The degree of economic interdependence among the countries of the region, coupled with the historical linkages among the states and peoples of the region, provide the ingredients necessary to establish such an order. Issues such as drugs, the environment, migration, refugees and other related problems, provide the impulses to drive on a process of integration. Not suprisingly then, the establishment of a regional security framework to deal with such problems seems to occupy the thoughts of regional elites³⁶. There seems to be a growing realisation that a security framework is best built by involving civil societies and governments of the region. What is necessary therefore, is to develop intergovernmental institutions simultaneously when regionalising organs of civil society. In short, a move-away from a minimalist conception of regional organisation, to an all-embracing, maximalist one.

In order to achieve the above outlined goals, the contention is that regional organisation can be

³⁶ Booth and vale contend that: "It is... construction of sound regional institutions that will provide civil society with a context in which to learn, and develop a different consciousness about security." (1995:302) The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, and the Inter-State Defence Security Community, established by SADC, provide the ideal context for civil society to regionalise their activities.

built by a combination of international and transnational means. Furthermore, there needs to be a realisation that transnational relations will only grow if the framework for such relations is provided by states and by the openness of national NGOs to co-operate regionally.

5.2 institutional Evolution within SADC

Since the establishment of the Southern Africa Development Community in 1992 we have witnessed an increased concern with institutional development which is a precondition for establishing a developed regional order. Foremost among the concerns, has been the idea of establishing a regional security framework, which needs to precede the establishment of a regional economic community. Jack Spence (1995) argues that it is necessary because a region needs to be fairly secured, before attempts at economic integration can be given serious consideration. Generally, the debate about security in Southern Africa under SADC is filled with dynamism. Moves towards a commonly held democratic value system (open society argument and the involvement of civil society in policy making) provides the building blocks upon which not only national security, but the security of the Southern African region as a whole must be based. Whilst it is appropriate to argue that the institutional building capacity of Southern African countries in the security orbit (due to the historical antagonism between South and Southern Africa) seems to be precariously balanced, it is right to concede that the preconditions for establishing such an institution is clearly more favourable than a few years ago. There is also the realisation that without democracy (which provides for popular participation) neither, security, stability, nor economic growth - the engine for people relations - is possible.

The most significant institution established by SADC, is the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The organ which was established in July of 1996 aims to:

- protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression;

- promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political value systems and institutions;
- develop a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and lobby as a region on issues of common interest at international fora;
- co-operate fully in regional security and defence through conflict-prevention management and resolution.
- mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;
- use preventative diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system;
- where conflict does occur, to seek to end them as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Only where such means fail would the organ recommend that the submit should consider punitive measures. These responses would be agreed in a protocol on peace, security and conflict resolution;
- promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states and encourage the observance of universal human rights, as provided for in the charters and conventions of the OAU and the United Nations;
- promote peacemaking and peacekeeping, in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;
- give political support to the organs and institutions of SADC;
- develop a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact for responding to external threats and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region or elsewhere on the continent;
- develop close co-operation between the police and security services of the region, with a view to addressing cross-border crime, as well as promoting a community-based approach on matters of security;
- encourage and monitor the ratification of United Nations, Organisation of African Unity and other international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights and peaceful relations between states;

- co-ordinate the participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
- address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa.³⁷ (South Scan, 5 July 1996)

Additionally, the debate about the establishment of a security framework has been boosted considerably by a proposal for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Southern Africa (Venter. 1996; Nathan. 1992 and Rugumamu. 1993:29). This, the proponents argue, is one of the necessary confidence building measures. Rugumamu proposes that the prime function of such a body should be to "... promote institutionalized non-violent forms of conflict resolution; oversee and guarantee an end to external involvement in domestic and regional conflicts; facilitate the reduction in military expenditure; switch to non-offensive defence and generally perform the task of confidence building and regional identity. Economically, the Conference would be called upon to harmonize economic policies and strategies in the sub-region."(1993:29-30)

Whilst multilateral solutions present the ideal, it is worth noting that the erstwhile pariah- South Africa, has simultaneously made significant strides in establishing bilateral security ties of great importance. Jakkie Cilliers (1996) refers to the joint agreement between South Africa and Mozambique to counter the trade in small arms. He also points to the agreement between South Africa and Namibia, which provides for cross-border-policing with a view to combat drug, arms smuggling, and vehicle theft. The agreement also provides for joint border patrols and the sharing of specialised training and technology.

