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TITLE.

A Critical Study of the Evidence of Andries
Stockenström before the Aborigines Committee
in 1835, Viewed in the light of his State-
ments and Policies before 1835.

A Thesis for the Degree of
Master of Arts
by
J.M. Urie.

Rhodes University, 1953.

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SUMMARY

A Critical study of the Evidence of
Andries Stockenström before the Aborigines
Committee in 1838, viewed in the light of
his previous Statements and Policies .

CHAPTER IThe Historiography of the Question.(i) The Contemporary Press.

The controversy about Stockenström originated in the contemporary press and the battle of words between John Fairbairn, editor of the South African Commercial Advertiser and Robert Godlonton, editor of the Graham's Town Journal.

The main features of the two opposing points of view may be summed up as follows:

Godlonton and his supporters maintained that Stockenström in his evidence not only refrained from disputing the Philip interpretation of frontier affairs and the causes of the war of 1835, but deliberately produced evidence which he must have known to be untrue or invalid, in order to lend colour to the philanthropist point of view and blacken the colonist in the eyes of the British Government. Not only could his statements on specific incidents, such as the Zeko affair, be refuted, but his general statement of opinion on frontier affairs could be shown to be utterly inconsistent with his previous opinions and policies. This was proved by constant comparison of certain of his statements as Landdrost with the views expressed before the Committee. And this extraordinary change of face, they asserted, could be explained by the fact that Stockenström believed that, in a Parliament dominated by Laeter Hall, where Philip and Duxton constantly had the ear of the Secretary for Colonies, his only hope of gratifying his ardent ambition for high office was to toe the philanthropic line.

Initially, Fairbairn took a more balanced view of the whole issue. He maintained that Stockenström's views on frontier policy had indeed undergone a material change - but not suddenly when he appeared before the Aborigines Committee. The change had occurred when he came into direct and continued contact with frontier affairs, as Commissioner General. From that time on, Fairbairn asserted, his statements of opinion in regard to the old frontier

system, and his statements on specific incidents, were entirely consistent with those so fearlessly made before the Aborigines Committee, as was proved by the fact that Stockenström relied upon his despatches to back up his statements, and frequently referred the Committee to them. Moreover, Fairbairn contended that Stockenström, far from attempting to blacken his fellow-colonists, defended them as a body, while revealing the abuses to which the old system could and did give rise. His appointment to office, according to Fairbairn, was a natural result of his experience and acknowledged abilities. If there were any change of face involved, it was a most gratifying one on the part of the British Government, which could at last see fit to appoint to high office a colonist of liberal views of long standing.

(ii) The Verdict of the Historians.

In general, where they refer to Stockenström, the writers on South African history fall into two main groups: either they accept Godlonton's interpretation, or they avoid all controversial points. Only two make any real attempt at an independent understanding or explanation of Stockenström's position in 1833. They are Professor J.L.M. Branken, in Piet Motief se Leue in die Kolonie, and Professor W.M. Macmillan in Bantu, Boer and Briton.

Godlonton's version appears again in The Case of the Colonists, and finds an echo in J.C. Chase's Annals of the Cape of Good Hope of 1869. The fullest exponent of Godlonton's interpretation is G.M. Theal, who seems to have accepted it more or less in its entirety, and to have judged Stockenström accordingly. This view has never been subjected to thorough criticism since Theal expressed it, though later writers have in some cases modified it. The problem of the assumed hiatus in Stockenström's career, from 1833 to the end of the Lieutenant-Governorship, is still untouched. And Theal's version crops up again and again.

Supporters of Theal are Gustav Preller and Edgar H. Brookes and also, as far as can be ascertained from passing references, S.F.N. Gie, Eric Stockenström, Manfred Nathan and P. van Biljon. "Justus, in The Wrongs of the Caffre Nation, published in 1837, also regarded Stockenström as having radically changed his views. But, being an extreme philanthropist, he approved the supposed change.

However, not all the historians have been partisan. In Notes on South African Affairs, Rev. W.B. Boyce, although no admirer of Stockenström, gives a remarkably fair account, avoiding the current derogatory allegations against him. He put the failure of the Lieutenant-Governorship down to the influence of the Fairbairn clique on Stockenström, rather than to any ideas he may have formed in England.

Whatever Sir George Cory's private opinions of Stockenström's extraordinary personality may have been, he contrived to keep them out of his historical works. He is not always strictly accurate in his representations of Stockenström's statements, but he makes no reference to the allegations about him, except in so far as they appear in quotations from the Graham's Town address and petition. He does not imply a sudden and unexpected change of opinion on the part of Stockenström. Nor, though he takes on the whole a very unfavourable view of the Lieutenant-Governorship, does he attribute its failure, as Theal does, to a temporary and sinister digression into philanthropic paths.

Other writers who adopt a neutral stand and neither accept nor refute the allegations against Stockenström are John Noble, E.A. Walker and C.F.J. Mulder.

A new trend in what might be called Stockenström historiography has become apparent in recent years. Professor Keyburn and the students who worked under him have been pioneers in this field. Increasing interest in Stockenström's career has led to a careful study and reevaluation of his work as Landdrost, Commissioner-General and Lieutenant-Governor. To this school belong P.J. van der Merwe, who has a most valuable study of the Landdrost-

ship of both the Stockenström in his Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek; J.D.Pitman, with his thesis on the Commissioner-Generalship; and P.J.Smits, who has made a study of the Lieutenant-Governorship. The latter points out that he has found little ground for Theal's assertion that Stockenström, in giving evidence, turned his back on his previous statements, but does not develop his argument. The general tendency now seems to be to ignore altogether the implications of the allegations about the period from 1833 to 1835.

The only two writers who have attempted to clear up the allegations against Stockenström are Prof.Francken and Prof. Macmillan. In his account in Santa, Boer and Briton, Macmillan makes four important points: that Stockenström's views on frontier policy were the product of a gradual development over years of practical experience; that his philanthropist sympathies were of long standing; that the most significant aspect of his evidence was its critical review of frontier policy as a whole rather than its reference to incidentals; and that it was given before his new appointment was ever in question. In fact, implicit in Macmillan's discussion is the suggestion that the evidence and the appointment were not closely interrelated. Macmillan thus provides the most significant counter-blast so far to the Theal school of thought. In his book, however, in the nature of things, his comments are made virtually in passing, and with little or no reference to any authorities for his conclusions.

Prof.Francken provides a most refreshing contrast to Trellier. In an excellent chapter on the background to the Stockenström-Nettief quarrel, in Piet Nettief se Lewe in die Kolonie, he tackles the question of what Stockenström really did say about the frontier system and the colonists in 1835. Prof.Francken's digest of the evidence is the first clear and completely undistorted version of Stockenström's statements to appear in South African historiography. But he, too, leaves a number of problems connected with the period still untouched.

CHAPTER IIThe Background to the Evidence.

In the light of the allegations against Stockenström, what facts can be regarded as established about this period of his career?

It is clear that Stockenström left South Africa embittered by the failure of the Commissioner-Generalship as a result of what he regarded as arbitrary mismanagement on the part of the colonial authorities. He was determined to resign rather than continue to hold the office as a sinecure. But he was by no means anxious to shake the dust of the Colony from his feet. He had a wife and family to support, he knew his own capabilities as an administrator, he was deeply interested in the Cape and all its problems. He represented his grievances forcibly to the Colonial Office, possibly with the hope that his office might yet be reinstated on an efficient basis. This the Colonial Office could not do, and the Commissioner-Generalship was abolished. Stockenström continued to hope that an office, equivalent to that which he had held, but on a satisfactory basis, would be created, and the Colonial Secretary's promise, that he would again be employed, fulfilled. It seems that his hopes were high when Spring-Rice came to office and when he received the questionnaire on frontier reforms at the end of 1834. His hope gave place to bitter disappointment and bitterness when nothing was done, and the Commissioner-Generalship still rankled. But it was not until the news arrived of the outbreak of war on the Eastern frontier in 1835 that Stockenström finally decided to settle in Sweden and give up all idea of returning to the Cape. He was therefore eager, right until July 1835, at any rate, to hold office.

