

**TOWARDS A BROADER APPLICATION OF DECISION - MAKING PARADIGMS : A  
CASE STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ECOWAS CEASE - FIRE  
MONITORING GROUP ( ECOMOG )**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS ( INTERNATIONAL STUDIES )

of

RHODES UNIVERSITY

by

**ALBERT DOMSON - LINDSAY**

**SUPERVISOR : DR. KORWA ADAR**

January 2000

## ABSTRACT

The thesis in the main, looks at the decision - making process which underlined the Economic Community of West African States' attempt to end the Liberian crisis. It examines the establishment of ECOMOG to intervene in the Liberian civil crisis and the various pacific attempts to resolve the Liberian question. It does so through the medium of decision - making theory and some of the conceptual models that have flowed out of it. The thesis' focus on the decisional process of a regional body marks an attempt to broaden the scope of application of decision - making paradigms, which are usually employed to analyse decisions of national governments. The imperative for analysing the decisional process of ECOWAS in its quest to find solution to the Liberian problem has in part been dictated by the novelty of the ECOMOG concept. It marks the first major attempt of a sub - regional economic organization to successfully find solution to a civil conflict, as a result, there are numerous lessons to be gleaned from its failures and successes. Its relevance in the African context, with its intractable conflicts cannot be overemphasized. It has also been motivated by the fact that more works need to be produced on the decision - making processes of governments and regional bodies within the continent.

The thesis argues that, both rational and "irrational" elements infused the decisional process of ECOWAS in its bid to solve the Liberian Crisis. Among other things, Policy - makers were influenced in their choice of decision by rational calculations based on national interest . It examines the clash of interests which characterized the establishment of ECOMOG as an intervention force, the impasse this fostered and how it was eventually resolved. It postulates that external actors influenced the decision process and that policy makers were aided to make the decisions they made by other organs in the decisional chain. The "irrational" component of the process, among other things, could be seen from the fact that the Liberian question was solved in " bits and pieces". Besides, blunders were committed through defective decision - making mechanism. The thesis concludes by offering suggestions to improve the quality of ECOWAS decision - making process with regard to conflict resolution and how to achieve regional consensus.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I am first of all grateful to God for his sustainance. My heart felt gratitude also goes to my wife, Zodwa , for her diverse support and sacrifices and to Lawrence and Ferdinard ( my brothers). Special thanks are extended to my supervisor, Dr. Korwa Adar, this project would not have seen the light of day, without his guidance, patience and invaluable suggestions. I am also grateful to the International Studies Unit for the facilities extended to me.

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

**CHAPTER ONE** **1**

Introduction 1

**CHAPTER TWO** **10**

Setting the Scene- A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 10

**CHAPTER THREE** **29**

Formation of ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group. 29

**CHAPTER FOUR** **51**

Organizational Process Model and ECOMOG. 51

**CHAPTER FIVE** **75**

Bottle-Necks in the Decisional Process- A Case of " Group-Think" 75

**CHAPTER SIX** **91**

Conclusion and Recommendations 91

**APPENDICES** **102**

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** **105**

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ANAD : The Accord de Non - Aggression Et d'Assistance en matiere de Defence.

AFL : Armed Forces of Liberia.

C 5 : Committee of Five

C 9 : Committee of Nine.

CEAO : Communauté Economique de L'Afrique de L'Ouest.

CFA : Communauté Financière Africaine

CFAO : Compagnie Française de L'Ouest.

CIA : Central Intelligence Agency.

CMS : Committee for Mediation and Security.

DFC : Deputy Force Commander.

ECOMOG : ECOWAS Cease - Fire Monitoring Group.

ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States.

EEC : European Economic Community.

EHD : ECOMOG Head - Quarters.

ESMC : ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee.

ESMC : ECOWAS Security and Mediation Commission.

FAO : Food and Agricultural Organization.

HACO : Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit.

ICBM : Inter - Continental Ballistic Missile.

IFMC : Inter - Faith Mediation Council.

IGNU : Interim Government of National Unity.

IMF : International Monetary Fund.

INPFL : Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

IRBM. : Inter - Mediate Range Ballistic Missile.

LDF : Lofa Defence Force.

LNC : Liberian National Conference.

LPC : Liberian Peace Council.

MRBM : Medium Range Ballistic Missile.

NPFL : National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

NPFL - CDC : National Patriotic Front of Liberia - Central Defense Council.

OAU : Organization of Africa Unity.

PMAD : Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense.

SOP : Standard Operating Procedure.

ULIMO : United Liberian Movement for Democracy.

UN : United Nations.

UNDP : United Nations Development Programme.

UNICEF : United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

UNOMIL : United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia.

U.S : United States.

WFP : World Food Programme.

WHO : World Health Organization.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

This thesis has been inspired by the fact that it has now become imperative, given the scant attention consigned to the decision - making process in Africa hitherto, for more work to be undertaken with regard to the process of policy formulation on the continent (Korany, 1987: 40). The thesis will seek, by its emphasis on a regional body, to broaden the scope of application of the established decision-making paradigms beyond the state level. This has been motivated in part by the fact that regionalism is a resurgent phenomenon around the globe and in Africa in particular. As a result the decision-making processes that are associated with such bodies have assumed enormous importance and therefore deserve close scrutiny.

The Liberian conflict could be spoken of as a reaction against almost a decade of Samuel Doe's authoritarian corrupt leadership and his ruthless dealings against any internal dissent. Through the system of patronage, he periodically used his state power to gain the loyalty and support of some sections of the society. One convenient yet harmful way of doing this was to provide them with public service employment. Between 1980 - 1985 he increased public service expenditure by a whopping 300%. Personnel salaries made up 74% of government budgetary spending. In the 80's as much as U.S \$300 million accounted for patronage pay - offs (Reno, 1998:85). Funds for such payments came from public corporations, which as a result undermined their viability. During his almost a decade in power, export earnings declined. For example, exports of rubber, iron -ore and timber declined from 484 million dollars to 362 million in 1983 (ibid:87) In response to the spate of corruption within the Doe cabal, the U.S Government sent a task force of financial experts to audit the government accounts and uncovered massive embezzlement of state funds by officials who included members of his known administration. He used the Liberian Petroleum Refinery to acquire subsidized oil imports which he later sold at cut throat prices (*West Africa*, 27 July 1987, 1430 - 1431).

With the spate of corruption, weak revenue base and dissipated state coffers, the country lost its capacity to honour its debts to financial houses such as the African Development Bank

With the spate of corruption, weak revenue base and dissipated state coffers, the country lost its capacity to honour its debts to financial houses such as the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund. They subsequently withdrew aid to the government. It was aggravated by the withdrawal of U. S grants to Liberia in 1988, because of misuse of such aid.

The nation was indeed in crisis, there was widespread feeling of discontent and disillusionment; unemployment was on the ascendancy as more and more people flocked to the city of Monrovia in search of jobs. Doe alienated large sections of the society, by filling the national army with members of his own Kran tribe from Grand Gedeh. He alienated his political allies through his unbridled passion to hang on to power and the political class by excluding them from active political life. This was much in evident when he banned comparatively more influential political parties from contesting in the 1985 elections, which he decided to contest, irrespective of the internal and external pressure against the decision (Reno, 1998, Tarr, 1993:74; and Dunn, 1998). Thus the culture of alienation which dates back to the settler days lingered on during Doe's tenure. The only difference was that this time the perpetrator was an "African" and the victims were both natives and people of settler descent. The discontent created by such stifling climate found expression in successive unsuccessful coups d'etat to be followed by brutal persecution of opponents. He conducted reprisals against the clansmen of Qiuwonkpa of Nimba county, as a result of Qiuwonkpa's unsuccessful coup against the Doe regime. The reprisals culminated in the massacre of about 5 000 people (Dunn, 1998).

The institutionalization of violence and the general insecurities which it brought drove political leaders from different political orientation into exile. They came to be united by a passion, to remove Doe from power. As it became neither possible to unseat him through the ballot box nor through coup d'etat, a consensus coalesced around insurgency as the only viable option to chip away progressively, the bases of his power and finally bring him down. Thus, on the eve of Christmas 1989, Charles Taylor who was a fugitive from justice, began an insurgency against Doe's government from Nimba county which borders on Cote d' Ivoire (Brelis, 1990; Reno, 1998:92). The insurrection degenerated into fratricidal war fare. Doe was purported to have massacred about 600 men, women and children of Nimba origin on



one Sunday in a chapel (Vogt, 1991). Krans, people from the Gio and Mano tribes became targets of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Other nationals from the sub - region resident in Liberia were trapped in the conflict and there were reports of nationals like Nigerians being singled out for murder by Taylor's men on the pretext that Babangida, the President of Nigeria was supporting Samuel Doe. The Liberian crisis was proving to be a humanitarian disaster as a result of the carnage and social dislocation caused by the civil war.

It coincided with a period in which much of the world's attention was focussed on the Gulf Crisis in 1990. It came at a time in which there was growing Western disinterestedness in the affairs of Africa, she was being marginalised in part because of the newly found interest in Eastern Europe, which had come out of communism. She was no longer of any strategic importance especially with the demise of the "Cold War" (Clapham, 1996). At the time of the crisis, there was the widespread belief that the United States was going to intervene primarily because of the historical links between the two entities. There was the feeling that Liberia was after all an American creation and therefore had a responsibility towards the country. For example, the then Italian Ambassador to Liberia echoed this sentiment when he declared that it was an American responsibility to intervene in the Liberian crisis. However, the truth of the matter was that there was a systematic U.S disengagement from the country dating back to 1985, in part because of the gross mismanagement and corruption in "high places" and the misuse of U.S. financial aid. By 1989, the process had been completed, it stopped giving financial aid to the country and most U.S firms had left. In fact Doe was no longer a useful ally to the U.S, this was in sharp contrast to the Cold War era when regardless of corruption and lack of democratic credentials the U.S. continued to support him in appreciation for his anti - Libya and anti-communist rhetoric. It has been noted that throughout the 80's he received a total financial package of 500 million dollars from the United States in appreciation for his loyalty (Chege, 1992: 146 - 63; Clapham, 1996 and Dunn, 1998: 84).

The disinterestedness in the Liberian crisis could be inferred from what the U.S Under Secretary had to say about opportunity lost: "I believe that we missed an opportunity in

Liberia... A modest U.S. intervention at that point (April - May, 1990) to end the fighting in Monrovia could have avoided the prolonged conflict that Liberia had enjoyed until the present "(Cohen in Dunn, 1998:84). It was even more explicit in the remarks by a U.S State official: "It is not our role to intervene, to engage in peace - keeping or to impose a government or political system in Liberia" (Tarr, 1998: 160). The symbolic representation of U.S disinterestedness in Liberia occurred in June 1990. She deployed 2,100 marines on four ships off the coast of Monrovia and contrary to the expectations of Liberians and the international community about U.S eventual intervention, a few marines disembarked to evacuate U.S. nationals and watched on dispassionately as the drama of carnage unfolded (Dunn, 1991 : 84).

Therefore in the midst of the international apathy towards Liberia and the death and destruction, ethnic blood - letting rampant all over Liberia as a consequence of the escalation of the war into inter-ethnic massacres and the loss of lives of sub-regional foreign nationals, the Economic Community of West Africa Cease - Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was formed. The regional body had to step into the vacuum to bring sanity into the war torn country. ECOMOG is therefore a novelty, it marks the beginning of a meaningful regional attempt outside the frame work of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U) to eventually broker peace between antagonists in a civil conflict. This observation is captured by the following lines: "The uniqueness of ECOMOG is predicated on the terms and nature of its genesis. It was established as the instrument of a policy which arose from the first genuinely collective initiative of a sub-regional economic organization in Africa" (*West Africa* 23 - 29, August, 1993.p. 1488).

However the formation of ECOMOG also brought to the fore the perennial antipathy between the Anglo - phone bloc of states and the Franco - phone bloc of states within the sub - region. It also revealed the hand of extra- African interest in the Liberia saga. In all not less than 13 accords were signed in an effort to resolve the crisis. Which in itself give a clue of the complexity of the Liberian imbroglio.

In the main, the thesis seeks to explore what informed the decision process, the reasons for its successes and failures. Magyar underscores the importance of ECOMOG when he

asserts: "We believe the ECOMOG's activity with respect to Liberia is an event that merits close examination as there are numerous lessons to be learned from this experience which may inform the historian, analyst and the policy maker..." (Magyar, 1998 : 173). Indeed one of the lessons which could be gleaned from ECOWAS experience in Liberia is that it takes diplomacy to build the necessary consensus needed to resolve conflicts stoked by conflicts of interest (Ayam, 1998 : 105). The lessons to be drawn from ECOMOG's experience have assumed much prominence especially in the light of the regional insecurities and intractable conflicts that have plagued the continent.

Again, as was pointed out earlier on, external actors had influence on the process of policy formulation, the thesis will therefore explore the nature of such influences and how they impinged on the quality of the decisions made. France, the United States and the United Nations all in varied ways helped shape the decisions taken by the sub - regional leaders with regard to the Liberian question (Tarr, 1998, Reno, 1998). Such interest in external influences would serve to broaden the scope of decision - making paradigms which tend to be silent on such influences. Undoubtedly such influences are unavoidable in the third world and in particular Africa as a result of their dependency status which have therefore rendered the state's boundaries highly permeable (Brecher, 1977).

The thesis seeks to capture the essence, in all its nuances, decision - making and implementation process which undergirded the formation of ECOMOG and all other attempts at the sub - regional level to bring peace to Liberia. It does so through the use of the various assumptions of decision - making theory and some of the works which have flowed out of them, namely that of Allison (1969 and 1971) Janis (1972) and Steinbruner (1974). This path has been chosen to, among other things, ascertain the level to which "rationalism" and "irrationalism" inform the decisions of policy - makers at the regional level; to ascertain why there were failures and successes and to what extent the general assumptions of decision - making theory help explicate the decision - makers choice to establish ECOMOG. The study, among other things, subjects the decision to establish ECOMOG to three levels of analysis. It uses the rational actor model, the Governmental or Bureaucratic and Organizational process Models of decision - making to analyze the

decision to set up ECOMOG. This in a sense reflects Allison's work of 1969 and 1971 in which he subjects the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962 to three conceptual levels of analysis.

Chapter Two examines the various works upon which the thesis is based, that is, the broad frame work of decision -making theory. The object of this is to provide the foundation upon which the discourse in the other chapters rests. Chapter Three utilizes the rational actor and bureaucratic concepts of decision- making to analyse the decision to establish ECOMOG, and its operations. The motivation for this has been largely drawn from the works of Allison (1969 and 1971) and decisional assumptions from the works of such scholars as Simon (1968) and Braybrooke and Lindbloom (1963). Organizational Process Model of decision making seeks to establish that contrary to the conventional wisdom that decision-making process is entirely within the domain of national leaders, organizational outputs play vital role in the process. In fact, Allison (1969 and 1971) postulates that organizational outputs state or define the problem which confront the leaders, set the constraints or parameters within which leaders make their choices and provide the input for implementation of those choices. It is argued that owing to the great variety and complexity which sometimes inhere in issues, the omniscient quality that rationalists invest on policy-makers which give them the ability to have a full grasp of any issue at a given time and make a rational choice is unrealistic (Braybrooke and Lindbloom, 1963:71-79). Rather, decisions made are based on limited information which is available to them at any given time. One of the things that happen therefore is that errors are committed and rectified upon receipt of new information. In essence, organizational behavior of sequential attendance to problems, among other organizational characteristics, may also seem to underline decisional behavior of leaders. Could it be that the many accords that were signed are symptomatic of this?

In the light of the controversy that initially surrounded the formation of ECOMOG some of the sub-regional leaders arguing against the procedure upon which ECOMOG was erected, Chapter five examines the character of the decisional group which met to set up the intervention force. It seeks to test the assumptions embodied in the work of Janis (1972) which, inter alia, postulates that a decisional group with a high degree of camaraderie and who share same ideology may "hijack" the decisional process to serve their own ends. He

argues that such a process may be faulty because of the existence of a "group think" syndrome. He lists as among the tendencies of this group their inability to seek external consultation on the issue at stake; their unwillingness to accept opinions or views which do not corroborate their intended line of action ; their false conception of the operational milieu and a sense of "invincibility."

The second half of Chapter Five examines the reasons for the successes achieved in the effort to resolve the Liberian impasse. It seeks to do so by ascertaining the degree to which the characteristics Janis asserts are the counterpoise to faulty decision-making process were prevalent in the decisional processes which accounted for those successes. Chapter six evaluates the various findings of the study of the decisional process and provides recommendations based on them.

## REFERENCES

- Allison, G.T. (1969) "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." In *American Political Science Review*, (63) pp.689 - 718.
- Ibid. (1971) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*: Boston, Little: Brown and Co.
- Ayam, J (1998) "Nigeria and the ECOWAS Peacekeeping Initiative in Liberia". In the *Journal of the Third world Spectrum*. Vol.5.pp.98 -104
- Braybrook et.al. (1963) *A Strategy of Decision*. N.Y. Free Press of Glencoe.
- Brecher, M. (1977) "India's Devaluation of 1976: Linkage Politics and Crisis Decision - Making". In *British Journal of International Studies*. (3)pp.1-25
- Brelis, M. (1990) "Rebel's Saga: Mass Jail to Show Down for Power". In *Boston Globe*, July, p.35.
- Chege, M. (1992) "Remembering Africa". In *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No.1 pp.146 - 163
- Clapham, C. (1996) *Africa and International System*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Dunn, E.(1998) "Liberia's Internal Response to ECOMOG's Interventionist Efforts". In *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P. and Conteh-Morgan (ed). N.Y: St. Martin Press.
- Janis, I ( 1972) *Group – Think: A Psychological Studies of Policy – Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Korany, B. (1986) *How Foreign Policy' Decisions are Made in the Third World. A Comparative Analysis*. Boulder. Co.: West View Press.
- Magyar, K.P.(ed) "Conclusion: Liberia's Peacekeeping Lessons for Africa". In *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*. N.Y: St. Martin Press.pp.173 - 184
- Reno, W. (1998) *War Lord Politics and African States*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Simon, H, (1968) *The Sciences of the Artificial*. Cambridge, Mass: Mit Press
- Steinbruner, J. (1974) *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision - New Dimensions of Political Analysis*.Princeton: University Press.

Tarr, B.(1998) "Extra African Interest in the Liberian Conflict". In *Peace -keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P. and Conteh - Morgan ( ed.) N.Y.: St. Martin Press. Pp. 150-172

Vogt, M. (1991) "Nigeria's Participation in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group - ECOMOG". In *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.17, No.1 pp.101 - 122

*West Africa* (1987) 23 July.pp.1430 - 1431

*West Africa* (1993) 23 - 29 August.p..1488.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **SETTING THE SCENE - A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

This chapter discusses the various concepts of decision - making theory and some of the models that have flowed out of them. David Easton provides a working definition of decision thus : " They are the out puts of the political system by which values are authoritatively allocated within a society" Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf (1971) indicate that decision - making, in the context of the state, is the art of examining possible alternatives to the redress of a given national problem. It is therefore one of the salient aspects of state - craft. This is particularly true in the light of the fact that decisional outcomes impinge either positively or negatively on the lives of governments and individuals both nationally and internationally. A careful survey of the various assumptions of decision - making theory, which have evolved over the years reveals two basic dynamics upon which the theory hangs, the rational and the irrational.

#### **Rational Actor**

Echoing the view of one of the modern exponents of political realism, Hans Morgenthau, Decision - Making theory posits that an element of rationalism infuses the decision - making process of government. That the hand of prudence guides the statesman to choose from a menu of alternatives an option with a high premium. The rational decision - maker rejects options on basis of costs and benefits calculations and settles for the option which is low on cost but high on utility value, defined as the national interest (Allison, 1969 and 1971, Morgenthau, 1967 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971, Steinbruner, 1982, Kissinger, 1957 and Scheling, 1962). Exponents of realism assert that the interest of the statesman is co - terminus with the interest of the state he represents. Hegel writes: " It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision makers, those whose authoritarian acts are to



all intents and purposes the acts of the state. State action is an action taken by those acting in the name of the state" (Hegel in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971:315 ). The statesman is deemed a rational actor, in the sense that in any given problem that confronts his national society, he ascertains what the facts are and their implications for national security and survival. The choices or the actions taken are the rational acts necessary to ensure the interests, security, protection and survival of the state. Morgenthau states that: "...all nations are compelled to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by other nations." (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971: 76).

Realists believe that unlike the state level where there is a centralized authority which imposes order and control through its laws and effective sanction mechanisms in case of violations, on the international level, there is no such overarching authority to impose order. This is in part because each state is a sovereign entity not subject to any external law. As a result, there is anarchy on the international plane. Therefore in the quest for survival, one of the options available to the state is the acquisition of power. Power is sought by states as both a means and an end. It takes power, which at one level, may be defined as military might, to combat any threat to the security and survival of the state. States will therefore use force to further their national interests. Again, in this world of anarchy, acquisition of power becomes a guarantee against external aggression.

Realists like Morgenthau argues that this element of rationalism in the decisions of statesmen is what lends continuity and similarity in foreign policies of nations. Thus regardless of who is in charge of the affairs of the state, choices that are made are guided by rational calculations defined as national interest. In pursuit of the national interest, it is argued that the state or the statesman is guided by a morality different from that of the individual. In essence the adage: "The end justifies the means" is applicable here. The morality of the decisions or the acts of state is determined by its national interest. This would lead Morgenthau to instruct that acts of statesmen or political acts must be judged by rational criteria.

### **The Multiplicity of Players in the Decisional Game.**

Besides the classic concept of a unitary decision - maker who decides in the interest of the state, it has been discovered that in any deliberation of policy decision, there are multiplicity of actors, who form coalitions and counter - coalitions and represent different interests and constituencies (Allison, 1969 and 1971, Riker, 1962; Truman, 1951; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf 1971). Therefore in any given issue, there may be diverse interests, which produce group conflicts. It asserts that the decisional unit comprises actors who represent various departments and " constituencies" such as defence, foreign Affairs and Treasury. It includes secretaries and advisors or the members of cabinet. Political parties and pressure or civil groups may influence the policy formulation process. In every policy deliberation process the players have different policy preferences. The players possess varied degrees of bargaining skills, knowledge and power potentials, which they enlist in their bid to secure the adoption of their preference. What emerges after much "pulling and hauling " as the policy choice is based on compromise (Allison, 1969, ... Destler, 1972: 14 - 20). Spanier (1987:544) puts it thus:" ... what emerges as the policy choice ... is the outcome of the political process, the government actions resulting from all the arguments, the building of coalitions and counter - coalitions and the decision by high officials and compromise among them ...". The adage: "where you sit indicates where you stand" assumes much prominence in such a decisional process. For instance, in any policy deliberation that touches on security, it is likely to find the defence team opting for a military action. Among other things, if the military industrial complex is not a myth, a military action would enable the military establishment to give contracts to their clients, manufacturers of military hardware.

