NEW WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING:

A GOVERNMENTALITY ANALYSIS OF BASIC EDUCATION POLICY IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

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By

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ABSTRACT

Social problems that are identified by government policy are articulated in ways that confer the responsibility of their management onto the state. In this way, policy reform serves as a means to justify political rule, as the 'answers' to policy failures are located within the realm of state intervention. This role of policy is maintained by the traditional definition of policy as it enables policies to be presented as the outcome of 'necessary' actions taken by state institutions to better the wellbeing of citizens. Since 1994, mainstream research on basic education policy in South Africa has employed traditional understandings of policy and its function. In doing so, these inquiries have failed to question the very idea of policy itself. They have also neglected to identify the productive role played by policy in the practice of power. To illuminate the necessary limits of policy reform, an alternative approach to analyse basic education policy is necessary. This thesis premises policy as discourse and advances a governmentality analysis of basic education policy during the first fifteen years of democracy (1994-2009) in South Africa. By drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, the study argues that government – 'those actions upon the actions of others' – during this period in South Africa was informed by both a liberal and a neo-liberal mentality of rule. The tensions between these two rationalities contributed to the continuation of apartheid's socio-economic inequalities in the post-apartheid era; an outcome buttressed by the contradictory impulses within basic education policy. By considering policy as a productive translation of governmental reasoning, the boundaries of intervention for future policy reforms are highlighted. These show that the inequalities that were perpetuated during the first fifteen years of democracy justify policy responses similar to those responsible for their production.

DECLARATION

I, Estelle Helena Prinsloo, declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for a degree at Rhodes University or any other university.

Signature  **Date** 12 / 03 / 2013

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Elmarie and Kobus Prinsloo.

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
Asgi-SA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
C2005	Curriculum 2005
CEPD	Centre for Education Policy Development
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CUMSA	Curriculum Model for South Africa
DBE	Department of Basic Education
DNE	Department of National Education
DoE	Department of Education
DoL	Department of Labour
ERS	Education Renewal Strategy
ETQA	Education and Training Quality Assurers
FET	Further Education and Training
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GET	General Education and Training

GNU	Government of National Unity
HCT	Human Capital Theory
HIV/AIDS	Hman Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMWG	Inter-Ministerial Working Group
NECC	National Education Co-ordination Committee
NEPI	National Education Policy Investigation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNSSF	National Norms and Standards for School Funding
NP	National Party
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
NRF	National Research Foundation
NTB	National Training Board
NUMSA	National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
OBE	Outcomes-Based Education
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PFET Policy Framework for Education and Training

PSPPD` Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development

RDG Research and Development Group

RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme

SAQA South African Qualifications Authority

SGB School Governing Body / Bodies

UDF United Democratic Front

US United States

VSP Voluntary Severance Package

WWII Second World War

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCING THE STUDY

…there is no safely privileged space for the inquirer, no place of autonomous reason beyond the discursive medium which all share in one way or another – Douglas Torgerson.[1]

In March 2010, South Africa's Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, announced that a new national 'Basic Education Action Plan', called Schooling 2025, was being developed by the Department of Basic Education (DBE). This policy plan was aimed at overhauling the basic education[2] system in order to increase access to schooling, improve the learner pass-rate and better monitor the quality of teaching and learning at schools.[3] Although these changes spoke to the prioritisation of education in the 2009 election manifesto (ANC 2009) of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), policy reform, in any sphere, forms an integral and ongoing part of the justification of political rule. This is because, in the words of Rose and Miller, government is a "problematising activity" (1992, p. 181), which continuously defines the parameters of 'social problems' while simultaneously devising policy measures to address these, in order to gain or retain legitimacy. Such an understanding of government is derived from the French scholar, Michel Foucault's (1926-1984), notion of 'governmentality'. Instead of understanding government as the institutional or administrative apparatus of the state, this approach considers government as an historical "mode of *action* upon the actions of others" (Foucault 1982, p. 341, my emphasis). Its goal is to direct the thoughts, behaviour and relations of populations (Rose 1990, pp. 4-5). A modern feature of this type of 'action', Rose and Miller (1992) further contend, is that selected 'social problems' and their management are constructed

[1] Torgerson (2002) as cited by Fischer (2003, p. 42).
[2] Basic education in the context of this thesis refers to primary and secondary schooling (Grades R to 12).
[3] In the months following this announcement, Minister Motshekga also indicated that the content and implementation of South Africa's contested Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) curriculum, Curriculum 2005 (C2005), would be reviewed. In particular, OBE's heavy emphasis on 'outputs', or 'learning outcomes', would be reviewed and 'inputs' into the three R's, that is, reading, writing and arithmetic, would be increased. The development of strategies to lessen the administrative burden on teachers as well as plans to better monitor the implementation of basic education policy were also put on the agenda (see Motshekga 2010a, 2010b; Sapa 2010a, 2010b).

in the language of policy as the responsibility of the state via its institutions. This legitimates the regulation of society through statist conceptions of power as the assumption that 'all social problems require policy solutions' is reinforced and accepted. One of the effects of this legitimation is that a priori assumptions about the 'naturalness' of state practices form the basis of questions that are explored by mainstream policy research. Instead of viewing the aforementioned changes to basic education policy as simply an outcome of South Africa's 2009 General Election, which is the dominant view, policy reform can be understood, arguably, as a *routinised* political practice that seeks to make "the activity of government [both] thinkable and manageable" (Rose (1999) as cited in Higgins 2004, p. 459).

Basic education policy in post-apartheid South Africa is an intriguing example of this concept in action. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, basic education has been an area of particular concern to policymakers. This can be attributed to the fact that the post-apartheid state inherited a racially divided and vastly uneven education system. The concern of education policymakers is therefore not surprising. Policy reform has served to justify the necessity of the state in producing the conditions that are needed to address the range of 'problems' within basic education. As South Africa's first post-apartheid Minister of Education, Sibusiso Bengu, stated, "[e]ducation and training are central activities of our society. They are of vital interest to every family, and to the health and prosperity of our national economy. The *government's* policy for education and training is therefore a matter of national importance second to none" (DoE 1995b, p. 2, my emphasis). The impetus to develop new policies, however, was also related to the function of education within societies. "Any system of education", Foucault tells us, "is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledge and powers which they carry" (1970, p. 64). Put differently, education plays an important role in shaping the subjectivity, or the thoughts, behaviour and relations, of

populations (Fitzsimons 2002). Policy reform then has not only reinforced the perceived necessity of the state as a form of social organisation, but has also enabled the reproduction, through the basic education system, of those "knowledges"[4] and power relations that regulate South African society.

One way of exploring this role of basic education policy is to interrogate the ways we traditionally think about policy. This is an important consideration, since these orthodox understandings constitute the conditions in which reform, or the activity of 'reproblematisation', is conceptualised and put into effect. The argument is as follows: the dominant definition of public policy – "prior statement[s] of the actions and commitments of a [current or] future government in respect to some area of activity" (Colebatch 1998, p. 1) – buttresses the role of policy described thus far. In this understanding, policies are presented to the public in a 'common sense' way which masks the place of power in the practice of policy. This is because policies are seen as the outcome of 'necessary' and 'moralistic' actions taken on behalf of the state to address 'social problems' and to improve the wellbeing of its citizens.[5] These understandings have been reinforced within basic education policy thinking through mainstream research which has employed these definitional orthodoxies. These studies focus on the content (or the changes to the content) of policy and, to a greater extent, on its outcomes (Motala & Singh 2001, p. 5; Spreen & Vally 2010). They fail thereby to question the very idea, or conceptual reality, of policy. What is necessary, and what the aim of this thesis is, is to present an alternative approach of analysis which problematises traditional understandings of policy as set by the state. This is to make visible the interests and power relations that basic education policy supports.

[4] "Knowledge" and "truth" are put it in double quotation marks in this thesis to indicate the constructed nature of *all* "knowledge" and to signify this thesis' objection of non-reflexive claims to "truth".

[5] For example, a recent government advertorial claimed that to "*really* achieve the…goals [of eliminating poverty and reducing inequality in South Africa]…and impact on people's lives, we need *appropriate policy responses*" (Pedra 2011, p. 28, my emphasis).

Therefore, this thesis was conceptualised as a challenge to the routine and normalising narrative offered by mainstream studies and reviews of basic education policy. Its task is not to disprove claims that South Africa's post-apartheid basic education system is in 'crisis' or falsify the conclusions of mainstream research by providing more 'accurate', 'statistically-better' explanations for policy 'outcomes' or 'failures'. Rather, the aim is to highlight the limits of future policy reform by considering basic education policy discourses during the first fifteen years of democracy (1994-2009). The study will thereby use mainstream basic education policy research against itself, by making visible the limits of the former's often positivist logic[6] in accounting for the productive nature of policy discourses and its effect on policy reform. Although a critique of some of the dominant approaches that are used to study basic education policy is advanced in this Chapter, it is by no means exhaustive. Instead, by drawing on Foucault's ideas on governmentality, the study will present arguments which will disrupt, as opposed to reinforce, "knowledge" boundaries in this area of study.[7] In order to consider the scope of this study more carefully, the discussion now turns to consider the research problem of this thesis.

1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Following South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, significant changes to basic education policy were introduced. These began in 1995 with the adoption of the first *White*

[6] Positivism is an epistemological orientation that proclaims "knowledge" encompasses only that which can be experienced through observation and measurement. Researchers who ascribe to positivist orientations believe in empiricism, that is, approaches and methods of research that produce observable and verifiable results or 'facts'.

[7] A recent study by Spreen & Vally (2010) also sought to problematise mainstream analyses of education policy during the first ten years of democracy in South Africa by arguing that global economic influences on education policy and policy outcomes are often evaluated at the expense of the actual policies themselves. The latter analyses, they further argue, disregard day-to-day experiences of those affected by education policy decisions and that studies which pay "meaningful attention to and inclusion of multiple (particularly the most marginalised) voices and diverse communities in the description of the 'problem' and the creation of solutions for social transformation" are needed (ibid, p. 431).

Paper on Education and Training (DoE 1995b) and the *South African Qualifications Authority Act* (RSA 1995), followed in 1996 by the *South African Schools Act* (RSA 1996c) and the *National Education Policy Act* (RSA 1996d). The effect of this legislation was that nineteen racially defined education departments were dismantled to form one national and nine provincial departments; access to schooling among Black[8] learners was increased; the allocation of funding and resources along racial lines was abolished; and a new national Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) curriculum was introduced in 1997 (Cross et al. 2002; Fiske & Ladd 2003; Motala 2001). Despite these efforts, post-apartheid basic education policy has remained the topic of much debate and analysis within academic and political circles. Driving this interest is the averred failure of the ANC's policies to effectively transform the legacy of the apartheid education system after almost two decades of democracy (Christie 1999, p. 279; Soudien et al. 2001, p. 78). Such criticisms often stem from the stated 'aims' and 'objectives' of basic education policy, whether considered appropriate or otherwise, being measured against policy outcomes and so-called 'realities'.[9] While the formulation and content of basic education policy have been analysed by mainstream studies (see Carter 2008; de Clercq 2006; Harber 2001; Hartshorne 1999; Maile 2008; van den Berg 2007), the latter have predominantly taken issue with policy outcomes, specifically the external constraints on policy implementation (see Chisholm 2004; Fiske & Ladd 2003; Kahn 1996; Jansen & Taylor 2003; Motala & Pampallis 2001; Weber 2005). Whether attributed to a lack of finance, inadequate resources or inefficient

[8] 'Blacks' in this thesis refer to 'non-White' South Africans who were classified during apartheid rule as either African, Coloured or Indian. 'Whites' refer to those South Africans who were historically considered to be of European decent but, in contemporary times, have to come to refer to both English and White Afrikaans-speaking South Africans.

[9] The official 'aims' and 'objectives' of basic education policy presented by policymakers and policy texts are generally employed by mainstream researchers, analysts and commentators as "truths". In this way, the outcomes of these policies and the 'realities' constraining them are evaluated against these "truths", that is, whether the policies do what they are 'supposed' to do or meet the 'aims' set by policy documents. However, it is the contention of this thesis that the 'aims' and 'objectives' of policy are constructed by dominant discourses that serve and reflect differing interests and rationalities. At the same time, the outcomes and 'realities' facing policies cannot be evaluated in an (objective) vacuum and should, therefore, not be presented and analysed as uncontestable research "truths".

teachers, these constraints have been prioritised at the expense of questions that problematise the policies themselves or, more importantly, that interrogate the idea of policy (Spreen & Vally 2010, pp. 430, 435).

As such, most studies on post-apartheid basic education policy are premised on the traditional definition of policy, which continuously recycles and confirms policy discourses. Most significantly, this technical-rational definition of policy emanates from orthodox understandings of government as an ahistorical and given entity through its association, and at times conflation, with the state. This is accepted conceptual practice. Seen in this way, studies which evaluate policy do so from the narrow viewpoint that 'policy is what governments do', as opposed to viewing policy as subjected to, and constituted by, a wide range of discursive practices which is the critical approach (Bacchi 2000, p. 48; Dean 2009, p. 9; Soudien et al. 2001, p. 79; Spreen & Vally 2010, p. 430). Within post-apartheid education policy research, the majority of inquiries – predominantly structuralist and empirical-rational in orientation – and the ideas they perpetuate, have failed to bring about ways of understanding and analysing basic education policy outside of its traditional conceptualisation (Tikly 2003, p. 161). They are also underlaid by the view that implementing education policy "is a process in which the experience of practice has to be drawn on to continuously interrogate the original vision, not to reject it" (Kraak & Young 2001, p. 4). Viewing policymaking as a process implies that it involves, and unfolds, within various stages – for example, agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy assessment. Since a predetermined and 'logical' sequence is followed, it is assumed to be a *rational* process (Jones (1977) and Anderson (1984) as cited in Lungu 2001, p. 93; Lungu 2001, p. 93; Spreen & Vally 2010, p. 434). Analytical frameworks based on this premise often evaluate each stage within the parameters of its

intelligibility and do not take into account, as Lungu (2001, p. 94) calls it, the 'peculiarities' (or 'discursivities') of policy and its formulation in different contexts.[10]

Pursued through so-called 'objective' and 'value-free' approaches[11], the majority of studies which interrogate basic education policy and its implementation in post-apartheid South Africa, can be said, therefore, to give "technical and scientific sophistication to the policy process in order to buttress its…[epistemological] legitimacy" (Olssen et al. 2006, p. 2). Instead of identifying or considering 'real problems out there', or the inability of basic education policy to address these 'problems', these types of studies contribute to the construction of certain policy 'problems' at the expense of others. They also set the limit, or the 'possibilities', of policy responses.[12] Although post-apartheid education policymakers have used research when formulating policy, Jansen has argued that this has been selective and that research is often employed to justify, as opposed to inform, policies (2003, p. 87). Despite the absence of a coordinated relationship between research and basic education policymaking, policy research and the "knowledge" it produces nevertheless have an impact on policy formulation. This is because, as Fischer has stressed, "inquiry is part of the same discursive medium [that] it studies" (2003, p. 41). The discourses that are recited serve to either disrupt or, in the case of mainstream educational research in South Africa, reaffirm "knowledge" boundaries. The role of policy in the assumed inevitability of statist forms of social organisation, therefore, is not put into question. Spreen and Vally (2010) suggest that what is necessary in this context is the

[10] Also see Spreen & Vally (2010, p. 431).

[11] This thesis takes issue with claims that certain social research is 'objective' and 'value-free'. All social research is conducted for a reason and, therefore, is non-objective, even when so-called 'scientific' methods are employed. The status afforded to 'scientific social research' in itself renders it political and employable for particular reasons. As Powers point out, "the ideals of objectivity, efficiency, prediction, control and value-freedom are themselves values" (2007, p. 22).

[12] As the Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development (PSPPD), a partnership between the European Union and The Presidency of South Africa aimed at promoting the development and employment of evidence-based research for policymaking, recently stated: "[g]ood quality research can help to uncover the extent of the problems and the underlying causes. This is important in deciding where to focus, as well as what interventions are needed to address the root causes" (Pedra 2011, p. 28).

advancement of a different conceptualisation and analysis of basic education policy; one that takes accounts of the constitutive effects of policy and which interrogates the problematisations *by*, rather than the 'problems' *of*, policy.

To address the aim of the study, which is to advance an alternative analysis of basic education policy which will highlight the limits of future policy reform efforts, this thesis does not employ the dominant definition of policy. Instead, in this study, policy is viewed as discourse. To understand this, we must once again turn to Foucault. Foucault defines discourse as "a group of statements that belong to a single system of formation" (2008, p. 212) or a discursive formation. Discourse is not simply "the expression of thought…[but] is a practice, with conditions, rules and historical transformations" (Moodley 2005, p. 17). Furthermore, because discourse is productive in nature, it systematically forms the objects of which it speaks (Danaher et al. 2010, p. x; Foucault 2008, p. 54). Drawing on these ideas, policy discourses can be understood as a "regulated practice [which] produce[s] frameworks of sense and obviousness with which policy is thought, talked and written about" (Ball 2006, p. 44). Put differently, the language of policy legitimises certain understandings of what policy is and what it 'can do' by constructing "knowledge" boundaries (Buckland 1982, p. 14). In this way, policy, to borrow Lemert and Gillan's frame, is language in practice (1982, p. 129). This premise allows the study of policy in this thesis to be freed from narrow and prescriptive frameworks as it is understood "on its own terms, […] as having a material effect in its own right" (Hindess (1997) as cited in Tikly 2003, p. 172). What will be accentuated and analysed are the language of policy and the claims to "truth" this language seeks to advance through political and other practices that identify and create the limits of policy intervention.

This conceptualisation of policy unsettles orthodox understandings of government qua the state and the way it is studied. Instead of a technical or instrumentalist analysis, the

objective of this thesis is to highlight the political rationalities – in line with Foucault's study of governmentality (discussed in the next section) – which have informed post-apartheid basic education policy. This objective will draw on the research of Tikly (2003), which argues that government in post-apartheid South Africa has been informed by both a liberal and neo-liberal mentality of rule. These will be highlighted in the context of the post-1994 negotiated settlement and will enable a "consideration of the *autonomous effects* of rationalities of government on shaping the possibilities of policy and invoking different forms of power" (Tikly 2003, p. 161, my emphasis). Such an analysis will also make possible an exploration of the self-styled 'unintentional' consequences of basic education policy by examining what role these rationalities played in giving shape to certain policy effects. In light hereof, the following research question will be explored by this thesis: *How have post-apartheid political rationalities informed basic education policy and its practice during the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa?*

As already noted, the methodology that will be employed to answer this question will draw on Foucault's governmentality research. But, before we consider this, it is necessary to outline the broad analytical approach, namely post-structuralism, to which Foucault's work and this study broadly ascribe to. This is an important reflection, considering the challenge that this study aims to direct towards mainstream approaches that are employed to study post-apartheid basic education policy.

1.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH

For the purpose of this section, an overview of Foucault's writings as part of the emergence of post-structuralism is given. In order to do this, Foucault's work is treated as an

event or an occurrence that is more befittingly contextualised in relation to "its external conditions of existence" (Foucault (1969) as cited in Lemert & Gillan 1982, p. 4). This is related to Foucault's rejection of the linear progression in traditional accounts of history and his advancement, rather, of the idea of history as a series of ruptures and discontinuities. By following this approach, those thoughts and movements which operated exteriorly to Foucault's writings are highlighted to make visible "his place, as an event, in series which act[ed] as intellectual forces" (Lemert & Gillan 1982, p. 7). This is opposed to framing his work as responses *directly* related to and born of *definite* intellectual and theoretical debates. Such a positioning of Foucault's work can be found in Dreyfus and Rabinow's book, *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (1982), which claims that Foucault's work seeks to

> avoid the *structuralist analysis* of which eliminates notions of meaning altogether and substitutes a formal model of human behaviour as rules governed transformations of meaningless elements; to avoid the *phenomenological project* of tracing all meaning back to the meaning-giving activity of an autonomous, transcendental subject; and finally to avoid the attempt of commentary to read off the implicit meaning of social practices as well as the *hermeneutic unearthing* of a different and deeper meaning of which social actors are only dimly aware (ibid, p. xix-xx, my emphasis).

Apart from engagements with phenomenology, Marxism and psychoanalytical theory, Foucault's work largely problematises the assumptions underpinning structuralism. Structuralism itself is broadly considered to advance the 'scientific' study of human behaviour by focusing on the relations governing it (Danaher et al. 2010, p. 7). Moreover, it holds the view that objects within the human or social sciences are constituted by relations or structures

that "enable elements to function individually as signs" (Young 1981, p. 3).[13] Foucault rejected the status afforded to science by structuralism although some of his earlier work was criticised for its "flirtation with rational structuralism" (Gutting 1993, p. 264). The interrogation, as opposed to displacement, of structuralism has been labelled post-structuralism. This term, as Young points out, somewhat misrepresents the assumptions informing this movement (1981, pp. 1-2). The prefix, 'post', suggests the 'fall' of structuralism which is not what post-structuralism contends. Post-structuralism is not a concept in itself but instead represents views expressed in a variety of disciplines that converge under its 'name' and, therefore, it lacks a discernable source (ibid). Although Foucault's work is frequently labeled post-structuralist, to propose that his work is a 'pure' manifestation of the assumptions underlying post-structuralism is misguided.

Post-structuralism emerged during the 1960s in Europe through a series of 'conceptual events' that drew heavily on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), a 19th Century German philosopher. Nietzsche's writings, among others, on morality, religion and science, questioned the value and objectivity of "truth". Nietzsche's work, and the interpretation thereof by a fellow German, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), resulted in a groundswell of theories that problematised the 'scientific' undercurrent of structuralism. Foucault, for example, employed a revised interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy that rejected, as noted previously, orthodox history's search for origins and continuities. Other French scholars followed suit. Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) furthered Nietzsche's take on modern philosophy's propensity to universalise by examining the role and function of language as narratives, whereas Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) questioned the governance of binaries by showing that within a binary, one concept is subordinate to another which can be unraveled and dislodged through deconstruction (Peters & Burbules 2004, pp. 18-19).

[13] Also see Caws (1997).

A central concern for these and other scholars who problematise structuralist assumptions is the role language plays in granting certain "knowledges" the status of "truth" and the representation of language as a closed, coherent system (MacLure 2003, p. 176; Peters & Burbules 2004, p. 4). Post-structuralism also seeks to deconstruct the conceptualisations of how the subject is thought about but, at the same time, 'dissolves' the subject. This is because scholars who draw on post-structural trends – such as Foucault and Derrida – did not develop a "theory of the subject" (Sarup 1993, p. 2). It is perhaps useful then to consider these two movements, that is, structuralism and post-structuralism, as 'thought-interactions' in which Foucault was an event in as much as his work sought to transcend phenomenology and hermeneutics, and while remaining neither fully structuralist nor *purely* post-structuralist. His work, however, did bear traces of both the latter movements in the way it responded to post-structuralist and structuralist ideas and the way in which these movements set the limits of his responses (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p. xix; Lemert & Gillan 1982, p. 7). Although Foucault's early work failed to circumvent the dominant current of Marxism and existentialism at that time, the emerging theme of his writings was the problematisation of what was considered "true" and rational, and what was deemed "knowledge" (Prado 2000, p. 10). These same questions also lie at the heart of the analysis advanced in this study.

By employing Foucault's work, this thesis broadly ascribes to a post-structural framework. Despite operating within a variety of disciplines in the human and social sciences, post-structuralism within education research is largely absent and "will be resisted for some time to come" (Peters & Humes 2003, p. 111). The dominance of 'scientifically-oriented' approaches in this domain of inquiry has produced a research tradition concerned with observable 'realities' by claiming that 'facts' and 'values' are separable through the promotion of 'universal', 'a priori' methods of 'science'. This has contributed to education research's

conservative nature which is descendent from the Enlightenment's conventions of 'objective', 'rational' and 'scientific' views of the social world (Grace 1998, p. 202; Peters 1999, p. 1; Peters & Humes 2003, p. 35). However, the use of 'science' to explain the social is not, as Foucault and others have shown, apolitical. Instead, its claims to "truth" serve particular interests and its status is used to construct a particular kind of 'reality'. A variety of other approaches and assumptions have and continue to suggest the plurality of understandings and, therefore, any form of research, as Ball points out, is "thoroughly enmeshed 'in' the social and 'in' the political" (2006, p. 15).

Peters and Burbules attribute the waning appeal of post-structural education research to its so-called unfamiliar and complex vocabulary (2004, p. 4).[14] The critique of especially dominant discourses and institutions inherent to post-structuralism and the lack of established post-structural methods due to its reflexive discourse are also advanced as possible reasons for its marginal use in education research. So, the 'challenges' post-structuralism present are also not well received, unsurprisingly so, by some in the academy and elsewhere "where currency and 'relevance' are often elevated over purely intellectual exploration for its own sake" (Peters & Burbules 2004, p. 4). This follows the earlier claim that structuralist and empiricist approaches have dominated research within the field of basic education and its policy in post-apartheid South Africa. Such approaches, however, overvalue their intelligibility and undervalue error and limit (Lemert & Gillan 1982, p. 21; Tikly 2003, p. 161). Although studies informed by post-structural assumptions and ambitions of basic education in South Africa are discernable (see Fardon & Schoeman 2010; Prinsloo 2007; Soudien & Baxen 1997; van Rooyen et al. 2004), they remain marginal due to the state's acknowledgement and employment of certain types of research ('evidence-based', 'scientific', 'value-free') which

[14] Also see Young (1981, p. 7).

produce certain kinds of "knowledges" ('objective', 'verifiable', 'result-oriented').[15] The effect of this is that approaches which challenge the status quo are sidelined.

As already established, this thesis assumes a critical position towards claims to "truth" and so-called objective "knowledge". The mainstream definition of policy is thereby dismissed in favour of the view of 'policy as discourse' constructed by discursive practices. Furthermore, speaking to post-structural assumptions, the language of policy – which masks the "knowledge-power" relations constitutive of it – is central to this study. The goal is to undermine "the tyranny of 'common sense' and the lauding of reason" (Downing 2008, p. 10) invoked by a language that promotes the appropriateness and accurateness of basic education policy. It is, however, not education policymakers that will constitute the object of this thesis but, rather, the discourses in which subject and object positions function. Policymakers are thus viewed as "spoken by policies, [taking] up the positions constructed for [them] within policies" (Ball 1994, p. 22). Drawn together, these (post-structurally informed) assumptions will drive the disruption, not replacement, of epistemological orthodoxies with regard to the formulation, content and 'aims' of basic education policy in post-apartheid South Africa. The study will also seek to challenge, as Peters and Humes frame it, the ahistorical and atheoretical nature of educational thinking in general (2003, p. 112).

[15] A recent advertorial published in the weekly South African newspaper, the *Mail & Guardian*, gives expression to this claim, that is, that the state favours 'evidence-based', or 'scientific', research when making policy decisions. In it, the PSPPD (see footnote 12) states that "[r]esearch evidence can help us understand the complexity of…[poverty and inequality in South Africa]…and, crucially, guide us in deciding what needs to be done about them…and by whom" (Pedra, 2011, p. 28). It further argues that "[p]olicy-making is a highly complex process influenced by many factors, ranging from people's beliefs, values, knowledge and vested interests to structural, cultural and financial constraints. But with the use of good quality *empirical evidence*, policy-makers can navigate their way through this often difficult terrain" (ibid).

1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 Foucault's Analytics of Governmentality

In order for this thesis to analyse "how language can be an instrument of power it is necessary to extend the concept of power itself" (Olssen et al. 2006, p. 66) beyond its usual state-centric locale. This orientation is found in Foucault's 'analytics of governmentality'. In his 1978 and 1979 lectures at the *Collège de France*, Foucault conceptualised government as those actions that guide and direct the 'conduct' of populations; the 'conduct of conduct'.[16] Phrased differently, government involves "the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end" (de la Perrière (1567) as cited in Foucault 1978b, p. 96). Instead of a purely institutional analysis of government, which is inherent to the idea of a central power (the state) "extending its sway throughout society by means of an extension of its control apparatuses" (Rose 1990, p. 5), an analytics of governmentality delineates the exploration of the different 'ways of thinking', or the 'mentalities of rule', that historically shaped certain practices of government (Gillies 2008, p. 415). Rather than employing universal concepts like 'state', 'sovereignty' and 'society' "as an obligatory grid of intelligibility [when considering] certain concrete practices", Foucault suggests that we "start with…concrete practices, and…pass these universals through the grid of these practices" (1979, pp. 2-3). A governmentality-centered approach involves studying "how…[a] way of governing develops, what its history is, how it expands, how it contracts, how it is extended to a particular domain, and how it invents, forms, and develops new practices" (ibid, p. 6). Changes in governmental practices then are

[16] Since Foucault's lectures on governmentality were only recently transcribed and translated into English, studies of governmentality in this language only gained widespread recognition from the 1990s onwards (Simons & Masschelein 2006, p. 420). Important initial publications on governmentality were made by Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996), Burchell et al. (1991) and Dean (1997), who both introduced and applied Foucault's analysis of governmental rationalities to themes inspired by his lectures, specifically focusing on liberalism and neo-liberalism within contemporary case studies. Since then, the diverse use of governmentality has given rise to what some consider a new sub-discipline across the human and social sciences (Gane & Johnson (1993) as cited in Dean 2009, p. 2).

attributable to the rearticulation and reconstitution of political rationalities. This stands in contrast to writings which start with (and give authority to) orthodox universal concepts such as the 'state' which are often employed, to use Foucault's analogy, as 'puppet masters' that direct the organisation of certain historical practices and the way we study them (ibid).

So, the term governmentality is used in different ways. In the first instance, the neologism encapsulates the idea that certain *mentalities* of rule informed historical practices of *government*. This meaning changes when governmentality is employed as a verb. As we have already seen, Foucault refers to the approach that is employed to study these mentalities as an 'analytics of governmentality'.[17] Such an approach focuses on the "knowledges", practices, texts and subjectivities of a regime of government and the historically specific features that determined its emergence, rearticulation and reconstitution (Dean 2009, pp. 20-21). As will become plain, however, another meaning is ascribed to the term governmentality by Foucault. Here governmentality delineates the rationalities which gave rise to and constituted modern states in Europe, namely, *raison d' État* and 'police reason'. Foucault argues that *raison d' État* emerged as a secular rationality following the breakdown of pastoral power during the 17th Century. Its concern was principally with the survival and functioning of the *state*. Police reason, which developed during the early part of the 18th Century, aimed to increase the strength, or 'force', of the state through surveillance and regulatory practices (Foucault 1978b, p. 313). These rationalities introduced and reinforced a new form of social organisation: the state. For Foucault, the move from feudal to state rule was informed by the development of a (secular) governmental rationality, or governmentality, out of which forms of liberal government developed. Liberal and neo-liberal reasoning, which emerged as rearticulations of *raison d' État* and police reason, together are referred to as modern governmentality by

[17] Unless indicated otherwise, this thesis predominantly employs the second understanding when referring to governmentality.

Foucault (Death 2011, pp. 4-9; Foucault 1978b, p. 227). By highlighting the broad political rationalities that historically constituted the organisation and regulation of European societies, Foucault demonstrates that modern mentalities of rule bear traces of this historical or genealogical trajectory.

Although Foucault principally studied the *ways of thinking* about government, employing a governmentality approach according to Dean (2009), Rose and Miller (1992) and Tikly (2003), can also involve studying the governmental programmes and the practices (or technologies) of government employed to govern populations. Governmental programmes are concerned with translating political rationalities into the "actual measures that affect populations", whereas governmental practices are the actions by governments which serve to "put political rationalities and programmes into effect" (Tikly 2003, p. 165). Through this optic, governmental policy can be viewed as "functioning at the interface of programmes and…[practices] of government" (ibid). Simply put, governmental programmes are made intelligible through government policies which aim to implement these programmes with the goal of speaking to the overriding political rationality or rationalities of government. Drawing on the earlier definition of policy as discourse, governmental programmes are then presented to the public through the language of policy produced by regulated practices. This is not to suggest that government policy unambiguously reflects the political rationality or rationalities informing it, since it has to navigate a range of governmental programmes and at times conflicting political rationalities (ibid, pp. 165-166) This was particularly the case in South Africa following the period of negotiation and the political settlement of 1994 which saw a wide range of discursive factors influencing policymaking.

