

Development NGOs:
Understanding Participatory Methods, Accountability and Effectiveness of
World Vision in Zimbabwe with Specific Reference to Umzingwane District

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
of
RHODES UNIVERSITY

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December 2013

Abstract

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) have occupied a prominent role in the development of rural Zimbabwe since the time of its independence in 1980. NGO work in Zimbabwe currently takes place within the context of a tense and fluid political climate, an economy struggling to recover from crisis, international skepticism toward long-term donor investment in development, and global expectations about the methodologies and accountability measures carried out in intervention-based development work.

In the light of the participatory methodologies and empowerment-based development frameworks that dominate the current global expectations for work within the NGO sector, this thesis focuses on the work of one particular NGO working in Zimbabwe, namely, World Vision. The main objective of the thesis is to understand and explain the participatory methods, accountability and effectiveness of World Vision in Zimbabwe (with particular reference to Umzingwane District) and, in doing so, to deepen the theoretical understanding of NGOs as constituting a particular organizational form. World Vision is a large-scale international NGO that has a pronounced presence in Zimbabwe and it is specifically active in Umzingwane District in Matabeleland South Province.

The thesis argues that NGOs exist within a complex and tense condition entailing continuous responses to pressures from donors and states that structure their survival. Ultimately, in maneuvering through such pressures, NGOs tend to choose directions which best enable their own sustainability, often at the cost of the deep participatory forms that may heighten the legitimacy of their roles. World Vision Zimbabwe responds to donor trends, national and local expectations of the state and its own organizational expectations by building local government capacity in order to maintain the longevity and measureable outputs of its projects. In doing so, it redefines the concept of participation in pursuing efficient and practical approaches to ‘getting things done’. This compromises deep participatory methodologies and, in essence, alters the practices involved in participatory forms in order to maintain World Vision’s own organizational sustainability and presence in Zimbabwe.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADP	Area Development Program
Agritex	Zimbabwe Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services
ANGO	Advocacy Non-Governmental Organization
CA	Communal Area
CWBO	Child Well-Being Outcome
DA	District Administrator
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DNGO	Development Non-governmental Organization
DPA	Development Program Approach
DSW	Department for World Service (Lutheran World Federation)
ECHA	European Commission Humanitarian Aid
EU	European Union
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HPI	Human Poverty Index
IG	Inclusive Government
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
ITDG	Intermediate Technology Development Group
LEAP	Learning Through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MTP	Medium-Term Plan
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLHA	Native Land Husbandry Act
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs
Oxfam	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief

PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RDC	Rural District Council
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
STERP	Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program
TDI	Transformational Development Indicator
TTLA	Tribal Trust Land Act
UNDP	United National Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WV	World Vision
WVI	World Vision International
WVZ	World Vision Zimbabwe
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

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Acknowledgements

With my greatest and most sincere gratitude, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Kirk Helliker, for his time, guidance, insight and honesty. I particularly thank him for his respectful approach and patience. I would like to thank Rhodes University for the financial support of a teaching assistant position, which helped to make my studies possible and provided a valuable experience. I am most grateful to the World Vision Zimbabwe employees who were willing to take the time to speak with me and for their honesty and openness. I also thank all of those who made this research possible by sharing their time and insight with me. I thank Papaw, to whom I am truly indebted, for sharing his great expertise and insight and for providing me with confidence in this endeavor. I would like to thank my husband Ross who has been amazingly supportive, encouraging and patient throughout this entire process. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my family, who has always loved and supported me.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Since independence in 1980, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have played a significant role in planning and implementing development projects in rural Zimbabwe. In the scholarly literature, the methodologies deployed by and the effectiveness of these NGOs in Zimbabwe has been subjected to only limited scrutiny. The thesis contributes to the existing literature by critically discussing the purposes, challenges and successes of development projects carried out by World Vision, a large-scale international NGO, in Umzingwane District in Zimbabwe, with a particular focus on participatory methods, accountability and effectiveness. The following sections of this introductory chapter provide an explanation of the context, objectives, research methods and limitations of this thesis. It ends by providing an outline for what is discussed throughout the chapters that follow.

1.2 Context of the Thesis

Internationally, NGO development work is carried out through individual projects and focuses on concepts of participation and capacity-building for the purpose of achieving empowerment and livelihood sustainability, generally for the poor and most vulnerable people. NGO visions widely accept that participatory methods in development projects – involving the assertion of community rights about decision-making – are necessary for achieving empowerment and, therefore, sustainability. ‘Participation’ however is open to conceptual slippage and is defined differently in different contexts, often either implying an empowerment-based (bottom-up) concept of participation, that is entirely beneficiary-driven and beneficiary-owned, or an involvement-based (top-down) concept, which involves a more consultative approach. The effectiveness of NGOs entails sustainable development for communities, but NGOs themselves often conflate this with their own organizational sustainability.

In the end, the question of participatory forms relates to the critical issue of NGO accountability which must be balanced between three major stakeholders: donors who fund NGO efforts, the states in which NGOs work and the beneficiaries who they are attempting to help. While the intention of NGOs is to prioritize accountability to the beneficiaries of their work, that accountability is often compromised due to efforts to meet the requirements of the other two stakeholder groups (donors and states). Ultimately, however, whilst seeking to respond to the often contradictory requirements of these stakeholders, NGOs maneuver their way through in such a way that they are accountable to themselves, in order to secure their own organizational sustainability.

The history of NGOs in Zimbabwe highlights many of these general points about NGOs internationally. Two main types of NGOs exist in Zimbabwe: rights-based advocacy NGOs which usually work within urban centers and development NGOs which work primarily in rural areas toward improving livelihoods, often with an agricultural emphasis. NGOs also conduct emergency relief and disaster response in times where people suffer from extreme conditions, and these actions are usually carried out by development NGOs. Development NGOs are the focus of the thesis.

Prior to Zimbabwean independence, development initiatives were carried out by external aid organizations, primarily mission churches, as well as a few NGOs. NGOs, however, received a significant boost in the 1980s with a specific focus on the Communal Areas (CAs) outside the white commercial farming areas (Moyo et al. 2000). Since their inception as Native Reserves under colonial rule up until the present, CAs have been treated as both a political and physical resource by the state (both the pre-independence colonial state and the post-independence Zimbabwean state), being subjected to various state laws and programs that have continually restructured their governance systems as well as being used as a pool for political support, a labor reserve, and even at times a dumping ground for unwanted urban dwellers. Factors traditionally affecting the livelihoods of people living in communal areas, which continue in many forms today, include access to land, quality of land and soil, access to water and irrigation systems, and limited infrastructure including access to education and health care (Ncube 2011, Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008, Mbiba 2001, FAO 1997, Mashava and Dzingirai 2010, Maroyi 2009, Makura-Paradza 2010, Vivian 1994).

Though Zimbabwe has experienced radical land redistribution from the year 2000 under Fast Track, decongestion in communal areas as a result of land reform has been minimal. Operation *Murambatsvina* in 2005 (Potts 2006), involving state destruction of informal housing and businesses in urban areas, and the movement of former workers from previously white-owned commercial farms (Ncube 2011), has undercut prospects for decongestion. Because of such conditions, and with goals of poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability, NGOs have for many years carried out development projects in rural, communal areas throughout Zimbabwe. Donors, who in large part refuse to fund projects in the new resettlement areas because of claims about the illegitimacy of Fast Track, continue to fund NGO work in CAs.

Particularly since the mid-1990s, there has been a tense political atmosphere in Zimbabwe which has directly affected NGO funding (notably for advocacy NGOs but also for development NGOs) because of the ruling party's suspicion of foreign-funded NGOs. Even development NGOs, before the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2008, were regularly accused by the ruling party of using food aid to support the main opposition party; this led to toughened legal restrictions and registration processes for all NGO activity. Particularly controversial in this regard was the repressive NGO Bill of 2004 which, for reasons which remain unclear, was never signed by the state president (Zimbabwe Institute 2008, NGO Consultancy Africa n.d., CIVICUS 2004, Tsunga and Mugabe 2004). The positioning of the ruling party vis-à-vis NGOs since the year 2000, while focused on the urban civic movement, has less directly (but still significantly) affected the work of development NGOs by influencing the funding decisions made by international donors and by creating excessive administrative requirements for NGOs which can be expensive and resource-consuming. Donors, having severely diminished their overall support for NGOs after the controversial land reform and changed focus toward emergency food relief during the economic crisis following the early 2000s, are only now beginning to open up again to more long-term, development-based NGO work.

Umzingwane District located in Matabeleland South (which provides the case study for the thesis), consists of twenty wards, of which thirteen are communal. Among other factors, livelihoods in Umzingwane have been affected significantly by severe problems with access to water, as it is located in agro-ecological zone IV, which is

characterized by low annual rainfall, seasonal drought, and dry spells during the rainy season (FAO 1997). As a result, people have diversified their livelihoods, sometimes even turning to illegal, dangerous and unsustainable practices for sources of income and survival (including gold panning, illegal beer brewing, and prostitution). NGOs working in Umzingwane have – amongst other things – sought to develop irrigation schemes, sanitation systems, and agricultural production (FAO 1997, Mashava and Dzingirai 2010, UNICEF Zimbabwe 2009).

World Vision, the NGO whose projects are examined in this study, has worked in Zimbabwe since 1973 focusing primarily on development work, with additional efforts toward food aid and security. It is present in all districts of Zimbabwe and conducts two types of development programs/projects: long-term, child-sponsorship funded programs called Area Development Programs (ADPs) and shorter-term, individual donor-funded projects, which are the focus of this study. All of its work in Umzingwane district involves the shorter-term, donor-funded projects. Because of its close relationship with the state, its large size, and its global efforts toward achieving organizational learning and accountability, its presence in Zimbabwe provides an excellent opportunity to examine and understand the priorities and accountability measures of NGOs, with particular respect to issues of legitimacy and effectiveness.

The existing academic work on NGOs in Zimbabwe is not extensive. The most comprehensive overview of NGO activity in the country dates back to the year 2000 and focuses on the early 1990s (Moyo 2000 et al.). More recent studies focus primarily on specific advocacy NGOs (Ncube 2010, Magure 2009, Rich-Dorman 2001, McCandless 2011). Bornstein's work (2005) on Christian Care and World Vision is the main exception to this. This thesis therefore seeks to fill a significant empirical gap in the prevailing literature. But it does so by also making a theoretical contribution to our understanding of NGOs (as a particular organizational or social form) with reference to participatory methods, accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness. In this regard, it draws on the works of Mosse (2004, 2005), Lewis and Moss (2006) and Helliker (2006, 2007, 2008), and their examination of processes and structures internal to NGOs which go beyond treating NGOs as 'black boxes'. NGOs exist and work within a tension-riddled and contradictory social field (including global, national and local pressures) and

they maneuver their way through this field regularly by way of ambivalent responses. They often also do so in a manner that compromises participation, downward accountability and effectiveness. Hence, ‘caught in the middle’ of varying and often contradictory interests, development NGOs face serious criticisms about their organizational openness, legitimacy and effectiveness.

1.3 Objectives of the Thesis

The main objective of the thesis is to *understand and explain the participatory methods, accountability and effectiveness of World Vision in Zimbabwe (using Umzingwane District as a case study) and, in doing so, to deepen our theoretical understanding of NGOs as a particular organizational form*. The time period covered is the Fast Track and post-Fast Track periods (from 2000 to current). In order to achieve this main objective, specific secondary objectives are pursued. These include:

- a) To identify the methods, procedures, systems and processes of action practiced by World Vision in Zimbabwe. This entails an in-depth ‘internal’ understanding of World Vision as a global organization, its policies and philosophies, and an examination of World Vision’s projects in Umzingwane District in Zimbabwe.
- b) To locate the work of World Vision in the context of the local political economy in the district and its communal areas and more nation-wide economic, social and political processes in contemporary Zimbabwe.
- c) To examine the work of World Vision in relation to changing donor policies and procedures vis-à-vis the Zimbabwean state, both at the national and project level.

1.4 Research Methods

The research undertaken for this thesis is qualitative, relying on primary sources of data. It involved gathering information from three groups of stakeholders, including World Vision, local government, and project beneficiaries.

Qualitative research, which does not require the informants to leave their daily routines for the purpose of measuring predetermined variables but instead involves entering into the informant’s regular setting in order to attain complicated, multi-faceted and contextual information, is a particularly beneficial approach in pursuing the key research objective of the thesis (Baily 2007). In this regard, the main objective of this

thesis is considered in terms of participatory methodologies, which are themselves rooted in the deeply qualitative and immeasurable concepts of empowerment and self-reliance. As such, qualitative research is a necessary and appropriate approach in attempting to understand the extent and appropriateness of NGOs' (and World Vision's specifically) abilities to carry out their work and achieve their largely un-measurable – as understood in a strict quantitative sense – objectives.

All the research for the thesis was carried out in accordance with general ethical standards concerning informed consent, deception and confidentiality (Baily 2007, Neuman 2000, Burgess 1984). This means that all research informants were made aware of the purpose and goals of the research and there was no aspect of deception involved. All confidentiality preferences of informants also have been honored.

Methods of gathering data are outlined below –

- a) Interviews with World Vision staff at varying levels, including the national Grants and Human Affairs Director, the regional (Matabeleland) Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager, the Umzingwane District Coordinator, the Umzingwane Field Officer, and a former World Vision employee (who is currently employed with a different NGO called TearFund):

These interviews were semi-structured, allowing the researcher to guide the discussion through prepared questions, while leaving space for open discussion in responding to unexpected conversational direction. This method was very helpful in gaining a holistic understanding of the informants' perspectives, including their professional and personal stances and understandings as well as shining some light on their everyday experiences both in the field and in the office. Initial interviews were conducted both in person and over the phone. Follow-up interviews were conducted after project site visits had occurred, which involved a video conversation and a written, email dialogue. In addition to interviews with World Vision staff, I interviewed staff from other NGOs working within the area, such as Operation Trumpet Call and (as indicated above) TearFund.

- b) Interviews with local government officials who have been involved in World Vision projects, including the head of Umzingwane district's Department of Agricultural, Technical, and Extension Services (Agritex), a district-level Agritex

field officer (who also accompanied me throughout project site visits and beneficiary interviews) and three ward-level Agritex field officers:

These interviews were both helpful in gaining an understanding of Agritex's (and therefore the state's) involvement in World Vision projects in Umzingwane, and necessary in gaining access to project sites. These interviews were unstructured, and those occurring with the field officers took place during, in-between and throughout project site visits, allowing me to gain insightful perspectives and understandings of the projects, both professional and personal. These discussion-based interviews also allowed the direction of the discussion to react to new information and follow up on unexpected comments or pieces of information provided by the Agritex officers at any given time.

c) Interviews with World Vision project beneficiaries located in Communal Areas in Umzingwane District:

Interviews with seven beneficiary farmers took place at seven of the eight sites which were visited. No one was interviewed at the eighth site (an irrigation scheme rehabilitation site) because the site visit was late in the day after the farmers had gone home. The sample sites were non-randomly selected by the Agritex district-level field officer who was tasked with accompanying me on the site visits. He suggested that his selections were based on providing me with an opportunity to view each type of project that World Vision was conducting in the district. The limitations and potential biases of this sampling are discussed below.

These interviews were semi-structured, again allowing the discussion to respond according to answers given, while still maintaining direction by returning to my pre-determined guiding questions. They were conducted partly in English and partly in Ndebele, with translation occurring through both Agritex officers and a translator (who is a teacher at a local private secondary school and is a dual first language speaker in Ndebele and English). These interviews allowed me to gain insight into the beneficiaries' personal involvement in the project, their satisfaction with project processes and outcomes, the successes and failures regarding their ability to sustain their project and the impact it has on their livelihoods, and their overall opinion about the effectiveness and usefulness of the project.

d) Site visits of World Vision projects in Umzingwane district's communal areas:

This entailed physically visiting current and previous project sites to observe what is still operational and how people are using project resources, and thereby gathering details and information on those projects. Seven sites located in communal areas were visited, which covered a range of overlapping projects, including conservation agriculture, guinea fowl production, rabbit production, goat production, chicken layers and egg production, and two irrigation scheme rehabilitation sites. Due to World Vision's key organizational value of holistic development (it is the conceptual framework in which they form and understand 'development'), covering a wide variety of project types – with overlap between beneficiaries – was very helpful in placing World Vision projects on the ground in Umzingwane within the overall context of the global World Vision organization and its values and objectives.

e) Collection of primary documentation from World Vision:

In order to understand and contextualize World Vision's work in Umzingwane within the organization's objectives, philosophies, ideologies, values, professed methodologies, and policies, it was necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the organization's primary documentation, both at the global and national levels. This documentation included World Vision's global accountability reports, official policies, a multitude of literature produced as practical guidelines for World Vision (WV) employees, and a national-level report from World Vision Zimbabwe.

f) Dispersal and collection of an information table:

A structured table asking for the following information was dispersed to ward-level Agritex staff to fill in about all World Vision projects being conducted in their ward:

- Project start and end dates
- Number of beneficiaries
- Description of World Vision physical inputs
- Number of beneficiaries currently sustaining their projects
- Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why
- Current monitoring status (was WV or Agritex conducting monitoring and support)
- Future intentions from WV (will they provide further inputs or support)

- g) Additional unexpected site visit located in an ‘old resettled area,’ which was resettled in the 1990s under the willing-buyer, willing-seller agreement:

Although this unexpected site visit was not located in a communal area, the Agritex officer wished to show it to me, as it had been included in the WV conservation agriculture project, which was conducted all throughout the district. It is included in the later research-based discussion, as the project was treated (by WV and Agritex) in the same way as those projects conducted in CAs, and observations from this site provided some interesting insights regarding the local political economy in the district.

Data analysis methods included memoing, descriptive accounts, theme analysis and critical event analysis as described in the qualitative field research guide by Baily (2007). Memoing involved the process of making notes based on my reflections throughout the data collection processes, and then revisiting those notes for further reflection and adaptation. Such memoing aided in theme analysis, allowing me to draw themes from recurring patterns and concepts throughout the qualitative data. Additionally, creating descriptive accounts of experiences during data collection enabled me to identify relevant critical events for further description and analysis. These techniques allowed thoughtful and careful analysis of the qualitative insights gained throughout the research.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

The methods carried out in this study have involved significant limitations, which may involve implications for the research. First, while the semi- to unstructured interviews allowed the collection of vast amounts of personal insights from various stakeholders involved in the projects, it also created a lack of consistency in the information gathered, as particular aspects were prioritized differently by different informants, depending on their role and situation. At the same time, though, this differing prioritization does indicate how the different stakeholders give meaning to the WV projects. But this lack of consistency, coupled with the absence of both quantitative and secondary data, does not allow for a comparison against baseline data, nor does it allow for the verification of reliability that could potentially be provided by juxtaposing primary data with secondary data.

Second was the necessity of being accompanied by Agritex officers during the site visits. This did provide an excellent opportunity to gain insight from them regarding their involvement in the projects and their general perspective (which was especially useful as it was found that they carry out much of WV's work themselves, involving conducting monitoring, evaluation and support both with and in place of WV). It also, though, created great potential for a biased perspective. This bias could occur in three ways. The first is that the Agritex officers were in control of selecting the sites to be observed. While one out of the eight sites visited did involve an unsuccessful project, the majority were sustained very successfully, implying that Agritex wished to evidence their good work. The second potential bias could arise from their very presence influencing the discussion and answers to questions given by the beneficiaries. The third potential bias that became evident throughout the research involved my very presence in visiting the project sites. It became clear that any presence of an outsider accompanied by an Agritex officer was automatically assumed to be either a donor or an NGO staff member. While the Agritex officers continually explained to the beneficiaries that the reasons for our presence was for information gathering and research purposes, that explanation does not guarantee that answers and discussion were not influenced by such an assumption.

1.6 Thesis Outline

This thesis has six ensuing chapters, which I now outline.

Chapter two includes a literature review which discusses the general role of NGOs in development and their ideologies and methodologies with regard to current development discourse, particularly the emphasis on the concept of participation. It then discusses the key issue of accountability to the three major stakeholders affecting NGO work: donors, states, and beneficiaries. Finally, the chapter culminates in a discussion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs and their role in development by conceptualizing them in the ambiguous state between the conflicting values and pressures of the three stakeholder groups and considering the compromises they make in order to navigate and maneuver through the inconsistencies of that relational context.

Chapter three provides an understanding of the social, political, and economic context of Zimbabwe as a whole and its communal areas, and the current and historical

roles that NGOs play in the country's development. It particularly considers the controversial and at times volatile political climate and its impact on NGO work in relation to the developmental needs of the rural poor, particularly those living in communal areas, and the impact on donor funding streams and trends. The chapter ends by providing a perspective on the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe within the broader context of their legitimacy and effectiveness, relating back to accountability to donors, states, beneficiaries, and ultimately, themselves.

Chapter four provides an in-depth study of World Vision, both at the global level and at the national level. There is significant emphasis in this chapter placed on World Vision global partnership's official policies and values, their internal contradictions, and the implications these have on the organization's approach to development, accountability and organizational learning. This chapter includes information collected through World Vision's primary documentation and through interviews with high-ranking World Vision staff, as well as with a former staff member.

Chapter five provides a discussion of the research findings from examining World Vision's projects in Umzingwane district. I compare the approach and methods of its work at project level against its global policies, values and general organizational context. This chapter carefully considers World Vision's practice on-the-ground. Emphasis is placed on WV's close relationship with local government and the ways in which that relationship enables WV to adhere to its own organizational values, stretch donor funding and build local government capacity in working toward organizational stability and sustainability.

Chapter six provides a synthetic overview of the thesis. It summarizes the research findings from Umzingwane district, and discusses what can be drawn from these findings in a theoretical way about the accountability, legitimacy, and overall effectiveness of the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe and globally.

Chapter 2: Participation and Accountability – The Role of NGOs in Development

2.1 Introduction

Non-governmental Organizations, or NGOs, function as deliverers of development throughout the developing world. Their purpose is to promote sustainable livelihoods for poor, oppressed or vulnerable people by means of catalyzing empowerment and self-reliance through carrying out participatory development projects. In attempts to achieve these objectives, NGOs fund and implement development projects while responding to the needs and requirements from their donors, the states in which they work, and their beneficiaries. This chapter considers the legitimacy and effectiveness of their role in development in the context of their accountability to the stakeholders to which they respond and the decisions they make to ensure their own organizational sustainability.

2.2 Development and NGOs

In the field of development, NGOs possess a leading role in both delivering and facilitating development initiatives, particularly in the developing world. NGOs emerged as the leading development aid channel in the 1980s, what is known by some as the “NGO decade” (Bratton 1987, Mitlin et al. 2007). They are separate from state systems and market systems and have grown in prominence as the supposed answer to (or substitute for) incompetent states and weak markets that have failed to deliver basic social services and infrastructure including access to health care, sanitation, education, and basic security and safety (Makoba 2002). The continual rising of their importance and prevalence in the development sector has subsequently led to much debate about the effectiveness and appropriateness of their role.

In order to understand this role, it is necessary to first understand the term ‘development’ and the ways in which NGOs are engaged in it. Development can be understood in two ways: as an immanent and unintentional process of structural, political and economic change, or as intentional intervention with the goal of creating change

(Bebbington 2004). Mitlin et al. (2007:1701) discuss this distinction in terms of ‘little d’ development and ‘big D’ Development, wherein ‘little d’ development refers to the immanent, unintentional and uneven processes of capitalist development on a global scale, and ‘big D’ development refers to targeted intervention projects in the developing world (sometimes referred to the development industry or the international development system). They go on to explain that NGOs are directly involved in ‘big D’ development but, in doing so, their activities form part of the broader processes of capitalist development (or ‘little d’ development). This means that NGO interventions (big D development) are a component of – or are integrated into – wider capitalist development processes. This thesis considers the ‘big D’ development interventions of NGOs and the legitimacy of NGOs in terms of both the effectiveness of their interventions, and their prominence in the ‘big D’ development sector. For the remainder of this chapter, the term ‘development’ will refer to ‘big D’ development, unless otherwise specified.

The legitimacy and appropriateness of the prominence of NGOs in development and social services delivery is a complex question. On the one hand, they are seen as alternatives to corrupt or incompetent governments (or even failed or fragile states) in delivering development, relief assistance and alleviating poverty. This is because of their supposed flexibility and freedom with regards to political pressure and influence, their open-mindedness, their efficiency with mobilizing resources, and their reputation for facilitating participatory, bottom-up approaches that reach the most vulnerable and the poorest people. They are idealized as analysts

See NGOs as everything that governments are not: unburdened with large bureaucracies, relatively flexible and open to innovation, more effective and faster at implementing development efforts, and able to identify and respond to grassroots needs (Fisher 1997: 444).

They are therefore seen as able to reach poor people and to bring to the fore (or innovate) new methods for helping people in ways that governments have difficulty (Clark 1997). They are as well generally considered as ‘doing good,’ as they are non-profit organizations whose work is charitable in nature. They have been embraced by donor agencies as the preferred method for delivering aid assistance and NGO involvement is often a requirement for international funding for development initiatives.

On the other hand, their effectiveness in facilitating long-term sustainable development programs, as well as the legitimacy of their role in development, has been called into question. NGOs have been criticized for furthering globalization (or ‘little d’ development) by using targeted development aid to transfer external, Western, donor-driven values of democracy (Brett 2003) and providing effective instruments for advancing external agendas that manipulate beneficiaries (Mosse 2004). The validity of their existence has been subjected to scrutiny with questions about what right they have as external agents to implement development initiatives and with criticisms about the assumption that communities are not already engaged in their own self-development (in other words, the assumption that local methods and values toward development require modification from external sources). That being said, the most common criticisms of NGOs question their legitimacy as development aid implementers, the effectiveness of their methods, and their accountability.

NGOs vary in size and function. They can be broadly broken up into three overlapping categories: community-based NGOs, national NGOs, and large, international NGOs (Bratton 1987). Community-based NGOs are small, local, and generally have limited resources and professional staff. They are often supported by larger national and international NGOs for funding and professional support. National NGOs operate within a specific country and include both intermediary NGOs (who direct funding and provide support services to community-based NGOs) and implementing NGOs (or a combination of both). They may also include umbrella organizations representing multiple community-based NGOs. International NGOs have large staffs of professionals, large budgets, and a presence in multiple countries. They are also involved in both implementing their own projects on the ground and acting as intermediary NGOs which support smaller, more local NGOs.

In addition to size, NGOs vary in function and usually fall within two broad types: development NGOs and advocacy NGOs. Development NGOs, the focus of this study, are involved in social services delivery, including infrastructural development, poverty reduction and alleviation, income-generation, access to health care services, education and other forms of social services. They are often based in rural areas and in large part steer away from political or policy-related projects. Advocacy NGOs are

primarily concerned with advocating for policy changes, particularly issues of human rights, and are often based in urban areas. There is a third type which is often connected with development NGOs, and that is direct aid and relief NGOs who provide emergency food relief and disaster response; at times, development NGOs enter into a relief mode of operation. All types vary in their focus and location; however, they do share the common feature of being voluntary. They are not entirely voluntary, in that they are comprised of paid employees (and not unpaid volunteers), but their existence and their functions are voluntary. This is contextually relevant to a discussion of their legitimacy, as it sheds some light on their very purpose.

NGOs are self-selected and self-appointed, and their staff members are not usually representatives from the poor and vulnerable groups that they aim and claim to help (Kaldor 2002). They have not been impelled into existence because founders of NGOs (and ensuing staff members) are subjected to oppression or marginalization in society, or as a result of obeying orders from governments or other forms of authority to operate. Rather, they have formed themselves for various reasons, such as charitable public service, as is reflected by Bratton's statement (1987:12): "NGO leaders tend to set basic organizational objectives and recruit and motivate staff on the basis of a shared core belief in the value of unrewarded public service." At the same time, there are more self-interested reasons for starting up NGOs, notably as a source of employment. Furthermore, this voluntary existence does not imply that NGOs are autonomous, as they must answer to multiple stakeholders within the development field. In working toward understanding the role of NGOs and their legitimacy and effectiveness as social organizations within the development field, the next section examines the discourse, frameworks and methodologies on which NGO operations are based.

2.3 Participatory Development Ideology and Methodology

The use of participatory methods is widely regarded as fundamental and vitally important to implementing development initiatives and schemes that are initiated by donor-funded outside agents for the purpose of improving the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable people. The goal of such initiatives and the reason for using participatory methods is to promote and develop sustainable livelihoods through aiding in the physical improvement of living

conditions and fostering a sense of empowerment that leads to further livelihood improvement and self-sustainability. The participation of the intended beneficiaries (or the people whose lives will be affected by the development initiatives) in the planning, implementing and evaluation of these schemes is considered to be both ethically and practically necessary. The ethical necessity comes from the need to legitimate the actions of these donor-funded development agencies (Brett 2003). This concept of legitimization through the use of participatory methods is attributed to the ideological belief that without local participation and input, an outside agency imposes its own values (namely Western values) and does not understand, or acknowledge, the values and needs of the particular group or community whom they aim to help. Such impositions undermine local knowledge, abilities, and confidence, and contribute to a sense of vulnerability rather than empowerment.

Participation is also considered practically necessary for various reasons, namely the following beliefs: it helps to build interest and mobilize people to cooperate with the development field workers; it helps the development agency to improve the management and efficiency of its projects by revealing local resources that may prove beneficial to the development project or scheme (including local skills and man-power); and beneficiaries are more likely to continue to use what was produced by the development scheme, after the outside agency has left, if they feel a sense of ownership, a sense that is developed through personal involvement in the project's planning and implementation and a full understanding of its purpose and functions.

NGOs and their funders recognize these ethical and practical reasons for conducting their work in a participatory way, and proclaim the importance of participatory methods in their mission and value statements, and in their publications (see for example WVI 2012a and – an Oxfam publication – Eade 1997). Due to these ethically legitimating and practical aspects associated with participation, it has become not only customary but a requirement to adhere to participatory policy and practice in the development sector.

Despite the general acceptance of this necessity and the broad adherence to its importance, the concept of 'participation' in development methodology is subject to conceptual slippage and is therefore understood and defined differently in different

contexts. This discrepancy between understandings has serious implications on development theory, organizational policy and, most importantly, on the beneficiaries who are ‘participating.’ Within these varying interpretations of what ‘participation’ truly means in development, a distinction can be made between top-down participation, or involvement, and bottom-up participation, or popular participation (de Beer and Swanepoel 1998).

Top-down participation is involvement-based and is at best consultative. This type of participation occurs where a development NGO, already having determined a project plan, informs and consults the local group or community about its plan and mobilizes them to take part in carrying out the intended projects. In this understanding, participatory planning and implementation meetings are more of an educational (or even propaganda) pitch to get people informed and excited than they are an effort to plan the project around local values. They also provide an opportunity for the NGO to learn about any local resources (for example ‘free’ local unskilled labor resources) and to gain somewhat of an understanding of local cultural values and power structures, for the purpose of success in executing the planned development project.

The overarching, long-term goal of this scenario remains to improve livelihoods and promote sustainable development; however, the fundamental focus is on the project itself – its success and its sustainability. This focus on project success in an involvement-participation scenario is considered top-down and ineffective, if not ethically illegitimate. It undercuts the deeper conceptual goals of participation and sustainability that are centered on complex processes of empowerment and its effects and implications. The shorter-term, project-focused goals therefore may promote project sustainability, but do not contribute to lasting, long-term livelihood sustainability. Through this involvement-based participation, the main effect may be the sustainability of the NGO, as short-term successes may facilitate further funding for the NGO.

These criticisms lead to the alternative understanding of participation as more bottom-up and empowering. Empowerment is considered to be inherently linked to livelihood sustainability and therefore is the truly meaningful objective of deep participation. This inherent linkage between empowerment and sustainability comes from the concept of self-reliance, or a person or group’s willingness and capacity to rely on

their own abilities and resources (Nikkhah and Redzuan 2012). This self-reliance is the platform for achieving livelihood sustainability and it is achieved when people are empowered to control and manage their own lives. This is opposed to a never-ending reliance on external sources for livelihood stability, which creates a dependent condition that is not sustainable and is often (although in large part unintentionally) perpetuated by external aid agencies. Rather than perpetuating this sense of dependency, an approach to development involving a deeper understanding of the term ‘participation’ must be considered. Popular participation derives its foundation from the goal of achieving empowerment and views individual development projects as a means for promoting this broader and longer-term goal.

This form of participatory methodology seeks to activate and nurture empowerment, particularly among the most vulnerable groups of people, and it contends that empowerment has the potential to grow out from mundane and ordinary development activities (Ndegwa 1996) by transforming the existing sense of poverty into self-confidence and self-reliance. It is therefore about mobilizing people to “play roles which development agencies and governments cannot play” (Shepard 1998: 182). In other words, issues involving livelihood sustainability cannot be solved merely by an outside agency or government implementing a development project; rather, they are solved by fostering empowerment and self-reliance through the transformative powers of participatory development projects. The most important aspect of this understanding of participation is the importance of people making their own decisions and controlling the factors that affect their own lives. This entails much more than mere involvement or consultation.

A popular framework for approaching empowerment-based participatory development is capacity-building. Capacity-building is a conceptual approach to development based on the belief that the capacities for development already exist among people and within communities, and that the role of an external development agent should be supportive in helping people initiate their own development by fostering their existing capacities. The goal of this approach is to discover what is preventing people from attaining their basic rights and to help people strengthen their own abilities to overcome those obstacles (Eade 1997). It emphasizes long-term change and sees

participation as a method of investing in people and helping them to identify, build-up, and use their own abilities, social relations and knowledge; in other words, their capacities. This framework for approaching 'participation' stresses that truly participatory development projects are at first catalytic and then supportive in nature; first involving helping people to identify and affirm their own capacities and then guiding, or facilitating, those people in developing their own plans and means for improving their livelihoods. In this sense, external development agents should be seen as community resources and not researchers, planners, or implementers (Wetmore and Theron 1998).

The question of how best to approach capacity-building generates a considerable amount of development discourse, which suggests ways in which to carry out such an objective. One such approach to achieving the goals of capacity-building is 'filling the gap,' which is where the role of the outside aid agent (such as an NGO) is to initiate and guide a project and then 'fill the gap' by providing only the most necessary materials, knowledge or funding that the local people are incapable of providing themselves. This requires the local people to carry out the project with limited resource input from the outside agent. Here, the role of the development agency is to facilitate local leadership and action, with the potential for providing additional resources where necessary. Its goals are to use local resources (for example, labor and land) to the greatest extent possible before inputting any new materials, in order to foster resourcefulness and self-reliance from the start. In this way, local people are acknowledging their own resource capacities to work towards development aims.

This approach hopes to achieve sustainability by instilling in local people a sense of ownership of a project, which in turn should promote empowerment and therefore sustainability. It is, however, highly idealistic. In his discussion of development images and perceptions, Tembo (2003:101) notes that "the major assumption for this framework, where assistance is perceived as filling the gap, is that there is [a] shared understanding of the existing assets and capacities." Such an assumption is very dangerous, as it leaves people vulnerable to misunderstandings. If an NGO field worker expects that the local people will produce bricks and labor for building a structure, and the members of the local community assume that the NGO has been given money to input into that structure, this discrepancy between expectations and assumptions may easily lead to hostility

between the NGO workers and the beneficiary community. The field worker may see the local people as lazy and unwilling to help themselves while the local people may see the field worker (and the NGO) as a crook in refusing to pass on the money and service that was to be allocated to the community. In such a case, both sides form negative perceptions that ultimately lead to unsustainable (if not unfinished and abandoned) projects, as well as to the undermining of the original goals of self-reliance and empowerment. Further, this sets up an environment where future development initiatives are likely to fail. Still, the ‘filling the gap’ approach can be effective when great care is taken to avoid assumptions that lead to misunderstandings.

Participatory Rural Appraisal, or PRA, is another approach to capacity-building that is a popular means of facilitating deep levels of participation. In addition to its ideological grounding in the same values as capacity-building, PRA presents a set of tangible methods intended to help facilitators guide local people in analyzing their own livelihoods and planning and implementing their own means of improvement. It draws its base from the belief that people are knowledgeable (and not ignorant) and are therefore capable of analyzing their own lives and needs (Kumar 2002). It therefore has a strong focus on the facilitation of locally-directed needs assessment and situational analyses. PRA methods particularly involve modes of communication, including visual aids and diagrams, transect walks, mapping, and story-telling, as mediums for local people to describe their community, culture and needs to the outside agent (Mukherjee 1993). Korf (2010) describes PRA workshops, or localized sessions, where external facilitators meet with the local community and together (using the communication methods listed above) they discuss needs and issues facing the community and jointly plan developmental solutions accordingly. These workshops are meant to create isolated, participatory windows that reveal needs and developmental solutions that are free from the pressures of development aid paradigms and are representative of the entire local community.

Overall, the goal of PRA is to introduce communication methods that provide a truer understanding of local perspectives and local knowledge and empower local people to plan improvements based on their own perspectives. Like other approaches to empowerment-based participation, however, PRA also lends itself to dangerous

assumptions and potential problems. First, there is the assumption that the facilitators (in particular the NGO field workers who facilitate the participatory workshops) are capable of creating environments where local people will speak freely and on an equal level without restraint from local political dynamics and power structures. Such a feat is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Even if external facilitators try to avoid the influence of local power dynamics by separating participants into groups (for instance, by gender, age, or local leadership level), they should not assume that people will in fact speak openly about their needs. Second, the external facilitator has a very influential level of power over the analysis and decision-making processes involved in PRA. In order to avoid this potential drawback, PRA facilitators must be carefully conscious of their own biases and make efforts to prevent influencing or controlling the voice of the community members; they must be able to ‘hand over the stick’ and not to lecture, and they must be particularly good listeners.

A third issue is the dangerous assumption that a consensus can even be reached that is in the interests of the community. The assumption that any rural community constitutes a cohesive group of people who are willing to work together is problematic (de Beer and Swanepoel 1998). That assumption can mask deeper issues of power dynamics among communities, an oversight that may cause vulnerable people to feel even more vulnerable while enforcing local elites and the possibility of elite capture of NGO projects. Finally, additional issues may arise when putting PRA methods into practice, as participatory sessions can easily turn to a more seminar-structured educational experience of formal learning (Green 2010) rather than a space for local people to teach external facilitators about their needs, desires and perspectives, and share their concerns and values. The problems and dangerous assumptions noted here are not specific only to PRA, but are potential issues of any capacity-building-based, catalytic, facilitative approach to participatory development.

