

MA THESIS: NAMIBIA'S LONG ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

THE BOTHA ERA

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**ABSTRACT**

**TITLE:** NAMIBIA'S LONG ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE:THE BOTHA ERA  
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This thesis deals with the ten years preceding Namibia's independence in March 1990. It examines the various characters and groups in this process, and how their roles delayed or promoted it. The era of Pieter W. Botha is very significant in that his rule brought many changes to the decision-making process and content of South African foreign policy. This period, 1978 - 1989, marked the formulation of the Total National Strategy in response to the Total Onslaught being waged on South Africa by perceived hostile external forces.

Namibia's transition to independence suffered under this military-oriented policy as did the rest of the region. Never before in South Africa's policy-making history had the security sector played such a major role. Regional relations changed subsequent to the policy changes because of the distorted vision the Botha regime had of black-ruled states. Namibia was seen as an important pawn in the Total National Strategy as the last buffer state in Southern Africa protecting South Africa's white minority regime.

## INTRODUCTION

"Then it came - betrayal, whimperingly, like a beaten dog, it cringed into the mouths of politicians: it was called...Resolution 435. And instead of kicking it back into the darkness that had spawned it, the politicians petted it, caressed it, nurtured it - and accepted it. Resolution 435, the final betrayal of a nation, a land, a legion of dead and crippled young men." (Vrye Weekblad:6-12/9/1991:8)

"Swartmentse, wat ter wille van vrede in dieretuine tuisshoort, is onintelligent wesens wat poskantore opblaas, hul hospitale met dooie en verminkte vroue en kinders volmaak en haatge vulde geskryfte skryf waarin totale uitwissing en verwoesting bepleit word." (Vrye Weekblad:6-12/9/1991:6)

These two extracts epitomise the feelings of South African rightwingers toward the independence of Namibia and the black inhabitants of the Southern African region as a whole. This attitude is the legacy of the National Party's Apartheid policies since their accession to power in 1948. These policies created racial hatred and violence of an unprecedented nature. Also, by virtue of their dependency on South Africa, the Southern African states were plunged into a state of chaos as a consequence of the economic, military and political strategies employed by the South African government.

The fight for independence in Namibia should be seen in this context of racial discrimination and the policies of the all-powerful South African state. The role of the South African military in the Namibian independence process has been exposed in the alternative press (Weekly Mail, Vrye Weekblad, South, New Nation) and by various academics (Davies and O'Meara, Chan, Geldenhuys). They have proved that the South African government used every possible means available to them to stall the

inevitable, prior to but especially during the Botha era. None of the governments before 1978 wreaked as much damage on the region, in both economic and human terms, as did the Botha regime.

Chapter One of this thesis will provide an historical foundation for the Botha era, for a country's present state cannot be analysed unless its past is understood. The United Nations' Security Council Resolution 435 took twelve years to be implemented. During this time the South African regime passed laws and set up structures such as the Turnhalle Conference, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the Interim Assembly and the Multi-Party Conference as alternatives to the United Nations (UN) proposed measures. South Africa also used Namibia as a military springboard into Angola in the war against the latter state.

Chapter two forms the theoretical framework of this paper. The basic premise is that a decision-making regime exists in the South African state. This paper examines the development of theories of foreign policy and offers a critique of the regime theory. Regime theory is then applied to the South African context in Chapter three in an attempt to prove that decision regimes exists in the policy-making structures. Kegley's regime analysis is used extensively due to its resourcefulness and applicability to the South African context.

In chapters three and four regime theory is applied to Botha's Namibian policy, especially the Total National Strategy (TNS)

which was spawned of the 'total strategy' first espoused by Prime Minister BJ Vorster in the early 1970s. Pieter Willem Botha, the Defence Minister of the Vorster regime in 1978, developed the concept of total strategy into governmental policy. The strategy set the rules for foreign and domestic policies under the guidance of the state's highest decision-making body, the State Security Council (SSC). Through this body, the powers of the state were heightened and, due to the increased participation of the military in the decision-making structures, the nature of foreign and domestic policies became more militarised. These chapters will also examine the dualist policies of South Africa with regard to Namibia and the rest of the region.

Following the analysis of the impact of TNS, an indepth study will be conducted of the roles the Western Contact Group and the UN played in the independence struggle of the Namibian people. The foreign policy of the United States of America's Reagan Administration toward South Africa will be under scrutiny because it played a significant role in stalling the independence process by linking the Namibian issue to the presence of the Cuban forces in Angola.

The reasons for South Africa's behaviour in the negotiation process are varied. This study will attempt to clarify each reason and offer an overall analysis of the impact the Botha era had on the independence of Namibia. In conclusion, it will evaluate the applicability of the decision regime theory to Botha's foreign policy.

## CHAPTER 1      HISTORICAL SETTING 1974 - 1978

South Africa's grand plan for Namibia began to take shape in 1974. From the early years of Namibia's colonial history, it had been under the sway of imperial powers. The Germans colonised the area in 1884 and surrendered the territory to South Africa in 1915 after the latter had defeated the Germans in Namibia during the First World War. From the outset the Namibian people were against colonial rule with the most notable revolts being the Great Uprising of 1903, the 1922 Bondelswarts protests and the 1932 Ipumbu Revolt. The South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), established in 1960, organised protests against colonial rule and fostered feelings of nationalism amongst the Namibian people which would ultimately lead to their independence.

The South African colonial period was characterised by the policy of separate development and the regimented control of the labour force. The Odendaal Commission of 1964 laid the building blocks for the reserve policy when it proposed ten native homelands, a form of self-government, and white and coloured areas in the territory (Cockram:1970:24). Despite Vorster's meeting with the Special Representative of the UN General Secretary in 1972 where he agreed not to formally annex the territory, this policy still applied to Namibia since Vorster still regarded it as an integral part of South Africa (Jaster:1988:28).

Prior to the dissolution of the League of Nations, Namibia was a 'C' mandate territory under the administration of South Africa.

The League's Covenant instructed the mandatary to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants" (Paragraph 1 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations). However, when the United Nations was formed in 1946, South Africa refused to hand over its mandated territory to the Trusteeship Council which had taken over the colonised countries.

South Africa had two main objectives for Namibia and these were to promote white rule in Namibia and to create a subordinate and malleable working class (Totemeyer:1989:3). White rule in Namibia was crucial to South Africa's continued position as the regional power in Southern Africa. An additional reason behind South Africa's reluctance to release its mandate was that by maintaining Namibia as part of South Africa, it would be able to use it as a springboard into Angola thereby facilitating its attacks on SWAPO in that country.

Prime Minister B.J Vorster was able to create "a period of great white confidence in South Africa's ability to ride out the storms and provide a secure future for its white inhabitants" (Geldenhuis:1984:34). Vorster was a diplomat by nature and consequently adopted an outward policy or detente initiative towards the rest of Africa. He had inherited a politically bleak landscape from Verwoerd. The Sharpeville uprisings in 1960 heralded a new era in South African domestic politics and its repercussions reverberated into the 1970s. The hardening attitude of the international community after Sharpeville also created

problems for South Africa. International pressure increased when the South African government demonstrated its readiness to violently suppress any opposition to its power whether domestic or regional.

As a result of South Africa's more belligerent stance and its reluctance to grant independence to Namibia, the people of Namibia formed liberation movements, and church, youth, cultural and worker pressure groups. The ideology of African Nationalism was a strong, binding aspect as "it sought to create a progressive, independent state and government...and to foster a spirit of collective purpose among all the people of Namibia" (Potholm and Dale:1972:88). SWAPO became the mouthpiece of the majority of Namibians at international forums like the UN and the Organisation for African Unity. In 1966 the UN declared South Africa's occupation illegal thereby giving the liberation movement increased leverage in its struggle against apartheid and colonial rule. SWAPO re-evaluated its diplomatic methods in 1966 and decided to "change tactics when it became clear that petitioning the UN and pursuing a non-violent approach in the nationalist struggle was not going to produce the desired results" (Katjavivi:1988:570).

Throughout the 1970's, the legitimacy of the South African government was being challenged. The National Party government faced an organic crisis which had its roots within the domestic political arena and within the party itself. Its legitimacy was under siege amongst the disenfranchised black majority and was

challenged by party hardliners who opposed the type of reform that Vorster propagated. The Rhodesian talks were cancelled, the Portuguese coup in 1974 against the Caetano regime delivered independence for Mozambique and Angola, and internal opposition to the National Party became more vociferous. These changes affected both the regional and domestic policies of South Africa leading to a more security-orientated policy being developed. The sacred cordon sanitaire was being threatened by the newly independent Marxist-Leninist Frontline States. Angola's independence posed significant problems because it meant that Namibia was the only buffer state between communist Africa and white-ruled South Africa. It also implied that an MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Angola would be more sympathetic to SWAPO guerrillas thereby giving them a broader base from which to operate against South African forces in Namibia.

In an University of Cape Town Honours' thesis entitled Not Giving Peace a Chance - Why Namibia Did Not Achieve Independence in 1978 (unpublished), Dean Prinsloo is cited as saying that the independence of these states was countered by South Africa tightening its hold on Namibia by passing

"a resolution in which it extended an invitation to all the population groups in the territory to come together in consultation with the aim of finding a political solution which will ensure that they will be able to live in peace, safety and prosperity in SWA in such a way that the interests of minority groups will

properly be taken into account" (Collins:1990:10).

In doing this, South Africa attempted to set up a moderate front of indigenous Namibian groups as a viable alternative to a possible SWAPO government. 1975 has been acknowledged as a watershed year for Southern Africa. On the international level, Britain terminated the 1955 Simonstown Agreement thereby effectively ending the hopes of the South African government of becoming an integral part of Western defence.

1975 also brought further attempts by the South African regime to manipulate Namibia's political development. The first ethnically based conference was held in the Turnhalle building in Windhoek in September 1975. The meeting became known as the Turnhalle Conference. Serfontein was correct in stating that the "only thing the Turnhalle talks had achieved was to give apartheid and discrimination 'a new mask' by pretending that a new era was being entered into" (1976:284). South Africa was prepared to set up a puppet government in Namibia as an alternative to the UN proposed negotiations with SWAPO and all the other parties in Namibia. A Declaration of Intent was drawn up after the first session which called for a constitution within three years. "It was important primarily for its clear and unequivocal rejection of force to obtain independence or change" (Carter and O'Meara eds:1979:160).