1.3.2 Employing Governmentality

As a former Dutch and British Colony, the rationalities analysed by Foucault in his governmentality research are of relevance to South Africa vis-à-vis the way political government was 'rationalised' through its appropriation and reconstitution of these mentalities. Given this thesis' concern with *post-apartheid* basic education policy, an analytics of governmentality will be advanced to trace the ways in which the practice of government was thought about and constituted during apartheid rule (1948-1994), as well as the reconsideration and rearticulation hereof, during the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa. Despite obvious departures in apartheid's logic, a governmentality analysis enables an evaluation of the discontinuities as well as the continuities of this logic into post-1994 political reasoning. An analysis of political reasoning aims to show how this logic informed the development of the parameters of post-apartheid basic education policy in terms of the problems and solutions it identified. To do this, Foucault's study of governmentality, which explores what he calls the 'governmentalitsation of the state' in Europe (Dean 1997, p. 183), will be outlined in Chapter 2. This will serve as the theoretical framework of the two levels of analysis of this thesis. The purpose of advancing two analyses is related to the research question of this study which, to remind ourselves, is concerned with establishing how post-apartheid political rationalities informed basic education policy and its practice. Addressing this question is dependent, firstly, on a discussion and evaluation of the specific political rationalities in question, where after its influence on basic education policy during the first fifteen years of democracy can be established.

The first analysis in Chapter 3 will follow Foucault's lines of enquiry and will attempt to trace the ways of thinking about government during apartheid and after. This discussion will be guided in particular by the research of Tikly (2003) which argues that governing in post-

apartheid South Africa has been informed by both a liberal and neo-liberal mentality of rule. The second analysis, which will be provided in Chapter 4, will highlight the ways in which post-apartheid political reasoning informed basic education policy and its practice. This will be considered in the context of the negotiation process and the resultant political settlement.[18] Both analyses will draw on policy documents, legislation and other relevant publications on governing to study political reasoning and its influence on basic education policy. Based on these analyses, the final Chapter of this study will explore the conditions of intervention created by these policy problematisations and how these will shape future policy reform efforts within basic education. Underlying this consideration is the view that policy reform is an activity central to the practice of government and statist conceptions of power. As was argued in the foothills of this Chapter, the continuous process of problematisation by policy renders the idea of government both intelligible and implementable (Rose (1999) as cited in Higgins 2004, p. 459). The study aims to advance an alternative analysis of basic education policy to show what limits of reform have been generated by this policy during the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa. It aims, therefore, to analyse basic education policy in a way that disrupt, as opposed reinforce, "knowledge" boundaries. This will be in contrast to mainstream research which has failed to illuminate the productive role of and power relations within post-apartheid basic education policy. To better contrast this study to mainstream research, the next section provides a short overview on some of the approaches that have been used to analyse basic education policy since 1994.

[18] Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the methodology that will be followed by both levels of analysis.

1.4 CONTEXTUALISING THE STUDY

1.4.1 Post-Apartheid Basic Education Policy Research

Given the critique this thesis aims to extend towards mainstream analyses of basic education policy, it is necessary to consider the dominant approaches in the field in order for the shortcomings of these to be identified. As a start is Chisholm's appraisal of education policy research in South Africa since 1994, in which she claims that "[t]here can…be little doubt that the social sciences and educational research have not been neutral and that the state continues to legitimate specific forms of knowledge and those specific forms of knowledge support policy" (2002, p. 95). Tikly suggests that the conservative epistemological trajectory of policy and its research in South Africa can be traced back to the introduction of the Total Strategy by the apartheid state in the late 1970s which included a number of repressive and reformative strategies intended to meet the increased international and regional pressures. Integral to this was the *South African Plan for the Human Sciences* (HSRC 1980), published in 1980, which sought to produce scientifically oriented research relevant to the reform efforts of the Total Strategy. This led to the reconstitution of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa and an increase in social 'scientific' research through the use of statistical and other empirical methods of research (Tikly 2003, p. 167). After 1994, however, the employment of international consultants and management firms to assist the transformation of sectors such as education, health and social services, has ensured both a continuation and rupture in the conservative approaches to policy enquiry through "extending and deepening the use of statistical techniques, neo-classical economics and management theory" (ibid). Tikly goes on to say that this has

> linked social policy in South Africa to a global archive of knowledge about populations and suitable policy options held by the international financial institutions

> and sections of the donor community. The expanded HSRC has also continued in its trajectory of becoming more out-ward-looking and to undertake and commission research in order to support public policy. For the most part, this knowledge is based on rational-scientific modes of enquiry in line with dominant, global positivist research paradigms (ibid).

Buttressing this approach is the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa – an umbrella agency established in 1999 in accordance with the *National Research Foundation Act* (RSA 1998b) which broadly funds, develops and coordinates research between funding agencies (NRF 2010) – which is also "primarily concerned with funding empirical research to support national policy priorities" (Tikly 2003, p. 168).

Linked to this approach are Western understandings of policy that have not only informed, as the title of Vally and Spreen's 2006 paper suggests, the 'globalisation of education policy and practices in South Africa', but also influenced the kinds of research that are conducted within the field of education policy research.[19] Similar technocratic and empiricist tendencies in Western policy research are visible in research orientations operative in the post-apartheid research space in South Africa. This means that averred 'value-free', 'evidence-based' research is often legitimised by its relationship to the state and whether the "knowledge" it produces is deemed 'normal' as opposed to 'delinquent'.[20] In another paper, Spreen and Vally argue that Western approaches to studying education policy do not adequately take account of the local 'realities' of the Global South (2010, p. 442). Related to this is the dominant view of education as a 'function' of government which is reinforced by traditional

[19] Jansen points out that a variety of Western policy approaches were drawn on to formulate post-apartheid education policy. For example, the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) – a "standardized system of credits and qualifications" (1999a, p. 43) that seeks to integrate teaching and learning and create greater equality within the education system – was based on similar models in Australia and New Zealand (Jansen 2001). The development of the new OBE curriculum, adopted in South Africa 1997, was also based on similar models found in Australia and the United States (US).

[20] Research is legitimated, for example, by the state providing or denying funding for particular projects and particular projects being given a platform by the state (Chisholm 2002, p. 96; Jansen 2009; Tikly 2003).

constructions of the social world. These ideas, as Dean suggests, normalise "a certain set of received ways of thinking about questions of government" (2009, p. 9). In South Africa, such ways of thinking are preserved by continued orthodox understandings of the state which has led to its association with the "apparatuses or institutions of organised and formal political authority" (ibid). Perpetuating such modern "truths" is the South African Constitution which holds the description of South Africa as "one, sovereign, democratic state" (RSA 1996a). Building on this idea, South Africa's Department of Education (DoE)[21] is construed as a task or function of government with the mandate of securing the right of all South Africans to be educated (Asmal & James 2001, p. 187). By focusing on the DoE's ostensible responses to education reform, implicitly as an activity of the state, researchers and critics have operated in, and have been limited by, what is referred to as the 'legitimising arena of knowledge' (Soudien & Baxen 1997). These discursive connotations (between state and government) are evident in Fleisch's claim that "[t]he role of the state, or more precisely the role of the national and provincial departments of education in school change has re-emerged as a major research theme in education scholarship" (2002a, p. 1) in post-apartheid South Africa.

Fleisch's assertion is evidenced in mainstream definitions of education research. One such is Kamper's, which holds educational research – applicable to both basic and higher education – as "a particular mode of social service, using rigorous scientific endeavours for the continuous improvement of educational practices" (2004, p. 233). The statement not only reflects the state's implicit dictation of 'appropriate' research, but also strengthens statist understandings of education (see Fleisch 2002a). Kamper's view is revealing for two reasons,

[21] Following the 2009 General Election, South Africa's then national Department of Education (DoE) was split to form two departments, one for basic education and one for higher education. However, because this thesis is concerned with basic education policy during the Mandela (1994-1999) and Mbeki Presidencies (1999-2009), reference will be made to the DoE (*not* the Department of Basic Education) throughout the thesis. With regard to the latter dates, although Thabo Mbeki was recalled as President of the country in 2008, some of the policies which were developed during his terms in office were only 'amended' or 'changed' following the 2009 election. For this reason, Mbeki's terms in office, specifically in relation to policy, are dated 1999-2009 in this thesis.

the first of which is that education research serves particular social ends which, as he explains, should be informed by the national research agenda. In pursuit of this agenda, Kamper suggests that the HSRC is "the best position to set national research priorities and initiate national research programmes in the Human sciences" (2004, p. 234). Secondly, Kamper's emphasis on 'scientifically orientated' research promotes the appropriateness and validity of positivist-inspired outcomes that is in line with current market-related approaches in education research. The latter has stressed the need for inquiries that inform and support, among others, attempts at "improved planning and efficiency [as well as] improved policy implementation" (Chisholm 2002, p. 103) within the education sector, thereby legitimating research programmes such as the HSRC's that claims to conduct education research focused on "national priorities" (HSRC 2011b). Kamper's view of research thus conforms to the type of research employable by the state in the process of formulating, assessing and implementing policy.

A significant body of basic education policy research has accumulated since 1994 in South Africa. This was particularly so following the adoption of new legislation which sought to formalise the process of education reform. By problematising the content, suitability and implementation of basic education policy, the majority of these studies are conducted and circulated within the discursive parameters of policy as set by the state. They embody a liberal technology of government by drawing upon the "truths" about society as enshrined in policy texts and eventually as they appear in law (Bastalich 2009). This is particularly apparent in the research conducted by the HSRC which is judged to be 'relevant' and which contributes to the process of education reform.[22] In 2001, for example, the HSRC published *Education in Retrospect. Policy and Implementation Since 1990*, edited by Kraak and Young. The goal of the volume is to present a conversation which occurred between education scholars critiquing

[22] On the Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) website, the parastatal organisation claims to conduct "large-scale, policy-relevant, social-scientific projects for public-sector users, non-governmental organisations and international development agencies" (HSRC 2011a).

education policy, specifically post-apartheid curriculum reform, and the response to this by policymakers at a Round Table discussion organised by the HSRC in 2000. Introducing the collection, Kraak and Young argue for the value of 'retrospective analyses'[23] of education policy within what they call the 'theory-policy-practice' nexus. Following this approach, the discussion and edited collection gave rise to three perspectives on post-apartheid curriculum reform policies: firstly, that curriculum policies (or aspects thereof) are flawed – explored in the Chapters by Jansen, Miller and Young; secondly, that problems surrounding curriculum policies are related to inadequate implementation, not content – argued by Rensburg, Cosser and Macun; and, lastly, endorsed by Kraak and Young, that political, pedagogic or curricular and administrative issues all play a role in the direction of curriculum and that retrospective analyses that bridge the first two perspectives appear more useful in the evaluation and reform of education policy (Young & Kraak 2001, pp. 8-9). Despite critical assessments, the general thrust of the volume considers the 'problems' with education policy within the policy parameters set by the state. It speaks, therefore, to Balls' assessment that "much of what passes for theoretically informed research lacks any sense of critical distance or reflexivity about its own production and procedures and its claims to knowledge about the social" (Ball (1997) as cited in Gale 2001, p. 379). Furthermore, the theory-policy-practice framework employed in the volume limits the scope of the analyses to three 'stages' or 'aspects' of education policy which is informed by traditional understandings of policy and which, of course, it reinforces.[24]

Another mainstream approach is the neo-liberal assessment advanced in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) report on the progress

[23] Retrospective analysis in the context of Kraak and Young's volume refer to the coming together of policy researchers and makers in a process of analysis that acknowledges the different contexts of researchers and policymakers, articulates a theoretical framework and based "empirically-based international comparisons" (Young & Kraak 2001, p. 15) in the analysis of past policies.

[24] Other publications by the HSRC which also employ traditional understandings and analyses of education policy include Maile (2008) and Peltzer et al. (2005).

and challenges of basic and higher education policies in post-apartheid South Africa. This report – published in 2008 and partially funded by the South African government – received input from the DoE and the University of the Witwatersrand's Education Policy Unit.[25] The report claims that under the ambit of the OECD, the governments of its thirty member countries "work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation" (OECD 2008, p. 2). Unsurprisingly, the discourses employed in the traditional analysis it presents are anchored in neo-liberal understandings of the state, government and market. The report provides an assessment of the 'state' of basic and higher education in South Africa and the 'challenges' it faces within the areas of governance, financing and curriculum implementation (OECD 2008). It also provides policy and structural recommendations in response to these 'challenges'. Similar to Kraak and Young's volume, the OECD report recites and circulates policy discourses, providing no critical insight to the "knowledges" or rationalities that gave rise to the policies and the interests these seek to advance. The report furthermore buttresses the dominance of neo-liberal discourses in education which construct the latter "instrumentally towards fulfilling vocational and economic goals in order to produce skilled workers with the requisite ability to compete in a globalised economy" (Spreen & Vally 2010, p. 443).

Elsewhere, books and journal publications on basic education policy in South Africa often take as its object what is called the 'policy gap' (Sayed 2002) – a term which encapsulates claims that education policy documents are 'idealistic' texts which are not grounded in, or responsive to, everyday 'realities' (Christie 1999, p. 282). Sayed and Jansen call this policy gap "a mismatch between policy intentions, policy practice and policy effects" (2001, p. 6). Periodically, the gap is evaluated by, say, the problematisation of policy-content,

[25] The DoE and the University of Witwatersrand's Education Policy Unit provided the 'background information' that was used to contextualise the report (OECD 2008).

the implementation process and other related concerns. Motala (1999), for example, attributes the poor quality of education in the country to policies that are not attuned to the complex nature of its social and cultural contexts. Similarly, Soudien (2007) speaks of the disconnect between, what he calls, the form (political and administrative apparatus) and substance (policy framework) of the South African government. This, he suggests, explains the lack of quality education. Christie (1999), for her part, suggests that the formulation of education policies by the DoE – to be implemented by the provincial departments – implicitly drew a sharp distinction at the onset between the formulation and implementation of policy. Although critical in intent, by employing the traditional definition of policy in the theorisation and assessment of the policy gap, the productive nature of policy is again neglected by all these studies. A policy as discourse approach could offer new explanations for the supposed disconnect between policy and practice – as possibly unintended but, nevertheless, productive, effects of policy discourses. Again drawing on Spreen and Vally, the 'policy gap approach' in South Africa has also promoted the idea of policy as a process, consisting out of predetermined stages. This has prioritised the study of policy implementation or outcomes over the policies themselves (2010, p. 434).

From the forgoing, it is clear that more nuanced understandings of the effects of policy discourses and their impact on future reform efforts are lacking in education policy research and thinking in South Africa. Motala (2001) makes the point that analyses frequently focus on the immediate, as opposed to long-term, effects of current education policies. This thesis agrees with this observation. But while Motala is referring to the long-term structural effects of education policy, the argument is interested in the constitutive effects of policy discourses. Based on the limits of intervention, policy discourses are mostly rearticulated as opposed to 'invented' by future reform efforts. The effects of policy, in as much as it sets *future* boundaries

for policy intervention, do then deserve attention. In an attempt to address this lacuna in the research, this thesis will approach basic education policy from an alternative epistemological footing – by framing it as discourse. Ultimately the aim is "to improve policy argumentation", not by presenting more accurate data or by revealing some hidden "truth", which is the conventional form, but by showing how certain "knowledges" are drawn on in policy articulation and how the "discursive structure of an argument itself has an impact on the deliberative process" (Fischer 2003, p. ix).

Another deficiency in basic education policy research is the scarcity of approaches that operate outside of the frameworks of traditional policy analysis and which take the "historical dimension of all human reality" (Tamboukou 1991, p. 203) into consideration. Fischer argues that a discursive approach to understanding policy formulation not be seen as an outright rejection of empirical research. Rather, he says, a discursive analysis "seeks to show that we need a much more refined understanding of the interactions that construct reality, in particular the way the empirical is embedded in the normative" (2003, p. viii). It is also clear that post-structural approaches in policy research are needed. These could ask critical questions about what basic education policy in South Africa is presented as and what "truths" it seeks to create and, indeed, perpetuate. Studies that have employed post-structural approaches to study education policy discourses in South Africa include those by Lugg (2009), Prinsloo (2007), Sayed (1997, 1999), van Rooyen et al (2004) and Weber (2005). Of particular relevance to this thesis are governmentality studies of education policy. The next section will consider the use of governmentality in education research abroad as well as the studies of Christie (2006), Gulson and Fataar (2011), and of Tikly (2003) who, similar to this study, employ a governmentality approach to analyse education policy in South Africa.

1.4.2 Governmentality and Education Research

Although Foucault makes reference to education and the role of educational institutions in disciplinarian forms of power (Simons & Masschelein 2006, p. 418), the history, practices or politics of education are not central concerns of his *oeuvre*. Despite this, Foucault's work and its "useful tools, concepts and styles of problematisations" (Gordon 2009, pp. xi-xii) have come to influence education research in many parts of the world in significant ways. This is especially so of Foucault's genealogical writings and, more recently, his study of governmentality. Despite its scant use in education research in South Africa, governmentality has been widely employed within education and education policy research in Australia, Canada, Europe and the United States (US) (Fimyar 2008). Fimyar (2008), Gillies (2008), Olssen et al. (2006), Peters et al (2009), and Simons and Masschelein (2006) have reflected on and presented the various forms of analyses enabled by governmentality of educational practices and policy. Other examples include Christie and Sidhu (2006) who employ a governmentality approach to consider the governance of refugee and asylum seekers in Australia. More specifically, they evaluate the impact that these hierarchical and dividing governing practices – informed by so-called concerns with state security – have on the provision of education (or lack thereof) to refugee and asylum-seeking children. In the US, Nadesan (2009) takes issue with the management of autistic children by highlighting the sometimes repressive tactics exercised over such children in mainstream schools. Due to neo-liberal funding structures and the assessment and rewards of teachers based on the aggregate test scores of learners, autistic children are often constructed as 'at-risk', 'ungovernable' and 'in need of discipline' due to a lack of adequate resources to facilitate them at school and because 'special needs' learners tend to bring down class aggregates. Simons and Masschelein, for their part, advance a broader analysis of governmentality by contending that the

"governmentalization of learning" (2008, p. 393) has become key in the working of the 'conduct of conduct' within advanced liberal societies. They argue that the idea of an 'active' and participatory citizenry has become synonymous with the advancement of democratic governance. In order to produce such a citizenry, 'socialisation' in terms of the norms informing that society is necessary. So, learning, which extends beyond formal education to a wider "process…to generate [democratic] competencies" (ibid, p. 391), has become "both a force of adaptation for entrepreneurial self-government and an instrument to secure the adaptation or added value of capital within society" (ibid, p. 413).

In South Africa, apart from the publications by Christie (2006), Gulson and Fataar (2011) and Tikly (2003), the use of governmentality in education research is thin. Tikly attributes this to the Western-centric focus of Foucault's analysis of governmentality as well as the generally 'limited penetration' of post-structural thought in educational research in South Africa (2003, p. 161). With regard to the analyses advanced by Tikly and by Christie on South African education, both point to the tensions between liberal and neo-liberal rationalities constituting the post-apartheid political sphere by evaluating the funding structure and curriculum content of the basic education system. The commitment by the post-apartheid state to ensure equal access to quality education for all learners in South Africa – informed by a liberal rationality of government – has been curtailed by neo-liberal measures which have had an impact on the funding available to the DoE. The latter has resulted in the 'progressive' OBE curriculum, Curriculum 2005 (C2005), failing to be adequately implemented in the majority of schools because its success was dependent on the availability of resources and on highly skilled teachers. Due to a strain on finances, schools that required extra support and that lacked basic resources struggled to implement OBE (Christie 2006, p. 379; Tikly 2003, pp. 11-13). These were chiefly rural and township schools. For their part, Gulson and Fataar examine neo-liberal governmentality in post-apartheid South Africa by focusing on the 'marketisation' of education

which they claim has reproduced apartheid's racial inequalities. In particular, they critique the policy of 'deracialising' school choice after 1994 and contend that this policy reinforced the effects of the spatial demographics of apartheid's reasoning. By also drawing on urban policy studies, they argue that just as urban technologies of government inform education policy and its practices, so education policy "is constitutive of contemporary cities" (Fataar (2009), Gulson (2011), Lipman (2011) paraphrased by Gulson & Fataar 2011, p. 274). The continued racialised rural/urban divide in South Africa, therefore, has been reproduced in part through the education system which itself, after almost seventeen years of democracy, has remained segregated, unequal and cast along racial lines.

Although the analyses of Christie, Gulson and Fataar, and of Tikly have opened up a new space in which to consider post-apartheid education policy, their research is not exhaustive. Since their writing predominantly focuses on post-apartheid political rationalities, the reasoning that informed apartheid rule is either underdeveloped or neglected in their publications. The present work seeks to draw attention to the illiberal rationality of apartheid and will focus on the continuities and discontinuities between apartheid and post-apartheid mentalities of rule. To do this, this study will also consider the period of negotiation (1990-1993) that preceded South Africa's first democratic elections since this process prevented a complete break with the logic of apartheid. It will also trace how post-1994 political rationalities (liberal and neo-liberal) have informed and have constrained basic education policy and have set the limits for future reform efforts. Tikly's brief analysis of 'risk' calculation and management by the post-apartheid state will be developed deeper in this thesis and will serve as an instance of the intersection of political rationalities, government policies and practices of government and the effects of these on basic education policy.

1.5 CRITIQUING FOUCAULT

As Foucault's work is essential to this thesis, it is important to highlight some of the advantages of as well as address the criticisms often leveled against his work. The advantages of employing Foucault's work to study basic education policy are manifold. This is because Foucault's work puts "different sorts of questions on the agenda for change…[because it looks] at and beyond the obvious" (Ball 1994, p. 2). As a result, it serves to broaden the possibilities of research to disrupt orthodox understandings and methodologies through, as we have already argued, the promotion of a post-structural approach to basic education policy analysis. In contrast, the frequently sterile and 'scientific' language that is used by government and researchers to account for the so-called failure of post-apartheid basic education policy, masks political interests. This is buttressed by studies that profess to be 'objective' and 'value-free'. By claiming its political agenda, Foucault's work seeks to show that all research is conducted for a reason, and that his approach can "address…both the rarity of statements and the power of affirmation" (Dean 1997, p. 33) which is neglected by the mainstream. Furthermore, the Foucauldian approach to viewing policy as discourse takes account of the productive nature of policy, something which is absent in more traditional discourse approaches in policy studies. Another advantage of the present study follows the criticism of governmentality analyses of policy which claims that "the policy concept confines itself to a definition of governmental programmes and/or technologies, leaving such dimensions of policy as discourse and policy as process under-conceptualised" (Fimyar 2008, p. 14). This work will incorporate an understanding of policy as discourse into an analysis of governmentality so that the discourses that informed policy texts as well as their productive effects can be highlighted.

Turning to the criticisms of Foucault work on governmentality, we must note that the relevance of his analyses in non-Western contexts is often brought into question (Williams

1997). Governmentality has been used to study post-colonial and post-communist contexts (Fimyar 2008, p. 13) and can be said to be relevant in at least two ways in the present work. Due to the import and intrusion of European ideas of religion, education and government – Dirk's (2001) "cultural technologies of rule" (as cited in Wagoner 2003, p. 783) – into the colonised world, the ways of thinking about government in colonial contexts were informed by European mentalities of rule. Secondly, non-Western societies helped to shape liberal ideas and practices of rule by contributing to the notion of liberalism's Other (Stokes (1959) as cited in Sigley 2006, p. 491). The latter was inherent in classic liberalism which saw the division of autonomous free subjects from segments of the populations that did not fit the criteria of 'rational' and 'autonomous'. Liberalism also promoted the cultivation of divisions internal to subjects as certain aspects of the self were disciplined through bio-political practices (Dean 2009, p. 132). It is necessary, therefore, to acknowledge the differences between the political rationalities and governmental practices that were employed in Europe and the manner in which these were reconceptualised and customised to fit colonial 'realities'. As a result, this should be "understood in its historical variation according to specific regimes of practices and forms of rationality" (ibid, p. 104).

A further concern often raised on Foucault's work is its descriptive nature of his analyses. For these critics, that Foucault's work generates new ways of understanding by exposing subjugated "knowledge" does not reveal how to do 'things differently' or how to 'move beyond' our current understanding. Foucault was wary of being prescriptive and disproved of the universal application of 'emancipatory' critical theories. This is because a priori theoretical objectifications are unable take account of the peculiarities and differences of power relations in different settings. That does not mean to suggest that a descriptive approach to discourse "does not…presuppose that everyday language and discursive practices are

innocent or neutral" (Norval 1996, p. 3); if anything, such an approach is underpinned by the assumption that discourse is socially constructed and "contingent [in] nature" (ibid). Subjugated "knowledge" can therefore be rendered visible by engaging – through description – with the context and practices of discourse. Practicing criticism, as in this thesis, serves to "[make] facile gestures difficult" (Kritzman 1988, p. 155) and, thereby, not only disrupt but dislodge dominant understandings that support power relations in policy argumentation (Foucault (2002) as cited in Gillies 2008, p. 426). The Chapters that demonstrate this will now be briefly discussed.

1.6 CHAPTER OUTLINES

Chapter 2 is concerned with providing an outline of the methodological approach – provided by Foucault's governmentality research – that is employed in this thesis. It firstly contextualises governmentality by discussing the movement in Foucault's genealogical work towards an analysis of the micro- and macro physics of power, that is, how power is exercised both on smaller, individualising, as well as on larger, more totalising scales. Foucault's analytics of governmentality is then presented by outlining the rationalities which constituted governmentality – *raison d' État* and police reason – as well as modern governmentality – liberalism and neo-liberalism – in Europe. This discussion shows how forms of liberal rule are constituted by earlier rationalities and that changes in governmental practices are linked to changes within political reasoning. The Chapter then considers the relevance of governmentality in this thesis. It is argued that European political reasoning was imported to and normalised in South Africa from the start of colonialism and that the rationalities identified by Foucault have a bearing on the conceptualisation of government in South Africa. This is further evidenced in adoption of both liberal and neo-liberal reasoning after 1994. Lastly, the

analytical approach that is employed to analyse governmental reasoning and basic education policy during the first fifteen years of democracy is outlined.

Chapter 3 advances the first level of analysis of this study which considers the rationalities that informed post-apartheid governing in South Africa. Brief critiques of apartheid's illiberal rationality as well as the period of negotiation are given. It is argued that governing during apartheid was informed by an illiberal, authoritarian rationality. This mentality sought to create the 'absolutisation of difference' between those who were considered 'worthy' (Whites) and those who were 'unworthy' (non-Whites) of freedom. The period of negotiation, however, had an impact on the ability of post-apartheid political reasoning to discontinue the logic of apartheid. This was because certain concessions had to be made between the negotiating parties and due to the 'solutions' offered by market economics in addressing underdevelopment and inequality. This is followed by a consideration of liberal and neo-liberal reasoning as post-apartheid governmental rationalities by outlining some of the policies and practices of the ANC government. It is argued that a liberal understanding of government was adopted in 1994, most notably expressed in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In 1996, a neo-liberal rationality was espoused as seen in the development of the Growth, Development and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. To illustrate the tensions between these political rationalities, the manner in which both calculated 'risk' to society is discussed. It is argued that two 'risk' strategies were developed, one for 'at-risk' citizens (informed by liberal reasoning) and one for 'active citizens' (informed by neo-liberal reasoning). The management of these strategies contributed to the reconstitution of apartheid's socio-economic inequalities. This is followed, finally, by a consideration of the continuities and discontinuities of apartheid's illiberal reasoning since democracy.

The second level of analysis is advanced in Chapter 4. The discursive changes which characterised the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid rule, which were navigated by political reasoning in its formulation of basic education policy, are considered in the first half of the Chapter. The policy proposals which were developed during the period of negotiation to transform the education system are firstly discussed. It is argued that the proposal to establish an integrated system of education and training became the dominant one and was adopted in 1994. This had a bearing on education and training being rationalised as 'appropriate' objects of post-apartheid governmental reasoning. Due to the pressures which the negotiated settlement placed on policymaking, education and training, however, continued to functioned as part of an integrated system only in name. This was buttressed by the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) policy which did not necessitate significant institutional transformation in its development of an integrated system of learning. Thereafter, the role that political reasoning played in the adoption of certain basic education policies after 1994 is considered in the second half of the Chapter. The new school funding policy as well as the rationalisation of teachers and of teacher training colleges are considered in this regard. These analyses show how that these policies contributed to the widening of inequalities within the basic education system due to the tensions within political reasoning. The extent to which the latter inequalities contributed to the reconstitution of socio-economic inequalities during the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa is also highlighted.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusions of this study and evaluates how these addressed the aim of the thesis. The aim of the study was to advance an alternative approach to analysing basic education policy to highlight the limits of future policy reform efforts. Following an overview of the objective of the thesis, as well as the methodology that was employed, the main arguments that were presented in the first and second level of analysis are briefly discussed.

The next section considers the main conclusions of the thesis. Specifically, it evaluates what impact the aforementioned arguments will have on future efforts to reform basic education policy. It also makes recommendations of future research on post-apartheid basic education policy.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

It must be possible to do the history of the state on the basis of men's [sic] actual practice, on the basis of what they do and how they think – Michel Foucault.[26]

This Chapter serves to contextualise and introduce Foucault's analytics of governmentality which, as we have seen, informs the methodological framework of this thesis. Within a post-structuralist framework, a methodology is considered the "'theory of knowledge and interpretive framework' guiding a particular research project" (Harding (1987) as cited in van Rooyen et al. 2004, p. 3) as opposed to a positivist conceptualisation that would view it as an "orderly way to achieve (objective) 'knowledge' or truth stories" (van Rooyen et al. 2004, p. 3). To enable the proposed analysis of basic education policy by this thesis, it is necessary to outline the assumptions that constitute Foucault's analytics of governmentality, as well as the insights advanced by this body of work. It should be noted that Foucault does not advance a theory of the state in his governmentality research. Likening a theory of the state to that of an "indigestible meal" (Lemke 2009, p. 35), Foucault describes the state as "nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities" (1978b, p. 358). Moreover, while new ways of thinking about governing are demonstrated by this approach, in an attempt to avoid prescription, Foucault also does not provide clear methodological guidelines for studying the so-called 'regime of multiple governmentalities'. The Chapter, therefore, will present the specific rationalities analysed by Foucault; not as a theory, but as a guideline, or tool, "for the critical analysis of political technologies and governmental rationalities in contemporary societies" (Lemke 2009, p. 37).

The Chapter opens with a broad outline of Foucault's genealogy. This body of work, historic in orientation, is concerned with articulating the surface play of domination in order to

[26] Foucault (1978b: 358).

call into question what is presented (or considered) as legitimate. The discussion highlights the assumptions that underpin Foucault's exploration of political rationalities and practices. As the first level of analysis is concerned with governing in post-apartheid South Africa, the rationalities that constitute what Foucault calls 'modern governmentality' – liberalism and neo-liberalism – are of greatest relevance to this thesis. However, because modern governmentality is constituted by rearticulations of earlier rationalities and, in order to follow the unfolding arguments in Foucault's thirty-five lectures on this topic (see Foucault 1978b, 1979), a brief discussion of the social paradigms that gave rise to modern governmentality is necessary. Thus, this early section outlines the emergence of the 'idea of government', traced back to Christian pastoral power by Foucault, followed by a schematic overview of his analysis of the rationalities that informed governmentality, *raison d' État* and police reason. Building upon these, the next section presents a detailed overview of liberal and neo-liberal reasoning in the discursive contexts explored in Foucault's research. Of interest, is how both these rationalities calculated 'risk' to society. This consideration, as previously mentioned, carries relevance for the analysis of post-apartheid political reasoning in this thesis. After this, it turns to elaborate on the applicability of the insights provided by Foucault's study of political reason and its relevance to this thesis. This is essential for this thesis because an understanding of post-apartheid basic education policy is contingent on the understanding of these rationalities and the dis/continuities between them. The Chapter closes with a discussion on the analytical approach followed by Foucault and its appropriation by this study.

2.1 CONSIDERING GENEALOGY

Spanning over two decades (1961-1984), Foucault's major works can be arranged within three broad domains of analysis, namely "of systems of knowledge (archaeology); of

modalities of power (genealogy); and of the self's relationship to itself (ethics)" (Davidson 1986). The thesis is concerned with the shift that occurred in Foucault's genealogical work from the accent on discourse towards a wider consideration of power and its role in the production of "knowledge" and "truth" by focusing on discursive and non-discursive, that is, social and institutional practices (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p. 105; Smart 2004, p. 47). Despite the centrality of discourse in his archaeological work, Foucault stated that he had been writing a history of power all along (1978a, p. 283). Foucault's acknowledgement of the role of power in understanding and explaining discourse – the "radicalization of the earlier project" (Connelly 1983, p. 232) – coincided with the tumultuous events of May 1968 (Downing 2008, p. 11; Lemert & Gillan 1982, p. 59; Young 1981, p. 10). This was explored by Foucault in two of his books, *Discipline and Punish* (1991a) and *The History of Sexuality* Vol.1 (1998b), which he called 'genealogies'.

