
**The Construction of News Texts on Peace : An Analysis of
Sunday Times Coverage of the Peace Summits in the
Democratic Republic of Congo
(August 1998 - January 2001)**

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of Master of Arts

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Abstract

This study examines the construction of news texts on peace and the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in *Sunday Times* articles dating from August 1998 to January 2001. Peace is an ideological frame that is applied to a complex process that Muller (2000) argues involves and employs a variety of dynamics: diplomacy, economics, force/military intervention and propaganda. As a consequence, different interest groups and nations define peace in different ways. But whatever the definition, the common objective is to restore normalcy via a cease-fire. Peace as a phenomenon has been heightened and sustained by repetitive media attention, thus effectively separating it from international politics (i.e. colonialism of the mind, economy and land), and firmly locating it as a matter of not just public concern, but of international public concern.

Using the cultural studies approach to a study of media texts provides a rich foundation for this study. Textual analysis of the articles explores themes and participation and places emphasis on the display of patterns of belief and value that are encoded in the language. What results is a sustained examination of media texts within their socio-cultural and historical context.

This study's findings challenge the claim that the media report peace objectively and on its own terms. In particular, the study denies that the *Sunday Times* objectively, fairly and truthfully reported the experience and process in the DRC between August 1998 and January 2001. Instead it finds that the newspaper constructed a particular understanding of peace, peace talks and the peace process, characterised by repetition, ritualisation and personalisation. Furthermore, this study proposes - and echoes the call for - an alternative news reporting model that will enhance audiences' understandings of conflict and its resolution, thereby enhancing the quality of their life.

Dedication

For my grandmother, *the top-dawg*, Mrs. Maregina Ramataboe,

For my parents Mants ekhe Limakatso and Moiloa Teboho

For my siblings Nts ekhe, Mampiko and Mantsikoe.

Hop-ka-fihla-hop-ka kena!

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To all of you compadres who helped in ways too numerous and too complex to mention, God bless you.

To my supervisor Mr. Nixon Kariithi: thank you for the time and enthusiasm you showed for this piece.

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And finally, to the L.B. patrons: from the Jjuuko royal beds to the Amuenyan deserts; the Maisvan highlands to the sprawling Kobedi cattle ranches; from India's Kerela to Winnie-the-Pink-she of Pretoria and back to Ekasi. And Cuz, I'll forget you when the Mohabi red turns to blue.

My sincerest thanks to you all.

Dieu de mai b nissent ce travail car il m a b ni.

Abbreviations

ADF	Allied Democratic Front
ANC	African National Congress
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAR	Forces Arm es Rwandaïses
FDD	Forces pour la D fense de la D mocratie a.k.a Forces for the Defence of Democracy
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
LRA	Lord s Resistance Army
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OPDS	Organ on Defence and Politics
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la D mocratie a.k.a Rally for Congolese Democracy
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPLA	Sudanese People s Liberation Army
UNA	Ugandan National Army
UNITA	Uni o Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
NWICO	New World Information and Communication Order

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Chapter One

Introduction & Overview

1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to develop an in-depth understanding of news texts on a peace process in a South African newspaper, using the coverage of summits as a benchmark. The research analyses how texts on the peace process are constructed. Such analysis involves investigation into the placement of texts, the framing of themes and emphasised issues, and representations of key participants in the processes.

The study is concerned with the recent history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), focusing attention on the period August 1998 to January 2001. Of particular interest in the DRC is the relative recency of the conflict along with the attempts to resolve it. Furthermore, the root cause of the conflict is not singular. It involves interwoven histories and the competing economic and political ambitions of central, eastern and southern African governments, international governments and other political institutions (Reyntjens 1999; Taylor and Williams 2001; Moore 2001; Nest 2001).

Sustained media attention to the conflict dates back to the early 1990s, when conflict in central Africa had entered mainstream media circles, giving rise to the common use of phrases like genocide and ethnic uprising becoming commonplace in the news and in everyday language. However, as is the nature of conflicts the world over, the root cause of the Congolese conflict is not singular, nor as distinct and clear-cut as the media portray it to be, and it has not drawn completely neutral international players.

The following is a brief overview of the Democratic Republic of Congo's political history from the 1800s to the present. It essentially illustrates the political normalcy of the current situation; again, nothing new in the Congo — at both international and micro-local levels (Moore 2001: 130).

1.1 Historico-Political Context: Leopold II to Kabila¹

Thirty years after its birth as an independent state, the Democratic Republic of the Congo still bares the imprints of its colonial past. Behind the omnipresent apparatus of control forged by President Mobutu Sese Seko since 1965 lurks the shadow of King Leopold II of Belgium, whose absolute and arbitrary sovereignty earned him the name *bula matari* (he who breaks rocks), symbolising the brute force with which he ruled (Moore 2001). Leopold accumulated a vast personal fortune from ivory and rubber through Congolese slave labour (Hochschild 1998). Millions are estimated to have died from forced labour, starvation, and outright extermination during Leopold's colonial rule (Moore 2001). His brutal exploitation of the Congo eventually became an international *cause célèbre*, prompting Belgium to take over administration of the Congo, which remained a colony until agitation for independence forced Brussels to grant freedom on June 30, 1960. The modern version of the *bula matari* state was subsequently evident in the infamous Mobutu regime's extreme centralisation of authority, highly personalised style of governance, and equal readiness to use force (Moore 2001 and Reyntjens 1999).

The Mobutist state, however, is - according to Reyntjens (1999), Moore (2001) and Nest (2001) - the product of a complex concoction of forces that go far beyond the eighteen years of Leopoldian autocracy. In between the formal proclamation of the Congo Free State in 1885 and Mobutu's second seizure of power in 1965, a number of events occurred that have had a profound and lasting effect on the Zairian polity and society (Hochschild 1998). The first occurred in 1908, when the Belgian parliament assumed full administrative and political responsibility for the colony, which until independence in 1960 would be known as the Belgian Congo (Hochschild 1998). The second involved the rise of organised nationalist activity, symbolised by the 1956 manifesto of the Alliance of the Congo People (Alliance des Bakongo) calling for immediate independence. The crisis of de-colonisation, dramatised by the mutiny of

¹ Information obtained from preliminary research of news and internet resources. Sources include, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.mg.co.za>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.sundaytimes.co.za>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.nyt.com>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.iol.co.za>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.washingtonpost.com>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.usnews.com>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.cnn.com>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.usip.org>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.time.com>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.bbc.co.uk>" }, { HYPERLINK "http://www.synapse.net/~acdi20/oua3/internet_reso/contemp/congo/" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.un.org>" }, { HYPERLINK "<http://www.concord.org>" } and the Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly.

the Force Publique in July 1960, constituted the third, and by far the most consequential, event (Hochschild 1998). The final stage in the Belgian Congo's precipitous leap to independence began with the proclamation of the First Republic immediately after independence, extended through the convulsive after-effects of regional secessions and rural insurgencies, and reached a plateau of sorts after the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1965, at which time Mobutu seized power. He later re-named the country Zaire in 1971 (Hochschild 1998).

{tc \l5 "Enter Laurent-D sir Kabila

*{tc \l5 "Enter Laurent-D sir Kabila }*In April 1990 Mobutu announced his intention to introduce multi-party democracy. With elections set for January 1991, he went on to announce a reduction in the number of political parties to two besides his own. Opposition leaders denounced the scheme as giving Mobutu's party an unfair advantage.²

In early 1993 Mobutu rejected Western demands that he relinquish power and announced plans to regroup his one-party Parliament, dismissing the main opposition leader, Prime Minister Tshisekedi.³ In January 1994 Mobutu dissolved Parliament and dismissed his Prime Minister. According to Moore (2001), Laurent-D sir Kabila and his long-standing but little-known guerrilla movement launched a seven-month campaign that ousted Mobutu in May 1997, with the backing of Ugandan and Rwandese forces (Reyntjens 1999). The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), its name before Mobutu changed it to Zaire in 1971.

Moore (2001) contends that as the last of the CIA-nurtured cold war despots, Mobutu had deftly courted France and the United States, which used Zaire as a launch pad for covert operations against bordering countries, particularly Marxist Angola. His downfall began in October 1996, when he planned to banish Zairian Tutsis who had lived for centuries in eastern Zaire, the Kivu region. Neighbouring Rwanda's Tutsi-led government came to their aid, as did other rebel groups, one of which was led by Laurent Kabila (Reyntjens 1999). After conquering eastern Zaire, Kabila earned the support of a host of Mobutu's enemies, including Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania,

² According to the Library of Congress — Federal Research Division.

Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Angola (Reyntjens 2001). Mobutu fled into exile in Morocco on May 16, 1997, where he died of cancer in September.

In August 1998, Congolese rebel forces, led by ethnic Tutsis in eastern Congo and backed by Rwanda and Uganda, began attacking Kabila's forces (Reyntjens 2001). The rebels gained control of a large portion of the country until Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops came to Kabila's aid and pushed the rebels back. Approximately 14 months after the ousting of former President Mobutu Sese Seko by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a new armed movement had announced a rebellion against the newly seated government; another war of liberation (Reyntjens 1999). This announcement came a week after the Rwandan troops were banished from DRC territory by Laurent Kabila's government (Reyntjens 1999). In January 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated, allegedly by one of his bodyguards, at which time his son, Joseph Kabila, was elected to succeed him as the new president (Moore 2001).

There has been significant coverage in the South African press of the turn in the conflict since August 1998 and the various efforts to resolve it. The military and diplomatic efforts to bring about peace involve at least ten African countries (Reyntjens 2001), namely Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania. Today, the conflict itself involves two Congolese rebel groups, the Mai-Mai and the Interahamwe (Reyntjens 1999). The Mai-Mai are Congolese while the Interahamwe are mostly Rwandan Hutus. The rebel forces are fighting Joseph Kabila's government forces, which are supported by allied forces from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The allied forces claim to have intervened under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Defence and Politics (OPDS), and at the invitation of the legitimate government of the DRC, initially led by the late Laurent Kabila (1997-2001) and Joseph Kabila (January 2001 to date) (Nest 2001). The immediate struggle is over control of the country, its future economic prospects and its natural resources (Reyntjens 1999), while the intermediate struggle involves regional hegemonic tensions, especially within SADC and the Great Lakes community (Nest 2001).

1.2 Contemporary Political Context: Multinational War with a Multiplicity of Interests

"1.2 Contemporary Political Context: Multinational War with a Multiplicity of Interests

As is the case elsewhere in Africa, both indigenous and western influences have been significant. The impact of the West has been felt most strongly through the import of institutions, policies, and culture that are otherwise radically new to the area. Many different ethnic groups with historically different beliefs, loyalties, and tensions represent Zairian traditions (Moore 2001).⁴ Whatever their exposure to these various historical influences, present-day Congo and the Congolese war is (according to the Federal Division of the Library of Congress) fashioned from a long chain of interlocking African conflicts. Naidoo (2000) concurs and identifies several conflicts between: the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government of Angola and UNITA rebels; the minority Tutsi government in Burundi and the pro-Hutu rebels of the Forces pour la D fense de la D mocratie (FDD); the Sassou Nguesso government of Congo-Brazzaville and militias backing ousted president Pascal Lissouba; the Rwandese government of Paul Kagame and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe charged with the 1994 Rwandan genocide; the Museveni government of Uganda and the Lord s Resistance Army (LRA) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); and the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People s Liberation Army (SPLA).

Since the advent of this second Congo war (Reyntjens 1999: 241) in August 1998, Kabila has been able to consolidate political support with a nationalist appeal both for Congolese sovereignty and to anti-Tutsi prejudice. However, desertions and military setbacks have forced the Congolese government and its allies increasingly to rely on the support of ex-FAR/Interahamwe (former Rwandese government army and militia), ADF (of Uganda), and FDD (from Burundi) units to slow the advance of its opponents (Reyntjens 1999). As early as November 1998, the Congolese government was charged with constructing an alliance with forces that committed the 1994

⁴ The DRC is the size of the European Union and it s home to nearly 45 million people it contains around 250 ethnic groups [and] extremely well endowed (Moore 2001)

genocide in Rwanda.⁵ There is disagreement on which came first: co-operation with the genocidaires (the Ugandan and Rwandan view) or the rebellion/intervention (the Congolese view) (Mamdani 1999).

{ADVANCE \d4}

{ADVANCE \d4}On the rebel side, the RCD and MLC (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo) are collections of individuals, political parties, and militia forces. Both are heavily dependent on Rwanda and Uganda, respectively, for military support (Reyntjens 1999). The parties - the rebels and their government backers alike - have overlapping although not identical agendas and interests. For example, the RCD represents a number of different interest groups that align themselves with Rwanda.

{ADVANCE \d4}

{ADVANCE \d4}Problems have emerged between Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi from the Itombwe highlands of South Kivu) elements of the RCD and the Rwandan government (Mamdani 1999). Officials of both see certain tactics and behaviours of the other as undermining their shared objectives. Some Banyamulenge leaders point to their physical insecurity s being exploited by Rwanda as justification for its intervention in Zaire (Reyntjens 1999: 243).

Contesting Kabila

The DRC has in effect become the battleground on which inter-state hostilities are being unleashed (Naidoo 2000). Uganda s conflict with Sudan is in part driving its involvement in the Congo, as Northern Sudanese forces have assisted a variety of Ugandan rebel groups/militias in launching cross-border attacks on Uganda, from Congolese soil (Reyntjens 1999).⁶ Simply put, Uganda supports the SPLA because Khartoum backed the Ugandan rebel force LRA and the most notable militia, the ADF. Sudan then rallied to the aid of Kabila against its enemy Uganda (Naidoo 2000).

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}Despite Uganda s support in ousting Mobutu, the establishment of what was hoped would be a government more supportive of border

⁵ per the UN Commission on Arms Flows.

⁶ The Mobutu regime is charged with supporting the Khartoum (Northern Sudan) government against Southern Sudan (supported by Uganda, USA, Eritrea and Ethiopia). Zairean territory was used to launch ADF (Ugandan rebel group backed by North Sudan due to alliance with Mobutu) attacks on

security priorities, and Uganda's substantial operational independence in border regions, ADF militia attacks across the Congolese border have not diminished. Because of these attacks, the humanitarian and security situation in the Rwenzori Mountains has deteriorated, leaving over 100,000 people displaced (Mamdani 1999; Prendergast and Smock 1999).

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}Rwanda's involvement is argued by Prendergast and Smock (1999) to be a multi-faceted affair: security promotion, by displacing its war into the Congo and thus moving associated human rights and security problems out of north-west Rwanda; nation-building, in order to leave behind a structure in the Congo that can fill the current vacuum of authority; economic expansion and commercial development, through the exploitation of minerals now and the re-routing of trade toward the east in the future; and human rights promotion, by protecting Congolese Tutsi populations and ensuring that ethnic cleansing or worse does not befall those populations.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}*Supporting Kabila*

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}The impetus behind Zimbabwe's involvement is multi-pronged. Zimbabwean President Mugabe refused to accept the move by Rwanda and Uganda to unseat Kabila and deployed significant military forces in Kabila's defence (Prendergast and Smock 1999; Reyntjens 2001). Economic benefits followed, as a management contract for Gecamines, the main Katangan mining parastatal, was transferred to two Zimbabwean companies (Nest 2001). Nest (2001) maintains that involvement also revolves around an economic engagement designed to prevent a repeat of the Mozambican debacle of 1992,⁷ a collective security provision under SADC's OPDS,⁸ President Mugabe's wish to assert himself as the

Uganda (p.241).

⁷ During the 1980s, Zimbabwe assisted the Mozambican government in its struggle with Renamo defending and securing a 250km railway line that linked Zimbabwe to the Mozambican port of Beira on the Indian Ocean. The aim was to secure trade and a trade route for Zimbabwean entrepreneurs so as to avoid using South African ports. Following a peace agreement in October 1992, South Africa took advantage of the changing political and economic climate in Mozambique, in effect reaping the fruits of Zimbabwe's labour (Nest 2001).

⁸ According to Article 4 of the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC (1992), the Democratic Republic of Congo as a member is guaranteed military support from other member states in the event that it is invaded.

premier leader in SADC (upstaging popular newcomer Nelson Mandela), and the need to recover several millions of dollars lent to Kabilan war efforts against Mobutu.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}Zimbabwe appears to have a strong commitment to withdrawing forces as soon as possible, as domestic sentiment against its involvement in the war and economic pressures mount (Nest 2001). Zimbabwe was and is still in need of an honourable and economically secure exit which a properly implemented Lusaka agreement would provide. Since signing the cease-fire accord, Zimbabwean forces have been regrouping, fortifying defences, and concentrating troops in certain areas.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}While there may be economic interest too, Prendergast and Smock (1999) argue that Angola's overriding interest in the Congo is to contain UNITA's movements throughout the region, particularly its ability to re-supply. The Angolan government saw a possible convergence of Rwanda, Uganda, and UNITA at the outset of the war, and the insertion of its forces surprised Rwandan troops advancing on Kinshasa and saved Kabila's government. However, since the beginning of 1999, Angola has been withdrawing most of its forces from DRC soil in response to the resumption of its internal war with UNITA.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}Other minor forces in the Congolese saga include Namibia's political and symbolic military support; Chad and Libya's military aid; and Sudan's occasional aerial bombings of rebel positions, arms transfers to the Congolese government, and support for the non-state actors (Prendergast and Smock 1999) (see Appendix B). What has been adopted throughout is a military logic that identifies the enemy of my enemy [as] my friend (Naidoo 2000: 4), a logic which has served to magnify the conflict into seemingly irresolvable proportions.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}*South Africa's foreign policy in the Great Lakes*

The DRC is to South Africa what the Middle-East is to America: a material haven. The exploration of South Africa's policies towards and in the DRC is premised on documented accounts of the blurred line between media and diplomacy. Some

analysts (Serfaty 1990; Kurz 1990; Bailey 1990) argue the media's influence in foreign policy decisions while others claim the media toe the line of foreign policy, mere tools of government. Whatever the stance, Simon Serfaty (1990: 1) writes:

the past many years have witnessed profound changes in the scope and reach of the international press and, perhaps most pointedly, in the media's relationship with national governments around the world... This new phenomenon, aptly dubbed medialism has by turns furthered or frustrated the aims of statesmen and politicians. But whether it bodes well or ill for particular national governments, medialism represents a force that political leaders ignore at their own peril.

The common denominator here is that there is interaction between the press and foreign policy-making bodies; there is a relationship that renders both parties to some degree dependent on one another: the press on the government to fulfil obligations to their sources of revenue (Serfaty 1990), the readership, and the government/politicians on the press to ensure successful campaigns, be they personal or policy-related.

Theoretically speaking, South Africa is a semi-peripheral state in a region of weak peripheral countries (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998). As a former regional and international pariah state, South Africa's entry into world politics and indeed regional politics ushered in hegemonic tensions and expectations. These tensions have been observed by analysts (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998; Taylor and Williams 2001; Williams 2000; Nest 2001) in trade negotiations and aspects of regional politics and defence.

Indeed South Africa's response to and relative involvement in the Congolese conflict has been dubious largely due to her precarious position. Since gaining her independence in 1994, South Africa - with the most advanced economy and political and technological infrastructure on the continent - was appointed continental policeman. She was further secured in that position by then deputy president Thabo Mbeki's controversial foreign policy document, the African Renaissance (Taylor and Williams 2001; Williams 2000).

Taylor and Williams (2001: 267) write of the African Renaissance: Indeed, at its core the notion of renaissance appears to be about maximising South Africa's

strategic options on the continent. Others (Williams 2000; Van Nieuwkerk 1998; Vale and Maseko 1998) concur, dubbing South Africa's foreign policy to be nothing more than the pursuit of domestic policies internationally. They maintain that South Africa's interests in DRC peace are deeply rooted in her five-year GEAR⁹ plan to generate wealth to compete globally. The OAU reports that although South Africa has refused to aggravate the situation by sending a military force she has a huge economic interest in Congo's diamond and mining industries and wants to create stability in the country to facilitate access to mines (www.synapse.net/~acdi20/oua3/internet_reso/comtemp/congo/).

On the other hand, conflict-ridden spaces offer a form of malignant competitiveness for both patron and client that can prove highly profitable (Taylor and Williams 2001: 273). Ironically, although situations of the Congolese calibre are in direct contradiction to President Thabo Mbeki's African vision, they are nonetheless lucrative for South African business, namely the arms industry. Human rights groups have accused South Africa of selling arms to the [Democratic] Republic of the Congo in 1997 in the face of compelling evidence that pointed to persistent instability (www.hrw.org/reports/2000/safrica/). Consequently, the dynamics of instrumentalised disorder are in effect serving to limit reform in what Taylor and Williams (2001: 273) call *vagabondage politique*.

However, South Africa's lethargic response to the Great Lakes situation is primarily due to the ambiguity with which her foreign policy document addresses human rights, justice and democracy. The ANC's white paper on developing foreign policy states:

We need to work out what it means in practice to place human rights, justice and democracy at the forefront of our foreign policy. This certainly should not mean that we should refuse to conduct any diplomatic and trade relations with countries whose record in human rights or democracy we regard as unsatisfactory. But it should also not mean that when we engage with the governments of such countries, we ignore, marginalise or subordinate these principles and only concentrate on trade. (www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/discussion/foreign.html: 7)

In other words, South Africa is not willing to forgo the immense economic opportunities in the DRC solely on the basis of unsatisfactory democratic practices, but, promises to place democratic and human rights concerns somewhere on the

⁹ GEAR is the five-year Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme embarked upon in 1999.

agenda. Therefore, as the document states, the South African government's involvement in the DRC is, at best, a learning example (p.7), a testing ground on which South Africa battles her politically correct conscience and tempting hegemonic tendencies.

