

UNDERSTANDING POPULAR RESISTANCE TO
XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: 'PEOPLE THINK' AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the crisis of xenophobia in South Africa. It argues, firstly, that xenophobia itself is not primarily a reaction to poverty, inequality, or any other set of social conditions. Rather, xenophobia must be considered to be a collective political discourse which has arisen in post-apartheid South Africa from an exclusionary conception of state nationalism. Where this work may be distinguished from the majority of research on xenophobia in South Africa is in the fact that its particular focus is on instances where ‘ordinary’ South Africans have challenged and resisted xenophobic violence in their communities through collective political mobilisation. I suggest that these sites of resistance deserve careful consideration in their own right. I argue that they may demonstrate a subjective break with the oppressive politics of state nationalism through the affirmation of alternative political conceptions. Drawing on the political theory of Sylvain Lazarus, and his principal thesis that people are capable of thinking politics in ways which can subjectively think *beyond* the social and the extant (underscored by his political and methodological axiom, *people think*), this thesis argues that these sites of resistance show that people – and especially those who are considered to be marginalised from the domain of legitimate politics – can and do think politically, and it is in the thought of people that new and potentially emancipatory visions of politics may emerge.

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CHAPTER ONE

PEOPLE THINK

Honam mu nni nhanoa (Humanity has no boundary) – Akan maxim¹

At a time when opportunism is everything, when hope seems lost, when everything boils down to a cynical business deal, we must find the courage to dream. To reclaim romance. The romance of believing in justice, in freedom, and in dignity. For everybody. – Arundhati Roy²

The possibility of the impossible is the foundation of politics. – Alain Badiou³

1.1. Introduction: *People think* and emancipatory politics

In 1996, the Congolese political theorist, Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, wrote:

Democratisation is creativity itself and not just a model to be applied to a territory. The imperialism of dominant paradigms, concerning democracy as well as development, must be challenged [...] The starting point of emancipatory politics is that all people think (every person thinks). Dominant paradigms imply that few people have the right to ask questions for themselves and for others, and these others disarm themselves of the right to ask those questions for themselves (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1996: 14).

The decline of the Marxist paradigm which signalled the so-called ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989) and the ideological domination of liberalism and parliamentary democracy as by and large the only acceptable way of thinking politics today, has resulted in what Wamba-dia-Wamba in 1994 called a ‘period of political crisis’ in which ‘theories of human and social emancipation and the practices they imply have suddenly become inoperative’ (1994: 249 [emphasis in original]). They are inoperative because the dominant political and ideological paradigms of the twentieth century – both Marxist and Liberal – have been unable

¹ Gyekye, 2011.

² Roy, 2006: 237.

³ Badiou, 1985: 78.

to provide an emancipatory vision of politics for the majority of people in the world. While some form of liberal capitalist democracy is still touted by most as the only alternative to totalitarianism, vast inequalities, environmental degradation, capitalist and neo-imperialist exploitation, and rising xenophobia and national chauvinism are all its more or less stable features. There has also been a theoretical disorientation as the social sciences have become unmoored from the dominant ideological frameworks which shaped political thinking in the twentieth century, the rise of post-modern relativism calling into question universalist theoretical conceptions of politics. The result, Neocosmos (2009a: 2) writes, is that ‘the absence of alternative thought to the systems of the twentieth century has led either to the clinging to dogmas, or to the capitulation to the view that neo-liberal economics and politics is the best thing on offer’. Rather than a force of creativity, as Wamba-dia-Wamba suggests above, democracy and indeed politics itself has increasingly come to be seen as the purview of states (of more or less ‘representative’ varieties). The state itself has become increasingly indistinguishable from the economy through an interpenetration of state and corporation overseeing the marketization of the former and the politicisation of the latter. The absence of political alternatives to liberalism have at least in part provided the conditions for the rise of oppressive communitarianism and a pervasive and global xenophobic politics – from South Africa to the United States, India, much of Europe and elsewhere.

In Africa, popular anti-colonial struggles during the twentieth century were largely replaced after independence by frequently authoritarian modes of state nationalism, and new forms of imperialism overtook the old, largely mediated this time through nationalist elites (see, for example, Fanon, 1961; Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1996). In South Africa, the popular emancipatory politics of the anti-apartheid struggle have given way to a pervasive discourse of state nationalism which has seen the rise of xenophobia and communitarian violence, culminating in the nationwide pogroms of 2008 in which sixty-two people were killed in one month. The poor in South Africa and elsewhere are routinely excluded from the domain of the political, constructed by the state and much of civil society as passive recipients of services and an increasingly objectified notion of human rights – these to be jealously guarded from trespassers. The immigrant poor (unlike wealthy ‘expatriates’), frequently represented in the language of invasions, floods, hordes and epidemics, are framed with growing intensity as the global enemy to states and societies alike.

I return to these arguments in greater detail throughout this work; here they only suggest the bleak landscape in which this thesis must be situated. The aim of this project is not, however, to deplore political failure, adhesion and impotence, but rather the opposite:

first and foremost, it is concerned with political *possibility*. Its central impulse is the possibility that people can *think* politics in ways which challenge the dominant paradigms which suggest, as Wamba-dia-Wamba (1996: 14) puts it, that only a ‘few people have the right to ask questions for themselves and others’. Less broadly, this impulse is situated within the crisis of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa, which I will argue, following Neocosmos (2010a), must be considered politically – and not as a reaction to poverty, inequality, or any other set of social conditions. More specifically, it must be considered at the level of political subjectivity. However, where this work may be distinguished from the majority of research on xenophobia in South Africa, is in the fact that its primary interest is not in explaining or accounting for the phenomenon of xenophobia as such (although I necessarily do spend some time trying to understand this). Rather, the particular focus of the research is on instances where ordinary South Africans have challenged and resisted xenophobic discourses and violence in their communities, and collectively mobilised in defence of their non-South African neighbours. With the notable exception of Joshua Kirshner (2012; 2014; and Kirshner & Phokela, 2010), there has been little in the way of analysis which has paid *particular* attention to sites where sustained and articulated political challenges to xenophobic violence have taken place. I suggest that these sites of resistance deserve careful consideration in their own right. In fact, at times, they may demonstrate a subjective break with the oppressive politics of state nationalism, through the affirmation of alternative political conceptions. Moreover, these sites of resistance show that people – and especially those who are supposedly marginalised from the domain of legitimate politics – can and do think politically, and it is in the thought of people that new and potentially emancipatory visions of politics may emerge. The scope of the foregoing argument will be further defined in this introductory chapter; for now, having indicated my general direction, I must briefly set out my theoretical foundation which relies on the central premise: *people think*.

The title of this chapter refers to the work of the French thinker, anthropologist and political theorist, Sylvain Lazarus. For Lazarus, the notion that *people think* is not given simply as a fact; rather, it is his ‘founding statement’ (Lazarus, 2015: 58; 2016: 108), or the central axiom on which his work relies. What does it mean to say that *people think* is a statement, rather than simply a fact? It is not simply or straightforwardly a fact because its concern is not with mental or rational capacity, which is the natural province of all people and thus absolute. It is a *statement* because it has to do with the nature of politics. It is in this specific sense that I

would like to position the idea that *people think* at the start of this work. While Chapter Four sets out Lazarus' theoretical approach in some detail, the following briefly introduces a few central notions which must be indicated from the outset.

For Lazarus (2016: 109), all people think, and all politics is thought; this is fundamental. However, politics is either thought 'in the space of the State' or 'at a distance from the State' (ibid.). In the first sense, politics is understood in terms of power and interests, of identities and hierarchies, of political parties, government and economy, and conceived of in terms of the objective reality of the state. As such it is a positivist and objectivist conception of politics which takes the state as the essential external referent on which political thinking must rely – or, it 'give[s] itself the State for object' (ibid., 108). Lazarus calls this notion of politics within the space of the state 'politics in exteriority' (ibid., 109), meaning that the thought of politics is defined by something that is external to thought itself. This external referent is the state, but it is also the 'state of things' – that is, the social which is managed and produced through state politics. In this conception, other supposedly objective categories such as class, race, ethnicity and so forth themselves operate within the space of the state, as 'it is the state which thinks location, hierarchy, interests and identities' (Neocosmos, 2016: 26), and thus manages and produces social place and social difference. As such, institutions which represent the interests of socially located groups, which largely make up what is today thought of as 'civil society' (namely, NGOs, trade unions, and others) also operate within the space of the state (even if they critique and protest it), as their political thought generally falls within the parameters of state thinking: it is expressive of interests, and the management of interests is the purview of state politics. This point will become clearer. We can then refer to political thought within the space of the state as 'state subjectivity' (Neocosmos, 2009b: 266). Importantly, state subjectivity is still *thought*, but it is thought which presents itself as objective reality (Lazarus, 2105: 1); as such, political thinking is reduced to opinion and interest. For example, people may have opinions about political parties, government, the economy, society, immigration, and moreover, these interests are to be expressed chiefly (within parliamentary democracy) at the ballot box (through which thought is by definition objectified). Finally, as the state is dominant, it is the state which shapes the way the political is thought most of the time by producing what Rancière (1999: 102) has called 'consensus'. We can then talk about the 'liberal consensus' in terms of a political subjectivity which is produced within a certain mode of state thinking; i.e. liberalism or liberal democracy.

Where politics is thought ‘at a distance from the State’, however, it is thought ‘in interiority’: or it is ‘of the order of thought’ (Lazarus, 2016: 109). In this conception, politics is not reducible to any object or external referent – be it class, race, society, or state power – but starts from itself and ‘thinks itself as politics’ (ibid., 113), or declares itself as political through its own specific categories of thought. Simply put, this view locates politics within the domain of the subjective, as thought, or consciousness, which cannot be subordinated to the objective – in fact in this conception the subjective is not only distinct from the objective but at a distance from it. This is because thought, for Lazarus, is not a relation *to* the real, which simply expresses the objective by reflecting it or reacting to it. Rather, Lazarus claims that thought must be understood as ‘a relation *of* the real’ (2015: 7 [my emphasis]). This de-objectification of subjectivity or consciousness, where politics is thought as a relation *of* the real, rather than *to* the real, allows for the possibility of new alternatives – or new *prescriptions* on the real – to emerge in the thought of people. For Lazarus, this is the essence of politics – hence the necessity of the central thesis, *people think*. I return to this principle in more detail later; for now, suffice it to say that ‘[i]n people’s thought, the real is identified via the *possible*. The investigation of what exists takes place but it is subordinated to the investigation of what *could be*’ (Lazarus cit. Neocosmos, 2009b: 285 [my emphasis]). Politics which are thought in interiority are then not reducible to the extant, to the state or to social place and interests, but have the capacity to subjectively exceed the objective *what is* and prescribe alternative conceptions, or relations of the real.

Lazarus is not suggesting that all thought has this capacity of irreducibility (see also (Badiou, 2005: 32) – in fact, only forms of emancipatory politics can be politics in interiority. This is because a politics which is irreducible to interests by necessity must affirm a politics of *universality* – something which can be affirmed by all, and thus some notion or principle of human equality. Such politics necessarily demonstrate a rupture or a break with state thinking, and as such, modes of politics in interiority are identified through their ‘inventive’ thought (Lazarus, 2016: 112), through what thought they have ‘opened up in the world’ (ibid.). As such, modes of politics in interiority are not always present; in fact they are quite rare, and must be rooted in the singularity of a specific subjectivity which exists finitely (that is, it is created, exists, and ends) in space and time, as a singular political sequence (Lazarus, 2015: 4, 52). In this regard, to say politics is thought is not a collapse into idealism; rather, politics must be considered to be a collective thought-practice (Neocosmos, 2016: xiv) which involves the action and agency of people in the present.

I return to these arguments later in more detail. For now it is essential to reassert the importance of the central thesis, *people think*, and that it is in the thought of people which emancipatory modes of politics can emerge which mark a break with state subjectivity. I will argue that in South Africa, popular resistance to xenophobic politics (which, it will become clear, must be considered to be a hegemonic state subjectivity predicated on an exclusionary conception of nationalism based on indigeneity) may at times demonstrate precisely such a subjective break – where such resistance appeals to alternative political prescriptions which assert some notion of a politics beyond socially located interest.

1.2. *People think* and liberal modernity

Although I have already said that Lazarus does not give *people think* simply as a fact, but as a statement on the nature of politics, it is also by necessity an egalitarian maxim: as he writes, ‘[p]eople think is worthy of everyone’ (2016: 108). However, and particularly within the context of the post-colony, it is not always accepted that people who live in spaces of subalternity or so-called marginality are capable of rationally understanding and articulating their struggles (as postcolonial, Subaltern, and other schools of thought have argued extensively). As Lazarus writes, ‘even though the thesis *People do not think* is not explicitly maintained, every effort seems to be made to get around both the fact of people thinking and its investigation’ (2015: 54). While Lazarus may be correct to say that the statement ‘people do not think’ is not *explicitly* maintained today, historically it was an express – and in fact constitutive – thesis in the production of western liberal modernity, which legitimated the expansion of capitalism and imperialism through the violent assertion that only some people were capable of rational thought and thus political agency and freedom. Moreover, this distinction, as a constitutive dialectical force within the production of liberalism, persists today through the delimitation of those who are considered to be legitimate custodians of political thought from those who are not. It is useful here to very briefly situate the principle *people think* (and its shadowy counter-thesis alongside it) within the history of liberalism, the West, and the modern world.

The birth of Euro-modernity in the mid-fifteenth century saw the creation of the West through ‘a global wave of material and symbolic transformations’ (Trouillot, 1995: 74). The Age of Discovery and the ‘founding’ of the New World led to the growth of global mercantilism and the beginnings of modern colonialism and capitalism, and the European

Renaissance brought about fundamental symbolic and ideological shifts in the ways in which the West began to conceive of itself in relation to the rest of the rapidly expanding ‘known’ world (ibid., 75). By the end of the eighteenth century, the conquest of much of the non-European world and the acceleration of chattel slavery in the Americas was taking place alongside the Enlightenment in Europe, and, following the American and the French Revolutions, the advance of liberalism and the apotheosis of reason, humanism, the sanctity of private property, and liberty from authoritarian oppression. As Losurdo (2011: 344) writes, the birth of liberalism was thus clearly marked by a radical paradox, a ‘twin birth’ of freedom and slavery within a ‘dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation’. In fact, Maximilien de Robespierre called out this contradiction in 1791, when he rebuked his fellow revolutionaries: ‘You are endlessly citing the rights of man, the principles of liberty; but you believed in them so little yourself that you decreed slavery constitutionally’ (Robespierre, 2007: 20). The Haitian Revolution (the most radical and egalitarian to occur during that period because it affirmed universal freedom) was to most in Europe ‘unthinkable even as it happened’ (Trouillot, 1995: 73). Clearly, freedom was not considered to be the natural province of all people – and in particular, not of the black slaves on which European prosperity relied. To reconcile this opposition between liberalism and the economic rewards of colonisation and slavery, the ontological question of the human became central. The ‘community of the free’ (Losurdo, 2011: 50) was produced both spatially and racially to encompass those included within the idea of ‘Man’, and as such the assertion was made that humanity existed in degrees, and ‘some humans were more so than others’ (Trouillot: 1995: 76).

Legitimated by the notion of an ontological hierarchy of being, Eurocentrism putrefied into scientific racism, bolstered by Christian theology and the claim that Africans, as supposed descendants of Ham, were condemned by Noah in the book of Genesis to perpetual servitude (Losurdo, 2011: 310). The ‘sacred space’ of the West was delimited from the ‘infinite profane space’ (ibid.), constructed as barbarian and monstrous, or, in related imageries, as existing in a phase of pre-modern immaturity and irrationality. For thinkers like Hegel, ‘development’ was not a sociological process but an ontological progression, a ‘necessary movement of Being’ (Dussel, 1993: 68), guided by an historical dialectic, whose immanent motor principle is Spirit (*Geist*) and in which ‘lower’ stages of human civilizational development are superseded or sublated by ensuing ‘higher’ ones. It was in this vein that Hegel would write: ‘The principle of the free Spirit makes itself here [in the West] the banner of the whole world, and from it develop the universal principles of reason. Custom and tradition no longer have validity’ (cit. Dussel, 1993: 72). As the self-proclaimed

apogee of reason the West could learn nothing from other peoples (whose humanity was in any case not affirmed in full) who were supposedly still mired in irrational and primitive custom. This assertion justified the West's 'civilising mission' to raise up the profane space from the darkness of its wild childhood to the light of rational maturity – by recourse to redemptive violence if necessary.

As decolonial theorist Aníbal Quijano (2007: 172) writes, knowledge was understood within the modern European paradigm as the product of a 'subject-object relation', in which the subject is the Cartesian isolated individual, who thinks and therefore is, constituted in itself and for itself. While the subject is the bearer of reason, the object 'is not only external to it, but different [in] nature. In fact, it is "nature"' (ibid.). As only those who were European or white (and male) could be full subjects within the ideation of western 'Man', others – especially black Africans who were by necessity positioned at the lowermost rung of the ontological ladder in order to justify the inhumanity of the slave trade – were relegated to the position of objects; like nature, objects of domination and also of knowledge, but never producers of knowledge in their own right. Thus the community of the free was delimited perhaps above all through the belief in the universal authority of western reason, knowledge and thought, and the supposed perversity of other knowledges and other ways of thinking. It is within such a logic that the British Lord Macaulay proclaimed in his 1835 *Minute on Indian Education* that 'a single shelf of a good European library [is] worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia' (cit. Losurdo, 2011: 314). As such, with the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation, the belief that only some people think while others do not – and moreover, that some people are the agents of knowledge, politics and history while others are only its objects – was a constitutive force in the production of liberal modernity.

Liberalism's 'counter-history' (Losurdo, 2011) is largely ignored in classical liberal historiography, which as Losurdo writes, is frequently not so much a historiography as a 'hagiography' (2011: 334) in which liberalism is apotheosised as primarily a 'philosophy and practice of universal emancipation' (Pithouse, 2015: 3). Where liberal discourse does recognise slavery and colonialism as its historical antecedents, it is often suggested that these were incidental rather than constitutive, and furthermore, that the very virtue of liberalism lies in its ability to self-correct through freedom of debate and contestation (ibid.). Yet as postcolonial and decolonial theory has argued, while explicit forms of colonialism have been eradicated under contemporary liberalism, they have been replaced by numerous covert forms of domination within a legacy of 'coloniality', described by Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243) as 'long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that

define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production'. Neo-imperialism, structural adjustment, and corporate globalism are some obvious examples in terms of economy. Politically, there is the West's 'democratising mission' (the more politically correct incarnation of yesteryear's 'civilising mission') and its exportation of a particular notion of 'freedom' (frequently, the freedom for extractive capitalism in particular). Wambadia-Wamba (1996: 14) deplores the West's purported 'monopoly on democracy' which discounts 'the entire range of historical experiences of peoples, movements, and groups who have fought for democracy and peace'. Ideologically, the West has maintained its position at the 'centre', simultaneously subordinating and appropriating from other cultures and knowledges on the so-called 'periphery' while asserting itself as normative and universal. The virtues of liberal societies notwithstanding, it is clear that the liberal political paradigm has not 'definitively left behind it the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation' (Losurdo, 2011: 334), and with it, the notion that only some people think and produce politics and history, while others from spaces of subalternity or supposed alterity do not.

1.3. Thinking political subjectivity in South Africa beyond social place

With the collapse of Marxism in the twentieth century as a global political and ideological alternative to liberalism, there has been a movement away from the notion of class as the basis for thinking politics. Indeed, a crudely configured class-based understanding of emancipatory politics is in itself increasingly redundant, given the changing composition of the 'working class' as well as the increasing precarity and 'lumpenisation' of labour through informalisation of work and widespread unemployment in many countries, including South Africa (Neocosmos, 2012a: 466; see also Barchiesi, 2011). In any case, much liberal political discourse on the Left has replaced the notion of class with conceptions of 'civil society', 'human rights' and 'identity' (ibid.). While these notions are discussed in more detail later, the problem which needs to be posed here is that they are primarily concerned with the expression of socially located interest, and as such they fundamentally reduce politics to the social. The organisations which make up to a large extent what is currently thought of as 'civil society' – for example, NGOs, trade unions, and some (though not all) social movements – generally represent the interests of some or other socially located group. As it is the state which is the manager of the social – 'of places and their relations to each other within the social division of labour and hierarchy' (Neocosmos, 2012b: 531) – civil society

organisations frequently operate within the domain of the political that is legitimated by state subjectivity (i.e. in terms of citizenship, democratic representation, or labour). So too the discourse of human rights ultimately falls within a state politics of trusteeship, wherein the state is seen as accountable to the degree to which it is the guarantor and protector of an increasingly objectified notion of rights, of which people (and in fact not all people) are constructed as more or less passive beneficiaries. Indian thinker Arundhati Roy, for instance, has frequently criticised the depoliticising language of human rights. As she puts it: ‘The idea of “human rights”, for example – sometimes it bothers me. Not in itself, but because the concept of human rights has replaced the much grander idea of justice’ (cit. Cusack and Roy, 2016: 44.). As such, the language of human rights ‘tends to accept a status quo that is intrinsically unjust – and then tries to make it more accountable’ (ibid., 46). ‘Talk loud enough about human rights’, Roy says, ‘and it gives the impression of democracy at work, justice at work’. Finally, politics which centre on social identities are themselves by necessity derived from social place, which they reflect and reproduce. Importantly for the argument at hand, thinking politics as reducible to social location means, as Kirsten Ross (2009: 21) writes, that ‘people’s voices, their subjectivities can be nothing more than the naturalised, homogenised, expressions of those spaces’. Within such a view there is no potential for collective political imagination to think beyond social space and posit alternatives to a politics of socially located interest.

It is also worth briefly noting here that the reduction of political subjectivity to social place and interests is not particular to liberalism alone. Within some narrow forms of Marxist discourse too there has been the tendency to reduce consciousness to the *consciousness of* – in this case, of the working class, produced as an historical and political subject. Marx himself said that ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’ (Marx, 1859: 1). While this quote should not be taken to represent Marx’s larger project (as the proletariat was more dynamic than this in his thinking), the position which it articulates is the obverse one to that which Lazarus argues for in the statement *people think*. Within such a perspective, political subjectivity can only be conceived of in exteriority, to use Lazarus’ formulation; as thought which is subordinated to an external referent such as, in this case, class, but in other configurations the state, civil society, human rights, or social identity.

This is the crucial point which needs to be maintained at this juncture – namely, that political subjectivities cannot be reduced to the expression of their socially located interests, and that all people are capable of thinking the political in ways which do not simply express

the social, but which can potentially transcend it. This assertion has particular relevance in the post-colony. Subaltern Studies theorist, Partha Chatterjee (204: 34), draws on Foucault's notion of governmentality (see Foucault, 1991: 201) when he argues that the modern liberal, and in particular, the post-colonial state has become increasingly 'governmentalized', deriving legitimacy not through a notion of 'democratic politics grounded in the idea of popular sovereignty' (Chatterjee, 2004: 4), but through the provision of welfare to the governed in which governance is 'less a matter of politics and more of administrative policy, a business for experts rather than for political representatives' (ibid., 35). Through governmentality the state rules less through a conception of the governed as 'citizens', denoting political agency and participation, than as 'populations' which are 'wholly descriptive and empirical' (ibid., 36). As Chatterjee writes: 'Citizens inhabit the domain of theory, populations the domain of policy' (ibid., 34).

Under colonialism, and within the dialectical logic of liberalism, the colonised were always subject to the biopolitical rule of governmentality (Chatterjee, 2004: 37, see also Mamdani, 2001a: 654) – that is, they were classified and 'objectified' by the colonial state through ethnographic tools such as, for example, the census, the taxonomy of groups along supposed tribal or ethnic lines, or the South African pass laws. After the national liberation struggles of the twentieth century which formally expanded the notion of citizenship to include all nationals, the newly independent governments of the South, in an effort to promote development and eradicate poverty, all too often adopted the same strategies of governmentality as did their colonial predecessors. Chatterjee writes:

In adopting these technical strategies of modernization and development, older ethnographic concepts often entered the field of knowledge about populations – as convenient descriptive categories for classifying groups of people into suitable targets for administrative, legal, economic, or electoral policy (2004: 37).

As such the line separating citizen from population was often not erased but redrawn, and in countries like South Africa the majority of people who live in spaces of supposed marginality – the shack settlement or the rural hinterlands – are frequently not treated as 'citizens' in any political sense, but as empirical, homogenous groups which express only social place. It is then the case that popular thought which emerges in such spaces is frequently not seen as legitimately political, but only as the expression of interests, or as the more or less automatic reaction to a set of social conditions.

Returning to Lazarus, the delimitation of what is seen as legitimate political thought is also related to the categories through which the political is understood within state

subjectivity – namely, the accepted registers of the state, the party, civil society organisations and NGOs, human rights discourse, citizenship, and so on. Within the social sciences too, Lazarus argues, there is a tendency towards positivism or what he calls ‘scientism’ (2015: 72), which reduces the subjective to the empirical and the objectively social. The result is an inability to recognise political thinking which subjectively exceeds the objective and the expression of social interests and which is not expressed in state political terms. When people think and express the political they may well do so through idioms which are drawn from their own lived reality and singular struggles, or from religion or traditional practices for example – however, such vocabularies are frequently disregarded as devoid of meaningful political content, and seen only as expressive of the interests of a particularly located group, defined in terms of ‘class’, ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and other categories which are regarded by state subjectivity and social scientism as ‘the fundamental explanatory foundation for consciousness’ (Neocosmos, 2012b: 534). What may in fact be political thinking is depoliticised, ignored or erased within state subjectivity.

Hayem (2016: 175) discusses one example of such logic in relation to the Marikana massacre of 2012 in which 34 striking miners were gunned down in South Africa by state security forces. In their demands to be met and recognised by management the miners invoked idioms which were cast off as simply traditional or ‘tribal’ (for example, they sang martial songs which called back to the Mpondo Revolt of 1960-1962) or atavistic and irrational (the miners sought guidance and protection from a sangoma, a traditional South African healer or diviner). As Hayem argues, the invocation of the traditional and the spiritual within the miners’ demands, which were a refusal to be represented by trade unions and instead to speak for themselves, and on their own terms, not as homogenised units of labour but as *men* attached to a proud and rich cultural history, was significant. It denoted a particular political subjectivity which was made invisible in the discourse which immediately followed the massacre which was largely framed in terms of, on the one hand, an issue of wage labour and class politics, and on the other, irrational atavism (see also Naicker, 2014). As this example suggests, the reduction of political subjectivity to the social disables any understanding of the ways in which people are capable of subjectively thinking in excess of their social location to affirm a politics beyond simply one of interest.

1.4. Xenophobia, resistance, and the possibility for politics?

The sections above have been concerned with situating the central principle, *people think*, in terms of, firstly, its function as a statement about the nature of politics in the work of Sylvain Lazarus. It is this specific sense that I apply the statement in this project. Secondly, I have indicated that the notion that only *some* people think was a constitutive force in the construction of western liberal modernity, which was produced through a dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation, legitimated on the basis that the West alone was the custodian of reason and knowledge – and thus the only agent of history and politics. Globally, western liberalism has maintained its ideological and political dominance, and forms of neo-imperialism and coloniality still reproduce liberalism's dialectical naissance in the present day. Within the post-colony, liberal governmentality and the technicisation of the post-colonial state has frequently redrawn, rather than fully disrupted, colonial divisions between citizen and population. Many people living in the Global South, in countries such as South Africa and India are largely excluded from the domain of 'civil society' (which denotes some measure of political and democratic inclusion), and treated as empirical, largely homogenous groups, or populations to be classified and managed by the liberal governmentalized state. Finally, dominant theoretical paradigms and social scientific discourse largely think politics in terms of a state subjectivity in which thinking is reduced to the expression of interests, opinions, and social location. Within such discourse, political subjectivities which mark a subjective break with the state and the social – and as such do not express political thinking through the categories of state politics – are not seen as legitimately political and as such are ignored, erased, and (particularly in the non-West or the post-colony) frequently reduced to the expression of 'tradition' or cultural atavism, or to the interests of supposedly homogenous ethnicities, 'tribes', classes or castes.

This erasure is evident in the discourse around xenophobia in South Africa today. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has seen an unexpected rise in xenophobic attitudes and violence against foreigners, culminating in the nationwide xenophobic pogroms of May 2008, in which 62 people were killed and thousands more displaced. The state, the media, and a preponderance of academic work have frequently treated xenophobia and particularly xenophobic violence in South Africa largely as a product of broad socio-economic factors including poverty, inequality, and competition for scarce jobs and resources. Within such a view, xenophobia is fundamentally seen as a reaction to a set of social conditions, or as a phenomenon arising more or less directly from social location. This involves two important erasures: the first is that this view either diminishes or occludes the fundamental role of state politics in shaping the way in which the political is thought. As I argue in the following

chapter, following Neocosmos' (2010a) extensive work on xenophobia in South Africa, xenophobia must be considered to be a political subjectivity which is the result of a hegemonic xenophobic discourse produced through an exclusionary conception of state-nationalism. In fact, as we shall see, although explicit communitarian violence has generally occurred in impoverished areas, xenophobia itself, as measured in attitude surveys, is not limited to the poor alone but is ubiquitous throughout South African society. This leads to the second erasure, which is that a view of xenophobia as arising more or less directly from the social precludes any notion of agency. As Neocosmos (2012b: 540) writes, 'it is assumed that perpetrators of violence, who are poor, are unable to think for themselves and to make political choices; they are said to simply (re)act as automata to their social condition'. All thought of people thinking (even if, in the case of xenophobia, people are thinking according to oppressive political discourses) and all thought of politics is essentially erased.

One of the questions this thesis poses is then this: if xenophobia is taken to be a reaction to social conditions and as such an expression of social place, how are we to understand those sites where xenophobic discourse and violence has been actively resisted through collective political mobilisation within South African communities? I posit that we cannot understand this resistance if we position xenophobia as primarily a sociological question, as there is no space within such an approach to think of political agency. The fact, however, that people are capable of subjectively thinking alternatives to xenophobic politics must indicate that xenophobia itself is first and foremost a political subjectivity and discourse, and not sociologically determined. In effect, this is the first move of my argument. The second move is to suggest, as I have done at the beginning of this chapter, that these sites of collective political resistance deserve careful consideration as they may in fact demonstrate a subjective break with hegemonic state subjectivity and a potentially emancipatory vision of politics in their own right. Both of these premises are necessarily underscored by the principle *people think*.

The following sets out the progression of this argument as it is presented in each chapter. Chapter Two, which is divided into two parts, is concerned with understanding xenophobia itself as a state political subjectivity. The first part of the chapter looks empirically at the rise of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa with a focus on the ways in which state politics and practices have produced a hegemonic xenophobic discourse in the country. The second part of the chapter situates this discussion within a review of the academic literature, arguing that sociological explanations are by themselves unable to

account for the phenomenon. Following Neocosmos (2010a), the chapter insists that xenophobia must be considered politically, and not as socially produced.

Chapter Three introduces for consideration three sites in which xenophobia has been effectively contested through collective political mobilisation. There were two notable cases in response to the 2008 violence; the first was in KwaZulu-Natal where South Africa's largest social movement of shack dwellers, Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) articulated a clear, sustained and deeply political challenge to the xenophobic attacks which were tearing through the country. Xenophobic violence did not spread to even one of the over thirty settlements which were affiliated with the movement during that time. Also in 2008, this time in the Khutsong township in Gauteng, a community-based mobilisation called the Merafong Demarcation Forum (MDF) condemned and actively opposed the pogroms taking place in other areas, and prevented violence against foreigners within their own community. Finally, in the Eastern Cape town of Grahamstown⁴ in 2015, a wave of xenophobic violence targeting Muslim immigrant shopkeepers was opposed by a grassroots social movement, the Unemployed People's Movement (UPM), which was instrumental in ameliorating the crisis and facilitating reintegration in its aftermath. While the discussion of AbM and the MDF is based solely on secondary resources (aside from AbM press releases and statements), I was able to conduct my own research with the UPM over the space of a year. Finally, it is suggested that the presence of collective political organisation before the outbreak of xenophobic violence provided the conditions for an effective challenge to xenophobic politics to occur within these three sites.

Chapter Four returns to theory, setting out in greater aspect Lazarus' theoretical position and his emphasis on the subjective, and principally, the statement *people think*. Drawing also on the work of Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière, the chapter argues that it is essential to insist on the subjective, as it is only in the thought of people that emancipatory modes of politics which exceed socially located interests may emerge and be constituted through collective mobilisation and struggle into political praxis. With the theoretical apparatus in place, the chapter returns to Abahlali baseMjondolo to discuss the movement's particular political subjectivity, suggesting that its universal conception of 'living politics' and 'living solidarity' was able to prescribe a radical political antidote and alternative to the politics of xenophobia and fear during the 2008 sequence.

⁴ As of October, 2018, the name of Grahamstown was formally changed to Makhanda (South African Government, 2018). For the sake of consistency, I have retained the use of Grahamstown here, as this was the name used at the time of my research and fieldwork.

Chapter Five sets out the methodological approach to my own research with members of the Unemployed People's Movement, which is largely drawn from the work of Lazarus and also Judith Hayem. The aim of the approach is to aid in the investigation of what Lazarus and Hayem have called 'subjective singularities' (Hayem, 2012: 518) – that is, the methodology is concerned with identifying, qualifying and delimiting 'specific forms of thinking which characterize a specific political sequence' (ibid.). Put simply, the approach endeavours to try to understand people's thinking on its own terms, through the categories and idioms which are specific to that subjective singularity, and which cannot be sociologically reduced through state subjectivity and social scientism to external explanatory referents such as class, race, power, or identity. The aim is to be able to identify and elucidate the specific *prescriptive* thought which may emerge as people think and articulate their own struggles.

Chapter Six sets out my own discussions with 18 UPM activists. Based on the methodological approach indicated above, the purpose of this empirical chapter was not to provide any form of ethnography or sociology of the movement, but to try and elucidate, through the activists' own categories, the subjective singularity which underpinned the movement's solidarity with the foreign shopkeepers during that sequence. As such, the purpose of the study, if it should in fact be called that, was strictly limited. Simply the aim was to try to understand what the UPM activists *thought* when they mobilised in defence and support of their foreign neighbours, in spite of the overwhelming impulse of their community to reject and expel. Why did they choose to protect the foreigners? How did they characterise this solidarity? What did they think was to be achieved through this action? How did this thinking interact, or come into tension with, other beliefs or conceptions they held? The aim was not to extrapolate from the activists' statements concepts, cases or types which might have broader application for the study of xenophobia generally, but only to try to understand and elucidate the forms of thinking which characterised this particular sequence in its subjective singularity. These forms of thinking, I argue, are notable and important in their own right. Within the wider argument of the work, this final chapter also demonstrates, as I stress throughout, that people indeed do *think*, that we must endeavour to recognise this thinking on its own terms, and that it is the thought of people which 'is the sole material basis of politics' (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1994: 259).

CHAPTER TWO

XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: CONTEXT AND DEBATE

PART ONE: STATE POLITICS AND THE PEOPLE

2.1. Introduction: Frantz Fanon and the ‘Pitfalls of National Consciousness’

From nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked, and in fact the government [...] commands them to go, thus giving their nationals satisfaction (Fanon, 1961: 156).

So wrote Frantz Fanon in 1961, after the political and social upheavals of the Algerian revolution in the early years of African independence. The chapter entitled ‘The Pitfalls of National Consciousness’, from his final book, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, or *The Damned of the Earth*⁵, has been noted for its prescience as it considers the political decline of the emancipatory project in the newly independent African states (see, for example, Neocosmos, 2008: 586). It is a valuable place to begin any discussion concerning xenophobia in South Africa, a country where Fanon’s work has attained an ‘extraordinary presence’ (Pithouse, 2015: 8; see also, Gibson, 2011) in recent years. Indeed, the passage could describe any number of the multiple scenes of anti-foreigner violence that the country has witnessed since the fall of the apartheid regime in the early 1990s.

For Fanon, the idea of the nation as a unifying political principle is produced through the liberatory struggle as a collective affirmation of a new popular subjectivity, or the ideation of ‘the people’ through a collective process of self-becoming. As he writes: ‘The living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people; it is the coherent, enlightened action of men and women’ (1961: 204). The nation is not in this view a social fact defined by indigeneity or nativism, but is ‘a purely political category’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 115). Or, in Lazarus’ terms, for Fanon the nation is not defined in the space of the state, (or ‘in exteriority’, which must take some external referent (indigeneity,

⁵ The common English translation for Fanon’s *Les Damnés de la Terre* is ‘The Wretched of the Earth’. In this work I use Lewis Gordon’s more direct translation, *The Damned of the Earth* (See, for example, Gordon, 2007: 10).

ethnicity or race) for its object), but exists as a political notion in ‘moving consciousness’, in thought and practice. It is, as Neocosmos (2016: 115) puts it, ‘a nation that is made up solely of those who fight for freedom’. For this reason, Fanon, who was neither an Algerian nor an African but who devoted much of his short life to the struggle for Algerian independence was able in good faith to count himself and be counted by others as ‘Algerian’ or ‘African’, as much a part of the new world in embryo as those born within the country’s borders (Neocosmos, 2016: 116).

This is a distinctly different principle to that which forms the basis of current modes of thinking nationalism or national identity in Africa (and indeed, the rest of the world) today. Fanon argues that in the immediate post-independence period, after the struggle for decolonisation has been won, the new elites or ‘national bourgeoisie’ (1961: 150) come to power at the head of the revolutionary movement. This class, in part due to its social proximity to the colonial authority, now distances itself from the popular movement of the people constituting themselves as the nation to step into the posts, offices and businesses of the former master, with whom their economic interests are in fact closely aligned (Neocosmos, 2016: 118-9). The objective of this ‘get-rich-quick’ (Fanon, 1961: 175) elite ‘is not the radical overthrowing of the system’ (ibid., 59), but assimilation within it. Concerned with the ‘dividends that the former colonial power hands out to it’ (ibid., 175), the new elite guarantees its interests through the assertion of an exclusive conception of nationalism rooted in indigeneity as the only legitimate grounds for accessing resources (Neocosmos, 2016: 119).

For the political party of nationalism, the emancipatory politics of the revolutionary struggle give way to a state logic wherein the party comes to represent not the people, who are sent ‘back to their caves’ (Fanon, 1961: 183), but the interests of the national bourgeoisie. There is then a ‘decline of the politics of the people-nation and their replacement by state politics’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 118). The nation is no longer a subjective collective principle but becomes inscribed, through a politics of inclusion and exclusion, as a positive fact, or as a nation-state, delimited by borders and by birthright, in other words as ‘a social category founded on indigeneity’ (ibid., 119). In short, it becomes a political representation, no longer a presentation of the people themselves.

Mamdani (2001a: 654) makes a similar argument when he writes that the colonial state in Africa fundamentally distinguished between two types of persons, ‘those indigenous and those not indigenous; in a word, natives and non-natives’. Unlike the nation-state paradigm, in the colony to be a *non-native* was to have access to rights – either as the coloniser, or as the (ostensibly) ‘non-indigenous’ group empowered by the coloniser to preside over the ‘true’

natives (who were not governed through a regime of rights but through customary law) through the colonial project of indirect-rule (as with the Tutsi in Rwanda) (Mamdani, 2001a). Through the anti-colonial struggle, the 'native' fought to become a citizen and a bearer of rights; however, conservative forms of nationalism had the effect of reproducing the political legacy of natives and non-natives, only in inverted form (ibid., 658). The result has been the tendency for 'indigeneity to become the litmus test for rights under the post-colonial state' (ibid., 657).

With the depoliticisation of the people after the popular struggle and the technicisation of the state under a project of national development (Neocosmos, 2016: 119), state nationalism penetrates popular subjectivity. As Fanon writes:

The working class of the towns, the masses of unemployed, the small artisans and craftsmen for their part line up behind this nationalist attitude; but in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their bourgeoisie. If the national bourgeoisie goes into competition with the Europeans, the artisans and craftsmen start a fight against non-national Africans [...] These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked (Fanon, 1961: 156).

Thus for Fanon, anti-foreigner violence in the post-colony is intimately linked to the process of decolonisation and the derailing forces of nationalism and ethnic chauvinism which arise in the aftermath of popular struggles. As such, when considering the phenomenal rise of xenophobia in South Africa in the wake of the inclusive, emancipatory politics of the anti-apartheid struggle, Fanon is an invaluable starting point.

The aim of this chapter is to show that post-apartheid xenophobia and its violent manifestations is a *political subjectivity* which has been produced through precisely the derailing state nationalist forces which Fanon maps, and as such it is not simply a product of structural or social factors. On this basis, the first part of this chapter traces state practices in contemporary South Africa alongside the advent of popular xenophobia, to show empirically how state political discourses have come to bear directly on the rise of popular anti-foreigner attitudes in the country. While these are ordered chronologically, the purpose is not simply to provide an historical overview of xenophobic violence, but rather to consider specific state-political practices and sequences which express particular or notable dimensions of this collective subjectivity. Nor is this review by any means exhaustive. With the empirical groundwork in place, part two of the chapter reviews the various academic literature on the question of xenophobia in South Africa, and argues that the dominant academic responses are often inadequate precisely because they fail to locate xenophobia at the level of political subjectivity.

2.2. Early state practices in the new South Africa: legislation and the nation

Since the early 1990s South Africa has seen a steady hardening of anti-foreigner sentiment (SAMP, 2008: 1-2) – a phenomenon that was unexpected and discomfiting appearing as it did in the promising years of South Africa’s post-apartheid honeymoon. As has been widely noted, South African xenophobia is not directed towards all foreigners alike – whites, for the main, have been exempt from this kind of hostility and attack – but has been predominantly directed at those identified as immigrants from the African continent, as well as poor immigrants from further afield (such as South Asians) (Steenkamp, 2009: 442; Neocosmos, 2010a: 1; Nyamnjoh, 2007: 75; Gqola, 2008: 213; Matsinhe, 2011: 296; Harris, 2002: 4; Human Rights Watch, 1998; SAHRC, 1999). Those who have come to be regarded as non-indigenous – and therefore strangers within the ideation of the new South African nation – have been excluded from South African community often on the basis of crude racial designations. Foreigners (or those thought to be foreigners – as many South Africans have also been subject to violent xenophobic practices – have been identified on the basis of skin colour, dress, vaccination marks, their inability to speak local languages, or some other bio-cultural signifier (Harris, 2002: 5; Worby, Hassim & Kupe, 2008: 16; Morris, 1998: 1125; Neocosmos, 2010a: 1). The derogatory word *makwerekwere* (or *kwerekwere* in the singular), widespread South African slang for African foreigners in general, allegedly imitates the sound of other African languages⁶ as dehumanised babble, and vulgar assertions that the *makwerekwere* have a pungent smell, or darker skin, have been mobilised against groups identified as non-South African. It is clear that this ‘othering’ is ‘a form of discrimination closely related to racism’ (Neocosmos, 2010a: 1); foreignness in this sense is not a purely legal designation but is centred on a discourse of indigeneity and authenticity, inscribed in racial, ethnic and finally nationalist terms.

In 1990, with the unbanning of nationalist political parties in South Africa and the legalisation of the African National Congress (ANC), the broad-based revolutionary militancy of the 1980s anti-apartheid struggle gave way to a new sequence of democratic state formation and constitutionalism. Yet, within this period of national optimism, by the

⁶ As Eze (2010: 98-99) points out, there is a clear parallel between the meanings of the words ‘amakwerekwere’ and ‘barbarian’. ‘Barbarian’ originates from the Greek *barbaros*, meaning to speak broken-Greek, or to speak unintelligibly. The word was used to refer to non-Greek speakers, and, like ‘amakwerekwere’, was onomatopoeic in origin – the *bar bar* sound reminiscent of today’s *bla bla*. The reduction of language to inarticulate babble reflects the dehumanising connotations of both words.

mid-1990s observers were already noting with concern the swelling tide of anti-foreigner sentiment among South Africans across class, age and racial demographics – including that expressed by state officials themselves. In 1994, then Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, proclaimed in his first parliamentary speech: ‘If we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (SAMP, 2008: 44). In his statements, as well as those made by others in the coming years⁷, foreigners were frequently called ‘aliens’, associated with criminality, drug running, prostitution, and assaults on South African women (SAMP, 2008: 17). Language of invasion or contamination was frequently mobilised against those entering South Africa from the rest of the continent, who were seen to be bringing disease, HIV/AIDS, and increasingly pathologised as a physical threat to the ‘health’ of the new nation (Harris, 2002: 8; Peberdy, 1999: 298). The latter half of the 1990s was punctuated by numerous outbursts of violence against immigrants (both documented and undocumented), many of whom had been living and working in the country for years⁸.

Estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants in South Africa during the 1990s were often exaggerated, notably in an oft-quoted state-sponsored report by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), published in 1995. This report claimed, using the language of ‘floods’ and ‘hordes’, that there were between five and eight million ‘illegal aliens’ in South Africa (SAMP, 2008: 17). Although this number was soon found to be inflated, the report was only withdrawn 6 years later (Neocosmos, 2010a: 83; SAMP, 2008: 44), after it was embraced by both the media and government, particularly the Department of Home Affairs, which claimed as late as 2001 that there were over 7 million undocumented migrants in the country (Duncan, 2011: 264). Within this climate, popular abuse of migrants increased throughout the decade, prompting a Human Rights Watch report published in 1998

⁷ For example, Defence Minister Joe Modise in a 1997 interview linked increased crime rates in South Africa with undocumented immigration: ‘We have one million illegal immigrants in our country who commit crimes and who are mistaken by some people for South African citizens. That is the real problem’ (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Duncan, 2010: 264). Officials from the National Party, too, blamed undocumented immigrants for ‘for taking jobs away from South Africans, exacerbating poverty, and spreading diseases in South Africa’ (Human Rights Watch, 1998). In 2002, the ANC Director General of Home Affairs stated that ‘approximately 90 percent of foreign persons, who are in the RSA with fraudulent documents, i.e. either citizenship or migrant documents, are involved in other crimes as well...it is quicker to charge these criminals for their false documentation and then to deport them than to pursue the long route in respect of the other crimes committed’ (Billy Masetlha, cited Neocosmos, 2010a: 85).

⁸ Kenneth Ngwenya, a Zimbabwean, had arrived in South Africa three decades before he was evicted in 1994 from Alexandra township in Gauteng Province (the site which would become the epicentre of the worst wave of xenophobic violence which took place in 2008) (SAMP, 2008: 44).

to condemn the degrading treatment of undocumented migrants by 'officials from the Department of Home Affairs, the police, and the army, as well as by the general public' (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Repressive immigration legislation in the early post-apartheid period reflected these political attitudes. The 'draconian' (Neocosmos, 2010a: 82) Aliens Control Act of 1991 managed immigration policy throughout the 1990s not only on the basis of preventing illegal immigration, but also to discourage and restrict low and unskilled migrants, particularly from the SADC countries and the rest of Africa. In fact, in 1998, the Department of Home Affairs stated that 'no one in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories would normally be accepted as an immigrant worker' (cit. Peberdy, 2001: 17). Described as one of the 'dying acts of apartheid' (ibid.), the Aliens Control Act effectively perpetuated apartheid discrimination; according to Harris (2001: 7) writing in 2001: 'racism is a key feature of South Africa's immigration legislation, both historically and, despite the country's transition to democracy and equality, currently'. Peberdy (2001: 18) notes that restrictions and barriers to entry, for permanent and temporary immigration, were 'directed primarily at people from other African countries' and 'fee structures create much higher barriers of entry for African immigrants than, say, those from Europe and North America'. Likewise, Valji notes that despite the hostility directed towards low-income African immigrants, in the year 1995 only 49 of the 26 000 people from the United States, Germany and Britain who overstayed their visas were deported (2003: 7). The figure of the 'illegal alien', then, was clearly raced and classed (see Harris, 2001).

In total, over one million people were arrested and deported without due process under the Aliens Control Act, and 'often lawless' (SAMP, 2008: 18) 'Aliens Control Units' combed streets and townships for anyone suspected of alienage, who were forced onto trains to be offloaded at the border or into holding facilities like the now notorious Lindela Repatriation Centre. Growing concern about such practices prompted an independent task team to produce a Draft Green Paper on International Migration, submitted in May 1997. The Green Paper signalled a liberalisation of existing immigration law; however, as Neocosmos argues (2010a: 78-9), it was hamstrung by its rights-based approach, and by the Bill of Rights itself. The Green Paper promised a shift away from the racism of apartheid-era immigration policy which favoured white, European immigration and prohibited African immigration. However, non-racism did not directly translate to democratic, and the rights-based approach of the report meant that it was restricted by the provision made to non-citizens under the Bill of Rights, which denies them any political rights, as well as, importantly, the 'freedom to trade,

occupation and profession' (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: Article 22).

In any case, the Green Paper was rejected by the Department of Home Affairs, and separate, state-appointed task teams were set up to draft further legislation, resulting in the Draft White Paper on International Migration of 1999, which became an Act of Parliament in 2002 (SAMP, 2008: 46). This report pointed to the high rates of unemployment in South Africa as defence for its hard-line approach (Neocosmos, 2010a: 83), and was criticised by human rights groups as a 'recipe for increased xenophobia' (SAMP, 2008: 47). An initial provision of the Act was that it should ensure that 'xenophobia is prevented and countered both within Government and civil society'; however, in 2004 this provision was, notably, amended to require only that 'xenophobia is prevented and countered' (*ibid.*, 40). How and by whom it should be prevented and countered was not made explicit. One worrying section of the Act encouraged South Africans to actively participate in its enforcement by reporting undocumented immigrants, and the Act also gave the police powers to stop anybody suspected of being a 'foreigner' to demand that they prove their residency status (Neocosmos, 2010a: 83). A further effect of this legislation and general state attitudes towards immigration from the African continent was the dismantling of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Protocol on the Free Movement of People, which proposed a Schengen-like regional labour market. Minister Buthelezi described the Protocol as a 'threat', stating that 'Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country' (Landau, 2010: 8; SAMP, 2008: 18).

Although this discussion has been necessarily brief⁹, the essential point here is to note that the subjective construction of the nation through immigration legislation during the early post-apartheid period was indicative of the rise of an exclusionary form of state nationalism, which saw indigeneity and autochthony as the basis for rights and entitlements (I return to this point in part two of this chapter). As Neocosmos writes, legislation is

⁹ It should be mentioned that between 1996 and 2000, the state did implement three immigration amnesties. The first, in 1995-96 offered permanent residence to mineworkers from the SADC region who had worked in the country since 1985 and who had voted in the 1994 elections (Peberdy, 2001: 20). The second amnesty granted residency to undocumented SADC migrants who had entered South Africa during apartheid. This amnesty was opposed by the Minister and some officials of the Department of Home Affairs, who predicted over 1 million (and as many as 12 million including family members) applicants; in fact, just over 200 000 claims were made, and only 124 079 applications approved (*ibid.*). The third amnesty granted residency to Mozambican refugees who had crossed the border before 1992. As Peberdy (2001: 20) the 'granting of amnesties to contract and undocumented workers recognized the discriminatory immigration practices of the apartheid era, as well as the contribution and sacrifices made by non-South Africans to South Africa's economic development'. However, these amnesties in effect 'merely regularized a de facto situation', and moreover, they established the boundaries from which the government could 'work to exclude all new undocumented migrants' (*ibid.*). For a more detailed discussion of these amnesties and their political significance, see Neocosmos (2010a: 71-77).

indicative of a specific form of politics, state politics, and provides one of the main dimensions of state discourse, which moulds the terrain within which discussion and debate within the 'public sphere' takes place. It is clear that South African legislation has systematically provided the basis for a hegemonic xenophobic discourse within the country (2010a: 84).

Finally, it is worth noting here that the Constitutional Court has made some positive rulings when it comes to the rights of foreign permanent residents in South Africa – for example, in *Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North West Province)* (1997) and *Khosa v Minister of Social Development* (2004), the Court passed rulings which established 'citizenship' or 'nationality' as prohibited grounds for discrimination in South Africa, even though they are not listed as such in the Constitution (Albertyn, 2008: 178-80). Albertyn (2008: 180) writes that these judgements envisaged 'a compassionate community that extends beyond citizens to embrace those who are in need and have been marginalised'; however, courageous though such a vision may be, it is a far cry from the reality faced by many foreign nationals in South African society. A later ruling on refugee's rights, *Union of Refugee Women v Director of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority* (2007), reflected this harsh reality, and, as Albertyn (2008: 183) puts it, 'began to reveal the faultlines in the court's treatment of foreign nationals'. Refugees working as car guards challenged legal provisions which made it difficult for them to register as security workers, and although the court recognised the vulnerability of refugees as a marginalised group, it upheld the legal provisions preventing them from finding more permanent work in the security sector on the grounds that the right to choose an occupation (Article 22 of the Bill of Rights) was guaranteed to citizens only. Furthermore, the judgement made the appalling assertion that foreign immigrants, on the basis of public safety, needed to 'prove their trustworthiness as security workers' (Albertyn, 2008: 186). The implications of such a statement speak for themselves. Notably, Justices Langa, Mokgoro and O'Regan disagreed with the judgement, arguing that the ruling amounted to 'unfair and damaging stereotyping of foreign nationals' (cited in Albertyn, 2008: 186). Nevertheless, this was a stereotype widely embraced by the South African state and society.

2.3. Xenophobia in the public sphere

In 1997 and 1999 the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) conducted national surveys examining the attitudes of South Africans towards foreign immigration. The results were shocking: South African attitudes towards foreign migrants had become increasingly

hostile and intolerant since 1994, cutting across divisions of age, gender, race, income and education (SAMP, 2008: 19). Importantly, SAMP (2008: 19) found that, unlike in other countries, it was ‘impossible to identify a “typical” xenophobe’ in South Africa. When the survey was repeated in revised form in 2006 (two years before nationwide xenophobic pogroms in 2008) xenophobic attitudes had not diminished; in fact, they had crystallized. The 2006 survey found that 76 percent of South Africans were in favour of electrifying South Africa’s borders (the figure had been 66 percent in 1999); 74 percent supported the deportation of those found not to be contributing the economy; almost 50 percent (with only 18 percent strongly opposed) supported the deportation of all foreign immigrants, both legal and illegal; and, disturbingly, 61 percent of those surveyed in 2006 would support the deportation of any foreign national who tested positive for HIV/AIDS (SAMP, 2008: 25). When the reggae star, Lucky Dube, was gunned down on the streets of Johannesburg in 2007, the accused reportedly said in trial that they mistook Dube for a Nigerian – as if, it has been suggested, to elicit some sympathy from the court, or that killing a *kwerekwere* was more ‘culturally acceptable’ (Matsinhe, 2011: 304). The findings of the SAMP surveys made clear that any state efforts to curtail xenophobia up to that point (such as the ‘Roll Back Xenophobia’ campaign by the SAHRC) had been largely unsuccessful.

As xenophobic attitudes increased, so did episodes of anti-foreigner violence. In communities, so-called foreigners were rooted out, their possessions seized and shops and dwelling appropriated or burned. Two foreign nationals were ‘necklaced’, or burned alive, in 1998; another two were killed the same way the following year (SAMP, 2008: 46-7). In 2001 hundreds of Zimbabweans were forced from the Zandspruit settlement near Johannesburg, after one Zimbabwean was accused of killing a South African woman (ibid., 48). A similar incident occurred in Knysna, in the Western Cape, in 2006 when Somali shop owners were chased from their homes and their shops destroyed (ibid., 50). Further attacks against Somalis took place in the same year in the Cape Flats, where between 20 and 30 people were killed in the space of a month, and continued through 2007, when anti-Somali riots broke out in Port Elizabeth (ibid., 50). Episodes of violence like these, which increased in frequency in the early 2000s, are too numerous to list here¹⁰. Moreover, violent practices against foreign nationals (and others thus identified) were not limited to the public. In 2000, the state launched ‘Operation Crackdown’, an anti-crime sweep by the police and the army. Reports of people forced to strip half-naked on the streets of Johannesburg so the police could check

¹⁰ SAMP includes a useful timeline of major xenophobic incidents during this period in its 2008 report.

whether their vaccination marks were 'local' were met with concern and condemnation by human rights groups (Smith, 2000: 1). Over 7 000 people were arrested on suspicion of being in the country illegally (SAMP, 2008: 47); many were sent to Lindela Repatriation Centre and then deported. Conditions in Lindela itself came under scrutiny as early as 2000 (three years after it was established in 1997), when an SAHRC report was published detailing the various abuses of occupants, including beatings and assault, extortion, and the general denial of basic rights (Landau, 2010: 12; SAMP, 2008: 47; Neocosmos, 2008: 589).

Police violence against foreign nationals has been widely documented. A particularly disturbing incident took place in 1998, when attack dogs were set on three Mozambican migrants by six white police officers. Unlike numerous other cases (and doubtless because the event was captured on camera) the officers in this instance were prosecuted and imprisoned (SAMP, 2008: 46); generally, the police have acted with relative impunity. Some foreign national groups have come under particular fire – Nigerians, for example, have long been associated with the drug trade in South Africa, causing police to actively seek them out for search and arrest. Morris (1998: 1130-1), in his study of Nigerian and Congolese immigrants living in inner city Johannesburg in the late 1990s, reports that the Johannesburg police regard virtually every Nigerian immigrant as connected to some form of illegal activity. As he writes, the Captain of the SAPS Aliens Investigation Unit, Giacomo Bondesio, once commented 'As far as I'm concerned they don't come to South Africa for political reasons or to work', alleging that 'as many as 90 per cent of the Nigerians who applied for Section 41 permits - which grant temporary residence to political asylum applicants - were drug dealers' (cited in Morris, 1998: 1120). These attitudes underpin a range of abuses inflicted on foreign immigrants by the police in South Africa. There are many reports of police refusing to recognise or even destroying documentation or work permits belonging to migrants (Landau, 2010: 11; Mosselson, 2010: 647), often within the ambit of extortive practices where foreigners are forced to pay bribes to police and border officials – to the degree that some police regard foreigners as 'mobile ATMs' (Landau, 2010: 11), or as 'arrest fodder' (Neocosmos, 2010a: 126), to bolster law enforcement statistics.

2.4. May 2008: Violence and denial

In 2008, South Africa witnessed an explosion of xenophobic violence, unprecedented in scale if not in content. On May 11, a sequence of violence which would signal a dark nadir for

democratic South Africa began in Johannesburg's Alexandra Township when group of young South African men entered a hostel on London Road and attacked residents who they believed to be foreigners. Angry mobs took to the street, targeting shops and shacks owned by foreigners and demanding they go back to where they came from. Two men were killed in this first wave of violence, which engulfed the township over the following days as a heavy police presence tried to restore calm. Thousands took shelter at police stations, mosques and churches as the lootings and killings spread throughout Gauteng Province over the next two weeks, and beyond into the townships of KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, and later to Cape Town and the Western Cape. By the 19th of May 22 people had been killed; just two days later the death toll had almost doubled (SAMP, 2008: 52). By the end of the brutal period, which came to an unsteady close at the end of May, after the army was called in on May 21, 62 people had been killed and hundreds more injured.

Among those dead, 21 were South Africans who had been identified as 'foreign' by some or other signifier of difference – such as being 'too dark', or being unable to correctly express on demand a particular phrase or word in a South African language; the IsiZulu word for elbow – *indololwane* – for example, was used in these weeks by the perpetrators of violence as a kind of shibboleth whereby claims of indigeneity could be proven or, failing the test, invalidated (Worby, Hassim and Kupe, 2008: 16). Over this period 'dozens' (the exact number is unknown) of women were raped (Landau, 2010: 2), millions of rands worth of property and goods owned by foreigners was expropriated, and between 80 000 and 200 000 people were displaced and forced from their homes and livelihoods (Neocosmos, 2010a: 120). Mozambican officials claimed that over 40 000 of their nationals crossed the border from South Africa (Misago, Landau & Monson, 2009: 20), and Malawians reportedly also fled the country *en masse* during the same period (Hayem, 2013: 78). Thousands more who were unwilling or unable to return to their countries of origin (particularly refugees and asylum seekers) were accommodated in the gathering winter in makeshift and ill-equipped camps outside Gauteng and Cape Town, set up by the government with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Hayem, 2013: 78).

The government response to the crisis in 2008 was woefully inadequate. Then President Thabo Mbeki was in Japan when the violence broke out, and he came under fire for not returning to South Africa promptly as the attacks continued (Hayem, 2013: 88). In fact, neither he nor then ANC leader, Jacob Zuma, visited communities or those displaced until the

end of May. Although there was condemnation of the violence by state officials¹¹, condemnation of xenophobia itself was often neither explicit nor unambiguous. While the ‘language of hatred’ (Neocosmos, 2010a: 121) mobilised against the foreigners, who were called ‘cockroaches’, ‘*grigambas*’ (dung beetles) and ‘*amagundane*’ (rats), recalled historical instances of ethnic violence such as in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, President Mbeki framed the violence not in terms of xenophobia, but as general criminality. Speaking on July 3, 2008, he said:

What happened during those days was not inspired by possessed nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiments of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners—xenophobia... I heard it said insistently that my people have turned or become xenophobic... I wondered what the accusers knew about my people which I did not know. And this I must also say – none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia. (Mbeki, in Dodson, 2010: 7).

The claim that xenophobic attitudes in South Africa were ‘hitherto unknown’ flies in the face of credulity, given the forewarning of at least fifteen years’ worth of reports and scholarship, not to mention countless incidents of actual violence against foreign nationals. Moreover, Mbeki was reportedly cautioned about the likely occurrence of widespread xenophobic violence in a report by the African Union’s (AU) *African Peer Review Mechanism* in 2007, as well as by South African intelligence services (Neocosmos, 2010a: 121).

Crucially, Mbeki’s suggestion that the events of May 2008 were no more than ‘naked criminal activity’, and that the naming of this activity as xenophobic was *itself* an incitement of xenophobia, falls into a pattern of denialist state discourse in South Africa which insists on locating the debate around xenophobia in the domain of criminality and security. As Landau (2008: 113) writes, ‘to the degree that government can code events as criminal, they protect their legitimacy as champions of transformation stymied only by practical challenges and reactionary forces’. There was little recognition of the fact that the 2008 event marked a political and social crisis affecting the whole country, not only those areas where violence

¹¹ Buthelezi, notorious for repeated and vitriolic anti-foreigner statements during his time as Minister of Home Affairs, was filmed weeping for the victims of the attacks. In a 2015 newsletter, written in the wake of yet another wave of xenophobic violence, he ruminates on the 2008 violence. ‘Far too little was said by the leaders of our nation to condemn the attacks’, he writes. However, he was ‘moved to tears by the plight of a Mozambican woman who had lost all her belongings to mob violence’ – ‘Deeply ashamed and distressed, I apologised on behalf of my country’ (Buthelezi, 2015: 1). ‘Did it make a difference?’ He asks. ‘So often people of goodwill ask what difference it will make if one person stands up and swims against the current. If the social tide is flowing against foreign nationals, what difference will it make if one South African stops to question the direction of the tide? I believe it makes a significant difference.’ After this self-congratulatory declaration, he recalls, with solemnity, the grim tidings of SAMP’s 2008 report on xenophobia. He forgets, perhaps, the multiple instances in the same work (SAMP, 2008: 16, 17, 23, 49, 51) in which his own statements and actions as Minister are identified by the researchers at SAMP as directly promoting xenophobic discourse.

broke out (Hayem, 2013: 87). This emphasis on criminality rather than xenophobia itself led the state to prioritise security-driven solutions (Nieftagodien, 2008: 68), which, though able to stem the immediate bloodshed, did nothing to address the underlying political and social causes of the violence. This was clearly demonstrated in how the government handled the aftermath of the crisis and in its treatment both of those who had engaged in the attacks and those who were victim to them.

2.5. State responses to May 2008

While the government pledged to set up a special court in which to try the approximately 1 400 people who had been arrested during the pogroms, it quickly failed to deliver on this promise. In the months following the unrest, many of the suspects were released due to pressure from communities, or their cases were postponed; in the end, only 16 percent of those who appeared in court were ever convicted (Hayem, 2013: 90). Despite the state's emphasis on the criminality of the perpetrators, the passivity with which judicial proceedings continued in the aftermath of the attacks suggest that the rights and interests of non-citizens plainly did not command much urgency.

For the thousands displaced by the violence, the government's refusal to recognise the underlying and distinctly political nature of the crisis hamstrung efforts for reintegration (Hayem, 2013: 90). While the Minister of Home Affairs promised that no foreigner, documented or undocumented, would be deported in the aftermath of the violence, the government failed to take the opportunity to demonstrate tangible commitment to reintegration and reconciliation by legalising the status of all undocumented migrants who had been displaced and victimised in the attacks. Instead, the state granted a partial amnesty for undocumented migrants, which gave them a period of six months in which to apply for a legal permit to remain in the country. This decision led to uncertainty and confusion for the thousands of foreigners who had been relocated to sprawling refugee camps on the outskirts of Cape Town and Johannesburg (Hayem, 2013: 92-93). To facilitate this partial amnesty, the Department of Home Affairs required that all those residing in the camps be fingerprinted and registered for the six-month application period. For some, particularly asylum seekers, it was unclear how this new registration would impact their existing asylum status, and whether they would in fact be exchanging already obtained two-year permits for one valid for six-months (Hayem, 2013: 94; Lawyers for Human Rights, 2008: 1). Moreover, inhabitants were

given little to no assurances of what would happen once the camps were closed. As one of the inhabitants of the camps remarked:

We are treated like criminals. We are not criminals. Our permits are valid to circulate and look for a job. Why do they ask for our fingerprints? For what permits? Why? We are refugees and asylum seekers. Why is the previous permit not valid anymore? (quoted in Hayem, 2013: 94).

Hostilities escalated between the Department of Home Affairs and foreigners who organised in rejection of the registration and fingerprinting process, with Minister Mapisa-Nqakula eventually threatening deportation for those who were undocumented, despite the promise made in the wake of the attacks (Hayem, 2013: 94). In one disturbing incident, 700 to 900 people who objected to this process were removed from one of the camps outside Johannesburg, temporarily held at Lindela, and then released. Unable or unwilling to return to their home countries or to the communities from which they had been evicted, and with nowhere else to go, many of this number set up an encampment alongside the R28 provincial road. Although some civil society actors tried to intervene on their behalf, police were sent in; the men were arrested, the women and children taken to a social centre, and in the end 120 people were deported and only 30 families reintegrated, not by government, but through the help of NGOs (Hayem, 2013: 95).

Finally, the response to the May 2008 crisis, in which perpetrators were treated with relative impunity and undocumented foreigners were in many cases (as in the case of the R28 encampment) effectively criminalised, was indicative of a disturbing logic in the state's response to xenophobia. Beyond the initial handwringing, the state's concern quickly shifted from the attackers and their motivations to the legal status of the victims themselves – suggesting that the central question for the state was not xenophobia itself, but illegal immigration. This focus was reflected in a HSRC report released just after the attack, in June 2008. Although the report did suggest a period of amnesty in which undocumented immigrants could apply for residency without fear of deportation (*ibid.*, 49), it recommended that government move 'urgently and effectively to protect South Africa's borders and points-of-entry' (HSRC, 2008: 10), and endorsed further restrictions on access to housing and jobs for non-citizens (HSRC, 2008; Sharp, 2008: 1). As John Sharp (2008: 1) argued, the HSRC did not challenge the 'Fortress South Africa' approach to immigration that had dominated legislation and state discourse since the end of apartheid. Finally, the focus on illegal immigration by the state and others, as Sharp (*ibid.*, 2) pointed out, tends to ignore the fact that, firstly, a third of those killed during the May 2008 violence were locals, and secondly,

the perpetrators certainly did not discriminate on the basis of whether or not those they attacked were documented¹².

2.6. Operation Fiela-Reclaim and state-sanctioned xenophobia

State discourse towards immigration in South Africa are, as has been suggested, frequently framed around the questions of illegality and criminality. Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) have noted the ways in which the difficult process of securing legal documentation for the majority of low-income immigrants itself often forces those immigrants to engage in ‘criminal’ practices with corrupt immigration officials and illicit markets where immigration documents can be purchased. For example, a migrant can apply for a Section 22 permit granting asylum-seeker status at one of only four¹³ Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) in either Musina, Durban, Pretoria, or Port Elizabeth, within fourteen days of entering the country. This permit allows them to live in the country for 6 months until a hearing to determine the validity of their refugee status claim. If this hearing finds them without sufficient grounds to claim refugee status, or a Section 24 permit, they are required to leave the country within 30 days. However, the DHA has reported that its rejection rate of refugee permits is 89 percent (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016: 990), and the procedure itself is generally lengthy and inefficient. If the asylum seeker permit expires before such a time as refugee status is decided, migrants must travel back to an RRO to try to renew the permit for another 6 months, or face deportation. Extortion on the part of corrupt officials at all points during this process is commonplace (ibid., 990; Human Rights Watch, 2005), and reports of sexual exploitation of female migrants in exchange for documentation or in lieu of bribes are frequent (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016: 990). It is clear that for many otherwise law-abiding migrants, paying bribes to corrupt officials or purchasing documentation illicitly are sometimes the only means of survival within the exploitative and inefficient system which in effect produces and perpetuates their criminalisation (ibid.).

Within this framework, the state justifies repressive practices against foreign nationals on the basis of their (often presumed) illegality and criminality. This logic was starkly demonstrated in 2015 when, following another spate of xenophobic violence as well as controversial statements against foreign nationals made by the Zulu King Goodwill

¹² This fact is noted in the HSRC report (2008: 23).

¹³ A fifth office, in Cape Town, has been closed since 2012, despite a Supreme Court order for it to reopen in 2018 (EWN, 2019).

Zwelithini, the government launched the now notorious Operation Fiela-Reclaim, ostensibly aimed at tackling crime in South African townships. King Zwelithini reportedly said to a crowd in KwaZulu-Natal in March 2015: ‘You find their unpleasant goods hanging all over our shops, they soil our streets. We cannot even recognise which shop is which, there are foreigners everywhere...We ask foreign nationals to pack their belongings and go back to their countries’ (in Desai, 2015: 247). Violence broke out soon after, resulting in several deaths and the displacement of thousands. The SAHRC conducted an investigation into the King’s statements, releasing a report which found Zwelithini’s comments to be harmful and hurtful to the migrant community in South Africa, but not constitutive of hate crime nor causally related to the violence which followed (SAHRC, 2016). However, a WhatsApp text message sent from a group of South African organisations and social movements went viral on April 12, 2015, calling for foreigners to leave the country. The message, addressed to ‘Dear Neighbour from Africa & Other Parts of the World’ told foreign nationals:

If you were quite prepared to disrespect the first Law of the sovereignty of our country why should you respect the rest of our laws? [...] we are all still developing countries and our development must be impeded with so many strangers and illegals in our midst. In Johannesburg alone you have taken over entire suburbs [...] there are signs of drug-dealing, prostitution and other criminal acts that you conduct – sometimes in cahoots with desperate locals. Your presence at this moment in our history is most destructive and destabilising to our country and our citizens. [...] We are pleading with you to return to your home countries – as our King Goodwill and many other great leaders have asked. [...] The genocide in this corner of Africa will be far worse than what happened in Rwanda in 1994. Then the entire continent will be condemned to ashes. Is that what you want? Our people built this country with their blood and tears, but built [sic] it we did. For you to come here and take jobs at cheaper rates, use and abuse our scarce resources [...] and further add to already high crime rates, IS WRONG and IMMORAL. [...] Our people are preparing for war against all foreigners (from Bulgaria to Pakistan and Bangladesh to Africa north of the Limpopo) and we are all very scared. Please GO HOME and BUILD Africa. Millions will die if you don’t. This we can guarantee (in Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016: 984).

It was within this unstable context that the government announced the launch of Operation Fiela-Reclaim – commonly referred to as Operation Fiela, meaning ‘clean sweep’ in Sesotho – a crime fighting operation framed as a response to the xenophobic attacks of April (Nicolson, 2015a). The operation, as described on the South African government website, was aimed at ‘ridding communities of crime and criminals [...] to create a safe and secure environment for all in South Africa’¹⁴. However, of the 9 968 people arrested in raids across the country by the South African Police Service (SAPS), Department of Home Affairs officials, and the army between April and June 2015, 6669 were undocumented immigrants

¹⁴ South African Government, 2015, ‘Police on Operation Fiela/Reclaim 2015’, 30 April 2015, South African Government website. Available at: <https://www.gov.za/speeches/police-operation-fielareclaim-2015-30-apr-2015-0000>, Accessed 3 February 2018.

(Desai, 2015: 252), many of whom were arrested for alienage or for low-level crimes such as the possession of counterfeit goods (Naicker, 2016: 2). Between April and July 1 5396 people were deported, with a further 6781 people held for screening as they awaited deportation (Naicker, 2016: 2). The ‘safe and secure environment for all’ plainly did not extend to foreign nationals living in low-income areas of South Africa, who were routinely targeted in the raids. It is worth noting that under the Constitution the functions of the police services are to ‘prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain public order, to protect and secure the *inhabitants* of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law’ (Constitution, section 205(3) [my emphasis]). The Constitution is not only citizens are entitled to police protection; however, the often violent and dehumanising nature of the raids and detentions under Operation Fiela, and its explicit targeting of foreigners both documented and undocumented, clearly belied this mandate (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016: 992).

Operation Fiela raised immediate controversy across the country. The fact that the operation followed so closely on the heels of the xenophobic violence of April immediately ‘raised suspicions about its intentions’ (Desai, 2015: 252), many seeing the operation and its clear targeting of foreign nationals as little more than xenophobia in its own right, legitimised by the state (Nicolson, 2015b). The civil society group, Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), at the time complained of being unable to access detainees, some of whom were deported without receiving any legal counsel (Wallis, 2015). South African citizens who were married to or living with foreign nationals or who were themselves mistaken for ‘foreigners’ were also caught up in the sweeps (Wallis, 2015). In the wake of this controversy¹⁵, the government released a statement on October 19 2015, reiterating the official aims of the

¹⁵ Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) in particular, condemned the operation, submitting an urgent application to interdict search and arrest raids under Operation Fiela on the grounds that they were in fact unconstitutional and in violation of human rights. LHR argued that the raids, which often took place in the early hours of the morning, and which saw the police and the army kicking down doors into private residences, were unlawful in that police did not obtain warrants to search the homes and often engaged in intimidating and violent behaviour, including reports that police ‘stood on people’s heads’ as residences were searched (Wallis, 2015). The raids were justified under section 13(7) of the South African Police Service Act which states that the ‘National or Provincial Commissioner may, where it is reasonable in the circumstances in order to restore public order or to ensure the safety of the public within a particular area, in writing authorise that the particular area or any part thereof be cordoned off’ (SAPS, 1995). LHR argued in its application that the ‘provision is supposed to be utilised in situations in which there is an immediate need to restore order in an area’ (Wallis, 2015), and that, given there was no such ‘immediate need to restore order’, the raids should have followed normal legal processes and warrants should have been obtained beforehand. The conduct of the police and army was thus ‘a violation of individuals’ rights to privacy and dignity’ (Wallis, 2015). LHR further called for due process as set out in the Immigration Regulations to be respected with regards those detained during the operation, and that no person should be held for longer than 48 hours while their immigration status was ascertained (Wallis, 2015). LHR’s application, however, was struck off the roll at the Pretoria High Court on 23 June by Judge Jan Hiemstra, on the grounds that it ‘lacked urgency’ (Wallis, 2015).

operation against the claims that it disproportionately targeted poor immigrants. The statement¹⁶ says only that ‘the breakdown of all the arrests made clearly illustrates that both South Africans and foreign national [sic] were targeted’ – however, as noted above, over two thirds of arrests between April and June were of immigrants. The statement goes on to say that ‘the feedback received to date has been a positive one. The public has played a significant role in providing government with pointers to illegal activities that take place in their respective communities’. The implications of the last comment are concerning; the fact that foreign nationals are disproportionately and often falsely linked to criminal activity means that they are more likely to be reported to the police by locals wanting to rid their communities of foreigners who are blamed for societal problems. As Alfani Yoyo from the Coordinating Body of Refugee and Migrant Communities (CBRMC), a civil society organisation, stated at the time, Operation Fiela perpetuated ‘the perception that migrants are to be blamed for the social ills in the country...Operation Fiela hampers integration and cements the attitude of ‘us and them’’ (in Desai, 2015: 252).

The case of Operation Fiela speaks to a wider contradiction in the way in which state politics have attempted to deal with the issue of xenophobia in South Africa. Although the operation was ostensibly aimed at tackling xenophobia in communities after the 2015 attacks, it amounted in large part to a targeted campaign against foreign nationals in itself. In fact, it was clearly xenophobic. Justification by government hinged on the question of illegal immigration and criminality, arguing that Operation Fiela was not xenophobic as it only targeted undocumented immigrants. ‘Law-abiding’ foreign nationals would ‘have nothing to fear’, according to Phumla Williams, the spokesperson of the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) on Migration at the helm of the operation (Williams, 2015). Setting aside the fact that documented migrants, such as those with asylum seeker permits, were frequently detained in the raids, it is clearly a perverse logic that suggests widespread popular xenophobia can be countered with the mass detention and removal of immigrants. The clear implication is that the violent expulsion of foreigners is only ‘xenophobic’ when carried out by the public (and even then, attacks are often framed as mere criminality anyway, and seldom punished); when it is the state rooting out and expelling foreigners as in the case of Operation Fiela, these actions are not xenophobic but legitimate state policing and the enforcement of legislation. The effect, as Neocosmos (2008: 589) writes, is that while ‘state institutions have never

¹⁶ South African Government, 2015. ‘Operation Fiela Reclaim’. Government Communication and Information System (GCIS). 19 October 2015. Accessed September 22 2018. <https://www.gcis.gov.za/newsroom/media-releases/operation-fiela-reclaim>.

condoned violence against migrants, they have provided an environment that legitimises such violence’.

2.7. Concluding remarks in 2018

To bring this review up to date, recent years have seen further sporadic incidents of violence against foreign nationals throughout the country. In October 2015 angry locals in Grahamstown, a small town in the Eastern Cape, looted over 300 immigrant-owned shops and displaced over 500 people. The response by the municipality and the police was largely ineffectual, and arguably enabling of the violence (O’Halloran, 2016: 8). The police services did, however, inexplicably claim their handling of the crisis to be a success for Operation Fiela (*IOL News*, 2015a). Ten undocumented immigrants were arrested alongside those who were perpetrating the violence. In fact, as will be the subject of later chapters, it was a local, community-based social movement called the Unemployed People’s Movement which was instrumental in restoring calm and facilitating reintegration after the attack.

In February 2017, the businesses and homes of foreign nationals were looted and torched in Pretoria and Johannesburg, and an anti-immigration march held in Pretoria in the same month turned violent (*Business Day*, 2017). The then President Zuma afterwards told press, echoing statements made by former President Mbeki in 2008, that he did not think that South Africans are xenophobic, and that the march had in fact been against crime, and not against foreigners as reported¹⁷. The media, Zuma said, should avoid labelling popular action as xenophobic: ‘We love using phrases in South Africa that at times really cause unnecessary perceptions about us’ (*News24*, 2017), he opined.

In 2018, which marks the grim decennial of the May 2008 pogroms, attacks against foreigners continue, occasionally punctuating national headlines. State officials, such as the Democratic Alliance Mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, continue to make anti-foreigner remarks. ‘They’re holding our country to ransom’ said Mashaba, ‘And I’m going to

¹⁷ The march, organised by the Mamelodi Concerned Residents organisation, was according to the spokesperson of the group not anti-foreigner but against crime, drug dealing and prostitution. However, given that residents had been distributing pamphlets in the Mamelodi township ‘pointing out the social ills and high unemployment rates that they attribute to illegal immigrants’ (eNCA, 2017), and that the destination of the march was the Department of Home Affairs, the criminal activity that the march was protesting was plainly attached to the presence of foreign nationals.

be the last South African to allow it’¹⁸. Or, in a tweet about informal traders in Johannesburg: ‘We are [not] going to sit back and allow people like you to bring us Ebolas [sic] in the name of small business. Health of our people first. Our health facilities are already stretched to the limit’¹⁹. According to the 2018 Human Rights Watch World Report on South Africa, ‘authorities appeared reluctant to even publicly acknowledge xenophobia and take decisive action to combat it, including ensuring proper police investigations’ (2018: 1).

So far this chapter has been largely narrative. The aim has been to show empirically the ways in which state practices have produced and legitimised a hegemonic xenophobic discourse in post-apartheid South Africa. It should be noted that these are not the only factors which have contributed to the rise of xenophobia in the country, and following sections outline structural and social dynamics which have also aggravated anti-foreigner sentiment. However, the issue must be considered a fundamentally political one, as will be the argument of part two. For now, in summation, we have seen that as a central dimension of state discourse, repressive immigration legislation hostile to low-income immigrants (documented or otherwise), particularly from the rest of Africa, has clearly provided a basis for hegemonic xenophobic discourse in South Africa. This discourse is reinforced by statements from state officials and others which frame immigration as a national threat, as well as by inflated migration statistics presented by individuals, media, and institutions such as the Department of Home Affairs in alarmist language which pathologises and dehumanises undocumented immigrants in particular. Prevalent abuse of foreign nationals by police, immigration officials and within facilities like Lindela are a clear corollary of this discourse. Within the public sphere, hardening xenophobic attitudes which cut across class and race and the rise of violent attacks against foreigners show that xenophobia has become a dominant popular subjectivity (which, it will be argued, has principally been produced via state politics). The bloody events of May 2008 demonstrated the terrible capacity of this discourse; however, the state’s response was marked by denialism at the highest levels and a reluctance to recognise that the events signified a political crisis. The treatment of both perpetrators and victims in the months following demonstrated that the question of illegal immigration was to become a political red herring which diverted attention from the issue of xenophobia itself – whilst

¹⁸ Cited in Schwartz, A., 2018, “‘No one must be in SA without documentation’ – Mashaba’, *Mail & Guardian*, 30 April 2018. Available at <https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-30-no-one-must-be-in-sa-without-documentation-mashaba>. Accessed on 2 January 2019.

¹⁹ *News24*, 2018, ‘Mashaba in Twitter Spat Over “Ebolas” Remark’, 13 November 2018, Accessed January 12 2019, Available at <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mashaba-in-twitter-spat-over-ebolas-remark-20181113>.

perpetuating the 'Fortress South Africa' state discourse which arguably legitimates xenophobia in its own right. Finally, this Janus-faced logic was exemplified by Operation Fiela which, ostensibly launched to combat xenophobia, amounted precisely to state-sanctioned xenophobia in its own right – legitimated on the basis of thwarting illegal immigration. While it should already be clear that state politics and practices have at least to an extent produced xenophobic discourses in South Africa, I turn now to the literature to show that other explanatory approaches which prioritise social or structural factors are inadequate, precisely because they depoliticise what must be considered to be political subjectivities – as such leaving xenophobic subjectivity and political agency largely beyond thought (Neocosmos, 2016: 176).

PART TWO: UNDERSTANDING XENOPHOBIA

2.8. Introduction

So far I have provided an historical overview of post-apartheid xenophobia, with the aim of showing how the politics of the new South African state have produced and legitimised a hegemonic xenophobic discourse in the country. Here I expand on this contextual discussion by setting out the dominant theoretical explanations for xenophobia in the literature. There are three broad axes of explanation²⁰. The first and most prevalent prioritises material and economic factors, maintaining that xenophobia arises predominately as a result of broad structural dynamics such as poverty, inequality, globalization, unemployment, lack of service delivery, and so on. While such factors may account for the desperation of South Africa's poor, they do not adequately explain why it is that violence against so-called foreigners is seen as a more or less legitimate political choice, nor why it is that foreigners are singled out as the targets of that violence. Nor can these factors tell us why some areas have experienced violence while others of comparable or even worse socio-economic conditions did not. Explanations centred on economic arguments are also based on an implicit assumption that it is only the poor who are disposed to xenophobia. This is empirically not the case, as noted in the first part of this chapter.

A second course of explanation emphasizes psycho-social factors such as 'Afro-' or 'negrophobia' and the fact that, prior to 1990, South Africans were relatively isolated from Africans from the rest of the continent, who they came to see as a threatening and unknown 'other'. However, such accounts, which frequently frame xenophobia in terms of a social pathology, apart from ignoring the empirical fact that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have also been targets of popular xenophobic violence, tend to psychologize and thus depoliticise the issue. Both structural and psycho-social explanations leave little room to think of political agency, and people are generally regarded as reacting more or less automatically negatively to a set of social conditions with which they are confronted, as we shall see.

A third set of explanations looks at historical and political factors. Insofar as these

²⁰ Here to some extent I follow Misago (2016) who groups the literature into three general categories: material/economic, psycho-social, and historical, political and institutional explanations.

explanations see xenophobia as a state politics (and do not just historicize the issue as a seemingly inevitable outcome of South Africa's torrid political past) they are most useful in helping us to understand the question of xenophobia in South Africa. As noted, anti-foreigner sentiment (as has been measured in attitude surveys) is evident across class and racial groupings and is not solely the province of poor South Africans. Moreover, as we have seen, xenophobia is clearly and frequently revealed in the practices and policies of the state (and its apparatuses such as the police) and in the statements of government and other officials. It is then plainly not explicable as simply or fundamentally a consequence of poverty or other broad socio-economic conditions, nor as a violent social pathology.