Genealogy can be defined as

> the union of erudite and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today…What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against the claims of a unitary body of theory that would filter, hierarchise, and order them in the name of some true knowledge (Foucault 1980b, p. 83).

To put this differently, a genealogical approach highlights the unsaid – those "knowledges" that are dismissed and sidelined by institutional and social practices that produce "knowledges" that are acceptable to those with the authority to decide what counts as "truth" (ibid, p. 131). In his essay, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,* Foucault draws extensively on Nietzsche's conceptualisation of genealogy, arguing that genealogy is not concerned with

uncovering historical origins, and that because of this, it allows for the capturing of things as they 'are' as opposed to searching the past for accidents and succession (1998a, p. 371). Addressing this, Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest that genealogists should realise "[it] is as it appears" (1982, p. 109) and not search for a masked 'reality', but, rather, they should question the seemingly obvious and the straightforward. A genealogy is not interested in bringing about more 'accurate' epistemological orientations. It aims to demonstrate that what is considered 'obvious' and 'straightforward', or "true", lies not within the exact essence of this "truth", but rather where "truth" is rendered as "truthful" discourse (Davidson 1986; Foucault 1998a, p. 372). Its goal then is to analyse the politics of "truth" – those practices, techniques and calculations that construct certain discourses as "true" – within "the discursive regime of the modern era" (Tamboukou 1991, p. 202).

In both his books, *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault aims to challenge the "two most important and uncontested concepts of our modern age" (Danaher et al. 2010, p. 24). These are the arbitrary claims to "truth" and the idea that "knowledge" and power were separate from each other (ibid). Foucault shows how the accumulation of discursive and non-discursive "knowledges" rendered humans objects and subjects of discourse. *Discipline and Punish* demonstrates how the documentation of human-behaviour in Europe from the 16th Century onwards led to a movement away from public executions and torture towards confinement and surveillance under the guise of 'reconciliation'. For Foucault (1991a), this did not signal the emergence of more 'civilised' forms of social punishment but indicated the manner in which "knowledge" about humans coincided with the dispersion of power through the social world. In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault (1998b) shows how the use of confessions became a tool of regulation as these enabled "knowledge" accumulation on the one hand and, on the other, saw people receiving guidance in terms of living more 'moral'

and 'disciplined' lives. So, at the heart of both of these analyses is Foucault's view that "knowledge" cannot be regarded as neutral or as something that flourishes in the absence of power. Rather, he argues, "power and knowledge directly imply one another" (1991a, p. 27) and stand in direct relationship to each other. Foucault calls this the "knowledge-power" nexus in which subject positions are created. This does not mean that the subject of "knowledge" is caught in the web of power – instead, it should be understood as an *effect* of the "knowledge-power" process or struggle (ibid, pp. 27-78, my emphasis). This reaffirms Foucault's decentering of the subject as meaning *maker* because "we make sense of ourselves by referring back to various bodies of knowledge" (Danaher et al. 2010, p. 50) and function within the subject positions created for us by discourse.

Power in a Foucauldian sense can be defined as

> 'actions on others' actions: that is, it presupposes rather than annuls their capacity as agents; it acts upon, and through, an open set of practical and ethical possibilities. Hence, although power is an omnipresent dimension in human relations, power in society is never a fixed and closed regime, but rather an endless and open strategic game (Gordon 1991, p. 5).

This understanding of power cannot be viewed as a theory of power since to do so would necessitate a theoretical situation to frame its emergence. Because power, according to Foucault, is dispersed throughout society, it does not have a point of emergence nor does it have a centre or a source (1980, p. 98).[27] Rather, through embodying different forms, Foucault's notion of power has always been present and is enabled by employing and extending the ever-present technologies of power (1982, p. 328). A theory of power also presupposes an 'objective' theory from which to theorise which contradicts the assumptions underpinning

[27] Also see Caputo & Yount (1993, p. 5).

genealogy. Foucault would reject "conventional, normative social and political theory…[which]…presupposes that social reality can be examined and explained through sets of pre-given principles assumed true beyond 'mere belief'. That is, upon fixed *a priori* assumptions concerning the nature and the mode of operation of social reality" (Gann 2004, p. 502). Because the concept power is an open one, consisting of clusters of relations, Foucault, instead of proposing a theory, uses a grid of analysis with which to study power.

This view differs from Liberal and Judicial understandings of power which claim that power can be possessed and exercised over people. Foucault contends that because subjects are constructed by the "knowledge-power" nexus, they are not able to possess power and, because power is productive and dispersed throughout society, it is not totally oppressive (1982, p. 342). His conceptualisation of power also differs from Marxist understandings since Marxists consider power inherent in those who own the means of production and who use a set of false beliefs (or ideology) as tools of oppression within class struggles. Foucault, however, claims that both oppression and resistance are located within discourse and that power practices employ ideology as moral and rational justifications, not vice versa (Danaher et al. 2010, p. 86; Foucault 1978b, p. 216; Foucault 1991a, pp. 27-28). As power reproduces and is relational; its exercise coincides with resistance and, it is in the manifestation of resistance, Foucault argues, that the analysis of "knowledge-power" relations must commence. In other words, that which stands in opposition to power and, by virtue of its opposition, that which is considered 'illegitimate', should be studied (Foucault 1982, pp. 211-212; Foucault 1998b, p. 95; Foucault (1980) as cited by Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p. 184).

A Foucauldian analysis of power in the sphere of political governance would necessarily ask new questions, would seek new 'grids of analysis' and, ultimately, would enable new ways of understandings. Foucault's research and his lectures on governmentality

sought to achieve this. However, before governmentality is considered in more detail, the relevance of genealogy as a broad methodological orientation must be highlighted. Like genealogy, this thesis is also concerned with uncovering those "knowledges" or understandings that have been marginalised by dominant political rationalities and discourses in post-apartheid basic education policy and in the manner in which it is mostly studied. This can be explained with reference to the "knowledge-power" nexus upon which we have already touched. Relations of power regulate the dominance and suppression of certain "knowledges", thus, any analysis of the discursive practices that have enabled, at the expense of others, the development and ascendancy of certain governmental rationalities and policy discourses will be considered. This is so that its influence on the development of post-apartheid basic education policy can be determined. However, this argument will not employ a theory of power to analyse basic education policy discourses but will concentrate on those practices of power that regulate discourse so that their specificity and operation within a wider regime of power relations can be highlighted. With this in mind, the development and logic of governmentality within genealogy, which serves as the framework of inquiry for this study, will now be discussed.

2.1.1 Genealogy of the Government

In his analysis of the microphysics of power – those "knowledges", practices and techniques that are exercised on bodies "to subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge" (Foucault 1991a, p. 28) – Foucault proposes that a variety of techniques are employed to observe, regulate and guide the conduct of humans within institutions. These include schools, prisons and psychiatric hospitals. This conceptualisation of power attracted a lot of attention and criticism, especially from Marxists who claimed that emphasising the 'specifics' of power lost sight of power that was exercised on a larger scale – so, the approach

neglected and devalued the importance of analysing the relationship between society and the state. Continuing his explorations of power, and in response to these criticisms, Foucault delivered a series of lectures in 1978 and 1979 at the *Collège de France* that more closely examined questions of governance (Death 2011, p. 6; Gordon 1991, p. 4). Two studies, *Security, Territory, Population* (1978b) and *The birth of biopolitics* (1979), explore what Foucault calls 'governmental rationality', or 'governmentality', which highlights the interaction of local and global, or the individualising and totalising, practices of power (Foucault 1982, p. 332). This 'interaction' is first introduced in *The History of Sexuality* as 'bio-power' in which Foucault aims to show how power was used as a disciplinary *and* a regulatory tool with regards to sexuality, driven by the increase in "knowledge" production about humans from the 17th to 19th Centuries. More specifically, the accumulation and documentation of sexual behaviour through confessions, observations and testimonials within the medical field, led to the classification of sexuality[28] as well as the treatment and attempted regulation thereof (Danaher et al. 2010, pp. 25-26).

At the opening of his *Security, Territory, Population* lectures, Foucault defines bio-power as "the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of political strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species" (Foucault 1978b, p. 1). The notion of bio-power, therefore, opens up a conceptual a space in which governmentality is explored. Furthermore, Foucault considers the study of the latter to be made possible by detaching the study of power relations from institutions (like prisons) and "replac[ing] [these]…with the overall point of view of the technology of power" (ibid, p. 118). Following this move, Foucault points out that an analysis of the state qua the state apparatus only substitutes one form of institutional analysis for

[28] Homosexuality, sexual deviancy or nymphomania, for example (Danaher et al. 2010, pp. 25-26).

another, whereas the study of governmentality enables an analysis of the state as part of the general technology of power. In this way, the state is analysed as "one element…in a multiple network of actors, organizations, and entities involved in exercising authority over the conduct of individuals" (micro practices of power) "and populations" (Inda 2005, pp. 1-2) (macro practices of power). The state is reconceptualised as an 'episode of the history of government' within Foucault's research on governmentality (Foucault 1978b, p. 248). In line with these shifts, this thesis does similarly not advance an analysis of basic education policy with the post-apartheid *state* as main referent as do the majority of inquiries discussed before. Instead, the apartheid and post-apartheid states are seen as episodes in the history of governmental reason in South Africa. To better understanding this, it is important to highlight Foucault's distinction between government and governmentality, considered in the next section.

2.2 GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTALITY

Within Foucault's analytics of governmentality, his understanding of government takes on both a general and more specific meaning. The former is concerned with the 'conduct of conduct'; in other words, "a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons" (Dean 2009, p. 1; Gordon 1991, p. 2). Given its plurality, this extends beyond sovereign-type rule to the self's relationship to the self, private interpersonal relationships as well as communal and institutional relationships. In this understanding, governing is reconfigured as a distinct activity with the goal of directing and guiding the behaviour of humans (which includes self-regulation) as opposed to governing as a forced activity (Dean 2009, p. 11; Foucault 1978b, pp. 116, 121-122). Foucault traces this understanding to the "[Western] idea of a government of men [sic]" (1978b, p. 123) which was located in the ancient Christian East and which saw rulers (kings, chiefs or gods) constructed as

'shepherds' within Egyptian, Assyrian, Mesopotamian and Hebraic societies. In Western Christianity, these shepherd-flock relations – called 'pastoral power' by Foucault – became more definite over time and mechanisms and institutions were introduced to incorporate the instruments of pastoral power into the functioning of the Roman Empire.

The 'idea of government' which emerged during this period is seen by Foucault as the "institutionalisation of the pastorate in the Christian Church" (1978b, p. 151).[29] The idea was a developer and enforcer of certain rules, procedures and techniques, as a prelude to governmentality, the second and more specific meaning of government, in two ways. Firstly, pastoral power led to the creation of complex power relationships with regard to the law, salvation and "truth".[30] Such practices gave rise to a multitude of techniques within pastoral power which, through its individualising practices[31], gave rise to individual subject positions. The latter is the second feature of pastoral power that Foucault considers characterised the modern Western subject's obedience, subjection and extraction of "truth". But, in order for the modern state to emerge, an erosion of this early form of pastoral power had to occur, This allowed more diffuse forms of governing to develop through the social body (Foucault 1978b, pp. 184-204; Nadesan 2006, p. 5). Foucault suggests that the rise of the modern state – "from [the] economy of souls to the government of men [sic] and populations" (Foucault 1978b, p. 227), which he terms governmentality, was accompanied by the production of new "knowledges" due to a shift in emphasis from 'salvation in the next world' to 'salvation in this world'. This meant a redefined concern over the security, social welfare, health et cetera of citizens, not in the next life, but in this (Nadesan 2006, p. 6).

[29] Quote taken from the footnote.

[30] Pastoral power represented a 'new' form of power – referred to by the Greeks as *oikonomia psuchōn* or 'the economy of souls' – a power which, as already mentioned, individualised.

[31] With regard to salvation, it individualised based on analytical identification of the merits and faults of *each* member in the flock. With regards to the law, it individualised by subjection as *each* in the flock was subjected to everyone else through obedience. And with regards to "truth", it individualised by a "truth" that was hidden – revealed to the Shepherd by *each* in the flock – which was in turn used by the Shepherd for 'spiritual direction' (Foucault 1978b, pp. 184-192).

This realisation occurred in relation to the crisis experienced by feudalism from the 16th Century onwards (called 'counter-conducts' by Foucault) which witnessed the rise of an autonomous and, importantly, *secular* governmental rationality. This new 'art of government' was "an activity which require[d] a craft, imagination, shrewd fashioning the use of tactics skills and practical knowhow [and] the employment of institutions" (Dean 2009, p. 18). Essentially it was concerned with the introduction of 'economy' which, during feudal rule, referred to "the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family…and of making the family fortunes prosper…at the level of the *entire state*" (Foucault 1991b, p. 92, my emphasis). Put differently, this secularised reasoning attempted to govern "in the form of economy" (ibid) by tending to the welfare of *all* of its inhabitants through surveillance and the regulation. This concern, as well as larger public questions of conduct under government jurisdiction, were given expression within two rationalities, *raison d' État* and police. Accordingly, governmentality principally focuses on government in the political realm and places greater emphasis on the role of power in its specificity. The discussion now turns to consider the rationalities, *raison d' État* and police reasoning, which developed in response to particular historical problems (Gordon 1991, p. 3; Olssen (2006) as cited in Fimyar 2008, p. 4).

2.2.1 *Raison d' État* and Police Reason

Foucault argues that the end of the Roman Empire[32] and the emergence of legal sovereignty in Europe during the mid-17th Century, codified by the 1648 *Treaty of Westphalia*, formed the backdrop for the development of *raison d' État*. This was a rationality that

[32] Foucault suggests the end of the Roman Empire should in fact be situated in the year 1648 which was when the realisation came into being that the Empire would no longer be the form of organisation for states (1978b, p. 291).

considered the formation and growth of the state, not according to divine, human or natural laws, but rather according to a "rationality specific to the art of governing states" (Foucault (2001) as cited in Olssen et al. 2006, p. 27). This mentality of rule found its rationality in those 'realities' that comprised, and were particular to, the state and according to the state's strength (Dean 1997, p. 184; Foucault 1991b, p. 97; Gordon 1991: 9; Olssen et al. 2006, p. 27). The development of this rational form of "knowledge" diverged from Machiavelli's influential thinking. The latter sought to conceive of, and describe the 'Prince's' relationship to the state; a relationship that was constantly under threat as the Prince's claim to his principality was limited to inheritance or conquest and, therefore, vulnerable to acquisition. In contrast to such thinking, *raison d' État* expressed concerns around the functioning and survival of the *state* "without subordinating it to the problematic of the Prince and of his relationship to the principality of which he is lord and master" (Foucault 1991b, p. 89). To do this, attempts to generate "knowledge" of the reality of the state with regard to its population ratio, mortality and birth rates, and trends of wealth accumulation, were undertaken. This gave rise to the use of statistics – a group of technical "knowledges" that sought to account for the 'realities' and workings of the state (Foucault 1978b, p. 274) – and the formation of administrative apparatuses. Both were required to procure and reproduce the "knowledges" necessary to govern *and* to execute the orders of the sovereign.

By the 17th Century, political reasoning understood sovereignty as "the exercise of ultimate authority over a territory and the subjects who inhabit that territory" (Dean 2009, p. 104). During this time, these newly formed units (states) also started to 'assert' themselves due to increased economic interaction and other forms of exchange between them. The space of interaction between states was characterised by increased competition with regard to trade, wealth accumulation, sea dominance, territorial conquest and the like. Unsurprisingly, given

the ultimate concern of *raison d' État*, namely, state preservation, it also monitored the changes that occurred vis-à-vis other states. These articulations highlighted the need for state security through the development of those elements or 'forces' concerned with the strength of the state (ibid, p. 89). So, the concern was "[n]o longer territorial expansion, [but] the development of the state's forces; no longer the combination of legacies through dynastic alliances, but the composition of state forces in political and provisional alliances" (Foucault 1978b, pp. 285-291). The implementation of this 'rationalisation of forces' was dependent on the development of two technological assemblages, that is, military-diplomatic apparatuses and the apparatus of *police* – the second of which developed into a governmental rationality. The military-diplomatic apparatus was used to manage and advance the state's relationship with other European states to maintain a 'balance of power', or 'equilibrium'. Paradoxically, however, in order for the creation of equilibrium between states, each state required a 'good' police to "prevent the relation of forces being turned to its disadvantage" (ibid, pp. 313-315). The notion of 'police' refers not to what is understood today as 'the police' but to the complex ways that the internal 'forces of the state' could be enhanced and increased while the good order of the state was maintained (ibid, p. 313). European equilibrium and police also shared a common instrument – namely, statistics. The constitutive "knowledges" of the state's own forces as well as that of the states it was in competition with were necessary to maintain this equilibrium through comparative calculation between states.[33]

In Foucault's view, the exercise of police was inseparable from mercantilism. This referred to the pursuit of state strength and competition through commerce and economic relations to promote inter-state equilibrium. However, in response to the workings of

[33] These calculations saw a collection of writings, termed *Polizeiwissenschaft* or 'science of police' – concerned with the populations of the state and its regulation – emerge in Germany. It "spread throughout Europe, […extending] *crucial* influence" (Foucault 1978b, p. 318, my emphasis) from the end of the 17th Century until the end of the 18th Century.

mercantilism, police reason came under increased scrutiny and was systematically dismantled through the articulation of certain 'economic problems' during the first half of the 18th Century. Critiques levelled against police reason were observable in the 18th Century through the writings of the *économistes*[34] which came to define a modified state rationality. This was because their writings "introduced...some of the fundamental lines of modern and contemporary governmentality" (Foucault 1978b, p. 348). These transformations in governmental reason included a conceptualisation of the population as a collective body; the idea of a 'civil society' came about as "a specific field of naturalness peculiar to man [sic]" and became the "necessary correlate of the state" (ibid, p. 350). The second transformation is linked to the idea of 'scientific "knowledge"' which required that the rule of evidence, endemic to 'scientific' inquiry, had to be exercised within economic domains. The notion of political economy which subsequently emerged was not considered "knowledge" *of* government; rather, it was seen as "knowledge" *internal* to government. It became essential for the exercise of what was called 'good' government. This particular transformation was related to the construction of the economy and the population as subject to 'natural processes' which implied that forms of regulation should not be *imposed* on these domains. So, government practices over populations were 'natural processes'. Governmental reason, therefore, had to work with these processes and, instead of opposing them – manage, steer and enhance their outcomes. The implementation and reception of these so-called 'natural intrinsic processes' within populations also saw the incorporation of the idea of freedom into governmental reason. This necessitated the fundamental respect for the legitimacy of individuals (within the population) as a *necessary requirement* of government. It was within these discursive shifts, as the next section will argue,

[34] The *économistes* argued for increased production, spontaneous price regulation, less state regulation of the population and its size as well as free trade between states which had to be regulated by private interests and competition as opposed to by the state (Foucault 1978b, pp. 343-348).

that the idea of citizens as 'free subjects' emerged and the development towards modern governmentality began (ibid, pp. 325-353).

2.3 MODERN GOVERNMENTALITY

Coinciding and contributing to the transformations within police reason, Foucault argues, measures which sought to curb the limitless objective of police became evident, most notably through the deliberations and contestations over fundamental laws.[35] These laws aimed to address the "problem of the nature of the sovereign's right to exercise his [sic] power and the legal limits within which the sovereign's actions [could] be inserted" (Foucault 1979, p. 37). Such laws aimed to delineate boundaries for the intervention of government in certain spheres and were external to *raison d' État*, serving thus as the "principle of its limitation" (ibid, p. 8). By the middle of the 18th Century, however, there was a shift in emphasis away from 'external' legal attempts to limit governmental intervention to an 'internal' regulation intrinsic to governmental reason. In other words, political reasoning became concerned with the idea of 'how to not govern too much'. Buttressing the concern with the 'limitation' of government was the calculation of political economy – "any method of government that can procure the nation's prosperity" (ibid, p. 13) within the new concern of limited government intervention. In addition, political economy attempted to highlight the 'naturalness' of governmental practices by making the different mechanisms, regulations and technologies of government intelligible, that is, 'how government worked'. The articulation of the intelligible connection of different governmental practices allowed for the differentiation between 'good' and 'bad' practices and led to the guidance of governmental limitation by the principle of "truth" (ibid, p. 18). Limiting government intervention was seen therefore as 'natural'. By the end of the 18th Century, a new

[35] For example, natural and contract laws (Foucault 1979, pp. 7-9).

regime of "truth", which fundamentally changed the way government was conceived, came about. Foucault claims that "the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form[ed] an apparatus of knowledge-power that effectively mark[ed] out in reality that which [did] not exist and legitimately submit[ted] it to the division between true and false" (ibid, p. 19). The market was the 'site' in which these transformations occurred and this gave rise to this new regime of "truth" – liberalism – that concentrated on the limitation of governmental power, or the frugality of government, in the management of processes external to political rule (Dean 2009, p. 98).

2.3.1 Liberal Reasoning

Liberalism, the "modern form of political intervention" (Dean 1997, p. 189), is framed by Foucault more as a practice of government than a philosophical view of the world.[36] As practice liberalism asks "where exactly is the principle of the limitation of government to be found; and how are the effects of this limitation to be calculated?" (Foucault 1979, p. 20).[37] Within the answer, liberal partitions of rule came to distinguish the public from the private, or the governed from the government, within civil society (Olssen et al. 2006, p. 29). In addition, the convergence of certain practices of government and liberalism's regime of "truth" promoted the market's own self-regulation or self-function. This was to produce the "truth" that ought to guide governing. The result, Foucault claims, was the development of the market as site of 'veridiction', or "truth" telling (1979, p. 36).[38] During its development in Europe and, later, in the US, liberalism found anchorage in the market and in the notion of utility which became

[36] Also see Christie & Sidhu (2006, p. 451).
[37] Quote taken from footnote.
[38] Other 'sites of veridiction' developed during the 18th and 19th Centuries within the rationality of liberalism such as penal and psychiatric institutions, so it was not *only* the market that functioned as a site of "truth" (Foucault 1979, p. 35).

important in the calculation of the limitation of intervention by administrative or public authorities. Limiting governmental intervention was then navigated and informed by the interaction of the "[e]xchange of wealth and utility of the public authorities" (ibid, p. 43) which meant that its functioning was based on the notion of *interest*. It was not the interest of the state per se (*raison d' État*) that this rationality was concerned with, rather it was focused on a variety of complex interests that consisted out of individuals, the population, the government, the law, human rights, and state equilibrium in Europe. Similarly, governmental authority was not exercised *on* those elements which constituted the state, as was the case with *raison d' État*. It was only exercised and considered legitimate if it was 'rational' and justifiable through law, and was interventionist only if it was in the interest of an individual or individuals (ibid, p. 45).

The principal object of liberal reason became the "man [sic] of interest" (Gordon 1991, p. 24), which was termed *homo œconomicus* by Foucault. It also witnessed a transformation of the law "in that its function as an instrument of the exercise of sovereignty [became] linked to a complex set of disciplinary and governmental apparatuses" (Dean 2009, p. 118). Law thus became an instrument for the normalisation of power and it resembled and functioned more like a series of norms than laws proper as it sought to establish a balance between too much and too little government and sought to create the conditions in which 'free' citizens acted in a responsible and disciplined manner (ibid, pp. 121-122). This led Foucault to claim that modern governmentality, in its broadest sense, was constituted by interplay between sovereignty, discipline and government (1978b, pp. 107-108). Foucault cautions that the rise of liberal governmentality did not signify a quantitative increase in freedom within European societies following the breakdown of the authoritarian police state. Instead, liberalism was a 'consumer of freedom' in as much as it needed freedom to both function and govern – the freedom of the market, freedom of expression, the freedom to sell and buy. Hence liberalism sought to

constitute the conditions necessary for freedom and the exercise of power and, thereby, embodied its management rather than its imperative (Foucault 1979, p. 63). For Foucault, "[l]iberalism [was] not acceptance of freedom; it propose[d] to manufacture it constantly, to arouse it and produce it, with, of course, [the system] of constraints and the problems of cost raised by this production" (ibid, p. 65). Because liberalism was concerned with producing *and* protecting freedom, it became paradoxically concerned with setting up certain limitations to prevent the restriction of freedom (ibid, p. 64). For example, for free trade between states to occur, agreements and measures were needed to prevent domination of some states by others.[39] Similarly, to ensure internal market (intra-state) competitiveness, anti-monopolistic measures had to be devised.

However, to address the cost, or the possible threats, to the interests of the population by the interest of individuals through the calculation and production of freedom, security became the principle of regulation of the cost of freedom (Foucault 1979, p. 65). Although security remained concerned with physical 'threats' from the outside, its reconceptualisation came to involve the 'management' of the population to secure the internal stability of the state.[40] Liberalism then sought to address what became one of the resulting consequences: the interests of the population came to face a constant 'danger' or 'risk'. This led to another important side effect of liberalism – the "considerable extension of processes of control, constraint and coercion which [were] something like the counterpart and counterweight of different freedoms" (ibid, p. 67). As Tikly points out

[39] An example is America's protectionist policies against the perceived economic hegemony of England at the start of the 19th Century.

[40] For example, the freedom of workers was not supposed to threaten the interests of enterprise and of production and, similarly, individual accidents (inevitable old age or possible illness) were not supposed to threaten the interests of society and, therefore, required regulation and management (Foucault 1979, pp. 66-67; Olssen et al. 2006, p. 26).

> [l]iberal governmentality retain[ed] and utilize[d] the techniques, rationalities and institutions characteristic of sovereignty and discipline but reposition[ed] them in accordance with the new object of liberal government. This object, which [took] the forms of an administrative imperative to optimise the health, life and productivity of populations are referred to by Foucault as bio-power (2003, p. 163).

This calculation of 'risk' to the welfare and prosperity of citizens witnessed the division of the population into sub-groups as certain individuals were classified and named, for example, as 'criminal', 'abnormal' or 'feeble-minded'. Such classifications, as well as the means to "prevent, contain or eliminate" (Dean 2009, p. 100) those who were classified, were aided by the increase in 'scientific "knowledge"' production about humans. This process also saw race – a bio-political imperative – being included in the calculation of possible 'enemies' to the wellbeing of the state (ibid; Olssen et al. 2006, p. 29). By the 20th Century, however, the initial supervision of bio-political practices led to even further mechanisms of control and, indeed, increased intervention as liberalism sought to 'breathe more life' into and, so, increase freedom. This took place in the context of the early 20th Century economic crisis that was perceived as a 'risk' to certain basic freedoms and which led to measures intended to lessen the 'dangers' of unemployment and the subsequent 'dangers' to consumption and political freedoms (Foucault 1979, p. 68). So, liberalism became a "product and critique of bio-politics" (Dean 2009, p. 118). As example, the American President Franklin Roosevelt's welfare policies were intended to address the social and economic insecurities during the 1930s. They ushered in a "series of artificial, voluntarist interventions, of direct economic interventions in the market represented by the basic [w]elfare measures, and which from 1946…were described as being in themselves [another form] of…despotism" (Foucault 1979, p. 68).

The Keynesian interventions that gave rise to the welfare state came, in turn, therefore, to be perceived as posing a threat to forms of 'democratic freedom' – so, it was that liberalism induced the 'crisis' of governmentality that developed during the first quarter of the 20th Century. This resulted in the cost of political freedom being evaluated against the 'threat' it posed to economic gains. In this, the idea of the market was used to oppose certain legislative measures that sought to address anti-monopolistic practices and promoted free trade. It did so by claiming that the latter amounted to excessive intervention that curtailed the freedom that the market needed to function effectively (Foucault 1979, pp. 68-69). It was thus the evaluation of the perils of liberal governmentality during the so-called 'crisis of capitalism' that gave the rise to what is today understood as neo-liberalism.

2.3.2 Neo-liberal Reasoning

In response to what was considered 'excessive' state intervention, which was brought about by the crisis of liberalism, neo-liberalism gained momentum in the 1930s in Europe and, later, in the 1960s in the US. Neo-liberalism is considered "a body of knowledge, strategies and practices of governance [which sought] to divest the state of [its] paternalistic responsibility by shifting social, political and economic 'responsibility' to privatized institutions and economically rationalized 'self-governing' individuals" (Nadesan 2006, p. 6). This rationality pushed for a redefinition of the relationship between civil society and state in response to mass industrial production and the further spread of global trade. Put differently, the classic liberal notion of the public and private self was recast, so affording the state the right to intervene in areas considered to be essentially private. This included interference in, and modification of, the economy in order to render it more 'market friendly' and, so, more entrepreneurial. It also meant greater responsibility was conferred on citizens to govern themselves. Under this

rationality, as Rose (1993) points out, the state did not govern through the social but through the *managed choices* of citizens (as cited in Nadesan 2006, p. 7).[41]

In *The birth of biopolitics*, Foucault analyses two schools of neo-liberal thought, both of which had "different cornerstones and historical contexts" (1979, p. 78). The first, the *Freiberg School*, was constituted by jurists and economists – known as the *Ordoliberalen*[42] – who devised ideas of a social market economy during 1928-1930 in Germany. The context for the development of these economic policies included the need to reconstruct the post-War ailing economy and, later, certain social objectives which sought to prevent recurring fascism and Nazism in Europe. Sharing some affinities with the Frankfurt school[43], the *Ordoliberalen* did not view liberalism as based on the natural freedom of individuals nor did it consider the market as autonomous and, therefore, self-regulatory (Foucault 1979, p. 80; Olssen et al. 2006, p, 167). This anti-naturalist conception of the market argued against "any form of economic government that systematically ignores the market processes that can insure stable price formation" (Dean 1997, p. 192). The result was a proposed institutionalist understanding of the market that is organised and regulated rather than planned, in which legal guarantees could be offered and social dislocations could be avoided by the machinery of government (Dean 1997, p. 192; Olssen et al. 2006, p. 167).

Of greater influence globally was the rise of neo-liberalism in the US, driven by the *Chicago School*, the second school analysed by Foucault. This approach furthered the idea of Human Capital Theory (HCT) which favoured government intervention only to the extent that it advanced economic freedom. Like the *Freiberg School*, it rejected state intervention and the

[41] Also see Nadesan (2006, p. 6) and Tikly (2003, p. 164).
[42] They were referred to as such as they published their works in the yearbook *Ordo*.
[43] The Frankfurt School was a neo-Marxist 'school of thought' that emerged during the early 20th Century in Germany. It is associated with the *Institute for Social Research* at the University of Frankfurt which pursued alternative social and economic theorisation in light of the failure of traditional Marxist analyses to explain the turbulent economic climate at the time.

growth of the state apparatus but offered a more 'radical' interpretation of the *Ordoliberalen* view of government as standing outside of the market. It suggested a breakdown of the boundaries between the economic, social and political so that these other spheres were all subjected to market laws. Put differently, the social and political had to be defined as part of the domain of economics (Foucault 1979, p. 169; Olssen et al. 2006, p. 168). Emerging in the 1950s, HCT, advanced by theorists such as Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, attempted to theorise one of the elements of the production of goods it considered neglected by classic political economy, namely, the element of labour. These theorists concurred with Marx that its neglect resulted in the misrepresentation of the process of production. This is because labour was constructed as "labour power, measured by time, put on the market and paid by wages" (Foucault 1979, p. 221) and, effectively, was 'cut off' from the 'reality' of labourers and their lives. So, labour, was considered in the abstract only. However, whereas Marx blamed the *logic* of capitalism for this abstraction, HCT argued that this omission was as a result of the economic theorisation of capitalist production. What was needed, instead, was the theorisation of labour as "an active, rather than as a passive, factor in production" (Olssen et al. 2006, p. 169).[44] This meant not simply constructing the workers as labour power but as 'active economic subjects' (Foucault 1979, p. 223). HCT did so by distinguishing between income (wage) and capital. Capital was constructed as inseparable from the person who possessed the skills that made income possible. This led to neo-liberalism in the US theorising labour not as labour power but as capital-ability so that the worker "appear[ed] as a sort of enterprise for himself [sic]" (ibid, pp. 223-225).

These developments saw the reassertion of the idea of *homo œconomicus*, not in the liberal sense of the economic citizen of interest "untouchable by government" (Tikly 2003, p. 164), but as an 'entrepreneur for him or herself'. This is achieved by being his or her own

[44] Also see Foucault (1979, pp. 220-221).

capital, his or her own producer of welfare and satisfaction, and his or her own source of revenue (Foucault 1979, p. 226). The neo-liberal *homo œconomicus* was viewed as a subject that could be modified by being "made more entrepreneurial through exposure to a market rationality that [had] been extended into the social sphere" (Tikly 2003, p. 164). Within this logic, sovereignty became concerned with the prosperity of its citizens and saw as its main threat anti-competitive practices. Whereas 'risk' had been previously calculated as collective threat to the welfare of citizens which the state had to manage; within neo-liberal reasoning, 'risk' was understood as threat to *individual* citizens. The management of 'risk' became the responsibility of these individuals through the use, for example, of private insurance policies, of private health care and of private education. This represented further movement by the state to encourage self-government and self-policing by citizens (Mythen & Walklate 2006, p. 385). Governing then was "performed through risk-based techniques which [were] more oblique and benign than expressions of power in previous epochs" (ibid).

