

September 11: Catalyst for Structural-Genealogical Narrative of a New World (Dis) Order

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By

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* * *

We have seen many world events, and recent years have been filled with any number of violent ones, from wars to genocides. But until September 11, we have had no symbolic event on a world scale that marked a setback for globalization itself...In dealing all the cards to itself, the system forced the Other to change the rules of the game. And the new rules are ferocious, because the game is ferocious...

- Baudrillard, 2002:1

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* * *

In Loving Memory of 'Alfie' ...

Synopsis

The attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed America forever. In a horrific manner the vulnerability of the highly developed states was demonstrated and exposed in world politics. The event is ushering a new political era where far-reaching shifts in international relations are under way.

In the post Cold-War international world it appears that the ideological conflict between capitalism and socialism has been replaced by a new world order. One that has retained the binary conflict structure of the Cold War, except that this binary is now presented by political Islam and consumerist's capitalism (Martin, 2000:155). Indeed, in the previous bipolar world order, the acute distinction between capitalism and communism served to attenuate the discord in and between religions. This complex blurring of distinctions has been systematically heightened since the end of the Cold War, as it has allowed Western governments to maintain controlling interests outside of their dominions (Gupta, 2002:6). This struggle has since been conceived in a variety of different, but related ways: A 'Clash of Civilizations' (Huntington 1996), or as an inescapable dialectic typical of the process of globalization itself (Barber, 1996:245).

In the case of Huntington's (1996:19-20) *genealogical* narrative, he refers to global politics and the way in which the future will be reconfigured according to cultural identities. The division along these cultural lines, will furthermore "shape" the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the Post-Cold War world" (Huntington, 1996:20). Huntington's thesis is rather overriding in explaining the clash between the supposedly 'West' vs. 'Rest', whose interaction is historically determined. Yet, the *genealogical* narrative is not sufficient in taking into account the dynamics of globalization. Benjamin Barber's *structural narrative*, on the other hand, goes to great lengths to illustrate the paradoxical relationship between *Jihad* and *McWorld*, and how both forces tend to survive in a world that they inevitably create. By acknowledging the relevance of both binaries (East/West), it is hoped to transcend them by presenting a *structural-genealogical* grand narrative, which will essentially allow one to understand *Jihad* as being a structural moment of the genealogical narrative. Given this general strategy, it will become perceptible that *Jihad* is one form of anti-globalization as the structural narratives become part of the genealogical and the genealogical part of the structural.

In essence, then, this thesis is attempting to come to grips with the phenomenon of September 11, from a political-philosophical perspective. More specifically, this study will firstly be looking at two different, but related narratives that have emerged post-September 11, to make sense of the event. Given the *structural-genealogical* approach, the central concern in this study is consequently to look at two separate but related interests. The one pertains to history and the other to historiography.

* * *

Synopsis (in Dutch)

De aanvallen van September 11, 2001, hebben Amerika voor altijd veranderd. Op zeer geweldadige wijze hebben zij aangetoond en tevens blootgelegd hoe kwetsbaar de overontwikkelde landen eigenlijk zijn in politiek perspectief. Deze gebeurtenis heeft een tijdperk van nieuwe politiek tot stand gebracht, waarbij verstrekkende verschuivingen, op het gebied van internationale relaties, in ontwikkeling zijn.

Op internationaal niveau blijkt het, dat na de Koude Oorlog, het ideologische conflict tussen kapitalisme en socialisme, vervangen is door een nieuwe wereldorde. Deze wereldorde heeft weliswaar het tweezijdige conflictstructuur van de Koude Oorlog behouden, behalve dat deze tweezijdigheid nu gepresenteerd wordt als een conflict tussen politiek Islam en het consumenten kapitalisme (Martin, 2000:155). Ongetwijfeld heeft het overduidelijke onderscheid tussen communisme en kapitalisme, in de vorige tweepolige wereldorde gediend, om de onenigheid, onder en tussen geloofsovertuigingen, te sussen. Deze complexe vertroebeling van verscheidenheid, heeft op systematische wijze gestalte gekregen sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog, en heeft het de Westerse regeringen toegelaten, om uitvoerende macht te behouden over belangen buiten hun grenzen om. (Gupta, 2002:26). Deze strijd is sindsdien op verschillende, maar verwante manieren geïnterpreteerd: een 'Clash of Civilizations' (Huntington 1996), of als een onontkoombare vervormde kenmerk van het globalisatie proces als zodanig (Barber, 1996:240). In de genealogische beschrijving van Huntington (1996:19-20), verwijst hij naar globale politiek, en de wijze waarop de toekomst geherstructureerd zal worden wat betreft culturele identiteiten. De verdeeldheid, wat deze culturele aspecten aangaat, zal bovendien de samenhangende patronen van disintegratie, en het conflict in de wereld van na Koude Oorlog gestalte geven, (Huntington, 1996:20). De thesis van Huntington minimaliseert de tegenstrijdigheid tussen de veronderstelde, "West" versus "Rest" wiens interactie in wezen al historisch bepaald is. Desalniettemin is deze genealogische beschrijving niet voldoende om de dynamiek van globalisatie te onderkennen.

De structurele beschrijving van Benjamin Barber (1996) daarentegen, getroost grote moeite, om de paradoxale relatie tussen *Jihad* en *McWorld* te beschrijven, en hoe beide krachten blijken te overleven in een wereld die zij onvermijdelijk zelf gecreëerd hebben. Door de betrekkelijkheid van beide tegenpolen, Oost/West, te onderkennen, hoopt het hen te vervormen door een grote structurele en genealogische beschrijving aan te bieden, waardoor men zal begrijpen, hoe de *Jihad* een structureel moment is van genealogische uitleg. Gezien deze algemene strategie, zal het duidelijk worden dat de *Jihad* een vorm is van antiglobalisatie, aangezien de structurele uitleg deel wordt van het beleg van zekere voorgaande data en evenementen. Gezien deze *structurele- en genealogische* benadering, is het algemene belang in deze studie dientengevolge, om twee afzonderlijke, echter verwante

belangen, in aanmerking te nemen. Het ene behoort aan geschiedenis toe, en het andere aan geschiedkunde.

* * *

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Uhlaselo langomhla weshumi elinanye kwinyanga yomsintsi ngonyaka wamawaka amabini ananye (September 11, 2002) luye lwanyijika iMelika ngonaphakade. Kwangokunjalo lubonakalise ukoyikeka kwendlela obungakhuselekanga ngayo ubuchwephesha obuphakamileyo baluyaphondo kwezo Politico. Esi sehlo sizise uhlelo olutsha kwezopolitiko, apho utshintsho iwamazwe ngamazwe ngokuhlobana belikade lijongeka mfiliba kwaye lungafikeleleki. Ngoku lutsho lwabonakalisa inqubela.

Kwimfazwe erhubuluzayo yamazwe ngamazwe, ingqo yenkolo ebinempikiswano iye yabonakala ukugcina iitlantlo mbini zengquzulwano kwimfazwe erhubuluzayo zitsho zinyamezelane, ngaphandle nje kokuba ngoku ezintlantlo mbini zibonakaliswa kwipolitika zama Isilamu kunye nezabafunxi abangama kepitali (Martin, 2001:155). Ngo kunjalo ngaphambili leyantlukwano intlantlo mbini yehlabathi yamandulo yokwenza izinto ngokwemigathango ethile ithatha eyona ngqalelo kumahluko ophakathi kobu komansi nobu kepitali, isebenza ekunciphiseni iingxwabangxwaba nokungevani okuphakathi kwezinkolo. Obubuxhakaxhaka bumfiliba bokwahlula izinto buye banyuka ngokunyuka emva kophelo lwemfazwe erhubuluzayo njengoko ithe yavumela orhulumente bamazwe aseNtshona ukuba baphathe belawulu imidla neemfuno ezingaphandle kwemida yabo (Gupta, 2002:6). Olukruthakruthano lungentla luye lwakhulelwa ngokhulelwa ngeendlela ezahlukeneyo kodwa ezinxulumeneyo. Ngokwencwadi: 'Clash of Civilizations' ka (Huntington, 1996). Okanye njengengafunkiyo inkqubo yehlabathi entlantlo mbini (Barber, 1996:245).

Kwimvo ka Huntington (Huntington, 1996:19-290). Kwimbali yakhe kwezobungzali uyibonakalisa imeko yehlabathi kwezopolitiko njengobuthathaka bezityalo nezilwanyana ezisakhulayo kwanje ngendlela eliya kuthi ikamva lihlengiswe ubume balo ngokwezithethe ezaziwa ngazo. Iyantlukwano kwezizithethe iyakuba nakho ukulungisa imigaqo yobanbane; iyantlukwano kwakunye nengxwabangxwaba zemfazwe erhubuluzayo yehlabathi yamandulo (Huntington, 1996:20). Ubhalo lwemfundo ephakamileyo luka Huntington nook oluyithatheli ngqalelo ibanzi ingcaciso efunekayo imbambano oluxhomekeke ekuhluzweni zezembali, kanti ngokunjalo lembali olunentshukumo olwenzekayo jikelele ehlabathmi.

Ibali lemilo lika Benjamin Barber kwelinye icala lingena nzulu ekubonakaliseni ukuhlabana kwentetho eziphikisanyao zinobunyani phakathi kwe *jihad* ne *McWorld*, nendlela oluxinezelwano lomficeselwano lwezindlela zimbini zithi ziphumelele ukuqhubekeka kwelihlabathi. Ngokwamkela ubukho bezintlu-mbini (Mpuma/Ntshona), kukho ithemba lokwazi ngokugqithisileyo ekubonakalisweni nakwinkcazelo echaseni nozwelonkenjengoko nemo yembali isiba yindowo yengcali zohlobo olubuthathaka buyindawo yobume.

Okubalulekileyo ke ngoko yinto yokuba olubhalo lubalulekileyo oluzame ukubonakalisa ngokupheleleyo enzinye zezinto eziqinisekisa ekukhokeleni

kwisehlo sange nyanga yomsintsi umhla weshumi elinanye xa lemeko iwelela kwicala lezopolitiko - nophando lwazi Ngakumbi nangakumbi lemfundiso isakugala ijonge iimbali ezimbini ezahlukeneyo kodwa zinxulumene ezithe zavela qwnge enzigqondweni ngesi sehlo. Eyokuqala yileyo inokhulo olubuthathaka ethe yabona kaliswa ngu Huntington kwicandelo lobhalo lweziju nge ezide kwimfundo esemagqabini, eyesibini yimo ethe yavikivwa yi *Jihad* ka Barber ekunye no *McWorld* (1996). Zombini ezimbalo zizakuphononongwa ngrnjongo yokufunana inyaniso apho ifihlakelele khona emileyo eyakuba yimbali ngesehlo senyamga yo Msintsi umhla weshumi elinanye, le mbali iyakubangela ukuba wonke ubani abe nalo ithuba lekuziphonononga zonke iintshukumo ezathi zasetyenziswa lihlabathi jikelele, ziguquququlwe kwanye zicingisiwe zonke izigigaba nezehlo ngokulandelelana kwanzo nokubaluleka kwazo, ngokwemihla ezathi zehla ngayo.

Ngokunikezelwa kwalenkcazelo yobume engezobungcali kukhulo olubuthathaka eyona nqontsonqa ekufuneka iyimfundiso kukuqaphela ngokweziphumo iimfuno ezimbini ezahlukeyo zibe zalamene ngaxeshanye. Enye yazo ingembali enye ingobhalo nocwangciso lwembali.

* * *

Statement by the President of the United States in His Address to the Nation

8:30 P.M. EDT

September 11, 2001

The President: Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom, came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbours. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.

A great people have been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.

America was targeted for an attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the very best of America – with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbours who came to give blood and help in any way that they could.

Immediately after the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and Washington D.C. to help with local rescue efforts.

Our first priority is to get help to those that have been injured, and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.

The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which have to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight, and will open for business tomorrow. Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will open for business, as well.

The search is underway for those who are behind those evil acts. I've directed the full resources behind our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them.

I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and so we stand together to win the war against terrorism. Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all those whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray that they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages of the Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me."

This is the day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and will do so this time. Yet, we go forward to defend the freedom and all that is good and just in our world.

Thank you. Good night, and God bless America.

-Edwards & DeRose, 2001:1

* * *

Bin-Laden Thanks Allah for 9/11

Here is America struck by God Almighty in one of its vital organs, so that its greatest buildings are destroyed. Grace and gratitude to God. America has been filled with horror from north to south and from east to west, and thanks be to God that what America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted.

Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same for more than 80 years, of humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrated.

God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America. May God bless them and allow them a supreme place in heaven, for He is the only one capable and entitled to do so. When those have stood in defence of their weak children, their brothers and sisters in Palestine and other Muslim nations, the whole world went into uproar, the infidels followed by the hypocrites.

A million innocent children are dying at this time as we speak, killed in Iraq without any guilt. We hear no denunciation, we hear no edict from the hereditary rulers. In these days, Israeli tanks rampage across Palestine, in Ramallah, Rafah and Beit Jala and many other parts of the land of Islam, and we do not hear anyone raising his voice or reacting. But when the sword fell upon America after 80 years, hypocrisy raised its head up high bemoaning those killers who toyed with the blood, honour and sanctities of Muslims.

The least that can be said about those hypocrites is that they are apostates who followed the wrong path. They backed the butcher against the victim, the oppressor against the innocent child. I seek refuge in God against them and ask Him to let us see them and what they deserve.

I say that the matter is very clear. Every Muslim after this event, after the senior official in the United States in America, starting with the head of international infidels, Bush and his staff who went on a display of vanity with their men and horses, those who turned even the countries that believe in Islam against us – the group that resorted to God, the Almighty, the group that refuses to be subdued in its religion.

They have been telling the world falsehoods that they are fighting terrorism. In a nation at the end of the world, Japan, hundreds of thousands, of young and old, were killed and this is not a world crime. To them it is not a clear issue. A million children in Iraq, to them this is not a clear issue.

But when a few more than ten were killed in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Afghanistan and Iraq were bombed and hypocrisy stood behind the head of the international infidels, the modern world's symbol of paganism, America, and its allies.

I tell them that these events have divided the world into two camps, the camp of the faithful and the camp of infidels. May God shield us and you from them.

Every Muslim must rise to defend his religion. The wind of faith is blowing and the wind of change is blowing to remove evil from the Peninsula of Mohammad, peace be upon him.

As to America, I say to it and its people a few words: I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Mohammad, peace be upon him.

God is the Greatest and glory be to Islam.

-Parfrey, 2001:304-305

Introduction

Every grown-up hates Americans, Jews, and Christians. It is part of our belief and our religion. Since I was a boy I have been at war with and harbouring hatred of Americans.

- Osama bin Laden, cited in Corbin, 2002:3

On the morning of September 11, 2001 (9/11), an airport security camera captured Mohammad Atta entering the departure area for a flight from Portland, Maine, to Boston, where he connected with American Flight 11 (Bergen, 2001:38). Precisely one hour after takeoff, Atta directed Flight 11 into the North tower of the World Trade Center. Perhaps an exaggeration, but nonetheless assorted intelligence and law enforcement agencies worldwide believe that the former student of urban preservation had now grown to be “the architect of the most spectacular act of urban demolition in history” by using four planes as al-Qaeda’s¹ ultimate *modus operandi* (Bergen, 2001:38-39).

Like most people, I was glued to my television screen watching the terror that struck America. At first I did not believe any of it, it seemed too incredible. It was the kind of morning when everything seemed ‘right’ with the world (Bergen, 2001:24). It was the perfect day to stop for a cup of coffee on your way to work, or simply to take the dog for a walk. It was also the ideal morning for flying (*ibid*). It is strange to think about it now, or perhaps not so strange considering I am a student in an academic field that is meant to analyze and understand all political facets of humans in society, but the first thing I thought

¹ ‘Al-Qaeda’ means ‘The Base’ in Arabic.

of - in addition to the tremendous shock and fear - was: oh no, now the United States will have free reign to respond to any opposition however it likes.

Prior to September 11, Americans and Westerners, generally considered themselves safe from foreign attack. Until that grim morning, the average American was statistically less likely to be killed by an act of terrorism than a bolt of lightning. But, as we are all too familiar, everything had now changed. In little more than an hour, the illusion had been shattered with the most catastrophic act of terrorism in the history of the United States. Seared into the world's consciousness are those terrible images: New York's tallest tower in flames, black smoke billowing from a yawning hole where a passenger plane had hit the building, while a second jetliner speeds, unbelievably, full throttle into the tower and explodes into a giant fireball (Mylorie, 2001:xiii). As a stunned nation watches, the Pentagon is hit as well (*ibid*). This then is our new reality: a century where it seems that issues of security and terrorism are back on the political agenda.

For me as a citizen of the global village, this thesis is essentially aiming at making sense of the events of September 11 by placing them or contextualizing them *historically* and *structurally*. The story that will be told here is not a pleasant one. It is in many ways the story of the roles that the United States plays around the world. It is a story about the consequences of interaction in an interconnected globe which experiences great disparities of power, wealth, freedom, poverty, and opportunity (Sardar & Davies, 2002:6).

* * *

1. General Discussion of Chapters

In *chapter one*, an attempt is made to raise the question *how* or *why* Islam has come to function increasingly as the necessary protagonist through which the United States defines and articulates its superpower status after the 'death' of communism. Western fears of militant Islam were confirmed by a prominent member of the Western academic establishment, Samuel Huntington, when he published his article *The Clash of Civilizations* in the *Foreign Affairs* issue of 1994. The debate over the 'Clash of Civilizations' has received widespread attention – especially in the Muslim world – where many saw the publication as yet more evidence of the West's true attitudes towards Muslims and Arabs (Esposito, 1992:viii). Continued criticism has been voiced towards the Western governments by many Muslims for their double standard in promoting democracy with fervor in the West but very selectively in the Muslim world (Esposito, 1992:viii-ix).

In an October 2002 broadcast, bin Laden stated: "As we speak, a million children are dying, killed in Iraq...Today, Israeli tanks are ransacking Palestine" (Kepel, 2002:14). It is clear that one requires examination of the problems that existed before September 11 in order to have a better understanding of the historical conflict that eventually culminated in the attacks. For Islamic fundamentalists, then, history holds the key to understanding not only the past, but the present and the future as well. The answer to the question that is so often asked by Americans: 'Why do they hate us?' becomes increasingly clearer as one dredges up the historical prejudices that Western countries have against Muslims and the injustices committed against their people. After all, Osama bin Laden did not wake up one day and spontaneously decide to bomb the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. To define the idea of America as *the* future, everyone else's future, is a rather conceited denial of the freedom of others, and the possibility of

the present to fashion alternative futures in a world consisting of a multiplicity of cultures (Sardar & Davies, 2002:10).

As far as one can judge, the attack on the United States took place at a moment when anti-American feeling in the Arab world had grown virulent. America's belief in the superiority of its institutions and its values (democracy, individual rights, rule of law and prosperity), combines with its despotic way of running global affairs, provoked the attacks (Fukuyama, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:28). Most Americans are simply oblivious or in denial of their government's policies towards the rest of the world. More significantly, a vast majority plainly do not believe that America has done, or can do, anything wrong. Yet bombs dropped on Muslims speak louder than press releases and speeches – the statements of U.S. officials that 'we are not against Islam' notwithstanding.

What this chapter suggests is that the modern prejudice against Islam derives from a long legacy of Orientalism which makes it difficult to dismiss the influence of Western fear and ignorance of Islam from current U.S. foreign-policy making. The long march of prejudice of the West against Islam can be traced back as far as The Crusades. From these perspectives, then, September 11 is perhaps no more than a contemporary culmination of a very old conflict.

In contrast with Huntington's (1996) and Said's (1978) *historical* narratives that tell the story of the long emerging 'Clash of Civilizations' and 'Orientalism', *chapter two* assesses Benjamin Barber's (1996) *structural*² approach to illustrate that as we become more modern, we are also apt to become a product of globalization while using the commodities of the modern world in our own

² It is important here to distinguish that this thesis deals with two meanings of the word 'structural.' In this case, structural refers to Benjamin Barber's usage of the term, which looks at the phenomenon of globalization and how its interconnected nature has itself caused it to reflect chaos. Take, for example, the al-Qaeda network and how, according to John Gray (2000:2), it is seen as a product of modernity and globalization, one which certainly will not be the last groups to use the products of the modern world in its own horrific ways. The second definition of structuralism is in agreement with the work of Michael Foucault who conventionally was labeled as a structuralist but who consistently denied this claim. Structuralism in this sense takes its starting point from language (Petit, 1975:2). "It derives from linguistics a framework of concepts which it seeks to extend from language to other areas of interests" (*ibid*).

monstrous ways. All forms of *Jihad*, including September 11, can be interpreted as a fragmentation of the structural moment of globalization. It is not simply generated *against* globalization but generated structurally and dialectically *by* globalization. The struggles of *Jihad* against “an integrative modernization and aggressive cultural imperialism” are in fact diametrically opposed but strangely intertwined forces (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:245). Many of the technological innovations, including the free movement of capital across borders, enabled international terrorists to coordinate events culminating in September 11. The global nature of al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups is as much a response to globalization as a creation of it and in that sense forms part of a greater resistance against globalization – all of which Barber considers under the generic term *Jihad*. Hence, Barber (cited in Booth & Dunne, 2003:249) makes a somewhat harsh, but rather interesting statement when he says that, “Bin Laden without the modern media would have been an unknown desert rat.”

It seems, then, that there are two ways of reading September 11, one *historical* and one *structural*. Taken on its own, however, the genealogy of the clash between Islam, and the Christian, Capitalist West, does not take into consideration the complexities of globalization. However, too much emphasis on these complexities tends to result in the genealogy of the conflict being ignored. Thus, by taking into account historical and contemporary (i.e. structural) elements of the conflict, the aim of *chapter three* is to synthesize the strengths and weaknesses of these genealogical and structural narratives, so that it will be possible to make sense of September 11 by means of a *structural-genealogical* grand narrative. By transcending the binary through a structural-genealogical reading, it is hoped that the underlying meaning of September 11 acts as a catalyst to outline the necessary parameters of the new world (dis)order. In other words, by making the connection how the attacks on September 11 ironically employed the language and methods on which modernity rests, it almost seems as if we have come full circle and as if there is a genealogical continuity between

the Crusades and September 11. Making sense of 9/11 through a *structural-genealogical* account offers a way out of the global war between modernity and its critics, as the war waged against *Jihad* will not succeed, unless *McWorld* is also addressed (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:247). The promise of a new world order will reveal that the paradox of the dialectical interdependence between these two forces has become noticeable as a result of the attacks on New York and Washington - exposing the contortions present *within* the system.

* * *

2. Methodological Framework: Discourse Analysis

To follow the complex course of descent is to identify the accidents, the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that the truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents.

- Foucault, cited in Fillingham, 1993:102

This study adopts a post-structural approach. It uses what Fairclough (1995:97) calls 'critical discourse analysis' or 'deconstructive analysis' to critique and contribute to the literature on September 11. Fairclough (1995) uses the notion of *critical* in the sense that it makes visible, through analysis and critiques, connections between properties of texts and social practices and relations which are generally not 'obvious' to people who interpret the texts. Discourse analysis can be defined as the act of demonstrating how within specific texts discourses have particular effects in terms of their distribution of social power (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999:154). In this case, the connection between language and power or discourse and power is of utmost importance, as it intends to illuminate how the conflict between the United States and Islam, or the forces of globalization, have been and still are, discursively constructed.

In *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings* (1972-1977), a collection of interviews, an essay, and a pair of lectures, Michael Foucault tries to work out new ways to talk about power. He seeks to articulate a new conception of how power and knowledge interact in the modern world (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999:162). Most of us are aware that there are people who know certain things that others do not. We also know that there are organizations that

rule other people (people are respected and suppressed without even knowing it – each willingly or unwillingly doing their bit). In this way discourse analysis demonstrates ways in which subjects are positioned in relation to each other, and who is empowered or disempowered in a particular context. In any discourse, therefore, knowledge, social relations, and social identities, are being constructed in historically specific ways. Thus, discourses construct who we can become and how we can project others and ourselves.

Edward Said sets this out convincingly in *Orientalism* (1978). He shows the effect of the scientific societies and the journals of the past three hundred years and how an institutionalized notion of “objective truth” was used for the proliferation of the authority of the truth. This operation allowed the West’s ‘Other’ to be invented. As Said states (1978:1-2):

...the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience...Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarships, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.