In addition, the much vaunted GEAR strategy has so far failed to produce the targeted employment growth (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998). Consequently, illegal immigration from economically and politically distraught regions of the continent into South Africa has fuelled widespread xenophobia (Fontana 1997). Thus, if common sense prevails, it follows that fears of an influx of Congolese seeking refugee status across South African borders are not far-fetched. Experience has already demonstrated the destructive repercussions of such migration when local street vendors burnt foreign kiosks in downtown Johannesburg, and in other documented incidents of verbal and physical abuse (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998; Solomon 1995).

The ruling party's white paper (www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/discussion/foreign.html: 7-8) on foreign policy outlines a direct link between economic integration and population movements into South Africa:

The reality of cross-border migration from less developed SADC states, to more developed ones, will continue to be a problem for as long as there are no co-ordinated strategies towards effective economic integration. It is important that as a movement we understand the issue of illegal immigrants from the region from this perspective.

Thus, according to *vagabondage politique*, the arms and mining industries flourish in the absence of law and order. In the long-term, however, the absence of peace and stability in the DRC, translates into the loss of economic opportunities for South Africa, and contains within it, a potential escalating refugee crisis and civil unrest on her city streets (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998).

1.3 Political, Social and Economic Roots of Congolese Conflict

The free-for-all over Congo's vast natural resources fuels the conflict. Some individuals close to the leadership have plundered the vast resources of the Congo in a fashion amounting to state subsidisation of personal enrichment (Nest 2001).¹⁰ As a

¹⁰ For extensive information on corruption and scandals, consult Dashwood's *Zimbabwe* pp. 99-103.

result, the Congolese government has sought to take over control of diamond sales, has outlawed such sales in dollars, and is seizing goods destined for export and exporting them directly (Prendergast and Smock 1999). Rwanda is exporting tantalite and other minerals, while Uganda is exporting gold and diamonds.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}Competition for land, resources, and favoured positions in a poverty-stricken environment fuels rivalries between Tutsi and non-Tutsi populations. The prevalence of minerals and export crops throughout rebel-controlled territories and the value of land in areas such as Masisi in North Kivu, increase the stakes (Prendergast and Smock 1999). The economic collapse and demographic pressure feeds insecurities and resentment, providing fertile ground for recruitment into various military forces.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \u4}There is tremendous anti-Tutsi and anti-Rwandan sentiment throughout the Congo that has been manipulated by two different regimes (Prendergast and Smock 1999). Initially under Mobutu anti-Tutsi sentiment was used as a mobilising force in the mid-1990s, and again more overtly under Kabila's government, whereby government officials openly encouraged mobs to kill Tutsis. Reyntjens (1999: 244) contends that currently, local civil society leaders - including church officials - in the Kivus use propagandist anti-Tutsi language as a weapon, exploiting resentment against Rwanda's occupation.

1.4 Mediation Efforts

What is interesting and unusual about this particular peace process, is the physical and, largely, political absence of the international community. According to Mngqibisa (1999), the intervention by SADC in DRC came at a time when the West was deeply engrossed in the Kosovo crisis. As such this peace process is a truly African phenomenon in terms of military involvement and diplomatic efforts to restore peace.

The increased fighting that has captured the attention of the continent and the international community is accompanied by intense African diplomacy (Kabemba 1999). Various summits — the Pretoria Summit, the meeting of the non-aligned

Movement in Durban, the Victoria Falls, the French, the Addis-Abba, the Mauritius-SADC, the Lusaka and the Namibian Summits — as well as many informal meetings have been organised on how to end the DRC conflict. Two of these, the Franco-African Summit in Paris on 27 and 28 November, and the Namibia Summit of January 1999, raised hopes that came to naught. There are several reasons for this impasse.

Firstly, Kabila's unpreparedness to enter negotiations explained - to a point - the failure of these concerted efforts. Besides the fall-out between Kabila and the international community, particularly the United States and the UN, Kabemba (1999) maintains the time was not ripe for negotiation. Most of these mediations took place while both sides to the conflict believed in their own military supremacy, thus making negotiations virtually impossible.

Secondly, the inherent bias against negotiation by the region's leaders militates against successful discussion. Kabila has been accused of a lack of commitment to negotiation (Reyntjens 1999) because of his persistent refusal to meet directly with the rebels. However, other role players like Kagame and Museveni share to varying degrees this non-commitment to negotiation (Kabemba 1999). All three have a common belief in the legitimacy of the use of force. Like Kabila, Museveni and Kagame have steadfastly refused to talk to any of the rebel movements or militias fighting their respective governments (Reyntjens 1999). All three have a common belief in the legitimacy of the use of force.

Fourthly, Kabemba (1999) argues that early calls for mediation lacked the urgency that the magnitude of the armed conflict warranted, perhaps due to the underestimation of the ability of the three SADC countries supporting Kabila to remain in Congo for any length of time. Some envisaged an early break-up of the alliance. This would have led to the easy defeat of Kabila. All this brings into question the ability of the mediators to gather intelligence.

In the fifth instance, the neutrality and independence of mediators have negatively affected their efforts. South Africa claimed to be the only country with the ability to mediate in the DRC conflict for two reasons: Firstly, because of its leadership

embodied in the person of President Mandela (Naidoo 2000); and secondly, because the call for an African Renaissance by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki created even higher expectations on the continent of the leadership role South Africa should play (Taylor and Williams 2001). As Mamdani (1998) puts it when the leadership of post-apartheid South Africa heralded the dawn of an African Renaissance, Africa and the world understood it as a claim to political leadership on the continent. South African initiatives have, so far, failed to bear fruit.

Although it appears that South Africa has been sidelined in Congo, it carries more weight than any other country in the region and has the capacity to influence the direction of events (Taylor and Williams 2001). Kabemba (1999) maintains that the choice to ignore or failure to gather adequate intelligence sent an incorrect signal to the rebels and their backers, seemingly condoning their actions. This is perhaps why it has been particularly difficult for President Mandela's peace and reform options to prevail (Naidoo 2000). Put plainly, South Africa is struggling to find its place as the pivotal middleman and political hegemon because of its apparent sympathy for the rebel camp opposed to Kabila.

Furthermore, Southern Africa is clearly divided on the Congo war (Mamdani 1999). On the one hand are Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, who intervened militarily in the DRC to prevent the toppling of Laurent Kabila. On the other, are Botswana and South Africa, who have declined military engagement in the DRC, arguing for an inclusive political settlement (although they saw it fit to intervene in Lesotho) (Kabemba 1999). This has led the participating protagonists to accuse South Africa of double standards.

The attempts to resolve the DRC conflict have clearly been undermined by the self-interest of virtually all countries involved. The war in Congo is also about who gets preferential access to her resources; the countries concerned are not prepared to accept a deal that threatens their economic interests.

There are signs that peace might be in the woodwork in the Congo. This note of optimism according to Kabemba (1999) relates to the aforementioned initiatives under the auspices of the OAU, SADC and individual countries to resolve the current crisis

in the DRC. He maintains that although these initiatives have not eased the fighting, the time may be ripe for mediation.

1.5 Locating the South African Press: Locating the *Sunday Times*

{ADVANCE \d4} Given the political and economic might of South Africa on the African continent, and in particular with respect to aforementioned events in the DRC, she is, for all intents and purposes, the ideal African case study. Western, and especially American, media coverage is frequently analysed due to American hegemonic tendencies projected in foreign and economic policies. For the same reason, South Africa's coverage of the DRC is considered for this study. There is a parallel relationship between politics and the nature of the press. The development of the press in South Africa must be understood in terms of developments in the wider society.

{tc \l3 "The DRC is to South Africa what the Middle-East is to America: a material haven. Given the political and economic might of South Africa on the African continent and in particular, with respect to aforementioned events in the DRC, she is, for all intents and purposes, the ideal African case study. Just as western, and especially American, media coverage is frequently analysed due to American hegemonic tendencies projected in foreign and economic policies, it is for the same reasons that South Africa's coverage of the DRC is considered for this study. There is a parallel relationship in the politics as in the nature of the press. The development of the press in South Africa must be understood in terms of developments in the wider society.}{tc \l3 "}{ADVANCE \d4}Broadly speaking, scholars (Tuchman 1978; Van Ginneken 1998; Schudson 2000) agree that journalism operates under theories of deductive reasoning, fancying itself as objective. However, the reality of the situation is that journalism and media institutions operate within societies, states and under the rules and regulations that govern those states. In other words, the media in any given society/country is subject to and restricted by the laws of that country. Such was the case in apartheid South Africa, where over 100 laws were enacted in a bid to restrict an already divided press from 1948 to 1989 (Louw 1990). By the same token, the press was — because of its pervasiveness — used in the historically propagandist form of a campaign in times of unrest (Tomaselli 1988).

{tc \l3 "Kariithi () explains that journalism operates under theories of deductive reasoning, fancying itself as objective. However, the reality of the situation is that journalism and media institutions operate within societies, states and under the rules and regulations that govern those states. In other words, the media in any given society/country, is subject to and restricted by the laws of that country. Such was the case of apartheid South Africa whereby over 100 laws were enacted in a bid to restrict an already divided press from 1948 to 1989 (Louw 1990). }{ADVANCE \d4}{tc \l3 "}{ADVANCE \d4}The divisions in the press were symptomatic of the racism of the state. According to Hachten and Giffard (1984), various sectors of the South African population had historically used the press to further their individual political objectives. Potter (1975) argues that the prevailing racism manifested itself in the tripartite division between the *Afrikaaner Press* - an instrument of the former apartheid government's political aspirations; the *English Press* - which prided itself on being the unofficial opposition but was routinely accused of being part of the white establishment; and the *Black Press* ; which continually agitated for an end to minority white rule.

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Historically, the White Press (that is, the Afrikaaner and English presses) and the Black Press (that is, African, Indian and Coloured presses) co-existed uncomfortably in South Africa. Far from being mere reflectors of society, they were very much a part of it, and were instruments in perpetuating the ideological sentiments of the government while at the same time adopting those characteristics (Jackson 1993). A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/4chap6.html) report contends that the South African press was forced to follow a policy of appeasement. It is within this legal and political framework that the *Sunday Times* came into being.

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A consequence of the skewed political climate that rendered the Blacks economically and educationally inept, was that issues of disposable income, political and social change, and foreign affairs were typically geared towards the Whites for obvious reasons. The *Sunday Times* like other papers had to attract adequate advertising revenue to survive and so found itself catering to the business community and the upper echelons of society (Tomaselli et al. 1987). Today it continues to cater to the upper class, although not necessarily white, and more specifically to the business community. In fact it can be deduced that because of South Africa's desired relationship with the African continent, and bearing in mind its business sector readership, the *Sunday Times* - having close links to the government - has significant economic and political interests in continental affairs. This explains the extensive intense coverage of Africa and the DRC and the recent addition of the *Africa* supplement to the newspaper.

1.6 Conceptual and Methodological Framework of study

1.6 Conceptual and Methodological Framework of study

Theoretically this study is informed by cultural critiques of news production, and theoretical critiques of the coverage of peace processes, for example Shinar (2000). Media scholars like

Schudson (2000), Gitlin (1980) and McQuail (2000) argue that news is socially constructed by values, criteria, representations and frames embraced by media professionals. According to Hall et al. (1998), cultural studies distinguishes itself in its concern with the generation and circulation of meaning within individual societies, thus providing contextualised analyses of the articles under review. They point out that cultural studies conceives meaning as a socially constructed phenomenon, and that media institutions are powerful agents in producing and perpetuating consensus and ideology.

The tenets of news and news values are based on attributes such as timeliness, unexpectedness, predictability, proximity, and especially conflict and unusualness (McQuail 1983: 139 and Schudson 2000). Coupled with the abstract notion of objectivity, these values have been used by generations of media professionals as the golden rules of reporting sought after by all aspiring and established journalists, including those from the so-called underdeveloped countries.

To concerned governments, media researchers and others involved in the media, it seems as if events in Africa and other parts of the Third World only become news in the Western media if conflict-orientated themes such as corruption, coups, civil and political unrest and famine constitute the main course on the news menu. Cohen et al. (1990) explain in detail the hypothesis that social conflict is a dominant news factor and that the media play a central role in the development and regulation of many social conflicts.

{ADVANCE \d4}{ADVANCE \d4}The debate is not over whether the media should or should not report on conflict. On the contrary, many social scientists agree that conflict within a system can lead to the renewal of old norms or the creation of new ones (Cohen et al. 1990: 26-28), and that the media, from a functional point of view, can regulate social conflicts and create the basis for consensus. The concern is that the media tends to present only the more intense negative moments of social conflicts. As Cohen et al. (1990) illustrate, in periods of conflict there are also periods of calm, but the media by-passes such phases collapsing the fluctuations into a continuous spasm of conflict.

{ADVANCE \d4}In the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa of the 1960s and 1970s (as elsewhere in the Third World), a negative attitude developed towards Western-style conflict-ridden news coverage of the continent, leading to the formation of New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in the 1970s and 1980s, as espoused by MacBride (1980). Reacting to what was perceived to be the West's negative media coverage of Africa, many African states began disseminating their own developmental news programs in an attempt to rectify the imbalance in news coverage about their countries (Giffard 1993).

Due to its apartheid policies, South Africa was not part of the NWICO/developmental media debate (McBride 1980). The negative media coverage South Africa received in international and local media was a direct result of its internal racial policies, namely apartheid, making it a pariah amongst the nations of the world. Political changes after 1990 (Froneman & De Beer 1993) brought South Africa to a new democratic dispensation in dealing with news, paving the way for new approaches to news.

In this study I will argue that the typical Anglo-American news value model is not necessarily the most functional model for emerging democracies in South or Southern Africa, or other developing countries for that matter. Secondly, I will argue that news and news values should be redefined in the present socio-economic and political transitional phase of South Africa; and third, that common ground can and must be found in elements of both the Western and developmental models, forming values that are applicable to South Africa and all other emerging democracies. Scholars such as De Beer and Steyn (1996) have already proposed and tested comparable models on a small scale. Evaluation of such alternative models is necessary in light of the wave of democratisation processes sweeping across the African continent that face all African media organisations and media professionals alike (Zaffiro 1992:61).

{ADVANCE \d4}

Bruck (1998) and Gilboa (1998 and 2000) offer lucid reviews of scholarship on peace and peace processes. Scholarly literature analysing news texts on war is extensive and centres on the Vietnam War, the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis, the Gulf War, and the protracted Arab-Israeli and Northern Irish conflicts (Hallin 1997; Bennett and Paletz 1994). Hallin (1997: 207) notes that this literature explores relations between the

media, the military and the government. Hallin (1997) further points to themes of ritualisation, trivialisation and propaganda in the media's coverage of war.

Shinar's (2000) and Kempf's (1998-2000) works are pivotal to this research in that they analyse the media's coverage of peace processes. Both authors use quantitative and qualitative content analysis to conduct comparative analyses of the media's coverage of peace processes in the Middle East, Northern Ireland and Bosnia, in various newspapers. They investigate how news texts were constructed, and argue that current media discourse is not sufficient to understand, report and interpret such processes, perhaps as a direct result of socio-political concerns. Shinar (2000: 86-89) finds the use of peace discourse to be sporadic as compared to the discourses of war, trivialisation and of ritualisation.

In examining the construction of peace and peace processes in the *Sunday Times* articles, this study aims to look particularly at the representational and ideological significance of this construction. It makes use of techniques drawn from qualitative content analysis. In short, the production and construction of news stories on the DRC peace process will be examined using qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques. This will facilitate a critical analysis of their construction to ascertain their ideological inflection. To this end, several key questions will be raised:

1. How was the discourse in the texts constructed?
2. Who in the general category of participants featured in the discourse?
3. How is participation in the discourse structured?
4. What themes received emphasis?
5. Are there competing themes and positions? Are they included? What treatment are they given?
6. What is the significance of the construction of the reports within the social situation of the country?

These are the broad questions that this study will attempt to address. A preliminary probe has already indicated that the news articles on the summits followed a particular pattern. They either focused on the negotiations, or reported peace in terms of the progression of the conflict, or highlighted the gains and losses of the peace process.

1.7 Conclusion

This research is divided into three main parts. First is the historical and contextual section, in which I attempt to provide an understanding and clarification of the conditions within which the peace summits are conducted, and of the politics that fuel the construction that ensues in the articles. Second are the theoretical chapters that explore the sociology of news: what values and realities influence the selection, representation and framing of issues. An attempt is made to explore techniques employed in the construction of processes and events, for example, those of peace and war. Last comes the analysis of the news articles.

As indicated above, reports on Congolese affairs and on the peace process span several years. The preliminary probe served to delimit the period by concentrating on reports of the summits. As a result, 26 articles will provide the focus of the study.

The following chapter lays the theoretical foundation for this study by providing the framework in which news in general and news on peace are constructed.

Chapter Two

Conceptual Framework & Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This study is informed by theories of news construction, and concentrates on the construction of texts on peace and on the discourse of peace in the *Sunday Times* newspaper. It aims to challenge the notion of the media as mere reflectors of events and conditions of the world at large. This chapter outlines the theories and methods that inform the production and construction of news texts on peace.

To this end, the chapter is divided into two main parts: the first elaborates a theoretical framework for analysis of the function of the news, and the second explicates some key concepts in the construction of news texts on peace.

2.1 The Function and Production of News

Within the normative view, a particular image and concept of news as information is embedded. Its formation hails from its natural character: we read newspapers to access important and often influential information about what transpires in the world. In this section we take this seemingly unimportant and natural occurrence and deconstruct it to show how it came to be revealing the values and perceptions behind the selection and construction of texts, and in particular, news texts.

Beginning with the concept of text, we find that the term is used in two basic ways: in one usage it refers in general terms, to the message itself, that is, the printed document or article; the tangible artifact. A second meaning is offered by John Fiske (in McQuail 2000: 237) who proposes that the term be reserved for the meaningful outcome of the encounter between content and reader, so that the article only becomes a text at the moment of reading; an abstract concept. It then follows that, given the many interpretations and understandings of the world; multiple texts can be generated by a single article (McQuail 2000). Therefore, mass media content, according to McQuail (2000: 238), is in principle, a polysemic creature.

2.1.1 Media Content as Information

Information is a word whose history of military and bureaucratic embeddedness is concealed in state discourse (Peters 1988). Information results from political, social and commercial institutions serving particular constellations of economic interests. And as Tomaselli (1992) points out, information is neither neutral nor value-free.

McQuail (2000) posits that the discourse surrounding media content finds its origins in information theory approaches. These approaches conceive communication as the intense transfer of information from sender to receiver using particular channels that are subject to interference. Although difficult to define, the concept of information is characterised by its capacity to reduce uncertainty (p. 248).

Historically, newspapers were not the domain of news and information. In fact Heibert et al. (1985) contend that newspapers were initially used primarily for business promotions. In more recent years, news has been commodified within the context of globalisation prevailed. As such, news has come to fill the shoes of the town crier, who informed communities of the latest events (p. 496).

However, news does not just happen (Howe 1968). Societal forces - political, economic, social and meteorological - define what has come to be referred to as news. These forces, coupled with professional values and selection criteria, account for journalists becoming definers of news and therefore information (Hiebert et al. 1985; Golding and Murdock 2000).

Obviously news is selective. Stuart Hall notes that journalists speak of the news as if events select themselves. Furthermore, they speak as if what the most significant news story, and which news angles are most salient, are divinely inspired (in Schudson 1991: 153). The criteria involved are not explicit, or at least not visible to the viewer. Richard Hoggart contends that the most important filter through which news is constructed is the cultural air we breathe, the whole ideological atmosphere of our society, which tells us that some things can be said and that others had best not be said (cited in Schudson 1991: 154). Schudson (1991: 154) adds that that cultural air is one that in part, ruling groups and institutions create, but it is in part one in whose social context their own establishment takes place. He continues thus:

The cultural air has both a form and content. The content, the substance of taken-for-granted values, has often been discussed. Gans (1979) arrived at a list for American journalism that includes ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, and moderatism as core, unquestioned values of American news.

They are the unquestioned and generally unnoticed background assumptions through which the news is gathered and within which it is framed.

Referring to Hall's (1978) notion of news as socially constructed text, the inference is made that news is not accidental but the result of a selection process. Lippman (1947) realistically points out that journalists and media organisations cannot possibly track all the events that occur at any given time. Even if they could, argues Van Ginneken (1998), someone, usually one of White's (1950) so-called gatekeepers, would have to sift through the thousands of reports, selecting information to be transmitted to a waiting audience. White (1950) conceptualises news editors as the influential gatekeepers responsible for the selection, transformation and transfer of incoming information, according to the preformed ideological position of the organisation.

Among White's (1950) critics is Gallagher (1982: 153), who maintains that White's model is limited in the way it accounts for conflict and change. He argues that White's (1950) model does not give credence to broader social structures within which decisions are made, neither does it consider the beneficiaries of those decisions nor the personal preference and bias of news writers.

This, on the other hand, is what Shoemaker's (1991) study incorporates. She outlines a model in which editorial decisions are considered within the context of the entire social system. Thus modern applications of gate-keeping theory, like modern deconstructions of texts, employ a multi-dimensional approach in which gatekeepers operate at multiple levels, from the ideological to the contextual to the individual. In Shoemaker's (1991) view, gates are not controlled by editors alone but also by other individuals, and are regulated by cultural beliefs, economic determinants, institutional requirements, and organisational control.

Genre-related factors also strongly influence the selection of items (McQuail 2000). News stories are categorised into broad types - placed into interpretive frames. News

is divided into categories such as: politics, the economy, foreign affairs, and domestic news, including stories of conflict and conflict resolution. Such categories are employed both to construct stories as well as to structure the newspaper by grouping them.

2.1.2 News Values and News Construction

In the Western context of practical journalism, as well as in theoretical and research work, news and news values have traditionally come to be defined and identified according to the Anglo-American model (de Beer and Steyn 1996).

