# *Chapter Eight The place of evaluation in linguistic theory*

If it can be shown that evaluation is a powerful semogenic feature of language, then, on the basis of Halliday's argument that metalanguage must share such features, I would suggest that metalanguage must include evaluation. It is unlikely that we should find ourselves able to set aside one of the integral features of language when using that very language to talk about itself. As Thompson observes, 'speakers are not parsing experiential content to each other; they are telling us where to stand in order to see things as they want us to see them' (2001), and linguists as language users are not exempt. In this chapter I consider the extent to which evaluation might fit in with Halliday's five features of linguistic theory (8.1-8.3), and suggest some reasons why we have been inclined to overlook it (8.4).

## 8.1 Seeing how it fits

My added feature *evaluation* is an extension, or more accurately an elaboration, of Halliday's argument. The possibility of including it is already implied in his discussion – 'language enacts **all** our interpersonal processes' (1997:6) – because evaluation is part of interpersonal meaning, as Hunston observes:

> Expressing evaluation in a text involves both a statement of personal judgement and an appeal to shared norms and values. In that it creates a shared point of view of speaker/writer and hearer/reader, its meaning is essentially interpersonal. (1994:191)

If linguistic theory, like language, enacts social relations, then it must also be evaluative, because a large part of interpersonal exchange consists in negotiating values. However, while Halliday's five features are controversial, given the current style of linguistic theorizing, they are unlikely to meet with the same degree of resistance as the feature *evaluation*, which clashes quite violently with the prevailing ethos. It contradicts the first and foremost of Hudson's issues on which linguists are supposed to agree: 'Linguists ... take language as it is, rather than saying how it should be' (1981:335). To say that linguistic theory *must* be evaluative sounds odd, because it is this feature that orthodox theory attempts to exclude above all. Although I believe there is ample reason, on the basis of Halliday's argument, to include it, I will admit that it undoubtedly has a different 'feel' to it, which requires some investigation. In TABLE 7.3, at the end of the

previous chapter, I have simplified the modality of Halliday (1997) and used the ambiguous modal *must*[1] to sum up Halliday's features, implying that he is saying they are both *inevitable* and *desirable* in a linguistic theory. For example, if a linguistic theory is to model the comprehensiveness of language, it will *inevitably* be comprehensive itself, and it is also *desirable* that it should be so. But it is not as easy to make either of these claims for the feature *evaluation*. I have attempted to make the difference clear in TABLE 8.1, in which I have quoted Halliday's original wording, showing how the modality fluctuates between the *is* and *ought* modes, in many cases being hard to assign definitively to either. This ambiguity may in part be explained as 'exploiting the mystification his community is habituated to' (Hodge and Kress 1993, quoted in 6.2, above), because he is attempting to change their minds about the nature of linguistic theory. But it is not only that; the ambiguity is inherent in his argument, because he is talking about the IS/OUGHT duality which is basic to linguistics and which the grammar construes through the duality of modals such as *must*.

In TABLE 8.1 I have used the SFL terms *modalization* and *modulation* to label epistemic (*must be*) and deontic (*must do*) modality (Halliday 1994a:88-92;356-7). *Modalization* relates to propositions and *modulation* to proposals (Halliday1994a:70-1;89). Halliday's terms make the connection with the MODALITY system more transparent than the Greek, and incidentally underline the difficulty of keeping the two strands of meaning separate. His terms have broader application than the formal semantic ones, because a functional grammar 'allows us to reason grammatically', not just semantically (Martin1992:3). I have used the formal terms in my discussion below because I am concerned here more with the semantics than the grammar (and because they make it easier to avoid confusion in the discussion).

1

This prototypical modal allows for the two possible readings 'certainty' and 'necessity'. Halliday points out that either is available in expressions such as *she must be very helpful*, and that in some cases it is impossible to rule out either interpretation; as for example in his 'silver' text, where the manageress, in saying to the assistant *Oh but you must,* seems to mean both 'I know you can' and 'you've got to', 'slipping imperceptibly from certainty... to necessity' (1994a:380). In some English modal verbs 'there seems to be a blending of the two, and the listener does not find it necessary to choose' (1997:9).

TABLE 8.1 Modalized and modulated expressions in Halliday (1997)

| | As **LANGUAGE** is ... | → | so **LINGUISTIC THEORY** is and ought to be |
|---|---|---|---|
| modalized (epistemic) | it seems it cannot be both, and yet the grammar insists that it is, in some mixture or other according to the language' (8)<br><br>Indeterminacy is bound to arise (9)<br><br>All of these characteristics ... are going to be implicated in any domain of practice where language is involved (11)<br><br>the grammar surely is neutral. It must be, if language has the enormous powers that we are constantly having to ascribe to it. (16)<br><br>Language is absolutely necessary for distinguishing self from non-self and for remembering beyond the small memorial interval which illuminates the present. (17)<br><br>the child's development of language must follow a certain trajectory (18) | modalized (epistemic) | could not our grammatics ... be comprehensive enough to model the whole of grammar? (20)<br><br>that a theory might be extravagant is probably more controversial (20)<br><br>the categories themselves are inescapably the product of compromise (21)<br><br>That the theory is non-autonomous is I think obvious ... there is no way in which a linguistic theory could be expected to be independent of a general theory of meaning ... (22)<br><br>it might be argued that linguistic theory has never been anything but variable (23)<br><br>it is perhaps not surprising to find that a theory of language ... should be rather closely analogous to what it is theorizing about. (23)<br><br>A theory is, inevitably, both enabling and constraining (23) |
| | | modulated (deontic) | our theory attempts to be comprehensive (19)<br><br>it seemed to me all the more important, therefore, that a theory of language was itself comprehensive ... Otherwise, the parts of the picture are unlikely to fit together; and if it is argued that there is no reason why they should fit together, I would suggest that if they don't, then we create a very impoverished picture (19)<br><br>Describing a language demands the same kind of trinocular vision ... in setting up grammatical systems we are necessarily approaching them from above ... below ... roundabout ... (21)<br><br>it would be perverse to theorize about language as an autonomous intellectual game (23)<br><br>whether we think we should be foregrounding the opening up or the closing off, the liberating or the enslaving, we do need to harbour the conception of a language's global semogenic force (25) |

Although Halliday himself hardly uses *must* in this paper (I found only two examples), he does use a number of variations on it, in both senses (as shown in TABLE 8.1). The overall pattern of the 1997 paper is of one modality seguing into the other: *is* becoming *ought*. Halliday is saying both that our theory *inevitably* mirrors the grammar (a proposition), and that we would be *well advised* to shape our theory to match the grammar (a proposal). In the natural sciences it is a sound principle to say that 'you cannot get an *ought* from an *is*'. However, in linguistics we cannot help but get an *ought* from an *is*, because language is a behaviour and it is only when we pretend that language is an object separate from its speakers that we can imagine we are saying what it *is* and not what it *ought to be* (as argued in 3.3.1, above). This ought to be self-evident, but the difficulty of challenging received wisdom is evident in Halliday's opening remark 'The burden of this paper is something that I feel is very simple; yet I have found it quite difficult to formulate' (1997:3).

In the plenary (1994b) on which the 1997 paper is based Halliday uses *must* more frequently,[2] and stresses the deontic interpretation more strongly; for example: 'it's very very important that our own field – our own grammatics, or linguistics, in the broader sense – *must* be comprehensive in its coverage of different aspects of language' (1994b). In the 1997 published version the deontic modality is expressed less emphatically: 'it seemed to me all the more important, therefore, that a theory of language was itself comprehensive' (1997:19). We can interpret this as resulting from a difference not just of mode (written rather than spoken) but also of tenor: the plenary was addressed primarily to the 'converted', whereas the readership for the published article might be somewhat less ready to go along with the idea. The dual intention is expressed explicitly in another paper, in which he says that 'indeterminacy is an *inherent* and *necessary* feature of a grammar, and hence something to be accounted for and indeed celebrated in the grammatics, not idealised out of the picture – just as the grammar's construal of experience recognises indeterminacy as an inherent and necessary feature of the human condition' (Halliday1996:27; italics added). Rather than fighting against the natural tendency of metalanguage to reflect the properties of language (because metalanguage *is* language), we

2

There are five instances. The other four are: 'the grammar *is* neutral - and it *must* be - if language does all these wonderful things that we claim it does'; 'the development of language *must* follow a certain trajectory'; 'the system *must* be a stratal one with grammar - lexicogrammar - evolving as the latest phase of all'; 'a parser *must* parse these [ambiguities] out - we've got to choose - it's either this or that' (1994b).

should, as he puts it, be 'celebrating' it and making it work for us. He says of his five features that 'the kind of grammatics that is of value, that we try to work towards, in a sense shares these very same features of language' (1994b).

The question is whether we can think about evaluation in the same way. If we acknowledge it as a feature of our metalanguage, a step which is controversial enough given the anti-prescriptive stance, can we then take the next step 'celebrating' it and seeing what it can do for us? This is not easy to do. Evidence that evaluation differs from Halliday's features is that *must* in the added 'evaluative' section in TABLE 7.3 seems to 'read' differently. In linguistics, evaluation is not easily interpreted as either inevitable or desirable, and especially not the latter, but initially it is hard to say whether it really is a feature of a different kind or whether it just seems so because we have become so accustomed to excluding it from our theory.