Apart from the formation of the Organ, significant progress has been made in other areas. Most significantly, four trade protocols were signed. According to Mzimkulu Malunga: " The aim of

³⁷ The institutional capacity, and indeed, the inter-governmental confidence-building mechanism within the SADC region, is aided considerably, by existence of the Inter-State Defence and Security Community. The functions of this body include, amongst many others, peace support operations in Africa.

the trade protocol is to set the framework for to the establishment of a free trade area in South Africa. " (Sowetan 16 August 1996). The SADC Trade Facilitation Protocol which was finalised by August 1996 resolved that (a) "SADC member states affected by existing trade imbalances should, as an interim measure... negotiate and conclude bilateral trade agreements with SACU countries... (b) SADC member states should work closely with the enterprise sector in addressing all forms of investment risks, and provide incentives to encourage both local/regional and international enterprises. (c) SADC member states should establish mechanism for involving the private sector, as partners, in policy formulation and implementation. especially with regard to industry and trade. (d) SADC member states should co-operate with the private sector in the development of human resources, generally, and especially those needed by industry. (e) member states should involve the local private sector in the implementation of economic reform measures which include restructuring and privatisation of states assets. " (SADC Consultative Conference 1996) This it is hoped, will lessen the tension between Southern Africa and her Southern African neighbours regarding trade matters³⁸.

Sean Clearly insightfully suggests that " Most government and parastatal organisations in the SADC now acknowledge that only through the strengthening of the private sector and the growth of its activities, can the economic decline of the region be arrested and reversed. " (1996:40) Not suprisingly, therefore, the trade protocol, as well as the mining and energy, infrastructure, transport and communication provisions, also embrace and share the insight of Clearly. the author further posits that the agenda for the private sector should include:

- Effective regional networking among businessmen and their representative institutions... which... will reinforce the crucial role of the private sector in the economy.
- A basic enabling environment meeting the core requirements for direct foreign investment must be created throughout Southern Africa, while permitting each country

³⁸ The recent disputes between South Africa and Zimbabwe regarding unfair trade fair practices by South Africa can be addressed by the above mentioned arrangements.

to retain the right to offer, or withhold, additional incentives. The base regime must include guarantees of a safe operating environment, a commitment to market mechanisms, efficient legal, administrative and financial infrastructures, protection of intellectual property, reasonable and transport taxation, and rights to repatriation of profits through dividends.

- An adequate inventory of potential investment projects in SADC countries must be established and marked professionally to international investors.

Competent partners must be identified in Southern Africa for foreign investors who identify and are committed to achieving a realistic vision of economic growth. These partners are available, albeit in small numbers, in the business communities of the SADC states³⁹.

Partnership arrangements, leading to closer co-operation and greater capacity, must be established between SADC private sector institutions and Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the European Union and elsewhere in the G-7. Business, both in the industrialised countries and Southern Africa, must assist greatly, in its own regional economic interest, in promoting effective co-operation in this region." (1996-40-41) Needless to add, this kind of arrangement will also have positive implications for people-to people relations.

It is noteworthy to point out that with positive and compassionate engagement Southern Africa can establish a security community, which in the words of Karl Deutsch "... grows out of mutual compatibility of values, strong economic ties, the expectations of more, multifaceted, social, political and cultural transactions; a growing density of institutionalized relationships, mutual responsiveness; mutual predictability of behaviour." (in Booth and Vale, 1995:290) The establishment of a "democratic culture" - albeit still nascent- and increased economic transactions between South Africa, the dominant economy of the region, and other SADC countries points to heightened sensitivity.