Just as Orientalism has been used by a mass of writers to dominate, restructure, and have authority over the Orient, so too have I found that it is useful to employ Foucault’s notion of discourse, as described by him in *Arachaeology of Knowledge* (1972) and in *Discipline and Punish* (1977), to understand the enormously systematic way in which European culture uses the Orient as a vision to make their own history a reality. Therefore as much as we want to assume that the Orient is an inner act of nature, we must rather acknowledge that the vocabulary that has brought it to life has been done in and for the West (Said, 1978:5). Once again, the way Foucault conceives of the relationship between the power and domination is reflected in the way certain cultural representation gain predominance over others. Through the justification and institutionalization of dominating representations, ideas gain acceptance as

'truthful' representations of reality and through this acceptance, acquire "serious, tangible social consequences" (Praeg, 2000:76).

The *a priori* rules that govern the historical dimension of discursively invented identities are therefore essential to this study. As they give us a glimpse of the contours of the invention of the Orient. The focus of a Foucaultian archaeology centers on speech acts or statements which are seen as performances. According to Foucault, any performance is a production of meaning (Praeg, 2000:74). By engaging in detailed readings of pieces of texts it is important to be sensitized to the context. Context is crucial as texts do not operate in isolation, but rather through being rooted in contexts (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999: 163). This point shall be dealt with in greater detail below, but for now it is imperative to note that statements, by contributing to discursive formations, can be interpreted through "a logically prior understanding of what it is that they are doing" (Praeg, 2000:74). For, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983:45) put it: a statement is "relative and oscillates according to the use that is made of the statement and the way in which it is handled." Consequently, what the archaeologist does is to:

...situate the statement neither in relation to its deep and unspoken or hidden meanings nor in relation to history vis-à-vis an origin that will clarify its meaning. Instead the statement is accepted at face-value.

- Praeg, 2000:77

2.1 Foucault's History of the Present

The work of Michael Foucault, conventionally considered as structuralist but denied by him to be as such, is unusually difficult to deal with in any short account. This is not only because this *oeuvre* is so extensive, but also because it is

hard at times to specify Foucault's own ideological position (White, cited in Sturrock, 1978:81). In *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (1982), Dreyfus and Rabinow adopt the phrase 'interpretive analytics' or 'history of the present' to describe the specific methodological approach to discourse analysis as used by Foucault (See also Tamboukou, 1999:201-217). It is worth spending a little time at this juncture indicating the type of historical analysis that Foucault is attempting to fashion (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983:118).

Within the field of modern philosophy there are two distinct camps that can be identified, according to Foucault. On the one hand are those philosophers who are dedicated to the 'analytics of truth' (the Pyrrhonian skeptics - those who seek to find essential rationality of the Enlightenment preserve) (Kendall & Wickham, 1999:29) On the other hand are those who see themselves to be part of Foucault's camp, namely the group concerned with 'an ontology of ourselves' (*ibid*). These philosophers explore the "contemporary limits of the necessary" (Foucault, 1984:47). What we take from the quote is that 'interpretive analytics' is all about the capacity of self-invention. A true Foucaultian is not so much concerned to find a parallel meaning in the past, but rather to trace the components of a specific time and what they have come to mean today. In this process of analyzing, the ultimate authority remains the actor as he/she will only become authentic, if it is acknowledged by the author that the truth is established out of deep interpretation (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:124).

It is in line with the recognition of the limits of our endeavour that one needs to return to the more mundane methodological distinction between genealogy and archaeology. As an archaeologist, Foucault sought to unearth the hidden structure of knowledge that pertains to a particular historical period (Strathern, 2000:19). By excavating the hidden structures of knowledge - the epistemological *a priori* - Foucault felt that he ultimately would be able to determine the ways in which we experience and perceive our roles in society (Kwant, 1978:136). Consequently, in the 'archaeological' phase of his work,

Foucault sought to excavate meaning in a quasi-Saussurian fashion by suggesting that speech acts or statements should not be understood as something exterior to the rule-governed system, but rather as *a priori* imposed order that exerts regularity (Praeg, 2000:77). As Dreyfus and Rabinow remarked (1983:55) about the epistemic *a priori*, "the rules governing the system of statements are nothing but the ways the statement are actually related." This implies that the world does not contain any transcendent meaning, since we filter as we go along:

The system of language is a vast structure that is always changing. Before men, linguistics focused on how language changes over time, but that doesn't give you any glimpse of language as a whole. We need to take a snapshot of the rules that hold it together.

- de Saussure, cited in Fillingham, 1993:94

In his *Madness and Civilization* (1965), for instance, Foucault illustrates how madness does not exist objectively, but is a condition that has been given meaning by the very discourse on madness (White, cited in Sturrock, 1979:90-91). In this view of the history of madness, Foucault sees a split at different point by sharp changes and breaks in the way people experienced and treated the mad. One such break occurred in the middle of the seventeenth century when large numbers of citizens (madmen and others) were confined in detention centers such as the Hospital General de Paris. Foucault locates another break in the history of madness at the end of the eighteenth century around the time of the French Revolution. This break illustrates a new way of experiencing madness that corresponds to 'mental illness' as we know it today. For one thing, when Foucault speaks of the 'experience' of madness, he does not mean that people of the age were aware of certain intrinsic characteristics of madness that other ages did not notice. Rather, the overall strategy that Foucault tries to illustrate here is that the present Classical experience of madness dominates the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries had their own set of assumptions, prejudices and mindsets about the mentally ill at the time, which structures the limited thought of that particular age (code of knowledge), or its *episteme* (Cousins & Hussain, 1984:7). An episteme is characterized by a certain discourse, a certain way of talking. It represents an accumulation of concepts, beliefs, and statements, which are produced by a particular discourse (Gutting, 1989:140).

The weakness of the early Foucault's archaeological method, however, was its failure to incorporate a theory of power into its analysis of discourse. In 1971, Foucault took his first major step towards a more satisfactory and self-consciously complex analysis of power in an essay entitled "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" to support and complement his theory of archaeology with that of genealogy (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:xxi). His shift away from discourse (preserving his archaeological theory and complementing it with genealogy) shows clearly how the issue of power had not been thematized:

What was missing in my work was the problem of 'discursive regime', the effects of power proper on the enunciative play. I confused it too much with systematicity, the theoretical form, or something like a paradigm.

- Foucault, cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:104).

In *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and the *History of Sexuality* (1976), Foucault identifies the rituals of power that take place by referring to the Panopticon of Bentham and the confessional. By using these examples he illustrated how power works, what it does and when it does it (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:7-80). History is thus not seen as progress or universal reason, but rather as the play of rituals in which power and humanity are advancing from one domination to the other. "Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized: they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose" (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow,

1982:110). What the genealogist derives from this is that particular groups will seize these empty rules and impose a particular interpretation on them. The more one interprets, the more one finds that the interpretation becomes a never-ending task as they have been imposed and created by other people and not by the nature of things.

What we see on the genealogical side appears to be the conclusion that everything is meaningless and lacks seriousness. As the “successor” of archaeology, genealogy concerns itself with “disputable origins and unpalatable functions” (Rose, cited in Kendall & Wickham, 1999:29). It is, in other words, a methodological device with the same effects as a precocious child at a dinner party: Genealogy makes the older guests at the table of intellectual analysis feel decidedly uncomfortable by pointing out the things of the origins and the functions that they would rather remain hidden. A genealogist would therefore ask: “*What is happening now? How did we get there and how is the ‘now’ within which we all find ourselves constructed?*” (Tamboukou, 1999:202). Thus, below the surface of events, history has its hidden structural *a priori*. The past is therefore alive in the present and the past will be able to show us how we can understand what is happening *now*.

By using Foucault’s energetically embraced ‘multidisciplinary’ framework, the present will not only do away with the archaeological method completely, but ‘backtrack’ the influence of structuralism to combine this with the return of an interpretive, critical dimension. This combination of archaeological and genealogical insight will allow me to situate myself in the current situation so that I have a way of articulating the complex meaning of the subject as a function of their tradition. As Foucault himself has noted:

I never stopped doing archaeology, I never stopped doing genealogy. Genealogy defines the target and the finality of the work and archaeology indicates the field within which I deal to make the genealogy.

- in Tamboukou, 1992:12

2.2. A Structural-Historical Reading of September 11

What is interesting about Foucault's archaeology and his subsequent shift to genealogy is that it provides a very useful way of conceiving of the challenges of this study - a study that seeks to take seriously the genealogical as well as the structural moments of the contemporary global political economy. Such an approach has already been advocated and applied by Modelski (1996) and Thompson (2000) in their analysis of the emergence of the global political economy. Paramount to this approach is a deconstruction of September 11 - an event that has acquired the status of a radical epistemic shift. From a *structural* perspective, the issues surrounding the attacks of September 11 would involve questioning what is typical or unexceptional about the way that it came about. What such questioning assumes is that there is a logic to the way in which global political economies rise and fall - something typical that has always a function of the relation between economics, politics, political leadership and global war (Modelski, 1996:1).

What Thompson (2000) offers is a *structural-genealogical* reading of the current global political order. Such a reading emphasizes *structural similarities but also historical differences*, continuities and change. It suggests that, although the rise and fall of the global political economies is always structurally similar. Each rise and fall is also historically different from the others in important ways. Thus, what the structural-genealogical methodology enables us to ask, in addition to

the above structural question, is the complementary genealogical question regarding where the roots of the current/future global economic system lies.

Is history continuous or discontinuous? Is change long-term, gradual and continuous or are changes abrupt? Foucault qua archaeologist maintained the latter when he suggested that history of Western civilization is marked by epistemic shifts that cause the end of one order of things and the beginning of another - changes that are sudden, all-embracing and structural. Can we attribute to September 11 the status of an epistemic shift in political order, and if so, how can we complement such a structural insight with the additional understanding of the genealogy of the conflict that has made the shift possible?

In order to understand the implications of September 11, it is necessary to make clear that the attacks are a product of a complex interplay of factors, at once historical and cultural, referring to a historical conflict and the structural complexities of globalization. So far, I have not only tried to delimit a certain investigative domain through a very brief discussion of central notions in Foucault's archaeology, but have also attempted to illustrate how a structural-historical approach can provide a methodological framework for the kind of synthesis aimed at here. True to a Foucaultian genealogy the focus on discourse as composed of statements will place my analysis in between hermeneutics as a reading (in which meaning is taken seriously) as well as structuralism, (in which meaning is abandoned all together) (Praeg, 2000:73). Such then is my brief Foucaultian interpretation of understanding September 11 and it is hoped that this approach will establish, in outlines, the necessary parameter to circumscribe essential features of a new world (dis)order.

* * *

Chapter One

September 11: A Genealogy of Resistance

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economical. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle of the future...

- Huntington, 1993:1

1. Introduction

'The present', as the Hungarian Marxist critic Gyorgy Lukacs once observed, is 'a problem of history' (Sardar, 2002:1). To understand September 11, we have to realise that current political dynamics have been evolving over a long period of time. One cannot understand the meaning of the September 11 crisis in a vacuum. "Without an understanding of what the past has been about, it is extremely difficult to make sense of the present" (Thompson, 2000:22). This chapter offers a *genealogical* reading of the events leading up to September 11 in order to answer the question: *how did an event like this become possible and how did we make sense of it?*

The Foucaultian analysis of Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1978), based on a theory of discourse as strategies of power and subjection, inclusion and exclusion, puts forward the kind of approach that is adopted here. Influenced

by Nietzsche's account of the body, Foucault asserts that the body and, by extension any identity, can be interpreted in many different ways -depending on the culture that interprets it. The issue raised here is of fundamental importance, since it shows how bodies and the identities they are associated with have become an essential component for the operation of power relations in modern society. It is this potent combination of knowledge and power, localized on the body that we are interested in as it is this internal relation of power and knowledge that will be used as a point of departure to interrogate the historical dimensions of a deep-rooted ideological difference between the 'West' and the predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East, the so-called "Orient." Such an overview of the genealogy of Muslim-Christian relations seems crucial, as this kind of interrogation is a condition for any meaningful, that is, constructive or critical engagement with the current world system.

To an extent, such a genealogical reading embraces the assumptions implicit in Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilization' thesis, which was published in the *Foreign Affairs* issue of 1993. In this article, Huntington commits himself to 'truths' or 'facts' in order to illustrate how the future of world politics will be dominated by a clash between civilizations. This study, however, does not commit itself to such an account of truths or facts solely (Huntington), but rather seeks to illustrate how discourses have historically produced facts (Foucault) in order to construct those identities that Huntington takes as his point of departure. The intention of this chapter is therefore, *not* to omit the historical facts to which Huntington attaches such great significance, but rather to establish a link with these facts in order to illuminate how knowledge structures take shape and produce the identities we take for granted. In other words, genealogy stresses the connection between talking and doing by illustrating how knowledge can be seen to structure those power relations in society that dictate how we act. This does not mean that there are no historical facts. The series of attacks known collectively as the Crusades were such historical facts; but what they mean in the narrative of conflict

between the West and the Middle East and how they may have contributed to the conflict that culminated in the attacks of September 11 is another question. Let us start, therefore, by reminding ourselves of the historical facts that substantiate Huntington's argument that there is indeed a 'Clash of Civilizations' taking place and which has been born out of an encounter dating back hundreds of years.

* * *

2. Muslims and Christians: The Genealogy of the Myth of the 'Other'

2.1 The Crusades and the Ottoman Empire

As world religions, both Christianity and Islam accommodate a high degree of religious and cultural heterogeneity as well as a spectrum of theological views. The interrelationship between Christianity and Islam is of particular interest to this study, as both religions are missionary by nature and have the inclination to declare a universal mission; each has a transnational community based upon common belief and vocation to be an exemplar to the nations of the world (with the understanding that one faith is better than the other) (Zebiri, 2002:37). This, ironically, only made them focus on their reinforced differences and has polarized rather than united these two great monotheistic traditions. Even the common ground that they shared as participants in the Abrahamic monotheistic tradition has frequently been a cause of discord rather than harmony. There are, according to Norman Daniel, (cited in Zebiri, 2002:13) "irreducible differences between non-negotiable doctrines... The Christian creeds and the Qur'an are simply incompatible and there is no possibility of reconciling the content of the two faiths, each of which is exclusive." The relationship between Islam and the West has thus often been marked by mutual ignorance, contempt, stereotyping and conflict. Because both these monotheistic religions had universalizing ambitions and because they were steeped in defining themselves culturally, as Christian West and Muslim Middle East, these religions began to construct the necessary 'Other' in their process of self-identification.

As a result, Byzantine Christian writings on Islam already represented Muslims as a military threat. Some of the themes of Byzantine polemic were later carried on into Western Christian views of Islam. Muhammad was sometimes seen as a figure that was inspired by Satan or among other things, it

was maintained that he inspired sexual promiscuity and suffered from epileptic fits (Zebiri, 2002:25). It was also commonly believed (roughly from about d.AH 428 to 1073) that the Qur'an was a jumbled collection of materials from biblical and non-biblical sources (*ibid*). Ignorance, sometimes wilful, continued to be common for centuries to come. In a similar manner, Muslim authors were also under the impression that the actual text of the Bible was not just an interpretation, but that it was in fact corrupted in the process of its compilation (Zebiri, 2000:50). From the broad spectrum of opinion, which is represented in Eastern scholarship, it is often the extreme representations of the 'Other' that are chosen; in this way authors can usually find what they set out to look for. Several Muslim authors even draw a contrast between Muhammad's success and Jesus' relative failure. Niazi (cited in Zebiri, 2002:64) comments that Jesus' miracles failed to have the desired effect, since "no one believed him except his twelve disciples, and even one of those betrayed him." In the absence of accurate information Western images of Islam and Islamic images of the West during the period leading up to the Crusades, were highly imaginative - containing elements of pure invention.

The latter illustrates only how cultures and civilizations try to speak with one voice in the quest of dominating the field of interpretation through manipulating the possible meanings of an event. For, as Foucault (cited in Gates, 1990:186) puts it, 'civilizations' will always try and exercise

the power of culture by virtue of its elevated or superior position to authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and validate: in short, the power of culture to be an agent of, and perhaps the main agency for, powerful differentiation within its domain and beyond it too.

One can presume that such representations about the 'Other' appealed because they satisfied certain needs on the part of those who adhered to them. Negative and stereotypical images of Islam provided the antithesis to European's own self-image, external threat. On a more popular level, they satisfied the demand for imaginative stimulation (Zebiri, 2002:26). This was

highly needed at a time when there was a lot of uncertainty in the institutions and ideas of society that were undergoing rapid change. It also prompted the search for alien elements within and outside to serve as targets to ideological and physical aggression (Murphy, 1976:28).

Feeding off the theological speculation and the need to relieve internal tensions and problems of their own societies, the Crusades, which obtain their name from "cross" (or *Crux* in Latin) gained momentum and culminated in a series of military expeditions which took place from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries (Generi *et al.*, 2000:90).¹ Initiated by Alexius's plea, Pope Urban II preached at Clermont in France and called for Holy War against the infidels on 27 November 1095 (Sardar & Davies, 2000:147). From Urban II's sermon in Clermont to the end of the Crusades three hundred years down the line, the Crusaders were constantly driven at least in part by a strong sense of idealism, a belief that the sacrifices they made, the hardships that they endured, were for a cause more important than their lives (Murphy, 1979:ix). The historians of the Age of the Enlightenment by and large summed up the driving motives of the Crusades as "Religion, greed and restlessness" (Brundage, 1964:viii). Twentieth century historians are of the belief that the relationship of the West with the Islamic world marked a turning point, when the West, emerging from the Dark Ages, began to mount a counterattack when it saw that the Islamic world had gained political and religious force. When the Byzantine Emperor Alexius I feared that the Muslim armies would also capture Asia and the imperial Capital of Constantinople, he turned to Christian rulers to turn back the tide by undertaking a 'pilgrimage' to unshackle Jerusalem from Muslim rule (Esposito, 1992:40). In Pope Urban's opinion, it was the right of the Europeans to attack the pagans and the infidels as the enemy was supposedly throwing them off their lands, destroying Christian altars and appropriating churches for their own religion. Those who decided to take part

¹ There is no consensus on how many attacks constituted the Crusades. It is believed that the journey to the Holy Land consisted of eight to eleven Crusades which inspired many stories of bravery and honour (Generi *et al.*, 2000:91).

by taking the cross became Crusaders and were believed to be set on the road to paradise (Sardar & Davies, 2000:147).

Ill-conceived and feebly orchestrated, the Christian success was short-lived (Zebiri, 2002:24). The Crusaders became an annoyance rather than a grave danger to the Islamic world and in 1187 the tide had once again turned when Jerusalem was reconquered by the Muslims under the leadership of Saladin (Esposito, 1992:42). Militarily speaking, the Crusades represented only a minimal threat to Muslims, for whom they seemed like yet another barbarian invasion on the borders of the Islamic world, with no exacting religious importance. The response of Western Christendom was, with few exceptions, defensive and belligerent. "Islam was a danger to be reckoned with" (Esposito, 1992:38). As Maxime Rodinson (cited in Esposito, 1992:37) has observed, "The Muslims were a threat to Western Christendom long before they became a problem." Few events have therefore had a more devastating and long-term effect on Muslim-Christian relations than the Crusades (Zebiri, 2000:15). Psychologically, the Crusades left a deep scar on the Western, Christian psyche that revealed itself over and over for the duration of the colonial era. The Crusades were therefore not just a chapter in the history of the anxiety between the Christian West and the Muslim East. Instead, the Crusades represent a perpetual desire on the part of the Christian West to preside over Islam and to demonstrate that religion as inferior (Youssef, 1984:ix). To many Muslims, the Crusades were the clearest example of militant Christianity, an earlier predecessor of the antagonism and imperialism of the Christian West. The recollection of the Crusades lives on as a dramatic *aide memoire* of Christianity's early hostility towards Islam. On further scrutiny of the larger historical context, it not only puts in proper perspective the motivation of the Crusaders but also helps one realize more the Islamic resurgence in the post-colonial, or the neo-colonial era.

Today, Middle Easterners, chiefly active Islamic groups, believe that the Crusades are not over. The United States and European countries are seldom referred to as the 'West' or even Christendom; in its place they refer to them as

kafirun (infidels) (Zebri, 1997:28). Therefore, in Muslim-Christian relations it is less a case of what in fact happened in the Crusades than how they are remembered. What is certain is that the Crusades constitute a chronicle of events that are of fundamental importance to the history of West-Islam relations. The meaning will be revisited every time the conflict emerges or needs to be fuelled. The last chapter looks at the way in which the United States did exactly this, namely to reinvent *Jihad* in military terms in order to capture the spirit of the Crusades.

No sooner had the Crusades passed than European forces had to confront the might embodied in the Ottoman Empire (Esposito, 1992:42). Creating a world Empire, the Ottomans became the great warriors of Islam and soon incorporated major Muslim centres. Some eight hundred years after the first Arab threat to Europe, Islam was back, but this time in the hands of the Turks. Yet, in 1571 at the defeat of Lepanto, the Ottoman Empire once again fell and subsequently saw the power shift to a revitalized and now self-confident Europe (Esposito, 1992:44).

Although we should not indulge ourselves too much in the outcome of the Crusades and the impact that the Ottomans had on European rule all together, understanding these events is significant as a backdrop to any attempt at theorising the current rivalry between the 'East' and the 'West' genealogically. Many people who admire and have learned from Foucault, including myself, come to find that a good way to illustrate how discourses take shape, is to remember that it is not so much *what* is said but *who* narrates the ideals of the particular discourse in question. A view of the world is more than politics and law; it finds expression in all cultural products of a civilization. The Crusades were not merely foreign military expeditions external to Europe - they were ideas which claimed that the Muslim East posed a threat to the Christian West and were subsequently internalized as an outlook to the world (Sardar & Davies, 2000:148). Jews together with Muslims were soon discriminated against and persecuted for their 'Otherness.' The invincibly ignorant were those 'Others' who had never encountered the message of

Christianity. In other words, the Jews and the Muslims were the necessary 'Others' in the construction of a sense of the Western or European self. European Images of Islam and Islamic views of Europe can therefore be attributed to the negative fallout from events in Christian-Muslim history that has emerged from the literature over the years. The stereotypes which were left behind by the Crusaders and the conquests made by the Ottomans went into constructing the 'Other' as the enemy. This furthermore dissuaded scholars that more exists underneath the layers of stereotypes that needed to be taken seriously. As Albert Hourani has noted, (cited in Esposito, 1992:45), "fear and disdain, coupled with European ethnocentrism, produced distorted images of Islam and Muslims and dissuaded scholars from serious study of Islam's contributions to Western thought."

This ignorance has certainly led to the main thrust behind Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilization' thesis. As his point of departure, Huntington uses cultural identities and their universalizing ambitions to define and defend themselves in the new international order. In the post-Cold War world, Huntington's thesis has often been used by foreign policy analysts to substantiate the rivalry between the Muslim East and the Christian West. Again, as is argued at a later stage in this chapter, because of the universalizing ambitions of Christianity and Islam, both religions define themselves culturally by constructing the 'Other' if so necessary. By creating a simplified picture of the post-Cold war politics shaped by two civilizations that rival each other, the central axis of the post-Cold war world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture with the power and culture of non-Western civilizations (Huntington, 1996:29). This necessary simplification rooted in a Cold War image of superpower competition that is now supposedly taking place between the United States and countries pertaining to the 'axis of evil' (Iran, Iraq and North Korea), highlights the importance of paradigms in international relations. As John Gaddis (cited in Huntington, 1996:30) so prudently observed,

Finding one's way through unfamiliar terrain generally requires a map of some sort. Cartography, like cognition itself, is a necessary simplification that allows us to see where we are, and where we might be going.

In short, worldviews and causal theories are a necessary in world politics as they portray 'reality' and simplify reality in a way that best serves our purposes (Huntington, 1996:31). While it is always expected that a one-world unity will be created at the end of conflicts, the tendency to think into two worlds recurs throughout history as the cultural bifurcation of the world is still too useful to be discarded as yet (*ibid*). Even though no paradigm is good forever, Huntington's civilizational paradigm is relevant at this point of departure as it allows one to conceptualise how a civilizational approach could justify the creation of the 'Other' in the attempt of acknowledging one's own self-identity.