A common thread among approaches to and methods of empowerment-based popular participation is that empowerment must be a necessary ingredient in each stage of a development project; from needs assessment, to planning, to implementation, to monitoring and evaluation. It is necessary in needs assessment, as developmental needs are multidimensional and community-specific. Traditional “blue-print” methods to

developmental needs assessment (such as pre-written surveys) are not culturally or environmentally adaptable (Mukherjee 1993) and thus they do not reflect local power dynamics, values or beliefs. In general, qualitative methods – which intrinsically require participation (they require thoughtful interaction from local people) – are more informative and enlightening. The emphasis that participatory methodologies place on project planning is also significant, as it is an important step to developing the sense of ownership and self-reliance through decision-making. Finally, each one of the approaches to deep bottom-up participation (as described above) places great importance on participatory implementation, monitoring and evaluation. If the true aim of the project is to empower people and help them develop sustainable livelihood practices, it is impossible to conduct any meaningful evaluation without gaining a true understanding of how those people actually evaluate and feel about the project, both during implementation and after.

In this regard, efforts toward achieving bottom-up participatory forms have increasingly led development theory to focus on organizational learning (for NGOs themselves) in order to practice more effective and legitimate development assistance. Meaningful learning, however, is difficult to achieve, mainly because the primary goals of development NGOs are not tangible or measureable in any strict quantitative manner. It is not possible to measure exactly the form or level of empowerment that may or may not have been instigated by an NGO project. Additionally, organizational learning cannot be one-dimensional. It involves multiple levels or ‘loops’ that are each essential to any meaningful learning.

The first level, or single-loop learning, is concerned with improving individual project effectiveness by looking at what was done and how the implementation of projects could be more effective in the future and better achieve participatory aims. The motivation for single-loop learning centers on projects and their impact. This type of learning is particularly important for developing more effective ways to achieve meaningful participation in the project implementation process and for building exposure, experience and preparedness among field workers. It is difficult, however, to apply this type of learning to project-specific improvements, as development projects are necessarily specific to the communities and environments in which they are carried out.

Double-loop learning is concerned with the legitimacy of the NGO within the context of achieving its stated goals of poverty reduction and fostering empowerment. Rather than being based on measureable results, this type of learning involves comparing the NGO's stated values to its actual practice. It can be undertaken therefore through examining the incongruence that is found between the two (Bloch and Borges 2002). This type of learning involves constant reflection on NGO motivations and the methods they carry out, and it requires long-term commitment to self-evaluation of all functions and aspects of the NGO. Such learning is necessary if NGOs are to seriously address issues of competence and legitimacy in delivering development assistance. Triple-loop learning also exists, and this is concerned with the role and legitimacy of NGOs as prominent organizations within the development sector, tasked with the overall goal of 'delivering development'. This type of learning questions the overall appropriateness and necessity of NGO interventions in development (or the role of 'big D' development within 'little d' development).

Also pertinent to organizational learning is the application of these learning loops to development discourse, which determines development methodologies and ultimately development practices. The discourse of participation, for example, provides the framework for much of development methodology. The belief that participation is the key to promoting empowerment and sustainable development is generally accepted among development NGOs and its necessity is embraced as the theoretical solution to top-down, intrusive and unsustainable development aid projects. It is important, however, to acknowledge that while participation serves to legitimize development projects, it is not necessarily an absolute course to empowerment. It could be argued that the concept of 'participation' has become so engrained and assumed as a necessary requirement (for authentic development in practice) in development discourse that its actual benefits, meaning, and authenticity have lessened as agencies have increasingly and uncritically adopted it. Hence, the rhetoric of participation is now in danger of becoming another externally-driven controlling force over local people, instead of being an exception to oppressive, unsustainable programs that involve the failure to acknowledge local values and needs.

It has been proposed that the belief that participation necessarily leads to livelihood improvement is “an article of faith,” rather than a questioned hypothesis (Tendler 1982:129). Nevertheless, participatory development methods still claim greater legitimacy than non-participatory methods, as they allow people to make their own decisions (or at least contribute some input) about their own developmental directions. What is necessary to draw from this is not to say that the value in participation is misplaced, but that elements of development discourse (such as participation), while so deeply embedded in development policy, should not be blindly accepted as an absolute truth, but should be continuously challenged and re-evaluated in order to work towards genuine development. Mosse (2004), in this respect, suggests that discourse in development policy functions as a product of development practice in order to legitimate it. If discourse is what legitimates practice, then goals of organizational learning must also question the discourse itself, in addition to discrepancies between that discourse and actual practice. This is particularly important to triple-loop learning (in considering the appropriateness of NGOs as deliverers of development).

This section has discussed the conceptual frameworks within which NGOs operate and has argued for the necessity of organizational learning. These frameworks have come about as a response to a call for legitimizing the actions of external development agencies through participatory forms. Through explaining how empowerment-building participation is considered both ethically and practically necessary to the aims of enabling livelihood sustainability and long-term development, this section has emphasized that participatory methodologies, while fundamental to development NGO policy and practice, are difficult to achieve in actual development situations. They must therefore be the subject of constant reflection in organizational learning and when developing methods and procedures for development initiatives.

2.4 NGO Accountability

The work of NGOs, particularly their use of participatory methods, should be considered both in terms of the efficiency and appropriateness of the methods they use to implement and facilitate individual development projects (for example, how a particular project could be more effective) and their overall legitimacy and justification for their existence

and their position in the development sector or industry. Ultimately, these considerations come down to the question of accountability. Accountability defines the relationships between the various stakeholders involved in the NGO development sector, and the extent and authenticity of an NGO's use of participatory methods in a development project is an indication of to whom the NGO is most accountable. The three primary stakeholder groups considered here are: the local people (or beneficiaries), who the development assistance is intended to benefit; the donor agencies who provide the funding for NGOs; and the governing powers (both national and local) for the area where the project is located. Ideally, an NGO's actions and its development goals would reflect a high level of accountability to the intended beneficiaries of their development projects (downward accountability), a situation where NGOs answer to the needs, values and desires of those whom they aim to help.

This downward accountability is the ideal because it is what legitimates the presence of NGOs in development; it is the notion that they exist for the purpose of meeting the livelihood needs of their beneficiaries. The necessity to adhere to the requirements of the other key stakeholders (donors and governing bodies), however, challenges the realization of this downward accountability. In this way, the notion that legitimizes NGOs (that is, downward accountability to beneficiaries) is not necessarily what ensures or defines their existence in practice. Carefully considering the relationships between NGOs and the stakeholders involved in their operations is necessary in order to scrutinize their role in society as a viable alternative to notably state-led development. I first discuss accountability to donors.

2.4.1 Accountability to Donors

The claim can be made that donors set the tone for NGO development work. After all, "he who pays the piper calls the tune" (Edwards and Hulme 1997:8). In order to function, NGOs are reliant upon donor funds. While it is too simplistic to claim that NGO practices and accountability are completely driven by the desire to secure ongoing funding, their reliance on donors has significant influence. Both the causes and implications of NGO-donor relationships are complex in character. The central aspect of the relationships between NGOs and their donors is the transfer of funds. Development projects conducted

by NGOs (their quality, sustainability, and effectiveness) are not the only entities whose success relies upon the stability and continual flow of these funds. NGO employees also depend on the influx of donor funding for their salaries and job security. In other words, donated funds are the sustenance and life-line of development NGOs in a variety of ways. This condition of dependency ensures that the stability of every aspect of an NGO's purpose and existence, from their infrastructure to their products (development projects), remains in a constant state of precarious uncertainty. Many NGOs, to some degree of success, try to address this fragile, dependent position by spreading their risk out among multiple donors (Borren 2001); however, this strategy inherently generates additional administrative costs and accountability issues, as different donors have different reporting expectations and requirements.

The process by which NGOs procure funding significantly limits (and sometimes eliminates) the use of participatory methods, therefore undermining the goals of empowerment and sustainability. The process of fundraising is competitive and normally takes place on a project-by-project basis. NGOs formulate and submit project proposals to potential donors, including a line-item budget for a project. The proposals are then considered against other project proposals from other NGOs. These proposals are submitted in response to calls put out by donors that often define specific elements that the donor will look for in the proposal. These elements may specify the type of development that they intend to fund (for instance, water and sanitation, education, nutrition and healthcare) as well as listing other requirements and values that must be present in the proposal (for example, the call may require that the project must reach a specified amount of beneficiaries, must include participation of intended beneficiaries, and must have direct benefits for women, elderly and other vulnerable groups). After, and if, funds are received, the NGO must continue to report monitoring and evaluation results to the donor, the criteria for which are also often very specific. This very process contradicts goals of participation. In breaking this down, this point becomes quite evident.

2.4.1.1 The Call for Proposals

The fact that the first step to implementing a development project begins in the domain of the donor is problematic for achieving participation. When the donor sends out the call

for proposals, they have often already determined the values of the project and the type of development that is to be implemented. This prevents NGOs from facilitating needs-assessments based on popular participation (where project beneficiaries actually determine what their own development needs are and how to go about meeting those needs). This is because the determinant for whether a project can be and is to be implemented or not (the funding proposal evaluation) takes place before much, if any, participation has occurred. Instead, the NGO makes those decisions based on limited assessments.

Therefore, from the beginning of a project, the extent and quality of beneficiary participation is already pre-determined and top-down driven, if not obsolete. It is difficult, if not impossible, for NGOs to conduct participatory needs-assessments prior to developing and submitting a funding proposal for the intended project. This is due to two important facts: the first is that the NGO may not have sufficient funding to facilitate participatory needs-assessment before it has been granted funding for future potential projects; and second, there is a risk involved in participatory needs-assessment before funding has been granted. The risk is that if the NGO was able to conduct participatory needs-assessment and then did not ultimately receive the funding, it would not be able to implement the project that it had assessed. At that point, it would be too late to take back any false hope that it may have created in the community. This would foster distrust and negativity.

2.4.1.2 The Development of the Proposal

After the call for proposals has been issued, there is small window of time in which the NGO can develop its project funding proposal for submission. This small amount of time is insufficient to conduct community needs, values and resource assessments, even if the NGO ignored the goals of authentic (empowerment-based) participation and conducted such assessments via top-down oriented methods. Thus, not only is an empowering, participatory process of designing the project – where local people are making the decisions – difficult, but it is also extremely difficult to even cater the project to a specific community. NGOs end up preparing generic proposals that they can have ready when the

call comes out, and then attempt to fill in the community-specific gaps in their proposal before submission.

Donors also significantly, though inadvertently, influence NGO methods and values even before the funding process begins. The NGO funding environment is extremely competitive. That competitive atmosphere necessitates that NGOs build their reputations by pursuing the values and performance standards that attract positive donor attention, such that when their funding proposal is received, they may stand out against other funding applicants. Because of this, the values of an NGO, which ought to be formed around participation, self-reliance, sustainability and respect for their beneficiaries, can be called into question. There is no doubt that donors claim to acknowledge these necessary priorities in a formal sense; however, by their setting standards for these values from the top, they actually undermine the values themselves.

This situation implies that the values of NGOs are regularly compromised in order to receive funding from donors and this therefore presents the question of whether or not it is appropriate for NGOs to develop official views and values as a tactic to attract funding. If NGOs do embrace official views, they may attract funding from particular donors with corresponding values; however, it may come at the cost of compromising goals of empowerment. Once an NGO has developed official views, local and community participation is then only encouraged so long as it aligns with the official values of the organization (Ellerman 2003). Additionally, while adopting official views may attract funding from values-based donors, it could also have the opposite effect, as espousing strong views does not allow the flexibility that may be necessary to adapt in order to appeal to a variety of donors.

2.4.1.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

Donors require monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports as evidence that the donated funds have been used for their intended purposes. They do this in order to ensure that the funds are reaching the intended people and impacting upon their lives in a positive way. The rationale for this requirement in itself is reasonable, as monitoring and evaluation are essential elements of implementing effective development projects, and a donor's desire to know how its money is being spent is not only justified but also necessary and

responsible. The problem, therefore, is not that donors require NGOs to report M&E results, but that they (the donors) specify the methods that they want used for carrying out M&E as well as the type of data that must be reported on and in what form it must be reported.

This is because, at the donor level, the need for control carries more weight than the push for participation (Wallace et al. 2006). In this way, the donors are determining what project elements are important enough to be monitored and evaluated and to what extent. In the case of bottom-up participation, these decisions (that say what should be evaluated and how to go about that evaluation) should in fact be made by local people participating with project facilitators; instead, they are made by donors. In addition, the continual receipt by NGOs of promised funds is often contingent upon these reports. As meeting these requirements, and adhering to their provisions, is heavily resource consumptive, both in time and money (Harsh et al. 2010, Tembo 2003), NGOs often cannot afford to conduct the donor-required M&E alongside of more participatory, bottom-up approaches.

This system, which entails the reporting of pre-determined evaluation project elements, impedes participatory aims, as well as creating additional pressures that affect the efficiency and impact of the development project. One such pressure comes from the rigidity of the required line-item budgets. For example, donors expect NGOs to spend money within the time and financial parameters set out in the project budgets and restrict the flexibility of moving funds between line-items. This constraint does not allow NGOs to be flexible in their project implementation and facilitation, as they cannot react to unexpected budgetary needs which inevitably will occur (for instance, the price of piping increases in the middle of implementing an irrigation project). This contradicts one of the most important elements of M&E, which involves the ability to directionally re-focus a project in areas where it is not working.

If an NGO project facilitator determines through M&E that its project is not meeting the needs of the beneficiaries, but the NGO does not have the flexibility to rearrange and reprioritize its funds, it will be unable to change project elements in order to adapt to those needs. Therefore the project will be ineffective in promoting empowerment and will be unsustainable. Nevertheless, donors maintain the expectation

that money will be spent for its intended purposes, and therefore inadvertently encourage (albeit through good intentions of requiring transparency and financial accountability) inefficient and even frivolous spending on the wrong (or unneeded) things, while posing the potential threat of project abandonment due to lack of future funding. The result is the pressure on NGOs to spend donor money quickly and within a specified amount of time, arising from the fear that sending money back would be more detrimental to future funding than spending the money on the wrong things (Harsh et al. 2010).

In addition to threatening project effectiveness by inadvertently discouraging participatory methods through accountability requirements, these donor-determined conditions also may lead to questionable and unreliable reporting (thereby threatening the integrity of M&E feedback) as NGOs may be reluctant to report any negative information about projects unless they feel certain that such reports will not jeopardize future funding (Mebratu 2003). This is particularly true if the overhead costs of the project were higher than anticipated. NGOs are expected to have low overhead expenses (this includes administrative costs and employee salaries) and these expectations are often very unrealistic. Smillie (1997: 570) argues in this regard that “the myth of the tiny overhead is a dangerous time-bomb waiting to explode in the face of NGOs” and that such unrealistic expectations encourage lack of transparency and deny the need for necessary and legitimate administrative costs that allow effective and professional development work. While some NGOs are able to gain donor funding for the purpose of covering core costs (or have other inner-organizational support systems as will be explained about WV later), this is often not the case.

The issue of rigid M&E requirements goes even deeper because these donor-oriented methods are often only carried out by the NGO for the sake of the donor and are never fed back down to the NGO field staff (Mebratu 2003). Particularly the more complicated, quantitative data that NGO fieldworkers regularly collect for reporting purposes is never shared with them after it has been analyzed, therefore presenting two major problems: the first is that it creates a disjuncture between field staff and M&E, where M&E data collection is a mundane task and has no practical application to their work in the field; and the second is that the opportunity and potential for improving projects that could come from insight discovered through M&E (which should be the sole

reason for carrying out M&E exercises in the first place) is denied. Instead of focusing entirely on control and verification, as they tend to do, donors need to “put learning back on the agenda” (Smillie 1997:573). Additionally, the quantitative data required by donors is not as beneficial to future NGO learning as qualitative data; however, donors are more concerned with tangible, measureable results, such as captured for instance in logical framework analysis. This oversight of the potential learning and implementation-improvement benefits that could be gained from qualitative M&E exercises excludes a significant opportunity to work towards achieving truly empowering, participatory development initiatives.

In summary, the greatest implication of all these factors discussed under donor accountability is the extent to which NGOs are able to realize genuine participatory aims that respond to local needs and therefore actually promote sustainable livelihoods. Donor expectations reflect incongruence between the reputations and the actual capacities of NGOs. Donors perceive NGOs as inherently able to achieve participation rather than recognizing the costs that are necessary for achieving participation. This discrepancy is fueled by competition for resources, as NGOs attempt to portray themselves as super-efficient with low overhead costs and high performance standards. Such supposed high standards lose their meaning through attempts at compartmentalizing projects (as complex processes) into measureable, tangible results that can be reported in numerical forms; however, donors continue to require measureable results rather than investing resources in analyzing qualitative, meaningful considerations of project effectiveness.

This is problematic because the goal of empowerment is not tangible and cannot be recorded or analyzed with numerical reports. Consequently, NGO responses to donor-driven accountability measures are sometimes a disturbing sense of resigned compliance and a tendency to fall in line with donor expectations, therefore perpetuating a level of accountability that makes the realization of participatory forms unrealistic. This fate is not necessarily inherent to NGO-donor relations, as NGOs also have the potential to place accountability demands on their donors; however, it would require a break away from the current competitive mentality and greater inter-collaboration of NGOs.

2.4.2 Accountability and the State

Relationships between development NGOs and states are inconsistent and contingent upon historical and contemporary national conditions. They are often fragile and can become politically charged at times when NGOs' presumed 'apolitical' role is questioned by the state. While there are many activist NGOs which are particularly political in character, development NGOs tend to stay away from politically-charged situations, even isolating themselves, in order to continue on in their work without attracting negative attention from governments. Additionally, the goals of development work are generally not very controversial, in comparison to the goals of advocacy NGOs, as issues such as access to clean water, health services and subsistence agriculture are easily agreed upon. The ways in which these goals are addressed, however, can become controversial, particularly if they involve questions of land use and land allocation.

Even if the content of their work is not particularly controversial from the perspective of political regimes, governments (especially authoritarian or repressive governments) may feel threatened or challenged by development NGOs for a number of reasons. One is the possibility that, through the use of participatory approaches, NGOs may empower groups which are traditionally oppressed by their government (Clark 1997). This is threatening to authoritarian regimes, because empowered people are more likely to challenge the *status quo*. But even if conducted with a mind to evade political implications, and with no apparent attitude or stance that is critical of the state, empowering development initiatives intrinsically question the competency of the state at delivering social and developmental assistance and infrastructure (Farrington et al. 1993). To states that have based the legitimacy of their authority on their ability to 'deliver development,' NGOs are particularly threatening (Ndegwa 1996).

Another aspect of NGOs that threatens governments is their international funding, which has the potential to disturb governments in two ways: the first is that they may perceive international donors as a foreign hand promoting a foreign agenda that threatens their hegemony; and the second is that governments may become jealous of NGOs, in the sense that they are preferred over governments for channeling international aid resources. Alternatively, governments may at times favor NGOs as a development medium to be manipulated. NGOs can be used advantageously by political regimes in both the positive

and negative sense: as a tool for gaining support by claiming credit when NGOs deliver development; and as a 'fall-guy' to pass on the blame for development shortcomings and poor rural living conditions. Even NGOs' capacity to bring in considerable international funding can be seen by governments in a positive light when the state has controlling power over the ways in which the NGOs use the money.

The potential positive or negative effects that NGOs may have on a state's hegemony create an inconsistent and fickle tone to NGO-government relationships. When weighing the possible outcomes in order to determine how to deal with NGOs, authoritarian governments are often more concerned with how NGOs may influence their hegemony than they are with how NGOs may boost socio-economic development. Bratton (1987: 17) argues in fact that "the amount of space allowed to NGOs in any given country is therefore determined first and foremost by political considerations, rather than by any calculation of the contribution of NGOs to economic and social development." These considerations decide the conditions of government-NGO relations.

There are two key strategies that governments use in responding to NGOs: the exclusionary strategy and the corporatist strategy (Heurlin 2009). Exclusionary tactics involve NGO harassment, national NGO registration requirements which are often arbitrary (where registration is left up to the discretion of the political official who does or does not approve it), and restrictions on when and in what capacity NGOs may receive foreign funding. Rather than controlling NGOs, the goal of exclusionary strategies is to minimize their presence and their influence. Exclusionary strategies are often carried out through vague and subjective legislative clauses that reserve the government's right to shut down NGOs whose practices are considered to be 'anti-state' or to "degrade social values" (Mayhew 2005:745).

These exclusionary strategies are in contrast to the second key type of government response to NGOs (the corporatist strategy) where the goal is to control NGOs through integration and co-optation. Somewhat akin to the idea of 'keeping your friends close and your enemies closer,' corporatist strategies allow and even support NGOs, but control the direction of their actions through co-optation. Governments go about co-opting NGOs through a variety of methods including: the development of GONGOs (government-organized NGOs) in order to preempt independent NGOs forming; controlling

registration requirements; appointing independent NGO leaders to government positions; handing out NGO leadership positions to retiring government or political officials; and providing government funding and physical resources to NGOs such as office space in government buildings (Heurlin 2009, Bratton 1987). In most cases, independent NGOs are wary of accepting government resources as, the more resources they accept, the more vulnerable they are to changing politics or even political-regime changes and the more their autonomy is challenged (Farrington et al. 1993).

Correlations between the type of government and their strategy toward NGOs can sometimes be seen. For example, authoritarian regimes that are losing support and fear the potential of being overthrown are generally more likely to use exclusionary tactics for controlling NGO activity. This is because corporatist strategies of co-optation require investment in time and resources and, unless a regime feels secure enough to see through those investments, it is not likely to initiate them. Long-term stable political regimes are more likely to employ corporatist strategies, as they are willing to invest the time and resources necessary for co-optation. That being said, it is also likely that any particular government will use elements of both strategies, depending on the current level of political tension within the country and the need for foreign aid and funding.

The implications of these strategies on NGOs can be severe and limiting. Strict registration and reporting requirements, whether from exclusionary or corporatist approaches, imply the use of additional resources by NGOs (in addition to what they use in complying with donor requirements) as well as restricted ability to carry out participatory development methods. Costly and administratively-intensive registration requirements particularly serve to inhibit the activities of smaller NGOs with limited funding and those which do not already have strong ties with lucrative donors (Bolton and Jeffrey 2008). Also, such registration requirements discourage transparency, as engagement with government risks leaving NGOs at the mercy of arbitrary restrictions of NGO practices. For example, broad or vague language in registration policy serves to threaten NGOs' ability to operate, as it gives the opportunity to selectively interpret phrases regarding 'public order and safety' to officials who are responsible for granting or denying registration (Bolton and Jeffrey 2008). Additionally, if NGO-government relations are already tense, NGOs may be reluctant to share information such as

employee names, office addresses and activity details, for fear that not only their operations but also the safety of their staff may be at risk. Such lack of transparency towards government not only threatens NGOs' legal status, but also their own integrity, as it could lead to their overall lack of transparency and to self-censorship.

In that sense, government legislative regulations on NGO registration and practices could be potentially beneficial by putting forth mechanisms to prevent corruption as well as protecting NGOs' rights to organize. In reality, however, such registration regulations have little capacity to ensure protection for NGO transparency and legitimacy and are often used as a "guise for arbitrary control" and even NGO dissolution (Mayhew 2005: 749). Registration requirements may further threaten NGO integrity by necessitating that NGOs align themselves with government values and ruling political parties if they are to be granted registration or maintain it. In general, and particularly in countries with authoritative governments, the risks of undermining the key NGO goals of empowerment and commitment to local people outweigh the potential benefits of NGO-government collaboration. Through costly requirements and strict control, legislation pertaining to NGO registration can effectively serve to limit the influence and operating abilities of NGOs as well as present questions about their transparency and their legitimacy.

2.4.3 Accountability to Beneficiaries

So far this chapter has discussed the ways in which development NGOs are accountable to their donors and the state, but at the heart of participatory initiatives is the emphasis placed on being accountable to the people who the project is intended to help. The achievement of that responsibility is the primary goal of, and indeed the rationale for, the development of participatory methods. Despite the fact that it is the founding principle of genuine participatory development and is the key intention of non-profit NGO development work, being accountable to project beneficiaries is sometimes last in the line of NGO priorities. Ideally, NGOs value people first; after all, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, development NGOs exist for that very reason: the desire to help the poor and vulnerable. This discursive claim is embodied in their missions and visions. Practically, however, downward accountability, where the NGO is in reality

accountable to the people it aims to help, is the most difficult to achieve. This is because conflicts around accountability end up coming down to a question of who wields the most power over the NGO, as well as the fact that “there is no contractual relationship between NGOs and recipients” (Tvedt 1998:161-162). Because of this, whether NGOs actually help people to make claims for their basic rights or whether they strengthen their own institutional relationships and stability requires investigation (Pearce 2003).

In addition to the pressure from direct conflicts between accountability to beneficiaries and accountability to states and donors, other factors also contribute to a deficiency in downward accountability. One such factor is the character of the relationship between development assistance ‘giver’ and ‘receiver’. NGOs try to minimize any sense of dependency of beneficiaries on NGOs and instead engrain a sense of participation and partnership by using vocabulary such as ‘client’ or ‘partner’ instead of ‘beneficiary’ or ‘recipient’. However, in practice, this effort is generally an exercise in semantics rather than one that addresses the deeper issue of ideology and the masking of reality. In a business/client relationship, the client holds the business accountable to its needs through payment for services rendered. If the client is not satisfied, the business will not receive payment or future business from the client and therefore the success and survival of the business is dependent on the client’s satisfaction. The survival of an NGO, though, is not dependent on the satisfaction of its ‘clients’ (the beneficiaries) but rather on the satisfaction of its donors (Power et al. 2003). Therefore, unlike a business client, local communities or beneficiaries remain vulnerable due to a lack of leverage which is necessary to hold the NGO accountable (leaving the NGO in the role of ‘giver’ and local beneficiaries in the role of ‘receiver’).

Such compartmentalization into ‘aid givers’ and ‘aid recipients’ is problematic, and the two groups should not be treated as if they were “governed by different, or even incompatible, logics” (Rossi 2006:27). It may, however, be possible to change this giver/recipient paradigm about roles, at least to some extent, in order to allow beneficiaries to hold NGOs accountable. Ebrahim (2004:22) stresses the importance of other (non-monetary) forms of capital in determining organizational practices, suggesting that the relations of power found in development can be rethought and challenged. If the discourse of development can be re-thought to consider alternative forms of capital that

local people can use to hold NGOs accountable (possibly through the use of more participatory evaluation and monitoring methods), perhaps development NGOs can begin to break away from the 'giver' and 'receiver' mold. These alternative forms of capital could potentially include information, reputation and status, and legitimization.

Another factor making downward accountability difficult to achieve is the challenge of actually getting people to participate in NGO development activities. Theoretical frameworks and development methodologies are helpful in achieving participation, but they cannot compel people to participate (and indeed should not do so). While development NGOs willingly prescribe to the concept that local people should feel a sense of ownership for the development project, it is not inherent or inevitable that the people themselves will connect and 'own' accordingly (Sayer and Campbell 2004). Nor do local people inevitably react to NGO presence and participatory methods in the ways that NGOs expect. Local people's desire or the lack thereof to participate in development initiatives is affected by varying cultural and social elements.

One issue standing in the way of achieving genuine participation occurs when local people form their statements of needs around what they perceive to be the development agenda of the NGO (Mosse 2004, Power et al. 2003). If an NGO is perceived as only delivering a particular type of development (for instance, the construction of structures), people will tell the NGO that they need whatever they believe the NGO intends to provide (such as a new ablution block) so as to secure their right to receive the assistance, even if it is not actually the most crucial or pertinent need in the community (Tembo 2003). If this is the case, even if participatory methods are considered successful by the NGO, the on-the-ground development carried out will not be truly accountable to the needs of the local people. Additionally, poor rural people may not participate because they are busy and over-burdened with the daily tasks of life (Shepard 1998); and through years of hardship, they may have even accepted their fate, and therefore feel apathetic towards NGO initiatives (Mukherjee 1993).

Finally, NGOs generally aim to reach the poorest and most vulnerable groups of people. This goal can be a complicated one where meeting the demands of local power structures and being accountable to local traditions can undermine the intention to help the oppressed and vulnerable. Respecting traditional leaders, cultural values and the

existing power dynamics in a community sometimes directly contradicts goals of empowering marginal groups, including women, people affected with HIV and AIDS, and people of a different ethnic background. In situations where local systems oppress and undermine those people who are in the most vulnerable positions, it is difficult and potentially impossible for NGOs to be accountable to both local traditional values (and the local systems of governance these justify) and the marginalized groups they aim to help. Unless NGOs are sensitive to this, they may simply reproduce existing power structures.

2.5 Caught in the Middle: NGOs as an Organizational Form

The operational structures of NGOs as organizations are complex and driven by ambivalent responses to contradicting social interests, as outlined in the previous section. Both the achievement of their goals and their means for survival are conditioned by this broader social field marked by competing pressures. NGOs as organizational structures are different to other organizations in that achieving their intended purposes and organizational goals (including empowering communities) are not directly related to their own sustainability; in other words, they may not achieve those purposes and goals, but they may still sustain themselves as viable organizations (as long as donor funding continues to flow their way). Though they attempt to be accountable to the various stakeholders in their social domain, perhaps the strongest accountability they show is to themselves; not in the sense of holding themselves accountable to achieving their stated goals, but in the sense of following directions that best enable their own survival. Still, the realization of this priority does not necessarily imply that NGOs are illegitimate or ineffective.

The answer to that question can be addressed through considering whether their efforts towards ensuring their own survival stand in the way of or undermine achieving their stated objectives, or whether the two priorities are merely disconnected but not contradictory. Mitlin et al. (2007:1700) argue that “[in] countries in democratic transition ... the NGO sector has been seeking to find a new role to enable survival, and does not appear to be concerning itself with higher order questions.” These higher order questions

about downward accountability and the reality of implementing empowering and sustainable development are very much a concern of development policy.

Such policy, however, is necessarily separated from practice (Mosse 2006). The necessarily separated character of policy and practice displays a disjuncture between NGO operations as envisaged and portrayed in NGO discourse and NGO on-the-ground practices. This disjuncture implies the timing-specific and situation-specific character of NGO organizational operations. This means that despite (ideally) pursuing the accepted discourse surrounding development policy, the actual practices of NGOs will depend on the context of the time and location of their work, particularly with regard to donors and states. In other words, NGOs' actions are context-specific, which may explain historical and spatial discrepancies in NGO presence and effectiveness.

Bebbington (2004) suggests that any authentic analysis of NGOs should consider not just their organizational form but should also examine them in terms of their broad historical, institutional and social structures, recognizing that they are created as a means to pursue strategic goals through the strength of a formal organization with legal and social recognition. This means that the significance of NGOs depends not only on their inner structures (their policies, values and objectives) or the achievement of stated objectives, but also on their interactions with the broader structures which surround them, and that such structures must be considered with regard to their historical significance. In recognizing this historical context, Bebbington (2004) also emphasizes that NGO development assistance (or 'big D' development) appears in response to the unequal spatial distribution of poverty and opportunity that inevitably results from immanent development, or structural, political and economic development under capitalism ('little d' development). These contexts play a role in directing NGOs in their reactions to contrasting stakeholder demands.

Helliker (2008) suggests that NGOs are both the victims and initiators of the ambiguous and complicated web of social relations in which they operate; infused within the contradictory pressures defining their situation and inclined to sustain themselves instead of engaging in sustainable development. Their role as victim is evidenced above in the discussions of accountability to donors, states and local communities. However, the very condition of responding to conflicting pressures that victimizes them, as well as the

significance of the position that they have etched and staked out for themselves in delivering development (that is now deemed essential to poverty reduction), may in fact provide NGOs with some space to determine their own direction as well as some grounding to direct, or at least influence, the outside forces that apply pressure on them.

Considering the legitimacy of the interests of NGOs as they maneuver through their complicated social environment, this thesis argues that although they do not always act in the best interests of their beneficiaries and in a manner that best achieves their stated goals (promoting empowerment and sustainable livelihoods), NGOs do pursue these goals with considerable vigor to the extent that they do not compromise their own survival, and therefore generally speaking, they do perform a legitimate and important function in the development sector. Due to the various pressures of accountability, they are often not capable of meeting the requirements of all of their contradictory stakeholders; hence they are caught in the middle of such stakeholder requirements. Nevertheless, they do have some freedom and latitude as well as great potential to control the defining factors of their organizational practices. By delivering development assistance, they are the institutions that bestow the development industry or system with its ethical legitimacy and, by way of this, they possess some power to influence the decisions of their donors (Tvedt 2002).

They also have the potential to use alternative and informal forms of motivation for carrying out more participatory, downward accountability. Mebrahtu (2003) provides an excellent example of this potential, where the junior field staff of a development NGO creatively worked alternative, participatory methods of M&E into their schedules for the purpose of improving their own performance. This evidences not only the potential flexibility of NGOs to have some control over their 'ambiguous' situation, but also the desire from within themselves, at least at the ground level, to effectively incorporate participatory forms. Although power relations between states and NGOs remain inconsistent, particularly in countries with hegemonic, authoritarian regimes, NGOs which avoid controversial positions can still foster empowerment and self-reliance through facilitating mainstream development projects. Additionally, aside from whether or not they always consistently achieve their stated goals of catalyzing sustainable development and fostering empowerment, arguments can be made to legitimate their

existence, merely on the grounds that they make contributions to the economies of the communities in which they operate by providing employment (Harsh et al. 2010) and bringing in international money.

This claim about the potentially significant role of NGOs in participatory development does not deny that their very existence may have a tendency to undermine their own goals and that their development initiatives can be, in the long run, ultimately unsustainable and ineffective, in that they perpetuate the *status quo* and legitimize state institutions in countries with incompetent, corrupt or oppressive governments by picking up the slack where those governments have failed to deliver basic services to their citizens (Clark 1997, Makoba 2002, Brett 2003). This type of argument suggests that development NGOs alleviate problems just enough for people to accept the circumstances of their poverty, rather than taking a stand against their governing powers to bring about fundamental institutional changes. NGO imperatives, though, still suggest and contend that such governmental changes can be brought about through grassroots, local empowerment, and need not arise from a revolution of dissatisfied, desperate and suffering people.

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn here is the importance of constant re-examination, comparing the discourse and actual practices of development NGOs and considering their legitimacy as organizations for development in a contingent and context-specific manner. A general acceptance of NGOs as miraculous alternatives to failing markets and governments, and which generally 'do good', oversimplifies their position within social networks and systems of accountability and leaves them as a 'black box' phenomenon whose internal processes and mechanisms are left uninvestigated. Such an acceptance would ignore the fact that NGOs are complex social organizational forms that have agendas of their own (whether or not those agendas are legitimate or questionable). It is also important not to oversimplify the structures within NGOs, as their internal structures are also complex and political and they augment the contextually-specific nature of NGO decisions and actions.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has contextualized NGOs within the concept of intervention-based development ('big D' development), the discourse surrounding that development, and the ways in which NGOs are accountable to the stakeholder groups affected by and affecting their efforts. Participatory methods are generally accepted throughout development discourse as necessary for achieving the goals of fostering empowerment and sustainability in livelihoods, and are therefore the basis of approaches taken by NGOs. It is important, however, to recognize the discursive character of participation and the importance of constant multi-loop learning in questioning development discourse in order to work toward legitimacy and effectiveness in approaches to development by NGOs. The ability of NGOs to carry out accepted norms of development discourse, particularly regarding participatory methods, and NGOs' effectiveness in promoting empowerment and sustainable livelihoods are heavily impacted by the social and political environment in which they exist, one in which they must constantly respond to various and changing levels of accountability to stakeholder groups (donors, the state structures existing where they work, and the beneficiaries whom they aim to support and empower). While this environment, in which they must respond to conflicting interests, may require compromises toward different stakeholder groups, NGOs continue to maneuver their way through this difficult social terrain with the goals of achieving their stated objectives and maintaining their own organizational sustainability.

Chapter 3: NGOs in Zimbabwe – Crisis, Communal Lands and the Role of NGOs

3.1 Introduction

The current context of Zimbabwe is marked by political tension and uncertainty, widespread poverty, and a dilapidated economy struggling to recover from crisis. This situation is felt heavily in rural areas, where the majority of the Zimbabwean population lives and attempts to sustain their livelihoods from agriculture and other livelihood strategies. This is particularly difficult in communal areas, where a history of exploitation and manipulation by central governments (colonial and post-colonial), as well as inconsistent land tenure and poor quality of land, has led to livelihood instability characterized by food insecurity, absence of sufficient infrastructural resources (including health and education), uncertain land tenure and overcrowding. NGOs operating in Zimbabwe, both national and international, have played a large part in attempting to alleviate poverty and improve livelihood security, particularly among the rural poor within communal areas. The direction and priorities of their involvement have been effected by opposing pressures, including donor priorities and trends, political tensions, government control through legislation and intimidation, and glaring economic and social crises. All of this has contributed to an NGO reaction of disengagement from controversial and confrontational aspects of Zimbabwean socio-economic development and a cautious ambivalence toward the Zimbabwe government.

This chapter discusses the following themes: the context of the economic crisis and the state of poverty and political uncertainty in Zimbabwe; a brief history of the communal areas and the livelihood uncertainty and development deficiencies in these areas; and a discussion of NGO roles in Zimbabwe pertaining to relations with the state, donors, and beneficiaries in communal areas. This culminates in an analysis of the legitimacy and appropriateness of NGOs working in Zimbabwe.

3.2 Political Economy of Zimbabwe

The current atmosphere in Zimbabwe is characterized by a struggling economy, political uncertainty, and widespread poverty involving food, health, and livelihood insecurity. Although progress toward political and economic stability has been made in recent years, particularly due to the Global Political Agreement between the three major political parties in 2008, the livelihoods of the majority of the Zimbabwean population remain characterized by poverty and uncertainty. The economy has begun to stabilize but is still struggling for recovery from severe crisis which was catalyzed by economic structural adjustment in the 1990s and a radical land reform program from the year 2000. This has created an environment of economic crisis, livelihood insecurity and high political tensions.