The Turnhalle Conference set up power-sharing structures with the white minority political groups having more power than the

ethnically based groups. It leaned toward "consociation... with a strong element of group autonomy" (Leistner and Esterhuysen eds:1991:45). The homelands or reserve system provided a conceptual base for the Conference providing ethnic voting blocs and delegates. Since the delegates were chosen by the South African government, this effectively sabotaged any chance of the Conference being accepted internationally. Another negative point was that SWAPO was excluded from the proceedings. Rotberg claims that the Conference was "designed to perpetuate white control over the kinds of governmental functions that most affected whites. Housing, educational and medical segregation would, in effect, continue" (1981:198). South Africa also increased its estrangement in the region by launching Operation Savannah against Angola in 1975. It became apparent that although South Africa was willing to engage in talks with certain sectors of the Namibian political arena, it remained intent on crushing SWAPO militarily and intimidating its regional supporters.

In 1976 the Turnhalle talks became more intense due to increased international pressure on South Africa. The 1976 Soweto Riots and resulting suppression by the government evoked widespread disapproval from the international community. A constitutional committee was set up under Dirk Mudge to create an interim government which would draft a constitution for an independent Namibia (Barber and Barratt:1990:200). The proposed date of independence was 31 December 1978. UN Resolution 385 had given the South African government and army until the end of August 1976 to withdraw from the territory. The Turnhalle Conference

then produced a statement of principles in August promising independence by the agreed date in 1978. This document had not been signed by South Africa and therefore this country could not be held liable for any actions which went against its principles.

Davis and Landis (Leistner and Esterhuysen eds:1978:162) argue that the statement proposed

"a different future for Namibia: the continuation of black domination by whites; the continuation of Bantustans; and the continuation of foreign exploitation of Namibia's vast mineral resources without the benefit to the general black population. The major differences would be the existence of formal independence and the creation of a government in which a number of blacks would play visible roles".

This was not what the Namibian people needed nor what the international community was requesting. South Africa had followed this road with minor reforms (such as the participation of moderate black delegates) but devised the plan in such a way as to limit the ultimate level of reform that occurred.

In 1976 Turnhalle delegates wished to involve SWAPO in the talks in an effort to give the proceedings more legitimacy but they failed because SWAPO had resolved not to participate in a South African sponsored plan.

"The Dakar Declaration of 1976 recognised SWAPO as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people, denounced South Africa's continued illegal occupation and its usage of Namibia for attacking Angola, and endorsed SWAPO's argument that when all other means have failed armed struggle is a legitimate and justified means of liberation" (Serfontein:1976:338).

The UN's support of SWAPO was a setback for the Turnhalle Conference yet South Africa refused to abandon the process.

The Turnhalle talks continued despite widespread opposition and in effect did not constitute a victory for the Namibian people. In 1977 it passed legislation which set up a three-tier government based purely along ethnic lines. The first tier was the local government, the second the regional and the third the national or central government. According to Dirk Mudge, leader of the white delegation, the rationale behind this was that "one of the conditions for success of the Conference was that the 'existence of separate ethnic groups must be recognised'" (Barber and Barratt:1990:200).

The Western Nations also supported a swift independence for Namibia due to the threat of Cuban involvement in Angola in support of its MPLA government. The main incentive which brought the United States to this point was its fear of the Cold War being transferred to Sub-Saharan Africa. United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, stated that the United States was demanding "an early independence, SWAPO participation in any future constitutional discussions and UN control or observation of elections" (Serfontein:1976:355). A Western bloc needed to be formed in order to counter the perceived drive of communism through Southern Africa. The Western Nations objected to the Turnhalle Conference and, as an alternative, proposed a joint initiative under the auspices of the Western Contact Group. The Group was made up of three permanent members of the Security Council: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and two additional members, Canada and West Germany. The Group was established as a means to guard Western interests in Southern

Africa. Katjavivi claims that "They...wanted to avoid a radicalisation of Southern Africa through a long-drawn-out armed liberation struggle, since this might jeopardise their long-term economic and strategic interests in the area" (1988:114). Its proposals were delivered to Vorster in 1977 and were the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 385 (1976).

This resolution called for UN supervised elections, the release of political prisoners, the free return of Namibian exiles, and the cancellation of the Turnhalle Conference and its proposals (Barber and Barratt:1990:222). In August 1977 the appointment of Judge M.T Steyn as Administrator General marked the end of the Turnhalle era.

South Africa had rejected the proposals tabled by the Contact Group yet had to concede victory to the latter because of various pressures facing South Africa. One major issue was the UN Arms Embargo of 1977 which limited the trade of arms between South Africa and the rest of the world. The 1976 uprisings also heightened the internal pressure to effect a resolution of the Namibian question. The international community's response also increased pressure on South Africa to affect meaningful change. Barber and Barratt argue that

"Pretoria, succumbing to the mounting pressures, had to revert to the international track of its two-track policy. Vorster had in effect lost the initiative on Namibia, as he had on detente, and moreover he was now faced with a serious domestic racial crisis which aroused international opinion against his government as never before" (1990:203).

Serfontein labels South Africa's concession to the Group as "(a) face-saving device to avoid a public embarrassment and political humiliation for Vorster...even it was detrimental to South Africa's self-interest" (1976:364). However, he argues that the Turnhalle talks came too late and gave too little in terms of power to the Namibian people. It was also run from Pretoria, had no legal authority and was not strong enough to survive without the support of the South African regime (Serfontein:1976:369).

1977 marked the year of changes in the United States' relations with South Africa. United States President Jimmy Carter was elected on a human rights ticket and this affected his administration's policies towards racist South Africa. In Rotberg and Barratt's book Conflict and Compromise in South Africa (1980:24), Dugard claims that the Carter administration was accused of attempting to prescribe a solution to South Africa's problems and of using the issue for its own domestic gain. Kissinger was replaced by Cyrus Vance, and Andrew Young became the United States representative at the UN. By the end of May 1977, Vorster declared that a Central Administrative Authority would be set up in Namibia to provide a transitional body until the permanent government could be set up after independence. He also gave the Administrator General more powers to deal with the political problems arising in Namibia prior to independence. Vorster misjudged Steyn who immediately began effecting meaningful reform by repealing the Mixed Marriages Act and modifying the pass laws (Carter and O'Meara eds:1978:169).

The Turnhalle Conference collapsed in 1977 with the appointment of the Administrator General and the announcement by Vorster that an interim government would not be set up by the Conference. Steyn managed to maintain order yet promote meaningful social change (Rotberg:1981:203). Vorster had also ended the Turnhalle's constitution-making role and provided for a transitional administration (Totemeyer and Seiler:1980:91). This was the first major concession that Vorster had made in terms of granting Namibia space to make her own decisions. It resulted in the breakaway of the Dirk Mudge contingent and other moderate black leaders. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) was formed in order to offer a middle road for voters not wishing to vote for the National Party nor SWAPO. In retrospect, however, the Turnhalle talks were doomed to failure for various reasons. The formation of a centrist political force led to a realignment of parties in Namibia and subsequently a changed balance of power. The controversy surrounding the talks stimulated political debate in South Africa which left the government uncomfortable. Furthermore, the realisation that the talks were not internationally acceptable led to a scramble for other diplomatic solutions such as the Western Contact Group (Leistner and Esterhuysen eds:1991:45).

The negotiations between South Africa, the Contact Group and Namibia started in February 1978. This process was stalled by both South Africa and SWAPO at various stages. South Africa did not wish to relinquish power over the independence process but was forced to because of internal and international pressure.

SWAPO did not trust its country's occupier and yet it was forced to continue the talks by the Front Line States (FLS) of Angola and Mozambique. The 'proximity talks' began in February in New York in an attempt to break the stalemate in negotiations. Neither South Africa nor SWAPO wished to attend meetings together and therefore a shuttle system was devised which allocated times to each party for negotiation via the mediator: the Contact Group.

In April 1978, after many alterations to the original document which had been based on UNSC Resolution 385 (1976), the Contact Group tabled its proposals. These included the role of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in determining the size of the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), the agreement that the Administrator General would retain power over the Namibian police, that the wishes of the constituent assembly would be considered during UN supervised elections and that the South African forces would be confined to two bases (Katjavivi:1988:118-119). Free and fair elections under the control of the UN were to be held after four months.

Watts reports that South Africa accepted these agreements in April and simultaneously launched Operation Reindeer into Angola in an attempt to destroy SWAPO bases at Cassinga (Rotberg:1983:21). Operations Daisy and Protea were launched before the final agreement between the two parties was reached. Walvis Bay was excluded from these proposals as the negotiators

felt that the issue would antagonise the South African and SWAPO contingents.

The talks were scuttled by the abrupt departure of the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha. He claimed that his power to make decisions had been limited and needed to return to receive further direction from the South African government. One important aspect to be noted during this period was that South Africa attended the talks and appeared to be willing to grant independence to Namibia but yet continued to follow its two-pronged strategy with military attacks on SWAPO bases, Namibian civilians and the FLS. Proclamation AG 26 by South Africa permitted the Administrator General to arrest the internal executive of SWAPO for impeding the flow of law and order in Namibia (To Be Born A Nation:1987:240). Esterhuysen asserts that the South African strategy was twofold as it continued the "international negotiation in terms of R385 and the steering of internal political developments in such a way as to present the international community and SWAPO with a series of faits accomplis" (Leistner and Esterhuysen eds:1991:46).

This dualist policy created distrust and tensions in the negotiation process. South Africa accused the UN and the Contact Group of being biased towards SWAPO and SWAPO believed the opposite due to the Western nations' trading links with South Africa. Stanley Uys reported in the Rand Daily Mail (11/7/1978) that there were two factors pushing SWAPO to a regional settlement with the Western Contact Group. The Frontline States

were pressurising Namibia for the sake of regional peace and dissention in the upper ranks of SWAPO regarding a settlement created a favourable negotiating atmosphere. The UNSC Resolution 431 was finally accepted on the 27 July 1978.

"By this resolution, the Security Council took note of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation and requested that the Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative for Namibia 'to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations'. The resolution also requested that the Secretary-General submit a report containing his recommendations for the settlement of the Namibian situation" (United Nations:1988:1).

