"IT WAS A BRILLIANT TIME": AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EXPERIENCES OF THE FOUNDER GROUP OF THE DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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By

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ABSTRACT

The President, Thabo Mbeki, established the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) in 1999 shortly after the general elections. The DSO was intended to supplement the efforts of the South African Police Services in combating crime. The unit would concentrate on national priority crimes and police corruption and would report to the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP).

The founder members of the DSO were identified in my research and open-ended interviews were conducted with them. The goal of my research was to understand the founder group's experience of the creation of the organisational culture of the DSO and what that experience meant to them. In particular, I wanted to establish what role the founder members of the DSO believed their values and beliefs played in creating the organisation's culture, and their perception of how those values influenced the leadership, management and organisation processes of the DSO.

The public sector environment seldom offers opportunities to create something new and this was a unique experience. The founder members received no personal gain except the satisfaction of creating something that would be there for their descendants, something that would change the face of law enforcement forever and in fact, pioneer the troika methodology for the first time in the world within a permanent structure.

The values of the founder members influenced their decision to join and they believed that the DSO would make a difference in the lives of ordinary South Africans. They were

dedicated, committed, loyal and passionate. Their leadership inspired the members of the organisation and ensured the success of the DSO, despite the lack of resources, staff and legislation.

This was an exciting time in the history of the organisation and many personal sacrifices were made. The founder members are proud of the achievements of the DSO and of having been a part thereof. It certainly was "a brilliant time".

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A special word of thanks to all the participants who openly participated making this an experience that has had a profound impact on the way I not only view them, but also the organisation as a whole. I have come to realise that there is depth in every man and that nothing is what it seems at first.

To the organisation, the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), who supported me during the last three years and allowed me to conduct this research and reveal the organisation to the world, I say thank you.

Krista Verster, the librarian at the Victoria Griffith Mxenge (VGM) building of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) spent many hours gathering newspaper clippings for me. The contribution of Emma Roothman was invaluable as she scanned these clippings and spent endless hours formatting the thesis. I would like to acknowledge the efforts of my friends Emma Roothman, Michelle le Roux and Valerie Moffit for assisting in transcribing the interviews. To my dear friend Danie Vlok who acted as a sounding board in these past months, I appreciate your encouragement and support.

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I cannot end without special acknowledgement to my family who have stood by me, supported me and believed in me from the beginning. To Jacques my loving husband, your encouragement has made this work possible and to our children, Günter and Merle, I will never forget how special you are.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

Adv.	Advocate
AG	Attorney General
ANC	African National Congress

C

CAD	Crime Analysis Division
CE	Chief Executive
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIO	Chief Investigating Officer
CSIR	Commercial Scientific Institute for Research

D

DDG	Deputy Director General
DDPP	Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
DG	Director General
DNDPP	Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
DSI	Directorate of Special Investigations
DSO	Directorate of Special Operations

E

EC	Eastern Cape

F

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations

I

IDOC	Investigating Directorate of Organised Crime and Public Safety
IDSEO	Investigating Directorate of Serious Economic Offences
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party

IRIC	Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ITU	Investigation Task Unit

K

KZN	KwaZulu-Natal

N

NADEL	National Association of Democratic Lawyers
NDPP	National Director of Public Prosecutions
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NT	National Treasury

O

OSEO	Office for Serious Economic Offences

P

PFMA	Public Finance Management Act

S

SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPS	South African Police Services
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SASS	South African Secret Service
SI	Special Investigator
SSA	Senior State Advocate
SSI	Senior Special Investigator

T

TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission

U

UDM	United Democratic Movement

UDF	United Democratic Front
V	
VGM	Victoria Griffith Mxenge
W	
WC	Western Cape

GLOSSARY

A

Amnesty Committee	A committee established to consider applications for amnesty by politically motivated perpetrators of criminal acts.
ANC	A national liberation movement formed in 1912 to unite the African people and spearhead the struggle for fundamental political, social and economic change. The ANC has been the frontrunner in the struggle against racism and oppression. The ANC has become a recognised political party and is the current ruling party in South Africa. The key objectives of the ANC are the creation of a united non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society (Unknown 2004).

B

Basotholand Mounted Police	A police unit in Lesotho dealing mainly with cattle theft investigations.
Boys Town	A rehabilitation institute aimed at developing boys of school age, in need of corrective discipline. The institute is situated in Gauteng.

C

Cape Flats	A low income residential area, historically allocated to the coloured people of the Western Cape.
Crime Analysis Division	A division that was established within the DSO headed by a divisional head. The purpose of the unit is to collect information and use analytical tools to

	determine crime trends. The crime analysis informs the top management of the DSO on future crime focus areas.
D	
DDG	A senior government official who is the deputy to the head of a government department. The head of the department is a director general.
de nova	Something that is newly established, generated from nothing.
DPP	A senior prosecutor within the National Prosecuting Authority who heads a provincial prosecution service.
DSO	An investigative unit within the National Prosecuting Authority with a unique methodology which combines investigators, prosecutors and analysts in the investigative process (troika methodology). The unit also has the capacity and authority to prosecute its own matters. The DSO was launched on 1 September 1999 in Gugulethu near Cape Town. The legislation enacting the DSO came into operation on 12 January 2001 (South Africa 2000). The legislation also made provision for the amalgamation of the investigating directorates (IDOC and IDSEO) within the National Prosecuting Authority, with the DSO.
E	
Ex post facto	after the fact

H

Human Rights Violation Committee	A committee that was established to look at alleged human rights violations which occurred between 1 March 1960-10 May 1994. (That is from Sharpville to the first democratic elections.)

I

IDOC	An integrated effort by the NPA, SAPS and NIA to address certain crime phenomena, regionally specific. The unit was established in terms of Presidential Proclamation R102 of 1998. Seconded members of these three agencies staffed the unit. It combined prosecutors, investigators and intelligence agents (troika methodology) to investigate and prosecute these crime phenomena. Four regional offices were created, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and then the Eastern Cape. An Investigating Director with special powers headed the unit (South Africa 2000).
IDSEO	This unit was formerly known as the Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO). It was established in terms of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act (South Africa 1991). And was incorporated into the National Prosecuting Authority on the establishment thereof in terms of section 43(7) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act (South Africa 1998). The unit investigated and prosecuted serious economic offences perpetrated in South Africa, and had two offices, one in Gauteng and the other in the Western Cape. The investigators were seconded members of the South African Police

	Services. On 12 January 2001, the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act (South Africa 2000) amalgamated the IDSEO and the IDOC to the DSO.
IFP	The Inkatha Freedom Party, originally named Inkatha kaZulu was launched in the 1920s by King Zulu King Salomon kaDinizulu to appose the Native Affairs Bill of 1920. Prince Buthelezi revived the organisation in 1975 as a cultural liberation movement, which has developed into a political party and has seats in Parliament.
ITU	The investigation task unit was set up on 12 September 1994 by President N.R. Mandela. The unit was established to investigate political violence (hit squads in the KwaZulu-Natal police, state sponsored violence as well as Self Defence Units in the KZN Midlands). The unit comprised of lawyers, investigators and analysts/researchers. The President appointed a board of three independent lawyers, the Investigation Task Board (ITB), to oversee the ITU. The unit also included three international police officers from Denmark and the Netherlands to act as International Observers.
M	
Magnus Malan trial	A trial in the high court in Durban of significance to the country involving high ranking government officials in the South African Defence Force (SADF) who were prosecuted for their role in facilitating and

promoting political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. During the investigation into Hit Squad activities in KwaZulu-Natal in the latter part of 1994, investigators interviewed a very senior IFP member. He, ironically, was the grandson of the laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize and a former President of the ANC, Doloxolo Madlandune Luthuli. Luthuli stated that he was tired of killing people on instructions from the IFP. He wanted to confess and intimated that he would co-operate.

Following intensive investigations, information led investigators to Military Intelligence in Pretoria. The ITU searched Military Headquarters and found documentary evidence. These documents revealed that the then State Security Council chaired by the then President of South Africa (PW Botha), had ordered the killing of the Ntuli family at Kwa Makutha outside Durban. This family were UDF sympathisers and their younger son was said to be the treasurer of the UDF in that area. The evidence later led to the arrest of General Magnus Malan, other senior generals in the SADF, a senior police official as well as a senior official in the IFP. A number of Hit men aligned to the IFP were also arrested. This project was codenamed "Operation Marion". The trial was heard in the Durban High court and the prosecutor was Adv. Tim McNally.

N
NPA

The prosecuting service within the country was united with the appointment of the National Director of Public Prosecutions. The national service was

	now called the National Prosecuting Authority.
P	
Prosecution lead/driven	A methodology of investigating cases in which the investigation is directed by a prosecutor. This is to ensure that the investigation is aligned to the Constitution and that the necessary evidence is obtained.
R	
Richmond	A residential area historically occupied by black people. The area is situated near Pietermaritzburg in the KwaZulu-Natal province. This area was one of the hotspots of political violence in the apartheid era and this violence continued into the early years of the democracy of the country. The political violence was between the two opposing political affiliations of the IFP and the UDF.
T	
TRC	A body that was established to investigate all Human Rights violations committed during the Apartheid era. The Committee sought reconciliation between the victims, families of the victims and the perpetrators of the violence and made certain recommendations to the government.
Troika investigative methodology	A method of investigation which combines intelligence gathering, investigation and prosecution from the start of the investigation.

Trust Feed Case	A police captain, Brian Mitchell, participated in the massacre of 11 people at Trust Feed in KwaZulu-Natal in December 1998. Four special constables acting on Brain Mitchell's orders carried out the murders. Brain Mitchell intended to kill UDF supporters but 11 Inkatha supporters attending a wake were killed. He was sentenced to death but because of the moratorium on the death sentence the sentence was commuted to 30 years imprisonment. He made two applications to the TRC for amnesty and in 1996 he was successful (Jeffery 1999).
U	
UDF	A political movement within the ANC started on 1 August 1983. It was formed in an attempt to unite the working class and others opposed to the apartheid policies of the then government. The movement could be seen as the legal arm of the ANC, which was at that stage banned. It operated as an internal arm of the ANC.
UDM	A political party established under the leadership of Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer in 1997. In 1999, Bantu Holomisa was elected to parliament. The party is still in existence.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Don't let the fear of the time it will take to accomplish something
Stand in the way of your doing it. The time will pass anyway;
We might just as well put that passing time to the best possible use.
(Nightingale 2004)

1.1 THE CREATION OF THE DSO

The President in his inauguration speech on 25 June 1999 announced the establishment of a well-resourced unit to combat national priority crimes (Mbeki 1999). The unit was to report to the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP). The NDPP had been appointed as the head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in August 1998. The unit was initially named the Directorate of Special Investigations (DSI), which was launched on 1 September 1999. The Minister of Safety and Security, Minister Steve Tshwete, dubbed the DSI "Unomadukudwane" that is a Xhosa word for Scorpion. That is the name by which the organisation is known and identified by the public. The unit was later renamed the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO).

The senior management of the DSO had been appointed (with the exception of one) by the time of the launch. The senior management consisted of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) assisted by three deputies. The unit would employ prosecutors, investigators and intelligence operatives and work in project teams (Maduna 1999). This approach to combating crime is known as the troika approach or methodology. A head of prosecutions was also appointed.

Prior to the establishment of the DSO, the NDPP had created three offices of the Investigating Directorate of Organised Crime and Public Safety (IDOC) and shortly after the launch, a fourth was added (late September 1999). The first of three offices was established in 1998. IDOC was region specific and the offices were situated in order of establishment in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape.

Regional Heads were appointed to manage these offices. IDOC was staffed with investigators, intelligence agents and prosecutors who piloted the troika methodology. IDOC was situated within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the investigators and intelligence agents were seconded mainly from the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) respectively. The DSO legislation was enacted on 12 January 2001 in terms of which, the IDOC and the Investigating Directorate of Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO) were merged with the DSO (South Africa 2000). IDSEO was another investigating directorate within the NPA that investigated and prosecuted serious economic offences. The unit, which had two offices, one in Gauteng and the other in the Western Cape, combined prosecutors and investigators but did not make use of intelligence operatives. The IDOC was functioning as the DSO in the period 1 September 1999 to 12 January 2001. Operational powers of the DSO were derived from the legislation of the SAPS and the IDOC in this period. IDSEO was not operating as the DSO and only became a part thereof after 12 January 2001.

1.2 THE REASON FOR THE RESEARCH

I was appointed regional head in the Eastern Cape in late September 1999, after the launch of the DSI. I have witnessed the birth of the organisation and seen it grow to a young organisation. The changes have been dramatic and have had a profound impact on me. The experience has been life changing. The biggest change I experienced was in the organisational culture which began as innovative, creative and supportive but grew to a bureaucracy with a hierarchical structure.

The organisation initially had two layers of management: the head office management that consisted of the CEO and his three deputies and the IDOC regional managers (see diagram Figure 1.1). The IDOC had existed from 1998 while the DSO began in 2001. The IDOC became the DSO and so the culture initially started in each of the regions was transmitted to the DSO. Each IDOC office functioned as a separate unit. The data has revealed that in the case of the DSO, there was a founder group and not a single founder.

The data reveals that the founder group consisted of 12 people. There was the CEO, Frank Dutton. The three divisional heads who assisted him, the head of training (Dr Ruben Richards), the head of operational support (Pete Richer) and the head of the crime analysis division (CAD), (Dr Makhosazana Msimang). The three divisional heads were stationed at head office. Adv. Percy Sonn was the first Investigating Director of the IDOC and was asked to head the prosecutors employed by the DSO. The four regional heads: myself, Adv. Gerhard Nel in Guateng, Adv. Chris Macadam in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and Adv. Dawood Adam in the Western Cape (WC) were also part of the founder group. The heads of the investigators in the regions also played a significant role. Three regions created these positions, KZN, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. In KwaZulu-Natal senior superintendent Clifford Marion and in Gauteng, Captain Andrew Leask were appointed as the heads of the investigators. The person who was initially appointed as the head of the investigators in the Eastern Cape is no longer a part of the organisation.

Figure 1.1. The organisational structure of the DSO in 1999



A decision was made later that the DSO should have two heads, a head of prosecutions and a head of investigations and that they would jointly run the DSO (see structure in Figure 1.1.). As a result, Percy Sonn and Frank Dutton shared the leadership of the DSO. It became customary to refer to this dual leadership as the two-headed monster. Lines of communication and accountability became blurred. Frank Dutton was boarded in 2000 and Percy Sonn took over as the CEO of the DSO.

A sad feature of the DSO has been the departure of so many of the senior members; Frank Dutton was boarded with ear problems, Peter Richer resigned, Makhosazana Msimang died, Chris Macadam was transferred, Dawood Adam was promoted and transferred. In October 2001, Andrew Leask was appointed as Chief Investigating Officer (CIO) and transferred to Head Office as the CIO attached to the Human Rights Violation Unit. In fact, the only members that remained in their original positions were myself, Gerhard Nel, Clifford Marion and Ruben Richards.

The original organisational culture that the founder group sought to create has been influenced by a series of events. Instead of being an organisation developed from a foundational level, it became one in which various entities were pressed together: IDOC, IDSEO and the new recruits to the DSO. The departure of Frank Dutton, Percy Sonn, Pete Richer and Makhosazana Msimang opened the door to new entrants and these "second generation" leaders have left their mark on the organisation.

Being a part of the founder group of the DSO meant a great deal to me both from a personal as well as professional perspective. I was interested in understanding what it meant to the rest of the founder group, as set out previously, to have been part of creating the DSO. Government officials seldom have the opportunity to create something from its beginnings and so the establishment of the DSO was something unique and interesting. I was particularly interested in the role the values of the founder group played in the creation of the organisational culture.

I anticipate that the research will contribute to our understanding of the establishing of an organisation's culture. As such, it will be of interest to other organisations in their start-up phase. There is a fair amount of literature available on the role of founder members in the establishment of the organisational culture. The literature concentrates on the founder/owner and is directed at private companies. Much less is written about the role of the founder members in creating organisational culture in public organisations especially in the start-up phase. The opportunities for founders in the start-up phase of public organisations is limited. Therefore, I thought it would be interesting to see if the leader and founder in the public sector played the same role as in the private sector.

1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The purpose of my research is to investigate the founder group's experience of the creation of the organisational culture of the DSO and to understand what the experience meant to them.

I am particularly interested in establishing what role the founder members of the DSO believe their values and beliefs played in creating the organisation's culture and their perception of how those values influenced the leadership, management, and organisation processes of the DSO.

1.4 THE RESEARCH APPROACH

The research was conducted within the phenomenological paradigm. This paradigm provided me with the opportunity of putting myself in the shoes of the participants and to "developing insights into how the participants interpret and make meaning of the world" (Cantrell 1993, p. 96). I believe that reality is socially constructed and wanted to understand the creation of the DSO's organisational culture. The use of qualitative data complements this objective. Three interviews were conducted with eight of the founder members and one interview with each of the other two. I did not interview myself. These interviews were transcribed. Themes were derived from the data and they were categorised. I conducted the data analysis by interpreting the meaning of the data within these categories.

1.5 THE RESEARCH PROCESS

The research process used was the following:

- A preliminary literature review was conducted.
- The participants were selected.
- The NDPP was approached for approval of the research.
- The participants were traced and requested to participate in the research.
- Interviews were planned.
- Interviews were conducted face to face.
- There were ten participants (I did not interview myself and Makhosazana Msimang had died)
    - Three interviews were held with eight of the participants.
    - One interview was held with the remaining two participants due to their unavailability.
- The interviews were open-ended, although an interview guide had been prepared.
- The interviews were recorded and extensive interview notes were made.
- The participants gave permission for photographs to be taken of them.
- The interview notes were typed up.
- The recorded data was downloaded and transcribed.
- The last interviews were conducted over the phone.
- The photographs were developed and scanned.
- The librarian of the NPA assisted in gathering all the newspaper clippings pertaining to the DSO in the period of research.
- These documents were scanned.
- An in-depth literature review was conducted.
- The transcriptions were read and areas relating to my research purpose were highlighted.
- These areas were identified as themes.
- The themes were compared and categorised.
- The data were analysed and a framework developed of the main themes.
- The data were overwhelming and I had to be very selective.

- The thesis was planned and written up.
- The data analysis portion of the research was forwarded to two of the participants to obtain their input.
- The input received was on a stylistic level and did not relate to the content of the analysis.
- The thesis will be made available to all participants.

The process as set out is intended to be a brief summary of which the detail is contained in the research methodology chapter, chapter three.