Zimbabwe is in a state of recovery from what is known as the crisis period, from 2000 to 2008, which was characterized by three primary dimensions: massive economic meltdown, collapse of social service delivery and state authoritarianism (Murisa 2010). The economic meltdown involved significant shrinkage in the gross domestic product, hyperinflation and a massive reduction in formal employment coupled with the further development of an already large informal employment sector. Between 2000 and 2007, the gross domestic product (GDP) shrunk by 40 percent and – in 2003 – unemployment was measured at 62 percent and was estimated to have reached 80 percent in following years (UNDP 2010:2, 4-5) because of the ongoing dwindling in the sheer size of the economy and loss of employment. However, it should be noted that these figures do not account for informal employment, which made up a significant component of economic activities. The informal sector (often involving illegal and dangerous activities) became a critical means for survival by people in both urban and rural areas (Jones 2010). Jones (2010) argues that even many of those who maintained formal sector, or ‘decent’ employment, took up informal and illegal means of making money, as the hyperinflation -- reaching 231 million percent in 2008 (Chimhowu 2009:14) – devalued their formal employment paychecks to the point where it was not enough to support a livelihood. In addition, the crisis economy saw the Human Poverty Index (HPI) rise from 17 percent in 2000 to 40.9 percent in 2006, with the percentage of people living under the total consumptive poverty line in 2003 standing at 72 percent (Chimhowu 2009:11,19).

Greatly affecting urban and rural livelihoods, in 2003 the extent of people living below the Food Poverty Line reached 58 percent, a figure that increased in following years (UNDP 2010:6).

This collapsing economy fed into a breakdown of social service delivery, particularly affecting education and health, which had already been instigated by the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), a set of neo-liberal economic policies that was put in place in the early 1990s. This program, which instigated the initial fall in the economy, involved the introduction of health center fees and school fees (Murisa 2010). After independence and into the 1990s, the Zimbabwean government had invested significantly in education, making huge headway and improving both enrollment statistics and the quality of education. However, due to ESAP and the further socio-economic crisis between 2000 and 2008, the government's education budget (combined budgets for Ministries of Education and Culture, and Higher Education) declined from approximately 22 percent (of the national budget) in the 1980s to 15 percent on average from 2000 to 2006, bringing the level of education down with it (Chimhowu 2009: 77).

This decline in social service delivery was particularly exacerbated by the hyperinflation which led to what is known as a 'brain drain,' or mass exodus of educated and trained professionals to other countries with more stable economies, better working conditions and better professional opportunities. This most severely affected the medical and educational professions (Murisa 2010, Chikanda 2007), which in turn worsened the already declining standards of social service delivery. In 2006, it was estimated that three million Zimbabweans were living outside of the country and that three quarters of Zimbabwean-trained doctors migrate soon after receiving their medical degrees (Shumba and Mawere 2012: 108). In 2010, Zimbabwe could only claim 21 percent of the required number of medical professionals (Murisa 2010). This immense brain drain has had serious negative consequences on both the quality and availability of medical care and education, among other professions.

Multiple other factors contributing to the economic and social-services meltdown crisis, including declining international donor funding and a decline in export revenue, can be linked to issues of state authoritarianism, particularly around the controversial Fast Track Land Redistribution Program (FTLRP) which began in 2000. The late 1990s were

characterized by a general dissatisfaction with the authoritarian single-party political regime, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and a rising opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Fast track land redistribution arose in the broader context of tensions between the two main contending political parties. Whether or not sanctioned by the ZANU-PF government (this issue remains controversial), the initial physical acquisition of land was largely characterized by widespread invasions of white-owned farms, many of which involved violence towards not only white farm owners but black farm workers.

Fast Track was the culmination of years of tension over the politically and emotionally charged issue of land reform. From independence up until FTLRP, white commercial farmers remained in possession of the majority of arable farm land, having owned 39 percent of land in Zimbabwe at the time of independence (Masiwa 2005: 217). After independence, efforts at land reform were slow, and land reform goals set by the state were not met. Original goals were to resettle 162,000 families onto 8.3 million hectares of acquired land; however, by 1989, only 52,000 households had been resettled on 2.6 million hectares (Thomas 2003: 697). Due to a 'willing seller-willing buyer' agreement and a lack of government funding, additional efforts at reform were limited and slow. In 2000, the land occupation movement (led by veterans of the war of liberation) finally brought the issue of land reform to a head, and the state responded with the formulation and implementation of the fast track program.

The land reform involved the redistribution of white-owned farms to new black farmers, both for small-scale household subsistence farming and larger-scale commercial farming. The fast track program is still very controversial, with both the methods used in carrying it out and the motivation behind it, remaining subject to debate. Some argue that it was a political ploy, possibly even a last resort reaction, by President Robert Mugabe and his political party (ZANU-PF) to retain political power, authority and popularity by benefitting political and economic elites as well as retaining support from war veterans (who had been a large support base for ZANU-PF) and rural communities at a time of high political tension and when the majority of the nation was questioning the party's legitimacy and hegemony (Hammar et al. 2000, Campbell 2007). Others (including Thomas 2003) argue that the FTLRP, although co-opted by ZANU-PF at an

advantageous time, was a progressive and necessary step initiated by societal pressure, and that after some transitional time, it will prove to be a successful piece of Zimbabwean development.

Despite this debate over the political corruption of resettlement and alleged motivations for implementing Fast Track, certain linkages between the FTLRP and the demise of the economy during Zimbabwe's crisis period are incontrovertible. The two most obvious links between FTLRP and Zimbabwe's crisis are the sudden massive decline in the commercial farming sector and the withdrawal of international donor aid and investment. The sudden drop in agricultural production significantly cut export revenue as well as diminishing tax revenue flow which was previously coming in from commercial farming on a significant basis (Masiwa 2005); it increased national food insecurity by no longer providing sufficient quantities of staple grains (Masiwa 2005, Murisa 2010); and it fueled unemployment with an estimated 200,000 job losses among commercial farm workers (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010).

Economic problems further exacerbated low agricultural productivity post-fast track, as the government lacked capacity and did not support the newly resettled family plot holders and commercial farmers after land acquisition. Donor funding was also not available. In fact, donor aid for land reform began to decline in the 1990s after the Zimbabwean government refused to produce a clear and transparent land policy for implementing the Land Acquisition Act, which allowed compulsory acquisition of land and moved away from the 'willing buyer-willing seller' agreement that was characteristic of the post-independence land reform up until that point (Zimbabwe Institute 2005). However, the most significant drop in foreign aid and foreign investment resulted from Fast Track and a widespread international disapproval of the program. This again hit particularly hard the delivery of social services as well as development programs, as donor aid financed 18 percent of the budget for such programs before the land invasions began (Chimhowu 2009: 18).

A political impasse following the elections in 2008 resulted in the three leading political parties of Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF and the two factions of the MDC – MDC-T and MDC-M) signing a Global Political Agreement and, in February 2009, an Inclusive Government (IG) or government of national unity was formed (UNDP 2012a). The IG

was a positive stride toward economic and political stabilization. Hyperinflation has been dealt with by the change over to the US dollar as the main currency, and subsequently the IG has launched recovery schemes intended to stabilize and re-build the economy and social sectors. These include the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) of 2009 and the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) for 2011 to 2015, launched in 2011 (UNDP 2012b). Despite these efforts, however, the country still suffers from an external debt of US\$6.9 billion, an estimated 72 percent of the population live under the poverty line, and a large informal employment sector exists with four out of every five jobs being informal (UNDP 2012b:2,3, African Economic Outlook 2012:12). Positive strides have been made toward health and education and some GDP growth is occurring, although it decelerated to 6.8 percent in 2011 and a projected 4.4 percent in 2012 (African Economic Outlook 2012: 2).

Despite the official Inclusive Government status of politics in Zimbabwe, evidence has shown that ZANU-PF continued to retain political control and any efforts made toward a more transparent and accountable government are disappointing. The Human Rights Watch (2009) reported that more than six months after the IG was formed, a series of human rights violations took place, including: violent attacks of MDC supporters by ZANU-PF supporters and police, unfair arrests of MDC officials, and the refusal to charge and arrest ZANU-PF legislators with known involvement in political violence in 2008. The same report also claimed that ZANU-PF remained in control of most senior ministries (including security ministries) and that the MDC has been unable or unwilling to push for human rights due to its desire for the survival of the power-sharing agreement. Subsequent reports (Human Rights Watch 2011, Human Rights Watch 2012) reported continual violent action or arrests against MDC supporters and human rights activists in 2010 and 2011; however, the occurrences reported declined significantly between yearly reports, evidencing positive progress. The parliamentary elections held in July 2013, which saw a victory for ZANU-PF, were highly controversial. A late challenge to the legitimacy of the election was made by the opposition MDC party which accused ZANU-PF of general dishonesty, lack of transparency and rigging the polling stations. At the time, various general news networks reported that this challenge was dropped and election results were not overturned (Smith 2013, BBC 2013).

The struggles swirling around the Zimbabwe crisis are far from resolved. The strides that have been made towards stability, including the Inclusive Government and the implementation of the US dollar as the key currency, have been important. Nevertheless, the dilapidated formal employment sector and the gap in professional resources left from the brain drain continue to affect education and health services, particularly in rural areas. Questions as to the success of the IG and the legitimacy of the 2013 elections exist and political uncertainty keeps tensions high. The struggle for livelihood security for the majority of Zimbabweans remains a serious concern. Although moving in a positive direction, the country remains weakened from its crisis and an uncertain political and economic future.

3.3 Conditions in Communal Areas

Of Zimbabwe's 386,000 square kilometers of land, 42 percent (approximately 16.4 million hectares) is designated as communal areas (CAs) (USAID: 4). Before the year 2000, 60 percent of Zimbabwe's population lived in CAs (Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 6). As of 2008, 63 percent of the Zimbabwean population was living in rural areas with 60 percent of the working population relying on agriculture for food and employment (USAID: 4). Given that the case study for this thesis is based in a communal area, I detail the history and contemporary conditions of CAs.

Communal areas were originally established as Native Reserves under the colonial Rhodesian government and many are located in drought prone, low agricultural productivity areas. The various governance policies both pre- and post-independence and precarious balances in power between traditional leaders and elected councils post-independence have created inconsistent systems of land tenure and allocation within CAs. Due to overpopulation, poor quality of land, and these inconsistent land allocation processes, living conditions for residents of communal areas are characterized by poverty, hunger and instability and require diverse livelihood practices for means for survival. Further exacerbating the situation and the natural lack of arability of the land, communal areas are in large part environmentally degraded from deforestation and overgrazing (African Economic Outlook 2012), making agricultural productivity even more difficult.

The complexity, precariousness and poverty of communal area livelihoods are the effects of exploitation, land scarcity and an inconsistent history of governance.

Native Reserves were originally established in 1898 as a supposed means of protecting the indigenous majority populations from becoming entirely landless, although the reserves were located in agro-ecological regions IV and V, which are agriculturally and productively marginal and were “considered unsuitable for European settlement” (Mbiba 2001:427). According to Mbiba (2001:428-429), the 97 percent of the population in 1930 which was black was apportioned nine million hectares of land in the native reserves under the Land Apportionment Act, which allowed 20.4 million hectares of land for white settlers. Although the nine million hectares was later increased to 16 million (Mbiba 2001: 429), it remained a ridiculously unbalanced apportionment of land, creating overpopulated, crowded and congested conditions in the native reserves. These conditions were then fed by rapid population growth, reducing the agricultural capacity and environmental quality of the already mediocre land.

In 1915, the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) was introduced by the Southern Rhodesian government as an effort to reduce environmentally-degrading practices of cultivation and to introduce individual land rights within native reserves as a means of incentivizing investment and commitment to conservation-friendly cultivation methods (Nyambara 2001:771). While widely opposed in rural areas due to its effect of creating additional landless households by force, the NLHA recognized a group of master farmers, or those who adhered to the training and methods laid-out by the law. This created a “differentiated nature of communal area society” due to new land asset holdings and unequal productivity (Mbiba 2001:429). In 1967, the Rhodesian government abolished the NLHA and its individual rights-based concept, replacing it with the Tribal Trust Land Act (TTLA), which placed the power of land allocation with traditional leaders and stressed the concept of ‘communal’ land tenure, rather than individual landholding. This remained the official policy on the management of land tenure in CAs up until independence in 1980.

After independence, governance over CAs was changed again and the Communal Land Act and the District Councils Act removed the official control of land issues from the traditional leaders and placed it in elected Rural District Councils, making the

individual sale of land illegal, vesting land ownership in the state, and placing administrative powers, including settling disputes over land, with the District Councils (O'Flaherty 1998). In 1986, land resettlement and reorganization within CAs was included in the Zimbabwean government's Five Year Plan (O'Flaherty 1998). Then, in 1999, the Traditional Leaders Act restored authority over land issues to the traditional leaders, with decisions remaining subject to Rural District Council approval (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010). In addition to these inconsistencies of governance affecting land allocation and tenure, overcrowding in CAs was severely affected by a population explosion occurring between 1982 and the late 1990s (Hartnack 2005) and, by 2000, fewer than five percent of households in communal areas had access to infrastructure and irrigation resources (Moyo et al. 2000: 66).

Issues of overcrowding, land allocation and governance were further exacerbated with events following 2000, though fast track was supposedly intended to decongest CAs by moving a large number of CA residents to fast track farms. Of significance is that some 200,000 farm workers lost their employment on commercial farms when the FTLRP reallocated formerly white-owned large-scale farms (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008). In this regard, some workers took to communal areas in search of residence (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010) while others migrated to urban informal settlements or back to their country of origin for those who had previously migrated (including decades before) from another country (Hartnack 2005, Campbell 2007). According to Kinsey's study of population movements in Zimbabwe's communal areas and resettlement areas (2010: 340), "in CAs, [the] mean household size remained constant over the period 1997 to 2000. Between early 2000 and early 2001, however, mean household size in CAs increased dramatically – by 100 per cent." This timing corresponds with the first year of the fast track program, suggesting that there is a link between those who were displaced as a result of the resettlement program and the population growth in CAs. It has also been claimed that workers who were displaced from their previous residences on commercial farms were in large part excluded from the target groups of fast track, which were 'landless peasants' and 'war veterans' (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008). Further, evidence suggests that many of those targeted beneficiaries from CAs who did receive land under the FTLRP still maintained their

rights to land in the CAs (Makura-Paradza 2010); therefore by maintaining dual households, the quest of reducing overcrowding in CAs was undermined. This claim supports Mbiba's statement (2001: 426) that "Zimbabwe's national land debate [neglected] land problems facing communal land."

Another significant historical event with evidence of affecting CAs is Operation *Murambatsvina*, or Operation Restore Order, which occurred in 2005 and involved the destruction of homes, communities and informal employment sources of mass numbers of urban poor populations who were living in informal backyard structures or illegal squatter settlements. This military-style operation, carried out by the Zimbabwe government, led to the mass displacement of approximately 570,000 people (or 133,534 households) from informal urban settlements (Potts 2006:276). This aggressive and extreme state intervention left an unspecified number of people seeking residence in communal areas. The combined effects of the operation and FTLRP have further increased the strain, poverty and livelihood insecurity in communal areas.

This history of CAs helps to explain the origins of the variety of complex systems of land tenure in communal areas. The basis of how land is allocated in communal areas today is a remnant of the former colonial government's NLHA and TTLA, with the NLHA having allocated land into individually-possessed plots and communal grazing areas (Makura-Paradza 2010), and the TTLA placing land allocation authority with traditional leaders. Before independence, and since the TTLA, traditional leaders were responsible for local governance in the communal areas. Further, despite the fact that the Communal Land Act and District Councils Act removed the control of land issues from the traditional leaders and placed it with elected Rural District Councils, traditional leaders retained local support, with communal area residents continuing to go to traditional leaders with land issues. Through this, traditional leaders illegally reacquired land allocation authority, which caused tension with the legal authority of the elected councils (Ncube 2011) until the introduction of the Traditional Leaders Act restored authority over land issues to the traditional leaders, with decisions remaining subject to Rural District Council approval (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010).

The way land tenure is managed in communal areas cannot be generalized across Zimbabwe because of local variation. However, studies of particular CAs have shown

evidence of informal land markets, where communal grazing land is commoditized and allocated land is bought or rented in response to growing populations. According to law, communal land may be transferred through marriages, across generations and in the case of death. But, in some communal areas, traditional leaders have been accused by families of targeting grazing areas for the sale of land to ‘outsiders’ (Matondi and Dekker 2011: 16). In their case study of Svosve communal area, Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2008) found that the sale of grazing land and renting of land to newcomers, particularly those displaced from former commercial farms and urban areas, is common practice. They also found evidence that those displaced from urban areas were most vulnerable in terms of paying higher prices for use of land, as they “were likely to be opposition supporters, and should not be allowed to settle in communal areas” (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008:295). Such informal land markets are potentially problematic in terms of livelihood security for communal residents, not only because they contribute to overcrowding and vulnerability, but also because their informality creates a precarious tenancy where landholders are reluctant to engage in long-term investments in the land (Matondi and Dekker 2011) or to practice sustainable land use methods because of possible future loss of the land. This lack of incentive to invest in conservation and sustainable practices, brought on by these systems of tenure, increase degradation of the land to the detriment of livelihoods (Vivian 1994).

Overcrowding, land scarcity and land degradation are central issues defining the context of communal area livelihoods. The lack of land and the necessity to seek supplementary and external employment (that is, employment outside CAs) has been characteristic of communal areas ever since their establishment under the colonial government, but this need has intensified with time. The absence of incentives for investment in land (that has resulted from variations and inconsistencies in land allocation and tenure) coupled with overcrowding puts significant strain on the already marginal land, further degrading its quality and arability and making farming efforts difficult and often unproductive. Because of this lack of arability and the fact that only nine percent of communal land can support consistent production of the staple crop of maize (Makura-Paradza 2010: 69), communal area livelihoods depend on diversification away from farming into non-agricultural and non-farm activities.

Agricultural efforts for supporting CA livelihoods include personal subsistence farming, casual labor on neighbors' fields and the sale of crops (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008, Maroyi 2009). Urban connections also make up a significant part of livelihood diversification, particularly urban wage remittances, which have historically played a large part in supporting rural agricultural endeavors in communal areas. Other methods of livelihood diversification for people living in communal areas include informal trading and more dangerous and illegal activities, particularly prostitution, illegal beer brewing and in some places gold panning. In addition to its contributions toward overcrowding coming from displaced commercial farm workers, the FTLRP also led to a decrease in seasonal employment on commercial farms which had provided an important source of income for many living in communal areas (Makura-Paradza 2010). In other words, fast track has inhibited opportunities for livelihood diversification. This condition – the insecure tenure, low productivity of the land, overcrowding and therefore the necessity to diversify livelihoods – is the outcome of deficiencies in state policy and programs towards the CAs from their inception under colonial rule up until the current time.

In concluding this discussion of CAs and in order to contextualize the current conditions of communal area livelihoods, it is important to consider the ways in which the state, including both the colonial Rhodesian state and the post-independence Zimbabwean state, has used CAs as mechanisms to serve its purposes as needed. The Native Reserves created by the Rhodesian colonial government were used as a means of furthering racial segregation, controlling the indigenous population, denying Africans urban citizenship (Mbiba 2001) and ensuring a reserve pool for cheap labor for the white economy. By locating the reserves in the worst regions with the least potential for agricultural productivity, the colonial state ensured the dependency of the reserve population on urban and commercial farming communities for labor wages to support their livelihoods (Makura-Paradza 2010). According to O'Flaherty (1998), a worker-peasant system was created in the early colonial days whereby reserve residents (or peasants) needed one foot in the market economy (as workers) to pursue household livelihoods. At the same time, the un-arable conditions in the reserves were a means of preventing significant productive farming from arising in the reserves in competition with

white agriculture and therefore inhibiting the economic independence of reserve peasants.

Furthermore, the concept of ‘traditional’ land tenure used for reserve (or communal) governance both pre- and post- the NLHA was a “colonial construction” to aid in providing the state with a system of “indirect rule” (O’Flaherty 1998:538, Nyambara 2001:772). According to Nyamabara (2001: 772), the concept of communal rather than individual land tenure enforced through the TTLA, and the placement of issues of land allocation in the hands of traditional leaders, not only transferred responsibility and accountability for land shortages in CAs from the central state to local leaders, but also attempted to mask blatant land shortages (hoping to make lines of individual tenure less defined) in order to “ward off the rising tide of African nationalism.” Additionally, the power vested in traditional leaders is seen as a means of creating a system of control, giving power to local leaders who “were seen to be friendly or at least malleable to the particular needs of colonial administration” and thus creating a colonially-constructed property regime of ‘communal tenure’ (O’Flaherty 1998:542, 545). In fact, traditional chiefs showing loyalty in standing against African nationalism were rewarded with positions of greater power. This manipulation of land tenure and local systems of governance allowed the Rhodesian state to dampen growing tensions and maintain social control, although it should be noted that varieties of political ideologies developed among various chiefs and that some used their local power in order to undermine policy, rather than acting merely as ‘government stooges’ (Nyambara 2001: 780).

After independence, communal areas continued to be used advantageously by the state. Ncube (2011:93) notes that, in many cases, locally-elected governing bodies designed for pursuing development in CAs (namely, Village Development Committees and Ward Development Committees) did not hold regular elections but were “imposed in accordance with ZANU-PF party cells at the local level.” It has also been claimed that the Traditional Leaders Act which returned land allocation authority to traditional leaders, as well as other state tactics such as providing food and drought relief, have been political moves made by the ruling ZANU-PF party in order to rally rural constituencies (Ncube 2011, Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008, Makura-Paradza 2010). This exemplifies the manner in which communal area leadership and local governance have been adjusted

according to the convenience of state prerogatives. As well, Operation *Murambatsvina* has been identified as another way in which the Zimbabwean government has used communal areas in order to achieve its own agenda, including as a form of urban management. The argument is that the Operation was largely used towards political ends, by sending urban dwellers to CAs as retribution for their presumed support of the opposition MDC party (Potts 2006, Makura-Paradza 2010). These suspected motives for the operation concord with Mbiba's statement (2001: 427) that "communal areas are a 'political resource' whose control will not be relinquished without a fight."

As has been evidenced in this section, people living in communal areas are victims of a long history of exploitation and manipulation. The outcomes of this history have penetrated every aspect of livelihoods for communal area residents, including income, food, agricultural security and tenure instability, which in turn prolong a cyclical pattern of land degradation and therefore a growing necessity for livelihood diversification. The resulting poverty has been a major concern of aid organizations (including NGOs) whose involvement in communal area development is discussed in the next two sections of this chapter.

3.4 NGOs in Zimbabwe and their Relations with the State and Donors

Since independence, NGOs have played significant roles in development in Zimbabwe. They vary significantly in size, focus, orientation and priorities, but all share a common dependency on donor funding, as well as a cautious attitude toward relations with the Zimbabwean government. In the last decade, NGOs in Zimbabwe have had to work within and respond to a crisis environment involving food and livelihood insecurity, political oppression and restrictive legislation, and changes in donor trends. All of these factors are important in considering the influence and legitimacy of their actions and the significance of their existence in Zimbabwe.

NGOs in Zimbabwe vary in size and function, but can broadly be described within a few overlapping categories. There are smaller regional or local NGOs which are often associated with larger umbrella NGOs; national Zimbabwean-based NGOs, both intermediary and implementing, which vary in size and often channel funding and facilitate relations between donors and more localized NGOs; and international NGOs

(INGOs) which often take on both the roles of intermediary and implementing NGOs. Size varies significantly among both national and international NGOs and NGOs of all types function primarily on the basis of international donor funding. Functionally, these NGOs can be (very broadly) classified as either development NGOs (DNGOs) or advocacy NGOs (ANGOs). DNGOs work mainly in rural areas. Their focus may include a range of projects dealing with agriculture, water and sanitation, education, health, basic infrastructure, environment, credit and loans programs, and income-generating projects. The main orientation of development NGOs is community mobilization through development projects. ANGOs are generally based in urban areas in Zimbabwe and focus on advocating for policy change on a range of issues including human rights, environmental issues and constitutional reform.

NGOs in Zimbabwe communicate with each other and with larger donor organizations through a system of clusters, which group together NGOs with similar focus areas. These clusters include Agriculture, Early Recovery, Education, Food Aid, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection, and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) (OCHA 2009). According to NGO staff members interviewed from World Vision, Operation Trumpet Call and Tear Fund (Appendix 1), these clusters meet on a regular basis to discuss national strategies and to gain information about funding opportunities. Government officials, sometimes very high in political rank, also periodically attend these meetings. The clusters are also used as a forum to share and combine data and assessment information gathered by various NGOs. Such meetings usually take place in Harare, rather than rotating the location, which makes it difficult for any smaller, locally-based NGOs who are not Harare-based to attend (although they are invited), due to lack of funding and transportation. Due to this issue, the cluster system, while providing an excellent opportunity for organizational learning and exposure to secondary data which may be helpful in conducting needs-assessments, places large-scale NGOs at an advantage over smaller, locally-based NGOs in terms of exposure and access to funding opportunities as well as recognition from government, therefore creating a necessity for intermediary NGOs in acting on behalf of these smaller NGOs.

Before independence in 1980, NGOs were few in number and were primarily welfare-oriented, targeting disadvantaged groups. However, after independence, the

number of NGOs increased significantly (supported by a large increase in international donor money) and the primary focus changed to development work (including food security, rural and urban energy, housing and employment schemes) with a particular emphasis on communal areas (Moyo et al. 2000). During the 1980s, much social service delivery was carried out through NGOs in partnership with the government, accounting for health, education and income-generating projects in notably rural areas (Murisa 2010). Government acknowledged these NGO activities as complementary, in filling gaps in areas that government programs were not reaching (Helliker 2006). In the 1990s, local government entities in CAs had come to rely on NGOs for implementation of development and they themselves were part of those “being developed” (Bornstein 2005: 121). This relationship between NGOs and the state, however, was also characterized by the avoidance of politically confrontational issues.

Into the 1990s, much NGO direction shifted towards advocacy work. In the late 1990s, accompanied by rising political tension, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a large coalition of over a hundred NGOs, along with churches and trade unions, was formed in order to pressure the government for constitutional reform and public transparency (Dorman 2003). In response, the government sought to exclude NGOs and the general public from engaging publicly in constitutional, political and civic issues; and accusatory propaganda against NGOs as being foreign-inspired became the dominant discourse of the state (Dorman 2003). After 2000, NGOs responded to fast track by refusing to engage with fast track farmers in development projects; additionally, because of the growing crises in the economy, their work in CAs shifted significantly towards humanitarian relief, such that many mainstream development projects were suspended (Helliker 2006). Since then, NGO work, both among NGOs and NGOs, has been marked by a cautious avoidance of issues which might lead to direct confrontation with the Zimbabwean state and specifically the ruling party.

NGO activities in Zimbabwe can be better understood within the context of their relationship with the state. By and large, NGO-state relations in Zimbabwe have been marked by a cautious ambivalence on the part of NGOs (Moyo et al. 2000). The Zimbabwean government has used several tactics for controlling NGO activities, including first an inclusive corporatism followed by extreme exclusion, intrusive

legislation, slander and bad press, and intimidation. From independence and into the 1990s, while the numbers of NGOs were growing and NGO activities were recognized by the state as opportunities for filling development gaps, the Zimbabwean government employed a corporatist strategy of control through NGO-government partnerships. Some successful desired effects included a variety of groups becoming “almost subservient wings of the ruling party” (Helliker 2008: 244). Government tactics towards NGOs turned more intrusive during the late 1990s in response to NGO policy advocacy and as the land question became more sensitive and volatile. In 1995, for instance, the Private Voluntary Organizations Act was passed, which contained restrictive and repressive sections which gave the government significant controlling powers over NGOs (NGO Consultancy Africa n.d.). Although highly independent political groups had always “felt the wrath of the state,” the treatment previously reserved for direct political opponents was increasingly extended to any non-ZANU-PF group, including NGOs such as the NCA; and this state action included violent raids on the offices of NGOs (Dorman 2003: 856-857). Suspicion and accusations by the state of supporting British colonialism were launched at NGOs and donors who had been involved with the NCA. Mugabe accused NGOs of being imperialist puppets used to further foreign and specifically Western donor interests (Moyo et al. 2000). This anti-NGO propaganda in large part accused NGOs of carrying out foreign agendas based on Western standards and ideals of democracy and prolonging colonial oppression and control over Zimbabwe.

In addition to accusations from the state that NGOs were agents of foreign agendas, the Zimbabwean government subsequently took, and particularly after the emergence of fast track, more legislative measures in order to control the actions of NGOs and other groups. The Public Order and Security Act of 2002 gave the government significant power to punish any acts of subversion, which was defined vaguely enough to include peaceful protests against human rights violations and any form of political advocacy (NGO Consultancy Africa n.d.). The most directly targeted NGO legislation was the NGO bill of 2004. Despite the fact that it was never signed into law, it had a significant impact on the actions and operations of NGOs in Zimbabwe. The NGO bill specifically targeted human rights-related organizations along with broadly targeting all NGOs (Tsonga and Mugabe 2004) and the many restrictive provisions proposed by the

NGO bill would have allowed excessive state control of NGO registration and actions, specifically the provision to prohibit foreign funding of any activities related to issues of governance and human rights (Zimbabwe Institute 2008). Although it did not become law, this affected NGOs in two distinct ways: it caused donor skepticism towards committing to medium- and long-term funding of NGOs in Zimbabwe, therefore limiting NGO ability to carry out meaningful work; and, by increasing apprehension and cautiousness amongst NGOs themselves, it limited the impact and quality of NGO work (Zimbabwe Institute 2008). These effects, particularly the influence of the bill on international donors, were detrimental to both development NGOs and advocacy NGOs.

Currently, NGOs working in both development and advocacy carry on the cautious role of avoiding direct confrontation with the state. Murisa (2010) argues that there is some opportunity for meaningful engagement with the state, but at the risk of cooptation. There is evidence, at the same time, that the state is still engaged in exclusionary and intrusive strategies, including the unexpected suspension of 29 NGOs in Masvingo province in February 2012, including both ANGOs and DNGOs (such as CARE International) on the grounds that they had not complied with elements of the registration requirements (OCHA 2012, Chinaka 2012). Regardless of whether the charges were accurate, this occurrence caused international concern and it contributes further to NGOs continuing their cautious approach.

NGO actions in Zimbabwe must also be understood within the context of donors, donor funding and organizational sustainability, which – as indicated – has been affected by the state's approach to NGOs as described above. In this respect, oppressive and vague legislation, along with a relationship of mutual distrust between NGOs and the Zimbabwean state, have influenced donors to invest in short-term, specific projects to the detriment of longer term sustainable investment in development. This is marked by the change from funding provided for development-based projects to funding provided for short-term relief projects for the period following the year 2000.

NGOs in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, are primarily funded by international donor money coming from both INGOs and larger donor agencies, including European Union (EU), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Department for International Development (DFID) and United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) (OCHA 2012, UNICEF and ECHA 2011). Because the majority of NGO funds come from these international donors, NGOs are subject to global development trends and the values and priorities of the international donors' countries of origin. International intermediary NGOs, which are responsible for channeling funds from larger agencies to national NGOs, must also respond to the priorities of the governments and organizations in their country of origin. To give one example, because international donors largely disapproved of the FTLRP, it became difficult if not impossible for NGOs to receive funding for projects in the fast track resettlement areas. Some major donors, including USAID, DFID and SIDA, refused outright to give funding for such initiatives (Helliker 2008). Also, due to the high demand for transparency, donors require quantifiable results and audits which not only require significant resources to produce, but are difficult to measure for projects that focus on promoting sustainable development. The drying up of donor funding post-2000 compromised the possibility of such detailed monitoring and reporting.

This demand, combined with the necessity to align with donor values and development trends, led Zimbabwean NGOs to cater their projects toward what would bring in funding, which at times led to the planning and implementing of projects that did not address the true needs of rural communities, or reflect the most effective methods for addressing on-the-ground development deficiencies. Examples of experiencing pressure from donors to approach projects in this way and as a means simply to acquire funding (as well as frustrations with such pressure) were expressed in interviews with World Vision Zimbabwe staff, as discussed in the next chapter (Appendix 1, Interview 1). Additionally, many of the smaller indigenous NGOs suffered even more because many donors fail to recognize the necessity of funding to cover core administrative costs (Helliker 2008).

In order to manage these pressures, NGOs diversify their funding among multiple donors. Other forms of income streams, including research consultation, government aid or returns from investments, are difficult to achieve in a sustainable manner. In Zimbabwe, these methods are mostly unachievable and unsuccessful at providing enough income diversity to move away from dependence on international donors. Such diversification is taking place though, as discussed later in the case of World Vision (and

its connections with government in carrying out monitoring and evaluation in order to stretch limited funding for project implementation). While government support is sometimes received in non-monetary forms such as carrying out NGO project-related responsibilities (such as monitoring and evaluation) or free access to office space and facilities, monetary support is rarely received in Zimbabwe (Moyo et al. 2000). Diversifying income sustainability through returns on investments is also near impossible, as the majority of people benefiting from NGO development projects are in the communal areas, where the income base is shallow and the beneficiaries have few materials to contribute to NGO projects. Attaining donations from the private sector is also problematic, as Zimbabwe does not offer tax breaks to private businesses on such donated funds, and there is thus limited practical incentive for private companies to support NGO activities (Moyo et al. 2000).

Another factor affecting NGO activities and priorities in Zimbabwe is the increasing professionalization and careerism that the NGO sector as a whole is experiencing. The NGO career field has created a competitive job market for development experts, consultants and trainers (Moyo et al. 2000). After the Economic Structural Adjustment in the 1990s, professionals from government ministries “flooded the staff of transitional NGOs” and the late 1990s saw NGOs as “prime employment for educated Zimbabweans” (Bornstein 2005: 101). This professionalism remains present today. Further, NGO employment has come to possess a sense of professional status and, as this employment is relatively lucrative, most expertise on development policy and practice resides within the sector (Murisa 2010). NGOs are traditionally and ideologically considered to be charitable organizations with the purpose of helping people, but professionalism and careerism increasingly mean that NGOs are sites of employment and, as such, sustaining NGOs as employment sites may be first and foremost in the minds of NGO staff.

NGOs in Zimbabwe are currently precariously located in a tension-riddled field, including responding to a social and economic crisis, the politics of state control over their actions, and international donor interests. Due to such a precarious political and economic context, DNGO action in contemporary Zimbabwe has been directed towards a fluctuating mixture of development and relief work, seeking to maneuver their way in

accessing whatever donor funding is available and acting in a kind of ambivalent avoidance of politics and state involvement. These conflicting interests and pressures affect the motivations, impacts and legitimacy of their work.

3.5 NGOs in Communal Areas

As indicated, a significant amount of NGO work in Zimbabwe has been rural development work in communal areas focusing on community mobilization for sustainable development. These sustainable development projects involve food security, agricultural production projects, income-generating projects, health and basic infrastructure projects, water and sanitation projects, and education and training on a variety of subjects. They promote values of self-help and community-based development and their long-term goals include capacity-building and self-sustainability.

As noted in the previous section, NGOs in Zimbabwe were few prior to independence. In addition, for a long time, the responsibility for and efforts toward development in communal areas were largely carried out as a form of non-governmental aid through churches and missionary efforts (including a focus on schooling). The current role played by development NGOs in Zimbabwe's communal areas and the expectations that accompany that role are the product of a long evolution away from church ministries and mission efforts during the colonial era to the independence period which became dominated by NGOs and large international donors. Both the colonial era and post-independence were characterized by the government relying heavily on foreign assistance for the development of CAs. Since independence, the role of DNGOs in communal areas has been significant; however, their methods, priorities, reliability and sustainability have fluctuated with, and been affected by, changing political and economic conditions which impact on livelihoods in CAs and on NGO-state relations in Zimbabwe.

In late nineteenth-century southern Rhodesia, 'development' and 'welfare' of the black Zimbabwean population was left up to colonial missionaries as a charitable act, which "complemented the colonial state" and was "characterized by a paternalistic concern for the natives through the civilizing mission" (Bornstein 2005:10-11). Bornstein (2005: 11) suggests that such historical ties between mission churches and the state are the foundation of current development efforts, stating that "Christian missions

worked arm-in-arm with the state to provide education and agricultural training in attempts to ‘civilize’ Africans, and at the same time, to create a docile, productive rural labor force for colonial capitalism”. This role and connection with the state was affected detrimentally particularly during the war of liberation in the 1970s, with church missions moving towards support of pro-African leadership and efforts shifting toward relief aid for those affected by the war. Bornstein (2005) also argues that, after independence, international NGO efforts focusing on development in Zimbabwe mirrored those of mission churches in the past, suggesting that the state still relied upon such efforts in providing development to the CAs, but with the “civilizing” agenda replaced with neoliberal market initiatives. This history set the context for the role NGOs currently play in Zimbabwe’s communal areas and the state’s continuing reliance on that role for the delivery of development.

Since independence, communal areas have been specifically targeted as beneficiaries of NGO work due to their lack of social services, poor quality of land and overall high levels of livelihood insecurity. Particularly since the FTLRP, with some exceptions, communal areas have taken precedence over resettled farm areas because of the controversial nature of land reform. I have also noted that, despite the FTLRP supposedly having been designed in part to decongest communal areas, these areas remain overcrowded and people living in communal areas remain vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity. Because of this, NGOs remain involved in communal area development projects in communal areas all over the country.

The economic crisis following 2000 and the political tensions associated with it impacted on the work of NGOs in communal areas. As the rural areas of Zimbabwe provide the majority of the support base for ZANU-PF, NGO work in communal areas was subjected to suspicion from government over project motivation, particularly in CAs with historically anti-ZANU-PF sentiment, such as many of those located in Matabeleland. This is particularly true regarding needs-assessments and beneficiary targeting, as such actions are easily labeled by the state as entailing some sort of biased political agenda. During election periods, World Vision, along with other NGOs, has been accused of involvement in rural politics (Helliker 2006). Such accusations particularly contribute to the cautious character by which NGOs approach their work.

Leading up to and during the most recent election period in July 2013, NGOs working in multiple CAs were requested to cease their activities and remove themselves from the areas to allow room and time for unhindered campaigning by political parties, undisturbed by the presence of NGOs (Appendix 1, Interview 3). In addition to political tensions, the economic crisis occurring throughout the first decade of the 2000s shifted – as mentioned earlier – much development work to short-term emergency relief around food insecurity as well as the HIV and AIDS pandemic (Helliker 2006). This in large part is due to changes in agendas of donors, who are only now slowly re-opening the idea of long-term funding as opposed to very short-term funding. Even as the economy has begun to stabilize, both political tensions and poverty remain prominent in communal areas. As a result, NGO development projects in communal areas are precarious in terms of answering to both donors and the state.