Martti Ahtisaari was elected as Special Representative and first visited Namibia and South Africa in August 1978. To add insult to injury, on the same day that R431 was ratified by the Security Council, R432 was also passed. It stated that Walvis Bay was an integral part of Namibia therefore South Africa should return the enclave to its rightful owners. Barber and Barratt state that this resolution was a compromise to meet SWAPO's concerns and to obtain support for R431, but Pretoria furiously reacted against it, and although Pretoria reiterated its acceptance in principle of the Western proposals, doubts and mistrusts were emerging yet again. These were compounded by disputes over the interim arrangements, with Pretoria suspicious that the UN was attempting to take control rather than monitor the situation (1990:224).

In September 1978 Vorster resigned from his position as Prime Minister and affirmed South Africa's intention to proceed with its own election plans (Carter and O'Meara eds:1979:173). South Africa rejected the proposed size of the UNTAG forces and the

extent of power held by the Special Representative, and criticised the Representative's failure to consult with the Administrator General. Pretoria also opposed the reduction of its troop size and the fact that they were to be confined to two bases. As a result of this, the Administrator General passed AG37 calling for Namibians to register for an election in opposition to the Western plan.

Vorster's defence minister, Pieter Willem Botha took over the reigns of government on the 28 September 1978, a day before UNSC Resolution 435 was passed. This resolution was an amalgamation of R385, R431 and R432. It decided to establish UNTAG for a maximum period of twelve months in order to assist the Special Representative to ensure the independence of Namibia via free and fair elections. The resolution welcomed the willingness of SWAPO to co-operate and adhere to the call for a ceasefire, requested that South Africa co-operate with the Secretary General, and declared that any non-UN supervised actions by the South African administration were to be regarded as illegal (PCR Information:1988:25).

Despite the signing of R435, South Africa continued to press for elections in Namibia before the end of 1978. The DTA won the election which was regarded as being a farce because of the absence of SWAPO and other left-wing parties. In an interview with DTA member, Moses Kozonguizi stated that the DTA won 41 of the 50 seats in the Constituent Assembly elections in 1978. At the time South Africa claimed that the elections were for a

National Assembly which would aid the Administrator General. The Constituent Assembly was only upgraded to a National Assembly in 1980. On the one hand South Africa argued with the UN on the other South Africa was concerned with setting up opposition structures.

Domestically Vorster had also failed to create an environment in Namibia that was either internally or externally acceptable. The Soweto uprising had also come at a very inopportune moment when UNSC R385 demanded the withdrawal of the Republic by August 1976, the Turnhalle conference had not been granted international acceptance and the UN's Council for Namibia was set up "to act as formal administrative authority in exile" (Rotberg:1981:199). All these setbacks challenged the South African government to change its racist policies.

The 1976 uprisings became a national struggle waged at the schools, factories, mines, churches, etcetera.

"In short, and at the risk of stating the obvious, the organised mass struggle of 1976 manifested a total rejection of white domination and a revolutionary movement for a fundamental change in the balance of power" (Lodge:1983:334).

The increased pressure from the UN on the Namibian independence issue led to an escalation of domestic unrest within South Africa. The MPLA and Frelimo victories in the old Portuguese colonies had done much to encourage liberatory sentiment in Southern Africa. The liberation movements still waging their struggles in the region received more attention from the

international community as the South African government increased its repression.

The economic crisis of the 1970s also created major problems for the National Party. The capitalist class called for reform in labour control practices in an attempt to maintain profit margins. The right-wingers opposed any reform which would grant the black citizens any leverage in the political arena. In effect, the National Party was being faced by the worst crisis it had ever experienced since 1948. In an article titled "'Muldergate' and the Politics of Afrikaner Nationalism", Dan O'Meara states that

"(t)he verligte wing began to push for far-reaching policy reforms, particularly with respect to labour and state control of the economy...The right was demanding a maintenance of tight influx control measures, restrictions on the employment of skilled African labour, no form of recognition of African trade unions and continued state control of the infrastructural sectors of the economy" (Work in Progress 22:1982:11).

During the most intense period of negotiation over the Namibian independence process, Vorster made the biggest mistake of his career: Muldergate. It emerged that the Bureau of State Security, the Department of Information and other conservative National Party members attempted to win domestic and foreign public support by financing the English medium pro-government newspaper The Citizen with money from the Information Department.

"The multi-million dollar campaign had been attempting for six years to use public funds, without the knowledge of Parliament, to influence media, politicians, and other opinion makers in the United States, Europe, and Africa" (Hachten and Giffard:1984:230).

This effectively destroyed National Party conservative, Connie Mulder's, chances of running for election in 1978. The period during which these attempts at media manipulation were most intense coincided with the Turnhalle Conference in Namibia, the negotiation process with the Contact Group, and the passing of UNSC R385, R431 and R432. These right-wingers felt that the Vorster government was becoming too reformist and attempted to curb this by means of pro-South African propaganda. Despite these underhand tactics, the Contact Group threatened to apply sanctions against South Africa. The UN Arms Embargo of 1977 was an example of the extent of the pressure the Group was willing to apply.

From this overview, it is clear that the UN's role up till 1978 in the process towards Namibia's independence was often perfunctory in spite of the popular support its resolutions amassed. It was not until the Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique had demonstrated their fortitude that the Western powers in the UNSC came to regard Southern Africa as a region requiring their sustained attention. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola after South Africa's failed invasion in 1976 added a note of urgency to their efforts to avert protracted liberatory wars and another intractable Cold War arena. With UNSC Resolution 435, the UN sought to make its role in Namibia far more sustained, coherent and effective. UNSC R435 marked a new era for Namibia as well as South Africa and indeed the region as a whole.

## CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theory of International Relations has evolved immensely since the start of the twentieth century. Not only have the theoretical analyses developed quantitatively but they have also become more qualitative. K.J Holsti (1983) sets out the development of the approaches to the study of International Politics. The traditionalists, the grand theorists, the middle-range analysts and the 'peace researchers' have contributed greatly to the development of the discipline (1983:8-12). Lloyd Jensen's work, Explaining Foreign Policy (1982), also posits various models of analysis of foreign policy-making. These include the strategic or rational model which attempts to open Easton's 'black box', the decision-making approach which has become the main area of investigation, the bureaucratic politics model which examines the roles played by the various bureaucracies, the adaptive model which attempts to explain how constraints and opportunities determine a state's policy, and finally, the incremental decision-making model which argues that because of the large array of options, foreign policy-makers tend to "tinker" with existing policies (1982:5-9). Despite this array of models, Charles Kegley asserts that research has reached an impasse because political analysts have not paid much attention to the formulation of foreign policy (Hermann et al:1987:247).

At this point it would be useful to define the concept of foreign policy. It encapsulates both the means and the ends of the external relationships of the government in question.

"We will view **foreign policy** as a set of authoritative decisions taken in the name

of the state that are intended to achieve certain goals in the international arena. In other words, **foreign** in foreign policy applies to anything beyond the legal boundaries of a particular state; and **policy** we define as a guide to action intended to realise the goals a state (i.e authoritative decision makers) has set for itself" (Toma and Gorman:1991:120).

The ends and means theory is supported by Couloumbis and Wolfe's definition (1978:89) which states that "foreign policy consists of two (fundamental) elements: national **objectives** to be achieved and **means** for achieving them". A state needs to examine the closest end to their objectives. There are many constraints that obstruct the achievement of the objectives. The domestic and international milieu have great influence on state policy. Also, as Kissinger states, "the domestic structure crucially affects the way the actions of other states are interpreted"; in other words, the foreign policy (Kissinger in Hanreider:1971:24).

The concept of foreign-policy has been delineated into comparative studies of foreign policy-making, the study of the behaviour of policy-makers and the analysis of the rationale that lies behind specific policies. According to Wilkenfeld and associates,

"(f)irst foreign policy indicators should rely upon structured observations and codifications of interstate events. Second, the individual foreign policy actions of a state, described as events, should relate to a portrayal of foreign policy activity. Third, the foreign policy events should provide information pertaining both to state behaviour and to actions with are initiated by other states and may affect foreign policy (as a part of the interstate component)" (1980:114).

Their investigation of foreign policy behaviour is invaluable as it deals with a review and critique of existing frameworks and offers an entirely new analysis by means of the Interstate Behaviour Analysis (IBA) framework. Five variable areas are identified: decision-maker values, public opinion, economic indicators, international trade and international organisation memberships (Wilkenfeld et al:1980:34).

Despite this large array of analyses, there is a paucity of analysis that looks at South African foreign policy in depth. There have been scholars like Greg Mills who, in his doctoral thesis entitled South Africa: The Total National Strategy and Regional Policy During the Botha Years, 1978 - 1989 (Lancaster:1990), examined PW Botha's regional policy. His policy analysis is of great significance yet it does not entail a theoretical analysis of how policy is arrived at. In other words, what determines policy at a theoretical level?

Garth Sheldon's article deals with foreign policy-making in South Africa (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986). Sheldon examines in three distinct phases the making of foreign policy in the South African context. The first deals with competition and conflict between the decision-makers whether they be military or civil. Phase two provides insight into departmental disagreements, and phase three examines the choice of an alternative via competition and consensus (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:6-7). He attempts to eliminate the "shopping list approach" that has been previously adopted and "(concentrates) on identifying, ranking and

explaining internal and external source variables which are demonstrably crucial to South Africa's foreign policy decision making process" (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:16). His level of analysis is sophisticated yet the study seems to lack insight into domestic policy-making. Sheldon only examines two "key" internal sources of pressure: the white sector of the population and the business community (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:11). Foreign policy is determined by domestic policy, and therefore his omission of this factor creates a lack of in-depth analysis. For instance, South African liberation movements played a significant role over the long-term as a pressure group and, as a result of this pressure, South African foreign policy was compelled to change.

The main body of theoretical analysis deals with foreign policy-making in the core of the world system, as Pat McGowan prefers to term it. These economically stronger countries, as opposed to the lesser developed countries (1991:11), have received more analytical attention than the latter. Many authors are also Western writers who analyse from their specific world-view. However, due to the lack of African analyses of foreign policy-making, the existing methods of analysis will have to be employed in this paper.

The available frameworks of analysis deal with the development of foreign policy as a result of observable external and internal pressures. JJ Van Wyk states that "foreign policy behaviour could be described as any observable activity where the government of

a society interacts with other governments that are part of the society's external environment" (International Affairs Bulletin Vol12/No2:1988:42). His analysis deals with the novel approach of events-data in South Africa. Holsti, in his book International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (1983:21), asserts the following:

"The student who analyses the actions of a state toward external environment and the conditions - usually domestic - under which those actions are formulated is concerned essentially with foreign policy".