The notion of security was also redirected, not towards those objects outside of the apparatuses of security, but towards the *governmental processes* themselves. This occurred in the in the context of globalisation from the 1970s onwards. Enabled by the 'internet revolution', globalisation witnessed an increase in global trade and greater flows of information and finances 'across' state boundaries (Macía & Maldonado 2007, p. 21). The seeming inevitability and desirability of free-market economics espoused by the West following the end of the Cold War, as well as the increasing 'interconnectedness' of states due to globalisation, led to more and more states embracing neo-liberalism. Neo-liberal reason gained momentum as a 'governmentality on a global scale' (Gupta (1998) as cited in Tikly 2003, p. 165). Securing the interests of the state in this (global) environment has come to mean the implementation of particular techniques of governmentality. Under the guise of democratisation, these include

privatisation, fiscal restraint and certain forms of public management. Failure to do this has resulted in global organisations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donor organisations subjecting institutionally weak states to forms of 'indirect government' to ensure compliance (Joseph, 2010; Tikly, 2003, p. 165). Under neo-liberalism, managing society requires embedding this rationality in the social world and making citizens "more competitive and efficient" (Tikly 2003, p. 164).

The effects of this, as Hamann recently remarked, is that "the way many of us think, act, and speak has, over the past couple of decades, become increasingly shaped in a manner consistent with the articulations of neoliberal governmentality, [but] this is nothing Foucault could have anticipated nearly twenty five years ago" (2009, p. 49). It is, therefore, necessary that the idea of a global modern governmentality should be investigated further by using the insights provided by Foucault to take account of late 20th and early 21st Century neo-liberalism. In this regard, the relevance of neo-liberal (and earlier) political rationalities to this thesis should be considered but, first, a brief overview of the insights presented in the foregoing sections will be provided so that the central argument of Foucault's analytics of governmentality remains apparent.

2.3.3 Summarising Governmentality

It is clear from the discussions thus far that modern governmentality is made up of an assembly of earlier governmental regimes and rearticulated rationalities (Gillies 2008, p. 417; Simons et al. 2009, p. 66). This approach challenges a priori understandings of the so-called philosophies or ideas that shaped and altered European history because these fail to acknowledge their discursive origins and connections. So, as we have seen, Foucault argues

that liberalism found its rationality within and regulated itself through continuous self-reflection; a process of rationalisation "which obey[ed]…the internal rule of maximum economy" (Foucault 1979, p. 318). It did so by reprioritising the central concern of political reason during the 16th and 17th Centuries, which was the existence and survival of the state, inserting the primacy of the market as both its central yardstick and mechanism of regulation. As a result, liberalism also articulated the 'unlimited' possibility of police reason to intervene in every aspect of governing by advancing the idea of frugal government (ibid, pp. 318-319). A further example is the development of the subject of modern governmentality which, through Foucault's frame, can be traced to pastoral power, to the introduction of the idea of civil society with the breakdown of the police state, and to the reconceptualisation (by both liberal and neo-liberal reasoning) of the governmental subject as *homo œconomicus*. Similarly, the origins of liberal welfare reasoning are found in pastoral power as shepherds sought to create welfare for and take care of their flock (Nadesan 2006, p. 6).

Governmentality also demonstrates how bio-power is composed by the reconstitution of the disciplinary power exercised by pastoral power, *raison d' État* and police reason. This has its roots in the acts of confession by the flock to the pastoral shepherd which were used to direct the flock towards living more disciplined lives. Furthermore, within liberal reasoning, the coming together of disciplinary and self-regulatory power during the 17th and 18th Centuries in Europe resulted in bio-political practices informing political reasoning and the way subjects regulated themselves as part of the machinery and logic of capitalist modes of production. This created conditions of regulation that gave rise to the entrepreneurial *homo œconomicus* to which the responsibility of creating personal welfare and satisfaction was conferred. Modern political reasoning, therefore, has retained elements of earlier rationalities by continuously rearticulating the notions of sovereignty, discipline and government. By drawing on these, this

thesis aims to similarly to show how post-apartheid political rationalities are constituted by earlier rationalities of governing and it will show how these have influenced the development of basic education policy in the post-apartheid era.

2.4 QUESTIONS OF RELEVANCE

It has been argued that Foucault's genealogy is of relevance to this thesis as it is concerned with analysing those "knowledge-power" relations that produce and regulate discourse. This is possible because power is framed by Foucault as productive and relational and inextricably bound to "knowledge". Within his early genealogical research, Foucault focused on the micro-physics of power; those power relations that are exercised on the bodies of individuals through social and institutional practices. However, the movement in Foucault's thinking towards considering both the micro- *and* macro-physics of power is demonstrated by his governmentality research. Although the emergence and rearticulation of the "idea of a government of men [sic]" (Foucault 1978b, p. 123) are limited to a Western context by Foucault's analysis, it is relevant to this thesis as elements of European political rationalities were imported to South Africa from the start of colonialism in the mid-17th Century onwards. The ascendancy of these rationalities was gradual and, despite being resisted and contested, these ways of thinking were eventually normalised, as was the case in most colonial territories. But because Foucault did not consider such forms of non-Western rule, the particularities (similarities and differences) of political reasoning within South Africa, which "generated changing ways of imposing and maintaining rule over the colonised and, therefore, changing terrains within which to respond" (Scott 2005, p. 29) vis-à-vis European mentalities of rule, should be acknowledged.

It is plain that aspects of pastoral power were employed by Dutch (1652-1795) and British (1795-1910) colonial rulers in South Africa. As Tikly argues, "[j]ust as the shepherd as a human being was a distinct and superior kind of being in relation to pastoral power, so the colonial rulers likewise saw themselves as superior to the colonized subjects" (2003, p. 163). However, when compared to Europe, pastoral reasoning in colonial South Africa gave rise to extremely oppressive forms of rule which created slave and servant subject positions. Similarly, the political rationalities that gave rise to governmentality in Europe had, and continue to have, a bearing on ways of thinking about government in South Africa. The articulation of European sovereignty by *raison d' État*, that is, absolute authority over the territory and inhabitants of the state, was extended to colonial territories, including South Africa. Combined with pastoral reasoning, this understanding of sovereignty sanctioned and legitimated the right of colonial rulers "to take life and let live" (Foucault 1998b, p. 138). Furthermore, colonial rule in South Africa was also informed by police reason which sought to create "state utility on the basis of and through men's [sic] activity" (Foucault 1978b, p. 323). Through imposed servile activity in a territory it claimed jurisdiction over, mercantilism (which developed alongside police reason in Europe) motivated for the creation of certain routines of conduct in South Africa that would directly benefit the economies and power of the Dutch and British states respectively.

One of the most palpable effects of European mentalities of rule in South Africa was the creation of the South African state in 1910 through an Act passed by the British Parliament. *The South African Act* of 1909 granted permission for the unification of four separate political entities, the Cape, Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State, to form the Union of South Africa. This development signalled the 'governmentalisation of the state' and the creation of "a complex of centralizing governing relationships and mechanisms aimed at steering people (both as individuals and population)" (Simons et al. 2009, p. 65), but within a context very

different from 17th Century state formation in Europe. Significantly, the legitimacy of South Africa's borders has rarely been questioned since 1910, with contemporary leaders such as South Africa's current Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, in response to the Centenary of the Union of South Africa, claiming that "[t]he post 1994 South African non-racial democracy is…a *logical outcome* of this long history of lofty principles that sought to create a unitary nation" (2010, my emphasis). Although an in-depth consideration of the appropriation and rearticulation of European mentalities of rule in South Africa will not be repeated here, it is worth noting the relevance of Foucault's analytics of governmentality to South Africa and other non-Western contexts.[45]

The rationalities that constitute modern governmentality in Europe (liberalism and neo-liberalism) are of greatest relevance to the moments of apartheid and post-apartheid rule in South Africa. However, because free subjects did not constitute the object of liberal reasoning during apartheid rule, South Africa was constituted by an evolved illiberal rationality that "[did] not accept a conception of limited government characterized by the rule of law that would secure the rights of individual citizens" (Tikly 2003, p. 163). Furthermore, racism, as a bio-political phenomenon in South Africa, sought to divide along racial lines those regarded worthy or unworthy of life or human rights. Despite the adoption of a liberal democratic system of rule following the 1994 election in South Africa, elements of apartheid's rationality are still evident in the post-apartheid political sphere within market-based economic policies and within the development of a new racialised bio-political imperative, highlighted by Tikly. Contrary to some teleological interpretations of South Africa's history, it is unlikely that one election (1994) and its aftermath can fundamentally alter centuries old entrenched political rationalities. There is a need to consider the continuities and discontinuities between apartheid's illiberal

[45] Studies of colonial and other authoritarian forms of rule by drawing on Foucault's analytics of governmentality have been conducted, among others, by Blake (1999), Kalpagam (2000a, 2000b), Scott (2005) and Sigley (2006).

rationality and South Africa's conflicting post-apartheid political rationality. As Tikly (2003) points out, liberal and neo-liberal mentalities of rule have informed the reconstitution of governmental practices since 1994 – evidenced, among others, in the adoption of a new non-racial Constitution in 1996, which is underlaid by liberal reasoning; the introduction of the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (National Treasury 1996) by the ANC government during the same year; as well as the calculation of post-apartheid 'risk' by both liberal and neo-liberal mentalities of rule. A more detailed overview of the approaches that will be followed in the two levels of analysis advanced by thesis is necessary and is provided in the section below.

2.5 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE

It is useful to recall the aim of this thesis, that is, to conduct, within the framework of governmentality, an analysis that will enable the limits of future basic education policy reform to be highlighted. In addition to premising policy as discourse, this will be achieved by examining how the post-apartheid state has rearticulated the illiberal rationality of apartheid by means of highlighting the rationalities that informed the first fifteen years of post-apartheid rule, with the specific goal of determining their influence on the development of basic education policy. The insights derived from Foucault's analytics of governmentality will serve as both points of reference – to explore the 'resemblance' of these specific rationalities within the ways of thinking about government historically in South Africa – and as points of differentiation – against which these latter ways of thinking can be contrasted to in as much as European mentalities of rule were *rearticulated* to fit particular South African 'realities'. With regard to his analytical approach, Foucault conducted an analysis on the level of political reason in Europe (and later in the US). Prioritised, then, were the considerations of the

"reasoned way of governing best" (Foucault 1979, p. 2) through the reflections of government on its practices and in relation to political sovereignty. Importantly, Foucault looked for the points at which these ideas about government "actually entered the reflexive prism that allowe[d] them to be organised into strategies" (ibid, p. 293). Government discourse, the object of Foucault's analysis, worked, and was conducted through, people – sovereigns, leaders, academics, government employees and policymakers – and was identified in the written and spoken word on how to govern 'best'.

Directed by this approach, this thesis will advance two levels of analysis, the first of which will be presented in Chapter 3. This will consider the features of the illiberal rationality of apartheid and the rearticulated political rationalities which constituted the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa. The schematic discussion of apartheid will draw on Foucault's research on governmentality to determine what and, importantly, how, elements of these rationalities constituted the political reasoning of this time. It will also examine the way liberal governmentality was reconceptualised and employed through illiberal means during this period by analysing government discourse on conditional freedom, racialised bio-political practices and the market. Thereafter, the rearticulation and reconstitution of apartheid's logic by the emerging post-apartheid rationality will be considered. Despite drawing on elements of earlier rationalities, governing since 1994 was informed by liberal and, to a greater extent, neo-liberal mentalities of rule. The period of negotiation (1990-1993) will be briefly discussed as it placed limitations on post-apartheid reasoning to completely reconsider the logic of apartheid. To highlight how these rationalities have informed government policies and practices, some of the broad policies and strategies adopted by the ANC government during the first fifteen years of democracy will be discussed. Furthermore, to highlight the tensions between the rationalities that informed these policies and strategies, as well as the discontinuities *and* continuities of the

latter mentalities of rule with the logic of apartheid, the manner in which 'risk' to post-apartheid society has been calculated and managed during this period will be considered. The extent to which these tensions contributed to the continuation of socio-economic inequality during the first fifteen years of democracy will then be discussed.

The second level of analysis will be advanced in Chapter 4. As Foucault did not principally analyse governmental programmes and practices in his research on governmentality, this level of analysis will draw on the arguments provided in Chapter 3 and in the work of scholars such as Christie (2006), Rose and Miller (1992) and Tikly (2003) who have applied governmentality to the study of policy. The analysis is concerned with exploring how the rationalities identified in the first level of analysis informed post-apartheid basic education policy. Since political reasoning does not function in a void, the wider discursive practices which it had to navigate will be considered in the first half of the Chapter. In this section, the period of negotiation which sought to end apartheid will firstly be discussed as a number of policy positions with regard to reforming the apartheid basic education system were formulated during this time. This is an important consideration as the dominant discourses that informed these proposals were drawn on by post-apartheid policymakers in education. Thereafter, the rationalisation of education and training as 'appropriate' objects of post-apartheid governmental reason will be considered. This process enabled further rationalisation through the development and adoption of new policies. The impact that the negotiated settlement had on policymaking will then be discussed. The second half of the Chapter will attempt to highlight specific examples of how post-apartheid political reasoning informed policy decisions with regard to basic education. The policy of school funding will be considered, as well as the policies of teacher rationalisation and the rationalisation of teacher training colleges. Relevant policy documents, legislation and other government publications, as

well as research which has evaluated the discourses underlying these policies, will be discussed. The Chapter will conclude by considering how the inequalities within the post-apartheid basic education system contributed to the broader socio-economic inequalities in South Africa.

CHAPTER 3

TRACING RATIONALITIES

The limits of each governmental intervention shape its successor. New thinking about how to govern arises not only from inspired ideas but from the pragmatic observation of how things work out in practice – Tania M. Li.[46]

The goal of this study is to advance an analysis which disrupts traditional ways of thinking about and studying post-apartheid basic education policy in South Africa. This is so that the productive role of policy in the justification of political rule can be highlighted. As was set out in this study's introduction, government is an action which continuously identifies 'social problems' while simultaneously developing the policy solutions that are 'necessary' to address them (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 181). Statist forms of power are reinforced through this process as the responsibility of managing 'social problems' is conferred onto the state. In response to the neglect by mainstream research of this function of policy, this thesis proposes a governmentality analysis of basic education policy during the first fifteen years of democracy. Such an analysis is dependent, firstly, on the identification of the political rationalities that informed governing during this period. This is because the rationalities that constitute governing similarly inform the development of government policies and their implementation. Thus, this Chapter constitutes the first level of analysis of this study. It lays the basis for a contextual overview of apartheid and post-apartheid political reason, from which basic education policy will be analysed in the next Chapter. To do this we draw on Foucault's lines of argument in his research on modern governmentality.

The first section of this Chapter reflects on the period of apartheid rule from 1948 to 1990. More specifically, it discusses the illiberal rationality that informed the apartheid state's far reaching policies of bio-political racism and segregation which drew upon earlier practices

[46] Li (2007, p. 19).

of governing. These were established during the periods of colonial rule and early self-government. The section is not so much concerned with offering an in-depth governmentality analysis of the apartheid regime as it is with highlighting elements of the reconstitution of European political rationalities by the South African state. This is so that the rearticulation of apartheid's logic by post-apartheid reasoning can be later discussed.[47] Following this schematic overview, the second section addresses the period of negotiation between the National Party (NP), the ANC and other relevant stakeholders. This is a necessary consideration as the boundaries of intervention in which the process of disarticulating and rearticulating the logic of apartheid governmentality occurred impacted upon the ability of the post-apartheid state to break with apartheid reasoning. Thereafter, the liberal and neo-liberal rationalities which informed governing during the first fifteen years of democracy are considered. This is done by analysing some of the main policies of the ANC government; as Doherty suggests, "we must primarily look to the executive of the current political project as the most unambiguous embodiment of state reason" (2007, p. 200). We then turn to a consideration of post-apartheid South Africa's 'governmentality-in-the-making' (Tikly 2003). The discussion offers examples of the employment of, and interaction between, the abovementioned mentalities of rule within 'risk' calculation. It also highlights the effect of the tensions between them on the policies and practices of government. The section furthermore considers some of the continuities and discontinuities between post-apartheid political reasoning and the illiberal logic of the apartheid state.

[47] Because an analytics of governmentality is concerned with delineating the *dominant* rationalities employed to govern, this section principally focuses on highlighting aspects of logic of the *apartheid government.* It is obvious that different understandings of governing existed during this period, evident in the discursive and practical forms of resistance against apartheid's logic by struggle organisations, community-based movements, labour unions and the like. However, in light of the limited scope of this Chapter, and in order to contrast post-apartheid political reasoning with the logic of apartheid, the *formal* political rationalities that informed the conduct of conduct of the apartheid government are privileged in this section.

3.1 APARTHEID'S ILLIBERAL RATIONALITY

At the outset, it is important to note that the rationalities that gave rise to illiberal forms of rule – such as colonial and apartheid rule in South Africa – were imported and drew upon conditions markedly different from those encountered in Foucault's analysis of political reason. For example, European populations were constructed by governmental reasoning as "a homogeneous undifferentiated mass of individuals" (Shani 2006, p. 35). Representations of unity then were based on the homogeneity of nations, aided by the creation of state boundaries. In colonial territories, however, subjects were classified according to race or ethnicity through a colonial discourse that operated as a means of social division. By differentiating the 'insiders' (Europeans) from the 'outsiders' (indigenous communities), colonial rule was legitimated (Norval 1996, p. 4; Vale 2003). Furthermore, hybrid forms of governing drew on those elements of European political thought that enabled the creation of imperial subject positions and routines of conduct in a non-European context.

From a liberal governmentality point of view, neither the colonial period of rule, nor the ensuing period of self-rule during Union and, later, apartheid rule, recognised non-European, or indigenous, communities as constituted by judicial subjects of rights.[48] These communities were governed according to an unlimited political rationality which was authoritarian in nature (Dean 2009, p. 147). Although historically varying in scope and intensity, this authoritarianism can be attributed to the employment of a bio-political rationality that was concerned with defining the population according to supposed 'primordial categories' (Shani 2006, p. 35); additionally, it was articulated alongside an understanding of sovereignty that paraded the

[48] Although South Africa only became a Republic in 1961 when the National Party (NP) declared its withdrawal from the British Commonwealth, the 'period of Union rule' commonly denotes governing from 1910 – when the Union of South Africa was created – until 1948 – when the NP came into power.

authority "to take life and let live" (Foucault 1998b, p. 138).[49] Racialised bio-politics, those practices, understandings and discourses concerned with "the production and management of…human resources" (Danaher et al. 2010, p. ix) along racial lines, gained momentum during British rule in South Africa in the 19th Century. This was made possible by the increased absorption of Black labour into the growth of capitalism, particularly after the discovery of diamonds and gold in the 1870s and 1880s respectively (Thompson 2006, p. 152).

Even though the creation of the South African state in 1910 resulted in a degree of official autonomy from Britain: South Africa was no longer a British colony and was therefore able to pass laws independently from the metropole, the majority of South Africa's population were not recognised as free citizens. They continued to suffer oppression and exploitation at the hands of their country's minority – a situation which would continue for decades. Racial subjugation was integral to apartheid reasoning, especially after the election of 1948 which saw the NP, with its predominantly Afrikaner[50] support base, secure a marginal victory over the United Party. The illiberal rationality that governed South Africa to that point was reconstituted and expanded by the NP's ideologues who, by employing a mix of orthodox Calvinism and Afrikaner Nationalism, came to advance in the decades that followed an extensive policy of racial separateness or apartheid. According to Norval, the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism – the productive effect of imperial practices of power – is related to particular events in the 20th Century. These were the Depression; the Great Drought; Afrikaner poverty[51] (later termed the

[49] Also see Tikly (2003, p. 163).

[50] Afrikaners refer to White Afrikaans speaking South Africans who are descendant primarily of Dutch, German and French immigrants who arrived during the period of colonisation.

[51] Prior to the creation of the Union of South African in 1910, widespread poverty existed among Afrikaners. This was attributed of the South African War between British troops and Afrikaners over the control of two Boer Republics – Transvaal and Orange Free State – from 1899 to 1902. During this time, Afrikaner farms were destroyed by British troops and those captured were sent to concentration camps. Following the conclusion of the War, Afrikaners struggled to gain formal employment as they were largely uneducated. This meant that they did not possess the technical skills necessary to work in positions occupied by English speaking South Africans, particularly in the mining industry – one of the main sources of employment in South

'Poor White Problem'); and the Second World War (WWII) (1996, p. 12). Of particular importance was their articulation within Afrikaner discourse, the result of which was a profound sense of social dislocation among Afrikaners. Moreover, successive social and political attempts to consolidate White (English and Afrikaner) power during the 1930s failed to address the so-called 'Native problem'[52] and its link to the issue of a dislocated Afrikaner identity. As a result, the latter was perceived as a threat to the viability and welfare of the 'Afrikaner *volk*'; this created the conditions that led to the NP's victory in 1948 (Norval 1996, p. 51).

The term 'apartheid' was used for the first time in South Africa's Parliament in 1944 by the then opposition NP leader, Dr. D F Malan, in his description of an 'ideal' South African republic. Malan, and the rest of NP, envisioned a Republic that would "ensure the safety of the white race and of Christian civilisation by the honest maintenance of the principles of apartheid and guardianship" (Louw (1965) quoting Malan as cited in Brookes 1969, p. 1). This aspiration drew on existing understandings and practices of governing in South Africa that considered Whites and, as was to become apparent after 1948, especially White Afrikaans Christians, as having the sole claim to both freedoms and rights, that is, to a liberal understanding of government. But, because these freedoms and rights were framed not only as exclusive, but as being under threat (partly from Communism and the rise of African Nationalism), this liberal understanding was dependent on the rearticulation of existing Black 'liberties' to fit their averred inferior status. These constructions necessitated governing by means of a reconstituted illiberal rationality (Thompson 2006, p. 180).

Africa at the time. The result was that poverty increased among Afrikaners and those who secured jobs in the mining and transport industries worked alongside Black South Africans as 'cheap labourers'.

[52] From the 1930s onwards, urban areas in South Africa experienced huge increases in Black migration from rural areas due to increasing poverty within the Bantustans. Black urbanisation was constructed as a threat to racial segregation within Afrikaner discourse. This threat was subsequently employed by the NP in its 1948 election campaign (Durrheim et al. 2011, p. 3).

Apartheid, however, should not be viewed as simply a political project that was devised and executed by the apartheid state (Gann 1994, p. 500). Such an understanding is tied to a liberal account of apartheid, otherwise known as the 'liberal modernisation thesis'. Advanced in the work of Bromberger and Hughes (1987), Horwitz (1967), and O'Dowd (1974, 1978), this account assumes that the racist ideology of apartheid interfered with the 'processes' of capitalism; as if it was somehow 'external' to the '*rational*' logic of capitalism. It is argued that this interference precluded the 'natural' development of capitalist modes of production towards liberal and democratic forms of government (Gann 1994, pp. 500-501). The approach, therefore, holds race as the basis of all of society (ibid, p. 500) and its theorisation of race serves as a framework through which all aspects of South African life – social, political and economic – are explained. Through a Foucauldian lens, in contrast, apartheid can be understood as the "institutionalisation of absolute difference" (ibid, p. 505), which was the process responsible for the formation of political identities. Apartheid sought to illuminate and regulate more closely than before the difference between White and non-White populations – the 'absolutisation of difference' – through authoritarian programmes and practices. Such an understanding of apartheid rejects the

> conventional, normative social and political theory underpinning [the liberal perspective on apartheid which]…presupposes that social reality can be examined and explained through sets of pre-given principles assumed true and beyond 'mere belief'. That is, upon fixed *a priori* assumptions concerning the nature and the mode of operation of social reality (ibid, p. 502).

One of the effects of instituting 'absolute difference' was the spatial segregation of racial groups. Racial segregation had characterised the idea of South Africa from the beginning

and was not particular to the rationality of apartheid. It was linked to one of the functions of bio-political racism, namely, to "establish a relationship between the right to segregate certain population groups off and even to limit their life opportunities to ensure the security and prosperity of the dominant population" (Tikly 2003, p. 163). Territorial segregation was formalised in South Africa with the adoption of the *Natives' Land Act* of 1913 and the *Natives Trust and Land Act* of 1936 which both sought to limit and demarcate the purchase of land by Blacks as a means to control and limit the interaction between races. Following the adoption of the 1936 legislation, demarcated 'Reserves' were created for Blacks by setting aside 7% of South Africa's land (later increased to 13%) in which 67% of the country's population had to reside (Brookes 1969, pp. xxiv-xxv; Joyce 2007, p. 43). Building on this, the apartheid state ushered in new legislation informed by the adoption of the *Population Registration Act* of 1950 which legislated for the racial classification of South Africans as either Coloured, Native or White[53], as well as the detailed registration of citizens who resided in the Union according to these racial categories. By drawing on the rhetoric of self-determination, which was reframed by the fashionable post-War conceptualisation of collective identity, the NP proceeded to justify more rigid social and spatial segregation between races. The result was the adoption of the *Groups Area Act* of 1950 which called for the establishment of 'Group Areas' and for 'Homelands': these were designated areas in which particular racial groups had to reside or be relocated to. This necessitated Black, Coloured and Indian 'South Africans' to carry passbooks to enter so-called 'White areas'.

Following the adoption of over a hundred pieces of apartheid legislation between 1948 and 1980, almost every aspect of South African society became segregated.[54] The adoption of

[53] Indians were included in the Coloured category but, in the years that followed, these categories evolved into African, Coloured, Indian and White.

[54] Some of the Acts included: the *Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act* (1949); the *Suppression of Communism Act* (1950); the *Criminal Law Amendment Act* (1953); and the *Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act* (1970).

the *Reservation of Separate Amenities Act* of 1953, as an instance, enabled the division of cities and towns, public transport, recreational areas, schools and universities; it even policed entrances to buildings, along racial lines. The logic of apartheid, therefore, sought to intensify the control exercised over racialised subjects by drawing on police reason to enforce social discipline and to maintain 'good order'. Hindess makes the point that the contention of police reason follows that in order to govern adequately, detailed "knowledge" about a state's population, its "forms of association and patterns of activity" (2001, p. 2), is needed; in apartheid South Africa this necessitated a 'hyper-administrative' state and effective security forces to implement state reason. The logic of apartheid also buttressed and expanded the accumulative economic system which emerged in South Africa during colonial and Union rule. This ensured growth in the White dominated agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors, a system that was secured by the cooption of cheap, semi-skilled Black labour. In his analysis of the development of bio-politics in Europe, Foucault shows that it was "an indispensible element in the development of capitalism [and that] the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes" (1998b, pp. 140-141).

To sustain the emerging capitalist system in South Africa, the apartheid state directed the behaviour of Black subjects both through education and training. In 1953, the *Bantu Education Act* was passed. The legislation granted the Department of Native Affairs and its Minister, Dr. H F Verwoerd, greater influence over the syllabi and financial structuring of Black education (Christie & Collins 1990, pp. 160-162) which, until then, had been controlled by missionary societies (Johnson 1982, p. 220). Limiting access to education; the unequal distribution of resources and funding to education along racial lines; and the generally poor quality and vocational orientation of Black education compared to the specialised nature of

White education, all sought to fix the particular social hierarchies of apartheid (Durrheim et al. 2011, p. 4; Johnson 1982, pp. 220-221). As Verwoerd famously claimed, the system had to ensure that Blacks remained the "hewers of wood and the drawers of water" (Christie & Collins 1990, p. 161). Bantu Education then essentially aimed to establish levels of competence among Black learners which would secure the White economy's need for a semi-skilled workforce. At the same time it also sought to create the conditions for 'self-determination' to contain Black socio-economic and political stratification.

Such an understanding of apartheid differs from the analyses offered by Marxists such as Johnstone (1970) and Legassick (1975). Johnstone and Legassick, in response to the liberal modernisation thesis discussed earlier, advanced an account of apartheid known as the 'racial thesis' (Gann 1994, p. 502). This argues that, instead of locating interference in the development of capitalism in the ideology of apartheid, apartheid and its particular 'brand' of capitalism were in fact mutually constitutive of each other (ibid, p. 501; Norval 1996). So, this approach explains the phenomenon of apartheid "through its relationship with the capitalist mode of production" (Gann 1994, p. 501). Posel, however, who also offers a Marxist-inclined analysis of apartheid, argues that the phenomenon of apartheid was more complex than simply an expression of racialised capitalism, and, by looking beyond the 'grand design thesis' of apartheid, shows how different practices, phases and strategies of apartheid spoke to different interests within the mining and agricultural industries, within the economy and within the state bureaucracy (Posel 1991). Nevertheless, Marxists "reduce all the relations between knowledge and power to a question of class power and class interest" (Hall 2003, p. 75). Foucault would have rejected such economic or class reductionism in the analysis of apartheid. Through a Foucauldian lens, the development and functioning of the apartheid economy is viewed as part of the racialised bio-political imperative of the apartheid state.

The logic of apartheid, however, was unsustainable. Foucault reminds us that any exercise of power is always met by resistance (1982, p. 329). Apart from the daily individual acts of resistance against the logic of apartheid reasoning, larger internal and external pressures to reform resulted in the gradual decline of apartheid's hegemony over South African society. Hegemony here refers to Norval's understanding and employment of the term in her 1996 book *Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse.* Norval draws on the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci's, notion of hegemony. For Gramsci, a crisis of hegemony refers to a crisis of an organic nature which is brought about by contradictory structural (economic) forces. These contradictions bring about 'socio-historical criticism' which seeks to bring about a new 'reality' (Norval 1996, pp. 219-220). Norval expands the concept of 'structural contradictions' to include "the whole of the imaginary horizon which regulates both the political and economic terrains" (ibid, p. 220). In this way, a crisis of apartheid's hegemony refers to the criticism of and resistance against the "imaginary on the basis of which social division…[was]…instituted" (ibid, p. 221). A discourse can only remain hegemonic for as long as it is able to conserve its horizon of intelligibility – "a framework delineating what is possible, what can be said and done, what positions may legitimately be taken, what acting may be engaged in, and so forth" (ibid, p. 4). The logic of apartheid was put into question by events and resistance discourses from the 1970s onwards which, among others, included mass resistance by the United Democratic Front (UDF)[55]; increased opposition to racialised capitalism by Black trade unions; community-based struggles against material and social conditions; international boycotts and sanctions; as well as the pressure from apartheid's Western allies to end the system through negotiation (ibid, pp. 216-218, 269-270). These pressures created the space within which apartheid's mode of social division could be disarticulated, and a new mode of social thinking imagined by those

[55] The United Democratic Front (UDF) was an anti-apartheid 'umbrella organisation' that was established in 1983 and comprised of churches, civil organisations, trade unions and student organisations, among others, to act as an 'united front' against apartheid.

"endorsed with the authority to speak" (Moon 2006, p. 260). This led to the formal process of negotiation which took place from 1990 to 1993 which paved the way for South Africa's first democratic election in 1994. Negotiation, however, presupposes some form of compromise and, as the next section reveals, distinct limitations were placed on the ability of the ANC and its alliance partners to rearticulate the reasoning and reconstitute the historical characteristics of apartheid (Norval 1996, p. 299).

3.2 DISARTICULATING AND REARTICULATING RATIONALITIES

3.2.1 Boundaries of Intervention

In 1990, following the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations, the country entered into negotiations.[56] This was a "process through which the *consensus* of values had to be attained…within a 'normalized' political process" (Norval 1996, p. 279, my emphasis). Upon his release from prison after twenty seven years internment, Mandela (1990) echoed the leadership of the NP and the business community when he expressed the need for so-called 'political normalisation':

> Today, I wish to report to you that my talks with the government have been aimed at *normalising* the political situation in the country. We have not yet begun discussing the basic demands of the struggle. I wish to stress that I myself have at no time entered into negotiations about the future of our country, except to insist on a meeting between the ANC and the government. Mr. de Klerk has gone further than

[56] After initial talks between the NP and African National Congress (ANC), the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was established in November 1991 which set out the 'rules of engagement', so to speak, between negotiating parties. A month later, CODESA was opened in Johannesburg and was tasked with negotiating an interim constitution as well as develop the final constitution following democratic elections. Three hundred delegates, which included representatives of established political parties and the ten homelands, partook in the CODESA process (Thompson 2006, pp. 244-245).