## **The Decisional Unit**

Decision - making theory focuses, in decisional analysis on the small group of decision - makers rather than the state. Especially if one understands that the choices are made by individuals acting on behalf of the state. This helps to concretise the locus of political analysis. As a result it is no longer what the state did which is of relevance but what the decision - makers did (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971:315 - 316). As a result the decisional behaviour of decision - makers who craft governmental policies have assumed much prominence in decision - making analysis. It has been accepted that the psychic complexes of the policy maker are relevant in the policy formulation process. His past experiences, education, childhood, beliefs, values and images shape the content of his decision (Synder et.al., 1963; Singer, 1963; Patchen 1965; Walker, 1977; Rosati, 1978). For example, it has been noted that the psychological content of the mind of the decision - maker may form a perception or a shadow of what exists in actuality. Brecher states: " Decision - makers act in accordance with their perception of reality not in response to reality itself (Brecher, 1972: 11 - 12). This dichotomy between the psychological milieu of the decision - maker and the operational milieu, what exists as the reality in the world out there, in part accounts for policy failures or flawed decisions.

Values and past experiences of policy makers impinge on the quality of their decisions. Values may be societal acquired, in other words certain societal norms and values overtime get deeply ingrained in the psyche of the decision-maker, which invariably influence his decisions (Frankel, 1963). It may also be personal convictions acquired through experiences or associations. During the deliberations on the "Cuban Missile Crisis" one of the options which was on offer was a "surprise attack or invasion of Cuba." The advocates of this option reasoned that this would give them the opportunity to correct the botched effort at Bay of Pigs. Robert Kennedy was however of a different opinion. He saw in a surprise attack as a negation of American value, which frowned upon such an action on an enemy. He equated this with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. If this hurt the world and most especially Americans' sensibility, it was bound to be the same if that option was adopted. Tojo, who ordered the

attack was seen as a villain, and since no one, especially the President, wanted to be seen as a villain, that option was dropped.

### **Decisional Conflict**

The decision - making theory posits that decisional conflict may inhere in the decision making process. Janis defines it as the opposing tendencies within an individual which interfere with the formulation, acceptance or execution of a decision. It may stem either from the psychological personality of the individual or pressures from competing groups or both (Janis, 1972). He posits that members of a cohesive group tend to suppress their personal doubts, or self - censor whatever misgiving they may have concerning a group decision. This may be due to a desire not to break the homogeneity of the decisional unit or atmosphere. The group that presided over the "Water - Gate" scandal exhibited self - censorship. President Richard Nixon acknowledges it in his memoir: "Looking back on it now I can see that we were all operating from different basis of knowledge and with different perceptions of our own vulnerabilities. These different perceptions and the chasm they created in our overall understanding are apparent now..." (Ibid : 226).

Sometimes members undergo self censorship rather than to express their misgivings for fear of coming under pressure from others. Schlesinger gave voice to his feelings after the Bay of Pigs" debacle thus: "In the months after the "Bay of Pigs" I bitterly reproached myself for having kept so silent during those crucial discussions in the cabinet room, though my feelings of guilt were tempered by the knowledge that a course of an objection would have accomplished little save to gain me a name as a nuisance. I can only explain my failure to do more than raise a few timid questions by reporting that one's impulse to blow the whistle on this nonsense was simply unwelcomed by the circumstances of the discussion" (Schlesinger in Janis, 1972:39). There could also be direct pressure on dissenters to conform. Robert Kennedy was purported to have once told Schlesinger during the pre - Bay of Pigs days after the latter had given him his opinions that: "You may be right or you may be wrong , but the President has made his mind up. Don't push any further, now is the time for every one to help

him all they can" (Ibid.: 40). Decisional theory acknowledges that the decision - taker makes his decision within a total perceived environment which includes his national political environment and the international system as a whole (Frankel, 1963). Though decision - making on the national plane is confined to the level of political leadership, activities of other forces within the domestic environment to a certain degree impinge on the nature of the decisions which are taken. In contemporary times public opinion polls have come to be cherished by national leaders as is evident in the popularity of opinion polls on both national and international issues. Public opinion is of much significance even in authoritarian societies (Korany, 1987). Hume underscores the important of such opinions in his assertion: "It is on opinion only that government is founded: and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments as well as to the most free and most popular (Hume, 1875:110).

### **Domestic Context**

External actors in the domestic context who may influence policy decisions may include the opposition parties (in democratic societies), the mass media, the intellectuals or the tiny critical sector of the society and interest groups on specific issue areas. For example, one would expect the labour union to considerably influence government's trade and labour policies. Such groups may at times mobilise public opinion to influence policy decisions. This is much in evidence in the third world where political institutions tend to be at the rudimentary stage or where political institutions tend to be less vibrant. It is common to find the intellectual class, especially the student body forming a coalition with both skilled and unskilled urban workers and other sections of the populace to influence policy decisions (Frankel, 1963: Almond and Verba: 1963: Korany, 1987:55, Holsti, 1967).

However , in most cases statesmen or policy framers shape public opinion in line with their own perceptions, or accept opinions which strengthen their own perceptions. In international affairs this is made possible in part because of the widespread ignorance or apathy of most members of the society to international issues. Whatever knowledge they may have on a particular issue may be based on official information, which contains some element of bias.

Sometimes the element of bias can be very strong, what Plato refers to as "one magnificent lie" (Frankel, 1963: 75; Holsti, 1967). President Nixon captures the essence of the assumption thus: "It is the responsibility of the leader to lead public opinion, not just to follow. The leader must get all the facts before making a decision and then must develop support for that decision among the people by making the facts known to them" (Nixon in *The Manchester Guardian*, 29 September, 1958). Gathering facts to develop support for decisions reveals an important aspect of the decision - making process. That decision makers attach great importance to reasons they give to their actions. In the policy formulation process, decision - makers are preoccupied with the reasons to be assigned to their contemplated action. Questions like what would the public say; what would other nations say; what will other decision - makers say are given great attention.

### **Motive Statements**

The motives of policy makers have therefore become a very relevant focus of analysis. Motive statements may not always be a reflection of real motive. However, such motive statements may in time influence the behaviour of the proponents, motive statements may also influence the behaviour of other actors. Decision - makers sometimes couch their motives in sentiments, values and norms shared by either the cultural milieu in which they form an integral part or the international community (Frankel, 1963: 137 - 160). This is necessary, if their decisions are to gain legitimacy and acceptability both in the domestic and the international contexts.

## **The External Environment**

The external environment also enters into the calculations of policy framers. The salience of the external milieu is due in part to the rising trend of internationalisation of factors of production, internationalisation of issues like ecology, human rights, the emergence or resurgence of regionalism. This has meant that in any given issue there is a commonality of both local and international interests and such interests invariably affect or impinge on the decision - making process. As Rosecrance points out, the fate of states is more interwoven now than ever before, especially due to economic factors (Rosecrance, 1990). Regionalism has also meant that national entities have had to harmonise their interests with that of their regional partners, which includes consultations on a regional level (Snyder et. Al., 1963). The commonality of interests has also necessitated the encroachment of regional partners in the affairs of member states when the need arises.

In the Third World, and especially in Africa the previous incidence of colonialism has created a pattern of underdevelopment. This has in part been brought about by the peripheralization of the continent which dates back to the colonial times. Their economies in most cases are adjuncts of the industrial world, reduced to producers of raw materials, with comparatively lower returns, and buyers of finished products. The resultant inequalities of income, and the underdevelopment which flows from it has meant that they continue to behold onto the industrialised nations and the former colonial masters. They continue to depend on their largess (Caporaso, 1978; Amin, 1977; Brecher, 1977; Adedeji, 1996). This dependency status has rendered the states boundaries highly permeable, in the sense that the states no longer have absolute control over decisions, therefore the decision - making process is heavily encroached on by external actors.

### **Antithesis of the Rational Actor Concept**

Works of such scholars as Simon (1968): Braybrook and Linbloom, (1963:71-79) and Steinbruner (1982) offer challenge to the classic model of rational decision - making, which emphasizes that the decision - maker spreads out before him all his available alternatives, measure them in terms of cost and benefits in order to arrive at an option with a maximum utility value is simply unrealistic. They argue that the decisional process bring along its own complexities. Again, the basis of their challenge rests on the assumption that the constraints of time, limitations of man's problem solving capacities, the limitation of information available and the cost of analysis (in terms of personnel, resources and time) make the assumption of the classic model improbable. In place of the maximization concept, they substitute the notion of satisficing behaviour, which presupposes that policy - makers examine alternatives sequentially until they stumble upon one which meets their minimum standards of acceptability. In essence, they keep rejecting unsatisfactory solutions until they can find one which they can agree is sufficiently satisfactory to enable them to act (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971). By inference therefore, decision- makers do not assign pay off values to option or engage in advance calculations of options. These observations have come out of the study of organizational behaviour in which Cyert and March (1963) and Cyert and Simon (1968) establish that in solving problems Organizations do not integrate value calculations in their decision process. They contend that organizations sequentially attend to problems and that decisional outcomes are selected on the basis of accepted standard set by the organization. They further contend that every organization, for the sake of efficiency and simplicity of decisional tasks is split up into sub units. Each sub unit specialises in a given task. This in essence, ensures the avoidance of uncertainty in the decision process, as each unit routinely applies a set procedure in executing tasks which it has much expertise, knowledge and competence. By inference, specialization has the effectiveness of circumventing complex decisional tasks.

Out of the assumptions of decision - making theory have flowed works of Allison, (1969 and 1971) and Janis (1972). Allison borrows the rational actor concept, the idea that governmental



decisions are made from an interplay of preferences from multiple actors and concepts from organizational behaviour to analyse the decision - making process of Kennedy's Administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962. The Soviet Union installs Missiles in Cuba and given the danger it portends for national security, the Administration meets to decide on the rational course of action.

### **The Rational Actor model**

Using this as a conceptual lens to examine the decision - making process of the Administration during the crisis, he postulates that the President as the rational actor, examined a wide range of alternatives solution to the problem. After examining the various choices open to him he decided on the blockade of Cuban coast, to prevent Soviet shipment of military hardware from reaching Cuban shores. This option was chosen with an eye on the security, protection and survival of the American nation and its people. It was seen as more rational and prudential than alternatives like surgical air strikes of the missile installation in Cuba or resolving the matter diplomatically. For example, it was seen that it was not in the national interest to embark on air strikes in the sense that the accuracy of such strikes could not be guaranteed, there could be loss of lives, including Russian soldiers stationed at those sites. This may at the end provoke nuclear war and thereby jeopardizing the security of the nation. The blockade however would afford the U. S the opportunity to gradually escalate confrontation with the soviet union, while ensuring that the proximity of U.S to the confrontation zone and preponderance of its power in that hemisphere would give it an edge over the soviets. In the end, soviets backed down removing their missiles from Cuba.

### **The Bureaucratic Process Model**

With this model, Allison postulates that the decision process was not dominated by a single actor, namely the President, examining the pros and cons of the various options before him but rather by a multiplicity of actors drawn from both the Kennedy administration and other governmental departments. He shows the interests, skills, power, knowledge, the propositions

and counter - propositions of the various players. For example, Macnamara favoured the "no action" option on the grounds that it did not matter where missiles were stationed since it could not change the fact that the Soviet Union already possessed the nuclear capability to strike, with the same deadly impact from any distance. President Kennedy initially favoured air strikes, targeting the missiles sites along with the defence team. Robert Kennedy, Sorensen, and Macnamara, who arguably represented much power by virtue of their closeness to the President skilfully deflated the air strike argument. It was noted that the accuracy of the strikes could not be guaranteed, besides if it was carried out it may broaden the theatre of conflict. It was reasoned that the Soviet may carry out similar attacks against Berlin or the worse scenario would be that it could provoke a nuclear war. In the end the blockade was chosen as the most rational and pragmatic option.

### **The Organizational Process Model - The Role of Organizational Unit in Decision - Making**

Allison, (1969 and 1972) borrows from the concepts of organizational behaviour in decision-making to analyse political decision-making process. In this model of decision-making process, he utilises the organizational concepts to analyse the decisions taken during the "Cuban Missile Crisis." Commenting on the Organizational process model, he asserts: "... borrowed from the studies of organizations, these loosely formulated propositions amount to tendencies ... In particular instances, tendencies hold more or less..." (Allison, 1969:698). He asserts that organizational outputs, in the main account for policy decisions of government. He further postulates that the broad spectrum of problems that confront government at any given time has meant that decisional tasks are cut up into segments and parcel out to various organizational units on the basis of speciality. Each unit operating in quasi independence, uses its standard operating procedure to execute tasks assigned to it. The *leit motif* of this model seems to be that in any policy decision process organizational outputs state the problem, provide the parameters or boundaries within which solutions or decisions are made and provide the where-withal for implementation of decisions taken. In simple terms it means that the decisional choices that leaders make depend greatly on outputs of organizational units. Theodore

Sorensen underscores this in his assertion : "Presidents rarely, if ever make decisions particularly in foreign affairs in the sense of writing their decisions on a clean state. The basic decisions which confine their choices have all been previously made " (Sorensen in Allison, 1967:699).

### **Organizational Outputs**

Allison contends that organizations cherish their autonomous status so much so that they are wary of external intrusion into their *modus operandi*. This presupposes that, at certain times, there is bound to be a considerable gap between what leaders choose and what organizational unit chooses. However, this is not to suggest that leaders do not have any leverage over departmental activities. Kennedy commented on the "intransigence" of the U.S State Departments thus: " The State Department is a bowl full of jelly" (Kennedy in Allison, 1969:699). Applying the concepts he had developed, Allison noted that the decision for the blockade was based on organizational intelligence. It was occasioned by photographs of missile sites in Cuba taken by the Intelligence unit. Kennedy with reference to this contribution of the Intelligence community in his announcement to the American public of missiles sites in Cuba and the subsequent decision for the blockade, opined: " I do not think probably we would have chosen prudentially as we finally did" (Kennedy in Allison, 1969:704). The discovery itself reveals something about organizational routine from the Soviet perspective. Allison (1969) contends that analysts from the rational model orientation marvel at the lack of elaborate secrecy concerning the building of missiles in Cuba. For example, it was noted that no effort was made to camouflage the building sites. No thought was given to the fact that U.S "U2" air reconnaissance flights were likely to photograph such sites. Besides, the missiles were built according to the specification in Russia, in spite of the fact that U.S intelligence was fully conscious of Russian model and therefore could easily link up such installations with them. Organizational process paradigm seems to solve the puzzle. The fact that the sites were not camouflaged indicate the notion that they were only carrying out routine exercise. The military establishment responsible for building such sites never operated clandestinely in Russia, in other words camouflaging was not an essential part of its operational code. Again, they could

only reproduce the missile system in Russia in Cuba as that was what they had specialised in. Organizational behaviour also explains the efficiency with which massive equipment and big number of personnel were transported without detection to the sites in Cuba. This task was carried out by the Russian Intelligence Service, which arguably has an enviable procedural regime built on secrecy (Allison, 1971:114 - 115).

The process that led to the decision to fly over Cuba to take photographs of the missile sites typifies organizational behaviour or procedure. Allison recounts that a C.I.A. agent sighted the rear profile of a strategic missile on September 12. However, this had to be subjected to the procedural regime of the intelligence unit; transmission of such information to Washington usually takes between 9-12 days. This is calculated to give enough protection to the agents on the field and to reduce the cost of communication. Even though the Intelligence unit had information of Soviet shippings to Cuba, information from the Cuban exile community about the presence of missile sites in Cuba, report about the boasting of the personal pilot of Fidel Castro, that Cuba had acquired an atomic bomb, such information had to be subjected to the procedural rigours of the organization. It first had to be processed to ascertain the accuracy of the report. Coupled with the conflict between the C.I.A. and the Air Force as to whose duty it was to fly over Cuba on an intelligence mission, a successful mission could only be undertaken on October 14 (Allison, 1969:704).

The two options which were highly favoured by the administration were the results of organizational output, the air strike and the blockade. For example, the details for the air strikes were according to the specifications of the Air Force or the defence team. What could also be gathered from this is that whether there should be air strikes or not depended on the capability of that force. It is interesting to note that the air strike option was dropped because the defence team could not guarantee more than 90% effectiveness in surgical air strikes. It is interesting to recall that the non feasibility of this option could specifically be traced to the realisation that the missiles to be targeted in Cuba in case of surgical air strikes were labelled as 'mobile' in the sense that they could actually be moved before they become targets of air strikes. This revelation and the fact that it helped put on hold that option throws up another

essential feature of organizations in the decision - making equation. That one of the variables of the constraints within which leaders make their choice is the organizational intelligence about (in conflict situations) the capabilities of the enemy. A choice is made if there is perceived weakness in the defences and capabilities of the enemy, on the other hand it is put on the shelf if organizational intelligence perceives an obstacle, to its successful implementation (Ibid.,: 706).

Both the decision to deploy missiles by the Soviet Union in Cuba and the Blockade by U.S. reveal organizational outputs. By 1961 the Soviet leadership were worried by the strategic gap between the US and the Soviet Union. Whereas U.S. capabilities could target Russian cities with ease, Russian missiles were trained only on Europe. This could in part be explained by the fact that as at then the military unit responsible for missile production was the ground force or the artillery units, which was concerned with artillery rockets, for defence against either German or NATO invasion. Hence, the specialisation in medium range systems like Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (M.R.B.M.). However, the perceived strategic gap meant that there should be a shift away from the preponderant production of those systems to strategic nuclear rockets. A division was created within the military establishment for this purpose, the Strategic Rocket Force. Manpower and expertise were transferred from the artillery division to the new unit, charged with the responsibility of producing Inter - Continental Ballistic Missiles. It is significant to note that the transfer of personnel in actuality entailed transfer of procedure from the old set up to the new. The end result was that more of the old systems were produced and less of I.C.B.M., the slowness of its production was also due to the fact of budgetary constraints. Thus with this "chess board" set the only option open to the leadership to circumvent the strategic gap was to install I.C.B.M. and M.R.B.M in Cuba, to target U.S.

The decision for the blockade and its implication also reveals organizational output. The navy provided the blue print within which that decision was made, and executed the task according to its procedural regime. The fact that this decision was really feasible was also due in part to the manpower and logistical strength of the navy. In the implementation of the blockade, we see the procedural regime of the navy coming into conflict with the desire of the political leaders.

Allison claimed that the President in response to an advice offered by the then British Ambassador to Washington instructed that the blockade be moved closer to Cuba. This was intended to give Krushchev ample time to reconsider his decision concerning the missiles in Cuba. Reliable reports indicated that the blockade line was not moved. It was viewed as an encroachment on naval procedure.

On one occasion, Macnamara being suspicious of the naval operational procedure quizzed the chief of naval operations. He asked him: "What would you do if Soviet ship's captain refused to answer questions about his cargo". He picked up the manual of Navy regulations and waved it in Macnamara's face and shouted: "it 's all in there". Macnamara replied: "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done; I want to know what you are going to do, now". The naval man ended the conversation by stating emphatically: "Now, Mr. Secretary if you and your deputy will go back to your office the navy will run the blockade" (Allison, 1969:707).

### **Group - Think - A Defective Decision - Making Process**

In a superb psychological analyses of decisional groups, based on some of the assumptions of decision - making theory, Janis ( 1972) lays a foundation for what may constitute a flawed decision – making process. In one breath, he shows that policy makers do not always concern themselves with calculating the pros and cons of an array of options. They may limit themselves to a few options. He argues that this is highly discernible in a decision group affected by what he terms a "group - think" syndrome. He defines it as a group with high sense of "camaraderie" which has a uniformed opinion on an issue, regardless of its intellectual capacity for divergence of opinion. He lists the following as the essential characteristics exhibited by the cohesive decision - making group: Illusion of invulnerability with a high degree of risk taking, cohesive with a strong bond of friendship and a common political and ideological background, stereotyped notion about the enemy and beliefs about its own morality, or shared illusion about the operational milieu and effort to rationalise policy among others (Janis, 1972:9-13). He also lists the following as among factors that accounts for defective decision - making : lack of norms requiring methodological procedure in decision - making; group's discussion limited to a few alternative courses of action, without a survey of a full range of alternatives and the costs and benefits in each of them or to examine the preferred policy from the standpoint of risks and drawbacks and to provide contingency plan; no attempt is made to seek expert advice and the rejection of facts and opinions that do not support the initial preferred policy among others (Janis, 1972:175).

### **Recipe for Successful Decision - Making**

If the afore mentioned characteristics are responsible for faulty decision then the opposite of these contain the recipe for good decision - making process. Janis therefore lists the following as amongst the necessary ingredients for a successful policy - making process. A survey of a wide variety of options; Critical appraisal of the options on offer; Critical appraisal of the preferred option; Provision for a contingency plan; A preparedness to seek advice from experts

and other informed groups and institutions and no shared illusion about the enemy (Janis, 1972:136). He attributed the successful handling of the "Cuban Missile Crisis" and the success of the "Marshall Plan" in part to the presence of these factors. Based on the many ill - fated decisions of policy makers; mistakes they do acknowledge, with the knowledge hind sight brings; the blinding smoke of camaraderie that sometimes hangs over the heads of decisional groups producing consensual short sightedness; the constraints by limited time space within which decisions are made, all serve to indicate that such rational assumptions as value calculations, appraisal of a host of alternatives in terms of cost and benefit calculations do not always enter into the minds of decision - makers. Time, availability of information, the quality of the issue at stake, among others, all impinge on the decision process.

The analyses of decision - making theory have, in the main, revealed that statesmen act or decide in the interest of the nation and that the choices they make may be rational choices aimed at ensuring the security, protection and survival of the nation and the people they represent. It has also shown that whereas rational theorists or rationalists believe that the decision - maker surveys a wide range of alternative solution to a problem before picking an option with an optimum value, other scholars contend that this is unrealistic and that the process is marked by sequential attendance to problems. Decision - makers incrementally adjust their decisions in the light of new information which hitherto was beyond the reach of the decision - makers. The individual decision- maker is important in any decisional analysis, as a result, the decisional group has become the focus of analysis. Thus such psychological elements as motives, values, beliefs, inner conflict, images and other factors such as the quest for power, the knowledge, skills, ambitions, interests and bargaining potentials as well as the external and internal environments of members of a decisional unit have all become necessary ingredients in the analysis of the decision process. The analyses have also revealed that organizations or various departments indeed play a vital role in the decision - making process. Organizational out puts in part account for identification of problems, formulation of decisions and implementation. Such revelation obviously retrenches the notion that the policy formulation process is exclusively confined to national leaders.



## REFERENCES

- Adedeji, A. (ed) ( 1996) *Africa Beyond Dispossession and Dependence*. London: Zed.
- Allison, G.T( 1969) "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis". In *American Political Science Review*, ( 63) pp.689-718.
- Ibid. ( 1971) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston, Little: Brown and Co.
- Amin, Samir ( 1977) *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.
- Braybrook et. Al. ( 1963) *A Strategy of Decision*. N.Y.: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Brecher, M. ( 1977)" India's Devaluation of 1976: Linkage Politics and Crisis Decision-Making". In *British Journal of International Studies* ( 3) pp. 1-25.
- Caporaso, J. ( 1978) " Introduction: Dependence and Dependency in Global System". In *International Organization*, 32 (1)
- Cyert, R.M. and March, J. ( 1963) *A Behavioural Theory of the Firm*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice - Hall, Inc.
- Destler, J.M. ( 1972) *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Dougherty, J.E et.al. (1971) *Contending Theories of International Relations*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Frankel, J. ( 1963) *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of decision making*. New York: Prentic Hall Inc.
- Korany, B. (1986) *How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World. A Comparative Analysis*. Boulder, Co.: West View Press.
- Le Figaro (1992) 8 January
- Manchester Guardian* ( 1958) 29 September.
- March, J. and Simon, H. ( 1968) *Organizations*. N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Morgenthau, H.J. ( 1967) *Politics Among Nations*. N.Y.: Alfred, A. Knopf.