Finally, it should be noted that this section, and this work more generally, does not purport to offer a comprehensive explanation of the causes of xenophobia in South Africa, a project which is far beyond the scope possible here, and which has in fact been undertaken in depth elsewhere²¹. Rather, the focus here is on outlining dominant accounts for the purpose of showing that broad sociological, or psycho-sociological, factors cannot account for the issue of xenophobia, because they 'depoliticise what are clearly political subjectivities' (Neocosmos, 2016: 176), and see people as reacting more or less automatically to the social conditions in which they are located. The aim of the section is then, firstly, to situate this work in relation to existing literature on the subject, and secondly, to argue that xenophobia must be thought of as a political subjectivity, derived from state politics, which has emerged particularly clearly in South Africa since the end of the anti-apartheid struggle. These state politics have become hegemonic in popular discourse and political practice across all divisions of South African society and thus have contributed to the creation of a xenophobic culture in the country. There is no one typical sociological or psychological profile for the South African xenophobe (SAMP, 2008: 4). It is crucial, therefore, that xenophobia is not considered to be merely a reaction to structural or sociological factors, in which 'xenophobic politics are thus depoliticised and political agency, however disastrous its parameters, remains largely beyond thought' (Neocosmos, 2016: 176). If we return to Lazarus' fundamental axiom that *people think* and that thought is not reducible to social place, it follows that we cannot simply reduce people's actions to their social class, poverty or identity. It can rather be seen that people are sometimes capable – through intellectual and practical effort, commitment and struggle – of thinking beyond their social location and of actively resisting hegemonic state politics, such as xenophobia and other forms of oppression. If we

²¹ See chiefly, Michael Neocosmos' *Foreign Natives, Native Foreigners* (2010a).

explain xenophobia in structural or psychological terms alone, then we render such resistance and alternatives illegible and inexplicable.

2.9. Xenophobic attitudes and xenophobic violence

Beyond the three broad explanatory approaches noted above, there are many important localized and micro-political factors which can help to provide a more detailed and nuanced account of the outbreak of violence in specific contexts. These include factors such as local governance and elite power, community organisations, and other ‘local conditions and dynamics’ in ‘the localised political economy of the violence’ (Misago, 2016: 121; see also Nieftagodien, 2008). These are important factors in determining specific conditions in which violence has arisen and should not be discounted, but they will not be discussed here as the focus of this section is not to explain particular episodes of xenophobic violence, but rather to account for the foundation of xenophobia in general terms within society. Such an endeavour is not only necessary but also logically prior to any conjunctural or particular factors. This leads to an important distinction between xenophobic attitudes, which cut across class and race, and xenophobic violence, which has taken place largely in low-income communities. The following suggests a way to make sense of this apparent contradiction.

Frequently, poverty and related social ills like crime are cited as reasons for the outbreak of xenophobic violence; however, as noted above, economic deprivation cannot automatically explain violence at all, nor can ‘criminality’ account for systematic violence against (those thought to be) foreign, as this itself requires explanation. The problem with these accounts is that they necessarily either frame the poor as inherently violent, or they frame xenophobia as ‘merely’ criminal. If xenophobic violence is simply collective criminality (as frequently implied in the statements of state officials, including those of former President Mbeki in the wake of the 2008 pogroms (see Dodson, 2010: 7)) on the part of desperate individuals who see vulnerable foreigners as a meal-ticket, then the fact of xenophobia itself – i.e. the fact that xenophobic attitudes are prevalent in South Africa beyond the episodic violent outbreaks – is obscured. If we assert instead that xenophobic attitudes are widespread, but that it is largely the poor who express these attitudes through overtly violent means, then we must attempt to provide some reason for this to be the case – if not, we are left with the assertion that the poor are simply violent. A combination of these positions – such as: ‘xenophobic attitudes are pervasive in South Africa, but they find violent

expression by the poor due to the exigencies of poverty’ – still falls short for the following reason. As already noted, poverty can account for the desperation of the poor, and it may in part account for some of the frequent characteristics of xenophobic attacks (such as looting and theft), but it still does not explain why poor people who are not otherwise ‘criminal’ can see *as legitimate* the violence unleashed against foreign nationals, the appropriation of their possessions, and their expulsion from community and country. It appears then that what is central is the question of the legitimacy of violence in impoverished South African communities. I turn here to Neocosmos’ formulation of ‘civil society’ and ‘uncivil society’.

As Neocosmos argues, a characteristic of the post-colonial African state is that it does not govern all people in society in the same way; in fact, ‘its subjective politics differ and, consequently, violence is not uniformly deployed according to the same logic everywhere’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 414). This distinction is most clear between rural and urban settings – where rural societies are very often ruled through appeal to categories of culture, custom and tradition²² – but state politics also differ radically in different domains of urban life. Moreover, these domains are not reducible to spatial location (for example, modes of customary rule may also be expressed in urban areas (ibid., 415) but are subjective political domains in which modes of thinking politics differ, according to the relationship which people share with state power. Chatterjee (2004), drawing on Foucault’s (1991) notion of ‘governmentality’, distinguishes between the ways in which state rule differs between those whom it regards as citizens, who inhabit a liberal-democratic and rights-based relationship with the state, and populations which are ‘wholly descriptive and empirical’ (Chatterjee, 2004: 36), subjects of the administrative policies and technicisation of the ‘developmental’ state. This has given rise to two distinct but interrelated domains of state politics in urban settings – the existence of which is determined by the state, through the different modes of rule deployed by the state in each (Neocosmos, 2016: 251).

In the first, largely middle-class domain of ‘civil society’, the relationship between people and state power is one based on a liberal-democratic conception of rights, citizenship and the law. The state does not, generally, rule in civil society through the deployment of violence but through a regime of rights – such as rights of private property, human rights, and juridical rights of equality before the law. The second domain, however, which Neocosmos calls ‘uncivil society’ (not ‘uncivil’ in any moral sense but because citizenship is here not the

²² The present work does not discuss the politics of traditional society. For more on how modes of state politics differ in rural areas see Neocosmos, 2016, Chapter 15. See also Mamdani, 1996.

primary relation between people and the state) is ‘a domain of politics where rules are bent, political relations are often informal (if not downright illegal) and the majority are only tenuously rights-bearing citizens’ (ibid., 415). The form of rule deployed by the state in uncivil society finds its antecedent in the practices of the colonial/apartheid state, under which the governed were not citizens possessing what Arendt (1973: 296) has called ‘the right to have rights’, but populations to be managed not through the rule of law but chiefly through biopolitical tools of control, and through routine and frequently extreme violence. Although under the new liberal-democratic state all members of society (with a claim to indigeneity) are formally citizens, in reality the state politics that govern uncivil society allocate people in that domain to a subjective political space beyond citizenship, the rule of law and a culture of rights. In this domain, people ‘are subjected to dehumanising practices, indignity and “unfreedom”’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 417), patronage relations and clientelism frequently characterise relationships between people and local elites, including political elites, and state violence is commonplace (ibid., 416). Over the years since democratisation the South African state has deployed increasing levels of violence within uncivil society, often in reaction to widespread ‘service delivery protests’, through the frequent evictions of land occupations, as part of ostensible crime-fighting initiatives accompanied by often egregious displays of police brutality, or against grassroots activists and social movements which challenge the state (see, for example, Neocosmos, 2016: 176-181; Pithouse, 2008a; Bruce, 2002; Chance, 2010). The gunning down of 34 protesting miners during the Marikana massacre of August 2012 was perhaps the most appalling incident within a litany of state violence against those who are not truly counted as citizens of the South African state, but rather to an increasing extent as its enemy.

It is clear that state rule does indeed differ between civil society and uncivil society, and, importantly for the discussion at hand, as a result ‘the kind of politics deemed to be possible and impossible in each case also differs’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 417). That is to say that the mode of rule of the state is the primary determinant in the creation of political subjectivity;

or, similar to Gramsci's conception of hegemony (1971)²³, the politics of the state determine, by and large, the way the political is thought. This is not to say that people do not have the capacity to think beyond and resist oppressive state subjectivities (they do, and this will be the subject of later chapters), but such thought is not an automatic response and requires serious political effort. Thus for Lazarus, political thought that marks a subjective break with the dominant politics of the state and the status quo – political thought which for him has the capacity of being irreducible to that which exists, of which the state is curator and custodian – is not always present (Lazarus, 2015: 4). For the most part, people's thinking of politics is overwhelmingly structured by dominant state subjectivities, and in this way, in the absence of alternative political prescriptions, people act and react politically in the way they are treated politically by the state, thus contributing to the reproduction of the different domains of state politics.

In civil society, therefore, political thought and action is generally structured by the rights and obligations people are afforded as citizens of the state, a commitment to the rule of law and constitutionalism, and the principles of an independent judiciary and a free media. Violence in civil society is usually deployed by the state as a last resort (Neocosmos, 2016: 251). However, in uncivil society, where state rule is not always mediated through citizenship, rights and the law, but increasingly through patronage and coercion, political subjectivity is structured by the state in such a way that violence comes to be seen as a legitimate way of solving political problems. This gives rise to what has been called by the media and others a 'culture of violence'. However, crucially, this is not essential or ingrained but is structured and delimited by dominant state political subjectivities; as such this violence is systemic. To this culture of violence must be added the subjectivity of entitlement to national resources which those in uncivil society frequently see as their right at any cost. I return to this point in detail in the final section of this chapter; as such I leave it here for now.

Consequently, in uncivil society, when usually there is an absence of affirmative

²³ In simple terms, Gramsci's conception of hegemony can be conceived of as the process through which the state (or ruling class) produces a form of consensus (through which it rules alongside coercion) – thereby shaping the way the political is thought. As Gibson (2011: 76) puts it: 'Hegemony can be conceived of as processes of political, economic and social consensus, involving the interplay of force, consent and complicity, and implying a struggle or contestation in a number of different spheres of society at the same time'. Laitin (cit. Kendie, 2006: 95) describes hegemony as 'political forging – whether through coercion or elite bargaining – and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a state, and the concurrent idealization of that scheme into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense'. In relation to my argument, through the function of hegemony, differing forms of state rule shape the ways in which the political is conceived within different subjective domains of society – that is, the political 'common sense' (while it is 'contested and never absolute' (Gibson, 2011: 76)) is produced by state modes of rule.

politics, 'repressive violence, indeed a "culture of violence", is simply allowed to fester and its prevalence is misunderstood as a natural effect of poverty' (Neocosmos, 2016: 417). It is then the case that it *is* possible to talk of systemic violence in uncivil society; however, this is entirely different to saying that African townships are simply violent places. This is because uncivil society is not a 'place' but a subjective domain which exists, like civil society, on the basis of different modes of state rule, and, to reiterate, the political choices made therein, in the absence of alternative conceptions, are structured by the subjectivities deployed by the state. The result is that 'within uncivil society, the dominant political subjectivity remains precisely a state politics of patronage, violence, fear and xenophobia' (ibid., 429).

It is important to maintain here that although political subjectivities are structured by hegemonic state discourses, people are not without agency. Xenophobic violence is in itself a political choice; it is not 'merely' criminal, nor is it a spontaneous result of any inherent violent nature. Rather, it is state political subjectivities that shape the kinds of choices with respect to which people can have agency. In this way, violence against foreign nationals can be seen by those who primarily relate to the state through uncivil society to be a legitimate political choice – certainly, it is a choice – as it is not so different from the treatment of foreigners by the state itself. However, where state violence can masquerade as crime-prevention or immigration control and so be legitimate in the eyes of civil society (as in the case of so-called Operation Fiela in 2015), popular violence against foreign nationals is framed as irrational or instinctive.

Yet, given that the rights of those in uncivil society are not protected by the state as they are in civil society, and that people rarely have the same recourse to courts to protect their constitutional rights when infringed upon, it is not surprising that people feel compelled to do their own 'dirty work', which the liberal middle classes of civil society can willingly leave to the state. Statements by some xenophobes themselves reflect this clearly, for example:

As long as the foreigners are here we will always have unemployment and poverty here in South Africa [...] if the government does not do something people will see what to do to solve the problem because it means it is not the government problem, it is our problem (cit. Misago et al., 2009: 28).

This amounts to a clear expression of political agency – however, it is also circumscribed by a particular set of conditions originating in and enforced by a violent state politics. It is not, as one author has described it, simply an example of how 'popular democracy in action is not necessarily a pretty sight' (Glaser, 2008: 54).

Finally, to understand agency, or political choice, in this or any context must be to locate the agent within the set of configurations, be they structural conditions or political hegemonies, within which the agency of her choice is limited. To do otherwise is to reduce the question of agency to a profoundly empty concept. In what follows I would like to distance the statement *people think*, which is really a commitment to the inalienable human capacity to radically think and act beyond such configurations of state power, from a conception of ‘agency’ which means little more than an ability to act on one’s interests within the established consensus, either through ‘empowerment’ bestowed by civil society representation, or through recourse to nativistic violence (as Glaser seems to imply above). If these are indeed the choices, then, as Neocosmos (2010a: xiii) writes,

[a] choice exercised within such parameters is in fact a simulacrum of agency, a pseudo-choice; in reality it is no choice at all for it requires no thought, but the mechanical reiteration of the logic and statements of those in power.

2.10. Academic accounts

Following Misago (2016), it is possible to group the existing academic work on xenophobia in South Africa under three main headings: material or economic explanations, psycho-social explanations, and historical and political explanations. The following briefly maps these three positions, and concludes by suggesting that xenophobic politics must be seen as a state subjectivity that has both been allowed to flourish and in some quarters been actively encouraged in the new South Africa, much in the way that Frantz Fanon predicted in 1961 – but one that can be and often is, to greater and lesser extents, intellectually and actively contested where there is a subscription to alternative political prescriptions.

2.10.1. *Material/economic explanations*

Accounts which stress the primary importance of broad socio-economic factors in determining the causes of xenophobia in South Africa are the most widespread in the literature (Dodson, 2010: 5; SAMP, 2008: 13). They often point to the failure of ‘service delivery’ on the part of the South African state, and generally argue that impoverished South Africans scapegoat foreigners who are seen as a socio-economic threat and competitors for scarce resources such as jobs, housing, state benefits, and so on (see, for example, Gelb, 2008; Morris, 1998; Steenkamp, 2009; Tshitereke, 1999; Pillay, 2008). Poverty and relative

deprivation are seen as the main drivers of conflict; Steenkamp (2009: 440), for example, writes that in South Africa ‘foreigners have become scapegoats for social and economic ills’; Pillay (2008: 94) similarly maintains that ‘class inequality as a systemic problem of uneven development lay at the root of the [2008] violence’. The general position of this category of explanation is captured in this statement from the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI):

[D]emocratic transition in South Africa heralded great promise for South Africa’s black population, but substantial positive economic change has been achieved only for relatively few, leading to widespread frustration amongst the population and a tendency to jealously guard against any perceived encroachment (CRAI, 2009: 6).

More specific accounts consider particular aspects of this deprivation, a few of which I will briefly map here, in no particular order. First is the issue of public housing in South Africa. Nieftagodien (2008), looking at the particular context of the Alexandra township where the May 2008 violence began, shows that a renewal project in the area increased residents’ expectations, particularly regarding housing opportunities, and exacerbated their anxiety of being excluded from these benefits (2008: 69). This heightened tensions between ‘insiders’ with a nationalist claim to state entitlements through citizenship and ‘outsiders’, seen to be encroaching on these entitlements. Another issue that has raised contention is the renting or sale of state-funded RDP houses to non-nationals. Only South African citizens over the age of 21 and with a household income of less than R3500 per month are eligible for RDP housing, and, legally, a recipient is not allowed to ‘sell or otherwise alienate his or her dwelling or site within a period of eight years’²⁴. However, many houses *are* sold or rented by their owners during this period, sometimes to foreign nationals, which may heighten the perception that foreigners are usurping resources which should exclusively belong to citizens – particularly as many South Africans are still waiting for RDP housing of their own²⁵. The HSRC report published in 2008 called for an audit of all RDP housing to ensure that their occupants were South African citizens, noting that

²⁴ *Mail and Guardian*, 2015, ‘Govt seeks to discipline those selling RDP houses’, 8 June 2015, Available at <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-08-govt-seeks-to-discipline-those-selling-rdp-houses>, Accessed 27 October 2017.

²⁵ *News24*, 2011, ‘Foreigners in RDP houses upset locals’, 25 January 2011, Available at <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Foreigners-in-RDP-houses-upset-locals-20110125>, Accessed 27 October 2017.

One of the most important triggers of the recent violence has been the occupation of national housing stock by non-South African citizens [...] The sale or rent of RDP houses to non-South African citizens exacerbates the housing shortage, compounds the pressure on informal settlements and foments community tensions around housing (HSRC, 2008: 9).

Such a recommendation, however, fails to take into consideration the fact, that for some South Africans, the sale or rental of their RDP house during the mandatory eight-year period may provide an otherwise unavailable and possibly indispensable source of income, and may in fact be a mutually beneficial arrangement (Sharp, 2008: 3). Far more egregious are widespread reports of corrupt local government officials who illegally sell and rent RDP houses or award them to political connections²⁶. Nonetheless, the issue of housing availability is a contentious one in all respects in South Africa, and it is likely that the presence of foreign nationals in state housing may indeed produce resentment and increase the anxiety of those who have been unable to acquire housing themselves (see also Hayem, 2013: 84).

A second commonly-cited issue is the notion that foreign nationals living in South Africa ‘steal jobs’ from locals. This perception is compounded by a dire lack of employment opportunities in South Africa (Statistics South Africa ²⁷ places the current rate of unemployment at 27.7 % as of the first quarter of 2017 – the highest since 2003). Dodson (2010: 6) points out that there is a degree of legitimacy to this notion – not, as she says, ‘because employment is a zero-sum game’, but because migrants, particularly those undocumented, are sometimes hired by unscrupulous employers at lower than minimum wage, and are often willing to work for less money than their South African counterparts²⁸ (either out of desperation, or, for itinerant workers or those sending money home, the wages may have greater buying power when converted back into the currencies of their home countries). While the claim that migrants put pressure on local job markets is frequently touted by state officials – for example, the Shadow Minister of Home Affairs, Democratic Alliance MP, Haniff Hoosen, said in March 2018 that ‘[t]he employment of illegal and

²⁶ *IOL News*, 2017, ‘Corrupt politicians selling RDP houses will be in firing line’, 3 January 2017, Available at <https://www.iol.co.za/news/corrupt-politicians-selling-rdp-houses-will-be-in-firing-line-7317243>, Accessed January 25 2018.

See also, Ngobeni’s (2007) investigation into housing corruption in the Maphata Village in Mopani District, Limpopo Province, where 70 RDP houses were allocated between 2001 and 2006. 51 of the beneficiaries of these houses were relatives of the Ward Councillor.

²⁷ Statistics South Africa, 2017, *Quarterly Labour Force Survey*, Available at: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=9960>, Accessed 13 June 2018.

²⁸ For example, Misago (2016: 102) quotes one South African, who complains:

‘When a white man takes five people for employment, about three are foreigners and two South Africans. On arrival at the firm, a white man asks ‘how much do you want?’ Foreigners always quote a small amount. When South Africans state their money, which is normal, employers say ‘no,’ they will employ foreigners because they accept small money.’

undocumented immigrants has a direct impact on our job creation abilities'²⁹ – the impact of immigration on labour markets is limited, according to a recent OECD report. While the report finds that immigrants are overrepresented in some sectors, and some negative impact on native-born employment rates can be observed at the regional level, it finds no evidence that immigration decreases local employment at the national level. In fact, the report finds that immigration has a limited but positive overall effect on local labour markets (OECD, 2018: 30-31). However, the popular perception remains.

Relatedly, the issue of small business ownership is also a point of contention – particularly with regards immigrants from countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Bangladesh who frequently open shops in South African communities and townships. This has led to the perception, and in some cases the reality, that foreign-owned shops undermine local businesses. In my own research in Grahamstown in 2017, the majority of respondents stated that the increase in the numbers of foreign-owned shops in the community had directly resulted in the closure of South African shops in the township. Although some respondents stated that this was simply a healthy effect of market competition, there was general agreement that this contributed to a sense of resentment on the part of some locals who are unable to compete with these businesses – primarily because they do not have the commercial networks nor the capital to buy products in bulk so as to be able to resell them at competitive prices. It is clear, given that xenophobic violence often takes the form of looting of the foreigners' shops and the expulsion of business owners from community (Somalis, for example, have frequently been targeted in this way), that the issue of small-business ownership is an important one (see also Misago, 2016) – although, given the reliance of many poor South Africans on these shops, the relationship between the foreign shops and the community is often ambivalent. I return to this point later³⁰.

Another issue, relating in part to questions of employment and business ownership, is the perception that foreign men 'steal' South African women. This is in part due to the fact that migration to South African townships is majority male (Dodson and Oelofse, 2000: 138), but also due to the perception that foreign men, in particular business owners who are considered well-off and are seen to be 'flashing money around' (ibid., 139), are able to compete favourably with poor, often unemployed South African men for female attention (ibid., 141).

²⁹ Haniff Hoosen MP, 2018, 'South Africa must prioritise medical skills development', 13 March 2018, Available at <https://www.da.org.za/2018/03/south-africa-must-prioritise-medical-skills-development/>, Accessed 5 December 2018.

³⁰ See Chapter 5, p.136

They are also accused of encouraging prostitution and the ‘corruption’ of South African women and girls (ibid., 134), as well as marrying South African women to gain access to residency permits.

Finally, some structural explanations blame South Africa’s porous borders for the rise of xenophobia in the country (see, for example, Coplan, 2008; HSRC, 2008; Cronje, 2008). However, as aforementioned, immigration statistics are frequently exaggerated, and nor has it been the case, as Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2011: 60) found in relation to the May 2008 violence, that areas with the highest number of foreign inhabitants have been most affected by violence, despite discourse which saw an influx in migration due to the economic crisis in Zimbabwe as having contributed directly to that attack (Misago, 2016: 108). In fact, many of those targeted in the 2008 violence had been living in the same areas for years, and were not themselves part of the new migration influx (ibid., 109).

It is clear that socio-economic factors including poverty and relative deprivation, joblessness, and the state’s failure to deliver services have contributed to the perception of immigration as a threat to the livelihoods of poor South Africans. This perception is bolstered by myth and hyperbole around inflated immigration figures, alarmist claims that foreigners drain the economy and usurp national entitlements such as housing, jobs, services (and women), as well as the stereotyping of foreigners as drug dealers, pimps and child traffickers. As Crush and Ramachandran (2014: 22) remind us, however, ‘[m]igration myths are not epiphenomena or post-hoc rationalizations; they have powerful mobilizing and animating effects’. Such factors have plainly increased frustration, anxiety and anger on the part of South Africa’s poor; it is thus not difficult to draw a line between socio-economic factors and the xenophobic violence which takes place in low-income areas. However, ultimately, explanations that emphasize material and economic concerns are largely descriptive. They do not account for the fact that xenophobic attitudes, as SAMP has illustrated, are not limited to the poor in South Africa; nor is it empirically the case that the poorest areas have been those to engage in violence (Landau, 2010: 3; Fauvelle-Amar and Segatti, 2011). They also do not enable us to think about those sites where xenophobia has been actively resisted in impoverished communities, or the ambivalent relationships that many communities share with their immigrant populations (Sharp, 2008).

Principally, socio-economic explanations frame xenophobia namely as a result of poverty – as such, violence in poor communities is explicable on these grounds. Yet this smacks of a tautology: at the risk of being reductive, such explanations may follow thus:

‘Why is there xenophobic violence in poor communities? Because the poor are xenophobic. Why are they xenophobic? Because they are poor’. Furthermore, aside from the fact that these explanations frequently point to state failures, they are often not far from dominant state discourses themselves in that they tend to foreground the perceived socio-economic pressure that migration places on the South African state. This has led to analysts like Sharp (2008), in his thoughtful critique of the 2008 report on xenophobia by the HSRC, to condemn the ‘Fortress South Africa’ approach often implicit in this line of explanation which, in line with the interests of the state and national elites, sees the fact of immigration itself as intrinsic to the crisis of xenophobia in that it increases competition for resources, within the logic of a zero-sum game. All thought of politics is essentially removed from the debate.

In sum, although these structural factors are important in the discussion of near any political issue in South Africa, including xenophobia, explanations which reduce the crisis to foremost an expression of social location, or aggrieved citizens reacting violently to their impoverishment, depoliticise the issue and fail to recognise xenophobia as a political subjectivity that is evident throughout South African state and social discourse. Like many other political questions in South Africa, it is reduced to a matter of delivery, development or legislation, with an underlying assumption that if service delivery is improved, if greater access to resources and opportunities are provided, and most importantly if legislation is enforced to reduce immigration then the problem of xenophobia itself would resolve. Primarily, as Crush and Ramachandran (2014: 13) write, when xenophobia is conceived ‘primarily as the outcome of limited material realities and economic competition between citizens and “foreigners”, then the frames of reference are automatically loaded against the latter.’ Resentments towards immigrants are seen as ‘inevitable, inescapable aspects of the social landscape’ which ultimately ‘invigorates the underlying rationale for xenophobia, the very idea that the presence of migrants and refugees poses a perpetual threat to the legitimate insiders’ (ibid.).

2.10.2. Psycho-social explanations

A second category of explanations are what Misago (2016: 117) calls ‘psycho-social’ accounts, which tend to focus on the perceived ‘otherness’ of immigrants entering South African communities. One argument, which Harris (2002: 4) refers to as the ‘isolation hypothesis’, situates foreignness or otherness itself at the heart of xenophobic hostility towards foreigners. This explanation postulates that apartheid-era legislation which enforced

boundaries not only internationally between South Africans and other Africans, but also internally between South Africans themselves, engendered a fear or mistrust of foreigners who represented an unknown 'other' from which South Africans had long been insulated. Morris (1998: 1125), for example, argues that this historical isolation has affected South Africans' willingness to accommodate others. He writes: 'There is little doubt that the brutal environment created by apartheid with its enormous emphasis on boundary maintenance has also impacted on people's ability to be tolerant of difference' (1998: 1125).

While one would expect that the isolation of South Africans from other Africans and from each other during the apartheid years may have increased tensions and hostility towards perceived otherness, it is not, as Harris (2002: 5) points out, immediately clear why, automatically, 'the unknown produces anxiety and aggression' – especially to the degree in which it has been produced in the South African case. Could not isolation produce curiosity or interest, for example? In a sense, although asserting that this 'intolerance of difference' is historically produced – which in any case may be belied by the many ways in which South Africans and foreigners *do* integrate and cooperate (see Sharp, 2008; Sichone, 2008) – this intolerance becomes framed as a type of social pathology. In other words, xenophobia is framed as a disease which has come to be ingrained in the South African collective social psyche, even as a marker of apartheid trauma. We might ask, however, why then have South Africans apparently become more, rather than less, intolerant of difference, despite increasing interface between South Africans and foreigners since the early 1990s? It is also true in fact that South Africa has a long history of migrant labour from neighbouring African countries, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho, and migrant labour from the whole region worked together in the mining and agricultural sectors in particular. While state power encouraged ethnic divisions, there was little difference in the ways in which black South African and foreign ethnicities were interpellated under apartheid (see Neocosmos, 2010a). Moreover, such accounts of the historical persistence of differences from apartheid to today forget that during the 1980s there existed a popular political subjectivity in South Africa which, to a large extent, eschewed differences between ethnic, national and even racial groupings in the struggle against the apartheid state. These arguments will be presented in detail presently.

Other accounts explain the 'otherness' which foreign migrants represent in racial terms. There is, as already noted, a clear racial demarcation between which foreigners are subject to xenophobic practices and hostility and which, by and large, are not. For this reason, xenophobia in South Africa has often been coded as 'Afro-' or 'negrophobic' (Matsinhe,

2011; Gqola, 2008; Mngxitama, 2008). Matsinhe (2011), for instance, discusses the ‘ideology of *Makwerekwere*’ in South Africa. Drawing on the work of Fanon, who argued that black people were ‘phobogenic’ to whites – that is, ‘a stimulus to anxiety’ (Fanon, 1952: 151) – Matsinhe (2011: 295) suggests that ‘Africans are phobogenic unto themselves, and that Africa is a stimulus to its own anxiety’. The central thrust of this argument is that while the end of apartheid signalled the dissolution of formally inscribed racism in South Africa, colonial/apartheid relations which positioned whiteness and blackness respectively within the self–other dialectic have persisted. The discourse of South African exceptionalism, which, as Matsinhe (2011: 301) correctly argues, predates apartheid, has long positioned South Africa as distinct from the rest of the continent, more advanced in industrial and liberal democratic terms, and therefore closer to ‘the west’, Europe, or the ideation of the white modern ‘Self’. Within self–other dialectics of recognition, the discourse of South African exceptionalism is of course related to and authorised by a discourse of ‘African’ un-exceptionalism. The continent continues to represent a place of lack, of famine and disease, war and dictators. Bio-cultural (Harris, 2002: 173) signifiers and perceived physical dissimilarities – such as darker skin, ‘outlandish’ clothes, or pungent smell – in what Freud would call a ‘narcissism of minor differences’³¹ (1930: 114), are coded as indicators of an essential ‘otherness’. In other words, Matsinhe argues that the ideology of *makwerekwere*, through an internalised racism and coloniality of thought, positions Africans from the continent as less modern, less civilised, less clean, and further from the colonial ideal of whiteness than South Africans. This has clear political ramifications, if we consider, for example, the dissonance between the ideals of Pan-Africanism and an African Renaissance touted by figures such as former president Mbeki, and the temptation to see and present South Africa as ultimately closer to European modernity and therefore the suitable geopolitical leader on the continent. As Matsinhe writes:

³¹ As Freud wrote of the ‘narcissism of minor differences’: ‘It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness. I once discussed the phenomenon that it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other as well, that are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other – like the Spaniards and the Portuguese, for instance, the North Germans and the South Germans, the English and the Scots and so on’ (Freud, 1930: 114).

The almost exclusive loathing of African foreign nationals in South Africa suggests that, to a lesser or greater extent, South Africans – their social relations, their interdependencies, their attitudes towards life, their habitus, their personality structure, their collective conscious and unconscious, and their emotions – bear the imprints of colonial/apartheid relations (2011: 300)

While it is clear that racism, colonialism and apartheid have left their mark on South African social relations, and continue to be sustained in many forms throughout the country, accounts which prioritise the psycho-social dimensions of xenophobia run into two main problems. Firstly, although xenophobic violence in South Africa is indubitably racialized and most commonly targets black foreigners from the rest of the continent, this is not exclusively the case. As Landau (2010: 3) argues, '[u]nless we accept a binary view of race dividing the world into 'white' and 'blight', negrophobia cannot explain regular attacks on Chinese and South Asians. Nor does it help us understand why citizens of Swaziland and Lesotho were left alone and some South Africans targeted'. While it may be the case that ultimate white supremacy in apartheid racial taxonomy did indeed have the effect, at least to some degree, of engendering a 'white or blight' binary in the South African imagination of race, the more complicated intersections between racial groups in South Africa – black, white, coloured, Indian, etc. – would seem to belie such an assertion. Secondly, while it should not be disputed that colonialism/apartheid necessarily bore socio-psychological consequences, the framing of xenophobia as a violent, Pavlovian response ultimately pathologises those who are seen to exhibit such behaviour (most often, those who are poor and black). The role of state politics and their hegemony in South African society is once again mystified.

2.10.3. Historical and political explanations

While both accounts above help us to understand dimensions of the crisis, they fall short in that they depoliticise the issue of xenophobia by framing it either as a product of socio-economic factors or as a form of social pathology, thus sociologizing and psychologizing it – leaving political agency 'beyond thought' (Neocosmos, 2016: 176). More useful are explanations in which the political as well as the historical takes primacy, not simply to provide a political-historical context in which to situate the two previous arguments (i.e. to explain the material/economic or psycho-social arguments in political and historical terms), but rather to show how widespread xenophobic attitudes in South Africa have become entrenched through a xenophobic state discourse and exclusionary conception of national identity based on indigeneity as the basis for entitlement. That is, the aim here is to show that

xenophobia must be considered as a hegemonic political subjectivity which has emerged from a specific state politics. Here I draw primarily on Neocosmos' extensive work on South African xenophobia, from his 2006 book (later expanded in 2010 after the 2008 pogroms) *Foreign Natives, Native Foreigners*, to his 2016 work, *Thinking Freedom in Africa: Toward a Theory of Emancipatory Politics*.

An understanding of post-apartheid xenophobia in political terms calls for consideration of three broad historical frames: the history of migratory labour in the country, the popular-political emancipatory sequence which resulted in democratisation, and the process and character of nation formation and state rule from 1990 onwards. These are important not simply for historical contextualisation, as I wish to steer away from an historicist analysis which determines the antecedents for modern xenophobia by way of examining history teleologically. Because historical analysis looks at the objective passage of time within which persons and groups are situated and 'make history', the tendency is to visualise a *telos* of history which necessarily implies causality and linearity. However, particularly in relation to Africa which has historically been positioned as having been 'acted upon' by history, a continent of victims of history rather than its agents, historicist analysis can exclude an analysis of political subjectivity. This is because historicism itself 'structures a state mode of thinking' in that 'this process always "objectifies" and naturalizes subjectivity' (Neocosmos, 2012: 532). So while we must of course look at South African history to understand xenophobia in the country today, it is the history of changing political subjectivities which is of interest here, rather than the construction of a genealogy of xenophobia as if it has some Hegelian essential nature that can be traced *ex-post-facto* through analysis of the violent permutations of South Africa's past. Because the effect of historicism is to totalise and in doing so reduce consciousness to social categories recognisable as political, structural, identitarian, or through some other moniker identifiable through state political thinking, there is little room for an understanding of the subjective breaks which can only be recognised in their own terms, and as discontinuous and singular (Neocosmos, 2012b: 533; 2016: 42-43). So in order to be able to think the current political subjective break with state politics demonstrated through a praxis of intellectual and practical resistance to the politics of xenophobia, we must think past a totalising historicist analysis of xenophobia in which this resistance can only be recognised in terms of anomaly.

2.10.3.1. Migratory labour in South Africa

The history of migrant labour in South Africa is significant because of the ways in which the social divisions which stemmed from the apartheid labour system, and the dismantling of this system after apartheid, have had an important bearing on the state interpellation of citizenship and national identity since 1990. As Neocosmos (2010a: 22) argues in *Foreign Natives, Native Foreigners*, what is important here is to understand ‘the connections between labour migration on the one hand and citizenship on the other, as these processes resulted from, and in turn impacted upon, the relations between state and people’. The following, although necessarily brief, outlines the key steps in this argument.

As noted at the start of this chapter, Mamdani (1996) argues that the ‘bifurcated’ colonial state in Africa ruled through the distinction between citizens and subjects, direct rule and indirect rule, and the division between the urban and the rural. In urban areas, colonial citizens were guaranteed civil freedoms, while native subjects were indirectly ruled in the rural areas through a state-inscribed traditional or customary law. Natives living in urban areas existed between these two domains (in what has been referred to here as uncivil society); while they were not subject to customary law, they were excluded from citizen rights and so existed in a ‘juridical limbo’ (Mamdani, 1996: 18-19). Apartheid state rule in South Africa was formulated in the same way, and extended through the attempt to construct separate, ethnic-based foreign entities where black people could live ‘independently’, in what came to be palatably termed as ‘separate development’. The formation of ten black ‘homelands’, or Bantustans – four of which, the TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), were declared independent in the 1970s (though they were never internationally recognised) – was a means to systematically denationalise black South Africans, resulting in mass relocations and forced ‘emigration’ to the homelands. By 1985, around 6 million of the 15 million black South Africans were denationalised in this way, with the rest intended to follow as the other homelands were to be made independent (Neocosmos, 2010a: 20-26).

At the same time, the apartheid state was reliant on a steady influx of black labour. People from the homelands now had to ‘migrate’ to South Africa to work – either on farms or in the cities, if they were able to obtain so-called ‘section 10’ rights to live and work in urban areas, or as temporary workers on the mines where they were housed in hostels. This meant effectively that there was no legal difference between a worker from one of the apartheid constructed TBVC ‘states’ and a migrant worker from one of the neighbouring Southern African countries, such as Lesotho or Mozambique, many of whom crossed the border for employment in South Africa’s mineral sector. The migrant labour system under apartheid had

two consequences which were important for, firstly, shaping the character of the anti-apartheid emancipatory struggle, and secondly, for the construction of national identity in the period of state formation after 1990. The first was that the efforts to interpellate black people as ‘foreigners’ within South Africa (which was in any case a status never accepted by the people themselves (ibid., 34)) meant that all, particularly rural, black people from the region were treated and oppressed by the state in much the same way. Neocosmos writes:

As a result of this oppressive interpellation, the ideology of resistance by the black majority tended to provide a mirror image of it. Bonds of solidarity were developed between all Africans in the region and beyond, so that the struggle against apartheid was very much conceived by those resisting oppression as a fight of all Africans and their allies against the apartheid state. The concept of ‘nation’ thus developed tended therefore to be inclusive rather than exclusive of Africans from the region in particular (2010a: 26).

A second consequence of the migrant labour system, however, was that it reinforced the distinction between the many urbanised black South Africans living in townships around the cities, and those from the rural areas. As we shall see in the next section, the division between the rural and urban which was concretised by the migrant labour and hostel system created tensions which were present during the anti-apartheid struggle, given its often predominately urban orientation, and which influenced the character of state formation with the denouncement of the migrant labour system after 1990.

2.10.3.2. Emancipatory politics and the anti-apartheid struggle

From the mid-1980s, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa entered a mode of mass, popular political action which, Neocosmos argues (2016: 137), was not simply a radicalisation of the long struggle for national liberation since the formation of the African National Congress in 1912, but rather a subjectively distinct process in that it ‘substituted for a while a notion of “people’s power” in place of state power’. With the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, a non-party coalition of churches, civic associations, women’s groups, student organisations, trade unions and a host of other organisations, the character of the emancipatory movement in this period was profoundly democratic, riding on a groundswell of innovation and organisation from below, and resistance rooted in the living, breathing experience and daily struggle of the people themselves. Of particular importance here is the way in which the notion of ‘the people’ came to be politically defined as those who fought for the struggle, irrespective of social categories like race, class, or even nationality. The UDF drew on the principles of Black Consciousness, which affirmed as

‘black’ all those who were oppressed, regardless of apartheid categorisation, and which, through the idea of ‘non-racialism’, proposed the radical reconfiguration of social relations both in affirmation of the whites who were actively committed to the emancipatory struggle, and in denouncement of the paternalism of white liberals who claimed to support the cause but were dismissive of black initiative itself (Neocosmos, 2016: 160). The idea of ‘the people’, then, was subjectively and politically produced through the thought and agency of those who participated in the fight for freedom – the ‘national consciousness’, in the sense in which Fanon uses the term, was thus by and large inclusive and emancipatory, promoting a politics of universality and not one based on statist social predicates. The universalising character of the anti-apartheid struggle fostered solidarity across racial and national lines, as other countries in the region supported ANC and struggle leaders in exile, and migrant workers from neighbouring countries participated alongside South Africans in strikes and popular action.

2.10.3.3. Constitutionalism and state nationalism after 1990

This period of ground-up popular action, however, came to an end by 1990 when, with the unbanning of the ANC and nationalist political parties, South Africa entered a new political sequence of constitutionalism and state democracy. The politics of mass action were replaced with a top-down politics of state formation, and as the ANC returned from exile, the non-state spaces of political organisation and activism were depoliticised. With the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which provided amnesty and absolution for apartheid crimes through public hearings and confessions, the political activism and self-organisation of the 1980s began to give way to a discourse of Human Rights, rather than political agency, and arguably of victimhood; or, a ‘politics of affirmation was replaced by a politics of supplication’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 163). The popular political mode was supplanted by one of state-led developmentalism and ‘service delivery’, which involved the proliferation of civil society organisations generally acting within the compass of state politics, and the widespread depoliticisation of popular thought and action.

Concurrently, the period of state formation and increasing neoliberalisation from 1990 onwards also saw the attempt to both nationalise and urbanise the migrant labour system which had existed under apartheid (Neocosmos, 2010a: 66). While the popular nationalist discourse of the 1980s was largely inclusive, and underscored linkages between African migrant workers from the region who were oppressed by the apartheid labour system

alongside the ‘denationalised’ South African workers forced to migrate between the homelands and the mines or cities, the state nationalist discourse which emerged after 1990 increasingly framed regional migration as well as rural-urban migration in ultimately negative terms, an inheritance from the apartheid system of labour control, seen as the *sine qua non* of apartheid rule and thus inherently undemocratic (ibid., 41). Democratisation came to be equated with the dissolution of the apartheid labour system, and thus of migratory labour itself, and its replacement by a ‘permanently settled urban proletariat’ living in family housing rather than the single-sex male hostels of the apartheid era (Naicker, 2016: 4). The attempt was then to decouple migrancy from labour by discouraging African immigration and encouraging the sedentarisation of a South African urban labour force. The result of the separation of migrancy from labour also meant that migrancy was separated from the notion of ‘economic contribution’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 429). As a consequence, the figure of the ‘foreigner’ has increasingly shifted from the figure of the ‘worker’ who contributes to the nation, to the figure of the economic ‘immigrant’ (or the ‘illegal alien’) who arrives only to take and usurp³². Where the 1980s *popular* nationalist vision recognised the contribution of African migrants to the emancipatory struggle³³, *state* nationalist discourse (as we have seen) increasingly moved to a focus on ‘illegal immigration’ as a threat to development and democracy. Ultimately, the rise of state nationalism in South Africa has been predicated on what has been seen as a ‘right to exclude’ (ibid., 429), justified on the basis of the apparent democratization of apartheid labour relations and thus the dismantling of apartheid itself – as well as on the privileging of indigeneity as the basis for rights.

We return here to where this chapter began, with Fanon. The popular and inclusive conception of the nation as an active political principle shifted with constitutionalisation to a state construction of passive citizenship and nation building from above³⁴. For the new elites, claims to nativism and indigeneity allowed them to assert legitimacy vis-à-vis the previous white ruling class, and therefore provided access to power and private accumulation. At the

³² Lazarus discusses the same phenomenon in France. With the beginning of what he calls a ‘parliamentary mode of politics’ since the mid-1980s, there was a ‘lapsing of the classist intellectuality of the word worker’ (2015: 148-49) and its substitution for the word ‘immigrant’. Under parliamentarianism, the factory is no longer the site of the worker (as a potentially political identity) – it is now only the site of production (Lazarus, 2016: 129). There are then no longer ‘workers’ – only French and non-French. Lazarus writes: ‘As for the country, parliamentarianism declares that it is defined by “the French.” This identification of the country by the juridical notion of nationality has for its real a permanent network of surveillance and persecution of the “non-French” [...] The central statement of parliamentarianism in this situation is: *there is an immigration problem*’ (2016: 130 [emphasis in original]).

³³ Some commitment to this idea can be seen after 1990 in the cases of the three amnesties which were offered to non-South African miners and others (See Chapter 1, footnote 9).

³⁴ For a discussion of this in the broader African context, see Wamba-dia-Wamba (1994).

same time, the discourse of South African exceptionalism, within the new imagination of the South African nation, set South Africans apart from their neighbours on the continent (Neocosmos, 2010a: 143). Affirmative action outcomes under Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies tended to allow connected individuals to amass great wealth, while the majority languished in growing impoverishment as the increasingly neoliberal economy failed to provide jobs and houses. The people, interpellated by the state as passive claimants of rights and entitlements which are inscribed nationally, as Fanon (1961: 156) writes, themselves ‘line[d] up behind this nationalist attitude’.

Like Neocosmos (2010a), Hayem (2013: 84) argues that the discourse of Human Rights, which was central to the process of nation building after apartheid (notably demonstrated in the experience of the TRC), has been ultimately depoliticising – but it has also itself been depoliticised. In the first sense, people are interpellated not as political citizens but as passive beneficiaries of rights guaranteed by the state; in the second sense, the notion of ‘Human Rights’ itself has shifted from a political principle, which is universalisable, to a system of national entitlements or electoral promises (Hayem, 2013: 86). Within what I mentioned earlier can be called a subjectivity of entitlement, those in uncivil society whose claims to the rights and entitlements of citizenship are not realised by the state (as they are treated as citizens in little more than name only), lay claim to these resources through violence against those perceived to be foreign usurpers – which is, as I have said, a legitimate form of politics within the domain of state rule wherein their own rights, as well as the rights of the foreign poor, are routinely violated by the state. Statements by perpetrators of xenophobic violence very often reflect not only concerns about scarce resources and poverty, but also anger and resentment that foreigners are encroaching on ‘our democracy’, ‘our freedom’, or ‘our rights’ – rights which they will protect if the government fails to do so. Consider the following examples of statements made in 2008:

We are the ones who fought for freedom and democracy and now these Somalis are here eating our democracy (quoted in Neocosmos, 2010a: 117).

Violence against foreigners is justified. There was blood for our freedom, it did not come cheap. [...] Government is not thinking for us [meaning on our behalf] ... So if government is failing to stop them at the borders, we shall stop them here (quoted in Monson, 2012: 472).

Foreigners are violating our human rights! (quoted in Hayem, 2013: 85).

And, lamentably:

We do believe that violence was correct, they must go. Our government understands only violence, if you talk, they do not listen (quoted in Monson, 2012: 472).

Ultimately, the rise of a hegemonic discourse of xenophobia must be thought of in terms of a specific relationship between state and society and a particular interpellation of citizenship as indigeneity in the post-apartheid construction of the nation from above. As Chatterjee (2004: 36) writes, following Foucault, the state within this situation sees the governed not as 'active citizens' but as 'passive populations' and beneficiaries of 'rights' which are constructed as national entitlements, from which those outside of the territorial and juridical conception of the nation are excluded. According to Neocosmos (2010a: 113), '[i]t is precisely this process, the replacing of political agency by appeals to the state, which had made xenophobia possible and is enabling its existence in South Africa today'.

2.11. Conclusion

Part One of this chapter has shown the empirical basis for understanding xenophobia in South as a state discourse which has been multiplied since 1990 through the practices of the state, as clearly evidenced by government legislation, the treatment of foreign nationals by the Department of Home Affairs and the police, and the statements of many officials who frame immigration as a threat to economic growth and democratic stability. Low-income and non-white migrants from Africa and other parts of the developing world, undocumented or otherwise, are frequently targeted by the state, often under the guise of crime prevention (as in the case of Operation Fiela). The result is a political discourse which links immigration with illegality and criminality, through which xenophobic actions on the part of the state are not framed as such, but are seen as legitimate. By contrast, popular xenophobic actions, most notably the 2008 pogroms, are roundly condemned as illegitimate, irrational, a product of poverty or of societal disease. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP), however, has shown through opinion surveys that xenophobic attitudes and anti-foreigner sentiment are present across all racial and class groupings.

Part Two of the chapter has been concerned with theoretical explanations, with the aim to show that xenophobia must be understood at the level of political subjectivity, as a state politics which has become hegemonic in the public sphere. To do this, I have argued that analytic accounts of the crisis which frame the phenomenon as a product of relative deprivation or as a psycho-social pathology are inadequate for the reasons following. Firstly, by framing the issue in terms of broad structural or social factors, the issue of political choice

and agency are obfuscated. People are seen to be reacting more or less directly to a set of social conditions, or their social location; where agency is considered, it is often in fairly base terms, and the fact that violence may be considered to be a viable political choice for the poor who engage in xenophobic attacks is largely accepted without interrogation of why this may be the case. This can lead to uncomfortable assertions about the relationship between poverty and violence. Secondly, and by extension, accounts which do not see xenophobia as a political subjectivity fail to recognise that within a hegemonic state discourse of xenophobia, xenophobic attitudes and violence may indeed be explicable and, within the logic of this discourse, rational. This is because modes of state politics differ, and the political choices a person makes are shaped by the ways in which state politics function within each mode. Where violence – either state violence or popular violence – is generally illegitimate within the mode of rule in ‘civil society’, it may often be seen as a legitimate political choice in ‘uncivil society’, as the people living under that mode of rule are themselves frequently violated by the state.

I have argued that xenophobia is political state discourse which has been able to proliferate within the public sphere through the rise of a state nationalist political subjectivity which has become hegemonic in South Africa since 1990. The efforts to decouple migrancy from work, framed as a dissolution of apartheid exploitation, in order to institute a nationalized urban proletariat has encouraged an exclusive conception of citizenship based on indigeneity, and bolstered nativist ideologies which have been exploited by elites for the purposes of private accumulation, whilst framing immigration as a threat to the economic security of the nation. The ground-up popular political subjectivity, or ‘national consciousness’ in Fanon’s terms, of the late-1980s, which was often inclusive and fostered bonds of solidarity across Southern Africa, was replaced with an often reactive, top-down politics with the constitution of the party-state – or ‘party-nation-state’ – under the ANC returned from exile. Through the 1990s and with the rise of economic liberalisation and a focus on developmentalism, and with the aid of an ultimately depoliticising Human Rights Discourse, popular politics were neutralized as an increasingly chauvinist state nationalism became hegemonic.

Finally, this chapter has not been able to provide a comprehensive account of the rise of xenophobia in South Africa, and as such there are many inadequacies. The purpose of the chapter, it must be maintained, is to locate xenophobia at the level of politics; as a hegemonic political discourse based on an exclusive state nationalism and a conception of citizenship which has largely gone unchallenged, due to the depoliticisation and delegitimisation of

alternative political prescriptions. I have spent some time developing this point as it is fundamental for the argument which follows. This is because it is impossible to think politically about those sites where xenophobia has been actively countered and resisted by people unless we understand the political hegemony of xenophobic subjectivity. It must be maintained that resistance to such a discourse is profoundly difficult, as it calls for a conception of politics beyond state thinking. To consider the significance of such resistance, which has sometimes involved commitment to radical political alternatives which are fundamentally transgressive of state politics, must be to take seriously the importance of that *subjective* break with state thinking.

CHAPTER THREE

ALTERNATIVE POLITICS: THREE SITES OF RESISTANCE

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter has been concerned with understanding xenophobia as it has arisen as a hegemonic political discourse in South Africa, with an aim to show empirically in Part One how xenophobia is the effect of a state politics of exclusion, and in Part Two to review the contours of the academic debate around the issue. With this empirical and theoretical background in place, I now turn to the core focus of this work, and an area which has attracted scant attention within the literature: that is, the fact that the politics of xenophobia have been actively resisted in some cases through collective political action. The concern here is not with instances of individuals protecting their neighbours, or indeed strangers, from attackers, as such acts of heroic kindness are witnessed in any case of collective violence – from the Germans who hid Jews from the Nazis, to Hutus who safeguarded Tutsis in Rwanda. Rather, I am here discussing sites of sustained, articulated and collective resistance to xenophobia in South African communities. Given the hegemony of xenophobic discourse, how can we explain these sites of resistance? What, if anything, do they signify politically?

In what follows I suggest that these sites are important precisely because they show that some people are thinking and acting outside of the dominant logic. Given, as shown in the previous chapter, the pervasiveness of this xenophobic subjectivity across all areas of South African society, collective mobilisation in support of foreigners living in South Africa (or those considered to be ‘outsiders’ in a more general sense) – and particularly, mobilisation by those who exist on society’s fringe and who stand to lose the most through such action – is noteworthy. I suggest that these sites should not be regarded as mere anomalies, or as footnotes in a descriptive account of xenophobia in South Africa, but deserve careful consideration in their own right.

In the following I look at three sites where there this resistance was articulated and sustained, and resulted in direct action to protect those identified as foreigners against popular collective violence as it erupted in these communities. In 2008, during the mass pogroms which blazed through the country, there were two notable sites of exception: in the areas of KwaZulu-Natal where there was strong presence of South Africa’s largest social movement

of shack dwellers, Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), and also in Khutsong in Gauteng, where a community-based organisation, the Merafong Demarcation Forum (MDF) had been engaged in a sustained contest with the state against municipal demarcation since 2005. Seven years later, in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape, an outbreak of xenophobic violence resulted in the looting of over three hundred shops and the displacement of over five hundred people. A local grassroots organisation, the Unemployed People's Movement (UPM) immediately condemned the violence, physically attempted to stop the crowd from looting properties, sheltered foreigners that were under attack, and provided invaluable support to the displaced in the aftermath of the violence. It should be noted that these are not the only sites where grassroots organisations have mobilised against xenophobia; the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, for example, also supported foreign nationals during the 2008 attacks (Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, 2008a and 2008b). I selected the three sites on the following basis: Abahlali baseMjondolo's inclusion is essential because of its coherent stance against xenophobia, articulated within a radical humanism which constitutes its wider political praxis, as well because of the sheer size of its membership and its broad influence in opposing the 2008 violence. Khutsong is included as perhaps the second most notable case where there was clear resistance to xenophobic politics during the 2008 pogroms – and indeed one of the only places where xenophobia did not occur in 2008 which has attracted any real academic attention (namely by Joshua Kirshner (2012, 2014; Kirshner & Phokela, 2010)). In Grahamstown I was able to conduct my own research through interviews with members of the Unemployed People's Movement about a year after the xenophobic violence there. I was also a student in the town at the time of the attack, and so witnessed a degree of the destruction and its aftermath first-hand. Importantly, in all three sites the alternative politics which emerged to contest xenophobic discourse and violence were not imposed or introduced from outside by state or civil society actors, but evolved through popular collective organisation within the communities themselves.

In this chapter I describe the background to each case and the events which unfolded as the threat of xenophobic violence arose. The aim here is to show that in each case there was already the presence of sustained and collective political organisation, and that it was through this collective organisation that solidarity with the foreigners was coordinated. In some cases this solidarity was clearly articulated as 'anti-xenophobic' – that is, subjectively opposed to the logic of xenophobia itself. In other cases, although there was solidarity with the foreigners, it was not uncontradictorily 'anti-xenophobic'. Resistance to xenophobia should not therefore be assumed to be monolithic, and each site must be considered within its

own logic, with appreciation of the ambivalences, tensions and contradictions therein. The politics of resistance or solidarity, if we should call it that, are in each rooted in the singularity and specificity of that site, and in the language within which the people themselves articulated their thought and actions. What is shared by each, however, is the fact that in the moment of violent excess, South Africans collectively came to the organised and explicit defence of non-South Africans, in direct contrast to the actions of their peers, and often at no small risk to themselves. The questions that arise are then: What is the subjective move that has allowed for this solidarity? What are people thinking? Is this thinking political? And finally, is it through collective organization that this space for thought has been opened?

3.2. Abahlali baseMjondolo: ‘A living solidarity, a solidarity in action’³⁵

When xenophobic violence broke out in Alexandra in May 2008, and rapidly spread in the first weeks of rioting from Gauteng Province to KwaZulu-Natal and beyond, members of the shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), immediately convened a meeting of the organisation’s elected leaders from various Durban settlements. After long and careful discussion (Gibson, 2011: 14), they released a press statement on May 21, entitled ‘Abahlali baseMjondolo Statement on the Xenophobic Attacks in Johannesburg’ (AbM, 2008). The statement unequivocally condemned the ‘attacks, the beatings, rape and murder, in Johannesburg on people born in other countries’ and vowed that the movement would ‘fight left and right to ensure that this does not happen here in KwaZulu-Natal’ (AbM, 2008). It listed a collection of decisive actions the movement had swiftly agreed upon to prevent the spread of violence, including meeting and staying in daily contact with non-national street traders’ associations and refugee organisations, contacting police officers who could be trusted to respond immediately if violence broke out, and making the issue of xenophobia a priority in all forthcoming meetings. Members were called upon to ‘defend and shelter their comrades from other countries’ (AbM, 2008). In the end, while killings, looting and brutality burned their way through other areas across the country, communal violence did not spread to even one of the more than 30 settlements affiliated with Abahlali baseMjondolo. Through a proactive, organised ‘living solidarity, a solidarity in action’ (AbM, 2008), the movement not only held back the tide of violence in its own strongholds, but was also able to bring a stop to two other attacks which were already in progress in non-affiliated settlements, and, despite

³⁵ AbM, 2008.

the economic precarity in which its members live, was able to provide shelter for many of the displaced (Pithouse, 2010, 2008b; Gibson, 2011: 14; Neocosmos, 2010b: 543).

The press statement of 21 May also issued eight remarkable demands to the government of South Africa. These were to:

1. Close down Lindela today. Set the people free.
2. Announce, today, that there will be papers for every person sheltering in your police stations.
3. Ban the sale of land in the cities until all the people are housed.
4. Stop all evictions and forced removals immediately.
5. Do not build one more golf course estate until everyone has a house.
6. Support the people of Zimbabwe, not an oppressive government that destroys the homes of the poor and uses rape and torture to control opposition.
7. Arrest all corrupt people working in the police and Home Affairs.
8. Announce, today, a summit between all refugee organisations and the police and Home Affairs to plan how they can be changed radically so that they begin to serve all the people living in South Africa (AbM, 2008).

For Abahlali, clearly, the issue of xenophobia was not separate from other social and political struggles of the poor, including housing, forced removals and corruption in government agencies. The demand for the government to ban all sales of city property until the poor are provided with housing and the demand that all undocumented foreign nationals housed into police stations be given papers are equally radical, equally ‘unthinkable’ within the existing political landscape. The demands are not utopian or rhetorical, nor are they simply pragmatic, but insist instead on shifting what Rancière (2010a: 54) has called ‘the distribution of the sensible’, based on an uncompromising declaration of irreducible human dignity. One key statement in the press release, which Neocosmos (2010b: 543) has called ‘the most progressive in the country’ to be pronounced on the events of 2008, states: ‘There is only one human race. Our struggle and every real struggle is to put the human being at the centre of society, starting with the worst off. An action can be illegal. A person cannot be illegal. A person is a person wherever they may find themselves’ (AbM, 2008). As I discuss in the following chapter, this statement is an expression of how the progressive, ‘deeply democratic’ (Pithouse, 2014a: 180) political praxis of Abahlali baseMjondolo has allowed for a genuinely ‘anti-xenophobic’ politics to emerge through the *affirmative* principle of universal humanity.

Abahlali baseMjondolo emerged in 2005 from the Kennedy Road settlement in Durban, a desperately impoverished shack settlement located on a steep hill on the suburban, largely middle and upper class Clare Estate, and which runs between the vast and noxious Bisasar Road municipal dumpsite (the largest landfill in Africa) and the 6-lane Umgeni Road freeway.

Although Clare Estate had been reserved for Indians under apartheid segregation, the permanency of the occupation which grew in Kennedy Road from the late 1970s was reluctantly acknowledged by the City by the end of the 1980s. Under the new ANC government, the settlement was first earmarked for upgrades and then, in 1995, for relocation, halting development on the basis that the settlement was now ‘temporary’ (Pithouse, 2008a: 71). The history of slum clearance in post-apartheid South Africa has demonstrated a callous disregard on the part of the new state for its most destitute inhabitants. In 2001 the decision was taken to stop electrification of shacks within these ‘temporary settlements’, and other services were removed, including refuse removal from Kennedy Road’s pit latrines (Pithouse, 2008a: 73). Pithouse (ibid.) writes: ‘The police force the settlements to remain ‘informal’, and therefore able to be described as temporary and denied basic services, and they force shacks to remain crowded, and therefore able to be described as dangerously overcrowded’. One of the key drivers behind slum clearance projects in the cities was (and this remains the case) to free up urban land for development by relocating shack settlements to often semi-rural townships on the city’s outskirts. These ‘relocations’ are often involuntary removals, and those families, frequently shack-renters rather than owners, whose names are not on the list for houses on the relocation site (the lists themselves often falling foul of patronage, corruption and vote-buying) are simply left homeless (ibid., 74). In a clear continuation of the spatial compartmentalism of the apartheid state, and the Manichean world of settler and native that Fanon describes in *Les Damnés de la Terre* (1961), Pithouse (ibid., 73) writes of the process of slum clearance in South Africa:

For those who were about to receive housing it was quite clear, although it was not stated as policy, that settlements in former African townships were generally slated for upgrades while those in former white and Indian suburbs were generally slated for relocation. It was equally clear, although again not stated, that the settlements were being relocated in an order determined by the degree to which they were visible from the bourgeois world.

Post-apartheid housing policies which aimed to remove the ‘surplus population’ (Gibson, 2011: 150) from the cities, relegating them to the periphery, often far from places of work or schooling, were met with resistance, particularly after 2005 when there was an increasing groundswell of popular protest across South Africa. The Kennedy Road settlement was one such site of resistance, which birthed the largest social movement of the poor in the country today.

Adjacent to the Kennedy Road settlement was a piece of land which had been promised for housing development for township residents (Zikode, 2006: 187; Patel, 2008: 100). On 18 March 2005, construction began on the plot – however, as residents discovered, it was not the

long-awaited housing which was being built, but a brick factory (Pithouse, 2008a: 75; Gibson, 2011: 144). A mass meeting was held in the settlement that evening, and the following day 750 protesters from Kennedy Road settlement barricaded Umgeni Road with burning tires, and held it for four hours against riot police. Fourteen people were arrested. Two days later, after collecting the money for bail of the arrested (Selmeczi, 2014: 235), 1200 people assembled in an illegal march to the police station to demand the release of the detainees. Key to the success of this mobilization was the fact that there was already a self-organized body in the settlement, the Kennedy Road Development Committee, which was participatory and democratic in its organization (Gibson, 2011: 147). This committee was to form the basis of the social movement which would emerge some months later as Abahlali baseMjondolo – meaning ‘people of the shacks’ in isiZulu – with the young, newly elected chairperson of the committee, S’bu Zikode, as its first president.

In the three years between its founding in 2005 and its statement against xenophobia made in 2008, Abahlali baseMjondolo developed into a mass movement. The ‘living politics’ (Zikode in Gibson, 2011: ix) of the movement were based on a radical inclusivity, irrespective of age or gender, ethnicity or citizenship (Pithouse, 2008a: 79-80; Neocosmos, 2016: 177; Gibson, 2011: 175; 2012: 61). Anyone could participate in meetings, which were held frequently and formally with democratically elected representatives from the various member settlements. The movement refused to affiliate with party politics – and in fact boycotted national elections under the slogan ‘No Land, No House, No Vote’ (Zikode, 2006: 188; 2008: 115) – as well as stubbornly resisted interference and co-option by NGOs and civil society (Gibson, 2011: 148). As such, Abahlali’s politics are ‘resolutely independent of state subjectivity’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 230). At the heart of the movement’s political praxis is intellectual and political autonomy, and the insistence that the poor can think their own struggles; that they ‘can be poor in life, but not in mind’ (Zikode, 2006: 189). This insistence has underpinned their resistance to representation, and their insistence to be spoken *to*, and not *about* (as Zikode (2008: 115) says: ‘We believe that housing policy requires, most importantly, the people who need the houses’), but also, critically, is a universalizing principle which recognizes, to use Fanon’s (1952: 181) formulation, ‘the open door of every consciousness’. As Zikode writes:

[I]f you are serious about victory, about succeeding to humanise the world, even a little bit, then your struggle must be a living politics. It must be owned and shaped in thought and in action by ordinary men and women. If every gogo (grandmother) does not understand your politics then you are on the road to another top-down system (quoted in Gibson, 2011: v).

Abahlali campaigns for housing, services, an end to evictions by the state, and has been met with brutal repression including attempted and successful assassinations of its members and leaders (see Gibson, 2012: 63; AbM, 2018a). However, as members of Abahlali have consistently maintained, the struggle is not for ‘service delivery’ itself, but for the ‘right to co-determine their future’ (Pithouse, 2006: 35): ‘the struggle is the human being, the conditions that we live in which translates into demands for housing and land’ (Zikode, quoted in Gibson, 2011: 157). This affirmative principle of shared and equal humanity, which is manifest in the living politics which has grown out of Kennedy Road, has formed the basis for a radically inclusive politics which confronts and contests hegemonic state discourses of exclusion and xenophobia in South Africa today. In the following chapter I return to the political thinking of Abahlali baseMjondolo, and the axiomatic statement that ‘a person is a person wherever they may find themselves’ (AbM, 2008), which finds its reflection in the political theory of Sylvain Lazarus and the principle that *people think*. As such I leave the discussion of ‘Abahlalism’ here for the moment.

3.3. ‘We are Gauteng People’³⁶: Khutsong and the Merafong Demarcation Forum

A second site where xenophobic violence was successfully contested in South Africa was Khutsong, an impoverished mining township on the outskirts of Greater Johannesburg, around an hour’s drive south-west of the epicentre of violence which spread from Alexandra in May 2008. While the wealth of scholarly literature written after the 2008 pogroms was largely concerned with trying to comprehend the wave of violence, Joshua Kirshner and Comfort Phokela’s (2010) report on the Khutsong ‘case of the dog that didn’t bark’ provides a valuable analysis of a site where such violence mysteriously did not occur. As Kirshner (2012: 1307) points out, it defied expectations that the sprawling township of Khutsong, with its high levels of deprivation and poverty and large immigrant population, would become a ‘haven of tolerance’ for non-South Africans in those bloody months. What were the conditions in place in Khutsong which might explain this in terms other than mere anomaly?

³⁶ For this heading I borrow from Joshua Kirshner’s 2012 paper by the same name – “‘We are Gauteng People’: Challenging the Politics of Xenophobia in Khutsong, South Africa”, *Antipode*, Vol. 44, No. 4.

Kirshner (2012; 2014) argues convincingly that collective organisation within the community in the years immediately preceding the 2008 pogroms ‘created openings for political identities and subjectivities that resisted xenophobia’ (2014: 117). Much like the case of Abahlali, solidarity with the foreigner was coordinated through collective political mobilisation already established within the community before the outbreak of violence – in this case, through a democratic, community-led organisation called the Merafong Demarcation Forum (MDF).

Between 1999 and 2005, Merafong City Local Municipality was a ‘cross-border municipality’, overlapping area on the southwestern part of Gauteng and the northeast of the North West Province. Given its proximity³⁷ to the country’s rich gold-mining belt, the economic base of the municipality is the mining industry, which provides the majority of formal employment (Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 7), despite the fact that the mining sector in Merafong has been in a general decline (Kirshner, 2012: 1313). Education and employment are lower in Khutsong than the municipality as a whole (ibid.). The Merafong Demarcation Forum was founded in 2005, after the government announced plans to consolidate Merafong within the North West Province (despite the fact that at this point 71 percent of the population lived within Gauteng (Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 7)), as part of a national scheme to phase out cross-border municipalities. The move, proposed in August 2005 by the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), was immediately met with resistance in Khutsong. Residents complained that while Gauteng was the wealthiest province in the country, the local economy of the North West Province was far smaller and primarily agricultural, had fewer and struggling services, less employment opportunities and inadequate health and emergency services, and was generally less developed and poorly resourced (Ndletyana, 2007: 106).

In the months after the announcement several peaceful protests were held against the proposal, spearheaded by local activists within the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Young Communist League (YCL). During this time, however, the government made a number of contradictory statements on the issue. First, after the initial announcement, the Gauteng mayoral committee promised that Merafong would remain within Gauteng, and then portfolio committees for Local Government of Gauteng and North West legislatures, after holding joint public hearings, also recommended that Merafong remain within Gauteng (Kirshner, 2012: 1316; Ndletyana, 2007: 107; Matebesi and Botes, 2011: 13). However, days

³⁷ The Khutsong township was originally established in 1958 to house black miners outside of the neighbouring, whites-only, town of Carletonville (Kirshner, 2012: 1313).

later, the committee reversed its decision, deciding instead that the views of Merafong residents were ‘secondary to the government’s view that sound municipal administration with a viable and sustainable revenue base was a more important consideration’ (Ndletyana, 2007: 108). Angered by the lack of public consultation and explanation of the process to local residents (Kirshner, 2012: 1316; Ndaba and Maphumulo, 2005), SACP and YCL activists ramped up protest action and formed the Merafong Demarcation Forum (MDF), a democratic organization including small business owners, church leaders, taxi drivers’ associations, and representatives of two of the largest unions within COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) – the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) – as well as party activists from the Pan African Congress (PAC) and United Democratic Movement (UDM) (Kirshner, 2014: 124). A schoolteacher named Jomo Mogale was elected as the Forum’s chair.

Although some resistance to the demarcation (which was officiated in December 2005) was expected, the intensity of the protest was not (Ndletyana, 2007: 107). On 2 November, protesters barricaded roads in Khutsong with burning tyres and debris, and activists organized a general stayaway. Schools cancelled matriculation exams for the day and youths took to the streets, where 27 were arrested for looting. In the following week, municipal buildings were burned down, further shops were looted, and the homes of Khutsong’s mayor and several councillors were petrol-bombed (Kirshner, 2014: 124; Ndaba and Maphumulo, 2005). No resolution was reached and protest action continued, with occasional violence, over the next two years. Mass meetings were held weekly, at least for the first year, and the MDF called for a boycott of the 2006 municipal elections – only 232 ballots were cast of almost 30 000 people registered to vote in Khutsong (Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 10). The anti-demarcation struggle, Kirshner writes, ‘grew into a sustained movement, which nurtured local political consciousness’ (Kirshner, 2014: 124), with crowds of some 20 000 people gathering in the Khutsong stadium during the height of the struggle.

For the activists in Khutsong, the demand to remain in Gauteng was not issued solely in objection to the poor service delivery in North West Province, but was also – as they articulated themselves – a question of respect, aggravated by the lack of consultation by the state on issues which affected them directly (Philp, 2009; Kirshner, 2012: 1318, 2014: 125). ‘It was the disrespect that united us’ said Paul Ncwane, a former football star and a prominent MDF activist (quoted in Philp, 2009). The MDF rejected the labelling of their movement as a ‘service delivery protest’, and instead, in the words of Jomo Mogale, stressed that the rebellion was ‘a practical demonstration of democracy’ (quoted in Kirshner and Phokela,

2010: 13). The assertion that ‘democracy should not only be representative, it should be participatory’ (Mogale, quoted in Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 11) was linked to the idea that the people of Merafong, as mineworkers, had historically contributed to the wealth of the province. As Mogale stated, ‘The people who built up Gauteng through their labour on the mines must be recognised as part of the province’ (in Kirshner, 2014: 124). The issue was clearly political; beyond the serious material concerns about service delivery in North West, the activists were insisting that they had the right to remain in the province which had been enriched by the mines on which they laboured, and thus were entitled to the relative benefits the economy of Gauteng afforded. The anti-demarcation struggle against the South African state (it was the central government, not local government, which had the authority to reincorporate Merafong into Gauteng), Kirshner writes, ‘encouraged a particular sense of place-based identity and belonging to emerge in Khutsong, which was based on a common situation rather than a common nationality or ethnicity’ (2014: 125). This was evidenced by the treatment of non-citizens in Khutsong during the xenophobic pogroms of 2008.

Like other mining areas in South Africa, following its founding in 1958, Khutsong attracted many migrants from neighbouring countries, and Mozambicans in particular settled there in their numbers. The relatively high level of employment opportunities on the mines generally eased economic competition (Park, 2009: 21), and the local branch of NUM, the National Union of Mineworkers, which invited membership regardless of nationality, also encouraged solidarity between citizens and non-citizens in Khutsong (Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 15; Kirshner, 2014: 128; Park, 2009: 21). However, as anti-foreigner sentiment increased across South Africa through the 1990s, researchers documented growing levels of hostility, intolerance and police repression against Khutsong’s mainly Mozambican immigrant population, particularly as migrants began to move into the townships from the apartheid era male-only hostels (Mistry and Minaar, 2000). Despite these tensions, many were able to integrate to some degree within the community, some marrying South African women and learning to speak the regional languages, isiZulu and Tswana.

When xenophobic violence broke out in May 2008 in Alexandra township, just 64 kilometres north-east of Khutsong, and began to spread to other vulnerable areas across Gauteng and then the rest of the country, the MDF and local leaders once again called a general community meeting in Khutsong’s stadium. Foreigners were assured at this meeting that the pogroms taking place in neighbouring townships would not reach Khutsong. Leaders immediately repudiated the violence and joined the Coalition Against Xenophobia (CAX), a Gauteng-based ‘broad coalition of civil society organisations, social movements and

individuals' (CAX, 2008) founded in 2008, which drafted a series of statements pledging solidarity with the foreigners and criticizing the government policies and discourse which, they argued, had encouraged xenophobia in South Africa (Kirshner, 2012: 1315; Park, 2009: 24). When on 6 June 2008 around 5000 Khutsong activists marched to Luthuli House, the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg, to demand action from ANC leadership on the demarcation issue, they also called for then-President Thabo Mbeki and the former Minister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils, to resign over their handling of the xenophobia crisis (Seokoma, 2008; Park, 2009: 25). According to the leaders of the rebellion themselves³⁸, Khutsong was the only large township on the Highveld – an area of 400 000 square kilometres, and roughly 30% of South Africa's territory – to experience no incidents of xenophobic violence during the 2008 pogroms (Philp, 2009; Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 13). Certainly, the absence of systematic xenophobic violence in a township like Khutsong, highly impoverished and with a relatively large immigrant community, and in such close proximity to Alexandra, was notable. While we cannot know whether the pogroms would otherwise have spread to Khutsong, it is clear that the articulated and deliberate rejection of xenophobic action was coordinated through the collective organisation which had mobilised the community over the preceding years.

Why did the MDF and the activists and residents of Khutsong choose to oppose xenophobia in 2008? It does not follow immediately that political organisation around the issue of the provincial border dispute would result in the rejection of xenophobic politics, and nor was the rebellion especially non-violent – damage to infrastructure alone amounted to an estimated R70 million by April 2006 (Matebesi and Botes, 2011: 17). On the one hand, there were clear strategic motivations for this decision; firstly, the leaders did not want the mobilisation to become derailed or divided through a dissolution into violence and looting (Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 14). Some foreigners, particularly those who had lived in the community for some time, joined the struggle voluntarily and attended meetings and marches alongside South Africans (Kirshner, 2014: 129); others, particularly newcomers, who did not necessarily have an interest in the demarcation issue may have offered their support in return for some protection (one respondent claimed (in Kirshner, 2012: 1320) that he thought looters would be less likely to target his shop if he were seen to be supporting the protesters). Others admitted to a degree of coercion to participate (ibid., 1322). Secondly, there was a tactical dimension to the MDF's resistance to xenophobia. Given that the Khutsong rebellion was not

³⁸ I have been unable to verify this claim.

only a rebellion against local politics but also against the national ANC government (as the only body which could direct the reincorporation of Merafong into Gauteng), the anti-xenophobic stance increased the rebellion's legitimacy and bargaining power with the state (Kirshner, 2012: 1320), and, as Park (2009: 25) suggests, may also have been a way of 'showing-up' the ANC government which was struggling to deal with the crisis nationally.

Alongside strategic motivations, there was also a clear ethical dimension to the decision to oppose xenophobic politics in 2008. Mogale, in an interview in September 2009, described the community resolution on xenophobia which the MDF had passed the year before:

We said 'these are our brothers and sisters.' We told people that blaming foreigners was morally wrong. After all, we owe Africans a debt of gratitude as repayment for their sacrifices during the anti-apartheid struggle and for their contribution to building our mining industry. It helps that I am a history teacher. [Former President] Zuma stayed in Mozambique during the liberation struggle, and Chris Hani [South African Communist Party leader assassinated in 1993] was in Zimbabwe. We made these examples to show people we have a history with neighbouring countries in the struggle (Mogale, quoted in Kirshner, 2012: 1320).

This moral stance was expressed in terms which recognised historical solidarity between South Africans and other Africans during the anti-apartheid struggle, and which also emphasised the economic contribution made by foreign miners. As one resident reported, 'the leaders told us that foreigners are also residents of Khutsong' (in Kirshner, 2014: 127), and another stated in 2009, 'the idea of separation was not there. We engaged with foreigners, and they supported us' (in Kirshner, 2012: 1319).

Given the nature of the demarcation struggle, place was in many ways the *sine qua non* of the Khutsong rebellion. The mobilisation which had been gaining momentum in the two years preceding the 2008 attacks encouraged social cohesion and solidarity around a conception of place, work and inhabitancy, and provided an entry point for popular political participation around a shared place-based identity. As Kirshner (2014: 127) observes: 'While focused on provincial boundaries, activists downplayed other boundaries of nationality and ethnicity'. The insistence that those who had lived and worked in Gauteng, and who had contributed to its wealth through their labour, were entitled to stay in Gauteng – or, rather, *belonged* there – did not only extend to citizens within the political imagination of the Khutsong rebellion. As one Mozambican resident who had been living in Khutsong for nine years, said: 'We did not want to be part of North West. We are *Gauteng people*' (my emphasis, quoted in Kirshner, 2012: 1322). It appears that residence, not citizenship, became the most relevant form of political identity in Khutsong during this sequence.

However, the question of who was seen as a legitimate resident was not altogether uncomplicated. As mentioned above, from its founding Khutsong attracted a majority

Mozambican immigrant population, who, despite experiencing levels of xenophobia and hostility congruent with other South African communities in the 1990s and early 2000s, did achieve a relative degree of integration in the township³⁹. However, Khutsong had also seen an influx of new immigrant groups, including Somalis and Ethiopians, many of whom work in small, often informal ‘spaza’ or tuck shops. Whereas Mozambicans in Khutsong were regarded to a degree as ‘cultural insiders’ (Kirshner, 2014: 129), the newcomers were generally less integrated, with less cultural, religious and linguistic proximity to South Africans of the region, and often lacking the social points of contact – such as churches or local bars – that Mozambicans and South Africans shared (Kirshner, 2014: 129). The relationship between the wider Khutsong community and these immigrant groups was more tenuous, and in fact, 2007 saw the looting and torching of some Somali shops, resulting in more than 20 arrests (IRIN, 2007), though it appears this was an isolated incident. As one of the leaders of the MDF, Siphwe Nkutha, pointed out, ‘The issue of xenophobia is around the Somalis because they did not yet familiarise themselves with the people’ (in Kirshner, 2014: 129). While Mozambicans in Khutsong may have achieved a degree of insider status as ‘Gauteng people’, this was not necessarily the case with the more culturally estranged newcomers⁴⁰.

The fact that Mozambicans, who had stronger cultural and linguistic ties to South Africans and a longer history of group residence in the country, had achieved higher levels of assimilation in Khutsong is not surprising. However, while the Khutsong rebellion demonstrated a political ‘process that focused on attachment to place and local identity, yet did not retreat into chauvinism’ (Kirshner, 2014: 130), the differing attitudes towards Mozambicans and other immigrant groups, particularly Somalis and Ethiopians, indicates a degree of ambivalence. The suggestion here, and this will be discussed further in the following chapter, is that while the mobilisation in Khutsong subverted the hegemonic state subjectivity that excludes on the basis of citizenship, and insisted instead on the importance of place, inhabitancy and work as legitimate grounds for inclusion, this was the political expression of the interests of a particularly located group – of ‘Gauteng people’ – and not

39 In the national context, many Mozambicans – over 176 500 – were granted permanent residence through the ANC amnesties which followed the end of apartheid, which may have contributed to a relative degree of assimilation (Polzer, 2004: 5), alongside a common history of mine work and trade union membership in the country.

40 Nonetheless, Somalis and Ethiopians did report that they felt comparatively secure in Khutsong, some choosing to move there from other townships after the violence of 2008, given its reputation as a relative safe haven for immigrants (Kirshner, 2012: 1315).

necessarily the expression of a universal political principle (as demonstrated in the statements of Abahlali baseMjondolo, for example). Or in other words, the more contradictory treatment of newer immigrants indicates that while inclusion was not predicated on nationality or indigeneity, there was still a dialectical relationship between insiders and outsiders within the politics of the Khutsong rebellion. More on this later.

The residents of Khutsong eventually won their protracted battle with the state, and Merafong was incorporated into Gauteng Province in 2009 (Matebesi and Botes, 2011: 14). The resolution of the demarcation issue initiated a rapprochement between the ANC (under the new leadership of Jacob Zuma) and the MDF – causing tensions within the MDF leadership, and claims that the Forum had ‘sold out’ to party interests (Kirshner and Phokela, 2010: 20). Solidarity with foreigners living in Khutsong, however, seems to have maintained. The Khutsong Crisis Committee, a community organisation which arose after 2008, apparently after what some saw as the ‘collapse’ of the MDF (ILRIG, 2014: 9), released a statement in 2015 in response to a fresh wave of xenophobic attacks in the country. The statement expressed gratitude ‘to the community of Khutsong for the brilliant and responsible position they have taken concerning the xenophobic attacks’, stating that

The enemies of the poor in South Africa are not the poor from other countries [...] We must not allow ourselves to become full of hatred and anger against those from other countries who live in our communities and who are also poor and fighting for the same things [...] It is not our brothers and sisters from Malawi, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh and Pakistan or anywhere else that are responsible for us living in shacks [...] We must come together as communities and put a stop to this now! (Carletonville Herald, 2015).

Finally, the inference that foreigners can be allies in political struggle (‘also poor and fighting for the same things’) recalls the ways in which foreigners were encouraged and sometimes coerced to participate in the Khutsong rebellion. Speaking about events in 2013, former MDF leader Paul Ncwane remarked: ‘We didn’t see the need to fight [the foreigners] because when we started with the protest they also fought with us to be moved to Gauteng’ (in Louw, 2013). The significance, for Ncwane, of the foreigners’ participation in the struggle raises an important point, which I will discuss here briefly.

Tamlyn Monson (2015), in her work on xenophobic violence in Mshongo, an informal residential area in Gauteng, considers the relationship between political commitment and belonging in the formation of ‘squatter identities’ in informal townships – and concomitantly, the link between a (real or ostensible) lack of political commitment to popular struggles on the part of foreigners, and xenophobic violence. Monson (2015: 40) argues that collective mobilisation in the informal settlement produces communal identities based on the shared

experience of marginalisation and also of civic labour and protest; however, these can have the effect of polarising the politically ‘committed and the uncommitted’ (Monson, 2015: 51). Many foreigners are seen as detached and indifferent, or as one respondent from Mshongo suggested, as wanting to ‘live for free’ (in Monson, 2015: 51).

The fact that many foreigners do not participate in mobilisations is not surprising; some, for example, may consider themselves temporary residents, and therefore not politically invested in the future of the community. Some with relative financial security, such as shop-owners, may not experience the same economic exigencies as the local population and so have less motivation to participate, while other foreigners in extreme precarity may accept employment conditions deemed to be unfair by locals, thereby undermining collective bargaining. Immigration policy also has the effect of polarising citizens and non-citizens, as recent immigrants cannot vote, nor can they claim other goods, such as housing, which citizen mobilisations often centre around (Monson, 2015: 51) – as such, they may not feel like they have a stake in the protest in any case. Foreigners, particularly those undocumented who risk deportation, may be fearful of altercations with the police who frequently extort from and abuse them. Nonetheless, however, the perceived lack of political investment by immigrants – while those immigrants are seen to be benefitting from the collective goods secured through the political labour of the local population – may produce and augment resentment. Frequently, episodes of anti-immigrant violence or looting occur in proximity to mass mobilisations or community protests (Von Holdt et al., 2011: 6), as was the case in Grahamstown when xenophobic violence erupted in 2015, as we shall see in the next section. Thus while political mobilisation may be a repertoire through which solidarity with the foreigners can be fostered and coordinated, as in the case of Khutsong where foreigners participated in the struggle, it may also be a driver for anti-foreigner resentment, if political commitment to the collective good is not seen to be reciprocated.

3.4. Grahamstown and the Unemployed People’s Movement

It was a cloudy afternoon in Grahamstown, a small and embattled university town in the Eastern Cape, when, on 21 October 2015, a protest led by local taxi associations sparked a wave of violence and looting of foreign-owned shops and businesses, which left several hundred displaced as it continued over the following days. The taxi drivers, alongside other members of the community, were protesting the increasingly potholed roads in the townships

– impoverished sprawls which stretch out over the hills to the east of the town – and rising violent crime. The concerns about crime were related to rumours which had been circulating in the recent months that women were being targeted in ‘muti killings’, their body-parts harvested for occult medicinal practices. While there had been a number of unsolved murders, police forensics denied that the bodies found had been mutilated, except in one case where the body was decomposed and had likely been disturbed by animals (*Daily Dispatch*, 2015). Nonetheless, rumours began to point to a suspect – described as an ‘Arab’, a ‘man with a beard’ – who was thought to be a Pakistani shop-owner, possibly working in tandem with others to prey on vulnerable women (O’Halloran⁴¹, 2016: 6). When the current mayor of Grahamstown, Nomhle Gaga, failed to meet with the protesters on 21 October, they directed their anger towards the ‘foreign’ community. Although it is unclear if the taxi associations had planned this xenophobic action it appeared that there was some anticipation of this, as the taxis were emblazoned with slogans including *mabahambe* (‘they must go’) and *abashwe* (‘they must burn’) (Tabensky, 2015: 2).

The attacks largely targeted Muslim shop-owners (while this discrimination was in part due to their perceived ‘link’ to the accused Pakistani, people from predominately Islamic countries also, apparently, own most of the shops in the Grahamstown townships⁴²) including Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Somalis, Ethiopians, Palestinians and Senegalese, although a small minority of Zimbabwean and Nigerian businesses may have also been attacked (O’Halloran, 2015a). Looting continued for almost a week, and while there were no deaths, over three hundred shops were destroyed and more than 500 people displaced. Loss of property was estimated to be within the range of 15 to 25 million Rand (*IOL News*, 2015b). The men went into hiding at a Muslim-owned hotel just outside Grahamstown, and many of their wives – the majority of whom were South Africans – were left in limbo, staying with relatives or friends in the community (to which many of them were born) which had just rendered them destitute.

The police response was largely inadequate – and at times bordering on complicit, as police reportedly acted with indifference in many cases, some apparently laughing at the scenes of looting (O’Halloran, 2016: 8). While officers did act to protect the foreign nationals from bodily harm, there was little prevention of the looting itself, and there were reports that

⁴¹ For factual events, I draw extensively on the meticulous work of Paddy O’Halloran, who covered the events in detail and depth in the press at the time and in later academic publications.

⁴² This observation is based on my own research in Grahamstown, and on statements from interview respondents.

some police either facilitated or took part in the plunder (ibid.). However, a police line which bisected Beaufort Street – which becomes Dr Jacob Zuma Drive as it snakes its way from the more affluent Grahamstown West, home to Rhodes University and a number of exclusive private schools, into the townships of Grahamstown East – clearly cordoned off the zone in which looting was tolerated from the protected zone of the town proper (ibid.)⁴³.

