COLLECTIVE FORGIVING

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ABSTRACT

Forgiveness is traditionally understood as a personal change of heart, in which an individual victim of a wrongdoing overcomes her resentment towards the perpetrator of that wrongdoing. Peter Strawson (1974) famously argued that resentment is a personal participant retributive reactive attitude, and the overcoming of such an attitude through forgiveness is itself a personal reactive attitude – in other words, forgiveness is an affective response to a wrongdoing by an individual victim, that is devoid of a retributive element. Because reactive attitudes are personal, it is argued that collectives – groups of individuals – cannot forgive, since collectives cannot, *as collectives*, hold reactive attitudes.

I argue against this. I show that it is possible for collectives to hold attitudes in a way that is not reducible to individuals holding attitudes as individuals, and yet these attitudes still remain personal. Individuals exist within communities, and are interdependent on one another. Much of an individual's beliefs and attitudes depend on the collectives that she is a part of. I argue that an attitude is collective when it is deemed to be the appropriate attitude for members of the collective to hold. Members of the collective will take this attitude on as their own insofar as they identify themselves as members of the collective. Individuals hold the attitude, making the attitude personal, but since the individuals hold the attitude in virtue of their membership to a collective, the attitude is also collective.

Given that forgiveness is itself a reactive attitude, and that collectives can hold attitudes, I argue that it is possible for a collective to forgive. Members of a collective will come to forgive when forgiveness is held up as the appropriate attitude for them, and once enough members have taken on the attitude of forgiveness as their own attitude, a collective can be said to have forgiven.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Forgiveness plays a role in our everyday lives. In our dealings with other people, we are often wronged by those around us – by both our loved ones and strangers – and often, we would respond with anger, resentment and other negative emotions. The possible wrongdoings that may be committed against us range from the trivial to the devastating, but with all these wrongdoings, we may feel strong emotions that involve us desiring to lash out and hurt the wrongdoer in retaliation. These emotions can potentially be disastrous for a relationship, if one exists between the victim and the wrongdoer.[1] If, for example, a woman resents her partner for cheating on her, this resentment can lead to the injury becoming a "festering wound" in the relationship. The woman, because of her resentment, will come to see her spouse differently, holding a different attitude towards him – she may not be able to trust that her partner is faithful to her, for example, and see the philandering as a pivotal occurrence in their relationship. Relationships may fall apart because of the negative attitudes that the victim may hold because of the wrongdoing committed against her. Forgiveness can help prevent this.

Forgiveness can heal a fractured relationship between a victim and a wrongdoer, and has the potential to reconcile them.[2] In forgiving, a victim comes to rid herself of the strong emotions of anger, resentment and other negative, violent emotions, getting rid of the negative, retributive attitudes that inform the way she relates to the wrongdoer. It is seen as an alternative to revenge: in ridding herself of the strong retaliatory emotions and desires, a victim decides to "turn the other cheek" or "forgive and forget." She can "move on" by no longer focusing on the wrongdoing, and it is this that may allow a relationship to be restored. When a wrongdoer is forgiven, his wrongdoing no longer stands as an obstacle to a harmonious relationship.

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[1] I will use the term "victim" to refer to the person harmed by the wrongdoing, and the term "wrongdoer" to refer to the person morally responsible for the wrongdoing. I realize that it is problematic to refer to a "victim," rather than a "survivor," because it involves viewing the person as weak in some way, but I do it for ease of discussion and to keep in focus that she was wronged. For easy distinction in discussion, I will also refer to the victim as "she" and the wrongdoer as "he."

[2] See, for example, Charles Griswold (2007); Eve Garrard and David McNaughton (2002); Jeffrie G. Murphy (1988); and Joanna North (1987).

The potential for restoration of a relationship is one of the most important features of forgiveness, and is what makes it an attractive idea to explore in relation to group-based harms.[3] Humans do not simply hurt each other on an interpersonal basis. The historical record stands as a testament to the atrocities that are committed by groups of people against each other: the wars, the genocides, the holocausts, the cruel ways in which whole groups are exploited and cultures annihilated. These atrocities are divisive: the hatred and the anger that they breed exists for decades, possibly even centuries, being passed on from one generation to the next, causing the animosity to become entrenched within the relations between the groups.[4] Because of the strongly retaliatory attitudes that are held by those that were harmed, the cycle of violence is perpetuated as each group sets out to seek vengeance, to seek out some sort of palliative for the horror that they were forced to endure. Conflicts become intractable with no end in sight, as the initial wrongdoing leads to a string of further wrongdoings. Given the vicious consequences of the anger, resentment and hatred that arise in response to the atrocities that are committed against collectives, forgiveness is seen as a peaceful alternative.[5] It is seen as a possible way to bring previously-opposed groups together, to end the conflict that exists between them, and to possibly bring about enduring reconciliation.[6]

One of the most vocal proponents of this view is Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, Noble Peace Prize recipient and Chairman of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee (hereafter, the TRC). In his book *No Future Without Forgiveness* (1999), Tutu asserts that,

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[3] Group-based harms are harms directed at individuals in virtue of their perceived membership to a collective. Larry May says that "harms are group-based when there is something about the structure, or perceived structure, of a given group that makes all of the members of the group at least directly or vicariously harmed whenever one of the members is directly harmed." He gives the example of Apartheid policies harming black people: "…apartheid is directed at people because they are Black, and only because they are Black, that is because of membership in the Negroid racial group" (1987: p. 116). I will briefly discuss this issue further in chapter two.

[4] See, for example, Darrel Moellendorf, 2007: p. 211. He quotes a sentiment expressed by Ezekiel Mphahlele of the hatred for white people for the years of abuse suffered by black people during Apartheid.

[5] I will use the terms "group" and "collective" synonymously.

[6] See, for example, Mark R. Amstutz (2005); Daniel Bar-Tal (2000); Russell Daye (2004); Peter Digeser (1998); Trudy Govier (2002); Barry Schwartz (1978); Donald W. Shriver (1995); and Desmond Tutu (1999). Shriver explicitly says that the "leftover debris of national pasts… will never get cleaned up and animosity will never drain away until forgiveness enters these relationships in some political form" (1995: p. 4).

> … [i]f we are going to move on and build a new kind of world community there must be a way in which we can deal with a sordid past. The most effective way would be for the perpetrators or their descendants to acknowledge the awfulness of what happened and the descendants of the victims to respond by granting forgiveness…[7]

Tutu argues that without forgiveness, two conflicting groups will not be able to achieve enduring reconciliation. He is supported in this claim by Daniel Bar-Tal who argues that collectives need to undergo certain psychological changes before peace can be achieved.[8] Bar-Tal argues that during conflict, certain beliefs and attitudes are formed as a response to the conflict about one's own group, about the other group, and about the relationship that exists between them, and these beliefs and attitudes will ensure the perpetuation of violence. He calls this the "conflictive ethos," which develops as a way for collectives to make sense of and to endure through long term conflict.[9] People in one group come to believe that the other group is evil, for example, holding attitudes of suspicion, distrust, anger, contempt and so on, towards them, and come to believe that the wrongdoings they commit against this group are justified due to the wrongdoings that were committed against them. They perceive themselves as being in opposition to the other group, and hold negative attitudes towards the other group.[10] While this conflictive ethos is in place, any peace efforts will be undermined. The groups will not be able to relate to each other in a positive or even neutral way. The ethos informs the way the groups see each other. Bar-Tal argues that a "peace ethos" needs to be formed, in other words, the beliefs and attitudes that keep the division in place need to change.[11] In order for two conflicting groups to unite as one community, certain attitudinal changes need to be effected, and forgiveness is suggested by Bar-Tal as one way to bring about such a change.[12]

In this thesis, I will not be looking at whether or not forgiveness can lead to reconciliation. My project is more fundamental than that: I will be exploring whether or not forgiveness can be a notion that makes conceptual sense when discussing intergroup relations. In other words, I will be exploring whether or not it makes sense

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[7] Tutu, 1999: p. 278.
[8] Bar-Tal, 2000.
[9] *Ibid.*: pp. 352 – 355.
[10] See also James M. Jaspers, 1998: pp. 401 – 402.
[11] Bar-Tal, 2000: pp. 352, 356 – 360.
[12] *Ibid.*: pp. 356, 358.

for a *collective* to forgive. Collective forgiveness is dismissed by many theorists as a conceptual impossibility. Attitudes are personal, they argue, and because they must be held by *individuals*, it is impossible for *collectives* to hold attitudes.[13] Because of this, these theorists think that it is impossible for a collective *qua* collective to hold a negative attitude towards a wrongdoer (be it a group or an individual) and, as such, forgiveness (the overcoming of the negative attitude) would be inapplicable to groups. On these accounts, there can be no such thing as collective forgiveness. These theorists view forgiveness as only applicable to individuals: only individuals can have retaliatory emotions towards another, and only individuals can overcome these emotions by forgiving. This is not to say that forgiveness cannot have political significance: even those who dismiss the possibility of collective forgiveness can concede that public displays of individual forgiveness can be inspirational to others, leading them to forgive certain wrongdoers in their own capacity as well, particularly when many individuals are the victim of the same crime (for example, a group-based harm such as Apartheid).[14] Since individuals exist within communities, one case of individual forgiveness may lead to a string of exchanges of individual forgiveness, until such a community can be said to have forgiven due to the large incidence of individuals forgiving.

Tutu's own examples of forgiveness in *No Future Without Forgiveness* (1999) are certainly compatible with such a view. Many of his examples of forgiveness, particularly those exchanges of forgiveness that took place during the TRC proceedings, are of individual victims who wanted to forgive individual perpetrators. He speaks of, for example, Ms. Beth Savage, who was badly injured during an attack by the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), indicating that she wished to meet the man who threw the grenade "in an attitude of forgiveness."[15] Ms. Babalwa Mhlauli, daughter of one of the Cradock Four, wanted to know who tortured and killed her father, saying that she and the widows of the Cradock Four men wanted to

[13] See, for example, Griswold (2007); Marguerite La Caze (2006a); and Moellendorf (2007).
[14] Griswold (2007: pp. 135 – 136) mentions the political significance of individual exchanges of forgiveness explicitly. The inspirational value of forgiveness is implied in many other accounts of forgiveness, for example, in Garrard and McNaughton's account (2002).
[15] Tutu, 1999: pp. 146 – 147.

forgive, but did not know whom to forgive.[16] Mr. Neville Clarence, who was blinded by a bomb blast outside the South African Air Force headquarters in 1983, attended the amnesty hearing for the perpetrators of that bombing. At that hearing, Clarence went over to the main applicant for amnesty, Mr. Aboobaker Ismail, and shook hands with him, telling Ismail that he was forgiven.[17] Tutu gives us these examples to show us the power of forgiveness, and to inspire such interactions within us, the readers. In these examples, an *individual victim* forgives an *individual perpetrator* in her own capacity. However, in amongst these examples of individual forgiveness, Tutu mentions one particularly interesting anecdote of an exchange of forgiveness, which I take to be an exchange of collective forgiveness. It is this example that is motivating this project, for it is this type of forgiveness that I want to make conceptual sense of. The anecdote appears to be an example of one *collective* forgiving another *collective*, in their respective capacities as collectives.

Tutu recounts the story of an exchange of forgiveness that occurred during the Rustenburg Conference in 1990, in which various South African churches, black and white, came together. During this meeting, a leading theologian from the white, Afrikaans, Apartheid-supporting Dutch Reformed Church (the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk*, hereafter the DRC), Professor Willie Jonker, asked for forgiveness from black Christians on behalf of Afrikaners, specifically those in the DRC, for the role that the DRC played in Apartheid by supplying the ideological (and theological) foundations and justifications for Apartheid. It was the DRC that helped keep Apartheid in place for so long, for Apartheid's ideology was tied to Christian (DRC) beliefs about the world, particularly of the relationship between black and white people. Tutu tells us that he consulted with Frank Chikane, the then-general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, and with considerations to the Church's religious teachings and the political significance of such forgiveness, Tutu stood up and accepted the request for forgiveness, presumably on behalf of black Christians or perhaps even on behalf of all victims of Apartheid.[18] In effect, this

[16] *Ibid.*: pp. 148 – 149.
[17] *Ibid.*: p. 154.
[18] *Ibid.*: pp. 276 – 277.

anecdote is of black Christians forgiving white Christians, particularly those in the DRC, for the role that the Dutch Reformed Church played in the Apartheid system.

In this anecdote, Jonker is taken as speaking for one collective – that of white members of the DRC – and Tutu responds in his capacity as a leader of the collective that is addressed by Jonker, assuming the role of a spokesperson for the collective. In asking for forgiveness, the members of the DRC are relying on the idea that it is possible for the collective to be forgiven. Jonker does not ask for personal forgiveness – that *he* be forgiven for *his* role in Apartheid – but for collective forgiveness – that his *church* be forgiven.[19] This is due to the nature of the crime that the DRC is asking to be forgiven for: it is a group-based harm that was committed by one group against another group. Apartheid was the oppression of millions of nameless and faceless people in virtue of their skin colour, and the oppressors were, by and large, white South Africans with varying degrees of guilt. Some white South Africans were active perpetrators, others were complicit citizens. Apartheid was by definition a collective crime: it was a system put in place by a collective, and kept in place due to both the lack of effective opposition to it by those whites who disagreed with the system and the support it had by those who held the racist ideologies of the time, and which was beneficial to white people at the expense of black people's freedom. An assumption that will inform my thesis is the idea of collective responsibility and collective guilt – for example, I will assume that each white South African that lived in the Apartheid era and reaped benefits from it is responsible for Apartheid, and has something to be forgiven for: either because that South African was complicit or perpetrated crimes in the name of Apartheid.[20]

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[19] For a discussion on the possibility of collectives being *forgiven*, see Glen Pettigrove (2006: pp. 493 – 497).

[20] I leave open the possibility that some white South Africans are not guilty, due to the active role they played in opposing Apartheid, or in the steps they took to dissociate from Apartheid. However, given that they would still be beneficiaries of Apartheid – they would have received a higher standard of education and would not have been turned away from various medical institutions, for example – they would still have a certain responsibility (along with their fellow white South Africans) to ensure that justice is served and reparations are made to the victims of Apartheid. For discussions on collective responsibility, see Virginia Held (1991); May (1987; 1992); Howard McGary (1991); Andrew Schaap (2001); Paul Sheehy (2006) and Marion Smiley (2005). For discussion of dissociating from a collective, see Keith Graham (2002: pp. 115 – 199); McGary (1991: pp. 84 – 86); Juha Räikkä (1997); Smiley (2005: pp. 15 – 17).

Tutu, by recognizing Jonker's plea for forgiveness as a legitimate request, implicitly endorses the idea that collectives can *be forgiven*. In accepting the request for forgiveness, thereby forgiving in his capacity as a spokesperson for black Christians, Tutu implies that it is possible for collectives *to forgive*. By speaking on behalf of black Christians, he is speaking *for* the collective, and the forgiveness he gives as a spokesperson for black Christians is not forgiveness offered to white Christians by Tutu as an individual. The forgiveness he offers is the forgiveness of black Christians, as a collective.[21] It is not simply that, as a leader in the black Christian community, Tutu makes a decision for the collective and decides what attitude the collective should hold (although this is certainly one interpretation of this anecdote). Tutu gestures towards a different understanding: he thinks that Christians would forgive, and thus he feels secure to say that the members in his collective (as Christians) forgive.[22] He considers himself to be speaking as a representative, not simply as a decision-making leader as such.[23] It is this idea that is in focus in this thesis: I will not look at whether or not collectives can *be forgiven*, but at the implication of Tutu's anecdote that collectives can *forgive*, in that the individuals within the collective forgive as members of the collective.

In order to develop a model of collective forgiveness, I will first, in chapter one, examine what forgiveness is as it is understood in the traditional exchange between individuals. Traditionally, forgiveness is understood as the overcoming of resentment, resentment which arises in response to a wrongdoing.[24] I will develop this understanding, and argue for an understanding of forgiveness that keeps intact some of our intuitions regarding forgiveness, such as whether or not forgiveness is obligatory and whether or not it is personal. I will show that forgiveness is a change in affective regard for the wrongdoer, in which the victim comes to hold a different

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[21] Tutu says that "*we* accepted the deeply moving and sincere plea for forgiveness," meaning the black Christians that were addressed by Jonker. He also alludes to the question of how he could speak on behalf of millions of victims of Apartheid (1999: p. 277. Emphasis added.).

[22] Tutu says that "[t]heologically, we knew that the gospel of our Lord and Saviour constrained us to be ready to forgive when someone asked for forgiveness" (1999: pp. 276 – 277).

[23] Tutu indicates that he thinks there are problems with his offering of forgiveness: he thinks he may have been presumptuous to forgive on behalf of others. Here he takes himself to speaking as a leader, not as a representative (Tutu, 1994: p. 223). I will deal with this worry later in the thesis.

[24] See, for example, Griswold (2007); Jean Hampton (1988); Aurel Kolnai (1973); Murphy (1988; 2005a; 2005b); North (1987); Peter Strawson (1974); and David Sussman (2005).

attitude towards him, one that is free of negative emotions such as resentment.[25] In outlining what forgiveness is, I will explore the relationship that forgiveness has with justice and what may motivate a victim to forgive.

In chapter two, I will argue for an account of collective attitudes, in order to show that a collective *as a collective* may feel a certain way about something – the collective may, for example, resent a wrongdoer for a crime. People are not persons in isolation – much of what we believe and emotionally feel depends on the context we find ourselves in, on who we identify and associate with. I will show that some attitudes might depend on one's membership to a particular collective. A collective attitude, on my account, will be an attitude that is held by a member because of her membership to a collective. She will adopt this attitude because she understands this attitude to be appropriate because of who she is and which collective she identifies herself as part of. I will show that these collective attitudes are not reducible to individual attitudes: these attitudes cannot be understood if reference to the collective is eliminated.

In my final chapter, I will develop a model of collective forgiveness, based on the model of individual forgiveness I articulate in the first chapter, and the possibility of collective attitudes that I argue for in the second chapter. I will show that a collective can come to change the way it feels about a wrongdoer, in other words, it can forgive – whether or not that wrongdoer is another collective or merely an individual. I will show that this model of collective forgiveness does not compromise what we mean by forgiveness: it will be forgiveness that is held by individuals, but is held by these individuals in their capacity as members of a collective.

In this project, I am only setting out to show that such a model of collective forgiveness is conceptually possible. I will not be looking at whether or not collective forgiveness is permissible, or when it is permissible.[26] I will remain ambivalent on whether certain wrongdoings are simply unforgivable – perhaps because the

[25] I will be agreeing with Lucy Allais's account of forgiveness (2008a; 2008b).

[26] Pettigrove makes the distinction between the issue of permissibility and the issue of possibility in his paper, and also opts to explore whether or not collective forgiveness is possible, rather than permissible. He understands theorists such as Digeser (who writes on collective – "political" – forgiveness) to be looking at the issue of permissibility (2006: p. 490).

wrongdoer has not made amends, or because of the nature of the wrongdoing[27] – and on whether or not certain conditions have to be met before forgiveness can be offered. I am inclined towards an unconditional account of forgiveness – in which a victim forgives the wrongdoer independently of him making amends for his crime – but as will become apparent in the third chapter, whether or not forgiveness is conditional will not have too much effect on the model of collective forgiveness that I will develop. I will simply show that it is conceptually possible for a collective to forgive *as a collective*.

[27] Certain crimes seem to be unforgiveable because they are manifestations of "radical evil." For a discussion on whether or not "radical evil" can be forgiven, see La Caze (2006b). Govier looks at it from a different angle: rather than the crime being unforgivable due to its nature, it may be that the wrongdoer is unforgivable (in the victim's view) because he does not acknowledge his wrongdoing (Govier, 1999: p. 64). See also Griswold (2007: pp. 90 – 98).

CHAPTER 1: FORGIVENESS

Introduction

When we are wronged, it is likely that we will have a negative reaction to the person we take to be responsible for the wrongdoing. Few of us are indifferent to crimes done against us – instead, we often blame the wrongdoer for the wrongdoing, and may have an emotional response towards him. We may respond emotionally with resentment or indignation, which may lead to the souring of the relationship that exists between us and the wrongdoer. The wrongdoing may become an important event in the relationship, something that we continue to think about and which continues to hurt us emotionally. These negative responses may be overcome through forgiveness.

Forgiveness is a response to wrongdoing that has been praised and held up as a virtue in theological circles for centuries, and is receiving increasing attention in philosophical literature. It involves moving away from these negative responses, which may be crippling to a relationship and may have long-term embittering effects on the victim. Forgiveness is praised for the reconciliation that it can foster, and the empowering mental health benefits for the victim and possibly the wrongdoer too – a wrongdoing is forgotten in a sense, for the victim and the wrongdoer can move past the wrongdoing. However, as philosophers have started to explore the concept of forgiveness, it has become clear that what is understood by the concept of forgiveness is by no means unanimous. There are many different ideas about what it means to forgive: some understand forgiveness to involve releasing the wrongdoer from his judicial debts;[1] others view forgiveness as the condonation of the wrongdoer, or the acceptance of the wrongdoing;[2] still others view forgiveness as akin to the justification or excusing of a wrongdoing in which the wrongdoer is released from blame.[3] Each understanding leads to different criticisms of forgiveness, and each has

[1] Amstutz (2005: p. 43); Digeser (1998: p. 701); Pettigrove (2006: p. 486).
[2] For example, Griswold (2007), Murphy (1988) and David Novitz (1998), and most theorists who argue for what I will later describe as a conditional account of forgiveness.
[3] I do not look at any theorists who argue for this understanding, but many of the theorists I do discuss explicitly show that their account of forgiveness does not amount to either justification or excusing of the wrongdoing. See, for example, Allais (2008a; 2008b); Christopher Bennett (2003); Pamela Hieronymi (2001); and Strawson (1974).

led some theorists to argue that forgiveness may be unethical for it may involve the victim in some way compromising her moral protest at the wrongdoing (because these theorists see protest as tied to the retaliatory desire to see the wrongdoer punished for his crime).

In this chapter, I will clarify what forgiveness is. In doing this, I hope to clearly delineate a role for forgiveness in our relationships. I will do this in three sections. In the first section, I will examine what responses a victim may have to a wrongdoing done to her, for it is these responses that forgiveness counters. In the second section, I will outline my account of forgiveness, showing how the responses to wrongdoings are overcome in a way that does not amount to other similar notions like mercy, justification, excusing, acceptance or forgetting of a wrongdoing. I will also look at what other theorists think motivates the decision to forgive in the second section, in order for the nature of forgiveness to be revealed more clearly, and I will show why these motivations are inadequate. In the third section, I will put forward what I think may motivate a decision to forgive a wrongdoer. I will argue that a victim may forgive because she is concerned with the type of character she is and what her attitude to the wrongdoer is. I do not argue that this is the only motive to forgive. I only highlight this particular motivation in order to point to the model of collective forgiveness that I will develop in the third chapter of this thesis. Before I can develop my model of collective forgiveness though, I need to clearly define individual forgiveness.

Responses to wrongdoings

Bishop Butler is famously attributed with defining forgiveness as the forswearing of resentment and many accounts of forgiveness use this definition as their starting point.[4] Resentment, on these accounts, is taken as the appropriate response to wrongdoing. Others argue that forgiveness is the overcoming of indignation because indignation is the appropriate response to wrongdoing rather than resentment.[5] Given this, it will be useful to explore what resentment is, as well the closely related concept of indignation. In the next section I will argue that understanding forgiveness as the

[4] Butler's account is explored in Murphy (1988: pp. 15 – 22) and Griswold (2007: pp. 19 – 37).
[5] For example, Bennett (2003).

overcoming of resentment or indignation is too narrow – forgiveness is the overcoming of *retributive reactive attitudes*, which include resentment and indignation, as well as other attitudes such as anger, malice, suspicion, and contempt.

In this section I will argue for the following claims:

1. Both resentment and indignation are possible responses to wrongdoings.
2. Resentment and indignation are examples of personal participant retributive reactive attitudes.
3. Retributive reactive attitudes are not morally obligatory in the sense that one *ought* to feel them in response to wrongdoing, but they are morally *appropriate* responses to have in the presence of wrongdoing.

Understanding the nature of these reactive attitudes will have important consequences for understanding the nature of forgiveness.

1. Resentment and indignation are possible responses to wrongdoings.

Resentment is a negative feeling that the victim of a wrongdoing has towards a moral agent for a culpable wrongdoing that the victim takes to have been done against her.[6] The object of resentment is the person responsible for the harm done, and the reason for the feeling being negative is that the harm is taken to be a wrong.[7] If the harm appears to be unintentional, or done with good intentions, the victim does not feel resentment. Rather, she feels resentment when she takes the harm to have been done either with ill will or without proper concern for her well-being, making the harm a moral harm, in other words, a wrong. In this way, the wrong is a harm on two counts: it is an injury *and* it is an insult to the victim, for it appears to the victim that the wrongdoer does not respect the victim appropriately.[8] It is this insult that could make the victim view the wrongdoer differently: she views the wrongdoer's action as a

[6] Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: pp. 42 – 43; Govier, 1999: p. 65; Griswold, 2007: pp. 25 – 26; Hampton, 1988: pp. 54 – 55; Murphy, 1988: pp. 16, 20; La Caze, 2001: p. 33; and Novitz, 1998: p. 300.

[7] La Caze argues that resentment is important for it serves as an indicator of wrongdoing: the emotional response alerts the victim that a wrong has been done against her (2001: pp. 39 – 41). This is an interesting point, but one I will not explore further.

[8] Garrard & McNaughton (2002: p. 47); Hampton (1988: p. 44 – 45); Murphy (1988: p. 25).

manifestation of his character, and since he has failed to respect her (or failed to show her good will), he becomes "lowered" in her eyes.[9]

Resentment is only an appropriate feeling to have towards a wrongdoer that the victim recognizes as a moral person, capable of responding to moral demands.[10] The wrongdoer is someone who belongs to the same moral community, and has no excuse for not meeting the demands that this community makes – he is not morally incapacitated in some way (due to a mental incapacity such as insanity, for example). When the wrongdoer fails to meet these demands by committing his wrongdoing, he is not excluded from this moral community as such. He is not seen as losing his personhood or moral agency, or as becoming less of a moral agent. Resentment is a response that maintains viewing the wrongdoer as a moral agent. The "lowering" that occurs in the victim's eyes in feeling resentment is a view of the wrongdoer as having failed to do as he should, while maintaining that he still could be capable of responding (and ought to respond) to moral demands. Lucy Allais argues that the wrongdoer is "lowered" in that the victim views him as someone who "ought to be censured."[11] This should be understood as the *recognition* that he is someone who has transgressed the moral rules.