As mentioned earlier, in recent decades the Western media have been repeatedly criticised for being anti-African by offering negative coverage only. Lange (1984: 69) argues that this charge is intuitively confirmed by the average Western reader's response to: What was the last news you heard about Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe--famine, corruption, etc.? De Beer and Steyn (1996) offer some possible reasons for Africa's negative image in the Western media. One is that negative, conflict-orientated news reports about the trials and tribulations of Africa and Southern Africa are attractive to Western audiences. According to Lange (1984:71), these kinds of stories reinforce a feeling of superiority about being Western and keep Westerners informed of possible threats to their affluence.

There is no conspiracy against Africa or any comparable part of the globe. De Beer and Steyn (1996) say it all boils down to two things: a basic traditional philosophy developed in the Anglo-American context of what constitutes news and news values (discussed briefly in Chapter 1), in terms of which Africa did not offer an overwhelming possibility of good news in the traditional Western sense, and developmental news was turned into either propaganda or education and training information. Each event reported in the news has gone through some kind of {
HYPERLINK "JavaScript:parent.remoteStart('../popups/gatekeep.html')"} process. According to some media researchers (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Schulz 1982), journalists and editors refer to a set of so-called news values. These are the criteria which enable them to determine whether a story is followed up and whether it makes it into the news, competing against all the other possible items.

One of the best-known lists of news values is supplied by Galtung and Ruge (1965). Although somewhat dated, and initially intended for the coverage of international events, their list is central to virtually all media analysts' discussions of news values.

The authors argue for the following 12 values: *Frequency*. The time-span of an event and the extent to which it fits the frequency of the newspaper's or news broadcast's schedule. Economic, social or political trends are less likely to make it since they take a long time to unfold. When they do make it into the news, it is via a clearly defined event (note upcoming discussion on events vs. processes). *Threshold*. How big is an event? The bigger the better. The size of an event tends to be mitigated by its degree of meaningfulness. *Unambiguity*. How clear is the meaning of an event? *Meaningfulness*. How meaningful will the event appear to the receivers of the news? This is where issues of proximity enter (de Beer and Steyn 1996): the closer the better. *Consonance*. Does the event match the media's expectations? Journalists have a pretty good idea of the angle they want to report an event from, even before they get there. *Unexpectedness*. If an event is highly unpredictable, then it is likely to make it into the news. *Continuity*. Once an event has been covered, it is convenient to cover it some more - the running story. Apart from anything else it allows media organisations already in place to cover the original event. This will depend very much on the nature of the event. *Composition*. This is a matter of the balance of the news. It's a matter of the editors' judgement, more than anything else. *Reference to elite nations*. This relates again to cultural proximity. Those nations which are culturally closest to the reporting society's own receive the most coverage. *Reference to elite persons*. The media pay attention to important people. De Beer and Steyn (1996) refer to it as prominence (the well known or famous). *Personalisation*. This connects with unambiguity and meaningfulness. Events are seen as the actions of individuals. *Negativity*. Bad news is good news. Bad news can have the other characteristics as well - it may be unexpected, unambiguous, consonant with our general expectations about the world, and so on.

There are certainly some obvious news values missing from the list, for example availability of footage. Entertainment value is another obvious candidate for the list - if a news item isn't entertaining then it's not covered.

Although the Galtung and Ruge (1965) list is central to most discussions of news values, it nonetheless contends with other versions. Schulz (1982) came up with a somewhat different list, which included nineteen different factors, under six broad categories: *Status*. elite nation, elite institution, elite person; *Identification*. proximity, ethnocentrism, personalisation, emotions; *Valence*. aggression, controversy, values, success; *Consonance*. theme, stereotype, predictability; *Relevance*. consequence, concern; *Dynamics*. timeliness, uncertainty, unexpectedness.

The implication in many studies of news values is that they (the values) are virtually objective factors, to which journalists and editors react. According to this view news items are subjected to a { [HYPERLINK](#) "JavaScript:parent.remoteStart('../popups/gatekeep.html')"} process, which is apolitical and unbiased. However, many studies of news production have led to the same conclusion as Tuchman s (1978: 216):

I do not mean to accuse newswriters of bias. The news professionals rightly insist that those who shout bias be able to define objective truth in a definitive manner. I do not claim that ability. But I do claim that it is valuable to identify news as an artful accomplishment attuned to specific understandings of social reality. Those understandings, constituted in specific work processes and practices, legitimate the status quo.

From this point of view, the selection of news events is not a reflex action, but a socially determined construction of reality.

2.1.3 Reality and the Quest for Objectivity

There is a general professional consensus that much of the news is a perfect reflection of reality (Griffith 1974). Challenging this is the structuralist approach that views reality as a social construct. It is the notion that news is a product of a particular social construction that provides the primary theoretical premise on which my research stands. Stuart Hall (1978: 53) argues for the complex nature of news thus:

The media do not simply and transparently report events which are naturally newsworthy in themselves. News is the end product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events.

Hall s (1978) structuralist position highlights that even the selection of what is newsworthy is based on a complex set of socio-economic, political, organisational

and ideological criteria. Everything, from what a journalist elects to make newsworthy, to the writing style, and to the sources attributed, is a product of the structured process of news construction. Even something as ostensibly harmless as deciding on which stories to cover on a given day, involves complex choices and thus helps to foreground particular realities while back-grounding others (Schudson 2000).

Contesting the Western journalistic assumption that newswriting purports to be a quest for objectivity, de Beers and Steyn (1996: 96) maintain that,

these assumptions do not take into account the phenomenon that news reporting is not identical to news as such. It is at most an undertaking by the individual journalist and the news organization to re-construct the essential framework of the news event.

Fiske argues that theories of news which foreground questions of accuracy, bias, or objectivity are based on a [particular] notion of reality... these questions are, however, important... because they can give insight into the professional ideology of the news makers (Fiske 1987: 282).

News stories are unavoidably handled from particular points of view. Goodwin suggests that the real issue is whether the range of biases represented is fair. In other words, does it adequately reveal the range of points of view held by the public? (Goodwin 1990: 54). He adds that

It is quite plausible to believe that all media images are constructed and still maintain that some constructions are more truthful than others. Surely there are competing explanations of social reality, and surely all factual statements are also statements of value... Some explanations receive more attention and validation than others (57).

Fiske extends his point, concluding that

News, of course, can never give a full, accurate objective picture of reality nor should it attempt to, for such an enterprise can only serve to increase its authority and decrease people's opportunity to argue with it; to negotiate with it. In a progressive democracy, news should stress its discursive constructedness, should nominate all its voices... and should open its text to invite more productively reading relations. (307-308)

Broadcasters, and by extension newspaper reporters, emphasise the informational and factual nature of the news: news can be gathered, uncovered or exposed. Curran & (Gurevitch 1991: 228) suggest that most of the time, objectivity is just the rationale for regurgitating the conventional wisdom of the day.

2.1.4 Framing Ideologies

As news is transmitted through language, ideological power relations are revealed in the representation of events. This critical study of the representation of a peace process in an African country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the national South African media market, is tangentially concerned with how ideology operates through language, mediating the reality it wishes to re-present, and in the process helping to sustain [often unconsciously] (Strelitz and Steenveld 1998:105) particular policy positions.

Central to the notion of news as a socially constructed text, is a post-structuralist emphasis on the pivotal role language plays in the process of constructing the subjectivity of the individual. Hartley (1982: 13) posits that the world is received, or realised in language. Like any other social and/or cultural institution, news is defined by a primary meaning system — language - and is therefore not a mirror but a frame, a frame literally made of words and pictures which thus comprises a specially differentiated sub-system within language (Hartley 1982: 7). In line with the Fiskean concept of text referred to earlier, one finds that the reality observed depends on how the message is received; moreover, interpretations are not idiosyncratic, but are shaped by the structures within which the audience is embedded (for example, class, gender, race and so on). These structures are in turn, understood and represented through language. Turner (1988: 43), highlights the significance of theorising language thus:

What language does is to construct, not label, reality for us. We cannot think without language. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine thinking things for which we have no language. We become members of our culture through language, and we internalise the value systems which structure our lives through language. (in Strelitz and Steenveld 1998: 105)

Here, ideology enters the picture insofar as ideology works to make that which is historically and culturally determined not only appear to be, but also be experienced as, the absolute truth, or a product of human nature. O Sullivan et al. (1994: 114) refer to [ideology as] a set of ideas which produces a partial and selective view of reality. In fact, as Briggs and Cobley (1998: 279) assert, representation in general can be considered to be ideological, because the very processes of selection and condensation serve not only to stereotype, but also to exclude many features and ways of understanding the social world.

The overriding understanding that flows from this discussion is that the daily occurrence of news is not a product of chance but rather the result of numerous decisions that are informed by particular news values and influenced by particular ideologies. Gans (1979: 77) summarises it thus:

In reporting news, journalists could in theory choose from thousands of potential activities. Yet, they can learn about only a tiny fraction of actors and activities. They are further limited by time and space and can only select an even smaller fraction of those activities, which are presented to them. More importantly, they cannot decide anew every day or week how to select the fraction that will appear on the news; instead, they must routinise their task in order to make it manageable.

The role of dominant ideologies in structuring the news, and the forces and criteria that shape the selection of news on a daily basis, bring certain aspects of individual realities into the foreground while back-grounding others, resulting in a representation of facts.

2.2 News and Representation: A Theoretical Critique

In brief, the term representation refers to the way in which images and language actively construct meanings according to sets of conventions shared by and familiar to communicators and audiences. Pieterse (1995) argues that representation refers to the construction in any medium of aspects of reality such as people, places, objects, events, cultural identities and other abstract concepts. Such representations may be in speech or writing as well as in still or moving pictures. According to Swanson (in Lusted 1991: 123), it is in the social context of representation that a hierarchy exists in which some meanings come to be dominant and others marginalised, thus raising questions of power. All signifying practices that produce meaning involve relations of power. This includes the power to define what and who is included and/or excluded (Hall 1997).

Some media theorists (Hall 1997; Schudson 2000; Briggs and Cobley 1998) work from the assumption that representations, at least partially, construct the social fabric of people's lives. As such, media texts are thought to affect, in a very real sense, the way we understand ourselves and others and the way we conduct our lives. These texts are important because of their ubiquity and because of the widespread belief that

they contribute to the production of common-sense understandings of the world (in this case, what it means to be an African peacemaker). The relationship between the media and representation lies in the notion that the media can be conceived of as an ensemble of texts.

These ensembles of text carry in them signifying practices and symbolic systems through which meaning is constructed and through which subjects are positioned. Woodward (1997) maintains that representation produces meanings through which audiences make sense of their experiences, their surroundings and themselves. Discourse and systems of representation construct places from which individuals can position themselves and from which they can speak (Woodward 1997: 36).

Now if representations are in essence an ensemble of texts and media texts are representations of producers' understandings of the world rather than a direct reflection of it, Hall et al. (1978: 56), in line with the constructivist view, stress that texts as notions of definitions of the situation are the result of a particular way of constructing reality. In other words, texts are the end product of the selecting, presenting, [mis]presenting, structuring and shaping of information that is represented to the reader (Hall et al. 1978: 53). News texts must therefore be viewed as representations of the encoder's individual realities and values, and as framed in particular ways to deliver particular meanings. Furthermore, to fully understand a particular representation channelled through any medium, one must understand the context in which the received message is constructed. Hence the exploration of the political context in which the *Sunday Times* exists and was born.

Representations are presentations (Hall et al. 1978). This means that they entail the use of the codes and conventions of the available cultural forms of presentation. Cultural forms set the wider terms of limitation and possibility for the (re)presentation of particulars, and so it is necessary to understand the way in which the latter are caught up in the former, in order to understand why something gets framed and represented in a particular fashion. Failing to understand the way images function in terms of narrative, genre or spectacle, leads to an incomplete understanding of why they turn out the way they do.

2.2.1 Meaning and Language

Hall (1997) says that the concept of representation has come to occupy an important place in the study of culture. This is chiefly due to the linking of meaning and language to culture embodied in representation. Representation is a crucial element in the process through which meaning is produced, exchanged and understood within a culture/society. Hall maintains that it involves the use of language, as well as signs and images which represent objects, ideas and ideals.

According to Hall (1997), representation is the production of meaning through language. It is this link between concept and language that facilitates reference to the real world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events. Hall (1997) points to two processes or systems of representation. First there is the system by which all objects, people and events are correlated to a set of mental representations. Without these mental interpretations, audiences cannot interpret the world meaningfully, the reason being that meaning depends on the system of concepts and images formed in thoughts which can stand for or represent the world, allowing for reference to things both inside and outside the audience's heads.

A second system of representation consists not of individual concepts but of the ways in which concepts are organised, grouped and classified, establishing the complex relations between them: for instance, the use of similarity and difference to establish or distinguish between relationships and concepts. Therefore, meaning relies on the relationships among things in one's environment — people, objects, and events both real and fictional — and the conceptual system which functions via mental representations (Hall 1997).

Hall (1997) views language as a tool that facilitates interpretation of the world in similar ways, thus building up a shared culture of meanings that construct the social arena out of which representation and ideology are born. The conceptual map that one transports in one's head can differ completely from that of the next person's. In other words, each person understands and interprets the world in a unique and individual way. Yet communication is enabled as a result of shared conceptual maps that allow for similar renditions.

The relationship among things, concepts and signs lies at the heart of meaning production in language. It is the process linking the three elements that Hall (1997:19) refers to as representation.

2.2.2 Theorising Representation

There are, broadly speaking, three approaches to explaining how representation of meaning works through language: the reflective, the intentional and the constructionist or constructivist approaches (Hall 1997). They attempt to answer the questions, where do meanings come from? and how can we tell the true meaning of a word or image?

In the *reflective* approach, meaning is thought to lie in the object, person, idea or event in the real world. Language functions like a mirror, to reflect the true meaning that already exists in the world. There may be some truth to such a mimetic theory, in that language works by simply reflecting or imitating a truth that exists, and since visual signs bear some resemblance to the shape and texture of the objects they represent. However, there are numerous words, sounds and images that are fully understood, but are completely fictional and reference imaginary worlds. Thus, the second approach to meaning argues the opposite. It holds that it is the speaker, the author, who imposes his or her unique meaning on the world through language (Schudson 2000).

That is, words mean what the author intends them to mean. This is what Hall (1997) calls the *intentional* approach. However, while it is true that individuals use language to convey or communicate things that are unique, this approach is flawed in that an individual cannot be the sole or unique source of meanings in language. The essence of language is communication, and that in turn depends on shared linguistic conventions and shared codes. Thus our private intended meanings, however personal to us, have to enter the set of rules, codes and conventions of language to be shared and understood. This means that private thoughts have to negotiate with all other meanings for words or images that find refuge in language (Hall 1997).

The third approach, the *constructionist* or *constructivist* approach, recognises this public and social character of language. It acknowledges that neither things in themselves nor the individual users of language can fix meaning in language. Things don't mean — we construct meaning, using representational systems of concepts and signs. While constructivists such as Hall (1997: 25) do not deny the existence of the material world, they argue that it is not the material world that conveys meaning, but rather the language system or whichever system is used to represent concepts (Hall 1997).

It is not that reality is excluded, but that one only apprehends reality only through particular presentations of reality, through texts, discourses and images (Dyer 1993). In other words, there is no such thing as unmediated access to reality and it's only through representation that reality can be accessed. The complexity of representation lies in its embeddedness in cultural forms, its unequal yet not monolithic relations of production and reception, its tense, unfinished, and unfinishable relation to the reality to which it refers and which it affects.

On the basis of the concepts and theories outlined above, I now turn to the domain of peace and war, looking at the various discourses in relation to media texts.

2.3 Culture and Discourse: War vs. Peace

According to Kempf (1999), the governmental rhetoric of power and violence was, in the Cold War era, was adopted by the media as an official discourse, while peace talk was tagged Communist, and received little emphasis from audience and professionals alike. Shinar (2000) argues that this preference for war discourses resulted in the absence of a peace discourse, and concludes that the invention of a media peace discourse is essential in order that truth continue to be the driving force behind the profession. In order to uncover the possible elements of a media peace discourse, a distinction must be first drawn between war culture and peace culture.

Detailed in the works of Bruck (1998), Gilboa (1998; 2000), and Bar-Tal (1998) are lucid explorations and theories of conflict and conflict management, in terms of which war logic produces a competitive environment in which conflicts are dealt with in the framework of a win-lose model.

War culture is conflict-oriented in that it is subject to dualistic thinking, which constructs an antagonism between us and them and between good and evil; a win/lose framework. War culture applies strategies of threat and violence and justifies them by idealising its own rights, intentions and behaviour, while at the same time demonising those of the opponent (Kempf 1999). For example, the current American war on terrorism finds the US cloaking Afghan civilian deaths in the rhetoric of the American nationalist quest, in the name of the American man and woman. Another case in point is the 1993 American intervention.¹¹ Secondly, war culture is founded on obedience and applies strategies of social pressure to unify societies and to enforce loyalty within the leadership (Kempf 1999).

At the other end of the spectrum is a win/win framework as espoused by Kempf (1999). He characterises peace culture as a co-operative environment in which conflicts are addressed within a framework that seeks a resolution to the conflict - a resolution that serves the needs of all parties involved. Peace culture is solution-oriented, basing itself on diversified thinking that deconstructs the antagonism: an attempt to foster mutual knowledge, understanding and respect for difference and equality (Gutierrez 1999).

Thus the two cultures are essentially defined by their objectives: *peace culture* is characterised by mutual respect, it applies creative strategies in order to make conflicting needs compatible, and is based on democracy, diversity and pluralism. Conversely, war culture is predicated upon hegemonic tendencies much like those discussed in the previous chapter.

The distinction made allows for a definition of peace discourse as a form of discourse that is apt to transform a polarised, competitive environment into a less antagonistic and finally co-operative one (Kempf 1999). Although peace discourse still requires extensive research, a significant start has been made through the deconstruction of war culture and war discourse.

War culture produces a form of discourse that creates a distorted view of conflicts and thus stimulates the dynamics of conflict escalation. This distorted view is not just the result of war propaganda. It is due to social psychological processes that take place whenever a person, group or society is involved in conflict (Kempf 2000). The establishment of an 'our rights and our benefit' logic culminates in a discourse that designates, validates, and justifies violence as the only possible route to conflict resolution. Comparative studies on Gulf War discourse and on the coverage of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kempf, 1999; Kempf and Reimann, 2000) have demonstrated that this form of discourse is the dominant form of war reporting in mainstream media.

In order to get people entangled, propaganda exploits the psychological processes described above, by offering polarised identification suggestions; by providing a motivation logic which designates warfare as a wall against destruction and/or as a bridge into a brighter future; and by the inter-weaving of day-to-day events (like heroic stories and stories of atrocity) with antagonistic interpretations of the conflict context, that the roots of the conflict, why it was unavoidable, what is being defended and why the enemy attacked (Luostarinen 2000b). The following table captures Kempf (1999) and Luostarinen's (2000) findings succinctly:

¹¹ Operation Restore Hope : President George Bush ordered 30,000 troops, munitions and armoured vehicles to subdue the warring factions of Somali society in a bid to restore hope (<http://cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-020.html>).

Table 1 - Features of Common Media Discourses in Conflict and Resolution

	War Discourse	Peace Discourse
Main Questions	Who is the aggressor? How can he be stopped?	What are the issues? How can they be transformed?
Identification Suggestions	<i>Polarized</i> - Humanizes our political and military leaders & dehumanises their political and military leaders - Humanizes our soldiers & dehumanises their soldiers - Humanizes our victims & disregards or dehumanises their victims. - Humanizes our civil population for its loyalty and sacrifice & disregards or dehumanises their civil population for its nationalism. - Humanizes their anti-war opposition & disregards or dehumanises our anti-war opposition.	<i>All-sided</i> - Keeps aloof from identification with political and military leaders on any side. - Keeps aloof from identification with military personnel on any side - Humanizes or at least respects victims of the war on any side. - Humanizes or at least respects members of the civil society and keeps aloof from identification with supporters of the war on any side. - Humanizes or at least respects those who strive for a peaceful conflict resolution on any side
Truth Orientation	Truth is only raw material & Referential levels are harmonized - Tells stories about our heroism their atrocities. - Explains the conflict context as an irresolvable antagonism. - Tells stories about the roots of antagonism and our victories - Bases our values on political, historical or ethnic myths.	Follows unconditional standards of truth & makes contradictions visible - Tells also stories about their suffering and our evils. - Explores possibilities for transformation of the conflict. - Tells stories about successful cooperation and the overcoming of antagonism. - Deconstructs mythical interpretations and searches for common values.
Motivation Logic	Designates warfare as a wall against destruction and/or as a bridge into a brighter future.	Points at the price of victory , on the damage to culture, economy and social relations etc. and explores the perspectives for peace and reconciliation.
Conflict coverage	Escalation-oriented with respect to - Conceptualisation of the conflict. - Evaluation of rights and goals. - Evaluation of actions. - Emotional involvement.	De-escalation-oriented with respect to - Conceptualisation of the conflict. - Evaluation of rights and goals. - Evaluation of actions. - Emotional involvement.

Shinar (2000: 93) points to simplification as a tool often used in the framing of peace in the dominant paradigm, war discourse. War discourse divides the world into us and them, producing polarised identification suggestions that humanise concepts of our political and military leaders, our soldiers, and our civilians for their loyalty and sacrifice. Similarly, war discourse dehumanises the projected enemy, their leaders, their civilians and their soldiers as collateral casualties, for nationalist reasons. Even third parties, like South Africa in this case, who try to stay neutral or to mediate in the conflict, are rejected or projected as lacking in one way or the other.

Peace discourse needs to deconstruct this simplifying ideology by following unconditional standards of truth and making contradictions visible. Peace discourse will also tell stories about their suffering and about our evils, it will explore possibilities for transformation of the conflict, it will tell stories about successful co-operation and the overcoming of antagonism, it will deconstruct myths and emphasise common values (Kempf 1999).