Having said that, it is now time to move on to the next leg of the *genealogy of resistance*, namely the impact that colonial rule and missionary discourse had in constructing stereotypes that perpetuated the myth of the 'Other.'

2.2 Colonial Rule and Missionary Discourse

The technological progress of Western Europe in development and management was a visible foundation of the strong sense of cultural supremacy that marked the period between the 17th and the 19th century (Youssef, 1984:53). The systematic approach that the European invaders utilized to absorb land in Africa and the Middle East has contributed greatly to the disunity and dysfunction of indigenous peoples; coups take place in Africa and the Middle East not because Africans and Middle Easterners are not able to govern themselves, but because their leaders have inherited a colonial legacy

that tends to place African against African and Middle Easterners against each other.

The Europeans travelled the world accumulating as many means and as much power as they possibly could, fought their colonial wars and established imperial governments, in order to generate, the best conditions for their economies (Youssef, 1984:53). For the most part, each colony took on the cultural milieu of its colonizer. Each colonial power pursued a cultural policy that it believed would give it effective results, and a policy that was in tune with the philosophy of the colonial administration. Thus the rise of the colonialism/imperialism ideology was based on the belief that colonies were an essential attribute of any great nation.

With the ascendance and growth of Western industrial capitalism during the nineteenth century, the majority of the regions brought under Western domination ² experienced confrontation among the local population. In the early stages, the colonized organized itself in politico-religious movements, that began to fight the foreign rulers under the banner of *Jihad* (Peters, 1979:39).

In subjecting the Muslim world to imperial rule the moral condescension of the Europeans is clearly discerned as it manifests in three aspects of the European outlook:

1. *Historic hostility between Christianity and Islam*
2. *The disapproval of Muslim polygamy, apparent sensuality, and the inferior position of Muslim women with the attendant "evil social consequences"*
3. *The tradition of treating Islamic things as exotic, a tradition which maintained a symbiotic relationship with imperialism.*

- Youssef, 1984:54

² In order for colonial domination to survive by the end of the nineteenth century, it was pivotal that colonies in Northern Africa (Algeria, conquered by the French in 1830, followed by Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912), the entire East Indian Archipelago, Central Asia and the Middle East (in 1882 Britain gained control over the Suez canal and then in 1899, the Sudan was taken), was secured for social, economic and ideological purposes (Peters, 1979: 1-2). Later, one of Europe's latecomers, Italy, also took full advantage in the 'imperialist scramble for land' by occupying Libya from 1912 onwards (Peters, 1979:1). It was only later when World War II came to an end that France gained control of the former Ottoman Empire of the Arab Provinces (Peters, 1979:2).

This kind of thinking still lays the foundation for ethnic (tribal) disputes in Africa and the Middle East, or at least contributes to the problem. It is therefore quite apparent that the effect of colonialism (was) is immensely detrimental. Take for example, the systematic, indiscriminate partition of Africa ('scramble') that came about as a result of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which brought different cultural tribes under one or more colonial power. This situation disrupted the political development of the social groups as ethnic groups were fragmented. The artificial boundaries created by colonial rulers as they ruled and finally left Africa had the effect of combining many different ethnic peoples within a nation that did not reflect, nor have (in such a short period of time) the ability to accommodate or provide for, the cultural and ethnic diversity (Barber, 1996:11).³ As a consequence of this ethnic fragmentation, groups such as the Hausas and Fulanis exist in British Nigeria, German, later French/British Cameroon, French Niger and Chad. European colonial administrators effectively set out to invent African traditions for Africa by creating their notion of tribalism. These were the dangerous foundations upon which the colonialists imposed a new political geography. However, once in motion, the Africans themselves enthusiastically reinforced the process. Tribes became the object of passionate African imagination and conflict.

In the light of this apparent partitioning and humiliation under the colonial powers it is intelligible that the forces of nationalist movements have directed their revulsion and anger toward the West. Psychologically, Muslim nationalists have never recovered from their mistrust of Western powers. Muslim discourse on Christian missions and colonialism, therefore, almost consistently refers to the historical association with imperialism, which is felt to be ongoing. Although actual Western political hegemony may have declined, missionaries are charged with being agents of secularization and with

³ It is noteworthy that a country such as Canada, which has been trying for hundreds of years with mixed success to accommodate only two linguistic groups - English and French - already had major problems in finding a common ground. This gives one an idea of what it must have been like for African states with much larger cultural and linguistic divisions (Robbins, 2002:302).

continuing to serve the interests of Western governments (Youssef, 1984:56). Indeed, Christian missionary activity is frequently characterized in Muslim discourse in precisely the same way as colonialism: as oppressive, exploitative, and unscrupulous as to methodology, ruthless, arrogant, immoral, and destructive to indigenous cultures.

Missionaries are one of the Western institutions used for intellectual invasion of the Muslim world. They tried to get the Muslims out of Islam by weakening the faith in their hearts and accepting the Western way of life. Outwardly they call for adopting the faith of Jesus, but in reality they try and facilitate the Western intellectual invasion of the Islamic countries.

- MEMRI, 2003:4

As with the Crusades, the interrelationship between colonialism and Christian missions has become deeply rooted in the consciousness of most Muslims, and has turned out to be part of the anti-Western language (Youssef, 1984:2). By and large, missionaries not only acquiesced in the imperialist endeavour but saw it as a good thing, both because it would be the benefit of the colonized, and because of the providential opportunity which it afforded to bring the gospel to the 'unreached.' The exporting of the Western culture and patterns of commerce could therefore be seen as complementary, if ultimately subordinate, to the diffusion of the Christian message. One of the controversial areas of discussion is the impact of missions on indigenous cultures. Missionaries like traders, travellers and colonizers, were agents of cultural change. For Muslims, however, the page is not easily turned, and the memory of the past subjugation is constantly renewed by the manifestations of neo-colonialism in the present.

With these historical 'facts' in mind (The Crusades, the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, the implications of Colonialism and the missionary 'invasion') we can now consider the *genealogy of resistance* in more Foucaultian

or Saidian terms. After all, the genealogical point that will be made during the next section is how stereotypes from the past can be established as knowledge structures and how these can be used to influence the power relations between people. It is the broader cultural context that has to be taken into consideration, as well as how historical facts are used for the invention and the reinvention of the 'Other.'

2.3 *Creating the Enemy: The Reinvention of the 'Other'*

Edward Said, the Palestinian thinker who died in September 2003, showed throughout his academic career how distorted stereotypes such as 'Orientalism' and 'militant Islam' were especially used by the United States to justify its periodic wars waged in the developing world (Internet 25). The most penetrating of his work is his now famous 1978 critique of Western studies of the Orient in which he shows how the West's misunderstanding of Islamic culture stemmed directly from the scholars, novelists, journalists and agencies of the state. By portraying Europe as an area of superior culture and the 'Orient', when compared with it, as an area of patently inferior culture, they proceeded to divide the world into the 'civilized us' and the 'uncivilized them' categories (Said, 1978:7). It would be difficult to find a clearer example of the Foucaultian concept of discourse as power or as "a violence that we do to things" (Foucault, cited in Gates, 1990:195).

What Western discourse on the Orient constructed was not a value-neutral knowledge, but an imperialist discourse - Orientalism - that represented the Orient as "a theatrical stage affixed to Europe" (Said, 1978:63). Reproduced over and over, this accumulating Euro-centric, imperialist knowledge passed into the West's collective memory banks, from where it not only proceeded to colour and condition Western perceptions of Islam on a continuous and unchanging basis, but also to influence the way developments infusing Muslim societies were and still are interpreted (Internet 6). In a sense,

then, Orientalism was a kind of library or archive of intellectual power that was man-made and whose vocabulary had given a history and tradition in and for the West (Said, 1978:5). These values explained the behaviour of the Orientals and supplied them with certain characteristics, with a mentality, a genealogy. It deepened and hardened the distinction between Easterners and Westerners. Categories like Oriental and Western are both the starting and end point of analysis - resulting in the polarization of the distinction. "The Oriental becomes more Oriental and the Westerner becomes more Western" - limiting the human encounter between the two cultures (Said, 1978:46). Because this tendency is found right at the centre of Orientalist theory, this sense of power over the Orient is institutionalized and established as scientific 'truth.'

With this 'truthful' belief that one culture is superior to the other, Western countries, in particular official America, began to develop this habit of not taking responsibility for their own actions. Questions such as *why do they hate us?* in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, become increasingly explicable in a world in which these ancient oppositions between 'us' and 'them' is now reflected in a parallel distinction, namely between the powerful and the powerless, the rich and the poor and so on. It is therefore predictable that the sense of infuriation that has manifested itself in many countries in the Middle East which have lent themselves to some suicide missions against Western buildings and Western personnel whose presence is perceived as a symbol of Western imperialism.

The following are but a few post-colonial case studies that explain the hatred Middle Easterners have towards the United States. They also illustrate how contemporary political strategies legitimize themselves with reference to a history of stereotypes rooted in historical conflicts that date as far back as the crusades, colonialism and imperialism.

2.4 Post-Colonial Imperialism

i. Iran

A combination of ignorance and stereotyping, history and experience often blind even the best-intentioned when dealing with the Arab world. The point is that the European representation of the Muslim, of the Ottoman or Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient – making them less fearsome to the West. For decades, international relations has seen how fear is used by superpowers in the demonization of an enemy or threat.

The Iranian Revolution (1978-1979) startled even those who were exceptionally knowledgeable about Iranian events. The Revolution perplexed political analysts and sent shock waves through the oil-dependent world. Questions were feverishly asked about the meaning of the social upheaval in the Middle East. The Revolution was a grand upheaval for Islamist forces at large. It provided them with a strong sense of inspiration and encouragement and demonstrated that an Islamic Revolution or ‘resurgence’ was indeed a realistic objective. From being the centre of Westernization and secularism, Iran had overnight become a centre of Islamist policies and agitation. Many asked whether the government of Reza Pahlevi, would be the last pro-Western government in the area to fall. To be sure, the easy path was to view Iran and Islamic revivalism as a threat – to pose a global Pan-Islamic threat, monolithic in nature, an historic enemy whose faith and agenda dramatically opposed that of the West. If one wishes to indulge into polemics, almost each allegation has a counter-accusation (Zebiri, 2000:230). As mentioned earlier, both Christianity and Islam have this universalist ambition to be the role model of the nations of the world, as this will enable them to impose their discursive boundaries.⁷ In the case of the Christian West, the revolution was interpreted in terms of an

⁷ Discursive boundaries are “rules governing what can and cannot be said within the boundaries of a particular discourse” (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:5).

Islamic resurgence – a myth which afforded the British a lens through which they could control the vast oilfields of Iran. In this way the British produced and codified knowledge about Iranian culture under colonial domination, enabling them to generalize the construction of ‘man and his others’ as objects of knowledge within this overall period (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:7).

After World War II the British choice of ruler, Raza Shah was deposed by the Iranian parliament and Mohammad Mossedegh was elected as Premier. He set about nationalizing Iran’s oil fields, upsetting the British, who along with the U.S. ousted him in 1953. Raza Shah was returned to power where he ruled in true dictatorship fashion, funded by the U.S. His regime was corrupt and brutal, with little of the vast wealth amassed from sales of oil going to the Iranian people. Eventually he was forced to abdicate because of the unrest of the country. This left a vacuum into which the radical Islamist Ayatollah Khomeini stepped to take up the reins of power. Khomeini’s aims were to instil a new confidence in Muslims in seeing their civilization as superior to that of the West. Alarmed at the emergence of the fundamentalist revolution⁸ in Iran, the U.S. backed and armed to fight Ayatollah Khomeini leading to the Iran-Iraq war, which left one million people dead.

Because of the success that the Iranian Revolution exerted, the United States has reacted to political Islam with distrust. This point of view gained credence not only in the United States, but also in Europe. Some of the Western powers believe that, if the various Islamic fundamentalist movements come to power, they might well work to the disadvantage of the strategic and economic security in the Middle East (Davidson, 1998:15). It is precisely when these interests are at stake that the West suddenly comes up with inherent problems with the practices of the Islamic fundamentalist phenomenon. For as long as the assumptions of *Orientalism* go unchallenged, the endpoint will always be

⁸ Here it is understood that which constitutes something as ‘fundamentalist’ can be defined according to two things: One, when it is uncompromising and two, when it consciously positions itself in a history of conflict and ‘othering’ – a positioning which would signal that the difference is so irresolvable, even metaphysical.

the same; the only difference being that a different justification for the actions of the West will be invented (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:14).

ii. *Iraq*

During the course of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. supplied more than five billion dollars worth of military equipment. Inevitably an imbalance of power developed in the region and Iraq began to see more expansionist possibilities. To this end, Iraq occupied Kuwait, another country rich in oil, in 1990. There followed the Gulf War, wherein the Iraqis were not only forced to withdraw from Kuwait, but much civilian infrastructure in Iraq was targeted by the U.S. Once sanctions and an embargo on the oil trade had been imposed, thousands of Iraqis lost their lives from malnutrition and preventable diseases after the war, at least, in part because of the harsh sanctions and occasional bombing to reinforce them. What is also vivid in one's mind is when the U.N. weapons inspectors were withdrawn and these same inspectors later admitted collecting intelligence to help undermine the Iraqi regime (that is spying to Jan and me). Under those circumstances it is not inconceivable why Iraq did not want to readmit inspectors, simply because of fears that the United States would resort to spying again. So the Iraqis detest the United States because even though they have readmitted those spying inspectors to Iraq, they were correct in asserting that this would not be enough to avoid an attack.

Increasingly, voices proclaim for the general public in America and Europe that Islam is news of a particularly unpleasant sort. Today, a state of panic exists in the Western world, especially after September 11. The media, especially in the United States, have intentionally succeeded in portraying Islam as the antagonist of the West. Negative images of Islam are much more prevalent than any others. Such images correspond not with what Islam 'is' but to what prominent sectors of a particular society would like it to correspond to.

The Bush administration invested a lot of capital in the war with Iraq, and the removal and ultimate incarceration of Saddam Hussein. Saddam has

been so demonized in the American media so that Bush could get away with making audiences believe that he had to go to war with Iraq to ensure Saddam's immediate removal (Ritter & Pitt, 2002:3). With the exception of Britain, the states with veto power in the Security Council (French, Chinese, and the Russians) were not persuaded to satisfy Bush's passion to go to war, as soon as possible, as they looked to containment as a solution (Mailer, 2003:40). The major weakness of Powell's presentation of the evidence to go to war with Iraq, however, was the evidential link of Iraq and al-Qaeda. It is certain, at least, that the Bushites, in assuming that such a link exists, had to have assumed the legitimizing myth of a monolithic Muslim culture, one in which 'all Muslims are the same.' The belief to throw all Muslims into one pot and to annihilate the distinctions between them is so powerful for camp Bush, that it even overpowers and nullifies the sovereignty of one Muslim state. Any dissent or difference between them is not perceptible in the Western mind, bent as it is on Orientalist thinking. As with the involvement of the United States in Iran, stereotypes seem indomitable when nothing is at stake and negotiable when not.

It was claimed by the United States government that Saddam retained nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction which he was prepared to surrender to the al-Qaeda network. This idea is laughable, as any weapons that would be given to al-Qaeda would first and foremost be used on Saddam himself, as he was a secular leader who worked for years to crush fundamentalist activities (Ritter & Pitt, 2002:4). There are not even facts to back up claimed connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Iraq therefore, does not have a history of dealing with terrorists of this nature.

From Saddam's point of view, bin Laden was the most troublesome kind of man, a religious zealot, that is to say a loose cannon, a warrior who could not be controlled. To bin Laden, Saddam was an irreligious brute, an unbalanced fool whose boldest ventures invariably crashed.

- Mailer, 2002:35

There are lots of 'stubborn facts' that have surrounded the war with Iraq, and the long history that has been shared with this nation. Based on the facts at hand, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a monster - he killed millions of his own people by using chemical weapons. But there is a phrase missing: "with the aid and support of Daddy Bush", who considered that that was just fine (Chomsky, cited in Junkerman & Masakazu, 2003:130). Bush I unrelentingly provided aid and support to Saddam, and so did Britain. Yet, Saddam for all his crimes against humanity did not have a hand in September 11 (Mailer, 2003:55). But still Americans yearned to go to war with Iraq - or any country that could be a potential culprit (*ibid*). The unfortunate thing for the Iraqis was that when the war in Afghanistan failed to capture the leading protagonists, the White House now decided that "the real pea was under another shell. Not al-Qaeda but Iraq" (Mailer, 2003:36). By using the American flag and words such as 'evil' many times in every speech, Bush's aim is beyond doubt to strive for American dominance in global affairs. In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush singled out Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an 'axis of evil' (Internet 13).⁹

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack their allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.

- *Disinfopedia*, 2004:1

⁹ Iraq, Iran and North Korea are seen as 'bad' actors for the following reasons: Iraq is suspected of wanting to pursue programmes to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Iran is equally depicted as an 'axis of evil' as it is listed by the United States as sponsoring state terrorism. It is claimed by the U.S. that Teheran plans to develop weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has been the main concern of the U.S. because of the manufacturing of missiles and the willingness to export sensitive technology (Internet 13).

Even though there is a real solidarity in the United States to take on terror, the actions and the words of Mr. Bush's State of the Union address seem to have "consequences that are very dangerous...when there is very little margin for error left" (Senator Hagel, cited in Internet 13). Bush also met increasing attack from the international community – even the closest ally of the United States, Britain, thought that it was hard to agree with Bush's remarks as his theory attempts to use the anti-war terror as a justification to continue invading 'evil' states at will (*People's Daily Online*, 2004:2; emphasis mine).

By entering Iraq, the U.S. has once again portrayed itself as the colonial or imperial power and enemy of Islam (Nye, 2002:3). By being perceived as an imperialist power in the region, the U.S. is already encountering an anti-imperial reaction that has led to attacks on its ground troops in which hundreds of soldiers have died. According to John Esposito, director of the centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding (CMCU) at Georgetown University, the U.S. administration risks a backlash in the Muslim world thanks to its inconsistent treatment of Muslim sensibilities. Esposito says that "many people in the Muslim world see the United States as a hegemon", a kind of neo-colonialist power, not a state engaged in a morally unimpeachable war on terror" (Esposito, cited in Internet 1).

iii. Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan was one of the most brutal wars of our violent era. Indeed, if any conflict should be called a just *Jihad*, the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan surely was (Bergen, 2002:52). Unprovoked, a super power invaded a largely peasant nation and inflicted devastation on it. It was one of the most significant conflicts since World War II, but paradoxically it was one of the most underreported wars of the past decades (*ibid*).

The victory against the Communists in Afghanistan not only moved men like Osama bin Laden spiritually, but certainly was an invigorating moral victory, since a superpower had been overpowered in the name of Allah. "It was an important lesson for the Afghan Arabs and for bin Laden himself, who applied it to his next holy war - against the United States" (Bergen, 2002:78). In Afghanistan, the United States encouraged, financed and armed *Mujaheddin*¹⁰ fighters, many of them from Pakistan and other neighbouring countries, in a fight against the former U.S.S.R. Drawing on nearly unlimited flows of weapons from Saudi Arabia as well as the U.S. funds, the *Mujaheddin* were able to wear down the Soviet occupation forces. Then, in 1989, once the Cold War was over, not only did the Soviet Union withdraw its forces, but the United States also abandoned the Afghans - leaving a battleground of ethnically and religiously divided Islamic militias fighting for control of the country. Afghanistan plunged into a brutal civil war with warlords across the country fighting for supremacy. When the Taliban finally took control, the Afghans thought that they might see the end of the horror that they had endured for the past twenty years. They were to be disappointed, as history has shown. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan thus became not merely a new national state, but a home for an international movement aiming to reinstate Muslim power by overturning secular governments and Western control all over the world. Because the Islamic movement had been exposed to the arsenal of lethal weaponry and tactics of stealth over the course with its battle against the Soviets, once the Taliban was in control, it was able to become the site of sophisticated training operations and communications for a network of Islamic warriors with international aims and ambitions (Goldstone, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:146).

In the case of Afghanistan, America is hated because the United States used Afghans to tempt the U.S.S.R into a long and destructive war from which

¹⁰ The Afghan *Mujaheddin* were approximately 35,000 Muslim radicals that came from as far as Central Asia, the Far East, Middle East, and North and East Africa to Afghanistan between 1982 and 1992 where they were trained in the *madrasses* (training camps that became like virtual universities for future Islamic radicalism where radicals studied, trained and fought together) (Rashid, 2000:130).

Afghanistan has never recovered. A familiar pattern re-emerges with regards to the *Mujaheddin* and the al-Qaeda network, as these two modern political projects have been invented by the United States – indirectly trained, equipped, and financed by the CIA – to put into service the global American campaign against the ‘Evil Empire’ (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:56-57). One cannot but notice how sinister this is. The United States, who uses the historical conflict between Islam and the West to justify its wars on Muslim nations, now abuses this history and exploits the currency of this war of the stereotypes to fight another war that has nothing to do with Islam.¹¹ Clearly then, what is at the heart of what is being explored here, is how America perceives others and how others perceive America. Each culture has its own founding myths and narratives of the ‘Other’ which evidently have come to shape a culture’s way of acting. In the case of the United States, America’s ‘war on terror’ has designated three poor and unconnected states (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) as an ‘axis of evil’, that are considered hostile to America and need to be eradicated, together with any other nations suspected of terror and terrorist activities. This reflection of a “moralist sensitivity to good and evil” has furthermore pointed out that the real axis of political evil running so strongly through the United States in fact underpins the Bush regime (Harmon, 2000:1). This axis, according to Harman (2001:1), includes the oil industry, military-industrial complex (MIC), and other transnationals. These players use Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ to carry out foreign and domestic policies. Apart from Bush himself, Cheney, Rumsfeld, O’Neill and Ashcroft are all important contributors to Bush’s electoral triumph - each of whom have a high level of representation in the administration of the United States. The “Washington Axis” certainly plays its part in accelerating all the ugly trends, wrapping themselves, for example, in the flag to persuade the public to revel in the game of war in order to beat up yet another small opponent (Herman, 2001:2).