³⁹ In this, expanding the number of indigenous entrepreneurs and well-trained managers in South Africa is, however, essential.

5.3 Informal Confidence-Building: People-to-People Relations

The relationship between the state and civil society on the domestic and transnational levels, not only provokes interest in the theoretical realm,⁴⁰ it has immediate consequences for the establishment of democracy across the region- of which people-to people engagement and organisation is an integral part. However, the discourse on the establishment of democracy and its implications for regional development and state-civil society relations are still being conducted within a paradigm defined in national parameters. Consequently, it fails to illuminate into the challenges facing a region in search of a developed regional order.

The reconceptualisation of security caters for and realises that civil society, in its various formations, also contributes towards the provision, or at least the promotion of security. The increase activism shown by civil society on a global scale, in the fight for democracy, human rights, equitable development and a safer environment, inter alia, has contributed to challenging the predominantly state-led political landscape⁴⁰. In Africa, like in other parts of the South, there has been a proliferation of organisations which seek to address issues of a transnational nature. needless to add, the issues which these organisations seeks to address, are invariably informed by a search for imminent solutions to problems such as hunger, poverty, development and human rights.

The report of the South Commission (1990) suggests that intergovernmental co-operation in the South should be supplemented by broad-based interaction between civil society and people of the South. Towards this end, the promotion of cultural exchanges, sport events, and other social contacts are the first crucial building blocks. This type of interaction and co-operation builds solidarity and bridges between peoples of the Southern African countries, and contributes to mobilising public opinion in support of Southern African co-operation. Moreover, many South

⁴⁰ Whilst only 25 non-governmental organisations from 17 African countries attended a regional meeting in 1984 (Barrow N, 1985:10), 32 regional NGOs called for the inclusion of a human rights commission into the SADC Organ (South Scan, 6 September 1996).

and Southern Africans have made their homes in Countries other than theirs in the region. These experiences may encourage and play a decisive role in the development of a regional consciousness. Similarly, special attention should be given to establishing co-operation among organisations representing the self-employed, neighbourhood groups, and non-governmental voluntary organisations that have sprung up through the region, for these have valuable experience and expertise to share on how to get organised and how to deal with daily problems of economic, physical, and environmental survival. Gathered together in some regional force, is hoped that especially NGOs will transcend the national outlook on problem that confronts the region. The hope according to David Korten and Antonio Quizon writing on the South lies in the fact that: "The very formation of these networks and coalitions is creating social reality as NGO's experiment with the creation of new organizing structures based on consensus, equality and mutual accountability."(1995:160)

In comparison to Europe, Southern Africa has a moderate history of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working within a regional framework⁴¹. However, there is a growing commitment to regional co-operation, and some national based organisations are forging regional links. The Social Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Workers in Southern Africa, signed between national trade unions of various countries in the region, is one example. It must be remembered that NGO collaborative efforts are likely to experience their own set of hurdles⁴². Already, textile trade unions in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe have had disagreements with the South African government regarding trade regulations in the textile sector. Textile workers in the latter two countries have lobbied their respective governments to negotiate for the reduction of tariffs in South Africa.

⁴¹ Ansu Datta (1989) suggests that even though non-governmental co-operation is desirable, it should not undermine inter-governmental ventures aimed at sustainable development and the provision of security.

⁴² John Clark rightly argues that although there has been increased networking among Southern NGOs in recent years: "Such networking is often weakest and most evidently donor driven in Africa." (1995:597) This has obvious implication networking amongst such NGOs.

Ansu Datta views the role to be played by NGO's differently from the above. Datta contends that we need to promote the growth of civil society on a national level, before we can secure its growth on a regional level. In supporting her claim that NGOs can be organised more easily and on a small scale, Datta has this to say: "...Non-governmental cooperation can be organized on a small scale with a modest beginning, but gradually growing into a more ambitious framework." She further argues that the second advantage to be derived from non-governmental co-operation on a national level first, stems from the fact that they are largely free from the formalities associated with protocol and related issues. This she contends enable NGOs to: "... foster local initiative and harness the vast source of experience and energy available at the grassroots level. Because it is not constrained by protocol, co-operation through NGOs can also selective, emphasizing the role of certain organizations while leaving out other organizations which do not conform to the goals set before the specific process of cooperation. " (in Oden and Othman, 1989:95-96) Once these NGOs can "stand on their own feet" they can regionalise their activities.