NGOs contribute significantly to communal area livelihoods in a variety of areas. They are a key source of finance, supplementing communal area inhabitants' incomes and livelihoods through income-generating projects, food relief, and loans for farming inputs (Moyo et al. 2000); and they also engage in infrastructural projects. Examples of NGOs in communal areas include Plan International, World Vision, Lutheran Development Service and Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) (Helliker 2006). Plan International focuses on child health care, food security and food relief aid, agricultural production of crops and livestock, and income-generating projects (Plan Zimbabwe 2012). World Vision carries out a variety of development projects, both input-related and training workshops, focusing on water and sanitation, education, HIV and AIDS, health and nutrition, agricultural production, and dam construction and irrigation (Helliker 2008). Lutheran Development Service focuses on water and food security, microfinance and economic development, environmental management, sanitation, HIV and AIDS, rural infrastructure development, information and communication technology, and emergency response and disaster preparedness (DSW 2012). And ITDG focuses on rehabilitating rural water points, agricultural production (including dairy, mushrooms and guar beans) and bee keeping (Helliker 2006). These examples represent only a very small number of the many NGOs working in Zimbabwe's communal areas. Often, though, these NGOs operate in an uncoordinated fashion and

often through patchwork development in which some communal areas receive greater development assistance than others.

Participation is generally expressed by most of these NGOs as central to their development methodology and values systems. The approaches taken toward participation vary among NGOs and between different communal areas. Most claim to engage in deep participatory methodologies but often this is not the case. Further, approaches are particularly specific to the district in which the communal area is located, as all NGO work must be approved by the District Administrator (DA) and the Rural District Council (RDC) for each specific district. Such state entities and personnel seek to determine the NGO's intentions prior to their direct involvement with communities in the CAs, and also require that NGO actions work toward or at least complement the district's development plan. In addition to this element of determining project direction prior to contact with intended beneficiaries it became evident through my fieldwork that, due to the cluster system (as explained above) and donor funding limitations, participatory needs-assessment and in-the-field project planning appears to be limited in actual practice, with much of the assessment and planning taking place prior to connections with intended beneficiaries.

As well, while some NGOs (such as those mentioned above) cover a wide variety of sectors and are therefore equipped to respond to a variety of needs, many NGOs are specialized in their efforts and therefore they enter a particular CA with a pre-determined intervention plan. An example of this is the NGO called Operation Trumpet Call, which works alongside partner churches in CAs throughout the country in order to teach a specific method of conservation agriculture (Appendix 1, Interview 17). Such NGOs use the cluster system in addition to official reports, such as those from the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC), as well as reports from their partner churches, to seek out and assess needs which have already been expressed by specific CA communities and that correspond to their pre-set, specialized interventions. They therefore approach participation from an involvement-based perspective rather than the catalytic empowerment-based approach (where the beneficiaries would determine and plan their own project with the aid or guidance from the NGO).

Another approach taken to participation in development interventions is a training- and knowledge-based approach which involves limited to no physical inputs. This knowledge-based approach attempts to achieve – as articulated by the NGOs involved – empowerment-based participation in project implementation by attracting motivated individuals who are willing to attend training workshops regardless of receiving inputs. Both World Vision and Operation Trumpet Call carry out these types of interventions in Zimbabwe's CAs.

Participation by rural communities with regard to monitoring and evaluation also varies considerably among NGOs working in CAs. As will become evident in the next two chapters, World Vision has taken on a practical, resource-saving approach to much of their monitoring and evaluation by saving the bulk of their donor funding for project implementation, and outsourcing much of their monitoring and evaluation processes and mechanisms to local government ministries. Again, however, such methods are restricted and depend on the particular CA and the district in which it lies, as relationships with local authorities (both elected government and traditional authorities) must be trusting, conducive and supportive for this approach to be achieved. As is evidenced in the above discussion of the historical and contemporary context of NGOs in Zimbabwe, such trusting and positive relationships are often non-existent.

The ability of NGOs in CAs to achieve participatory methods is also affected at times by the beneficiaries themselves. Witchcraft in rural areas is a concern for NGO effectiveness, as economic success for communal households can be treated as suspect and responded to with apprehension, with the improved livelihoods of household members becoming subjected to the believed affects of witchcraft (Bornstein 2005). In this case, the very goals that NGO development efforts are attempting to achieve are working toward breaking down or changing such local beliefs.

In summary, DNGOs continue to be an important source of development provision in Zimbabwe's communal areas, but their work in contemporary Zimbabwe is marked by deep tensions and contradictions. As a result, they struggle to match the practical requirements of accountability to the state and to donors with their proclaimed ideals of empowerment and participatory development. This will be exemplified later in my case study of World Vision in Matabeleland.

3.6 Social Space of NGOs in Zimbabwe: Legitimacy and Effectiveness

Despite the sparse literature on NGOs, and specifically DNGOs, in Zimbabwe, critical questions have long arisen over the motivations, legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs in Zimbabwe. Their inherent dependence on international funding and therefore the implicit international influence over the direction of their projects, goals and priorities is problematic in-itself though not unusual for NGOs worldwide. This dependence has also been used by the Zimbabwean state to justify tactics of oppressive control over NGO actions. Additionally their disengagement from controversial issues, both before the FTLRP and dramatically after it, has been questioned. This includes their seemingly absent role in advocacy for significant land reform prior to 2000, their lack of development work within ‘newly’ resettled areas post-2000, and their avoidance of direct confrontation with the state. Other questions relate to the need and legitimacy of the role of NGOs, particularly in rural communal areas, in filling in gaps where the competence or willingness of the state to address development and social services deficits has fallen short. In this respect, there are two concerns. First, it can be argued that such development activities by NGOs play the role of an unsustainable bandage for gaps in state delivery, whereas NGOs could be involved in building state capacity for implementing sustainable rural development initiatives. Secondly, in engaging in development work, NGOs may be patching up public service deficiencies to a point of minimal acceptance from the perspective of rural communities and therefore dampening rural opposition to state inadequacies and standing in the way of any potential for more far-reaching and empowering development. In addressing these complex questions and concerns, which I also pursue in and through my case study, I briefly consider NGOs in the context of their social space in Zimbabwe and, in so doing, reiterate some of the points made already.

Donor funding has been a critical aspect of NGO activity in Zimbabwe on multiple levels. On the level of project design and implementation, it has been a determinant in focus areas, methods and longevity of development projects. This is problematic in realizing the integration of deep participatory methodologies into projects as well as toward implementing long-term sustainable projects. As well, donor priorities create the potential for excluding from projects a number of people or even entire

communities who are in dire need of development assistance. As mentioned above, fast track resettlement areas have been excluded, with minor exceptions, from internationally-funded development aid due to disapproval of the program by the international community. This is particularly troublesome in that, regardless of the debate over the motivations and methods pursued through FTLRP, the 127,192 households which were resettled onto family plots under what is called the A1 scheme (Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 14) could benefit greatly from development projects given the state's failure to provide proper post-settlement support. Also, even in communal areas, where most development NGO projects are concentrated, shifting donor trends and international responses to Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis have impacted on the sustainability of ongoing projects.

Judging from these influences, NGOs appear to be a subordinate group in the international ('big d') development system, at the mercy of international trends and top-down donor driven methods. Helliker (2008:266-268) however points out that although NGOs are subordinate partners in their general relationship with donors, donors do not coercively impose themselves on NGOs, as NGOs in fact "tactically 'negotiate' their dependence" on donors. This means that NGOs are not simply victims, but are aware of their inherent dependence and therefore hope to manage that relationship in a way that is most advantageous to their own goals, which could be a mixture of goals focusing on sustainable development in rural communities and those focusing on their own organizational sustainability. In other words, they are not merely doing the bidding of 'others' (in this case, donors), but are attempting to make adulterated decisions that go some way to realizing their goals and that often involves compromises vis-à-vis their visions and missions. This also holds true within their relationship with the state.

While NGOs may be criticized for complementarily filling development gaps instead of taking a more active role in contesting the hegemony of the state (and particularly an authoritarian state), it should be recognized that they are inhibited by the culture of fear – not always a fear of violence and repression necessarily, though this sometimes happens, but the fear of organizational insecurity if subjected to a state crackdown. As Moyo et al. (2000:85) point out, NGOs "cannot apply pressure against officials who are known to engage in unethical conduct unless an appropriate, free and

democratic environment exists in the society”. It has already been pointed out that, as a result of intimidation, false accusations and oppressive legislation, such an environment does not exist in present-day Zimbabwe. DNGOs therefore have chosen to follow the cautious direction (or the course of least resistance) that leads to mobilizing development initiatives in rural areas that are neglected by the state, rather than head-on confrontation where they risk further oppression and exclusion. That, however, leads to a large overarching question as to their legitimacy: does filling in gaps truly benefit people and catalyze the development of more sustainable livelihoods, or does it merely ameliorate deeply-engrained issues in the short term, therefore prolonging a state of uncertainty instead of allowing true, long-lasting, fundamental change which arguably must penetrate the realm of government?

The argument that criticizes NGOs for filling gaps implies that if people no longer received humanitarian and development aid, they would refuse to tolerate their situation and rise up against the state, catalyzing revolutionary change. This argument, however, is simplistic and unrealistic. Even if such a reaction could occur, the results would be uncertain and the brunt of the costs of such changes could be born mostly by the poor and vulnerable, first through the increased livelihood insecurity from the likely withdrawal of aid and, second, through the uncertain impacts of such a situation (Bird and Busse 2007). In the case of Zimbabwe, such a situation would be particularly felt by those located in CAs, which have a history of bearing government manipulation. If this argument for social frustration leading to revolutionary change is not appropriate or feasible and if long-term development change and increased livelihood security must involve fundamental changes at the state level, a key question then arises: how can NGOs in Zimbabwe not only fill in gaps but influence change in government development policies and practices whilst maneuvering in a social space in which the fear of exclusion makes confrontational advocacy impossible?

It was argued earlier in this chapter that, despite the positive progress made in 2009 when the power-sharing agreement was signed, the political tensions remaining still shape an NGO attitude of ambivalent avoidance of controversial issues. Therefore, the true root of this question regarding NGOs’ legitimacy in Zimbabwe is whether or not they are capable of, and are active in, maintaining a constant process of self-reflection

that critically scrutinizes their decisions and their impacts, as well as recognizes opportunities for instigating meaningful change. As part of organizational learning, such a demeanor of reflection and readiness is what is necessary for NGOs to have at least the possibility of remaining on the progressive and appropriate side of the fine line between the superficial alleviation of development discrepancies (and therefore the perpetuation of the *status quo*) and meaningful development assistance that catalyzes sustainable livelihood practices and social change. In this respect, Helliker (2008:266) notes that “failure to reflect regularly and meaningfully on organizational practices is considered to be one of the ‘biggest weaknesses’ of NGOs in Zimbabwe because ‘we are operational all the time’”. If that weakness exists, then the fundamental flaw in the priorities and practices of NGOs in Zimbabwe must be resolved if they are to carry out an appropriate and meaningful role in the socio-economic development of Zimbabwe and a role that brings to the fore empowering participatory methodologies.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe and the contexts in which they carry out their work. Due to its complex and tension-riddled history in addition to recent economic crisis and political uncertainty, NGOs in Zimbabwe have experienced great precariousness in their pursuit of funding, adhering to government restrictions and requirements and ensuring their own organizational survival while attempting to carry out meaningful development assistance (namely in communal areas). If these NGOs are to achieve meaningful and appropriate practices in carrying out their central role in development in Zimbabwe, continual self-reflection and scrutiny that questions their methods and the very character and existence of that role is necessary. In this context, the following chapter looks more specifically at World Vision, both globally and nationally in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 4: World Vision – Globally and Nationally

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses World Vision, in both the global and Zimbabwean context. In the first part of this chapter is a contextual basis for understanding World Vision as a global partnership by briefly describing its historical background and philosophical base, as well as its organizational structure. Then a careful consideration is taken of World Vision's official policies around development approaches, practices and accountability, all of which shed great light on the legitimacy and appropriateness of its role both globally and in Zimbabwe. This provides a basis for both understanding its existence and legitimacy as a voluntary organization, and in contextualizing my study of its work in Umzingwane district in Zimbabwe which is discussed in Chapter Four.

4.2 World Vision: Introduction and History

World Vision International (WVI) is a large-scale, international, Christian NGO which focuses on working against the causes of poverty with a particular focus on children. It is primarily a development NGO, but also conducts work in relief and advocacy. World Vision's values and directives are rooted deeply in evangelicalism. It was formed by a group of evangelicals with close ties to the Fuller Theological Seminary (California, USA) in the late 1940s to early 1950s as an answer to the growing push from evangelicals to spread Christianity throughout the world and throughout all aspects of social life (Bornstein 2005). According to WVI's history statement (WVI 2013a), the inspiration to form the organization came from a Reverend Pierce's experience on a mission-based trip to China, in which he met an abused orphan named White Jade and pledged to send a monthly support stipend for the girl's care. After that, the organization was officially established in 1950 (Gwynne and Miller 2011:26) and, from then, began to spread throughout the world.

In 1977, World Vision International was formed as a global partnership, creating a structure to govern and connect World Vision work throughout the world, with a board

of directors, advisory council and an organizational headquarters (Gwynne and Miller 2011:26, Bornstein 2005). At that time, WVI was also incorporated as a non-profit religious corporation in California, USA (WVI 2011a). The evangelical values and the atmosphere of the time in which WV began (post-World War II) connect WV's roots with Western (namely American) ideals that tie together material and economic prosperity with Christianity and moral behavior (Bornstein 2005). These values are still evident in WV's work today, particularly in their development-based efforts and their microfinance subsidiary, VisionFund, the purpose of which is to provide small loans to people where access to fair banking is unavailable. From its beginnings to the present, the work of World Vision has grown from direct aid and evangelical efforts to economic and social development, as well as advocacy and emergency relief, but always keeping within the context of evangelical values. Such values are relevant to the existence and character of the NGO itself and the justification for its role. Within these values, the priority of addressing the needs of children (as with the story of White Jade) has remained central to World Vision's activities.

4.3 World Vision's Global Structure and Presence

The organization and its affiliates are present in 97 countries around the world (Gwynne and Miller 2011:25), with 53 national offices that, in signing World Vision's Covenant of Partnership, make up a "federated network" which adheres to a common vision and mission statement (WVI 2011a:5). This network, the World Vision Partnership, involves multiple types of organizational relationships at varying levels. World Vision recognizes its partnership through signing the Covenant of Partnership, which is a commitment by all World Vision entities. This covenant is an informal agreement, rather than a legal agreement, in which mutually-dependent bodies have all committed themselves to the same four covenant principles: empowerment of each (national) entity and its right and ability to make decisions and be held accountable; interdependence, or the recognition of the necessity of the global World Vision Partnership and all intrinsic values and missions that accompany such an international commitment; twin citizenship, recognizing allegiance to both the global and the national entity; and accountability in upholding the values and missions of World Vision as individuals and as national bodies.

Understanding the structures which constitute WVI helps to contextualize the ways in which the organization channels learning and funding, as well as maintains organizational continuity and integrity through internal accountability structures.

Before looking into the global, regional, and national structures of the organization, as well as the tiers of leadership and accountability within such structures, there is much that can be learned about World Vision by considering these four key Partnership Covenant principles to which all World Vision partners must commit. They are seemingly contradictory, placing great value simultaneously on both the individuality of each WV entity (such that decisions and actions made are appropriate to local contexts) and the dependence and subservience of these same entities to World Vision International and its Global Partnership in order to achieve coherence, consistency and accountability throughout the organization (such that the direction of all World Vision work is based on the same set of values and priorities). According to World Vision International, the first principle, empowerment, “ensures that bureaucracy does not impede the rights of the local entity” whereas the third principle, twin citizenship, acknowledges that there are times when “the immediate interests of the smaller unit must be sacrificed to interests of the whole and to the ultimate benefit of all” (WVI 2011a:11). What this contradiction signifies is that while World Vision hopes to prioritize local values and directives – a necessary aspect for participatory and empowering development to occur – and therefore attempts to allow a degree of local independence, WVI also wishes to maintain what it sees as its organizational integrity and accountability to official values and objectives.

In order to achieve this, World Vision International operates on three levels: global, regional, and national. Within a country, national offices also operate on a variety of levels. At the global level, WVI is governed by the WVI Board of Directors, the WVI President, whom the board oversees, and the WVI Council. The board is responsible for overseeing the global partnership operations, creating WV policy and making sure WV offices worldwide are aligned with policies. The president implements the board’s directives through the Global Center (or headquarters), which is responsible for the following: financing, including resource allocation, fundraising, and monitoring and accountability; building global continuity and infrastructure, as well as operational

strategy; promoting, protecting and advertising the World Vision identity; and any other areas which may highly impact the organization globally. The vision and philosophies of World Vision, also determined at the global level, are the responsibility of the World Vision International Council.

The governing bodies listed above – the World Vision International Board of Directors, made up of voted-in, regional representatives who serve on the board voluntarily (there is no pay for sitting on the board), and the World Vision International Council, made up of the WVI board members and a representative from each WV national office – decide the direction, objectives and policies of WVI. The WVI Council evaluates the organization's values, goals and achievements; then, based on these assessments, it recommends policy changes to the WVI Board for the latter's consideration. While unable to create or amend policy, or control WVI operations, the council is influential in determining the direction and philosophies of the organization, as it has the authority to make changes to WV's official mission and values, including core documents and the covenant of partnership. The WVI Board may in fact amend policy and control the operations of WVI, but cannot make amendments to the values, mission and direction of the organization as contained in core WV documents. The board meets two times a year and has an executive committee that meets two additional times separately. The covenant of partnership includes a commitment from national offices to follow the policies and core documents made by the board and the council.

At the regional level, WVI is broken up into regions with eight regional forum areas and seven regional offices (WVI 2011a:15). Regional forums are made up of representatives from national offices and national advisory boards. These regional forums do not hold governing power over national offices (as the global center and the board of directors hold this power); however, they bring national representatives together to develop regional strategies as well as strengthen the connections between the national level and the global level. Finally, the regional forums allow national offices to be represented at international board level. Out of the national representatives who make up each regional forum, a regional representative is chosen by vote, and these regional representatives make up the WVI Board of Directors. The regional areas include Africa, two Asian regions, Australasia, Europe and the Middle East, Latin America and North

America. Other than North America, which is allowed five board directors, each region elects three directors (regional representatives) for the international board (WVI 2011a:12). Unlike the regional forums, the regional offices do hold some direct governing powers which are delegated from the international president to the regional leaders. These include regional resource allocation, approving national office strategies and aligning regional strategy.

At the national level, there are four types of offices: program offices, national office branches, intermediate national offices and interdependent national offices. Program offices are smaller offices which are managed by WVI line management (at the international level) and are located in countries where WVI has decided to carry out specific work. These offices generally conduct relief work, rather than development or advocacy work, and they do not have a vote in the WVI Council. National office branches have an advisory council which may vote in the WVI Council, and may send a member to run for a position on the WVI Board of Directors. They are, however, a dependent part of the overall WVI entity and therefore report to WVI line management. An intermediate national office is an entity of its own, separate from WVI, which has its own board of directors; nevertheless, some decision-making powers are still regulated by WVI. This type of office may vote in the WVI Council and its board members are eligible for election to the WVI Board of Directors. Finally, interdependent national offices are legally separate entities, and are governed by WVI only through their commitment to the Covenant of Partnership. An interdependent national office has a vote in the WVI Council and its board members are also eligible to be elected onto the WVI Board of Directors.

Under a national office, World Vision may have multiple offices dispersed throughout a particular country, the number and location of which depends on the size of the national office and the number and extent of programs and projects they are conducting. Their larger offices will usually be in large cities and places where they are able to meet with national government, other NGOs and larger organizations such as UNICEF, European Union, and Food and Agriculture Organization. World Vision will also often have small offices located within the areas where they are working, sometimes including office space in government office blocks.

World Vision's organizational structure also involves means for intra-organizational support amongst national offices, specifically in regards to funding, in order to support organizational stability and consistency and to enable offices to adhere to global policy and accountability requirements. These systems include Support Offices located around the globe, which act as intermediary NGOs, channeling monetary support to implementing WV offices in other parts of the world.

Finally, in addition to World Vision International's global, regional, national and local structures, there is the subsidiary entity VisionFund International. In 2003, after ten years of carrying out microfinance programs for small business owners and entrepreneurs, World Vision decided to develop a specialized subsidiary in order to address the complexities within this area of need and create fair banking and loan opportunities for the "economically active poor" in areas where fair banking is not available (WVI 2011a:17). VisionFund International is registered as a non-profit religious corporation in California, USA and is governed by its own board of directors, who are appointed by the WVI Board of Directors. It must also align to the WVI global partnership policies and strategies.

4.4 Philosophy, Approach and Policy

World Vision maps out its policies, practices and philosophies in a series of published statements, handbooks, guides and diagrams. Found within these are the Mission Statement, Vision, Ministry Framework, Ministry Goal, Integrated Focus, Core Values, Ministry Pillars, Development Program Approach, Transformational Development Indicators and LEAP (Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning). These published standards include further breakdowns of philosophy and practice, some more specific than others, such as the Child Well-Being Outcomes, which are a set of benchmarks for measuring the quality of a child's life. Some of these have remained consistent over time in both substance and rhetoric, such as the mission statement, while others have been altered in either wording, substance or both, in order to keep in agreement with current discourse surrounding what is deemed acceptable by international development assistance standards.

World Vision claims six core values which join with the mission and vision statements as the ideological foundation for its work. These are as follows: Christianity, commitment to the poor, value for people, stewardship, partnering with other stakeholders and responsiveness. In working toward those values, World Vision has three main areas of focus which they call ministry pillars. Those refer to three types of NGO work: development (Transformational Development Pillar), direct aid and relief (Emergency Relief Pillar), and advocacy (Promotion of Justice Pillar). Within each of these areas, the work is, theoretically, either directly or indirectly working toward the organization's ministry goal, which is "the sustained well-being of children within families and communities – especially the most vulnerable" and toward its vision statement, which is to achieve "life in all its fullness" for all children (WVI 2010:1).

Programs that fall within its advocacy pillar, while growing, are not as prominent as programs for emergency relief or development. The largest of its advocacy programs are those advocating for behavioral change (particularly in relation to preventing the spread of HIV), and the Citizen Voice in Action program model. The latter is a development-related advocacy program intended to be carried out with other WV development projects for the purposes of identifying the local causes of poverty and empowering people to organize and engage with government and various stakeholders for improving essential services, such as health and education services (WVI 2012b). It is also significant to note, that despite the name of its advocacy pillar (Promotion of Justice), the advocacy programs are not particularly designed to excite political engagement, but rather focus more on tangible development-based goals which may or may not involve engaging with government and political authorities.

The behavioral change programs also run hand in hand with other development or relief programs, targeting the same people, rather than being conducted as solely advocacy exercises. Additionally, while World Vision is a large contributor to direct food aid and other direct aid services, many of its relief programs are development-focused, as they involve post-disaster or post-conflict development and the development of pre-disaster or pre-conflict preparedness (which involve livelihood impact prevention methods) (WVI 2011a). These examples, Citizen Voice in Action, behavioral change and emergency impact prevention, exhibit World Vision's emphasis on development, even

within its advocacy and relief based pillars. Finally, its development pillar, Transformational Development, is incredibly prominent within World Vision efforts and is multi-faceted, involving a variety of program types.

4.4.1 Transformational Development

Transformational Development is the conceptualization of World Vision's approach and philosophy toward development aid. As stated on its website, World Vision's mission is to "follow [the] Lord and Savior Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to promote human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the good news of the kingdom of God" and – as indicated – its overall vision is "life in all its fullness" (WVI 2013b) for all children. In other words, its goal is to provide a better life for children through transformational development and evangelism. In order to keep up with global expectations about development methodologies and accountability as well as its own desire to continually better its programs and act as a learning organization, World Vision continues to adapt and fine-tune its approach to development within the values of its consistent mission statement, valuing child betterment and human transformation as critical.

Transformational development, which is defined as an approach which focuses on holistic processes of change in order to "move toward wholeness of life with dignity, justice, peace, and hope" through the actions of children, families and communities (Byworth 2003:103), has been the ideological framework for World Vision's ever-adapting approach. In 2002, World Vision International Board policy included transformational development as a "required core competency of World Vision" and it has since remained central to the organization's approach (WVI Board 2002:1).

The foundation of transformational development involves two principles: the belief that the presence of Jesus Christ in someone's life involves a continual transformational process of betterment (a Christianity-based justification for the necessity of development); and the belief in a holistic approach, meaning that all the factors and systems affecting development are interlinked such that the process of change must continually involve all aspects of life through cross-sectoral development. This emphasis on holism supports two key aspects of World Vision's work.

The first is its aim to keep the key focus on children while recognizing them as an integral part of a broader group (from the level of family up to community and country). World Vision therefore works with and for those broader groups rather than excluding them by limiting its work to children only. In other words, while targeting a specific group, children, WV has chosen to work holistically (across a variety of groups) to benefit all those who influence or affect children (the target group). This aim is evident in its Ministry Goal, which is “the sustained well-being of children within families and communities – especially the most vulnerable”; this explicitly places children within their surrounding social environments (families and communities) (WVI 2011a:5). It is also evident in World Vision’s Integrated Focus, which states that the organization is community-based, Christian and child-focused, implying both an inability to separate a child from its community and an inability to separate Christ from development.

The second key holistic aspect is the wide range of development sectors covered by World Vision’s projects, including water and sanitation, education, health care, agriculture, small business/financial support, and behavioral change. WV supports this holistic aspect with its concept of Area Development Programs, which are long-term programs that aim toward improving all aspects of life within specific geographical vicinities over a period of 15-20 years. Not all World Vision projects are part of an Area Development Program and many efforts are carried out as independent projects; however, even those separate projects are often carried out within close vicinity of each other with overlap of their targeted beneficiary groups.

In order to form the concept of transformational development into tangible goals and measurable outcomes, World Vision defined five Domains of Change, or areas where change in the quality of livelihoods should be assessed and measured and, within those domains, created Transformational Development Indicators (TDIs) as outcomes to be measured against. The five Domains of Change are: the well-being of children, particularly regarding physical and spiritual health and opportunity; empowered children, as having an important role in the development of their communities; transformed relationships, entailing relationships within target communities and relationships between communities and other stakeholders involved in development (such as government, churches, and other organizations, including WV); interdependent and empowered

communities; and transformed systems and structures, which are related to policy-based and culturally-based institutions (such as governments and churches) (WVI 2003). The TDIs involve specific measurable standards at household and community level regarding the following areas: immunization, nutrition, primary education, water, diarrhea management, household resilience, HIV and AIDS prevention, caring relationships, evidence of hope, Christianity, community participation in development, and social sustainability (Byworth 2003:106).

Some years after putting TDIs into practice for assessments and evaluations, they were found by WV itself to be very useful for bettering national-level organizational awareness of communities as well as recognizing transformational change. At the same time, they were found to be weak in linking that change to World Vision and its programs. In 2009, these TDIs were found to be difficult to measure (requiring too much technical capacity, time and labor), and they had only been measured in about 60% of area development programs worldwide (WVI 2009:5). These challenges led World Vision to begin developing a second edition of revised TDIs, which should align better with other World Vision policies and frameworks and make clearer World Vision's specific impact on transformational change.

As mentioned above, World Vision's policies are intertwined in a series of handbooks, definitions, programming guides, publications and statements which exist in order to unify WV's values and practices and to guide its staff in achieving partnership policies and approaches. Most of these fall under or run hand in hand with its Development Program Approach.

4.4.1.1 Development Program Approach

The Development Program Approach (DPA), outlined in its handbook for development programs, is the intended approach for all WV projects (both sponsorship-funded projects in Area Development Programs and donor grant-funded projects outside of these projects). The handbook highlights the importance of the principles and goals laid out in the ministry framework as the basis for the approach. This Development Program Approach is the product of the organization's efforts as a learning organization to produce a model for programming which is based on learned experience from WV

projects across the globe, with a particular emphasis on the learning achieved from local-level staff experience (WVI 2011b). The approach has four areas of focus: contributing to child well-being which requires a clearly reported connection between the project and child well-being outcomes (discussed below); working with communities and ‘partners’, particularly involving local authorities including government; equipping local-level staff, in terms of training, resources, reflective evaluation and facilitating their close connections with the beneficiary community; and basic program parameters, which include the requirement of a manageable geographic area corresponding to government boundaries already in place (for example, a district or county) and the resources necessary to meet World Vision expectations.

The DPA includes a set of fifteen goals for the quality of life of children, deemed the Child Well-Being Outcomes (CWBOs). These are World Vision’s central objectives and are the basis for project design. They are also the benchmarks upon which WV has set achievable targets (the Child Well-Being Targets) and these are the standards against which WV projects are measured during evaluation for fulfilling accountability expectations. The CWBOs are categorized into four key ‘aspirations,’ which are built around World Vision’s ministry goal of sustained child well-being, particularly for the most vulnerable children. The four aspirations are: that children “enjoy good health”, “are educated for life”, “experience love of God and their neighbors” and “are cared for, protected and participating” (WVI 2011b:10).

These CWBOs are the basis for the child well-being targets, which are central to the current World Vision Partnership strategy. The targets, which World Vision hopes to achieve by 2016, are that: children “report an increased level of well-being” (in terms of the CWBOs); there is an increased number of children from birth to age five who are well-nourished; there is an increase in the number of children of that same target age group who are protected from disease and infection; and there is an increase in the number of children who can read by age eleven (WVI 2011b:10). Not all WV projects involve all four of these targets. In this respect, the targets to be prioritized are decided on regionally and then nationally, as part of both regional and national strategies, in order to maintain relevance to the local context. Additionally, WVI claims that rather than imposing CWBOs, it uses the CBWOs as a starting point to guide discussion which leads

to a “shared vision and priorities of child wellbeing” among the community and other stakeholders, and therefore it does not require all targets to be worked on and achieved at one time (WVI 2009:2).

Finally the CWBOs, while intended for all children, target the ‘most vulnerable’. World Vision defines that group as:

Children whose quality of life and ability to fulfill their potential are most affected by extreme deprivation and violations of their rights. These children often live in catastrophic situations [where] relationships [are] characterized by violence, abuse, neglect, exploitation, exclusion and discrimination (WVI 2011b:12).

While recognizing that this definition is of a general character, and that practical application will be different between different local contexts, WV adheres to the belief that interventions which are not specifically focused on the most vulnerable take the risk of supporting the existing structures which lead to that vulnerability in the first place.

Under the DPA, these targeted aims are carried out through two project model types, which are outlined for World Vision staff as “technically sound approaches” which do not necessitate designing “completely new projects” (WVI 2011b:5). The first is through specialized project models, which are specific to a sector or theme, for example educational improvement. The second type, the ‘enabling project model’, involves combining specialized project models to create holistic project models which work toward wider goals.

4.4.1.2 Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning

To be used hand in hand with the Development Program Approach and as a practical framework for applying TDIs and CWBOs within programming, World Vision uses a program policy framework called Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning (LEAP). While the DPA provides a guide to thinking about and carrying out programs and projects, LEAP outlines World Vision’s approach for carrying out its work and achieving accountability in design, monitoring and evaluation. Much can be understood about World Vision by studying the LEAP policies, as they present both actual requirements and discursive perspectives regarding World Vision’s ‘take’ on

development and poverty. By looking within LEAP and comparing its requirements with its recommendations and explanations, it is possible to compare the ideological base of World Vision work with what is prioritized and required on the ground. LEAP also exhibits a practical perspective with flexibility between what is desirable in project methodology and what is actually achievable on the ground.

LEAP provides the framework for all of World Vision's work and adherence to it is required of all World Vision offices. It was introduced in 2005, has been since updated based on feedback and evaluations and, according to WV, it has led to improvement in project effectiveness (WVI 2009:1). The LEAP approach was developed from an extensive review of development literature and lessons learned from WV's work and the experience of other NGOs and organizations, including Oxfam, UNDP, CARE International and European Union (WVI 2007). LEAP outlines a six-step process approach to development projects, where each step includes required standards (what staff *must* do in each step of the process) and advisory guidelines (what WV *recommends* that staff do whenever it is possible and efficient, but is not required of all projects and interventions). While the general requirements of the approach are to be used across all World Vision projects world-wide, the approach requires context-specific action. Rather than a project format or outline to be followed, it is a step-process specifically related to unifying values and minimum standards throughout the global World Vision partnership. It also requires specific aspects of accountability to be measured for the purposes of meeting international and local accountability standards and achieving reflection and active learning as an organization. According to World Vision, LEAP's purpose is to align organizational strategy with actual action on the ground (WVI 2007).

The six steps in the LEAP process are assessment, design, monitoring, evaluation, reflection and transition. While they are put in this order, WV recognizes that each step involves significant overlap and that, within each step, there are necessary aspects of the other five. The first step, assessment, involves producing a report which includes a description of the assessment process, findings, analysis of findings, recommendations, lessons learned and a plan with a budget for use during the design phase. LEAP outlines seven steps within this assessment phase, which are: (1) to ensure everything done is in alignment with national strategy; (2) hold initial discussions with major partners (which

include government at various levels depending on context, community leaders, NGOs, churches, other organizations and other World Vision partners) in order to understand what is already being done to address poverty and to assign who should carry out other assessment objectives; (3) agree with WV support offices to secure funding for the assessment; (4) conduct an analysis of power among the various stakeholders (or partners) in order to identify authority, conflict, and capacity that already exists; (5) collect and review information about the community to understand local issues; (6) analyze the data and write the assessment report; and finally (7) reach an agreement with all partners (both World Vision and local partners) to go ahead with designing a project (WVI 2007).

As mentioned above, each step in the LEAP process contains required standards and advisory guidelines. Among the advisory guidelines for the assessment process, two stand out as being particularly prioritized. These are that secondary data is the preferred type of data for collection and analysis (for understanding local needs and the poverty context) and that assessment should only be undertaken where there is a strong likelihood that the intended work will indeed be carried out. The second of these is clearly in place as a means of avoiding any disappointment or distrust that would inevitably arise from conducting assessment with local partners and then being unable to move forward with any project design (due to lack of funding or other reasons). The emphasis on secondary data has other implications. The first implication is that primary data is costly and time-consuming, and can also be a means of inadvertently raising false expectations among potential partners and beneficiaries. World Vision suggests that the benefit of quantitative data is derived from good analysis, rather than collection processes, and therefore emphasizes the use of secondary data, particularly quantitative secondary data, as a first step. WV then suggests that, after analyzing secondary data, and if it is deemed necessary, qualitative data as well as any primary quantitative data may be used as a means to understand gaps or reasons for what is discovered through the secondary data analysis. While both time- and cost-efficient, as well as avoiding the development of misunderstandings and false expectations in the field, this strategy takes the risk that valid information, which may arise during primary data collection (particularly qualitative collection), and which may have been beneficial in understanding important

aspects of local context, is overlooked. This priority of secondary, quantitative data also implies that participatory assessment with general community members may not even take place, if it is not deemed necessary for filling in ‘gaps’ from secondary data.

The design stage of the LEAP six-step process involves building on the assessment to develop a program plan. LEAP requires this plan to emphasize the following: alignment with National Office strategy and guidelines; a strong understanding of local issues and context-specific causes of poverty; establishing local power relationships among stakeholders (government, community leaders and local organizations); ensuring shared responsibility between WV and local partners in the form of assigned roles for program actions; local project ownership; explanations of local capacity enabling anticipation of sustainability after World Vision’s withdrawal from the area; anticipated risks and risk management; and criteria that will be used to judge program success. Emphasis is also placed on the responsibility of government as the “primary duty-bearer for issues arising in an area” (WVI 2007:42). If working toward an entire program design, this process involves creating a program-specific framework and mindset which are supported by secondary data. If working on a specific project design, the project must align with the overall program under which it falls. It is also required, within WV standards, that the design process involves participatory approaches with beneficiaries “whenever practical and cost effective” (WVI 2007:38). This provisional statement is revealing, for practicality and cost-effectiveness once again places efficiency as a priority over participation, just as in the assessment stage. That being said, the advisory guidelines (which are not explicitly required) do acknowledge participation of all local stakeholders (including general community members) to be conducted in such a way that WV merely facilitates the process. Additionally, the guidelines during this design stage, unlike during the assessment stage, do specifically emphasize the promotion of leadership among vulnerable groups such as women, children and disabled people.

While adhering to the above, designs must include the following: day-to-day management and implementation plans, specific monitoring and evaluation plans which outline the accountability information which must be gathered and indicators of achievement, plans that emphasize sustainability based on the risk analysis, fully developed transition plans for World Vision’s withdrawal of support and an explanation

of how the program or project will be funded. It is also required that the entire design plan be written in such a way that is clear and understandable to all project partners. Importantly, when this document is completed, all the partners (for instance, local government, partner NGOs and churches) must agree on the design's approach, practical plans and proposed budgets in order to move forward with implementation.

The monitoring step of LEAP involves a constant practice of gathering feedback and comparing it to the project design, 'baseline indicators' (measurements of the situation taken at the start of implementation for the purpose of measuring change) and design objectives. LEAP requires specific monitoring report formats, and any additional reporting that donors may require must be done alongside (and not in place of) LEAP reporting mechanisms. In such cases, LEAP policy indicates that the implementing office that entered into the grant contract with the donor is responsible for the additional communications and reports. LEAP monitoring reports are periodically fed back to the national office level and are used toward informing national strategy.

While LEAP clearly states the monitoring objective of influencing national strategy, it is vague in regards to the influence of monitoring reports on current implementation (i.e. making necessary changes as a project progresses based on beneficiary feedback). All that is specified in this respect is the statement that "monitoring informs decision making" (but it is not specified at what level – national, local or project level) and that if such actions are carried out (if monitoring actions change design and implementation plans in response to beneficiary feedback) then all changes must be reported. Neither of these points though is discussed as a *requirement* for project implementation. At the same time, a clearly participatory and locally-focused guideline (again, not required but suggested) within the LEAP monitoring step is that monitoring should be carried out by local project partners (although that does not necessarily mean beneficiaries, as it could mean government or smaller partner organizations).

