

**FARM LEVEL INSTITUTIONS IN
EMERGENT COMMUNITIES IN POST
FAST TRACK ZIMBABWE: CASE OF
MAZOWE DISTRICT**

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ABSTRACT

The thesis seeks to understand how emerging communities borne out of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe have been able to ensure social cohesion and social service provision using farm level institutions. The Fast Track Programme brought together people from diverse backgrounds into new communities in the former commercial farming areas. The formation of new communities meant that, often, there were ‘stranger households’ living next to each other. Since 2000, these people have been involved in various processes aimed at turning clusters of homesteads into functioning communities through farm level institutions. Fast track land reform precipitated economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe characterised by a rapidly devaluating Zimbabwean dollar, enormous inflation and high unemployment figures. This economic crisis has impacted heavily on new farmers who find it increasingly difficult to afford inputs and access loans. They have formed social networks in response to these challenges, taking the form of farm level institutions such as farm committees, irrigation committees and health committees.

The study uses case studies from small-scale ‘A1 farmers’ in Mazowe District which is in Mashonaland Central Province. It employs qualitative methodologies to enable a nuanced understanding of associational life in the new communities. Through focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, narratives, key informant interviews and institutional mapping the study outlines the formation, taxonomy, activities, roles, internal dynamics and social organisation of farm level institutions. The study also uses secondary data collected in 2007-08 by the Centre for Rural Development in the newly resettled areas in Mazowe.

The major finding of the study is that farmers are organising in novel ways at grassroots levels to meet everyday challenges. These institutional forms however are internally weak, lacking leadership with a clear vision and they appear as if they are transitory in nature. They remain marginalised from national and global processes and isolated from critical connections to policy makers at all levels; thus A1 farmers remain voiceless and unable to have their interests addressed. Farm level institutions are at the forefront of the microeconomics of survival among these rural farmers. They are survivalist in nature and form, and this requires a major shift in focus if they are to be involved in developmental

work. The institutions remain fragmented and compete amongst themselves for services from government without uniting as A1 farmers with similar interests and challenges.

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ACRONYMS

AAPG - All Africa Parliamentary Group
Agritex - Agricultural Technical Extension
AIAS - African Institute for Agrarian Studies
AIDS - Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome
ARDA - Agriculture and Rural Development Authority
AREX - Agriculture Research and Extension
BIPPA - Bilateral Promotion and Protection Agreement
CBO - Community Based Organisation
CEO - Chief Executive Officer
CFSS - Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme
CFU - Commercial Farmers Union
CIO - Central intelligence Organisation
Cottco - Cotton Company
DA - District Administrator
DAC - District Aids Committee
DAEO - District Agricultural Extension Officer
DCC - District Co-ordinating Committee
DDF - District Development Fund
DLARR - Department of Land Acquisition and Rural Resettlement
DLC - District Lands Committee,
DLIC - District Land Identification Committee
EMA - Environmental Management Agency
FCTZ - Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe
FLI – Farm Level Institutions
FTFs - Fast Track Farms
FTLRP - Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GAPWUZ - General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union
GMB - Grain Marketing Board
GoZ - Government of Zimbabwe
GPA - Global Political Agreement
Ha - Hectare

HIV - Human Immunity Virus
ICA - Intensive Conservation Area
JAG - Justice for Agriculture
MDC - Movement for Democratic Change
MLRR - Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement
MRDC - Mazowe Rural District Council
NAC - National Aids Committee
NGO - Non Governmental Organisation
PLIC - Provincial Land Identification Committee
RBZ - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RDC - Rural District Council
SIRDC - Scientific Industrial Research and Documentation Centre
SADC - Southern Africa Development Community
SAFIRE - Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources
TIMB - Tobacco Industry Marketing Board
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UZ - University of Zimbabwe
VIDCO - Village Development Committee
WAC - Ward Aids Committee
ZANU PF - Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZESA - Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Company
ZFU - Zimbabwe Farmers Union
ZIJRI - Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative
ZNA - Zimbabwe National Army
ZNFU - Zimbabwe National Farmers Union
ZRP - Zimbabwe Republic Police

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The year 2000 heralded a revolutionary change in Zimbabwe's rural landscape. From the land occupations popularly known as *jambanja* (chaos/violence) to the government-initiated Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), Zimbabwe's commercial farming areas saw the emergence of new communities, new farmers and new social relations. This thesis concerns itself with the emergent and evolving forms of social organisation at farm level. These farm level institutions (FLIs) are important forms of farmer agency in response to various challenges faced by (the new class of) fast track farmers especially with regard to after-settlement service provision. Fast track land reform was criticised both locally and internationally for its chaotic character and dire economic effects¹. Such criticism especially from Western donors brought with it sanctions, suspension of balance of payments supports, reduction in direct foreign investment and decreases in humanitarian aid. This, combined with declines in agricultural productivity and subsequent industrial production in downstream industries, led to a rapidly devaluating Zimbabwean dollar, enormous inflation and high unemployment figures (Masiiwa 2005:222). This economic crisis has impacted heavily on new farmers who find it increasingly difficult to afford inputs and access loans. Unlike in the communal areas, most new farmers (in resettlement areas) cannot depend on kinship ties for help: thus they have formed other social networks to respond to these challenges, taking the form of institutions such as farm committees, irrigation committees and health committees.

The thesis seeks to understand how emerging communities borne out of the fast track land reform process have been able to ensure social cohesion and social service provision using farm level institutions. Communities in the newly resettled areas of Zimbabwe are made up of black farmers (A1 and A2²), former farm workers and new farm workers, with a few remaining white-owned farms alongside redistributed farms. The study uses case studies from A1 farmers in Mazowe District which is in Mashonaland Central Province. A1 farmers in

¹ Critics included among others the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change, Commercial Farmers Union, Western donors, United Nations Development Programme, Zimbabwe Farmers Union and Non-governmental organisations.

² The new resettlement areas consist of two broad categories, namely, A1 (villagised and three tier farms) and A2 (small, medium and large scale commercial farms). A1 villagised farms arose from original commercial farms being subdivided into a number of plots; each farmer was given an average of six hectare fields and separate stands to build homesteads in a village form. Three tier farms are mainly for cattle ranching areas such as Matabeleland where ranches are subdivided for three or four farmers who normally reside elsewhere.

Mazowe consist of people from diverse backgrounds in terms of age, wealth, status, profession, gender, and educational and farming qualifications. New farmers are mostly from the nearby Chiweshe communal areas but a significant number are from urban centres especially Harare. These farmers face serious agrarian problems in terms of production and marketing as well as social issues such as theft and illness. They try to address these challenges through informal institutions such as development committees, burial societies, school development committees and farmer groups/clusters.

My conceptualisation of institutions in the new settlements avoids dichotomising formal and informal institutions; rather, institutionalisation is seen as a continuum. At one end are institutions completely formed at the grassroots level with no government intervention (burial societies, saving clubs and irrigation committees), and at the other extreme are formalised semi-state organs (notably the position of village head). Inbetween are various emergent formations with no legal basis but established at the behest of government. Of particular importance in this respect are Committees of Seven (Chaumba et al. 2003b:20). Their roles include listening to the people's grievances, addressing problems and leading communities³. There is considerable controversy regarding these specific committees; for instance, are they 'viable community organisations to ensure the sustainability of new settlements' (UNDP 2002:24) or are they part of 'an infrastructure for rural violence and intimidation that subordinates development plans to political ends'? (Human Rights Watch 2002:4).

The vertical relationships of localised institutions with government or state organs tend to be unidirectional; however the influence and advocacy of local groups cannot be understated. These vertical relationships have to be understood in their particular social and historical settings. For example, Committees of Seven are answerable to the District Land Committee (DLC) which is chaired by the District Administrator and is made up of district level government agencies and line ministries together with the army, police, war veterans and traditional chiefs (Matondi 2007:17).

This thesis seeks to offer a critical analysis of farm institutions, which includes key questions such as: Can the institutions of A1 farmers in new resettlement schemes be seen as possible building blocks in their own empowerment? What is the nature of their leadership? What

³ Matondi (2007) argues that an additional role is entirely political as they monitor movements in their area of operation.

processes and mechanisms of accountability are put in place within these institutions? What are the forms of articulation between institutions that are local in outlook and the local power structures (local government and councils) and the state? How do local institutions relate to larger national institutions? It is erroneous to think that by virtue of being at the grassroots, that these groups are invariably democratic or participatory. By identifying and understanding power dynamics at local level they might in fact appear as mechanisms for generating inequalities and exclusions. In answering the foregoing questions the study will examine farm level institutions in terms of their types, forms of internal differentiation, the principles of membership and participation, the character of local power structures and the state, and the relationship between these structures and the functioning of the institutions. Social organisation in the context of the post-FTLRP period is mainly based on the agency of farmers trying to survive with little or no government support.

The state however influences associational (or institutional) life through its various agencies including agricultural extension officers and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party structures. In discussing agency, the thesis concentrates on how power at local level affects responses of fast track farmers to various problems facing them. This avoids generalising and romanticising agency as something always for the common good and papering over class and gender differences. I thus use the formation and internal dynamics of farm level institutions to show how individual interests motivate associational life in the fast track farms. Using Pierre Bourdieu's conceptualisation of social capital, the thesis demonstrates how power and privilege become manifested in social organisation at farm level. Associational life and institutional formation occur in specific social, cultural, political and economic contexts.

1.2 Background to the study

Significant literature exists analysing the farm occupations and fast track land reform process that emerged in Zimbabwe in the year 2000 and that led to the A1 and A2 farms (Alexander 2006; Andrew and Sadomba 2006; Cousins 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Moyo 2001, 2002; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Sadomba 2008; Shaw 2003; Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004). Much of this literature on Zimbabwe tends to focus on the broader political economy of the country. In so doing, these works regularly make unfounded claims and assumptions about the people on the land without offering a critical examination of their lived experiences. There is hence a serious gap in the literature on the conditions of existence of

this novel class of farmers within the emerging communities in the newly resettled areas. The few relevant studies (Matondi 2011; Moyo et al. 2009) have published their findings but the quality and significance of their evidence remains unclear. Indeed, it was only in 2010 that the first systematic study of livelihoods post-land reform was published by Ian Scoones et al. (2010), focusing though exclusively on Masvingo Province. The story of land reform is diverse and different in all regions in Zimbabwe thus this thesis alone cannot tell the whole story of life on the new farms. This study however rectifies a critical lacuna in the Zimbabwean literature, and provides a localised understanding of farm level groups and networks as plausible vehicles of social cohesion and service delivery. In doing so, it contributes to the lack of rigorous analysis of institutions in the context of rural development in Africa more broadly (Meagher 2007:410).

This study avoids idealising local level forms of agency and posturing about what various institutional forms should be. It rather explores and presents institutional forms at farm level on their own merit without making grand assumptions of what they are or what they intend to achieve. It constructs an empirically-grounded conceptual frame for understanding everyday realities of A1 farmers; with the realisation these people have hopes, dreams, wishes, thoughts and ways of knowing. All these processes ultimately shape how farmers interact, socialise and associate at farm level. The thesis thus offers a nuanced and rich description and understanding of rural organisation, highlighting how specific forms of institutions emerged as a response to various dilemmas facing A1 farmers in Mazowe. The formation and organisation of these institutions is based upon power and status relations that have led to various inequalities and cleavages at farm level. Unpacking these relations entails an in-depth understanding of the internal dynamics, roles, activities, strategies, democratic content and gender issues connected to these novel forms of social organisation.

The lived experiences of fast track farmers, involving an articulation of the human condition on the farms in Zimbabwe, are brought to the fore in my thesis. The prevailing literature, with macro-level debates about state restructuring and land reform effects on agricultural productivity are not irrelevant, but they simply frame structurally the current study. The forms of sociality emerging on the A1 farms are regularly ignored in the existing literature but are critically important. A1 farmers have resisted processes of dehumanisation by a state which has had negligible means to provide support, a private sector which was highly sceptical of their farming capacities and a donor community which did not recognise their

legitimacy at all. In many ways, A1 communities exist under pronounced social, political and economic marginalisation. These processes of marginalisation were exacerbated by a state which restricted the entry of external actors onto the fast track farms to ensure it maintains near hegemonic control of the fast track areas. In this light, my study offers a localised and nuanced perceptive of experiences at farm level of how people made sense of their dilemmas and created their own spaces to survive within a hostile environment characterised by lack of services and social infrastructure, droughts and a national political and economic crisis.

The FTLRP in Zimbabwe – code-named Third *Chimurenga* (war of liberation) or *jambanja* (violence) – was characterised by chaotic and violent land invasions which led to the destruction of property, sabotage, beatings and in some cases murder (Chaumba et al. 2003; Guardian 2001; Human Rights Watch 2002; Masiwa 2005; Sithole et al. 2003). The ordered nature and continued existence of communities that germinated from *jambanja* is sociologically intriguing. The Zimbabwean case illuminates important insights into how communities borne out of conflict can sustain themselves through various forms of associational groupings at local (in this case, farm) level. Another related dimension of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe is that there were very few restitution cases that resettled whole communities on their ancestral lands. Rather, land redistribution under fast track meant that on the majority of farms there were people drawn from diverse ethnic groups, languages, professions, communal areas, urban areas, sex, age, religious beliefs, customs and traditions. The new farm inhabitants in Mazowe are a collection of war veterans who were allocated a quota (on average, 15% of the plots on farms), youths, war collaborators, government workers, formerly unemployed urban dwellers, politicians, women, and ordinary people from all walks of life. This thesis thus analyses how communities constituted of people with such varied backgrounds have been able to form communities that have existed over the past ten years.

The government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) had neither the funds nor the capacity to provide social amenities when the fast track programme started. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: We cannot hide the fact that the Fast Track Programme has room for improvements. For example, the settlers require access roads, water supplies, schools, clinics, dip tanks, draught power, initial seeds and fertilizers, extension services, training and many more which the Government is unable to provide at present. If we get some help some of these facilities can

be provided to the settlers⁴. The A1 farm communities have tried to ensure services provision through their own initiatives. Certainly, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) never had the foresight or resources to monitor let alone enforce the people into becoming communities. It is through informal institutions built up through interaction and negotiation, and built on trust, reciprocity and unity of purpose, that these communities have sustained their existence. This study offers an analysis of how power and social context influences the formation and dynamics of institutional behaviour at farm level.

1.3 Why institutions?

Academia abounds with work that seeks to place the importance of institutions, whether formal or informal, in socio-economic development. Such works include Ostrom's (1990) famous study about institutional rational choice in which institutions play a role in shaping individual and collective behaviour. Institutions are seen as formalising mutual expectations of cooperative behaviour, allowing the exercise of sanctions for non-cooperation and thereby reducing the costs to the individual of transactions (Cleaver 1998:347). In the 1990s the new institutional economics (NIE) school emerged, and approached institutions as evolutionist, progressing from weak and inefficient forms of collective action towards stronger more sustainable forms. This school of thought supposes that institutions can be designed and reformed with little or no intention paid to the underlying power dynamics (Hyden 2008:3). Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1992) have shown in their work that institutions can only be understood in the context of prevailing power structures and relations because they are reflective of values and norms that are backed by key groups of actors. Institutions do not appear from thin air; rather they are introduced – from domestic or external sources – or reformed at critical junctures, i.e. times when a society opens itself to new influences. In many instances they are thus products of particular power configurations (Hyden 2008:3).

Institutions matter because they offer clever solutions to problems of trust and malfeasance in economic life; in particular, they can make cheating and free riding too costly an activity in which to engage (Granovetter 1992:59). Institutions are cultural imperatives. They serve as regulatory agencies, channelling behaviour in culturally-prescribed ways: Institutions provide procedures through which human conduct is patterned, compelled to go, in grooves deemed desirable by society and this trick is performed by making the grooves appear to the

⁴ Excerpt from the speech made by Foreign Affairs Minister Mudenge at the dinner held in honour of the former United Nations Development Programme Administrator, Mr. Mark Mallock Brown, 30th November, 2000.

individual as the only possible ones' (Berger 1963 in Eitzen and Barca-Zinn 2001:47). In the context of fast track farms, institutions are important in the creation, re-creation and contestation over norms, customs, rules and ways of life for new communities evolving in Zimbabwe. Institutions are thus social arrangements that channel behaviour in prescribed ways in important areas of social life. They are interrelated sets of normative elements—norms, values, and role expectations—that the people making up the society have devised and passed on to succeeding generations in order to provide permanent solutions to society's perpetually unfinished business (Eitzen and Barca-Zinn 2001:47).

Externally imposed grassroots institutions in Africa have over the years mirrored Western-styled organisations which focus on elections, constitutions and formal democratic considerations. Mamadou (1996:78) argues that many African countries are characterized by an institutional disconnection between formal modern institutions transplanted from outside and indigenous, informal institutions rooted in local culture. Institutional disconnection manifests itself through institutions that are unresponsive to people's needs. It is at the grassroots level that we begin to understand agency in communities, through an examination of the diverse ways in which people communicate, interact, help each other and come together. This thesis hence focuses on grassroots institutions, because they create and shape interests, influence the goals of actors, and constrain the options open to individuals to achieve those goals. Such institutions have a direct impact on the livelihood options of poor communities.

1.4 Local governance in rural Zimbabwe

Rural Zimbabwe has a dense network of local level institutions. These are organised along customary and modern state lines as well as appearing in the non-state sphere (non-governmental organisations, community based organisations and Community Trusts). Local institutions have since independence in 1980 increased and diversified, and this has led to various contests for space and relevance as they all purported to speak for the people'. The rural institutional milieu places people under a wide variety of competing constraints which include state laws and regulations as well as local customs and beliefs. There are many competing agencies of authority including local councillors, traditional leaders (including chiefs and kraal heads), district administrators and various other state agents. In the resettlement areas this includes the Lands Officer and the District Lands Committee, and these claim a level of control over the rural farmer. In large part, Zimbabwe has three formal

hierarchies of governance, namely a customary chiefly system, a multi-sectoral hierarchy of government ministries and local government, namely, rural district councils.

The Prime Minister's Directive (PMD) of 1984 reconstituted over 220 colonial African councils into 55 district councils with the aim of expanding services to marginalised areas (Helmsing 1990). This saw the creation of village development committees (VIDCOs) and ward development committees (WADCOs) at village and ward levels respectively. The Provincial Councils and Administration Act (1985) translated the Prime Minister's Directive into legislation. It however went further to create planning structures at provincial level in the form of Provincial Development Committees and Provincial Councils to ensure a coordinated and systematic planning process in each province. In the year 2000 the Traditional Leaders Act (1999) became operational, effectively repealing the Chiefs and Headman Act (1988) which had sidelined traditional leaders in developmental issues. The Traditional Leaders Act provided for the establishment of traditional structures in the form of Village Assemblies comprising all adult heads in the village chaired by village heads, and Ward Assemblies chaired by headmen. VIDCOs and WADCOs are also provided for in the same legislation and play an executive role to the traditional structures before feeding into the Rural District Council (RDC). Effectively, unlike its predecessor, the Traditional Leaders Act attempted to harmonise local government structures and traditional structures. This was intended to reduce conflict and enhance development at community level (Matumbike and Masendeke 2001:7).

Contestations between local government and traditional authorities over space, before 1999, had seen chiefs being relegated to the periphery. Hammar (2005:13) notes that subsequent to independence there have been alternating measures introduced to either undermine or revive the authority of traditional leaders. Immediately after independence there were measures to curtail the authority of chiefs and headmen over land allocation and the administration of local justice, as the new state aimed to establish a more democratic, decentralised form of local government. The Traditional Leaders Act served to increase the influence of traditional chiefs in areas such as land allocation. There are opposing views as to why this increase in chiefly authority took place, especially given that there was no strong advocating group for traditionalism. One explanation notes that chiefs represented potential allies given waning support for the ruling party and state during the late 1990s (Hammar 2005:14). Soon after the implementation of the act, chiefs became paid government officials with benefits such as cars and electricity. Another explanation often given by the ZANU-PF party was that in most

cases the chiefs ignored the earlier reforms that undercut their authority and continued to hold court over land disputes and to allocate land. This was strengthened with the claim that people also seemed to prefer traditional courts over RDC processes and that locals continued to pay allegiance to their chiefs. The GoZ justified its move as a form of capitulation in the face of unchanging local practice, thus restoring the powers of the chiefs through the Traditional Leaders Act (Murisa 2010:291).

In the resettlement areas that emerged from fast track, apart from the three centres of power (traditional, local government and central government ministries), there are various grassroots level forms of authority which influence associational life. It is these localised forms of authority that are described and analysed in the thesis. With so many competing and often confusing forms of authority, A1 farmers are subjects with multiple identities and have to respond differently to the needs of each authority. In this milieu of control by many forms of authority, farmers still carve out their own institutional spaces which authorities cannot necessarily control or destroy.

1.5 Fast Track Land Reform Programme: An institutional analysis

In August 2002 the government formally ended the FTLRP though land acquisitions continued. The programme oversaw an abandonment of all previous systems of land and natural resources administration. Committees and task forces sprouted up overnight to speed up processes of land acquisition and allocation. Numerous power struggles emerged at all levels as competition for space and control raged between different power players. At national level there was a command centre as different ministries (agriculture, information and publicity, legal affairs, local government) jostled for space and at the same time collaborated to bring the programme to fruition. The various committees and sub-national statutory bodies such as the office of the provincial governor, district administrators, chiefs, headmen and interest groups such as war veterans all competed to have a say in the programme. Local, district, provincial and national state-based and non-state institutions were critical in the programme and gave rise to land administration systems in which the ‘old’ and the ‘new’, the *de jure* and *de facto*, the legal and extralegal all sought to operate side-by-side in order to bring order to chaos, and sometimes creating chaos in the process. Table 1 below outlines the various institutions involved in the FTLRP.

Table 1: Taxonomy of Key Institutions within the Land Reform Programme

Categories	Type of institutions, agencies/organisations	Role and mandate
Farmers organisations	Commercial Farmers Union/Justice for Agriculture Group	Represents the former land owners and still contesting land acquisition
	Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union	Represents the better-off black farmers and supposedly A2 farmers
	Zimbabwe Farmers Union	Represents peasants and now A1 farmers
Political parties	Ruling party – ZANU-PF	Heavily used the land question for political campaigning and had a role in transfer and beneficiary selection as part of the DLICs and PLICs
	Opposition parties (Movement for Democratic Change)	Law making in parliament, pressing for accountability and transparency
National Government	Ministries and departments	Land administration, policy making, land acquisition, settler support, information, extension and training
	National Land Identification Committee	Command centre involved in administration and trouble shooting of key problems
Local Government	Provincial Land Identification Committee	Co-ordinated and collated the lists of farms identified and played a role in land allocation particularly for A2
	District Land Identification Committee	Involved in the listing of farms and allocation of land for A1
	Traditional leaders	Listed potential beneficiaries from their villages and participated in the DLICs
Non-state actors	NGOs	Provided infrastructural support e.g. FCTZ
	International organisations	Provided food relief in some of the resettlement areas
	Churches	Spiritual healing and supplementary feeding
Pressure groups	War veterans	Spearheaded land reform process and co-ordinated activities in the new farms through a committee of seven
	Peasant associations and CBOs	Some made the decision to move to farms close to their areas

Source: Matondi (2004)

At national level there was the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development (CRD) which has been in existence since 1998 and is chaired by the Vice President and includes representatives from key ministries. Under the FTLRP there was a sub-Committee, the National Land Task Force (NLTF) – again with key ministries represented – which was created to assist the CRD. In mid-2000, this was followed by the creation of a command centre to coordinate FTLRP. Below the national level there were Provincial Land Identification Committees (PLICs) and under these District Land Identification Committees (DLICs). The DLICs were chaired by the District Administrator and comprised district level

government agencies such as line ministries, security bodies (police and army), party officials and traditional leaders, as well as war veterans. The district committees had several functions that included the identification of farms for acquisition, co-ordination of logistics (transport, security, food provisions, and reporting to higher level authorities) and reported to the PLICs. The provincial governor chaired the PLICs which were composed of provincial level government leadership, district administrators, war veterans, police, members of the Central Intelligence Organization and ZANU-PF. Utete (2003) notes that the PLICS and DLICs lacked the executive authority to direct the fast track programme and they were also found guilty of allocating land irregularly. Post-fast track, the DLICs became District Lands Committees and PLICs became Provincial Lands Committees.

On the redistributed farms authority was vested in base commanders who were war veterans, with a supporting committee (known as the Committee of Seven). The committees were composed of a chairperson and vice-chairperson, secretary and vice-secretary, treasurer and two ordinary committee members. In general these scheme management committees have been adopted to provide some level of authority in the new schemes. In the majority of cases, the committees were made up of war veterans, the village head and the youth. Women were also regularly represented as part of mainstreaming gender within the land reform programme. The committee of seven was answerable to the DLICs and also dealt with state agencies responsible for land demarcation, distribution of inputs and setting up of infrastructure. Subsequently, significant variations in institutions and practices arose between districts. In 2004-5, in the Goromonzi District for instance, the structure was changed by district land committee members through a quasi-democratic system (Marimira 2010). The new structure in Goromonzi is now under the village head who is elected by the district land committee, and the other six members are democratically elected at farm level. The selection criteria for the village heads are unknown, as land committee members were unwilling to disclose information on these criteria. In the case of Mazowe (the research site for this thesis), the village heads are chosen by traditional chiefs.

1.6 Research questions

Research questions are a methodological point of departure in any study. They determine the study design and how methodological issues will be organised. The research sought to probe varying questions to allow an in-depth understanding of social organisation at farm level. The questions included:

- What are the emerging forms of farm level institutions on the fast track farms?
- How, why and by whom were these institutions formed?
- In what ways have these institutions assisted in the livelihoods of fast track farmers?
- In which activities are these institutions involved?
- How do farmers interact in their everyday lives in Mazowe?
- What types of communities are emerging in Mazowe?
- Are farm level institutions viable mechanisms to deliver socio-economic development?
- How can farm level institutions assist in building the collective action of farmers?

1.7 Goals of the research

The main goal of the thesis is to critically analyse the role of farm level institutions in facilitating social cohesion and service provision in the communities in the newly resettled areas. Secondary goals include:

- Critically examine the formation, processes and structures of farm level institutions; of particular interest is the social, political and economic context in which these institutions emerge.
- Examine and investigate the evolving institutional forms in terms of their types, forms of internal differentiation, principles of membership and participation, and relationship to other institutions.

1.8 Background to research site

Mazowe District is located in Mashonaland Central Province and is divided into twenty-nine wards, of which thirteen wards are in Chiweshe communal areas and the rest in new resettlement areas. Mazowe has three administrative centres (Concession, Glendale and Mvurwi) and it has a total surface area of almost 453,892 hectares⁵. It is in the south-western section of the province where Guruve and Muzarabani mark the district's boundaries to the north, Bindura and Mashonaland East Province to the east, and Harare to the west. It is also bordered by Zvimba district in Mashonaland Central Province. The district's main government administrative centre (Concession) is about sixty kilometres from Harare. Mazowe district is divided into two constituencies called Mazowe East and Mazowe West. Mazowe West covers most of the new resettlement schemes while Mazowe East covers most

⁵ This is based on figures obtained from the Ministry of Lands office in Mazowe.

of Chiweshe communal areas. The district government body is called Mazowe Rural District Council.

The main topographical feature of the district is the high plateau with the Great Dyke features being a significant landmark. In the central part of Mazowe are found red soils of the arthoferrallitic groups. However, in the Mvurwi area there are sandy light textured soils derived predominantly from granite. In most of the district there are some soils with heavier content and having excellent cropping potential if irrigated. The new resettlement areas in Mazowe still retain most of the natural ground cover with significant savannah grasslands and woodlands. The granitic soils, found in most of Mazowe East and Mvurwi areas are of low fertility, but they still retain some agricultural potential, particularly in years when there is high rainfall. These soils, particularly in the Mvurwi area, have contributed to high tobacco production in the past. The soils are also ideal for groundnuts, maize production and livestock ranching.

The topography gives the district a very diverse climatic structure. The district lies in Natural Regions II and III⁶. The high altitude areas closer to Harare generally receive higher and more reliable rainfall (750-1000mm per annum) compared to low altitude areas⁷. Most of Zimbabwe's rainfall in the highveld is received during the five summer months. In general Mazowe district receives above normal (national average) rainfall though some areas receive below average rainfall. For instance in the 2004/2005 agricultural season, most wards were affected by dry spells which threatened crop yields. A significant feature of the rainfall in Chiweshe communal lands is its unreliability both in terms of amount and duration. The onset of the rains, critical for planting, is rather unpredictable. The areas of lowest rainfall are also the areas of least rainfall reliability.

The dominant tree species in Mazowe are the *Brachystegia spiciformis* (*musasa*) and *julbernardia globiflora* (*mutondo*). In Mazowe west, prominent tree species include *Albizia amara* (*muora/mugunduzi*), *Combretum zeyheri* (*muruka*), *Peltophorum africanum* (*muzeze*) and *Parinari curatellifolio* (*muchakata*). In areas with *vleis* (wet lands) *mukute* have been

⁶ On the basis of the climatic pattern, altitude and soil type, the country is classified into five agro-ecological regions with agricultural potential declining from Region I to Region V.

⁷ Mazowe just like other highveld areas has three seasons: (i) a dry winter, covering the months from April to August, with cool temperatures especially at night when frost is sometimes experienced, (ii) a hot season with temperatures building up to a maximum in October and (iii) a wet summer season in which the main rains are received from November to March.

noted. The species of trees provide the district with distinct vegetation cover. In Mazowe east, the vegetation cover has been severely reduced due to human interventions, particularly in the thirteen wards of Chiweshe communal lands. However, ward 14 surrounding Concession, where most small-scale mining activities take place, also suffers from extensive vegetation reduction. The human populations found in these wards tend to be higher than the resources can support.

Overall the soils are fertile and in normal years Mazowe produces a surplus crop. For a long time Mazowe together with the land stretching from Shamva to Lomagundi was known as the breadbasket of the nation. Historically, various groups (urban people, rural people, people with traditional land claims and the state through parastatals such as Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) have claimed significant amounts of land in Mazowe. The district has massive water resources, with Mazowe Dam being one of the largest in Mashonaland Central province. It is one of the districts where the state experimented with the catchment councils and water user associations following the reformed Water Act in 1998. The district also possesses one of the largest dairy farms, has the strategic citrus producing Mazowe Estate and has the largest agricultural research and experimentation centre called Henderson. In Concession, there is one of the largest Grain Marketing Board grain silos, used nationally as a strategic grain reserve. It was located in Mazowe simply because Mazowe and surrounding districts have traditionally been the largest producers of grain in the country. Because of this, land and agrarian reform in Mazowe is in many ways a signifier of the success or failure of fast track land reform.

1.8.1 Demographic profile

The population of Mazowe district did not change significantly in the 1992 and 2002 inter-census years. There was a diminished population growth rate, which reflects the reduced national population growth rate of 1.5%. In 2002 the population was 199,408 people and this jumped to 205,493 people in 2004, which is a significant growth rate (Central Statistical Office 2002). This increase derives from the movement of people onto fast track farms as farm _owners‘ and additional farm workers brought in by new farmers. The communal areas consist of 36% of the population. The urban areas such as Mvurwi, Glendale and Concession consist of 8.8% of the population. The newly resettled areas and the remaining large commercial farms consist of 55% of the population.

1.8.2 Agriculture and farming patterns

Mazowe District has a diverse agrarian structure which emerged out of the FTLRP. Besides a few remaining white-owned commercial farms, there are A2 and A1 resettlement farms, communal areas and state farms of various sizes and involved in various enterprises (crop production, horticulture, citrus, wildlife, seed production and dairy). Mazowe District has the following agrarian characteristics: proximity to vibrant markets in Harare (which is also a gateway to international markets), new land tenure arrangements that are highly contested, significant differences in land use and agricultural production, and rapid pace of land acquisition and redistribution. Mazowe experienced its first redistribution of large-scale owned land in 2000 and was not affected by the first phase of the land reform and resettlement programme, which ended in 1997.

The district holds a large percentage of the prime lands that have been allocated under the A1 and A2 schemes. In fact, Mazowe has more farms that have been allocated to A2 farmers than in any other district in the country. There are also large ‘indigenous’ large-scale commercial farms (these are farms purchased by blacks prior to 2000 through market sales) that have not been affected by the land reform programme. The district has well-developed productive infrastructure such as roads, energy and rail, and is also well connected with telephone services. It has the bulk of ‘weekend’ farmers (mostly among A2 farmers) who reside in urban areas. Mazowe also has some of the largest seed producers.

The district’s area incorporates the Chiweshe communal area (86,200 hectares), which is a large block of small-sized communal plots averaging between three to five hectares. Chiweshe lands are based on a combination of tenurial arrangements with arable land, common grazing, and residential areas forming the total continuum of the tenure systems. There is no individual title to land in Chiweshe, except in a few growth points such as Nzvimbo Growth Point where there is local authority recognition of ownership based on the payments of rates, fees and development levies.

The Mazowe communal farmers are ranked among the most productive in the country and compete with communal farmers in areas such as Gokwe in the Midlands and Hurungwe in Mashonaland West. Crops grown are mainly maize, cotton and burley tobacco. A challenge that has faced the institutions and farmers in Chiweshe communal land is the over-use of land, especially encroachment into grazing areas contributing to diminishing livestock herds.

Conservation and environmental protection measures have not been successful. Rampant tree cutting for fuel and soil erosion are major concerns. Furthermore, the poor socio-economic condition of the communal farmers means that they put survival before environmental protection. Land degradation has accelerated because of recent increases in gold panning in the area as new farms are opened up.

The commercial farming area, which used to be the bulk part of the district, was technically divided into four Intensive Conservation Areas (ICAs), namely, Barwick, Marodzi Tatagura, Mvurwi and Glendale ICA. These ICAs had different agricultural systems stemming from variations in soil types and vegetation, which in turn were influenced by the parent materials from which the soils were derived:

- Barwick ICA was 88,250 hectares with predominantly sandy soils. The main agricultural activity was livestock ranching.
- Mvurwi ICA was 128,386 hectares with sands and sandy loam soils dominating. Tobacco was the main crop with other field crops such as maize and soya beans. Intensive to semi-intensive livestock production systems were also carried out.
- Marodzi Tatagura ICA was 53,250 hectares and had deep red clay soils generally referred to as Tatagura soils. The soils are heavy and crack when dry. The area was intensively cultivated and livestock production was confined to areas where cultivation is restricted by slopes. All key crops were grown except tobacco.
- Glendale ICA was 77,736 hectares with sandy loam soils suitable for all crops. Intensive to semi-intensive livestock production systems were the main activities.

Only Mazowe Citrus Estates farms and Forrester Estate farms were not acquired and settled under FTLRP. Mazowe Citrus Estates are the country's biggest citrus producers (oranges, lemons and limes). Forrester Estates have a country-to-country agreement between the Zimbabwe government and the German government. Forrester Estates have however been informally settled. There are 36 large 'indigenous' large-scale commercial farms that have not been affected by the land reform programme.

1.9 Research methodology

Before providing the thesis outline, I discuss in some detail the research methodology that forms the basis of this thesis.

1.9.1 Ontological and epistemological concerns

In this section I outline the basic system of ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological assumptions underlying this thesis. The knowledge production enterprise is fraught with contradictions and contestations. What is knowledge in more ways than one depends on the reality it has previously created as knowable and defined as its object (Gialdino 2009). This research acknowledges multiple ways of knowing and as such opens itself up to myriad alternative methodologies based on the assumption that everyone is a knower.

Epistemology considers the appropriate foundation for the study of society and its manifestations, and provides the underlying philosophical basis for the arguments supporting the validity of a research strategy. Quantitative research is routinely depicted as linked to the positivist tradition of the natural sciences, with an objectivist, atomistic view of the world and science, and a fundamental view that reality is a concrete structure which can be defined and understood as a sum of its parts. In this regard, replication, causation and objectivity are considered as minimum conditions for the production of knowledge (Schell 1992:7).

According to Lindlof, unlike quantitative researchers, who perform tests of prediction and control, qualitative inquirers strive to understand their objects of interest (Lindlof 1995:9). It is through the researcher's insight that qualitative research achieves its ultimate goal - understanding. Qualitative research begins from an ontological foundation that defines reality as some type of projection of imagination, the point of view of at least one actor and ultimately a social construction, which can be explored through a science of meanings, phenomenological insight and subjective processes. Different epistemological assumptions about the constitution of knowledge mean that a clear consensus about what comprises a fact is impossible. A justification of qualitative research is not likely to succeed under positivist assumptions, and is thus linked to a subjective, phenomenological epistemological position. Under a subjective theory of being, the views of actors (as communicated through for instance case studies) are the empirical point of departure (Schell 1992:7).

Qualitative methodologies assume the existence of multiple and dynamic realities that are context-dependent. Joniak (2007) argues that qualitative researchers embrace an ontology that denies the existence of (or at least the efficacy of arguing for the existence of) an external reality. By external reality, we mean one that exists outside and independent of our

interpretations of it (Searle 1995:154). Thus qualitative researchers value participants' own interpretations of reality which are deeply embedded in a rich contextual web that cannot be separated and generalized out to some mass population (Joniak 2007). If we are to study human beings, it is only within their context where meaning is constantly under negotiation. Denzin and Lincoln demonstrate how a paradigm's ontology invariably affects its epistemology:

The epistemological question: What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known? The answer that can be given to this question is constrained by the answer already given to the ontological question; that is, not just any relationship can now be postulated (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:108).

This means that sociologists' specific views on the nature of reality affect how they come to gain knowledge of reality. Since qualitative researchers embrace internal reality, they cannot embrace an objective epistemology (Joniak 2007). Therefore, qualitative researchers, in valuing and indeed privileging human agents' own interpretations of reality, maintain that knowledge emerges from achieving a deep understanding of the evidence and the context in which it is embedded (Joniak 2007). Researchers' acts of interpretation, translation and representation are socially constructed such that they cannot be considered objective. Processes of knowing should be seen as engaged, value-bound and context determined. Michel Foucault argues that the criteria of what constitutes knowledge, what is to be excluded as outside valid knowledge and who is designated as qualified to know involve acts of power. Knowledge is therefore never neutral and universal (Scoones and Thompson 1994:24).

This study is premised on both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. This mixed-method approach is necessitated by the need to offer both a generalised picture at district level and an in-depth understanding through farm-level case studies. Quantitative methodologies were employed in the *Land and Livelihoods Study* (discussed below) which served as the baseline for my own work in the field. This study is used in one chapter of the thesis to empirically frame the investigation of fast track farms in Mazowe. Simultaneously, the in-depth and focused research questions guiding this thesis were pursued using a qualitative approach rooted in the social realities of everyday life in Mazowe. My own fieldwork was based on a qualitative methodology that draws from multiple techniques which place the participants' voice at the centre of analysis. Ways of interpreting experiences are

available to each of us through interacting with others, and first and foremost it is the meaning of our experiences that constitutes reality. Reality, consequently, is socially constructed. As such, this thesis makes no claims of offering ‘truths’ that are generalisable beyond the case studies contained in this study. Universal claims to truth such as postulated by the Enlightenment project are not possible in research work that highlights knowledges as situated and contested. Understanding these situated knowledges requires qualitative researchers to become familiar with everyday interpretations of reality. Utilizing the emic approach, in which one becomes immersed ‘in the data’; the qualitative researcher observes, records and interprets social phenomena from participants’ perspectives.

1.9.2 Primary data: Land and Livelihoods Study⁸

This study is a culmination of work that began under the guidance of Prosper Matondi in 2004/05 in relation to the *Land and Livelihoods Study* in Mazowe. In this thesis I utilise the 2008 baseline survey from Mazowe to provide a vivid picture of land reform in the district. Chapter five is wholly premised on the data collected in this survey and it analyses the social differentiation and livelihoods of fast track farmers in the district. I also draw examples from interviews, focus group discussions and secondary data collected in this research. The 2008 Mazowe baseline triangulated the use of quantitative and qualitative methodologies to ensure that we collected data that was grounded in the everyday experiences of farmers on the fast track plots. The use of varied research techniques not only increased the number of farmers we were able to question but also allowed us to cross check the validity of information collected.

1.9.3 Case studies: Qualitative work on six farms⁹

My own fieldwork was focused on six purposively selected A1 schemes in Mazowe. The choice of farms and research questions were shaped by my initial stay in Mazowe doing fieldwork in the *Land and Livelihoods Study* at the Centre for Rural Development (CRD) in Harare. By living with new communities and interacting with them I noticed a pattern in which farms with high levels of institutional organisation had more communal investments (boreholes, equipment and productive assets), produced more agriculturally and had fewer conflicts than farms with little or no institutionalisation. While this CRD research offered an exploratory foray into understanding how and why institutions are formed, their internal

⁸ For a detail methodology of the *Land and Livelihoods Study*, see Appendix 1.

⁹ For an indepth description of the fieldwork and methodology see Appendix 2.

dynamics and whether they are viable vehicles for service delivery, more work needed to be done in analysing why farms with institutions are more successful.

The farms were chosen using a purposive sampling technique. Purposive sampling is done when the sample is selected by keeping a certain purpose in mind in order to include certain individuals/populations in the study. Purposive sampling was used in my study because of its convenience and its accuracy in providing the information related to the subjects under study (Keith 2004). Five of the schemes selected (Hariana, Hamilton, Davaar, Visa and Usk farms) has one or more of the following: irrigation equipment, school and clinic as well as proximity to A2 schemes to ensure that a wide range of farm level institutions are covered. The assumption was that, on farms with such infrastructure, management and conflict issues will arise and one or more farm level institutions will be in operation. The sixth scheme (Blightly Farm) covered is situated a long distance away from major roads and service centres and would have none of the facilities noted above.

The case study approach entailed studying social phenomena through analysis of an individual case. A case study represents a detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, that is, it strives towards a thorough examination of one or a small number of instances of the unit identified by the research interest. The case method gives a unitary character to the data being studied by inter-relating a variety of facts to a single case. Hence, it entails an in-depth study of a particular situation by narrowing down a very broad field of research into an easily researchable topic (Punch 2004). In this study, the six farms offered a chance to gain an intimate understanding of everyday life on fast track farms. Using a variety of research techniques outlined below, this thesis brings forth the voices of A1 farmers in a way that pronounces their experiences in a profound way. Situated research methodologies that take into cognisance local contexts require reflexivity and flexibility so as to respond to everchanging needs in the field. Given the political polarisation that characterised fast track farms and Zimbabwean society as a whole in 2009 (when I undertook most of my research), many negotiations were done to allow fieldwork that respected farmers as knowers in their own right. In that way, these case studies were designed in such a way that research would reflect the views and opinions of farmers as clear as possible, but without inconveniencing them in any way during the process of gathering data.

1.9.4 Research techniques

a) Focus group discussions

Focus groups belong to the genre of qualitative research methods aimed at gaining an understanding of participants' views, feelings and attitudes. Group discussion produces data and insights that would be less accessible without interaction found in a group setting, as listening to others' verbalised experiences stimulates memories, ideas, and experiences in participants (Lindlof and Taylor 2002:182). Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2005:888) suggest that they are unique formations of collective inquiry where theory, research, pedagogy and politics merge. They provide an opportunity for a mixture of learning, discovery, education and empowerment deriving from the interactions between the researchers and the research participants.

Kitzinger (2004) suggests that the group interactions between participants provide several benefits. For example, the group interactions can encourage a variety of communication including anecdotes and jokes, which may tell the researcher much about what the participants know and encourage a wide understanding of issues. Insight may also be gained from an exploration of what is censored and discussed within the group process as the participants relate issues between themselves. The researcher gains an understanding of areas that often remain untapped by more conventional data collection techniques such as one-to-one interviews. The different forms of communication used during the focus group may also sensitize the researcher to the cultural values and norms of the participants (Kitzinger 2004). Furthermore, it may encourage open conversations about embarrassing subjects and facilitate the expression of ideas and experiences that might be left underdeveloped in a one-to-one interview.

In total, eight focus group discussions were held on the six schemes. The groups had an average of sixteen participants. Five group discussions were a mixture of male and female plot holders, farm workers and spouses. Two discussions at Haryana and Blightly were conducted separately with women living on the farms, whilst another group discussion was with the health committee and members of the Committee of Seven at Davaar. The discussions involved various issues pertaining to institutions at farm level, including bringing to the fore the collective memory of farmers to help each other provide a vivid picture of life since settlement. The discussions narrowly focused on how institutions were formed, why they were formed, their activities and roles, levels of satisfaction with their activities,

democratic content and various other issues around associational life. This was done because data on livelihoods on farms in Mazowe had already been collected during the *Land and Livelihoods Study* noted above.

b) Key informant interviews

Key informants are ‘people in authority working within or with people’ in the newly resettled areas such as local government authorities, teachers and nurses (Meis 2007:4). While the actions of key informants may be to respond to the demands of the meso- or macro-levels, their significance lies at the micro-level as they alter the whole question of livelihoods, governance and power. Most members of any community or society do not know the full repertory of forms, meanings and functions of their culture. Key informants, as a result of their personal skills or position within society, are able to provide more information and a deeper insight into what is going on around them (Marshall 1998:92). The major challenge however in this research was that informants who were civil servants were only likely to divulge information that is politically acceptable for fear of retribution even when their anonymity was guaranteed. In this study, key informants included committee members of various institutions, *sabhuku* (headmen), traditional chiefs, councillors, council officers and workers from various government ministries such as Lands, Agriculture, Education, Gender and Health.

c) Institutional analysis

The farmers were asked what institutions were operating and have operated at farm level such as churches, savings clubs, community-based organisations, farmer groups and women’s clubs. For each of these institutions or organizations, people would be asked: Who are members? How does this body operate? How effective is it? Where does and how does it derive its legitimacy? What are the linkages or overlaps with other organizations? Is it successful? What motivates the group? Who initiated it? Plot holders were asked to describe historical changes in the institutional structure, rules, bye-laws and everyday dynamics of these institutions. This was done in focus group discussions in which participants helped each other remember all institutions.

d) Observation, interaction and informal questioning

The data-gathering exercise in Mazowe was not only limited to structured and formal interactions with farmers. Various informal techniques were employed which included

observation of committee meetings, attending field days and training days, interacting with farmers on a personal basis, and informal talk around life on the fast track farms. Working in Mazowe since 2007 allowed for interaction with various actors including agricultural extension workers and government officers. Through discussions at social events, important issues around land reform were discussed which they were not comfortable to divulge in interviews. With time, certain key or influential farmers would sit down and talk about their interests, ambitions, fears and issues affecting their lives in the resettlement areas. This type of interaction allowed me to gather rich and in-depth stories of A1 farmers and those who provide them with services. These stories told a tale of success, failure, pain, anguish, happiness, overcoming and strong resilience of black farmers in the face of multiple threats to their livelihoods. There were many places and chance events in which rich data was collected in this research; from church meetings, at bottle stores or after giving farmers a lift I was able to hear about many interesting social facts pertinent to the research.

1.10 Outline of the thesis

After this first introductory chapter, the thesis is organised into the following chapters. Chapter Two presents the theoretical underpinnings of this research. It outlines how this study is influenced by the concept of social capital. In particular, it identifies and addresses the ways in which social capital shapes the formation of farm level institutions and how their continued existence relies on it. Bourdieu (1986:249) conceives of social capital as one of four key forms of capital, along with economic, cultural (embodied, objectified or institutional) and symbolic capital. Social capital is regularly seen as inherently formed for the benefit of everyone in a community. Hence, Putnam (1995: 2) argues that the productive activity of social capital is manifest in its capacity to facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.⁴ This chapter questions any such necessary link, especially when focusing on heterogeneous communities such as the newly resettled areas. In fact, in examining the co-construction of the variety of capitals and the interrelations between them, Bourdieu (1986:253) argues that social capital is not always mutually beneficial; privilege and disadvantage are covertly and simultaneously reproduced (Butler and Robson 2001:2146). In this regard, Ben Fine (2000:12) argues that in raising the virtues of civil society to pedestal status, social capital has studiously ignored questions of power, conflict, the ruling elite and the systemic imperatives of (contemporary) capitalism.⁴

Chapter Three focuses on the history of land reform in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1999. It analyses how the impasse on land in Zimbabwe has evolved from the Lancaster House Agreement of 1980 until the explosive land invasions of early 2000. From this perspective the chapter interrogates the various academic debates over the process of land reform through various stages. The chapter tracks how land reform failed to achieve set goals in this period due to a myriad of factors especially after the adoption of a structural adjustment programme in the 1990s. I argue that the Lancaster House Constitution sowed the seeds of the events of 2000 in Zimbabwe. The constitutional basis of property in Zimbabwe had to be challenged because the independence constitution simply legalized what had gone before, i.e. ninety years of prejudice and racial injustice in the distribution of property. The Lancaster Agreement did not provide any form of retribution for the victims of this historical injustice, the black majority. Various critics (Goebel 2005; Makumbe 1999; Moyo 1996) argue that redistribution of land lacked transparency and some claim that it was marked by regional, ethnic and class biases that favoured elite blacks from the regions and ethnic groups that dominated the ruling ZANU-PF party. The chapter also discusses social organisation and formation of community-based organisations in the first resettlement areas in Zimbabwe.

In Chapter Four, I outline the debates around the 2000 farm occupations and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. This chapter provides a contextual understanding of the processes that led to the emergence of communities which are under study in this research. The chapter notes that significant literature exists analysing the farm occupations and FTLRP that emerged in Zimbabwe in the year 2000 and that led to the formation of A1 and A2 farms. One school of thought argues that land reform was instigated by war veterans as part of ZANU-PF's official campaign strategy for the 2000 elections and as a response to the dwindling support for the party as shown by the results of the February 2000 referendum on the state-sponsored constitution (Alexander 2006; Cousins 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Shaw 2003; Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004). An opposing perspective views the land occupations in 2000 as part of a longer-term and clearly identifiable land occupation movement in post-independent Zimbabwe (Andrew and Sadomba 2006; Moyo 2001; 2002; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Sadomba 2008).

The fifth chapter is the first to discuss empirical data based on fieldwork in Mazowe district. Much of the literature on Zimbabwe tends to focus on the broader political economy of the country. Such works regularly make unfounded claims and assumptions about the people on

the land without offering an authentic understanding and analysis of their lived experiences. The chapter is based on the survey carried out in Mazowe in 2007/2008, and secondary data and interviews I conducted in 2009 and 2010. Firstly, it provides a brief history of land reform in Mazowe showing how it has evolved over the years. Secondly, it paints a picture of the social background and differentiation of the farmers who acquired land in Mazowe. It tries to offer a vivid description of these new inhabitants showing their age, religion, ethnicity, family structure, hope, process of acquiring land and various challenges they are facing. It is only through knowing who the farmers are and their lived experiences that we are able to analyse the various forms of institutions that they have formed. These relate to everyday activities such as agricultural production, housing, clean water, transportation, health and education. The way communities meet these germane needs of life provides insights into their character and social organisation. The chapter ends by highlighting the hopes and fears of these various individuals who took a leap of faith into the frontier of new resettlements in the hope of making a better life for themselves and their families.

Chapter Six is concerned with highlighting the various processes and dynamics involved in the formation of these institutions subsequent to fast track. It offers diverse typologies of farm level institutions and how they are structurally organised. The chapter defines farm level institutions as all associational groupings (small or large, formal or informal) that operate at farm level on the fast track farms. It shows that farm level institutions on the fast track farms in Mazowe appear in fluid forms that do not easily fit into often contested taxonomical categories. I discuss the processes involved in the formation of farm level institutions and highlight how institutions are in a constant state of wax and wane (where they are never fully formed but are rather created and recreated in interaction among farmers). Social organisation at farm level is shown to be a result of a number of interacting and competing internal (charismatic leaders, age, gender) and external (extension workers, political parties, non-governmental organisations) factors.

In Chapter Seven there is an analysis of the activities, relationships, strategies, roles and influence of farm level institutions. All these areas are critical to our understanding of local level politics. It looks at specific farm level institutions found on farms in Mazowe showing what they do, how they do it and why they do it. This helps in understanding the myriad and various social, political and economic roles and functions played out by different groups on the fast track farms. The chapter investigates the strategies used by farm level institutions to

lobby various external agencies including government. Strategies employed by social groups in many ways depend on the nature and depth of their vertical and horizontal relationships. Farm level institutions are only as successful as the amount of resources (both social and economic) they can summon in lobbying for their interests. Rather than romanticising on the emergence of novel institutions that disrupt evolutionary narratives or heroes who outwit big institutions, this chapter shows how class and gender configurations are handled in these new institutional forms.

Finally, Chapter Eight is a summary of the thesis and provides an in-depth discussion of the major findings from the study. It ties up various conceptual strands with empirical data and provides a way forward for research in agrarian issues.

1.11 Conclusion

This introductory chapter lays the foundation of the thesis by framing the central questions analysed in this study. The lived experiences of fast track farmers so far have been under-researched and this study adds to the still limited knowledge of the social organisation of communities that emerged out of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe. The chapter explains the place of this work in current academia while illuminating its empirical and theoretical value to our understanding of communities constituted by people coming from diverse backgrounds. It also provided the overarching goals of this research and what it seeks to achieve. Newspaper reports and academic work around land reform in Zimbabwe have tended to be overly negative of the programme, concentrating on the macro-debates without giving sufficient voice to the resettled farmers. The lived experiences of these farmers are ignored as debate rages on over the merits/demerits of the programme. This study is therefore important because it sheds light on how communities that emerged from the programme have managed to evolve and survive since 2000. It deepens our knowledge of how communities made up of strangers and borne out of a chaotic process manage to remain together for over ten years and even succeed at times in operating cooperative projects. Finally, the thesis is also important for Southern Africa broadly, given that the land question is still unresolved in countries such as South Africa and Namibia. The Zimbabwean case offers lessons on what to do and what not to do as these countries try to resolve the land question.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORISING EMERGENT RURAL FORMATIONS

2.1 Introduction

Theorising emergent rural formations is an enterprise fraught with complexities. The specific focus of this thesis (A1 redistributed farms) necessitates that I define what is meant by farm level institutions. In analysing the formation, gender differentiation, metamorphosis, activities, typologies and democratic content of farm level institutions, the thesis employs the concept of social capital and shows how it relates to power and agency. The genesis of these institutions, in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, is conditioned by the prevailing social, political and economic environment. In this chapter, I offer a conceptual framework that guides my research work in terms of understanding farm level institutions. The chapter will first offer a brief background to social capital. It will then outline a conceptualisation of farm level institutions noting the various theoretical strands. Thirdly, the chapter outlines the strands of social capital which I will use in my analysis. Overall, the chapter discusses conceptualisation of rural social organisations showing how other scholars have variously defined such formations.

2.2 Background to theoretical framework

This study is influenced by the concept of social capital. In particular, I seek to identify and address the ways in which social capital shapes the formation of farm level institutions and how their continued existence relies on it. Bourdieu (1986:249) conceives of social capital as one of four key forms of capital, along with economic, cultural (embodied, objectified or institutional) and symbolic. He defines social capital as:

The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986: 249–250).

Social capital is thus a collective asset that grants members social ‘credits’ that can be used as capital to facilitate purposive actions (Glover and Parry 2005:452). Social relations, in this

fashion, constitute useful resources for actors through processes such as establishing obligations, expectations and trustworthiness, creating channels for information, and setting norms backed by efficient sanctions (Burt 2000; Coleman 1988; Putman 2000).

Social capital has been viewed as a concept which is formed for the benefit of everyone in a community. Hence, Putnam (1995:2) argues that the productive activity of social capital is manifest in its capacity to ‘facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.’ Lin (2001:56) highlights that – like other forms of capital – social capital is premised on the notion of an investment (in social relationships) which will result in some benefit or profit to the individual. In other words, social capital makes it possible to achieve certain aims that cannot be achieved by individuals alone. Investing in social capital is however a risky venture; for example, given that a member of the network may fail to perceive or act upon a mutual obligation, any investment may fail to yield any positive result (Holt 2008:232). This raises doubts about the links between social capital and the common good.

My study questions any such inherent link, especially when focusing on heterogeneous communities such as in the newly resettled areas. In fact, in examining the co-construction of the variety of capitals and the interrelations between them, Bourdieu (1986:253) argues that social capital is not always mutually beneficial; privilege and disadvantage are covertly reproduced as well (Butler and Robson 2001:2146). In this regard, Ben Fine (2000:12) argues that ‘in raising the virtues of civil society to pedestal status, social capital has studiously ignored questions of power, conflict, the ruling elite and the systemic imperatives of (contemporary) capitalism.’ Building on Bourdieu (1986), I determine how social capital also involves social exclusion, power differentials and inequality in the newly resettled schemes (including along gender lines). For instance, in the case of irrigation schemes, the required payment of a levy becomes a source of exclusion.

Few concepts have gained as much widespread usage and derision over the past twenty years as social capital. Its popularity is infuriating especially in the wake of problems associated with understanding or measuring what social capital entails. Concepts such as trust, volunteerism, social networks, neighbourliness and friendship have all now become synonymous with social capital. I interrogate such misleading conceptualisations of a concept that holds so much promise for understanding evolving social entities in rural Africa. In

particular, the thesis seeks to identify and address the ways in which social capital shapes the formation of farm level institutions and how their continued existence relies on it.

2.3 What are farm level institutions?

Farm level institutions in this thesis include all institutional forms that emerged in the communities that grew out of the fast track land reform. Various farm level institutions emerged as a response to a multiplicity of challenges facing the new class of farmers. For example, fast track land reform was criticised both locally and internationally for its chaotic character and dire economic effects¹⁰. Such criticism especially from Western donors brought with it sanctions, suspension of balance of payments supports, a reduction in direct foreign investment and a decrease in humanitarian aid. This, combined with falls in agricultural productivity and subsequent industrial production in downstream industries, led to a rapidly devaluating Zimbabwean dollar, enormous inflation and high unemployment figures (Masiiwa 2005:222). This economic crisis has impacted heavily on new farmers who find it increasingly difficult to afford inputs and access loans. Unlike in the communal areas, most new farmers cannot depend on kinship ties for help: thus they have formed other networks to respond to these challenges, taking the form of institutions such as farm committees, irrigation committees and health committees.

2.4 Conceptualising institutions in rural Africa

Institutional formations in rural Africa have been variously described as ‘traditional institutions’ (Mukamuri et al. 2003), ‘rural institutions’ (Mohomed 2003), ‘peasant organisations’ (Romdhane and Moyo 2002), ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006) and recently rural civil society (Murisa 2010). These institutions have for a long time been viewed as informal because they operate outside the realm of government or state control and are not formally registered (Meagher 2007). The genesis of these institutions has depended upon the social, political and economic environment prevailing at the time. For example the advent of burial societies was only made possible due to urbanisation and migration that disintegrated the extended family which was responsible for funerals. In this thesis I focus on a particularly distinct type of rural institution which is emerging out of newly created communities. This

¹⁰ Critics included among others the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change, Commercial Farmers’ Union, Western donors, United Nations Development Programme, Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (representing black small-scale farmers) and NGOs.

type of institution derives partly from traditional institutions but is largely dependent on the prevailing socio-economic and political environment.