To speak of his "ardent solicitations for place", however, is to exaggerate - perhaps even completely to distort. He certainly gave the Colonial Office very clearly to understand that he was prepared and anxious to serve at the Cape. He may even have hinted at an appointment in his letter to Spring-

office of 5 November 1834. But he cannot with justice be said to have solicited for office. When he gave evidence in 1836, it is clear that nothing was further from his thoughts than that his evidence would lead him to office. Stockenström appeared before the committee in a mood of indifference, disillusionment and considerable irritation at an unexpected delay in his private arrangements. He was actually on his way to settle up his affairs at the Cape, preparatory to settling in Sweden, when he was called to the Committee. Stockenström did not expect the findings of the Committee to influence colonial policy, and the only result he foresaw from his own evidence was opposition from certain quarters. He made no attempt to make Glenelg's acquaintance and, in fact, avoided the Colonial Office. It was not voluntarily that he supplied the Committee with all the evidence he could lay hands on as to his past character in office. He was evidently surprised even that it was requested. He was, of course, only too ready to comply: he was proud of his record, and always ready to defend his character.

Neither can it be asserted with finality, quite apart from Stockenström's own attitude, that his evidence was the major stepping-stone to his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor. During the period that evidence was being taken, Buxton was not apparently, much in contact with Glenelg except in connection with the business of the Committee. Glenelg was not, at first, vitally interested in the findings of the Committee. He was concerned rather with the immediate problems connected with the war at the Cape, about which not one of the witnesses called during the first session was in a position to give him first-hand information. Buxton's closest contact with him, and his use of the evidence to support various contentions, only commenced nearly a month after Stockenström had finished his evidence. Even then, it seems probable that it was Philip's recommendation, rather than Stockenström's evidence, that was the decisive factor in the summoning of Stockenström.

Philip's recommendation of Stockenström had nothing whatever

to do with any statements made by Stockenström during the time he was in England, since it was made at a time when he could not have known what Stockenström had said or was going to say. It was based upon what he knew of Stockenström and his policy through long years of acquaintance at the Cape.

There, too, began Stockenström's supposed "collusion" with the London philanthropist group. His connection with Buxton and his circle came about through very normal channels. Philip he had known for many years, and had much in common with him, despite their various heated differences on points of expediency and policy. Fringle had been, and became again of his own volition, an intimate friend. Far from seeking "collusion" with the Buxton circle, Stockenström studiously avoided it. He did not even make use of the opportunity of contact with Buxton afforded by Philip's letter of introduction. Through Fringle, he made normal social contact with Buxton and other well-known philanthropists, with whom he discussed the matters that were of deep and vital interest to them all. He knew that they were planning a campaign against the Cape frontier system, which would involve the administration of it by the colonial authorities. Where that campaign would touch other colonial authorities, Stockenström refused his official support, and made his own criticisms only through government channels. Where the campaign seemed likely to touch himself, he was quick to defend himself, his principles and his policy, as he did in the Memoir of 1833, and the evidence of 1835 and 1836.

From the general tone of that defence, from remarks in private letters, and from some evidence in Fringle's Narrative of a Residence in South Africa, it does not seem that Stockenström in any way attempted to slur over the fact that definite differences did exist between his views and those of the philanthropists, or that he tried, from any motives whatever, to mould his ideas to suit their opinions.

CHAPTER III

A Critical Study of the Evidence:
The Eastern Frontier.

- (i) The Causes of the Frontier Dissensions; the early Expansion of the Colony; the Commandos of 1818 and 1819; the Ciskei Treaties.

Reviewing the causes of frontier dissensions, in his evidence on 14 August 1855, Stockenström referred to the encroachments of the whites on the aborigines. This aroused great criticism in the Graham's Town Journal, which asserted that this was a new attitude to frontier relations in one who had himself been enriched by the very process of encroachment. There are two flaws in this assertion:

(a) It implied that Stockenström was referring to encroachments on Bantu territory on the Eastern frontier. It is clear, both from the statements in evidence and from a similar discussion in Stockenström's letter to Spring-Rice, the Colonial Secretary, in November 1834, that he meant the encroachments of whites, and later also of Bantu, on Hottentot territory.

(b) It suggested that the idea that the whites encroached upon the aborigines in South Africa was a view not previously held by Stockenström. Despatches from as far back as 14 February 1822 reveal that Stockenström had long considered the whites in the 17th and 18th centuries to have been the aggressors against the Bushmen and Hottentots, and to have provoked retaliation by an oppressive policy.

In his evidence, Stockenström did not accuse the 18th century frontiersmen in so many words of the first aggressions against the Kaffirs. But this is implied in certain passages in the evidence in 1855, and expressed in a passage in the Memoir he wrote in 1835, and one in the letter to Spring-Rice of 1834. This had not been Stockenström's original attitude. Since the days of his father's treacherous murder by Kaffirs in 1711, the Kaffirs had been to Stockenström "the Enemy". He regarded them as the aggressors, against whom the colony

must always act on the defensive. And he played a vigorous role in the campaigns of 1811-1812, 1813, 1818 and 1819. But the change in Stockenström's attitude probably had its origin in the view of the frontier policy which he came to hold when, as Commissioner-General, he became aware of abuses of the reprisal system.

Colonel Wade, in giving evidence, had considerable comment to offer on Stockenström's statements in connection with Brereton's commando of 1818. It seems likely that he considered Stockenström deliberately to have presented a false picture of the actual reasons for the commando. But the instructions given to Brereton by Major Rogers bear out Stockenström's repeated statements to the Committee that the primary reason for undertaking the commando was to assist Gaika against the confederate chiefs, and not to punish the Kaffirs for depredations on the colony. Stockenström's despatches of the period show that this was his own impression at the time of the commando. In giving evidence, he did not deny that there had been depredations on the part of the Kaffirs: he stated that the cattle captured were used partly to compensate the colonists for losses. It is impossible to determine from the despatches whether or not Stockenström approved of the 1818 commando at the time as a measure necessary for the security of the frontier. If he did, it is true that he did not emphasize this point in evidence, his only reference to this aspect being his statement that the government had presumably decided to intervene from "motives of precaution."

In his statements in 1833, 1834 and 1835, however, Stockenström made it very clear that he considered the seizure of enormous quantities of Kaffir cattle by Brereton's commando to have been the primary cause of the disasters of 1819. This was by no means a new point of view, but one most forcibly expressed by Stockenström in a despatch written on 12 February 1819.

Neither in 1819 nor at any time afterwards, however, did Stockenström express any doubts as to the necessity for the 1819 campaign, after the ghastly depredations which had taken place and the attitude which the Kaffirs had assumed. Accordingly, in his evidence in 1835, he emphasized the "unavoidable necessity" of Willshire's campaign, and the practical advantage of shifting the boundary line from the untenable Fish River jungle to the line of the Chumie Ridge and the Keiskama River. Upon the absolute necessity of maintaining the boundary line of 1819 once it had been established, and the unwisdom of ever allowing the Kaffirs to re-cross it into the Ceded Territory, Stockenström had always insisted. In despatches on 14 September 1823 and 21 November 1823, he stated his reasons very clearly, and he repeated the substance of these two despatches in detail and accurately in his evidence on 19 August 1835.