What undoubtedly does make it different from the others, and difficult to accept, is that whereas Halliday's five features of metalanguage *reflect* features of language, evaluation in metalanguage would not only *reflect* language but also *affect* it. TABLE 8.1 is uni-directional: language affects metalanguage – because language is *comprehensive*, metalanguage must be *comprehensive*, and so on – but metalanguage does not affect language (it does not follow that because metalanguage is *comprehensive* language must be *comprehensive*). But to accept evaluation as a feature would be to produce a bi-directional picture: because language is *evaluative*, metalanguage must be *evaluative*, and if metalanguage is *evaluative* it in turn has the power to *evaluate* language, which is inevitably to affect language in a variety of ways. To admit that linguistic theory is evaluative would thus entail admitting that the linguist cannot help affecting the object of analysis, which would mean giving up the cherished role of objective scientist. The deontic modality is thus extremely problematic: it is difficult enough for linguists to accept that we *do* affect language, let alone that we *should*. That would involve a complete about-face for the discipline.

Setting aside for the moment the question of whether evaluation should be a *welcome* feature of linguistic theory (to be taken up in Chapter Nine), I will explore the idea that it is *inevitable*, that our metalanguage *is* if not *ought to be* evaluative (but recognizing all the while the difficulty of keeping these apart). The question seems to be whether evaluation can be regarded as a powerful meaning-making feature of the grammar, as Halliday's five features are. Could it be that it is in some way part of the grammar, rather than just an unfortunate semantic and pragmatic side effect

that we can eventually exclude, as the orthodoxy would have it? The following two sections are a tentative exploration of some angles from which evaluation might be seen as a powerful semogenic feature of language (8.2), having its own realizations in the grammar (8.3), and thus, according to Halliday's view (1997), an inevitable component of linguistic theory.

### 8.2 Evaluation pervades language and metalanguage

A basic function of language is to give value to experience, and in the same way metalanguage must give value to language, which is the facet of experience it in turn construes. As Hasan suggests, 'while language is not the only means for (re)producing the values attached to human action, it is, none the less, one of the most powerful instruments for the purpose' (1986:143). Language confers meaning on experience, and in so doing establishes the value of an entity or phenomenon – not just its goodness or badness, but even more basically its interestingness, or relevance to our concerns. Merely to give a name to an entity gives it value, by distinguishing it from the unnamed.[3] Recognizing this, Martin classifies 'interest' as evaluative, including it as a component of the sub-system of AFFECT in APPRAISAL theory: 'the framework includes interest (e.g. curiosity) as an emotion' (2000a:152). One of the earliest signs Halliday distinguishes in a child's 'protolanguage' is a squeak which might be glossed as 'that's interesting' (1975:148): the squeak not only calls attention to the interesting thing but confers value on it as being distinct from all the things that are not interesting. Language also functions to reproduce the values others confer on things:

> Even at Phase 1 [9-16½ months] the context of situation is a social construct and its elements are defined by social value: an object is a favourite object, a person is a mother. At no time does the environment in which meaning takes place consist solely of "props", of the uninterpreted sights and sounds of the material world. Even at nine months, the "things" to which the child's meanings relate realize values in his social system. (1975:143)

---

[3] The way naming enhances the value of things is expressed thus in the letters of George Eliot: 'Almost every yard of these banks is a "Hunt" picture – a delicious crowding of mosses and delicate trefoil, and wild strawberries, and ferns great and small ... I never before longed so much to know the names of things as during this visit to Ilfracombe. The desire is part of the tendency that is now constantly growing in me to escape from all vagueness and inaccuracy into the daylight of distinct, vivid ideas' (Uglow 1987:57).

In our early language we learn to give an enhanced reality and value to concrete things by naming them. Later we learn do this with abstract entities, and extend our values beyond the range of observable phenomena. Grammatical analysis is such a process. It is not so much a matter of naming existing entities as of calling entities into existence and giving them value (as discussed in Chapter Six). A prominent example is the highly-valued concept of Deep Structure, which grew from a simple term for the 'initial phrase structure' (giving value to the grammatical concept of 'transformations') into a catch-all for a multitude of values, not least of which was the desire to prove language to be innate, with the side-effect of proving that language is able to take care of itself and consequently that the prescriptive approach is wrong: Chomsky's values strengthening themselves by forming an interconnected system.

We do not value independently, but base our notions of what is worth paying attention to according to the frame of thinking common to the community we belong to, or in reaction against it. This must affect what we perceive as the 'facts' of language. As a member of a community of generative linguists, Martin was, he explains, a confident 'grammaticality adjudicator' but, since this role 'is obviously something one has to be socialised into and stick with', later found that he had 'lost [his] intuitions... about whether borderline English sentences were actually English or not' (1997:431). Similarly, Sampson says 'I can make such judgements myself, but then I was explicitly taught to make them during the years when I received a traditional grammar school education in the 1950s' (2001:123). He points out the mistake of believing that a clear division can be drawn between *grammatical* and *ungrammatical* in a natural language as it can in an artificial logical or computational language. In a natural language, *grammatical* means conforming to the preferences of a particular community, and *ungrammatical* means 'frowned on as substandard'; it does not mean 'not part of the language' (2001:165-6). On this understanding, judging grammaticality must be an evaluative process.

Metalanguage must therefore be evaluative in this sense of 'conferring value'. Producing an instance of language, or evaluating an instance, such as a particular text, instils a value into that instance that must ultimately affect the system (as observed in 5.4, above), and metalanguage, as a sub-system of language, must work on the same principle. Linguists are therefore obliged to take into account the role of value in their investigations: the fact that their view of language is affected by the values of the linguistics community and in turn has the potential to affect the ordinary language user's view once we take linguistics into the wider social arena.

This view I have put forward of the involvement of evaluation in theory is admittedly rather broad and non-specific. To be able to compare the feature *evaluation* with Halliday's five features I want to show that, like those, it counts as a powerful feature of the grammar.

### 8.3 How we might recognize the realization of evaluation in the grammar

Natural language has developed a variety of resources for inducing others to accept our values. If we can identify the realization of these *in the grammar* we can claim that evaluation, like Halliday's five features, is another resource that might be described as 'really critical as the source of grammatical energy ... from which a language derives its semogenic power' (Halliday 1997:5), and therefore also a powerful feature of our metalanguage, our grammatics.

Halliday mentions the grammatical resources associated with four of his features: under *comprehensive*, the idea of systems of choices; under *extravagant*, complementarities such as aspect and tense; under *indeterminate*, conflicting categorizations such as those in the English modal verbs; under *variable*, the grammars of dialect, register and code. Only under *non-autonomous* does he fail to specify a resource of the grammar, which makes non-autonomy somewhat different from the other features: it has to do with the general relation of language to its social context rather than with specific grammatical resources. It is concerned with 'the ongoing dialectic between the material and the semiotic in human life' (1997:10); with the grammar 'evolving as part of human history – in cahoots with all the layers and strata within semiotic itself' (1994b). Non-autonomy is the rationale for the theoretical concept of the metafunction: the idea that the social context and language must not be separated if theory is to construe language in a believable fashion. Perhaps evaluation might be seen as a feature of this kind, a necessary part of the 'dialectic between the material and the semiotic'. If social context and language are to be kept together in the theory, then we have to admit evaluation, a basic element of the social context. Yet it seems to me that evaluation is more than just social context, and that it is worth considering how it might be shown to be involved in the grammar. The motivation for Halliday's model of grammar is to show how 'the uses of language ... have shaped the system' (1994a:xiii), and as evaluation is one of the prime uses its realizations ought to be identifiable in the grammar. By considering grammar and evaluation from the following perspectives we should be able to identify some connections.

### 8.3.1 Grammar as choice

Systemic grammars focus on the paradigmatic axis of the grammar, thus emphasizing the importance of choice. Formal (generative or traditional) grammars, focusing on the syntagmatic, are primed to emphasize inevitability and underplay choice. If to choose is to evaluate, then a grammatics that emphasizes choice must in some sense include evaluation. An English lecturer observes that

> next to the gift of language itself, one of our distinctly human and humanising abilities is our sense of values, an awareness that certain kinds of experiences or actions are preferable to certain other kinds of experiences and actions. ... a good deal of every adult's life is made up of making choices, and these choices are usually based on some sense of "better or worse" – even if that is only "better or worse for me". (Walters 1998:4)

and the linguist might add that it is primarily *through* language that we evaluate, beginning with our earliest experience:

> A small child does not know what the noises coming out of adults' mouths are, but he can easily see that they matter a lot to adults, that they look like a key to closer interaction with adults – including one adult with whom he has a relationship perhaps more passionately loving than he will ever have with anyone again: his mother. ... Pinker believes that utterances like 'Don't play near the fire' must have special importance for children, because he assumes that language is innate. But utterances like 'Who's Mummy's great big boy, then?' may be just as important, or more so. (Sampson1999:88)

The way the child learns the adult's evaluations is largely through the language choices the adult makes. In Sampson's example the mother conveys her evaluation of the child by means of a combination of choices from a range of linguistic resources – lexical, syntactic and phonological.[4]

---

4

I have omitted from consideration here the question of the conscious/unconscious nature of choices. Perhaps a conscious choice might be defined as a speaker's (or more likely writer's) own personal language decision, while an unconscious choice (the default variety) is one that reflects the countless decisions of countless earlier language users/makers that go to make up the language system today.