This form of grand absolutism is a recipe for disaster as it dehumanises and demonizes relations with the rest of the world that is growing even more

¹¹ This dynamic is looked at more closely in chapters two and three.

interconnected as a result of globalization. It reinforces America's belief that its way is always the right way, while painting the enemy as some embodiment of evil who hates the U.S. (Sardar & Davies, 2000:87). As the historical analysis has shown in the first section of the proposed *genealogy of resistance*, the theological conflicts between Christianity and Islam which stretch as far back as the Crusades, have been used by Western governments, particularly American and British ones, to define Muslims according to stereotypical fabrications which have been incorporated into present knowledge structures when referring to Islam (a common belief is that all Muslims are fundamentalist-loving people). By undertaking such a stance, Western culture has been capable of illustrating that their values and beliefs are by far more advanced and 'peace-loving' than those of Muslims, or terrorists, if you will. In that sense, if the enemy is a bunch of freedom-hating and progress-hating fundamentalists, then it is easier to hate them back.

iv. Saudi Arabia

The House of Saud, controlled by Crown Prince Abdullah, rules Saudi Arabia. Moderate and reformist voices do exist among the Saudi princes, but those voices have little power, because Crown Prince Abdullah is protected by U.S. troops stationed within Saudi Arabia and by weapons provided to his own army by the U.S. Interestingly enough, the Saudis, together with the United States, have had a primary accountability for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism world-wide, especially during the long and disorderly years of the Cold War. In the environment of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia and the United States equally worried about their interests in the Middle East, especially during the heyday of Arab nationalism under Jamal Abdul Nasser, who hoped to cause the downfall of the Saudi government in the 1950's and 1960's (simultaneously with other pro-western governments) (Abukhalil, 2002:58). While the United States was concerned with the threat of communism externally, the Saudis were resolved to maintain political control within the

country. The United States, during the 1980's, however, no longer had a *raison d'être* to encourage the growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism, especially since the events surrounding the trial of assassins of Anwar Sadat in 1981, and more importantly, since the movement had increasingly turned against the United States. The waning importance of the Saudi alliance was also coupled with two noteworthy developments: first, that the Russians and Venezuelans are competing to supplant Saudi Arabia as the leading exporters of oil, and second, that the majority of Middle Eastern countries are siding with the United States in the 'war against terror' (Bergen, 2002:237). Even countries that were sympathetic to Saddam Hussein throughout the Gulf War (such as Yemen and Jordan) are implacably opposed to al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

As a consequence of these developments, there has been a dramatic decline in the friendly relations between the United States and the House of Saud. Broad questioning of the United States' support for the House of Saud has also been implemented because Osama bin Laden comes from a prominent Saudi family and because the majority of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi nationals. In order to distance itself from former relations with Saudi Arabia, the United States began to resurrect older stereotypes of 'the Arab' and Islam in terms of Bedouin, desert, camel, polygamy, harem, and rich oil sheikhs. There was, therefore, no doubt when the world watched in horror on the morning of September 11 that the identity of the people responsible for the attacks had to "be Muslims/Arabs/extremists/fundamentalists, it was unquestionably 'Them'" (Sardar & Davies, 2002:45). The conclusion came before the investigation had even gone ahead or before the evidence was collected. In the broader context, it once again reveals how the history of ideas gets established as 'knowledge' and how these 'facts' subsequently become a common cultural convention. As a hall of mirrors, Orientalism distorts images as not merely being known as popular stereotypes, but as *cultural knowledge* (Sardar & Davies, 2002:53).

v. Palestine

The Palestinian people were promised a state of their own in the 1947 partition plan, which split the region, then under British control, into Palestine and Israel. However, Israel invaded Syria, Jordan and Iraq in 1967 and won a war, which resulted in their seizing a lot more territory from the Palestinians. Since then Israel has continued to occupy Palestinian territory, and refused Palestinian refugees the right to return to which they had been entitled to in the first place under international law. U.S. relations with Israel are but one of the many aspects of U.S. foreign policy that are the major source of irritation and resentment in the Middle East. Viewing Israeli-Palestinian developments from the perspective of the Muslim world, Arjomand (cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:162) claims "the inability of the American superpower to stop the expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory even during the period of the peace accord is incomprehensible." Such incomprehension has even led to the spread of the conspiratorial rumour, widely current in the Arab Middle East that the Jews were behind the World Trade Center attacks as opposed to al-Qaeda. As a matter of fact, more than two years ago, a prophetic document about the U.S. threat posed by terrorism, was only recently released in which it is claimed that "some catastrophic and catalyzing event like Pearl Harbour" was needed that could present "the opportunity of ages" for the United States in following 'The Project of the New American Century' (Internet 17). A series of articles that had been published in the *Washington Post*, repeatedly reveals that the Bush Administration manipulated September 11 as an "opportunity" to go to war with the terrorists (*ibid*). According to a classified document which was made in preparation for Rumsfeld, known as the 'Proactive Pre-emptive Operations Group' (P2OG), terrorist attacks are provoked which will eventually call for "counter attack" by the United States on countries that harbour these terrorists. In other words, innocent people might have been killed *by* the United States on September 11.

Certainly, then, when turning back to the success of the Israelis in the Middle Eastern conflict, their dominant demeanour in Middle Eastern affairs could not have been made possible, if it were not for the support of the United States. Since May 2001, it has been impossible to miss the conspicuous use of American weapons that have been used to destroy Palestinian civilians throughout the Middle East. Under cover of propaganda in which the United States claims to combat Yasser Arafat and his terrorist inclinations, the truly dangerous men, such as Rumsfeld and Cheney, are well aware that Sharon, after all, has a firm hold on the U.S. administration (Mailer , 2003:55). With the Mossad, Sharon has one of the best intelligence services in the Middle East, if not in the world. The CIA, prominent by now for its small members of Arab spies in the Muslim world, cannot do without Sharon's services (*ibid*). The Israelis, in turn, can count on the United States using their veto in the U.N. Security Council to stop most Resolutions against Israeli actions. So the Palestinians hate the United States because they support the Israeli policy of slowly taking over more and more Palestinian land, bulldozing houses and shooting children on their way.

The mutual implication of Foucault's power-knowledge nexus can once again be applied to this post-colonial case study. In the context of *Orientalism*, Western power (in this case that of the United States and particularly the power to enter or examine other countries at will) enables the production of a range of knowledge about other cultures (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:8). Such knowledge in turn enables (legitimizes, underwrites) the deployment of U.S. power in the feud between the Israelis and Palestinians. Consequently, we can also begin to understand Said's point that Orientalism is a cultural and political fact which follows a "distinct and intellectually knowable line" (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:138). With this in mind, it begins to be more apparent that the Israeli-Palestinian example is part of the genealogy of the conflict. As *Orientalism* was such a system of truths, in Nietzsche's sense of the word, the system of representations regarding the religion of Islam began to be framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western awareness (Williams

& Chrisman, 1993:142). At this stage I do not want to press all this any further on general theoretical grounds: it seems to me that the value and credibility of my case can be demonstrated by referring to these case studies to illustrate the ways in which the 'subaltern' native subject is constructed in the discourses (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:16). This reasoning has been carried down from one generation to the next and has led Bush and his handlers determine authoritatively who are the terrorists, who harbours them, and who can build weapons. Israel is of course let off from this regulation and has been given *carte blanche* to smash the Palestinian civil society (Herman, 2002:2).

This then, has been the briefest of summaries of the U.S. activities in the Middle East, yet it highlights more than enough reasons for the countries and people of this region to have an extreme dislike for the U.S. and, given the historical backdrop of West-Orient relations, to articulate this dislike in terms of the historical conflict between them. The developments in Afghanistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Iran gave renewed life to the Islamist movements that had been able to overcome authorities and establish themselves in such Muslim secular states such as Egypt, Syria, or Pakistan (Goldstone, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:146). The Afghan revolution drew Islamist supporters together, gave them a mission, combat experience, and sophisticated weaponry and training ground; under the Taliban, they gained a territorial base. These supporters all had the common desire to destroy the dominance of the Western power and culture in the world, and to undermine that power and prestige that the Western allies had in the world. With repeated wars against the Arab nations by the Western allies, these Islamic warriors felt that the events from the 1970's through to 2001 created a formidable basis for an international Islamic movement that is prepared to use terror in order to advance its goals.

In their book entitled *Why Do People Hate America?* Ziauddin Sardar and Meryll Wyn Davies (2002), take the question of hostility towards Americans even further. By turning their attention to the background and context of September 11 and the problems that would have existed irrespective of such a

crime, they give an exposition of the problem of relations between America and the rest of the world (as illustrated in the above-mentioned examples). Their inquiry is extremely relevant to this study, for unless the background of the attacks is revealed and made part of the debate, there is little hope of understanding the *genealogy of resistance* that led to 9/11.

* * *

3. 'Why Do People Hate Americans?'

As a 'hyper power', America affects the lives of people all around the world. Yet, many Americans are not even aware of the actual consequences of U.S. engagement with the rest of the world (Sardar & Davies, 2000:11). Many Americans are held back from achieving a better understanding of how their government is perceived by knowing so little about their own history, and even less about the history of other peoples. This is one of the central problems that Sardar and Davies (2002) try to illuminate when they answer the question so often posed by Americans: "Why do they hate us?" In more precise terms they call it the problem of 'knowledgeable ignorance' - Americans maintain a particular view of other cultures and belief systems even though the means exist to know differently. Knowledgeable ignorance is a term that is more than just general negative attitudes and ideas (Sardar & Davies, 2000:51;11-12). Rather, it defines the ways in which certain attitudes (in this case the way the West views Islam and Muslims in particular) are built into an approach to knowledge, a body of study and expertise called *Orientalism*. The problem of knowledge is not exclusive to the United States alone but also to the Western civilization in general. Europeans, for example, often see Africa and Africans as inferior. They use their history and their civilization as a yardstick for what is acceptable and reasonable. Anything that slightly deviates from that norm is seen as 'abnormal' or 'backward.'

Recently Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was metaphorically carpeted for blurting out that he considered the Western civilization superior to the Islamic civilization:

We must be aware of the superiority of our civilization, a system that has guaranteed well-being, respect for human rights and – in contrast with Islamic countries – respect for religious and political rights.

- Berlusconi, cited in Internet 5

Berlusconi was attacked from all sides after that statement and was even forced to apologise to the Arab ambassador to Rome, because it was feared that his statement might damage the dramatic efforts of allies. Suspicion and apprehension in America and Europe towards Islam is further heightened by the existence of the large Muslim communities in major cities. Take my country of origin, for example, the Netherlands, where this phenomenon sustains feelings of apprehension toward the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. They are perceived as a threat to their own life style – leading to the rise of xenophobia and the boost in the popularity of the extreme right, which blames the rise in unemployment and crime on immigrants. Muslims, like Jews in the past, find themselves in Western cultural contexts where they are often regarded as completely 'Other.' This approach risks painting all Muslims, and indeed Islam itself, as violent, rather than carefully distinguishing between a radical fringe and the mainstream, those who manipulate and distort the religion to justify their actions and the Islamic tradition itself.

Once again, we could say that we have come full circle. It is like we are back in 1492 when the Crusaders induced anti-Muslim sentiments which resulted in the final expulsion of the Moors from Spain. In orchestrating the *genealogy of resistance*, it is central to refer back to this historical connection. The significance of Orientalism as a discourse should not be underestimated as the stereotypes which became established as 'facts' have had a significant influence on both the 'Western' and 'Eastern' side of the divide. The realities of colonialism and imperialism, forgotten or conveniently overlooked by many in the West, are part of the living legacy, firmly implanted in the memory of many.

If there is an 'Islamic threat', many Arabs and Muslims also believe that there has also been a 'Western threat' - of political, economic, and cultural imperialism. Just how Western politicians used 'Islamophobia' and their anti-Muslim brigade as a weapon to make sure that 'the (Islamic) threat' is kept before our eyes - "assuring profitable consultancies, frequent TV appearances and book sales" (Internet 25) - so too is anti-American propaganda used as a means to embrace the present-day *Jihad* against the United States and its allies. The established doctrine of *Jihad* (in the sense of the 'Holy War', lit. 'exerting oneself to the utmost') has for all time been measured as a salient feature of Islam by Western observers (Peters, 1979:6). Anti-colonial struggle, above all during the first stages of the European expansion into the Islamic world, was often enthused by religion and armed struggle was waged under the banner of *Jihad*. Later, however, when secular ideologies began to dictate the anti-colonial struggle, proclamations of *Jihad* have turned out to be more part of the common war propaganda directed at the U.S. and its Western allies.

The doctrine of *Jihad* is still a hotly debated issue in the Islamic as well as the Western world, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. As the doctrine is concerned with the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, the modern writings of *Jihad* reflect the attitude of the modern Muslims towards the Western powers (Peters, 1979:2). Fundamentalists such as Osama bin Laden have, therefore, formed the impression that the purpose of *Jihad* is to corroborate the complete superiority of Islam.

Thus, by using *Jihad* as an anti-American propaganda slogan it is hoped that the Muslim population can rebel against Western domination as long as these struggles can be ideologically professed by those people that take part in them. Because of their preoccupation with political activism, leaders of contemporary Islamism have been more concerned with emphasizing segments of the Qur'an that serve their purposes (as illustrated in the above - extensive reduced quoting of verses) than with interpreting the texts itself. Consequently, by using the *Jihad* doctrine, Islamic fundamentalists use this movement as a

validation for using terror as a means to fight the United States and its Western allies.

Extreme dislike for America has a deeper root; it is to be found in the imposed inability of other societies and cultures to live as they would wish to live. Whether it is because of America's support of the state of Israel (seen by many in the Arab world as a U.S. armed and funded colony) or because of Washington's support for authoritarian regimes such as those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and many others; or alternatively, because of the United States to intervene militarily in the developing world (Sardar & Davies, 2000:67). The Arab world sees America as the main culprit and the continuing source of their predicaments, and which accounts for their hostility towards it. They feel that, even though the U.S. may be an open society, the government operates in such a way that outside concerns and voices cannot penetrate its self-interests.

Indeed, the *Jihad* doctrine could be said to have come about as a result of many obvious reasons to hate America. In the preliminary stages of European colonialism in the Islamic world, Muslims in many places vigorously resisted the new situation and appealed to the doctrine of *Jihad* in order to activate the population, to rationalize the struggle and to identify the enemy (Peters, 1979:2). During the 1980's, for example, when the Palestinians called for an *Intifada* against Western powers, as their political concessions were not met, *Jihad* had two main goals: self-determination and liberation from Israeli occupation, and secondly, democracy, accountability and good governance (Klein, 2002:2).

History, may well have taken a different course if the year of the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan would not have taken place. From the day the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, American diplomatic strategy was to mobilise world opinion against the Soviets. Afghanistan was doomed to be a pawn and given the highly conservative nature of the Afghan society and the spontaneous resistance to the Afghan communist regime, it did not take a genius to suggest that Islamic international solidarity could be used as a powerful weapon. Given the fact that the super powers were non-Muslims, the

doctrine of *Jihad* was well suited for these purposes (Peters, 1979:2). The result of the contradictions that were presented during the Afghan war, has led Muslim thinkers to reinterpret the doctrine of *Jihad* which was done in the general framework of modernity. To the best of my knowledge, *chapter two* offers a deeper analysis of the role of *Jihad* within the framework of the doctrine's new interpretations which paradoxically turned al-Qaeda into a modern phenomenon.

As the American government both exemplifies the distinction between 'us' and 'them', professors and foreign policy experts still weigh in about Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' model for viewing the future of international relations. Huntington's thesis supplied Americans with "a new phase" in world politics after the Cold War and his terms of arguments seem, large, bold and visionary even today (Internet 20). Does a *genealogy* of the conflict between the East and the West which resulted in September 11, such as this, buy into or confirm the fundamental binary as propagated by Huntington? Is there an essential, perhaps even metaphysical difference between Islam and the West that bears testimony to a history of conflict and which casts its shadow over the future?

* * *

4. Exploring the Scholarly Debate about the 'Clash of Civilizations'

According to many Western commentators, since the late 1970's, and more particularly, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Islam and the West, are on a collision course. Despite attempts to evade it, it appears to Westerners that the ultimate aim of fundamentalist terrorism is to muster the Muslim masses against the United States and Europe. In initiating the campaign against Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization, Western leaders repeatedly stated that it was not a war against Islam nor a "clash of cultures", but only the need to eradicate a group of dangerous fanatics that signify a threat for the world as a whole (Internet 21). This 'truth' is embodied in a historic statement of the U.S. State Department in June 1992: "...the United States Government does not view Islam as the next 'ism' confronting the West or threatening world peace" (*ibid*).

Huntington (1996:20) posited that the basis of friendships between nation states would be civilizational affinity and the world may be seen as being composed of civilizations that overlay nation states. He identifies several civilizations including Western-Christian, Eastern-Christian, Islamic, Hindu and others. In the case of nation states like Germany and France belonging to the same civilizations, there is little likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, when two or more civilizations meet on the ground, as in former Yugoslavia, it can give rise to conflict. The boundary where two or more civilizations meet, is to be seen as a 'civilizational fault line' (Huntington, 1996:22). Yugoslavia furnishes a particularly good example as it is the meeting ground of three civilisations (as conceived by Huntington) - Western (Croatia), Eastern (Serbia) and Islamic (Bosnia-Herzegovina).

The challenge for Western policy makers, says Huntington, is to make sure that the West gets stronger and fends off all the others, Islam in particular. Said (Internet 20) describes Huntington as an 'ideologist', someone who wants to make 'civilizations' and 'identities' into what they are not. Huntington

divides the globe into nine occasionally awkward tectonic plates: Western (led by the U.S), Orthodox, Islamic, Hindu, Confucian and Japanese, with Latin America and Africa more doubtfully classified as 'candidates' for civilizational status (Huntington, 1996:45-46). He envisages friction in all directions along the borders between these civilizational plates, and also within civilizations. At various times, the vast and increasing global reach of Western power and influence will bring civilizational groups into conflict with each other (the West against the Rest) (Huntington, 1996:43). In particular, there will be two major clashes: one in the short term with a resurgent Islam, and perhaps more portentously, a long-term clash with the emergent China.

Following the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama, an old student of Huntington, also wrote a book in which he proclaimed that it was the "End of History." The idea was that in a unipolar world, with no superpower rivalry to fuel them, economic activity would be everyone's prime anxiety and that any conflicts would be contained (Internet 18). This utopian visualization was reconfirmed by Western powers, because of the outbreak of religious and ethnic conflicts, in many parts of the world (*ibid*). Faced with this reality, some political scientists in the West tried to explain them in terms of civilizations rather than economic and political terms or ideologies that dominated the Cold War era. Thus, in the post Cold-War period there is a salient tendency to define Islam as a new threat or as the enemy of the West following the collapse of Soviet Communism. The discourse of 'the Clash of Civilizations' certainly gained a new momentum in the Western media and literature after the U.S. Vice-President, Dan Quale, and the Secretary-General of NATO, Willy Claes, publicly identified Islam as succeeding communism as the greatest threat to Western security (Internet 21).

This also explains why there is a pronounced tendency to find the roots of terror in Islam and not in any other religion. As a matter of fact, the discourse on the 'Clash of Civilizations' happened for reasons that not many people have spoken of. There has been for centuries, a conflict between Islam and Christendom. Now, Christianity knew how to come to terms with Islam

per se. But it did not know how to come to terms with political Islam. Political Islam, in any situation, is linked with territorial expansion of the Muslim community. In the first half of the 20th century, the Western hemisphere did all that it could to ruin socialist and communist ideas and with the self-destruction of communism and socialism in the 1990's, the spectre of the 'Other Enemy' had to be found.

Gopal (2001) maintains that the United States has marshalled all her resources and rhetoric to the destruction of the 'Other.' Even if there were no Osama bin Laden, he would have been invented and nurtured by the United States. This is dangerous as the annihilation of Osama and the Taliban will only produce more bin Ladens.

No one can justify terrorism. What is happening in Kashmir, the kind of terrorism aided and abetted by Pakistan, is not acceptable. Nobody is going to support it. But then when do you find a solution? The solution does not lie in just targeting one individual or one community or one country. Earlier it was Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Before it was (Yasser) Arafat and the Palestinians. And now it is bin Laden and the Taliban.

- Hasan, cited in Gopal, 2001:2

Similarly, in their well-structured study, Andrea Lueg and Jochen Hippler (Internet 21) point out the hypothesis in which they assess the real impulses behind the Western perceptions of Islam:

We no longer have the Soviet Union or Communism to serve as the enemies justifying expensive and extensive military apparatus. It was in the mid 1980's at the very latest that the search began for new enemies to justify arms budgets and offensive military policies, at first part of the Communist threat and then in its place.

* * *

5. *Culture Clash or Clash of Ignorance?*

After September 11 and with the growth of terrorism, many people in the West (and elsewhere) thought that the carefully planned suicide attacks by a small group of militants have been turned into proof of Huntington's thesis. President Bush in a few words in the post-September 11 address, to the joint House of Congress stated: "This is the world's fight. This is a civilization's fight" (Bush, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:295). Clearly underpinning the speeches of Western leaders such as Bush and Blair is the conviction that they represent the modern world while al-Qaeda are, in some sense, a throwback to an earlier time, with "a medieval theology and atavistic notions of society" (Brown, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:296).

The assumption in all this, though generally unstated, is that terrorism is to be equated with the Islamic civilization (Huntington himself rejected it, but it was too late to have much effect). However, Western leaders, including President George W. Bush clarified that the extremists' elements within the Muslim world did not represent Muslims as such, but themselves only. A preponderant majority of Muslims worldwide have always been of the opinion that the idea of a monumental clash between Islam and the West is highly dangerous and must be discouraged at any cost. The boldness of people like Osama can be highly destructive. Muslim critics of Huntington furthermore see his theory as an exercise to defend Western interests. They point out that he is too ready to portray the non-Western nations as belligerent while ignoring the West's record of aggression and domination (Internet 25). Huntington's thesis is seen as a product or function of the historical conflict between Islam and the West and not, as he himself presents it, as a natural, historical account of it. Huntington's 'Clash of Civilization' thesis is therefore part of a perpetuation of the myth that drives the conflict, rather than a description of it.

Another criticism directed against Huntington's thesis, is that it is difficult to identify Islam as a monolithic civilization, as there have been, and

continue to be, conflicts within Islam (Internet 19). Geopolitical theories like the 'Clash of Civilizations' make the facile assumption that human beings everywhere think and behave the same way and have similar priorities dominated by economic interests. To scholars in the secularized humanist West, it is inconceivable that people would lay down their lives for religious or cultural beliefs. Also, with terrorism striking in places, as far apart as, New York, Kenya, Moscow, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Bali, there is no distinct 'fault line' (*ibid*). In reality, terrorism represents no civilization and follows no boundaries.

In addition, the reactions against September 11, were not along civilizational lines, as evidence from the Asian nations suggests, since states such as Muslim Indonesia, Buddhist Thailand, and Hindu India, acted more as states than as civilizations (Acharya, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:195). Religion and civilization do not replace pragmatism, interest and principle as the guiding motives of international relations. When asked to pick sides between the terrorists and Washington, these Asian countries overwhelmingly sided with the United States, despite the support given by the US to Israel.

Why governments acted this way speaks more to pragmatism and principle than to their cultural disposition and civilizational affinity. National interest, regime security and modern principles of international conduct were placed ahead of primordial sentiment and religious identity.

- Acharya, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:195

The afore-mentioned quote furthermore exemplifies that Huntington's thesis is naïve because it assumes that countries will act in accordance with their civilizational identity. On the contrary, if the Asian countries reacted to Bush's plea to join the global 'war on terror', it is not because they had a civilizational affiliation with the United States, but rather political-economic agendas that needed to be met.

The most effective critique of Huntington's theory, however, has come from Esposito (1992) who warns against the risk of theories like that of Huntington as they de-emphasize the commonly shared ground between civilizations and emphasize distinctions alone. Esposito rejects the notion of a 'Clash of Civilizations' between the West and Islam as a rehash of old imperialist theories. As mentioned earlier, Esposito is saying here about Huntington what was said previously, namely that this thesis is part of a genealogy and not a neutral description of it. "There is no one West, no one Islam: and to speak of civilizations in isolated entities defies the very logic and nature of what civilization is all about" (Internet 1). The question, explains Esposito, is whether the United States truly believes in the promotion of self-determination for everyone, or is selective when it comes to the Middle East and the Muslim world. "If the U.S. and Europe are really concerned about the promotion of democratization and human rights, then they have to be consistent with regard to that policy" (*ibid*). Otherwise, says Esposito, "they will be vulnerable to anger that contributes to the conditions that allow Islam to be hijacked and used to legitimate the kind of terrorist actions that we have seen on September 11" (Esposito, cited in Abdel-Latif, 2001:5).

* * *

6. Conclusion

A crucial aspect of this chapter was with regards to the distinctive Foucaultian approach to history. With reference to Said's (1978) *Orientalism*, it has been seen that subjectivity is critical to Foucault's account of power and hence his account of power-knowledge. In being productive, power produces subjects. While subjects are products, this does not mean that they are not active; they are active in producing themselves as subjects in the sense of those subjected to power. For Foucault and Said alike, the subject is produced through discourse. Subjects are therefore, the punctuation of discourse, and provide the bodies on and through which discourse may act. The disciplines of knowledge, such as anthropology, development studies and political science, interpret the rest of the world, not only for use in shaping politics and policy of the West, but also in explaining the rest of the world to itself. In the light of all of this, texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality that they appear to describe. In time such knowledge produces a tradition, or what Michael Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence is responsible for the texts that are produced out of it. The contemporary intellectual can learn from *Orientalism* and apply it to the discourse of the 'Clash of Civilizations' and that of 'Islamophobia' in order to distinguish the human ground in which texts, visions, methods, and disciplines begin to grow, thrive and eventually degenerate.

When looking at the background noise of cultural *clichés* that both Arabs and Westerners have about each other, it becomes apparent that both Christians and Muslims prevent themselves from learning more about other people and their way of being. With the most highly developed education system and institutions of scholarship, it is not difficult to notice how badly informed Americans are of world affairs. They are not aware of the leaders of other countries or where these countries are situated. Americans are ignorant of their own history, let alone the history of the world (Sardar & Davies, 2000:200). America's uniquely and self-interested way in defining and

redefining herself, and most chillingly, the way in which she defines the way in which others people have to be seen and characterized, puts her in a position to have the power to define the welfare and well-being of others which often leads to the misrepresentation of entire groups of people. Because stereotypes are so widespread and so deeply interwoven into the fabric of American and Muslim societies, it will be difficult for genealogists to unpick them.