The municipality's response to the emergency was also feeble. Two days after the attacks began Makana Municipality held a meeting at City Hall to give assurances that the crisis would be dealt with effectively by the municipality and the police. Tellingly, no representative from SAPS was present at the meeting, and little good was made on these promises over the following days (O'Halloran, 2016: 8). A number of statements made by municipal officials were themselves openly xenophobic: one ANC ward councillor, Mthuthuzeli Matyumza, reportedly told a crowd of community members that the evicted 'foreigners' indeed 'would go', while another ward councillor from the Democratic Alliance (DA) told those gathered in City Hall that when the 'foreigners' came back to the community they should not be permitted to own so many shops (O'Halloran, 2015a). While the municipality officially condemned the violence, both statements are clearly enabling of the xenophobic discourses which provoked it. In a particularly disturbing instance during the following week, a number of the wives of the displaced men, who had organised in a group calling themselves the Voices of the Foreigners' Wives⁴⁴, convened a protest outside City Hall where they intended to present a memorandum to Mayor Gaga. The police and municipality at first tried to block the protest – Councillor Matyumza allegedly telling the women that 'they were drunk', as one of the women states in a documentary by Jane Berg, a journalist covering the events at the time (Berg, 2015:[time:8:58]). The Mayor refused to come out of her office to accept the statement. Some of the women, exhausted and afraid, wept, and an older South African man shouted invective at them from the side-lines, where the protest was eyed warily by a number of local residents⁴⁵. In fact, the Mayor had told the

⁴³ This boundary recalls the centuries-old frontier on which Grahamstown was founded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Graham in 1812, as a military outpost to protect British interests against the Xhosa to the east – a frontier which in many ways, both practical and symbolic, still characterises the socio-spatial division which, to draw on Fanon's (1961: 38) formulation, clearly dissects the settler's town to the west from the native town to the east. See Paddy O'Halloran (2015c) for a detailed discussion of the spatial history of Grahamstown and its reflection in the social and political organization of the town today.

⁴⁴ In the following year, the group (who continued to organize around issues relating to xenophobia and violence against women and children for almost the next two years) renamed themselves Voices of Women of Africa (VOWA), asserting an identity independent of their husbands', predicated on pan-Africanist values and rejecting of the nationalist discourses which were leveraged against them as 'foreigners' wives'.

⁴⁵ I attended the march and witnessed the mayor's refusal to meet the women; these observations are my own.

women in the days prior to the protest that she had ‘forgotten about them’ (O’Halloran, 2016: 9). The implications of this action were quite clear, as the voices of the ‘forgotten’ women were deliberately ignored.

In the absence of coherent action by Makana Municipality, the most effective response to the 2015 attacks was coordinated by civil society groups (including the local NGO Masifunde Education and Development Project Trust) supported by academics and students from Grahamstown’s Rhodes University, and, primarily, the Unemployed People’s Movement (UPM), a grassroots social movement which played an instrumental role in the resolution of the crisis. The UPM was formed in 2009, when members of the community mobilised to demand that the municipality provide electrification in two informal shack settlements within the townships of Grahamstown East (O’Halloran, 2015c: 89; Matthews, 2015: 9)⁴⁶. The movement comes into near-constant contestation with the municipality over issues of unemployment, housing, local government corruption, failing and inadequate services within the township including water and sanitation, rising crime and violence against women and children, and the marginalisation of the poor from the basic right to a life of dignity. While the UPM’s is a political struggle, often positioned as anti-capitalist and pro-socialist, employing leftist and Marxist vocabulary, the social movement is not affiliated to any political party (although many of its members also have party membership) (Matthews, 2015: 9-10). Paddy O’Halloran, who has done insightful research with the UPM, reminds us that within the designation ‘social movement’, ‘the term “social” does not preclude people’s thinking and acting “politically”’ (2015c: 86). The UPM (like Abahlali) claims that its struggle is not only for practical social goods (although these may often shape the movement’s immediate concerns), and rejects the depoliticising and ubiquitous discourse of the ‘service delivery protest’ as a blanket appellation for near any mobilisation of the poor in South Africa. As expressed in a 2011 UPM press statement:

We are not struggling for service delivery. We are struggling for justice and dignity. We are struggling for land, jobs, decent schools and homes, safe streets, equality between men and women and a democracy that includes the poor and allows poor people to plan their own communities and their own future (UPM, 2011).

When xenophobic violence erupted in October 2015, the UPM actively tried to prevent the attacks, sheltered those who were displaced, and worked closely with the affected and with the community in the weeks and months after the crisis to foster reconciliation and

⁴⁶ Another key event in the movement’s history was a protest against the bucket toilet system in 2011, in which UPM activists furiously pressed their demand for the installation of proper toilets in areas of the township by emptying the contents of said buckets at the entrance to Grahamstown’s City Hall (*Grocott’s Mail*, 2011).

reintegration. This was not an uncomplicated process, for a number of reasons. In some instances, this brought the movement into direct confrontation with municipal officials, whose maladroitness handling of the crisis belied any authentic interest in the devastation faced by the stricken foreign national community. Moreover, (indeed, the UPM is well-versed in confrontation with local government) the UPM's support of the foreign nationals also gave rise to tensions between the movement and the community. Finally, within the movement itself, xenophobia was not an uncontroversial issue. Unlike issues of unemployment, corruption or poverty, UPM members were equivocal on the role of foreign nationals in their communities, and many at times expressed clearly 'xenophobic' views, while at others affirmed political solidarity with the foreigners. This ambivalence is explored in detail in the final, empirical chapter of this work.

The UPM had, in fact, predicted that the rumours circulating in the townships might lead to violence against the foreign community, and they expressed this concern to the police, calling a community meeting on 12 October where the SAPS could address the anxious residents. Representatives from SAPS arrived an hour and a half late, and then only after they were reminded of the meeting by telephone (O'Halloran, 2015b). Little was done to assuage the fears of the community. The police did release a public statement aiming to dispel the rumours of a serial killer, but this came execrably late – five days after the looting had already begun (O'Halloran, 2015a). UPM members were the first to respond when the attacks began, in some cases bodily placing themselves between the crowds and the shops, at no small risk to their personal safety. Emergency meetings were called immediately, where members of the UPM

affirmed the right of the shop owners to live and trade in South Africa and Grahamstown, not as foreigners who had the appropriate documentation but as community members who, in both their countries of origin and in South Africa, had to confront the same exclusions as the locally- and South African-born people (O'Halloran, 2015c: 114).

Many of the displaced took shelter at the UPM and Masifunde headquarters in the early days of the looting, and UPM members distributed thousands of pamphlets throughout the townships which condemned both the looting and the murders, and called for an end to xenophobia and recognition that the 'foreigners' (many of whom are in fact South African citizens) were also part of the community (O'Halloran, 2015a). In the months after the attack, the UPM facilitated the process of reintegration by holding a number of community dialogues, where they listened to the locals' concerns and tried to show that their anger was misplaced. As one UPM member told me, which is worth quoting here at length:

We think the dialogues were important, other than to march. We should demonstrate, but we should also be able to listen. So as we were conducting dialogues and listening to our people, you'd realise that their anger has got nothing to do with the foreigners. They're angry because they are unemployed. They're angry because of the lack of essential services, because Makana Municipality is failing. [...] And in our discussion in those dialogues and in those talks, people were able to realise without us saying that actually, they don't make us angry. Even if they were to leave tomorrow, we'll still be found in this position. We'll still be unemployed, we'll still be suffering, we'll still be exposed to diseases, our healthcare system will not improve, etcetera. So without us having said those things, they were able to realise. So I think the dialogues were an eye-opener, to also say then, how do we work together? Because in the end we are all in the same position (Interview 15 [M], 2 August 2017).

The emphasis on 'being able to listen' to the community, as members of the community themselves, rather than prescribing or condemning from above, is central here. For its part, the municipality was openly hostile to the UPM in the protracted aftermath of the attacks. One contentious issue involved accommodating the displaced men until they could return to their shops. The hotel that was operating as a safe-house had sheltered the men free of charge for the first two weeks after the attack, at which point it requested that the municipality contribute towards costs. The municipality initially agreed to provide a sum of 8000 Rand per day, but then announced after a week that it could not afford to continue paying (UPM, 2015; O'Halloran, 2015d). Allegedly, there was talk that a tented camp would be opened for the refugees, perhaps at the army base several kilometres away, or at the village green within the town. The UPM rejected this idea outright, on the grounds that it would only increase separation and hamper reintegration:

[The municipality] wanted to set camps here, at the Village Green. We went there and we said, you will not, these are human beings. [...] [We said] we are busy working on the integration. But they are not going to refugee camps, they are not going anywhere, they are staying here. They are not going to any tents. From here they are going back to the community, period (Interview 15 [M], 2 August 2017).

Tensions between local government and the UPM came to a head during a stakeholders' meeting held by the SAHRC in City Hall, where a representative reported the municipality's 'achievements' in supporting and reintegrating the foreign nationals. These were disputed by the displaced themselves, who said that it had been organisations including the UPM, Masifunde and the Red Cross who had supported them, while the municipality had in fact done very little (O'Halloran, 2015d). At the meeting, where the 'stakeholders' in attendance included only eight of the displaced, four men and four women, who were unrepresented and only present to observe, Ayanda Kota of the UPM tried to explain to the SAHRC commissioner the reality of the municipality's abortive response to the crisis. Councillor Matyumza interceded with the suggestion that the UPM was a 'third force' aiming to destabilise Grahamstown before local elections in 2016 (O'Halloran, 2015d). In response,

one of the displaced women reportedly said (in the only instance any of those affected were given the chance to speak during the meeting) that ‘only Ayanda’ should speak on their behalf (O’Halloran, 2015d). The SAHRC, however, concluded the meeting by saying that the municipality should lead the process of reintegration.

The UPM met with the same hostility from the SAPS. As Kota told me in an interview in 2017:

They were angry with us. You remember when we went in one meeting, myself and the director of Masifunde? [Police Captain Mali] Govender said, ‘Get out of my meeting.’ We said, but why? You called the civil society, we constitute civil society [...] They started to say that Masifunde and UPM, they are responsible for the xenophobia. This was coming from Makana Municipality and the police. Because they were exposed, their backs were against the wall (Ayanda Kota, Interview 2 August 2017).

According to a UPM (2015) press statement, ‘the UPM was contacted by two people who both wish to remain anonymous. They warned [the UPM] that Ayanda Kota, UPM and Masifunde are being investigated by the police for instigating and being behind the xenophobic violence’. Although it is impossible to verify these claims independently, they are, however, reminiscent of a statement by then Home Affairs Minister, Malusi Gigaba, who said in April 2015 that a ‘third force’ with the aim of destabilising South Africa and tarnishing its image abroad was responsible for that year’s wave of xenophobic violence. Gigaba said: ‘There are people who are behind this and their main aim is to destroy the image of and embarrass SA internationally. These people buy the youth drugs and arm them to go on a looting frenzy’ (in *Business Day*, 2015).

The notion of the ‘third force’ (a term originally coined by ANC leaders in the 1990s to refer to an alleged covert network of security agents offering military support for Zulu nationalist violence against the ANC, with the aim of destabilising the revolution (Selmeczi, 2012a: 505)), has frequently been invoked by the South African state after 1994 in reference to both xenophobic violence and social protest (Mhlana, Tolsi & Alcock, 2008; Neocosmos, 2010a: 122; Selmeczi, 2012a: 505). This link should not be seen as purely incidental. In the case of protest, the state attempts to dismiss and delegitimise activism through the figure of the ‘third force’ – often typified as clandestine anti-ANC agitators including academics, oppositional party members, or foreign agents – which is ostensibly fomenting dissent from behind the scenes. Blame can thus be shifted from state failures to nefarious anti-democratic

machinations⁴⁷. In the case of xenophobia, blaming a third force of agents provocateurs for inciting and supporting violence against foreign nationals for the purpose of regime destabilisation again provides an alibi for the state⁴⁸. Perhaps more importantly, however, the ‘third force’ discourse frames both protest and xenophobic violence as reactionary practices with an ultimately common impulse. This belies the essentially democratic nature of much protest action in South Africa, while framing xenophobic violence as anti-state when, as I have argued, xenophobic discourses in fact reflect the politics of state nationalism. I asked Kota how the municipality and the police tried to justify the ‘third force’ allegation. ‘They did not,’ he replied. ‘They did not even attempt’ (Interview 2 August 2017).

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with, firstly, introducing for consideration three sites where xenophobic politics have been effectively resisted in South Africa through collective political mobilisation. It must be noted that these are not the only sites in which xenophobia has been contested in this country; other social movements, as well as other groups including NGOs, churches, and trade unions, and civil society bodies representing foreign nationals like the Congolese Solidarity Campaign in KwaZulu-Natal, have also at times posed effective challenges to xenophobia in South African communities. I have not discussed them here because the focus of this project is not to catalogue the various opposition to xenophobic practices but to suggest that collective popular mobilisations against xenophobia may indicate, at times, the possibility of a subjective break with exclusionary state discourses which have depoliticised and delegitimised alternative politics in the new South Africa.

This has been the second concern of this chapter; to suggest that the presence of collective political mobilisation may create the discursive space for such subjective openings to occur – where these popular politics are not expressive of state discourses, but have the

⁴⁷ S’bu Zikode superbly responded to the ‘third force’ allegations in a 2006 article. He writes: ‘Well, I am Third Force myself. The Third Force is all the pain and the suffering that the poor are subjected to every second in our lives. The shack dwellers have many things to say about the Third Force. It is time for us to speak out and to say, “this is who we are, this is where we are and this is how we live”. The life that we are living makes our communities the Third Force’ (Zikode, 2006: 186). For Zikode, the agents of the third force are not foreign proxies or crusading academics, but poverty and hunger, impending winter and the threat of shack fires. The poor, Zikode affirms, know well why they protest.

⁴⁸ Thabo Mbeki, in response to the 2008 pogroms, also invoked the notion of the ‘third force’ when he complained that ‘none in our society has any right to *encourage or incite xenophobia* by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia. (Mbeki, in Dodson, 2010: 7 [my emphasis]). For further discussion, see Monson (2012: 465-469).

capacity to exceed them. As such not all (in fact very few) popular modes of politics do ‘think’ outside of state subjectivity, as attested to by the rise of exclusionary nationalist, chauvinistic or identitarian populisms in South Africa and the world over. It is also the case that some popular social and political movements in South Africa are in fact directly supportive of xenophobic politics⁴⁹.

A third point that has been indicated here, which will be extended in what follows, is that collective politics are singular and must be considered within the specificity of their sites. The politics of Abahlali baseMjondolo are not the same as those of the Khutsong rebellion, nor of the Unemployed People’s Movement, and the expression of ‘anti-xenophobic’ solidarity exemplified in each will differ. Nor in any case is this solidarity in each instance uncontradictorily ‘anti-xenophobic’. In fact, it is worth considering the usefulness of such a categorisation in the first place. Implying that there may be a ‘xenophobic’ and an ‘anti-xenophobic’ subjectivity infers a dichotomy which has little substance in reality. Firstly, the idea of a dichotomy obfuscates the fact that the hegemonic political subjectivity is *itself* xenophobic, as I have argued. Those who contest xenophobia are in fact contesting the dominant logic of the state. This is, or may be, an insurgent act, an act of what Jacques Rancière would call ‘dissensus’. ‘Dissensus’, Rancière (2010a: 38) writes, ‘is not a confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the demonstration (*manifestation*) of a gap in the sensible itself’. A truly ‘anti-xenophobic’ subjectivity is a contestation of the ‘sensible’ order established by state-politics.

Contestation, however, is a dialectical process – this is the second reason why it is not useful to speak of a simple ‘xenophobic’ or ‘anti-xenophobic’ dichotomy. As the next chapter sets out theoretically, politics which are able to exceed state thinking nevertheless always exist within a dialectical relationship to it. While Abahlali’s statement that ‘a person cannot be illegal’ (AbM, 2008) indeed exemplifies a radical departure from state politics, in the case of Khutsong, the rejection of xenophobic violence in 2008 was at least in part predicated on the basis of another form of place-based identity as ‘Gauteng people’. Likewise, as we shall see, a number of the UPM members who contested xenophobic violence also themselves held xenophobic views. It is precisely Rancière’s (2010a: 39) point that politics is ‘always of the moment and its subjects are always precarious. A political difference is always on the shore

⁴⁹ For example, the xenophobic WhatsApp message addressed to ‘Dear Neighbour from Africa & Other Parts of the World’ which went viral before the April 2015 xenophobic violence (see Chapter 1, p.32), was sent from a group of social movements including the Patriotic Movement, Pan Local Forum, Unemployed Workers Forum, and the Anti-Crime Movement (see Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016: 984).

of its own disappearance: the people are always close to sinking into the sea of the population or of the race'. That is to say that contesting state subjectivity is never automatic, but an active process, and always dialectical – hence its precarity. It is in fact not effortless for anyone to think against xenophobic (or any other hegemonic) subjectivity, and especially less so for those for whom 'foreigners' are constructed as a direct threat to an already punishing daily struggle for survival.

CHAPTER FOUR

THINKING POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY

‘It is essential to argue for a position other than that of adhesion and impotence. It is essential to insist on the subjective [...] otherwise the presumption of a rupture is impossible. The only argument in favour of the possibility of a rupture with the order of things is that the subjective exists, even if it is as adhesion to the order of things. If people think, then *another* subjectivation is possible’ (Lazarus, 2016: 119 [emphasis in original]).

4.1. Introduction

I would like to begin this chapter by briefly reviewing the argument thus far. I began with a short introduction of the principle statement by Sylvain Lazarus which underpins this work: *people think*. I have said that within the imagination of liberal modernity which divided the white, Western, male and propertied domain of Enlightenment rationality from the rest of the world, the fact of people’s thinking was not accepted as universal, and those who presumed themselves the custodians of enlightened thought delimited themselves from those declared to be incapable of reason. The belief that only some are capable of proper and rational thought, which was constitutive of the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation inherent within the advent of liberal modernity⁵⁰ and the ‘civilising mission’ of colonialism, persists today, and thought which emerges from today’s spaces of supposed alterity, or subalternity – such as the shantytown – is frequently dismissed and delegitimised. Any attempt to understand political subjectivities arising from these spaces (or indeed any spaces) must take the affirmation *people think* (and ‘*people think* is worthy of everyone’ (Lazarus, 2016: 108)) as central. Thus *people think* is axiomatic to this study of xenophobic and potentially ‘anti-xenophobic’ subjectivities in South Africa. The first part of Chapter Two is concerned with showing empirically that xenophobia has become an intrinsic dimension of state politics in South Africa, demonstrated through the actions and statements of state officials and state apparatuses like the police and the Department of Home Affairs, and entrenched through oppressive and exclusionary legislation. The second part of Chapter Two outlines the chief arguments within academic accounts of xenophobia in South Africa, which in general sociologize the issue as a product of broad structural factors such as poverty, to which people are said to be reacting more or less automatically. I argue instead that it is

⁵⁰ See Chapter 1, p.6.

important to recognise xenophobia as a state political *subjectivity* based on an exclusionary conception of the nation which has come to position indigeneity as the basis for rights and entitlements, endorsed by elites who claim autochthony as a vehicle for personal accumulation, and which has become hegemonic in the public sphere. Chapter Three has shown, however, that at times this subjectivity has been collectively and deliberately resisted, which I have suggested in some cases may demonstrate a rupture with state politics which has the capacity to shift subjectivity. This final claim is the subject of the present chapter.

The question I begin with is this: is it the case, as I have said, that collective resistance to xenophobia may (sometimes) indicate a break with the dominant state subjectivity in South Africa? Does it amount to (in some instances) a demonstration that ordinary people are thinking beyond the ultimately exclusionary and oppressive politics of the state, in ways which may be novel, autonomous and potentially emancipatory? This chapter attempts to answer these questions by, firstly, returning to the theory of Lazarus and the centrality of political subjectivity introduced in Chapter One. I then resume the discussion of Abahlali baseMjondolo in relation to this theoretical apparatus, with the suggestion that the social movement has indeed marked a subjective rupture with state politics, and this is clearly evidenced by its response to the xenophobic attacks in 2008. This section also provides the theoretical and, in part, methodological basis for the empirical inquiry which follows in the final chapter.

4.2. ‘The thought of politics, and politics as thought’,⁵¹

The passage from Lazarus with which I began this chapter points to the importance of understanding politics as subjectivity, which is taken as a first principle in this work. I have said that if we fail to understand xenophobia as a state political subjectivity, and instead view it as spontaneously produced via some social determinant like class, poverty, history, or ethnicity, then we are unable to make sense of subjective breaks with xenophobic discourse, which then can appear only as anomalies or externalities. A subjective break with state thinking is not reducible to anomaly – which simply means ‘not even’ (from Greek *anomalos* ‘uneven, irregular’: from *an-* ‘not’ + *homalos* ‘even’) – but is, to use Neocosmos’ formulation of expressive and excessive politics (see, for example, 2016: 27), something which does not express state thinking but exceeds it (from Greek *excedere* ‘to depart, go

⁵¹ Lazarus, 2015: xviii

beyond': from *ex* 'out' + *cedere* 'to go'). Nor is this excess an externality – produced from outside of the situation/ exogenous to the situation – but is what Badiou calls an 'immanent exception' (Badiou, 2015: 63; Neocosmos, 2016: 39); that is, it arises from within the particular conditions of the situation itself, but it is not reducible to those conditions and in fact transcends them.

It should be clear from the preceding chapter that it is not simply the case that xenophobic politics were arrested in those sites of resistance, but that (to greater and lesser degrees) an alternative thought of politics to the dominant discourse was offered in their place. At this point it is necessary to better explain what is meant by politics as subjectivity, and why it is important to insist on it. What this calls for actually is an explanation of what is meant by politics itself in this work, as understood according to the theory of Lazarus on which I rely here. I will try to set out briefly some of Lazarus' key ideas in the following paragraphs, although the attempt here is not to synopsise what is an extremely detailed and complex theory⁵², but to elucidate a number of principles and categories which I make use of in this work.

4.2.1. Politics as subjectivity

What exactly is meant by politics as subjectivity? Lazarus says that 'if politics exists, either it is in the space of the State or it is of the order of thought' (2015: 1). To say that politics is in the space of the state is to say that 'the field of politics is power' (ibid.), and its main issue is the occupying of the state. This view of politics is definitional; the political is defined by the state and by its registers and machineries: of power, laws, political parties, ballot boxes, and measurable outcomes and 'efficiency and results' (ibid.); and it is objectivist, as the subject of politics is the object of the state. Politics in this construction is presented as objective reality: it refers to the domain of the given, the measurable and the quantifiable – the state, and the state of things. Lazarus names the view of politics in the space of the state as 'politics in exteriority' (2016: 109), because this thought of politics relies on an external referent, either empirical or conceptual, given as an object: it is defined by that which is exterior to itself.

To say that 'politics is of the order of thought' is to say that politics is not reducible to or contingent upon an object, be it the state, society, class, and so on. Nor is politics as a field

⁵² For this, see Lazarus' *Anthropology of the Name* (2015) as well as Michael Neocosmos' (2016) *Thinking Freedom in Africa* which sets out much of Lazarus' thought in detail.

of thought subordinate to any other external field, whether economical, philosophical or historical (Lazarus, 2015: 3). Politics is therefore understood as subjectivity, of the order of thought and not of the order of objective reality (Lazarus, 2015: 3; 2016: 108-9). Lazarus names ‘politics in interiority’ political thought which is not reducible to any entity outside of itself (Lazarus, 2016: 108; Neocosmos, 2009a: 14). A politics in interiority starts from itself; it ‘thinks itself as politics, and thus states what founds itself as political’ (Lazarus, 2016:113), or in simpler terms, a politics in interiority is non-dogmatic, it is not motivated by statism or classism or another external entity.

Although politics in the space of the state ‘has the noteworthy characteristic of not presenting itself as thought’ (Lazarus, 2015: 1) but as objective reality, this is impossible for Lazarus, as the state (or race, class, history, society, etc.) as an object cannot think itself as a politics. A politics may only think itself *in terms of* the state (a mode in exteriority, giving itself the state for object), and in this way politics in the space of the state is still subjective – it is still a thought, but it is a *thinking of*, or a *consciousness of* an object (the state). Thus for Lazarus, all politics is thought, and this thought may be in exteriority (defined by an object, in the space of the state) or in interiority (defined by itself, in the space of thought).

We might ask if it is in fact possible that politics can be thought in interiority, as thought that is not contingent on an object, without a collapse into idealism (Neocosmos, 2016: 24). It is helpful to look for a moment at Lazarus’ overall project. Neocosmos (2009a: 13) puts it succinctly here:

In order to make sense of his work, we need to begin with an understanding of the fact that Lazarus is interested in making intelligible, not just the existing configuration or structure of social situations of various types, but the existence of possible alternatives to the manner in which these situations are configured. In other words he is interested in theorising the subjective and the objective, not only as distinct, but as at a distance from each other. Not only is there no ‘correspondence’ between the two, but there is in many cases a distinct distance between them. In such cases the possibility exists that people’s subjectivities – thought – can assert something different from what is, an alternative to the existing.

Lazarus is proposing the de-objectification of consciousness (Lazarus, 2016: 117), a distancing between subject and object, and a rejection of the dialectical assumption that ‘the subjective expresses the objective and then reacts back onto it’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 328). This is essential for any thought of emancipatory politics, which must be able to assert political alternatives, and not simply be an expression, combination or permutation of what exists already. The formulation Lazarus chooses to express this idea (what he calls his second axiom, *people think* being the first) is that ‘thought is a relation of the real’ (2016: 109). What this statement means is that, in a politics in interiority, while ‘the real is essential to thought’

(Lazarus, 2015: 62), the real is not related to thought ‘in the sense of the real being the object of thought or of claiming that the thought can only be of the real’ (ibid.). A ‘relation of the real’ is rather a prescriptive relationship to the real, not a definitional one. By ‘prescriptive’, Lazarus means that people’s thinking – and indeed, the words they use to express their thought (I return to this later⁵³) – is not reducible to an objective or positivist description of the way things are (as in the thinking of science), but can also apprehend what *could be*. It can prescribe alternative possibles to what exists. Although there is more complexity to this idea in Lazarus’ work, for my purposes this point can be summed up as follows: ‘In people’s thought, the real is identified *via the possible*. The investigation of what exists takes place but it is subordinated to the investigation of what *could be*’ (Lazarus in Neocosmos, 2009b: 285 [my emphasis]). What *could be* exists as a relation of the real, but not as an expression of it. Lazarus (2016: 109) writes that ‘this twist of grammar serves to thoroughly underscore that thought does not take the real as object’. ‘Relation of the real’ is thus a ‘non-objectivizing formula’ (ibid.). The thought of what *could be* is subjective but, crucially, it has the capacity to make prescriptions on the real which can change the real. For this reason, politics is distinct from general thought in that it must also be a ‘thought-practice; it concerns the demands and actions of people in the here and now’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 247). It is through practice that political thought is made apparent in the world: political subjectivities then do not function purely in the realm of the imagined or the imaginary; they can be ‘analysed, explained and understood rationally as much as any objective factor can be’ (ibid., 24).

4.2.2. State subjectivity

I return to the statement *people think*. As Lazarus writes, people think ‘whether in the framework of a politics *at a distance from the State (politics in interiority)*, or in the framework of a politics *in the space of the State (politics in exteriority)*’ (2016: 109 [emphasis in original]). We can refer to the thinking of people in the space of the state (in exteriority) as ‘state subjectivity’, as I have done throughout, where political thinking is expressive of state politics. Because ‘it is the state which thinks location, hierarchy, interests and identities’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 26) and reproduces these as it produces the objective *what is*, the status quo, or what Rancière calls ‘consensus’ (1999: 102) state subjectivity reduces political thinking to the interests of some or other socially located group. The reduction of

⁵³ See Chapter 5, p.119.

thought to interest is central as it is through the management and the division of interests that the state (in liberal democracies) rules. Democratic politics are defined by the degree to which these interests are said to be represented.

In liberal democracy, interests are said to be represented by way of the vote and the party – both forms of politics in exteriority, as they affirm the state as the principal political domain where the vote is ‘a sign of adhesion to the State which renews it as such, regardless of the competing parties’ (Lazarus, 2016: 128). Civil society organisations, too, represent interests to the state – generally the interests of some or other socially located group. Within civil society, organisations are generally recognised as properly or appropriately political to the degree to which they conform to and reproduce state thinking, with the result that many non-governmental organisations, far from being the extra-state actors that they purport to be, are often little more than an extension of state political thinking (see, for example, Neocosmos, 2012a: 467; Chatterjee, 2004: 142) – this notwithstanding the valuable humanitarian work that some in the sector do perform. In the manner of a closed circuit, state subjectivity affirms that because the object of politics is the state, anything that does not in some way express state political thinking (for example: modes of rule (parties, government, laws), measurable outcomes (voting, polling), efficiency and results (service delivery and development), social stratification and differentiation (citizenship, social identities)) is not properly political (Lazarus, 2016: 118). Critically, it is the state which organises the way in which most people think the political most of the time⁵⁴. State subjectivity is thus hegemonic, and politics which make a subjective break with the dominant view are relatively rare.

4.2.3. Historical modes of politics

Lazarus states that modes of politics in interiority, which mark a break with state subjectivity or politics in exteriority, are rare and sequential (Lazarus, 2016: 112; 2015: xiii). This is because, for Lazarus, politics does not always exist; there is no ‘politics in general’ (Neocosmos, 2009a: 16) – rather Lazarus maintains that politics occur in historical *modes*, which are singular, and which emerge, exist, and then end within a specific sequence in space and time. The mode is identified according to the specific thought – the subjectivity – of the mode itself. In this way, historical modes can be dated and analysed; activists of the mode, those who ‘most clearly embody, express and represent that mode in thought’ (Neocosmos,

⁵⁴ I have already raised this point elsewhere in relation to civil and uncivil society (See Chapter 2, p.42).

2009a: 16), can be identified, as can its sites – the locations, not necessarily physical, where the politics of the mode are practiced.

Historical modes of politics occur both in exteriority and in interiority. The mode in exteriority generally assigns politics to a single site – the state, or party-state (Lazarus, 2016: 118) – whereas the mode in interiority has a multiplicity of sites (ibid. 113). In a mode in exteriority people's thought is organised by the state or party; however the mode itself is still identified by the subjectivity of people within that mode, the relation of thought to a politics, as (and this is important) people still think in modes in exteriority (ibid., 114), even though 'political consciousness is subordinated to consciousness of the state' (Neocosmos, 2009a: 18). For example, the *Parliamentary mode of politics* is a mode in exteriority in which the assumption is not that *people think* but that *people have opinions* (ibid., 128) – about the government, the party, the economy, the society, and so on. Opinions are expressed chiefly through the vote, which is a simulacrum of politics, as it is ultimately the 'replacement of political principles by which situations might be judged with the juridical fetishism of the numerical majority' (Badiou, 2006: 43).

A mode in interiority, by contrast, is identified via what thought has been 'opened up in the world' (Lazarus, 2016: 112). This thought is 'inventive' (ibid.) because it is irreducible to the extant (being the state or the present state of affairs). For Lazarus, it is only various modes of emancipatory politics which have the capacity of irreducibility, as the mode in interiority affirms a politics of universality, not of located interests (which must be the *interests of*). By universality we are necessarily talking about a notion of equality – however, 'equality' in this sense is not an objective goal (such as economic or social parity). Rather, it is subjective – that is, it is prescriptive; not an ambition, but a political maxim which is declared in the present. As Rancière (2010b: 166) writes, 'equality is not a goal; it is a starting point, an opinion or a presupposition which opens the field of a possible verification'. A political mode in interiority is *necessarily* a universal politics because if it were to *only* reflect or represent socially located interest or identity, it would immediately collapse into exteriority, as it is the state which manages the division of the social. In fact, 'it is always the state that manages interests and resists emancipation precisely by denying the existence of a universal politics beyond interest' (Neocosmos, 2016: 22). This is why narrow forms of identity politics, which take forms both reactionary and violent (like xenophobic politics) as well as liberal and progressive (such as the struggles for minority representation), cannot be politics in interiority *insofar as* they only express the interests of social or political groups which are in fact the designations of oppressive state politics. This is not to say, of course,

that social identities such as race, gender, sexuality, class (also a form of social identity), and so on cannot inform emancipatory politics – indeed, they absolutely must – but such a politics cannot be reducible to the expression of socially located interests if it is to be compatible with a genuine politics of interiority. As such, Neocosmos (2016: 12) writes that a truly emancipatory politics must be ‘dis-interested’ – it must ‘eschew narrow interests in favour of a “disinterested interest” or universal interest beyond social interests and identities’.

A historical mode creates categories which are specific to that mode, which are not generalizable, and which become exhausted when the mode ceases, and the sites where the politics of the mode manifest themselves disappear (Lazarus, 2015: xvi). Importantly, the end of the mode does not mean its defeat as such, only the ‘exhaustion of its specific political capacity’ (ibid.) – but the cessation of a mode in interiority will result in the return to a thinking of politics as state politics, and so a depoliticisation of the mode, as the politics of the mode ‘gradually become unable to think the new problems posed to them independently of state thinking’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 52). This points us to recognise the precarity (Lazarus, 2015: xiii) of political modes in interiority – as Rancière maintains (2010a: 39), a politics ‘is always on the shore of its own disappearance’. State politics normalises itself and asserts that the system that exists is absolute, if imperfect; in the Western paradigm, it is the notion that the advent of liberal capitalist democracy signals ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989) and the rise of the ‘universal homogenous state’ (ibid., 8) as the consummate form of politics. Liberal democracy asserts that the current system is the best one there is, indeed the only one possible besides totalitarianism, and so adherence is framed as common-sense (Neocosmos, 2009a: 5).

Finally, modes in exteriority and interiority produce collective subjects through a process of ‘subjectivation’; these are never given, but produced via the thought of the mode (Lazarus, 2016: 118). As Lazarus writes, ‘there are two forms of subjectivation. In exteriority: it reveals itself as cohesion, adhesion. In interiority: it reveals itself as opening up a possible’ (ibid.). Subjectivation in the mode in exteriority – a situation which Lazarus calls ‘malicious’ (ibid., 114) – produces ‘oppressive singularities’ (ibid. 118), and for this reason the statement *people think* should not be understood as an ‘angelism’ (ibid.), or necessarily emancipative. *People think* can also apply itself to reactionary or criminal politics (ibid.), as in the case of xenophobia. Thus we can understand xenophobia theoretically as a subjectivation of politics in exteriority (a state subjectivity) and this does not preclude the fact that xenophobes, too, are people who think. Moreover, it is essential to *insist* that they think, that theirs is a subjectivity, too. I return to the extract at the beginning of this chapter, which is really the

linchpin of my argument here: ‘It is essential to argue for a position other than that of adhesion and impotence. It is essential to insist on the subjective [...] otherwise the presumption of a rupture is impossible’ (Lazarus, 2016: 119). We must see xenophobia as a subjectivation of politics in exteriority (state subjectivity) and not as socially, economically or historically determined; we must see xenophobes as people who think and not as people who spontaneously react to social conditions and determinants – because ‘[t]he only argument in favour of the possibility of a rupture with the order of things is that the subjective exists, even if it is as adhesion to the order of things. If people think, then *another* subjectivation is possible’ (ibid. [emphasis in original]).

4.3. Thinking a politics in interiority: Abahlali baseMjondolo’s politics of universality

I have introduced the politics of Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), and in particular their response to the xenophobic pogroms of 2008, in the previous chapter. The following sections aim to show that these actions indeed do signify a subjective break with state politics in post-apartheid South Africa, which marks a refusal to adhere to a politics of interest and national chauvinism, and the emergence of another subjectivation – a subjectivation in interiority, of ‘dis-interested interest’, or a politics of universality. It is arguable that such a politics is the only real antidote to xenophobia in any case, in the face of rising global protectionism against immigration and the increasing dehumanisation of migrant lives. From the bodies which drift like flotsam through the Mediterranean to the families sundered by the ‘zero tolerance’ immigration policies of the United States⁵⁵ to the detention island of Nauru where asylum seekers trying to enter Australia have been left to waste in a mental health crisis in which children as young as eight are attempting suicide⁵⁶ – to a litany of other examples too numerous and outrageous to consider – the disposability of migrant lives has become an accepted feature of the global order. A politics which is truly universal must by definition be one in which the migrant is also counted, and in the case of Abahlali, the inclusion and protection of the ‘foreigner’ in South Africa as an equal part within the political struggle is an

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch. 2018. ‘Q&A: Trump Administration’s “Zero-Tolerance” Immigration Policy’, Human Rights Watch, 16 August 2018, Available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/16/qa-trump-administrations-zero-tolerance-immigration-policy>, Accessed November 12 2018.

⁵⁶ Henriques-Gomes, L., 2018, ‘Nauru orders MSF to stop mental health work on island’, *The Guardian*. 6 October 2018, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/06/nauru-orders-msf-to-stop-mental-health-work-on-island>, Accessed November 12 2018.

BBC News, 2019, ‘The island where children have given up on life’, 1 September 2018, Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45327058>, Accessed 12 November 2018.

essential and indivisible feature of the movement's politics as a whole.

In the following I ask the question: are Abahlali's politics a politics in interiority? Let us consider some of Lazarus' criteria as discussed above: a politics in interiority thinks itself as a politics; its thought is not subordinate to the state; it is a thought-practice, involving what people think and do; it has multiple sites and multiple activists; it affirms the principle *people think*; it affirms a politics of universality, not located interests; it declares a maxim of equality; its thought is identified not by adhesion but by the opening up of new possibles; it has its own categories; it makes prescriptions on the real. With these in mind, let us look closer at the politics of AbM, retaining a particular focus on its response to xenophobia, but with an understanding that the movement's resistance to xenophobic politics is indivisible from its wider political praxis; therein lies the principle of universality.

4.3.1. Abahlalism as a living politics

Members of Abahlali baseMjondolo have frequently referred to the politics of the movement as a 'living politics' (see, for example, Zikode in Gibson, 2011: ix; Zungu in Selmeczi, 2012b: 156). This category is specific to Abahlali's thought (that is, it is not generalizable, it must be understood from within the logic of this politics and not through an external logic), and central to the way in which *Abahlalism* thinks itself as a politics. Considering some of the meanings of this category can help us understand principal aspects of Abahlali's politics through its own inventive thought – that is, via subjectivity. It is also only through an understanding of living politics that we can comprehend Abahlali's rejection of xenophobic politics. What then does this category, living politics, mean in the thought of Abahlalism? Anna Selmeczi, who has written extensively on Abahlali and whose work maintains a deep fidelity to the movement's unwavering principle of speaking for itself⁵⁷, points us to understand the multiple meanings of the term 'living politics' as it is used by members. In one sense, the idea of a living politics relates to what Selmeczi calls Abahlali's politics of 'proximity' (2012b: 152); that is, its foundation in the collective experience of *living* as the 'people of the shacks', and its insistence that Abahlalism maintains, above all, closeness to the real and daily struggles and suffering of the people themselves (ibid., 153). As S'bu Zikode (in Gibson, 2011: 269), has put it, 'we must – as we always do – start with a living

⁵⁷ In what follows, as my engagement with Abahlali is limited to secondary sources only, I endeavor to remain as close as possible to the direct speech, as quoted in these sources, of members themselves.

politics, a politics of what's close and real to the people'. Another member of AbM, Philani Zungu, describes living politics as 'politics that one speaks in order to reveal what's real. In order to say the present tense [...] it's an engagement to present the present tense, especially the poor's tenses, our tenses: the shack-dwellers' (in Selmeczi, 2012b: 509). This notion of temporality shows that a living politics, which 'presents the present tense', which is the 'tense of the poor' and of the urgency of poverty, is shaped by the 'immediacy of lives exposed to biopolitical abandonment' (ibid.). It is through this abandonment that their lives and suffering are made invisible, as Zikode tells us:

Those in power are blind to our suffering. This is because they have not seen what we see; they have not felt what we are feeling every second, every day. My appeal is that leaders who are concerned about peoples' lives must come and stay at least one week in the jondolos [shacks]. They must feel the mud. They must share six toilets with 6000 people. They must dispose of their own refuse, while living next to the dump. They must come with us while we look for work. They must chase away the rats and keep the children from knocking over the candles. They must care for the sick when there are long queues for the tap. They must have a turn to explain to the children why they cannot attend the Technical College down the hill. They must be there when we bury our children who have passed away in the fires, or from diarrhoea or AIDS (Zikode, 2006: 186-7).

I include this passage in full with attention to the fact that while academic (or any) work must never fetishize or make a spectacle of the suffering of others, nor should it sanitize and abstract. If we are to try to understand living politics as a politics of proximity it is important to listen to activists when they tell of their suffering. Living politics is not an abstraction; it is born in the very immediate realities in which people must live – and it is the conduit through which they can improve their lives, individually and collectively. As Zungu continues (in Selmeczi, 2012b: 509), a living politics is one which says: 'this is how I'm suffering and these are the ideas, at least, that should help me. It's all about me, the people, and the present tense'. Abahlali's many struggles for land, for housing, for sanitation, for jobs, reflect the direct concerns of the present tense, of the people in their daily lives and immediate struggles.

A living politics, however, cannot be reduced to demands for 'service delivery' – an appellation which rightly deserves shudder quotes in the South African context today, given the ubiquity of the deeply depoliticising discourse of the 'service delivery protest' as it is applied to near any form of popular action by the poor. Abahlali vehemently rejects this discourse and its anti-political and anti-democratic impetus (see Friedman, 2009), which asserts the politically stultifying logic of the 'governmentalized' (see Chatterjee, 2004: 34) state. To draw on Chatterjee's (2004: 34) formulation⁵⁸, this logic divides *citizens* who have

⁵⁸ See Chapter 1, p.11.

rights and the agency to insist on them, from *populations* which, without the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1973: 296), are left only with entitlements to ‘welfare’, or whatever nominal goods state policy sees fit to ‘deliver’; goods for which they must patiently wait – or violently demand through rioting or the dispossession of foreigners. Read with Lazarus, we see that service delivery discourse is firmly a state subjectivity, which can only see the expression of popular politics as socially located interest, as reducible to the objective and to material demands, and not as political itself. The politics of the poor, it is assumed, is an impoverished politics, which can think only as far as its empty stomach. While living politics retains proximity to the material conditions in which people live in the vocalisation of its demands, the material is not its object, and its thought is not subordinate to the objective. Zikode is crystal clear on this point in these statements: ‘It is not only about physical infrastructure [...] we have *shifted our thinking*’; ‘the struggle is the human being, the conditions that we live in which *translates into* demands for housing and land’; ‘people are *starting to remember* that they are human beings’ (cit. Gibson, 2011: 157 [my emphasis]); and ‘We have shown the world that *we know* that we are *not supposed to be* living the way we do’ (cit. Selmeczi, 2012a: 503 [my emphasis]). The centrality of the subjective is clear. The objective demands for the material amelioration of their suffering are subordinated to the subjective affirmation that they are people who know that they should not suffer as they do. A living politics is thus a politics of humanity, which affirms the subjectivity of people who live, who *know* that they are human beings whose lives cannot be disposable. It is thus a maxim of equality. As Selmeczi (2012b: 510) writes, ‘at the roots of Abahlali’s political subjectivization is the recognition that their suffering is unjust, with the articulation of this recognition contemporaneously demonstrating their equality as thinking and speaking human beings’. We can compare this to Antonio Negri’s reading of the biblical book of Job, wherein Job’s suffering – which in Negri’s reading stands for the suffering of labour under capitalism – establishes the imperative for the ‘construction of a new possibility of justice’ (Negri, 2009: 48). As Cucchiara (2013: 191) writes, for Negri, ‘[u]nlike fear, which prompts people to accept draconian measures, pain creates horizontal relations among people. Thus, suffering generates the condition of possibility for the creation of a non-hierarchical order’.

We can understand living politics on the one hand as meaning its proximity to (but not reduction to) the concerns of daily living and suffering, but activists also explain that living politics is a discursive space, a space of ‘speaking and listening’ (Selmeczi, 2012b: 153), in which all members are equal within the movement’s rigorously democratic configuration. Here what is important is articulation and recognition, or the activists’ ‘militant practice of

putting everyday life into discourse' (ibid.). As Zikode (cit. Selmeczi, 2012b: 154) explains:

[Living politics is] a very – very important space for any human being that is oppressed in the manner that our members are oppressed. It's a space where they can cough out all their frustrations. In many aspects, it's a space where their dignity is restored. Their thoughts are respected, their views are listened to.

In this discursive sense, living politics is the intellectual space of thinking, listening and speaking, and in so doing, articulating a politics which starts from itself, and one which affirms itself as a politics while it affirms the thinkers, listeners and speakers as political subjects. Living politics is thus a politics of presentation, not representation. Its political sites are multiple – they include the meeting space, the protest march, the road blockade – demonstrative sites where the politics of the movement are thought *in actu*. It is precisely through presenting itself as politics – through political appearance – that Abahlali ruptures the social order in which its politics are rendered invisible, and that its members, to use a formulation of Rancière's (2006: 302), 'demonstrate that they indeed have the rights they are denied'. As one AbM member puts it:

Now when you join Abahlali as a community, Abahlali educate you and remind you that look: you are a law abiding citizen of South Africa! Then you automatically...that "uummff" comes up within you and you automatically reclaim that space, that political space and you become somebody, out of nowhere! (cit. Selmeczi, 2012b: 159).

This process of political subjectivation described above, of becoming 'somebody, out of nowhere', is linked to learning and knowledge, but not that imposed from outside the movement. Rather, Abahlali activists say that they are 'professors of [their] own poverty' (cit. Gibson, 2011: 211) or 'professors of their own suffering' (cit. Selmeczi, 2012b: 160); they know the nature of their struggles, and in this sense living politics is also a 'form of knowledge' (Selmeczi, 2012a: 510). Indeed, Abahlali activists have marched under the banner of 'The University of Abahlali baseMjondolo'⁵⁹, emphasising their struggle as an intellectual praxis. Yet, within the logic of living politics, this intellectuality cannot be exclusive, its pedagogy cannot be hierarchical. As Zikode writes (in the foreword to Gibson, 2011: v):

[I]f you are serious about victory, about succeeding to humanise the world, even a little bit, then your struggle must be a living politics. It must be owned and shaped in thought and in action by ordinary men and women. If every gogo (grandmother) does not understand your politics then you are on the road to another top-down system.

This principle of the democracy of intellectual capacity, of decentralised and horizontal

⁵⁹ See AbM (no date), 'University of Abahlali baseMjondolo', *Abahlali.Org*, Available at <http://abahlali.org/university-of-abahlali-basemjondolo/>, Accessed October 23 2018.

knowledge (Gibson, 2011: 207) which is accessible to everyone, is by no means a question of abridging political thought so that it can be understood by the poor and the uneducated. To the contrary, Abahlalisms furiously opposes the presumption that the poor cannot appropriately think and articulate their own politics. ‘We are the people who are not meant to think’, Zikode (2008:1) says. ‘[...] They fail to understand that we are poor, not stupid’.

Central to Abahlali’s politics of presentation is the rejection of the patronizing efforts by others to speak on their behalf, and their refusal to be represented. This repudiation of representation has placed Abahlali’s living politics outside of the domain of formal civil society, and at a distance from state subjectivity and the state itself – a defiance which has had grave consequences for AbM’s members, many of whom have been intimidated, assaulted, arrested or murdered by local and regional state actors and their hired thugs (see, for examples, Zikode, 2013; AbM, 2018a; Naki, 2018; Clark, 2018; Friedman, 2018). Neither the state nor NGOs, Abahlali maintains, know the struggles of the poor in South Africa, and representation by either serves only to silence and depoliticise the voices of the shack dwellers themselves. As Zikode (2008) states:

We do not allow the state to keep us quiet in the name of a future revolution that does not come. We do not allow the NGOs to keep us quiet in the name of a future socialism that they can’t build. We take our place as people who count the same as everyone else.

Where Abahlali has in some cases accepted support from civil society organisations, lawyers, and academics, the movement insists on preserving its autonomy (Gibson, 2011: 180). AbM has maintained its distance from party politics for the most part, with Zikode repeatedly declining calls to run for local government (Gibson, 2011: 154), and through boycotting the local and national government elections which took place in 2006, 2009 and 2011. In the last two elections – for the national government in 2014, and local government in 2016 – Abahlali has equivocally supported electoral politics, controversially encouraging a

tactical bloc vote for the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), in 2014⁶⁰. In 2016 members voted (or didn't vote) as they chose. Despite this engagement with electoral politics, and in the face of ongoing brutal repression, Abahlali remains unaffiliated with any political party.

Care should be taken not to idealise the movement, which faces internal challenges like any other. Increasing membership (there are now said to be over 50 000 members across South Africa (AbM, 2018b)) has led to growing bureaucratisation, and legitimate security priorities have at times dominated the movement's agenda over other concerns (Pithouse, 2014b). Where security threats have escalated, older men have sometimes become more prominent in leadership positions (*ibid.*), despite AbM's effort to keep young and women members at the centre of the movement. There have been various disagreements and divisions within the organisation (for example, relating to the 2014 endorsement of the DA). Most recently, in 2018, following concerns within the movement that three members of the leadership had been co-opted by the ANC, AbM called a general assembly open to all members, where a collective decision was taken to dissolve the provincial leadership. The result was that all leaders, including the three in question, would have to democratically seek a new mandate (AbM, 2018c). Finally, despite the many gains the movement has made, it has

⁶⁰ The choice to endorse the DA in 2014 was a contentious one, and deserves some attention here. Many commentators on the Left lambasted the decision, accusing the movement of selling-out to party politics, and complaining that the policies of the DA, which are generally to the right of the ANC, are also anti-poor. Cape Town, in the DA governed Western Cape, has seen multiple unlawful and frequently violent evictions of shack dwellers (see, for example, De Vos, 2013; Tshabalala, 2014), amounting to what Pithouse (2014b) calls an 'exclusionary urban regime [...] that is often predicated on state violence and illegality'. In this regard, AbM's decision was certainly contradictory. However, in the face of violent repression from the ANC, Abahlali maintained that the decision was strategic, with an aim to weaken the ruling party and oppose and punish it directly. The endorsement was also given in return for a legal agreement that the DA would support some of the movement's demands, and it was not, AbM asserted, an endorsement of the DA's politics or ideology. Rather, they had made the complicated decision to 'suspend ideology for a clear goal: weaken the ANC, guarantee the security and protection of the shack dwellers' (Zikode in Tshabalala, 2014). Nor did the endorsement equate to party membership, and AbM clearly articulated the importance of preserving its autonomy as it had in the past. Most importantly, the decision was undertaken democratically, after careful deliberations and a transparent voting process, in which the large majority of delegates, after lengthy engagements with the settlements they were elected to represent, voted in favour of the endorsement. The top leadership of the movement – some of whom did not support the decision – sat out of the vote completely (Sacks, 2014; Pithouse, 2014b). The outrage at the decision often failed to take into account, or did so only grudgingly, the democratic nature of this process: some accounts condemned the decision as influenced by white supporters from outside (Sacks, 2014; Pithouse, 2014b), others made claims that the endorsement proved that in fact AbM was not as 'radical' as they were made to appear in academic accounts of the movement (Bohmke, 2014). AbM, for itself, stated, 'We share a sadness that we have had to make this decision' but that it is the members of the movement who 'must live in shacks and they must try and survive repression. Their organisation is theirs and it will be directed by their decisions' (AbM, 2014). AbM affirmed that the appropriate action for the movement is the one that is decided on openly by the movement as the best course for the welfare of its members, and not the action that is deemed to be appropriately political from outside: 'Maybe for these people it is better for us to be oppressed by the ANC than the DA. For us it is better not to be oppressed' (*ibid.*).

been unable to bring about substantial material change for most of its members through the provision of proper housing, land or jobs. Despite these and other challenges, however, the movement has continued to insist on a vision of politics which is distinct to the oppressive politics of the state in South Africa, one which asserts the centrality of the human being as the beginning and end of its living politics. Ultimately it is the universality, and thus the irreducibility to interests, of Abahlali's living politics which has set it subjectively at a distance from the politics of the state and of civil society. It is through this universality, constitutive of its living politics, which Abahlali's refutation of xenophobia, and its affirmation of a 'living solidarity' (AbM, 2008) in its place, must be understood.

4.3.2. Living solidarity against a politics of fear

Abahlali's radical and sophisticated 2300-word statement against xenophobia, made on May 21 2008 against the pogroms tearing through South Africa, expressly rejects divisive nativism in favour of political solidarity. The remarkable statement – which Neocosmos (2012a: 477) has called 'the only political statement in the true sense of the term uttered at the time because it was able precisely to express a truth evident to all' – warrants close reading. Its opening paragraphs contain two clear political prescriptions: 'An action can be illegal. A person cannot be illegal. A person is a person where ever they may find themselves', and 'If you live in a settlement you are from that settlement and you are a neighbour and a comrade in that settlement' (AbM, 2008). The first statement refutes the category of the 'illegal immigrant' and the dehumanizing construction of unauthorised migrants as 'illegals' by asserting that personhood is never contingent on the juridical construct of the state and the lawfulness or unlawfulness of one's presence there; rather, it is the laws which define one's presence as legal or illegal which are contingent (and which may be discriminatory and unjust). The same prescription was made by the *sans-papiers* ('without papers') movement which began in France in the mid 1990s, a political organisation of undocumented migrants who rejected their designation by the state as *clandestins*, or 'illegals'⁶¹ (Nail, 2015: 113), and other non-status migrant justice movements have emerged across Europe and North

⁶¹ In fact, Sylvain Lazarus and Alain Badiou were founders of a French militant group called L'Organisation politique (OP) which supported the struggle of the *sans-papiers*. The OP made the following statement about the movement, which bears comparison here: 'the sans-papiers are not illegal, this is what the movement makes intelligible. They are people who live here and do not have papers. This is the fault of the government and the laws that prevent them from obtaining them' (in Nail, 2015: 113).

America under the banner ‘No One is Illegal’⁶² (Nail, 2015: 121). The principle that ‘a person is a person wherever they may find themselves’ itself reflects prescriptions from other egalitarian political sequences, as Neocosmos (2017) observes. The *Donsolu Kalikan* or *The Hunters’ Oath of the Manden*, an extraordinary statement against slavery made in 1222 by the Mandinka hunters’ guild (in what is now areas of modern Mali, Senegal and Guinea), declared that ‘every human life is a life’ (ibid., 19), and in Haiti, the expression *tout moun se moun* (‘every person is a person’) was invoked as an egalitarian prescription both in the early 1800s, following the Haitian Revolution, and then again in the popular political movement *Fanmi Lavalas* in the 1990s (ibid., 21-22). Their recurrence in historical emancipatory political moments attests to the universal capacity of these prescriptions.

The assertion that anyone who ‘lives in a settlement is from that settlement’ and is a ‘neighbour and a comrade’ affirms subjective political belonging over autochthony and nativism⁶³. This political belonging is configured, at one level, experientially through shared suffering and alienation: ‘We need to be clear’ the 2008 statement reads, ‘that many politicians, and the police and the media, talk about “illegal immigrants” as if they are all criminals. We know the damage that this does and the pain that this causes. We are also spoken about as if we are all criminals’ (AbM, 2008). If we return to Neocosmos’ notion of uncivil society⁶⁴ as a subjective domain of state politics where the chief relation between the state and the people is mediated not through citizenship, the rule of law or a culture of rights, but through patronage, coercion and frequent explicit and illegal violence, it is clear that both the South African poor and the poor born in other countries are routinely treated as non-citizens by the state. As Abahlali observes,

In South Africa some of us are moved out of the cities to rural human dumping grounds called relocation sites while others are moved all the way out of the country. Some of us are taken to transit camps and some of us are taken to Lindela [Repatriation Centre]. The destinations might be different but it is the same kind of oppression (ibid.)

While AbM (2008) is clear that ‘[n]either poverty nor oppression justify one poor person turning on another’, it asserts that it is oppression which produces ‘the kind of stress that can damage a person’ (ibid.) and which breeds the fear and rage which generates violence: ‘the reason why [violence] happens in Alex [Township] and not Sandton [an

⁶² For example, ‘Kein mensch ist illegal’ in Germany, ‘Ninguna Persona Es Ilegal’ in Spain, ‘Zaden Czlowiek Nie Jest Nielegalny’ in Poland, ‘Ingen Manniska Ar Illegal’ in Sweden, and ‘Geen Mens Is Illegaal’ in Holland (Nail, 2015: 121)

⁶³ L’Organisation politique made the same prescription in France: ‘quiconque vit ici est d’ici’ (whoever lives here, is from here) (Nail, 2015: 112).

⁶⁴ See Chapter 2, p.42.

affluent area in Johannesburg] is because people in Alex are suffering and scared for the future of their lives' (ibid.). Yet unlike arguments which see xenophobia as sociologically determined, AbM rejects the mechanistic explanation of xenophobia as a function of poverty – and thus, of poor people. While unequivocally condemning the xenophobic actions perpetrated by the poor, Abahlali's statement also convicts the oppressive systems which produce desperation, as well as the overtly xenophobic practices of 'many politicians, and the police and the media', of the 'Department of Home Affairs [which] does not treat refugees or migrants as human beings', and of 'the South African government' and the exploitive actions of 'South African companies in other countries' (ibid.). Against what Abahlali recognises as an oppressive and xenophobic state politics directed against *all* poor people who live in South Africa, they reject the patronising assertion that it is the poor who should be educated against xenophobia:

We hear that the political analysts are saying that the poor must be educated about xenophobia. Always the solution is to 'educate the poor'. When we get cholera we must be educated about washing our hands when in fact we need clear water. When we get burnt we must be educated about fire when in fact we need electricity. This is just a way of blaming the poor for our suffering [...] The solution is not to educate the poor about xenophobia. The solution is to give the poor what they need to survive so that it becomes easier to be welcoming and generous. The solution is to stop the xenophobia at all levels of our society. Arrest the poor man who has become a murderer. But also arrest the corrupt policeman and the corrupt officials in Home Affairs (ibid.).

Instead, Abahlali says, 'let us all educate ourselves' (ibid.). In a series of six repeating (almost mantra-like) paragraphs, the statement recites and then challenges common grievances expressed against 'people born in other countries'. Here are examples:

People say that people born in other countries are selling mandrax. Oppose mandrax and its sellers but don't lie to yourself and say that people born in South African do not also sell mandrax or that our police do not take money from mandrax sellers. Fight for a police service that serves the people. Don't turn your suffering neighbours into enemies.

People also say that people born in other countries are willing to work for very little money bringing everyone's wages down. But we know that people are desperate and struggling to survive everywhere. Fight for strong unions that cover all sectors, even informal work. Don't turn your suffering neighbours into enemies.

People say that people born in other countries don't stand up to struggle and always run away from the police. Oppose cowardice but don't lie to yourself and say that people born in South Africa are not also cowards. Don't lie to yourself and pretend that it is the same for someone born here and someone not born here to stand up to the corrupt, violent and racist police. Fight for ID books for your neighbours so that we can all stand together for the rights of the poor. Don't turn your suffering neighbours into enemies.

People say that people born in other countries are more successful in love because they don't have to send money home to rural areas. Oppose a poverty so bad that it even strangles love. Live for a life outside of money by fighting for an income for everyone. Don't turn your suffering neighbours into enemies (ibid.).

The statements speak for themselves, but what can be emphasised here is the subjective potentiality of the prescriptions ‘don’t lie to yourself’ and ‘don’t turn your suffering neighbours into enemies’. The verbs ‘lie’ and ‘turn’ denote subjective capacity, not mechanistic behaviour; in their negation, they assert universality – in *not* lying, one affirms truth, in *not* turning, one affirms solidarity. Using Badiou’s (2015: 63) formulation, the subjectivity expressed in these statements marks an ‘immanent exception’ in that it ‘reveal[s] not just the concrete conditions of [its] existence but also a rupture within these conditions’, which affirms a universal value – meaning it opens ‘a subject space where anyone can be counted’ (Rancière, 1995, cit. Neocosmos, 2016: 40), and thus a vision of human equality. Badiou makes the comparison of a mathematical proof: ‘If you understand the mathematical proof, you know that that proof is for everyone. You understood it precisely because it can be understood by everyone’ (2015: 73). Kwame Gyekye (2011) discusses a similar notion that appears in historical Akan (now modern Ghanaian) moral thought, in which the principle of a common or universal good is frequently depicted through the motif of a two-headed crocodile. While the twin heads signify individual preferences, differences, and so on, the shared stomach represents that which universally and indivisibly benefits both crocodiles. The contents of the stomach, in Akan morality, were ‘defined by the traditional thinkers of the Akan society in terms of peace, happiness or satisfaction (human flourishing), justice, dignity, respect, and so on’ (Gyekye, 2011: n.p.). Other traditions may describe the common good differently; the point is that whatever the good is, it can be affirmed by all. The stomach, or collective good, is not the sum of differentiated appetites (in a utilitarian sense), in which case it would be only contingently collective, but it is that which *has the capacity to be* universally affirmed – in the same way that a mathematical proof that is correct has the capacity to be understood by anyone. Simply, an immanent exception in politics, though it arises from within a particular context (which inevitably marks it through the dialectic of the expressive and excessive politics – more on this presently), cannot be that which ‘glorifie[s] particularity’ (Badiou, 2015: 74), but must subjectively eschew particularity for that which can be affirmed by all. In this sense it is in fact an authoritarian (Badiou, 2012: 60-1) prescription – though strictly not a statist authoritarianism – because it is an injunction to *all* and thus entirely intractable to opinion.

In eschewing xenophobic politics of nationalism and identitarianism, which assert particularity, for a living solidarity between neighbours, Abahlali affirms a political conception of neighbourliness and belonging which is subjectively invented and not socially determined. This political belonging recalls Fanon’s conception of the revolutionary ‘national

consciousness' (1961), conceived of as a political subjectivity, in which 'the living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people' (1961: 204). As opposed to state nationalism, it is not represented by the state or the party, and is not reflective of social appellations of race, class, indigeneity and so forth, but is constructed in thought and practice by ordinary people through political presentation, and is inclusive of all of those who participate in the political project. Thus Fanon as a foreigner could be considered an Algerian within the collective imagination of the national struggle. Likewise, in South Africa, as aforementioned⁶⁵, mass popular action during the anti-apartheid struggle in the later years of the 1980s – before the period of constitutionalisation after 1990 – promoted an emancipatory national vision which fostered bonds of solidarity across national, class and racial lines. In this regard Abahlali's living politics and living solidarity can be said to demonstrate a 'fidelity' to the South African emancipative event (Neocosmos, 2016: 239), which rejects exclusionary state nationalism and affirms a vision of political citizenship, in which 'a person is a person wherever they may find themselves', and which upholds the promise of the Freedom Charter of 1955 that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'.

4.4. Concluding remarks: the dialectic of expressive and excessive politics, a further note on the Khutsong rebellion

There is one point still to make before concluding this chapter, by way of which I return for a moment to the resistance to xenophobic politics demonstrated in 2008 during the Khutsong rebellion. I have already discussed this resistance at some length in the previous chapter, and have pointed out some of its contradictory aspects. I will not reiterate here, except to briefly show that the more ambivalent rejection of xenophobia in the Khutsong sequence demonstrates the function of the dialectic between expressive and excessive politics that has been mentioned already.

The point is simply that while excessive politics is a movement beyond identity and place – beyond the particular – it is still dialectically in a relation to the social, in the sense that 'excess always exceeds something' (Neocosmos, 2016: 40). Within this dialectic, excessive or emancipatory politics are always marked in some way by expressive or state politics – which is why, to paraphrase Lazarus (2016: 115) slightly, to practice politics at a distance from the state is by no means to ignore the central character of the state itself. In a

⁶⁵ See Chapter 2, p.56.

stronger sense, however, Neocosmos (2016: 40) argues that the ‘level of excess’ – that is, the distance between the excessive and the expressive – in a political sequence will vary. In the case of Abahlali baseMjondolo, as we have just seen, the political subjectivity pronounced in the category of living politics greatly exceeds state thinking, or the ‘excessive gap’ (ibid.) in this case is vast. It is this which has regulated the principled stance against xenophobia which Abahlali has, so far, been able to uphold. That is not to say that Abahlali’s project has not in other ways sometimes invoked more expressive forms political thinking – for example, it could be arguable that the return to an engagement with electoral politics may signify precisely this. We should also be clear that a form of ‘saturation’ in this sense, or a return to aspects of state thinking, does not mean the failure of a political sequence or its ideological impotence or collapse, but can be (as was the case in Abahlali’s decision to endorse the DA) a result of brute repression and the violent homeostasis of the state consensus. Finally, as Neocosmos (2016: 52) suggests, it is perhaps not useful to understand Lazarus’ category of politics in interiority as meaning a politics which is thought ‘exclusively internally’, entirely independent of the state or state thinking. Rather, an emancipatory politics exists within the dialectical tension between the excessive and the expressive – as its distance from the state closes, so does its capacity to transcend sociological facticity by way of its exception.

In the case of Khutsong, we have seen that although a strictly national conception of identity was eschewed by the rebels during the collective political action of the rebellion, which fostered political solidarity with foreigners against the 2008 violence, political belonging was not primarily affirmed through any universal conception, but was more narrowly constructed (reflecting the local dimension of the struggle) on the basis of the rebels’ place-based identity as ‘Gauteng people’. For this reason, foreign-born people who had long histories of residence and work in Gauteng, such as Mozambicans, and who were politically engaged in the rebellion themselves, were largely included within this conception of belonging. However, relative newcomers who were not seen to have contributed to the development of Gauteng through historical labour on the mines – generally Somalis and Ethiopians – were more ambiguously treated during this sequence. To make sense of this within the theory, I suggest that while the collective politics of the Khutsong rebellion did create a political space in which xenophobic politics were able to be contested, the subjective limitations of this process, in comparison to Abahlali, were that the politics of the Khutsong sequence did not demonstrate so great an ‘excessive gap’. While the thinking of the Khutsong rebels was able to exceed state subjectivity to some degree, it was also in some aspect clearly

expressive of state subjectivity, as its politics were generally based on the expression of localised interests rather than the affirmation of a more universal or egalitarian principle.

Finally, to reiterate, the limits of an excessive politics do not constitute its failure, and we should not forget about the lives and livelihoods which found a haven in Khutsong in 2008, and the expressions of solidarity and generosity that were confirmed there. It is precisely important to remember that the act of thinking beyond place and identity is necessarily a dialectical process. This dis-identification and dis-placement, as a kind of subjective unmooring, quite naturally must involve tension and ambivalence, as the praxis of thinking and maintaining a politics at a distance from the state is never an easy nor an automatic task. In the final chapter I undertake a close investigation of the words and statements of members of the Unemployed People's Movement (UPM) in Grahamstown with whom I spoke following the 2015 xenophobic violence there. Although the movement took an uncompromising official line against xenophobia, members themselves articulated the difficulties of contesting xenophobic thinking and practices. Often, people made clearly contradictory statements, at one point affirming solidarity with the foreigner and at another expressing doubts, concerns or resentments which were frequently to some degree (and sometimes overtly) 'xenophobic'. As I try to demonstrate, however, such contradictions can be comprehended by way of the dialectic between excessive and expressive thinking, and should not be dismissed as incongruity, irrationality or some kind of 'false consciousness'. Rancière (cit. Neocosmos, 2016: 40) writes: 'Any subjectivation is a dis-identification, a tearing-away from the naturalness of place, the opening of a subject space where anyone can be counted'. It is precisely, I think, this 'tearing-away' which is at stake here, where, within the dialectic of excessive and expressive politics, the thought of what could be tears away from the thought of what is – in the struggle to affirm the new.

CHAPTER FIVE

INVESTIGATING SUBJECTIVE SINGULARITIES

5.1. Introduction

I think that if I'm a novelist with a *message* it's only one [...] and that would be the effort that one has got to make according to me, the very dangerous effort one has got to make, to deal with other people as though they were simply human beings. To remember that no matter what the details of their lives may be, or how much they seem to differ from you superficially, or what the social pressures are outside or what the psychological pressures are within, to deal with this other human being precisely as though – as it is true in fact – he or she was here for the first time, and the only time (James Baldwin, 1963)⁶⁶.

I begin with this passage by James Baldwin as it reflects two principles which are important for the remainder of this work. First, for my research with the Unemployed People's Movement (UPM), it represents something of a maxim. I came across the passage in the year I started this project, in an online video of a BBC Bookstand interview recorded in 1963. Struck by the words, I wrote them inside the cover of a notebook which was to become my field journal. Baldwin's message, I decided, hubristically, would be mine too. Like *people think*, Baldwin's injunction underscores not only an egalitarian principle, but also an epistemic and methodological decision – one which I hoped to take seriously in my interactions and interviews with members of the UPM. This chapter is concerned with that position. The quote became doubly meaningful as the activists recounted their own dangerous efforts to treat those inhabitants of their communities not as 'foreigners', but simply as human beings, necessarily deserving of humanity from others. Each was in various ways an uncertain militant of Baldwin's prescription, each labouring under the effort of that radical endeavour. This is the subject of the next chapter.

I begin here by describing the parameters of my research with the UPM, before a more detailed discussion of methodology. The research was conducted over approximately one year, consisting of structured interviews with 18 participants following around eight months of 'participant observation'. It is not representative of the UPM as a whole, nor does it aim to

⁶⁶ James Baldwin, in an interview for the BBC Bookstand with Peter Duval Smith, 1963. [Video]. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dNd1xh-BNbE&t=840s>. (Timestamp: 12:20 – 13:08). Accessed 19 October 2018.

be an ethnography. Rather, I am investigating what Lazarus and Hayem have called ‘subjective singularities’ (Hayem, 2012: 518) – that is, the study is an attempt to ‘identify, qualify and delimit specific forms of thinking which characterize a specific political sequence’ (ibid.): in this case, the UPM’s contestation of xenophobic violence which began in October 2015 and extended through January of the next year as the movement worked to facilitate reintegration and reconciliation within the fractured community.

5.2. Research methods

I was a student in Grahamstown during the xenophobic attack in 2015, and, while I did not witness very much more than the police line which cordoned off the chaos unfolding in the township from the relative peace of the town ‘proper’, the sense of disaster during that time was palpable. Impressions which reappear are the stricken faces of the wives waiting outside City Hall for the mayor who refused to meet them; a car guard acquaintance of some years who gravely told me that the foreigners must be chased out because ‘they are killing our sisters’; the group of Bangladeshi men from my local corner store, Get Lucky Take Away (fortuitously situated just on the safe side of the police line), standing outside their barred shopfront on the second night of the attack, staring with baleful eyes towards the lights on the eastern hill. Arif, from whom I usually bought milk and cigarettes, told me quietly that the hollow-faced man who sat near the door had lost everything in the looting of the previous day. Get Lucky is still there, and so is Arif. I do not know what happened to the other man.

During that time, I heard a little about the UPM’s response to the crisis and attended some of the public events against xenophobia which the movement had been involved in organising. I started formal research with the UPM in August 2016. The process began slowly. For the first eight months my interaction was limited to what might be broadly described as ‘participant observation’, with the aim of introducing myself to members, identifying possible interview participants, and learning about the movement more generally. The stronger relationships I formed were with a number of young women activists from the UPM affiliate, the Young Women’s Forum (YWF)⁶⁷, whose weekly meetings I attended on and off during the year of fieldwork. Other sites of interaction and observation were the larger UPM assemblies and marches, the UPM offices, and some members’ homes in the

⁶⁷The Young Women’s Forum (YWF) has disbanded as of 2018, but many of its former members are now part of a new grassroots women’s movement in Grahamstown, called *Imbokodo*.

township.

Given that I do not speak or understand isiXhosa my role was generally limited quite literally to observation, rather than participation. The language barrier posed an obvious limitation to what ‘data’ I could gather; still, I was able to note tone and gesture, laughter, anger and song⁶⁸. Sometimes people spoke in English, or the person next to me would translate. Limitations notwithstanding, these observations were themselves valuable, and I gathered a notion of how the movement organised, a sense of its membership and how discussion was conducted – from what I could see, mostly freely and fairly. Beyond these impressions, I shared many informal exchanges with people in English during the cumulative hours of waiting for events or meetings to begin. Many of these interactions would inform the questions I asked later in the formal interviews.

Where my role was less observational and more ‘participatory’, moving from what Adler and Adler (1987: 36, 50) describe as ‘peripheral membership’ to a more ‘active membership’⁶⁹, there were other implications to consider. Some months into the research I was asked to give a speech about xenophobia at a large UPM event, after the original speaker dropped out at the last minute. While I was unsure about the idea, I felt it would have been ungracious to decline. I was also grateful to have been asked to contribute. I made a short speech to the assembly (I guessed sixty or seventy people) about the importance of contesting xenophobia as the UPM had done, as a way of expressing solidarity against all forms of oppression. The speech was translated line by line by another speaker. Heated debate followed my presentation; in fact, I was surprised that the issue raised so much contention. Some of the comments which were made in English, or which were translated for me, referred to familiar refrains that foreigners take jobs, bring drugs, traffick children, and marry South African women for their passports.

The implications of this participation were ambiguous, and I had the sense that speaking at the event had placed me in an uncomfortably didactic role as I became *speaker* rather than listener/observer, ‘expert’ rather than learner. This was clearly met with warranted scepticism by some UPM members. Evans (2012: 98) describes participant observation fieldwork as ‘a learning phenomenon’ where the position of the researcher

⁶⁸ My favourite of these was an adaptation of a South African gospel song (apparently by Nduduzo Matse), which centres on the refrain ‘On your marks, get set, we are ready for Jerusalem!’ The version frequently sung by the UPM is: ‘On your Marx, get set, we are ready for Socialism!’

⁶⁹ See also Kawulich (2005) for discussion of observer roles in participant observation.

is revealed from this perspective as a novice – the would-be participant – who must approach from the periphery of the action, seek permission to join in and, from that ‘legitimate periphery’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991), begin to understand.

My sense was that in this instance I had stumbled from this ‘legitimate periphery’ into a form of participation which was ultimately illegitimate within my role as a researcher, and more importantly, as a learner. Nonetheless, the experience was significant in that it made me evaluate my own presuppositions; namely, that the UPM’s response to the xenophobic attack was a straightforward indication of what kind of thinking I could expect from its activists. I was disconcerted by some of the apparently ‘xenophobic’ statements I heard, and I felt uneasy about my project, unsure how to reconcile my understanding of the 2015 event with my observations. The unease was useful, however, as it revealed the problematics of my assumptions. Crucially, this appreciation informed my approach to the second phase of my research; I realised that the interviews would ultimately fail if they were unable to uncover the tensions and ambivalences which were expressed during that meeting.

Between April and August 2017 I interviewed eighteen members of the UPM, nine women and nine men. Fourteen were one-on-one interviews, and two were joint-interviews, as the participants preferred. The interviews were generally structured, comprising of around 60 sub-questions grouped around several larger topics, although conversation often strayed from the questionnaire. Each lasted around an hour. Interviews were conducted either in the offices which the UPM shared with the local NGO, Masifunde, or else at the participants’ homes within the township⁷⁰. Audio-recordings were made of each interview, which I transcribed in full⁷¹, and I took field-notes during or afterwards, as appropriate. In total the interviews amounted to around 19 hours of audio and over 65 thousand words of transcribed text (excluding my questions)⁷². The questions themselves were largely informed by the months of observation. They were prepared with the following in mind: firstly, not to presuppose that the movement’s response to the xenophobic attack would be an indicator as to what the respondent might think about people from other countries living in their community; secondly, to frame the interview in terms of the concerns of the wider community, including both ‘foreigners’ and South Africans; thirdly, to avoid questions which

⁷⁰ For the most part I was assisted in identifying and contacting participants by an activist I met at the weekly YWF meetings, whose help was invaluable in this regard. She also acted as my interpreter for two interviews with older members who spoke mostly isiXhosa (the rest were conducted in English). She was compensated for her time, and all participants were remunerated for their taxi fares to and from the UPM offices.

⁷¹ See Appendix B.

⁷² Before each interview, I explained the purpose of the research and each participant signed a consent form, prepared in English and isiXhosa (See Appendix A).

may be considered to be moralistic or didactic; and fourthly, to focus on what each respondent thought or felt in their individual capacity, and not only as members of a movement.

5.3. Methodological approach

Before I set out the methodology, which has at its centre the theoretical position outlined in the previous chapter, underscored by the axiom *people think*, it is necessary to briefly situate this research in relation to this work as a whole. I have said already that the aim is to identify and qualify specific forms of thinking which characterise a political sequence (Hayem, 2012: 518); in this case, the politics of the UPM and, in particular, its challenge to xenophobia in 2015. My research question is then a simple one: what did activists think during and about that sequence? Or, what was the particular subjectivity, or the subjective singularity, which underpinned that political action? As such the scope of this research is necessarily limited. The point is strictly not to explain thought via external factors, concepts or theories, but to try to make the resistance to xenophobia demonstrated by the UPM in 2015 explicable in its own terms. The wider argument of this work insists that we cannot understand political subjectivities through structural, sociological or historicist – which we can call ‘statist’ – perspectives alone. In particular, I have argued that we cannot explain xenophobia through these perspectives, for one reason (there are others), because they render subjective exceptions to xenophobia unthinkable. We might say that political subjectivity which contests xenophobia is then the exception which proves the rule; the fact that there are subjective exceptions to xenophobia proves the rule that xenophobia is itself a (state political) subjectivity, and not a mechanistic reaction to some or other set of sociological determinants. We can only recognise and apprehend these subjective exceptions if we begin from the principle that *people think*. Again, we must *insist* on the subjective, because if people think, then another subjectivation is possible (Lazarus, 2016: 119).

The previous chapter has shown that Abahlali baseMjondolo’s resistance to xenophobic politics cannot be understood through state subjectivity, but through Abahlali’s praxis of ‘living politics’ and concomitant ‘living solidarity’ – as such, it can only be apprehended through the movement’s own discourse, categories and prescriptions. The aim of the following chapter is to present the UPM activists’ own discourse, as they told it to me, in order to try to identify and qualify the specific forms of thinking which characterised the

movement's exception to xenophobic politics. In order to do this – to study subjective singularities – Lazarus (2015), and following him, Hayem (2012), propose a specific 'theoretical problematic and methodology' (Hayem, 2012: 517). I have already outlined the theoretical foundation; the rest of this section presents the methodological superstructure.

5.3.1. *A note on 'positionality'*

One question that arises regarding an attempt to investigate 'in subjectivity' must relate to my own positionality as a researcher. This was indeed a question which provoked much anxiety throughout this process. Within the briary politics of power and privilege, authorship and representation, is such an investigation possible? Would people be willing to tell me what they really *think* in any case? And would I be able to understand this thinking on its own terms, given linguistic barriers, idiomatic variances, and social, economic, cultural and experiential divides? Worst of all was I, as Spivak (1988: 292) has put it, 'the first-world intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for themselves'? There were no simple answers to these questions. I had a rudimental understanding that these concerns called for reflexivity and transparency regarding my own *positionality*; that as researchers 'we must recognize and take account of our own position, as well as that of our research participants, and write this into our research practice' (McDowell, 1992: 409). However, the notion of accounting for my position filled me with deep uncertainty. I was unsure how to 'situate' myself in relation to the activists of UPM in a way which did not appeal to categories of social differentiation, which, it seemed to me, made essentialising claims about the nature of our interactions based on social identity – claims which at least to an extent belie the principal argument of this work.

I was heartened by Richa Nagar's discussion of feminist fieldwork practices (see Nagar, 2014), and her insistence that the 'messy politics of power and representation involved in the fieldwork encounter' (2002: 181) need not necessitate a paralysing impasse. While Nagar stresses the importance of understanding how one's social positionality as a researcher shapes and impacts the knowledge that one produces (2002: 180) – meaning that the knowledges we produce are never universal or objective, but always partial and situated in some way – she rejects the idea that one can address the issue of positionality through engagement with a narrow, identity-based reflexivity which appeals to and essentializes certain social categories and appellations (2002: 183). As Nagar writes, this type of reflexivity should be

challenged and resisted because uncovering ourselves in these terms contradicts our purpose of problematizing the dominant meanings attributed to pre-defined social categories – that is, social categories that are not just essentialist or overly coherent, but a view of categories as existing prior to and isolated from specific interactions, rather than as created, enacted, transformed *in* and *through* those interactions (2002: 183 [emphasis in original])⁷³.

Given my own argument throughout this work that subjectivity is not pre-determined by social location, I do not want to engage here in an identity-based reflexivity which essentializes social categories and difference, and which makes an ontological assumption that there can be ‘a pre-defined reality (about researcher–subject relationship) that can be known, represented, challenged or altered through reflexivity’ (ibid., 182). Gillian Rose (1997: 311) problematizes this notion of ‘transparent reflexivity’ as inadequate because it ‘depends on certain notions of agency (as conscious) and power (as context), and assumes that both are knowable’. She writes that ‘assuming that self and context are, even if in principle only, transparently understandable seems to me to be demanding an analytical certainty that is as insidious as the universalizing certainty that so many feminists have critiqued’ (1997: 318). For the purposes of this work, we might say that ‘doing positionality’ via state political categories, which assert social place as hierarchical and thus knowable, relies on the very reductive sociological assumptions – namely, the reduction of thought to social location – which the study of subjective singularities endeavours to exceed.

Rather than engaging in identity-based reflexivity which risks ‘reducing positionality to [a] retrogressive kind of identity politics’ (Nagar, 2002: 183), Nagar emphasizes the possibilities of ethical fieldwork engagements across social divisions of class, race, gender, or language through interactions based on solidarity, co-authorship and collaboration, and a ‘muddying of the waters’⁷⁴ of ‘neat positions and categories’ (Nagar, 2014: 2) with a rejection of the hierarchical separation of academic theory from the everyday multiplicities in which thought exists. She (2018: 10) writes that researchers must ‘disrupt our inherited understandings of the social that perform epistemic violence by obliterating’ so that we can ‘learn to recognize that which we have been disciplined not to anticipate, hear or appreciate’. Such a recognition, Nagar proposes, can be facilitated through a praxis of ‘radical vulnerability’ (2014: 22) as both an epistemological position and a methodological approach, cultivated through the creation of an inter-subjective space where the subject/object positions of researcher and researched can be thoroughly destabilized. In such a way, the problematics

⁷³ For later discussion on this issue in Nagar’s work, see Nagar (2014: 92-95).

⁷⁴ A reference to the title of Nagar’s 2014 book entitled *Muddying the Waters: Coauthoring Feminisms across Scholarship and Activism*. (Urbana, Springfield, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.)

of power and representation might be disrupted, as the academic location itself is made vulnerable through the interrogation of the ‘epistemic hierarchy’ (2014: 3) which privileges academic thought as knowledge and popular thought as ‘data’. While my own fieldwork did not approximate the radical collaborative practices which Nagar discusses in her work, and involved far more traditional methods of ‘data collection’ which were also guided pragmatically by the requisites of completing an academic work for the purposes of a degree, Nagar’s approach complements Lazarus’ work and the epistemological decision underscored by the statement *people think*. An approach in vulnerability (which it seems to me is also Baldwin’s ‘message’ in this chapter’s epigraph) and indeed in humility (Nagar, 2018: 3) – which for Nagar is a recognition ‘that for each one of us who is afforded the means or tools to step in with an authority to make knowledge claims, there are millions of others whose words and knowledges we stand on’ (ibid.) – is, if not a map through the problematic reality of conducting ethical research within a situation of inequality, at least a signpost which suggests a way through the impasse without asserting an identity-based approach which often depends on the very social categories which vulnerability disrupts.

5.3.2. Investigating subjective singularities

This excerpt from Lazarus (2016: 116) provides a useful description of the movement from theory to methodology in his thinking:

Politics is posed here as having its own field of thought which cannot be, without it disappearing, subordinated to an exterior field, whether that be philosophic, economic, or historical. Thus, it is a matter of thinking politics based on itself and not starting from other disciplines: politics has its own intellectuality. Consequently it is necessary, in order to subscribe to this demand (thinking politics through itself), to think it in subjectivity in a manner that never makes it into an object. Thinking it as thought, and not as object, is what I call proceeding by a process in subjectivity.

It is such a ‘process in subjectivity’ which I have attempted to follow in order to understand the subjective singularity of the UPM’s contestation of xenophobic politics. To set out what this process entails I draw primarily on the work of Judith Hayem, a former student of Lazarus’, who employed this approach in the study of workers’ political subjectivities in South Africa during the 1990s, after the democratic transition⁷⁵. Given the significant overlap between theory already discussed and this methodology, this section will be relatively brief. The aim is to set out some of its key principles and categories and to

⁷⁵ See Hayem, J., 2008, *La Figure ouvrière en Afrique du Sud*, Paris: IFAS-Karthala.

illustrate how these operate via an example in Hayem's work.

Recall⁷⁶ that Lazarus proposes a movement away from 'scientism' (2015: xxiv, 55-56, 72), which is the positivism or 'conception of science' (ibid. 55) which has, he argues, come to delimit thinking within the human or social sciences. Within the scientistic approach 'the object is connected to the general, to establishing general laws which are laws of the real. The order of the real and of its laws prescribes the order of thought' (ibid. 72). Thus, scientism proposes concepts, definitions and examples which demonstrate 'repeatability' (ibid. 56); like in the natural or biological sciences, these are testable and generalizable, and they posit a universal 'scientistic rationalism' as 'the sole possible form of rationalism, [which] alone is in a position to develop coherent debatable ideas about reality' (ibid. 55). However, Lazarus maintains that '[i]f politics is a thought, it is *of the order of singularity* and will be an exemplification thereof. There is no such thing as politics in general, only singular political sequences' (ibid., 72 [emphasis added]). Within the scientistic approach 'the hypothesis of irreducible singularities appears antinomic to the universality⁷⁷ of the scientistic conception of the real. In the scientistic view, there is no such thing as singularity, only cases and types' (ibid. 72). As such, a methodology which is able to think politics as thought, as subjective singularity, must abandon the approach of scientistic rationalism and its process of definitions and concepts, cases and types.