The lexical resources are the most obviously evaluative choices, but individual lexical items are not necessarily positive or negative on their own, they acquire their value through being combined with other choices. For example, the intensifier *great* and the adjective *big* in Sampson's example become positive in proximity to *Mummy's* and *boy*. They could just as easily express negative evaluation, for example: *Don't be a great big nuisance*. The Mood choice also supports the positive interpretation: the interrogative functions here not as a request for information but as an exclamation of positive evaluation. (This seems to be a common choice for expressing approval of small children and pets: *Who's a pretty Polly, then?*) The choice of tone adds evaluative force: it is possible to imagine a number of ways this example might be spoken to convey strong approval:

// 1 who's Mummy's / great big / **bòy** then //
// 42 **whô's** / Mummy's great big / boy thén //
// 5 who's / **Múmmŷ's** / great big boy then // [5]

Irony can of course reverse the polarity of the evaluation, although the choice of lexis, Mood, and intonation pattern might remain similar: *'Does Mother's little chickabiddy want his nose pushed sideways?' she said. 'Very well, then'.*[6] As observed by Halliday (1994b;1997), and emphasized by Martin (2001), the resources themselves are neutral; they do not realize fixed values: we imbue them with our values (positive or negative) in use.

Intonation may be the most basic and instinctive way of expressing evaluation – as Thompson observes, 'intonation is a set of mini-systems on its own: it does textual, experiential and intonational things' (2001). In spoken language the patterns indicative of evaluation are clearly recognizable, for example, a typical English intonation, tone 5 (rising-falling), can be used to express strong approval, as in Halliday's manageress's demonstration of how to make a sale by exclaiming: // 5 isn't / that / **bêàutiful** // (1994a:368).

5 Intonational notation following Halliday (1994a:295 ff.).

6 P.G. Wodehouse, 1950, *Nothing Serious*.

The important thing about choice, however, is that it is not choice on its own that is evaluative so much as choice against things *not* chosen, which implies a system. If grammar is defined as systems, then intonation is grammar; as Halliday views it: 'the contrasts expressed by intonation are quite systematic, like other contrasts in the grammar; they are not vague and individualistic nuances' and 'they are closely tied to other grammatical systems such as mood and modality' and 'since intonation can express lexical meaning (that is, can function as part of the shape of a word, as it does in a tone language), it is only to be expected that it will also be able to function in the grammar' (Halliday 1989:49). (The patterns of written language that have to do duty for the evaluative function of intonation are of course more difficult to recognize and describe. Some are discussed in 8.3.6, below.)

### 8.3.2 Grammar as system

The value of an instance depends on our awareness of the underlying system from which it is chosen (as discussed in 7.1, above): the knowledge of what it is *not* makes it what it *is*. Meaning is not *sui generis* but is 'beholden to the existence of that network of relations which, for short, we call "language"' (Hasan 1987:101). Awareness of the system does not of course mean that the speaker is *consciously* aware of the thousands of possible choices: it means that he or she can demonstrate command of the system, the ability to make a variety of selections from it. Such 'awareness' shows up in the familiar conversational trick in which speaker B replaces speaker A's choice with a choice B thinks more appropriate to the situation. An example allows us to imagine a system – of material Processes construing 'behaviour at parties'? – from which speaker B makes a choice that conveys her own appraisal of the behaviour, grading it as less negative:

> [A] "Was I *making a pass* at Elinor?" he said. "Did I do that?"
>
> [B] "Of course you didn't," she said. "You were *only fooling* that's all."[7]

Such conversational adjustments reveal contrasting evaluations of a phenomenon or situation and provide a glimpse of the delicate systems of choices available for realizing appraisal. This particular example reveals the system Appraisal theorists have labelled AMPLIFICATION: 'turning up the volume ... or playing things down' (Martin 2000a:148). In monologic mode, such glimpses

[7] Dorothy Parker, 1939, *You Were Perfectly Fine.*

into the speaker's implicit knowledge of system are revealed in self-corrections. For example, in the following a plenary speaker can be seen (heard) taking advantage of the possibilities for amplification that the system of intonation also provides:

> Now, the situation today is very different. For the first time now, we as linguists have data – the corpus. (As Robert has foregrounded.) I mean, it is the first time we have had data. Let's face it, it should transform the whole discipline. (Halliday 1994b)

// 1 ‸for the **fìrst** time // **nòw** // we / as linguists have / **dàta** //

1 ‸ the / **còrpus** // [*sotto voce* As Robert has foregrounded]

1 ‸ I mean it is the first / <u>**tìme**</u> // we have / <u>**hàd**</u> // <u>**dàta**</u> //

The speaker splits the utterance *I mean, it is the first time we have had data* into three separate information units. This repetition-with-variation has three heavily stressed points of tonic prominence (*time*, *had*, *data*), conveying an evaluation which I interpret as 'Let's remind ourselves once more how startlingly new and significant this data really is for linguistics; let's not just take it for granted'. The speaker re-patterns the intonation contour to convert what we would expect to be Given information into New one more time before finally picking it up as Given (*it*) in the next utterance: *Let's face it, <u>it</u> should transform the whole discipline)*. The underlined ***time***, ***had*** and ***data***, which might be called 'reprise News', are New here not 'not because they have not been mentioned before but because they are contrastive' (Halliday 1994a:298) and also emphatic, amplifying the first mention. The information pattern is shown in TABLE 8.3.2, below. They are contrastive in two ways. First, the reference is endophoric: they contrast with the less heavily stressed first mention: *For the first <u>time</u> now, we as linguists have <u>data</u>*. The heavy stress on ***had*** is particularly marked, because it is unexpected on a relational process. It contrasts with the previous unstressed *have*, making it suggest real possession: 'we now *own* data in a more graspable form'. Second, the audience could be counted on to pick up the contrast with the implied exophoric reference to the previous situation in linguistics. The intonational pattern works to convey strong approval of the new resource, against an implied background of recent linguistics in which the large scale electronically searchable corpus was not only not available but was actively disapproved of by some as not the right route into linguistics.[8]

---

[8] Sampson quotes Chomsky (1961, a reference I have not seen) as saying that 'a direct record – an

Given that much of linguistic theory is propagated in the form of spoken address, the evaluative effect produced by intonation must play a considerable part in promoting a theory. (In monologic *written* mode, of course, we are unlikely to get these clear glimpses of the author re-selecting from the systems for evaluation, unless we are reading a self-edited manuscript. (This is discussed in 8.4.4, below.)

TABLE 8.3.2 Choices from the thematic and information systems

| Theme | | Rheme |
|---|---|---|
| interpersonal | topical | |
| | *For the **first** time **now**,* | *we as linguists have **data** – the **corpus**.* |
| | New | Given New New |
| | | *(As Robert has foregrounded.)* |
| | | Given |
| *I mean,* | *it* | *is the first **time** [[we have had **data**]].* |
| | Given | (reprise) **New** (reprise) **New** |
| *Let's face it,* | *it* | *should transform the whole discipline.* |
| | Given | New |

It might be argued that evaluation is primarily realized not by grammar but by lexis, and, whereas we might accept that an obviously grammatical resource such as a verbal group can be construed as part of a system, it is perhaps less easy to see a lexical item as part of a system and therefore a part of the grammar. However, moves are being made currently to demonstrate that lexis can be shown to be systemic – consisting of networks of choices, not random instances – just as grammar can. SFL treats lexis not as something of a different kind from grammar but as its more delicate manifestation – indeed, would like to 'turn the whole of linguistic form into grammar' (Hasan 1987:73).[9] It is this kind of 'grammar' that Hasan conceptualizes as 'semantic networks'

---

actual corpus – is almost useless as it stands, for linguistic analysis of any but the most superficial kind' (Sampson 2001:2).

9

*Delicacy* means degrees of refinement of the grammar. Halliday explains that 'This has been referred to by various metaphors: refining the grid or mesh, sharpening the focus, increasing the granularity and so on' (1996:13).

(1996). APPRAISAL theorists are also attempting to categorize evaluation as systems of meaning that can be described by the same methods as systems of grammar (Martin 2000a; White 2001), and success in this enterprise would be a strong argument that evaluation is indeed part of the grammar.

### 8.3.3 Grammar as form *and* meaning

Apart from the argument that evaluation is 'only' lexis, it might also be argued that it is 'only' semantics; that it resides in the meanings, which are somehow separate from the grammar. The formal view (and the lay commonsense one), seeing meaning as somehow prior to language form, would be that evaluative meanings lead us to select those forms; it is not the forms themselves that are evaluative. However, in the SFL model, meaning and form are not treated as separate entities: 'there are no meanings waiting around to be encoded; the meaning is created in language' (1994a:xii). The semantics is part of the grammar, not a separate component, the two being related by *realization*, 'a symbolic relationship between content and expression' (Matthiessen and Halliday 1997:28) as discussed in 7.2, above. In Halliday's view, 'A language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be realized' (1994a:xiv). In this sense, evaluation, as part of meaning, is part of grammar.

### 8.3.4 Grammar as propositional *and* interpersonal

Formal models of linguistics focus on propositional, or ideational, grammar, sidelining the interpersonal as 'pragmatics', something external to the grammar. Halliday's five features appear to be primarily ideational, but the interpersonal is included by implication under *comprehensive*, as I have indicated in TABLE 7.3. Interpersonal meaning is the speaker's use of language 'as the means of his own intrusion into the speech event: the expression of his comments, his attitudes and evaluations, and also the relationship that he sets up between himself and the listener – in particular, the communicative role that he adopts, of informing, questioning, greeting, persuading and the like' (Halliday 1973:106), realized in particular by the Mood and Modality systems. The interpersonal is not a separate kind of language; as White observes: 'Under systemic functional perspectives, of course, all utterances are analysed as simultaneously ideational and interpersonal – there is no utterance which is without interpersonal value' (2001:18). Lemke makes the link between interpersonal and ideational more explicit:

> One of the most basic functions of language is to create interpersonal relationships between speakers and addressees through the way in which the text is worded. Speech act functions establish whether we are offering or demanding, aiding or attacking, creating solidarity or emphasizing social distance. In these and other ways we use language to take a stance towards and socially orient ourselves and our text to others. But we do not just use language to orient to addressees, real and potential; we also take a stance toward the ideational or propositional content of our own texts. Whatever we have to say about the world, we can also tell others, in the same utterance, to what extent we believe what we say is likely, desirable, important, permissible, surprising, serious or comprehensible. In making these evaluations of propositions and proposals, we also orient our text in the larger world of available social viewpoints on our topic, and we further define our identities as meaning-makers with particular values as well as beliefs. (Lemke 2001:1)

Lemke's explanation makes it clear not only that the interpersonal is inextricably bound up with the ideational, but also that the evaluative is inextricably bound up with both of these. It is therefore reasonable to regard it as an integral part of the grammar. If we can identify the resources or patterns that realize interpersonal meanings, it may be that we can also identify those that realize evaluative ones.