By looking at the events leading up to September 11, 2001, one finds that at the heart of it all are misinterpretations and a clash of viewpoints as opposed to a 'Clash of Civilizations.' While a 'Clash of Civilizations' can become the clarion call that justifies aggression and warfare, future global threats and wars will be due less to a 'Clash of Civilizations' than a clash of interests, economic and otherwise.

A civilizational clash is not so much over Jesus Christ, Confucius, or the Prophet Mohammad as it is over unequal distribution of world power and those who do not, those who control the world's destiny and those who are the subjects of control.

- Fuller, cited in Sezgin, 2000:4

* * *

Chapter Two

Globalization and Resistance From Within

Jihad is a rapid response to colonialism and imperialism and their economic children, capitalism and modernity; its diversity run amok, multiculturalism turned cancerous so that cells keep dividing long after their division has ceased to serve the healthy corpus

- Barber, 1996:11

1. Introduction

After September 11, America's 'war on terror' soon saturated the media with one or another cultural theory of politics ¹ (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44). From a simple Huntingtonian version of a 'Clash of Civilizations', we now read more refined notions of a clash *within* civilizations: specifically, we are told that 'bad Muslims' have hijacked Islam, which 'good Muslims' must now be ready to define. In other words, what we seem to be experiencing is a struggle in which each culture grapples with the ambivalence of modernity. We live in a world so integrated, where everyday operations are geared at each other, that there are instant global consequences to any interruption. The disruption of the world transport system, international meetings and institutions, global markets, and even whole economies, can happen with a speed unthinkable in any previous period. The implication is

¹ "This is a theory to define cultures according to their presumed 'essential' characteristics, especially as regards politics" (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44).

that the only way forward is a civil war inside a quarantined culture (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44).

In his powerful book, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1996), Benjamin Barber illustrates how “the collision between the forces of integrative modernization and aggressive economic cultural globalization (*McWorld*) and disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism (*Jihad*)” have been exacerbated by the dialectical interdependence that these seemingly oppositional forces exert (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:245). Barber’s use of the term *Jihad* is understood as “the struggle of local peoples to sustain solidarity and tradition against the nation-state’s legalistic and pluralistic abstractions as well as against the new commercial imperialism of *McWorld*” (Barber, 1996:232). “*McWorld* is a kind of virtual reality, created by invisible, but omnipotent high-tech information networks and fluid transnational economic markets” (Barber, 1996:26). It is merely a natural culmination of the modernization process that has gone on since the end of the Renaissance birth of modern science and its accompanying paradigm of knowledge constructed as power.

The purpose of this chapter is to refer to Barber’s explanations of *Jihad* and *McWorld’s* dialectical interdependence in order to exemplify how September 11 was as much the challenger of modernity as its child. The two are locked together in such a way that neither is able to coexist with the other, nor is complete without the other. I want to suggest here, as Mamdani does, (in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44) that one needs to go beyond an earlier round of discussions associated with Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (which demonized Islam in its entirety). As will become clear, the problem is larger than claiming that all suicide bombers are Muslim. It lies with an undisguised argument in which tribalists and fundamentalists have recognized modernity as their adversary (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44). Central to the post-September analytical predicament should be a line of reasoning that traces the political histories of the modern roots of the *Jihad* movement. In other words, the political tendencies of indirect rule as exercised by the colonial powers have mistreated and avoided the history of the

emergence of the *Jihad* movement. Rather than dismissing history altogether, the *Jihad* movement, as promoted by al-Qaeda, is “a modern ensemble at the service of a modern project” (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:46).

* * *

2. World Politics in a Globalized Era

Globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon in world history; indeed, many argue that it is a new name for a long-term feature. Dani Nabudere, in his article, *Globalization, The Post Colonial African State, Post-Traditionalism, and the New World Order*, suggests as Tandon does, (cited in Nabudere, 2000:11) that one could perceive globalization as either a completely new phenomenon or “an old enemy in a new guise.” In many respects globalization has countless qualities in common with modernization theory (Baylis & Smith, 1997:7). It seems that modernization is a component of the globalization process, in that industrialization brings into existence a whole new set of contacts between societies, and changes the political, and economic processes that characterized the pre-modern world (*ibid*). The importance of economic interrelations and modern technology has been influential in establishing what Marshall McLuhan (1964) calls the ‘global village’ in which people, nations and economies, are intertwined closer than ever before (Bayliss & Smith, 1997:8).

Globalization could be described as a fast train: “either you jump in from the start, or you are out forever” (Amalric, 2002:100). Claude Ake (cited in Nabudere, 2000:11) defines globalization as the “march of capital all over the world in search of profits.” The marginalized in society are indispensable for the capitalist system as they allow capitalism to continue its enhancement of “capital accumulation” (Nabudere, 2000:12). So, while globalization brings the world closer together, the global divide between developed and developing or underdeveloped states is widening at an extraordinary rate. The ‘weaker’ societies become marginalized, swept to the periphery of the world economic forum. In this regard, globalization is a very uneven process, where serious inequalities exist with regards to the distribution of benefits and losses.

The consequence of the imposition of the Western values and beliefs which accompany globalization, therefore, do not take into account many of

the inherent cultural differences that countries experience when they are 'forced' to take part in the global process. It ignores the devastating impact that it has on the developing states. The result, as we have witnessed over the years, is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. It is just the beginning of *culture* playing an increasingly substantial role as a way to resist and oppose globalization (Nabudere, 2000:50; emphasis mine). Globalization should not just be studied with an emphasis on the rising global village, but more attention should be paid to counter-movements that are resisting this process and that this view would be particularly important with relation to Africa and other Third World States (*ibid*). It cannot be a globalization where one part of the world is exploited so that the other part can retain a privileged position. Globalization can only be talked of, only if all cultures and traditions are taken into consideration and not just those advocated by the West (Nabudere, 2000:50).

Indeed, a few years earlier, Huntington's former student, Francis Fukuyama, had come up with his own theory of the end of history, in which he anticipated the onset of globalization by arguing that with Western democratic liberalism and market capitalism, the rest of history would become a kind of American mopping-up operation. Fukuyama's theory is not even that far-fetched when referring to the predicament Third World countries find themselves in. They live in an environment of despairing rage, as American unilateralism is really a form of arrogant imperialism and a betrayal of democratic principles. Because of its competitive nature, globalization has led to conflicts, tiffs, and annoyances - between governments and between people. More importantly, these jealousies by chance erupt into a struggle for dominance, an attempt of people to ensure that their communities are free from elimination, butchery, enslavement, absorption, exploitation, or domination by others. As Hobbes once said:

In all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of

their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours...

- Hobbes, cited in Nossal, 1998:484

From the earliest civilizations to the modern nation-state, these sources of division can be variable, and deeply dependent on context. Language, race, class, tribe, religion, nationality, ideology, wealth - are but a few of the facets of the human condition that may well be "the hinge on which division is hung" (Nossal, 1998:483). It is true that there are those who see new enmities lurking in the shadows. Indeed, the 'Clash of Civilizations' argument examined in the last chapter encourages this tendency in which the enemy's 'Otherness' is reasserted.

A good example of this dynamic at work at present is the demonization of Islam, particularly in the United States. Now more than ever, the term 'green peril' (after the colour usually associated with Islam), is replacing the 'red peril' (used by the Americans to describe Communism) and the 'yellow peril' (to describe China). Indeed, Samuel P. Huntington even feels comfortable writing that "Islam has bloody borders", as though the interethnic conflict between Muslims and others in different countries can somehow be attributed to religion and as if only Islam is guilty of this (Huntington, cited in Nossal, 1998:486). The 'Clash of Civilization' thesis assumes a degree of homogeneity among Islamic rebellions, which they evidently do not possess. It is a serious mistake to treat all Muslims as belonging to a single homogenous whole. Some may point to the statements made by the Bush administration that attempt to distinguish between 'good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' with the implication that Islam must be quarantined so that the devil can be exorcised from it by means of a civil war (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44). The Secretary of State's call may be seen as unbiased and appropriate in the wake of the September 11 attacks, but the real profound biases of culture are revealed in the simple fact that the same biases are not applied to all. Christian leaders are not exhorted to reign in 'bad Christians' after abortion clinics are bombed by

Christian fundamentalists, or when African-American immigrants are victimized by the burning crosses and hate crimes of the KKK.

Mamdani's (2003:45) argument goes beyond the point that if there are 'good' Muslims and 'bad' Muslims, there ought to also be 'good' Westerners and 'bad' Westerners. The politics and power that have come about as a result of reading Islamist and Western politics as an effect of Islamic and Western civilization, then can be understood as a result of an encounter which will neither be understood in isolation, nor external to the history of that encounter (*ibid*). Aside from the feelings of anti-Westernism - common to most - and over the Palestinian question - common to all - deep schisms divide Muslims (Legum, 1991:3). Thus, the Muslim world is deeply divided *within* itself. Many of the extremist groups now being branded as Islamic or terrorist (or both), are combating their own governments, whether, or not, these governments are associated with the United States or not (Acharya, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:197). It is, therefore, very much so a clash *within* civilizations rather than *between* civilizations.

The impact of globalization, and in particular the emergence of global financial markets, poses an even greater challenge to the autonomy of different peoples and their communities. Now, more than ever, the modern world is a complex jumble. The truth is that the neo-liberal utopians live by the myth that globalization will fill the world with liberal republics, linked together in peace and trade (Gray, 2003:118). Yet this newfound ability of capital, corporations and technology to move around the planet almost instantly, did nothing Western, or modern to allow different communities to coexist peacefully. In fact, as societies throughout the world became more modern they often grew further apart in a world which has encouraged a move of governance away from a distinct focus of the state-system to a multi-layered complex of rule making and order creation where rule is sovereign (Bayliss & Smith, 1997:26). Now that politics lacks a clear centre of command and control of the kind previously provided by the Westphalian state has been taken away, one cannot but wonder what the implications are for the developments of democracy. The

following section poses a critical normative question, namely, what is happening to democracy in the contemporary globalizing world?

* * *

3. Democratization in the Context of Globalization

Economic globalization has entered a critical phase. A mounting backlash against its effects, especially, in the industrial democracies, is threatening a very disruptive impact on economic activity and social stability in many countries. The mood in these democracies is one of helplessness and anxiety, which helps explain the rise of a new brand of populist politicians. This can easily be turned into a revolt

- Barber, 1996:298

True champions of *laissez-faire* have argued that globalization and democratization would be two sides of the same coin, yet even those states who receive top rating from Amnesty International hardly ever specially consult their populations on global policies (Bayliss & Smith, 1997:27). So the real enthusiasts claim that the market enlarges the scope for popular participation and control. However, this vision has proven to be contrary to 'popular' belief, since in the present-day globalizing world, the construction of rules takes place mainly through *elite* opposition rather than through representative, let alone participatory democracy (Bayliss & Smith, 1997:26).

Barber's analysis in *Jihad vs. McWorld* articulates the latter point considerably as he places emphasis on democratization in the context of globalization. Barber's main concern is with something that he refers to as 'participatory democracy' or 'civil society', a kind of political system in which each individual takes an active role in nearly every decision in government. The cutting line that Barber would like to pencil in is between good, democratic civil society and a dire, vulgar McWorld (Internet 8). He sees both *Jihad* and *McWorld* as threats to the system, *Jihad*, because it represents a cultural sectarianism rooted in race which:

...holds out the grim prospect of a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization of

nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and mutuality: against technology, against pop culture, and against integrated markets; against modernity itself as well as the future in which modernity issues.

- Barber, 1996:4

McWorld, because it represents:

...onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerizes peoples everywhere with fast music, fast computers, and fast food – MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's – pressing nations into one homogenous global theme park, one world tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitously apart and reluctantly together at the very same moment.

- Barber, 1996:4

According to Barber, the nation-state, the institutional cradle of democracy and citizenship, is being threatened by *McWorld* for the simple reason that it takes away from people their conventional political communities - subverting these communities' power to regulate their own forms of behaviour (Internet 8). Barber gives a provocative insight that the world is becoming simultaneously more homogenous and diverse which subsequently questions the validity of the frame as "markets are not designed to do the things...invent the common language of 'we' (Barber, 1996:242). Naomi Klein (2002:283) adds to Barber's point when she refers to 'free' speech and how meaningless it is as the voice of the commercial mainstream is everywhere. To subdue the inherent tension in the frame is to substitute and humanize it in order for individuals "to adapt to their own interests and their own rules" (Praeg, 2003:72). The frame could be described as the capitalist, consumer society that constructs the identities of people through public spaces (these are "spaces in which the contemporary subject has to find a voice and speak out against a variety of forms of domination that are at once political, economic

and cultural" (Praeg, 2003:28). Benjamin Barber (1996:220) offers an eloquent description of this process in *Jihad vs. McWorld* when he writes:

The apparent widening of consumer choices actually shrinks the field of social choices and forces infrastructural changes no public community ever consciously either selects or rejects. For example, the American's freedom to choose among scores of automobile brands was secured by sacrificing the liberty to choose between private and public transportation, and mandated a world in which strip malls, suburbs, high gas consumption, and traffic jams became inventible and omnipresent without ever having been the willed choice of some democratic decision-making body or that matter of individuals who like driving automobiles and chose to buy one. This politics of commodity offers a superficial expansion of options within a determined frame in return for surrendering the right to determine the frame.

The *McLibel*¹³ trial of the mid 80's was a project that typified the kinds of resistance aimed at democratizing our civil spaces (Praeg, 2003:66). By meeting the multinational face to face in the witness stand *McWorld* began to acknowledge the force of the 'ordinary' - that they too have the power to make a difference and to:

encourage and empower ordinary people to articulate their own needs and rights, to understand how society is really functioning and in whose vested interests, and to be able to take partial stapes to fight for their own interests individually and collectively with others.

- Morris, cited in Praeg, 2003:71

¹³ In 1985 two ordinary people, a gardener and a bartender, confronted one of the largest transnationals, McDonald's, by taking them to court. According to Morris and Steele, McDonald's symbolized everything that they considered wrong with the prevailing corporate mentality. Although they were both well - aware of the fact that as ordinary people the odds were stacked up against them, they wanted to ensure that McDonald's would not succeed in silencing them. What the *McLibel* trial brought to our attention is that within the frames there are alternative frames - we have more choices than we are led to believe (Praeg, 2003:69). *McWorld* started to become a form of oppression and "transnational corporations often became more powerful and even less accountable than local and national governments - hence they should also have no right to suppress free public debate over their activities" (Morris, cited in Praeg, 2003:69).

Consumerism sells itself as the grand democratizing strength, but in reality mass culture exists to reinstate and reiterate the cultural inequalities and class distinctions in society. This could be referred to as the ambiguity of consumption, as consumption seems to operate as an explanation of democratization in a stratified society, while at the same time operating to reinforce this very stratification. This paradox, epitomized by the *McLibel* trial and typical of the globalization discourse, has very effectively revealed the contortions of the system. These contortions are notably the assumed affinity between capitalism and democracy.

3.1 The Antidemocratic Animus of Jihad

Historian John Pocock asks 'whether the subordination of the sovereign community of citizens to the international operation of post-industrial market forces' is a good or bad step in the architecture of a post-modern politics'. My answer here is: bad. No, not bad, disastrous.

- Barber, 1996:236

Democrats once dreamed of a society where the common language of the market with its accompanying currency would produce common behaviours that would flower out any inequalities in the world. It was believed that by shrinking the world and by diminishing the salience of national borders, the prevailing market imperative would push against national boundaries in search of an international economic emporium (Internet 2). By introducing the Enlightenment dream of a universal rational society that has been homogenized through technological innovations, it seemed as if the quest for universal solutions was complete (*ibid*).

As individuals we have always have the desire for the most attractive democratic ideal - the yearning for self-government, some expression of

partaking, liability, and most of all, to be represented (Internet 2). It would be expected that living in a democratic society would allow for self-determining communities to open up to others as well as respecting their values and idea of community (Barber, 1996:279). While the majority of us seem to think that democracy is a "universal prescription for some singularly remarkable form of government", it really is a certain fashion how to live our lives (*ibid*). The way that democratic life presents itself makes one believe that it lays the foundations for self-determining communities. Yet, these communities are constantly open to outside influences which impose a firm sense of their own values (Barber, 1996:279).

Tragically, 'democratic capitalism' does not do what 'strong democracy' should represent.¹⁴ The reality is that it does not engage citizens in civic activity or civic judgement. Increasingly, we are finding ourselves in an era in which nation-states are stranded as the rights of their citizens are eclipsed. This contradiction is precisely what al-Qaeda is fighting against; their first priority is with the reinvention of democratic citizenship (Barber, 1996:275;284). To be sure, global government, above all democratic global government, does not nurture a democratic civil society. *McWorld's* market imperative has done nothing to live up to its democratic claim of creating freer societies. The pursuit for science and technology compels 'open' societies yet in this high-tech commercial world there is nothing that looks particularly democratic. Governments of today, especially those of developing countries, have allowed markets to push them around by allowing international banks into thinking that *laissez-faire* capitalist economics is a self-contained collective system (Barber, 1996:238). As will be seen below, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn refers to this system as 'savage capitalism' - "fraught with unproductive, savage and repulsive forms of behaviour, the plunder of the nation's wealth" (*ibid*). A powerful irony is at work here in which:

¹⁴ 'Strong democracy' is a term that Barber (1992:7) describes as "a system that suits the political needs of decentralized communities as well as theocratic and national party dictatorships."

Capitalism and democracy have a relationship, but it is something less than a marriage. An efficient free market after all requires that consumers be free to vote their dollars on competing goods, not that citizens be free to vote their values and beliefs of competing political candidates and programs.

- Barber, 1992:4

As a result of the emergence of the 'relationship' that capitalism and democracy exert has led to an ever-greater degree of rebellious fractions, that not only claim to be at war with modernity, but also with the traditional nation-state (Internet 2). Increasingly, these forces that Barber calls *Jihad* are working in the opposite direction of *McWorld's* movement towards homogenization. The mood expressed by *Jihad* is thus to go to war with *McWorld* as an expression of community, in order to resecure their parochial identities and to redraw their boundaries. Culture has, therefore, been implicated at the forefront of superstructure as the real players are no longer nations, but tribes that use identity politics and multicultural diversity to represent strategies for a free society (Barber, 1996:8-9). The first priority of the angry brothers of *Jihad* is thus with the reconstruction of civil society by giving it a voice with which to speak which has been left stranded within nation-states devoted to democratic citizenship (Barber, 1996:284).

On that token, Jean Jacques Rousseau once wrote that freedom is: "a food easy to eat but hard to digest" (Rousseau, cited in Barber, 1992:8). Yet freedom, if ever achieved by *McWorld's* prisoners of cultural monism, comes at a price. If the United States is undeniably interested in constructing a democratic architecture for the world, it needs to operate on the premise that the world does not have to join *McWorld* in order to "suffer the consequences" (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:253). Rather, it is essential that as citizens of the global village, we remove ourselves from the realities of interdependence so that we can negotiate on an equal footing. On the global plane today, the freedom of the market has helped to sustain the freedom of politics which in

turn has led to the globalization of democracy. Precisely because democracy is political and is defined by sovereignty, globalization has left this political institution 'trapped' in the nation-state box (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:258). In fact, the paradoxical interdependence between *Jihad* and *McWorld* has given democracy little chance to embark on creating a civil society that reflects a democratic way of life. Wrestling with the terrors of *Jihad*, and the insufficiencies of *McWorld*, have appeared to leave little or no opportunity for a dialectical interplay between these two forces in which global democracy is supposedly to prosper.

Furthermore, apart from the democratic option being importable to rescue democratic citizenship, a pattern also begins to persist which presents an image of *McWorld* in which the contrary is taking place - the world is concurrently more united and interdependent than before as well (Barber, 1996:12). Take, for example, the economic and commercial forces, the latest round in capitalism's time-honoured hunt for world markets and global consumers, which have constituted a scheme of power and control that generates prosperity and development with unparalleled effectiveness. Together with the influence of the media and advertising, these developments have become dominant forces in the rationalizing process of the consumer mentality.

Before long, by observing the patterns of consumption in a systematic way, our need for particular objects has become more alienating as we choose objects, not to satisfy needs but to differentiate ourselves from others (Baudrillard). *McWorld* has transformed capitalism into a system where 'needs' are manipulated and created to create and recreate social stratification along class and gender lines (Barber, 1996:268). While we are under the impression that the control given to us by science and technology appears to be gratifying, what we are in fact experiencing is the contrary. The more influential technology becomes and the more gratifying durable goods become in replacing our sense of identity, the more we will long for an unsatisfied or longing for community that has been lost (Barber, 1996:243). This is the hard

lesson of interdependence in which consumption plays an active role in creating our identities. The following section discusses at length the interdependence between consumers and consumption as presented by the frame and *Jihad's* perpetual yearning to re-create our sense of community which has been lost as a result of *McWorld's* consumer culture.

* * *

4. The Hard Lesson of Interdependence

Economic globalization has entered a critical phase. A mounting backlash against its effects, especially in the industrial democracies, is threatening a very disruptive impact on economic activity and social stability in many countries. The mood in these democracies is one of helplessness and anxiety, which helps explain the rise of a new brand of populist politicians. This can easily turn into revolt.

- Schwab, cited in Barber, 1996:294

Alfred M. Zeien, Gillette's chairman, once said "I do not find foreign countries foreign" (Zeien, cited in Barber, 1996:23). In the world before *McWorld*, there was a genuine independence for democratic sovereign nations, and sovereignty offered peoples of different nations autonomous control of their lives. Today, by many measures, however, multinational corporations, or rather 'anti-national' corporations, are much more central players in global affairs than nations (Barber, 1996:23). Their customers are no longer citizens, but consumers who belong to a universal tribe of needs and wants. "A consumer is a consumer is a consumer" (*ibid*). As far as production and consumption are concerned, there is only one world and that is the world of *McWorld*. Hence, what we are faced with today is a world in which there are no walls high enough to defend us against a corrupt ideology. While democracy allows markets to operate through offering consumers consumer choices, there are no alternative non-market forces in place to counteract their accompanying vices (Barber, 1996:244).

By globalizing the market place and constraining the logic of sovereignty, international organizations such as the GATT and the WTO undermine civic power and public spaces. These institutions lack distinctive national identities and do not reflect nor respect the nation *qua* imagined community as an organizing regulative principle. The latter is also labelled as

market fundamentalism¹⁵ which softens citizens up to believe that they will be a lot 'freer' when they think of themselves not as public citizens, but as private consumers (Barber, in Booth & Dunne, 2002:260). As Felix Rohatyn has bluntly confessed,

... there is a brutal Darwinian logic to these markets. They are nervous and greedy. They look for stability and transparency, but what they reward is not always our preferred form of democracy.

- Rohatyn, cited in Barber, 1996:7

Markets simply are not designed to do the things that democratic polities do. They enjoy contractual rather than communitarian modes of discourse and allow us to stroke our solitary egos but leave unsatisfied our longing for community. They offer us durable goods and short-lived dreams but not a common identity or a collective membership. In a democratic society the opposite happens, as we are citizens as opposed to just consumers. Democratic governance does not just concern choosing, it is about public choosing. This is important with regards to the global sector, as only public and democratic decisions will be able to set up social justice and equity on earth. Put plainly,

... the struggle against Jihad (which is in itself a holy 'struggle' against us) can succeed only if it is also a struggle on behalf of the genuine transnational public good against the private interests in McWorld.

- Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:261

¹⁵ 'Market fundamentalism' is also known to the Europeans as neo-liberalism. It "is an ideology that saps democracy by attacking government and its culture of public power" (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:260).

Certainly the hurried pursuit of free markets gives us the impression that we have the right to choose between dozens of automobile models or the many different brands of designer labels. The disillusion behind that, is that those who do not have the monthly salary to keep up with the rising price of bread, let alone the men and women who do not have jobs at all, do not have that 'freedom' to choose as advocated by the free market.

The politics of commodity offers a superficial expansion of options - a feeling of freedom while diminishing the range of options and the power to affect the larger world. Capitalists might be democrats, but that does not necessarily mean that they practise democracy or that capitalism produces democracy. Contrary to this, the widespread postulation has always been that the power at the top knows best and that people are no good - they have to be controlled (Mailer, 2003:16).