Rural institutions in Africa have been regularly labelled as informal because they always emerge outside and against formal authority. With its complex landscape of weak states and resilient indigenous institutions, Africa offers a particularly rich terrain for the investigation of informal institutions (Meagher 2007:408). However Eisenstadt (2002) argues that what is meant by the term has proved elusive. In this respect, Meagher (2007) provides four analytical ways of viewing informal institutions in Africa, as shaped by disciplinary differences, varying levels of historical depth and debates about the role of structure and agency in informal organizations. The first analytical framing entails an evolutionist perspective arising from new institutional economics, in which informal institutions are seen as remnants of pre-modern times. The prominent institutionalist Marcus North (1990:74) identifies formal institutions with 'state enforced rules' such as 'political (and judicial) rules, economic rules and contracts', while informal institutions are restricted to 'societal rules' such as 'routines, customs, traditions and conventions' (North 1990:83). Despite its compelling simplicity, this perspective fails to take into account the more complex realities of colonial and post-colonial societies in which pre-existing legal codes and business regulations as well as customs have been displaced into the informal realm. Klein's (2007) research on health systems in Benin confronts the opposite problem, in which informal treatment systems such as traditional healers have been licensed by the state, leading her to question the relevance of the formal-informal institutional divide (quoted from Meagher 2007:408).

A second perspective, arising from history and anthropology, shifts the focus from institutional evolution to 'legal pluralism' (Merry 1988). Legal pluralist perspectives stretch the concept of informal institutions beyond the customary and the small scale, but restrict it to patterns of behaviour deriving from pre-existing forms of public authority, which may compete for legitimacy with current formal institutions. In his work on informal systems of resource governance in rural Ethiopia, Stellmacher (2007) argues that informal institutions do not represent communal vestiges, but multi-ethnic social arrangements created by a pre-existing state – institutions which were in-formalized, but not eliminated, by the imposition of the military *derg* in 1974 (quoted from Meagher 2007:4009).

Structuralist perspectives argue that complex informal institutions are not only the legacies of Africa's pre-colonial past; they have also emerged in the context of colonial and postcolonial struggles for access to power and resources (Berry 1993; Tostensen et al. 2001). In addition to focusing on pre-colonial normative orders, structuralist analyses therefore highlight the role of contemporary social, political and economic processes in reshaping, transforming or disrupting informal institutions. These processes often giving rise to 'multiple modernities' (Eisenstadt 2002), involving the emergence of 'modern' informal institutions, such as hometown associations, women's organizations, and vigilante groups, from the interaction of formal and informal (quoted from Meagher 2007:409).

The fourth analytical perspective entails poststructuralist approaches which emerged from political science and anthropology. Combining legal pluralist thinking with the post-structuralist literature on power and popular resistance, poststructuralists identify informal institutions with all unofficial forms of ordering, including social networks, cultural values, corruption and coping strategies (Bayart et al. 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Lund 2007). Examining informal institutions as mechanisms of agency rather than non-state structures, poststructuralists highlight the competing, contesting and sometimes contradictory orders outside formal institutions, in which power and public authority are viewed as products of continuous struggle and negotiation (Meagher 2007:410).

In this thesis I take a poststructuralist approach to understanding the emergence of farm level institutions in Mazowe. The emergence of these institutions will be viewed as a mechanism of agency by new farmers who are using various coping strategies to survive the economic meltdown and lack of government support in Zimbabwe. Following Meagher (2007:410), the thesis will analyse how power and public authority in the new resettlement areas are a product of continuous conflict and negotiation. Whilst noting how farm level institutions highlight agency on the part of A1 farmers, the thesis does not romanticise this action. Rather, it uses Bourdieu's conceptualisation of social capital to analyse the nature of power relations within these local polities. It will show that even within grassroot organisations inequalities in power and control do exist.

2.5 Institutionalisation as agency in Africa

Lund (2006:685) argues that political authority in Africa does not always fall within the realm of government institutions. Africa has diverse and varied institutions which attempt to

exercise public authority. These include modern government institutions and also traditional institutions which are recognised by government, whilst many emerging institutions have entered the competition for public authority. African politics and history detail how governments and chiefs have negotiated, forged alliances and competed for public authority (Lund 2006). Public authority is the amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of local institutions and the imposition of external institutions conjugated with the idea of a state. Bierschenk and de Sardan (1997) argue that the exercise of control in Africa is fluid and depends on the social context for example in some areas there is a hegemonic understanding of all institutions whilst in others there is serious conflict. As Lund (2006:685) points out: ‘Strategic groups defending shared interests may form or disintegrate in the course of struggle and can be seen as undergoing constant reproduction and transformation.’ Thus these institutions are in a state of wax and wane, and are never definitely formed: ‘Such institutions operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and private’ (Lund 2006:686).

Lund (2006) argues that the existence and functioning of local or grassroots institutions cannot be separated from the state as an idea or physical entity. Moore (1978) for example notes how the change of central government regime and political rhetoric in post-socialist Tanzania led to the emergence of new institutions and changes to already existing ones. She argues that to discover the dynamics in rural African politics and the latest in organisational modernities, there is nothing so revealing as contests for directing organisational milieus. Incident by incident, local designs for personal and collective futures are designed to ensure certain interests are met (Moore 1996:602). The exercise of power and authority by these local institutions is bolstered by references to the state in that whilst they appear anti state, they act like and at times on behalf of the state. For example in Niger hometown associations and vigilante groups acted like the state in ensuring social order while considering themselves as anti-state.

Pratten and Gore (2003) show that the idioms by which youth associations, vigilante groups in southern Nigeria describe themselves are quite elastic. They think of themselves as maintaining order, protecting ordinary people and performing functions that the state fails to do. The youth associations ‘screen’ politicians before they are supported to run for electoral office, and they control the work of contractors in the local community. Similarly, secret societies on Nigeria’s university campuses operate to curb abuse and corruption by the

lecturers. These are popular responses to political and economic disorder, and an exercise of accountability at the local level. However these organizations do not project a revolutionary anti-state message' (Pratten and Gore 2003:232), and often have no qualms about becoming the instruments of the class of politicians and businessmen in patron-client relations. They depict the state as distinct and distant, while simultaneously vying to establish or entrench their own public authority. Hence, paradoxically, they become part of what they depict as exterior' (Lund 2006:688).

Farm level institutions in Zimbabwe are conditioned by a variety of polities imposed from above' (state, local council and agricultural extension workers) and by processes emerging from the grassroots. With this distinction, there is still agency involved even within state-imposed institutions since farmers can change the shape, roles and activities of these polities at a local level. Through a nuanced understanding of social capital, this thesis interrogates how power and privilege are (re)produced within the emergent farming communities in Zimbabwe. The concept of social capital broadens the scope of understanding of how these local level formations assist in farm cohesion, service delivery and maintaining social order. Understanding power relations at farm level assists in identifying the ways in which different individuals and groups use various forms of capitals to ensure they benefit. Below I discuss the concept of social capital more fully, including what it entails and its theoretical value within this study.

2.6 So what is social capital?

In this section, I offer a critical understanding of social capital as conceptualised by varied scholars. I look specifically at Bourdieu's handling of the concept and how this offers insight into associational life in emerging communities. Social capital has varied definitions which stem from the highly context specific nature of the concept and the complexity of its conceptualization and operationalization. It does not have a clear, undisputed meaning (Dolfsma and Dannreuther 2003; Foley and Edwards 1997). Because of this, there is no set (and commonly agreed upon) definition of social capital, and the particular definition adopted by any study depends regularly on the discipline and level of investigation (Robison et al. 2002). There are various, often contradictory, frameworks describing social capital which leads to significant confusion and difficulties in explaining what the concept effectively means (Adler and Kwon 2002). I provide a discussion sensitive to the varied usages of the concept as found in the literature.

There are three main strands or ways of understanding social capital as propagated by its three main proponents, namely, Robert Putman, James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu. Putman (1995) views social capital as an entity which is formed for the benefit of everyone in a community. Hence, he argues that the productive activity of social capital is manifest in its capacity to ‘facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam 1995:2). According to Coleman, ‘Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist in some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure’ (Coleman 1988:98). Like other forms of capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others. Bourdieu (1986:249) conceives of social capital as one of four key forms of capital, along with cultural, economic and symbolic capital. Social capital is thus a collective asset that grants members social ‘credits’ that can be used as capital to facilitate purposive actions (Glover and Parry 2005:452).

Social capital is regarded as important to the efficient functioning of modern societies since it is a *sine qua non* of stable democracies and communities (Fukuyama 1999; Putnam 2003). Fukuyama describes social capital as an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals within a given society; he defines it as ‘the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations’ (Fukuyama 1995:10). The norms that constitute social capital can range from reciprocity between two friends to complex and elaborate doctrines like Christianity or Islam. Thus trust, reciprocity, networks and civil society can result in formations that can be described as social capital. Lin (2001:56) highlights that – like other forms of capital – social capital is premised on the notion of an investment (in social relationships) which will result in some benefit or profit to the individual. In other words, social capital makes it possible to achieve certain aims that cannot be achieved by individuals alone.

In this context, social capital is referred to as ‘features of social life-networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam 1994:1). Social capital is thus productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. Coleman however disputes this view from Putman, arguing: ‘Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or

in physical implements of production' (Coleman 1988:98). It is thus in relationships of various kinds that we begin to see and understand social capital. In analysing farm level institutions in Mazowe, I emphasise how relationships and networks formed by new farmers help them pursue shared goals.

The World Bank (1999) argues that increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and to achieve sustainable development. The World Bank further defines social capital as referring to institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Social capital exhibits a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of capital. Unlike physical capital, but like human capital, social capital can accumulate as a result of its use. Social capital is both an input into and an output of collective action. Other forms of capital (such as physical and human capital) have a potential productive impact which social capital does not. Creating and activating social capital requires at least two people. In other words, social capital has public good characteristics that have direct implications for the optimality of its production level. Therefore, social capital should be the pre-eminent and most valued form of capital as it provides the basis on which a true civil society exists (Cox 1995). This view is largely premised on Putmanian understanding which emphasise the positive aspects of social capital.

Becker (1996) describes social capital as a particular kind of intermediate good for the production of assets (the so-called 'commodities', corresponding to people's basic needs). Hence, people rationally invest in social capital in the context of a utility maximization problem. Becker's notion of social capital is thus as an individual resource, used within the context of utility maximization by perfectly rational and informed agents (Sabatini 2006:4). On the other hand the role of social capital as collective resources serving the achievement of macro-outcomes is well explained by the new economic sociology perspective (Granovetter 1973; 1985). Social capital in this way self-perpetuates and continually strengthens the work of a group in its ability to create supportive environments and helps individuals reach their fullest potential as members in groups that are capable of generating more social capital.

Social capital can either be bonding (intra-group) or bridging (inter-group). The bonding form of social capital is exclusive, whereas the bridging form is more inclusive (Putnam 2000:22). Putnam's distinction between bridging and bonding is useful for examining

interaction of different groups (for example different racial groups). Bridging social capital can be developed within a particular context by creating ties among members who are otherwise not affiliated to the same group. However, bonding social capital relies upon the principle that contact between people who are similar occurs at a much higher rate than for those who are dissimilar. Bridging social capital allows people to leverage resources, ideas and information from contacts outside their own groups. Bonding social capital refers to the ties between people in similar situations, such as immediate family members and friends. In this form of social capital, behaviours, rules and expectations are known and met by the people who share the same ideas and value systems. This form of social capital can be elitist, negative and destructive if the networks are used to exclude those who do not conform.

Social capital can be subdivided into social leverage and social support (Briggs 1998). Social support is a resource that is produced in the strong social ties between family members, close friends, and members of ethnic groups. These strong ties are a major source of emotional and material support, allowing individuals who can mobilize it to survive and cope. Open, honest and fair discourse is necessary for the formation of trusting relationships and the creation of shared meaning (Brandell 2003). Strong ties thus emerge over time in which social support is an important benefit thus in such instances there is a bonding form of social capital. In other contexts where there are no strong ties, social leverage is mobilized from the weak social ties between individuals, such as being friends of friends or indirect acquaintances. This latter form of social capital for example helps migrants get ahead or change their opportunity structure through access to resources in other social circles than their own (Meeteren et al. 2009). This is a good example of bridging social capital. This distinction between bonding and bridging is important for my work since it allows me to understand relationships between people on the same farm (bonding) and people from different farms (bridging).

Uphoff and Wijayaratra (2000) go beyond the distinction between social support and social leverage arguing that social capital spans the range from structural manifestations to cognitive ones (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002). Structural social capital facilitates mutually beneficial collective action through established roles and social networks supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents. Cognitive social capital, which includes shared norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs, predisposes people towards mutually beneficial collective action (Krishna and Uphoff 2002; Uphoff 1999). Cognitive and structural forms of social capital are commonly connected and mutually reinforcing (Uphoff and Wijayaratra

2000). Hardin (2003) summarises further distinction of social capital which can be variously described as strong (intensive and repeated) or weak (temporary and contingent); vertical (operating through formal hierarchical structures) or horizontal (in which authority is more decentralized); open (civically engaged and exercising open membership) or closed (protective and exercising closed membership); geographically dispersed or circumscribed; and instrumental (membership as social collateral for individual wants) or principled (membership as bounded solidarity).

Warner (1999) further differentiates social capital into horizontal and hierarchical. Putman (1993) argues that horizontal social capital is found in communities where horizontal ties are strong and norms of broad community participation exist and tend to produce egalitarian and democratic structures. Hierarchical social capital is characterised by patron-client relationships (and gangs) which can stifle socio-economic development. Absence of social capital is found in communities with few networks among residents, such as wealthy gated communities which substitute economic capital for social networks and isolated communities characterised by insecurity and fear (Flora and Flora 1993).

Portes (1998) differentiates two sources of social capital, and two kinds of consequence. One source he calls consummatory, deriving from socialization processes in families, kin networks, class backgrounds and occupational groups; and the other he calls instrumental, entailing purposive exchanges based on expectations of reciprocity. He also points out that the outcomes can be either positive or negative. Positive outcomes operate through social control or norm observance, family support and benefits mediated through extra-familial networks. These affect a broad range of outcomes including education, income, health, performance of firms, and collective action at the community level. The positive benefits of solidarity networks can also be seen in the opening up of economic and employment opportunities within ethnic groups, poverty reduction, and increased gender and racial equality. There are, however, also negative consequences to consider. The same ties that bind can also exclude. Powerful networks can restrict access to opportunities, for example the caste system in India with its rigid boundaries. Social capital thereby restricts individual freedom (such as women in *purdah* in northern India), and can lead to such excessive claims on successful group members that successful individuals are sometimes driven to break off ties with the larger ethnic group. Solidarity networks can also lead to downward levelling mechanisms by which individual achievement is discouraged (Portes 1998).

Warner (1999) illustrates how organised civil society in the United States has never flourished apart from an active government. Her argument seeks to repudiate the views of Etzioni (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) that government intervention destroys rather than builds social capital. In my study area the state is ever present and dominates associational life. I therefore analyse the relationship of the state and social institutions in relation to social capital. My work also concentrates on the distinction between individual or family level social capital, and community level social capital which resides in larger groups and the networks among them. Community social capital creates the civic infrastructure which supports formal and informal processes of decision-making and, as public capital; it provides spaces for interaction, networks for information exchange and leadership development.

2.7 Deconstructing social capital: It ain't social, It ain't capital and it ain't Africa¹¹

In this section I offer a critique of social capital by focusing on its weaknesses. Through this process, I further build on the aspects of social capital which my work will focus on. In critiquing social capital, I appreciate and acknowledge its weaknesses yet emphasize the theoretical value it has for my understanding of farm level institutions. Fine (2002:18) makes the assertion that ‘social capital purports to reign over a domain that ranges, even for a single author and leading promoter of social capital, Robert Putnam (1993 and 2000), from twelfth century Italy to twentieth century United States. Concepts with such scope of ambition should be treated with caution if not contempt.’ In this study, I not only agree with the many critical appraisals of the concept of social capital but, in addition, argue that the concept – if understood from Bourdieu’s point of view – has great analytical value. Holt (2008:228) supports this view, indicating that it is unwise to dispose of the concept completely, ‘as social capital can have potential analytical value, although it requires explicit conceptualization. In particular, critical accounts of social capital can provide insights into the (re)production of inequalities and advantage through everyday sociability within a variety of intersecting social networks.’ This section provides a critical examination of the notion of social capital. In doing so, I develop my own position of social capital – as this position will conceptually frame your empirical study of A1 farms in Mazowe.

Holt (2008:229) highlights that the scepticism held by social scientists about the concept of social capital is tied to the capturing of this concept by dominant policy perspectives, which

¹¹ This is the title of Ben Fine’s (2002) article which sought to deconstruct the mainstream use of the concept especially by international financial institutions.

are limited and even erroneous. These policy understandings are predominantly associated with Robert Putnam's envisioning of social capital. DeFilippis (2002) notes that such versions of social capital tend to underplay the conceptual weaknesses that social scientists have identified as fatal flaws within Putnam's accounts. It is however the neo-liberal underpinnings of the concept and the ways in which it is seen as a panacea for every 'ill' that are evident in dominant representations of social capital that has led to widespread disrepute of the concept. For Amin (2005) these facets are attractive to many policymakers, given the generalized neo-liberal shift in global and national governance. Ponthieux (2004:19) states that social capital may have appeared as a miracle remedy to solve deep social problems and ease the experts' charitable minds, particularly since it is apparently costless.

Various scholars (Amin 2005; Foley and Edwards 1999; Jackman and Miller 1998; Portes and Landolt 1996) have questioned the dominant accounts of social capital on interconnected conceptual, methodological and epistemological grounds. Putnam's account demonstrates troubling ontological tendencies, as he endeavours to produce an objectivist and even universal account that romanticises social capital (Holt 2008:229). As Putnam (2000: 228) says, 'an impressive and growing body of research suggests that civic connections help make us healthy, wealthy and wise.' Fine (2001:18) categorically denies this causal, universally applicable status accorded to social capital, which is implicitly bound up with particular neo-liberal politics that shift the cause of inequality, hardship, socio-economic exclusion and poverty away from the operations of the political economy ultimately onto individuals' and groups' civic engagement (Holt 2008:230).

Fine (2002:20) questions the rise and acceptance of social capital as analytical, empirical and policy panacea. In his view:

These features are aptly captured, respectively, by the World Bank's notion of social capital as "missing link", its flush of dedicated household surveys, and its view of social capital as "the glue that holds society together". Further, most worryingly for some, the World Bank is heavily committed to social capital as it moves, at least in rhetoric, from the neo liberal Washington consensus to the apparently more state-friendly post-Washington consensus (Fine 2002:20).

The move by the World Bank (and other international financial institutions) towards the social was initiated in order to survive the crisis of legitimacy for these institutions at the turn of the last century and to present themselves as people-friendly whilst leaving their neo-

liberal adjustment policies unchanged. In short, social capital is attractive because it can be applied to almost all situations without being critical of past practices (Fine 2002: 20).

The most serious problem for Fine (2002:21) is that there is no clear definition of the concept or any clear agreement about what it entails. He argues that more and more variables are being added: from the horizontal to the vertical, from the bonding to the bridging to the linking, and from social values to networks and associations, to name a few. In detailed household surveys seeking to measure social capital, as many as a hundred variables could be counted, from formal associational group membership through to ad hoc communal weeding of paths (Fine 2002:22). Even various World Bank surveys express the limitations of seeking to measure social capital. Defining it therefore remains a chaotic field as there is confusion over conceptualising social capital, including questions about what it is and what it does (concentrating on the functions rather than the relational approach).

Linking causally local economic well being with social capital devalues the importance of broader economic and political forces in shaping the well being of communities. Scholars such as Flora and Flora (1993) together with the World Bank have tried to use higher social economic well being as a proxy for social capital. These attempts to overemphasize the importance of social capital in determining economic well being are ontologically erroneous. Portes and Landolt (1996) argue that it is not the lack of social capital, but the lack of objective economic resources that underlies the plight of impoverished groups. It does not follow then that communities with high social capital are by necessarily economically developed. While there may be a relationship between social capital and wealth, the one is not a simple indicator of the other. Molyneux (2002:17) notes that much of the controversy surrounding social capital reflects the ambivalence of the new policy agenda that combines neo-liberalisation on the one hand with attempts at fostering participatory approaches to development on the other. Social capital has arguably played an important ideological role in the neo-liberal project, accommodating it more than questioning it (Bebbington 2007).

Cleaver (2005: 904), explicitly drawing on Bourdieu, suggests that development would be better off without deploying the concept: ‘a scrutiny of the lives of poor people throws doubt on the utility of the concept of building social capital as a policy prescription’. This is because in sharing the optimism of actor-oriented approaches, it ‘tends to underplay the crippling impact of inequitable social structures on the very poorest’ (Cleaver 2005:904).

Molyneux (2002:185) adds that understanding types of social capital in terms of distributions of other resources makes clear that building certain forms of social capital _in the form of networks and associational activity can be an important resource in combating poverty and social disintegration and in assisting the effective delivery of social welfare'. But he stresses that this endeavour would be _no substitute for policies designed to achieve a more socially integrated society through redistributive measures and sound economic policies.'

When researching social capital there should be an insistence on identifying the ways in which gendered, racialized and other forms of power are embedded in different forms of social capital, and thus also on the ways in which certain forms of social capital serve to reproduce prevailing norms of inequality. This would make clear that a critical domain of social policy would be to challenge these norms – to upset _doxa' with public debate (Bebbington 2007). Bourdieu's (1977) analysis of the reproduction of forms of power within institutions allows for a deconstruction of concepts sanitised of their radical intent. This is clearly the view of Laurie et al. (2005), who argue that the very language of social capital has played precisely this sanitizing role in policy discussions of ethnicity, exclusion and poverty in the Andes. They argue: _Whereas some versions of development with-identity engage with empowerment, racism and institutional strengthening, the understanding that has become predominant in donor rhetoric is one rooted in narrow understandings of social capital and culture which sideline such concerns' (Laurie et al. 2005: 474).

2.8 Gendering social capital

Gender analysis is an important aspect of this study. New resettlement areas in Zimbabwe are highly gendered as roles between men and women are based on patriarchal values. In this section I outline how gender and social capital relate. This will ground my analysis of gender within the concept of social capital. Bebbington (2007) and Molyneux (2002) allude to the gendered silence of social capital. Feminist authors insistently emphasise that social capital is not innocent, neither in its place in development discourse nor in its existing forms as social networks (Bebbington 2002). The term is not only gender blind but laden with many gendered connotations. One of these is that social capital is a form of capital for the poor and in particular a capital for poor women. In this regard, women are assumed to have the time to engage in associational life and microfinance programmes (Molyneux 2002:179).

In Bebbington's (2007:157) words, 'the tendency to essentialize poor people's predispositions to organize thus seems even greater when poor women are the implicit subjects of social capital maintenance.' These essentializations prosper because social capital debates have ignored intra-household gender and age dynamics. Social capital as viewed by scholars using Putman's and Coleman's ideas is seen as a household, community or even regional asset without regularly considering the varying forms and levels of social capital that different members within the unit (for example household) possess. Following Bourdieu's definition of social capital to understand 'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to [women's] possession of a durable network', one must also understand the ideologies that influence how far other household members are able to make claims on the resources made available through these networks (Bebbington 2007:157).

In Cameroon, women's lack of income is not directly due to their deficient social capital; rather, it is a result of discriminatory practices and institutions sustained through men's social capital and which limit women's access to markets, assets and institutional spheres (Mayoux 2001:449). The nascent body of work on gender and social capital shows not only that this lacuna leads to distorted analyses, but also to dangerous policy prescriptions that can all too easily lend themselves to the reproduction of forms of social capital that are already part of the maintenance of gendered norms and structures. The existence of gendered social capital requires understanding distinct forms of social capital in their social (regularly patriarchal) context in which hierarchy and difference are embedded. For Bebbington (2007:158), this means keeping ever-present in one's analysis the relationships between forms of social capital and the ideologies that underlie, normalize and help reproduce difference, domination and inequity.

Mayoux (2001:440) notes that 'there is a need for much more serious consideration of the ways in which gender inequalities in resources, power and rights structure the nature of the rules, norms and forms of association between women and between women and men.' Silvey and Elmhirst (2002: 866) therefore call for a 'more complete picture of social capital, specifically one that includes attention to the gendered and intergenerational conflicts and hierarchies within social networks, and the broader contexts of gender difference within which social networks are forged.' Such a re-conceptualisation might lead to an understanding of social capital that is more analytically attuned to issues of equity and inclusion (Bebbington 2007). This is what I intend to do in this thesis by focusing on how

social capital impacts and is impacted upon by gender inequalities and conflicts. Below I offer my own conceptual understanding of Bourdieu's social capital as a mechanism that reproduces privilege and inequalities.

2.9 Re-theorizing social capital as a mechanism for reproducing privilege

In this section I further outline Bourdieu's conceptualisation social capital which I have already discussed and introduced in earlier sections. I largely adopt a Bourdieurian understanding of social capital as my analytical framework. According to Bourdieu (1983:241) capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital which is convertible, under certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations (connections) can be converted, under certain conditions, into economic capital. Social capital is never completely independent of economic or cultural capital because the exchanges instituting mutual acknowledgement presuppose the re-acknowledgement of a minimum of objective homogeneity. Bourdieu (1983:249) highlights that the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which in turn makes them possible. This does not mean that these profits are consciously pursued. This is true even in the case of groups like select clubs, which are deliberately organized in order to concentrate social capital. Members of select groups derive full benefit from the multiplier effect implied in concentration such as all the types of services accruing from useful relationships, and symbolic profits.

Whilst taking into cognisance the earlier critique of social capital, I argue that the concept has significant conceptual value. Much criticism of social capital has been levelled against the widespread use of what Holt (2008:230) labelled as tamer versions of social capital (associated with the likes of James Coleman and Robert Putman). As Fine (2002:25) argues, 'Why, other than its awkwardness for less radical and serious scholarship, should Bourdieu's contributions have been largely ignored in the evolution of social capital? So social capital is adopted but Bourdieu is disinherited.' Yet Bourdieu's framing of social capital holds much analytical value and remains a potent tool to understand the production and reproduction of inequalities. Holt (2008:231) highlights that Bourdieu's conceptualization of social capital addresses many of the critiques levelled at Putnam; including the lack of sensitivity to socio-economic inequalities and wider historical-political and material processes. For Bourdieu

(1986:249), social capital was just one form of non-economic capital, alongside the cultural and symbolic. Bourdieu is concerned with the nature of social capital, how it is reproduced and transformed, how it connects to social stratification and the reproduction and exercise of power, and the relationship or exchange between different types of such capital (Fine 2002:25).

Like all forms of capital, social capital is accumulated labour. It has its own capitalists who accumulate it in the form of relationships, networks, and contacts. Relationships are a product of investment strategies (individual or collective and consciously or unconsciously) aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships which are directly usable in the short or long term (Bourdieu 1986:249). Thus social capital is an arena for the reproduction of class inequalities. However, among American communitarian scholars such as Putman, social capital is community-centred. They see communities as voluntaristic social units that promote harmonic development, and fail to see that communities are arenas of conflict and competition. All communities are built upon unequal power relations which necessitates the accumulation of social capital to gain advantage over others. Social capital is unequally distributed among individuals (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), thereby determining the chances of success of an individual's actions (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003).

Bourdieu (1983:251) argues that every group has its more or less institutionalised forms of delegation which enable it to concentrate the totality of the social capital. Every group be it a family, nation or association places in the hands of a single agent or small group of agents the mandate to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and (with the aid of this collectively owned capital) to exercise a power incommensurate with the agent's personal contribution. The institutionalised delegation which ensures the concentration of social capital has the mandate to shield the group from discredit by for example expelling embarrassing individuals. If the internal competition for the monopoly of legitimate representation of the group is not to threaten the conservation and accumulation of the capital which is the basis of the group, the members of the group must regulate the conditions of access to declare oneself a member of the group and, above all, to set oneself up as a representative (delegate, plenipotentiary or spokesman) of the whole group, thereby using the social capital of the whole group (Bourdieu 1983:251).

Like any other form of capital, social capital can be embezzled or misappropriated. This embezzlement is latent in the fact that a group as a whole can be represented, in the various meanings of the word, by a subgroup. This subgroup or individual is clearly delimited and perfectly visible to all, known to all, and recognized by all. They may speak on behalf of the whole group, represent the whole group, and exercise authority in the name of the whole group (Bourdieu 1983:252). In such cases the leader becomes the group personified, similar to the phenomena of personality cults or the identification of parties, movements and trade unions with their leaders. Bourdieu (1986) emphasized the importance of investment costs and returns in building and maintaining social capital. He argued that building and maintaining networks is not a given, but requires investments of time, energy and political or cultural capital that yield a return. If network building is not expected to produce social, economic or cultural returns, then the effort will not be considered worthwhile. The establishment and maintenance of social capital also requires proximity in physical, economic or social space.

Bourdieu's idea of social capital puts emphasis on class conflicts: social relations are used to increase the ability of an actor to advance his interests, and social capital becomes a resource in social struggles. In the discussion below I link social capital to the concept of power as it relates to everyday struggle and interaction within the emerging communities in Zimbabwe. This links to the above discussion on how for Bourdieu social capital (in tandem with other forms of capital) produces and reproduces social inequalities.

2.10 Social capital and power

In this thesis I analyse the link between social capital and power and how these two concepts help explain the emergence and configurations of farm level institutions in the newly resettled areas. At the same time, while "power" seems to be one of the basic and most attractive concepts in contemporary sociology, it is also one of the most difficult to define. Putman's celebrated analysis of the performance of regional governments in Italy suggested that whole societies may be differentiated in terms of the extent of their social capital. This misleading and pernicious view has however become the 'big idea' or missing link in development. Harris (2001:4) notes that part of the enthusiasm for constructing social capital and building civil society is that they are consistent with the neo-liberal agenda of reducing the role of the state, partly so as to make possible large cuts in public expenditure. A good deal of the policy literature on social capital reflects a similar idea of people pulling

themselves together from below without substantial help from government or their privileged fellow citizens. This view of social capital involves abstraction from context, and particularly from the context of power relations within society. In this thesis I show how power affects the formation, nature and effectiveness of social capital held by different groups or individuals. Understood in this way, social capital is thus not a resource held by a whole community but rather by specific interest groups and individuals.

Social capital operates within certain fields of power. In the newly resettled areas, for example, A1 farmers may have large stocks of social capital in the sense that there they participate in dense social networks (with high levels of reciprocity and of trust) but they are regularly denied access to, or cannot secure access to, material resources. Their social capital is ineffective compared to the durable social relationships obtaining between the members of an elite club (Harris 2001:5). Using Bourdieu, I re-contextualise social capital showing how power relations exist between new farmers, local authorities, traditional leaders, farm workers and central government, and how these relations play out to create various networks of privilege and disadvantage. There has been a tendency to glorify rural civil society as a form of agency among rural people who are actively influencing their livelihoods and futures. Whilst this is true, we should be careful not to be caught up in romantic visions in which individual communities can somehow resolve problems of livelihood and sustainability on their own. Analysis of rural agency has to be understood in its socio-political context because power relations are inherent in all social networks.

In my analysis of social capital and power, I invoke Jenkins (1992:119) question: how does a social system in which a substantial section of the population is obviously disadvantaged and exploited survive without its rulers having to depend on physical coercion for the maintenance of order? This is important especially among A1 farmers in Mazowe who are mostly living under difficult conditions and lack access to the most basic of social services. As Foucault points out, 'the state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth' (Foucault 1986:64). Thus analysis of the state alone is unable to cover the whole field of actual power relations that are dispersed through the social body/society. In relation to Mazowe, for example, it is through analyses of power relations at the personal and community level that we begin to identify and understand new forms of governance such as

farm level institutions that affect the exercise of power. In this way social capital becomes an important resource in the creation, recreation and exercise of power and resistance to it.

Certain types and amounts of social capital are important in gaining influence within the newly resettled areas. They open doors for the access to scarce resources and services. Schultheis (2009:3) highlights that capitals (economic, cultural and social) represent what Max Weber called ‘_life chances’ (*Lebenschancen*) but we could also label them as resources of action and resources for action, in other words social power. The concept of social power thus becomes important in analysing how resources and services are accessed and used by various groups. Social capital always exists in a structured social world with fundamental inequalities in the distribution of goods and resources. You cannot divorce the ‘_capitals’ since they work in tandem. For example a rich farmer with agricultural equipment tends to have a denser social network than a poorer farmer. Thus you find that in choosing people for committees new farmers look at the resource endowment of the individual.

Bourdieu’s (1986:248) concept of social capital puts the emphasis on conflicts and the function of power (social relations that increase the ability of an actor to advance her/his interests), instead of on the power function for society as a whole. This is because, for Bourdieu, society does not exist as a monolithic totality but only as a hierarchically structured space. Membership in groups can be used in efforts to improve the social position in different social fields. Thus farmers might organise not because they trust each other but because the membership of groups avails certain resources. Membership in certain groups becomes an investment for farmers as they can call and rely upon the group when in need of certain resources. In this respect, it is not only the number of people one knows that becomes critical but also the space they occupy in society. Having a few friends who are in control of resources such as fuel, inputs and credit can be invaluable especially in Zimbabwe where – because of the dire economic situation – accessing inputs and credit has become almost impossible. What ultimately happens is that the political elite are the ones who have networks that control resources; as a result, the poorer farmers without any connections are marginalised. Social capital regularly works to the detriment of the poor and less powerful since they are not in close proximity to the networks that control resources.

2.11 Conceptualising everyday relations in the newly resettled areas

Above I have noted the various theoretical conceptualisations of social capital which this thesis addresses. In this section I am going to outline and operationalize these concepts, thereby highlighting how they shape the conceptual understanding of my thesis. This thesis is mainly interested in analysing how social capital is used in the production and maintenance of farm level institutions. The main thrust is to analyse how different power relations are played out at scheme level as various individuals seek control and influence over farm issues. In doing so, I use Bourdieu's (1986:249) understanding of the co-construction of capitals (economic, political, social, symbolic and cultural). For example, some farmers regularly use money or resources (economic capital) to their advantage, traditional chiefs make use of culture and tradition (cultural capital) while war veterans through symbolic power try to maximise their control and influence on the farms. Political influence or capital of politicians, civil servants and policy makers is another important factor in understanding the power plays at farm level. All these various actors use the variety of capitals at their disposal to influence the nature, composition and functions of farm level institutions. Though this thesis focuses on social capital, it does not operate in a political, economic or cultural vacuum. Rather, I stress the ways in which the various capitals work and compete in tandem (unlike some of the a-historical and context-less accounts of social capital outlined earlier).

All actors in the newly resettled areas invest consciously and unconsciously in the relationships and networks that benefit them in social, economical and political ways. For example, voting ZANU PF is perceived as a political investment guaranteeing continued residence on the farms. This is because of the widespread belief (propagated and supported by ZANU PF itself) that, if they lose power, white farmers will return to the farms. The new farmers are also largely resource poor and thus find it difficult to be productive if they work in isolation. Thus, collective action towards political goals by new farmers has to be understood in relation to their insecure status on the land. The new farmers participate in and contribute to all state/political party events such as Independence and Heroes day celebrations. Such sociability is in most cases not a by-product of high levels of trust amongst farmers but a necessary investment to keep their land. The ZANU-PF party has since 2000 successfully used the threat of farm eviction to ensure that new farmers vote for it, though it is difficult to prove especially in Mazowe where the opposition MDC is increasingly improving in elections since 2000.

Social capital entrenches old and produces new forms of class inequalities and power relations within the rural landscape, despite it often being viewed as a social good and communitarian feeling that seeks advancement for all in society (see Putman 2000, Coleman 1988). In the newly resettled areas there are certain scheme level groups that require investment in monetary terms (for example irrigation fees) which might exclude those who are unable to pay. Ability to pay thereby becomes an organising factor that leads to new forms of social differentiation. Geography plays a significant part in making some institutions exclusive by ensuring that people from a particular region or area are the only ones that can join a group. Of importance also is how gender functions in the formation, activities and internal dynamics of farm level institutions. Hence, many factors are important in making these institutions remain exclusionary and promoting inequalities within societies. Social and economic investment in these schemes means that some tend to gain at the expense of others in terms of access to things such as inputs and services.

Farm institutions are mostly composed of members who are voted into power, but this requires a certain level of support among the plot holders. Those voted into various committees have control over certain power resources such as respect, more voice at meetings, meet visiting delegates from government and other organisations and ultimately having control of farm assets (including farm equipment and even group finances of which they can take advantage). The leaders are given a collective voice to speak on behalf of the scheme or institution; in this way, power inequalities are institutionalised and legitimised in the name of the common good. Out of social networking and associational life, a new class of aristocracy albeit at farm level has emerged. What started as people working together for a common cause and using their so called ‘social capital’ often leads to power inequalities and differential access to various types of resources.

Another important dimension is in understanding the gendered nature of social capital. Most accounts of social capital (such as Putman’s which celebrates community and civic duty) totally ignore how gender inequalities not only affect social capital but also the power relations in society. Social capital like all other social entities is gendered and, in patriarchal society such as Zimbabwe, males tend to dominate the public sphere. They are therefore more likely than women to lead farm groupings. Gender is an important organising element at farm level and women are likely to be under-represented. The social networks between and amongst the patriarchy marginalise women to the periphery and undermine their contribution

on the farms. Farm women tend to be sidelined to token positions such as secretaries. The committees of seven mostly have males with only one female included who is supposed to be responsible for gender issues. Women are regularly sidelined to women's clubs and not farm management structures. However there are cases of women who are actively involved in farm management.

The distinction between bridging and bonding social capital is important, because it highlights that institutionalisation in the newly resettled areas can do more harm than good to small-scale farmers. The emergence of small farm level groupings that have no horizontal relationships with similar entities on other farms means that they end up competing rather than complementing each other. Bonding social capital is the type that occurs among people who know and interact with each other every day (such as within a farm) but bridging social capital occurs when relationships are built with people from a different geographical area, background and race or in this case farm. A1 farmers on different farms share in many ways the same class status of being resource poor, and experiencing the lack of support services and social services.

Instead of uniting as a broader group with similar grievances, the various schemes are approaching policy makers, service providers and government as individual farms. In the end they compete for the same audience, and it is those schemes which have politically connected leaders that are more influential than others. The social capital of the varying scheme level institutions is unequal as some are more able than others to petition and influence policy makers. In contrast, white farmers through the Commercial Farmers Union (which had country-wide affiliates before the year 2000) were able to offer a concerted voice that was highly influential at national level. Small-scale farmers will never reach such levels of organisation as long as they continue to operate as scheme level without building structures that reach the apex of policy. Different groups or farms though are trying to build up their stock of social capital to ensure that they are more successful than others. They are thus those with more valuable social capital and they use this to access resources.

2.12 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the conceptual frame which will guide this thesis. The chapter firstly grounds the concept of farm level institutions and providing parameters of what entities this thesis is going to focus on. It goes on to outline the concept of social capital

which directs my understanding of associational life, agency and institutional formation in new communities. It highlights how social capital can be used by various actors within the new resettlement areas field not only to accumulate social power but economic gains. It provides a foundation of understanding social capital not as a process for ‘community good’ but a together with cultural, economic and symbolic power can be appropriated by certain individuals to further their interests. Emergence of new institutions can be viewed as a way of producing and reproducing capital within an uncertain social field post fast track land reform in Zimbabwe. The chapter examines the co-construction of the variety of capitals and the interrelations between them to show that social capital is not always mutually beneficial; privilege and disadvantage are covertly reproduced as well. It outlines that social capital has studiously ignored questions of power and conflict. Building on Bourdieu (1986), the chapter discusses how social capital also involves social exclusion, power differentials and inequality in the newly resettled schemes (including along gender lines).

CHAPTER THREE: LAND REFORM IN POST-COLONIAL ZIMBABWE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the history of land reform in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1999. It analyses how the impasse on land in Zimbabwe evolved from the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement until the explosive land invasions of early 2000. From this perspective, the chapter will interrogate the various academic debates over the process of land reform in Zimbabwe. Land reform during the first two decades of independence was virtually negligible and hopelessly inadequate as it did not significantly address issues of poverty alleviation and historical redress. Phase I of Zimbabwe's Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) from 1980 to 1996 is marked by the first ten years of independence during which the Lancaster House Agreement was in effect, and the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that was launched in October 1990. Both Lancaster House and ESAP entailed significant global pressure on the post-colonial state which means that land reform in Zimbabwe has been in large part externally-driven (Mbaya 2001).

National reconciliation together with the Lancaster Agreement created a land time-bomb in that it protected existing racially unequal land ownership while groups which had participated in the war of liberation (ex-combatants and peasants) were expecting substantial social changes. This chapter argues that the land invasions of 2000 were not a spontaneous event but were part of a longer process punctuated by broken state promises, failing land reform policies and a white commercial farming sector reluctant to give up land. It shows how land reform in different phases (1980 – 1990, 1991 – 1997 and 1998 – 1999) before 2000 sowed the seeds for the 2000 – 2001 period now popularly referred to as *jambanja*. Phase II of the LRRP was introduced in 1997 (to 2004) and includes the fast track period of land reform. The unresolved character of land reform (despite fast track) is highlighted by the ongoing movement of people onto farm plots amid reports of new farm occupations up until 2010.

3.2 Post-independence land reform in Zimbabwe (1980 – 1990)

At the dawn of a new Zimbabwe on the 18th of April 1980 the black majority government took control of a racially-divided agrarian structure. About 4,500 white commercial farmers

owned roughly 15.5 million hectares (39% of the total land in the country). More than a million black farming households, on the other hand, had access to only about 16 million hectares. Undoubtedly, the most acute and difficult question confronting the first Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) at independence was land. This was because of the political, social and economic importance of land to both white and black people. Palmer (1977:246) adds:

The problem will not be an easy one to resolve. The continuing stranglehold of the land division of the 1890s, the fact ... that Rhodesia is part of the Southern African regional economic system, and the lessons to be drawn from the agricultural failures of neighbouring Zambia, will all impose constraints on future land and agricultural policies.

When the new Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government led by Robert Mugabe came into power in 1980, it made land redistribution a high priority. It set itself a target to acquire 8.3 million hectares from white commercial farmers to resettle 162,000 black families during the period 1982 – 1985. This target was not achieved, as the government was only able to acquire about 2.1 million hectares, on which about 60,000 families were resettled (Masiwa 2005:217).

Given unequal land ownership, it is not surprising that land redistribution featured prominently in the rhetoric of liberation movements in the sub-region and in the policies specifically of the post-independence GoZ (Cousins 1983:274). In reality, though, the GoZ in the first twenty years of independence gave far less priority to land redistribution than its policy platforms and manifestos would suggest. The dominance of neo-liberal policies with a strong emphasis on attracting foreign capital (and the need for a stable socio-economic environment) and a widespread scepticism among policymakers about the prospects for smallholder agriculture help explain why the land reform programme was stunted. The deeply-rooted agrarian structure inherited from colonial rule was an unequal duality comprising large-scale commercial agriculture mainly comprising white farmers and a peasant sector made of black farmers in customary areas.

In 1980 the commercial sector produced about 80% of national agricultural production (in terms of value) and 90% of formally-marketed agricultural commodities, while also employing a third of the total labour force in the country (de Villiers 2003:7). Armed with these statistics, white farmers successfully argued against radical land redistribution during the first fifteen years after independence. The irony of the whole situation is that commercial

farmers, most of who had vigorously fought against independence, became the most protected 'species' in the new Zimbabwe.

3.2.1 Agreement at Lancaster House

Scholars have written extensively about the Lancaster Agreement, highlighting its failures and weaknesses (Kinsey 2004; Moyo 1995). The academic debates around the agreement pinpoint differences about what the warring factions should and could have done to ensure that the gnawing issue of land redistribution was made of greater immediate importance. Palmer (1990) indicates that, before the Lancaster Agreement, the British had proposed a Zimbabwe Development Fund with 75 million pounds to buy out white farmers, but by 1979 when the conference started this initiative was shelved. Britain reneged on this promise but offered a compromise under which, in return for the Zimbabweans guaranteeing existing property rights, the British would underwrite half the costs of a resettlement programme. At the Lancaster House Conference of 1979, the British government did not disengage from Zimbabwe since it promised to fund land redistribution, which put it at the centre of an issue that was at the heart of the nationalist movement. However, Britain's ability and willingness to finance such a programme was questionable from the outset (Mushimbo 2005:85). The agreement was a pragmatic solution to restore peace but, in the end, it did not resolve the pertinent issues of land reform and sowed seeds for future conflicts on land.

Moyo (1995) contends that, despite the Marxist rhetoric of the new government, the agreement safeguarded the economic rule of a few over the rest. The land issue is intricately linked with the whole question of sovereignty. The Lancaster Constitution effectively insulated private property rights in land from government interference and, therefore, the exercise of sovereignty. The issue of land acquisition and redistribution was safeguarded by the Constitution from the influence of democratic politics and the exercise of state power (Tshuma 1997:44). Although it guaranteed majority rule, the agreement did not address the inequalities within the economic and productive sectors. For example, in terms of Section 16 of the Lancaster House Constitution, only under-utilized land could be compulsorily acquired for settlement for agricultural purposes and – in the event of compulsory acquisition – prompt and adequate compensation was to be paid by the GoZ. Further, the funds paid as compensation could be remitted to one's preferred country of choice.

Any disputes arising out of land acquisition were to be handled by the courts and as part of the Declaration of Rights, Section 16 would be entrenched for a period of ten years from the date of independence, during which period it could only be amended by a 100% parliamentary majority (Tshuma 1997:39). In terms of the Lancaster-negotiated constitution, not only was there reconciliation of races but also of capital and labour, as the entrenched system of class inequality was protected through the protection of property rights. De Villiers (2003:9) summarises the key elements of the Lancaster Agreement with regard to land reforms as follows:

- The constitutional guarantees had a lifespan of ten years and could only be changed prior to the expiry of the ten years with consensus of all members of parliament (impossible given the guaranteed seats of parliament given to whites in the constitution);
- The right to property was guaranteed. Only under-utilised land could be compulsorily acquired, with all other property being subject to the willing buyer, willing seller principle;
- Proper notification had to be given to inform land owners of the state's intention to acquire land:
 - Land would be bought at market related prices;
 - Payment had to be prompt and adequate and could be remitted to any country of choice;
 - Any white farmer who wanted to sell land had to offer it to the government first before being allowed to sell it on the open market;
 - The British government would contribute half of the costs provided the GoZ could match it pound for pound.

The Lancaster Agreement marks an important watershed in the history of land reforms in Zimbabwe. It sowed the seeds that would later germinate into a struggle for land that would cripple the young Zimbabwean nation. In this regard, the influence of the British government at Lancaster was strong – although the basic principles of a majority government were accepted, various safeguards were built into the constitution to protect the rights of the white minority (De Villiers 2003:9). The new government was thus faced with a complex riddle of striking a balance between immediately fulfilling a tangible land reform programme and protecting white commercial agriculture (which was critical to the maintenance of skills and investment to support economic growth). Riddell (1980:11) aptly concludes: In short, it

appears that the proposed Zimbabwean constitution has been designed more to maintain the present structure of commercial agriculture than to address comprehensively the national problem of land.’

The negotiations for political independence, and the exact arrangements and conditions worked out to pave way for independence, have had long-standing residual effects on the land reform path followed by individual countries throughout Africa (Marongwe 2008:111). In the case of Zimbabwe, the Lancaster Agreement is the single biggest explanation for the snail-paced nature of land reform in the first ten years of independence and beyond. Hence, Moyo (1995:106) argues that the pre-independence December 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement signed by Britain, the Patriotic Front (consisting of the liberation forces) and Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s Rhodesia–Zimbabwe ‘puppet’ government, produced a constitution which contained elaborate provisions geared towards the preservation of white minority interest. These provisions included an extensive Bill of Rights which protected the expropriation of private property, enshrined Western-style civil freedoms and dual citizenship, protected the pension rights of white citizens and ensured a restricted executive power.

3.2.2 Early land reform programmes

Guided by the clauses contained in the Lancaster Agreement, the GoZ embarked on an ambitious land reform project after independence. Kinsey (2004:1671) points out that ‘the new government honoured its liberation war promises by swiftly launching a land resettlement programme based initially upon land abandoned during the war.’ The constraint of the agreement meant that, for much of the 1980s, there was a limited programme of resettlement which involved moving families or cooperatives onto land acquired mainly through the willing buyer/willing seller model. The main objectives of the first phase of land reform were to: reduce conflict by transferring white-held land to black people; provide opportunities for war veterans and landless people; relieve population pressure on communal lands; expand production and raise welfare; and maintain levels of agricultural production (De Villiers 2003:10).

The GoZ’s plan initially targeted the resettlement of 18,000 households over five years; in 1981 the number increased to 54,000 and in 1982 it further escalated to 162,000 to be

resettled by 1984 (Palmer 1990:169). Palmer notes though that by the end of July 1989 only 52,000 families (around 416,000 people) had been resettled, which translated to only 32% of the 162,000 target. In terms of the land transfer, 2,713,725 hectares had been bought for resettlement which was 16% of the area owned by whites at independence. The number of farms acquired peaked in 1982 (600); two years later the relevant figure dropped by 93% and, for the second half of the 1980s, an average number of 48 farms were acquired per year (Kinsey 2004: 1690).

The first ten years of land reform was focused on providing land for landless and land-short people, including those living in communal or customary areas. In other words, the objectives of land reform entailed addressing racial inequities through land redistribution, and this was seen by the GoZ as critical for fostering social and political stability. Land reform was purely rehabilitative and hence beneficiaries were drawn from the following groups of people, in order of priority: *Refugees and other people displaced by the war* - this category was comprised of extra-territorial refugees, urban refugees and former inhabitants of protected villages; *the landless* - these included those who had no or little land to support themselves and their dependents; and *those with inadequate land* to maintain themselves and their families (Government of Zimbabwe 1981:10). The beneficiaries were expected to be married or widowed (with dependents), aged between 18-55 years, physically fit to enable them to make productive use of the land and not employed in the formal sector of the economy. Communal farmers moving to resettlement areas were expected to give up their land rights in those areas but to this there was rarely adherence. After 1984, experienced master farmers were added onto the list provided they were willing to forgo their land rights in communal areas (Marongwe 2008:125).

The evidence outlined above indicates that the early resettlement programme failed dismally to meet its targets. The targets tended to be highly ambitious given the capacity and capability of the GoZ to implement such complex programmes. Even the President Robert Mugabe noted that *‘we had wanted to resettle 162,000 families in three years. It just proved to be impossible, because it was beyond our management and our resources’* (*The Herald*, 27 October 1989). At the same time, Bratton (1990:267) emphasises: *‘The number of beneficiaries must be increased. The initial target of resettling 162,000 has been rendered irrelevant by time, and the current de facto target of 150,000 families per year will not make a meaningful impact on the problem of landlessness’*. The Lancaster Agreement’s stipulations

of willing buyer/willing seller transactions were clearly responsible for hampering the possibility of extensive legal land acquisition in the 1980s (Andrew and Sadomba 2006:4). In addition, the GoZ seemingly lost all but rhetoric interest in the entire land issue, only mentioning it at election time. Kinsey (2004:1671) points to several pieces of evidence which show that the GoZ had lost interest in land reform, including:

- Even before the matching grants from the British came to an end in the late 1980s, budgetary appropriations for resettlement – always inadequate – had begun to decline.
- The failure by the GoZ to submit a new proposal when the first phase of the programme had finished, without the British funds being exhausted. The accounts in fact were closed with a positive balance.

There are various interrelated factors which explain why the land question went quiet in the mid-1980s. Not all land acquired between 1980 and 1983 was suitable for resettlement and, after this period, not many whites were willing to sell their land or were only selling marginal land (Palmer 1990:169). However there were several other legal modes of land acquisition available and alternative methods for accessing land (such as a land tax, reparations and reclaiming historic subsidies¹²) which the government did not pursue and utilise (Kinsey 2003). There were also a sizeable number of farms belonging to the state which were on lease to the agrarian bourgeoisie in terms of the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 37), and such farms could have been repossessed without violating the letter of the Constitution. The scrupulous compliance of the GoZ to the Lancaster Agreement, in the view of Madhuku (2003), was short-sighted and in the end severely compromised land reform.

The role of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) in slowing the pace of resettlement cannot be underplayed since its members assiduously courted the government, travelled with the president on foreign trips and ensured that they were influential in the debates on agriculture (Palmer 1990). Indeed, the first minister of agriculture, Dennis Norman, was a past president of the Rhodesia National Farmers Union (later CFU) thus their interests were represented at the highest level within the government (Bratton 1990:183-186). The CFU skillfully argued and lobbied that a rapid land reform process would lead to a massive decline in agricultural production and threaten vital export earnings resulting in significant job losses. Not only would agriculture suffer but investor confidence would be dented by such a move, an

¹² White farmers pre and post independence received a lot of support from government in terms of cheap inputs and loans.

argument that the CFU also used more recently in the face of losing their land in 2000. White commercial farmers, in alliance with trans-national capital, argued for some (but not significant) land redistribution (Weiner et al. 1985:158). Their arguments, based on the need to maintain agriculture's role as a source of food, industrial raw materials, employment and foreign exchange, were very persuasive to a state that was all too aware that, even if it wanted to, it could not redistribute as much land as the peasants expected. The guaranteeing of agriculture's contribution, in practice, meant the continued existence of the commercial farming sector and the distributional imbalance in land and agriculture.

Post-independence, the CFU expanded their ranks to include approximately 300 black farmers (including ten government ministers) thus they entrenched their interests further within government policy. This meant the creation of a new landowning class with more interest in taking land for their own benefit than giving it to peasants (de Villiers 2003:13). The strategy of CFU therefore entailed not only direct lobbying of the Zimbabwean state on agricultural and land policy, but also contributing more generally to 'an atmosphere of risk-aversion by stressing the importance of commercial agriculture' (Herbst 1990:56) relative to peasant holdings (Sachikonye 2003). Von Blanckenburg (1994:12) in his sympathetic empirical work on white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe concludes that resettlement in Zimbabwe is 'negative rather than a positive experience.' More specifically, he says that the export performance of large farms is of 'strategic importance' (von Blanckenburg 1994:27) and that the agricultural performance in resettled areas is 'weak' (von Blanckenburg 1994:32). Helliker (2006:178) claims that this big farm ideology is misplaced and von Blanckenburg goes to great length to dress this ideology in theoretical garb. The counterargument is that the acquisition of over three million hectares of commercial farmland during the 1980s did not lead to 'production losses' within the commercial sector and that in fact the exact opposite took place (Moyo 2000:16).

In terms of budgetary appropriations to resettlement, Palmer (1990) argues that in 1983, under pressure from the World Bank, Britain and other Western donors, the GoZ tightened its budget. It seemingly made more political sense for the government to cut back on land reform than on the social programmes (schools and clinics) in which they had invested heavily. Other reasons for the failure of the GoZ to act on land resettlement as outlined by Palmer (1990:171-183) include:

- Severe droughts of the mid-1980s which led to some people who had moved into resettlement areas going back to communal areas. This led to government spending funds on emergency relief and bolstered the argument about food security put forward by white farmers;
- The post-independence boom in peasant agriculture (in certain customary areas) misled the government¹³ into believing that such an increase would enhance rural livelihoods without extensive resettlement.

De Villiers (2003:7) highlights that the financing of land reform was one of the major stumbling blocks in the first ten years of independence. The British had undertaken to assist financing land reform provided its contribution was met on a pound for pound basis by the GoZ. However, the Lancaster Agreement did not contain a detailed and enforceable commitment from any of the foreign donors to actually contribute to land reform. The British had promised £75 million and the U.S.A. a further US\$500 million, but by 2000 the GoZ had only received £35 million because there were no guarantees for these promised funds. In contrast, the British had bankrolled the Kenyan land reform process to the tune of £500 million (de Villiers 2003:7). The commitment to Zimbabwe by the British government was at best suspicious and at worst myopic and misguided. Because of this, more land became available (as white farmers sought to sell) for resettlement than the government could acquire in the early 1980s. In the mid-1980s land prices started to increase. It became a seller's market perversely to the detriment of land reform as it meant good quality land became scarce. Given the modest support from Western countries and donors for land acquisition, it is understandable that the GoZ did not vigorously address the land question.

The post-acquisition settlement of new farmers ended up being extremely resource intensive and complicated (de Villiers 2003:14). The infrastructural, technical, financial and educational demands were beyond what the GoZ could realistically achieve. Most funding was spent on land acquisition leaving minimal funds for ensuring basic service provision on the farms. Again the support from overseas towards post-acquisition settlement was nonexistent. The British had only agreed to provide half the funds for land acquisition; this meant that the GoZ had to bear the burden for paying half of the funds for land acquisition and the full costs of resettling new farmers. This was an impossible task for a government

¹³ This is known as the 'peasant miracle' where communal farmers increased production of maize with government providing inputs.

that was faced with the need to also invest heavily in the provision of social services to the previously disadvantaged black majority. Rural poverty (notably in customary areas) was another serious problem faced by the government. Government departments thus were not organised or properly equipped to deal with all of these problems, especially arising from re-settlement of communities in areas with no basic amenities (de Villiers 2003:15).

Another reason for the failure of land reform during the first ten years has to do with the secretive nature in which black political heavyweights were acquiring land for themselves. Between 1980 and 1987 the government repossessed about 400,000 hectares of state land for redistribution (Moyo 1995:262). Tshuma (1997:60) notes: ‘Most of the leases were only terminated after the expiry of the entrenched constitutional clauses in an attempt to transfer them from white farmers to mostly black politicians, civil servants and influential people under a tenant farmer scheme.’ The main concern was the secretive nature in which the leases were allocated and the lack of transparent advertising to the public on the availability of these farms (Moyo 1995). This represented visible and real attempts by the government to restructure the existing political and agrarian space to pave way for the allocation of land to members of the governing elites (Marongwe 2008:113).

The British government became sceptical of land reform in Zimbabwe partly because of fears that beneficiaries were not being drawn from the appropriate target groups and that land allocation was open to abuse by ZANU-PF. At the same time, resourced black farmers acquired land through private markets, with Palmer (1990) noting that about one million hectares were transferred through this approach. Consequently, about 7% of the large scale commercial farms (LSCF) were black owned by 1986 (Alexander 1994:337). This was mainly due to the fact that the GoZ in the mid-1980s refused to purchase many farms on offer, allowing them to go onto the private market which wealthy blacks with government connections were able to purchase (Goebels 2005:20).

In 1985 government enacted the Land Acquisition Act. Modifications were introduced in the assessment of compensation, shifting from explicit reference to the willing-seller/willing-buyer market-based compensation to fair and reasonable compensation. Another important addition was the redefinition of under-utilized land, reducing the period of under-utilization from five to three years, and placing in the hands of the courts the identification, based on multiple factors, of under-utilized land (Madhuku 2003). Another creative addition was that

of the 'right of first refusal' to the state, where the state would have the first option to buy any rural land available on the market.