### 8.3.5 Evaluation as parasitic on other resources of the grammar

However, as it is difficult to identify grammatical resources whose dedicated function is to realize evaluative meaning, it might be suggested that evaluation is 'parasitic' on the grammar (Hunston and Sinclair, 2000:74). At this point it becomes necessary to consider again what Halliday means by *grammar*, in case to include evaluation might seem merely to capitalize on too broad a definition of the term. But Halliday's understanding of grammar is quite specific. In contrasting a child's protolanguage with adult language, he maintains that the latter has a grammar, while the former has not:

> The adult language is not a two-level system but a three-level system; it is composed not merely of meanings and sounds, but has another level of coding in between ... . In technical terms, in addition to a semantics and a phonology, [the child] has a level of linguistic form, a lexico-grammar. ... Grammatical structure is a device which enables the speaker to be both observer and intruder at the same time... . With a grammar one is free to mean two things at once. (Halliday 1975:30)

Or, indeed, three. Equipped with a grammar, we can express a proposition, an evaluation of the proposition, and an orientation towards the listener or reader, all in one utterance, as Lemke observes, above. For example:

1. Believe me, my dear Elizabeth, that your modesty, so far from doing you any disservice, rather adds to your other perfections.[10]

2. but do not accept the sophism propagated by half-thinking academics and fully used by incompetents to gloze mistakes in their writing, that there are *different Englishes*, one as good as the other. (Bruton-Simmonds 1990:125)

3. Of course, we all know that this is not a genuine question – just one of those tainted speech acts we are given to producing in everyday life. (Hasan 1984:13; referring to her plenary title *What kind of resource is language?*)

Through long being habituated to privileging propositional meaning we have come to consider evaluative meaning as something 'added on'. But all the meanings are in the grammar at once; there is no separable piece we can set aside as expressing only proposition, or only evaluation. TABLE 8.3.5.1 attempts, however, to imagine the individual strands of meaning that the reader/listener might pick up. (I am not suggesting that this is what the writer or speaker 'really' meant. However, in the text from which Example 3 is taken the speaker helpfully goes on to elucidate the meanings herself.)

10 Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*.

TABLE 8.3.5.1 Evaluation of proposition and orientation towards reader/listener

| | Example 1 | Example 2 | Example 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| proposition | You are modest. | Academics and other incompetents say there are *different Englishes*, all equally good. | My title is not really a question. |
| evaluation of proposition | I approve of modesty in a bride-to-be. | I think this is nonsense. | 'there were good reasons for presenting the title as a question' (Hasan 1984:13) |
| orientation to reader/ listener | I commend you for your modesty – we both know this is the standard format well-brought up young women use for responding to a first marriage proposal. | I am warning you as sensible and thoughtful people not to be taken in by such stuff. | I know that as an audience of experienced linguistics conference delegates you will understand my use of the interrogative ('I feel justified in my belief that no one is going to steal my turn', Hasan 1984:13), my linguist's habit of analysing my own discourse, and the ironic tenor of this introduction. |

Plainly much of the evaluation in these examples is expressed through the attitudinal lexis, but to be maximally effective it must be arranged in a pattern, which is grammar. However, the habit of concentrating on the propositional puts an obstacle in the way of our seeing the evaluation as grammar. We have become expert at describing the resources that typically realize experiential and even textual meanings, but less so at describing those that realize the interpersonal. The other metafunctions have their own grammatics, as Martin explains: experiential meaning (*particle*) is realized by constituent resources of the grammar (processes and participants and circumstances); textual meaning (*wave*) by culminative resources (Theme and Rheme); interpersonal meaning (*field*) by prosodic resources (Subject, Finite, Predicator, Complement, Adjunct); and he adds logical meaning (*chain*), which is realized by recursive resources (parataxis and hypotaxis) (Martin 1992:549). As evaluation does not (yet) have its own dedicated grammatics, it might be seen as piggy-backing, or *parasitic* (Hunston and Thompson 2000:74), on the others, 'borrowing' any or all of the resources of the grammar, particularly the interpersonal, for its realization. Whereas *particle*, *wave*, *field* and *chain* are physical entities, a *parasite* is biological, and thus of a different kind of complexity, as evaluation is of a different kind of complexity from the other resources of the grammar, and more inextricably entangled with other features. Conceptualizing evaluation as 'parasitic' on the grammar perhaps qualifies it to be included with Halliday's powerful semogenic features of language: if not exactly grammar, it is certainly closely attached to it or involved in it.

Martin (1992) explains that the expression of attitude is not so much a discrete element of a clause, (as for example the Mood can be identified as the Subject and Finite – the 'Mood Block') as a 'colouring' over the whole clause, requiring a prosodic representation. In the clause he gives as example of 'negative affect as a clause prosody' – *That stupid bloody cretin is really giving me the bloody shits* – the negative attitude is realized prosodically in continuous fashion through the interpersonal resources of the grammar, 'amplifying attitude wherever the potential for expressing attitudinal meaning is made available' (1992:11). The 'parasite' analogy envisages evaluation as taking advantage of these resources, as shown in TABLE 8.3.5.2.

TABLE 8.3.5.2 Positive affect as a clause complex prosody (based on Martin 1992:11, Fig. 1.6)

Positive attitude ------------------------------------------------------------->

| Predicator | Complement | Vocative | Subject | Predicator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Believe* | *me,* | *my dear Elizabeth* | *that your modesty,* | *so far from doing* |

------------------------------------------------------------------------------->

| Complement | Complement | Mood Adjunct | Finite/Predicator | Complement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *you* | *any disservice,* | *rather* | *adds to* | *your other perfections.* |

Evaluation can also be seen as borrowing other metafunctional resources for its realization. For example, Hunston and Sinclair give an example of what they call a 'bogus definition': *A dog is a damned nuisance*. In this example I would describe the evaluation as parasitic on the typically propositional resources of the grammar of definitions (Token and Value), so that a pattern we generally read as a definition is co-opted to mean an evaluation. Hunston and Sinclair remark that if this clause 'occurred in the definition position of an entry *dog* in a dictionary, one would have no choice but to accept it as a definition' (2000:80). (This parasitism is of course the source of the humour in Samuel Johnson's famous dictionary entries, such as *A lexicographer: [is] a harmless drudge*.) The examples given in 8.3.1, above – *'Who's Mummy's great big boy, then?'* and *'Does Mother's little chickabiddy want his nose pushed sideways?'* – might be described as 'bogus questions': interrogatives functioning as exclamations of positive and negative appraisal respectively. The label *bogus*, however, suggesting as it does an illegal operation of some kind, is not entirely appropriate, as this kind of transfer of function is a normal procedure of the grammar. It is grammatical metaphor (mentioned in 3.3.1, above): the idea that 'for any given semantic configuration there will be some realization in the lexicogrammar – some wording –

that can be considered congruent; there may also be various others that are in some respect "transferred", or metaphorical' (Halliday 1994a:342). This process is 'fundamental to adult uses of language' (Halliday and Matthiessen 1999:7). But the label *parasitic* conveys the idea of this particular trick of the grammar, in which a propositional form is co-opted to express an evaluation.

### 8.3.6 Evaluation as having its own dedicated patterns of grammar

The difficulty of identifying resources of the grammar whose *dedicated* function is evaluative may of course be not so much an inherent difficulty as simply the difficulty of doing something that has not been done before, accustomed as grammarians are to concentrating on single sentences in isolation and to putting propositional meaning first. Taking a new perspective obviates some of this difficulty and allows us to talk about grammar in new ways. Using a corpus, Hunston and Sinclair (2000) have identified electronically searchable patterns whose dedicated function is evaluative; i.e. in which evaluation seems to be the primary rather than the secondary function. Introducing an account of these findings, the editors explain that

> the generally accepted view [is] that, except in the case of modality, evaluation does not have its own grammar and can most efficiently be explored in lexical terms alone. This bias arises partly at least because, from the viewpoint of a general grammar of the language, evaluation appears parasitic on other resources and to be somewhat randomly dispersed across a range of structural options shared with non-evaluative functions. If, however, we start from the expression of evaluation and identify the set of structures that are involved, we may well end up with a more systematic and coherent picture. (Hunston and Thompson 2000:74)

Hunston and Sinclair have shown that by using 'local grammars', which do not 'squeeze the description into ill-adapted general categories', it is possible to identify 'some patterns whose primary purpose is to evaluate, or to attribute evaluation to another speaker' (2000:100). Such a grammar of evaluation affords a more powerful role to evaluation, demonstrating explicitly, rather than just claiming intuitively, that it is 'a central function of language' (Hunston and Thompson 2000:74).