What does this involve in practice? To understand politics as thought 'immediately raises the question of *knowing what thought we are speaking of* and requires that we *identify the singularity of thought that makes thinking politics possible*' (Lazarus, 2015: 4 [emphasis added]). The italicised phrases point to two distinct but connected processes. The first process, to know what thought we are speaking of, requires that we know *whose* thought. Two points follow. The first point is that there must be a shift from the scientistic position in which the scientist or researcher is the 'first thinking' (in the sense in which a scientist may postulate a hypothesis to be confirmed or disconfirmed) to a position where people are the first thinking, as is proposed in the statement *people think* (ibid., 57) – which is here not given as a fact, but as a 'problematic decision' (ibid., xi); as such it is methodological. What this means is that we cannot understand what people think through *a priori* conceptual or theoretical paradigms, which just constitute the thought of people 'as an illustration of the thought of the

⁷⁶ See Chapter 1, p.12.

⁷⁷ 'Universality' in this case refers to the scientific conception that there is a universal rationalism which is based on positivism (i.e. it's relation to the real), and must be distinguished from the subjective or prescriptive 'universality' discussed in the previous chapter, which is a consequence of a thought's *irreducibility* to the extant, and therefore quite different.

investigator’ (Hayem, cit. Neocosmos, 2016: 331). This relates to the second point, regarding the referent ‘people’. For Lazarus, the term ‘people’ is what he calls a ‘certain indistinct’ (2015: 58) which does not designate any collective social subject but is rather an ‘indistinct *being-there* with regard to history and society’ (ibid.) in which ‘nothing is prejudged (this is what makes it “indistinct”’) except their existence (and this is what makes the term certain)’ (ibid. x). Thus analyses must not proceed from ‘a problematic of the subject’⁷⁸ (ibid. 59). This is why Lazarus’ approach is, for one thing, ‘post-classist’. It is post-classist because it does not use the conception of class dialectically to make sense of people’s ideas and prescriptions (Hayem, 2012: 519), and so adopts the obverse position to the Marxist notion that ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’ (Marx, 1859: 503). Nor does this approach substitute class for another supposedly objective basis for analysing subjectivities, such as identity, race, or religion, wherein a ‘renewed dialectic of objective and subjective thus replac[es] the earlier one’ (Hayem, 2012: 518). However, while Lazarus seems opposed to the notion of a dialectic, I follow Neocosmos (2016) in this regard in maintaining a notion of the ‘excessive gap’ (2016: 40) as indicating a tension between expressive and excessive forms of thinking.

I turn now to the second process. Having determined that the thought under investigation is the thought of people (people are the first thinking), and thought is not conceived of through *a priori* concepts or paradigms in the thought of the researcher⁷⁹, and ‘people’ is a ‘certain indistinct’ which does not denote a social subject, the question is not ‘*why* do people think this way?’ but ‘*what* do they think?’ Importantly, as Hayem makes clear, the aim is not to invalidate analyses which ask why people think as they do. Rather, this approach ‘intends to open up a path for another kind of knowledge distinct from a Marxist [or any other] sociology’ (Hayem, 2012: 518), so as to identify and understand subjectivities which exceed or break with, for example, the classist logic through which they (may have)

⁷⁸ By subject, here Lazarus is referring to a collective social subject (for example, class) and not a political ‘subject’ that emerges from a process of subjectivization.

⁷⁹ In this regard, the procedure is similar to the phenomenological approach to fieldwork as discussed by researchers such as Moustakas (1994), wherein investigators must ‘bracket’, as far as is possible, their own preconceptions and experiences of the phenomenon under study – what is referred to, following Husserl, as a phenomenological reduction or ‘epoché’, meaning ‘suspension’ (Cresswell, 2007: 59) – so as to describe the ‘essence’ of the phenomenon as experienced by individuals (ibid., 58). While it is not the essence of an experience which is under consideration here, but thought itself, Lazarus’ aim is substantively different in principle to that of the phenomenological approach to fieldwork: however, aspects of the procedures, in particular the movement from an emphasis on empirical scientism to the subjective, are comparable (see Cresswell, 2007: 57-62; Moustakas, 1994).

been formerly understood. We arrive now at the second process, which is to ‘identify the singularity of thought that makes thinking politics possible’ (Lazarus, 2015: 4), or in other words, to identify ‘what is being thought in what people think’ (Hayem, 2012: 518).

In order to do this, Lazarus proposes a movement away from ‘definitions’ to ‘identifications’ (2015: xi), and from ‘concepts’ to ‘categories’ (ibid. xi, 63). Whereas concepts may be generalizable, categories are singular to the political sequence under consideration – they are created by the sequence itself, and are meaningful only within that sequence. As such, it is through the identification of such categories, by way of ‘careful and lengthy examination of what [people] say and contend, and from the elucidation of the various prescriptions they pronounce on a given situation, that the researcher can get access to their forms of thinking’ (Hayem, 2012: 519). As there are a ‘multiplicity of intellectualities’ (Lazarus, 2015: 53), which are singular, it is only through identification of the categories specific to that intellectuality that the singularity of thought can be understood. This has to do with the identification of what Lazarus (2015: xii) calls ‘problematic words’.

Problematic words are those categories which are identified within people’s speech as ‘being at stake’, ‘in as much as they happen to be used to indicate alternative – and sometimes contradictory – “possibles”’ (Hayem, 2012: 519). If we recall that for Lazarus, thought is conceived of as a relation *of* the real and not a relation *to* the real, what Lazarus and Hayem are interested in elucidating through the identification of problematic words is forms of thought which are prescriptive and not descriptive, where thinking ‘is not conceived as a proposition on what is, but as a prescription on what is possible and on what could or should be attained in a given situation’ (Hayem, 2012: 519). It is through the prescriptive that alternative politics may be expressed; for Lazarus (2015: 46), ‘[p]olitics, at least politics “in interiority”, is prescriptive’. Categories which are identified as being problematic words are distinct from casual speech not only because of their polysemy but because of the various alternatives/possibles which these words open up to in thought (Lazarus, 2015: 46); or, Lazarus writes, ‘the possible arises when they decide on these words’ (ibid., xii).

The following example, from Hayem’s (2012) account of her study on workers’ subjectivities in South Africa, centring on an illegal strike which took place at an auto-manufacturing company in Port Elizabeth in 1998, briefly illustrates how the identification and elucidation of problematic words can give us access to subjective singularities. The strike was called over the reduction by management of a year-end monetary voucher or bonus for the workers. Rather than a straightforward wage labour issue, however, Hayem argues that the strike indicated the drawing to a close of a subjective sequence of engagement and

communication between management and workers that had followed the end of apartheid, the breakdown of what the workers had seen as a more optimistic period of mutual respect, appreciation, and reciprocity, and a return to the 'apartheid of speech' (Hayem, 2012: 521) which had characterised worker/management relations prior to 1994 (ibid. 524). During the sequence in question, the workers Hayem interviewed repeatedly used the category 'happy' or its variant 'unhappy' in describing their dealings with management. For the workers, 'happiness' did not simply denote an emotional state, nor was it directly related to a financial imperative, but indicated what they saw as a newfound communicative and reciprocal relationship with management since the end of apartheid. They were 'happy' to work, they said, when they felt that they were able to communicate with management, and when management appeared to value and respect their efforts. As such, the workers did not consider the year-end voucher to be a 'bonus', but an indication that management was interested in upholding their side of this new relationship. Within the logic of mutual respect and communication, the bonus was thus, for the workers, obligatory. The reduction of the voucher was not simply a financial blow but a violation of this relationship, denoting the end of what the workers saw as a period of trust and communication. For management, however, keeping the workers 'happy' through the bonus was 'merely a stratagem to increase production' (Hayem, 2012: 525). In the strike itself, which the workers lost (with the result that they received no voucher at all), 'the workers had tried to have their money back but, most of all, they had aspired to preserve/restore the principles of reciprocity, communication, and engagement in the factory which they had seen as a characteristic of a new sequence contrasted with the apartheid of speech' (Hayem, 2012: 525).

There is not space here to set out Hayem's elucidation of the workers' subjectivity during this sequence in full. My aim is simply to show that, as Hayem argues, the singular logic of the workers within this situation (and importantly, the logic of what they *wanted* from the situation) could only have been understood through their prescriptions on the worker/management relationship in that sequence, and which were expressed through unexpected categories such as 'happy' (2012: 526). An analysis in terms of class, for example, would not have been able to access this subjectivity; in fact, the notion of the 'working class' was notably absent from the workers' analysis of their position and identity during that sequence, despite its ubiquity in the discourse of civil society, trade unions, and political parties at that time. The fact was that 'their preferred discourse was simply not reflective of their social position as workers in a factory' (Neocosmos, 2016: 331). As Hayem writes, 'If we wish to be able to identify, analyse and understand new unforeseen emancipatory politics,

we must admit that they will be expressed and thought out in unexpected ways giving unexpected meaning to unexpected words, or assigning new meaning to old words' (2012: 56). It is clear that the word 'happy', though an important category of thought in this sequence, would not bear much prescriptive potential in other circumstances, or even among the same factory workers today (ibid.). Given that the sequence is over, the category dissolves.

The following chapter presents my investigation into what a number of UPM activists thought about the issue of xenophobia in their community, how they conceptualised the relationship between South Africans and people designated as 'foreigners', and how they understood the 2015 attack and the UPM's response. The aim was not to try to explicate this sequence via reference to external factors or theoretical or explanatory paradigms (even those which have been articulated in this work), but rather to try to understand the movement's contestation of the 2015 event through the thinking of (some of) its activists, and through their own specific categories and prescriptions. I have already described the UPM and the context in which the xenophobic attack took place in 2015 in Chapter Three; I now turn to the statements of the activists themselves.

CHAPTER SIX

RESISTING XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN GRAHAMSTOWN: VIEWS FROM THE UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT

6.1. Introduction

Responses from the 18 UPM members are presented under five subsections. These do not reflect the order in which questions were posed in the interviews themselves, but address some overarching concerns which emerged in the research. The first section looks at how the 2015 attack was understood by the participants – how they qualified and characterised the event, as well as the motivations of those who participated in the violence. The second section outlines how, despite the UPM's collective stance against the attack, the respondents in their individual capacity sometimes articulated ambivalent and even clearly 'xenophobic' attitudes – often reflective of state discourses. The third section unpacks how the respondents characterised the possibilities of interaction and engagement between foreigners and locals in their own communities. The fourth and fifth sections consider the ways in which the UPM members described the movement's response to the 2015 attack, and the ways in which, despite clear tensions and ambivalences, they articulated a conception of political solidarity with the foreign shopkeepers.

To analyse the interviews, I initially coded each transcript line-by-line, resulting in over 300 individual codes. Similar codes were grouped, and then narrowed down into around two-dozen sub-themes, which were finally arranged within the four subsections outlined above. I also used digital methods to determine the number of times certain words or phrases were used by respondents, allowing me to pay particular attention to descriptors which occurred with notable or unexpected frequency (or infrequency). Interviews are referenced in the following format (items in square parentheses denote gender and age): (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017).

6.2. Qualifying the 2015 attack

At the start of each interview I explained that I was researching xenophobia and that I was interested in the UPM's response to the xenophobic attack of 2015. It soon became clear,

however, that while I formulated my questions using the terms ‘xenophobia’ and ‘xenophobic attack’, these categories were rarely chosen by the respondents. In fact, in over 65 thousand words of transcribed statements, there are collectively only 45 instances where the terms ‘xenophobia’ or ‘xenophobic’ were used by the 18 participants. It should thus be noted from the outset that this was by no means the primary mode of constructing or conceptualising the issue in this situation.

Respondents were particularly reluctant to refer to the 2015 attack as ‘xenophobic’, and the majority emphatically problematized the term when I used it in this context. In some instances, this may have been a question of definition; for example, one respondent remarked that

Xenophobia to me is like a phobia, a fear. So I don’t think that us black people have fear of [the ‘foreigners’], we are just jealous of them, we have no phobia against. But there is a hatred (Interview 5 [F:26], 8 May 2017).

And according to another activist:

They were doing it because some of them were just trying to get things from it. It was not xenophobic really. It’s something else, not xenophobic [...] It’s jealousy. Because of the shops, and ‘our girlfriends’, and we are hungry (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017).

Frequently, the words ‘jealousy’, ‘anger’ or ‘hatred’ were used by respondents to describe antipathy towards the ‘foreigners’, as opposed to the more opaque ‘xenophobia’. However, this was not only a question of semantics, but rather one of how to qualify the 2015 event and the motivations of those who participated in it. Mamdani (2001b), writing on the Rwandan genocide, stresses the need to understand the troubling popular dimension of that episode; that is, that the violence was not only a state project, but involved popular agency. As he writes: ‘We may agree that genocidal violence cannot be understood as rational; yet, we need to understand it as *thinkable*’ (Mamdani, 2001b: 8 [my emphasis]). While there was agreement among the UPM activists that there had been premeditation by the taxi-associations and probably others within the community to target the Muslim shopkeepers (in the wake of the serial killer rumours), there was clear uncertainty in how to evaluate or understand – or make *thinkable* – popular agency and participation in the attack. Respondents said that they were ‘shocked’, ‘disappointed’, ‘surprised’, ‘confused’ or even ‘ashamed’ or ‘embarrassed’ at the degree to which their communities participated in the violence and

looting. While there was consensus that tension had been building for some time⁸⁰, and that members of the community had been discussing the ‘foreigners’ in hostile tones at the taxi rank and other communal spaces, the attack itself was compared to ‘electricity’ (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017), a bomb or an eruption; something unexpected and uncontrollable once ignited. One activist recounted, ‘It was like we were watching a movie [...] It was like I was in another world’ (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017). ‘People were caught by surprise’ said another, ‘But they were surprised to the extent that they participated’ (Interview 8 [M:37], 23 May 2017).

For a number of respondents, the primary motivations of those who participated in the violence were not xenophobic but economic, related to the act of looting itself. As one UPM member said: ‘That’s sometimes what I try and ask myself...was it looting or was it xenophobic? Maybe [it was xenophobic] because of what was written on the taxis. But you can see criminals were starting to go in, and making it like it was xenophobia...’ (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017). Other statements were less ambivalent:

Hey, they portray it like that, but to me it was not [xenophobic], it was just a normal crime. It was crime. I don’t think there was a hatred of the foreigners...it’s just, you can’t take away the fact that there’s poverty (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

They were taking advantage of the foreign people. This was not about xenophobia. People just wanted to take advantage of the foreign people knowing that they would not do anything to them (Interview 11 [F:25], 13 June 2017).

You know, I can’t lie – sort of like me, I’m making sort of like an example. Here’s a truck of beer, or of fruit, it’s falling there. I am on the street to pick it up. But it’s not my mind, you see? So that’s why there are a lot of people who are taking looting [...] You don’t want to do sort of a wrong thing, but if you are hungry you are hungry (Interview 9 [M:52], 24 May 2017).

There is nothing particularly unexpected about these observations; of course there *were* both criminal and opportunistic dimensions to the attack. The role of poverty, hunger, and joblessness in producing the frustration and desperation which no doubt contributed to the looting should not be overlooked or understated. It should also be noted that, notwithstanding threats made against the shopkeepers, there was little in the way of bodily violence enacted against them (although this may have been, in some cases, a result of police – and UPM – protection). Apparently, in any case, the primary motivation of the attackers was to loot, not

⁸⁰ Recall also that the attack in Grahamstown occurred in the context of other xenophobic events in the country; 2015 had seen other incidents of xenophobic violence throughout South Africa, most notably in April. This was also the year that launched the notorious ‘Operation Fiela’, the government operation ostensibly targeting ‘crime’ in South African townships, but which amounted to no less than a round-up of undocumented immigrants and vulnerable non-nationals in itself, and was widely critiqued as little more than state-sponsored xenophobia in its own right (See Chapter 2, p.31).

to kill or harm.

Yet more nuanced accounts of the violence problematized simple economic explanations for the attack. For example, one respondent uneasily suggested that the looting was underpinned by a deeper animosity which could not fully be explained by narrow opportunism:

The issue of food is very embarrassing. Because they were behaving like scavengers, if I could put it like that [...] Food was just flying, they were throwing food, because if they want food they would have kept it for themselves [...] That attitude showed me it's not about hunger or something, it's about...ravaging someone else's (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

Interestingly, however, the same respondent, when asked whether he thought what had happened was 'xenophobic', replied:

No. For lack of better words – I'm lacking because I do have a feeling, a sense of what, but I'm just lacking the real words to put it...it was a huge confusion, a huge misunderstanding. It was an...opening. The foreign nationals were opened up. They were opened up for that. It's like accusing someone of stealing your possession and then victimising them. It's like...to make someone – to downgrade someone. To discredit. The foreign nationals were discredited. They were placed into that position so that anyone who wanted to throw something at them could find them weaker (Interview 3 [M: 32], 11 April 2017).

The rejection of the appellation 'xenophobic' in favour of 'opening' is curious. The respondent, it seems to me, is complicating the idea that it is possible to draw a straight line between 'xenophobia' and the attack, implying rather that the attack *itself* was an 'opening', perhaps a release, of hostility and anger – possibly directed towards 'degrading' those foreigners who are considered to occupy a position of superiority – which no one in the community had anticipated. In effect, he is challenging the idea that the incident was straightforwardly a direct manifestation of xenophobic attitudes, or anti-foreigner hatred – as the term 'xenophobic attack' suggests. He goes on:

Everything was foolish that happened there. Because you saw even old people, people who I would never think would do such things, people who go to church, who are prominent members of our society, they were looting. What is this? I couldn't understand what it was. I couldn't understand where the anger came from (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

Another respondent expressed a similar sense of inexplicability:

I think it was...cruel. It was something very cruel. Because you cannot just – a real human being would never do those things. You would never do something like that. So I do not think it was xenophobic, I think it was just something else that I cannot explain (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017).

The issue of how the attack was understood by the UPM respondents – and in particular, the reluctance by most to characterise the attack as 'xenophobic' – raises some interesting

questions. On the one hand, where respondents described the attack as narrowly opportunistic or criminal we hear an echo of statements often prevalent in the media and such as those made by former President Mbeki which described the 2008 pogroms not as xenophobic but as ‘naked criminal activity’ (cited in Dodson, 2010: 7), as well as academic accounts which frame xenophobia in predominately socio-economic terms⁸¹. However, it must be maintained that such explanations are mostly descriptive, and then only narrowly so, and do not interrogate the prevalence of xenophobic attitudes and discourse as a wider political subjectivity in South Africa. One respondent articulated this concern clearly:

I think one of the reasons that it [xenophobic violence] keeps resurfacing in many areas is because you deal with it as nothing but criminals, so you are missing...what do you call it, the bush for the forest? So I think it was important to recognise it, and say let's deal with it [...] Also because you want to dismiss it as nothing but criminal activity or element, you don't want to deal with the issues of unemployment, you don't want to deal with the issues of abject poverty, you don't want to deal with those issues and the anger that is vented in the wrong direction (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017).

On the other hand, however, the reluctance to characterise the attack as ‘xenophobic’ suggests that, for the respondents, the relationship between anti-foreigner attitudes and violence directed against immigrants is not as straightforward as the term ‘xenophobic attack’ suggests. This is not revelatory, but it emphasises an important argument made earlier in this work⁸²; namely, that xenophobic attitudes should not be conflated with incidents of xenophobic violence. While localised and micro-political factors which make up what Misago (2016: 121) has called the ‘localised political economy of the violence’ enable us to understand specific conditions under which an outbreak of violence occurs⁸³, xenophobia itself, as a political subjectivity, is not limited to the townships in which overtly violent manifestations of this discourse occur (which I have argued is a function of state rule in uncivil society). As such, a distinction must be maintained between incidents of violence, which are singular, and are violently produced through numerous factors that are not reducible to ‘xenophobia’ as such, and xenophobic subjectivity as a hegemonic political discourse.

Finally, the ambiguity around this term demonstrates that the attack which took place in 2015, as well as the issue of xenophobia more broadly, was understood in various and contested ways by the UPM members, and as such the meaning of these categories should not

⁸¹ See Chapter 2, p.45.

⁸² See Chapter 2, ‘Xenophobic attitudes and xenophobic violence’ p.40.

⁸³ In this case, the role of foreign-owned shops in the local economy; the rumours of the serial killings, within the context of endemic crime in South Africa; and abysmal service delivery provision by a failing and contemptuous municipality.

be considered as given. While some respondents explained the violence primarily through economic factors, in line with dominant state discourses, others pointed to the inadequacy of such explanations, and although there was no clear consensus on how to understand or make ‘thinkable’ the popular participation in the violence, the respondents all (in various ways) challenged the notion that the attack was a simple manifestation of ‘xenophobia’, and that all those who participated were simply, or un-contradictorily, ‘xenophobic’. As a following section demonstrates, interactions between the foreign shopkeepers who were the targets of the attack and locals themselves were described as fluid and adaptable – sometimes expressive of tension and hostility, and other times tractable and cooperative. Yet, as the next section shows, wider concerns over the impact of low-income immigration on the lives and livelihoods of South Africa’s poor (which are by and large reflective of state political discourses) entrench xenophobic attitudes and frustrations which no doubt found expression during the 2015 attack. Notably, such resentments were not limited to those who participated in the violence, but were also expressed by a number of UPM members themselves – despite their disavowal of xenophobic violence during that event.

6.3. The Freedom Charter speaks only to us⁸⁴: ‘Xenophobic’ statements and state discourses

In light of the coherent action taken by the UPM against the violence of 2015 it is notable that a number of the activists themselves expressed attitudes which were ambivalent, and sometimes clearly ‘xenophobic’, about foreigners in South Africa. Many statements echoed dominant state political discourses which frame low-income immigration as a threat to the national economy, and migrants (particularly but not exclusively those undocumented) as illegitimate competitors with the local poor for opportunities and resources. The following section moves fairly quickly through some of these arguments as articulated by the UPM, as the claims themselves more or less directly express state discourses around xenophobia as have been described above. What is notable is not the arguments themselves, but their apparent contradiction to the principled stance the movement took against xenophobia in 2015.

A number of respondents expressed the view that South Africa has become ‘too free’ and thus too attractive to migrants fleeing repressive regimes or looking for better economic

⁸⁴ Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017.

opportunities. As one respondent told me:

It's too free, South Africa, anyone would want to come. Especially criminals. Like in Zimbabwe, if you are a criminal there, [former President] Mugabe will just kill you. So they just run from there, and come here. Nothing is going to be asked here (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017).

And another:

I think foreigner people are getting more benefits than us. I think everything is easier for them. It's easier for them to just get married with us, it's easy for them to just come here in South Africa and do their businesses and stuff like that. But for us, it's not very easy (Interview 16 [F:28; F:29], 24 August 2017).

The perception that South Africa is 'too easy' or 'too free' for immigrants reflects inflated notions about the success of foreign workers in securing jobs (and marriages), the proliferation of foreign-owned business, as well as the prevalence of foreign criminal networks. While some low-income immigrants do achieve relative success compared to their South African counterparts, due to a number of factors such as pre-existing business and community, and family networks, access to start-up capital, and so forth, many obviously do not. Related to this notion is the perception that there are 'too many foreigners' in South Africa, which reflects inflated immigration estimates (particularly regarding undocumented migrants) which are repeated in the public sphere and by state officials. 'I see it as a slow crusade,' one respondent told me, 'I do not want to be offensive, but I see it as a slow moving crusade because after sometime, maybe in 50 years to come, a lot of their children you'll see here' (Interview 14 [M:28], 14 June 2017). According to another:

There are many foreigners. At least government can limit. And it is not easy for the government to limit, because others are coming with their own ways [...] We need at least to limit them, because we already don't have enough for ourselves (Interview 13 [F:46], 14 June 2017).

Many respondents expressed concerns over competition for jobs and resources; as one activist put it: 'We are fighting for small economy [...] We have a loaf of bread – now instead of sharing this loaf of bread with four of us, we have to share it with six of us (Interview 8 [M:37], 23 May 2017)⁸⁵. For some, this concern was articulated in terms of citizenship and national entitlement, generally claiming that that immigrants were usurping

⁸⁵ It is worth noting briefly that research shows that immigration in fact has a net positive impact on South Africa's economy. For example, a recent report by the OECD found that immigrants' contribution to the economy is considerable: rather than reducing the national rate of local employment, they are likely to increase employment opportunities for locals; they raise per capita income; and they tend to pay more in taxes (OECD, 2018: 15-16). State discourse, however, does not reflect these findings, and among the majority of the UPM respondents there was little awareness of any economic benefits immigration might bring.

the resources to which black South Africans, disenfranchised under apartheid, were now entitled. One activist explained to me:

Because of the history that we have in South Africa – I remember that our forefathers, or our grandparents used to work in the gold mines, they used to work very hard for little amount of money. So much of the money they could have got they didn't get, so much of the money that we are supposed to get as beneficiary we have not got it yet. So now I am afraid of other people from other countries to benefit to what I have to my roots, to what I believe belongs to me as a South African (Interview 12 [M:30], 13 June 2017).

The issue for this respondent is not simply economic competition, but also birthright – expressed here both in terms of indigeneity and as restitution for historical oppression. The statement reflects nationalist discourses which have become prevalent in democratic South Africa (as I have already discussed), as well as a degree of historical amnesia about the history of migratory regional labour in the mining sector during apartheid, which is notable. For others, the ANC government's failure to realise meaningful change for the country's poor was associated with its apparent unwillingness to effectively curb immigration, which increased with democratisation. One respondent, when asked what she thought of the celebrated phrase from the Freedom Charter that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it', replied:

I think it's for those olden times, because there were less foreigners in the apartheid time. There were less, until we have this so-called freedom, and then more of them are coming. That [the Freedom Charter] speaks just only to us. I don't know whether they knew that there were people who were going to come and stay here when they wrote this (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017).

Later she argued that the ANC government should have consulted the people about immigration:

[The government] should have come and sorted things, and we should have known how many of them [immigrants] are going to come and use our space [...] we don't have spaces for ourselves, so how are we going to get spaces for other people to come here? [...] Because in my belief, I cannot say the foreigners must go, because I don't know why they are here. But [the government must] answer us the reasons why they have to be here. And for how long. But it must not be only the government who knows. People must be involved. [...] Things were better before the foreigners. Before the foreigners it was the time of the apartheid struggle. So things were better. Yes, we were suffering, there were struggles every day, but it was not like now. Now, we didn't expect that what is happening now (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017).

The statement is interesting because, while the tone is not overtly hostile to immigrants themselves, immigration is positioned as an anti-democratic decision taken by elites – and a betrayal of the anti-apartheid struggle itself. Another older respondent, speaking through an interpreter, said that 'it all goes back to Mandela, because Mandela brought [his wife] Graça Machel here in South Africa – so when he brought her here, all the foreigners came here'

(Interview 7 [F:59], 23 May 2017). The implied correlation between the perception of ‘free’ immigration and what is often seen as a betrayal on the part of the ANC government to deliver on the promises of the democratic transition speaks again to the notion that at issue is not only a question of economic precarity, but a fear that the ‘foreigners’ are encroaching upon South Africa’s hard-won democracy itself. It is not difficult to draw a line between these statements and Buthelezi’s proclamation in 1994 that if ‘South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (SAMP, 2008: 44). The statements, too, bear an uneasy resonance to the notion expressed during the 2008 pogroms that the ‘foreigners’ are ‘eating our democracy’⁸⁶. As one respondent told me, with frustration:

We are unemployed, we don’t have money, so we see these people – they have money and they are having businesses, and we don’t have anything. And they are not even the citizens. So they must go back (Interview 14 [M:28], 14 June 2017).

Overall, the statements reflect the widespread anxieties that immigrants from developing nations put pressure on the local economy and unfairly compete for employment and resources which should belong to citizens. As such, they reflect some of the state political discourses around immigration which frequently ignore the economic and social benefits migrants bring to South Africa, and instead position low-income foreigners as a threat to jobs and security. It is possible that because these discourses are not positioned by the state as being ‘xenophobic’ (this is largely true of the media also), this may in part explain why some members did not see the looting during the 2015 attack as motivated by xenophobia as such – but rather as an expression of jealousy or anger motivated by economic opportunism. Moreover, statements which equate rising immigration with the betrayal of the anti-apartheid struggle, and of democracy itself, speak to wider social frustrations in the country. The statement above that things were better during the apartheid struggle, before the foreigners came, is a depressing indictment of South African democracy today.

Clearly, despite the UPM’s principled action against the violence of 2015, many of the activists in their individual capacity articulated doubts, frustrations and resentments which expressed pervasive anti-foreigner or xenophobic attitudes. As one respondent exclaimed in an interview: ‘I don’t think they have a right to be here at all! I think they must go back to their country. I don’t have problem with them, but I think that they must leave us in peace!’

⁸⁶ See Chapter 2, p.59.

(Joint interview 16 [F:28; F:29], 24 August 2017). In light of these views, how do we begin to make sense of the movement's stance against the attack? Was it only a disavowal of violent tactics, and not an expression of solidarity with the 'foreigners' themselves? I will show that this was not the case. Returning to the dialectic of expressive and excessive thought, it is clear that while some of the statements above are expressive of hegemonic state political discourses which legitimate xenophobia, the respondents contemporaneously articulated political prescriptions which clearly exceeded state political subjectivity. In a movement towards this conclusion, the following section traces this dialectical thought in the ways in which the respondents described the interactions between foreigners and locals in their own communities, and the possibilities for cooperation and solidarity – and, indeed, also for hostility and resentment – inscribed therein.

6.4. Friend and stranger, community and customer: 'Maybe we can live with each other'⁸⁷

Beyond the incident of violence in 2015, how did the UPM activists characterise the relationship between immigrants and South Africans in Grahamstown? One notion which arose frequently was that of 'being in the community'. Where immigrants were said to be 'in the community', their relationship with South Africans was generally considered to be positive, or 'friendly'. The category opened up to a number of ideas; the notion of reciprocation and responsibility, of participation in the social and political life of the community, and of physical engagement in the spatial community itself, its streets and places of interaction. It was frequently used as an injunction to the foreigners; to have a good relationship, they should *try* to be more 'in the community'. The idea also reflected the fact that foreigners may be excluded from community by hostile South Africans. As one activist put it, 'it is the whole community that thinks they don't belong here' (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017). The notion of being in the community was polarized with the notion of 'being in the shop'. This idea was linked to a self-interested, potentially exploitative (in one formulation, 'capitalist'), business-orientation on the part of the foreign shopkeepers. Where the shopkeepers were described as 'always in their shops' they displayed no interest in the political or social life of the community and treated South Africans not as fellow community members, but as 'customers' – a relationship characterised as 'unfriendly' or 'rude'. The

⁸⁷ Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017.

notion of being in the shop also related to a lack of trust – immigrant shopkeepers were sometimes described as hiding behind their ‘burglars’ (the burglar bars or metal grids through which business is often conducted) because they did not trust the community. The community in turn mistrusted the ‘foreigners’ for secreting themselves behind their store-fronts. The following statement is worth quoting at length as it explicates the tensions expressed in the opposition between these two ideas. The respondent was asked whether he thought the ‘foreigners’ tried to integrate when they came to the area:

Some, and some don’t try. Because for example, maybe those...I believe some, they just close themselves in their shop, you know. Because as Xhosas in the community, there are events that are happening, so you don’t see them there, it’s rare that you see them. But it’s the places that if we talk about integration, they should have been part of [...] My father used to own a shop, so the soccer team from the location will come and ask something, and then my father because he knows them, he will donate something. But with these guys it’s difficult to get those kind of donations. So that’s where this hatred becomes more and more and more, this anger, because they are not giving back, they are always locked within burglars. So you see, they don’t have that trustworthy with their customers [...] Everything they try to have their own, own, own. But they are here. I think for me it is going to be better, if they are here, [to] try. I don’t say they must just leave their own things totally – but try to get another way of doing things. Try to just get in in the community (Interview 8 [M:37], 23 May 2017).

These points suggest that xenophobic violence is not so much ‘anti-foreign’ as it is anti-stranger, anti-outsider to community. Foreignness (in terms of the passport one carries) is only one instantiation of the outsider. Using as an entry point the respondents’ own categories, of ‘being in the community’ and ‘being in the shop’, the following section sets out how the UPM activists described the relationship between South Africans and immigrants, and the ambivalences and tensions – and also the possibilities for building better relationships – articulated therein.

The relationship discussed here refers to that between South Africans and the shop owners and shopkeepers in Grahamstown, who are majority-Muslim, and come from countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Bangladesh and Pakistan. It should be noted that other immigrants living in the townships featured only rarely in the discussions with the UPM members⁸⁸. Primary tensions in the community, as the UPM activists described it, were

⁸⁸ Some generalised pejorative statements made reference to common stereotypes about Nigerians ‘bringing drugs’ into South Africa; for example, one respondent said that ‘the Nigerians, those people, they are selling drugs a lot. So they are ruining our young people [...] And they will take our sisters and make them prostitutes’ (Interview 14 [M:28], 14 June 2017). Such statements were few, however. Zimbabweans as a group, by comparison, were generally spoken about positively, as skilled tradesmen, well-educated, and well-integrated within the Grahamstown community. Respondents commented that they shared churches and other spaces of interaction, like taverns, with Zimbabweans, Nigerians and Mozambicans.

focused on the shopkeeping, Muslim immigrant population⁸⁹.

The notion of ‘being in the shop’ was linked to a number of issues which prevented a ‘friendly’ relationship. Frequently, customers are separated from the shopkeepers by a metal grid or burglar bars through which business is conducted, which act as physical representations of the often guarded exchanges between the locals and the ‘foreigners’. In the first sense, the complaint that foreign shopkeepers are always in their shops is quite literal – respondents explained that many shopkeepers are rarely seen in the streets or other public spaces, but often keep to themselves, within the walls of their businesses. ‘When there’s lots of shops, it’s just that it is not a very sociable way of living with other people’ (Interview 6 [M:31], 17 May 2017), one respondent told me. More broadly, the notion of being in the shop denoted an attitude of unwillingness to participate or engage with the community in matters – social or political – which were not directly related to trade. ‘One big problem with them,’ said one respondent, ‘[is that] they see the locals as their customers’ (Interview 8 [M:37], 23 May 2017). As another put it:

Besides their business to the community I haven’t seen them stretching their hand to participate in the community. They are always in their shops. They do speak some Xhosa, that’s mainly because they have to communicate. In terms of culture they are so withdrawn (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

Others stressed that when it came to public community actions such as meetings, marches and so on, the shopkeepers did not participate, or did so only rarely, despite the fact that they would benefit from the gains made through collective communal action. As one older activist complained (via an interpreter):

When there is a protest that is arranged by the residents, they will just sit and watch from their shop windows [...] when the services are delivered, the services will be delivered to everyone, so they don’t want to take part in, they want people to fight for them (Interview 7 [F:59], 23 May 2017).

As Monson (2015: 51) has expressed it in relation to her research in Gauteng⁹⁰, the perception that immigrants ‘live for free’ by reaping the benefits of community action by others was a source of tension in the Grahamstown community, and contributed to the perception of the shopkeepers as self-interested and only willing to reach out to the community when directly affected by an issue. As the respondent went on:

⁸⁹ This reflects the experience in Khutsong where relative newcomers from Somalia and Ethiopia experienced more prejudice than Mozambican immigrants (See Chapter 3, p.75).

⁹⁰ See Chapter 3, p.77.

They don't take part in things that are happening in the area, they just stay in their shops and ask what is happening [...] what they usually do as foreigners is, if they are in a crisis, they will come to the people. So they will adjust. But if that problem is solved, they will disappear (Interview 7 [F:59], 23 May 2017).

By comparison, when the 'foreigners' were seen to participate and engage in the life of the community, the relationship was described as positive and friendly. One respondent spoke about the relationship between foreigners and South Africans in her neighbourhood:

You find that they do mingle with the community, they go to meetings, they played their role. If there are programs whereby the community is being called to do some community work, probably to go and clean around the place that we are living, they are part of it. For example, the one that I live near, he's called Thomas, he's always there. In every meeting he's always there, in every community engagement he's always there, [to] the extent that the children always love him. If he comes out of his shop, he's always playing around with them in the street (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017).

Shopkeepers who shared a positive or friendly relationship with the community were often referred to by name. An older female UPM member spoke of a long-time resident named Mohammed, a shop owner in the Vukani area in Grahamstown. 'We had a really close relationship with him' (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017), she said, and when the looting began in 2015, residents telephoned Mohammed to warn him before the looters arrived, allowing him to escape with some of his stock. (Thomas was not so lucky; his shop was looted in the attack and all his possessions stolen).

'Being in the community' also involved communicating with community leaders through appropriate channels. In Vukani, shop owners were encouraged to attend meetings of the local Community Policing Forum (CPF) where concerns could be raised and addressed, and newcomers could receive permission from the community to set up a shop. The same Mohammed regularly attended these meetings:

Because every time there was something, he will just come to us. And I was a committee member then, so he would just come to us and complain about whatever. So we would just call all of them and sort whatever problem he had. Even if some of them are just people who just came here and do not understand even the language and stuff, and maybe some of them are rude in the shops, then we had those complaints and we just sort things. So we just listened to each other (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017).

Another respondent from Vukani gave a similar account:

In Vukani they do try to be a part, because when we as a community needed something, sometimes we used to go to them, and give them a friendly. So we tried to build the good communication [...] What we did in Vukani [other areas] must do the same. Having community meetings, invite them, explain what you would like, and also they must also be given a chance to ask how do things work in Vukani (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

By fostering a culture of communication and listening between community leaders and the

shopkeepers, in which concerns could be raised and addressed publicly and through appropriate channels, the residents of Vukani apparently created, for a time, a positive and workable relationship between the shop owners and the community. After the 2015 attack a special committee was formed to try to prevent further violence against the shopkeepers in the area:

We discussed how we could prevent the attacks, as we are hurting Mohammed, and Mohammed was like family to the Vukani people. So a committee was selected, whereby within the committee they would be able, if there was a misunderstanding with the people or matters affecting the foreigners – so the Vukani residents would be able to resolve them without any violence. So there was that committee that was set up. But it didn't go that far, but at least we tried something (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017).

The close relationship which Mohammed shared with the Vukani community was clearly significant, and it appeared that it was this relationship in particular which helped to foster a degree of solidarity between the shopkeepers and the local community in Vukani. Although the committee collapsed, and Mohammed left the area, for a time it was able to restore a degree of trust and rapprochement between the shopkeepers and the community in the wake of the 2015 violence.

Another central issue was reciprocation and fairness. This was sometimes formulated in the following terms: where the community considered that it was their patronage and custom which supported the shopkeepers, there was some expectation of quid pro quo – particularly given the perception that the shopkeepers were relatively more wealthy than the locals⁹¹. One respondent, for example, suggested that the shopkeepers could create a better relationship with the community by sponsoring school uniforms for local children:

What I'm thinking about...I'm willing for them to do something [...] For instance, sometimes in Vukani, small boys they must dress for the schools in their uniforms and their shoes [...] If maybe we can advise the foreigners at least to help us, some of the children, because it's going to get cold now (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

While the statement shows that the wealth of the shopkeepers may well be over-estimated, the perception that the 'foreigners' should 'give back' to the local community who supports them, even in more modest ways, was a recurring theme in the interviews. Consider the following statement:

⁹¹ We can compare this subjectivity in fact to the one discussed by Judith Hayem relating to the 'voucher' strike at the auto-manufacturing factory in Port Elizabeth in the 1990s, and the particular intellectuality around the word 'happy' expressed by the workers there (See Chapter 5, p.119).

I would say the most useful ones are the Zimbabweans [...] if your tap is leaking you can go to them and they will fix it for a cheap price. Not cheap, but affordable. They are not capitalists, they are not here to do the money and so on. They are fair. But the Somalians and the Ethiopians and others, to them it's all about making money. Say for example you have a football club [...] You even go there and ask for donation, they'll give you five rand. I mean, it's just stuff like that, now people get angry, because like these people, I mean, we support them a lot, but when it's us asking for support, they always tell that they have to ask for permission from their boss. And you'll never know who this boss is. (Interview 6 [M:31], 17 May 2017).

The notion that the shopkeepers were 'capitalists' configures them at odds with the 'working class', the poor and the unemployed – and also sets them apart from other immigrants who do not control such business assets. The claim that the shop owners were exploitive of the local community was related to complaints that they rarely hired local people – and only then for very low wages – as well as to accusations of unscrupulous business practices. As one respondent told me, the products sold by the 'foreigners' are 'cheap, dangerous also. When you eat too much of these, you get to – something happens to your skin. It's just there for making money, it's not up to standard' (Interview 8 [M:37], 23 May 2017)⁹².

This perception of the shopkeepers as 'capitalists', and exploitive of the local community, was in some statements linked to the fact that foreign-owned shops have undercut local informal businesses. As one respondent complained: 'During the pre-democratic time, a lot of businesses, a lot of shops were owned by black South Africans. So [the foreigners] arrived after that time and now it's them who are owning the businesses' (Interview 14 [M:28], 14 June 2017). Social and family networks within the immigrant communities provide the knowledge and experience required to successfully install and run a business, as well as capital investment to open shops and bulk-buy goods, with the result that the foreign-owned shops are generally cheaper and able to stock a greater variety of goods than local competitors. They also tend to have longer opening hours and often sell items in smaller, affordable quantities, and some are equipped to sell pre-paid electricity vouchers and

⁹² Frequently, throughout the country, foreign shop owners are accused of selling expired food or counterfeit products, as well as for tampering with or 'watering down' goods to increase profits. While some shops undoubtedly do cut-corners and engage in bad business practices, 'foreign'-owned shops are expressly and disproportionately targeted in this rhetoric. In August 2018, following reports on social media that immigrant-owned spaza shops were selling 'fake food' – literally, plastic or synthetic rice, bread or Coca-Cola – as well as counterfeit and expired products, the Department of Health announced a probe into the issue, and called on members of the public to assist the department in collecting evidence (*SA News*, 2018). Following the announcement, which arguably amounted to no less than dog-whistle xenophobia in itself, foreign-owned shops in Soweto were looted by angry South Africans, and three immigrants were murdered. Remarkably, the response to the violence from the Gauteng MEC for economic development, Lebogang Maile, was to call for the vetting of foreign-owned shops (Maketha, 2018) – discourse which plainly blamed the foreign business owners for the violence which was enacted against them. After a countrywide investigation of over 470 shops, no 'fake food' was discovered (though one shop did stock counterfeit goods, and some food items were past their sell-by date) – and a number of undocumented immigrants were arrested (Child, 2018).

cell-phone credit (see also Charman et al, 2012). In Grahamstown, the spaza market has been effectively cornered, and few South African-owned shops remain⁹³.

While one might expect that the encroachment of foreign businesses in the spaza sector would be seen as a demonstration of how foreigners ostensibly ‘steal jobs’ from locals, surprisingly few respondents in this study (in fact only three) expressed resentment at the expansion of the foreign shops (although some did suggest that there should be a more even distribution of locally and ‘foreign’-owned businesses). All respondents pointed to the benefits of the shops for the community in terms of convenience and affordability, compared to the South African spazas that came before. They unanimously lauded the fact that the shopkeepers will allow their customers to buy on credit, which was invaluable for the elderly and the unemployed who survive on small, month-to-month social grants from the government – and which for many, including some of the UPM members with whom I spoke, prevents literal destitution by month-end. While considered smart business-practice on the part of the shopkeepers, many respondents also regarded this as a gesture of reciprocation and goodwill towards the community, and a way of ‘giving back’. As one respondent told me:

There was this other foreign guy who was very, very friendly. So even the community members would go there sometimes, and go borrow and say that I will pay you back the other time [...] I think my community is very lucky to get those foreign guys who are very nice, that at times they go and ask for things and they have a...I could say, a happy relationship in the community (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017).

In fact, for many of the respondents, market competition which drove down prices was considered healthy and beneficial for the community, and simply a function of the small-scale economy in the townships. As one respondent put it:

It’s anybody’s market. If [locals] can come up with a strategy that beats the foreign nationals...I mean the foreign nationals now, they’ve become so relaxed. They are selling rotten stuff. They are buying too much. So those are the things the South African guys can use, to get into the market. Because that’s competition. It’s not something we must throw stones at, we must fight over, it’s just business (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

Another argued that South Africans should accept that ‘there are many different kinds of businesses, and everyone doesn’t have the same skills. So you can do what you know best’ (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017). While Muslim immigrants were most competitive in the retail sector, this did not prevent other groups, including South Africans, from opening other businesses, such as hair salons – should they have the skills and resources to do so. Some indicated that the immigrant shop owners could even be helpful for South African would-be

⁹³ In fact, many respondents did not know if there were *any* South African spazas left; one person, however, did tell me that they knew of one which had remained open, despite receiving few customers.

businessmen and women; as one respondent suggested:

We need as people of the community to convene meetings where we can [...] build partnership with the foreigners so that they can learn from them how to maintain a business. Because I think the foreigners what do they do, they start with a business plan. You know? [...] The foreigners are saving, they're doing everything by all means to provide for their families (Interview 11 [F:25], 13 June 2017).

We can compare this respondent's statement to that made in February 2015 by Small Business Development Minister, Lindiwe Zulu:

Foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy and our priority is to the people of this country first and foremost. A platform is needed for business owners to communicate and share ideas. They cannot barricade themselves in and not share their practices with local business owners⁹⁴

While the respondent speaks about building partnerships and learning from the foreign businessmen, Zulu's comments are distastefully divisive and vilifying – particularly as they were made in response to a wave of looting of foreign shops in Soweto. The point here is that while resentment against foreign-owned business certainly exists in Grahamstown and elsewhere, it should not be considered as given. While the government should be aiming to promote local participation in the spaza shop economy, the demonization of foreign-owned shops serves only to inflame xenophobia, rather than provide the means – such as access to start-up capital investment and skills training – through which local entrepreneurs could effectively compete in the spaza market, which is estimated to be contributing around R9 billion to the economy per year⁹⁵.

Finally, all of the respondents emphasised that the community had suffered greatly during the period in which the shops were closed after the 2015 looting. As one person told me, 'as soon as they closed their shops we had nowhere to buy food [...] That was a big, major problem. And even the same people who did these things, they were regretting what they did' (Interview 12 [M:30], 13 June 2017). Clearly, while there may be tensions over the rise of immigrant-owned businesses, the shops are also an integral and valued part of daily survival in Grahamstown's townships.

The notions of 'being in the community' and 'being in the shop' expressed what were

⁹⁴ *Mail&Guardian*, 2015, 'DA: Business minister's xenophobic comments "fuelled the wedge"', 3 February 2015, Available at <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-03-da-business-ministers-xenophobic-comments-fuelled-the-wedge>, Accessed 1 December 2018.

⁹⁵ Jeeva, M., 2017, 'The Backbone of The Economy', *News24*, Available at <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local/City-Vision/the-backbone-of-the-economy-20170621>, Accessed January 4 2019.

perceived to be either ‘friendly’/positive or ‘unfriendly’/negative relationship between the shopkeepers and the community. As characterised by the respondents, these interactions involved the fulfilment – or not – of what were considered to be responsibilities or obligations on the part of the shopkeepers: to participate in community meetings or public actions, to engage with and communicate concerns to appropriate community leaders, and to ‘give back’ to the community through reciprocal actions – behaviour which amounted to treating the locals as community and not as ‘customers’. Beyond these factors, however, many respondents also emphasised that the shopkeepers and the community simply did not ‘know each other’.

They need to start getting into our communities, being part of our communities, not just shop owners, or some peoples that sell us stuff for cheap. That’s just the business side of them. After that we need to know them, we need to follow them as people, as community members. We need to know them in that fashion (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

For many of the respondents, there was a need for mutual exchange beyond the dynamic of customer and shopkeeper but as members of a *shared* community. As one respondent said:

Being part of your community is not about doing something big for the community but to let them know that this is me, I’m from this country, and I’m part of the community by this reason. That’s how easy it can be (Interview 12 [M:30], 13 June 2017).

In the absence of such a relationship, people live as ‘complete strangers’ (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017), and tensions and hostilities go unchecked. As one respondent explained to me in a nuanced statement which is worth quoting at length:

People arrive, coming from elsewhere. Let’s say this room, this whole building is ours. People arrive and stay in that room that side. We only see each other, just greetings maybe. Not even introduce ourselves formally. And we see their children. Remember, we are using the same toilet, we are using all these kinds of things, petty issues that we can see they’re petty – but when the problem comes, and the pipe bursts, that’s when we might say, no, when my children were playing here alone, this thing didn’t happen. So the fault becomes. But if someone who arrives in a certain community, if they can introduce themselves formally, if they introduce themselves, they try to participate to the things that are common here – if there’s a soccer team, try to care about that soccer team. If there’s a choral choir, they try...try not just to see the locals as their customers. [...] Because now, when things have gone wrong, we will say, we didn’t even know why you were here in the first place, how did you get here in the first place? We don’t have that relationship, as people who are in a commune together [...] We can’t say it’s up to them, we can’t say it’s up to us. Everyone, it should be a mutual respect as we say. If there’s respect it must be mutual. (Interview 8 [M:37], 23 May 2017).

As the respondent suggests, community is produced mutually. As another activist put it, ‘we’re all at fault here for being strangers to one another’ (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017). Respondents stressed the need for platforms where such ‘formal introductions’ could take place, outside of the commercial space of the shop. Some commented on the role of local

churches in bridging divisions between Christian immigrants and locals. As one woman told me: ‘Our pastor took them, the new foreigners, and put them in the pulpit and asked the congregation to accept them [...] he gave a speech that they are also the same, they are one (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017). Local taverns also provide a space for social interaction: ‘at Mandisa’s [tavern], there are people from Zim[babwe], there are people from Nigeria, and they drink with us. We don’t see anything wrong about them being here (Interview 11 [F:25], 13 June 2017). However, between the predominately Christian locals and the majority-Muslim immigrant shopkeepers, there are fewer spaces for cultural or social interaction beyond the store fronts.

As aforementioned, community organisations can be platforms through which the foreign shopkeepers can make a ‘formal introduction’ to the community, as was the case in Vukani. One respondent spoke about his local ward committee in Glenmore, a rural community about 45 kilometres outside of Grahamstown: when a newcomer wants to open a business ‘they have to let the ward committee know that I am coming from this place and I’m here to open a shop, so that the community can be made to know that there is this person who wants to open a shop here’ (Interview 12 [M:30], 13 June 2017). The same procedure existed for the CPF committee in Vukani: ‘if you are coming in Vukani, you report to the committee. The committee will try to give you some questions, so that they can understand you’ (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017). According to another Vukani resident, ‘that is why those foreigners that are here now, we do understand them’ (Interview 4 [F:50], 12 April 2017). However, as the respondents described it, everyday spaces of social contact between the shopkeepers and the local community were limited, and interactions were frequently strained – particularly after the attack, which devastated trust between the shopkeepers and the locals.

‘They were scared of us,’ one respondent said. ‘They didn’t trust us. Because they saw that, hey these people, we mustn’t fully put our hopes on them, because they can take back and attack us again. I don’t think they are relaxed now’ (Interview 14 [M:28], 14 June 2017)). Another respondent suggested that locals need to appreciate the fact that foreign shopkeepers are vulnerable in the community:

We are so...strangers to one another. I don't know what can break those barriers. Because they need to feel protected other than by burglar bars in their shops. I know for a fact that if any South African is to open a shop, it's not easy for tsotsis to go and raid that shop. But it's easier with the foreign nationals (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

Many of the respondents commented on the hostility and abuse they sometimes witnessed in the shops:

They call them names, like 'kwerekwere', 'uncircumcised people', 'terrorist' (Interview 14 [M:28], 14 June 2017).

I see xenophobia sometimes. Maybe someone goes to my friend's shop and buys something, and then he responds with verbal words – like 'Kwerekwere, give me my stuff, you are wasting time!' and all those things. Like attacking my friend for no reason. Even if it's not physically, people sometimes can use foul language to pull down my friend (Interview 5 [F:26], 8 May 2017).

In the statement above, the respondent refers to the foreign shopkeeper as 'my friend'; the term does not, however, denote an actual friendship or relationship. Rather 'my friend' is a vernacular term which generally refers to immigrant spaza shop owners – seemingly, in particular Muslim Africans, like Somalians and Ethiopians, and South Asians – which is used throughout South African townships⁹⁶. The term was used by a number of respondents, and often to refer to the shopkeepers as a group, in somewhat peculiar sounding statements such as 'many people are not cool with these *my friends* coming from other places' (Interview 5 [F:26], 8 May 2017). Apparently, the name originates from the shopkeepers' tendency to refer to their customers as 'my friend': 'It's the foreigners who said "my friend", so we took it back to them' (Interview 7 [F:59], 23 May 2017). While not necessarily considered to be offensive or derogatory like 'kwerekwere', the label is not wholly innocuous, and both monikers serve to delineate immigrant groups from the South African population. In an interesting statement, one respondent problematized the prevalence of the term:

This 'my friend' one, in many instances, its used for those with lighter skin, those who are whiter. The kwerekwere, as you know, is for those who are darker. So it's just that kind of way of distinguishing them. For the Bangladeshis, Pakistanis [...] they like to use it, those who own shops and stuff. Even those guys, they will say it when they are helping the customer. Then, even that as it is, is problematic. Because now, I don't want to say who is your name. I'm calling you 'my friend', and you are calling me 'my friend', and we are not even friends, we don't even know our names. We don't have that formal introduction (Interview 8 [M:37], 23 May 2017).

Another made a similar point:

⁹⁶ There are few references to the term in published media, but see, for example: The Citizen, 2018, "VIDEOS: Something's Floating In My Coke; Spaza Shop Food Questioned". *The Citizen*. Accessed December 18 2018. <https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1988659/videos-somethings-floating-in-my-coke-spaza-shop-food-questioned/>. The term is widely visible across South African social media, in comments sections or 'tweets' referring to foreign spaza shops.

But if me, I'm a Xhosa, I see an Angolan and a Pakistan one I'm saying 'kwerekwere' that one, 'my friend' that one. Why I'm giving a name? Because I must ask a name to that guy – then he says he's Patrick, I must call him Patrick, it's finish and klaar⁹⁷. Then talk to Patrick what is. You see? (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

And:

I used to encourage people not to say to them, 'my friend' – there's that term, 'my friend', like kwerekwere. I used to say to them, ask the person what is their name, so that you can call them by their names (Interview 13 [F:46], 14 June 2017).

The couched irony within the term 'my friend', as the respondents suggest, is that it alienates – it precludes naming and knowing, and the mutual respect exchanged in the notion of the 'formal introduction'. As already mentioned, those shopkeepers who were described by respondents as being 'in the community' or close to the community – like Thomas and Mohammed – were spoken about by name, not as shopkeepers or 'my friends', but quite simply as people.

What these statements show are the ways in which the UPM respondents thought about and characterised the relationship between the locals and the foreign shopkeepers in Grahamstown during this sequence: the tensions and limitations which produced hostility and resentment, and also what they saw as the possibilities of 'knowing each other', and making 'formal introductions'. The categories of 'being in the shop' and 'being in the community' refer to two distinct and subjective ways of being and interacting – the former precluding knowing and subsuming interaction or 'friendliness' within commercial exchange between shopkeepers and customers; the latter expressing the possibility of exceeding this mercantile relationship to one of shared membership within community. These statements are not particularly revelatory and they do not represent ground-breaking or generalizable insights for the study of xenophobia more broadly: in fact, they may be quite mundane. However, the aim is not to interpolate meaning into the statements of the respondents but to elucidate, through their own categories, how they understood and made sense of their environment and the issues which they saw as being at stake. It is after all within the dynamics of everyday and commonplace interactions that the nation-wide fault lines of xenophobic politics tremor and shudder to the surface – and also where alternatives to these politics may begin to emerge in the thought of people, and new habits of interacting and knowing may produce community in unexpected ways. Consider the following statement by one respondent; while the incident described may be trivial, it demonstrates the possibility – within this dialectic – of alternative

⁹⁷ 'Klaar' is the Afrikaans word for 'finished'. 'Finish and klaar', in South African parlance, generally means *really* finished, or 'over and done with'.

ways of thinking and knowing, and of living together:

I've had this argument with the guy that I normally buy at. They are Muslim, so now this other lady who walks in the shops while I was there, she was wearing a Xhosa regalia. She was a traditional healer, a sangoma. She painted her face white, and she wore a napkin – so they were laughing at her. I said no, why are you guys laughing at her? They said, why is she dressed like that? I said that's our culture, that's what we believe, that's what we as Bantu do. And they wanted to ask me a couple of questions, and I said you know, if you could start doing that on a regular basis, start asking questions about us, and then learn to understand us – and if we can do the same – then maybe we can live with each other (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

6.5. Thinking alternatives

The previous sections outlined how UPM respondents qualified the 2015 attack and their contention over the characterisation of the attack as 'xenophobic', as well as what they saw as the broader issues or problems pertaining to the question of immigration to South Africa. In part, these concerns expressed pervasive state political discourses which position low-income foreigners as a threat to national entitlements which should belong to citizens only. For some respondents, the state's apparent failure or unwillingness to limit immigration (either through inadequacy or corruption) represented a further betrayal of the promises of the democratic transition, compounding the wider state failure to effect meaningful change for the country's poor. However, the ways in which the UPM members described the dynamics of interaction between the foreign shopkeepers and the locals within their communities demonstrates, despite apprehensions which were to varying degrees expressive of 'xenophobic' discourse, the possibilities of fostering 'friendly' relationships between locals and foreign nationals, and of 'living with each other'. The suggestion is simply that 'xenophobic' or conversely non- or 'anti-xenophobic' subjectivities are not static, but dialectical. John Sharp, referring to Owen Sichone's (2008) anthropological fieldwork with refugees and immigrants in Cape Town, makes a similar point:

Sichone showed that [South Africans] who were not in a competitive relationship with the foreigners valued their presence for a variety of reasons, and had generally friendly and warm relations with them. So pronounced were the divisions among poor South Africans in this respect that he felt obliged to balance the usual, easy portrayal of their xenophobia by calling attention to the existence of a complementary 'xenophilia' among them. Moreover [...] a great many people veered between these poles, depending on the circumstances of their encounters with foreigners and the foreigners they were dealing with (Sharp, 2008: 3).

Such observations, while not surprising, challenge dominant – as Sharp says, 'easy' – portrayals of xenophobia as a more or less automatic response to a set of social conditions.

As Sharp and Sichone argue, relationships between local and foreign nationals are mutable, and while they may well display discriminatory or xenophobic attitudes, they may also, dialectically, reflect cooperation and sociability. This tension was clear in many of the statements from the UPM activists. I stress its importance precisely to insist that xenophobia must be considered as a subjectivity, and not as an automatic response to any structural factor. If xenophobia is indeed a subjectivity, based on, as I have argued, a state political conception of exclusionary national identity, then it can be contested through the collective affirmation of an alternative political subjectivity. The final section of this chapter shows how the UPM respondents articulated the movement's rejection of xenophobia during and after the 2015 attack through the affirmation – though tenuous – of inclusive political solidarity in place of exclusionary national chauvinism.

Chapter 3 described the actions taken by the UPM in response to the 2015 attack, including physical interventions during the violence, efforts to ensure accountability on the part of municipal and police officials in the aftermath of the crisis, and a prolonged sequence of dialogue with the community to combat xenophobic attitudes and facilitate reintegration. It is important to emphasise that there was much at stake for the UPM members throughout this process, who were effectively opposing the popular will of their own communities, their neighbours and friends. As one activist explained:

[The community] said we were protecting the foreigners, and the foreigners are giving us money [...] When it's lunch time we did not want to go to Checkers [supermarket] because they will point fingers at you. And we were in danger, we had to stay here in the office, locking the office, from eight until five, waiting for the director to send us home. And we were afraid that people would burn our houses (Interview 11 [F:25], 13 June 2017).

These risks should not be underestimated; in fact, it is essential that we maintain a proximity throughout this discussion to the lived reality of the UPM activists, many of whom are unemployed, some without proper housing and little formal education, many reliant on social grants from the government to survive and support their families. We should remember that these are not NGO employees, nor university researchers, who may make pronouncements on the dreadfulness of xenophobia from the comfort of offices and libraries. The UPM's response to the attack was by no means automatic or uncomplicated. With this in mind, the following sets out some of the ways in which the UPM activists understood and articulated the solidarity expressed during this sequence.

Like in the case of Abahlali baseMjondolo, central to this praxis was an alignment of the struggles of the UPM with those of poor immigrants in the country. This was articulated in a number of ways, as we shall see. As one respondent told me, in an exceptional statement

which is worth quoting at length:

For me, to be a South African means not to be a citizen. It means not to have a stake in the society. It means to be excluded. It means to be waste. Because how come so many people and young people in this country, that have got so much talent, that they can only wake up in the morning and have nothing to do, they are unemployed? And they live in the extension of the society, in what you may refer to as the dumping places [...] I wouldn't be struggling everyday if I thought I was a citizen in this country, and I enjoyed the rights of that citizenship. I wouldn't be struggling on a daily basis. We are struggling because we want to assert our humanity, we are struggling because we want to be treated as full human beings. So if you are treated as a sub-human being, you can't feel happy, and say I'm a South African (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017).⁹⁸

The statement suggests two things: firstly, that the local poor are excluded from the 'right to have rights' (Arendt, 1973: 296), and as such they themselves do not enjoy the benefits of citizenship as South Africans. Treated as non-citizens, their situation is subjectively not so different from that of the immigrant poor. 'In the end,' the respondent said later, 'we are all in the same position' (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017). Secondly, the statement positions 'citizenship' not foremost as a question of indigeneity, but as one of humanity. There is a shift in argumentation from the notion that ostensible 'non-citizens' are encroaching on the rights and entitlements of South Africans to the notion that the poor are themselves citizens in name only (within the parameters of my earlier argument, I would add – and as such they do not enjoy those rights and entitlements which elites have claimed on the basis of state-sanctioned nativism⁹⁹). Within the logic of this shift, the 'struggle' is not only for the delivery of services – to be competed for by 'deserving' South Africans and 'non-deserving' foreigners – but is the struggle to be counted, in the first sense, as those who belong. For the Khutsong rebels, the sense of having been discounted by the national government caused them to count themselves in non-national terms, as 'Gauteng people'. For Abahlali, belonging was inscribed politically. Similarly, UPM members suggested other means of subjective belonging which prescribed alternatives to nativist conceptions of citizenship – at times affirming universalist principles which, though inchoate, had the potential to mobilise solidarity across nationalist divides.

A central notion was that of shared African, or in some formulations 'black', identity – as well as concomitant ideas of traditional African values of hospitality, humanism, and *ubuntu*. While pan-Africanism was an important liberatory ideal during independence

⁹⁸ This clearly resonates with the statement by AbM that 'In South Africa some of us are moved out of the cities to rural human dumping grounds called relocation sites while others are moved all the way out of the country [...] the destinations may be different but it is the same kind of oppression' (AbM, 2008) (See Chapter 4, p.103).

⁹⁹ See Chapter 2, p.58.

struggles throughout the continent, it has largely collapsed into a state-political subjectivity, or a ‘multi-state conception’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 5), with the popular thought of African unity replaced by state nationalism. As Fanon wrote in 1961: ‘We observe a permanent see-saw between African unity which fades quicker and quicker into the mists of oblivion and a heart-breaking return to chauvinism in its most bitter and detestable form’ (1961: 157). In South Africa, pan-Africanism, connected to the notion of an African Renaissance, was touted during the post-apartheid period by figures such as former President Mbeki; however, this was ultimately an state project designed to ‘manufacture an African elite which could hold its own on the international stage’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 172). Pan-Africanism in any case was increasingly contradicted by deepening state nationalism and notions of South African exceptionalism¹⁰⁰, and the growing communitarianism which was precisely a result of the ‘emphasis on indigeneity and other forms of identity politics developing from state-sanctioned “nativism”’ (ibid.). Similarly, the notion of *ubuntu*¹⁰¹ was ineffectually mobilised by the state in a ‘half-hearted’ (ibid.) attempt to unite South Africans under a conception of national community, with the result that much of the unifying potential of the idea has been lost in hollow sloganeering (ibid., 173). However, given the evocation of these notions by UPM members in articulating their disavowal of xenophobic politics, the suggestion is that while notions of pan-Africanism and *ubuntu* have ultimately failed as state political subjectivities, the principles themselves may retain their prescriptive potential if they are re-constituted – that is, not seen as given but as to be struggled for through political praxis – as popular political subjectivities which affirm a principle of universality.

When discussing the notion of shared African identity, the UPM respondents emphasised the importance of history and understanding the continent’s colonial past and the imposition of its colonial borders. As one respondent told me:

For my point of view, for the fact that you call this Angolan, South African, or whatever, it was a colonially – I can say, colonially framed, to divide Africa. So if then we are keeping on calling colonial names, we are not going to have one common, to build our Africa as a whole. Because Africa I believe should have no borders. Because we are all Africans (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

While it might sound quotidian given its ubiquity in popular and other media, the phrase ‘we

¹⁰⁰ See Chapter 2, p.58.

¹⁰¹ *Ubuntu* generally refers to the notion of social interdependence within traditional African ethics and attendant values of compassion, humanity, hospitality, and the notion that ‘*A person is a person through other people*’. As Michael Onyebuchi Eze (2010: 190-1) writes, *ubuntu* ‘strikes an affirmation of one’s humanity through recognition of an “other” in his or her uniqueness and difference [...] This idealism suggests to us that humanity is not embedded in my person solely as an individual; my humanity is co-substantively bestowed upon the other and me. Humanity is a quality we owe to each other’.

are all Africans' should not summarily be dismissed as an empty prosaicism. The vast majority of the respondents appealed to this notion in no uncertain terms: for example: 'People need to be taught that xenophobia should not be existing at all, because *we are all Africans* (Interview 11 [F:25], 13 June 2017); 'Whether you are from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Angola – *we are all Africans*, we are all one' (Interview 5 [F:26], 8 May 2017), among many others. Moreover, the respondents explicated this notion in ways which were often nuanced and sophisticated, with consideration of wider political and social factors, and not simply as a platitude. Many respondents, for instance, pointed to the fact that the notion of shared 'African-ness' is actually a contested one in South Africa. While people may may evoke the principle more or less as a slogan of African cultural authenticity (particularly vis-à-vis whites), South Africa is still seen as an exception on the continent. The notion of 'South African exceptionalism' is frequently referred to in academic work (I have done so throughout), but it was also clearly identified and articulated by the respondents:

We see ourselves in a better place than Africa [...] they said Africa is a desert, and that South Africa is like a luxurious place (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017).

It's the role that we've taken in Africa, where we're the youngest state but we've managed to lead the continent in many things [...] It's that attitude that makes us think we're better than the rest of the continent, because they're backward (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

There's an element of thinking, it's an old colonial mentality that comes during the colonial era, that says South Africa is better than the other African countries [...] [that] it's not part of Africa, because of what Africa represents in terms of the world and everything. So it's this colonial and racist mentality (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017).

Relatedly, respondents universally stressed that South Africans should remember the role that other African nations played in supporting the anti-apartheid struggle and harbouring activists, positioning the fight against apartheid not only as a South African struggle, but as an *African* one. As one respondent told me:

We have to be united as one nation. We can never change the fact that we are all Africans in one country. That's why I said we need to educate ourselves, our communities. Because these things of people from other countries coming to South Africa, it didn't begin in 2015. Because some of our leaders back then were also foreigners to other countries so they were welcomed in those countries. So we need to study for them where it all started, so that people can know and realise, no, this thing is wrong in this way (Interview 12 [M:30], 13 June 2017).

And another:

I didn't feel very well [after the attack], because I had that in my mind, there is a lot of work that needs to be done in our communities. Because people they don't understand the tricks of divide and rule, the tricks of capitalism, the tricks of apartheid. They don't understand those things, they don't understand that colonising was because of apartheid and capitalism. They don't understand why there was South Africans instead of being Africans. [...] There's a need for us to educate people, so that people can understand when we are saying, Africa, we are all Africans. And there's the history that they don't know. Our South African people were hiding in these countries in the time of apartheid, whilst we were fighting for our liberation [...] So you can't say South Africa is for us only because the struggle was not only for us. All the Africans were in our struggle, and by the time we get liberation in 1994 all the continent was very happy for us (Interview 13 [F:46], 14 June 2017).

Clearly, the notion that 'we are all Africans' is not given here simply as a platitude, but is attached to broader political, social and historical considerations. Importantly, both respondents above emphasize the need for political education within their communities. The second statement reflects the anti-capitalist vocabulary of the movement; however, its most notable proposition is that 'you can't say South Africa is for us because the struggle was not only for us'. *For us* in this context may imply both that other Africans fought in the struggle, and thus helped to achieve liberation – but also that the liberation itself was not won *for* South Africans alone, but for all who supported the liberatory vision. The statements recall how, during the late 1980s sequence of the anti-apartheid struggle and the popular democratic politics of the UDF, political solidarity existed across class, racial and national boundaries. The notion of 'the people' was subjectively produced in the name of all those who were oppressed under apartheid, and in the name of all those who fought against this oppression – and not necessarily coded nationally.

Importantly, for many (but not all) respondents, the possibility of 'being African' was not necessarily dependent on one's being born on the continent. For some, African identity was connected to Blackness; as the following respondent told me (my speech in square parentheses):

The Europeans are foreigners! The Africans are not foreigners. [How about the Bangladeshis?] Hey! In fact, to me, people from Africa, and black people from other areas, to me are not foreigners. I'm Black Conscious, although I'm also a feminist. So to me, blacks from other areas are not foreigners because they are suffering like we are doing. Our struggle, we have one struggle (Interview 13 [F:46], 14 June 2017).

The identification of the Bangladeshis alongside black people from Africa and others who are 'suffering like we are' recalls the principles of Black Consciousness (which the respondent evokes) in which Blackness was identified in political terms – regardless of apartheid racial taxonomies. Said Biko: 'this is not a movement for Africans, not a movement for Indians, for Coloured people; it's a movement for people who are oppressed' (Biko, 2008: 26). For this respondent, the 'foreigners' were not the immigrant poor of any nation, but were 'the

Europeans'. '87 percent of South African land is for the foreigners', she said, referring to majority-white ownership of private land in South Africa¹⁰². 'Those are the people I want to fight with! The capitalist system, because it is based there. Those are the people we need to look at. Especially the system, that system' (Interview 13 [F:46], 14 June 2017). While the language of nativism and authenticity has been mobilised against whites in South Africa by state and other figures (a matter which is obviously complicated by the country's racial history and its permutations in the present-day), the respondent (it appears) does not necessarily cast whites *as such* as 'foreigners', but rather those who perpetuate 'the system' of oppression. She clearly subverts the dominant discourse in which unwanted immigration is poor and black, but desirable immigration is rich and white and brings 'capital investment'. Again, the suggestion is that belonging – and by extension, un-belonging – may be inscribed politically and not *by default* on racial or national grounds.

Relatedly, a category which was repeated by a number of respondents was the notion of how one 'takes oneself'. In some formulations, this was expressed in terms of multiple local identities: for example, one respondent said she could 'take herself' to be African and South African, Zulu and Xhosa (as her parents were). Others said that children of 'foreigners' and South Africans could 'take themselves' to be either, or both. Most interesting were statements which expressed the possibility that immigrants could 'take themselves' to be Africans. While a few respondents stated that only those who are black, or of African descent, could be African, others suggested that non-indigenous groups like Indians and Europeans could also claim African identity. For some, the same principle potentially applied to newer immigrants, such as South Asians, who were not born on the continent. As one respondent said: 'If they consider themselves and they take themselves as Africans, then they are Africans' (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017). Another respondent articulated the notion differently, qualifying that while 'anyone who wants to be called an African can be an African', the central procedure is not only identification, but involves responsibility. Consider the following response:

¹⁰² In 2018, the Land Audit Report, which was commissioned by the Rural Development and Land Reform department, showed that whites owned 72% of private land, followed by coloured people at 15%, Indians at 5% and Africans at 4% (IOLNews, 2018, 'Blacks Own the Least Land – Report', 7 February 2018, Available at <https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/blacks-own-the-least-land-report-13145254>, Accessed November 18 2018).

[Q: The Freedom Charter says that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it’. What do you think about this?] – I think that statement needs to be worked at, like seriously [...] First things first, whoever wants to be called an African can be an African...whoever feels like they are. But I can’t get into your house and want to employ my rules. If I get to your house, I have to know it’s your house. There are house norms, there are laws, there are things that the people who live there should abide. So I think that’s that. People should be made aware of what South Africa stands for, so that if they want to live here they will be part of the vision, the bigger vision. Because the people who’d want to come here and exploit others and say that it belongs to everyone – you have the wrong mind-set for living here then (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

Particularly compelling is the respondent’s notion of the ‘house rules’, with the suggestion that these are not strictures or controls on how ‘foreigners’ must behave (as, for example, appears in debates over migrants’ ‘cultural assimilation’ in Europe) – except insofar as they must ‘be made aware of what South Africa stands for’. By extension, the respondent suggests that his dissatisfaction with the oft-repeated statement from the Freedom Charter is that the words cannot be removed from political responsibility, or the ‘house rules’. South Africa cannot belong to those who live in it in order to ‘exploit others’ but belongs only to those – and to all those – who are part of ‘the bigger vision’.

For some, this ‘vision’ was articulated in terms of traditional African values, including *ubuntu*. Consider the following statement:

To me it is a privilege to be an African. Because when you look, all Africans, they’ve got humanity, called *ubuntu*. That thing, we’ve got it from our forefathers. So that culture is human being. [...] In the older days that we had in history, if we are walking from town and see a house you don’t know, they will call you and say, ‘Come this side! We can see that you are travelling, here is some food!’ And you are given food and everything [...] So that is our culture, for a long time, before the whites came (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

Neocosmos writes that an understanding of *ubuntu* as a more or less ‘lost’ cultural ideal, or ethical tradition, erases the political potentiality of the notion – or ‘the understanding that such a conception of mutual interdependence is not given but must be struggled for by a political practice’ (2017: 11). In fact, conceived in terms of culture alone, *ubuntu* can ‘easily collapse into identitarian communitarianism’ (ibid.) in which interdependence – or the notion *I am because we are* – can be inscribed within a politics of identity¹⁰³. While the notion of *ubuntu* was not at the centre of the UPM’s political praxis, its invocation by some members as a way to suggest that xenophobia itself is *un-African*, and a betrayal of African humanist

¹⁰³ Jonathan Shapiro, or ‘Zapiro’, South Africa’s preeminent political cartoonist, gestures towards this idea in his cartoon entitled ‘Xenophobia and the meaning of ubuntu’, published in the Sunday Times on 25 May 2008, during the xenophobic pogroms. The cartoon depicts a group of South Africans, armed with axes, clubs and a petrol can, standing over the smouldering body of an immigrant. One exclaims: “I could *tell* he was a @#&* foreigner! ...He didn’t know the meaning of *ubuntu*!” (Zapiro, 2008).

values, was notable. As another respondent suggested:

Maybe if a group of us would show the other that being friendly to a foreign person, there's nothing wrong with it, it's not a sin, it's not something bad, it's just being a human being...it's just *ubuntu*. Now as South Africans we're living opposite what we call *ubuntu*...we're just being those cruel, selfish people (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017).

Notions of pan-African solidarity and a subjective conception of 'African-ness' not necessarily based on indigeneity, as well as the invocation of principles of Black Consciousness and *ubuntu* articulated by the respondents, expressed aspects of what may more broadly be identified as a conception of humanism as an antidote to the anti-humanist politics of xenophobia. As Richard Pithouse writes, humanism – as the 'spontaneous, universal and enabling language of resistance' (2003: 129) – has been explicitly located in the work of radical thinkers such as Marx, Sartre, Fanon, Césaire and Biko – yet in contemporary theory, humanism is often considered to be 'at best, a naive anachronism, and, at worst, dangerously repressive' (ibid., 107). Indeed, as a legitimising discourse within liberal modernity, a reactionary conception of humanism delineated 'Man' from native in the justification of the latter's domination (ibid., 113). However, humanism as a non-ideological conception – as Aimé Césaire writes, 'a humanism made to the measure of the world' (cited in Pithouse, 2003: 111) – 'refuses all objectification' (ibid.), as it must hold as its desideratum some idea of human equality – and thus may prescribe a politics of universality. If humanism is non-ideological – and as such, it expresses a 'disinterested interest' (Neocosmos, 2016: 12) or a universal interest beyond the interests of any socially located group – then it is no more and no less than, as Pithouse (2003: 129) puts it, 'a way of saying that everybody's right to self-creation matters'.

In my conversations with the UPM activists, the notion of the 'human being', and also of 'being human' (in some cases, informed by principles of shared African-ness, blackness, and *ubuntu*), were central categories in how respondents articulated the possibilities of solidarity with the 'foreigners'. I include a selection of these statements below, which largely speak for themselves. In the first sense, xenophobia was formulated as a refusal of the humanity of the 'foreigner'. As an older UPM respondent, who had spent several years incarcerated for fighting against apartheid in his youth, told me:

The foreigner is a human being, sort of like me. You can't change that now. They've got their mother, they've got their father, sort of like me. I come from my father, I come from my mother. So they are human being. They didn't come from the stone (Interview 9 [M:52], 24 May 2017).

And, later, he went on:

There are people who come from overseas, etcetera, but I didn't say they have no chance to come here in South Africa. He is a human being, you see, something like me. The blood is red, and yours, it is red, and my heart – you've got my heart, you've got my lungs, something like the poor foreigners. Whatever they come from. If the foreigners are doing the wrong things, I can say, sit, don't do this and this. I didn't say that thing it is right or it is wrong, but we are supposed to treat as a human being. I didn't say the foreigners, if they are there in South Africa, they are totally wrong. No, it is not wrong, that is what I know. They look sort of like me (Interview 9 [M:52], 24 May 2017).

And according to another respondent:

We are human beings, if we respect each other. Because all those things are found on earth – we didn't bring any money when we came down. All those things that divided us was on earth, but you can take that for the fact that you're a human being, I am a human being, he has a right to live, I have a right to live. We have equal breath...What do you call it? Oxygen, something like that. So we've got the same blood, if you cut here it's the same. Blood is red (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

And finally:

That's the problem – we start to treat each other as Nigerians, what-what, white, but if we start to see each other as human beings I think that's where the problem will stop. (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017).

In the second sense, xenophobia was formulated as a perversion of the humanity (including the African-ness and the *ubuntu*) of the xenophobe him- or herself. As one activist said, speaking about the 2015 attack:

It reduces us to a state near to that of an animal, without reasoning. Because there's a question mark on top of our communities now. Are these people even capable of reasoning? Of getting into a meeting and sorting their issues out, in a humanely fashion? [...] It raises serious questions about our communities. I mean we can do things better, for sure (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017).

Or another:

A real human being would never do those things [...] Because as a human being you would – when you do something to someone else you would also think that what will happen to me one day if I could do this to someone else? (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017).

Like in the case of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a conception of human equality as indivisible by social categories of nationality, race and so forth, where all blood is red and no human being 'comes from the stone', was central to the ways in which the UPM activists articulated the movement's opposition to xenophobia. We should not dismiss these conceptions as meaningless truisms, and in fact, a number of statements expressed clear and in many ways profound political prescriptions based on this conception. For instance, I asked a young female activist if she ever thought that there were too many 'foreigners' in South Africa. She replied carefully:

I don't think that. Because I said they are human beings. That's what I said. It's just people. So there's never too much people in a place. For the fact that you actually thought to ask that there's too much, that shouldn't be even a question (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017).

It is worth considering the implications of this statement briefly. The statement affirms, like Abahlali, the principle that 'a person is a person wherever they may find themselves', and rejects the zero-sum logic of state immigration discourse in which 'foreigners' and 'nationals' are numerical abstractions. 'It's just people', she tells us. For her, like Lazarus, people is a 'certain indistinct' – a *being-there* in which 'nothing is prejudged [...] except their existence' (Lazarus, 2015: x). On the basis of this premise, as she so lucidly articulates, there can no more be 'too many' foreigners than there can be 'too many' South Africans than there can be 'too many' human beings in general; in fact, the question itself, as she informs me, is invalid and illegitimate. While the statement is simple, the political principle it prescribes is radical. It is also *true* – like Badiou's (2015: 73) mathematical proof, it is refractory to all opinion, irreducible to any doxa, indifferent to all particularity.

Another respondent, discussing the issue of whether non-citizens should have access to services and resources in South Africa, told me 'By virtue of being a human everyone should get the same treatment' (Interview 3 [M:32], 11 April 2017). And another, in response to the same question: 'We are all one person, so everyone should be included as one thing' (Interview 1 [F:26], 29 March 2017). One activist even told me that she believed desperate foreigners should also be eligible for social grants: 'We're all the same. We need to get the same benefits. Everyone deserves...if you get a grant of 1500, we all need to get a grant of 1500' (Interview 11 [F:25], 13 June 2017). 'Let's take an example,' said another:

The kids from foreigners, it's sick. But still it's a kid. You're having the resources like clinics, better clinics – you can't say that kid cannot go there and get a doctor or medication because he's a foreigner. If you say so, what does it make you, as a parent? (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

I re-emphasise that we *must* resist any temptation to see these statements as mere platitudes. For those who keenly feel the state's failure to deliver services for the poor, who languish on interminable housing lists and who are faced daily with the crisis of unemployment, crime, and hunger; who are met with relentless state oppression – and who are told incessantly by vote-hungry politicians that tides and hordes of immigrants are 'holding the country to

ransom’¹⁰⁴, and who live in communities which widely accept and sometimes violently express this state politics of fear – for people in this situation, it is *surely* not a platitude to affirm that foreigners are ‘just people’ who must be treated with humanity.

6.6. The possibility for politics

I have already shown that there were clearly limits to the excessive thought of the UPM activists, as the statements above which articulate a humanist vision of solidarity strained within a dialectical tug-of-war against discourses of fear and hostility expressive of hegemonic state political xenophobia. Moreover, it must also be stated that these humanist expressions do not in themselves constitute a political praxis; rather, it is through collective mobilisation and struggle that the space for thinking alternative political conceptions is opened. As such, these individual expressions must be located within the collective politics of the movement. As one respondent told me:

[The UPM aims] to constitute ourselves into the assembly of the unemployed, the oppressed...it’s to constitute ourselves into that, and also to fight the corrupt practices in our local municipalities. But over and above...you’d also understand that in the struggle for the emancipation, the aims and objectives will differ many times, because there is no straightjacket. But we are working in and trying to understand the struggle that we are in (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017).

The notion of ‘trying to understand the struggle we are in’ is an important one, and it speaks to, as S’bu Zikode (in Gibson, 2011: v) of Abahlali baseMjondolo says, the idea that the struggle ‘must be owned and shaped in thought and in action by ordinary men and women’. Critically, it is the insistence on the subjective, as Lazarus (2016:119) maintains, which is important here – that is, the capacity for people to think from a position other than ‘adhesion and impotence’ (ibid.), in ways which can collectively affirm alternative political conceptions and practices. As the respondent continued:

¹⁰⁴ Herman Mashaba, the Democratic Alliance (DA) mayor of Johannesburg, said about immigrants in 2018, ‘They’re holding our country to ransom and I’m going to be the last South African to allow it [...] the national government has opened our borders to criminality’ (cited in Schwartz, A., 2018, “‘No one must be in SA without documentation’ – Mashaba”, *Mail&Guardian*, 30 April 2018, Available at <https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-30-no-one-must-be-in-sa-without-documentation-mashaba>, Accessed on 2 January 2019).

You've got this violence against the woman body, and you've also got this violence against the so-called foreign nationals. But if you look at this crisis that's taking place in our country, then you'd realise that it's perpetuated by...the ruling class tends to benefit, because it's disunity and fragmentation of the working class. And our strength as the working class is constituting ourselves into a unit, rallying together and uniting. So thus it is important for us to struggle against the abuse of woman body, patriarchy, which is very huge in this country, and struggle also against xenophobia (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017).

The idea that xenophobia is a dis-unifying force which ultimately benefits the ruling elite, and thus is destructive to a collective emancipatory project, was voiced by other respondents in a number of statements. For example:

I don't think that to the municipality or to the government that this issue of xenophobia even affects them, I don't think so. Because I think to them the issue, that we are even fighting, it is not a problem for them. Because we are fighting and that, like, blocks us fighting them, it could be (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017).

[The foreigners] are also human beings, they are here for the living...so we mustn't take our anger out to them, you know. Because our government has failed us dismally. So instead of taking that anger towards them we should have done that to those who are ruling, because they are full of promises without fulfilment (Interview 14 [M:28], 14 June 2017).

Sometimes, this notion was associated with the idea that government officials themselves are xenophobic:

If they are not xenophobic, why are they not making peace with us South Africans and the foreigners? So that we can unite? Because it seems to me they don't care whether we are not informed about these foreigners (Interview 5 [F:26], 8 May 2017).

The more they become xenophobic, the more that spreads to the people on the ground. So the people on the ground say, even Zuma is also xenophobic, they say even Malema¹⁰⁵ is xenophobic – so we have to be. (Interview 12 [M:30], 13 June 2017).

In the above responses, resistance to xenophobia is not only positioned as an expression of humanism, but also as a form of resistance to state oppression itself – and thus part of a wider collective political praxis. Rancière (cit. Neocosmos, 2017: 11) writes that 'people do not come together in order to realise a future equality; a certain kind of equality is realised by the act of coming together'. As one respondent suggests above, the act of collectively constituting themselves into a unit or assembly *in itself* asserts some notion of equality between the oppressed – the poor, women, and potentially also the 'so-called foreign nationals'. Another UPM member emphasizes precisely this point:

¹⁰⁵ Julius Malema is the current leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), an opposition political party in South Africa.

We're supposed to be all the time on the workshop, to say our problems. I don't like to see the xenophobia about the foreigners. If all the time we were dealing with them, that mind will be far away from if you are a foreigners or a what-what, you see. If we can be together [...] then we can look what our plan is now, to go like this and this and this and this. There is no other way now. We are the people of South Africa. Only God knows the people [...] You can't say it is difficult or not difficult. But if we can all the time to organise, to make some workshops with the foreigners, to survive. We can't say now these are foreigners and this is not a foreigner. Equal, in the workshop (Interview 9 [M:52], 24 May 2017).