That being said, while not discussing it specifically as a requirement, LEAP does suggest that the time lapses between collecting data from monitoring, analyzing it and "application of learning" should be short, such that problems can be addressed quickly (WVI 2007:60). This means that WV is to some degree (be it minimal) acknowledging

the need to address project implementation issues which arise from feedback. It is also suggested, however, that it is better to prepare for addressing problem scenarios ahead of time, rather than reacting at the time, in order to be more efficient. This however could lead to generalizing problems and solutions, rather than truly listening to beneficiary responses during participatory exercises and acting based on such participation. This shows that, while WV may consider the application of feedback suggestions to be important, it has still not *required* such action as a priority, nor has it prioritized the quality of participation over efficiency. Finally, if monitoring is to be carried out by local partners, but responses to issues are to be anticipated and planned in advance for efficiency purposes, it begs the question as to whether any power is given by WV to those local partners who are conducting the monitoring so as to allow them to directly act on implementing suggested changes which may have come to light through monitoring practices.

The evaluation stage of LEAP involves measuring the successes of projects and programs in reference to World Vision's organizational objectives (such as transformational development goals), the program or project's actual outcomes compared with its projected outcomes (developed during the design stage), and the project or program's general relevance with regards to tackling the causes of poverty. These evaluations are conducted at the close of a project, according to time specifications of specific donors, or every five years (which is the specified length of a program cycle) (WVI 2007:63). They include going through previous monitoring reports as well as carrying out additional evaluation processes with local partners. LEAP requires evaluation reports to provide details about partner input and explain World Vision's specific inputs and achievements (essentially, indicating what in the project can be specifically attributed to World Vision's involvement). While evaluations are intended to be useful to the local partners during and after transition (World Vision's withdrawal from the area), this purpose is yet again merely suggested as one of LEAP's advisory guidelines and not a requirement. That being said, it is a required standard that all partners agree on the evaluation report before it is finalized (here "all partners" would not necessarily include the direct beneficiaries but may include local government, other organizations and the WV National Office).

The reflection stage is closely tied with evaluation and is geared toward both single- and double-loop learning, with the purpose of assessing impact and relevance at both the project level and National Office level by juxtaposing experience with policy. Finally, transition is the last step in the LEAP program, which refers to preparing for and implementing World Vision's withdrawal from the area. LEAP suggests that all the steps leading up to transition should involve anticipation and planning for the sustainability of the project goals, but the transition step specifically involves preparation in conjunction with local partners who commit to the responsibility of sustaining the project's imperatives. That collaborative process involves identifying potential risks to sustainability and designating who (of the local partners and beneficiaries) is responsible for addressing issues that may arise and in what capacity those issues will be handled.

Throughout all the stages of LEAP, one required standard is that all partners who contribute tangible inputs (financial or other resources) must return reports and responses within a timely fashion and using the formats and tools provided by World Vision. The tools and time requirements are specific to each step (for instance, for the assessment step, partners are required to return reports and responses within four weeks of receiving the tools and formats for reports) (WVI 2007:26).

4.4.1.3 World Vision's Strategic Mandates

In addition to TDIs, the DPA, and LEAP, World Vision's ministry model highlights five organizational Strategic Mandates. These include reinforcing and witnessing its Christianity; strengthening "grassroots field capacity"; growing in resources and organizational influence in order to increase organizational impact; being an "authoritative voice" that drives change; and building up organizational sustainability (WVI 2007:95). Its strategy also names six themes to be prioritized throughout its programs including the recognition that its interventions may impact men and women differently; a value for environmental sustainability; the protection of fundamental rights of people; peace building, which it defines as "restoring broken relationships between people engaged in destructive social conflict, as well as preventing escalation of conflict"; equal and fair inclusion of disabled people in participation; and being Christian (WVI 2007:24-25).

4.4.1.4 WV and Participatory Development

In this regard, WV has made its recognition of participation clear by listing participation as one of its core values and by making statements throughout its literature (including the introductory statements within the LEAP publication) which claim that participation of all partners is included in all steps of the development process. However, the actual outline and explanation of requirements of the six-step process of LEAP (assessment, design, monitoring, evaluation, reflection and transition) does not reflect such a value to the extent that is claimed within the LEAP introduction or in other WV discourse. While there is a great emphasis on partner involvement and consultation, as well as joint decision-making and agreement between partners with almost each step of the process, that emphasis generally comes out within the advisory guideline sections (which are not explicitly formulated as requirements) and not as required standards.

Additionally, the emphasis on partners and joint decision-making, while both valuing local input and emphasizing sustainability after transition, seems to place more importance on local leaders rather than direct beneficiaries. For example, within the assessment section of LEAP documentation, the list of “important partners” includes “government at local and national levels, community leaders, community-based organizations, non-government organizations, faith-based organizations (including churches, if present), appropriate institutions of higher learning (for example, universities) and World Vision partners (National, Support and Regional Offices)” (WVI 2007). But this list does not include target beneficiaries. In a local context, there may be overlap with members included in this list and direct beneficiaries, but it is relevant to note their lack of explicit mention. The LEAP outline does go on to include a generic definition of partners which does recognize groups or individuals who are interested in or responsible for poverty issues; however, there is no explicit reference to intended beneficiaries in these assessment, planning and decision-making activities.

In this respect, it is evident throughout the policies, programs and ideologies discussed above, that World Vision’s philosophy towards participation involves the value of collaboration and partnership with local entities and recognition of the necessity of supporting local structures if development initiatives are to be sustainable. According to its own documentation, its most valuable roles include bringing existing groups in an area

together in collaboration toward locally-oriented child well-being objectives, “and then [strengthening] their capacity if necessary” (WVI 2011b:14). This collaboration particularly extends to churches, local civil society and various levels of government. The form, extent and capacity of this partnering is to be determined by four factors, including the outcomes desired by each group, the willingness of each group to work collaboratively, the compatibility of values and the available timeframe for working together. This partnering, when connected with local government, is where World Vision sees opportunity for local-level advocacy in addressing policy changes that affect livelihoods.

In agreement with the concept of bottom-up empowerment through development, WV sees local advocacy as contributing to higher-level policy change, because “it provides legitimate evidence on which policy dialogue can be based” (WVI 2011b:17). World Vision not only speaks about this bottom-up view of capacity-building for enabling and promoting empowerment, but it also visualizes more top-down approaches as well. In the end, WV refers to promoting empowerment in four ways (two top-down approaches and two bottom-up approaches). The top-down approaches are to promote policy change through engagement with those in power and to support policy implementation by supporting those in power to fulfill promises; and the bottom-up approaches include engaging in awareness of individuals’ rights and responsibilities, and mobilizing vulnerable groups to build confidence and engage in influencing policy (WVI 2007:21).

When these philosophies enter into actual practice through the application of LEAP, advisory guidelines and required standards provide additional insight into WV’s value for, and approach to, participation. The advisory guidelines throughout LEAP often indicate aspects of participation that ideologically should be required, rather than merely recommended. What is advised through these *guidelines* is often less tangible than what is required through LEAP *standards*, and it requires context-specific information. This is most likely the reason that such advised guidelines are not written into LEAP as required standards. Therefore, while the guidelines claim that participation is a foundational principle of LEAP, when considering the standards versus the guidelines, it seems that participation is regularly considered to be only applicable when it is timely and cost-

effective in the local context, and the reference to participation only vaguely implies its inclusion of direct beneficiaries who do not already hold a leadership role.

The Development Program Approach documentation does make explicit mention of “communities and partners” as fully owning a “Shared Program Plan,” which does hint toward genuine beneficiary participation (WVI 2011b:28). LEAP, however, and not the DPA, is the actual policy that is required throughout the global WV Partnership for informing practice on the ground. The DPA also mentions that shared program plans may include projects which do not fall within national strategy, in which case World Vision may decide not to contribute toward those specific pieces of a program but still may contribute to other projects within the shared program plan that do align with WV national strategy. The mention of this is significant as it demonstrates the potential for true local ownership of the planning process (because WV would not specifically plan projects with aims outside of their national strategy).

Despite the often contingent character of participation in the LEAP outline as a guideline rather than a standard, the introduction contained in the LEAP documentation claims that “design, monitoring and evaluation explicitly include participation by all partners” which includes “children and their families, local communities and their organizations, local and national governments, local faith-based organizations, businesses, National Office staff (field and support), and donors” (WVI 2007:13). World Vision also acknowledges participation as a means of building capacity among partners, claiming that LEAP is an empowerment-based approach. What this contradiction suggests is that while WV is thinking about development in terms of participation, empowerment, sustainability and ethical appropriateness, it is sticking to a practical application of its approach which is adaptable to local constraints.

4.5 World Vision Funding

Globally, the World Vision Partnership acquires and spends over one billion dollars each year, including gifts-in-kind. In 2012, World Vision spent roughly \$1,062,261,000, with over \$902,000,000 spent on program services and almost \$160,000,000 spent on overhead costs for management and fundraising (KPMG LLP, 2012:5). WV has two primary means of acquiring funding: child sponsorship funding and grant-funding from

donors (including donation and grant funding from both the private and public sector). In addition to such funding, the organization also accepts and allocates gifts-in-kind (GIK), meaning non-monetary resources which have been donated. The largest fraction of its income comes from sponsorships, with the next largest fraction coming from both private and public sector grants and donations (WVI 2010a:34). Its large size, global presence, and reputation allow the organization, to some extent, greater stability and potentially greater flexibility than other aid organizations in acquiring donor sources.

The size and breadth of the organization supports the success of its sponsorship funding programs by making the efficiency of its sponsorship accountability methods possible as well as supporting consistent financial support from individuals from the general public. While sponsorship programming and accountability is resource-consumptive, it also inherently provides mass-scale advertising and positive reinforcement to World Vision's global image. Additionally, child sponsorship programs provide the organization with a regular and steady funding stream for a variety of development projects that are located in sponsorship areas, so long as those projects have some connection to affecting the livelihoods of the children who are sponsored. Child sponsorship funded programs are carried out through Area Development Programs, in which sponsorship money not only affects the sponsored individuals, but also affects their entire community. This type of sponsorship also gives WV full control of monitoring and reporting requirements, as it determines the timing and extent of reporting to be given to the individual sponsors. Although these traits (child sponsorship programming, a large size and global recognition) may allow World Vision more independence than other NGOs, the organization does still experience many of the funding difficulties that prevent true participation and effective developmental practice on the ground.

Donor funding, whether public or private, is less consistent than sponsorship funding, as it is acquired on a program- or project-specific basis. Again, because of its size and global reputation, the organization may have some flexibility when seeking out donor funding, and such flexibility could potentially relieve some of the implications that usually accompany the processes for receiving and maintaining donor funding. As explained above under the discussion of World Vision's structure, the size of the

organization has allowed it to create Support Offices, whose purpose is to acquire funding and enter into agreements with national or smaller offices in order to fund and support programs in doing assessments and covering administrative costs which often would not be approved by donors. These support offices help to fill the gaps in funding that may not be covered by donor-grants. World Vision may also be in a position to influence donors to align their values and requirements with systems that World Vision already has in place (for example, reporting mechanisms, focus areas and methodological requirements), as donors may be willing to adhere to the monitoring, evaluation and other accountability measures of a long-standing, reputable organization.

The type of funding (through sponsorship or donor grants) used for a project is determined by the type of project or program. Area Development Programs (ADPs) are funded primarily by child sponsorship. ADPs are WV programs which take place in a specified geographical area and involve a variety of interventions across multiple sectors. The national office, usually in conjunction with government and other stakeholders, will decide where the ADPs will be located, based on its national strategy, levels of poverty, and other considerations outlined by WVI (WVI 2011b). These offices also look at available services and infrastructural facilities to aid in communication, and they prefer to place ADPs in areas where the local people consider themselves as forming a community or sets of communities (where there is some continuity or social connection between the local people in terms of values and needs). These ADPs are long-term, cross-sectoral programs, usually lasting about 15 years (and they need to be at least 10 years for funding feasibility).

The child sponsorship funding involves private donations of the same amount made monthly for the support of one particular child. The private donors (often families or individuals who live in a more economically-developed country) are connected to a specific child from an ADP area to whom their donation is allocated. The sponsorship money is then broken down into funds that go toward community development work which benefits the entire ADP area, and funds that go directly to the specific child's needs, including school fees, hygiene products, medicine, food and other personal necessities. The sponsored children are usually chosen from a smaller area within the ADP area which has a high concentration of vulnerability. That area then becomes the

primary focus area of the ADP, and allows WV to practice the ideal of “depth before breadth” (WVI 2011b:21). This type of funding helps to guarantee long-term stability for use in other projects (such as education, health, water and sanitation, and agriculture) within the primary focus area.

Grant funding from donors is achieved on a project-by-project basis, and is used toward independent projects in a variety of areas as well as to boost projects within ADPs that are partially funded through child sponsorship. This grant donor funding is ascertained through the proposal process required by the specific donor (as discussed in chapter two). In keeping with the WV ideals of holistic development, individual donor grant funded projects which are not part of ADPs are still often carried out in groupings within close proximity to each other (both in time and space) and with an overlap of beneficiaries. These grant funded development projects vary in size, duration and focus. As noted earlier, child sponsorship is a means of both receiving funds and advertising for fundraising at the same time, and can therefore positively benefit donor-grant funded projects by means of building up WV’s reputation and global recognition. This is an indirect way of sponsorship-funded programs affecting individual projects funded through donor grants.

That being said, WV projects funded in this way are limited by the parameters set by the donors who have put out a call for proposals, as is the case with other NGOs. Sometimes adhering to World Vision policy and requirements, particularly those laid out in LEAP, creates great difficulty in acquiring grant funding from donors. While World Vision’s size and reputation may sometimes influence donors to be flexible with requirements, this is not always the case. World Vision’s Development Program Approach requires grant-funded programs to participate with local stakeholders in identifying needs and priorities and in coordinating monitoring and evaluation, just as they require from ADPs. However, donor requirements (especially when funding is contingent upon the results of monitoring reports) and the necessity to write specific project proposals before acquiring the funding, can prove challenging. This is one explanation for the contradictory requirement found in LEAP policy that assessment be based primarily on secondary data. If cost effectiveness and efficiency in assessment

practices are prioritized, there will be less overhead costs prior to submitting funding proposals.

LEAP budget requirements involve additional significant implications for how project design processes will work and how they are funded. LEAP requires that all costs for assessment, design, monitoring and evaluation are included in project budgets as direct program costs. It also requires, however, that the entire design process (within the requirements laid out in the design step of the six-step process) must be completed before producing a donor proposal for acquiring resources, as “donor proposals should contribute to National Office strategy and program objectives” (WVI 2007:49). While this allows assessments and design processes to be more thorough and truer to the local imperative, as they are carried out before donor requirements can limit program or project aims or methods, it presents a serious issue regarding how to fund assessment and design.

World Vision does recognize that there is still need for front-end resources to be available for use during assessment and project design if participatory objectives are to be pursued, which is why support offices should provide core funding to enable national offices to adhere to LEAP standards. The issue still persists, though, particularly if an agreement with a support office cannot be made. Front-end funding is also accessed through internal funding from national offices. Such funding, though, is limited and difficult to ascertain, as it must be taken in pieces from here-and-there on an almost *ad hoc* basis in the national office’s budget.

Donor grant funding also involves the added pressure of M&E requirements from the donor, in addition to World Vision’s internal requirements within the Development Program Approach and those laid out in the LEAP policy. Because of this, WVI urges national offices to: seek out donors whose strategies are compatible with the national office strategy; influence donors to align their proposal requirement strategies with more community-led strategies; use appropriate and realistic timeframes when designing the project; and design project structures that are as flexible as possible with the ability to downsize or grow depending on funding and contextual fluctuations (WVI 2011b:24). While LEAP policy does point out that the aims to align donors with national strategy are “not always practical”, it sticks to the imperative that adapting assessment and design for

the purpose of accepting funding from external donors should not affect the direction or quality of the program (WVI 2007:50). This, however, is much easier said than done.

These budgetary LEAP requirements (to complete all assessment and design procedures before producing a funding proposal) also present a potential contradiction with the LEAP assessment guideline which indicates that assessment and design should not be entered into unless the intended work is highly likely to be carried out, as there is great potential that funding from donors whose objectives align with World Vision's national strategy might not be available. Such a risk is sometimes lessened if WV can ascertain a sense of the donor's interest by submitting a concept paper which is written based on very initial discussions with important partners before significant assessment or design takes place (WVI 2007). This situation could still present challenges if the project direction takes significant turns as assessments and partner dialogues are carried out. An additional budgetary requirement of LEAP is that those who enter into a funding partnership with WV must provide the necessary funding for adhering to all LEAP requirements and activities, including staff costs for the life of the program or project. This requirement may be geared toward WV support offices which would be more likely to agree to such a condition. With other funding partners, this imperative may create significant difficulty for attempting to obtain donor agreement.

4.6 World Vision and Accountability

World Vision sees accountability in various ways, and assesses its work from a variety of perspectives. It works toward achieving accountability to the following: its beneficiaries (including an ethical imperative for integrity); other international organizations and thereby current standards of acceptable methods and practice for charitable development aid organizations; and donors, with a particular emphasis on accountability for the sake of financial stability. In doing so, it seeks to achieve general transparency with all partners (those who work with WV in various capacities), which WV sees as a biblical imperative (Gwynne and Miller 2011). WV is also accountable to the state, often as a development partner and particularly with regard to local governments and major local partners. WV has set many expectations for itself with regard to accountability, and discussions of accountability measures are very prevalent throughout its policy and discourse.

At the global level, World Vision has prioritized accountability to current expectations as found in development literature, adherence to international standards for development aid organizations, and keeping with ethical standards of society at large. In this regard, it works toward accountability in two ways. The first is by seeking transparency and defining accountability as “allowing others to know us well, with the hope that this transparency will bring greater freedom” (Gwynne and Miller 2011:2). The second is through continually analyzing and updating its policy, methodology and discourse, with an emphasis on practicing “active learning” as an organization.

In order to achieve the initiative for transparency, World Vision has become a member of the International NGO Charter of Accountability (an international group that researches and sets definitions and requirements for NGO actions), as well as over a dozen other regulatory organizations and initiatives (including Humanitarian Accountability Principles International, or HAP International, which is dedicated to ensuring that NGOs are accountable to beneficiaries) (Gwynne and Miller 2011). To meet the requirements of such organizations, WVI periodically publishes Accountability Reports. In this respect, an extensive report evaluating and explaining WVI’s policy and practice was undertaken and published in 2010, and since then there have been yearly booster reports which update variable information. As well, it publishes audited financial statements (WVI 2011a, Gwynne and Miller 2011, KPMG LLP, 2012). These statements and reports include explanations of programs, reports on donations and spending, salary figures, and other information on WVI globally (although they do not include specific project-level discussion or evaluations, and are only concerned with the global World Vision Partnership as a whole and the WVI entity). WV has also published third-party case study reports on accountability measures and methods and procedures from specific project areas for handling beneficiary complaints, although these reports have been vague in description, and are introduced with the disclaimer that they are not actual evaluations but rather are presented for discussion purposes with the goal of instigating reflection and general organizational learning (Wood 2011a, Wood 2011b). Regardless of the lack of more specific publicly available case studies, these commitments and efforts display a desire for reflection and improvement based on learned experience, as well as the intent for openness and transparency, at least at the international level.

As another basis for accountability, World Vision's practice of constantly updating its discourse and policy expresses and demonstrates a great emphasis on learning as an organization. This learning emphasis is also seen through its organizational structure, with national-level representation at the policy-making level. Within the national context, project and program reports are the baseline for creating national strategy, which in turn is the foundation of project-level practice. The reason for developing LEAP came out of this priority for learning from and adapting to feedback. Before LEAP, World Vision policy was framed around the Transformational Development Indicators, which measured WV's work toward the five domains of change (explained above). But after the TDI framework for reporting and evaluating (which was in place from 2003) was deemed overly laborious and technical, as well as incapable of linking World Vision's specific inputs to local change over time, it became clear that new policy was necessary. While TDI indicators are still used, the monitoring and evaluation reporting systems have been re-done as a part of LEAP.

The first edition of LEAP was later adapted in response to staff feedback and a second edition was put into policy. Since then, additional updates and amendments to LEAP have been made, and another updated and adapted version of the policy was being developed at the time of the most recent LEAP publication in 2009 (WVI 2009:5). Additionally, the Development Program Approach is an update of a former approach framework (the Integrated Programming Model). This adaptation of programming once again stemmed from feedback and learning, which was passed upward through the organizational channels from project level to national strategy level and on to discussion in international forum. WV has also recognized both the lack of integration and the redundancy in its various interconnected policies and frameworks (such as LEAP, TDI, and DPA), stating that "the large number of different initiatives being introduced at the same time and their lack of integration has caused confusion for staff" (WVI 2009:7) and, in response, it claims to be working toward addressing this issue.

World Vision also seeks to achieve internal accountability through transparency in addition to external transparency. Roughly every three years, internal reviews are carried out for each World Vision Partnership office. These reviews include peer reviews, which assess the effectiveness of governance in local offices, boards, and advisory

councils and involve both self-assessment and an assessment by a separate team made up of global World Vision staff from outside of the local office. There are also program capability reviews, which assess the relationship between local implementing offices and fundraising offices in terms of their capability to achieve strategic goals. These reviews likewise include both self-assessment and assessment by global WV staff. As well, there are operational and finance audits, which involve the Global Center auditing local offices' finances and their compliance to WVI policy and procedure (WVI 2011a:17). Furthermore, for the purpose of achieving internal transparency, World Vision developed what it calls a 'traffic light dashboard' in 2010 which is supposed to report the accountability status of each office (in terms of its reviews of governance, capability and operational and financial audit results) onto the World Vision intranet for the senior management team to view.

At the national level, World Vision works toward accountability to the relevant national context by constantly feeding evaluation feedback into national strategy development. National strategies and priorities are based on feedback from ADPs, government ministries, local (national-level) peer organizations, and larger organizations (such as the UN). This input of experiential feedback from ongoing, long-term and on-the-ground WV projects and programs as well as similar feedback from other organizations into national strategy development creates, at least to a minimal degree, a level of accountability to beneficiaries that may actually affect program direction and design.

At the program and project level, World Vision discourse addresses two types of local accountability: accountability to local 'partners,' which includes local government structures, traditional leadership, churches, and other organizations, and accountability to 'children and communities,' which includes the direct beneficiaries. For the former, WV defines accountability as "demonstrating responsibility to provide evidence to all partners that a program or project has been carried out according to the agreed design" (WVI 2007:10). For the latter, WV discusses accountability in terms of 'key principles', including transparency, project results, appropriate reporting systems for local concerns, being open to listen and willing to learn, and informed consent, meaning that WV has provided enough information to enable informed decision-making (WVI 2011b:18).

Regarding both groups (however particularly regarding direct beneficiaries), WV seems to place more emphasis on consultation, representation, and agreement rather than local ownership. This is seen in the Development Program Approach, which suggests that CWBOs are used to “inform dialogue” which leads to a “shared vision and priorities of child wellbeing” between WV and community and other stakeholders (WVI 2011b:10). This recognizes participation as consultation and information-sharing and not local ownership, as it exhibits a semi-manipulative disregard or lack of flexibility in catering to local needs and values; as true accountability to beneficiaries should ideally result in not a shared vision that aligns with WV, but a vision entirely owned by the ‘target’ community. WV does recognize that, through discussion, values and needs that do not align with WV national strategy may present themselves, in which case WV would not take part in design or implementation of efforts toward addressing such needs. In such a case, it still would have played a positive role in facilitating or catalyzing their identification and assessment.

In regards to monitoring and quality of project implementation, World Vision exhibits accountability to its beneficiaries through the priority it places on the receiving and handling of complaints, particularly through its commitment to HAP International, which involves adhering to a set of “standard benchmarks” or requirements for practice. WV’s complaints-handling policy is based on the HAP international benchmark, which requires that complaints-handling procedures are “effective, accessible, and safe for intended beneficiaries”; are developed through consultation with the beneficiaries and local community; are clear, consistent and documented; are understood by the beneficiaries; offer confidentiality without fear of retaliation; are responded to; and are handled according to what is agreed upon (WVI FPMG 2009:11).

At the same time, World Vision recognizes accountability not only as an ethical imperative but also as a practical means of global support. The definition of transparency given by WV (explained above) clearly expresses that practical objective when it states that transparency and accountability will provide WV with greater freedom. This implies a tactic of using accountability as a way to assist in organizational sustainability. Throughout its literature, WVI constantly makes the point that accountability to the public and upholding the ethical standards of current societies contribute to securing

funding stability for the organization. This emphasis is one means by which WV is accountable to itself as an organization. Much of its policy involves emphasis on adherence to the global World Vision Partnership's values and agendas, which are carried out through adherence to expectations laid out in various levels of its organizational structure. For example, LEAP (WVI 2007: 96) emphasizes that:

When it comes to local programming, the most important connection is back to a national strategy. The model of ministry informs national strategies, then LEAP processes use those country-specific programming approaches to tailor programs and projects towards objectives in the national strategy. Local strategies and designs are checked for alignment with national strategy, so that a program reflects organizational strategy.

This emphasis, however, inherently involves a level of accountability to beneficiaries at the local level, as national strategies include learning inputs from local-level program monitoring and evaluation feedback.

Finally, accountability to the state is seen prominently throughout LEAP in terms of support of and partnership with local government through the continual mention of agreement with local 'partners'. The list of local partners given throughout LEAP documentation always includes local systems of governance (WVI 2007). Partnership with the state is valued as both a practical means to conserve resources by taking advantage of government-produced secondary data, and a means of achieving development sustainability through building the capacity of government structures to enable them to support and sustain initiatives after World Vision has withdrawn itself from a program or area. As will be evidenced in the next section and in chapter five, World Vision in Zimbabwe has taken on an almost corporatist strategy of placing itself in a supportive role to government in order to do the following: gain access to rural areas and facilitate its ability to carry out its work; manipulate the use of short-term funding for carrying out longer-term projects through outsourcing monitoring and evaluation to local government ministries; and promote sustainability of projects after World Vision's funding stream for a specific project has finished.

4.7 World Vision in Zimbabwe

World Vision International first entered Zimbabwe in 1973 and, at that time, focused on relief aid for those who were victims during the struggle for liberation, with a specific focus on orphaned children (Bornstein 2005). WV worked closely with churches to conduct both relief work and evangelism. Throughout the 1990s to the present, it has continued to work with churches and also with the state. Currently, it is present in each province throughout the country (OCHA 2009), conducting projects and programs in 28 districts (OCHA 2012). WV actions a multitude of individual donor-funded projects throughout the country, and has twenty-four ADPs (WVI 2011c). In doing so, it has a close working relationship with the state, both at higher national levels and at local levels. In fact, much of its work is carried out in conjunction with or through government offices. Within the global World Vision Partnership, World Vision Zimbabwe (WVZ) is a national office branch, which means that it votes in the WV Partnership and has an advisory council whose members may be elected for representation on the WVI Board, but it still reports to a regional leader for WVI line management (see section above discussing organizational structure) (WVI 2011a).

World Vision Zimbabwe's national strategy is what prioritizes its opportunities and intentions for programs and projects, and the work it does is built around its priorities. The national strategy is developed based on three elements: secondary information from national-level assessments (for instance, the yearly vulnerability report from the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee); program and project evaluations and feedback from ADPs; and input from other national stakeholders including government ministries, peer organizations, and larger international organizations such as the UN. The strategy is re-evaluated every three to five years, in order to consider the current alignment with local contexts, WVI's global organizational priorities, local opportunities, and geographical conditions. The strategy's objectives are based on the four child well-being targets (children are well-nourished; children are protected from disease and infection; children feel an increase in well-being; and children can read by age 11) as well as local context, and it places significant emphasis on behavioral change, particularly in regard to HIV and AIDS prevention and personal sanitation (WVI 2011c). Additionally, according to the WV Zimbabwe's Grants and Human Affairs Director,

since 2009 its national strategy has involved the following six strategic goals: health, nutrition and HIV; livelihoods and economic development; education; policy advocacy “to some extent”; child well-being; and organizational effectiveness (Appendix 1, Interview 1).

WVZ’s input toward improving health, nutrition and HIV has been focused on the following: increasing food availability (through agricultural and income-generating projects), increasing access to safe water and sanitation (through borehole drilling, input of sanitation facilities, and providing education on hygiene, sanitation and water-related diseases), improving health facilities (through rehabilitating clinics, inputting drugs for disease treatment, and promoting immunization), and valuing issues of HIV and AIDS prevention as a separate, prioritized target sector (through educational programs, raising awareness, and improving nutrition for those already affected by HIV) (WVI 2011c). For its strategic objective to improve livelihoods and economic development, it has primarily carried out agricultural projects, particularly involving livestock inputs and educational programs for conservation agricultural methods. In relation to the third strategic objective (improving education), it has worked on classroom construction, improvement of teacher homes and sanitation at schools, paying school fees, and inputting textbooks and reading materials. Recently, WVZ negotiated significant funding for education through UNICEF, European Union (EU) and Department for International Development (DFID).

In regards to the objective for policy advocacy, WVZ’s most recent published report (WVI 2011c) does not address any progress; however, through working toward the child well-being objective, it has reported on social advocacy, including the promotion of child birth registration and children’s rights, with an emphasis on orphans. According to its child well-being report (WVI 2011c), WVZ places more emphasis on the most vulnerable children (namely orphans, children-headed households and those affected by disease or disability) within each of the other strategic goals. While its programs and projects (both ADPs and individual grant-funded) are intended to benefit various community members, priorities are placed on the most vulnerable, by supplying direct-aid (for example, school fees and food inputs) in addition to the development-based projects taking place around those most vulnerable. As will be evidenced from the discussion in chapter five, this focus on the most vulnerable *children* specifically is in

some cases more of a national objective that is worked toward and achieved in the sense of holistic community development and not an explicit focus of the individual projects on the ground at the local level.

With regard to the strategic goal for organizational effectiveness, WVZ's child well-being report (WVI 2011c) indicates that the projects and overall work of the national office have been successful in some aspects, but are in great need of reprogramming to address other aspects where WVZ's interventions are not having enough impact. Its report found that food programs, mainly focusing on food availability rather than nutrition, have not improved the number of children with stunted growth and those who are malnourished, and it suggested that programming is inadequate due to a lack of baseline data on nutritional measurements during design, monitoring and evaluation. Immunization programs have also had difficulty, although the report found this to be greatly affected by religious paradigms, as some religious sects do not believe in immunization. Additionally, it reported that HIV awareness in WVZ project areas is high; however, there is a great need to improve baseline assessments with HIV testing and nutrition programming for those affected by HIV. Regarding its strategic objectives to improve livelihoods and overall child well-being, WV Zimbabwe reports shortfalls of various kinds within their program and project areas, including a high percentage of children without birth certificates, a high percentage of houses which are supporting orphaned children, and a high percentage of agricultural difficulties (particularly limited inputs, draught power and local markets). Finally, the report found that, with regard to education, WVZ (along with government and other NGOs) has helped address issues of textbook to student ratios and school drop-out rates, but has not addressed what it sees as the largest issue – demoralized teaching staff – in design, monitoring and evaluation.

The next section examines World Vision Zimbabwe and accountability to beneficiaries, donors, the state and World Vision International.

4.8 World Vision Zimbabwe and Accountability

As discussed earlier in this chapter, World Vision globally promotes beneficiary participation throughout its publications, but its actual organizational requirements (laid out in LEAP) seem to take a more practical and efficiency-based approach, placing the

use of secondary data and avoiding more resource-intensive methods of assessment at a higher value than achieving truly empowerment-based participation. In Zimbabwe, to some extent, WV seems to have found a compromise between the two which allows it to carry out data collection and use data from meaningful, participatory assessments collected over long periods of time in conjunction with secondary data in order to influence national strategy, project design and grant funding proposals. This process, however, is mainly only applicable in ADP areas and therefore does not mean that each WV project carried out has involved participatory assessment and design.

WV Zimbabwe conducts assessments for project design in four ways: the analysis of secondary information from national-level assessments; community-level participatory engagement within ADPs; gathering information from other stakeholders (such as government, peer organizations and the UN); and, on occasion (this is often not possible to do within budget and time constraints), participatory community-level engagement with intended beneficiaries of grant-funded projects located outside of ADPs (Appendix 1, Interview 1). Due to their long-term nature and funding stability from child sponsorship, ADPs are in a better position to carry out meaningful, empowerment-based participation for assessment, design, monitoring and evaluation than are other shorter-term grant-funded projects. ADPs are also in a good position to guide national strategy development and organizational learning, as their locations are spaced throughout the country and their five-year program cycles are scattered, such that while some are working on redesign, others are evaluating. This allows for a constant application of current learning, both retrospective and prospective, on the ground. Unfortunately, this idyllic situation of continual participatory application of learning over long periods of time is not applicable to many of World Vision's shorter-term projects and programs outside of ADPs, as these endure funding and time-limiting constraints. While sometimes it is possible to instigate funding opportunities, generally funding must be accessed through answering a call for proposals from the donor. As discussed in chapter two, these calls for proposals often involve specific requirements and allow a very limited amount of time for drafting and submission.

Whenever possible, WVZ attempts to conduct focus group discussions with community members and any other participatory means of assessment through what the

WV Grants and Human Affairs Director described in an interview as “quick and dirty consultative processes” (Appendix 1, Interview 1). For this purpose, WV has teams who are ready to carry out such processes at short notice. While at least inclusive of beneficiaries, these necessarily rushed methods do not allow for relationship-building, joint understanding, community engagement and sense of project ownership which is often deemed necessary to incite empowerment. Additionally, WVZ is not always able to carry out these “quick and dirty” assessments due to lack of funding or time. When that is the case, WVZ bases its funding proposals on the local district government’s strategic plan. This is the most common practice for conducting project assessments. While not involving beneficiaries directly, this method of assessment is based on local government stakeholders, who would ideally carry out their own regular participatory assessment and monitoring of the local context, though this is not necessarily the case.

In addition to the constraints with timing that make the participation of beneficiaries difficult, WVZ employees expressed frustration with donors and donor perspectives on Zimbabwe in noting that, since 2002 (when only short-term emergency funding was available), donors are only now just beginning to be prepared to get involved in longer-term projects, thus making the acquisition of donor funding incredibly competitive (Appendix 1, Interviews 1,2,7). The general attitude of donors toward aid agencies like WV, it is claimed, is to keep them “at arm’s length” and pin them up against each other, such that agencies and NGOs fight for “bits and pieces” of donor funds in a contest to see who can provide the best value for money (Appendix 1, Interview 1). In addition to this, WVZ finds itself competing with an increasing number of quasi-private NGOs which are run like businesses and act like “roving consultants who go after money [without a specific footprint or mandate]”, although such organizations struggle with getting permits to operate on the ground as they do not have relationships with or approval from local government (Appendix 1, Interview 1). Therefore donors shift back and forth between favoring these business-like organizations because of their desire for efficiency and avoidance of the uncertainty of the Zimbabwe context, and more grounded organizations like World Vision, because of their capacity for local partnership on the ground.

World Vision's funding in Zimbabwe is also affected by the ambiguous nature of roles in the development sector and sources of funding. Funds will be pooled into multi-donor trusts and placed in the domain of the UN and government ministries which, according to World Vision employees, do not have a good knowledge of what is actually happening on the ground. These ministries will then channel funds down with specified priorities for NGOs to pursue, leaving the NGOs unable to voice local context-specific priorities. It was noted earlier that input and voice toward funding directives and national strategies for development have improved with Zimbabwe's cluster system, where representatives from various NGOs, donors, the UN and Zimbabwean government meet periodically. These meetings, though, often simply involve progress reports rather than collaborating on development direction and unified national strategies. The recent funding for education channeled through the EU (mentioned above) is an exception to this, as it was determined and granted through an "across the table" negotiation process (Appendix 1, Interview 1).

World Vision Zimbabwe's size of overhead costs, coupled with factors of the Zimbabwean context, makes it difficult to access sufficient funding. Within ADPs (sponsorship-funded programs), overhead costs are not so much of a problem, as the private funding revenues are fairly consistent and predictable. For donor grant-funded projects and programs, however, covering overhead costs becomes a very difficult struggle. The Grants and Human Affairs Director admitted that while staff members strive to manage overhead structures annually, it often ends up being a quarterly issue. She attributed some of this difficulty to the short-term paradigm that many donors still hold about Zimbabwe (Appendix 1, Interview 1). Staff salaries are the largest issue affecting these overhead costs, as WVI requires that direct project staff must be fully budgeted for within individual projects, and therefore their contracts are directly tied to specific project grants; and budgets for shared staff (including higher-level management positions) are to be covered by pulling bits of funding from project grants and general administration budgets. In this context, WVZ tries to make up any shortfalls by partnering with support offices including World Vision UK, World Vision Germany, and World Vision Netherlands. When this is the case, those support offices enter into a contract with the donor and into a contract with WV Zimbabwe. In such a case, when the

donor does not pay for the entire budget (for example, a line item for WV staff salary), the support office has to pay the difference. The consistency of the necessity for WVZ support from other World Vision offices has led to a stigma within these offices against entering into contracts with World Vision Zimbabwe, as they would rather assist other national offices that have less overhead costs.

These difficulties see WVZ going after funding opportunities and meeting donor priorities for the sake of acquiring funding and maintaining organizational stability rather than adhering to the LEAP model which requires World Vision to attempt to persuade donors to align themselves with World Vision strategies. This necessity for organizational stability was expressed in two ways – the necessity to employ qualified experts who are capable of doing the job properly (for example an education specialist to write the funding proposals for education-related programs) and the necessity to provide employment security for employees. In this respect, the Grants and Human Affairs Director saw the WV funding policies as inherently contradictory (Appendix 1, Interview 1). More specifically, she referred to the requirement that employees be budgeted for project-by-project under the specific project proposal as in contradiction with the LEAP requirements that WV does not adjust or compromise its methods, requirements or values for the sake of receiving donor funding. She claims that she spends a significant percentage of her time searching for “bits of funding from here and there” in order to fund project assessments and designs, as well as overhead costs and people’s salaries.

Her concern was especially great concerning the salaries, suggesting that such strategy requirements lead to a “disincentive” which makes it difficult to turn down funding opportunities that do not align with strategy “because it’s somebody’s job at the end of the day”. As well, a large overhead cost issue specific to Zimbabwe is the need to pay for taxes. International donors expect their contributions to be tax-exempt and therefore do not allow for the incorporation of the cost of taxes into the budget even though the Zimbabwean state does not exempt such costs from taxes. These issues with regard to financing overhead costs were attributed to a policy issue specific to World Vision, and it was suggested that other NGOs are given a budgeted lump sum for strategic investment (which would include for example salaries), rather than having to pull from individual projects in order to cover those types of costs.