Once these patterns are recognized, it becomes clear that the evaluation resides not just in isolated lexical items but also in typical clause patterns; as for example, in Hunston and Sinclair's

pattern 5 (i) *What's very good about this play is that it broadens people's view*, parsed as What + link verb ʌ adjective group ʌ prepositional phrase ʌ link verb ʌ clause or noun group:

TABLE 8.3.6.1 A local grammar of evaluation (Hunston and Sinclair 2000:90 Table 5.10)

| *What's* | *very good* | *about this play* | *is* | *that it broadens people's view* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What + link verb | adjective group | prepositional phrase | link verb | clause or noun group |

or pattern 5 (ii) *What's interesting is the tone of the statement*, parsed as What + link verb ʌ adjective group ʌ link verb ʌ clause or noun group:

TABLE 8.3.6.2 A local grammar of evaluation (Hunston and Sinclair 2000:90 Table 5.11)

| *What's* | *interesting* | *is* | *the tone of the statement* |
|---|---|---|---|
| What + link verb | adjective group | link verb | clause or noun group |

Hunston and Sinclair also demonstrate that evaluative adjectives are to some extent dependent on such patterns – the patterns 'tend to select evaluative adjectives', and that the patterns may 'mak[e] a non-evaluative adjective temporarily evaluative' (2000:100), thus showing more clearly that it is the grammar itself that is evaluative, rather than the evaluation being parasitic on the grammar.[11]

### 8.3.7 A grammatical pattern whose dedicated function may be evaluative

Hunston and Sinclair's discussion is limited to 'evaluations which are explicit and which use typical evaluative words' (2000:84) and patterns which 'may be used as a "diagnostic" for evaluative adjectives' (2000:100). I would suggest that we might, however, consider some patterns as evaluative per se, whether or not they select explicitly evaluative lexis.

---

11

The idea of local grammars owes a debt to Firth, who believed that descriptive linguistics "is at its best when applied to a restricted language", which he defines as "serving a circumscribed field of experience or action"... and having "a micro-grammar and a micro-glossary" . [He] was of the opinion that 'it is "unnecessary" "to attempt a structural and systemic account of a language as a whole" (de Beaugrande 1991:212).

Linguists are often guilty of taking a monocular view of language and missing one of its most elementary characteristics: the way there is always more than one thing going on at a time. And even when we *are* aware of several strands of clause meaning we tend to think of one strand as primary, as being the dedicated function of that kind of clause. The Western tradition of grammatical analysis privileges the informative and logical functions of language. (This is evident in Labov's discussion of Larry's language, discussed 4.1 and 4.2, above.) But if the interpersonal and evaluative functions are ontologically primary – Halliday's 1975 study of child language development shows that the informative function is the last to appear, at about two years of age – then I believe it might be just as reasonable to claim that it is the informative that is parasitic on the interpersonal function. To view grammatical structures this way would involve taking a fresh perspective. Instead of seeing the ideational meanings of language (experiential and logical) as primary, which leads us to treat evaluation as parasitic on these features, or merely evoked by the context (as discussed in 3.3.2, above), we might treat the interpersonal as the primary meaning, bringing evaluation to the fore.

As an exercise in rediscovering the evaluative nature of our metalanguage, I have taken this perspective on one of the natural language forms we habitually use. It is the pattern, common in academic writing, that is made by the coordinating correlative conjunctions *not only ... but also*: a structure that would standardly be described as primarily ideational (logical), but having evaluative force. The following is a small corpus of examples of this construction (with variations), taken from a draft of this thesis, including quotations from other sources. Its frequency in the genre of persuasive writing, which attempts to induce the reader to share the writer's values, leads me to believe that the function of this construction may be primarily evaluative.

1 Evaluation is expressed **most obviously** through individual lexical items, **but also** through patterns of text that we recognize as evaluative.

2 In fact, all three terms in generative linguistics are marked, **not only** by their divergence from common use **but also** by their restriction to a particular task, as is evident from Haegeman's standard introductory text on Chomsky's 'Government and Binding' (or 'Principles and Parameters') theory.

3 The theoretical incoherence lies **not only** in the bizarre idea of Standard English as somehow simultaneously homogeneous and diverse, **but also** in the undefined term 'setting'.

4 To write about the English language is to discover something about who we are and who we are not, and this is true **not only** in what we say **but also** in how we say it. (Michaels and Ricks 1980:xiii)

5 We might want to ask whether linguistics could perhaps accommodate a more balanced approach to prescription, treating it **not only** (or even necessarily or primarily) as an authoritarian gambit, **but also** as evidence of a deep concern for the *value* of language.

6 The state of emergency in which our planet finds itself consists **not only** in the contamination of nature **but** of the very roots of our thought, which are still shaped by thousands of years of prejudice and prescriptive categories. (British National Corpus)

7 Attitudes cannot be changed by fiat, but only by persuasion; and persuading people to any point of view or course of action depends **not only** on telling them what is true to the best of your knowledge, **but also** on engaging their sense of what is right. (Cameron 1995:235)

8 Ideology is **not just** socially **but also** of course linguistically constructed.

9 ...the functional aspects of language are **not only** just as important **but also** – and this is the critical thing – just as capable of being illuminated by a careful and systematic inquiry as the formal. (Halliday1994b)

10 The sentence is **not only** complex **but also** elegant, creating a satisfying rhythm with the grammatical parallelism of its three relative clauses *who are not treated as badly...*, and the two *you find*s introducing the dependent and dominant clauses which contrast *the people* with *the Establishment*.

11 The term *grammar*... joins company with a group of other English words which share the same type of ambiguity (for example, *music, politics*) being **not only** (i) what the subject is called, **but also** (ii) what the subject-matter itself is called. (Roy Harris1981:41)

12 What linguists do is *theorize* and that is **not only** a descriptive process – it is **also** an evaluative one.

13 Since linguists have traditionally tended to assume **not only** the equivalence of all languages with respect to their referential adequacy and power, **but also** an idealized and undifferentiated universal competence of the native speaker, we know very little about the upper and lower limits of expressive resources which languages have and which speakers can avail themselves of within particular languages. (Romaine1984:112)

14 What makes us hesitate is that whereas Halliday's five features of metalanguage reflect features of language, evaluation in metalanguage **not only** reflects language **but also** affects it.

15 To call all ways of gaining knowledge by the same name, i.e. 'observation', **not only** is uninformative, **but** – as we shall see later on – conceals important methodological differences. (Itkonen 1978:3)

16 There is much that we can share, and emphasizing difference **not only** alienates those who might be interested in the insights we have to offer **but also** cuts us off from theirs.

17 The process that is revealed in the introductory linguistics texts appears to be similar: it is evident that linguists writing for students are **not only** teaching them methods of describing language **but also**, and crucially to the success of these methods, inculcating in them a particular value system.

18 Sampson's case for linguistics being an empirical science is convincing **not only** because he makes so much of the difference between linguistics based on intuitive data and linguistics based on the corpus, **but also** because the segregational approach (Roy Harris's term) allows the linguist to imagine that a piece of language extracted from its context remains the same thing.

19 ...the grammar wants to have it both ways: **not only** does the system as a whole accommodate both perspectives **but** many processes are construed as a tension between the two. (Halliday1997:8)

20 Theoretically 'neutral' introductory linguistics textbooks often act as vehicles of indoctrination into a certain theoretical viewpoint; **not only** is the text's ideology apparent in the first chapter, **but** what that theory sees as its antithesis is **also** revealed and argued against. (Lawson 2001:1)

Quirk et al. describe this construction as 'essentially additive'; they say that it 'distinguishes rather than equates the conjoins, forcing us to look at the first conjoin as "given ground"'. It has an 'emphatic effect' (1985:941). It seems that the first and second conjoins may be any grammatical category – the examples in this small corpus include prepositional phrases (1-7); adjectival groups (8-10); nominal groups (11-13); verbal groups (14-17); and clauses – hypotactic (18) and primary (19-20) – so long as they match. TABLE 8.3.7.1 shows the pattern, borrowing Hunston and Sinclair's notion of a 'local grammar' and their term *hinge* (2000:81).

TABLE 8.3.7.1 A 'local grammar' of the *not only ... but also* construction

| **introduction**<br><br>Subject + Finite + Predicator, or full clause | **hinge**<br><br>***not only*** (and variations) | **first conjoin**<br>'given ground'<br>prepositional phrase; adjectival group; nominal group; verbal group; clause ... | **hinge**<br><br>***but also*** (and variations) | **second conjoin**<br>'new ground' (higher value)<br>prepositional phrase; adjectival group; nominal group; verbal group; clause ... |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1 Evaluation is expressed* | *most obviously* | *through individual lexical items,* | *but also* | *through patterns of text that we recognize as evaluative.* |
| *6 The state of emergency in which our planet finds itself consists* | *not only* | *in the contamination of nature* | *but* | *of the very roots of our thought* |
| *7 ... persuading people to any point of view or course of action depends* | *not only* | *on telling them what is true to the best of your knowledge,* | *but also* | *on engaging their sense of what is right. (Cameron 1995:235)* |
| *12 ... other English words which share the same type of ambiguity... being* | *not only* | *(i) what the subject is called,* | *but also* | *(ii) what the subject-matter itself is called. (Roy Harris1981:41)* |
| *19 ...the grammar wants to have it both ways:* | *not only* | *does the system as a whole accommodate both perspectives* | *but* | *many processes are construed as a tension between the two. Halliday1997:8)* |

An evaluative stance realized as a grammatical structure is likely to be persuasive because it is less obvious and therefore less challengeable than that realized as 'just' lexis. The *not only... but also* construction does not require evaluative lexis to prop it up, but the writer/speaker sometimes adds it anyway. (Example 3 could make its point without the addition of *bizarre*.) Some are bolstered by explicitly evaluative interpersonal comment, typically placed after the *but also* and before the second conjoin, a position which does not carry the information focus and is therefore relatively unobtrusive. This is shown in TABLE 8.3.7.2.