Godlonton devoted considerable attention to the last point in this section of Stockenström's evidence, viz. his statement, in answer to Q. 595, that he could not say whether there had been any Kaffir irruption during Donkin's administration, since he had had no further connection with the frontier at that time. It was with this statement that Godlonton compared, in parallel columns, a despatch revealing that Stockenström must, in fact, have been aware of depredations during this period. It was in his own interest not to emphasize these, since he was a known and consistent advocate of the policy favoured by Donkin, as a solution to the frontier problem. He may, therefore, have been evading the point in his answer. But in the light of the fact that he had not elsewhere in his evidence denied aggressions or cruelty on the part of the Kaffirs, it does not seem to warrant the attention it received at the hands of the Graham's Town Journal.

In seeing as the salient feature of this part of Stockenström's evidence his insistence that Gaika's cession of the Neutral Territory was unwilling, Godlonton obscured the significance

of Stockenstrom's emphasis on the necessity for the 1819 campaign and the advisability of shifting the boundary and maintaining that of 1819.

(ii) The Expulsion of Macomo and the Settling of the Ceded Territory.

Stockenstrom's statements on 19 August 1833 on the expulsion of Macomo were entirely consistent with his previously expressed views on the subject. He made no attempt to whitewash Macomo, although he could not but have been aware of the opinion of Duxton and Fringle on the subject.

The missionary Shaw had virtually accused Stockenstrom of making Macomo's attack on the Tambookies the pretext for expelling him in order to provide a site for a Hottentot settlement, but the documents show that the eventual expulsion of Macomo was, quite clearly, as Stockenstrom stated in his evidence, the logical outcome of his views on the impolicy of allowing the Kaffirs to return to that strategic sector of the Ceded Territory. Stockenstrom made no attempt to shelter behind Shaw's version of the expulsion, which might have served to soften the philanthropists' criticism of his policy.

Stockenstrom stated in evidence that the Kat River Hottentot settlement had occurred to him as a means of executing Sir Rufane Doekin's plan of settling the Ceded Territory with colonists, of which he had always approved. His despatches to Cole in 1829 reveal that he did firmly recommend the settlement of the Ceded ~~of~~ Territory after the expulsion of Macomo as the only guarantee of future security, and that he then suggested that the Hottentots might be suitable settlers.

Stockenstrom told the Committee that he had drawn up Suggestions as to the conditions upon which farmers could obtain land in the Ceded Territory, because he considered that the government had the right to lay down stricter regulations for these people than for those on the western side of the old boundary, except for some minor details, such as, for instance, the number of armed men required to defend each farm. Stocken-

strom's description of his plan corresponds to that contained in his suggestions to Cole in 1829.

His reasons for regarding such a plan as essential constitute his major criticisms of the abuse of the reprisal system.

Conclusion: In this part of the evidence, the most significant apparent deviation from Stockenström's earlier views as Landdrost appears in the implied censure of the Eastern frontier colonists as the first aggressors against the Kaffirs and in the criticism of Somerset's reprisal system.

(iii) The Reprisal System

(a) Stockenström's Earlier Views on the Reprisal System.

As Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, Stockenström was concerned with only a small sector of the Kaffir frontier. After the creation of the district of Somerset, he had no direct connection with the Eastern frontier. There are therefore few direct references to the policy on the Kaffir frontier.

The absence of any criticism of the patrol and reprisal system, in instances where Stockenström had occasion to refer to the Eastern frontier, suggests that, as Landdrost, he was not alive to any extensive abuse of that system. In particular, his despatches expressing strong disapproval of Bourke's frontier policy, suggest that, on the Bushman frontier, Stockenström had not come across the abuses of the reprisal system which Bourke's suspension of it was designed to check.

But Stockenström was by no means unaware of the dangers inherent in the system of allowing parties of burghers, headed by field-cornets, to go in pursuit of marauders. The fear that the "revenge motive would lead to "unnecessary bloodshed" seems to have obsessed him. He was aware of the existence of irregularities, as references in despatches from as early as 1817 show, although these do not appear to have been the general rule. He made a point of insisting on immediate pursuit of robbers, so as to avoid the possible punishment of the innocent. And he conducted a careful inquiry into the proceed-

ings of every patrol that went out.

Stockenstrom realized the tendency of frontier farmers to be careless and to exaggerate petty depredations on the part of scattered bands of marauders into frontier alarms. He always insisted that habitual marauders should be firmly dealt with. But he was extremely cautious lest the whole community be punished for depredations on the part of scattered groups, probably driven to theft by need.

Before the introduction of Somerset's policy, Stockenstrom followed the same policy towards the Kaffir kraals as towards the Bushman kraals: no kraal was to be in any way interfered with unless there were incontestable proofs of its guilt. Even after the introduction of the reprisal system, Stockenstrom evidently preferred the seizure only of cattle known to have been stolen from the colony.

Conclusion: While Stockenstrom as landdrost may not have been conscious of any extensive abuse of the patrol and reprisal system as it existed on the Eastern frontier, his experience of the frontiersmen may in some measure have prepared him for what he evidently found there during his Commissioner-Generalship. And the general principles upon which he appears to have based his policy as landdrost prepare us for many of the features of his Eastern frontier policy.

During his first tour of the Eastern frontiers as Commissioner-General, Stockenstrom seems to have found nothing in any way to alter his ideas on the frontier system. He again gave expression to views on Bourke's system which may very possibly have been instrumental in persuading Cole to abolish that system and re-introduce the system of pursuit 'on the spoor'.

But on 5 May 1839, reporting on the situation after the expulsion of Basuto, Stockenstrom launched the first of a series of despatches severely criticizing the abuse of the reprisal system. These despatches were worded quite as strongly as anything he said in evidence before the Committee in 1855. His

attitude definitely changed during April-May 1839, the first period he had ever spent on that sector of the frontier during a period of frontier alarm. J. B. Pitman speaks merely of the developing of a clear policy towards Eastern frontier problems, and does not bring out the change distinctly.

Stockenström's knowledge of the Northern frontier had taught him the need for the utmost caution in the operation of the patrol system. But on the whole, his experience of the Northern frontiersmen led him to defend the colonists against charges of injustice, and to support their pleas for the pursuit of marauders. It seems quite evident that in 1839, when Bourke's system was suspended, Stockenström realized fully, for the first time, exactly what Bourke had realized about the Eastern frontier three years before, when he insisted on putting a stop to the system of pursuit "on the spear." Although Stockenström came to understand the reason for Bourke's policy, he did not agree with him as to the means he had adopted to check the abuses. The utmost vigilance on the part of the colonists, and the immediate pursuit and punishment of marauders, across the boundaries when necessary, remained the bases of his policy. He ~~regarded~~ ^{regarded} the appointment of responsible field-cornets to supervise the patrols, and the prohibition of "reprisals" of Kaffir cattle, as ~~the~~ the safest checks upon abuses of the patrol system.

Stockenström's attitude towards all aspects of Northern frontier policy, with its different conditions, remained fundamentally unaltered throughout this period. That is to say, he cannot be said suddenly to have succumbed to the views of Philip and the philanthropist group. His attitude to this group as exemplified in his report on Philip's Return of Missions at the end of 1839 also makes this clear.

(b) Stockenström's Attitude towards the Colonists as Landdrost and Commissioner-General.

Notwithstanding Stockenström's evident awareness of the faults of the colonists, perhaps the most striking fact which emerges from a study of his papers is his complete sympathy with the point of view of the frontiersmen. He was always ready to put the colonists' case.

He refused to countenance the assertion that his own generation of colonists had brought their sufferings at the hands of the Bushmen upon themselves. And he was quick to defend them, especially against the charges made by the Griquas, who found supporters in Dr Philip and the London missionaries.