> any other nationalist president in taking real steps to *normalise* the situation. However, there are further steps, as outlined in the Harare Declaration, which have to be met before negotiations on the basic demands of our people can begin.

Even though the NP created the 'climate for negotiation' as stipulated by *The Harare Declaration* (1989)[57], the concessional nature of negotiation forestalled a complete break with apartheid reasoning (Andreasson 2006, p. 305; Norval 1996, p. 279). Furthermore, the displacement of the myth of apartheid was dependent on the conceptualisation of an alternative myth that could "articulate a *new* project capable of introducing a *new* mode of social division [and] disarticulate the form of social division upon which the apartheid imaginary was based" (Norval 1996, p. 270, my emphasis). In this, the NP's rhetoric became less racialised during the 1980s as the party started to distinguish between those who were 'reasonable', non-violent and committed to negotiated change, and those who were 'unreasonable' in their commitment to violence and anarchy. By entering into negotiations, the NP was able to "reactivate…the grounds of existing frontiers" (ibid, p. 279) within a 'normalised' political environment. This saw the exclusion of radicals on both the left and right and the inclusion of more 'moderate' and 'pragmatic' parties in the negotiation process (ibid; Kallaway 2006, p. 35).

Despite the ANC's militant rhetoric during the struggle, it was never a revolutionary organisation. Since its formation in 1912, it has never disputed the legitimacy of South Africa's borders which, in 1910, had established the country. Rather, what the ANC rejected was the legitimacy of the successive White governments that had ruled South Africa from 1910 as these were not elected through non-racial and participatory election processes (Alexander 2002, p. 46). The ANC sought transformation of the state apparatus but through negotiation and

[57] *The Harare Declaration* (1989) was issued by exiled members of the ANC executive who met in Harare in 1989 to discuss the 'conditions' under which the ANC would enter into negotiations with the NP government. The main conditions included that all political prisoners had to be released; that bans on political organisations had to be lifted; that troops had to be removed from the townships; that the 'state of emergency' had to be suspended; and that all political trails and executions had to be halted.

eventually elections. Other factors such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1989 also contributed to the appeal of ('rational') negotiation between the NP and the ANC. The events in Eastern Europe which signalled the failure of socialism provided 'evidence' that ideological dogmatism could not succeed and that reason – conveniently orientated towards the present and future[58] – was required. The breakup of the Soviet Union also delegitimised the prospects of an economic rationality outside of the free-market model which had gained ground in South Africa during apartheid's final years. This strengthened Alexander's claim that the negotiated settlement determined the boundaries of political, social and economic intervention prior to the political party promises that preceded South Africa's first democratic election in April 1994 (2002, p. 3).[59]

Despite winning 63% of the votes in the first free and open election, the ANC, together with its alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), formed a Government of National Unity (GNU).[60] A decentralised structure of governance consisting of one national and nine provincial governments as well as a local government sector was adopted. Assuming a place in the GNU, however, compromised the ANC's ability to reconceptualise governing because it inherited a public service which retained civil servants from the apartheid government (Christie 2006, p. 378). The was related to the negotiated settlement's 'sunset clause': this provided for the gradual phasing out of Whites in the public service both in the interest of so-called 'national unity' and to prevent a mass exodus of skilled public servants following the 1994 election. As a result, the ANC had to navigate "*established*

[58] The NP stressed the need to 'look and move forward' but invoked the past when it served a purpose such as the previously mentioned rhetoric of 'reason' and 'non-violence' which the NP started to employ in the 1980s (Norval 1996, p. 280).
[59] Also see Norval (1996, p. 281).
[60] One day after the new Constitution was adopted on May 8, 1996, the NP announced its withdrawal from the Government of National Unity which largely signalled the 'end' of this interim arrangement.

rules and procedures" (ibid, p. 376, my emphasis) – or, as Greenstein calls it, "distinct agendas and modes of operation" (1997, p. 366) – as well as those "knowledges" that amassed over time which directed the work of the established public service (Christie 2006, p. 376).[61] As will become plain, one way in which the emerging political rationality departed from apartheid's illiberal rationality was through the adoption of a liberal understanding of governance. As Tikly points out, this was in keeping with the post-apartheid state's "*broad trajectory*…towards a version of the advanced liberal [read neo-liberal] state" (2003, p. 166, my emphasis).

3.2.2 Adopting Liberal Reasoning

A liberal governmental rationality, Foucault argues, has to address the question of "where exactly…the principle of the limitation of government" is to be located, and "how…the effects of this limitation [are] to be calculated" (1979, p. 20).[62] This feature is related to liberalism's emergence as a critique of the 'unlimited' objectives of the authoritarian police state, especially in Europe. Leveled against the illiberal rationality of the apartheid state in South Africa, liberal reasoning required that apartheid legislation such as the *Group Areas Act* and the *Population Registration Act* of 1950 should be replaced with a legal framework that would provide for an alternative limitation of government. Such thinking gave impetus to the deliberation of a new Constitution – adopted in 1993, and officially promulgated in 1996 – which represented a legal break from apartheid's qualified view of human rights. A Bill of Rights, said to be among the most liberal in the world, was adopted in which discrimination based on age, disability, language, race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation, was outlawed

[61] Also see Christie (1999) and Mc Lennan (2009).
[62] Quote taken from footnote.

(RSA 1996a). Equality before the law was considered as the foundation upon which the long-held vision of a 'non-racial' society could be built.

The concept of non-racialism gained popularity in the late 1980s and was employed by mass mobalisation organisations such as the UDF to unite communities and organisations which had been long divided by the logic and practices of apartheid. During the negotiations, social division functioned as one of the myths that "competed in the attempt to re-suture the dislocated structure of the old, dying [apartheid] imagination" (Norval 1996, p. 275). However, the ideal of non-racialism within a racially divided and unequal society was not without tensions of its own. These were discernable in the *Freedom Charter* of (ANC 1955)[63] which proclaimed "that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief", while also claiming that, "[t]he national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the *people*" (ibid, my emphasis). Norval points out that during the struggle to end apartheid, "[n]on-racialism was constituted on the basis of creating equivalence between different *oppressed* 'groups' in order to foster a common opposition to apartheid articulated around the *people*" (1996, p. 295, my emphasis). So, even if legal equality between races was realised, as the formulation of a new Constitution sought to achieve, without social and economic equality between them, the ideal of non-racialism could not be achieved.

As a result, economic redress was vital for the enhancement of post-apartheid freedoms. Just as the market had functioned as the site in which the transformations towards modern governmentality had occurred in Europe, so the conditions for freedom were conceptualised in terms of economic interest by South Africa's post-apartheid liberal rationality. This is reflected

[63] *The Freedom Charter* was adopted by the ANC and its alliance partners under the banner of the South African Congress Alliance in 1955 at a meeting termed 'The Congress of the People' in Kliptown. This set out the demands of the 'people' oppressed by the apartheid system.

in Section 9 of the Bill of Rights which offers the protection and advancement of the rights of citizens who had been "disadvantaged by unfair discrimination" (RSA 1996a). The open-ended nature of this clause facilitated the adoption of an 'equality of outcome' approach to address the protection and advancement of the economic rights (read interests) of previously disadvantaged citizens by the incoming government (Jeffery 2010, p. 150). Within countries with market-led economies, an 'equality of opportunity' approach is often adopted to formulate public policy. This approach focuses on 'inputs' to ensure equal access to education and training and other services to enable citizens to compete for jobs and opportunities on a 'merit' basis (ibid). In contrast, the post-apartheid equality of outcome approach was concerned with achieving certain 'outputs' or 'outcomes' through the use of quotas and the policy of Affirmative Action with the goal of ensuring that certain positions, contracts and promotions benefit previously disadvantaged citizens (ibid). This approach can be attributed to the pressing need, following the 1994 election, to deliver tangible redress for apartheid. Considering that race was the chief signifier of inequality during apartheid, an equality of outcome approach to ensure the redress of past injustices would, according to the ANC, necessarily be based on racial categorisation and prioritisation (Jordan 1997, p. 8).

The ANC subsequently adopted *The Employment Equity Act* in 1998 with the goal of creating "demographic representivity at all levels of the workplace" (Jeffery 2010, p. 151). This required that public and private sector employers give preference to Black people (defined in the Act as Africans, Coloureds and Indians) with regard to appointments and promotion on condition of such candidates possessing the necessary qualifications, experience and skills. This approach to redress, however, appeared to stand at odds with the free market reasoning which was espoused two years earlier in the form of a macro-economic policy called GEAR.[64]

[64] Argued later in this Chapter, Affirmative Action policies in post-apartheid South Africa have mostly benefitted the Black middle class – those citizens who possess the necessary skills, qualifications and

This policy emphasised the need for human resources development through better education and training, with minimal intervention by the state in the economy (National Treasury 1996, p. 2). Although GEAR was informed by market economics, and the adoption (alongside the aforementioned liberal rationality) of a neo-liberal mentality of rule, it departed from an earlier left leaning economic strategy known as the RDP (Redistribution and Development Programme), which had been adopted by the GNU in 1994. To understand why this happened, we must look closer to its development and logic – to this task we will now turn.

3.2.3 From Liberal Welfarism to Neo-liberalism

The 1994 *White Paper on Reconstruction and Development* (RSA 1994), a policy framework document "for integrated and coherent socio-economic progress" (ibid, p. 8), was informed by a liberal welfare understanding of governing. Known as the RDP, the document claimed to be driven by two chief social concerns: the alleviation of poverty and the restructuring of the economy (ibid, p. 4). In other words, post-apartheid emancipation was only possible through socio-economic transformation. It also espoused a Keynesian view that through state intervention, economic growth could be aligned to the goals of reconstruction and development (Lodge 2002, p. 54). According to Chipkin, the RDP was "referenced to a certain political vision", in order to realise "a certain image of the *good* society" (2007, p. 152, original emphasis). Because the South African state was not captured through revolution, neither the

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experience favoured by *The Employment Equity Act*. So, although Affirmative Action policies spoke to the liberal understanding of government adopted by the ANC in that it sought to create economic redress and greater socio-economic equality, it also spoke to the neo-liberal understanding of governing adopted shortly thereafter which considered political subjectivity in term of economic 'activity' as was argued in the previous Chapter. In other words, those Black citizens who possessed the skills, qualifications and experience necessary to grow a modern, free-market economy spoke to the neo-liberal rationality of the state and to Affirmative Action policies. Although a liberal equality of outcome approach appear to contradict the seeming equality of opportunity approach of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, because Affirmative Action policies were also informed by neo-liberal reasoning, it did not stand at odds with the programmes and practices of GEAR.

relations of production nor the terms of property-ownership could be transformed; this limited the RDP to conceptualise a "non-revolutionary path to socialism" (ibid, p. 154). Although issued under the auspices of the GNU, the RDP had its roots in negotiations between the ANC, its alliance partners, the Mass Democratic Movement[65] and other Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) but, ultimately, was born out of engagements between the ANC and COSATU. A 1990 workshop between the ANC and COSATU in Harare saw the adoption of proposals which included "an extension of public ownership, state regulation of credit, a prescribed high-wage economy, and a central role for organised labour in policy formulation…[with redistribution serving]…as the principal agency of economic growth" (Lodge 2002, p. 21). This followed the socialist ideals espoused by both organisations during the struggle against apartheid. However, the RDP base document (ANC 1994a), published by the ANC prior to adoptions of the White Paper, revealed the influence of both socialist *and* market-based discourses. The state was framed less as a direct driver of economic development but, more ambiguously – as an active partner, catalyst and facilitator of economic growth. In the document, reference is also made to the private sector's role in providing utilities and welfare to the population; thus signaling the marked departure from the outcomes of the Harare workshop (World Bank Development Report (1997) as cited in Lodge 2002, p. 56).

Nevertheless, the RDP was broadcast as a 'people-driven' programme that would advance a growth-through-redistribution thesis and, in addition to restructuring the economy, was intent on delivering housing, water, electricity and other services to the poor (RSA 1994). To achieve its goals, an RDP office was established in the Presidency to oversee and coordinate the RDP but its implementation was met by many difficulties. Some considered the programme as complex and impractical; others blamed the inexperience of the government bureaucracy to

[65] The Mass Democratic Movement was a loose coalition of anti-apartheid organisations during the 1970s and 80s in South Africa. It succeeded the UDF after the latter was banned in 1988.

service a considerably larger constituency than before. The fact was that much of the RDP budget was unspent during the first two years of democracy (Handley 2005, p. 224; Jeffery 2010, p. 241). In February 1996, in addition to the business sector's increased agitation with the "underlying tone of authoritarianism in the RDP" (South African Chamber of Business (1994/95) as cited in Jeffery 2010, p. 243) (largely due to its encouragement of state intervention in the economy), the country's currency came under pressure. As has become clear, a new macro-economic programme (GEAR) was being drafted in secret by a group of economists and academics, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, during this time. This new programme was presented to Parliament in June 1996; it resembled a 'localised' Structural Adjustment Programme because of the appropriation of the "essential tenets and policy recommendations of the neoliberal framework" (Adelzadeh 1996, p. 67) advanced by the IMF and the World Bank. So, informed by a neo-liberal rationality of governing, this 'self-imposed' pro-market economic strategy (Tikly 2003, p. 167; Vally & Spreen 2006, p. 2) was officially endorsed by the ANC at its national conference in December 1997. The ANC undertook to implement "deficit reduction, government 'rightsizing', tariff reduction, privatisation and productivity-linked wage rates" (Lodge 2002, p. 25). The conclusion is unavoidable: the market became, to draw on Foucault, a site of veridiction, as "strategically placed officials announced unequivocally that GEAR was *non-negotiable* – because of globalisation there [was] *no* alternative" (Hart 2008, p. 681, my emphasis). This famously echoed Margaret Thatcher's 'TINA' ('There is no alternative') claim.

Despite assertions that GEAR was aligned to the goals of the RDP, and that it sought to produce rights-bearing citizens which were able to participate "in the democratic institutions of civil society" (National Treasury 1996, p. 1), it envisioned a different society from the one

promised by South Africa's liberation discourse. The role of the state in creating jobs through intervention in the economy was downplayed and it emphasised redistribution-through-growth by encouraging international investment, competition and skills development (ibid). It furthermore envisioned a citizenry that possessed the skills necessary to function, as Foucault puts it, as 'active' economic subjects (Foucault 1979, p. 223), within a market-driven, investment-friendly economy. Among other things, this meant fostering an 'entrepreneurial mindset' among South Africans by encouraging "small and medium-sized enterprise development" (National Treasury 1996, p. 14) so that new jobs and new wealth could be created by economically-responsible citizens. It soon became clear that GEAR – in line with HCT (Human Capital Theory) – positioned economic-growth above all societal concerns, including liberation politics (Greenstein 2009, p. 76; Peters (2001) paraphrased by Doherty 2007, pp. 201-202). So, it was that the market, together with business management principles, came to inform subsequent policies and practices of government. This was evidenced, most notably, in the call for fiscal restraint by the state and the privatisation of select public utilities. The wider logic of austere public spending was presented in GEAR's strategy document as a *necessary* step towards managing inflation and ensuring the availability of domestic resources to finance the development of capital markets (Hart 2008; Narsiah 2007; National Treasury 1996, p. 8).

Informed by this reasoning, the ANC government introduced a policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE); a set of guidelines that private companies were compelled to follow in order to do business with the government. BEE was initially implemented on an informal basis until the adoption in 2003 of *The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act* (RSA 2003). After this, a criteria scorecard, as outlined by the Act, had to be met by companies wishing to do business with the government. Among other things, a company's

scorecard had to favourably reflect its empowerment of Black South Africans either through the ownership or management of the company (ibid). It also had to show the human resource development, the equity standards, the preferential procurement and the investment by the company in other companies (or enterprises) were owned or managed by Blacks (ibid). BEE was framed by the ANC as an 'accumulative vehicle' which, once a Black capitalist class had been established, could further drive the deracialisation of the capitalist system (McKinley 2011; RSA 2003, p. 5). Such reasoning, however, bares traces of earlier discursive constructions of BEE (Nzimande 2005). Nzimande points to the similarities between BEE and the policy of Black Advancement which was introduced by some American companies in the late 1970s in response to increased pressures to disinvest from South Africa. This involved the training and promotion of Black South Africans to managerial positions in order to create a Black petty bourgeois class with an eye to "convin[cing] black South Africans that capitalism [was] in their interest" (ibid). Although the national-socialist discourse of the ANC during the struggle period constructed BEE as a way to assume 'control' and eventually overthrow the capitalist system, by 1994

> the mould of any future BEE was set. The primacy of developing a black bourgeoisie as the accumulative vehicle for an extended BEE and the maintenance/enhancement of capitalist relations of production as the macro-developmental framework within which that took place (alongside political 'freedom') – was presented as the *logical* and indeed *desired* outcome of the liberation struggle itself (McKinley 2011, my emphasis).

By 2004, however, GEAR had not realised its promise of creating, as the strategy phrased it, 'accelerated economic growth'. In the previous year, the country's economy had only grown by 1.9% (compared to GEAR's vision of a 6% growth rate by the year 2000) and

the unemployment figure[66] stood at 27% (compared to 17% in 1995) (Jeffery 2010, p. 252; Manuel 2004, p. 11; National Treasury 1996, p. 5). The lack of skills and expertise among Black citizens due to continued structural inequalities, especially within the education system, buttressed high levels of unemployment and witnessed a lack of transformation in the private sector. In the public sector, the need to achieve employment equity targets saw the appointment of Blacks who did not necessarily possess the required qualifications and skills. This led to widespread mismanagement (Jeffery 2010, pp. 152-155; SAinfo 2009). In the face of unemployment and inadequate service delivery to the poor, the ANC announced in 2004 that a new growth plan would be pursued – this one would launch South Africa on a 'Developmental State' path. Drawing on the development strategies employed in East Asia after WWII, the new strategy aimed to "accelerate…economic growth in order to expand service delivery, redistribution and social development" (Mc Lennan 2009, p. 33) through intervention (where this was necessary) in the economy, through the provision and extension of social grants and free basic services, and through a greater infrastructural development (ibid). The ANC subsequently unveiled the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (Asgi-SA) strategy (RSA 2006). Instead of departing from the neo-liberal logic of GEAR, this approach highlighted and proposed to address the 'binding constraints', or obstacles, to the (reframed) governmental objective of 'accelerated and shared growth'.[67] Like the RDP, Asgi-SA was informed by both market-directed and interventionist economic discourses; calling on the one hand for greater liberalisation of the economy and the introduction of competition and, on the other, suggesting the active development of strategic industries through the provision of state subsidies and the use of tax concessions (ibid). This contradictory and obscure change to

[66] Using the strict definition, unemployment here refers to the *active job seekers* who were unemployed as opposed to unemployment according to the 'expanded' definition which would include "all discouraged workers not actively seeking jobs" (Jeffery 2010, p. 252).

[67] These constraints included currency volatility; a deficient national logistics system; skills shortages; barriers to investment and competition; obstacles to small and medium business enterprises; and weaknesses in state capacity (RSA 2006, pp. 2-4).

the language of South Africa's economic policy resulted in little real adjustment in the economic programme of the ANC government.

Laubscher (2007) noted that although *elements* of a Developmental State were visible – the state's involvement in the development of the motor industry; the pressure that the state put on financial institutions to provide financing to low-income groups; and the attempts by the state to develop an overarching industrial policy – South Africa could not be considered as a Developmental State.[68] Unlike Asia's Developmental States, South Africa preferred to regulate as opposed to intervene in the economy[69]; there was also no relationship between the public and private sector to coordinate service delivery; and South Africa did not possess "an elite, meritocratic bureaucracy that attract[ed] the best talent in the country" (ibid). Until 2009, therefore, which is relevant to the timeframe of this thesis, governing in post-apartheid South Africa continued to be informed by a neo-liberal rationality of government. This mentality of rule navigated and functioned alongside an earlier adopted liberal mentality of rule. The next section considers some of the tensions alluded to above between these rationalities, specifically the impact of the latter on 'risk' calculation by the South African state.

3.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S 'GOVERNMENTALITY-IN-THE-MAKING'

Taking a cue from Tikly – since a single rationality cannot be ascribed to government during the fifteen years of South African democracy, we should think of post-apartheid political reasoning as emerging; in other words, it was a 'governmentality-in-the-making' (2003, p. 166). Furthermore, because post-apartheid rule has been informed by a dual political

[68] Also see Gumede (2011).

[69] Early neo-liberal reasoning framed any attempt by the state to regulate the market as unwanted interference. The distinction Laubscher makes above between regulation and interference is enabled by a new wave of neo-liberal thinking referred to as the Post-Washington Consensus. The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (Asgi-SA) strategy was thus able to justify certain interventions in the South African market "to make it a better market" (Allais 2009, p. 253). Also see Mc Lennan (2009, p. 35).

rationality, the tensions between these mentalities should be considered. Before doing so, the variance of the analysis thus far with Foucault's analysis of modern governmentality, should be addressed. This seeming disparity is because, although part of the same epoch, Foucault analysed liberalism and neo-liberalism as differentiable political rationalities because they emerged at different times in response to particular historical problems and governed according to rearticulated conceptions of political subjectivity, the market and 'risk' calculation (Read 2009, pp. 27-28). Negotiating the end of apartheid in South Africa, however, followed upon "the dramatic collapse of Marxism-Leninism[,]…the serious and, in some cases, successful challenges to one-party states in Africa, and the demonstrable superiority of market driven systems" (Welsh 1994, p. 62). Both singly, but especially together, these events gave liberal reasoning "a powerful new impetus" (ibid) as it was also able to articulate the ANC's vision of a non-racial democratic order.

Around the same time, neo-liberalism, which had started to function as a governmentality on a global scale, had great appeal to the ANC due to its promotion of economic growth as a means to development and job creation. Furthermore, at the end of the Cold War the 'triumph' of market capitalism was proclaimed (see Fukuyama 1989); this also contributed to the construction of globalisation and the free-market as inevitabilities. The post-apartheid state, therefore, in order to remain 'relevant' and economically competitive, internationally, '*had*' to ascribe to a neo-liberal rationality of government. As Narsiah contends,

> [i]n many ways the new South African democracy became the poster child of the ideal modern state, with aspirations and recognition of a range of socio-economic and citizenship rights being enshrined in the 1996 Act of Constitution. Yet, in

> achieving this ostensibly progressive document, the space was created for the implementation of a new organ of regulation for these rights (2007, p. 34).

This organ was the market which served as the site in which governing practices were rendered intelligible by addressing local and fostering global expectations of socio-economic redress *and* modernisation (Simon 2003, p. 8). GEAR embodied the adoption by the post-apartheid state of a neo-liberal rationality alongside a liberal mentality of rule, which attests to the distinct circumstances which characterised South Africa at the start of democratic rule when compared, say, to the contexts analysed by Foucault in his governmentality research. This difference was located within the vast level of socio-economic inequalities between different racial groups which the post-apartheid state sought to address through the calculation and management of 'risk' to society to prevent the restriction of freedom. Tikly points out that an example of the tensions between liberal and neo-liberal political reasoning can be found within the calculation and management of post-apartheid 'risk' (2003, p. 166). This is an important consideration because it allows for a demonstration of the effects of the intersection between government policies and practices.

3.3.1 Tensions and Effects of Political Reason in 'Risk'

As has been argued, liberalism is not the imperative of freedom but its guardian (Foucault 1979, p. 63). In response to the logic of apartheid, liberal reasoning sought to produce the *conditions* necessary for freedom, that is, "freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from deprivation, freedom of ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from fear" (Mandela (1994) as cited in RSA 1994, p. 6).[70] With the lifting of international sanctions and the ending of hostility between South Africa and its neighbours

[70] Also see ANC (1994c) and RSA (1996a).

following the 1994 election, securing the internal stability of the South African state by addressing 'risks' to freedom took centre stage. In contrast to the conditions that gave rise to liberal and, later, neo-liberal 'risk' calculation in Europe and elsewhere, the extreme level of socio-economic inequality in South Africa at the start of democracy was met by the adoption of a dual strategic plan to manage citizens' 'risks'. The first strategy targeted 'active' citizens; an extension of the largely privatised "collective indemnification against risks for [W]hites" (Tikly 2003, p. 168) which emerged during apartheid, to also include 'active' Black citizens after 1994. The second strategy was aimed at mostly Black, 'at-risk' citizens: "those groups who [were] not expected to participate in the labour market and, therefore, vulnerable to low income: the elderly, those with disabilities, and children" (Samson et al. 2006, p. 1).

Addressing the latter carried a commitment by the state to provide free basic healthcare, housing, water, electricity and education, among others, to the poor, and the roll-out of a variety of social grants to eligible citizens financed through national tax revenue. In 2009, 13 million citizens received social grants which, for the ANC, "remain[ed] the most effective form of poverty alleviation" (Molewa (2009) as cited in Khumalo 2009). The latter strategy, namely, the provision of grants and (free) access to services *denied* by apartheid with the goal of "facilitate[ing] the development of human capacity and self-reliance" (DoW 1997, p. 9), drew on elements of early 20th Century liberal welfare reasoning. The management of the 'risks' to 'active' citizens, on the other hand, was based on neo-liberal understandings of 'risk' calculation (Mc Lennan 2009, p. 21; Tikly 2003, p. 168). Because 'active' citizens fell outside of the 'at-risk' category, *they* themselves were responsible for managing potential risks with regard to illness and old age (by taking out private medical aid and pension schemes); crime (by making use of private security companies); unemployment and accidents (by taking out private insurance policies); and education through its privatisation. The wellbeing of these

citizens in this category became, or continued to be, the responsibility of these citizens themselves (Tikly 2003, p. 168).

The 'risk' strategies mentioned here are related to a distinction within the conceptualisation of political subjectivity at the start of democracy in South Africa. Foucault shows in his governmentality research that certain subject positions are created for citizens within the dominant political rationality that informs governing (Fitzsimons 2002). Post-apartheid liberal reasoning reconceptualisation South African's population to consist out of a non-racial, autonomous and rights bearing citizenry. That said, it is important to recall that classic liberalism was "predicated on a belief…that the population to be governed consists of individuals endowed naturally with the *capacity* for autonomous action" (Hindess 2001, p. 4, my emphasis). When this capacity was found to be lacking due to 'criminal tendencies' or 'feeblemindedness', for example, these subjects were considered 'reformable' through disciplinary intervention (ibid, p. 6). However, within contemporary societies constituted by "an already improved population" (ibid, p. 7), liberal reasoning frames this distinction as being between those citizens who possess the capacity to manifest autonomy and those who, because of *external* constrains – poverty, lack of education, ill health, discrimination, and the like – do not. So, although post-apartheid liberal reasoning considered all citizens, and not just empowered Whites, to possess an intrinsic ability to realise autonomy, there was an obvious 'capacity disjuncture' between the previously advantaged and previously disadvantaged South Africans. As we have seen, this resulted in the development of a collective 'risk' strategy in the form of social welfare policies and the provision of certain free services which targeted the previously disadvantaged, mainly the country's Blacks. This approach was informed by a liberal calculation of 'risk' and was first made intelligible through the RDP. Through the exclusion of previously advantaged, mainly White citizens, as well as members of post-

apartheid South Africa's growing Black middle class, an individual 'risk' programme that had to be managed by citizens (rational agents) themselves was adopted. This approach was informed by a neo-liberal rationality and buttressed by the adoption of GEAR in 1996.

This duality in political reasoning was also buttressed by the ANC's conceptualisation of South Africa's economy as constituted by two economies – the so-called first economy and the second economy – particularly during the Mbeki presidency (1999-2009[71]). The first was constituted by autonomous *individuals* who were responsible for managing their own 'risks' and was defined as modern, responsible for most of South Africa's wealth creation and was framed as part of the 'global economy' (Mbeki 2003a, 2003b). It was considered to be the 'benchmark of reform' for the second economy which was constituted largely by the non-autonomous segment of *society* whose collective 'risk' was managed by the state. The second economy was defined as underdeveloped, unproductive and, importantly, as "*incapable* of self-generated growth and development" (Mbeki 2003b, my emphasis). Furthermore, the goal of autonomy for citizens within the second economy was considered possible through, as Mbeki (2003a) phrased it, the expansion of South Africa's "first world economy". This approach invoked the notion of the 'First World' to refer to South Africa's 'active', developed and preferred economy. It revealed the post-apartheid state's ascription to Western dominated neo-liberal reasoning that ties the achievement of autonomy, welfare and prosperity to economic growth.[72] The distinction in political subjectivity that was made by liberal reasoning was recast in economic capability terms by neo-liberal reasoning following the adoption of GEAR. The result was that neo-liberal understandings of political subjectivity, the ideal or benchmark for non-autonomous subjects, came to inform the majority of government policies and practices

[71] See footnote 20.
[72] The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative fir South Africa (Asgi-SA) strategy document claimed that the Second Economy had to be eliminated, implying the viability and desirability of the First Economy (RSA 2006, p. 8). Also see Greenstein (2009).

(Narsiah 2007, p. 34). The government, therefore, attempted to create the conditions that would produce a citizenry based on the neo-liberal conception of *homo œconomicus* – 'entrepreneurial subjects'[73], who possessed "the skills required by a modern economy and society" (Mbeki (2004) as cited in Greenstein 2009, p. 80).

Such an understanding of political subjectivity, however, was in tension with the liberal welfare conceptualisation of 'risk' calculation in post-apartheid South Africa. This was because the conditions that were necessary to develop the capacity of 'at-risk' citizens were not achieved. One, but certainly not the only, reason for this was the antagonism between the liberal commitment to create greater socio-economic equality, and the neo-liberal logic and, importantly, implications of fiscal austerity within a national context characterised by structural inequalities, resource limitations and uneven education and training (Hart 2008, p. 685; Tikly 2003). Neo-liberal practices of government demand 'equitable distribution' of national revenue between government departments which means that the post-apartheid "state…[was]…severely constrained in its ability to intervene in the area of social welfare" (Tikly 2003, p. 169). Government-sponsored income grants were insufficient to sustain living expenses, and despite several incremental increases in expenditure, day-to-day realities such as rising oil and food prices, natural disasters, and the impact of HIV/AIDS, frequently outweighed budgetary increases (Braude 2004, p. 54). Similarly, service delivery in post-apartheid South Africa was also limited in its capacity to provide adequate services, particularly to the poor (Booysen 2009; Stanton 2009, p. 13).[74] Following the adoption of GEAR, which called for 'cost-cutting' initiatives at a local level, funds and grants to municipalities were significantly reduced and the privatisation of utilities were pursued as a means to secure new sources of government revenue. Creating a 'better life for all', to use a government slogan, came to mean the constitution of the

[73] This does not only imply entrepreneurial economic activity but refers the wider creation of individual satisfaction, wealth, 'risk' management et cetera by citizens themselves.
[74] See Bank, Minkley & Kamman (2010) and Seekings (2007).

post-apartheid "state in such a manner that it provide[d]…[a] better life in the most *cost effective way*" (ANC 1996, p. 6, my emphasis).

Neo-liberal reasoning led to the conceptualisation of all citizens on the level of service delivery practices as 'customers', or 'active' subjects, with a focus on making the delivery of services and goods more efficient by drawing on market principles (Mc Lennan 2009; McKinley 2004; Narsiah 2007). The privatisation of utilities after the adoption of GEAR, which led to drastic increases in levies unaffordable to 'at-risk' citizens who could not conform to the idea of customers able to pay for the services they demanded.[75] However, as Mc Lennan observes, service delivery is not only about distributing services but also includes "shift[ing] established deprivation and poverty. This requires a focus not only on distribution, but also on the social structures, institutions and norms that condition people's ability to control their lives and livelihoods" (2009, p. 22). So, the failure to address the 'risks' faced by 'at-risk' citizens in post-apartheid South Africa, coupled with the failure of the state to create the conditions necessary for the latter to achieve autonomy and freedom, in part through proper education and training, contrast with the ability of 'active' citizens to conform to the notion of 'active' economic subjects. Since 1994, 'active' citizens had access to proper health services through private healthcare; they were financially cushioned by private pension and insurance schemes; they had access to independent (private) school education; and they were able to sustain their level of income or generate new wealth through BEE contracts, for example (Kon & Lackan 2008; Tikly 2003). Furthermore, 'active' citizens received better service delivery than 'at risk' citizens in rural areas and townships (Managa 2012). This was as a result of the historic capacity – institutionalised practices and "knowledges" – of certain municipalities to provide

[75] Due to non-payment of utilities such as water and electricity, supplies have been cut poor communities. Between 2000 and 2001, a severe cholera outbreak occurred in KwaZulu Natal which was later linked to inadequate water supply and sanitation to communities in rural areas (Bond 2004; Hart 2008, p. 684; McKinley 2004).

more effective service delivery to particular constituencies, aided by the ability of 'active' citizens to pay for services (Ngoma 2009, p. 198). The effects of the tensions between liberal and neo-liberal mentalities of rule on governmental programmes and practices have contributed to the continuation and widening of the socio-economic inequalities that characterised apartheid South Africa.[76] On a deeper level, however, this point to a continuation of elements of apartheid's logic within post-apartheid political reasoning, and it is to this issue that we now turn.