Helliker (2006:177) notes that, for resettlement purposes in the 1980s, the government devised two main schemes. Model 'A' schemes gave individual households 5-6 hectares of arable land plus common grazing areas. An accelerated version of this scheme – involving minimal pre-settlement infrastructural provisions – existed in the early 1980s to meet the challenges posed by a squatter 'movement'. Model 'B' schemes involved co-operative farming arrangements originally consistent with the state's early post-independence socialist rhetoric but most of these schemes were eventually discontinued because of various inefficiencies (Masuko 1995). By 1996, 93% of all schemes were Model 'A' schemes. Palmer (1990:168) notes that despite the GoZ's ideological preference for Model B, the majority of would-be settlers preferred Model A. De Villiers (2003:10) notes that a Model C scheme was later added to provide for a core commercial estate with individual small holdings, as well as a Model D which provided for pastoral grazing land. Model A schemes were never properly integrated under traditional authority structures but, otherwise, their landholdings and land tenure seemed similar to customary areas. The schemes existed on resettlement land owned by the state, and access to land involved an insecure permit system rather than a well-documented leasehold arrangement. Hence, it would appear that resettlement involved the communalization of land in Zimbabwe (see Helliker 2006).

3.3 Land reform under structural adjustment (1990 - 1997)

3.3.1 Towards a new land dispensation (Land Acquisition Act 1992)

On April 18th 1990 the restrictions¹⁴ imposed by the Lancaster House Conference expired and the land issue rose to the fore again. This time however it became an electioneering ploy as an opposition under Edgar Tekere emerged (de Villiers 2003:16). The land issue became a rallying point with Mugabe again promising a revolutionary land reform programme. The British had wanted a continuation of market-based land reform and were unwilling to support reform without this assurance. However, the GoZ was faced with the first opportunity to redress the land question in its own way, without Lancaster House restrictions. It issued a

¹⁴ Following the expiry of the Bill of Rights provision after ten years of independence, the Constitution of Zimbabwe could be amended through a two-thirds majority, as opposed to a 100% consensus that was operational prior to that (Marongwe 2008:118).

policy paper in January 1990, which culminated in an amendment of Section 16 of the Constitution in order:

- (i) To enable the Government to acquire any land (including utilized land) for resettlement purposes;
- (ii) To require “fair” compensation to be paid “within a reasonable time”;
- (iii) To abolish the right to remit compensation out of the country as required by Sections [5] and [6] of the Constitution; and
- (iv) To strengthen the independence of the judiciary (Mushimbo 2005:96).

These provisions were similar to the constitutional reforms to expropriation laws that occurred in Malawi and Zambia after independence. In the case of Zimbabwe, the farms belonging to multiple farm-owners and absentee landlords, and underutilized or derelict land contiguous to communal areas, were targeted first for redistribution.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No 11) (Act No. 30 of 1990) and Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No 12) (Act No. 4 of 1993) allowed for both commercial and unutilised land to be acquired for resettlement with “fair” compensation being payable in a “reasonable time” (de Villiers 2003:17). This was a break from the Lancaster Agreement which called for adequate compensation that had to be paid promptly. Payment in any currency of choice as stated at Lancaster was abolished. Parliament was empowered to specify through legislation certain principles upon which compensation could be calculated (thereby moving away from the market value system) and the period within which the compensation had to be paid. Nnoma (2008:380) summarises the tenets of the Land Acquisition Act 1992 as follows: Payment for land acquired is to be in local currency only; the Government could now compulsorily acquire land which is being fully utilized whereas before the amendment of the Zimbabwe Constitution in 1990 only “under-utilized” land could be acquired; the Government could now pay a “fair price” within a “reasonable period” instead of “adequate” compensation “promptly”; and the willing-seller/buyer principle is discontinued. The Act effectively would enable the government to acquire some 5.5 million hectares of the eleven million hectares of land still held by white farmers. The Act sought in particular to distribute land to the poorer farmers who were dispossessed of their land following Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. However, since the late 1980s, the government faced increased pressure from black capitalist farmers and business owners for access to land and a greater role in the economy (Moyo 1994: 2).

For white farmers, Britain and various civil society groups the new land policy was seen as a fundamental breach of human rights. The Commercial Farmers Union (1990:9) argued that a number of changes were expected when the entrenched clauses of the Lancaster House Constitution could be amended after April 1990. It was however not expected that basic property rights, the willing seller/willing buyer concept and the right of appeal to the Courts on levels of compensation paid, would be challenged or repealed. The white-dominated CFU believed that there should be no discrimination of landowners in terms of either the number of properties they own and operate or the size of those properties, provided they are fully utilized and productive. It argued that one of the most serious issues facing Zimbabwe at the time was the question of unemployment, and that as long as farmers were utilizing their holdings fully, and were productive and maximizing employment opportunities, they should be no more prejudiced than chain store owners, bus company owners or transport fleet operators. The political reality of the time was that the decline in the ruling party's support in the rural areas and economic hardships being experienced by the majority of urban and rural people played a key role in the radicalisation of the land acquisition and redistribution process. What the CFU and its Western supporters were trying to do was to deracialise the land issue without realising that it was and still is impossible to talk about land in Zimbabwe without reference to racialised agrarian space.

The constitutional amendments culminated in the constitutional crisis of 1991, when the Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay challenged Parliament's power to amend the constitution by invoking the "essential features" doctrine. In a speech marking the beginning of the 1991 legal year, Justice Gubbay asserted the power of the courts and their prerogative to oversee the legal aspects of land reform. He warned that the courts might invalidate the constitutional amendment. The legal debate on land reform became polarized, and included issues about the speed of the legal process and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. In the end, Justice Gubbay was asked to step down as a judge. The amendment which revoked the farmers' right to appeal to the judiciary to determine the amount of compensation made land redistribution a political rather than a legal matter (Mushimbo 2005:99). However, the politicization of land redistribution was necessary in order to invoke and involve public opinion, which had hitherto been excluded from the land reform process (Van Horn 1994:194).

The irony is that the drastic change in policy did not benefit the peasants and poor. Rather a scramble for land began among the political elites as corruption became rampant (de Villiers

2003:17). Although introducing the new reforms as a means of empowering the poor, ‘the ruling elite have made little more than token resettlement of the landless peasant farmers on acquired land’ (Makumbe 1999:14). Makumbe (1999:15) goes on to note that ‘the elites have made effective use of the Land Acquisition Act 1992 to feather their own nests’. Various critics (Goebel 2005; Makumbe 1999; Moyo 1996) argue that redistribution of land lacked transparency, and was marked by regional, ethnic and class biases that favoured elite blacks from the regions and ethnic groups that dominated the ruling ZANU-PF party. A report in the *Guardian Weekly* (30 June 1996:4) highlighted: ‘In 1992 the Zimbabwean parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act, authorising the government to buy land compulsorily. Two years later it was revealed that the first farms compulsorily purchased had been allocated to cabinet ministers, top civil servants and army generals’. Similarly, the *Zimbabwean Herald* (1 July 1996:10) noted: ‘A proper commission of inquiry should be appointed to look into, and establish the veracity of allegations made at the weekend that senior government officials in Masvingo have taken over a farm earmarked for resettling peasants, and that they are helping themselves to the farm.’

The 1992 Land Acquisition Act empowered the president to acquire rural land compulsorily and set out the procedure in accordance with which that acquisition should take place. Once written notice had been given to an owner that his/her land fell within the acquisition category, he/she could not dispose of the land or make any permanent improvements thereon. The notice was for one year and as soon as it was published, ownership automatically transferred to the state even though compensation had not yet been settled. The responsible Minister had discretion to designate any land as rural that could be compulsorily acquired for public interest. The Minister was required to specify the purpose for which the land was acquired and the period within which it was intended to be acquired, and this period could not extend beyond ten years. The GoZ set up a Compensation Committee which determined the amount to be given to white farmers whose land had been designated. The committee would take into consideration factors such as the nature and cost of improvements made by the farmer as well as the type and size of land holdings, while any dispute regarding compensation was to be referred to the administrative court. The act required the owner to receive half of the compensation within a reasonable time (within a year) and the remaining balance within five years (de Villiers 2003:18).

Various scholars (Matondi 2007, Moyo 2000, Makumbe 1999, Marongwe 2008, de Villiers 2003) highlight that despite the drastic and controversial measures spelt out in the Land Acquisition Act, the whole process of resettlement remained frustratingly slow. De Villiers (2003:18) notes that, by the government's own statistics, of the 162,000 families that needed to be resettled by 1995, only 60,000 had been resettled on 3.4 million hectares. Reasons for the snail-paced nature of land reform are multiple and complex but include government's lack of will, funding, corruption and class biases that increasingly favoured black business people rather than peasants. There was a clear weakening in government's commitment to the large-scale resettlement of the rural peasantry in the 1990s. This was partly in response to the reality of international macro-forces but largely it was conditioned by the shift in class interest and mentality of people in government (Goebels (2005:21). The logic of the Rhodesian colonialists that had cast poor peasant farmers as backward and environmentally destructive increasingly made sense to political leaders; thus government's agrarian policies in the 1990s differed little from those of the colonial state. The whole process of land reform in the 1990s was also plagued by controversy as allegations of political abuse of the programme were widespread.

The decline in political support for ZANU-PF dictated that political considerations rather than economic rationality would prevail (Makumbe 1999:14). In the end the ruling party was in many ways taking care of its own interests within the whole process of land reform while the needs of the poor especially rural and landless people remained unfulfilled. This led to the reoccurrence of large-scale squatting in the mid-1990s and, this time, the GoZ was not as active as in the 1980s in evicting people mainly because the government had lost legitimacy at the local level (de Villiers 2003:19). At the same time, the land transfer policy was shifting towards distributing land to capable farmers rather than peasants. Moyo (1994:3) concludes that this trend is reflective of the agenda of 'black business people' and highlights a shift from (if only rhetorical) socialism to a more market-oriented economic management system which further marginalised the poor and landless in the rural areas.

3.3.2 Structural adjustment and land reform

3.3.2.1 Land Acquisition Act and Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

While the Land Acquisition Act 1992 seemingly marked a break from the market-based land reform programme, the structural adjustment programme implemented in Zimbabwe ensured the continuation of and further support for large-scale white commercial agriculture.

Zimbabwe officially embarked on structural adjustment in October 2001. Since 1980, the World Bank has been Zimbabwe's largest donor and has thus been able to exert critical pressure on GoZ policies (Goebel 2005:16). The process of adjustment (backed by the World Bank) meant the withdrawal of state interest in land redistribution issues as neo-liberal policies which promoted commercial agriculture took root (Gibbon 1995). Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was supposed to do the following: step-up economic growth from the prevailing rate of four per cent to five per cent by 1995; attract foreign investment through trade liberalization, privatization and currency devaluation; create employment; deregulate working conditions; and reduce government expenditure by reducing spending on all social services (Mushimbo 2005:93). Land reform therefore soon became a 'hostage of measures intended to reduce budget and balance of payments deficits' (Tshuma 1997:58).

Intriguingly, land reform under ESAP involved the economic programme working against the spirit and clauses of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. ESAP led to an 'increasingly market oriented conception of Zimbabwe's land question' (Moyo 2000:9). The economic reform programme became a major stumbling block to land reform leading to what Sachikonye (2003:231) termed an 'interlude' in resolving the land question. In the context of global pressures on the state (including ESAP), the GoZ seemed disengaged from land reform, as local 'political pressures ...were less intense than before.... Opposition parties were fragmented and weak, and thus unable to mount a credible challenge to the incumbent party' (Helliker 2006:180). Until 1998, there was little organised pressure from peasants and the landless (Sachikonye 2003:231). The period from 1987 to 1996 entailed declining redistribution as black commercial farming was increasingly promoted. The historical redress thrust was overtaken by neo-liberal market realities and new black bourgeoisie class interests. In fact ESAP dovetailed neatly with the legitimating of agricultural accumulation amongst an aspiring black landed class; hence 'accumulation from above' was promoted, despite the promulgation of a potentially more transformative land policy in 1990 involving the acquisition of five million hectares of land (Helliker 2006:181).

3.3.2.2 Economic liberalisation and land reform

Economic liberalisation under ESAP reconfigured the political economy of Zimbabwe's land question (Moyo 2000:1). The orientation of production towards the global market and emergence of new land use patterns led to changes in the contestations and actors involved in

Zimbabwe's land drama. The value of land and its use was transformed as neo-liberal policies allowed for greater benefits from alternative land uses. As Moyo (2001:1) points out, ESAP-oriented policies led to the redefinition of Zimbabwe's land question through the promotion of intensifying rural economic differentiation among varied landholders and regions. Such differentiation was the result of the diversification of land use, labour management and commodity marketing, as well as of increased commercial crop and natural resources marketing, including sub-contractual systems of farm production, increased foreign financing of exports and imports-induced technological change during the 1990s. The convergence of agricultural capital (white commercial farmers) and government became more apparent as the black political elite found ways to benefit from the increased revenue in agriculture. This led to a serious imbalance in rural economic accumulation, as smallholder farmers and rural peasants were largely left out of this restructuring process.

The various structural adjustment policies which included trade liberalisation, devaluation of currency, deregulation of the domestic agricultural market and promotion of export-oriented production all had an impact on land reform in Zimbabwe. For example, the growth of new export markets for agricultural goods put pressure on the GoZ to follow the path of land privatisation and not land redistribution. There was thus a fundamental shift from the focus of the 1980s on redressing the racially-unequal ownership of land. The shift was significant given that the 1992 Land Acquisition Act had signalled a government willing to deal with unresolved land questions once and for all. This inconsistency and confusion in policy led to questions over the willingness of Robert Mugabe's government to implement widespread land reform. The GoZ seemed to be favouring minority land owners producing for a profitable global market than the rights of the majority black peasants.

Between 1994 and 1996 white farmers offered the GoZ 642 farms for sale (amounting to fifteen percent of all large-scale commercial farms in the country, but only six percent of the commercial farm area) (Moyo 2000). Prices in land were however increasing during the 1990s as ESAP led to a rise in interest rates. The rising of LSCF land market prices and the limited area of land voluntarily offered to the GoZ contributed to minimal land acquisition by the GoZ. The GoZ purchased about 200,000 hectares, yielding an average land acquisition rate of 40,000 hectares per annum. At the same time, the GoZ had constrained its own acquisition programme by not increasing budgetary allocations for this purpose and by not using more extensively the compulsory land acquisition and price fixing mechanisms it had

enacted by 1992. Nor were other instruments such as land taxation and state-supported LSCF land subdivision programmes embarked upon. Furthermore it was only in 1996 that serious efforts to source donor funding for land acquisition seem to have been negotiated (Moyo 2000:5).

This multiplicity of issues led to the land question remaining unresolved in Zimbabwe during the 1990s. The GoZ's land acquisition programme was gradually overtaken and replaced by the market through ESAP (despite the constitutional amendments of 1992) (Jowah 2009:73). The pot was left to simmer and the stage was set for a dramatic turn of events in Zimbabwe's land drama as will be discussed in Chapter Four. As a result, less urgency was attached to resolving the country's land question, with less than 20,000 households receiving land between 1990 and 1997 (Sachikonye 2003:231).

3.3.2.3 Diversification, tourism and the economics of land reform

The ESAP involved a complex set of specific economic policy and sectoral reforms including land, agriculture, natural resources, wildlife, environment and tourism policies...which influence[d] new export land use' (Moyo 2000:1). Under ESAP, export-dependent accumulation strategies were stressed and this was to the marked advantage of large-scale white commercial farmers who monopolised the export market of agricultural produce such as tobacco (Helliker 2006:181). This period entailed a change in land use patterns as white agrarian capital branched into non-traditional high earning crops such as horticulture plus wildlife ecotourism as part of extroverted economic liberalisation processes. The arguments of CFU resonated with some politicians within GoZ who demonstrated hesitancy in transforming [the white commercial agriculture sector] which was viewed as the goose laying the golden egg' (Karumbidza 2004:12).

The intensification of production towards the global market is captured by the land use changes in the 1990s. For example, the areas under flowers and horticulture grew from 400 hectares to almost 11,000 hectares while the area under fruits and vegetables tripled to 35,000 hectares. This meant that twenty percent of the total area of the LSCF sector was under horticultural crops (Moyo 2000:5-6). Zimbabwe soon became the second largest exporter of flowers in Africa to Europe. These developments left communal peasants out in the cold as the cost of for example building and maintaining a greenhouse were way beyond their means.

The dual agricultural system continued, if not intensified, as white farmers and new black elites benefited further from global trade markets (Moyo 2000:5-6).

One of the major impacts of ESAP was the reshaping of the traditional value of land in Natural Regions IV and V, which was previously viewed as unproductive. In this regard, wildlife land use became a huge industry in the 1990s. This led to contestations about the right to have land under wildlife while millions of people were land-short. Wildlife enterprises mostly favoured remote arid regions with only three percent of land in Natural Regions I and II being used for animals. Forty percent of land in Regions III and IV were soon used for animal ranching. The 1990s also saw another significant change in land ownership and administration due to the creation of large-scale conservancies which were billed as environmentally sustainable ways of managing resources within marginal regions. For Moyo (2000:7) the creation of such conservancies became a significant prism through which Zimbabwe's land question has been mystified under ESAP, through processes of creating a 'market economy' based upon the restructuring of forms of ownership and distribution. The conservancies included the amalgamation of large farms with the largest being the Save Valley Conservancy made up of 17 farms and over 326,331 hectares in size. They were owned through diverse shareholdings including corporate hoteliers and state farm parastatals (Moyo 2000:8).

The growth of tourism in the conservancies opened way for foreign ownership of land as investors from outside poured money into these enterprises. Activities such as sport hunting, selling of live animals and game viewing became commonplace. As tourism numbers increased the value in wildlife land use became even more lucrative. Ostrich rearing became another lucrative avenue within the commercial farming sector. Dominated by white farmers this subsector offered significant returns and land use under ostriches expanded throughout the 1990s. Moyo (2000:10) notes that an estimated fifty percent of large scale commercial farmers were involved in these new land uses. This land use diversification promoted under ESAP meant that the rural black farmers remained marginalised. It favoured the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few local elites and foreigners, resulting in under-consumption and mass unemployment (Jowah 2009:73).

3.4 Pre-Fast Track period and the land occupations (1998 – 2000)

This period provided a critical watershed in the land reform programme in Zimbabwe. It is the period that directly provided impetus to the farm occupations of 2000. In 1998 the GoZ unveiled the Land Reform and Resettlement Phase II Programme (Matondi 2008:18). The objectives of Phase II were spelt out as follows: acquire five million hectares from the LSCF sector for redistribution; resettle 91,000 families and youths graduating from agricultural colleges and others with demonstrable experience in agriculture in a gender-sensitive manner; and reduce the extent and intensity of poverty among rural families and farm workers by providing them with adequate land for agricultural use.

In 1997 there was an attempt by the state to acquire over 1,471 commercial farmers (Marongwe 2006:124). These farms were designated¹⁵ but were later reduced to 841 farms following the de-listing of over 400 farms. Most of the remaining farms were removed from the designation list after owners appealed to the courts: government failed to respond to the appeals within the legally-defined period and it subsequently discontinued the process. This, coupled with lack of funding, led to serious frustrations over the pace of land reform among the landless especially veterans of the armed struggle. Britain began renegeing on its ‘responsibilities’ for land reform. For example, Claire Short (then Labour government Secretary of State), in a letter to Kumbirai Kangai (then Zimbabwe’s Minister of Agriculture) in 1997 distanced the British government from the land issue in Zimbabwe. Part of the letter read:

I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new Government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonised not colonisers (quoted in Matondi 2007:12).

The British government was not willing to fund any accelerated land reform programme and felt that it had no obligations to Zimbabwe. The Blair government in fact claimed that it did not feel duty bound to the agreements and obligations at Lancaster House; in the same vein, the Zimbabwean government was under no obligation to follow these agreements. In the face of this rebuttal, forced land takeovers without compensation became a viable policy option.

¹⁵ Listed for acquisition by government.

A 1998 Donor's Conference in Harare saw the GoZ making an effort to speed up land reform through democratic means. Forty eight major countries including Britain, the United States and South Africa, as well as donor organisations such as the UN, AU, IMF and World Bank, attended. But Masiwa (2005:218) notes that donor unwillingness to fund land reform in Zimbabwe was underscored at the Harare conference. Here, government unveiled a US\$1.9 billion (about ZW\$42 billion) fund for its Phase II land reform programme. To the disappointment of the Zimbabwean government, the donors only pledged about ZW\$7,339 million, just a drop in the ocean. The conference though considered a number of issues discussed in an influential 1996 Overseas Development Agency report and agreed on certain principles: transparency, respect for the rule of law, poverty reduction, affordability, and consistency with Zimbabwe's wider economic interests. It advocated a broadened and more flexible approach to land acquisition and resettlement, and strengthened stakeholder consultations and partnerships – this became embodied in the Inception Phase Framework Plan (IPFP) 1998-1999. There was also consensus around addressing gender issues; access to and control of land and proportionate representation on decision-making structures; and streamlining land policies such as land taxation, subdivision and tenure (Mushimbo 2005:106).

The donors agreed that 118 farms would be expropriated and redistributed over an initial two-year period. Britain and the European Union would help in the compensation and evaluation processes. Nevertheless, Britain failed to produce the required funds. In November 1998, 841 of the 1,497 farms were expropriated for redistribution. Although this did not lead to immediate dispossession, donors were furious because the expropriation conflicted with the –spirit of the Land Conference” (Mushimbo 2005:106). In 1999, British-funded consultants began work to identify ways in which Britain could support land reform in Zimbabwe. The terms of reference for a follow-up visit were agreed with the GoZ in September 1999. These activities were interrupted by the farm invasions that gripped the country in the run-up to the 2000 Parliamentary elections. The late 1990s witnessed a number of sporadic farm invasions, mostly notably the Svosve and Chikwaka farm occupations in Marondera and Goromonzi districts respectively, spearheaded by war veterans and traditional leaders (Sadomba, 2003:24). These occupations were often driven by specific land restitution claims but they provided the backdrop to the occupations (focusing on general redistribution) that were to follow in the year 2000, as discussed in the following chapter.

3.5 Social organization in the first resettlement areas

In this section I turn my focus on the social organisation of the first resettlement areas. It is important to note how communities in the first phase of land reform were organised as they were composed of people coming from different backgrounds. Between independence in 1980 and 1997, over 70,000 Zimbabwean households were resettled on land previously owned by white farmers under the Rhodesian government. Criteria for selection for these resettlement schemes included the following: a refugee or other person displaced by the 1970s war, unemployed, a landless resident in communal areas, or having insufficient land to feed one's family (Bourdillon et al. 2003:8). The resettled farmers were required to give up claims of land in communal areas and at the time of settlement the household head was supposed to be married or widowed, aged twenty five to fifty and not in formal employment. The farmers were not given ownership to land but permits. There were many challenges involved in resettlement. Palmer (1990:173) notes that incentives for people to move to the resettlement areas were often not great, that the new settlers received only (conditional) annual permits of occupancy, and they had the disincentive of losing the right of access to land in the communal areas. The resettlement areas were often characterized by a degree of bureaucratic control which was all too reminiscent of past colonial schemes.

In settling people into villages under Model A, the process was done in a random manner that ensured that mostly strangers were settled side by side. The Zimbabwean government created new villages from lists of official applicants; thus, unlike traditional villages, this brought together households that were typically unrelated to and unacquainted with each other, often not even belonging to the same lineage (they were also diverse in terms of wealth). However some of the households would have been related, by either blood or marriage, to one or a few of their new neighbours (Dekker 2004:67). Baar (2004:1754) notes that the households in these first resettlement areas were faced by the task of changing their status from strangers to neighbours.

In order to survive and prosper, the inhabitants of these villages had to solve various problems of collective action relating to natural resource management, access to inputs, inadequate access to financial and other services, and the management of risk and uncertainty (Baar, Decker and Fafchamps 2010:3). Institutionalisation became the major way to meet the various socio-economic challenges involved in settling where there was no kinship support. Associational life in the first resettlement areas in Zimbabwe was thus dominated by what

Decker (2004) describes as community-based organisations (CBOs) which were set up through farmer initiatives. Resettled families actively invested in new social relationships as a way of ensuring social safety nets.

3.5.1 Farm level and governance structures

In the early resettlement areas people are not settled according to lineage as in communal areas. There is a diversity of people in terms of home, cultural, social and political origins. Goebel (1998:297) notes that state institutions do not compete with pre-existing traditional institutions but stand as the only local institutions. The ultimate authority over all villages in the resettlement schemes is the Resettlement Officer while traditional chiefs have no role at all. At the village level, a Village Chairman is elected by democratic vote and can be deposed for unsatisfactory performance. The Chairman's roles include channelling grievances of settlers to the Resettlement Officer and chairing of the village development committee. There is also a VIDCO (Village Development Committee) structure meant to stimulate grassroots self-help development in the rural areas. It has six members, one of which is the Village Chairman. The committee assists in administration of the villages and also monitors resource use and management. Geza (1986:88) notes that, in each committee, an executive heads various sub-committees with responsibilities for agriculture, political mobilisation, health, education, women's and youth organisations, logistics, conservation of natural resources, security and production.

Six VIDCOs constitute a WADCO (Ward Development Committee) which consists of the local elected Councillor and the six VIDCO chairmen. Because traditional leaders since the inception of the first resettlement areas have remained outside the resettlement areas, many traditional practices such as *chisi* (compulsory rest day) have not been pursued in these areas. Resettlement is a modernist development project of the state designed to redress land injustices and create a successful small-scale commercial farming class. In this regard, it is curious why – in the case of the more recent Fast Track Land Reform Programme – traditional practices are being imposed on A1 farmers (Goebels 1998:299). Putting up structures such as village and ward committees was the only way of accelerating the development of a community spirit and community living, thereby enabling each scheme to become a viable, cohesive and progressive rural community (Geza 1986:36). It is on this basis that settlers were willing to work together for the betterment of themselves, their

families and local communities, for instance through their own efforts in constructing primary and secondary schools and other community facilities.

3.5.2 Characteristics of settlers

Decker (2004:72) in her study found that the majority of the settlers were already farming on their own account or on their fathers or brothers land elsewhere. Other settlers came from commercial farms or nearby towns where they worked as agricultural labourers, drivers, builders, miners, storekeepers, teachers and various other professions. Thus the settlers were a mixture of people from different educational, occupational and professional backgrounds. Despite the random selection of beneficiaries, most families came with other families from their home area mainly because they had applied at the same time and their papers were processed together. These acquaintances were hence a source of help during times of need, such as borrowing cattle for ploughing during planting season. Such prior relationships provided farmers with sources of social support in the new areas they inhabited. In other words, farmers were coming from diverse backgrounds but there were relations prior to resettlement from which to build social networks. As I will show later, in the new communities under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, prior relationships were of paramount importance as a safety and security net given the various challenges they faced.

In the absence of blood relatives, a person with the same totem can play important roles in ceremonies related to illness, marriage, death, mutual assistance and emotional support. Totemic relations were very important in building social networks among settlers. Like a blood relationship, a totem relationship is a (patrilineal) lineage relationship but one in which a genealogical connection is difficult to trace. A person's totem is determined by three elements: *mutupo*, *chidawo* and *dzinza*. *Mutupo* is the clan name and refers to a patrilineal descent group (the name is usually an animal and members of the clan cannot eat that animal). *Chidawo* is the sub-clan name or praise name so that people with the same *mutupo* can have a different *chidawo*. The *dzinza* is one's great great grandfather (Decker 2004:80). People sharing the same *dzinza* and *mutupo* see each other as relatives; they are socially connected and are obliged to help each other. In the absence of blood-based kinship ties, totemic relations became important in the early resettlement areas.

3.5.3 Community-based organizations in first resettlement areas

After settlement, many people invested in new relations in their village¹⁶ and one way of doing this was by joining an association. Decker (2004:74) notes that by 1984 over half of her respondents were members of an association in their new village, including village committees, political party-based organisations, sewing clubs, burial societies and other assistance-based associations. Baar, Decker and Fafchamps (2010:4) note that in 1982 wealthier households were forming community-based organisations (CBOs) while poor households were not doing so. This later changed as CBO membership became denser in poorer villages, possibly because these villages had a greater need for organizations that would address indivisibilities in agrarian inputs and help cope with uncertainty. Those who settled early tend to associate less with those who settled later and geographical proximity influenced association only in the early years (by 1985 there was no effect of proximity on association). Kinship relations and their effects were occasional and ephemeral, and shared lineage had no bearing on CBO memberships; while at the level of the community there is some evidence that shared lineage and CBO activity are substitutes in times of uncertainty (Baar, Decker and Fafchamps 2010:5).

The CBOs in the first resettlement areas were not elitist in that poor and rich households associated without any barriers. Female-headed households were not excluded or chose not to exclude themselves from associating with male-headed households in associational life; in fact more often than not these different households share membership. Households which arrive considerably later tend to either be excluded from or chose not to join existing CBOs in the village, and set up new CBOs with other late settlers instead (Baar, Decker and Fafchamps 2010:19). The CBOs were overall largely inclusionary and seemed geared towards ensuring the wellbeing of all people. They were voluntary such that households could decide not to join, though they would not be privy to the benefits of members. In some cases however, especially with burial assistance, social norms dictated that people help each other to avoid social sanctions. Social sanctions included withdrawal of community help if the person found themselves in a similar predicament.

Resettlement in Zimbabwe was voluntary but the process carried many uncertainties for the families that decided to leave their rural homes in customary areas – especially in a context

¹⁶ In Zimbabwe a village is a relatively small number of households sharing a common rural locality.

where kinship ties were largely absent. Resettlement farms allowed for the emergence of forms of cooperation in new communities that were not based on traditional kinship organisation. These new forms of association were a substitute for traditional forms of cooperation such as labour sharing arrangements (*nchimbe*) or inter-family burial societies. They were in this way a continuation of traditional institutions but now adapted to the new context of resettlement.

Settlers recognised the significant work of religious institutions in promoting social cohesion in the communities. Decker (2004:84) places the churches into three different types: missionary churches such as the Salvation Army or Roman Catholic Church; apostolic churches some of which continue to grow out of the established ones (such as Roman Catholic) and some with an international network of congregations such as Johanne Masowe; and traditionalist ones such Chinyahwo and Zhana from Malawi. There are however other types of religious gatherings that Decker (2004) fails to account for, notably Pentecostal churches such as Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA) and Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM). Some settlers also practiced traditional African religions. Broadly speaking, religion played an important role in community building and enhancing social networks.

By the early 2000s, after over twenty years of settlement, Decker (2004:88) notes that, in addition to civil associations, settlers established social relationships through marriages. In fact, kinship relations through marriage developed and constantly brought people together as relatives. Specifically, intermarriage between sons and daughters of first settlers and marrying of second or third wives by settlers increased the density of kinship relations. Marriage can be a strategic way to ensure access to certain resources especially if it entails marriage into a rich family. Ties through marriage ensured help during periods of serious challenges and hence it increased the pool of people that can assist in risk-sharing. The creation of affinal relations facilitates income pooling. In Shona custom for example, the son-in-law does not pay the bride-wealth in full thus, as Bourdillon (1987) notes that outstanding bride-wealth obliges the son-in-law to provide all kinds of services or payments. The Shona have a proverb that says *‘mukuwasha murwonde hauperi kudyiwa’* (a son-in-law is like a fruit tree which you eat for life), meaning that the son-in-law becomes a source of insurance.

Decker and Kinsey (2011:28) show that between 2000 and 2010 livelihood from farming became extraordinarily more difficult for farmers resettled in the 1980s as inputs, credit and

support systems became major problems. These problems led to a substantial decline in cropped area. It was only contract farming¹⁷ and donor support in the form of free inputs that prevented small-scale farming in old resettlement areas from becoming a wasteland. Given this adverse socio-economic environment, farmers instituted various coping mechanisms such as migrating, pursuing a wide range of non-farm activities (such as trading) and using social networks. Social networks have remained an important coping mechanism but these have changed in nature and do not operate as they did when people first settled.

Migration of settlers was mainly recorded in 1999 as most of those who left went to join the fast track land reform programme. The average age of migrants was 26 years, but there was a clear difference in age for those leaving before 1999 (31 years) and after 1999 (25 years). If we look more closely at the relationship of the migrant to the household head, it is quite clear that – after 1999 – the majority of individuals leaving were adult sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren (Decker and Kinsey 2011:18). This was due to demand for land as families grew and could no longer survive on the plots they had. As sons married and started having families, they required their own field to plough and thus the fast track farms offered that opportunity. The migration however affected CBOs as members and social networks were lost when families moved away.

The economic and political situation post-2000 in Zimbabwe required more collective action as settlers battled to cope with various challenges. Yet, as Decker and Kinsey (2011:22) highlight, the CBOs themselves were severely affected by these same challenges. While the population movements, cash constraints and general deterioration in economic conditions in the 2000s increased the need for collective action, many non-religious community-based organizations (CBOs) and other networks were also badly affected by the same events. Preliminary results of a sub-sample of six villages shows that almost seventy-five percent of the CBOs that were active in 2000 no longer existed in 2008 (Decker and Kinsey (2011:22). Most households still provided assistance to each other in the form of labour, childcare, food or tillage (ploughing fields) as well as cash assistance to cover medical or educational expenses or to meet costs for agricultural production or investment. However, the percentage of those giving help decreased. These findings might challenge the assumption that in times of trouble there is more mutual assistance. The economic situation in Zimbabwe made it

¹⁷ Contract farming is when a company such as Delta provides inputs to farmers and when the crop is ripe the company buys it from them while deducting money for the inputs.

difficult for families to assist each other (especially with cash) but despite the decrease in assistance the majority of households still supported each other in different ways.

3.5.4 Risk sharing and mutual assistance among resettled farmers

Hoogeveen (2001) highlights how partial income pooling among settlers in the first resettlement areas was a source of mutual assistance and a coping strategy. Research in Zimbabwe (Dzingirai 2001; Mararike 1999) has tended to suggest that mutual assistance often takes place within kinship networks. The relocation away from kinship networks to new communities that are relatively scarce in intra-village kinship relationships affects household coping behaviours and the types of relations used to obtain support in times of need (Decker 2004:107). In the absence of opportunities to secure livelihoods through formal arrangements, households explore the possibilities of entering into informal insurance arrangements (Hoogeveen 2001:27). After all, by pooling incomes within the community, households can shield themselves from idiosyncratic risks. Thus farmers entered into various mutual insurance arrangements such as burial societies and income saving groups to ensure that in the absence of kin they were able to cope with various shocks to the household.

3.5.5 Conceptualising help amongst the poor

This section highlights the concept of ‘_help’ and how it relates to new communities in the resettlement areas. Help is an important instrument in building communities and bringing people together. In a case study of four countries in Southern Africa, Maposa et al. (2006) argue that help between poor people is widespread, deeply embedded, morally grounded and operates as a vital element for both survival and progress. Rather than random or disorganised, horizontal philanthropy is part and parcel of the social fabric. It follows proven, unwritten, acculturated rules with associated sanctions for non-compliance. People who are poor mobilise and pool their resources in response to a need or problem; thus they are both givers and receivers of help. Within African communities, philanthropy is not always a voluntary act informed by altruism and generosity. Help is not always, nor necessarily, a ‘_free’ choice. Such behaviour can be driven by social duty as well as by a deep moral obligation emanating from a shared identity premised on a common humanity. Principles of reciprocity and co-operation grounded in mutual support are a prevalent and defining feature of horizontal philanthropy. An assumption that material goods and, in particular, monetary donations are the most significant philanthropic content and form, must give space and value

to a broader resource base including non-material exchanges such as advice, counselling and emotional support (Maposa et al. 2006).

Mutual assistance for resettled farmers in Zimbabwe was not an alien idea and though institutions of help might have differed from communal areas, they were simply a continuity of what they had done in their areas of origin. Helping each other is thus a part of the social fabric within African communities, though the nature of help has been affected by colonisation, urbanisation and globalisation with their consequences for migration and displacement of the extended family. The ethos of help has remained part of African people and communities no matter where they live or where they have been settled. This is important to note because farm level institutions – which are the focus of this thesis – have to be understood in their historical context. There are many instances of the continuity of customs and traditions passed on over generations; what only differs is the context under which they appear.

3.6 Conclusion

The foregoing chapter has provided a historical overview of land reform in post-colonial Zimbabwe from 1980-2000. This important foundation helps us understand the historical roots of post-2000 Zimbabwe which is discussed in the next chapter. The chapter highlights how the land question unfolded post-independence, with a clear emphasis of how events within this period sowed seeds for the farm invasions in 2000. It discussed various competing arguments around land in Zimbabwe and provided a vivid discussion of how various processes (such as the Lancaster House provisions, lack of funding, renegeing of British funding promises, structural adjustment and a lack of political will) contributed to a dismal land reform programme which failed to meet its stated objectives. The constitutional basis of property in Zimbabwe had to be challenged because the independence constitution simply legalized what had gone before, i.e. ninety years of prejudice and racial injustice in the distribution of property. The Lancaster Agreement did not provide any form of retribution for the victims of this historical injustice, the black majority. In addition, the same legal framework that had been used to dispossess the blacks was now used to protect the white minority, thus protecting the sanctity of property. The issue of legality and the rule of law in Zimbabwe are often evoked as an alternative to the exercise of reason. As practiced in Zimbabwe, the rule of law regarding land reform fails to serve the best interests of its people, and hangs like a death sentence over the future of the country.

The chapter also offered an in-depth look at the social organisation and associational life of the settlers in the first resettlement areas. It showed how there are continuities with the past in terms of institutionalisation, mutual assistance and risk sharing. Farmers entered into various mutual insurance arrangements such as burial societies and income saving groups to ensure that in the absence of kin they were able to cope with various shocks to the household. Social organisation in the first resettlement areas allows for a comparison with communities emerging in Zimbabwe after fast track land reform. There are continuities and discontinuities in terms of institutional forms and associational life between the old and new resettlement areas. This chapter places in context land reform in Zimbabwe showing how processes and contestations over land have evolved post-colonialism.

CHAPTER FOUR: TOWARDS A NEW LAND ORDER – FAST TRACK LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

Academic debates in Zimbabwe around fast track land reform are polarised and tend to be pro- or anti- ZANU-PF. This creates a false debate that essentially turns political and is detrimental to any in-depth understanding of the complex character of land reform. This chapter offers an in-depth anatomy of the events that transpired in Zimbabwe from the year 2000. It highlights the various debates in the academic literature about the nature, composition and internal dynamics of what is now known as the ‘Zimbabwean Crisis’. The land occupations of 2000 heralded a new land era and led to the country’s isolation from the international (particularly ‘Western’) community. The ripple effects of the land occupations and the ensuing fast track land reform programme were to mark all sectors of the Zimbabwean economy leading to widespread social suffering. We thus had new communities in the newly resettled areas emerging in the context of economic meltdown and political turmoil. The many competing narratives of the crisis have in large part tended to ignore the lived experiences of these new farming communities. This chapter engages with the key studies by Moyo et al. (2009) and Scoones et al. (2010) as well as various other smaller studies that have focused on the communities emerging from the Fast Track Land Reform.

In trying to grapple with the realities of the fast track programme in Zimbabwe, Derman (2006:2) puts across the following questions:

How will ‘fast track land reform’ be understood? Are Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (2005) correct that there has been a land occupier's social movement that portends, if handled correctly, a national democratic revolution? Will Zimbabwe serve as the warning bell for South Africa to rapidly achieve its own land reform (Bernstein 2005; Cousins 2004; Hall 2004; Hall, Jacobs and Lahiff 2003; Lahiff 2003)? Can it be successfully argued that the land reform has been so fundamentally flawed and unjust that it should be undone or is it the case that no matter how unjust, it will become the new starting point for all new policies and programmes? Or has the mishandling of

land reform in Zimbabwe made further land and agrarian transformation more difficult?

This chapter grapples with these (among other pertinent) questions that surround the competing debates on Zimbabwe's land reform programme, while also highlighting the importance of fast track processes for the nature of communities that emerged in Mazowe District (the focus of this thesis).

4.2 Background

By early 2000 Zimbabwe was facing an unprecedented social and economic crisis. The deteriorating economic situation adversely impacted on the pace of land reform. The food riots in 1998 were the beginning of open protest against the ZANU-PF establishment in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The economy was severely compromised by the costs of the war in the DRC and war veterans' payouts in the late 1990s also took their toll. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions took the lead as a conglomeration of civil society organisations challenged the ruling hegemony; further, the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 was the first real threat to ZANU-PF's political hegemony in Zimbabwe. The rejection of the draft constitution in February 2000 was a precursor to the land occupations in Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2001, a period popularly known as *jambanja* (chaos) due to the violent nature of the process. The GoZ had initiated a constitutional process culminating in a draft revised constitution which, among other things, reinforced the right to compulsory acquisition and qualified the existing market criteria for compensation for acquired land (permitting the state to pay only for improvements on the land). A referendum held in February 2000 led to an overwhelming defeat for government. According to Kagoro (2004:249), it was a protest vote against the manner in which the constitution-making process had been carried out by the government, as well as an angry protest against the performance of the government and parlous state of the economy.

This unprecedented defeat of the ruling party by an opposition party (which according to ZANU-PF was backed by white commercial farmers and the West) appeared to precipitate the largely state-sponsored land invasions, political violence, institutional interference and economic decline that were to follow, although there was of course a much longer and more complex history behind these trends (Hammar 2005:4). A massive campaign comprising of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the MDC and the white Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) led to the defeat of the draft constitution at the polls, with Mugabe immediately

accepting the result. But, within days, twelve war veterans occupied farms in Masvingo Province, decrying that the white farmers had connived to defeat the constitution in the referendum. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWA) supported these occupations and called for further action as a way of demonstrating the need for land. When leaders of the war veterans association and the ruling party realised by the end of March that white farmers were actively campaigning for the MDC, and encouraging farm workers to do the same, farm occupations became more violent and intertwined with the political campaign for the June parliamentary elections (Moyo 2001:318).

The events that precipitated the fast track land reform programme have become the focus of major academic and political debates. Significant literature exists analysing the farm occupations and fast track land reform process that emerged in Zimbabwe from the year 2000 and that led to the creation of A1 and A2 resettlement farms through redistribution. One school of thought argues that land reform was instigated by war veterans as part of ZANU-PF's official campaign strategy for the 2000 elections and as a response to the dwindling support for the party as shown by the results of the February 2000 referendum on the state-sponsored constitution (Alexander 2006; Cousins 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Shaw 2003; Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004). An opposing perspective views the land occupations in 2000 as part of a longer-term and clearly identifiable land occupation movement in post-independent Zimbabwe (Andrew and Sadomba 2006; Moyo 2002; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Sadomba 2008). In this regard, Sadomba (2008:145) notes that whether the occupations fit the sociological category of a social movement, or they were just a political ploy by ZANU-PF (and a moribund ruling oligarchy) trying to cling to political power, has aroused emotive debate. The first school of thought therefore argues that the land occupations do not have characteristics of a social movement. This argument is based on an analysis and synthesis of the role played by the state including alleged high levels of violence associated with the occupations (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). The second school of thought (linked to the work of Sam Moyo) claims that there is a long history of land occupations in Zimbabwe, and that the fast track occupations differ only in form but not in content in relation to previous rounds of land invasions.

I interrogate these schools of thought in terms of how they analyse the events during both the pre- and post-2000 period in Zimbabwe. The ensuing debate has dominated academic and public discourse on Zimbabwe where there are polarised ideas either praising or demonising

Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Derman (2006:5) notes that '[t]here has been the celebratory literature including how Marxist guerrillas and spirit mediums worked together (Lan 1985), the popular and progressive nature of the revolution (Martin and Johnson 1981), and how the land reform of 2000 continues revolutionary ideals (Moyo and Yeros 2005).⁶ There is an equally intense stance that denigrates the Zimbabwean state, including reassessing and highlighting issues of state violence under the ZANU-PF ruling party (such as the Zimbabwean army campaign in Matabeleland in the 1980s under the suspicion that there were links between the apartheid regime in South Africa and dissidents from the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)) (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 1997). The initial post-independence policies of racial reconciliation have disintegrated over the past decade, notably during a series of elections including one referendum, two parliamentary elections and one presidential election (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Raftopoulos and Savage 2004). In a return to the use of state violence, the ruling party ZANU-PF claims that it is simply continuing the liberation war (the *chimurenga* as it is known locally) because of continued colonial efforts to re-subjugate Zimbabwe. Below I go in-depth with regard to the various competing stances around Zimbabwe's land reform programme.

4.3 Zimbabwe's land occupation movement

Moyo's (2000, 2001 and 2002) work has largely justified FTLRP as a legitimate programme that satisfied the land hunger of the peasantry. Moyo and Yeros (2005) make a strong argument that the war veterans association is an organic organization that represents the rural masses. This implies impartiality in its role of mobilizing communities for land invasions, as opposed to simply being seen as the key architect of ZANU-PF party machinations and its political campaign. Yet the forced restructuring of the judiciary, especially of the Supreme Court which was seen as a defender of white farmers, is telling (Thomas 2003). For Moyo, the land movement was borne out of frustrations in the countryside during the post-independence years of market-based land resettlement led by a state that delivered very meagre results. For Sadomba and Andrews (2006:2), the land reform movement should be understood as a legitimate 'movement from below' composed of mainly rural social classes.

Moyo (2001:314) argues that the adoption of a centralised method of compulsory land acquisition on a massive scale during 2000-2001 was instigated in 1997 by war veterans who, while few in number, mobilised a broad rural backing. Thus, the land occupation movement

that emerged in 2000 might be centrally instigated but it is differentiated by the many local pulses driving it, including the interests of war veterans, traditional and other leaders, and informal community organisations. Within this context, land occupations have been an ongoing social phenomenon in rural (and sometimes urban) areas of Zimbabwe subsequent to independence. They represent an unofficial or underground social pressure deployed as a tactic to force land redistribution to be taken seriously. Moyo (2001:314-316) tries to dissect the fast track land occupation movement and argues that war veterans formed the core of the movement and had the ability to absorb various other disgruntled groups. It is telling that Moyo (2001) accepts that the movement was centrally instigated, as this places serious doubts on the spontaneity and grassroots emergence of the land occupation movement in Zimbabwe.

The rural land occupation movement crystallised from the shared view that the post-colonial government had failed to deliver on its stated promises over land. The land issue was critical and central to the Zimbabwean state and people, so that it was not a simple matter of ZANU-PF using it as a political electoral tool (Moyo cited in Chirambo and McCullum 2000: 2–3). Land is clearly a political concession made by President Robert Mugabe, and it is a massive concern for at least 70 percent of the Zimbabwean people. All the political movements (including the MDC formation) support land reform in one way or another; it is the method where there is disagreement. This may be true, but given the slow-paced nature of previous land reform programmes (as discussed in the previous chapter) it appears that the land issue was not previously prioritized in practice. Fast track land reform significantly radicalised the land acquisition process and, in the context of country-wide invasions, it did in only a few years what the previous twenty years of independence had failed to achieve. By 2009, 10,816,886 hectares of land had been acquired for the resettlement of 162,161 families with 145,775 settled under the A1 model and 16,386 under the A2 scheme.

Helliker et al. (2008:11) citing Moyo and Yeros (2005:165-168) argue that the land occupation movement in Zimbabwe is the most prominent among rural movements globally. This movement challenged the neo-liberal tendencies of neo-colonial states in Africa. Moyo and Yeros (2005:168) are convinced that the Third *Chimurenga* has a ‘fundamentally progressive nature’, much to the chagrin of many critics (see Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). Helliker (2008:12) aptly summarises the critique of the land occupation movement school:

The many critics of this depiction [Moyo's depiction of the land occupation movement] claim that it entails – almost perverse – value judgements made by patriotic agrarianists ... or left nationalists ... who fail to conceptualize analytically or even highlight empirically the increasingly repressive character of state nationalism in contemporary Zimbabwe, designated as an exclusionary nationalism, ... an exhausted nationalism ... or an authoritarian populist anti imperialism.

Attacks by these critics have often mistakenly criticised Moyo's work as a rather shallow propaganda attempt to dress in theoretical garb ZANU-PF's rendition of events, thereby acting as an apologist for a violent regime seeking to stay in power by all means. They claim that Moyo (2001 2009) romanticises the land movement and fails to highlight the authoritarian restructuring of the contemporary Zimbabwean state. This view regrettably does not allow for academic debate on the merits of the land occupations as a social movement and dismisses the occupations without a clear analysis of what they entail.

In this regard, Sadomba (2008:144) argues that Moyo's work does not delve deep enough into pre-independence history to identify the temporal linkages and developments of the land movement in Zimbabwe. Although Moyo (2001) makes the connection between the land movement and liberation movement, he does not adequately show the origins and development of internal conflicts around land reform within the liberation movement. Thus, Sadomba (2008) attempts to demonstrate the historicity of the land movement in Zimbabwe by showing how the liberation movement that brought independence to Zimbabwe was an aggregate of numerous organised struggles such as a peasant land movement, nationalist movement, guerrilla movement and even a farm worker movement. There are movements within a movement constantly pulling and pushing against each and in a similar vein the land occupation movement is made up of multifarious groups. The analysis by Sadomba (2008) of the pre-independence liberation movement through its various phases highlights how different groups were involved and it allows for an understanding of the reconfiguration of these movements after independence. After 1980, a range of politicians (ZANU and PF-ZAPU¹⁸) began to monopolise the political and cultural capital of their war veteran status for purposes of capital accumulation, while most combatants were sidelined socially and economically.

¹⁸ These were the two major parties that participated through their military wings in the independence of Zimbabwe. In 1987 they joined together to form ZANU-PF.

In the case of the peasants, they largely benefited from the huge investment by the new government in social services such as schools and clinics. The land issue however was not resolved quickly in the 1980s; hence there were numerous land occupations on farms which had been deserted by white farmers. Farm workers were left at the mercy of commercial farmers who now included among their ranks wealthy politicians who had bought farms. New alliances began to emerge among groups that had not been part of the liberation movement such as nationalists who had participated in the internal settlement¹⁹, returning residents from abroad and – critically – captains of white industry. At the inaugural meeting of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans (ZNLWV) in 1992, war veterans were worried about this reconfiguration of alliances (Sadomba 2008:157). The political elites began to form alliances with new partners, such as the emerging black businessmen, as class differences increasingly came to the fore in political mobilisation. The war veterans, peasants and farm workers were left out in the cold, and it is these groups that began to challenge the new powerful classes on the land issue through various methods including squatting.

The land movement that emerged ten years ago was thus a multifarious formation with many contradictions. It was made up of different actors with differential power and access to instruments of mobilisation and organisation. Certain groups were able to manipulate and control the political and social space that other groups came to occupy. The political elites controlled the instruments of power and as such were able to manipulate other members of the movement through coercive means. While ZANU-PF was not centrally involved in planning the land occupations and at first discouraged them (in 2000) as exemplified by the comments of acting state president Joseph Musika, it opened the space for other elements of the land movement such as war veterans to operate without significant hindrance. The nature and pattern of occupations differed from one part of the country to another, from province to province, district to district, and even farm to farm. Hence, the land occupations were not centrally planned by the ruling party or war veterans' movement. In some cases even farm workers and peasants alone occupied farms without veterans. As Sadomba (2008:171) notes: Although ZANU PF and the state participated in their own right, reducing the land occupation movement to a mere ZANU PF project is erroneous as it is simplistic.

¹⁹ Rhodesian government in 1979 came to agreement with some African leaders like Bishop Muzorewa to form a new government and a new state called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Matondi (2011) acknowledges the existence of a land movement spearheaded by war veterans but falls short of crediting it for bringing about Fast Track Land Reform. He notes that, on the surface, the fast track land reform process seemed to have been triggered by the land occupations from the year 2000 led by the veterans of the liberation struggle. But it would be over-crediting them if labelled as the architects of the FTLRP, because historical factors are also critical – including institutional failures and a lackadaisical approach to agrarian reforms by a state disinterested in widespread reform (Moyo 1995; Matondi 2001; Hammar 2007). There is no denying though that war veterans and the rural landless put government under intense political pressure. With the emergence of Movement for Democratic Change and pressure from (mainly urban) civil society groups, the ZANU-PF government could not afford to have divisions within its own ranks.

Eleven years after land occupations questions still abound on whether the land reform programme in Zimbabwe could result in a successful national democratic revolution as posited by Moyo and Yeros (2005). Derman hence (2006:5) questions

[w]hether – if most former commercial farms are given to village-based small-scale farmers – Zimbabwe will be repeasantized. What would be the place of the ruling party? What social, political and economic relations would we expect? What have been the features of resettlement programs in the past so that one might be able to better understand this vast new program? What have we learned from the numerous studies of Zimbabwe's communal areas? What vision of a repeasantized Zimbabwe has been expressed by its political leadership and how does this fit with Moyo and Yeros'?

It was apparent in the year 2000 that there was no clear vision on the part of government in what the expectations were for new farmers especially A1 farmers; and this failure remains today.

4.4 Fast track to destruction: ZANU-PF and the land 'invasions' in Zimbabwe

Various scholars (Alexander 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003) criticise Moyo's (2001) argument on the continuity of the land occupation movement in Zimbabwe because he fails to explain the sudden rupture (from 2000) of widespread violence, intimidation and economic meltdown. Hammar and Raftopoulos (2003:19) note this, in drawing qualitative distinctions between the 2000 invasions and the occupations occurring in 1998 or in previous periods since independence.⁶ Thus, there is a distinction to be made between the ZANU-PF led occupation movement and earlier occupations. In this regard, Selby (2006:3) highlights that

Zimbabwe since 2000 has been dominated by violence, political intolerance and intimidation, economic implosion, food insecurity and general uncertainty. In many ways this crisis was an unavoidable culmination of unresolved and deep-rooted resource and race disparities, but it has been dominated by ZANU-PF's often-ruthless struggle to retain power. There was a sudden instrumentalisation of power in what Selby (2006:4) calls the rejuvenation of the security state:

Had ZANU PF lost power in 2000, senior officials would probably have been held accountable for a range of unresolved issues such as the genocide in Matabeleland, key corruption scandals of the 1990s, and the looting of the War Victims' Fund. Senior officials therefore had a clear interest in retaining power which clearly influenced ZANU PF's post-2000 strategies. The nature of the state changed considerably during the late 1990s with the co-option of the war veterans and the growing influence of an impatient and radical empowerment alliance.

There is no way we can talk of a land reform movement in Zimbabwe without the crucial intervention of the state: more specifically, understanding the forced land takeovers can only be done through a thorough analysis of the monopolization and militarization of state apparatuses. Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:356) elucidate that this authoritarianism involved an internal reconfiguration of Zimbabwean state politics leading to the emergence of domestic tyranny.

Chan and Primorac (2004:69-71) highlight how war veterans (from the 1970s struggle against white rule) took the law into their own hands in executing Mugabe's land reform policies in a violent manner. Their actions during the occupations involved killing numerous white farm owners and black farm workers, setting fire to more than ten million acres of crops, interrupting and preventing cultivation on many farmlands, and displacing hundreds of thousands of farm workers. Chaumba et al. (2003:534), in describing the scene in Chiredzi soon after the land reform, argue that this ostensibly chaotic space was peopled by an anarchic bunch of self-proclaimed liberation war veterans, disaffected jobless and landless youths, and spirit mediums who appeared to be beyond the restraint of the police, and was even encouraged in their lawlessness by members of the governing ZANU (PF) party. And Masipula Sithole notes that the farm invasions and fast-track land reform involved a normalising of the abnormal.²⁰ There was an upsurge in violence unseen in rural Zimbabwe

²⁰ Violence, arson, destruction of property and general lawlessness became accepted as everyday occurrences.

outside Matebeleland since the liberation war of the 1970s, with much of the violence and intimidation during this period being state-led and sponsored. Only a state which supported (in principle and strategically) such a policy of widespread violence could stand aside and watch as violent acts were perpetrated across the country.

Forty people were killed in the wake of the farm invasions, thirty-four black Zimbabweans and six white farmers (Mitchell 2001:588). Despite the attention these murders have received, violence on white-owned farms is not limited to Zimbabwe. Since 1995, almost 500 white farmers have been killed in South Africa. Hundreds of black farm labourers and other rural black South Africans have been beaten, raped and murdered by white farm owners, managers and private security personnel. Although fewer murders occurred on farms in Zimbabwe in 2000 than on farms in South Africa, a large number of Zimbabweans have been victimized by crude acts of political violence. Political violence that accompanied elections in 2002 should not be confused as part of the land occupation movement though this distinction is difficult given that the perpetrators (war veterans and ZANU-PF youths) were essentially the same. The international gaze and condemnation of land occupations in Zimbabwe was not in effect focused on the violence; the main concern was the attack on the very ethos of neo-liberalism, notably private property regimes and market-led reforms. If violence mattered, or the plight of farm workers was of great concern, then the South African agrarian landscape would be subject to global scrutiny.

Sithole et al. (2003:11) summarise the process as follows: ‘While the early –spontaneous’ invasions by peasants were hailed as the unfolding of a genuinely people-centred story on land reform, the later invasions by war veterans were a politically-motivated story crafted by the state.’ Critics (Alexander 2006; Cousins 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Shaw 2003; Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004) of the land occupation movement argue that the violence and chaos that characterised the 2000 occupations were instigated by the state. The FTLRP was characterised by violence, coercion and opportunism. War veterans engaged in a whole range of illicit activities and ensured that the farms became ‘no go areas’ for outsiders. They effectively became ZANU-PF territories as (at least allegedly) members of the opposition parties were regularly beaten on fast track farms.

This period became known as *jambanja* which literary means anything from a state of disarray to anarchy or violence. This term became popular to describe the years particularly

from 2000 to 2002. Chaumba et al. (2008:540) highlight that ‘in essence it has come to refer to a time and space of at best confusion and nonsense, and at worst disorder and chaos.’ As aptly summarised by Tagwirei Bango (*Zimbabwean Daily News* 27.11.2001):

For new words to get accepted into a language, they must reflect the mood of the time, fill in a vacuum in the standard lexicon and be accepted as an appropriate form of expression. Thus, the word *jambanja* which became part of our vocabulary in the past two years, helped people to accept their confusion with an executive order directing the police to ignore crimes classified as political. *Jambanja* means state-sponsored lawlessness. The police are not expected to intervene or arrest anyone in a *jambanja* scene because those taking part will have prior state blessing and approval. But, only one interest group, war veterans and ZANU (PF) supporters, is allowed to engage in a *jambanja*.

Given the widespread use of this word by the occupiers themselves, it would be surprising that this process could be defined as anything but chaotic²¹. *Jambanja* also needs to be understood in the context of a government under Mugabe, supported by war veteran leaders such as Chenjerai Hunzvi and Joseph Chinotimba, trying to re-invoke images of the liberation war through all night vigils, training of a new cadre of youths, and reviving old enemies such as Rhodesians and imperialists.