Stockenström was not afraid to admit his sympathies with the colonists to the Colonial Secretary in England, as the conclusion to his letter to Spring-kice in 1834 shows.

Conclusion: The documents of the Landdrostship and the Commissioner-Generalship justify Stockenström's stating, towards the end of his evidence in 1836, that it had always been the most agreeable part of his duty to espouse the cause of his countrymen, though he considered it inconsistent with that duty to justify or ~~even to~~ deny crimes which some of them might commit.

(c) The Reprisal System: Stockenström's Statements 1833-1836.

A digest of Stockenström's statements in evidence on the subject of the patrol and reprisal system reveals that the main points of criticism correspond to those made during his Commissioner-Generalship.

Stockenström's main criticism of Son-ruel's system was that the prospect of being able to get Kaffir cattle, if one's own were not discovered, not only set a bounty upon carelessness, but provided an irresistible temptation to some people to misrepresent their losses. His account of the abuses to which the system could lead represented his reasons for determining to put a stop to the taking of Kaffir cattle upon the frontier.

In illustration both of his reasons for wishing his system adhered to, and of the violation of it on the frontier during the latter part of his Commissioner-Generalship, Stockenström quoted the cases of Erasmus, Scheepers and Dreyer. The evidence does not seem to bear out the allegation that Stockenström used these cases deliberately to blacken the frontier colonists or that he knew his facts to be unfounded. He was clearly prepared and even anxious to have his statements investigated, quoting documents or names in each case.

It seems very clear that Stockenström did not intend his criticism of the abuses to which the reprisal system was subject to apply to the colonists in general. He had the Ceded Territory specifically in mind. And he stated quite explicitly, in the Memoir of 1833 and in answer to questions 1004 and 1016, that the majority of colonists deplored the system and desired only peace and the protection of their property.

Stockenström denied that the Kaffirs could be described as a "nation of thieves" or as "savages". But he made no attempt as did many philanthropists, to idealize the Kaffir character, as his answers to questions 1045, 1046, 1047 and 1391, and passages in the Memoir of 1833 and the letter to Spring-lie in 1834 show.

The absolute necessity for protecting the colonists against robbers and marauders was the first principle which Stockenström expounded in the Memoir of 1833. He repeated the same opinion forcibly in his letter of 1834. And it recurs constantly in the evidence.

Stockenström drew a distinction between "commandos" and "reprisal patrols". His answer to q. 2149 seems to indicate that it was the reprisal system to which he objected, and that he evidently approved commandos under certain conditions. It can, however, be argued, as Prof. Cronken has shown, that there are statements in his evidence which definitely carry the implication that he condemned commandos in general. Other passages, again, convey the impression that Stockenström preferred

commandos under government authority to the use of the burgher patrol force - which, if applied to the Northern frontier, was not the case.

Part of the difficulty lies in the loose way in which the terms commando, patrol, commando system and reprisal system were used. It is possible that, in the evidence, Stockenström and his questioners were sometimes using the same words for different conceptions, with the consequent lack of consistency. The explanation lies mainly in the differing conditions on the Northern and Eastern frontiers.

On the Northern Bushman frontier, Stockenström preferred the use of small burgher patrols to pursue robbers "on the Spear". Here, large-scale punitive commandos, sent out some time after the raids, could not possibly trace the real Bushman depredators, and the innocent might then be punished.

On the Eastern frontier, conditions differed, and the fact that the Kaffirs possessed cattle complicated matters. Here, Stockenström insisted that the Patrol and reprisal system led to abuses. He urged the pursuit of marauders "on the spear", but evidently preferred the burghers to act in conjunction with a disciplined military patrol, in order to lessen the danger that Kaffir cattle might be seized. As a further precaution, he forbade absolutely the "reprisal" of Kaffir cattle by a patrol. But, where a whole kraal could be proved guilty of habitual marauding, a commando, consisting of a military force, aided by burghers, could and should be sent against it, to punish the Kaffirs and seize their cattle to indemnify the colonists. Such government-authorized commandos on the Eastern frontier Stockenström believed to be both necessary and permissible, provided the utmost caution were exercised to prevent the calling out of commandos unless the provocation were very strong. It was criminal, he insisted, to send a commando to punish a whole community for false alarms or the depredations of individuals. Such a commando, he maintained, was simply, to the few abandoned frontiersmen who hoped to derive benefit from it, an easy,

lucrative, but most demoralizing form of retaliation, and to the mass of well-disposed farmers, a source of danger and annoyance. But the abuses which Stockenström described were those which took place on patrols.

When, therefore, Stockenström told the Committee that Englishmen "very often" served on commando, and that the English settlers of Albany were liable to be called upon as well as the Dutch Boers, and often were, he was surely implying no slight upon the men of Albany. The annoyance of Godlonton, and later Chase and Cory, at this section of the evidence is apparently the result of their impression that "commando" and "patrol and reprisal" system were the same thing. Chase stated incorrectly that the Albany settlers were specifically exempt from commando service. They were exempt for three years after arrival. And, although English settlers were only once officially levied for service before 1836, see many did apparently go out on commando with the Dutch farmers as volunteers. Stockenström therefore probably gave the information in good faith, under the impression that the Englishmen had been levied in the same way as the Dutch.

Conclusion: In his evidence on the reprisal system, Stockenström cannot with justice be said materially to have contradicted his former statements or to have attempted deliberately to blacken the case of the colonists as a whole.

(iv) Stockenström's Plans for the Frontier: before and after 1835.

As Commissioner-General, Stockenström envisaged a policy which, by capitalizing the eagerness of the chiefs within the Ceded Territory to maintain friendly relations with the Colonial Government and retain their land, would enlist their co-operation in the defence of the frontier. The dense population he considered essential for the Ceded Territory, was to consist of colonists, Hottentot and European - on the one hand, and Kaffirs on the other, each group with its own clearly defined areas of settlement. For each group the Colonial Government reserved the right

to lay down specific regulations, and to expel from the territory those who infringed the regulations. Although the authority of the Kaffir chiefs in their own areas was recognized, all inhabitants of the Ceded Territory were bound to recognize the undisputed right of the Colonial Government of the whole area right up to the boundary of 1819. To this latter point Stockenström adhered very firmly. No part of the territory, he maintained, should be ceded entirely to the Kaffirs as Kaffirs.

Stockenström regarded the tribes beyond the Keiskama as quite independent. There is no indication that he ever contemplated incorporating them. The degree to which he was prepared to acknowledge the independence and sovereignty of the chiefs is suggested by his policy towards the Griquas. He warned the emigrant farmers against molesting the Griquas, and advised that in case of non-compliance the offender should be left to the native chiefs to be dealt with according to the laws and customs existing amongst them, and the government should not interfere on his behalf.

On the Northern frontier, Stockenström would have solved the problem of the Bushman lands by setting aside reserves for them. He would have obviated the possible evil consequences of the Northward migration of the colonists by a scheme of systematic colonization under government supervision.

The scheme which Stockenström proposed to the Secretary of State for Colonies in 1834 was based upon the ideas which he had contemplated, and in some cases even begun to put into practice, during his Commissioner-Generalship and before.

The leading features of the plan Stockenström outlined to the Committee in 1835 are those familiar from a study of his previous papers. Two variations appear. One passage may be interpreted to mean that Stockenström now contemplated the incorporation of the Griqua tribes, where formerly he had included them in the category of independent groups with whom treaties would be made but which would not be incorporated.