3.3.2 Dis/continuities between Apartheid and Post-Apartheid Reasoning

The adoption of liberal reasoning by the post-apartheid state enabled a departure with the rationality of apartheid, most specifically through the conception of a new mode of social division. This was based not on apartheid's racial categorisation but on a non-racial and judicial mode of division. Giving effect to this logic was the adoption of a new Constitution which extended rights and legal equality to who lived within South Africa's borders. Apartheid's authoritarian practices, which drew heavily on police reason, gave way to a system of universal franchise and the abolition of racist apartheid legislation and segregation policies through the adoption of a liberal democratic understanding of government. The calculation of a new welfare 'risk' strategy for previously disadvantaged citizens also represented a break from the exclusionary policies of apartheid which sought to protect and advance only White interests. But, the failure of the alternative thinking on economics to make inroads into the governmental rationality of the post-apartheid state enabled a continuation of some features of apartheid's logic. As Foucault points out in his governmentality lectures, there is no "autonomous socialist governmentality", that is, "a reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, modes, and

[76] This is evidenced in the fact that in 2009 South Africa surpassed Brazil as the country with the highest Gini-coefficient, or level of income inequality, in the world (Bhorat et al. 2009, p. 8).

objectives of governmental action" (1979, p. 92). Socialism does have a historic and economic rationality but its *functioning* as an art of government has been 'intertwined' with other rationalities. For example, socialism has partnered with a liberal understanding of government and assumed the role of "counterweights, as a corrective, and a palliative to internal dangers" (ibid). This was seen in the logic of early 20th Century welfare states and more recently, in the RDP's employment of a Keynesian inspired paradigm in post-apartheid South Africa. Socialism also drew on police reason which manifested in hyper-administrative and authoritative states, as was the case in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ibid, pp. 92-93).

Unable to assert a coherent and autonomous rationality of government, given the failure of the logic of the RDP "to prevail over regimes of practices and domains of knowledge [that operated] in the existing government" (Christie 2006, p. 378), and given the discursive context of the negotiated settlement, socialist alternatives for South Africa were sidelined. This was due to the dominance of market discourses, aided by the unfolding events in Eastern Europe, as well as the policy documents of the ANC which were informed by both leftist and orthodox economic discourses. These factors weakened attempts to disable the economic rationality of apartheid. Hart points out that despite the continuation of elements of apartheid's free market logic into the post-apartheid era, the ANC was able to contrast the post-1994 market economy with the one that preceded because it took "the market as its model, to which it…articulate[d] freedom, democracy, and flexibility as opposed to apartheid state repression and rigidity" (2008, p. 689). Although BEE and Affirmative Action resulted in some form of redress and created a Black middle class, inter- and intra-racial socio-economic inequality increased since 1994 (IRIN 2010; Peet 2002). This points to a continuation, as opposed to rupture, with those elements of apartheid's logic that resulted in unequal racialised subject positions.

Despite the rhetoric of non-racialism employed by the ANC government and the extension of legal equality to all citizens at the start of democracy, racialised bio-political discourses continued to permeate and define South African society. This was evidenced in the legislation, and ongoing use, of apartheid's racial categories.[77] Instead of creating the conditions which would ultimately enable equality of opportunity, as Affirmative Action and quota policies claimed to do, racial categorisation recreated binary subject positions – White equals privilege, Black equals disadvantage – which largely masked the growth in intra-racial inequality since 1994 (Alexander 2010b, p. 2). As Alexander argues,

> [s]ocial inequality continues to be reproduced objectively largely as racial inequality in spite of the continued growth of a "black" middle class. Racial prejudices, inequality justified on alleged cultural, linguistic, ethnic or nationality differences, all the things that defaced colonial-apartheid South Africa, persist even if in attenuated forms (2010a).

This outcome led to the ongoing justification of Affirmative Action[78] policies despite the fact that these mostly benefitted members of post-apartheid South Africa's Black middle class (Alexander 2006); its 'active' Black citizens. So, although South Africa's post-1994 Constitution formally delineated a non-racial bio-political imperative the continuation of racialised discourses largely reinforced apartheid subject positions. Put differently, attempts to enhance the capacity of previously disadvantaged citizens through the provision of welfare grants and certain free basic services have failed to address structural inequalities. Furthermore, because of inadequate education and training, the majority of previously disadvantage, or 'at-risk', citizens were confined to reconstituted subject positions in need of the very welfare

[77] For example, in the *Employment Equity Act* (RSA 1998a).

[78] Liberal reasoning framed Affirmative Action policies as governmental measures that sought to create greater social equality but because it was qualified with the condition that Affirmative Action candidates have to possess the necessary skills and qualifications, it conformed to the neo-liberal understanding of economically active citizens, hence affirmative action having largely benefitted middle class Black South Africans that have had access to proper education and training.

grants and free services intended to create a more equal society (Horn 2006; MacGregor 2007). 'Active' citizens, as we have noted, were able to sustain and reproduce their own social and economic autonomy and freedom. This was because South Africa's "economy continue[d] to restructure around skilled employment" (Seekings 2007, p. 15).

This constitutive contradiction which was brought about by the tensions within post-apartheid governmental rationalities had an impact on basic education as its provision formed part of the calculation of 'risks' to post-apartheid society. The provision of free basic education and school subsidies to 'at-risk' communities was included in the welfare strategy of the post-apartheid state whereas the provision of basic education to active citizens, mostly at former Model C[79], or former White schools, as well as independent schools, has seen the management and funding of these schools conferred onto 'active' parents by legislation. There has been a continuation of inequalities, largely along racial lines, within the post-apartheid basic education system and, based on the discussions in this Chapter, the goal of the next level of analysis will be to determine how both liberal and neo-liberal mentalities of rule informed the development of basic education policy since 1994 in South Africa.

[79] The Model classification for White schools was introduced by the apartheid government's Department of National Education in 1992. This will be considered in greater detail in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER 4

RETHINKING BASIC EDUCATION POLICY

...social policy…[is] …the art of the long view, the view from the balcony: sculpting the present and the future – Chabanyi Manganyi.[80]

The forgoing analysis has sought to provide an alternative consideration of the post-apartheid state as the mobile effect of a 'governmentality-in-the-making' constituted by liberal and neo-liberal reasoning. As was argued, these mentalities steered the "ways by which government [was] exercised in all its complexity" (Olssen (2003) paraphrased by Gillies 2008, p. 417) during the first fifteen years of South Africa's democracy. Although reference was made to some of the White Papers, legislation and broad policies, as well as to some of the governmental practices and procedures, the goal of the first level of analysis was principally to illuminate political reasoning. The second level of analysis offers a narrower and more detailed consideration of one of the programmes of the post-apartheid state, namely, basic education policy. The relevance of this consideration as it was set out in the study's introduction relates to the role of education in the creation of subjectivity. Education, it was said, reproduces the dominant discourses and power relations that regulate what we understand and how we behave within a society (Foucault 1970, p. 64). Given the nexus between education and government (in the Foucauldian sense), basic education policy is an apposite example of what Rose and Miller call "an expression of a particular concern in another modality" (1992, p. 181). Put differently, since the practice of government is dependent on the production of socially 'useful' and 'knowledgeable' citizens by the education system, basic education policy is of particular interest to the state and, therefore, useful when considering policy as a translation of political reasoning. Such an analysis enables the productive role that basic education policy has played in 'limiting' and, so, necessitating future government intervention, to be highlighted.

[80] Manganyi (2001, p. 27).

That said, policy "[does not] simply '*reflect*'…the dominant political rationality of the state" (Tikly 2003, p. 166, my emphasis). As Tikly argues,

> [i]n…the South African context, education policy understood as discursive formation with boundaries between the state and civil society has been subject to a rage of sometimes conflicting rationalities and political programmes from within and without of the state both during the apartheid era and subsequently (ibid).

So, policy can be understood as a translation of political reasoning within a particular discursive regime. For this reason, the first half of the Chapter highlights some of the discursive and non-discursive practices that influenced education policy during the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid rule.[81] These include the policy positions that were produced during the negotiation process with the goal of transforming the education system as well as the rationalisation of education and training; as 'appropriate' objects of governmental reasoning in 1994. In order to demonstrate the outcome of their convergence with liberal and neo-liberal reasoning, these discursive practices are discussed in relation to the adoption and development of the NQF (National Qualifications Framework). The NQF was presented in the 1995 *White Paper on Education and Training* (DoE 1995b) as the policy that would drive the entire process of education reform. Due its broad scope, it is a useful policy to consider as it provides a backdrop for the introduction of new basic education policies subsequent to the NQF. An in-depth consideration of the content of the NQF or its implementation, however, is not given. Rather, the aim is to show that education policy was, in addition to political reasoning, shaped by a number of discursive contestations during the first fifteen years of democracy – the NQF being a case in point.

[81] The development of post-1994 *basic* education policy followed the changes that were made to education policy more generally. These included the creation of an integrated system of education and training and the adoption of the NQF. These changes will be considered first since basic education policy forms part of post-apartheid education policy and, therefore, was affected by the changes to the latter.

While the broader context in which policy was formulated is explored in the first half of the Chapter, the study, nevertheless, is concerned with evaluating how liberal and neo-liberal reasoning (and the tensions between them) informed post-apartheid basic education policy. The second half of the Chapter is dedicated to this question. The goal is to demonstrate how the said tensions played a role in maintaining or widening the disparities between former Black schools and former Model C and independent schools. This follows from the suggestion in Chapter 3 that the post-apartheid basic education system contributed to the reconstitution of socio-economic inequalities due to the social reproduction of its own inequality. To do this, a select few policies are considered. The first policy is that of school funding which was adopted in 1998. Liberal in intent, the policy reflected the pressures of the negotiated settlement and of neo-liberal reasoning on policymaking. These led to the marketisation of basic education and its inclusion for 'at-risk' citizens in the welfare 'risk' strategy of the post-apartheid state.[82] Thereafter, the rationalisation of teachers and of teacher training colleges are considered. Similar to school funding, both policies aimed to create greater equity; this time in the training and distribution of teachers within and between provinces. But, because the (neo-liberal) principles of cost-efficiency and of fiscal austerity "shaped…equity impulses" (Chisholm et al (1999) & Vally & Tleane (2001) paraphrased by Vally & Spreen 2006), both policies resulted in widespread personnel losses and a lack of teaching expertise. The impact that these outcomes had on the implementation of the OBE (Outcomes-Based Education) curriculum, C2005 (Curriculum 2005), particularly at former Black schools, are then evaluated. The discussion now turns to consider the discursive practices which had a bearing on the development of post-apartheid basic education policy.

[82] A brief mention is made of the policy of education decentralisation but this is in relation to the school funding policy and does not constitute an analysis on its own.

4.1 DISCURSIVE INFLUENCES ON BASIC EDUCATION POLICY

4.1.1 Constructing Policy Positions

The negotiation process prior to 1994 engendered the development of often conflicting policy proposals on almost every aspect of society in South Africa with the goal of asserting particular policy (discourse) positions. In his governmentality research, Foucault demonstrates that state creation in Europe coincided with the development of the human sciences and an increase in technical "knowledge" production (statistics) about the 'realities' of the state and its neighbours (1978b, p. 274). These sets of, what Lemke calls, political "knowledge", were used "to represent events and entities as information and data for political action" (2009, p. 39). The movement towards creating a democratic state in South Africa saw a similar, although contextually specific, increase in "knowledge" generation through both research and the development of policy proposals to overhaul the economy, social services, health systems as well regional and international relations. No more was this true than within the field of education which saw interest groups put forward policy plans to transform the education system which had occupied a central place in the practice of apartheid reasoning (Christie 2006, p. 373; Jansen 1999b, p. 4). The negotiation process gave these groups legitimacy as did the term 'stakeholder' which inserted them in the process (Lugg 2009, p. 261). As the "knowledges" generated by these interest groups contributed to the formation of certain objects of post-apartheid government intervention (ibid), these policy positions; particularly those which had a bearing on the adoption and development of the NQF, ought to be considered in more detail. But before we do this, a brief overview of the apartheid education system, the object of reform, is necessary.

Apartheid's racialised bio-political practices had left the education system fractured, unequal and dysfunctional. Nineteen separate and hierarchically disparate education

departments were created for different racial and ethnic groups.[83] These were characterised by the unequal distribution of finances, facilities, personnel and other resources, as well as marked differences in syllabi content and quality (Hartshorne 1999, p. 26). In 1988/89, for example, the apartheid state spent R656 per learner on African education, R2 067 per learner on Indian education and R1 221 per learner on Coloured education. These figures stood in contrast to the R 2 882 per learner that was spent on White education (Christie (1991) as cited in Harber 1998b, p. 76). Even after the introduction of substantial increases to the funding of African education towards the end of apartheid, in 1994, the amount spent per learner on White education was still two and a half times more than the amount spent on African education in urban areas and almost five times more than in some rural areas (Allais 2009, p. 258; DoE 1995a, p. 15). Similar discrepancies existed with regard to the teacher: learner ratio, the level of training and expertise of teachers as well as the literacy rate between racial groups which attest to the varying levels of quality and access to education during this period.[84] As Allais notes, apartheid education was

> used to reinforce [the] lack of democracy, by denying access to education, providing poor-quality education to most black people and controlling the content of syllabuses to reflect the interests of the apartheid state. What was needed was an educational reform that could entirely overhaul the fragmented, inefficient and unequal apartheid education system and ensure that education could play a role in

[83] This included the National Department of Education; the House of Assembly and four provincial departments which controlled White education; the House of Representatives which controlled Coloured education; the House of Delegates which controlled Indian education; and the Department of Education and Training which controlled African education. Furthermore, four separate education departments were located in the 'independent' homelands of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda, with a further six departments that controlled education in six self-governing territories.

[84] In 1995, remnant of apartheid education policy, the teacher : learner ratio was still 43 : 1 in African schools, 27 : 1 in Coloured and Indian schools and 23 : 1 in White Schools. The previous year, 47% of African, 29% of Coloured and 7% of Indian teachers were deemed under-qualified compared to the 1% of White teachers. Moreover, in 1991, functional illiteracy among Whites stood at 20% compared to the 36% among Indians, 47% among Coloured and 64% among Africans (Chisholm & Vally (1996) as cited in Harber 1998b, p. 76; Fiske & Ladd 2004, p. 55; Gilmour 2001, p. 8; van Aardt 1994, p. 29).

> overhauling the economy and reducing social inequalities: the miracle transition needed a miracle education policy (2009, p. 259).[85]

Among those who weighed in on the debate to reform education during the period of negotiation was the trade union movement which, as it turned out, presented formative ideas about how to integrate the two largely separate systems of apartheid education and training. Prior to 1994, education and training functioned as separate systems of learning which produced two 'types' of "knowledge". Whereas educational "knowledge" acquired through schooling and university education was considered to be academic and theoretical in nature, "knowledge" accrued through technical and industrial training was considered vocational and applied in nature (ANC 1994b, p. 19; RSA 1994, p. 8). While this distinction was not unique to South Africa[86], White education was purposefully oriented towards producing academic "knowledge" and Black education (read training) towards producing vocational "knowledge" (Badroodien 2004). The union movement's proposals to transform this system took shape following the creation of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa's (NUMSA) Research and Development Groups (RDG) in the mid-1980s. While Black workers attended the RDG courses led by graduates of the popular Sociology course in Labour Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, the limitations of the narrow skills training they received as well as the workers' future aspirations were discussed (Jansen 2001 p. 14). This informed the conception of an integrated model of learning constituted by both education *and* training components by RDG trainers. Following consultations with unions engaged in similar projects elsewhere in the world, an Australian model was proposed to ensure training mobility for

[85] Also see Allais (2007).

[86] Young (1997) points out that the boundaries between vocational and academic education were institutionalised during the 19th Century in Europe and elsewhere. Ever since that time, people have debated the relevance, necessity and nature of this divide (cited in Allais 2003a, p. 2).

workers outside of the formal schooling system. The contention was that such a system could "improve both the quality and relevance of educational knowledge and skills for the world of work and bring about greater equity and redress" (de Clercq 2006, p. 151).

The proposal to integrate education and training spoke to reforms that were in vogue internationally (Allais 2009, p. 248). These advocated for the development of 'qualification frameworks' by governments to establish greater synergy between education and training. Endorsed by the International Labour Organisation and the World Bank, qualification frameworks were said to expand access to learning as a multitude of qualifications could be pursued through a number of education and training avenues (Allais 2009, p. 249; Kraak 1999, p. 32). With the end of apartheid nearing, South Africa's business sector took an interest in these ideas. The sector recognised the importance of developing market-'relevant' skills to resecure South Africa's place in the global economy and called for the creation of a highly skilled and participatory – in Foucauldian terms, an 'economically active' – post-apartheid citizenry. Following COSATU's adoption of the NUMSA model, negotiations between the National Training Board (NTB)[87], which largely represented the business community, and COSATU, principally around the idea of an integrated system of learning, ensued.[88] These deliberations became "the main stream of…policy negotiation for the new education and training system that was to emerge in official policy" (Jansen 2001, p. 15)[89] after 1994. In these, the business sector found a foothold (through the NTB) in the formulation of post-apartheid education policy. As we shall see, through business aligning itself with the construction of *alternative* policy positions, "through a new corporatist pact between the state,

[87] The National Training Board (NTB) was formed by the apartheid state and consisted out of representatives of the business sector, unions and certain government departments (Allais 2003b, p. 6).
[88] This was facilitated by Adrienne Bird, one of the trainers at the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa's (NUMSA) Research and Development Groups (RDG), who joined the NTB in 1991. The decision to ask Bird to join the NTB was considered a bold move for the White conservative organisation, one that would see the NTB work for the first time with radical and/or Black labour unions (Jansen 2001, p. 15).
[89] Also see Chisholm (2003, p. 3) and Lugg (2009).

labour and business" (Lugg 2009, p. 262), market discourses were strengthened within the debate to transform the education system. This, however, occurred under the rhetorical guise of 'development' and 'equity'.

A different position was taken by the apartheid government's Department of National Education (DNE) which unveiled its *Education Renewal Strategy* (ERS) (DNE 1992) in 1992. The ERS echoed much of the findings of the HSRC's 1981 'De Lange Report' (HSRC 1981) – a study that was commissioned by the apartheid government in an attempt to 'reform' education in order to address business sector concerns over skills shortages and the need for market-driven training (Hartshorne 1999, p. 27). Despite the seeming commitment to 'renewal', the ERS, in contrast to the thinking of unions, drew a distinction between academic education and vocational training. This implicitly reaffirmed the apartheid education system's provision of academic education mainly for Whites and vocational training mainly for Blacks (Jansen 2001c, p. 19; Kallaway 1990, p. 4). During the same year, the DNE also published the *Curriculum Model for South Africa* (CUMSA) (CHED 1992) which outlined a number of proposals to render syllabi content more 'relevant' and oriented towards the needs of industry. Although the ERS and CUMSA policy documents drew on the language of equality and non-racialism, both strongly advanced market-oriented principles like efficiency, productivity and cost-management. This attracted widespread criticism from the ANC and the wider liberation movement. It was argued that the DNE's policy positions disregarded the structural inequalities that prevented many children from accessing education and other public services (Chisholm & Fine 1994; Kallaway 1996, p. 17).

Also in 1992, but in contrast to the reforms proposed by the DNE, the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC)[90] released the findings of the *National Education Policy Investigation* (NEPI) study (NECC 1993). In light of apartheid's unraveling hegemony, the ANC recognised the importance of formulating a position on education that would champion the 'values' of the 'People's Education' movement[91] and commissioned the NEPI in 1989. The outcome was a series of twelve reports that were informed by discourses of democracy, equity, non-racialism and non-sexism. The reports sought to provide guidelines for negotiating and developing policy with regard to basic and adult education and training, curriculum reform, higher education and education governance (Chisholm 1992, p. 155; Cross et al. 2002, p. 174; Jansen 1999b, p. 4, 2001c, p. 18; Kahn 1996, p. 283). But, because the NEPI's proposals were developed with limited access to the "knowledges" and established institutional practices of the apartheid education bureaucracy, the reports were criticised by bureaucrats and researchers as 'idealistic'; not grounded in possible post-apartheid education 'realities' (Chisholm 1992, p. 158; de Clercq 2006; Jansen, 2001c, p. 18, 2003). To address these concerns, the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) was launched by the ANC together with the Canadian based International Development Research Centre. The CEPD was tasked with conducting policy support research for the ANC by collaborating with NGOs, sympathetic academics and labour unions. Together with the ANC's Education Desk, the Centre launched the Implementation Plan for Education and Training with the goal of producing strategies to implement the NEPI's proposals (Christie 2006, p. 373).

[90] The National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC), formerly known as the National Education Crisis Committee, was formed in Soweto in the 1980s following an upsurge in protests against apartheid education and consisted out of a broad alliance of student organisations and labour unions.

[91] People's Education was a campaign established by the NECC during the 1980s in Soweto in an attempt to bring learners back into the classrooms under the slogan 'People's Education for People's Power'. Due to the increased opposition of Black learners to the apartheid education system, the campaign, whilst rejecting Bantu education, nevertheless stressed the value of education – as something that should be fought for (Allais 2003b, Lugg, 2009). The organisations that formed part of the People's Education movement together promoted the idea of education as a human right and social good as opposed to strictly a government service (NECC 1993, p. 1; Vally & Spreen 2006).

While its policy positions were being refined, divisions emerged within the ANC on the viability and desirability of an integrated system of learning. Those opposed to this model preferred the creation of a 'single' system of learning in which education and training each had their own curriculum councils and qualification boards (Lugg 2009, p. 262). This would be accompanied by "a strong interventionist post-apartheid state that would focus on the delivery of education and training and would prioritise resources to the most marginalised" (Wolpe (1992), Bennell (1992) & Swainson (1992) as cited in Lugg 2009, p. 262). In contrast, the integrated approach proposed one curriculum council and one qualification board for both education and training. There was also disagreement over the elements that would structure the integrated system. This included "negotiated institutional reform" and the creation of a corporatist state (Lugg 2009, p. 262). A series of deliberations between COSATU, the NTB and the ANC followed but, despite its concerns, the ANC was both conceptually and politically "outmaneuvered in this process" (Jansen 2001, p. 16). This can be attributed to the failure of the ANC to develop clear policy positions despite the attempts to transform the NEPI's policy proposals into 'practice'. In addition to lacking policymaking experience, the ANC was also disadvantaged by the NP's refusal to engage it on education reform during negotiation.[92] Consequently, the ANC's 1994 policy document, *A Policy Framework for Education and Training* (PFET) (ANC 1994b), espoused COSATU and the NTB's proposal of "a national [integrated] system of education *and* training which [would] enable…citizens to become progressively qualified in a life-long learning process" (ibid, p. 10, my emphasis).

[92] The NP consented to the negotiations between the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the NTB on a new training system in light of its desire for South Africa to're-emerge' as a global economic player. Although this seemed 'less' threatening than the ANC's proposals with regard to education reform, the dialogue between COSATU and the NTB, and the policy positions that developed as a result, strengthened the proposal of an integrated system of learning (Lugg 2009, p. 261). This was expressed in the adoption of the NQF after 1994 (SAQA 2012a).

Curiously, although the first piece of legislation[93] concerned with the development of the new system was adopted as early as 1995, education and training continued to function largely as separate avenues of learning. This was despite the fact that both were framed as part of the same 'integrated' system. To understand why this happened, and to consider the influence of post-apartheid governmental reasoning on policy, it is necessary to pause and reflect on the process that rendered education and training 'appropriate', or 'natural', objects of political reasoning. This is an important consideration because the navigation by post-apartheid governmental reasoning of the objects of intervention created by the aforementioned policy positions was dependent on the rationalisation of education and training. This was so that the process of developing the policies to transform the education system could be legitimated and be presented as a break with the apartheid past. However, the negotiated settlement as well as the concerns and objectives of liberal and neo-liberal reasoning also had an impact. The next section traces the influence of these different discursive practices on the rationalisation of education and training and presents the NQF as the main policy expression of these contestations.

4.1.2 Rationalising Education and Training

At the onset of democracy in South Africa, a liberal understanding of governing was adopted. Commenting on the intent of liberal reasoning to render intelligible the practices of government by acting in accordance with the 'natural' processes intrinsic to society and the market, Burchell (1996) claims that liberalism

> does not so much set out what in a particular case government policy should be, as define the essential *problem space* of government, and define it in such a way as to

[93] Here reference is made to the *South African Qualifications Authority Act* (RSA 1995).

> make a definite art of government both thinkable and practicable. Early liberalism determines the questions of how to govern in relation to an object-domain which is a kind of quasi-nature with its own specific self-regulating principles and dynamic. This natural space is both what must be governed and what government must produce or, at least, maintain in the optimum condition of what naturally it is. Civil society becomes at the same time both object and end of government (as cited in Doherty 2007, pp. 197-198, my emphasis).

By adopting a liberal mentality of rule, the post-apartheid state sought to produce the conditions that would "shape the liberty of…citizen[s] in such a way as to ensure that [they] exercise freedom responsibly and in a disciplined fashion" (Dean 2009, pp. 121-122). In addition to developing a new non-racial Constitution, the introduction of a multi-party political system and the adoption of policies which aimed to produce greater socio-economic equality, the state sought to create the conditions for autonomy and freedom by expanding access to quality education and training. The choice of rhetoric – education ***and*** training – represented, as was established in the previous section, the hegemonic expansion of the discursive practices that were generated by both the unions and business during negotiation (Lugg 2009).

Underlying the commitment to expand access in an integrated system of education and training was the view that both "*empower* people to participate effectively in all the processes of democratic society, economic activity, cultural expression, and community life" (DoE 1995b, p. 10, my emphasis).[94] These were described in the ANC's PFET document as fundamental human rights and were said to be informed by the following 'values':

> [t]he development of human potential, so that every person is able to *contribute* freely to society, advance common values, and increase socially useful wealth; [t]he realisation of democracy, so that *independent*, *responsible* and *productive* citizens

[94] Also see DoE (1995b, p. 57).

> will be enabled to participate in all facets of the life of their communities and the nation at large; [t]he reconciliation of liberty, equality and justice, so that citizens *freedom of choice* is exercised within a social and national context; [and the] pursuit of national reconstruction and development, transforming the institutions of society in the interest of all, and enabling the social, cultural, economic and political *empowerment* of all citizens (ANC 1994b, p. 3, my emphasis).[95]

It can be argued, therefore, that education and training were conceptualised as key in the production of freedom as a resource of the state and thereby rationalised as 'appropriate' objects of governmental reasoning. Due to the 'utility' of education and training in the production of autonomy (DoE 1995b, p. 14), noted by the majority of policy proposals discussed earlier, both were rendered "generic *service[s]* to be delivered" (Allais 2009, p. 248, my emphasis). In other words, since education and training were considered correlates of the conditions envisioned by post-apartheid liberal reasoning, they were framed as services, or functions, of the state.

The development of government policies and practices to give effect to education and training as services was dependent, firstly, on the creation of objects of government *intervention*. As Rose and Miller argue, policies "make the *object[s]* of government thinkable in such a way that their ills appear susceptible to diagnosis, prescription and cure by calculating and normalizing intervention" (1992, p. 183, my emphasis). Because the proposal to integrate education and training was the dominant one, it served as the object of intervention for post-apartheid policies, such as the NQF, which sought to give effect to this idea in practice. Here policy development was the function of an Inter-Ministerial Working Group (IMWG) which was established by the Departments of Education (DoE) and Labour (DoL). The group was comprised of representatives from both departments, the NTB and from organised business and

[95] Also see ANC (1996, p. 5).

labour and was tasked with drafting legislation to establish the NQF (DoE 1995b, p. 9). According to the *White Paper on Education and Training*, the IMWG allowed "ample scope for the NQF to be developed from within the diverse education and training sectors, in terms of national guidelines and a mutually agreed regulatory framework, [and] not by bureaucratic dictation from one or other department" (ibid). The working group further had to advise policymakers on whether training had to become the responsibility of the DoE (advocated by integrationists) or remain that of the DoL (Lugg 2009, p. 263).

The negotiated settlement placed certain constraints on this process. The early post-1994 political context compelled policymakers from both the NP and the ANC to conceptualise policies that would align diverging pre-election 'ideals' to the goals of "reconstruction, development and reconciliation" (Lugg 2009, p. 263). As Blade Nzimande, a key figure in early post-apartheid education policymaking, put it:

> It was important at that time to secure the transition. The situation was explosive and we were on the brink of civil war. Our policies were therefore crafted in a context where ensuring a smooth transition was as important as developing progressive policies for social transformation (2001, p. 41).

Moreover, consensus had to be reached in an environment still largely constituted by the "knowledges" and institutional practices of the apartheid education bureaucracy, and between less experienced ANC policymakers and their NP counterparts who were more familiar with the workings and practices of the government (Christie 2006, p. 377). Consequently,

> the ANC and its allies made circumstantial if not arbitrary choices alongside considered policy decisions, and the rationalities which took shape around these

> actions inevitably glossed over the historical struggles of the past, […] giving a sense of purpose and inevitability to the results (ibid).

Due to these pressures, the *South African Qualifications Authority Act* (RSA, 1995) of 1995, which served as the legal framework of the NQF, failed to provide adequate details about the development and content of the NQF. The NQF became, as Lugg calls it, an "empty signifier", which "link[ed] different elements into a precarious unity, representing unattainable ideals…by…[indicating]…what was absent" (2009, p. 263). As a result, the discursive distinction between education and training as separate systems of learning re-emerged despite the continued employment of the 'language' of integration (ibid). Without the adequate disruption of the "knowledges" and procedures of the apartheid bureaucracy, both education and training "were kept in separate ministries, and policies for the two were developed separately" (Christie 2006, p. 379). Although some felt that the latter institutional continuity would undermine the integrated approach to learning, it proved acceptable to those within the NP (and the ANC) who were opposed to radical transformation. This was because change was required on the level of outcomes instead of fundamental institutional change. The NQF was able to adapt to this context as it too was concerned with the achievement of outcomes, albeit in terms of qualifications (Lugg 2009, p. 262). This is related to the espousal by the NQF of an "outcomes-led qualification framework" (Allais 2007, p. 2). In order to understand the development of the NQF, the averred policy expression of an 'integrated' system of learning, despite the lack of institutional change, a closer consideration of the role that liberal and neo-liberal reasoning played in its formulation is necessary.

4.1.3 The NQF and Political Reasoning

Although education and training remained in separate ministries, the adoption of the NQF enjoyed widespread support in Parliament (Lugg 2009, p. 263). While the negotiated settlement certainly facilitated its espousal, political reasoning generated the consensus which emerged around this policy. South Africa's liberal rationality framed post-apartheid education and training as services that would produce greater autonomy, freedom and rights for citizens as well as increase economic participation (DoE 1995b, p. 2, 10). The NQF fit well into the liberal expression of greater equality and socio-economic redress and was presented within this discourse as the "key mechanism to overhaul the apartheid education system" (Allais 2009, p. 248). It was argued that the NQF would foster greater participation and mobility by "expand[ing] the ways in which people are able to acquire learning and qualifications of high quality" (DoE 1995b, p. 6).[96] Such a system, it was further said, would ensure that all citizens but, especially those previously disadvantaged, would gain the skills necessary for the achievement of autonomy and the enhancement of freedom. So, upon adoption, the NQF was articulated at a particular juncture within policymaking between "equity, inclusion, and integration" (Lugg 2009, p. 263). This rendered the NQF attractive to policymakers as it gave expression to the dominant rationality of the state: liberal reasoning.

Following the adoption of this policy, the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), a statutory body established by the *South African Qualification Authority Act*, was charged with developing the NQF. More specifically, the SAQA had to develop qualifications which consisted out of specified "statements of learning outcomes or competencies" (Allais 2009, p. 262) independently from educational institutions. The emphasis on 'outcomes' was, as previously mentioned, related to the model employed by the NQF. In an outcomes-based

[96] Also see RSA (1995) and Soudien & Baxen (1997).

framework, qualifications are designed as "expression[s] of what someone can do", as opposed to "how or where they…acquired the skill" (Allais 2003a, p. 8). Different types of learning are also judged as equal and prior levels of education are accommodated (ibid: 9; DoE 1995b, p. 8). What is important is the achievement of these outcomes regardless of the institutional avenues that are used. Eight NQF Levels, arranged into three bands of learning, namely, the General Education and Training Band; the Further Education and Training Band; and the Higher Education and Training Band, as well as corresponding qualifications were developed.[97] When it came to implementation, however, numerous practical difficulties arose. In addition to criticism that the NQF was too complex and ambitious, conflict started to mount particularly around the introduction of Education and Training Quality Assurers (ETQA). As a structure of the NQF, ETQA were responsible for monitoring quality across the different sectors of education and training. But, instead of establishing new quality assurance bodies, existing councils were asked to apply for accreditation as ETQA. Conflict between these bodies over established meanings of quality and its evaluation emerged and consequently stalled implementation (Lugg 2009, pp. 264-265).