- Patchen, M. ( 1965) "Decision Theory and the Study of National Action". In *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, ix, pp. 165-169.
- Riker, W. ( 1962) *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rosati, J. ( 1987) *The Carter's Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on Behaviour*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Rosecrance, R. ( 1996) "The Rise of the Virtual State". In *Foreign Affairs*, 75/4 July-August, pp.45-61.
- Schelling, T. ( 1962) *The Strategy of Conflict*. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
- Simon, H. (1968) *The Sciences of the Artificial*. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press.
- Singer, J.D. ( 1963)"Inter- Nation Influence: A Formal Model". In *American Political Science Review*, LVII. Pp. 428-430.
- Snyder et. al. ( 1963) *Foreign Policy Decision - Making*. N.Y.: Glencoe.
- Spanier, J. ( 1987) *Games Nation Play*. Washington: C.Q. Press.
- Steinbruner, J. ( 1974) *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision - New Dimension of Political Analysis*. Princeton: University Press.
- Truman, D. ( 1951) *The Government Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Verba, S and Almond, G. ( 1963) *The Civic Culture*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Walker, S.G. ( 1967) " The Interface Between Beliefs and Behaviour: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War". In *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21, pp. 129-168.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **FORMATION OF ECOWAS CEASE - FIRE MONITORING GROUP**

This chapter focuses on the process and the dynamics which under-girded the decision to establish ECOMOG. It, inter alia, discusses it within the framework of decision-making theory. With particular reference to the Rational Actor and the Bureaucratic process Models of Allison. In this regard, it explores or put into proper perspective the myriad of motives of the decision-makers, seen through their national and personal interests and the constituencies they represent. It examines the conflict of position, power, knowledge, craftiness and skills, ambitions, hopes and fears they bring to bear on the decision process. It establishes that, external actors to some degree encroached on the process and discusses how policy makers exploit shared domestic and universal values to win public support for their decisions.

At the 13<sup>th</sup> summit of the economic Community of West African States, President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria floated the idea of a mediation committee to mediate in the on going conflict in Liberia and other future conflicts that may crop up within the sub-region. It was unanimously endorsed by member states. As a result of that resolution a mediation committee of five members was established comprising Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Togo and the Gambia. Membership of this standing committee was to be rotational, each set of members serves for three years (Vogt, 1990: Tarr, 1998; Elwood - Dunn, 1998:87). Its immediate task was to secure a cessation of hostilities and an agreement from the warring faction for a peace-keeping force to be deployed in Liberia; to ask Samuel Doe to step down, for an interim Government of National Unity (IGNV) to be set up which would oversee the election of a new government.

Armed with this mandate, the Committee held its first meeting in Free Town, Sierra Leone in mid July, 1990. Sierra Leone and Guinea were specially invited to join the committee because of the effect of the crisis on their respective societies, as a result of their proximity to the belligerent nation. At this meeting all the stake holders in the Liberian conflict were invited, both civil groups and the armed factions. As it should be expected in such mediatory talks an

impasse developed especially when Charles Taylor demanded the resignation of Samuel Doe and categorically refuse the deployment of a Peace - Keeping force in Liberia. Ostensibly, he doubted the impartiality of such a force.

It was in the face of such intransigence that the committee subsequently decided in August, 1990 to set up an intervention force, ECOMOG, and the following peace plan: There was to be an immediate Cease - fire; the deployment of a cease - fire monitoring group; the supervision of the cease - fire by this monitoring group; Doe was to be persuaded to step down as President, the setting up of a broad interim government of national unity (IGNU); the leaders of the warring faction to be ineligible to head the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the setting up of a committee to organise national elections in which the leaders in the IGNU and the warring factions would not be eligible to stand as candidates. At the onset therefore, ECOMOG's mandate was to keep peace in Liberia, it was based on the premise that there would be cease - fire. However when National Patriotic Front of Liberia went on the offensive against ECOMOG on the ground that the Liberian led intervention force was not neutral because of the perceived Nigerian Links with Doe, the mandate changed from a Peace - keeping to Peace - enforcement. Inegbedion comments that: " ... ECOMOG's operation changed from peacekeeping to peacemaking. In other words, ECOMOG would now impose a cease - fire. This meant doing battle with the rebel forces, if need be. This formalized the current policy of Nigerian Command of ECOMOG" (Inegbedion in Ayam, 1998:140). By 1996 ECOMOG's operations reverted to peacekeeping when all the factions finally stopped fighting. The following countries participated in ECOMOG at the beginning of its operations: Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Gambia.

### **Source of ECOMOG Funds**

At the onset of the operation it was agreed that each contributing country should provide for the expenses of its troops. Iweze, the Chief of staff at the initial stage of the operation writes: "At the onset of the operation, because of scarcity of funds by ECOWAS Secretariat, the policy that was adopted was that each contributing nation should cater for the expenses of her contingent (Iweze, 1993:237). It was provided that an emergency fund should be set up for ECOMOG operations. The initial capital of the fund was put at U.S \$ 50 million from voluntary contributions from both the ECOWAS member States and the international community. However most of the member states did not honour their commitments to the fund, as a result only \$3 million was reported to have been collected from participating states. It has been reported that the Financial cost to Nigeria of the ECOMOG operations stood at between U.S \$250 - 500 million (*Financial Times of London*, June 27, 1991). Nigeria was able to fund its operations in ECOMOG as a result of the windfall it received from the sale of oil on the world market. As a result of the Gulf crisis, the price of oil temporarily shot up. It has been estimated that Nigeria earned about \$ 5 billion from the sale of oil within the period (Ayam, 1998:102). U.S financial aid to ECOMOG increased when it persuaded Senegal to participate in ECOMOG. Initially, U.S offered a sum of U.S \$2.8million in non-lethal assistance to ECOMOG. She provided the sum of U.S \$3.75 million to support the Yamousoukro peace process. Senegal was given financial incentive, to the tune of U.S \$10 million for her participation (Mortimer, 1998:127).

### **The National Dimension of the Involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia**

The concept of political realism is discernible in the motivations of the major players within the Mediation Committee. Therefore Allison's Rational Actor Model can be factored in here. The assent to the decision to set up ECOMOG by the individual statesmen who formed the Mediation Committee was undoubtedly based on rationalism which could be defined as the national interest. Statesmen, as exponents of realism contend, represents the interest of their individual nations, thus their interests are synonymous to their individual national interests.

Morgenthau, argues that statesmen acts rationally by seeking what is best for the nation Morgenthau in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1987:76). They are eternally preoccupied with steps that will ensure the security and survival of the state in all its ramifications. For example, the cultural, physical, political and economic security of the state.

The Liberian crisis undoubtedly presented a security challenge on the sub-region. Therefore the decision to set up ECOMOG could be seen as prudential move, rational in outlook to safeguard the security and survival of the various national entities and the sub-region as a whole.

### **National Interests**

Joseph Momoh, the President of Sierra Leone, and a member of the Committee which met to form ECOMOG, must have been motivated by the desire for national survival, in the light of the socio - economic and political effects of the Liberia crisis on Sierra Leone. The influx of refugees in Sierra Leone which is geographically contiguous with Liberia created socio - economic strains on an already weak economy. Momoh highlighted the effect of the refugee problem in this assertion: "We are stretching our resources to take care of his (Charles Taylor) people. Our social amenities are being over taxed and even our economy has been dislodged" (*West Africa*, November, 1990). By August, 1990, the Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone numbered about 20,000 (*West Africa*" August, 1990). Momoh must have been worried about this, ostensibly because such strains on the economy and social services if prolonged was bound to create disaffection with his government. Economic hardships and coup d'etat have always been convenient bed fellows.

Sierra Leone's geographical contiguity with Liberia must have provided an additional source of worry for him and the impetus for deciding in favour of ECOMOG. He must have reasoned that the spirit of insurgency may easily be transported into Sierra Leone. Sierra Leoneans had been identified in the ranks of N.P.F.L, it was therefore an unspoken fear that once Charles Taylor succeeds in establishing himself as the head of the Liberian state, it will motivate such elements to begin their own insurrection movements against Momoh's regime.

This fear would become a reality when Fodeh Sankoh, in 1991 began a rebel movement against his regime (Conteh – Morgan, 1998:147;Reno, 1998:123). And it was the ineffectiveness of his regime to flush out the movement that would in part lead to his overthrow by the “Young Turks” led by Captain Valentine Strasser (Inegbedion, 1994:228-229). He must have therefore fallen under the conviction that supporting a decision for a regional intervention force and providing troops for it would help secure his own survival, the stability of his country and the region as a whole for economic development.

Lansana Conte of Guinea must have been attracted to the decision for almost the same reason as Joseph Momoh. Guinea is geographically contiguous with Liberia. It is reported that Guinea and Sierra Leone had the largest number of refugees (*West Africa*, 1990). He must have also been influenced by religious and tribal considerations. Charles Taylor was purported to have carried out systematic killing of members of the Gio and Mano tribes of Liberia, who belonged to the Mandingo stock, a linguistic group largely based in Guinea. Because, they were accused of collaborating with the Doe regime. Besides, there were Guinean elements in Charles Taylor’s N.P.F.L. He had a taste of the political danger to his survival when Charles Taylor earlier on in the conflict, in July, 1990 made a brief incursion into Guinea (Conteh – Morgan, 1998:147, Elwood – Dunn, 1998:87).

### **Reason for Ghanaian Support**

Jerry Rawlings, the President of Ghana and the Intelligence community of Ghana had developed a close relationship with the Liberian exile political community in Ghana who were against the unbridled ambition of Taylor. He was once incarcerated in Ghana after he escaped from U.S prison in Boston as he was facing extradition order. Apparently he was not in the good books of Rawlings. His interest in the Liberian situation must have been motivated by the plight of the sizeable Ghanaian community trapped in Liberia. It was also reported that there were some Ghanaians fighting for the N.P.F.L. (Tarr, 1993). Report had it that such elements have the potential of destabilising the regime once they were through with the Liberian situation.

## **Gambia**

Sir Dawda Jawara, the President of Gambia and the Chairman of ECOWAS authority at the time the decision to intervene was taken was motivated by national and regional security concerns. There were reports of Gambians and other West African dissidents fighting alongside the N.P.F.L.

## **Nigeria**

The key actor and the driving force behind the decision was arguably Babangida. Earlier on he had called for the establishment of a Standing Mediation Committee during the ECOWAS 13<sup>th</sup> summit in Banjul, on 6<sup>th</sup> July, 1990 to mediate in the conflict in Liberia and any other future conflict that may rear its head anywhere in the sub – region (Vogt, 1991, *Africa Insight*, 1993). His interest on the surface seemed to have been motivated by the national interest of his country, which among other things have been defined in the shape of three concentric circles. It stipulates that the national interest of Nigeria converges with that of her immediate neighbours and the sub – region as a whole. The protection of the people of Nigeria and its territorial integrity and sovereignty is co – terminus with that of her immediate neighbours and the sub – region (Adisa, 1993; Vogt, 1991; *News Watch*, 1990, *West Africa* 1990). During a presentation at a Nigerian Army Chief of Staff he declared that Nigeria's participation in ECOMOG was dictated by Nigeria's foreign policy which had been evolved over the past three decades (May, 1998:112).

Thus Babangida's interest and sensitivity to the Liberian crisis must have been predicated on the notion that an instability in that country jeopardises the security of the region and by extension that of Nigeria in both political and economic terms. He asserted that, in apparent reference to situation in Liberia, "When certain events occur in the sub – region ... which are bound to affect Nigeria's politico – military and socio – economic environment, we should not



stand by as helpless and hapless spectators” (*West Africa*, 26 November – 2 December, 1990). Obviously an unstable regional environment militates against a healthy climate needed for regional development and integration, which is the linch pin of ECOWAS. Nigeria without doubt stands to gain immensely from this, given the size of her economy and the immensity of the volume of her economic activities in the sub – region. Thus the economic down turn which may flow out of political upheaval anywhere within the sub – region may be bound to be immense and catastrophic for Nigeria. Vogt (1991) gives a glimpse of the economic implication for Nigeria as a result of the on going strife in Liberia. She recounts that the Managing Director of Cadbury, Nigeria limited (a beverage enterprise) lamented that the company had lost about N10 million ( about a quarter of a million dollars) in export proceeds since the inception of the war. Now, one begins to appreciate the concern when you add up the loss of that company to the losses of other Nigerian businesses in Liberia.

There was also the humanitarian and the factor of Nigerians being singled out for murder by N.P.F.L. forces. When Charles Taylor began his insurgency, Nigeria had about 70,000 of her nationals in Liberia. They became targets of N.P.F.L attacks. Taylor at one stage held about 200 Nigerians hostage and threatened their lives. It was reported that on 8 August 1990, N.P.F.L. fighters forcefully entered the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia, where about 2,000 nationals had taken refuge. After looting the place, they were reported to have killed between 700 - 1,000 of the Nigerian refugees. In reference to the incident, Babaginda on 11 August 1990, declared: “If the harassment of Nigerians by troops of Charles Taylor continues, what will follow will be another matter” (May, 1998:111) The assault on the embassy itself is a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria. Embassies are considered in international law as extensions of national territories. By extension therefore, the assault on the embassy could be deemed as a violation of one of the core principles of Nigerian national interest and foreign policy. In fact, Babangida justified Nigeria’s involvement in ECOMOG as a defence of Nigeria’s territorial integrity (May, 1998:110). It could therefore be stated that from the rational point of view Babangida’s decision reflects the national interests of Nigeria as enshrined in her foreign policy objectives. The event in Liberia threatened these interests. The lives of her nationals were in danger, her sovereignty and territorial integrity was being

violated, the politico – economic stability of the sub – region was under threat. Rationalism dictates that force need to be applied to safeguard these interests.

### **Close Relations Between Nigeria and Liberia**

The advent of Babangida's regime witnessed a close relationship between Nigeria and Liberia. The Nigerian Government was noted to have funded and helped staff the Graduate School of International relations of Liberia. Nigerian lecturers and professors were known to have taught there. Doe once enrolled at the institute. Doe was reported to have named the highway linking Liberia to Sierra Leone after Babangida upon completion of the project (May, 1998:113). The *Lagos Guardian* reported that Doe was presented with the highest award of Nigeria when he visited with Babangida. The title the "Grand Commander of the Federal Republic of Nigeria" was conferred on him. The paper lamented that, Nelson Mandela who was comparatively of a higher international stature received a lesser award when he visited (*The Guardian of Lagos*, June 1990:11). When Liberia was put on the black list of both the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank for failing to honour her debt, the Nigerian government helped reschedule the loans the country owed to A.D.B. It made a contribution of about 4.5 million U.S dollars towards the rescheduling (*Africa Event*, January, 1995:39; May, 1998:113). Ayam (1998:98) contends that : "The epitome of the closeness between Doe's Liberia and Nigeria emerged at the start of the insurrection launched by Charles Taylor. Doe was in Nigeria in April 1990 on a solidarity visit after Babangida survived an attempted coup d'etat but also ostensibly to request for weapons needed by the Liberian Armed Forces to fight the NPFL". Therefore the decision must have been motivated to save an ally of Nigeria. Ayam testifies that the Standing Mediation Committee was faced with the problem of divergence of interests. In the case of Nigeria the main issue was its closeness to the Doe regime (Ayam, 1998:98). There was therefore the assumption that ECOMOG was conceived to save Doe. Critics contended that at the time of deployment there was in actuality no cease – fire in place. Charles Taylor had vowed to shoot at the force if they dare land in Monrovia. The argument was that since the factions were still fighting the only option for ECOMOG would be to interpose itself between the belligerents to enforce peace which would obviously

entail some fighting on the part of ECOMOG. It was therefore seen as an intervention force calculated to deprive Charles Taylor of his ultimate prize, the presidency, and to bale out the tottering Doe.

### **Selfish Motives**

Critics see the decision as a shrewd move by Babangida. The Liberia crisis came at a time when his popularity and moral credibility was at an all time low due to his prevarication with regard to his commitment to return the country to civilian rule. The Liberian quagmire may have presented him with a golden opportunity to divert minds away from the domestic scene. It would give him the opportunity to hang onto the reins of power once Nigeria became involved, he could use that as a pretext to stay on. (Adisa, 1993: 148 – 149 ).

Again, they viewed his motive as selfish especially when placed against the fact that the cost of intervention to the Nigerian economy and the people was bound to be enormous. It occurred at the back drop of severe economic hardships as a result of the government decision to implement the I.M.F. economic reform package. The nation was reeling under the effect of the social cost of the economic adjustment. The reform stipulated, among other things, less public expenditure, retrenchment and diversification of state enterprises. They wondered why he would rather use the windfall created by the oil glut as a result of the Gulf Crises to finance operations in Liberia rather than using it to ameliorate the social cost of structural adjustment ( *Nigerian Tribune*, 15 August, 1990 ). That, this was a national concern could be seen in the position of Nigerian Labour Movement on 20<sup>th</sup> August, 1990: “ We scarcely need to emphasise that Nigeria’s involvement in the mediation will no doubt place on us enormous economic and political responsibilities at a time when hands should be on deck to help turn our crisis – ridden economy towards healthy growth” ( *The Tribune*, 15 August, 1990 ). However, from the realist perspective Babangida’s decision, in spite of the mounting criticisms has a morality of its own. Regardless of what his personal motives must have been it was also calculated with national interest in mind. In this regard the sacrifices that the nation had to make was worthwhile.

### **Collective Interest**

The desire to maintain the status quo within the region undoubtedly informed their decision. There was a common aversion to the precedent which was being set by the insurgency of Charles Taylor. It was felt that if it was unchecked, it could spill over to areas within the sub – region. It was indeed the first time that there had been an insurrection led by a civilian, against an autocratic regime. In fact it threatened the very foundation of the status quo, when viewed from the perspective that most of the leaders had the same dictatorial credentials as Samuel Doe. This is reinforced by the assertion that : “ ... there was general consensus that Taylor’s virus must be stopped before it contaminates the whole of the West Africa sub – region ( *New Africa*, October, 1992: 16 ). The Guinean President, Lansana Conteh puts it in perspective : “ Charles Taylor is a bad example. Civilians should not be encouraged to overthrow military regimes. Again, Sir Dawda Jawara, the then President of Gambia, gives voice to the implication of the insurrection to regional security in the following statement : “ ... If Charles Taylor with the support of what I may call mercenaries from other countries of the sub – region were to come to power by force, one can imagine the implication it will have for sub – regional security...” ( *West Africa*, 28 November – 2 December, 1990 ). Babangida reechoed this fear when he alleged, in apparent reference to Liberia, that crisis or conflict in any West African State may have dangerous spill over effect on the peace and quiet of Nigeria (May, 1998 ). In the end force was applied, as ECOMOG mandate changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, in the face of NPFL intransigence to accept a cease – fire. The individual nations saw this as the only rational option to guarantee their national and collective regional security and interest.

### **The Bureaucratic Process Model and the Regional dimension of ECOWAS in Liberia:**

The process leading up to the decision to set up ECOMOG, and the controversies it generated share some affinities with bureaucratic politics as expounded by Allison. Actors built coalitions, skilfully outmanoeuvred others to put forth their preferences, there were arguments and counter arguments in a bid to put forth their preferences

### **Skilfulness in Decision – Making**

Critics argue that Babangida must have planned it all from the beginning. He knew what he wanted and masterfully schemed to achieve it, out manoeuvring in the process his opponents. It shows the skills and knowledge that decision – makers bring to the decision – making process. He was fully conscious of the procedural regime of ECOWAS and exploited it to his advantage. As a result, opponents charged him of having personal interest in the entire Liberian saga. When he made his suggestion for the establishment of a standing mediation committee, he added that one of the members of the mediation committee should be a member who held the chairmanship of the Authority. He suggested this with the fullest knowledge that it was shortly to be passed on to Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia, and as chair of the Authority he had the mandate to call up a meeting and give his consent to whatever decision made. He must have reasoned that it would be easy to secure the consent of Jawara who also had a vested interest in the conflict. Earlier on he had intimated his desire to see the carnage in Liberia brought to a halt.

The suggestion for the establishment of a Mediation Committee, was endorsed by all the members of ECOWAS, including the known supporters and sympathisers of Charles Taylor, Blaise Campore of Burkina Faso and Houphouet Boigny of Cote d' Ivoire. These two statesmen may have lent their support for the mediatory concept on the assumption that by the time the curtain was finally closed on the “mediatory charade” Charles Taylor must have “shot” his way to the “Executive Mansion”. They must have known that such talks are always stalled or come to a halt as a result of irreconcilable differences among stake holders in conflict, and would always get the opportunity to oppose the deployment of an intervention force, once peace talks failed, whenever it was introduced on the summit floor of ECOWAS. The script however turned out to be different. Babangida manipulating the procedural regime of the organization managed to secure the decision to deploy a force in Liberia. Campore, out –

manoeuvred, surprised, disappointed, frustrated and angry burst out: “ We learned from the international media, the momentous decision by some member states of ECOWAS to send a supposedly reconciliatory force to Liberia and without first fully briefing other countries on the exact assignment of the force. As far as we are concerned the Mediation Committee of ECOWAS is not competent to intervene in a member state’s internal conflict” (*West Africa*, 22-28 July 1991).

### **The Anglophone Coalition**

A look at the composition of the Standing Mediation Committee reveals a powerful coalition of Anglophone members, comprising, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia, and Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone. This coalition was boosted in strength by Lansana Conteh of Guinea, who shared the interest of the coalition to send in an intervention force to stop Charles Taylor. The other two Francophone members of the group, namely the representative from Mali and Eyadema of Togo were undoubtedly unable to match the resolve of the coalition to send in the intervention force regardless of the fact that there had not been any cease – fire in place. For example, the representative from Mali was on record to have resented to the deployment of a force, arguing that there must first be a cease – fire. Eyadema, was purported to have expressed his misgivings and unhappiness of the : “ Free wheeling role the mediation cabal had adopted” (*West Africa* 3 – 9 September, 1990).

### **Francophone Position**

On the other hand such positions undoubtedly reveal the perennial cleavage between Anglophones, namely Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Gambia (Former British colonies) and Francophones, among this group are Cote d’ Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Benin and Togo (former French colonies) which have always dogged the decision – making and implementation process of the sub – regional body, ECOWAS. This is in part because of the different positions and interests each group represent on any given issue. The interest being

represented by their positions, a case of Francophone solidarity, may extend beyond those of Campoare and Houphouet Boigny to include those of France. Both of them were active backers of Charles Taylor. Burkina Faso was used as a base for military training of N.P.F. L soldiers and served as a conduit for arms and armament from Libya.