The other more significant variation is the possibility he

suggested of an arrangement whereby compensation might be obtained through the chiefs, and the aggressors even brought to punishment, without using military violence on every occasion. This had not hitherto been explicitly laid down as a policy in any of his statements. The arrangement he suggested, more or less tentatively, in 1836, is, however, implicit in the obligation which, according to his 1829 scheme, rested upon all the Kaffir chiefs to capture and deliver up to the colonial authorities any plunderers or stolen property found within their territory, whether a colonial party had yet come in pursuit or not.

In Stockenström's letter to Glenelg on 7 January 1836, the only new feature which appears in his proposals is the suggestion that residents should be appointed in the Kaffir kraals to act as consuls on behalf of the Colonial Government. It was an idea of which his own practical experience of the value of his ionaries as agents amongst the native tribes naturally would have led him to approve, although he had not suggested it before. There are two possible sources for it: (1) An article in the Commercial Advertiser of 22 February 1834, in which Fairbairn made the suggestion of a British resident in Kaffirland - a proposal which Philip approved in his letter to D'Urban on 13 March 1834. (2) A similar suggestion from Rev. A. Shaw, in an open letter to the Earl of Aberdeen, quoted in his evidence on 7 August 1835.

J. D. Pitman, in the Commissioner-Generalship of Andries Stockenström, is incorrect in supposing that Stockenström's disapproval of D'Urban's policy of incorporating the Kaffir tribes beyond the Keiskamma represents a fundamental divergence from the policy suggested by him to Spring-aid in 1834. Stockenström himself explained to Glenelg that he had at that time envisaged the incorporation of various tribes within the Ceded Territory, but not of those beyond the boundary of 1819.

In Stockenström's statements with regard to a general frontier policy, given in evidence in 1835, no features appear which he had not referred to and discussed, either in the letter

to Spring-Rice in 1834, or in the plan which he outlined to Glenelg in January 1835.

Stockenström and Philip are normally cited as having played the largest part in the moulding of Glenelg's ideas, particularly as expressed in the despatch of 26 December 1835.

There are several features which appear both in Stockenström's evidence and in Glenelg's despatch. But to lay too much stress on the similarity of Stockenström's and Glenelg's ideas is to ignore the fact that these are points on many of which the South African witnesses concurred.

The blame for Glenelg's unbalanced opinion of the enormities perpetrated by the colonists upon the aborigines cannot, however, be laid upon the witnesses before the Committee in 1835. There is general agreement with Stockenström's view that, though in a large community, unpleasant characters must be expected, the colonists as a whole were law-abiding. It is true that only Stockenström gives concrete instances of the irregularities the possibility of which some witnesses admitted. In this respect, his evidence may be said to have lent more support to Philip's criticism of the reprisal system, which Buxton had brought to Glenelg's notice, than that of other witnesses. But it must be borne in mind that there is ample proof in Stockenström's evidence that he did not intend his strictures to apply to the frontier colonists as a whole. Had Glenelg made a thorough study of Stockenström's evidence when he wrote the December despatch, he must surely have been aware of this.

Two other features of the December despatch suggest that Glenelg had not made a thorough study of Stockenström's evidence:

(1) It is hardly credible that anyone who had paid the attention which Glenelg is supposed to have done to Stockenström's evidence could have failed to be aware of the existence of large numbers of European settlers in the Ceded Territory on the western side of the Kat. It was only as a result of Stockenström's recommendations in 1835 that Glenelg was persuaded not to insist on the abandonment of the entire Ceded Territory.

(ii) It is unlikely that anyone strongly under the influence of Stockenström's ideas would have proposed a boundary other than that of 1819 for the Colony.

Conclusion: While bearing in mind the possibility that Burton used selected extracts from Stockenström's evidence to drive home Philip's ideas, one should be wary of exaggerating the general influence of Stockenström's own ideas upon Glenelg in 1835.

It has been asserted, by those opposed to Stockenström's treaty system, that Stockenström, in working out his policy, prostituted his principles to serve Glenelg's purpose and retain his favour. Yet, in a study of the treaty, with the Gaike tribes, as an example, features which one would expect to bear the stamp of Stockenström's approval emerge clearly.

Articles 23, 24 and 25, concerning the recovery of stolen cattle, gave rise to most of the unfavourable comment on Stockenström's system. In these articles, the familiar features of his policy appear. The entirely new feature is the prohibition upon the crossing of the boundaries by any patrol or armed party of any description. This is precisely the instruction issued by Bourke in 1835, against which Stockenström had protested very strongly. It is very likely that, in this respect, Stockenström relinquished one of his own ideas to meet Glenelg, for it is probable that the inclusion of this clause was at Glenelg's insistence. But this feature loses the sinister significance which his opponents read into it if the following points are borne in mind:

(1) Stockenström had always approved wholeheartedly of the principle of recognizing the Kaffir tribes and their chiefs as sovereign and independent in their own territory, and to be treated with on a basis of accepted international law. In a plan based upon such a principle, an armed party unauthorized by government could not be allowed for every theft to make an incursion into the territory of another nation state.

(ii) Even in the heat of his arguments against Bourke's system as it applied to the Graaff-Reinet district, Stockenstrom had admitted that it might be applied to the Kaffir community, where there were chiefs who could be held responsible for the acts of their people.

(iii) When Stockenstrom introduced this principle into his treaties, he made definite arrangements for the further proceedings of a patrol in pursuit of stolen cattle. Bourke had made no provision for the punishing of depredators who managed to get across the borders, or the compensating of the colonists.

Stockenstrom himself admitted later that he was not altogether sure of the practicability of the final scheme under the conditions prevailing in the Colony. But all the basic features of the treaty were entirely in accordance with the principles which he has been shown to have held.

Conclusion: There is a remarkable consistency in the fundamental principles of frontier policy to which Stockenstrom gave expression as Commissioner-General, during his stay in England, and as Lieutenant-Governor. Certain basic features constantly recur. It cannot, therefore, with any justification be claimed that Stockenstrom prostituted his fundamental principles in order to ingratiate himself with Exeter Hall or Glenelg.

CHAPTER IV.THE ZEKO INCIDENT AND THE COMMANDO OF 1831.
GLADSTONE vs. STOCKENSTROOM.(i) The Zeko Incident and the Commando of 1831.
The Contemporary Documents.

The first account of the death of Zeko appears in Stockenstroöm's despatch to Bell on 26 June 1830.

Stockenstroöm stated that Erasmus reported that, having collected all the cattle from Zeko's kraals, he was proceeding with them to Fort Wilshire, where the colonial cattle were to be selected, when he was furiously attacked by Zeko and some of his men, who were assisting in driving along the cattle. In the skirmish, Zeko and several of his men were killed. Great quantities of Kaffir cattle were necessarily brought out with the colonial cattle. On hearing of the attack on the Erasmus party, Stockenstroöm decided on the confiscation of all the Kaffir cattle.

The following points emerge from a study of the despatches connected with this commando:

- (1) Stockenstroöm was perfectly satisfied with the proceedings of the commando and the justice of it, although, as in previous despatches in 1830, he censured the carelessness of the colonists and was cautious about the dangers of indemnification.
- (2) There was, when the commando set out, no question of the retention of any Kaffir cattle. Stockenstroöm's views on this were clearly expressed in his correspondence with the Secretary to Government preceding the Commando, and in his written instruction to Field - Commandant Erasmus.
- (3) The removal by Erasmus' party of all the cattle from Zeko's kraals appears to have been in conformity with Somerset's instructions to the Commando. The actual order to bring out all the cattle, from which the colonial cattle could then be selected, would have been given by Somerset. But Stockenstroöm's despatch

certainly suggests that he knew of, and agreed with, this arrangement. In accordance with his principles, on hearing of the attack made by Zeko on the Erasmus party, Stockenstroëm decided upon the confiscation of all the cattle.