1.6 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

In chapter two, I discuss a selection of the literature applicable to this research. In chapter three the methodology employed as outlined above is set out in more detail. Chapters four and five contain the data analysis. The chapters have been divided according to the themes and categories that developed from the data.

Chapter four has two parts; the first deals with the beginning of the organisation to enable the reader to better understand the background of the creation of the DSO while the second part looks at the values of the founder group and their impact on the organisation's culture. The impact of these values on the management of the organisation is highlighted. Chapter five is a reflection on what the experience meant to the founder members and is somewhat nostalgic.

The research has been a learning experience for me and I enjoyed it. I am excited about the outcome and trust that readers will identify with the account.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Treat a man as he is, and he will remain as he is; treat a man as he can and should be, and he will become as he can and should be. (Goethe 1749-1832)

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the concept of culture and more specifically organisational culture will be looked at to determine what it is, how it is created and the factors that impact on it. Of particular importance to this research is the role of founder members in the creation of organisational culture, more particularly the role of a leader's values. Various types of organisational cultures are highlighted. My research was conducted within a public sector environment. The role of the leader and founder in the public sector is therefore examined. National culture is also looked at as it impacts on organisational culture.

2.2 ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Organisational culture or corporate culture as some authors refer to it, is a broad concept with a wide interpretation. The origins can be traced to the term culture that originates from social anthropology and means the qualities of a specific human group passed down though generations. "*Culture* consists of the shared patterns of behavior and associated meaning that people learn and participate in within the group to which they belong" (Hunter and Whitten 1985, p. 3). *Culture* is defined *inter alia* as: "all the arts, beliefs, social institutions, etc characteristic of a community, race etc" (Hornby 1974).

Dawson defines organisations as "collections of people joined together in some formal association in order to achieve group or individual objectives" (1996 p. xxii). These "collections of people" will also have "qualities" that will be passed down from generation to generation and therefore a culture that is called organisational culture. These "qualities" are defined as the "shared values and beliefs" which characterise a particular organisation (Dawson 1996, p. 141). These shared beliefs and values are embedded as

patterns of thinking, feeling and action and are created through the "collective programming of the mind" (Hofstede 1991, p. 5). Culture can be understood as the "accumulative shared learning of a given group, covering behavioral, emotional and cognitive elements of the groups member's total psychological functioning" (Schein 1992, p. 10).

Shared learning creates organisational culture. A common phenomenon in the various definitions of organisational culture is the words "*shared* or *held in common*" (Schein 1992, p. 10). To understand culture better on a practical level one can look at the overt phenomena associated with culture. These are: "o*bserved behavioral regularities when people interact; group norms; espoused values; formal philosophy; rules of the game; climate; embedded skills; habits of thinking, mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms; shared meanings; "root metaphors" or integrating symbols*" (Schein 1992, pp. 8-10).

Schein is of the opinion that two other critical components are left out (1992, p. 10). The first is "*structural stability*", culture implies that it is shared but it is also deep and stable (Schein 1992, p. 10). Deep implies that it is intangible and not visible (Schein 1992, p. 10). The second concept is *"patterning or integration*" of the various elements that are at the deeper level into a larger paradigm or gestalt (Schein 1992, p. 10). For Schein, this patterning is the essence of what is understood by culture (1992, p. 10).

As indicated there are various definitions of organisational culture, but Schein's is preferred because his work, though dated remains seminal. The definition of Schein is as follows: *"A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems"* (1992, p. 12).

Organisational culture has three sources. The first source, the beliefs, values and assumptions of the leaders/founders have already been discussed. The second source, evolution of the organisation results in the group members undergoing various learning

experiences which also contribute to the creation of the culture. The last source is the addition of new members who bring new beliefs, values and assumptions (Schein 1992, p. 211).

2.3 THE CREATION OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Organisational culture does not suddenly appear. There is a process involved in its creation. Each organisation forms a unique culture much the same way as human groups do. The formation of culture requires "shared learning" that can only happen over time. The group therefore needs to have a history, to have functioned together and to have shared experiences (Schein 1992, p. 11). Some degree of membership consistency or stability is a prerequisite for the "patterning or integration" of all elements into a gestalt which will bind those at a deeper level, together (Schein 1992, p. 11). A group that has existed for a period of time with a stable membership and has faced either internal or external challenges will have developed a culture (Schein 1992, p. 15). However, if there was a great turnover of staff this will not have happened (Schein 1992, p. 15).

Culture formation is the "striving toward patterning and integration" (Schein 1992, p. 11). This formation occurs during one of two processes. The first is at an external level and happens during interactions in the economic environment of the organisation (the fight for survival) while the second occurs during the internal integration crucial for the adaptability and functioning of the organisation (Schein 1992, p. 11). This can be explained with the following example. A competitor makes a drastic price cut. The organisation needs to decide whether to follow suit. The leader proposes for example, that the organisation enter into a price war based on his or her previous experiences. The organisation accepts this suggestion and the result is favourable. This is an example of an external challenge (external level) faced by the organisation. The same process occurs at an internal level.

The organisational culture is the shared learning of a group and although individual learning also occurs within the context of the organisation, this does not result in the creation of organisational culture (Schein 1992, p. 12). Therefore, culture formation is

reliant on the shared experiences of the members. Culture formation occurs in the start-up phase of the organisation. The formation of culture is initiated by a member of the group who assumes a leadership role and who proposes a course of action to deal with a challenge arising at either the internal or external level (Schein 1992, p. 12) (see example above). The past experiences, values and principles of the leader inform the proposed course of action (Schein 1992, p. 19). If the leadership is acceptable to the majority of the group, they will be more susceptible to the proposal. The proposed solution is then adopted and if found by the group to produce an acceptable result the proposed action will continue to be used (Schein 1992, p. 12). The group will reach a stage where the action will be taken for granted. In other words, the response becomes automatic and does not require thought, and the underlying rationale for the proposed action will no longer be questioned (Schein 1992, p. 12). The group has now formed "shared assumptions" that begin to function outside of awareness and these assumptions are unique to the group and also differentiate the organisation from others (Schein 1992, p. 12). This process is called "cognitive transformation" (Schein 1992, p. 19). The values and the principles of the leader inform the action. The action is then adopted and over time becomes a learned response to the situation and the assumptions of the group.

The method described above is an example of behavioural learning. Humankind, however, has the ability to assimilate knowledge at a sub-conscious level. This is known as internal learning which supplements behavioural learning (Schein 1992, p. 11). Learning therefore, takes place at two levels and inconsistency between the learning that occurs at these levels can cause conflict within the individual and ultimately impact on the culture that is created. As will be seen later in more detail, the leader influences the formation of culture and needs to be aware of these levels of learning and coordinate the learning process to achieve the desired culture.

Values are difficult to test in the behavioural learning context, but social validation can allow values to be accepted after confirmation by the "shared social experience of the group" (Schein 1992, p. 20). The values of the leader or founder are accepted when the group establishes that the values are successful at "reducing uncertainty in critical areas of

the group's functioning" (Schein 1992, p. 20). In the same way as proposed actions, these values are then accepted and become non-negotiable assumptions supported by a verbalized set of "beliefs, norms and operational rules of behavior" (Schein 1992, p. 20).

The culture can also become embedded in the organisation when the leader communicates his/her concerns and beliefs by what he/she repeatedly pays attention to (Dawson 1996, p. 231). The employee will respond to the assumptions of the leader in order to make the work experience more rewarding. In the same way, the employee will want to act in a manner which attracts the attention of the leader. The leader therefore determines future behaviour by what he/she pays attention to. There are "primary embedding mechanisms" and "secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms" that can be used to embed the culture (Dawson 1996, p. 231).

The primary mechanisms are relevant to the research and include:

- That which is regularly controlled, measured and receives the attention of the leader
- The reaction of the leader to serious incidents or dilemmas in the organisation
- The observed standards of the leader in determining the allocation of scarce resources
- The purposeful teaching, role modelling, and coaching by the leader
- The allocation of rewards and status by the leader
- The selection, recruitment, promotion, retirement and/or other ways in which employees are rewarded and "punished" by the leader (Dawson 1996, p. 231)

Schein also refers to the process of embedding assumptions which the leaders or founders can use (1992, p. 252). These include the manner in which they allocate resources, the selection criteria of new members, what they pay attention to and reward, how they deal with dilemmas and the promotion and excommunication of members (Schein 1992, p. 252).

The process of culture formation is impeded when the organisation is spread over various regions, provinces or even countries and may not have the same depth (Kotter 1999, p. 176). The opportunities for shared learning are reduced and even the primary mechanisms of embedding the culture are not as effective. In an organisation that consists of a small head office with satellite offices, one central leadership figure is not going to influence the creation of culture. There will be a person in each of the satellite offices who will influence the values of the organisation and ultimately the culture (Kotter 1999, p. 177). Therefore, this results in a situation of "multiple leaders" and this can also be a reason for differences in the cultures of regional offices (Kotter 1999, p. 177).

2.4 LEVELS OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

The definition of organisational culture tells us what it is, but not how it manifests itself in an organisation or what it influences or how one is to interpret what one sees. The description of the levels of organisational culture gives one a better understanding thereof. However, there is no uniform description or understanding of the levels of organisational culture. For Schein, culture operates at three levels. The overt manifestation of the shared values or assumptions that forms the outer, visible layer, the middle layer is the "espoused values, norms, rules and behavior" used by members to display their culture, and then the deep level where basic assumptions are to be found (1992, p. 15).

Hofstede likens culture to the layers of an onion with values forming the core; the next layer is rituals, then heroes and the outer layer, the symbols (1991, p. 7). The outer layer is the most superficial and consists of "words, gestures, pictures or objects" that one can observe and that have a particular meaning to those that are a part of the culture (Hofstede 1991, p. 7). *"Heroes"* are persons that could be dead, alive, or even imaginary who serve as role models and who possess certain characteristics valued in a particular culture (Hofstede 1991, p. 8).

"Rituals" are "collective activities" essential within the social context of a culture and are carried out because they always have been (Hofstede 1991, p. 8). The term "practices" is

used as an umbrella term for the three outer layers of symbols, heroes, and rituals. They are visible to the outside observer, but their "cultural meaning" is invisible and their true meaning can only be interpreted by those who are a part of the culture (Hofstede 1991, p. 8).

"Values" form the core of the culture and are the "tendency to prefer one state of affairs over others" (Hofstede 1991, p. 8). Children learn values very early in life, but it is an unconscious learning process in which they are unaware of the values embedded in them (Hofstede 191, p. 8). These values cannot be observed by outsiders, but can be derived from the actions of people in certain circumstances (Hofstede 1991, p. 8).

Dawson (1996, p. 143) has created "a Map of the Corporate World: How Culture may be Revealed and Created in Organisations" Figure 2.1. At the centre of the map are shared values, beliefs and assumptions. These cannot be seen and it is accepted that they exist within the organisation in varying degrees (Dawson 1996, p. 144). The relationship between the values of the people within the organisation and the structure, practices, strategy and technology within the organisation are interactive and complex (Dawson 1996, p. 144).

The outer rings are the visible parts of culture and have been created by people. They are the subject of decision-making and are the results or future results of proposed action (Dawson 1996, p. 144). The influence is from the centre outwards and decisions are influenced by the values. If the values within the organisation are highly diversified, then all values will not be equally represented (Dawson 1996, p. 144). However, this influence is a two-way stream and when each layer has been created, it in turn has an impact on the way in which future values are created (Dawson 1996, p. 144). Because organisations are open systems there are also external influences which impact on decisions made, much the way in which organisations impact on the environment (Dawson 1996, p. 144).

The first layer of the map is the symbols, stories and rituals which are influenced by the values. They in turn shape values (Dawson 1996, p. 144). The next layer is the human

resource management and development practices which are closely related to motivation in the workplace and also shape values (Dawson 1996, p. 144). This layer is concerned with issues of performance evaluation and appraisals, rewards, recruitment and selection and promotion and it is here that any misalignment between values and practices will be revealed (Dawson 1996, p. 144).

Figure 2.1.

A Map of the Corporate World: How Culture may be Revealed and Created in Organisations



The next layer is the rules and procedures and once again a misalignment may be apparent when for example, the organisation professes to place a high value on financial management, innovation and flair, but does not decentralise the budget or allow the individual to make independent decisions (Dawson 1996, p. 144).

An understanding of these layers will allow the researcher or consultant to appreciate that what he or she sees happening within an organisation cannot simply be interpreted at face value. The core needs to be understood in order to interpret the visible parts of the organisation. What is also of importance is that culture impacts on every facet of the organisation from the structure to the motivation of the members.

2.5 TYPES OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Much research has been conducted on organisational culture and there are different views on the composition of culture. However, similarities are found which have already been mentioned. Firstly, concepts used to define culture "overlap and indicate the centrality of the competing influences of the internal/external and control/flexibility divides within organisations" (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 127). Secondly, there is a general consensus that "values" as a measure of organisational culture are preferred to assumptions or artifacts-assumptions are too difficult to measure and are unreliable (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 127). The competing values model as set out in Figure 2.2 focuses on competing values along the internal/external and control/flexibility divides (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 128).

The map divides organisational culture into four dimensions. On the horizontal axes, focus is set out with internal and external focus as the two extremes. On the vertical axes, the conflicting demands are set out with flexibility and control as the two extremes. In organisations where there is an internal focus, the emphasis is on the processes that take place within the organisation such as communication, information management and integration. The organisation is inward looking. Organisations that have an external focus are outward looking and the focus is on external communication, growth and resource acquisition (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 128). Stability and cohesion are emphasized in

organisations with a focus on control while the emphasis is on adaptability and spontaneity in organisations with a focus on flexibility (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 128).

The dimensions as set out above map out four cultures:

Internal process model: control/internal focus –The culture which develops is a "hierarchical culture" in which stability and control are achieved through communication and information management. This culture is usually found in the public sector and relies heavily on formal rules and procedure to effect control (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 129).

***Open systems model*:** flexibility/external focus- A "developmental culture" characterises this dimension which is known for its innovative leaders. These organisations are ready for change, are entrepreneurial and dynamic (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 129).

Human relations model: flexibility/internal focus-The "group culture" that develops ensures that the organisation is "associated with trust and participation through team work" (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 129). Trust, allegiance and tradition underscore compliance with norms rather than the use of control and the goals of the organisation are achieved through reaching consensus (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 129).

Rational goal model: control/external focus – The "rational culture" emphasizes outcomes and goal fulfillment. Organisations are "production orientated", employees are organised in order to achieve set goals and objectives and "rewards are linked to outcomes" (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 129).

The ideal situation is for the organisation not to have only one of these organisational culture types, but rather a healthy balance of all four (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 129). Parker and Bradley propose that public organisations, in order to meet the present demands on them, make a conscious effort to move away from the traditional hierarchical culture and find ways to develop the other three cultures as set out (2000, p. 132). The research conducted by Parker and Bradley in six of the largest public organisations in Australia indicated that there is still a very strong presence of the hierarchical culture.

They attempt to explain this by stating that cultures are deeply embedded and cannot easily be changed, and then by suggesting that there may be a difference in the values and motives of public sector employees (2000, pp. 134-138). Referring to research conducted in the area of the values of public sector employees, they conclude that public sector employees may be more altruistic than their private sector counterparts and that they have a "commitment to social development and the pursuit of public interest" (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 138).

Figure 2.2. The competing values framework of organisational culture

Source: Parker and Bradley (2000, p. 128)



The public sector is in a particularly difficult situation. They need to adapt to the changing environment and to be innovative and flexible. At the same time, they must remain focused on service delivery and are accountable to a wide range of stakeholders, but must remain non-profitable (Parry and Proctor-Thomson 2003, p. 377). There are authors who argue that in the light of this, the public sector should not attempt to change the organisational culture to be more flexible because change may even be detrimental to the public sector (Parry and Proctor-Thomson 2003, p. 379).

Hofstede (1991, p. 181) conducted research on organisational culture between 1985-1987 with the help of the Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation (IRIC). The research finding, interestingly, was that the role values played in organisational culture differed to that in national cultures (Hofstede 1991, p. 181).

Hofstede found that the differences between the cultures of various organisations are at the level of practices and not at the level of values as is the case with national cultures (Hofstede 1991, p. 182). Hofstede does not agree that shared values are the core of the organisational culture stating that values are learnt prior to entering the organisation (in fact are embedded as a child) and that the core is rather the *"shared perception of daily practices"* (Hofstede 1991, p. 4 and p. 183). He argues that the values of the founders and key leaders shape the culture of the organisation but that these cultures affect ordinary members through shared practices. "Founder-leaders' values become members' practices" (Hofstede 1991, p. 183). Members with "shared values" are hired and then taught the practices, the rituals, symbols and heroes (Hofstede 1991, p. 183).

This may seem to be at odds with what other authors like Schein and Dawson are saying and is at odds with more recent authors like Valle (1999), Kotter (1999), Pool, Parker and Bradley (2000) to quote but a few. However, these authors have never suggested that the values are created for the first time in the organisational context, but rather that there are "shared values", in other words, values that the members have in common. The leader will determine which values will apply in any organisation. The "practices" which Hofstede discusses are the way in which values (that cannot be seen) are manifested in the

organisation. For the purposes of this research, it is not necessary that any opinion carry more weight than any other since the important factor is the role the leader plays in creating the culture and the role of the values of the leader.

Hofstede (1991, p. 188) found six practice dimensions of organisational culture:

- Process orientated versus results orientated
- Employee orientated versus job orientated
- Parochial versus professional
- Open systems versus closed systems
- Loose control versus tight control
- Normative versus pragmatic

There is a measure of overlap with the cultures of Parker and Bradley, as previously discussed, although here, cultures are juxtaposed. Hofstede developed a measurement of the strength of the culture determining that a culture was strong when it was homogenous and weak when it was heterogeneous (1991, p. 189). The research indicated that there was a strong correlation between a strong culture and results orientation (Hofstede 1991, p. 190).

The first dimension of organisational culture, as set out above, apposes process orientation to results orientation. The second dimension opposes "a concern for people *(employee orientation)* to a concern for completing the job *(job orientation)*" (Hofstede 1991, p. 190). The third dimension opposes organisations where the identity of the employees is dependent on the identity of the organisation *(parochial)* to organisations where identity is based on their jobs *(professional)* (Hofstede 1991, p. 190). The fourth dimension opposes *"open systems"* to *"closed systems"*. This dimension relates to communication and the way in which people are welcomed into the organisation, for example with orientation courses (Hofstede 1991, p. 191). The fifth dimension relates to the amount of "internal structuring" in the organisation, in other words, whether there is a flat organisational structure or a hierarchal structure (Hofstede 1991, p. 191). The notion of "customer orientation" is dealt with in the sixth dimension. *Normative organisations* regard their

responsibility to the external world as the "implementation of inviolable rules" while *pragmatic* organisations are market driven (Hofstede 1991, p. 191).