The possibility of equality in the collective political space of the workshop is essential. 'Equal, in the workshop' is in itself a political prescription. Still, as aforementioned, in the UPM workshops and events which I attended there was often clear contention around the issue of the foreign nationals in Grahamstown. However, the fractures and contradictions, and the tensions between political principles and their effectuation in the daily life of a movement, precisely show the effort of collective organisation and the struggle to think past hegemonic and oppressive discourses and, as Fanon (1961: 316) puts it, to 'work out new concepts'. One activist explained this to me quite clearly:

You see that in this country, with the promise that look here, we will prioritise South Africans when we give jobs, and some of the Premiers like in KZN [KwaZulu-Natal] and in Joburg, [DA Mayor] Herman Mashaba...you see the Trump-making, if I can put it like that, and it's populism you're appealing to. I mean there's so much xenophobia, tribalism in this country, and racism. So it's not easy. And we have to be able to be honest and talk about this issue. And go into that uncomfortable space, navigate and talk about it (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017).

It is precisely within such a discursive space that alternative prescriptions which can challenge hegemonic state doxa can emerge and be constituted within a political praxis. Clearly, despite tensions and ambivalence on the broader questions of immigration and xenophobia, the movement was capable of actual, effective mobilisation during and after the 2015 attack, and, as a political collective, were able to both appeal to their communities as well as put significant pressure on the local government to facilitate resolution and reintegration:

Because of the dialogues, and really being able to show and talk to people, because of our stance, because we are not victims in addressing, we did not march and say, oh, please, Makana municipality! We made demands, to say, pay for [the foreigners'] loss. We were able to say, intervene. We were able to say to police, do your work, protecting them. So I'm saying we did not march and say, oh please can you help them. We were not confrontational but we were very radical (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017).

Finally, while appreciating what the UPM achieved within this sequence, the point here has strictly not been to suggest that this is in itself a demonstration of a clearly-defined 'anti-xenophobic' political development, either in Grahamstown or within the country in general. The respondents themselves expressed concerns that another attack could occur in

Grahamstown, and many indicated that they did not think that enough was being done by the movement and others to prevent such an eventuality. While the UPM had been successful in ameliorating the immediate crisis in 2015, its capacity is limited, and the question of xenophobia is not the most pressing concern for its South African members. For my part, it was not clear to what degree the movement's engagement with the community and with the shopkeepers on this issue had or could be sustained, and perhaps, the long-term practical gains made by the movement in the fight against xenophobia in Grahamstown were tenuous at best. As one activist told me:

I think it could happen again, if the matters that are faced between us and foreigners are not resolved. There may be other attacks in the future. Because to resolve those attacks, it's not a one-day thing, or a one-month thing. It doesn't have to be approved by the government but it has to be us at the community to approve them (Interview 12 [M:30], 13 June 2017).

What must be maintained – and this is in fact all that this chapter has endeavoured to show – is that through collective political organisation, the members of the UPM were able to think beyond oppressive discourses towards political alternatives which subjectively exceeded, and marked a break with, dominant state subjectivity. The political alternatives prescribed within the sequence exist only insofar as activists maintain a fidelity to them – no more and no less. My concern has been with demonstrating that such a subjectivity can exist. While such a conclusion may indeed be modest in practice, we should not dismiss its real-life implications. For example, I asked one woman what she thought needed to be done about xenophobia in Grahamstown, now that the immediate crisis was over:

We should try and educate our community, even my own community. So maybe when I see someone speaking rudely to a shop owner, try and speak to that person calmly, try and educate them, but not really showing them that you are educating them. Like, even though it's not a workshop (Interview 2 [F:29], 29 March 2017).

And according to another:

As I've said earlier, if people are given information about the foreigners – the foreigners are not here to take people's jobs, they are here to make money for themselves, because South Africa is a rich country, and maybe they feel like it's a place where they can make money. So I feel like if people are told, are informed about foreigners, this xenophobia will no longer be something that happens (Interview 5 [F:26], 8 May 2017).

It is, after all, and as this project has argued throughout, in the thought of people that ruptures with the state-established consensus occur and may be collectively articulated into political practice. It is for this reason that we must insist that people do indeed think, and that subjective exceptions which may prescribe political alternatives are indeed possible. As Lazarus (2015: xxx) writes: 'At bottom, all thought is prescriptive. Freedom resides therein'.

Let me end with the following injunction:

I think the people should unite in our communities, even the foreigners, and raise our voices. What would we like our country to be? We must have that opportunity. To express what we would like our country to be (Joint interview 10 [M:42; M: 44], 25 May 2017).

6.7. Conclusion

As the following, final chapter situates this one within the overall argument of this work, this conclusion will only be a brief summation of the central ideas which have been raised here. The first section discussed how the UPM respondents understood and qualified the 2015 attack against the foreign shopkeepers, and I drew attention to their reluctance to characterise the attack, and the motivations of those who took part in it, as straightforwardly ‘xenophobic’. While some statements pointed primarily to economic motivations, others were more nuanced; the contestation around the term suggests, however, that this was not the primary way in which the respondents understood the violence which took place. The second section outlined how, despite the movement’s principled stance taken against the attack, a number of the activists themselves articulated ambivalent attitudes towards immigration, in some cases expressive of state political xenophobic discourses. The third section looked closely at how the respondents characterised the types of interactions which were possible between ‘foreigners’ and South Africans in Grahamstown, to show that while there were indeed hostilities and animosities, these existed dialectically alongside cooperative and sociable relationships. The fourth and fifth sections showed how the UPM’s principled stance against xenophobia during the 2015 attack was articulated in terms of a political humanism, which was capable of exceeding discourses which are expressive of state political xenophobic subjectivities, and which suggested the possibility of solidarity based on political prescriptions rather than nationalist conceptions of belonging. While the implications of this engagement with the Unemployed People’s Movement for the wider argument of this work will be discussed presently, I end with Camalita Naicker’s (2016) invitation to

understand and engage with relationship building that occurs within communities of so-called ‘foreigners’ and South Africans, who frequently live together in shack settlements across the country. It is here that stories of solidarity, hope, despair, and most certainly humanism, as well as, at times, sustained progressive organisation, can be found (Naicker, 2016: 12).

CONCLUSION

What then was the purpose, for this work, of the engagement with the Unemployed People's Movement? This section clarifies this question within a review of the central arguments made in this thesis. Firstly, the function of the previous chapter was not primarily to present 'data' or a set of findings which can be extrapolated to inform the study of xenophobia, xenophobic violence, or social movements in any particularly generalizable sense. As I have said, the research with the UPM activists aimed rather to try and elucidate the specific subjective singularity which underpinned the collective response to the xenophobic attack of 2015. Nonetheless, I do not think it is an overreach to suggest that the UPM activists offered a number of insights which may have a wider significance and contribution. Their problematizing of the characterisation of the attack as strictly 'xenophobic', for example, indicates a tension between the way in which violence against foreigners is commonly framed in academic and other discourse, and the way in which it may be popularly recognised. Deeper investigation into this tension may perhaps reveal more about the ways in which violence against foreigners in South Africa is frequently framed within popular discourse as a legitimate form of action. Also notable were the responses from the respondents that characterised the types of relationships they considered to be possible between the foreign shopkeepers and South Africans in Grahamstown, which they articulated through the specific categories of 'being in the shop' or 'being in the community'. The various possibilities opened up in these two ideas, indicate (as Sharp (2008), Sichone (2008) and Naicker (2016) have all suggested) that while xenophobia is indeed a hegemonic discourse in South Africa, 'xenophobic' attitudes are not monolithic or uncomplicated. Rather, they intersect with various other social realities relating to being and belonging, reciprocity, fairness, cooperation and indeed also grievances, competition and contestation. The point is that inasmuch as local social dynamics may provide the conditions which aggravate xenophobic hostility, they are also the conditions in which sociability, friendship and solidarity may take root. As Landau (2018: 1) has recently written, these may be 'the stories – seldom told – that can salve and offer direction' and which 'remind those willing to listen that while immigrants live in almost all South African townships, violence against them is remarkably infrequent'. There is much room for further studies which engage with the relationship building that occurs between foreigners and South Africans, particularly amongst the poor who are often

framed in almost Hobbesian terms as perpetually ‘battling it out’, but who in fact coexist most of the time in relative harmony and frequently settle disputes and grievances through non-violent means.

For the purposes of this work, however, the research with the UPM was concerned not primarily with those aspects of thought which may be generalizable, but with the *specific* subjectivity which underpinned the particular sequence under consideration. The sequence can be considered as beginning in late October as the attacks broke out, and continuing through into January of the following year as the UPM worked to reintegrate the foreigners and hold dialogues about xenophobia within the community. By the time of my interviews, the sequence had ‘ended’ as the crisis of xenophobia had been overtaken with other issues of importance to UPM activists and the situation in Grahamstown pertaining to the foreign shopkeepers had more or less returned to ‘normal’. The aim of the interviews was to try to elucidate, through the activists’ own categories and not through appeal to external explanatory paradigms, what prescriptive or political thinking may have been at the centre of the movement’s response to the attack. As such, the research with the UPM is positioned directly between the three central impulses in this work, which can be called political, methodological and subjective. These are all underscored by, entangled within, and necessarily subject to the principal statement *people think*.

I turn first to the idea of politics, which is primary. The second, lengthy chapter of this work sets out in some detail the argument that xenophobia in South Africa must be considered to be a hegemonic political discourse which has arisen primarily through an exclusionary conception of state nationalism based on indigeneity as the grounds for accessing rights and resources. As such, it must be located at the level of state political subjectivity – that is, a way of thinking politics that is produced by and reflective of a form of state politics. This is demonstrated in fact through various and multiple state practices and discourses in the post-apartheid era, including exclusionary legislation which is both raced and classed, constituting a ‘Fortress South Africa’ approach which positions low-income migrants, particularly from the African continent, as a direct threat to the economy and to national stability. State officials, from the early 1990s to the present, have repeatedly reiterated this notion, framing low-income immigration (‘legal’ or otherwise) as a national threat, frequently invoking the language of floods and hordes, epidemics and invasions. The immigrant poor, particularly those who are black, are disproportionately linked to crime, disease, South African underemployment and the exploitation and appropriation of scarce resources and services. Through actions such as the notorious Operation Fiela, the frequently

corrupt and often downright criminal conduct within institutions such as the Department of Home Affairs, the police force, and Lindela Repatriation Centre, the state itself carries out sustained and systematic abuses of foreign nationals¹⁰⁶. These practices are not framed as xenophobic, but are legitimated primarily on the basis of fighting crime and illegal immigration. The same discourses of criminality and illegality are frequently invoked in state responses to xenophobic attacks, including the large scale pogroms in 2008, where xenophobic violence itself is often framed in the language of mere ‘criminality’, and the legal status of those targeted frequently becomes central within the response and debates which follow. The question of xenophobia itself largely becomes obfuscated within these discourses.

I have argued that analysis which frames xenophobia as ultimately or even primarily a reaction to socio-economic factors such as poverty and inequality, or as a form of social pathology or a socio-psychological legacy of apartheid, are inadequate on their own. While they may account for the frustration and desperation of the poor, and while they may be useful in determining ‘the localised political economy’ of specific outbreaks of violence (Misago, 2016: 12), they do not in and of themselves provide a valid account for, firstly, why the anger of the poor is directed towards foreigners in particular. Secondly, they do not take into consideration the fact that xenophobic attitudes are not limited to the poor alone but have been measured within all class and racial groupings of South African society; as such, there is no one sociological profile for the South African xenophobe. Thirdly, and of chief importance here, sociological accounts do not explain why xenophobic violence occurs in some impoverished areas but not in others of equal or greater socio-economic precarity. In fact, as has been shown, xenophobic violence is in some cases actively challenged and resisted by poor South Africans. Moreover, sociological accounts frame xenophobia as a more or less automatic, negative reaction to social place; they occlude the primary role of state politics, and they make it difficult or impossible to conceive of the agency of those engaging in xenophobic violence – and indeed, that of those who choose not to.

¹⁰⁶ Incidentally, at the time of this writing in 2019, the South African government contracting company, Bosasa, to whom the Department of Home Affairs outsourced the management of Lindela since at least 2003, is embroiled in an escalating corruption scandal which is bringing human rights abuses at the facility into the media spotlight. A recent report indicates that, although Bosasa was found by a ministerial committee in 2005 to be incapable of delivering healthcare at its clinic after the deaths of 21 detainees that year, Bosasa obtained a R1-billion contract from the state in the same year to continue running Lindela, and to continue to provide healthcare at the facility ‘temporarily’. In 2015, a further R500 million contract, which former CFO Angelo Agrizzi has stated was improperly awarded, renewed Bosasa’s management of Lindela and its clinic. The report discusses the case of a four-year-old South African child, Sinoxolo Hlabanzana, who was detained with his aunt in 2004, a documented Congolese national. The boy died in custody after falling ill. His body was never returned to his family, and still lies in an unknown pauper’s grave (van Dyk, 2019).

Contra to such accounts, I follow Neocosmos' argument that xenophobia has arisen as a political discourse following the depoliticisation of the popular emancipatory politics of particularly the 1980s period of the anti-apartheid struggle, and its replacement with a politics of state nationalism. The 1980s sequence saw clear bonds of solidarity emerge between black South Africans and other Africans from the region, who were both constructed as non-citizens under the apartheid state, and who shared a common history of work and association in the South African mining sector in particular. The end of this popular political sequence initiated a process of top-down state formation, which, alongside efforts to decouple migrancy from work (as the migrant labour system was framed as a fundamental technique of apartheid exploitation), encouraged an exclusionary conception of citizenship based on autochthony. Much in the way that Fanon describes in 1961, the movement from a revolutionary 'national consciousness' to state nationalism has presided over the private accumulation of the new nationalist elites, legitimated through a conception of indigeneity as the 'litmus test for rights' (Mamdani, 2001a: 657) – a notion which has become hegemonic in popular discourse. Neo-liberalisation, developmentalism and an ultimately depoliticising discourse of human rights have contributed to the neutralisation or decline of clear political alternatives to hegemonic state nationalism and xenophobic discourse.

In what may be considered to be an extension of Neocosmos' argument in this regard, I have insisted that without an understanding of xenophobia as a hegemonic collective political subjectivity, we are unable to comprehend those sites in which people have actively contested or challenged xenophobic violence through collective political action. I have argued that the fact that people are capable of subjectively thinking alternatives in this way must indicate that xenophobia itself is first and foremost a political subjectivity and discourse, and not sociologically determined. As a subjectivity, it can be challenged through subscription to a different subjectivity. I have argued that these sites of political contestation deserve careful consideration in their own right, and have tried to afford such consideration to three notable examples. In these sites – although the subjectivity articulated and expressed in each is necessarily singular – resistance to xenophobic violence was mediated through pre-existing political mobilisations: Abahlali baseMjondolo in KwaZulu-Natal, the Merafong Demarcation Forum in Khutsong, and the Unemployed People's Movement in Grahamstown. Of course, not all collective politics or social movements are necessarily progressive in this regard, and some are clearly reactionary and endorse xenophobia – and are thus expressive of state subjectivity (even if they resist and contest the state in other regards). For example, the group of social movements which circulated the text message in 2015 warning African

immigrants to leave the country or face violence clearly expressed state political discourse – which the message itself patently invoked when it said: ‘We are pleading with you to return to your home countries – as our King Goodwill and many other great leaders have asked’ (in Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016: 984). However, in the cases that I have considered in this work it was clear that those activists were, though perhaps to different degrees and within different parameters, thinking beyond xenophobic discourse in ways which exceeded state subjectivity.

Following Lazarus, I have argued that politics must be fundamentally considered to be *thought*, or a collective thought-practice, which exists within different subjective domains. Where politics is thought ‘in the space of the State’ (Lazarus, 2016: 109), or in exteriority, the thought of politics is subordinate to the thought of an external referent such as state power, class, nationality, citizenship, social identity, and so on. I have said that xenophobia must be considered to be a collective discourse firmly rooted in state subjectivity, wherein nationalism, indigeneity and identity are among the external referents on which xenophobic thinking relies. It must be maintained always that those who participate in collective violence are people who think and have agency, even though this is a thinking which is expressive of a state mode of rule. As Lazarus maintains, ‘it is essential to insist on the subjective’ because the ‘only argument in favour of the possibility of a rupture with the order of things is that the subjective exists [...] If people think, then *another* subjectivation is possible’ (2016: 119 [emphasis in original]).

The central argument of this thesis is that the sites of resistance to xenophobic violence which have been discussed here may demonstrate precisely the existence of such a rupture. Politics which mark a break with state thinking are also necessarily not reducible to the social (which is managed and produced by the state); although they emerge within a particular configuration of the social, they have the capacity to think beyond it. They mark then what Badiou has called an ‘immanent exception’ (2015: 63), which is a production *in* the world but also an exception *to* it. In other words, a political exception arises from within particularity, but it is not reducible to that particularity and in fact transcends it. Lazarus (2016: 108) calls this type of political subjectivity a ‘politics in interiority’ – one which thinks and declares itself a politics, but does not rely on any external referent beyond its own thought to do so. Such a politics announces, in Badiou’s formulation, a *truth*, as it has the capacity to be universally affirmed. As such, it opens ‘a subject space where anyone can be counted’ (Rancière, 1995, cit. Neocosmos, 2016: 40), and thereby, by necessity, appeals to some vision of human equality. In this way, political thought in interiority is prescriptive, or it has the

capacity to make prescriptions on the real which transcend the objectively social and affirm a politics of ‘disinterested interest’ (Neocosmos, 2016: 12) – a politics that eschews particular interests in favour of an interest which can be affirmed by all.

Chapter Four argued that the resistance to xenophobic politics articulated by Abahlali baseMjondolo may have demonstrated precisely such a subjectivity. Abahlali’s notion of a ‘living solidarity’ with the foreigners who were under attack in 2008 was indivisible from its broader conception of a ‘living politics’; the essential, prescriptive category of a politics which is universally ‘owned and shaped in thought and in action by ordinary men and women’ (Zikode, in Gibson, 2011: v). The prescription, made in response to the xenophobic attacks, that ‘a person is a person wherever they may find themselves’ (AbM, 2008) is a *universal* axiom. It applies equally to the Abahlali activists themselves, who affirm that they are *people* who live in shacks (and not less than human because they are forced to live in inhuman conditions), as it does to the ‘foreigners’ whose humanity is denied by xenophobia. As Abahlali maintain: ‘If you live in a settlement you are from that settlement and you are a neighbour and a comrade in that settlement’ (AbM, 2008). The radical, political potentiality of this subjectivity is clear.

As I have said, however, ‘excessive’ politics necessarily exist in a dialectical relationship with forms of thinking which express the social, and state subjectivity. As Neocosmos (2016: 40) writes ‘excess always exceeds something’. In the cases of the MDF and the UPM, there was clear ambivalence between thought which was able to exceed state thinking and particularly located interests, and thought which was still by and large expressive of state subjectivity. While the Khutsong rebels affirmed a conception of political belonging not derived from state nationalism, this belonging was (given the particular objective of the struggle) linked to a conception of place-based identity. Although this identity was inclusive of those foreigners, mainly Mozambicans, who were considered and considered themselves to be ‘Gauteng people’, the more ambivalent attitudes towards newer Somalians and Ethiopians suggests that the political subjectivity which underpinned the resistance to xenophobic violence demonstrated during that sequence was still delimited to some degree by the interests of social place. Likewise, in my discussions with the UPM activists, there was a clear tension between statements which articulated notions of solidarity based on shared humanity and struggle, and those which expressed apprehension, hostility, and xenophobia. The point is not to say that these tensions imply that the politics of the MDF or the UPM were in some way deficient. Rather, the suggestion here is that thinking in ways which exceed state subjectivity is not an automatic process, but a difficult one. As Rancière

(in Neocosmos, 2016: 40) writes: ‘Any subjectivation is a dis-identification, a tearing-away from the naturalness of place’. It is then necessarily a dialectical process.

This is what is at stake in the notion *people think*. The statement must be recognised not simply as a fact about people’s capacity to be rational (in which case the likely response might be to say that *of course* people ‘think’). What Lazarus is arguing is that people think in terms of the *possible*, not only of the extant (in his formulation, thought is a relation *of* the real, and not *to* the real (Lazarus, 2016: 109)). While the notion of what is possible may be delimited within state subjectivity to refer only to the objective and the status quo, people are at times, through collective effort and struggle, able to conceive of possibilities which transcend the objective *what is* and prescribe some notion of what *could be*. Lazarus is then not chiefly concerned with people’s capacity to think about the world as he is with the fact that they can think of new worlds. In doing so, those individuals who belong to the situation over which the state presides, but who are not counted by the state as having a place – which Rancière (1999: 9) calls the ‘part of those who have no part’ – appear in the world as political subjects. By appearing, ‘those who “cannot” do something show in fact that they can’ (Rancière, 2003: 202), and ‘the people who are not meant to think’ (Zikode, 2008:1) show in fact that they do. This is where ‘politics begins’ (Rancière, 2003: 202). As such, this act of appearance in some way, and by necessity, changes the world by entering it: as Badiou writes: ‘There exists no stronger a transcendental consequence than that of making something appear in the world which had not existed in it previously’ (Badiou, 2006: 285).

In this first sense, then, the engagement with the UPM was an investigation into the possibility of politics. By this I mean that, in resisting xenophobic violence and by contesting the discourses which underpin it (even if this contestation was contradictory and marked by tension), the UPM activists demonstrated their subjective capacity to think beyond state subjectivity and prescribe an alternative conception of the political. The central categories in this conception were not the referents on which xenophobic thinking relies; namely, citizenship, the nation, or indigeneity as the basis for rights and entitlements (although it is true that these discourses were not wholly forgotten). Rather, solidarity was articulated through the possibility of shared community and struggle, in some formulations shared African or black identity (and these often configured fairly inclusively as extending to South Asian immigrants), and most importantly, through the simple but principal notion of the human being and of human equality. The possibility of unity between the oppressed against oppression of all kinds, including xenophobia, is precisely the possibility of a politics which exceeds particular interests and affirms a political subject which is not subordinate to the state

or to the social. I stress that it is *possibility* which must be insisted on here, and my intention is not to suggest that such a subjectivation has necessarily been realised within the UPM. While clearly it was through collective political organisation that the UPM was able to challenge xenophobia, to ‘go into that uncomfortable space, navigate and talk about it’ (Interview 15 [M:42], 2 August 2017), and to actively confront it during the 2015 attack, these politics are still precarious and tenuous. Moreover, they are depend on continual contestation, and exist only insofar as people struggle for them. As such, I do not want to exaggerate or idealize, but rather to insist on the importance of recognising such subjective singularities for all their ambiguity, tension and contradiction – and indeed also, for the possibilities for freedom and equality which they may prescribe.

This brings me to the second, methodological impulse of this thesis. For Lazarus, in order to try to apprehend what he calls subjective singularities, one must proceed by a ‘process in subjectivity’ (2016: 116). The approach is necessarily linked to Lazarus’ understanding of the political and the subjective; however, the point here is that it is not enough just to establish *people think* as a political principle – we must ask *what* people think, and we must be able to identify, as Hayem (2012: 518) puts it, ‘what is being thought in what people think’. In short, in order to actually recognise the thinking which underpins or characterises a specific sequence, we must be able to comprehend this thought *on* and *in* its own terms, within its subjective singularity – and not through external explanatory paradigms, which often transpose the thinking of the investigator onto the thought of those investigated. This involves, for Lazarus, a movement away from ‘scientism’, or an approach in positivism which largely reduces the subjective to the empirical and the objectively social. Where scientism attempts to explain thought through concepts, types and definitions which are generalizable and demonstrate ‘repeatability’ (Lazarus, 2015: 56), Lazarus argues that ‘[t]here is no such thing as politics in general, only singular political sequences’ (ibid., 72). To try to understand these sequences in subjectivity we must identify, delimit and elucidate those particular categories through which people think the political within that sequence. While I will not reiterate the specifics of this process here, the aim is to distinguish those forms of thinking which may in fact be political through their capacity to make *prescriptions*, or which denote alternative ‘possibles’. It is then a process of carefully considering those particular ‘problematic words’ and categories which are at stake for the respondents, which articulate the particular ways in which the political may be conceived within a certain sequence.

While I have said that the research with the UPM was in the first sense an investigation into the possibility of politics, it was in the second sense also an investigation into this particular methodological approach. I do not suggest that my discussions with the UPM activists, and their later analysis, were able to fully describe and explain their response to the xenophobic attack of 2015 – and indeed it is likely that I was only able to scratch the surface of the tensions, contradictions and possibilities demonstrated through that sequence. The aim, however, was to try to identify and elucidate some of the specific forms of thinking which underpinned or characterised that sequence, and in this regard the scope of the research was fairly modest. However, these forms of thinking themselves, and the subjective exception – and indeed, the political potential – which they suggest, are, I maintain, important and notable in their own right.

Finally, what then is the subjective exception demonstrated by the UPM respondents? Simply, the possibility of conceiving of people as first and foremost *human beings*, where personhood is not contingent on any social predicate, is a fundamentally egalitarian conception which, it seems to me, presents the only real alternative to a politics of xenophobia. The proposition, as one respondent told me, that ‘there can never be too much people in a place’ – or Abahlali’s expression that ‘a person is a person wherever they may find themselves’, or the principle that ‘no one is illegal’ – all mark subjective exceptions to the world into which they are announced. What they announce in fact is the impossibility of the presumption that the value of a human life can be contingent on where a person is born or where they live. As such, the immigrant, the refugee and the shack dweller cannot be anything less than fully human. Of course, this principle is true in fact – but it is a truth about the excluded ‘part of no part’. Affirming this truth demands that the rules of inclusion themselves are changed.

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APPENDIX A: CONSENT FORM

Name of researcher: Jemima Parker

(Mark with ☒ if you confirm)

- ☐ I confirm that I understand the purpose of the research and have had the opportunity to ask questions about it.
- ☐ I understand that participating in this study is voluntary; I do not have to answer any questions I would prefer not to, and I can withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. If, after the interview, I choose to withdraw from the study, then my interview will be deleted and not used in the research.
- ☐ I understand that any information I provide will only be used anonymously, and I will not be identified if my views are presented to other participants, or in any published work stemming from the research.
- ☐ I consent to the use of an audio recording device to record the interview(s). Recordings are for the researcher's purposes only and will not be distributed. All recordings will be deleted once they have been transcribed by the researcher.
- ☐ [Where applicable] I consent to the presence of an interpreter, who has signed a confidentiality agreement not to disclose or discuss the contents of the interview.
- ☐ I consent to the transcript of this interview, in which I will not be identified by name or any other description, to be stored by the researcher to be used in future research.
- ☐ I agree to take part in this study.

Name: _____

Date: _____

Signature: _____

Igama lomphandi: Jemima Parker

(Phawula ☒ ukuba uyaqinisekisa)

- ☐ Ndiqinisekisa ukuba ndiyayiqonda injongo yophando kwaye ndilifumene ithuba lokubuza imibuzo malunga nalo.
- ☐ Ndiyaqonda ukuba ukuthabatha inxaxheba kolu phononongo kukuzithandela; andinyanzelekanga ukuba ndiphendule nayiphina imibuzo endinokukhetha ukungayiphenduli, kwaye ndingarhoxa naninina, ndingakhange ndinike nasiphina isizathu. Ukuba, emva kodliwano-ndlebe, ndikhetha ukurhoxa kuphononongo, ngoko ke udliwano-ndlebe lwam luza kucinywa kwaye lungasetyenziswa kuphando.
- ☐ Ndiyaqonda ukuba naluphina ulwazi endilunikayo luza kusetyenziswa ngaphandle kwegama, kwaye andiz'ukwaziwa ukuba izimvo zam zithiwa thaca kwabanye abathabathi-nxaxheba, okanye nakowuphina umsebenzi opapashiweyo ovela kuphando.
- ☐ Ndivumela ukusetyenziswa kwesixhobo sokurekhodwa kwelizwi ukurekhoda udliwano-ndlebe. Okurekhodiweyo kokweenjongo zomphandi kuphela kwaye akuz'ukuhanjiswa. Konke okurekhodiweyo kuza kucinywa kusakube nje kukhutshelwe ngumphandi.
- ☐ [Apho kuyimfuneko] ndivumela ukuba kubekho itoliki, esayine isivumelwano sobumfihlo ukuba ingabhengezi okanye ixoxe iziqukatho zodliwano-ndlebe.
- ☐ Ndivumela ukukhutshelwa kolu dliwano-ndlebe, apho ndingaz'ukubizwa ngegama lam okanye nayiphina enye ingcaciso, ukuba lugcinwe ngumphandi ukuze lusetyenziswe kuphando lwexesha elizayo.
- ☐ Ndiyavuma ukuthabatha inxaxheba kolu phononongo.

Igama: _____

Umhla: _____

Utyikityo: _____

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

INTERVIEW 1 – 29 MARCH 2017 (Female)

1. May I ask your age? - 26
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? - Yes. Here in Grahamstown.
 - 2.1. [YES] What makes you South African? Or, what does it mean to be South African, do you think? - Probably I could say it's because maybe I was born here in South Africa and I live according to the South African Constitution maybe.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? - No not really, besides that I see myself as a Christian...black strong South African woman.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? - At UPM
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – UPM and Young Women's Forum
 - 5.1. [YES] What does the organisation do? – Basically with the YWF we work with young women and we empower them. I think that basically summarises it... mostly we empower young women. Also with UPM we work with social struggles. Where people have struggles we try – I could say we also empower the society... in most cases we would find that there are people out there who don't even know their rights, who don't even know that if they have some kind of a situation where can they go. So I could say that we're there in that place that we go out there and bring out information that they have no idea of.
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – I joined UPM through YWF. They had a meeting, I was invited by my friend who was part of YWF and UPM. I think I got interested...ok, I think I should mention this, I was never when I was growing up... I never saw myself as a person who would be interested in politics, so when I was there in that meeting of YWF there were things that really attracted me, things that I saw, but I didn't know that they were *political*, so then, I think that's what attracted me to... the struggles that women face.
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – Oh, a lot. (laughs) Um...mostly I'm hoping that we could see some change in our communities where we live in, because you would find that there are those people that are really, really, really struggling, that they barely have anything to maintain them, to eat, anything... so I'm hoping maybe UPM could somehow find a way that could reach out to the community, to those people who are really suffering, and bring out a helping hand where they can. And also to find ways where we as a community could work with each other without discriminating each other.
6. Are you married? - NO
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – No children
8. What is your first language? - Xhosa
9. Can you speak other languages? – A bit – Afrikaans, and also a bit of Zulu. I can understand but I cannot talk Sesotho.
 - 9.1 Where did you learn them? – At school. I learned Afrikaans at school, and I learnt to understand Sesotho from a friend, and IsiZulu I learned from my dad because he's a Zulu guy.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – Yeah, of course it is. Because as a person you cannot just stay in one country you have to travel, so obviously when you go to other countries you will have to understand what the other people are saying.
11. Do you think you should have any benefits from being South African? [THIS QUESTION IS UNCLEAR]
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means. Do you agree? – No. I do not think so. Because you would still find that there are places where some of us cannot go to. So you cannot say that South Africa belongs to all of us. [Can you explain more?] I think it's because...ok firstly, for example, there are those people – Nigerians and other people – who cannot come to South Africa you see, so I don't think, I think they should [INTERRUPTION] I don't know whether this will answer your question but I think that it is relevant to it, you'd find that other people from other countries who want to come to South Africa, there are some processes that they have to go through before they could come into South Africa... So I cannot agree with that. I think if anyone comes from other places could just come automatically to South Africa... [There can't just be a free for all? If you are here and if you are established here legally is SA for everyone who lives in it or is it to do with whether you're born here?] That's quite a tricky one. Probably – it looks that way to me. Like if you were born here in South Africa then you 'own' South Africa, but then if you were not born here then obviously you won't even get the label of being South African.
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – Joza, Extension 9
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Yes. You'll find mostly that at times in my neighbourhood – ok, I live in a disadvantaged neighbourhood, but fortunately for me, I wouldn't say that I'm fortunate but at least I do have a better living than others. So where I live in that community we share things...if a neighbour comes knocking at your door, they come and they ask can I please maybe have a cup of sugar then you borrow that person – or even give, you don't have to borrow – and then also at times it gets really, really bad where you find other people from other locations, maybe Extension 7, they come and do criminal things, they come and break in and stuff, so we look out for each other's houses.
15. What are some of the issues or problems in your neighbourhood? - Crime. Crime. Alcohol abuse... I think that's the most one, because there's a tavern around my area, so you'd find a lot of the youth hanging around there.

16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? – Yes, especially the foreign guys...there's a shop there of a foreign guy, so they come and go, come and go. [How do people feel about this?] I wouldn't say... I think, I don't really know because... but they do get along I could say very well. Especially, there was this other foreign guy who was very very friendly. So even the community members would go there sometimes, and go borrow and say that I will pay you back the other time, so I think it's that kind of relationship. Maybe I could say that I think my community is very lucky to get those foreign guys who are very nice, that at times they go and ask for things and they have a ...I could say...a happy relationship in the community.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? N/A (I missed this question)
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – Yeah it is, I don't think it should be something that is very difficult to do.
 - 18.1. **[YES]** How can this happen? – I think it all depends to a person.... How you are, the way you are, or the way that you were raised. Your attitude towards other people. I think the best way is to try and engage with the community. Maybe I think it's because of, as I said we were lucky enough to get the very friendly foreigners so I think it's the way they were engaging with the community.
 - 18.2. **[NO]** Could you explain why not? N/A
 - 18.3. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities? N/A (answered above)
19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – No it's just a few, the ones who own the shops.
20. What do the foreigners do? - They own the shops. I think there are three shops around my neighbourhood.

Do they do something useful? – Of course. Yeah it is! Because comparing from before, where South Africans were owning the shops, you'd find that prices were very very high. And then now these guys have at least reasonable prices. And you'll find that these guys they have this system of like, if you don't have money now, they will give you credit and then at the end of the month you go and pay them.
21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? - Yes
 - 21.1. Why? What are the benefits of these shops for you, if any? [Answered above]
22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – No, I haven't heard of that one.
 - 22.1. **[YES]** Why do you think it's true/how do you know if it's true? N/A
 - 22.1.1. Do you think that South African shops and businesses also bribe the municipality? N/A
23. Someone I've spoken to described the shops in the location as 'mushroom shops' because they come up everywhere, like mushrooms. Do you think there are too many shops? – Yeah there are...but I think they are helpful, they are really really helpful because you'd find that – for example, in Extension 9, in each street there's almost a shop. So I think that it's really helpful in that way that you don't have to walk far to a shop.
 - 23.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops? – I don't think it's a problem.
24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – Yeah...I think they should...but also in a way it would be difficult for them to own.... But also there are many different kinds of businesses, and everyone doesn't have the same skills. So you can do what you know best. It's not only about selling food as the only business there is. So for example I have an aunt who owns a salon at my street and her business is booming. And also there are people that you would find that can sew....so I don't think that it would be a problem. [What about the idea that South Africans feel like they are in competition with the foreign businesses?] I think that's our way as South Africans trying to hide from our laziness. I could say that South Africans are very lazy, really they are very lazy. They look for – ok let me make an example. You find that at Shoprite there are those street vendors...they are all selling the same thing. That really doesn't make any sense. Because if for example – we don't have a business mind. If they had a business mind you would find that if another street vendor is selling something else then I don't have to sell that thing, I can sell something else. If this one is selling this, then I don't have to sell this I can sell something else. You see? So that's why I'm saying that we as South Africans are very lazy... we don't want to think, we just – if we see that person selling that and we see that its booming business, I also want to sell that, of which I don't know if it's going to work for me. You see? [Where do you think this mentality comes from?] I really don't want to lie, I don't know. I don't know. Maybe it could be lack – they don't want to think for themselves. It could be that. I don't know.
25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops? [Answered above]
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? [Missed this question]
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – Of course. Yes, of course they do.
 - 27.1. **[YES]** Can you tell me how? – I'll talk about my area...yes, you find that they do mingle with the community, they go to meetings, they played their role. If there are programs whereby the community is being called to do some community work, probably to go and clean around the place that we are living, they are part of it. For example, the one that I live near, he's called Thomas, he's always there. In every meeting he's always there, in every community engagement he's always there, and the extent that the children always love him. If he comes out of his shop, he's always playing around with them in the street....so, I could say that they do try to be part of the community.
 - 27.2. **[NO]** Can you explain to me how they do not? N/A
 - 27.3. **[OR]** Can you explain what the difference is between those who do try and those who don't?
28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? [Answered above]
29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – No, unfortunately I was in Uitenhage. I only heard of it from a call from my mom telling me that South Africans are looting the foreigners' shops, and to the extent that she was also scared that she was alone in the house at that time. Both me and my sister were in Uitenhage and she was alone. So she was scared that it was becoming extremely bad that even now the youth were even vandalising the other people's houses, not only they were looting the shops they were also vandalising the South Africans' homes who were

helping the foreigners during the time when the others were looting. [Was Thomas looted?] Yes he was [How did your Mom feel about that?] She was – ok firstly before Thomas had a shop there he was selling blankets and curtains and other things, and then my mom knew Thomas that way because he used to go sell to my mom those things. And then later on he had the shop there. So my mom and Thomas had kind of a relationship, so she knew him that way and he was kind of close, also to me and my sister were kind of close to him. So she was very devastated when that happened, in the extent that, the time that the looting started she went there to go and help Thomas to take some of the things from his shop and put them at our house, but it was too much because the people were like so much to us she was saying... so she couldn't, and because the other people were busy shouting at her and threatening her that is she sleeping with these foreign guys and stuff, why is she helping them. So I think that's why she was also kind of scared.

30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] N/A
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
 - 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true?
 - 31.2. Did you think so then? Can you tell me why/ why not? - I think at the time I kind of believed it because I once had a friend who was threatened by the guy, and also again, at a later stage, also other things that there were South African guys who were doing these things to other women – so again my mind changed...I don't think it has to be him because these guys are also doing this, or is it because they heard that that guy was doing it? So I had two minds about it.
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? - Yes
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? - I think it was also the anger that they had of thinking that the foreigners have taken their jobs, their women. I think it also led to those things. It wasn't just only about this thing of the foreign guy doing all this stuff.
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? [Answered above]
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – I was not here.
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? N/A
37. How did you feel after the incident? N/A
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – Not really, I only heard that the police couldn't do anything because the South Africans were very very angry, and they also took out their anger and frustrations to the police.
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – N/A
 - 39.1. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not?
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – Not really. I do not think so. I think it was...cruel. It was something very cruel. Because you cannot just – a real human being would never do those things. You would never do something like that. So I do not think it was xenophobic, I think it was just something else that I cannot explain. [Then why only foreigners attacked, if not xenophobic?] I don't know....maybe it comes to the thing that I was saying that they were fighting for the things that I was saying that the foreigners are taking their women, that the foreigners are taking their jobs. Or maybe... it is xenophobic. I really don't know. But what I saw is cruelty. It was really really cruel. Because as a human being you would – when you do something to someone else you would also think that what will happen to me one day if I do this to someone else.
 - 40.1. **[NO]** How would you describe it?
 - 40.1.1. Why were only foreigners attacked?
 - 40.2. **[YES]** Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? {Missed this question, but is answered later I think}
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? N/A
42. Who is a foreigner? – From my understanding foreigner is someone who doesn't live in the same country as you do.
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? – Yes, I think so. I think if you are in South Africa then you should be a South African, and if I'm in Nigeria I should be a Nigerian. I think it should be automatically like that.
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? **[Yes/No]** Could you explain? – As if I do not belong? [long pause] I think sometimes I do. Sometimes I do feel like as if I wasn't in South Africa, I was in maybe overseas somewhere else where maybe I could have a better life or better opportunities. I think so.
45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – Maybe to have a better living? Yeah.
 - 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – Low prices! I think it could be the fact that they're very helpful in our communities in the sense of their shops. And also in their skills because now you'll find that most of them – to go back to that thing that I was saying that they have a mind-set of business, because now, there's a new thing that the foreigners are doing – they are building. They are building homes and they are really on a very nice quality. So I think also that's another positive thing.
 - 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – Probably maybe at sometimes they are quite rude. Yeah they are quite rude. I can't think of anything else.
46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – Absolutely nothing wrong with it. Because, for example, if I would go to overseas, I would love to marry a white guy (laughs). I don't think it should be an issue when another person from another country comes and gets married with a South African woman, or if, would it be wrong for me if I go to Nigeria and then when I go there I marry a Nigerian man? Or is it wrong when a Nigerian man can marry a South African woman? I don't see that should make any conflict. [Why do you think that people have such a problem with that?]

Definitely I think it's a man thing. Because the foreign guys, probably they have money, and the South Africans don't really have money, so they're thinking that these guys they are taking their women because – I think probably it's a girl thing, because every girl wants to be spoiled at some time, so now these foreign guys they have the ability to do that, whilst these South African guys sometimes cannot do it. So they have this anger towards foreign guys.

- 46.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know? – Yeah I think often this is the case, but there are cases where you'd find that there are other foreign guys who do marry South African girls for love, not just for that. There is another couple that I know, a foreign guy and a South African girl, they've been married since, I don't know since when, and they have so many kids together.
- 46.2. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives? N/A
- 46.3. Do you think it's a problem when foreign men don't pay lobola when they marry South African women? Why do you think so/don't you think so? – In families where you'd find that they really follow tradition then it becomes a problem, but in other families that don't follow tradition then I don't think it is a problem. I think it depends to the families. But I've never heard any case where you hear that a foreign guy has paid lobola.
- 46.3.1. Then do you think that marriage between a foreigner and a South African women is ok, as long as they pay lobola? N/A
47. What do you think about South African men marrying foreign women? [Answered above]
 - 47.1. Is it different to foreign men marrying South African women?
 - 47.2. **[YES]** Why do you think it's different?
48. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – I could say yes and no. For example I'm Xhosa and also Zulu – sometimes I like to say 'I'm a Zulu girl' and sometimes I like to say 'I'm a Xhosa girl' so I think it depends to those kids how they see themselves. I think if someone would be saying that you are a foreigner to those kind of kids they wouldn't be wrong, also if they were saying that they were a Xhosa child they also wouldn't be wrong. It depends to the person how they take themselves. [Is it more about how they take themselves rather than how society takes them?] Yeah I think that mind-set that people should adapt to is that how do you see yourself.
 - 48.1. **[YES]** Even if they are born in South Africa?
49. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – It's very difficult. Because you'll find that other families do have clashes, whereby, for example if there is a marriage the black culture would not want maybe to use the Nigerian culture because they have their own culture, their own ways of doing things, so they wouldn't maybe want to adapt to...
50. What is it that makes people different? (For example) how they dress? Their religion? – It could be religion, it could be culture. It's the way people have their mind-sets, it's the way that people think.
51. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? {missed this question}
52. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Yes, I do, a lot.
 - 52.1. How do you know them? – Mostly by going and buying at shops, so I talk with them. [Are any of them friends now?] Yeah I could say so, like Thomas.
53. Do you go to church? – Yes, I do.
 - 53.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – Yes, mainly Nigerians. [Is this a place where people come together?] Definitely. [Is your pastor welcoming?] Yes, he is. He's the one who introduced us – before they attended the church, our pastor took them, the new foreigners and put them in the pulpit and asked the congregation to accept them. I think it was after the xenophobic attacks, and then our pastor asked the congregation to accept the foreigners because he gave a speech that they are also the same, they are one, all of that. By just welcoming them in the church they are helping.
 - 53.2. Where do foreigners go to church? N/A
54. Are the foreigners friendly? N/A
55. Should foreign children go to school here? – Yes! Why not? [Do you know anything about the situation with the foreign children?] When I was in matric, I was in class with a foreign boy... he used to be teased a lot, called kwerekwere, 'what is he doing in our school' and stuff, why shouldn't he go back to Zimbabwe, so he was living that life. But he was very quiet, he wouldn't say anything back. But what I liked about him, he was always the cleverest one in the class, he used to get the best marks then everyone in the class, so that's why I was saying that these foreign guys have a very good mind, so maybe that's also one of the reasons that South Africans really hate these foreign guys. [Is there a difference in the way the community feels about the foreigners who are Christian and the foreigners who are Muslim?] I think it's the same.
 - 55.1. Don't you think that's a good way for them to become more South African? N/A
56. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – No. Because I think, also in the case of that looting, I think after that what the local municipalities should have done is to bring the community together and also maybe bring the foreigners...and maybe educate the South Africans, that also these foreign people are also part of our communities, we cannot just throw them away, or out, where are we saying they must go? Things like that, the government should do. Educating the South African people. Because it seems as if they are also part of this thing now, because they are not doing anything to help the foreigners.
57. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – Capitalism. I think that's one of the biggest problems. And also crime. [Does Capitalism have any bearing on xenophobia?] It could be.
58. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? [answered above]
59. What do you think people should be doing? N/A
60. Do you think that South Africa has a problem with immigration? In what ways? – Yeah they do. It comes to this thing that they're scared of other people coming to South Africa and taking their things away from them.
 - 60.1. Is the government doing enough to solve this problem?

61. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – No. They are xenophobic.
 62. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – I don't know, probably they are. I think it comes to what I was saying that I haven't seen anything that the officials have been doing to help, so that's what I was saying that they seem like they are also being part of this xenophobia thing.
 63. What does it mean to be African? – Ubuntu. Being helpful to another person. Giving a helping hand to another person.
 64. Is South Africa part of Africa? – It should be. Because we are all one person, so everyone should be included as one thing.
 - 64.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways? – Other people do see it that way, but I don't see it that way. [Why do you think that people see it that way?] I think maybe it's because of the way that our mind-sets are....maybe we see ourselves in a better place than Africa. Some other people who have talked about Africa to me they said Africa is a desert, and that South Africa is like a luxurious place, of which I do not think that's true.
 65. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes, I am.
 66. Are you proud of being African? – Sometimes I'm not....
 67. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? Yes! They are Africans...not because they were born in or, ok yeah, probably....um maybe it's if they are born in Africa?
 68. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – Yes. They are Africans also.
 69. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – Yes I do. Because people they haven't been educated, there was nothing done after the looting. So it could come back again because you'd find also incidents where the guys from the location still say anything they like to the foreigners....ugly words. It could cause something one day.
- [FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]**
70. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – I don't really know, I wasn't part of the UPM at that time.
 71. How did the community respond to these actions? N/A
 72. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – To have harmony, to live in harmony in South Africa. If we could all live as one and not see each other as different people, because we all have flesh and blood at the end of the day, it's only the skin colour that changes us.
 73. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia? N/A
 74. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state) – Maybe educating each other about the way of living... I don't know. Maybe if a group of us would show the other that being friendly to a foreign person, there's nothing wrong with it, it's not a sin, it's not something bad, it's just being human being....it's just Ubuntu. Now as South Africans we living opposite what we call Ubuntu... we're just being those cruel, selfish people, we're not living according to Ubuntu.
 75. What did you think of this interview? – It was ok. The questions were ok but they just need you to think hard about it.
 76. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me? – No.

INTERVIEW 2 – 6 April 2017 (F)

1. May I ask your age? - 29
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes, 100 percent. I'm from Grahamstown. I was born here in Grahamstown and grew up here. Then I went to PE for four years to study then I came back because of financial issues. [what did you study?]I was studying IT, which is the perks of studying in a black community and then you don't know which way, which career you want so I just took what's in front of me.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? Or, what does it mean to be South African, do you think? - [missed this question]
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? - I think of myself as a human being.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – I volunteer at the UPM. I'm getting a stipend.
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – UPM and YWF.
 - 5.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? – The UPM works with the community, but it's not the voice of the community. It works with the community in terms of fighting the...getting the services for the community and also making sure that the community understands their rights when it comes to getting services on their rights. The YWF works with young girls in the community and also with schools. Its main aim is to empower young girls and also to teach them about their rights, and also to teach them about which ways... and also to fight rape and gender inequality.
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – Nothing drew me to UPM because I didn't know what was being done by the UPM, but because I was sitting at home I was doing nothing and unemployed and not going to school so...because I knew Ayanda, so he told me about the UPM so I thought just maybe let me go and see what is going on in the UPM, and then when I saw that they work with the community, and then most of the time even myself I didn't even know what was going on around my community and around South Africa, I was even ignorant myself. So I also wanted to be part of that change that the UPM is trying to do.
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – Hopefully...let's not say hopefully. Or let's say hopefully. We're aiming for at least to see change and development in our communities.

6. Are you married? - No
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – Yes I do have one. She's two years.
 - 7.1. **[YES]** What would you like them to do when they grow up? – I wouldn't choose for her, I would want her to take that decision for herself, but I would want her to be a strong woman.
 - 7.2. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? N/A
8. What is your first language? – it's Xhosa.
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – English. At school, and I learnt it on the way.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – Yes I think it's important because it's another way of understanding other cultures and other people, how they live, their culture.
11. Do you think you should have any benefits from being South African?
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? – I think it says it – they say there, that it belongs to everyone that are in South Africa. Because they also don't specify – which means for as long as you're *in* South Africa. [do you agree with that idea?] Yeah.
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – in Joza. Extension 5.
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Not really. Not in my neighbourhood. We just greet. It's like they're taking themselves like...it's more or less like modern suburbs area, so they are treating themselves as maybe, I don't want to say white people. But to them it's only greet.
15. What are some of the issues or problems in your neighbourhood? – Oh there are many problems. It's crime, poverty – every area is poverty – the issue of water.
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Yes. Well in my neighbourhood there's no problem.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? - No
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community?
 - 18.1. **[YES]** How can this happen? I think it will take time. [But you think it is possible?] I don't think so.... Because it's the whole community that thinks that they don't belong here. And that community is the community that still needs to be... [so the community doesn't accept?] No, but we have to try.
 - 18.2. **[NO]** Could you explain why not?
 - 18.3. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities? – As I said, I think to me, I think it will be a process. Because I saw in the workshop that we were in, we had many topics, and then they only focussed on the issue of xenophobia and you could see the anger that was there. So we have to start somewhere because they were mentioning many things there. But at the same time I think they're also like using them, because to them they are a soft target, I don't know. [So the foreigners are a soft target for the frustration of the community...?] Yes, for the services.
19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – there's a salon, and then there's a shop....yes I think there is, there are many foreigners around my area.
20. What do the foreigners do? Do they do something useful? – They just sell. But you can go to them and be like, I need a cool drink and then I will pay you back, and then they just give you. And the prices are lower.
21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? – yes.
 - 21.1. Why? What are the benefits of these shops for you, if any? [answered above]
22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – it might be true, because I don't think that to the municipality or to the government that this issue of xenophobia even affects them, I don't think so. Because I think to them the issue, that we are even fighting, it is not a problem for them. Because WE are fighting and that like blocks us fighting them, it could be. Because I also saw during the xenophobic attacks that they were not taking much interest, the municipality.
 - 22.1. **[YES]** Why do you think it's true/how do you know if it's true? – N/A
 - 22.1.1. Do you think that South African shops and businesses also bribe the municipality? –N/A
23. Do you think there are too many shops? – In my area, I don't know. There are like three.
 - 23.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops? N/A
24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – I think to me there should be a balance of the two.
25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops? – I don't know, because they [South Africans] say that it's because of them [the foreigners], but to me I don't know because they come and then they open their own shops. So to them [South Africans], they are saying that when they [foreigners] come they lower their prices which affects their businesses. So that's why I think that the way to solve this is that if the South Africans and the foreigners could come together like maybe together with the committees, and then say that, let's all have the same price.
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – They do.
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – I think before the looting, but now they like mostly....especially those that have shops. [So before the looting they would try to integrate more?] Yes.
 - 27.1. **[YES]** Can you tell me how? [in what ways would they try to integrate before?] They were walking around, walking in the community freely. But now they are not that anymore.
 - 27.2. **[NO]** Can you explain to me how they do not? N/A
 - 27.3. **[OR]** Can you explain what the difference is between those who do try and those who don't? N/A
28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – because most of the time they are coming to a community that already has a different mind-set...I don't know. Maybe they can try to fit in and not keep themselves in their shops or anything. I don't know. Socialising with people.

29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes.
30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] – First of all there were rumours of dead people being caught in different areas. And then we did approach as the UPM and the YWF the police, and then because we are part of the community we could see that the community is getting angry because they were accusing ...I think it's one of the biggest of the foreign brothers, that he was the one who was cutting them, like using it for muti. Because we stay in the community we could hear people like saying, we should kill them, because they are killing our own people, they should go back to their one home because they are not even from here, all of those things. But the police obviously didn't listen to us. So the next thing that happened, it was the taxi drivers who were striking for roads, but they had written words on their taxi, that were written: they must go, they are taking our women. And then that was a big march that went to the municipality. And then when the municipality didn't respond the way they wanted, the people came from there and then they started looting. It started very small here in town and then it went voooh! Like an electricity and then we rushed to the community, and it was like woah. There was not a single shop that wasn't hit. [do you have any idea what sparked it? Was it planned do you think?] I think so, because of what was written on the taxis. Obviously people would read...and even though the taxis were fighting for services, they know that there was these rumours that it was the foreign brothers that were killing those people.
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
- 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true? – I don't know. I don't want to say they were true, I don't want to say they were not.
- 31.2. Did you think so then? Can you tell me why/ why not? - Not really, I don't know. Even then I was confused because people were saying this and other people were saying that.
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? – Yes.
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? [missed this question]
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? – to them, they are all the same I think. If it's you and you're white...if they say that you're not from here, to them it affects everyone, and then to them it was like they must go, all of them.
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – it continued afterwards, because there was a drama that was happening....where also the community was striking for the people who were arrested during the looting, saying they must come out, they have done nothing wrong. And then after that, because the shops were closed, and then after the food that was looted was finished, I think it affected the community because you can't go to Shoprite and buy one beef [?] and then take a taxi for ten rand.
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – I was surprised, because we were like watching at UPM, like it was something that was small, you know, it was like we were watching a movie. And then when we went to the communities it was like even worse....people were like everywhere, taking food, taking food, and...I didn't know, it was like I was in another world. [was it all parts of the community?] Young and old. Even small children.
37. How did you feel after the incident? – I was even shocked then, it was I was watching a movie.
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – I think the role of the police was...they were trying to even fight us when we were trying to stop. And they will just, if there is an owner inside, take out the owner, and then let them do it. [So they didn't even try to stop?] They said they couldn't because there was a crowd of people, but I don't think so.
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – we had many meetings with the municipality, but they didn't show much interest, I don't want to lie. As I said, I think to them it doesn't affect the, because for as long as the taxis are no longer talking about the roads, people are just talking about xenophobia.
- 39.1. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not? – No.
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – that's sometimes what I try and ask myself...was it looting or was it xenophobic? Maybe because of what was written on the taxis. Because you can see criminals were starting to go in, and making it like it was xenophobia.
- 40.1. [NO] How would you describe it?
- 40.1.1. Why were only foreigners attacked? N/A
- 40.2. [YES] Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – I think there is, because sometimes when people go and buy in the shops there is things that they say to the foreign brothers. Maybe they would say, even say strong words to them, exchange words that show that you are not from here. Rude.
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? [answered above]
42. Who is a foreigner? – someone who's not from....no, let me not say that. I don't know.
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? – yes, because there are foreigners who are already part of South Africa. [how do they become South Africans?] because they are in South Africa. Even though they only need to have a paper that states that they are South African. [Can you explain?] I don't really know.
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? [Yes/No] Could you explain? – No. I don't know.
45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – Maybe because to get a better living? Because I think where they stay, there's too much war. And also in South Africa when there was apartheid, some of our people went to exile there. [Do you think this is important?] Yes.
- 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – Shops. I don't know.
- 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – I don't know... because I understand how they get here, and I understand that...they are also human.

46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – it's their choice. Every woman has a right to marry whichever man they want.
- 46.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know? – I don't know. Because it's the choice of the woman. So even if it was that.
- 46.2. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives? N/A
47. What do you think about South African men marrying foreign women? – I don't think it's a problem.
- 47.1. Is it different to foreign men marrying South African women?
- 47.2. **[YES]** Why do you think it's different? N/A
48. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – It depends if their fathers are even foreigners. If they take themselves as South Africans and they take their children as South Africans... I think it depends on both parents, how do they want, which culture maybe. I don't think we should specify which way to go.
- 48.1. **[YES]** Even if they are born in South Africa? N/A
49. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – I don't think so, because you get to learn from another culture, and they also get to learn from you.
50. What is it that makes people different? (For example) how they dress? Their religion? – the way people dress, religion, culture.
51. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – again, it depends on them, because all the time the decision starts with you, it doesn't matter what other people think. So if you want to convert then it's between you and your husband, or between you and your family.
52. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Yes. Some of them are friendly, even in the shop here.
- 52.1. How do you know them? – because we go there and by all the time, so we sometimes talk. And also the one I buy at, he's also friendly.
53. Do you go to church? – yes.
- 53.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – not really.
- 53.2. Where do foreigners go to church?
54. Are the foreigners friendly? – yes. They are less friendly after the looting.
55. Should foreign children go to school here? – they are South Africans, so they have every right.
- 55.1. Don't you think that's a good way for them to become more South African? N/A
56. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – There are still a lot of things that are just not right, like here in the local government, issues of housing, there are still a lot of people who don't have houses. Even with the RDP houses that are there, there's already corruption that is happening there, there's people who are supposed to be there who are not there. There are people from the municipality, from government, who stay there who are not supposed to stay there. The issue of water and sanitation, because the water that we drink is very dirty. And then even the government itself is like collapsing like seriously. The issue of SASSA, the issue of – there's been changes with the minister of finance, I don't know how many times he was changed. Now they've put another one who they've said has no experience. Even the police system is also not working. Like schools.
57. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? [above]
58. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? – they should be providing services to the people. Or maybe just move and let young people control the whole thing, like the people are old. We need new minds now. And Zuma must go. And also like, I don't think it's a matter of changing, first of all, I think it's a matter of changing the whole system, because I think it starts there. Even if you put [me] as president, the laws and the policies are still there that will repeat the same thing.
59. What do you think people should be doing? – I think that the community and the social movements should try and come together. Because I believe that there is no political party that can actually change South Africa. Except for people, because it is the people who know how they suffer. Because them [political parties] they're like up there, and then the community is here, and then social movements are like here on the ground. So I don't think that there's any political party that can actually change South Africa.
60. Do you think that South Africa has a problem with immigration? In what ways? – maybe. [Do you think that there's too many foreigners here?] I don't think that... because I said they are human beings. That's what I said. It's just people. So there's never too much people in a place. For the fact that you actually thought to ask that there's too much, that shouldn't be even a question. [Another UPM member interjects here: And there's too much space in South Africa to accommodate everyone. Because here in Grahamstown, they not more than 200. But here to work. But people say they're more than us, the way we go on and on. So it's not that they're crowding us. There's too much space for everybody. But because of what they're doing and what we're not doing, so what they're doing is making noise more than what we are doing. Because they are able to wake up and set up something that will benefit them, that will make their lives go on. And we can't, we just have to look down, and that will make us actually feel good about ourselves. So it's that pull-down syndrome, in that we pull each other down, and what they're doing, they work together. You'll find – Abdul owns a shop; brother of Abdul is working with Abdul to build that shop. But we can't do that, we pull each other down].
- 60.1. Is the government doing enough to solve this problem? N/A
61. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – No, they are xenophobic. But as I said, Zuma doesn't care if we fight, if people loot, it doesn't affect him. Because he'll be chilling at Nkandla, watching us fight, while he goes deep in the swimming pool. Less worries for him.
62. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – Yeah...because I can see sometimes in the news, the way some of them comment, to the xenophobic issue. [Do you think that government officials benefit from xenophobia?] I

think so, because most of the time, when I was watching the other xenophobic attacks....there was also one on service delivery [in Johannesburg], that turned into looting. That's why I had a question over when do you tell its xenophobic and when do you tell it's looting? Because they were striking for services, but when they get angry from not getting what they wanted, they start to go to the foreigners.

63. What does it mean to be African? – To be human, to have Ubuntu.

64. Is South Africa part of Africa? – yes.

64.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways? – I don't think so, because we are all Africans.

65. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes.

66. Are you proud of being African? – Oh yes. African woman.

67. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – Yes....if they consider themselves and the take themselves as Africans, then they are Africans.

67.1. And when they're born in Africa? N/A

68. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? [Other UPM member interjects: I think because of how whites came in here, we adapted their lifestyles. So I think it is possible for them to be Africans, because as whites, you guys also have to adapt. Because I've seen a marriage where you get a white guy married to a black girl – because when you marry a black girl, you have to pay lobola, and do the traditional wedding, and then you get to see a white guy wearing beads, wearing what African men wear....so I feel like they can be. You make your own choice, if you want to adapt it this way, if you want to adapt the roots of whichever culture you want to be it's your own choice]. As I said with Indians, we should treat each other as humans. That's the problem – we start to treat each other as Nigerians, what-what, white, but if we start to see each other as human beings I think that's where the problem will stop.

69. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – You never know. You just never know, because even that one, we were never ready.

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

70. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – We had foreigners like staying in our office. There were so many, even through December, they were staying in there. And we even went to the shops during the time that they were looting and I remember Ayanda would stand in front of the door, and say you're not coming in there and the community would throw stones. We went to all over. And they [foreigners] were even here at Masifunde, they were everywhere at Masifunde, and then we tried together with Masifunde to resolve the issue. But trying to also protect the foreign nationals because they didn't want them at all in the community. So we tried to provide them with accommodation, and also people gave donations in terms of food, because they had wives and children. So they gave donations in terms of nappies, clothes and everything. We went to the municipality, we had meetings with the municipality, and they were promising but they said they would take them to an army base. And that's where the UPM felt like that's just not it, because they were treating them like not people – they were saying that they would put them in an army base, because we were asking for at least accommodation. So some of them were saying at Tariq's, at Stones Hill, and we had meetings there and also providing food for them there. And then the women felt like they were not being treated like equal – they were also treated like people who were not from South Africa, and they were not recognising their rights because they were married to the foreign nationals. Even the municipality was judging them, and other people were saying, even those children are not from here, all those things. So we helped the women, and we even have a silent march going....and even there there was community around us like talking things. So how did we finally resolve the issue....through dialogues. Like going to the community. [Other UPM member interjects: We would actually plan today we're going to Joza....whereby we invite members of the community, and then through that we know there would be a professor from Rhodes that would be doing a speech on capitalism and how does it affect us as ordinary people, and then link it with African countries, link it with how it comes all down on us attacking each other in xenophobia, how we can go forward, who is actually the person to aim for, who is to attack who is not to attack, so we had speakers that would talk and then the community would also engage on how they feel, what should be done. So we went around the whole of Grahamstown doing those dialogues].

71. How did the community respond to these actions? – they responded well, because they [the foreigners] were able to relocate to the location.

72. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – Because we are all human beings. It is the same as resisting violence against [other UPM member's name], I think that's how we should take it. For as long as we take each other as this is you, this is my sister, this is my brother. So when something happens to you, I should be able to resist.

73. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia? – Yes, actually [other member] is doing a piece on xenophobia. So we're trying to also find out how people are thinking now, to follow up, so that we try and not let another looting happen.

74. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state) – We should try and educate our community, even my own community. So maybe when I see someone speaking rudely to a shop owner, try and speak to that person calmly, try and educate them, but not really showing them that you are educating them. Like, even though it's not a workshop. [Other UPM member: The more we educate people, whether it's direct or indirect educating, the more power they will have. Because people are not educated about – they do not have enough information about the xenophobia, they don't know whether it's xenophobia attack or it's looting or whatever, so they need to actually be sensitized with the information that they need, equipped more so that they can know, ok, this is how it should be done. Because sometimes let's say you get one guy in the location, let's say anyway in my street, there's this guy who we know that everybody listens to, so he comes and says you know what let's attack those guys, and then we all go because he says so. So sometimes it's something like that, we think ok we'll listen to one person and that person will lead us, so if you were able to equip more information we could say, no it

doesn't work like this, we don't have to attack them, we can sit down with them and tell them you must close the shops earlier, for example, if you want to fight against that. So something like that – with every day, you get more knowledge out there.]

75. What did you think of this interview? [was it ok?] - Yes

76. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me? N/A

INTERVIEW 3 – 11 APRIL 2017 – UPM MEMBER (M)

1. May I ask your age? – 1984, I'm 32.
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – I was born here in Grahamstown, but I've lived in a couple of cities – I've lived in PE, I studied there. I've studied in King William's Town, but I've spent the rest of my life in Grahamstown. [What did you study?] I studied lower grades in PE, and then went to King William's Town. And then I studied one year in Rhodes – I studied social sciences. And then I moved to Fort Hare and studied public administration, management and commerce. And some politics of course.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – Wow. That's quite a huge one. I think to me it's the history more than anything. What the country came through, and all of that. If an outsider were to ask me how does it feel to be South African, I would say to be able to share spaces, to be able to reconcile, to be able to live within a community with values. I mean my name is ubuntu – my name is Buntu – so when I was growing up people asked me, do you really know what the concept of Ubuntu means? So at some stage I was annoyed because I couldn't give the adequate answer, so I thought, what is this concept of ubuntu, what does it really mean? So after I've learned the concept of ubuntu and learned it in the sense of what does it mean, I've realised that Africans really do have something about them that they have to offer in the world. Yeah, that's what it means to be an African.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – Yes. I'm an African. I'm an African. Sometimes you sit and ask yourself, why were you born in Grahamstown? Why was I born black? Why – you can sometimes seek questions to that. But it is just what it is, you are just who you are and there is a purpose to that. There is a purpose for us, there's a lesson we have to learn, God is just trying to teach us something and I'm open for any lesson.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – Right now I'm self-employed, I'm just kicking up my businesses which is quite hard. Sowing is very difficult, planting is very difficult. [Is that what you're doing?] Yeah. It's very difficult.
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – The UPM. I've decided in recent years to retreat myself, or pull myself from political parties. I've enjoyed being in a movement, quite more than being in a political party.
 - 5.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? – The UPM is founded on the Marxist theory – I mean it relates to the concept of ubuntu, that's one of the reasons why I would ever be part of the UPM. That's what I've figured out, that even if I get something else to do, that maybe I don't have time for UPM, but I'll always be a member of UPM. I fully...what do you say, subscribe? There's a connection with me, with the kind of work that we do. I mean it's social advocacy, they're advocating for people that can't really shout about their social issues. I mean there's a lot that's going on, seriously, that gets untold.
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – Well Ayanda was battering me, if I may put it that way. He has always wanted me to join the UPM. But I never really had time to join the UPM because I was busy with school, I was away. But then when I got back from school I was at the location, just before the xenophobic attacks, I was paying a visit to the offices and then everything just happened and then I was part of it like that.
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – Awareness. Sometimes when sitting with the cadres we used to say that if the people that go to churches, if you can get the people that are religious, and all the other people that have their beliefs, to have that...attitude towards the government, to say that we need to at one week hold meetings, and hold the government accountable – to get them to rally, to rally them so that they can pay attention to the issues of their government, that would be lovely. That would be great.
6. Are you married? – No, yes, that's quite another issue. Because I can't say I'm single because I'm committed. It feels like I'm married!
 - 6.1. **[YES]** are you married to a South African? **[If YES go to 7]** – Yes.
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – Yes I do have children. The first one is six, the second one is three.
 - 7.1. **[YES]** What would you like them to do when they grow up? – I would give them that choice – anything that makes them happy, that makes me proud, it's fine.
 - 7.2. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – they do.
 - 7.3. **[YES] [EITHER]** Do any foreigners' children also attend school with your child/ren? How do they get along? - No not that I know of. But my niece, they do go with the foreigners. I didn't know that the foreigners' kids attended the same public schools. My attitude when I saw them was like, do we even get foreigners that go to public schools? I felt like, why didn't I know that. The attitude that I took was that it was wrong, sort of like, like why didn't you know that? Where did you think all along foreigners' kids go to school? And that attitude we've got, it seriously needs to be worked on.

[OR] How do your children get along with the other children? Are they treated differently?

8. What is your first language? - Xhosa
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – I'm forced to speak Afrikaans because when people gossip in my house they only speak Afrikaans. So if you sleep in my house then you speak Afrikaans.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? - Yes, very much. Because not only will you learn their language you'll learn their way of doing things. You'll understand them better as people. Their culture will come out with that, with the language. It cuts the ignorance between us.
11. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – No. By virtue of being a human everyone should get the same treatment.
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? – I think that statement needs to be worked at, like seriously. It just confuses me some of the time. It just needs a lot of work. [Can you explain why?] I don't know....first things first, whoever wants to be called an African can be an African...whoever feels like they are. But I can't get into your house and want to employ my rules. If I get to your house, I have to know it's your house. There are house norms, there are laws, there are things, that the people who live there should abide. So I think that's that. People should be made aware of what South Africa stands for, so that if they want to live here they will be part of the vision, the bigger vision. Because the people who'd want to come here and exploit others and say that it belongs to everyone, but you have the wrong mind-set for living here then.
 - 12.1. Do you agree?
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – I live in Hlalani.
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Yes. Particularly in my street. There's that neighbourly feeling – I can just wash my sneakers and put them there. If anyone can see them, then I hope that if they disappear then someone will tell me where. So if my things are out there then I feel safe.
15. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – I think it's crime. It's a mix – it gets confusing. But there are areas in my area where you get the shebeens. And there are menaces, if I could put it like that. There are guys who have been in jail so when they come back that's when Hlalani is getting hot. Amongst those other things, if the government can put in some stringent laws, some control over some issues, then it would be a good place to be. And the other thing is service delivery. It seems as if sometimes we've been left...we've been forgotten about. [And Hlalani is quite far from the CBD too...] Yes. The roads, you can actually tell that you're getting into another area. I mean, you have to leave the road and drive near the fences. What's the point if there's no longer a road?
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Not recently. It's people who are going out of my area.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – N/A
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – Because we are sitting with the crisis of the foreign nationals now...they are sometimes accepted, and when it suits the community they are not accepted. You don't know how that goes. Because when it pleases the community they accept them, but when it doesn't please them they are easily kicked out. [Do you think this has to do with the way the foreign nationals act, or is it just the community...?] I can't say whose fault it is, but I think we're all at fault here for being strangers to one another. I think if I can point a finger that's where...I think if we can try and fix that then we can try and see what else is a problem. We are complete strangers.
 - 18.1. [YES] How can this happen?
 - 18.2. [NO] Could you explain why not?
 - 18.3. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities?
19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – There's four shop owners. But then the others are just roaming around those shops.
20. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – yes very well. Because some of the things we don't see when they are happening, but it's in the absence of the value they bring in the community that we start to realise that maybe we are missing out something here. Because when they were kicked out the price of bread, it skyrocketed, it doubled to 20 rand. I mean we used to get bread for 10 rand, 9 rand. [So where did you get bread when the foreigners were kicked out?] Some South Africans started taking advantage of the fact that...and they doubled the money. And we used to walk as far as Joza, because there are fewer shops now. Like, I think in the apartheid days that was an issue because we used to walk, we used to walk if we wanted to get bread. So I think those guys have made it easy, I must say. If every street owns a shop you just walk a few blocks and then there's a shop.
21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? - Yes
 - 21.1. What are the benefits of these shops for you? [See above]
22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – There's a quite fiasco in that area, there's quite a huge fiasco. And the police guys, they are not treating the foreign nationals the way they should be treating them. I mean I've seen it, I've witnessed it for myself. We went into a meeting in Joza police station, just before the rumours of xenophobia came back, so the police wanted to make sure that the foreign nationals are protected in a way. So they said they would regulate the time of closing their shops. 9 o'clock . The colonel, Colonel Becker (?), said that guys I'm going to be strict with you on closing time, because beyond that is crime time, you cannot open up until whenever you like. Close at 9 o'clock, and I'm going to be fighting with you if you don't do that. So that's where the clash started. The other foreign national said, that even if we comply with that you still abuse us. He said how? And [the foreign national] said that one of you came into my shop at 5 to 9 and said I must close, and when I refused because I had five minutes remaining, he pepper-sprayed me, and then he pulled me up behind the burglar bars and he beat

me. And so we were astonished about that, and he said – you know what, you are the guy that did that, I know you. So we were all so surprised – Colonel Becker, abusing the foreign nationals! That’s just so embarrassing, the attitude these guys have. And that guy [the foreign national] was crying, he was being so emotional about it. [And it was the colonel...?] It was the colonel! You can’t believe...and then the colonel laughed and he said, ah you must be kidding, I don’t even do nights. And he said I’m sure, you’re the one who beat me at my shop. So the contradiction – he was trying to be a good guy to these guys, but he was there first... it’s confusing.

23. Someone I’ve spoken to has described that in 2012/13 there was violence between the foreign nationals over territory, because they said there are too many shops. Do you think there are too many shops? – That thing started in Vukani, and sadly there were issues of foreign nationals shooting each other in that area. And then I remember the second area it started spilling over into was Hlalani...there was a foreign national who wanted to open a shop in my area and then people said no, there’s already too many shops, we already have a shop down here, which we all go to. We don’t actually need a shop here, pack your things and leave. It was an issue because the owner said no, I want him here to open a shop, this is my house. But the community says, yes this is your house, but this is our community, so we decide what happens here in this community. It was quite a very fascinating issue to watch. The community won over the individual. But...I don’t know if that is quite true, that there are too many shops.
 - 23.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops? – N/A
 - 23.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops. Are there South African shops? – No, they all closed down. But there is a competition between foreign nationals – the competition is between them now because they’ve managed to close down all the south African shops. [How did they close down the SA shops?] It’s management. I think it’s an issue of management. Those guys are very good at managing shops, the foreigners. They are consumer-driven – whatever the consumer wants, they beat the South African guys on that.
24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – It’s anybody’s market. If they can come up with a strategy that beats the foreign nationals. I mean the foreign nationals now, they’ve become so relaxed. They are selling rotten stuff. They are buying too much. So those are the things the SA guys can use, to get into the market. Because that’s competition. It’s not something we must throw stones at, we must fight over, it’s just business.
25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops? N/A
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – Yes they do.
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – I haven’t seen them. Besides their business to the community I haven’t seen them stretching their hand to participate in the community. They are always in their shops. They do speak some Xhosa, that’s mainly because they have to communicate. In terms of culture they are so withdrawn.
28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – You know, it goes back to what I’ve said. We are so...strangers to one another. I don’t know what can break those barriers. Because they need to feel protected other than by burglar bars in their shops. I know for a fact that if any South African to open a shop, it’s not easy for tsotsis to go and raid that shop. But it’s easier with the foreign nationals. I don’t know what is...there might be issues owing to that, but if they can be integrated.
29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – I was.
30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren’t here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] – I was woken up...I don’t know, it was like, if it was a genocide it would have been bad. Because everything happened very quick. If anyone wanted to stop it, they would have had a rough time stopping it, it was so quick. By this time – what time is it now, afternoon? By this time most of the shops were looted in the location, and you can think how many shops are there? I was in my house and it was when they robbed the shop that was nearby me, I heard a very loud noise, and then there were people who told me – I thought it was a toyi toyi, for some reason, but when I got closer I heard the story that there are lootings everywhere. And I think, to my judgement, I was so embarrassed and ashamed by the behaviour of our people. The issue of food is very embarrassing. Because they were behaving like scavengers, if I could put it like that. They were all going for anything that they could snatch out of the shops. And I noticed that there were some tsotsi elements, some thieving elements. There was the loss...food was just flying, they were throwing food, because if they want food they would have kept it for themselves. Some of the food was spilled down, it was wasted. So that attitude showed me it’s not about hunger or something, it’s about...ravaging someone else’s. And there were loaves flying. And they even took the refrigerators, the TVs, everything that the foreigners owned.
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an ‘Arab man’ being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
 - 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true? – The rumours were never true, and most of us knew that – that they were far-fetched. But for some reason, for that looting they needed any reason to do that looting, any reason would have made it.
 - 31.2. Did you think so then? Can you tell me why/ why not? N/A
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or ‘Arab’ that were targeted. Is this correct? – Yes. The salons were never touched.
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – That was foolish.
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders?
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? N/A
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – Most of the people spoke against it. But I don’t know... my society, as I’ve said I was so disappointed, they have showed me another side, that I don’t know. No one stood up for anything and said this is wrong, no one came out at that time. And for that matter, I was so disappointed with some figures who I thought were going to stop that thing. Even the land owners, that’s where my questioning started...I said, these foreign nationals are

renting spaces from the landlords. So the looting happened in the landlords' yards. So I said, if I was a landlord I would say, this is my yard, first of all. If you invade this yard you're invading my property. That was a responsibility on the South African side. They didn't do anything about it. So it's very disappointing.

37. How did you feel after the incident? N/A
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – It was vague, from what I've seen. I saw them driving around and they were so, I don't know, reluctant about it. They never treated it as an emergency.
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – I never saw them. I saw them on the papers saying nonsense...but I never saw them on the ground.
 - 39.1. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not? - No
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – No.
 - 40.1. **[NO]** How would you describe it? – For a lack of better words...I'm lacking because I do have a feeling, a sense of what, but I'm just lacking the real words to put it. But it was a huge confusion, a huge misunderstanding. It was an...opening. The foreign nationals were opened up. They were opened up for that. It's like accusing someone of stealing your possession and then victimising them. It's like...to make someone, to downgrade someone. To discredit. The foreign nationals were discredited. They were placed into that position so that anyone who wanted to throw something at them could find them weaker.
 - 40.1.1. Why were only foreigners attacked? – Everything was foolish that happened there. Because you saw even old people, people who I would never think would do such things, people who go to church, who are prominent members of our society, they were looting. What is this? I couldn't understand what it was. I couldn't understand where the anger came from. I'm just baffled by what happened there. There's quite a huge number of reasons that might have led to that, and I think in every individual went into it with their own reason or feeling about it. But it certainly opened the foreign nationals up to that, it made them vulnerable. I think there are other forces at play also. We've learned that a couple of months after the xenophobia attacks. The hawkers, the street vendors, the ladies who are selling on the street – they came and approached Ayanda in an emergency, and said Ayanda, if you don't talk with these foreign nationals we're going to hit them with another wave of xenophobia. I said if that can do that, what are the chances that they might have done something in the first one? Because their strategy was they were going to go to the taxi rank, and tell the taxi rank guys that they are fed up of these guys. The taxi rank guys will then take it from there. And to our understanding the taxi rank had the most influence on the first wave, because the posters were on the taxi rank, and the taxi rank is the assembly point for the communities. In the morning and in the afternoon, that's where most of the people will assemble. If you have got an announcement you need to make – you do it there. These propagandas start in different sectors, and then they are propelled there at the taxi rank. [Why were the street hawkers angry with the foreign nationals?] Because of business. They were kicked out systematically in the business. They said that the foreign nationals are retailers – and then there are wholesalers and retailers, and they said there is no place for them. They are selling the veggies, and then they sell the retail ...so then they lose business.
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? [See above]
42. Who is a foreigner? (For example) is it someone who doesn't speak the local language? Looks different, speaks different? From somewhere else? – A foreigner is someone you don't know, for any reason.
 - 42.1. How can you tell that someone is a foreigner? N/A
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? – Yes they can. It goes back to what I just said...we've done a great deal of selling SA as a good product to the rest of the world, so why are we surprised when people come here? So it depends on what attitude they want to come here with. And then there's that notion that the Nigerians steal, coming here to sell drugs – and that's an argument for another day – but people tend to look at Nigerians as, I don't know, in a narrow way. Because there are many Nigerians in the academic fraternity, they are doing very good jobs, most of them are in the hospital as we speak, they are doctors, they are very good professionals. And we know that Africans are very educated – they are a very helpful factor in our communities. So when you go to a doctor and get healed and are given a medicine by a Nigerian, it doesn't come up in a xenophobic term. It just confuses me. But I think it's those ones that we live with in the community that are discredited, for some reason, and made soft targets.
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? **[Yes/No]** Could you explain? N/A
45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? It's just that SA is a good place to be. We're good people – well, were supposed to be good people!
 - 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – Wow. There's quite a lot. Apart from the health, from their professions they bring, the bring in their culture. We see how it is full of things we don't know, things we are interested in...they open up our eyes so that we can know that what we have doesn't only end with us. There's other people out there, they are doing things differently, and we ought to cherish whatever is out there. It's just fabulous what they bring in.
 - 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – If they can come here and accept us as a people. I've had this argument with the guy that I normally buy at. They are Muslim, so now this other lady who walks in the shops while I was there, she was wearing a Xhosa regalia...she was (?). You know what (?) is? Traditional healer, sangoma. She painted her face white, and she wore a napkin – so they were laughing at her. I said no, why are you guys laughing at her? They said, why is she dressed like that? I said that's our culture, that's what we believe, that's what we as Bantu do. And they wanted to ask me a couple of questions, and I said you know, if you could start doing that on a regular basis, start asking questions about us, and then learn to understand us – and if we can do the same – then maybe we can live with each other.

46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – That's a love thing, I don't have anything to say...but if a foreign man loves a South African woman and the South African loves them then it's their thing, it's a love thing. If it works for them it works for them. [Why do you think other people seem to have a problem with this?] I think...according to the arguments and the conversations we've had with the guys here at the UPM, it's the issue of unemployment. I would make an example... if anyone comes and takes my girlfriend, I would feel like I'm less of a man, I didn't do much better to keep my 'lady' (I don't want to say my 'woman!') my better half. So I think that voice resonates with that. Because they are in business, they are doing things, they have money, they have resources to keep the ladies. I think that's it. [So they have assets that South African's don't have?] Yes. I think that's what that argument resonates with. But they are not saying it very clearly. It's an insecurity.
47. What do you think about South African men marrying foreign women? N/A
- 47.1. Is it different to foreign men marrying South African women? N/A
- 47.2. [YES] Why do you think it's different? N/A
48. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? - No, not at all. Foreign to what? Because they are born here, so this is what they know. They are born in SA. They don't know what something else is, not unless they've been there. But they are born here, they are South Africans.
49. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – I can't say it's easy or difficult. It is a mind-set – I think it starts in a mind-set, in what you tell yourself. Because if you're going to have an attitude towards something when you haven't even known anything about it, then your mind will be shattered because you wouldn't want to learn about them. That's the attitude we had on maths at school, we said that maths is difficult so we started bunking classes.
50. What is it that makes people different? (For example) how they dress? Their religion? – Wow. How are we different from each other? Wow. Values? I think it's what we value in life that makes us really different. Because on a day to day business, we are more or less the same, we are all struggling to make the same ends meet. We all breathe the same air. It's just values, that's what we...play at.
51. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – Nope. Because of the religion, everyone is open to whatever religion they want to.
- 51.1. [NO] Why do you think some people have a problem with this? - It's the insecurity. Because I remember, some people view it as a matter of the foreign guys being powerful, so they impose their religion on the women. Some had that feeling. But you find that I've seen other guys and ladies joining the Islamic culture voluntarily...so I don't think that's a problem.
52. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Lots of them. I'm friends with them, every now and then. We see each other every now and then.
- 52.1. How do you know them? – I've actually wanted to get into business with them. I want to venture to it, to work with them closely. [What would you be doing?] Food. Food is the biggest element in our society, it's influential. When you have food it's becoming that commodity – if you have food in your hands these days you have the power to say anything. So we need to work around that. Food is a social thing, it's supposed to put people together. But it can be used as a source of power.
53. Do you go to church? N/A
- 53.1. Are there foreigners at your church? N/A
- 53.2. Where do foreigners go to church? N/A
54. Are the foreigners friendly? N/A
55. Should foreign children go to school here? N/A
- 55.1. Don't you think that's a good way for them to become more South African? N/A
56. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? - Yes. [Why do you think so?] The government has laws and regulations, we have one of the best Constitutions which gives mandate to the government, which in turn makes us entitled to certain services and treatment. So I think according to that the government is obliged. But it's us, who do not tap into those opportunities. In fact most of the people – hence I've said when I was starting this interview, if you can get people to concentrate on governmental issues, they would know what's due by them. They would start demanding what's due by them. And most of the resources are sitting there at the municipality I think, and that's when they are stolen there, because we do not pay that much attention to these issues. So if people can start...I don't know the right way to put it...but these are public assets, they're public goods, so we need to consume them. And if you don't push the government...we have to always push them to their maximum. We can't say we are happy with their 60 percent service delivery they are giving us, they have to be giving us 100 percent.
57. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? N/A
- 57.1. [If answer like 'capitalism'] What does this mean to you?
58. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? N/A
59. What do you think people should be doing? N/A
60. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – I haven't seen too many! I don't know.
61. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – No, that's not true. They are xenophobic.
62. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – They are, they are humans as well. They are not immune to this. And the police, a lot of them are xenophobic.
63. What does it mean to be African? – Wow. Wow. To be African? It just means...to open our shores for the world. I mean, I'm Xhosa. There are parables in my Xhosa, and there are sayings, there are things we are taught, values, or morals, which I think glues us to the African sentiment. To be an African, in the way I have been raised, is to open whatever you have, your house,

your resources, to strangers so that the travellers, if people are travelling and they need water, they must know that there is a house there, they can always run there...that's what it means to me to be an African. But it's hard these days. You would open up for a stranger and they'd end up taking your house.

64. Is South Africa part of Africa? – Yes. [Why do people sometimes think of the two as different?] I think it's the role that we've taken in Africa, where we're the youngest state but we've managed to lead the continent in many things. I've just known that SA is the gateway in Africa, so most of the stuff that comes. I think it's that attitude that makes us think we're better than the rest of the continent, because they're backward and we have all of this stuff, and they first see it with us.
65. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes, very much.
66. Are you proud of being African? – Very proud, I wouldn't change it for anything.
67. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – Those ones that are born here...but it's a matter of what people say, it's a matter of how they feel, if they feel African. Then I don't know. And I think Indian is just what, the name of a country? It doesn't say anything about a person...
68. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – Yes. There are more white Africans than African Africans. There are more white people who cherish the idea of being an African than most Africans. Some Africans are lost. Though that's another debate for another day, but they don't actually find the connection with them in Africa. And most people find that most white people, they are aware of African rhythm and stuff. It's scary.
69. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – Yes, certainly. It has the potential. And with the fact that there are no preparations set up to avoid such constantly, so there's nothing that's stopping it from erupting again.