The monopolisation of violence by the ruling party and its supporters tends to blur the existence of a land occupation movement after 2000. What exists in fact is an orgy of state-sponsored violence and counter-violence based more on political lines than on land issues. The issue of land became subsumed under ongoing electoral processes and became one among other important issues of policy driving campaigns for political office. As Selby (2006:4) notes, government officials stressed the spontaneity of the occupations but the political utilities of the invasions and evictions of white farmers were obvious. The farm occupations served multiple objectives: neutralising a political threat, providing an election campaign strategy, detracting attention from more fundamental political contests and economic stagnation, and placating the demands of strategic client groups. In this way it is thus impossible to talk of the land movement outside the control of ZANU-PF simply because of the monopoly it has of instruments of violence. The electoral process riddled with

²¹ Though Sadomba (2008) has shown there were cases where the process was orderly without any violence or destruction of property.

violence became synonymous with land reform and it is difficult to separate land issues from this process.

4.5 Beyond the false debate

As shown in the preceding discussion, two main approaches have tended to dominate explanations of the land occupations. One school of thought argues they were a spontaneous rejection of the prevailing bureaucratic process of reform led by a land movement which has a traceable history whilst the other school of thought views occupations as a state-orchestrated process. This dichotomy is however not necessarily helpful. There were a variety of further motivations for the farm occupations, ranging from top-down directives to bolster support for ZANU-PF in its rural heartlands, to localised desires for the restitution of ancestral land, to those who joined occupations because they were simply jumping on the bandwagon (Chaumba et al. 2008:541). The Zimbabwe situation is in fact a product of complex historical and social processes that are embedded in local, regional and international arenas. To reduce an analysis of the complexities of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe to either of the two main schools of thought is neither desirable nor enriching conceptually. What the debate does though is to offer two sides of the same coin, thereby allowing for a multi-dimensional picture.

The land issue in Zimbabwe is highly emotive without any in-depth analysis of what has transpired on the ground. Critical voices of the land reform have deemed it a dismal failure on the basis of limited agricultural production and the failure to respect rights (human and property). Defenders²² of the programme outline that production has since the year 2000 increased and that it achieved success in redistributing land. The problem quite often is that Western neo-liberal notions of production, capacity, skill and scale dominate the debates without Zimbabwean people (academics, policy makers and farmers) deciding for themselves what success for this programme would entail. There are no clear indicators for what is termed ‘_success’: Is it getting land? Producing at the same level as former white farmers? Making a living out of farming? Having a home? Without first defining from a local perspective what the programme entails and its indicators for success, controversies around land reform will invariably remain within Western conceptualisations and critiques, thereby within Western political agendas.

²² See Moyo et al (2009) and Scoones (2010).

4.6 Legal debates in FTLRP

The GoZ continuously passed legislation after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme as it sought to appropriate and legitimise the process with laws and the technocratic language of the previous phases of land reform. Marongwe (2008:134) argues that FTLRP was born out of a legal miscarriage which resulted in the rejection of the Draft Constitution in February 2000. The Zimbabwean state has historically taken a rather monopolistic and dictatorial approach to legal debates and contestations around land and other issues (Herbst 1990; Alexander 2003). Christodoulou (1990) argues that administrative and technical bureaucracies are key instruments for exercising state power. This analysis is relevant under the FTLRP where the administrative and technical bureaucracy, together with the state security agencies, had a central role in reinforcing the role and power of the state in land acquisition and settler selection. The state initially relied on despotic power to disobey its own courts' judgments. It went further to reorganize the existing political space through 'fast-track' judiciary reforms, followed by a full process of enacting legislation that suited its political agenda. In the view of Madhuku (2003), what transpired was the case of law following politics.

The GoZ was following a dual and contradictory path (Madhuku 2003). It claimed that the land problem was a political and not a legal matter, yet it was constantly manipulating the courts and laws to suit its agenda. There were numerous court cases and constitutional amendments that occurred during FTLRP, as the government tried hard to legalise an issue it had always claimed to be political and not judicial. Importantly, the Supreme Court bench changed during this time as white judges such as Chief Justice Gubbay (who had consistently ruled in favour of white property owners) were forced to resign leading to a pro-ZANU-PF bench which ultimately declared the FTLRP legal.

Fast track land reform had multiple land administration systems: old and new, *de jure* and *de facto*, and legal and extra-legal all working in tandem. This led to various contestations and confusion at the local, provincial and national level over control of the land reform process (Matondi 2007:26). At the local level, there were committees called District Land Identification Committees (DLIC) which reported to the Provincial Land Identification Committee. The DLIC was chaired by the District Administrator and was made up of district level government agencies and central state line ministries together with the army, police, war veterans and traditional chiefs (Matondi 2007:26). These committees usurped the power

of local councillors who under the Rural District Council Act (1988) are the rightful land managers. The government commission under Utete (2003) concedes that there were many new institutions at national, provincial and district level which were hastily set up to ensure that the process was fast tracked, but this led to duplication of duties as well as conflicts over control of the process. The institutional problems were augmented by ‘certain persons’ who, though lacking official authority, proceeded to allocate land mainly in districts near the main towns and cities (Utete 2003:31).

4.7 Anatomy of land reform: Who benefited?

Questions abound over who truly benefited from the fast track land reform programme. While it is not the major concern of this thesis, this section will deal with various issues arising from accusations from varied critics (including crucially the war veterans who had spearheaded the land occupations) that the political elite had amassed for themselves huge tracts of land. Marongwe’s (2008) thesis is specifically based on analysing who benefited from the land reform in Goromonzi District near Harare. He concludes that the political and social processes governing land allocation created particular classes of beneficiaries whose ‘qualifying characteristics’ were divorced from agriculture in terms of farming experience, and commitment and skills possessed. The new set of A1 and A2 beneficiaries are classes or groups of people who have both urban and rural origins, with many of them employed formally. Some of the A2 beneficiaries wield political power which has been applied in different contexts under FTLRP. In some cases, these beneficiaries used their power to access whole farms with developed infrastructure, and such farms have been shown to be reasonably productive. The allocation of farming inputs (for instance diesel for tractors) and farming equipment was also influenced by such power dynamics (Marongwe 2008:326).

Sadomba (2008:168) reveals that war veterans presented a corruption document at a Mashonaland West Provincial Stakeholder Dialogue meeting in 2004, accusing ZANU-PF officials of ‘changing farms willy-nilly’, ‘leasing farms to former white farmers’, and ‘deliberately ignoring the mandatory twenty percent allocations for war veterans’. These problematic actions according to Sadomba (2008:168) led to displacement of occupiers by people connected to the ruling party elites, as well as to what he terms serious internal conflicts within the land occupation movement. Overall, it seems that land was given along political party lines especially in the A2 schemes, with members of the opposition party being sidelined in the process.

According to the Utete Commission, 35 percent of land seized was allocated to A2 beneficiaries. Much of this was potentially productive land in terms of infrastructure, soil-types and locations. Selby (2006:40) remarks that, in Matabeleland, land allocations among key ruling party and security elites were also strategically decided. For example, many A2 farms are along the course of the proposed Zambezi pipeline project. The spoils of ‘fast track’ have gone disproportionately to members and supporters of the regime. Virtually every senior party official, army officer, police chief or Central Intelligence Organisation officer has secured an A2 farm or part of an A2 farm. The war veteran leaders have similarly benefited from A2 farms, along with key individuals in the judiciary, the church and state media houses.

Hence, the actions of the GoZ in hijacking the land occupations and implementing the FTLRP, which often did not benefit those individuals in the land occupation movement (as described by Sadomba (2008)) demonstrates the use of power structures in Zimbabwe by the ruling elite to support or thwart movements depending on the latter’s strategic value. In focusing on the patterns of the land occupation movements in the 1980s and 1990s, many examples arise of land squatters being forcibly removed by the government; but in the year 2000 they were actually supported. What is clear is that there has always been a land movement in Zimbabwe but it existed under specific political contexts controlled by ruling elites; thus land occupations were only possible in 2000 because of state support.

Moyo et al. (2009:5) argue that existing research on land reform in Zimbabwe has failed to properly track the existence of class (and social and ethnic) ‘struggles’ or confrontations over the allocation of land, due to the presumed effective dominance of the ZANU-PF elite over the process. They claim that the land allocation process was not a homogenous process, centrally controlled by ZANU-PF; rather, it was a contested, localised and complex process comprising a range of actors such as war veterans, politicians and traditional leaders. Thus the debate about elite capture of land allocations has tended to treat beneficiaries in an aggregated and undifferentiated manner. Some of the beneficiaries are elites, but their character and the extent to which they benefitted is diverse. The tendency to generalize the notion of an ‘elite’ leaves unexplained the social content of the concept, as well as assuming that elites lack differentiation in what in fact is a dynamic process of class formation. The beneficiaries of land reform were therefore a differentiated grouping, such that to simply claim that only ZANU-PF elites benefitted is erroneous.

Moyo et al. (2009) however seem to downplay the fact that while – within the A1 schemes – many peasants got land, party affiliation was and still is in large part necessary for accessing land. However, Matondi (2005:23) in a study of land allocations in Mazowe District argues that it is very difficult to tell from amongst the beneficiaries who belong to which party. The fact that opposition parties obtained significant votes in the 2005 parliamentary elections in the new resettlement schemes does prove that the land reform allocations cannot simplistically be said to have benefited one political party. ‘Elite capture’ of A1 farms may be absent but there are many cases of land occupiers and new farmers being removed by force by politicians. One such case which made headlines was at Little England Farm in 2003 in Mashonaland West, where a thousand beneficiaries resisted being removed from the farm and defended themselves because state institutions could not provide them with security. In the presence of police they protested and accused politicians saying:

You are corrupt and delivering a corrupt message. How did you come up with 21 people (selected to remain at the farm)? We have suffered enough and we are ready to be killed by the evicting policemen and soldiers. The President must know that his ministers and officials in Mashonaland West are corrupt and receiving bribes from rich people (ZWNEWS online, 19 August 2003).

Many others cases, including in Mazowe, are known of politicians seeking to gain the best lands for themselves and their families. In the light of such cases, the black political middle class amassed land through a programme that might have otherwise benefited many more ordinary Zimbabweans.

Erllich (2011:2), citing the two recent studies by Moyo et al. (2009) and Scoones et al. (2010), concludes that contrary to popular belief land reform in Zimbabwe benefited ordinary Zimbabweans. He denies the prevalent reports that claim that fast track land reform was a ‘land grab’ by ‘cronies’ bringing about a more unequal distribution of land than what had preceded it. The surveys conducted by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (Moyo et al. 2009) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) (Scoones et al. 2010) found that most beneficiaries of land reform are ‘common’ people, whereas those who might be categorized as ‘elites’ constituted a small minority. According to the IDS study, this minority amounted to less than five percent. The figures of beneficiaries²³ show that ordinary Zimbabweans benefited most from the land reform, but Murisa (2010) claims that public service

²³ See the Utete Report (2003).

professionals such as teachers, school principals, post office managers and administrators dominate the A1 farms. He notes:

The majority of these professionals were based in the rural areas and were part of the local elite, therefore when it came to applying for A1 land they took advantage of existing good relations with the chiefs and the local authorities but could not break into the A2 because of lack of official documentation proving their financial capabilities (Murisa 2010:157).

Hence, there is a clear class dimension in relation to the beneficiaries of land reform. This is of importance to this thesis, in terms of how these local elites associate with ordinary people on fast track farms.

4.8 From *jambanja* to Fast Track Land Reform Programme

On the farms government soon disregarded the planning that had been done by war veterans as technocrats took over the process. This led to accusations of corruption and to the removal of some occupiers from farms which were taken over by politicians or individuals connected to senior politicians²⁴. Sadomba (2008) notes that in Nyabira war veterans felt left out of the system because of the intervention of technocrats. Chaumba et al. (2003a:545) add: ‘The violent political demonstration element of the farm invasions during the time of *jambanja* of 2000 was to be replaced with the imposition of a particular type of ‘order’ and ‘planning’, and a shift in register from the political to the technical.’ Technical planning from the colonial times returned through the use of the maps, photo mosaics and chinograph pencils of land-use planners. This did not necessarily mean bringing planning to bear on a state of absolute chaos. Instead, it was often a case of superimposing state planning on settlements which, in many cases, had already been ‘planned’ and surveyed by war veterans and other occupiers, who had measured out fields using tape measures and settled in tidy lines. The implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme nevertheless in many ways meant a devaluation of the power of war veterans and land occupiers over land reform. At technocrats moved in, the occupiers became subservient to those with technical skills in land-use planning.

In Chiredzi, the war veteran commanders of the new resettlement areas and local political leaders were able to exert considerable influence, not just over plot allocation, but also over

²⁴ Sadomba (2008) notes that with government and party officials in control, there were new waves of occupations on already occupied farms in what was termed *jambanja* on *jambanja*.

the precise size and location of plots, frequently making minor adjustments to ‘official’ practice and demarcations (Chaumba et al. 2003b:546). Extension workers sometimes complained of simply following the instructions of war veterans who seemed to be in charge. War veterans saw the exercise as a joint effort with Agritex (the state’s agricultural extension body) and saw themselves as helping out state planners. In land reform plans in the 1990s, there was an emphasis on giving land to those with skills in agriculture or those who could afford to carry out viable projects. Under FTLRP however there was less emphasis on this; for example, 20% of land was to go to war veterans and beneficiary selection for A1 farms was not guided by any known criteria. The new farmers have however bought into the technocratic language of planning originally imposed under colonial rule and they have not been emancipated from these strictures and the technical parameters of disciplining development (Chaumba et al. 2003a:549).

4.9 Livelihoods after resettlement

Scoones et al. (2010:1-2), in the introduction to their important book on fast track, argue that much of what has been written about land reform in Zimbabwe is based on limited empirical work. They note: ‘Those of us exposed regularly to the international, especially British, media found it hard to match what we heard on the TV and radio and read in the newspapers with what we were finding on the ground’ (Scoones et al. 2010:1-2). Critical research around actual experiences ‘on the ground’ of farmers is now being done and shared through the works of Scoones et al. (2010) in Masvingo Province, Moyo et al. (2009) in many districts around the country, and Matondi et al. (2011) in Mazowe. These works show the diverse experiences of farmers who have grappled with an adverse economic environment, reoccurring drought and a serious lack of support from the government. The experiences of these farmers are varied and thus it is erroneous and simplistic to attempt to provide a singular picture of what life on fast track farms entails.

Both Scoones et al. (2010:210) and Moyo et al. (2009:77) note that international NGOs have refrained from providing services to resettled farmers. NGOs could not support a programme they had openly campaigned against. In this regard, Erlich (2011:1) says: ‘Relying for their funding on Western governments hostile to the land reform process, NGOs were loath to support the beneficiaries of a process they preferred to see fail.’ Thus farmers had the government as the only source of funding and support, yet the government was unable to offer all the necessary assistance. Given this serious lack of support, plus droughts and

general lack of infrastructure and social amenities, Scoones et al. (2010:77) note that impressive investments have been made [by farmers] in clearing the land, in livestock, in equipment, in transport and in housing. This has taken place to such an extent that the scale of investment carried out by people themselves, and without significant support from government or aid agencies, is substantial, and provides firm foundations for the future (Scoones et al. 2010:122).

4.9.1 New authority and governance structures in the newly resettled areas

On the new farms, particularly the A1 farms, there were new governance structures emerging such as Committees of Seven at each scheme. The roles of these committees included listening to the people's grievances, addressing problems and leading communities²⁵. Some of these communities have been criticised of being as political tools and of perpetrating violence (Human Rights Watch 2004:4) Chaumba et al. (2003b:17), in the newly resettled areas in Chiredzi, identify four axes of power and authority: war veterans, committees of seven, traditional authority and new elites. All these centres of power compete for space and control, and in many ways they shape social organisation and associational life at farm level. Their influence has to be understood though within the local context in which they appear. For example, in Mazowe, these four axes of power appear in different guises and their influence depends on their locality. On farms with former security forces and army personnel, these new local elites tend to be influential.

It is generally acknowledged that war veterans spearheaded the fast track land reform and in some situations remained in control of all activities at the scheme level (Matondi 2007). Chaumba et al. (2003b:18) argue that the new resettled areas became militarized spaces (as with broader Zimbabwean society) owing to the presence of war veterans and the training of ZANU-PF youth militia. The militarised nature of the farm settler communities was in fact part of a broader pattern of militarisation of Zimbabwean society during 2000-2001. This was aided by the setting up of youth militia training camps across the country under the guidance of the late Minister for Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation, Border Gezi. In the wake of the 2000 Parliamentary election, there was a realisation in ZANU-PF that most youth supported the opposition and were influencing their parents accordingly. The resulting youth brigades were intended to re-educate the lost youth, instil in them a supposedly

²⁵ Matondi (2007) argues that another additional role was entirely political as they monitored movements in their area of operation.

unbiased history of Zimbabwe and be an aggressive campaigning body for the ruling party and foot soldiers in the farm occupations (Chaumba et al. 2003b:18).

The new farms were therefore highly politicized areas, such that at times just knowing an opposition activist was enough for someone to be attacked or removed from the scheme (Chaumba et al. 2003b; Human Rights Watch 2002; McGregor 2002). The ‘Zanu-nization’ of the newly resettled area meant that many forms of associational life were based on or related to the party. Fast track land reform was criticized both locally and internationally for its hasty, incoherent, haphazard, unsystematic, chaotic nature and its tendency of simply ‘dumping’ people on land without adequate infrastructure (such as roads and clinics), and with insufficient provision of inputs, credit and marketing assistance, and agricultural extension advice (Chaumba et al. 2003b:20). Thus new emerging communities were facing serious challenges (including problems with basic infrastructure), while belonging to ‘the party’ (ZANU-PF) seemed to be a prerequisite for residency. In this context, institutionalisation within the farm areas tends to be largely un-critical of ZANU-PF.

War veterans became an important social force because they offered an effective national organisation, reaching down to district level, but they also had symbolic importance as exemplars of the liberation struggle that the ruling party respected and exploited effectively. They were the vanguard of the land reform programme and played the role of vigilante groups, monitoring the movement of people within resettlement schemes. Chaumba et al. (2003a:6) note that war veterans in certain contexts defied District Administrators, politicians and other authorities at the height of *jambanja*. It was only at the later stages of the FTLRP that state institutions began to take back control of the various aspects of the programme, particularly at the district and provincial levels. Hammar (2005:1) quotes an article in Zimbabwe’s former independent daily newspaper, Daily News, which summarised what it saw as the profound undermining of ‘normal’ practices of government by the actions of ‘so-called war veterans’:

The grim reality...is that *we haven’t got a normal government* in Zimbabwe. Whatever the so-called war veterans say is what goes. They can sack teachers, nurses, and district council officials, order the transfer of magistrates, district administrators and senior police officers, close down schools, clinics and rural district council offices. They can disrupt any court proceedings. And, with absolute impunity, they can harass torture or order anybody’s arrest.

War veterans thus became a prominent power base and they were given leeway to use force and coercion, in the main backed by the state. In other words, they became an instrument of the state in unleashing violence especially around election time²⁶. In this respect, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Land (PoZ 2003) reported that the District Administrators in Mashonaland West Province (mostly in Kadoma, Chegutu, Makonde and Zvimba) complained of interference in their work by war veterans. Even some headmen in Zvimba complained how groups of war veterans in their areas were defying their authority (PoZ 2003).

At farm level, the relationship between landowners, farm workers and new settlers was not always cordial; in some areas there was co-existence, in others there were serious tensions. For instance, anecdotal evidence shows that there was less violence in the Midlands province because land transfer proceeded on the basis of negotiations. However, as Sachikonye (2003:69) notes, the relationships created uncertainties because – in a sense – farm workers acted as a kind of buffer between the farmer and the settlers. At the same time, the workers were hostages of the situation: they may have wanted land also, but they could not agitate for it openly and be seen to be joining the settlers. Some farm workers did join the settlers, not in their own workplace but on neighbouring farms.

In their case studies, Moyo et al. (2009:108) show that there is mistrust between settlers and former farm workers because the latter are perceived as anti-land reform. Land beneficiaries accuse former farm workers of refusing to work for new farmers and are thus perceived to be against fast track. On the other hand, former farm workers allege that land beneficiaries are poor employers who pay sub-economic wages for their labour services. The mistrust between former farm workers and land beneficiaries was bred during the period of land occupations, when the former tended to forge alliances with white farmers in defence of the existing farm against land occupiers (although in some cases farm workers were mobilised by war veterans to join the land occupation movement with other peasants from the communal areas – see Sadomba 2008).

Chaumba et al. (2003a:9) highlight that occupiers/settlers represent a broad spectrum of people of varying ages, ethnicities and degrees of wealth. They include men and women,

²⁶ This is what Hammar (2005:4) calls the normalisation of violence as a technology of rule.

communal area farmers and urban employees, Christians and spirit mediums – all with contrasting motivations for being there. For example, there are a few females who headed households in Chiredzi who were either widowed or divorced and came because they had failed to access land in the communal areas. These ‘new farmers’ were at first united by politics as the rhetoric of reclaiming ‘our stolen land’ marked their identity as Zimbabweans. The mentality of ‘them’ against ‘us’ became dominant as they saw former white farmers, opposition parties and Western countries as enemies bent on stalling or reversing their gains. This creation of a shared identity has ensured, in the short term at least, a camaraderie and togetherness among new farmers who have cooperated in many ways to ensure that they are effective communities.

The FTLRP was characterised by violence, coercion and opportunism. Farms were initially invaded by war veterans, who were often mobilised by district level war veterans’ associations (Chaumba et al. 2003b). On each farm there were base commanders whose real purpose was not clearly outlined. Many of them were involved in illicit activities such as closing farm roads; cutting down trees; poaching; cattle theft and mutilation; starting fires; attacking game guards; demanding meat and mealie meal from white farmers; looting property and sugar cane; ordering farmers, farm workers and neighbouring villagers to attend political rallies; defying police orders; and, at one stage, appropriating a police vehicle (Chaumba et al. 2003b:542). Base commanders wielded significant local power in most parts of the country. In Mazowe, there were former war veterans within ZANU-PF structures who were appointed caretakers on some farms to oversee the infrastructure left by white farmers. In some instances, the caretaker became problematic as he wielded so much power that, in the case of Selby Farm, he ended up siphoning movable property off the farm.


As an overall tendency, there were various competing institutional forms which were set up on an ad hoc basis on the newly settled farms, which lead to confusion, duplication and conflict. The farmers therefore were under the control of the state in its various competing faces – as war veterans, as ZANU-PF, as traditional leaders and as extension workers. This duplication and contestation often became magnified after the departure of the white farmer.

4.9.2 Social relationships in the newly resettled areas

Munyuki-Hungwe (2008:31) notes that, in Mazowe district, religious groupings are offering social networking space in new resettlement areas. Most A1 farmers in the resettlement areas

belong to a church or loose religious grouping. With the absence of physical structures such as churches, the A1 farmers normally belong to various groupings called apostolic faith churches. Social relationships at farm level have thus been greatly influenced and aided by religion. More broadly, Moyo et al. (2009:151) note that there are various types of associative networks that are emerging from within the newly redistributed areas, while others already existent in communal areas are also being replicated on A1 farms. Such organisations include farmers associations, women's organisations and religious (church) groups.

Figure 1: Arda Farm layout



Source: Munyuki-Hungwe, 2008

In Mazowe there are a few farms in which an A2 farmer shares the farm with A1 farmers. Munyuki-Hungwe (2008:25) argues that in such instances conflicts tend to arise as class and power issues come to the fore. The A2 farmers are socially different to A1 farmers in that they are not under traditional leadership; as well, politically they tend to have higher posts in ZANU-PF and economically they have more resources. There is one case, at Arda Farm, in which the A2 farmer had taken over all productive assets and claimed ownership of everything on the farm. Figure 1 above shows the farm outline and composition, indicating

how the area with the most productive assets belongs to the A2 farmer (Munyuki-Hungwe 2008:26). At the end of 2009, the A2 farmer finally managed to have the A1 farmers resettled elsewhere and now the farm belongs exclusively to him.

4.9.3 Gender relations on fast track farms

In Zimbabwe overall, not many women accessed land through fast track; the Utete Report (2003) claims that only eighteen percent of beneficiaries were women. The problem is that the discourse of land reform has almost totally ignored gender, as Kesby (1999:38) notes: ‘Unfortunately, debates about imminent land tenure reform are constructed around issues of race and economic efficiency, leaving those related to gender as a largely unanalysed set of assumptions.’ At the same time, the resettlement programme has opened up a sanctuary for a class of women who had found it difficult to survive and possess land in their own right within the communal areas. Chaumba et al. (2003a:10) note that it is quite common for widows and divorcees to be accused of witchcraft and causing the death of husbands (particularly in AIDS cases), and they are sometimes even chased away by their in-laws. Resettlement provides an opportunity to start anew with the provision of new livelihoods opportunities. Though in Mazowe such stories are rare, there is a new breed of combatant women who not only partook in the initial land invasions but have carved out a niche for themselves. Selby Farm in Ward 21 offers examples of women who have benefited from the land reform programme. The farm committee is made up of women who were all part of the land invasions, and they have over the years worked very hard to ensure that women have equal access to inputs.

In patrilineal societies, such as among the Shona, women’s access to land is mediated by their relationship to men. In communal areas where land is owned by clans and is traced back to ancestors, married women are viewed as outsiders with only secondary rights to land. They are given small strips of land to grow their own vegetables and crops. Land is passed down through men from generation to generation. A revolutionary programme such as the one undertaken in Zimbabwe offers a chance to reconstitute gender patterns in land possession and access. This is because the land is provided by the state in such a way that there is no connection to ancestors or lineage. Goebel (2005:152) notes that certain aspects of the resettlement policies and processes in the 1980s and 1990s created strategic spaces for some women, especially widows, to improve their access to arable land. On the death of a husband, for example, a resettlement widow was able to retain control of her homestead and fields, and

to even have the name on the resettlement permit changed from the husband's to her own. Married women also reported that their families' access to large arable fields in resettlement areas had improved their ability to grow crops under their control.

However the patrilineal mode of organisation is now being implemented in the newly resettled areas. In this regard, the control, administration and management of land by men are vital ways of controlling women. Land, tradition and culture are used as important bases in the construction and reinforcement of masculine domination. Hence, as Goebel (2005:153) notes, the tenuousness of women's relationship to resettlement land must be understood through the lens of culture and ritual, particularly through the ways in which 'tradition' is deployed in the resettlement context ... [where] ... aspects of traditional culture such as family ancestor appeasement and bringing home the dead (*kurova guva*) are commonly practised.' These practices enact and express a cosmology that understands the environs as populated by and under the care of ancestral spirits. The practices also reinforce patrilineal control of land and hence distance women from the possibility of controlling land in their own right. Space for women in the newly resettled areas is thus limited and their influence is minimal in terms of decision-making.

While previous sections in this chapter have concentrated on various aspects of fast track land reform, there is need to understand the broader social, economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe during that period. The next section interrogates this context through historically analyzing how the crisis (characterised by food shortages, hyperinflation, cash shortages, mass migration etc) that affected Zimbabwe post-2000 came about. This is important because it provides the context in which new farming communities emerged and highlights the role of land reform in the crisis.

4.10 Zimbabwean crisis post-2000

It is important to paint the economic, social and political picture of the Zimbabwean crisis. Gross domestic product (GDP) in Zimbabwe declined by about 43 percent between 2000 and 2007. Coltart (2008:2) notes that agriculture, which historically was the mainstay of the economy, declined dramatically after 2000 due to the land reform programme. For example, annual wheat production plummeted from a high of over 300,000 tons in 1990 to less than 50,000 in 2007. Tobacco, which was Zimbabwe's single largest generator of foreign exchange and accounted for almost one-third of Zimbabwe's foreign exchange earnings in

2000, fell from US\$600 million in earnings in 2000 to less than US\$125 million in 2007²⁷. The manufacturing sector shrunk by more than 47 percent between 1998 and 2006, which carried output levels back to figures recorded in 1972 (Coltart 2008:2). Government figures indicate that the rate of inflation had been rising since 2000 and had reached its highest at more than 1,500 percent in 2008 (Central Statistical Office2008). Independent analysts however placed the rate of inflation at 150,000 percent. At the time, the second highest inflation rate in the world was Iraq at only 58%.

The end result of this was the widespread migration (legal and illegal) of Zimbabweans (skilled and non-skilled) to all parts of the world but mainly South Africa, United Kingdom, Australia and Botswana²⁸. Further, with unemployment hitting the 80%²⁹ mark in 2008, Robertson (2008) estimated that the proportion of the population living below the official poverty line had more than doubled since the mid-1990s to over 80 percent. Coltart (2008:7) adds that Zimbabwe's human development indicators ranked 151st of 177 countries surveyed. In 2006, the World Health Organization reported that people living in Zimbabwe have one of the lowest life expectancies in the world. Since 1994, the average life expectancy for women in Zimbabwe has fallen from 57 years to 34 years and for men from 54 years to 37 years.

According to WHO, an estimated 3,500 Zimbabweans die every week through the deadly combination of HIV/AIDS, poverty and malnutrition. The 2005 Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) report also estimated that 36 percent (2.9 million) of the rural population would not be able to meet its household food requirements during the 2005/06 season (Murisa 2010:72). According to findings released in July 2006 by the Zimbabwe Demographic Health Survey, the health of Zimbabwean children has deteriorated dramatically. For example, in 70 percent of Zimbabwe's provinces, more children suffer from stunted growth now than ever before. Coupled with HIV and AIDS, the Zimbabwean crisis

²⁷ It should be noted that tobacco production has increased and small farmers are starting to produce. Tobacco output increased from 58 million kilogrammes in 2009 to 123 million kilogrammes in 2010. <http://www.thecropsite.com>

²⁸ Between 3 million and 4.5 million Zimbabweans are estimated to be living abroad. <http://www.dfzim.com>

²⁹ Formal sector urban employment shrunk from 3.6 million in 2003 to 480,000 in 2008 (*Mail and Guardian*, 18 January 2009)

hence has had serious humanitarian consequences, which was worsened in 2005 by Operation Murambatsvina³⁰ which displaced over million people in urban areas.

4.10.1 Explaining the Zimbabwean crisis

The aftermath of the FTLRP saw criticism from Western donors, and this brought with it sanctions, suspension of balance of payments supports, reductions in direct foreign investment and in tourism, and decreases in humanitarian aid. This took place in combination with a decrease in agricultural productivity and a subsequent fall in industrial production in downstream industries. The effect was a rapidly devaluating Zimbabwean dollar, enormous inflation and high unemployment figures. To understand the politico-economic environment in which this research took place, we first have to unravel what is meant by the Zimbabwean crisis. Populist and easy explanations of Zimbabwe post-2000 have tended to brand Robert Mugabe as the sole cause of the crisis. As Pulitzer Prize-winner Samantha Power (2003) said: ‘The country’s economy in 1997 was the fastest growing in all of Africa; now it is the fastest shrinking ... How could the breadbasket of Africa have deteriorated so quickly into the continent’s basket case? The answer is Robert Mugabe.’

In answering the question of when Zimbabwe’s economic downturn started, Bond (2007:149) notes significant historical points in the country’s recent history. These include the land invasions in the year 2000, the unbudgeted payment to war veterans and Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC war (the latter two factors played a part in the sudden devaluation of the Zimbabwean currency by 74% in November 1997 – known as Black Friday); the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme; and the heavy borrowing by government in the 1980s to fund social services provision. All these historical moments played a significant part in the ensuing crisis in Zimbabwe. Coupled with this is the Lancaster House Agreement which resisted radical reordering of land ownership in Zimbabwe and protected white property rights.

Murisa (2010:73) highlights that there are various explanations for the emergence of the crisis. Some identify the roots of the crisis in the IMF and World Bank-led economic reform programmes adopted in 1990 (Moyo 2001; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Murisa 2008); while

³⁰ 92,460 housing structures were demolished directly affecting 133,534 households. 32,538 structures of micro- and medium-size enterprises were demolished. Thus 569,685 people lost their homes and 97,614 lost their primary source of livelihood. <http://ww2.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf>

others (Hammar et al. 2003; Richardson 2005) emphasise the ‘mismanagement’ of the economy, corruption and the inappropriate manner in which land reform was executed by the GoZ and the consequent loss of property rights.

The government of Zimbabwe has over the years blamed the economic malaise in Zimbabwe on sanctions imposed (mainly by America) on the country. Western countries have denied this, claiming that what are in place are targeted sanctions and travel embargos specifically directed at members of the ZANU-PF regime. Erlich (2011:1) argues that by abandoning the destructive Western-initiated structural adjustment programme, and then by accelerating land reform efforts in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of land, Zimbabwe triggered Western hostility. Neo-liberal sensitivities were offended, and punishment was not long in coming. By late 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which instructed U.S. officials in international financial institutions to ‘oppose and vote against any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe’ (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 2001). The U.S. wields enormous influence in the decisions of the IMF, World Bank and other international financial institutions. Great Britain and other Western countries were of like mind, and Zimbabwe was shut out of the kind of normal credit operations that are essential for any modern economy to operate. The sanctions on Zimbabwe are real and have had a serious impact on the economy. ZANU-PF thus has some justification in claiming that sanctions have been the major cause of the economic downturn.

Critics of the FTLRP, including the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change, the (white) Commercial Farmers Union, Western donors and NGOs, have tried to pin the causes of the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe on the land reform programme. There are in fact many competing ways of explaining the Zimbabwean crisis which, when brought together, provide a more rounded picture of how internal problems (such as corruption, economic mismanagement and political polarisation) and external influences (for example sanctions) combine in the development of the crisis.

4.10.2 Debates on compensating white farmers

Another contentious issue is on compensation to white farmers. With respect to compensation, several key questions need answers. For example, on what grounds is the compensation to white landowning commercial farmers justified – on moral, humanitarian,

political or economic grounds? What is the compensation to cover? Is it to compensate for the confiscation of the large share of the productive land with adequate rainfall? Is it to compensate whites for enormous government subsidies, as was the case between 1935 and 1956, when a 50 percent subsidy, including technical support, was made available to facilitate the construction of dams for irrigation? Is it to compensate for the generous capital supply made available by commercial institutions and government parastatals agencies, including a well-organized and coordinated system of funding operations, such as financial packages for the acquisition of farms under a deferred loan repayment plan? Is it to compensate for other forms of support, which included an elaborate communication infrastructure and marketing services? Or is it to compensate for the preferential treatment accorded white farmers over black farmers for nearly a century? (Nnoma 2008:374).

4.10.3 Inclusive government and land in Zimbabwe

On 15th September 2008 the three major political party players³¹ in Zimbabwe signed the ‘Global Political Agreement’ (GPA) to end the political stalemate that had plunged the country into further crisis after the 2008 presidential election. The election was riddled by violence and allegations of cheating, gross abuse of human rights and the withdrawal of Morgan Tsvangirai from the re-run. This paved the way for an inclusive government that was formed in February 2009. Given the differences in their approaches to land reform and their rhetoric in the local newspapers over the issue, land became a serious area of contestation.

The GPA section on land had the following provisions: (a) Conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, during the tenure of the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, for the purpose of establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships; (b) Ensure that all Zimbabweans who are eligible to be allocated land and who apply for it shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of race, gender, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation; (c) Ensure security of tenure to all land holders; (d) Call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former land owners for resettlement; (e) Work together to secure international support and finance for the land reform programme in terms of compensation for the former land owners and support for new farmers; and (f) Work together for the restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land (Global Political Agreement 2008).

³¹ ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations led by Morgan Tsvangirayi and Welshman Ncube. The MDC split into two parties after a dispute over participating in senatorial elections.

The GPA however provided some relief to Zimbabweans. In an attempt to restore credibility in the monetary system and also to arrest the hyperinflationary trend, the Government of Zimbabwe introduced the use of multi-currency on 30th January 2009, including the adoption of a multi-foreign currency system. Following the introduction of this regime, the month-on-month inflation trend sharply declined from the rate of above 49 billion percent to less than 1 percent since February 2009 (Makochekamwa 2010). The Government further suspended the use of the local currency, the Zimbabwean dollar (Z\$), on 13th April 2009 initially for a year, and then later for a further three years (starting from January 2010). According to the country's three-year macroeconomic framework announced on 23rd December 2009, GoZ would maintain use of multiple currencies until 2012. Thus, the use of multiple currencies and the suspension of the Zimbabwean dollar from the monetary system have resulted in immediate and tangible effects on the economy. For instance, besides single digit month-on-month inflations rates, the country for the first time in more than a decade has registered a positive economic growth rate and average production activities have leapfrogged from less than 10 percent in January 2009 to above 35 percent by the end of December 2009 (Makochekamwa 2010). This has meant the availability of food and other products in the shops. As well, inputs such as fertilizers and seeds are now available although most farmers may not have the money to buy them. Despite these positive trends, most rural farmers without any source of income are finding it difficult to get their hands on foreign currency.

4.11 Conclusion

FTLRP has seen the emergence of new actors who are negotiating land reform on the ground, situated in a new political terrain where new identities, patronage and client networks are at play. This chapter solely focused on FTLRP since this programme forms the basis for the formation of the communities that this thesis discusses. It highlighted the various debates and schools of thought surrounding the FTLRP. One school of thought argues that land reform was instigated by war veterans as part of ZANU-PF's official campaign strategy for the 2000 elections and as a response to the dwindling support for the party as shown by the results of the February 2000 referendum on the state-sponsored constitution. An opposing perspective views the land occupations in 2000 as part of a longer-term and clearly identifiable land occupation movement in post-independent Zimbabwe. The chapter has provided the context in which life for new farmers started: a context of economic and political hardships characterised by world record inflation, lack of inputs and lack of support. It is in this context of need and lack that this thesis offers an analysis of how institutionalisation became an

important survival strategy for new farmers. The next chapter offers a more localised experience of land reform in Mazowe.

CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND SETTLER CHARACTERISTICS IN A1 FARMS IN MAZOWE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the new communities in Mazowe, analysing their social character and social organisation. The chapter is based on the survey carried out in Mazowe in 2007/2008, secondary data and interviews I conducted in 2009 and 2010. Firstly, it provides a brief history of land reform in Mazowe showing how it has evolved over the years. Secondly, it offers an understanding of the background and social differentiation of the farmers who acquired land in Mazowe. In doing so, it tries to paint a vivid description of these new inhabitants showing their age, religion, ethnicity, family structure, hopes, ambitions, process of acquiring land and various challenges they are facing. I provide an analysis of the novel forms of association, actors, communities and relationships that have metamorphosed post-2000, showing how they are shaping and being shaped by the conditions of life in the resettlement areas.

The chapter paints a picture of the people that now form communities in Mazowe. It is only through knowing who they are and their lived experiences that we are able to analyse the various forms of institutions that they have formed. This involves focusing on the various factors affecting their everyday lives such as housing, access to clean water, transportation, health and education. The way communities meet these germane needs of life is very revealing about their character and social organisation. The chapter ends by highlighting the hopes and fears of the various individuals who took a leap of faith into the frontier of new resettlements in the hope of making a better life for themselves and their families. While focusing on assorted aspects of the new settlers' lives, the chapter also looks at the lives of minority groups who now transect and interact with the new inhabitants. These include farm workers and the few remaining white farmers. In this regard, the focus is mainly on the farm workers because they interact more often with A1 farmers who are the main subject of this research.

5.2 Land reform in Mazowe

At independence in 1980, Mazowe was prime agricultural land, located near the capital city of Harare, and was owned and occupied mostly by white farmers with only a few black farmers being in a position to buy farms³². Only minimal land was redistributed prior to 2000 because white farmers were not predisposed to giving up such prime land. The influx of black farmers was mainly through individual purchases of land by those who could afford the market prices. The willing buyer-willing seller policy adopted at the Lancaster House Conference in 1980 and in effect for the first ten years of independence meant that white farmers only sold land in less productive areas. Mazowe, as a productive agricultural district, was hence so valuable that land was rarely made available for resettlement. Moyo (1999:2) notes that in the 1990s – under structural adjustment – there was an emergence of new and global markets for the products of rural land and natural resources, and the resultant land use conversions particularly towards wildlife management, horticultural export cropping, livestock exports and other tourism related land uses.⁴ Many farms in Mazowe were converted to these various land uses, such that even game farms and crocodile farms emerged. Under such a regime, land reform was put aside and left unaddressed by the state as liberalisation meant soaring land prices.

As the wave of farm occupations spread across the country in early 2000, Mazowe district was not spared. Chaumba et al (2003b:534) note that war veterans spearheaded this process which took on a military style organisation. Sadomba (2008) provides a vivid description of the organisation and experience of these land occupations which included traditional leaders, landless peasants, some farm workers and unemployed urban elements. As planning and technocracy replaced the *jambanja* phase (late 2000-2001) the government of Zimbabwe created two types of resettlement models (A1 and A2) while numerous whole farms were taken over by government elites. Indigenous (black)-owned farms acquired before 2000 (forty farms in Mazowe) as well as land owned by different institutions and international organisations were not affected by resettlement (Matondi 2005). Officially, access to land was through the application process, with forms being submitted by applicants to the Ministry of Lands. Successful applicants were then invited to the survey and demarcation exercise on farms which was carried out by Agritex extension officers. For some applicants who had

³² Key informant interview with Agritex officer in Glendale on 20th April 2009.

participated in the land occupations, it was only a matter of regularising their land possession; other occupiers though were resettled on farms that they had not originally occupied.

Matondi (2005:14) notes that, under the A1 scheme, successful applicants were allocated plots by the District Administrator's office in Mazowe using a raffle system, whereby the applicant would simply pick a numbered card and that would be his or her plot number. The A1 model was mainly villagised, as the government sought to make it easier and cheaper to provide various social amenities such as schools, water and electricity. The A2 model, on the other hand, was premised on the ability of the applicant to raise funds required for commercial agriculture. Table 2 below outlines the number of farms and beneficiaries by Intensive Conservation Area (ICA) in Mazowe. Data from the district lands office indicate that in 2004 Mazowe was very popular in terms of applicants for land. In fact, Matondi (2008:28) suggests that Mazowe had perhaps the highest number of applications for land with 11,081 in 2004 nationally. At that time, 5,658 applicants had been successful. However, because of problems of surveying and demarcation, not all successful applicants were accommodated (Matondi, 2005). There were over 5,000 beneficiaries in both the A1 and A2 schemes on 338 farms. The total farms in Mazowe are over 450, including (besides A1 and A2 schemes) farms owned by institutions, government parastatals, municipalities, remaining white land owners (less than ten) and 'indigenous' black owners. The waiting lists for both A1 and A2 farms triple the number of qualifying beneficiaries, making Mazowe district a choice district for would-be farmers.

Table 2: Number of Schemes and Beneficiaries in Mazowe

ICA	A1		A2	
	Schemes	Beneficiaries	Schemes	Beneficiaries
Barwick	24	795	72	396
Glendale	50	1 357	103	246
Marodzi – Tatagura	14	360	37	415
Mvurwi	17	1 615	21	393
Total	105	4 127	233	1 450

NB: Distribution by ICA shows that there are less schemes and beneficiaries than officially recognized for the A1 model. The Ministry of Lands in Mazowe states that they have 136 schemes and 4,215 beneficiaries. However, estimates show that there are 105 schemes with 4,127 beneficiaries. For the A2 model, the distribution by ICA shows that there are more schemes and beneficiaries than recognized in the official records.

Source: Matondi 2005.

5.3 The beneficiaries of FTLRP: Social differentiation of new farmers in Mazowe

The new farmer communities are composed of an assortment of people from different backgrounds, educational qualifications, religious denominations, ages, genders and ethnicities. This collection of individuals, families and communities include plot-holders, their spouses and children, old farm workers, new farm workers, indigenous commercial farmers and a few remaining white farmers. To understand everyday associational life and institutionalisation requires an examination of the people in these communities. The foregoing discussion outlines the various characteristics of the new farmers including occupation, area of origin, livelihoods, family structure, current location and residency.

5.3.1 Origins and date of settlement of beneficiaries

The 2007/2008 survey highlights that 33% of the respondents were from the nearby Chiweshe communal areas, 6% from other areas in Mazowe district and 17% from within other parts of Mashonaland Central Province (within which Mazowe district falls). In addition, a significant number of people were from Harare (9% but this is less than anticipated given the short distance between the capital city and Mazowe) and 35% were from other parts of Zimbabwe. Even then, these Harare-based settlers moved from Chiweshe communal lands and they saw themselves as originating from there and not the city. Many of the farmers thus originate from the same general area and probably know and share the social norms and cultural practices of that area. People sharing the same social history, who might in fact have come from the same village or had been friends (or are even connected by marriage or blood) regularly find it easier to relate to each other. Barr (2004:1754) argues that familiarity is an important precondition for trust to occur. Notwithstanding these pre-existing social bonds within the newly formed resettlement villages, there were many pairs of households that were strangers to one another. Because of this, one of the tasks facing many newly resettled villagers was to forge social relationships and thereby transform their new co-villagers from ‘strangers into neighbours’ and their villages from mere clusters of homesteads into effective communities (Barr 2004:1753).

Another important element in the formation of these communities is that people did not settle all at once. Households moved onto the farms at different times and this meant having new neighbours with whom bonds would have to be formed constantly. Only 6.9% of the respondents settled in 2000, and these households were at the frontier of the land occupations. They in many ways see themselves as the original settlers and fighters for the land, and they

tend to be more visible and influential on schemes since most of them are war veterans. In 2001, another 25.8% further settled in Mazowe while 28.4% came in 2002, 22.8% in 2003, 6.5% in 2004, 3.9% in 2005 and 5.2% in 2006. The extent of settlement seems to be decreasing year on year but shows no signs of stopping. The reports at the lands office in Mazowe show that people were still being given plots in 2010.

5.3.2 Journey to the resettlement: Processes and motivation to acquire land

The stories of new farmers' journeys to the resettlement farms highlight contrasting processes and justifications of people seeking land. Different people joined the land reform 'bandwagon' for varying reasons. Understanding people's motivations for acquiring land is important because, for most farmers especially in the A1 resettlement areas, it was about finding a rural home rather than looking at land as a commercial entity. Matondi ³³(2005:4) identifies seven types of beneficiaries of the land reform programme in Mazowe district as shown in Table 3 below. This shows a variety of different categories of people who used various tactics to gain access to A1 plots.

Access to land was mediated through various means and mechanisms. Gaining entry into Mazowe was particularly difficult for potential farmers because of the intense competition for land in the district. For most urban and professional dwellers, especially those within government, the proximity of the district to Harare was a distinct advantage since they could monitor farm activities while holding on to their employment. This 'bribe' of cell phone farmers, who manage by remote control, is mainly evident among A2 farmers as 56% of these farmers are not resident on the farm.

The motivations for accessing land are complex and multiple. The reasons for seeking land were interconnected and did not have a distinct pattern. The respondents provided a variety of stories as to the motivation of accessing land, such that it is difficult to clearly delineate specific economic, political and social reasons. The most common reason for accessing land was the need for larger arable land. Most respondents indicated that there was not enough land in the areas from where they came. The respondents coming from urban centres noted

³³ Matondi (2005) is a five volume (Mazowe-based) report that examines land reform, agricultural production and marketing, and institutional and social services after implementation of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe.

that they had no land on which to farm, and most settlers in farms near Harare such as Selby and Dunbury Park are from urban areas.

Table 3: Beneficiaries of the resettlement programme in Mazowe District

Category	Type	Presence in Mazowe district
1. Ordinary	These were mostly people from Chiweshe communal areas as well as from urban areas such as Harare, Chitungwiza and others	These constituted the bulk of the beneficiaries
2. Civil servants	From different ministries. However, those from agricultural-related ministries tended to be prioritised	Close to 20% of the civil service seem to have benefitted in both the A1 and A2 schemes
3. Security forces	Zimbabwe Republic Police, Army, Central Intelligence Organisation, Air Force	They have a very strong presence in the district
4. War veterans	These included veterans of the liberation struggle plus war collaborators and ex-detainees	Based on 20% national allocation which was applied in Mazowe
5. Women	Land reform was seen as a chance to redress historical gender imbalances	Around 13% benefitted in the A1 and 10% in the A2 scheme
6. Youths	As the vanguard of the party they got specific farms. In addition there was a policy from the land committee that recommended two youth to be allocated on any A1 scheme	Less than 3% of the youth seem to have benefitted through this arrangement
7. Farm workers	Specific farms were allocated to farm workers. But beneficiaries were also encouraged to set aside land for farm workers as the former owners used to do. This ownership varies from season to season.	Less than 5% benefitted in the whole district

From the survey results, it seems that the District Administrator's office was central to the land acquisition process. Table 4 below shows that 35% of respondents acquired land through the District Administrator. A significant percentage (22.7%) took part in the land invasions but they still had to regularise their land possession through registering with the District Land Committee. The marginal role of chiefs (0.9%) who are purportedly the guardians of the land is telling. However, later chapters will show how chiefs have tried to reassert their control within the newly resettled areas through appointing headmen. Undocumented reports also claim that chiefs continue to give out land without proper authority. Another interesting practice seen on some farms in parcelling out land was a 5% quota for those coming from for instance Mt Darwin (such as at Davaar Farm). This was because some districts like Mt Darwin did not have farms on which to resettle people.

Table 4: Process of Getting Land for A1 and A2 Beneficiaries

How they got land	Type of scheme				Total	
	A1		A2		No.	%
	No.	%	No.	%		
<i>Jambanja</i>	79	14.7	43	8.0	122	22.7
Applied to AREX	5	.9	1	0.2	6	1.1
Applied to DA	170	31.7	19	3.5	189	35.2
Applied to Councillor	33	6.1	0	0	33	6.1
Applied to ZANU PF	6	1.1	0	0	6	1.1
Applied to Chief	3	0.6	2	0.4	5	0.9
Applied to Min. of Lands	19	3.5	99	18.4	118	22.0
Applied to Lands committee	21	3.9	23	4.3	44	8.2
Inherited	7	1.3	1	0.2	8	1.5
Not answered	6	1.1	0	0	6	1.1

The new resettlement programme offered new hope for the impoverished people within both the urban and communal areas. Among the respondents, a vast majority saw the chance for increased and optimal production within the prime lands in the formerly white-owned areas. The lure of fertile soils and the chance for irrigation gave most people the hope for increased production and the economic gains to be found in agriculture. Most saw a chance to venture into farming as a full-scale business venture. A few respondents highlighted that they were not employed and saw resettlement as an opportunity to be self-employed as farmers. A number of the plot holders indicated political motivations for accessing land. Most of these simply ‘regurgitated’ the government’s popular saying that ‘we are reclaiming what is rightfully ours.’

They see land as their birthright and reclaiming the farms was merely redressing the injustice done to their forefathers. Respondents who were war veterans and had fought in the war of liberation indicated that land was the prize for the sacrifices they had made in the war. They said that it was only fair for them to get the land because it was what they had been promised in the war. Repossession of land from whites was a form of justice in the eyes of these respondents and that it took until the year 2000 to happen was unacceptable. One woman, whose husband was killed during the liberation struggle, said that she was motivated by the memory of her husband to access land and getting land was proof to her that her husband did not die in vain.

5.3.3 Gender dimension of access to land

Goebel (2005:10) argues that the tenuousness of women's relationship to resettlement land must be understood through the lens of culture and ritual, particularly through the ways in which 'tradition' is being deployed in the resettlement context. Kesby (1999:29) adds that the linkages between land and tradition are profoundly about the construction and reconstruction of masculinity. Men have dominated the land reform process since independence in Zimbabwe. Generally the resettlement policy has maintained the approach to land which is commonly associated with Shona custom. This approach prevents married women from gaining access to land in their own right. Resettlement permits³⁴ were assigned to married couples in the husband's name only (Chenau-Repond, 1993; Goebel, 1999). In Mazowe, the majority of people (81.8% in A1 and 84.8% in A2) who got land were men (Table 5 below). Women constitute 18.2% of the plot holders in A1 schemes, which represents a figure similar to the national average of 18% (Utete Land Report 2003).

Table 5: Sex of plot holder

Model	Sex %	
	Male	Females
A1	81.8	18.2
A2	84.8	15.2

Gender organisation is a critical indicator in understanding the power relations involved in community building and institutional formation. The dominance of men in land possession mirrors their dominance in the social and political spheres in the newly resettled areas. Moyo (2002:9) argues that the ethnic basis of rural leadership and its patriarchal grounding reproduce the male dominance of rural associations' leadership and their encroachment even into the leadership ranks of mainly women's organisations. Women in most rural institutions are given token positions either as secretary or the responsibility for gender issues. Women-based institutions tend to coalesce at the margins of mainstream rural economic and political systems; they are rarely autonomous and do not espouse any feminist or empowerment ideology. This marginalisation of women is disturbing in Zimbabwe given that they constitute more than 52% of the total population of Zimbabwe (National Gender Policy of Zimbabwe 2004) and more than 60% of the women in Zimbabwe depend on farming (Matondi 2008:45).

³⁴ In the first resettlement areas in the 1980s.

5.3.4 Age and family structures of new farmers

The youngest plot holder in the survey was twenty four years old and the oldest was eighty five years old. The average age of plot holders is forty six years, which means that those within the upper middle age range regularly got access to land. People of this age are also more likely to have existing land in the nearby communal areas. Younger people found it difficult to access land. This is a reflection of the age-based nature of Zimbabwean society in which the youth are only required as foot soldiers; yet, when it comes to reaping the rewards, they are left on the margins. Sadomba (2008) notes that unemployed youths were part of the movement that participated in the land occupations but this is not expressed in the land ownership patterns that have emerged post land reform. This clearly highlights that age is an important factor in social organisation and it affects the social capital one can acquire within the community. Age influences not only access to physical resources but also engagement in social networks and decision-making positions. Institutionalisation, which is the main subject of this thesis, is thus effected by age as older people tend to control the most influential farm scheme groups.

Analysis of the family structure and organisation of the new farming households has important labour availability implications. This is because most small-scale farmers depend on family labour for production purposes. Baar (2004:1761), in her study of civil society activity in the first resettlement areas in Zimbabwe, highlights that larger households and households with a greater proportion of aged members maintain a larger number of civil-social memberships. The average household size on A1 farms in Mazowe is seven, with the smallest household having one member and the biggest with twenty-one. As well, the respondents alluded to the fact that households had on average three dependents staying outside the plot. This includes children who are attending school elsewhere away from the farm. Households have an average of three children under fifteen and less than one person over sixty-five. These age groups are largely dependent on the fifteen to sixty five age group, with the high average (seven per household) implying a high dependence ratio. This however may be erroneous given the amount of work (involving long hours) that children in the newly resettled areas are being made to undertake. Rather than being dependents strictly speaking, they form an integral part of the agricultural workforce such that those households without children are disadvantaged compared to those with many (at least in terms of labour supply).

The most important finding in the survey was the presence of split households or the maintenance of dual homes. Most new farmers are maintaining two separate households as they try to cope with the uncertainty of resettlement life. There are many reasons for these split households but they appear to be a coping mechanism to protect their land rights through maintaining their communal homes. Some farmers (19.5%) still farm on the communal plot while others have left their children or relatives (66.2%) on the land in case they ever need to return to their communal land. Others from urban areas have a house in the city that they are maintaining together with the farm. Split households mean that at any given time these farmers are trying to invest in and maintain both homes. However, such households have led to many social problems; for example at Hamilton Farm some men now have two wives (one in town or the communal area and the other one on the A1 farm). These novel types of households are bringing with them a different set of social issues such as absent parenting, extra marital affairs and associated social trauma with which communities have to deal. Split families and households need to be understood as they evolve, in order to analyze their impact on children and the social structure in the newly resettled areas.

5.3.5 Education levels, occupation, livelihoods and class background

Education levels and occupations of newly resettled farmers are instructive in understanding the class background of the new communities. Local and international media reports have tended to argue that land reform in Zimbabwe benefited the urban middle class, employed mostly within government. Marongwe (2008:309) notes that the key social characteristics of new farmers in Zimbabwe are generally: high education/literacy levels, dual residence (farm and urban or other rural home) and multiple livelihood options. Education, class and occupation have a direct bearing on the nature and type of associational forms that emerge within societies. The survey in Mazowe highlights that 75.5% of the plot holders have attended secondary school and 19.1% have primary education; this leaves only 5.4% with no education. From the findings it can be concluded that 94.6% of the interviewed beneficiaries have at least received primary education and thus can be considered to be literate. High literacy levels affect the nature of associational life in that scheme-level institutions tend to have a more or less formalised structure and record keeping.

The majority of the new farmers in Mazowe (60%) are full-time farmers and 40% are part-time farmers. A further analysis reveals that 73.8% of A1 and 42.2% of A2 farmers are full-

time. Agriculture thus is the major source of livelihood for the majority of A1 farmers but less so for A2 farmers. Comparatively speaking, A1 farmers have more motivation to ensure that their productivity is sufficient for sustaining livelihoods. They are thus more likely to engage in activities such as cooperatives or groupings for productive purposes. Only a small percentage (23.7%) of A2 farmers resides on the plot, which explains why they are rarely part of associational life in the newly resettled communities. A1 farmers on the other hand are largely (81.9%) resident on the plot. These are the farmers who form the heart and soul of the emerging communities. They experience daily the conditions and nature of life at the frontier of these new farms, discovering novel ways of mitigating the various challenges that they are facing. My thesis concentrates on these A1 farmers because they organise and associate with each other as they build new communities, more so than A2 farmers. This is not only because they in the main reside on the plots, as the villagised nature of their settlements (unlike A2 farmers who reside alone) also facilitates association.

Off-farm strategies are varied but rarely practiced by the new farmers in Mazowe. For example, only 3% have flea market operations, 1.3% are involved in cross border trading and a further 3.7% engage in trading within Zimbabwe. This lack of diversified livelihood options leaves farmers at the mercy of droughts or misdirected agricultural policies. The farmers are even more rarely involved in exploiting their natural environment for income: only 2.4% are involved in bee keeping, 0.7% in wood marketing, 1.8% in grass marketing and only 5.2% collect wild fruits or vegetables. All these activities can supplement income and food sources for new farmers but only a few farmers seem to be involved. The new communities require certain services and goods which offer an opportunity for some entrepreneurs to exploit. People are providing services such as brick making (7.2%), building (7.8%), carpentry (3.5%), welding (3.1%), sewing (3.9%), beer brewing (1.3%) and handicraft (0.9%). There are other rather clandestine activities being undertaken by some people in the newly resettled areas as livelihood options which are illegal and considered social vices. These include selling illegal brew (*kachasu*), prostitution and selling dagga (*mbanje*).