Family considerations, regional ambitions and external influence may have accounted for their opposition to the decision. Campoare is married to Houphouet Boigny's step - daughter who was the wife of Adolphus Tolbert, son of President Tolbert both killed by Doe. The crisis therefore afforded both Campoare and Houphouet, united by marital links, an opportunity to avenge the killing of their late family members by Doe ( Vogt, 1991, Reno, 1998). Their opposition in essence reveals what Conteh – Morgan (1998) refers to as “cooperational insecurity”. A concept which is akin to “Games Theory” which inter alia stipulates that players in international conflict may feel reluctant to cooperate, especially if the “game” at hand is not one of “iteration” but rather where outcomes are permanent and unchangeable, where a player's gain is another player's loss, a “zero sum game”. Reluctance to cooperate may also stem from uncertainty with regard to how the gains will be shared, or may stem from a situation where cooperation may bring gains less than present one ( Stein, 1983: 115 – 140, Axelrod, 1984: 152 – 4, Snidal, 1885– 42).

Lending support for the peace formula, they may have reasoned, obviously may entail loss for Taylor, who may not be able to win the Presidency through the ballot box. He may as a result lose whatever he had already achieved. He controlled 90% of Liberia. Non – cooperation was therefore attractive as it would offer Charles Taylor the opportunity to mount the final onslaught to dislodge Samuel Doe who was holed up in the Executive Mansion. They must have felt therefore that the best option was non – cooperation since their *protegee* was just on the threshold of power. As was stated earlier, this logic sound plausible especially in the light of the fact that they had initially supported the establishment of the mediation committee with the fullest conviction that it would come to nothing.

## **Ambitions**

Besides, the decision may have been influenced by the age – old rivalry between Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria now personified by the ambitions of Houphouet Boigny and Babangida for pre-eminent role in the sub – region. The two nations are arguably the putative heads of the two blocs. Houphouet must have been peeved by Babangida’s initiative to find solution to the Liberian Crisis as an affront to his integrity and authority as the “elder statesman” of the sub – continent. He was the one to take the diplomatic initiative to broker peace in Liberia if possible on his own terms and not Babangida. That this may not have been far from his calculation could be gleaned from the fact that when later Babangida ceded the leading role in mediatory efforts to him, this elevated status helped produce four accords in a row, the “Yamoussoukro I –IV” (Adisa, 1993).

## **External Influence of Francophone Position – A Case of French National Interest**

Again, the Francophone position may have been influenced by the fear of the hegemonistic pretensions of Nigeria. Houphouet had always looked with suspicion, whenever Nigeria flexed its political muscle to take regional initiatives. He viewed it as an attempt to dominate the region. The role of France in the context of the Liberian crisis and the ECOMOG saga provides an instance of extra – African influence on decision – making and implementation process on the sub continent. Thus the decision taken by the representatives of Mali and Togo just as it expressed the interest of Blaise Campore and Houphouet Boigny in essence harmoniously articulate that of France. France’s relationship with her former colonies, especially in West Africa, has been exceptionally close. The colonial links survived after independence, through the erection of Neo – colonial “ Accords de Defense and Accords de Cooperation” Such cooperations manifested themselves in arrangements such as cultural cooperation, monetary union, defence pacts, personal relationships and economic and trade ties (Ate, 1983, Tarr, 1998: Martin, 1995).



The importance of this relationship is underscored by the fact that France's African policy falls within the exclusive domain of the "Elysee". French presidents from de Gaulle to Mitterrand struck up personal relationships with various Francophone leaders. Houphouet enjoyed special relationship with respective French Presidents and was held in high esteem within French governmental circles. The cultural relationship that existed between France and the Francophone states dates back to the colonial period and found its most visible expression in the policy of assimilation. A paternalistic policy which foisted on the African's psyche the French way of life. Africans for example, could aspire to become French citizens and thus could sit in the French parliament as deputies. Houphouet, for example became a deputy in the French Assembly in the 1950's. The monetary union which embraces the various Francophone states within the sub – region links them up to France with the use of a common currency, the franc. The C.F.A the currency commonly used by the Francophone zone was until 1994 pegged to the French franc at a fixed parity.

France signed up defence pacts with the various Francophone states that gives French troops the right to intervene to shore or prop up incumbent government faced with internal threats. It also through technical cooperation offers military assistance and expertise to the states. Such defence arrangements culminated in the establishment of Francophone defence zone at the behest of France, The Accord de Non – Aggression Et d' Assistance en Matiere de Defence. (A.N.A.D). Their economies are tied to the "apron strings of the "Metropole" (France). They are largely suppliers of raw materials and provide markets for French goods and services, through such ubiquitous French retail out – lets like Compagnie Francais de L'Ouest (CFAO). France until the 1990's offered them direct financial assistance from time to time, it now does so through the instrumentality of the International Monetary Fund and the European Economic Community. This is indeed a kind of symbiotic relationship. On the one hand , it gives France the opportunity to exploit them economically , and by its control over them, a political clout in the international arena, an aspiration enshrined in the French policy of " rayonment" vigorously pursued by de Gaulle and his successors ( Ate, 1983; Martin, 1995). For the African states, such relationship offers them the security and the economic assistance that they need in the sub – region. It could therefore be said that the sets of relationship have produced an

impregnable bond of common destiny between them, which therefore makes the Francophone bloc within the sub – region to identify themselves more and more with France and less and less with the sub – region and their Anglophone African brothers. The resultant cultural antipathy has been described by Leopold Sedar Senghor as the “spirit of fashoda”, the colonial hang over of Anglophone and Francophone misunderstanding ( Adisa, 1993).

Therefore, given the huge interest of France in the sub – region and the bond between the Francophones and France, the preferences of decision – makers from the bloc in any decision – making and implementation is tailored to accommodate that of the French. France, has never looked on favourably to the hegemonistic potential of Nigeria within the sub – region. This obviously strikes at the heart of her own ambition to perpetually dominate the region. Successive, French Presidents, de Gaule, Pompidou, Destaing and Mitterand all found Nigeria’s physical size and economic potential tremendously daunting. The substance of this apprehension could be seen, first in her middle power potential. According to Shaw ( 1978) Nigeria belongs to the emerging middle powers rank alongside countries like Brazil, Iran, India and Indonesia. A middle power, among other things, has an industrial base, though not on the same par as a fully fledged industrialised state or what Wallerstein ( 1991) refers to as a core state. It has the potential to capture the market, by virtue of its comparatively industrial advantage, within the region in which she is situated. Wallerstein ( 1990 ) contends that such semi – peripheral states specialise in technological products, which the core states or fully fledged industrialised states, specialising in high technological products are no longer keen on producing. Nigeria’s potential could be seen from the size of its economy. Its gross national product is 34.2% more than the 14 Francophone states and 29.19% larger than the twenty states within the sub – region. It pays 32.8% of the ECOWAS budget larger than any other member state, with Cote d’Ivoire only contributing 13% (Inegbedion, 1994: 238). Undoubtedly, if carefully nurtured, it could serve as the engine of growth within the sub – region.

Second, France has sought at different historical junctures to either weaken the hegemonistic potential of Nigeria or prevent its realisation. When the Ibos who occupy the eastern section of Nigeria embarked on the part of secession between 1967 – 1970, de Gaule and Houphouet

Boigny recognised the secessionist “state” of Biafra. Eastern Nigeria is rich in oil, thus by recognising Biafra, France would not only gain access to the oil wealth of that entity but also fragment the territory of Nigeria and remove from her grasp one of the economic pillars of the nation. It was therefore a move calculated to weaken her hegemonistic potential. Pompidou in cohort with Houphouet Boigny and Senghor of Senegal initially tried to prevent the idea of ECOWAS from becoming a reality. ECOWAS was the brain child of Gowon of Nigeria, with the support of Eyadema. Pompidou, Houphouet and Senghor were instrumental in the setting up of a parallel Francophone economic zone, the Communauté Economique de L’Afrique de L’Ouest, CEAO, in 1973. Earlier on in 1962, de Gaulle through his African advisor, Michele Foccart, effectively torpedoed the idea of a customs union put forth by President Olympio of Togo, which would have embraced Nigeria, Togo, Niger and Dahomey (Benin). Obviously they knew, Nigeria was bound, by virtue of its economic might, to dominate the economic zone. This may serve to progressively retrench France’s economic influence in the region (Ate, 1983: 24).

What inspired Mitterand’s predecessors to oppose Nigerian propositions in the sub – region may have informed his opposition to the formation of ECOMOG. It may have been seen as an attempt to play a domineering role in the region. Besides, France has always had a special interest in Liberia. She has on occasion sought to bring her under the orbit of French influence and control. For example, Mitterand in the 80’s invited the then foreign minister of Liberia, Cecil Dennis, to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, in preparation for a Francophone Summit. He was at the meeting paraded as a “prize acquisition”, this contrasts markedly with the little attention he receives whenever he visits Washington (Tarr, 1998:164). Taylor was seen as more inclined to turn over Liberia to the Francophone bloc, once he became the president of Liberia, this may have been because of his close relationships with Blaise Campaore and Houphouet Boigny. French parastatals established earlier contact with Charles Taylor to have access to the resources in the area under his control. French firms like “Sollac” were engaged in logging and mining activities in the area under the jurisdiction of Charles Taylor. For instance, by 1995, French imports of logs stood at 94.4 million cubic metres, emerging as the third supplier of logs. From March 1991 French state owned firm “Sollac” bought 70,000 tons

of ore from N.P.F.L. on contract basis (Reno, 1998:97, Tarr, 1993). “*Le Figaro*” asserts that : “French private commercial infrastructure support the N.P.F.L and undermined ECOWAS by ambushing official Ivorian policy to its own end” (*Le Figaro*, 8 January, 1992).

In an interview with *West Africa* Babangida made a veiled reference to the role of France in the Liberian crisis. He stated that when he had an audience with the U.S Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, he made an appeal through him to “all those who may have influence on either Charles Taylor or two countries we think are providing support for him . Mr Mitterand’s Advisor was here and we asked him to use his influence on Blaise Compoare” (*West Africa*, 1-7 October, 1990). Her interest also accounted for the diplomatic support she gave the N.P.F.L at the Security Council.

### **Arguments and Counter Arguments**

Frankel (1963) stipulates that decision – makers do not only restrict themselves to formulation of decisions but also attach motives which have domestic and international appeal to their decisions. Motive statements are couched in language which reflect the values, principles, aspirations, morality and sentiments which are up held by the society in which they form an integral part. By so doing they mould and shape and eventually win public support for their actions. In essence therefore, the motive statement which is dished out serves to cover up the other selfish motives behind decisions taken. Ibrahim Babangida faced with internal and external criticism of the decision of the group to send a multilateral peace keeping force to Liberia, embarked on a campaign to rally public support for the decision of the group. His motive statements appealed to such values as humanitarianism, solidarity, security and such sentiments as pride and pan – Africanism.

To the legalistic argument mounted by the opponent of the force, especially by the Francphones led by Blaise Campoare, that the mediation committee’s action was unlawful as it violated the O.A.U Charter provision of Article 111-112 which among other things upheld the territorial

integrity of the state, and other domestic criticisms he responded by soliciting the pride and dignity and the humanitarian temper of the African race:

“Perhaps many do not yet know nor appreciated either the danger or the international embarrassment the Liberian crisis portends for all of us in this sub – region in particular and to Africa and the black race in general. In a changing world marching fast into the 21<sup>st</sup> century... We are in Liberia because events in that country have led to massive destruction of property, the massacre by all the parties of thousands of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and children some of whom had sought sanctuary in churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under the red cross protection, contrary to all standard of human behaviour” ( *West Africa*, 26 November- 2 December, 1990).

He reinforced it by affirming that the action was in pursuit of both national and sub – regional security interests, as it is expressed by Nigerian foreign policy objectives:

There is therefore no gain saying the fact that when certain events occur in the sub –region depending upon their magnitude which are bound to affect Nigeria’s politico-military and socio-economic environment we should not stand by as a helpless and hapless spectator. We believe that if the events are such that threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, Nigeria and in collaboration with others in this sub-region is duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary either to avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony”. ( *West Africa*, 26 November-2 December, 1990 )

Such statements undoubtedly help legitimise their action especially in the wider international contest. For example, the appeal to military humanitarianism, intervening in a country where in reality there is no effective government, where lawlessness is the order of the day, where there is massive loss of human lives and the living only live on borrowed times, international humanitarian law permits intervention (Starke, 1984; Dugard, 1994 ). An example would be the U.N. intervention in Somalia where in place of a central government there were enclaves of clan-centred authority. The exploitation of such universal values must have in the end won the sympathy and the support of the international community, as expressed by U.N. and the

U.S. backing of the ECOMOG concept. Babangida, for example, expressly instructed his ambassador to the U.N. Ibrahim Gambari and the Foreign Minister, Riwalnu Lukman to lobby vigorously for the ECOMOG position at the U.N. The result must have been the affirmative statement of the Security Council that the ECOWAS Plan offers the “best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian Conflict by creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections” (Inegbedion, 1994: 230 ).

The survey of the decisional process to intervene in the Liberian crisis by the community of West Africa states reveal that there is the element of “real-politic”. National interest is the motivational drive behind the decisional preferences of policy-makers. It also reveals the antipathy between the Franco-Phone bloc and the Anglophone bloc, the rivalry and the bid for pre - eminence, that characterised the decisional process. The chapter has also shown how French national interest was served in the ECOMOG saga.

## REFERENCES

- Adisa, J. ( 1993) "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Under Currents and the Burden of Community Spirit". In *Nigeria in International Institutions*, edited by Jide Owoeye. Ibadan: College Press.
- African Event* ( 1995) January, p.39
- Africa Insight* ( 1993) Vol. 23, No. 1
- Ate, B. ( 1983) "The Presence of France in West – Central Africa as a fundamental Problem to Nigeria". In *Millennium*, Vol. 12. No. 2.
- Axelrode, R. ( 1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books. Pp.152 – 4.
- Ayam, J. ( 1998) "Nigeria and the ECOWAS Peace – Keeping Initiative in Liberia". In the *Journal of the Third World Spectrum*. Vol.5 No. 2 pp. 98- 104
- Conteh – Morgan and Kadivar, S. ( 1998) "Sierra Leone's Response to ECOMOG: The Imperative to Geographical Proximity". In *Peace – keeping in Africa; ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P and Conteh – Morgan ( ed.) N.Y.: St. Martin Press.
- Dougherty et.al. ( 1971) *Contending Theories of International Relations*. Philadelphia.: Lippincott
- Dugard, J.( 1994) *International Law: A South African Perspective*. Ndabeni, Cape: Rustica Press.
- Dunn, E. ( 1998) "Liberia's Internal Responses to ECOMOG's Interventionist Efforts". In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P. and Conteh – Morgan (ed.) N.Y.: St. Martin Press. Pp.76- 105.
- Financial Times of London* ( 1991) 27 June.
- Frankel, J. ( 1963) *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision – Making*. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
- Guardian of Lagos* ( 1990) p.11 June.
- Inegbedion, J ( 1994) "ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective". In *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS*, Shaw, T.M. and Okolo, J.E ( ed.). St. Martin Press: London.
- Iweze, C. ( 1993) "Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG". In *Nigeria in International Peace – keeping, 1960 – 1992*, Vogt, M.A and Ekoko, E.E. ( ed.)pp. 217 – 243
- Le Figaro* ( 1992) 8 January

- Martin, G. ( 1995) "Continuity And Change in Franco – African Relations". In *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No. 33 ( March)
- May, T( 1998) "Nigerian Foreign Policy and its Participation in ECOMOG". In *Peace –keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, in Magyar, K.P and Conteh – Morgan ( ed) N.Y.: St. Martin Press.
- Mortimer, R.( 1998) "Senegal's Role in ECOMOG : The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis". In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P. and Conteh – Morgan ( ed). N.Y.: St. Martin Press
- New African*( 1992) October, pp. 11 – 16.
- News Watch* ( 1990) August,27. P.16
- Nigerian Tribune* ( 1990) 15 August.
- Ren, W. (1998) *War Lord Politics and African States*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Shaw, T. 9 1978) "Inequalities and Interdependence in Africa and Latin America". In *Cultures and Development*, Vol.10. No.1. p.29.
- Snidal, D. ( 1985) "Coordination vr. Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes'. In *American Political Science Review*, 79. Pp.923 – 42.
- Starke, J. ( 1984) *Introduction To International Law*. London: Butterworths.
- Stein, A. ( 1983) "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchical World". In *International Regimes*, Stephen Krasner ( ed.). Ithaca: Cornwell University Press.
- Tarr, B. ( 1993) ECOWAS ECOMOG Initiative: A Liberian Perspective". In *Nigerian Institute of International Affairs*, Vol. 13. No. 3 –4, March – April.
- Vogt, M. ( 1991) "Nigeria's Participation in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group- ECOMOG". In *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp.101 – 122.
- Wallerstein, I. ( 1991) *Geo – Politics and Geo – Culture: Essays on Changing World System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- West Africa* ( 1990) 3- 9 August, p.2290.
- West Africa* ( 1990) 3 – 9 September, pp2390 – 1.
- West Africa* ( 1990) 1 – 7 October.
- West Africa* ( 1990) 26 November – 2 December.
- West Africa* ( 1991) 22 – 28 July. p.1204.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL AND ECOMOG

Allison (1969 and 1971) has shown in his organizational process paradigm of decision –making that choices that decision-makers or government leaders make, depend, to an appreciable extent, on choices presented to them by organizational units. He postulates that organizational outputs and capabilities offer the constraints within which decisions are made and once they are made offer the requisite expertise and know how for its implementation. Every government decision presents its own complexity, which is however “cut” into pieces and each piece parcelled out to different units on the basis of speciality and competence: the standard operating procedure (S.O.P) stands it in a good stead to perform the task assigned. This assumption therefore presupposes that the absence of such procedures would account for failure or poor implementation of assigned tasks. The analyses below not only test the afore – mentioned assumptions in the decision –making process which undergirded the establishment of ECOMOG and the implementation of the task assigned the interventionist force, but also to affirm that organizational behaviour of incremental decision-making, sequential attendance to problems, are equally attributes of political decisional units.

#### Sequential Solution to the Liberian Question

A survey of the various attempts to find an acceptable peace formula for the Liberian crisis reveal the principle of incrementalism and sequential attendance to problem in decision – making. Policy makers do make decisions based on existing *modus operandi* and that at any given time the information available to them is limited. The peace formula put in place at the first meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee of ECOWAS was a mixture of proposition from the Inter –Faith Mediation Council (IFMC), an organization made up of Christian and Moslem Clerics as well as prominent citizens of Liberia and a modification of O.A.U standard

peace plan (Conteh – Morgan, 1993:37). The Inter – Faith Mediation Council at the beginning of the conflict, as early as June 1990, attempted to broker peace between Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor but failed because of irreconcilable differences between the two parties. Their propositions which included immediate Cease-fire, the establishment of an interim government of national unity headed by a non partisan person formed the basis of the peace formula. The rest of the Peace Plan was a modification of the O.A.U peace plan as was drawn during the Chadian crisis in 1980, which saw the nascent of the peace keeping concept in O.A.U conflict resolution procedure (Klay – Kieh, 1998).

In essence the process which subsequently led to the decision to intervene mirrors the traditional O.A.U steps for the resolution of conflict. It sanctions initial effort at pacific resolution of conflict through the following media: Conciliation : It promotes the use of a facilitator, who will use his “good offices” to get disputants to talk directly to each other without the intervention of a third party. On other occasions, depending on the nature of conflict, the O.A.U will mandate Heads of State who are not party to the conflict to peacefully resolve the conflict. Usually the mediators listen to the various stake holders to the conflict and based on the information gleaned from the various positions, establish the condition for the pacific resolution of the conflict. At other times, the organization would request the service of an eminent person, for example, a head of state to transmit messages to and from each of the disputants and in the end provide a rendezvous for peace talks. Or it could be through conciliation in which one of the organs of O.A.U, for example, the Assembly of Heads of State or the Council of Ministers would preside over peace talks (Kieh, 1998: 13).

It is worthy to note that the Mediation Committee followed this procedure, an initial attempt at peaceful resolution of the conflict, largely through the mediatory track. The ineffectiveness of this method in part was responsible for the adoption of the peace-keeping formula. In fact it must be mentioned that such standard procedure is enshrined in International Law, which stipulates, inter alia, the pacific means of resolving both international and non-international armed conflict, however, it allows the use of force through peace-keeping and enforcement measures on certain grounds, including humanitarian, as was the case in the Liberian crisis

(Dugard, 1996; Starke, 1989). Thus far, the analysis has sought to establish that policy makers do follow established procedure as a guide in their decision formulation as exemplified by initial pacific methods of the Mediation Committee and the subsequent use of force.

The organizational pattern of sequential attendance to problems is equally discernible in the works of the various summits which hammered out a suitable plan to resolve the Liberian debacle. The various decisional groups had to make adjustments on their decisions based on the outcomes of previous decisions. Their monitoring mechanism is really restrictive as attention is exclusively focussed on feedback produced by previously made decisions. This behaviour is really insightful. It does not only negate the omniscient rational policy maker paradigm, it indicates interestingly that decision – makers at any given time, given, among other things, time constraints and the urgency of a given situation, have limited information upon which to form their decisions.

The decision to set up the interventionist force was in part motivated by the intense conviction of the Standing Mediation Committee that the forces on the ground in Liberia were merely “rag – tag” that could easily be wiped out in a two hour operation. It was in fact a wrong calculation based upon little or no relevant grasp of the military and economic dynamics of war – lordism in Liberia. It never occurred to them until much later that any political arrangement that effectively excluded, arguably, the *defacto* head of the country, Charles Taylor, who at that time controlled about 90% of the country was bound to fail. It took bruising battles on the field for political leaders to build bridges to Charles Taylor. This observation is very much in evidence in the earlier accords which attempted to solve the Liberian crisis. Accords such as the Bamako Cease- Fire of November 1990, Banjul Joint Statement of December 1990, the Lome Agreement of February, 1991 and the Yamousoukro I – IV accords signed in Cote d’Ivoire between June and October 1991. In the main, these accords had as their referent point, the ECOWAS Peace Plan. At Bamako, the participants, namely, the NPFL and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) accepted the ECOWAS Peace Plan and agreed to an immediate Cease – Fire. Lome provided the modalities for the implementation of the Cease – Fire. ECOMOG was given the prime role to ensure the encampment and disarmament of the combatants. Their

roles included the supervision of the handing in of weapons, the registration of troops, the receiving of the sick and the resettlement of the displaced. Yamoussoukro IV established that all the modalities for the establishment of the necessary conditions to hold elections should be completed within 60 days. It gave central role for its implementation to ECOMOG. Such accords revealed the short sightedness of the group which met to craft the various accords. They sought to give little or no role to the warring factions in the administration of the country, besides, as was evident in the Yamoussoukro accords, the principal protagonist in the conflict, Charles Taylor's NPFL signed them under duress. The party's heart right at the onset was not in the agreement hammered out. Such aversion was compounded by the fact that they gave central role in the implementation of the accords to ECOMOG. The accords, for example, stipulated that none of the warring factions could head the Interim Government of National Unity that was to be set up and that none could participate in the general and Presidential elections ( Abiodun 1998).