Jeffrie G. Murphy argues that the primary value being protected by resentment is that of self-respect. Resentment is recognition by the victim of a failure by the wrongdoer to respect her. He goes so far as to say "that proper *self-respect* is essentially tied to the passion of resentment, and that a person who does not resent moral injuries done to him… is almost necessarily a person lacking in self-respect."[12] On his account, resentment is essentially a morally obligatory emotion, and so should be felt when one is wronged.[13] Charles Griswold agrees with him, saying that a "deficiency of an appropriately resentful response is to be taken as a moral defect in

[9] Allais, 2008b: p. 55. Maximilian de Gaynesford discusses the attitude of contempt, which bears some similarities to resentment, and notes that contempt is "informative since it is an attitude of assessment" of the person that is the object of the attitude (2008: p. 48).
[10] Griswold, 2007: pp. 26, 29; Hampton, 1988: p. 55; Murphy, 1988: p. 20.
[11] Allais, 2008b: p. 55.
[12] Murphy, 1988: p. 16.
[13] Murphy later concedes that in some cases, it may true that a person secure in their own self-esteem would not feel resentment. He then says that resentment is not obligatory, but simply is not wrong – which is compatible with what I will argue for (2005b: p. 78).

the agent."[14] Insofar as a wrongdoing is disrespectful to the victim, one *should* resent the wrongdoer for committing that wrongdoing.[15]

However, Jean Hampton disagrees that one *ought* to feel resentment when wronged – people secure in their own self-esteem and estimation of self-worth would have no need for resentment, since they would not see themselves as diminished in any way by the wrongdoing.[16] Hampton argues that when one views oneself as *diminished*, one thinks that one's status (as someone worthy of respect) has been lowered, that one's rank has been revealed to be less than what one thought it was or that the wrongdoing did in fact lower one's rank.[17] For Hampton, resentment indicates that one has been *demeaned*, in that one is treated in an inappropriate way given one's rank as a moral agent (and so is a protest against this treatment), *and* that one fears that one has been *diminished* by the wrongdoing.[18] Resentment, then, is a protest against the wrong, against being demeaned, as well as "a defense against the action's attack on one's self-esteem."[19] While Hampton says that we could criticize a victim for not feeling resentment towards the wrongdoer if we suspect that this is because of a lack of self-respect on the victim's part, the fact that she recognizes that some people are "beyond resentment" because they do not feel the need to defend themselves against diminishment means, I think, that we can surmise that resentment is not an *obligatory* response, although it might be both an understandable and appropriate one.[20]

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[14] Griswold, 2007: p. 27, 43 – 47.

[15] Kant argues that to be "too forgiving is a vice that manifests a failure of proper self-respect" (cited in Sussman, 2005: p. 88). See also Hieronymi, 2001: p. 530. Novitz agrees that a victim should not forgive too quickly, for this would indicate that they do not have the "right degree of self-respect". However, he thinks the absence of resentment is odd, but not wrong (1998: pp. 299 – 301).

[16] Garrard and McNaughton disagree with Hampton, as does Griswold: they think that a person secure in her own self-respect may still feel slighted by a wrongdoing (Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: p. 43; Griswold, 2007: p. 45).

[17] To make this clearer: Hampton gives the example of a rape survivor who views herself as less of a woman because of her rape. The rape, it seems to the survivor, has robbed her of her dignity as a woman and lowered her status as someone worthy of respect (1988: pp. 49 – 52).

[18] *Ibid.*: pp. 45, 49, 57.

[19] *Ibid.*: p. 56. See also Griswold, 2007: p. 39; and Hieronymi, 2001: p. 547.

[20] Hampton, 1988: pp. 55 – 56.

Friedrich Nietzsche would be a famous example of a philosopher thinking that needing to forgive indicates a weakness in the victim, for a person secure in her own self-esteem (a noble, in other words) would not recognize a wrongdoing as an insult against her and would not feel the need to "move passed" the wrongdoing. In fact, she would not even recognize the wrongdoing as a wrongdoing against her:

Christopher Bennett offers an alternative account of how one should respond to wrongdoings, because he thinks resentment is not only *not* morally required but is also a "morally inappropriate reaction" to wrongdoing.[21] He thinks that indignation and blame are the appropriate responses to have towards wrongdoing. Indignation is a very similar emotion to resentment, but does not include the fear of diminishment. Indignation is merely a recognition that one has been *demeaned* by treatment that is disrespectful or lacking in good will, making it inappropriate treatment to the victim, and so is a recognition that the wrongdoing should not have been done.[22] Like resentment, the object of indignation is the person morally responsible for the wrongdoing (the wrongdoer), and like resentment, indignation is thought to be a moral protest to the wrongdoing. It is, however, a protest to a wrongdoing that is not accompanied by a protest to the threat of diminishment of self.

Given that indignation is recognition of a wrongdoing, without the fear of a threat to one's self-respect (the threat of diminishment), it is, as Peter Strawson points out, an emotion that can be personal and vicarious.[23] "Vicarious" in this context simply means that it is felt by a third party (someone who is not the victim or the wrongdoer). One can be indignant about wrongdoings done to oneself (if one is personally indignant) or wrongdoings done to other people (if one is vicariously indignant).[24]

Those who subscribe to the view that one ought to feel *resentment* when one is wronged, like Murphy and Griswold, think that indignation is not personal but is

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> To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even one's misdeeds seriously for very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget (a good example of this in modern times is Miabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he – forgot). Such a man shakes off with a single *shrug* many vermin that eat deep into others; here alone genuine "love of one's enemies" is possible – supposing it to be possible at all on earth. How much reverence has a noble man for his enemies! – and such reverence is a bridge to love. – … In contrast to this, picture "the enemy" as the man of *ressentiment* conceives him – and here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived "the evil enemy," "*the Evil One*…" (*Genealogy of Morals* I:11).

Here we can see that the strong noble does not consider what the actions indicate about the character of the wrongdoer. The affective change of regard for the wrongdoer that occurs when the victim is wronged is done by the person of *ressentiment* – the weak slave.

[21] Bennett, 2003: p. 139.

[22] Hampton, 1988: pp. 56 – 60; Bennett, 2003: p. 137.

[23] Strawson, 1974: p. 14.

[24] Griswold, 2007: p. 24; Hampton, 1988: p. 56.

merely resentment felt by a third party. Indignation becomes a "lesser" kind of resentment: it is resentment towards a wrongdoer felt by a person whose self-respect is not challenged by the wrongdoing since she is not the object of the wrongdoing. In contrast, on Bennett's view (and Hampton's), indignation can be personal, since it would be the response that people secure in their own self-esteem would feel towards wrongdoers who have committed wrongdoings against them.[25] Bennett thinks that this makes indignation the appropriate response to have towards wrongdoing because he thinks that people should recognize that wrongdoings cannot diminish them. Virtuous agents would recognize that being wronged does not lower their status as moral agents and as moral agents, we should all strive to be virtuous.[26] On his account, *contra* Butler, Murphy and Griswold, forgiveness would be the overcoming of indignation, rather than resentment, since the fear of diminishment that distinguishes resentment from indignation would be overcome by the recognition that one cannot be lowered by a wrongdoing.

I am not concerned with whether or not indignation is a better, or more appropriate, response to wrongdoing than resentment. Both are possible responses to wrongdoing, and the presence of either indicates that the victim perceives a wrong to have been done to her. The victim sees the wrongdoer as responsible for the wrongdoing, and sees him as disrespecting her or showing her ill-will. The wrongdoer has harmed *and* insulted her by committing his wrongdoing. This leads the victim to view the wrongdoer's character as "lowered." The difference between the two emotions is that, in feeling resentment, the victim takes the wrongdoing as having the potential to "lower" her in some way, whereas in feeling indignation, the victim recognizes the insult but does not feel less self-respect because of it. I will not enter the debate on whether or not a victim is wrong to feel diminished by a wrongdoing (as Bennett claims). I will assume that a victim may respond with either

[25] Bennett, 2003: p. 137; Hampton, 1988: pp. 56 – 60.

[26] In an ideal world, being wronged would not lower one's rank within a community. But we do live in a flawed society, and some wrongs, such as rape, are seen to taint the victim. Bennett recognizes that "few of us are able to react as the virtuous person does [by not thinking one is diminished by a wrongdoing], but this is how we ought to react if we are fully committed to our moral beliefs" (2003: p. 139).

resentment or indignation to a wrongdoing.[27] What I am concerned with right now is what type of responses resentment and indignation both are.

2. Resentment and indignation are examples of personal participant retributive reactive attitudes.

Both resentment and indignation are types of personal participant retributive reactive attitudes, which are attitudes adopted towards a moral agent for a culpable wrongdoing.[28] Reactive attitudes are, in Strawson's words, "non-detached" reactions of people interacting with each other. We place importance on the attitudes displayed towards us by other people, and so we react to other people based on what we take their attitudes to be.[29] I will give an analysis of what makes these reactive attitudes "personal," "participant" and "retributive" in what follows.

Before doing that though, it is important to understand that these reactive attitudes are affective attitudes, meaning that they are emotional responses which involve seeing a person's character differently. In the case of resentment and indignation, they are responses to what a victim perceives to be the ill-intentions of the wrongdoer, rather than to the wrongdoing itself. They are a victim's affective response to her perception of the wrongdoer's attitude manifested in his wrongdoing, what his wrongdoing seems to say about his ill will or indifference towards her.[30] So a person who is perceived by a victim to accidentally harm her may elicit a different response (or perhaps no affective response at all) from the victim than the wrongdoer who is perceived to intentionally harm the victim.[31] Importantly, affective attitudes are a way of regarding the other person, the wrongdoer, in a way that extends past the single wrongdoing, and this regard means "being disposed to have characteristic

[27] As will become clear later, once I have shown that the two responses are of the same category of attitudes, I think that neither response is the *obligatory* response, and that both can be *appropriate* responses.
[28] Allais, 2008b: p. 41; Griswold, 2007: p. 39. Murphy also recognizes resentment and other "vindictive passions" ("anger, the desire to strike back, the desire to see the wrongdoer punished, sometimes even hatred") as reactive attitudes (1988: p. 17; 2005a: p. 34)
[29] Strawson, 1974: pp. 4 – 5.
[30] Griswold, 2007: p. 39; Strawson, 1974: pp. 10, 14 – 15.
[31] Strawson, 1974: p. 5.

patterns of attention, expectation, and interpretation with respect to [his] actions."[32] In other words, a wrongdoing may lead the victim to form a particular affective attitude, and this attitude will affect how the victim views the wrongdoer's other actions because she views the wrongdoer in a particular light. Her attitude will lead the victim to interpret the wrongdoer's other actions in light of her attitude towards him. Responding with resentment or indignation to the wrongdoing amounts to the victim seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered;" this means she will regard his further actions negatively, by being prone to seeing them as manifestations of his ill-will or indifference towards her (or others).[33]

These responses are *participant* attitudes because they arise out of our participation with one another in interpersonal relationships, and involve seeing the other person as a decision-making moral agent. We place great importance on the intentions of other people in the way they treat us, and our emotions and reactions towards them focus largely on their intentions. It is because we relate to other people, and because we see them as participants in our moral community, that we demand good will from them.[34] When they fail or excel at this task, we are prone to reacting with feelings that indicate a change in the way we see them. The "participant attitude" is in contrast to what Strawson calls the "objective attitude," which is when one treats the other as an object rather than a person, as something that cannot take anything more than causal responsibility for an action. When one adopts the objective attitude, one does not see the other as a moral agent, as being morally responsible for his actions, and because of this, one does not take his actions to be manifestations of his intentions or attitudes. In this case, we respond with wariness or caution to the human inflicting harm, instead of with participant reactive attitudes.[35] Under normal circumstances, when we have no reason to question the moral agency of the wrongdoer because they do not appear incapacitated in any way, we would respond with participant attitudes. The objective attitude is, in practice, only adopted in

[32] Allais, 2008b: p. 52. Griswold uses the term "re-framing" to discuss this change in affective regard: it is to see the wrongdoer in a new light (2007: p. 57).
[33] Allais, 2008b: p. 55.
[34] *Ibid.*: p. 53; Strawson, 1974: pp. 5 – 6.
[35] Strawson, 1974: pp. 8 – 9. As Bennett points out, this would mean that one could not engage the person in any dialogue on questions of value and moral responsibilities, and could therefore not engage the person in a trusting relationship (2003: p. 132).

peculiar cases, where there is reason to think the other is morally incapacitated, or because the situation is simply too stressful for the victim to recognize as being a case of ill-will directed at her.[36] For the most part, though, Strawson thinks that participant attitudes are an unavoidable aspect of being human – he goes so far as to say that it is "practically inconceivable" that we would be able to drop these attitudes permanently in favour of the objective attitude.[37]

The responses to wrongdoing that we are considering here are to be understood as *personal* reactive attitudes, in that they are responses by the victim who was wronged.[38] I said earlier that indignation could also be vicarious in that it is felt by a third party who was not the object of the wrongdoing. While this is a feature of indignation, I am concerned in this project with the reactive attitudes that are a *victim's* response to wrongdoing, simply because I am concerned with forgiveness. I will assume (but not argue for) the claim that forgiveness is given to a wrongdoer by a victim.[39]

The reactive attitudes in question here, resentment and indignation, are *retributive* in that they have ideas of retribution built into them. The victim's view of the wrongdoer is changed through feeling resentment or indignation: she sees the wrongdoer as "lowered," as someone who has failed to meet the moral demands of the community and so needs to face exclusion or condemnation in some form. This retribution may be as simple as the fact that the victim distances herself from the wrongdoer, withdrawing from him.[40] As Bennett describes it, when discussing indignation, there is a "recognition of [the] changed relationship with the

[36] Strawson, 1974: pp. 9 – 10. He also mentions that we might adopt the objective attitude as an "aid to policy" or out of intellectual curiosity. It should be noted that hard determinists would argue that we should adopt the objective attitude permanently, since our attitudes of good and ill will would not be adopted freely, in their view, and so we have no moral responsibility for our actions or our attitudes.
[37] *Ibid.*: p. 11.
[38] Allais, 2008b: pp. 37, 55; Griswold, 2008: p. 32; Murphy, 1988: p. 21.
[39] The victim I refer to in this chapter is an individual. In chapters two and three, the victim will be a collective, because I will be discussing forgiveness in the context of group-based harms. How collectives can be victims of wrongdoing will be briefly pointed to in the next two chapters.
[40] Withdrawing or turning away from the wrongdoer is a way of retaliating against the wrongdoer. The retributive desire need not manifest as punishment or a physical lashing out (de Gaynesford, 2008: pp. 49 – 50). In Strawson's words, indignation and resentment "tend to promote an at least partial and temporary withdrawal of goodwill" (1974: p. 21). See also North (1987: pp. 502 – 503).

wrongdoer."[41] This withdrawal involves seeing him as tainted by his action and feeling that he ought to be blamed for his action. I said earlier that seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered" is a way of viewing his *character* – it is not a belief about how he should be *punished*.[42] The retribution involved here is that one views his character as deserving of blame and censure, rather than thinking that his action justifies a certain punishment.[43] The object of the feeling is the *person* because of their action, rather than their action in isolation. This is an important distinction. If one thinks that the retributive reactive attitude involves a belief about the punishment that the wrongdoer's action ought to attract, as Griswold, for example, does, one will be led to think that a failure to feel these emotions is a failure to take the wrongdoing seriously. Failing to see a wrongdoer's character as "lowered" is, it is presumed on these accounts, a failure to condemn the wrongdoing.[44] I will argue in the next section that this is mistaken: there is no necessary tie between thoughts about a person's character and thoughts about how he should be treated, and so seeing a person as deserving of blame does not necessarily correlate to thinking he ought to be punished.

We can now see that the responses we have to wrongdoings committed against us by morally responsible agents are affective responses that amount to seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered" because of his action. The affective responses are personal participant retributive reactive attitudes, in that they are retributive reactions by the victim of the wrongdoing to a wrongdoer that could and should meet the community's moral demands, and so could and should refrain from showing ill will or disrespect to the victim. I have discussed two examples of retributive reactive attitudes, namely resentment and indignation, but these are by no means the only two responses a victim could have to a wrongdoer. A victim may respond with other

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[41] Bennett (2003: pp. 130 – 131).

[42] As will be seen, though, some theorists think that viewing the wrongdoer as "lowered" is necessarily tied to a belief about how he should be treated (Murphy, 1988, 2005a; 2005b; Griswold, 2007; Strawson, 1974). I will argue against this.

[43] In Strawson's words, these attitudes show "a readiness to acquiesce in the infliction of suffering on an offender, within the 'institution' of suffering" (1974: p. 22). He is of the view that the reactive attitude is the "correlate" of the moral demand. See also Griswold, 2007: pp. 38 – 29.

[44] This will lead Murphy and Griswold to argue that forgiveness should be conditional on reasons for thinking that the wrongdoer can be separated from his action, that the action does not taint his character. An apology is usually seen as a way for the wrongdoer to distance himself from his wrongdoing, and so provide a reason to be forgiven. I will discuss this account of forgiveness further on.

retributive reactive attitudes: malice, contempt, hatred or suspicion, for example. It is also possible that a victim may respond with more than one attitude: her resentment may be accompanied by suspicion, for example. Each of these attitudes involves seeing the wrongdoer's character as tainted by his wrongdoing. What I want to explore now is the moral status of these attitudes, and whether or not one *should* feel these attitudes.[45]

3. Personal participant retributive reactive attitudes are not obligatory *responses to wrongdoing, but they can be* appropriate *responses to have in the presence of wrongdoing.*

Because personal participant retributive reactive attitudes are about the other's character and how this character is regarded *affectively*, they can be separated from *beliefs* about obligations within a moral community. The retributive element involved in the affective attitudes currently under consideration, those that amount to regarding the wrongdoer as "lowered," is not necessarily correlated to beliefs about punishment and post-wrongdoing obligations.[46] These latter beliefs are formed on the basis of evidence and rules within the community, and if the evidence for the belief exists, the belief should be formed. If the wrongdoer commits an act that meets the definition of an immoral act, one should form the belief that he has committed an immoral act. With this belief would come attendant beliefs about what his obligations are, given his wrongdoing. This would include beliefs about how justice should be carried out, what kind of punishment he should face, how he can compensate for his wrongdoing, and so on. The objects of these beliefs are his actions: his wrongdoing is immoral, his punishment is a just consequence of his action, his compensation to the victim or

[45] It should be noted that not all reactive attitudes are retributive: we respond to actions that seem to indicate good will or respect, and come to esteem the person responsible for those actions. This will be important for the third chapter of this thesis, when I explore forgiveness as a reactive attitude.

[46] I am going to use the term "post-wrongdoing obligations" to refer to the steps the wrongdoer needs to take after the wrongdoing to redeem himself. This is a fairly broad and loose term for both moral and judicial obligations. In terms of justice, the wrongdoer has obligations to complete his punishment for his wrongdoing and make reparations for the harm done. Morally, he is expected to distance himself from his wrongdoing by recognizing his action as immoral, through the expression of regret or apology. These two types of obligations can come apart – a wrongdoer may not regret his wrongdoing or recognize it as a wrongdoing but serve out the terms of his punishment as stipulated, or a wrongdoer may apologise and come to condemn his action but never face judicial punishment. I will simply use the term to refer to *any* steps the wrongdoer may take to make amends for his wrongdoing.

moral community is a right response from him.[47] The judgement that one gives to these actions is that they are right or wrong, that they meet or fail to meet the moral requirements of the community. What makes the wrongdoing a wrong is that the evidence meets the definition of an immoral act.

Affective attitudes, on the other hand, are formed on one's interpretation of, or attention that one gives to, the evidence, and are evaluations concerning the character of the person who committed a particular act.[48] The actions are taken to be indicative of the person's character, rather than factual evidence as such. Allais argues that these attitudes are not epistemically mandated or obligatory, because they are character judgements that are not formed on the basis of evidence as such. This is because we are "seldom well positioned" to judge people's characters, and because characters are not fixed, making them difficult to judge.[49] Rather, these attitudes arise because of the affective focus given to the evidence of the other person's actions, and this makes these attitudes *optional* responses to a wrongdoing.[50] These attitudes do not align with the way the world is, but rather with the way the world appears to one when one focuses on the evidence in a particular way. This is not to say that just any attitude may be formed at will. The evidence presented does place constraints on the attitude that can be formed. Attitudes can be appropriate or inappropriate (rather than right or wrong) responses, and this appropriateness depends on the evidence presented. So while evidence of an immoral act does not mean that one is *obliged* to form a retributive reactive attitude of resentment, for example, the lack of evidence of wrongdoing would make the attitude *inappropriate*. In the absence of a wrongdoing, resentment is an inappropriate response to another person.

That personal participant retributive reactive attitudes are not obligatory means that beliefs about a wrongdoer's post-wrongdoing obligations (punishment, compensation, reparations and so on) need not correlate to one's reactive attitudes toward him.[51] *Contra* Murphy and Griswold, the victim can form the belief that the

[47] Allais, 2008b: pp. 59 – 62.
[48] *Ibid.*: p. 59. See also Hampton, 1988: pp. 84 – 85.
[49] Allais, 2008b: p. 60.
[50] *Ibid.*: p. 61.
[51] As far as Kolnai is concerned, punishment is "quite outside our context," meaning that the issue of punishment does not relate to the issue of our feelings towards the wrongdoer (1973: p. 93).

wrongdoer has committed an immoral action, and is culpable for it, without forming a retributive reactive attitude about the wrongdoer's character. This means that the victim still takes the wrongdoing seriously, and is not condoning the wrongdoing. The evidence for the wrongdoing will merely allow that the victim is entitled to her retributive reactive attitude, should she have it, and that the retributive reactive attitude is appropriate in light of the evidence. The victim may choose not to give *affective* attention to the evidence, and so form only the belief, rather than the belief and the reactive attitude. This also means that, conversely, this affective attitude may persist even when the wrongdoer meets his post-wrongdoing obligations, by apologizing or making compensation for his wrongdoing, for example. The wrongdoing may be "undone" in that the wrongdoer has made amends for his deed, making him now the author of moral actions, but the victim's regard for him as someone who previously failed to show her respect or good will can persist. She may not give affective attention or focus to the new evidence of the wrongdoer's actions, which means that her existing attitude is not changed. The new evidence of the wrongdoer's actions means her beliefs about the wrongdoer's present culpability should change, but her view of his character can remain unchanged.

It may be thought that this new evidence of moral actions by the wrongdoer makes the retributive reactive attitude inappropriate, and so new evidence about culpability should dissipate the reactive attitude.[52] This is to misunderstand the way the new evidence works: the new evidence (of his moral actions) does not override the old evidence (of his immoral actions). The beliefs about the wrongdoer's culpability are changed because the new evidence is of amends being made for the wrongdoing, not because the new evidence erases the old evidence of the wrongdoing. Even when one believes the wrongdoer should no longer be punished because he has met the demands of justice, the belief that he was the author of the wrongdoing still stands. This means that the evidence that makes the attitude appropriate still stands, and the victim need not withdraw her focus on the evidence

[52] As Allais says, the thought might be that the new evidence makes the retributive reactive attitude of resentment "justifiably revisable" in that it becomes inappropriate. What would follow on from this is that, in light of new evidence, forgiveness becomes obligatory (2008b: pp. 38, 64). See also Murphy, 1988: pp. 29 – 30. Like Allais, I disagree with this, as will be shown later.

as support for her regard of him as "lowered." The distinction between moral beliefs about actions, on the one hand, and affective attitudes focused on the wrongdoer's character, on the other, allows that the victim can believe that the wrongdoer ought to be punished without regarding him as "lowered," and oppositely, she can believe that the wrongdoer has met his justice and has no further obligations to her or the community, yet still affectively regard him as "lowered."

Understanding the nature of these affective attitudes allows us to see why a failure to have these attitudes is not a moral defect, or a failure to take wrongdoings seriously. Condemnation of wrongs and the assignment of blame are justified by the evidence for the wrongdoing, but this condemnation need not lead the wrongdoer to change her personal attitude towards the wrongdoer. It is possible for a victim to condemn a wrongdoer without feeling resentment or indignation towards him. She is simply entitled to hold these attitudes should she do so. These attitudes are affective and depend on her interpretation of the evidence available, and this makes them a personal, optional response rather than an obligatory response.

It is because the attitude can persist even after the post-wrongdoing obligations have been met or because the post-wrongdoing obligations may never be met (due to the death of the wrongdoer, for example), that there is a space for forgiveness in our interactions with one another. Since new evidence of the wrongdoer's moral actions may not necessarily change the victim's negative feelings towards the wrongdoer, and because new evidence may never be given, she may need another way to overcome these personal participant retributive reactive attitudes (hereafter, I will use the broad term "retributive reactive attitudes"). This is where forgiveness comes in.

Forgiveness

Having outlined what retributive reactive attitudes are, I will show in this section what forgiveness is. I will argue that it is not merely the overcoming of resentment (as suggested by Butler, Griswold and Murphy) or indignation (as suggested by

Bennett).[53] Instead, forgiveness is the overcoming or forswearing of the retributive reactive attitudes described above (of which resentment and indignation are but two examples – other examples include malice, contempt, and anger), which amounts to the victim no longer viewing the wrongdoing as "lowering" the wrongdoer's character. In order to do this, I will discount various other ways of understanding what forgiveness is. In doing this, I will outline various parameters that the forswearing of reactive attitudes needs to meet in order to qualify as forgiveness. It will emerge that there are two kinds of forgiveness: forgiveness that is conditional on the wrongdoer giving reasons for being forgiven and unconditional forgiveness which occurs even when the wrongdoer has provided no reason for being forgiven. The fundamental difference between these two kinds of forgiveness is the issue of when a victim may forgive the wrongdoer, on whether or not it is permissible to forgive an unrepentant or unpunished wrongdoer. However, in this thesis I am not concerned with the permissibility of forgiveness as such, but with what forgiveness *is*, and so will not look at whether or not forgiveness *should* be conditional or unconditional. I will also leave aside for now the issue of what may motivate the victim to forgive if we understand forgiveness to be optional (and possibly unconditional), but I will take this up in the next section. Some reference will have to be made to reasons for forgiving in the description of forgiveness, but the concern here is primarily on the nature of forgiveness.

1. What forgiveness is and is not.

Forgiveness is often spoken of as "wiping the slate clean" or "no longer holding the action against the person," which is why we often say we should just "forgive and forget." What is entailed by having resentment or other retributive reactive attitudes is that the victim views the wrongdoer differently, and sees the relationship between them as having changed. Asking for forgiveness is often an appeal from the

[53] Bennett (2003); Griswold (2007); Murphy (1988; 2005a; 2005b). Butler's account of forgiveness, according to Griswold, does not strictly amount to the overcoming of resentment: instead, he argues that forgiveness is the overcoming of excessive resentment, or revenge (Griswold, 2007: pp. 31 – 32). Allais disagrees with this understanding of forgiveness: as she says, excessive resentment is always inappropriate and we should not have inappropriate resentment (2008b: p. 39). Griswold, himself, says that ultimately, forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment (2007: pp. 39 – 43).

wrongdoer to the victim for the relationship to go back to what it was before the wrongdoing, back to before the victim thought of the wrongdoer as "lowered."[54] It is for this reason that I think understanding forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment or indignation is too narrow. When one thinks negatively of a person, a lot of affective attitudes can be involved, and one's affective attitudes may change over time. Resentment may develop into hatred or contempt. Resentment may fade, but a deep suspicion of that person may remain intact, seeing the wrongdoer as a "lowered" person.[55] Another reason for thinking it too narrow to restrict forgiveness to the overcoming of resentment or indignation is that I also think that people may respond in a variety of ways to a wrongdoing. There are other possible responses that that involve changing the way one views the wrongdoer – such as contempt, malice, anger and hatred.[56] Because of this, I will follow Allais in suggesting a broader definition of forgiveness, which is the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes.[57] As I will show in the rest of this section, *how* the retributive reactive attitudes are overcome is important – forgiveness is not simply the elimination of retributive reactive attitudes.

At this point, it will be useful to cash out a preliminary definition of forgiveness in terms of retributive reactive attitudes. This understanding of forgiveness will be supported and clarified in the rest of the section as I will contrast it with other proposed understandings of forgiveness and draw out the implications of my understanding of forgiveness. So far, I have said that forgiveness is the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes and I have hinted that it does not conflict with the demands of justice (since it need not affect one's beliefs about post-wrongdoing obligations because one's reactive attitudes are not necessarily tied to those beliefs). To have retributive reactive attitudes is to view the wrongdoer's character as "lowered" because of his wrongdoing. To overcome these attitudes is to

[54] As North says, "[w]hat is annulled in the act of forgiveness is not the crime itself but the distorting effect that this wrong has upon one's relations with the wrongdoer and perhaps with others" (1987: p. 500). Garrard and McNaughton understand forgiveness as involving the "bracketing off" of the wrongdoing, so that reconciliation can be fostered (2002: p. 41).