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

70. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – The UPM, it has played a huge role, but within the constraint of what we can do as a movement, as a unit. And I wouldn't want to count the physical and the tangible, and the material that we give to it, but to the spiritual and to the upliftment of it. That's what was important. To reinstate or reunite the people with the community, that was really a challenge. Because after that they were driven to the hotel, to exile – so the issue of them coming back and being incorporated to the community was the biggest issue. The incorporation is still going on I think, it's a never ending process. [Are there still tensions with the foreigners?] Yes, their movement is measured. Everything they do it's measured, it's spoken about in the taxi rank – “have you seen the foreign nationals, they're opening taverns now! They're doing this now!” – so the talk is still out there.
71. How did the community respond to these actions? N/A
72. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – It reduces us. It reduces us to a state near to that of an animal, without reasoning. Because there's a question mark on top of our communities now. Are these people even capable of reasoning? Of getting into a meeting and sorting their issues out, in a humanely fashion? It raises a lot of questions. About the violent nature...I don't want to delve into that. But it raises serious questions about our communities. I mean we can do things better, for sure. We can do things better.
73. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia? N/A
74. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state) – Ayanda said something about opening a foreign nationals' soccer team. That's a good idea. We need to have lots of those. We need to have, I don't know... they need to start getting into our communities, being part of our communities, not just shop owners, or some peoples that sell us stuff for cheap. That's just business side of them. After that we need to know them, we need to follow them as people, as community members. We need to know them in that fashion.
75. What did you think of this interview? – it was ok.
76. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me? -

INTERVIEW 4 – APRIL 12, 2017 (F)

1. May I ask your age? - 50
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes I am. I was born here in Grahamstown.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – Makes me? It's ok, because it's how it's supposed to be. My parents were from here, so...
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – Anything else? I'm not sure. Because I've never been there.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – No I am not. [Did you work before?] I had a crèche for disabled children. This is my child. Then I was struggling to get a place for him, because of I was trained to be an edu-carer, then I used that to take kids like him. So it survived for 7 to 8 years. Then because of funds it just quit.
5. Are you a member of a political party? – No. I was but not now. [Which one?] COPE. [Can I ask why not now?] Yes, at the time I joined COPE it was because of if you want something good then other people will say, no you have to have membership of the ANC and stuff. But as I saw that the way that they were doing...because things were not good, ne? And if you want something...everything was for them. So I wanted to break that, not to join them, but to be against that. So that we can correct what they were doing. Because everyone was not seeing what they were doing. So If you want to eat you can join them, everything will be fine for you, if you want a job, if you want everything, they will do it for you. Only if you have a

membership. So I saw that – no, I mustn't. But luckily for me COPE was born and then I joined the COPE hoping that is going to work, you know. But things didn't go well. [Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)?] Yes I am a member of the UPM, because the UPM is a movement. It's not a political party...it's just for the individuals. Like it's a movement. It's not like the political parties – everyone is welcome to be in the movement. So that is why I joined.

- 5.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? N/A
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? N/A
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – I think what I'm hopeful for... but the problem is... {TRANSLATOR: So she's saying that when someone comes in to join the UPM, they will come in as a normal person even though that person is from a certain political party. And then when they're inside their true colours to show} The party politics make problem for the movement.
6. Are you married? – No.
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – I do, I have five of them. Lots.
 - 7.1. **[YES]** What would you like them to do when they grow up? – N/A
 - 7.2. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – Two of them. They were doing it at PE and they finish it up here.
 - 7.3. **[YES] [EITHER]** Do any foreigners' children also attend school with your child/ren? How do they get along? – No. We didn't have a relationship with them. The reason, some of the foreigners are not staying here, they are just having their businesses here, they are staying in town. That is why they are far from us. So they are not using our schools they are using there – the multiracial schools.
8. What is your first language? – Xhosa.
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – English, Afrikaans. And Zulu, and Sotho.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – Yes, I do. If for instance I go to Lesotho, then I don't know Sotho, most of the people there are used to Sotho, then I will feel unaccepted or unwelcomed. So it's easy when we talk the language, we interact easily.
11. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – No, not at all. But the policies are the ones that are separating the people that are here. The policies, the laws. Because some of the policies, they won't allow them. There are things that allow you to be the same as us, but the policies and government stuffs – also they do take part in this. [So you are saying the government policies don't allow the foreigners...] to be the same as us. For an example, it's a permit – they were supposed to stay here for some time and then after that to move out. So there are some things that {TRANSLATOR: that are separating them from us.}
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? – I think it's for those olden times, because there were less foreigners in the apartheid time. There were less, until we have this so-called freedom, and then more of them are coming. That [the freedom charter] speaks just only to us. I don't know whether they knew that there were people who were going to come and stay here when they wrote this.
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – In Vukani.
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – You know here, they know that I'm anti-ANC. Everyone here, they know. Now if there's something in these things where we have to have jobs or projects, where we have to consult the councillor, so they don't even come in this house. Even there is a job, they don't even come here, and they know that there is no one working here. So there is that element, if you are not an ANC member, there is nothing you can get. [And everyone around here is ANC?] Even if they don't like it, they will just pretend you know, because they want to benefit from it. I'm just out. If I can get it I must get it, but I won't sell my happiness for something you know. Because the other time, I won the award in the community service. I was the overall winner. In those awards there were different categories. So I won in community service, as an overall winner. So by that time they didn't know, I don't know whether they were just selling me, because after that they asked me if I can join the ANC. I said why? Because there are people there, you know, so why do I have to join them. I said no, I don't like it, the way they were doing. I don't have a problem with the ANC, but it's the people that are. And you shouldn't have to be a member to benefit.
15. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – As you can see, it's not progressing. I stayed here from 2004. From 2004, even if we are complaining here, they will say as if everything is normal. There was a time that there was no water for about 3 months. And when we just stood up for that and complain and try to bring people on board, the people here were against that. As if we had that water, whereas we don't have. People don't want to expose themselves, they don't want to be seen or heard talking about the things that are not...about our problems. There are a lot of problems here. You can see the houses here. You can see that house? We have a same problem. Cheap stuff, because the material was cheap. But we don't complain, because where can we complain that to? *That* is the problem. And we have kids here, we don't have a crèche – we do have now, but we didn't have even the crèche here. We don't have schools here. Can you see how far you can walk from here down to the township there? We have 5, 6, 7 year old kids that have to go. There is a slot down there, when it's raining – maybe it's raining in the day, but the time they are going to school it's not raining – but the time they are going to struggle to come back, because the slots were full and stuff. If we can just have, even a primary for those little ones just to be around. So there's a lot. Even the streets, they are dusty streets – most of the people here have TB, from the dust. It's very dusty here.
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Yes we do have, but they are not staying, just for the business. And most of the girls here are married to those. Some of them. [They don't live in the shops?] Their houses are in town. Those that are sleeping here are just to watch the shop.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – There's no tension here. Except that, people are hungry. The time there was this xenophobic attacks, people just were doing this looting of stuff, because of, I can't remember even in a day a foreigner fighting with a community member. Even Mohammed, he moved now, but he was having a shop here, and he was one who we had a really close relationship with him. Because every time there was something, he will just come to us

- and I was a committee member then, so he would just come to us and complain about whatever. So we would just call all of them and sort whatever problem he had. Even if some of them are just people who just came here and do not understand even the language and stuff, and maybe some of them are rude in the shops, then we had those complaints and we just sort things. So we just listened to each other. [Were you on a ward committee?] No, it was the CPF. Community Policing Forum.
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – You know... Some of them they just honour their cultures, because they have these things that they have to do, because in my beliefs, even if we had a meeting, just a community meeting, there are members that are around here, they were supposed to attend those meetings. They were supposed to know what we were doing here. [So you're saying that the foreigners are supposed to attend the meetings...?] No, in the time that I was a committee member they do, they did that.
 19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? [Answered above]
 20. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – They own shops. It is [something useful]. Because I'm not working, so I do get at the end of the month, so sometimes sugars and stuff are finished before that, so I go there and ask them to give me so that I can pay later. So they do that. So they are useful.
 21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? – Yes.
 - 21.1. What are the benefits of these shops for you? [Above]
 22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – Yes, but in our area I don't think that applies. Because what are they going to bribe for? Because it's seldom. Even these shops that were attacked – it's a hunger, I can say that. When these kids are hungry and they don't have anything to do, they just go and break in and steal. There were some – we call it my friend, the foreigners, we call it my friend – so there were some people who were having a shop down there, and then they just asked other from extension nine to come and open [a shop]. Since they were just staying here, they were so scared of break-ins and stuff. We were watching them – at night we did walks around to make sure that there's peace. So they were asking some of their friends to come and open a shop in my street. So we didn't know about that. The owner of the house just sold the house to my friend, and then they agreed on opening a shop. So we saw they people that were digging there so we just went there and asked what is happening, and then the people that were digging they told us they were going to build a shop there. So we asked, who is it from? And then they directed us to that man. So he said to us, he bought this space and stuff. But we said no – we had agreed on our meeting that the shops we have here are enough. We don't want more shops, because in these shops we have kids. Our kids, they just stay in these shops and we don't know what they are doing. And some of them, they were just keeping those schoolkids in those shops, they were working there. And some of them were staying there, not going to school and stuff, so we just asked them not to open the shop here, because we have enough shops, and we don't want to even fight about that. So we agreed on that.
 23. Do you think there are too many shops? – Yes, a lot. Because even them, some of them are not nice. That is the problem. Because you will send a child to the shop to go and buy something, change might be short. Or you might be given a stale bread. And if you are complaining they will just pick up a fight on that. So that is why those that are here now, we do understand them. So we keep it that way.
 - 23.1. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – Big. A big one. Because if the foreigner comes here and opens a shop here, then obviously the one next door is going to close. Because of prices. They can sell things cheaper. The foreigners are buying in bulk. So they are buying with a profit – they can buy it cheaper than the price you are supposed to buy it. On our side I don't know – you can see the foreigners have groups and companies which we don't have. If they are buying you see the truck is going to deliver in different shops – but us, we just go and buy stuff and deliver in your shop only. We don't have that network. So I think it's a problem that we have. Because if I'm buying one box, I will have to pay that lot of money. But those people are buying maybe a hundred box, in discount. So they will sell it cheaper, while I have to stick on that price. That's where the problem is.
 24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – It depends. Because if I'm lazy then – must other people suffer because I'm lazy? If only we can work together, and even them, because there's this thing of even if they are having a shop here, they don't bank here. They send money to their countries. I know, they just send it, their money.
 25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops? [Answered above]
 26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – They do.
 27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – if they can attend whatever we do have here, meetings, and be part of our things – I don't talk about the rituals and stuff – but if we have a meeting here, or we have some games, then they come and be part of it. So if we do have that interaction then it will be better. Only if they have this thing on their mind that they are staying here. Then maybe we can. Because if maybe I'm in PE for a certain time, but I know that I will come back, so I won't be fully stayed – so there's that thing that I don't belong there. So whatever I do in PE, they won't trust me because I don't belong there. But if we know that these people are coming here to stay here, because they have these wars on their countries, so they are just coming to stay with us. Then we can build that trust.
 28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? [Answered above]
 29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes I was here.
 30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] – I was so scared. I had people, they started down there. So most of them they just run to that. So whilst the people there were on that side, so we heard that they were breaking the shops and looting, so obviously the ones that were just left in the area started to pick up their zincs and stuff. But there was the one that was on this street, he was disabled, he was deaf. [A foreigner?] Yes, a foreigner. So we have a shame because we know him, because he was staying here. Then I just run to the shop but, unfortunately there were people already there. But what we stopped it was not for them to fight with them. If they want to loot they can go through and loot, but not to touch the people that were there. Because you can't stop the crowd. Because they were already in crowds. So we just stopped them not to touch them, not to do anything. There was the

one, Mohammed, who was very close to the community. The people who were in town then, they called him and tell him that he must take all of his stuff that was in the shop – it was the people from the community who phoned him. That he must take the stuff out, because the people are coming. As a result, Mohammed managed to have a bakkie full, and get it away.

31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an ‘Arab man’ being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
 - 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true? – I can’t say yes, because I have to see it happening. But unfortunately it was happening maybe during the night or somewhere far, I don’t know. But all I knew, we saw the police that were gathered there by the cemetery. So we just ran there – we really saw it. It was the leg. It was only a leg and a head. There was no body, there was nothing there. So we just heard rumours that people saw this white combi that was driven by Shogati (?). At extension 9 they were dropping somebody – I’m not going to say whether it’s true or not true, that was something I heard from other people. But the only thing I saw, it’s a leg, with a head only. But we don’t know who was doing that. But other people said that people from the community were hired by this Shogati. [Who is Shogati?] It’s – do you know who owns the Frontier Hotel? It’s his brother, who owns the hotel. So if you get the name of the owner of the hotel, then you get the name of the brother. But Shogati is a well-known name around Grahamstown, so they use that name. He’s a foreigner, an Arab. He’s one of the richest ones. [Is he the person they think was involved in the murders?] Yes. And it was that person with his group. But I don’t know. Because people were seeing that transport with him, that’s why people were saying that.
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or ‘Arab’ that were targeted. Is this correct? - Yes
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – I think there were those rumours, and the other thing that people kept on saying was that, these foreigners are coming here to take their girlfriends, shops, you know?
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? N/A
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – It was sad you know? Like you can’t just chase people away, but at the same time – even them, they were coming from maybe Joburg to stay here, within a while they will move here from the other place you know? I think those things are counting, because they don’t just come from the country and then come to pick up a place and stay on that place, so they can have that relationship with the people and stay, and we can know that these people are desperate and they have nowhere to stay. But now they are moving from one place to another around here, so you never know, what are they really for? But it was tense. But then we created a committee here, with them, so that if on their side there is something, they can come and share it, and even if on our side there is something, you just but it didn’t work. [TRANSLATOR: So remember she told you about Mohammed? So Mohammed had this relationship with us, with the people from his area. So, he and the residents here, there was a meeting called with the police that are working in this sector. So in this meeting we discussed how we could prevent the attacks, as we are hurting Mohammed, and Mohammed was like family to the Vukani people. So a committee was selected, whereby within the committee they would be able, if there was a misunderstanding with the people or matters affecting the foreigners – so the Vukani residents would be able to resolve them without any violence. So there was that committee that was set up. But it didn’t go that far, but at least they tried something].
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – it was a shock. Because when something like that is happening, I was so scared. So as a result I was just standing here, after we came from the shop that was on that side, I just came straight to the house, I was so scared. And another thing, even the community, if they see you are blocking them on something, if they want to do that and then you always block them from that, then they will suspect that you are impimpi you know? So I was just scared of those things. But the only message that we were sending is that they must not touch them or do anything to the people. If they want to take things they can do it, but not the people.
37. How did you feel after the incident? [Above]
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? - If there was police here they didn’t do much I think. Because they started on the other area – why didn’t they send some police on these areas where it was not [happening] at that time. Because the police are just like any other body. Because they were here and people were looting in front of them. And those people, all of the were not secured really.
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – Wasn’t involved. I haven’t seen anyone from municipality, even after....they were supposed to call meetings, for the residents, just to make aware. But there were no awarenesses, there was nothing. Municipality is nothing. We don’t have a municipality.
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – As I was saying, they were doing it because some of them were just trying to get things from it. It was not xenophobic really. Because if it was a xenophobic, it was supposed to be addressed in a right way. I think this started in the town whereby, there was a march before, whereby those women were picketing in front of the municipality. The municipality was supposed to have I don’t know how – but in our areas we do have ward committees. It’s jealousy. Because of the shops, and ‘our girlfriends’, and we are hungry – these people are working. Because these people are coming from rural areas without money, or without what they [the foreigners] are having here. But they make a way to have these things that are having. And there are rumours also that these people are bringing drugs – so maybe all of these things. But I don’t know how the drugs can get in here when we have police.
41. I’ve heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? – N/A
42. Who is a foreigner? (For example) is it someone who doesn’t speak the local language? Looks different, speaks different? From somewhere else? – If I have to go to England, I am a foreigner.
 - 42.1. How can you tell that someone is a foreigner? – We just judge them. We are confusing people and we are confused. We are really confused. The only person who can sort this thing is the government. I tell you that. If they can come

to the people everyone can be involved. But I don't know how can they do that, but they can try. We are pointing fingers to each other. [TRANSLATOR: So she's saying that instead of the government making decisions for us up there, they should actually interact with us on matters because those matters they affect us the most and not them. So interact with us first on how to deal with those matters and then make a decision. Because now we end up pointing fingers at each other because of the principles, of the laws that are set by the government, we end up pointing each other.]

43. Can foreigners become South Africans?
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? [Yes/No] Could you explain?
45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – There are those wars. When there is a war everyone is suffering. So maybe they are escaping from that. But some of them when they see on TV that South Africa is free on anything, anyone can just want to come here. [Do you think that's a problem?] It's too free, South Africa, anyone would want to come. Especially criminals. Like in Zimbabwe, if you are a criminal there, Mugabe will just kill you. So they just run from there, and come here. Nothing is going to be asked here, no one is going to ask you whatever you do, and then you want to do it.
 - 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – They bring jobs to others. And what else is it? I think there are some people who are getting jobs from them. And like I said before, most of us are paying grant – most of the people of SA are paying grant. So during the month, the people don't have money, so they say to my friend [the shopkeepers] they will make a grocery, and then pay it back at the end of the month. That is important.
 - 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – Negatives? It's difficult, because I never experienced. Maybe, about those kids that I told you before – at the age of 13 years, a child will stay there, working there at the shop, not even going to school, and even not consulting the parents. They will keep those kids there at those shops.
46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – It is a problem. They have their culture and we have our culture. I think at the end – because these people will go back and some of them they have wives or families there, so when they go back, what are you going to do with the kids left here? Because you will have a fatherless child, of which you don't even know who the father is, because some of these people are just coming here without identity. Using somebody's identity. So then you are staying with this person who you don't even know. So what is it going to do to your child at the later stage? Because that's when we have those criminals, because this child will be desperate, growing up without a father, growing up without even knowing his background.
 - 46.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know? - I think some of them, they want to marry because they want citizenship. Because if I remember, this Shogati – they had a shop, and I was helping the other lady who had a salon next to this man's shop. So they had a shop in Peddie. He had a brother, who was there at the shop – the brother came after they were here, so they opened a new shop in Peddie – so that brother was new here. So he had to marry a lady here so that he can stay, you know. I remember that. Because they paid the lady for grocery R500 a month, because they know that we are hungry, and we will take that.
47. What do you think about South African men marrying foreign women? – Is there some? I haven't even heard of it. Because it will be the same thing, but the child will be left with the father here. But it will be better, because the child will inherit the father's everything.
48. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – That's a problem. Because the mother is from here, and the father is from there. [And are the children treated like foreigners? Should the children be treated like foreigners?] No, I don't think so. But it's going to confuse them, because the child will not know who the real person he is or she is, at the later stage. Because on our culture, if you don't do the rituals the right way, then you get problems. You get sick or whatever. So imagine those children – they are going to marry. So what about their kids? They do have problems. It's not only that we don't want them here. If they can just... behave right, I don't see any problems.
49. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – If we can know where does the culture come from. The problem is there. We don't know why we have these separate cultures, different cultures I mean. If we knew, then we won't have a problem. But the problem is, I don't know why they have that culture. [So do you think there needs to be more communication about culture?] We need to dig. We need to. Because there's a reason for that culture to be like that. If there was no reason, then it should be the same as any other. But it's a certain kind of culture that is done for a reason.
50. What is it that makes people different? (For example) how they dress? Their religion? [N/A]
51. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – they are crazy. Because you don't know why those people are doing that. In our culture, we are wearing our stuff, because we know why we have to do that. They are doing those things but they don't know why they are doing those things, you know? Because that was not meant for us, it was meant for the Muslim wives or whatever. It's *their* culture.
52. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Yes, I know them. From the shops.
53. Do you go to church? [TIME]
 - 53.1. Are there foreigners at your church?
 - 53.2. Where do foreigners go to church?
54. Are the foreigners friendly?
55. Should foreign children go to school here?
 - 55.1. Don't you think that's a good way for them to become more South African?
56. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – People are angry. If the government was doing enough, they wouldn't have to be angry. Firstly, the prisoner, is more expensive... [TRANSLATOR: She is comparing the life of the normal person in the location, with the person in prison. Where the person in the location, there's a possibility that tomorrow they won't eat, or have electricity, or

anything to live on. But in prison, a prisoner, whatever they have done, will have a healthy meal each and every day, free education in prison, hot water to bath with, no worries about where my next meal will come from...] So why should I be happy? The government is doing things for other people, but not normal people. Because he is not catering for us.

57. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa?

57.1. [If answer like 'capitalism'] What does this mean to you?

58. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? -

59. What do you think people should be doing?

60. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – I think before they came here, there was something – I don't know if there was a meeting or what. They didn't just come here. There was something which I don't know what, or where. Then they were supposed to look for these things before, they were supposed to come to the people, to come to us and live with us. They should have come and sorted things, and we should have known how many of them are going to come and use our space. Because we don't have space for ourselves. I have grown up kids who need to have their own spaces, but there are people from outside places now, using the space that we are supposed to use – maybe my kids could use. If they came up here in the right way, at least there would be less issues.

61. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – Like religiously? We are all xenophobics. All. Because this is not our world. So I don't know in which sense he means? And Zuma sometimes he just speaks, he doesn't understand. Because everyone is a xenophobic. Because in the bible, if I can quote, it says this is not our world. It's up in heaven, everyone. Because we are going to die here. So we cannot just sit here and fight about these things, we are going to leave these things here. You don't know if you are going to get tomorrow, whilst we are busy fighting today. [Do you think it's important to try and bring foreigners more in the community?] Not more. Not more. It's what I was saying – because even us, we don't have spaces for ourselves, so how are we going to get spaces for other people to come here? We don't own the land, it's only Zuma who knows how much land we have here. [So what do you think the government should be doing?] The government should consult the people. The government should come down. Because the real government is us, it's us. It was supposed to come from the people. Because he is just the representative. But it's not working like that, it's a vice-versa now. He's taking decisions for us. We are supposed to discuss whatever and give it to him. Because in my belief, I can't say they must go [the foreigners] because I don't know why they are here. But if the government can sort...so when they are coming, I ask why do they have to come here? And how many have to come here? That was supposed to be done before, but they are already here now. And now they are just bringing families. In the wrong way, because they didn't come...[TRANSLATOR: So she's saying, they don't come in legally, they just come illegally. So the government should try balance everything. Whereas they won't have to come illegally] And to answer us the reasons why they have to be here. And for how long. But it must not be only the government who knows. People must be involved. The government is just working alone with the ministers. And they will just do it – because we don't even know if the government is getting money from those people who are coming here. We don't even know that. [And do you think if there were less foreigners in SA, things would be better for South Africans?] Yes, I do think so. Things were better before the foreigners. Before the foreigners it was the time of the apartheid struggle. So things were better....yes, we were suffering, there were struggles everyday, but it was not like now. Now, we didn't expect that what is happening now. Because those people that are doing these things to us were our brothers, that we were fighting together for the freedom, but now they are just having freedom for themselves. [The government?] Yes. They don't care. They don't care about the people.[RAN OUT OF TIME TO COMPLETE QUESTIONS].

INTERVIEW 5 – 8 May 2017 (F)

1. May I ask your age? - 26

2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes. From Grahamstown.

2.1. [YES] What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – Well, to be a South African to me is being – it's not just being born here in South Africa. You can come here in SA, if you live here you are South African. The fact that you are not born in SA doesn't not make you a South African. I believe that everyone who lives in South Africa is a South African.

3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – I do identify myself as a black woman. Yes I'm a South African, but I define myself as a black woman.

4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – No, I'm unemployed. I'm currently a volunteer here at Masifunde. But I'm applying – I'm still waiting for feedback whether I'm taken or not for the jobs. [Did you work before?] No, I have never worked before.

5. Are you a member of a political party? – Yes, the EFF. I joined it last year because I wanted to assist there, they were busy with the voting thing. There was the voting of the councillors, so I was assisting there at the office.

6. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – Yes.

6.1. [YES] What does the organisation do? – Well, it does many things. It informs people. I went there knowing nothing about politics and all that, but because I joined there I got more information about the world generally and what happens here in Grahamstown politically. And it also empowers us women to be leaders, and to know ourselves. Like we have this forum that we formed, the Young Women's Forum, where we empower each other to stop depending on men in order for us to wear clothes and all that. We must wake up and work for ourselves.

6.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? [Above]

6.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – What I hope it will achieve is that it empowers many women, and in our societies the women can change, and stop relying on men and wake up and go and find a job.

7. Are you married? – No.

8. Do you have children? How old are they? – One. He's two.

- 8.1. **[YES]** What would you like them to do when they grow up? – Like workwise or what? I'd like him to be a doctor, and play rugby! That means I have to work hard and have money.
- 8.2. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – He does.
- 8.3. **[YES] [EITHER]** Do any foreigners' children also attend school with your child/ren? How do they get along? – No.
9. What is your first language? - Xhosa
10. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – English and Sotho mainly.
11. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – I think it's very important. Every language is important. Worldwide I don't know why is it that you have to only know English to be heard by someone else.
12. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? - No, I don't think so. Just because I'm a South African doesn't mean I have to get a special benefits. Someone else can come outside with ideas. The problem is with us South Africans is we are very lazy, and the people from outside they are fresh minded and they love each other and all that.
13. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? – Well, that is true. It's true because exactly as what I've just said, because people from outside, I don't know whether I could say they have more ideas than us. We here in South Africa – well not all of us, but some of us – we are very lazy. The people from outside, even at school from primary, are given a skill maybe to be a hair stylist. Here in SA you don't get that. [What do you mean by lazy?] We don't work hard I think because maybe the way the system is here in South Africa. Because if you take a child from Zimbabwe and a child from here in SA, they are both in Grade 12, the one in Zimbabwe will pass maybe all his subjects with A's, and the one here in Sa will pass his subjects maybe with 30% - the reason being is that there in Zimbabwe the education system is, when you go to school basically you know what you want, and the law is very strict there compared to here in SA.
14. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – In Joza, Extension 5.
15. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Where I stay, it's middle class. We have the nurses, the teachers, the policemen and all of that. So your neighbour doesn't care about you – they are just living for themselves. They don't care about one another there.
16. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – You see my parents died, so I'm left now with my three sisters. My big sister is working at social development, she stays there and looks after the children that are orphans at the shelter. So I stay with my other sister. Sometimes I'm not at home because I stay at my child's father's house, so now my sister stays alone at the house. You'll find out that the robbers will come inside and steal some things at my place. The neighbours won't even look, it's not even safe. You can't even trust your neighbours. It's like that.
17. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – No, not really.
18. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – Well, to some people there are, but to some people there are not tensions.
19. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – Well the problem is that people are not informed. Because many people are not cool with these 'my friends' coming from other places. Especially guys – they are saying that they are taking their women. They feel like the my friends are buying us women, and they've got the money to buy us women.
20. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – Not so many.
21. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? - Shops, mostly.
22. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? – yes.
 - 22.1. What are the benefits of these shops for you? – Well, the benefits are that sometimes you go there and you are short with two rand, my friend will give you. But if you go to a black shop, the person will tell you to go and look for the two rand, I am not going to give you. [Are there SA shops in your neighbourhood too?] Yes there are, but they are not functioning well. The prices are very high. And the other thing with my friend, you can go there and say that you want to borrow a ten rand for a taxi, he'll give you, especially if he knows where you stay.
23. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – Well I've heard of such a thing. Because last year there was this thing where the foreigners were fighting, so we went to the police station. They were having the problem with someone who was selling many shops in the same area. So the police were taking charge – they wanted to do an action but there was no action taken. The story ended up not being solved. So maybe it's true that they buy these people.
24. Do you think there are too many shops? – It is true, there are too many shops.
 - 24.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops? – Well, for me I see no problem with that. Because having a shop here you are helping the people that are around you and then in that corner you are helping the people that are close to you. But it can cause conflict too. That's the only problem.
 - 24.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – well, the SA shops are actually not functioning. People don't even go and buy there, so they must just rather close the shops, they are no longer functioning. [Did they used to function?] They used to. But now they are no longer functioning. The problem with us South Africans is we are not nice and we don't know our customers, we are very rude. And 'oh my friend' are very nice. If you are short of money they will say that you can bring it back later when you have it.
25. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – Not necessarily by South Africans, by anyone who has money to open a shop, whether you come from Europe or what.
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – No, I've never seen that...
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – Yes, they try to, but some people don't want to accept that. They do try, but some of us black people are very difficult, so they rather are just to themselves.

28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – Well the UPM actually was thinking of making maybe monthly soccer competition with the foreigners and the black brothers, so that we can form a friendship, and maybe also inviting them into meetings and all that.
29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes I was here.
30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] – Well, I remember, I was actually at home, and I heard people screaming on the streets and holding drinks and all that. I asked from a friend what was going on, then she told me that people were looting the shops. I don't know where the problem started, it started from one shop – the looting came here in town too – the people were saying that they don't want the foreigners. So the foreigners now they were being chased away, they were staying at Stone Crescent. So it was very difficult, the UPM was helping the wives and the husbands of my friends, because the shops they were looted, there was not even a single food left for them to eat. They had to start afresh even now. So it was a very very sad thing.
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
 - 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true? - Well, with no evidence I can't say they were true. Because we can't say that it's the foreigners that are killing those girls. Because our black brothers, they are also robbers, they can also rape people and cut them up, so we can't blame the foreigners.
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? – Yes. Also the Zimbabweans – because the salons were also closing, people wanted to take the fibres and all that. It was very bad, because the salons ended up closing too.
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? - Well, it was because of the rumours, and the other thing, the people are hungry. They just wanted an excuse to go and steal the food. The black people are very hungry. They just wanted something to go and steal the food, because some were just taking not because they knew what was happening, hey just went, they saw people taking things, they went there knowing nothing about the my friend that was killing the people.
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? {above}
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – it was very tense. All the foreigners took time to come back to the locations. They had to make sure that there was no...that people were now fine with this thing. It was very difficult.
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – Well, they were not surprised, because before the looting people were talking on texts about this foreigner who was killing people and cutting their parts. So they were not surprised, they were waiting for it. They were planning, those people who were planning.
37. How did you feel after the incident? – Well, I felt sorry for the foreigners. Because my fear was that what if one day I go, or maybe my son gets a scholarship, to go and study maybe outside South Africa – he will also be a foreigner. I don't know why people don't understand that being a foreigner doesn't mean you are from Zimbabwe – I can also be a foreigner if I go to Europe. And this whole process of xenophobia and xenophobic attacks reminds me of apartheid, when I was reading about it. It's like me being black and being attacked by a white person – but we black people are actually attacking another black person, not knowing that it's not right, but we feel like it's wrong when a white person attacks me, a black person. I don't know why people don't understand that.
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – Well, some of the police were helping, and some of them were just also stealing things for their families. They were not helping as such. They didn't do much.
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – Oh that municipality is very rotten. They didn't even help, we didn't even see them anywhere. The only thing they did, they took some of the foreigners there to the army base and gave them blankets and just threw them there, and just gave them bread to eat. That's all they did, they don't care what happens after. Because they could have come made meetings in the halls and informed people to stop this thing. But they didn't do that.
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – Well, maybe it was xenophobia. Because I can't say that – because xenophobia to me is like a phobia, a fear. So I don't think that us black people have fear of my friend, we are just jealous of them, we have no phobia against. But there is a hatred.
 - 40.1. **[YES]** Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – Yes there is. I see xenophobia sometimes. Maybe someone goes to my friend's shop and buys something, and then he responds with verbal words – like 'kwerekwere, give me my stuff, you are wasting time!' and all those things. Like attacking my friend for no reason. Even if it's not physically, people sometimes can use foul language to pull down my friend.
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? – it was very difficult. Even for the electricity, we had to go to town. Imagine that electricity is 10 rand, now you have to take a taxi for 20 rand – no it was 8 rand then, so you have to have 16 rand – to go to town, to buy electricity for 10 rand. So we were suffering actually.
42. Who is a foreigner? (For example) is it someone who doesn't speak the local language? Looks different, speaks different? From somewhere else? – Everyone is a foreigner actually. If I go to Europe, I'm a foreigner there. If someone else comes from outside here in South Africa, he is a foreigner. A foreigner actually is someone who lives in a country that he was not born into.
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? – Yes!
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? **[Yes/No]** Could you explain? – Well I do because I'm unemployed. Sometimes I apply but I am not taken, I feel like some people from outside are working but you are not working and you are from here. [How does that make you feel?] It goes back to what I was talking about – sometimes the people from outside maybe comes here and maybe we're both applying for something, and then the person has more skills than me, so the job will be the person's. [Do you think you deserve the job because you are from here?] Well I do deserve it, because I am from here, but sometimes we are kicked

by the people from outside because they have more experiences and more skills than us. [Can that create conflict?] Well... I am not talking about foreigners only, I'm also talking about the people from Umtata that comes here in Grahamstown, you see?

45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? - Because SA is a rich country.
- 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – The positive things? Well, when you have a problem your phone you go there and they fix it cheaper...what else? There are many things – they do your hair, they are very good at doing hair. And they marry some of our single sisters!
- 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – The negative things? Well the drugs – I think they're also involved in the selling of drugs.
46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – Well, I don't think it's a problem. If a women feels that she wants to marry a foreigner, she must go for it. But my only problem is that when I sit with these women who are married to the foreigners, they are married because of money. They don't love these guys, as much as these guys don't love these women, because they want to have the passport. They want to be South Africans. So it is said that if you marry a South African girl they are automatically also South Africans because they married someone from here. [Why do you think so many South Africans have a problem with these marriages?] Maybe it's because most of our black men can't afford to marry us women. So they are kind of jealous that my friend are marrying their women. That's the problem. Maybe jealousy. Because us black women, when a man comes and says they want to marry me, they have to pay lobola. So if you don't have that lobola, you are not going to marry the girl. So that's where the problem lies. [Do the foreigners ever pay lobola?] Well, there's this girl I was talking with, she says that she got married with this foreigner, and the foreigner paid lobola.
- 46.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know? [above]
- 46.2. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives? – It's not that...if you've got the money as I've said then you can.
47. What do you think about South African men marrying foreign women? – There's nothing wrong with that.
48. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – Yes they are foreigners.
- 48.1. [YES] Even if they are born in South Africa? – That's where the problem lies. But we black people, Xhosas, believe in culture you see. There's a thing that is called clan names – my son cannot use my surname, even if I am not married. He has to use his father's surname. Something like that. So my point is that the foreign children have to name themselves according to their father's surname. So that's why I'm saying that they are also foreigners. Because the ancestors – sometimes when the baby is sick, he has to go – my son cannot go to my home and talk to my ancestors, he has to go to his home, and talk to his ancestors, to his father's ancestors, in order for him to be well again. So it will be like that for the foreign children too – if they are sick, they have to go to Zimbabwe, to his father's place, so that he can be well.
49. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – Well it's not. Because if I'm going to say it's difficult, I am also difficult to that person.
50. What is it that makes people different? (For example) how they dress? Their religion? – Well everything. Your background. People don't have the same interest in things. There are many things that make people different.
51. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – It's the same thing that I've said – when you get married you have to adapt to the culture of the person that you are marrying. So if you're getting married to a my friend who wears those things then you have to wear those. Or bear the surname of the person that you got married to. But it's her choice, it's her decision. The problem is that as a wife you have to obey the culture of your husband.
52. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Yes.
- 52.1. How do you know them? – well, I just greet them.
53. Do you go to church? – Sometimes.
- 53.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – No.
54. Are the foreigners friendly? – they're very friendly.
55. Should foreign children go to school here? – Absolutely.
56. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – No they are not. Because if people were employed there would be no time for us, for people to be having plans that they are going to loot shops and all that. It's hunger that makes people do these things, it's unemployment, not having something to do. So if the government gives people jobs, then I guarantee you, there will be less of these attacks and all that. [What do you think about the social grants?] They are not assisting at all. You get 350 maybe for a baby. How much are the Huggies? How much is the milk? You go to the shop, you come back with three things. And then what? What happens? You have to wait until the next month.
57. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – It's unemployment, and crime.
58. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? – He has to give the people employment. There are many graduates who are sitting down there at the township. They are not employed. There are many Grade 12s, they do qualify to go to these colleges, but they are not taken. The people from the Department of Health {} are corrupt because they take the people they know. You see? Same applies when it comes to applying to being a police – a person has a Grade 12, you apply and you are not taken. And when you are asking for a reason you are told of things that you don't even hear – because they want to put their people in. It's very difficult to be a South African young person sometimes. In order for you to be employed you have to buy people, sleep with people, sleep with the boss. In order for you to go and drive cars, you have to sleep with the boss, or to get promotion. Where is this change? Where is this democracy? They are still saying we are free, I don't even see that.
59. What do you think people should be doing? – Us people are not easily united. It will take maybe years and years and years for us to see, to make maybe like a move. When I'm talking about a move, is to no longer vote for ANC. That is where change

will start. This ANC government is very corrupt, they are corrupt in such a way that they even buy votes. So I don't know, it will take years for us to find change in this country. [And what should we do in the meantime?] Well, do the things that the UPM and the Masifunde does. Politically educate people, so that people are aware of what is going on around them. And make meetings and tell people that you do not have to rely on the government to be employed. You can go and make yourself a business, make yourself a garden, sell veggies and all those things.

60. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – Yes there are too many. Everywhere you go there is a foreigner. [Is this a problem for you?] Well I don't think it's a problem. As long as they are not causing any problem to me, I have no problem with them.
61. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – Well that is false. If they are not xenophobic, why did we have these attackings of the foreigners, if South Africa is not xenophobic? The problem with them is that they don't want to be seen as if they don't accept or don't welcome the foreigners. They had to say that because they didn't want to be seen as the Presidents who live in a place where foreigners are not accepted.
62. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – They are xenophobic. They are, because if they are not xenophobic, why are they not making peace with us South Africans and the foreigners? So that we can unite. Because it seems to me they don't care whether we are not informed about these foreigners, what are these foreigners doing in our country. Because some of us don't know what are these foreigners doing here. We think that they are taking our land, they are taking our shops, there's just a misunderstanding. But I feel like if there's someone from the municipality, or from these high dum-dums, comes up and tells us and explains to people why are these foreigners here. They are not here to take our jobs.
63. What does it mean to be African? – Well to be African is....whether you are from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Angola. We are all Africans, we are all one.
64. Is South Africa part of Africa? - Yes it is.
64.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways? – It's the same. No it's not different. It's just that it's at the South.
65. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – I am an African.
66. Are you proud of being African? – Yes!
67. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – Well if you are born in Africa you are an African, or if you stay in Africa you are an Africa. If they stay here they are Africans.
68. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – They are Africans! If you are white, purple, blue and you stay in Africa you are an African.
69. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – Yes, it might. Because people are not informed about these things.

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

70. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – Well, they went –Ayanda Kota and Siyasanga – they went to the papers and the tried to write articles saying that this should stop, the foreigners are also Africans, we are one and all that. And also donations, to give the children and the wives, food and all that. And the community dialogues. [Were they successful?] Well they were, but we couldn't reach out to everyone, that's the problem, not the whole of Grahamstown.
71. How did the community respond to these actions? – Well they were very emotional, because the thing is they're saying that they thought the foreigners were part of the people that were cutting them, the women who were dying. But what the UPM told them is that, did the police say so? Now the people can't respond. They were just assuming, they had no right information, they were just assuming by rumours.
72. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – Well it is important, because like I said, we may think it's fine now because we are here, but who know, maybe one day in years to come there would be another apartheid that could happen, and then maybe I have to go and live in another country. What if I'm also treated that way, that side? So we have to think broadly, not just think now. Think about the future.
73. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state) – The problem is that, as I've said earlier, if people are given information about the foreigners – the foreigners are not here to take people's jobs, they are here to make money for themselves, because South Africa is a rich country, and maybe they feel like it's a place where they can make money. So I feel like if people are told, are informed about foreigners, this xenophobia will no longer be something that happens.
74. What did you think of this interview? – I thought it was going to be difficult!
75. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me? – No.

INTERVIEW 6 – 12 May 2017 (M)

1. May I ask your age? – I'm 31.
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from?- Yes. From Grahamstown.
2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – For me? I think it's like, if you look at it in that context of just being a human being, without looking at it politically, it's actually like being born there. Now if you look at it from the political context it will take you now way back, as to, first of all, who was here first. And the history behind all of that now, how did most people come to live here, their entrance you see....was it a

friendly entrance? How they got to have possession of most things that they do have, and the privileges that they have, and now those that were here first now they don't have privileges to those resources. Now that's the political context of it. Now you'll find people now, when they look at people that are privileged, of having many things, like accessibility of high quality education, they're not poor and so on, and they look at those people like, hey, these people, their origin – they are not even from here, and we are from here. That from here it refers to....you know what I mean mos? It refers to our roots, our ancestors were killed, for this land and so on. Things like that. So that's basically I think...from my own understanding....

3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – I'm a human. You know, that thing doesn't apply to me... [Which thing?] South African. It doesn't even make sense to me when you say I'm South African. And race. Those things they don't apply to me. And I can even explain why. You know for example this thing of colour, you know, race. When you look at it from the evolution of human beings - it's just that I'm not going to get into detail because I don't want to take up too much time – but everything comes from here in Africa. That's a fact. It's just that it's different climates. Now, as people – you know, people they like adventure. Even today they are like that, they like to travel, see the world for what it is. But it's just that at that time, people travelled, crossed seas and so on, when they went to other parts of the world, you know like Europe, it's a bit cooler there than here in Africa. Now because of that melanin, it functions a lot where it is very hot. Now here in Africa it's very hot, that's why you find people are darker. Now there it's a bit cooler, that's why it doesn't function a lot, you see. And the body does not secrete it a lot, into the blood stream. So now, that's what causes people who live there to be a little bit lighter in complexion, I wouldn't say white, but lighter in complexion. So to me politics of race, you know when you look at it from the context that I've just given you right now, they really don't apply to me, the politics of race. That's why I say, I'm a human, I just belong to the human kingdom. It's meaningless, it's just class politics you know. So that's why I'm saying that it doesn't apply to me. Also, I don't blame the people, I blame the system for not knowing such information, because you don't get it at school level. I never learned that from school also – by school I mean the government schools, and the private schools also, they don't teach you that. That's colonised education. The decolonised education, you get it from for example these political workshops, the leftist ideologies, and social movements. There's more now a conversation about that, they engage you on such matters and now you tend to learn about such stuff. So that's why I'm saying that if for example they were teaching those things at school, even in those government schools, and in the private schools, in tertiary level, the environment now would be different to what it is right now, even in the past.
4. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – Yes, one of the founders of the UPM. [Why did you form the UPM?] The UPM, as the name suggests, it is strictly based on the idea of mobilising the poor and the unemployed, to give a voice to the voiceless. Because you would find that in the class struggle, the people who are always found as the voiceless is the unemployed and the working class, and the poor also. The youth in particular. Now it was formed by mostly those people and you would find that people are told to go to school and get educated and so on, but there are no programmes in place that are put there by the government to at least assist those people after they graduate. Because there were graduates also in the foundation of the UPM. Including Ayanda Kota also is a graduate. Because you would find that it is based on mobilising those people, because what the capitalist system does, it employs people. And when it employs them it does not give them decent wages. It uses these poor and the unemployed as the rare reserved army. That is why now when the people who are employed, when they strike – those companies they do not go down to their knees and beg those people. It is simply because there is the unemployed, and the unemployed is desperate, for jobs and so on. So the idea of introducing the unemployed was to help conscientise the poor and the unemployed into bringing them to the leftist ideology and to try in a way workshop them more and give them at least some space so that they can at least be able to analyse how the government system and the capitalist system works. So it's basically that. And it worked very well. Because now a lot of people, including students now – the UPM is everywhere, it's networking everywhere now. So that's basically it.
5. Are you married? – Yes.
 - 5.1. **[YES]** are you married to a South African? **[If YES go to 6]** – Yes, she was born here .
6. Do you have children? How old are they? – Two girls.
 - 6.1. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – They do.
 - 6.2. **[YES] [EITHER]** Do any foreigners' children also attend school with your child/ren? How do they get along? - As far as I know....no I'm not sure if I do know. Because, you know, the blood of the Africans is strong. A foreigner might have a child with someone who is African, but you'll find that the child looks completely African, and speaks African. Now you would find that the genes are stronger. But there is someone I know, that has a father that is a foreigner. But there's nothing bad that I know. She's a very fine girl, there's nothing funny about it. She's learning properly.
7. What is your first language? – IsiXhosa.
8. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – Yeah, Zulu, a bit of Sotho, Tswana, Sepedi but not too much, just learning. And then English. Afrikaans a bit – not because I don't want to, but it's difficult for me, because I live in an area where it's not spoken every day.
9. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – Yeah. Language is a way of communicating, so if you can't learn languages of others you'll be in deep trouble.
10. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – You know, it depends what you mean by benefits. Because even the corrupt are benefitting. Our government is corrupt. Maybe it's because of that ideology – of some must benefit and some must not benefit. But I really don't believe in that ideology of – I'm a socialist, you know. Everybody must benefit. Equally. [Even if they're not from SA?] I'm an internationalist, if you understand where I'm coming from. We're facing a common enemy everywhere you go is the same system, it's the capitalist system, ruled by imperialists. People who are hungry for power everywhere you go, so...everybody, they idealise those people, they want to be like those people. That's why you find people are corrupt. They want to be rich,

and we all know what money does, it makes people powerful. Because that's what this system allows and that's how it was built, it was built for that. Not that there was nothing communally before, it was, but it's just that now people were hungry, they wanted to rule others, you see.

11. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? – You know, I'm going to talk about myself. My motto is, everywhere you go, that's my home. Nobody built the earth. Not even the billionaires or the trillionaires. They just were born here like I am. So I really don't believe that someone can tell you you don't belong here. Who are they to tell you that you really don't belong here because of these silly reasons, like maybe of skin colour, these politics of race, the ones I was talking about. People need to be workshopped about these things, they need to understand that, you know. I like that, South Africa belongs to all those you live in it – but to me, not only South Africa. The focus must not only be South Africa. There is the same crisis in America, with Mexicans. You see? You can go to Brazil, the same system, although it's worse there. Because those people they were born in Brazil but because of the politics of race and power, politics of land, wanting to take land from people....so this politics of race are very dangerous. They go the same with power you know, people want more power. So I think this ideology of country and boundaries, I don't know who came up with that thing, but it's not working. It's not working.
12. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – I live in Fingo, a place called Luvuyo.
13. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Yeah, yeah. The neighbours, there's no problem. The problem is the quality of the living conditions that are unfriendly to the people who live in Fingo. Same as any other place here, that is you know, black – there is so much inequality. And it's only because the apartheid government, when it had that developmental plan, it never included the areas where the "blacks", according to that race thing, where the Africans lived. Mostly it was concentrating on the places where they live. And the ANC, when it got into power, it never changed that document or amended that document, it just changed the name of that document. Now it became the NDP. So basically what's inside the NDP is what was inside during that apartheid government. Hence it's still the same. They never built nothing – these buildings that you see, they were built by the apartheid government. There's no new place that you can name here and say, this place was built by the ANC. They're even finding it difficult to renovate roads that were made before.
14. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – Drugs, alcohol, being poor every day. Poverty, you know. Taverns. Drugs. Crime.
15. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Yeah, they come and they go.
16. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – I mean there's nothing they can do, because some of those new people who come are students, they are renting, when you rent you have a right to that property. So who can say you can't rent here, if it's not our house.
17. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – I think so. But, as I am saying, there need to be programmes put in place – even if it's sport, because I think sport is the best way to unify people. Because I've watched something – I'm in football as well, but I don't see anything that has whites or coloureds in football, but in netball it's different. There was a tournament there in the old indoor sports centre up there, and I saw a lot of white girls, white ladies playing, and I thought oh wow, transformation. Way to go, women. And then I was like, ok this thing it needs to be introduced also in the community. Now people will get a way of having to come together.
18. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – Yeah.
19. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – Shops. Some are bricklayers, they're self-employed. Like the Zimbabweans, they're mostly working because of a skill that they have. It's not them, it's Mugabe. That's what Mugabe does, even if you're a qualified teacher, Mugabe says you must be able to do burglars [bars] on the side. Or you must be a car mechanic, or you must be an engineer. So the Zimbabweans, that is what they do. Even if they are teachers they are able to have a skill, to feed themselves also with that skill. Some of them they are bricklayers, some of them are doing lots of stuff. Some of them they are selling clothes there, they can design sheets for the bed, duvets, curtains, cloths for couches. I mean, all sorts of stuff. [And the shop owners, are they mainly...?] Muslims. Ethiopians. Yeah. [Do the foreigners do something useful for the community?] No. [What do you mean?] I would say the most useful ones are the Zimbabweans. Because you know that if you want your house to be renovated, or you need a veranda in your house, you can go to the Zimbabwean guys and say guys I need a veranda, and then they will offer you that brotherly type of a...you know, advice first of all. And then also they will help you to assist. They are the ones that you know when they are around, if your tap is leaking you can go to them and they will fix it for a cheap price. Not cheap, but affordable. They are not capitalists, they are not here to do the money and so on. They are fair. But the Somalians and the Ethiopians and others, to them it's all about making money. Say for example you have a football club, they would never participate, like playing, for any local football club. They distance themselves in their shops. And then you would find that the Zimbabweans, if you have a soccer club there – like in my club I have lots of Zimbabweans. Yes, I've got proof of that. Paperwork that proves that. [But no Ethiopians or others?] No, no. You even go there and ask for donation, they'll give you five rand. I mean, it's just stuff like that, now people get angry, because like these people, I mean, we support them a lot, but when it's us asking for support, they always tell that they have to ask for permission from their boss. And you'll never know who this boss is. You see, so now it's things like that that make people angry. Or when you are short of for example one rand, he's like no, no, I can't give you. But when it's these young girls, they give the young girls. And it's like now some sexual molestation or some sort of a thing. [You think that stuff like that happens...?] Yeah it does, it does a lot. Because these guys that don't sleep, that go to taverns at night, they do see for example some of the young girls, and you'll find that there's a lot of group of girls standing outside the shop at night, and you would say like – hey, hey, hey, go home, what are you doing there? It's a creepy style of a thing. Unfortunately, we are being ruled by a corrupt system that accepts illegal donations and so on. And we don't know who funds the ruling party. Because there are rumours that the ANC does not have any money, but it just gets funded by businessmen.

[Like the Guptas?] Yeah, yeah. The politics like that. Corrupt people. But they don't have money. They depend on the membership and money from such people.

20. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – Yeah it does happen a lot that thing. Especially the ward committees. For example, there must be a maximum number of shops in one area. Now what these people do, they say here's five thousand, let me open another shop. And you'll find that this thing, it tends to be a problem, because some of these shops they are spots for these boys who are committing crime. You see, and these guys, they get together very well with these boys that do crime. That's how these things now of suspicion – like they are being suspected of selling drugs, because since they came into this country, the drugs have been too much. And it is drugs that people are not used to when they were still young. There's new drugs. Because we all know that here in South Africa, we are not capable of bringing so many drugs, we don't have access. I mean even fake cigarettes.
21. Do you think there are too many shops? – Yeah.
- 21.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops? – When there's lots of shops, it's just that, it is not a very sociable way of living together with other people. Because the way it used to be back then – in this area, when there is a shop, we know, ok, we buy in these shops here, or in these two shops. When you go to another area you know, it's these two shops. But when the foreigners came – the “foreigners”, you know, the political term of South Africa – but when the foreigners came, that's when now the other shops had to close. Because these people who are said to be so-called South Africans, were not bribing to open shops. Now these guys bribed to open shops. That's how it came about now, this feud, and this huge fight over shops. And then, they were selling products that were new, that we don't know – because these shop owners, the South Africans, were selling like the famous products, like Simba, Cadbury's, Beacon, like these ones that you know. But now these ones {the foreigners} they came with Truda, and all those ones...even though there's a scientific, you'll find that that's how they got to sell those cheap things.
- 21.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – Yeah. [Is it because the foreigners are able to sell things at lower prices?] Lower prices, but they are not those products. They are cheap, dangerous also. Because I think there's something now, when you eat too much of these, you get to – something happens to your skin. It's there just for making money – it's not up to standard.
22. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – I think there needs to be a minimum number, or a maximum. So let's say in Makana here – foreigners: forty percent. And they must pay tax. Because it contributes. Or rent. Pay rates. Because it contributes to the development of this area. And then the sixty percent it belongs to the people who are from Makana. That is the way it should be. Because I can't just go to England and open up a shop. I'm making an example. The rules are different, and there must be some strict rules of controlling, a control system. And it can't just be open for anything or everything to just happen, the way I please to do things. That is dangerous, for anybody. That's why people are angry. Because they don't have money to bribe, they are poor. Because this government is corrupt, when you bribe, you get things. You see? We don't know how many of them are here, legally, because as I've said, there's no controls you see. They don't have passports, you can go there and ask for your passports, they don't have passports. But I'm telling you right now, I've met people from Palestine. You will not just go as you like in Palestine. They will strip search you, even though you are a lady. They will tell you to take all your clothes off. All. Strip your phone, strip your laptop. You won't question that. The Israeli government does not play, if you understand what I mean. Now, I'm not concerned about the internal affairs of other countries, but what I'm saying is that, at least South Africa must have some strict rules. Unfortunately it can't because it's captured. It's controlled, they are told what to do. [But the danger perhaps, is there are these frustrations with these issues, but the danger is in where the blame lies. Does it lie with the foreigners? Does it lie with the government? What do you think about that?] It's poor management. You know when you are a poor manager, you can't keep on blaming the subordinates all the time. Like whenever there's a blame, you blame to the subordinates. You must foresee things. Like, I have a club. In my club, I am proactive, I act before things happen. I must always be ten steps ahead of the players. I must give them direction – that's the duty of the executive. You give them direction, you plan ahead. They don't do that. And they don't even have the quality to do that. Those who have quality, they don't allow or include them in.
23. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – No, no, no. The only thing they try is to just get married that's it, to just get citizenship. I don't know how many children are orphans because of that, who don't have fathers. I mean we must be realistic about these things. There's no point in trying to paint a perfect picture – they're not picture perfect. This is the reality.
24. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – They must enter here in the right way, you understand? If it's five years and then you renew, then you renew. Don't bribe. And the government, we need a strong government to be able to do that. Also, they must have passports. I do have a passport. At least a passport is R450, look at how much money they make. They can't say I can't afford a passport. What really raises my eyebrows, is that ...why are they afraid to make a passport? What is it that the government of SA will see? Are they running away from crimes? Because this thing is no longer political – it's corruption. Little girls, they disappear. There's human trafficking. Now you can't say it's South Africans, you can't say it's foreigners, you can't say it's Chinese. But all we know, the most dangerous mafia in the world is the Chinese. We keep on looking at the Nigerians – no! It's not the Nigerians. And the other one, is the Muslim – the Pakistani mafia is the most dangerous mafia in the world also. Yes, the Yakuza, but they are few. The Chinese, they are very dangerous. Also, the Pakistani mafia, they are very dangerous. Someone who used to be in intelligence, once said that if you think the Nigerians, the Ghanaians, the Zimbabweans are dangerous, you're wasting your time. The Pakistanis, they are the most dangerous. He's been inside. He knows. Now, from the age of six, you know how an AK-47 works. Now you tell me, how are you skilled – how skilled are you when you are eighteen, or at the age of twelve, when from the age of six you know an AK-47, and you know all the parts – you can play it like a puzzle from the age of six. So that means, when the soldiers of SA go there and they are being shot....I mean these things are very deep. There's lots of

layers to it, but you'll never get to the base because they are protected by this system. The system wants these things to happen, because it benefits from these things. Remember, one of the most dangerous capitalists around is that company from America that makes and sells weapons. So if there are no gangsters to buy weapons that company does not make money, if there is no war...you see?

25. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes.
26. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] – As I explained, it's the anger, frustration. Of being poor. Helpless. And you know that there's still no hope – hopelessness. [And why do you think that the foreign nationals became the targets of this?] That thing, I don't think it was because of what I've explained right now only. But, there were – the people went missing. There were the murders, the body parts. And I think people did their own investigation, and the fingers were pointing at this guy that is owning lots of property. And then these people, they are driving cars around, they paint their windows white. People are asking, if you're selling food, why are you hiding food? [Which people?] The Muslims, the Pakistanis. I mean, you're saying you're selling veg. When you're selling veg is there a need to hide the veg? I'm asking you now. [No I don't think so....] We know Fruit and Veg does not hide veg, you see?
27. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015. [ABOVE]
 - 27.1. Do you think the rumours were true? - The police, instead of investigating, they sided with those people. We all know how rich that guy is. He can just buy the whole of Grahamstown if he was allowed to do it. He just buys, and we can't say he's getting that money from these shops. Where is he getting the money from? [This is the guy that runs Stone's Crescent?] Yes, and the Frontier Hotel. And lots of buildings here, even in the location.
28. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? – There's no evidence showing that. Because there are some people who have their own shops, so I don't know, because it was happening all over Grahamstown.
29. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? [Missed this question]
30. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? – He's the boss. He's operating with those guys. Like I'm saying to you, when you go and ask for a donation, they say you have to ask the boss. You'll get shocked even here in town when you go to them and they say, no, I have to phone my boss. We all know who the boss is. [You think it's true that he was involved in the murders?] Anything is possible, he's rich. Rich people can do crazy things. They can just start a war and then there's a bloodbath – look at Cyril Ramaphosa, he's rich, he has shares in Lonmin, he owns lots of MacDonald's, he just told the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, that time, by an email – shoot to kill. I mean, that's rich people. The system, imperialists, they kill.
31. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – I don't think they were surprised, because it was on TV, it was happening already in other provinces. So Grahamstown, you know, it's just that it's happening now, in another town in South Africa. It was happening already. Even in PE. Everywhere you go it's happening. All over the world, by the way.
32. How did you feel after the incident?
33. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – They always do a good job in shooting people. You can resist now about being raped as women, they will shoot you. You can say you can't afford these fees at a tertiary institution, they will shoot you. Their job is shooting people.
34. How did the municipality respond to the lootings?
35. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – I think it's a global crisis. It goes way beyond xenophobia. Xenophobia is just a minor issue. It's the global crisis. The main enemy is not any of us, it's the capitalist system.
 - 35.1.1. Why were only foreigners attacked? – As I'm saying, the system allows these things to happen, the system wants these things to be there. Remember, if there are no murders happening then the funeral parlours, the people who buy caskets...(laughs) there's money in everything! You see, we must die, we must live, it's expensive to die, it's expensive to live...
 - 35.2. [YES] Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – You know, I think the problem is with our government. Because when the president was still Nelson Mandela these things never happened. When Chris Hani was still alive, these things never happened. People knew what they were fighting for, they were very clear. And when it was Thabo Mbeki at least he had programmes in place, it doesn't matter what they were but he had programmes in place. But now ever since Zuma took over, South Africa became a circus, a laughing stock. Look at the value of the rand. There are no programmes to rescue South Africa. [I'm interested in what you said that before people knew what they were fighting for...do you think that makes a difference now, in terms of how people feel about the way that they live?] You know, when I am saying that they knew what they were fighting for...they were fighting for equality. You understand? Equality. Having rights to the resources that were here. Because now they don't have rights, you'll find that mines are owned by companies from America, people who don't even live here. You understand? Why can't the mines belong to the government? Because that is the source of income of South Africa by the way. You see? South Africa can't be said to be poor, Jemima. Why? We have lots of resources, like iron, platinum, gold, diamonds.
36. Who is a foreigner? (For example) is it someone who doesn't speak the local language? Looks different, speaks different? From somewhere else? – Like as I've said, everything started in Africa. So everybody belongs in Africa. [So no one is a foreigner then?] No. According to me.
37. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – South Africa is loose. It's loose. It's not strict, like some other countries. You do what you want when you want to. The prison, even you watch satellite dish, you eat what you want, if you say you want fish, you don't eat beef, so South Africa's like that. Even the prison, you know. It's loose, there are no strict policies. They only apply to the poor.

- 37.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – So far it's the white foreigners... There are things that you can depend on from the white people, you know. Like my friend now that's coming in you know, I just go to him and I say I'm struggling, I'm out of soccer balls. And he brings me five. I mean it's things like that, just the small things. We're not saying give us a share of your millions, but it's just....knowing that you can depend on the people who you're spending all your money on. [And the other foreigners, do they bring something positive?] They are poor like us. They haven't got that privilege.
- 37.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – the drugs. The crime. It's difficult to trace crime committed by foreigners.
38. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – Yes it is a problem. But you can't say to a woman don't marry this guy. But I'm saying it can be a problem in the sense that....how can I say this. It can be a problem in the manner that there are many orphans as I've said. Now, poor unemployed women are here, they don't have jobs. The guy is not coming back. They marry the women for citizenship. They pay these women. Some women who are foreigners pay men also. Because you would find that some people are going to court to fetch like 20 000 or 10 000 a month. So it's particularly that kind of a contract, that you'll pay me this money because you're using my surname. So it's for money.
- 38.1. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives? – I think that, with the South African men, there aren't many foreign women in South Africa. Those who are here have their men who are also foreign. Not that we don't get attracted to foreigners, but I don't know how foreign women see South Africans, but sometimes you feel like you greet, and the lady doesn't greet back. So the only hope for South African men of getting a partner is getting married to a South African. Of falling in love with a South African. I mean we are people who love a lot, Africans. But you find that we don't get the same treatment from other people. I mean a white man can easily fall in love with a black woman, but when it's me coming to a white lady, that lady can even go and open a case, like 'that guy approached me!' So it's things like that, now now I look like a rapist, or someone who harasses women. So that's why I'm saying, even the white people they need to be educated about these things of race. They're not that important.
39. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – Now, you can look at that from two aspects. We, specifically Xhosas – let's say the Nguni group, the people who fall under the Nguni group – there's this issue of what you call a clan name. For example, my name is ----- but, even though I have a name and a surname, I belong to a clan. You see? Now, even women belong to a clan, because they're born to South Africans as well. But what's the problem now when you have a child with someone who is not belonging from a particular Clan...is that, the different cultures of some sort. Those are cross culture. And people now – we believe in ancestors. And we know why we believe in ancestors. It's not a matter of other people don't believe in this thing, so because they don't believe in this thing it's not there. No, no, it's just that my culture's different from yours. It's fine, you have the right to have your own culture. Now, the ancestors now would want to demand that child also. It's things like that. They are very deep...they are not literal. You know, it's a spiritual belief. Now... the thing of now having a father like that – it's not a problem. But when you look at it from that aspect it's very complicated. But in terms of being a foreigner....there are things of like black women marrying to an English guy. It's not a problem. But at least we know that those people they are together, forever. They're not going to....so it's just that these guys, they leave the children.
40. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – I don't think that's a problem. But the only thing is that, I know how the Islam religion works, they would never allow someone from their group to join another religion. [So you think it's a double standard?] Yeah, so, what I'm saying is that we mustn't be biased. We must be realistic. They would never allow that. You'd rather die, rather than....you're seen as a traitor.
41. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – No. [What should the government be doing for South African people?] Not only South African people. But ok, if it was for South African people, as I'm saying, the local resources – it must start from municipal level, even if it's called ward level, but I'd rather choose municipal level, because these things of wards they were never there in the past, they were also introduced to divide people. But this thing of municipal level, now you boost the economy of that municipality. South Africa would go somewhere if they would work like that. Sixty percent of whatever it is that is there as a resource – especially natural resources – that money goes to the municipality. Then the municipality would never go bankrupt, and then the municipality would have money to what? To have its own programmes. And at least, when they have to donate some cash to those people who are volunteering, who are activists, for example who have orphanage homes, crèches, sports clubs, NPOs, at least they know that, ok, we have a list of these people and then, per year, we donate this chunk of money to these people. Then at least there wouldn't be a problem. For the local business man this is how we support them. There wouldn't be this fight now. We would be living in a communal.....you know what I am trying to say? We'd be living in a communally owned community. Because even if the foreigners were there, the people wouldn't be angry, because – our government supports us. The problem is support. Economic support.
42. What do you think people should be doing? – They must vote this government out. [And on a more grassroots level, like the UPM...?] The function of social movements is to analyse state policies. And after doing so, it.... teaches people about their rights, and gives them a voice, to voice their concerns, and so on. But in terms of governing the country, South Africans still have a lot to learn. Especially social movements, because they include politics in social issues. Now that's a contradiction – you can't fuse those two things together. People need to learn to be a member of social movements only, no political parties. [Are you a member of a political party at all?] Yes, at the moment. Because at the moment South Africa is still in that manner. Now you would find that the social movements, this thing – like for example the biggest I know is the MST in Brazil. It's got more than a million members, brigades, who are socialist, and they don't belong to any party. They're so amazing – I've been there, I've seen them. Now, there needs to be something like that here, a huge movement. Let's say more than a million people type of a movement. [And what would those people be fighting for?] Land. Land. That's the main issue for now. Land. You know. Agrarian rights. Fishing rights. Jemima – not for chasing people away, but for living in a place where we are

living in harmony. If you see me walking behind you in the streets, or in town, you know that's your brother coming there, it doesn't matter what skin colour is he. You can ask for any assistance from me. A place where you can marry who you want to marry. Not being judged. You see? Not being restricted because of laws that were made by liberals. And these laws – they are imposing them on us, like we have no say at all. People need to have a strong voice. If you understand what I'm saying.

43. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – As you know, to me the word doesn't exist....I mean, I take it as transformation. I'm happy now that I'm speaking a different language. Because when I get home, and I...for example, in sport or whatever, I speak my own language. Now getting to learn new things, it's a challenge. It helps boost the functionality of the mind. [So you think that's something that can be a benefit of having foreigners?] It can be a benefit also. Being exposed to new things. [And do you think that there are too many foreigners in Grahamstown?] (Laughs) Not that I know any stats! Because they work with stats.
44. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – I think I can partially agree in the sense that you can't judge people based on anger. When you judge a person on anger you're making a huge mistake, because most of the time that's not what that person does. Those people that were looting are the same people that are buying from the same shops, smiling with the same people. You see? But like I've said, the system....where would the SAPS buy bullets? They need to buy bullets. It's created, it was thoroughly planned, this whole system. [But how does it filter down from the system to the point where you do have people that buy from a shop, and then two weeks later they are trying to kill them?] I'm not sure. But I think that everything in life deserves to have a name. Those attacks, yes they are called xenophobic attacks. But, like I said, I partially agree – meaning some part of me doesn't agree. But also, the government is to blame. They are saying there, in a very smart way, we are also to blame – because this question, I explained to you, that I blame the government, exactly. The government is not doing enough. But they were taking blame, they were taking accountability, but they can't say on international TV, 'we are to blame'. They would lose votes. So they must say it in a smart way. And it is up to the level of intelligence of any resident or politician, to try and analyse. But that's our work as movements, to analyse what was he saying. He was taking accountability. [So you think when Zuma said that South Africans are not xenophobic, that was a way of taking accountability?] Taking accountability as the leader.
45. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic?
46. What does it mean to be African? – It means a lot, because as I'm saying that, after I've learned that everything comes from here, it means it is the mother continent, to all continents. You know I wish I can say that to Donald Trump's face, that you are also an African! Even to Queen Elizabeth...
47. Is South Africa part of Africa? – Yes. I wish there was one president in Africa.
48. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes.
49. Are you proud of being African? – Yes.
50. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – Indians, it's like, they're from Asia. They're Asians. But, if they are here, like according to the laws – of the liberals – you need to live for five years, and then you get citizenship.
51. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – Oh yes. But as I've said, it depends on that in the political context of the person you're talking to. They refer to the politics of race, of which to me, like I've said, they don't even exist. They are inapplicable to me, politics of race.
52. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015?

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

53. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this?
54. How did the community respond to these actions?
55. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – I mean, if we can look at it from the aspect of racial politics, then yes, because I really believe that xenophobia is not only to foreigners, only these Muslims and whatever....even a white person that is a racist, to me that's a xenophobic. You know? You just don't want to accept me for who I am. It's the same thing, but they've just called it with different names.
56. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia?
57. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state)
58. What did you think of this interview? – It was very good.
59. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me? – No.

INTERVIEW 7 - 23 May 2017 (F) (Interpreter [I])

1. May I ask your age? - 59
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes. From a farm in Fort Brown.
 - 2.1. What does it mean to be South African for you? – [I] She is saying, to be a South African means that she was born here.
3. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – [I] She is no longer employed. [What did you do before?] She used to be a domestic worker.

4. You're a member of the UPM – Why did you join? – She met Ayanda in 2008. Because of the infrastructure that they had here in Papamani, there was no electricity, there was no development. So that's when she met Ayanda. He came with an idea, let's protest, so that the needs – what you are demanding – can be heard. So that's when she joined UPM.
 - 4.1.1. What do you hope the UPM will achieve? – Her wishes for the UPM is that UPM will be able to provide people financially to start their own businesses. For example, to invest in chicken businesses, where they will be able to sell chickens instead of depending on gardening only. Because of seasons, they change, so she doesn't want people to depend on gardens only. So if the UPM was willing to invest, to give people money, then they can start their own businesses and lower their poverty.
 - 4.1.2. Are you a member of a political party? – She no longer belongs to any political party because she was a member of COPE, but because it's no longer visible, she's not part of any political party.
5. Are you married? - Yes. But her husband passed away.
6. Do you have children? How old are they? – Three children. Born in '80, '85 and '88.
7. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What does this mean for you? Do you agree? – She says the Freedom Charter is just something that is there written. It does not get implemented, it's there in writing but it does not get implemented. [Do you agree with that statement?] She's saying she does not feel she's in a position to agree with it because you get that a South African will migrate to the USA and then you get a USA here in South Africa. [Can you clarify a little...?] One cannot say South Africa belongs to a certain person – you cannot define where it belongs. Because there are South Africans who will go to America for better work opportunities, and then you get Americans here. So it does not specifically belong to anyone.
8. Do you think you should get any special benefits because you are a South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – She's saying that it is impossible for her to say we should get special benefits, because if you get – a foreigner will come here, and then impregnate a girl, and because that child is born within South Africa that child will get a grant. [Do you think that's a problem?] She says yes, she thinks it's a problem, because those people will benefit, get social grants and stuff, but then there is a time for them when they will have to go back home. [So people from outside shouldn't get the social grants?] She's saying that because of the girls who get impregnated are from South Africa – their children....she doesn't say they shouldn't get grant, because they are from SA. The girls, and their children.
9. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – Papamani.
10. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? In what ways? – She says she is minding her own business in her own place so she doesn't know.
11. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – Housing. And sometimes it's water.
12. Are there many foreigners in your neighbourhood? – They're not this side, they are in Pumlani, which is the neighbouring area nearby. But ever since they have electricity, you get a few of those shops the foreign shops. [Are the foreign shops useful to you?] She says they are not that useful because of their prices. Since they are competing, their prices are up and down, but if you go to Shoprite, if you see a packet of soup, if it's R1.99 it will still remain R1.99. But in the foreigners' shops it goes up and down, you get different prices from the different shops.
13. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – Shops.
14. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – No. [Should they try?] She says that they should try, because when you go and live in another area you need to adjust to the living conditions, you need to adjust to those people. So they should try.
15. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – She says, even if they try, they just can't do it. Because if there's a march that is organised by the residents of Papamani, they won't come they'll just ask what is happening. But they should be part of it, because they are living in that area. So they don't take part in things that are happening in the area, they just stay in their shops and ask what is happening. [Do you think it's possible for people from somewhere else to become part of a new community?] Well, what they usually do as foreigners, is if they are in a crisis, they will come to the people. So they will adjust. But if that problem is solved, they will disappear. So she made the example of, when there were xenophobic attacks and they needed help, they came forward. But then after things were calm, they wouldn't be seen to be attending meetings to become more of the situation. But then you get their girlfriends and their wives that are coming up front. And then she's saying that there was a meeting that we held in the location, whereby one of the residents came forward and said, 'where are they? They should be here with us.' Instead of sending their girlfriends or being absent. [Why do you think they stay away?] Because they don't care.
16. Were you in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Around that time she got a call from Ayanda. Ayanda was at the police station, so he asked her to come down to the police station. When she got there it was full of the foreigners. And then Ayanda said they should take the foreigners to the UPM office, and she said she's not going to be part of that.
17. How did you feel about what happened? – She wasn't feeling ok about the lootings. When you fight with someone you can't take their things like food and stuff. If you're fighting just fight but don't take anything.
18. Did you think that the rumours about an Arab man committing the murders were true? – She says that she's not in a place to say it was because of the murders that were happening, but currently if you look at what is happening in Johannesburg, you get foreigners being found with girls, young girls, with human trafficking, prostitution. So in her own opinion, the foreigners are not good. So she's comparing the two incidents.
19. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – She says, yes, that's why they started, because of the rumours that were happening and because of the Arab men that were involved.
20. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? – She says because they don't know whether it was true or not, with the fact that there was only one person. People were not sure whether it was that one person only – hence they attacked the others.

21. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? Were you surprised? – She is saying, she wasn't shocked that it actually happened, because people were talking about it for so long. But her opinion was, do not fight with the shop, fight with the person. She was also shocked how old women would actually carry out food from the shops when the looting happened. [What would have been a better way to deal with the issue? Instead of targeting the shops?] She's saying, if someone has proof, then you have a strong case to fight with the person. But if there's no proof of the rumours then you're just fighting a fight with {another black(??)}.
22. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – So she's saying that she would say it was crime, it was more like looting, because when they fight, they will fight and fight and fight, and end up going to the shops to take food. Because in Johannesburg, they fought with the foreigners, they fought and fought, and then went to get some food. So it's because of poverty, they thought oh I can still get something to live on. Because you never see people go to attack and loot in pick and pay and checkers, they go to loot in foreigners shops. [Is that because the foreigners are easy targets, or because people don't like the foreigners?] She's saying because if you put your stand where you sell vegetables where people are always around the stand – if you put your stand in the community people will see you as a target because you are in a place where there's a lot of people who have nothing to do. That is where the trouble starts.
23. Zuma said South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think there is a problem of xenophobia in SA or not? – She says it all goes back to Mandela, because Mandela brought Graça Machel here in South Africa – so when he brought her here, all the foreigners came here.
24. Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? - ???
25. Who is a foreigner? – A foreigner is someone born from Somalia, outside the country, not born in South Africa.
26. Can foreigners become South Africans? – Because of when the foreigners came in they said we have to accept them, so it's something that when they were born it was not there, but because the foreigners had to come in...that's when people adapted to it.
27. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – Because they live better here in SA than in their own countries, where you get, they don't even have bank accounts here – they keep their money in shoeboxes, and they don't even get taxed for keeping their money in those boxes. And that's easily how they transfer their money to their countries back. So yeah, they live better here in South Africa.
 - 27.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring. Do they contribute? – There's nothing that they bring in, it's just that they marry the girls. [So there's nothing positive?] No.
 - 27.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – So basically, besides the marriage thing, there's nothing, they just sit in their own shops and they stay there.
28. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – So she's saying it is a problem, because they get married in Grahamstown and then when they go to another town like King William's Town they also get another girl. Whenever they move to a new place they get another girlfriend, whereas back home wherever they're from they've left a wife and child there.
29. Do you think it's a problem when South African women convert to Islam? – She's saying that they don't even know what that is, they are doing it for the sake of doing it, they don't understand the meaning of it, so they are just wearing those clothes because they are told to wear them.
30. Why do you think SA women choose to marry the foreign men? – Hunger. [Do you think it's ever because they love them or...?] There's no love, it's just hunger.
31. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – She saying she doesn't know, because you don't know which side they will end up in, since their fathers are from another country and their mothers are from another country. So she can't position whether they are South African or not because you don't know where they will end up.
32. Should foreign children go to school here? – They will go if they are staying here in South Africa. [Should they go, is it good that they go to school here?] – Because they need to get educations, so they will go to school. So it's good that they go.
33. Do you think that the government is doing enough for the people of South Africa? – The government doesn't do anything, she doesn't see any good. She says even with education, the quality of education here in the location is not as good as the one you get from VG or from Graham College.
34. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – All is bad, nothing is right. She's saying that even in households, if you go to a certain house, and you find that there is nobody at home you will think oh they're at work. But truly they are not at work, they are going through the trash to look for food. [Can I ask, what did you hope for after 1994?] She's saying that she hoped that the oppressing tactics that were used back in the days would actually end, whereby there would be more jobs created, but to look at reality there are no jobs available, and in the grants, old people would not have to wait until they are 60 to get grants, they would get them at maybe 50, but that is not changed, they have to wait to 60. And she said that during the oppressing times, you would find you would get a white man sitting in his farm, and there would be a car that would come and fetch people who want to work, and they would earn even a thousand... but nowadays even that has stopped, you don't even get a bakkie here to collect people to go to work. [Were you involved in the struggle against apartheid?] No.
35. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? – So on Wednesday, she heard that there's a possibility that people might get grants. So it was a talk in East London that people should get grants just for being in the location, to get a grant, R500, but she does not think that is a good idea because instead of giving people 500 a month they should open more jobs, so people can actually work to earn. So more jobs for them to work, and even to invest in let's say they're using their hands to create something, so artwork. Because if people just get grants, you will get someone who says I am not working, so that person will actually qualify for a grant, because that person is saying she's not working. If you work to earn, then people will be able to come together and make something and they will know who's working and who's not working. So to avoid the corruption.

36. What do you think people should be doing? – As she said before, if there are more job opportunities, people will have something to occupy with, they will know I have a job, there is nothing wrong that they will think of. So some of the youngsters won't think to go and rob someone. They won't think to do crime because they will focus on their work.
37. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – Not even in South Africa, here in Grahamstown. Even the shops, there are many shops of foreigners in Grahamstown and when those foreigners employ people they will pay R50 a day. She makes an example that in a street there are three or four shops in a street. [Why is that a problem?] As citizens and residents they don't fight, but as foreigners they fight because of distance. They fight alone but residents don't fight. [Does it make it more difficult for South Africans to have businesses, when the foreigners have businesses?] Yes, it's a problem, because number one, a black person does not wish well on another black person, and number two because there are many shops now a black owned shop will not get as many customers as the foreigners shops. So she made an example of a shop here in Joza, that shop no longer gets any customers because of foreign shops. [Can I ask what she means by 'a black person does not wish well on another black person'?] She's saying even if you wanted a black person to work with another black person to open a shop, that would not even work, because of the jealousy that we have amongst each other. So some will be jealous, even if someone does not open a shop, so for example you have a little business in your own home, another person will get jealous of the fact that you have something going on in your own home. [Do people get jealous of the foreigners too?] She doesn't know...she says that she's not sure, but you'll find that a person will, if there's a sale at Shoprite, that person will go to Shoprite, but still come back and buy food from the foreign shops, whereas the foreigners food is not in a good quality because they stay in the shops a long time. [Would things be better for people in Grahamstown if the foreigners were to leave?] She says she doesn't have a problem with foreigners, it's just that with the foreigners there is something not right about them. [What does she mean by that?] It's how they sell their products....she made an example of the Rama (margarine) that we buy there. She's saying that she doesn't even like the colour of that Rama, but basically the Rama is...you buy it and it has to be cut in half. And they use their own things to cut it. So she does not like how they sell their food products, that they have to split it in halves. [So it's not about the foreigners themselves as people, but about the way they do business, or...?] She's on that point of business side. They do have things that they manufacture themselves that do not sit well with her. When we pass by the taxi rank, by the river, so there were these shops where they used to sell milk that they bought in farms, but that place now looks like it will be owned by a foreigner. So she's saying that when you buy milk, you don't buy milk that is already in a bottle, they have to refill your owned bottle. So because it is owned by foreigners now she will not be part of it, cause they are now to do it, they will pour water in it. So it's the quality of the service that they bring.
38. Is South Africa part of Africa? – So she's saying she's not in a position to say whether it is part of Africa or not. She was born here, she's never been to another African place where she can compare.
39. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes
40. What does it mean to be African? – Because she's from here, only in Grahamstown, only from this side only, so she cannot tell you much about what it means, because she hasn't explored other places. So she was born here, her whole life is here, she will die here, that's what it means for her.
41. Do you think that Indians or Muslims can be African? – Because of they were born here with Indians, so they know they were born with Indians here. But They do not have a relation whereby they can say they were born with foreigners here, they were born with Muslims here. Because of they were born with having Indians around here, they cannot say they are not from here because they were born here. Whereas with the Muslims and foreigners it's a different case.
42. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – Yes. And she makes the same example as the Indians, is that they were born here. [So is what is important then that people were born here, and there's a history together – is it important that people come from the same place for them to get along well together?] She's saying that it's better that way, that if we come from the same place it will make it better with relations, whereas with the foreigners since they just arrived in the picture now, when there is a protest that is arranged by the residents, they will just sit and watch from their shop windows, same as with the Afrikaners, the coloureds, they don't join in. [Is it a problem when people don't join in on the protests?] She says yes it's a problem because when the services are delivered, the services will be delivered to everyone, so they don't want to take part in, they want people to fight for them. So UPM once had a march to the municipality, where we had whites in that march but we never saw coloureds or foreigners. [Would it be a good thing if the foreigners joined the protests?] Yes, because they also want those services that the residents are in need of. [I want to ask – you often say 'my friend'; is that how you refer to the foreigners? What does it mean?] So they brought it in, it's the foreigners who said my friend, so we took it back to them. So instead of using the word amakwerekwere, the foreigners feel offended when we use that word, so instead of saying amakwerekwere we use 'oh my friend'. [Does everyone say 'my friend'?] She's saying there will always be people who will go with what is wanted – so there will always be people who say my friend – but within those good people there will always be bad ones that will say amakwerekwere.
43. One other question – she said before that when the foreigners were all in the police station after the incident, Ayanda wanted to take them to the UPM but she didn't want to. May I ask why? – She's saying that because of the community members that she lives within, who are against the foreigners, so she didn't want to be the only one within the community who says, ok, let's not fight them. [Because that can make problems for you?] Yes.
44. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – It is still coming. She's saying that she feels that because it is happening in other cities, it will still happen in Grahamstown. Because she's saying that when it happened and the director from Masifunde and the VOWA women were all together to calm the situation, and now you see, within those groups there is a difference now, they don't get along well. So she is keen to see how they will work together, to try and calm things. [Do you think that it is important to try and stop xenophobia when it happens?] She's saying that her statement is clear. That if it happens again, the only thing she wants to see is how will the movements work together, since they are not on good terms now, work together to calm things. That is the only thing she is keen on knowing.

45. Is there anything else you would like to add? - She's saying that this xenophobic thing is such a sensitive issue, but she remembers there was an incident where she gave one of the children R50 to go and buy electricity for R10, where she can split the R50, and then the foreign guy at the shop gave the child a R50 electricity, so she went to the shop to try and understand what had happened since she did not ask for R50 electricity. So as there was a conflict arising, one of the foreigners calmed himself, and he said you can take the R50 note and you can take the electricity and you can pay me at a later stage. So as much as there are issues, there are those that are willing to work together. [It seems that sometimes South Africans blame the foreigners for some of the problems in South Africa. Does she agree that we can blame the foreigners? Or who should we blame?] She says that yes, because she remembers she heard on the radio that there is this manufacturing place they have in Johannesburg that makes tyres, where it's only foreigners that work there. And then in some cases you get that there is a black person and a foreigner, and they go to the same place to work and they will get R20. That black person will say I cannot work for R20 a day, but that foreigner will adjust to the R20, knowing that when he or she goes back to his country, the value of the R20 will go up.

INTERVIEW 8 – 23 May 2017 (M) (UPM)

1. May I ask your age? - 37
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes. Here in Grahamstown in the township.
 - 2.1. [YES] What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – For me? I am a South African because I was born here, even my parents were born here. So I owe – South Africa and me, it's me.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – I would say because of humanity, as a human I see myself as a human whenever.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – No.
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – The UPM.
 - 5.1. [YES] What does the organisation do? – UPM it's a gathering of people who are unemployed, but it went as far as fighting for social issues.
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – Because I am unemployed first. And then I thought let me just, because I knew some people in, then I ended up joining.
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – My hope, it can at least bring down certain issues such as corruption and housing and all those corruptions. Bring them down, because I don't think as the UPM alone can achieve everything, but at least it can try to minimise everything.
6. Are you married? - No
7. Do you have children? How old are they? - No
8. What is your first language? – Xhosa.
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – A little bit of Zulu, Xhosa and Tswana.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – Yes. Language is everything.
11. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? - I think well....everyone expects that. To have...at least because you are the children of the soil. So at least you have to have that soil, first.
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? – For me? Firstly let me say that for me, as a person, the Freedom Charter does not exist at all, as much as....I never believe on it. I don't subscribe to anything like this, especially this famous quote, that quote. [Why don't you subscribe to it?] As I said before – you can't...everyone owns a thing. So you can't arrive when someone....so this cell phone itself, it can't belong to me because it's here, or it is in my hand, it belongs to you, the original owner it's you. Then I can use it, on your instruction.
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? - Tanti location.
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Yes. I never saw anything beside that. People always will be friendly with each other, but there are some consequences whereby maybe...many people {tackle it socially?} and other ones just burn things up and don't understand each other.
15. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – I can say the biggest, is people, young people being unemployed, it's effecting the location as a whole. Then service delivery from the municipality, because the location is very dirty, neglected and stuff. You can see.
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Yeah there are people from other countries that are residing there.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – As I said before, as we saw a few years back, some kind of {....} and then boom and it cooled down. As I said, it's just people get along, but there will be consequences of them getting along and certain influences...but I never seen that, besides that time we know. And I'm one of those that believes that what happened will happen again in future. I mean I'm not a prophecy, I don't prophesise it whereby....as we see things, because even in other areas it started early in 2006/2007 the first one. Then it happened – it does come up again, even if it's five years before you see. So that's why I'm saying even this one, it might come back. Even if I'm not there, during my great-grandchildren's time or whatever.