Pool conducted research in 305 business organisations to establish the relationship between organisational culture and job tension looking at the variables of job satisfaction, performance and commitment (2000, p. 34). The research found that the organisational culture plays a very important role in mediating the effects of job stressors, therefore the key to reducing the impact of the these stressors lies in the ability of the organisation to create the "right" environment, and therefore the right culture (Pool, 2000, pp. 43-44). What the "right" culture is will be answered by looking at the relevant stressors within the organisation and rather than exacerbate them, strive to remove them.

The need to change and adapt to demands has become part of the organisational life cycle. The success of any organisation is dependent on the achievement of strategic objectives. Organisational culture has been shown to be crucial in bringing about change and achieving strategic objectives (Parker and Bradley 2000, p. 125). The leader influences the type of culture that is created as will be seen later on. A sound understanding of the types of cultures and the effect thereof enables the leader to make informed decisions in respect of the culture that he or she seeks to create.

2.6 THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP

The fact that the leader influences, to a large degree, the culture that is created has been discussed above. The proposed action by the leader, as a solution to a challenge, becomes entrenched over time. Contradictory behaviour becomes almost unthinkable. The assumptions also become implicit and guide future behaviour of both present and future members of the organisation. They are used to indicate to members how to perceive, think and feel about things (Schein 1992, p. 22). The assumptions become embedded and it becomes extremely difficult to change them should they no longer suit the needs of the organisation (Schein 1992, p. 22). It then becomes the function of the leader to identify these mismatches and to act as the change agent and adapt the culture (Schein 1992, p. 15).

There are key value dimensions or basic assumptions that impact on the creation of the culture and relate to beliefs about:

1. "The nature of people (e.g. are they (a)"naturally" moral/immoral; (b) lazy/conscientious; or (c) fixed in their ways/open to development and change?)
2. The relationship between people and the natural world (is it "naturally" harmonious, conflicting, dominating?)
3. The nature of people's relationship to space and time (How is territory defined? How is time assessed? Are horizons for planning and action typically long or short term?)
4. The nature of essential, desirable or irrelevant behaviour (e.g. doing, controlling, being?)
5. The nature and implication of barriers between "them" and "us" (who is "in" and who is "out"?)" (Dawson 1996, p. 141).

Basic assumptions become the foundation on which management and control systems are built. The leader, who assumes that all employees are lazy, will treat employees accordingly and employ high control systems to manage the group. People who are repeatedly treated in terms of this assumption will eventually come to behave accordingly in order to make their lives more stable and predictable (Schein 1992, p. 24). Therefore, what the leader thinks of the nature of human nature will be perpetuated in his/her organisation and will become a reality. The expectations of the leader will be fulfilled. So instead of a group of energized people, the leader will have a group of negative, "lazy" individuals who will certainly not be motivated to attain the objectives of the organisation.

Leaders need to be aware of the power they have to impose their own assumptions on others within the organisation. They need not be apologetic about it, but they need to understand the role that they play in creating order out of the initial chaos and setting the course for the future (Schein 1992, p. 376). The level of awareness of the leader of these factors is directly proportional to the consistency and effectiveness of the culture creating process (Schein 1992, p. 376). Founders usually are very determined and self-confident.

They have opinions on most things and have no difficulty imposing their views on others (Schein 1992 p. 213).

As previously indicated the leader needs to be aware of the conscious and subconscious learning which occurs. There needs to be consistency in learning at both levels as both the conscious and subconscious learning becomes embedded. Dawson, as earlier referred to in the levels of the organisation (paragraph 2.5 above) points out the inconsistencies which can arise. An organisation that which promotes the idea that people come first, but its policies and procedures contradict this notion, creates an inconsistency. This kind of policy forms the basis for the creation of subcultures and countercultures within the organisation (Schein 1992, p. 252). These cultures can work against the achievement of the objectives of the organisation and the leader needs to be aware of this.

The organisation will over time become successful in utilizing procedures, structure, espoused values and rituals. The more successful it becomes the greater the influence of the culture on determining the leadership criteria of future leaders (Schein 1992, p. 253). The selection of future leaders will be based on the culture of the organisation and the fit between the new leader and that culture.

There is a great deal of literature on what leadership should reflect. There is even talk of a leadership model. If one is to accept that leadership influences culture (in the start-up phase particularly) and that culture influences leadership (as set out above) then one needs to question the idea of an ideal leadership style. The ideal management style for an organisation depends on factors such as the mission statement, historical background and most importantly, the degree of overlap between the assumptions of management about the members and their actual characteristics (Schein 1970, pp. 50-51). The assumptions of the manager will also determine the management strategy to be utilized (Schein 1970, pp. 50-51). There is no one leadership model or style that can be applied universally. Specific leaders are required for specific stages in the lifespan of the organisation. Only those who have the insight to realize when an organisation has changed and the attitude to reinvent themselves and to reengineer their leadership style to suit the changing needs of

the environment like Jack Welch, will remain relevant and applicable (Bennis 2001, p. 153). (Jack Welch was the former CEO of General Electric. He is regarded as the quintessential manager of the twentieth century [Van Niekerk 2002]).

The organisational culture in which the leader finds himself/herself and the specific universal attributes of the leader are what determine success (Bennis 2001, p. 154). Leaders need to have a vision, a sense of direction, of purpose, as Bennis puts it; this is the main differentiator of management and leadership: "leading means doing the right things while management just means doing things right" (2001, p. 154). The other attribute is the ability to articulate the vision simply but compellingly (Bennis 2001, p. 155). The leader needs to do more than give an inspiring speech; he also needs to live the vision, be the embodiment thereof (Bennis 2001, p. 155). The leader also needs to generate trust by being honest in his/her communications and by having empathy (Bennis 2001, p. 155). (Also, see the "principle centered" leader of Covey as set out below.)

Organisational culture has been likened to an anchor in times of change, but Kotter argues convincingly that the ideal is to create a culture that facilitates change (1999, p. 167). However, for this to happen the management group needs firstly to value all parties in the organisation's value chain sincerely and honestly, not forgetting the employees (Kotter 1999, p. 167). The second requirement is that leadership and initiative is acknowledged and valued at all levels within the organisation (Kotter 1999, p. 167). This is nowhere more applicable than in the global environment in which we currently find ourselves. Companies wishing to be competitive need to realize that knowledge provides the competitive advantage and according to Covey companies need to move to a "principle-centered leadership model" (1999, p. 35). The model accepts that natural laws or principles will ultimately govern and seeks to help people find fulfillment and meaning in their work (Covey 1999, p. 35). Covey argues that the organisation in the global economy needs to have high quality and low cost that can only be achieved in a "high-trust" culture (1999, p. 35). Conversely, this "high-trust" culture is dependent on the organisation being "principle centered" (Covey 1999, p. 35). Covey argues that there are basic universal principles such as for example, justice, trust, integrity, honesty and fairness

which apply to everybody including people in organisations (1999, p. 36). These principles are universal and unquestioned and the organisation needs to be based on these principles (Covey 1999, p. 36).

The value of this "high-trust" culture is that it empowers individuals and ensures work quality (Covey 1999, p. 36). Quality can only be achieved when people are empowered and empowerment is a result of trust, which is in turn based on trustworthiness (Covey 1999, p. 37). Thus, the individual also plays a part in creating this culture by acting trustworthily. This results in trust and then empowerment. Obviously, the assumption of the leader needs to be that the individual is trustworthy as explained earlier in order to eliminate any dissonance within the individual.

When people feel that they are making a valuable contribution to something meaningful, they are motivated and this leads to individual fulfillment (Covey 1999, p. 37). This process releases the true potential of each individual. The organisation ultimately benefits from the creativity and released energy of the employees (Covey 1999, p. 37). The real test of the culture is when there is a crisis. It is then that the organisation either splits and divides or copes with the situation in a synergistic way (Covey 1999, p. 42). Organisations with low trust are characterized by in fighting in difficult times and the cracks start to appear. This demonstrates that principles were never there to begin with and that the value statement is just a piece of paper (Covey 1999, p. 43). This is particularly evident when the leadership in not "principle-centered" which translates to the leader not being principle-centered (Covey 1999, p. 42). This reaffirms the research conducted by Pool who asserts that there is an inverse relationship between the types of culture (paragraph 2.6) and the stress factors experienced by the employees. In the same way, there is a direct relationship between the motivation of the employees and the type of culture in the organisation.

The discussion so far has centred on the founder or leader and the impact that the founder has on the creation of the culture. The "founder" of an organisation may be a group of persons. The paradigm that is then established arises from the way the group reaches

consensus on their assumptions (Schein 1983, p. 14). The ultimate organisational culture will be a mixture of the assumptions and theories of the original founder group and the subsequent learning of the group from its own experiences (Schein 1983, p. 14). In the start-up phase of an organisation the founder will usually seek out like-minded colleagues and employees (Schein 1992, p. 227). Conflict is inevitable between those who do not think alike, resulting in some leaving the organisation leaving behind a more homogenous group (Schein 1992, p. 227). The founding group and the first generation employees usually know each other well as organisations usually start small with everyone working very closely together (Schein 1983, p. 25).

The growth of the organisation leads in a new stage in the development of the organisation and the need for passion is replaced with a need to manage effectively. Many founders experience this as an anti-climax. Most organisations will come to be managed by professional managers who bring with them their own assumptions (Schein 1983, p. 27). Schein is of the opinion that there are differences in the entrepreneur/founder/owner and the professional manager of which the most noteworthy for this research is the fact that managers are less innovative than owners (1983, pp. 26-27). Another difference is in the culture that they create or seek to create. The founder usually wants to create group culture while the professional manager would like to create a more efficient organisation and therefore a rational culture (as set out above in types of cultures paragraph 2.6) (Schein 1983, p. 28). The transition is inevitable. The organisation should strive to retain the "good things" of the original culture while still enabling the organisation to adapt to its new needs (Schein 1983, p. 28).

2.7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ORGANISATION

The individual who enters an organisation as either an employee or manager plays a very important role as has been concluded from the discussion. The individual brings with him/her a mixture of values and attitudes. The characteristics of the individual and the social context in which the individual operates are interdependent. Social influences leave their mark on the individual and in some cases where the individual has a strong power

base, they also leave their imprint on the organisation (Dawson 1996, p. 29). In other words, individuals impact on the culture of the organisation to some degree depending on their position within the organisation and the nature of their jobs.

The image that the individual has of the organisation affects the quality and quantity of their work. The usual motivational aspects of monetary reward and the general characteristics of the job are not the only motivating factors (Schein 1970, p. 3). In the 1970's, Schein indicated that the individual experiences the organisation as a "psychological entity" and reacts to it (1970, p. 3). This reinforces the views of Covey that when people feel a part of something worthwhile they are more motivated and fulfilled (1998, p. 36).

Motivation of the individual in the workplace has been linked to the "psychological contract" between the individual and the organisation. The organisation has certain expectations of the individual and vice versa (Schein 1970, p. 12). The contract for the individual is implemented through a belief that he/she will be able to influence the organisation to such a degree as to be able to ensure that he or she is not taken advantage of (Schein 1970, p. 13). The authority of the organisation over the individual is implicit because the individual accepts a position on a contractual basis (Schein 1970, p. 13). The individual who feels that the organisation is not fulfilling on its obligations will feel frustrated and angered. Creative and innovative employees are usually beneficial to all organisations (Schein 1970, p. 18). The challenge for the management team is to create the environment that will stimulate creativity, but also ensure that primary tasks are performed well (Schein, 1970, p. 18). Covey has suggested the "high trust" culture as a solution. The role of the leader in creating the appropriate culture has already been discussed. The culture clearly influences the performance and the well being of the individual and the organisation, therefore great care needs to be taken with its establishment.

2.8 PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS

The role of the leader discussed so far has been centred on the leader in a private organisation. The appropriate culture for public organisations has been touched on. The international trend is that public organisations are expected to apply business principles and to be managed effectively and efficiently. The role of the leader in that environment has become very challenging. The leader in the public sector is faced with the same challenges as the leader in the private sector and needs to prepare the members of the organisation to adapt to new demands, a change in direction and even changes in the mission (Valle 1999, p. 245). The role of the leader in the public sector is to develop and adapt the organisational culture to prepare for the changes. Valle argues that the most important core competency of an organisation is the organisational culture (1999, p. 246). The public sector has also become technologically advanced. The impact of the global markets is also being felt (Valle 1999 p. 246). In the law enforcement arena, criminals have become excellent global players looking for "investment" opportunities.

Most public sector organisations are still characterised by historical leadership or what is know as transactional leadership. Employees are trained to react to a situation in terms of certain pre-determined rules and regulations and not to be creative and innovative (Valle 1999, p. 247). The "anticipatory culture" that develops because of this is reactive and passive (Valle 1999, p. 247). This culture is only acceptable in a predictable, stable environment that simply no longer exists (Valle 1999, p. 248).

Figure 2.3 is a model for leadership in the public sector developed by Valle. The focus of the model is on the relationship between the culture of the organisation, as moulded by the leader, and the ability of the organisation to fulfill its responsibility to it stakeholders (Valle 1999, p. 249). Valle concurs that in most cases the organisational culture is created as a result of "critical incidents" during the formation stages and early development of the organisation (1999, p. 250). Public organisations seldom have the opportunity to create a new organisation and therefore, these "critical incidents" seldom occur.

The leader in the new public sector needs to do more than establish an adaptive culture. The leader needs to be transformational, to provide the followers with a compelling vision and have the ability to communicate that vision in a manner that inspires others and paints a clear picture of where the organisation is going (Valle 1999, p. 251). The main characteristic often ascribed to the transformational leader is charisma. Charisma is an attribute. In other words it is dependent on the attitude of the followers towards the leader, whether they believe he/she is charismatic or not (Valle 1999, p. 252). Leaders who regard their subordinates as their "immediate customers" are successful and will find that subordinates will in turn regard them as their customers (Valle 1999, p. 253).

Figure 2.3 "Leadership Processes in Turbulent Environments" Valle 1999, p. 249 figure 2



The literature clearly indicates that there is no difference in the role of the leader in the public and private sector. The same leadership qualities are required. The organisational culture is also created in the same manner, although the opportunities for establishing new organisations are very limited in the public sector.

2.9 NATIONAL CULTURE

The concept of culture has been looked at from the anthropological as well as the organisational perspective. There are various layers of culture which the individual wears

like layers of clothing. In the same way that a person can be affiliated to various groups at the same time, various influences can form the culture of the individual allowing the individual to carry with him or her various layers of "mental programming" (Hofstede 1991, p. 10). These layers correspond to the various levels of culture, for example, a national level, a regional level, a gender level, an ethical level, a generation level, a social class level and many more (Hofstede 1991, p. 10). The list is not exhaustive and many other layers could be added.

In the empirical research conducted by Hofstede in the 1970's in 50 countries of IBM employees throughout the world, four dimensions of culture were identified, later a fifth dimension was added (Hofstede 1991, pp. 12-13). The dimensions identified are important as they also relate to the work environment that was found to exist in the various national cultures identified. Earlier work conducted by Inkeles and Levinson suggested that there were three main issues that qualified as common basic problems worldwide (Inkeles and Levison, 1969, pp. 447ff as cited by Hofstede 1991, p. 13) The three main problems identified relate to, the relation to authority (the relationship between the individual and society), the individual's concept of masculinity and femininity and ways of dealing with conflict. It is interesting to note that the dimensions identified by Hofstede show a degree of overlap with this earlier work.

The dimensions of Hofstede are the following:

1. Power distance (from small to large)
2. Collectivism versus individualism
3. Femininity versus masculinity
4. Uncertainty avoidance
5. Long-term orientation versus short term orientation

The aim of this research is to investigate organisational culture and therefore these dimensions will not be dealt with in great detail.

Nations is a new concept and is a political division that cannot be equated with societies that were "organically developed forms of social organizations" and strictly speaking, the concept of a common culture is more applicable to societies than to nations (Hofstede 1991, p. 12). Most countries feel the effects of globalisation which is eroding the previous high levels of homogeneity associated with the closed societies of the past (Hofstede, 1991, p. 12). Hofstede nevertheless argues that there is evidence of the formation of "historically developed wholes" and that in some countries there is even more integration with various national bodies, for example a national army, a representation of various sports at a national level that has symbolic meaning, a national education system or a national media (Hofstede 1991, p.12).

The work of Hofstede on national cultures leads one to query some of the old established theories in respect of motivation. Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory has lower order to higher order needs. These needs are from the bottom up: physiological needs, need for safety, belongingness, esteem, and self-actualisation "(Hofstede 1991, p. 125). Hofstede criticizes this theory by pointing out that in a collectivist culture the need for self-actualisation is not a primary consideration and will not be the highest order need of individuals within that culture (Hofstede 1991, p. 125). In cultures where there is strong uncertainty avoidance, safety or security is likely to prevail over other needs (Hofstede 1991, p. 125). In feminine cultures, belongingness (human relationships) will prevail over esteem, but in masculine cultures, the reverse is true (Hofstede 1991, p. 125).

Organisational culture does not replace national culture even if one is working for a multinational organisation within your own country (Adler 1991, p. 58). In fact, the opposite appears to happen the national culture comes stronger to the fore (Adler 1991, p. 58). South Africa is a multinational country which is culturally diverse and not homogenous. The national culture of South Africa as found by Hofstede in his research needs to be placed in the correct perspective. He conducted his research in 1970 within the IBM company. One can safely accept that in those years, IBM did not worry about its equity profile and one can assume that the bulk of the employees where white Afrikaner males. This needs to be taken into consideration when reading the work of Hofstede.

Leaders operating in multinational or global organisations need to be aware of the effect of national culture on the individual and their values. The leader is responsible for creating the cultural environment that reduces stress factors and increases job satisfaction. A clear understanding of what motivates different people can only assist the leader.

2.10 CONCLUSION

Leadership is central in creating organisational culture and in bringing about cultural change in any organisation, whether it is a public or private sector company (Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003, p. 380). It is clear that as stated by Schein (1992, p. 15) and tested by Parry and Proctor-Thomson (2003, p. 383) that leadership is a function of organisational culture and organisational culture is a function of leadership.