TABLE 8.3.7.2 The *not only ... but also* pattern with included interpersonal/evaluative comment

| **introduction** | **hinge** | **first conjoin** | **hinge** | **(explicitly interpersonal/ evaluative comment)** | **second conjoin** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *8 Ideology is* | *not just* | *socially* | *but also* | *of course* | *linguistically constructed.* |
| *9 ... the functional aspects of language are* | *not only* | *just as important* | *but also* | *– and this is the critical thing –* | *just as capable of being illuminated by a careful and systematic inquiry as the formal. (Halliday1994b)* |
| *15. To call all ways of gaining knowledge by the same name...* | *not only* | *is uninformative* | *but also* | *– as we shall see later on –* | *conceals important methodological differences. (Itkonen 1978:3)* |
| *17 ... it is evident that linguists writing for students are* | *not only* | *teaching them methods of describing language* | *but also,* | *and crucially to the success of these methods,* | *inculcating in them a particular value system.* |

In terms of the logico-semantic system of *expansion* the second conjoin not only *extends* but also *enhances*. In other words, it is additive and also concessive: the added feature is presented as contrary to expectation (Halliday 1994a:220;234). It is this unexpectedness – Quirk et al. mention the quality of 'surprise' – that makes it an effective rhetorical form for strengthening an argument. It gives added value (positive or negative) to, or in APPRAISAL terms *amplifies*, the value of the second conjoin, as can be seen by comparing the following:

*Portia believed the judiciary should dispense justice and mercy.*
*Portia believed the judiciary should dispense not only justice but also mercy.*[12]

On the subject of conjuncts as evaluative devices, Hunston and Thompson explain that '*and* and *but* and subordinators such as *because* and *although* assume a common ground between reader and writer in terms of what is expected or unexpected at any point in the discourse' and they observe that 'the less obtrusively the evaluation is placed in the clause, the more likely it is to successfully manipulate the reader' (2000:9, Introduction). It may be that the evaluative meaning of the conjunctive pair *not only ... but also* is the primary reason for choosing it: to make an

---

12 The way she put it was that mercy should *season*, i.e. *mitigate* justice, using the lexical equivalent of the extending + enhancing function of the *not only ... but also* construction.

evaluative point convincing by construing it as a logical progression, using the pattern of the fundamental information-structuring device, Given ^ New.

Admittedly the function of some of the Examples in my list does seem to be primarily to give information. Examples 1, 2, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19 and 20 might be seen this way, but in their contexts they all evoke values. For instance, Example 11 in isolation looks like no more than a pair of definitions, but in its context it is part of Harris's evaluation of the 'science' of linguistics and leads ultimately to his appeal to the reader 'to recognise the language myth for what it is' (1981:204). The others can be seen as clearly evaluative even without appeal to their contexts, most being of the variety *X is good/bad and Y is even better/worse*.

The strength of the *not only... but also* pattern is its familiarity as a standard construction, which makes what it is saying seem as if inevitable. Variation on the pattern is sometime successful, but needs to be motivated if it is not to produce a weakened form. Example 1 deviates unsuccessfully from the standard: instead of persuading unobtrusively, it loses confidence in itself and falls back on attitudinal lexis – *most obviously*. It is of course essential that the two conjoins should match grammatically. Fowler notes the way the construction's persuasive power is destroyed if the match is not perfect, leaving the *not only* 'out of its place ... like a tintack on the floor' (1988[1926]:397). Halliday observes that 'most discourse falls somewhere in between the rhetorical ideal and the total flop' (1994a:391), and Example 6, from the British National Corpus, is close to the latter end of the scale because it has lost the essential balance.[13] Examples at the other end of the scale are 19 and 20, which handle smoothly the complex form that results when the conjoins are full clauses, requiring inversion of Subject and Finite in the first conjoin, and the *also* to be separated from the *but*, or omitted. Example 20 is particularly elegant in its use of the thematic equative (Halliday 1994a:40-42).

It is not only the pattern itself but also its placing in the text that gives it its evaluative force: it is likely to be found at a point where the writer (or speaker, though it is more typically a written, or formal spoken, device) has a stake in what is being said. Like nominalisation and other

[13] In this example, part of the introductory wording, *contamination*, which should apply to both conjoins, has got into the first, making the second say 'the state of emergency consists of the roots of our thought', which is plainly nonsense. It needs rewording thus: *consists in the contamination* ***not only*** *of nature* ***but also*** *of the very roots of our thought*.

features of persuasive language, it is 'a resource for making interested truths', as Martin puts it (2001). I would suggest it is likely to appear in genres whose tenor does not allow values to be set out explicitly. However, the author of some of the Examples listed above is in a position to reveal the unstated values and preferences that led to the 'choice' of this construction:

3 *[I dislike the label 'Standard English', because it is impossibly woolly, and I'm irritated with people who fail to define their basic terms.]*

5 *[I value correctness and elegance in language, so I don't think that telling people how to use language is such a bad thing as the anti-prescriptivists make out.]*

18 *[I think Sampson is wrong, and I like the idea that language is of a piece with its context of situation and does not have a fixed nature, because this lets me see language from an interesting new perspective.]*

These evaluations plainly would not pass muster as academic argument. It is a matter not only of wrong register but also of wrong kind of meaning-making: linguistics, in common with most other academic genres, likes its values well concealed. It is very seldom that a theorist admits a personal evaluation outright. The following is one such rare statement,[14] in which the speaker is referring to theories of the evolution of the brain:

> there are alternating theories and competing views, among which I am obviously not competent to judge. But for reasons which will appear later (though they can be summed up now if I simply say that "it appeals to me"), I shall take one theory to represent the whole achievement: the theory of neuronal group selection, or "neural Darwinism" ... Since I am a "qualified realist", and also a materialist (I hope a "sophisticated" one), I like this theory. (Halliday 1995:1)[15]

But, interestingly – and almost predictably, given the power of the *'not only... but also + (optional) explicitly evaluative comment'* construction in persuasive writing – a few lines down

14

And another: 'One of the ideas in this article I find most exciting (using myself for these purposes as a kind of litmus paper or geiger counter) is the notion of networks...' (Hodge 1988:143).

15

This is from a draft version, which may partly explain the openness. The speaker's status in his community is of course also a factor in determining what form evaluation may take in a text.

the same page he slips back into the expected academic mode and uses a (stylistically effective) variation on the pattern to bolster his argument:

> Edelman is explicit about his own precursors: *not merely* in acknowledging specific contributions from other individual scholars, *but – more tellingly for readers who are not neurobiologists* – in relating his work to the thinking in other disciplines. (1995:1. Italics added.)

Since he was at this point emphasizing qualities high on his list of values – drawing on past achievements, recognizing the contributions of contemporaries, sharing insights across disciplines – there was a good probability that this construction would appear.

The primary motivation for using the construction may be not to parade a logical argument but to get someone to share our values. It may be that logical constructions such as this one developed as a response to evaluation of a situation and a need to make others share values. The interlocutor is to be persuaded by the logic, taken through the steps as it were, and made to believe that he or she is being swayed not by emotion but by cold reason. Once again, Golding's picture in *The Inheritors* is intuitively right. In the emotional stress of the moment and needing to prove the value of his 'pictures', Lok struggles for logical order: *He wished he could ask Mal what it was that joined a picture to a picture so that the last of many came out of the first* (quoted in 7.2, above). Labov's subject Larry produces (with prompting) an argument that has logical steps to it, but its essential force is not logical but emotional: the black man's values against the white man's (*'cause the average whitey out here got everything, you dig?*). Gerry Adams's logically arranged clauses serve the emotionally charged cause of *the people* against *the Establishment*. What we think of as logical grammar may be better described as evaluative grammar par excellence.

Finally, the *not only... but also* construction's rhetorical force stems not only from its unobtrusiveness but also from its aesthetic value: the elegant balance of its grammatically matched first and second conjoins, and the way it allows variation within restraints. It exploits our irrational faith in elegance; as Chomsky puts it: 'an almost mystical belief that there is something about our concept of elegance that relates to the truth, and that is certainly not logically necessary' (Huybregts and Van Riemsdijk 1982:30). Burchfield is another who was plainly puzzled at this strange habit of ours, when he talked about the way wartime BBC English

'used to stand alone like some great isolated supreme power of language – so that what it said was both correctly said and was the truth' (quoted in 2.1.1, above). It is a truism that language well used is powerfully persuasive. Form and meaning are one: valued style *is* valued idea. And valued style is of course not just the style of those in authority; Larry was respected for the verbal skills *his* community valued (4.1). Surface form is never 'just' surface form.

## 8.4 Why we miss the evaluation in our metalanguage

To sum up, my point in exploring the above arguments has been to show that evaluation is not a random, arbitrary extra 'added on' to language and therefore 'removable' at will, but systemically involved in the grammar in ways that can be systematically demonstrated. If evaluation can be shown unarguably to be part of the *grammar*, then, on the basis of Halliday's linguistics-as-metaphor argument, it must also be accepted as part of the *grammatics*. Even when we use 'parallel semiotics' such as diagrams and mathematical symbols, which look purely informative, we must use natural language to explain them, as mentioned in 5.2, above. Language explaining language 'becomes a kind of self-portrait' (Halliday1994b).