18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – Yes, in my experiences, I remember I stayed even in Joburg, and you can see some of them have a place, and you will be told but you will not believe it. But it's possible. [Have you experienced this in your community? Are the foreigners in Tanti part of the community?] Slightly, slightly. But not...
19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – Some...
20. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – Many of them are working here and there. Some do their small businesses, some are working...especially there was a few I know, they drive motorbikes for the pizza delivery, and then upgrade from that and drive delivery cars or whatever, delivery bakkies. And the shops – the Somalis and Pakistanis, the Indian types, but not Indian...
21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? – Yes, because all the shops in the community which were owned by indigenous people closed down. So I'm forced to go there. [Why did they close down?] So many issues. Some were not...education-wise with their businesses, they were not running even...some, it's a lack of resources or finance, and the skills. Then even the guys from outside we can blame them partly but I would not blame them too much. Because they do work together in whatever way. Black businesses, it was one was doing his own thing one was doing, they don't care. There was no cooperation between them. So they ended up getting things expensively, more than that bulk discount thing.
22. Do you think there are too many shops? – Competition as it is it's good, for even the customers. But now it's when the survival of the fittest comes in. Because for me as a customer - I am starting to try to sell some things, trying to do my own thing, like knowing that there are other people doing it makes me stronger, like trying to be better. So rather than if I was alone I would have even ended up getting very poor, poorly serving those few people who trusted me to do this thing. Because remember, to do a business, there are those people who always look up to you, especially in our communities, so they will support you wherever, without you're – even if you've treated them badly, they will always support you. Then, when the competition makes you try to treat even those who don't have hope within you...you try and please them. That's why I'm saying, competition is good.
 - 22.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops?
 - 22.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops?
23. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans?
24. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops?
25. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans?
26. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – Some, and some don't try. Because for example, maybe those – I believe some, they just close themselves in their shop, you know. Because as Xhosas in the community, there are events culturally that are happening, so you don't see them there, it's rare that you see them. But it's the places that if we talk about integration, they should have been part of. Yes I know there will be some names being called but... [Do you think it would help the situation if the foreigners participated more in the communities?] Yes it will. For example, we always try...you know, as I'm saying I am born and bred here. So my father used to own a shop, so the soccer team from the location will come and ask something, and then my father because he knows them he will donate something, but with these guys it's difficult to get those kind of donations. So that's where these hatred becomes more and more and more, this anger, because they are not giving back, they are always locked within burglars. So you see, they don't have that trustworthy with their customers whereby, even if they have a girlfriend or whatever in the township, they are always locked or whatever, not going outside. Maybe the only time they go outside is when they go and look for their stock and then they come back. But when there is something in the neighbourhood – but I am not saying all of them, but many of them. [So some of them do try and become part of the community?] Yeah but very few. They have their own churches which we...you know, everything they try to have their own, own, own. But they are here. I think for me it is going to be better if, they are here, try - I don't say they must just leave their own things totally – but try to get another way of doing things. Try to just get in in the community.
27. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes I was here.
28. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] – [NO TIME]
29. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015. – When that happened, there were too many rumours...
 - 29.1. Do you think the rumours were true? – Rumours are rumours, you can't – it's a rumour, because maybe someone else experienced it, or maybe someone else wanted to cause trouble you see. It's just a rumour, and it can be true or it can be...so you can't...
30. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? - Yes
31. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – It's only because of the rumours, because up to now, there's no tangible, because as you maybe know, the UPM tried to follow up after those. I remember we went even to SAPS and stuff, but we never got any tangible evidence for those rumours.
32. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? – There were so many because people are so many – so when one spark is happening, it just turned out to be uncontrollable.
33. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident?
34. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – Yes, people were caught by surprised, but they were surprised to the extent that they participated, because it was their surprise, so they were caught in the moment.
35. How did you feel after the incident? – I feel bad, I feel bad. Because as much as I say...I don't believe in that. If you say someone took out your job, or took out your business, as some of us are trying to do these little businesses, why can't you –

because this goes back to the competition thing – you must learn that you don't owe anybody and nobody will do you a favour because you are a South African or not. If someone you are, to me, it's a social problem that we are living in, we are living in this bomb, this bomb that is there, we don't target. And we tend to target the smaller, those who don't have power to change it, instead of targeting the power, where the power lies.

36. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? - The police tried, but some police...they were instrumental of not making it, not saving it. Instead of trying they were making it worse.

37. How did the municipality respond to the lootings. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not? – I don't know what I can say. Because, really I don't know if. But I saw them, but later on trying. But I might not say it's a good job.

38. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – I can say Afrophobia, instead of xenophobia. The guys always being targeted whenever these things are happening are those African from African countries. Because if it was xenophobic – because I remember that thing started here in town, I was here in town earlier, then I took a taxi while it was starting here in town. Not started but the march was happening. I remember it was a march. And then when I arrived in the township I remember the day, I was visiting my cousin, in the location called Joza, extension 4, so when I was there I started to check on my Facebook, getting those kind of information on my Facebook, that there is looting happening in town and the police are there in full force. And then as I'm going out to my home from there, I saw things, people are starting to gather, those who were in some taxis. And then it was. Because if it was xenophobia, even the town, those guys would have looted shops like Lewis, or Checkers/Shoprite. But they tend to focus to the Somali and Pakistani guy shops, not those. So even there in Beaufort street where they started, there is Checkers down there... but they never went down there to Checkers. [So why do you think they targeted the people that they did?] You know, when you – you can't test your power to someone who can defeat you. You always test your power to someone that you will defeat. [Could you explain Afrophobic a little more to me?] As I'm saying, I'm saying it's Afrophobic to me because it's a target, they only target the African guys. [And the Bangladeshi and Pakistani guys...?] Yeah those guys, Asians, even coming up from the apartheid that we experienced, we knew that, for example, Indians and blacks and coloureds were grouped in one – but one was important than the other. You see, it's the same as here and what we are doing to us – that us are doing now. We say that those who have lighter skins are become more important than those who have darker skins.

38.1. [YES] Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – No, no, no, no – if you look to Grahamstown, where almost all of us will spend our money, it's mainly the place that we concentrate on, Beaufort street and stuff, it's mainly those Bangladeshis, Somalians and others. Even here when you go to High street, you find out blacks don't use too much that part of High Street which is upper – even in that side now the guys are there, you will see their shops are starting to flourish on that side. So that means whenever a business opens, you know that he has seen his or her target market.

39. Who is a foreigner? (For example) is it someone who doesn't speak the local language? Looks different, speaks different? From somewhere else? – Foreigner, it can be by birth.... To me? I would say that anyone who is not born in Africa is a foreigner to me, because I am in Africa. I'm saying the whole of Africa because to me, I believe we were divided for colonialization. Because if you try to read history books, they will always say....for example I'm Xhosa, but you'll find out if you follow the history, I was not born in this area, I was born in the area of Natal, and then we were divided....that's why even, if you compare the Ngunis with Sotho speakers, the Ngunis have their own language, which they all – Nguni being Ndebele, Xhosa, Zulu – at least their language is familiar, and you look at Tswana, Sotho, and others – at least they understand each other in that language. And you find again, when you move from the Ndebele, or Xhosa and then someone from Zimbabwe – you get that one who speaks Shona, at least he won't become lost when you speak Xhosa. Colonialists divided because of divide and rule, because if you divide – it's like when you have your loaf of bread, you can't just eat the whole loaf. You cut it in slices.

40. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? - Because we are living with economy, it's a part of economy.

40.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – Everyone, even if he or she is bad, he will always have his positivity. So as much as I will not have specific things, but I knew....even if it's what is called a criminal, he will have his positivity, to the people who knew him. [Do you think it can benefit the country, having the foreigners here?] Yeah....in terms of, as I'm saying, in terms of competition and stuff – it's beneficial in the sense that people will know that, when they arrive in our townships, they do things that we undermine. Like they will buy clothes maybe here in town or in Joburg, they will go to door to door selling those clothes or blankets, whatever. And the business grows out of that. Before we just wink of our eyes. Now it's no longer using food, it's driving. Before that, he's moving, and the younger brother is coming to manage this one....the one who was here first is moving to another area to open something, even then when he arrives in that area....so that mentality, it's such a great mentality. I'm saying that even with the famous Guptas, we only knew that they arrived in '93, selling in their cars, using their cars to sell clothes. Where are they now? Because they didn't stop with that thing, they moved and moved and moved....they went through with that thing, and then they flourished. As I said, I used to live in Joburg – someone will arrive and look for a garden job, maybe get one to just look after a child or being a cleaner, he will do that job and then you will see, within months he is changing, and they have a way of saving money, look for the guys back home....that's humanity as a human being. That black culture, at least they try to keep....because it's not like it's me, me, me. It's me, my brother, my sister.

40.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring/ negative consequences of them being here? – Because we are fighting for small economy. Because we have now as I said before, we have a loaf of bread....now instead of sharing this loaf of bread four of us, we have to share it with six of us, which now it's no longer one has his quarter – now everyone wants that piece.

41. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – Even that one it's a problematic, it's very problematic. As much as we'll say love is love, and love is between two people....but in the way that they are doing, it ended

up affecting others. Because they do these things –they will give many of them, especially when they arrive, they will give this women a money, a certain portion of money, they will come and marry here, then they stay with her in certain areas. You'll find out, many of them they experience bad things when they go with them back home, and then they ended up divorcing. So that person, she was used in that way....it's coming back to the family. And even they don't take – I don't know whose fault this is, when they were doing this marriage thing, you find that the family is not being too much involved. It's kind of these two people doing their own thing there, you see? So it's becoming problematic to us. You could see, when sometimes the going gets tough, the men move to another place. Because they tend to do this thing when they arrive, they're starting their business, and then when their business is flourishing, in some instances, they will go....you see?

42. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? - I'm not good with that kind of thing. Because as a Xhosa, in my culture, if we had a child....so the child can stay with you, but he or she will depend on me. In many instances, he or she will come....it's mine, culturally it's mine, as much as you've just given birth. But culturally that child must come and claim my surname, the clan name. [So that can make it complicated if the father is a foreigner...?] It does not make complicate...but it's complicated in terms of this, like I said, these people do these things together there. Now, when things get bad, these things...this child, we'll have to accept this child as ours. And you'll find that some of these guys, not all of them, they have wives at home. So now they are taking these wives for business purposes, of being here, or for easier road for their business to grow, and prosperity.
43. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – It's not difficult. It can be a very good thing, because every culture has its own way of doing, which many times gets interesting and stuff. An exchange.
44. What is it that makes people different? (For example) how they dress? Their religion?
45. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not?
 - 45.1. **[NO]** Why do you think some people have a problem with this?
46. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown?
 - 46.1. How do you know them?
47. Do you go to church?
 - 47.1. Are there foreigners at your church?
 - 47.2. Where do foreigners go to church?
48. Are the foreigners friendly?
49. Should foreign children go to school here?
 - 49.1. Don't you think that's a good way for them to become more South African? {OUT OF TIME}
50. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – Not enough, not enough.
51. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – As I said before, jobs are such a big issue. The issue of land, which is unresolved, is such a cluster of all these things. Maybe if they can resolve land, and give even those that they have given, because some people have that piece of land, which is not title deeds and stuff – they don't have anything that says it's theirs. Whenever they try to do something they will be told, no wait for the title deed, especially in the rural areas, you find those people want to do something, develop something, but they can't, they can't even insure that thing so they can't risk too much.
52. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? – At least deal with the issue of land, give people jobs, then we will see. Give opportunities to those that don't want jobs but who want to be their own boss.
53. What do you think people should be doing? – Even government actually is ordinary people. So they have to make sure that at least those they put there....because not all of us can lead. So to me, government is ordinary people, those people who are in government are elected representatives, officials of those who are down here. [So what should the people down here be doing?] Force those who are up there to do what they mandated them to do. If they mandated them to do a corruption, they must force them to do corruption, but if they mandated them to do better things than corruption, to fight corruption, then they must make sure that if they don't fight corruption then you go. You can't stay doing something that you were not employed for. You can't stay in any company when you do something opposite for the company. They should make them accountable. [Do you think that's the role of organisations like the UPM?] Yeah, that's what we are trying to do. It's a role, because we must make sure that those who are upper than us are account.
54. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – I can't...that one, I really can't, because I don't know how many we can accommodate first, so I can't say we're supposed to have twenty, while I don't know. But my problem, is there are those who are not here legally, who are not accounted for. My problem is those ones. If those ones can be sorted, then I will be fine, because those who deal with those issues will know that this country is supposed to accommodate how many.... [So it's a problem of keeping track of who's here?] Yeah, because that's another problem that we are facing here. For example, there is this famous pastor who abducted children and did those kind of things....after so many years being here, doing churches, collecting, he is found out, he is there in the country illegally. And he's famous, having his own TV stations and all that kind of stuff, illegally.
55. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – I can say it's true. Because that thing, as I said, it's always sparked by a certain issue. We're staying with these people, with them, for maybe 800 days, then one day something happens, then it sparks the whole thing. It's like, when you're in a relationship, you don't fight every day, but then divorce can happen because of one thing. For example, if we can go back to the topic, underneath there are all those things – land issues, jobless issues, lack of business opportunities issues, they are underneath. Then we are here, just walking on top of them. Then there will come one day, someone will get angry with a child, and beat a child. And then, someone will remember, no, this guy is not from here, we don't even knew his parents here. His or her parents here. We should beat him. Then all these issues come up – they just BOOM. [Why do you think it's so often the foreigners who become the targets?] Because, even within our families, if we do something as children, and eat sugar, when

we are getting reprimanded, the child from next door often will be reprimanded more than us from the family, because the parents will always think that that behaviour comes with that one and not from here. So even in this, people will always think that if you take a gun, or maybe a knife and stab a citizen, all of your brothers will do the same issue. Because remember that thing, it takes one day to spark up, it takes even a minute to spark up – it can spark up while we are here – and then when we go outside it's just uncontrollable. But within a day or so, it will just go back again peacefully with the way we are.

56. What does it mean to be African? – Because I'm an African, because I've never been to any place before, I only knew Africa, so I would say it means what I am now, though I can't describe it, I was in what is called the borders of Africa.
57. Do you think that Indians or Muslims or whites can be are African? – Yes, if they belong...if they claim they are indigenous here and they can prove it, then I don't have a problem.
58. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – It can. It can.

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

59. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – Just to call people in the same house. Because remember it is difficult when one is in this corner or one is there....it's like you can't have a marriage where your wife sleeps in another room. So the best thing is to bring people here together, to face whatever challenges they had, whatever rumour, and to scrutinise the rumour and you can't...if I spread the rumour and if it affected you, we should sit at one table like this and talk about the rumour, and what proof is.
60. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – Yes! Because we are humans. In Xhosa we say, 'feet does not have an ear' – meaning that, I don't know where can I land up tomorrow. I don't know where I will end up tomorrow.
61. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia?
62. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state) – As I'm saying, even those who are coming, you know what happens – people arrive, coming from elsewhere. Let's say this room, this whole building is ours. People arrive and stay in that room that side. We only see each other, just greetings maybe. Not even introduce themselves formally. And we see their children again. Remember we are using the same toilet, we are using all these kinds of things, petty issues that we can see they're petty – but when the problem comes, and the pipe bursts. That's when they might say, no, when my children were playing here alone, this thing didn't happen. So the fault becomes. But if someone who arrives in a certain community, if they can introduce themselves formally, if they introduce themselves, they try to participate to the things that are common here – if there's a soccer team, try to care about that soccer team. If there's a choral choir, they try ...not just to see the locals as their customers, because that's one big problem with them. They see the locals as their customers. So it's not something that can make that integration. Because now, when things have gone wrong, we will say, we didn't even knew why you were here in the first place, how did you get here in the first place? We don't have that relationship, as people who are in a commune together. Because if you are in a commune – at least you must have that. But now we don't have that kind of thing. [Do you think that organisations like the UPM can help build that kind of space, or do you think it's up to the foreigners to come to the table?] Yeah everyone....maybe, I don't know, we can't say it's up to them, we can't say it's up to us. Everyone, it should be a mutual respect as we say. If there's respect it must be mutual.
63. [I noticed today in my previous interview that they were calling the foreigners 'my friend' as a slang word – can you tell me about this?] – This 'my friend' one, in many instances, its used for those with lighter skin, those who are whiter. The makwerekwere as you know, is for those who are darker. So it's just that kind of way of distinguishing them. For the Bangladeshis, Pakistanis. But now, at least, the 'my friend' – they like to use it, those who own shops and stuff. Even those guys, they will say it when they are helping the customer. Then, even that as it is, is problematic. Because now, I don't want to say who is your name. I'm calling you 'my friend', and you are calling me 'my friend', and we are not even friends, we don't know our names. We don't have that formal introduction.
64. What did you think of this interview?
65. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me?

INTERVIEW 9 (24 May 2017) (M)

1. May I ask your age? – I've got some 52 years
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes. I was born here in Grahamstown.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – I'm so very happy if I'm a South African, because I was born here in South Africa. No matter what's going on. Yes I know that there are people who come from overseas, etcetera, but I didn't say, they have no chance to come here in South Africa. He is a human being, you see. I like the human being, something like me. The blood is red, and yours, it is red, and my heart – you've got my heart, you've got my lungs, something like the poor foreigners. Whatever they come from. If the foreigners are doing the wrong things, I can say, sit, don't do this and this. I didn't say that thing it is right or it is wrong, but we are supposed to treat as a human being. I didn't say the foreigners, if they are there in South Africa, they are totally wrong. No, it is not wrong, that is what I know. They look sort of like me.
3. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – I'm unemployed. [Did you work before?] I was working before. [What did you do before?] Oh there's a lot of...I can't say. I was there at Rhodes University. I was a domestic worker,

general worker. I was working on the kitchen, Jan Smuts, etc. But you know the problem, the problem – everybody they get some problem. That's why I'm not working, you see.

4. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – The UPM

4.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? [Below]

4.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – The problem I was joined the UPM, is the UPM is the organisation who knows what's going on in South Africa. There are many people who are still suffering, sort of like now, you see? So, the rate of the unemployed, you see, the UPM, they fight for the people to get something to eat. To get something to benefit. That's why I joined the UPM, to support the UPM, they help the people. If something is wrong they go to the municipality to tell that, no this thing is going like this and this and this and this. There are lots of people that are not working, they are supporting us, that's why I joined the people who are still fighting for the poor, who are still fighting for the people who have got no houses, who are helping everybody, you see.

4.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – There are a lot of things. I can't say. I would like the UPM to actually something like, to know who are you? Where did you come from? We are supposed to benefit – sort of like everybody, you know, I can do with this and this and this, I would like the UPM to change the people to know, you are not favouring another organisation, you know who you are. The people of South Africa, we are supposed to know, we are still suffering, we have got the right to have something, sort of like the houses, everything, you see. I don't want to say me I'm rich. Everybody – if they like to be cool, to get something, I don't like if somebody is 'oh this one is rich, this one is poor' – we are still suffering. We are still – we've got no land, we've got nothing, we are supposed to know what is going on. I like the UPM to be for that.

4.1.3. Are you a member of a political party? – Yes, I'm a member of the EFF. Before I was the ANC, in the time of apartheid. You know that time, of apartheid. But something was changing now. Where I saw, the ANC, they didn't do sort of like the Freedom Charter they said the days before. We are looking, the people are still suffering. That is why I joined another organisation. I didn't say I don't like the ANC, but I don't like the ANC – they're promises....

5. Are you married? – Yes.

5.1. **[YES]** are you married to a South African? - Yes

6. Do you have children? How old are they? - Yes

6.1. **[YES]** What would you like them to do when they grow up?

6.2. Do they go to school in Grahamstown?

6.3. **[YES] [EITHER]** Do any foreigners' children also attend school with your child/ren? How do they get along?

[OR] How do your children get along with the other children? Are they treated differently?

7. What is your first language? – Xhosa.

8. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – I am trying to speak English...

9. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – every language is important. If I was people who are...if I got a chance to go back to school to learn too much, I am supposed to know every language, but the problem is that I was in detention. I didn't get a chance to go forward to know what's going on with the school. Now, I want to go to the school – but I'm still old now. Yes I know that...but if I'm going to go back to school, I'm wasting my time because I've got 52 years. Just look now!

10. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – This question, makes me to be...if I can tell you the truth now, I am still under the bad condition. I think last year on the 26 December, I get some big storm – you know that storm that was here? I'm still living in the squatter's camp. My house is broken. Everything is. I'm still fighting for that. The Makana municipality, they said they are coming to give me something like a structure, until now. I can't say I am benefitting, I benefit something, because I'm living on the squatter's camp, and when the little rain is coming, I'm worried because I'm supposed to put something like a bath, because the water is coming. Look today, I've got some fever, flu. And my wife, my wife is blind, she doesn't see, I think on the 6 December I'm supposed to go to the hospital provincial, to get some treatment of the eyes, you see? And when we are back again, the transport they put us here in town, they didn't take us again to put at the location. It's still another oppression, you see. Because sometimes I've got no money to take a taxi to go there, you see? That's why I say...I am not benefitting.

11. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? - Today, it means to me, it's a liar. Because you are talking with the mouth, but still we are still suffering now. The Freedom Charter, it is right – that clause. But we didn't go with that clause now. The Freedom Charter, they said, there shall be share among those that are working, there shall be equal education...but there is no equal education, just look today, other people they are still going to another school, another day they are still suffering. But the Freedom Charter, we didn't go right with the clause now...we are talking about what we didn't do.

11.1. Do you agree? – Yes. Yes.

12. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – Now? Now I'm living at Extension 7, Etemeni(?) location, squatters' camp.

13. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Ja, we can say we are together, but we are still suffering...if you can go there now, if it is raining, ours streets there is a lot of mud. You see? And whenever you've got some car, you can't go to our location that side because...there's a lot of things who are corrupt, that are broken, we are still suffering.

14. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – we are still suffering with the water, we are still suffering with the transport, we are still suffering with a lot of things you see? Because we are still living on the squatters' camp. If it is cold it is cold, if it is raining our roof, our – we've got no houses, we've got no shelter, we can say that, our shelter...we are worried, yes we need some water, when it's raining we need some water, but when it's raining we are still worried, hey, where are we going to sleep. Sometimes the water goes through under the bed. So we are still suffering.

15. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this?

16. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents?
17. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community?
 - 17.1. **[YES]** How can this happen?
 - 17.2. **[NO]** Could you explain why not?
 - 17.3. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities?
18. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – There are a lot of my friends. They are still...love us. Sort of like me, I'm a clown. I like to make jokes, joking – they like me. My name at the location, they are using that name [Kokelyu(?)], they know me at location. In other words Kokelyu in English, it is a leader you see? They were still joking sort of like that. We are building stones, sort of like to be united.
19. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – Shops. We've got no shops...and if we go and we've got sort of like that shortage of money, we can say my friend, this money, it is short, you can't give me a sort of like a bread? They give you a chance to pay when you get some salary again.
20. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? - Yes
 - 20.1. What are the benefits of these shops for you? – [Above]
21. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true?
 - 21.1. **[YES]** Why do you think it's true/how do you know if it's true?
 - 21.1.1. Do you think that South African shops and businesses also bribe the municipality?
22. Someone I've spoken to described the shops in the location as 'mushroom shops' because they come up everywhere, like mushrooms. Do you think there are too many shops?
 - 22.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops?
 - 22.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – There is a competition....sometimes...Look here now, in South Africa, most of foreigners looked at competition. And black people now, they've got no shops. I didn't say the foreigners they are wrong to get something, sort of like a shop. But there is problems. [Do you think that sometimes South Africans are blaming foreigners?] Yeah....sometimes we are blaming the foreigners, sort of like maybe, they are dealing with the drugs. Not that they are blaming for...that they don't want them to be here. Most of the foreigners are others, they bring sort of like the drugs, really, you know that? So there is sort of like...lots of drugs, they come from there. That's why you see there is a clash between the foreigners...because of the problem that mostly they bring cocaine in. So we didn't say we don't like the foreigners, but the problem is they bring.
23. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans?
24. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops?
25. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans?
26. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – Yes. [Does the community treat them like part of the community?] Yeah, we treat them sort of like a part of the community. They going around around now. You can't....what can I say? Everywhere there is tsotsis, in America there is a tsotsi, in Nigeria and overseas there is another tsotsi. But it's here in South Africa we're trying to be all together you see? You can't say no there is no tsotsi in the foreigners....there are everywhere there is a something, whatever, even a priest, your mother your father your dada....
27. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods?
28. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yeah, we were here. It was us, the Unemployed People's movement, who are helping the looting of the foreigners. It was the place of us. And Rural People's Movement, and Voice of...Women [VOWA], and the UPM were trying to stop that thing where people were supposed to loot the shops of the foreigners. So that's why we said, the UPM is the organisation we are trying to be. [Why was it important to stop the looting?] The problem is that, they are coming from there to do something, they give us a chance to get some jobs. Other of our sisters, they got some jobs from the my friends, that's why we were trying to say, No, this is a people, don't do this and this and this. You see?
29. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?]
30. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
 - 30.1. Do you think the rumours were true?
 - 30.2. Did you think so then? Can you tell me why/ why not?
31. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct?
32. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted?
33. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders?
34. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident?
35. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – Yes I got some shock, because I didn't think the people were going to do the looting. I remember the day, I was at location. I was coming from a job here at UPM, at Masifunde. When I get to the location I say to the people hey, they are doing this and this and this. They were sort of like shocked, sort of like me. But it was starting from the rumour of the foreigners, he was kidnapping some, but it was the rumours you see. I got some shock, really. [Did you think that the rumours were true?] I can't say it was true, I can't say it is not true, because it was rumours, you see? [Do you think that it was only the rumours that was the reason for the looting, or was it something else as well?] It

was the rumours, really – but I can't say it was the rumours or it was not the rumours, but the problem it was starting with the taxis. The taxi – this is another rumour, I can't say really, I've got no proof – but the problem was it was the taxi who was making people start. [Why do you think that so many people joined in with the looting?] You know, I can't lie – sort of like me, I'm making sort of like an example. Here's a truck of beer, or of fruit, it's falling there. I am on the street to pick it up. But it's not my mind, you see. So that's why there are a lot of people who are taking looting, other people, who are not on that...mood. They saw, hey, here's another body who got a drink – no man! You know, mos? But you can take those people that they are stealing some things. But there is a problem, if the people are not working, there is something that will be...your mind to be changed. You don't want to do sort of a wrong thing, but if you are hungry you are hungry. You see?

36. How did you feel after the incident? – After the looting of the shop, what did I feel? Hey, after that I was so worried because foreigners....they lost a lot of things. They've got nothing to sleep, they've got nothing to eat, you see? It was the VOWA who tried the foreigners to get something. Trying to raise to help the foreigners you see. But the foreigners they are still....survive in that matter. So I was worried in that time, that the foreigners would get some more looting you see...
37. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings?
38. How did the municipality respond to the lootings?
 - 38.1. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not?
39. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – Hey, there are a lot of questions, there are a lot of problems. Because I can't say....there is a problem of finance, there is a problem of what-what, you see, but if you are steal you are steal, you see? So the problem, they are most of tsotsi, they have got some powers you see, to get something you see? But you are running that place, oh no this is oh my friend... if the tsotsi they get some chance to do the corrupt, they can say there are a lot of tsotsi. Sort of like me, I'm not silly – but, the end of the day, I'm going to see, you can't go with that bad company, you know the law. If you are working with that bad company you going to be a wrong man. There is another problem – you will know that black people here in South Africa or here in Grahamstown, there are a lot of black people who've got some shop, but when comes the most of foreigners, there are a lot of black people who didn't get some shops...that's why we see, hey, those people, they take our business. That's why they can be [attacked].
 - 39.1. **[YES]** Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence?
40. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this?
41. Who is a foreigner? – The foreigner? The foreigner is a human being. I can't say now, but the foreigner is a human being sort of like me. You can't change now. They've got their mother, they've got their father, sort of like me. I come from my father, I come from my mother. So they are human being, they didn't come from the stone.
42. Can foreigners become South Africans?
43. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – I can say here in South Africa there are a lot of place, maybe, in that side, they like to fight, every time there's a war, war, war. So other people they don't like if there is a war, so maybe they say, we can go to the South Africa, because here in South Africa there are a lot....they can have a better life.
 - 43.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – They bring sort of like...they bring the good things. There is another foreigners, there is a Nigerian who is doing a wrong thing, maybe sort of one people, you see. Now that one people can make another people catch some suffering, you see. Another one, they bring sort of like the right stuff, other one they bring bad stuff...that's why they start a fight. Hey, those foreigners, sometimes they are right, sometimes they are wrong. They bring something right, other one they bring something wrong.
 - 43.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? [Above]
44. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – There is another problem – you're asking a good question. If, I didn't say, but our sisters sometimes, they are unemployed. They making our brothers and sisters, they don't know what's going on – other foreigners, they give something like a soup pack or something, but they didn't bring to get married sort of like they want to marry really. They are using, to succeed here in SA. But other ones, they are right.
 - 44.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know?
 - 44.2. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives?
45. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – I can say he's South African because he was born here in South Africa.
46. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why?
47. What is it that makes people different? (For example) how they dress? Their religion?
48. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not?
 - 48.1. **[NO]** Why do you think some people have a problem with this?
49. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown?
 - 49.1. How do you know them?
50. Do you go to church?
 - 50.1. Are there foreigners at your church?
 - 50.2. Where do foreigners go to church?
51. Are the foreigners friendly?
52. Should foreign children go to school here?
 - 52.1. Don't you think that's a good way for them to become more South African?
53. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – The government sometimes, if there is an action, they take a long time, you see? They want to do something but our government, no, the wait until you fall in the blood....you can't say the government – sometimes the government, they need the blood falling on the ground, before they do. It is our social movement who are support, the

foreigners, the government they wait until to die, and then they take some action first. You know everything first. [So you are saying that the UPM is actually working with the foreigners before it gets so bad that people get killed?] Yes.

54. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – The biggest problem in South Africa is that most of people are not working, and the biggest problem is there is a lot of drugs. Other ones....we are still suffering, because our municipality, they didn't do right things. The biggest problem is the corruption in SA, I can say that is the biggest problem is corruption.
55. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems?
56. What do you think people should be doing? – People is supposed to be unite, to forget about past, we are supposed to change our minds now to unite as the people of South Africa. You see, I can't say you are a white guy, or you are a Nigerian, or if you are....we are supposed to know we are the human beings and we're supposed to do the right things, you see, to be united. [Were you involved in the struggle?] Yes – I was in the struggle, I was told you first, I can't continue school because I was in detention, I was serving for a couple of years to fight the fighting for the freedom. But now I can see that the Freedom Charter is not going like that, that time. Look, today, I am poor. There are another people who came from there, but they are up there now. Those who were fighting for the freedom they are still suffering.
57. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – Hey, there are too many foreigners. I think so, you can't run away. Now we're going to see in our world we're going to be instead with the foreigners. If you're going to Stone Crescent, there are foreigner, if you're going to the Port of PE, there are foreigners, you can't run away now. You know, the foreigners, they are going around around, we are together now. [Do you think there is a place for the foreigners in South Africa?] There is a lot of place, they are still living at location now.
- 57.1. Is the government doing enough to solve this problem? What should the government be doing?
58. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – It is not true. That's because, you can't all the time listen to the people of the Zumas. He is lying, I can't trust Zuma, because I know what I see. Zuma is a lizard, I am sorry to say that, but he is looking sort of like a lizard.
59. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – The foreigners, there are a lot of foreigners here, but the problem is our government, they need some money for the foreigners....but they didn't treat sort of like to be together. The government, they don't care what's going on because they know that the government, they are safe. They go with their planes, they are safe, but the foreigners they are not safe, they are going around sort of like me.
60. What does it mean to be African? – You are supposed to be here because you are an African, you are still here now, you are still born in South Africa, we are still born on the Africa. We are the Africans. That will never change. I am talking with you now, you are an African. Amandla – it's me and you.
61. Is South Africa part of Africa?
- 61.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways? – No I don't think so, I think it's the same. But the problem is not understanding the languages, you see? But we are still the same!
62. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes!
63. Are you proud of being African? -Yes
64. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – It is an African – an Indian looks my colour, looks the part. Only the problem is if you are a white or if you are a black, 'no you're not African!' – it has nothing to do with the colour. The problem is the blood. The problem – look, you've got some knees, you've got some body, we are African. You are not a dog!
65. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? [Above]
66. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015?

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

67. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this?
68. How did the community respond to these actions?
69. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – Ok, I can say it first, we're supposed to be all the time on the workshop, to say our problems. I don't like to see the xenophobia about the foreigners. If all the time we were dealing with them, that mind will be far away from if you are a foreigners or a what-what, you see. If we can be together. Just forget about you come from there, you come from what, if we are dealing together, and stop to to the wrong thing, to bring the wrong things, then we can look what our plan is now, to go like this and this and this and this. There is no other way now. We are the people of South Africa. Only God knows the people.
70. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia? N/A
71. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state) – You can't say it is difficult or not difficult, but if we can all the time to organise, to make some workshops with the foreigners, to survive. We can't say now these are foreigners and this is not a foreigners. Equal, in the work shop.
72. What did you think of this interview?
73. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me?

(JOINT) INTERVIEW 10 - 25 MAY 2017 (1-M) (2-M)

1. May I ask your ages? – 1- 40s, both of us.

2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – 1-We are from Vukani in Grahamstown, both of us.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – 1- I can say, to me, South African means that, since I was born here in this area....but it doesn't take me away from...I'm an African. It's just I was born in this area. 2 -And for me, still the same thing, because we were born here in SA, but we don't say we're not ...people from Africa, Uganda, whatever, we different to them, we are still the same. We are the people.
3. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – 1- No, we're not right now...
4. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – Yes we are.
 - 4.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? – 1-The UPM, the reason why we joined the UPM, we heard that UPM is supporting the struggle of the community, all the struggles. Like we see things are happening to our areas, so then if we can fix things, we're trying, we're supporting whatever struggles. 2-And to add more to that, the UPM is a group of unemployed people. But even if we have a problem at work, you can go to UPM to explain what's the problem, and maybe he sort out the problem.
 - 4.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – 2-We joined it because we are not working. Then maybe, UPM, if it sees that we are not working but we are trying to solve the problems of the community and the people as well, maybe it can be another thing, somewhere else....
 - 4.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – 1- I think the UPM, the way I see it, someday somehow, it will create a space for people who are unemployed, because it raises the question to the government why people are not employed. So the government will maybe come up with ideas of how to create other jobs. 2- For instance, now, we have in Port Elizabeth the GM [General Motors], it's closing – more the people are not working even now, but what about those from the company that's closing there? Then will add more – the number will go up, of the unemployed. So I think the best way, if we can speak to government, at least then maybe give us a direction. Because even if, you can see in Grahamstown, Grahamstown is not clean. It's another thing, we have to pick up the papers, to do something, and at least at the end of the month we must get something. We're having a baby – he's having I think three or four – but me I'm having two, but I'm unemployed, I'm not working.
 - 4.1.3. Are you members of a political party? – Yes, yes. [Which one?] Both of us we're the same. DA. [Why DA?] 1- No, because when you look at the DA, it's got the strategies that were used by Tata Madiba....to build the country as one, instead of saying country is for the blacks, this [part?] is for the whites, it must be that our country is one. Because we are South Africans. If you're South Africans, it doesn't matter what colour are you. That's why I was attracted to the DA, cause it's finishing the rainbow nation.
 - 2- And another thing, I don't know why we differentiate the people. If you're black you are black, whether you come from Nigeria or whatever. But I don't know why...I don't know that idea we have when you feel you are Xhosa speaking you are Xhosa speaking, [unclear] But only the problem is the language. I don't know what, are we jealous of the language or what? Why are we not learning that language? So that we can speak one thing, and be united.
 - 1 - Just to help you a little bit... because you find that sometimes amazing, they are fighting apartheid for many years, but now that they are the ones in power, they are the one who call other parties by names – like this party is playing to the whites. I don't know what they are saying exactly because they are fighting apartheid for many years, but now they are doing the same thing.
 - 2 – Yes, they do the same thing! And they're more than apartheid now, it's more than apartheid! Apartheid, you can't pay a toilet. You must pay two rand to go in toilet! You're not going to do that something there, maybe you go there just to pee, but you must pay that two rand! You see, at that time there was a toilet everywhere here, you're just not paying, you just go there and do that something you're supposed to do there, and you go. But now you have to pay two rand! I'm not working – where am I going to get two rand? But now I have to... close to the tree? In the middle of the road, now I have to...do something there? Well it is wrong! And I make dirty as well, because somebody there, when the sun is shining, then other people they go there to just relax there. But after that they can't, it's smelling there, because I just left the thing there!
5. Are you married? – 1 – Yes I'm married. 2 – I was married, but....
 - 5.1. **[YES]** are you married to a South African? – 1 – Yes...
6. Do you have children? How old are they?
 - 6.1. **[YES]** What would you like them to do when they grow up?
 - 6.2. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – 1 – No my children now are underage, they are very young.
 - 2- Two of them, they are in [Fikazole?] lower primary school.
 - 6.3. Do any foreigners' children also attend school with your child/ren? How do they get along? – But it's fine? I have no problem... if there is a problem then the teachers always used to call me, and tell me what is going on.
7. What is your first language? -
8. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them?
9. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so?
10. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – 1- I don't think...let's take an example. The kids from foreigners - it's sick. But still it's a kid. You having the resources like clinics, better clinics – you can't say that kid cannot go there and get a doctor or medication because he's a foreigner. But if you say so, what it makes you, as a parent?
 - 2- Yes. And another thing, we're going to churches. In churches we are trying to unite, it's where another problem of being there to express their words – because we must be together, but I don't know which way we can be together. But we are separated.

11. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? Do you agree? - 1 – Yes, I agree. Coming back to that idea of Madiba, because South Africa belongs to all who live in it. [Does this also apply to people who come here to work?]
- 2- Because now, we are having a problem in what you're saying...because there's the foreigners, they already have a baby here now. We call it...include in that statement. But the father is not for South African, maybe he's for Angolan, then now the baby is for South Africa and the father is for Angola. Then I don't know what... But I go with Bob Marley, as long as you are a black man you are an African! [So if an Angolan is living here and working here, can this statement apply for him as well?] Hey. There's something now... it's a tricky one, this one. Because, what I'm worried, we are the Xhosa tradition...we're having a problem, but if you see a China and an umlungu coming from England, umlungu doesn't say to other umlungus Kwerekwere this one. Why? Why he's not saying that? But if me, I'm a Xhosa, I see an Angolan and a Pakistan one I'm saying Kwerekwere that one, my friend that one. Why I'm giving a name? Because I must ask a name to that guy – then he says he's Patrick, I must call him Patrick, it's finish and klaar. Then talk to Patrick what is. You see?
- 1 – for my point of view, for the fact that you call this Angolan, South African, or whatever, it was a colonially – I can say, colonially framed, to divide Africa. So if then we are keeping on calling colonial names, we are not going to have one common, to build our Africa as a whole. Because Africa I believe that should have no borders. Because we are all Africans.
12. Where in Grahamstown do you live? - Vukani
13. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – 1 – Yeah now, because before, there was that thing called xenophobia, it affected the whole county, but also Vukani, it was a part of misunderstanding. But with the community leaders there, we tried to call them and explain to them, no, let's work together. I understand that not all the foreigners are [unclear---cleanse? Something positive.]. I can say that. But even if you say that they bring drugs or whatever, a lot of things, even before the foreigners there were drugs in South Africa. But we mustn't fight, we must sit down and try to solve that problem in that time. [What misunderstanding in Vukani?] That thing where there was all the looting in the shops.
14. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? - 2- The biggest problems in Vukani, because we need a hall, we do not have a hall there. There's a lot of spaces, but there's no crèche there in Vukani, but the spaces are there for those things. Then now this things, we are not saying nothing about that, but the spaces are created there. But if we have a meeting we have to stand outside, if it's raining sometimes, if it's raining there's nobody there. If it's cold, sometimes very cold, nobody there. But we tried to call a meeting but people are not coming because they've seen the weather.
- 1 – To me, the problems in Vukani I am seeing is like... in the country. Because they still divide the opportunities to their parties, not according to the community. Not as a citizen. So that thing, it divides us.
15. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – 1- No, I mean before Vukani, we were taking to all the squatters around, since Vukani is a new location, but then Vukani people, some of the people are renting. The owners of the houses have gone away, so you see every day new faces.
- 2- It's where the other problem is happened, because remember the guy who killed the other girl there, he was staying up there in Vukani, and then after that the neighbour don't know this guy. He was doing something there in the other location, and then he run away to Vukani. But then after that, we don't know that...the neighbour don't know this people, but they've seen this people each and every night, past ten, past twelve. But the time goes on, and they find out about this one, he make that thing there in the other location and went running to our location. So we removed that person quickly, because he must go back where he was doing that thing there, he can't just run away. And the skellums, they go like that. Even at the small shop with the foreigners, and the foreigners must be having a specific time of closing their shops there. Because they like to open their shops while it's too dark... then that's when the problems happen. You have to be careful about yourself, because at night, sometimes we go there, sometimes it's closed. But I like when you're not having a straight time to close that shop, because sometimes when you're thinking about closing the shop, close the shop immediately. Because even if you're thinking about closing the shop, you take the time to close the shop, maybe the skellums will come then.
16. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? [Above]
17. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – 1- No I don't think it will be a problem, because in Vukani there's a committee now. If you are coming in Vukani, you report to the committee, the committee will try to give you some questions, so that they can understand you. So also you are given the guidelines – so here in Vukani, we are working according to those rules. [And is this the same procedure for non-South Africans?] Yes, the same thing.
- 2 – And after that, even the taverns...they must have a time to close. Because sometimes at night, past 1, the music is loud. We're trying to sleep, and you will hear that thing. And sometimes you hear the fights. And the police must make sure all the time...they said – we are CPF, right? – the police they said that the time for Friday is 2 o'clock in the morning. For Saturday it's 2 o'clock. Sunday only 10 o'clock, then you must close. But they don't close at that time. Sometimes more than 2. And Sunday, maybe past twelve, it's another thing because people are getting out of there, they're drunk, and they're getting robbed all on the way. Tomorrow you'll find that somebody sleeping there is killed. Who knows? Nobody knows.
- 17.1. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities?
18. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – 1 – Not so many, just the ones who have got the shops.
19. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – 1- I can say yes, because even their shops are affordable.

- 2 – And you can open an account there. You can take there, but you pay at the end of the month, you see? Another thing, people they like them to be there. Because sometimes, if me I have a shop, I'm willing you to buy cans – you can't have the cans the whole month, you have to give me something at least I'll pay you at the end of the month.
- 1- Another thing, the shop that is in Vukani there, it closes very early and it opens very late, because that guy is not sleeping in Vukani, he's sleeping in Extension 7, but he's got a house also in Vukani. So you can imagine in Vukani the one shop, for the whole of Vukani....because we did experience that time, the time of the xenophobia, when all the shops were closed, it was difficult even to buy a matches.
- 2- And the guy's not good to the people. The guy is rude sometimes. Sometimes you ask, and maybe you ask and you don't have the money, but the answer for him was not right at that time. If you said, how much is that one there? He would say, oh, it means you're not coming to me to buy, that is why you don't know. And only that one guy is open now.
20. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? - Yes
- 20.1. What are the benefits of these shops for you? [Above]
21. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – 1- It did try in Vukani, but in Vukani since the community are unite, we say that, no, the shops of the foreigner in Vukani they are enough. We don't need others to come.
- 3- Even the guy was busy building, but we said immediately, stop what you are doing.
- 21.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops? – What we experience, with the foreigners, they are not from the same country. Maybe some are Ethiopians, some are the Pakistanis. They make a fight among themselves. So that is why we were trying to control, to stop the fighting.
- 21.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – 2 - Yeah, there was a competition but the competition is slightly down, because they South Africans they end up to close the shops, you see? Because the foreigners – they were having that problem of foreigners were cheap, and the South Africans were too expensive. It was like that, but now they end up not buying from the South Africans, always buying from the foreigners. It's where that thing started. They end up to close the shops. And after that, why the other ones – they said that they selling to each other, the foreigner, while the shop is inside the heart of the other people. But they're selling about 25 thousand. This new owner is coming now, he paid 25 thousand to that one – but that one's gone. But you, you have to deal with the South African, the owner of the plot. Then there's another problem because you are coming with the stock of 25 thousand, but me, this shop is building inside my plot, then after that this guy he used to rent me, then now you tell me you buy this plot – but my plot is in my heart now. Then what am I supposed to do? I have to tell you straight, I don't care whether you buy that 25 thousand from that guy, but you must rent me each and every month, finish and klaar. They were having something like that.
22. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – 1 – Yeah I think everybody is entitled in our country to practice what he believes. If you have some resources to do so you must do so. But they must also accept the competition, because it's necessary that you've got a competition anywhere in the world.
- 2- And what is supposed to be something that is cutting off to us, is jealous. Jealous people of the South Africans. If you're selling the apple there, my neighbour will sell the apple as well. Then you must choose where you're going now. It's jealous that thing. If I'm selling something, fruit, you must sell something else, you mustn't look at me, what I'm selling. Then you will sell what I'm selling. And after that its why the witches are going to take it back – because now I have to go to witchdoctor to buy medicine. So my business must grow! [Laughter]. That their business can stop there!
23. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops? [Above]
24. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – 1 – In Vukani we see some, we don't know what is happening. 2 – It's what we're busy with as the CPF. But I don't know these guys for the shop, because they carried on to leave these young boys inside the shop. And after that the young boys... even yesterday, I asked another small one there by Mohammed, he used to close the burglars, I asked him, do you go to school? What standard are you? He said, I'm standard two. Then I said, you must go to school, and if you do your homework – he said he doesn't have homework today. So I said it's alright, and I asked does my friend pay you? Are you working here? He said I'm working here – then now when you get out here (because I think it was past nine he was leaving) then I said go home straight, because another thing is they run around in the darkness. They smoking, they doing dagga, that thing [You mean the boys that hang around the shops?] Yes.
25. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – 1 – I'm not talking much about there in town because I'm not often in town, I don't have the money. But I can speak about the ones there in Vukani. In Vukani they do try to be a part, because when we as a community needed something, sometimes we used go to them, and give them friendly. So we tried to build the good communication. I don't know about other areas.
26. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – 1 – I can say, what we did in Vukani, they must do the same. Having community meetings, invite them, explain what you would like, and also they must also be given a chance to ask how do things work in Vukani. They're views, from both sides.
- 2 – But what I'm thinking about...I'm willing for them to do something. Maybe they can...because what I'm thinking about is what they can do. For instance, sometimes in Vukani, small boys they must dress for the schools in their uniforms and their shoes. If you can buy the pants and see....always their jerseys are torn, I don't know why. And the shoes – they kick the stones instead of kicking the ball. If maybe we can advise the foreigners at least to help us, some of the children, because it's going to get cold now.
- 1 – And the other thing that I think seems to be the problem is that, you go to these ones, you make an agreement, but somehow you find out that there are new faces there, not the one you agreed with. [This is in the shops?] Yeah in the shops. So you don't know who exactly the owner of the shops is. Maybe in two or three years we see other staff, and they say no, me I'm not going to that thing, because it was then.
27. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes we here here.

28. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? – 1 – To me I can't say exactly because at that time I was at some project, but in Vukani, so we see things happening but we were not allowed to go and see what was happening. But we could see the people running around.
- 2 – But always they are starting at Alexandra, that thing it comes from that direction, it's where it appeared. But you can't say the TVs must not seen that...but here they were doing that thing, it comes from there. But you will find out the other one are not willing to do this thing. But there's a criminal inside here, somewhere, somehow, there's a criminal and they force him to do that. Other people they worried about where are going to get a job now?
29. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015. – 1 – yeah there were those rumours but we didn't have proof of that. I heard those rumours, but I can't say they were true or not true. It's the police department to look through.
30. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? - Yes
31. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – 1 - I think, in my view of it, that no, it was not only that thing. Because the criminals is targeting things so that they can loot. They use it as an excuse to do this thing.
32. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders?
33. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident?
34. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – 1 – Some of them they were surprised, because, if you were to go to my friends, some of them, there was a good communication before that. That's why they were surprised.
35. How did you feel after the incident? – 2 – They feel shame about it. They feel shame. Because there's no shop now, so they must end up to come and buy one thing in town. Then you go back.
- 1- Even that day, the day I was at work, I could see what's happening. To me it was not right. Because they are the people who come to look for something, to make a life for themselves. Because typical of South Africa – you've got some people who were in exile, to liberate our country. So you can't do that – even if a man do wrong, it's not right to make it wrong again. Because you can times any wrong, it's still wrong.
- 2- Even God does not allow that. He says, pray to me – you must not be angry at that one, you must just speak lightly. But in real life that one, why he's not cross for me? But I did things to him. Why? He's asking for himself and answer by itself as well. As long as you're moving. Just live.
36. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – 1 – Hey, it was a funny thing that day. The police did come later, but we find that there was not much. They were just protecting the owner, but not the shops.
37. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – 1 – I don't know, on our side. But maybe on our side mostly there was the police, but they didn't do much to protect the shops.
- 2 – But I hear the rumours, they were willing to get ten thousand for that looting. To pay back them. I think they would ask government. They asked to municipality to pay them ten thousand for that looting. Each shop. I don't know if that was happening.
38. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – 1 – Hey, they portray it like that, but to me it was not, it was just a normal crime. It was crime. I don't think there was a hatred of the foreigners... it's just, you can't take it away the fact that there's poverty. So you think, hey, that thing, I can get it now for free, because I don't have any money...
- 38.1.1. Why were only foreigners attacked? – They have the shops so...
- 38.2. [YES] Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – 1 – Not that I know. I don't want to lie.
39. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? – [Above]
40. Who is a foreigner? – 2 – It's the people who are not from South Africa, it's the people who are coming from anywhere else. Overseas or whatever.
- 1 – I can put it that way too.
41. Can foreigners become South Africans? – 1 – I hear that the country gives you some citizenship, according to a certain time. After 10 years. [And you think that will make you a South African?] 1 – I think so, because anything, even us, telling us that we are South Africans, is an ID document. Because let's say I take you to Zimbabwe, you say you're a South African, you'll need a document to prove that you're a South African. Is it not so? Because it is the document that binds us together. Us we were born here, but we've got the same documents with the foreigners. [And if there were no documents?] 2 – We have to take you to Home Affairs now!
- 1 – Then you assess us on the languages, because all day we are speaking different languages...
42. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – 2 - It's the business. Maybe that side they are fighting, and there are a lot of shops there, so after that they see they can do something in South Africa. When they come here, they see they do the business. And after that business they took some other people they were working the people...it's a small money they get paid each and every day. I think they get paid each and every Sunday. Most of them are working there for that one for forty rand for the day. Then after that Sunday you get paid. Then at least you do something, it's better than nothing. They do at least to those unemployment people, at least a little bit. People must work and then get paid. That way the unemployed people at least...
- 1 – To me I can say that they've got different reason to come to South Africa. Maybe some of them, because of what's happening in their countries, they are the refugees. Some, because South Africa is portrayed as America in Africa...so they come for many reasons. I can't pretend that I know what exactly.
- 42.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – 2 – I already said, they gave the people a job. 1 – Some of them, they've got skills. 2 – They trained the people to do that thing. Even at Vukani, each and every one now, they

choose the foreigners to build the houses. They are good at that. [Do you think the foreigners can be a benefit to South Africa?] 1 – Yes, they can be a benefit.

42.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – 1 – The negative side...you know, a human being is a human being. You can't turn away from that thing. Even to us as South Africans, not all of us are good. Also to them the same thing. Not all of them are good, they'll be human beings like us. So we've got the same thing. So some are willing to communicate with South Africans, some maybe they've got also richer, so when they see you are poor they maybe can undermine you. Because it's different to them.

2 – And what I like, other one there in location, the mechanic there – they do properly. But the only problem is they like to charge. Their prices, it's too much. The price for them – because there's a lot of cars there. But if they do their jobs they do it well.

43. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – 2 – I can say to me there's no problem.

1 – To me I can tell you a story that I know. There was a guy in Vukani – that guy is owing some guy some money. Then in Vukani location, if you borrow money, then I need your ID, your bank card or whatever, as a proof my money is going to come back. And that guy, what I laugh, is my friend, he lost the ID of that guy who owes him money. What's happening is that the other guy, he is getting money from a foreigner, from a Nigerian who's got a salon. Because that guy said no I'm the one who's on that ID. And that guy was married to that lady, without knowing everything. So one day it happens that the real owner of the ID has got money somewhere, and he went for a cut to the same foreigner, the same salon. The foreigner was hairdressing that guy, he looks at his face, he says – this is the one guy. The foreigner showed that guy his ID, he says, where did you get my ID from? It's been a long time looking for this ID. Then this guy was going to the police, the other said no, no, ok what am I going to give you – so they agreed that that lady would pay that guy a month's certain money. The one who perpetrated – that lady chased him away, they found the real owner of the ID. So what I'm trying to say, you can never know – you can get married even unaware that you are married! Then to me, it's not a problem if there's agreement with each other. But to do something when it's dishonest...

43.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? – Sometimes...

43.2. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives? – 1 – No, no, there are many ladies in South Africa. No I don't think so.

2 – No, I don't agree with that, because of that jealous...

44. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – 2 – They're South African, because they will get that birth, that paper for the birth. They were already born here then now they're South African.

1 – The question I want to know is that – it's not a gender in our laws, because if you say that the mother is a South African, can you say that the baby will be South African. If me I've got a lady foreigner, and I've got kids, why those kids can't be South African? Because I'm a man from South Africa...

45. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – 1 – No...no, to me, I will accept your culture and you accept my culture, then you will find each other's got certain rules, and follow that rules.

46. What is it that makes people different? – 1 – I can say to me there are many things, like social injustice, because your background and my background are not the same. Some different ideas make us different. But we are one, if you take all those things away. We're human beings, but since we're born with different ideas, different cultures, different organisations...

2 – Yes, the same, there's nothing I can say more... [So what is it that makes us the same?] 1 – what makes us the same...to me it's the fact that we are human beings. If we respect each other. Because all those things are found on earth – we didn't bring any money when we came down. All those things that divided us was on earth, but you can take that for the fact that you're a human being, I am a human being, he has a right to live, I have a right to live. 2 – That's all. 1 – We have equal breath.... What do you call it? Oxygen, something like that. So we've got the same blood, if you cut here it's the same. 2 – Blood is red.

47. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – 1 – No it's fine to me as long as it's what she wants to do.

48. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – 1 – Yes I know some, like the mechanics he mentioned are my good friends. I used to work with them, but a long time ago in 2005-8. They are Zimbabweans.

49. Do you go to church? – 2 – Yes.

49.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – 2 – No, no foreigners there. Methodist Church, Southern Africa. No foreigners.

49.2. Where do foreigners go to church? – 2 – I don't know, not to the Methodist. You'll see them in – what do you call it? 1 – Universal. – 2 – In the churches where they use the organ, you will see a lot of them there. 1 – I used to go to church but since the church politics, I decided no. There were foreigners in that time I went to church. [And was the church able to be a space where people got to know the foreigners...?] The problem that time was that time most of them were pastors, so there is always a gap you and the pastor – whether the SA pastor or the other foreign pastor, there's a gap.

50. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – 1 – It's not doing enough – it's not doing nothing at all. You can't say if they're doing enough – is there something they are doing?

51. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – 1 – I think, the biggest problem in South Africa, to me, is they've become very selfish. Because if a train, the head of a train, is going wrong, you can't expect the carriages to go the right way while the head is going wrong. So me, I'm that kind of person, if I want to solve the problem, I'll go to the root of the problem. To solve it once and for all.

52. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems?

53. What do you think people should be doing? – 1 – I think the people should unite in our communities, and raise our voices. What would we like our country to be? We should must have that opportunity. To express what we would like our country to be.
54. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – 2 – There are plenty. 1 – There are too many. I remember one night I was working for Bafana Bafana – I don't know which country they were playing – but the stadium was full with foreigners. I asked myself, is South Africa playing outside or inside the country? The stadium was full with foreigners! [Do you think it's a problem that there are so many foreigners?] 1 – No, I don't think it's a problem here in South Africa. It means there's a problem in Africa as a whole. So the leaders – our leaders, of Africa as a whole – like you've got, what they are doing, there's a problem in Africa as a whole. Why people every day leave to a certain country? Because that thing will automatically create a problem in the future. You can't take all of the country and go to England, and then expect that things will be the same.
- 2 – They bribe even at the borders. That is why they come a lot here. Because government – if our government says maybe, I have so many people in South Africa, if our government says, I can take 100 of you to be in South Africa, then close. Like Trump – build a bloody wall, so they can't go there.
- 1 – By building a wall? Tell me, by building a wall do you think you'd solve the problem?
- 2 – You are not going to solve this problem –
- 1 – Then why build a wall, but you know that you're not going to solve the problem? (laughter)
- 2 – We have the aeroplane, we have the ships, then after that they go at the end! But I hope maybe he can do that, they'll make sure that he has a.... even a ship, they have the papers...
- 1 – But you can't solve a problem if you don't know what is a problem. Because by building a wall, you're not solving a problem. You're taking a shortcut to solve the problem. We must be thinking *how* to solve the problem what is. [And what do you think the problem is?] As I already said, in Africa, really the problem is with the leaders. The leaders were elected maybe in the 60s – all life-presidents. They are becoming dictators to their people. So then people have to leave, because maybe the government now every day is bringing laws. If you're opposing then maybe you are sentenced or killed.
- 2 – To add, we can talk about Nkandla. Zuma made Nkandla for himself – what about us? And after that now you hear the two billion, they go to the kings, to build his house. 2 billion must build that thing. And what about us? We are not working? Zuma does what he likes. And he prefers that one and that one for the Zulus. And what about the Eastern Cape? Nothing!
55. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? - 1 – Hey, I don't know about other areas. I really don't know about other areas, we talk what we know. Maybe he's right, maybe he's wrong. Until he can explain himself why he says so.
56. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – 2 – I don't know...
57. What does it mean to be African? – 1 – To me, to be African, I'm glad I'm African. Because I'm proud to be an African. To me it is a privilege to be an African. Because when you look, all Africans, they've got humanity, called Ubuntu. That thing, we've got it from our forefathers. So that culture, is human being. It's not the resources that makes a human being, it's something inside you. Because in the older days that we had in history, if we are walking from town – because in those days there were no busses, maybe there were horses or whatever – an a house you don't know, they will call you and say, come this side! We can see that you are travelling, here is some food. And you are given food and everything. People you don't know, will ask you are you all right, do you need medicine, you are given a room to rest if you need – sleep now, you can't go. So that is our culture, for a long time, before the whites came.
58. Is South Africa part of Africa?
- 58.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways?
59. Do you consider yourself to be an African?
60. Are you proud of being African?
61. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – 2 – As long as those that are born here are Africans.
- 1 – No, as I said, to be an African is inside you. You can be born in America or in Asia or whatever, but if you are black, that thing is inside you. Because my spirit and their spirit will be the one, automatically. So that's why I cannot define Africa as an area or whatever. It's more about inside.
- 61.1. And when they're born in Africa?
62. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans?
63. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015?
- [FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]**
64. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – 1 – A that time I was in a community area, I was not involved in anything at that time.
65. How did the community respond to these actions? -
66. Do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – 1 – Yeah we must resist that thing. And as I said, we must not do that thing, we call the community, call a meeting, and explain. [And you think that would be a way of solving these problems?] 2 – Yes. Because sometimes the smallest thing, between a girlfriend and a boyfriend, a small thing started to be a big thing. Why this thing happened now? Because this thing, it was small but now it's too big. And the other one's big, it expands to other wards now. But if a small thing happens in Vukani, a girlfriend and a boyfriend, it can be enlarged now to be the whole of Grahamstown now.
67. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia?
68. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state)
69. What did you think of this interview?
70. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me?

INTERVIEW 11 – 13 JUNE 2017 (F)

1. May I ask your age? - 25
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes, I am a SA citizen. I'm from a small town called Grahamstown, I was born and raised here. In the location called Fingo.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – Um....it means a lot of different things. How to behave. How to treat other people. How to respond to the context that is happening here in the world. So being a SA citizen to me is a big challenge, and, in terms of understanding and knowing people's problems, and coming with issues that we can solve. So being a SA citizen is a very very big problem, but as us people of the citizen, need to solve, need to articulate, need to stand and fight for. Because you can see that here we are SA citizens, but there's this state capturing of the Guptas, want to come here in South Africa and get in control. So now as South Africans we have to be united and be one, so that we can properly fight for our citizenship. Because I can't be a South African, but not knowing the constitution, and everything about SA. So we need to go out there and teach people, and build their consciousness up of being a South African citizen.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – I am an African.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – No, I'm not currently, I used to be employed here at Masifunde but I got retrenched.
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – Yes, the UPM and Masifunde.
 - 5.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? – I'll start with Masifunde – it's a non-profit organisation, which focuses on many things. Building the communities. I can say, women and land issues, children's rights and education, local government. When Masifunde goes out there in the communities, teaching people about these things that happen in our world, so Masifunde does lots of things. Building people's consciousness. So UPM focusses on housing, feminism, women's rights. So they are building a partnership where UPM and Masifunde can do the same work together. Which they can build one national movement which is called Inyanda national movement. Which has RPM, UPM and Masifunde, whereby they can change the whole name of being RPM and UPM and Masifunde to Inyanda. So, they want to be a broad, besides being in the Eastern Cape, nationally, Western Cape, KZN. So Masifunde does lots of things and I for one got problems, lots of things, here. Because I came here in 2015 not knowing how to contextualise things. Not knowing anything about children's rights and education. When I came here, Ayanda approached me to go and attend meetings when they were held in Frontier Hotel, about climate change. That's when I got interested in coming and joining Masifunde, because I was part of UPM. Then I got recruited there by Masifunde. They said we can see the potential that you have, can you please come and volunteer first. After volunteer then I got some stipend. [What does Inyanda mean?] Being one. Inyanda National Land Movement.
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – [Above]
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – I hope, and I want to see change within our community. Especially rural areas. Because you'll find that in the rural areas most of the people they do not know anything. And they have been blind-minded. And I just hope that we can go there in the rural areas and teach them more. And do more workshops. So that the people can get more educated. Because you will find that there are lots of people who are interested in the rural areas, but we do not have much resources, so that we can go there and teach people. I want people like me who are willing to say, I can volunteer, so that my community can change. Or South Africa can change. I want to see change within my community, I want to see change within South Africa. So ja, I think.
 - 5.1.3. Are you a member of a political party? – No. [Why not?] I didn't see myself being involved into politics, because I have a different mind-set about politics. So I don't see myself being involved into politics. But even though I do and I know how to analyse things politically, but the way that people are state-captured now....and because of the corruption things, you could say that some of the people have sold our soul to the highest bid. So being involved in politics is like being trapped. So I just want to see changes. [What do you mean you have a different mind-set?] Ok...the thing is, you see that in political parties, in order for you to be a member, you need to have 30 rands to have a joining fee. Just look at most of the unemployed, they want to be a member of a particular political party, but you do not have the thirty rand. How can they say you need to have a joining fee in order for you to become part of that political party? And another thing, in order for you to get employed in that political party, you need to bribe a person. How can you bribe a person when you're unemployed? Where can you get that 1500 when you're unemployed? That will lead you to go and be a prostitute, so that you can get that 1.5, so that you can get employed. By being a prostitute, you'll regularly do that because you'll see that it's an easy way to get money. And I think, it's a way of sabotaging people. Because they know that it will never be easy for you to get a certain amount so that you can buy work from them. And if ever they want to employ you, there's a possibility that the person who wants to employ you will need you to sleep with him or her first. So they know that us as black people, I'll do that because I want to be employed. I want to produce somethings for my family and for my children. And the thing of being state-captured...eish, that's the big issue. Because when you're there, I've got this different

perspective of how to maybe change mining, you understand? So maybe I come with my own ideas that, hey, in order to change this mining thing because it affects people's lives – maybe I come with that concept. And then one of them will say no, remember, we do gain money from the capitalists. So we have to sell this soul. I can't sell someone's soul in order for me to get money, you understand? So, eish. That's what puts me off about being in a political party.

6. Are you married? – No.
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – Two. The first one she is five, the other one he is one year five months.
 - 7.1. **[YES]** What would you like them to do when they grow up? – I don't want to take decisions for them. They can do anything that they want to do, but as a parent I need to guide them first.
 - 7.2. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – Yes.
 - 7.3. Do any foreigners' children also attend school with your child/ren? How do they get along? - Yes, because my elder daughter goes to a crèche. She has a friend there, and she attends school with her in Cape Town. So she calls her best friend. There's no problem there.
8. What is your first language? – Xhosa.
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – English.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – Yes, I think it's very important because in the country that we live in we have many different people that come from the Asian, from the African, that we meet because we take them as our brothers. I'm also a foreigner in this land that I'm living in. I was not born to judge. I was not born to say that because of your speaking English, you're not from South Africa. I don't know your roots or where you come from, or why did you come to be in South Africa. So another thing I do is to build a good relationship with foreign people, to take them as our brothers and sisters. Because we don't know the reasons why they left their own countries to be in South Africa. Because most of them came here because of different reason, so we have to take those reasons that they came for and make them ours. Remember we have children that are in Canada, learning there to be doctors. What would we do if tomorrow we hear that something happened to them? So we have to take those people who are foreigners here in our country as our brothers and sisters.
11. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – No. We're all the same. We need to get the same benefits. Everyone deserves...if you get a grant of 1500, we all need to get a grant of 1500.
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? Do you agree? - I do, I totally agree with that. Because the thing is that we are all born with flesh and blood. We're not aliens. So we have to take those foreign people as our brothers, they are here, we have to understand that they came here with a different concept. They came here because of different reasons. So we have to take them as our brothers, as our sisters, as our mothers, as our fathers.
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? - In Fingo.
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Yes they do, except now there's too much crime. People are getting robbed. But in my community we do not have a problem with other people.
15. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – It's only crime that affects us very much.
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Yes. There are because in my community, there are three shops, and one tavern which is called Mandisa's Tavern. And at Mandisa's, there are people from Zim, there are people from Nigeria, and they drink with us. We don't see anything wrong about them being here. And they speak the language that they are comfortable speaking in. They go to the same shops, because the rent of the houses that they live in there are affordable for them to stay here. So we don't have a problem with them staying in our communities.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – (above)
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – Yes it is. It's very important. People need to learn, and people need to understand because they have this thing that foreign people change us to prostitutes, they sell drugs, not knowing that we also have pimps, we also have drug dealers. You understand? So we need to change that concept that not *all* of them do the same thing. Because some of them just attend church. You know?
19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – (above)
20. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – They sell clothes, no, blankets, and food. Shops. And there's another one who has a salon, he cuts my hair. He's my very close friend. [Do they do something useful for the community?] Yes they do, because some for the people do not have money for bread, you know. You can just go to them and say, David, I do not have money for bread. Can you please provide just a half a loaf for me. And David will say, ok, I'll do it. I'll give you, because they do not have a problem at all.
21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? – Yes.
22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – No, it's a myth! There's no such thing.
23. Do you think there are too many shops? – No not really because those shops they help us a lot. Because I can't take a taxi from the location using ten rand to town to buy a bread that costs 11 rand, then go back to the location. Then I'm going to spend 31 rand. But if I go to the shop, then I only spend that 11 rand.
 - 23.1. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – Yes, there is, because us South Africans think that the foreigners have taken their businesses from us. Which is not bad, because the foreigners came here because they have their own problems back at home. They need to provide for their families too. So, there's a big competition, so we need as people of the community to convene meetings where we can say, how can we as the shop-owners partnership, build partnership with the foreigners so that they can learn from them how to maintain a business.

Because I think the foreigners what do they do, they start with a business plan. You know? So that their business can grow. As you said, they have too {so} many businesses, but they start...us South Africans, when I have the 1000, I just go and buy the rice etc. and then sell it, without thinking that, how much profit will I get from that rice that I'm going to sell, and how much will I save from that profit. The foreigners are saving, they're doing everything by all means to provide for their families.

24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – It should be equal. We should own, the foreigners should own too.
25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops?
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – They do. There's a supermarket in Joza where there's a black – a Xhosa – man who's employed. He works there at the supermarket. So they are employed.
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – Oh, very hard. They do, very hard try to become part of the community. Because some of them attend community meetings. Because they're part of the community, remember! Because those people are also black people. You know?
28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – They should not stop. They should go to the community meetings. They should ask if they want to ask, it's their own right. Remember what you said about the Freedom Charter? They should ask whatever they want to ask, because it's their own right. They should go to meetings, they should do whatever they want to do, because they're part of the South African people. So...eish, I don't understand black people! Us, not even black people, Xhosa people, how do they adapt things, and how to they react. They react with personal emotions. Yes, they react with personal emotions, without knowing the root cause, because you can say that a child that fell from a truck that was driven by a foreigner person, you must ask the person why did that child fall from that truck? How did this happen, where did it happen? Why did it happen? You have to ask yourself those questions you know, before reacting, convening toyi-toyis, looting, and blaming and all of that stuff. You know?
29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – I was here.
30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?] – I was working in Pedi, I had a meeting there, so I was coming from there. When I came to Joza, I saw the shops, people were taking bags of maize meal, drinks. So then we stopped and we said, what's happening? People are looting. Why? Because they think that the foreigners are the people taking the private parts...and I was like, are they sure? Who did they see doing that? And they said it's this Shakart/Shagat {?}. Is there any person who came in front of the police station and said, I saw it, or I was taken by Shagat to a certain place, he wanted to kill me or something. You know? So eish, it affected a lot of people, it affected a lot of shops. Because our brothers, the foreign people, they were afraid to go to the location, and they were afraid to talk with me or you because they didn't trust anyone by that time. So we convened a meeting at Masifunde, trying to solve the issue of xenophobia, trying to come with ideas on how we can stop these xenophobic attacks, and how did they start, and how people should take the foreigners as our brothers. Because remember, one day, this will change. The capitalists will take the land back again, and we'll need those people to fight with us! What will they do? (laughs). They'll say no, come on, you said we are foreigners so we're going back to our countries you need to sort your issues. You know? And you have to understand that the people from the other countries of Africa are well resourced than us. So we're building a relationship with other foreign countries, in terms of ... I can't think of the word...
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
 - 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true? – No.
 - 31.2. Did you think so then? Can you tell me why/ why not? – No.
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? – It was. And the Somalians.
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – Yes. It was only because of the rumours. Because before the rumours nothing had happened. It was because they thought that they killed people and took their body parts. Nothing other than that.
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? – The other day we had a meeting here, I came with an idea saying that, why don't we go to the communities, take one person in each community, so that they can convene a meeting with Shagat and ask him questions. Because this thing is affecting many people and many shops. So, there was some of the foreign people that were here at the meeting, they didn't want it to happen like that because they were afraid of the people that would come with guns, and shoot them, and all that stuff. So I think that if ever, before they did the march or looted the shops, they should have called a Muslim leader, a Somalian leader, a Zimbabwean leader, and convened a meeting with them at the police station, with the police too, and say, look, there are these rumours that are happening. And so-and-so has been accused – because you are accused before proven guilty – they were accusing Shagat – so, so-and-so has been accused and the community wants to respond to this. How are you going to address this matter? To him. You understand? So they can come with solutions, before looting. Going to Shagat, and saying, listen, you are accused of this and this.
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – People came here and said that we are protecting the foreigners – we were also in danger, here at Masifunde. They said we were protecting the foreigners, and the foreigners are giving us money, we get groceries from them, and you know, when it's lunch time we did not want to go to Checkers because they will point fingers at you. And we were in danger, we had to stay here in the office, locking the office, from eight until five, waiting for the director to send us home. And we were afraid that people would burn our houses. [Just for defending the foreigners?] Yes. And even though they wanted to do bad, we're still standing, and we're still saying that those people didn't do anything. And those people are our brothers, we have to be one, we have to be united. You know?

36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – Yes, lots of people were surprised, because they didn't know that the person who was accused was Shagat. And afterwards I was in a taxi going to Joza, and there was this lady saying, I'm very worried about this looting. My brother works at a funeral parlour. One of the bosses there goes with him during the night, takes women, goes to the bush, slaughters them and takes their private parts. That's what she was saying in the taxi, during the looting. And my cousin is willing now to go and testify. No one took him seriously, I took her seriously, after following his cousin he disappeared. He just disappeared that guy. He was a foreign guy.
37. How did you feel after the incident? – Because of working with children, because I used to work with children here at Masifunde, I felt that the children aren't protected, especially those children who are foreigners' children. Because you don't know what can happen to them. Because what came in my mind, it's what's happening in...what's this country? Where young girls and children are being kept by Boko Haram, that came into my mind, that hey, South Africa will change into what Boko Haram is doing to the children. So we need to do campaigns and awareness raising on children abuse, and women abuse, because also the women of the foreign people were also affected. Because people swore at them saying, you're selling your bodies, you know? All that stuff. So I felt like as a woman, I need to protect the wives, I need to protect the children. No matter what happens I need to put myself in the forefront, you know? So eish...
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – Those people. There was not much response. Because they ended up saying that we are – Masifunde – are the people that caused the looting. The police said this. [Who did they say this to? To you?] No, there are rumours, and also to the ladies that are working in the back. That the Masifunde people are the ones who caused this looting, and that we are being used to fight against the ruling party. You know? It's very crazy. And when we wrote a letter with them we didn't get a response immediately. I think the state is failing, you know? It's failing us, it's failing the people.
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – There was no response. I don't even remember going there in a meeting to the municipal office, talking about the xenophobic attacks. The only thing I remember is that only students from Rhodes did respond, and they were donating clothes and food.
- 39.1. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not? – no!
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – No, it was not xenophobic.
- 40.1. [NO] How would you describe it? – People were stoked – you know what I mean? They were taking advantage of the foreign people. This was not about xenophobia. People just wanted to take advantage of the foreign people knowing that they would not do anything to them. Because in my understanding, in order for them to say it's xenophobia, they need to see that certain people did that, then the attacks should happen....that was not xenophobia. [So do you think the same thing could have happened to South Africans?] Yes.
- 40.2. Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – Yes, there is. I have this friend of mine called Nomhlahla from PE, she's married to a Nigerian. She is staying in Pretoria now. People were swearing at her. Recently last year...they think marrying a foreigner is living in a palace as you're giving him a citizenship to South Africa, you know? And I responded, saying to them, listen here, even if she marries a foreigner or not, it's her own choice. She loved that man. She didn't see anything wrong about being married to him. So yeah, people, I do not understand how they react to things. Because you also say you see that when you go to a certain shop and you go and buy bread, and maybe the person that is in front of you is short a fifty cents, and then the person that sells there, our foreign brother or sister, says no, I can't give you because you are short, you'll hear people saying, hayi, you my friend, what-what, kwerekwere, all those certain words. You know? So eish.
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? – I did. I hated it – whenever I had to buy bread, I had to buy bread here in town, and then send it home after work, and then in the morning I had to buy bread. And then it was a big challenge, because kids come back from school, they need their bread, they're hungry. And then they need to wait for me until half-past-four until I come back to work, even go back home.
42. Who is a foreigner? – There's no one called a foreigner, we're all foreigners in this world.
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? – Yes.
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? [Yes/No] Could you explain? – No.
45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – For a change. To build a new living.
- 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – Jobs. Bringing jobs to people. Learning. Because you get that some of them are doctors – they help us. They're people, so they bring so much and too much in us. But we don't understand the brighter side of them.
- 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – Nothing.
46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – There's no problem at all. If you love a person, do you need to know if it's a foreigner? You love that person, that's all.
- 46.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know? – That's what I was saying, no. I had my other friend also who was married to a guy who had a shop. She married him because she loved him. He went home for a year, and then she divorced that guy. That guy was sent papers. Now she's married to another person. So it's just a matter of love. [Why do you think so many South Africans seem to have a problem with this?] Poverty, unemployment, uneducated. If ever they were educated enough, they wouldn't have any problem with foreign people. If ever we were not facing poverty, if ever we were not unemployed, we wouldn't see them as foreigners. So I think that's the problem – unemployment, poverty, education.
47. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – No.
48. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – Let me tell you a secret. My boyfriend is currently a Muslim. He's a South African. He was born and raised here. But he took the Islamic culture. He

adopted it. And I don't have a problem with that, even if he prays five times a day. He's a Muslim! I'm not a Muslim. It's just that I love him, you know? So...I do not have any problem with their culture, because here in South Africa you don't get too much Muslim. We're Christian, most of the time you get Christians. So, the Islamic culture comes from the foreign people, so they adapt. So I don't have a problem. Even now my boyfriend is fasting for this Ramadan...

49. What is it that makes people different? – Personality. Self-esteem. [And what is it that makes people the same?] Their race, nationality. Their flesh and blood, they are the same.
50. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – No, no. But I'll never convert to be a Muslim. But I don't see a problem with other women being Muslim.
51. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Yes.
 - 51.1. How do you know them? – The guy from the salon, he cuts my hair. And then the others have shops, that's how I know them.
52. Do you go to church? – Yes, I do.
 - 52.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – No.
53. Are the foreigners friendly? – Very friendly.
54. Should foreign children go to school here? – Of course!
55. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – Hey, I don't think there's any justice. Because you know, I always say that media doesn't give justice to people. Because in terms of broadcasting, people say that, I'm just making an example, that people looted at the Transkei. They just say people looted at the Transkei. They don't start at the main point, why did it happen, why did people loot in the Transkei? So they bring a different picture to the viewers. So I think the government is not giving justice to the foreigners too, you know? They're just protecting the economy, they don't care about how do they feel. So I think that they also need to be taught – we also need to sit down with those government officials, and say listen here, those people are our brothers you know? Just don't do things as protecting your economy, because remember that you get more from the foreign countries. If ever some of those go back to their country, how will SA be, because remember some of the cars have been transported from other countries you know, so we'll face lots of things.
56. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – I think in terms of politics, we're in deep trouble. We are captured even though we think we are not captured. And in terms of climate change, remember, I said we had a meeting here, and my mom was saying at home, hey, it's raining in Cape Town {during time of giant storm in Cape Town in June}, Jesus is coming, and all of that. I said to her, no, no, it's not about that. Jesus is not coming any time soon. It's climate change! In Cape Town it's raining, but in Knysna it's burning. I think that we are in big trouble because of these mining industries. And remember, Cape Town, they didn't get rain for such a long time, and the farmers there are planting grapes in order to produce wine. And I heard that in order for a certain place to rain or to stop raining you must shoot the clouds. Do you know that thing with the grapes? You must shoot the clouds. And I think that's what happened in Cape Town. Because the famers wanted their crops to grow! (laughter) And people are being tricked, saying hayi, Jesus is coming. Proof there's no Jesus here.
57. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? – Lots of things. Firstly, it should change from the top, from our President, through his cabinet. We should cut off those people and find new people. Because in the coming years we will be in trouble because of the finances you know? So if ever we don't fix those matters now, hey, it's going to get worse. And in terms of education, you know? We should improve our education. Because you find that in China a child who is doing grade three, has an access to a computer. But here you have to be in grade 12 or grade 8, and you have to be in town schools, not in township schools, in order for you to access the internet, you know? So I think if ever they can improve education, and improve the Fees Must Fall, you know? Because some of the parents who send some of the children to Rhodes University are unemployed, they're depending on NSFAS, and NSFAS is depending on our taxes, you know? So I think if ever they can see that, if this Fees Must Fall thing can work, we could have our own economists. We can have our own engineers who come with ideas of doing cars. We can make South Africa improve better.
58. What do you think people should be doing? – People should go to the government doors. And knock. Agriculture, what do you have for us? Department of Land Affairs, what do you have for us? Municipality, show us the IDP {Integrated Development Plan}. All those institutions. Department of Education, what bursaries do you have for our children? I think that's what we should do now, as the people of South Africa. Because you get that education gives a certain amount for education, in terms of bursaries. Maybe thirty children go there and get that bursary, twenty of them do not get a bursary, or do not go there and get a bursary. Where does that money go? We need to find out those things.
59. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – No. We are equal enough.
60. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – It's not true. He's xenophobic too.
61. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – Yes, they are. But in a tricky way. They do it in a tricky way. They don't show it in people's eyes, that they are also xenophobic. But they are xenophobic.
62. What does it mean to be African? – It means lots of things. We have different beliefs about being an African. I can give you my own belief about being an African, another person can give you their own belief about being an African. So it's by combining all of those things, I think we are African. So I can make an example, we've got African feminist, we've got Indian feminism from Indian feminist, but if ever we combine those ideologies and bring them into one thing, we can all be the same feminist, you know?
63. Is South Africa part of Africa? – Yes.
 - 63.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways? – No.
64. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes, I do.
65. Are you proud of being African? – Very proud.
66. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – Yes they are.

67. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – Yes, they are!
68. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – Not any time soon.

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

69. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – We had community dialogues. We wanted to hear from the communities, what do they think about the xenophobic attacks. We also invited different stakeholders. And also we had the opportunity, that we had the Voices of Women of Africa, so that they can learn to stand for their husbands, for themselves too. So I think Masifunde and the UPM played a huge role in changing the community minds. [Do you think it worked?] It worked, it worked.
70. How did the community respond to these actions? – At first they were not impressed, but now they can say that hey, we are wasting our time, because these are our brothers, these are our sisters. If we could learn from them I think we could learn, or we could see more differently.
71. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – Because I think we are going to kill each other. And that people need to be taught, that xenophobia should not be existing at all, because we are all Africans. When I see you as Jemima, I should see my sister. I should not see a white lady who studies at Rhodes. I should come to you and say how did you do it – you study at Rhodes, how can I do it in order to go there too. You know? So, the word xenophobia to me doesn't exist at all. It needs to be flushed out.
72. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia?
73. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state)
74. What did you think of this interview?
75. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me?

INTERVIEW 12 – 13 June 2017 (M)

1. May I ask your age? – I'm 30.
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – I'm a South African. I'm living in Pedi Township in Glenmore location. I'm from there.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – To me it means a lot, not only to be a South African but to be an African, because I see myself as an African child not as a South African, because South Africa is in Africa so I see myself as an African child. I think for me it is a privilege and an honour to be of such a country as South Africa which has diverse languages and traditions and all of that. So it's a privilege to me to have such an experience to be in a country as South Africa, a rainbow nation.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – I'm a Christian, I can say.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – Yes. It's not an employment exactly but it's a project. I'm a contract at Gamtoos Irrigation Point, it's a project that is funded by the government.
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – the RPM, the Rural People's Movement.
 - 5.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? – The RPM works with three municipalities, what we do is look at the needs of the people in rural areas, especially people who don't have houses, people who work in farms, women and farmers and youth as a whole. So we look at the challenges that people are facing so with them we standing to them as a power so that when they don't receive their services we stand on their behalf on the offices, we go there and claim what belongs to them so that's what we are looking at. And also the rights of our people who live in our villages and our municipalities.
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – I joined the RPM because there's a lot of education about how this government of South Africa works, and also we learned a lot about the politics, we have a lot of political schools. You must remember that the rural people's movement is under an umbrella called Inyanda, so that is the main umbrella of this movement, the RPM and the UPM and other organisations. So there's a lot I've gained, there's a lot of knowledge I've gained. I'm the secretary.
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – What I hope it will achieve...the state of our government firstly and the state of our rural communities, because you'll find out the people in our communities they don't have water services, they don't have resources, and also they don't have vegetable gardens and they don't have seeds to plant on the land. And also our people in the rural areas they don't have enough education about their rights and also the rights of the land that they're in because you'll find that some of them, the land that they live on, they were evacuated from the farms where they used to live so you find that they don't have rights to stand on...so they don't know what belongs to them, what is rightfully belongs to them. So we give them much information and also we help them a lot with their gardens, so we supply them with seeds. I think what also we want to achieve is that our people don't depend on the government officials as their source of income and their source of self-supporting, they should rather depend on their own, come up with their own projects and businesses. So those are the main aims of our organisation as RPM, so that people can stand on their own not depending on government.
 - 5.1.3. Are you a member of a political party? – Yes, ANC. [Why are you a member of the ANC?] It's a difficult question because I don't have a party...but what I know is that you cannot be a South African citizen and then you don't

vote for any political party. In order for you to count you must be a member of a political party. So you see, for one other reason is that the ANC has been saving this country for quite a long time, since 1994, so those are one of the reasons you see. But I can also add that if I wanted to I would change to be in another political party, but seeing the state of our country now, it doesn't make a difference what other political party will come in, because we don't see a change even in our own political party you see. So now we are unable to trust any other political party because of what is happening to our own political party.