What should be of special interests are voluntary organisations in which women participate. Indeed, women represent a key social force for Southern Africa co-operation at the grassroots level, for they are able to find easily a common language across borders and continent, united by the same similarity of their experiences and roles in society. More importantly, by allowing women to play a more proactive role in the economic, political and social spheres (the all-embracing security scope), we will provide them with an opportunity to advance and protect their interests. Towards this end, the education of women is a precondition. Ken Booth and Peter Vale allude to the advantages of educating women by asserting that it is "... a necessary building block in a security policy which aims to reduce population growth; to combat the social and economic difficulties that arise from disease; and to overcome the problems that arise from inadequate economic development."⁴³ They rightly conclude that: "Without the emancipation of women there will not be lasting regional security in Southern Africa."

⁴³ Although the Women in Development (WID) debate has been a prominent theme on the NGO schedule in general, the "spill over" effects of such a debate is not yet discernible in Southern Africa.

(1995:301)

In conclusion, this thesis contends that we are witnessing the emergence of an institutional and political centre between SADC and the NGO community. The SADC government are providing NGOs the opportunity to regionalise their activities through their NGO Council. In an attempt to "breathe life" into the SADC NGO Council, a number of positive events have taken place among and between NGOs. Most significantly, the establishment of the South African regional NGO alliance⁴⁴, the formation of regional environmental and human rights networks, the existence of The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) and trade union alliances all point to growing NGO involvement in the region⁴⁵.

5.4 Conclusion

As was pointed out above, the critical role to be played by the state and civil society will be the defending factors in the search for developed regional order. Whilst the process towards integrating the Southern African region has historically been the domain of the states of the region represented by their regional elites, a combination of factors have made such an approach unsustainable. Foremost among which is the need for the regionalisation of politics with SADC at its centre. Furthermore, the globalisation of democratic values, and a realisation that the region will become increasingly marginalised, in the absence of a collective response to new globalising trends and transformations, have served as critical interventions. More importantly, the acknowledgement that regional development and the sense of a community will remain a "distant dream", without the involvement of the people of the region, signifies a leap in attempts to develop developed regional order.

⁴⁴ The formation of this nationally based alliance, which are already forging regional links, support the earlier assertion that due its resource endowments, South Africa has important role to play in the regional integration process.

⁴⁵ Information was provided by Marian Kantoor, 4 December 1996.

In the final analysis, the question to be answered is: Whether SADC as an intergovernmental forum will adequately represent Southern Africa's people interests? The exclusion of NGOs by SADC member states when the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was adopted casts doubt about the gravity of SADC governments to embrace a broader spectrum of stake-holders into the security arena. Earlier agreements between SADC and regional NGOs to include a human rights monitoring mechanism into the Organ were discarded shortly before formalisation of the body (South Scan, 5 July 1996). Clearly this has serious implications for future inter-governmental and non-governmental relations. Furthermore, it provides ample evidence that the democratic dimensions needed to incorporate the regions' civil society, are absent. The solution to this obvious predicament, according to Peter Vale, is the following: " When SADC... gathers in formal conference, civil society needs to set up its own stall. a loud and very messy talk-shop which can air the increasing amount of disquiet which the region's people- as opposed to their government- feel about the processes which democracy and development through Southern Africa. Energy, environment, development, human rights, gender questions: there must be no end to the talking." (1995:24) This, one can conclude, might be the most effective manner in which security concerns of the region can be tackled⁴⁶.

⁴⁶ The contribution of Monna Monnakgotla, towards strengthening the ideas of this chapter, is hereby acknowledged.