The short sightedness of these accords could be seen through the ignorance of the facilitators about the complexity of the socio – political and economic character of Liberia in crisis. Undoubtedly such exclusions must have been motivated by a desire to discourage the recourse to violence to attain political ends. However, it was a decision based on a failure to come to grasp with the dynamics of the Liberian society, that war – lordism had become an integral feature of the Liberian landscape, and that any peace formula that did not effectively pacify them was bound to fall on the rocks. For an example, Charles Taylor controlled about 90% of Liberian territory, he counted on external military assistance as well as considerable income from the exploitation of the resources in the vast area under his jurisdiction ( Reno, 1998). He was therefore better off without a peace formula which did not cede much authority to him. Besides, the previous accords suffered a major set back because of lack of credibility of the interventionist force (ECOMOG). The major stake – holder in the conflict repeatedly expressed his hostility towards ECOMOG. He saw it as Nigerian creation, formed to do the bidding of its master ( Nigeria), which was out to deny him his prized goal, the presidency. He on one occasion referred to the Nigerian President, Ibrahim Babangida as a “ mad dictator”. In an interview with three foreign reporters in March 1993, he asserted that : “ ECOMOG is a

warring party. They have brought genocide to our people. We will talk when Nigeria is out of here” ( *Africa Watch*, March, 1993).

The Cotonou accord which was signed on 25 July 1993 brought together the major stake – holders in the conflict, namely the representatives of the Interim Government of National Unity ( IGNU), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and ULIMO. This accord has assumed enormous significance in the diplomacy to resolve the Liberian civil conflict. It marked the first major attempt to rectify the problems thrown up by the earlier accords. All other accords which ensued used this as the referent point. It was also the first attempt to “ flesh out” the details of the peace formula. In this regard, it could be spoken of as building on the previous accords. It provided details for the monitoring, supervising and verifying of the cease – fire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization and rehabilitation. It gave central role for the implementation of the programme to ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission. It provided details for the composition of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and its functions, which included transitional administration of the country, and supervision of general and presidential elections in accordance with the ECOWAS peace plan. It made provision for a Violation of the Accord Committee, comprising UN observers, representatives of ECOMOG and one member from each of the factions. For the Legislature, it provided that it shall be unicameral Assembly of 35 members. The NPFL would have 13 members, Ulimo, 9 and also given the right to nominate the speaker from one of its members in the assembly as well as the option to nominate two members to the Electoral Commission. It provided that all parties to the civil conflict shall be given amnesty. They agreed that executive power be vested in a five member council, with each of the parties appointing one member and the remaining two appointed by a procedure where each party is given the option to nominate three members who will then meet to appoint two members to the council.

It is clear from the provisions of the accord that it really marked a break with the past. From the feedback thrown up by the earlier attempts at resolving the conflict, the group that put together the Cotonou accord focussed on the relationships and interests of the armed factions. It presided over a power- sharing regime which took care of the interests of the factions. It

served to water down the central role of ECOMOG, by diversifying the scope of external involvement. This was undoubtedly aimed at appeasing the NPFL. In essence, it acceded to the calls to include facilitators outside the sub – region ( Mortimer, 1998; Abiodun,1998). Thus the UN and O.AU. participated in the search for the peaceful resolution to the conflict. It, for example, made provision for inclusion in the interventionist force, troops from as far afield as Uganda and Tanzania. Participants at Cotonou included Professor Canaan Banana representing the OAU and the UN represented by Dr. James Jonah. ECOMOG was to work in close association with the United Nations Mission in Liberia ( UNOMIL).

The accord, nonetheless produced problems unforeseen at the time the agreement was reached. The 60 days allowed for the implementation of the agreement was, to say the least, unrealistic given the enormity of task to be performed by the Interim Government of National Unity, ECOMOG and UNOMIL. In the end the programme was derailed by the delay in deployment of UNOMIL and ECOMOG to the entire country. The delay had the effect of producing an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust among the various factions which heightened the atmosphere of conflict. It made possible the proliferation of new armed factions and the resumption of hostilities. The accord failed to specify whether members nominated to the council would represent the interest of the various factions or would be independent decision – makers. This produced an impasse between nominees and factional leaders, as was the case between Thomas Woewuyo and Charles Taylor ( Abiodun, 1998).

The surge in war – lordism, as more factions tried to carve out “enclaves” for themselves must have been motivated by a desire to have a political niche to use as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Besides, there was the general assumption that the major backers of the warring factions, namely Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso for the NPFL and Nigeria, which was claimed to have leverage over ULIMO could not exert the required pressure on them needed to keep the forces at bay and for them not to renege on their promises to the accord. Unknown to the framers of the accord, Houphouet Boigny, for example, no longer wielded any effective control over Charles Taylor, he had developed close links with both external and Ivorian businessmen and officials who both ensured the supply of arms to Liberia from the Ivorian side of the border

and through their business activities with him ensured that he had the where withal to continue fighting ( Reno, 1998).

At Akosombo, a Ghanaian resort town, the actors who met sat down to mend the Cotonou accord. It culminated in the signing of the Akosombo accord on 12 September 1994. The Armed Forces of Liberia which was a new participant in the armed conflict was given a representation in the Interim Government of National Unity to forestall the squabbling between the armed factions and their nominees and the civilian members of IGNU, this accord ceded effective control of the executive branch to the more powerful factions, namely ULIMO and the NPFL. It gave the armed factions the right to determine the status of their appointees in the Interim Government through the Council of State. It provided that the Legislature shall give consideration to appropriate benefits for the heads of the warring factions. To the protestations from the warring factions, especially the NPFL, that too much power was vested in ECOMOG at the expense of the Interim Government, the accord sought to rectify the anomaly by including it in such exercise as monitoring, verifying and observing of the various programmes. The accord removed the requirement for consensus decision – making and replaced it with the authority of a simple majority which invariably favoured the more powerful factions. To forestall the proliferation of armed factions it prohibited and made it an offence for any individual to help create other groups including splinter groups. What could be said about this prohibition is that the crafters of the accord failed to grapple with the underlining cause of the proliferation of armed factions. The cause may be in part due to the political rewards that the armed factions have scored in the agreement, which was therefore a huge incentive for the emergence of new armed groups. It was also due to the fact that it did not provide effective mechanism for the resolution of disputes that may arise out of the appointments to the executive branch of the transitional government.

The Akosombo accord, in an attempt to plug out the loopholes in the preceding one, the Cotonou accord, produced an outcome which was less favourable to those who felt sidelined. There was indeed a backlash against it, for it yielded too much political clout to the two powerful armed factions. For example, they were really over represented in the executive

positions. The civilian sections of the society were really incensed by the degree of recognition given to the armed factions, they saw it as retrogressive, unproductive and a misguided attempt to reward militancy ( Abiodun, 1998; Sessey, 1999). The Akosombo accord produced intra – factional fighting over allocation of positions. It accounted for the schism within ULIMO, which effectively split up into two, ULIMO – K led by Alhaji Kromah, a Mandingo, ULIMO – J, led by Roosevelt Johnson from the Kran ethnic group. In essence the pre- eminence given to armed factions led to coalitions and counter – coalitions of factions as they jostled for positions, newer factions sprang up , as it were, to challenge the provisions of the accord which they had not been party to and therefore had little regard for it. Newer factions sprang up such as the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), the Lofa Defence Force ( LDF) and an off- shoot of NPFL, the CRC – NPFL. Armed hostilities among the various factions resumed on an upswing scale, destroying whatever possibility there had been for peace. The Accra Clarification of 21 December 1994 brought the new groups into the peace process including members of civil society. In fact it co – opted this group without assenting to its concern over the militarization of the peace process. The new groups included the Central Revolutionary Council of NPFL, who accused Charles Taylor of being a stumbling bloc to peace and disassociated themselves from him, the Lofa Defence Force represented by Francois Massaquoi, the Liberian Peace Council represented by Saigbe Boley, ULIMO – J by General Roosevelt Johnson and Liberian National Conference represented by J.P. Baygar Junius. However, the parties failed to reach a consensus on the composition and chairmanship of the Council of State. The AFL and its coalition comprising the five new members on the “ block” failed to agree on their joint nomination. As a result, a new interim administration could not be put in place in time to oversee the implementation of the accord. It must be stated however, that the Accra Clarification for the first time, unlike the previous ones specified or clarified what could be done to the disarmed combatants. It provided that the combatants and non- combatants who satisfied the conditions for recruitment should be included in a reconstituted armed force, Police, Immigration and other Security Agencies ( Abiodun, 1998).

In all the previous accords, the heads of the warring factions were outside the Transitional government, they were only represented by proxies. This may have in part produced lack of



total commitment to the provisions of the accords. What the Abuja Agreement of September, 1995 did was to bring the leaders of the warring factions into the transitional government. Charles Taylor of the NPFL, Alhaji Kromah of ULIMO, the coalition represented by George Boley and Oscar Quiah of Liberian Peace Council. A professor of Literature, Wilton Sankawula, from the University of Liberia was appointed as chairman of the Council of State to replace chief Tamba Taylor, an octogenarian, nominated by the powerful factions but rejected by the others on the ground that he was old and could not effectively perform his duties. In fact, there was a conviction among those who opposed his appointment that the real people who would be wielding effective power in the council would be the powerful factions represented by Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah. To further forestall the squabbling over appointments in the Council, all other members were made vice-presidents previously only two could be made vice-presidents. In spite of these provisions there were continuous fighting within groups like ULIMO.

Looking at the errors which characterised the many different accords and the very fact that there were too many of them, in fact in all as many as 16 agreements were signed, much as it must have been due to the intransigence of Charles Taylor, it must have in part due to the fact that the various groups who met at different times to craft the different accords never engaged in critical appraisal of the issues at stake. Ostensibly each group could only act on limited feedback produced by previous decisions. The full picture spelling out the complexity of the situation and how best to deal with them was out of the visual range of each group. It is no wonder that problems were dealt with in a sequential mode. This suggests a simplistic decisional behaviour which circumvent real thorny issues. For example, one of the causes for the protracted nature of the Liberian conflict was that while acceding political power to the armed factions, in fact to the factional leaders, no attempt was made to ensure that they accede to the military pre-conditions specified in the accords, they continued to jealously guard their territorial and commercial resources.

If such organizational behaviour as expounded above were discernible in the activities of the various groups who met to fashion out a peace plan for the crisis, it would be equally true to

assert that organizational outputs were largely responsible for the formulation and implementations of the peace formula. The Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence put in place in 1981 in Freetown, Sierra Leone, by ECOWAS provides that member states or the community could intervene either in intra – state or inter- states armed conflict where there is proof that a third external party is involved in the conflict. It then provides that the ECOWAS Authority and a defence sub – committee decide, after failure of pacific means to resolve a conflict, on the expediency of military action and entrusts its execution to an allied force commander. Though this protocol was in limbo at the time of the Liberian crisis, the committees that were set up corresponded to this provision. The Mediation Committee that was set up had a defence sub – committee to assist it ( Iweze, 1993).

### **Policy Options: Merits and Demerits**

The defence team within the Mediation Committee was given the task of producing the specifications and the blue print for intervention. It considered a number of options. The first option which was examined by the team would have meant moving into Liberia by land across Sierra Leone to the east and moving into Monrovia from the west of Liberia. However, after careful scrutiny of this option it was discarded because of inadequate logistical back up. It did not have the requisite transport facilities to move in by road, especially given the nature of the road. Besides, the NPFL controlled that part of the country and as there was much uncertainty with regard to the reception that would be accorded troops on arrival it was prudentially dropped. The second option was to move in by air and land at the Roberts – Field airport and then move west –ward to Monrovia. It was abandoned because it was felt that it will be strategically dangerous or unwise to move in by air into a hostile territory. Consensus however, coalesced on a third option. It called for an entry by sea. The attractiveness of this option could be seen in the following advantages: Two of the factions, the Armed Forces of Liberia, AFL, which was supporting the embattled Samuel Doe and a splinter group of NPFL, the INPFL, led by Prince Johnson had already agreed to a cease – fire, both were operative in Monrovia, and had received news that Johnson was prepared to receive them once the troops landed in

Monrovia. In fact when the force did finally arrived in Monrovia, Prince Johnson was on hand to welcome them with his body – guards at the Free Port of Monrovia ( Iweze, 1993:224).

The team then provided the blue print for the option, which was organised into phases:

PHASE 1: A move into FreeTown harbour and loading of the necessary logistics.

PHASE 2: A move into Monrovia.

PHASE 3: Landing and breaking out.

PHASE 4: Reorganising and subsequent move.

A sub – committee carried out preliminary logistic planning, which included requirement for vehicles, equipment, arms and ammunition, drugs and stores, and other aspects like funding, control of funds, procurement procedure, equipment schedule, maintenance policy and contributions by participating countries ( Iweze, 1993). The blue print with the specifications and requirements were turned over to the Mediation Committee. Later, with troops and the necessary logistical back up already assembled in Sierra Leone, (Ghana Navy had three vessels, Nigeria had five vessels including Tug boats and Tankers with Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia and Guinea providing troops) the decision to deploy an interventionist force by sea was adopted on 20 August, 1990.

A few observations need to be made. It emerges from the above account that in conflict situations the decisions which are made depend heavily on organizational outputs and capabilities, measured in terms of requisite manpower, logistics, funds and other capabilities. Obviously the option which was chosen could not have been possible if there were no requisite manpower, logistical back up, naval vessels and the requisite personnel to handle them; and most crucial of all if there was no perceived weakness in the enemy defence system.

The implementation of the task reveals organizational outputs. The immediate task of imposing a cease – fire; ensuring the safety of Monrovia and its environs to make possible the evacuation of both foreign nationals and locals; and to create an enabling environment for the establishment of the Interim Government of National Unity stranded in FreeTown, Sierra Leone, in Monrovia. ECOMOG as events unfolded took independent decisions and performed

certain administrative task. It is insightful to note that when the blue print was presented to the decision – makers and a question was raised by the defence team as to the next line of action once the initial plan had been executed, it was reported that the decision – makers had no clue as to what should be done in the event of a reaction from the principal antagonist in the conflict, Charles Taylor, who had already vowed to shoot at the forces once they landed at Monrovia. Iweze who was the Nigerian Chief of Staff of the operation writes: “In the planning stage we asked the ECOWAS Secretariat for our anticipated reaction to the leaders of the warring factions should we meet them. Unfortunately the leadership could not provide an answer, rather we had to manoeuvre as the situation emerged ( Iweze, 1993: 219). This revelation indicates that ECOMOG was given a *carte blanche* to make decisions on the ground. On the positive side, it made it possible for some crucial on the spot decisions to be taken while on the negative tally, as subsequent events revealed, like decisions at certain stages of the conflict to align with some of the factions, for example, with the ULIMO, it deprived ECOMOG of its neutral status ( *Africa Watch*, 1993; Magyar, 1998: 182). It was an unacknowledged alliance based on the common axiom that “My enemy’s enemy is my friend” however, it served to heighten the atmosphere of distrust and antagonism which helped to prolong the war.

### **Fragmentation of Task**

The actual happenings revealed organizational behaviour, characterised by fragmentation of tasks according to standard military combat procedure. The immediate task on arrival was to secure the Free Port harbour to be used as the ECOMOG head – quarters ( E.H.D) and certain vantage points around the Free Port. The objective was to make it safe from the range of artillery fire from the NPFL. The military task at hand was shared among the various contingents from the contributing countries. For example, the Ghana battalion had the task of securing two bridges on a creek adjacent to the Free Port; the Nigerian battalion was to advance from the Free Port area, west and north, to secure a bridge over the St. Paul river; the Guinean battalion was to move towards the centre and to secure a bridge on Stockton Creek and to capture Garnersville; and the Sierra Leone battalion was to hold the break – waters as from the

outer perimeter defence of the headquarters (Iweze, 1993:223). Whereas the navy carried out sea patrols and gave naval gun – fire support when needed, the Air Force carried out reconnaissance missions at the onset and later air strikes on designated military targets.

At the end of this exercise they proceeded through shared tasks to rid Monrovia and its environs of the menace of armed factionalism. ECOMOG managed, at the end of the initial operation, to disarm and confine the INPFL and AFL forces to barracks and secured a temporary cease – fire from the NPFL on 22 September, 1990. With subsequent reinforcement from Nigeria and Ghana, the force made the entire Monrovia safe for the entry of the Interim Government of National Unity to begin the task of administering at least Monrovia. It also made it possible for the first set of refugees numbering about 7,500 to be evacuated and managed to stop the slaughter of Krahn and Mandingos in Monrovia. These initial successes captured in the expression of a Liberian health worker obviously reflected the sentiments of most Liberians : “ ECOMOG was our saviour, it was a salvation. ECOMOG saved the population of Monrovia... We feel sorry for them, they have no cause to die here for this stupid and senseless war” ( *Africa Watch*, 3 March, 1993). ECOMOG took up some administrative tasks, performing policing duties, as the police force had been largely discredited, and settling disputes which was outside its peace – keeping mandate ( *The Guardian*, March, 27, 1993).

### **Absence of Standard Operating Procedure**

In spite of these successes there were flaws in the implementation process. Allison (1969 and 1971) points out that the “ health” of an organization, that is its ability to perform a given task to what is deemed by the standard of the organization depends, among other things, on well established standard operating procedure, coordination of activities, the existence of relevant manpower, expertise and logistics. These are very crucial in the implementation of tasks. There was to some extent a dearth of these ingredients in ECOMOG as an organization, which may have accounted for the “hiccups” in the implementation process, at the initial stages of its operation not- withstanding some of the successes.

Indeed ECOMOG was an ad-hoc measure, designed to meet an immediate challenge. This meant that there was no established standard operating procedure, as it would have been in an already established organization, to govern its conduct and activities. For example, there was no well defined command structure. This undermined discipline, control and proper coordination of activities. The force was broken up into national battalions. What this fostered was troop restrictive allegiance to their national units which created problems for overall command and control as well as discipline. There were anomalies in the appointment of the Deputy Force Commander and the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff was a Brigadier from Nigeria, while the Deputy Force Commander was originally a Lt. Colonel from Guinea. He was later promoted to the rank of Lt General to meet the qualification for a Deputy Force Commander. All these created problems of discipline, control and inefficiencies. Iweze, who was the Chief of Staff, recounts that when the Sierra Leone President, Joseph Momoh, arrived to address the troops before their departure for Liberia, the Chief of Staff, in the absence of the Deputy Force Commander, instructed the Ghanaian battalion Commander to bring the troops to attention or order and then hand over to him. He will in turn report, according to military procedure, to the august visitor. The commander retorted that it was impossible for him a Ghanaian to hand over to a Nigerian, whereupon the Chief of Staff replied that he would not be handing over to a Nigerian but rather to a Chief of Staff who was a Nigerian ( Iweze, 1993:223). Obviously if there was a laid down command structure, this unhealthy stand-off would not have occurred. Besides, it may have been that his rank as a major must have encouraged others to undermine his authority.

The break down of command resulting from lack of standard operating procedure was very much in evident in the execution of tasks assigned to the Guinean battalion. It enjoyed a certain kind of independence in operation which proved disruptive to the overall plan of the organization. Each time they captured their target, they subsequently withdrew for it to be recaptured by the NPFL. As was later explained by the Deputy Force Commander, who was a Guinean, the behaviour of the battalion stemmed from the fact that it was against the idea of each battalion being assigned to different task. What he preferred was the establishment of a multinational units assigned to different tasks. He further stated that he felt it would be

expedient to leave the objective plan of each battalion to its commander. There was also the feeling among the Guineans that they had been singled out for the most difficult task. After extensive discussion with the leadership of that battalion, they did eventually recapture their target and even went beyond it, however, they proceeded to rescue their nationals held in the Guinean embassy. In the excitement and jubilation that followed the reunion, the original mission to hold their target so as to link up with the Ghanaian battalion coming from the rear was torpedoed. The result was that the NPFL surrounded them, when they were finally rescued by Ghanaian forces, they had already lost four men and an armoured fighting vehicle ( Ibid.: 227). There is no doubt that the language barrier must have contributed to the Guinean battalion's predicament. Instructions were issued in English to a battalion which was French. It is possible they never grasp the full imports of the instructions given to them. Eventhough Iweze ( 1993) stated that the commander of that battalion was asked whether he had understood the instruction and replied in the affirmative there is a strong possibility the understanding may not have been complete. This assertion is made in the light of some of the events which occurred.

The problem of command and control affected the effective implementation of the evacuation exercise, the evacuation of different nationals. The sprit of nationalism pervaded the exercise. Each of the nations wanted a special treatment for their nationals. The corollary was that with each of the national units offering maximum protection for its nationals, there were not enough free hands left to offer protection for the refugees who did not have representations. Those became very vulnerable. One group of refugees who fell into this category were the Krahn, the clansmen of Samuel Doe. Prince Johnson who had unlimited access to the headquarters, where the refugees were kept, would from time to time fetch some of the Krahn people to be "punished". For example, Johnson was reported to have hand- picked 30 former government officials for execution., including the Police Chief, Alfred Fofana and the Commisioner for Excise and Tax, who were first cousins of Samuel Doe ( *West Africa*, 15 – 21 October 1990). When the remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia, who were largely Krahn had wind of this treatment, they were incensed so much so that they vowed to go to the headquarters to give their clansmen the needed protection. What followed was a mayhem as on their way they set

a lot of public buildings on fire. It must be stated that the freedom that Johnson had, as a result of inefficient leadership in the command structure of ECOMOG at the initial stage of its mission, undermined the force's credibility as impartial and non – partisan in the conflict. This would in later period serve to foster distrust in the intentions and capabilities of the Forces. It will therefore not be out of place to assert that such atmosphere of distrust must have accounted for the lack of cooperation of the main protagonist in the conflict, Charles Taylor.

### **Lack of Requisite Personnel**

Undoubtedly the efficiency with which an organization executes a given task as Allison (1969 and 1971) asserts, depends to a very great extent on the availability of the requisite personnel, having the corresponding skills, knowledge and experience needed for the successful implementation of the given task. At the initial stage of ECOMOG operations the officer picked to head the mission had had no prior experience in Peace – keeping. He was therefore ill – equipped for the task assigned. Apparently his inexperience, in part accounted for some of the “ blotches” in the operation. A Peace – keeping force has to be above the fray on the ground, as much as conditions permit because its credibility to a large extent depends on the level of its neutrality. It is prohibited to engage in any activity or liaison which may be construed or misconstrued as instance of bias towards one faction or cooperation with that faction. In essence, the leadership of the Peace – keeping force is obliged to communicate unequivocally by deeds and pronouncements that it cherishes and would maintain at all times its neutral status. This principle was sacrificed at the initial stages of the operations. The force commander was known to have been very accommodative towards Prince Johnson. He was forever popping in and out of the Force Headquarters with his body guards armed to the teeth! with the tacit consent of the force commander. An episode was recounted where the Chief of Staff expressed his disapproval before Johnson of his habit of going into the Headquarters with an entourage fully armed and impressed it upon him that it was against military protocol. He understood the logic of the Chief of Staff's argument and promised to abide by it. Johnson later in his usual visit with the Force Commander reported the incident to him, who on receipt of that report told the Chief of Staff that he had told Johnson to disregard his instruction. The



liaison between Johnson and ECOMOG included the presentation of gifts to the force, which included the supply of uniforms, boots and souvenirs to the troops! (Iweze, 1993: 231).