Finally with respect to donors and funding, the Grants and Human Affairs Director continually expressed a desire for long-term, integrated and holistic development, which she argued is not actually achievable within the current organizational funding structures (Appendix 1, Interview 1). In her view, it would be necessary to restructure WV Zimbabwe's funding structures completely. In the end, though, she placed the necessary ultimate change in the domain of the donor, suggesting the need for donors to be more flexible and more willing to negotiate priorities.

Historically, World Vision Zimbabwe and its work has involved a cautiously submissive, yet closely tied relationship with the state, marked by both the state's dependence and control over WV and, in certain ways, WV's dependence on the state. Bornstein (2005:101) discusses the close connections between WV and the Zimbabwean state throughout the 1990s as being marked by "troubled categorical boundaries between NGOs and the state", including members of the ministry of agriculture sitting on the WV board and many WV staff members being former state employees. She also referred to government dependence on WV, arguing that the state had limited resources for development and that therefore the so-called partnership between WV and the state was a "necessary fiction," meaning that it was not truly a partnership at all (Bornstein 2005:109).

Currently, the actual or fictional nature of this 'partnership' is different depending on the district. All work that is carried out by WVZ within a district must be done under the approval of the District Administrator (DA) and the Rural District Council (RDC), and the relationships between those state individuals and WV staff, as well as the management of the specific district, will determine the tone of the 'partnership' within each district. At the national level, WV is recognized by the state and has regular communication with various government ministries, particularly through cluster meetings. As mentioned above, in the discussion of funding, World Vision has developed a presence within the country that allows them some stability in terms of achieving permits and government approval to conduct development assistance.

This state-WVZ relationship, primarily characterized by cooptation and dependence, has at times involved periods of exclusion, particularly during times of extreme political tension. Food distribution and development efforts have been

politicized during such times, and WV has been suspended or removed from certain rural areas after having been accused of pushing the agenda of the main political opposition to the ruling party. In the early 2000s, WVZ was told to terminate its food distribution efforts in particular areas on the grounds that its beneficiary targeting and distribution systems involved a hidden political campaign (Munyanyi 2005). According to an interview with a former WV employee, during the time leading up to the 2008 elections, high-ranking WV staff members were arrested on similar charges of pursuing a political agenda (Appendix 1, Interview 7). Leading up to and during the 2013 elections, exclusions appeared to involve more amiable measures, in that WVZ along with other NGOs were asked prior to the election period to suspend their programs until the election period finished, in order to allow space for political campaigning (Appendix 1, Interview 3). These specified incidents appear to only occur during politically-charged periods.

One aspect of World Vision Zimbabwe's work that stood out throughout the research is that great faith and responsibility are placed in local government and its ability to assess, design, carry out, monitor and evaluate projects in partnership with World Vision, and sometimes in place of World Vision. Although it was mentioned that this is variable depending on the district, it is WVZ's objective to involve local government in its development projects and to build state institutional capacity in this regard. Considerable reliance is therefore placed on the competency of government, particularly regarding assessment and monitoring, and sustainability of projects and programs after WV's withdrawal from an area. While WVZ conducts its own monitoring and evaluation during the process of projects, both monitoring and support after WV has withdrawn its presence from a project is placed in the hands of local government structures. Additionally, it appears that the practical ability to 'get things done' is more easily achieved in partnership with government, or at least with significant recognition of government input (regardless of the value of that input) in order to maintain positive relationships and good communication. In this light, much of WVZ's knowledge-based aid (including training in agricultural methods) is carried out specifically for building government capacity. WVZ thus conducts 'trainings of trainers,' by teaching and guiding government employees in carrying out projects and development initiatives.

In terms of the government's function and impact in its relationship with WV Zimbabwe, there are two juxtaposed sides to government that are at the same time separate and integrated. These are local ministry government on the ground and at project level, versus higher-scale politically-contextualized government. Both levels carry power over World Vision in terms of what it is allowed to carry out and with whom. World Vision Zimbabwe appears to support the local ministry side in a vigorous manner, thereby carrying out its work through and in conjunction with these ministry offices and staff and building state capacity and credibility in the delivery of development. On the more politically-charged national side, however, WVZ takes the cautiously ambivalent approach, with the goal of sustaining its presence in the country.

This creates a unique relationship of interdependence between WVZ and the state which has both positive and negative connotations. In the positive sense, working so closely with government may be the only long-term path to development, as the government is ultimately the long-term institution which is responsible for it. Additionally positive is the fact that the willingness of WVZ to work with government, (including listening to its values and allowing it credit for development) may grant World Vision more freedom to carry out its work in agreement with its own organizational values, as government may not see WVZ as a threat compared to other NGOs which isolate themselves from government. Nevertheless, this close partnership (which allocates both responsibility and credit to the government for work that World Vision is catalyzing, funding, and guiding) may unwittingly reinforce faith in unfair or corrupt systems of governance, particularly reinforcing the popularity of political leaders who claim to be the bearers of development. For this same reason, World Vision Zimbabwe may be limited in receiving funds and working in partnership with other organizations that refuse to work so closely with government.

4.9 World Vision – Legitimacy, Appropriateness and Effectiveness

The ways in which WV attempts to address issues of appropriateness, legitimacy and effectiveness, both globally and in the Zimbabwean context, can be considered by asking a series of questions. For example, do its approach and official policies compromise the values of empowerment-based participatory methods for purposes of practicality and

organizational stability, particularly with regards to global donor trends, and if so, is that a real compromise of accountability to beneficiaries? Does its relationship with the state, marked by caution, cooptation and support (all at the same time) create a false sense of confidence in corrupt systems of governance thereby perpetuating a *status quo* of marginal social services and government dependence on aid, or does it catalyze long-term, sustainable change and development in government social structures and services by building capacity? And finally, do World Vision's systems and structures of accountability and reflective organizational learning at the global and local levels legitimize its role in development in Zimbabwe?

In addressing the first question, it is clear throughout World Vision's primary policy (LEAP) that, while WV values participatory methods sufficiently to discuss the concept's importance and to include it as an idealistic measure under the suggested LEAP guidelines, World Vision takes a practical stance toward its methodology. In addition to this, World Vision's literature also makes evident its value of development partnership with local stakeholders, such as government, churches and other local leaders, which it sees as achieving local participation, even if beneficiaries are not directly involved in such joint assessment and planning. This perspective is practical, as it allows for the use of secondary data in assessment and, in particular, for the avoidance of building up false expectations. It is also practical in the sense that local authorities will remain after WV leaves a project area, and therefore the brunt of social support will eventually fall to them. This aspect legitimizes World Vision's approach to participation which sees empowerment-based participation and capacity building as occurring in and through local authorities.

What all of this brings to the fore is the question as to whether or not WV's perspective compromises accountability to beneficiaries. According to the overall discourse surrounding participatory development and approaches such as PRA, the answer is yes. While such approaches preach the necessity of beneficiary-assessed, beneficiary-planned, beneficiary-monitored and beneficiary-evaluated development, all of which is merely instigated or catalyzed by the outside aid agent if sustainability is to be achieved, World Vision's approach to development which occurs through local leaders and structures of authority seems to question that necessity. Its approach may still be

achieving capacity-building, just not in the sense that much of development discourse necessitates – which is within and by communities themselves.

This leads into the next question as to whether such support and capacity-building of official authority structures, particularly local government, create false senses of confidence in potentially corrupt or incompetent systems and allow government to remain dependent on WV's support. While such an approach does open up World Vision's aid and assistance to exploitation by government for political or other reasons, which could potentially have very negative affects perpetuating the *status quo* and supporting systems which may be unfair, WV's choice to approach development this way seems to achieve two positive objectives, at least to some degree. The first objective is practicality, both in the sense that positive relationships with government support World Vision's likelihood of being granted permits and permission to conduct its work and assert its values, and in the sense that World Vision can benefit from government inputs, such as data collection for situational assessment and monitoring and evaluation. The other objective that may be achieved is sustainability of development initiatives, in that if WV builds up local government capacity to perform the supportive social services that help beneficiaries sustain their development, then that sustainability is more likely to be achieved after World Vision has withdrawn from the project area.

Finally it was argued in earlier chapters that, because of the constantly changing, ambiguous and sometimes fickle atmosphere in which NGOs must adapt and maneuver their role and existence, constant reflection and multiple-loop learning is necessary to legitimize and add meaningful purpose to their work. As is evidenced above, World Vision places great organizational emphasis and priority on organizational learning for accountability purposes. Learning is expressed as a priority throughout all of its documentation, particularly LEAP. Globally, WV has set up structures in order to provide opportunity for ground-level feedback and experience to slowly work its way up to the international board level. In Zimbabwe, the cluster system allows feedback from all major stakeholders (including WV's own experience, donors, peer organizations and government) to influence WV's national strategy. Partnered with the staggered cycles of program evaluation which bring constant feedback to the organization at local and national levels, this provides an opportunity for meaningful learning. These structures do

not guarantee meaningful observation and reflection at the ground level, particularly if monitoring and evaluation reporting is left up to local partners such as government; however, they do emphasize a value of such learning and organizational support for its occurrence.

4.10 Conclusion

The role of World Vision in Zimbabwe is characterized by a long-standing and consistent presence which has adapted as necessary to changes in the political economy of Zimbabwe as well as global changes in international ('big D') development. Its organizational values and policies have determined its methods in carrying out development assistance in Zimbabwe, particularly with respect to its approach to the state, donors and beneficiaries. The adaptations or changes that WVZ has made in order to respond to the political economy of Zimbabwe as well as to the local contexts in which it carries out development assistance have included the following: careful yet close partnerships with government at various levels, compromises (to some extent) for the purposes of accessing funding, a locally contextualized practical approach to 'making things happen' and intra-organization accountability. Such responses present issues as to whether true accountability to beneficiaries is compromised through WV's approach to participation, its close connections with government and, ultimately, its pursuit of organizational sustainability.

Chapter 5: World Vision in Umzingwane

5.1 Introduction

In order to understand the work of World Vision Zimbabwe and its contextual situation with regards to donors, the Zimbabwean state and beneficiary communities, this chapter examines the work of World Vision in Umzingwane District in Matabeleland South Province. Because Umzingwane is characterized by increasingly low rainfall, limited agricultural output and food insecurity, World Vision has become more involved in Umzingwane District since 2009, focusing primarily on agriculture and particularly with respect to crop and livestock production under minimal rainfall conditions. My study looks at a variety of such projects, across three wards within the district.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the agricultural conditions and socio-economic context of Umzingwane district, followed by descriptions and explanations of World Vision projects in the district. Seven WV projects with beneficiaries spread across four districts are examined individually. The ensuing discussion explains WV's methodology in carrying out its work in Umzingwane, in terms of needs-assessment, implementation and monitoring and evaluation, after which there is a critical analysis of WV's accountability to donors, the state, beneficiaries and ultimately to itself.


5.2 Umzingwane District: Local Context

Umzingwane district, located in Matabeleland South Province, has a total population of 62,510 people and is divided into twenty wards (Appendix 11.1). The majority of the district consists of four communal areas, and the rest is comprised of mining and privately-owned land (including 'old resettled land' dating back to the 1980s, land resettled during FTLRP, and private commercial land which has not been resettled) (Zimbabwe Parliament Research Department 2011). In addition, there are five business centers in the district.

Umzingwane is located in agro-ecological zone IV, which is characterized by low annual rainfalls, seasonal droughts, and dry spells occurring during the rainy season

(FAO 1997). The annual rainfall for the 2012/2013 agricultural season totaled 404.4mm which, just like the year before (which totaled 356.9mm), is below the expected amount of rainfall per annum (Appendix 11.2). Due to low rainfall, cereal production – including maize, sorghum and two types of millet – is low compared to the estimated requirement for the district. The total cereal production for 2012/2013 was 2688 metric tons, marking a 4188 metric ton deficit from the determined required output of 6876 metric tons (Appendix 11.2). Food insecurity is therefore high, with 44.1 percent of the district being food insecure during peak hunger periods (from January to March) (ZIMVac 2013:126). Formal employment is low, leading many to take to illegal gold mining for informal income (Zimbabwe Parliament Research Development 2011). The district has fifteen health centers, 36 primary schools and 22 secondary schools (Zimbabwe Parliament Research Development 2011:6, 9-10).

Map 5.1 Location of Umzingwane in Zimbabwe



5.3 World Vision in Umzingwane

World Vision's work in Umzingwane district focuses primarily on agriculture, particularly small-scale agricultural development at the household level. There are no Area Development Programs (ADPs) in the district, which means that there are no sponsored children and all projects are funded through grants from donors. WVZ also carries out some additional work in HIV and AIDS prevention, health and livelihoods in Umzingwane. In this regard it recently began a Health and Livelihoods program, targeting children from ages five and below. This is part of Umzingwane District's involvement in the Millennium Development Accelerated Program (a new initiative in Zimbabwe which has targeted specific districts to work toward additional Millennium Development Goals, MDGs). The health and livelihoods program focuses on two MDGs of the accelerated program – MDG 4, the reduction of child mortality, and MDG 5, maternal health. This WV program also includes early childhood development education.

Aside from the health program, World Vision's programs in Umzingwane are primary short-term (under three years), are carried out in close partnership with Umzingwane district-level government (with whom WV claims a very productive and positive relationship) and focus on conservation farming methods as well as livestock production. Additionally, all WV projects carried out in Umzingwane involve HIV and AIDS prevention training, regardless of sector (for example, both WASH – water, sanitation and hygiene – related projects and agricultural projects involve HIV and AIDS prevention). Due to the holistic and complementary character of World Vision's development initiatives, the agricultural projects undertaken are closely connected to each other with significant overlap in beneficiaries. The fieldwork and the following discussion cover a range of World Vision projects in Umzingwane and examine the connections and overlap between them. These projects are carried out largely in partnership with the state department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex).

WVZ's work in Umzingwane is carried out primarily in communal areas, with some work also being carried out in "old resettlement areas" (meaning an area that was resettled shortly after independence under the willing-buyer, willing-seller system). It does not work in areas that were resettled under fast track, primarily due to the

controversy surrounding fast track and the remaining disapproval of the program among international donors (as explained in chapter three).

5.4 World Vision Projects in Umzingwane

The World Vision projects discussed below include conservation agriculture, rabbit production, guinea fowl production, goat production, layer chickens for egg production, and the rehabilitation of two dam-fed irrigation schemes. These projects are spread out across the district (in wards 5, 8, 13, and 20) and are mainly located in communal areas. The project area examined in ward 13 is located in an “old resettlement area”. Although my study focuses on CAs, the old resettlement site visited in ward 13 offered some interesting and relevant perspectives and is therefore included here. All of the projects discussed involved physical inputs or training (or both) as provided by World Vision, and implementation was carried out either in conjunction with or through the Agritex department attached to Umzingwane district government. For each of the projects discussed, WV was no longer monitoring at the time of research, and monitoring duties had been turned over to Agritex and were its responsibility.

5.4.1 Conservation Agriculture Projects

World Vision has implemented conservation agriculture projects throughout Umzingwane District. Its beneficiary constituency for these projects is widespread across multiple wards, targeting a large number of farmers. As well, these beneficiary groups also benefit from other World Vision projects involving livestock production and the receipt of agricultural inputs. The projects are carried out in conjunction with each other, creating significant overlap in beneficiaries among livestock production projects and conservation agriculture projects. Between 2010 and 2012, World Vision carried out two large-scale conservation agriculture projects across wards. One targeted 500 beneficiaries across nine wards and was funded by the European Union (EU) and the other targeted 250 beneficiaries and was funded by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Both projects were carried out through a Trainer of Trainers (TOT) model, in which World Vision provides training and instructional pamphlets to Agritex, and Agritex in turn conducts training on the ground with beneficiary farmers. All such programs are intended

to have a trickle down affect on the entire rural communities in which they occur by means of good examples shown by productive and successful farmers. The method of farming which was taught through both of these projects involves zero tillage and minimal water usage, and is designed for drought-prone or difficult-to-farm areas of Zimbabwe like Umzingwane.

The project funded by EU was carried out in response to a request from the Rural District Council for WVZ to aid in carrying out a plan which the council had formulated but did not have sufficient funding for implementation. The project involved both trainings (TOT) and physical inputs. Training in the beneficiary communities (carried out by Agritex) was made available to all members of the selected communities. But the targeted beneficiaries strictly speaking only included those who, in addition to the training, also received physical inputs. These inputs included, per beneficiary, 5kgs of sorghum seed, 2kgs of cow pea seed, 100kgs of fertilizer, steel trowels and water buckets. These beneficiaries were selected based on the following ‘most vulnerable’ criteria: the elderly (aged 65 and above), child-headed households, families housing two or more orphans and households without a stable income. An additional factor considered in the selection process for this conservation agriculture project was the amount of land which an individual could farm, seeking out those with at least 0.5 ha.

Within this project, I visited sites in Ward Five and Ward Thirteen. The program in Ward Five targeted 49 beneficiaries to receive physical inputs and, at the time of my research, forty-two of the forty-nine beneficiaries were sustaining their farming plots with the conservation agriculture methods. The other seven were still farming their plots, but had resorted back to conventional tillage methods. Their crops were not doing as well as those who were still pursuing the conservation methods. Three beneficiaries were interviewed in ward five, of which all gave very positive feedback (Appendix 1, Interviews 13, 14, 15). At the time of research (in November 2013), their fields were successfully sprouting, and they each claimed success in agricultural output subsequent to the training.

One site from the same project (with the same inputs as in Ward Five) was visited in Ward 13, where the farmer had sustained his conservation methods and had continued to produce successful crops each season since the project inception in 2010 (Appendix 1,

Interview 12). He claimed to have sustained his inputs since 2010 by saving seeds, that is, by planting seeds from previous yields. The same farmer had planted a section of his plot by means of conventional tillage the year before (in 2012) in order to compare results between farming methods. He noted that the section planted using the conservation agriculture methods had produced a full yield, while the section planted through conventional tillage had completely failed. Overall his feedback during the interview was very positive. However, he did suggest one issue with which he struggled each season, namely, finding sufficient grass to create the mulch necessary for the conservation agriculture methods. He suggested that, due to lack of rain, the minimum amount of grass that could be found needed to be saved for cattle to eat, rather than used in crop farming. Despite this challenge, his yields had been very successful in previous years. Even so, he remained worried about the current season because he felt that he had even less grass for the mulch than he had in past seasons.

The conservation agriculture project funded by FAO involved mostly training and very limited physical inputs. Rather than hosting large training sessions open to entire communities, the sessions targeted 250 farmers to receive both inputs and training. The farmers, which are called 'lead' farmers, were trained through a series of five demonstration trainings carried out by Agritex (again, World Vision had trained the Agritex officers, preparing them to train community members). After the initial trainings, each lead farmer was tasked with training ten other farmers from their respective communities. These further trainings involved no inputs for the (non-lead) farmers. Finally, the FAO-funded trainings also involved Field Days, where one of the most successful of the original lead farmer beneficiaries is chosen to present his field of crops to the surrounding community in conjunction with Agritex officers. These field days involve an open invitation, where local farmers are encouraged to come and hear the success stories of their peers, in the hope that this will inspire others to take up the successful conservation agriculture methods and also become more productive. Nearby farmers are encouraged to attend field days through the offering of prizes (namely farming tools or inputs). It is not clear whether or not FAO funds the purchase of field day prizes; however, many of the field days involved sponsors from seed companies, which provided seed packs as prizes. Additionally, field days exhibit farmers who have

not been successful despite adopting conservation agriculture, and this is done in order to discuss reasons for failure and present problem-solving solutions. These events are conducted both at village and district level and occur during the harvest seasons.

While supportive of course of the training methodology, an interviewed World Vision staff member expressed concern over the specific form of participation in the training system, suggesting that small-scale farmers are reluctant to participate when there are no inputs (although he was very positive with regard to the Field Day events) (Appendix 1, Interview 4). In general, World Vision staff considered these conservation agriculture training projects to be successful, based on the grounds that non-beneficiary community members had also adopted conservation agriculture methods (Appendix 1, Interviews 2,4). As well, Field Day functions demonstrated a trend in improvement in group management and farming management throughout Umzingwane communities.

One issue raised by both WV and Agritex staff was difficulty in getting farmers to plant the suggested crops, including vegetables and ‘small grains’ (such as sorghum and millet). They claimed that community members preferred to eat and grow maize – which indeed is the staple food in the country for making *sadza* – which requires intensive water inputs and is not conducive to conservation methods (Appendix 1, Interview 9). Despite this, my field visits indicate that the beneficiary farmers as a whole were very positive about small grains and vegetables production (though the selection of visited sites by Agritex may have led to bias in this regard). Further, in response to this difficulty of crop selection, WVZ has been working toward developing incentives for growing alternatives to maize by creating market contracts that stabilize income for farmers from the growing and sale of non-maize crops.

Fig. 5.1 Conservation agriculture beneficiary farmer exhibiting last year's crop
Fig. 5.2 Beneficiary farmer's recently planted field



5.4.2 Rabbit and Guinea Fowl Production Projects

The rabbit and guinea fowl projects, both funded through FAO with additional funds coming from the EU, were each carried out in conjunction with conservation agriculture programs. According to a WV staff member, the projects were initiated by World Vision (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5). In other words, there was no specific request from the Umzingwane Rural District Council (URDC) for WVZ to implement rabbit and guinea fowl production. However, WV initiated the project in order to complement other projects which had been requested as part of the RDC's development plans. Together, these two projects (rabbit production and guinea fowl production) targeted 1,026 beneficiaries across five wards. Beneficiary selection was based on the same vulnerability factors that were considered when selecting conservation agriculture beneficiaries. For the fieldwork, two rabbit production project sites were visited in ward five, and two guinea fowl production project sites were visited (one in ward five and one in ward thirteen, with the latter site in an old resettlement area). These projects were short-term projects, with World Vision's involvement fully carried out during the year 2012.

The rabbit production project located in ward five targeted forty beneficiary households, and each household was given a set package of inputs, including two rabbits (one male and one female), a 50kg bag of rabbit feed, wire mesh for the enclosure to house the rabbits, two different types of veterinary medicines (1 x 20g of ESB3 and 33.4g of piperazine), a bucket, a garden trowel, a two-liter hand sprayer, and vegetable seed. In addition to material inputs, the project also involved training and instructions in building an enclosure according to a set design developed by World Vision. This enclosure requires minimal materials, such as scrap wood, mud, and the wire mesh that World Vision provides. Thirty out of the forty targeted beneficiaries were still sustaining their projects at the time of research (November 2013). The reason for failure, as given by the ten beneficiaries who had been unable to sustain their projects, was that their two rabbits had died of diseases (Appendix 10). The two project sites visited showed great success with the breeding and sale of rabbits. The first of these had a current stock of seven rabbits and claimed to have sold eighteen since August 2012 (Appendix 1, Interview 15). The second had a stock of twenty-five rabbits and claimed to have sold thirty-three since the project's inception (Appendix 1, Interview 16).

Similar to the rabbit project, households benefitting from the guinea fowl production project received both physical inputs and training. The physical inputs included four guinea fowl (two male and two female), wire mesh (for the WV-designed enclosure), veterinary medicines (1 x 20g of ESB3 and 33.4g of piperazine), a bucket, a garden fork, a two-liter hand sprayer and vegetable seed. The farmers were also given training in raising methods for guinea fowl as well as in construction of the enclosure structure (the same design as was used for the rabbits). Within ward five, 184 beneficiaries were targeted, and 180 of them were still sustaining their guinea fowl production. For the four households who had failed to sustain their projects, their birds had been attacked by predators. During the site visit in ward five, the interviewed farmer indicated considerable success in her guinea fowl production (involving some sales) and she had taken the initiative to invest in a larger production business, raising turkeys in addition to her guinea fowls (Appendix 1, Interview 12). She claimed that her turkeys were doing very well and that they bring in more money than the guinea fowl, and she intended to continue raising both guinea fowl and turkeys. The same guinea fowl

production project was carried out in ward thirteen. Inputs reported were slightly different in this ward, with only two guinea fowl (one male and one female) provided per farmer. The farmer interviewed from ward thirteen had not yet made a profit from his guinea fowl, but he still had two live birds and hoped that he would be able to improve his project. While he was not yet successful in breeding and selling, he still fell under the category of those sustaining a guinea fowl project, as his two guinea fowls were still alive.

Fig. 5.3 WV-designed enclosure

Fig. 5.4 Beneficiary-designed shade structure for turkeys



Fig. 5.5 Rabbit beneficiary farmer with self-designed enclosure



5.4.3 Goat Production Project

The goat production project, which targeted 150 beneficiaries across four wards, was carried out during 2010 to 2012. This project was funded by EU and, according to a WV staff member, was part of the same RDC request for development assistance that had included the request for conservation agriculture training (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5; Appendix 7.4). Again, beneficiaries were selected based on the same WV vulnerability factors as for the other projects. Beneficiary households were given two female goats each, and one male goat was provided for rotation between each set of ten households. I visited three beneficiary sites in ward five, of which one had failed (Appendix 1, Interview 13) and two had succeeded (Appendix 1, Interviews 15, 16). The number of beneficiaries who are still pursuing goat production was not provided during the fieldwork, although it was requested from Agritex. This could mean that Agritex either did not have the requested information or it did not wish to make available the exact number (possibly because the project did not seem to be particularly successful). I do not have sufficient evidence to determine the exact reason for the non-disclosure of this information pertaining to success rates.

The first of the successful beneficiaries interviewed had sold ten of the fifteen goats she had produced since 2010 (Appendix 1, Interview 15). With the money she made from her sales, she invested in a cow, which was pregnant at the time of my research. She intended to sell the calf. Additionally, some of the goats she had produced had been slaughtered for home consumption. Finally, she claimed that her root stock – the two goats originally provided by World Vision – were still alive and producing. The second successful beneficiary interviewed had received her goats in 2012, and had already grown her herd to seventeen, of which many were still young (Appendix 1, Interview 16). She claimed to have sold two goats, and planned to save her profits from future sales in order to invest in a cow. Since she began in 2012, the male goat provided by World Vision had died, but she had successfully sought out another male for breeding with her mature female goats. Finally, at the third site visited, the farmer had been unable to sustain her goats. She had received her goats in 2010 and claimed that both goats had died within the first 5-6 months of ownership, one having been attacked by a predator and the other died for reasons unknown (Appendix 1, Interview 13). Both deaths occurred

before the goats had reproduced. The farmer also said that the male goat in her rotation had died.

According to the World Vision District Coordinator, the overall project was largely affected detrimentally by lack of rainfall, which may have been the root cause for some of the goat deaths (Appendix 1, Interview 4). The interviewed farmer who had failed to maintain her goats was in fact doing very well in her efforts at conservation agriculture, and her current seeds were all sprouting during the fieldwork. She seemed uninterested in the lack of success from her goats. Both of the successful goat farmers were experiencing great success in their other agricultural production efforts, with one also carrying out successful conservation agriculture (having been involved in World Vision's original conservation agriculture training) and the other benefitting from a surface irrigation scheme which had been implemented by a different NGO. This latter farmer fed her goats using what she called field residue, which included weeds, dried vegetation and excess cuttings taken from the surface irrigation field. This allowed her greater security in sustaining a feed supply for her goats compared to other WV beneficiaries who were not involved in other agricultural development schemes.

Based on the interviews with the three goat beneficiaries and discussions with Agritex, it appears that the perspective surrounding the goat project was to treat it as a high yield (and high risk) investment. The care and keeping of goats requires greater investment than smaller animals (such as the rabbits and guinea fowl), with more reliance on crop successes (for supplementary feeding for goats) and a significant danger of malnutrition threatening goat production. The World Vision District Coordinator's explanation for goat project failure (namely, crop failure due to lack of rainfall) reflects the reliance on crops for sustaining goat production (Appendix 1, Interview 4). The successes of the two goat farmers who were interviewed (with the one farmer having invested in a cow and the other farmer intending to do the same) are evidence of the high yield that can occur if the risks are overcome.

Fig. 5.6 Goat beneficiary farmer

Fig. 5.7 Field residue that she feeds to her goats



5.4.4 Layer Chickens and Egg Production Project

The layer chicken project was funded by the EU and carried out in ward eight between August and December of 2012. It targeted 50 beneficiary households, who were again selected based on WV's vulnerability requirements. This project was not in response to a URDC request, but was initiated by World Vision. Inputs from World Vision included forty-five layer chickens per farmer, food-feeders and water-feeders, mesh wire for constructing the enclosure (again, the same design by WV), chicken feed and veterinary medicine (type and amount unspecified). This project had an even more negative success rate, with only six out of the fifty beneficiary households still sustaining their project at the time of research.

The reason reported by Agritex for the other 44 beneficiary households failing in their layer projects was that they had been unable to feed their layers due to a shortage of feed. While this was the official reason (as outlined in official Agritex documentation) the Agritex officers in the field expressed other suspicions during discussions. These suspicions centered on claims that some of the beneficiaries had failed to see the long-

term potential of the egg business, and therefore had eaten their chickens or produced and sold them for meat instead. They also suggested a lack of effort and motivation from beneficiaries and were worried that future projects may result in the same failure. This was the only project where such an attitude was suspected or mentioned.

One egg-layer production site was visited in ward eight, where the farmer had been very successful in her egg production, having earned substantial profits (Appendix 1, Interview 11). Forty of her forty-five birds remained alive and were producing eggs, with a collection rate of 39-41 eggs per day. Her records indicated that she received profits (money kept after purchasing feed and medicine for her chickens) of between \$75 and \$195 per week, and that she intended to double her layer program in the near future. She had already begun construction on an additional enclosure, which she was constructing according to the same WV design which had been used for her first set of layers (and the same design that WV had provided for the rabbit and guinea fowl projects).

The farmers included in the layer project have been re-targeted for another World Vision project, along with an additional forty farmers, this time for producing broiler chickens. According to Agritex, this new broiler chicken project will involve contract farming in order to provide a reliable market for the farmers. During discussion, Agritex officers expressed the hope that the contract farming arrangement would provide better incentive to those beneficiaries who had failed with their layer production (Appendix 1, Interview 9).

5.4.5 Mzinyathini Irrigation Scheme Rehabilitation

The Mzinyathini Irrigation Scheme is a 32.4 hectare surface irrigation scheme which receives its water from the Umzingwane Dam. The access to water from the dam is, for the time being, guaranteed by way of an agreement between Bulawayo City Council and Mzinyathini Communal Area. The scheme was originally built in 1965 and was successful for a very long time; however it became degraded over the years and needed rehabilitation. World Vision's three-year involvement in rehabilitating the scheme took place from 2009 to 2012, and this involved rehabilitating the irrigation systems of canals and piping. In addition, agricultural training and input provision took place. WV's involvement was in response to a request from the RDC, likewise as part of the

development plan mentioned earlier for other projects. The scheme targets 81 beneficiaries, each with a 0.4 hectare farming plot. Beneficiary targeting was again based on vulnerability factors, with an additional consideration for those who do not own cattle. Within the scheme, farmers practice conventional tillage, and not the minimal-tillage conservation method.

World Vision's funding for this project involved a three-year contract with the EU, where the receipt of each year's funds was contingent upon a yearly audit which would compare actual implementation and spending against the original project plan. The research revealed contradicting statements as to whether or not this funding system created problems for timely and efficient implementation. One World Vision staff member suggested that the audit condition and contingency caused serious challenges (Appendix 1, Interview 2). At the time he was interviewed, he revealed that the project had been sitting still with no progress for five months while they were waiting to receive the next year's funding. He attributed it to EU's complex audit system, which requires reports to be audited from a support office in Brussels and then approved before the next set of funds can be sent, thereby creating severe lag time between yearly accesses to funding. Another World Vision staff member supported this view during the course of my first interview with him (Appendix 1, Interview 4), suggesting that the project had been stopped due to a funding cut. However, in an interview a year later, and after the project had been completed, he claimed that the yearly audit system had no affect on the project "*because implementation was done well*" (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5). Despite any lag time in funding, World Vision completed its rehabilitation efforts and withdrew from the project area by 2013.

Since World Vision's withdrawal from the scheme, and until recently, agricultural production has been successful under the guidance and support of Agritex. However, Bulawayo City Council then refused to honor the water agreement and simply cut off the majority of the agreed water supply. During my fieldwork, on average, only eleven out of the eighty-one farmers were receiving water each week. When asked if World Vision had made any effort to addressing this problem as part of its monitoring function, the Agritex officer suggested that the issue was ultimately a legal and even a political matter, and therefore attempts by World Vision to address the water supply problem would not be

appropriate or relevant (Appendix 1, Interview 9). Although Agritex and the greater Umzingwane Rural District Council were unable to make headway in addressing this issue, it has since been resolved but not through the courts. Rather, the resolution entailed the personal (and presumably political) connections of a concerned and interested third party.

5.4.6 Malunika Dam and Irrigation Scheme Rehabilitation

The Malunika Dam and Irrigation Rehabilitation project also involved rehabilitating a surface irrigation area. However, World Vision's largest contribution in the case was the repair of the Malunika Dam wall (which had a large hole) and setting up pipelines for feeding water into the surface irrigation scheme. This project was implemented from 2010 to 2012 and was not requested by RDC but was an initiative of WV. The agricultural plot for the irrigation scheme is located in ward eight. The dam is located in the communal area but the farming scheme itself is located on privately-owned land. The private land owner has donated the use of the land, which is just less than two hectares in size. The scheme targets 27 beneficiaries, each with 0.06 hectare plots. The scheme is set up with a canal system which is fed by the pipes from the Malunika Dam. World Vision inputs included cement, pipes, a siphon system, horticulture seeds and fertilizer.

All twenty-seven beneficiaries are so far clearly devoted to sustaining their plots in the scheme, although a recent break in the valve which controls the water coming through the pipelines from the dam has caused concern about the continuous availability of water. According to Agritex, the usual procedure in such a situation would be for the 27 benefitting farmers to pool together funds to pay to have the valve fixed (Appendix 1, Interview 9). The farmers though are unwilling to contribute any funds because "*someone from government*" came and took the valve, promising to have it repaired. The person who promised to fix the valve has not arranged any funding, so now the situation sits unresolved. The Agritex officer believes that the farmers are in fact not willing to replace the valve because they think that if they wait long enough, it will be repaired for free (meaning that they will not need to come up with funding) (Appendix 1, Interview 9). However, if the promise to fix the valve is ever fulfilled, it may be long after in-field crops and income opportunity have been lost. In other words, in the opinion of the

Agritex officer, the farmers will suffer more from loss of crop production than they would if they simply paid for the valve repairs.

Fig. 5.8 Malunika Dam wall

Fig. 5.9 Malunika irrigation farming scheme



5.5 WVZ Methodology in Practice in Umzingwane

All of the projects discussed above were originally assessed, implemented, monitored and evaluated, through similar systems and all involved great reliance on Agritex. In accordance with WV's LEAP policy (although LEAP was not mentioned by district level WV staff), the methods used by WVZ in Umzingwane involved a practical and efficient approach with objectives to stretch donor funding through effectively outsourcing responsibilities to local government (Agritex) and to enable long-term project support through building local government capacity. Such a methodology (involving the close connections forged between WVZ and Agritex) and its implications are discussed in this section.

5.5.1 Needs-Assessment

With regards to needs-assessment, there were two different motivations expressed by World Vision staff for WV's involvement in the local area. The first entailed WVZ responding to a request for assistance from the Rural District Council in order to

implement a development plan which the council already had in place but could not carry out due to lack of funding. These included the Mzinyathini irrigation rehabilitation, the EU-funded conservation agriculture project and the goat production project. The second motivation did not involve a response to a request from the RDC, but related to WV initiatives to supplement the development projects which were being requested by the RDC. Information used in needs-assessment for determining project direction and plans was gathered through Agritex as well as directly by World Vision. According to World Vision Zimbabwe, ‘point of entry’ for all its projects is through the Rural District Council and the District Administrator (DA)’s office (Appendix 1, Interviews 1,3). World Vision also attends thematically-based district-level developmental meetings (food security meetings were given as an example) on a regular basis as part of the needs-assessment process. Further, any World Vision involvement in the district must be approved by the District Administrator before it occurs. The three regional and district-level World Vision staff members who were interviewed expressed a solid working relationship with the DA and claimed to have never had problems regarding gaining access to areas in Umzingwane or having specific projects approved in the district (Appendix 1, Interviews 2-6). This is unlike other districts, where they noted challenges in this regard.

Beneficiary selection processes occur as part of assessment processes. As mentioned above, when formulating each project, World Vision targets individuals who it considers to be the most vulnerable. That vulnerability is marked by age (those who are 65 years of age and higher), the number of orphans a household is caring for (particularly if a household has two or more orphans), child-headed households, and/or a lack of stable income. Sometimes, as indicated, additional selection criteria which are more project-specific will be considered, for example, the amount of land to which a farmer has access and possession of livestock by farmers. World Vision works alongside Agritex in determining and identifying these factors in selecting project beneficiaries.

While the Agritex officers who were interviewed seemed to indicate that WV’s involvement in selecting project beneficiaries was minimal, they did assert that World Vision is in fact on-the-ground interviewing and assessing project beneficiaries in the communities of Umzingwane. In this regard, they expressed frustration with World Vision’s requirement to target those who are most vulnerable. They suggested that

because World Vision is funding the project, they as Agritex must of course ensure that WV's objective related to vulnerability is adhered to, but they did not agree with its logic. They felt that, by targeting the most vulnerable, World Vision is in the end setting up projects to fail, and these projects will not be sustainable in the long run.

In this light, one Agritex officer was of the view that farmers who are vulnerable because of old age or ill-health (such as suffering from HIV and AIDS) will forever remain vulnerable, regardless of whether they receive World Vision's development assistance or not (Appendix 1, Interview 9). He felt that while a specific project might help these particularly-vulnerable people in the short-term, the project will not be sustainable and will not help entire rural communities. In this sense, the effect is that development assistance simply becomes relief aid. While he was not advocating for ignoring vulnerable people, he suggested that it would be more appropriate to help those who are capable and ready to take on a project with full energy and commitment. He suggested that such farmers would not only sustain their own projects but would facilitate broader change by inspiring and guiding other farmers in the area. His view, however, is based on the view that vulnerable people are not capable of inputting intensive labor and time, but this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, not all groups found in World Vision's vulnerability criteria are necessarily weak or incapable. This is particularly true of the vulnerability criteria including households that lack a stable income and households hosting orphans. The success of some of the beneficiaries interviewed (for example the woman with her goat and rabbit projects who had invested in a cow) demonstrates this.