CHAPTER 6

"Organise as never before, for organisation decides everything." (Kwame Nkurumah)

6. CONCLUSION

The logic of globalisation, which requires, amongst many others, the search for transnational solutions to economic, political and social problems, can be used as a "window of opportunity" by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in its attempts to establish an all-embracing, maximalist regional order. In doing so, SADC can also draw on the historical linkages among the regions respective countries, to solve problems which pose a threat to the security posture of Southern Africa. Towards this end, the establishment of a political centre is essential. SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and its Inter-State Defence Council can provide the much needed political centre for inter-state relations. Once established, this political centre must be used civil society as a platform around which to congregate and regionalise their activities.

Richard Higgot contends that "... we need to understand the impact of ideas on public policy and the manner in which ideas find their way into public policy." (1994:369) In this regard, it is critical to assess how integration theory, specifically transactionalism, can be use to broaden our understanding of regional integration in Southern Africa. Firstly, the transactionalist theory contends that sensitivity will result in an increase in the sense of community. This sensitivity is brought about by, amongst others, the globalisation of values (i.e. democracy). Sensitivity regarding the political system for the region was enhanced by the democratic change in South Africa after April 1994. Malawi held multi-party elections for the first time in decades. Elections of a similar nature took place in Mozambique in October 1994. Botswana and Namibia, which have democratic governments, held peaceful elections in the same year. Tanzania also held elections in October 1995. Angola, Lesotho and Swaziland are being pressurised to adhere to the "democratic culture" that prevails in the region (Morna. C, 1995).

Integration theory is also instructive in providing us with some insight into the development of a sense of community, as defined by Hodges. There is certainly more involvement and co-operation in the economic, political and social spheres, in the SADC region, more now than previously. The call for, and moves towards, the establishment of a common market⁴⁷, the increased participation of the different civil societies in national and regional endeavours— notably the trade unions, and call for the synchronisation of policies on issues such as aids, migration, etc., starkly bears testimony to the emergence of a sense of community within SADC. It is hoped that the establishment of a common market to drive the integration process forward among states, will enhance institutionalisation, and therefore the creation of a political centre around which NGOs can congregate and regionalise their activities.

In retrospect, the above bears testimony to interdependence between and among agents involved in regional endeavours such as national bureaucrats, elites, civil society, and the grassroots. Furthermore, the application of integration theory in Africa is evident in a number of regional developments, particularly as we have shown in Southern Africa. Admittedly, what is missing, which makes it difficult to appreciate integration is regional symbolism's. However, the potential to develop a sense of community exists and can best developed around the SADC Organ and its NGO Council. Additionally, the "web of relations" which integration theory alludes to, can be seen in the nascent human rights and environmental networks, and the more formal trade union and South Africa regional NGO alliances, to name but a few.

The above governmental and non-governmental dichotomy aptly depicts the ingredients necessary for a developed, maximalist regional order. In other words, the state-led efforts to create a SADC's NGO Council, shows that at least there is an attempt underway to "create" the political space needed, which, given the political will, will aid the creation of a "web of relations" for NGOs. This will hopefully encourage NGOs to seek transnational solutions to

⁴⁷ The SADC Heads of States and Government meeting on the 24 August 1996, resolved to establish a common market within ten years. The construction of the Maputo Corridor is one the first steps taken towards the formation of a common market.

common regional problems. Finally, it must be realised that whilst it is important for regional states to allow for the evolution of a regional civil society, a non-governmental culture and NGO influence depends on defining security that has as its bottom line, inter alia, the rule of law and democracy. In short, the conception of security must be reflective of conditions necessary for the development and progress of an all-embracing, developed and maximalist regional order.