He also defines policy as being "the decisions that define goals, set precedents, or lay down courses of action, and the actions taken to implement those decisions" (Holsti:1983:21). Firstly, this definition only examines those aspects of foreign policy-making that are observable, and secondly, it ignores a whole plethora of effects that determine which policy finally gets accepted and applied. Those aspects which are not observable are found in the external and domestic environments but have not been included by Holsti in this particular definition. In all fairness, Holsti does analyse foreign policy outputs as a consequence of orientations and roles of the states, and the psychological make up of the decision-makers which, together, constitute the whole (1983). Pat McGowan cites Dessler as saying there are

"`two uncontentious truths about social life'.  
The first truth is that the events, outcomes and actions of the social world are the product of human agency - the observable, real undertakings and projects of individual men and women acting alone and in groups and organisations such as the state.  
The second truth is that human agency can only take place in concrete historical circumstances

that 'condition the possibilities for action and influence its course' (International Affairs Bulletin Vol13/No3:1989:39).

McGowan further argues that new criteria should be found in order to examine the effects that different types of structural factors will have on the process of foreign policy-making and the implementation of those policies (International Affairs Bulletin Vol13/No3:1989:52).

Joe Hagan, in a chapter titled "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy" (Hermann et al:1987) proposes four basic sets of actors affecting foreign policy, as opposed to McGowan's structural characteristics. Personality, factional and bureaucratic leadership divisions, legislative and non-executive actors sharing power with the executive, politically active segments of society in the form of bureaucratic and interest group actors and, finally, the less structured activity of the mass public by means of opinion polls and civil unrest all affect foreign policy. Hagan attributes changes in foreign policy largely to the internal dynamics of a country.

One common underlying concept in these definitions is 'observable' human behaviour. However, human behaviour is conducted within an environment, and the cultures and norms of that sphere will be manifest in that person's actions. There is the added issue of socialisation of the person which is a conglomeration of genetic, psychological and sociological

characteristics. This combination is what the theoreticians are examining in foreign policy analysis. Kegley asserts that

"we've been asked to believe that foreign policy behaviours are influenced almost exclusively by the internal characteristics of nations or the attributes of those nation's external environments" (Hermann et al:1987:248).

Easton's 'black box' theory, as mentioned in Kegley's chapter in New Directions in the Making of Foreign Policy (Hermann et al:1987:248), has been discounted because it views the formulation of policy in a closed environment which is not open to examination by researchers. By opening the 'box', analysts have discovered a new area of analysis which casts a completely new light on the foreign policy of a country. Hagan quotes Wilkenfeld as follows: "there were 'large gaps...in existing literature on foreign policy and political phenomena'" (Hermann et al:1987:340).

In addition to the analysis of the environment that policy-makers are located in, a theory of ends and means has evolved. Coulombis and Wolfe define foreign policy as "consist(ing) of two (fundamental) elements: national objectives to be achieved and means for achieving them" (1978:89). A state needs to examine the means at its disposal in order to achieve the closest end to their objectives.

This definition is guided by the belief system of policy-makers because the national objectives are determined by the ideals and beliefs of the people within that country. The means are chosen by virtue of the policy-makers' norms and their understanding of

their roles in the world, their region and in their domestic environs. "Holsti's typology of political belief systems is based upon the assumption that a leader's views on the nature of the world are 'master' beliefs and constrain the individual's other political beliefs" (International Affairs Bulletin Vol13/No3:1989:71). 'Belief systems' are also known as the 'operational codes' of a society. Therefore the choices made by the policy-makers are accepted as those that set the boundaries of action in that particular country. Alternatives do exist but they are discounted as not being the norm.

The analysis of policy-makers as a variable has led to new approaches being developed. Regime analysis has been developed by scholars like Young (1982), Puchala and Hopkins (1982), Kegley (1987) and Hagan (1987). Lisa Thompson's thesis entitled "SADCC - Part of the whole or whole of the part?" (Rhodes University:1989) uses Young's definition of regimes in her paper. Young defines regimes as the "conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behaviour in practise" (Thompson:1989). In the same paper, Puchala and Hopkins are said to agree that regimes "exist as participants' understandings, expectations or convictions about legitimate or moral behaviour (Thompson:1989:246). Charles Kegley's states that

"regimes are generally believed to come into being in response to perceived problems, to develop among parties that share a common problem, and to be created from the mutual interests of these parties to cooperate in order to find solutions to the shared problems" (Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:250).

Regimes arose because of the need to regulate the making of choices by decision-makers in accordance with the rules and norms of their belief systems.

Hagan further develops the theory by arguing that though regimes exist, they are not infallible as there are various conditions and effects that change them. He proposes that the extent of vulnerability and fragmentation that occur at various levels and times are the main proponents of change in regimes.

Regime theory lends an innovative level to analysis that mere behavioural theories do not achieve. Kegley's invaluable chapter entitled "Decision Regimes and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy" develops the argument that

"in asking us to take into account human actions, it demands that we escape the deterministic logic that has attempted to explain national behaviour abroad by reference exclusively to the political, social and economic forces that influence decisions, but not by reference to the decision makers who, in the last analysis, do the deciding" (Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:249).

Regime theory does need to be evaluated in order to determine whether it has achieved what it set out to prove: regimes dictate the policy makers' choices.

In the process of answering this question, Kegley's regime theory will be set out in this paper as it is a noted source about regimes and the forms in which they manifest themselves. As opposed to plain regimes, he distinguishes substantive and

procedural decision regimes. Decision regimes tend to materialise to shape foreign policy making and

"may emerge when there is leadership consensus regarding the substance of policy as well as the process by which it is made. The former are termed **substantive** decision regimes, the latter **procedural** decision regimes" (Hermann et al:1987:252).

Substantive regimes exist if there is consensus about the substance of the nation's foreign and domestic policies. This implies that the belief systems or operational codes of the decision-makers are similar or are at least open to negotiation. Power struggles are not excluded from this type of decision regime.

Coalitions form in every institution in society as a recognition of the necessity to co-operate in order to present an inviolable policy and a united front to foreign countries. This minimises the vulnerability and chances of fragmentation occurring in regimes. Many governments are threatened by internal and external opposition which in turn weakens the resolve of the said government to implement a particular policy. This opposition also adversely affects the coalitions within the government decision-making structures. Hagan identifies four basic sets of actors affecting foreign policy:

"leadership divisions (such as personality, factional and bureaucratic differences), legislative and non-executive actors sharing power with the executive politically active segments of society in the form of bureaucratic and interest group actors, and the less structured activity of the mass public (in the form of opinion polls and civil unrest)" (Hagan in Hermann et al:1987:342).

Hagan's choice of actors is not new. Wilkenfeld et al (1980) and Jensen (1982) used the same variables in their academic analysis. Hagan does, however, introduce two new variables which affect foreign policy. He argues that the vulnerability and the fragmentation levels affect foreign policy-making in a state. He adds that these variables affect consensus in and also confront the legitimacy of the regime (Hagan in Hermann et al:1987:344).

To continue, Kegley's more extensive definition of a substantive decision regime states that

"substantive regimes are predicated on a negotiated view of global reality and a nation's place in it...By operating as an expression of the broad aims of a society in its relations with actors beyond its borders, substantive decision regimes contribute to the definition of a nation's foreign policy goals" (Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:254).

The perceptions of the foreign policy-maker are vital to the decision-making process. Shared perceptions lead to shared aims which in turn affect the decisions taken. This introduces the ends and means theory which many theorists have utilised in their analyses. The ends of any foreign policy are agreed upon within the substantive regime. The means are contested by various bureaucracies within the decision-making process and manifest themselves in the procedural regimes. These regimes arise out of a need to adapt uniformly to changes occurring internationally and domestically in terms of the goals (or ends) the government has set for itself. Young claims that these changes or alterations to regimes do not take place peacefully but rather as a result of pressure both from within the ruling party and

class and from the masses (Thompson:1989:). This is the power relationship Olson identified between two states (1987:227).

Regime analysis has its merits and demerits. Kegley's diagrammatical exposition of the foreign policy decision-making process is valuable in that he has yet again pioneered another method of analysis. The methods of research developed by other theorists have become over-used therefore a fresh approach opens previously closed doors. The relationship between inputs and outputs in the decision-making process is clearly outlined in Kegley's diagram (figure 2.1). Regime analysis operates on the premise that the policy-maker's belief system or 'operational code' is the most important issue in decision-making for, as Kegley argues,

"policy maker's behaviours and cognitions may be assumed to be the factors that directly determine foreign policy behaviour - not the internal and external conditions operative at the point of decision. National and international circumstances do not make decisions and forge foreign policy; decision-makers alone do this"  
(Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:248).

Kegley fails to mention that beliefs are formed by living in a particular environment and by being socialised in a particular way. The external and domestic environments in which the policy-maker has to decide on policy are therefore the most important aspects in policy formulation. As Wilkenfeld and his associates state:

"foreign policy behaviours may be classified in terms of 'who does what to whom, where, when, and in what immediate context?'" (1980:36).


The full picture needs to be analysed.

One problem with regime analysis is that the research of human behaviour is conducted on an entirely subjective basis. The researchers cannot divorce their own norms and beliefs from their work. This shortcoming inevitably manifests itself in their work. Western analysts enter research with a world-view based on a particular system of beliefs and cultures. The same applies to core and periphery analysis. Kegley's analysis asserts that a procedural decision regime exists in the decision-making process. In some cases, this is impossible for even though there may exist consensus about the ends or goals of a policy, there may be numerous procedures or means available to achieve those ends. Agreement may never arise even though coalitions form and negotiation occurs. The world-views of the decision-makers may be too divergent in which case a pure procedural decision regime will not arise. He does not make allowance for this peculiarity.

Another bone of contention arises with the levels of influence different external and domestic actors exert. The international community does not wield the same level of pressure in all states. In the authoritarian regime, the international pressure groups are largely negated due to the centralisation of the decision-makers and the fact that a great measure of power is used in order to regulate the domestic environment. Contrary to Kegley's assertions (Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:253/254), policy-makers do not as a rule choose "less than optimal foreign policy options", neither do they often "act on principle", nor do they "resist the temptation to make decisions arbitrarily". This applies especially to regimes that do not rely on public

approval. If the regime is imposed, it tends to ignore the majority of its populace's dissatisfaction with its actions.