5.3.6 Agricultural skills and experience

The majority of farmers (55.6%) do not have any form of agricultural qualification. However a significant number (25.4%) have a master farmer training certificate; while 10.9% hold a certificate in agriculture, 4.6% have a diploma and 0.7% have a degree. Agricultural skills – especially on farm management – are important in increasing or improving the productivity

of these farmers. The mindset of viewing farming as a business depends on the nature of agricultural training one receives which builds capacity to plan and manage. Dannson et al (2004) argue that the lack of skills is one of the fundamental problems facing African agriculture. Through a five country case study they try to show how a lack of agricultural skills affect and impact the livelihoods of small scale farmers. It is thus disheartening to note that the majority of new farmers do not possess any training in agriculture. Given that a significant number of the respondents indicate that they were from rural Mazowe, it was interesting to note that on average farmers have merely 2.7 years of experience in farming. This shows a relatively inexperienced farming class even from the communal areas.

5.3.7 Religion and other forms of associational life

Religion is a strong basis for social relationships and social networking. Its importance in understanding social formations is immense given that some institutions may be formed strictly on the basis of religious affiliation. Religion offers people a rallying point and a common foundation to start relating with each other especially when they are strangers. The new farmers in Mazowe are largely Christian (92%) but are involved in different religious denominations. The most popular of these sects is the *Johane Masowe* apostolic sect which is followed by 25% of the respondents. There are also various Pentecostal churches including AFM and ZAOGA (both of which are attended by around 23%), and the Salvation Army which has a following of over 20%. The Salvation Army has a long history in Mazowe (as discussed later) since it also runs the hospital in the communal areas. Other forms of associational life include women's groups and youth clubs. White farmers used to have country clubs in Glendale and Concession where they met, interacted and discussed issues that affected them. Through sports such as swimming, tennis and darts they would meet and create social bonds that increased networks amongst the farmers. For the new farms there are only a few A2 farmers with access to these clubs, which have become more like beer halls than places to improve social networks. There are no social places for A1 farmers to meet and interact.

5.3.8 Asset base and resources of new farmers

The overriding characteristic of A1 and most A2 (especially small-scale commercial) farmers is that they are resource poor. The asset base of most farmers makes it impossible for them to finance any meaningful agricultural enterprise. It is this shared characteristic that makes cooperation and associational life possible and desirable in poorer communities (Gertler et al.

2006:456). In terms of small productive assets, 95.4% own a hoe, 85% axes, 77.3% shovels, 62% knapsack sprayers, 52% mould board ploughs and 40% an ox-drawn cultivator. However few farmers own bigger productive assets. For example only 8% own a tractor drawn cultivator, 15% water pump, 9% planter, 5.6% maize sheller, 4% scotch carts and 15.2% a tractor. In terms of other household assets, 40% have bicycles and 16.4% (especially among the A2 farms) own cars.

The farmers inherited an assortment of infrastructure and assets from the former white farmers. These include tobacco barns, paddocks, dip tanks, storage tanks, irrigation pipes, houses, green houses and farm sheds. Many conflicts (noted later in this chapter) emerged over the sharing and use of these assets. There is variation in terms of what has happened to infrastructure on the former white-owned farms. In most instances, such as at Glengrey Farm, immovable assets that were found on the farm were taken over by the farmers and are now under the control of the farm committee. At most farms, the new farmers only found buildings and very few gained access to heavy equipment which was either taken by powerful people (senior politicians in the district) or removed by the white farmers before they left the farms. Management of the assets found on the farms has been mainly in the hands of the Committee of Seven though some farms such as Kierredale have a farm development committee. The intention is that all members of the community should benefit from the infrastructure but conflicts do arise in the use of shared resources especially if they are limited. This is the case at Blightly Farm where the tobacco barns on the farm are insufficient for all the farmers; because of this, there is a problem in trying to ensure access for all.

5.3.9 Production and agricultural challenges since 2000

The main crop of choice for new farmers is maize while some venture into wheat, soya beans, tobacco, sugar beans and horticultural crops. The A1 farmers though are almost exclusively maize growers. According to the farmers, this is because the government directed them to grow maize to boost national food security. At farms such as Hariana, where tobacco barns are available, tobacco production is taking place. Major problems exist, notably sharing the inadequate barns and the widespread use of firewood for curing the crop. There are many farms with dams and some farmers inherited irrigation equipment. Various committees at scheme level have emerged to manage the sharing of such infrastructure, as discussed fully later. There has been considerable controversy over the productivity of the new farmers in Zimbabwe. While it is important to discuss the parameters for measuring success or

productivity, this is not the main concern of this thesis. The focus of the thesis, in this particular case, is the forms of organisation utilised for production and the various challenges the farmers face.

Among the most common challenges involves the claim made especially by A1 farmers that the land is too small for commercial production. At Fairview Farm, one respondent indicated that the farm size was not conducive for engaging in farming enterprises such as livestock production. What is quite interesting is that the majority of the farmers are not utilizing all their land yet they complain about the size of their plots. Another constraint which was highlighted is the lack of agricultural inputs. A respondent at Virginia Farm stressed that all the inputs are going to the politicians (who have obtained commercial plots or farms) and not the A1 farmers. At the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) depots, trucks belonging to politicians are regularly seen leaving with inputs yet the poor A1 farmers wait all day without receiving inputs. Overall, the input support system from government suffers from poor coordination, corruption and ineffective targeting. It is open and subject to abuse by political ‘bigwigs’ and A1 settlers are bitter about this. At Almeroy Farm, another respondent argues that the government has forgotten the A1 farmers and is only supporting A2 farmers. On the other hand, at Danbury Park, small-scale A2 farmers complain that the government was sidelining them and treating them as A1 farmers.

The emergent communities in the former commercial farming areas offer colourful and exciting stories of individual farmers trying to make sense of a harsh and cruel existence. The new farmers are a collection of diverse people with varied ethnic, religious, education and status backgrounds. Among the A1 farmers, a significant number are drawn from the Chiweshe communal areas, in line with the objective of decongesting the communal lands. The villagised system of residence has meant that A1 farmers interact with each other on a daily basis, unlike those who live alone on their farms. They are forced by circumstances to interact, so that relationships have mutated and evolved among them. In most cases these relationships arise out of the need for people to unite for a common cause such as building a clinic, like the farmers at Davaar, or the sharing of everyday implements. The households on these farms have turned from being strangers to neighbours over the past ten years. The loss of kinship support has meant that people are forming new relationships based on friendship and trust.

5.4 Conflicts, conflict resolution and social cohesion

The land occupations and chaotic events that precipitated the fast track land reform programme in Zimbabwe were invariably going to lead to long-term conflicts between various actors in Zimbabwe's land drama. Mazowe has faced its fair share of ongoing land, social and political conflicts. Land conflicts come in a variety of forms and include a multiplicity of actors such as the farmers, politicians, rural district councils and even traditional leaders. The conflicts are numerous and the box below (Table 6) offers only a few examples of the land conflicts. A most important thing to note is that there is a system of conflict resolution for the different types of conflicts. Within the A1 schemes there is a channel to follow in terms of disputes over land and other disagreements. The matter is first reported to the *sabhuku* (headman) who hears the case and if he thinks he cannot handle the case he refers it to the chief. With boundary disputes, the *sabhuku* calls extension officers from Agritex (who have the maps and land demarcations) to come and settle the conflict. There are some matters which might require going before the District Lands Committee (DLC) which is made up of traditional leaders, council officials, extension officers and the Ministry of Lands. The other social conflicts that arise among farmers, which include witchcraft accusations and breaking traditional norms, are usually brought before the traditional chiefs.

Table 6: Conflicts in newly resettled areas

Type of Conflict	Example	Attempted solution
Double allocation of plot/farm	At Seddies Farm two settlers were allocated the same plot	The DLC resolved to tell the one settler to stop interfering with operations of the other settler
Boundary disputes	At Mugutu Farm, farmers on Plot 17 and 19, Plot 8 and 33, Plot 13 and 23, Plot 23 and 24, Plot 23 and 25, and Plot 22 and 23 were involved in boundary disputes	It was resolved that the Department of the Surveyor General solves this by establishing proper boundaries
Use of farm houses by civil servants	At Ardura Farm two disabled war veterans refused to vacate a farmhouse earmarked for a clinic	The DLC resolved that he be given reasonable notice to vacate the premise. They were to be allocated plots which were vacant
Asset sharing	At Blanco Farm a farmer removed and took away the centre pivot causing disruption of irrigation for other farmers	Police and the DLC intervened. The farmer was asked to replace the centre pivot It was returned but in a disjointed form
Neighbours and farm occupants (social)	These include various accusations of witchcraft, thefts, vandalism, prostitution and other social vices	Generally settled by village heads and traditional leaders

Conflicts have a potential to cause social upheaval and peaceful co-existence of communities requires conflict management. There are farm level mechanisms that have evolved in Mazowe to deal with problems at that level. Such mechanisms are located in the various institutional structures which will be analysed fully later in this thesis. For example, conflicts around the use and sharing of irrigation equipment inherited from the white farmer at Usk Farm have been resolved by the Committee of Seven together with the irrigation committee. All conflicts reflect a certain amount of power manoeuvring. In many instances conflicts between people with differing power bases often lead to the less powerful losing out. At Arda Farm the A2 farmer, after years of conflicts with the A1 farmers, finally managed to evict them and consolidate his land holding. This was mainly facilitated by the fact that the A2 farmer is a local councillor and a big political figure in the district.

Various farm level institutions emerge as a response to a multiplicity of challenges facing the new class of farmers. For example, fast track land reform was followed by a rapidly devaluating Zimbabwean dollar, enormous inflation and high unemployment figures (Masiwa 2005:222). This economic crisis has impacted heavily on new farmers, who find it increasingly difficult to afford inputs and access loans. Unlike in the communal areas, most new farmers cannot depend on kinship ties for help: thus they have formed other networks to respond to these challenges, taking the form of institutions such as farm committees and health committees.

One of the critical questions addressed in this thesis is around social cohesion, specifically the basis for cohesion in farm-level communities borne out of the chaotic and often violent land occupations, whose inhabitants come from diverse backgrounds and who have farmed without significant government support over the past ten years. There is no easy answer to this question but, as the communities continue to evolve, I attempt to define the parameters for social cohesion. Minimising conflict and having institutional frameworks to resolve conflicts go a long way in ensuring social cohesion. Such institutions are effective though only if they have legitimacy in the eyes of the farmers. On-farm institutions, with traditional authority and government (local and central) backing, have managed to ensure social cohesion and reduce conflicts.

5.5 Social service provision and quality of life in the newly resettled areas

The movement into the commercial farming areas was for most farmers a promising step towards better livelihoods. What most had not envisaged was that an opportunity to change their life for the better soon became a struggle for existence. The huge movement of people into the commercial areas previously occupied by white farmers and their workers led to increased demand on an infrastructure that was created to support a limited number of people only. The challenges faced by new farmers in terms of service provision should be understood in the context of Zimbabwe's economic and political crisis since 2000, which saw an unprecedented economic meltdown accompanied by widespread food shortages, record breaking inflation and socio-economic suffering.

Ten years after FTLRP, the new resettlement areas still lack basic social infrastructure such as decent schools and clinics. The government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) neither had the money nor the capacity to provide social amenities when the programme started and to this day they still do not. This was most notable when then Minister of Foreign Affairs said:

We cannot hide the fact that the Fast Track Programme has room for improvements. For example, the settlers require access roads, water supplies, schools, clinics, dip tanks, draught power, initial seeds and fertilizers, extension services, training and many more which the Government is unable to provide at present. If we get some help some of these facilities can be provided to the settlers³⁵.

Apparently the GoZ had adopted a 'resettle first, services later' approach.

5.5.1 Health care provision

The provision of health care could not cope up with the fast track movement of people into the commercial farming areas. Before 2000 white farmers were responsible for the provision of health to their workers. This was mainly through farm health workers who they paid. The health care was at best primary with more complicated cases taken to district hospitals. The government was always reluctant to build clinics on private property thus there were no proper health facilities in the commercial farming areas. *The World Health Organisation Bulletin* in 2003 noted that farm workers on average had to travel more than twenty kilometres to reach a health facility.

³⁵ Excerpt from the speech made by Foreign Affairs Minister Mudenge at the dinner held in honour of the former UNDP Administrator, Mr. Mark Mallock Brown, 30th November, 2000.

The Mazowe District Council reacted to the increased demand in health services through setting up various satellite clinics in the district. These clinics were set up by converting former farm houses into patient treating rooms. However the clinics are under equipped, under-staffed and do not meet the minimum required standards outlined by the World Health Organisation. For example, the architectural design of the houses was meant for residential purposes and not for medical purposes. In all of the clinics there are no drug rooms as per the standard requirement. Staff on site at some of these clinics is not qualified to provide proper health care. The facilities have nevertheless ensured that 80.9% of the survey respondents walk under two kilometres to get to a clinic. The only problem is that the quality of care is very poor at best and non-existent at worst. The Council established nine clinics of which six are operational. These are at the following farms: Ardura (Ward 14), Belgownie (Ward 21), Davaar (Ward 14), Donje (Ward 29), Holme Eden (Ward 23) and Von Abo (Ward 14).

5.5.2 HIV and AIDS in the newly resettled areas

HIV and AIDS have emerged as serious problems on the African continent. The effects of the pandemic on the continent have been widespread and well-documented³⁶. In Zimbabwe the pandemic which emerged in the 1980s has placed a massive burden on an already wilting health delivery system. Studies by scholars such as Buve et al. (2002) and Ritcher and Sherr (2008) have shown that movement of people (through forced or voluntary migration or displacement) has an impact on the spread of HIV as family structures and relationships change. The emergence of split households in the newly resettled areas has led to many new sexual relationships. The major challenge is associated with the resistance of the disease to medication and the exorbitant costs of the antiretroviral drugs as well as multiple opportunistic diseases associated with the disease.

HIV and AIDS pose a unique and dangerous challenge to the success of land and agrarian reforms, and the impacts of the pandemic on agriculture are multi-fold and interconnected. HIV and AIDS remains a highly sensitive issue that raises emotions and distrust when it is discussed. Coming up with a distinct aggregate of HIV prevalence within the newly resettled areas in Mazowe is difficult. According to Buchman³⁷ (2007) the Tariro Clinic at Howard Hospital serves a community with a nearly 22% HIV prevalence rate. However Tariro Clinic

³⁶ AIDS in Zimbabwe, <http://www.avert.org/aids-impact-africa.htm>

³⁷ He is a palliative care physician with the Temmy Latner Centre for Palliative Care and the Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care in Toronto, Ontario, and is an Assistant Clinical Professor in the Department of Family and Community Medicine at the University of Toronto and at McMaster University.

serves a wider community from both newly resettled wards and communal areas and, again, it is difficult to disaggregate the data in terms of the patient's residence.

There is still considerable stigma associated with the disease in the newly resettled areas and it remains difficult if not impossible for residents to openly declare their status. HIV is couched with many negative connotations and those suspected of being ill are ridiculed through sayings such as *akarahwa nematsotsi* (was beaten by thieves) or *aka crossa red robot* (crossed a red traffic). This stigma has led to much suspicion, accusations and conflicts among farmers. In the survey, only 15% of the respondents highlighted HIV as prevalent but this statistic is not valid because there is no way of knowing without testing. In interviews, most farmers denied being affected by the disease; for example, farmers at Ballyhooly Farm blamed it on farm workers whom they accused of being promiscuous and lacking morals. As pointed out by one farmer, *AIDS haiko kuno kuma settlers. Yakazara kukomboni kune mafarm worker* (AIDS is not found among settlers but farm workers who are promiscuous). At Hamilton Farm a respondent said that *tinowudza mafarm worker nezve AIDS ivo vototi AIDS mafuta vanotoita yekuzora* (we tell farm workers about AIDS but they do not listen saying it does scare them). The problem with these statements by new farmers is that sexual networks between farmers and farm workers are actually increasing, thus they are likely now all affected.

Access to treatment is generally difficult in Zimbabwe due to the economic situation in the country. However Tariro Clinic offers programmes for tuberculosis treatment and HIV/AIDS antiretroviral therapy for free. It also runs a home-based care programme throughout the whole district. Getting treatment is done in secrecy because of fears about stigma. In the case of Tariro Clinic, it is far away from the new resettlement areas and hence patients can go there without fearing that people will see them (however the distance poses a serious problem in terms of transportation). The clinic used to have a mobile unit, which has broken down – this impact negatively on access to treatment especially for those patients who cannot afford transport fees to the clinic.

5.5.3 Education services

The story of education in Mazowe mirrors the situation prevalent in the Zimbabwean education sector over the past seven years; however the situation is particularly dire in the newly resettled areas. The nature of the schools, created from tobacco barns, farm sheds,

former farm worker housing and various other farm infrastructure, paints a hopeless and uncertain future for the children residing in these areas. The schools lack basic materials such as boards, proper ventilation and stationery. They were set up without the minimum requirements such as sanitation and qualified staff. In Mazowe, the district council was responsible for sighting, pegging and planning the location of schools in the newly resettled areas. In some instances, such as Hariana Farm, council responded to complaints by farmers but the schools are usually located at a strategic location which ensures that children will not have to walk long distances to school. Most of these are described as satellite schools which mean that they remain outposts of more established schools in urban or communal areas.

The lack of teaching staff at most of these schools has seen the development of such novel concepts like ‘_duster classes’. This occurs when two grades are combined into one class and then taught alternatively by one teacher. The situation is not any different for the few secondary schools in the district where one teacher is expected to teach six different specialised subjects, for most of which he/she was never trained. The quality of education is so low that some parents opt to send their children to their rural (communal) homes to attend schooling. The situation however mostly affects A1 farmers who, unlike the mostly urban-based A2 farmers, have not much option but to send their children to these schools. Later in the thesis I analyse how A1 farm parents have devised various ingenious ways to improve schooling. For the students, especially at secondary schools, the situation can be summed up with the comments by one pupil, who said:

Zvakadhakwa izvi kungouyawo kuchikoro kuzotandadza vamwe but hapana zviripo. Mateacher acho hauye plus hapana kana mabook. Kuscience maexperiments tinomaonera mubhuku saka vakawanda havapedzi chikoro nekuti zvitori nane kunokorokoza (It is hopeless, we just come to school for nothing. The teachers are mostly absent and there are no books. We do not have any science experiments so most people do not finish school because it is better to go and look for money).

5.5.4 Water provision, energy and housing

As with other basic services, the social infrastructure in the newly resettled areas could not cope with the increased influx of people. From only accommodating one farmer, his/her family and farm workers, there was the need to provide housing, energy and water for over thirty households with an average size of seven. At first, resettlement (especially during the *jambanja* phase) involved the new A1 farmers building shacks and temporary structures for

housing. However with time they began to build more permanent structures. Most large-scale A2 farmers simply took over the farm houses on the land they occupied. From the interviews with A1 farmers it was ascertained that, at the inception of fast track, the government had advised them not to build permanent structures. Such directives were a source of mistrust of government's intentions which affected the nature and level of investment taken by farmers on their land.

On A1 schemes the farm houses could not be shared thus they were either converted into schools and clinics or given to various civil servants (nurses, teachers and extension officers) as residence quarters³⁸. There have however been many conflicts over the use and control of farm houses. For example, at Engleborough Farm, the farm house was designated for a clinic but the war veteran who occupied the residence is not willing to vacate the house. This was because, at the time of occupation, certain senior war veterans and ruling party officials were designated as caretakers of farm infrastructure and they believed that this was tantamount to ownership. Some A1 farmers actually had to invade farm worker compounds and take over the houses (for instance at Vonabo, Amelroy and Blighty farms), but this went against government's policy of leaving farm workers within the compounds.

In terms of water sources, the widespread vandalism of infrastructure such as boreholes that characterised the land occupations meant that on most farms water shortages became the norm. However the majority of people (83.8% of the survey respondents) indicated that they had access to safe drinking water (boreholes 39.7%, protected wells 27.6%, and piped water 16.5%). There are still a small percentage of farmers using unsafe sources of drinking such as dams, rivers and unprotected wells. Another encouraging trend is that 90.5% of the respondents walk under a kilometre to get to the water source. The most common type of sanitation is the blair toilet (58.6%). Other types of sanitation include the bush system, flush toilets and pit latrines.

The use of energy at domestic level has very important environmental consequences. Over 85% of the respondents use firewood as the sole source of energy. This is because of a lack of viable alternatives, with electricity only available in the farm houses. With so many households on the farms, tree ranges which took years to nurture and mature are being

³⁸ Through the Policy on Shared Infrastructure drafted in late 2005, the government reserved homesteads for use by the civil servants.

destroyed by the day. Firewood has also become a livelihood option as farmers sell it at road sides for motorists going to Harare and Bindura because of the power cuts affecting urban centres. In this sense, a fast track to environmental degradation exists, as the widespread cutting down of trees continues. At other farms, like Mandindindi, A1 farmers have used naked wires to draw electricity from the main supply line into their homes. This poses a real risk of electrocution but it is one way that farmers have responded to their energy needs.

5.5.5 Transportation services

Transportation remains one of the major problems facing farmers. Prior to 2000 there were no buses plying commercial farming routes since white farmers had their own cars and farm workers were transported by tractors or farm lorries. The new farmers are faced with a situation where very few have cars and there are even less tractors or lorries. The challenge is to attract bus service companies who are unwilling to ply routes with bad roads. The road network in the newly resettled areas has suffered in the years following the fast track land reform. This is mainly because of confusion over the maintenance of the roads with the farmers blaming the council for failing to do the necessary work. The council on the other hand insists that farm roads (certainly before the year 2000) were always the responsibility of the individual farmer. In this regard, Moyo (2009:14) notes that, in the past, white farmers complemented the council's efforts in maintaining the secondary roads through provision of resources to the council such as tractors, fuel and labour. White farmers also paid substantial levies that created a decent resource base for Mazowe Council to carry out any capital work that included road maintenance and rehabilitation. However there are some A2 farmers who are using personal resources to maintain the secondary roads that service their farms. The A2 farmer at ARDA Farm levelled the road that stretches 8 to 10 kilometres to make his farm accessible when he hosted the Agricultural Field Day. The farmer was assisted by his A1 farming compatriots and farm workers who provided labour to carry out the road rehabilitation.

Social service provision has thus remained a serious challenge for new farmers. Farmers newly settled on the fast track schemes have experienced a myriad of challenges as they realised how different life really is in the new settlements, compared to where they came from. The wider Zimbabwean context over the past ten years has experienced a searing economic and political heat wave that has led to the suffering of rural people in particular. Those in the newly resettled areas were faced with their own peculiar problems, due mainly

to the inadequacy of basic social services in these areas. Life at the frontier of fast track Farms has been difficult for most farmers, especially on the A1 schemes. The dream of a better life filled with bumper harvests has not come true for many. They have met with poor service delivery and a daily struggle for inputs and support. Ten years after *jambanja*, most do not have anything to show for the years they have lived in the resettlement areas.

5.6 Trust, theft and social issues in newly resettled areas

Trust is built over years of interaction and knowledge of your neighbours. While the survey did not have many questions to tease out the level of trust among the new farmers, it did ask whether they trusted their neighbours. In this regard, 60% of the respondents highlighted that they did not trust their neighbours. Those who settled in 2000 have had many years together in build up trust, but the problem is the continued influx of new arrivals every year (as well, some people are actually leaving). This means that there is a constant change in the communities due to the movement of people. No doubt, as these communities continue to evolve and consolidate with people getting to know their neighbours better, it will become easier for them to trust each other.

Trust and familiarity have been used as a measure of social capital within communities (Realo, Allik and Greenfield 2008:458), but associational life and civil society are still prevalent in so-called ‘trust-less’ societies. One factor which affects trust among new neighbours is the security of one’s belongings. In the survey, 76.9% of the respondents claimed that they have had something stolen on the farm – trust becomes difficult to build in such circumstances. Items that have been stolen include farm produce (42.4%), farm equipment (30.7%), livestock (13%), and food and household goods. The chaotic nature of the land occupations – which were punctuated by vandalism, theft and destruction of farm infrastructure – meant that such behaviour became part of the new communities. At Selby Farm, the farmers accused the person placed to become the caretaker of the farm during the land occupations of selling all movable assets at the farm. Many farms with paddocks have had fences stolen, while pumps and other movable assets were siphoned off during the confusion of land occupations.

5.7 Wishes, hopes and dreams of new farmers in Mazowe

At the end of the survey, farmers were asked for their wishes and hopes of life in the newly resettled areas. Like others, these farmers have ambitions and dreams they wish to

accomplish within their life span. Though they may not have much academic significance, the hopes and dreams of new farmers deepens our understanding of the farming communities that form the basis of this thesis. Through their wishes, we learn what type of communities they intend to build over the years. The initial excitement of resettlement has waned and now the farmers are faced with a difficult reality of life without much service support. The hopes of new farmers mainly concentrate on improving production and building their asset base. Most farmers wish for improved support service from government and private companies especially banks. They hope for an increase in inputs, tractors, irrigation equipment and boreholes. Intriguingly, another common wish among farmers is a change in the farm settlement pattern. Except for Davaar Farm, farmers live in a village model on all other A1 farms in the survey. Most farmers want to build on their own plots (a consolidated homestead and field plot) for various reasons. For example, at Selby Farm, they indicated that because of theft of crops they need to be near their fields. Other wishes include building of schools, clinics and general improvement of life in the former commercial farming areas.

5.8 Background to six cases studies

My thesis is largely based on qualitative work carried out on six farms. In this section I provide background information on the farms with particular focus on their location, size, number of plot holders, assets and crops they grow amongst other things.

5.8.1 Visa farm

Visa farm is located in Ward 25 and it is 571.331 hectares in size. There are no youth who were allocated land and all plots are six hectares each. There is one female plot holder. There were originally twenty two plots but the total number of plots now at the farm is twenty seven as more farmers arrived later. The main crops grown are tobacco, maize, cotton and groundnuts. Most livestock kept are cattle and goats. Overall, farmers at the farm received land through the fast track mayhem; but the DA then came with lids which had numbers written on the bottom and each farmer was to pick one lid. Twenty two farmers received two acres of land each to build their homesteads. Assets found on the farm include sixteen tobacco barns, grading shed, one farm house, two dams and a dip tank. Farmers have also invested the following since settlement: flue pipes, thirteen ploughs and harrows, twelve cattle, two irrigation pipes, seven scotch carts, two cars and one motor bike. Five parents are sending their children to boarding school. Visa farmers have reconstructed the farm road from the next door farm up to the main road. And they have started collecting two bags of

maize per farmer (or the money equivalent to the bags) every year so that they can start an irrigation scheme.

Key natural resources at the farm are *musasa*, *mikute* and *munhondo* trees, and warthogs. Tobacco growers are given an area for tobacco curing. Nearby communal people are given a letter by the *sabhuku* for permission to cut down trees. In terms of poaching firewood, most of the poachers are relatives from communal areas of plot holders and it is difficult to chase away relatives. There are two electrified boreholes at the farm and one which is manual. The farmer who stays at the farm house is the one who pays the electricity bills. Livestock use drinking water from the dam. There are twelve houses with blair toilets and the rest use makeshift toilets. Most fields have hydrants and underground piping is still intact. The former white farmer however left with the engine, transformer and irrigation pipes.

The produce is marketed to GMB Mvurwi and Nzvimbo. A sub-depot is usually opened at Arda Farm which is next to Visa. Tobacco is sent to the auction floors in Harare such as Zimbabwe Tobacco Auction Centre (ZITAC). Groundnuts are sold to other farmers. There are two officers from the government's Livestock Production Department who stay at the farm plus a village health worker. There are no churches at the farm but people go to such churches as Roman Catholic, Apostolic Faith Mission and the Salvation Army. There is a burial ground for farmers. There is also a women's club which bakes buns for sale on the farm. The farm is under the administration of a Committee of Seven, in which six of the members are elected by villagers and Chief Makope selects the *sabhuku*. As well, there is a development committee where members are democratically chosen by farmers. Musarara Primary School is four kilometres away and Howard hospital is fifteen kilometres away.

5.8.2 Davaar farm

Davaar farm is located in Ward 14 of Mazowe district and is 1137.5 hectares. There are 33 plots on the scheme. There used to be 32 but one plot was sub-divided because it was too big. There are 5 female plot holders on the scheme and no youths were offered land on the scheme. The average plot size is 6 hectares. There are 30 farm worker plots. Davaar together with Trulough Farm belonged to one white owner. Trulough Farm has mainly benefited an A2 farmer who is now in charge of citrus. Crops grown on Davaar Farm include maize, soya beans, cotton, tobacco, wheat, sugar beans, potatoes and ground nuts. In terms of livestock, farmers own cattle, goats, pigs, chickens (free range), ducks and donkeys. One farmer has a

project for broilers. There were a number of ways used by the plot holders to obtain land. Four of the participants got land through applying to the District Administrator who was responsible for giving out land. *Jambanja* (farm invasion) was the way used by 7 of the farmers to acquire land. Two indicated that they had acquired land through the government policy of giving 5% of the land to people from Mt Darwin. One former farm worker was given a plot of 3 hectares by the chief but had no offer letter; he had to go to the DA to get the offer letter for that piece of land.

Most of the participants indicated that they still maintain their communal homes. Some left the land in the hands of relatives or children so as to safeguard their claims in case they are evicted from resettlement areas. Most indicated that they would only give up their communal homes if they were given title deeds for their A1 plot. Another participant argued that an African never severs his roots thus links with communal areas will continue. Another indicated that it was mainly because of distance – most of the A1 farmers are from Chiweshe, which is near, thus the distance allows them to maintain dual homesteads. The nearest primary school is 4 kilometres away from the farm and the nearest secondary school is nine kilometres away. The roads are in bad condition. The farmers believe that council is responsible for the main road that leads to the highway because it is used by many people including haulage tracks. The farmers do not have the resources to maintain and fix roads. They are not even maintaining the inner farm roads. The farmers indicated that they were happy to have a clinic at the farm. The clinic came about after the local Member of Parliament argued that since the farm was positioned centrally in the ward it will get a clinic. The farm house was then converted into a clinic and nurses residence. The council is responsible for the clinic and it serves all the surrounding farms which include Kirreadale, Longcroft, Muripfumbi and Plymouth.

Boreholes are the source for drinking water. Water for washing clothes is from a river and borehole. The reservoir wall at the dam is leaking. The farmers approached Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) but the latter said they could not fix it because it is not on their map. In terms of sanitation, there are thirteen Blair toilets and one farmer has a flushing system; there are more toilets in the farm worker compound which are communally shared. The farmers found the following on the farm; two farm houses, two tractors (one non-functional and one functional but used by Troughlor farm), four fuel tanks, thirty six compound houses, six hundred irrigation pipes (the white farmer sold them to the farmers),

two engines, a reservoir (currently leaking), five boreholes (only two are functional and are electrical), thirty pig sties, a dip tank, grinding mill, shed, cold room (non-functional), garage, workshop (now being used as a homestead), water transfer systems and a citrus estate (43 hectares) which is now being used by a A2 farmer. The plot holders bought the following assets after settlement: cattle (ten farmers), scotch carts, car, ox drawn ploughs and planter, bicycles, tractor (one), houses (twenty built), borehole (manual), peanut butter machine (two), harrows and water pumps. At Trulough Farm they have acquired the following assets: tractors, grinding mills, pigs, two tobacco barns, cattle and bicycles.

5.8.3 Hariana farm

Hariana is an A1 farm located near Mvurwi in Ward 26 of Mazowe district. The village is headed by Mr. Dahwa. There were seventy two plots at the beginning but now there are eighty eight plots (sixteen more plots were pegged in the former pastures/grasslands). There are seventy seven male plot holders and eleven female. Average plot size is 6 hectares except for twelve farm worker plots. The main crops grown at Hariana include maize, tobacco, soya beans, sugar beans, sunflowers and ground nuts. Almost every settler has managed to buy cattle and goats in the past 3 years. Participants indicated that they came from diverse areas which include Mt Darwin and Centenary but the majority are from Chiweshe. Most indicated that they got land through land invasions in 2000 and were later given an offer letter by the DA. Some received land through the 20% quota for people from Rushinga. The farmers on arrival found three houses (two are now occupied by teachers and one by AREX and ZRP officers), dip tank, tractor, thirty tobacco barns, storage tanks, grinding mill, farm shed, store rooms, three boreholes (but all were vandalized) and paddocks.

Farmers at Hariana use unprotected wells as their source of water for domestic use, because of the vandalised boreholes. For laundry, farmers use dam water which is 300 metres away. People indicated that only 25% of the farmers at Hariana use blair toilets, a few constructed temporary pit toilets and others use bush toilets. Currently farmers note that they are not carrying out irrigation because they do not have a transformer and engines. They only have pipes so they are planning to apply for a loan from the Irrigation Department in the Ministry of Agriculture. Farmers have invested in and through farming. Some have built nice houses, and have purchased cars, tractors, cattle, household furniture, stands in Mvurwi and water pumps. Some manage to send children to boarding schools. There is a primary school at the farm. It is a satellite school of Lucknow Farm primary school. The secondary school is at

Mandindindi which is 3 kilometres away. Roads are in bad shape especially the farm road from the main road. They are looking for assistance from council and the District Development Fund (DDF) to help in road construction.

5.8.4 Usk farm

Usk is located in Ward 18 of Mazowe district. The farm falls under the jurisdiction of Chief Negomo. There are sixty eight plots at Usk but only fifty nine plot holders. This is because some plots were combined as they were too small (for example plot numbers 1 and 3). The former white farmer also owned a small farm called Kasipa but it was put under Usk during the land reform. This farm has 9 plot holders. The average plot size at the farms is 3 to 4 hectares. There are four former farm workers who were given plots on the farm of 2.5 hectares each. A number of small plots of 1-3 acres were left out during pegging of plots, and these were given to the four workers by the *sabhuku* to use (these are known as farm worker plots).³⁹ The four held senior positions under the white farmer such as assistant manager, mechanic and irrigation supervisor. The A1 farmers thought it wise to retain such staff so that they would help the new farmers with the skills they had acquired. This shows incorporation of farm workers into the new social networks that are emerging within the new resettlement areas.

There is a cemetery at Usk farm where farm workers are buried. A few of the settlers are burying their dead at the cemetery. The majority however are still burying their dead where they came from. The participants indicated that they were not sure about ownership of land so they could not risk burying their relatives and then be evicted from the farm. The main crops grown on the scheme are maize, soya beans and tobacco. Some of the farmers grow wheat in winter. The female participants highlighted that there were no women plot holders (except one who inherited from her dead husband but the offer letter still has the husband's name) at the scheme. They complained that women did not have their own pieces of land on which they would grow what was termed as 'female crops' such as groundnuts. Women referred to the fields as *zunde rababa* (father's field) because it is men who control the land, make decisions on the farm and most importantly control the proceeds from farming. The farmers found the following equipment at the farm: irrigation (pipes, engines, and transformers), water tank, planter, tractor, vicon spreader, barns, generator, sheds, grinding mill and one

³⁹ The tenure of these farm workers is precarious as they depend on the kindness of the *sabhuku* who can remove them anytime he wishes.

farm house. Most of the assets are communally owned except for the house which was being used by Colonel Munjaranji (who has since left).

Issues of HIV and AIDS have been difficult to discuss with communities in the new resettlement areas mainly because they have not been open about the pandemic. The farmers have tried to dismiss the issue indicating that it is hard to know about the effects of the disease on people because it is personal. All the participants were aware of the disease and how it is spread but reported low known incidences. It might have been difficult to talk openly about the disease in a group given the stigma still attached to the disease. The interesting point was that the youths who were in a focus group murmured in low voices how it was impossible to talk about the pandemic when there were people present who were infected.

The participants indicated that conflicts are not very common among the farmers on the scheme. However there is a clear structure and channels that are followed when there is a conflict among the farmers. The most common conflict is about boundaries. The participants indicated that this was caused by the way extension officials demarcated plots. They accused the officials of making mistakes when plots were pegged leading to most people having small plots. The participants indicated that most of the plots at Usk were less than the stipulated 6 hectares. Boundary disputes are thus very common among the farmers on the scheme. Extension officers together with *sabhuku* are responsible for handling such issues because they have maps that clearly show the boundaries of each plot.

5.8.5 Hamilton farm

Hamilton farm is situated in Ward 18 of Mazowe district and is 439.568 hectares in size. It is located along the Harare-Bindura highway and only a few kilometres away from Glendale urban centre. The scheme is made up of forty one plot holders. At first there were only eighteen when they settled; but the number increased to thirty four and now forty one as more people were given offer letters. The average size of the plots is 6 hectares. Of the forty one plot holders only five are women. No former farm workers were allocated land on the scheme. Two youths have land on the scheme but they both have links to the DA's office. One is the son of a former DA who passed away while the other is a girl who works for the DA. The participants claimed that the majority of the plot holders were from Chiweshe and others are from Mt Darwin, one from Wedza, two from Glendale and three from Harare. The

participants used various ways to access land. One applied through the army where he works while most applied through the DA. Three of the participants were involved in the farm invasions or *jambanja* while another got land through the 20% quota for war veterans.

Assets found on the farm include the following: one farm house, two cottages, twenty two compound houses, one borehole (manual), and electricity. The settlers have bought the following items since moving on to the farm: cattle, ox drawn ploughs, scotch carts, irrigation pipes, ox drawn cultivator, tractors (four) and others have built houses. The main crops grown at the farm include maize, soya beans, cotton and sugar beans. Livestock kept at the farm include cattle, goats, chickens and rabbits. Natural resources in the area include the following: Mazowe River, dense trees (used for fuel), Nyamuhumbe mountain, hills and wild life (wild pigs, baboons, snakes and buck). The farmers complain that the wild pigs and baboons were destroying their crops. They claimed that no hunting was currently taking place.

People get water for drinking and washing clothes from the borehole. The borehole is protected and provides clean drinking water. They also use a stream for washing clothes. A few farmers (six) have Blair toilets while the rest have temporary toilets. There is no irrigation on the farm currently but the farmers are working towards this. They have acquired underground pipes for two fields which cover 42 hectares. They acquired the pipes from the government through the Irrigation Department. Personal investments by the farmers made from proceeds from farming include the following: sending children to boarding school; marrying through farming and buying stands in Glendale. Government public investments include the following: irrigation pipes, fixed borehole and a train service to Bindura and Harare (the railway station is next to the farm). The nearest primary school is Chen Chimutengwende School which is one kilometre away and the nearest high school is Rujeko in Glendale four kilometres away. There is a crèche at the farm. The nearest clinic is in Glendale. Three of the participants indicated that the AIDS pandemic only affected people in Glendale and not on the farm (*tongoinzwa kuGlendale pano hapana*). Others disagreed indicating that it is impossible to know who is affected and who is not. No farmer has disclosed they are infected so people can only guess how many people are affected. The farmers claim that it has affected farm workers more than them.

5.8.6 Blightly farm

The farm is located in Ward 27 and is 888.21 hectares in size. There are forty two plot holders within this scheme of which thirty four are male and eight are female. There are twenty six farm worker plots (little strips of land which remained after land partition and were given to former farm workers although they do not have offer letters for the land). The majority of the participants who were early to settle on the farm came from Chiweshe. The average size of the plots is 6 hectares and farm worker plots have an average size of 2 acres. The main crop grown at the farm is tobacco (twenty two of the respondents) followed by maize and soya bean. The main types of livestock kept at the farm include cattle, goats, hens and sheep. The majority of the participants indicated that they acquired land through *jambanja* (farm occupations). The minority acquired land through applications to councillors and the DA's office. The participants unanimously indicated that they were no longer farming on their former communal plots indicating that they had left their land to be used by their relatives or children who had their own families.

Assets found on the farm include twelve tobacco barns (four are not functional), an E.D.B. applicator, motor, borehole and fuel tanks. The settlers have managed to buy a variety of assets. Twelve have purchased ox drawn ploughs; additionally, there are ten scotch carts, four harrows and thirteen cattle purchased. One farmer has managed to buy a car while eight have built houses and others have bought tobacco clips. One farmer is planning to buy a grind mill. Most of the plot holders have not built proper houses because most could not afford to build the houses. They acknowledge that they had been struggling with farming. Another reason was that they were afraid of being removed and they had been told by the DA's office that proper planning for houses would be done but nothing has happened.

People on the scheme are aware of the AIDS disease. The problem is that people cannot be sure who has the disease or not. One of the participants was the community health worker who indicated that people were not willing to be tested. He said that people were getting tested at a very late stage. The health worker says that people are still afraid and shy to openly talk about the disease and their status. There is thus no sure way of knowing who is infected or affected because people keep it a secret. There is an awareness campaign on the scheme. The issue of HIV is on the agenda for every meeting on the scheme and condoms are provided. There are dramas educating people about HIV.

Domestic water is mainly from two sources. There is one manual borehole which serves a portion of the farm but others who live far away from it are using unprotected wells. The manual borehole is in need of repairs and the other electricity borehole is not functional. The water for washing clothes is from the same sources. For sanitation, people use Blair toilets and pit latrines. Water for livestock is found in two small perennial dams which are nearby and from the springs. There is no irrigation taking place mainly because there are no transformers and engines. Half of the farm has underground pipes. The scheme members have approached Operation Maguta⁴⁰ through their irrigation committee to apply for irrigation equipment. They tried to apply to non-governmental organisations but nothing came out of this. Maize and soya beans are marketed through the GMB at Nzvimbo or Mvurwi. The GMB also has a satellite depot at Muswenhede nearby. Tobacco is sold at Boka auction floors in Harare.

The farmers indicated that they have been suffering. They have not been productive and farming was not a business for them. The participants were forthright in claiming how they have failed to be highly productive on the land. There was however one farmer who has managed to send children to boarding school. Another participant has been able to rent a house for her children in Mvurwi so that they could attend school. There have been no investments from government or non-governmental organizations at Blightly. The nearest primary school is Copley which is seven kilometres away and the nearest secondary school is Wela which is fourteen kilometres away. The nearest clinic is in Mvurwi. Other closeby health centres are Howard and Rosa. The councillor promised them a clinic at Muswenhede two years ago but nothing has materialised. The plot holders contributed money to fix tobacco barns last season which were destroyed by wind. Those farmers who did not pay are known and will not be allowed to utilize the barns in future.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter has tried to offer a vivid picture of the communities in Mazowe's new resettlement areas. The chapter, based on a broad survey of both A1 and A2 farmers plus my own more recent research, tries to highlight the general characteristics of the new communities. It explains who these farmers are, where they are from, how they got onto the land, what they grow and their general experience of life in the resettlement areas. Apart from

⁴⁰ Inputs programme run by the army.

that, it analyses the emerging actors, institutional forms, social spaces and gender relations. The chapter offers background to the following chapters which go into detail on social capital and institutionalisation in relation to six specific farms. To understand how these concepts operate in practice, we have to know the type of people and community in which they appear.

The widespread movement of people from different areas which included urban, communal, old resettlement and other former commercial farming areas into Mazowe led to the emergence of new communities. These new communities are a collection of new farmers (made up of war veterans, youths, war collaborators, government workers, formerly unemployed urban dwellers, politicians, women, and ordinary people from all walks of life); farm workers; a few remaining white farmers; and service providers (such as teachers, nurses and extension officers). All these are people of diverse cultures and backgrounds fused together into new neighbours. New relationships and social spaces have been created within the newly resettled areas. This chapter describes these new communities and relationships in Mazowe which are important in understanding institutional forms that have emerged post settlement. The main aim of the thesis is to understand how farm level institutions have aided communities made up of such a diverse collection of people from contrasting backgrounds, ages, beliefs and genders to evolve over the past ten or eleven years of resettlement.

CHAPTER SIX: FORMATION, TAXONOMY AND RECRUITMENT PROCESSES OF FARM LEVEL INSTITUTIONS

6.1 Introduction

A kaleidoscope of farm level institutions appears in various guises in Mazowe. These institutions occur on a continuum ranging from the formal to the informal. Farm level institutions include all associational groupings (small or large, formal or informal) that operate at farm level on the fast track farms. The taxonomy and formation of these various groupings is dependent on many internal and external dynamics which are fully discussed below. The emergence of new communities and new citizens in the old commercial farming areas was marked by novel associational forms. These institutions are in most cases an attempt by new settlers to make neighbours out of their farm counterparts who are often strangers. Classification of these grassroots organisations is dependent on factors such as size, activities, membership base and geographical area. This chapter is concerned with highlighting the various processes and dynamics involved in the formation of these institutions. It offers diverse typologies of farm level institutions and how they are structurally organised. For Moyo (2002:10), rural organisations are complex and diverse in their superficial character. This makes it difficult to construct rigid typologies and classifications of these institutions.

Institutional formations in rural Africa have been variously described as ‘traditional institutions’ (Mukamuri et al 2003), ‘rural institutions’ (Mohomed 2003), ‘peasant organisations’ (Romdhane and Moyo 2002), ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006) and recently rural civil society (Murisa 2010). These institutions have for long been viewed as informal because they operate outside the realm of government or state control and are legally recognised (Meagher 2007). The genesis of these institutions has depended upon the social, political and economic environment at the time of their formation. For example, the advent of burial societies was linked to processes of urbanisation and migration that disintegrated the extended family which was once responsible for funeral arrangements.

In this chapter I outline the formation, taxonomy and recruitment processes of farm level institutions in Mazowe. My discussion draws on various case studies to better understand how these institutions were conceived and have evolved over the years. It notes how internal and external forces and actors help shape farm level institutions. The chapter discusses various typologies of farm level institutions such as social, political, economic and multi-purpose. It highlights how some of the institutions can be viewed as continuities of practices that farmers pursued in their areas of origin (for example burial societies) and how new forms of institutions have emerged on fast track farms (for example electricity committees). The chapter offers an analysis of the recruitment processes used by farm level institutions to attract membership. It outlines various processes of recruitment such as self selection and coercion. I begin the chapter by discussing social space within the newly resettled areas post-2000 in Mazowe.

6.2 Social space and governance in the newly resettled areas

The land reform process post-2000 in Zimbabwe led to the emergence of new actors, new communities, new citizens, new spaces and new contestations within the rural landscape. The farmers in Mazowe constitute a broad gamut of people of varying ages, ethnicities and degrees of wealth. Among them are men and women, communal area farmers and urban employees, Christians and spirit mediums – all with different reasons for coming to the resettlement areas. This melting pot of differing and often contradictory personalities gave rise to communities that have coexisted since 2000 in Mazowe. Baar (2004:1753) notes that resettlement often brings together strangers who become neighbours. In such cases, new relationships and trust have to be built which allow cooperation and help in times of need.

During the focus group discussions, there was a sentiment that the farmers were not united. One farmer pointed out: *‘Pano mazvake mazvake. Nhamo yako ndeyako wega’* (Here it is each person for themselves. Your problems are yours alone). No one was willing to work together with others where there was no foreseeable individual benefit. The formation of farm level institutions is thus premised upon selfish individual needs and not for the common good. Most farmers I came across indicated that because people had known each other for only a short time it was difficult to completely trust anyone. This lack of unity however does not stop them from coming together when need arises especially where uniting brings farmers individual benefits.

In Mazowe, during the *jambanja* phase, fast track farms essentially became militarised zones as war veterans and youth brigades controlled the movement of people in and out of the farms. Even now war veterans still have considerable authority and through the Committee of Seven they undertake surveillance on the farms. In addition, party meetings are still being held frequently. The ‘Zanu-nization’ of the newly resettled areas has meant that all forms of associational life were based on or related to the party (Chaumba et al. 2003b). The strong grip of ZANU-PF on the fast track farms has meant that farm level institutions have in the main been influenced by the party. Thus any institutional form which is regarded as anti party will not be allowed to exist on the farms. In fighting their cause new farmers will inevitably have to confront the government but this might be misconstrued as supporting the opposition which might lead to losing land. This explains why at every institutional meeting I attended ZANU-PF slogans followed after the opening prayer.

6.2.1 New farmers and new actors

The land reform programme involved the large movement of people into the formerly sparsely populated commercial farming areas. In Mazowe, the population in the new resettlement areas grew (as an estimation) from around 2,000 to over 40,000 people⁴¹. A new breed of farmer had been born, one which is mainly characterised by limited resources, technical skills and relevant experience. These new farmers are a collection and variety of men and women ranging between twenty four and eighty five years of age, and coming from a diverse range of ethnic, religious and educational backgrounds. They tell varying stories of how they moved onto the resettlement land, but they all share a harsh experience of life in the resettlement areas. From these diverse stories, we can therefore provide a broad generalised picture of the new farmers while offering selected vignettes illustrating particular people’s experiences in the new resettlement areas.

An example is Mr and Mrs Murerwa, small-scale A2 farmers at Bouncegreen Farm who left their employment at an orphanage and a home in Epworth in Harare to do farming full-time. They have a thriving market gardening project which has helped them buy a new truck. Using their own resources and without external support they have been able to sustain a growing enterprise. There are also stories of unmarried widows such as Alice Mupeti at Fairview Farm who is a war veteran and was involved in the land occupations. She did not have land

⁴¹ Interview with Lands Officer, 24th April 2009.

before and now possesses thirty-nine hectares. For her, land reform has tried in part to redress gender imbalances by allowing women access to land. Other stories are more of pain and anguish such as Thomas Kanyemba at Truro Farm. He is virtually destitute as he used to live on his brother's A1 plot which subsequently was taken by a new farmer. Thomas had quit his employment at his brother's insistence to come and look after the plot but the brother left him in the cold when he gave up the farm to the local DA after accessing another plot in Chinhoyi. Now he is begging and working simply for food together with his wife and two children. There are many more stories of new farmers which provide a rich tapestry of the people who came from different areas and with varying motivations to become part of the new farming citizenry.

New emerging relationships of importance include the new farmer-farm worker interaction. Before fast track, farm workers worked for one farmer who offered them accommodation, but the situation is different in that there are thirty to forty farmers (on one former commercial farm) who mostly use family labour. There are both advantages and disadvantages for farm workers within this new system. Sachikonye (2003:69) notes that, nationally, the predominant relationship used to be that between 4,500 white landowners and 300,000 to 320,000 farm workers. Now the relationship is between about 300,000 small-farmer households and 30,000 black commercial farmers on the one hand; and on the other hand the remaining farm workers (working for either A1 or A2 farmers) and former workers. There are no precise figures on how many farm workers remain employed, nor is it possible to trace where all the former workers are. But a new pattern of social relations is emerging. By and large, the settlers (i.e. new farmers) have been the primary beneficiaries of land reform, while farm workers have mainly been losers. Whereas the authorities interpret the success of reform in terms of the relocation of 300,000 settlers, they in large part ignore the fate of the 300,000 farm workers. The success of land reform should be judged on the basis of whether both sets of social groups benefited from it. Farm workers in Mazowe have largely failed to access land under resettlement. The Lands Officer actually claims that the number of farmer workers who got land is negligible and it was only those workers who possessed a necessary skill such as irrigation maintenance that were given land by the new settlers such as at Usk Farm.

The rest of the farm workers were mainly left on the farms but there were some who were removed and had their compound houses burnt by the new settlers. The main problem

between the farmers and the workers is the new emancipation for ex-workers to refuse work that does not provide an adequate wage. The farm workers can now negotiate for better wages and refuse to work for less. This has caused problems with the new farmers who claim that if the workers still want to live in the compounds they have to work for them. The survey in Mazowe highlights that the farmers believe that wages being demanded by farm workers are exorbitant in that they charge piece-rate amounts per line of crops in the fields. With the introduction of multi-currency, the situation became more intense as workers demand as much as three American dollars per line. Thus we see a new form of labour arrangement which is still evolving but is riddled with conflict and mutual suspicion.

6.2.2 New communities and new institutions

One of the greatest legacies of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe is how communities were created seemingly overnight⁴². The social relationships in the new communities are important in the analysis of the political and administrative structure on farms. Chaumba et al. (2003a:19) note that there was a sudden emergence of a hierarchical governance structure which ensured easy monitoring and surveillance by government. They argue that in its own way the sudden appearance, seemingly from nowhere, of an integrated top-down system of governance in the new resettlements is as striking as the dramatic physical transformation of the landscape. This new pattern of authority is characterised by a very hierarchical committee-based structure and has parallels with the decentralised ruling party cell and district development committee systems of the 1980s. The various institutional arrangements that cropped up at farm/scheme level require careful analysis. In doing so, the thesis investigates the ways in which the concepts of social capital and power can be used to understand the formation and evolution of these various entities.

In Mazowe the A1 farmers have been grouped into villages on every scheme, leading to the creation of what Baar (2004:1753) terms ‘stranger neighbouring households.’ These new communities were created by chance⁴³ and include households that have never met before. These stranger neighbours were forced by circumstances to settle and interact with each other. Given that 39% of A1 settlers in Mazowe are from Chiweshe communal areas, many people have a starting point with which to relate to each other. This is because they are

⁴² Morgan Tsvangirai (then president of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change) was once quoted saying these communities were sprouting everywhere like mushrooms.

⁴³ A1 plots in Mazowe were mainly given to people through picking a number from a hat.

coming from a similar cultural and social background. However 26% of members of these A1 communities come from a different cultural setting to the one in Chiweshe. These new citizens were forced to learn and assimilate the many norms prevalent in Mazowe. This was a source of conflict as new farmers were caught breaking various norms in Mazowe. One example is of a farmer at Wychwood Farm who killed a python which is not allowed in Mazowe.

The A1 farmers are organising for anything and everything while such a level of organisation is almost non-existent among A2 farmers. A2 farmers have tended to shun cooperating amongst themselves or with A1 farmers. The major reason for this is the nature of residence in which A2 farmers live alone on their plots, while A1 farmers are grouped together in a village. In such a case, A2 farmers rarely find time and opportunity to interact as A1 farmers do. However A1 farmers believe that A2 farmers are arrogant and act as if they are superior to everyone else. As one farmer at Arda Farm commented, *MaA2 ndovatove varungu vacho, havatedzeri zvese zvechisi kana mitemo yamambo* (A2 farmers are now like the white farmers. They do not follow the traditional chief or traditional rules). This thesis can only speculate on why the A2 farmers behave in the way they do, as they did not form part of the sample for the study. However, from the general survey, it seems clear that their lack of associational activity exists because most of them are not resident on their farms. The A2 farmers are however organising at a much higher level through various consortiums, clusters and marketing groups. These groupings have different power bases and influences, and are based not only on geographical location but ethnicity, political affiliation and class.

6.3 Formation and taxonomy of informal institutions in the newly resettled areas

The formation of farm level institutions is an enterprise fraught with contestation, negotiation and sometimes domination. In this chapter diverse processes involved in the formation of institutional forms at farm level are discussed, including the involvement of charismatic leaders, external agents, everyday interaction, coercion and even negotiation. Processes of formation are highly complex and, at times, it is difficult to delineate the different factors involved in influencing farmers to organise. As noted before in this thesis, the formation of institutions was largely a response to the diverse challenges facing fast track farmers (though there are other social and political factors involved, as discussed below). What is important to highlight is that these institutions are in a constant state of wax and wane, such that they are never fully formed but are rather created and recreated in ongoing interaction among farmers.

Farm level institutions emerge in different forms within the fast track farms. Under fast track reform, each A1 farm became a community on its own – defined and delimited by the farm boundaries. Farm level institutions are thus any groupings that emerge and evolve within this bounded geographic area serving the needs of some or all the people. These institutions are however fluid and expand in some cases to operate and influence beyond the physical borders of the farm. In many ways their existence and identity has a spatial and temporal fluidity which makes typologies difficult. This thesis however offers a broad-based taxonomical understanding of farm level institutions. The institutions range in size, form, organisation, membership and influence. This wide variety of institutions found in the newly resettled areas is testimony to the vigour and enterprising spirit of rural societies in Africa (Romdhane 1992:2).

Table 7: Taxonomy of institutions in new resettlement areas

Type	Brief description
<i>Sabhuku</i> /village head	Unlike traditional <i>sabhuku</i> in communal areas who inherit the position, in the new resettlement areas they are chosen by the traditional chief.
Committee of Seven	<i>Sabhuku</i> heads this committee but the other members are democratically chosen by the plot holders on the farm.
Irrigation Committee	Present at farms with irrigation and usually chosen by only those involved in irrigation.
Development committee	Present at some farms and works independently of the Committee of Seven. However at other farms the Committee of Seven becomes the ad hoc development committee.
Farm committee	Present at some farms and works in the same manner as the development committee but differs in that it has more responsibility over other non-developmental issues.
ZESA/Electricity committee	Usually tasked with issues that relate to payment of bills, fixing faults and in cases spearheading applications for connection.
Health committee	This committee, like most locally-initiated committees, is chosen by the settlers and is responsible for health issues including HIV and AIDS. There are also Home Based Care Committees initiated by Tariro Clinic at Howard Hospital.
School Development Committee	Operates at schools in the newly resettled areas.
Women's clubs	Women come together once or twice a week to discuss issues that affect them.
Youth's clubs	Mainly organized along sports or church lines.
Revolving savings clubs	Small groups based on trust where people pool resources together and share.
Burial societies	Arrangements at scheme level to offer assistance in case of death.

Source: Fieldwork 2010

New farmers in Mazowe create and recreate conditions of their own existence through various forms of associational activities. Given the paralysed nature of the Zimbabwean government post-2000, new farmers were forced to invent ways to survive and provide basic on-farm services. Based on my own fieldwork, Table 7 above shows some of the different types of governance structures within the new resettlement areas, and provides a brief description of each associational form. The following table (Table 8), on the other hand, derives from the Land and Livelihoods Study and shows that 73.3% of the 539 respondents belong to religious groups. This highlights the dominance of religion and its accompanied beliefs in influencing associational life at farm level.

Table 8: Types of social institutions in Mazowe

Institution	Frequency	Percentage
Religious group	395	73.3
Agricultural consortium	64	11.9
Farmer organization	153	28.4
Women's organization	85	15.8
Burial society	20	3.7
Savings club	14	2.6
Irrigation committee	189	35.1
Cooperative project	14	2.6
School development committee	68	12.6
Commodity association	8	1.5
Football club	68	12.6
Health committee	48	8.9

Source: Land and Livelihoods Survey 2007/08

Institutions in newly resettled areas are formed for the specific political, social and economic needs of communities. In most instances, the farm-level formations are a response to challenges or are a way to ensure that certain needs are met. For example, the HIV pandemic has forced Howard Hospital to initiate a programme of Home Based Care Committees on farms, which are responsible for out-of-hospital patients. At Blightly Farm, there is an operational committee which helps in the caring of terminally ill patients on the programme. It assists with food, medicines, psycho-social support and general care of the terminally ill. It is headed by a health worker who was chosen after training workshops with the hospital.

Figure 2: Socio-political understanding of farm level institutions




Figure 2 highlights the interrelationship of the various institutions which can be grouped into social, economic, religious, developmental, political and gender based institutions. This taxonomy however is not rigid as most institutions are fluid in what they do and they have multiple identities. For example, the Committee of Seven at Davaar Farm has political, social and even developmental roles. The fluid character of these groupings ensures that different institutions are responsive to the various challenges facing farmers, regardless of why they were first instituted. An example is at Hariana Farm, where the school development committee ended up ensuring provision of clean safe water through constructing a borehole on the farm. It is thus important to highlight the fluid quality of farm level institutions and how they interrelate. The following discussion outlines the various types of institutions noted in Figure 2.