All in all, the road to an all-embracing, developed regional order should be premised on the realisation that:

- Economic and social progress in the region is inseparable from further progress towards good governance - characterised by governmental accountability, tolerance of diversity and respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law -... accompanied by the ... the growth of healthy civil societies. Failure to continue to move in this direction will fatally undermine development.
- Just as security is a precondition for development, so economic growth and social advancement in market-led economies is necessary to prevent socio-economic frustration threatening future stability.
- The scale of the resources necessary to achieve regional reconstruction and development is so vast that success will only be possible if the SADC countries agree to plan collectively for the provision of basic infrastructure, share high cost resources such as tertiary medical facilities and specialised educational institutions, concentrate on the development of skills and human capital, create an enabling environment for foreign direct investment, and proceed with care to market and financial integration, to facilitate trade and investment within the region." (Clearly, S. 1996:42)

CHAPTER 7

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

7.1 Books

1. Abegunrin, L 1985. " The Southern African Development Coordination Conference: Politics of Dependence" in R Onwuka and A Sesay (eds.), The Future of Regionalism in Africa. London.: Macmillan Publishers.
2. Ajulu, R 1995. "South Africa and the North/South: pragmatism versus principle" in C Landsberg et al., (Eds.) Mission Imperfect- Redirection South Africa's Foreign Policy. Cape Town.,: Foundation for Global Dialogue, Centre for Policy Studies.
3. Beattie, and Rispel. 1994. "Improving health in the Southern Africa region through regional co-operation" in M Venter (ed.) prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa. Cape Town: Maskew Muller Longman.
4. Bull, H. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan.
5. Chazan, N et al. 1992. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
6. Cockroft, L 1993. " Is Development in South Africa Compatible with Development in Southern Africa?" in Baker et al., (eds.), South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990's, Cape Town: David Philip.
7. Data, A 1989. "Strategies for Regional Cooperation" in N Hayzel et al.' (eds.),

Government-NGO Relation and Challenges for People-Centred Development. London.: Macmillan.

8. Davies, R 1993. "The case for Economic Integration in Southern Africa" in Baker et al. (eds.), South Africa and The World Economy in the 1990's. Cape Town David Philip.
9.1994. "Creating a Appropriate Institutional Framework" in Venter M. (ed.) Prospects for progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa. Cape Town.: Maskew Miller Longman Limited.
10. Du Pisani, A 1992. "South Africa and SADCC: Into the 1990's" In G Maasdorp and Whiteside A (eds.), Towards A Post Apartheid Future-Political and Economic Relations in Southern Africa. Hong Kong: Macmillan Press Limited.
11.1994. "South Africa and the Region" in G Mills (ed.) From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994. Johannesburg: The South Africa Institute of International Affairs.
12. Green, R 1992. "Economic Integration/Co-ordination in Africa: the dreams lives but how can it be lived?" in Picket J And Singer H (eds.), Towards Economic Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa. Routledge: London and New York.
13. Haas, E 1971. Beyond The Nation-State. Stanford, California.: Stanford University Press.
14. Hanlon, J 1986. Beggar your neighbour-Apartheid power in Southern Africa. London: James Currey.
15. Harris, A 1992. "Regional Associations: Economic in M Hawkesworth and M Kogan (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics. London and New York.

16. Hayzel, N 1995. "Towards New Government-NGO Relations for Sustainable and People-Centred Development" in Hayzel et al., (eds.) Government-NGO Relations in Asia- Prospects and Challenges for People-Centred Development. London: Macmillan.
17. Henderson, R 1985. "The Southern African Custom Union: Politics of Dependence" in R Onkuka and A Sesay (eds.), The Future of Regionalism in Africa. London.: Macmillan Press Limited.
18. Heyzer, N et al. 1995. Government-NGO Relations in Asia: prospects and Challenges for People-Centred Development. Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific Development Centre.
19. Hodges, M 1978. "Integration Theory" in T Taylor (ed.), Approached and Theory in International Relations. New York.: Longman Group Limited.
20. Keohane, R And Nye, J 1977. Power and Independence. Boston, Mass.: Little Brown.
21. Keohane, R and Nye, J 1989 (2nd ed.). Power and Independence. San Francisco, California.: Harper Collins Publishers.
22. Mills, G and Bayham, S 1994. "South Africa Foreign Policy, 1945-1990" in G Mills (ed., From Pariah to Participant- South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.
23. Mills, G. et al. 1995. South Africa in the Global Economy. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.
24. Nye, J. 1971. Peace in Parts Boston.: Little Brown.
25. Oden, B and Othman, H. 1989. Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa- A Post-