Figure 2.1: Kegley's diagram




Source: Hermann et al New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1987, page 265.

Hagan's analysis of regimes, and the forces affecting them, also has a number of shortcomings. He does not examine the nature of regime changes effectively. Each factor has been proposed as an individual source of change (Hagan in Hermann et al:1987:347-348). In reality, however, there are usually a number of reasons for changes in regime make-up. There may be a change in the leadership altering the coalition construction in the government

eventually leading to a complete regime change via a coup d'etat due to public and military opposition. His four basic sets of actors affecting regimes (as mentioned above), in addition to shedding light on how they affect foreign policies, expose the fact that knowledge of a regime's internal strengths could inform researchers of the leadership's ability to withstand the pressures of actors outside the regime whether they be interest groups inside or outside the borders of the country. Therefore, in certain regimes, the presence of these vulnerabilities and levels of fragmentation could promote aggressive rather than conciliatory policies. In the face of crisis, certain policymakers may opt for more power-orientated decisions by virtue of perceived threats, their tenuous legitimacy and their need to remain in power.

In the light of these criticisms of both Charles Kegley and Joe Hagan's regime analysis, this author wishes to propose a revised diagram which applies to the specific area of study addressed by this paper. The diagram takes into cognisance the criticisms discussed above, and attempts to formulate new ideas on regime analysis.

Figure 2.2



The regionalist attributes of certain countries may be particularly strong in that they are part of a regional bloc and cannot be studied out of that context due to the close, mutually influencing relationships within the bloc. The global attributes are not as effective as Kegley proposes and therefore the feedback from this dimension is not as strongly depicted as that from regional and national attributes. All these factors have

input on the procedural decision regimes. Note the plural has been used due to the argument that consensus may never be reached. However, at various stages, and on specific issues, different coalitions may form but revert to their former composition as soon as the issue has been solved. The only aspect which remains unchallenged is the substantive decision regime. Consensus about the aims of policy exists in the majority of regimes regardless of the contrasting methods being used. At various stages of decision-making, there is also input from the procedural regimes. The dominant party or group in any one coalition always has an effect on the aims of the policy. In periods of crisis the military will project policy-options which espouse a world-view of a regional power in terms of military strength and security. This perspective in turn will affect the economic, social and political relationships within that region thereby affecting policy content.

The most important questions which need to be raised in the context of this paper pertain to the applicability of the decision regime theory to the Namibian-South African relationship during the Botha era. Did a decision regime exist during Botha's rule and, if so, did it comply with the regime analysis offered in this chapter? Did P.W Botha's character directly affect the policies that emerged during the decade prior to Namibia's independence and, if so, in what way? What kind of policy emerged during the period 1978 - 1989 by virtue of the crisis situation and the domination of the military in the decision-making process? Did the ends that the South African government set for

itself justify the means both domestically and in Namibia? Which pressure groups played significant roles in changing the regime in Namibia and creating a policy of reform in the 1980s? If the pressure groups and other factors influenced decision making during this period, how did they achieve it?

An attempt to answer these questions will be made in the following chapters. South Africa's domination of Namibia is unique in that Botha's policy was pursued adamantly despite mass opposition from the international community, from communities in South Africa itself and in Namibia, of course. In Wilkenfeld and associates' words, an analysis of "who does what to whom, where, when and in what immediate context" (1980:36) will be the basis of this paper.

### CHAPTER THREE      REGIME ANALYSIS AND BOTHA'S NAMIBIAN POLICY

This chapter deals with the application of the regime theory to South Africa's foreign policy making process with specific reference to Namibia's independence process. An analysis of PW Botha's character presents insight into why certain policies were chosen during his term of office. This writer argues that Botha's policy-making forums did constitute decision-making regimes. These changed in composition according to the issues but did not change the objectives the South African government held for the Namibian issue. The proposed internal settlements and the policy of destabilisation comply with the concept of procedural decision regimes. Finally, the chapter examines the South African regional policy based on the carrot and stick approach which underlined Botha's regional relations with the Frontline States of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Namibia was also subjected to this combination of incentives and disincentives in order to achieve a favourable outcome for the South African Botha regime.

Colin Legum suggests that South Africa has four main elements in its strategy for survival. The first deals with maintaining political control domestically, the second is to create a stable environment for continued economic growth, the third is to build a defense system strong enough to withstand any attacks, and finally South Africa aims to improve its relations with the rest of Africa as a means of gaining Western approval, countering Soviet expansion and creating a greater African market for its goods (Price and Rotberg:1980:283-284). Barber and Barratt, in their book entitled South Africa's Foreign Policy - The Search

for Status and Security 1945 - 1988 (1990), state that the study of foreign policy

"focuses attention on the government, and in particular the executive - its aims, its resources, how it employed those resources, the pressures on it at home and abroad, who made the decisions on what basis" (Barber and Barratt:1990:1).

The objectives the South African government chose were firstly, to be a regional leader, and secondly, to maintain white domination at all costs. The objectives were styled into policies based on repression and aggression both within South Africa and the region. Even though the policies may have changed in degree, they had not altered in essence by the end of the 1980s. The foreign policy of South Africa was based on the ends and means theory which allowed for different methods to be used in order to achieve their objectives.

The premiership of Pieter Willem Botha created a scenario that was new to the average South African. With it, argues Rotberg, came the realisation of "South Africa's weakened internal and world position and a calculated assessment that mere stonewalling offers no solution" (Foreign Policy No38:1980:132). Not only was he a military man, but he also believed that big business could play an important role in policy-making. Up to this point, Vorster had left policy formulation to various committees and had acted simply as a "chairman of the board". When Botha took over the reins, he restructured the decision-making body of the government, rationalised the State Security Council and gave it more power to make decisions without the need to consult or inform parliament. He afforded the incumbent of the premiership

more powers and revitalised the civil service (Leadership Vol4/No2:1985:38). This was to form the basis of his National Security Management System.

P.W Botha had been a National Party official since 1953 and worked himself up through the ranks of the party machine to the powerful position he held when he siezed the premiership. He had been known for his "organisational skills, perseverance, party loyalty and ruthlessness" (International Affairs Bulletin Vol13/N03:1989:74). In an article entitled "The Operational Code of PW Botha: Apartheid ,realism and misperception" Van Wyk and Van Nieuwkerk posit an interesting analysis of Botha's psychological make-up and relate this to the foreign policies which emerged during his rule. They attribute Botha's policies to his operational codes and typify him as having a B-type belief system. Realist policies characterise B-type belief systems because these policy-makers view reality as being competitive and aggressive. The policy-makers believe that humans are inherently violent and therefore need to be controlled by means of aggressive policies. The policy-makers attempt to acquire as much power as possible in order to protect their societies because of their obsession with survival. Misperceptions are also common to the B-type belief system.

"Botha's `Cold War' world view, combined with `Total Onslaught' rhetoric, gave rise to a foreign policy based on realist assumptions, and conducted with vigour by the South African state. These assumptions include: strength produces peace, might yields influence, superior firepower can both deter and compete, power can be purchased, the capacity to destroy is the capacity to control, and political problems are susceptible

to military solutions" (International Affairs Bulletin Vol13/No 3:1989:70-86).

Arising from this is a view that threats emanate from all quarters of political life. Botha's Total National Strategy was based on the idea that communists had a vested interest in South Africa. He believed that communists would stop at nothing to overthrow the white regimes frustrating their evil designs. When Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola achieved independence, his fears were reinforced.

Botha's links with the military sector afforded him a "managerial attitude to the structures of central government", especially the bureaucracy (Political Studies xxxvii:1989:67). He engaged the captains of the South African economy directly by encouraging South Africa's armaments and other key industries. The first important conference between business and the government was held at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg in 1979 where he attempted to involve them in his policy-making. Barber and Barratt report that "subsequently many of them (business leaders) complained about the meagre results of the Conference and what they saw as Botha's attempt to co-opt them to his side" (1990:258). Despite this hindsight, at the time the leaders in the economic sphere were honoured to be part of a process which had previously been denied to them by the Vorster regime. Botha's regime was therefore made up of military specialists and leaders in big business. This granted him the opportunity to formulate various policies at different stages in South African politics.

The period of Botha's takeover was also noted for intense worker and student militancy against white rule. The liberation movements increased their attacks on civilian targets and were much stronger because of the ideological and military support they received from the Frontline States and the communist bloc. SWAPO also increased its attacks on civilian targets and South African Defence Force bases due to its strengthened position from its Frontline bases. As a result of these events, states Chrisopher Coker, the South African Defence Force was transformed into

"a powerful arm of the state. In part the change was prompted by the belief that the West no longer considered the Republic a useful ally; America's failure to come to South Africa's assistance in Angola convinced her that it was no longer in her interests to act as a member in all but name of the Western Alliance" (Survival March/April:1983:59).

The policies of Botha were governed by the concept of a Total National Strategy developed as a response to the increased onslaught on the South African state. Initially it had been a response to a Red (communist) threat but after the increase in black opposition, it became a response to a black threat. An organic crisis existed in the National Party and in the South African government. The Total National Strategy entailed four reforms which were "streamlining apartheid, strengthening the military, supporting business and bringing it into partnership, and creating a new regional policy" (Hanlon:1986:13).

The National Party was faced with demands for a new dispensation for the black majority from the South African capitalist class, the domestic black majority as well as international pressure

groups. Davies and O'Meara state that these policies "were produced out of deep political conflict within the ruling class and the consolidation under P.W Botha of a new political alignment of class force" (Review of African Political Economy No29:1984:68). The 1977 Defence White Paper states that total strategy

"is the comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies" (1977:5).

The Total National Strategy was directed at all aspects of the political, economic and social spheres of South Africa. The policy was formulated by the State Security Council. The SSC was dominated by the military and included a few leading civil servants.

"Although government spokesmen maintained - correctly in a **de jure** sense - that the SSC, like other Cabinet Committees, had no executive authority and that its recommendations were subject to Cabinet approval, there were grey areas involving sensitive security, intelligence and foreign policy matters, where the SSC in practice was effectively the decision-making body" (Barber and Barratt:1990:253).