[55] Allais gives a similar example, and argues that in this situation, the victim cannot be said to have forgiven (2008b: p. 43). See also Griswold, 2007: p. 41.

[56] Hampton gives a clear overview of a variety of emotions – anger, simple hatred, moral hatred, spite and malice – and clarifies the similarities and differences between them (1988: pp. 61 – 79).

[57] Allais, 2008b: pp. 51, 54. See also Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: p. 44.

overcome, or forswear, this view of the other. The retributive reactive attitudes arise through the focus the victim is giving to the wrongdoing; to overcome these reactive attitudes then is to withdraw her focus from the wrongdoing. This means that when the victim thinks of, or relates to, the wrongdoer's character, she does not focus on the wrongdoing, allowing for her to be able to cease seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered" in his character, in seeing him affectively *as* a wrongdoer.[58] "Wiping the slate clean" means that in relating to the wrongdoer, the victim does not see the wrongdoing as playing a role in the way she relates to the wrongdoer. The slate is "clean" because the victim views the wrongdoer as she did before the wrongdoing. She changes the way she regards the wrongdoer back to the way she viewed him before the wrongdoing, in effect, separating him from his wrongdoing.

One benefit of understanding that forgiveness is concerned with retributive reactive attitudes is that it allows us to immediately dispel Aurel Kolnai's paradox, which is meant to undermine the thought that forgiveness has a useful role to play in our relations to other people.[59] This paradox is that when the wrongdoer commits a wrong, the victim would respond with a retributive response. When the wrongdoer distances himself from his wrongdoing – by revoking and disavowing it – and so has caused "a rupture with his past," the victim should acknowledge this by changing her attitude to the wrongdoer.[60] If she does not, she would appear to be vindictive. So when the wrongdoer morally separates himself from his wrongdoing, there appears to be no role for forgiveness to play: the retributive response is undermined by the wrongdoer's condemnation of his own deeds.[61] In other words, by meeting what I have loosely termed his post-wrongdoing obligations, the wrongdoer would "undo" the wrongdoing. In acknowledging these actions (the wrongdoer's condemnation of

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[58] Griswold, 2007: p. 54; Hampton, 1988: pp. 37 – 38. In Kolnai's words, the wrongdoing is "annulled" for the wrongdoing is eliminated "from the texture of their [the victim and the wrongdoer's] relationship" (1973: p. 101).

[59] This is technically only one half of the "logical paradoxy of forgiveness." The other half is the paradox that if the wrongdoer does not make an effort to distance himself from his wrongdoing (through meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations), any forgiveness would amount to condonation of the wrongdoing. This is because forgiveness amounts to refraining from any retributive response to an action that demands one (Kolnai, 1973: p. 95). I will explore this issue later in this chapter when I argue that forgiveness is not condonation.

[60] *Ibid.*: p. 98.

[61] *Ibid.*: p. 98.

his wrongdoing being one such action), the victim's retributive response would dissipate since the wrongdoer's new actions would make the response inappropriate. This would mean that forgiveness would be unnecessary: the acknowledgement of the wrongdoer's new (right) actions would amount to the overcoming of the retributive response, and there would be nothing further for forgiveness to achieve. The paradox here relies on the thought that one should change one's attitude in light of new actions: the wrongdoing would demand one response, and this response would not be dissipated until the wrongdoer "undid" the wrongdoing. Forgiveness would not be possible until the wrongdoer met his post-wrongdoing obligations,[62] but in meeting those obligations, he "undoes" the wrongdoing, which should make the retributive reactive attitudes dissipate because they become inappropriate. Forgiveness could not occur then because there would be no retributive reactive attitude to overcome. This paradox can be dispelled immediately if we recall how retributive reactive attitudes relate to the evidence of wrongdoing. I argued that the retributive reactive attitude is formed by focusing on the evidence, and that the object of the attitude is the wrongdoer's character, not the wrongdoing itself. This retributive reactive attitude could persist even when the wrongdoing was "undone" – and it is because of this that forgiveness still has a role to play. Retributive reactive attitudes are not necessarily overcome by seeing the wrongdoer do right actions. He can still be seen to be "lowered" because he remains the author of a wrongdoing, even if he later condemns the wrongdoing himself.[63] This is why there is a space for forgiveness to play in our interactions with one another.

Retributive reactive attitudes *are* dissipated if the victim is shown that what she took to be a wrongdoing is in fact a right or permissible action in the circumstances, or that the wrongdoer is not morally responsible for the action. But neither of these tactics amount to forgiveness. The first is a matter of justifying the action, showing that it was only apparently wrong. The second amounts to excusing the action

[62] This is the other half of the "logical paradoxy of forgiveness" that I mentioned in footnote 59 of this chapter. This half of the paradox is relying on the idea that forgiveness is conditional on there being a reason to forgive. I will explore this idea a bit further on.

[63] It is often because the wrongdoer recognizes and condemns his action that he comes to ask for forgiveness. If he did not condemn his action in some way, he would not see himself as needing forgiveness. This highlights that he remains the author of his wrongdoing, even when he later distances himself from it, and thus may need forgiveness if the relationship is to be restored.

because the wrongdoer was in some way sufficiently incapacitated so as to be unable to be morally responsible for the action.[64] In both cases, the dissipation of the retributive reactive attitudes does not amount to forgiveness, because rather than being overcome, the retributive reactive attitudes are undermined as the retributive reactive attitudes are rendered inappropriate responses to the action because the action is now judged to not be a wrongdoing. Forgiveness is a way to overcome *appropriate* retributive reactive attitudes, which are responses to actions that *are* wrongdoings because the action is done by a morally responsible agent, and because it is a moral transgression.[65]

My account of retributive reactive attitudes allows us to dismiss another view of forgiveness, that of forgiveness as leniency or dismissal of debt or punishment.[66] The thought motivating this view is that when the victim changes her view of the wrongdoer, in no longer seeing him as "lowered," she would treat the wrongdoer differently. Treating the wrongdoer differently would amount to no longer demanding that the wrongdoer meet his post-wrongdoing obligations. This is because, on some level, we take our actions to be manifestations of our attitudes (this is what supports our formation of reactive attitudes after all), and if we did not see the wrongdoer as "lowered," we would not think of him as deserving of punishment. However, this conflates the affective view of the wrongdoer with the beliefs about post-wrongdoing obligations – the affective view of the wrongdoer as "deserving of blame" is a view of his character, rather than his actions. To think forgiveness amounts to leniency or the forgoing of punishment confuses forgiveness with mercy.[67] If forgiveness was tantamount to leniency in punishment, there would be no need for forgiveness once

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[64] Allais, 2008b: pp. 34 – 36; Murphy, 1988: p. 20; Strawson, 1974: pp. 7 – 8, 16.

[65] For a victim to offer forgiveness means that she sees the other person as a wrongdoer, and this explains why such an offer can potentially be offensive to the other person. The implication of forgiveness is that the person being forgiven has done something wrong (Govier, 2002: p. 74; Hampton, 1988: pp. 40 – 41). If this person does not see himself as a wrongdoer, because he thinks his action was right or permissible, or he can be excused from taking responsibility for it, the offer of forgiveness indicates to him that he is being seen as "lowered" in the victim's regard, possibly without cause, which can be insulting to him. Because the retributive reactive attitudes are personal interpretations of what the action seems to indicate about the other's attitude towards her, it is possible for the victim to be mistaken.

[66] The debt may be a debt to society for a moral transgression.

[67] Allais, 2008a: pp. 6 – 8; Allais, 2008b: pp. 47 – 50; Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: p. 48; Griswold, 2007: pp. 60 – 62; Murphy, 1988: p. 33 – 34.

the wrongdoer had been punished. The victim would have no way of forgiving, and would have to find another way to get rid of her retributive reactive attitudes. This is counter-intuitive: a wrongdoer who has repented and been punished may still ask for forgiveness, and what he would be asking for is that the victim change her view of him as a person and let go of her retributive reactive attitudes towards him. We can see why forgiveness does not amount to leniency: I argued earlier that one's beliefs about post-wrongdoing obligations are not dependent on one's retributive reactive attitudes towards the wrongdoer. Given this, a victim may think that the wrongdoer has obligations to meet in cases where the victim has no retributive reactive attitudes, either because they were never formed or because they have been overcome. Her beliefs about punishment are not necessarily affected by her feelings about the person.[68] To forgive is to overcome one's reactive attitudes; to have mercy is to be lenient towards a wrongdoer regarding punishment for his wrongdoing. Forgiveness is still possible even after punishment has been meted out; mercy is not.[69] This means that a victim can be forgiving and unmerciful (meaning she no longer regards the wrongdoer negatively but still insists that he be punished), or unforgiving and merciful (she may view him as "lowered" but feel that he should not be punished to the full extent for other reasons).[70]

2. The first of two accounts: conditional forgiveness.

Even though I have argued that the victim's beliefs about the wrongdoer's post-wrongdoing obligations are not compromised by her forgiving the wrongdoer, some theorists still argue that forgiveness is only *permissible* after the wrongdoer has met

[68] Novitz claims that "one can punish… yet not forgive; and one can forgive without ever punishing" (1998: p. 304).

[69] Mercy is also often in the hands of the authorities: it may be the judge in a court of justice who decides the punishment, rather than the victim, and so it may be him that can be merciful. But if punishment is in the hands of the victim, she may choose to forgo punishment, or be lenient, as an act of mercy (Allais, 2008a: pp. 2 – 3).

[70] John Tasioulas, for example, mentions some grounds for mercy. It might be that the wrongdoer has some obstacles in his history that prevents him from "forming a decent and law-abiding character" (2003: p.116). Or it may be that the obstacles that the offender faced were unusually severe. Examples of these obstacles would be abject poverty and prolonged abuse. Other grounds might be that the wrongdoer is suffering from another misfortune, such as illness, that would be cruelly exacerbated by his full punishment, or that the wrongdoer has sincerely repented, making him worthy of less severe punishment (*Ibid.*: pp. 116 – 119).

some of his post-wrongdoing obligations.[71] They may agree with how I have conceptualized forgiveness, but think that forgiveness should only be offered once the wrongdoer has provided some reason for being forgiven. On this account of forgiveness, forgiving is not the forgoing of punishment or dismissal of debt, or simply a change in affective regard for the wrongdoer, but is the recognition of the wrongdoer meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations. This is the first of two accounts of forgiveness that emerges in the literature: conditional forgiveness. The victim needs evidence to support changing her view of the wrongdoer, evidence that shows her that the wrongdoer is no longer "lowered" or worthy of censure. Certain conditions have to be met before she can forgive, which provide a reason for thinking the wrongdoer's slate can be wiped clean. Contrasted with this account is unconditional forgiveness, which is the view that forgiveness can occur at the victim's discretion. I will discuss this account further on; for now, I will briefly explore conditional forgiveness.

Conditional forgiveness is the view that forgiveness should only be offered once the wrongdoer has taken steps to distance himself from his wrongdoing, giving the victim reason to separate the wrongdoer from his wrongdoing by forgiving him. The authors in support of this view argue that the victim needs a reason for thinking that the wrongdoer is not "lowered" because of what they understand retributive reactive attitudes to involve. Their understanding of resentment, for example, is that it is not simply a negative affective regard for the wrongdoer, but includes a protest of sorts that should not be overcome without reason.[72] Murphy and Griswold are both proponents of conditional forgiveness, but for slightly different reasons. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Murphy thinks that resentment is essentially tied up with self-respect, and so the victim must forgive for reasons that are compatible with

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[71] Recall that I defined "post-wrongdoing obligations" loosely as involving both moral and judicial obligations. Forgiveness that is conditional on the wrongdoer providing a reason for being forgiven is probably more concerned with the moral obligations. Forgiveness would be offered when the wrongdoer recognizes and condemns his action as immoral, meaning that he can be welcomed back into the moral community.
Griswold understands the issue as a conceptual problem, not a permissibility problem, saying that forgiveness is a process that involves certain conditions being met, and "forgiveness" that occurs before these conditions are met is "non-paradigmatic" forgiveness, or is something that seeks to be forgiveness but is not yet forgiveness (2007: pp. 113 – 133). I will disagree with this.

[72] Griswold, 2007: pp. 49 – 53. Hieronymi, 2001: p. 546; Murphy, 1988: p. 18.

self-respect.[73] She would have to have reason to think that the wrongdoer no longer disrespects her. Griswold, on the other hand, thinks that resentment is a moral protest at the wrongdoer having done the wrongdoing, and so the victim may only forgive when the wrongdoer recognizes that he has done wrong.[74] Only once he has done this can he be accepted back into the moral community (through forgiveness). On both of these accounts, the condition that needs to be met before forgiveness can occur is that there is a reason for thinking the wrongdoer's action no longer taints his character, or that the action is not enough to make him "lowered" in the victim's regard. So, for example, the wrongdoer needs to recognize his wrongdoing as wrong by meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations (such as through apology or punishment).[75] Once these conditions have been met, once the wrongdoer has provided a reason for not being seen as "lowered," the victim would recognize the wrongdoer as having a different character.[76] Forgiveness amounts to recognition that the wrongdoer has provided new evidence for his character, and in forgiving, the victim decides to focus on the new evidence to change her view of the wrongdoer. The new evidence displaces the old evidence of his wrongdoing. Forgiveness is the act of separating the wrongdoer from his wrongdoing, but only in recognition of there being evidence for that separation, of having reason to think more highly of the wrongdoer. Bennett calls this type of forgiveness "redemptive forgiveness" because forgiveness is a response to the wrongdoer redeeming himself to the moral community, and dissociating himself from his wrongdoing.[77]

If one thinks that a victim should only overcome her view of the wrongdoer as "lowered" (in other words, forgive him) once she has evidence of him distancing himself from his wrongdoing, it may further be thought that if the victim forgives the

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[73] Murphy, 1988: p. 19, 24.

[74] This is one of the conditions that needs to be met by the wrongdoer in order for forgiveness to occur (Griswold, 2007: pp. 49 – 50).

[75] Murphy also allows that perhaps the victim knows the wrongdoer in other contexts, and so she can recognize that he is generally "a good guy" (1988: p. 24, 29 – 30). As I understand this claim, it is due to the existing relationship that we do not see the wrongdoer's character as lowered. The wrongdoing does, perhaps, indicate ill will or disrespect to the victim, but given that the wrongdoer usually treats the victim with good will or respect, his character seems to resist tainting.

[76] Murphy and Griswold argue that this is only an imperfect duty, rather than a perfect duty. The victim is not obliged to give up her retributive reactive attitudes towards the wrongdoer, but should realize that this is the good thing to do (Griswold, 2007: p. 69; Murphy, 1988: p. 29).

[77] Bennett, 2003: pp. 135 – 136.

wrongdoer before she has this evidence, she is condoning the wrongdoing.[78] The victim's expression of her retributive reactive attitudes, of her perception of the wrongdoer as "lowered," is to express the judgement of the immorality of the wrongdoer, on these accounts. This is what makes resentment a moral protest for Griswold, for in seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered," the victim is saying that the wrongdoer should not have done the wrongdoing. Griswold argues that for the victim to change her view of the wrongdoer is for her to take back her disapproval of the wrongdoer as author of the wrongdoing, and so to take back her condemnation of the wrongdoing.[79] Murphy puts forward a similar view, saying that it is "impossible to hate the sin and not the sinner if the sinner is intimately identified with his sin – if the wrongdoer is intimately identified with his wrongdoing."[80] To forgive without tacitly approving of the wrongdoing, the wrongdoer must distance himself from his action.

I disagree that forgiveness offered to an unrepentant or unpunished wrongdoer (one who has not distanced himself from his wrongdoing) is condonation or tacit approval of the wrongdoing, because I disagree that retributive reactive attitudes are necessary for moral protest.[81] As I have argued, a victim can condemn a wrongdoing without forming a retributive reactive attitude towards the wrongdoer. This allows that the victim can still condemn a wrongdoing even if she decides to overcome her retributive reactive attitude towards the wrongdoer. In changing her view of the wrongdoer, the victim is not taking back the belief of that person as the author of the wrongdoing. She is not changing her beliefs about how that wrongdoer should make up for his wrongdoing.[82] All she is changing is how she feels about him, and as I argued earlier, the way she regards the wrongdoer is not *determined* by the evidence of the wrongdoer's wrongdoing. The evidence only makes an attitude appropriate or inappropriate, rather than right or wrong. Griswold and Murphy should not be

[78] This is the other half of Kolnai's "logical paradoxy of forgiveness" that I mentioned earlier in this chapter (1973: pp. 95 – 96). See also R. S. Downie who discusses how easily forgiveness could be understood as condonation (1965: pp. 130 – 131).
[79] Griswold, 2007: pp. 45 – 46.
[80] Murphy, 1988: p. 24.
[81] This is not to say that I think forgiveness should be understood as unconditional. I think that we can understand forgiveness as conditional and unconditional, and both play a role in our interpersonal relations.
[82] See also Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: p. 49; and Jessica Wolfendale, 2005: p. 351.

sneaking moral protest (as a protest to wrongdoing or as a protest against being disrespected) into their descriptions of resentment. Retributive reactive attitudes merely recognize acts that seem to convey disrespect or ill intention. Moral protest occurs when the victim forms the belief that the wrongdoer committed a wrong action. Given this, it is not true that forgiveness should only be offered on condition of the wrongdoer meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations, or giving reason for the victim to think he is not "lowered." The wrongdoer's efforts to distance himself from his wrongdoing may make forgiveness easier, but this does not mean that forgiveness before such efforts is impermissible.

3. The second of two accounts: unconditional forgiveness.

Because forgiveness can be offered without compromising the victim's moral beliefs about the wrongdoing and her protest towards the wrongdoing, we can understand how forgiveness could be unconditional, which is the second account of forgiveness in the literature. Unconditional forgiveness is the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes independently of the wrongdoer giving a reason for not thinking of him as "lowered." The wrongdoer would not have to meet certain conditions such as meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations in order to be forgiven. This is a fairly ambitious account of forgiveness, for unconditional forgiveness allows the victim to forgive "unexcused, unjustified, unacceptable" wrongdoings, committed by unrepentant and possibly unknown wrongdoers.[83] This view is that the victim does not rely on the wrongdoer to provide support for the victim to change her view of his character. Instead, the victim chooses to no longer focus on the wrongdoing when thinking of his character, and so no longer sees him as "lowered," for other reasons. Whereas conditional forgiveness is the decision to separate the wrongdoer from his wrongdoing in response to his own efforts to distance himself from it, unconditional forgiveness is the decision to separate him from his wrongdoing independently of there being new evidence to affectively regard him as better than his wrongdoing indicated. This is not to say that forgiveness is a random decision that lacks good

[83] I borrow the term "unexcused, unjustified, unacceptable wrongdoing" from Allais (2008b: p. 35).

motivation. Rather, forgiveness need not occur simply in response to a wrongdoer's action that shows good intention or good will.[84]

There are many accounts that try to show how unconditional forgiveness works, in terms of what may motivate the victim to decide to forgive, and these accounts are instructive in how they fail. I will look at three different accounts in the rest of this section: Trudy Govier's account of unilateral forgiveness, Cheshire Calhoun's account of what she calls "aspirational forgiveness," and unconditional forgiveness offered due to an appeal to either respect for persons or human solidarity, as outlined by Eve Garrard and David McNaughton. All three are attempts to show how one overcomes retributive reactive attitudes by exploring possible motivations for forgiveness. In the final section of this chapter, I will put forward a reason that I think motivates forgiveness, both conditional and unconditional, that gets around the problems these accounts present.

3.1. Govier's unilateral forgiveness.

Govier defends a notion of unilateral forgiveness, which is when the victim forgives the wrongdoer out of a concern for the risks involved in having retributive reactive attitudes toward him. She explores (and agrees with) Margaret Holmgrem's position that this concern may be motivated by both psychological and ethical reasons.[85] The psychological reason for forgiving is that holding retributive reactive attitudes such as resentment for an extended period of time is unhealthy for the victim, for these retributive reactive attitudes could have negative effects on her mental health. The ethical reason would be that by forgiving the wrongdoer, the victim could restore her self-respect.[86] She gets rid of these retributive reactive attitudes in order to promote psychological health and restore her self-respect. The focus here, to use Garrard and McNaughton's term, is "attitude-focused" – the victim needs to get rid of her

[84] This is what apology and compensation are meant to show: the wrongdoer disassociates from his wrongdoing, and tries to make amends, which is a show of good will. It also allows for Murphy's concession that one can forgive an unrepentant wrongdoer who is generally "a good guy" or a friend: one would have evidence of good will from other actions (Murphy 1988: p.24, 29 – 30).
[85] Govier, 1999: pp. 61 – 62; Govier, 2002: p. 63.
[86] Govier, 1999: p. 61. For the issue of self-respect, see also Amstutz, 2005: pp. 56 – 58; and Murphy, 2005b: p. 79. Murphy raises concerns about such a view, that one forgives in order to restore one's self-respect.

retributive reactive attitudes in order to move on with her life, and so sets about getting rid of her resentment or indignation.[87] She may allow the feelings to fade, or perhaps put them out of her mind by putting the wrongdoing or wrongdoer out of her mind. She may deal with her feelings more forthrightly, in telling herself that she need not be concerned with the wrongdoer's disrespect or ill-intentions towards her, for her self-respect need not depend on him.[88]

However, getting rid of one's retributive reactive attitudes does not necessarily amount to forgiveness, which is why I dismiss Govier's account of unconditional forgiveness. If the victim simply puts the wrongdoing out of her mind, she is forgetting the wrongdoing (or more accurately, repressing it), rather than overcoming her retributive reactive attitudes. Was she to think about the wrongdoing, she may find that she still has her retributive reactive attitudes. If she allows her initial feelings to fade, she is not changing her view of the wrongdoer's character. She would still think of him as "lowered," which would perhaps be manifested as suspicion or contempt. What is key to forgiveness is that the victim changes her view of the wrongdoer while maintaining her condemnation of the wrongdoing. Govier's unilateral account outlined here involves the victim either ridding herself of her feelings by forgetting the wrongdoing, or letting the feelings fade without changing her view of the wrongdoer. As I have defined it, forgiveness is an interpersonal notion which means that it needs to involve a concern about how the victim and the wrongdoer relate to each other.[89] The victim, in forgiving, needs to be concerned with how she will regard the wrongdoer. Govier does not recognize this concern in her account of unilateral forgiveness; Calhoun, on the other hand, recognizes that in forgiving, there needs to be a focus on the wrongdoer.

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[87] Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: p. 5. In discussion with my supervisor, Dr. Thomas Martin, it was raised that the term "attitude-focus" is problematic, since attitudes are generally understood to be intentional. As Allais says, the term "attitude" "captures a form of regard" (2008b: p. 52). I think that Garrard and McNaughton had the colloquial understanding of attitude is mind. I hope the term does not create too much confusion – I think their distinction is useful, despite it being a slight misnomer.

[88] Govier, 1999: p. 62; Govier, 2002: p. 63.

[89] Strawson list forgiveness as a participant reactive attitude (1974: p. 4). Forgiveness is a response to another moral agent.

3.2. Calhoun's aspirational forgiveness.

The alternative to "attitude-focused" forgiveness (discussed by Govier) is "object-focused" forgiveness, in which the victim is concerned with the relationship that exists between her and the wrongdoer.[90] By being concerned for the relationship, the victim is concerned with how she relates to the wrongdoer, how she affectively regards *him*.[91] Her forgiveness is the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes in order to relate to the wrongdoer as she did before the wrongdoing, before she saw his character as tainted by his wrongdoing. Being concerned with this is not to say that the victim is necessarily concerned with reconciliation, although oftentimes this would be a concern. This is a very subtle distinction, and an example may make this point clearer. An abused wife may forgive her husband, in that she affectively sees him as she did before the abuse.[92] She may think of him with fondness or respond to him as she responds to other people. But she should recognize that he is a danger to her, and so take steps to protect herself (by leaving him, for example). When she meets him, she will not be indignant or resentful, but will be able to interact with him without those negative feelings. She does not interpret every other action he does through the lens of seeing him affectively as a wrongdoer. She would not forget his wrongdoing though. The wife can do this because there is no necessary tie between holding retributive reactive attitudes and having beliefs about the wrongdoing. This account of forgiveness focuses on how the victim's regard of the wrongdoer is what is changed in forgiving, rather than simply her feelings of resentment and indignation.

It may seem that changing one's regard for an unrepentant wrongdoer is too ambitious, and that forgiveness should not entail having to change one's view of the

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[90] Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: pp. 51 – 52. Allais notes too that an account of forgiveness needs to involve "the right kind of focus" on the wrongdoer (2008b: p. 45).
Most accounts of forgiveness that are object-focused are conditional accounts of forgiveness. Govier's notion of the "classic scenario" of forgiveness is one such conditional account (1999: pp. 59 – 60). I am arguing for an unconditional account of forgiveness that is object-focused.

[91] Novitz understands forgiveness as "other-regarding," rather than "self-interested" (1998: p. 308). Kim Atkins agrees, saying that the "point of forgiveness is not simply to calm one's own emotions, but to assume a moral posture toward the agent: forgiveness is 'other-directed'" (2002: p. 126). See also North (1987: p. 503); Pettigrove (2006: p. 488).

[92] I am adapting this example from Wolfendale. On her account, forgiving the husband would not amount to the abused wife reconciling with her abusive husband: instead, she would stop affectively regarding her husband as "unforgivable" (2005: p. 349). Murphy mentions a similar example, to show that forgiveness does not necessarily lead to reconciliation (2005b: p. 14).

wrongdoer. Why couldn't the battered wife get rid of her retributive reactive attitudes but still regard her husband affectively as a bad man, scum of the earth, as a wrongdoer? In forgiving, the victim could have the relevant "object-focus" by coming to accept the wrongdoer, and so affectively regard him as a wrongdoer, without feeling retributive reactive attitudes. This is how Calhoun understands what she terms "aspirational forgiveness." She argues that when the victim forgives (in cases where the wrongdoer has not met his post-wrongdoing obligations), she tells herself a narrative in which she comes to understand why the wrongdoer committed the wrongdoing.[93] This understanding would not involve excusing or justifying the wrongdoing, for forgiveness would not be necessary then, but would involve making "biographical sense" of the wrongdoer's action. When telling a story of the wrongdoing, the victim condemns it as a wrongdoing, and recognizes that it was done intentionally. What forgiveness means, on this account, is that the victim no longer "demands that the person be different from what [he] is."[94] In forgiving, the victim accepts that the wrongdoer showed her ill will or disrespect, but no longer holds reactive attitudes against him. She resigns herself to the idea that this is who he is and so no longer holds retributive reactive attitudes towards him.

This is a problematic account of forgiveness for two reasons. Firstly, Calhoun does not show why understanding the wrongdoer and his immoral decision would lead to the victim changing her affective view of him. In fact, as Griswold points out, understanding the story of the wrongdoer, entering sympathetically into his situation and his motives, may increase the victim's resentment and anger.[95] Secondly, there are two ways of understanding what "no longer demanding the wrongdoer be different" could mean: 1) the victim simply accepts the wrongdoer is incapable of meeting moral demands to respect others, or 2) she accepts the wrongdoer as immoral.