Although aspects of the NQF were implemented; such as the development of unit standards and the introduction of an outcomes-based curriculum in schools (Allais 2010, p. 34), the aforementioned disagreements saw a seven-year policy review period. This culminated in the request for an appraisal of the NQF by the Departments of Education and Labour in 2001 (Allais 2003a, 2007, 2010, p. 34). The review revealed that both departments interpreted quality assurance differently and that they held different structures responsible for the failures of the NQF (DoE & DoL 2002). In 2003, the departments agreed to jointly develop recommendations to restructure the NQF but, after four years, no announcement had

[97] Nearly eight thousand qualifications (which included existing qualifications) were registered (Allais 2010: 34).

been made on the future of the NQF (Lugg 2009: 265). Despite being clouded by uncertainty and playing an insignificant role in the provision of education and training (Allais 2009: 266), the system was not abandoned. It remained, rather, 'under construction'. In 2008, a new Act, called the *National Qualifications Framework Act* (RSA 2008), introduced two more Levels to the NQF. The Act also reorganised the NQF by creating three linked frameworks: one for General and Further Education and Training; one for Higher Education; and one for Trades and Occupations (ibid: 6). In order to understand the continuation of the NQF, we must once again turn to political reasoning; this time to South Africa's neo-liberal rationality.

Following the espousal of GEAR, governmental reasoning sought to develop programmes and practices that would constitute 'economically active citizens'. Citizens were encouraged to produce their own welfare, capital and satisfaction and so address unemployment and poverty. Within this logic, education and training were reframed as necessary tools in the production of 'active' freedom. A certain basic level of educational attainment was considered necessary to generate the "high skilled workforce" (Faulkner & Loewald 2008, p. 21) that was required to grow modern economies and create employment (Allais 2007, p. 15; Vally & Spreen 2006). Within these neo-liberal terms, "education and training [were] transformed into a panacea for economic performance as it [was] assumed that investment in human capital and technology will automatically increase productivity and skills on the shop floor" (Vally & Spreen 2006). Neo-liberal reasoning then, while also conceiving of education and training as services, considered them (more narrowly) in service of economic growth and development (Allais 2007, pp. 14-15).

In its application, the NQF spoke to the attempts by neo-liberal reasoning to render education and training more market friendly. Allais argues that neo-liberal public sector reforms call for the disaggregation of government agencies into smaller structures which are

then "constituted as cost centres and expected to compete with one another or with private institutions by the state" (2009, p. 250). These are used to promote, similar to the market, accountability and efficiency. Correspondingly, the NQF's role of disaggregating education and training provision, through the development of certain outcomes achievable through a number of institutional avenues, spoke to such reforms. The 'inputs', or the programmes and means, necessary for the attainment of these outcomes did not form part of this development. The NQF was principally concerned with assessing the *achievement* of the various outcomes against preset outcome-criteria and against 'unit standards' which make up qualifications (ibid, p. 263). Substantial institutional change, therefore, was not a necessary condition for the NQF's implementation since the focus on outcomes disregarded input assessment. In the context of the GNU, the NQF was acceptable as it proved to be the least "intrusive option…for an integrated approach to education and training" (NTB (1993) as quoted by Lugg 2009, p. 262). It allowed, as Christie notes, for "conventional forms of government [to] prevail…over radical visions of change" (2006, p. 379).

The NQF then serves as an example of how the transition from the apartheid to the post-apartheid rule facilitated the continuation of the status quo. The proposal of an integrated system of education and training, which were informed by market discourses but cast in the language of development and equality, became dominant. This was due to the ANC's failure to present clear policy positions and because the environment that was created by the negotiation process favoured established practices. The negotiated settlement saw the continuation of a market-led economy which emerged in the dying days of apartheid and was buttressed by the adoption of a neo-liberal rationality in 1996. These strengthened the institutional "knowledges" and practices that were in place and which kept education and training in separate ministries. Because the NQF was concerned with managing outcomes, and because it was presented as an

alternative to apartheid education, it was able to adapt to this institutional context, instead of transform it. Within this context, it is necessary to also highlight some of the more specific ways in which political reasoning informed basic education policy. The next section is dedicated to this question.

4.2 TENSIONS WITHIN BASIC EDUCATION POLICY

Under the banner of education and training, the distinction between basic and higher education was remade in 1994. Whereas higher education referred to institutions of higher learning which issued diploma, degree and post-graduate qualifications, basic education referred to primary and secondary schooling (Grades R to 12). The majority of schools were classified as public (that is, state-owned), with the remaining schools, which served 2% of school-going learners, classified as independent.[98] The latter were privately owned and appointed their own teachers (Fiske & Ladd 2004, p. 84; Patel 2004, p. 3; RSA 1996c). By demarcating this 'problem space' through the "delineation of concepts, the specification of objects and borders [and] the provision of arguments and justifications" (Lemke 2001, p. 191), basic education was rationalised as an 'appropriate' object of governmental reasoning (Gillies 2008, pp. 415-416; Lemke 2001, p. 191; Rose & Miller 1992, pp. 181-183). Linking the 'ideals' of political reason to the 'problem' of basic education normalised intervention within the discursive field constructed by government discourse. This was so that new policies and practices could be developed and adjusted to transform the apartheid basic education system. One of the priorities of the post-apartheid state was to replace apartheid's racially determined school funding policies with a non-racial, democratic and equitable funding model. The next section evaluates the effects of this new model and argues that the transformation it envisaged

[98] Formerly, independent schools were known as private schools.

did not materialise due to the contradictory rationalities which underlaid it. This discussion is followed by a consideration of the policies of teacher rationalisation and the rationalisation of teacher training colleges, particularly how these affected the implementation of C2005.

4.2.1 School Funding and 'Risk' Calculation

As was argued previously in this study, liberal reasoning in post-apartheid South Africa made the distinction between those citizens who were autonomous or 'active' and those 'at-risk' citizens whose autonomy was constrained by external circumstances such as poverty, discrimination, ill health, old age, and the like (Tikly 2003, p. 168). In order to address these 'social problems', a state-managed welfare 'risk' strategy was extended to 'at-risk', mainly previously disadvantaged, citizens. This was essential because 'at-risk' citizens were in need of certain interventions that would lessen the 'risk' to their welfare and enable them to become autonomous; the ultimate aim being the creation of greater socio-economic equality. By excluding previously advantaged or 'active' citizens from the latter strategy, the responsibility of managing the 'risk' faced by these citizens remained or became their own. This followed the logic of neo-liberal conceptions of 'risk' and its management (ibid). Similar to the provision of free services in healthcare, water and electricity and housing, expanding access to basic education for 'at-risk' citizens was a function of its inclusion in the post-apartheid welfare 'risk' strategy. This was in light of the inability of most 'at-risk' citizens to pay for school uniforms and/or transport services as well as other factors, such as child-headed household and HIV/AIDS, which prevented these children from accessing schooling. As the first education White Paper put it:

> [T]here is a need to understand and, where possible, address the barriers that prevent some children from going to school. Distance and lack of transportation, hunger, disability, looking after young siblings, herding, household tasks, lack of parental guidance, homelessness, having to find work, and inability to pay for uniforms, are all factors which may prevent children enrolling for school or remaining in school for the duration of the programme. Only some of these matters fall within the competence of the education departments to alleviate, but will be affected for the better as the Reconstruction and Development Programme takes hold at grass root level (DoE 1995b, p. 70).

Policies informed by liberal reasoning were subsequently developed and adopted; these increased overall expenditure on basic education and allocated more funding and resources to poorer, under-resourced provinces (see DoE 1995b; DoE 1996a; DoE 1998; RSA 1994). Feeding schemes and free transport services were also extended to schools located in poor communities (see DoE 1995b, p. 27; DoE 2003, pp. 20-21; Mandela 1994; RSA 1994, p. 65; RSA 1996c, pp. 6, 15). This was related to the fact that poor citizens faced the greatest 'risk' to their welfare and, therefore, the greatest possibility of not accessing basic education. This service (basic education) was considered vital to the creation of autonomy – the "capacities and potential [of citizens in order]…to make their full contribution to society" (DoE 1995b, p. 14). More significantly, however, the inclusion of basic education for 'at-risk' citizens in the welfare 'risk' strategy was related to a new approach to school funding that was adopted as by the DoE in 1996. During the previous year, the Minister of Education, Sibusiso Bengu, commissioned a framework report under the leadership of the retired academic, Peter Hunter, with regard to the organisation, governance and funding of schools. Based on the

recommendations of the report[99], a 'partnership funding approach' was espoused (DoE 1996a). This advised that the funding of South African schools had to be the shared responsibility of both the state *and* communities since "the provision of quality education for all at no direct cost to parents and communities [was] not affordable in terms of [the]…anticipated budgetary allocations to education" (ibid, p. 29). The partnership funding approach was enabled by the adoption of another policy; that of education decentralisation. The latter policy, introduced by the *South African Schools Act* in 1996, devolved the governance and partial funding of public schools to elected School Governing Bodies (SGB).[100] This policy, however, was not specific to the post-apartheid period (Sayed 1999, p. 142).

Education decentralisation was introduced by the NP in the form of Model classifications for schools in 1992. This was in response to the ERS' (*Education Renewal Strategy*) call for the governance of White schools by communities (read fee-paying parents). The ERS argued that, through the establishment of SGBs, decentralisation would "enhance [the] efficiency, effectiveness and quality" (Sayed 1999, p. 142) of schooling. The Model regulations engendered three possible classifications for White public schools: they could either choose to be classified as private schools (Model A); they could choose to manage their enrolment figures so that 50% of their total enrolment consisted out of Black learners (Model B); or they could, at the expense of a reduced state subsidy, choose to supplement their funds through private donations or fund raising efforts and, thereby, determine their own admission requirements and set their own schools fees (Model C).[101] By August 1992, 96% of White schools chose to be classified as Model C (Chisholm & Fine 1994, p. 239; Chisholm & Kgobe

[99] This report was entitled the *Report of the Committee to Review the Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools*, otherwise known as the Hunter Report (DoE 1995a).

[100] Because independent schools are privately owned, the procedures followed by public schools in the establishment School Governing Bodies (SGB) are not applicable to independent schools. The management of these schools, rather, is guided by the *Companies Law Act* and by common law and, instead of SGBs "dominated by parents" (Hofmeyr & Lee 2004, p. 164), independent schools are run by elected boards

[101] A fourth model (Model D) was later introduced which allowed schools to enrol an unlimited amount of Black learners.

1993, p. 4). Although the system was abandoned after 1996, South Africa's Interim Constitution ensured the rights of Model C SGBs to participate in the process which determined the status of these schools after 1994 (Kruss 2006, pp. 86-87).[102] Decentralisation was thereby reaffirmed and reintroduced by post-apartheid legislation. This policy was acceptable to the ANC as it too was in favour of decentralised control of schools. But, for the ANC, decentralisation spoke to the idea of 'grassroots control' of education; an expression of the rejection of apartheid state power by communities in favour of 'people's power' in the provision of education (Sayed 1999, p. 143). This 'ideal' was framed in terms of strong community participation in education policymaking and governance in an attempt to democratise the state and the education system (Sayed & Ahmed 2009, p. 8). The establishment of SGBs according to the ANC fulfilled this mandate even though, as will be argued, it largely served to protect the interests of 'active', mostly White citizens.

By classifying public SGBs as "juristic persons in charge of schools" (Sayed & Ahmed 2009, p. 3), the *South African Schools Act* determined that SGBs had to set school fees[103], raise funds and secure private donations to supplement the subsidies which schools received from provincial education departments.[104] Previously, the national DoE determined provincial education budgets but, following the 1996/1997 financial year, the amounts allocated to education became the responsibility of each province (Fiske & Ladd 2004, p. 103). Provincial education budgets were based firstly on redress needs. This referred to the backlogs, inequalities and resource deficiencies between schools determined by provincial authorities

[102] After 1994, former Model C schools were largely de-racialised as those White and Black middle class parents who did not enrol their children in independent schools did so in former Model C schools. Those Model C schools on the "borders of historical group areas" (Soudien et al. 2001: 84) were also de-racialised as working class parents enrolled their children these schools. Former Black schools have largely not be de-racialised.

[103] The amount of the fees charged by a School Governing Body (SGB) has to be agreed upon by majority of the parents attending annual school budget meetings (RSA 1996c, p. 16).

[104] The funds raised from school fees can also be employed to hire additional teachers who are referred to as 'school governing body teachers' (Fiske & Ladd 2003, p. 6).

(Botha 1998, p. 69). As a result, different amounts were allocated for purposes of redressing education inequalities within and between the provinces. Secondly, budgets were based on what Botha calls "provincial preference" (ibid); preference given to certain services such as transport and health by provincial governments by means of fund allocation. This meant that education had to compete for funding with services that faced their own backlogs and unique challenges (ibid; Fiske & Ladd 2004, p. 104). Within this context, the introduction of school fees was framed as a means of supplementing the subsidies that schools received from 'strained' provincial education budgets. According to Nzimande, "[i]f education was free for all, then extra resource demands would [have been]…made on government and we would [have been]…unable to redress inequalities in the system" (2001, p. 41). But, as the funding approach was introduced in the second education White Paper (DoE 1996a), the ANC adopted GEAR. So, the strain on government funding was in fact attributable to the government's neo-liberal rationality which called for fiscal austerity and the so-called equitable distribution of funds across government departments (Christie 2008, p. 137).

Sayed and Ahmed argue that the introduction of this market mechanism (school fees) was

> premised on the assumption that the quality of educational 'goods' is correlative of the price (value) that is paid. The worth of the education product is thus secured in the value of the exchange. User fees secure market logic by engendering commitment to monetary transaction as a basis for the determination for quality and worth. In this case, not every citizen is therefore able to maintain the same level of financial investment and consequently, the level of substantive equal social entitlement depends on a citizen's wealth (2009, p. 10).

To address the exclusion of 'at-risk' citizens; those citizens who, according to this market logic, would not be 'entitled' to quality educational goods, the Act also made provision for the total, partial or conditional exemption of parents who could not afford to pay school fees (RSA 1996c, p. 16). The necessity of school fees and other means of fund raising, nevertheless, was framed by the DoE in budgetary constraint terms (DoE 1995b, p. 16), instead of the response to the marketisation of basic education. The DoE justified the partnership funding approach by labeling it a 'pro-poor policy' that would allow it to spend more on the provision of basic education for 'at-risk' citizens (Sayed 1999, p. 145) and, thereby, include it in the welfare 'risk' strategy. As the second education White Paper claimed:

> The distribution of resources for education provision must address the fact that almost half of South African families live in poverty, mainly in rural areas. A primary objective of the new strategy for schools must be to achieve an equitable distribution of education provision throughout the nation, in such a way that the quality of provision in under-resources areas is raised, and *reductions in public funding to better-resourced schools* are responsibly phased in (DoE 1995b, p. 7, my emphasis).

Similarly, the *National Norms and Standards for School Funding* (NNSSF) Schedule, stated that

> [a]ll too many schools in poor rural areas and urban working-class communities still suffer the legacy of large classes, deplorable physical conditions, and absence of learning resources, despite a major RDP National School Building Programme, and many other projects paid directly from provincial budgets. Yet the educators and learners in poor schools are expected to achieve the same levels of learning and teaching as their [wealthier] compatriots. Such contradictions within the same public school system reflect the past discriminatory investment in schooling, and *vast*

> *current disparities in the personal income of parents*. The present document addresses these inequalities by establishing a sharply progressive state funding policy for ordinary public schools, which *favours poor communities* (DoE 1998, p. 11, my emphasis).

The aforementioned NNSSF Schedule, which claimed to establish greater equity in the distribution of funding to schools, became policy on January 1, 2000, even though it had been adopted two years earlier (Sayed 1999, p. 145; Sayed & Ahmed 2009, p. 11; Tikly 2003, p. 170). In broad terms, the NNSSF was concerned with providing guidelines with regard to the subsidisation of, or allocation of resources to, schools but, in particular, enabled the provision of free basic education to 'at-risk' communities based on a so-called 'index of needs' for recurrent cost allocations.[105] Funding norms for public schools were developed based on the "physical condition, facilities and crowding of the school" and the "relative poverty of the community around the school" (DoE 1998, p. 25). Based on these, provincial authorities had to rank schools from the poorest to the least poor on a five-point scale and allocate the corresponding percentages in expenditure. In turn, SGBs had to manage the distribution of the budgetary allocations (Christie 2008, p. 139).[106]

In 2005, the NNSSF was adjusted so that the budget allocations could take account of the differing levels of poverty in each province (Christie 2008, p. 139). Despite claims that the

[105] Recurrent cost allocations are costs that are not related to the construction of new classrooms and other facilities (capital costs) (DoE 1998, p. 21).

[106] The funding norms employed to subsidise independent schools were not based on the subsidisation criteria of public schools, but on school fees: "The level of school fees charged by the primary and secondary phases of an independent school is taken [by the government] as an objective, publicly-available criterion that correlates well with the socio-economic circumstances of the school's clientele for each of those two phases. Subsidy levels are therefore related to fee levels on a five-point progressive scale…Eligible schools charging the lowest fees will qualify for the highest level of subsidy. Schools charging the highest fees, in excess of 2.5 times the separate provincial arrangement estimates per learner in primary or secondary phases of ordinary public schools respectively, are considered to serve highly affluent clientele, and 0% subsidy will be paid to them from public funds" (Patel 2004, p. 5).Independent schools then were able to navigate little or no subsidisation by the government by charging higher school fees and through private fund raising efforts.

post-apartheid funding model enabled a weightier distribution of resources to poor schools, spending on schooling for 'at-risk' citizens (relative to the resources of former Model C schools) was not enough to address the resource deficiencies faced by these schools (ibid; Spreen & Vally 2006; Tikly 2003). The Hunter Report calculated in 1995 that a 144% increase to the basic education budget was needed to address inequalities within the basic education system but this was not feasible within the confines of the education budget (Greenstein 1995, p. 206). Despite education being the "largest category of government spending" (DoE 2008, p. 3), austerity in the allocation of funds to government departments meant that basic education had to contend with other governmental services for resource allocation and so, could not effectively address the resource deficits faced by schools in 'at-risk' communities (Spreen & Vally 2006). The effects of neo-liberal reasoning on school funding are illustrated by the following figures: The total allocation to provinces during the 1997/1998 financial year amounted to R31 billion and, together with the budget of the national DoE, R37 billion in total was allocated to education. Compared to the total education budget for the 1994/1995 financial year, which amounted to just under R30 billion, increases to the education budget by the state seemed evident (DoE 1995b, p. 58; Greenstein 1997, p. 367). However, the official inflation rate of 7.5% for the 1997/1998 financial year (the unofficial figure was estimated to be even higher) meant that the 4.1% increase in the education budget from the previous year did "not catch up with inflation" (Greenstein 1997, p. 367). In real terms then, the education budget suffered cuts. Ten years later, during the 2007/2008 financial year, although R105,5 billion was spent on education, there was a decline in spending in real terms on education from 19% in 1996 to 18% in 2007 which the DoE attributed to an unexpected rise in economic growth figures and the fact that governmental services had to compete for national revenue (DoE 2008, p. 3; Pandor 2007, p. 5).[107]

[107] Also see Christie (2008, p. 138).

Due to the nature of the funding policy, SGBs in 'at-risk' areas were frequently not able to raise the level of schools fees and private funding to the same extent as schools in 'active' communities. Former Model C schools made use of the NNSSF clause that encouraged "[a]ll parents, but particularly those who are less poor or who have good incomes…to increase their own direct financial and other contributions to the quality of their children's education in public schools" (RSA 1998b, p. 11). The rationale was that this in turn would enable the DoE to spend more on schooling for 'at-risk' citizens (Fiske & Ladd 2003, p. 9). However, as Christie et al. have pointed out, instead of addressing inequality within the basic education system, schools located in more affluent areas were able to raise enough funding to retain or employ better trained teachers and attend to infrastructural and resource needs in contrast to schools located in poorer areas (Christie 2006; Tikly 2003; Vally & Spreen 2006). This is because

> the suburban SGB is better able to obtain sponsorships from the private sector since during SGB elections, parents with managerial experience are elected, the SGB governs an already well-resourced school, with an already well-developed solid infrastructure and the SGB has the potential of marketing the school effectively, which contributes to its sustainability through continued enrolment levels and paid-up school fees (McPherson (2000) paraphrased by Mncube 2009, p. 99).

The ability of former Model C schools to supplement government subsidies accounts for the extension, as opposed to the undoing, of "the spatial logic of apartheid" (Pithouse 2011). This has kept the racialised spatial divisions of apartheid demographics largely intact (Samara (2010) as cited in Gulson & Fataar 2011, p. 273). Schools have continued, therefore, to service either 'at-risk' or 'active' communities depending on their location. This is attributable to the fact that school choice has been closely connected to school fees and other school related expenses as the latter have "constitute[d] an incentive for parents to sort themselves out by income in their selection of schools" (Fiske & Ladd 2003, p. 13). 'At-risk' citizens were more

likely to send their children to schools located in or near their area of residence, which enabled their children to either walk to school or travel short distances and where they would able to pay reduced school fees or receive fee exemption (ibid: 14; Gulson & Fataar 2011, pp. 274-275). Similarly, 'active' citizens largely continued to send their children to schools either in their area of residence or to other former Model C (or independent schools) that charged comparatively higher school fees and that employed certain school admission policies which excluded the children of 'at-risk' citizens.[108]

This has seen a continuation of the inequalities which characterised apartheid basic education within the new system during the first fifteen years of democracy (Christie 2008, p. 140). This can be attributed in part to the tension between the goal of creating greater equality between schools, which is informed by liberal reasoning, and the 'equitable' distribution of funds between government departments, which is informed by neo-liberal reasoning. While the new school funding model maintained and exacerbated inequalities within the basic education system, the problem, nevertheless, should not be reduced to one of funding alone (Seekings 2007). The next section considers how the neo-liberal logic of rationalisation negatively affected the size and quality of the South African teacher body. More specifically it evaluates what effects these policies, as well the inequalities within the basic education system, have had on the implementation of C2005.

[108] Although no learner may be refused access to schooling in South Africa based on race, religion or socio-economic status, some former Model C schools have employed the DoE's (Department of Education) soft-zoning policy which allows schools to grant privileged access to learners who reside within a 5 kilometer radius of the school – called the 'feeder zone'. There have also been cases of schools whose medium of instruction is either Afrikaans or English refusing entry to learners whose mother tongue is not Afrikaans or English or simply stating that the schools are full to capacity to applicants (Gulson & Fataar 2011, p. 275; Tikly 2003, p. 170; Vally & Dalamba 1999, pp. 45-46).

4.2.2 Rationalisation and the Implementation of C2005

In 1996, the DoE introduced the policy of teacher rationalisation, also referred to as 'teacher right-sizing'. This policy followed neo-liberal thinking and was informed by research that was done by the World Bank (2005) on class sizes and teacher salaries (cited in Vally & Spreen 2006). Through the selective comparisons of international case studies, the research on class sizes concluded that there was no evidence to suggest a marked difference in the learning outcomes of classes comprised of between twenty five to forty learners (ibid). But, as learning outcomes in classes whose numbers exceeded forty learners were inadequate, the World Bank research suggested that the teacher : learner ratio of primary schools should be 1 : 40 and 1 : 35 in secondary schools. Vally and Spreen (2006) point out that this generic calculation was based on the market principles of productivity and cost-efficiency and disregarded the particular challenges faced by schools in developing countries such as South Africa.[109] Related to this was research which was conducted by a World Bank consultant who claimed that, as a percentage of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the personnel costs of teachers in terms of their age, qualifications and other labour market factors were too high (ibid). This required that the salaries of teachers had to be restructured and reduced to fit into the 'equitable management' of national revenue (Vally & Tleane 2001, p. 179).

Based on this, the groundwork for the teacher rationalisation policy was laid down by the *White Paper on Education and Training* which stated that

> [t]he government is committed to the establishment of a lean yet *effective* system of educational administration. In terms of the 1993 Constitution, the ethnically-based education departments or services responsible for providing education under the previous Constitution are being dissolved and their functions and personnel

[109] Also see Vally & Tleane (2001).

> rationalised into nine new non-racial provincial education departments. Once the provincial departments have been consolidated and their staff establishments rationalised in line with the government's policies, the new structure of organisation will be considerably *less complicated* and should be more *cost-effective* than the one it replaces (DoE 1995b, p. 47, my emphasis).

The DoE undertook the task of redeploying teachers from areas that had a surplus to areas that had a shortage with the goal of making the basic education system more 'efficient' and 'cost-effective'. To do this, the teacher : learner ratio for public schools was set at 1 : 40 for all primary schools and 1 : 35 for all secondary schools (Govender et al. 1997, p. 354; Harber 2001, p. 14). Teachers could either be redeployed or could take a Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) and so leave the system. Instead of the policy being used selectively, administrative and organisational difficulties led to sixteen thousand teachers receiving VSPs. This included teachers from areas that had staff shortages and in subjects such as maths and science (Vally & Tleane 2001, p. 188). In 1997, the approved VSPs cost the government over R1 billion: this figure excluded the costs of teachers who were placed on redeployment lists who continued to draw salaries and schools that, due to staff-shortages, resorted to employing temporary teachers (Govender et al. 1997, p. 355; Harber 2001, p. 15).

The redeployment policy was abandoned at the end of that year but it had a significant impact on the size and expertise of the public teacher body and the perceived viability of teaching as a profession (Vally & Spreen 2006). It also resulted in a significant loss in state funds (SACE 2011, p. 6; Vally & Tleane 2001, p. 178). Due to averred budgetary constraints, provincial education departments continued to retrench teachers even after the policy was abandoned. In 1998, seven thousand seven hundred temporary teachers in KwaZulu Natal and three thousand temporary teachers in the Western Cape were retrenched (Vally & Tleane 2001,

p. 193). The result was that a large number of qualified teachers either migrated to independent schools or to former Model C schools that were able to raise enough money to employ additional teachers. Those who did not leave the profession entirely, left the country for better paying positions in countries such as Australian, Canada and the United Kingdom (SACE 2011, pp. 6-7). Most of the teachers who remained in rural and township schools were employed by provincial education departments. These teachers were often un- or under-qualified (ibid, p. 15). Research revealed that in 2000, more un- or under-qualified teachers were employed by provincial education departments (22%) than in 1975 (11%) – mostly, these were employed at former Black schools (Crouch & Perry (2003) as cited by Chisholm 2004, p. 6).

Another policy which contributed to the waning teacher body was the rationalisation of teacher training colleges which took place between 1997 and 2001. Due to the fractious nature of apartheid education, a hundred and twenty teacher colleges were in existence at the start of democracy. These were controlled by separate education authorities and varied in size and quality (Bloch 2009a, p. 7; Chisholm 2010, p. 14). The 1996 *Green Paper on Higher Education Transformation* (DoE 1996b) claimed that teacher colleges were expensive and unproductive and that they had to be restructured (ibid, p. 21). As a result, Section 21 of the 1997 *Higher Education Act* (RSA 1997a) made provision for teacher colleges to be incorporated into universities and technikons (now called universities of technology).[110] By 2001, the number of institutions which offered teacher qualifications was reduced from thirty two to twenty six (Chisholm 2010, p. 16). This, and the new stringent quota system for teacher training, saw the number of student teacher enrolments drop from eighty thousand in 1994 to ten thousand in 2000 (Gordon (2009) cited by SACE 2011, p. 15). Following the 2005 mergers within the

[110] Provision was made for the establishment of autonomous teacher colleges on condition that they enrolled a minimum of 2000 students (Chisholm 2010, p. 16)

higher education system[111], the number of institutions which offered teacher qualifications was again reduced; this time to twenty. Combined, these changes resulted in South Africa failing to produce enough qualified teachers. In 2006, it was estimated that South Africa had to produce between seventeen thousand and twenty thousand teachers annually to fill vacant teaching positions (Morgan et al (2006) cited by SACE 2011, p. 6). But, due to the poor appeal of teaching as a profession and a decreased capacity to train teachers, South Africa only produced about nine thousand teachers annually (ibid).[112] Furthermore, research suggested that the shortage of teachers in rural schools was attributable in part to the closure of teacher colleges. Since most universities and colleges are located in urban centres, students from rural areas were often unable to enroll for teaching programmes due to financial constraints (Gordon (2009) cited in SACE 2011, p. 15).

This outcome negatively impacted on the implementation of the new curriculum, C2005, which was introduced in 1997. C2005 represented the DoE's espousal of Outcomes-Based Education or OBE. This sought to align the basic education curriculum to the NQF's goal of "a liberating, nation building and learner-centred outcomes-based initiative" (de Waal 2004, p. 42). The new curriculum consisted out of eight Learning Areas[113] for which corresponding outcomes were developed. This required teachers to develop teaching plans and activities that would ensure learner achievement of the preset outcomes (Bengu 1997; Christie 1999, p. 282). Despite Minister Bengu's announcement that C2005 would take effect in Grades 1, 4 and 7 the following year, its sudden announcement and a lack of resources to coordinate

[111] In 2005, the higher education system in South Africa was restructured. According to the late Prof Kader Asmal, who set the merger process in motion, this was necessary to bring higher education institutions in line with the goals set for them in national policy (Hall, Symes & Luescher 2004, p. 11). Thirty-six institutions were cut down to twenty two to establish three types of universities: traditional universities, comprehensive universities and universities of technology.

[112] Also see Bloch (2009a).

[113] These included Communication; Literacy and Language; Natural Sciences; Human and Social Sciences; Mathematical Literacy; Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences Technology; Economic and Management Sciences; Art and Culture; and Life Orientation.

and implement the new curriculum saw C2005 used only on Grade 1 learners in 1998 (Christie 1999, p. 283). The complexity and vagueness of the curriculum content, the "weak and sporadic" (Jansen & Taylor 2003, p. 39) training of teachers and the lack of skills and resources, particularly in former Black schools, led, in the years to come, to confusion among teachers, difficulties in learning transfer in classrooms and a decline in learner performance – again, particularly at former Black schools (Chisholm 2003, p. 3; Christie 2008, p. 142; Jansen & Taylor 2003, p. 39; Seekings 2007, p. 14). This was because, in addition to the teacher shortages in rural and township schools, Black teachers who were trained under apartheid were often un- or under qualified. In 1989, for example, a study estimated that 50% of teachers at African and Coloured schools were under-qualified and poorly trained (Hofmeyer & Buckland 1992). Because "OBE require[ed] levels of skill and experience that only exist[ed] among the best teachers as well as access to resources [that were] not easily available, say in rural contexts" (Bloch 2009a, p. 9)[114], un- or under qualified teachers who remained in the system struggled to implement the new curriculum.

In 2000, the second post-apartheid Minister of Education, the late Prof Kadar Asmal, ordered a review of C2005. The *Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005* (CRC 2000) found that the implementation of C2005 was constrained by the following factors:

> a skewed curriculum structure and design; a lack of alignment between curriculum and assessment policy; inadequate orientation, training and development of teachers; learning support materials that are variable in quality, often unavailable and not sufficiently used in classrooms; policy overload and limited transfer of learning into classrooms; shortages of personnel and resources to implement and support C2005;

[114] See, for example, the study by de Waal (2004) on the challenges faced by teachers at former Black schools with regard to the implementation of C2005.

> [and] inadequate recognition of curriculum as the core business of education departments (ibid, p. 2).

A *Revised National Curriculum Statement* (DoE 2002) was subsequently developed and became official policy in 2002. Based on the recommendations of the review report, the language of the new curriculum statement was simplified, its outcomes and assessment standards were more closely defined and streamlined, and the statement sought to promote certain core 'values' that included democracy, social justice, equity, non-racialism, non-sexism, and reconciliation (ibid; Jansen & Taylor 2003, p. 39). Despite this effort, problems persisted. Although OBE departed from apartheid education's top-down, insular and content driven system of learning, a distinctly neo-liberal reasoning informed the development of the new curriculum. Similar to the NQF, the government was less concerned with monitoring the *ways* in which these outcomes were achieved and more interested in putting into place mechanism to monitor their 'outcomes' (Allais 2007, p. 14).