Chaired by the Prime Minister, it headed the National Security Management System which "provided the basis for legitimising the increasing military involvement in all spheres of strategic decision-making, coordinated through the state security council" (Work in Progress 56/57:1988:22). Every means available to the South African government would henceforth be employed at all levels of society in order to effect the changes which were needed to maintain South Africa's position as a regional power. These means included the use of security forces within and

without South Africa's borders, the use of political reform to co-opt various sectors of the population and finally to upgrade the living conditions of the 'African' community. The National Party displayed a remarkable convergence of interests in the early years of Botha's rule. Glenn Moss states that

"in responding to these changing dynamics (increased opposition from blacks and dissatisfaction among white voters) these two 'groups' - military power and organised capitalist interests - found that their new interests were converging: a total strategy was being formed" (Work in Progress 11:1980:1).

A substantive decision regime emerged as a result of the unity on goals.

In a Weekly Mail article (October 3-8:1986), Anton Harber correctly states that the security system "has an extraordinary ability to go around normal departmental procedures and ensure that its recommendations are decided on at the highest level". The State Security Council had been given greater powers with Botha's ascent to power and now formed the eminent decision-making body in the South African government. The Star (5/8/1983) reported that the SSC

"are military pragmatists, guided by the central principle of Afrikaner survival, that no concession should be made to an enemy until absolutely necessary".

The article argues that the members of the SSC are not 'hawks' but are "military pragmatists". The general understanding of military personnel was that they were hawkish in orientation, preferring military solutions to political problems. Garth Sheldon, however, states that the division between the military

hawks, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information (DFAI) existed only on the means employed, not on the objectives.

"Therefore if one insists on bird imagery  
it would be more accurate to describe  
the inhabitants of the competing foreign policy  
nests as eagles (military) and hawks (DFAI) for  
the difference is one of degree rather than kind"  
(Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:9).

Botha's militarist tendencies were made obvious by his dismissal of Vorster's detente initiatives. "PW Botha and the military establishment were sceptical of the co-operative approach advocated by Hilgard Muller and adopted by Vorster" (Barber and Barratt:1990:181). Ivor Sarakinsky, however, reports that according to Mark Swilling, reformists were dominant in the policy-making sector prior to 1986 (Work in Progress 52:1988:47). This is not entirely correct as the destabilisation policies of the South African state were very evident until 1982. Diplomatic initiatives took the place of destabilisation policies until 1986. In spite of this, South Africa covertly supported dissident armies in the Frontline States in order to counter the perceived threat from outside its border (Cammack in Moss and Obery:1990:194). In 1983, the era of the new constitution and the Tricameral Parliament arrived. Reform occurred as a result of an escalation in internal and international pressures. In accordance with its carrot and stick policies, South Africa increased its regional military attacks at the same time. The visit by the Eminent Person's Group in 1986 coincided with a complex programme of destabilisation against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, resulting in mass opposition. South Africa seemed to balk at the idea of external control and prescription from the international

community on the Namibian, Angolan and domestic issues. 1986 signalled the end of the reform era and the start of a series of State of Emergencies directed at the internal crises.

Sheldon's article "Theoretical Perspectives on South African Foreign Policy Making" (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:6-11) asserts that foreign policy formulation is characterised by competition and conflict between the civil and military intelligence establishments. The Foreign Affairs Department and the State Security Council often chose divergent solutions to the same problem. Departmental disagreement, he says, does not necessarily imply that the party in the majority will dominate the policy-making process. "Thus an SADF majority in the Secretariat (of the SSC) is more likely to produce interdepartmental antagonism and conflict than to ensure SADF control of foreign policy" (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:7) because of the ability of the foreign minister to bypass inferior committees and address the State Security Council directly.

There is evidence of Kegley's substantive decision-making regime in Botha's era in that the objectives were common among all the parties and were based on a world-view premised on white domination and regional control. The procedural decision-making regime presents a greater problem in the process of analysis. The hawks and the doves formed different procedural blocs, each one favouring a specific method of solving problems. Contrary to Tjonneland, who argues that "such competition and confusion reveal severe contradictions at the level of policy objectives"

(Discussion Paper 2:1989:26), the South African decision-makers shared the same objectives. The hawks chose military options as is evident by the various incursions into the Frontline States starting in 1975. These attacks occurred simultaneously with the doves' attempts at forging co-operative relationships between the Frontline States and South Africa.

The Constellation of Southern African States attempt had been initiated by Vorster but did not achieve any success even after Botha's rise to power. The Frontline States refused to deal with the 'independent homelands' in South Africa and did not wish to become dependent on the latter nation. The idea was finally laid to rest when the newly independent states chose to form the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference in 1980. As a result of their defiance, South Africa increased its military attacks on these nations. The increase in black domestic opposition was also an incentive for these attacks because the African National Congress was reported to have bases in these Frontline States. Raids increased tremendously in the period 1977 to 1980. This was the period of negotiation for Namibia's independence settlement. South Africa continued to attend talks despite the opposition to their military programme in the region. Destabilisation occurred simultaneously with the offers of peaceful solutions to regional problems. Accords and treaties were offered to the Frontline States. "It's (destabilisation) primary goal can be seen as the collapse of radical anti-South African governments and their replacement by regimes that are clients of Pretoria" (Price in Chan 1990:155). The Frontline

States managed to maintain their Marxist-Leninist ideologies despite South African domination on the economic, social and political fronts.

This two pronged approach characterised Botha's foreign policy towards Namibia in the 1978-1989 period. Julie Frederickse's article in Africa News (7 July 1980:6) exposes this plan as one in which the Botha government wanted to "weaken SWAPO and build up South African/DTA alliances". DTA remained South Africa's designated party until the independence of Namibia. Africa Confidential also carried an article titled "Namibia: The Last Charade" (Vol24/No6:1983) in which it was reported that South Africa wished to weaken the MPLA and build a 'multi-racial' party in Namibia as a prelude to eventual internal elections. South Africa and the DTA hoped that SWAPO would be disqualified from such elections on the grounds that it did not constitute an organised political party. At this stage, South Africa engaged SWAPO in low-intensity warfare which amounted to basically terror tactics by the SADF, the South West African Police, the South West African Territory Force and Koevoet. The latter force was established in 1978 as a means to counter SWAPO in the operational area. Their targets were mostly the civilians who harboured supporters of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia in their villages (Work in Progress 29:1983:5). This constant conflict situation made it impossible for the liberation movement to become a legal political party.

The decision to support the DTA was not the only the South African regime made. Problems emerged in the DTA after the resignation of Kalagula and the withdrawal of Ovambo support giving "Pretoria the perfect opportunity to call for the formation of an interim government that would be 'more effective and more representative'" (Cullinan in Moss and Obery:1990:33). Cullinan continues by stating that "the responsibility of reorganising the interim government was given to senior military advisers" (Moss and Obery:1990:33). By the end of 1982, the DTA temporarily disbanded in an attempt to gain credibility at this late stage in the negotiations process.

During 1983, the South African government attempted to form an anti-SWAPO coalition in the Multi-Party Conference. Disagreements in the Conference stalled Botha's attempts to form an internal government (Barber and Barratt:1990:283). The MPC shouldered the responsibility of drawing up a new constitution in Namibia. Forming an interim government was one of its aims. The MPC was not as widely accepted as had been hoped and was criticised for being "a farce and a body with no intention of hastening independence" (Weaver in Moss and Obery:1990:213). The South African government had backed this conference hoping that it would offer an alternative to SWAPO. This in effect stalled the UN Resolution 435 process as the MPC contravened the agreement that a constitution would only be drawn up by a post-independence body. The MPC lost even more of its limited credibility when Pretoria gave "full governing powers (short of Defence and

Foreign Affairs) to the MPC's 'transitional government of national unity'" (Du Preez in Moss and Obery:1990:347).

Judge Hiemstra, the head of the Constitutional Council, stated that the TGNU established the Council in order "to work out a basis on which the territory can exist as an independent and sovereign state'" (Leistner and Esterhuysen:1991:81). This was an attempt to produce an independent structure which would hopefully meet with the approval of the UN and the Western Contact Group. Firstly, it was different to the Turnhalle arrangement in that it included SWAPO as an important body (even though SWAPO declined to participate in the Council). Secondly, political parties were represented rather than specific ethnic groupings. Finally, unlike the Turnhalle Conference, the TGNU did not discuss policy issues: their main emphasis was on constitutional matters and governmental functioning (Hiemstra in Leistner and Esterhuysen:1991:81-82). In spite of the more acceptable structure of the TGNU, Namibia was not truly independent. All the structures that Botha had established in Namibia were still supported by South Africa and did not comply with the regulations of Resolution 435. The international community was not prepared to accept any compromise the South African government might orchestrate. The TGNU continued to operate until its dissolution in April 1989 in preparation for the independence process which was to take place at the end of the same year.

South Africa's foreign policy towards Namibia was characterised by its two-pronged approach. The decision-making regimes did not remain static but changed composition to suit the issue at hand. There was no significant change in policy even though the choices vacillated between military and diplomatic. As Sheldon states

"often no clear outcome (of the competition) is evident thus policy is characterised by a 'gyroscopic effect' promoting the continuance of policy options originally agreed to, despite changing circumstances. (South Africa's policy on Namibia certainly falls within this category). This condition is related to the need for consensus" (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:9).

What became apparent was the tendency of the South African government to become, on the one hand, more militarily aggressive in the event of a crisis, and on the other, to resort to diplomatic tactics that were certain to gain international acceptance, to alleviate pressure from the region and to appease its voters and black middle class in South Africa. Davies and O'Meara state that "'destabilisation' had never been a first option of Pretoria...particular emphasis on such 'disincentive' tactics has specifically emerged in periods of defeat/crisis for the broader strategy of the apartheid regime" (Journal of Southern African Studies Vol11/No2:1985:1985). The South African creation of the DTA, the Constituent Assembly, the MPC and finally the TGNU evidently support this assertion. They chose to engage every other party except SWAPO in the process of reform and attempted to discredit the liberation movement. This was done by pointing out to moderate Namibians that even though SWAPO was not prepared to negotiate for independence, the South African

government was willing to compromise and grant independence to the former mandated territory.

On the domestic front, in 1982 the National Party once again experienced rightwing opposition to its latest reform proposals. The Conservative Party, formed by Andries Treurnicht, was a breakaway rightwing group from the National Party. In spite of this vote of no confidence, the National Party continued its reform policies by drawing up a new constitution in 1983. A nationwide referendum proved that white South Africans were willing to open up their ranks to the 'coloured' and 'Indian' sectors of the community. The 'Africans' were excluded from this new dispensation.