Both of these meanings are problematic. The first meaning amounts to the victim changing her view of the wrongdoer in that she no longer views him as a

[93] Calhoun, 1992: p. 92.
[94] *Ibid.*: p. 95.
[95] Griswold, 2007: pp. 57, 79. See also Hieronymi, 2001: p. 538.

person, capable of choices and responding to moral demands.[96] In effect, she would be adopting what Strawson described earlier as the objective attitude towards the wrongdoer.[97] By doing this, the victim is excluding the wrongdoer from the moral community entirely, for he would no longer be a moral agent in her eyes. Forgiveness, as an interpersonal notion, is offered to those the victim recognizes as having moral responsibility and so being moral agents, which is why it is one of the participant attitudes. Seeing the wrongdoer as an object rules out the possibility of forgiveness.[98] Calhoun denies that this is what her aspirational forgiveness amounts to – she says that the victim would still see the wrongdoer as a person, albeit an immoral person. She says that the victim maintains her view of the wrongdoer as a "substandard" person.[99] This is why I think her account is closer to the second meaning, that of acceptance of the wrongdoer and his wrongdoing, which is also problematic.[100] By saying that we make "biographical sense" of the wrongdoing, Calhoun says that we come to view the wrongdoer's actions in a larger context, and so understand why the wrongdoer made that particular choice, without justifying it. In doing this, we choose to "place respecting another's way of making sense of [his] life before resentfully enforcing moral standards."[101] Acceptance, in this context, can be defined as letting go of one's retributive reactive attitudes, possibly for moral reasons – perhaps in order to keep the peace as Hampton suggests,[102] or as in this case, because the victim decides to respect the wrongdoer's decision – but without changing one's affective regard of the wrongdoer. It is a resignation that indicates that one thinks the wrongdoer has a tainted character, but that one wants to move past the wrongdoing, much like Govier's notion of unilateral forgiveness. It is very similar to letting one's retributive reactive attitudes fade away with time, because similarly,

[96] This is how Atkins' interprets Cheshire Calhoun's account, and she equates Calhoun's "aspirational forgiveness" with a distancing from the wrongdoer as a moral agent. Atkins thus sees this account as inadequate, for this forgiveness fails to view the wrongdoer as an agent (2002: p. 124).
[97] Strawson, 1974: pp. 8 – 9.
[98] As Hieronymi says, "[w]ithout responsibility, there is no culpability. Without culpability, there can be no forgiveness" (2001: p. 537).
[99] Calhoun, 1992: p. 95.
[100] Allais has the same opinion (2008b: p. 46).
[101] Calhoun, 1992: p. 95.
[102] Hampton, 1988: pp. 39 – 40. She says that this amounts to condoning the wrongdoing – the wrongdoing is accepted without moral protest.

the victim's affective view of the wrongdoer stays the same. The wrongdoer remains "lowered" in the victim's eyes, as someone who fails to respect the moral rules.[103] Forgiveness, as I have articulated it, involves changing one's view of the wrongdoer by no longer seeing him as "lowered" while maintaining the view that he is a person who *could* respond to moral demands. In other words, the reactive attitudes are overcome, rather than ignored or allowed to simply fade away.

Calhoun's account of forgiveness is an improvement on Govier's account, in that it is object-focused rather than attitude-focused, but ultimately it is not an account of forgiveness as the *overcoming* of retributive reactive attitudes. This is because her understanding of the retributive aspect of retributive reactive attitudes is much narrower than my understanding. She sees it as an urge to demand that the wrongdoer meet moral demands, manifesting simply as a desire to lash out at the wrongdoer. Once this desire to lash out has waned, Calhoun argues that forgiveness has occurred. I, on the other hand, understand the retributive aspect as an urge to demand that the wrongdoer meet moral demands, manifested by the victim affectively seeing the wrongdoer's character as "lowered" because of his failure to do so, rather than simply as a desire to lash out at the wrongdoer. The retribution is that the victim withdraws from the wrongdoer by seeing him as "lowered." This difference in understandings is what allows Calhoun to take forgiveness as being compatible with seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered." It is because of Calhoun's understanding of the retributive aspect of retributive reactive attitudes that I reject her

[103] Hieronymi levels the charge at Novitz's account that he confuses pity or compassion for forgiveness, and as she shows, compassion and pity are compatible with retributive reactive attitudes such as resentment (2001: pp. 534 - 544). I think the same charge can be made against Calhoun's account. If this is the case, then what Griswold has to say about pity becomes important in dismissing any account that defines forgiveness as pity. Griswold says that "pity and forgiveness are mutually exclusive, even though both may forswear revenge and resentment… When I forgive you… I do not pity you. I am instead engaged in a very different project of changing my moral relations to you and my sentiments about you. And if I pity you even when you have done me injury, I cannot forgive you, for I have concluded that you are beneath resentment and unworthy of the reciprocal moral project that is forgiveness" (2007: p. 81).

account. Forgiveness, as I understand it, involves changing one's affective regard for the wrongdoer.[104]

3.3. Respect for persons and Garrard and McNaughton's appeal to the human solidarity.

Govier and Calhoun have each given their accounts of forgiveness in which they discuss what may motivate a victim to forgive a wrongdoer. Govier thinks that a victim may forgive in order to get rid of her retributive reactive attitudes, and I rejected this account due to its lack of object-focus. Calhoun thinks that a victim may forgive for the same motivation, to get rid of her retributive reactive attitudes, by making sense of the wrongdoer's motivations for his wrongdoing. This account is object-focused, but ultimately, the retributive reactive attitudes are not overcome since the victim's affective regard of the wrongdoer remains unchanged. There are two last motivations for unconditional forgiveness – forgiving a wrongdoer who has not met any of his post-wrongdoing obligations – that I will briefly look at, for these are motivations for accounts of forgiveness that attempt to be object-focused and involve the affective regard for the wrongdoer being changed so that he is no longer seen as "lowered." Garrard and McNaughton canvas the first option, that one possible motivation for forgiving a wrongdoer is that respect for persons would lead us to forgive, but they end up rejecting this motivation. They then offer what they take to be a good motivation for forgiving, namely that our shared humanity with the wrongdoer and the solidarity that would arise because of it would make us recognize that we are all fallible. This would make a victim sympathetic and forgiving to the wrongdoer. I will reject this motivation for the same reason that they reject the appeal to respect for persons as a motivation to forgive: the particularity of the wrongdoer and his offence is ignored.

[104] There is another reason for rejecting Calhoun's account. I cannot see how her "aspirational forgiveness" allows for the possibility of the restoration of the relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim, which is one of the intuitions about what forgiveness achieves. At best, I can only see that this forgiveness allows for a cessation of animosity, but ultimately, the victim does not relate to the wrongdoer as her fellow moral agent. The wrongdoer remains "other" in that he is someone who makes bad decisions.

Garrard and McNaughton explore the argument that a victim may be motivated to change her view of the wrongdoer – to forgive him – by recalling the belief that all humans are intrinsically decent, or more mildly, that no human can be "lower" than others because we are all autonomous agents worthy of respect.[105] In forgiving, the victim would re-assume the default position of respecting all others, which would be incompatible with seeing him affectively as "lowered" by his wrongdoing. In order to overcome her retributive reactive attitudes, the victim would withdraw her focus on the wrongdoer and his wrongdoing and focus on her belief about the respect that all persons are owed.

I reject this understanding of unconditional forgiveness because it is not sufficiently object-focused. This understanding of forgiveness is very similar to Govier's unilateral account of forgiveness because the victim ignores the wrongdoer and how she affectively views him in his particularity. The victim's retributive reactive attitudes arise as a response to the wrongdoer in his particularity so forgiveness needs to be the overcoming of the negative regard of the particular wrongdoer in order to be object-focused – there must be a focus on the relationship that exists between the victim and the wrongdoer, in his particularity. By appealing to the idea of respect for persons in order to forgive, the victim is appealing to the respect that should be offered to all people, rather than to the respect (the esteem) that one has for the particular wrongdoer.[106] As Allais points out, the appeal to a respect for persons as a motivation to forgive confuses the role of respect in forgiveness. The idea that all persons are worthy of respect is what forgiveness is premised on, precisely because the forming of reactive attitudes is only appropriate to those whom we regard as autonomous agents. In holding the wrongdoer responsible for his wrongdoing and affectively changing her view of him, the victim is respecting the wrongdoer's agency.[107] If she did not respect him as a moral agent, she would drop her participant attitudes and adopt the objective attitude towards him. To hold the belief that all people are worthy of respect is different to affectively viewing people

[105] Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: pp. 52 – 53.
[106] Allais, drawing on Stephen Darwall, distinguished between recognition respect, which is respect owed to all moral agents, and esteem respect, which is respect given to people worthy of admiration. To appeal to respect for persons in order to forgive is to appeal to recognition respect (2008b: p. 53).
[107] Allais, 2008b: p. 45; Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: 52.

in terms of their actions: the former is necessary for the latter, but the former does not determine the affective view that the victim should hold.[108] If we did think that the belief that all people are worthy of respect means that we must hold the affective view that no one can be "lower," there would be no place for forgiveness since we would never be entitled to feel those particular retributive reactive attitudes. To view someone as "lower" is not to view them as unequal to us: it is to view them in an unfavourable light, as someone whom we feel makes the wrong decisions. Recognizing that all persons are worthy of respect does not mean that one's retributive reactive attitudes will be overcome – a victim can hold this general ethical viewpoint and still have retributive reactive attitudes to a particular wrongdoer.

Garrard and McNaughton recognize that holding retributive reactive attitudes towards someone is premised on respecting them as persons, and so think that instead of appealing to a notion of respect for persons, an appeal should be made to human solidarity when seeking a motivation for unconditional forgiveness.[109] On their account of unconditional forgiveness, a victim would choose to forgive due to the fact that our shared humanity should create a concern for the wellbeing of others in our species and lead us to recognize that all persons are fallible. Our shared human frailty, which should make a victim recognize that in similar circumstances she might have done wrong too, should make a victim less ready to see another as "lowered."[110]

However, as I see it, despite Garrard and McNaughton thinking their motivation for unconditional forgiveness gets around the problem that the appeal to respect for persons presents, the appeal to human solidarity as a motivation to forgive shares the same problem as the appeal to respect for persons – it ignores the particularity of the wrongdoer. It amounts to saying that the victim should feel concern rather than resentment or indignation for the wrongdoer because she should feel concern for all persons.[111] More than that, being less ready to see someone as "lowered" does not mean that we may never view someone as "lowered," and the

[108] See also Wolfendale, 2005: p. 355.
[109] Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: pp. 52 – 59.
[110] Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: pp. 55, 57 – 58. See also Murphy, 1988: p. 32.
[111] As Griswold notes "recognition of shared humanity by the injured party is a necessary step on the way to forgiveness… though it is not sufficient for it" (2007: p. 79).

idea that we may be "lowered" in our or others' esteem when we do wrong does not mean that we should not react this way to a wrongdoing.[112]

I reject the accounts I have just explored of what may motivate a victim to forgive unconditionally, for none of those three accounts meet all the requirements of forgiveness as I understand them. I have shown that forgiveness is the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes which amounts to understanding forgiveness as changing one's affective view of the wrongdoer. In forgiving, the victim decides to change her affective focus on the evidence of wrongdoing, separating the wrongdoing from the way she views the wrongdoer's character so that she no longer views the wrongdoer as "lowered" by his wrongdoing. This does not involve changing beliefs about the wrongdoing as such, and so my account of forgiveness is, to borrow Pamela Hieronymi's term, an "uncompromising" notion of forgiveness. An uncompromising account keeps intact the judgements that a wrongdoing occurred, that the wrongdoer ought not to have committed that act, and that the victim ought to have been treated better.[113] In changing her regard of the wrongdoer, no longer affectively seeing him as deserving of affective blame and as a moral transgressor, the victim is not taking back her beliefs about the wrongdoing. What she is changing is how she feels about the wrongdoer. This is why forgiveness is not acceptance of wrongdoing, nor a dismissal of the wrongdoer's post-wrongdoing obligations to the moral community. It is not a justification or excusing of the wrongdoing. To make this understanding of forgiveness clearer, I contrasted it with similar notions: forgetting or repressing a wrongdoing, letting one's retributive reactive attitudes fade over time, and appealing to respect for persons or human solidarity to rid oneself of one's retributive reactive attitudes, all of which I have dismissed as viable understandings of forgiveness. Overcoming retributive reactive attitudes by forgiving is done by changing the way

[112] I agree with La Caze who says that, "[r]ecognition of human frailty is a reason to be forgiving, but not for victims to forgive in a particular case. A victim could accept that they might have been a perpetrator but still feel that if they had been they should not be forgiven" (2006a: p. 457). Griswold has a slightly different view: he thinks that our common frailty might actually be a reason to *not* forgive, so that we "hold ourselves and each other accountable" (2007: p. 66). This is because he thinks that unconditional forgiveness amounts to condoning the wrongdoing, because our resentment entails a protest at wrongdoings.

[113] Hieronymi, 2001: p. 530.

one regards the wrongdoer as a person, how one feels about him in his particularity, without ignoring his wrongdoing and so involves keeping him in focus.

In the final section of this chapter, I will put forward what I think motivates a victim to forgive, namely that she could be concerned about what kind of person she is and how she reacts to others. I think that this motivation will provide a useful nuance to understanding what forgiveness is, and will make it easier to approach the issue of collective forgiveness in the third chapter of this thesis. By showing that a victim may forgive because of the character she wishes to be, I can, in the final chapter, show that members of a group may forgive because of what they wish their group identity to be, and what they understand the appropriate attitude for a group member to hold because of that group identity.

Forgiveness as a choice of character

Thus far, I have not committed myself to understanding forgiveness as either conditional or unconditional, and have not shown why a victim may forgive in cases where the wrongdoer does not make efforts to distance himself from his wrongdoing. I have briefly critiqued two accounts of conditional forgiveness, as put forward by Murphy and Griswold, and argued that I think that they both incorrectly understand retributive reactive attitudes, resentment in particular, as being expressions of the victim's beliefs about the immorality of the wrongdoer because of his wrongdoing. Because of this, they have committed themselves to the view that forgiveness amounts to condonation of the wrongdoing unless the wrongdoer recognises and separates himself from his wrongdoing, through meeting at least some of his post-wrongdoing obligations.[114] I argued that retributive reactive attitudes are not determined by one's beliefs about the wrongdoer's actions, and so a victim's reactive attitudes may linger even after the wrongdoer has met his post-wrongdoing obligations, and, conversely, may be absent even though the wrongdoer has met none of them. These affective attitudes may be absent because they were never formed, or because the victim has managed to get rid of them in some way. I argued against understanding forgiveness as simply the elimination of retributive reactive attitudes,

[114] Murphy, 1988: p. 18. Griswold thinks that being too willing to forget may amount to being servile (2007: p. 18).

saying that these attitudes need to be overcome while keeping the wrongdoer in focus. Otherwise, forgiveness may amount to forgetting the wrongdoing, or to accepting the wrongdoer as immoral, or to adopting the objective attitude towards the wrongdoer and so dropping participant attitudes altogether. Instead, the wrongdoing needs to be kept in focus, so that the victim's moral beliefs regarding the wrongdoing are not compromised, and the victim needs to maintain the view of the wrongdoer as a moral agent, in his particularity. Given this, what could motivate the victim to forgive a wrongdoer?

The motivation to forgive may lie in the victim's concern for her character.[115] Forgiveness is an interpersonal notion, and on Strawson's account, is one of the participant reactive attitudes.[116] In other words, it is a reaction to a wrongdoer by a moral agent, one who expects respect and good will from others and who has not been shown that by the wrongdoer. Being a participant attitude, it is a reaction to another moral agent which displays good will towards the wrongdoer, or more minimally, a lack of retributive reactive attitudes. All our reactive attitudes are responses to what we take the other's attitudes towards us to be. If we are concerned about how we relate to others, we should recognize that not only is it important that others display good will or respect to us, we should display good will and respect back to them. Social interactions are transactions between moral agents and, in exchange for good will and respect, we should be prepared to show good will and respect to others. The retributive reactive attitudes are, by definition, attitudes that have a retributive aspect, and are therefore attitudes of ill will (albeit appropriate ill will) towards the wrongdoer. Forgiveness is a response to a wrongdoing that is not an attitude of ill will. It is a token of the victim's good will to the wrongdoer to commit to changing her affective regard of the wrongdoer, one that indicates that she is concerned with how she relates to the wrongdoer.[117] Forgiveness then can be motivated by a concern for the way she appears to others, and what they take her

[115] Griswold discusses why forgiveness might be praiseworthy by discussing the praiseworthiness of being a forgiving person, but does not see a concern for one's character as a motivation for a particular act of forgiveness. Instead, the act of forgiveness will come from one's disposition to forgive at the appropriate time, and the process of forgiveness will involve coming to change how one thinks of oneself – in that one no longer affectively views oneself as a victim (2007: pp. 70 – 72, 104 – 108).
[116] Strawson, 1974: pp. 4, 6.
[117] Garrard & McNaughton, 2002: p. 44; North, 1987: p. 499.

character to be.[118] By holding retributive reactive attitudes, the victim is showing ill will to the wrongdoer; by forgiving, she is showing good will to the wrongdoer. The good will she is showing reflects positively on the type of character she is. She is shown to care about how she relates to the wrongdoer, and wants to foster the relationship that exists by showing good will to the wrongdoer.[119]

The advantage of this motivation is that it allows for us to understand one benefit of unconditional forgiveness, in which forgiveness may have instrumental value for the victim, for she can initiate reconciliation with, or moral regeneration in, the wrongdoer. It is because forgiveness is a show of good will, or a lack of ill-will, that it is sometimes attributed with having therapeutic value, or restorative value. Murphy and Govier, for example, note that a victim can help a wrongdoer meet his post-wrongdoing obligations by forgiving him.[120] In showing him that she has no retributive reactive attitudes towards him, the wrongdoer may feel comfortable enough to recognize and admit that he has committed a wrongdoing, and be prepared to repent and atone for it.[121] In this way, reconciliation can be initiated by the victim. She need not wait for the wrongdoer to show that he is prepared to distance himself from his wrongdoing – she can facilitate his moral development by bringing him to admit his own wrongdoing through her forgiveness of him.[122] Of course, it is not guaranteed that a wrongdoer will be moved to distance himself from his wrongdoing by meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations. He may be offended by the offer of

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[118] This would be, to a degree, compatible with those theorists who do understand forgiveness as a virtue. If one wants to be a forgiving person, one needs to develop the disposition to forgive and one does this by forgiving. However, virtue theorists like Novitz and Griswold would offer conditional accounts of forgiveness, since, like other virtues, forgiveness should only be offered when it is appropriate – at the right time, in the right way and to the right degree (Griswold, 2007: pp. 17 – 19; Novitz, 1998: pp. 309, 314). See also Amstutz, 2005: pp. 58 – 61; and Murphy, 1998: pp. 17 – 18, 23.

[119] I think this motivation can be acceptable on both conditional and unconditional accounts of forgiveness. The victim may be concerned with the type of character she appears to be to the wrongdoer either after he has met some of his post-wrongdoing obligations or independently of him doing so.

[120] Bennett, 2003: p. 141; Govier, 2002: pp. 64 – 65; Murphy, 1988: pp. 30 – 31.

[121] Sussman argues that in forgiving, the victim allows for the wrongdoer to be redeemed, saying that the wrongdoer is, in being forgiven, able to appeal "to what he may become… [and is] able to disown the act, to claim a moral identity that would be beginning only now…" (2005: p. 104).

[122] There is a parallel to what Govier calls "therapeutic trust" which is when one trusts another in order to increase the other's trustworthiness. The motivation for such trust is the idea that everyone is capable of responding to a moral appeal, and in trusting another, we are appealing to that person's potential as a moral agent (1998: pp. 170 – 174).

forgiveness, because he does not see himself as a wrongdoer and does not appreciate that the victim saw him as a wrongdoer before she forgave him. Nonetheless, this instrumental value of forgiveness is worth noting, for it indicates that reconciliation can be initiated by both parties.[123]

The victim would be concerned to show good will to the wrongdoer, and thus would be motivated to forgive the wrongdoer. This would be *both* an attitude-focused and an object-focused reason for forgiving which keeps the particular wrongdoer in focus. It would not be because the victim is concerned to show good will to *all* people or because she is concerned with the negative effects of holding retributive reactive attitudes that she forgives, but because she cares about the attitude she displays to the wrongdoer in his particularity. She would see forgiveness as the appropriate attitude to hold because she would see it as being a manifestation of a non-retributive character, one who relates to people without ill will (this is the attitude-focused nature of this motivation). It is offered to the wrongdoer in his particularity: it would be because she recognizes that she is showing ill will to the wrongdoer with her retributive reactive attitudes that the victim would be motivated to forgive. It is because she cares about that particular relationship, or at least about how she relates to him, that she comes to forgive (making this motivation object-focused as well).

Conclusion

I have argued that forgiveness may be offered to a wrongdoer, who may or may not have met his post-wrongdoing obligations, because the victim is motivated by a concern for how she relates to him and the attitude she shows to him. It is because she is concerned about the kind of character who would hold personal participant retributive reactive attitudes (such as resentment and indignation) that she comes to forgive, and in doing so, she would be developing her own character, making it one that holds non-retributive attitudes towards others. Understanding forgiveness as being motivated by a concern for who one is will be useful for understanding

[123] This value of forgiveness is instrumental because it is not part of the "essence" of forgiveness – the therapeutic effect is not guaranteed. In fact, if the wrongdoer finds the forgiveness offensive because he does not perceive himself to be a wrongdoer, he may resent the forgiveness. It is because of this possibility that Kolnai urges that we resist seeing forgiveness as a "moralizing strategy" (1973: pp. 102 – 103).

collective forgiveness. In the next two chapters, I will argue that members of a collective may take on certain attitudes – including forgiveness – because they recognize themselves to be members of a particular collective, and take the group to deem that certain attitudes are appropriate attitudes for its members. It will be out of a concern for the type of collective member she is that the member will take on the collective's attitudes as her own.

CHAPTER 2: COLLECTIVE RETRIBUTIVE REACTIVE ATTITUDES

Introduction

In the previous chapter, retributive reactive attitudes were understood as personal responses by an individual to an action by another morally responsible agent. The attitudes were defined as affective responses, formed by the person's emotional focus on the evidence of (in this case) a wrongdoing. I briefly pointed to the possibility of vicarious retributive reactive attitudes, such as indignation, but these too are formed by the individual's own focus on evidence of wrongdoing, though, in such cases, the wrongdoing is done to another person. In both cases, the attitude is held by the individual *qua* individual. Because of this, forgiveness was understood as a personal, individual overcoming of these individually-held reactive attitudes. What does this mean for my project of conceptualizing a notion of collective forgiveness? Can reactive attitudes be held collectively, and overcome collectively? Can there be "collective reactive attitudes?" Attitudes, particularly reactive attitudes, are understood to be the type of thing that only individuals can hold, and because of this, the idea of collective reactive attitudes is often dismissed. In this chapter, I will argue for a notion of collective retributive reactive attitudes – retributive reactive attitudes that are held by the collective *as a collective*. This chapter will be devoted to exploring this challenge: I will show that retributive reactive attitudes may be formed because a collective responds to the evidence of wrongdoing *as a collective*, and that the members of a group hold attitude because the group holds that attitude. The attitude would be a "we-attitude": *we* are angry together.[1]

There are a number of ways of understanding what the term "collective attitude" might mean that I will consider in this chapter. The term might refer to:

[1] I am copying this terminology from Raimo Tuomelo, who, in discussing collective responsibility with reference to collective intentions and collective actions, uses the term "we intentions." Margaret Gilbert, discussing collective intentions, also makes use of the term "plural-subject" which I will also borrow later in this chapter. I borrow these terms from a summary article on collective responsibility by Smiley, to use in reference to shared *attitudes* – attitudes held by many members of a group together (2005: pp. 6 – 7). This may not cohere with the way Tuomelo and Gilbert use the terms, for they are situated in the collective *action* debate. For a discussion on plural-subject theory, see Sheehy, (2006: pp. 53 – 72).

1. an attitude held by a collective's *decision-making body*;

2. an attitude held by some kind of *collective mind* that exists over and above the group;

3. an *aggregate* of individual attitudes, whereby we simply mean that many individuals in a collective hold that attitude; or

4. an attitude that is held by many people together in their capacity as group members, such that the collective's attitude influences the individual's attitude.

I will dismiss the first option, the collective attitude as the attitude of a decision-making body of a collective, because the type of attitude that can be attributed to such a body is not clearly an affective attitude. I reject the second option, the collective attitude as the attitude of the group mind, because it is metaphysically implausible to view collectives as independent of the individuals who make them up. The third option, an aggregate notion of collective attitude, I will argue is a useful notion but the "we-attitude" that is formed is fairly weak and does not capture the phenomenon I am trying to conceptualize. The fourth option, which I will refer to as a non-aggregate notion of collective attitude, is a stronger notion: it captures the phenomenon that attitudes can be held by individuals because of the people around them and who they identify with. The "we-attitude" is strong in that the attitude is formed by the individual within and as a member of a collective, not the individual in isolation. It is this fourth option I will rely on in the third chapter when I explore collective forgiveness, and so I will focus much of my attention on developing this notion of collective attitude. I will show that it is the collective that defines the appropriate attitude with which to respond to a wrongdoing, and it is because of this that the individual holds the attitude. It is in recognizing herself as part of the collective that the individual comes to hold that attitude, and it is as a member of the collective, rather than as an isolated individual, that she holds this attitude.

The central example

Before I conceptually explore the notion of a collective attitude, I will outline an example that is useful in illuminating the sense of collective attitude that I will develop. In our everyday talk, we do talk about collectives holding affective attitudes,

feeling emotions, and being motivated to behave in certain ways. We might say that a particular group is unhappy with service delivery, or outraged at the level of crime in their community. It is not thought of as weird to say that supporters of a team are happy that their team won, or that the gay community is happy that gay marriage is legal.[2] The members in each of these different collectives are related to each other in varying ways, and this will affect how the collective attitude referred to should be understood. I want to explore an example of a collective that is fairly loosely related in that the collective is not formally organized with a leader or executive decision-making body (such as a church or a business), and yet might still be said to hold a collective attitude.

Let us say that a woman is raped on a university campus. When asked, other women on campus respond with outrage – they feel angry and resentful at this crime, despite the fact that it was not them that was physically assaulted. Our first response might be to say that they are holding vicarious retributive reactive attitudes: they have been presented with a wrongdoing and are responding to the wrongdoing as someone who was not harmed. On this response, that the women on campus are women is largely irrelevant: men could also respond vicariously in this way. All one would need is a basic capacity to affectively respond to suffering of others. While this might accurately describe some responses to a crime, we can also imagine a far more personal response than this – a response that is more specifically tied to women. The other women on campus may respond as if it were they who were directly wronged. They respond with the anger and resentment that would be appropriate if they were themselves the victims. This type of response is seen particularly with activists, such as the women involved in a campaign like the 1-in-9 Campaign,[3] who respond with *personal* retributive reactive attitudes like anger and resentment. Possibly, this could be because of an imaginative identification with the raped woman. The women may

[2] Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, in discussing the attribution of trust, a type of attitude, to groups, give the following examples: "India does not trust Pakistan in the wake of partition, conflicts over Kashmir, and the development by each country of nuclear weaponry targeted at each other; Israeli Jews do not trust the Palestinian Arabs in the wake of many terrorist incidents; African Americans do no trust the white medical establishment in the United States in the wake of the Tuskegee scandal; Canadian Mohawks do not trust the Catholic Church in Quebec in the wake of humiliating treatment over many decades" (2002: p. 188).