While this study does not focus on gender, it is useful to note that, of the six conservation agriculture and livestock production project sites visited, five of the farmers were women. At one household visited, the farmer's husband was home but he could not provide any details about the projects, saying that his wife was the one who was involved. World Vision does not specify how gender is factored into beneficiary selection and in the analysis of vulnerability in Umzingwane, but women appeared to be prevalent amongst all the different WV projects.

5.5.2 Implementation

Implementation of WVZ projects in Umzingwane seems to exemplify some of World Vision's organizational values, including the significance of local partnership with government, the use of already-established local structures, efficiency of time and monetary investment placed as high priorities and holistic development. The values of efficiency, the use of established structures and strengthening the capacity of local partners are all seen through WV's close relationship with Agritex and its overall involvement in carrying out agriculturally-based development projects. World Vision's emphasis on holistic development is evident through the overlap which has been created among project beneficiaries, with many farmers benefitting from multiple and different WV projects at the same time. This holistic approach is also seen in the embedding of HIV and AIDS education and prevention in all other project training and implementation practices, regardless of the specific agricultural sub-sector within which a project falls. Additionally with respect to exemplifying WV's organizational values, while district level WV staff and Agritex officers seem unaware of LEAP and other WV policies and official procedures, the requirements and values of such policies and procedures are evident through the ways in which projects are implemented.

Implementation of VW projects in Umzingwane is primarily carried out by Agritex although, according to Agritex officers, World Vision is still present – at least to some extent – on the ground, meeting with and speaking to community members. In this context, one World Vision field officer who was interviewed indicated that Agritex officers would be in a stronger position than him to provide details of the multiple projects in Umzingwane, suggesting in effect that World Vision takes a backseat role in guiding and supporting Agritex as well as building-up government capacity, rather than taking on a direct role as implementers on the ground (Appendix 1, Interview 6). When asked about this, the WV Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager suggested that working through Agritex allows WV projects to be more sustainable (Appendix 1, Interview 3). He argued this on the basis that donor funds for WV projects have short cycles of time and, therefore, working with and through Agritex (a permanent presence) complements WV's efforts. Simultaneously, during the length of WV's participation, WV ensures that Agritex has or builds the necessary capacity to monitor

and sustain the projects subsequent to WV's withdrawal. Through building such capacity with Agritex, he suggested, World Vision is in effect avoiding the negative implications of short-term funding. As such, even if funding streams are short-term, projects themselves should not be, in that Agritex remains to see projects through in the long term. In fact, of the projects which were studied in Umzingwane, most involved very short-term (less than a year) funding and implementation periods for WVZ, making the reliance on Agritex for any long-term project support very critical.

At the same time, he highlighted though that, during the funding period, WV is involved in implementation of the projects (as well as monitoring) alongside Agritex. This is necessary because, ultimately, WV is responsible for these functions as per the specifications and conditions of the project funding and must report to the donors accordingly. Engaging in this short-term project-based development was also seen by him as a tactical adaptation by WV to current donor funding opportunities in Zimbabwe (Appendix 1, Interview 3). In this sense, WV is taking advantage of short-term donor opportunities, as long-term funding is often not available in Zimbabwe. Additionally, in doing so, it is not concerned about the negative implications for the prospects of long-term participatory-based development that inevitably arise from short-term funding (when there is a rush to conclude development projects on the basis of project efficiencies) because of the long-term support from Agritex. In this respect, however, the food security and livelihoods program manager expressed some concern that Agritex (as part and parcel of the contemporary Zimbabwean state with all its incapacities as witnessed by the failure to provide post-settlement support to fast track farmers) had very limited capacity to perform its role vis-à-vis the WV project (Appendix 1, Interview 3). Agritex, he claimed, suffered from a lack of physical mobility (unable to transport its officers to different sites in order to monitor and provide support to farmers), lack of morale (possibly because of low public servant salaries), and even an absence of competency with respect to necessary experience and relevant education.

By conducting training sessions with Agritex officers (as indicated previously) in addition to recently providing a vehicle to the local Agritex office, World Vision is seeking to overcome these challenges and, in the process, is working to build Agritex's capacity to carry on with the projects. World Vision also benefits from this relationship.

In general, given the short-term funding, it is more efficient, both in time and money, for WV to work through Agritex. Agritex collects varying types of field data on agriculture, has long-term relationships with farmers and has government authority to carry out work and access rural areas. Thus WV receives a steady flow of secondary data which can be used to develop project proposals at short notice. The cooperation also allows communication flows between WV, farmer beneficiaries or intended beneficiaries, and local political government (notably the RDC and the DA) to remain open. Perhaps even more important, by working through Agritex in the implementation phase, World Vision's presence is legitimized from the perspective of the central state which – as discussed – has a rocky relationship with NGOs including at times with DNGOs.

The holistic character of WV projects in Umzingwane is a clear reflection of World Vision's overall organizational values. In the various projects researched, there was significant overlap between beneficiaries of different projects. Most of the livestock production beneficiaries had also been involved in receiving both training and physical inputs with regard to the conservation agriculture project. Two of the three goat farmers visited were successfully growing crops through conservation agriculture methods; the two most successful goat project sites visited were also benefitting from World Vision's rabbit project; and both guinea fowl farmers visited also practiced conservation agriculture successfully. Additionally, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, all World Vision trainings and inputs are accompanied by HIV and AIDS education, therefore providing a health dimension (and possibly facilitating behavioral change with respect to unsafe sex practices) to all agricultural support projects. The HIV and AIDS counseling is significant given that the pandemic has had serious repercussions for agriculture in Zimbabwe, including the loss of thousands of economically-active farmers. Hence, it contributes to the prospects of sustainable livelihoods rooted in agriculture in communal areas.

As well, by supporting income diversification through implementing a variety of agricultural projects among the same targeted beneficiaries, World Vision is providing what could be considered a safety net to protect beneficiaries from uncontrollable factors that may lead to project failure. For example, one of the farmers visited had been very successful with her conservation agriculture but had been very unsuccessful with her

goats. Therefore, while she had failed at one project, she was still able to sustain herself and improve her livelihood from the other project. At the same time this diversity of projects, when successful, exhibits the value in spreading-out agricultural investments and may therefore inspire confidence that leads to self-initiative among beneficiaries to further expand or diversify their projects. Such success and expansion was seen with the farmer who had been successful in her WV rabbit, goat and conservation agriculture projects and had therefore invested in a cow, intending to build up a cattle herd over time.

Finally, the official World Vision organizational policies and procedures laid out throughout its documentation (such as LEAP, Child Well-Being Outcomes and the Development Program Approach) are not explicitly acknowledged by field or district level World Vision staff in Umzingwane, but the objectives of such documentation are evident through WVZ's implementation practices in Umzingwane. It seemed that lower-level World Vision staff members were not only unconcerned but seemingly unaware of the intricacies of policies such as LEAP. Yet, the values those policies put forth, such as efficiency, building the capacity of established structures (including government capacity – in this case Agritex) and holistic development, were evidently being carried out in actual practice.

The one significant value that was not particularly prevalent on the ground (or in the field) was the involvement of and priority for children. Child protection is though recognized by lower-level WV staff. For example, when the WV District Officer was asked how WVI's official methods, requirements, training documents and minimum standards around children come into actual play in project implementation, he could only think of the requirement that children must be protected, and he suggested that WV ensures this by "*providing guidelines to stakeholders on the right to education, shelter, clothes, etc. for the children*" (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5) Despite the mention of protection, when asked directly how the projects covered in this study tied in with World Vision's Child Well-Being Outcomes, the district officer responded that the projects did not tie in with CWBOs at all. That being said, other global WV organizational values were evident in the projects studied.

5.5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

Similar to assessment and implementation, monitoring and evaluation for WV projects in Umzingwane are carried out through Agritex. As mentioned above (under implementation), WV sees Agritex's involvement as a path to sustainability, particularly regarding monitoring and evaluation, as Agritex must carry on long after World Vision's funding stream for a particular project has finished. For each of the projects considered in this study, monitoring was carried out in a variety of ways. What stood out as the most prominent means for monitoring were reports from Agritex. Despite the claim from both WV and Agritex that World Vision was also on the ground conducting monitoring, the primary means of monitoring was clearly through Agritex.

When asked how WV receives feedback about projects, three methods were outlined by World Vision staff: reports, which are received through Agritex; feedback meetings; and direct complaints coming straight to World Vision from individual beneficiaries or others within the benefitting community. The report process was explained in this way: ward-level Agritex officers assess the situation of the project beneficiaries and report to Agritex at district level; then, Agritex at district level in turn reports to World Vision (Appendix 1, Interview 3). The WV district coordinator noted that this report process may be carried out differently in other districts, but due to (in his opinion) the good relationship between WVZ and the Umzingwane district government, they are able to receive monitoring reports in this manner (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5). In the case of feedback meetings, it was not clear whether these meetings consisted of Agritex and World Vision attendees only, or whether they also included local village or ward-level representatives. It was clear, however, that feedback meetings occur directly between World Vision staff and Agritex. With respect to direct complaints, farmer beneficiaries are provided with the contact details for the relevant World Vision field officers, district coordinator and program manager. If a complaint arises, whether it is against Agritex, a local leader or community member, or one of the World Vision staff members, beneficiaries may express their concerns directly to World Vision in confidence, and they have the option of contacting who they wish to speak to amongst the field officers, district coordinator and program manager.

Additionally, when asked about feedback mechanisms, the World Vision food relief and livelihoods program manager described what WVZ calls ‘information provision’ (Appendix 1, Interview 3). Information provision happens at the beginning of implementation, and involves World Vision informing the community about the project by summarizing its objectives, targets and plans in the form of information pamphlets and meetings which are called ‘inception meetings’. It is in the pamphlets distributed at such meetings that World Vision provides the contact details for the field officers, district coordinator and program manager that can then be used for receiving complaints. The World Vision program manager suggested that inception meetings are a time when people can share concerns regarding the project, and he therefore spoke about them as a way of monitoring feedback. However, these meetings are more of a preliminary act rather than an opportunity to monitor projects during implementation or post-implementation. Thus, they are not proper feedback mechanisms which can be used as a monitoring mechanism for projects. Such consultative meetings imply that World Vision addresses and uses participatory methods that derive from an involvement-based participatory concept rather than an empowerment-based concept of participation, at least with regard to beneficiary participation. Seemingly, if deeper participation is to be discovered with respect to the Umzingwane projects, then it is to be found in the relationship between WVZ and Agritex and not between WVZ and farmers.

Turning finally to evaluation, project-specific, detailed and measured evaluations had not yet taken place for the projects studied. This is not surprising, as the projects have all occurred within the last four years and, as mentioned in chapter four, the World Vision program and project cycle is based on a five-year time span between evaluations. Feedback meetings and theme-based development meetings (for example the drought relief committee) do take place on a regular basis with Agritex, the RDC and the DA, which creates a regular flow of evaluative feedback and which could provide a basis for a WV-driven evaluation of the projects.

The trend that is evident among these systems of assessment, implementation, monitoring and evaluation in Umzingwane is that World Vision’s approach to empowerment-based participation and capacity-building is very government-focused, centered on empowering and supporting the established systems that exist in local

government. This is in contrast to the approach to participation that is taken with beneficiaries directly, which seems to be more of an involvement-based approach that uses consultation as the means of assessment and feedback. This trend, which is evident in projects happening on the ground throughout Umzingwane District, corresponds to the approaches laid out in LEAP.

5.6 WVZ Accountability in Umzingwane

In this section, I discuss World Vision's work in Umzingwane in relation to the broader question of accountability. In its close connection with and support for local government, WV appears to have achieved a level of project sustainability and accountability to beneficiaries, while manipulating short-term donor funding to achieve longer-term impact. As well, WV's work shows evidence of significant accountability to the organization's own values and policies, even when ground-level staff members are not explicitly aware of or concerned with the details of such policies and values. With regard to accountability, I examine in turn donors, government and beneficiaries.

5.6.1 Accountability to Donors: Issues of Funding

Donors and their requirements and the necessity to be accountable to them are a concern affecting higher-ranking WV managerial and administrative staff, such as the Program Manager and the Grants and Human Affairs Director. Due to World Vision's approach to needs-assessment in Umzingwane that relies heavily on Agritex, WV does not directly involve beneficiaries in projects until funding has already been approved. As well, the short-term character of the majority of the projects looked at during this study seems to have significantly reduced complications associated with meeting donor requirements, as funding requirements associated with longer-term projects are more convoluted and multi-dimensional. Both the WV district coordinator and the WV food relief and livelihood program manager did though highlight the importance of WV's accountability to donors even for short-term projects, and they suggested that this was one reason for the necessity of WV's direct involvement on-the-ground (no matter how limited this was compared to Agritex's on-the-ground involvement in WV projects) (Appendix 1, Interviews and Correspondence 2, 3, 4, 5). To reiterate, though donor accountability

requirements impacted on WV fieldworkers and their responsibilities, the affects, difficulties and challenges associated with these requirements were felt primarily by higher-level World Vision staff.

Of all of the projects in Umzingwane district, accountability to donors in terms of responding to specific requirements seemed to have the greatest direct affect on the Mzinyathini irrigation scheme rehabilitation project. As mentioned earlier, funding from the EU was granted for this three-year project on condition that a yearly assessment and audit was undertaken by WV. This led to significant frustrations and a five-month lag period in funding and temporary project suspension. Additional frustrations were expressed regarding EU's strict requirements and absence of flexibility with respect to adhering to line-item spending plans which were originally specified in the funding proposal, as well as EU's refusal to approve certain necessary line items, such as tollgate fees. Frustrations and difficulties specific to the even shorter-term projects (such as conservation agriculture and livestock production) were not explicitly expressed. Both the very short term cycle of these projects, as well as the reliance on Agritex to carry out monitoring and beneficiary support, may have contributed to this.

WV's close relationship with Agritex, which builds up the latter's capacity to provide sustainable monitoring and support for beneficiaries, might provide the basis for carrying out meaningful projects in the short term, therefore allowing WV more freedom to accept short-term funding and with less resource and time intensive commitments and requirements on its part. If looked at from another perspective, however, the comparative inability or inopportunity in achieving long-term funding may dictate the necessity of the reliance on Agritex for fulfilling project sustainability. If short-term funding is all that is available or mainly available, WV does not have the option of carrying out long-term, meaningful monitoring themselves and must therefore rely on Agritex (because of WV's quick withdrawal from short-term projects when the funding for a specific project is finished). WV staff members, as mentioned, did express concern with Agritex's competence and capacity, but suggested that its prominent role is critical to project sustainability, as Agritex is able to continue working on projects after WV no longer has funding to monitor and support them (Appendix 1, Interview 3, 6). Essentially, the general attitude within WVZ district-level staff toward donors regarding these short-term

projects is marked by acknowledgement of a necessary system that must be accepted and worked around as part of the process, regardless of the complications and difficulties it presents.

Other frustrations regarding funding included the local-level perception that NGOs have plenty of funds to spend and therefore are expected to provide generous allowances to Agritex and other local leaders who partner with WV in their development efforts, but such generous allowances are not in fact accepted as part of funding proposals. According to the WV food relief and livelihoods program manager, UNICEF and other larger organizations often offer hefty meal allowances to government officials (of between \$40 and \$60), while a WV allowance may be \$10 (Appendix 1, Interview 2). This creates unrealistic expectations of World Vision. He also suggested that there is a general dislike toward WV from local professionals, including both government and non-government employees (such as doctors and teachers), which is residual from the period when many NGOs had access to foreign currency but local professionals were paid in the inflated Zimbabwe dollar (prior to the government of national unity); this, he claims, has created the misconception that NGOs are flush with funds for ready dispersal. The result is that local stakeholders cannot understand the strict expenditure requirements that WV must adhere to, for example, when WV staff members assert that they must check with their organization and follow formal procedures before spending WV money. Other issues of funding and frustrations and difficulties over donor requirements appear to be mainly an issue at the national WV level (as was described in chapter four), although such issues are still felt to an extent at the district level.

5.6.2 Accountability to Government: Legitimizing WV's Presence

Up to this point, in terms of the relationship between WVZ and government in the Umzingwane projects, the discussion has focused on local government. But my research also shines some light on relationships between WV and provincial and national governments with regards to political impact. The emphasis on local government of course reflects the WVZ-government dynamic. The most significant aspect of World Vision's relationship with the state is its close connections with local government, particularly Agritex and the latter's role in supporting agricultural development projects.

Throughout organization-wide WV policy and documentation (as discussed in the preceding chapter), stress is placed on both building capacity of local government structures for the purpose of development sustainability as well as relying on secondary data and existing systems of assessment for efficiency of time and money. In Umzingwane, both of these imperatives are carried out through WV's close partnership and reliance on local government for carrying out each stage in the development projects (assessing, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating).

The point of entry for all World Vision projects in Umzingwane district is through the office of the District Administrator (DA) and the Rural District Council (RDC). These state bodies have the authority to grant permission to WV to take action in carrying out development projects within the district. The WV program manager, district coordinator and field officer for Umzingwane all expressed a high level of satisfaction with their relationship with both the DA and the RDC (Appendix 1, Interviews and Correspondence 3, 5, 6). According to the district coordinator, interactions between WV on the one hand and the DA and RDC on the other hand are “*very positive*,” claiming that “*updates besides monthly reports are done any time and it's a good way of monitoring activities of NGO work*” (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5). The food relief and livelihoods program manager commented that WVZ does not have any critical stumbling-blocks in its relation with the DA in Umzingwane (Appendix 1, Interview 3). Beyond the DA and RDC, World Vision must meet with and gain approval from the local head of Umzingwane Agritex, to move forward with any agriculturally-based projects.

Not only are these channels of consultation and authority required of World Vision by government in order to gain permission to carry out projects, but World Vision staff considered the WV-local government relationships and partnerships to provide legitimization of their projects and motivation for these projects from the perspective of the beneficiaries, as well as giving WV projects and WV itself a level of political security. The WV district coordinator commented that:

Workmanship on projects such as construction of fowl runs is monitored and supervised by government workers so WV is not blamed for poor workmanship. DA, Council and other offices were taken to do project site monitoring regularly, say every three months, and that alone was a good motivator to the beneficiaries. The best method to manage

political labeling is to plan [site] monitoring with government line ministry departments.

(Appendix 1, Correspondence 5)

The WV district coordinator suggests that, because of government's involvement (and even its leading role in monitoring) in the projects, World Vision is protected from two possibilities: the first is being blamed for project failure, and the second is being considered as having a political presence or promoting a political agenda in the area. As discussed in chapter three, the political atmosphere in Zimbabwe is often tense (including in rural areas), and foreign or international NGOs have not always been welcome by the state in pursuing their work and gaining influence.

When asked whether or not the parliamentary elections carried out in July of 2013 had any impact on the progress of WV projects or the presence of WV in the field, the WV food relief and livelihoods program coordinator provided a mostly positive but very carefully-crafted answer. He said that WV removed its presence during the time surrounding elections to allow space for political party campaigning (Appendix 1, Interview 3). He also acknowledges that, for certain areas, WV was literally asked to remove itself, again to provide space and time for campaigning. While this seems to suggest that WV was removed from the field to the detriment of its activities, it seemed to be a welcome removal. The WV program coordinator therefore argued that WV's presence during the time of elections would have been unwise, creating the potential for being accused of a political agenda. He said that he appreciated the honesty of the political campaigners and the government in asking WV to remove itself from its areas of operation.

Another struggle, again arising from the tense political atmosphere, involves the perception among Umzingwane communities that World Vision's funding comes from the ruling ZANU-PF party as a service from the Zimbabwe government. One World Vision staff member indicated that *"politicians claim that they can give or take NGO money away, [and make] these claims usually to uninformed or uneducated people when trying to gain political support"* (Appendix 1, Interview 3). This has two potentially negative impacts on World Vision. First of all, this belief leads rural communities to develop expectations about World Vision that may not be achievable. Because government is seen as responsible for providing infrastructural and social services, if

rural communities are told that World Vision is acting under the direction of government, they will expect the same from World Vision that they do from their government.

The second potential negative impact relates to the fact that politicians do not want rural communities to know that they are not responsible for the development services which are being provided. They are threatened and wary of the presence and activity of NGOs like World Vision and hence they propagate the idea that these NGOs are working on behalf of – if not at the behest of – government. This was experienced firsthand during the research. While visiting a project site with an Agritex officer, we had picked up a farmer to view his field, and then returned him to the village center so that he could attend a compulsory political meeting. While the purpose of the meeting was not made known, the Agritex officer suggested that we leave immediately, as my presence as an outsider had been noticed and was very unwelcome. As we were leaving, the Agritex officer explained the reason for my unwelcome presence, namely, that the political figures who were holding the meeting gained legitimacy from the perception of them as the deliverers of development and services, and that the presence of an outsider accompanied by an Agritex officer would give the meeting attendees the impression that I may be a representative from an NGO. The fear was that, if I had been delivering some type of development assistance at the time, people would question the legitimacy of the claim made by government officials that development came from government.

With regard to government, one perspective that became evident through discussions with informants, both WV and Agritex, is a semi-dichotomous, semi-integrated juxtaposition of local government ministries and higher forms of government. This is in the sense that local bureaucratic government offices, particularly with respect to employees and their actions on the ground, expressed a sense of separation from higher forms of government (with specific respect to politics and its negative implications), while at the same time implying a sense of cooperation with higher government in order to secure power and authority. Although this appeared to be an underlying theme peaking out through various comments which were made by informants, this was made particularly evident after the occurrence of the event described in the above paragraph. During this happening, the Agritex officer expressed a clear separation between himself as part of Agritex (and therefore part of the bureaucracy of the state) and any politically-

oriented member of government. The implications of this are not entirely clear. However, it may explain the comfort World Vision expresses in working with Agritex, while at the same time its employees expressed a very cautious approach toward discussing the 2013 elections as well as toward discussing the procedures for gaining access to rural areas. While they claimed to have positive and productive relationships with local government, they remained careful and tentative in their comments and approach.

5.6.3 Accountability to Beneficiaries

World Vision seeks to achieve accountability to its beneficiaries through a variety of methods. These entail a method involving a consultative, involvement-based approach to direct beneficiary participation combined with an empowerment-based method to the participation of local leaders and government stakeholders (which involves an indirect form of accountability to beneficiaries). Rather than accountability only being pursued through a grassroots system that is in some way beneficiary-led and -owned, accountability is attempted in an indirect fashion, through meaningful participation with leaders and existing structures (notably Agritex).

While direct contact and feedback from beneficiaries is welcomed through the complaints-reporting system, the projects themselves are not instigated, needs-assessed or planned by the direct beneficiaries in any meaningful way. This is in line with LEAP and its imperative that beneficiaries should not be involved in a project in any way until funding has been guaranteed in order to avoid the emergence of unachievable expectations amongst rural communities. This does not necessarily mean that WV is not at all accountable to its beneficiaries or the progress of its development projects, but it does mean that the methods of participatory accountability that are generally embodied in development discourse are not particularly pursued by WV in Umzingwane district.

It was also noted that the close and positive relationship between WV and Umzingwane district government allows for a constant stream of feedback from monitoring. This open flow of communication provides World Vision with opportunities to respond to challenges that may arise or to positive feedback with reinforcement and further support and, in actively doing this, increasing its accountability to beneficiaries. An example of WV responding to evaluative feedback is the new plan to implement a

broiler-chicken project with the same target beneficiaries who failed in their attempts with layer chickens (possibly because eggs were not valued as a lucrative source of income). This would also entail contractual arrangements to ensure a more stable market incentive for successful broiler production. Another example is the new initiative to provide market contracts for alternative grains in response to problems linked to the growing of maize by Umzingwane farmers.

A further accountability mechanism by World Vision in Umzingwane is the prioritization of unforeseen impacts of their projects. The WV food relief and livelihoods program manager stressed the importance of WV conducting impact assessments as well as conflict-resolution training in preparation for unforeseen impacts (Appendix 1, Interview 2). One example he used involved the question of land access and possession, suggesting that agreements about plot boundaries and land access have been historically subject to change and dispute within communities in Umzingwane and continues to be so. Land agreements in one agricultural year may be contested in subsequent years. These challenges are particularly relevant to both irrigation schemes described in this study. He argued that accountability, amongst other things, entailed forging connections within communities and not dividing them (Appendix 1, Interview 2).

One reason, as noted, for working so closely through Agritex (rather than directly with beneficiaries) is the belief that Agritex will be provided with the necessary capacity to support sustainability after World Vision has terminated its project involvement. This aim of sustainability, in effect, is a means by which WV is attempting to achieve accountability to beneficiaries, as if project success is equivalent to accountability. It reduces accountability, therefore, to a product (measurable and quantifiable) and not a complex and nuanced process of consultation, deliberation and engagement. This is a critical weakness of WV with reference to accountability, at least in the case of the projects studied in Umzingwane, and it undermines any genuine participatory development methodologies.

5.6.4 Trends in Accountability of World Vision in Umzingwane

Two types of accountability are evident as the prominent means of accountability for World Vision in Umzingwane: accountability to government and accountability to World

Vision itself. While accountability to donors provides challenges which are dealt with regularly and are accompanied by sacrificing certain priorities, accountability to the government and accountability to World Vision itself stand out as prioritized.

That being said, in the view of World Vision staff, they *are* being accountable to beneficiaries *through* being accountable to government and themselves. But the dimensions and elements of their accountability to beneficiaries do not directly align with the generally-accepted norms of even concepts of basic participatory development as outlined in chapter two. WV meets the basic requirements of participatory development regarding the government and building government capacity, but not at the individual, household and community levels amongst beneficiaries. While wary of politics and careful to avoid political implications of its work, WV embraces a close relationship with government in order to achieve both sustainability in its work and to protect itself from the very political implications that it tries to avoid explicitly.

World Vision's methods and actions in Umzingwane district do correspond however with organization-wide policies and values, particularly with regard to efficiency, practicality, holism and building the capacity of local stakeholders. Despite the fact that ground-level staff is not concerned with or aware of many of World Vision's official policies and objectives, these staff were faithfully carrying them out. Additionally, WV has managed to find a way to manipulate short-term donor funding into working toward more long-term projects (such as the livestock and conservation agriculture projects) by allocating organizational resources toward equipping the existing systems and structures in place (notably Agritex) in playing a support role to facilitate sustainability of projects. Though the short history of these projects makes it difficult to come to any definite conclusions, and because World Vision is still to withdraw from some of them, WV's efforts at preparing Agritex to support the beneficiaries seem to be achieving the intended goals, with the exception perhaps of the highly unsuccessful chicken layer project.

Finally, World Vision appears to exhibit accountability both to beneficiaries and local stakeholders through long-term, positive relationships with the government structures that it has capacitated. The outcome of the potentially-negative impacts of such close connections to the state are yet to be seen, but the immediate effects have been

positive as understood in terms of the agricultural productivity emerging from the projects studied. As noted though, this is to understand success as a concrete product and not an intangible process. The fact that WV does not necessarily see this as a critical problem and that it does not even go against WV's organizational policies and strategies, is problematic and disregards the very intangible concept of empowerment. In this end, it implies the existence of a marked divergence of WV policies and values from well-recognized participatory methodologies within the development industry ('big D' development).

5.7 Conclusion

World Vision plays a significant role in small-scale agricultural development in Umzingwane district, which is characterized by a climate that is not conducive to farming. Its work stays true to WV policies and its efforts in pursuit of practicality and efficiency, as well as its value for holistic development. It implements its wide variety of projects on a large scale which is dispersed across multiple wards with overlapping beneficiaries, and it relies heavily on local Agritex in order to carry out such work.

World Vision's methods in Umzingwane and its efforts toward accountability are carried out through top-down approaches which support the state structures and do not involve empowering, bottom-up participation. The implications of this approach involve many potential issues with respect to downward accountability. Not only does this create potential for supporting possibly corrupt, incapacitated or demoralized structures which may perpetuate current conditions of vulnerability, but it does so also at the cost of aims to catalyze empowerment and self-reliance. In allowing efficient use of donor funds and maintaining positive relationships with local government, WV facilitates its own organizational stability.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The main objective of this thesis is to understand and explain the work of World Vision in Zimbabwe, particularly in Umzingwane district, with specific respect to participatory methods, accountability and effectiveness. In so doing, the thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of NGOs as an organizational form. In working toward the main objective, the thesis has considered the following: global theories and approaches toward development, particularly with regard to deep empowerment-based participation; the socio-economic and political atmosphere in Zimbabwe and its communal areas, and the Zimbabwean history and context of NGOs working toward ‘big D’ development; the approaches, methods and priorities of World Vision globally and in Zimbabwe; and an examination of World Vision’s projects in Umzingwane district.

From this, the following conclusions can be drawn about World Vision: (1) World Vision has developed its own conceptualization of ‘participation’ that allows it to pursue policies and practice approaches which prioritize efficiency and project sustainability while addressing the demands of their donors and authorities of the state; (2) while allowing efficiency and easing constraints from donors and the state, World Vision’s heavy reliance on local ‘partners’ (namely, local government), while possibly a recipe for great sustainability of both development projects and WV’s organizational stability, is potentially ethically problematic with regard to supporting existing systems of power that lead to and reproduce vulnerability; and (3) WV’s conceptualization of participation allows WV to pursue its own sustainability and organizational interests and values (prioritizing accountability to itself over accountability to beneficiaries) while adhering to the global standards in development assistance (‘big D’ development) that call for participation and organizational learning.

Ultimately, these conclusions about World Vision exemplify the inherent conflicts between deep and meaningful empowerment-based participatory aims and other organizational aims of organizational stability and sustainability pursued through

efficiency and compliance to donors and the state. From this conflict arises a devolution of ‘participation’, fitting with the perspective that NGOs pursue organizational survival at the cost of addressing “higher order questions” (Mitlin et al. 2007:1700) with regard to empowerment and downward accountability. That being said, WV’s pursuit of organizational learning suggests that it is in fact considering these higher order questions although still prioritizing organizational survival and sustainability.

6.2 ‘Participation’ and World Vision

Participatory methods are not only prominent in the discourse surrounding ‘big D’ development but are accepted as a necessity of legitimizing such development work. As is noted in chapter two, practicing participatory methods is deemed both ethically and practically necessary. It was also noted that the concept of ‘participation’, while deemed necessary by global standards for acceptable and ethical ‘big D’ development, is open to conceptual slippage. This thesis has stressed the difference between involvement-based (top-down) participation, in which outside development agendas are pursued through consultation and inclusion of local beneficiaries, and empowerment-based (bottom-up) participation, which focuses on beneficiary decision-making. Additionally, it has been argued that while the value in the concept of participation is not misplaced, its central role in development discourse, just as other elements of development discourse, should be subjected to continuous scrutiny that challenges and reevaluates the paradigms surrounding it. In its efforts toward achieving both project and organizational sustainability through the efficient use of resources and answering to the requirements of the state and donors, WV has indeed questioned the very meaning and application of the concept of participation to a significant degree. In doing this, it has managed to balance the demands of donors and the state; however, this has been at the cost of deep, empowerment-based participation.

World Vision’s approach to participation is complex and draws on elements from both bottom-up and top-down participation. Dispersed throughout its policies seems to be a push for understanding bottom-up participation as more of an idealistic goal or guideline that may only be fully achieved if all other conditions are permitting and should not be pursued at the risks of compromising relationships with local stakeholders (mainly

the state and direct beneficiaries) or compromising the value of efficient spending of both time and money (and ultimately the sustainability of World Vision). Chapter four emphasized this aspect in its discussion of LEAP, WV's primary policy and framework. This framework strictly *requires* methods of efficiency through its *standards* (for example, the prioritization of secondary quantitative data for assessing rural community needs over primary qualitative data), whereas it *suggests* methods of bottom-up participation through its *guidelines* (for example, the guideline found in the design stage of LEAP that suggests the participation of general community members and the promotion of leadership among vulnerable groups). Therefore World Vision is continuously pushing toward two seemingly conflicting aims: stressing the importance of bottom-up approaches to participation and, simultaneously, prioritizing the necessity for practicality, efficiency and support of existing local structures of authority. For the two aims to be achieved simultaneously, compromise to some extent must take place.

In achieving this compromise, World Vision's application of its concept of 'participation' questions the notions of who the true beneficiaries are and how they are reached. By conducting bottom-up participatory methods with local structures of authority (particularly emphasizing local government) and top-down participatory methods with direct project beneficiaries, the very role of 'beneficiary' and concept of 'participation' is redefined. As was noted in chapter five, WV conducts trainer-of-trainer (TOT) sessions intended to build the capacity of Agritex to support local farmers. Here, the local government (which World Vision sees as the true means of achieving sustainability in initiating long-term support of the poor and vulnerable) and its employees are treated as the beneficiaries themselves. The direct beneficiaries on the other hand (the poor and vulnerable who receive World Vision's inputs) are benefitting not through their own empowerment-building self-reliance which should emerge from their own instigation of and leadership in development projects, but through the receipt of long-term support from local state structures which is intended to generate a sense of stability. That support and stability is intended to create conditions for project success, thereby building confidence in personal achievement that catalyzes self-reliance. In the case of the projects in Umzingwane, these successes involve profitable agricultural production.

This approach to participation allows WV to address the demands of its donors and the state. With regard to the latter, by implementing projects alongside of and through local government systems and structures (Agritex, in the case of Umzingwane) and by pursuing regular communication channels and building the capacity of those systems and structures, WV manages to maintain positive interactions and carry out its work. World Vision then uses this approach to its relationship with the state as an advantage in meeting the requirements of donors by allocating responsibilities (particularly in implementation and monitoring) to state structures and thereby stretching donor funds. As well, as is noted in chapter five, World Vision maintains some (be it minimal) presence with rural farmers, therefore meeting the participatory requirements of donors.

This conceptualization of ‘participation’ and its implementation question the foundation of deep participation. That foundation involves the inherent linkage between empowerment and sustainability being driven by self-reliance. WV’s ‘participation’ links empowerment and sustainability to long-term stability and support (by way of state structures) rather than to capacity-building that is merely externally catalyzed. Ultimately, WV’s ‘participation’ involves flexible and efficient maneuvering in the face of external pressures (from the state and donors) that allows it to pursue organizational sustainability while carrying out its projects.

6.3 Ethical Implications of World Vision’s Support of State Structures

While World Vision’s approach to participation may allow efficiency, enabling sustainability for both development projects and WV as an organization through building government capacity to ‘partner’ in carrying out development initiatives, its reliance on local ‘partners,’ particularly structures of state authority, takes the ethically problematic risk of contributing to factors that lead to vulnerability by supporting existing systems of power which may employ unjust or unethical practices. On the one hand, this conceptualization of ‘participation’ (which rethinks the role of the ‘beneficiary’ in clear support of state authority and existing structures of power) has the potential to instigate development and positive change within local government and its approach to responding to local needs and interests. From this perspective, such aims address the long-term

complaint made against NGO-driven ‘big D’ development that it merely pacifies local frustrations and therefore perpetuates the *status quo*. On the other hand, however, such practices have the risk of reinforcing and providing additional power to potentially incompetent, corrupt or unjust systems of governance that perpetuate vulnerability.

Here may be where the implications of the dichotomy between local government ministries and associations with politics (discussed in chapter five), come into play. Representatives from both World Vision and local government in Umzingwane considered local government facilitators as separate from political representation and initiatives, although it is difficult to determine if this is a true reflection of actual systems of authority or if WV purposely does not publicly acknowledge the risk of such connections in order to maintain carefully-balanced relationships with local authorities. Chapter five explained the incident where my presence was very unwelcome at one WV project site in a rural farming area when political figures were present, and the reason given was that the political figures wished to maintain the local misconception that they (the political figures) were responsible for (and therefore should be credited with) any development assistance received by the community. World Vision’s approach of supporting and working through Agritex would support this understanding that development assistance is initiated by the state.

6.4 World Vision’s Pursuit of Organizational Stability

World Vision’s approach to participation that prioritizes accountability to itself allows it to pursue its own stability and sustainability, as well as its organizational interests and values. Through this approach to participation, which both supports local structures of state authority through capacity-building programs and draws on them for beneficiary support, particularly in project monitoring and evaluation, World Vision has enabled itself to achieve efficiency in the use of donor funds and to maintain an acceptable relationship with government, two elements which significantly contribute to organizational security and sustainability. World Vision’s approach to supporting and developing state structures allows it, at least to an extent, to stretch donor funding, therefore easing funding pressures. In the case of Umzingwane, this efficient use of resources was evidenced through World Vision’s connection with Agritex. As noted in

the previous chapter, World Vision saw its investment in capacity-building for Agritex as a way to stretch their funding. Because Agritex was held accountable for much of the monitoring and evaluation, a lesser portion of WV funding needed to be used towards those processes, allowing a greater portion to be budgeted for implementation. It is important to note that this trend does not resolve all difficulties in accessing sufficient funding but appeared to minimize these difficulties at district and project level, whereas such challenges were felt largely by higher levels of World Vision staff. The district-level staff appeared to accept such limitations as a circumstance which must be dealt with and therefore manipulated their methods accordingly to stretch funding. Their actions were made possible through their approach to participation which built the capacity of local state structures and then placed emphasis and accountability on Agritex to 'partner' in conducting necessary projects steps with beneficiaries (the Mzinyathini irrigation scheme rehabilitation may be an exception to this, as donor constraints significantly affected implementation plans).

The emphasis on building state capacity by engaging with state authorities in bottom-up participatory programs also greatly contributes to World Vision's organizational sustainability by ensuring a positive relationship with government, helping to secure its access and permission to carry out its work. This occurs at both national and local levels. As is mentioned in chapter four, WV sees itself as having an advantage over other NGOs in terms of gaining government permission and access to rural areas, due to its longstanding presence and relationships with state authorities, both at local and national levels. While this relationship between WV and the state does employ characteristics of the corporatist strategies that governments regularly take toward achieving control over the actions of NGOs (discussed in chapter two), WV appears to manipulate the power dynamics in the relationship to its advantage. By building government capacity, World Vision has influence over the ways in which government carries out development work. The close relationship also creates a sense of reliance of government on World Vision for funding, training and capacity-building. By building government capacities for carrying out social services and developmental support and holding government structures accountable for carrying out development tasks, World Vision's presence builds up expectations among local constituencies of government's

role in delivering such social services and support. With greater expectations from local communities, government structures are interested in maintaining World Vision's support, which therefore allows World Vision some power and freedom in pursuing its own organizational values and directives by choosing how it supports government and what capacities it chooses to build-up.