Internally, there was evidence of polarisation between the 'hawks' and the 'doves'. The hawks propagated domestic policies which were based on aggressive repression by means of the states of emergency which were renewed for three consecutive years, detention without trial, banning of organisations and the presence of the military in the townships. The 'doves', on the other hand, proposed constitutional reform in order to maintain capital growth as an alternative to the maintenance of the destructive white-ruled regime. The 1984 Tricameral elections introduced a new era in South African politics and also renewed the military's attempts to eliminate the opposition's rejection of this parliament by the black majority of South Africa. What followed therefore were domestic policies that were similar to

the content of the foreign policies: incentives and disincentives.

The two decision regimes were convergent in terms of their objectives for the region but were divergent in their attempts to formulate policies which would succeed. The procedural regimes did not affect the substantive decision regime in any way. They could be seen as entirely separate entities, each being affected by the various pressure sources. The procedural decision regimes existed as parallel decision-making blocs. The inputs from the various pressure groups had different effects on these blocs. The increased pressure on the reformist bloc resulted in the 1988 Municipal elections, the Transitional Government of National Unity and finally Namibian independence. Locally the statist bloc responded with heightened repression and a regionally, they increased their destabilising activities.

CHAPTER FOUR      SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND NAMIBIAN  
INDEPENDENCE

This chapter deals with the process of negotiation for Namibia's independence. First of all, the world-view of the policy-makers is analysed as this throws light on the actions undertaken by the regime during the period this study. It examines the various sources of pressure which eventually effected change in Namibia. A discussion of the changing world system is also included because it had major implications for peace in the Southern African region. In addition to an analysis of the UN's role, the Western Contact Group's participation in the negotiations will be examined. Figure 2.1 forms a diagrammatic characterisation of this chapter. The inputs will be the main focus of this stage of the paper. Finally, the reasons for South Africa's decision to grant Namibia total independence will also be discussed.

A document of the World Council of Churches explains that South Africa would not accept Resolution 435 passively because of Namibia's position as a "buffer state" between Marxist-Leninist Southern Africa and white-ruled capitalist South Africa. South Africa opposed SWAPO rule at all costs because the liberation movement's victory in Namibia would encourage the liberation movements in South Africa to believe that they too could achieve black rule in this country (1988:26-27). Namibia was under the complete control of the republic. South Africa

"owns the rail-transport system, the airline, the entire communications network and the only viable port (Walvis Bay); it supplies the territory's oil, and coal, most civil servants are South Africans and could be withdrawn;

Namibia is knitted into the Rand Monetary Area and the South African Customs Union; and, until independence, there will probably be no exchange control" (Watts in Rotberg:1983:111).

Namibia also played a major role in attracting destabilisation to the rest of Southern Africa, especially Angola. SADF bases in the Caprivi Strip and in the north were more effective at repelling SWAPO and were also close enough to support the UNITA forces in conflict situations with the MPLA (PCR information:1988:28-30).

Effective methods were needed to remove the South African regime from Namibia. There were three main sectors who rallied for change. These were the international community, the Frontline States and the domestic opposition groups. Kurt von Schirnding correctly stated that "(i)nternational pressure can never play a decisive role in South Africa. But it has the potential to do great harm"

(South Africa International Vol20/No2:1989:100).

The relationship between South Africa and the international community during the Botha era took on any of three forms. Firstly, some nations isolated South Africa completely, secondly, a number penetrated her economy and thirdly, the remaining nations intervened. With the growing interdependence of members of the internatioanl community, involvement in countries by their neighbours becomes more common. This occurs to such an extent that if a crisis arises within one country, it normally has a profound effect on the other countries in its immediate region.

The further apart the countries are, the less impact they have on one another. This holds true for countries which do not have legitimacy problems therefore present a united front to any aggressor. South Africa does not escape from international currents despite its pariah status. International intervention escalated during the Botha era as a result of the South African regime's vulnerability.

South Africa did not enjoy links with many of the European nations due to the sanctions imposed by the UN in 1986. The most important relationships South Africa had were with the United States of America and Britain due to historical ties with these two countries.

During the era of the Cold War between the Eastern and the Western blocs, South Africa believed that it had a duty to perform in Southern Africa. This entailed the protection of western capitalist ideals in the face of a communist onslaught.

John de St Jorre supports this by saying

"(t)he South Africans insist that Soviet imperialism is entering a dangerously aggressive phase in Africa, and they urge that the Western alliance support the republic as the most effective bulwark against communism" (Foreign Policy No28:1977:85).

South Africa had seen itself as an integral and critical part of the Western security system. The cancelled Simonstown Agreement proved this notion to be a gross misconception. As if to drum this in, the British Navy did not have any use for the naval station during the Falklands' war in the early eighties. The presence of strategic minerals and raw materials in South Africa

also fed the misconception that the US would wish to enter into bilateral agreements with this country.

Prior to Botha's rule, American policy was based on human rights. The Carter Administration propagated the isolationist path. However, change came about in 1981 when Republican Ronald Reagan became president. The US policy towards South Africa then became Crocker's policy of constructive engagement. The Reagan Administration's policy was meant to "encourage change in the apartheid system through a quiet dialogue with that country's white minority" (Ungar and Vale:1985:235). This was demonstrated in US handling of both the Namibian and the apartheid questions.

The US identified the presence of Cuban troops in Angola as an obstacle in the path to Namibian independence. They wanted to link South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia with the withdrawal of all foreign (meaning Cuban) powers from the region. The hope was that this linkage would bring about a communist-free Southern Africa simultaneously with Namibian independence. This did not have the desired effect for "paradoxically, the Cubans probably became still more entrenched in Angola because of the reverberations from the linkage proposal" (Carter:1985:35).

Other members of the Western Contact Group opposed the linkage of the Angolan and Namibian issues. Jaster identified this opposition as the main factor which led to the end of the combined Western initiated talks and the start of a primarily US diplomatic venture after 1982 (1990:13). The US did not withdraw

from South Africa willingly when the UN called for mandatory sanctions in 1986. They handed over many of their companies to South African management under different names. This was merely a change of facade rather than a complete withdrawal of US capital. The 1984 Tricameral parliament also met with US approval as this system broadened the capitalist base of the country and was preferable to a black-ruled state. The one significant success story of US policy was the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. "Inter alia this forbade the import of South African coal, iron, steel, uranium, arms and ammunition, textiles and agricultural products" (Barber and Barratt:1990:333). This Act placed immediate pressure on the South African government because it struck at the heart of the South African economy. The American influence in changing South African policies was not very effective. However, one cannot ignore the 'success' of their punitive sanctions, for with the additional internal pressure, change came about in the late 1980s.

The British policy toward South Africa was also an exception to the international rule of isolation. For many reasons they were reluctant to sever ties with South Africa. Britain had been the colonial power in South Africa until 1961. Britain did accept the arms embargo against South Africa in 1977 but, with the advent of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher in 1980, their politics moved to the far right of the political spectrum. With great reluctance the UK went along with a limited sanctions package with loopholes in order not to be isolated from the rest of the Commonwealth and the European Economic Community.

"The British government has persistently and strenuously opposed the imposition of sanctions against South Africa on the grounds that it would be a punitive measure that would hurt blacks more than whites in South Africa" (Aluko:1989:60).

In a very controversial article, Austin presents six reasons for Britain's reluctance to disengage itself from South Africa. Among these is the arguments that there is still time "for change to prevent revolution and for reform to avert disaster" (International Affairs Vol62/No3:1986:393). Britain could never have singlehandedly created conditions to ensure change in South Africa nor in Namibia. Hedley Bull's argument supports this by stating that Anglo-American policies are due to their view that

"a policy of complete disinvestment would imply severance of serving diplomatic and economic links, and would lead to total isolation of South Africa except for links it may have with other pariah states" (International Affairs Bulletin Vol2/No2:1978:11).

Ultimately, South Africa only benefitted from these policies in terms of prolonging the inevitable independence of Namibia and delaying change in its own domestic sector.

The Namibian issue generated massive international response. As early as 1946 the UN formulated policy on the issue of South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory. By the time PW Botha came into power in 1978, the UN's struggle had spanned more than three decades and had employed various strategies such as economic sanctions, an arms embargo, ostracisation and public condemnation of the South African policies of apartheid. In spite of its valiant attempts, the UN could not have achieved its goals without initial backing of the Western Contact Group and the

continued US actions in the field. Du Pisani reports that the UN initiatives failed as early as 1981 when the Geneva Conference was aborted. This marked the collapse of the UN transition plan (Politikon Vol8/No1:1981:14). The UN's lack of success was also due to South Africa's defiance of the UN proposals because of this nation's exclusion from the international organisation. The effectiveness of UN was limited by Article 2 (7) of its own Charter. South Africa invoked this article in order to prevent intervention from the international organisation (Bennett:1977:401). It was only when the situation threatened the peace and sovereignty of other nations that the UN was empowered to act effectively.

The main thrust of the international pressure came from the Western Contact Group which had been established by the US, UK, France, West Germany and Canada in 1977.

"The protracted negotiations about Namibia between the Contact Group of five and South Africa have been a splendid device for harmonising the pursuit of the major powers' interests in Southern Africa" (Hill in Carter and O'Meara:1982:109).

Resolution 435 was agreed upon as a result of negotiations between the Contact Group, South Africa and Namibia. Despite failure at various points in the negotiation process, the Contact Group managed to guide the parties to an agreement. The linkage issue not only counted in the favour of the US but it also gave South Africa incentive to conclude the Namibian issue. The removal of the communist threat had been a fixation of the South African policies since the start of the Botha era.

Throughout the negotiation process South Africa waged war against SWAPO and its bases in the Frontline States. It also held second tier elections in 1980 in an attempt to lend the DTA more credibility. These 'two-track' policies occurred parallel to the Western Contact Group's efforts to produce peaceful change.

"On the international track, South Africa has been offered a formula that could bring international legitimacy to an independent government willing to protect South African interests - the DTA or possibly some other combination that would deny SWAPO a winner-take-all victory. On the internal track, the DTA has been strengthened and given more and more governing powers leading to an internal settlement short of UDI" (Rocha:1983:142).