[3] http://www.oneinnine.org.za/ [Accessed 31 January 2009.]

be thinking about the rape and imagining that it happened to them, and so by substituting themselves imaginatively with the victim, come to feel their personal responses in this way. This type of response would be more difficult (and so more unlikely) for men to achieve.[4] Again, this may be an accurate explanation for anger felt by a lot of women, but it seems to me that this may not cover the anger felt by all women. A lot of women, it seems to me, may be responding with anger, without imagining themselves being raped. Let us imagine there is a woman on campus who has no chance of being raped, because she is engaged in a scientific experiment that involves her being locked up, alone, in an area that has no physical interaction with the outside world.[5] She hears about the rape (via the internet or some other media) and still feels angry, despite the fact that she knows she cannot be raped and without imagining being raped.[6] Her response to this type of crime, a rape, is stronger than her response to the news of another person's car being stolen, or their being robbed. In the latter cases, she is likely to be responding with vicarious emotions; with the rape, I imagine that it is possible that she responds personally without thinking it is because she could be hurt or because she imagines being hurt.

I want to suggest that this is because there is a difference in kind between robberies and rape. Rape is a crime that is committed (largely) by men against women and so has very specific group connotations. The victims are mostly raped because they are women, not because of who they are in their particularity. What makes them vulnerable is that they are women. As with hate crimes, apartheid and ethnic genocide, these crimes are committed against people because of the group they belong to.[7] So when the woman in the experiment responds so personally to the news of the rape, she may be responding to the wrongdoing because it is a wrongdoing

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[4] I am not saying that men cannot be raped or identify with raped women. I am simply saying that rape tends to be, and is perceived to be, a crime committed by men against women.

[5] Imagine an experiment similar to the one portrayed in the movie *Bio-Dome* (1996), which involved people being locked in a self-sustaining dome for a year. Or think about a very secure *Big Brother* type of experience, with people being locked in a house and televised.

[6] I am not suggesting that because there is no possibility of her being raped, it is impossible to imagine being raped. I am just ruling out the possibility that in the back of her mind, she does think it is a possibility that she could be raped.

[7] Some wrongdoings cannot be understood without reference to the collective that the victim belongs to – the wrongdoings have a collective element to them, in addition to being a particular assault on an individual. See May, 1987: pp. 116, 140 – 141. I will discuss this a bit further down.

against her group. She may be angry because women, together, have been harmed, because one of their own was attacked, because she was one of them. I aim to argue that she may be angry (personally, not vicariously) because she identifies with the group (women, or more specifically, university women), and that the attitude she holds is not because she imaginatively substitutes herself with the victim, but in virtue of her membership to their common group. My intuition is that insofar as she recognizes herself as being part of the collective of women, and recognizes the victim as part of the collective of women, she is angry about the rape, and it is this intuition I want to explain. Other women become like an extension of herself, and if she could accurately describe how her retributive reactive attitude is formed, she would appeal to the collective and say that she is angry because the collective is angry. She recognizes that as a woman, this is the appropriate response to have to a crime of this sort.

This example shows us that there are a few possible ways to understand the statement, "The women on campus are angry because of the rape." I will briefly explore the possibilities I mentioned – that it could be because the women are responding vicariously or through imaginative identification, both of which I will categorise as subsets of the aggregate notion of collective attitude – as well as the possibility that there is a group mind that is angry, which influences the women. I will then spend some time exploring my intuition that the women may be angry because they identify with the group and see themselves as holding a collective attitude. I will term this the non-aggregate notion of collective retributive reactive attitudes.

A few disclaimers

Before I continue, I would like to clarify that I am assuming that it is conceptually possible for a collective to be harmed. I will not pursue it but I am in agreement with Larry May and Iris Marion Young who both argue that it is plausible to think of group harms. Some crimes by their very nature are crimes done to a collective, whereby the members of the collective are harmed because of their membership to that collective. Crimes like apartheid and genocide target particular groups, and it is

because the individual is black, Tutsi, Jewish, etc., that she is wronged – not because of who she is as a unique individual.[8] Her group membership defines her in the eyes of the wrongdoer. Group membership may be defined by the members of the group, what May calls the *participant perspective*, or by outsiders to the group, people who are not part of the group, termed the *observer perspective*, and it is this latter perspective that helps us understand collective harms. The participant perspective involves a member ascribing a group identity to herself, either through self-perception or recognition of commonality; the observer perspective involves the group being defined by the perception of the members of the group by non-members.[9] May argues that without understanding that group membership can be determined by the observer perspective, we would not be able to understand the nature and basis of collective harms. He says that "group oppression is often hard to understand or even recognize without taking account of how the society at large categorizes the oppressed group, rather than how the group members view themselves."[10] Young, in her discussion on the politics of difference, also shows that groups may be harmed due to the way the group membership is ascribed to individuals. It is in virtue of the way the group is perceived and defined, that the group is harmed.[11] Women may be defined by men as weak, emotional, intellectually inferior, and because of this, every woman is treated according to this ascribed identity.[12] When harms are done because of it – when women are barred from being doctors or executives, for example – the

[8] See footnote 3 in the Introduction.

[9] May, 1996: pp. 33 – 34. See also Iris Marion Young, who talks of the (often) involuntary nature of our group identities (1990: p. 46).

[10] May, 1996: p. 35.

[11] Young, 1990, especially chapter two.

Jean-Paul Sartre gives a beautifully eloquent description of this phenomenon in "Black Orpheus:"

> Like the white worker, the negro is a victim of the capitalist structure of our society. This situation reveals to him his close ties – beyond the nuances of skin color – with certain classes of Europeans who, like him, are oppressed; it incites him to imagine a privilege-less society in which skin pigmentation will be considered a mere fluke. But even though oppression itself may be a mere fluke, the circumstances under which it exists vary according to history and geographic conditions: the black is a victim of it insofar as he is black and by virtue of being a colonized native or a deported African. And since he is oppressed within the confines of his race and because of it, he must first of all become conscious of his race. He must compel those who throughout the centuries have vainly tried, because he was a negro, to reduce him to the status of a beast, to recognize that that he is a man. (2001: p. 118)

[12] Wolfendale calls this type of wrongdoing an "act of dehumanizing evil" because the wrongdoing stems from the belief that the entire collective is inherently inferior (2005: pp. 345 – 347).

harm is done to the group, and not merely to the individual women who try to be doctors and executives.[13]

I will also not look at the issue of collective action. I have not defined forgiveness as an act, but as an attitude, and so will side-step this issue. I am not concerned with how groups come together to make decisions, or how a group organizes itself. I am not concerned with how members of the group are led to act in the interests of the group. I am concerned instead with the relationship between the collective and its members in terms of *attitudes*, how the group affectively influences the individual, or, to put it another way, how the members of the collective, as a collective, hold an attitude.

Understanding collective attitudes by reference to a decision-making body of a collective

One way of understanding the idea of a collective attitude is to understand it as residing with a leader or executive body which is able to act on behalf of the group.[14] The collective would be a formally organized group, what Young calls an "association," that has a decision-making method in place.[15] By a decision-making method, I mean a mechanism that allows for intentions to be formed for collective action, such as the vote in the democratic system. In larger groups, the decision-making is often handed over to a smaller group, such as a governing body or the parliament of a country, or even one individual. This smaller entity makes certain decisions, which, in virtue of being endorsed by the rest of the collective to make

[13] For further discussion on the possibility of harming groups, see May, 1987: pp. 135 – 155. Sheehy discusses group harms in relation to the issue of group rights in his book, *The Reality of Social Groups* (2006: pp. 175 – 196). Graham shows that there is prima facie reasons for treating collectives as objects of moral concern, for they may have interests that can be interfered with, or they may be prevented from flourishing as a group (2002: pp. 89 – 102).

[14] This understanding can be understood as a very loose idea of a collective "mind," but differs from an appeal to a transcendent group mind, which I will explore in the next section. The executive body or leader is like a mind, for it is this unit which exercises the agency of the group through deliberation and decision-making (May, 1992: p. 84).

This way of understanding a collective attitude is not the only understanding that May explores or supports. As will seen later in this chapter, May also explores the phenomenon of solidarity in order to understand how collectives, particularly unorganized collectives, come to hold beliefs and act.

[15] Young, 1990: p. 44.

those decisions, can be said to be the decisions of the collective.[16] These decisions will be informed by the beliefs and attitudes of the members making up the executive body, and so can be said to reflect certain beliefs and attitudes (these beliefs and attitudes can be explained by the aggregate notion which I will explain a bit further on).[17] This attitude, of a small subset of the collective or even just one individual, is attributed to the whole group. When a government announces through a spokesperson, for example, that it is happy with the terms of a particular peace treaty, it is speaking for the whole country, yet without necessarily consulting the citizens of the country. The executive body decided that it, the country, was happy. This attitude then is formed prior to most of the individuals of the group forming or holding the attitude.

However, this understanding of collective attitude is inapplicable to my project, for two reasons. Firstly, I am looking at collectives, such as ethnic, gender, racial and sexual collectives, that are not formally organized. These are collectives that do not give the power of decision-making to a small executive subset. They are also often the collectives that are victims of group-based harm, of oppression, and it is these collectives that I have in mind in this project. It is the victims of collective harms that would possibly require a notion of collective forgiveness. Secondly, I also think that much of the talk of attitudes at this level is not necessarily the same as the talk of reactive attitudes such as those I have been talking about so far in this thesis. The attitudes here often seem to be more the product of decisions, rather than emotional responses to certain events. That the country is "happy" with a peace treaty means that the group has decided to settle, rather than keep challenging the treaty. I am not ruling out that perhaps there may be an affective element to the attitudes attributed to these groups, but it does generally seem to be a very weak notion of attitude at play.

[16] Held notes that the attribution of a decision-making method is what makes a group a moral agent, an entity that can act (1991: p. 89). This decision-making method may entail that the leader or the individuals from the executive body can speak on behalf of the group. See also Amstutz (2005: pp. 83 – 84).

[17] Govier and Verwoerd remark that "Groups as such do not feel any sensations such as grief and pain. They are not conscious. And yet groups can and do deliberate, make decisions, and act. In the light of their deliberations, decisions, and actions, it will often seem plausible to attribute attitudes, beliefs, and emotions to them" (2002: p. 188).

For these two reasons, I will reject an appeal to a decision-making executive body to understand the notion of a collective attitude.[18]

Understanding collective attitudes by reference to a group mind

Another way of understanding the notion of collective attitude is to attribute a collective mind to a collective, a mind which is able to make decisions, form beliefs, and hold attitudes. Decisions (intentions and actions), beliefs and attitudes are thought to be products of a mind, and so it is argued that for these things to be attributed to a collective *qua* collective, the collective needs to have a mind that transcends the minds of the individuals.[19] For an attitude to be attributed to a collective *as a collective*, this attitude would transcend the attitudes of the individuals within the collective, in that it does not depend on the individuals' attitudes in order to exist. In fact, a collective attitude is often experienced as independent of the individuals who make up the collective, and influences the members of the collective to feel attitudes that they would not have felt alone. Consider the phenomenon of the power that a "mob mentality" exerts on the individual, which is the example Paul Sheehy uses to highlight the plausibility of this type of understanding of a collective attitude:

> The idea that a group possesses a single and unified consciousness or mind seems most plausible when we think of the way in which the mood of a crowd can turn from being jovial to angry; a mob's joy switch to fear; or a nation become engulfed by fear. Of course it is individuals who are the loci of the emotional experiences, but it sometimes seems as if they are responding as one to some event or state of affairs.[20]

Sheehy is pointing to the phenomenon felt by people that the collective somehow holds an attitude that is transmitted to and manifested by the individuals. There is a directionality here, in that the attitude is experienced (by the individuals) to be formed at the collective level before it is felt at the individual level. Members of a mob find themselves holding attitudes that they did not feel before their membership

[18] Although I reject this understanding of collective attitude, it will come up again in the third chapter, which is why the option is worth surveying briefly.
[19] A phenomenon that Smiley, when discussing collective responsibility, refers to as "non-distributive" (2005: p. 3).
[20] Sheehy, 2006: p. 93.

to the mob: the attitude that is felt is "contagious" in that it spreads through the individuals, seemingly without the attitude being held initially by any individual.

Despite the experience that a collective attitudes seems to exist independently of the collective members' attitudes, and the experience that values and traditions are passed on through the generations via a collective, attributing to a collective a group mind that exists independently of the individuals who make up the collective is metaphysically suspect. It is true that certain groups have an existence that is not exhausted by the members of the group – for example, a mob exists even though the rioters who make up the mob may change, for some may leave the mob while others may join the mob later. The group may have a different ontological status to individuals, for this means that the group is not reducible to the individuals who make up the group, as methodological individualists would have it.[21] But the difference does not amount to metaphysical independence: the mob would cease to exist if no rioters came together to form it.[22] The collective cannot act, hold attitudes and beliefs, or deliberate independently of any individuals. Particularly with attitudes, the sensation of grief, anger, happiness, and so on, can only manifest through the members of the group.[23] Like Sheehy says in the quote above, individuals are the loci of the attitudes. Because the idea of a transcendent group mind is metaphysically suspect, I will dismiss the understanding of a collective attitude that relies on an appeal to this type of group mind.

By rejecting an appeal to a group mind in order to understand the notion of collective attitude, I am rejecting a notion that sees the collective attitude as existing independently of the attitudes of the individuals that make up the collective. With this, I rule out one implication of the idea that a person takes on a collective attitude because of the collective: that the formation and influence of the attitude goes in one direction only, from the collective to the individual. I dismiss the idea that an attitude can be formed at the collective level without the attitude being held by any individual, despite the felt experience of the collective attitude transcending and existing prior to the attitudes of the individuals in the collective. It must be

[21] May, 1987: pp. 14 – 24.
[22] Govier & Verwoerd, 2002: p. 192. They call this the error of "hypostatization."
[23] *Ibid.*: p. 188.

individuals who hold the attitude. The next two understandings of collective attitude that I will explore will involve the attitude being held by the individual.

The phenomenon of the influence of the collective attitude on the individual is not an illusion though. It can be explained through the solidarity that arises between group members. Sheehy points to this possibility, saying that "fellow-feeling" may lead the individuals to develop shared emotions, and Young and May commit themselves to the thesis that it is the relations between individuals that explains how groups act (and possibly hold attitudes) collectively.[24] This will be explored further in the section on the non-aggregate notion of collective attitudes. Before I look at that though, I will explore the option of reducing the collective attitude to the personal attitudes of the individuals who make up the group.

The aggregate notion of collective attitudes

Those who reject that there is a group mind that transcends the individuals within the group, as I do, may argue for the extreme converse position, the aggregate notion of collective attitudes. Some argue that to talk of a "collective attitude" is merely short-hand for "attitudes widely held within the collective:" there is nothing over and above each individual holding the attitude.[25] To say that Israelis are angry just means that when surveyed, a proportion deemed large enough to be representative of Israelis reports that they are angry. Each individual forms this attitude alone, in her own capacity. This is a strongly individualist position.[26]

On this view, the attitudes are held by individuals in isolation, and are strongly personal responses to the wrongdoing. There is no consideration of a collective response, of how others may be feeling, for the collective attitude is a concept that logically follows, rather than precedes, the individuals' attitudes. The collective is a

[24] May, 1987: pp. 33 – 41; Sheehy, 2006: pp. 93 – 94; Young, 1990: pp. 45 – 46. May specifically uses solidarity to explain mob action, saying that collective action need not require that the group have a decision-making method in order to act, but just the solidarity that arises in crisis. I will discuss solidarity with respect to attitudes in the section about non-aggregate notions of collective attitudes.
[25] Pettigrove, 2006: p. 491.
[26] I borrow the term "aggregate" from Young, who uses the term to describe a particular type of collective. In her work, an "aggregate" is a collective of people that share a particular attribute but this particular attribute does not necessarily imbue the collective with a sense of a common identity. She points out that this notion is an individualist concept (1990: pp. 43 – 44). Smiley also uses the term "aggregate" in her summary article on collective responsibility (2005: p. 3).

collection of individuals, and the collective's attitude is an epiphenomenon, a summation of those individuals' attitudes. The formation of the attitude is in one direction only: the collective attitude is formed by the aggregate of the individuals' attitudes, and the individuals form their attitudes in isolation rather than through reference to or in interaction with the group.

The "we" that can be referred to on this notion of collective attitude is a fairly "weak" sense of "we." If we refer back to the central example, this view would have it that each woman responds with anger at the rape. She does this because she is angry about the moral wrongdoing, and so either forms her attitude vicariously ("that should not have been done to her, the rape victim") or through imaginative identification ("I would be angry if I was raped"). There is no appeal to the attitude that all women should hold, or reference to how other women are responding. It is in her own capacity, alone, that the woman responds. To then report that the campus women are angry is a report on the individual attitudes held by the women. The "we" that arises – the fact that women can say, "we feel angry" – arises after the attitudes are formed. The "we-attitude" that can be referenced is an epiphenomenal attitude, following on from the individual attitudes, rather than playing a role in the formation of the attitude. It in no way informs the attitude held by each individual.

I pointed out two ways of forming the attitude: vicariously, or through imaginative identification. The subject of the wrongdoing is different in each of these cases: when forming a vicarious retributive reactive attitude, the subject is the other person, but when imagining that the wrongdoing is being done to oneself, the subject is oneself. This is an interesting difference between the two, but for our purposes, it is important to notice that while the person forming her attitude is able to notice others or step into others' shoes (through imagination), and in this way reference others, she is still not referring to others' attitudes when forming her own attitude. The question she asks is, "how do *I* feel or respond to this wrongdoing?"

This aggregate view of collective attitude has a strong appeal because it keeps intact the intuition that attitudes are personal responses to the situation. To avoid appealing to a transcendent attitude that exists independently of individuals (as in the group mind approach), many feel that any discussion of group attitudes must collapse

into individual attitudes in order for the attitudes to be personal.[27] I will not reject outright this aggregate notion of collective attitude – in many situations, an aggregate of individuals is all that the "collective" amounts to. When surveys are done and results given, it is this notion that is being used when reports are given on how a particular collective feels. It is certainly a useful notion, and, as will become clear in the next section, must still play a role in how we understand collective attitudes. Collective attitudes must always supervene on individual attitudes in that it must be true that a large enough proportion of the group to be deemed representative do hold that attitude. It would be ridiculous to hold that, for example, rugby spectators are happy with the referee's decision when, if asked, it turns out that a vast majority of them are not. This aggregative notion places a constraint on the notion of a collective attitude: before something can be termed the collective's attitude, it must be true that a proportion deemed representative of the collective do in fact hold that attitude.[28]

My problem with the aggregate notion, though, is that this view is not strong enough to account for some social phenomena – the attitude is not strongly a "we-attitude" because the "we" that is referred to plays no role in the individual's attitude formation.[29] This notion of collective attitude collapses into a notion of widely held individual attitudes. The attitudes are formed at the individual level before any attitude can be attributed to the collective and without any reference to the collective attitude, and so are attitudes held by an "I." I will argue for a stronger notion of collective attitude in which it is as a "we," as a collective, that an attitude is formed and held by the individuals involved.

The non-aggregate notion of collective attitudes

The aggregate notion of collective attitude does not capture a very important aspect of social life, which is why I will move beyond a purely aggregative notion of collective attitude. I will move towards a notion which captures the sense in which our attitudes are formed with reference to others in our group, in which our attitudes

[27] Moellendorf, for example, seems to imply this view (2007: p. 212), as does Griswold (2007: p. 139).
[28] Govier & Verwoerd, 2002: p. 189.
[29] Govier and Verwoerd think that it is a myth that individuals can be understood in isolation – trying to understand individuals without reference to their group affiliations is, they claim, the error of "atomization" (2002: p. 192).

are formed in conjunction with others' attitudes. As social beings, much of who we are and how we think and feel depends on those around us.[30] Human beings are interdependent. Even those who believe in strong individualist conceptions of self can recognize that society influences us. Charles Taylor, discussing the moral self, shows that our moral beliefs are framed by what our society believes:

> People may see their identity as defined partly by some moral or spiritual commitment, say as a Catholic, or an anarchist. Or they may define it in part by the nation or tradition they belong to, as an Armenian, say, or a Québecois. What they are saying by this is not just that they are strongly attached to this spiritual view or background; rather it is that this provides the frame within which they can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value. Put counterfactually, they are saying that were they to lose this commitment or identification, they would be at sea, as it were; they wouldn't know anymore, for an important range of questions, what the significance of things was for them.[31]

May, who describes himself as a "liberationist communitarian" and so is opposed to a strongly individualistic view of the self, goes so far as to say that who we are is largely the product of social factors.[32] Each group I am a part of influences who I am, or more strongly, defines who I am. As I grow, I am socialized in the ways of the groups that I belong to.[33]

I do not want to commit to either an individualist or communitarian understanding of the self. I am just pointing out that it is important to recognize the influence that group membership has on us, on who we are, on what we believe, and, for my project, I want to stress that our group membership has a role to play in our reactive attitudes as well.[34] Individuals do not necessarily respond to wrongdoings as individuals in isolation. They may respond due to the influence of the attitudes of

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[30] As Young says, "Group meanings partially constitute people's identities in terms of the cultural forms, social situation, and history that group members know as theirs, because these meanings have either been forced upon them or forged by them or both" (1990: p. 44).

[31] Taylor, 1989: p. 27.

[32] May, 1996: p. 3, 11, 13 – 14. Young also says that "the self is a product of social processes" (1990: p. 45). This is not to say that a person has no autonomy – in fact, May argues that people should be exposed to many different groups in order to develop their critical powers to develop their autonomy – but rather that a person cannot be a person in isolation (1996: pp. 17 – 21).

[33] May, 1992: pp. 173 – 174; See also May, 1996.

[34] Jaspers agrees with this point, saying that "emotions are as much a part of culture as cognitive understandings and moral visions are, and all social life occurs in and through culture. We are socialized (or not socialized) into appropriate feelings in the same way we learn or do not learn our local culture's beliefs and values" (1998: p. 398). See also May, 1996: p. 11.

other members in their group, or due to the recognition that as a group member, they need to respond in a way that is appropriate given that group membership. There is a sense of togetherness that informs the individual's attitude when it is formed.[35] It is this type of appeal – a "we" understanding of attitudes – that suggests that group attitudes cannot always be understood as aggregates of individuals' attitudes. By appealing to the group, a bi-directionality of attitude formation is suggested. We have seen that a collective attitude is not independent of the individuals' attitudes, as suggested by the understanding of a collective attitude through reference to a group mind. I am also rejecting the idea that individuals' attitudes are *always* developed independently of a group-attitude, as suggested by the aggregate notion of collective attitude. Rather, a collective's attitude and an individual's attitude can be interdependent in a way that is not captured by either the group mind understanding of collective attitude or the aggregate notion of collective attitude. I will argue that a collective attitude can inform the individual attitude in that the individual considers what she takes the collective attitude to be when she forms her attitude. At the same time, the collective attitude is constrained by and dependent on what the individuals' attitudes are, in that a significant proportion of the collective must hold that attitude in order for the attitude to count as being the collective's attitude. The collective attitude must be formed by and held by the individuals making up the collective. The collective's attitude influences the attitudes the individuals may hold, but at the same time, the collective's attitude is dependent on what the attitudes held by the collective's members are.[36]

As I see it, there are two ways of appealing to a non-aggregative "we" when forming one's attitude. One way is to appeal to a paradigm, to a sense of what an ideal member of the group is, and how that member would respond to the situation at hand. This is a way to appeal to the values that the group believes in, and to the way

[35] See also Jaspers, who says that "[d]efining oneself through the help of a collective label entails an affective as well as cognitive mapping of the social world" (1998: p. 415).

[36] Sheehy claims that, "I am partly determined or shaped by the impact of the collective I form with others, and it is shaped in part by my reflections and actions" (2006: p. 80). He sees the member of the group contributing to the formation of the group's practices, norms, attitudes and so on, but at the same, understands the member's practices, norms, attitudes, and so on, to be impacted by the group she belongs to.

the group characterizes that feature that the members share.[37] For example, a Christian may respond to a wrongdoing by saying something like, "I will turn the other cheek and forgive the wrongdoer because the good Christian (or Jesus) is kind and forgiving." The Christian is appealing to a view of the paradigmatic Christian person, an ideal embodiment of certain values. This notion of collective attitude is very close to the notion of a group mind understanding of collective attitude that transcends the individuals, for it is an appeal to an abstract body of ideas, values and traditions that can inform the identity of the collective over many generations, an abstract body of ideas, values and traditions that continues to exist despite the changing membership of the collective. But this notion differs to that of a group mind understanding of collective attitude in that it is formed by the individuals together, and so this notion of collective attitude is dependent on the individuals for its existence, or manifestation. This notion of collective attitude is formed by an appeal to an idea of the ideal group member that is formed by the individuals' thoughts, debates, changing ideas and so on, rather than to some kind of essence to be embodied by the members. It is a pooling of beliefs and values, that influence each other and set up *what is appropriate* for members. In this way, it acts as a constraint on those that take themselves to be members of the group. I am thinking of, for example, when women began to come together and challenge the patriarchal societal view of women. Ideas were put forward that women could choose to have a career, and be equal partners to their husbands in marriage. It was challenged that women were servile, soft, and intellectually handicapped due to their "emotional" natures. The ideal woman became strong, compassionate, thoughtful, understanding, independent, and so on, and this ideal is what motivated many women to do things that society previously prohibited. When the individual woman forms her attitude regarding, for example, sexual advances towards her in the workplace, she can appeal to this ideal that has been forming due to many women putting forward their ideas about women. The "we" referred to here is a type of *zeitgeist*, the spirit of the times,

[37] See Govier for examples: she mentions Martin Luther King, Tutu and Nelson Mandela as such paradigms (2002: pp. 96 – 97). See also Daye (2004: p. 151). Young seems inclined to the idea of a paradigm: she discusses Dianne Fuss's exploration in identity politics and agrees that there is not a single defining "female" identity, but that "feminist politics itself creates an identity *woman* out of a coalition of diverse female persons dispersed across the world" (1999: p. 210).

to the values that are placed on the group by various members who shape how the group should be understood. The individual forms her attitude through reference to the group, to the way the group understands the ideal member.[38]

The second way of appealing to a "we" when forming an attitude is to appeal to the attitudes that other members of the group might actually hold, rather than what the ideal member would hold. The members are seen as relating to each other and mutually influencing each other.[39] When forming her attitude, the member considers how other members of the group would respond, and aligns her attitude with their attitudes. She perceives herself as part of the group, and in feeling solidarity with the group, responds as part of a plural-subject.[40] She understands herself to be responding as a member of the group, as part of a "we." It is not simply that she mimics other members of the group. Rather, she responds as if responding for the whole group, forming her attitude based on what she takes the attitude of the other members to be and what she takes the interests and beliefs of the group to be. She is not appealing to a notion of the paradigmatic group member, but rather to the attitude she takes the other members to actually hold. There is a strong sense that the attitude here is shared by the members, rather than simply held up as appropriate by appealing to a paradigm.[41]

To understand how an individual holds an attitude in a way that would suggest she is holding the attitude of the collective, I need to explore the concept of solidarity. I will need to look specifically how solidarity breeds a sense of togetherness which leads to a shared attitude. Solidarity, according to Tommie Shelby, consists of four elements.[42] Firstly, it involves a mutual identification between group members, seeing the others as similar to oneself due to one's situation, perhaps even coming to see them as an extension of oneself in that one empathizes and cares immensely for

[38] I want to suggest (but not elaborate on) that this is the way great leaders work, and great intellectuals – they may represent the paradigm in person or put forward a new paradigm to refer to.
[39] May suggests this while discussing how values are shared, rather than attitudes (1992: p. 75).
[40] Refer back to Sheehy, who suggests that the intuitive force of the example of the crowd's mood, the mob's anger and the nation's fear being felt as prior to the individual's experience of these feelings, may be explained by "fellow-feeling" (2006: pp. 93 – 94).
[41] Jaspers, 1998: p. 417.
[42] Shelby, 2002: pp. 236 – 239.

them.[43] Secondly, members share values and goals. This is due to the mutual identification of members – members are drawn together because they are similar in some relevant way. But these goals and values are vague and can be malleable – as the bond between the individuals strengthens, so the values and goals will strengthen and become more defined. Thirdly, group loyalty exists – one is faithful to the ideals of the group and is more willing to offer support to fellow members than one is to non-members. Lastly, there is mutual trust between the individuals, which allows for cooperation between members. May offers a similar analysis of solidarity arguing that feeling solidarity amounts to feeling attached to the members of the group (he calls this "bonds of sentiment"[44]), sharing beliefs and values, having an interest in the group's well-being, and being prepared to show moral support for the others.[45] May sees solidarity as providing individuals with a motivation to act for the good of the group. He says that "solidarity provides a basis for the sense of connectedness that builds communities, and it also provides a basis for the kind of security that individuals seek, especially when they are asked to sacrifice their individual interests for the common good."[46] From these accounts, we can see that solidarity binds individuals together, leading them to offer moral support for one another. It provides the individuals with, to use May's word, "resources" to draw on, to form beliefs and to be motivated to behave in a certain way.[47] It provides the individual with the security of knowing that others are like her and will support her if need be, and it provides pressure to conform to the principles of the group. The individual becomes invested in the group, and so will be invested in the well-being of the group. This will lead her to feel motivated to act in the best interests of the group, rather than in her own interests.[48]

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[43] McGary claims that, "[g]roup solidarity exists when all members of a group share interests, feel pride when one of its members does something noteworthy, and feels shame when one of its members acts badly" (1991: p. 81). However, he also notes that group solidarity can be more minimal than this – a simple identification with the group, without the member necessarily supporting the other members of the group, is sufficient. See also May, 1996: p. 32.
[44] May, 1996: pp. 37 – 38.
[45] *Ibid.*: p. 44. See also Govier & Verwoerd, 2002: p. 190.
[46] May, 1996: p. 28.
[47] *Ibid.*: p. 40.
[48] *Ibid.*: p. 39.