Analytic techniques such as Hunston and Sinclair's 'local grammars' suggest that we will regard evaluation as more central if we become accustomed to looking for whole patterns in text. Those they identify, for example their patterns 5(i) and 5(ii), shown in 8.3.6, above, are common, unavoidable patterns of ordinary language, and must therefore appear regularly in linguists' own language, and with their customary evaluative force, as in the following:

5(i) *what is clear from Edelman's discussion is that this process has been part of human history since the evolution of mankind* (Halliday1994b)

TABLE 8.4.1 A local grammar of evaluation in a linguist's language

| *what is* | *clear* | *from Edelman's discussion* | *is* | *that this process has been part of human history since the evolution of humankind* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What + link verb | adjective group | prepositional phrase | link verb | clause or noun group |

5(ii) *what is really striking is that we talk about language construing experience, but it construes all human experience* (Halliday 1994b)

TABLE 8.4.2 A local grammar of evaluation in a linguist's language

| *what is* | *really striking* | *is* | *that we talk about language construing experience,* |
|---|---|---|---|
| What + link verb | adjective group | link verb | clause or noun group |

Joseph, commenting on ideology in linguistics, states that it is not 'even certain that conceptual and rhetorical power can be meaningfully separated from one another in linguistics' (1997:12). A local grammar of evaluation would not so much separate them as show *why they cannot be meaningfully separated.* Several of the evaluative patterns identified by Hunston and Sinclair are Token and Value clauses, such as the thematic equatives in TABLES 8.4.1 and 8.4.2. If we look at the information focus in TABLE 8.4.1 we can show that the function of this clause is to realize propositional and evaluative meanings simultaneously in one rhetorically effective form. As this was a spoken text, the intonation made the pattern of information/evaluation particularly clear. We can split the *Wh-* nominalization and the embedded *that* clause into their thematic and information components to show this, as in TABLE 8.4.3:

TABLE 8.4.3 Evaluative information focus of the thematic equative

| *what* | *is really striking* | *is* | *that we* | *talk about language construing experience,* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Theme | | Rheme | | |
| Theme | Rheme | [equals] | Theme | Rheme |
| New | | New | | |

Adding to the rhetorical force is what we might call the 'reprise New with variation' that completes the utterance, as shown in TABLE 8.4.4, producing the elegant balance which, as observed in 8.3, above, has its own persuasive power:

TABLE 8.4.4 Evaluative information focus

| *but it* | *construes all human experience* |
|---|---|
| Theme | Rheme |
| | New |

Another reason we underestimate the evaluative force of an utterance may be that we do not take sufficient notice of its anticipatory function. The remark in TABLE 8.4.1 might seem no more than mildly evaluative – it says only that Edelman has made something clear – but it leads to an overt evaluation a few remarks further down my transcript, in discussion of the implications of Edelman's theory: 'He is of course absolutely right about that'. The patterning of the earlier remark sets the listener up to expect and accept the confirmatory evaluation that follows. This suggests that evaluative patterning might be identified across longer stretches of text. Lemke identifies some 'phenomena of evaluative propagation': evaluative cohesion, syntactic propagation, projective evaluation, and extended prospective and retrospective evaluation. He says that 'evaluations propagate and ramify through a text', that 'these phenomena occur for all the evaluative dimensions', and that they 'can span very long distances in the text' (2001:9-11). The identification of such long-distance patterns in metalanguage would strengthen the argument for treating linguistic theory as *interpretation* of language rather than factual *description*.

The following sections list a few of the reasons why we have been inclined to overlook the evaluation in our metalanguage. The most obvious reason is of course that we have not been looking for it, because faith in the possibility of a language-independent explanation of language has meant that the tool of investigation, the linguist's own language, has not been called into question. And of course linguists have not been in the habit of turning the resources of SFG on their own language and looking at how it functions, experientially, textually and, inevitably, interpersonally. But once we re-categorize and re-shape linguistics as a self-reflective activity then we cannot help but notice the way we have downplayed, disregarded or missed altogether the evaluative slant.

### 8.4.1 Our focus is ill adjusted

In one way, formal models based on Chomsky's generative grammar focus too narrowly. The result of concentrating on the syntax of isolated sentences is that the analyst misses the evaluative effects that operate at the level of discourse semantics and whole text. Linguistics of this kind cannot develop the analytical resources to talk about evaluation in language, much less in metalanguage. In another way these models focus too broadly. The search for a 'Universal Grammar' casts the net too wide to pick up localised effects such as the evaluative patterns identified by Hunston and Sinclair, which are likely to be peculiar to particular registers, dialects

and languages, so not of interest to the UG searchers. Looking for universals and looking for particulars are both legitimate ways of doing linguistics, but the latter is more likely to bring to light subtleties such as evaluative meaning. The universalist, believing that the function of metalanguage is to realize propositional meaning, is likely to exclude evaluation as mere superimposed social meaning that has no connection with the underlying structure. And at present the theories which concentrate most intensely on universals are driven by (what they perceive as) the ethos of natural science, so would want to bar evaluation altogether from their descriptive language.

### 8.4.2 Our own viewpoint seems natural

That linguistics is ideology-driven has been observed by many critics (for example, Joseph 1990, Joseph and Taylor 1990, Hodge and Kress 1993, Cameron 1990, 1992,1995, Taylor 1997, Lawson 2001, Roy Harris passim). One reason why insufficient notice is taken of these warnings may be that linguists are isolated in separated research communities; another may be that the fragmentation of the discipline limits opportunities for comparing views. Conferences are narrowly specialized, affording contact with others only in our own small specialized area. So each analytical approach appears to reveal 'the facts', and other linguists' 'facts' (to say nothing of the layperson's 'facts') are treated as mistakes rather than as equally plausible interpretations of the same phenomenon. As Halliday says, 'So often we find ourselves saying 'Look, you've got it wrong. I mean, fine, what you said, it looks great to you, but from my point of view it doesn't make sense: language couldn't be like that, because I'm looking at it from some other angle' (1994b).

The illusion of factualness comes from focusing on the bits of language that matter to us. Metalanguage cannot deal with all of its subject simultaneously, but must select. A different focus – semantics rather than syntax, diachronic rather than synchronic, particular rather than universal – is evidence of different preferences. Language becomes what we want it to be. For example, if we most value *stability and continuity* we will focus on the invariable aspects of language, whereas if we value *changeability* we will focus on the variable. The following two examples give the idea:

> [Using language correctly] gives us the pleasure of hearing or seeing our words – because they are abiding by the rules – snapping, sliding, falling precisely into place, expressing with perfect lucidity and symmetry just what we wanted them to express. (John Simon, language columnist, *Esquire* magazine, and author of articles deploring declining standards of English. Simon 1981:205)

> The slipperiness of language is apparent everywhere. As T.S.Eliot said, words strain, crack and sometimes break ... slip, slide, perish, decay with imprecision, will not stay still. (Jean Aitchison, Professor of Language and Communication, Oxford, and presenter of the 1996 Reith lectures, *The Language Web*. (Aitchison 1993:369)

Particularly revealing of the polarized ideologies behind these statements is the way the two writers use the word *slide*: for Simon, words slide *into* place; for Aitchison (Eliot), they slide *out*. The underlying metaphors make language into two very different things for these two language observers. Neither view is exactly a *fact* about language, though there is truth in both.(The topic of the metaphors linguist and layperson use to talk about language is explored in Kilpert 2000, illustrating the difficulty both experience in pinning down the ontological status of language.)

### 8.4.3 We miss the interpersonal dimension

All too often, a sentence or a text is regarded as something to manipulate, in an exercise devoid of social reality. As Roy Harris observes, 'the entire situational and interpersonal context of language is omitted from consideration' (1981:34). However, the evaluative effects become obvious when we admit interpersonal grammar to the analysis.

Halliday identifies six functions of early childhood language: *instrumental* ('I want'); *regulatory* ('do as I tell you'); *interactional* ('me and you'); *personal* ('here I come'); *heuristic* ('tell me why'); and *imaginative* ('let's pretend'), (1975:19-20). A seventh function, the *informative*, which 'tends to predominate in adult thinking about language', does not appear until a later stage, when the child is around two years old (1975:21):

> The idea that language can be used as a means of communicating information to someone who does not already possess that information is a very sophisticated one which depends on the internalization of a whole complex set of linguistic concepts that the young child does not possess. It is the only purely intrinsic function of language, the only use of language in a function that is definable solely by reference to language. (1975: 21)

It is an illusion of adult thinking about language that the informative supersedes the other functions – that we as it were 'grow out of' them. The earlier interpersonal functions of course persist, and can be described by a grammar that recognizes them. For example, the Mood Block (mentioned in 8.3, above) is an essential resource in the interpersonal grammar for negotiating meaning: it is 'the nub of the message available for argument or discussion'; the language we use 'to position ourselves (and our audience) to show how defensible we find our propositions, to encode our ideas about obligation and inclination, and to express our attitudes' (Butt et al. 2000:110). Once we recognize the interpersonal element we are primed to take the evaluative more seriously, because interpersonal grammar recognizes the possibility of negotiation of values. An utterance such as *Language is an instinct*, or *Language is a social semiotic* is worded as a proposition, but by implication it is an evaluation, because its Mood grammar offers the possibility of opposing other evaluation-cum-propositions to it: *No, it isn't X, it's Y.* (Hoey 1983 explores the way embedding 'submerges' an evaluation by removing the negotiable bit, the Mood Block, and thus shielding the proposition from challenge.)