The whole affair seems to have assumed for Stockenstroëm a very different complexion in the middle of 1831. While he was investigating the state of the frontier, a propos of Somerset's representatives that a commando into Kaffirland was necessary, he recorded in his Journal Tyali's version of the incident.

Stockenstroëm, Tyali said, had told him that the commando would only seize cattle recognized as colonial property, and that no Kaffir cattle would be taken, or Kaffir molested, unless the commando met with resistance. He had accordingly given orders that no-one should interfere with the commando searching the flocks. Zeko, when he saw Erasmus rounding up all his cattle, asked him why he did so. Erasmus replied that he was ordered to do so, but told Zeko he might accompany the cattle to Port Wilshire, and there demand them of Stockenstroëm. But Zeko and his men were to leave their assegais behind. As a concession, Erasmus allowed Zeko first to pitch out the milch cows and leave them behind. Then Zeko and several Kaffirs, armed only with kieries, accompanied the party, assisting to drive the cattle. Suddenly, when the cattle were in the bush, some Kaffirs on a nearby hill shouted, the cattle made a rush, and the burghers commenced on indiscriminate fire in the midst of them, killing Zeko and six other men, and wounding an eighth.

Tyali's version Stockenstroëm found confirmed by the Hottentot Boesak, the burgher Peffer, and Tyali's Kaffir witness.

In the face of all the confusing evidence which was later brought forward, it is difficult to arrive at a sound conclusion as to what really happened.

Stockenstroëm reported the revised version of the incident in a despatch to government on 31 August 1831.

The following comments may be made on the report:

- (1) Stockenstroëm stressed the fact that the Boors were told that any man taking Kaffir cattle would be

severely punished, while the Kaffirs were threatened with confiscation of their cattle if they offered violence to the commando. But there is no indication that he considered Erasmus to have done wrong in bringing away all the cattle in the first instance.

- (2) He drew the conclusion that there could have been no inducement for the brutal conduct of the burgher party but to have a plea for the confiscation of the Kaffir cattle. He considered the dismissal of Erasmus as essential, as a result of his false report. But he drew this very grave conclusion without mentioning the chief extenuating factor: the shouting of the Kaffirs and the stampede of the cattle, which may have thrown the burghers into a panic.
- (3) It was unlike Stockenstrom to condemn a colonist lightly. The explanation may be: He was avowedly anxious to prove his argument against the whole patrol and reprisal system, which Somerset saw as the only solution to the frontier problem. Throughout July and August he spoke in strong terms against that system, in order to prevent the Governor from being induced to allow another expedition such as that of July 1831. His investigations just prior to his receiving Somerset's August despatches revealed several instances of the abuse of the patrol system and the violation of the Governor's agreement that Kaffir cattle would not be taken. All these factors may have combined to make Stockenstrom write as strongly as he did about Erasmus.

The events of July and August 1831 - the Scheepers, Gordon and Erasmus cases, and the sanctioning by the governor, without consulting Stockenstrom, of another commando - seem to have convinced Stockenstrom that he was powerless to impose his views on frontier policy on the authorities, and that the patrol and reprisal system, of the dangers and abuses of which he was now more than ever assured, would continue to be applied to Somerset's hands.

(ii) The Memoir of 1833 and the evidence of 1835.

(ii) The Memoir of 1833 and the Evidence of 1833.

In the Memoir of 1833, illustrating his condemnation of the reprisal system, Stockenstroëm gave an account of the Zeko incident, which agreed with the view he had come to hold of it in 1831, except in one significant feature : his account conveys the impression that the Boors brought away all the cattle, colonial and Kaffir, in the first instance, contrary to his orders, on the strength of the pretended attack by Zeko and his men.

This further blackens Erasmus' case, but the context does not suggest that this was deliberate, although Stockenstroëm was certainly anxious to put as forcibly as possible the case which, he considered, most clearly justified his attitude towards Somerset's requests for commandos in July and August 1831.

The explanation for this version may be that Stockenstroëm had uppermost in his mind his own repeated warnings before the commando of 1830 against the seizure of any Kaffir cattle as compensation, and his written orders to Erasmus on the subject before the commando went into action. It is possible that he actually did forget the tactical arrangement as to the rounding up of all the cattle, decided upon by Somerset and verbally communicated to the burgher division before it set out.

This was the version to which Stockenstroëm afterwards persistently adhered, all efforts to prove the contrary notwithstanding.

(iii) Gladstone vs. Stockenstroëm: The Zeko Incident.

The Zeko incident came under discussion again on 23 February 1836.

Stockenstroëm's evidence had already provoked criticism from certain quarters, which found a mouthpiece in W.H. Gladstone, a newcomer to the Committee in the 1835 session. Gladstone had evidently made a very thorough study of Stockenstroëm's evidence during the previous session, and of the papers delivered in connection with it, and had become aware of several discrepancies in the evidence concerning the Commissioner - Generalship. The lengthy cross-questioning to which he subjected Stockenstroëm on 26 February and 1 March, revealed not only that he wished to prove

Stockenstroöm that he himself, and not the Colonial Government had misinterpreted the instructions concerning the Commissioner-Generalship, but that there were several points upon which he considered him to have neglected his duty. Stockenstroöm, however, persisted in his contention that the office had never been put upon a sound basis by the governor, so as to enable him to fully carry out his instructions.

On reading the correspondence of 1830 - 1831 which Stockenstroöm had submitted to the Colonial office, Gladstone had become aware of the two obvious flaws in the 1833 and 1835 versions : (1) his assertion that Erasmus had acted entirely contrary to orders in bringing away both the colonial and Kaffir cattle in the first instance ; (2) his representation of Erasmus as having reported that he was attacked while in the process of selecting the colonial cattle to bring off. His questions were therefore carefully planned, to show that these two assertions of Stockenstroöm were not consonant with the documents of 1830 and 1831.

Conclusion: After a study of the cross-questioning by Gladstone, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, on some point Stockenstroöm had indeed tried, albeit not very successfully, to make out a case. From the charge of wilful misinterpretation of the basic elements of the Eeko story he must be exonerated. Whatever the weight to be attached to Tyali's evidence in 1831, there can be no doubt that by 31 August 1831 Stockenstroöm was convinced of the truth of it, and so represented it in all the later evidence. The effect of the manner in which Stockenstroöm described the affair in 1833 and 1835, however, was decidedly to worsen Erasmus's case. The possibility that Stockenstrom had really forgotten Somerset's orders to the commando, seems to be borne out by the evidence under discussion, where this is one fact about which Stockenstrom is consistent throughout.

There was, in any case, no need for him to suppress the fact of these orders, or his acquiescence in them, as a point of self-justification. Somerset's suggestion provided it were explained to the chiefs, was, in fact, an added safeguard against

indiscriminate seizure of cattle by the colonists, and therefore something of which Stockenström could well have approved: as indeed he appears to have done. It may be that, going through the despatches of 1830 - 1831, preparatory to writing the memoir which was to justify all his proceedings against possible attacks, and having in his mind no recollection of Somerset's orders to the Commando, Stockenström stumbled over just the point which Gladstone had made: why had Erasmus not in the first instance been reprimanded for bringing away Kaffir cattle with the colonial cattle? Seeking the explanation which justified a procedure about which, at the time, Stockenström knew his own conscience to have been clear, he found what he wanted: of course, it was because Erasmus had reported the Kaffirs to have resisted the taking of the cattle in the first instance, that he had countenanced the Kaffir cattle being brought out and retained. To this version, in 1833 and 1836, Stockenström adhered. But it was not one which bore investigation, as he was to discover, to his cost, at Gladstone's hands. Nevertheless, nothing could convince Stockenström that he had ever known of or given orders for the rounding up and bringing to Fort Wilshire of all cattle, least of all the affidavits from the Cape which Colonel Wade produced in the Committee as the colonial counterblast to Stockenström's evidence on the Zeke incident.