My research looked at the role of the founder group in establishing the organisational culture in a public organisation. The group had the unique opportunity of creating a new organisation and the research will look at how they set about selecting a suitable culture and then embedding it. The organisation had a small head office component and regional offices. In the regions, there were strong leaders and their influence on the culture will be looked at as well as the head office component. During the period under investigation, new members joined and there was a change of leadership and the impact thereof will also be looked at. In the next chapter the methodology employed in conducting the research will be set out.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A dot becomes a line, a line becomes a shape, shapes become patterns, patterns become artwork.
One must always remember to start at the pure basics.
In the end, you'll end up with a masterpiece.

(Raccuia 2004)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The process of creating an organisation's culture is complex and requires the emotional commitment of the founder group. The DSO, as a public organisation, presented a unique opportunity for the founder group to influence the creation of the culture. The research goal was to understand the founder group's experience of the creation of the organisational culture and what that meant to them. The research was therefore conducted within a single case study since the establishment of the organisation was a unique occurrence. In this chapter, I will discuss my research goal, my research paradigm, the case study, the research respondents, the interviews, the data analysis, the document analysis and my personal reflections on the research process.

3.2 RESEARCH GOAL

The goal of my research was to understand the founder group's experience of the creation of the organisational culture of the DSO and what that experience meant to them. In particular, I wanted to establish what role the founder members of the DSO believed their values and beliefs played in creating the organisation's culture, and their perception of how those values influenced the leadership, management and organisation processes of the DSO.

My research was intended to cover the period 1 September 1999, the date of the launch of the DSO (or DSI as it was launched) to 12 January 2001, the date of the actual enactment of the legislation. The IDOC era preceded that of the DSO. The DSO launched on 1

September 1999 and begun in January 2001 was in fact the IDOC renamed. The DSO took over the staff, the equipment, the furniture, the skill, the expertise and the successes of the IDOC. The culture of the organisation had already started to be created in the IDOC period and so this was included in the study. The study therefore, covers the period from about August 1998 to January 2001 since the first three IDOC offices were established in 1998.

3.3 RESEARCH PARADIGM

The research was conducted within a phenomenological (interpretive) paradigm. The word "phenomenon" from which phenomenological is derived, comes from the Greek verb "to appear or show" (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 52). The phenomenological paradigm seeks to understand human behaviour from the framework of the participant (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 52).

This paradigm provided me with the opportunity of putting myself in the shoes of the participants and of "developing insights into how the participants interpret and make meaning of the world" (Cantrell 1993, p. 96). The focus of my study was on the meaning of the experience and not on the measurement of the social phenomena being researched (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 53). The idea of the research was to use interpretive techniques to understand and put into words the meaning of the experience for the participants (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 53). I was not interested in measuring the frequency of naturally, reoccurring phenomena in the social world (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 53).

My ontology is that reality is constructed and that there are multiple realities (Christie et al. 2000, p. 9). I wanted to understand the creation of the organisational culture within the DSO and to interpret the meaning to the founder group within the social and cultural context of the natural setting (Cantrell 1993, p. 84). The research methodology selected was qualitative research. This methodology was the most suitable in the circumstances in order to achieve my research goal (Cantrell 1993, pp. 81-88). Open-ended interviews were conducted with the participants as will be seen from the discussion following. This

methodology appealed to me because I believe that knowledge is constructed within the individual and open-ended interviews lend themselves to uncovering how meaning is constructed (Silverman 2001, p. 95). The social interaction of the interviews facilitated the sharing of experiences, feelings and perceptions of the participants which allowed me to learn through the process (Seidman 1991, pp. 1-4). The research was conducted within a single case study because I had a particular interest in this organisation.

3.4 THE CASE STUDY

The DSO interested me, having myself been involved since its inception and having seen it grow and change. I was interested in investigating what the experience meant to my colleagues. My particular field of interest was the organisational culture because I had experienced its development. I was interested in the role that the founder members played in the establishment of the culture. I wanted to understand the dynamics present within the DSO as a single entity and therefore, a case study is appropriate (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 65). According to Yin, a case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (1994, p. 13).

The use of a single case study is sometimes criticized because of a lack of generalisability and questions are raised on the validity of the results (Yin 1994, p. 37). The case study on which my research is based, provided me with a unique opportunity to learn "a lot from an atypical case (rather) than a little from a magnificently typical case...Opportunity to learn is of primary importance" (Stake 1994, pp. 243-244). The public sector offers few opportunities to create something *de nova* and therefore, this case is in a sense unique.

The tests applicable to the research method employed and their application to this research are now discussed:

Rigour:

The emphasis is on quality and depth of the data in the interpretive paradigm and the term 'rich" is widely used to describe the amount of detail and the nuances found in the

phenomena that is being studied (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 56). Van der Mescht warns that "thickness" does not amount to quantity and cannot be used to hide shoddy work (2002, p. 49). He argues that the researcher needs to apply what he calls 'internal rigour", a need for systematic work (2002, p. 49). The manner in which the research was conducted is addressed in the interview section. The data collected is very detailed and captures the emotions, excitement and disappointments of the participants.

Data integrity:

This is the characteristic of the research that affects error and bias in the research (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 56). Van der Mescht argues for "scientific rigour" (2002, p. 50). The absence of scientific rigour is evident in a "researcher's failure to engage critically with their work, consider the ethics of their positions as researchers, question the validity of their findings, and most importantly acknowledge the shortcomings of the method they have used" (Van der Mescht 2002, p. 50). In the present study, I acknowledge that I am biased and that my values do play a role in the way in which I interpret the data (Adler and Adler 1987, p. 112).

Reliability:

The question to be asked is if another researcher followed the same procedure and conducted the same case study at a later stage, would the outcomes of the research be similar (Yin 1994, p. 36). During the interviews, I took copious interview notes which provide a summary of what was said. The interviews were audio taped and transcribed to ensure that an accurate and complete record was obtained for analysis (Silverman 1997, p. 15).

Validity:

This term is the extent to which the research findings represent what is actually going on in a particular situation (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 57). There are high levels of validity as the data is rich in its "explanation and analysis" and the aim was to capture the meaning and knowledge within the participants in the phenomena (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 59).

Validation was found in the emergence of concepts from the data. A natural saturation of themes has occurred (Melia 1997, pp. 30-33). There was a very high ratio of participant to researcher voice during the interviews. There is a level of fairness in the presentation of the data. Fairness is for Lincoln and Guba a "quality of balance; that is, all stakeholder views, perspectives, claims, concerns, and voices should be apparent from the text" (2000, p. 180). For the purpose of obtaining participant feedback on the plausibility of the study and for ethical reasons, I followed Seidman's (1991, p. 54) suggestion by making the entire report available to the participants. Unfortunately only two participants: Dr Ruben Richards and Adv. Gerhard Nel were available. The feedback from the participants was of a stylistic nature. This process provided the participants with the opportunity to point out anything in the document that they were uncomfortable with or that they felt was inaccurate or unfair (Seidman 1991, p. 54).

Generalisation:

This term is the extent to which the research results can be applied or are relevant in another context (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 58). There is a connection between the experiences of the participants that Siedman offers as an alternative to generalisability (1991, p. 42). He is of the opinion that "such links among the people whose individual lives are quite different but who are affected by common structural and social forces can help the reader see patterns in the experience (1991, p. 42). I have attempted to learn enough about the case "to encapsulate complex meanings into a finite report but to describe the case in sufficient descriptive narrative so that readers can vicariously experience these happenings, and draw their own conclusions" (Stake 1994, p. 243). This will allow the reader to identify with and recognise the situation (Stake 1994, p. 243).

3.5 THE RESEARCH RESPONDENTS

The participants were members of the DSO and this is a case study of the creation of that entity. They were self-selected and were the founder members of the DSO. The participants were the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), who was also the head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Frank Dutton, Chief Executive officer

of the DSO and his two surviving deputies (Dr. Makhosazana Msimang died in 2001) Dr Ruben Richards and Pete Richer.

At the time that the DSO was announced, the IDOC was already in existence and by 12 January 2001 when the legislation was enacted, the IDOC became the DSO. The four regional offices established within the IDOC, remained and regional heads were appointed. During the period of the research, the organisational culture of the IDOC later to become the DSO was already forming and therefore, the regional participants needed to be added. The regional head of the Western Cape was Adv. Dawood Adam, in KwaZulu-Natal Adv. Chris Macadam, in Gauteng Adv. Gerhard Nel and in the Eastern Cape myself.

The organisation is made up of different professions (prosecutors, investigators, analysts, intelligence operatives, administrative personnel). Within the regions with the exception of the Western Cape, the regional heads had appointed a head of investigators. In Gauteng, it was Andrew Leask and in KwaZulu-Natal it was Clifford Marion. I did not include the representative from the Eastern Cape, as he is no longer a part of the organisation after extended sick leave. These heads of investigation played a very important role in the establishment of the organisation and the creation of the organisational culture.

To protect the identity of the participants codes have been used. I refer to the participants as A, B C–H. However, with reference to the history of the participants their true identity has been used. The reason for this is that the continued use of codes would have disclosed their true identity.

3.6 INTERVIEWS

I decided on a qualitative research methodology to complement my research paradigm. Open-ended interviews were used to collect the data. Although the interviews were open-ended, I prepared a broad guideline for each interview and there was a main question with each interview (Hitchcock and Hughes 1995, p. 221). The prepared outline was informed by the literature I had read.

The idea was to conduct three interviews of no longer than 90 minutes with each participant (Seidman 1991 p. 13). The interviews were to be spaced over a three-week period to allow time in between each for reflection (Seidman 1991, p. 14). The first session focused on the life history of the participant and they were encouraged to talk about how they came to join the DSO (Seidman 1991, p. 11). During this interview, I attempted to establish past influences which may have influenced the development of the values of the individual, but did not pry. Some of the participants wanted to give extensive detail of their backgrounds and lives and I did not discourage them. Others did not want to talk about their past in much detail or become too personal.

The second interview dealt with their perceptions of the creation of the organisational culture and their experience of it (Seidman 1991, p. 11). The participants had different views of what organisational culture meant. When asked what their perception of the creation of the organisational culture was it became clear from their responses that there was a misunderstanding of the term in some cases. I decided that it would be better to ask about the manifestation of the organisational culture and related topics rather than attempt to explain it to them. My understanding of these areas was informed by the literature review.

The third and final interview provided the opportunity for the participants to reflect on the meaning of the experience for them (Seidman 1991, p. 12). This was a very sad experience for both the participants and myself. They were filled with regrets about unfulfilled dreams, but shared a vision of a better future. The interviews were audio taped and transcribed to ensure that an accurate and complete record was obtained for analysis (Silverman 1997, p. 15).

The bulk of the interviews were conducted face to face at a place that was convenient for the participant. Due to financial constraints, the last participant was interviewed telephonically, but in the same manner as the others. I do not think that this changed the value of the interview although it did not allow time to observe their body language. The

observation of the body language in the other participants was not interpreted by me or noted as relevant.

The recordings of two interviews were of a very poor quality. The first was with Frank Dutton. Because he is no longer employed by the NPA, I met him in Durban where he now lives. We met at a public place one evening and unfortunately, the noise level was too high. As a result the quality of the recording is very poor. The interviews conducted with Percy Sonn were by telephone. Unfortunately, the quality of the recording of the first interview was also very poor. In both cases, I had to rely on my interview notes which I typed up immediately after the interview and before talking to anyone. During the second and third interviews with Percy Sonn, dialogue, which needed clarification, was dealt with and recordings were taken.

Unfortunately, the DSO no longer employs many of the members and their availability was problematic. Frank Dutton has left the organisation and I was always concerned about his availability. However, I managed to have one interview with him, but due to ill health, others had to be postponed. I do not think that his unavailability had a material impact on the research for two reasons: the first is that he left the organisation at a very early stage after an extended period of illness. His role was therefore limited. The second reason is that the data had become saturated at that stage of the research.

Clifford Marion is in the KwaZulu-Natal regional office and I managed to have one interview with him. Due to his and my unavailability, I was unable to conduct further interviews. I believe the same argument in respect of data saturation applies here.

The interviews were intended to be no longer than 90 minutes, but in two the time limit was exceeded. The interview with Frank Dutton lasted 1:58:40 and the second interview with Ruben Richards lasted 1:54:44. Both participants were engrossed in their storytelling and clearly wanted to share the whole experience with me and I felt that it was appropriate.

A further problem was that due to the nature of the business of the participants as well as my own commitments, meetings that were set up with participants had to be cancelled and rescheduled. This resulted in longer time lapses between the interviews than originally planned. This could have caused the participants to lose their train of thought. However, from the interview data this did not appear to have happened.

3.7 DATA ANALYSIS

The interviews were transcribed. The participants are not all first-language English speaking. I have used direct quotations in the data analysis where grammatical errors will be apparent. To ensure that the voice of the participant remains in tact for the reader I have not changed the wording except where it is difficult to follow.

According to Yin (1994 p. 102), "data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, or otherwise recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study." The data was read and areas highlighted which addressed the question posed or the area under investigation. Specific quotations that struck me as being very descriptive or rich were also highlighted. The highlighted areas where then compared. Common themes emerged and thematic connections were made (Seidman 1991, pp. 91-101). This then led to the categorization of the data (Neuman 2000, p. 420). The data was interpreted and "rich or thick descriptions" were sought and were used as "the building blocks" to develop my argument (Remenyi 1999, p. 28).

Wolcott (1994, p. 16) refers to a "descriptively orientated account" and recommends that the researcher: "Tell the story. Then tell how that happened to be the way you told it." The descriptions cannot be divorced from the analysis and interpretation, according to Wolcott, and "data are tainted with an analytical or interpretive cast *in the very process of becoming data"* (1994, p. 16). Descriptions can be regarded as "implicit analysis, implicit interpretations (Wolcott 1994, p. 16). Each of the following two chapters deals with the main identified themes. The chapters are written as a "descriptive orientated account" of the research (Wolcott, 1994. p. 16). In each chapter, certain sub-themes have been discussed which emerged from the data. In line with the interpretive approach containing

rich data I have fore grounded the narrative and kept only background references to the literature.

3.8 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

The DSO has been in the public eye since its announcement and there have been various newspaper reports. The NPA has quite an extensive library at its headquarters at the VGM building in Pretoria and a full time librarian. Copies of newspaper clippings which apply to the NPA are kept. I asked the librarian to assist me with copies of these clippings and she forwarded them to me. She also assisted me with an informal research document of the DSO conducted by Dr T Pretorius (Draft document on the creation of the DSO, 2003) in which the events of the establishments of the DSO are set out chronologically. This is an internal research document intended to be of historical value to the organisation. I also obtained copies of the strategic plan for the NPA (2001) in which the three-year strategy, vision, and mission etc. of the DSO are set out. I also drew a copy, from my records, of the annual reports for the NPA (2001/2002).

During the interviews, I requested permission from the participants to take photographs of them and they agreed. The photographs are added as an appendix to the thesis to enhance the account (see list of Appendices).

The documents have been studied and I looked for links between the data obtained through the interviews and the documentation (Hitchcock and Hughes 1995, p. 222). The newspaper reports were not as useful as I had hoped, but the research document and the strategic plans assisted with the chronological events and the historical background. They supported the versions of the participants in respect of the sequence of events.

3.9 PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS

There were many limitations to the research, but I have learnt a great deal. No amount of reading can prepare the researcher for the unexpected events that occur during an interview. Some of these limitations in respect of the interviews conducted have been touched on above. Before commencing with the research, I approached the NDPP for his

approval. The participants were then approached and requested to participate in the research. The purpose of the interview was carefully explained to each of the participants beforehand and they also fully understood what was to be done with it on completion (Remenyi 1998, p. 111; Seidman 1991, pp. 49-52).

I explained to each participant at the outset that they had the right to remain anonymous and that they may voluntarily withdraw from the process at any stage during the research (Seidman 1991, p. 53). The participants did not want to be anonymous. During the compilation of the analysis, I realised that the participants could be compromised if their identity was exposed and subsequently decided to retain anonymity. Before starting the interview, I obtained permission from the participants to audiotape the interview and to transcribe it.

I was a complete-member-researcher who was opportunistic having first been part of the group and then deciding to do the research (Adler and Adler 1987, p. 68). As already indicated in the introduction to the research, I was and am a regional head in the DSO for the Eastern Cape region. As such all participants are known to me to a lesser or greater degree. Some like Gerhard Nel and Andrew Leask I have worked with since 1993 and we have built up a friendship over the years. Clifford Marion, Ruben Richards and Percy Sonn have also become close acquaintances over the past four years.

The other participants were my colleagues and I interacted with them on a professional basis for some period of time although my interaction with Frank Dutton was very limited. I realized that this closeness to the participants combined with the subject could impact on the interviews. I was particularly careful not to be drawn into discussions or to offer my views and kept the researcher voice to a minimum. Despite my apprehensions, I was surprised at the information which was forthcoming. Most of the detail shared with me was "new information" and consequently I was unaware of their feelings and of the events they described.

There are advantages to being a complete-member-researcher, but also pitfalls which I had to guard against. The most important potential pitfall as a researcher was the role of conflict between the roles of participant versus the role of researcher (Adler and Adler 1987, p. 73). This also presented an ethical dilemma for me as I reflected on the evidence and recorded my findings (Adler and Adler 1987, p. 81). I experienced an inner struggle and consciously reminded myself of the need to be as objective as possible in my interpretation of the data. I also made a conscious effort to ensure that the perceptions of all participants were stated. My own perceptions and sub-conscious bias influenced my analysis although I attempted to reduce this (Adler and Adler 1987, p. 111).

I am aware that I am biased but believe the rich descriptions in the following chapters, where I am very much in the background, will enable the reader to formulate his/her own ideas and decide whether my interpretation is valid or not. Bias is something that one will find in all research and cannot completely be excluded.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DSO AND THE FORMATION OF THE CULTURE

Great spirits have always found violent opposition from mediocre minds.
The latter cannot understand it when a man does not thoughtlessly
Submit to hereditary prejudices but honestly and courageously uses his intelligence.

(Einstein 1879-1955)

4. 1 INTRODUCTION

The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) was formed in response to the needs of society. The National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) was to head this unit. A committee was established to thrash out the final details of the unit. The DSO needed to be staffed and senior management was recruited. Prior to the establishment of the DSO, the NDPP had established three offices of the Investigating Directorate of Organised Crime (IDOC). Regional heads were appointed in each office which had a distinct mandate. The establishment of the DSO is dealt with in the first part of this chapter. In the second part, I look at the values of the founder members. These are expressed through assumptions and in the managerial style of the members. The values, experiences and assumptions are illustrated in quotations from the data. The values and assumptions of the founder group played a very important role in forming the organisation, the processes and procedures that were adopted as well as the culture. The attraction of the DSO to the founder group was the opportunity to be part of making history, of establishing a unit within the public sector which would become a beacon to law enforcement agencies.