We don't control our country. Corporate power is running this country now. The notion that we have an active democracy that controls our faith is not true. Was I ever able to vote on how high buildings could or should be? Nobody's ever been able to vote on many an item that truly matters in terms of how our lives are led...We're on a power trip in which only a small fraction of America manages to participate.

- Mailer, 2002:104

The unequal distribution of resources and unbalanced affairs have turned *McWorld* into a playground for some, but a cemetery for those who cannot play along. Not only do the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, but the rich get freer while the poor get enslaved. It's worth, while then, to understand terrorism in the context that terrorists see it. "Terrorists feel that they are gouging out an octopus that's looking to destroy their world" (Mailer, 2002:22). You go into a McDonald's in Panama and there are marble floors. Corporate capitalism does have this tendency to take over large parts of the economies of other countries. *McWorld* does not always pay attention to what it tramples. To some degree there is a lot of envy towards the United States. But

on the other hand, the hatred expressed is rightly so for various intrusive reasons. As seen in the previous chapter, the core of the hatred of Muslims towards the United States is the fear that they are going to lose their own people to Western values.

These manifold ironies, while contributing powerfully to the story of growing global injustice and shrinking the prospects of global democracy, are important footnotes to the primary focus here: the fundamental analysis of the dialectics that bind Islamic *Jihad* and *McWorld* together.

* * *

5. *The Paradoxical Interdependence of Jihad and McWorld*

It is not *Jihad* or *McWorld* that Barber (1996:5) is interested in, but the relationship between them. Squeezed between their opposing forces, the world has been sent spinning out of control.

Progress moves in steps that sometimes lurch backwards; in history's twisting maze, Jihad not only revolts against but abets McWorld, while McWorld not only imperils but re-creates and reinforces Jihad. They produce their contraries and need one another.

- Barber, 1996:5

While *Jihad* is driven by parochial hatreds - re-creating ancient subnational and national borders from within, *McWorld* is driven by universalizing markets, making national borders porous from without. Both these forces have something in common as they make war on the sovereignty of the nation-state by belittling its democratic institutions (Barber, 1996:6). Yet neither can do without the other: *McWorld* needs *Jihad's* religion and culture to feed its endless appetites for differences that can be branded, while *Jihad* needs *McWorld's* communications systems and markets to sell culture (Barber, 1996:155-156). Telecommunications technology has therefore the capability of strengthening civil society, but it also has a capability for unparalleled surveillance and can be used to encumber and manipulate as well as to access information. "Left to the market, which is where *McWorld* leaves technology, monsters may end up with a free and mighty profitable reign" (Barber, 1996:270). Technology can as easily become an instrument of repression, as it can be one of liberation. In many ways, the modern terrorist is the creation of the modern media. Acts of terrorism command wide attention in the media,

and terrorist demands routinely are accorded extensive publicity, permitting the terrorists to advertise their causes to the world. At this point doubts begin to arise, as there is something suspiciously modern about the sense of public relations that terrorists use. The very extensive use of video technology, the Internet, and the urbane administration of dealings with the Arab-language TV station, *al-Jazeera*, suggests a distinctive sense of modern approach which coincides with the modern narrative (Brown, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:298). If al-Qaeda were truly in opposition to Western ideals, we would not even have heard of them, or certainly not in the way in which they have made themselves known to the world at large (*ibid*).

5.1 Terror Networking in the Information Age

The information revolution has led to the fastest-growing economic expansion in U.S. history, and led to unusual productivity gains in recent years (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:29). Alongside these benefits, however, has come the ominous side of the information technology, namely cyberterrorism (*ibid*). Middle-East Arab terrorists are on the cutting edge of organizational networking and stand to gain extensively from the information revolution. Today, in the business world, virtual or networked organizations are heralded as effectual alternatives to traditional bureaucracies because of their innate elasticity, adaptiveness, and capability to get the most out of the talents of all their members (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001:31).

It appears that conflicts are increasingly being fought through 'networks' in which the power is migrating to non-state actors. The result is that the old power-politics model of international relations becomes less stable as states have to negotiate with other actors to achieve their goals - which in turn question the very identity of a state. The information revolution is altering the nature of conflict across the spectrum. It affects not only the types of targets

and weapons terrorists choose, but also the ways in which such groups manage and comprise their organizations (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:30). A few of the most dangerous terrorist organizations are using information technology (IT) to achieve a better control and management of dispersed actions. Just as companies in the private sector are forming alliance networks to provide complex services to customers, so too are terrorist groups relying less on the bureaucratic fiat and more on shared values to achieve their aims (*ibid*).

Perchance the most appealing example of a terrorist network actor is Osama bin Laden's compound network of rather autonomous groups that are financed from confidential sources (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001:34). Bin Laden uses his wealth and his organizational skills to support and direct al-Qaeda, a multinational alliance of Islamic extremists (Corbin, 2002:xviii). Although bin Laden finances al-Qaeda and directs some operations he apparently does not play a direct command-and-control role over operatives. Rather, he is a key figure in the coordination and support of several dispersed nodes. Thus the latest communications technologies are enabling terrorists to operate from almost any country in the world, provided they have access to the necessary IT infrastructure; this affects the ways in which groups rely on different forms of sponsorships. IT can be used to chart, direct, and carry out operations. Using the Internet for communication can increase speed of mobilization to permit more discussion between members, which enhances the organization's plasticity (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:36).

To be sure, there are also limits to how much reliance terrorist networks will place on information technology. While IT-enabled communication flows can greatly help a network coordinate dispersed activities, they also present security risks. Communication over Internet sources can also become a liability as it leaves digital 'traces.' For example, FBI officials have of late recognized that they used an Internet wiretap program called "Carnivore" to follow

terrorist email correspondence at least 25 times (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:39).

The case of Ramzi Yousef, the World Trade Center bomber, also provides a helpful example of how information-technology can stand for a double-edge sword for terrorists. Yousef's numerous calls to fellow terrorists during the preparations of his strike were registered in phone companies' computer databases, providing law enforcement officials with a significant set of leads for investigating terrorists in the Middle East and beyond (Reeve, 1999:39). Prior to his arrest, Yousef unintentionally lost control of his portable computer in the Philippines. In that laptop, U.S. officials found incriminating data, including plans for future attacks, flight schedules, projected detonation times, and chemical formulae (*ibid*).

5.2 Terrorism and the Media: Violence for Effect

*The television camera is like a weapon lying in the street.
Either side can pick it up and use it.*

- Clutterbuk, cited in Livingstone, 1982:1

Many of today's terrorists have learnt a significant lesson about the technological age that *McWorld* has introduced: that television and news organizations can establish the link between the terrorists and their audience. In order to ensure public preoccupation with terrorism, terrorists resort to 'violence for effect' to make propaganda by the deed. They choose to stage spectacular and violent displays (Morris & Hoe, 1987:20). Kidnappings are internationally organized, reaching out across continents. Assassinations of the important and random slaying of the innocent capture the headlines or are set for prime-time coverage, seen in living rooms, during breakfast, or on TV in colour. The kaleidoscope of violence is beamed by satellite across the world

and seen by millions. "Terrorism...may be seen as a violent act that is conceived specifically to attract attention and then, through the publicity it generates, to communicate a message" (Hoffman, cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:42).

Getting the message out and receiving extensive news media propaganda are therefore important components of terrorist strategy, which ultimately seeks to undermine the will of the opponent. In addition to such traditional media as television or print, the Internet now offers terrorist groups an alternative way to reach out to the public, often with much more direct control over their message. The news media therefore play an integral part in the terrorist act because they are the conduits for news of the violence of the general population (Internet 22). Some terrorist groups such as Hizbollah, through its own television station, has included special cameramen to record dramatic film footage of Israeli casualties so that they can re-broadcast it on Israeli television stations. The fact that many terrorists now have direct control over the content of their messages offers further opportunities for perception management, as well as for image manipulation, special effects, and deception.

The fight for the future is making daily headlines. Its battles are not between the armies of leading states, nor are its weapons the hefty, expensive tanks, planes, and fleets recurrently used in armed forces. Rather the combatants come from bomb-making terrorist groups that operate in small, dispersed units that can deploy nimbly - anywhere, anytime. They know how to penetrate and disrupt, to elude and evade. All feature network forms of organization, doctrine; strategy, and technology are attuned to the information age.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, I felt I was being bombarded already by the enormous quantity of images, information, opinions, and political rhetoric, that was conveyed to me by the mass media. Moreover, I had the feeling that I was strongly sucked into the continuous discussions and debates that were humming around me - on the television, in the streets, everywhere. I also felt that the images, opinions and attitudes that the mass

media were bringing before me were often irresponsible and unthinking. Indeed, I felt that the very surfeit of what the mass media presented to me, and to everyone around me, was both a manifestation of this unthinkingness as well as a manipulation of it.

A brief look at the skilful use of the media of the world's best - known terrorists, Osama bin Laden, raises interesting questions about the impact of the media on events during a terrorist crisis. As Judith Miller (2003) so aptly put it, "With his turban and camouflage jacket, his ornate Arabic and harsh vows of continued terror against America, Osama bin Laden revealed in his speech the instinctive cunning that has made him such a formidable foe" (Miller, cited in Combs, 2003:153). Although this was not the first call by bin Laden for a *Jihad* against America, the video shown around the world in early October 2001 was by far the most effective. He used the media to secure a platform with a worldwide audience, to explain emotionally the cause for his anger and his anguish, and to paint the enemies of his *Jihad* in ways that shook the alliance that President Bush was trying to form.

Society has therefore become vulnerable to a new kind of terrorism in which destructive power of both the individual terrorist and terrorism tactic are infinitely greater. The advanced societies of today are more reliant on electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information, which expose enormous fundamental areas of national life to mischief and sabotage by any computer hacker, and concerted sabotage which could render a country unable to function. Hence, the growing speculation about info terrorism and cyber warfare. An anonymous U.S. intelligence official even has gone so far as to boast that with one billion dollars and twenty capable hackers, he too could shut down America. What he could accomplish, a terrorist could too (Laqueur, 1996:35). There is little concealment in the wired society, and defensive measures have proved of limited value: teenage hackers have penetrated highly secret systems in every field. The potentials for creating chaos are almost boundless even now, and susceptibility will most definitely increase.

Experts in the field of media and terrorist studies alike have also noticed this coming together of interests between the media and terrorism:

- ♦ *Frederick Hacker, a Californian psychiatrist who has served as negotiator in terrorist incidents, notes that "if the mass media did not exist, terrorists would have to invent them. In turn, the mass media hanker after terrorists' acts because they fit into their programming needs: namely, sudden acts of great excitement that are susceptible, presumably, of quick solution. So there is a mutual dependency.*
- ♦ *Walter Laquer, a chairman of the International Research Council of the national Research Council of the International Studies, stated that: "The media are a terrorist's best friend... [T]errorists are the super-entertainers of our time.*
- ♦ *Raymond Tanter, political scientist at the University of Michigan, makes the relationship dilemma a bit clearer in his statement: "Since the terror is aimed at the media and not at the victim, success is defined in terms of media coverage. And there is no way in the West that you could not have media coverage because you're dealing in a free society.*

- Hacker *et al.*, cited in Combs, 2003:138

As the experts above have suggested, the media are increasingly acting like a weapon that terrorists are learning to use with rapidly improved sophistication. It is moreover, a gun that democratic governments have provided, and continue to provide, essentially without controls, against itself. It appears more and more so that the irony of it all is that the fundamental freedoms of the 'world-free-press' - is becoming instrumental in its own destruction.

What I am suggesting, then, is that this offers quite an extreme perspective on globalization and resistance. In the structural world, where *Jihad* and *McWorld* are functions of one another, the original role of the media is such that the difference between globalization and *Jihad* collapses - creating a simulation of terror. The extreme implication of such a structural analysis is that, given the role of the media, the fundamental opposition between *Jihad* and *McWorld* is necessary to understand September 11. The conflict between the United States and bin Laden then becomes a kind of professional wrestling match: everybody may be watching it, but nobody believes that it is any longer a real conflict. One does not necessarily have to agree with renowned authors

such as Baudrillard on this, whether it is true or not. That is not the point. Rather, it is my belief that this kind of analysis charts the far extreme of the media-led structural conflict.

For analytical purposes, the following section pulls up by the roots the myth that, as we become modern, we are also becoming more alike. On the contrary, nothing could be further from the truth. While *McWorld* might want to attempt to point out that the real source of world conflict lies with those cultures that try and resist the reshaping that it might wish upon them, the true foundation of difference between civilizations rests with *McWorld's* dire ways of imposing its cultural monism upon civil societies.

* * *

6. McWorld's Cultural Monism: Modern and Alike?

A hundred years ago, European civilization considered itself the model for world civilizations to look up to. Because of the backing of its overpowering economic and military strength, Europeans had no hesitation that this century would be one in which their values would be recognized everywhere (Gray, 2003:5). The central concern of Chapter Three of Thompson's *The Emergence of the Global Political Economy* (2000), is to deconstruct the conventional reading of the 1490's - a decade which in Western historical mythology has acquired the status of radical epistemic shift, the birth of a new age and the origin of a Europe conquered world system (Praeg, 2003:11). His more immediate concern with deconstructing the 1490's is to answer two closely related questions:

1. *How do we account for the rise of the European world system? Are we in error to pay so much attention to the 1490's?*
2. *Why did the shifting centrality of the global political economy shift from China in the East to Europe in the West?*

To be very clear about what he does, one could say that Thompson has two separate, but closely related interests, history, and historiography (Praeg, 2003:12). Thompson gives us a very fine and detailed deconstruction of the historical meaning of the 1490's, but he never elaborates a great deal on his philosophy of history. This is where he informs his analysis with plentiful references to his collaborations with Modelski. Embedded in his historiographical model of continuous structural change is the central historical question of Chapter Three: *why did leadership in economic growth pass from one end of Eurasia to the other?* As is pointed out much more extensively in Chapter Three of this thesis, one of Thompson's aims is to decentre the discontinuous - structural reading of the 1400's - by pointing out the historical roots of the

change during this period and the continuities that made it possible (Praeg, 2003:12).

Modernization can be described as a process in which social and cultural changes converge to become more systematically organized (Gray, 2003:27-28). Modernization theory furthermore emphasizes normative forms of behaviour, belief systems and modern values (Gray, 2003:1). As a result, theorists of this persuasion argue that terrorism and criminal activities are caused by the breakdown of norms and values. Thus, when a particular nation-state is not developing contemporaneously with the rate of rapid modernization, or when relative deprivation is experienced, group behaviour such as crime and terror is more than likely to result.

The structural analysis above suggests that, rather than seeing the contemporary supra-national fundamentalism as the residue of a pre-modern culture in modern politics, terrorism is a modern project, a product of contemporary globalization (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:46). Contrary to the great deal of thinking in this area - this is an important point being raised, as there are potentially a number of ways of being modern. Not, for example, just one way espoused by the liberal, largely post-Christian humanist West - best represented in the teleological thinking of modernization theory. Islamic fundamentalists want a world in which individuals do not distance themselves from their own beliefs, but at the same time they see no reason why such a world cannot encompass the creature comforts of modernity. Borrowing the more advanced technologies of the West when it suited them - witness the network's ability to mount an audacious attack by turning Western technology to itself, with "knives acting as the force multiplier at the critical moment as aircraft were hijacked" (Freedman, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2003:45).

Modernization theory, in its classical and contemporary manifestations, is governed by the idea that the more modern people become, the more alike they grow to be. The truth is that, as societies throughout the world become more modern, they do *not* necessarily become alike (Gray,

2003:113). The Taliban and the al-Qaeda network are the result of an encounter with modern imperial powers which make these movements neofundamentalist products of the Cold War (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:56). The flaw in the modern myth is that there is the hope of unity, when in fact the contrary is at work (Gray, 2003:112). J.G. Herder discards the Enlightenment ideal of universal civilization, believing that, as there are countless cultures, they are unique in their own ways (Gray, 2003:25). He adds to this by saying that what we have to accept, is that we all have divergent and incompatible values that need to be appreciated and valued (*ibid*). In the globalizing world of *McWorld's* cultural monism, however, this seems to be exactly the opposite. Zbigniew Brzezinski is spot on in asserting that we could describe the modern post-industrial world as a 'technotronic' society, "shaped culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of electronics" (Brzezinski, cited in Livingstone, 1982:58). The American way of life is often advocated as the reality in which we should dwell. Information has been digitalised and accelerated to such an extent that knowledge gets communicated to people around the world via sound and pictures. Indeed, we live in a visual age that is highly powerful in shaping and influencing our political and cultural attitudes. Hollywood's images have taken the place of numbers and words, which traditionally were the ways in which humans communicated. Unfortunately, television has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of the pioneers in the field. Although the print medium is still in power, it is from television that most people get their information. "Television is a world stage and everyone wants to be on it: I am on television therefore I am" (Livingstone, 1982:58).

Also referred to as *McWorld's* front parlour, Disney World is a good example of the latter, as it is America's promotional piece - illustrating illusion, manipulated desire, and vicarious satisfaction; it is an unreal place that wants to redefine our reality. Through this highly effective medium, "image-mongering" makes life over into consumption, consumption into meaning, meaning into fantasy, fantasy into reality, reality into virtual reality, and

completing the circle, virtual reality back into actual life again so that the distinction between reality and virtual reality vanishes. No one knows how to stop the American tidal wave, as nothing is quite what it seems. The time is not so far off that there will be one single image of America. Indeed, in *McWorld's* terms American popular culture is everywhere visible, whether it be through cinema, television, books, or theme parks (Barber, 1990:84).

Recognizing the power inherent in the force of *McWorld's* cultural monism, Walter Russell Mead is under the impression that nationalism is "the most powerful political force on earth today" (Mead, cited in Barber, 1996:158). As a moment of anti-cultural life of *Jihad*, what nationalism is interested in promoting, is narrowness, ethnic and cultural particularism as opposed to *McWorld's* monocultural whole. Rather than spending an extensive amount on *Jihad's* combat against *McWorld's* cultural monism, it would be more useful to move on to a further discussion on the structural dimension of September 11 - how the event should be interpreted as a clash *within* civilizations as opposed to *between* civilizations.

6.1 The Reinvention of Jihad: Clash Within Civilizations

... history is the raw material for nationalists or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin-addiction", and since "in the nature of things there is usually no entirely suitable past", where necessary "it can always be invented.

- Hobsbawn, cited in Barber, 1996:162

Perhaps no other society has paid a higher price for *Jihad's reinvention* and the defeat of the Soviet Union than has Afghanistan. Out of a population of roughly fifteen million, a million lost their lives, another million and a half were maimed, and a further five million became refugees. There are two

countries that destroyed Afghanistan in the last twenty years and devastated it: the former Soviet Union and the United States.

It has been speculated by political analysts, that during the Afghan war of the 1980's, the CIA searched for a Saudi prince to lead the modern crusade in Afghanistan in the war against the Russian occupation. But when this prince was not to be found, the United States settled for the next best thing, the son of a well-known family closely related to the Saudi family (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:53). The CIA created the *Mujaheddin* and bin Laden as alternatives to secular nationalism.

With reference to the past, old models have frequently been used by the United States for purposes that make the assumption that those rituals and practices change the function in a newer context (Hobsbawn, cited in Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983:5). Inventing traditions, it is assumed here, is essentially a process that has a well-known weakness insofar as it functions as a justification for invariant performances of countries that calculatingly involve themselves in the affairs of other nation-states. The following chapter specifically focuses on this issue - how historical traditions such as *Jihad* which appear to be old in origin, but are in point of fact recent in foundation and sometimes even an attempt to establish continuity with the past through repetition (Hobsbawn, cited in Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983:1).

* * *

7. Conclusion

To recapitulate, this chapter has suggested that contemporary history is witnessing a significant shift in the spatial character of world politics. In addition to the old geography of places, distances, and borders, we now have an extensive global dimension in which certain circumstances are effectively placeless, 'distanceless', and borderless. The romantic belief that the world can be reshaped by universal ideas is extremely precarious. "Yet modernity in politics is about moving from exclusion to inclusion, from repressions to integration" (Mamdani, 2000:27). By doing so, we broaden the bounds of lived community, and lived humanity. That is perhaps the real confrontation of today. It is the recognition that life cannot be lived in isolation. As Karl Kraus once said, "radical Islam is a symptom of the disease of which it pretends to be the cure" (Klaus, cited in Gray, 2003:26).

With respect to McWorld, the clearest conclusion that can be drawn from this review is that the integrating forces of interdependence associated with globalism actually reinforce the fragmenting tendencies of Jihad they seem to combat.

- Barber, 1996:43

The elimination of global forms of inequality that would end terrorism is a tall order. And many will view this idea as an ideal - a fanciful utopian international society - that cannot be accomplished. The history of the world is essentially, the history of nations imposing their wills on another in an effort to dominate and take advantage from scheming relationships. It must be comprehended that terrorist actions will continue to occur as long as the nations of the world continue to live in an international web of interdependency which is characterized by inequality and oppression (Lynch, cited in Onwudiwe, 2001:xii).

The struggle between *Jihad* and *McWorld* is not so much a 'Clash of Civilizations' as it is a dialectical expression of tensions built into a single global civilization, as it emerges against a backdrop of traditional ethnic and religious divisions. Many of these divisions are actually created by *McWorld* and its 'infotainment' industries and technological innovations (Barber, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:249: emphasis mine). This is precisely *McWorld's* paradox; it cannot survive the world it inevitably tends to create if not countered by civic and democratic forces it inevitably tends to undermine. The dynamics of the *Jihad-McWorld* linkage are, therefore, deeply dialectical. Until democracy becomes the aim and the end of those wrestling with the terrors of *Jihad* and the insufficiencies of *McWorld*, there is little chance that we can even embark on the long journey of imagination of the probability of a peaceful option. In the end, "Jihad will not succeed unless McWorld is also addressed" (Barber, 1997:247).

* * *

Chapter Three

Contextual Synthesis: Structural - Genealogical Narrative of September 11

The Islamic world has not yet seen an armed Jihad for centuries, but now the CIA was determined to create one, to put a version of tradition at the service of politics. Thus was the tradition of Jihad – of a just war with a religious sanction – nonexistent in the last 400 years, revived with American help in the 1980's.

- Mamdani, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2003:52

1. Introduction

Following the alarming events of September 11 in New York and Washington, it seems as if terrorism has become the leading concern of politicians, police chiefs, journalists, and writers alike. The growing stream of books and articles published on this subject bears witness to the continuing concern, their contents reflecting the fact that terrorism is seen as a major threat to human rights and political and economic stability in many countries.

September 11 and its aftermath has certainly created a frightening beginning of the new millennium (Kellner, 2003:27). In the first traumatic days after the attacks, open criticism of America's greatest intelligence malfunction since Pearl Harbour (a failure which gave birth to the CIA¹), was still muted

¹ CIA is the abbreviation for Central Intelligence Agency

(Corbin, 2003:49). The Directors of the CIA and the FBI came under fire for failing to ensure the country was as prepared as it should have been. The most catastrophic realization by far, was not only the failure of the United States to have detected the terrorist assaults on New York and Washington, but the realization that the United States had covertly contributed to producing the groups who were implicated in the heinous September 11 atrocities (Kellner, 2004:30). What September 11 has done is to leave Americans unsure and fearful of their future. As the National Security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, (cited in Johnson, 2004:229), said to the National Security Council, "I really think this period is analogous to 1945 to 1947", referring to the years when panic and mistrust led the United States into its Cold War with the former Soviet Union. In retrospect, the attacks are essentially the first massive violence that continental America had suffered since the American Civil War (Carroll, cited in Johnson, 2004:78). Elsewhere in the world the realities are all too common. In fact, the devastation of war has been a familiar sight to those living in Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East. What September 11 has in actuality done is to underscore the fact that Americans have never been touched by modern warfare (*ibid*). As a result, the implementing of America's 'War on Terror' has showed signs of militarism and the creation of a national security state around the world. "We wage war without knowing war" comments Johnson (2004:78). As long as the rhetoric of 'preventive war' gains an immediate reality from the Bush administration, it seems as if the Americans will literally do anything in their power to further their quest for global empire.

The analysis in this chapter is concerned with mapping a *structural-genealogical* narrative of September 11. So far, both *genealogical* and *structural* theories have been used to contextualize the world-shaking events of September 11. In *chapter one*, I argued that there is a need for a historical understanding to grasp the origins and nature of the terrorist attacks. In that analysis it is suggested that September 11 does not represent a catalyst, but rather a ferocious culmination of a historical conflict between the West and Islam.