(iv) More Flaws in the Evidence about 1831:

Later Gladstone returned to the attack with the vexed question of the substantiation of the reports on the cases of Schessers and Gordon. That a government-authorized military enquiry had been threatened, before which he would be required to substantiate his charges, but which he could not institute, and which never took place, Stockenström asserted throughout. Even when confronted by Gladstone with his own comment on Bell's concluding paragraph, which suggested that he considered Bell to be requiring him to substantiate some aspect of what he had advanced concerning Schessers and Gordon. Stockenström said that what he had meant here was that he was prepared with evidence to substantiate his charges. But that the purport of Bell's letter may have been

that Government required him to give a fuller statement of the grounds on which his opinion was founded, Stockenstrom persistently denied.

Three other points raised by Gladstone suggested that he detected further flaws in Stockenstrom's case against the colonial authorities. He endeavoured, without success, to prove to Stockenstrom that Colonel Somerset's suggestion that it should be indispensable to shoot the Kaffirs whenever a patrol carried the spoil of cattle to a kraal, should be related to the context, in which the murder of a Hottentot herd was referred to. He asked whether Stockenstrom considered it true that Cole authorized commandos to pursue stolen cattle and take from any Kaffir's kraal cattle to an equal amount : to which Stockenstrom replied that he did not know, but that it was done. And he ascertained that, of the three commandos against Kaffirs during Stockenstrom's Commissioner-Generalship, two went with his sanction, while the third was sanctioned by Cole, on the supposition that Stockenstrom was absent from the spot at the time - a point upon which Stockenstrom remained sceptical.

(v) Gladstone vs. Stockenstrom : Bourke's Frontier System.

The final flaw which Gladstone perceived in Stockenstrom's previous evidence was in connection with Bourke's Frontier Policy.

When cross-questioned by Gladstone on two occasions, Stockenstrom professed no recollection of a suspension of the reprisal system during the administration of Bourke, or of any effects of Bourke's system.

It is odd that J.D. Pitman, in writing on the Commissioner-Generalship, appears to have accepted this evidence at its face value.

Stockenstrom had had no direct information on the subject of the suspension of the reprisal of Kaffir cattle on the Eastern frontier in 1826, since Somerset had been instructed to regard this part of the order as confidential. But he had not only known of, but had strongly objected to, that part of Bourke's system whereby patrols were forbidden to cross the boundary into Kaffir territory. In the despatch recommending the expulsion of Macosna in 1829, the

other features of which Stockenstrom had recalled accurately in earlier evidence, he had commented forcibly on Bourke's system.

Conclusion: Two possible explanations of Stockenstrom's answers occur: (1) the explanation of this apparent mental aberration may lie in the unrelated context in which the questions appeared. (2) Stockenstrom may have been evading a possible discussion of the views he had expressed on Bourke's system, because he knew they would not meet with Glenelg's approval. As Lieutenant - Governor, he was now bound to the support of a frontier policy approved by the Colonial Secretary.

(vi) Stockenstrom, Philip and the Philanthropist Press:

Two series of questions put by Gladstone afford some ground for supposing that he believed Stockenstrom to be deliberately contradicting himself in order, with some ulterior motive, to gain favour with Buxton and his philanthropic associates.

- (1) Gladstone introduced the topic of Dr. Philip and the Griqua station at Philippolis, on which Stockenstrom was known to have differed strongly with Philip, and questioned Stockenstrom minutely on the subject.

The statements which Stockenstrom made on the subject are fully borne out by the relevant documents. He made no attempt to ponder to Philip's point of view or to disguise the existence of differences between them, in answer either to Gladstone's or, during a later session, to Buxton's questions.

- (2) Gladstone also questioned Stockenstrom as to his opinion of the general fidelity of the representations of Bruce, Kay and Pringle.

Stockenstrom replied that he knew some of Bruce's statements to be correct. But he said that his recollections of the works were very vague and he refused to commit himself as to whether there was any impression of serious misrepresentations on his mind. He could recollect one instance, in which Bruce had very incorrectly charged Colonel Somerset with great severity on the subject of Macommo's expulsion.

In his reply to the colonial office Questionnaire in 1834, Stockenstrom had commented that he knew some of the most heinous things Bruce, Kay and Fringle had said to be true, and had never scrupled to give his sentiments on them. But he connected the impression, conveyed by Fringle in his African Sketches, that the conquests of the Kaffire over the Hottentots were more merciful than those of the whites.

During the 1835 session, Stockenstrom had also indicated that he had been much displeased with the reports he had heard of certain statements made by Dr. Philip to the Kaffir chiefs, just before the Sixth Kaffir War.

Conclusion: On two important points, viz., the London Missionary Society Crique Stations and the speech Dr. Philip was alleged to have made to the Kaffir chieftans, Stockenstrom made no attempt to conceal the fact that he had differed strongly with Dr. Philip.

CHAPTER V.

SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF THE EVIDENCE.

(i) Stockenstrom, Philip and the Hottentots:

Stockenstrom and Philip had also, in the past, diverged on the subject of Hottentot emancipation.

In June 1833, the Colonial office had forwarded to Stockenstrom a questionnaire on the Hottentots, which was submitted in evidence before the Aborigines Committee. This document, and the statements made by Stockenstrom in evidence, in which he confirmed all that he had said in answer to the questionnaire, must be studied in conjunction with one another. The following significant points emerge:

(1) Stockenstrom as Landdrost had been averse to any measure that tended to bind the Hottentots in service for any length of time, thereby curtailing their liberty of movement. He favoured monthly parole contracts, and disapproved of the principle of apprenticing Hottentot children. His suggestions to the governor on 3 April 1838, upon which Ordinance 50, drawn up by Mr Justice Burton, was largely based, reveal that Stockenstrom's theory of the origins of the Hottentot problem was essentially in harmony with the Philip school of thought. He attributed the degradation of the Hottentots to the policy of discriminatory legislation, directed towards keeping them in submission. He recommended the enactment of a law, sweeping away all the earlier discriminatory legislation and placing every free inhabitant in the Colony on a level as to the enjoyment of liberty and the security of his property. But he differed from Philip in believing that strong checks upon vagrancy, in the form of pass laws and a vigorous enforcement of the existing laws against vagrancy, were essential. He considered that the existing laws against vagrancy would have sufficed to check it, had they been vigorously enforced. If, as Cory suggests, Section 11 of ordinance 50 did carry the implication that, while Europeans could be punished for proved vagrancy, Hottentots and other free persons of colour were exempt - and this is a moot point - it was obviously a complete misinterpretation of Stockenstrom's idea. Nowhere in his answer to the Colonial office questionnaire nor in evidence did

Stockenstrom give support to the idea that there should be no restraint upon the liberties of the coloured classes.

(2) Stockenstrom admitted, in answering the questionnaire and also in evidence, that the promulgation of Ordinance 50 did give rise to vagrancy, drunkenness and breach of contracts on a considerable scale. He maintained that although the laws of the Colony would have sufficed to check vagrancy, even had no land been available, only by making land available to the Hottentots could full effect have been given to the spirit of Ordinance 50. But he was opposed to any form of exclusive Hottentot settlements. He explained to the Committee in evidence that his original plan for the Ceded Territory had been a dense settlement of Europeans and Hottentots; amalgamation and not exclusive colonization. His despatches of the period show that this was the case. Stockenstrom pointed out that circumstances eventually made the Kat River an exclusively Hottentot settlement, since the Europeans were not satisfied with the smaller grants of land which could be made to Hottentots.