The DSO in the period 1 September 1999 to 12 January 2001, was the IDOC which had assumed a new identity. The members of the organisation were situated in the regions (in the IDOC regional offices). New recruits to the DSO were also transferred to these offices after completing their initial training. At head office in Pretoria, there was a very small

component. Percy Sonn had a secretary and later a prosecutor and later one or two investigators who assisted in the administrative processes. Frank Dutton and his deputies initially had no staff. Later, analysts were recruited for the Crime Analysis Division (CAD), and the training division acquired a few staff members. The operational support unit received some recruits. The organisation was regional, but centrally managed to a degree.

The term "senior management" of the DSO, as used in this chapter, is intended to mean Frank Dutton, and his three deputies: Pete Richer, Makhosazana Msimang and Ruben Richards. The term "top management" of the DSO is intended to mean the senior management as well as Percy Sonn and Bulelani Ngcuka. The other founder members are Gerhard Nel (regional head Gauteng), Andrew Leask (head of investigators, Gauteng), Chris Macadam (regional head, KZN), Clifford Marion (head of investigators, KZN), and Dawood Adam (regional head, Western Cape).

The literature as reviewed in chapter two that is applicable to the data analysis is the following: - The role of the values of the founder members on the organisational culture, the role of the founder group in establishing the organisational culture, the relationship between organisational culture and the individual (social contract), the way in which founders embed the culture they seek to create, founders in the public sector environment, the layers of organisational culture, the types of organisational culture and the impact it has on the success of the organisation, the impact of values on different layers of organisational culture and the motivation of the individuals within the organisation. Pitman (1992, p. 761) states "Data are already theory" and therefore the literature will not be discussed in detail in this chapter. Wolcott (1994, p. 34) states that a more common approach to data analysis "is to draw connections with external authority...in the tradition of literature review. More recently, the researcher has been allowed, even encouraged, to make the connection personal or part of everyday experience."

4.2 PART I: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DSO

The DSO was established within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and as the NDPP was the head his appointment will be briefly looked at. The DSO was preceded by the IDOC and by 12 January 2001, the IDOC had become the DSO, and so the establishment of these units will be examined. The background and reasons for the establishment of the DSO as well as the announcement thereof are set out. The DSO needed staff so the recruitment of the top management is discussed, then the launch, and then the effect of governmental pressure on management to perform.

The appointment of the National Director

The appointment of the NDPP, Bulelani Ngcuka (see Appendix A) on 1 August 1998 symbolised the dawn of a new era in the prosecution service. Previously there was no national coordination of the prosecution service and it was provincially managed. Ngcuka had come full circle as he started his career in the magistrates' court as a prosecutor and was re-entering the scene now as the national head of the prosecuting authority:

> Whilst I was at the university in 1975, I then started working during the school holidays. I worked at Mdantsane Magistrates' court, firstly as a complaints' clerk, then as clerk of the civil court, then clerk of the criminal court. ...Then I became a court interpreter then (I) became a prosecutor. I worked from about 1977, from November 1977 to April 1978 as a prosecutor...

The creation of IDOC

The appointment of a National Director of Public Prosecutions was controversial and there were fears of a political agenda. Ngcuka decided on a simple strategy to entrench himself into the position and at the same time allay the fears of those concerned with his appointment. He would let the directors of public prosecutions (DPP's) "do what they were doing; I needed to do something different. It would give me time to win their confidence." The bombings in the Western Cape were not being dealt with and he saw this as the ideal "opportunity to do something different without interfering with anybody."

This was the start of the IDOC and the beginning of what was later to become the DSO, more commonly called the Scorpions. The idea for the IDOC was informed by visits from the NDPP to various law enforcement agencies throughout the world and by extracting the best practices. Adv. Percy Sonn was called and "I sat down and I told him that this is what I wanted to do. And we sat down and we drew (up) a list of people whom we were going to invite over to form the IDOC". And so, they set up the office in Cape Town with Adv. Sonn (see Appendix B) as the Investigating Director of Organised Crime.

The IDOC was a joint venture with the police and carried the blessing of the Deputy President of the country at the time as Bulelani Ngcuka recalls:

> Then, I had a long meeting with the Minister of Safety and Security at the time Sydney Mfumadi. We agreed on this project. He then invited me to a meeting with the then deputy president, now the President. And then, (we) met with Commissioner George Fivaz, gave the list of names of people that we wanted from the police to be seconded over to us. He agreed with most of them...(and) we put a team together.

The attention of the NDPP was next drawn to Richmond and the political violence there. Another IDOC office was established under the leadership of Adv. Chris Macadam (see Appendix C). Senior Superintendent Clifford Marion (see Appendix D) later joined him.

Gauteng was next and was established to combat hi-jackings and the regional head appointed there was Adv.Gerhard (Gerrie to some) Nel (see Appendix E) who was assisted by Captain Andrew Leask (see Appendix F). The NDPP appointed Gerhard Nel after interviews for the post of deputy director of public prosecutions (DDPP) for Johannesburg. He "was impressed with Gerrie very much in the interviews. I remember D'Oliveira wrote me a note and said this is your man for organised crime. I was looking for somebody who would be based in my office, who will deal with this."

The Eastern Cape office was established in September 1999 to address taxi violence which was escalating and claiming the lives of many innocent people. The NDPP was approached to intervene and he initially sent a group of investigators from his office to start the project. Late September 1999 it was decided to establish another IDOC office and I was sent to assume responsibility and was later appointed as the regional head.

The concept of the DSO

IDOC was functioning well and showing results. A turn of events would impact on the IDOC and change the lives of members, both seconded and permanently employed. Mr Ngcuka was summoned by the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, on Election Day in 1999

> And he said that, and Sydney was there as well, Sydney Mfumadi, and he said to us: Listen, he has been visiting people all over the country during the election campaign, everywhere he goes people talk about this issue of crime. He has [got] to do something different. He has to be seen to be responding to people...to issues that have been raised by the people.

And thus the DSO was born, an improvement on the IDOC model which had already been highly successful. The problem with the model was the dual accountability of the investigators, who were seconded SAPS members. They were accountable to the police for administrative purposes and to the NPA for operations. Ngcuka recalls, "the model that we put in place in the form of IDOC was achieving results...and so the question was how could we then do this thing, deal with all our shortcomings in the model that we had. That was when we tabled the idea of the Scorpions." Ngcuka indicated that he always intended IDOC to be the "core of the DSO".

The announcement

President, Thabo Mbeki, announced, during his inauguration speech in the National Assembly in Cape Town on 25 June 1999, the establishment of this unit, later to become

known as the DSO. He also indicated that he had instructed certain ministers to come up with a plan in respect of the implementation of this unit.

> To enable our law enforcement agencies to translate this into reality, I am privileged to announce that a special and adequately staffed and equipped investigation unit will be established urgently to deal with all national priority crimes, including police corruption.
>
> I have directed that the Ministers of Safety and Security, Defence, Intelligence, Justice, Home Affairs and Finance must finalise all outstanding matters which relate to the activation of this unit within a fortnight (Mbeki 1999).

These ministers in turn appointed a working committee chaired by Pete Richer (see Appendix G) a deputy director general (DDG) with NIA to draft the requested plans. An urgent meeting was called and during the first meeting, names were thrown around and the Directorate of Special Investigations (DSI) was suggested. This was later changed, but only after the official launch. A attended the meeting as a representative of IDOC and recalls

> That first night we threw around lots of names, DSI came up Directorate of Special Investigations...instead of the FBI we wanted to be just the DSI, that made perfect sense to us, the Directorate of Special Investigations...

The name was later changed to the DSO. "Investigations" does not do justice to the fact that the unit was intended to do more than merely investigate, but to also prosecute and therefore "operations" was more fitting. The constitutionality of having an investigative capacity outside of the South African Police Services (SAPS) was a further issue. B recalls the name change in the following detail:

> So, later on we reconsidered and said no it must rather be the Directorate of Special Operations to prevent any Constitutional challenges relating to [you know

to] the name and what its objectives are. Because they wanted it to be located in Justice obviously...

(Section 205 of The Constitution of South Africa [1996] makes provision for one national police force in South Africa with an investigative capacity. The DSO was intended to have investigative capacity and this could be interpreted as being in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. The placement of the DSO in the National Prosecuting Authority Act prevents this challenge).

One of the stumbling blocks in the establishment of the DSO was that after the election and the announcement of the DSO, there was a new President. The portfolios of many of the ministers changed. Other people now held the portfolios which were important to the establishment of the DSO, but they had not been part of the initial planning. The late Steve Tshwete replaced the Minister of Safety and Security Sydney Mfumadi. The name of the DSO best known to the public is the Scorpions. This name was selected by the then Minister of Safety and Security, the late Steve Tshwete as recalled by Bulelani Ncguka:

> We searched for a name that would be popular... and the one day we were sitting at the President's house discussing this issue because he kept on raising (the question) what is the name that is going to be given to this unit. And then the Minister of the Police Steve Thswete came up with the name Scorpions he gave it the name Scorpions and it stuck.

Staffing of the unit

The "newly" established unit required staff and the National Director headhunted his senior management. Pete Richer was chairman of the working committee and also worked closely with the IDOC Western Cape offices in the early days. Bulelani recalls:

> I had been working with Pete Richer since we started with IDOC whilst he was with NIA. ...Pete Richer was one of the people who were very close to me at the

time and I had been working with him. I came with the idea of the Scorpions and shared it with him and he became very excited about it.

Frank Dutton (see Appendix H) who was known to the then Minister of Safety and Security Sydney Mfumadi was suggested for the position of CEO. Percy Sonn was well known to Bulelani Ngcuka

> The idea to bring Dutton back, I didn't know Frank Dutton personally, it was Sydney Mfufumadi's idea he had previously worked with Frank Dutton. He even raised the matter with the President and myself and it was agreed that we must bring Frank back...Percy had been running IDOC in Cape Town and so it was easy for me and I had known Percy for many years. And so, I invited Percy to come and join.

The NDPP recruited Dr. Makhosazana Msimang (see Appendix I) and Dr. Ruben Richards (see Appendix J):

> Dr. Msimang was working for SASS (South African Secret Services) and when we put up a team to do the work on the Scorpions, we invited all the agencies to second people to our unit.... Ruben Richards I met Ruben in Durban, I was attending a conference in Durban, which was organised by the Technikon RSA. One of the guest speakers there at the conference was Sir John Stevens. Ruben Richards came and introduced him to me and I met Ruben and thereafter recruited him to come and join the organisation in charge of training.

Why did they join?

The values of the founder members shaped by their past, influenced their decisions to join the DSO. For most of them, the opportunity to join was seen as an opportunity to make a difference in the crime-ridden environment in which they found themselves. A states:

> But my expectations were that...I could establish something to suit me and something that I certainly could guarantee would be successful and subsequently make a difference I though that this is a chance to make a difference as far as crime ...were concerned, this is the opportunity to make a difference.

As a prosecutor in the Attorney General's offices D had been frustrated by the old working methodology. This was an opportunity to implement what he had been advocating for many years and which was "not accepted by the Attorney General and I now had the opportunity to prove him wrong. "

For B it was the challenge "I thought the IDOC thing was very challenging because there was a life threatening ...world threatening phenomena developing. Here was the opportunity to so something about it."

E indicated that it was the fulfillment of an ideal to be part of the creation of something new, something with integrity.

> It was it met all the principles and ideals that I ...wanted to achieve [you know] standing up being something special within the community. That was why we all joined the Scorpions in the first place; it was something that was going to be there for the first time, it was unique. There were very high expectations put to us because of what had been portrayed in the eye of the public and I say that because of the words that were thrown around-that of an elite group of crime fighters, highest integrity based on FBI sort of principles.

The senior management of the DSO who had been headhunted in fact may have paid a higher price to share in the vision of the government of "Batho Pelo" – people first. They were motivated by the same vision as the founder members of the IDOC. The mandate and strategic plan had not been developed for the organisation at the time, but the potential of the concept and the opportunity to share in it, excited them and filled them with passion.

They had occupied senior positions in mainly government departments and they were accustomed to certain privileges and staff. The DSO in the start up phase with no budget and no resources could not compare. But they persevered despite this because of the opportunity and the vision as F says:

> And I think ...that the DSO was an incredibly important initiative...which I think had to work, it, it was going to, be the kind of more focused force that would help to turn the crime situation around...Well I have always been I suppose ideologically motivated-in very simplistic terms was sort of doing what was right, [you know from], from student days. I had, [had] always been very political driven and [by], by that and I think the same sort of thing affected my decision [to], to go with the Scorpions job. But, I really believed that it could make a difference and [you know, ja,] I sort of finally decided that it was worth doing. I like setting up things as well, [you know] I always like building something new and this also perhaps this is part of my character, which also made the Scorpions very appealing. Here was something starting from, which wasn't building on any previous foundation, it was like starting from absolute scratch building up from absolute zero based.

But like many others, there was a price to pay and in fact, he "didn't get paid... When I did finally get paid it was at a level considerably lower to what I was previously at..." Frank Dutton and Ruben Richards also accepted the position with a considerable reduction in salary. The case studies that follow look at the early life influences on some of the founder members and the values that they brought to the organisation.

Vignettes

Frank Dutton had a reputation of being a man of integrity developed over many years in the police. He was known for the stand he took against perpetrators of crime even when they were members of the police. He was well respected by human rights lawyers and was the chief investigator in the Magnus Malan case.

The influences that formed his values were evident early in his life when he lost his father and as a result realised that he was out of control. He put himself on a train as a young 14-year-old boy and reported to Boys Town, requesting to be taken in. He later joined the police influenced by the fact that both his grandfather and great-grandfather had served in the Basotholand Mounted Police a decision that he acknowledges his father would not have appreciated (Raphaely 2000, pp. 46-50). He decided early on in his policing career not to follow the "dark side" and this decision defined his life earning him both respect and wrath. He recalls in the interview with Raphaely (Appendix K)

> There's a culture of silence in the police, he explains. You never turn a colleague in. Even though my fellow police officer Brain Mitchell was eventually found guilty of murdering 13 people in the Trust Feed case, I was the person they vilified.

The value that Frank Dutton brought to the organisation was that of breaking the silence. The DSO was created as a new entity that would address police corruption as well as national priority crimes. The reputation of Frank Dutton made him the obvious choice for the position.

Adv. Dawood Adam (see Appendix L) was recruited by the NDPP initially to join Percy Sonn in the Cape Town IDOC office. After the launch of the DSI and the transfer of Percy Sonn to Pretoria, he became the regional head of the province. The sacrifice that he made to join the organisation was huge. As a former human rights lawyer of eighteen years " prosecutors ...were seen as persecutors and not prosecutors" and police were the perpetrators of human rights violations. The calling to join was a patriotic one, to be part of the transformation of the Justice system, even though this meant now having to work very closely with former persecutors. He felt that his country needed him.

> My only decision was because it was a request from the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka who I had known because he was also in private practice about a kilometre away from where our practice was. ...He was to

> me a person of integrity as far as a lawyer is concerned. It was a conscious decision to be able to assist in my small way to transform a component of the prosecution services to bring diversity to it.

The value that Dawood Adam brought to the organisation was forgiveness and patriotism. The organisation was created post-apartheid and needed patriotic individuals who would appreciate the privilege of serving their country. His patriotism and commitment to making a difference started when he left school and had to decide on his future.

> When I matriculated my intention wasn't to become a lawyer, my intention in fact was to become an optician and leave the country.... I then did A & O levels part time... But whilst working and having some level of understanding of what was happening in South Africa from a political point of view, I said why do I want to become an optician... I said no I need to do something that is much more constructive and that will be very satisfactorily for me.

Adam then studied law and became a human rights lawyer where he had the opportunity to make a difference. These same values contributed to his decision to join the organisation.

Clifford Marion was a senior superintendent in the police when "on the 24th of January 1999 ... I got a call from Sydney Mfumade the Minister of Safety and Security who said that Bulelani Ngcuka and himself wanted to see me. And I was informed that Sifusiso Nkabinde had been killed. The UDF, UDM leader of Kwa Zulu Natal was killed in Richmond and [that the] that Kwa Zulu Natal didn't have a suitably qualified investigator to investigate that type of case."

Clifford Marion was a seasoned investigator who had worked with Frank Dutton and in a similar fashion gained a reputation for speaking out and acting effectively against crime. He indicated that the turning point in his life was when the security police became involved in one of the murder cases that he was investigating. After the successful

prosecution, he was called in by the provincial head of the security branch in Durban and told

> If I do not stop or desist from investigating and arresting Inkatha people that I would kill myself. By that, I understood him to mean that normally the security branch kills you and makes it look as though you had killed yourself. I informed him that I didn't care about that and that I was going to go back and do my work. A week after this incident my home was petrol bombed

He reported the matter but the case was never solved. The incident strengthened his resolve and he continued to take a stand against crime. This could be the reason why he was asked to investigate the death of Sufisiso Nkabinde. As Bulelani Ngcuka recalls, "the UDM didn't want us to investigate the case they didn't trust us. They wanted an international investigator to be appointed." The IDOC office successfully solved the case within two months of taking over. The values that Marion brought with him were determination in the face of a death threat, to courageously and fearlessly fight crime.

Ruben Richards was newly appointed to the position of Executive Director at the Technikon South Africa as head of the police practice programme. He had previously worked with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as the executive secretary for the Human Rights Violation Committee and the Amnesty Committee. He came from an established environment with various support staff. He was earning a considerable salary being in fact third in line in a tertiary education institution of a hundred thousand students. The offer to join the DSO was unsolicited and came as a total surprise, more surprising was the salary offer and his response: "and then they said okay and they offer me R100 000-00 less than what I was earning. And of course what does Ruben say? No sure." He felt that the vision was "something that I (can) give my life to. If they offered me the money, the money wasn't the issue. I thought this is it! This is it!"

It was not the first time that Ruben Richards had made a decision like this. As a young tradesman in the fitting and turning industry earning a good salary, he received what he

calls an "evangelical call on my life". At that stage, he was supporting his mother and sister after the untimely death of his father and was also recently wed. The calling meant to him "giving up everything that I had, going to study the Word of God and becoming a missionary." He left this lucrative position, entered the ministry, and reflects on this decision as follows:

> There was a whole range of issues linked to what I would call my commitment, the vision part of my father and then the commitment part. So, when I commit myself to something it comes at a price even to myself. So, the passion with which I do my work, the quest to be perfect in what I do, the uncompromising nature with regard to professionalism, the job it all culminated for me in my current portfolio, or job in the DSO.