However, these two accounts of solidarity are limited in their usefulness to my project. Shelby and May outline solidarity as already involving feelings of attachment, shared beliefs, and coming to involve mutual trust and moral support. I want to step back from this a bit – I want to look at how the solidarity that arises from commonality influences the individuals, bringing them further together. I want to understand how mutual identification leads to the bonds of sentiment with one another, and then how, because of this solidarity, the individuals will come to share their reactive attitudes.

May discusses two types of solidarity: *organic solidarity*, which arises because members have different roles or functions which lead to them being interdependent; and *mechanical solidarity*, which occurs when there is much similarity between the individuals.[49] I am going to ignore the idea of organic solidarity: it is applicable to collectives in which members are organized into their various roles, and, as stated earlier, my project is dealing with a far looser type of collective, one that is not organized and does not have leaders or a decision-making capability. Mechanical solidarity, however, does capture the type of solidarity I think is involved in the formation of collective attitudes in the kinds of collectives I am considering. Mechanical solidarity leads the individual to seeing the group as a collective being, as one entity. Hereafter, when I mention "solidarity," I mean mechanical solidarity.

This solidarity arises from the homogeneity of situation that the members feel. Frantz Fanon, in discussing the plight of black people in oppressive colonial times, mentions that black people are in similar situations because they are the objects of the white man's gaze, a gaze that marks them as different to white people.[50] Going back to the quick discussion of group harms earlier, the objects of group harms are in a similar situation due to the treatment they receive from other groups. Homogeneity may also be more mundane, what Jean-Paul Sartre referred to as a *seriality*: people that are simply in the same situation whether or not this has any importance for them,

[49] May, 1987: p. 62; 1996: p. 29.
[50] Fanon, 1967: pp. 109 – 140, especially pp. 110 – 111.

for example people in a queue for a bus.[51] However, homogeneity on its own is not enough for solidarity.[52] The members of the collective need to recognize the homogeneity and see this as an important feature of who they are or what their projects are.[53] For Young, drawing on Sartre, this may occur when a "serialized condition" faces the members, in other words, a common experience becomes important to the members.[54] This common experience may be the realization of a group harm, such as group-based oppression.[55] The homogeneity needs to be recognized by the members before they can be said to feel solidarity, and this homogeneity should create a bond due to their shared condition.[56] In becoming a group that shares a condition, the individuals in the group recognize themselves as a plural-subject, a "we."

The way May discusses solidarity, it seems that the bond arises from a consensus or convergence of moral beliefs and values – his account of solidarity does not foreclose the possibility that it is simply happenstance that the members of the group share their beliefs and attitudes.[57] This reading of his account would diminish

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[51] Sartre, 1991: pp. 256 – 269. Young defines a "series" as "a social collective whose members are passively unified by the objects around which their action are oriented or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of others." The individuals are "isolated but not alone. They understand themselves as constituted as a collective, as serialized, by the objects and practices through which they aim to accomplish their individual purposes" (1999: pp. 213 – 214). In other words, a member of a series recognizes the homogeneity with others but does not understand herself to be part of plural-subject. The "we" that arises (for example, "we are waiting for the bus") is aggregative.

[52] As Young points out, the similar experience or way of life allows for group identification – the members will recognize other members as sufficiently similar to themselves, and will see themselves as different to members from other collectives. It is important to note that this identification of similarity and difference arises when different collectives interact with one another – the difference is required for the similarity to be recognized (1990: p. 43).

[53] For Young, the series needs to become a *group*: a "collection of persons who recognize themselves and one another as in a unified relation with one another" (1999: p. 212). Note that her term "group" refers to a specific type of collective, whereas I have been using the term in a broad, colloquial sense.

[54] Young, 1999: p. 224.

[55] Sartre uses the example of Jews encountering anti-Semitism and of this experience being "lived by every Jew in his direct or indirect relations with all the other Jews, and in so far as it constitutes him, through them all, as Other and threatens him in and through the Others" (1991: pp. 267 – 268).

[56] Remember that the group harm need not directly affect every individual. Rather, every individual is harmed because the harm is done to individuals in virtue of their group membership, and all those sharing the membership are harmed because it is that identity that is attacked.

[57] He says, for example, in discussing Durkheim, that "[c]ollective consciousness and conscience is a coincidence of values and beliefs of the members of a group directed at the well-being of fellow group members" but also says that certain rituals can "help intensify the feelings of group identification that can increase feelings of consensus concerning not only shared beliefs but also shared values" (1996: p. 52).

the role that solidarity plays in the *formation* of our beliefs, values and attitudes. There must be enough of a commonality for mutual identification to occur, and possibly a crisis such as group-based oppression is required for the commonality to be brought to the fore, but to say that the way people feel and what they believe is developed *before* the solidarity with others is felt is counterintuitive. If this is true, an account of collective attitude that relies on an appeal to solidarity collapses into the aggregate notion of collective attitudes. While May allows that the solidarity felt will encourage every individual to act in the interests of the group, to stick to the principles of the group, and to recognize feelings of obligation and responsibility to the group, he does not explicitly discuss how the attitudes of the members come to be "we-attitudes."[58] It seems to me that if the solidarity felt can lead to members *acting* in the interests of the group, it should be true that it can also lead members to *hold attitudes* in virtue of what they take to be violations against the group. When a group is harmed, the bonds of sentiment, of attachment, should lead individuals to see the harm as affecting them: their group is harmed and so they are harmed.

If we can grant that a collective may be able to hold attitudes in virtue of what they take to be violations against the collective, it becomes possible to see how retributive reactive attitudes may have a role to play in intergroup relations. If members, together, in virtue of the solidarity they feel with the collective, can recognize a wrongdoing done to the collective, they may each form a retributive reactive attitude in which they recognize that it is *as a collective* that they are harmed. By recognizing their collective as the victim of a collective wrongdoing, and forming retributive reactive attitudes in virtue of their recognition of the membership to that collective and because of their solidarity to the collective, seeing themselves as the victims of the wrongdoing, the reactive attitude would be shared by the members, rather than formed and held individually.

The question arises, though, why the recognition of a group harm would lead to the individuals responding in the same way. Given that retributive reactive attitudes are optional responses because they are formed by the individual's affective focus on

[58] May, 1996: p. 38. He does, however, say that attitudes formed in groups will be different to the attitudes formed by individuals in isolation, and that solidarity is important for this (May, 1992: p. 153).

the evidence of, in this case, wrongdoing, it might seem that solidarity felt by members still cannot ensure that members share the same retributive reactive attitude.[59] If one individual responds with anger to the wrongdoing, another with despair, another with emotional indifference, how would the retributive reactive attitude be shared? I want to suggest that given the shared beliefs of the group, and the moral support and pressure that arises from the solidarity felt, the attitudes that arise will largely conform with one another.[60] Remember that I said in chapter one that beliefs will determine whether a reactive attitude is appropriate or not: if one believes that a wrongdoing occurred, resentment is appropriate (but not obligatory), and gratitude would be inappropriate. The solidarity felt by a collective would allow that certain beliefs – beliefs about the collective's identity, its relationship to the wrongdoer, beliefs about how the collective should be treated – become salient to the individual, and would be shared by members of the collective. Recognition of membership to a collective and loyalty to that collective would make certain beliefs play more of a role in the way the member perceives the world around her, and it these beliefs that are shared.[61] These shared beliefs of the group limit the range of possible reactive attitudes that the members may hold in response to a wrongdoing. By believing, for example, that sexism is wrong, the members would see certain retributive reactive attitudes held in response to sexism as appropriate. The moral support and the mutual trust and loyalty that solidarity imbues the individual with

[59] See chapter one for my argument on why retributive reactive attitudes are optional.

[60] May says that "in some other groups the identifications individual members make with other group members, that is, the solidarity, camaraderie, commonality of interest, or alienation from what adversely affects the whole, breeds a conformity of values within the group" (1992: p. 73). See also May, 1996: p. 45.

[61] What stands out as important for an individual may depend on her membership to certain collectives. A businesswoman, for example, who has never experienced any obstacles in her career, may not see herself as working from a disadvantage in the workplace or as having different problems to the businessmen she works with, until she recognizes herself as a member of the collective of women. Upon recognizing this, she may become more aware of the obstacles that women generally face in the workplace. Then beliefs about the "glass-ceiling" phenomenon, so-called "women's issues" and other types of concerns would become important to her. Even if she, for example, never intends on having children, she may see it as important that her company recognizes the rights of working mothers, out of solidarity with other women, including mothers.

will then put pressure on the individuals to respond appropriately.[62] They will look to each other when deciding how to respond, in order to find the support for their responses, and so influence each other to respond in the same way. In this way, by recognizing a wrongdoing as a group harm, and bearing in mind her solidarity to the group, the individual will come to feel that she is responding as a member of the group, with other members. If hesitant about her response, she will be pushed into holding a particular attitude because other members of her group are holding that attitude, and her attachment to them will lead her to "join" them. The attitude will be formed by many individuals together, through the moral support and loyalty each feels to the others. When the women in my central example think of themselves in terms of their membership to the collective, identifying themselves as women, they will hold this collective attitude of anger in response to the rape, against who they perceive to be the wrongdoer (be this an individual or a collective), because of the solidarity they feel with one another and the recognition that other women are angry.

I have outlined two ways of understanding a non-aggregate collective attitude: the "we-attitude" may be formed by reference to a paradigm, where the individual appeals to an ideal member of her group to determine the appropriate response; or the "we-attitude" may be formed due to solidarity felt to the group, which leads the individual to refer to other members of her group to determine the appropriate response. To a degree, this distinction is artificial – often, both ways of forming an attitude may be occurring at once. The woman in the experiment, to refer back to the central example, may feel that she is angry because other women are angry *and* because the ideal woman would be angry. Notice that in both ways of understanding a collective attitude, the attitude is dependent on individuals forming and holding the attitude, but at the same time, the attitude is formed by reference to the group – either the ideal member, or to actual other members. This means the attitude held is at once both personal and collective – it is a "we-attitude" felt personally.

[62] May, discussing values, says "the social force of an individual's feeling of obligation comes from a complex set of beliefs, for instance, believing that he or she is a member of a particular group, believing that the members of the group have agreed that a certain type of conduct is required for continued group membership, and believing that one wants to remain a member of that group" (1996: p. 60).

An interesting problem is that it may be possible to be mistaken in what one takes to be the collective attitude, particularly with the first way of understanding the non-aggregate collective attitude. An early generation feminist may not have kept up with the revolution and the changes in the way feminists challenge patriarchy, and so be completely mistaken in what she takes the collective attitude to be. She may still be responding with antagonism and resentment towards men, taking this attitude to be that which is held by all feminists or by the ideal feminist, when in fact other feminists have changed the way they react to men. This leads to the interesting situation that the individual holds a collective attitude – a "we-attitude" – by herself, alone. This is a problem since I argued that the aggregate notion places a constraint on whether or not the attitude is collective or not, because a significant proportion of the collective's members should hold the attitude in order for the collective attitude to be truly collective. My response to this problem is to suggest that the isolated individual who thinks she is holding a "we-attitude" has a type of false consciousness. May discusses false consciousness in a slightly different context – he is responding to the problem that it is possible for an individual to fail to perceive herself as part of a collective while outsiders to the collective perceive that individual as a member of the collective. Because of this, May rejects that group definition depends on the members of the collective (the participant perspective) solely. His solution is to say that the definition of the group depends on both the participant and observer perspectives.[63] My response to the problem of the isolated individual appearing to hold a "we-attitude" is parallel to May's solution: the feminist may think she holds a collective attitude, but her attitude is not actually shared with others or viewed as an ideal by others and so fails to be a collective attitude, despite its reference to a group. Her perception of what the collective attitude is is mistaken, and so her attitude remains an individual attitude, despite her reference to a "we."

Conclusion

We now have a few ways to understand the statement, "The women on campus are angry because of the rape." I dismissed the appeal to a group mind approach, but we

[63] May, 1996: pp. 36 – 37.

can still make sense of the statement through an appeal to an aggregate notion of collective attitude, as well as through an appeal to a non-aggregate notion of collective attitude. According to the aggregate notion, a proportion of women, large enough to be deemed representative of the whole group, would each form a participant retributive reactive attitude (in this case, anger) as a response to the rape. However, it is a fairly weak understanding of collective attitude for the aggregate notion of collective attitude collapses into the notion of individual attitude: the collective attitude is nothing more than a report on the fact that many individuals are angry. The attitude is formed by individuals in their own capacity, without reference to the collective. The stronger understanding of collective attitude is the non-aggregative notion, in which reference to the collective plays a crucial role in the individuals' attitudes. The women are angry, on the non-aggregate understanding of collective attitudes, because they hold the "we-attitude" of anger. They recognize themselves as part of the collective of women, and recognize that the retributive reactive attitude that is appropriate for them to hold is anger. They do this either by appealing to a paradigm of "woman," to the attitudes the ideal woman would hold, or by appealing to other women through the solidarity they feel with each other, and so forming the attitude of anger together. This attitude is still a personal reactive attitude: it is a response to a wrongdoing against the collective, and the attitude is held by the members of the collective in a personal way.

I have shown that retributive reactive attitudes can be held collectively – either aggregatively or non-aggregatively. In the next chapter, I will argue that it is possible for retributive reactive attitudes to be overcome collectively. That is, I will argue that it is possible for there to be such a thing as truly collective forgiveness.

CHAPTER 3: COLLECTIVE FORGIVENESS

Introduction

Tutu is famous for being a strong proponent of forgiveness in the political realm, arguing that if collectives cannot forgive each other after atrocities, there can be no future that is free of conflict and thus there can be no true reconciliation between the collectives.[1] He is supported in this idea by Bar-Tal, who argues that the cycle of conflict will continue and any reconciliation will be undermined unless a divided community moves from a "conflictive ethos" to a "peace ethos," which requires an attitudinal change in the communities as a whole.[2] Both Tutu and Bar-Tal understand political reconciliation to involve attitudinal changes of the members of the collectives, and both understand forgiveness to be a way to bring this attitudinal change into place. While I am not concerned here with whether or not forgiveness is indeed a requirement for reconciliation, I am intrigued by the notion of forgiveness that is being appealed to. That Tutu and Bar-Tal think forgiveness is a notion that can be applied to collectives is interesting and in conflict with much of the literature on forgiveness. It is this idea that is under scrutiny in this chapter. Having looked at what forgiveness is in chapter one, and having explored the possibility of collective retributive reactive attitudes in chapter two, we are now ready to formulate a notion of collective forgiveness in this chapter.

I will briefly explore the literature on collective forgiveness, in order to see how it has been understood thus far. Collective forgiveness has largely been explored in relation to the problem of political reconciliation, in focusing on how two collectives can come to live together after gross human rights violations have been committed by each against the other. The theorists in this literature discuss the possibility of collective forgiveness with respects to collectives that have decision-making methods in place, since they, by and large, understand the political realm as involving collectives that can act in the political arena.[3] They each offer different and

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[1] Tutu, 1999.

[2] Refer back to the Introduction for a discussion on the "conflictive ethos" and the "peace ethos." *Cf.* Bar-Tal, 2000.

[3] Sometimes "collective forgiveness" is referred to as "political forgiveness." For my purposes, I will take political forgiveness and collective forgiveness as referring to the same idea.

often opposing viewpoints: some think that collective forgiveness is not possible since forgiveness is essentially a *personal* change of attitude;[4] others think forgiveness is possible if it is understood primarily as an act, not an attitudinal change.[5] Having explored the literature on collective forgiveness which does not give place to a collective attitudinal change, I will then consider two accounts of collective forgiveness that do involve an attitudinal change, one aggregative, the other non-aggregative.

Before I continue, it is important to realize that I am not concerned here with the issue of whether or not a collective *can be forgiven* but rather on whether collectives *can forgive*.[6] The issue of collectives being forgiven is situated in the collective responsibility debate and issues arise over whether or not groups can be responsible and blameworthy for wrongdoings. This chapter is focused on whether collectives can be the forgiving subjects, not on whether groups can be the objects of forgiveness. The collectives that forgive would be the collectives that are the *victims* of group-based harms.

Literature survey: forgiveness in the political debate.

Forgiveness has been increasingly debated in the political context over recent years, as theorists tackle the problem of how to reconcile divided groups in the aftermath of atrocity. Hannah Arendt discussed forgiveness as a way of undoing the past after the Holocaust,[7] Tutu put it forward as an alternative to retaliation (in the form of retributive justice) and blanket amnesty after Apartheid,[8] and after decades of guerilla war in Northern Uganda, a so-called "forgiveness ritual" was undertaken by war criminals in the place of a criminal trial.[9] This has led many theorists to explore whether or not forgiveness can be spoken about in the political arena and applied to

[4] Amstutz (2005); Griswold (2007); Moellendorf (2007).
[5] Digeser (1998); to a degree, Govier (2002).
[6] Pettigrove distinguishes between these two issues, and has a brief discussion on both topics (2006). See also Govier (2002: p. 88).
[7] Arendt, 1958: p. 237.
[8] Tutu, 1999: pp. 15 – 32.
[9] Griswold, 2007: pp. 168 – 171. I call it a "so-called" forgiveness ritual for, as Griswold points out, there are issues of translation here, and what is understood as forgiveness in this context does not necessarily map onto the understanding of forgiveness that I am appealing to, or even to the understanding of forgiveness that the other theorists that I will explore appeal to.

collectives that interact politically. This will be a useful place to start. I will first look at the theorists who deny that forgiveness can be applied to collectives since they argue that forgiveness can only be offered by individuals; I will then look at two theorists who agree that forgiveness as an attitudinal change of heart is personal, but try to show that forgiveness can still make sense with respect to collectives.

1. The mode of interaction between collectives.

Many theorists argue that collectives cannot forgive because forgiveness is essentially a personal change of attitude towards a wrongdoer. The political realm involves collectives, and so forgiveness is an inappropriate concept to talk about in the political realm. This is because the political realm has a different mode of interaction to that of the interpersonal realm – a different type of morality as Mark R. Amstutz puts it – that deals with norms, principles and legalities but not personal, spiritual and ethical issues. According to this line of thought, collectives can, at most, only formally accept apologies, rather than offer forgiveness.

Amstutz differentiates between public (political) and personal morality, saying that,

> ...[t]he former – which comprises general principles (for example, liberty, equality, and impartiality), political traditions (for example, liberalism and communitarianism), and moral theories (for example, just war doctrine) – provides norms and principles for pursuing peace and justice within or among states. Private morality, by contrast, includes ethical standards such as the Ten Commandments and moral obligations such as fidelity, promise keeping, and truth telling that foster personal integrity and stable interpersonal relationships.[10]

Darrel Moellendorf, in discussing political reconciliation, puts forward a similar distinction and argues that it is problematic to require attitudinal changes, such as contrition and forgiveness, at a political level, by which he means the level of the collective.[11] He argues that for a group to require that the members who make up the group have a change of heart (to overcome their retributive reactive attitudes, in other words), would be "a serious infringement on freedom of thought and conscience."[12]

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[10] Amstutz, 2005: p. 80.
[11] Moellendorf, 2007: p. 211.
[12] *Ibid.*: p. 212.

These feelings could be changed, through education and over time, but he argues that public policy and the legal system, which is how he understands political collectives to bring about change, are "poorly suited" to effect these changes of heart and to enforce them. In his view, forgiveness, being a personal change of heart, is not something a collective can express. Instead, he argues, collectives can express certain *judgments* that do not require a change of heart: political regret and political respect. These judgments condemn wrongdoing and demand a respect for equal citizenship, and fall into the category of what Moellendorf calls "public morality."[13] These judgements may encourage the members of the collective to have a change of heart, but these changes of heart would occur in the individual's capacity as an individual, rather than as collective member. The attitudes of the members may be affected (rather than demanded or prescribed) by the public judgements, but ultimately, the public judgements outline only how the members are required to *act*, not how they are required to *feel*.[14]

Amstutz and Moellendorf see the public realm as being limited to acts of public policy and public judgements – both are political acts (if only a speech act) that can be expressed by political agents, but that do not necessarily correlate to any sort of sentiment or affective attitude. Instead, these acts are practices that are governed by rules and follow certain procedures, and are often committed in order to achieve certain political goals, rather than to reflect beliefs and attitudes. It is this view of the public realm that also leads Griswold to argue that forgiveness is not applicable to the public realm. Instead, he argues, when an apology is offered by a political group for a wrongdoing, the appropriate response from the victim-group is a formal acceptance of the apology, rather than forgiveness.[15] He argues that there are a number of important differences between the public and private arena, and that what works in

[13] *Ibid.*: pp. 211 – 213.
[14] *Ibid.*: pp. 212 – 213. As Griswold says, the "redemption of the soul ought not to be the aim of politics" (2007: p. 173).
[15] Griswold, 2007: pp. 142 – 143. Recall that Griswold understands forgiveness to be conditional on an apology or some other effort from the wrongdoer to distance himself from his wrongdoing and so forgiveness can only be offered in response to an apology.
La Caze offers a different argument to make the same claim: she argues that since forgiveness is based on sympathy for others (what she calls "love"), and apology is based on respect, the two concepts are not parallel concepts. Because of this, the response to political apology is not forgiveness (La Caze, 2006a).

the interpersonal, private arena can only be applied imperfectly to the political, public arena.[16] Due to the complexity of the public realm, in that there are many diverse individuals within any collective and that the nature of collective wrongdoings is complicated by the fact that it involves both individual and collective wrongdoers, with both individual and collective victims, Griswold thinks that consensus of sentiment (what I call affective attitudes) between collective members is "unlikely."[17] Further, Griswold also argues that the attitudes that a collective is said to hold are not the affective reactive attitudes involved in the forgiveness process.[18] In the personal realm, the individual holds *affective* attitudes and represents himself when he expresses his attitudes. In contrast, in the public realm, the collective expresses itself through a proxy (a spokesperson, for example), who may speak on behalf of the collective but may not hold the attitude that the collective is said to hold.[19] In fact, the attitudes that are attributed to the collective are not necessarily held by any individual member. Instead of referring to affective responses, these attitudes are the products of decisions or the expression of beliefs. These two considerations make the expressions of attitudes by collectives symbolic – the attitudes are not emotional responses felt by any individual, and are conveyed through a representative who speaks on the collective's behalf.[20] This means that an exchange between two collectives is a moral exchange that does not involve any emotional change in either party. Given this, Griswold argues that, at most, in response to an apology (which, in the political arena, is an expression of recognition of and responsibility for wrongdoing, rather than of an affective attitude of, say, guilt or contrition[21]), a collective can formally accept the apology but cannot offer forgiveness. The acceptance of apology is a speech-act, a

[16] Griswold, 2007: pp. 138 – 139.
[17] The sheer number of individuals would seem to make conflict between members about the appropriate attitudes to hold inevitable – attitudes are likely to be varied and perspectives may be quite diverse (*Ibid.*: p. 139).
[18] *Ibid.*: pp. 140 – 142. I make the same claim in chapter two, saying that the "attitudes" of organized collectives that are the result of deliberations seem more like the product of decisions than affective responses to a particular event.
[19] *Ibid.*: pp. 139 – 140. Pettigrove also understands the spokesperson as an individual who acts on behalf of the collective – the spokesperson commits the collective to act in a certain way, which will then lead to attitudinal changes (2006: p. 492). See also May, 1987: pp. 45 – 48; and Moellendorf, 2007: p. 212.
[20] Griswold, 2007: p. 140.
[21] *Ibid.*: pp. 144 – 145; La Caze, 2006a: p. 450.

"norm-governed concept" rather than an affective attitude, which expresses certain beliefs and commitments and follows certain rules of expression, but does not involve an emotional change of heart.[22] The acceptance of apology indicates publicly that the victim-group accepts that the wrongdoing-collective has recognized the wrongdoing and is committed to abiding by certain public judgements (such as to treat all individuals as equals). Forgiveness, being a change of affective regard, requires that someone actually hold the attitude of forgiveness, and so, since political groups do not hold affective attitudes, forgiveness cannot be offered by political groups.[23]

I do not agree with the idea that affective attitudes are inapplicable to the public (political) realm, since I think that the idea that the public arena involves only norm-governed interaction is a very narrow conception of the public arena. While I could agree to a degree that the interaction between collectives in the political domain is different to the interaction that occurs between individuals in the private domain – I can agree with Griswold's claim that the exchanges that occur in the public domain mix with "money, liability, and power in a way that is not characteristic" of the private domain, and that the public domain is far more complex than the private domain[24] – I do not think that this rules out attitudes existing within the public sphere and that they may be held by and perpetuated by various collectives.[25] I have already shown that collectives can hold retributive reactive attitudes – and we can see that if these attitudes are held because of political crimes, such as oppression, then these attitudes are very clearly situated in the political sphere. As Bar-Tal argues, these attitudes will affect political acts: if the retributive attitudes are not dealt with, any formal reconciliation or peace treaty may be undermined as these attitudes may lead the collective to seek retribution for the wrong done to them.[26] Given this, I do not

[22] Griswold, 2007: p. 145.
[23] It is due to this argument that Griswold suggests that Tutu's example of collective forgiveness, in which the South African Council of Churches forgave the DRC at the Rustenburg conference in 1991, is "more accurately characterized as pertaining to apology and the acceptance thereof, rather than forgiveness" (*Ibid.*: p. 159).
[24] *Ibid.*: p. 139.
[25] This may seem to conflict with what I have said about formally organized collectives, that they do not seem to hold affective attitudes. However, this is only a conflict if the public realm is seen to only involve interaction between formally organized collectives. I see the public realm as the interaction between individuals, organized collectives and unorganized collectives.
[26] Bar-Tal, 2000: p. 352.

think we should simply dismiss any attitudinal concept as inapplicable to the political domain, and we should not dismiss any attitudinal concept as inapplicable to collectives.[27] For this reason, I will continue exploring a notion of collective forgiveness.