Peace discourse needs to deconstruct this polarity by keeping aloof from identification with political and military leaders, and from military personnel and supporters of the war on any side. It may reconstruct the relation between the warring societies by all-sided humanising or at least respecting of victims, members of the civil society and those who strive for a peaceful transformation of the conflict.

While war discourse produces a motivation logic that supports society members willingness to fight, peace discourse needs to deconstruct this motivation logic by pointing to the price of victory, the damage to culture, economy and social relations. Peace discourse needs to deconstruct distortions of conflict perception as well.

2.4 Construction of News Texts on Peace

Various scholars have adopted the view that because of the termination of the Cold War, war discourse has become a dominant discourse in Western culture (Kempf 1999). Luostarinen (2000) argues that decades of living under supposed communist and nuclear threat (for example, the arms race and construction of war-like ideologies) has resulted in a war logic that permeates even the simplest social reality, domestically and internationally.

Consequently, Luostarinen and Ottosen (2000) posit that media and national defence institutions have become integrated in a way that compromised editorial and journalistic independence. According to Whitefield (1996), the boundaries between peace and war became blurred in the process, giving rise to a militarised logic, with everything from hard news to even the most seemingly innocent forms of entertainment being ideologically skewed.

2.4.1 Framing Peace in the Discourse of War versus Direct Peace Frames

Hall et al. (1978) posit that framing creates privileged meanings through selection, emphasis, presentation and exclusion. Gitlin (1980) argues that frames are composed of tacit theories about what exists, what happens and, ultimately, what matters. In other words, frames routinely organise discourse, whether verbal or visual (Gitlin 1980: 6-7). Gamson (1988) notes that due to the Cold War, peace talk was subordinated to the rhetoric of power, with the result that war terminology was used in the coverage of peace issues.

Shinar (2000) highlights the framing of peace in the discourse of war as a dominant technique. He further notes that it resorts to a violent terminology employing several tools: *symbolic clichés* as in Congo peace talks on ice (*Sunday Times* 27/06/1999), *direct quotes of leaders*, especially military leaders, and, *signed copy* and/or editorials speaking of peace in terms of the progression of conflict (p. 85-86).

As can be expected, the direct framing of peace enjoys lower status in times of war in societies that are involved in one way or the other (Shinar 2000).

The discourse of trivialisation is a direct result of information black-out (Shinar 2000: 86). Shinar (2000) further notes that in the absence of a peace discourse that satisfies dominant news values, minor issues and personalities are upgraded to newsworthiness. This is where matters such as attire, narration of diplomatic incidents (p. 86) and meals shared take precedence as news, over issues surrounding the proposed peace. In other words, there is an element of glamorisation and of a momentary divorce from the objectives and issues behind the proceedings.

Shinar's (2000) work goes on to reveal that the tone adopted by a newspaper is equally important. A jovial tone of triviality has the effect of reducing the importance of the issues at hand and, depending on the angle taken, the actors involved.

Due to the limitations of the newspaper medium, rituals and ceremonies are preferred to narratives of non-ending items. According to Shinar (2000) peace-making negotiations feature ritual elements that mainstream media readily adopt. Dayan and Katz (1992) indicate that these ceremonies qualify as media events. The discourse of ritualisation centres itself on repetition, symbols and symbolic language, symbolic

transition (Shinar 2000: 86) and a time dimension that describes the duration of the conflict, negotiations and sessions.

Another news value featured in the discourse of ritualisation takes on two forms as personalisation. First, it prefers the listing of personalities as opposed to expounding on abstract ideologies (for example, Zionism, nationalism and the like.). Secondly, it adopts a discourse of familiarity in seeking to regularise personalities and empathise in especially tragic circumstances, as is so often the case in war. Personalisation is perhaps the most frequently used value in both ritualisation and trivialisation (Shinar 2000).

Like ritual in general, simplification is structured by well-defined links between symbolic units (Turner 1986), thus effectively helping to order relations between actors and issues at stake and thereby simplifying reality and change.

2.4.2 Reporting: Media Events versus Processes

Journalists often prefer reporting events to processes (Schudson 2000). Dayan and Katz (1992) point out that this is not at all surprising since such events intervene in the normal flow of broadcasting and daily routines. Shinar (2000: 89) adds that the events receive intense, repetitive and performative coverage, resulting in personalised, simplified and sensationalised news coverage. He argues that while peace is a process, the resulting coverage is event-oriented, and therefore pivotal moments are preferred while is occluded the preceding process. Hence, this study's focal choice of peace summits as opposed to evaluation of the entire peace process.

When a ritual is televised an anthropological artefact, a ritual hybrid is thus born (Dayan and Katz 1987: 174). The media event is altogether another experience involving a new form of spectatorship (Dayan and Katz 1987: 194). Analysing the representation of women in bullfighting, Pink expresses the difference between live and media events thus: the structure and organisation of televised [meetings] deviate from the live performance and involve new characters and new discourses and the live performance and [fighter] are fragmented and reconstituted in the [media peace meeting] (Pink 1997: 131).

2.5 Conclusion

The concepts examined above provide a useful theoretical foundation for the analysis of news articles on peace. Such analysis will necessarily be complex requiring suitable methodological combinations. Hall (1997) and Hansen (1998) suggest qualitative methods to achieve latent and therefore contextualised meaning from the texts under review. These methods take borrow traditions of literary analysis.

In the following chapter, I examine the theories supporting the selected methods for this study, namely quantitative content analysis and qualitative content analysis. I first use quantitative content analysis with which I empirically trace apparent trends or patterns, and demonstrate a systematic approach to content that will explain how I came to qualify peace summits as my units of analysis from the numerous articles on the DRC conflict in the *Sunday Times* and the South African press in general. Secondly, I will use qualitative content analysis to glean cultural and ideological meaning from the resulting 26 articles.

Chapter Three

Research Methods

3.0 Introduction

Researchers often resort to content analysis as the ideal method that offers them the better of two worlds. It functions quantitatively, as in the manner of a survey, and again qualitatively in textual analysis. As McQuail (2000) points out, textual analytic methods range from simple classifications of types of content for organisational or descriptive purposes to deeply interpretative inquiries into specific examples of content with the aim of uncovering subtle and hidden meanings in the texts.

This study will analyse the political content in the *Sunday Times* newspaper during a period in which South African foreign policy was aimed at restoring peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The pivotal question will be: how was peace and the peace process framed, and in whose terms? I will infer, from the resulting representations, the ideology of the day following Thompson's (1984) assertions that the language of everyday life is the locus of ideology, and the location of meaning which sustains relations of domination. Quantitative and qualitative research techniques are used in the selection and analysis stages of this study. This chapter outlines and qualifies each technique.

3.1 Quantitative Content Analysis

Berelson (1952), quoted in McQuail (2000: 325), defines content analysis as a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. This technique according to Berelson's definition is the traditional method of choice in analysing media texts and is said to be the earliest and most central (McQuail 2000). Used to characterise and compare documents and the content of popular magazines, books, newspapers and the like, it has become popular in cultural studies and mass communications research (Manning & Cullum-Swan 1991). Although definitions vary, all convey the notion that content analysis is a rigorous process with a definite structure to it.

Content analysis relies on two basic assumptions. The first is that the link between the in-text reference and the object of reference is clear thus making interpretation straightforward. The second is, that the repetition of selected codes justifiably expresses/reflects the predominant and intended meaning of the text (McQuail 2000).

Understanding the purposes of content analysis is crucial in assessing its appropriateness for the task at hand. Deacon et al. (1999) and McQuail (2000) assert that content analysis assists the researcher in the following: disclosure of international differences in communication content; comparison of media levels of communication; identifying the intentions and other characteristics of the communicator; detecting existence of propaganda; reflecting the cultural patterns of groups, institutions or societies; revealing the focus of individuals, groups, and institutional or societal attention; auditing communication content against objectives; and in describing trends in communication content. These are essential components, given the political, cultural and economic scope of this study.

Weighed against other data-generating techniques, content analysis has several advantages and distinct characteristics that render it ideal for the study of media texts. To begin with, according to Brewer and Hunter (1989) content analysis methodology accommodates and combines qualitative and quantitative operations on text. Text is excellent for the study of long-term changes in attitudes, concerns and styles (Babbie 1992). Next, communication as a central aspect of social interaction requires content analytic procedures that operate directly on text (Berg 1998). Furthermore, the beauty of content analysis also lies in its acceptance of unstructured material and that it allows, in conjunction with other reliable data, the use of culture indicators to assess statistically the relationships between economic, social, political and cultural change (Wimmer and Dominick 1987). All in all, Webb et al. (1981) and Berg (1998) proclaim it to be unobtrusive.

Basic Sequence and Development

There is a sequence that a researcher must adhere to when carrying out content analysis. Table 2 below illustrates the required sequence and its application to this study:

Table 2 - Content Analytic Sequence, Development and Application

Sequence and Development	Application
1. Formulate the research question, theory and hypotheses.	What is the overall representation of the peace process in the <i>Sunday Times</i> ?
2. Select a universe or sample of content; a population and define categories.	The <i>Sunday Times</i> . Categories/search codes include end, accord, peace, summit, talks, and unity.
3. Select a unit of analysis; that which will be the focal point. Here are various types of units: physical units e.g. articles; syntactical units e.g. symbols, words, metaphors; referential units e.g. what the text is about: positive and negative accounts of peace; prepositional units e.g. positions taken by actors and authors; and thematic units e.g. focal topics like the use of hegemonic themes.	News articles referencing the peace initiatives in their headlines or body text.
4. Match content to the sample by counting the frequency of coded variables.	(see Quantitative Findings in chapter 4).
5. Express the results as an overall distribution of the complete universe or sample as objectively as possible (Deacon et al. 1999; McQuail 2000; Wimmer and Dominick 1987).	(see discussion on Patterns and Trends in chapter 4).

Wimmer and Dominick (1987) also indicate that for legitimate inferences to be drawn from texts, it is important that the classification procedure used produce accurate data. In other words, different people should code the same text in the same manner.

In this study, the focus is on the message produced, and the objective is to find links between the message and other parts of the environment. For such studies, content analysis is a tool to be used in conjunction with other qualitative techniques.

Handicaps

While the potential benefits of using content analysis in media research seem extensive, it is not without weaknesses. First and foremost, this method is susceptible to the biases of the researcher, which can affect the decisions made in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data. For example, the very construction of categories before applying the method means that the researcher already has preconceived notions of what is [and what is not] important (McQuail 2000). The result is a category system that reflects the researcher's reality, with a set of results that do likewise and thus affect the study's contribution to knowledge.

Secondly, as Berg (1998) points out, content analyses are constrained in their potential in that they often are limited to reporting specific elements in

communications. Such exploratory approaches make it difficult to consider theoretical perspectives given the categorical nature of data yielded. Although the data are rich in descriptive, classificatory and identification powers, they are less sensitive to subtleties.

Third, given that media texts are social constructs resulting from particular values, framing and the re-presentation (Schudson 2000) of facts, it follows that in analysis one may be creating a new text which may diverge from the meaning in the original text (McQuail 2000: 327). Hence the importance in relating analysis back to the social context.

Fourth, should the researcher choose to employ coders, interpretations will differ despite training to make reliable judgements about categories and meanings (McQuail 2000: 327), rendering internal relationships within texts neglected. Without textual analysis, content analysis is fragmented and relates very little to the cultural context within which the text is produced (McQuail 2000).

Despite its being a popular research tool it tends to ignore both internal and external influences on content. Tuchman (1978) maintains that the drawback of content analysis lies in its implied stance that the media are mere reflectors and presenters of reality, and not constructors of particular realities.

According to McQuail (2000: 327-328) there are other analyses of texts that devote attention to latent rather than to manifest content, and latent meaning is regarded as actually more essential; they transcend surface meanings and quantification. Qualitative textual analysis is one such method. For this reason, quantitative content analysis was used as a precursor to establish a sample size, units of analysis and a population. The rest of this study employed qualitative methods of analysis of news articles to explore the role of themes and particular frames in constructing a peace discourse in the *Sunday Times* newspaper. Such analyses include attention to the placement of texts, the themes and issues emphasised, and the representations of key actors/participants.

Combining Quantitative and Qualitative: why?

The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is, although seemingly contradictory, ideal for this study. Case studies provide one of the chief arenas in which qualitative research can be combined (Bryman 1995: 175) with other quantitative methods.

Kempf (1994) argues that the terms qualitative and quantitative analyses do not refer to radically different approaches. According to him, they deal with the same methodological problems and each of them has its specific advantages and disadvantages. Using a Nicaraguan study on U.S. propaganda and psychological warfare during the Contra War, he contends that the most crucial advantage of the qualitative approach was to provide the opportunity for a detailed exploration of the dynamics of the transfer processes by which the latent content of a communication determines the perception of its topic.

For simple pragmatic reasons (such as the immense amount of work that is necessary to perform this kind of analysis), qualitative analysis will often remain exemplary, requiring the quantitative to narrow focus and offer generalisability (Wimmer and Dominick 1987). As Bryman (1995) notes, a comprehensive and representative picture of the climate of opinion produced by the media is possible using quantitative methods.

Bryman (1995) goes on to argue that the combination of the two offers additional advantages. The first is the ability to check the validity of findings using a different method (Bryman 1995): in the case of this study, the patterns of representation of key actors and frames of key issues derived from the quantitative methods are checked against those derived from subsequent thematic analysis.

Furthermore, in line with this study, the use of quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis in conjunction often allows for access to different levels of reality (Bryman

1995). In fact, Bryman argues for the very utility of employing quantitative and qualitative methods at different stages of the research process.

The overriding factor in the reconstruction of communication which cannot be covered by mere quantitative analysis is the identification of its latent content. This involves the reconstruction of those psychodramas which are deployed (or at least suggested) by the communication.

3.2 Qualitative Content Analysis: Textual Analysis

According to Gill (2000) there is, strictly speaking, no single discourse analysis. Rather, there are different styles of analysis that resort under the same label. What binds these perspectives is a rejection of the quantitative assumption that texts exist outside of their social contexts (be they internal or external) and that they are not constructs of those contexts. In other words, common amongst qualitative analysts, is the notion that texts (including media texts) are the product of particular social realities.

Emphasis on the social context of media texts enables the media critic to expose the assumption that ideological messages appear in isolated speech. Kaplan (1990: 202) and McQuail (2000: 328) concur that texts are multidimensional and layered, like a sheet of thick plywood consisting of many thin sheets lying at different angles to each other, each requiring separate elucidation.

In exploring themes and participation in the articles, it is crucial to note that qualitative techniques treat language as a type of social practice used for representation and signification. Kress (1990: 86) contends that texts are produced by socially situated speakers and writers. The relations of participants in producing texts are not always equal. Some count more than others (McQuail 2000 and Schudson 2000). Meanings are formulated from the interaction between encoders, texts and decoders. By the same token, linguistic features come about as a result of social processes which, many agree, are never arbitrary. In most interactions, users of language bring with them different concepts and understandings of language and the

world, which are closely related to social positioning. Hence history must also be taken into account, as ideologically and politically inflected time (Kress 1990: 86).

Ideology plays a pivotal role in qualitative analysis. Kress (1990: 85) explains that any linguistic form considered in isolation has no specifically determinate meaning, nor does it possess any ideological significance or function. Consequently, the defined and delimited sets of statements that constitute a discourse are themselves expressive of and organised by a specific ideology. Language, can never appear by itself - it always appears as the representative of a system of linguistic terms, which themselves realise discursive and ideological systems (Kress 1990: 87).

Content analytical studies usually do not only deal with just one aspect or theme to be found in the analysed material. Kempf & Reimann (1994), for instance, investigated two such themes: first, the focusing on and substantiation of reproaches against the war parties, and secondly, the featuring of worthy and unworthy victims.

Deacon et al. (1999) identify several interrelated concepts which are significant in unravelling the rhetoric of news discourse. Pertinent to the aims of this study are the following: *Thematic structure*, which is a preoccupying concept which runs throughout a media text, surrounding an initiating topic. It provides the reader with an overall sense of organisation, hierarchy and relations between different units of the text, that is, sentences and paragraphs. *Discourse schemata*: This involves the grouping of information into ordered categories and units of meaning. In the case of news, this encompasses patterned movement from headlines and lead paragraphs to statements and commentary from actors, which are ranked in implicit order of priority. *Source quality and quantity*: The manner in which sources and discourses are referenced and given rank in terms of the degree of assurance, qualification and emphasis of phrasing and tone. *Framing procedures*: This refers to the examination of the way certain sources are used to undermine or discredit actors with divergent interests to those given prominence.

These four concepts set up textual analysis as a method which seeks to display the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language and which are beyond

those who accept discourse as natural. This perspective makes qualitative analysis ideal for investigating the discourse on peace in the *Sunday Times* newspaper.

3.3 Measurement

Priest (1996) posits that a good qualitative content study requires more than just description. A good qualitative study of content requires an open-minded researcher, a specific research question and a systematic way of looking at whatever content is chosen (Priest 1996). To this end, quantitative methods were employed.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, South Africa is to DRC what America is to the Middle-East and the third world: a socio-political hegemon. Compared to the rest of the continent it is infrastructurally, economically and politically as stable as America is compared to the rest of the world. Furthermore, with the US engaging all her efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo and further burdened by her self-imposed policing responsibilities,¹² South Africa seized the opportunity to establish her strength and influence continentally in the DRC conflict (www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/discussion/foreign.html).

South African coverage of the DRC peace process spans several years. The conflict pre-dates August 1998 and is greatly influenced by events dating as far back as the Leopoldian era. According to the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response,¹³ there have been several major peace initiatives after the second Congo war (Reyntjens 1999: 241), between August 1998 and January 2001, from which a resolution seemed eminent.

A general search of South African publications revealed the *Sunday Times* to have published the most articles on the Congolese conflict during August 1998 to January 2001, establishing it as the ideal paper to review. The search further revealed more than 100 stories on the peace process in the South African press during that time. 54 articles addressing the peace process in either the headline or within the article were

¹² It is broadly argued that since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the US as the victor in the fight against communism has now become the sole policer of the international community and has set about trying to establish herself the ultimate hegemon.

¹³ The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response is a foundation piloting projects in Central Africa managed by non-governmental organizations.

found in the *Sunday Times* alone, thus setting the newspaper apart as having the most regular coverage of the peace process in South Africa. It is also noteworthy that the paper has the largest weekly circulation and regularly contains extensive coverage of African affairs, via an African politics supplement. The following table shows the breakdown:

Table 3 - DRC Peace Coverage Across South African Press Landscape

Name of Publication	Number of Articles
Business Day	13
Sowetan	5
Financial Mail	29
Time	10
Sunday Times	54
Sunday Star	8
Beeld	2
Die Burger	3
City Press	5
Mail and Guardian	41

A closer reading of the 54 articles in the *Sunday Times* probe revealed that much of the coverage of the peace process revolved around the peace summits. Thus the summits were selected as the populations and news articles as the units of analysis. Supporting this decision for two reasons is Shinar (2000: 89). First, he explains that media coverage relating to the ending of long conflicts enjoys high news value and receives significant media coverage. Second, the summits are the key organising moments in the peace process. As such, 26 articles published by the *Sunday Times* on the peace summits will be analysed. These are articles that fall into two main sections of the newspaper, namely, *Africa* (the African current affairs pull out) and *News* (the front page of the newspaper).

A preliminary probe also revealed that the news articles on the summits followed particular patterns. Technically, they focused on the negotiations, reported peace in terms of the progression of the conflict, or highlighted the gains and losses of the peace process in terms of particular personalities. Thematically, four broad areas argued by conflict resolution scholars to be the main themes in such process were also found: *Economic Agendas*, *Conflict Intervention*, *Demilitarisation and Peacebuilding*, and *Disarmament*. Furthermore, these articles are analysed within the context of three distinct genres: news, editorials, and features.

Hansen (1998) highlights the efficacy of content analysis in quantifying specified characteristics or dimensions of texts. Such insights are crucial to understanding the representations of such texts and their wider social significance. However, the inferences that are derived from such indications depend entirely on the context and framework of interpretation by which the texts analysed are circumscribed (Hansen 1998; McQuail 2000). Therefore, the textual analysis techniques referred to above are essential to the capturing of meanings, emphasis and to the understanding of the organisation and processes of meaning production and presentation. This study applies Glaser and Strauss's (1967) methodology of assessing the role of frames, themes and discourse insofar as these shaped *Sunday Times* representation of the peace process.

3.4 Conclusion

In most critical studies of the media, analysis does not go beyond impressionistic readings of news, or practically relevant but under-theorised stories about well-known cases of bias (Manoff & Schudson, 1987). Van Dijk (1991) argues that consequently, there is a lack of detailed analysis of individual news stories, despite the relevance of such work.

The construction of 26 articles has been analysed. In the following analysis chapter, the qualitative examination of these articles relies on the concepts explored above; it is located in the theoretical assumptions previously outlined in Chapter 2, and is informed by the textual techniques already discussed.

Chapter Four

Analysis — *Sunday Times* Articles

4.0 Introduction/Overview

In the preceding chapters, a foundation was laid. These chapters outlined the historical and political context in which and from which the current conflict in the DRC was born, and then set out the theoretical assumptions/understandings from which the following analysis comes.

To reiterate, this study explores the particular representational and ideological significance of peace dialogue, as commonly depicted in the press, namely in the *Sunday Times* newspaper. Special attention is paid to four common themes as espoused by scholars (Nathan 1995-1998; Lamb 2000; Odendaal 1998 & 2000) of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town. Supplementing the thematic discussion is a linguistic exploration of lexical sets or terms (words for describing for example, terrorist versus freedom fighter) and agency (who is responsible for x), both of which are excellent indicators of societal representations and understandings and of how power relations are organised, thereby revealing the prevailing ideology of the state. Lexical sets or terms often also involve questions of denotation and connotation.