For Ruben Richards this passion and vision had been handed down from his father who was a visionary by all accounts, and influenced young Ruben to a great extent, an influence that would later come full circle in a prophetic way when he followed in his father's footsteps and became an ordained minister. Being the only son in the family of four children, he enjoyed privileged access to his father. His father wanted to attend a missionary school in America and saved up for 20 years on a postman's salary for the air ticket of four hundred rand.

> I came to appreciate much later in life, the kind of vision that my dad had. So let us say this was the 70's. So, in the 50's, the 40's probably my father must have had this vision and in the 50's, he started saving money...Now in that, in that context of having a vision, saving up money for it basically dreaming up the impossible, being the only son. I want to believe that those kinds of experiences rub off onto you, probably subconscious probably.

The vision was never fully realised. His father had not done his research. With only standard 5, he did not qualify to register for the training at the Friendship Missionary Society. However, this did not deter him and he decided to go and visit at least. The

determination must have rubbed off on the young Ruben as he demonstrated these same characteristics in his approach to his work in overcoming the obstacles he encountered. "For example, when we had the first boot camp, I couldn't get petty cash from what we now know as corporate services. And I used my credit card quite extensively to buy supplies." Therefore, the values that he brought with him were his evangelical commitment and relentless pursuit of a vision at great personal sacrifice.

The launch

The DSI was launched on 1 September 1999 in Gugulethu, Cape Town. The choice of the venue was made after an extensive debate and consideration of the impact that it would have. B recalls that they wanted it in Cape Town "to show ...what is going to happen to criminals I think there was some kind of criminality that they wanted to deal with in Cape Town at the time and so is was supposed to have played that role as well."

The decision met with the approval of A who saw it an excellent opportunity to launch the DSI among the people it was intended to serve, but was hurt by the fact that they and the other regional offices were not invited to attend the launch:

> Then Percy and Bulelani decided no we had to go to the Cape Flats, this needs to be launched among the people which I thought was a brilliant thought. We were very hurt at the time that IDOC was not invited ...we were not invited to the launch that we thought was us (IDOC).

The apparent "oversight" can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that it was just that, an oversight. The other is that senior management did not intend to include IDOC in the DSO. The problem was that this is not what was communicated to the regions. B indicated that it was always intended that the SAPS members "were going to become a part of this thing as soon as the legislation gets in place and, we can get the budget. They were supposed to become full members." A recalls that Percy Sonn "spoke to the people and he assured us that this is it. This is where IDOC were going, this is what we are becoming."

The view of the DSO senior management Frank Dutton and his three deputies, was that they were starting from scratch with the opportunity to build something with real integrity. As F recalls "because of, [you know] because we were starting from scratch there were no sort of, residual issues of, corruption and things like that, one could actually start really from a clean slate and I guess that sort of values of cleanliness and renewal, was what really attracted me."

This was also the perception of G "... it was not very clear, what the future of IDOC was going to be. It never really affected me to get planning discussions because it was assumed and believed that the DSO would have its own act. ...The DSO would be a separate entity."

There appears to have been a misunderstanding between the IDOC and the DSO and even between the top management itself, if you include Percy Sonn. The future of the IDOC and the DSO had not been settled. Perhaps it was the first sign of future developments.

The pressure

The President indicated during the launch that the government would be watching for results. This pressure to deliver coupled with the expectations of the community that were created by the announcement and launch of the DSO, played a big role in the hastiness apparent from the data. This resulted in the DSO claiming credit for arrests two weeks after the official launch of the DSO while the DSO had no investigative staff other than seconded members of SAPS who received no credit. F recalls

> There were no Scorpions, there was nothing. And it was using Police personnel, NIA personnel, [you know,] and of course, none of that credit was given back to the Police, to NIA and so on. So, it created a lot of resentment. And I think that, quite reasonably.

The establishment of the DSO was approached in a very hasty manner and promises were made that were simply not possible to keep in a realistic environment. F sums it up quite frankly and perhaps a bit harshly

> If you look at this from an NT, PFMA, from a governance perspective and so on it was a disaster...it was set up like a corner café. Sort of big fat Greek businessman sets up corner café, great idea find a place, buy some goods, throw them all together, hope that it works. That's very much it, you know.

But it is also the opinion of G that the haste of the DSO to produce results was unrealistic. "In South Africa you cannot plan and grow and develop an organisation on the assumption that you have ready made products, because they simply don't exist. You've got to develop and grow with the process."

4.3 PART II THE FOUNDER GROUP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

The DSO was launched and the founder members were entrusted to establish and develop the organisation. In this part of the chapter, the creation of the organisational culture is looked at and the role that the values of the founder group played in the process. Firstly, the influences on the way the DSO was managed will be examined. Then the effect of these values on processes: first trust, then the management style, the culture of appreciation, personnel management, training, and resources. The awareness of the founders of their role in the creation of the culture will be considered and the effect of leadership on the organisation.

Influences on the way the DSO was managed

The values of the founder group influenced them to join as has been seen in Part 1. It also influenced their management style. Their values stemmed in most cases from their childhood experiences. As E recalls "I have always followed principle based on my upbringing, what my dad had told me what I had learnt from other people..."

All the participants indicated that they had consciously thought about the principles and values that they wanted to apply in their office or the DSO as a whole. They made every effort to instil that, and were in fact very successful. As E puts it "if principles are good principles then people should never have a problem buying into it....Values are values, everybody knows the difference between good and bad, everybody knows what is right and wrong, everybody knows the consequences."

In answering a question in respect of the values that applied in his office A replied as follows:

> The fact that if one worked everyone worked, small things like nobody leaves work until their work is done. When we did investigations everybody would remain until the last person had taken the warning statement then we would get together and then we would decide to leave.

These principles are confirmed by D who indicated that the concept applied of "prosecution driven investigations and putting all facets of the investigation under one umbrella, your intelligence, your operational support all being coordinated from a central point."

The values for C were to create high levels of integrity and then the " barriers are broken down the issues pertaining to skills transfer and empowerment is a much easier process. It allows for easier change management within an organisation and also what it allows for, it allows for the situation where you give each and every person the opportunity in the unit to express themselves in any forum..."

Gerhard Nel was a highly successful advocate in the High Court and well respected. He brought with him passion, commitment and the value of justice:

> I was always passionate about the law, passionate about helping people, not really helping people, putting things right, making a difference, that is why I prosecuted,

> I just prosecuted to make a difference to get somebody convicted for something that he did wrong.

This value is also encapsulated in the vision of the organisation: "Justice in our society so that people can live in freedom and security

- Loved by the people
- Feared by criminals
- Respected by peers" (South Africa 2001, p. 50).

Many of the founder members only realised the role that their values played in creating the organisational culture upon reflection. G reflects that "I think there was a coincidence of meeting of values, I could see myself in this role without having any conflict of interest, or conflict of a conscience."

C realised the impact on reflection more so when he met a former member of his office and said "in hindsight I believe it (my values) played an enormous role in trying to create an organization culture of partnership, respect, dignity and sensitivity."

The values of the leaders also impacted on the principles that they applied in the organisation. The principles applied to the decision-making process and the way in which they managed. E recalls

> And I think the important thing is we stuck to principles where, irrespective of what cases we got, irrespective of what kind of people we got there irrespective of people's political or other views...well I think it is the cornerstones of the integrity we were trying to establish...The principle in the office was we would never allow drugs to go onto the street. When you say that the principle is that we will not allow for instance a firearm to go onto the street, you see academically that was terrible, why not. If we could sell one and then another one we then go in. We identified the people behind this and also it is then important that we then find out who all the gun leaders are.... And you come along and say no-no-no. I would

> not at any stage want somebody to phone me and say that my wife, or my sister or my friend had been shot in the back or whatever and because somebody had allowed weapon to go in.

The examples illustrate that amongst the regional members of the founder group there were common values and principles that impacted on the manner in which the organisation was managed and the way in which culture was created.

The impact of the founder group on the formation of the culture received a severe blow with the untimely loss of most of the top management. The DSO was unfortunate to lose Frank Dutton. He left in 2000 and then Pete Richer left in November 2000 and in 2001 Dr Msimang died and in 2002 Percy Sonn also resigned. Frank left because he developed an ear problem which caused him to become medically unfit. Pete Richer left in frustration because the organisation was departing from the original vision. The unfortunate result is the impression created when the top management leaves one after the other. D says

> It sends out a message, you know any organisation that has solid you know top management and the minute you see your top people all bailing out one after the other it makes you think whether you on the Titanic or so.

The interpretation thereof can certainly be that the organisation was sorting itself out and those who did not have the same values, assumptions would be forced out, or they would leave in frustration and this is what happened. There appears to have been conflict within the ranks of top management that corroborates this interpretation. F sums it when he says that the conflict "was the result of people having such diametrically opposing views of where that organization was supposed to be going that they couldn't reconcile."

Trust

There was another important theme in the culture within the regions and that was that there was a high level of trust. This trust started with Percy Sonn trusting his regional management. According to him "I, to a large extent, attempted to give them full authority

to run their offices to use their own discretion because I trusted them. And I attempted never to intervene." This trust needs to be seen in the context that prior to his appointment he did not know any of the regional heads, with the exception of Dawood Adam. This trust was based on his assumptions of humankind according to the data.

It appears that the regional heads were empowered to make decisions. A describes the trust he experienced: "Never once did either Ngcuka or Sonn question our judgment in any case...We were trusted to do what we needed to do, given a mandate, ...and we were trusted to do that. There was no need to ask to permission to get involved, it was required of you to get involved and make a difference."

This trust made people feel empowered and they were not afraid to make decisions. More importantly this trust could be cascaded down the ranks. Mutual trust developed in the organisation. In the words of A

> Internally we had very few documents, we developed policies that we wrote down. But there was no written document about discipline, there was no written document about office hours there was no written documents about the fact that you should not abuse of cars. There was no written document that everybody worked and that we were always on standby, there was no written document.

The development of a "high trust culture" is evident within the DSO during that period (Covey 1999, p. 35). When asking A how cases were managed he replied:

> It was on trust it was an unbelievable system. From the start, I introduced a system where everybody knew what everybody else was doing, to me that was of paramount importance. I knew that I could not afford any kind of corruption; I knew that that unit was based on trust.

The sharing of information with all the members of the regional office as described by A occurred in the other regions as well. This is confirmed by the data. The time that this

relates to is in the beginning of the IDOC period. The regional offices had just been established. The members were seconded from different entities and had not worked closely together before. There was an immediate trust by the regional heads in their staff. This appears to have been based on the assumption of the leader that the members were trustworthy. We clearly see the "principle centered" style of leadership of Covey (1999, p. 35). E puts this blind trust into words. The trust was based on "basically just plain instinct, that would be the first concept just this: "Who can we trust? We are on a wave length here I am telling this person things that I trust and believe that he will believe me and he is telling me things which I trust is correct."

Leading by example

The investigators and prosecutors who joined and specifically those who made up the founder group were highly committed and dedicated to the cause, the cause of making a difference, of building a new South Africa, contributing to the democracy and of being part of something that was greater than the individual. They were strong in their opinions and convinced that they had the answers to the problems. They were not daunted by the obvious lack of resources and other amenities as will be discussed later. The leadership provided is demonstrated in the examples below and it appears that there was a belief that one should lead by example.

The regional management would be there when the members met in the early hours of the morning to plan an operation. C would be there when the team met

> They saw the need to come in the office at 10 o'clock in the evening to come and plan an operation and do the operation at four in the morning. And the support that they receive because when they used to do that type of planning the leader and also the project leader would be there to ensure that everything is planned is done in terms of a plan, an operational plan.

Most of the regional heads took matters to court personally. They did this to benchmark the standard of work required and to also show that although these were dangerous

criminals, one should not be afraid to do what is right. The environment in which the members were operating was dangerous and threats to the lives of the prosecutors and investigators were not an unusual occurrence. This did not appear to affect the determination of the regional leadership. D recalls

> I even entered the dangerous areas and got shot at indicating that we should not be afraid of these criminals and I myself prosecuted cases that members felt were too difficult and may not achieve results.

A introduced a system of a moot court before taking matters to court. " The prosecutor and his investigators would present their case to the office and we would then act as [defense,] defense advocates and ask lots and lots of questions and identify problems in the case." He did not exclude himself from the process: "Even when I went to court with the (X) matter I called to moot court. When (X) wanted to plead guilty and I thought that it was very difficult to accept so there was a big moot court on the guilty plea of the (X) case."

D describes his management style as leading by example:

> I used to as I said...if a case was going to court I would actually show my face at court to see what is going on and so that the prosecutor if the defense is making some or other objection I would be able to give guidance. The same way I would pop in at offices of investigators and if they were having problems I would give them advice and assistance.

The same passion and dedication that was apparent in the regional management also appears from the data in the top management of the DSO. G reflects " the entire group, leadership team at the time were infused, infused with passion and vision...Not any of us had an ounce of negativity and also none of us thought that what we wanting to do was impossible." The fact that there were no resources and staff at the time serves to confirm the commitment and lack of negativity that he speaks about. And G confirms this "the fact

that the DSO managed to [call it,] create itself within a relatively short space of time given the stymied atmosphere of bureaucracy is a miracle in itself."

The bureaucracy referred to relates to the fact that the DSO is part of the NPA and needs to follow government regulations in respect of procurement, recruitment etc. The original vision was that the DSO would be created as an entity that would not be bound by normal government policies and procedures which tend to inhibit expediency and effectiveness. This did not happen. The DSO is a unit within the NPA and is bound by government regulations and prescripts that make it a bureaucratic entity.

Appreciation

There was a strong commitment to building a culture of appreciation. The leaders rewarded commitment in different ways embedding the culture they wanted to create. They also entrenched a culture of appreciation. The contribution of each person was acknowledged. Appreciation was displayed in various ways. C displayed his gratitude

> I mean many times they would be working at 11, 12 o'clock in the evening. How do you repay an individual who works for you, a person who works for you? I mean you are not in a corporate environment where you can write out a cheque at the end of the month and say here is an extra R500 for you or here is a gift for you or whatever. ...What you can basically, simply say is thank you.

Other leaders would invite the top management to congratulate the members on a job well done. A was one of them:

> Ngcuka and Sonn would congratulate people on all the work that had been done, ...there was never anything negativity. There was just a positive snowball that took everyone along and got bigger and bigger and created more successes as it went along.

Appreciation was also shown by reminding members of the importance of their role and how this contributed to the achievement of the goals of the unit. This contributed to developing loyalty and motivation according to C

> And I think the other component as far as loyalty is concerned is [that] a continuous reminding to all the persons in the office. To say to them: what is the value of the work that they are doing and how does it impact on their lives firstly, and then on their neighbour's life and then in the community and then in South African context.

These examples illustrate an understanding of the Learned Needs Theory (McClelland as cited by Hellriegel et al. 2001, p. 268) and the three key motives of individuals, achievement, affiliation and power.

Teamwork

The regional management handpicked the investigators who were assigned to the IDOC. The selection was based on the specific needs of each office at the time. There was no thought that the IDOC would outgrow its original mandates of hi-jacking in Gauteng, political violence in Kwa Zulu Natal and urban terror in the Western Cape. The regional requirements for recruitment were not a formal education, but rather practical experience in the field. As E puts it

> Most of them; I would say more than 80% of the people were people who had, irrespective of their fields of investigation, [had] years of experience. In other words, they had all been to court they all known what goes into an investigation they had all been involved in high court prosecutions. And they could easily grasp the aspect of teamwork.

The success of the IDOC can be ascribed to the fact that the members had the core competencies required to achieve its objectives. D sums it up with reference to his unit although this certainly applied to the others as well:

> The unit was successful because people were handpicked for their dedication, loyalty, and willingness to work closely to achieve all the objectives. The investigators also had extensive experience in the areas in which we wished them to investigate and the unit was very focused and goal directed.

Prosecutors and investigators working closely together on a crime phenomenon was not new. The DPPs had used it in the past. E had "basically been working on (the concept) for years and [you know] I just thought it was a recipe for success." This may have been so for E but for the majority of the other participants it was something new. Prosecutors and investigators had not been housed in one unit before and there were teething problems. As C recalls: "Initially despite the fact that, that type of investigative methodology adopted the name of the Troika principle it wasn't easily acceptable by prosecutors."

The lack of acceptance was not one sided. There was a general lack of understanding of the role of the different professions within the troika methodology and their contribution to the successful conclusion of a case. There were also cultural differences between the prosecutors and the investigators. E is of the opinion that the cultures of prosecutors are the same all over the world as is the culture of investigators:

> (It) will never disappear and it is that police culture which prevails not only in South African police but in international police law enforcement and our international training has only now brought to the fore that prosecutors and investigators all over the world are the same.... We can go now to America, now to England, now to Denmark and you find that a prosecutor can talk to a prosecutor and a policeman can talk to a policeman. Fundamentally, our fundamental cultures are the same.

The difference in the culture and the implications thereof needed to be understood by the leaders. They sought to overcome the divide by embedding an appreciation of the

contribution of each member. This appreciation was also the cornerstone for the success of the troika principle that the DSO was implementing. A gives an example

> The first thing we had to do was to let prosecutors realise that investigation was a profession and that SAPS members knew more than they did...and we also had to show prosecutors how difficult it was to investigate and how much work had to go into investigations.

A pointed out that the opposite was also true that the investigators needed to not only develop respect for the prosecutors "but a realisation of [the part of] what the others were doing. The IDOC investigators, when they realised what it took to draft a fraud charge sheet, they had a whole different view on charge sheets."

The IDOC methodology, the troika principle, also required an appreciation of each role player to be successful. C sets out this methodology: "A project within the IDOC scenario and which transported itself into the DSO that when dealing in a project one would basically need an intelligence capacity, an investigative capacity and prosecutor driven investigation."

Training

The DSO advertised positions for fifty investigators and the management reviewed the culture that they wanted to create within this organisation. The culture that they had in mind according to F was

> I think from a management point of view there was an attempt to create a relatively flat structure and to develop a fairly creative culture, culture in which people, members of the organization would show initiative, would be self motivated, would not require a great deal of supervision, and therefore a fairly flat structure.

They discussed the method of instilling this culture. G recalls: "The environment, it was decided, there's documents to that fact, it was decided, recommended and decided that the

best place to engender and to imbue your workforce with organisational culture is with training environment."