2. Forgiveness as an act.

Some theorists accept that the public, political realm has a different mode of interaction to the interpersonal realm and agree that collectives cannot *hold* affective attitudes as collectives. However, they disagree that this makes forgiveness inapplicable to collectives, as the theorists discussed in the last section argue. Instead, they argue that forgiveness can be an *act* devoid of affective requirements, allowing for forgiveness to be something that collectives can offer,[28] or forgiveness can be *attributed* to collectives in virtue of the collective's actions.[29] I will explore the latter possibility, that of attributing forgiveness to collectives, in the next section. In this section, I will explore Peter Digeser's account of political forgiveness. Digeser argues for a notion of forgiveness that could be applied to collectives, for he argues that forgiveness can be an act rather than an attitudinal change of affective regard for the wrongdoer. He argues that forgiveness can be free of affect, which opens up the possibility that forgiveness need not be essentially personal. Extrapolating from this position, Digeser's understanding of forgiveness allows that forgiveness could be collective.

Digeser argues that forgiveness can be distinguished from the affective elimination of resentment, and thus can be understood as an act without an affective component. This makes it an applicable political concept, for it allows that collectives could forgive.[30] He sees forgiveness as having two elements: forgiveness as *self-enactment*, in which one changes one's attitude in order to be able to be a certain way: free of resentment, feeling trust, and so on; and forgiveness as *self-disclosure*, in

[27] Notice that I am not saying that the Amstutz, Moellendorf and Griswold are incorrect. Much political interaction may be about the norms and legalities of certain actions. But the political sphere is much broader than the activities of parliamentarians and government leaders – it includes the activities of the people and how collectives interact with one another.
[28] Digeser (1998).
[29] Govier (2002).
[30] Digeser, 1998: p. 703.

which one acts in a certain way to achieve a particular goal, in this case, reconciliation or mutual trust.[31] He argues that these two aspects can come apart: one may hold an attitude which does not lead to a particular act, and one may act without having the attendant attitude. Interestingly, he does not think that both elements are necessary for forgiveness: forgiveness can simply be forgiveness as self-disclosure, an act that the victim does, rather than an attitudinal change. In other words, he argues that a victim can forgive even though her retributive reactive attitudes linger (in other words, she can forgive and still have resentment towards the wrongdoer).[32] Given that it is often difficult to know what attitudes a person holds, and that one can act in a particular way with many different attitudes, Digeser argues that we should focus on the acts that people perform rather than the attitudes that may or may not motivate the act.[33] The forgiveness that Digeser is advocating is a type of conduct, which has performative value: the victim treats the wrongdoer in a particular way, despite how she feels about him, and this can lead to the relationship being restored for peaceful interaction is restored. Political forgiveness, on this account, is what is offered after wrongdoings are acknowledged and addressed by both parties, and nothing more can be done in order for justice to be met.[34] When justice is imperfect, and cannot be fulfilled or followed any further without further injustice, political forgiveness can be offered in order to bring to an end the animosity that exists in the aftermath of the wrongdoing.[35] What this forgiveness amounts to is accepting that an injustice occurred, and that justice cannot be pursued any further to make amends for

[31] *Ibid.*: pp. 702 – 703. This may sound similar to Garrard and McNaughton's distinction between the "object-focused" nature of forgiveness and the "attitude-focused" nature, mentioned in chapter one. It is not quite the same distinction: the "object-focus" of forgiveness is to be concerned with the relationship, in how one *feels* about the wrongdoer, whereas the forgiveness as self-disclosure is concerned with how one *acts* towards the wrongdoer. (Forgiveness as self-enactment and the "attitude-focus" of forgiveness strike me as being more or less the same idea.)

[32] Digeser also allows that, conversely, a victim can forgive even though she never held any retributive reactive attitudes in the first place. Forgiveness is not necessarily about the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes on Digeser's account, and the presence of these attitudes is not required for forgiveness to be appropriate (1998: p. 704).

[33] *Ibid.*: p. 703.

[34] *Ibid.*: p. 707.

[35] *Ibid.*: pp. 709 – 710.

the injustice, and so initiating peaceful interaction without the past injustice weighing in on the future interaction.[36]

Digeser understands this political forgiveness as being offered by citizens to governments.[37] Although he does not specifically discuss whether it can be applied to collectives, we can see how it might be possible for it to be. Since political forgiveness can be merely an act, without any attitudinal requirements, the objection that was raised in the previous section, that forgiveness is inapplicable to the public realm in which collectives interact, is dissipated. It is possible for collectives to act in a certain way, particularly collectives with decision-making methods, and collectives can require its members to act in a certain way, without intruding on freedom of thought. As far as I can see, if forgiveness is understood as Digeser understands it, Amstutz, Moellendorf and Griswold should have no problem as seeing forgiveness as applicable to collectives, since actions, unlike attitudes, are not essentially personal.[38]

The problem with this view of political (and as I understand it, collective) forgiveness is that it is closer to an account of mercy, or perhaps pardon, rather than forgiveness.[39] If one understands forgiveness as an act that releases victims from the debt that is owed in terms of justice, reparations and compensation, as Digeser seems to understand political forgiveness (albeit in cases of imperfect, unattainable justice),

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[36] *Ibid.*: p. 716. Griswold's example of the so-called "forgiveness ritual" that took place in an Ugandan community after guerrilla war may be an interesting example of this type of forgiveness: the perpetrators underwent a ritual in front of the community and its leaders, and after this, were allowed back into the community. One woman, who was a victim of terrible violence done by the rebels, even says that she thinks the perpetrator should be punished, and that she has nothing to say to him, indicating the she still has strong retributive reactive attitudes towards that person. But in the next breath, she also notes that for the sake of peace, the community can take the perpetrators back (Griswold, 2007: pp. 168 – 171).

[37] Digeser, 1998: p. 700.

[38] Griswold does note Digeser's argument, and argues that insofar as Digeser's "political forgiveness" amounts to nothing more than an act, the use of the term "forgiveness" is misleading and the term "apology" should be used instead (2007: pp. 141 – 142, 141n5).

[39] Schwartz argues that collective forgiveness is amnesty, which is a type of mercy, in which all involved come to "forget" the wrongdoing by never referring to it. On his account, collective forgiveness is an act (1978: p. 658). This is very similar to Digeser's account of political forgiveness, in that the wrongdoing is no longer allowed to weigh in on interaction between the two collectives. I have the same problems with his account as I do with Digeser's account, namely that it seems closer to a notion of mercy than a notion of forgiveness.

then one is confusing it with the concept of mercy or pardon.[40] In the first chapter, I showed that forgiveness is an attitudinal change: it involves letting go of one's retributive reactive attitudes, of seeing the wrongdoer *as a wrongdoer*, his character defined by his misdeed. As I argued, forgiveness is compatible with demanding justice. Mercy, on the other hand, is leniency towards the wrongdoer, in which less than what justice demands is asked of the wrongdoer. Mercy is at odds with justice, in a strictly retributive sense. Pardon, too, involves amnesty or immunity from judicial claims.[41] As I argued in the first chapter, it is possible to be merciful yet unforgiving, and conversely, forgiving yet unmerciful. If "political forgiveness" means releasing the wrongdoers from their debt, committing oneself to not asking for reparation or compensation, then it is misnamed and should be called "mercy" or "pardon."[42]

Digeser's account of political forgiveness is therefore not helpful to me. Although he outlines a concept that could be applicable to collectives, thereby taking us one step closer to the goal of a model of collective forgiveness, his defining of forgiveness as an act, devoid of an affective element, takes us further from the goal. His understanding of forgiveness compromises on an important feature of

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[40] Digeser seems to think that his account of forgiveness is not mercy because it is offered by citizens rather than judges. He states that "[i]f judges may temper the demands of justice with mercy, citizens may temper justice with forgiveness" (1998: p. 708). This strikes me as being an overly narrow understanding of mercy – while mercy is predominantly a judicial notion, it can be applied to other types of interaction as well.

[41] Griswold, 2007: p. 137.

[42] But perhaps, to be more charitable, treating someone with "forgiveness" means that one still demands justice, but in one's other interactions with the wrongdoer, one does not mention the wrongdoing. An example makes this clearer: although I resent you for being careless and crashing my car, I ask you to pay for the damages but also allow you to borrow my car again. Even though I view you as someone who has crashed my car, and may do so again, I do not allow my attitudes to manifest in my actions. Internally, I worry about you crashing my car every time you drive it, I expect that you will crash it, but externally, I give you the keys when you ask. I do not forget the accident, I do not stop viewing you as a reckless driver, but as far as our interaction goes, the slate is clean. I think Digeser would agree with this conception of "forgiveness." But, although this conception of forgiveness is not incompatible with justice, it is still contrary to what I have shown forgiveness to be. This seems closer to repressing the retributive reactive attitudes, rather than overcoming them: I try to put my resentment out of my mind when I am interacting with you, and quash my attitudes, preventing them from manifesting in my actions. I ignore the attitudes or try to forget them, which, as I showed in the first chapter, does not amount to forgiveness. Eventually, these attitudes may fade away due to being suppressed in this way. This is not overcoming one's retributive reactive attitudes. And while this may be an effective way to deal with conflict, restoring peace in the short term, it does not deal at all with the worry that lingering resentment and anger that may fail to fade away will eventually undermine the peaceful interactions, and possibly defeat the goal of enduring reconciliation.

forgiveness, that of forgiveness as the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes, and in doing so, becomes a different concept altogether.

3. Attributing forgiveness to groups that are agents.

The second response to understanding the political arena as involving actions rather than attitudes is Govier's account of collective forgiveness. Govier attempts to attribute forgiveness to collectives in a quite different way to Digeser. She does not argue that forgiveness can be understood as an act, like Digeser does, because, like me,[43] she wants to hold on to the understanding of forgiveness as an attitudinal change. Instead, while Digeser argues that forgiveness can be act, devoid of an affective component, making it applicable to collectives, Govier argues that in virtue of the acts of a collective, forgiveness (as an attitudinal change of heart) can be *attributed* to the collective. Given this, she too thinks that a notion of collective forgiveness is possible.

Govier argues that for forgiveness to be applicable to collectives, it needs to be true that a collective can be an agent of wrongdoing, can suffer wrongs as a collective and have attitudes attributed to it.[44] She argues that for attitudes to be collective, rather than aggregative,[45] the collective needs to be considered "as something logically distinct from its individual members."[46] This she takes to mean that collectives need to be considered as agents, and so proceeds to show that collectives can be agents – either in unorganized collectives such as mobs, or in organized collectives such as formal institutions.[47] Her final move is to show that collectives can hold attitudes, and she does this by attributing attitudes to the collectives in virtue of their actions. She argues that based on the policies of the collective and the statements made by the leaders, amongst other things, we can understand the

[43] And the other theorists I discussed in chapter one: Murphy, Griswold, Butler, Bennett, and so on.
[44] Govier, 2002: p. 87.
[45] "Aggregative" is my term. Govier uses the term "distributive" (*Ibid.*: p. 85). See also Govier & Verwoerd (2002: p. 189).
[46] Govier, 2002: p. 86.
[47] There seems to be a missing premise here. Govier states the a group is considered to be logically distinct from the members that make it up in virtue of the structures of the group, and by structures, she means the decision-making methods that are in place, which allow for the group to make decisions and act as a group. This is why she thinks that a collective that is logically distinct from its members is an agent, an entity that can act.

collective to hold certain attitudes and beliefs. These attitudes, she says, explain the actions of the collective.[48] She says that,

> ...[g]roups deliberate about policies and actions, and when those deliberations culminate in decisions, we are able to make attributions on the basis of those decisions. Groups can also deliberate about what to believe and what attitude to adopt.[49]

By showing that collectives can be agents and can deliberate, Govier argues that attitudes can be attributed to collectives *collectively* (non-aggregatively), and that because of this, it is possible for a collective to hold an attitude. If a collective can hold an attitude collectively, it can change an attitude collectively, and so a collective can be said to forgive collectively.[50]

The first problem I have with Govier's account is that the type of collective that she relies on in her argument is that of formally organized collectives that have a decision-making method, which makes her account unhelpful to my project.[51] I have already said in the second chapter that I am not concerned with these types of groups. I am looking at a looser type of collective, in which individuals recognize themselves as being members of the same collective but are not formally organized as a collective that can make decisions. In the debate on collective forgiveness, it is very easy to think in terms of organized collectives, since the collectives in question are often political collectives that do have decision-making methods (such as the vote) in place: during Apartheid, for example, various political parties fought to end Apartheid by fighting for a representative government, and these parties were each understood to be speaking on behalf of various collectives of the country. I take it that Moellendorf, Amstutz and Griswold have this type of group in mind when discussing

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[48] Govier, 2002: pp. 86, 91.
[49] *Ibid.*: p. 92.
[50] Amstutz's account of collective forgiveness is akin to Govier's – he understands leaders as being able to grant and accept forgiveness on behalf of collectives, and relies heavily on the idea that forgiveness is an act (whereby the victim releases the wrongdoer from his debt), but also thinks that forgiveness involves an attitudinal change (2005: pp. 85 – 90).
[51] Although Govier mentions unorganized groups, and refers to May's explanation of a how a mob – an unorganized group – can act, she seems to forget about them in the rest of her discussion, relying instead on the explanation of how organized groups can act in virtue of its decision-making method (2002: pp. 87 – 88). The problem with this is that unorganized groups do not act as a result of deliberation and decisions.

the morality of the public realm.[52] But many of the collectives (such as racial and sexual collectives) that an individual is a member of, and is harmed because of, are not formally organized. It is with this in mind that I ignore any understanding of forgiveness that *is limited to* collectives being able to act as decision-making agents because it is not useful to my project. Because unorganized collectives can be harmed, I am looking for an understanding of forgiveness that can apply to organized *and* unorganized collectives.

The second problem I have with Govier's account is a problem that I think is internal to her account, rather than merely being unhelpful for my account. I suspect that the notion of attitude that she thinks she can attribute to collectives in virtue of their actions is a very weak notion of attitude that does not involve an affective element. Govier wants to hold onto a notion of attitude that involves an affective element, but as I see it, she can only attribute attitudes that are not truly affective: "attitudes" that indicate that decisions have been made, rather than indicating an affective state. I have mentioned already, as has Griswold, that the attitudes that are attributed to groups are not necessarily affective reactive attitudes but rather the products of decisions made by the collective. In chapter two, I gave the example of a country that is "happy" with a peace treaty – this attitude of happiness does not necessarily refer to an affective state of happiness but rather to a decision made by the decision-makers of the country to settle on the terms of the peace treaty. I suspect that it is only these types of attitudes that Govier can attribute to collectives in virtue of their actions.

Govier would respond that her notion of attitude *is* an affective reactive attitude, because the actions undertaken by the collective would not make sense unless they were informed by the affective attitudes attributed to them.[53] A collective, to use her example, would not stage a boycott against a company if they were not angry – in the truly affective reactive sense – at the company for using child labour.

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[52] Digeser may have this notion of collectives in mind in his account of political forgiveness, but not necessarily. It is possible for unorganized collectives to act, despite its inability to make decisions as such. See May, 1987: pp. 33 – 41.

[53] Govier, 2002: p. 91. See also Govier & Verwoerd, 2002: p. 190. Since both organized and unorganized collectives can act, albeit in different ways, I will assume for the sake of argument that she can refer to both types of collectives in her argument.

However, even if I make a concession and allow that there is room for her account to be applicable to unorganized groups *and* accept that the attitudes she attributes to collectives are affective (thereby overcoming the two problems I have just outlined), Govier's account is still of limited usefulness to this project. She attributes attitudes to the collective in virtue of the actions of the collective, saying that these attitudes would have to be present in the members for the collective to act in this way. In chapter two, I argued that a collective can hold an attitude in an aggregative way: a large enough proportion of the collective to be deemed representative of the collective would individually hold a particular attitude, and the collective's attitude would simply be a report on the widely-held attitude. Govier does not show how the attitudes that she attributes to a collective can be anything more than aggregative collective attitudes. She needs to argue further to show how these attitudes might be collective in a non-aggregative way. She has only *attributed* attitudes to a collective, and has not shown how these attitudes might be *formed* collectively. She has not shown how these attitudes might be formed in a way that references the collective: they are purely individual attitudes, held by each individual in his or her own capacity. This is a problem for Govier, since she set out to give an account that was not aggregative.[54] As will be seen in the next section, the aggregative notion of collective forgiveness has merit and is popular. However, given that Govier set out to give an account of collective forgiveness that is formed in the social context rather than purely individually,[55] Govier's account is incomplete as it currently stands.

Govier's account is an improvement on Digeser's account since it holds onto the understanding of forgiveness as an attitudinal change of regard to the wrongdoer, rather than understanding forgiveness as merely an act, devoid of an affective component. Her account is also a step closer to my goal of conceptualizing a model of collective forgiveness, for she allows for the possibility of such a phenomenon, which is more than Griswold and Moellendorf allow. However, her account is limited in usefulness to my project since it is limited to collectives with decision-making methods and, if we allow that the attitudes she argues we can attribute to collectives

[54] She wants to attribute forgiveness to collectives in a way that is not "distributive" (2002, p. 85).
[55] *Ibid.*: p. 85.

are affective, she has at best only offered us an aggregative account of collective forgiveness. I will, in the next section, show why this account of collective forgiveness is not truly collective for it is forgiveness offered by individuals in their own capacities.

In exploring the understanding of forgiveness in the literature, specifically of forgiveness in the political arena, a few important elements have been highlighted. Firstly, I think that collectives can hold attitudes – in the second chapter I showed how a collective may hold a retributive reactive attitude collectively – and so I dismiss that forgiveness cannot be applied to collectives. Secondly, I am trying to hold onto the understanding of forgiveness that I developed in the first chapter; namely, as an affective change of regard to the wrongdoer. I hope to apply this understanding to collectives without fundamentally changing the core notion or compromising any of the important intuitions that informed my understanding. In doing this, I am challenging the idea that, because forgiveness is a personal change of heart, an overcoming of personal participant retributive reactive attitudes, it cannot be applied to collectives. Thirdly, I am concerned with unorganized collectives such as racial and sexual groups, whose members may have been the object of group-based harm, and so any account of collective forgiveness that is limited to collectives with decision-making methods is unhelpful to my project. And so with this, I will put aside the above views of collective forgiveness (or the alternative of the formal acceptance of apology), and focus on developing an attitudinal account of collective forgiveness.

The aggregate notion of collective forgiveness.

Let us move back to theorists who think that forgiveness involves a change of attitude – an overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes such as resentment and anger – and do not rely on a the idea of formally organized groups in order to talk about collective forgiveness. Authors such as Tutu, Russell Daye and Donald W. Shriver clearly think there is a space for a discussion on collective forgiveness.[56] They discuss forgiveness in the political arena, arguing that there is a need for forgiveness after atrocities have

[56] Daye (2004); Tutu (1999). Shriver, for example, cites Sir Bernard Crick: "Politics involves genuine relationships with people who are genuinely other people, not tasks set for our redemption or objects of our philanthropy. They may be genuinely repulsive to us, but if we have to depend on them, then we have to learn to live with them" (Shriver, 1995: p. 67).

been committed by collectives against each other, and give examples of what they take to be collective forgiveness. The problem is that they do not clearly conceptualize what they mean by collective forgiveness and how it works. Shriver, for example, showcases various empirical cases of what he takes to be forgiveness, without discussing how such an attitude of forgiveness comes to be collective.[57] One example is a statement by African Americans at a black convention in Charleston after the Civil War, saying that they give up their malice and hatred towards slave-owners, and "extend the right of fellowship to all."[58] Tutu gives many examples of victims forgiving perpetrators, or expressing a desire to forgive, at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,[59] as well as the example of the South African Council of Churches' forgiveness of the Dutch Reformed Church, but offers them as anecdotes to be pondered by the reader, rather than as examples to be explored conceptually. Daye does do some conceptual work by showing that certain steps are required before forgiveness can be offered – certain truth-telling processes and the offering of apology, for example – but focuses on the need for forgiveness as a final step to reconciliation, rather than on how forgiveness may be collective.[60] None of these authors analyze how forgiveness as applied to collectives actually works.

One interpretation of how this forgiveness could work is to appeal to an aggregate understanding, and this type of understanding certainly seems to be at work in many of the examples given by the abovementioned authors. Daye, for example, in trying to explain how political forgiveness may come about, says that,

> The best metaphor for political forgiveness is not the building of a structure where groundwork is laid and then built upon piece by piece, each being added in a foreordained sequence. Rather, it can be better understood as seeds that are planted here and there; in some places it immediately flourishes and flowers, sheds its pollen, and spreads; in other places it withers and dies.[61]

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[57] Shriver simply says that forgiveness in a political context "calls for a collective turning from the past" and then proceeds to outline various cases that highlight both the need for and the presence of forgiveness in the political realm (*Ibid.*: pp. 9, 11, 71 – 72).
[58] *Ibid.*: p. 176.
[59] Tutu, 1999: pp. 146 – 154.
[60] Daye talks of political forgiveness having five "acts" which include truth-telling, a transitional justice framework, apology and the claiming of responsibility, a healing process and the embrace of forgiveness. He devotes a chapter to each "act" (2004).
[61] Daye, 2004: p. 149.

Here, the understanding of collective forgiveness seems to be that many individuals forgive in their own individual capacity, and this may encourage others to do the same. The idea of forgiveness is the seed, and in some individuals, this seed is allowed to flower, in that the individual comes to forgive; in others, the individual cannot forgive and so the seed withers. If forgiveness "flowers" in one individual, it may in turn inspire others to forgive, for they may come to see forgiveness as a good thing, and in this way, forgiveness is spread from one individual to another. Some of Tutu's examples of the forgiveness that was offered during the TRC proceedings are also of individuals forgiving other individuals. Often, what these individuals are doing has political significance – their forgiveness concerns a political crime, one that was committed to many others, and so the offer of forgiveness is made public (allowing for the idea of forgiveness to spread through the community).[62]

However, as I discussed in the second chapter with reference to retributive reactive attitudes, the "collective" referred to in an aggregative understanding of collective attitudes is fairly "weak," in that the notion of collective forgiveness collapses into the notion of individual forgiveness. The collective is made up of many individuals acting in their own capacity, and the collectivity of their forgiveness arises as an epiphenomenon of their individual forgiveness. The individual is not appealing to the collective when forgiving: she is not thinking that, as a member of a group, it is appropriate for her to forgive, nor is she viewing herself as part of a plural-subject of forgiveness. Instead, she may be inspired when she sees that others can forgive, or is informed that forgiveness is a good thing to offer to the wrongdoer, and so is motivated to deliberate about whether or not *she* should forgive the wrongdoer. She does not forgive *with* the others who are forgiving because she identifies with them. Rather, the individual forgives because she is inspired to do so by the others, and understands her offer of forgiveness as offered by her as an individual in her own capacity.[63]

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[62] I mentioned examples in the Introduction. Tutu writes about them so that we, the readers, can read about them, and this makes these examples of forgiveness public. Tutu clearly has hopes that these examples will serve to inspire readers to forgive in their own capacity as well.

[63] There is a subtle distinction here between being inspired to forgive by others, and thereby forgiving as an individual, and identifying with others and coming to forgive because of that identification, thereby forgiving with them, as a collective. This distinction will become clearer in the next section.

Because this forgiveness is individual, even theorists like Griswold who want to deny that forgiveness is appropriate at the political level can accept this phenomenon, where forgiveness is "contagious," spreading from one individual to another, making individual offers of forgiveness attain political significance because other victims of the political crime may be motivated to forgive because of it.[64] However, this understanding of collective forgiveness does not capture the phenomenon that I am trying to capture since it employs too weak a sense of "collective" – the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes is collective only in the sense that there is a widespread occurrence of individuals in a collective overcoming their retributive reactive attitudes, making the collectivity of the phenomenon of collective forgiveness epiphenomenal. The forgiveness is not offered by the collective, *as a collective*, but rather by many individuals *as individuals*. The aggregate understanding of collective forgiveness is reducible to the understanding of individual forgiveness, for it is forgiveness offered by a single person, an "I". I am trying to develop a notion of collective forgiveness that means that the members of a group forgive together, as a "we."

In the next section, I will develop this understanding of collective forgiveness that relies on a stronger notion of collective. The notion of "collective" is "stronger" because a reference to the collective plays a role in the formation of the attitude, unlike in the aggregative understanding of collective forgiveness. This non-aggregative collective forgiveness will be forgiveness offered by a collective *as a collective*.[65] Some of the discussion from Daye and Shriver alludes to this stronger sense, and I hope to conceptualise how this might work, giving meat to their examples. I will do this by reminding the reader that forgiveness is itself a type of reactive attitude, in that it is an attitude one adopts towards a wrongdoer in response to a wrongdoing, and so, like the retributive reactive attitudes I discussed in the second chapter, it can be formed collectively.

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[64] Griswold, 2007: p. 135. The forgiveness also has political significance because the wrongdoing being forgiven is a political crime.

[65] I will be looking at the non-aggregative collective overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes. I will not be concerned to distinguish between cases where these retributive reactive attitudes were formed collectively or not, since, as far as I can see, this distinction will have no effect on my account. For our purposes, it is the *collective overcoming* of these attitudes that is important.

Collective forgiveness

In chapter two, I discussed two ways in which a collective may form a retributive reactive attitude through reference to the collective, making the attitude a "we-attitude." A member of the collective could form her attitude through reference to a paradigm: an attitude would be appropriate because the ideal member of the collective, one whom the member aspires to be like or identifies as someone worthy of aspiring to be like, would hold this attitude. Alternatively, a member could form her attitude because she feels solidarity with other members of the collective, and so forms her attitude in conjunction with them forming theirs. This would quite strongly be a "we-attitude", for the attitude is formed by many people together, based on their shared beliefs and loyalty to the collective, which encourages them to conform to the collective's expectations. I illustrated both ways of forming a collective retributive reactive attitude with my central example. I argued that the statement that "the women on campus are angry because of the rape" could make sense in a non-aggregative way because many women either felt that the paradigmatic woman would be angry about the rape, and/or because the women felt solidarity with one another, identifying the victim as one of their group and seeing the rape as a manifestation of a wrong done to them, together, as a group. I want to suggest that *overcoming* retributive reactive attitudes can work in the same way – it is possible to collectively forgive, either by reference to a paradigm or out of solidarity with one another.