4.1 Quantitative Findings and Trends/Patterns

As noted in Chapter 1, a preliminary probe revealed an inclination to report peace in terms of the progress of the conflict, along with a tendency to highlight the gains and losses of the peace process. The result is that there is an overwhelming use of negative or, in Kempf's (1999) usage, escalation-oriented vocabulary and therefore coverage. Shinar (2000) concurs with this assertion, maintaining that peace summits or events are commonly reported in terms of failed or rejected talks, in line with common journalistic practice that prefers the negative to the positive.

In the table below is a sample of terms used in the *Sunday Times* articles categorised according to their positive and negative connotations, and to the frequency with which

they occurred throughout. Clearly they support this study's hypothesis and give credence to its endorsement of alternative models for reporting peace.

Table 4 - Use of Positive vs. Negative Discourse

Positive Vocabulary in Discourse	Negative Vocabulary in Discourse
agreement, accord, reconciliation, amity, amitor, order, concord, serenity, repose, calmness, contentment, peacefulness, harmony, quiet, silence, agree, calm, warm, heat, ceasefire, reconstruct, construct, peace-maker, peace-builder, peace-keeper, build, unity, talks, end of war, progress, tranquil, break-through	ice, cold, uproar, reject, resume, revive, troops, war, chaos, pandemonium, upheaval, tumult, din, turbulence, renewed fighting, bombing, set-back, battle, discord, hostility, argument, antagonism, strife, friction, disharmony, disunity, battle, struggle, fight, skirmish, collision, collide, strife, contention, contest, oppose, clash, differ, contradict, disagree, dispute, contest, combat, interfere, force
44.7%	55.3%

4.2 Thematic Analyses

4.2.1 Theme 1: Economic Agenda

A common aspect of many wars has been conflict over access to scarce resources, such as minerals, food, land and trade routes. In the case of the Congo, it has become a matter of access to diamonds. While not explicitly mentioned, it is implicitly alluded to across the sample in the mention of rebel vs. government positions and intense areas of conflict. The eastern Kivu region, or according to **South Africa must stay the peaceful course** (6/9/1998), the east where they would engage Rwandan and Ugandan regulars, is the site of some of the most intense fighting for political strategic reasons and for financial reasons. The valuable resources that are being used to finance the war (by both rebel and government), to purchase arms, ammunition and military assistance. It has been alleged that where economic privileges and assets have been acquired in an armed conflict, either from control of the state or secured through illegal means, parties to the conflict tend to acquire vested interests in prolonging the conflict, especially in those valued areas.

Humanitarian aid also falls under the finance category. Here the argument is proposed that because of continual donor funding, conflict has been sustained through the reinforcement of inequalities. The question of in whose hand donor funds deposited is a potentially dangerous one that renders the recipient party powerful thus turning what is humanitarian into a weapon. Given the fact that in 2000 there was still no resolution, moreover, no adherence to a resolution, I argue that the distribution

of aid may have in fact sustained the conflict and reinforced inequalities in effect trivialising funding efforts of R20 million to pay for efforts to find a solution to the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict (**Fun for DRC peace talk** - 1/8/1998).

There is also the issue of consumerism campaigns, that in the Congolese context involve high profile campaigns often targeted at the diamond consortiums that are used to finance faction activities. This generally gives rise to illogical behaviour in the name of maintaining mining concessions, as in the case of Zimbabwe. In **Thabo stays home as Congo bid flops**, Robert Mugabe's actions are depicted as those of a small child who can't get his way. For Mugabe, to have peace according to the Lusaka agreement is to pull out Zimbabwean forces and likewise relinquish the mining concessions that Laurent Kabila awarded him for his assistance. Thus the *Sunday Times* construction of Mugabe's refusal to withdraw has rendered him repeatedly trivialised and his reasoning simplified (refer to Chapter 2).

The conditions for intervention are predetermined by the economic potential prospects. For instance when Kabila requests assistance from South Africa, the focal point of the discussion on peace appears to centre on future economic prospects, cessation of fighting and withdrawal of troops. In fact South Africa's role is referred to in economic and infrastructural terms: South Africa would head a technical team to establish infrastructure ahead of the deployment of a UN peace force (**Help us end this war** 28/1/2001). This preferred focus ignores a seemingly obvious fact: it is scarcely conceivable that developed countries would be plunged into civil war because of a crop failure. Therefore in developed countries policies that discriminate against ethnic minorities may generate heated protests but they are unlikely to result in an armed rebellion, as they might in a state that is as weak or authoritarian as the DRC.

Lastly, there is the issue of treaty and sanctions violations. **Bombing claims shatter Congo peace prospects** (8/8/1999) provides a useful example of treaty violation that so commonly characterises conflict resolution in Africa. The sanctions have been consistently and systematically violated - Congolese president, one of the main signatories to the accord, stands accused of staging a new air offensive against rebel positions (8/8/1999). On analysis, it becomes evident that these instruments could be

more effective if the financial assets of the leadership or rebel groups were targeted. Furthermore, if monitoring were improved, multilateral agreements were drawn, and more resources were made available to enhance the implementation of sanctions regimes.

As noted earlier, the South African government, like other African governments embroiled in the conflict, has an economic interest in the Congo. However, there is a distinct difference in the way in which the *Sunday Times* chooses to portray South Africa's interests in relation to the similar interests of other countries such as Zimbabwe. For example, Mugabe and Zimbabwe are portrayed as promoting confusion and obstructive in his efforts to retain his mining concessions.

To add to the confusion, Kabila's travelled to Harare for talks with his main backer, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe [Kabila] refused to budge Mugabe was adamant he would not travel to Lusaka. (**Thabo stays home as Congo bid flops** 27/6/1999)

He (Mugabe) was very early on in the conflict, editorially (**South Africa must stay the peaceful course** 6/9/1998) associated with impressionistic shards of information, utter codswallop and mop up operations. The *Sunday Times* adopts a sympathetic tone to South Africa's lethargic response; a tone that crescendoes into the attribution of virtual glory and maturity (6/9/1998), leaving Mugabe as the immature one who steals centre [stage] with a plan to get the warring parties together from under South Africa's nose; but of course South Africans are not impressed by Mugabe's impressionistic shards of information (6/9/1998). The anti-Mugabe ideological position can be argued to stem from the hegemonic tensions between South Africa and Zimbabwe, within the context of SADC's OPDS discussed in Chapter 1.

4.2.2 Theme 2: Conflict Intervention

Conflict intervention is perhaps the most prevalent of the four themes. Muller (2000) observes that peace processes are a result of a variety of instruments used in foreign policy, for example, diplomacy, economics, and military intervention. Such instruments, he adds, are extensively employed in the course of peace processes. The common denominator is that they are interventionist. For this study, intervention is broken down into four broad categories: the focus of intervention, the timing of intervention, the type of intervention, and the form of intervention.

Focus of intervention

Throughout the texts there appears to be less emphasis on the structural causes of the violence and more interest in the violence itself. The headlines alone (for example **Prerequisites for peace** - 20/6/1999 and **SADC in third attempt to end region s wars** - 15/8/1999) are indicative of content that focuses on what do with the violence rather than the pivotal question of how the violence came about; a mere update of events if you will. In fact the very scarcity of feature or in-depth analyses bears testament to the *Sunday Times* preference for updates as opposed to analytically educational and informative content. Thus, there is little sense in down-playing structural causes in favour of emphasising the proximate attempts at diffusing violence. So doing results in a model geared more towards crisis reaction than to crisis prevention or resolution. The issue of the status of the Banyemulenge and the Banyarwanda must be addressed and addressed in an amicable way. With the propagandist hate-language that has been perpetuated since the 1994 Rwandan debacle and exacerbated in the Congo, merely withdrawing forces from Congolese soil will not lead to peace and stability. It is necessary to distinguish between the symptoms and causes of crisis.

Through peace operations, emergency relief and on-going humanitarian aid, the international community devotes substantial resources (**Fun for DRC peace talk** 1/8/1998) and energy to various symptoms of intra-state crises, especially when a crisis reaches the catastrophic proportions of civil war, genocide or mass starvation. Such responses are noble and serve to mitigate human suffering. However, symptoms will persist for as long as the underlying causes prevail. In fact Nathan (2001) stresses that where a particular problem is misdiagnosed in terms of the distinction between causes and symptoms, strategic interventions may be misdirected.

By way of illustration, many local and foreign organisations attach a high priority to demilitarisation and disarmament in Africa, on the grounds that weapons flows and other forms of militarisation promote a culture of violence, divert resources from development, and hence perpetuate and deepen conflict and insecurity. The basic thesis, propagated by a range of United Nations agencies, is that there is a positive relationship between disarmament, development and security. However, there is an

oversight in this prognosis. Demilitarisation campaigns are least likely to succeed where the problem is greatest, namely in situations that give rise to a security vacuum which state and non-state actors compete to fill through violence as a way of maintaining power, challenging power, self-protection or economic sustenance. Demilitarisation is therefore contingent on filling that vacuum by legitimate political means and with legitimate political institutions. At the most fundamental level it requires democratic and effective governance, both of which are foreign to Congo/Zaire.

For example, the demilitarisation of the South African state flowed from the ideological demise of the Cold War and the mollifying of adversarial intra-state relations. It was then accelerated dramatically with the advent of democracy. The point here is that there is a fundamental change in the mindset of the post-apartheid South African that has been largely facilitated by laws and regulations that have addressed or focused on the root cause of conflict: white supremacy.

Timing of intervention

Intra-state crises cannot be resolved quickly and easily. Civil war and genocide are social phenomena whose multiplicity, range and complexity of causes, dynamics and contested issues preclude prevention at short notice. The challenge is immeasurably greater where, as in most national crises, there is a plethora of foreign and domestic parties with different needs, values and perspectives on a variety of issues. The situation is further complicated by the conduct of neighbouring states - The bloody 35-month war has sucked in six African states, fighting on different sides (**Summit to revive Congo Peace** 13/8/2000) - who exacerbate the conflict. The larger the number of parties, the more difficult it is to reach a settlement.

A crisis does not end with the cessation of warfare. Here I refer to what has come to be known as the CNN effect. This refers to the international or mediating community's quick exit to the next crisis following the signing of an agreement. Such a conclusion to the DRC crisis seems unlikely, however: South Africa, with her economic aspirations in the Congo along with ambitions to plant herself firmly in the big-brother role, may very well not be hasty in her departure, if she leaves at all. At the very least, she will remain to counter Zimbabwe's influence in their quasi-Cold

War. Just as a state of crisis precedes the outbreak of violence, so the crisis does not end with the conclusion of a peace agreement.

Type of intervention

The articles discuss peace and, intervention in the name of peace in terms of what options are available. Clearly, the *Sunday Times* and the South African government view issues of governance as inconceivable unless there is a cessation of war. The peace timetable in **SA Troops face threat from rebel groups. Agreement spells out duties of Congo peacekeepers** (11/7/1999) expresses it thus:

DAY TWO: cessation of all hostilities
THREE MONTHS: conclusion of national dialogue and establishment of new institutions of government.
THREE TO NINE MONTHS: re-establishment of state administration.

Form of intervention

While conflict resolution scholars call on local rather than foreign actors in peacemaking and peacebuilding, the articles point to an intense effort by international/foreign actors to bring about peace in Congo. For example, the South African, French and SADC initiatives are quite pointedly articulated in **SA to take over DRC's peace drive - 7/1/2000**, **SA delegation talks peace in Congo - 19/3/2000**, **SADC prepares to calm Congo - 5/3/2000**, and **Kabila Scuttles Congo Summit, humiliating the French - 13/12/1998**. Contrary to what politicians may claim, foreign intervention does not alleviate the conflict, it merely stalls it for a even more complex return. The involvement of regional forces in solving the Mobutu problem has resulted in the DRC conflict as we know it today; more complicated than it was before. Continued foreign intervention in the name of restoration of order without involving local groups and the Congolese nation as a whole will only perpetuate an already mangled situation.

International actors should practice what they preach before taking a lead in the peace process. This places South Africa in a position where her attempts at restoring peace are shunned by parties to the conflict: at the meeting were leaders from Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, Uganda and Rwanda. South Africa was not invited (**Congo talks draw a blank - 8/9/1998**). Her alleged sale of arms to the Congo and other countries embroiled in conflict appears to have blown her holier-than-thou image. Furthermore, her economic aspirations, unlike the other countries, were somewhat veiled causing her to be perceived as conniving to say the least. Foreign powers that

promote democratic norms in Africa are obliged to adhere to these norms. When they undermine the norms, and incur resentment and resistance from leadership and communities, when they operate without any accountability and transparency. Through their conduct, South Africa and the other countries, appear to regard Congolese as objects rather than actors.

Peacebuilding strategies are the only viable means of preventing and resolving a crisis. Although relatively new and undefined in conflict resolution circles, peacebuilding has received wide recognition in past years. Coined by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995), peacebuilding functions to identify potential crises and uses requisite strategies that tackle the root causes of violence. These strategies are similar to those employed by South Africa in her transition to a multi-part state. They include respect for human rights and political pluralism, accommodation of ethnic and cultural diversity, strengthening or modifying the capacities of state institutions, and promotion of economic growth and equity (Odendaal 1998). These measures are imperatives in preventing war and are likewise essential in preventing the recurrence of war, in the DRC or in any country for that matter. South Africa having been a success story in many respects by applying these measures, is perhaps best suited to recommend and oversee a similar model tailored for the Congolese case. However, South Africa must not make the same mistake that the international community has made repeatedly. She must not assume the Congolese situation to be identical to her own and therefore in need of the same remedy she did. Each case is unique.

4.2.3 Theme 3: Demilitarisation and Peacebuilding

Boutros-Ghali (1995) defines peacebuilding as a move to identify and support structures that will strengthen and solidify peace so as to avoid a relapse into conflict. He further stresses that in order for peacebuilding to be successful, comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures, which will consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well being and sustain economic reconstruction should be pursued. This may require both military and civilian involvement. This peacebuilding is encapsulated in the Lusaka Accord that receives considerable mention throughout the *Sunday Times* articles. Reference to the accord is made in terms of violations of the agreement (**Bombing claims shatter Congo peace**

prospects - 8/8/1999) and its rejection (**Another setback for peace in Congo** - 27/6/1999; **Kabila Scuttles Congo Summit, humiliating the French** - 13/12/1998). The number of activities or mechanisms is virtually infinite. These mechanisms amongst others, include: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, monitoring of elections, the protection of human rights, reforming or strengthening government capacity, economic and social reform and reconciliation. Most of which are outlined in the Lusaka Peace Accord and broadly captured in the Peace Timetable in **SA troops face threat from rebel groups. Agreement spells out duties of Congo peacekeepers** - (11/7/1999).

While the origins of demilitarisation, on the other hand, have deep historical roots that date back before World War II (areas free of military occupation and influence) and to the Cold War (it came to refer to the notion of a reduction in the military potential of states, a decrease in the role military institutions played in both national and international affairs), in the post-Cold War era, interest in demilitarisation is flanked by interpretations coming from social and cultural perspectives. This demobilisation and disarming of groups is emphasised in the Lusaka Accord and the Peace Timetable (**SA troops face threat from rebel groups. Agreement spells out duties of Congo peacekeepers** - 11/7/1999) mentioned throughout the articles. Furthermore, although the accord is mentioned in terms of South Africa and Botswana's capacity to monitor, facilitate and assist with infrastructure and national dialogue (**Museveni flies in for Congo talks** - 18/6/2000), it nonetheless outlines systems of support on military, civilian, ideological and administrative governmental levels.

Although peacebuilding and demilitarisation are distinct concepts in their own right, they are interrelated, because they are both concerned with similar issues; they are mutually beneficial. Demilitarisation serves to limit the broad scope of peacebuilding. It is an avenue towards achieving peace where conflict has already occurred.

4.2.4 Theme 4: Disarmament

Since World War Two the United Nations has devoted much attention to the cause of disarmament in pursuit of its mandate to maintain international peace and security.

African countries have endorsed this position through numerous resolutions of the Organisation of African Unity (www.oau.org). They have emphasised that a positive relationship exists between disarmament, development and security, and have declared their commitment to disarmament in general, nuclear disarmament in particular, and the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean.

SADC has similarly resolved to free resources from military to productive development activities. This has not been idle rhetoric. According to the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, as a result of the collapse of the Cold War and the reduced state of conflict in the Southern African region, many of the most militarised Southern African states have lowered their force levels by substantial amounts. For example, between 1991 and 1994 full-time force levels dropped from 54 600 to 46 900 in Zimbabwe; from 58 000 to 30 000 in Mozambique; and from 70 000 (SWAPO guerrillas and South African-controlled troops) to 8 100 in Namibia (Lamb 1997).

Common military logic understands security in terms of the state and its military strength, justifying the maintenance of large armed forces and other forms of militarisation as essential and effective basis for stability. This logic crumbles in most African states as exemplified by **Kabila Scuttles Congo Summit, humiliating the French** (13/12/1998) whereby Laurent Kabila being legitimate head of state refuses to both meet with his opposition or with other groups attempting to achieve a ceasefire. In this case the security of the Congolese state is patently not synonymous with the security of its citizens, as the state is authoritarian and is in some cases the alleged propagator of violence: President Laurent Kabila, one of the main signatories to the accord, stands accused of staging a new air offensive against rebel positions (**Bombing claims shatter Congo peace prospects** - 8/8/1999). Where the rights and needs of the citizenry are neglected - as in the Mobutuist state and again under the Kabila rule - and where the state's capacity to govern is weak, a security vacuum arises that will be filled by violence for defensive and offensive purposes.

4.3 Linguistic Analysis

In the mutual pursuit of economic agendas, South Africa was marginalised while Zimbabwe brushed aside the prospect of an early ceasefire (**South Africa must stay the peaceful course** 6/9/1998). Implicit in these classifications is the demonization of one party by the other: South Africa becomes the victim while Zimbabwe becomes the bully. Yet, they both want economic benefits: in the long-term and short-term, respectively. The characteristics and language attributed to Zimbabwe are antagonistic and almost untamed. In this context, according to Kempf (1999), Zimbabwe's rights are denied and demonized and the common interests of both countries overlooked.

Help us end this terrible war! Joseph Kabila appeals for meeting with Mbeki to discuss how South Africa can aid efforts to save his country from destruction (28/1/2001) is another piece that exhibits lexical use. South Africa brings[s] peace to a war-ravaged DRC. Peace is synonymous with stability, which ushers in economic reform and prosperity, thus elevating South Africa to the-land-of-milk-and-honey status. What this does is to tug at the heart-strings of the reader and in effect persuade him/her to support government attempts to get parliament to approve the deployment of South African troops - which at this stage had not been achieved, despite Mbeki's promises to the contrary.

Interestingly, while Kempf's works identify this demonization to be between warring parties, technically that is not the case here, given that South Africa is, at this point in time, technically not involved in the combat or in negotiations. However the *Sunday Times* characterisations point to a quasi-ideological war of the Cold War type - a war of tactics between two rival nations, contested on Congolese soil - much like the US and Soviet skirmishes that often took place on foreign soil.

In the simplification of the conflict and the structural causes of the conflict, there is an additional simplification of the actors in the conflict. This is carried in the way the *Sunday Times* - and most mainstream media - elects to label the opposing parties. Despite the fact that according to democratic norms and ideals there is no legitimate government in the DRC, the press in line with their governments have accepted the Laurent and Joseph Kabila's governments as the legitimate and recognised

governments. All other forces in opposition to this legitimate authority is referred to as rebel. This labelling indeed simplifies things for the Sunday Times and deludes the paper into believing in its own objectivity. However, rebels are by definition dissidents, creators of conflict and chaos and are very often in the African context, painted as irrational, uneducated parties to the conflict. The irony in the case of the DRC, is that the profile of the rebels, contradicts this depiction. They are for the most part intellectuals (especially in politics) of prize-winning stature. While Laurent Kabila is at times portrayed as irrational and to some degree inept in relation to South Africa's capable personalities, compared to the rebels he remains the force to be coaxed and cajoled forcing summit chairman Chiluba to send envoys after him to bring him back to the talks he refused to budge (**Thabo says home as Congo bid flops** - 27/6/1999). Consequently, Wamba dia Wamba, a whole Professor of political science is portrayed as the menace to society while long time dissident, Laurent Kabila is given international stature and legitimacy.

There is intense personalisation adopted in the articles that is typical in reporting. For instance, Mugabe and Kabila - presidents and representatives of nations - are often divorced from their positions and in effect their influence diminished: [Kabila] must be made to realise that until his country is ruled by all its people, it will be ruled by war (**South Africa must stay the peaceful course** - 6/9/1998). Commentaries of this sort have the effect of reducing the intellectual capacity of the person to whom it is directed. In fact a post Laurent Kabila article in the *Sunday Times* echoes this sentiment quoting European Union special representative as noting a difference in Joseph Kabila thus:

Ajello who met Kabila last Sunday, said although the young leader was not a talking person, he sure gives the impression that he's listening to you he gives the impression of someone with brains. (**DRC rebel leader calls for return to Lusaka Accord** - 4/2/2001)

A quote that is not only patronising but re-affirms and reassures the West's belief in its superiority and supposed civility, written in a paper that caters to a predominantly white business sector.

Also interesting is the fact that there is no particular and consistent trend in terms of agency or the designation of responsibility to any one party. There is an even spread of responsibility in the headlines. For example, in as much as there are headlines that

read: **Kabila Scuttles Congo Summit, humiliating the French** (13/12/1998), they tempered by some positive ones **Kabila agrees to sign ceasefire in Congo** (29/11/1998) and **Rebels in unity talks** (9/1/2000).