6.3.1 Religious and spiritual institutions

Tradition and indigenous religions play an important role in the social set up and everyday lives of fast track farmers (especially A1 farmers). The traditional chief and spirit mediums are important cornerstones of religion, culture and spirituality. The position of traditional

leader at scheme level (headman or *sabhuku*) has serious religious and cultural roots. Spirit mediums have traditionally been involved in the process of selecting all traditional leaders. In the communal areas, the position of village head/*sabhuku* is hereditary. The new breed of *sabhuku* on fast track farms has no connection to spirit mediums and the title is not hereditary. The break with tradition negatively affects the legitimacy of these leaders particularly given that they are expected to be at the forefront of safeguarding cultural norms and traditions.

During informal interviews with war veterans in Barwick Intensive Conservation Areas (in Mazowe), it was highlighted that (before the occupation of most farms in the area) consultations with religious leaders (*masvikiro*) in the area were made. Traditional ceremonies were held before farms were invaded, and thus spiritual issues were important in guiding the land occupations. But the imposition of farm level leaders was done without the guidance of spiritual leaders. In the creation of new traditional authorities, the role of spiritual leaders was undermined – as the state directed chiefs to choose a village head at every A1 scheme. The chief chose the leaders alone without any guidance of the spirit mediums who were completely alienated from the selection processes. The village heads are in essence appointees of the chiefs thus there is some form of political patronage involved. Scoones et al (2010:198) aptly point out: ‘_Whilst traditional religion played a critical role during the liberation struggle of the 1970s, it was perhaps not such an important consideration during 2000s.’

In certain cases, due to the dominance of Christianity, spirit mediums have also been completely ignored. In the six farm case studies, religious institutional forms were mainly Christian. Traditional religious beliefs are practised in adherence to traditional customs which are enforced by chiefs, such as *chisi* (the designated rest on which no one is allowed to do any work). The traditional institution of *chisi*, like most other customs, is selectively practised by A1 farmers (A2 farmers are exempt from following traditional customs). Other traditional rules followed by A1 farmers include not killing python snakes or cutting down certain types of trees. But traditional religion has in most instances been neglected in the social organisation of fast track farms. Only a few farmers adhere to all traditional norms. Most farmers pick and choose which traditions to follow, in large part because they fear being made to pay fines for non-adherence.

Traditional leaders saw land reform as an opportunity to regain control over their lost ancestral lands. Traditional chiefs have been at the forefront of the land reform programme. Mujere (2010:19 quoted in Scoones et al. 2010:211) concisely sums up the issue:

Whilst for technocrats the land redistribution programme is about taking land from the minority white farmers and giving it to the landless black majority, the traditional authorities did not quite see the programme in the same way. Instead, they view it as an opportunity to reclaim lost ancestral lands, graves, mountains and sacred places and also to re-establish their *nyika* [territory] boundaries which had been greatly altered during the colonial period.

Chiefs have tried to ensure their influence in the new communities and they have largely succeeded in the A1 schemes; A2 schemes though remain insulated from their control.

The dominance of Christian beliefs has meant the emergence of certain institutional forms based on values of love, neighbourliness and unity. This has assisted in the formation of communities as people interact at multiple social levels including at church. In Masvingo Province, churches were one of the most significant sources of organisation such that in a number of areas religious affiliation and land invasions were tightly linked (Scoones et al. 2010:208). Churches in Mazowe have become important signifiers of meaning especially given the challenges facing the fast track farmers. Church members have tended to see each other as relatives and hence new social networks are formed by members. These networks transcend farm boundaries. A church leader⁴⁴ in the area had this to say: ‘Churches have provided people with relatives when they had none. In church we are all God’s children and emphasis is on helping each other. We have also helped in resolving conflicts even in the homesteads involving our members. We are thus community builders and an important part of new communities.’

6.3.2 Economic institutions

Economic institutions within the context of fast track farms are all institutional forms related to production and marketing of farm produce. Production-based and marketing institutions concentrate on access to inputs, credit and other productive assets. Such institutions vary in size and structure. They may be made up of only three or four farmers who put together money monthly to buy each other inputs in turn. Such a scheme at Hamilton Farm is between

⁴⁴ Key informant interview with church leader, 23rd October 2010.

three close farmers who had known each other long before coming to the fast track farms. On the other end of the scale are various commodity associations and farmer unions. In the field I came across the Mazowe South Cluster. It is a grouping of A2 farmers in Mazowe South region. The cluster's committee is made up of farmers from different farms and the treasurer is from Dunberry Farm. It was voted into power by all farmer members and has tenure for three years. The cluster offers farmers the platform to meet and discuss their problems so that they can have a united front as farmers; thus, it is the voice of the A2 farmers in Mazowe South⁴⁵. The group however has limited impact at national level and has failed to lobby government for farm machinery.

6.3.3 Social institutions

Social institutions are complex, integrated sets of social norms organized around the preservation of a basic societal value. On fast track farms there are various such institutional forms. In certain times of troubles, fast track farmers come together to help each other regardless of personal differences. One such time is when there is a funeral. Of great interest though is that on all the farms in the study there were no burial societies. At Hamilton Farm the farmers previously had a burial society but it was disbanded after there were problems with money and accountability. Currently at the six farms, in the event of a funeral, farmers pay an agreed amount towards helping the grieving farmer. At the moment this ranges from US\$1 to US\$5 per farmer. The arrangement is based on trust and reciprocity, and hence on the knowledge that in time of grief others will pay for you just as you pay for others. Failure to pay means that in the case of a death, you might not get help from others for funeral expenses.

6.3.4 Political institutions

There are explicitly political institutions at the farm level which mainly act as the vanguard of ZANU-PF within the fast track farms. Party cells begin at the grassroots and are very active in Mazowe. These party structures are not initiated by farmers but form an important part of their lives within the farms. The farmers feel that they owe their possession of land to ZANU-PF and, certainly, the party is forever reminding them of this, especially during elections. The party has thus imposed in these areas strong party structures that ensure that they maintain their rural support base. At some of the farms in Mazowe, I had to first seek permission from

⁴⁵ See Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of the cluster.

district or village party officials to interview farmers. Party institutions are prevalent at all levels on the fast track farms. They perform several roles, chief of which is to maintain the support base of the party (as will be shown later in the thesis).

6.3.5 Developmental institutions

Developmental institutions are involved mainly in infrastructural development and management on the farms. They are involved in various fundraising initiatives to ensure farms acquire necessary property such as grinding mills or boreholes. Farms such as Usk have a separate farm development committee. This institution has a mandate to forge ahead with development issues in the farm village. The committee works in tandem with the Committee of Seven but remains independent, and its members are voted in by the farmers. It is the voice of the farm to the outside world, as its main task is to lobby various line ministries, departments and nongovernmental organizations so they can contribute to the development of the farm. Committee members are not paid for the service they give to the community.

6.3.6 Gender and age based institutions

There are other types of institutions which are exclusively organised according to gender or age. Studies (Mararike 1999; Moyo 2002; Rahmato 1991) of rural institutions have focused primarily upon farmers unions or associations moulded within an interest group conceptual framework. Such studies correlate the emergence and growth of these associations with the rise of the market economy based on ‘Western’ experiences which often neglects various gender, age and class dynamics which underpin the political-economic basis of these institutional forms. Gender-based groups include women’s clubs which exist on most farms in the district. On Blightly farm the association is not open to female farm workers but only to women plot owners and wives of plot owners. Thus, social class becomes a form of exclusion in the composition of gender-based groups. The youth are marginalised in most farm level institutions. The average age of the members in farm level institutions in the farms covered by this study is forty seven, and the youngest member I came across was thirty four years old. This in part reflects the fact that young people did not obtain land in their own name in Mazowe. Chapter Seven analyses the role of women and youths in detail on the fast track farms.

6.4 Mutual support groups and multi-purpose farm organisations

In Mazowe farm level institutions vary from mutual support groups to multi-purpose farm organisations. Small-scale mutual support groups do not extend beyond the farm (Romdhane 1992:2). They are usually informal and involve a small number of members. At Usk farm, there are various groupings of farmers involved in rotating saving clubs (*maround*). At the time of the research there were four such groups operating at the farm. They were made up of three to six members who contributed money on a monthly basis which was given to one member monthly. Money dispersed ranged from twenty to fifty American dollars. One of the groups ensures that the money collected per month is used to buy inputs by the farmers. Such groups are based on trust since farmers contribute on the grounds that, when it is their turn to receive money, everyone will also contribute. They are self-selective and, at least at Usk, it is usually people who have known each other before settling on the farm who form these groups. Trusting people you have known for only a few years (i.e. since the start of fast track) with money is difficult for most farmers.

One member of a saving group indicated: *‘Zvinonetsa kutrusta munhu nemaUS dollar. Vamwe vanhu vakauya kuma resettlement vadzingwa kumisha yavo nenyaya dzekuba saka unotoita nevanhu vawaziva kwemakore akawanda’* (It’s difficult to trust people with American dollars. Some people were chased away from their rural homes because of theft so you can only trust people you have known for years). One of the groups had two members who had been involved in a similar scheme when they were in the communal areas. Revolving savings clubs are thus not novel to the resettlement areas; rather, these clubs exemplify continuities from communal areas. In 2007, at the height of the Zimbabwean economic crisis and before the introduction of the American dollar, there were no revolving clubs operating at Usk due to the inflationary environment that made it impossible to save with the local currency. At other farms such as Kia Ora, farmers during this period used groceries, kitchen utensils and inputs as a form of barter exchange. Each month members would buy soap, sugar and cooking oil and give to one member at a time.

On the upper end of the continuum there are multi-purpose farm institutions which involve all the farmers on a particular farm. Such institutions are more or less formally constituted and are geared towards service provision. An example of such an institution is the electricity committee at Blightly Farm, which ensures a regular supply of electricity to the farm. The committee is responsible for the maintenance of electricity infrastructure and the collection of

monthly levies for payment of the farm's electricity bill. It comprises five members who are voted in every five years. Currently the chairperson is a woman who was chosen by the scheme members. One farmer noted: *Committee yakazara vanhu vakachangamuka. Tinoisa vanhu vanomhanya mhanya* (The committee is made up of wise people. We only choose people who work hard). There is an element of participatory democracy through the fact that the committee is chosen by an election.

Farm level institutions are fluid in how they operate. In many cases institutions overlap and at one point or another all institutions are multi-purpose in nature. At Hariana Farm, the school development committee provided and manages the borehole which the community uses for its water. Water provision on the farm is the responsibility of the Committee of Seven or the farm development committee. The school however took the lead in providing water and it controls the use of and access to the water source. Thus an institution created for education provision can be involved in water provision. At Blightly Farm the home-based care group now also works as the health committee as it is involved in all health issues and not only HIV and AIDS. Farm level institutions are thus multi-purpose and, in the section below, I focus on the management of these institutions.

6.5 Self-managed and externally-managed institutions

Self-managed institutions have (quasi-) voluntary membership and decisions are usually made by consensus (Romdhane 1992:5). Voluntary, in this instance, does not mean people willingly work for the benefit of others. Rather it entails people realising that they can sustain their own needs only through working with others. The majority of farm-level institutions are self-managed by committees which are chosen through democratic elections. The committees are given a mandated term of office and in most cases they can be removed by consensus before their term expires. At all the six research sites there were numerous self-managed institutions. For example, at Davaar and Usk farms, there are irrigation committees which were started by farmers to spearhead irrigation activities.

Externally-managed bodies are mainly controlled and managed by outside interests with the local A1 farmers totally excluded or at least marginally involved in decision-making. An example of such institutions is the Committee of Seven, which is present on every farm. It is made up of seven members, six of which are elected by farmers. The committee is headed

though by a village head (*sabhuku*) who is appointed by the Chief⁴⁶. This appointment is done in the presence of the District Administrator, officers from the district council and the six other members elected by settlers. On most farms the *sabhuku* tends to be someone known to the Chief or who was very active in the farm occupation. The Committee of Seven is not strictly speaking a new form of organisation, since during the war of liberation in Zimbabwe war committees made up of seven members were in place. During the Third *Chimurenga* (war of liberation), these earlier institutional forms were therefore reincarnated in another form. The committee usually has a treasurer, gender representative (almost always a woman) and four ordinary committee members.

The role of the Committee of Seven mainly entails administration of the farm, as a quasi-government institution that is answerable to either the council or traditional chief. The committee is hence a good example of an externally-managed institution in which the farmers have limited input into its operations. It would seem, at first glance, that there is community ownership of the committee through the right of A1 farmers to vote six members onto the committee. But the mandate to operate is actually controlled by government which wants to maintain support from the farmers. This is done through using the committees to arrange political meetings (and ensure attendance at these meetings) and campaigning for the ruling party. The committee structure however is not legally recognised by any statutory instrument in Zimbabwe. While it operates within the bounds of government, it remains a weapon of control and surveillance for ZANU-PF. The committee in a sense acts as a gate keeper in terms of monitoring entry into, and movement within, the newly resettled areas.

The committees have different specific mandates and practices on different farms. For example, at Blightly Farm, the committee is in office for five years after which a new election is held. On all the farms the committee could however be dissolved by farmers for unsatisfactory service and replaced with a new committee (except for the position of *sabhuku*). Only the traditional chief has the right to replace the *sabhuku*. Thus farmers have little recourse if they are unhappy with the village head. As one farmer at Blightly noted: *‘Masabhuku ndevamambo, isu hapana zvatingavaite chero munhu akakubhowa’* (Village heads belong to the chief and there is nothing we can do even if they annoy us). Village heads throughout Mazowe are mostly men with only a few women, such as at Kia Ora. In an

⁴⁶ Either Chief Chiweshe or Negomo (depending on the location of the farm).

interview with the female *sabhuku* at Kia Ora, she indicated that it is difficult for women to be given the position because it has traditionally been associated with men. The fast track farms could have offered an opportunity to institute some kind of equality between men and women. However the gender identity of village heads indicates that this opportunity was not actioned.

6.6 Continuities and discontinuities in rural institutions

Some institutions are unique or novel to the newly resettled areas, but others are adapted from farmers' areas of origin to suit local conditions on the A1 farms. In Mazowe, many people from various communal areas received land and these people had been involved in various associational forms in these areas. The customary (or communal) areas of Zimbabwe embody many types of rural institutions, including externally-initiated bodies such as village development committees (VIDCOs) and grassroots groups such as burial societies and revolving funds. From this rich history of associational life, farmers adapted old institutional practices to new realities on the former commercial farms. Scoones et al. (2010:207), in their study in Masvingo Province, also note this trend – they identify social networks on A1 farms which replicate those found in communal areas, including work parties, funeral assistance and religious-based interactions.

The farm development committee is a clear example of an institution that is a continuation or adaption from communal areas. In the communal areas the village development committees were state-sanctioned institutions intended to be the major conduits of government-initiated development projects. At Usk farm, the farm development committee is modelled differently from the VIDCO because it is not government-driven and is based on the specific needs of the farm. Unlike the VIDCO, it also does not involve local authorities or traditional leaders as it is comprised of farmers voted into power. This committee is responsible for the maintenance and management of all farm infrastructures, and for ensuring farm socio-economic development and security. Novel institutions which entail a complete break from the past also exist. These include electricity committees which were necessitated by the presence of electricity on the commercial farms. In the communal areas there was no electricity. At Blightly Farm the institution was based on a popular vote. The individual benefit of electricity is only possible through the group thus the farmers came together. At the same farm there is no other functional grouping for production or farm development.

6.7 Patterns of farm level institutions

Farm level institutions are instituted by different processes which are either internally- or externally-driven, and they emerge either as a result of individual effort or the work of like-minded individuals. This section illuminates the dynamics involved in the creation of these farm groupings. Below I discuss the various ways in which different farm level institutions came into being.

6.7.1 Internally instituted farm groupings

6.7.1.1 Need-driven farm level institutions

Farm level institutions are a form of agency on the part of fast track farmers in response to the numerous challenges facing them. In any land reform programme, the provision of social services such as schools, health facilities, transport and social welfare is critical. However, the government of Zimbabwe adopted a ‘resettlement first, services later approach.’ There was no concerted effort to provide the new communities with social services in terms of water, health, education and sanitation. It might even appear that the Zimbabwean government simply dumped people onto the land and left them to fend for themselves.

In response to these harsh realities of life on the fast track farms, A1 farmers initiated various novel institutions to improve their lives. In response to a lack of health facilities, farmers in most parts of the district began organising for the establishment of clinics on their farms. At Davaar Farm a health committee was already in existence before the clinic was established. The health committee was responsible, together with the farm committee, for coordinating the turning of the farm house into a clinic. Together, they influenced the rural district council to site a clinic at Davaar, ensured that the A1 farmers contributed in sinking the necessary borehole, provided shelter for the nurses, and made bricks for – and paid part of the costs in – transforming the farm house. In this case, the need for health services led to the formation of an institution that took the lead in rallying the community and ensured the setting up of a clinic. People thus invest in social relationships to obtain benefits that accrue to them.

In other cases, institutions were formed to advance an already-existing service. Interviews with school development committee members at Mapere Farm School highlight how farmers organised to ensure that challenges facing schools are alleviated. Mapere School was built by the white farmer but was taken over by the government after 2000. It serves a total of five surrounding farms. The school now has teachers provided by the Ministry of Education and it

sustains itself through levies paid by the parents of students. The school though faces many challenges in raising funds to sustain its operations. The parents whose children attend the school have set up a school development committee as mandated by the Ministry of Education to raise levies and run the affairs of the school together with the headmaster. The committee has eight members from the farms served by the school. It includes farm worker representatives and is chosen yearly by the parents.

6.7.1.2 Institutions initiated by influential farmers

On some farms there are individuals who for various reasons were able to rally whole communities behind specific efforts. These individuals use money, power, status, charisma and knowledge (or a combination of these) to stamp their authority over the group. Usk Farm at one time had an irrigation committee chairperson who was a top-ranking army official. He has since moved to an A2 farm. He dominated associational life at Usk although he was not always present at the farm. His army rank made him a powerful figure that could influence people to rally around him. The decisions of such dominant individuals also are rarely questioned and they are made on an ad hoc basis without prior consultation or discussion with the group. The leader speaks and acts on behalf of the group. After the military man at Usk Farm left the farm around mid-2008, there was a decrease in the impact and success of farm level institutions at the farm in terms of lobbying government and local authorities.

Another interesting case – which was not one of the six case studies – I came across in Mazowe was at Selby Farm. Initially the farm was facing serious challenges because of contestations between new farmers and the caretaker.⁴⁷ The caretaker was allegedly siphoning off movable property from the farm as well as renting out occupied plots to peri-urban farmers. The farmers felt powerless because the caretaker had political connections and they were afraid of being evicted. One of the farmers however was at one time organising farmers to fight against the caretaker. This farmer appeared very influential and was at the forefront of organising farmers into various groupings. At the time of the study there were no functional groups on the farm mainly due to tenure insecurity⁴⁸ and problems farmers were facing from the caretaker.

⁴⁷ During the height of land occupations, the government appointed farm caretakers to watch over farm property. The caretakers were in most cases war veterans.

⁴⁸ This stemmed from the fact that some of the farmers did not have offer letters (which is proof of possession) and because of constant threats of eviction from the caretaker.

6.7.1.3 Institutions as forms of grassroots resistance to state authority

James Scott's (1985) seminal work on 'weapons of the weak' offers valuable insights into how some forms of farm level institutions can become springboards for protest against the established order. Fast track farmers in Mazowe owe their allegiance to ZANU-PF, which at election times has threatened to withdraw land from A1 farmers if they lost in specific constituencies or districts. Party structures are very strong on A1 farms (especially with the presence of war veterans) and dissent is not tolerated. On all the farms in this study the farmers were equivocal on the support for ZANU-PF. What is ironic is that one of the farms falls under a ward with a MDC councillor.

Given the lack of political space to air grievances that are interpreted by the ruling party as unpatriotic and against the government, farm level institutions do at times offer a platform for the discussion of such taboo issues. Through these institutions, various failures of the government are discussed and people vent out their frustrations in a way that is not threatening to the party. For example I came across a youth soccer club at one farm⁴⁹ which was not part of my sample and where the names of senior politicians were used as nicknames for players. The youth would describe in sarcastic manner how politicians cheat and lie while playing their football games. In another instance, farmers were using a budding cluster group of farmers to vent their anger at the favouritism shown to large A2 farmers (who are either politicians or politically-connected) by the Reserve Bank through being given tractors and inputs.

Grassroots resistance may not ultimately lead to changes in the situation of the people and in most cases remains hidden even to those in authority. It however remains an important outlet for the grievances, anger and feelings of poor voiceless farmers with limited or no political capital to ensure that their critical issues are addressed. Farm level institutions therefore form, at least potentially, an important part of the mechanisms at the disposal of farming communities for furthering their interests in relation to political authorities. They are a platform for discussing, sharing and complaining about a range of issues directly affecting them. Admittedly, in doing so, these institutions may not address the plight of A1 farmers in any meaningful manner – but they at least offer a valve to reduce the pressures they face and the frustrations of life on the fast track farms.

⁴⁹ Identity of the farm withheld for anonymity.

6.7.2 Externally instituted farm groupings

6.7.2.1 Government initiated farm level institutions

There are different types of government-initiated institutions on A1 farms which play a multitude of roles. There are political, social and economic reasons for top-down imposition of associational life. Of political importance is the manner in which ZANU-PF views the fast track farms, namely, as enclaves of support which they intend to keep safe from the machinations of the opposition. To do this effectively, various groupings were formed at farm level to act as vanguards for the party. The most important of these groupings is the party cells at ward level. These ensure attendance at party meetings and the surveillance of people on the fast track farms (such that opposition party members cannot access the farms for campaigning purposes). Party cells comprise of prominent local level members who are mainly war veterans. They are either chosen by the community or imposed by senior political figures.

The Committee of Seven is another government-initiated institution which performs multiple functions. As noted earlier, these committees were adopted at the beginning of the fast track land reform programme on every A1 farm. During the liberation war, similar committees were instituted to coordinate the war effort. The *jambanja*⁵⁰ era was dubbed the Third *Chimurenga*⁵¹ and war veterans took up war tactics as they occupied farms⁵². Chaumba et al (2003a:16, 17) note that the War Veterans Association and ZANU-PF have deliberately echoed the language and symbols of the liberation war, including: reviving the former enemies (Rhodesians and imperialist, mainly British, aggressors), slogans, *pungwes* (all night ceremonies of song and dance), *mujibas* (youth auxiliaries), *chimbwibo* (women supporters/cooks), ‘sell-outs’, and the creation of a new cadre of youth brigades. Even some of the guerrilla tactics, such as arson, stock theft and mutilation, were revived on the occupied farms.

⁵⁰ The *jambanja* landscape was characterised by a proliferation of signposts proclaiming ‘No go area – war veterans inside’. This was a visibly politicised landscape where Zimbabwean flags were planted on anthills or hung from trees; and ZANU-PF posters proclaiming that ‘Land is the economy, the economy is land’ and ‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again’ plastered on trees and gate posts.

⁵¹ *Chimurenga* means war of liberation.

6.7.2.2 Local council initiated farm level institutions

Mazowe Rural District Council (MRDC) is the overall (de-centralised) authority that is responsible for the administration and development of the district. The council comprises thirty-two councillors. The functions of Mazowe RDC are guided by the Rural District Act (1988) (Chapter 29:13). Councils are local government structures reporting to the Ministry of Local Government and Urban Affairs. Though they provide diverse services at local level, in the fast track areas their role has been mainly political, focusing on drumming up support for the political parties to which they belong. This has been to the detriment of development work on the farms, as political needs have overridden the more technical business of councils. Local authorities therefore have been used to prop up support for political parties, and all positions in council depend on some level of political patronage.

There are a few cases in which councillors or council have influenced associational life in a positive way through cooperatives and groups. At Arda Farm, before the A1 farmers were removed, the councillor (who is the A2 farmer now occupying Arda) initiated a project to repair the local road. He provided the machinery and fuel while the farmers provided labour, and in this way they were able to fix the road. Otherwise, councillors do not have considerable political or economic leeway to do as they wish. On the fast track farms, they do not have significant authority and they tend to clash with traditional chiefs (Chief Chiweshe and Negomo) when it comes to working with the Committee of Seven. The chiefs feel that the committees should report to them since they are the ones who install headmen. However, if these committees are to be developmental in an authentic manner, they would need to work closely with local government through the councillors. At Batanai Secondary School in ward 14, the councillor is a member of the school development committee. This helps when lobbying council for support and resources.

6.7.2.3 Institutions initiated by agricultural extension officers

Agricultural extension officers are an important source of knowledge and direction for fast track farmers. As holders of agricultural knowledge, they have power to influence farmers in terms of agricultural production. As such, in some instances, they have been involved in organising farmers into groupings for different reasons. At Hariana Farm, the extension officer suggested that the farmers form a committee to control and manage the tobacco barns. The barns at the farm are insufficient for all the A1 farmers and there were conflicts over the control and use of the barns for curing tobacco. To avert these conflicts, the extension officer

initiated a committee that controlled the management of the barns to ensure that everyone gains access equally. This has reduced the conflicts and facilitated a process whereby when there is need for repairs to the barns everyone makes a contribution. On other farms, extension officers have initiated production groups where farmers come together in small groups to help each other with inputs.

6.7.2.4 Institutions initiated by other private or non-government agencies

Private organisations and non-government organisations have initiated various development projects that involve the formation of groups at farms. These groups are formed though for the mere purpose of responding to the projects. This means that people quickly organise as a mandatory step of getting support from external agents. The problem in most cases is that people end up being paired in groups with people they do not trust. One good example is the programme initiated by Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) in 2009 which organised A1 farmers into groups of five or six. The farmers were given agricultural inputs or money to buy the inputs. They signed a contract which stated that they would pay back the loan in full after harvesting their crops. However, one of the requirements was that if one member of the group defaulted, then the rest of the group became responsible for repaying the loan. This made every group member liable for a loan taken by any other group member.

These CBZ groups were formed in haste as people responded to the available inputs. In retrospect, many farmers regret the incorporation of certain members into their group because they face the real possibility of paying back loans for defaulters. At Kia Ora Farm, one lady indicated that she ended up being in a group with lazy farmers because there was no other group available – she either joined the group or had to forego the loan. All her group members did not have bumper harvests so she may be obliged to pay back loans for others. Such groups have a high risk of causing conflict among farmers. The farmers did not have any production groups before CBZ came along, and they only formed the groups because the bank demanded it. In the process, the choosing of group members was done without ensuring that people who trust each other and work together cohesively made up the groups. The problem with externally-initiated groups is that they ignore the local and contingent social and political conditions on the farms. On some farms there is so much mistrust, hatred and jealousy that groups bring enemies together, making them liable for each other's failure to pay. In fact, a farmer at Mapere Farm, in an informal discussion, told me that he was withholding payment to fix the other farmers who had stolen his irrigation pipes.

On a number of farms, Farm Community Trust Zimbabwe (a local NGO) has tried to initiate revolving fund/saving groups (or *mukando* in Shona). This is where people grouped together pay an agreed amount every month and the whole amount is given to a different person every month. The groups are more evident among farm workers though very few were still operational under fast track given that farm workers are finding it difficult to raise money. However, informal savings groups between two or three farmers are prevalent and they are not in any way influenced by external agencies. The success of institutions which are initiated from outside using a top-down approach is rare. Indeed, in most cases they increase the conflicts and rifts within communities. Prescribing cooperation to local people without understanding the social context in which they exist is problematic.

6.8 Recruitment of membership

There are fundamental characteristics of farm level institutions which help explain their recruitment processes. Firstly, by virtue of being based on specific farms, their recruitment is bounded within a specific spatial boundary. Recruitment of membership is therefore within a rigid sphere of influence and does not include people who are not resident on the farm. Secondly, given that the average number of farmers in A1 schemes in Mazowe is between thirty and thirty-five, the membership pool is limited for these institutions. This is more so for institutions which are only open to plot holders and exclude farm workers. I discuss below the various ways used by institutions to recruit members in Mazowe.

6.8.1 Recruitment through payment

Payment of a joining fee is one of the most effective ways of creating income or class-based farm level institutions. Exclusion and inclusion is based on one's ability to pay the prescribed fee. This leads to the creation of class distinctions (understood simply in terms of different socio-economic conditions) on the fast track farms. Those with the ability to pay know that membership in the group brings with it certain social and economic benefits not enjoyed by those who cannot pay. Usually payment is a way of regulating the number of members that can be part of the group. Recruitment in this manner hence leads to differentiation within A1 farmers among those with resources and those without. This results in divisions and a lack of collectivism as some farmers feel superior to others. In the long run, it becomes impossible for farmers to act as one so as to lobby government to address the various challenges they are facing.

At Usk Farm, the irrigation committee is joined through paying a fee. This means that only a few farmers with money are the ones irrigating. On initially arriving at the farm, the farmers began by communally sharing irrigation pipes and equipment. There was however problems as some farmers felt that communal sharing was disadvantaging them. The pipes were then shared among the farmers equally. But the electric motor and pumps were still communally owned and controlled by the irrigation committee. At one time the electric motor and pump broke down and farmers had to pay for repairs. Only a few farmers were able to pay for these repairs. After this incident, anyone who wanted to start irrigating had to pay the amount that the rest paid to the committee. The amount has effectively become the joining fee. The irrigating farmers are more productive and this will continue creating sharp income and material differences between the farmers. Economic capital is the major determinant in joining such institutions and usually status distinctions between farmers develop when such groups exist.

6.8.2 Self selection of members

There are many instances in which farmers self select into various groups. Self selection means that it is through farmers' own initiative that they decide to organise. Normally this is based on familiarity and trust. It is thus close friends or people with relationships prior to fast track that came together to form these groups. Groups that are self selecting mostly involve prior relationships or investment in economic/social resources. In many instances, such groupings are places and spaces where people with similar interests meet and interact. Joining certain institutions maybe of benefit to all members involved who realise the mutual benefit of organising. Examples of such groups include burial societies, rotating fund clubs and marketing groups. The need to cooperate is guided by the understanding that in times of trouble everyone requires help from others. Given that most of the people on the farms were settled far away from their kinsmen, such institutions offer security when challenges such as death or hunger occur. In Box 1 below, I outline the thoughts of one committee member on self selection.

Box 1: Building trust

When we arrived on the scheme most of us did not know each other. With time you get to know the true colours of people and you know who you can trust and cannot trust. What has happened is that living in a village model makes you know people's faults and strengths. After the first days of lending and borrowing each other money, you begin to know who pays back and who does not. Through that people select who they can be friends with and who they do not trust. Groups starting forming with time as people select their close comrades. Ultimately when it comes to things that involve money like rotating funds, it is with close friends that you start with.

Source: Indepth interview, Blightly Farm, 21st June 2009

6.8.3 Coercion

In some instances people are forced to join groups or institutions against their will. Circumstances or direct use of threats usually turn farmers into members even when they are not interested. A1 farmers living under the villagised model are easy to control and organise, especially for political reasons. In Mazowe, the threat of eviction due to tenure insecurities has been used as a weapon to ensure that farmers support ZANU-PF. The fast track farms were and in some cases still are militarised zones controlled by war veterans and geared towards the maintenance of the party's dominance in rural Zimbabwe (Chaumba et al. 2003b). Party cells and structures start at farm level with consistent meetings which all farmers are supposed to attend. Living on the fast track farms in Mazowe (especially A1 villages) means that one is a *de facto* member of the ruling party. As one war veteran at Hamilton Farm puts it: *‘Kuno tine musangano one’* (We only have one party here). The election into office of Movement for Democratic Change (T)⁵³ councillors in Mazowe district shows though that there is more than one party supported by fast track farmers.

In other cases, coercion takes place through certain *‘knowledgeable’* institutions which impose on A1 farmers the *‘right way’* of doing things based on the notion of expertise. One such institution is the agricultural extension officer, who views farmers as unskilled and unknowing agents, and sees himself as superior given his agricultural training. Farmers readily accept their position of the unknowing subject (or effectively *‘object’*) as they are prescribed constantly about proper agricultural techniques by extension workers. Their lack of power in such instances ensures that they use what Scott (1985) calls a *‘hidden transcript.’* A hidden transcript is a social encounter between an authority and subordinates which drives

⁵³ The formation led by Morgan Tsvangirayi.

a portion of the full social transcript of a group of people (including opinions, beliefs, ideas and values) underground so to speak.

The less powerful only reveal part of their full transcript to the authority (in fear of repression) and this leads to the fragmentation of discourses. Thus, through agency, the less powerful are constantly probing to find out what they can get away with from those in authority (Scoones and Thompson 1994:28). In Mazowe, farmers might seem to accept the discourse and authority of the extension worker without resistance. However, in the absence of such authority, they regularly resort to their own ways of doing things. Box 2 below highlights a case where an extension worker was trying to organise farmers into commodity groups and to help them in production and marketing. The groups appeared when he visited the farm but, the moment he left, farmers resorted back to their own (and old) ways.

Box 2: Extension worker's story

We had training on how to help farmers improve marketing through commodity groups. I thought it was a good idea to introduce this to the farmers in my area. I went there and conducted training and asked them to choose groups. None of the farmers had a problem with this and they appeared happy with the idea. But after I left the groups never materialised and they would appear to be in groups when they knew I was coming. Ultimately I gave up on the idea.

Source: Key informant interview, Davaar Farm, 23rd March 2010

6.9 Everyday interactions of fast track farmers

Over the past ten years fast track farmers have grown to know each other as neighbours, friends, acquaintances and even enemies. Everyday interactions have been important in the evolution of these communities. Life at the frontier of fast track farms has been difficult for A1 farmers. The lure of a better life filled with bumper harvests has not transpired for many. Rather they have experienced poor service delivery from government, involving a daily struggle for inputs and support. Away from the help and support of kith and kin, fast track farmers have devised various ways to face their challenges. Through relationships and networks formed in interaction, the farmers have tried to make sense of their surroundings.

Farmers relate to each other differently according to age, gender, status, interests and class. Interactions at farm level are thus structured and occur within a specific social context. For instance, at Hariana Farm, the farmers highlight that men are often discouraged from visiting and borrowing from a woman when her husband is away. Another example is that farmers

with similar interests tend to interact more. A female farmer at Blightly Farm had this to say about farmers with similar interest: *‘Varume vakawanda manew farmer vakabatana chaizvo asi chavakabatanirana ndicho chakaipa. Vano batanirana doro’* (Male farmers are very united for the wrong reason, which is beer). Sharing similar interests is not always positive, but farmers of the same flock tend to fly together. It is also very rare to see youths interacting with older farmers, as they tend to group themselves around their own interests such as sport.

Fast track farmers have managed to live with some level of harmony even though there have been serious conflicts over the past ten years. The farmers have become familiar with each other as they relate together over the years. As they get to know each other, social networks between farmers are constantly being created, realigned and destroyed. Over time, the farmers – through marriage, sharing totems and familiarity – will see each other as relatives and not strangers. Social relationships impose obligations and counter-obligations on social agents to act civil towards each other and to help and cooperate in times of need. Everyday interaction therefore helps farmers, especially A1 resident farmers, to form a cohesive community geared towards production.

6.10 Tenure security and institutionalisation

Investment in institutionalism, whether in social or economic forms, is in many ways influenced by security of tenure. A reasonable assumption is that fast track farmers are unlikely to invest in farm level institutions if they are uncertain about the length of their stay on the resettlement farm. A1 farmers have offer letters which do not specify clearly land rights and these letters do not protect them from forced eviction by government. Building social relationships takes time and effort. In groups where reciprocation is involved, people are unlikely to come together with other farmers if they feel that they will not benefit in the long-term. Tenure insecurity has led to farmers keeping (and investing in other) social ties away from their farms. For example at Davaar Farm some of the farmers are still members of burial societies in their communal homes in Chiweshe. They contribute to these structures and attend funerals. These farmers also wish to be buried in the communal areas (thus communal burial societies will help ensure that this happens by providing funds).

Another strategy employed by farmers to guard against problems arising from tenure insecurity has been having split households; in other words, families spread risk through maintaining dual farming households as a fall back plan if they are ever evicted from the A1

farm. In this regard, 20% of farmers are still ploughing their previous (communal) plot while 63% have left the plot with their children, parents or relatives. 'Ownership' of plots in the communal areas was thus never totally surrendered by most farmers, who enjoy the security that possessing two plots brings. This however impacts in splitting investment and spreading it over two separate households. In addition, most farmers did not come with whole families to the resettlement areas because the lack of basic social services made many reluctant to bring their children. During a focus group discussion at Davaar Farm, the farmers accepted that they had kept their claims in the communal areas because they were not sure if they would stay in the resettlement area for a long time. This has meant that farmers are unwilling to give their all in building social networks and structures on A1 farms.

Split households also have a gender dimension. Fast track farmers have invested significantly in new marital and cohabitation relationships in order to manage split households. In particular, men who participated in the initial *jambanja* (mayhem) period on the farms have tended to establish new households. In an era of HIV and AIDS, this has created real problems on fast track farms where there are ongoing reports of new infections and cases of deaths attributable to the disease. As men in A1 schemes create and recreate new households in a context of limited land (that is still under the control of the state), there is the emergence of new social conflicts between wives and children especially in the event of the husband dying. New (second) wives on the A1 plot tend to organise with the community and thus are recognised by other people on the farms. They create social networks which might be important for them in their fight to inherit the plot in the event of the man dying, but in most cases they have little legal right to be on the land. In terms of institutionalisation, the overall point is that farmers are investing in social relationships elsewhere because they are unsure of their tenure of the farms.

Another response to tenure insecurity by farmers is through exiting the fast track farms, as outlined in Box 3 below. Matondi (2008) highlights the different patterns of exit in Mazowe. Farmers weigh the benefits of staying and investing on the plots which, in the long run, may not remain in their hands. Their decision to exit is not solely dependent on the weak land rights but also by their failure to succeed as farmers. Because of constant in- and out-migration of farmers, it becomes difficult for farmers to organise and form any sustainable social formations. As farmers exit, they leave behind various social gaps in networks and institutions at farm level. Tenure, to emphasise, is thus a major determinant in building

associational forms. Most farmers have not abandoned associations they had joined in their areas of origin in case they are forced to return.

Box 3: Patterns of exiting settlements in Mazowe district

1. ***Movement from A2 to A1:*** Voluntary where A2 farmers leave for the A1 farm because of lack of farming resources or having been too ambitious at the onset of the programme. Most new farmers would not have left the farms had there been adequate resources. So rather than abandoning farms they voluntarily leave for the smaller A1 that they can manage with the resources available.
2. ***Movement from A1 to Communal Area:*** These are mainly disillusioned with the land reform programme and move back to communal areas. The promises of inputs and agricultural support have not been forthcoming. Security of tenure is not guaranteed and most have had poor harvests since settling on the farms.
3. ***Moving from A2 to formal job in town:*** This stratum includes new farmers who applied for land yet held formal jobs in industry. For these farmers applying for land was to be a past-time activity and not their core source of livelihood. But the weekend part-time exercise proved to be costly, and time constraints in a situation of weak land rights forced them to concentrate on core business outside farming.
4. ***Oscillation between A1 and Communal Area:*** The farmers in the study were not keen to mention that they were maintaining two homesteads. This is because they thought the research exercise was part of an audit by the government. They were afraid that the land will be taken away from them if they indicated that they were still maintaining homesteads in the communal areas that they had left. Through inference it could however be noted that most still maintained their homesteads because if they are not investing in the new resettlement areas they must be investing in homesteads elsewhere.

Adopted from Matondi (2008)

Institutionalisation is thus hindered by continued uncertainty over tenure. At Selby Farm however the opposite is actually the case in that tenure insecurity has led the farmers to become more united and cooperative. The majority of farmers at Selby do not have offer letters and they face counter claims from peri-urban farmers and Mazowe council which contracted a tree felling company to harvest a pine plantation on the farm. The farm has also seen vandalism and the siphoning of property by the former caretaker of the farm. All these issues and conflicts have resulted in farmers becoming more organised to ensure that they retain possession of the farm. Tenure insecurity in this manner has galvanised institutionalisation as there is now a farm committee which continues to lobby on behalf of the farmers.

6.11 Conclusion

Farm level institutions on the fast track farms in Mazowe appear in fluid and often contested taxonomical categories. This chapter has offered an understanding and analysis of the various institutional forms – in their various dimensions – emerging within communities borne out of the fast track land reform. It discussed the processes involved in the formation of farm level institutions highlighting how these institutions are in a constant state of wax and wane; where they are never fully formed but are always created and recreated in interaction among farmers. Social organisation at farm level was shown to be a result of a number of interacting and competing internal (charismatic leaders, age, gender) and external (extension workers, political parties, non-governmental organisations) factors. As fast track farmers interact with each other every day they are creating new forms of association and recreating old ones to form an interesting mosaic of differing and competing centres of power, authority and meaning.

These institutions recruit using diverse means depending on the type of institution. In Mazowe recruitment is mainly through self selection, coercion and payment. All these processes vary in their success to attract membership and the level of participation by farmers. For instance self selecting groups have more trust and cohesion and higher levels of participation. In the case of groups in which members were coerced, farmers are reluctant to participate and such groups will disintegrate when coercion is removed. Using payment as a recruitment method in rural areas creates class enclaves especially where the amounts are high as in the case of irrigation groups. The chapter has shown the significance of the influence of ‘outsiders’ in the formation of farm level institutions. These external agents include: central government through various ministries, local government through councillors, private companies such as banks, non-governmental organisations and extension officers. All farmers are powerless to resist ‘outside official’ authority and thus are expected to follow orders from these technical people without question. Their agency and knowledge is denied. The farmers have however initiated their own institutions which respond to their own issues and challenges. Chapter Seven will focus on the activities, relationships, internal dynamics and strategies of farm level institutions.

CHAPTER SEVEN: ACTIVITIES, RELATIONSHIPS, INTERNAL DYNAMICS, STRATEGIES AND ROLES OF FARM LEVEL INSTITUTIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is an analysis of the activities, relationships, strategies, roles and influence of farm level institutions. All these areas are germane to our understanding of local level politics. I look at specific farm level institutions found on farms in Mazowe, showing what they do, how they do it and why they do it. This helps in understanding the various social, political and economic roles played by various groups on the fast track farms. The chapter shows that institutions are involved in a myriad of roles and functions within the farms. Apart from these roles, there are various strategies used by farm level institutions to lobby external agencies including government. Specific strategies employed in many ways depend on the character and depth of a group's vertical and horizontal relationships. Farm level institutions are only as successful as the amount of resources (both social and economic) they can summon in lobbying for their interests.

The chapter highlights important conceptual issues around leadership, democratic content, gender and class issues at farm level. The arguments illuminate the activities and roles of farm level institutions showing how they are a source of meaning, control and association. Drawing from six case studies and other cases from Mazowe, the chapter outlines how gender is an important facet in understanding farm level institutions and associational life. It offers a nuanced understanding of how women in Mazowe organise amongst themselves according to class (as farm worker women are usually excluded in women's organisations).

7.2 Farm level institutions as a source of meaning, action, association and control

Woodhill (2008:4) notes that there are four institutional domains, namely, meaning, action, association and control as outlined in Figure 3 below. Farm level institutions (FLIs) in Mazowe exhibit these four institutional domains. To understand the activities of these groups I employ the four domains in my analysis of what they do for the farmers. Each of the four

domains has two sub-domains as outlined in the discussion below. Formal and informal institutions are equally important, and often reinforce each other. Institutional analysis at farm level thus requires an understanding of the four domains and how they interrelate. Below I use examples (such as a women's club at Blightly Farm) to demonstrate how Woodhill's (2008:4) domains interact in institutional analysis and elucidate the dynamics of FLIs in Mazowe.

Within the domain of *meaning* the focus is on the beliefs, norms and values that define institutions. Women at Blightly came together to form a group mainly because they are driven by the desire to help each other start projects. As one woman⁵⁴ pointed out: *‘As women, we have also done things with our hands to help our families. Coming together as women to teach each other about knitting or sewing is important.’* Their belief system is based on hard work and the need to cooperate with others. As the group evolves over time it continues to generate its own unique norms and values which guide the framework for relating within these institutions. The main functions of the women's group include:

- Teaching each other household skills and tips such as cooking, designing, sewing and knitting
- Advice on raising children
- Sex education especially HIV education.

Beyond these functions, one of its most important social services is that it provides a unique space for women to meet and discuss freely without the surveillance of patriarchy.

The *control* domain helps to understand mandates, policies and strategies of the institution. This includes all formal and informal rules. However, when discussing grassroots level groups without any legal standing such as the women's group at Blightly, it is difficult to talk about distinct formal and informal rules because there is no clear distinction between these rules. What exist are overt and covert forms of rules which are not documented but are known by all members; and sanctions against breaking these rules vary with context, time and status of the offender. At Blightly some of the overt rules include punctuality and consistent attendance at meetings which, when broken, require some kind of fine such as bringing vegetables. Institutions such as the Committee of Seven have strong control mechanisms since they are backed by traditional authority through the headmen who is

⁵⁴ Key informant interview, Blightly Farm, 24th May 2009.


chosen by the chief. The headman, who can thus invoke the help of the chief, is in many ways responsible for applying traditional rules and norms. This domain of control is important because it is specifically concerned with how institutions enforce their policies, rules and norms of membership.

The third domain is *association* which highlights the formal and informal relationships of institutions. In Mazowe, farm groups have overtime built various formal and informal relationships. Later in this chapter I provide an in-depth analysis of relationships and alliances between various types of FLIs, and other formal and informal organisations at all levels. Concerning this domain it is important to stress that it only through forming networks and relationships that FLIs are able to ensure that they fulfil their mandate. A good example is the health committee at Davaar Farm which requires vertical relationships with council and councillors to ensure that it gets the necessary help in running the clinic. Successful FLIs have strategic partnerships with influential groups or individuals. These partnerships are mainly informal in that there is no legally recognised agreement but rather an informal understanding between farmers. For example, at Usk Farm, the irrigation committee once had an ex-military brigadier who had strategic linkages with people in various government ministries which allowed the group to gain access to certain resources and spaces. The brigadier through his military background had vast social networks which he put to use in ensuring advantage for his group. Social capital of the influential person became group capital in that it was used to help the group access resources such as irrigation pipes. The outcome was that the brigadier alone effectively became the committee, and he made decisions on behalf of all the farmers without consultation. Thus while there are advantages in having an influential member in the group, this situation suffocates democratic-decision making.

Woodhill (2008:5) notes that there is a fourth domain of *action* which focuses on functions, products and services of institutions. FLIs are specifically formed to perform functions and meet needs on the fast track farms, such that they are defined by their functions or services they provide. There are health, water and school institutions which offer specific social services to the farmers. Their functions become embodied in regular practices and behaviours. The school development committee at Hariana Farm works towards the improvement of the school as its primary function. What it does on a day-to-day basis – fundraising, and building classrooms and toilets – have become regular practices which now

define the nature of the institution. The farm development committee at Usk Farm in the same manner is defined by its developmental behaviour and work.

Figure 3: Institutional domains



Adopted from Woodhill, 2008

7.3 Activities of farm level institutions

FLIs in Mazowe represent a variety of activities and functions within the fast track A1 farms. Their activities include political, social and economic actions which relate to the everyday lives of farmers. This section interrogates the services provided by institutions to farmers. Farm level institutions are fluid thus one institution can be involved in two or more activities. Among the many activities of farm level institutions are the following.

7.3.1 Political activities of FLIs

7.3.1.1 Committee of Seven

Committees of Seven are in essence scheme management committees which in many ways provide some level of authority in the new schemes. They are mostly made up of war veterans, the village head, and a youth representative. Women are also represented as part of an attempted mainstreaming of gender within the land reform programme. The committees are critical in identifying the developmental needs of the scheme and they also regulate the

daily lives of the settlers through ensuring harmony and good neighbourliness within the resettlement communities. This governance role of committees has played an important role in ensuring the maintenance of order within A1 farms. Sachikonye (2002:67) summarises the functions of the committees as ‘to listen to the people’s grievances’; ‘to address the people’s problems’; ‘to lead the community’; and ‘to register all the people when meetings with government officials are called or when there is food distribution.’ Another function which is entirely political is to monitor movements in their areas of operation.

Box 4: Committee of Seven at Hariana Farm

At Hariana Farm there appeared to be some level of devolution of responsibilities through the committee of seven. This committee channels farmers’ needs to the district land committee which will take these needs up to national level. It addresses all issues affecting the farm; this could be health-related, natural resources, production, marketing etc. I tried to probe whether the farmers really know what powers these committees hold. There is a narrow understanding of the duties of this committee. Most farmers viewed the committee as the sole owners of land and having the power to determine what should or should not be done within farmers’ plots. For example, they believed even the cutting down of trees needed the committee’s authorization. However others felt that was the councillors’ jurisdiction. It seems there is a power struggle between councillor and committee. For instance, the councillor disregards the power of the committee of seven.

Source: Focus Group Discussion, Hariana Farm 13th September 2009

Box 4 outlines the thoughts of farmers at Hariana on the roles of the Committee of Seven. There is still confusion on many farms over what the committee can or cannot do. With many centres of authority in Mazowe, it becomes difficult to know where any one institution begins or ends. For example, questions arise as to whom the committee should report. At one level it reports to the traditional chief because the head of the committee is the *sabhuku* hand-picked by the chief. In other circumstances the committee is part of the district development structure and thus reports to the councillor. Given that these farm-level structures have been in existence over the past ten years, it may be possible to build on this authority towards more formalized devolution of power and responsibility. There are many questions still unanswered that pertain to the capacity and preparedness of these institutions to successfully manage land administration at the local level on a sustainable basis.

Going forward, it will require much effort in capacity building and changing mindsets if these committees are to be transformed into developmental structures. The committees emerged within a specific ideological and political context: a context fraught with conflict, mistrust

and confusion. There is no clarity over the process of constituting the committees and war veterans seem to have influence and control over the selection of members on these committees. It is also not clear for how long they are supposed to hold office and to whom they are accountable. Given the contest for control between traditional leaders and local government in Mazowe, it remains uncertain who has clear authority over these committees. In 2010 there were attempts to change these committees into village development committees which would in turn lead to ward development committees headed by councillors.

7.3.1.2 Party cell structures

ZANU-PF party structures are a common feature on the fast track farms in Mazowe. Land acquisition and resettlement is attributed to the ‘benevolence’ of the party. From interviews and discussions with farmers it was apparent that most of them identify their ‘ownership’ of land inexorably to ZANU-PF. The party has thus maintained a strong hold in the former commercial farming areas. The political activities of the party are organised and maintained at farm level by various cells which link at ward level upwards. These cells ensure that the ideology of the party is known by all inhabitants of the farms. They are the eyes and ears of the party at the grassroots and offer surveillance on dissenting voices. One party cell official had this to say: *‘We are here to defend the gains of our hard won independence. We ensure that there is no one in Mazowe who is working with the enemy [whites] to reverse the land reform programme’*⁵⁵. The presence of ZANU-PF functionaries is undeniable and obtaining access to conduct field work for social research requires their consent. They are the gatekeepers of fast track farms, monitoring the movement of people in and out of the areas.

Belonging to or supporting the opposition is tantamount to treason and supporting a reversal of the land reform programme. Such sentiments by farm-level party officials mirror the messages from President Mugabe since 2000 which have sought to demonise white farmers and the opposition, effectively picturing them as enemies who need to be exterminated. This in many ways explains the violent tactics used by party cells to drum up support and deal with opposition activists. Farmers in Mazowe highlighted how in 2008 the district became a war zone especially during the run up to the June presidential run-off election. The party cells were instrumental in calling meetings and overnight vigils, and in beatings of those perceived to be supporting the opposition.

⁵⁵ Key informant interview, Hamilton Farm, 14th July 2010.

One farmer notes:

Zvangazvakaoma nguva yema elections tairara tiri kupungwe tichiimba nziyo dzechimurenga. Mameetings aingo sheyedzerwa chero nguva ipi. Kuti ubude muvillage waitono kumbira kana vaienzi chaivo vaitogona kurohwa. Takaona zvakawanda vanhu vachirohwa zvakaipa. Zvimwe taita zvekunzwa kuti kwauurawa vanhu kana kupiswa magaro (It was a difficult time on the farms during the time leading to the June 2008 presidential election runoff. We used to have overnight vigils and meetings singing revolutionary songs. Going away from the farm required permission and it was difficult to have visitors because they could be beaten. We saw people being beaten up and heard stories of murders on other farms.)

Party cells were instrumental in the campaign of violence and intimidation as they ensured that ZANU-PF got support from farmers. With political and physical capital, party cells at farm level are pervasive in all associational forms.

7.3.1.3 Political activities of non-political institutions

Lund (2006:686) notes that associations and organizations which do not appear at first sight to be political may also exercise political power and wield public authority. Such institutions play a role in public authority as a substitute or in combination with recognised institutions of public authority. In Mazowe there are a number of institutions which are multi-faceted with overt and covert functions. Such institutions might appear developmental, religious or social, but they have other covert functions including exercising public authority and maintaining order. For example burial society arrangements appear at face value as ways to help people in time of distress. The payments however have other hidden functions in that everyone on the farm is expected to pay as a social rule. Paying reaffirms membership in the farm community and ensures that the household can claim reciprocity in times of funerals. Besides the immediate practical assistance, burial societies aid in community building and cohesion. Even the role of the Committee of Seven is in dispute with questions sometimes raised about its political and non-political functions. The fact that it is dominated by people who spearheaded the *jambanja* on most farms makes it open to suspicion of political agendas and activities, and this makes it difficult to later on change its orientation towards development.

7.3.1.4 FLIs as public sphere

The public sphere consists of all those conditions of communication under which there can come into being a discursive formation of opinion and will on the part of a public composed

of the citizens of a state' (Habermas 1992:446). Ultimately public sphere is the social infrastructure that enables discourse. But questions remain as to whether it is a physical space or is better conceptualised as a cerebral one (Berger 2006:46). Splichal hence argues that the public sphere is a mental space that enables social integration on the basis of open, public discourse on matters of public concern', even if it is a space where many different actors (individuals, groups, organisations) meet' (Splichal 1999: 22, 23). The public sphere, then, is the infrastructure that enables various publics to debate and dialogue, and to demand things of the state should they so choose (Berger 2006:46). The public sphere on the farms in Mazowe is punctuated by FLIs which bring together farmers with different backgrounds, thoughts and beliefs to converse and dialogue about the factors that impact on their everyday lives.

The farm institutions act as spaces in which public issues such as the provision of social services or access to inputs are discussed in relation to what the state has or has not provided. This platform to discuss matters of common interest not only helps in community-building through increased interaction of farmers but most importantly allows for the formation of a collective conscience among them by understanding that – despite their diversity – they face similar challenges and problems. The public space encourages dialogue and exchange of ideas even at a mundane level, for example women in a club teaching each other new recipes or home making tips. From Berger's (2006) understanding of public sphere there is an element of placing demands on the state. This is evident in mainly hidden, low-key and covert ways in Mazowe because demanding from the state is viewed as an anti-government stance which is not allowed on the farms where ZANU-PF returns control and support. Hence, demands are rarely vocal or driven by overt demands or protests; rather, lobbying and trying to find favour with influential politicians and policy makers regularly takes place. For example the irrigation committee at Usk Farm visits council and water authorities' offices to push their agenda for irrigation support. Such strategies are not openly against government but are ways used by individual farms to ensure that they gain at the expense of other farms.

7.3.2 Economic Activities

This section provides details on economic activities of farm level institutions. It focuses on various productive, asset management, labour pooling and savings groups.

7.3.2.1 Asset sharing

When A1 farmers arrived on the land they sequestrated and inherited various types of movable and immovable assets. The sharing, use and ownership of such assets are still a source of conflict. This sub-section highlights the role of FLIs in the sharing and use of farm infrastructure on A1 farms.

Box 5: Sharing and management of irrigation infrastructure at Usk Farm

1. Dam

The dam maintenance is the responsibility of Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) but the community feels it has a duty to keep it in working shape since farmers require water for irrigation. However, the community feels ZINWA should do more in its service provision since farmers pay for permits.

2. Irrigation pipes

On arrival at the scheme, the newly resettled farmers used and shared the pipes communally. The approach was abandoned and the pipes became individually owned. This arrangement prevailed for about five seasons but significantly resulted in a drop in yields. This affected almost every farmer since the allocated pipes are not enough to service most plots. Farmers rely on or borrow from friends or rent at a cost from neighbours. A meeting was called by the Committee of Seven in 2007 and it was agreed to revert to group sharing of pipes.

3. Management of irrigation infrastructure

The irrigation management committee is responsible for the coordination of all irrigation activities at the farm. The committee includes a former farm worker who was an irrigation supervisor under the ownership of the white farmer. The retention of such expertise at the scheme is attributed to the success of the irrigation projects. The committee is also responsible for collection of resources to pay for water permits and maintenance of water pumps and motors. However, not all farmers at the scheme are involved in irrigation due to the prohibitive costs.

Adopted from Moyo (2008)

Box 5 above outlines the case at Usk Farm, explaining how productive assets such as dam and irrigation infrastructure are shared and used. Though irrigation pipes became individually owned after having previously communal, there is an irrigation committee which oversees all activities. This committee was chosen by the people who are involved in irrigation. Its main responsibility is to co-ordinate irrigation activities at the farm. The committee has the task of collecting contributions from people interested in irrigation. The tenure of the committee was not indicated since only a few of the participants were involved in irrigation due to the high cost of joining. This leads to the exclusion of many who cannot afford to pay the exorbitant prices.

At Davaar Farm the farmers found among other things: two farm houses, thirty compound farm houses, two tractors, two water engines, six hundred irrigation pipes, a reservoir, five boreholes, thirty pig sties, farm shed, dip tank, grinding mill, cold room, workshop, water transfer system, fuel tanks and maize sheller. There have been contestations over the control and use of these assets, and movable assets have been lost to theft and in some cases vandalism. However for immovable assets such as houses they have been brought under the control of various committees. The main farm house has been turned into a clinic under the control of the health committee which is responsible for all the property around this house including the borehole. The other properties such as farm shed and grinding mill are being run by the farm committee (Committee of Seven).

Farmers at Hariana Farm formed a committee that controls the use of a farm tractor. They inherited the tractor from the white man who used to own the farm. The committee ensures farmers pay for the use of the tractor. The fee is usually decided before the start of each agricultural season. With the adoption of American dollars in 2009 the fee was twenty dollars, using the farmer's own diesel for disking and ploughing. Communal ownership of inherited assets makes it impossible to operate without some form of structure to ensure that every one benefits equally as noted by the chairperson of the committee: 'Sharing things has been difficult because everyone wants to benefit at the expense of others. We formed this farm committee to ensure that all inherited assets are shared equally amongst farmers.' FLIs thus become important instruments for the sharing of farm resources so as to avoid conflicts over ownership.