Although contested, research suggests that there was a drop in the standard of basic education in post-apartheid South Africa (see Bloch 2009b, pp. 58-68). In 2008, one in twenty nine Black learners who received their National Senior Certificate in Gr. 12 was considered functionally illiterate. This was related to the challenges faced by former Black schools discussed in the paragraphs above. Assessments also showed that compared to international standards (which include southern Africa and the African continent as a whole), South African learners were some of the worst performers in literacy and maths in the world (Bloch 2009b, p. 58). There was also a marked difference in the annual matric pass rate at former Black schools and at former Model C schools. In 2009, the matric (Grade 12) pass rate at former Model C schools was 94% compared to the overall national pass rate of 60% (Roodt 2011). The discrepancy in these figures is more revealing when the fact that only 21% of pupils who

passed matric in 2009 attended former Model C schools is taken into consideration (ibid). These outcomes contributed to the production of what Gulson and Fataar call "subjective dynamics" (2011, p. 274) in which 'active' citizens remains privileged and 'at-risk' citizens are confined to reconstituted conditions of poverty and unemployment. This is because the majority of 'at-risk' citizens failed to conform to the dominant neo-liberal understanding of citizenship which envisioned the 'ideal citizen' as one that is educated and skilled to produce his or her own freedom, his or her own wellbeing and his or her own prosperity (Read 2009, p. 28). According to this logic, because citizens function according to their 'economic capability', unemployment and poverty were related to the "chronic skills shortages in the country and the inability of the education and training system to meet the demand-driven needs of the economy" (Rasool & Botha 2011, p. 3). As the previous Chapter argued, this was buttressed by inadequate service delivery to 'at-risk' citizens and, together, resulted in the reproduction of racialised subject positions.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

For to adopt without revision the concepts prevailing in a polity is to accept terms of discourse loaded in favor of established practices – William E. Connelly (1983, p. 2).

The final Chapter serves two main functions. While providing both an overview and an assessment of the study, it also considers the impact of the main conclusions on future efforts to reform basic education policy in South Africa. The latter consideration, often neglected in studies on basic education policy, enables the limits of future policy reform – a necessary condition of government – to be illuminated. As was previously argued, government, 'those actions upon the actions of others', is dependent on the identification of 'social problems' and the development of 'appropriate' policy responses to address them. State intervention, thereby is not only justifiable, but necessary. The traditional definition of policy, which masks the productive role of policy in the practice of power, has been problematised by the study. Alternative ways of thinking about basic education policy was achieved by presenting policy as discourse and by employing Foucault's governmentality research as the broad analytical framework of the study. Foucault once claimed that he would not have had the courage to start writing if he had to "communicate what [he] was already thinking" (1980a, pp. 239-240). "I only write a book", he said "because I don't know exactly what to think about this thing that I so much want to think about, so that the book transforms me and transforms what I think" (ibid). Similarly, the study set out to explore transformative conceptual possibilities in relation to how we analyse and understand basic education policy. Although Foucault's analytics of governmentality provided entry points into the analysis, the thesis also sought, as previously mentioned, to study policy discourse "on its own terms" (Hindess (1997) as cited in Tikly 2003, p. 172). This meant taking account of the productive and constraining effects of policy

and "of its possibilities…in and between arenas of formation and implementation" (Ball 1990, p. 185).

The overview of the thesis is presented as follows: The first section of the Chapter provides an overview of the aim and the objective of the study. The methodological approach that was employed in the thesis is outlined in the section thereafter. Such a reflection is useful, since methodological codification in a Foucauldian study "is best regarded as a summary that revisits and clarifies analysis after the event, rather than a rationalistic plan put into practice by analysis" (Dean 1997, p. 2). Following this, the main arguments, advanced by both levels of analysis, as well as their engagement with the aim of this thesis are considered. This is followed by a discussion of the main conclusions of the study and its impact on future efforts to reform policy in the field of basic education. The work concludes by exploring the intellectual space opened up by this thesis, and makes suggestions in relation to further research in this area of study.

5.1 AIM AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The grounding argument of this thesis followed that the traditional definition of policy – those objectives and action plans developed by policymakers to address 'social problems' – limits our understanding of the role that policy plays in the practice of state power. This definition of policy is limited to orthodox understandings of the state and its institutional apparatus. In this way, policy is to be seen as the product of certain 'natural' and 'well-intended' actions taken on behalf of the state to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens. It was argued in Chapter 1 that this understanding of policy dominates thinking around post-apartheid basic education policy in South Africa. One of the ways in which this understanding is

reinforced is through mainstream analyses of basic education policy. This is because the orthodox definition of policy is used as the epistemological base of these studies. It was further argued that this research has mainly advanced empirical and structural-rational methods of analysis. These contribute to the normalisation and routinisation of basic education policy discourses in South Africa and do not provide critical assessments outside of the 'limiting' analytical frameworks based on the orthodox definition of policy. There is also a tendency within basic education policy research in South Africa to focus on the outcomes or implementation side of policy at the expense of, not only the problematisations by policy, but also the 'idea' of policy. As a recent column on basic education policy in the weekly *Mail & Guardian* newspaper opined, "ultimately judgment is not based on policy – it is based on the successful implementation of policy" (Spaull 2012, p. 39). Such an understanding leads to policy issues being reduced to either 'bureaucratic problems' or, particularly in South Africa, the 'failure' of decentralised policy implementation. The latter places 'blame' on those upon who the responsibility of implementing policy falls, namely, provincial education departments, teachers and SGBs (School Governing Bodies). These findings, Gilmour argues, are "consistent with the effort to protect the legitimacy of the bureaucracy" (2001, p. 16). While it is necessary to evaluate the effects of policy practices, it is equally important to problematise definitions and assumptions of policy and the "truths" policies seek to perpetuate. By doing this, broader questions of policy as a translation of governmental reasoning, can be pursued; an aspect too often neglected by policy research.

Basic education policy served as an interesting example of the idea of policy as part of the art of governing. This is because education plays a key role in the creation of subjectivity and, therefore, is of particular interest to the state. Not only was the ways in which political reasoning informed basic education policy highlighted, but the study showed how the basic

education system reproduced the socio-economic inequalities characteristic of the post-apartheid era. The relevance of problematising mainstream research on basic education policy followed from the argument that research and the "knowledge" it produces plays an important role in either reinforcing or disrupting the regime of "truth" which governs a society, or

> the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; [and] the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault (1980) as cited in Humes & Bryce 2003, p. 179).

Following from this, the aim of this thesis was to challenge the dominant narrative offered by mainstream analyses of basic education policy by advancing an alternative approach to policy analysis. It further endeavored to highlight the boundaries of intervention generated by basic education policy during the first fifteen years of democracy (which are considered in this Chapter). In order to do this, the objective of this thesis was to disrupt the traditional conception of policy by premising policy as discourse. This unsettles orthodox understandings of the state, and speaks to Foucault's research on governmentality. In his analytics of governmentality, Foucault analyses historically constituted government within Europe by focusing on political reasoning. Government, Foucault argues, is informed by certain ways of thinking about governing and that changes in governmental practices are attributable to the reconstitution of political reasoning. Applied to this thesis, such an approach allowed for an alternative analysis of the post-apartheid state compared to traditional institutional or instrumental approaches in this regard. This in turn enabled an alternative analysis of basic education policy. The problematisation of policy *itself*, by positing policy as part of the art of governing and considering the rationalities that have informed it, confronted the propensity of

mainstream research to focus predominantly on basic education policy implementation. The manner in which this study employed governmentality to analyse post-apartheid political reasoning and basic education policy in South Africa will now be considered.

5.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

As we discovered, Foucault avoids being prescriptive about the analytical approaches employed in his work. He does, however, provide some clues in his governmentality lectures with regard to the approach that was used to study the European state as an episode in the history of political reasoning. For Foucault,

> we cannot speak of the state-thing as if it was a being developing on the basis of itself and imposing itself on individuals as if by a spontaneous, automatic mechanism. The state is a practice…[and]…is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things and a way too of relating to government (1978b, pp. 276-277).

Foucault was also not interested in studying the history of the state apparatus: what its function is, how it works, what problems it addresses and so forth. But aimed, instead, to study the art of governing. "[T]he reasoned way of governing best and at the same time *reflection* on the best possible way of governing" were of concern to Foucault (1979, p. 2, my emphasis). Prior to the constitution of the modern state in Europe in the mid-17th Century, the exercise of pastoral power saw the organisation of communities around and based on the principles of the church, enforced by rulers known as 'shepherds'. *Raison d' État*, which followed, constituted the creation of the state through a secular governmental rationality: "a way of thinking the specific nature, connections, and relations of certain *already given* elements and institutions"

(Foucault 1978b, p. 286, my emphasis). The development of police reason and, later, of liberalism and neo-liberalism, sought to conceptualise and effect the most appropriate ways of governing with state security, individual interest and economic interest, respectively, serving as "the regulatory idea of governmental reason" (ibid) which, in turn, constituted the state. So, by analysing ideas and prescriptions (spoken and written) with regard to the art of government throughout history, Foucault was able to identify the articulation of government in relation to sovereignty, populations, markets, freedom and security.

By following the broad arguments within this approach, Chapter 3 sought to study the reconstituted post-apartheid state as the rearticulation of apartheid's illiberal rationality. It highlighted the ways in which post-apartheid governmental reasoning drew on, and applied, the rationalities identified by Foucault, to conditions informed by apartheid's bio-political practices and illiberal mentality of rule. In other words, the conditions that gave rise to post-apartheid political reasoning and to which it was applied were distinct from those that gave rise to governmentality and modern governmentality in Europe. The analysis of apartheid rule in South Africa highlighted the racialisation of bio-politics which emerged during colonialism and was perpetuated by the logic of apartheid. The result was the legal and physical segregation of different racial groups with the goal of protecting and advancing the interests of a single group, namely of White South Africans. This analysis pointed towards the articulation of sovereignty during apartheid alongside pastoral reasoning which legitimated the exercise of absolute power over the state territory and its inhabitants. Such reasoning enabled the domination, relocation and termination of indigenous communities by colonial and apartheid rulers. The further development of capitalism and the conditions necessary for its functioning, such as a cheap semi-skilled Black labour force and the creation of the so-called Homelands in which the socio-

economic and political stratification of Black South Africans could be confined and regulated by police reason, were also discussed.

The analysis of liberal and neo-liberal reasoning in post-apartheid South Africa differed from Foucault's analysis, most noticeably through the consideration of South Africa's post-apartheid 'governmentality-in-the-making' constituted by both liberal and neo-liberal reasoning. The unique circumstances which characterised South Africa's political landscape at the start of democracy saw the continuation of a market-led economy and a public service still largely constituted by the "knowledges" and institutional practices of the apartheid bureaucracy; significant levels of socio-economic inequalities between racial groups; and the triumph of global market capitalism following the end of the Cold War. These contributed to the adoption of both rationalities following the 1994 election. Nevertheless, the arguments advanced by Foucault in relation to liberalism and neo-liberalism's articulation of security, freedom, the economy and 'risk' were applied to the context of this thesis and were used to highlight the ways in which both rationalities articulated these domains in post-apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 3 also sought to highlight the continuities and discontinuities between the logic of apartheid and post-apartheid political reasoning. This followed demonstration of the rearticulation and reconstitution of political reasoning through history in his governmentality research.

The second level of analysis in Chapter 4 was concerned with employing the insights developed in the analysis of post-apartheid political reasoning to examine its impact on the development and practice of basic education policy during the first fifteen years of democracy. Because Foucault does not principally study government policies and practices, the analysis of post-apartheid basic education policy drew on the work of Christie (2006), Rose and Miller (1992) and Tikly (2003). Understanding government policies as the translations of political

reasoning, "an expression of a particular concern in another modality" (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 181), and governmental practices as those actions, strategies and processes working to make governmental programmes practicable (ibid, p.183), this analysis sought to highlight how basic education policy and its practices were informed by liberal and neo-liberal reasoning. Because political reasoning emerges and functions within particular discursive regimes, the analysis firstly evaluated the broader context in which policymaking in South Africa occurred, particularly the period of negotiation and the negotiated settlement in which the process of rationalising education and training occurred. To consider the impact of these discursive practices on education policymaking, the NQF (National Qualifications Framework) policy was discussed.

The second part of the Chapter was concerned with analysing how political reasoning shaped some of the basic education policies that were adopted after 1994. The policies that were evaluated were the funding policy which was adopted in 1998 and the policies of teacher rationalisation and the rationalisation of teacher training colleges which were espoused in 1996 and 1998 respectively. This was done by analysing policy texts, reviews, speeches and other official government publications pertaining to the said policies. In particular, the analyses focused on highlighting the ways in which these policies contributed to the continuing inequalities between former Black schools and former Model C schools since 1994. The next section will consider the boundaries of future government intervention that were created by these policies.

5.3 SUMMARY OF MAIN ARGUMENTS

The first level of analysis argued that the logic of apartheid drew on elements of liberal reasoning, as presented by Foucault in his governmentality research, but that this was applicable only to the governance of White South Africans. Apartheid political reasoning can be framed then as an illiberal rationality that did not consider Black South Africans as judicial subjects of rights (Tikly 2003, p. 163). This is related to the employment of a racialised bio-political rationality by the apartheid regime that divided South Africans into four racial groups (Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Whites) and which segregated them territorially, politically and economically. The logic of apartheid also drew on police reason which informed the development of state security forces and an 'unlimited' administrative apparatus that assisted the apartheid regime in controlling, organising and monitoring the implementation of legislation and oppressive governing practices. Capitalism, which developed during the period of British colonial rule, was also expanded during apartheid. Blacks were subjected to an inferior and divided education system that sought to produce semi-skilled, vocationally oriented political subjects that would service the interest of White capital. Whites, for their part, received a superior education, during apartheid rule, which allowed them to pursue economic and political stratification.

The resistance discourses and practices that emerged from the 1970s onwards started to increasingly challenge apartheid's hegemony. Pressures to reform apartheid from within and outside of South Africa resulted in the NP entering into negotiations with the ANC, IFP and other interested parties. However, negotiation presupposes compromise and the subsequent negotiated settlement that gave rise to the GNU (Government of National Unity) ended attempts by the ANC to discontinue the logic of apartheid, particularly with regard to the economy and racialised bio-politics. Despite the rhetoric of greater socio-economic equality

and non-racialism following the 1994 election, the inability of the left to present a coherent governmental rationality due, in part, to the employment by the ANC of both leftist and orthodox economic discourses in early policy documents enabled the continuation of South Africa's market-led economy. This was aided by the presence of policymakers and the institutional "knowledges" and practices of the apartheid bureaucracy within the GNU. The negotiated settlement also did not deracialise the economy. This resulted in the 'necessary' employment of apartheid's racial categories to establish redress and points to a further continuation of the logic of apartheid during the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa. This also resulted in the reconstitution of racialised subject positions.

Nevertheless, the post-apartheid state departed from the logic of apartheid by adopting a liberal understanding of government. The latter differed from apartheid's illiberal reasoning in terms of its conceptualisation of all South Africans as legally equal. In other words, discrimination based on race, sex and religion was outlawed through the espousal of the new non-racial Constitution and Bill of Rights. Liberal reasoning, therefore, was concerned with defining the limits of governmental reasoning and with creating the conditions necessary for the production of greater freedom. To do this, a system of universal franchise was also adopted and apartheid's racist and segregationist legislation was abolished. This was followed by the espousal of the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) which sought to introduce welfarist policies and interventions in the economy based on Keynesian economics. Freedom furthermore was conceptualised in terms of economic redress which led to the development of Affirmative Action policies based on apartheid's racial categories.

Neo-liberal reasoning was adopted soon thereafter which can be attributed to the dominance of neo-liberalism internationally; the pressure which the business sector put on the ANC in response to the RDP's economic proposals; the favourable conditions within South

Africa (continuation of apartheid's market-led economy) for the adoption of free market economic principles; and the ability of neo-liberal reasoning to articulate its economic programme in terms of development, equity and redress. South Africa's GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) policy functioned as the translation of government's newly adopted rationality. This conceptualised all citizens on the level of government policies and practices as 'active economic subjects' capable of producing their own freedom, welfare, prosperity and 'risk' management. It also introduced market principals into the management of the public service which called for fiscal austerity measures, rationalisation and the privatisation of certain public utilities which impacted on the ability of government to deliver services, particularly to the poor. Furthermore, a policy of BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) was adopted which appeared to push for greater equity but had its roots in the policy of Black Advancement. The latter had attempted to create a black petty bourgeoisie class during apartheid. Within a market-led economy, BEE in post-apartheid South Africa benefitted individuals and their companies as opposed to creating greater equity among Black South Africans. Because Affirmative Action policies targeted skilled Black citizens, its impact too was limited considering the levels of unemployment and poverty in post-apartheid South Africa.

An example of the tensions between liberal and neo-liberal reasoning in post-apartheid South Africa was the manner in which both rationalities calculated 'risk' to society. It argued that liberal reasoning made the distinction between 'at-risk' and 'active' citizens at the start of democracy. 'At-risk' citizens were constituted mainly by previously disadvantaged Black citizens whereas 'active' citizens consisted out of previously advanced White citizens as well as the emerging Black middle class. 'Risk' to previously disadvantaged citizens was based on liberal-welfare conceptions of 'risk' whereas 'risk' to active citizens was based on neo-liberal

understandings of ‘risk’ calculation. Due to the failure of the state to deliver proper services to ‘at-risk’ citizens, the structural nature of the economy as well as the continued inequalities within the education system, ‘at-risk’ citizens were not able to conform to the neo-liberal conceptualisation of ‘active’ citizens by governmental reasoning. In contrast, ‘active’ citizens continued to produce their own wealth, had access to private health care and education and were able to manage ‘risks’ to their welfare themselves. This led to ongoing socio-economic inequalities between ‘active’ and ‘at-risk’ citizens, largely along racial lines.

The second level of analysis, which was provided in Chapter 4, started by considering the period of negotiation, in particular the “knowledges” that were produced during this period to transform the apartheid education system. Considering these policy positions was important, as these contributed to the creation of certain objects of government intervention. Rose and Miller argue that “[g]overning a sphere requires that it can be represented, depicted in a way which both grasps its truth and re-presents it in a form in which it can enter the sphere of conscious political calculation” (1992, p. 182). The argument was made that during negotiation, a number of interest groups put forward policy proposals to transform the apartheid education system. Under the auspices of COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), the union movement, together with the NTB (National Training Board), developed an integrated approach to education and training which would enable greater access to learning and lessen the ‘traditional’ divides between education and training. This approach was underlaid by market discourses but proved an acceptable option due to its claims of greater access, development and life-long learning opportunities. Because of the overt ascription by the NP’s ERS (*Education Renewal Strategy*) and the CUMSA (*Curriculum Model for South Africa*) policy documents to market discourses and the distinction these made between education and training, these proposals were delegitimised. The integrated approach to learning gained further

ground due to the ANC's failure to present clear policy positions during this time. Rather, the NEPI (*National Education Policy Investigation*) study produced broad 'value' frameworks to guide policymaking. The ANC were also disadvantaged by the NP's refusal to discuss education reform with it, endorsing rather the negotiations that were taking place between the NTB and COSATU.

The proposal of an integrated system of education and training subsequently became the dominant one. This lead to education and training being rationalised as 'appropriate' objects of post-apartheid governmental reasoning, and the adoption of the aforementioned approach to learning. Nevertheless, because the policymakers from the NP and ANC had to strike compromises in the formulation of post-apartheid basic education policy, both education and training remained the responsibility of the Education and Labour Ministries respectively. This was seen by some as a blow to the implementation of the integrated system. They argued that, in order to transform the system, training had to become the responsibility of the DoE (Department of Education) and not remain that of the DoL (Department of Labour). Nevertheless, the NQF – the policy expression of an integrated system of education and training – was able to adapt to the latter institutional environment as its implementation did not require fundamental institutional change. While liberal reasoning generated the consensus which surrounded the adoption of the NQF, neo-liberal reasoning employed the policy to render education and training more market friendly. Despite the difficulties surrounding the implementation of the NQF, since it did not challenge established power relations, it continued, by virtue thereof, to be justified and reformulated by governmental reasoning.

The second half of the Chapter was dedicated to providing more specific examples of how political reasoning informed basic education policy. It was firstly argued that under the banner of education and training, basic education was rationalised by government reasoning in

non-racial terms and for reasons which differed from those of the logic of apartheid. Rationalisation was necessary to define the spheres of education and training, to legitimate the development of policies to transform it and to link education and training to the 'ideals' of governmental reasoning. The first policy which was analysed was that of school funding. This followed from the NP and ANC's proposals of education decentralisation which resulted in the devolvement of school management to SGBs. The *South African Schools Act* determined that SGBs had to supplement the subsidies schools received from provincial education departments by setting school fees and raising private donations and sponsorships. This approach to funding necessitated the contribution of parents in the funding of schooling as the budgetary allocation placed a 'strain' on the funds available to the DoE. In other words, this approach was presented to the public as 'necessary' as there simply was not 'enough' money available. This, however, was related to the adoption of a neo-liberal rationality of government which called for the equal distribution of government revenue between departments. In other words, policies that allowed fiscal austerity, cost-efficiency and cut-backs were introduced.

To regulate this market, and to address the fact that 'at-risk' children were more likely to encounter obstacles with regard to accessing basic education, the provision of education to these learners was included in the post-apartheid welfare strategy. To enable provincial education departments to enforce the 'risk' strategy for basic education, the DoE adopted a partnership funding approach. However, instead of addressing the inequalities between schools, the policy reinforced them. Former Model C schools were able to raise enough funding to employ additional teachers paid for by SGBs; these were able to maintain or upgrade school infrastructure and resources and, therefore, were able to better implement changes to basic education policies than former Black schools. Former Black schools were not able to raise funds similar to that of former Model C schools because poor, mostly Black communities could

not afford school fees and often did not have experience to effectively raise funds and organise sponsorships. Due to the government's neo-liberal reasoning, subsidies to poor schools, compared to the revenue that was available to former Model C schools, were not sufficient to address the deficits faced by these schools.

Thereafter, the policies of teacher rationalisation and of the rationalisation of teacher training colleges were considered. It was argued that these policies had a negative effect on the size and expertise of the teacher body which affected the implementation of C2005 (Curriculum 2005). The rationalisation of teacher's policy resulted in many well qualified teachers and teachers in areas that suffered shortages leaving the profession by taking VSPs (Voluntary Severance Package). This did not only cost the DoE over R1 billion but resulted in greater teacher shortages and unequal supply of teachers due to former Model C and independent schools possessing the finances to employ additional teachers. Former Black schools either suffered shortages or had un- or under-qualified teachers appointed by provincial education departments in their employ. The rationalisation of teacher training colleges, for its part, resulted in less qualified teachers being produced. This was related to a decreased institutional capacity to train teachers and because teaching had been rendered an unattractive career choice. These policies had an impact on the ability of schools to implement the new OBE (Outcomes-Based Education) curriculum, C2005. Due to this outcomes-oriented curriculum requiring well-resourced schools and well qualified teachers to be implemented properly, former Black schools struggled to implement C2005. This resulted in a drop in the quality of basic education and, consequently, the literacy and pass rate of learners. The matric pass rate of former Model C schools was also much higher than former Black schools.

These considerations showed how the tensions within political reasoning created contradictory impulses within basic education policy. These contradictions deepened the

inequalities between former Model C and former Black schools. This has contributed to the reproduction of socio-economic inequalities during the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa as 'at-risk' citizens (who mostly attended former Black schools) do not conform to the government's conceptualisation of an 'active' citizenry that possess a certain level of education and skills to produce their own prosperity, wealth and security. In contrast, 'active' citizens have had access to better levels of basic education and have been able to conform to the neo-liberal understanding of *homo economicus*.

5.4 CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY

This thesis has shown that discourses are productive and constitutive in nature. The policy discourses that were analysed in this thesis, therefore, will have an impact on future basic education policy reforms. Considering the scarcity of approaches that take account of basic education policy discourses in post-apartheid South Africa, there is a need to evaluate the conditions that have been produced by these discourses so that new questions can be posed to efforts that will seek to improve the basic education system in years to come. The assumption of future reform efforts should not be seen as the ascription by this thesis to the idea of the policymaking 'process' as an epistemological certainty. Drawing on the research of Malpas and Wickham (1995), Higgins argues that for the "activity of government [to remain] thinkable and manageable", government must "necessarily [be] incomplete and as a necessary consequence must always fail" (2004, p. 459). Put differently, the reproduction of policy problems as a consequence of failing governance in turn legitimates the necessity of governance made intelligible through new policy developments and implementation strategies. Socio-economic inequalities, for example, are more often than not framed by government discourse as policy failures – either current or past. This suggests that *within* policy reform; *within* the 'right'

government policies lay the solutions to socio-economic inequalities. 'Social problems' then are produced, or perpetuated, by 'bad governance' and, therefore, 'should' be solved by states – hence the necessity of failing governance to legitimate political rule. Applied to basic education in post-apartheid South Africa, it is necessary to consider the limits of future policy reform efforts which act as legitimators of rule.

The main argument in the first level of analysis was that the tensions between post-apartheid liberal and neo-liberal reasoning resulted, in part through the 'risk' strategies that both calculated, the continuation of apartheid's socio-economic inequalities. 'At-risk' citizens remain dependent on the welfare strategy managed by the state, whereas active 'citizens' continued to manage their own 'risk', frequently opting out of state-run services by employing private service providers. The conditions that have been created by governmental reasoning during the first fifteen years of democracy have given rise, therefore, to unequal subject positions that cannot be reconstituted over a short period. Should the post-apartheid state abandon its neo-liberal rationality and policy of fiscal austerity in the hope of channeling more money to the welfare 'risk' strategy and address the inequalities within the basic education system, the subject positions that were created by apartheid reasoning and reinforced by post-apartheid mentalities of rule will both persist and reproduce. According to Lemke,

> a political rationality is not pure, neutral knowledge which simply 're-presents' the governing reality; instead, it itself constitutes the intellectual processing of the reality which political technologies can then tackle. This is understood to include agencies, procedures, institutions, legal forms, etc., that are intended to enable us to govern the objects and subjects of a political rationality (2001: 191).

Put differently, subject positions that are created by governmental reasoning are based on the representation of 'reality' by this reasoning and the government policies and practices adopted to 'manage' it. Subjects then are constituted to *govern* according to the political

rationality (or rationalities) responsible for their development by functioning within the limits of their subjectivity. In light of the subject positions that were reinforced during the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa and the extreme inequality between them, the creation of new limits of subjectivity will take decades to establish and will have to contend with existing strategies of government intervention which are aided by, as Lemke points out, institutions, legislation and local practices (ibid).

The study also showed that basic education policy, during the first fifteen years of democracy, deepened the inequalities between former Black schools and former Model C schools. The effects which the funding model had on the maintenance and development of school infrastructure at former Model C schools as well as the enhancement of the expertise of teachers and SGBs at these schools have promoted the idea of 'active' self-government. This strengthened resistance to the state interfering with the role of SGBs at these schools. Former Black schools, on the other hand, remained largely dependent on the state for funding and for the supply of teachers. The dual funding model for former Black and former Model C schools have reinforced the 'necessity' of a dual policy response by neo-liberal reasoning. This is because fiscal austerity dictates that 'limited' resources are available to education and that the state is dependent on both public and private contributions in order for it to increase the subsidisation of former Black schools located in poor communities. The inadequate implementation of C2005, on the other hand, due to the rationalisation policies discussed previously, resulted in the production of poorly educated, mostly Black citizens which did not conform to the neo-liberal conception of 'active economic subjects'. So, because schools continued to service their immediate communities, and because South Africa remained spatially segregated according to income, the inequalities within the basic education system reproduced socially and fed back into schools.

The way in which state framed the reforms to basic education policy in 2010 established the limits of their intervention. Tikly (2010) provides a useful critique of the 'Education Roadmap', a report presented to the DBE (Department of Basic Education) in 2009. Despite employing the rhetoric of social justice and critiquing the inequalities within the basic education system, the Roadmap suggests market-based solutions to the crisis within basic education, informed by neo-liberal thinking. Tikly argues that this is precisely what neo-liberal governmentality is able to do, that is, "its ability to bind itself to multiple political projects in contradictory ways" (2010, p. 7). Because neo-liberal reasoning is the dominant rationality in post-apartheid South Africa, it limits the ability of basic education policy to conceptualise solutions outside of governmental reasoning. As long as government is informed by a neo-liberal mentality of rule, basic education policy is to a large extent limited to its logic for solutions. Furthermore, the social conditions created by governmental reasoning and by basic education policy during the first fifteen years of democracy justify, as the *White Paper on Education and Training* put it, the necessity "to pursue policies that treat different groups of people in somewhat different ways" (DoE 1995b, p. 71).

5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In obvious ways, this study has opened up a space in which to reconsider the post-apartheid state and basic education policy. However, there is a need to further engage with and expand on what has been said here so that alternative approaches of inquiry and understandings can play more defining roles in illuminating and problematising that which is considered "true". Firstly, there is need for a more in-depth consideration of the import of European mentalities of rule to South Africa from the start of colonialism. Employing a governmentality frame to reconsider South Africa's colonial (and its more recent) history could illuminate in

more detail what elements of European mentalities of rule were applied and what elements were transformed by the local realities they were exercised upon and sought to reconfigure. Such an analysis in a post-colonial or post-communist context, however, should take note of the unique circumstances and historically specific features of governmental reasoning and practices when compared to Western contexts, as well as the forms of resistance against European-inspired mentalities. Such a study will bring to light the strategies that buttressed the normalisation of colonial and later apartheid rule. This will enable deeper engagements with policy which is produced not only with particular social and economic contexts but in historical ones too.

Secondly, there is a need, as Christie urges, for a "range of different theoretical framings…in these times as a basis for critical engagement with educational change" (2006, p. 380). Studies that employ post-structural forms of analysis to consider basic education policy and its practice, therefore, should not dominate but should be part of a wider movement towards the employment and acknowledgement of critical and post-structural approaches to study policy so that new forms of understanding to improve policy argumentation can be furthered. There is then a need for critical and post-structural approaches to studying basic education policy to function alongside and engage empirical, structural and other traditional forms of policy analysis so that there is continued engagement with and disruption of "knowledge-power" relations. Education systems play a key role in effecting governmental reason. This was the case during apartheid rule in South Africa and, since 1994, the failure to create the conditions that would produce autonomy and freedom by the basic education system is further evidence of the constitutive nature of education systems and its necessity in the practice of political reasoning. It is therefore of critical importance that post-apartheid South Africa's basic education system and its policies continue to be problematised by approaches

that assume critical positions towards the policies themselves. This will not only strengthen attempts to disrupt power relations that reinforce the inequalities within the system but can also put new ways of understanding in the public arena, capable of effecting change.

That said, there is a third area of consideration which has emerged in this thesis. As noted, this thesis employed the arguments made by Tikly with regard to the calculation of 'risk' to society in post-apartheid South Africa. Judging from the research question, the analysis of 'risk' was not considered central to this study when it was conceived. Although this study set out to expand Tikly's analysis and extend it to the analysis of basic education policy, it became and important frame through which socio-economic inequalities can be viewed and understood as well as a new way of considering basic education policy. The idea of 'risk', not only internationally, but also in South Africa, is a very important and powerful one. Foucault shows that the notion of risk emerged during the 18th Century with the rise of liberal reasoning. This mentality of rule governed through the management of various interests which faced constant 'dangers' or 'risks'. To protect the interest of citizens, social security or welfare policies were introduced to lessen the 'risk' of poverty, unemployment and political freedom during the economic crisis of the early 20th Century (Tikly 2003, p. 162). Following this, neo-liberalism sought to lessen the overt involvement of government by deploying strategies which sought to make citizens more responsible and that encouraged the self-management of interests and 'risks' (Foucault 1979, p. 226). However, in contemporary times, 'risk' is understood in more diverse ways: the 'risks' posed to state security, economic 'risks', ecological 'risks', et cetera. Sociologists too have considered the notion of 'risk', particularly Ulrich Beck who has written on what he terms 'risk society' (Baert & da Silva 2010: 256). 'Risk' is used to develop policies and also justifies the necessity of the state in the management of these risks. As Rothtein (2006) argues, "risk…is emerging as a key organizing concept for regulatory regimes and extended

governance systems within a wide range of policy domains and organizational settings…Risk is no longer the exclusive reserve of scientists and technocrats, but fast becoming the *lingua franca* of business and even of general public policy" (as cited in Grinberg 2007, pp. 3-4). It is important to problematise the notion of risk and as was demonstrated by this thesis, it has a bearing on all governmental programmes and practices as it is part of the rationality of governing.

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