However, approximately half the article headlines are host to passivisation with agency deletion whereby there is mention of particular events but no mention (in the headline) of who is responsible for what action. This occurs with greater frequency in instances where there is failure to reach an agreement. Nowhere is it more obvious than in **Bombing claims shatter Congo peace prospects** (8/8/1999). There is no mention in the headline as to who does claiming and who stands accused. The article reveals President Laurent Kabila as the alleged attacker of rebels at a time when peace is supposed to be agreed upon! Deletion of the agent in this or any text omits the aggressor and assumes readership understanding of the dynamics of the conflict. Deleting the agent (the aggressor) assumes that we have a prior knowledge of who the aggressor is and what the conditions of aggression are. So, in effect this becomes an implied admission on the part of *Sunday Times* that there was no objective reporting; that the paper has taken a view (in line with government or not) on who is what in the grand scheme of things.

4.5 Conclusion

What has emerged from this analysis are particular representations of pivotal actors in the eyes of the DRC conflict in the *Sunday Times*, the South African government and ultimately the South African reader. Amongst the numerous players (six African countries) directly involved - and numerous others indirectly involved - Zimbabwe, Congo and South Africa are featured prominently and regularly - with Zambia being secondary - in the discourse.

The discourse of the *Sunday Times* coverage of the peace summits and the peace process is constructed using particular techniques: simplification of conflict dynamics, trivialisation of actor's positions and actions, repeated indications of ideological perspectives (especially between South Africa and Zimbabwe), and at times belittling undertones in the discourse. Amongst the four competing themes, conflict intervention received the most emphasis indicating its preference as a cessation tool, while the higher use of antagonistic language - coupled with trivialisation,

simplification and repetition - indicates the tendency to report peace in terms of the negative aspects of the conditions in which peace emerges/results.

In sum, the construction of these texts reveals traces of hegemonic tensions and competition between two main players: South Africa and Zimbabwe. Because of these tensions the two conduct themselves and address each other in distinct ways. They are mannerisms that messaged to the public by way of reporting in effect influencing the public's understandings of the politics of intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Chapter Five

Conclusion to the Study

5.0 Introduction: Scope for Further Research

The state of peace coverage in both developed and developing countries is unstable and undefined, to say the least. As Kempf, Shinar and Luostarinen find, peace is hardly ever reported in and on its own terms. This is largely because of the immense subscription to western reporting norms discussed earlier. If there is a general bias in the way the media report peace, and in the way they report Third World countries, then the coverage of peace processes in Third World countries is doubly biased. The case for peace journalism, and more to the point, Third World peace journalism, arises from and is justified by this bias.

Clearly, this area has received little to no academic attention. However, interest, concern and consequent scholarship are growing, with organisations like the United Nations giving more credence and support to related studies and proposed alternative models to reporting both peace and conflict (see www.mediapeace.org). This review of reporting models, norms and values is certainly welcome, especially in ethno-conscious conflict resolution scholarship circles.

Pointing to the flawed nature of western news coverage of the Third World, Fiske (1987: 285) notes that:

Third World countries, are, for example, conventionally represented in western news as places of famines and natural disaster, of social revolution, and of political corruption. These events are not seen as disrupting their social norms, but as confirming ours, confirming our dominant sense that western democracies provide the basics of life for everyone, are stable, and fairly and honestly governed.

This bias is further entrenched through western professional ethics like the infamous McLurg's Law, named after a legendary British news editor, that prioritises coverage in terms of 1 dead Briton equals 5 dead Frenchmen equals 20 dead Egyptians equals 500 dead Indians and 1000 dead Chinese. How many more Africans must die to create African news?! However, McQuail (1987: 194) adds that ethnocentric bias is equally visible in the portrayal of countries that are culturally,

economically or politically close, regardless of size or proximity; a general bias in favour of things close to home.

But, why re-invent the wheel for peace journalism when we can merely perfect it? Already alternative reporting models are available that can work beautifully for our purposes. One such model is developmental news, precisely because of its high regard for general processes and processes of change within which peace belongs.

5.1 Discussion and Recommendations

Nawaz (1984) argues that the concept of developmental news is two-pronged (in de Beer and Steyn 1996). In one sense it refers to the formal education of a population, the more tangible general information that keeps people aware of developments that may not directly affect their immediate activity, but that is designed to add to their stock of knowledge and help improve their lives (p. 44).

In the second and crucial sense, development news is thought to [posit] the concept of process news, taking the long view on the process of change unfolding in developing countries, making it possible to encompass the process of development and the advance of those countries in meeting their long-term goals (Jakubowicz 1985: 88). This means that news is not only to be defined in terms of the typical Western criteria as illuminated by Galtung and Ruge (1965), but rather in terms of commitment, mobilisation and participation in the total transition-policy of a specific country and nation (de Beer 1989).

While Western media have predictably refused to make any major changes in their own definition of news values, African media have by no means enthusiastically espoused the idea of developmental news. As renowned journalist and media critic, Baffour Ankomah maintains, African journalists have for many years been trained to believe that the Western media are the epitome of all that is good and all that is great, to the extent that there are no major differences in output between them and their European and American counterparts. According to Jakubowicz (1985: 89), it was at that stage difficult to find even a marginal enthusiasm for the reportage of positive news - be it developmental, social, cultural or educational.

Despite efforts to promote developmental news and implement NWICO principles, there is still too little emphasis on the progress and process of conflict resolution. Developmental news policies do, however, point to a need for greater awareness of developmental issues in general. Yet in the same breathe one must also stress that in an ethnically diverse Africa and South Africa, development cannot be separated from equality politics (which involve socio-economics and tribalism), as these are often grounds for much of the conflict we witness. These factors must be taken into account when considering new news policies in South Africa and Africa at large.

Just as negotiated change engulfed South Africa in the early 1990s, so too is there a need now to reconcile competing media policy goals in a more representative and effective way than was the case in many countries to the north. As de Beer and Steyn (1996) point out, Western news values and developmental news values are not necessarily conflicting concepts of reality. Rather, they argue that a form of symbiosis ought to be found in order to come to a new understanding of news values for the South African context.

Finally

This study has argued for an alternative to the Western news models and in the process recognised the role of the media in influencing the opinion of its audiences.

According to the Conflict Resolution Network (ca. 1990) in Australia, the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, and authors Shinar, Kempf and Luostarinen, there is a growing realisation in media ownership circles, management and staff that a new genre is arising where freedom of the media means freedom to be part of the resolution of conflict. The network and the authors, propose the following guideline for journalists in dealing with conflict and its resolution in a positive way:

Table 5 - Suggested Media - Conflict Resolution Guide

Level of Conflict Escalation	Cooperation
Conceptualisation of Conflict	Win-win orientation. Where is the conflict story? What s really wrong? Don t just report positions. Go back to underlying needs and concerns. What information will you need to be even-handed in your treatment of each side s case?
Evaluation of rights and goals	Mutual respect for all sides rights and needs & accentuation of common interests. A creative response: Encourage the search for positive outcomes. Journalists questions to protagonists can be in themselves tools for positive change.

Evaluation of actions	Taking all sides benefit into consideration. Negotiation skills: Make the problem the enemy rather than the people. Report areas of agreement as well as disagreement. This encourages the problem solving process to continue. Can you expose the opportunities for positive change that arise out of the present situation?
Emotional involvement	Mutual trust and empathy. Managing emotions: There is a difference between exposing injustice, or prejudice and pinning the person so they squirm. Attack the problem, not the person.
Identification Suggestion	All-sided. Mapping the conflict: Report and explain fully and fairly for all parties on the conflict situation, i.e. needs; fears and concerns; values; objectives; limitations (personal, financial, situational); prevailing attitudes. Look for and encourage parties to look for: new perspectives and insights; common ground; special concerns; hidden agendas.

Incorporating such responses in academic curricula and in-house training sessions may prove valuable in counteracting the typical emphasis on negative peace coverage.

5.2 Summation: Media Contribution to Peacebuilding

The public has a dismal understanding of the peace process or the negotiation process, but most people know about the latest announcement of the breakdown of the process reported in antagonistic terms. It is, of course, much easier and more sensational to cover violence or war than peace.

Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo is constructed no differently from war or any abnormal event in the South African press. Traces of negative undertones run throughout the articles, while hegemonic and ideological tensions are accentuated. From this analysis, we find that DRC peace discourse takes its cues from the classic war discourse landscape, combines it with regional politics and wraps it in the vague blanket of South African foreign policy. The analysis further reveals a climate of opinion in which South Africa's short-comings are forgivable and justifiable while those of other actors are childish, selfish and irrational. In this perspective, there is little to differentiate South Africa from the West in her dealings, her ambitions and her foreign policy towards the people of Africa. The South Africanisation of Africa has begun.

With South Africa's new-found freedom and Africa's transiting self, it is prudent to explore avenues for raising public and professional awareness of the dynamics of change in conflict and in resolution. Given the change in the political dispensation in South Africa, the changing political climate in the rest of the continent and the

changing expectations of the Southern African Development Community, it is perhaps not premature to call for re-evaluation of the media institution so as to re-cast the media as conflict mediator rather than conflict generator. Once a ceasefire is signed, the continued apocalyptic coverage of the peace process will be counter-productive.

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APPENDIX A

Catalogue of DRC Peace Talks since August 1998.

Efforts to broker a peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo began six days after war broke out on 2 August 1998. From that point until the signing of the cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999, there have been monthly peace initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis, both at a Ministerial and Presidential level.

The following is a compilation sourced from the OAU (Organisation for African Unity), ICG (International Group Crisis) REPORT No. 5, and, the United States Peace Institute.

1. 8 August 1998: Victoria I (Zimbabwe)

Two days after the conflict broke out, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops to stop the Congolese rebels from taking over Kinshasa. Six days after the conflict broke out the South African Development Community (SADC) countries together with Uganda and Rwanda, tried to resolve the conflict peacefully through talks. Zimbabwe, which holds the chairmanship of SADC's political, defence and security organ used this first regional summit on the DRC conflict to put forward a request for military intervention to support Kabila. The proposal was supported by Angola and Namibia. South Africa and other SADC members gave a lukewarm response.

2. 18 August 1998: Victoria II (Zimbabwe)

All the countries involved in the conflict attended this second regional meeting. This was the first time the rebels were invited to attend a summit but there was disagreement on the mode of involving the rebels. It was decided that a proxy mechanism should be put in place to allow consultation with the rebels. However, the rebels insisted on holding direct talks with President Kabila and his government officials, a demand that was not met until almost a year later.

3. 22 August 1998: Pretoria Talks (South Africa)

This meeting was called by President Nelson Mandela as an alternative to the highly charged Zimbabwean led Victoria Falls meetings. Zimbabwe's hard line position on the rebels and their allies Rwanda and Uganda was obstructing the peace process. The Pretoria Talks were attended by Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, Rwanda's Vice-President Paul Kagame and Kabila's representative, Justice Minister Mwenze Kongolo. At the meeting Mandela introduced the idea of a transition government in the DRC tasked with setting up the necessary structures for democratic elections. The meeting exposed divisions within SADC as President Mugabe demanded to know which side Mandela was on in the conflict. Reversing his initial position against SADC's military intervention in the DRC, Mandela said Kabila was entitled to invite friendly countries to support him.

4. 11- 13 September 1998: Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)

This was the first official meeting that attempted to discuss a draft cease-fire agreement; the meeting was attended by all the Defence Ministers from the belligerent countries.

The meeting broke down after Kabila and his allies refused to allow the rebels into direct negotiations. Uganda and Rwanda walked out of the meeting in response. However, the cease-fire document presented at this meeting by OAU experts has formed the basis of the final, accepted cease-fire agreement text.

5. 14 September 1998: Grande Baie (Mauritius)

The conflict in the DRC dominated the SADC heads of state summit in Mauritius. There was pressure on all SADC members to contribute troops to protect Kabila's government but no framework for ending the conflict was presented. Instead, the meeting highlighted the differences in SADC on the DRC crisis. Uganda and Rwanda were invited as observers.

6. 14 September 1998: The Chiluba initiative begins

This was the first attempt by President Chiluba of Zambia to mediate an end to the DRC conflict. He travelled with President Benjamin Mkapa to Uganda and Rwanda for consultations. Although not much came out of the tour, Chiluba started to appear as mediator and gained the confidence of Uganda and Rwanda. However, Chiluba did not manage to gain credibility from Kabila's allies or Southern African leaders due to allegations that the Zambian authorities support UNITA. Concurrently, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was in Rwanda and Uganda negotiating the safe passage of Rwandan and Ugandan troops stranded in Western Congo after attempting to take Kinshasa. The offensive was stopped by Angolan and Zimbabwean forces. President Mugabe agreed the stranded fighters would be given safe passage after surrendering their weapons. The Rwandan and Ugandan fighters are said to have escaped by crossing through territory controlled by UNITA.

7. 18 October 1998: East African Community summit (Nairobi)

The East African Community consultative summit on the DRC conflict was attended by President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, President Yoweri Museveni and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania. The meeting was aimed at forging a common position to which the three East African countries could sign-up. Uganda is the only country in the East African Community with troops in the DRC. With the signing of the East African community treaty scheduled for this year, Kenya and Tanzania are worried about the implications of EAC member state Uganda's continued involvement in DRC. However, the heads of state reached an agreement to present a common line on the conflict. This strategy did not work. The differences between the three states came to the surface when President Moi made a statement to the effect that all uninvited troops should leave DRC; implying that Uganda should withdraw from Congo. This remark caused great concern in Uganda, prompting the Kenyan Ambassador to Uganda Peter Ole Nkuraiya to issue a correction to the press which asserted Moi had been misquoted. Nkuraiya said that President Moi had meant that all foreign troops should withdraw from DRC, in line with Uganda's position on the DRC. If Kenya's position on Congo has been somewhat inconsistent, Tanzania's has also been vague. Some analysts now believe that the Tanzania leadership is divided over which policy to adopt. President Mkapa and former President Nyerere are close to President Museveni and giving him the benefit of the doubt. Other senior and military officials are in favour of persuading Uganda and

Rwanda to drop a militaristic approach to regional issues and instead pursue political solutions. The Congo effect by Adonia Ayebare, *The East African Alternatives*, January-February 1999.

8. 28 October 1998: Lusaka (Zambia)

This meeting was attended by Foreign and Defence Ministers of Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda, Gabon, South Africa and Kenya. For the first time a draft cease-fire agreement was adopted and a mechanism for implementing and monitoring it was discussed pending further consultations. Again, the true shortcoming of this meeting, like its predecessors, was the failure to directly involve the rebels.

9. 20 November 1998: the Francophone summit in Paris (France)

French President Jacques Chirac hosted the 20th Franco—African summit in Paris, France on 20, November 1998. The meeting attracted a record 34 African heads of

states with representation from 49 African countries. At the end of the summit seven key actors in the DRC conflict (Kabila's government and his allies Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad as well as rebel allies Uganda and Rwanda) gave a verbal commitment to sign a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia on 8 December 1998. The significance of the Paris summit is that it introduced the DRC conflict to a wider audience of African countries not directly involved in the conflict. President Kabila gained support of other African heads of states that considered the decision by Rwanda and Uganda to send troops to Congo a direct violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC. The United Nations and the OAU gave a pledge to support all peace initiatives on the DRC including sending a peacekeeping force if the parties concerned signed a cease-fire agreement. The then Chairman of the OAU, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso attempted to shift the base of the mediation from SADC to the Burkina Faso, under the OAU structure and his leadership. His interest was to capitalise on the Paris summit, and bring Francophone Africa back into the picture. He suggested that the signing of the Congo cease-fire agreement be shifted to Burkina Faso on 17 and 18 of December at a special OAU summit, a suggestion that was ignored by the predominantly Anglophone East, Central and Southern African states.

10. 8 December 1998: Lusaka (Zambia)

This meeting was a follow up to the Paris Franco—African summit that recommended the December signing of a cease-fire agreement. This meeting broke down because President Kabila vowed never to meet the rebels face to face. He felt empowered to take this step due to the show of support he received from other African heads of state in Paris. The meeting was postponed to 28 December 1998 to give time to all parties to consult on cease-fire proposals agreed on in Paris.

11. 18 December 1998: OAU conference (Burkina Faso)

The meeting was attended by President Kabila and delegates from Uganda, Angola, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe who agreed to meet the rebels directly in Lusaka, Zambia on 28 December and sign the cease-fire. The meeting was facilitated and organised by the staff of the OAU's central organ for conflict prevention, management and resolution and was chaired by President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso.

12. 28 December 1998: Lusaka (Zambia)

For the third time running, the talks failed to take off due to disagreements on the participation of the rebels. President Kabila and his allies insisted on proximity talks with the rebels, while the rebels and their allies pushed for direct talks. South Africa proposed face to face talks involving all warring parties, and suggested that talks without the rebels were a waste of time. It was this stand that later persuaded Kabila and his allies to soften their line.

13. 16 January 1999: Lusaka (Zambia)

This meeting was attended by Defence and Foreign Affairs ministers from countries with troops in the DRC, and representatives from the Kabila government. The rebels did not directly participate in the talks. The meeting was to discuss and adopt a cease-fire agreement with the aim of calling a heads of states summit to sign a cease-fire agreement. The ministers failed to reach a consensus on key issues such as the direct participation of the rebels, the withdrawal of foreign troops and disarming of various militia groups in DRC.

14. 18 January 1999: Windhoek (Namibia)

This was a significant meeting in the peace process; informal talks brought together countries from opposing sides in the conflict. The one day summit led to a great leap forward in the process. There was consensus on the modalities of the cease-fire agreement and heads of states present committed to signing a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia. The weakness of the Windhoek meeting was the silence about the

participation of the rebels and the absence of Kabila and the President Dos Santos of Angola.

15. February 1999

The month of February was dominated by bilateral consultations between allies about the cease-fire agreement. President Fredrick Chiluba of Zambia assisted by President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique travelled in the region meeting all sides in the conflict. During the weekend of 27- 28 February, five regional heads of states were involved in consultations. The main issues that arose were security guarantees for Uganda and Rwanda, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congo, the deployment of UN peacekeeping force and the direct involvement of rebels in the talks.

16. 6 March 1999: Pretoria (South Africa)

This meeting was called by President Nelson Mandela, to convince Kabila's backers to soften their stand and agree on the direct participation of rebels into the talks. The meeting tackled the issue of President Chiluba's role as mediator in conflict, a contentious point given allegations by the Angolan government that Zambian authorities have been arming UNITA. While there was no concrete outcome, the meeting marked a last ditch effort by Mandela to resolve the crisis before handing over power.

17. 23 March 1999: Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)

The Addis meeting was attended by 36 African foreign ministers. It was at this meeting that Kabila's side first agreed to meet the rebels. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Kabila's Foreign Minister, said Kabila was ready to meet the rebels to reach an agreement on a Constitution on electoral law and elections. Later, Kabila announced that he would only meet the rebels on condition that the meeting took place in Kinshasa for security reasons, a condition that the rebels rejected.

18. 9 April 1999: UN initiative (New York)

Following nine months of inaction in relation to the DRC conflict, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed former Senegalese Foreign Minister Mustafa Niasse as his special envoy for the DRC peace process. The main task of the UN special envoy was to identify the main obstacles to signing the agreement and evaluate the progress made so far by the Chiluba initiative. He was also tasked to establish contacts with political and civic leaders in the DRC and determine the contribution to be offered by external actors to the negotiated settlement of the DRC conflict.

19. 19 April 1999: Sirte (Libya)

This meeting was seen as a major step forward, as two major belligerent parties signed an agreement and there was an attempt to deploy a peacekeeping force. Presidents Kabila and Museveni, two of the central actors together with Presidents Afeworki of Eritrea and Idriss of Chad, held talks in Libya and signed an agreement that called for: a cease-fire, the deployment of African peacekeepers, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC and an internal dialogue process for all parties in the DRC. As a follow up initiative, Libya sent an advance party to Uganda to prepare for the deployment of peacekeeping troops. The deployment of 41 troops caught the Ugandan authorities completely off guard. Ugandan Minister for Regional Co-operation Amama Mbabazi said that the Ugandan authorities had not expected the Libyan government to send troops within a few days. The Sirte initiative injected momentum into the DRC peace process because it proved that a deal could be signed. President Chiluba kickstarted the Lusaka initiative by building on what the Libyan President had achieved at Sirte, and by integrating the Libyan initiative into the Lusaka process. President Kadafi achieved

what he wanted, which was to be recognised as an African peace maker, and Museveni got what he wanted by convincing Kadaffi and President Derby to pull out Chadian troops from the DRC. This then paved the way for Ugandan troops and MLC rebels to take new strategic territory such as Gbadolite and Gemena.

The Sirte agreement was rejected by Rwanda and all the three Congolese rebel factions on the grounds that they were not directly involved in the negotiation and signing of the deal. Significantly, Kagame thought that the Sirte agreement was based on good intentions despite the fact that it was negotiated in a hurry.

20. 5 May 1999: Dodoma talks (Tanzania)

Museveni, Bizimungu, Mkapa and Kagame met in Tanzania to forge a common position on the Lusaka peace process. This meeting was prompted by the emerging rifts between Uganda and Rwanda over the conduct of the war in the DRC. The Tanzanian President assigned his Foreign Minister Jakaya Kikwete to hold meetings with Ugandan, Rwandan and rebel officials and work out a joint position for Lusaka. Interview with ICG analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kampala, June 1999. Sirte is a small town in Libya. We can fight on for years by Michael Wakabi and Levi Ochieng, *The EastAfrican* 5-11 July 1999. The initiative failed to produce any significant progress. A meeting scheduled to take place in Kampala between the two antagonistic rebel groups; (RCD Goma and RCD Kisangani) with Rwandan, Tanzania and Ugandan officials did not take place as RCD Kisangani did not show up. As a result there was no common position amongst the rebels once they got to Lusaka, resulting in their failure to sign. Mediator Frederick Chiluba and Tanzanian officials were blamed for this outcome.