7.3.2.2 Internal savings and loan groups

There are various groups involved in internal loan and savings operations. They are commonly called *maround* (rounds). Such groups involve pooling together an agreed amount every month which is given to one member. This lump sum allows the recipient to buy items or take care of any task which s/he could not do on his or her own. Trust becomes an important component of the social make-up of these groups because they are based on the assumption of reciprocity. Whoever obtains money in the first month of operation is obligated to continue contributing. These groups are usually made up of people who are related or had relationships prior to the resettlement areas. It is rare to come across people in the same group who met each other after resettling. In such cases strong bonds of friendship

would have emerged amongst such farmers to trust that each other would not abscond. The groups remain particularly small with an average of four members.

At Usk Farm there are two groups of women involved in savings. One group is made up of four women and the other has six women. Two of these women are plot holders, four are wives of plot holders and the rest are relatives of plot holders. There are no farm workers involved, mainly because they rarely interact with A1 farmers at a level that can allow trust to develop. Social class is also important as farm workers might be perceived as unable to afford membership in the groups, as membership requires a regular source of income every month to be able to meet the obligations. This type of group is thus highly exclusive and depends not only on trust but also on access to resources. Another female savings group at Hariana indicated that during 2007, when there was a problem with accessing money in Zimbabwe because of inflation, they resorted to using household utensils or groceries bought from neighbouring countries as modes of exchange.

The absence of men in savings groups on the farms in this study was an interesting observation. Through further probing among men I discovered that *marounds* have always been viewed as a feminine activity in the areas where these people come from. The majority of farmers were from Chiweshe communal areas in Mazowe and from Harare. Talking to men on the farms it was apparent that they viewed saving groups as a women's activity as one male farmer at Hariana noted, *zvema round ndezve vakadzi izvi*⁵⁶ (Internal savings and loans are for women). It was however not entirely clear why savings clubs are viewed as a women's domain, because men on other A1 farms were taking part in saving clubs⁵⁷. Exclusive female participation was thus limited to the farmers in my sample. It however remains a significant finding in that women were able to form groups in which exchange of goods and money was the major preoccupation. Women in patriarchal societies such as the Shona are mainly relegated to the private domain and men are the ones involved in public transactions involving money. These saving groups challenge this notion and thrust women into positions in which they amass a considerable amount of resources. The question nevertheless is whether these women ultimately have control at household level of the resources acquired from this activity.

⁵⁶ In-depth interview with household head, Hariana Farm, 23rd April 2010.

⁵⁷ Interview with Agritex officer at Glendale, 7th June 2009.

7.3.2.3 Production and marketing: social networks and pooling together

Another critical activity of FLIs has been the provision of assistance in productive activities. The general characteristic of A1 farmers not only in Mazowe but in the whole country is that they are resource poor. Farming is an enterprise which requires considerable resources and most farmers coming from poor backgrounds find it difficult to obtain productive assets. Most farmers depend on help from others in their productive activities. Production and marketing of agricultural produce is the major economic activity that ensures that farmers associate together.

Labour pooling: A1 farmers in Mazowe generally lack mechanisation thus they have serious problems with tillage. Access to cheap labour is crucial for successful farming. The Mazowe Land and Livelihoods Survey found that, in the resettlement areas, 51% of the farmers use donkey drawn ploughs whilst 38.4% use ox drawn ploughs. Another 7.5% practice zero tillage while 2.6% use hoes to prepare their land for planting. Only 0.4 % use tractors for land preparation. This lack of mechanisation makes it necessary to develop cooperative arrangements to find enough labour for ploughing. With only 34.4% of farmers owning cattle, draught power becomes a major challenge for those without cattle. Labour pooling takes various forms which include borrowing draught power, reciprocal help in ploughing, and drawing resources as a farm to hire a tractor.

Borrowing cattle or donkeys from those who own them is a difficult process as people will only loan you their livestock after they have already finished with their fields. Given that there are few people with livestock, not everyone without is able to borrow as this is based on trust, friendship or family bonds. Most A1 farmers have six hectares of land, and livestock is only able to plough a limited percent of this land. In most cases farmers are forced to employ zero tillage or reduce the area under cultivation.

Reciprocal help is when farmers give each other a hand in their fields on alternate days. This takes the form of three or four households who agree to all work on a particular A1 plot for a day or two and rotate between plots. This type of arrangement resonates with the traditional system of *nhimbe* where a farmer will brew beer, prepare food and invite people to come help him/her in the fields. After work the beer and food will be consumed by all those who attended. In the newly resettled areas such an arrangement is difficult, considering that with monetisation people are more concerned with what they may earn and not with food.

The other form of labour pooling is the putting together of money to hire tractors when and where they are available. Tractors are often hired from A2 farmers or government through the District Development Fund (DDF). On some farms such as Blightly there are no nearby A2 farmers with tractors and the DDF only comes to their area once such arrangements are not possible. At Usk they inherited a tractor and planter which are controlled by the Committee of Seven who ensure that everyone benefits from the resources. It is at Hariana and Hamilton farms that the pooling of resources amongst farmers to hire tractors occurs. Hiring a tractor as a group is cheaper as costs are shared.

Combating marketing constraints as a group: Finding transportation for their produce remains a big challenge to farmers. Bad roads, long distances to depots and high transport costs are all serious challenges with which farmers have to grapple. At Hariana Farm, maize and soya beans are marketed at the Mvurwi GMB depot which is approximately twenty kilometres away. Tobacco is sent to the auction floors in Harare which is approximately eighty kilometres away. The advantage is that Hariana is next to the Mvurwi highway thus the A1 farmers do not have a problem of bad roads. It is easy to find transportation but the major problem is the cost. Tobacco farmers at Hariana produce on average ten to fifteen bales each with some farmers having as little as one bale. Transporting a few bales on your own is very expensive as you have to pay for the whole truck alone. Tobacco farmers have resorted to transporting all their tobacco at once to reduce costs. Transport owners only bring their lorry if the amount of tobacco available is enough to fill their lorry so that they realise the maximum benefit. Filling a lorry means that many farmers are forced to market together as a way of securing transport to the market.

7.3.3 Social activities of FLIs

FLIs remain in essence social entities guided by the principle of cooperation grounded in African traditions of good neighbourliness and working together. Local groups are involved in a variety of social activities which at times transcend to even ward level. In this regard, social activities are all ceremonies, deeds, actions and behaviours that are communal, shared and collective. They are social in their public nature and in the involvement of many community members.

7.3.3.1 Burial societies

Death is as an uncertainty and for families without insurance it comes as a serious economic shock. The cost of burial (including the food and coffin) demands that families help each other. On the six farms under study there were several deaths but none of the farmers had been buried on the farms (preferring the communal areas which they still viewed as home). The farmers indicated that one has to be buried amongst their ancestors, which shows that it is impossible for new farmers to give up links with their areas of origin. There were no formally organised burial societies on the six farms. This was mainly because of the problems with money and inflation in 2008, but by 2010 with the adoption of multi-currency they were still non-existent. At Hariana Farm they had started with a burial society on initial settlement (around 2002) but after a year it was disbanded because of mistrust over control of the money and non-payment by some farmers. After disbanding they now have an arrangement that in case of a funeral each household provides an agreed amount of money (in 2008 because of inflation it varied, in 2010 it was US\$5) and a bowl of mealie meal. All the farms had this type of arrangement where assistance in burials was mandatory though there was no formal structure to control it.

This type of assistance is based on reciprocity and social sanctions are deployed against those who fail to help. Farmers know that in case of a funeral they would require help from others; thus they invest in this mutual insurance policy knowing that in their time of need they will also receive. In this regard, transporting a corpse back to the communal areas is very expensive. This payment of money is known in Shona as *chema*. *Chema* is a traditional mutual insurance system which ensures that a family gets community help in the event of death. This institution has always existed in traditional Shona communities and the arrangement on A1 farms is a continuity of a tradition that people have always practised. In this instance however the form of *chema* is now cash because it is required to cater for a diverse set of funeral costs. Investment in social networks hence can work as an insurance system which might be necessary for farmers especially those without any relatives nearby to assist them. This institution however is only among plot holders as farm workers have their own systems of helping each other at funerals.

Chema is not the only action involved in mutual assistance among farmers during deaths. Women also provide labour in cooking, fetching water and washing plates. Women who fail to help in this way are left open to the threat of not receiving such help from others in the

event of the death of a loved one. Labour provided at funerals is free and often this means that women have to forgo their own household chores to help. Funerals require the presence of all those in the community, even if the men simply sit around the fire talking. Such a presence in itself is important and no one can go to the field to work while others are at a funeral. A farmer at Visa Farm indicated that working during a funeral may lead to accusations of witchcraft. There are therefore very effective social sanctions involved in not attending funerals.

The other important dimension of funerals within the fast track farms is the issue of going with the funeral party to the communal home of the deceased for burial. At Visa there was one funeral in 2007 in which transport was available for those who wanted to go for the burial. Most farmers were however reluctant as this meant losing out two days of working in the fields during the planting season. Close friends were the ones mostly involved in what was termed *‘kuperekedza hama kuimba yake yekuzorora’* (Taking our relative to their last place of rest). The social sanctions for not taking the journey to bury a deceased person are less severe, and mainly apply to those within the farming community who are close to the family.

7.3.3.2 Youth football clubs

Soccer is a very popular game especially among male youths in the farming communities. Inter-farm games are a common sight especially in dry seasons when farming is not being down. Soccer is relatively cheap to play as it simply requires a ball and goal posts made of tree branches. Youth usually play money games where the winner takes all the money put together by the two teams. The farm teams are not formally organised as football clubs though some of the teams have given themselves names. Some of the names reflect the farm names or names of European teams such as Arsenal. Football plays an important role in offering entertainment to youth in communities that lack any social spaces for recreation. The A1 farmers have no access to club houses or recreational parks of any kind. Besides football the farm drinking bars are the only other source of recreation.

The situation is rather more difficult for female youth in terms of recreation. There is no social infrastructure to support girls' recreation activities. Usk is the only farm with makeshift facilities that allow girls to play netball. On some of the farms, younger girls can be seen playing games which require cheap material like plastic balls. These games offer a break

from monotony from farm life. Girls usually play games such as *raka raka* played with a plastic ball, *nhodo* and *pada* played using stones and many other girls play using ropes. These creative games ensure that in the absence of recreational infrastructure children have many outdoor activities when they are not working or going to school. Since 2000 there has been little or no investment in recreational infrastructure either by government or farmers. A2 farmers have been utilising facilities such as the Glendale Club of which they have become members. They simply meet and drink but white farmers used to have many sporting competitions and events at the club. A1 farmers do not have transportation and many cannot afford to be members at the club thus they are excluded from such social spaces. It is difficult to form networks or share information without such infrastructure where farmers can meet and discuss in social spaces.

7.4 Roles of FLIs

The roles and everyday activities of farm level institutions are an important analytical component. These not only help in understanding the origins but also the purposes of such formations. Normally the meanings and reasons behind joining an institution are based on perceived social and economic benefits that can be derived from associational behaviour. At Usk Farm, farmers highlight that the Committee of Seven has many responsibilities. They include the following:

- Safeguarding natural resources for example controlling of the cutting down of trees.
- Control and maintenance of farm assets that include a grinding mill, fencing and tractors.
- Employment of security guards.
- Collection of contributions for repairing broken down machinery and maintenance fees for different assets.

The committee meets with the people every fortnight to report on issues affecting the scheme. At the end of every month a financial report is presented narrating how finances were used on the farm. The scheme has a bank account but at the moment it has little savings. Below is an outline of some of the roles and strategies of various farm institutions.

7.4.1 Security roles

Given the care-free attitude that characterised the *jambanja* phase, in which almost any kind of activity was allowed when occupying farms, security became a major concern for the new communities in the early years in Mazowe. There are many allegations and complaints from

fast track farmers themselves of wanton destruction of farming equipment, looting of irrigation pipes, sabotaging of boreholes and conflicts over access to such infrastructure. Threats of theft and actual threat to crops and movable property are still persistent on fast track farms. Security is thus of paramount importance on the farms. The role of providing security on all the farms in this study is given to the Committee of Seven which is responsible for all farm infrastructure and safety. At Davaar and Usk farms, the committee has turned to hiring security guards. The security guards are paid by funds raised through the community; for example at Usk the money is raised through sales from the grinding mill which they inherited from the white farmer.

7.4.2 Advocacy

There is a grouping of small-scale A2 farmers in Mazowe South region called the Mazowe South Cluster. Its committee is made up of farmers from different farms and the treasurer is from Dunberry Farm. The committee was voted into power by all the farmers and has tenure for three years. The roles of the cluster are mainly developmental. It offers farmers the platform to meet and discuss their socio-economic problems so that they can have a united front as farmers. It is in a way the voice of the A2 farmers in Mazowe South. The cluster is currently in the process of trying to acquire tractors through the government. It has however failed to receive any tractors under the government's mechanization programme. The farmers in the group complain that they have been neglected by the government and that the mechanization programme has only benefited the political bigwigs. They claim that the criteria for choosing beneficiaries are unclear and unfair since the programme benefited those who already had tractors. The cluster does not have a say over national policy so they end up discussing policy issues without having any real influence over government. However the farmers complain that it is demoralizing and saddening to see people with equipment getting more while they have nothing. The cluster has also applied for loans from Agribank to buy tractors but it was told that the hectares farmed by its members are below the minimum required for accessing these loans.

7.4.3 Conflict resolution

FLIs are the first level of conflict resolution on the fast track farms. The Committee of Seven, in particular the *sabhuku*, is responsible for hearing cases on conflict among A1 farmers. Farmers with a case first approach the *sabhuku* who can then decide whether he/she can solve the case or it should be sent onward to higher authorities such as the chief and District Lands

Committee. Cases such as domestic disturbances, quarrels, fights and misunderstandings can be easily resolved by the *sabhuku* with the help of the Committee of Seven. Issues such as witchcraft accusations or working in the fields during rest day (*chisi*) are sent to the chief who can fine people (and the fines can be as high as a cow). Other cases such as boundary disputes are heard by the District Lands Committee. The Committee of Seven has the backing of traditional and state structures and is thus able to legitimate its decisions in resolving cases. There are cases in the past where farmers have refused to recognise the judgement of the committee and were later forced to accept it after the intervention of the chief. Box 6 below provides an excerpt from an interview with a *sabhuku* at Blightly Farm and highlights the cases handled with the help of the Committee of Seven.

Box 6: Cases heard by *sabhuku*

Cases handled by the *sabhuku* are mainly at family and village level. For example if a husband and wife fail to resolve their issues through family channels they will go to the *sabhuku*. At Blightly Farm some of the cases I have overseen include divorce, adultery, theft, witchcraft allegations, boundary disputes and rebellion against laws on the conservation of natural resources and sacred rules. There are however cases which I failed to resolve and I had to hand them over to Chief Chiweshe. An example is a case of witchcraft accusations in which hatred and conflicts will continue between two parties even after resolving the issue. In such instances the chief has more authority and respect from the people thus they are likely to live together peacefully if he intervenes. There are cases such as working on sacred rest days (*chisi*) and incest which go straight to the chief's court.

Source: Interview with *sabhuku*, Blightly Farm, 13th May 2009

7.5 Strategies of FLIs

Strategies and tactics largely depend on the internal and external context within which farm level institutions are operating. This point is key to understanding the politics of rural institutions. In Mazowe District there are no underground or military groups seeking to overthrow the ruling elite. In Mazowe, then, the strategies of FLIs have to be understood within the context of a hegemonic power structure called ZANU-PF. The dominance of ZANU-PF in the newly resettled areas means that the formation of institutions is firmly grounded in pro-state ideologies and rarely do they seek radical transformation. Strategies of farmers should not be seen as antagonising the party which is 'responsible' for them getting land in the first instance. Farmers are careful not to accuse and condemn the government. Farmers have however used other means to voice their disgruntlement with government. There is a varied range of advocacy strategies such as petitions, letters and visiting government or private companies seeking assistance.

Demands of rural organisations are generally directed towards the struggles for the redistribution of concrete resources such as water or land (Moyo 2002). Most farm level institutions seek an improvement of their situation within the prevailing political order. One strategy commonly used by rural organisations in Mazowe is the pooling of resources such as labour, finance or savings, public infrastructure and marketing facilities. Another strategy, in protesting against late payments from authorised buyers of produce such as GMB, is side marketing or finding alternative buyers. In Chapter Five I outlined some of the weapons of everyday resistance that farmers use.

7.6 Relationships of FLIs with state and wider society

7.6.1 FLIs and the state

Relations with the state determine the existence of FLIs in more ways than one, because it is the state which allows them the political and social space to exist. This relationship with the state is fraught with contradictions, cooperation, contestation, cooptation and compulsion. The problem with farm institutions' relationships with government is that they are constantly seeking resources from the latter. This means that they at most times have to play to the tune of the state's resourced bodies and not do anything to rock the boat. Government officials actually give in to the demands of rural institutions only if they can achieve some leverage such as votes at elections.

7.6.2 Relationship of FLIs operating on the same farm

The interesting aspect of FLIs working on the same farm is that they remain independent entities and rarely work with other groups. All these groups were formed in response to farmers' needs, thus working together (regardless of groups) to meet these needs remains an important aspect in how they organise. However committees that run institutions are made up of different people who have competing interests at any time and there are often personality clashes. This leads to conflicts as committees jostle for space and influence on the farm. Clashes often arise when institutions feel as if their roles are being disregarded by other groups. A good example of the conflict-based nature of farm institutions' relationships is at Hariana Farm where the school development committee and *sabhuku* clash over the use of farm infrastructure. The District Council's engineer, on planning the farm, had suggested that the compound houses be taken by the school. There is material on the farm to help renovate and modify the houses into classrooms. The farmers who had taken over the compound houses were to be given stands to build their own houses – but the *sabhuku* refused. Most

decisions by the school development committee are in fact disregarded by the *sabhuku*. The school headmaster also notes that the school development committee was problematic in that it ignored the staff at the school and this meant that school projects were not progressing well.

There are a few instances in which institutions on the same farm have complemented each other perfectly. In such scenarios the working relationship of these farm groups is based on the belief of oneness. At Usk Farm this is most evident as the Committee of Seven and farm development committee complement each other in the roles they take up. Members of these committees seem to believe in the idea that they are all working for the good of the farm and not personal glory. Control, power and authority are vested in the farmers and not the committees. This is more so since the departure of the former army general who had a plot at Usk. On farms where there are problems between institutions (such as Blightly), the major cause is competition for space and power. At Blightly the *sabhuku* and the Committee of Seven are accused of trying to control all aspects of social life on the farm because they are afraid that some people will get more popular and displace them.

7.6.3 Relationship between FLIs on neighbouring farms

One significant finding on FLIs in Mazowe is that they work in isolation from similar groups on neighbouring farms. There is actually a competitive element to the relationship with neighbouring farms. All A1 farms in Mazowe have, in different guises, institutional formations which cater for different issues and needs. Each of these formations exists solely to serve the needs of those who reside on the farm. Social networks created from joining such groups extend only to those living on the farm. Institutions with similar interests rarely meet to discuss and share experiences in Mazowe. In 2010 there were various training workshops on leadership for a few chosen farmers (not necessarily committee members) by a non-governmental organisation. The workshops however were not meant to ensure that these institutions find areas of common interest and organise together to offer a broader more vocal voice for their needs. What they were taught was leadership and conflict resolution skills, but targeting a few farmers only led to resentment from those who were left out.

FLIs compete with each other for space and access to resources. While these groups have been crucial in influencing on-farm relations, they have in many ways created competition and conflict between farms as they fight to ensure that they get resources. This is detrimental

for A1 farmers because, at least for now, they tend to identify with their farms rather than with a class of farmers with similar interests. As individual farm groups, their voice remains very weak and they are unlikely to achieve much in terms of advocacy. It is in fact easy for government to play these institutions against each other and ensure that A1 farmers remain disaggregated and unorganised. To illustrate this more poignantly, in Mazowe there are 105 A1 farms and each has an irrigation committee. This means that there are 105 dispersed and competing groups in Mazowe who could potentially come together and organise themselves into a viable farmer group.

7.6.4 Relationship between FLIs and local government

The Mazowe Rural District Council is responsible for providing social amenities in the district. Schools and clinics fall under its jurisdiction and control, and thus it is a key factor in service provision on fast track farms. Good relations with council are crucial in accessing goods and services. Council is represented by various agents at local level and councillors are the most important of these agents. There is however conflict between councillors and committees of seven over control. For example, at Haryana Farm, farmers feel that the committee (as the sole owners of land) should have the power to determine what should or should not be done within farmers' plots. For example, they believe that even the cutting down of trees needed the committee's authorization. However others at the farm felt that this was the councillors' jurisdiction. There seemed to be confusion and power struggles between political (council) and development (Committee of Seven) structures. The councillor was accused of disregarding the power of the Committee.

7.6.5 Links with areas of origin/communal areas

Fast Track Land Reform Programme has led to the creation of split households as families spread risk through maintaining dual farming households as a fall back plan if they are ever evicted. The Mazowe survey showed that 20% of farmers were still ploughing their previous plot while 63% had left the plot with their children, parents or relatives. Ownership of plots in the communal areas was thus never totally surrendered by most farmers who enjoy the security possessing two plots brings. This however leads to the splitting of agricultural investment and spreading it over two separate households. Most farmers rarely came with whole families to resettlement areas. Lack of basic social services on A1 farms made many reluctant to bring their children. During a focus group discussion at Davaar Farm, the farmers accepted that they had maintained their claims in the communal areas because they were not

sure if they would stay in the resettlement area for a long time. The effect of split households is that farmers tend to maintain and invest in social networks in their communal homes. This makes them reluctant to invest in new networks within the fast track farms. One good example is of satellite schools (such as at Hariana) where most farmers are not involved in developing the school because they do not have children attending.

7.7 Internal dynamics and democratic content

7.7.1 Legitimation of leadership

The overall inadequacy of all farm level institutions is their weak internal dynamics as they lack skills necessary for better functioning such as conflict resolution, record keeping and leadership. Leadership within farm level institutions is legitimated in various ways depending on the nature of the group. Legitimation is important in gaining authority to speak on behalf of the group and leaders can use this to push through their own agenda in the name of their followers. The process of becoming leader is directly related to the legitimation process. Max Weber (1958) provides three distinct ways in which authority of leaders is legitimated, as follows:

Traditional authority: This is legitimated by the sanctity of tradition. The ability and right to rule is passed down, often through heredity. It does not change overtime, does not facilitate social change, tends to be irrational and inconsistent, and perpetuates the status quo (Williams 2003:2). In fact, Weber states: “The creation of new law opposite traditional norms is deemed impossible in principle.” Traditional authority is typically embodied in feudalism or patrimonialism. In a purely patriarchal structure, the servants are completely and personally dependent upon the lord’, while in an estate system (i.e. feudalism), the servants are not personal servants of the lord but independent men’ (Weber 1958:4). But, in both cases, the system of authority does not change or evolve.

In Mazowe the traditional chiefs have this type of authority over communal areas and A1 farms. The chiefs have traditional authority and it is a hereditary position recognised by law through the Traditional Leaders Act. At farm level there is however a new form of traditionalism imposed by government to manufacture leadership structures. This new form of traditional leader is the *sabhuku* who is chosen by the traditional chief for every A1 scheme. This title is not hereditary and the chief can replace or remove the *sabhuku* as he pleases. It is thus open to patronage and chiefs normally appoint people they have known for

some time. The position of *sabhuku* is just like paid government work as headmen receive payment, which in 2009 was reported to be US\$20 a month. Though they claim traditional authority and impose traditional rules and norms, these leaders are nothing but a manufactured form of traditionalism imposed upon A1 farmers to facilitate the influence of traditional chiefs. The *sabhuku* is responsible for hearing all cases at farm level, mainly social conflicts or disrespect for traditional rules. Many of the cases are however passed on to the traditional chief who has the right to fine offenders.

Charismatic authority: This is found in a leader whose mission and vision inspire others. It is based upon the perceived extraordinary characteristics of an individual. Weber saw a charismatic leader as the head of a new social movement, and one instilled with divine or supernatural powers, such as a religious prophet. He seemed to favour charismatic authority, especially in focusing on what happened with the death or decline of a charismatic leader. Charismatic authority is ‘routinised’ in a number of ways according to Weber: orders are traditionalized, the staff or followers change into legal or ‘state-like’ (traditional) staff, or the meaning of charisma itself may undergo change (Williams 2003:3).

At Selby Farm in Mazowe I came across one charismatic leader who was vocal and instrumental in trying to set up structures such as farm development committees. He was also involved in organising farmers in their conflict against the farm caretaker⁵⁸ who was accused of siphoning movable property off the farm. There are however very few charismatic leaders except for those in religious settings. While I did not quantify the numbers, there was a distinct increase in apostolic churches over the two years of my field work in Mazowe. These churches are usually initiated by charismatic individuals who break away from other apostolic sects to start their own church. Charismatic leaders in other forms of organisation find it difficult to gain authority given the overwhelming control ZANU-PF has on the farms. Leaders at farm level have the authority of the party behind them in terms of any influence on farmers. The influence of the party is pervasive in all forms of social organisation and farmers are very careful not to appear as if they anti-government in how they operate. Thus charismatic authority has to be understood in the context of party control on the fast track farms.

⁵⁸ On certain farms, government appointed caretakers to care of farm infrastructure during the *jambanja* phase.

Legal-rational authority: This is empowered by a formalistic belief in the content of the law (legal) or natural law (rationality). Obedience is not given to a specific individual leader – whether traditional or charismatic – but to a set of uniform principles. Weber thought that the best example of legal-rational authority was a bureaucracy (political or economic). This form of authority is frequently found in the modern state, city governments, private and public corporations, and various voluntary associations (Williams 2003:4). In fact, Weber stated that the development of the modern state is identical indeed with that of modern officialdom and bureaucratic organizations just as the development of modern capitalism is identical with the increasing bureaucratization of economic enterprise (Weber 1958:3).

Bureaucratic organisation is the norm in most of the farm level institutions in Mazowe as noted in the section 7.7.2 below. While FLIs mimic legal-rational structures, they are mostly informal without any legal status. They do however have sets of uniform principles which every member is obliged to follow. For example, the irrigation committee at Usk Farm has rules on water usage that allow for a fair sharing of water especially in winter cropping so that every farmer benefits. At Blightly Farm, the electricity committee has the principle that every household pays a similar amount for bills every month. These principles are agreed upon by all farmers and are enforced using social sanctions even though the committees cannot take legal recourse.

7.7.2 Leadership structures

Most FLIs have leadership hierarchies which are in most cases bureaucratic. There are positions with specific roles and duties. These institutional forms are based on formalised state-initiated village and ward development committees initiated in the 1980s and 1990s in the communal areas where the majority of A1 farmers come from. Given that there is a mix of past professionals such as teachers and security forces on the farms it is not surprising to discover these bureaucratic forms of organisation among A1 institutions in Mazowe. Table 9 below provides an example of this by outlining the roles of various positions of Committee of Seven members at Usk Farm. It clearly indicates how duties and responsibilities are delineated within the institutional structure to avoid duplication. Like in any bureaucracy, the major problem is that if a position-holder is not available then certain decisions cannot be made by the committee. This is especially true in the event that the *sabhuku* (as the chairperson) is not available. No decisions can be made without him/her.

Table 9: Structure of the Committee of Seven

Position	Role
Chairperson/ <i>Sabhuku</i>	Overall head of the committee and in most cases has the final say. Chosen by traditional chief. Can only be removed by the chief.
Treasurer	Oversees all financial issues on the farm.
Secretary	Calls for meetings and is responsible for organising all activities.
Women's affairs	Always a woman who is supposed to ensure that gender issues is addressed.
Committee Member	Helps in decision making and taking over duties and responsibilities for other members when they are not there.
Committee Member	Helps in decision making and taking over duties and responsibilities for other members when they are not there.
Committee Member	Helps in decision making and taking over duties and responsibilities for other members when they are not there.

7.7.3 Democratic content and election of leaders

Rural organisations have leaders chosen through election by members, lineage leaders or agents imposed by the state or private organisation. The type of leadership and representativeness depends on the nature, origins and the context in which the institution operates. I concentrate on understanding how the leadership is chosen, how long it stays in office and the roles of various leaders. Questions which need to be looked at include: Do these institutions have constitutions and are the rules and regulations followed? Do they have conflict resolving mechanisms?

7.7.3.1 Choosing leaders

FLIs that derive from the grassroots and farmers' own initiative largely have leaders which are elected through the popular vote of farmers. There are instances though in which leaders are imposed by external agents on the farmers. In this regard, Box 7 below shows how leaders for the Committee of Seven were chosen at Davaar Farm.

Box 7: Choosing Committee of Seven: Davaar Farm

One day in 2003 the Chief sent word that he would come and instil the *sabhuku*. When the Chief arrived he selected one man to be our *sabhuku* though we do not know what criteria were used. What is apparent, looking at most of the people, who became *sabhuku* on farms around us, is that they are mostly from Chiweshe and thus know the customs and rules of this land. They were known previously by the Chief thus we trust that he choose the best person for the job. The other committee members were chosen by the plot holders by nominating and electing from amongst themselves. We had known each other for some time, thus it was easy to know the people who could do well in the various positions on the committee.

Source: Interview Davaar Farm 17th July 2010

Fast track farmers are subservient to competing forces of authority which include party, local government, central government and traditional leaders. All these centres of authority in many ways influence the way leaders are chosen on the farms.

Leaders are chosen in various ways as follows:

Elections: This is when plot holders nominate and choose their own leaders. Institutions such as irrigation committees and health committees that were initiated at the grassroots tend to have leaders who are elected by their peers. Elections are open to each A1 farm household but farm workers are almost always excluded from the vote. At some farms such as Vonabo the farm workers are not even part of the meetings. At Davaar, the farm worker representatives are available for the health committee meeting and the plot holders indicate that for most meetings they request a representative for workers. Elections are done in the open by raising and counting of hands. Farmers usually choose people they believe are up to the tasks required by the position. There is however committees such as the irrigation committee at Usk Farm where only members of the group can be position holders. Thus only those who can afford to join the irrigation group are able to choose or be chosen onto the committee. Other institutions such as ZANU-PF cells are chosen by members; usually war veterans and those who are always working for the party are chosen to these positions.

Imposition of leaders: This occurs when leaders are imposed on the farmers by external authorities. The *sabhuku* is a good example of imposing leadership on farmers. The *sabhuku* is chosen on all A1 schemes by the traditional chief without any consultation with the farmers. The farmers thus do not have any control over the *sabhuku*, who is answerable to the chief and not the people he/she leads. In such cases, allegations of misuse of authority such as renting out small plots, favouritism or even bribes in hearing cases and incompetence are not investigated. And farmers do not have the authority to question or remove a *sabhuku* they suspect of engaging in such acts. The institution of the *sabhuku* relies on the patronage of the traditional chief thus accountability is to an upper authority and not the grassroots.

7.7.3.2 Mandate and length of office

The length of office for institutions varies with the type of institution and whether it was internally or externally initiated. The Committee of Seven is an institution which is present across all the cases in this study. There were different interpretations on the term of office of this committee on the farms under study. At Hamilton Farm the committee has no clear

mandate and there are contestations over the term they are supposed to serve. Some farmers were saying that only the chief has the power to dissolve the committee; others indicated that the farmers can dissolve the committee for incompetence but that the *sabhuku* cannot be removed under any circumstances. Farmers at Davaar seem to have no idea over the mandate or length of office of the committee. Most of the respondents in focus group discussions at the farms noted that the length of term of office depends on whether farmers are satisfied with the work that the committee is doing (see Box 8). At all the farms, it was indicated that it was only the chief who can remove or replace the *sabhuku*. This means that the farmers are unable to take any action in removing the *sabhuku* even if they are no longer satisfied with him/her. *Sabhuku's* term of office hence is controlled by an external agent and farmers have little recourse in the event of dissatisfaction. Similarly, at Hariana Farm, the village head is selected by the chief and other members of the committee are chosen by the farmers (with farm workers having no voting powers). The tenure period of farm committees depends on how the committees work with farmers; as for the village head, they indicated that they are not sure of the tenure period.

Box 8: Committee Of Seven mandate: Usk farm

Farmers at Usk noted that the Committee of Seven is headed by the *sabhuku* who was appointed by Chief Negomo although the area falls under Chief Chiweshe. The other six members were chosen through a vote by the settlers. The term of office for the committee is not known as the participants indicated that it was up to the chief to determine when to remove the committee. The farmers think that they have no mandate over the term of office. They believe that it is only the chief who called for the setting up of the committee and who has the right to remove the committee.

Source: Focus Group Discussion, Usk farm, 17th August 2009

For other committees which were formed as a result of farmers' initiative, the terms of office vary from three to five years. For example the irrigation committee at Davaar Farm has a mandate to lead for three years though it can be dissolved at any time if the farmers are dissatisfied. In committees where farmers are all elected to committee positions, it is generally possible to change the members any time the farmers choose to do so. Grassroots organisations thus tend to be democratic allowing for members to change leadership when necessary. The major problem comes with structures where there is a charismatic leader or a leader backed by (or with) various forms of capital who can withstand pressure to step down. At Usk Farm in 2007 the chairperson of the irrigation committee was a former army general and, when asked the term of office for this army officer, the farmers were reluctant to state

any specific time line. As a former service chief, he had political and economic capital to the extent that he made decisions on behalf of the irrigation committee without discussing with others in the committee. The farmers accrued benefits in terms of access to government resources but at a cost of having a domineering leader whose presence undermined democratic processes. At Blightly Farm the electricity committee has a five year mandate but the farmers can remove any member at any time if they are not satisfied by their performance.

7.7.3.3 Constitutions, rules and regulations

The Committee of Seven at Usk Farm is not guided by any constitution, or blue print of rules and regulations, in their operations. The farmers claim that as a people they are governed by their own set of norms and values (*Ubuntu*). This is made possible by the fact that most people came from the same area in Masembura communal area. The few farmers from other areas have been assimilated into the way of life of those from Masembura. They have been forced to accept and follow the norms of the majority. This story is prevalent across the case studies where most institutions have no written-down agreed ways of operating; rather, social taken-for-granted and verbal norms and ways of behaviour dominate institutional life. Such agreed-upon rules include the prohibition of killing sacred animals which include pythons, monkeys and baboons. In 2007 there were over ten cases of people being fined cattle for killing these animals. All traditional rules and norms on the A1 farms are not written down but are ways of knowing that are affirmed by these local societies. Newcomers into the area have to learn from insiders the local rules, which also include prohibiting incest, adultery and prostitution, and adhering to *chisi* (rest day). This is the major reason why chiefs chose *sabhuku* on the new farms, namely, to ensure that only those with knowledge of local customs lead people on the farms.

There are however certain institutions which have written down rules and regulations. Such institutions mostly have members who are or were professionals elsewhere as teachers and civil servants. Farm level institutions which require payment of money to join (such as irrigation committees) are also highly formalistic entities where rules and regulations exist in written form. There is record keeping of budgets and expenditures to account for the money paid by members, including the joining fee for the group. At Usk the farm committee actually has a bank account where all farm proceeds from the grinding mill or other activities are deposited. Most other groups do not have bank accounts because, firstly, of the distance from

major centres and, secondly, the collected money is invariably used up immediately and there is never any funds left to save.

7.7.3.4 Multi-currency and farm level institutions

The Government of Zimbabwe introduced the multi-currency on 30th January 2009 after hyperinflation had decimated the local currency. With hyperinflation the Zimbabwean dollar had become meaningless as prices changed almost every hour and cash shortages became common place. Holding positions in farm level institutions was only associated with social prestige and had no monetary reward. Positions such as treasurer were not attractive as there was considerable stress due to grappling with inflation and cash shortages. With the adoption of the United States Dollar and other currencies (notably the South African Rand), managing funds became easier. The position of treasurer now involves more than prestige as there is also competition over the control of money. For example, if thirty farmers each contribute US\$5, this amounts to US\$150 – which is a significant amount of money for A1 farmers. Controlling such a purse becomes a serious issue often with accusations of mismanagement and conflicts. Adoption of multi-currencies has entrenched class differences especially between farmers with jobs elsewhere and those that depend solely on agriculture. Access to forex in rural areas is difficult especially for those without any off farm livelihood options.

7.8 Class and gender identities

Farm level institutions are more than rural farmers group which come together for socio-economic or production purposes. To understand them deeply, a precise and detailed portrait of their sociological texture is required, along with the political processes that underlie their activities. For Moyo (2002:10), rural organisations are complex and diverse in their superficial characteristics and this makes it impossible to construct rigid typologies and classifications of these institutions. Studies of rural institutions have focused upon farmers' unions or associations moulded within an interest group conceptual framework which correlates the growth of such associations with the rise of the market economy based on Western experiences. This often neglects various gender, age and class dynamics which underpin the political and economic basis of these institutional forms.

There has been by and large a systematic failure in institutional, social network and social capital writings to identify and problematise the underlying assumptions about gender subordination embedded in the rules and norms governing associations and relationships at

all levels' (Mayoux 2002: 440). Moyo (2002) argues that the ethnographic basis of peasant (small-scale farmer) leadership and its patriarchal grounding reproduce male dominance of peasant associations' leadership and their encroachment even into the leadership ranks of mainly women's peasant organisation. Women in most rural institutions are given a token position either as secretary or responsible for gender issues. However there are wealthier women who have emerged out of rural institutions through their improved access to land and production infrastructure. Women-based institutions tend though to coalesce at the margins of mainstream rural economic and political agrarian systems; and they are rarely autonomous and do not espouse any feminist or empowerment ideology.

It is necessary to ask critical questions of difference between, identity of and control over institutions because they have an effect on livelihood opportunities in rural Zimbabwe. Rather than romanticising about the emergence of novel institutions that disrupt evolutionary narratives or about heroes who outwit big institutions, it becomes important to understand how class and gender configurations are handled in these new institutional forms (Peters 2002). Peters (2002) shows that the plurality of institutions may open alternatives for some of the poor but that the more affluent, the better connected and the more knowledgeable within or outside the group always seems to benefit. Lund (2006) argues that people are divided into social classes not necessarily in terms of labour and capital, but more profoundly as either haves or have-nots. Bourdieu's (1987) concept of capital comes into play. Economic, social, political and cultural capital determines access to institutional resources and power. Thus these institutional forms exhibit a class hierarchy in which the poor ultimately always lose out. Power and class distinctions often systematically recognise the interests and claims of some while the plight of others remains out of focus and is effectively denied legitimate attention. In this regard, [s]trangers, migrants, women, pastoralists and squatters are only the beginning of a long list of human beings out-classed by distinctions produced by political practices of institutions of public authority' (Lund 2006:700). Moyo (2002) therefore claims that wealthier people stand to gain more from rural associations than the poorer in terms of access to credit, water rights, land and infrastructure which are delivered by the state.

7.8.1 Women and farm level institutions: experiences from Mazowe

Women on A1 fast track farms in Mazowe are a mixture of plot holders, wives of plot holders, 'small houses'⁵⁹, daughters and relatives of plot holders, and new and old farm workers. These women are of various ages with different educational, class, religious, ethnic and even national backgrounds. Their interests and their experiences are so diverse that it is neither possible nor desirable to talk of women as a singular, homogenous unit. These diverse characteristics in many ways shape the relationships established by women on the fast track farms, including with whom. Gender is an important associational category which many times separate men and women into different groups and positions. There are roles and positions which are generally considered to be within the male domain. For example, there are very few female *sabhuku* or treasurers in the Committees of Seven. Overall, the gendered division of labour relegates women from the public sphere to the private sphere. Women do however establish and operate their own forms of association which particularly focus on domestic issues such as teaching cookery.

It is important to note that women's interests in many meetings at farm level are never considered. As one woman at Blightly Farm noted, *tinongouya kuma meeting asi zvichemo zvedu hazvinzwike. Ukada kutaurisa unonoona moto kumba nababa* (We just come to meetings but our issues are never considered and if we talk our husbands will be angry with us). Culturally, among the Shona, women are not entitled to talk when men are around. It is men who are the leaders and fathers who make the decisions on the welfare of everyone. It is for this reason that the fieldwork focus groups were separated by gender to allow women to speak freely. In the focus group discussions, women indicated that sometimes they had better ideas than men but there was no space for them to express these. They also complained that women do most of the agricultural work (including both economic production and social reproduction) but have little control over the proceeds from that work. All agendas at meetings never raise specific issues pertinent to women even at the few farms that have women as *sabhuku*.

The institution of *sabhuku* in its traditional sense is known as a hereditary position through the patriliney. In the case of the new resettlement areas, where the institution has been adopted

⁵⁹ These are women who are in extramarital affairs with farmers and live on the farm while the wife of the plot holder is resident elsewhere and does not know of this girlfriend at the farm. This practice is rampant among A2 farmers but some A1 farmers also practice it.

and modified, it has opened an opportunity for women to be part and parcel of 'new traditionalism.' Traditional chiefs, as the vanguard of Shona patriarchal customs, were at the forefront in Mazowe in appointing women to positions they knew were always male dominated. The ushering in of new traditions in this way provided space for women to gain access to positions that previously were not open to them. The number of female *sabhuku* remains very low when compared to their male counterparts. This presence of women as *sabhuku* has not however translated into more let alone equal attention at farm level to issues that concern women. Meetings and decisions are made in a gender-blind manner without any regard for the specific challenges facing women. One female *sabhuku* at Kia Ora farm in fact complained that some farmers were disrespecting her because she was a woman.

In the Committee of Seven which is the biggest decision-making body at farm level women are mostly absent. On the six farms in this study there was only one woman on each committee who was responsible strictly for women's affairs. The presence of this female member is a mere window-dressing ploy to make it appear as if women's issues are important. There is however examples in Mazowe of women gaining influential positions in farm level institutions. One notable example is the all-female Committee of Seven at Selby Farm (which however was not part of my case studies). At Blightly Farm the chairperson of the electricity committee is a woman who was chosen by all the plot holders, largely because of her good organisational skills. In male focus groups the participants highlighted that most committees required people who had the time and skills to call for meetings, visit different government/council offices and command respect. They noted that in their opinion most women did not have such skills and that most men did not want their wives leaving families behind in order to work on committees.

Women in Mazowe have negotiated their own spaces to meet, organise, share and discuss. These forums are not only gendered (women only) but also class-based. For example at Blightly Farm there is a women's club at the scheme called *Budiriro Kumaruwa* which was planning to embark on a horticultural project. This club excludes farm workers who are viewed as outsiders. There are a plethora of women's clubs on A1 farms in Mazowe. Some of them such as at Komani Farm are organised by the ZANU-PF Women's League. Such clubs (while politically-based) nevertheless organise women into clubs with such activities as sewing and cooking classes. Among the important issues discussed at women's clubs are sexual education, condom use, and maternal health and HIV issues. All of these issues are

manifestations of patriarchal definitions of what women are supposed to be doing. These organisations do not question gender relations as they mutate within the fast track farms. Rather they concentrate on improving the ‘wife’ by enhancing her household skills. Gender relations are rarely contested and women have found ways to carve out spaces without necessarily upsetting the prevailing patriarchal system.

7.8.2 Class and farmer organisations in Mazowe

Across the six farms under study, none of the farmers belonged to any national farmer organisation. A1 farmers require a concerted and united voice at district, provincial and national levels to ensure that their interests are protected. Without having a voice these farmers are continuously left out of processes of national policy formulation and implementation. For example at Hariana farmers do not have access to any form of presence at district, provincial or national level. A2 farmers in the same district have at least an association to lobby for their interests. The Mvurwi Farmers Association is only for A2 farmers who use this grouping to form commodity groups and consortiums. The ‘classed’ nature of inter-farm farmer organisations leaves out A1 farmers who mainly organise at farm level. When dealing with state institutions such as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), A1 farmers do so as individuals and thus find it hard to ensure that their concerns are heard. Even when A1 farmers are sometimes invited to the meetings of the Mvurwi Farmers’ Association, the environment is discriminatory. A1 farmers are not given the chance to share their own experiences and, even if they do, these are not taken seriously.

The Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU), which is the national platform for small-scale farmers, is known locally but very few A1 farmers are members in Mazowe. At Hariana and Davaar farms, the farmers criticized the union for its failure to address the plight of farmers. For example no ZFU official has ever visited the farms. A1 farmers at Arda (before they were evicted) noted that the ZFU was not particularly helpful to farmers. The union officials are only visible when they want to collect money to organise agricultural shows⁶⁰ and subscriptions. In a way each farmer represents themselves as there is no union to represent everyone. One participant in focus group discussions indicated that A1 farmers were afraid of being arrested under the Public Order and Security Act (POSA 2002) if they organized meetings as farmers.

⁶⁰Yearly each district in Zimbabwe conducts an agricultural show to exhibit produce and choose the best farmer.

The Zimbabwe Farmers Union has been existence since 1939 representing mainly communal farmers. From discussions with A1 farmers it is evident that one major reason for not joining the union entails a class-based explanation. A1 farmers feel that they are in many ways superior to communal farmers and are reluctant to join them as part of the same union. Their interests differ from communal farmers, thus they claim that they require a union which speaks to their experiences and needs. Joining with A2 farmers appears desirable for most farmers but as one farmer at Longcroft Farm pointed out:

We are different from A2 farmers. Our needs are simple. We require inputs, tillage, fuel and basic services. A2 farmers got equipment and houses from former farmers. They are politically connected thus have access to tractors, seeds and fertilisers. How can such people drive our interests as A1 farmers? We need are our union.

There is thus a vacuum in terms of unionisation amongst A1 farmers as they lack leadership, structure and unity to organise as a group facing similar problems.

7.9 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the internal dynamics and external influence of farm level institutions. It highlighted important conceptual issues around leadership, democratic content, gender and class issues at farm level. The arguments illuminated the activities and roles of farm level institutions showing how they are a source of meaning, control, association and action. Drawing from six case studies and other cases from Mazowe, the chapter outlined how gender is an important facet in understanding farm level institutions and associational life. An analysis of the activities, relationships, strategies, roles and influence of farm level institutions are critical to making sense of local level polities. This helps in understanding the myriad and various social, political and economic roles and functions played out by different groups on the fast track farms, as well as providing insights into their relationships beyond the specific farm on which they operate.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

Institutional formation in Mazowe is an enterprise fraught with contesting and competing loyalties in which membership is based on social, political and economic considerations. Social capital invested in new networks and relationships has been crucial in maintaining order where the government clearly did not have the resources to do so. Preceding chapters have highlighted issues around the formation, taxonomy, activities, functions and internal processes of farm level institutions. This concluding chapter brings those arguments together to illuminate a conceptual way of understanding the processes on the fast track farms. Borrowing from various theoretical standpoints (most notably Bourdieu's conceptualisation of social capital), the chapter provides an in-depth understanding of how emergent communities on former commercial farms are responding to challenges of social order, service provision, production and marketing. Such an analysis helps us understand the ways in which grassroots organisations can be established as a means to provide services and usher in social transformation in rural communities. The chapter is organised into three broad sections. First of all, I outline the original contribution of this thesis to conceptual debates on social capital and secondly I identify how my thesis adds new dimensions to our understanding of rural institutional formations. Lastly, I suggest how the thesis provides a nuanced view on empirical questions and debates about the lived experiences of communities that emerged post fast track land reform in Zimbabwe. Before doing this, I offer a brief summary of the thesis chapters.

8.2 Thesis Summary

This thesis has offered an exploratory insight into the social organisation of emergent communities borne out of Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme. These communities emerged out of a highly disputed, often violent and in many ways chaotic process characterised by farm occupations that involved various conflicts around double allocations, boundaries, vandalism, thefts and evictions. Institutionalisation has been an important factor for fast track farmers as new events continue to shape and reshape their life conditions on the farms. The thesis offered insights into various dimensions and questions around farm level institutions including: can farm level institutions be seen as possible building blocks in the empowerment of farms? What is the nature of their leadership? What

processes and mechanisms of accountability are put in place within these institutions? What are the forms of articulation between institutions that are local in outlook and the local power structures and the state? How do local institutions relate to larger national institutions?

The first chapter grounded the important question driving the research and outlined the objectives, focus, methodological approach and goals embodied in the research process. In the second chapter, I focused on the theoretical underpinnings of this research – notably how this study is influenced by the concept of social capital. In particular, the chapter identifies and addresses the ways in which social capital shapes the formation of farm level institutions and how their continued existence relies on it.

The thesis traces the land question in Zimbabwe from independence in 1980, outlined in chapter three. This chapter analyses how the impasse on land in Zimbabwe has evolved from the Lancaster House Agreement until the explosive land invasions of early 2000. I interrogate how the land question was left to ferment for over twenty years, failing to achieve any meaning redistribution of land due to a myriad of factors especially after the adoption of structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s. This sowed the seeds for the events of 2000 which saw veterans of the liberation struggle occupy white owned farms.

In chapter four, I indicate that significant literature exists analysing the farm occupations and the track land reform process that emerged in Zimbabwe in the year 2000 and that led to the formation of A1 and A2 farms. There are many competing explanations for the events of 2000 and beyond in Zimbabwe. What is clear is that there was a new land order which was a major factor in the descent of the country into a serious economic meltdown. It is this context of serious economic challenges and a government without any resources to adequately support agriculture that new farmers faced after getting the land.

Chapter five of the thesis offers a social differentiation of the new communities and citizens in Mazowe. It shows the origins, ages, class and backgrounds of settlers noting their diversity. The chapter is based on the survey carried out in Mazowe in 2007/2008, secondary data and interviews I conducted in 2009 and 2010. Firstly, it provides a brief history of land reform in Mazowe showing how it evolved over the years. Secondly, it offers a picture of the social background and social differentiation of the farmers who acquired land in Mazowe.

Chapters six and seven illustrate the various processes and dynamics involved in the formation of farm level institutions on six A1 farms in Goromonzi. The chapters focus on typologies, structural organisation, activities, relationships, strategies, roles and influences of farm level institutions. Farm level institutions are taken to include all associational groupings (small or large, formal or informal) that operate at farm level on the fast track farms.

The thesis shows how power, social capital and agency influence associational life at farm level. As they are currently constituted, farm level institutions lack internal capacity and independence from external forces that would otherwise lead to significant transformation and service delivery in the newly resettled areas. They are however promising social formations borne out of survival strategies of farmers faced with the daunting task of producing without significant support from government.

8.3 Contribution to debates on social capital

This thesis has provided important insights into the usefulness and relevance of social capital in analysing emergent rural communities. Despite the criticism of the concept by scholars such as Fine (2002), I have shown that social capital remains a valuable analytical tool to understand social networks and institutions at grassroots level. The discussion below firstly outlines how farm level institutions can be viewed as structural forms of social capital. Secondly and most importantly it outlines how Bourdieu's conceptualisation of social capital is useful in illuminating relationships at farm level and shows how social capital can lead to differential access to power.

8.3.1 Farm level institutions as structural forms of social capital

Farm level institutions in Mazowe embody a particular and important form of structural social capital. In many ways they constitute an important asset in farmers' livelihood strategies and thus are essential in service provision, agricultural development and poverty reduction. These institutional formations vary greatly in scale, size, effectiveness, democratic content, activities and degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. Such diversity makes it neither possible nor desirable to invoke unitary conceptions of social capital among fast track farmers. It also cautions us from romanticising about the existence and work of rural organisations. The diversity and competitive positioning of farm level institutions, and their internal relations and social cohesion (based often on trust and reciprocity), illustrate the existence of both bonding and bridging capital.

Various discussions of social capital have suggested that it is important to distinguish between two types of relationship, each of which constitutes social capital but which apparently have different characteristics. One set refers to intra-group relationships: relationships of *'bonding'* or *'integration'* that strengthen links between people facilitating forms of intra group interaction and collective action. The other set of relationships has been called *'linkage'* or *'bridging'* mechanisms, relationships that strengthen linkages between groups and other actors and organizations (Bebbington and Carroll 2000). The problem is that farm level institutions remain fragmented and separated by divergent interests. They represent often competing groups, opinions, interests and sometimes political actors; such that there are only limited bridging relationships between groups (particularly across farms). As such it is easier for government to play them against each other through *'divide and rule'* tactics and keep A1 farms governable.

A1 farmers, despite their numbers, appear voiceless and lack any coordinated movement to propagate their cause. Mazowe is littered with hundreds of singularly independent groups operating in isolation and competing against each other for space and resources. Discussions with several groups indicate that they are aware of other similar groups; but rather than seeing them as allies, they are viewed as competitors and strategies are formulated by groups to ensure that they are more successful than others in lobbying government. Until A1 farmers realise that they belong to the same farming class by virtue of shared characteristics (such as being resource poor or lacking access to resources) they will remain without any form of collective action. Following Bourdieu's thesis on social capital, it is apparent that most farmers join farm level institutions as a strategic move to ensure their selfish needs are met. As such the vision of most institutions is short sighted, focusing on resources that can be accrued from group membership and not focusing on cultivating collective action amongst farmers.

The farm level institutions form a part of multilayered *'survivalhoods'* based on short term ambitions to acquire basic resources by farmers. Such organisations are survivalist and needs-based. Murisa (2010) in a study of farmer organisations in Zvimba and Goromonzi has shown that they lack an agrarian vision or plan. This is typical of farmer institutions in Mazowe. My research shows that most need-driven institutions have no agrarian vision beyond meeting the needs for which they were formed. Beyond that A1 farmers remain individualistic, viewing farming as a lone enterprise and avoiding collective action. These institutions do not have any

developmental or future plans. For example irrigation committees only concern themselves with ensuring equipment is working properly but they do not come up with any future irrigation plans. There is no thought into how irrigation equipment can be increased and ways of improving irrigation systems.

Farm level institutions are however important sources of social cohesion through maintaining order and resolving conflicts at farm level. Institutions such as the Committee of Seven have several roles in maintaining security and ensuring good neighbourliness amongst fast track farmers. Organising into institutions allows greater interaction and promotes togetherness of farm dwellers as they work for the collective good. Bonding of farmers is facilitated through working together for similar causes. Households that were strangers to each other find space through associational activities to know and interact with each other. Rules, norms, mores and regulations are affirmed, shared and policed through various institutional forms that ensure that, despite personal differences, conflicts remain manageable. This positive side of social capital as outlined by Putman (1995) is apparent in Mazowe and building on it has potential benefits for fast track farms as they continue to evolve towards well functioning and highly productive communities.

8.3.2 Bourdieurian perspective on farm level institutions

Whilst there are positive aspects of local institutions in maintaining order and conflict resolution there remains an important dimension of how power and class influence associational life at farm level. The basis of this thesis is grounded around Bourdieu's conceptualisation of social capital which seeks to highlight the creation and recreation of social inequalities. Bourdieu emphasises from the start the co-creation of all capitals (economic, cultural, social, symbolic and even political), such these 'capital' processes do not exist in isolation from each other. This basic premise grounds the understanding of how farm level institutions are created and function to serve interests of interested individuals in the name of the group. Social capital is never completely independent of economic or cultural capital; for example traditional chiefs use their cultural capital to create a new type of traditional leader on fast track farms who pays homage to them (thus they maintain control and power over these areas through this patronage system). The traditional chief, through choosing these headmen (*sabhuku*), creates a dense network of loyal people, who report and owe allegiance to him. In this way chiefs entrench their power and control over A1 farmers.

Powerful individuals through economic or political power in many ways invest in social capital to accrue the backing of a group behind their cause. Like all forms of capital, social capital is accumulated labour. It has its own capitalists who accumulate it in the form of relationships, networks, and contacts: '[T]he network of relationship is the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships which are directly usable in the short or long term' (Bourdieu 1986:249). They 'capitalists' speak for their own interests in the name of the group. However the group does obtain benefits albeit at a cost of having a powerful and often domineering individual leading them. At Usk, when the former army chief was still there, the farmers had access to many government support initiatives through him – but he made decisions for them in most cases without consultation. As such his position allowed him to dominate even the *sabhuku* and stifle democratic processes. As A1 farmers progress into a cohesive collective, the control of such organisations will give its leaders social and political capital. Power clearly affects the formation, nature and effectiveness of social capital held by different groups or individuals.

Understood in this way social capital is thus not a resource held by a whole community but rather by interest groups and individuals. There are social capitalists who are manipulating and orienting various networks for their benefit. Knowing the 'right' people especially in the period of economic challenges in Zimbabwe is an important resource for farmers seeking support services. In 2007-2008, at the height of the economic meltdown, getting money or inputs required a dense network of people who could provide these things. At one time the agricultural extension officer became the most important person in the fast track farms because of controlling fuel. Extension officers were responsible for compiling lists and deciding the amount of fuel for farmers depending on the assessment they made of their productive capacity. Solidifying connections with extension officers became an important endeavour in which people tried to use every advantage they had to get access to a scarce resource. Social capital is thus a mechanism which ensures exclusion for those who exist outside of the network of relationships.

Power relations at farm level affect how people interact and their forms of control. The ineffectiveness of most farm level institutions to lobby the state for the provision of basic services highlights how much they lack in terms of power. While A1 farmers have carved out spaces to operate and manoeuvre, the state machinery through political structures and war

veterans have maintained a grip over the fast track farms. Thus institutions can have many social networks but without the political capital that are less likely to achieve their goals. The translation of social capital into other forms of capital is mediated by power relations which in most cases leaves ordinary farmers without any other resources (political, economic or cultural) and at a distinct disadvantage. This explains why A2 farmers living alone on a farm are far more effective in accessing goods and services. It is because they have access to political networks that affords them such rewards regardless of how many people they know.

Bourdieu (1983:249) highlights that the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes groups possible. This is in many ways why farmers join institutions. This view tends though to be instrumentalist, reducing reasons for joining institutions to mere economic or social gains. But the research in Mazowe shows that most farmers join institutions for such gains. For example, burial societies not only offer social support in time of bereavement but assist in financial ways during a funeral. In the same vein joining an irrigation committee is motivated by the need to find ways to enhance production thereby increasing profits. All institutions have a social, economic or political profit that accrues directly or indirectly to the participant. Whether joining institutions is motivated by this profit is sometimes debatable given that in certain instances the benefits accrued are not easily visible. Respect and social status are also important benefits that arise in being a committee chairperson or other important position even when there is no economic benefit. This is not to say that farmers are cold calculating beings inspired by self gain. Rather, it only shows that social capital can be an individual asset and as individuals work towards satisfying their interests they inherently help the community as a whole. For example joining an irrigation committee involves the pursuit of an individual interest (to increase production), but this also helps others increase their production. The interest of the individual in some cases intersects with interests of the community.

In chapter two of this thesis I invoked Jenkins' (1992:119) question: how does a social system in which a substantial section of the population is obviously disadvantaged and exploited survive without its rulers having to depend on physical coercion for the maintenance of order? The government of Zimbabwe neither had the resources nor the time to maintain order and enforce cohesion on fast track farms at the height of fast track land reform. Due to the huge demands of the process and the legal battles with former commercial farmers (coupled with the movement of large numbers of people onto the farms), it was

necessary to create new functionalities with various forms of social and political capital to reduce acts of thefts, vandalism and conflicts. There occurred the invention and re-invention of various authoritative bodies meant to ensure order on fast track farms. One such invention was the caretaker who was supposed to oversee the security of infrastructure left by the commercial farmer. One re-creation is the Committee of Seven which was used during the liberation struggle to coordinate war efforts. On A1 farms, committee of seven members were selected to ensure conflict resolution, security, coordination and mobilisation of farmers.