It was during one of his routine visits to the head –quarters that he encountered Samuel Doe, the besieged President of Liberia at the time, and his entourage. Doe had visited the camp in spite of procedure agreed upon that communications between him and the head- quarters should be facilitated through a liaison officer ( Ibid.: 229). He had come to remonstrate with the leadership of ECOMOG for ignoring his invitation to them to pay him a courtesy call as state protocol demanded. He apparently still regarded himself as the President of Liberia, notwithstanding the fact that he had lost 90% of the country he ruled and been reduced to a fugitive holed up in the Executive Mansion. In the argument that followed the encounter between Johnson and Samuel Doe, a scuffle broke out leading to the capture and subsequent assassination of Doe by the forces of Prince Johnson. All this took place right in the head – quarters of ECOMOG. At the time “hell broke loose” the force commander disappeared from sight and when he reappeared, his main preoccupation was to take pictures of the dead bodies littered around. I believe this is inefficiency at its height. He was later heard to have remarked that it was wrong to have sent a Peace – keeping force. His replacement with another commander from Nigeria helped infuse greater sense of purpose, direction and efficiency.

Also some of the officers were put into positions in which their experience and qualifications at the time ill – equipped them to perform successfully the demands of the positions. For example, it was decided that the Deputy Force Commander should be a Guinean and the minimum qualification for that position should be a Brigadier. It happened that the only Brigadier Giunea had was the President, the Guinean who got chosen to occupy the Deputy Force Commander slot was a Lt Colonel. He was later elevated to the position of Lt General in commensuration with that position. The position of Chief of Staff which normally requires a General was given to a Brigadier in the Nigerian Army. Obviously such appointments imparted negatively on the command and control structure of the force and may have contributed to the inefficiencies in the implementation process.

### **Inadequate Organizational Intelligence**

Adequate organizational intelligence on for example, the intended theatre of operation is very important in the decision – making and implementation process. Among other things, it serves to determine the appropriate course of action to be taken. In fact, decisions are made based on organizational intelligence. The operation was mounted without adequate knowledge of the operational milieu ( Iweze, 1993:221). He points out that: “... a correct assessment of the situation was not made in order to present a clear picture of what was happening”. They did not have military map of the country at the onset, what they had was a tourist map of Monrovia, which served as the basis for the initial planning. It accounted for the underestimation of the military strength of Charles Taylor’s NPFL. The flaw in the intelligence set up accounted for the selection of the harbour area as the Force –Headquarters. It proved to be unsuitable as it came under persistent artillery fire from the NPFL ( Iweze, 1993: 224).

### **Ineffective Communication**

Furthermore, there were communication problems which delayed the transmission of vital messages, first, between the field and ECOWAS Secretariat and secondly between the Force Headquarters and other units. Such bottlenecks in communication may have delayed or prevented the implementation of decisions and delays in implementation of missions assigned to units further afield. There was ineffective communication between the Force Headquarters and the Naval and Aerial arms of the operation. Missions needed to be implemented by the Air Force, which was based in FreeTown, Sierra Leone, had to be relayed to them via Accra, Ghana and vice – versa. The length of time taken to get information to and from policy – makers was frustratingly long, in part because the communication devices like the radio were not functioning properly. There was a case where the force had receipt of a decision one month after it had been taken by the ECOWAS Committee!.

In relation to communication it could also be said that the recommendation to the effect that each contributing country should provide the logistical needs of their contingent, induced some

of them to bring their own communication equipment. What therefore happened was that contrary to the order issued by the Field Headquarters that the general ones provided by Nigeria should be used for communication, other contingents refused to use them to communicate with their home government, they rather used theirs. They therefore breached the channel of communication (Iweze, 1993:238). In some sense they may have been at ease using their own gadgets because of familiarity with them.

### **Implementation of the Abuja Peace Agreement – A Case of Organizational Outputs.**

When sanity finally prevailed as indicated by the general goodwill on the part of all the stakeholders in the conflict to accede to the peace formula as stipulated in the Abuja Agreement of 1996, the implementation of the peace plan which represented a continuum from cease – fire or cessation of hostilities, encampment, disarmament and demobilization, rehabilitation or reintegration to general and presidential elections was made possible by the capabilities of various governmental, inter- governmental and non – governmental organizations. It is noteworthy that the modalities for the conduct of a free and fair elections as adopted by the decision – makers of the Economic Community of West African States was the result of organizational activity. A United Nations Team of Consultants appointed by the Secretary – General was charged with the responsibility to consult with Liberian leaders in December, 1996 to ascertain the steps needed to create a viable and credible Frame – work for free and fair elections by May, 1997. Based on their findings, they prepared a draft recommendation on the following general steps : A fair and credible political frame – work , an efficient and well planned electoral operations and adequate support from the international community. The draft recommendations were proposed to the Chairman of ECOWAS who accepted it in principle as “a provisional electoral package for the forthcoming elections”. It was subsequently accepted at a special meeting of ECOWAS Committee of Nine ( a group given the task of monitoring the peace process) as part of the frame- work of Abuja Agreement.

The task to be implemented without doubt was indeed a daunting one, however, the complexities and uncertainties involved were kept at a minimum, in fact, removed by the

principle of “fractionated” attention to goals (Allison, 1969). It meant that the tasks to be performed were cut up into “slices” and each piece parcelled out to a unit with the necessary expertise and repertoire to execute it, and a co-ordinating body to liaise between the various units. This is necessary, as the co-ordinating body forms the heart of the operation, it helps to ensure that there is no break in the chain of activities which is crucial for the ultimate success of the entire programme. The military aspect of the programme was entrusted to ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). ECOMOG had the task of deploying to the entire country, to perform such tasks as establishing and providing security at Assembly and Encampment sites, disarming the various combatants, enforcing arms embargo at the various borders and maintaining general security throughout the country. UNOMIL was entrusted largely with the task of observing, verifying and reporting on the process.

Previously, ECOMOG could not implement this task, in part because it did not have the requisite logistics and required a number of troops to fan out through the entire country. It could only do so when its military strength was boosted to 8,430 by June, 1995, with troops coming from as far as Uganda and Tanzania, coupled with financial assistance from the international community. As a result, by 27 February 1997, a total of 20,332 fighters had been demobilised. It included 4,306 child-soldiers and 250 adult female fighters. It had established 15 Disarmament sites as well as mobile disarmament tents to reach fighters in remote areas (United Nations Public Information Department at website: [www.un.org/Dept/DPICD/mission/unomil-b.htm](http://www.un.org/Dept/DPICD/mission/unomil-b.htm)).

### **Co-ordination of Organizational Activities**

To link up the various efforts of individual units, the Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Organ (HACO) headed by a UN appointee, was set up in 1995. It had two sub-units namely, a Humanitarian Reintegration Unit and a Demobilization and Reintegration Unit. The HACO was composed of representatives from UNOMIL, United Nations Agencies, ECOMOG, the Liberian National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission (LNDDC), the European

Economic Union ( EEU) the United States Agency for International Development ( USAID) and other international non – governmental organizations ( NGOs). HACO provided food, health services, shelter, water and basic sanitation for the Disarmament centres. It drew up a plan for child – soldiers and resettlement.

After demobilization, those with no immediate means of livelihood were absorbed into bridging activities. These included work and training projects to ensure that they were productively engaged. It was indeed a provision to bridge the gap between disarmament and the long term reintegration programme. The various specialised agencies contributed according to their areas of specialization. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) provided hand tools and vegetable seeds. The United Nation Development Programme ( UNDP) extended small grants to ex – combatants to start small scale projects; World Health Organization and UNICEF provided for the health needs of the people. For example, FAO embarked on a project of controlling cholera while UNICEF provided drugs and trained personnel to immunise children. To address the issue of demobilised child – soldiers, it supported the establishment of community centres for vocational and literacy training, the provision of shelters, transit homes and trauma counselling for children. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees, repatriated and helped settle externally displaced Liberians scattered among countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

The elections, from its conceptualization to its implementation reveal organizational capabilities. As was pointed out earlier on in the chapter, the frame – work for the election was an organizational output. The Liberian Independent Electoral Commission formulated and enforced guidelines through the assistance of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, for the conduct of elections. Organizations involved in the electoral process, such as the European Union and the International Foundation for Electoral System through their speciality in the field of elections provided such technical assistance as advice on election management, voter registration and civic education. Other assistance like material and logistic support was provided by organizations such as the European Union.

The following observations could be made from the above analyses: The decision – makers who presided over the Liberian crisis relied on existing laid down procedures and formulae or propositions to solve the Liberian question. The decisional processes were characterised largely by sequential attendance to problems; each decisional group which presided over the Liberian crisis made incremental adjustments to what has been established by its predecessor. Each was hampered in the quest to find solution to the issues at stake by the constraints of limited information, which may have put beyond their field of competence other complexities of the plot of the Liberian drama. It could only be unravelled one step at a time. Such revelations obviously negate the age – old realist assumptions that decision – makers, among other things, engage in conscious rational calculations of the decisions they make; which seems to suggest that they have at any point in time an unlimited pool of information to draw on. In addition to this, the analyses have established that the decision – makers relied on organizational outputs in the formulation and implementation of decisions. It had also shown that if successful or satisfactory implementation of decisions hinge in part on established standard procedure of organizational units then its absence would as well account for flaws in the implementation process as was evident in ECOMOG's initial operations.

## REFERENCES

- Abiodun, A. ( 1998) “ Commentary on the Liberia Peace Process”. In *Accord* at <http://www.c-r.org>.
- Accord* ( 1998) Website: <http://www.c-r.org>
- Africa Watch* ( 1993) vol. 5, No. 6, 3 March.
- Allison, G.T. ( 1969) “ Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crises”. In *American Political Science Review*, (63) pp.689 – 718.
- Ibid. ( 1971) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston, Little: Brown and Co.
- Conteh – Morgan and Kadivar, S. ( 1998) “ Sierra Leone’s Responses to ECOMOG: The Imperative to Geographic Proximity”. In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P and Conteh – Morgan ( ed.). N.Y.: St. Martin Press.
- Guardian of Lagos* ( 1993) 27 March
- Iweze, C. ( 1993) “ Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG”. In *Nigeria in International Peace- keeping, 1960 – 1992*, Vogt, M.A. and Ekoko, E.E. ( ed.). St. Martin Press: London.
- Kieh, K. ( 1998) “ International Organization and Peace – keeping in Africa : Introduction”. In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P and Conteh - Morgan ( ed.). N.Y.: St. Martin Press.
- Magyar, K.P. ( ed.) (1998) “ Conclusion: Liberia’s Peace – keeping Lessons for Africa”. In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*. N.Y. : St Martin Press.
- Mortimer, R. ( 1998) “ Senegal’s role in ECOMOG: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis”. In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P. and Conteh – Morgan ( ed.) N.Y. : St Martin Press
- Reno, W. (1998) *War Lord Politics and African States*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sessay, A. (1999) “ ECOMOG and Sub – Regional Security in West Africa”. In *Conflict Trends*. September, pp. 27
- Starke, J. ( 1984) *Introduction to international Law*. London: Butterworths.

*United Nations Public Information Department* (1997) Website:

[www.un.org/Dept/DPICD/mission/unomil-bhtm](http://www.un.org/Dept/DPICD/mission/unomil-bhtm).

*West Africa* ( 1990) 1 – 7 October.



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **BOTTLE – NECKS IN THE DECISIONAL PROCESS – A CASE OF “ GROUP – THINK”**

The Liberian drama was more and more becoming a human catastrophe of frightening proportion as a result of the fratricidal dimension it assumed, with the concomitant loss of lives, property and massive human dislocation. The chapter argues, contrary to criticisms levelled against the decision to deploy a Peace – keeping force to intervene in the Liberian imbroglio, that the decision was expedient and propitious. However, it also seeks to show that there were flaws in the decision – making process which culminated in the establishment of ECOMOG. The defects are traceable to what Janis ( 1972) refers to as “ group – think” syndrome: A set of characteristics accountable for faulty decision – making. In one sense the flaws had the effect of making the deployment unacceptable to the principal disputant in the conflict and his regional backers, this arguably helped to prolong the conflict. It also discusses the reasons for the successful resolution of the impasse and postulates that this laid the basis for the eventual resolution of the conflict.

Much controversy accompanied the Mediation Committee’s decision to send an intervention force into Liberia at the height of the civil conflict in that country, ostensibly to stop the carnage being wrought out there. Among the criticisms were that the force will be inserted into a theatre of conflict in which there was no cease – fire in place. A Peace – keeping force is deployed based on the premise that all the disputants to the conflict have agreed to a cease – fire. However, in the case of Liberia the major antagonist, Charles Taylor, and his NPFL had not consented to lay down their arms. Besides, legal arguments have been used against the decision. It was seen as a violation of the “ sacrosanct” provisions of the O.AU, which inter alia, prohibits the meddling in the internal affairs of a member state, seen as a violation of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the state. Others contend that the decisional group failed to follow the laid down procedure of ECOWAS and therefore did not have the mandate to set up an intervention force. This, they argued requires the consent of the full house.

The Liberian saga was indeed a “Catch 22” scenario; the decision to intervene broke one of the tenets of the principle of Peace – keeping, which advocates for the consent of the parties to the conflict. On the other hand not to have intervened would have presented the sub – region with a huge human tragedy of callousness, chaos, suffering and misery. Again, the charge that the intervention was a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state shows a poor grasp of the reality on the ground. Undoubtedly, one of the essential characteristics of state – hood, in fact what accords it a legal personality before international law is the government’s title to territory and its effective control over it ( Starke, 1984). In the light of this fact, it could be stated that the viability of the state at the time of the conflict was indeed suspect. Doe could no longer be spoken of as having any effective control over Liberia. His forces abysmally controlled a section of Monrovia, while he was holed up in the Presidential Mansion. There were in reality two governments in place, Doe’s precariously based in Monrovia and Charles Taylor’s, unchallengeably based in Gbarnga. As a result the territory and the state – hood of Liberia was in contention. The break down of the state structure therefore warranted regional intervention.

To the charge that the decisional group lacked the competence to set up the force, it could in part be refuted on the grounds that, the ECOWAS Summit summoned to consider the establishment of ECOMOG was attended only by the members of the Mediation Committee, other members failed to attend ( Adisa, 1993). It could therefore be asserted that the decision was therefore binding on the member states who were absent. Besides, extra Liberian actors were involved in the Liberian “ drama” which therefore effectively internationalized the conflict. The ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) sanctions intervention when the conflict is no longer an exclusively internal one. Countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya were known to be involved in the conflict ( Anning, 1999 and Dunn, 1998).

It is the expressed view of this chapter therefore, that it is not the decision to intervene which is to be at issue but rather the defects in the decision – making process to establish ECOMOG. The defects could be traceable to the group which constituted the Mediation Committee. It is

the view of this section of the essay that the group exhibited traits which Janis refers to as “Group – Think” syndrome. A set of characteristics which a great number of decisional groups share and this contributes largely to faulty decisions.

### **Homogeneity of the Decisional Group – Linguistic Affinity**

The group that met as the Mediation Committee was largely homogenous. To begin with, most of the members belong to the same linguistic bloc, the Anglophone, besides the fact that such common linguistic background creates a natural affinity for bonding, the sub – regional politics has always been a polarised one. It has always witnessed a cleavage between the Francophone and the Anglophone linguistic blocs, marked by suspicions and rivalry in their quest for pre – eminent position in the affairs of the sub – region. It is therefore not surprising that, the group, predominantly Anglophone came to share a common opinion with regard to immediate intervention, dictated by national and regional security concerns. Sir Dawda Jawara, the then ECOWAS Chairman and member of the group, commenting on the misunderstanding which ensued upon the establishment of ECOMOG concurs that : “... it had been along linguistic lines” ( *West Africa*, 9 – 15 September 1991). Besides, their decision must have been influenced by the fact that already there were some members of the Francophone bloc, namely Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso actively supporting the major belligerent in the conflict.

### **A Sense of Camaraderie**

There was a strong bond of friendship and cooperation among the major members of the group. Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone had a personal relationship with Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria. It was a friendship which dated back to the period when both of them were student at the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna ( Adisa, 1993). Nigeria already had a military and judiciary arrangements with Sir Dawda Jawara’s Gambia. The then head of the armed forces of the Gambia was a Nigerian, Abubakar, who later became the transitional Head of State of Nigeria after the mysterious death of Sunni Abacha. Nigerian judges were on secondment to Gambia. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Babangida had a good chemistry between them, besides,

the economic bond between them must have been very strong. For example Ghana relies hugely on subsidised oil from Nigeria. It is surprising to note that Eyadema of Togo was party to the decision to set up the intervention force. He must have been influenced by the spirit of cooperation that existed between Togo and Nigeria. Eyadema and his predecessor, Sylvio Olympio, are famed for their cooperation with successive Nigerian leaders. For example, Sylvio Olympio and his counterpart in Nigeria in 1962, proposed the establishment of a Custom Union to embrace Nigeria, Niger, Togo and Dahomey ( Benin) which was however foiled by de Gaulle and his African Advisor, M. Foccart. Eyadema and Gowon were the key instrument behind the establishment of ECOWAS in 1976. He also had a close personal relationship with Obasanjo and Babangida ( Ate, 1983; Adisa, 1993: 139). However, in the light of his subsequent change of mind, seen through his failure to contribute troops at the eleventh hour leads one to conclude that he must have been faced with a decisional conflict: He must have been compelled to go along with the decision because of his lack of “nerve” to break the homogeneity of the group. This line of reasoning becomes plausible especially when examined in the light of the comment he made about the Mediation Committee. He was purported to have expressed his misgivings and unhappiness of the “ free wheeling role the Mediation cabal had adopted” ( *West Africa*, 3 – 9 September, 1990). On the other hand, it must have stemmed from external pressure from the Francophone states involved in the conflict, especially Houphouet Boigny.

### **Shared Apprehensions**

Moreover, the group was united in a common apprehension about the precedence being set by Charles Taylor’s insurgency. Momoh, Rawlings, Jawara, Babangida and others must have perceived that if it was left unchecked it may destabilise the entire sub – region. It was reasoned that an insurgency masterminded by a civilian constituted a dangerous virus in the body politic of the sub – region. The *New Africa* ( October 1991: 11 – 16) was apt when it asserted that : “ ... there was general consensus that Taylor’s virus must be stopped before it contaminates the whole of West Africa sub – region”. It further argues that it marked the first major attempt in which ordinary civilians backed by few trained commandoes have taken up arms to overthrow

a military dictatorship. It further asserts that it was a common fear that it may be replicated in other parts of the sub – region thus threatening the security of the region and the various dictatorial military regimes. The apprehension expressed here is captured in the statement of the Guinean President, who was party to the decision to set up the force. He stated that : “ Charles Taylor is a bad example. Civilians should not be encouraged to overthrow military regimes ( *West Africa*, 28 November – 2 December, 1990). This fear gains additional cogency when examined in the light of the fact of the report that sub – regional nationals, trained in Libya, like Ghanaians, Gambians, Sierra Leoneans and possibly Nigerians formed part of Charles Taylor’s NPFL. Sir Dawda Jawara, in an interview with the *West Africa* affirmed this and expressed the fear that if : “ ... Charles Taylor with the support of what I may call mercenaries from the other countries of the sub – region were to come to power by force, one can imagine the implication it will have for sub – regional security...” ( *West Africa*, 28 November – 2 December 1990).

### **Shared Ideology**

Most of the members had a common military background, which may have predisposed them towards impetuous militaristic solutions rather than engaging in any effective diplomatic negotiations to win over opponents to accept the intervention formula. The consensus of the group must have shut out any other alternative options. For instance, the Malian representative wanted a cease – fire before the deployment of the Peace – keeping force. It was as a result of the rejection of this option that a statement was issued that Mali would not be contributing troops to ECOMOG. It must also be stated that Eyadema of Togo deploring the dictatorial nature of the group was reputed to have spoken against the “ free wheeling style of the Mediation cabal” ( *West Africa*, 3 – 9 September, 1990).

### **Misperceptions of the Operational Milieu**

Janis ( 1972) contends that such a decisional group tends to have a wrong perception of the enemy and the operational environment out there. This may in part be due to a perception of

“invincibility” of the group which borders on recklessness and risks. There was the perception that with the calibre of force at their disposal Charles Taylor’s forces and other belligerents could easily be intimidated into submission. Apparently this emboldened them to deploy a force into a dangerous terrain of conflict. This mentality must have also affected the disposition of the troops, in fact it must have affected the combat readiness of the force, a kind of complacency must have entered the psyche of the force. Iweze, the Field Commander from Nigeria, sums it up: “ I remember in one of my discussions with one of the officials of ECOWAS, he had the impression that with the calibre of soldiers all the warring factions had, the sight of tanks, armoured cars and air crafts would scare the living daylight out of them and we will just walk over the area... Many troops arrived without personal weapons...” He continued that: “ Some members of the troop were simply para – military personnel who only serve in their respective countries as custom and immigration officials ( Iweze, 1993:228). Undoubtedly their knowledge of the military strength of the NPFL was indeed poor! At the time of the deployment , Charles Taylor controlled 90% of Liberia and was just at the treshhold of power. He had unimpeded supply of arms and huge income from the extractive business in the area under his jurisdiction. Requesting for a cease – fire without seeking a meaningful compromise with him was bound to be unacceptable to him. Besides, they reckoned without the resolve and determination of the rank and file membership of NPFL, of fighters seasoned by an already militarised society, who saw their liberation and revenge for the atrocities they and their kin have suffered at the callous hands of Doe as tied up to the cause of Charles Taylor. It was a resolve which may have been strengthened by his vilification of the intervening force as the hand maid of Babangida, who was bent on bailing out his embattled crony, Doe.

### **Inability to Seek Expert Advice**

The decisional process lacked informed expert assistance. It should be bourne in mind that the Committee which was a creation of ECOWAS, just like its parent organization, had had no prior political experience in conflict resolution. Until the advent of the Liberian conflict it had been primarily an economic organization with little or no experience in security issues. Such

handicap could have been circumvented if the institutional and administrative structures undergirding the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence had been put in place ( Anning, 1999). The protocol itself seemed to have been forgotten. Thus, neither the Organization nor the Mediation Committee had the personnel with the requisite competence, experience, authority and negotiating skills required in mediation efforts. It has been attested that Abbas Bundu, the Chairman of ECOWAS, who engaged in initial mediation efforts to bring Charles Taylor and his regional backers on board was handicapped by the fact of his political inexperience. He lacked the authority ( for it was a common knowledge that he neither had the economic nor the political experience for the position of Secretary – General of the Organization) and the necessary diplomatic skills required to secure a harmonization of positions between Anglophones and Francophones. It was a tricky situation which was beyond his ability to pull off. For example, he failed to convince Charles Taylor to attend the Banjul conference, in which the IGNU was formed ( Dunn,1998).