21. 15 May 1999: Sirte (Libya)

This was a follow up on the Sirte agreement of April 1999. In attendance was President Kabila, President Blaise Campaore chairman of the OAU, President Ange Felix Patasse of the Central Africa Republic, Issayas Afeworki of Eritrea, Yaya Jameh of Gambia, Vice-President Kagame of Rwanda, Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, former Algerian President Ben Bella and the UN Secretary General's special envoy for the DRC, Mustafa Niasse. The significance of this follow-up meeting was that the attendance list was expanded to involve other actors in the DRC conflict such as Kagame, who refused to put a signature on the Sirte agreement until Rwanda's security concerns were addressed. This meeting further confirmed that Libya's intentions to shift from Arab politics and become a major player in Great Lakes affairs.

22. 28 — 30 May 1999: Kampala (Uganda)

For the first time since the war broke out on 2 August 1998 a delegation of Ministers from the DRC government visited Uganda, these included Justice Minister Mwenze Kongolo and Economics minister Saolona Bemba. The meeting was a follow up to Sirte, both Uganda and the DRC committed themselves to setting up a committee of experts that will work out practical modalities for the implementation of the fore mentioned agreement. Both delegations undertook to promote, in the shortest time possible, the Sirte spirit to all parties involved in the DRC. Uganda's Minister of State for Regional Co-operation under played the importance of the Kampala meeting with the DRC government delegation, saying it merely showed that Uganda was interested in the peaceful resolution of the Congo crisis.

23. 17 June 1999: Pretoria Mini Summit (South Africa)

Regional leaders took advantage of President Thabo Mbeki's inauguration to hold a consultative summit to iron out their differences over a proposed cease-fire for the DRC. South Africa introduced radical proposals aimed at making the DRC peace process more realistic. These included direct talks involving all parties to the conflict, cessation of troop movement until there is an acceptable political arrangement by all Congolese parties to the conflict, and withdrawal of all foreign troops after the deployment of a peacekeeping force.

This meeting set the stage for the Lusaka summit that took place on 10 July 1999. Saolona Bemba is the father of Jean Pierre Bemba the rebel leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo. On his visit to Uganda he called on the Ugandan government to convince his son to return home. A joint communiqué dated 1 June 1999 by Ugandan officials and DRC government officials after their meeting in Kampala, Uganda.

APPENDIX B

Strategic Interests in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Country.

The following is a summation of the players and their individual reasons for involvement in the D R C (www.oau.org):

¥ **Rwanda**

Rwanda helped President Laurent Kabila overthrow the former ruler, Mobutu Sese Seko, in 1998. However the alliance did not last. Rwanda accused Kabila of supporting the Interahamwe, who are believed to have been responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and, being guilty of discriminating against the ethnic Tutsis that had helped him into power. Rwanda's interest in the Kivus (eastern DRC) is strategic as well as economic. The stretch along its western border serves to provide an invaluable buffer zone against Hutu insurgents. Furthermore, it would give Rwanda access to mining resources that would sustain the war effort and assure independence from donor communities.

¥ **Uganda**

Uganda also has security concerns. It claims Laurent Kabila has failed to secure its border against Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) - a rebel movement that uses Congo as a base from which to launch attacks on Uganda. Uganda borders Congo to the northeast and is also said to back rebels with tanks and troops. Uganda has threatened unilateral intervention in Congo if other foreign forces backing Kabila don't withdraw. Under pressure from increased insurgent activities by the ADF, the Ugandan National Army (UNA) has shifted bases from Uganda onto DRC territory. Ugandan operations inside the DRC have increased the fighting around the border areas of North Kivu.

¥ **Angola**

Angola has one of the best trained and equipped armies in the region, but its position is rather ambiguous. Angola's involvement is a direct result of its concern about UNITA's (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola). It shares a huge border with Congo, and is concerned that supplies for the former rebel movement, UNITA, are passing through Congo and holds the potential of resurrecting the war. On the one hand, Angola is dissatisfied with Laurent Kabila's efforts to crack down on border traffic. Yet on the other hand, there is no guarantee that the situation would improve if Kabila were deposed, therefore Angola has joined Zimbabwe in pledging support for the Congolese government.

União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)

With UN-sponsored peace talks at an impasse, Angola is close to a renewal of full-scale civil war between the forces of President José Eduardo dos Santos' government and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Such a war would become entwined with the growing conflict in the neighbouring DRC. The dos Santos regime in Luanda has sent troops to help DRC President Laurent Kabila against the Tutsi-led rebellion, and Savimbi has sought an alliance with the Tutsis.

¥ **Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe's enthusiastic response to President Kabila's appeal for help came as a surprise to most Africa analysts. Zimbabwe appears to have no immediate strategic concerns: it does not share a border with Congo. Within Zimbabwe there has been opposition to military intervention because of fears that the economy could not support it. What has been cited as Zimbabwe's primary objective, is the mining region of Kivu to which it has gained concessions courtesy of the Kabila regime. Zimbabwean officials elect to describe their proposed intervention as an attempt to restore law and order.

¥ **Kenya**

Kenya, being suspicious of the Tutsi-led rebellions in the region is pro-Kabila. According to OAU reports, when President Mobutu Sese Seko fell from power, there were demonstrations in the streets of Nairobi, demanding the resignation of President Moi. Thus it is conceivable that Kenya's involvement is designed to divert attention from an unpopular government and to quell possible joining of rebel forces (especially Mai-mai forces) in DRC and Kenya.

¥ **S o u t h A f r i c a**

Former South African President, Nelson Mandela, initially refrained from sending a military force. He held a regional summit in an attempt to broker peace talks with Kabila, the rebels and their respective allies. South Africa has a huge economic interest in Congo's diamond and mining industries, and for that reason, wants to create stability in the country.°

¥ **Zambia**

Zambia shares a long border with the richest part of Congo. It supported President Kabila when he came to power - but slowly its allegiances remain ambiguous.

Zambia - Angola

Zambia has decades of experience of the Angolan war. It hosts the oldest continuous refugee camp in Africa, Muykwayukwa, in operation since 1966 for Angolan refugees. Relations between the Angola and Zambia reached an all-time low when Angola's Lusaka Ambassador, Manuel Augusto, accused the Zambian government of permitting arms traffic through Zambia to Angola and subsequently threatened to attack Zambia. Consequently, Zambians are w a t c h i n g A n g o l a c l o s e l y .

¥ **Namibia**

Namibia's motivations for supporting Congo remain a mystery to most experts. What is clear is the unwavering support President Nujoma has for Zimbabwean President Mugabe.

¥ **R e p u b l i c o f ° C o n g o**

Congo's sister country to the west with its capital strategically located just across the Congo River from Kinshasa. It maintains it will remain neutral in this conflict.

¥ **U.S.A**

The breakdown in the solidarity between Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC threatens the foundations of political and military stability that Western governments, especially the United States, have been counting on. The breakdown of this alliance mimics events in the greater Horn of Africa where Ethiopia and Eritrea, major allies of the US, are now engaged in a full-scale war, ostensibly over a border dispute.

APPENDIX C

Sunday Times Articles

1. August 1, 1998 — Fun for DRC peace talk

THE SADC and European Union have signed a R20 million accord to pay for efforts to find a solution to the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict. The money is intended to offset the costs incurred by Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, who is involved in peace negotiations.

2. August 9, 1998 — Congo talks draw a blank

ZIMBABWEAN President Robert Mugabe's attempt to mediate a cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo has failed, the BBC reported last night.

A meeting of seven heads of state at Zimbabwe's Victoria Falls had ended without progress.

President Laurent Kabila of Congo had met with President Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda, which he accuses of masterminding the rebellion.

Also at the meeting were leaders from Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, Uganda and Rwanda. South Africa was not invited but sent cabinet ministers to a separate meeting with Kabila.

Mugabe was reported to have said that Kabila and Bizimungu could not agree on who was the aggressor in the fighting.

Rwanda says the uprising against Kabila is coming from inside Congo, and Bizimungu has warned that his country will hit back if Congo strikes.

The Congolese government has repeatedly broadcast statements by Kabila declaring that there was no room to bargain with Rwanda. There is nothing to negotiate in Zimbabwe except the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan troops, he quoted as saying.

Hundreds of unemployed men and women turned out at a military base yesterday to enlist in the army, vowing to crush the rebellion and take the war to Rwanda. We are determined to protect our country, said one young woman. If they give us arms today, we ready to go all the way to Rwanda.

Their threat was matched that of the rebel Tutsi fighters who also appeared to ignore the diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, vowing to push toward the capital, Kinshasa.

The rebels announced a new set of targets in western Congo, pledging to push inland from their Atlantic coastline stronghold to within 250kmsouthwest of the capital.

We want to remove President Kabila from power for the interest of the people because he has failed to rule them, rebel-run Radio Bukavu said.

In the face of growing hostility, ethnic Tutsis in Kinshasa are facing reprisal attacks for the rebellion. — *Sapa-AP*

3. September 5, 1998 - Congolese rebels will be at talks

CONGO rebel leaders will attend peace talks in Zimbabwe tomorrow, reports **Sapa — AFP**. The summit is aimed at ending the war in Central Africa.

The rebel's territorial administration chief, Joseph Mudumbi, said a delegation of rebel leaders had left their eastern stronghold of Goma last night to attend the talks.

The summit — between the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and the rebels — is due to start in Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe tomorrow.

The rebels said earlier they were hoping to change the venue to a country not involved in the fighting, but the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe rejected this proposal, writes **CRAIG DOONAN**.

Mugabe is to chair the talks after an agreement reached at a meeting of Southern African Development Community in Durban this week.

Preliminary talks are due to take place in Victoria Falls today between the foreign and defense ministers of Congo, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

Diplomatic insiders say the rebels' attendance at tomorrow's talks is largely irrelevant — what matters is the position taken by their backers, Rwanda and Uganda.

Meanwhile, Uganda is reported to have flown in more troops to Congo as violence continues in the country.

A news agency claimed yesterday that rebels had killed more than 600 people in an attack on a village in the eastern city of Bukavu.

A Uganda opposition leader said his country had flown in more troops to both the east and west of Congo ahead of the peace talks.

4. September 6, 1998 — South Africa must stay the peaceful course (editorial)

IN THE inscrutable world of diplomacy, things are seldom what they seem — as the twists and turns of this week's Democratic Republic of Congo peace talks in Durban proved.

At the beginning of this week, it appeared that South Africa had seized the initiative by scheduling a meeting of the heads of the Southern African states and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to broker a cease-fire.

By the end of the week, it seemed that South Africa had been marginalized and the Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe had taken centre stage with a plan to get the warring parties together for a meeting at Victoria Falls.

But these impressionistic shards of information are not sufficient for us to reach a conclusion, as if we were spectators at a football match.

It is true, this newspaper has pointed out, that South Africa has dallied unnecessarily when it was apparent to all that Congo was entering another frightening phase of war more than a month ago.

Instead of stepping in early to steer all parties towards talks, South Africa ceded the initiative to Mugabe who brushed aside the prospect of an early cease-fire and committed troops to Congo.

But, having been slow out of the starting blocks, South Africa has since led with maturity, insisting on dialogue and a cease-fire and taking a principled decision not to send troops to that country.

This stance does not arise out of an assessment of the tactical and strategic odds of losing soldiers in foreign war. It comes out of the very hard lesson of the futility of conflict that South Africans have learned from the experience of their own country.

The argument has been put forward that by intervening militarily in the conflict, Mugabe established a balance of forces which has made it possible — if not necessary — for other countries such as Rwanda and Uganda to go to the negotiating table.

This is, militarily speaking, utter codswallop. The few thousands soldiers that Mugabe has in Congo are already said to be costing him millions of valuable US dollars.

If he were to move them from the west, where they have been fighting mop up operations against anti-Kabila bandits, to the east, where they would engage Rwandan and Ugandan regulars, Mugabe would have to accept the domestic consequences of massive casualties and a severe drain on foreign reserves.

If anything, this line has spun out of kindness to Mugabe, offering him a way of stepping down from his military posturing with some semblance of dignity.

President Mandela, ever prepared to take the bullet if it serves the greater good, made another such face-saving gesture for Mugabe on Thursday, gritting his teeth and stating publicly and at some cost to his image, that Mugabe may have been correct to send troops to the Congo.

What must be remembered is that no amount of weaponry and soldiers will succeed if there is no political solution for the Congo that will see elections and the establishment of institutions of democracy.

This must now become the primary focus of South Africa and those countries interested in a permanent solution to the conflict.

The real reason that Laurent Kabila finds himself in the middle of a new civil war, is that he has done nothing to implement democracy, choosing instead to jail opposition leaders.

On top of this, he has fuelled tribal divisions in a region where hundreds of thousands have died because of their tribal origins.

Kabila has also refused to allow the UN to inspect areas of his country where massacres are said to have taken place at his behest.

Kabila, having been spared a military routing by diplomatic intervention, must now be made to democratise his country and to put a stable reconciliatory administration in place. He must be made to realize that until his country is ruled by all its people, it will be ruled by war.

5. 6 September 6, 1998 — INSIDE AFRICA: Craig Doonan (Feature - Africa supplement)

THE prospect of spending a Saturday night out in Goma, headquarters of the rebel faction in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is about as appealing as an evening on the streets in the government's stronghold of Kinshasa, about 1 300km to the west.

Both cities are fraught with anxiety and the expectation of anarchy that accompanies war. Foreigners are easy prey jittery soldiers who have been known to abduct, beat and rob journalists, in particular, for either trying to do their jobs or merely being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

So it was with some trepidation that I joined a group of hacks and headed into the night in Goma, a city that has been caught up so many wars and seen so much suffering that thought of fun, or even night life seemed unreal.

But in Goma, as in Kinshasa, the human spirit has ensured that there are still sanctuaries of sanity.

Huddled on the edge of this wary eastern Congo city is little bit of paradise. It's called Le Chalet and where the local yuppies hang out.

It's also a place where the war ceases to exist. From the minute you leave a rutted track and walk along the trimmed lawn towards this bamboo-roofed restaurant and pub, you are filled with a sense of normality and, with it, relief.

Le Chalet overlooks a sprawling deep-green lawn which slopes about 50km down to the beautiful Lake Kivu.

The area is surrounded by lush sub-tropical vegetation. Inside Le Chalet, it's warm and comfortable.

It's as if you have been cocooned from the horrors of the Congo war. The clientele is distinctly up-market, something that seems out of place in this poverty-stricken region.

Le Chalet also boasts what is apparently the only pool table in Goma. There is no charge for a game and a little jostling to get onto the table.

This is a place where young locals come to relax and to forget about the possibility that their homes could come under mortar fire the next day.

It's a place where businessmen mix with commercial pilots and play pool with foreign journalists (who have become as much a part of this ravaged city as have successive rebellions).

There is no talk of the latest revolt. The focus is on the pool game. Everyone manages to communicate with everyone else in a buzz of French, Lingala, English and Swahili. There is a sense of solidarity, as if we are all just relieved to interact as humans and not as participants in, or observers of, an explosive conflict. The most common expression heard in Le Chalet is 'no problem'.

Out on the balcony, there is a menu which offers a variety of pizzas, at about \$10 each (about R60), or local dishes such as tilapia, a fleshy fish from the nearby lake.

A variety of beer is served, averaging between \$2 and \$4 a bottle.

In between the banter around the pool table, the music of '80s pop band Imagination wafts through to the balcony. The lyrics, *It's Just an Illusion*, ring very true.

And later, even Bob Marley's *So Much Trouble in the World* becomes just another tune.

The only reminder of the central African strife is a uniformed soldier, who strolls in to buy a packet of cigarettes.

Around midnight, riding pillion on a local taximan's motorbike, I'm off to Coco Jambo, which I have been told is the happening nightspot in town.

Motorcycles have become a popular means of public transport in Goma.

You can buzz from one end of the town to the other and back (a total distance of 7km) for about \$5 if you're a foreigner and about one-tenth of that if you are a local.

Whizzing past small spaza shops in the poorer areas and the high walls made from volcanic rock which surround former colonial homes, you suddenly feel part of Goma, of the country beyond its outskirts, and of the civil war. Everywhere there are leering soldiers and potholed roads.

Inside Coco Jambo, locals sway to the sounds of Lingala music, interspersed with more popular 80s dance hits.

You're very welcome, the barman, John, shouts above the music before asking for \$5 for a local beer that usually goes for \$2.

Journalists have become an indispensable source of foreign currency.

After we convince him that we are South African, he apologizes and drops the price. John tells us he has dreams of living in South Africa one day. Like almost everyone here, he says he is very, very tired of war.

Again the conversation is friendly as locals, keen to find out about life outside this bleak region, talk about how much they want to lead a normal life. But it's Saturday and there's little time for concentrating on serious matters.

Go and dance, urges John, there are plenty of nice girls here tonight.

Later, holed up in our small hotel room, a South African journalist remarks: Tonight I felt like I was back home.

— *Craig Doonan is the Sunday Times KwaZulu-Natal bureau chief*

6. September 13, 1998 — Congo talks collapse

DELEGATES from seven African countries — six of them involved in the rebel conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo — ended talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, yesterday in full disagreement on how to resolve the crisis.

On Thursday Congo rebels vowed to go on fighting and said the Organization of African Unity session was pointless if they were not invited.

7. November 29, 1998 - Kabila agrees to sign a ceasefire in Congo

JUSTICE MALALA: Paris

THE Democratic Republic of Congo has agreed to sign a cease-fire by mid-December with representatives of the governments of Uganda and Rwanda, which have backed a rebel military assault against President Laurent Kabila's government.

President Jacques Chirac of France confirmed yesterday that Congo President Laurent Kabila had agreed to sign a peace deal in mid-December following a meeting of key players convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The Congo rebels were not at the talks, which took place at the 20th Africa-France summit in Paris this week.

This is the first time that Kabila, who has snubbed a series of South African-led peace initiatives, has agreed to halt the fighting. The decision is said to have the backing of his military allies, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola.

Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, who met Chirac yesterday, was also at the summit.

— Mbeki earlier told a meeting of the French Institute for Foreign Affairs in Paris that apartheid-era generals and other operatives who had committed crimes on foreign soil should not be extradited from South Africa to face prosecution.

Mbeki said he did not support the extradition of those granted amnesty by the truth commission if it compromised the process of reconciliation.

We decided on truth and amnesty in order to have stability. If they [other countries] wanted to extradite the apartheid generals it would detract from the process, he said.

Hundreds of operatives have confessed to killing, bombing and maiming ANC members and other South Africans living abroad in the 80s

Many foreign security agencies have still not closed their dockets on the crimes. French police have kept the file on the assassination of Dulcie September, then ANC chief representative in Paris, in 1988.

In Britain, Scotland Yard detectives are still interested in the bombing of ANC house in London, just one of many crimes to which superspy Craig Williamson has confessed.

8. December 13, 1998 - Kabila Scuttles Congo Summit, humiliating the French

CONGO President Laurent Kabila has scuttled a summit of Southern African leaders scheduled for next week, spattering diplomatic egg on the face of French President Jacques Chirac, who announced last month that a cease-fire would be signed at the meeting, writes **RAY HARTLEY**.

Kabila was supposed to have signed a cease-fire with Uganda and Rwanda, who are backing rebels fighting his government, but the summit was called off by the host, Zambia, this weekend after Kabila refused to attend if rebel representatives were invited.

Foreign Affairs spokesman Marco Boni said yesterday that South Africa has been officially informed that the summit meeting and a planned meeting of regional defense and foreign ministers had been called off. Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo said earlier this week the talks would be a waste of time if the rebels were not present.

9. January 17, 1999 — Another setback for peace in Congo

Chris Simpson

I SHOULD admit that I was over-ambitious, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba admitted as his long-awaited peace summit on the Democratic Republic of Congo was again postponed.

Foreign and defence ministers from more than a dozen African countries did meet in Lusaka yesterday to thrash out a framework for a possible ceasefire. But there seems little scope for any lasting agreement at the moment despite Chiluba's vigorous shuttle diplomacy and the support of other African leaders such as Nelson Mandela.

From the rebels' side, the president of the Congolese Rally for Democracy, Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, dismissed the Lusaka initiative as a useless exercise.

The rebels still remain on the periphery of the peace process and have repeatedly warned that they must meet Congolese president Laurent Kabila face to face if there is to be any breakthrough.

Kabila has invited the rebels to talk to him in Kinshasa, but they see this as either a trap or a bluff.

The past fortnight has been disastrous for the rebels. News seeped out from Goma over the New Year of serious faction fighting. In a New Year's address, intended for broadcast but scrapped by his colleagues, Wamba-dia-Wamba warned that his movement was being taken over by freeloaders who have ruined our country and want to hold us hostage for their selfish ends of power for power.

This was seen as a direct attack on former Mobutu prime minister Lunda Bululu and his entourage, who have challenged Wamba-dia-Wamba's leadership skills and were accused of trying to stage a coup within the movement. Rebel leaders were flown to Kampala and Kigali for a series of meetings brokered by their Ugandan and Rwandan allies before returning to Goma with their differences officially re-solved and Wamba-dia-Wamba talking unconvincingly of reaching an understanding about our misunderstandings.

Just as damaging for the rebels was a report from Rome by the Missionary News Service of a massacre by rebel troops of 500 civilians. This was a major propaganda coup for

Kabila, who organised memorial services for the dead in Kinshasa and invited the United Nations to resume its human rights investigations in the country.

Stung by the accusations, the rebels responded with a commission of inquiry with foreign press accompaniment.

The rebel version suggested a maximum of 10 civilians killed in crossfire as rebel troops liberated Makobola in South Kivu province from an occupation by Congolese Mai-Mai militiamen and Burundian guerrillas from the Forces for the Defence of Democracy, both vaguely aligned with Kabila.

But several witnesses said rebel troops fired indiscriminately at civilians and burned huts and houses. There were strong suggestions of a cover-up.