- Apartheid Perspective. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
26. Ofstad, A. 1993 "Will PTA be Relevant in the Post-Apartheid Era?" in B. Oden (ed.), Southern Africa After Apartheid. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
 27. Ostergaard, T. 1993. "Classical Models of Regional Integration- What Rélevance for Southern Africa" in B. Oden (ed.), Southern Africa After Apartheid. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
 28. Petland, C. 1973. International Theory and European Integration. New York: The Free Press.
 29. Rugumamu, S. 1993. Post-Cold War Peace and Security Prospects in Southern Africa. Harare: Sapes Books.
 30. Robertson, D. 1993. (2nd edition). A Dictionary of Modern Politics; London: Europa Publications Limited.
 31. Rosenau, J. 1980. The study of Global Interdependence: Essays on - the Transnationalisation of World Affairs. New York: Nicholas.
 32. Scott, T. 1995. "An Overview of South Africa's Future International Economic Relations", in G. Mills. et. al. South Africa in the Global Economy. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.
 33. Shaw, M. 1994: Global Civil Society and International Relations. Cambridge: Polity Press.
 34. Shaw, T. 1989. "The Revival of Regionalism" in R. Onkowa and T. Shaw (eds.),

African in World Politics. London: Macmillan Publishing Company.

35. The Report of the South Commission 1990. The Challenge of the South. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
36. Viotti, P. and Kauppi, M. 1987 (2nd ed.). International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
37. Weisfelder, R. F. 1989. "SADCC as a Counter-Dependency Strategy: How much Collective Clout?" in Williams, M. 1994. International Economic Organisation and the Third World. Hartfordshire: Harvester Wheateaf.
38. Willets, P. 1982. Pressure Groups in the Global System. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.

7.2 Articles and Journals

39. Barrow N. 1985. "The Decade NGO Forum" Africa Report, 30:9-12.
40. Booth K. and Vale P. 1995. "Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism" International Affairs, 71,2:283-304.
41. Birchall R. 1995. "South Africa's Trade Policy: Regional Perspectives for Global Success" Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.
42. Bratton M. 1989. "Beyond The State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa", World Politics, x11, 3: 407-430.
43. Cheru F. 1992. "The Not so Brave World! Problems and Prospects of Regional Integration" Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
44. Cilliers J. 1996. "The evolving security architecture in Southern Africa" Africa Insight, 26,1:13-25.
45. Clark J. 1995. "The State, Popular Participation, and the Voluntary Sector" World Development, 23,4:593-601.
46. Corbey O. 1995. "Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as Booster of European Integration" International Organisation, 49,2:253-284.
47. Davies R. 1994. "Approaches to Regional Integration in the Southern African Context" African Insight, 24,1:11-17.
48. Du Pisani A. 1991. "Ventures into the interior: Continuity and Change in South Africa's

regional policy (1984-1991)" Conference Paper, Southern African into the 1990's and Beyond, Magaliesberg, 15-19 April 1991.

49. Eichenberg R. and Dalton R. 1993. "Europeans and the European Community: the Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration" International Organisation, 47,7:507-534.
50. Evans G. 1991. "Myths and Realities in South Africa's Future Foreign Policy" International Affairs, 67,4:709-721.
51. Fedotov V. 1993. "Problems of the Asia-Pacific Region" International Affairs, (Special edition).
52. Gonclaves F. and Deve T. 1993. "PTA and SADC Merger Imminent?" Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, 6,6:26-28.
53. Landsberg C. 1994. 'Selling South Africa's New Foreign Policy". Indicator SA, 12,1:69-73.
54. Maasdorp G. 1994. "The future Structure of Regional Trade Integration and Development Cooperation in Southern Africa", Africa Insight, 24,1:5-10
55. Mandaza I. 1995. "Peace and Security, Regional Cooperation and Economic Integration", Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, 8,7:29-30.
56. Morna c. 1995. "New Era of Cooperation" Africa Report, 40,3:64-67.
57. Mutharika, B. 1993. "The PTA secretary-general, Bingu Wa Mutharika's Vision of Wider Regional Cooperation", Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, 6,7:12-13.