Chapter two, on the other hand, argued that the events of September 11 reveal contradictions typical of the process associated with globalization. Far from being simply a culmination of a historical conflict, 9/11 qua *Jihad* is a structural component of a greater *Jihad* directed against the forces of globalization and modernity. In this chapter, it is suggested that neither the *genealogical* nor the *structural* narrative is acceptable as an explanation of 9/11 and that choosing one narrative over the other will not do justice to the question at hand.

Having read this far into the thesis, it should be apparent that *chapter one* depended on a different methodological alternative, one that looks at historical generalizations as opposed to an exhaustive catalogue of texts dealing with September 11. Foucault's 'history of the present' was extensively used to uncover the layers of meanings that make September 11 what it is. History for Foucault is not seen as a reality, but rather as a construction shaped by the dominant discourses and their interaction with social practices. Identities are, therefore, constructed discursively through the use of stereotypes. Hobsbawn was mentioned briefly in this regard as he deals specifically with the 'invention of traditions' and how formalizations and rituals gain character through reference to the past (Hobsbawn, cited in Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983:4). This kind of generalizing paves the way for the weaker 'Other' (in the case of this study 'Islam') to be contained and represented by dominating frameworks which eventually produce 'truths' and 'facts' about the other - leading to a historical confrontation between 'East' and 'West.' *Chapter one* has thus provided the tools to make out how Edward Said's notion of Orientalism is not a binary variable by which we can test for presence or absence; it refers to the process by which value-laden descriptions are bought, or sold as objective truths, and become implicated in prejudices and biases which inform scholarship and public policy. The point of chapter one was to illuminate how history has been used to create enemies by making sure that unwanted facts remain unacknowledged. I argued that this discourse took shape through and beyond the end of the Cold War, during which the

American administration started to 'invent' new enemies. As we have seen with Bush's 'war on terror', 'Islamism' is currently at the top of the new list of enemies. The 'green threat', which is represented by Middle Eastern Islamic fundamentalism, has been perceived as something inherently rooted in the religion of Islam.

The arguments presented in *chapter two* elucidate Barber's point that both *Jihad* and *McWorld* are "locked in a Freudian moment of the ongoing struggle, neither willing to coexist with the other, neither complete without the other (Barer, cited in Le Pere, 2001:2). While the rapidly globalizing world of the past decade brought many people the benefit of open borders, the speed-of-light communication of the Internet, freer markets and cheap travel it was precisely in this new environment that the al-Qaeda network and other terrorist organizations flourished (Bergen, 2002:29). The extent of al-Qaeda's dependence on the Internet was revealed when U.S. officials ultimately found over 2,000 encrypted messages and data files in a password-protected sector of an Islamic website which had been downloaded on the computer to correspond with Mohammad Atta and the hijackers (Corbin, 2003:353). What this suggests is that al-Qaeda's *Jihad*, which supposedly is against the United States and the *infidels*, is actually working against modernity in a very modern way, that is, from the *inside*. This raises an interesting question: should we reduce this paradox to just another moment, albeit a very complex and paradoxical moment, in the long *genealogy* of the conflict between Islam and the West? Or are the dynamics of the contemporary conflict surrounding globalization so particular and Islamic *Jihad* and other forms of anti-globalization *Jihad* so similar in their objectives that to talk of September 11 in terms of the historical conflict between Islam and the West makes very little sense? What weighs heavier, the history of *Jihad qua* anti-Western resistance or the similarity between Islamic *Jihad* and other forms of anti-globalization *Jihad*? To suggest that history weighs heavier (that September 11 was a product of history) is to prioritize the *genealogical* narrative of chapter one. To suggest, on the other hand, that *Jihad* is only one extreme example of anti-globalization is to prioritise

the *structural* meaning outlined in chapter two. In this chapter I shall argue that this is an impossible choice and that we cannot choose between these two narratives - what is really needed is a synthesis of their meanings. Fundamental to such synthesis is the fact that, after 400 years, the very notion of a military *Jihad* was reinvented by the CIA in the 1980's as an instrument in contemporary politics. Here, the very notion of *Jihad* becomes an invented tradition, sourced from history and applied in contemporary politics, refiguring the entire September 11 and not just those responsible for it, essentially as ideological 'blowback.' At this interface we find the *genealogical* at the heart of the *structural* and the *structural* at the heart of the *genealogical*; less interdependent than conceptually inseparable from one another.

It should therefore be acknowledged that neither the *genealogical* nor *structural* narrative is more acceptable and that by choosing one narrative over the other will not do justice to the question at hand. Accordingly, in order to make sense of the meaning of September 11 we have to acknowledge that a combination of both narratives is necessary. It has been suggested that we have to understand the role of the United States in two different perspectives. First, as historical, Western antagonist (*genealogical*) and secondly, as contemporary superpower that represents the forces of globalization (*structural*). These two narratives are only analytically distinct because much of the hatred for the United States as contemporary superpower taps into the historical conflict and finds in it a historical justification for a contemporary conflict.

The central point in *chapter three* is to acknowledge that there are two binaries (East/West), but that there is a need to transcend them by criticising the *genealogy* of September 11. Building a grand-narrative surrounding the September 11 attacks means steering away from looking exclusively at long-term causes or textual interpretations. Rather, a *structural-genealogical* grand narrative will provide the tools to put together two halves of a rather intricate argument. Given this general strategy, September 11 will serve as a catalyst in enabling both the *genealogical* and *structural* narratives to interface. It is at this juncture that September 11 gains relevance as a catalyst for a *structural-historical*

narrative of a new world order, as historical and structural conflicts are no longer analytically distinguishable.

What needs to be kept in mind, however, is that caution is needed in putting together this *structural-genealogical* grand narrative. The process does not amount to cutting and pasting elements of both historical and structural narratives to produce a third narrative. Rather, it requires a synthesis or fusion of the relevant elements of each narrative.

Kellner's book, *From 9/11 to Terror War : The Dangers of the Bush Legacy* (2003), will be used to flesh out the contextual synthesis in theorizing September 11 as he suggests that Chalmers Johnson's (2003) concept of 'blowback' provides a useful way of mapping the meaning of September 11. Kellner (2003) furthermore provides a more probable account of the attacks because rather than "dualizing civilizational discourses of the September 11 terrorist attacks" or by solely accepting Barber's (1996) model of a dialectical interpenetrating of both the forces of *Jihad* and *McWorld* (demonstrating contradictions and tensions between capitalism and democracy in the new world (dis)order), the useful concept of 'blowback' can be said to contain both *historical* and *structural* elements (Kellner, 2003:29) necessary for a third, synthetic narrative. This is the theoretical argument as discussed in the following section.

* * *

2. 9/11: 'Blowback' of an Invented Tradition of Jihad

World politics in the twenty-first century will in all likelihood be driven primarily by blowback from the second half of the twentieth century – that is, from the unintended consequences of the Cold War and the crucial American decision to maintain a Cold War posture in a post-Cold War World.

- Johnson, 2003:vii

The term 'blowback,' which was first used in March, 1954 by the Central Intelligence Agency, in a recently declassified report on the 1953 operation on how to overthrow the government of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran, is increasingly beginning to circulate among international relations students (Johnson, 2003:8). In straightforward terms, 'blowback' is another way of saying "that a nation reaps what it sows" (Johnson, 2003:231). Although people generally do not fully know or understand what they sow (or claim not to know), the managers of the American empire make sure that what should not be known will be kept under its watchful eye.

In retrospect, the attacks of September 11 are a textbook example of a 'blowback' of the consequences of the previous imperial policies of the United States in Afghanistan and elsewhere (Kellner, 2003:30). Indeed, the United States has turned out to be the world's most prominent target for 'blowback' as it is the world's lone imperial power that shores up repressive regimes and sells weapons to the 'rogue' states of the world. It is common for imperial people to deny their imperial acts, but even an empire cannot control the long-term effects of its policies (Johnson, 2003:12-13). This is the essence of *Blowback* that Chalmers Johnson (2003) writes about following the months of September 11. *Blowback* was no longer read "like a comic book" by the Council of the United States Foreign Relations (Zelikow, cited in Johnson, 2003:viii). It suddenly became a bestseller sensitizing the American people to some of the

self-proclaimed roles of the United States as the last remaining superpower at the end of the Cold War in 1991. On the day of the September 11 calamity, President George W. Bush told Americans that they were attacked because the United States represented "a beacon of freedom" and because the terrorists were "evil-doers" (Johnson, 2003:xi). By attempting to define the attacks, the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis has been used in Bush's address to the United States Congress on September 20, to evade the accountability that America's imperial projects have generated. Culture and politics thus became interchangeable as the attacks paved the way for the media, in particular the U.S. media, to saturate our television screens with a rather dubious theory that justified a link between Islam and terrorism (Mamdani, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2001:45). As a modified line of argument, the Bush administration presented a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims to define a global civilization, such as Islam, with 'inherent' characteristics. The very premise on which this suggestion is based is addressed by Mahmood Mamdani, in his article entitled, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: a Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism* (2002). Mamdani's purpose is to throw light on the public's general perception that people's behaviour is determined by their culture. In order to demystify this radical assumption, Mamdani recognizes the importance of both *historical* and *contemporary* conditions. Events such as September 11 are not entirely the result of 'evil Muslims' but need to be understood as a modern construction which is at the service of modernity *itself* (Mamdani, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:45; emphasis mine). This kind of conviction might seem suspicious at first, but on closer inspection it makes absolute sense. By offering a narrative of September 11 where both the political history of America and the world is presented (*genealogical narrative*), and by giving us a synopsis of current global affairs (*structural narrative*), we are laying the foundation for a narrative in which the structural and genealogical can no longer be separated from one another. As Benjamin Barber (1996:157) states, "Jihad does not stand and is in itself a dialectical response to modernity whose features both reflect and reinforce the modern world's virtues and vices."

Take the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1980's, in which the United States rediscovered *Jihad* on behalf of Muslims in the fight against the former Soviet Union. Over the years, the fighting in Khabul, which was once an Islamic centre of culture, was curved into a facsimile of Hiroshima once the bomb had been dropped (Johnson, 2003;13). The Afghan war was in all probability the most obvious form of 'blowback' that the United States has yet encountered. It is in fact not generally known that the United States, with the covert assistance of CIA operatives, aided the *Mujahiddin* guerrillas, beginning shortly after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. The invasion of Afghanistan, can therefore, be seen as one of the direct causes of the attacks of September 11. Camp Bush and previous U.S. administrations, for that matter, will never hold politicians or high-ranking officers responsible for the September 11 attacks. It gradually begins to make sense that the current post-Cold War American jargon of the 'Clash of Civilizations' is used by the United States government to make sense of September 11; for, *if* it is acknowledged that 'blowback' played a part in the events, then some high-elected officials in the Bush administration would have to take responsibility for the death of several thousand fellow citizens (Johnson, 2003:xi; emphasis mine).

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was certainly an opportunity for the Americans to get even with the Russians (Bergen, 2001:66). Just as the Soviets had supported the Northern Vietnamese in their war against the United States, so too were the Americans determined to finance the Afghan struggle against the Soviets (*ibid*). American policies ensured that the former Soviet Union would endure a similar kind of devastating defeat in Afghanistan as the United States had experienced during the Vietnam War. In fact, the damage done to the Soviet Union was so severe during the Afghan invasion, that at the end of the 1980's the former Soviet Union officially collapsed (Johnson, 2003:13). In an interview with the French weekly magazine, *Nouvel Observateur*, Zbigniew Brzezinski, confirms this thought when he says that,

"The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying: 'We now have the opportunity of

giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.' What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet Empire?"

- Brzezinski, cited in Johnson, 2003:xii

The CIA made several tactical errors during the Afghan war. It allowed all decisions about the funding and prosecution of the conflict to be made by Pakistan under the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence Agency). It handed Pakistan absolute control of how the funds would be disseminated which turned out to be a costly mistake (Bergen, 2001:71). Letting Pakistan run the show made sense during the early years of the war – first of all to preserve the United States' ability to deny its role in the conflict, and also because Pakistan understood the facts on the ground better than anyone else. There was a lack of direction in Washington on United States' policy towards Afghanistan and in the early days of Taliban rule, the American administration was prone to grant the new regime the benefit of the doubt (Corbin, 2002:65). The United States ended up playing a double game which would eventually result in a catastrophic 'blowback' (Bergen, 2001:70).

By continuously funnelling hundreds of millions of dollars to, what was essentially, anti-Western Afghan factions, America was effectively pushing bin Laden into the arms of the Taliban. As the alleged mastermind of September 11 and the embassy bombing in Kenya, bin Laden is seen by many political analysts to be a former *protégé* of the United States in driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan (Johnson, 2003:11). It was only when Afghanistan suffered a Vietnam-like defeat, and the United States turned its back on the destruction that the CIA had helped cause, that Osama bin Laden took his anti-American stance (Johnson, 2003:iv). Bin Laden furthermore regarded the stationing of American troops in the 'holy land' of Saudi Arabia during and after the Persian Gulf War, as a violation of his religious beliefs. When the House of Saud refused to remove the troops after the Gulf War, bin Laden broke the ties with his country and was seen as a *persona non grata* by the Saudis who felt that his behaviour was provocative (Kellner, 2003:33). "Ever since, bin Laden has been

attempting to bring the things the CIA taught him home to his teachers” (Internet 10).

In as much as the United States anticipated reinventing the Muslim tradition of military *Jihad* for its own ideological purpose, it was the world’s super-power that on September 11 had to bear the consequences for doing so. Instead of attacking the embassies in Africa, the bombings of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (which was suspected of harbouring nerve gas), or the attacks of September 11, the United States could have avoided all the unnecessary bloodshed by removing the large-scale and provocative military presence in Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, the ‘victory’ of the Afghan war was an important lesson for the Afghan Arabs, but it similarly was influential in orchestrating the *modus operandi* for al-Qaeda which applied it to the next holy war against the United States (Bergen, 2001:78).

The following section will look more closely at a critique offered by Noam Chomsky (2003) and other critics of American foreign policy, who direct their condescension towards America’s single-minded focus on securing a global ‘Pax-Americana’ - justified through its ‘imperial grand strategy’² of ‘preventive war.’³ For Chomsky, there is only *continuity* - not the kind of continuity identified in *chapter one* but the continuity of an ‘imperial grand strategy.’ While some speak of Foucaultian epistemic shifts that signal the transition from one order of things to another and while it is suggested that September 11 signals the dawn of such a new (dis)order, Chomsky argues that there is nothing exceptional or unusual about the series of events that have defined the role the United States exerts in the contemporary world (dis)order. Contrary to prevailing opinion, then, the operating philosophy of American foreign policy has been going its way for decades. Chomsky’s analysis is very

² The aim of the ‘imperial grand strategy’ is committed to maintaining and containing “a unipolar world in which the United States has no peer competitor,” a condition that is to be “permanent [so] that no state or coalition could ever challenge [the U.S] as global leader, protector and enforcer” (Chomsky, 2003:11).

³ This is a term coined by the imperial grand strategy which asserts that the United States has the right to undertake ‘preventive war’ at will. Whatever the justifications are for ‘preemptive war,’ the U.S. military forces use this concept as an interpretation to use armed force to eliminate an imagined or invented threat (Chomsky, 2003:12).

plausible and does not necessarily clash with what is being suggested here. After all, such an 'imperial grand strategy' needs to legitimate itself through concepts, tools and strategies in order to pass itself as the crude kind of Huntingtonian war of the 'West' against the 'Rest.' Firstly, it can be argued that these concepts and strategies are characterized by the expedient use of history; secondly, that in the contemporary context of globalization, the *simulated Jihad* aligns itself with other *Jihads*.

By all means, Chomsky's kind of continuity of an 'imperial grand strategy' is necessary, but what needs to be taken into consideration is how this simple grand strategy narrative interfaces with some of the complications that have been spelt out until now.

* * *

3. *America's Quest for Global Empire*

Whether or not the United States today should be called an empire is a semantic game. The important point is that it resembles previous empires enough to make the search for lessons of history worthwhile. Overwhelming dominance has always invited hostility. U.S. leaders thus must learn the arts of imperial management and diplomacy, exercising power with a bland smile rather than with boastful words.

- Cohen, 2004:1

3.1 The American Imperial Grand Strategy

The underlying thesis of Noam Chomsky's, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest For Global Dominance* (2003), dissects America's quest for global hegemony - presenting a scrupulously researched critique of America's 'imperial grand strategy.' In international politics it is only self-explanatory that state policy seeks to construct systems that are open to economic penetration and political control. The goal of any hegemonic power is to recognize whichever challenge is presented to its power, position, and prestige.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States did precisely this by rashly committing itself to maintaining a global empire. It decided to "convert its slipping preeminence into an exploitative hegemony," to try and coerce the much weaker and smaller economies according to the American model of 'democratic freedom' (Johnson, 2003: 28; 233). As has been demonstrated over the years in international relations, whoever occupies a territory will also impose its social system on the people that live there. It cannot be any different (Johnson, 2003:20). The effects or by-products of the 'imperial grand strategy' are likely to build up reservoirs of resentment against the United States and other Western powers as a result (Johnson, 2003:5). "Yet American foreign policy remains on autopilot, instead of withdrawing from a place where a U.S.

presence is only making a dangerous situation worse" (Pfaff, cited in Johnson, 2003:xv). American installations and embassies are still to be found in every part of the globe where they use American capital and markets to force upon others a global economic integration that is not necessarily beneficial to them. Without good explanations, Washington projects its military power on its terms just so that it can exercise its global hegemony.

By fall 2002, high on the global agenda of the most powerful state in history, was the ambition to do exactly this; to maintain its hegemonic position in world politics (Chomsky, 2003:2-3). In the televised state of the Union address on January 29, Bush promised to wage a 'War on Terror' not only on those countries who harbour terrorist groups, but also on countries that possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bush junior furthermore claimed with confidence that he was ready to wage a war on countries that formed an "axis of evil," as they posed a threat to world peace. As an 'empty vessel' (totally bereft of ideas and insight himself), Bush mentioned his programmed speech in a desperate attempt to assert U.S. power and to justify U.S. aggression in the coming years (Kellner, 2003:211). All that Bush junior really wants is to ensure that the United States can be the policeman of the world and go after whoever it likes in the project of creating a 'new world order' (Kellner, 2003:211). As we should be aware by now, such a discourse serves as a cloak for United States world dominance.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq could be seen as a stunning example of how America's 'grand imperial strategy' has represented the United States desire for hegemony. Beyond doubt, far from eliminating the terrorist threat, Bush's administrative policy of 'preventive war' against Saddam Hussein has enhanced terrorist activity against U.S. targets in Iraq. As a consequence of America's involvement with 'rogue'⁴ states in international relations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, one could unquestionably assert that 'Camp Bush' has invoked the 'War on Terror' to lay the foundation for the 'civilization'

⁴ Johnson (2003:224) notes that official America might be talking a great deal about 'rogue' states like Iraq, North Korea or Iran, but what we must really ask ourselves is whether the United States has itself not become a 'rogue' superpower in international relations.

discourse. Huntington's well-known thesis, whose political commentaries claim that a major war between Islam and Christianity, somewhat affirms the assertion that the United States is determined to fight a battle with Islam - any Islam (Moussalli, 1998:7). As to be predicted, Saddam Hussein would be depicted as the first one responsible for the September 11 atrocities. The invasion of Iraq drew worldwide criticism, in part because it seemed to present a new philosophy of 'preventive warfare' and an appearance of global empire building. Yet, despite popular opposition that was without precedent, U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, addressed the United Nations Security Council on February 2003, informing its members that the United States would go to war with Iraq with or without U.N. authorization. Echoing Powell, White House Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, explained that "the U.N. can meet and discuss, but we do not need their permission" (Card, cited in Chomsky, 2003:32). There is no place more appropriate to begin a reconsideration of America's imperial policies than with American behaviour in the Iraq war of 2003. While, at first glance, the suicidal attacks of September 11 appear to have been a catastrophic event on a grand scale, in retrospect, it only puts into place America's 'imperial grand strategy' - giving the United States a 'legitimate' reason to beat its war drums on Afghanistan and Iraq (Chomsky, 2003:17). So while going to war with Iraq was an unpleasant truth for some, it is sometimes overlooked that the great evil of war certainly can have a great virtue for building empire, in particular an American Empire.

3.2 War on Iraq and the Useful 'Tragedy' of September 11

"After all, this is the guy [Saddam Hussein] who tried to kill my dad."

- President Bush, cited in Johnson, 2004:217

September 11 was just what the American administration needed to wage war on Iraq. Within days after the events, Condoleezza Rice approached members of the National Security Council and asked them "to think about 'how to capitalize on these opportunities' to fundamentally change the American doctrine, and to shape the world, in the wake of September 11th" (Rice, cited in Johnson, 2004:229). Nevertheless, in order for the Bush administration to go to war with Saddam, there needed to be some way to tie Hussein's regime to the terror attacks of September 11 (*Ibid*). This is where the small group of ideologues that work for Bush come into play. Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, vigorously sold to the Secretary of Defence stories based on reports from Iraqi exiles (who had been discredited by the CIA), that Iraq was in the possession of nuclear weapons (Johnson, 2004:305). It is therefore quite simple really, if the American government does not like the information that they are receiving from the CIA, they will bring in people that shall write manufactured intelligence information that justifies the American machine to act. In other words, "If it does not fit their theory, they won't accept it. Simple!" (Johnson, 2004:231).

On October 7, 2002, President Bush (Johnson, 2004:231) did exactly that; to bring in people to write the stuff that would provide for a war with Iraq. In a speech delivered in Cincinnati he stated:

Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction...Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical and biological weapons across broad seas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these unmanned aerial vehicles for missions targeting the United States.

The initial U.S.-British invasion of Iraq was therefore justified by the two Enlightenment leaders, Bush and Blair, as they were 'absolutely certain' that Saddam was "assembling the world's most dangerous weapons [in order to] dominate, intimidate, or attack" (Chomsky, 2003:17). In the words of President

Bush, “[Saddam] possesses the most deadly arms of our age” (Johnson, 2004:229). Hans Blix (cited in Johnson, 2004:302), the chief United Nations weapons inspector, directly countered this testimony on February 14, 2003, by commenting that

Since we have arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.

When no so-called unconventional weapons of any kind were found (which would be used to justify the invasion under the ‘imperial grand strategy of ‘preventive war’), yet another pretext was manufactured to go to war with Iraq. Bush and his Bushites now began an eloquent denunciation of the dictator’s use of dangerous weapons on his own citizens – leaving “thousands dead, blind, or transfigured ... if this is not evil then evil has no meaning” (Chomsky, 2003:17). It is impressive to note that the administration was harping that Saddam might have given some unconventional weapons to “evildoers” and that his monstrous offences in the gassing of the Kurds are recounted at a convention when Bush’s midterm election campaign opened. This kind of propaganda rings a familiar bell during the first Gulf War, in which Bush senior also had the habit of mobilizing the administration by referring to Iraqi soldiers that had pulled babies from Kuwait’s hospital incubators (Johnson, 2004:230). And in the words of Bush senior, the Iraqi soldiers “scattered them across the floor like firewood” (*ibid*).

As the opponents of the Bush administration’s tactics consistently point out, there is a dangerous paradox at work here. While the American government supported Saddam Hussein for many years prior to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait (which demonstrates how the United States is happy to fund despots when it is in American interests), as it “would improve human

rights, regional stability, and peace," Bush junior turned on Saddam only last year, when the Iraqi dictator lost his 'usefulness' to the Bushites (Chomsky, 2003:111). He consequently was abruptly transferred to the category of 'evil' and became the target of invasion and was placed on the United States' 'most wanted list' together with Osama bin Laden. Even though there has never been an actual link between bin Laden and Hussein, there now was suddenly strong 'evidence' that Saddam's ruthless secular regime must have been staunch to bin Laden's religious commitments in bombing the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Washington subsequently justified its launch of attack on Iraq, a country known to be devastated and defenceless. Overwhelming victory was likely to be guaranteed before going to war in any event. What Washington is doing is sending out a disturbing message to the world: enthusiastically march upon the weak but leave out vastly more dangerous tyrannies such as North Korea which has openly threatened to put its nuclear weapons to use (Chomsky, 2003:38). The point that needs to be made very clear is that America's 'imperial grand strategy' effectively dispenses with international rule of law when it so pleases. "Our invasion is legitimate," Bush declared, because "the United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security" (Chomsky, 2003:33). The U.S. government has adopted a standard practice in which it regularly chooses force over law, no matter how "grievous" the effect might be on others (Chomsky, 2003:29). With the fall of Baghdad on April 11, 2003, America's dutiful aim in inching toward imperialism and militarism gives way to the assertion of the coming of the second Roman Empire. "American imperialism used to be a fiction of the far-left imagination... now it is an uncomfortable fact of life" (Bunting, cited in Johnson, 2004:284).