The rebels hold on the eastern region of South Kivu looks increasingly tenuous. The Mai-Mai, who have considerable local support, attacked the lakeside town of Bukavu on Thursday, targeting the radio station and the airport. The rebels claimed to have repelled the raid, killing 47 of the enemy.

The rebels northern stronghold of Kisangani was bombed on January 10, with the rebels accusing Sudan, one of Kabila's more low-profile allies, of being responsible. Kisangani is the main headquarters for rebel military operations throughout the north.

The rebels have also been losing territory in the far north-west, with maverick commander Jean-Pierre Bemba forced out of three towns.

Kabila's forces have been accused of carrying out their own massacres in the north-west. But Kabila appears unphased by such charges, hinting that he now has the rebels on the run.

10. April 18, 1999 - Congo peace talks get back on track

AFTER several aborted meetings to find a peaceful solution to the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, another attempt at a peace initiative is under way in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, with the rebel group participating directly in the talks.

Sources close to the meeting say the fact that the rebels are taking part could be a major step forward after several attempts by Zambian President Frederick Chiluba to bring the warring sides together yielded nothing. Rebel leader Professor Wamba dia Wamba has always insisted on direct participation in any peace negotiations. Up to now, Congolese President Laurent Kabila has refused to negotiate with his opponents.

Secrecy surrounds the meetings, and no official comment has come from either side about any progress or lack of it. Zambia's Minister of Presidential affairs, Eric Silwamba, is chairing the peace talks.

Reports by own correspondents

11. June 20, 1999 - Prerequisites for peace

THE breakaway leader of the Congolese Rally for Democracy rebel movement, Emile Illunga, yesterday spelt out conditions to end the 10-month rebellion to topple the Democratic Republic of Congo's President Laurent Kabila.

The rebels who hope to convey their demands to the president at a peace summit in Lusaka on Saturday, want Kabila's troops to stop targeting civilians, release Tutsi prisoners held in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi and stop acts of genocide.

12. June 27, 1999 — Congo peace talks on ice

OLGA MANDA and JON QWELANE

THE ceasefire proposed by President Thabo Mbeki to end the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has failed, at least for the time being.

An agreement was due to have been signed in Lusaka by nearly all Southern African leaders last night but the talks deadlocked. This forced Mbeki to cancel his departure for the Zambian capital last night. Instead he attended the Siyabonga dinner at Midrand in honour of his predecessor, Nelson Mandela.

Late yesterday Mbeki's office was still optimistic about a ceasefire agreement, saying there was a possibility the President might leave for Zambia today.

But both Zambian President Frederick Chiluba and Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, Salim Ahmed Salim, said in Lusaka that the heads-of-state summit to consider the ceasefire agreement was definitely off for the time being and might resume within days .

Serious disagreements have threatened the talks all week, with the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese soil being the main bone of contention.

The Congo demanded the immediate departure of Rwandan, Burundi and Ugandan troops assisting the rebels because they were armies of occupation .

The rebels want all troops to leave simultaneously, including those from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, which are on Congo President Laurent Kabila's side.

To add to the confusion, Kabila's travelled to Harare for talks with his main backer, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, and ignored the meeting in Lusaka. Afterward he flew back to the Congo, forcing summit chairman Chiluba to send envoys after him to bring him back to the talks in Zambia. He refused to budge.

Mugabe was adamant he would not travel to Lusaka yesterday unless there was a concrete agreement to sign, and also hinted that he would send more troops into Congo next month — in addition to the 3000 he sent last week, bringing to 11 000 the Zimbabwean soldiers assisting Kabila.

The Congolese rebel movement yesterday refused to participate in the drafting of the accord unless Wamba dia Wamba, faction leader of the Congolese Rally for Democracy, was removed from the talks. The hitch was resolved by the intervention of Tanzania and Uganda.

By late last night the meeting of Southern African ministers, due to have been held on Thursday, has still not begun. The ministers were due to discuss and ratify the ceasefire agreement drawn up by their technical teams. Representing South Africa were foreign affairs Minister Nkosazana Zuma and Provincial Affairs Minister Sydney Mufamadi.

13. June 27, 1999 — Thabo stays home as Congo bid flops

Olga Manda and Jon Qwelane

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14. July 4, 1999 — Breakthrough in Congo talks

OFFICIALS representing the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and its rebel adversaries have agreed to form a unified army — and on a formula that will allow rebel fighters to hold onto territory under their control in the eastern third of the vast country.

The move has paved the way for the leaders of the warring parties and their foreign backers, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe to sign a ceasefire agreement at a summit meeting held in Lusaka.

Zambian president Frederick Chiluba, the chief mediator, said he hoped to convene that summit soon.

I'm almost bursting with excitement but that is as far as I can go. I will remain confident a ceasefire agreement will be signed very soon, he said.

The breakthrough occurred at talks between officials of rival forces convened by Zambian mediators in Lusaka.

Some points need to be polished, but there's an atmosphere of great optimism, said a senior Western diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Rebel official Bizima Karaha said the rebels would remain in the territory until details were worked out on administrative control across the Congo. — *Sapa-AP*

15. July 11, 1999 — SA troops face threat from rebel groups

Agreement spells out duties of Congo peacekeepers

Ray Hartley

THE peacekeeping force which will implement the Congo ceasefire will be expected to play a dangerous peace enforcement role, including disarming the militia and arresting those responsible for genocide.

The duties of a peacekeeping force, which is likely to include South African soldiers, were spelled out this weekend in the draft agreement to be signed by the warring Congolese parties and their backers in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. According to chapter eight of the agreement, which outlines a proposed United Nations peacekeeping mandate, the force will be responsible for:

- The tracking down and disarming of armed groups;
- Screening mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals;
- Handing over genocidaires to the international Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda; and
- Working out such measures (persuasive or coercive) as are appropriate for the attainment of the objectives of disarming, assembling, repatriation and reintegration into society of members of the armed groups

Chapter nine of the agreement goes further — stating that the force will also have to disarm Unita soldiers based in the Congo, from where they are waging war against the neighbouring Angolan government.

The mandate could see peacekeepers engaging in armed combat, as the armed splinter groups fighting in the Congo war are not likely to give themselves up voluntarily.

Among the most violent of the armed bandits operating in the vast country are members of the Interahamwe militia that was responsible for the slaughter of half a million Rwandans five years ago.

President Thabo Mbeki has pledged to send troops to the Congo as part of the peacekeeping force, although no decisions have yet been taken on the nature of this contribution.

One option being debated in government circles is a role for SANDF medic in the force, which will face tropical infections, malaria and snake bites in extremely hostile terrain.

The force will fall under a Joint Military Commission, which will be responsible to a Political Committee consisting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the countries involved in the talks — Congo, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Uganda and Rwanda. Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Zuma and Defence Minister Patrick Lekota will also sit on the committee.

The peace agreement, based on proposals made at a summit in Pretoria last year, includes plans to re-establish the Congolese state which has deteriorated into anarchy following years of misrule and corruption.

Chapter six of the agreement calls for a consultative mechanism among the Congolese parties which shall make it possible to carry out operations or actions throughout the national territory which are of general interest.

These would include a national immunisation programme, the marking of school leavers exams and the control of the movement of persons and goods.

PEACE TIMETABLE

DAY ONE: Signing of ceasefire

DAY TWO: Deadline for cessation of all hostilities

DAY THREE: Release of hostages

DAY SEVEN: Establishment of joint military commission and observer groups

DAY FOURTEEN: Disengagement of forces

DAY FIFTEEN: Selection of facilitator, redeployment of forces in conflict zones

ONE MONTH: Mobilisation of OAU observers and release of prisoners of war

ONE TO FOUR MONTHS: Disarmament of armed groups

ONE MONTH TO A YEAR: Measures to secure international borders

ONE AND A HALF MONTHS: Start of national dialogue

THREE MONTHS: Conclusion of national dialogue and establishment of new institutions of government

THREE TO NINE MONTHS: Re-establishment of state administration

FOUR MONTHS: Deployment of UN peacekeeping mission

SIX MONTHS: withdrawal of all foreign forces

ONE YEAR: Disarmament of non-military personnel

16. August 8, 1999 — Bombing claims shatter Congo peace prospects

Chris Simpson

ZAMBIAN President Frederick Chiluba says regional peace making is his favourite part of the job. But the past weeks events in the Democratic Republic of Congo will surely have tested even his relentless optimism.

Four weeks after Zambia brokered a peace accord in Lusaka, hostilities appear far from over.

Congolese President Laurent Kabila, one of the main signatories to the accord, stand accused of staging a new air offensive against rebel positions. Rebel leaders already sceptical of any ceasefire proposals, have talked of the need to retaliate.

The United Nations has once again warned that peacekeeping troops will not be sent to the republic unless both sides prove that they are serious about peace.

The new allegations against Kabila come from Jean-Pierre Bemba, commander of the Congolese Liberation Movement, which has taken over large chunks of territory in the north, including the former headquarters of the late Mobutu Sese Seko at Gbadolite.

Bemba had just given the Lusaka accord cautious endorsement when he changed when changed tack on Tuesday, repeatedly claiming that Kabila had bombed the villages of Makanza and Bogbonga, killing more than 500 people.

Kinshasa issued a denial, but Bemba withdrew his commitment to the accord and pledged to hit back.

The Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy, which found Bemba a wayward ally in the past, issued a similar warning. The organisation did not sign the Lusaka deal, partly because of suspicions over the whole peace process and fears of a sell-out, and partly because of internal divisions.

Meanwhile, a delegation of Zambians has been flying around the region, sounding out all relevant parties on where they now stand. Its findings are likely to be bleak.

On Thursday, it travelled to the cities of Goma and Kisangani, both held by the Congolese Rally for Democracy.

The delegation leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eric Silwamba, urged rebels to sign the accord, because without their signature there can be no end to the fighting.

But the rebels refused. Of course we want peace that's why we agreed to the Zambians coming here, said Emile Ilunga. But we have never had any illusions about Kabila. He is not trustworthy.

Ilunga, like Kabila, hails from the south-eastern region of Katanga, and was once a close associate of the president. But the old alliance has long been ruptured. I know this man, Ilunga said, He will sign a peace agreement on day and bomb you the next.

17. August 15, 1999 — SADC in third attempt to end region's wars

Jon Qwelane

THE Southern African Development Community summit, which takes place in Maputo later this week, will be the third time in a month that the 14 Southern African presidents have met to find solutions to two of the region's seemingly intractable civil wars.

The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has continued despite a ceasefire agreement signed in Lusaka, Zambia, last month by the governments of most of the region's countries.

The rebels failed to sign and then ignored a plea by the Organisation of African Unity to do so.

The OAU's call came at a summit in July which was attended by SADC leaders.

On Thursday, South African Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Zuma returned to Pretoria after a futile two-day foray to the Congo during which she tried to bring the bickering rebel factions together as a prelude to securing their signatures on the ceasefire pact.

The division within the rebel camp was so pronounced that, on arrival, Zuma was mobbed by competing representatives, each claiming to be the sole voice in the campaign to oust President Laurent Kabila.

At the Maputo meeting the deployment of regional peacekeeping forces in the Congo will be debated and a resolution passed, in keeping with a decision taken at the OAU summit last month.

Late last week, the SADC secretariat said the other important item on the agenda of the region's leaders was the 30-year-old Angolan civil war.

The summit will examine ways to intensify sanctions against the rebel Unita movement.

The presidents may even consider broadening the campaign by the ruling MPLA to crush Unita leader Jonas Savimbi — who has been declared a war criminal.

The organisation's secretariat has hinted at the presidents considering the possibility of deploying a multinational force to fight Unita.

While Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos will be attending the Maputo meeting, Savimbi will be absent.

18. January 9, 2000 — Rebels in unity talks

THREE Congolese rebel factions began a second round of talks in Uganda this week in an effort to unify their efforts in a 17-month-old civil war, Ugandan military sources said.

19. February 20, 2000 - Congo accord close

UN SECURITY Council members are nearing agreement on a resolution to send military observers to the Congo but are still negotiating a proposed arms embargo on rebel groups and the protection of civilians.

Council members heard a briefing this week from Assistant Secretary General Hedi Annabi on the difficult logistics of deploying the 500 observers and 5 137 logistics and security personnel to support them.

The US-sponsored resolution calls for observers to monitor implementation of a ceasefire signed last summer and lay the groundwork for possible deployment of a much larger UN peacekeeping force.

20. March 5, 2000 - SADC prepares to calm Congo

DEFENCE force chiefs from 11 Southern African Development Community countries met in Harare this week to begin paving the way for the deployment of their troops as international peacekeepers in Congo, writes HENRY LUDSKI.

Although there has been no mention yet by the United Nations of the involvement of any community countries in the peacekeeping operation, policing the conflict in the Congo looks set to be their first mission.

Community-trained peacekeeping forces, and South African National Defense Force troops in particular, are expected to form the nucleus of a special 5 537-strong UN force expected to be deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a few months time.

The Minister of Defense, Mosiuoa Lekota, said this week that the SA defense force would form the main bulwark of a peacekeeping force which would be deployed to restore peace and stability to the region.

The defense force has available 2000 troops and 500 military liaison officers who will be able to act as UN observers, a spokesperson said this week.

Addressing navy officers in Simon's Town this week, Lekota said only the highest calibre of troops would be selected for the peacekeeping mission.

In terms of the UN Security Council resolution adopted last week the 5 537 military personnel would be sent to the Congo to monitor the implementation of last July's stalled Lusaka ceasefire deal and pave the way for a larger UN intervention.

21. March 19, 2000 - SA delegation talks peace in the Congo

DELAYS in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo will not be tolerated, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Zuma and her counterpart from the Congo, Yerodia Ndonbase, said after a meeting yesterday.

SABC radio news reported that the high-level South African delegation which left on Friday for a 3-day visit to the Congo, met Ndonbase in Lubumbashi until around 3am yesterday. South Africa's Minister of Defense Mosiuoa Lekota and . Relations between the two countries have strained since the Congo government accused South Africa of secretly backing the rebels who have been fighting to oust Kabila since 1998.

Lekota said earlier this week that the United Nations had asked for South African troops to be part of an International peacekeeping force required under the Lusaka Peace Accord.

Before leaving for the talks, Zuma said: There has been some kind of expression that

22. April 30, 2000 - Zuma trip to include DRC peace summit

Mondli Makhanya

THE minister of foreign affairs, Nkosazana Zuma, left South Africa yesterday on a 30-day visit to seven countries on three continents.

This will be Zuma's 11th foray abroad this year. She is accompanying President Thabo Mbeki to Algeria for a summit on the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

From there she will go to Switzerland, Nigeria, Britain and several other countries, rounding off the trip by accompanying Mbeki on a state visit to the US.

The summit in Algiers, called by Algerian President and Organisation of African Unity chairman Abdelaziz Bouteflika, is aimed at getting the DRC peace accord back on track.

Zuma has been one of the main drivers of this peace process, having spent her first two weeks as a foreign minister in Zambia negotiating the pact. She also maintains contact with DRC President Laurent Kabila and the rebels fighting him.

This year alone Zuma has spent more than two months out of the country visiting more than 10 countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In March she spent only two weeks in South Africa, while in April she spent just over a week in the country.

She has stood in for Mbeki at inaugurations. During Mandela's tenure as president, this task was rotated among the deputy president and several senior ministers.

ANC insiders say there is a deliberate effort to sell Zuma to the world as one of Mbeki's possible successors.

23. June 18, 2000 - Museveni flies in for Congo talks

UGANDAN President Yoweri Museveni jetted to South Africa yesterday for a meeting with President Thabo Mbeki on the latest crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, writes CELEAN JACOBSON.

The recent clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in the northern Congolese city of Kisangani, in which 300 civilians were killed, is expected to be high on the agenda.

The Pretoria discussion comes as the UN Security Council on Friday called for the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from the city. Fighting between these two former allies threatens to stall UN plans to send a peacekeeping mission, which would include South African military personnel.

Mbeki and Museveni were also expected to discuss the call for the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of the Lusaka agreement signed last year, which would see the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Uganda's Foreign Minister, Eriya Kategaya, was also in attendance.

SIGNATORIES to the Lusaka agreement to end the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo will meet in the Zambian capital tomorrow to iron out the differences that have stalled the pact, writes OLGA MANDA.

The mediator in the Congo conflict, President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, has confirmed that all parties to the Lusaka agreement will attend. He dispelled fears that Laurent Kabila of Congo would be absent.

Chiluba met Kabila this week in the city of Lubumbashi, where he convinced him to attend tomorrow's summit.

One of the main reasons that the peace process has stalled is Kabila's failure to accept Ketumile Masire, former Botswana president, as dialogue facilitator.

The other problem has been the United Nations security council's intention to freeze the deployment of troops in the Congo. The UN says current conditions are not suitable for the deployment of peacekeepers.

The bloody 35-month war has sucked in six African states, fighting on different sides. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia back Kabila's government and Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi back the rebel forces, which have split into three factions.

25. January 7, 2001 — SA to take over DRC's peace drive Simon Zwane

SOUTH Africa has taken centre stage in the talks to end the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota replacing Zambian President Frederick Chiluba as the main mediator.

Lekota has been given the task of driving the process leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congo.

South Africa's assumption of the key role was requested by some of the belligerents in the two-year war. They felt Chiluba did not have the clout to get all the sides to the negotiating table.

Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have deployed troops to back President Laurent Kabila. Rwanda and Uganda have sent troops to help rebels trying to topple him.

Fighting has continued despite the signing of the Lusaka peace accord last July.

Dennis Kapata, a press secretary at the Zambian embassy, confirmed that South Africa had taken over from Chiluba as facilitator after belligerent forces did not get on on a number of issues.

South Africa was seen as a key player that could bring all parties together, he said.

However, he pointed out that South Africa's involvement was seen as supplementing Chiluba's efforts.

Zimbabwe's acting High Commissioner to South Africa, Mudekunya Danson, said President Thabo Mbeki had been asked by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Rwanda to become involved late last year.

He has respect across the board, said Danson.

Mbeki organised two meetings of heads of state in Mozambique towards the end of last year to smooth the implementation of the Lusaka accord. Zambia was not represented.

At the last meeting in November, it was agreed that Lekota should chair a committee of foreign ministers that is preparing for the implementation of the peace agreement. The committee comprises ministers from Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Congo.

Danson said another reason Lekota had been appointed to chair the committee was because South Africa was expected to contribute troops to the United Nations peacekeeping force to be deployed in Congo.

Lekota's spokesman, Sam Mkhwanazi, said the minister had already held several meetings with foreign ministers from Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Congo to examine why the accord had not been implemented.

Aides at the Rwandan and Angolan embassies in SA were still on leave and could not be reached for comment. A Namibian aide refused to comment because he was also on leave.

The head of the Africa Early Warning Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Richard Cornwell, warned that it would be foolish for South Africa to be drawn into a premature peace deal. Although it had significant influence in Rwanda and Angola, Cornwell said, all parties were prepared to continue fighting.

Jan van Eck of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, said it was important for South Africa to become involved.

Foreign Affairs spokesman Dumisani Rashaleng confirmed that South Africa was driving the peace process but said that this was supplementary to Chiluba's efforts.

26. January 28, 2001 — Help us end this terrible war!

Joseph Kabila appeals for meeting with Mbeki to discuss how South Africa can aid efforts to save his country from destruction

Bobby Jordan: Kinshasa

Rafora Rangongo and Simon Zwane: Johannesburg

THE Democratic Republic of Congo's new President, Joseph Kabila, has appealed to South Africa to help bring peace to his war-ravaged country.

And in his first address to the Congolese people on national television on Friday night, a solemn Kabila committed his country to relaunching the Lusaka Peace Accord and to restoring peace to the Great Lakes region.

Commenting on Kabila's overtures to South Africa, Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota said this week the government remained ready to move quicker and deploy troops under the United Nations.

Yesterday the South African government confirmed that President Thabo Mbeki would meet with Kabila in Kinshasa on Tuesday on his way back from the World economic forum summit in Davos, Switzerland.

Kabila requested help from South Africa in a series of discreet meetings with top South African diplomats in Kinshasa following the assassination of his father, DRC dictator, Laurent Kabila.

South Africa was represented in the discussions with Kabila by its ambassador to Kinshasa, Sisa Ngombane.

Talks got under way even before Kabila's swearing-in at the National Palace on Friday.

Ngombane told the Sunday Times team in Kinshasa this week that Kabila had said:

3. His priority was to end the civil war in the DRC;
4. He sees a big role for South Africa in the peace process; and
5. He wants to meet face to face with Mbeki to discuss South African assistance to the DRC.

Kabila's comments are the strongest signal yet that there could be an end to the stalemate in the DRC peace process, and the possible deployment of 6 000 UN peacekeeping troops.

The young leader's comments also signalled possible progress towards implementing the 1999 Lusaka Peace Accord, under which South Africa would head a technical team to establish infrastructure ahead of the deployment of a UN peace force.

Laurent Kabila always strongly opposed South Africa's involvement.

However, Ngombane said Joseph Kabila had said this week that peace was critical and very urgent and cannot be delayed any further.

He did indicate that he feels South Africa has a big role to play — he has been moved by the messages of condolence he received from the South African government after his father was assassinated.

Lindiwe Zulu, Foreign Affairs' chief director of Equatorial Africa, said: we think he's taking South Africa's involvement seriously because he's looking at both the political and economic problems.

Ngombane said there were strong indications that Kabila could review various regulations signed during his father's presidency which effectively banned South African investment in the mineral rich country.

In our contact with him he made a specific reference to the need for economic growth in his country. He said the Congolese people have an expectation that things will change for the better, Ngombane said.

- Son of slain Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba launched a court action against Belgium on Friday, accusing Congo's former colonial ruler of hiding its role in his father's murder.

We want to know the truth about the assassination, Roland Lumumba 43, told Reuters after his lawyers filed the suit in a Kinshasa court.