The training environment would be the entry point to the organisation. Therefore, the training itself was a very important decision. The values of integrity and trust played a role in the decision to train the investigators outside the country. There was a clear distrust in the police by the community. This distrust emanated from the role that certain elements within the police played in facilitating the political violence in KZN, promoting Apartheid and perpetrating human rights violations in the period before the first democratic election in 1994 (see Trust Feed case, the Magnus Malan trial and the TRC in the glossary and the vignette of Clifford Mation). One needs to also remember that most of the top management of the DSO had been ANC activists' prior to 1994. This did not engender a great deal of trust in the police. Bulelani Ngcuka at the time had a special advisor from America, an ex-FBI agent, who was keen on him visiting Quantico, the FBI training academy. While being shown around the premises, Bulelani Ngcuka recalls, "it occurred to me to ask them to train our members. It looked like a very good facility and I wanted our people to get the best. So I approached them, they were very, very reluctant. I went to see the Attorney General Janet Reno I raised it with her she was supportive, she thought it was a brilliant idea."

Ngcuka came back and sold the idea locally, "it's the only time the FBI has ever given training to another country" according to F and "it was quite an achievement". Scotland Yard also wanted to be part of this initiative and it was decided to train half the recruits at the FBI academy and the other half at Scotland Yard.

Many have criticized the decision. The main criticism from A was that the training would be "outside the borders of the country in a legal system that was totally different and foreign with a culture that is totally different and foreign. " But the decision was based on the question of the integrity of the investigators and of having witnessed and experienced the apartheid abuses of power. Bulelani Ngcuka comments

> We wanted to set them apart and we wanted the best training that was available in the world ...I think it is a fact that the police have a bad image, it is a historical, [it is something that we didn't want to,] we didn't want to be branded with that. Image is very important you won't be effective; you'll never get people to trust you. You can only do that if people have a certain level of confidence in your organisation.

The only other entity that could have assisted in the training within South Africa was the SAPS. The unsuitability of that possibility is apparent from the quotation of Bulelani Ngcuka. Scotland Yard offered to train some recruits and this was agreed to. There is a definite conflict in this decision to train at both the institutions as their approach to investigation differs vastly. There is also a marked difference in the cultures of the two institutes. G sets out the differences

> The FBI gave us a view of training which was very "Ramboish", in your face. Arrogant, proud, all of those kinds of things the Americans seem to be known for. The Scotland Yard training, completely different, it was sedate, it was not militaristic, it was very sophisticated at the level of interpersonal skills.

F felt that there were "disparities between the two trainings there were a lot of inconsistencies. There was no training plan that would look at how these would be integrated. And it created a problem because you didn't create a standard of what the young Scorpion would actually know and build on it from there."

The FBI training appeared to be more appropriate for the mandate of the DSO from the data obtained. G justified the FBI training: "I think it has to do with the very, if you will, perceived violent nature of our society. Where life is cheap and also in the context of an environment where the law enforcement, the life of a law enforcement official is cheap." There is value in the training provided by both agencies, but there should have been a plan on the table on how the two approaches were going to be integrated and this was lacking.

However, the conflicting values that each training facility represented did not embed a single culture within the organisation.

The need for integrity similarly influenced the decision not to populate the DSO with too many SAPS members. This was according to G, based on the findings of the TRC that "the South African Police service is guilty of committing gross human rights violations, against the people of this country and so we needed something outside of and not to be tainted by the South African Police Service"

A also acknowledged the lack of trust by the community in the SAPS structure. The credibility of the IDOC was in fact compromised to a degree by the high occupancy of SAPS members.

> The one big problem with IDOC was that society lost trust in the South African Police Service and that affected the credibility of the police investigators that formed a part IDOC and that link that we still had with SAPS was a big problem.

"We had nothing, but it was brilliant time."

The period from the inception of the IDOC in 1998 to the date of the enactment of the DSO on 12 January 2001 was a time in the history of the NPA when there were scarce resources. Prior to the recruitment of investigators to the DSO the IDOC, investigators were seconded from the other law enforcement agencies. The research clearly indicates that there was little or no operational equipment. C recalls: "I mean we didn't even have bulletproof vests..." But the relationship with SAPS was such that all it took; according to C was "you pick up the phone and say please [man] I need ten bullet-proof vests I need ten torches for example to you go out on an arrest and search in the early hours of the morning or I need backup or I need the intelligence agencies...."

But this did not deter the leaders. Their motivation and dedication enabled them to overcome these obstacles. They even enjoyed the challenge and A describes the period

> We had nothing, but it was brilliant time. ... I approached the police and said we needed vehicles... And it was a brilliant time, we had all these vehicles that were seized and declared forfeited. ...They were dirty, there were bad, some of them crashed, people would jump in and fix the vehicles, use contacts in the police and fix the vehicles, use their own money to fix vehicles and the pride at the office at the time was the vehicles we had.

There were no new, sophisticated vehicles, paid for by the state. But there was pride and a willingness to do the job, to make a difference and to serve the community. The DSO did later acquire its own resources. One of the decisions that needed to be made was the choice of a firearm. Here the values of patriotism and integrity were displayed again. The history of the country affected the decision. As F recalls:

> If you again go back to the issues in KZN where [the] people have been shot with police firearms and other firearms and even despite ballistic tests it was not always clear. The value of having a weapon, 10mm, is that it would be absolutely distinct...There were issues around, again trying to make this a very distinct force, very recognizable, different...Rather have a well-made South African weapon, rather than imported.

The effect of the leadership on regional members

The results of the commitment exhibited by the leaders as seen from the research was that the regional members became infused with passion. They would work long hours without any complaint or regard for themselves. They were totally committed to the cause. D recalls the dedication: "Nobody took leave and if members were not on stand-by and therefore could be at home over the weekends if anything significant happened the members would of their own accord insist in coming and helping the teams that were working on the case."

SAPS members with 10-15 years of experience were earning less than the new recruits who had no experience. The SAPS members had also not been appointed at the time.

They were dedicated to the vision of a DSO regardless. D ascribes their commitment and dedication "to their own characters the fact that they were doing the job for the love of the job and not for the money." His motivation was no different it was "also the love of the job itself".

The SAPS members saw the opportunity of becoming part of a permanent structure that had been likened to the FBI. This was more apparent after the launch of the DSO. A states that they

> Saw for themselves that they became part of something unbelievable big and there was always that commitment to do whatever it takes to make it big. People would give their hearts and soul to be a part of this. That came out in the way we worked. There was unbelievable discipline at the time although no code of conduct. There were rules and regulations that everybody followed, although it was not written down, people just knew it, it was part of the culture.

The motivation and commitment that was exhibited is powerfully summarised by B: "The enthusiasm that was generated by people, the discretion that people applied when there were nothing else to use to address the problem, you know the fact that people sometimes selflessly and against their own self-interest did things was brilliant."

Reflection on cultural development process

The manner in which the culture was created has been discussed. The interesting question is whether the founder group was aware of the role that they played in the creation of the culture. The data reveals that senior management were consciously aware that as the leadership, they influenced the development of the culture. This is deduced from the data. In the words of G the formal criteria for the DSO had been "inherited from the cabinet but we gave it some flesh. So, we said: how do, how do we ensure that the organisation that we're about to give birth to is characterised by a these kind of values hopefully with the kind of ethos that we were looking for."

The Cabinet's criteria were that members be "vetted to ensure that they performed their duties competently, free of corruption and without fear or favour. It will also monitor the activities of the Scorpions to ensure that they are conducted ethically and in compliance with the Constitution and other legislation pertaining to their activities" (Maduna, 1999). The values were a loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law. The ethos was that the DSO would be identified by a professional dress code of the members (suits) and the ability to think independently. G states: "You know they say the devil is in the detail. When you're creating a culture you've got to be very clear. I call myself a social engineer. That's what this job required. You needed to engineer and create a culture out of nothing."

This illustrates the appreciation that you need to be consistent in what you do. You need to send out the same message on a conscious and subconscious level to members in order to be successful in creating the desired culture. This supports the interpretation that senior management were aware of the impact they had on the creation of the organisational culture. But there is no indication that they were aware of the impact of their values on culture.

From a regional perspective, the realisation of their role as leaders was more *ex post facto* as seen from the data. The realisation appears in reflection and there does not appear to have been a planned effort. It was something that developed naturally and evolved. But looking back, they realised how skilful they had been in establishing the organisation. This includes the culture although they were not aware of this. The reflection of A illustrates the awareness of the role he played in establishing his office: "I was a centre. I played an unbelievable role. I drove this I made it happen, the things that I wanted to happen happened. I would like to think that I was skilful in, in, in allowing people to think that they created it or that I just followed."

The regional managers were aware that they needed to lead and set the example, but they were not consciously aware of their influence on the creation of a culture. More particularly, they were unaware of how their values would influence that culture. At a

regional level, the method employed by management to enforce desired behaviour was by positive reinforcement. Principles developed from the establishment of best practices. These were identified during a routine evaluation of the last operation. The events would be relived and critical issues distilled. This routine was a common factor in the regions although the detail of the process may have differed.

The culture was not deliberately created. The envisaged culture of senior management was not realised. Instead, a culture evolved which was the natural outcome of the values of the founders.

Reflection on the chapter

This chapter clearly illustrates the results of effective teams in the workplace. Effective teams require complementary skills which result from the combination of investigators, prosecutors and intelligence agents (Katzenbach and Smith 1993, p. 114). Team accountability is the core of the team and is about the promises that "we make (to) ourselves and (to) others, promises that underpin two critical aspects of effective teams: commitment and trust" (Katzenberg and Smith 1993, p. 116). Both commitment and trust are clearly illustrated and contributed to the success of the DSO at this time. Teamwork is also one of the most important characteristics of a learning organisation (Meyer and Botha 2000, pp. 260-261).

The reactions of the members in the regions to the way in which they were managed can be ascribed to the fact that "people generally respond in the manner to which they are treated" (Mullins 2002, p. 29). The assumptions of the leader about humankind will determine the manner in which they treat their employees. The leaders in the DSO trusted the employees both with sensitive information as well as to do the job. They also appreciated their contributions. This was rewarded with dedicated and committed individuals. Porter et al. also supports this: " that the degree to which the organizations value and seek to perpetuate the contributions of their members varies directly with the extent to which these contributions fulfill the expectations that the organization has of the individual" (1987, p. 109). Leadership that empowers others and that is prepared to invest

in developing individuals is characteristic of the transformational leader (Charlton 1993, p. 21). Transformational leadership was evident from the data as set out in this chapter. The success of the organisation can largely be ascribed to this.

4.4 CONCLUSION

The passion and dedication which is a common thread throughout all the interviews, has a very emotive effect. It is almost as though it is a movie and you cannot help but feel the excitement and pride in what the DSO has become to many South Africans. The endurance and perseverance of the participants was tangible, despite the fact that there were no resources, no staff, no legislation, a bureaucracy and internal jealousy. These factors did not dampen their spirits, but were rather seen as obstacles to be overcome, as opportunities hidden in the challenges.

The public sector environment seldom offers opportunities to create something new. This opportunity was rare in many ways, and the leaders who participated received no personal gain from the organisation, other than the satisfaction of creating something that would be there for their descendants, something that would change the face of law enforcement forever. There was also the challenge of pioneering the troika methodology for the first time in the world in a permanent structure. The leaders who came were from the public and the private sector and the nectar that drew them was the opportunity to participate in the making of history. Their values and assumptions as well as their early experiences and influences, played a key role in forming the organisation. Their values impacted on their assumptions.

CHAPTER FIVE

REFLECTIONS ON THE EXPERIENCE

The important thing to recognize is that it takes a team, and the team ought to get credit for the wins and the losses.
Successes have many fathers, failures have none.
(Caldwell 2004)

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the meaning to the founder group of the experience of establishing the DSO. The participants were open about the shortcomings of the DSO and the things that went wrong, but in the end the interviews clearly indicated that for each person this had been an unforgettable experience, something that touched their lives, turned it upside down and left it changed. Words that recurred in the discussions on the experience were pride and privilege. But there were also many regrets of things that should or could have been done differently which might have changed history. It is difficult to conclude whether any other effective changes could have been made. This was a time of great innovation in which events moved at there own speed discarding those who could not keep up.

Achievements

The founder group remains proud of the Scorpions and what they achieved. B did a comparison of the progress of the organisation with other international initiatives and is of the opinion that "even in a great democracy or perceived democracy, like Australia you have the same kind of problems which we have faced, you know with people, and with institutions and with politicians...they are less successful than we are".

My impression gleaned from the interviews with the founder group is that they are highly demanding, setting perhaps unreasonable targets for themselves. Perhaps this accounts for

their disappointment in where the organisation is now. The words of F express their general feeling:

> But I think it would have been unfair to say that there hadn't been incredible results. (The results were incredible) There have been some very good outcomes, and I think again, the concept is a right one. I think having that interface in which prosecutors and investigators work together in that way, I think is a winning formula. But that winning formula could have won considerably more.

The organisation was set up in haste and what is happening now appears to be as F says a " slowing down (of) the true development of the organization, [later on]. And I think that is what happened, to a large extent that you ended up with a façade you ended up with form and not content." Some might feel that he is a bitter man, but there is a lot of wisdom in his words. This also offers an explanation for the current frustration of the founder group with the progress of the Scorpions.

The achievements of the DSO and IDOC were remarkable by all accounts, in all the regions and Chris Macadam recalls the success they had in the Richmond area in KwaZulu-Natal.

> IDOC was successful because immediately we stopped the violence. When we were set up, there were a thousand soldiers on duty 24 hours a day in Richmond nevertheless anything up to 13 people were being murdered every night. Now I mean it was the people that were killed the people had to flee their homes and sleep in the bushes because they were too scared that their house would be attacked and they would be killed. It was all the businesses had closed because the communities could not support them...everything failed and violence increased. So, we came and immediately stopped the violence and the perpetrators were brought to book and the whole of society normalized.

The success left the participants with a sense of achievement. It is something that no matter what happens as G puts it, "no-one can take (it) away from me, that experience and that privilege that I've had." A expresses it in the following manner: "Well I said the words proud and grateful well I am glad I was a part of it, it changed me, it changed me tremendously I am just glad that I was a part of it, it is something that nobody can ever take away from me. It is something that is still visible."

The experience

But the experience itself has been unforgettable, regrets included; there are a number of regrets of lost opportunities to do things differently, to influence critical decisions or to have had more time to finish what was started. As A reflects: "And if I think back further and I'm sitting her in 2003 and I am thinking back I feel sad, because I think what I created I couldn't really pull through. I think everybody would tell you if I only had five more years in that culture."

The overwhelming feeling or emotion that was expressed by the participants was of feeling privileged and proud. For G

> I feel enormously blessed, and I mean that sincerely, enormously blessed to have been part of the group to create for our country its elite crime busting squad. Blessed and privileged. And the flipside of feeling blessed and privileged, when things don't go right you feel sad, sad and betrayed.

For C the experience "means a lot. It is not just as a page or paragraph in one's CV to boost ones ego, because it was a national government initiative."

B had similar sentiments about the experience, it was: "Very important. It did my ego wonders...It made me feel that I was contributing to the construction of a very new and lovely society of which I wanted to be part of...So I, I felt very good to be associated with the thing."

The data revealed that the participants felt very proud to have been a part of the setting up this organisation. G states: "And the popular mystique is: hey, if the Scorpions are investigating this thing, then one: it is a serious matter. And two: they've probably got all the evidence already. There's that, that notion, the mystique."

Others made it very clear how they felt. As A states

> We would look out at what we have here and what we have done and feel unbelievably proud. I felt so grateful for having had the opportunity to create something like IDOC that was working, a diverse people brought together with one vision and everybody just working themselves really, really hard to reach that vision. It wasn't written down, it was just there everyone accepted it.

The experience was for E something he feels proud to have been a part of:

> No law enforcement agency just bubbles up on the street corner. It first of all is the greatest to know you were there at right time in the development of a country and I think if I look back and look at the success that we had and the successes I was involved in with the team I worked with it has been great...I am personally very proud of everything that has taken place I am proud of the organisation where it started off and, and where we are now.

Some of the participants described it as a life changing experience. In the words of A

> Well, it changed my whole life, the A before 2000 and the one sitting here are two different people... I don't even think you can compare the two. I think I matured. The major change (is) I became a manager... The DSO however, took over my life; I lived the DSO. For months that was everything I thought about. I would sleep and every waking moment I would think and strategize about investigations, about the unit and how to fix things that were wrong, what I could do better. I started reading management books, and thinking back about managers that I had

had in my life and what was good about them. So, it changed me completely. And [it was] for me it was like a case that took over my life because I felt that what I was doing was good.

One of the participants was particularly negative about his experience and the impact that it had on his personal life but it was interesting to note during the last interview, as we were finishing off, I looked up and noticed that he was wearing the Scorpion cufflinks and I realised that despite the regrets there was pride.

The future

The participants all felt very positive about the future of the Scorpions as G states: "I think the future can only be bright, we have been off to a good start, and we have all the popular support, the political support that any organisation could wish for. The challenge is to be able to maximize support."

But things have changed and for those that remain and want to still be a part of building the organisation and shaping the culture the words of B are very applicable: "I think it was a successful period, but it is a different period now so people have to change there has to be changes now."

I am not sure that all are ready for that change. There is an element of wanting to cling to the past, but at the same time a belief that the organisation is bigger than the individual. G puts it into words

> Let me say that what we are doing in the Scorpions... (is) of much greater significance to the country than it is for my own personal ego, one of the objectives that we set for ourselves was to rebuild and regain the people's trust and support for the rule of law in South Africa. You don't get a more serious objective than that one, because the alternative there, of course, is anarchy. It had nothing to do with ....we were the mechanisms, the agents, the vehicles to create an environment where that objective could be attained.

A shares this view

> I am very aware of society's need for the Scorpions...I still feel that we are doing well, that we are doing what we should do and giving [so] hope and addressing issues that bother society. And so I am not saying that there is nothing wrong in this organisation I am not saying that I wouldn't change 50% of the organisation as it is. But I am saying that I am really, really, really honoured and grateful that I am a part of it because for me it is something big. It is something too big for one person. Something that in 20 years from now people will have forgotten about us but it will be really, really big.

Growth and learning

Each participant also felt that the experience was one of tremendous personal growth and learning as G states: "In fact...it's been a positive for me. I have learnt and grown in ways that I would probably never ever have grown and developed. And I have discovered things about myself I would probably never have discovered."