### 8.4.4 Academic language is deceptively impartial

Academic language has many ways of disguising evaluation, and much has been written about this (Hoey 1983; Couture 1986; Hodge and Kress 1993; Coulthard 1994b; Hunston 1994; White 2001, to name only a few). Hoey, for example, comments on 'the high traffic in evaluations of various sorts' in passages from Chomsky (1965) (1983:32), and Hodge and Kress, talking about a passage from Chomsky (1957), observe that academic language 'presents a world without people, where no one thinks or speaks, but language is produced, where no one studies or investigates, but investigation proceeds unerringly to its goal' (1993:31). But apart from the analysis of all the rhetorical tricks which academic language exploits, a simple and perhaps not often mentioned explanation for why we miss evaluation in written language of this kind is that it is highly polished and we do not (usually) see the choices the writer rejected. Academic writing covers its tracks, so the final version has a spurious air of inevitability. A self-edited manuscript gives a truer picture. Writers make changes not just to correct mistakes and increase clarity but because they are aware that some forms, in a given context, are more persuasive than others.

Writing is in truth just as full of hesitations as speech, if not more so. Halliday points out that 'people only ever analyse the finished product, which is a highly idealised version of the writing process', and he supplies as evidence a sample of a handwritten manuscript of his own (Halliday 1989:100). If we were habituated to seeing linguists' writing in this form we would perhaps be less inclined to treat it as objective. In this sample, which appears to be a text prepared to be spoken to an audience, most of the original wording is thoroughly scribbled over, but there is one legible bit which may serve as illustration:

> ~~*It's very hard to give data in a talk like this, but here's a very brief example based on*~~ *It is difficult, for that very reason, to give a brief example; but here is a piece of discourse based on a* (1989:100)

The changes here make for improved coherence (*for that very reason* refers to the previous remark) and slightly more formal tenor (the full forms *it is* and *here is*, and *difficult* in place of *hard* change the tone from classroom-speak to conference-speak). This is not a *very* telling example, but it serves as a reminder that every little adjustment gives a glimpse of the systems of choices which we evaluate as more or less suited to our purposes all the while we speak and to an even greater degree when we write. A search of the deleted electronic material and discarded hard copy that have preceded the final product which is this thesis would reveal the extent to which the adjustments have been aimed at fine-tuning the evaluative lexis and grammar. The following are two examples picked at random from this corpus of rejected material:

1. the latter being rewording of
   ~~which is plainly~~ the influence behind Labov's ~~belief that he can reword~~ Larry's
   subsequent
   speech to show the underlying structure and ~~then~~ claim that this is what Larry said

Here apparently the writer has removed the suggestion that she can read Labov's mind, knowing that the systemic linguistics community she sees herself as part of frowns on 'psychologizing'. *Subsequent* has no doubt been substituted for *then* in order to nominalize *claim* and thus produce a more formal register, bringing the language into line with academic expectations. *Plainly* has been removed on the principle that the reader should be persuaded to persuade him or herself, so tendentious attitudinal lexis should be kept to a minimum.

2. an isolated example of a typical usage in
*Prescribe* is not ~~alone in being used by~~ current orthodox linguistics in a way that is typical ...

Again the nominalized form has been substituted for the more congruent verbal form. Much has been written about nominalization as a valued resource of the grammar, functionally and as a solidarity marker (Halliday and Martin 1993; Brown and Herndl 1986), but it might also be considered evaluative. Like *not only ... but also*, it exploits the Given/New pattern that is essential for presenting an argument: summing up and moving on, getting one value accepted as given, so as to focus the reader's attention on the new value the writer is arguing for.

The ways that values and evaluation are involved in the grammar are complex, and merit further investigation. One problem that would have to be considered in any investigation of this topic would be how to maintain the distinction between *evaluative grammar* and *valued grammar*: the two are interconnected in complex ways which need to be explored.

### 8.4.5 We fail to recognize overlapping contexts

Finally, our failure to take into account the overlapping nature of contexts – in particular the way the regulative 'projects' the instructional, as observed by Christie (1999a), and discussed in 2.3 and 3.2.2, above – is another reason for our failure to recognize the evaluative nature of our own texts. Because linguistics claims to be an objective science it in effect denies the existence of the regulative context in which it is embedded. But we need to be induced to see language a particular way before the 'objective description' makes sense. The second context is, as Hasan (1996:115) puts it, 'permeable' by the first. Sinclair observes the same phenomenon, which he considers to be a basic general principle of language:

> initiations in exchanges ... preclassify what follows. ... a major central function of language is that it constantly prospects ahead. ... whatever does happen has a value that is already established by the discourse at that point. So the scene is set for each next utterance by the utterance that is going on at the moment. (Sinclair 1994:15)

He points out that linguistic description has been much concerned with retrospective patterns in language – cohesive devices of reference and the like – but very little with prospection, and he suggests that the notion of 'primed frames' (Emmott 1994) is useful: 'Some form of mental representation of the text so far, the state of the text, must be building up in the mind of a

competent reader, and must be available for interpreting the text at any particular point' (Sinclair 1994:17). This must of course include the evaluations that have been built up.

In the course of a seminar on semantic networks Hasan made the remark: 'I am regulating your minds as to how you should look at language'.[16] This was intended to illustrate, self-referentially, the point she was making: that although the class might be under the impression they were being taught 'the facts' about language, if they paid attention to the regulative context in which her instruction was 'embedded', they would realise the extent to which the 'facts' were dependent on their accepting Hasan's view of language. There had been no direct order to see things a particular way; only the 'bringing together' of 'the semantic system specific to control and that specific to instruction' (Hasan 1996:115). At the same seminar she observed that 'boundaries of contexts, for example, the context of control, are as hard to draw as boundaries of linguistic units', and it is this merging of one context into another, or embedding one in another, that makes it difficult to spot the evaluation that helps create the 'facts'. Given any text in linguistics, it should, however, be possible to distinguish two overlapping or intermingled primary semantic networks construing two contexts: one establishing control (evaluative) and the other conveying instruction (ideational). If we take as an example the first two pages of one of Hasan's own texts (1996:104-5), we can identify evidence of the evaluative context in such expressions as: *the consensus seems to be*; *I say this*; *could itself be viewed*; *throws in doubt*; *have been supposed by some*; *Notably*. The ideational context is evident in unmodalized statements such as *The human infant's protolinguistic system and the systems of animal communication are alike in one respect*, and also in modalized ones such as *the meanings construed by language must relate to an extra-linguistic reality*, (in which *must* functions as a statement of likelihood that is virtually undeniable, a device often used for making propositions); and particularly in the diagram – the familiar co-tangential circles showing '*strata for linguistic description*' (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology). Diagrams are interpreted as ideational rather than evaluative; as Hodge has pointed out, they lack the interpersonal dimension: 'Diagrams are a more solitary code, furthest removed from spoken language and its negotiable forms of interaction' (1988:152). The two contexts (realising two kinds of tenor, with the reader as recipient of information and also absorber of doctrine) are merged into one text, and because the overall social context is academic theorizing, the tendency is to treat the text as statement of fact rather than instrument of persuasion.

---

16

Systemic Functional Linguistics Summer Institute, Ottawa, July, 2001. As observed in the previous section, such admissions of the speaker's or writer's 'hidden agenda' is rare. Hasan's admission indicates that she is fully aware of the place of evaluation in linguistic theory.

In some instructional texts the boundary between the two contexts may be clear. Once the regulative context has been laid down there is little need for further overt construal of it: the reader can be assumed to have 'got the message' and to be willing to use it implicitly in understanding the descriptions that follow. For example, in the preface to an introductory textbook on morphology the author states (in another rare admission of personal evaluation): 'I've chosen the framework which I personally find most congenial, namely, the so-called Government-Binding theory of Chomsky' (Spencer 1991:xiii). This ought to be read as a warning that the instruction that follows is influenced by this evaluative context, and the author in fact explicitly mentions this influence: 'the dominance of GB theory means that it tends to serve as the backdrop for theoretical discussion in any framework' (1991:xiii). However, it is unlikely that the readership for this work will come to it sensitized to the dependence of meaning on more than one context; rather the opposite, as the model it promotes omits all discussion of context.

In other kinds of texts the instructional and the regulative contexts may interact in more complex ways, variously conceptualized as *framing*, *embedding*, *projecting*, as pointed out in 2.3, above. Halliday identifies an intricate pattern in his 'silver' text (1994a:368ff.), reflecting

> the organization of the discourse around the two texts of exposition and injunction, the one following the other. The exposition (explanatory description) is characterized by metaphorical expression of the content and congruent expression of the force: the nature of the process is disguised, the nature of the speech act is not. The injunction, on the other hand, is characterized by congruent expression of the content and metaphorical expression of the force: the nature of the process is not disguised, but the nature of the speech act is. And this underlines the importance of metaphor in ordinary discourse, since in each case it is brought in to help with that component that is critical to the move in question – ideational in the first part, and interpersonal in the second. (1994a:390)

This pattern suggests another metaphor to add to the ones mentioned above, that of *disguise*. The injunction is disguised in the exposition, and vice versa. Hidden ideologies have long been a concern of Critical Discourse Analysis; what is new here is the very close attention to the elaborate patterns of language that constitute such disguise. The 'silver' text was, as Halliday points out, 'spontaneous and unselfconscious' (1994a:391); a speaker producing without effort an ordinary piece of everyday language. However, to the analyst it appeared to be an intricate mesh of instruction and persuasion, and it required 24 pages of highly developed technical metalanguage, based on a functional theory, to thoroughly describe its complexities. It is therefore not very surprising that we fail to notice the evaluative element in our metalanguage, when language has developed such a variety of techniques for disguising it. Perhaps rather than talking about the grammar of evaluation we should be talking about the grammar of *concealing* evaluation.