58. Mills G. and Bayham S. 1990 "Changing the Guard: South Africa's Foreign Policy in the 1990's" *Africa Insight*, 20.3:176-188.
59. Mandela N. 1993. "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy" *Foreign Affairs*, 72,5:86-97.
60. Nathan L. 1992. "Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa" *Africa Insight*, 22,3:212-217.
61. Schweickert R. 1996. "Regional Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa" *Africa Insight*, 26,1:48-56.
62. Shaw M. 1994. "Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 23,3:647-667.
63. Southall R. 1994. "The New South Africa in the New World Order: beyond the double whammy", *Third World Quarterly*, 15,1:121-137.
64.1992. "Southern Africa: Regional Sub-system or Sub-Imperial Complex?", *The African Review*, 9,2:36-61.
65. Taylor, P. 1991. "The European Community and the State: Assumptions, Theories and Propositions", *Review of International Studies*, 17,2: 109-125.
66. Thompson C. 1992. "African Initiatives for Development: The practice of Regional Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa" *Journal of International Affairs*, 46,1:222-235.
67. Tsie B. 1996. 'States and Markets in the SADC" *Journal of Modern Southern African Studies*, 22,1:75-98.
68. Vale P. 1995. "Prisoner of the Past? The New South Africa Abroad" *Southern Africa*

Report, July 7-10.

69. Van Den Broek M. 1994, "South Africa, Southern Africa and the Southern Africa Development Community: Contemplating the Future" Politeia, 13,1:51-61.
70. Venter D. 1996. "Regional security in Sub-Saharan Africa" Africa Insight, 26,2:162-175.
71. Weeks J. 1996. "Regional Cooperation and Southern African Development" Journal of Southern African Studies, 22,1:99-117.
72. Young T. 1994. "South Africa's Foreign Relations in a Post Apartheid World" South Africa International, 21,4:234-243.

7.3 Other Sources

73. Bischoff. P. 1995. Democratic South Africa and the World One year After: Towards a New Foreign Policy. Belleville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape.
74. Carrim. Y. 1994. The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa and Comesa: A Call for Suspension. Belleville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape.
75. Davies. R. 1992. Integration or Co-operation in a Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Some Reflections on an Emerging Debate. Belleville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of Western Cape.
76. et al. 1993. Reconstructing Economic Relations with the Southern African Region: Issues and Options for a Democratic South Africa. Macro Economic Research Group Report.
77. Dlodlu. J. 1996. "Custom Union members meet to resolve outstanding issues". Business Day. 21 October.
78. Keet. D. 1994. International Players and Programmes for- and against-economic integration in Southern Africa. Belleville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape.
79. Malunga. M. 1996. "SADC summit to sign protocols." Sowetan. 16 August.
80. Nkuhlu. M. 1993. The State and Civil Society in South Africa: Transition to Democracy, Social Reconstruction and Implications for Regional Relations in Southern Africa.

Belleville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape.

81. Mills. G. 1996. "SA torn between global economic imperatives and regional demands". The Sunday Independent, 18 August.
82. Mutharika B. 1994. Comesa: New Trade and Development Opportunities. Zambia: Comesa Policy Paper. No 1, pp. 1-53.
83. South Scan. 1996. "Breakthrough Announced on SADC Free Trade Deal" 26 September.
84. Spence. J. 1995. "Realists Wrestles with Radicals" Mail and Guardian, 25-31 August.
85. Vale. P. 1992. Hoping Against Hope: The prospects for South Africa's Post-Apartheid Regional Policy. Belleville: Centre for Southern African Studies.
86. World Bank Report. 1989. Sub Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development. Washington.
87. Cosatu International Policy Conference, Johannesburg, Resolution on Migrant Labour, 21-23 April.