The reader may be wondering why I am pushing towards a non-aggregative understanding of collective forgiveness. Why push for forgiveness to be a notion that can be applied to collectives in a way that does not collapse into individual forgiveness? I said in the first chapter that the nature of some harms is essentially collective: genocide, apartheid, and other types of oppression cannot be understood if we try to see them as harms against many individuals. During Apartheid, for example, the oppressed people of South Africa were wronged in many different ways, but all by the same system and for the same reason. Whether it was the loss of a loved one or a denial of quality education, the crime was racial oppression, which manifested in many ways. Sometimes a specific crime can be dealt with – Tutu's examples of the exchanges of forgiveness in his book, *No Future Without*

Forgiveness (1999), are concerned with specific instances of murder and torture, for example. Other crimes were more general, perpetrated against nameless and faceless millions, wronged only because they were not white. The wrongdoing is shared, and because of this, appeals for forgiveness from the wrongdoer (or wrongdoers, in this example), would be directed to the collective, rather than each individual. I refer back to Tutu's example of his granting of forgiveness to the Dutch Reformed Church at the Rustenburg Conference in 1991. Professor Willie Jonker, speaking on behalf of Afrikaners, or more specifically, the Dutch Reformed Church, asked for forgiveness from his black fellow Christians.[66] The request was to a collective of people from many different Churches, sharing their blackness and their Christianity, to adopt a new attitude towards the members of the Dutch Reformed Church. This request leads Tutu, in his book, to muse about the possibility of forgiveness for the great atrocities of history, such as the Holocaust of Jews and the slavery of African-Americans, and about what he sees as the horror of not forgiving:

> I can just imagine what would happen if Africans were to say that there is nothing that Europeans could do to make amends for the sordidness of the slave trade; that Africans alive today can never have the temerity to forgive Europeans for the outrage that was slavery, in which at a conservative estimate some forty million people died, apart from all its other pernicious consequences – the families which were destroyed, the women who were abused, and the toll this scourge took on so many of God's children.[67]

The victims in these examples are from large collectives, and so cannot be identified in their particularities. In fact, all slaves and immediate families of slaves (from the slave trade that was legal in the United States of America) are most likely dead – and yet, Tutu identifies that this is still a crime that needs to be forgiven. The impulse for a non-aggregative understanding of collective forgiving is implicit in these thoughts: there are crimes which cannot be individually forgiven because they are directed at collectives which may continue to exist long after the original victims are dead, and because, by the nature of the crime, the individuals cannot be identified. If there is an impulse to ask a collective to forgive, there must be some thought that the collective can forgive *as a collective*. It is for this reason that I am motivated to articulate a

[66] Tutu, 1999: p. 276.
[67] *Ibid.*: p. 278.

notion of non-aggregative collective forgiveness, in which a collective overcomes retributive reactive attitudes in its capacity as a collective.

I have shown that retributive reactive attitudes can be held by a collective in their capacity as a collective. I will now show that forgiveness is also a reactive attitude – I will argue that it is a non-retributive response to what the victim perceives to be the wrongdoer's attitude of ill will or disrespect, as manifested by his wrongdoing. Instead of seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered" because of his wrongdoing, as happens when the victim holds retributive reactive attitudes, the victim forms a non-retributive reactive attitude that does not involve seeing the wrongdoer as "lowered" but is nonetheless an affective response to his wrongdoing. Given this, it will be possible to show that, just as the retributive reactive attitudes of anger and resentment can be held collectively, so the non-retributive reactive attitude of forgiveness can be held by a collective as a collective.

1. Forgiveness as a reactive attitude.

Strawson, in his paper "Freedom and Resentment" (1974), lists forgiveness as an example of a reactive attitude, along with gratitude, resentment, love and "hurt feelings."[68] He does not explain or develop this thought, other than to briefly say that forgiveness is the acceptance of a wrongdoer's repudiation of his wrongdoing, and the overcoming of resentment towards him.[69] As I have argued for in chapter one, forgiveness is an affective change of regard, a new attitude, adopted as a response towards a person perceived by the victim to be a wrongdoer, and this is compatible with understanding forgiveness as a reactive attitude. I argued that forgiveness is the victim's decision to change her affective focus on the evidence of wrongdoing, overcoming her retributive reactive attitudes towards the wrongdoer by changing the way she views the wrongdoer's character. It is a decision to no longer affectively see the wrongdoer *as a wrongdoer*. This decision may be motivated by the wrongdoer meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations; it may, on the other hand, be independent of the wrongdoer's actions and be motivated by a concern for the victim's own

[68] Strawson, 1974: p. 4.
[69] *Ibid.*: p 6. Strawson, like Murphy and Griswold, understands forgiveness as conditional on the wrongdoer taking steps to provide evidence of his good-will towards the victim.

character and the way she wishes to relate to the wrongdoer. I also argued that beliefs about the wrongdoer's actions do not determine how the victim feels about the wrongdoer: retributive reactive attitudes are appropriate, but not obligatory. The same applies for forgiveness: even if the wrongdoer meets his post-wrongdoing obligations, the victim is not obligated to forgive.[70] This definition lends itself to understanding forgiveness as a reactive attitude.

Forgiveness is, like the retributive reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation, a personal participant reactive attitude. Forgiveness is a reaction to a wrongdoing that keeps intact the view of the wrongdoer as a morally responsible agent that should meet the moral demands of the community.[71] It is an attitude adopted towards the wrongdoer that is concerned with the way the victim will relate to the wrongdoer, himself a moral agent, making it a participant reactive attitude like the retributive reactive attitudes. The wrongdoing prompts the victim to affectively see the wrongdoer in a particular light: if she feels resentment, she sees him as a wrongdoer; if she forgives him, she no longer sees him as a wrongdoer. This makes it an affective attitude for it is a change of affective regard. And one of the assumptions I made in the first chapter is that forgiveness is a personal attitude, rather than a vicarious attitude, held by the victim of the wrongdoing rather than a third-party.

However, forgiveness is unlike the retributive reactive attitudes in one important way: forgiveness means that the victim no longer sees the wrongdoer as "lowered" or "worthy of censure." Forgiveness is instead a *non-retributive* reactive attitude, for it is a withdrawal of the retributive attitude. (By "non-retributive reactive attitude," I am simply referring to the reactive attitudes that are not retributive.[72]) This means that forgiveness is akin to non-retributive reactive attitudes such as

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[70] Forgiveness is "elective" (Allais, 2008b: pp. 37 – 38). This is an intuition that even Murphy and Griswold are not prepared to give up on, who argue that the victim only has an imperfect duty to overcome her resentment, rather than a perfect duty (Murphy, 1988: p. 29; Griswold, 2007: p. 69). Some theorists do argue that wrongdoers have a right to forgiveness: see, for example, Schwartz, 1978: p. 661.

[71] Calhoun tells us that the "forgiving abandonment of resentment is also a reactive attitude. It is something offered to disappointing *persons*" (1992: p. 87).

[72] I am going to refer to forgiveness as a non-retributive reactive attitude to contrast it with retributive reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment. I have not seen this term in either Strawson or Allais's papers, but I hope it captures the sense that forgiveness is an attitude which indicates that the victim no longer sees the wrongdoer as "someone who ought to be censured," as Allais puts it (2008b: p. 55). See chapter one for a discussion on what makes a reactive attitude retributive.

gratitude, awe, love, and so on, to the extent that the other person is not affectively seen as "lowered." The affective regard of the other person may stay the same, or may be improved, for he may be seen as "higher" than before. However, forgiveness is not identical to these non-retributive reactive attitudes: forgiveness differs from them in that it is a reaction to an action that seems to indicate an attitude of ill-will towards the victim (the wrongdoing) whereas gratitude, for example, is a response to an action that seems to indicate an action of good-will towards the grateful person.[73] In this regard, forgiveness is akin to the retributive reactive attitudes such as resentment. Forgiveness therefore bears some similarity to both retributive and non-retributive reactive attitudes. The reason for this is that forgiveness is, by definition, a secondary reactive attitude, unlike the retributive and non-retributive reactive attitudes I have just compared it to. The non-retributive reactive attitudes can be primary reactions to actions that are perceived to indicate good will (or possible a "neutral" will of indifference), and the retributive reactive attitudes can be primary reactions to actions that are perceived to indicate ill-will.[74] Forgiveness, on the other hand, is a reaction that logically proceeds from a prior retributive reaction – after all, a victim cannot forgive if she did not feel any retributive reactive attitudes in the first place. Forgiveness is a secondary reaction, a non-retributive reactive attitude adopted by the victim after she has held retributive reactive attitudes.[75]

It may be argued that reactive attitudes are formed based on what one takes the will of the other person to be, and if the wrongdoer has not shown good will to the victim by trying to make amends, forgiveness, as a non-retributive reactive attitude, is an inappropriate attitude to adopt towards him. Retributive reactive attitudes are formed because the victim judges the wrongdoer to have treated her with ill-will; primary non-retributive reactive attitudes are formed because the (for example,

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[73] Strawson, 1974: p. 5.

[74] These attitudes may also be secondary reactions, for attitudes may change over time. Resentment may become contempt for example. The difference between these attitudes and forgiveness is that they can be primary responses, whereas forgiveness cannot be.

[75] Arendt understands forgiveness as a reaction to a wrongdoing that is not "conditioned" by the wrongdoing: "it is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and thereby freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven" (1958: p. 241).

grateful) person judges the other person to have treated her with good will.[76] Forgiveness, on the more ambitious account of it being offered independently of apology, reparations, and so on (the account of unconditional forgiveness), would be a non-retributive reactive attitude formed towards a wrongdoer who has treated the victim with what is perceived as ill-will.[77] This might strike some as inappropriate, which is why they would insist that the wrongdoer show some good will towards the victim first, through actions like apology and reparations for his wrongdoing. They would argue that forgiveness could only be offered on condition of good will being shown to the victim (in other words, they would be arguing for a conditional account of forgiveness).[78] This would align forgiveness with the other non-retributive reactive attitudes, since forgiveness would then be a response to an action that is perceived by the victim to indicate good will.

However, forgiveness offered independently of the wrongdoer's display of good will would only be inappropriate if it was inappropriate to have non-retributive reactive attitudes towards an action of ill will, and it is not clear that this must be so. Non-retributive reactive attitudes like gratitude are reactions to actions of good will (or at least, the absence of ill will), which would make them inappropriate responses to a wrongdoing. Forgiveness, on the other hand, is a non-retributive reactive attitude that is conceptually required to be a response to an action of ill will because it can only be offered when a wrongdoing is done to the victim. In the absence of a wrongdoing, forgiveness is inappropriate and potentially offensive to the perceived wrongdoer, as I have already said. I have argued that retributive reactive attitudes are appropriate responses to wrongdoing, but they are not obligatory responses. I have also argued that a lack of a retributive reactive attitude to a wrongdoing is not inappropriate or impermissible. It is appropriate, for example, to feel resentment

[76] Refer back to my discussion on resentment as a personal participant retributive reactive attitude in chapter one. Strawson, 1974: pp. 5 – 6.

[77] In North's words, forgiveness is an endeavour "to view the wrongdoer with compassion, benevolence and love while recognizing that he has willfully abandoned his right to them" (1987: p. 502).

[78] Murphy and Griswold do not talk of forgiveness in terms of retributive and non-retributive reactive attitudes as such, but in terms of resentment and anger. I am rephrasing the understanding of conditional forgiveness in these terms in order to make my point clearer; I hope I am not doing any damage to their accounts in doing this.

towards a wrongdoer because of his wrongdoing, and it is also appropriate to not feel resentment. Given this, it seems that it can be appropriate to hold resentment and to then overcome this resentment so that one no longer resents the wrongdoer. In other words, it seems that that overcoming one's retributive reactive attitudes by forming a non-retributive reactive attitude towards the wrongdoer (by forgiving him) can be appropriate.[79]

Even if the proponents of a conditional understanding of forgiveness are right, and they can show that it is inappropriate to forgive in the absence of a show of good will by the wrongdoer, my account of collective forgiveness will not be affected greatly. It will simply mean that forgiveness will be a non-retributive reactive attitude that can only appropriately be adopted in response to an apology or other such effort by the wrongdoer to distance himself from the wrongdoing.[80] As a reactive attitude, it can still be held collectively, whether or not it is only adopted after a display of good will. Collective forgiveness will conceptually be possible, if I am right in my formulation of the notion, but will only be permissible after the wrongdoer has met his post-wrongdoing obligations (or, if the wrongdoer is a collective, their post-wrongdoing obligations). Forgiveness could still be adopted by a collective, through an appeal to solidarity or a paradigm member, but would only be done once the collective has been apologised to (or other amends have been made). There is not much at stake for my concept of collective forgiveness in the debate on whether or not forgiveness should be conditional on apology and reparations or not.

2. Forgiveness as a collective reactive attitude.

Having shown that forgiveness is a reactive attitude, albeit a non-retributive one in which the victim no longer sees the wrongdoer as "lowered," I can argue that forgiveness, like the retributive reactive attitudes discussed in the second chapter, can be non-aggregatively collective. Collective forgiveness, on the non-aggregative

[79] Allais says that forgiveness is not impermissible in the absence of the wrongdoer meeting his post-wrongdoing obligations: the way beliefs and reactive attitudes relate to evidence is different, and the attitude held is the victim's personal evaluation of the character of the wrongdoer, rather than an evidentially-constrained judgement (2008b: p. 64).

[80] Amstutz (2005), Daye (2004), Shriver (1995), and Tutu (1999), for example, all think that truth-telling needs to play an important role in collective forgiveness. This might be one such condition that is particularly important in intergroup relations, especially if the goal is reconciliation.

model I am discussing, occurs when members of the collective decide to forgive because of their membership to the collective. The member may appeal to a paradigm in deciding to forgive ("the good Christian would forgive the wrongdoer, so as a Christian, I will forgive the wrongdoer"), or she may forgive because of the solidarity she feels with other members of the group and be moved to forgive *with* them because of her identification with the other members, who are forgiving the wrongdoer. The member of the victim group would then be changing her feelings towards the wrongdoer due to the recognition of herself as part of the collective, and it would be in virtue of her membership to the collective that she would be motivated to forgive. This is the important distinction between individual forgiveness and collective forgiveness: in the former, the victim makes no appeal to considerations of her identification with the collective; in the latter, it is in virtue of her membership to the collective that she forgives. When a member of the collective forgives (collectively, in a non-aggregative way), she forgives in her capacity as a member of the victim collective, and because forgiveness is deemed appropriate by the collective.

There are glimpses of this understanding of collective forgiveness – particularly the first way of collectively forgiving, by appealing to a paradigm – in Shriver, Daye and Govier, made in passing, undeveloped observations. Shriver, for example, in trying to explain the role that leaders play in political forgiveness, shows that collectives may follow a leader due to the example he sets. The leader would be an inspiration, an ideal to aspire to:

> A political leader who speaks publicly of how his mind has changed is beginning to teach his constituents to change too. Such a leader fulfills both sides of Edmund Burke's famous definition of what democratic representatives should represent: not only the interests of constituents to the whole body politic but the interests of the whole to the constituents… such leaders generate the glimmer of forgiveness in politics.[81]

[81] Shriver, 1995: p. 71.

Great people like Nelson Mandela and Tutu are seen in this light. Tutu is often called "South Africa's moral conscience"[82] and Mandela is seen as almost saintly, with Daye remarking that he is "a remarkable incarnation of the very spirit that can heal the nation."[83] Govier notes that leaders like "Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu and Martin Luther King may be understood, in part, as embodying the traits of cultural and religious groups."[84] An appeal can also be made to the *zeitgeist* in order for a member to come to forgive collectively, and Daye recognizes that the narratives that inform the *zeitgeist* and what is held up as the ideal would have to be changed for forgiveness to occur:

> For forgiveness to be manifest between Africans and Afrikaners, for example, each group will not only have to alter narratives that characterize the other, but each also will have to alter narratives that define themselves… myth-makers and other architects of culture will have to reach deep into the symbol systems that give shape to the two cultural/ethnic groups and rework those systems.[85]

Collectives may come to forgive if an ideal is formed, an ideal which holds forgiveness up as the appropriate response to the wrongdoer. This ideal – what I am calling the paradigm – will either be embodied by an individual, or be an abstract idea that defines the very identity of the group.[86]

The second way of collectively forgiving, by appealing to the solidarity that is felt by the members of the group, is, as far as I am aware, not alluded to in the literature at all. Yet, I can see no reason for excluding it as a way for a group to forgive as a collective. On this way of understanding collective forgiveness, forgiveness would be collective because each member would look to other members of the group in deciding what attitude to adopt. A culture of forgiveness would develop amongst the members, and the loyalty and trust that the members have

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[82] This is an expression often used in the media. A few newspaper articles can serve as examples: http://talkradionews.com/2008/06/south-africas-moral-conscience-speaks-out-on-aids-funding-holdup/; http://www.sin.ie/site/view/207/; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-is-africas-shame-tutu-declares-440536.html [All accessed: 10 January 2009].

[83] Daye, 2004: p. 151.

[84] Govier, 2002: p. 96. For an interesting example of a negative ideal, Sheehy notes in passing that the rise of Hitler could be explained by the attitudes of his group, allowing that Hitler be seen as the "representative individual" of the group (2006: p. 73).

[85] Daye, 2004: p. 150.

[86] Daye also says that collective forgiveness involves the very identities of the collectives being transformed, which supports the idea of a paradigm existing which members aspire to be like (*Ibid.*: p. 11).

towards each other would lead them to adopt forgiveness together as their attitude towards the wrongdoer, because they identify themselves as part of the group.[87] They would forgive as a "we" – in that they would offer forgiveness in their capacity as group members – rather than as an "I." It is by thinking of themselves in terms of their membership to a group and looking to other members to see what the appropriate attitude to adopt is deemed to be, that the members come to forgive, meaning that this forgiveness is non-aggregatively collective.

These two ways of understanding collective forgiveness are very closely intertwined, and could work in conjunction with each other. A culture of forgiveness may be developed by positing what the paradigmatic member would be like, what the ideal for the group is, and so on. It may be spread by the solidarity that the members feel to each other, looking to each other to get support in looking up to the ideal. In discussing one way of appealing to the collective to decide to forgive, it is very difficult to not refer to the other way of appealing to the collective. They are, however, logically distinct appeals, and so I have tried as best I can to keep them separate. In the practical world, though, I suspect that the two ways of appealing to the collective might not be so readily separated and may be easily elided. Members may come to forgive by appealing both to other members and to a paradigm, and what is seen as appropriate would be informed both by the ideas of what the ideal member is and by what the members are moving towards together.

To refer back to the central example from the second chapter, it is possible for the women on campus to collectively forgive the rapist in a non-aggregative way. They could do this in two ways: each individual woman would think what the ideal woman would do; and/or each woman would look to other women to decide what attitude to adopt. In the first way, ideas about womanhood would be informing the individual's decision to adopt forgiveness as her attitude. This conception of womanhood would be formed by many different things: academic literature, campus campaigns on women's rights and issues, the political climate concerning women, cinematic and other artistic portrayals of women, and so on. The sources informing

[87] This would be different to the idea of forgiveness being "contagious" where a victim in inspired by another to forgive in her own capacity, rather than as a member of a collective.

the ideal that is held up are varied. What is important is that each woman looks to this ideal, and because of her understanding of womanhood and what is appropriate for women to feel, would come to forgive. In the second way of appealing to the collective, each woman would appeal to others in deciding what the appropriate attitude is. She would see that other women are forgiving, and would, in virtue of the solidarity she feels with them, align her attitudes with theirs. The culture of forgiveness may be spread by various women in the community publicly proclaiming their forgiveness, or their belief that forgiveness is appropriate, or simply via word of mouth.

Conclusion

I have argued for a non-aggregative understanding of collective forgiveness, in which a collective comes to forgive *as a collective*. I have shown that this amounts to individuals forgiving because they see themselves as members of a group, and it is in virtue of that membership that they come to hold the attitude of forgiveness. This makes forgiveness personal, for it is held by members as individuals, but it also makes forgiveness collective, for it is due to consideration of the collective's attitude that these individuals decide to forgive. It is because the collective holds up the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes as appropriate that the members come to see it as appropriate as well.

There are a few advantages to my conception of collective forgiveness. Firstly, my account of collective reactive attitudes (both retributive and non-retributive) accounts for the observation that much of our attitudes are informed by the collectives we belong to, and that who we are depends on our socialization to particular collectives. We form our attitudes based on the people around us and the context we find ourselves in, and the collective identities that inform our individual identities have a large influence on the attitudes we form. My account allows that we locate the formation of at least some of our reactive attitudes in a social understanding of the self. Secondly, my understanding of collective forgiveness holds intact the intuition that forgiveness is personal: it must be held by individuals, because it is a change of attitudes which must manifest in individuals. I therefore

agree with the theorists that argued that forgiveness is personal, but disagree that this means that forgiveness cannot also be collective. Collective forgiveness, on my account, is also personal because the member of the collective actually holds the attitude. Thirdly, my account is an understanding of "collective forgiveness" that does not collapse into an individual understanding of forgiveness, as happens with the aggregate understanding of collective forgiveness. The non-aggregative notion of collective forgiveness that I have outlined makes an important reference to the collective, and without that reference, members would be forgiving as individuals in their own capacity. It is because the individual's decision to forgive is informed by the recognition of her membership to the collective, allowing for her to be influenced by what she takes the collective's attitude to be, that the forgiveness is collective. Lastly, in discussing forgiveness as applicable to collectives, I have not compromised any of the intuitions that I incorporated in the understanding of individual forgiveness that I developed in my first chapter. On my account, both individual and collective forgiveness are optional, may be motivated by a concern for who one is, are compatible with punishment, and essentially involve a change of heart. I have shown in chapter one that forgiveness is the overcoming of retributive reactive attitudes, and I have applied this to collectives by showing that a collective can overcome its retributive reactive attitudes, and come to hold a new reactive attitude, that of forgiveness.

POST-SCRIPT: SPECULATIONS ON POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE APPLICATION OF THIS MODEL OF COLLECTIVE FORGIVENESS

There are many different issues that arise from the conception of non-aggregative collective forgiveness that I have argued for, having to do with the legitimacy and permissibility of this type of forgiveness. In this final section, I will offer brief descriptions of some of the objections that come immediately to mind, and offer speculative responses to them. However, I do not intend to offer any arguments in support of my speculations. My project has been to outline the conceptual possibility of collective forgiveness. I am not concerned in *this* project with whether this concept has any practical application, although this is the implicit assumption and hope that has motivated my project. It may well be that practical considerations make this type of forgiveness impermissible or improbable. This would not undermine the work I have done here. It would merely undermine the application of it.

The first possible objection has to do with the additional success condition that collective forgiveness needs to meet in order for a collective to have been deemed to have forgiven.[1] Like the collective retributive reactive attitudes I discussed in chapter two, the collective attitude of forgiveness has to be held by a large enough proportion of the collective to be deemed the attitude of the collective. This was the aggregative constraint that informed the non-aggregative notion of collective retributive reactive attitudes in order for the individuals to be the loci of the attitudes. Until it is true that a large enough proportion of the collective to be deemed representative of the collective actually hold the attitude, although many individuals may overcome their retributive reactive attitude towards the wrongdoer, it cannot be said that the collective *as a collective* has forgiven the wrongdoer. The collective may be in the process of forgiving, but it may fail to forgive as a collective because a significant proportion of the group does not forgive. This is an interesting problem, for this means that those individuals who forgave in virtue of their membership to the collective, by appealing either to a paradigm or to the solidarity they feel with the collective, are either mistaken in what they take the ideal of the collective to be, or

[1] It is additional in the sense that this is not a condition that my account of individual forgiveness has to meet.

the solidarity that is felt is only felt by a subset of the collective and is not strong enough to motivate the whole collective (or a large enough proportion of the collective) to forgive.

I suspect that both of these possible explanations for the failure of a large enough proportion of a collective to hold the same attitude would point to a problem in the collective's cohesiveness, because the members do not strongly identify themselves as collective members and are less inclined to give weight to that collective identity as important to who they are. It may also point to a divide that exists within the collective, which prevents all the members from identifying as a collective, or to a conflict of ideologies that exists within the collective. If this is the case, there seems to be an empirical constraint that affects the concept of collective forgiveness: some things may prevent members of a collective from identifying with one another in a way that allows for solidarity to build up or for a sense of the ideal member to be formulated. It may be that some collectives are simply too large to allow for a strong identification,[2] or that the group affiliation is one that is easily and often overridden by the individual's other collective affiliations (for example, a South African woman may feel her concerns as a woman are more pressing than her concerns as a member of a particular race group, and so her attitudes would be more strongly influenced by her solidarity to the collective of women than by her solidarity to her race).

This is speculation, and I will offer no further discussion on what may prevent members from identifying with each other, or what may prevent a large enough proportion of the collective to be representative of the collective from adopting the same attitude. I also offer no discussion on how a collective might set about establishing what attitudes and beliefs the ideal member would hold, or how a collective might try strengthening the solidarity that is felt by the members of the group. This is largely an empirical matter, dealing with issues of how ideas might be conveyed to members of collectives, how the culture of the collective is transmitted

[2] May, 1996: pp. 40 – 44.

and changed, and how education to change established ideas and values can occur.[3] All my project is concerned with is the idea that a particular attitude can be held up as the appropriate response by members of the collective to a wrongdoing, and that the members will come to hold this attitude because they identify with the collective. I am not concerned here with how that attitude comes to be deemed the appropriate attitude for the collective to hold.

A second possible objection to my conception of collective forgiveness concerns who should be entitled to forgive on the model that I have outlined.[4] A collective of victims is likely to consist of a mix of primary victims (those who were directly harmed), secondary victims (people closely associated to the primary victims and who suffered indirect harm because of the wrongdoing) and tertiary victims (the broader community which the primary victim is a part of).[5] So, for example, to go back to the central example I used in the second chapter, the primary victim would be the woman who was raped, the secondary victims would be her family and friends, and the tertiary victims would be women as a collective, because rape is a crime that is committed against women *because* they are women (or, if one is worried that that is too large a collective, the women on campus who identify with one another as a collective). It is possible that the scenario may arise where the secondary and tertiary victims come to think that forgiveness is appropriate, and so, as a collective, forgive the wrongdoer, yet the primary victim, the woman who was raped, is not prepared to forgive. The statement, "the women on campus have forgiven the wrongdoer" would be true, because a large enough proportion of women would have forgiven. To then say that the rapist has been forgiven would strike many as counterintuitive: he has been forgiven by the collective but not by the primary victim. This raises two issues: who can legitimately forgive a wrongdoer, and what kind of crimes can be forgiven by a collective?

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[3] Bar-Tal mentions, for example, that various "[c]ultural, educational, social, and political mechanisms are mobilized to impart these beliefs" – beliefs that are salient to group members when their group identity is important to them, and that keep the conflictive or peace ethos in place (2000: p. 354).

[4] This builds on the intuition that only victims can forgive, and the term "victim" is often thought to be a term that can only be applied to an individual. This idea is referred to by Govier as "moral scepticism" (2002: p. 92).

[5] Amstutz (2005: p. 82); Govier (2002: pp. 93 – 94).

I have already said that some crimes are by their very nature collective.[6] It is these types of crimes that I think could be forgiven by a collective. The problem is that these crimes are manifested by particular crimes: for example, sexism is suffered by women globally, but one rape is experienced by one woman. To understand then how a rape could be forgiven by a collective, as it may be by the collective of women on campus (in my central example), a sophisticated understanding of how a wrongdoing is collective and how a wrongdoing is particular is required, and this is beyond the scope of my thesis. I can only point to the intuition that with every collective wrongdoing, it manifests as an assault on a particular individual, and for a wrongdoing to be forgiven, these two tightly intertwined elements have to be distinguished and separated.[7] It may be possible then for a black person to say that, as a black person, she forgives white South Africans for Apartheid, but for the crime committed against her (perhaps the murder of a loved one, for example), she cannot forgive the individual perpetrator. This would mean that she is prepared to no longer regard white people as oppressors, but to the individual perpetrator, she refuses to change her affective regard of him as a murderer. It seems to me that the particular crime is a manifestation of the collective crime, but is not identical to it. My intuition is that a group can forgive the collective crime, that which leads to individual crimes, and insofar as individual crimes represent collective crimes, they can be forgiven by a collective. But insofar as the crime is against the individual, a collective cannot forgive it. This intuition needs to be explored and refined, and would require much sophisticated thought; this however is a project for another day.

These objections are interesting, and would required extensive exploration to get satisfactory replies. This is beyond the scope of this thesis though. I have shown that collective forgiveness in a non-aggregative sense is conceptually possible. I leave it open that others may show that it is not practically possible, or perhaps possible but impermissible.

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[6] See chapter two for my brief discussion on group-based harms.

[7] Sheehy points to this understanding of harms – that harms can be personal and collective (2006: p. 163 – 164).

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