F was critical about the DSO, but he acknowledged that he had learnt a great deal

> I can...sit back and say (I) have learnt a lot from this, things I need to do now, what needs to be done, what shouldn't be done... I think I have a much clearer sense of organisational process, and I've read up a lot more on it since then. The need to plan things out, to go through the soft side of things, getting buy in, getting commitment, getting all of that, if you don't do it, inevitably...further down the road you'll find you'll end up...having to do a lot of things...it was a huge learning experience you know, I have regretted in some senses from personal point of view ...I feel proud that it happened that we got something off the ground.

5.2 CONCLUSION

The people who are currently part of the Scorpions and who walk into stylish offices with hi-tech equipment and an established environment do not realise what it took to build that environment. They were not there when there was no furniture, no resources, no staff and work to be done. They see a finished wall, not the individual bricks that were carefully laid to build that wall. The current top management is new and E sums up this lack of appreciation with reference to them but I think it applies to everybody:

> I don't think that especially some of the leadership now realize what really went into starting off this organization that we are in. And I am specifically talking about the personal sacrifices, the individuals, every single person that got together that dealt with a thing, the meetings, the frustrations. I don't think that at all times people realize what the individual people, what each individual building block meant...we have forgotten, we are looking at the wall and not the individuals because a lot of individuals played very important roles in getting us to where we are now.

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LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Bulelani Ngcuka the National Director of Public Prosecutions. The photographs were taken in his office at the VGM building during the first interview.



APPENDIX B

Percy Sonn Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions. After Frank Dutton left Percy Sonn became the Head of the DSO.

APPENDIX C

Chris Macadam the Regional head of the KwaZulu-Natal DSO Office. He was the regional head of the IDOC KZN office. He was later transferred to head office to take over the Witness Protection Unit. He thereafter headed the Human Rights Violation Unit.

APPENDIX D

Clifford Marion the head of the investigators of the KwaZulu-Natal IDOC office. He was appointed as the Chief Investigating Officer of that office now the DSO KZN office. The pictures were taken in his office in Durban where he posed with a drawing of Mr Nelson Mandela and the DSO caps that he collects.



APPENDIX E

Gerhard Nel the regional head of the Gauteng DSO office and previously the regional head of IDOC Gauteng.

The photographs were taken in his office. Here he is next to the international award from the Bureau for Justice Assistance he received. The award reads as follows: "In recognition of your commitment and contribution to the prosecution task force on car hi-jacking March 1999-Sept 2000."

APPENDIX F

Andrew Leask was the head of the investigators of the Gauteng IDOC/DSO office. He was appointed as a Chief Investigating Officer (CIO) in October 2001 in the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions. He was attached to the Human Rights Violation Unit. The unit has been renamed the Special National Projects Unit.

APPENDIX G

Pete Richer was appointed as the head of operational support. Here he is in the office of the regional head of Gauteng (Gerhard Nel) next to the flow diagrams that he drew two years ago. The photograph was taken during the second interview.

APPENDIX H

Frank Dutton the CEO of the DSO. He left after becoming ill. The photo-graphs were taken during the interview in Durban.

APPENDIX I

Dr Makhosazana Msimang she was appointed as the divisional head of the Crime Analysis Division.

APPENDIX J

Dr Ruben Richards the divisional head of training in the DSO stationed at head office. The photograph was taken in his office at the VGM building during the third interview. He posed by his collection of law enforcement memorabilia collected during his many and varied international trips.

Dr Ruben Richards behind his desk. Behind him are pictures drawn by his two children.

APPENDIX K

The Sting: crimefiles Style magazine October 2000.



crimefiles

Many regard them as our only salvation from the cancerous crime and corruption that's spreading through the country. But are the Scorpions up to this enormous task? What makes South Africa's uber-police deserving of salaries nearly three times that of a normal police officer? And what of recent allegations of fraud levelled against senior members? These are some of the questions Carolyn Raphaely asked Frank Dutton, CEO of South Africa's elite crime-fighting unit.

PHOTOGRAPHY BY SALLY SHORKEND

Scorpion CEO Frank Dutton couldn't be less like the stereotypical beer-*coeped*, mustachioed policeman of the old-order if he tried. He is unfailingly polite and quietly-spoken, has a reputation for honesty, a preference for pin-striped suits, and eschews guns.

Dutton (51) also happens, by his own admission, to be a good poker-player. For like any good investigator, he's learnt to be inscrutable; to hide his feelings. "In the type of work I've done," he explains, "you have to distance yourself to survive. Working for the SAP for 26 years, I was exposed to an extremely violent side of life. I investigated the murders of thousands of people in KwaZulu-Natal, including cases of gunmen throwing petrol bombs into houses, then gunning down people escaping through windows. Working for the UN War Crimes Tribunal in the late 90s, I saw and spoke to thousands of Kosovo refugees streaming through the borders, all with horror stories.

"I've overseen the exhumation of mass graves in Bosnia and seen the remains of old and young people handcuffed and blindfolded. What always amazes me is that when you're exposed to these levels of violence and ugliness, you're inevitably exposed to equally wonderful qualities in people. I've seen the worst and the best. Ironically, my exposure to violence has turned me into a pacifist; made me increasingly idealistic and softened me."

So perhaps it's not surprising that in the face of one of the highest crime rates on the planet, Dutton has taken on the formidable task of trying to save SA from itself. As head of SA's elite crack crime-fighting unit, it's his responsibility to prevent SA from turning into a criminally anarchic bloodstained basket case; the stuff of its citizens' worst nightmares.

Right now, Dutton is elated at his proteges' success in pulling off what he believes is the biggest Mandrax bust ever undertaken anywhere — 4.5 tons with a street value of R200m.

"This haul, which resulted in the arrest of six people, will have a huge impact on crime in general," says Dutton. "Studies have shown that in most SA crimes of violence, people hype themselves up with drugs or booze, and Mandrax plays a significant role in hijackings."

Modelled on the FBI, the unit was launched last September, in a climate of considerable hype, to investigate and prosecute "all national priority crimes of an especially serious nature, particularly individual high-profile crimes and corruption in the criminal justice system." Since then the Scorpions have cracked seven major hijacking syndicates and also impacted significantly on white-collar crime through the Asset Forfeiture Unit.

However, without the certainty of prosecution, arrest, conviction and imprisonment — the only real crime deterrents — Dutton's hands are tied. "For us to be fully operational will take a few years," says the gentle crime-buster.

"We have 400 recruits right now, plus 140 from the SAPS and if we prioritise correctly, we can make a difference. The specialist hijacking court recently established in Jo'burg achieved a 48% conviction rate in the year to March 2000, whereas in 1998 only 2% of

reported hijackings and 16% of reported murders resulted in convictions."

The most encouraging sign, according to Dutton, is the fact that communities are no longer prepared to tolerate criminals and are now willing to turn them over. In addition, the Scorpions' investigative skills and ability to target organisers are being continually refined.

They're an elite bunch, picked from 6 000 applicants who responded to newspaper advertisements. All new recruits, a third of whom are women, have at least one university degree, the majority have two and all speak four languages. They're also reaping the benefits of intensive Scotland Yard and FBI training (a gift from the FBI as part of an initiative to promote international co-operation in policing).

Dutton's personal preference is the Scotland Yard approach which precludes firearm training: "I don't like guns. However, the SA reality means we can't adopt this method now."

'Strike' (26), a bright-eyed and bushy-tailed rookie who won't divulge his real name, has different ideological convictions to his boss. For Strike, the sophisticated hi-tech weapons training he received at Qantico, the FBI's Virginia headquarters, was the high point of his 11-week training stint. With a brown belt in karate, a history of political activism and two degrees from the University of Natal, this young black 'dude' is like Dutton, an atypical cop. So is his fellow Qantico returnee Malebo Ramagoshi (25), an attractive, funkily-dressed Tukkies LLB graduate in knee-high black boots, a short black skirt and black jacket.

"Of everything I've learnt about — including fraud, murder, money-laundering, how to shoot accurately, forensics and lots of technical stuff — the ethics classes and emphasis on integrity impressed me most. The FBI's reputation for integrity and trustworthiness is what makes it truly successful," says Ramagoshi earnestly.

Integrity is also the quality Dutton values most highly: "We can't measure integrity but we've given notice that this is what we're looking for. We can teach investigative skills but credibility has to be earned. All we can do is warn that if people don't display integrity, they're in the wrong job."

"We need to hold our heads high, to say to the community that there's an organisation that's on your side; that'll help reduce crime and can be trusted," says Ramagoshi. "It's no secret that the community doesn't trust the police."

Questions have even been raised about Dutton, whose impeccable credentials were firmly established after his exposure of police and Third Force involvement in the 1991 Trust Feed massacre — an investigative coup which resulted in his being hailed as an incorruptible good cop both locally and internationally.

"There's a culture of silence in the police," he explains. "You never turn a colleague in. Even though my fellow police officer Brian Mitchell was eventually found guilty of murdering 13 people in the Trust Feed case, I was the person they vilified. We have to turn that culture around. We have to recognise criminality in the Scorpions and instil a culture of human rights, fairness, honesty and effective investigation, which isn't that strong in the police."

In July allegations also surfaced in the media implicating "Mr Clean" and his counterpart Deputy Director of Prosecutions Percy Sonn in the misuse of public funds and the acquisition of luxury homes with State funds. "This is absolute nonsense," snorts Dutton. "The bill governing our activities hasn't been passed yet so I don't have the ability or authority to spend a cent of public money. I can't even authorise a trip from Pretoria to Jo'burg. All expenditure has to be approved by the Justice Department.

"Part of my contract," he explains, "was the provision of safe, secure housing for my wife and me. The four-bedroom official residence the department built for us is far too large so I'm still renting. All I require, or want, is a small house, because my children — two sons and a daughter — have all left home."

Dutton's reputation isn't easy to impugn. He's highly respected and almost universally liked. Durban human rights lawyer and activist Jenny Wild, for example, says she has the highest regard for Dutton as a person but little regard for the structure he heads. "I've never seen Frank running round in a baseball cap with a sten-gun," she says. "All that hype is Americanised crap; a public relations exercise created to allay fears and one we can well do without.

"It would've been better to create a special task-team to handle specific projects staffed by people drawn from existing structures, not a standing army which operates like a palace-guard. The problem with the organised crime under-world is that it's full of counter-intelligence spooks, police and military intelligence agents who conduct themselves like criminals, purporting to find criminals. Frank has both power and credibility, and has lent his name to something which has none. The Scorpions have unchecked powers and will basically be able to do what they like. The specific crimes they'll investigate are unspecified in the draft bill governing their activities. This gives them the potential to act capriciously and ruthlessly — particularly now that the Internal Security Act and 14-day detention without trial is being resurrected."

Given that the bill governing their activities doesn't specify the "specified offences" they're supposed to investigate, the question of who will police the Scorpions is crucial.

Given that the Directorate of Special Operations Bill governing their activities, scheduled to be passed in September doesn't specify the "specified offences" they're supposed to investigate, the question of who will police the Scorpions is crucial.

Dutton is responsible to National Director of Prosecutions Bulelani Nguka, Minister of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete and ultimately President Mbeki. But as Mark Wiley, former Minister of Community Safety in the Western Cape legislature points out, there's no mechanism for any oversight of the Department of Justice, which includes the Scorpions. In the US, 200 laws and statutes govern FBI operations, and Congress has full oversight.

Wiley has serious qualms about the Scorpions. In fact, last

month he resigned his position in disgust because he believes Government is undermining and demoralising its own police force by creating a parallel police force.

"What's more," scoffs Wiley, "the creation of the Scorpions presupposes we require an FBI. We aren't a Federal State, and police officers can operate across the country with impunity. The Scorpions can't operate like the FBI because there's no need for an FBI.

"Government is also grossly misleading the public because their hidden agenda is a political one — to make them look as if they're serious about tackling crime and lift public morale. Tackling crime realistically takes hard police work and visible policing. Yet the police were only given an 8% budget increase this year, are already 40% under budget and basic policing is collapsing."

One thing is clear: The Scorpion's very establishment represents a de facto recognition by Mbeki and Tshwete that the police are simply not up to their jobs. But can a force of 400, or even ultimately 2 000, seriously impact on the more than 2 million serious crimes reported each year?

"The Scorpions are a complete waste of money," says Wild. "They represent not only a duplication of services and resources but a multiplication! The money would've been better spent upgrading existing resources. For example, Sydenham police station in Durban which services 650 000 people, has only two vans, one tank of petrol each per night and a daily R4,5m narcotics crime economy."

Adds Institute for Security Studies senior researcher Eric Pelser: "Instead of creating a whole new structure, the money would have been better utilised improving operational practice in the police and prosecution services. There are about 37 000 functionally illiterate police personnel and about 12 000 without drivers' licences who could be empowered to do their jobs better with this money. The 20 000 detectives in the police, at least a third of whom have no basic investigative training, could also have

benefited significantly from this cash-injection."

"It's a valid criticism," Dutton concedes. "However, our R150m annual budget would be swallowed by a police force of 120 000 in no time. In a small organisation, we can figure which systems work best and pass on our knowledge. We aren't in competition with the police. We want to complement their service and work closely together."

Any level of co-operation may be an unrealistic pipe dream given the turf-wars, and jealousies regarding salary discrepancies between the police and Scorpions. According to Dutton, the Scorpions are highly educated, can demand high salaries and are remunerated in accordance with the Department of Justice's salary scales.

"They're jeopardising and undermining the work of seriously overloaded police-officers by luring poorly-paid top police-investigators with incredible packages — up to two-and-a-half times their current earnings," says Wiley. "A Scorpion investigator earns the same as a Police Commissioner.

"Also the Scorpions select cases which are 99% complete as a result of thorough investigations by hard-working policemen and then claim the kudos. They had nothing to do with the breakthrough in the Golden Arrow case, for example. It was achieved through hard police work."

"There are elements of non-co-operation in the police," Dutton acknowledges, "but there's also a vacuum that needs to be filled. The SAPS by law are obliged to investigate every alleged crime and they're absolutely swamped. The Scorpions don't have this legal obligation so can initiate proactive investigations."

a sidelined, disillusioned Dutton to head a Goldstone Commission investigative unit. The offer, which couldn't have come at a better time, was followed by an invitation to head a team investigating hit-squad activities in the KwaZulu-Natal police and ultimately led to a UN appointment investigating war crimes against Croatians at the Hague. "Frank epitomises what a professional policeman should be," says Goldstone. "He's a man of tremendous courage with whom I built up a relationship of absolute trust, confidence and admiration. He's cool, has an independent approach to policing and a desire to follow the truth at all costs."

Within nine months at The Hague, he was promoted to head a team of 90 investigators from around the globe and then appointed to head the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Sarajevo where he lived for 18 months. "Unfortunately," says Dutton, "one of my credentials was more experience of extreme violence than any other investigator."

So what makes a good investigator? "You can train someone up to a point but there's an indefinable quality I know when I see. Tenacity, intelligence, logic and an open mind are all good qualities. A good investigator shouldn't be too emotional or give much away."

Dutton probably learnt to hide his feelings at an early age: After his father died of a heart attack when he was 14, his seamstress mother struggled to bring up her three children. Dutton, a bewildered youth trying to come to terms with death, read an article on Boystown and recognised he needed help. He took himself to Pretoria station, boarded a train, arrived on Boystown's doorstep the following morning and begged to be taken in.

Influenced by his grandfather and great-grandfather, who both

"A good investigator shouldn't be too emotional or give much away."

In a country where basic policing is breaking down and life is cheap, Dutton is a sitting duck. Whereas Sonn has been reported to employ five security guards outside his Cape Town house, the unflappable Dutton has none. "I refuse to be intimidated," he says, "I see this as capitulation. Even when I was in the police I preferred not to carry a weapon most of the time."

Dutton's had more death-threats than he cares to remember: "When people phone and threaten me, I always say I'm happy to meet them and they usually put down the phone. They're mostly cowards and aren't really dangerous. Those that don't threaten are the ones to worry about."

These days threats arise when cases he's involved in grow too hot. In the past they mostly emanated from fellow policemen whom Dutton knew too much about or who regarded him as a Judas for ratting on his colleagues.

Prior to the Trust Feed case, Dutton says he was totally naive, suspecting a few security-police colleagues of involvement in KwaZulu-Natal's pervasive violence but never considering that instructions may have emanated from the top. It was Wilson Mdlala, a detective who worked under him, who opened his eyes and whom he describes as the most influential person in his life.

When the Trust Feed case was over, Judge Goldstone asked

served in the Basotholand Mounted Police. Dutton joined the SAPS at age 16. On graduating from police training college, the *rooinek* boy was fortuitously posted to Durban where he remained for 26 years.

The slightly vague Colombo-type cop soon made a name for himself as an ace murder and serious crimes investigator. So when political violence reared its head in the 80s, it seemed natural that he and his crack unit should be called in.

"I don't really know how I've coped," he says. "The impact of what I've seen has affected me, even made me a little crazy. I've never sought therapy — I might one day — but I know we'll have to teach the Scorpions that it's not sissy to seek trauma counselling."

Dutton is remarkably resilient, driven by his desire for good to triumph over evil and a need to make things better for crime victims. "If you go to a mass grave and know you're working to bring the perpetrators to book, that offers some relief," he explains.

"I've been exposed to the very worst side of humanity and the best. I've seen people from relief agencies help refugees: seen Albanian people take refugees into their homes and share whatever they had. I've gone to horrific murder scenes and seen how communities rally round the bereaved.

"Maybe it's my defence, but when I see something horrible, I always ensure I find something good. I consciously look for the paradox and I always find it." ●

APPENDIX L

Dawood Adam the regional head of the DSO Western Cape (previously the IDOC WC office). He was later promoted to Director of Public Prosecutions and heads the Witness Protection Unit in the National Prosecuting Authority. The photographs were taken in his office that he decorated at his own expense. He also did the decor himself. The photographs were taken during the third interview.

APPENDIX M

TIME LINE OF EVENTS

Date	Event
1 August 1998	NDPP appointed
September 1998	IDOC Western Cape established
September 1998	IDOC KZN established
November 1998	IDOC Gauteng established
25 June 1999	President Thabo Mbeki commits government to establishment of a crime fighting capacity.
8 July 1999	Minister of Justice and Constitution Development on behalf of the President announces the establishment of the DSO (DSI).
1 September 1999	DSI (DSO) launched in Guguletho in Cape Town
September 1999	IDOC Eastern Cape established
12 January 2001	Legislation enacting DSO and amalgamating IDOC and IDSEO into the DSO comes into operation.