With such an apparent handicap, it will have been expedient to seek external assistance or cooperation. This assertion is made notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the crisis there seemed to be an international apathy to what was going on in Liberia. Given the intractable nature of the conflict, the unbridgeable polarity it created between the two linguistic blocs, the diplomatic stalemate, Charles Taylor's suspicion and hatred towards the Peace – keeping arrangement, it would have been sane to right at the onset mount up a vigorous diplomatic campaign to secure a UN involvement. UN eventually got involved from 1993, but it was in a sense belated, because if it had been involved in the process at the beginning, the conflict may not have been protracted as it turned out to be. What was sorely needed to break the log-jam was a credible third force, with the necessary expertise, experience, negotiating skills and authority, which the UN possessed. A similar effort could have been made to woo the U.S. into the process. It had a lot of clout over the major actors in the conflict which could have been successfully exploited. No attempt at the beginning was made in this direction. It is a behaviour consistent with "Group – Think" syndrome.

Besides, no meaningful sustained effort was made to co – ordinate their efforts with that of the Inter – Faith Mediatory Council ( IFMC), which undoubtedly had informed knowledge of the socio – political dynamics of the Liberian affair ( Dunn, 1998:890). The composition of the IGNU formed one of the basis for Charles Taylor’s rejection of the peace plan. The plan called for the establishment of an interim government which would oversee the return of the country to a democratically elected government. In line with this, the Committee sponsored a conference in Banjul between 27 – 30 August 1990. The political and the civil groups who participated in the conference were largely exiles based in Sierra Leone. Most of them shared a common characteristic, they were loyal supporters of Amos Sawyer. At the end of the conference he was elected as the chairman of the interim government. The government was therefore filled with elements hated by Charles Taylor. There was already an antipathy between Charles Taylor and Amos Sawyer. He had for example, branded the politicians who had formed the government as cowards and conservatives because of their half – hearted effort to carry out armed struggle against Samuel Doe. Besides, he hated their brand of ideology, which was too leftist for his liking ( Dunn,1998). A consultation with the IFMC would have produced a composition of a government which was centrist in outlook. Again, the exiles abroad, that is the Liberians outside Sierra Leone, in places like the U.S, were absent from the conference. Their participation in the conference and inclusion in the government may have mollified Charles Taylor because of the influence they wielded over him.

### **Intolerance of Opposing Views**

Janis ( 1972) postulates that a decisional group which suffers from the "Group – Think" malaise, besides making no effort to seek external advice strives to reject views which are contrary to their preferred line of action. One sees this tendency in the Mediation group. The deployment of the force in the face of opposition from such heads of states as Campoare of Burkina Faso and Houphouet Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire was in a sense irrational. They were actively backing Charles Taylor not only in words but also in deeds. Blaise Campoare had provided bases for the training of NPFL fighters and depots for arms and ammunition coming from such countries as Libya. Cote d’Ivoire’s borders, on the other hand, were opened to



ensure the smooth passage of arms to the NPFL. They were therefore indispensable players in the Liberian “game”. It is incontestable that they were opposed to intervention at the onset for personal and political reasons and therefore presented a formidable challenge. However, the fact of their indispensability alone should have spurred them on to embark on an intensive diplomatic drive to secure a compromise that may in the end have paved the way for a Peace-keeping force comprising a fair balance of Francophones and Anglophones. This would have lent credibility to ECOMOG. Such an opportunity was missed and as a result, ECOMOG was formed with the conspicuous absence of the major Francophone countries. It therefore had to “hobble” into Liberia with the huge liability of the preponderance of Nigerian participation.

### **Lack of Contingency Plan**

One of the hallmarks of a good decision – making process, as Janis ( 1972) postulates is the ability of the decisional group to lay out contingency plans. This is prudential especially in the world of armed conflicts where there are so many uncertainties ( Liberia was a typical example) and decisional goals are stifled by complexities on the operational field. The group, it appeared never had any contingency plan with regard to an alternative line of action in the event of NPFL resistance. Iweze recalls that the political leaders were at a loss as to what should be done when the question was posed to them. Again, they did not have any clue to the next step, once the initial plan had been executed ( Iweze,1993: 219). As a result, ECOMOG had to improvise solutions to problems as events unfolded in the Liberian political scenario. This accounted for some of the decisional blunders at the early stages of the operation.

The homogeneity of the group produced a dangerous consensus, which denied them the healthy opportunity to critically examine their preferred course of action. As has been pointed out earlier, this alienated other major players in the conflict and effectively made the ECOMOG concept unacceptable to them. The next section of the chapter looks at how this situation was remedied. To lay the basis for the eventual resolution of the conflict.

### **Recipe for Success**

It is an undisputable fact that any discussion of successes in the decisional process during the conflict in Liberia is bound to be relative. For as the conflict progressed it assumed a very complex and uncertain character. Factors such as cooperational insecurities of the main protagonists in the conflict, proliferation of armed factions, differences over power sharing, mistrust and suspicions all contributed to its complexity and stoked it. On countless number of times accords were made and broken. Yet in the midst of such uncertainties, one thing remained certain and that is, the introduction of such ingredients as the effective external participation, accommodation of opponents and a dose of better grasp of the operational milieu helped to inject fresh life into the decisional process. It broke the log – jam, by bringing the dissenters into the process. This laid the foundation upon which the eventual successful resolution of the conflict rested.

In an apparent move to correct the initial blunders, Babangida, besides embarking on a national, regional and international campaign to garner support for the Peace – keeping force, ceded the leading role in mediation efforts to Houphouet Boigny, the “Doyen” of the sub – regional politics. This was evident in the Yamousoukro summit on Liberia in June, 1991. He assumed the chairmanship of the summit, which brought together all the major regional actors in the conflict, namely the heads of state of the Gambia ( Sir Dawda Jawara), Togo ( Eyadema), Nigeria ( Babangida), Burkina Faso ( Blaise Campoare), Cote d’Ivoire ( Houphouet Boigny) and Ghana ( Jerry Rawlings). The meeting was the first major attempt to break the stalemate between ECOMOG and Charles Taylor, who had previously resisted the intervention and the peace plan, especially the composition of the interim government. At the end of the summit it was reported that Charles Taylor and Amos Sawyer accepted the ECOWAS Peace Plan with the Francophones and Anglophones playing an important role in establishing a consensus. Houphouet Boigny observed that : “ Our job was to reconcile the two of them. We will declare that there is only one winner, Liberia, which must find peace” ( *West Africa*, 8 – 14 July, 1991).

As a result of the seeming success of the conference, a Committee of Five (C5) was constituted to oversee other mediatory talks. It comprised representatives from Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Guinea Bissau and the Gambia. It was under the chairmanship of Houphouet Boigny. The preponderance of Francophone membership on the committee was an apparent move to appease the Francophones who felt slighted by the Anglophone initiative. The newly found goodwill which came to exist between the two blocs found its most eloquent testimony in the fact that the C5 invited some of the members of the Standing Mediation Committee into their meetings. It was a successful cooperation which helped produce four accords in a row, the Yamousoukro I – IV Accords. It was reported that Houphouet Boigny's stewardship of the peace process gave Charles Taylor : “much succour and spurred him to acts of reconciliation” ( *West Africa*, 9 – 15 September 1991: 1496). Taylor offered to release several hundred Nigerians, Ghanaians and Sierra Leoneans held hostage. He also formally requested the Red Cross to supervise the evacuation of refugees. Again, the goodwill translated into the establishment of an all encompassing Mediation Committee (ESMC) at Cotonou, Benin on 7 November, 1992, a Committee of Nine (C9) conferred with the responsibilities to oversee the Liberian peace process was inaugurated. It comprised representatives from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo, Nigeria, Gambia and Senegal. Thus as Anning (1999) points out after much squabbling, a compromise was achieved which helped merge the various major actors in the bid to resolve the Liberian question.

### **Reliance on External Expertise – United States Involvement**

Janis ( 1972) postulates that a good decision – making process makes use of external expertise. The United States by her own volition, as a result of a change in policy, stayed away from any effective or direct participation in the quest for solution to the conflict. It rather ceded this responsibility to the sub – regional organization. However, her later involvement, though low key, brought without doubt into the process the sorely needed credibility, authority, skills, experience and the where – withal which helped break the impasse.

The historical links between the U.S. and Liberia gave her an appreciable degree of influence over the domestic affairs of Liberia. It is an influence that stretches from the time she helped set up a republic of “freed black slaves” on the shores of Cape Mesurado in the mid nineteenth century to the dictatorial regime of Samuel Doe in the 1980’s. Liberians had always felt a certain kind of kinship with U.S. Dunn (1998:840) states that the U.S protected Liberia from external aggression, especially during the two world wars and mediated in conflicts between the natives and the settler community.

The influence of the U.S at the early stages of the conflict could be gleaned from Charles Taylor’s assertion in an interview conducted by Balfour Ankomah of *New Africa*. In the interview, he claimed that he could have easily taken Monrovia had the Americans not stopped him. He contended that, Herman Cohen, the U.S. Secretary for African Affairs, anticipating a blood – bath in the event of an NPFL military assault on Monrovia, contacted him in Liberia and prevailed upon him to desist from such attack. He also urged him to leave Monrovia open to allow people to flee unimpeded to Sierra Leone. On hindsight, he lamented taking his advice: “I made a terrible mistake, terrible mistake, very, very bad mistake... There was no fighting by our soldiers in Monrovia” (*New Africa*, October, 1992: 12).

It is significant to note that when the U.S. began to take an interest in the Liberian question, it helped through its representatives break the log – jam between Charles Taylor, his regional backers and ECOMOG. The U.S. Congressman, Mervyn Dymally, who was then the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives for Foreign Affairs Sub – Committee on Africa met with both Amos Sawyer and NPFL leader Charles Taylor and secured their consent to meet in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire to discuss the future of Liberia (*West Africa*, 13 – 19 May, 1991). It was an event which led to the agreement to a cease – fire at the Yamousoukro Conference, which the U.S. co – sponsored. Thus, at the end of the day through the influence, authority, diplomatic skills vested in her representatives, all the major stake – holders in the conflict sat together in a spirit of cooperation to constructively engage each other in a bid to solve the Liberian puzzle.

One of the sticking points in the effort to solve the Liberian problem was that ECOMOG was hamstrung from the onset because of its largely Anglophone composition. Charles Taylor repeatedly made issue out of this. He accused it of being hijacked by Nigeria, which had a hidden agenda and that it was impartial. In fact, it provided him with a convenient excuse to dishonour his commitments to agreements made, ( including his promise to allow his troops to be encamped and demobilised). The major Francophone countries were out of ECOMOG. The only Francophone member which had troops in the Peace – keeping force was Guinea. But its credibility and impartiality was doubtful as a result of Lansana's vested interest in the conflict, which was really anti – Taylor. Repeated calls by the Anglophones to such countries as Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire to contribute troops had gone unheeded. What was therefore needed was some one who could successfully bring on board the Francophones to give ECOMOG the credibility it needed and to neutralise Taylor's excuse.

President Bush, the U.S. Special Representative for Africa, Herman Cohen and James Baker, the Secretary of State, at different times sought to persuade Abdou Diouf, the President of Senegal, to contribute troops to ECOMOG. An interplay of diplomacy and financial inducements in the end secured the consent of Diouf to contribute Senegalese troops to ECOMOG. The Senegalese troops were subsequently deployed for Peace – keeping exercise in the northern Liberian market town of Vahun. Six Senegalese soldiers in the area immediately after their deployment were killed by the NPFL. It happened at the back – drop of renewed accusations by Charles Taylor that ECOMOG was in league with a new armed group, ULIMO, which was fighting against the NPFL. Taylor claimed: “ We have proof on film that ULIMO soldiers are training in camps in Conakry, Guinea and Sierra Leone” ( *West Africa*, 25 – 31 January 1993; Mortimer, 1998). The countries named had troops in ECOMOG. This twist in the Liberian game, in essence, made redundant the *raison d'etre* of Senegalese participation in ECOMOG. With the rising tide of public opinion against Senegal's participation, elections just around the corner and troubles in Senegal's Casamance province, Diouf felt convinced that he would be better off if the troops were back home ( Mortimer, 1998: 123 – 137). What could be salvaged from the wreck of Senegalese involvement? To begin with, Through U.S. diplomacy, the awkward situation of Francophone absence from the intervention force was

removed. It helped expose Taylor as one who was not interested in peace and therefore made it impossible for his allies to stand by him.

### **United Nations – Organization of African Unity's Involvement**

The solicitation of the U.N assistance at the later stage in the conflict gave a fillip to the decision – making and implementation process. It brought into the process the expertise and experience of its representatives into the mediation process. It contributed immensely to lend credibility to the decisional groups' search for peace. Following the joint meeting of the Committee of Five and the Standing Mediation at Cotonou, Benin, on 20 October, 1992, a communique was issued on 7 November, 1992 at Abuja, which among other things, requested the U.N to send a group of observers to monitor the encampment and disarmament of the warring factions. It was a request that induced the Security Council to recommend the appointment by the Secretary – General of the U.N, a Special Representative to assist in the mediation efforts. The U.N therefore actively, by the appointment of the Special Representative, from November, 1993 participated in the process ( The United Nations Public Information Department, 1997, website: [www.un.org.dept/mission/unomil](http://www.un.org.dept/mission/unomil)). Through its representatives the UN undertook diplomatic moves to urge the ECOWAS countries to pursue a unified approach to the Liberian problem. The UN became an effective partner with the Mediation Committee in negotiating the various peace accords and agreements and effectively used the factions to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis. The Special Representative along with his O.A.U. counterpart from Zimbabwe, Professor Canaan Banana, spearheaded the Geneva and Cotonou negotiations which produced the Accord of 25 July, 1993. The accord marked an important turning point in the history of the various efforts made to bring the crisis to an end. It became the referent point for all other subsequent accords ( Abiodun, 1999). Cotonou marked a break with all the previous agreements in one special sense, that is it was the first serious attempt to come to terms with the power dynamics of Liberia at war. All the previous agreements effectively barred the armed factions from any effective participation in the interim government. However, the Cotonou negotiations brought them on board. Undoubtedly this inclusion of armed factions in the interim government, especially when the

leaders finally directly participated in it by the Abuja Agreement, contributed immensely to bring the conflict to its logical conclusion. Besides, through the UN – O.A.U. participation, extra sub – regional troops were introduced, making ECOMOG more internationalised and credible. When goodwill finally prevailed the new ECOMOG presented a face benign and acceptable enough for the forces of the main antagonist, Charles Taylor, to agree to be disarmed and demobilised.

Thus far the following proposition could be made: That, misconceptions about the operational milieu, among other things, accounted for the under estimation of the force potential of the main protagonist in the conflict; that it accounted for lack of any effective efforts by the decisional group at the onset to build bridges to the major regional backers of the main antagonist; that it reflected in the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity, which was in reality unrepresentative of the political realities of Liberia and that it showed in the deployment of an intervention force whose composition was regionally less representative. The creases in the decisional process were however ironed out by a reconstituted, reinvigorated and an enlarged Mediation units: The decisions made by such bodies, such as gathering in of the major actors, diversifying the force structure of ECOOMG; acknowledging the indispensability of the principal disputant in the conflict and bringing the armed factions into the interim government, showed a better grasp of the operational milieu. Furthermore the transformation of the decisional environment from a highly homogenous one to a more diversified and heterogeneous one produced the compromises and the goodwill that underpinned the successes in the varied efforts to find a lasting peace for Liberia. Besides, the external support and expertise in no small measure contributed to lay the foundation for the solution of the Liberian question.

## REFERENCES

- Adisa, J. ( 1993) “ Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Under Currents and the Burden of Community Spirit”. In *Nigeria in International Institutions*, edited by Jide Owoeye, Ibandan: College Press.
- Anning, K. ( 1999) “ Negotiation, Conflict and Compromise: The Liberian Challenge to a Sub – regional Security System”. In *Accord*, No. 2/99.
- Ate, B. ( 1983) “ The Presence of France in West – Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem to Nigeria”. In *Millennium*, Vol.12. No.12.
- Dunn, E. ( 1998) “ Liberia’s Internal Responses to ECOMOG’s Interventionist Effort”. In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*. Magyar, K.P. and Conteh – Morgan (ed.). N.Y.: St. Martin Press.
- Iweze,C. ( 1993) “Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG”. In *Nigeria in International Peace – keeping, 1960 – 1992*, Vogt, M.A. and Ekoko, E.E. ( ed.) pp. 217 – 243.
- Janis, I. ( 1972) *Group – Think: A Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Mortimer, R. ( 1998) “ Senegal’s Role in ECOMOG: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crises”. In *Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*. Magyar, K.P. and Conteh – Morgan ( ed) N.Y. : St. Martin Press.
- New African* ( 1992) October, pp. 11 – 16.
- Starke, J. ( 1984) *Introduction to International Law*. London: Butterworths.
- United Nations Public Information Department* (1997) Website: [www.un.org/dept/mission/unomil](http://www.un.org/dept/mission/unomil).
- West Africa* ( 1990) 3 – 9 September, pp.2390 – 1
- West Africa* ( 1990) 26 November – 2 December.
- West Africa* ( 1990) 24 December – 30 December.
- West Africa* ( 1991) 13 – 19 May.
- West Africa* ( 1991) 8 – 14 July.
- West Africa* ( 1993) 25 – 31 January, pp. 102 – 104.



## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This survey set out to investigate to what extent the various assumptions of decision – making theories and some of the models that have flowed out of them, namely Allison’s conceptual models of decision – making, Janis “ Group – Think” model and the propositions each postulates helped to unearth the essence of decision – making and implementation processes which underpinned the establishment of ECOMOG as well as the decisional character of the first Standing Mediation Committee and various summits which produced the accords. In relation to this, chapter Two set the scene by offering a discussion of theoretical assumptions of Decision – Making Theory.

Chapter Three revealed that some of the assumptions of the rational Actor and Bureaucratic Process models of decision – making explain the decisional process to set up ECOMOG. Trailing in the footsteps of Allison, the study set out in Chapter Four to find out the extent to which the decision taken by the political leaders as revealed in Chapter Three and its implementation was made possible by organizational output. It was discovered that some of the assumptions which underline Allison’s Organizational Process Model in decision – making hold true in so far as the decision to set up ECOMOG and the tasks to be performed are concerned. It has shown that the decision could not necessarily have seen the light of day without organizational outputs. However, the study found out that such organizational characteristics as the existence of standard operating procedure ( SOP), the requisite manpower and intelligence crucial for successful implementation of tasks were largely absent. The survey has demonstrated to an appreciable degree that the non existence of the appropriate supporting institutional and administrative structures at the time the Liberian conflict erupted, contributed to the flaws in the implementation of task at the beginning of ECOMOG’s operations.

Earlier on in Chapter Four, the survey had revealed that contrary to rationalists suppositions that decision –makers confronted with a problem at any particular moment always examine a

whole range of options and rationally make a decision. A careful tracking of the entire efforts made at resolving the saga, from individual efforts at brokering peace between the belligerents to the collective efforts revealed that the decision makers or the facilitators never at any point in time grasped every nuance of the complexity of the Liberian conflict. As a result, they could only solve problems on sequential basis. It has also confirmed that decision – makers rely on laid down procedures in solving problems. Such behaviour of a political decisional unit seems to confirm the notion that owing to the great variety that inhere in any situation, decision – makers can only solve problems on an incremental basis. The study has therefore discovered that organizational mode of problem solving is as well traceable to political decisional units.

Also, as was evident in Chapter Five, a critical analyses of the decisional group, the ECOMOG Standing Mediation Committee set up at the beginning of the conflict, have shown that an appreciable number of the characteristics spelled out by Janis ( 1972) as contributing factors for faulty decision – making process are discernible in the group which met to decide on the formation of ECOMOG. It has shown that such “ Group – Think” traits as *esprit de corp*, homogenous atmosphere, consensus seeking, non critical appraisal of preferred decisions, illusions about the operational milieu, unpreparedness to accommodate the views or criticism of others and failure to seek external informed assistance, absence of contingency plans were among the characteristics exhibited by the group which composed the first Mediation Committee. The flaws made the decision taken to be unattractive to the major stake – holder in the conflict and his regional backers.

The second section of this Chapter which adopted Janis ( 1972) recipe of successful decision – making process discovered that when external expertise was sought, when in – roads were made to achieve constructive consensus, based on compromises through diversifying the composition of the decisional groups and when the operational milieu have been sufficiently mastered these paved the way for the eventual resolution of the conflict.

It must however be stated that the successful resolution of the conflict delayed in part because of unforeseen bed fellows of armed conflict. Like cooperational insecurities, proliferation of

armed factions, mistrusts and suspicions among actors in the conflict, personal ambitions and differences over power sharing. It must have also been due to lack of critical appraisal by the decisional group at any given stage of efforts at resolving the conflict or the problems they were confronted with. In the light of the foregoing conclusions the following propositions are made with the view to help “prime” the decision – making and implementation machinery of ECOWAS.

### **General Propositions**

The West Africa sub – regional political theatre is a re- enactment of the old Anglo – Franco rivalries of the colonial era. The same old competition for pre – eminence, mistrusts and fears that informed the relationships of their colonial masters hang like an “albatross” on the necks of the Anglophone – Francophone leaders of the sub – continent. Adding to this has been the half – hearted commitment of Francophone West Africa to the affairs of the sub – continent. The apathy finds expression in the existence within the sub – region of parallel economic groupings, whose functions are indeed duplicatory. Operating simultaneously with ECOWAS, the umbrella economic body that caters for the entire sub – region is the corresponding Francophone economic zone, the CEAO. It has an exclusive collective security regime in ANAD, which was helped set up by France.

It gives prime attention to its relationship with France, to the detriment of the cohesion needed for effective sub – regional development and stability. The compactness of the relationship with France could be seen through the various cooperational agreements the countries, in their individual and collective capacities have forged with France. Ali Mazrui puts the solidity of the relationship in perspective when he asserts : “ ... apartheid is an anachronism and hated by all blacks in South Africa. French culture is loved by its victims in West Africa. South Africans are seeking to be redeemed from white racial hegemony, many West Africans are contented to bask in France’s cultural hegemony” (Mazrui, 1983; Ate, 1983). France’s unparelled interest in Africa and in particular West Africa , an interest which is destructive to sub – regional unity, has meant that the Francophone bloc side with the interest of the ex – colonial boss. This

attitude has in part been an irritant link in the decision – making and implementation process of the sub – region. Liberia presents a classic example of such frustration.

The question now is, what measures need to be adopted to remove such barrier to the cohesion and the political goodwill needed to take decisions and implement them ? Undoubtedly one of the attractions of France to the Francophone bloc has been the economic support that she offers. Therefore, it behoves on the economic giants within the sub – region, especially Nigeria given its middle power potentials, to take steps to translate its middle power potentials into reality. Nigeria in alliance with other sub – regional states who resent the influence of France, should strive to develop a technological base which will have the effect of producing a self reliant economy whiles at the same time serving as growth centres for the rest of the sub – region. This may serve as an alternative to the over reliance on France.( Ate, 1983).

Ali Mazrui also suggests that there is the need, especially Nigeria which resents the French influence, to accelerate efforts at “ re Africanizing” Francophone West Africa, in order for it to develop a more introverted sense of its existence and needs ( Mazrui in Ate 1983). To some extent it could be stated that ECOWAS, though primarily an economic-organization is already doing that. Through its purpose and functions gleaned from its constitutive document, it serves as a vehicle for cultural penetration; it is promoting the spirit of collective self – reliance and forging a regional identity. It is hoped that this process will proceed at a quicker pace, especially by bringing the process of economic integration to its logical conclusion. For when economies are effectively tied up to each other it fosters a sense of shared destiny.