These concerns necessitate a state of constant reflection and active learning that questions and reevaluates World Vision's 'take' on participation at multiple levels. The research found that World Vision attempts to achieve this from a variety of perspectives. A very strong emphasis is placed on such learning at the global level, and the continual updating and restructuring of the policies and guidelines of the World Vision global partnership is evidence that efforts toward constant organizational learning are being taken seriously. At the national level in Zimbabwe, initiatives aimed at such learning are carried out through WV's use of the cluster system, which allows WV to both share its experiences and learn from other organizations and stakeholders for purposes of programming. In the case of Umzingwane, local-level learning (in terms of learning from beneficiary feedback) is once again carried out through local government. As was noted, however, not all districts claim the same positive interactions between WV and local government that Umzingwane does and, in those districts which do not, evaluative efforts at local-level learning are handled differently. This acknowledgement perhaps suggests that even though relationships between WV and Umzingwane government are close, WV is in fact regularly reflecting on the existence and implications of such close relationships.

6.5 NGOs as an Organizational Form: the Significance and Legitimacy of Their Role

The NGO objective of catalyzing empowerment through pursuing deep participation entails inherent conflicts between achieving such pursuits and achieving the objectives that enable NGOs to exist and carry out development assistance. Chapter two argued that the notion that legitimizes NGOs (downward accountability to beneficiaries through deep participation) is not what ensures or defines their existence. In fact, their existence and survival is defined by their ability to meet the demands and expectations of the various

stakeholders in their domain. Such demands regularly conflict with the realization of implementing deep participation.

The accountability that NGOs show to states and donors is the means for ensuring their organizational sustainability, and is therefore a reflection of their accountability to themselves. This study of World Vision has recognized that such self-accountability may involve two perspectives: that of holding themselves accountable to their own stated goals and values, and in following directions that allow for sustaining their own existence. The example of World Vision, though, also exhibits (through its devolved conceptualization of ‘participation’ and the official role of participation in WV policies and values) that the former of these perspectives (holding itself accountable to its stated goals and values) is ultimately a means to achieving the latter (enabling its organizational survival). This is shown through WV’s writing of values and policies into its documentation that ultimately shape a form of participation which enables organizational sustainability. In this respect, there is no discursive approach to participation that addresses the legitimizing standards of downward accountability and deep participation as well as addressing what is effective or achievable in actual practice. Therefore fluidity of the definition and application of the concept of participation inevitably occurs within NGO practices through efforts in working toward both organizational sustainability and downward accountability.

Chapter two notes that the realization that NGOs prioritize their survival does not necessarily imply that their existence and their development aid are illegitimate or ineffective, provided that such a priority does not undermine their ability to achieve legitimate objectives for development assistance. Further, it may be that the priority of organizational survival and the priority of downward accountability are not always contradictory but have the possibility to coexist although they are disconnected. It was also noted in chapter two that the role that NGOs have come to fill in delivering development is deemed crucial to poverty reduction, and the very significance of that role may provide the opportunity for NGOs to impact on the forces that pressure them (namely states and donors).

6.6 Conclusion

Ultimately, the legitimacy of the role of NGOs as structures of development and their practices must be questioned and considered within their specific social contexts. In the context of World Vision in Umzingwane, WV has compromised participatory methodology and empowerment for the purpose of enabling continued organizational presence and survival. Additionally, its policies remain focused on measurable, tangible results and prioritize efficiency in response to the pressures of its domain, rather than attempting to use the position of its role in development as a bargaining chip in order to change the character of the forces that determine its fate. In the end, if progress toward deep empowerment-based development is to be achieved, the existing paradigms that govern the character of relationships between NGOs, states, donors and beneficiaries must be significantly questioned and adjusted.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List and Details of Interviews

1. Interview with WVZ Grants and Human Affairs Director: in-person interview, May 24, 2012
2. Interview with WVZ Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager (Interview 1): in-person interview, May 24, 2012
3. Interview with WVZ Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager (Interview 2): skype phone interview, December 4, 2013
4. Interview with WVZ Umzingwane District Coordinator: in-person interview, May 21, 2012
5. Email Correspondence with WVZ Umzingwane District Coordinator: questions sent October 3, 2013; responses received October 5, 2013
6. Interview with WVZ Umzingwane Field Officer: phone interview, October 15, 2013
7. Interviews with WVZ Former Employee: May 21, 2012; May 24, 2012; and September 28, 2013
8. Interview with the head of Umzingwane district Agritex: November 13, 2013
9. Interviews with district and ward-level Agritex field officers: November 14, 2013 and November 19, 2013
10. Interview with Beneficiary 1: crop farmer at Mzinyathini irrigation scheme rehabilitation site (ward 20), November 14, 2013
11. Interview with Beneficiary 2: chicken layer farmer (ward 8), November 14, 2013
12. Interview with Beneficiary 3: conservation agriculture and guinea fowl farmer (ward 13), November 14, 2013
13. Interview with Beneficiary 4: goat and conservation agriculture farmer (ward 5), November 19, 2013
14. Interview with Beneficiary 5: guinea fowl and conservation agriculture farmer (ward 5), November 19, 2013
15. Interview with Beneficiary 6: goat, rabbit and conservation agriculture farmer 1 (ward 5), November 19, 2013

16. Interview with Beneficiary 7: goat and rabbit farmer 2 (ward 5), November 19, 2013
17. Interview with staff member from Operation Trumpet Call, May 21, 2012

Appendix 2: Guiding Questions for Interview with World Vision Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager and Umzingwane District Coordinator (Interview 1)

1. What WV projects are in Umzingwane district?
2. Could you please describe those projects (please include location, objectives, number of beneficiaries, project duration, inputs from WV and how success is measured)?
3. How are they funded?
4. What impact does the government have on these projects?
5. Are there any political impacts or implications?
6. What are WV's processes for assessing needs, planning projects, acquiring funding, implementing projects and carrying out monitoring and evaluation in Zimbabwe? In Umzingwane district?
7. What happens when it is time for World Vision to leave the project area? How are withdrawal and preparation for withdrawal handled?
8. What kinds of issues do you and lower-level staff face in carrying out these projects with regard to donors and funding?
9. What kinds of issues do you and lower-level staff face in carrying out these projects with regard to beneficiary involvement?

Appendix 3: Guiding Questions for Interview with WVZ Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager (Interview 2)

1. How often is WV staff actually in the field in Umzingwane?
2. What is the structure of the WV chain of command in Umzingwane?
3. Do you ever use the WV office located in the government block in Esigodini?
4. The district field officer alluded to the idea that all WV work is done through Umzingwane government (almost outsourced). Is that true? Please explain how that works.
5. In that regard, I mostly visited sites where WV had completed their involvement and now Agritex was monitoring project progress. Could you please explain the balance between WV working through Agritex vs. WV working directly in the communities? Are duties allocated evenly or are more carried out by WV or Agritex?
6. Can you tell me about the health and education project? (What is involved? Who is carrying it out (e.g. Umzingwane ministry of health)? How is it funded? (through sponsorship or donor grants)?)
7. Are there any sponsorship-funded projects in Umzingwane?
8. Could you please tell me about any new projects in the district?
9. How is feedback passed back from beneficiaries to WV, both throughout project implementation and post-transition?
10. I was wondering if you could clarify a few aspects about the Mzinyathini Irrigation Scheme project:

The notes I have from our interview last year said that the project had been put on hold due to lack of funding, and that it should continue if more funding could be acquired. But then this year, the district coordinator said that the project had never been paused or put on hold for any reason. Please could you clarify this situation?

Agritex officers implied that WV had not been involved there for 5 or 7 and that WV simply fixed up the irrigation systems and left? Please could you explain the timing and situation of WV's final involvement and transition from Mzinyathini?

11. What happened with regard to project implementation during the elections last July? Did WV have ongoing projects in progress, and if so, were they halted during the months leading up to and following the election period?
12. LEAP suggests that its guideline aspects must be flexible as local and national contexts differ from each other. Does practice on the ground actually get carried out exactly by the LEAP requirements and guidelines? Is LEAP ever limiting or frustrating?
13. I learned that WV had done a project in an old resettlement area. Does WV ever get involved in the fast-track resettlement areas? If not, why?

Appendix 4: Guiding Questions for Interview with WVZ Umzingwane Field Officer

1. Of the following projects, which are finished (WV having transitioned out of the project) and which are still in progress?
 - a. FAO conservation agriculture and field days
 - b. EU conservation agriculture
 - c. Mzinyathini irrigation scheme rehabilitation
2. What other projects are happening in Umzingwane now?
3. Please describe those projects (including location, number of targeted beneficiaries, vulnerability criteria, duration of the project, inputs from WV and what is actually being done)?
4. Could you please tell me about the health and livelihoods project?
5. How are needs assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation carried out in Umzingwane?
6. How do you ascertain feedback from beneficiaries and when? Do you apply such feedback during implementation?
7. How involved is local government (mainly Agritex) in World Vision projects?
8. Do you have a positive relationship with local government?

Note: I did not need to ask questions seven and eight, as the field officer suggested that I should speak directly with Agritex officers because he felt that they could provide more accurate information of what is happening on the ground.

**Appendix 5: Guiding Questions for Interviews with Former WVZ Employee
(currently employed by TearFund UK)**

1. During your time with WV, what did you experience with regard to donors and accessing funding?
2. How exactly do the ADPs work in terms of funding?
3. Is there sponsorship funding available for projects outside of ADPs?
4. The Grants and Human Affairs Director suggested that ADPs play a large role in determining national strategy. How so?
5. How does such feedback affect strategy discussion at cluster meetings?
6. What affects did the economic decline in the early 2000s have on World Vision?
7. How did the 2008 elections affect World Vision, its work and its staff members?
8. What do you think about WV's relationship with the Zimbabwean state (both at national and local level)?
9. In general, what do you think about WV's methods and approach to responding to donors, the state and participatory processes with beneficiaries?

Appendix 6: Guiding Questions for Interview with WVZ Grants and Human Affairs Director

1. What is the WVZ funding process?
2. How do you go about acquiring funding?
3. What kinds of issues are experienced with funding from donors (requirements and expectations as well as the proposal process)?
 - a. Are there ever issues with line items in the budgets?
 - b. Are there issues regarding monitoring and evaluation for donors?
 - c. Are there issues with lag time in receiving funding?
 - d. Is funding in Zimbabwe very competitive?
4. How does that affect participation and needs assessments?
5. What is the WVZ national strategy?
6. How are beneficiaries and other stakeholders involved in developing national strategy and organizational learning?
7. How does the LEAP policy affect WVZ?

Appendix 7: Email Interview Correspondence with WVZ Umzingwane District Coordinator

This was carried out as follow up to the original interview and took place before the site visits.

Appendix 7.1 Email sent after brief phone discussion where he agreed to answer questions but requested that I send them in email form

Dear Mr. Bhuza,

Thank you so much for taking the time to answer my questions. Since we last met, I decided to focus my research on WV, specifically in Umzingwane district. I hope to conduct 5 case studies, one in-depth study covering the Mzinyathini irrigation project and 4 other case studies of WV development projects in Umzingwane district (which are: the EU funded conservation agriculture project; the Mzinyathini Poultry Project; the FAO Rabbit and Guinea Fowl project; and the FAO conservation agriculture project).

I was hoping to learn from you about each of those case studies in depth, to get a better idea of how the projects were planned, carried out and finished. I hope that my research may be both useful and interesting to World Vision, in addition to working toward my master's degree.

I have attached an Excel Document which has the questions regarding the specific projects in a table format. It is a pretty long list of questions, so please only answer what you can. The table has organized the questions by type and by project. Additionally, below I have listed a few general questions which are not related to a specific project.

I want to thank you again so much for your time and help. It is most greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Kayla Waghorn

Appendix 7.2 Questions attached to the email (list)

1. Are there any child-sponsorship projects taking place in Umzingwane? Have there ever been? Are there project clusters, or do projects in Umzingwane stand on their own as separate projects?
2. Is WV still involved in Umzingwane, and if so, who in WV is currently managing those projects?
3. What impact do the official WVI methods, requirements, training documents and minimum standards have on actual real-life project implementation?
4. What are the structures of WV offices? (e.g. I have noticed that there is a WV office located in the government building in Esigodini – who runs it? How often, if ever, is it open? Are there smaller offices for each project or project area (ADP)? What business takes place in such offices?
5. How often do World Vision field workers have contact with government (both elected officials and civil servants) and with whom do they have contact (councilmen, DA, etc.)?
6. Are these positive interactions? Why or why not?

Appendix 7.3 Additional detailed questions attached to the email (sent in table form)

Please answer the following questions for each of the listed projects:

Projects:

1. Mzinyathini irrigation scheme
2. EU funded conservation agriculture
3. Mzinyathini poultry project
4. FAO rabbit and guinea fowl project
5. FAO conservation agriculture project

Questions:

1. Who funded the project? (If multiple donors, what % was funded from each)
2. If the project lasted multiple years, was funding dependent on year end reports/results?
3. Did such requirements hinder project operations? If so, in what way?
4. How much feedback from the beneficiaries was reported back to the donors? Were they only interested in their own evaluation criteria?
5. Were there group meetings, committees, etc. from the area who contributed to needs assessments? E.g. who decided what the project was going to be, where it was going to be, and how it was going to be planned?
6. How many people were involved in giving input during the assessing and planning stages?
7. Did the community (members of the community, council, local leaders, etc.) request that you come to do a project there, or did WV make the initial contact?
8. Were there children involved at all in discussions...e.g. how does this project tie in with the Child Well-being goals of WV?
9. How many direct beneficiaries were targeted? How many direct beneficiaries were actually reached (based on project evaluations)?
10. How many indirect beneficiaries were targeted? How many indirect beneficiaries were actually reached (based on project evaluations)?
11. How were the beneficiaries selected?

12. What criteria (specifically) determine who is most vulnerable? E.g. is there an official age that is considered "elderly", or is there a number of children in the household that would classify a family as most vulnerable?
13. What else was involved in the selection process?
14. What daily M&E activities were carried out?
15. What weekly M&E activities were carried out?
16. What monthly M&E activities were carried out?
17. What quarterly M&E activities were carried out?
18. What annual M&E activities were carried out?
19. Were there committees, focus groups, local leaders, etc. who were responsible for monitoring?
20. How were monitoring results reported back to World Vision?
21. What complaints and feedback mechanisms were in place?
22. Would it have been easy for someone to give negative feedback?
23. Were there disagreements among the beneficiaries about what was or wasn't working (what they liked or disliked about the project)?
24. Will there be a post project evaluation, for example, an evaluation that takes place 5 or 10 years after WV exits the project area? If so, will the field workers who were originally involved also be involved in this post-project evaluation?
25. Is the project finished?
26. What was the intended length of the project?
27. What was the actual length of the project?
28. Was there a stop or a break at any time during the project progress? Please explain what happened.
29. Did the project achieve its intended goals? Why or why not?
30. Would you consider the project a success? Why or why not?
31. How many Word Vision employees were directly and indirectly involved in the project?
32. How often did a WV employee go to the project site?
33. What was government involvement in the project? E.g. was Agritex involved at all? What were they responsible for?

34. What happened to the project in the time leading up to elections? Was it put on hold? Was there no difference?
35. What, if anything, did the community contribute toward this project? (e.g. did the community contribute labour, materials, etc.)?
36. Did WV outsource any expertise to contract companies (e.g. did WV hire an engineer to design the irrigation scheme)?
37. Did this project involve any efforts to build local government capacities such that they will be able to provide better services in the future? If so, please describe them.

Appendix 7.4 Answers to listed questions

QUESTION	RESPONSE
1) Are there any child-sponsorship projects taking place in Umzingwane? Have there ever been? Are there project clusters, or do projects in Umzingwane stand on their own as separate projects?	There a program called Integrated Health and Livelihoods that started early this year targeting 6 wards. The Program is targeting children indirectly through their mothers. The intention is reduce Child Mortality up to the age of five. The program therefore aims to rehabilitate and create shelters for mothers waiting to deliver. Capernaum a Trust branch from used to pay fees for less privileged Children. May you verify with Umzingwane Ministry of Education. WV projects in Umzingwane are a standalone though logistically there is integration eg Use of Vehicles and Offices etc
2) Is WV still involved in Umzingwane, and if so, who is currently managing those projects?	Yes. Mr Farmer Mulagis as usual is still in running the show there. Contact- 0775259404
3) What impact do the official WVI methods, requirements, training documents and minimum standards have on actual real-life project implementation?	Not sure if I got the Question right: Anyway minimum standards- think of the child protection. As WV you are there to monitor children rights and protection issues by providing guidelines to stakeholders on the right to education, shelter, clothes etc for the children.
4) What are the structures of WV offices? (e.g. I have noticed that there is a WV office located in the government building in Esigodini – who runs it? How often, if ever, is it open? Are there smaller offices for each project or project area (ADP)? What business takes place in such offices (receipt of feedback, complaints, etc.)	The very same offices you saw last time are still WV Umzingwane Offices. They were initially 100% EU Food Security and Livelihoods grant owned. Before the end of the EU program last year they were shared by WV Behavior Change (Global Fund) grant and EU program on a 50-50 payment. There is no ADP in Umzingwane .Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation (A, M &E) department is a cross cutting program

	in WV conducting feedback and complaints and assist/monitor the proper implementation of projects. A storeroom to store essential documents is needed
5) How often do World Vision field workers have contact with government (both elected officials and civil servants) and with whom do they have contact (councilmen, DA, etc.)	Coordination is a day to day phenomena, Stakeholders have important roles explained at Inception eg Department of Veterinary need to do all the trainings in the goat project the same with other Departments. All NGOs are part of the Drought Relief Committee so meeting with DA and Council is ongoing following their annual plans and schedules.
6) Are these positive interactions? Why or why not?	My view: Very positive the organization becomes part of the community. Updates besides monthly reports are done any time and it's a good way of monitoring activities of NGO work. Workmanship on projects such as construction of Fowl- runs is monitored and supervised by Government workers so WV is not blamed for poor workmanship. DA, Council and other offices were taken to do project site monitoring regularly say every three months and that alone was a good motivator to the beneficiaries. The best method to manage political labeling is to plan and site monitoring with government line ministry departments.

Appendix 7.5: Answers in table (as filled in by the district coordinator)

Question	Mzinyathini Irrigation Scheme	EU Funded Conservation Agriculture (seeds and goats)
Who funded the project? (if multiple donors, what % was funded from each)	EU	EU
If the project lasted multiple years, was funding dependant on year end reports/results?	Performance was critical for release of funding	Performance was critical for release of funding(Same program with Umzinyathini)
Did such requirements hinder project operations? If so, in what way?	Not at all because implementation was done well	Not at all because implementation was done well
How much feedback from the beneficiaries was reported back to the donors? Were they only interested in their own evaluation criteria?	Our reports and their own Evaluation	Our reports and their own Evaluation

Were there group meetings, committees, etc. from the area who contributed to needs assessments? E.g. Who decided what the project was going to be, where it was going to be, and how it was going to be planned?	The Project Management Committee provided Information during needs assessment. The area assessment results determined the selection of the project location and its management. Eg dilapidated canal and project proximity to Mawabeni Business Centre for marketing of produce once the project becomes vibrant.	The Project Management Committee provided Information during needs assessment. The area assessment results determined the selection of the project location and its management. Eg dilapidated canal and project proximity to Mawabeni Business Centre for marketing of produce once the project becomes vibrant.
How many people were involved in giving input during the assessing and planning stages?	4	4
Did the community (members of the community, council, local leaders, etc.) request that you come to do a project there, or did WV make the initial contact?	Project Requested as it was on RDC plan but without Funding	Project Requested as it was on RDC plan but without Funding

Were there children involved at all in discussions...e.g. how does this project tie in with the Child Well-being goals of WV?	Not at all	Not at all
How many indirect beneficiaries were targeted? How many indirect beneficiaries were actually reached (based on project evaluations)?	150 Beneficiaries	10 000
How were the beneficiaries selected?	Households with a garden plot in the Scheme	No cattle, Elderly, Those with orphans
What criteria (specifically) determine who is most vulnerable? E.g. Is there an official age that is considered "elderly", or is there a number of children in the household that would classify a family as most vulnerable?	Elderly 65+ yrs. Child Headed Families, Families having 2 or more orphans and do not have a stable Income	Elderly 65+ yrs. Child Headed Families, Families having 2 or more orphans and do not have a stable Income
What else was involved in the selection process?	Those who do not have cattle at all	Those with land exceeding 0.5 hectares
What daily M&E activities were carried out?	Project Site Monitoring, Complaints from beneficiaries	Project Site Monitoring, Complaints from beneficiaries

What weekly M&E activities were carried out?	Project Site Monitoring, Complaints from beneficiaries.	Project Site Monitoring, Complaints from beneficiaries.
What monthly M&E activities were carried out?	Project Site Monitoring, Complaints from beneficiaries. Indicator Tracking Table to see monthly achievements against set targets	Project Site Monitoring, Complaints from beneficiaries.
What quarterly M&E activities were carried out?	Quarterly reports, and Stakeholder visits	Quarterly reports, and Stakeholder visits
What annual M&E activities were carried out?	Mid Term planning and Review meetings	Mid Term planning and Review meetings
Were there committees, focus groups, local leaders, etc. who were responsible for monitoring?	Irrigation Committee	Focus Group Discussions
How were monitoring results reported back to World Vision?	Reports and Feed back Meetings	Reports and Feed back Meetings
What complaints and feedback mechanisms were in place?	Help Desk	Help Desk

Would it have been easy for someone to give negative feedback?	Yes	Yes
Were there disagreements among the beneficiaries about what was or wasn't working (what they liked or disliked about the project)?	At Times but not always	At Times but not always
Will there be a post project evaluation, for example, an evaluation that takes place 5 or 10 years after WV exits the project area? If so, will the field workers who were originally involved also be involved in this post-project evaluation?	Not at all because implementation was done well	Not at all because implementation was done well
Is the project finished?		
What was the intended length of the project?	3 years	3 years
What was the actual length of the project?	3 years	3 years
Was there a stop or a break at any time during the project progress? Please explain what happened.	No	No

Did the project achieve its intended goals? Why or why not?	Yes, Canals were rehabilitated and people watered their vegetables	Yes, This was shown by the increase in adoption of the project by even non beneficiaries
Would you consider the project a success? Why or why not?	It was a success as they are doing vegetable farming again	Yes, This was shown by the increase in adoption of the project by even non beneficiaries
How many Word Vision employees were directly and indirectly involved in the project?	7	7
How often did a WV employee go to the project site?	Twice a week	3
What was the government involvement in the project? E.g. Was Agritex involved at all? What were they responsible for?	Agritex	Agritex
What happened to the project in the time leading up to elections? Was it put on hold? Was there no difference?	Direct Interaction with groups of people was discouraged	Trainings were discouraged
What, if anything, did the community contribute toward this project? (e.g. did the community contribute labor, materials, etc.)	Labour for construction of the canals and Toilets, Fencing of the Scheme	Labour for digging Holes and general crop management

Did WV outsource any expertise to contract companies (e.g. did WV hire an engineer to design the irrigation scheme)?	Yes, Engineers were outsourced from Gwanda	No
Did this project involve any efforts to build local government capacities such that they will be able to provide better services in the future? If so, please describe them.	Leadership, conflict resolution trainings. Best practices in crop production done by Agritex, Asset Management Trainings	Training of Government line ministry eg AGRITEX and Training of beneficiaries

Question	Mzinyathini Poultry Project	FAO Rabbit and Guinea Fowl Project	FAO Conservation Agriculture Project
Who funded the project? (if multiple donors, what % was funded from each)	FAO with funds coming from EU	FAO with funds coming from EU	FAO with funds coming from EU
If the project lasted multiple years, was funding dependant on year end reports/results?	3 months Program	3 months program	6 months Program
Did such requirements hinder project operations? If so, in what way?	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable

How much feedback from the beneficiaries was reported back to the donors? Were they only interested in their own evaluation criteria?	Check progress Poultry records, WV reports and Own Evaluation and site monitoring	Check progress Poultry records, WV reports and Own Evaluation and site monitoring	Check progress Poultry records, WV reports and Own Evaluation and site monitoring
Were there group meetings, committees, etc. from the area who contributed to needs assessments? E.g. Who decided what the project was going to be, where it was going to be and how it was going to be planned?	The Project Management Committee provided Information during needs assessment. The area assessment results determined the selection of the project location and its management. Eg dilapidated canal and project proximity to Mawabeni Business Centre for marketing of produce once the project becomes vibrant.	The Project Management Committee provided Information during needs assessment. The area assessment results determined the selection of the project location and its management. Eg dilapidated canal and project proximity to Mawabeni Business Centre for marketing of produce once the project becomes vibrant.	The Project Management Committee provided Information during needs assessment. The area assessment results determined the selection of the project location and its management. Eg dilapidated canal and project proximity to Mawabeni Business

			Centre for marketing of produce once the project becomes vibrant.
How many people were involved in giving input during the assessing and planning stages?	4	4	4
Did the community (members of the community, council, local leaders, etc.) request that you come to do a project there, or did WV make the initial contact?	WV Initiative to supplement the Umzinyathini Irrigation Project	WV Initiative to supplement the Umzinyathini Irrigation Project	WV Initiative to supplement the Umzinyathini Irrigation Project
Were there children involved at all in discussions...e.g. how does this project tie in with the Child Well-	Not at all	Not at all	Not at all

being goals of WV?			
How many indirect beneficiaries were targeted? How many indirect beneficiaries were actually reached (based on project evaluations)?	500		
How were the beneficiaries selected?	80 irrigation Beneficiaries and 20 who were providing labour to the Irrigation Farmers	Elderly, Those with orphans	Those with cattle but no agric Inputs
What criteria (specifically) determine who is most vulnerable? E.g. Is there an official age that is considered "elderly", or is there a number of children in the household that would classify a family as most vulnerable?	Elderly 65+ yrs. Child Headed Families, Families having 2 or more orphans and do not have a stable Income	Elderly 65+ yrs. Child Headed Families, Families having 2 or more orphans and do not have a stable Income	Elderly 65+ yrs. Child Headed Families, Families having 2 or more orphans and do not have a stable Income
What else was involved in the selection	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable

process?			
What daily M&E activities were carried out?			
What weekly M&E activities were carried out?			
What monthly M&E activities were carried out?	Project Site Monitoring, Complaints from beneficiaries.		

Note: The questions left out of the second table were asked but were not answered (their boxes were left blank in the table).

Appendix 8: Guiding Questions for Interviews with World Vision Project Beneficiaries located in Communal Areas in Umzingwane District

1. Have you heard of World Vision?
2. What is this project? Please describe it.
3. Whose owns this project?
4. When did you hear about doing this?
5. Who told you about it / How did you hear about it?
6. What have you done to carry out this project?
7. Did anyone ask you to do this project?
8. If yes, who asked you?
9. How did they ask? (e.g. did they ask a large group for volunteers, or come to you individually)
10. Do you think the project is good?
11. Why or why not?
12. How does the project help you?
13. Do you think it will last?
14. Why or why not?
15. Who has helped and supported you the most in this project?
16. Where did these materials come from?

Appendix 9: Information Table Distributed to Umzingwane Agritex Officers

Project	
Ward #	
Date Started	
Date Finished	
Number of Beneficiaries	
Description of inputs from World Vision	
Number of beneficiaries who are sustaining their project	
Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why	
Does World Vision still come to monitor this project?	
Will World Vision provide more inputs for this project? If so, what other inputs will be provided?	
Any other comments?	

Appendix 10: Returned Information Tables (Filled in by Ward-level Agritex Officers)

Please kindly fill in the following table:

Project	MALUNIKA DAM & IRRIGATION REHABILITATION
Ward #	8
Date Started	JULY 2010
Date Finished	DECEMBER 2012
Number of Beneficiaries	27
Description of inputs from World Vision	CEMENT, PIPES, SIPHON SYSTEM, FIELD & AGRICULTURE SEEDS & FERTILISER.
Number of beneficiaries who are sustaining their project	27
Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why	NIL
Does World Vision still come to monitor this project?	NO
Will World Vision provide more inputs for this project? If so, what other inputs will be provided?	THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS FOR THE PROVISION OF MORE INPUTS.

Any other comments?

FARMERS ARE FACING DIFFICULTIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SIPHON SYSTEM SINCE MAIN GATE VALVE IS NON-FUNCTIONAL.

Please kindly fill in the following table:

Project	MALUNIKA LAYER PRODUCTION
Ward #	8
Date Started	AUGUST 2012
Date Finished	DECEMBER 2012
Number of Beneficiaries	50
Description of inputs from World Vision	POINT OF LAY KIDS, FEEDERS, WATERERS, MESH WIRE, CAGES, ABOUT 1/3 OF TOTAL FEED & MEDICINES
Number of beneficiaries who are sustaining their project	6
Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why	AA. THERE WAS A SHORTAGE OF FEED AS MOST FARMERS REALISED VERY LOW YIELDS.
Does World Vision still come to monitor this project?	NO
Will World Vision provide more inputs for this project? If so, what other inputs will be provided?	THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS FOR THE PROVISION OF MORE INPUTS.

Any other comments?

THE FARMERS HAVE BEEN TARGETED FOR BROILER PRODUCTION ON CONTRACT BASES SO AS TO EASE THE MARKET TROUBLES FACED DURING LAYER PRODUCTION. 90 FARMERS HAVE BEEN REGISTERED AND PROMISED BASIC INPUTS.

Please kindly fill in the following table:

Project	CONSERVATION FARMING
Ward #	5
Date Started	2010
Date Finished	2012
Number of Beneficiaries	49
Description of inputs from World Vision	5kg ^s seed sorghum, 2kg ^s seed cow peas, 1x 50kg CD, 1x 50kg Fertilisers A/N
Number of beneficiaries who are sustaining their project	42
Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why	7 - Resorted to Conventional tillage
Does World Vision still come to monitor this project?	NO
Will World Vision provide more inputs for this project? If so, what other inputs will be provided?	NO

Any other comments?

Please kindly fill in the following table:

Project	Rabbit keeping
Ward #	5
Date Started	2012
Date Finished	2012
Number of Beneficiaries	40
Description of inputs from World Vision	5x 1x 50kg pellets, 1x 20g ESB3, 1x 33, 4g Iperazine, Bucket, garden fork, garden trowel, 1x 2L sprayer, Vegetable seed
Number of beneficiaries who are sustaining their project	30
Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why	10 deaths due to diseases.
Does World Vision still come to monitor this project?	NO
Will World Vision provide more inputs for this project? If so, what other inputs will be provided?	NO

Any other comments?

Please kindly fill in the following table:

Project	GUINEA FOWL KEEPING
Ward #	5
Date Started	2012
Date Finished	2012
Number of Beneficiaries	184
Description of inputs from World Vision	1x20kg E5153, 1x33, 4g Poperazine, Bucket, garden fork, garden trowel, 1x2L hand sprayer, Vegetable seed
Number of beneficiaries who are sustaining their project	180
Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why	4 = Attacked by predators
Does World Vision still come to monitor this project?	No
Will World Vision provide more inputs for this project? If so, what other inputs will be provided?	No

Any other comments?

Please kindly fill in the following table:

Project	
Ward #	
Date Started	
Date Finished	
Number of Beneficiaries	
Description of inputs from World Vision	
Number of beneficiaries who are sustaining their project	
Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and reasons why	
Does World Vision still come to monitor this project?	
Will World Vision provide more inputs for this project? If so, what other inputs will be provided?	

Any other comments?

Appendix 11 Umzingwane District Agritex Data Charts

Appendix 11.1 Cereal Production for the 2012/2013 Season

CEREAL PRODUCTION FOR 2012/2013 SEASON

UMZINGWANE DISTRICT

Province	District	Ward	Population	Maize	Sorghum	Pearl millet	Finger millet	Total Cereal	Requirement	(Mt)
MATB	Umzingwane	1	3340	173	0	0	0	173	367	-194
	Umzingwane	2	3605	55	0	0	0	55	397	-341
	Umzingwane	3	5347	12	0	0	0	12	588	-576
	Umzingwane	4	3987	69	0	0	0	69	439	-369
	Umzingwane	5	4314	14	0	0	0	14	475	-460
	Umzingwane	6	4146	21	5	0	0	26	456	-430
	Umzingwane	7	2950	264	14	0	0	278	325	-46
	Umzingwane	8	2776	96	1	0	0	97	305	-208
	Umzingwane	9	2288	56	0	0	0	56	252	-196
	Umzingwane	10	1138	37	0	0	0	37	125	-88
	Umzingwane	11	2157	65	3	0	0	68	237	-169
	Umzingwane	12	3730	199	5	0	0	204	410	-206
	Umzingwane	13	1889	111	9	0	0	120	145	-55
	Umzingwane	14	3304	384	7	0	0	391	363	27
	Umzingwane	15	447	8	0	0	0	8	49	-41
	Umzingwane	16	3338	0	0	0	0	0	367	-367
	Umzingwane	17	2930	184	5	0	0	189	322	-133
	Umzingwane	18	4675	49	0	0	0	49	514	-465
	Umzingwane	19	4245	752	0	0	0	752	467	285
	Umzingwane	20	2108	67	3	0	0	70	232	-162
	Total		62510	2624	64	0	0	2688	6876	-4188

MAIZE	YIELD T/Ha	PRODUCTION T	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	ANN. TOTAL	REMARKS
10/11	0.24	3873	0.0	55.5	212.2	388.1	7.0	7.0	619.3	A B Poor Dist.
11/12	0.34	3101	29.0	58.1	157.5	3.3	58.5	55.5	256.9	Below Norm
12/13	0.3	2624	56.2	24.0	38.9	136.8	133.0	15.5	404.4	Below Norm

Appendix 11.2 Crop Production and Rainfall from Seasons 1999/2000 to 2009/2010

CROP PRODUCTION: LIMZINGWANE DIST REGION IV												
MAIZE			RAINFALL MONTHLY TOTALS (mm)							AN. TOTAL		
YEAR	YIELD T/Ha	PRODUCTION T	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL	REMARKS		
09/00	0.10	4415	18.3	57.5	85.9	343.5	380.5	31.0	916.7	CYCLONE GINE EFFECT ABOVE NORMAL.		
00/01	0.30	1456	0.0	29.2	42.0	12.5	297.0	67.0	447.7	Below Normal		
01/02	0.04	239	30.0	153.6	69.5	27.0	0.0	0.3	280.4	Below Normal drought str.		
02/03	0.23	825	53.5	13.8	44.0	48.5	97.5	112.0	369.3	Below Normal drought		
03/04	0.75	4727	77.0	36.0	103.7	168.5	78.5	183.8	647.5	Normal		
04/05	0.20	1489	40.0	0.0	185.0	119.5	86.0	13.0	443.5	Below Normal		
05/06	0.95	6872	0.0	64.8	307.5	59.4	129.5	78.1	649.3	Normal		
06/07	0.30	1950	6.5	237.5	72.5	20.0	197.5	54.0	588.5	Normal		
07/08	0.36	1119	23.5	78.5	309.1	239.4	3.9	18.5	782.9	Above normal		
08/09	1.00	6597	1.0	99.5	194.7	213.3	152.2	92.6	753.3	Above Normal good distrib.		
09/10	0.77	11693	56.5	77.8	123.3	72.5	97.5	157.9	534.2	N Good distribution		
NOTES.			Below normal rain in 10 years							4/10		
			Normal rain in 10 years							3/10		
			Above normal rain in 10 years							3/10		

Appendix 11.3 Maize Yields per Hectare and Total Production Seasons 1999/2000 to 2008/2009

MAIZE YIELDS T/Ha AND PRODUCTION (T) 1999/00→																				
WARD	04/2000 T/Ha	09 T/Ha	01 T	01/02 T/Ha	02 T/Ha	03 T	03/04 T/Ha	04/05 T/Ha	05/06 T	06/07 T/Ha	07/08 T/Ha	08/09 T/Ha	T							
1	2.0	540	0	0.0	0	0.1	12	0.2	21	0.6	77	1.5	563	0.3	59	0.3	31	0.5	227	
2	1.2	596	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.2	29	0.5	190	1.4	317	0.8	98	0.3	41	0.8	358	
3	1.1	381	0.4	438	0.1	38	0.1	16	0.6	109	0.3	104	0.3	104	0.3	27	1.2	232		
4	0.5	699	0.2	135	0.2	73	0.1	54	0.4	201	0.1	38	0.5	225	0.3	124	0.3	82	0.6	124
5	0.3	181	0.2	17	0.2	13	0.1	16	0.4	88	0.01	3	0.7	206	0.3	117	0.3	29	1.0	372
6	0.6	263	0.3	159	0.1	46	0.5	263	0.3	85	0.1	57	0.5	267	0.3	127	0.3	87	0.8	211
7	0.5	159	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.4	63	0.4	108	0.02	113	0.4	277	0.3	98	0.3	80	0.7	140
8	0.8	415	0.4	165	0.2	45	0.1	55	0.4	59	0.3	100	0.5	283	0.3	41	0.3	29	0.8	157
9	0.6	267	0.4	146	0.0	0	0.5	123	0.5	36	0.4	91	0.8	214	0.3	32	0.3	26	1.2	241
10	0.4	186	0.5	197	0.0	0	0.3	50	0.5	87	0.3	141	0.4	230	0.3	78	0.3	18	0.8	152
11	0.6	333	0.6	85	0.0	0	0.3	29	0.5	221	0.4	140	0.5	194	0.3	215	0.3	34	0.5	124
12	0.6	445	0.2	114	0.02	24	0.4	98	0.4	163	0.2	100	0.4	355	0.3	195	0.3	79	0.8	733
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92	0.01	3	0.1	161	0.3	69	0.4	86	0.9	655
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2182	0.1	95	2.0	5990	0.3	4464	0.4	122	1.0	493
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72	0.5	288	3.0	4718	0.3	38	0.5	18	2.3	89
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	39	0.3	6	1.8	47
17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1260	0.5	45	2.0	416	0.3	38	0.4	12	2.6	1102

18																					0.5	126	0.6	392
19																					0.7	174	0.6	471
20																					0.4	62	1.3	276
LIMZINGAST	0.7	4415	0.3	1456	0.04	239	0.2	825	0.8	4727	0.2	1489	1.0	6872	0.3	1950	0.3	1119	1.0					6597