6. Are you married? - No
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – No not yet.
8. What is your first language? – IsiXhosa.
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – English. IsiZulu I can understand also.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – Yes it's very much important, because we travel a lot across our country even in Africa so we meet a lot of different people so they speak other languages. So in order for us to be really the rainbow nation we must learn to know other languages so that we can be one. Also what is an advantage to learn other languages is maybe when you apply for jobs and looking for work that will be an advantage to know other languages, other than your English and your Xhosa. That is an advantage. [Can you tell me, what does rainbow nation mean for you?] The rainbow nation...I'll put it this way, it means as us in South Africa the different languages and cultures we are able to connect to each other, able to learn one another's languages and cultural activities and all of that.
11. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – Yes, yes, yes. Because of the history that we have in South Africa – I remember that our forefathers, or our grandparents used to work in the gold mines, they used to work very hard for little amount of money. So, so much of the money they could have got they didn't get, so much of the money that we are supposed to get as beneficiary we have not got it yet. So now I am afraid of other people from other country to benefit to what I have to my roots, to what I believe belongs to me as a South African you see. If I heard your question correctly.
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? Do you agree? – I wish – it is very broad. There's no problem in it – that South Africa belongs to all the people who lives in it. Yes, in terms of freedom, in terms of some other rights that people have, like the fact that our government or our leaders allowed other people from other countries to come to our country freely, not being able to do tortures, or some laws that stand against them. So I think for me...it's all right for me, I have no problem with that. I'm being honest, I don't have a problem, because what I know is that our leaders way back then, we used to have fights in this country so they used to run to other countries for safety. And in those countries they were welcomed for safety. Even others, they took their wives and their children to start in those countries, not because they like it but because they were pushed there by the situation that was happening. So to me, I have no problem with that because we were also in the same state that the nations that are running to South Africa.
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? {In Pedi}
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Yes, but I remember there was a conflict where we live in Glenmore – the neighbouring community claimed the place that we stay at as theirs, because back then, before 1986, because our community was established there in 1986. But before 1986 it was somewhere else, so the government of that time took us now to the place where we are. So now somehow there are conflicts that this is our place, this is where we belong. As a result now they are building houses reaching towards where we live, just to show that the place where we are, it belongs to them. So I'll say that that's the only conflict we have. [So would you say in a way that they treat you almost like foreigners, or that you don't belong there?] Yes, it's something like that. They, for a little while they raised it up, then they took it down. But sometimes that question, that mind-set that they have, it just comes up and they raise it, even in their own meetings. They do stuff like that.
15. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – Our biggest problems is the lack of job opportunities, also the lack of education is very poor. Job opportunities, education, poverty also. And houses, people don't have the right houses to stay in, you see. Even the youth. Because the houses that we have now as RDPs, are the houses that belong to our grandparents, from 1986. Now we are old to have our own RDP houses now. So we have that issue. Those are the main issues that we are facing I guess.
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Like in faraway cities? Yes they move from Pedi to Cape Town, to Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown and Gauteng, Joburg, yes. [Do people move to Pedi from anywhere else?] A few number of people come, but most of them they go out.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – N/A
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? – Yes, because we have people coming from farms, from farm areas that go there and buy houses there in Glenmore, so they stay there. So these days now, rather than ten years before, we have new people, new community members. [Are there any tensions?] Mostly people are ok. But the only tension we have is the community that is a neighbour to us, not the people who come and buy houses.
- 18.1. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities? – Yes, they can become. Because we have I think about seven shops that belong to them – there's only one in our community that belongs to the person who lives there. So, they are more than welcome, because we buy from them food, we make loans, so everything we have we got from them you see. So they are helping a lot, rather than our own shops. Because the difference between their shops and ours is that when you go to their shop you find everything that you need, as compares to in my own shop, if I have a shop, somethings I don't have, like maybe I don't have sugar or I don't have soap for washing, I don't have flour or maize meal, if you go to them, they have everything that you need. So customer wise they know everything that the customer needs.
19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? {above}
20. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – {shops} Yes, they do.

21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? – Yes.
22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true? – Not that I've heard of any. But what I know is when they go there and open shops they have to let the councillor know, like the ward committee, they have to let the ward committee know that I am coming from this place and I'm here to open a shop, so that the community can be made to know that there is this person who wants to open a shop here. So they don't just come, they have to get permission from the leaders of the community.
23. Do you think there are too many shops? – No, not there.
 - 23.1. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – I don't think there is a competition, because like what I've just told you that when you go to our shops you don't find everything, but when you go to them you find everything, so there's no competition, you know who's the best and who's not the best.
24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – If they had the ability to own shops, they would have even more shops even now, but there's no ability to open their own shops. [Do you think that this is a problem – can it make problems between the South Africans and the foreigners?] What I know is that people from other countries, those people that open shops, they are very business-minded, they know what the customer needs. So there are no such conflicts, unless you as a South African you open your own shop and then you start spreading rumours that these people they are doing these things...that's what our people do sometimes, they spread the wrong rumours that these people they are stealing from us, they are selling drugs, they are doing this, which is not the case sometimes. [The foreign people there, are they part of the community? Do people treat them as part of the community?] Yes, absolutely. [Where are they from?] Some of them are from Malawi, some are from Ethiopia and some are from Somalia, mostly. [In what ways are they part of the community?] We have meetings where they are needed to attend those meetings.
25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops?
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – Sometimes.
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here?
28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – To become part? Is to relate to our communities. Being part of your community is not about doing something big for the community but to let them know that this is me, I'm from this country, and I'm part of the community by this reason. That's how easy it can be. And like me, I have to open a new house I have to come and say this is me, I come and open a new house, so it's the same thing.
29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes I was here.
30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? – Actually, I was at work. But my employers heard about what was happening here, that people were looting the shops of the foreigners. Now, they wanted to go because they were afraid because they were afraid they would lose what belongs to them – or they wanted to go join their friends who were looting the shops. As a result we went early from work, we knocked out at half past three. Some of the people I worked with wanted to go join the looting.
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015. – Yes, I've heard those rumours.
 - 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true? – Me, what I wanted to do was to get the person who did this, not listen to those rumours, but to get the person punished.
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? – Yes, mostly, yes. Because people believed it was the guy who was owning the Stone Crescent hotel, so now they were looking for anybody who is of that kind, you see.
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – No, no. [What do you think were the reasons?] The other reason is that people in our communities they are not employed, they are staying - some of them they depend on the foreigners as a source of incomes. Some of them, they are saying that these people are taking our jobs, and one other major reason people have is that, they say about foreigners that they are taking away their economy. They are afraid of their economy now, what will happen to them, their jobs. Because some of them say, no, I was working as a domestic worker, now my employer fired me and then she hired one of these foreigners, and then these foreigners request a little money as a wages. [So the foreigners will work for less money?] Yes, for less money, yes. [Do you think that those are valid concerns?] I don't think they were valid concerns, because if they were valid concerns – if you as a person have a problem with anyone, you go to the police station and report to what is happening. You don't just jump to conclusions and decide that this is it, this is what is happening.
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders? {above}
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – It was a chaos, even during this time it was a chaos. People from the other countries, I don't want to say they were afraid, but they felt threatened that they were all included in this same thing, so they preferred to stay away and close their shop. So what I've noticed is that as soon as they closed their shops we had nowhere to buy food, we do not have to buy our basic things. That was a big major problem. And even the same people who did these things, they were regretting what they did, because now nobody is able to get food from the shops, they have to go from locations to town to get things, you see. That was the major problem. And it was a long time that the shops were closed.
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – I don't think they were surprised....because this thing didn't only start in 2015 at that period. It's something that was happening during the year, people were talking, this don't like, I don't like it, I'm tired of this. So now they took all of that and then they just shoot it. It was building underneath and then they just came out. [It was building even before the rumours of the murders?] Yes, even before that, it was something that people were talking – like, these people I'm tired of them, even they spoke in radios, they had debates about these people, they're doing this and this and that, you see.

37. How did you feel after the incident? – It's not right. Because the first time it happened, I think it was... I was in Cape Town before this one, even then I was at work. But I'm glad that I was not part of it. Even when I came back from work, I went home, I didn't take part in those lootings. But it's a very sad thing, because they come from those countries, they have their own money to buy these things, not our money they don't use our money, they use their own money from their governments to open their shops. So we can't lay blame on them for our lack of being not able to open our own shop, we must never blame them, it's not their fault, it's us.
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – The police were there, but the police, they don't act fast as you would want them to act fast in those situations. They come late, because maybe they're afraid of those people, or maybe they're part of the people that say these people must be evacuated. [Do you think that the police are also against the foreigners sometimes?] Yes, because being against the foreigners, it's not about the lower class only. Even the middle class, even the higher class have the same image that the lower class have. It's not about the people who don't work, even those who are on the working class have the problem about the foreigners.
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – I'm not sure how they responded to this situation, I can't talk much about that.
- 39.1. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not? – I don't know...
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – It was more than xenophobic, to me. And then fact that it was racism, you are coming from Zimbabwe, you are not supposed to be here, go back to your own country, go back to Mugabe, we don't have jobs for you. So it was more than xenophobic to me. Because the most people that were affected by these lootings were the women who were married to these foreigners. They were very affected emotionally and physically you see, and mentally, they were affected. So those are our sisters you see.
- 40.1. Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – Yes, in the attitudes. And also what I've noticed is that even the people from other countries are becoming more tired in the fact that now, they take the fight on their own now. They don't wait for us, for people to start fighting, because they are tired of being abused, you see? Now they take the fight in their own hands. But I wouldn't blame them, because now, they see now it's no longer xenophobic but now it's hunger, it's poverty from us as people of South Africa. So poverty is included here, to that question you're asking. Poverty is also involved. [Are there other things involved too do you think?] I don't want to say unemployment also, because people, you'll give them a job – I'm talking from my own experience – you give them a job today but two weeks later they don't want the job, or they are not working, they are playing at work...
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? – {Discussed above}
42. Who is a foreigner? – I want to go to the dictionary to search the word foreigner! They say it's people who come from other countries, come to that particular country. I can put it that way. It's people who don't have a permit to be a citizen of this particular country.
- 42.1. How can you tell that someone is a foreigner? – Someone who does not have a South African ID book that says you are the citizen of South Africa. [And if, say, someone from Mozambique came here and lived for 20 years, and they gave him an SA ID book, would he be a South African now, or is he still a foreigner?] I don't think he'll be a foreigner, because he has a South African ID. So to me, I must say it's not about speaking Xhosa in South Africa or speaking Zulu, but the fact that only you don't have a permit to be a South African. It's not your colour of your skin who says you, you're not a South African. Because we have whites here, we have Indians, we have Coloureds, you see.
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? {Above}
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? – Me, in my own country? It's a difficult question...do I ever feel foreign? Yes, ok, I'll put it this way – Ok, maybe it's not the correct answer, but I'll say it...when I was in Cape Town, or wherever I go, people say I'm not from South Africa, they say hey, my friend, because of the skin colour, of my hair, and my beard, all of that. Even though they say that, I don't have to define myself and say no, no, I'm not, I just say hi, how are you – because I know that one thing is I'm an African child. So it doesn't bother me at all.
45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – They come to South Africa to look for job opportunities firstly, because some of them, where they come from in their countries they are not free as us South Africans. But some of the people that come here they are free, but because they need to make money, they need more opportunities. They need to open businesses, they see business opportunities and job opportunities to grow in this country. So it's not only about those ones who are not liberated already, it's even those who come from rich countries, they come for job opportunities.
- 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? – Those people, they are very talented in terms of skills. They are very skilful people, that's what I've noticed. They do jobs on their own. They use their own hands to do jobs like painting, plumbing, the doing of the hair, opening their own salons. Something that we've lost along the way as South Africans, because we used to do it but now we no longer do it. So those people they are very talented in terms of skills.
- 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – I will say drugs is one of them, that's the only negative side.
46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – It's not a problem, because even in our church, there are people, women who are getting married to men from the other countries. So it's not a problem, no.
- 46.1. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives? – No, no, no. There are more women in the world than men. [Why do you think we hear about this issue so much?] I think it's the fact that there's no man in South Africa that we hear they got married to women from other countries, it's only men from there that decided to be married to women from our countries.
47. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – No, they're not foreign, they are the citizens because they were born in this country. [What if they weren't born here?] Even then, I don't think they are foreigners in either countries.

48. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – I don't think it's a difficult thing, it's not a difficult thing to live with, because we have 11 languages, meaning 11 different cultures in South Africa already so there's no problem with that.
49. What is it that makes people different? – From? [From each other] It's their backgrounds, their culture, their heritage, that's the only thing that makes them different. [And what is it that makes people the same?] What makes people the same is to be together, learning one another's culture and getting all along, learning where the other came from. So that makes us the same, because our cultures are more similar to other ones, it's just there and there.
50. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not? – I don't think – because that is culture, Islam – it would be like Syamthanda getting married to a man from Zulu, it's the same thing. It's the same thing because she has to learn that culture, and the same way as Islam, they have to learn what they can do. So as far as I can know it's not a problem.
- 50.1. Why do you think some people have a problem with this? – It's because they don't understand what is culture, I can put it that way, I think is the main thing. They think culture is Xhosa and Zulu and Tswana and all of that. They think it ends there. But there are different cultures in this world, many different cultures.
51. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Yes.
- 51.1. How do you know them? – I know them because I talk to them, I ask them where do they come from, they tell me, and then I ask them what made you come here in SA and all of that. So we get along that way. I don't just meet them and say how are you, know I sit with them sometimes and ask them.
52. Do you go to church? – Yes.
- 52.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – Many. [Are they welcome in the church?] Yes, most welcome.
53. Are the foreigners friendly? – Yes, yes. Because I have a sister, she's a close friend to me – they are very friendly, pure friendly, they are not pretending to be friendly, they are friendly.
54. Should foreign children go to school here? – Of course.
55. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? – I think for me...well, I don't think it is enough. They make these problems to us even as South Africans that they are going to do so and so and so, and then they never fulfil those promises, so no, they don't do enough, it is not enough. Because there are people who have been free since 1994 but they still live in shacks, so they're not doing enough. It's not enough.
56. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – The biggest problems facing South Africa is the fact that the South African government does not fulfil their promises. I think that that's the major problem. If we can work together as South Africa and give services to the people then we don't have a problem.
57. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? {Above}
58. What do you think people should be doing? – What they need to do, people, is they need to support their government, they need to be on the side of their government, supporting them in this way that in decision making and fulfilling their problems they must work together. And supporting the government, not standing against the government, you see. Because in order for us to work together as one we need to be united. [What do you think needs to change, does the government need to change, do the people need to change?] It's the government that needs to change. [So that people can get behind it?] Yes. Yes. Because the government is made by the people, if there are no people then there are no governments, because we take the people and vote for them and make them our leaders, but they don't fulfil. So they need to change the system, I think it has something to do with the system that they govern with. [How do you think that people can get the government to change?] They need to be very united and speak in one voice, because this country, I think it was liberated because people were in one voice, they were saying the same thing. Even if it means we phone these organisations that pull to the government and say this we don't like, this is what the people need, so what the people need we must get.
59. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – As far as I can see, yes there are too many. [Do you think it would be better if there were less foreigners here?] No... It would be better how? Because we say these people increase our economy at some level, so they're needed, their businesses and all that stuff. [So you think that even though there are many here they do do something useful?] Yes. Yes. [Would you support deporting many of them?] No, no, not. Never, never, never. Because I know, if they go, we all have to start from scratch in our businesses.
60. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? – It's not true if he says they are not xenophobic. Because, if they were not xenophobic, they would never do anything against the foreigners.
61. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – Yes, yes, yes, sometimes they are. [Can this be a problem for South Africa?] Yes, because the more they become xenophobic the more that spreads to the people on the ground. So the people on the ground say, even Zuma is also xenophobic. So they say even Malema is xenophobic, so we have to be.
62. What does it mean to be African? – To be born in Africa...it means a lot to me, I can't even begin to explain it. It means a lot. Because we have this rich treasure in us, we have gold and oil and paraffin, and also lots of resources. So we are very rich. If only we could see it and act upon us.
63. Is South Africa part of Africa? – Yes.
- 63.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways? – It's not different. It's never different.
64. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes.
65. Are you proud of being African? – I'm proud.
66. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – Yes.
67. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – Yes. Because there are white people, Indians and others who were born and raised in Africa, so those people are Africans. Even if you can trace their roots back to India or England, if they are born here it means their roots are here.
68. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – Yes, I think it could happen again, if the matters that are faced between us and foreigners are not resolved. There may be other attacks in the future. Because to resolve

those attacks, it's not a one day thing, or a one month thing. It doesn't have to be approved by the government but it has to be us at the community to approve them. [How do think the best way is to improve those relationships?] I think it's that education is the key to success. If we put in education in our schools, in our primary schools and high schools and at the tertiary level, so that our generation that is growing up they can grow towards the knowledge that is needed.

[FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]

69. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? [Was the RPM involved?] – Yes, because we were part of – we were supporting the women who were involved in those attacks, we were helping the UPM and VOWA, because those people in VOWA, they were the people that were most affected, because some of them are with these guys that are from other countries. [What did the RPM do?] What we did is we raised awareness against these attacks in the communities.
70. How did the community respond to these actions? – Because we as the movements were doing it, they responded in a positive way. But maybe if it was the government doing that they would never have, because of the state of our government.
71. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – It's important because we have to be united as one nation. We can never change the fact that we are all Africans in one country. That's why I said we need to educate ourselves, our communities. Because these things of people from other countries coming to South Africa, it didn't begin in 2015, because some of our leaders back then were also foreigners to other countries so they were welcomed in those countries. So we need to study for them where it all started, so that people can know and realise no, this thing is wrong in this way.
72. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia? – For now, there's not an issue that we've touched on that for now, but we support anything that stands against xenophobia.
73. What did you think of this interview? – It was very helpful.
74. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me? – No.

INTERVIEW 13 – 14 June 2017 (F)

1. May I ask your age? – I'm 46
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes, I'm from Glenmore.
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – I think what makes me South African...I was born in South Africa. My grand-grand-grand grandparents are from here in South Africa, so that's why I'm confident to say I'm South African. Because there's no other place where I can say my grand-grand-grand parents came from. We're all from here.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – I can say I'm an African, because, to me, I think as South Africa is part of the continent called Africa, and we are all Africans. Because we belong here in this continent. So I'm an African, I am a feminist, I'm an activist.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? {Didn't ask as she was just retrenched from Masifunde}
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – I'm a member of the Rural People's Movement, I'm a member of the Young Women's Forum, I'm a member of Rural Women's assembly, of Inyanda Landless Movement – a national organisation. I work with many organisations. The UPM, VOWA...
 - 5.1. What does the organisation do? -
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – The work that we are doing in these organisations, we make sure that we interpret the policies to the people who are unable to understand them and unpack them so that they can participate. We encourage people to make sure that engage government, they participate in hearings, they write submission letters to the NCOP {National Council of Provinces} so that they can feel that they are participating in policy. Although our government negates all our efforts, because you can see sometimes our input is not there, and they don't consider it at all. It's a pity that we are talking to the government that doesn't have ears. [Why do you think the government doesn't listen?] Our government doesn't listen. The ruling party is very stubborn. Because they are working hand in glove with the capitalist system. They are part of the system. So they don't see things with the eyes that we are using. Because I can say they are petit bourgeoisie because they live the style of the bourgeoisie, that capitalist style, and there's a lot of corruption, a lot of lack of service delivery. Even if these things are there in parliament they don't discuss these things. They just look how am I going to be in power so that I can enrich myself. Instead of looking to the people, instead of delivering to the people, they just look at themselves and make sure that they enrich each other. [Are you a member of a political party?] Oh no. I used to be, but now I'm not. [Why not?] It's because you can't rely on these people, they are not reliable. And they are good liars. And they are not there for making sure that they are making the change. Instead each and every one looks for a chance for him or her to get there in the parliament so that they can consume our wealth. As we speak, I just prefer to be an activist, to fight for the poor. So I like to be in the left side.
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – The only thing I want to achieve, if I can sum it up, I'm working with them because I want to see the total change. Because, if you can see how the levels of poverty, unemployment, racism, education....you can see that we are still living in a poor poor poor state for South Africans.

Because there's no change. If you can compare this time to the apartheid era time, you can say it was better on that time. Although there were policies that bind us, or that are more racist. But in terms of hunger – at least by that time people were not like this. In terms of employment, at least on that time there were more people employed. But as you compare with the time that we – the so called liberation or freedom, we're still poor, or more than that. So these organisations we want to make change, we want to participate in the formulation of policies, to take part in making sure that we criticise and analyse the policies that the government is giving us and make sure that there is, or there are policies that are in favour of the poor. Especially women in rural areas.

6. Are you married? – No.
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – Yes, two. It's 1994 and 2014.
 - 7.1. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – No, she was schooling at Glenmore until grade 12, then she attended at NMMU, now she's looking for a job. But there are no chances for them to work, even if you have a degree.
8. What is your first language?
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them?
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so?
11. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – Previously, although I didn't have that opportunity of getting a land, but there are South Africans, some of them who have access to land, even if it's a piece of land, but they have access to land. But now I think there is, I don't know whether it's a deal or what, but the government is trying to give now land even to the people who we think are foreigners. I don't think it's that one. And also the South Africans benefit in the social grants, and I don't think people from other countries are benefitting on that. What else? In terms of working, they work, they have places, shelters, they get the shelters. And if they want to do a business they do that...
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? Do you agree? – It's supposed to be like that, but it is not like that. That's why you have people in the left, who are fighting for that. When you say South Africa is for all who live in it, we are meaning, suppose our government nationalised some or many of the....for example the issue of land. Our government was supposed to nationalise land. Suppose land belongs to the South Africans. But if you can see now, 87 percent of South African land is for the foreigners. We are only in 13% percent. That is why it's difficult now for government, or for the ANC to give people land, because there is no land. Even the Constitution of South Africa was not talking to the Freedom Charter. If the South African Constitution was talking to the Freedom Charter, you should not have the property clause. Because it's that property clause which makes people not be able to give people land. Because the land is still on the hands of the foreigners. And that willing buyer willing seller also is a challenge.
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? - In Glenmore..
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? - Yes, but Glenmore was established in 1979 through a forced removal. So all the people who are there in Glenmore are not used to stay there. Some were from Kouga, which is the business side now, some were from the farms on this area of Port Alfred, Klipfontein, and some who are from different areas in South Africa. Especially the areas where there is wealth, the areas where you can have space, enough space for you to have livestock. They were removed from those spaces. It's those spaces now where you can see there are white farmer only. So people were taken and dumped there, in a rocky place, where you can't have even cattle. [Is there a sense of community now?] Yes there is a community, because they have also the local structures, like schools.
15. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? -
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Some from other parts of the country, they go there to Glenmore because there's a history there. So people visit.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – Not really in Glenmore. Although, sometimes you can hear that the youngsters feel threatened by people from other countries, especially those who have their small shops, spaza shops. Because they have this song they sing, that these people came to take our ladies, because we don't have money, we're not working. So they take our lovers. Number two, they have this song – they take our businesses. But they were not doing any business before. These people came and do what they are not doing. That's why in the small areas like Glenmore it's easy to control that, because we call everyone to the meeting and say, hey people, these are the people like you. We are one because they are from Africa and we are Africans. You were not using these shops, these people came to assist us because even the town is too far from Glenmore, it's 45kms, so we need shops there. So what do you want them to do?
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community?
 - 18.1. [YES] How can this happen?
 - 18.2. [NO] Could you explain why not?
 - 18.3. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities?
19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood?
20. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? Do they do something useful? – The foreigners, they do something useful. Because sometimes when there are funerals, they want to be part of the community. If we have funerals, especially to the homes that do not have, they make sure that they give them some groceries. So they want us to accept them. Because by so doing, many community members accept them, they say these people have Ubuntu, because when they don't have they make sure that they give people. [So they try to become part of the community?] They do try. But those who are not doing well, we call them because there's this issue of drugs. One time there was a foreigner who started to sell the drugs in the community. Then the committee – because we didn't want to spread it to the community because it would be chaos – the committee local forum, called that brother and sat down with him and said, you are not allowed to sell drugs because we don't want them. Children are not attending school and they become rude to the teachers because of these drugs. So if you want to stay in

Glenmore, stop this. That one, he decided to go from Glenmore, because I'm sure he was going to continue with that business. The ones that are here, that are there in Glenmore now, they are humble.

21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? - Yes
 - 21.1. What are the benefits of these shops for you?
22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true?
 - 22.1. **[YES]** Why do you think it's true/how do you know if it's true?
 - 22.1.1. Do you think that South African shops and businesses also bribe the municipality?
23. Do you think there are too many shops?
 - 23.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops?
 - 23.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops?
24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans?
25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops?
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans?
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here?
 - 27.1. **[YES]** Can you tell me how?
 - 27.2. **[NO]** Can you explain to me how they do not?
 - 27.3. **[OR]** Can you explain what the difference is between those who do try and those who don't?
28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods?
29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Well, by that time I participated by the time we assisted women, because these people they have lovers who are South African and lovers who are not South African, and that incident also affected them. Then we thought, hayibo, women are in trouble, let's call these women and sit down with them and check what are the challenges they are facing. So during that discussion we discover that not only women, but also their children are not happy even at schools, because there are people who are threatening them. Then, that's when we assisted them in the struggle to stop or minimise that issue. We worked together with Masifunde, UPM, to make sure that we are fighting that bad incident, that xenophobia. There were marches, there were negotiations with the communities, there was a lot of work done at that time to make sure we stopped that crisis. We're also working with UPM and Masifunde, to look where are the people that can assist them with food, who can give them back their groceries. There were linkages done to make sure that we're working with them. And also there was in that period establishment of VOWA, so that they can take their struggle and continue. Their aim was to make sure that they are educating community members to understand that we are all Africans, let's treat each other as a family. [How did the community respond to those measures?] Yeah although it was difficult, indeed after some time they stopped to do that looting, that xenophobic attacks.
30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? [If you weren't here, can you tell me what you know about what happened then?]
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015.
 - 31.1. Do you think the rumours were true? – I can't say anything on that, I'm not sure, I don't know what was happening. But the only thing I know was it was not good to loot. If there were some things like that they were supposed to go to the police and take that route. Not looting and killing and beating people.
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct?
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? – I don't think there are other reasons, except those people who take chances. Because other people when they there is something they make sure they go for taking chances because they were there to steal, not for anything. Just to rob these people.
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders?
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – By that time, people were divided. They were divided because people – others, they said that people may stay, they are right, they are people like us, and others they said that no these people are not doing very well in our communities. Even the municipality, they didn't take the lead, because they are leaders, they are supposed to take the lead and make sure that there's quietness around that. But they didn't do that. And by that time also it was the time for elections, local government elections. They don't want to be seen taking sides, because they want to buy people's votes. They were not honest at that time.
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – Some were surprised, but some were not.
37. How did you feel after the incident? – I didn't feel very well, because I had that in my mind, there is a lot of work that needs to be done in our communities. Because people they don't understand the tricks of divide and rule, the tricks of capitalism, the tricks of apartheid. They don't understand those things, they don't understand that colonising was because of apartheid and capitalism. They don't understand why there was South Africans instead of being Africans. They thought that South Africa is for them, because they are from here, but they don't have... what's supposed to be if there were not capitalism. There's a need for us to educate people, so that people can understand, when we are saying Africa, we are all Africans. And there's the history that they don't know. Our South African people were hiding in these countries in the time of apartheid, whilst we were fighting for our liberation. So these countries were the countries that helped our people, and trained them. We had uMkhonto weSizwe, they were not training here, they were training on other countries. There were many other comrades who were there hiding in the African continent. So you can't say SA is for us only because the struggle was not only for us. All the Africans were in our struggle, and by the time we get liberation in 1994 all the continent was very happy for us. So they need to understand that.

38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings?
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings?
 - 39.1. Do you think the municipality did a good job in dealing with the situation? Why/why not?
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – It has elements of xenophobia, I can say it was xenophobia.
 - 40.1. Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – Yes, there is. Because even now, some people they don't like – or they don't love – people from other countries. You know what makes that? It's because of our African National Congress failed us. If people were not in this state of hunger, poverty, unemployed, homeless, no water, no roads, they would be not like this. They have this mentality because they are hungry. People are living in poverty. [Why do you think it's often the foreigners who are blamed for those problems rather than the government?] I think their level of political consciousness is very low. That's why I said we need to educate them to understand that. Because when you go to the rural areas, people don't have water. But when it comes the time for voting, they say – ah ANC! Ah, Tata Mandela! But they don't have water. They are hungry, they are not working, the government is not creating jobs, but when you go for the vote, they say, ah Mandela! That's why, you understand, there is a need for political education.
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this?
42. Who is a foreigner? – A foreigner? Ai, the Europeans. The Europeans are foreigners! The Africans are not foreigners. [How about the Bangladeshis?] Hey! In fact, to me, people from Africa, and black people from other areas, to me are not foreigners. I'm Black Conscious, although I'm also a feminist. So to me, blacks from other areas are not foreigners because they are suffering like we are doing. Our struggle, we have one struggle.
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? – Foreigners, meaning Europeans? Yhu! Those are the people I want to fight with! The capitalist system, because it is based there. Those are the people we need to look at. Especially the system, that system.
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? **[Yes/No]** Could you explain?
45. Why do you think that foreigners (people from Africa/Asia) come to South Africa? – They come to South Africa, because – I mean, even if you are looking at TVs. When they are talking about South Africa, it's been like it's a bright country. It's a bright country because we have this idol, Mandela. Who definitely sold our country. I can say it. Because if that guy was fighting for us, why are we still in this chaos of not having land? Of not having wealth? But in those countries they have statues of Mandela. Mandela is an international icon. Why is he an international icon if he was really fighting for the South Africans or for the Africans? You can ask yourself that question first. Then you will realise that there's something that Mandela did that makes us to this situation. In other words, Mandela is a sell-out. I think like that. So even other countries when they see SA, it's like a bright place where you can get everything. Why is this? South Africans are great sufferers. We are suffering.
 - 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring {Is there a benefit to South Africa}? – I'm not sure, I don't know. But I think, if there was no benefit, why do they open for them to come? So there are some benefits, but those benefits benefit only those who are there. That's why that Zuma doesn't want to step down. He's busy benefitting.
 - 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring?
46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – I don't think it's a problem, if people do understand that we are all African. To me it's not a problem. They are people like us. [Why do you think so many people do have a problem with this?] Some people get their opinion of cultural issues. Like we Xhosas have amasiko, our cultural or traditional ceremonies. So many people they are thinking of that – how am I going to have amasiko of this child? Because we don't know their culture. So I think that those are problems. And they have that – how do we call this child? Because an amaXhosa and a Somali, our product is then what?
 - 46.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know?
 - 46.2. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives?
47. What do you think about South African men marrying foreign women?
 - 47.1. Is it different to foreign men marrying South African women?
 - 47.2. **[YES]** Why do you think it's different?
48. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – I'm not sure, because the father is from Somalia and the mother is here... but when they married they have permits to be South Africans. So that child can be a South African and also that child can be a Somalian. It's a double benefit for the child.
49. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – I think it's something that we can work with...
50. What is it that makes people different? – Language, cultural issues, religion, beliefs... [And what makes people the same?] Acceptance, when you accept each other. Give space to learn and understand each other...
51. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not?
 - 51.1. **[NO]** Why do you think some people have a problem with this?
52. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – In my perspective, or people from other countries? Yeah there are people who I know from other countries. And I used to encourage people not to say to them, 'my friend' – there's that term, 'my friend', like Makwerekwere. I used to say to them even there in Glenmore, ask the person what is there name, so that you can call them by their names.
53. Do you go to church? – I do.
 - 53.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – Yes, there are. There's no problem with them. [Can church be an important space for creating relationships between the foreigners and the community?] Yes, because in the church there is not that discrimination. We are all church members.
54. Are the foreigners friendly? – They are friendly, they are.

55. Should foreign children go to school here? – Yes, of course.
56. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – It's not.
57. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – We can start with education, because education is the key. What kind of a society, what kind of a country, has people who are undereducated? The curriculum that the government is using... also the issue of not having access to the universities. So education. The infrastructure, facilities, education facilities especially in rural areas, children are travelling long distances... government is violating their right of people, especially in education. Because they said we have a right to education, but right now, government is closing schools. And also he's violating the right to children for safety and security. Because on the way home from school there's no safety. There's a killing of children now on their way to schools. Not enough textbooks but they expected them to pass. And also by the time I was doing grade 12, the passing mark from grade 12 was 50 percent. But right now it's 30 percent. How can they compare with other countries? Really, in the issue of education, government has dismally failed. In fact in all the departments! Even if you go to the Department of Health – there are clinics, but even in those clinics you get only Panado. There is no other medicines. And other clinics are too far, other areas don't have clinics. They have to travel when they go to clinic. And government outsourced the ambulances, they are not part of the hospital, so you struggle to get an ambulance when there are people who get ill in the community. Even in the issues of infrastructure, there are no roads, bad roads, no water, or dirty water if there is water.
58. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? – I think we need to take all the people who are in government now and take them down because they failed. And make sure that we restart.
59. What do you think people should be doing? – I think people... it's not easy. Because, even if we can take a new party, another party, it will not be easy for them because already there are debts. And also when you look on the policies of these political parties, you're supposed to look for people who are guaranteed to work for people. But when you look in their policies you can see they are not strong in saying South African wealth is going to be for the South Africans. They are not strong on that. We need our land back. Because when you are talking about land you're talking about your sea, your forest, your wealth, like your gold and everything that is there. You are talking of isibhakabhaka, the sky, when you're talking of land. If there will be a party that will say let's nationalise all these things because our people don't have the access even in fishing. Because there are people who said you can't, you can, you can't. There are policies for that. So if there will be a party, or a movement, that will say let's nationalise all these things, that could be good. I don't know whether socialism could make it better, I'm not sure, but I think at least it would be better than this.
60. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – There are many. There are many foreigners. At least government can limit. And it is not easy for the government to limit, because others are coming with their own ways. That's why there are many. Because many of them have no permit to be here. [And it's a problem?] It's a problem. We need at least to limit them, because we already don't have enough for ourselves.
61. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – Ah man, he's not right. He knows nothing except corruption.
62. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – I don't know, I can't say anything about that because I'm not sure.
63. What does it mean to be African? – All people who belong to Africa are Africans.
64. Is South Africa part of Africa? – Yes, I can proudly say that. It's part of Africa because we are in Africa, and we are Africans. No matter if old Zuma can take South Africa to other places, but we are still Africans and we are fighting for that.
65. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes.
66. Are you proud of being African? – I'm proudly African. That's why I'm a part of the Rural Women's Assembly. The RWA, it's vision is to make sure it is working in all Africa with women, especially in the rural areas. At the moment we are working in SADC region.
67. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – Indians? They have a long time being here, and they claim Durban as their place. Because of their long time being here. They were going to say our great-great-great grandparents were here... I don't know.
68. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – Some, they can. If they have our mind, if they are not capitalists, they can.
69. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – It is possible that, because we didn't go and educate people. There is a need for that education. As long as we don't educate people – and it's not our role only, government is supposed to teach people about that. As long as we don't make sure that there are also adverts on the TVs and social networks that educate people, or awareness raising so that people can understand that we are one – as long as we don't do that, there's a possibility of having it again. [So you think that's the most important way?] Yes, it's the most important to do that education, and also the political education, so that people they must know *why* now it is like that.
- {Out of time but already answered some of these questions}
- [FOR UPM (AND OTHER) MEMBERS]**
70. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this?
71. How did the community respond to these actions?
72. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign?
73. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia?
74. What should be done to fight xenophobia? (by ordinary people/ the state)
75. What did you think of this interview?
76. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me?

INTERVIEW 14 – 14 JUNE 2017 (M)

1. May I ask your age? – I'm 28
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes. Grahamstown. I was born here, grew up here...
 - 2.1. **[YES]** What makes you South African? What does it mean to be South African? – The history of this country...starting from the colonialism until today. So, when I read about the history, there was some sort of conflicts between the Europeans and...but the history ended with trying to harmonise and build one nation and forget about the past and everything that happened.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – Yeah, because you know, if I was a successful person I would have been in the UK, and staying there because those countries are the first world countries, since ours is still the developing one. So I would prefer the developed one than the developing one.
4. Are you employed? What is your job/ where do you work? – Yeah, I was employed but it was a contract job so it ended last week. So now I'm not employed, I'm still seeking for another job.
5. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/etc.)? – The UPM, yes.
 - 5.1. **[YES]** What does the organisation do? – It's an organisation that helps people with social aspects, you know, everything that has to do with social issues. And it's an organisation that tries to disclose the corruption that is made by those ones that are in the ruling class, and it helps people from townships.
 - 5.1.1. Why did you join the organisation? – I think because of the ideas that they have concerning the social system and the things that they do to help people.
 - 5.1.2. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – A lot, a lot. But even though sometimes I become pessimistic but...you know, I wish it could achieve a lot. To engage with people who seem to be hopeless about the political issues, and also to facilitate youth to understand what is happening around here.
 - 5.2. Are you a member of a political party? – No. [Why not?] The reason I'm not a member of any political party....firstly I prefer anarchism, and secondly, you know, these political organisations are the tools that are being used by the capitalists, in order to fulfil their needs. You could see EFF is trying to impress us that we should follow them, but if you could follow the founders of this political organisation, you'll find that it's capitalism that is behind. That's why I do not want to be a part of it.
6. Are you married? – No.
7. Do you have children? How old are they? – Yeah I have one, and the other one is on the way.
8. What is your first language? – Xhosa.
9. Can you speak other languages? Where did you learn them? – Yes I can speak English, and a little bit of Greek and Hebrew. [Where did you learn Greek and Hebrew?] I did my self-studying.
10. Do you think it's important to learn other languages? Why do you think so? – It's good, in fact, the reason why I studied these languages is, since I'm a Christian so it's the language that was used to write the Bible, so I was interested in those languages so I could understand the original languages of the manuscripts.
11. Do you think you should get any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – Yeah...I think so, because...I mean, we are the citizens of this country so at least the government should accommodate us.
12. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? Do you agree? – Yes, I agree, but at the same time I do not agree. But it depends, it depends because, if you could say that South Africa belongs to all who live in it...there are some foreigners in our country, but now eish, I think they...I see them like they are here to ruin things but at the same time they are here for their living...
13. Where in Grahamstown do you live? – Vukani.
14. Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together? Can you explain what you mean? – Yeah, but black neighbourhoods are...you anticipate a lot from a black neighbourhood. You might get well, but at the same time there are somethings that will just burst out of the blue.
15. What are some of the main problems in your neighbourhood? – Drugs. Drugs, and unemployment, because a lot of young people are unemployed. So they prefer to do drugs because they have nothing to do, so when you're high you're just in another state, you don't feel anything.
16. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? – Yeah, like Fingo Village. Some of us were staying there and so we moved to Vukani.
17. Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – I wouldn't say there are tensions, because we are sometimes ignorant, we might ignore other people who are new, but sometimes we might want to know where you're from, but you're not that deep in it.
18. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community?
 - 18.1. **[YES]** How can this happen?
 - 18.2. **[NO]** Could you explain why not?
 - 18.3. What about people from outside of South Africa? Do you think it's possible for them to become part of South African communities?

19. Are there many non-South Africans in your neighbourhood? – Yes.
20. What do the foreigners do in your neighbourhood? – They have shops. Others they are selling blankets, walking all around. But it's business what they are doing. [Do they do something useful for the community?] No, because they are doing that for themselves. They don't care about the South Africans. I mean, if I could go to another country, I go there for my own benefits. It doesn't matter whether other people are being affected by what I'm doing, as long as I'm benefitting. [Do you think that the community benefits from having the shops there?] Yeah, because of their prices, the things that they sell are affordable, and you can even negotiate with them if you don't have money to pay after some time.
21. Are you a customer at any of the foreign owned shops? – Yes.
 - 21.1. What are the benefits of these shops for you? {Above}
22. I have heard that sometimes municipal officials are bribed by foreign nationals to set up shops. Do you know anything about this? Do you think it's true?
23. Do you think there are too many shops?
 - 23.1. Why is it a problem if there are too many shops?
 - 23.2. Do you think there is competition between South African shops and foreign shops? – There's no competition at all because black South Africans do not have businesses. So it's only them. By the time they arrived here, South African businesses went...boom.
24. Do you think that more small businesses should be owned by South Africans? – Yes. Because during the pre-democratic time, a lot of businesses, a lot of shops were owned by black South Africans. So they arrived after that time and now it's them who are owning the businesses.
25. Why do you think fewer South Africans own shops? – You know, those people are coming from their countries, they are running from their countries, because they didn't know that this country of ours is a {Canaan?} land. So they are united, they are in unity to sustain themselves you see. It's networking that they have.
26. Do foreign shop-owners sometimes employ South Africans? – Yes, sometimes.
27. Do you think foreigners try to become part of the community when they come here? – Yeah, yeah. Because they interact with our sisters, they get married with our sisters, and then they have children....so I see it as a slow crusade, but I do not want to be offensive, but I see it as a slow moving crusade because after sometime, maybe in 50 years to come, a lot of their children you'll see here.
28. What do you think that foreigners should do to become part of communities or neighbourhoods? – Um, I don't know about that one. Because they adapt with their community, they easily adapt with us, so it's easy for them to create friendship and new relationships. They even understand our cultures and beliefs...
29. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Yes, I was here.
30. Could you tell me the story of what happened then? – It was a most, I would say, scariest period of time, I would say, because people were very aggressive towards them, they were looting their shops, attacking them, chasing them that they must go back to where they belong. And these people, they are also human beings, they are here for the living...so we mustn't take our anger out to them, you know. Because our government has failed us dismally. So instead of taking that anger towards them we should have done that to those who are ruling, because they are full of promises without fulfilment, so it was the most scary thing I've ever seen.
31. Tell me if you can about the rumours of an 'Arab man' being responsible for the murders of young women which happened in Grahamstown in 2015. – Yes, that was one of the major reasons. Because they started with that false allegation – I could say it's a false allegation, because there's no proof. At least if there was any proof I would have said it was right for you to attack them, but there was no proof. So it was the essence of that xenophobic attack. [Do you think there were other reasons too?] Also the, like what I said before, we are unemployed, we don't have money, so we see these people, they have money and they are having businesses...and we don't have anything. And they are not even the citizens. So they must go back. [Do you think that that is right?] It is right, but it is wrong how they did it. I always say to them, guys I understand why you are here. You are running away from the civil wars in your countries, we see a lot of catastrophes on TV. But look at us here in South Africa. A lot of us remained here, and some of the politicians went to other countries, and we fought the apartheid regime and we emerged victoriously. So, if you think by running away from your country and coming here, that will solve things, then no, that won't solve. Fight for your country. You see?
32. From my understanding, in the events of October 2015, it was only the businesses owned by foreign nationals who were Muslim or 'Arab' that were targeted. Is this correct? – Yes, mostly.
33. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? {Above}
34. Why do you think so many foreigners were targeted, even though the rumour was that only one man was responsible for the murders?
35. Can you tell me what the mood was like after the incident? – Yeah there was a tension, because they were scared of us, first of all, they didn't trust us. Because they saw that, hey these people, we mustn't fully put our hopes on them, because they can take back and attack us again. So I don't think they are relaxed now.
36. Were people surprised that this thing had happened? – No, because, it was not the first time here in South Africa that that thing happened. You know in Joburg there were xenophobic attacks, in Port Elizabeth there were xenophobic attacks, you see, so I don't think that people were really surprised.
37. How did you feel after the incident? – I was kind of sad, because I mean, those people didn't do anything. Like the allegations of murdering people...I mean even if that did happen, I think it's one person who did that. So why are we attacking the others who do not know anything about this thing?
38. Can you describe the role of the police during the lootings? – Yeah, the police were kind of protecting them...
39. How did the municipality respond to the lootings? – No, I don't know much about that.
40. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – Yes, it was xenophobia. Because there was hatred towards them.

- 40.1. **[YES]** Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – Yeah, because you know those people, like what I said before, they are no longer relaxed now. They always select their words. Even if you make them angry, they will kind of accept that anger of yours, but you can see that this person is very cross, he doesn't like what you're doing but they have that fear also, that if I could respond in the same manner, then maybe this person would mobilise and then people would attack them again. So they are no longer open now.
41. I've heard that after the shops were closed in the aftermath of the lootings it was difficult for some people to buy things without going all the way into town. Did you experience this? – Yes, you had to go to town to buy things. I mean, their businesses are so full of stock, everything that you want is there, there's no need for you to go to town, you know that if you want something you just go to the nearest shop. So after that xenophobic attack their shops were closed and it was very for us. We had to come to Shoprite, to Checkers you see, so you had to pay taxi fare. [Do you think this difficulty made people think about the foreigners and the shops in a different way at all?] I think they did realise that what they did to them was wrong, because some were complaining, hey, now we are suffering. We did attack them but now, we see that now things are not the same, they must come back!
42. Who is a foreigner? – I'm also a foreigner, because the Southern Africa was for the Khoi-san, the Nguni nations, which is us, we come from central Africa. So all of us we are foreigners in South Africa, it's only the Khoi-san who are the original ones here.
43. Can foreigners become South Africans? – Yes...
44. Do you ever feel 'foreign'? **[Yes/No]** Could you explain? – There once was a time – my hair is kind of curly, so there was this guy who came to me and asked me, hey my friend, where is this place? So I responded in my language, and he said, oh, no I thought you are an Ethiopian! So I was like, ok...so it was that time I felt like a foreigner! [How did it make you feel?] I felt bad but at the same time I felt happy that, to some people I don't look like a South African.
45. Why do you think that foreigners come to South Africa? – They want a better life for themselves.
- 45.1. What are the positive things you think that they bring? What are the benefits to South Africa? – You mean economically? [Anything.] Economically, so far, I haven't seen any good benefits. [Do you think there are any other benefits?] In understanding other people's culture and religion. I mean I really understand Muslim now.
- 45.2. What are the negative things you think that they bring? – Especially you see the Nigerians, those people, they are selling drugs a lot. So they are ruining our young people. So that's the bad thing about them. And they will take our sisters and make them prostitutes, you see. All that stuff.
46. What do you think about foreign men marrying South African women? – I mean, I won't say it's a problem. But it is a problem in like I said to you, there is this slow crusade that is moving. Maybe, who knows, in 50 years we'll be a Muslim country. Because their children are the citizens of South Africa, you see? [Would that be a problem, if things changed like that?] It would be a problem because even the colonialism caused a problem, in so much that I am a conservative Christian because of colonialism. Maybe if there was no colonialism I would have been an African, like, understand my – but now, I don't want anything to do with my original religion you see? I'm a Christian...
- 46.1. I have heard some people say that some of the foreign men only marry South African women for their passports, that sometimes they even have wives at home. Do you think this is true? How do you know? – Yeah, that's true. Some people do get married because they are in love, but that is true.
- 46.2. Do you think this makes it harder for South African men to find wives? – No it does not affect us...but some of us have been affected by that because maybe a guy will be dating this girl, but the guy is not working, he doesn't have money, so this girl will be approached by this foreign guy with money, he'll be supplying everything to her...
47. Do you think that the children of foreigners and South Africans are foreign? – By birth they are South Africans, but genetically it is mixed up.
48. Do you think it is easy or difficult to live with people who are from a different culture? Why? – It depends because, like, in our African culture, let's say my sister got married to a Pakistani. Let's say they had a boy. According to our culture, at the age of 18 he has to be circumcised, he has to go to the initiation school. But in the Muslim religion, I don't know whether it's eight days or ten days that you must be circumcised... so it can cause problems. [Do you think that would be something that could be worked out?] I don't think we would be able to work that out. Because some people are very strict with their culture.
49. What is it that makes people different? – It's how they live. And ethnicity, and race. [What makes people the same?] It's only our understanding one another, and you don't criticise me, and I don't criticise you also. You always accept what comes from me and I always accept what comes from you.
50. Do you think it's a problem for South African women to convert to Islam? Why/ why not?
- 50.1. **[NO]** Why do you think some people have a problem with this?
51. Do you know any foreigners in Grahamstown? – Yeah a lot.
- 51.1. How do you know them? – The shop owners, those who are owning shops, and the other ones who are selling blankets.
52. Do you go to church? – Yes I do.
- 52.1. Are there foreigners at your church? – Yes. [Are they welcomed?] Yes they are very welcome, because even my leader in the church is a Zimbabwean. So he's our leader from another country, and we never say that because you are from another country you can't be...I mean, we are worshipping the same God, we are in the same denomination, so even though we don't speak one language, we speak one language according to our religion.
53. Are the foreigners friendly? – Especially the Pakistanis, they are very friendly, I will always talk with them about their religion. I like religion, so I will always talk to them, sometimes I will tease them like, I'm an atheist, I don't believe in Allah. So to them that is very offensive so they will try to explain, no, God exists...so I try to build that friendship. Some of them, I'll ask them to teach me their language, the Arab language. And the other one he even gave me the Koran, translated in English.
54. Should foreign children go to school here?

- 54.1. Don't you think that's a good way for them to become more South African?
55. Do you think that the government is doing enough to help the people of South Africa? Could you explain why you think so/don't think so? – No, no no.
56. What do you think are the biggest problems in South Africa? – Corruption, they are very corrupt. Because if the body is headless, then...so the head has been cut off.
57. What do you think the government should be doing about these problems? – The government should persuade people, young, old, to be educated, it should create more jobs. I mean there's a lot.
58. What do you think people should be doing? – Since I've said that I'm an anarchist, so you know for anarchism, if they don't help us, then we must strive by our own, and see what will happen if we try by our own selves. Maybe the government will assist somehow. [Is this what the UPM is doing?] Yes, yes.
59. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – A lot, a lot. [Is it a problem that there are so many?] Hmm, I wouldn't say there's a problem...
60. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? Can you explain? – He's lying. He's lying. I don't know whether he is trying to defend himself or what, but he's lying. [Do you see people in the community being xenophobic towards the foreigners?] Yes. They call them names, like 'kwerekwere', 'uncircumcised people', 'terrorist'.
61. Do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic? – Since I don't follow them too much I don't care what they are saying or what they're not saying, so...I don't know about that.
62. What does it mean to be African? – I would say intellect.
63. Is South Africa part of Africa? – Yeah it's part of Africa...
- 63.1. Do you think it is different to Africa? In what ways? – No it's not, it's just that we are being soft too much here. If you look at other countries you'd see when people are fighting against the government, you'll see that people are very radical. Here we are so soft. [Why do you think we are soft?] I don't know. Maybe it's Mandela? Because Mandela came with that peace thing – peace, peace, peace, violence won't solve it. Maybe that's the reason.
64. Do you consider yourself to be an African? – Yes.
65. Are you proud of being African? – Yes I'm proud, because this is the richest continent in the world, but poor. Rich in culture, minerals. I was even shocked that when I research about Africa I learned that philosophy began here, education began here. But why these young children are rejecting education when education is something that belongs to Africans?
66. Do you think that Indians or Muslims are African? – They can't, because they're Asians...
- 66.1. And when they're born in Africa? – If they're born in Africa I could say they are, maybe I could say they are Asio-African or something...
67. Do you think that whites can ever be Africans? – No, they can't. They are the South Africans. If a white person is born in South Africa he is a South African, or a Euro-South African. But not an African.
68. Do you think Grahamstown might experience another incident like in 2015? – Yes, yes.
69. During and after the incident in October 2015, the UPM helped to stabilise the situation and restore calm. How did the UPM do this? – We took the victims and we helped them with accommodation, food. Even our Ayanda Kota was the person who would always appear on media trying to calm the people in Grahamstown not to attack them, and he was trying to explain the reason. That it was because of capitalism – so he was trying to explain them that no guys, the thing that we should fight against is capitalism. [And you agree with that?] Yes I do agree with that.
70. How did the community respond to these actions? – Since people are not I could say, wise? Intellect? Some of them they didn't accept that idea, or that ideal. But some of them did accept that. Because after they've attacked them they faced the consequences of that, because there were no shops.
71. Why do you think it is important to resist violence against people who are thought to be foreign? – Um, I would say that, since this is a rainbow nation, this country is recognised as a rainbow nation, we should accept one another.
72. Are there other measures that your organisation is currently taking against xenophobia?
73. What should be done to fight xenophobia? – we should facilitate people with the corruption that the government has done, the system that is oppressing us, and we should teach them about the cultures of those people, and we must create some strong relationship with them.
74. What did you think of this interview? – It was fine.
75. Do you have anything you would like to add, or to ask me? – I'm not against – like I don't support xenophobia. But at the same time I would like the foreigners to assist us because they are in our country. I would like them to not run away from their affairs. They should fight and fight, because if you fight, no matter how many people are dying, you are fighting for your freedom. So you cannot fight whilst you are running away, you're not fighting you're just running, and that brings no solution.

INTERVIEW 15 - 2 AUGUST 2017 (M)

1. May I ask your age? – 42.
2. Are you a South African? Where are you from? – Yes, from Grahamstown.

- 2.1. **[YES]** What does it mean to be South African for you? – For me, to be a South African means not to be a citizen. It means not to have a stake in the society. It means to be excluded. It means to be waste. Because how come so many people and young people in this country, that have got so much talent, that they can only wake up in the morning and have nothing to do, they are unemployed? And they live in the extension of the society, in what, if you insist, you may refer to as the dumping places. Living in townships that you can refer to as concentration camps. Yeah, I think that's what it means to be South African.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else besides South African? – I don't think, I mean, I wouldn't be struggling everyday if I thought I was a citizen in this country, and I enjoyed the rights of that citizenship. I wouldn't be struggling on a daily basis. We are struggling because we want to assert our humanity, we are struggling because we want to be treated as full human beings. So if you are treated as a sub-human being, you can't feel happy, and say I'm a South African.
4. When did you start the UPM and why? – We started the Unemployed People's Movement in 2009, we felt that there were social movements across the country, and we did not have the voice for the excluded. We needed to amplify their voice. And the only way to amplify their voice was through constituting ourselves into a unity, and to rally together, because that's where our strength is as the excluded. So we constituted ourselves into the UPM. [Can you tell me a little about why it's called the Unemployed People's Movement?] Well, it's called the UPM because you'd remember at some point the unemployment rate in this country was 30 to 70 percent, and at some point was said to be over 60 percent, around 65. And also in this country unemployment is very huge. And if you look to the ills of our society, they speak to the unemployment crisis in this country, unemployment that came with the dispossession of our land, where people were pushed away from our land, through the barrel of the gun. Not only through the barrel of the gun but also through instruments like {politics/poll-tax?} where people were literally pushed away and sent to mines and had to come back very sick and do nothing. So we thought that the unemployment resonates with the people and the issues.
5. What are the main aims of the UPM, and what do you hope to achieve? – Well, it's to constitute ourselves into the assembly of the unemployed, the oppressed, it's to constitute ourselves into that, and also to fight the corrupt practices in our local municipalities. But over and above, you'd also understand that in the struggle for the emancipation, the aims and objectives will differ many times, because there is no straightjacket. But we are working in and trying to understand the struggle that we are in.
6. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What does this statement mean for you? Do you agree with it? – Well, I don't know, but as I'm saying, how can it belong to all those who live in it, but we live in this country but we don't feel like residents, we don't feel like citizens. And as long as the question of land has not been addressed in this country, we cannot say we are residents in this country. So as black people we can't say that we belong, in the true sense of the word in South Africa. [So even before we start talking about whether foreign people...] Yes. Yes, I mean, even talking about - in terms of the population we constitute the majority and white people constitute the minority. And black people not less than or is it above 13 percent of the land? And white people own the commanding heights of the economy on the land. So there's conflict there.
7. Do you think South Africans should get any special benefits from being born here? Benefits that wouldn't apply to non-South Africans? – Well, I think, and we are calling for a Basic Income Grant (BIG), and there has to be a conversation, that do you confine that to South Africans only, or to whoever is unemployed in this country? And I think if you were to take that route, I think it would have to apply to those that have got a permit to be in this country, that in one way or another have become inhabitants of this country as well. So I don't think we would be hostile to that.
8. Where in Grahamstown do you live? Do people in your neighbourhood get along well together/ is there a sense of community? – In Fingo. Wherever you go, there is no sense of community. I mean our townships are the hubs of drugs, substance abuse, and all other social ills. So the fibre of the societies is not there, there's so much brokenness.
9. Do new people often move into your neighbourhood from elsewhere? How do people feel about this? Are there tensions between the newcomers and the residents? – No, I mean, it's not that, because of the socio-economic conditions in Grahamstown, so you don't find that influx around movement, people from outside going in and others going out.
10. Do you think that it is possible for people from other places to become part of a new community? And do you think it's possible for foreigners to become part of South African communities? – Well the reality of the matter is that Africa is characterised by these imperialist wars. So it is not the making of the working class in African countries, but they are forced to bear the brunt of these imperialist wars that have taken place in Africa. And the brutal policies of the African states, such as Structural Adjustment Programs, which pushes as I've said, which makes our people feel as if they are not the citizens of African countries. So I think to me, what becomes important is, we might feel better in South Africa compared to those other African countries, where even the economic sanctions will not be imposed on the people, will not be imposed because one is siding with the plight of the working class, will be imposed because of the economic interests of the ruling class. And the working class, they are always losers. So I'm saying, as the working class in this country, it would be really dangerous if we were not to pledge solidarity with the working class in the continent, because we are all in the same boat. And in terms of the social classes in society, we all belong in the working class. The working class in relation to the means of – our social class in relation to the means of production. So I would say it's important that we should be pledging solidarity, because what hit Zimbabwe 20 years back, you can't say the working class in this country are safe, they will not come for you. At some point Zimbabwe was the African basket, and then many other African countries. So I'm saying what's important is to pledge solidarity. [Is that what the UPM is trying to do in Grahamstown with the immigrant communities, trying to create those links of solidarity?] Well, we are very glad to say when we went to the dialogues, we listened to our people. Because we think the dialogues were important, other than to march. We should demonstrate, but we should also be able to listen. So as we were conducting dialogues and listening to our people, you'd realise that their anger has got nothing to do with the foreigners. They're angry because they are unemployed. They're angry because of the lack of essential services, because Makana municipality is failing. Fundamentally, it is the anger, because of their plight, because of their position, because of their

conditions. And in our discussion in those dialogues and in those talks, people were able to realise without us saying that actually, they don't make us angry. Even if they were to leave tomorrow, we'll still be found in this position. We'll still be unemployed, we'll still be suffering, we'll still be exposed to diseases, our healthcare system will not improve, etcetera. So without us having said those things, they were able to realise. So I think the dialogues were an eye-opener, to also say then, how do we work together? Because in the end we are all in the same position. Because as result of that, it's only in Grahamstown where you heard that the xenophobic tendencies, lootings and attacks, because of dialogues and intervention, you did not hear of any other reports, or to say now it has moved from Extension 9 it is in Joza. In places like PE, in places like Durban or Cape Town, it will move from Gugulethu, it will hit eKhayelitsha, it will move from eKhayelitsha, it will hit another place. Because of the dialogues, and really being able to show and talk to people, because of our stance, because we are not victims in addressing, we did not march and say, oh, please, Makana municipality! We made demands, to say, pay for their loss. We were able to say, intervene. We were able to say to police, do your work, protecting them. So I'm saying we did not march and say, oh please can you help them. We were not confrontational but we were very radical. And proactive, rather than to ask for the mercies of those who are responsible for our plight. So as a result the police were very angry with us, the Makana municipality was very angry with us, a number of people, because of the approach that we took. As the help was coming in as well, we need not rely on help, because we did not see that... we appreciate the help of the Red Cross, but we were able to see they're not going to stay here forever. These are human beings, we want them back in the community.

11. In terms of the foreign nationals here in Grahamstown – do you think they're a benefit to the community? – Well, it varies. I mean people during the dialogues will say, I don't have money and they will give us groceries, others will say I'm unemployed, I'm giving them my house and I'm staying at the back, they pay rent, I get to benefit. Others will be able to say, but no no, they are quite expensive, no they are not hygienic, etcetera. And we said that those are the things that could be addressed by communities, to say...the issue of hygiene. Again, we were saying we should not fight about it, the issue of hygiene, there's a department in Makana municipality, there's a directorate that deals with the issues of hygiene, which deals with licenses etcetera. They should be doing their job. If we feel unhappy we should be able to report and say, do your job. And they are happy when we fight about these issues. Someone is failing to do the job, right? And because we are not experts, for example, if you say must I come here for health and safety measures, I don't even know how many exit doors should be for the safety of the people, what constituted the hygiene for the building that does a business, etcetera. They're the people that should be responsible, instead of us fighting, and we should be putting pressure on them to say, do your job.
12. Could you tell me about what was happening in the location leading up to the lootings? – Well there's crime even to this day, right, and there were rumours that people's bodies were being removed etcetera, and we visited a number of homes doing interviews. There was a woman who stayed in Extension 6, and the mother confirmed to us she was missing. After two days she was called by the police, she went to the police station, the police showed her. And she thinks that it was the white birds that started eating on the breast and other parts, because she has been lying there. They don't know if she had been raped or not. That's number one. Then they said that there was a deceased body with body parts removed in Vukani. And we went around the area – people who were staying in the nearby houses did not see, right? And we said, we can only speak once anyone has confirmed to have seen. And we went to the police station and they said no, we haven't received such a deceased body here. And we talked to the local funeral undertakers, they said we haven't received such a body. And we said to the police we are worried, we are worried. You should be doing – it could be that the community is panicking, because there's so much high rate of crime. Convene meetings and dispel these rumours, and start working, be very proactive on the issue of crime. And we arranged meetings, they did not honour the meetings, and in some instances they made commitments that they did not honour. Up until that moment. [So they didn't take it seriously?] No. Even during the looting they were also looting. So you had to tell them, you did not only fail, you were also looting. And they were angry with us. You remember when we went in one meeting, myself and the director of Masifunde, Govender said get out of my meeting. We said, but why? You called the civil society, we constitute civil society, he said no, out of our meeting. [So who did they consider legitimate stakeholders?] Everyone, except for UPM and Masifunde, because they started to say that Masifunde and UPM, they are responsible for the xenophobia. This was coming from Makana municipality and the police. Because they were exposed, their backs were against the wall. [How did they try to justify that claim?] They did not. They did not even attempt, and they were in trouble because the police commissioner from the province wanted to know what was happening. They failed, and not only they failed, but they were looting. And also, some of the councillors were very xenophobic, right? And they also benefitted from the looting. So that made us very unpopular. As a result, some of the councillors had to make a commitment to say, we will see to it that Masifunde closes, or the ANC takes over Masifunde. We will deal with the UPM and Masifunde in one way or another. There were such threats and commitments made.
13. I know the rumour of the murders became attached to one of the business owners...I'm curious about how you think people justified the attacks on the whole Muslim community? – We said to the police, you've got an intelligence department, they must do their work. They must stop spying on activists and what activists do, they must go into the bottom of this. They get paid, the intelligence. They must tell us what was happening there. If they think we are responsible, it's ok, let them do that work very quietly, and they will tell us if we are also responsible, or if we were responsible for the xenophobic looting. So it exposes that the work of the intelligence is to only spy on activism. Because that type of information, it's information that we should know at least by today. But it's not there. They did not even do. During that crisis they were busy instigating and following Masifunde and UPM activists, where do we go, what type, what are we doing and how. It tells you that you've got a failed state, that is not democratic, that doesn't take the lives of its residents and its citizens very seriously.
14. And in terms of how the municipality treated the displaced afterwards? – They wanted to set camps here, at the Village Green. We went there and we said you will not, these are human beings. You will not just put up tents and say they will stay there. So I'm saying we were very radical throughout. And we said, you will not. So they [the displaced] were staying at Stone's Crescent, about this we felt better because they can have access to hot water and etcetera, with the discretion of Tariq, Tariq was accommodating them for free. But we were saying, we know you are carrying the burden, and we know it's quite

expensive, give us time, there will be integration very soon. We are busy working on the integration. But they are not going to refugee camps, they are not going anywhere, they are staying here. They are not going to any tents. From here they are going back to the community, period.

15. And how long did it take before they got back into the community? – I think it took about three weeks. [And that was facilitated through the dialogues?] Yes. Yes.
16. I heard there was a stipend given by the UNHCR to the municipality for the displaced people, and that the municipality basically appropriated that money and little of it went to the displaced at all. Was this the case? – They were saying it's a voucher, we will give you a voucher, but even with the voucher – they were given blankets and mattresses, but things that were not of quality. We were very unhappy, we felt that could have been done otherwise. And also we were very unhappy that they were only looking at men, they were not looking at women. So there were a number of things that made us unhappy. And also some people were saying we did not receive our vouchers, and we talked to the UN. But we realised that they were apologists, they were really trying to say, oh please Makana municipality. But we were not working in that way. We were just saying, these are human beings, that's how they will be treated. And we told them that could have been done differently and otherwise, considering the needs of women and children, and also not dealing only with men, also dealing with the women – not dealing with the women via men, but also dealing with the women and the needs of children. Because the moment you deal with women via men it becomes very problematic. [So the UN worked through Makana municipality?] Yes, because they were apologists who wouldn't listen to anyone.
17. Do you think that what happened then was xenophobia? – I think it was. And it was quite some time that it was coming and so that's why you had...because if you thought otherwise, and you wanted to deal with it differently, you would not have been able to resolve. You are going to be in denial. Because they were going to be attacked over and over again, and you would be in denial. And I think one of the reasons that it keeps resurfacing in many areas is because you deal with it as nothing but criminals, so you are missing...what do you call it, the bush for the forest? {wood for the trees} So I think it was important to recognise it, and say let's deal with it.
18. Do you think there is xenophobia happening in communities even when there's not violence, just in day to day? – Well, I don't want to lie, that has gone quiet. And you hear complaints, you hear complaints here and then, of people complaining oh these people, that people – so it's there. But how do you deal with it?
19. Zuma said this year that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you agree? – As I'm saying, if you think this is just a criminal activity or element, you are missing something big. And you won't be able to deal with it. Also because you don't want to dismiss it as nothing but criminal activity or element. You don't want to deal with the issues of unemployment, you don't want to deal with the issues of abject poverty, you don't want to deal with those issues and the anger that is vented in the wrong direction.
20. And do you think that government officials are sometimes xenophobic themselves? – Absolutely. I mean you see that in this country, with the promise that look here, we will prioritise South Africans when we give jobs, and some of the Premiers like in KZN and in Joburg. Herman Mashaba, you see the Trump making, if I can put it like that, and it's populism, you're appealing to....I mean there's so much xenophobia, tribalism in this country, and racism. So it's not easy. And we have to be able to be honest and talk about this issue. And go into that uncomfortable space, navigate and talk about it. And we prefer to talk about it otherwise.
21. How would you explain or characterise the problem of xenophobia? – Well there's an element of thinking, it's an old colonial mentality that comes during the colonial era, that says South Africa is better than the other African countries. So it's a continuation of that. This of thinking South Africa is an island, it's not part of Africa, because of what Africa represents in terms of the world and everything. So it's this colonial and racist mentality.
22. Why do you think it's important that South Africans organise against xenophobia? – It's...look here, there are crises in many levels. At the level of the state you've got two factions that are fighting. This fight has got nothing to do with aspirations of the working class, black people in this country. Zuma and Ramaphosa. One represents the state capture in the form of Gupta, the other one in the state of the world capital, or white monopoly capital. So at the other level you've got this violence against the woman body, and you've also got this violence against the so-called foreign nationals. But if you look at this crisis that's taking place in our country, then you'd realise that it's perpetuated by -- the ruling class tends to benefit, because it's disunity and fragmentation of the working class. And our strength as the working class is constituting ourselves into a unit, rallying together and uniting. So thus it is important for us to struggle against the abuse of woman body, patriarchy, which is very huge in this country, and struggle also against xenophobia, which is also, you could see it's gaining momentum. Maybe I wouldn't be surprised if they say they'll remove the fence and borders and create a huge wall, as you have seen with Trump. So it's important that we should struggle against these things.
23. I'm interested in the idea of the nation in South Africa, who is a SA citizen and what people think about that. Do you think the way that the nation is thought about in SA needs to change? – Absolutely. And the state will not change it. It is the role of the movements, of the unions, and the leftists in this country, to come with an alternative narrative. To say this dominant narrative is flawed, and say here's another narrative which is correct, which is really correct. And considering the issues of migration, people coming from Mozambique to work in mines, and also to look into the Berlin Conference, the Balkanisation of Africa, and to say Algeria – to say French go to Algeria, British go to Zimbabwe, go to South Africa – and Balkanising Africa into pieces for the colonisation. Those are some of the issues, those are the narratives that have to be coined that it defeats that one.

INTERVIEW 16 – 24 August 2017 (1 – F) (2 – F)

1. May I ask your ages? – 1 – I'm 28. 2 – I'm 29.
2. Are you South African? Where are you from? – 1. Yes, we both are. From Grahamstown.
 - 2.1. What makes you South African? Or, what does it mean to be South African, do you think? – 1 – What can I say...I'm proud to be a South African, because everything is free...you know, we have free education, you can do whatever you want to do, there is a freedom of speech. So I'm just proud to be a South African.
2 – I'm also proud, because at least we've got a freedom but...not exactly freedom. We have freedom, but just like she said, we've got the free education, and...
1 – And we have lots of opportunities here in South Africa, unlike other countries outside there, they don't have lots of opportunities like us South Africans. But it depends that how do you use those opportunities or how do you act on those opportunities. [Do you think everyone has access to those opportunities] 1 – No. 2 – No, no.
1 – But there is one thing we must understand is that people are not the same, we are not equal, so the only thing we have to do is we just have to be united, although that we are not equal, we are not the same. You know? I can have 10 million in my pocket and you can only have 10 rand in your pocket, but it doesn't mean that you are not a human being, do you understand? So it's like that.
3. Do you think of yourself as anything else? – 1- I don't know how to answer...
4. Are you a member of any organisation (UPM/RPM/VOWA, etc.)? – 1 – VOWA is an organisation that started in 2015 after the looting of the foreigner people, so we started the VOWA after that. Most of the people who started the VOWA is a women who are married with foreigner guys. SO VOWA is all about fighting xenophobia, child and women abuse. But the main thing that we were fighting for is xenophobia. [And it was originally called Voices of the Foreigners' Wives?] 1 – Yes it started like that. [Why did you change the name?] 1 – Because I think we didn't like that name 'foreigner's wife'. It's because most of us are South African, the women who are married to the foreigners are South African. So we just changed the name and said Voices of Women of Africa because we are from here in Africa.
 - 4.1.1. What do you hope the organisation will achieve? – 1 – What can I say now, because VOWA is out now. But what can I say now....what we were planning to achieve is for people and community to unite with foreigner people, to understand them, also foreigner people to understand South African people. We wanted them to have peace, we wanted them to have an understanding that we are different people, we have different religions, we have different cultures, and we are coming from different worlds. So we have to meet each other halfway. Because you know, sometimes, people will think they are criticising you because of who you are. But they are not criticising you, it's just that it is the way they grow up. Do you understand? So you will think that now she is criticising me for the way I am. Or if you are wearing a miniskirt and your boobs are out, the foreigner will ask many question like why's your body out and stuff like that. He is not criticising you, it's just that it's the way they grew up there (2 – In their culture) It's just that they are covering their bodies, so it's so funny for them when they came here in South Africa and they see the girls not covering their body.
2 – And we also want the foreigner people to understand which things we are doing to our culture. Because when you stay with a foreigner guy, he doesn't want to understand your culture things. Even he wants you to only do his things. But he's supposed to understand also my culture.
[What did VOWA do – would you have events?] 1 – Yes, we had events, we had workshops, we were talking about the xenophobia and women and child abuse, and the community out there was also involved helping us. [Was there a good response from the community, were they willing to listen?] 1 – Yes, they were willing to listen but you know everywhere there will be a black sheep, so you must understand that. There was people who don't agree to what we are saying, but there was people who had an understanding of, oh, these people they are from out there, they don't understand our culture and our religion, so we have to meet them half way so that they can understand us too. So it was like that.
5. Are you married? – 1 – Yes we both are. [Are you married to South Africans?] – 1+2 - No
 - 5.1.1. Where are your husbands from? - 1 – My husband is from Bangladesh. 2 – Mine also comes from Bangladesh.
 - 5.1.2. How did you meet? – 1 – If I tell you my story, how we met, I wish that you cannot keep the recording. [I won't use your names at all – is that ok?] Yes, that's ok. What happened is that most of us who are married to the foreigners, it's not like South Africa when you meet a guy and you date that guy, and then that guy can be your boyfriend, and then after that maybe two years or three years you just decide to get married. It's not like that to them. When you meet a foreigner guy you just meet him today, and he just talks to you that he likes you, and if you like him you will tell him that you like him, then you will learn about each other just for a while, maybe one month or two months, then after that he will decide to get married with you. That is what they are saying, that they are doing that in their culture and stuff like that. Then after that two month you just get married to this guy. You are not even in love with this guy, you just like him. You understand? So you got married with this guy, and then you will fall in love with this guy when you are in marriage. You understand? So that is how I met my husband. I was not in love with my husband, he just liked me and I like him, and then maybe after 2 months he decided to get married with me, and then I decide – I just got married with him.
2 – For me, we date, me and my husband, and then we married after 3 months. But we were in love, I won't lie to you, we were in love. And he treated me nice, he do all everything for me. But he changed after the looting. And then after the looting he decide to give me a space – and now we stay separate. So I see this thing is not right, so I decide to give him a divorce. And then before he doesn't want to give me a divorce, and so I tell him, it's not a marriage because I see you staying too far from me, then when I need something to you sometime, it's where the

fight is coming from. So I decide to give him a divorce – now we're divorced. [How did something change after the lootings?] Because before everything was right between me and him. And then after the looting, he decide – when he was talking, he'd say 'you people, you're the one doing this thing to us'.

1 – The way they are talking, most of us, we broke up with our husbands after the lootings. The reason why we broke up, there was a very bad conflict, because they were accusing us, they were blaming us that, if we could have protected him in their shops that looting was not going to happen. Why didn't we do something to prevent the looting. (2 – But how?) Because we are South Africans, those people who are looting the shops, they are South Africans. So if we could go and talk with them those people would understand, so there was no need for looting if we, the wives, were united and talk to each other and talk to those people who was doing the looting, then that looting was not going to happen at all. But how were we going to do that? There was no warning, there was nothing. Those people they just made picketing, then there was a looting. So we didn't have any idea what is happening. So the only thing we were doing is protecting ourselves and our kids. So we didn't have time to protect the shops – how can you protect the shop. So it's like that, most of us here in Grahamstown, I can tell you now, most of us we broke up with our husbands. So that is very hectic, it's very hectic.

2 – It's a problem. Because sometimes when you want something from your husband, he don't want to give you. He's blaming us. He says, you are the only one who do this thing to us. But we don't do that. Because they also know. Because that time there was a looting we were inside the shop, and then you can't just stop the people who are coming to you, maybe they're going to kill you or beat you, you don't know. That is the problem. [When did your ex-husband come from Bangladesh?] 2012.

5.1.3. What has their experience of South Africa been like? – No, he says to me, the time that I was talking to him, he said no in South Africa I see everything is free, and if you want to make a business you can make a business. But the problem is thugs, that is a problem for them. Everything is fine for them, but the problem is the thugs. And there in his country, everything is not easy, because they're fighting, they're doing a lot of things, that's why those people have got anger after the looting, because they're coming from there, back in their country...anger, that is a problem. After the looting he was thinking to go back in his country because he said no, there's no life here, because I don't want to die. A lot of things he was saying. But anyway, he decide to stay because even in his family it's him and his brother who give the family money to look after the family. So that's why.

5.1.4. Did people treat you differently after you married him? – 2- Yes, there's some people talking a lot of things. You know, people what they are calling foreign people, they say amakwerekwere, and then they say you're married to those people because why, because you want the money, or you're hungry, you're coming from a family who's hungry and don't have nothing. But I'm not listening to those people because that time I know that I love this guy, so I'm not listening to what they say. That's what I was telling myself.

1 – You have no idea, because me too I was wearing the black scarf and black dresses so people from my community they were not treating me well, they were talking things, that I am married with a foreigner and that foreigner is maybe married in his country so he can leave me any time, because he just got married with me for the papers and stuff like that. So even if I am in the taxi coming here in town, people will talk. But when I'm wearing my normal clothes, they are not saying anything. But when I'm wearing those clothes they will have a problem, they will say something. If I am with him around town, they will say something. [What kinds of things will they say?] They were just judging that he's not your husband, he's just your fake husband, he just got married with you because of the papers, he just wants to stay here in South Africa, so you don't have to be serious and tell yourself that he's your best husband, because he can leave anytime. Of which, you know, when you are in love with someone and people they are criticising you about things, some of the things you can't see them on that moment, you are busy telling yourself that no I am in love with this person so they can say whatever they want to say, this is my life...

5.1.5. Is your husband Muslim? – Both - Yes.

5.1.5.1.1. Did you convert to Islam? – 2- No, I told him that if he wants me to be his wife, I can't just leave my culture things, and I don't want to be a Muslim, I'm not wearing those things. It's where we were fighting, when I have to go home, maybe for my culture thing, or maybe when there's a funeral, if you stay with him in the shop he doesn't want you to go to do your culture things., or you want to go to the funeral.

1- For me it was not difficult, because me too I was a Muslim too. So it was not so hard.

6. Do you have children? How old are they? - Both – Yes.

6.1. Do they go to school in Grahamstown? – Yes.

6.1.1. How do your children get along with the other children? Are they ever treated differently because one of their parents is not South African? – 1 – No it's not difficult at all for them.

7. Do you think you should have any special benefits from being South African? Benefits that should not apply to non-South Africans? – 1 – Yes, I think so. Because I think foreigner people are getting more benefits than us. [How do you mean?] I think everything is easier for them. It's easier for them to just get married with us, it's easy for them to just come here in South Africa and do their businesses and stuff like that. But for us, it's not very easy. But for them they can do their business any way they want to, they can get married to us just like that. So, I think most of the things is very easier for foreigner people. [Why is it easier?] They have money, and everything they get here in South Africa they use money to get that thing. And as we all know South African people they like money. Not all of us, but we know that South African people like money.

8. The Freedom Charter says that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. What do you think this means? – 1 – What can I say? I can say I agree. 2 – I agree.

9. Do you feel like your husband has been able to become part of the community? – 1 – Yes, some of them, but some of them are not treated well. But as I said before to you, people are not the same, so I can do the right thing, she can do the wrong thing. So people are not the same. So there were some people who were treating them well, some people who was not treating them well. So it's like that.
10. Did your husbands have shops here? Did you work in the shops? – 1 – Yes, both of us. [How did the customers treat you and your husbands in the shops?] 2 – Some customers they are right, but some they are not right. They can tell you a lot of things. And I think sometimes it depends on how you treat your customers, because even the foreign people sometimes they don't have respect for their customers. It depends.
1 – On both sides, the customer and the business guy. Because sometimes the business guy can treat the customer so badly, and sometimes the customer can treat the business guy so badly. So it's a problem both ways, it's not only the customers who's doing bad things. Also the business guy is not responding well to the customers. And we know that there is that policy that the customer is always right, but sometimes the customer is not always right. But we must look to the both sides.
11. What do you think the foreigners could do to become more a part of the community? – 1 – I think that they have to be more understanding about our religions, our culture, and where we come from. And they have to have more understanding that we are not the same, like them, we didn't grow up the way that they grew up. Also us, we must understand their religion and their culture, and we must...we just have to have more understanding how they grew up and how they see things. We don't have to just say that these people are not treating us the way they are supposed to treat us.
12. What do think is the role of the foreigners' wives in communities? (Do they act as go-betweens?) – 1 – I think so but you can't help all of them, you just have to help those that understand you better. Because there are people who understand where the foreigners are coming from and their culture and their religion and all of that, but there are people who don't even want to know anything about the, it's not like they don't understand anything about them, it's just that they are not even interested about where they are coming from. They just don't want them at all here in South Africa, they just want them to go.
13. Can I ask if you were in Grahamstown in October 2015 (during the time of the looting)? – Both – Yes.
14. Were your husbands' shops looted? – Both – Yes.
15. It was only the businesses owned by the Muslims that were looted, correct? – yes.
16. Do you think that the rumours were the only reason that Muslim foreigners were targeted? - No I don't think that was the only thing. Maybe those people had been planning that thing for a long time, but they didn't have the chance to do that, because they didn't have a main story to do the looting. Now they had these rumours and then they had a chance to do that. Because most South Africans, they don't like foreigners. That is one thing for sure we have to know, that they don't like foreigners, they just want them to go. Some people they are ok with them.
17. Do you think that what happened was xenophobic? – 1 - Yes, it was.
17.1. Do you think there is xenophobia even when there is no violence? – 1- Yes.
18. How did you feel after the lootings? – 1 – We were so sad. I can't explain how I felt at that time. Because I was sad, angry, and very emotional. Because the only thing I was thinking about was my kids, I was just thinking what they were going to do with my kids. Because I live in the location, and people there are talking things, so I was just thinking that maybe these people will come to my home and burn my mother's house, and then they will kill my kids. I was thinking many things at that time, I was very emotional at that time. I didn't even eat for maybe two weeks, because I was very emotional and I was very angry. I was very angry with my community, I was very angry with foreigner people, I was very angry even with myself. I was blaming myself, why did I get married with a foreigner guy? So it's like that.
19. Do you feel safe in Grahamstown now? – 1 – yeah, I think so. 2 – Yes, we feel safe. I don't think something will happen again. 1 – I don't think that something will happen to me and my kids, but I'm not sure about the looting to the shops and stuff, I'm not sure about that. But I'm very sure that nothing will happen to me and my kids.
20. Why do you think people have such a big problem with South African women marrying foreigners? – I don't know, some people are asking things, like why is it so easy for foreign guys to marry Xhosa women, but for South African guys it's not easy for them to get married to their sisters from Bangladesh. 2 – That's what they ask me all the time. We say it's because those women don't come here.
21. President Zuma recently said that South Africans are not xenophobic. Do you think this is true? – 2 – No, it's not true.
22. Do you think the government is sometimes xenophobic too? – 1 – Yes! Because the government didn't help us that much at that time. The people who helped us, it's Masifunde, Rhodes University students, but the government didn't help us.
23. What did the government do? – 2 – Nothing! – 1 – They didn't do anything for us. And it's not like we are blaming them for the looting, but I just think that they could have done something at least.
24. I heard that the municipality used the money from the UN to make parcels of blankets and food vouchers, but that some of the money wasn't used. Do you know anything about that? – 1 - Yes, we know. They just gave them the blankets and Shoprite vouchers, and cosmetics only. There was more money than that.
25. What does it mean to be an African for you? Do you think of yourself that way? – 1 – You know, sometimes I don't think so. Sometimes I don't feel like an African, because there is a lot of criticism, and judgement, and lots of bad things happen. Even though now we are not with our husbands anymore, people still say the funny things to us.
26. Do you think that there are too many foreigners in South Africa? – 1 – Too many! Back then I was just saying that people talk, they like to judge and stuff, but now enough is enough, they have to go back to their countries!
27. What should the government be doing? – 1 - I don't know, because even the government is benefitting from the foreigners, so you can't say the government must do something to stop the foreigners, because the government is also benefitting something. It is benefitting something to the Guptas or something. So I can't say that the government can stop, because he won't do anything. Because he knows that he's benefitting something. Zuma has lots of businesses outside of South Africa, so if he said that the foreigners must stop to come here or the foreigners must go back to their countries, he will lose a lot of money.

28. Do you think the foreigners can be a benefit to South Africa as well? – 1 – I don't know...I can't say they can be a benefit or not. Maybe they can, maybe not. 2 – I'm not sure.
29. Why is VOWA no longer together? – 1 – It's not operating anymore, because of personal issues, the community issues, organisation issues. There's lots of stuff.
30. Do you still think it's important to fight against xenophobia? – 1 – Yes I think so, I think it's important. But I so wish that South African people can be united and have more understanding that people are not the same, you can't judge a book by its cover, you know. Because some foreigners are good people, some not, just like South Africans.
31. Do you think that foreigners have a right to be here? – 1- I don't think some have a right to be here... I don't think they have a right to be here at all! I think they must go back to their country. I don't have a problem with them, but I think that they must leave us in peace.
32. Why do think that they should go? – 1 – From what I experienced to stay with the foreigner guy. You have no idea. I'm not saying that South African guys are better – guys are not ok, at all. Even if he's South African, or it's foreigners. But. We must be clear here and we must talk the truth. If you are married with a foreigner, you won't benefit anything. Let me make an example at me. Look at me. I don't have a house. I've been married with my husband for seven years. I don't have a house. I don't have insurance. I don't have a police. I have nothing. So if that guy decided to go to his country today, he can go and buy his ticket there and go to his country, then he will leave me with what? Nothing. I'm not saying that when you are married with a guy you have to benefit something, but you must think about your future and think about your kids. I don't even have savings for my kids. So I can't even plan that I'm going to send my kids to this school so I'm going to invest this amount of money and stuff like that. Because I don't have nothing. I'm not educated, I don't have qualifications to get a better job. Because I was busy with this guy.

2 – And if you marry these guys they don't want you go at work, be educated, to just stay with him inside the shop. It's like you don't have anything you can do for yourself.

1 – They only want you to depend on them, so when they are tired of you, they can just throw you out just like that. Look at me, I'm staying at my mother's house right now, I have one room in the yard, I'm staying with my kids in that room. He is providing his kids, but it's not enough. I have three kids, my firstborn is 12, she is not his child. And then I have twins. So tell me, who will want marry me again? I don't have life anymore. I'm not educated, I'm not working, I have three kids, I was married with a foreigner guy – you know South African guys they don't like the foreigner guys – who will want to get married with me again? Tell me? The reason why I was avoiding this interview was because of this, because every time I'm talking about xenophobia I'm talking about the foreigner people, I'm just getting hurt and I'm just getting angry. I wasted my time. I got married with this guy when I was 20 years old, I was doing grade 11 on that time. I just leave the school and get married with that guy, for seven years. I wasted my time for what, for nothing. I so wish that some girls cannot experience what I have experienced. That is what I am trying to prevent. I so wish that some girls cannot involve with them, they have to think before they do. The only thing I was thinking about was ok, at home we are going to have electricity, at least the cupboards will be full, at least the fridge will be full, then I'm going to wear the nice clothes. I don't want to lie, I got married with him because I was thinking of those things. I'm not going to... make the story as if I'm a better person. I'm not a better person. I got married with a guy because of that. But I fell in love with him after maybe a year, I fell in love with him and everything was ok, but I was a slave. He was not treating me like his wife, I was working for him. And these guys the only thing they think can solve their problems is only about money. You know, to say sorry and thank you to someone, that is the biggest thing to me. If you say sorry to me it's like you are giving me a million rand. But you are not giving me even one cent just to say sorry and thank you. Those people they are not using those words at all. To say sorry, thank you, and I love you, and I appreciate your work. No, you won't hear that.

2 – It depends sometimes I think, like people are not the same as you were saying before. Just like South African guys they are not the same, like my husband, he was doing everything for me when I was staying with him, and I don't want to lie, about sorry and thank you and all those stuff – he was saying sorry for me when he was doing something wrong. But this thing she's saying that they can go back to their country, I think yes. I think maybe they can go, to me, because I'm also wasting my time to stay with him. Because I'm not benefitting nothing.