The efforts to bring Francophone West Africa back to the West African family of nations could be given a boost through the provision of a viable alternative regional security arrangement to effectively replace that set up by France. It is in this direction that the ECOMOG concept need to be taken seriously. An allied armed force ready to intervene in trouble areas to maintain peace and stability in the sub – region is indeed a laudable concept. It is gratifying to note that at a conference in Banjul 1998 the Francophones accepted, at least in principle, to accept the new security mechanism that ECOMOG provides ( Sessay, 1999).

There has also been a suggestion that Nigeria and other regional actors should by way of policy make a persistent bold declaration rejecting the exercise of neo – colonial hegemony by extra – regional powers in West Africa. Apparently the intended target is France. It is believed that if such a doctrine is adopted and pursued vigorously it may in time acquire a moral force of its own, which will serve as a restraint on the behaviour of France in the affairs of the sub – region ( Ate, 1983:28).

The Liberian saga revealed the suspicions, mistrusts and rivalry that exist among major regional actors. It showed the suspicions the Francophone states, especially Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso about the real intentions of the major contributing states, especially Nigeria. In an environment where there are deep suspicions about the hegemonistic intentions of Nigeria, whenever it initiates any course of action on the sub – region, it raises an “eye brow” especially from the Francophone bloc.

ECOMOG has revealed in no uncertain terms, Nigeria's willingness and capacity to lead in the affairs of the sub – region. This role shows a desire to see a sub – region free of political instability, to ensure an atmosphere conducive for development. She was consistent in her participation in the quest to solve the Liberian conflict. This is not meant to down – play the role played by other states. But it is undisputable that she made more sacrifices in terms of funding, contribution of troops, commitment and resolve. It has been reported that the war in Liberia cost her four billion dollars and the loss of 400 Nigerian lives ( Howe and Urell, 1998). The unparelled commitment of Nigeria in Liberia, the unilateral decisions it took in the course of the affairs earned her the charge that Babangida had a ‘ hidden agenda’. For example, the first ECOMOG Force Commander, Arnold Quainoo, a Ghanaian, was unilaterally removed from his position by the Nigerians. It was Nigeria which changed the mandate of the force from peace – keeping to peace – enforcement; apart from Quainoo, all subsequent Force Commanders were Nigerians ( Sessay, 1999).

Such unilateral measures obviously run against the unanimity which is needed in any decision – taking environment. Nigeria obviously is set to continue in the path it has curved for itself on the sub – continent, a leader in the sub – continent’s affairs. However, it must seek do do so without leaving doubts about her altruistic intentions. Depending on the degree of sensitivity of the issue at stake, there is the need for proper consultation on the regional level, a need for conscious effort to secure the cooperation of at least the major regional actors, a need also for Nigeria and the other major actors to find a desirable balance between national interest and sub – regional interest.

It is also recommended that with regard to issues that bring out irreconcilable differences and interests, decision – takers should not hesitate to bring into the process external actors picked on the basis of their impartiality, authority, influence and expertise. Decisional units, on any given issue, should be composed of actors selected on the basis of their knowledge, expertise, experience, negotiating skills and sufficient degree of independent – mindedness to ensure among other things that there will be a fair diversity of advocacies and that what is finally chosen is based on compromise.

### **Specific Propositions**

It is imperative, in the light of the rumpus which surrounded the establishment of ECOMOG and its operational problems, especially at the beginning, for ECOWAS community members to redouble efforts to complete the process of putting in place the institutions and the administrative structures enshrined in the Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence ( PMAD). The protocol provides, inter alia, that any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community. In the event of such a scenario arising it stipulates that an assistance will be given to the member state through an Allied Armed Forces composed of units from member states.

It stipulates that if an internal conflict within a member state is actively engineered and sustained by external actors, which may endanger regional security of the whole community,

then the ECOWAS Authority in union with the member state concern will consider the matter and decide on the appropriate course of action. The protocol provides for the establishment of an Allied Armed Force and a mediation committee of Foreign ministers and Defence Ministers who will liaise with the ECOWAS Authority in conflict mediation. Institutional mechanisms and administrative arrangements were established under the protocol. It provides that a collection of ECOWAS member states armies would constitute an Allied Armed Force of the community under a joint command. It provides that ministers of defence and foreign affairs shall constitute a Defence Council, whiles Chiefs of Staff would form a Defence Commission. The authority alone retains the right to decide on the appropriate course of action. For example, the protocol provides that if a member state requests for the community's assistance in the event of an aggression from non member state, the Authority will meet to decide on the expediency for military action and entrust subsequent enforcement to the Force Commander. In case of conflict between member states the Authority will deploy the Allied Force as a Peace – keeping force, but when the conflict is actively sustained from outside it will respond in the same way as it will in the event of external aggression. In essence, the protocol provides that the Authority be aided in its decision by the Council.

However, this decisional making process could be augmented by administrative structures. In this regard, I find the recommendations of Williams ( 1993) very useful. He recommends the establishment of an ECOWAS Security and Mediation Commission. It should constitute a permanent department at the ECOWAS Secretariat. This department should have two divisions, namely, the Information, Mediation and Relief Division headed by an experience civilian with much expertise in mediation and international peace – keeping, and Operations, Plans and Logistics division to be headed by a military general who is in active service and has a wealth of experience in military and peace – keeping. It is the suggestion of this writer that among some of the functions of this department must be the gathering of information with regard to the operational milieu of any area of intended operation. In this regard it should have the expertise, know how and the resources to gather and analyse data; it must be able to provide expert advice on mediation. Such vital information should then be passed on to the Committee for Mediation and Security ( CMS). It must be noted that such a body was recommended during

an extra – ordinary Summit of the Authority which was held in Lome, Togo in December 1997. Membership to this body is rotational. It is a nine member committee, which comprises heads of state, ministers of foreign affairs and ambassadors ( Anning, 1999:1).

The Operational Plans and Logistics Division shall have, among its tasks, the drawing up of blue print for operations as well as the logistical back up for it. This may then also be passed on to the Committee. It is recommended that the final decision for any course of action should be the prerogative of the full session of the ECOWAS Authority. Again, it is recommended that the ESMC shall maintain close contact with an intervention force and in close consultation with the political leaders, provide the necessary political decisions and direction to the force on the ground. This will forestall the situation where the force, as was the case with ECOMOG, in addition to its normal military functions or peace – keeping duties will have to take other decisions which are outside its mandate.

One of the things that largely affected the operational performance of ECOMOG was the ad – hoc nature of the force., it was quickly assembled for peace – keeping duties. Most of the soldiers who made up the force had little or no combat experience or peace – keeping training. Besides, the contingents came from different military background in terms of training and doctrine, strategy of operation and different linguistic backgrounds, all these created problems of command, control and lack of cohesion. This, as has been pointed out earlier affected the operational performance of the force, especially at the beginning.

It is therefore recommended that the envisioned Allied Armed Force which will be given operational task in case of decision to intervene in a crisis area must be a force with a standard operating procedure. How could this be ensured ? I concur with the suggestion of Williams (1993) that each would be contributing state should have a stand – by unit trained especially for peace – keeping operations, capable of being deplored with a maximum notice of 48 hours. With this in place, there could be joint military exercises periodically. It will serve to build the necessary standardization in the event of an operation. The force so constituted should be under a single force commander chosen on the basis of his experience and peace – keeping credentials. It is further recommended that the force commander and those at the top of the chain of



command should be bilingual. They should have effective command over both English and French. This would make for effective communication and ensure efficient implementation of task. The experience with the Guinean Battalion makes such requirement necessary. Organizational “health” depends on adequate logistical back up. It has been identified that ECOMOG had problems with logistical control. At the time of the operation it was recommended that each contributing state should provide for the logistical needs of its troops. As a result of this, there came to be established two command structures. Logistically, ECOMOG was under the command of different troops while operationally under the command of ECOMOG. This anomaly obviously affected command and control mechanism of the operation. As was the case with the Ghanaian contingent who had the facility and enough supply of medication to carry out surgery operations. It was reported that contrary to operational policy which recommended that such resources should be pooled and placed under a single command for the benefits of all the troops, that battalion refused and only catered for wounded Ghanaian soldiers. It is suggested that member states should marshal the necessary political goodwill to make the necessary financial sacrifices so that adequate and requisite logistical back up could be secured for any peace – keeping mission.

Iweze (1993) complained that the personnel chosen for the logistical cell of the operation were not chosen on the basis of their experience in logistics. They were chosen on the grounds of political expediency, in fact, to reflect the principle of equitable participation by the contributing countries. It is recommended that in any future operations it should be the task of the Plans, Operation and Logistics arm of ESMC to ensure that the appropriate personnel with the requisite skills and experience are selected for the logistics cell of the operation.

It was reported that in line with the recommendation for contributing countries to provide their own logistical needs, contributing countries which brought along their own communication systems preferred to use them for communication purposes rather than those recommended by the general command. One possible reason for this, may have been their familiarity with their own systems. To forestall the occurrence of such a scenario in future, it is suggested that a

uniform set of communication systems be adopted, and that selected personnel should be trained on how to man them.

Organizations are important links in any decision – making and implementation process. Their ability to contribute effectively to the entire decisional process depend hugely on the existence of Standard Operating Procedure, requisite manpower and logistics; it is therefore in the acknowledgement of this that the above recommendations have been made.

## REFERENCES

- Anning, K. ( 1999) “ Negotiations, Conflict and Compromise: The Liberian Challenge to a Sub – Regional Security System”. In *Accord*, No. 2/ 99.
- Ate, B. ( 1983) “ The Presence of France in West – Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem to Nigeria”. In *Millennium*, Vol. 12, No.2.
- Howe, H.M. and Urell, A. ( 1998) “ African Security in the Cold War Political Era: An Examination of Multinational vs Private Security Forces”. In *African Journal of Political Science*. New Series Vol. 3, No. 1 ( June).
- Iweze, C. ( 1993) “ Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG”. In *Nigeria in International Peace – keeping, 1960 – 1992*, Vogt, M.A and Ekoko, E.E. (ed.) pp. 270.London: St Martin Press.
- Janis, I ( 1972) *Group – Think – A Psychological Studies of Policy – Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Mazrui, A. ( 1983) “ The World Economy and the African – Afro American Connection”. Seminar on the *Dynamics of the African/ Afro American Connection*, University of Liberia, Monrovia, 10 – 15 June.
- Sesay, A. ( 1999) “ECOMOG and Sub – Regional Security in West Africa”. In *Conflict Trends*, September.
- Williams, I ( 1993) “ Strategic Planning of Peace –keeping Operations”. In *Nigeria in International Peace- keeping, 1960 – 1992*, edited by Vogt, M.A and Ekoko, E.E. London: St. Martin Press.

**Appendices : Table 1.I Composition of ECOMOG as at 27 August 1990:**

| <u>Country:</u> | <u>Troop Strength</u>   |
|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Gambia          | A Riffle Company ( Coy) |
| Guinea          | A Battalion             |
| Ghana           | A Battalion             |
| Nigeria         | A Battalion             |
| Sierra Leone    | A Battalion             |

The naval and Air Force personnel was drawn from Ghana and Nigeria. The Ghana Navy contributed three naval vessels, namely: 1. A Fighting Patrol Graft

2 . A Naval ship

3 . A Merchant ship

The Nigerian Navy contributed five vessels, namely:

1. A Landing Ship Tank.

2. Two Fighting Patrol Graft

3. A Tug Boat.

4. An Oil Tanker.

Source : ( Iweze, 1993: 220)

**Table 1.2 Composition of ECOMOG as at February 1993:**

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Troop Strength</u> | <u>National Total</u> |
|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Gambia         | 150                   | 900                   |
| Ghana          | 1,500                 | 11,900                |
| Guinea         | 600                   | 9,700                 |
| Mali           | 6                     | 7,300                 |
| Nigeria        | 9,000                 | 94,500                |
| Sierra Leone   | 700                   | 3,150                 |
| Total          | 11, 256               | 146,350               |

Senegal had withdrawn its 1600 troops at this time.

Sources : IISS, *The Military Balance 1991 – 1992* ( London: IISS, 1991): 136 – 7; and *West Africa* ( 23 – 9 November 1992): 2008 – 11.

**Table 1.3 The Armed Factions in the Liberian Conflict**

| <b>Faction</b>                                               | <b><u>Troop Strength</u></b> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia ( INPFL) | 500                          |
| The National patriotic Front of Liberia ( NPFL)              | 25,000                       |
| United Liberation Movement for Democracy ( ULIMO- K)         | 2,000                        |
| - - - - - ( ULIMO –J)                                        | 8,000                        |
| Armed Forces of Liberia ( AFL)                               | 9,000                        |
| Liberian Peace Council ( LPC)                                | 4,500                        |
| LOFA Defence Force ( LDF)                                    | 750                          |

Source : *Accord* website : <http://accord/actors.htm>.

**Table 1.4 The Composition of ECOMOG as at 1995:**

| <b>Country</b> | <b><u>Troop Strength</u></b> |
|----------------|------------------------------|
| Nigeria        | 4,908                        |
| Ghana          | 1,028                        |
| Guinea         | 609                          |
| Tanzania       | 747                          |
| Uganda         | 760                          |
| Sierra Leone   | 355                          |
| Gambia         | 10                           |
| Mali           | 10                           |

Total 8,430

Source : United Nations Department of Public Information. Publication on 4 July 1997 at  
UN website : [www.un.org.Depts/DPICD/missions/unomil](http://www.un.org.Depts/DPICD/missions/unomil) – bhtml.

**Table 1.5: The Gross Domestic Product of the Various ECOWAS Member States as at 1996:**

| <b>Country:</b> | <b>GDP</b> |
|-----------------|------------|
| Benin           | 1,522m     |
| Cote d'Ivoire   | 6,716m     |
| Gambia          | 363m       |
| Burkina Faso    | 1,856m     |
| Cape Verde      | 334m       |
| Guinea          | 3,395      |
| Guinea Bissau   | 243m       |
| Ghana           | 5,421m     |
| Mali            | 1,871m     |
| Niger           | 1,540m     |
| Nigeria         | 35,200m    |
| Mauritania      | 1,027m     |
| Liberia         | 2,800m     |
| Senegal         | 3,881m     |
| Sierra Leone    | 843m       |
| Togo            | 981m       |

Source: Africa Confidential ( 3 January, 1997) Vol. 38, No.1 p.2.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abiodun, A.(1998) "Commentary on the Liberia Peace Process." In *Accord* at <http://www.c-r.org>. *Accord* (1996) website:<http://www-c-r.org>.
- Adedeji, A. (ed) (1996) *Africa Beyond Dispossession and Dependence*. London: Zed.
- Adisa, J. (1993) "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Under Currents and the Burden of Community Spirit." In *Nigeria in International Institutions*, edited by Jide Owoeye, Ibadan: College Press.
- Africa Event* (1995) January, p.39
- African Insight* (1993) Vol.23 No.1
- African Watch* (1993) Vol.5.No.6, March 3.
- Allison, G.T. (1969) "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." In *American Political Science Review*, (63) pp.689 - 718.
- Ibid. (1971) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*: Boston, little: Brown and Co.
- Amin, Samir. (1977) *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. Hassock, Sussex: Harvester Press
- Anning, K. (1999) "Negotiation, Conflict and Compromise: The Liberian Challenge to a Sub-Regional Security System." In *Accord*, No.2/99.
- Ate, B.(1983) "The Presence of France in West – Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem to Nigeria." In *Millennium*, Vol.12.No.2.
- Ayam, J. (1998) "Nigeria and the ECOWAS Peacekeeping Initiative in Liberia." In the *Journal of the Third World Spectrum*. Vol.5.No.2.pp. 98 - 104
- Axelrode, R.(1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.pp.152 – 4.
- Braybrook et.al.(1963) *A Strategy of Decision*.N.Y: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Brecher, M.(1990) "Rebel's Saga: Mass. Jail to Show Down for Power." In *Boston Globe*, July 1990,p.35.
- Caporaso. J. (1978) "Introduction: Dependence and Dependency in Global System." In *International Organization*, 32 (1).
- Chege, M. (1992) "Remembering Africa." In *Foreign affairs*, Vol.71,No.1. pp.146- 163
- Clapham, C.(1996) *Africa and the International System*. Cambridge University Press:

- Conteh – Morgan, Kadivar, S. (1998) “Sierra Leones Response to ECOMOG: The Imperative to Geographic Proximity.” In *Peace Keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P. and Conteh Morgan (ed) N.Y: St. Martin Press.
- Cyert, R.M. and March, J. (1963) *A Behavioural Theory of the Firm*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice – Hall Inc..
- Destler, J.M.(1972) *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Dougherty et.al.(1971) *Contending Theories of International Relations*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Dugard, J. (1994) *International Law: A South African Perspective*. Nabeni, Cape: Rustica Press.
- Dunn, E(1998) “Liberia’s Internal Responses to ECOMOG’s Interventionist Efforts.” In *Peace Keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*. Magyar, K.P. and Conteh – Morgan (ed) N.Y: St. Martin Press.pp.76 – 105
- Financial Times of London* (1991) 27 June.
- Frankel, J.(1963) *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision – Making*. N.Y. : Oxford University Press.
- Guardian of Lagos* (1990) p. 11. June.
- Ibid.(1993) 27 March.
- Holsti, K.J.(1967) *International Politics: A Frame work for Analysis*. N.Y.: Prentice Hall Inc.
- Howe, H.M. and Urell, A.(1998) “African Security in the Post Cold War Era: An Examination of Multinational vs Private Security Forces.” In *African Journal of Political Science*. New Series Vol.3 No.1 (June).
- Hume, D. (1875) *Essays Moral Political and Literary*. Vol.1.p.110.London: St. Martin Press
- Inegbedion, J. (1994) “ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective” In the *Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS*, Shaw, T.M. and Okolo, J.E. ( ed.) London: St. Martin Press.
- Iweze. C. (1993) “Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG.” In *Nigeria in International Peace – Keeping 1960 – 1992*, Vogt M.A. and Ekoko, E.E. (ed) London: St.Martin Press.pp.217 –243.
- Janis, I. (1972) *Group – Think: A Psychological Studies of Policy – Decisions and Fiascoes*.Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.



- Kieh, K. (1998) "International Organization and Peace – Keeping in Africa: Introduction." In *Peace Keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*. N.Y.: St. Martin Press.
- Kissinger, H. (1957) *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. N.Y: Harper.
- Korany, B.(1986) *How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis*. Boulder, Co:West View Press.
- Le Figaro* (1992) 8 January.
- Manchester Guardian* (1958) 29 September.
- Magyar, K.P.(ed) (1998) "Conclusion: Liberia's Peace Keeping Lessons For Africa." In *Peace – Keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia..* N.Y. : St. Martin Press.
- March, J.and Simon,H.(1968) *Organizations*. N.Y. : John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Martin, F.(1995) "Continuity and Change in Franco – African Relations." In *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No.33 (March)
- May, T.(1998) "Nigerian Foreign Policy and its Participation in ECOMOG." In *Peace – Keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, in Magyar K.P. and Conteh – Morgan (ed) N.Y.: St.Martin Press.
- Mazrui, Ali (1983) "The World Economy and the African / Afro – American Connection." Seminar on *The Dynamics of the African /Afro-American Connection*, University of Liberia, Monrovia. 10 – 15 June.
- Morgenthau, H.J. ( 1967) *Politics Among Nations*. N.Y. : Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mortimer, R. ( 1998) " Senegal's Role in ECOMOG: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis." In *Peace – Keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P.and Conteh – Morgan (ed) N.Y: St Martin Press.
- New African* (1992) October, pp.11 – 16.
- News Watch* (1990) 15 August.
- Patchen, M.(1965) "Decision Theory and the Study of National Action." In *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, ix.pp.165 – 169
- Reno, W. (1998) *War Lord Politics and African States*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Riker, W.(1962) *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven.: Yale University.
- Rosati, J.(1987) *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community.: Beliefs and their Impact on Behaviour*. Columbia.: University of South Carolina Press.

- Rosecrance, R.(1996) "The Rise of the Virtual State." *In Foreign Affairs*, 75/4 July – August.pp. 45 – 61.
- Sawyer, A.(1992) "The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia." San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Schelling, T.(1962) *The Strategy of Conflict*. N.Y. : Oxford University Press.
- Sessay, A.(1999) "ECOMOG and Sub Regional Security in West Africa" *In Conflict Trends*, September, p. 27
- Shaw, T. (1978) "Inequalities and Interdependence in Africa and Latin America." *In Cultures and Development*, Vol.10.No.1p.29.
- Simon, H.(1968) *The Sciences of the Artificial*. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press.
- Singer, J.D. (1963) "Inter – Nation Influence: A Formal Model." *In American Political Science Review*. LVII pp.428 – 430.
- Snidal, D.(1985) "Co-ordination vr. Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Co-operation and Regimes". *In American Political Science Review*, 79. Pp. 923 – 42
- Snyder, et al. (1963) *Foreign Policy Decision – Making*. N.Y.: Glencoe.
- Spanier, J. (1987) *Games Nation Play*. Washington: C.Q. Press.
- Starke J. (1984) *Introduction to international Law*. London: Butterworths.
- Stein, A. (1983) "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchical World." *In International Regimes*. Stephen Krasner (ed.)Ithaca: Cornwell University Press.
- Steinbruner, J.(1974) *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision – New Dimensions of Political Analysis*.Princeton.: University Press.
- Tarr, B.(1993) "ECOWAS ECOMOG Initiative: A Liberian Perspective." *In Nigerian Institute of International Affairs*. Vol.13, Nos 3-4 March –April.
- Ibid. ( 1998) "Extra – African Interest in the Liberian Conflict" *In Peace – keeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Magyar, K.P and Conteh – Morgan ( ed.) N.Y.: St. Martin Press.
- United Nations Public Information Department (1997). Website: [un.org/dept/mission/unomil/bhtml](http://un.org/dept/mission/unomil/bhtml) .
- Verba, S. (1963) *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: University Press.
- Vogt, M. (1991) "Nigerian's Participation in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group - ECOMOG." *In Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.17, Nol pp.101 – 122.

Walker, S.G. (1967) "The Interface Between Beliefs and Behaviour.: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War." In *Journal of Conflict Resolution.*, 21, pp. 129 – 168.

Wallerstein I (1999) *Geo – Politics and Geo – Culture: Essays on Changing World System*: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, I (1993) "Strategic Planning of Peace – Keeping Operations." In *Nigeria in International Peace – Keeping-1960-1992*, edited by Vogt, M.A. and Ekoko, E.E. London: St. Martin Press.

*West Africa* (1987) 27 July, pp. 1430 – 1431.

----- (1990) 3 – 9 August, p.2290.

----- (1990) 3 – 9 September pp. 2390 – 1

----- (1990) 1 – 9 October.

----- (1990) 26 November – 2 December.

----- (1990) 24 –30 December.

----- (1991) 13 – 19 May.

----- (1991) 8 –14 July.

----- (1991) 22 – 28.p. 1204.

----- (1993) 25 – 31 January. pp.102 – 4.

----- (1993) 23 – 29 August.p.1488.