(3) Stockenstrom asserted in evidence that the Missionary Shaw was wrong in stating that the Kaffirs were driven from the source of the Kat River primarily in order to obtain land for Hottentots. The expulsion of Macomo was a measure necessitated by the depredations and the attack on the Tambookies, and one long advocated by Stockenstrom. The Hottentots were the class which would most easily be used in the experiment of a dense frontier settlement of colonists. The evidence which Stockenstrom gave to prove Shaw mistaken is fully supported by the documents of the period, and, in querying this point, W.B. Boyce was clearly wrong.

(4) There appears to have been in Dr. Philip and his supporters a decided predilection to regard Ordinance 50 as directly the result of Philip's influence, the excellent effects of the Kat River settlement upon its inhabitants as a direct product of the liberty granted to the Hottentots by that ordinance, and the success of the Kat River settlement itself as primarily the result of the influence of the London Missionary Society. Philip went so far as to list the Kat River locations as a London Missionary Society

Station in his Return of Missions of December 1830.

The impressions Stockenstrom firmly corrected in his Remarks on Philip's Return of Missions in 1830, and in answer to the questionnaire of 1833. In the latter he painted a glowing picture of the reformation in the character of the Kat River Hottentots. But he pointed out, and was quick to confirm in evidence, that what he had said applied specifically to the Hottentots of the Kat River settlement, and that these beneficial effects were not simply the result of granting liberty to the Hottentots under Ordinance 50, but of granting land to them under the government experiment.

(5) In evidence, he re-iterated the opinion, formerly expressed in his Remarks on Philip's Return of Missions, that the Hottentots from the London and Moravian Missions had contributed to the improvement of the Kat River Settlement, but not more so than many that came from farmers with property.

(6) Stockenstrom similarly re-iterated before the Committee the opinion that the Hottentots themselves, and not the missionary institutions, should have the right to the lands annexed to the institutions, and that the Kat River Settlement, since it afforded the prospect of gaining possession of the soil, was a type preferable to the missionary institutions.

Conclusion: The answers to the questionnaire of 1833, and Stockenstrom's evidence before the Committee, reveal clearly the points both of similarity and of difference in Stockenstrom's and Philip's views.

(ii) Stockenstrom and the Missionaries:

Upon the subject of the missionary institutions, too, Stockenstrom and the missionaries, Dr. Philip in particular, had, in the past, not seen eye to eye. Stockenstrom acknowledged as much in his evidence. He told the Committee that there were missionaries who, he considered, were sometimes in the habit of making ill-founded representations on behalf of the natives, which he, as magistrate, had had to refute. In these controversies, he said, angry feelings had often been displayed, from which he himself had been by no means exempt.

The records reveal several such controversies, though Stockenstrom specified no instances. But Stockenstrom was bigoted opponent of missionary work. Nor was he opposed to missionary institutions run on sensible lines. His despatches show, too, that he by no means disapproved of the presence of missionaries among the tribes beyond the borders, and considered that "good and prudent" missionaries could well do the work of government agents, keeping in touch with the government authorities and, as far as was compatible with their calling, assisting in seeing that local regulations were carried out. As Commissioner - General he recommended the employment of the missionaries in effecting a reconciliation among the various border chiefs and urging them to maintain peace and order. And there is every evidence of his co-operating with, and using the services as agents of, the missionaries stationed with the Kaffir tribes beyond the borders.

In giving his evidence before the Committee, Stockenstrom must have run a mental eye over the many occasions when he had strongly criticized the missionaries, and recalled also the good he knew them to do. He remarked therefore that he always considered in "moments of sound reason", where missionaries felt themselves called upon to act more particularly as pleaders of the cause of the coloured classes, allowance should be made for very strong feeling on their part. That strong feeling had often been exercised with very great advantage in eliciting truth and bringing benefit to the natives. And if that feeling had sometimes led to so strong a bias as to lead individual missionaries to "shut their eyes and ears against every but their own side of the question", it should not be forgotten that they regarded their clients as the weaker party, and that their opponents often displayed "an equal degree of partiality."

It was in accordance with his experience, too, that Stockenstrom pointed out that the main value of missionary work beyond the borders lay, in the initial stages, not so much in

their religious as in what he called their "political" influence in restraining the natives amongst whom they worked, and acting as a medium of communication between the government and the natives beyond the borders. He was aware that his was not a popular view of the function of missionaries, but, notwithstanding several suggestions from Buxton that the roots of their influence lay in their Christian influence, it was a view to which Stockenstrom adhered. On the other hand, as might have been expected, Stockenstrom maintained that he could see no value at all in missionaries exercising any sort of "political" or "diplomatic" influence within the colony itself, where there were officials who could act in this capacity on behalf of the natives.

(iii) Stockenstrom Says His Say:

During the second-last appearance before the Committee on 11 March 1836, Stockenstrom emphasized that he had neither counted nor shrunk from examination before the Committee, and that when called upon, he had at once appealed to "public documents, every word of which was written under the impression that they would immediately reach the eye of the late governor".

Stockenstrom was evidently suspicious of the motive behind the questions on his Remarks on Philip's Return of Missions. He re-iterated that he had never been the champion or instrument of any party.

Where he had differed from the missionaries he had given his sentiments, regardless of the supposed influence of the missionaries, and where he found them doing work directed to the promotion of the public welfare, he gave them his support. He concluded with the assertion that he had always consistently pleaded justice for both his countrymen and their non-European neighbours, and punishment for wrongdoers on both sides.

Conclusion:

These remarks reveal that Stockenstrom suspected that what Philip had foreseen, when in 1832 he warned Stockenstrom that they should avoid the appearance of collusion,

had come to pass. But no rumours from the colony could possibly have reached him at this time. This seems to bear out the idea that his source of information must have been in England, and that Godlonton's diatribes possibly had their origin in England.

CHAPTER VI.CONCLUSION: THE OCEAN OF RASCALITY.

The events of 1833 to 1836, and the analysis of the evidence in the light of his former statements and policies, lend astonishingly little support to the allegations against Stockenstrom. Except in the evidence on the Zeko murder and Bourke's frontier policy, Stockenstrom's statements have been shown to be consistent with his previous policies and statements. He did not attempt to disguise either the similarities or the differences between himself and the philanthropists. The evidence does not support the contention that he tried deliberately to blacken the colonists, or that he prostituted his basic principles in order to ingratiate himself with Glenelg or the Duxton circle. Stockenstrom's critics have not made use of or have not investigated the full facts.

In the final estimate, he stands vindicated. He may have been a man of many faults. But unscrupulous compromise, unprincipled and ambitious pandering to the influential, lack of integrity, cannot be counted among them at any period of his life. Those who have seen in Stockenstrom a man of principles and ideas, a capable and conscientious worker, an honest servant of the community, both European and non-European, have proved that opinion justified by their study of his terms of office before and after 1835. There is no need to except, in this evaluation of him, the period from 1833 to 1836.

This, however, is only one side of the picture. If the majority of the allegations against Stockenstrom cannot be regarded as valid, the question arises: why then all the violent opposition to him? It did not begin and end with a newspaper controversy. It seems clear that the opposition came originally from certain official quarters in London, and that Stockenstrom anticipated this. To explain the opposition to Stockenstrom solely as the natural and spontaneous reaction of a sensitive and sorely tried frontier community to the man who came to represent

the reversal of the D'urban policy, the dashing of their hopes and the unjust criticism of the frontier colonists, is to oversimplify the situation. The campaign against Stockenstrom began some time before any one in the colony was aware that a Lieutenant- Governor was to be appointed, that Stockenstrom was the chosen candidate, or that the D'urban policy was to be reversed.

The whole question of the "Ocean of rascality" invites re-investigation.