* * *

3.3 Towards an American Emporium

"Far be it from the American President to get to decide who leads what country"

- George W. Bush,
April 5, 2002
Interview with ITN in Crawford,
Texas.

American self-glorifying triumphalists, such as the likes of the Bush-Cheney gang, compare themselves to the imperial Romans that once acquired an empire through their military monopoly (Johnson, 2004:15). But the irony in America's case is that the majority of Americans are not even clued up about Roman history. To the uninformed civilian, Bush's foreign policy towards Iraq or any other defenceless country might be terrifying, but in fact there is nothing new to U.S. foreign policy since the 1950's. The innumerable misdeeds of the United States Empire have been documented not only by Chomsky, but also by other critics of United States foreign policy, such as Herman and Johnson (Kellner, 2004:38).

There is far more symmetry between the post-war policies of WW II and the actions of the United States today. The agenda of problems that the United States faces at present would simply not have arisen if it were not for the imperial commitments and activities that the United States was involved in after/during World War II and the Cold War. While the United States government fattens itself on the notion that the United States 'won' the Cold War, today's imperialists give us clues how the United States, like the Roman Empire before it, embarked on the path towards militarism and empire (Johnson, 2004:16). In the first place, within a decade of the Cold War in Europe, the position of the United States in world politics underwent a

fundamental change. As Galston (cited in Johnson, 2004:22), deputy assistant to President Bill Clinton for domestic policy from 1993 to 1995 stated:

Rather than continuing to serve as first among equals in the postwar international system, the United States would act as a law unto itself, creating new rules of international engagement without agreement by other nations

By citing examples from similarly aggressive policies from previous administrations, Chomsky (2003) points out that, as the world's lone superpower, the United States, accelerated the country's sense of its role in world history and its noble ideals – not to mention its military might at home and abroad. As a means to fill the void left by the Cold War, Walter Russell Mead of the Council of Foreign Relations, advocates open imperialism (Johnson, 2004:68). To keep states loyal and docile, client states were paid off or went through “regime changes” (*ibid*). In Latin America, for example, “Operation Just Cause,” removed a former CIA “asset,” Miguel Noriega, from power. When the former commander of the Panama Defence Force refused to follow Washington's orders, George H.W. Bush sent 26,000 troops into Panama City with the intent of decimating the Panamanian army, which was Noriega's main defence (Johnson, 2004:69). Inevitably, the cover story surrounding “Operation Just Cause,” was that Noriega was involved in the selling of recreational drugs that were on their way to the U.S. market (*ibid*). With Noriega out of the way, the invasion of Panama by the Americans was once again a successful example of intrinsic imperialist behaviour. It ensured that, after Panama was once again declared a ‘sovereign’ nation, that the United States would remain with some sort of influence of the Panama Canal.

“In all of American public life there is [now] hardly a single prominent figure who finds fault with the notion of the United States remaining the world's sole military superpower until the end of time.”

- Bacevich, cited in Johnson, 2004:67

What imperialists like to assert, is that they are there to bring 'stability' to the world through 'democratic' means. They believe in making the world safe for democracy. Yet, these imperialists also tend to 'forget' that imperialism is the base of the most unpleasant maladies inflicted by Western civilization on the rest of the world (a good example is racism). According to the long tradition of imperialism, it is not really seen as a form of domination but rather expansionism. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, perceived himself to be an "expansionist" as opposed to an imperialist (*ibid*). Arguing for the annexation of the Philippines, he said,

*"There is not an imperialist in this country...
Expansionism? Yes... Expansion has been the law of our
national growth."*

- Roosevelt, cited in Johnson, 2004:29

While Roman imperial sorrows of 'expansionism' took place over a hundred of years, it appears that if the present trend continues, the United States seems determined to bring about precisely the threats that it says it is trying to prevent. Its apparent acceptance of a 'Clash of Civilizations' and of wars to establish a moral truth that is the same in every culture sounds part of politically expedient theatre. The great alarm that we are faced with today, as a result of terror collapsing into *simulated* resistance, is that the United States uses this constructivist logic to legitimate its 'imperial grand strategy' of 'preventive war' on countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

The fact that contemporary Islamic *Jihad* is to a great extent the product of an America-driven imperial strategy lends the discourse on *Jihad* a certain 'unreality.' Not quite the historical continuation of a tradition of military resistance but not quite an arbitrary invention either, *Jihad* now perhaps presents the logic of what French Jean Baudrillard (1988) theorized in terms of *simulation* to produce the notion of terror as simulated resistance.

According to Baudrillard (1988), with the distinction between terror and media theatre collapsing - terror becomes theatre and theatre becomes terror. Baudrillard's concept of *simulation* (cited in Poster, 1988:166-167) can be seen as the use of "models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal." Simulation threatens the difference between 'true' and 'false,' between 'real' and 'imaginary' (Poster, 1988:168). It is a reproduction of something that is real, an exact image of the real image and obscures the reality. What is of extreme importance is the fact that it is not an imitation or a duplication of reality but instead a substitute for reality. The result is one of confusion, of trying to distinguish between what is real and what is in fact *simulated*, presented as being real. *Simulacra* have become equivalent to reality and the consequence of this is that there is no way of distinguishing between the real and the imagined.

When an event or object is simulated, it "takes on a life of its own" (Kellner, 1989:76). It loses its status as an object or a representation of something else and becomes 'real.' To Baudrillard (cited in Kellner, 1989:78) the *simulacra* become a natural law or right and serve to control and dominate society. The goal is to reproduce a new system. Society is thus told how things are to be done and what are the correct codes by which society should behave. These precoded choices signify everyday life and 'simulate' people into specific society that it has created (Kellner, 1989:80). The function of these codes is to preserve the system and to reproduce it.

It is within this framework of reference that Baudrillard studies, among other things, the processes and effects of American monopolistic power. The Bush administration is trying to make the masses believe certain facts about the American 'imperial grand strategy' against the 'evil' forces of *Jihad* but at the same time the former is dependent on strategies and concepts borrowed from its enemies. The fact is, that the masses are at the mercy of the United States to create the reality they inhabit. Terrorism can therefore be interpreted as violence for effect as it choreographs dramatic incidents to achieve maximum publicity - the real is collapsed into simulacra and the encoded system of thought and behaviour substitute our 'reality' with a *simulated* reality. This

accounts for the somewhat strange epistemological status of concepts like 'blowback' and 'useful tragedy' which function as the cornerstone of a narrative about 9/11 that goes beyond the limitation of *historical* and *structural narratives*.

* * *

8. Conclusion

It almost seems as if history has come full circle. Communism is dead, and today its successors in Russia and elsewhere are helping the United States extirpate the dreaded terrorists. Yesterday's freedom fighters in Afghanistan, many of them Islamic fundamentalists from other countries, are today's terrorists. There is a very good chance that in the coming years we will see enemies and friends reshuffled again. It is a human tendency to look towards others in times of need. We seek out friends and allies in times of danger. But in times of richness, the shortsighted tend to walk away with others (Mamdani, 2002:27). Nothing is certain anymore; our world has become inordinately complex - not just for onlookers but, above all, for those who seek to rule.

Lack of knowledge about other peoples has made Americans oblivious to other cultures and peoples around the world. Ignorance and myth about Islam can breed self-righteousness - a dangerous base on which to engage with the world. Narratives are therefore significant in understanding the roots of the conflict, the reactions of many of the protagonists, the United States and other responses to the attacks, and the upcoming actions that are, or are not, contemplated (Ross, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:308). In the enterprise of constructing reality, both the *historical* and *structural* narratives have been used to frame the discourse around September 11. These narratives head off in different directions that evoke very different images of the September 11 attacks. Whereas the *historical narrative* invokes images of justice and predicting

the controlled revenge that has characterized the relationship between the West and Islam, at least since the first Crusade, the *structural narrative* is connected to the anger and resentment towards the United States as expressed by many parts of the Muslim world. This narrative could be viewed as further evidence that rather than to neatly dichotomise (West/East or West vs. Rest) the world and deducing that we are experiencing a 'Clash of Civilizations,' it would be better to suggest that we are in fact witnessing a clash *within* civilization.

Either way, the complexity and ambiguity of both the *structural* and *historical* narratives, as well as the experiences underlying them, has offered the opportunity to bridge these two completely incompatible worldviews into a *structural-historical* narrative, which is relevant to an understanding of the attacks of September 11. We can therefore not have a structural argument without a genealogical one - even, and perhaps especially, if in such a genealogical account of the notion of a religious *Jihad* (against the West, against Modernity, against secularism and so on) emerges as nothing more than a tradition that was recently invented by the secular in order to mobilize the religious to fight a secular war, a war that they had to pay a very high price for.

Over time, the consequences of September 11 will be decided by the factor that itself caused this crisis. The outcome is, to say the least, quite uncertain but the 'blowback' could possibly lay the foundations for a crisis that could impair, or even end America's hegemonic influence (Johnson, 2003:232-233). Many observers have argued that the war against terrorism will lack legitimacy, unless the powerful nations embark on reducing global inequalities and extreme poverty. Moreover, many have insisted, the global war against terrorism cannot succeed without bold initiatives to secure justice for the Palestinian people. What the United States needs is to seek desperately a new analysis for its role in the post-Cold War world and to implement policies that will prevent any other major war from taking place (Johnson, 2003:34). Although most Americans do not even have a hand in deciding how the foreign policy of the United States is governed, they are certainly going to pay a steep price for their imperialist escapades of the past decades (Johnson,

2003:34). David Castello, a professor in international relations (cited in Johnson, 2003:232), has correctly observed,

The international system breaks down not only because unbalanced and aggressive new powers seek to dominate their neighbours, but also because declining powers, rather than adjusting and accommodating, try to cement their slipping preeminence into an exploitative hegemony.

* * *

Conclusion

In the end we are all swimming in the same waters, Westerners and Muslims and others alike. And since the waters are part of the ocean of history, trying to plough or divide them with borders is futile.

- Said, cited in Internet 19

On September 11, the vulnerability of the United States and the rest of the world was revealed – in particular, the United States homeland was no longer resistant to the consequences of American foreign policy in international relations (Hershberg & Moore, 2003:3). Strong-minded enemies could show hostility and impose dire harm upon the ultimate symbols of American power, the Pentagon and Wall Street. The city of New York was just like any other city in the world, chaotic, crowded and in ruins: “Lower Manhattan was like a city after an earthquake...Wall Street executives were wandering like the homeless. Streets like Kinshasa. Rubble like Beirut or the West Bank” (Gole, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:343). The actions and the purposes of the terrorists are unspeakable and can neither be rationalized nor negotiated (Berber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:246). When terrorists hijacked innocent people and turned civilian aircraft into fatal weapons, these self-proclaimed ‘martyrs’ of faith subjected others to an inescapable martyrdom interchangeable from mass murder (*ibid*).

Osama bin Laden is not just some Arab who woke up one morning in a bad frame of mind, his turban in a twist, only to decide that America was ‘the enemy.’ He has reason for hating the United States, and by understanding those reasons; *chapter one* has given a glimmer of insight into what provoked the events of September 11 by substantiating the argument with a *historical* narrative.

The mood of the crisis has its roots in a history that goes back as far as the Crusades. Given its causes, such a crisis was virtually inevitable. The Crusades and the Ottoman Empire have unmistakably shown that despite theological roots of affinities between Christianity and Islam, contra religious and political interests fashioned a history of difference and warfare. For centuries, Christian Europe often found itself in the position of defending itself against Muslim armies, which seemed at times to be fighting for its very existence (Esposito, 1992:44). In fact the phrase *guerra fria* (Cold War) originated in the thirteenth century in order to describe the altercation between Islam and Christianity in Spain (Booth & Dunne, 2002:16).

At the end of the Cold War, during the late 1980's, and the early nineties, (one with which we are more familiar) the United States did not only lose the Soviet Empire as the 'Other' or 'enemy' to justify its behavior in international affairs, but it was unable to find its role in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. It did, however, do so when it began to single out Islam as the 'dark force' in tomorrow's world. The project in *chapter one*, was therefore, to illuminate just how the struggle between the two 'forces' of Islamo-fascism and Western globalization, have been deliberately constructed by the United States and influential European powers such as Britain, in order to serve as a 'tool' to justify their imperial behaviors worldwide. For globalization to have worked and for superpowers to justify their imperialist aggression against sovereign nations, the 'Other' had to be created which gave the 'West' a free hand in fighting their battles against the so-called 'Islamic dictatorships.' The confrontation between these new forms of culture-based political stereotypes about the 'Other' was effective because of the essential differences between the dissimilar ideologies to which the 'West' and 'East' adhered to. Some Westerners, including the former President of the United States, Bill Clinton, have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islamic extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise.

Narratives are therefore reflectors of deeper worldviews and assumptions that parties make about each other. By understanding these narratives as being motivating factors and reactions of the parties, it can also give one an indication how to interpret clashing actions that might otherwise be hard for the naïve observer to notice (Ross, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:304). "As exacerbates, narratives provide in-group support and solidarity that promote negative images of the enemy, escalatory actions, and offer little room for accommodation" (*ibid*).

Superficially, bin Laden seems to fit into the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis. After all, he reveals the attacks on American targets. But a closer look shows how this rage is as much directed against one of the most conservative Muslim states in the world - Saudi Arabia - as against the United States. The 'Clash of Civilization' thesis, however, is a seductive theory to explain the post-Cold War world, and certainly Huntington (1996) can point to a wealth of examples: a bloody war in the Sudan between the Islamist regime and the animist and Christian rebels; continued wars between the Russians and the Chechens; the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines; Arabs *versus* Jews in Israel; and now, perhaps, the events of September 11. But age-old hatreds are not sufficient explanations for September 11.

Edmund Burke (cited in Mossali, 1998:41) observes: "Scholarly concern with the Islamic roots of culture and politics is very recent." All knowledge as well as the criteria with which we identify knowledge, is a product of a particular historical moment. For centuries Islam was associated with the colonized peoples and the backwardness at the time when Western (scientific) knowledge was being constituted. This situation produces 'interests' on the part of those at the top of the hierarchies which became, at least in part, constitutive of 'knowledge' because knowledge was defined by those who occupied dominant positions (Wolff, cited in Moussali, 1998:42). Moreover, what this illustrates is that, because the monopoly of technological and industrial power was maintained by those who claimed to 'know,' we in the 'West' have this habit of

looking for solutions. Part of the spirit of technology is to assume that there is always a solution to a problem, or something very close to one. "There may be no solution this time. This may be the beginning of an international cancer we cannot cure" (Mailer, 2002:29).

The *structural narrative* in *chapter two* argues that *neither* side is fighting a civilizational war but that instead what we are experiencing in the post-Cold War period is in fact a clash *within* civilizations. Thus, on the contrary, the really decisive cultural conflict that is taking place is *within* the horizons of each civilization (Hefner, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:51). The attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon was an attack from *within* and not *beyond*. Undoubtedly, the attacks provided shame among Muslims, but also a hidden feeling of pride and empowerment. Even if only for a day, the suicide bombers were able to reverse the roles - revealing the vulnerability of the Western powers. The central question addressed to Islamists in particular and the Muslim world in general, is to know the ways in which they can come to terms with their own experience of modernity. "The fear of sameness and modernity led them to search for purity through the destructive performances and to exorcise the modern in themselves" (Gole, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:343). Contemporary Islam therefore challenges the 'West' to know and understand the diversity of the Muslim experience.

To paint all Muslim students in Europe and the United States and all the Muslim diaspora in the West with the same brush as we paint the Taliban is to endanger the forces of modernization and doom the catalysts of modernization of Islam in the cleft global modernization of modernity. Only then may the Islamic Jacobin dream of a clash of imagined and ossified civilizations come true.

- Arjomand, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:175

Movements are more often motivated by objection to specific Western policies than by civilizational hostility. U.S. Presence and policy, not a generic hatred for Americans, is often the primary motivating force behind acts against American government, business, and military interest. Islam was not just turning against some kind of external, colonial, or occupant force of modernity (Gole, cited in Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:343). We “should not counter Occidentalism with a nasty form of Orientalism. Once we fall for temptation, the virus has infected us too” (Arjomand, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:175).

The tragedy of September 11 provided, among many other things, an important reminder that the globalization so widespread in homogenizing the world’s cultures has in fact done the contrary. The terrorists are thus, themselves a product of the modern world, using modern arms, and attacking modern targets. It is easy to see the cause of resentment towards the United States as expressed by Asians, Arabs, Africans, and Latin Americans. Anti-Americanism goes back a long way and for good or ill, American foreign policy has not done a good job in winning the hearts and minds of people. It has created humiliation, worthlessness, and hopelessness in many places, particularly in Islamic nations. The resentment of modernity and world integration therefore resonates widely in many societies – giving al-Qaeda no better prospect to target globalization than by attacking New York City – the hub of modernity’s worldwide finance.

The resistance to globalization has, therefore, itself been globalized. *Jihad* and *McWorld* could be described as a rather melodramatic *tableau vivant* who are attracted to one another yet neither promotes nor needs democracy (Barber, 1992:6). Both *Jihad* and *McWorld* have their different sets of virtues to the extent that they have turned out to be more antipolitics.¹

¹ Some of the virtues of *McWorld* are prosperity and relative unity, whereas *Jihad* has a different set of virtues such as a vibrant sense of identity and community (Barber, 1999:6). For *McWorld*, antipolitics furthermore includes that of globalism – bureaucratic and technocratic which is focused on the administration of things (Barber, 1996:6-7). *Jihad* has also been anti-political as trivialization has been explicitly undemocratic. With regards to theocratic fundamentalism, it is

The underlying philosophy of the democratic front that has as its aim to transform passive participants into engaged civilians has not been consistent in constructing autonomous individuals in the global economy (Barber, cited in Booth & Bunne, 2002;247). It was partly the cost of civilizational globalization that was emphasized in the *structural* chapter. Each individual is juggling with both these benefits and costs that modernity has to offer. What *McWorld* has created, is a milieu where needs are manipulated to such an extent that 'we' as global consumers find ourselves in a situation of profound civic alienation. The outcome between the cruel battle between *Jihad* and *McWorld* has led to a culture that is "unquestionably in the process of forging a global *something*: but whatever it is, that something is not democracy" (Barber, 1996:276).

*Still, democracy has always played itself out against the odds.
And democracy remains both a form of coherence as binding as
McWorld and secular faith potentially as aspiring as Jihad.*

- Barber, cited in Internet 2

Chapter two has furthermore also attempted to illustrate that there are a few things more interesting about anti-globalization resistance than that it draws whatever strength it has from itself to contribute to the process of globalization. The stereotype of al-Qaeda as a band of nomadic cave dwellers are in fact the members of a highly organized network that are so modern that communication technology is used to exchange their messages. It is precisely by transmitting these messages via video recordings as reported on the world's media, that Osama bin Laden directed the fate of the suicide bombers of September 11. Why has it been so important to note this? Because it has shown us that it is not globalization itself that is the problem but the way in which the world is being

not uncommon to find an individual empowered who rules on behalf of the people (Barber, 1992:7).

globalized through the blind dissemination and imposition of free-market principles and the power accumulated by the multi-nationals (Praeg, 2003:58). What we need to appreciate from the anti-globalization resistance is exactly the fact that it has contributed in a significant way to globalization.

Thus, amid the enthusiasm for the spread of information technology, in which social processes have become more interconnected around the world, the issue of cyberterrorism moved to the forefront of attention – along with more straightforward ways in which the Internet and improved communications technology could actually aid in the communication of terrorists. “Few seemed to appreciate that one of the prime ironies of 9/11 has been the way in which advanced technology has been turned against its makers” (Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:6). Globalization has in fact become the shorthand to create the conditions for the September 11 attacks.

Perhaps the most essential conclusion to be drawn from *chapter three*, then, is that there is no end in competing narratives whether *historical* or *structural*. September 11 is the point where the *structural* and *genealogical* narratives overlap most forcefully. To illustrate the interface between these narratives, reference has been made to the United States (as contemporary power representative of *McWorld*) and how it has been able to exploit history by reinventing the tradition of *Jihad* to manipulate the politics of globalization in its own favor. In the end, there is no moment where we can say that September 11 meant this or that of the same to any one of us all the time (Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:2). The way that one reads September 11 depends on the particular experiences that we have had at the end of the day and the broader contexts and ideas that we carry with us. By offering a contextual synthesis of both the *historical* and *structural* narratives, this study has attempted to come up with a *structural-historical* grand narrative. Through a contextual synthesis of the strengths and weaknesses of both these narratives and by taking into account the historical and contemporary elements of the conflict (i.e. globalization), it has

been made feasible to establish the parameters of the new world (dis) order. In the light of the September 11 attacks, then, either one accepts the 'Clash of Civilization' thesis as propagated by Samuel Huntington (1993) which leads one to predict an all-out assaults against ostensible culprits and the nations that shelters them (Rubio, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:68); or, alternatively, someone who recognizes the intricacy of September 11, and its inherent shades of gray would take a far more parsimonious view of the future.

Whatever one's interpretation of the meaning of September 11, what has been demonstrated to be certain, is that by reinventing the tradition of *Jihad*, the United States has given us clues in three central ways: *one*, the interface between *structural* and *genealogical* narratives; *two*, the complicity of the U.S. in the attacks in which the attacks qua *Jihad* appear full-scale 'blowback'; *three*, much as authors such as Baudrillard and Barber talk about the 'system' as if it were some anonymous menace, we are in fact dealing with imperial politics in which the United States has the power to dedicate, to a very large extent, the nature and rules of a game – taking out players along the way.

Over the long term, the United States and other countries need to dedicate themselves to resolving, once and for all, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As long as this impasse remains, the United States campaign against al-Qaeda and the Islamic *Jihad* against the non-believers and the *infidels* will continue. There are no quick-fix solutions. It would be naïve to think that differences in culture, historical, historical experiences, and political disagreement could be bridged so easily (Sardar & Davies, 2000:209). It is only appropriate that in the post-Cold War world, the United States puts the welfare of citizens ahead of its quest for global hegemony (Johnson, 2003:237). More generally, the United States should comply with an agenda where it seeks to lead through diplomacy as opposed to imposing military force and presenting itself as an economic persecutor (*ibid*). It is not a matter of simply altering a small number of policies in a few places. In 30 or 50 years to come bin Laden will soon be forgotten, but the kind of political

violence and destruction that has been left behind will remain very much with us.

To be sure, the September 11 attacks have demonstrated that we have sadly entered an era where we have become accustomed to conflicts that we once would have found difficult to imagine. In retrospect, leaders of the United States seem to have become used to the habit of using 'unfortunate' events such as September 11, as tactical strategies to legitimize their 'imperial grand strategy.' The latter will inevitably generate multiple forms of 'blowback,' as has been demonstrated with the terror attacks of September 11.

As a student in international relations, one is prone to think that the United States 'won' the battle against the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, this conclusion might appear to be a little too far-fetched. In all probability, those who will look at this study in years to come, will find that while the United States might appear to have won the battle, it is in fact losing by maintaining its present imperialist stance in global affairs (Johnson, 2003:238). While the war on Afghanistan and Iraq might have satisfied the popular American demand for now, in the long run, things will only turn out for the worse because of the American threats at home and abroad. It is important to keep in mind that it is nowhere written that by operating in its guise by building an empire to dominate the world that the United States' global quest for imperial extension must go on forever (Johnson, 2003:xvii). Empires do not last forever and their endings are not of the pleasant sort (Johnson, 2004:310). Much like the Roman senate in its time, the American Emporium cannot be cleansed from its widespread corruption. And failing to implement reform through letting people take active control over Congress, gives Nemesis, "the goddess of retribution and vengeance, the punisher of pride and hubris," the power to wait impatiently for her meeting with the United States (Johnson, 2004:312).

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