Government-initiated farm level institutions were aimed at ensuring control and order on the farms without much cost to the state. In effect, authority over law and order was decentralised to local functionaries who were acting on behalf of the state but were not belonging to it. These are what Lund (2006:686) call ‘twilight institutions’ which operate ‘between state and society, between public and private.’ They are substituting for the state as public authorities ensuring order and peaceful co-existence on the fast track farms. Committee of Seven is a classic example of a twilight institution. It acts on behalf of the government but is not in any way officially recognised as governance structures. In this way the state still has control over associational life on farms and near hegemonic support for one political party is affirmed.

8.3.3 Social capital, gender and class: Politics of belonging on fast track farms

Identity is at the heart of belonging and an important marker of who ‘is’ and who ‘is not’ a farmer, Zimbabwean or ZANU-PF supporter on the fast track farms. As such, restructuring of gender and class configurations are important in understanding how various social actors relate and interact at farm level. Everyday interaction on fast track farms is shaped by identities which are always under negotiation. Such identities define inclusivity and exclusivity when it comes to group formation and definition of a ‘farmer.’ For example, former farm workers resident in most farm compounds in Mazowe are seen as non-citizens with no rights and are thus excluded from most forms of associational life. Many instances were given of how institutions do not allow farm worker representatives or women’s clubs which are not open to female farm workers. Class and gender interact to delineate who belongs. When trying to understand the situation and experiences of women on the fast track farms, we should be careful not to generalise them into broad classifications as farm workers, farmers, wives or children. These women are classed, aged, ethnicised and nationalised (Crenshaw 1994).

The patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean society has ensured that women remain outside influential decision making positions. Women's representatives, even when their numbers expand significantly, cannot be expected automatically to be representative of women. A feminine presence in politics is not the same as a feminist one. Getting more women into decision making is a worthy project from the point of view democratic justice, but the real challenge is in institutionalising gender equity as a government policy. Unfortunately the first project – increasing the number of women in politics – is the easiest, and it is often mistaken for the second. This entails confusion between numerical and strategic representation of women. Women in decision making positions have in most ways negated to focus on women issues. They become representatives of the same system which has placed women at the periphery of all important decisions. Hence, a mere increase in women representation in farm level institutions is not the answer; rather, a systematic way has to be found to place their interests on the agendas of these groups.

Analysis of social capital shows that the concept, while gender blind, can offer an understanding into how institutions can produce and reproduce gender inequalities. As Bebbington (2002) notes, the insistent theme coming out from feminist authors is that social capital is not innocent; neither in terms of its place in development discourse nor in its operational forms as networks. Women appear deficient of social capital as a result of discriminatory practices and institutions sustained through men's social capital, which limit women's access to markets, assets and institutional spheres. Women's organisations are often not recognised as anything but pastimes. They are not regarded as important elements of associational life; with most men I met often criticising them as gossip groups. Gender inequalities in resources, power and rights structure the character of the rules and norms of association between women and between women and men. Structural inequalities are thus enforced through associational forms that promote male dominance in the public sphere and relegate women to the domestic realm. The issue however is not a simple dichotomy between male oppressors and oppressed women as it entails a multilayered relationship in which different women and men at different times and in different classes have varying power, control and status. Women have agency and there are some who have revolted against the gender order and forced their way into influential positions at local level. Some women on A2 farms because of their class are accessing more resources and better services than A1 men.

Gender alone cannot explain the variances in people's experience of resettlement. Class is a crucial aspect to understand the politics of belonging in Zimbabwe's agrarian landscape. Class is an important determinant in the inclusion of people in particular networks or their exclusion, thereby providing differential access to a wide array of services. A1 and A2 schemes are structured in such a way that there are distinct class differences and varying expectations between classes. One example is how traditional rules and authority are only enforced upon A1 farmers and not A2 farmers. A2 farmers have in many ways replaced white farmers and Zimbabwe's dual agrarian system has continued, albeit now based on class rather than race. A2 farmers through syndicates or 'round table' arrangements have devised ways to increase productive capacities.

With most A2 farmers being politically connected and having access to resources especially in certain years (around 2006-2007) when the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe became an 'agrarian institution', they were able to amass equipment and machinery, most notably tractors and combine harvesters. They had access to cheap fuel and inputs with most A1 farmers in Mazowe complaining that 'mashefu' (big men) were getting inputs and fuel. On the farms I researched the A1 farmers received fuel or inputs rarely and they were not amused by the alleged favouritism shown to A2 farmers. A1 farmers have their own networks, which unfortunately do not afford them the chance to access resources at district, provincial or national level. The advantages of being A2 farmers were also evident at settlement especially on farms where both A1 and A2 plots existed. At farms such as Davaar and Arda, A2 farmers took over all the equipment including farm houses and tobacco barns. A1 farmers were left to invest in equipment and housing when in fact they were the poorer class. Sharing of equipment was based on class lines and A1 farmers were mainly losers.

Class is thus a form of social capital in that it leads to the inclusion and exclusion of groups. Another distinct class cleavage emerging on the fast track farms is between A1 farmers and farm workers. In Mazowe, farm workers were mostly left in their compound homes though there are cases of displaced workers whose houses were burnt down by new farmers. Farm workers were in large losers in the land reform process in that their lack of citizenship (often being born of foreign migrants) ensured that they could not qualify to access land. The programme however empowered them to negotiate for the price of their labour unlike when they still worked for white farmers. Under the governance of the white farmer and his wife, workers suffered from low pay and poor conditions without

representation of complaints. With the new farmers, workers now can decide not to work and withhold their labour if the price is not right. They can choose who to work for and when to work. This is the source of conflict with new farmers who feel that if the farm labourers are not willing to work for them, then they should leave the compounds so that the farmers can find their own workers. Farmers complain that labour has become prohibitively expensive. Writers such as Arrighi (1973) and Van Onslen (1976) have shown that white colonial settler agriculture was partly successful in then Rhodesia because of the presence of a cheap, abundant labour force. It will be interesting to see how this labour conflict evolves over time in Mazowe.

Farm workers are viewed by A1 farmers as people without morals who because of their promiscuity are causing the spread of HIV. Such allegations are highly subjective and highlight a deep seated antagonism between the two groups especially with suspicions that workers were supporting white farmers during the occupations. The lack of citizenship by most workers is problematic in that the state has left them at the margins of agrarian society. This story however is not true in all cases as some farm workers have managed to create space for themselves. One such example is at Trulough Farm where a farm worker was able to get equipment from the white farmer. When the new farmers arrived, he managed to convince them that he had bought all the equipment which now belonged to him. Using this equipment, the farm worker has managed to create various networks and even ‘own’ pieces of land demarcated for him by some plot holders. Other farm labourers have managed to access land through farm worker plots which are strips of land under two hectares given to workers with a particular skill such as irrigation required by the A1 farmers. Skill thus became an important bargaining chip for farm workers to access certain networks and even land.

This issue of using skill to access land has a gender dimension to it because it is only male workers who possess such skills. Female workers have not been able to access land. These women are largely despised by women among the new inhabitants who accuse them of stealing their husbands especially during marketing seasons. Informal discussions with female farm workers at Ballyhooly Farm painted an interesting picture in which by day farmers are accusing workers for being immoral but by night the A1 husbands are busy visiting women in the compounds. Female farm workers face the double barrel of class and gender exclusion which intersect to leave them vulnerable to many forms of abuse and

violence. Their social position excludes them from important networks which can improve their livelihoods. In other words they do not possess the necessary social, political or economic capital to ensure access to land or services. Such issues have led to friction between these two classes and, in going forward, there needs to be finality to the plight of farm workers because they cannot remain indefinitely in their compounds when farmers are eagerly advocating for their removal.

8.3.4 Farm level institutions as forms of agency

Post-structuralist approaches emerged from political science and anthropology. Combining legal pluralist thinking with the post-structuralist literature on power and popular resistance, post-structuralists identify informal institutions with all unofficial forms of ordering, including social networks, cultural values, corruption and coping strategies (Bayart et al. 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Lund 2007). Examining informal institutions as mechanisms of agency rather than non-state structures, post-structuralists highlight the competing, contesting, and sometimes contradictory orders outside formal institutions, in which power and public authority are viewed as products of continuous struggle and negotiation (Meagher 2007:410). Farm level institutions understood in this way highlight how fast track farmers are actively involved in creating and recreating their life situations. It is through various forms of agency that fast track farmers have responded to the failure of the state to offer security and provision of services. In this way creating institutions can be viewed as rational actions towards creating social capital which assists in farm cohesion, service delivery and tackling challenges faced by farmers.

This type of agency is influenced by and influences the wider socio-political context. With this approach farmers are not viewed as victims of a merciless structure that has dumped them on the farms with no support, but as active actors who are constantly recreating their life conditions. Farmers in Mazowe are involved in various processes such as school development associations and health committees to meet actual needs through coming together and contributing to their own well being. Institutions within the rural landscape are nothing but never ending series of contestations. Such contestations make these institutions fluid and they are always changing. Agency occurs within and in response to specific structures which shape the kind and nature of individual actions. Thus farmers tend to choose options which create space for manoeuvring without antagonising the political structure dominant in the newly resettled to avoid eviction. The government and precisely the state

president are never criticised openly and any form of dissent is not allowed. Elections have however shown that in the voting booths the ruling party has little control over people's choices as the MDC has done reasonably well in Mazowe.

8.4 Contribution to understanding of rural institutional formations

In this section I outline how this thesis offers a different and novel understanding of the formation, taxonomy, internal dynamics and efficacy of rural institutional formations in emergent communities. The study of farm level institutions provided a grounded understanding of social organisation in communities made up of people from diverse backgrounds and borne out of a process (*jambanja* and fast track land reform) characterised by controversy and confusion. In the discussion below I outline various processes that were identified from my field work in Mazowe as they relate to farm level institutions.

8.4.1 Sociological analysis of farm level institutions

In large part I seek to broaden the understanding of farm level institution through a sociological analysis of how such formations come into existence. Moyo (2002:5) argues that the study of politics of rural social mobilization through a more broadly based conception of the social basis of rural institutions has tended to be neglected in academic literature as most studies focus on the economic and functionalist aspects of these organisations. The social class and sociological categories that define the emergence of rural civil society and the socio-political roots of their advocacy are ignored. The social base of any institutional formation can be traced through the type of organisations formed, their origins, membership, and key functions. The case studies in Mazowe show that these organisations originate in varied ways; for example, some grew out of traditional survival institutions of mutual self help or were initiated by charismatic leaders, while others responded to certain challenges facing new farmers such as marketing or production. In the following discussion I outline some of the processes involved in social formation and offer a description of farm level institutions.

Douglas (1986:74) develops two complementary concepts that can help in understanding the social origins of institutions, namely, leakage of meaning and institutional bricolage. Institutional bricolage refers to how mechanisms for resource management and collective action are borrowed or constructed from existing institutions and styles of thinking as sanctioned by social relationships. For example irrigation committees at Usk are based on

ideas of cooperatives that farmers had from their areas of origin, as well as long-standing relations of mutual trust and feelings of *ubuntu*⁶¹. Leakage of meaning happens for instance when the institution of *sabhuku*/headman (which is a traditional system) is adopted and changed to fit into a modern-day or new context. Traditionally *sabhuku* is a hereditary leadership at village level as legislated in the Traditional Leaders Act (1999). However, in the newly resettled areas the system is based on patronage of the paramount chief who can choose (or remove) a headman at will. The title is not hereditary and not legally recognised.

The mobilization behind farm level associations, as well as memberships of (for instance) burial societies and religious fraternities in Mazowe, are often based on claims of common identity, and the organizations' everyday activities become expressed in terms of this common identity. These identities are not only based on kinship or blood relations but also on class, gender, geographical space and same life experiences. These are potent markers that bring people together to form a collective conscience. For example fast track farmers might face similar productive challenges which become a shared lived experience. To combat this challenge they organise into commodity associations or production units. Scoones et al (2010:210) note that, in the period from 2000 to 2009, both the capacity and legitimacy of the state collapsed as key committees and operations were taken over by war veterans and party cadres. This gave emergence to overlapping, blurred and often conflictive axes of power at farm level. The concern of this thesis is on these axes of power which were generated in large part internally at farm level and occupy an intermediary position, which is outside and yet in many ways supportive of the existence of the state.

Scoones et al. (2010) note that the creative solutions generated by the necessity of solidarity, organisation and building a sense of community have emerged on the margins of state action and practice. These however are also in turn shaping how the state is being reconstructed. We begin to note how uneven power relations construct new types of public authority and institutional forms in which exclusion and inclusion are based on variable factors. There are hybrid visions and complex forms of governance operating within the resettlement areas (Scoones et al. 2010). Peters (2004: 304) however cautions that we must accept that not only are relations around land socially embedded but that they are embedded in unequal social relationships.' Thus the hybrid and negotiated nature of emerging social relations around land

⁶¹ In a focus group at Usk participants actually used the term *ubuntu* to describe how they relate to each other. This means that they are united as Africans and show kindness to each other.

reveal major conflicts between classes, genders and generations. Power and authority is channeled in particular ways: by the technocratic state, by political elites, by chiefs and lineages and by gendered relations, among others. The evolving institutional terrain in the new resettlement areas is therefore characterised by diverse forms of organisation and diffuse, disconnected and often arbitrary forms of authority (Scoones et al. 2010).

Veltmeyer (1997:140) argues that the multiplicity of rural institutions reflects the postmodern search for multiple identities among farmers who face radical differentiation. Social isolation from kin that comes with moving into the fast track farms leaves farmers vulnerable and without a safety net. There is need for them to have multiple identities through different institutions that offer a promise of security in times of trouble. Fast track farms were new frontiers fraught with uncertainties especially for farmers in the A1 schemes. The new farmers had to devise manifold strategies to survive an unfamiliar environment without support of kin. A single farm has a plethora of institutions, all catering for different needs. For example Usk has seven different FLIs and farmers belong to numerous institutions. The validity of this claim though is open to debate given the apparent social cleavages and identities that are being reproduced and reinforced around class and gender exclusiveness (Moyo 2002:6).

8.4.2 Factors affecting formation and composition of FLIs

The diverse processes involved in the formation of FLIs pose a very critical question around issues of group formation in new communities. The underlying question is: why are there differences in the nature, activities, relationships and internal dynamics in farm institutions? The pronounced differences from institutions to institutions and farm to farm indicate that there are context specific factors that impact on the character of groups. Some of the factors include the process of getting land and settlement, the geographical location of farms and the nature of leadership (as discussed in this section).

8.4.2.1 Process of getting land and settlement

Firstly, there are a number of ways used to access land on the six farms covered. The majority of the people got land through formal application by various channels (such as District Administrator (DA), councillor, Ministry of Lands or president's office) but plots were ultimately given by the District Lands Committee. Few people on the six farms I studied were involved in the farm occupations; for example seven out of thirty three at Davaar Farm, eight out of forty one at Hamilton and ten out of fifty nine at Usk. How people got settled

affects associational life in that people with prior relationships like those who were involved in the farm occupations together tend to have more trust. This is because of a shared past in the land occupations; unlike people who received land through application and who often only get to know each other at settlement. What is interesting is that most of the farmers who were involved in land occupations were not settled on the farms they occupied. This is because some of the farms were considered strategic and became A2 farms (thus those who occupied together were in some cases separated and settled on different farms). New farmers regularly had little shared history or experiences besides being of the same nationality. At Hariana Farm, interviews with farmers showed that those who were involved in the farm occupations were more likely to trust each other and became involved in revolving-funds groups or lending each other money. As one farmer at Hamilton⁶² noted, ‘People you knew during *jambanja* are more trustworthy.’ With farmers that only met when they were picking out plots, trust will take time to build. Social capital is thus stronger amongst people who settled at the same time.

Another interesting factor is that farmers settled at different times. At Hamilton Farm at first there were only eighteen settlers, but the number increased to thirty four in 2004 and to forty one in 2005 as more people were given offer letters. Associational life is stronger amongst people who settled at the same time. Earlier settlers have had more time to know each other and social networks have emerged as they have interacted. The same is true for people settling later, who all felt as outsiders at first – they hence were drawn to each other especially if they felt outright hostility from farmers that are already settled. At Hamilton there are two youthful farmers who settled later and are perceived by most farmers to have received land because of favouritism. The male youth plot holder is the son of the late DA and the female youth works for the current DA. It is these interpersonal relations (often characterised by subtle forms of hostility) that impact how and if any farm level groups succeed. Farmers tend to overlook conflicts when the benefits of coming together outweigh the costs. A farmer cannot provide social amenities by him or herself; neither can he or she afford to transport goods to the market alone. It is only through investing in collective action with other farmers that all this is possible.

⁶² Key informant interview: Hamilton Farm, 18th July 2009.

8.4.2.2 Geographical location

Geographic location affects associational life and institutionalisation in diverse ways. In one instance the mere fact that a farm is located in a place faraway from basic social amenities such as schools or clinics and away from major roads and markets can lead to people coming together to help each other. In such circumstances, farmers find positive motivation for coming together as a community and assisting each other. Farms that are in remote areas thus force farmers to create networks for mutual support. Circumstances in which farmers are isolated from markets and services require collective action in a variety of forms. For example remote areas usually have bad roads thus transport is a big problem to and from town centres where markets are located. To alleviate the cost and problems of transporting produce farmers join together to hire trucks. In some cases where accessing government fuel required constant trips to urban centres like Glendale, those on remote farms could not all travel every day so they would put money together and send a representative for collecting fuel. In this way remote geographic location can be a positive factor in building collective action.

When you look at marketing and geographic location, Hariana Farm offers a good example for different crops. The farm is near to Mvurwi Township where there is a depot for maize, and because of this farmers find their own transportation to the market. There is no collective action or institutional arrangements. Yet when it comes to marketing tobacco which is sent to the auction floors in Harare, it is impossible for a single farmer to transport tobacco from their own produce which is usually only a small number of bales. This is when farmers come together and hire a truck that takes their combined tobacco crop to the market. Being in remote areas however does impact negatively on some forms of collective action. Remote areas are physically and economically isolated. Institutions formed by farmers that focus on lobbying various authorities and service providers tend to slowly decay because of lack of access to these people. The groups are rarely successful and most farmers cannot afford to pay any fees to help leaders move around advocating on their behalf. On remote farms, any investment in social capital or networks occurs when there is a direct benefit to the household such as in marketing products. Being near a highway or urban centre can also be adverse to institutional formation. Farms that are near urban centres have access to social services such as schools and clinics. This means that they are not interested in investing in such services on the farms since they can easily access them off-farm. A good example is at Hariana School

where the parents on the farm do not have children at the school thus they tend to vandalise and steal materials from the school.

8.4.2.3 Charismatic and influential leadership

Another factor that influences the creation of farm level institutions is the presence of charismatic or influential leaders. Influence in this case means a person with a certain level of political clout or connections, who is able to rally people around him/her. Associational life on the farm revolves around this person who has many contacts outside the farm. These contacts are not always important for farming but they give such a person the appearance of being well connected. The person usually has a certain level of education, wealth or political career behind him/her. One old man⁶³ told me however that such people appear wiser than everyone else and want to dominate the rest of the group. He described such people as *_yanhu ivavo vakangongwarandunuka. Vanonyebedzera kungwara zvenhema'* (Such people are just street wise and want to appear as if they know everything). In the field I came across many such characters who become opinion leaders. They are skilled at mobilising others into action. Such characters are always initiating new schemes or plans (sometimes without support from farmers but always with their attention).

8.4.3 Contradictions of shared and unshared interests

A1 farmers in Mazowe are not a singular, homogenous group. They are aged, classed and gendered; belong to different religious, social, political and ethnic groupings; and come from diverse backgrounds. Besides this diverse group of farmers, communities on fast track farms include women, men, children, former farm workers, new farm workers and government employees. John (1998) drawing from Tilly (1978) notes that mobilization theory focuses on the social processes of collective action. Notably, this involves how interests come to be defined as common or oppositional, the processes by which groups gain the capacity to act collectively, and the organization and opportunity requirements for collective action (Mapuva 2011:2). Using this theory, it is clear that A1 farmers are yet to gain the capacity to act collectively. An important distinction that arises from Marxist literature is the difference between a *_klasse an sich'* or class in itself, and a *_klasse für sich'* or class for itself⁶⁴. Briefly, a class in itself is a class defined solely by its position in the relations of production. In this case A1 farmers constitute a class in itself simply because of each individual's lack of access

⁶³ Key informant interview: Davaar Farm 15th June 2010.

⁶⁴ <http://interconnected.org/matt/archive/james/Class.html>

to capital and machinery, as well as support services and social services. In order for the A1 farmers to become a class for itself, there must also exist class consciousness, by the consciousness of common interests and by the psychological bond that arises out of common class antagonisms' (Ossowski 1963:70).

The fact that we have uncoordinated and competing A1 institutional forms is cause for concern for collective action. As noted in Mazowe, over one hundred A1 schemes have over one hundred different irrigation committees all advocating around the same assets. The needs and challenges of A1 farmers are similar yet they remain divided and act in isolation. There are no structures at the moment to bridge the divide between neighbouring farmers (across farms) that see themselves as different entities and not part of the same class. Collective action amongst white farmers and A2 farmers to some extent is aided by having areas to meet and discuss such as club houses. The organisation of A1 farmers can be difficult at the moment given the strong grip that ZANU-PF maintains in the area. Any form of association deemed to be anti-party is not tolerated in Mazowe and the government prefers a divided A1 class because their numbers are enough to cause serious problems if organised.

When analyzing relations at farm level we should avoid viewing them in terms of conflict or collaboration. This simplistic view hides the different layers of relations that are not easily visible to an outsider. Relations are not always easy to define as there are always layers and different facets to relationships. Sithole (2000) describes how despite obvious tensions between the government and communities over use of contested resources, actual practice exposes some underlying relations which show that (for the most part) the two stakeholders accommodate each other's interests. Stakeholders pursue a variety of competing objectives and in doing so they engage in a number of power plays and enter into complex and shifting relations with each other at different moments in time, ranging from alliances or collaboration at one end of the spectrum, to wary neutrality or relative indifference, and to outright hostility and confrontation at the other end (Kepe 1997). Interests between and amongst groups are constantly converging and diverging thus alliances and networks are continuously being shaped and reshaped.

8.5 Contributions to empirical understanding of newly resettled communities

In the introduction to this thesis I argued that there is a lacuna in the current literature on the lived experiences of fast track farmers – the literature lacks a clear articulation of the human

condition on the farms in Zimbabwe. There exists a wide range of superfluous arguments concentrating on macro-level debates on the Zimbabwean state, or debates on whether the land reform programme was a success or not. In this section I outline how my thesis contributes to the understanding of communities that have emerged on the formerly white owned commercial farms in Zimbabwe after 2000.

8.5.1 Internal characteristics of FLIs: Permanent or transitory?

In this discussion I analyse the internal dynamics of farm level institutions with an emphasis on whether they are sustainable institutional formations which can drive the agrarian vision of new farmers. Generally FLIs in Mazowe are internally weak and lack leadership with a clear vision; they appear as if they are transitory in nature. Social organisations such as women's clubs appear more permanent as they will always operate if there are women. Other institutions such as health committees might cease to exist if the state was to provide adequate health care. The lack of capacity in most groupings stems from a lack of any form of training or experience in administration among members. For those which appear to have any significant organisational capacity this has mainly been through external help. Home based care committees are the best example where external partners play several critical capacity building roles such as helping access to resources and investing in human and administrative resources. In Mazowe, Howard Hospital trains and builds the capacity of care-givers and provides resources such as food and gloves. This external help improves the sustainability of such projects through various forms of support.

From this experience the debate on whether external help is required to help build capacity of farm level institutions takes different dimensions. It is clear that without outside assistance in human and financial resources most institutions will die a natural death; however several questions need probing. The most important is whether access to A1 farms is desirable to political actors who have historically viewed them as their strongholds. On whose terms will the engagement with fast track farmers happen? The second question is whether non-governmental external actors who appear to have resources are willing to work on fast track farms given their widespread condemnation of the process of land reform. How plausible is it that non-governmental organisations can work in areas that were borne out of a process condemned by their donors? Thirdly, is external support which does not respect local experiences, customs and knowledge desirable? External actors have greater impact on capacity when they sustain longstanding relationships of partnership with communities, and

where – on the basis of nuanced knowledge of local conditions – they are able to adapt capacity building measures accordingly and go beyond any simple preconceptions about the form that local organizations ought to take.

Connected to this is the fact that local farmer groups remain marginalised from national and global processes. Their associations lack critical connections to policy makers at all levels thus are not involved in making decisions that affect their lives. This isolation from critical networks means that A1 farmers remain voiceless and unable to have their interests addressed. Whilst the poor help each other, their networks remain at the periphery of policy and decision making. These networks remain survivalist in nature and rarely lead to wealth creation or upward mobility. They do not give farmers access to credit or contacts that can help in accessing various support services. In most cases these networks do not go past the farm level and their impact on agricultural development is negligible (though they are important for the livelihoods and survival of farmers). In a global world where access to markets and products is mediated by communication and technological networks, A1 farmers in Mazowe have been left behind. This has meant that institutions at farm level are mainly preoccupied with the micro politics of survival without a grand agrarian plan.

Farm level institutions are multifaceted in nature catering for a wide variety of interests. They are age, gender and class based with varying degrees of influence. Evidence from Mazowe provides a nuanced understanding of the various latent and manifest functions of farm level institutions. These institutions have in some cases become important signifiers of meaning and belonging of A1 farmers. The multiplicity of institutions highlights the fluid nature of farmer identities as they struggle to meet different needs. In one instance they are resource poor and A1 farmers come together to help each other. In another instance they are brought together by political influences at meetings and events to affirm their affiliation to the political party which gave them land. At times they are in various networks based on identities such as gender. These fluid rationales highlight the agency of farmers in constantly changing into different selves in an attempt to ensure they access services and goods.

Macro-economic challenges in Zimbabwe that followed the Fast Track Land Reform Programme impacted on the nature, structure and dynamics of farm level institutions. Shortages of cash, food, fuel and basic commodities impacted heavily on people especially A1 farmers who had the burden of investing in moving and settling in new places. An

investment in an initial form of housing, land clearance and planting required money that simply was not readily available. Institutionalisation became one important livelihood strategy through which farmers tried to access scarce resources. Through various forms of help networks, such as revolving funds or input groups, farmers struggled to provide for their households. However the macro-economic conditions were not conducive for informal institutions because they were resource poor. Advocacy and sourcing for assistance from government and non-state actors requires money for travelling (which at the height of cash shortages in 2007-2008) was not available. Many institutions which required cash payments to join were left with a few members as farmers found it almost impossible to get cash. In places where farmers combined their money to fix farm assets such boreholes, it became a struggle to have such cooperative projects. The economic crisis therefore financially incapacitated farm level institutions which existed more as social gatherings where people received moral support and affirmation in difficult times.

8.5.2 New forms of traditional governance

The fast track farms saw the emergence of a new form of quasi traditional leadership based on the patronage of the chiefs in Mazowe. What is interesting is that in the first resettlement areas (in the 1980s) the government excluded traditional authorities in the administration of the villages choosing instead to employ resettlement officers. The logic then was that resettlement areas were commercially-oriented and different to communal areas. Under the fast track programme, traditional authorities offered the simplest and cheapest way of administration, maintenance and order as their existence did not require any significant investment from a government that did not have the funds or capacity. The village head or *sabhuku* is the authority at farm level and reports to the chief who selected him from among all the plot holders on the farm. The chief usually decides on people who they knew before settlement, who are mainly from Mazowe and have knowledge of local customs. The same chief is the only one who can remove or replace this village head even if the people are not satisfied by him/her. This new type of traditional position cannot be inherited like positions in the communal areas. Once the village head dies, the chief will appoint someone to replace the deceased. There is only a resemblance of traditionality and in truth it is nothing but an imposition of leaders on the people. Such leaders are chosen to ensure that certain agendas are pushed and new farmers keep their allegiances to certain power bases including the chiefs. It also ensures that values and customs of the land are maintained.

The new traditionalism however points towards the communalisation of A1 fast track farms. Imposition of communal structures in spaces that have been under commercial white agriculture for over a century provides many contestations on the meaning and purpose of resettlement. A1 farmers came onto the farms with grand plans of emulating the success of white farmers and making money out of agriculture. What pertains now is a process of creating a new peasantry geared towards production for household consumption, as evidenced by the lack of support to A1 farmers. A1 farmers are under communal rules of production and work such as *chisi*, yet many see themselves as small-scale commercial farmers. In discussions with farmers over five years, I notice that they try to differentiate themselves from communal farmers, arguing that they are on the land to produce for the nation. The state has responded with treating them similar to communal farmers under the jurisdiction of some kind of traditional structure. I am not trying to argue that traditional systems impede commercial production in any way; my argument is solely that there seems to be a dissonance between government policy of communalising A1 farms and the farmers' hopes of commercial enterprise.

Villagisation is part of this process which sees farmers lose of freedom in choosing where to site their homesteads on the land. Most A1 farms have villages in which every family was given two acres to build homesteads; the government claimed that this would make it easier for the state to provide services. A more clandestine purpose was to ensure easy surveillance of people and coordinate party meetings. The majority of villagers want to be autonomous, living on their plots. Some were complaining of the gossip and social conflicts of living in the villages. Others noted that they needed to be near their fields to safeguard them against thieves. The imposition of a clear distinction and demarcations between fields and residential areas shows that state technocracy had usurped power from the movements that led the farm occupations.

8.5.3 From Committee of Seven to Village Development Committees: Institutions for social transformation?

Of particular interest to this research was the question of whether farm level institutions are a viable alternative for social transformation on fast track farms. Are these novel grassroots organisations best placed to ensure service delivery to people or they are fraught with internal weaknesses which make them unfit? For example we can question the long-term mandate of committees of seven: are they viable community development organisations or are they part

of an infrastructure for rural violence and intimidation? In the long run they are to become village development committees in the mould of VIDCOs in the communal areas yet the needs of resettled farmers and their context is different. There is little discussion around how they are to operate or what will happen to the institution of the *sabhuku* which is basically under the patronage of traditional chiefs. There is no simple answer as to whether FLIs can be more responsive than the state or other non-state actors in addressing and actioning the needs of farmers. What is crucial is that they are mostly based on a participatory ethos albeit excluding marginalised group such as youths, women and to a greater extent farm workers.

The widespread accusations that most FLIs are subservient to ZANU-PF are difficult to argue with given that party slogans are retorted at most meetings. The party has tried to ensure that it maintains its stronghold over the fast track farms. Committees of Seven have served clandestinely as surveillance agents, ensuring that all people affirm support for the party (at least overtly). Dissent from the party line is not allowed and any institutional formation should not be seen as opposing ZANU-PF. This has meant that FLIs are rarely openly confrontational and they seldom openly oppose government policies. In a bid to maintain control in these farms ZANU-PF has maintained cell structures at the grassroots level which are powerful. The party also retains key people within farm committees who openly advocate for the party's interest. It is debatable whether this implies that these structures are politicised or not. What is clear however is the undeniable influence of the party at farm level.

FLIs as such are the forefront of the microeconomics of survival among rural farmers. They are survivalist in nature and form which requires a major shift in focus if they are to be involved in developmental work. The internal capacity of most institutions remains a major concern in terms of efficacy in service provision. The Committee of Seven where the *sabhuku* is the overall head presents fundamental problems. This quasi-traditional position is chosen and answerable to a chief and not the farmers. The criterion for choosing a person to this position is not clear and the mandate of the headman remains vague. If the Committee of Seven is to play any crucial role in the development of farm communities there is need to ensure that its leadership derives a mandate from the people and not traditional authorities. It is not clear whether there could be space for another developmental structure separate from the Committee of Seven. At Usk they have such a parallel development committee with a mandate to forge ahead with development issues in the village. The committee works in tandem with the committee of seven but remains independent. It has different members which

were voted in by the farmers. They are the voice of the farm to the outside world. Their main task is to lobby various line ministries, departments and non-governmental organizations on how they can contribute to the development of the farm.

8.6 Conclusion

Novel forms of social organisation in emergent communities are fluid and respond to a wide variety of needs. They form a part of the survivalhoods employed by new farmers at the height of Zimbabwe's economic meltdown. The question is whether these institutional forms can be vehicles for social development and service delivery in A1 farms. This research has shown that capacity building will be required to build the internal strength of these organisations. While farm level institutions are a form of agency from the grassroots, they may also entrench class and gender inequalities. Social capital was shown to be a mechanism by which inequalities are reproduced. Institutions at farm level are highly exclusive as farm workers have been left out and deemed non-citizens. The research also highlighted that A1 farmers remain divided and contained within their farms with little collective action at district level. Ultimately farm level institutions will continue to evolve as farmers create and recreate associations and networks in their everyday interaction. This chapter has outlined the three original contributions this thesis makes to academia: contributions to empirical literature on fast track farms; contributions to the understanding of rural formations in emergent communities; and contributions to debates on social capital.

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APPENDIX 1: LAND AND LIVELIHOODS STUDY IN MAZOWE

Introduction

In this appendix I provide an overview of the Mazowe Land and Livelihoods Study, which this thesis used significantly⁶⁵. Though the study was not conducted specifically for my thesis, I was part of the research team and (for thesis purposes) I drew in the main on the raw data collected. The survey in 2007 provided baseline information on the new farms in Mazowe. The land reform programme began in 2000 in Zimbabwe and was national in character. The study team, of which I was a member, started its preliminary work in 2003/4. As a team, we sought to assess how the fast track process was unfolding in Mazowe District and to interpret the meaning of the outcomes. This included themes such as: the evolution of new farming systems; the exacerbation of rural differentiation and poverty; the local politics of land access and management; the rules that were used to resolve and manage farm-level conflicts; and the formal and informal administrative practices that were emerging in new resettlement areas.

The research programme

The FTLRP in Zimbabwe transformed rural livelihoods and social relationships in fundamental ways. Understanding these dynamic and fluid processes at farm level in Mazowe required that we employ rigorous as well as nuanced methodologies in the fieldwork. Different social, economic and political circumstances in Mazowe led to diverse approaches to our fieldwork, guided by both participatory and quantitative research approaches. The Land and Livelihoods Programme instituted a two-phased data collection strategy based on a common survey.

The first baseline survey was carried out in a 2004 household survey covering Mazowe. In 2004, the study was about quickly learning what had happened on the fast track farms, hence most attention was focused on getting quantitative data on many of the aspects noted above. In completing this work there was a range of outstanding issues on the substantive meaning of the fast track changes, resulting in designing a deeper household survey in 2007. The 2007

⁶⁵ This appendix summarises the methodology outlined in Matondi (ed.) 2011. The Mazowe Land and Livelihoods Study was conducted by Matondi's research institute, and I was involved in the research.

household survey centred around understanding the types of communities emerging on the farms, and how this relates to the possibilities of long-term agricultural development. While the first studies in 2004/05 were largely exploratory, the 2007 studies offered a stronger basis for more explanatory work. Given the vastness of our study, we had to employ triangulation of the various methodologies to determine how the transfer of land affects the livelihood options of the people settled on the land.

National patterns and the field study sites

National patterns

The research team commenced its work in 2003 by first establishing the national processes and relating this to local processes, after making a decision to focus on Mashonaland Central (and specifically Mazowe). This stage of fast track (including land acquisition and allocation) was of paramount importance; hence, through participation in different research processes such as the Parliament of Zimbabwe Land Audit (2002) and the Presidential Land Review Committee (2002-2003), the members of the research team obtained a good grasp of the national processes. One of our key activities was to track the media-generated stories on a range of thematic issues (such as acquisition, allocation, production, conflicts, gender issues, farmworkers and estate acquisition). The storylines during that time demonstrated to us the need to understand better what was happening at the local level.

The research sites

A range of factors influenced the selection of the study sites in 2004 and 2007. In 2004, a strategic decision was made to choose a site that was accessible to the researchers. Mazowe (close to Harare) was chosen on the basis of for instance: a) its track record in agricultural production and production mix (diversity in cropping, livestock, and wildlife); b) the natural conditions favourable to agriculture; and c) contests over accessing land by various people (rural and urban) in terms of class and gender.

Research programme process

Research approval

Research on land reform at a time when land redistribution was happening, particularly given the ongoing political conflict, was not an easy process. Given the political sensitivities of land reform, the research group commenced by building rapport with the Rural District Council (Mazowe) on the research programme. The research co-ordinator presented the rationale of

the research to the council, how it would be done and what would be shared with the councils. Given that rural councils are made up of politicians (councillors) located on the ground in the various wards, it became easier to access people in the fast track farms. We also required trust from provincial and local authorities to ensure that our field work went on without any significant challenges. The research activities in Mazowe were approved by the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation Development and Mechanisation (which was also combined with Land Affairs before the formation of the inclusive national government). In addition, the research team applied to the offices of the provincial governor and resident minister of Mashonaland Central, where letters of approval were granted and conditions for the research were spelt out.

Testing of instruments and revisions

All the instruments used during the research were tested and revised when necessary. In 2004, the testing was done in April during the enumerator training at Concession Country Club. In 2007, the testing and revision of research instruments was conducted on 3rd and 4th of March 2007 at Glendale Country Club. These sessions also involved training and familiarising enumerators on the different research instruments. Pre-testing of the questionnaire was done with farmers at specific farms, along with focus group discussions with men and women separately. This was followed by a debriefing exercise in which research instruments were revised to include new issues that emerged out of the pre-testing exercises.

What to research: variable choices

The research in Mazowe (and Mangwe) sought to arrive at a deeper understanding of the dynamic and complex communities that are emerging from the land reform programme. This then influenced the variable choices based on key assumptions we had developed about the programme. The assumption was that significant agrarian transformation had taken place on the fast track farms. This led to examining the variables as outlined in Table 10.

Table 10: Key variables and variation between the 2004 and 2007 surveys

Thematic Area	2004 survey	2007 variable variation
1. Background	Size, farming enterprises, area, type of soil and geographic location	Same issues
2. History	Previous owner of farm and production patterns	None (as covered in 2004)
3. Land acquisition	Procedures, methods and mechanisms	None (covered in 2004)
4. Land allocation	Who got land by age, gender, area of origin and institutions responsible for land allocation	Same issues
5. Tenure	Type and nature of land rights	In-depth case studies on rights, inheritance, tenure preferred
6. Land use and production	Irrigation, commercial water management, livestock, crop production	Splitting of water for domestic use and agricultural use
7. Agricultural production support	Extension, information, knowledge, inputs	Same issues, but with less emphasis on human resources in government
8. Marketing	None	Intensive marketing survey
9. Natural resources management	Use, management, rules, availability	Use and management of natural resources, connecting tenure to resource stewardship
10. Investments	Type (movable or non movable), Investments by farmers, government, council or private companies	Detailed investment survey, asset building, investments costing
11. Gender	Access to land, resources, credit for women, Split households, Roles and activities of men and women	Better disaggregation of gender
12. Social issues	None	Relationships, migration, use of farm houses
13. Social services	Secondary survey (based on district data held in government and other service providers)	Education, health, HIV and AIDs, housing, domestic energy, domestic water, communication (telephones, cellphones, transport), farm houses
14. Institutions and land administration	Institutional matrix, types of land administration	Covered in case studies

The data generated based on these variables enabled us to have a solid understanding of the characteristics of A1 and A2 farmers. In addition, we used different questioning angles to probe further details on production patterns (area, yields and outputs), production support (inputs, labour, and skills), land tenure issues, marketing and irrigation. In order to full grasp production activities, we used qualitative approaches (focused group discussions, narratives and key informant interviews) to decipher and elaborate upon the meanings of quantitative statistics. Other primary data in the form of statistical reports, minutes of meetings, feedback meetings, attendance at agricultural field shows and stakeholders' meetings enabled us to

undertake a more thorough interpretation and analysis of agricultural production patterns and trends.

Quantitative data collection methods

Quantitative data collection methods included the following:

Plotholder questionnaire survey

2004 survey

During the 2004 survey in Mazowe we covered 13 A1 farms (9.7% of the total number in the district) and 21 A2 farms (10% of the total). Of 4,963 A1 beneficiaries, 240 (5%) were interviewed using a household questionnaire. Given the large numbers of resettled farmers in Mazowe, the household questionnaire sample (see Table 11) represents various types of farmers by ward, geographical location, age, gender, and farming enterprise.

Table 11: Sampling frame

Sampling	2004 – General Survey		2004 – Production Survey		2007 – General Survey	
	A1	A2	A1	A2	A1	A2
Farms (schemes)	137	211	137	211	205	233
Sample	13	21	25	35	21	20
% coverage	9.7	10	18.24	16.58	20	16.3
Beneficiaries	4963	1054	4963	1054	4963	1064
Sample	240	120	264	175	357	172
% coverage	4.84	11.39	5.31	16.6	24	8

Mazowe - Area: 453,892 hectares; **Population:** 199,408; **Farms:** 367

2007 survey

With the 2007 household questionnaire in Mazowe, we managed to cover 21 (21%) of the 105 A1 farms on which there were 4,963 farmers, of which we interviewed 357 (7.2%). We tried to cover most of the same farms as in the 2004 study to allow for a long-term comparison, but we also had new farms and respondents in 2007. The data however still contributes to a valuable long-term understanding of changing dynamics in the fast track farming areas of Mazowe. We also managed to cover 20 (8.5%) of the A2 farms and 172 (16.3%) of the A2 farmers. In Mazowe district, of the total sampled farms, 17 farms (7 A1 and 10 A2) were covered by both the surveys done in 2004 and 2007.

Qualitative data collection approaches

The research work in Mazowe was a process and not a one-off event. This process approach meant that our work had to be grounded in an everyday understanding of the livelihoods of people living on the fast track farms. We employed research techniques that ensured that the voices of farmers, farm workers, women, men, civil servants, extension workers, and various other actors living and working on the farms were heard. Table 12 outlines the various qualitative methods we used.

Table 12: Summary of qualitative approaches used in 2004 and 2007

Qualitative techniques	Mazowe	
	No of sessions	Total Population reached
1. FGDs	24	313
2. Narratives	54	54
3. Key informant interviews	16	16
4. Opinion leaders	12	12
5. Farmer feedback meetings*	20	500
6. District meetings*	30	5000
7. Field shows attended (plus one district show)*	15	1200
8. Training programme	5	220

Notes: *These involved council meetings, stakeholder meetings, introducing visiting delegations. Figures under 5, 6 and 7 are estimates.

Focus group discussions (FGDs): Much of these were held in 2007. In the FGDs, there were village heads, community members, women, leaders, youths, police, health workers and agricultural extension officers. In general, we found the participants to be very lively and open about various issues. Groups ranged from 20 to sometimes 30 or 40 participants. Selection of participants was difficult as almost all ploholders would show up for the meetings thinking that they would be left out if they did not participate. Women participation was also very high. The discussions allowed community members to air some of their opinions about issues such as land ownership, production, and access to inputs and credit. The FGDs also provided farmworkers to voice their concerns. The discussions were conducted mostly at the A1 farms because of the problem of mobilizing A2 farmers who do not reside on their farms.

Farmer narratives: This allowed us to have a picture of the newly resettled areas from the perspective of people living in the areas. The narratives entailed vivid accounts of people's personal lives, hopes, successes, failures and thoughts about their future. Though the stories

cannot necessarily be generalized, they allowed for an understanding of many underlying feelings of new farmers. Narratives were administered concurrently with the focus group discussions. They were analysed based on criteria developed during the survey instrument field testing.

Key informant interviews: Key informants were very visible in the fast track areas as service providers and government officials working with new farmers. They are part of the processes of social life within the fast track farms and hold valuable information.

Interviews of opinion leaders: Opinion leaders act as agents who transform the ways in which a community thinks about land, governance and livelihoods. It was critical to get as much information as possible from the chief executive officer of the Rural District Council, councillors, farm scheme leaders and agricultural extension officers.

In enhancing the quality of our qualitative research, we did the following:

Farmer feedback meetings: At the beginning of 2009, we started extensive farmer feedback meetings. Facilitators used a pre-made guideline developed from all the reports by the researchers. This guideline captured the ‘key’ issues emerging from the fieldwork. While the research was on fast track farms, we also made a decision to roll out the farmer feedback meetings in Chiweshe communal areas, given the synchronicity of land and agricultural issues. As with the focus group discussions, communal area farmers expressed bitterness over being left out of the resettlement process and lack of government support for their own agriculture.

Regular field meetings: The research team (researchers) held meetings with the field team (enumerators and field supervisors) on a fortnightly basis for the duration of the field activities. The meetings were held in the field so as to interact with and guide the fieldworkers at the district level. The purpose of the joint researcher/field team meetings was to discuss the strategy and logistics of the research and the timeline for various activities. This interaction allowed researchers to tap into the field experiences and knowledge of the field team. At the meetings, the following were comprehensively covered: updates on fieldwork and reports per given period; discussion of research experiences and challenges; updating of national and district level consultation; secondary data collection, and the process of developing the research instruments.

Farmer training: In 2009, we designed a programme for farmer training as part of our contributions to resolving the key challenges we identified through the research. The training offered us an opportunity to go in-depth over a range of issues we had identified, but also opening new research streams. In the training, we involved government (agricultural extension and other departments), the private sector, farmers union and local authority in Mazowe. The training allowed farmers (from 9 out of 29 wards) to directly understand institutions that serve or provide services to them. As researchers, in facilitating the process, we enhanced our understanding of the daily lives of A1 farmers.

Ward and district farmers' field shows: In order to reach the masses of people, our research team decided to invest time and effort in farmer field shows, which starts at the level of the farmer. A selected farmer organises a day at which they showcase their production; they invite others including service providers to celebrate their achievements. The invited participants normally range from fifty people to several hundreds. The farmer field shows are followed by the district show, where most farmers enter competitions. We engaged with these field shows in order to get people's views, structures of interactions, and levels of agricultural organisations at the district level.

Research challenges

Land reform issues are sensitive in Zimbabwe; hence while we were optimistic from the beginning, we realised that there were going to be many hurdles. In the field, resettled people are often concerned about the presence of researchers. In many cases, researchers ask politically sensitive questions, about which respondents are often not comfortable. Often respondents refused to answer questions which might be viewed as incriminating (such as conflicts over tenure). The questionnaire was administered by mostly young people who were each allocated wards from their village of origin. This was done because farmers cooperate more with people they know than with total strangers. This was critical considering the level of political polarization in resettlement areas. The field workers were trained on the administration of the questionnaire and also on recording personnel experiences and observations in the field. They noted the following challenges:

- Some interviewees complained of hunger and asked how this survey was going to assist them. Some respondents accused the enumerators of trying to earn a living through enumerating when they themselves will not benefit from the exercise.

- The anticipation of receiving help from either NGOs or Government after the survey was a challenge.
- The questionnaire was long and sometimes farmers found it to be tedious. In some instances, a respondent would continue doing their daily chores such as gardening while they were being interviewed.
- The field team indicated that they had problems in tracking down A2 farmers because most of them are not resident on their farms.
- Some farmers refused outright to be part of the survey. The main reason given by A1 farmers was that they saw this survey as a government audit.
- There were some farms which were politically inaccessible because the farmers were highly placed political officials. In some cases, we were refused entry to such farms.

Data processing and analysis

Data entry and analysis was done using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). Due to the open-ended nature of the questions in the questionnaire, it was necessary to have a post-coding session before entering the data, ensuring that all responses were entered. Similar responses were grouped together, and it was interesting to note the diversity of the responses that the openended questions managed to generate. Thematic analysis was used to make sense of qualitative data. In our case, themes were identified by bringing together components or fragments of ideas or experiences, which often were meaningless when viewed alone. Informants' stories were pieced together to form a comprehensive picture of their collective experience.

We used cross-disciplinary methods in which different approaches were combined to develop a comprehensive view of the stories and processes emerging on the fast track farms. The research thus drew on some of the following: demographic change analysis, land-use analysis, social dynamics analysis, gender analysis, livelihood assessment analysis, political economy analysis and institutional analysis.

APPENDIX 2: SIX CASE STUDIES ON A1 FARMS IN MAZOWE

Introduction

The thesis research utilised qualitative methodologies as a way to gain an in-depth understanding of life on fast track farms. Fieldwork in Mazowe was conducted on six selected farms which acted as case studies. All these farms were amongst those covered in the study outlined in Appendix 1. Key informant interviews however were also conducted with farmers on farms other than the six. Some evidence was gathered in informal settings such as club houses, field days and training sessions for farmers. The case study approach was adopted to offer an in-depth analysis of farm level processes. Such a micro-focus on selected farms allowed for a nuanced understanding of how farmers relate to each other. This appendix outlines the research methodology used in the six case studies highlighting the progression of field work in Mazowe. While Appendix 1 concentrates on primary data from the earlier district-wide study in which I was involved and which provided a baseline for fast track farms in Mazowe, this appendix offers a description of my own thesis-based research on farm level institutions on A1 farms. Table 13 below provides a snapshot of the six farm case studies.

Table 13: Farms covered as case studies

Ward	Farm	Model	Hectarage of original farm	No of Beneficiaries	Farming activities
14	Hamilton	A1	516.3091	41	Maize, soya, cotton, sugar beans
14	Davaar	A1	1468.75	33	Maize, soyabeans, piggery
18	Usk	A1	919.9003	59	Maize, soya, cotton
27	Blightly	A1	888.21	42	Maize, tobacco, soyabeans
25	Visa	A1	571.33	20`	Maize, tobacco, soyabeans
26	Hariana	A1	5069.048	88	Maize, tobacco

Ethical Considerations

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe has polarised opinion and is highly controversial. With widespread reports of political violence (Human Rights Report 2002), land reform remains a very sensitive issue. Ethical issues are of paramount importance especially where potential harm might befall research participants. Rocco et al. (2003:21) note that research ethics are concerned with the ethical rightness of a particular research

process. The centrality of ethics to my study necessitated trying to attain a mutual balance between pursuing my research objectives and ensuring study participants are not harmed in any manner. Ethical aspects include informed consent procedures; minimising deception or covert activities; confidentiality towards participants, sponsors and colleagues; maximising benefits to research participants over risks; and avoiding participants' requests that go beyond social and research norms.

Case study approach

The case study is the most flexible of all research designs, allowing the researcher to retain the holistic characteristics of real-life events while investigating empirical phenomena. In general a case study is an empirical inquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. Case study is a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher explores in-depth an event, activity, process, or one or more individuals. Cases are bounded by time, space and activity and the researcher can collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures. Leary (2004) notes that a case study has shortcomings; for instance, the observed respondents tend to change their behaviour in order to suit the study (such that expected results of the researcher may unknowingly guide the subjects to those expected results).

Research Methods

Focus Group Discussions

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with various groups of people living and working in the fast track farms (see Table 14). These included plot holders, spouses of farmers, youths and farm workers. The FGDs focused on all facets of social life on the fast track farms with a special emphasis on institutional issues and social networks. A total of eleven groups were conducted on the six farms targeting a total of hundred and forty women, men and youth. Such coverage allowed me to gain a wide array of views from a large number of people living on the six targeted farms. The group discussions were lively and, through collective memory, participants weaved stories on social networks from time of settlement to present circumstances.

Table 14: Focus group discussions

Farm	Number of groups			Number of participants
	Female	Male	Mixed	
Blightly	-	-	2	20
Hamilton	1	1	-	18
Davaar	1	-	1	27
Haryana	-	-	2	36
Usk	1	1	-	23
Visa	-	-	2	20

In-depth Interviews

Twenty in-depth interviews were conducted with a variety of men and women of different ages and backgrounds. The respondents were purposively drawn from committee members, vocal farmers in the FGDs, youth and farm workers. Interviews detailed the life story of these people before and after settlement focusing on experiences of everyday life on the fast track farms. Questions focused mainly on institutions, social networks, trust and everyday life. The table (Table 15) below outlines the in-depth interviews conducted over two years of fieldwork.

Table 15: In-depth interviews

Farm	Sex	Age	Date	Description of person
Blightly	Male	46	21-06-09	Plot holder and committee of seven
	Female	52	21-06-09	Member of home based care, women's club
	Female	23	22-06-09	Youth, farm worker
Hamilton	Male	43	18-07-09	Spouse of plot holder, electricity committee
	Female	37	18-07-09	Plot holder and committee of seven member, member savings club
	Male	18	19-07-09	Brother of plotholder, youth club
Davaar	Male	46	15-06-10	Plot holder, member health committee
	Female	46	15-06-10	Spouse of plot holder, women's club
	Female	26	16-06-10	Youth club
Haryana	Male	48	11-11-09	Plot holder
	Male	43	11-11-09	Plot holder, committee of seven member
	Female	38	12-11-09	Farm worker
Visa	Female	34	13-04-08	Plot holder, farm committee
	Female	40	13-04-08	Plot holder, committee of seven
	Male	27	15-04-08	Plot holder, irrigation committee
Usk	Female	38	17-08-09	Plot holder, member irrigation committee
	Male	43	17-08-09	Plot holder, development committee
	Male	22	17-08-09	Youth, football club, youth league (political party)
Mapere	Male	37	04-09-10	Plot holder, school development committee
Bouncegreen	Female	41	08-04-08	Spouse of plot holder, savings club, member farmer group

Institutional Mapping

This involved establishing all the institutions that operate or have operated on the farms since settlement. It also included identifying their roles, activities, makeup and relationships with other institutions on and off the specific farm. On the six farms, I developed an inventory of institutions and groups. The tables below (Tables 16 to 21) outline all the groups that have existed on the farms since settlement.

Table 16: Usk farm institutions

Institution	Roles	Year Initiated	No of members	Mandate/ Term of office
Committee of Seven	Overall farm management/conflict resolution	2002	All farmers	Determined by chief
Farm Development Committee	Management of farm infrastructure/farm development projects	2003	All farmers	Five years
Irrigation Committee	Irrigation management and development	2005	Twelve	Yearly
Revolving fund group	Pool resources together and share	2006	Six	n/a
<i>Sabhuku</i>	Traditional leader in charge of the committee of seven	2002	n/a	Determined by chief
Women's club	Cooking classes, sexual health classes	2006	Nineteen	n/a
ZANU PF party cells	Organising party activities at grassroots	2002	n/a	Four years

Table 17: Hamilton farm institutions

Institution	Roles	Year Initiated	No of members	Mandate/ Term of office
Committee of Seven	Overall farm management/conflict resolution	2002	All farmers	Determined by chief
<i>Sabhuku</i>	Traditional leader in charge of the committee of seven	2001	n/a	Determined by chief
Irrigation Committee	Irrigation management and development	2003	Twelve	Yearly
Revolving fund group	Pool resources together and share	2006	Six	n/a
ZANU PF party cells	Organising party activities at grassroots	2001	n/a	Four years

Table 18: Visa farm institutions

Institution	Roles	Year Initiated	No of members	Mandate/ Term of office
Committee of Seven	Overall farm management/conflict resolution	2002	All farmers	Determined by chief
Irrigation Committee	Irrigation management and development	2004	Nine	Yearly
<i>Sabhuku</i>	Traditional leader in charge of the committee of seven	2002	n/a	Determined by chief
Burial group	Help in bereavement through cash donations	2003	All farmers	n/a

Table 19: Davaar farm institutions

Institution	Roles	Year Initiated	No of members	Mandate/ Term of office
Committee of Seven	Overall farm management/conflict resolution	2002	All farmers	Determined by chief
Electricity Committee	Payment of electricity bills	2004	All farmers	Two years
Irrigation Committee	Irrigation management and development	2004	Nine	Yearly
Health Committee	Management of clinic and all health issues	2006	All farmers	Three years
Revolving fund group	Pool resources together and share	2007	Four	n/a
<i>Sabhuku</i>	Traditional leader in charge of the committee of seven	2002	n/a	Determined by chief

Table 20: Haryana farm institutions

Institution	Roles	Year Initiated	No of members	Mandate/ Term of office
Committee of Seven	Overall farm management/conflict resolution	2001	All farmers	Determined by chief
<i>Sabhuku</i>	Traditional leader in charge of the committee of seven	2001	n/a	Determined by chief
Irrigation Committee	Irrigation management and development	2005	Twenty	Two years
Revolving fund group	Pool resources together and share	2006	Sixteen	n/a
Burial groups	Help in bereavement through cash donations	2002	All farmers	n/a
School development committee	Fundraising, income generation and management of school	2006	All farmers	Yearly

Table 21: Blightly farm institutions

Institution	Roles	Year Initiated	No of members	Mandate/ Term of office
Committee of Seven	Overall farm management/conflict resolution	2002	All farmers	Determined by chief
Revolving fund group	Pool resources together and share	2003	Fifteen	n/a
Irrigation Committee	Irrigation management and development	2004	Eight	Two years
Home Based Care	Caring for HIV patients and support group	2006	n/a	Undefined
Youth Club	Sporting activities	2004	Eighteen	n/a

Electricity Committee	Payment of electricity bills	2003	All farmers	Undefined
<i>Sabhuku</i>	Traditional leader in charge of the committee of seven	2001	n/a	Determined by chief

Observation

Observation took different forms which at times were not planned in advance. In its structured form, observation included attending four group meetings (see Table 22). Unstructured observation entailed chance meetings at training sessions, field days, agricultural shows and other events.

Table 22: Meetings attended

Farm	Group	Agenda	Date
Davaar	Health committee	Bi monthly operational meeting	07.08.09
Blightly	Home based care	Training	12.05.09
Usk	Irrigation committee	Regular meeting	19.07.09
Mapere	School development committee	Regular monthly meeting	17.09.09

Key Informant Interviews


Interviews were conducted with committee members of various farm level institutions including *sabhuku* (headmen). In these interviews (see Table 23) I also got access to records kept by different institutions such as meeting minutes and membership registers.

Table 23: Key informant interviews


Position	Organisation/Department/Farm	Time in Mazowe	Responsibilities	Plot Holder
Traditional chief	Traditional leader	Whole life	Owners of the land	Yes
Headmaster	Hermiston school	Three years	Education provision	No
Extension officer	AREX	Ten years	Extension services	Yes
Leader	Blightly Home Based Care	Seven years	Liaising with Howard Hospital	Yes
Chairperson	Irrigation committee, Davaar	Six years	Representing committee	Yes
Officer	Mazowe Rural District Council	Ten years	Social services provision	No
<i>Sabhuku</i>	Davaar, Blightly, Usk, Visa, Hamilton and Haryana	Average eight years	Leadership at farm level	Yes
Nurse	Davaar	Two years	Health care provision	No
Officer	Ministry of Gender	Three years	Women programmes in agriculture	No
Officer	Ministry of Lands	Six years	All land related issues	Yes
Committee members	Representatives of farm level institutions on the six farms	Average of six yrs	Issues relating management of FLIs	Yes

APPENDIX 3: MAPS


Map 1: Zimbabwe



Map 2: Mazowe Wards




Map 3: Mazowe River System



Map 4: Mazowe socio-economic infrastructure



Map 5: Davaar farm



Map 6: Visa Farm