The Western Contact Group continued to pressurise South Africa into accepting the UN proposed settlement. South Africa continued to attend the talks but also set up internal structures that threatened the UN's proposals. An interim government was set up in 1985 and later became the transitional government of national unity. In 1986, however, South Africa threatened the negotiations by expelling the Eminent Persons' Group from inside its borders. This did not result in Western Contact Group cancelling its involvement in the negotiation process: indeed, it enhanced their role.

The regional pressure group consisted of the Frontline States and SWAPO. Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe pressed SWAPO into attending the negotiations because of the pressure South Africa was applying to them. The policy of destabilisation had ruined their economies and infrastructures. The presence of both the US and the Soviet Union in the region had grave implications for these states. Southern Africa had become another arena for the

Cold War. SWAPO's role in coercing South Africa took the form of guerrilla attacks on SADF bases and rallying Namibian opposition against South African rule. Armed contacts between the SADF and SWAPO increased dramatically after 1986 (Wood cited in Herbstein and Evenson:1991:171). The churches, youth and other civic organisations played a major role in bringing the South African regime to a non-negotiable settlement under Resolution 435. The /Ai-//Gams Conference, convened by the Namibian Council of Churches in 1986, proved that opposition to South African rule permeated all sectors of the Namibian life.

Just as 1975 had been a watershed year for South African politics, so was 1988 for regional relations. All the while that South Africa was engaged in negotiations it had a final card up its proverbial sleeve. The military attacks increased against SWAPO bases in Angola under the pretexts of protecting the border region and the Caleque dam. In the South African Defence Force magazine, Paratus, the commander of the 1987/1988 operations into southern Angola admitted that it had never been South Africa's intention to capture the town of Cuito Cuanavale (March 1988:14). This may have been the military's brief to the press but what actually happened was that heavy fighting lasted for days in the town between the SADF-UNITA forces and the MPLA-Cuban forces. Reporter Jeffrey Herbst from Die Suid-Afrikaan commented that

"Fidel Castro het 'n klassieke `chicken'-spel met die SAW begin met as doelwit om die Suid-Afrikaanse opmars te stuit, die Angolese magte uit hul penarie te red, en die militere magsbalans in Suidelike Afrika te verander" (No19 February 1989:25).

The SADF's Achilles heel had finally been discovered. The same forces which for years had reduced the region to a dependent conglomeration of states, withdrew ignominiously. The war in Angola had escalated as South Africa protected its rebel UNITA army from the MPLA forces. The more the UNITA forces were threatened by MPLA and Cuban attacks, the more South Africa and the US supported Savimbi's army. The war dragged on for such an extended period that in January 1988 South Africa had difficulty in keeping up the same level of attack as it had done the previous year. In an attempt to regain the initiative and win MPLA areas, UNITA redirected its attacks in the south east section of Angola (Southern Africa Dossier:October 1988:3).

The attack did not achieve what it had set out to do: the town of Cuito Cuanavale did not fall, neither did UNITA win any new areas in Angola. Even though the combined Cuban and MPLA forces managed to gain the upperhand in the war as a result of their superior military power, there was no outright victory. The Angolan forces had sustained heavy artillery attacks on the town and lost a number of lives. Similarly, the South African government had lost the white voters' support for the border war. They had also been militarily crippled by the economic and arms sanctions imposed by the international community. As a result of this isolation, the arms used by the SADF did not compete favourably with the Soviet produced MIG-23/Su-22 fighters. Another factor leading to the withdrawal of South African troops was the very real possibility of losing more lives than the SADF could afford. "As young white boys started coming home from

Angola in body bags, many whites began to doubt the wisdom of the war" (New Era Vol3/No3:1988:5). This promoted the formation of anti-conscription campaigns and an increase in the number of conscientious objectors.

The end of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale heralded the return to the settlement proposed by Resolution 435. Brendan Seery comments that South Africa and SWAPO entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" which led to a de facto ceasefire coming into effect in northern Namibia on 1 September" (Moss and Obery:1990:237). This was the initial step leading to the formal independence in 1990. The Brazzaville and New York accords were signed soon after the defeat at Cuito Cuanavale. Not only did South Africa receive a promise that Cuban forces would withdraw from the region, it also gained an opportunity to re-establish the ties it had with the region during Vorster's period of rule (Davies in Moss and Obery:1990:177). However, these developments did not imply the demise of South Africa's two-track policy. There were reports from Namibia that Koevoet and the other security forces continued to inflict terror on the Namibian people despite the agreement. The UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) had delayed their arrival therefore failed to prevent further loss of lives and senseless violence.

On the domestic front, the liberation movements of South Africa intensified their opposition to the white regime in the late 1980s. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1984 signalled a new phase of opposition politics in which the people

took to the streets to openly defy the South African government. The Tricameral elections came under strong attack from the UDF. The black community also vociferously opposed the Municipal elections in 1988 as proof of their rejection of puppet councillors. The defiance campaign of the late eighties also played a major role in effecting change. The deployment of SADF troops in the townships during the three states of emergency created new survival tactics in the black population. Underground activities of banned organisations in the 1986-1988 period proved to be more telling on the South African government than the opposition of the pre-Botha era.

Pressure not only came from the black sector of the population but also emanated from white dissatisfaction with the financial and social costs of South Africa's continued military presence in Namibia and Angola. The financial burden incurred by the war, combined with the maintenance of South African authority in Namibia, cost the government as much as R1 000 million a year (Davies and O'Meara in Chan:1990:205). This vast expense was increasingly difficult to justify in a period of deepening economic depression. The high death rate of white soldiers on the Angolan border was unacceptable to the white voters. The rationale behind them being so far outside South Africa's borders while domestic townships became ungovernable was lost in the government's explanation that there was a communist threat in Angola.

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s left that argument redundant. Both America and the Soviet Union were experiencing economic and political problems. It was in their best interests to reduce the funding of armies and groups in Africa and elsewhere in the world. They therefore decided to opt for peaceful solutions to conflicts that previously would have been settled in Cold War tactics of sustained attrition. The linkage of Angolan sovereignty to the independence of Namibia therefore had its advantages. Not only did the Americans remove the Cubans from the region, they also inadvertently gave SWAPO the leeway to win the elections. SWAPO's victory therefore added another pro-Soviet government to the existing number in Southern Africa. This did not win any decisive Cold War points for either superpower but it did add another nail to the coffin of white rule in South Africa. Many analysts correctly attribute peace in Southern Africa to the end of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

International, regional and national pressures finally combined to force the South African government to the negotiating table. The crises at home and in the region, however, were far greater than the pressures applied by the UN, the Soviet Union, the Organisation for African Unity and the Western Contact Group. This writer holds that sophisticated liberatory movements, like the South African ones in the 1980's, have to be considered major players affecting national and, indeed, regional political developments. Given the policy-making history of the South

African government, external pressures are by no means the only or even major factors.

The reasons for the failure of the international initiatives are many. The United Nations failed because of its limitations that were inadvertently encapsulated in its Charter. The UN was virtually ineffective if a situation did not threaten the peace of other nations. It could only function properly if the agreements and recommendations were ratified by the members of the Security Council. This fact proved to be a major stumbling block for the independence struggle of Namibia. First the US, then the Soviet Union would veto decision at Security Council level thereby stalling the process even further. This is supported by Rocha who claims that "the commitment on Namibia that the General Assembly assumed on behalf of the United Nations is not consistent with the power configuration in international relations" (1983:157). Brendan Seery also accused the UN of delaying the deployment of UNTAG forces and the tardy release of funds. The peacekeeping force had been severely trimmed resulting in a period of unnecessary violence just prior to independence (Moss and Obery:1990:240).

Resolution 435 was also riddled with loopholes, a fact which the South Africans exploited repeatedly.

"The 435 plan was riddled with flaws, omissions and obscurities, and then compounded by concessions to Pretoria following private negotiations which never received the Security Council's ratification" (Herbstein and Evenson:1991:179).

The New York and Brazzaville accords were influenced by the US delegation of the Western Contact Group. Du Pisani and Von der Ropp attribute the failure of the Western initiative to the non-imposition of sanctions in 1978, the absence of an American representative at the Geneva meeting in 1981, and the linkage idea of the US in 1981 (International Affairs Bulletin Vol12/No2:1988:8). The presence of these countries did, however, prove to be one of the sources of pressure that was necessary for change to occur in the region. On 22 December 1988, the peace agreement between South Africa, Namibia and Angola was signed in New York. The independence process was to start on 1 April 1989, leading to the elections for a constituent assembly and final independence on 21 March 1990.

This was not the end that everybody had anticipated. After almost three decades of armed warfare, the SADF and SWAPO were not willing to trust one another. South Africa reported a buildup of SWAPO forces just before April. The stipulation that SWAPO forces withdraw north of the 16th parallel had been ignored. Jaster (1990:36) states that the South African regime was not ready for "the biggest cross-border penetration in SWAPO's 23 year insurgency" on the eve of 1 April 1989. The delay of the UNTAG forces facilitated this attack and the confined South African forces could not retaliate effectively. West Africa (No3768:6-12 November 1989:1836), with a different ideological background to Jaster, reported that the independence process began with

"a tragic episode emerging from conflicting interpretations of the agreements. Some of SWAPO's freedom fighters, the People's

liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), believed they could be 'confined to base' in Namibia and crossed into Namibia from Angola. The South African Defence Force was released on a manhunt that left some 300 PLAN members dead, and a handful seeking shelter with UNTAG positions".

SWATF forces were eventually deployed to counter the SWAPO attacks. The settlement was threatened by a full-scale war in the area. The Mount Etjo Declaration between Angola, Cuba and South Africa managed to get the situation under control. SWAPO members were to be escorted to UN monitored bases, infiltrators were ordered to leave the territory by the 15 April and the late UNTAG forces were deployed in the area (Jaster:1990:36-37). The conflict lasted until mid-May after which the settlement was resumed.

Andre du Pisani offers an analysis of the three stages of Namibia's transition process: the period from 1 April 1989 to the certification on 14 November 1989 by Ahtisaari that the elections had "been free and fair", the process of constitution-making, and finally the "phase of state and nation building" (SA International Vol20/No4:1990:197). Namibia had finally reached its objectives after years of struggle and negotiation with the same party who had initiated its struggle. Ten political parties registered in the first democratic elections in Namibia. These ranged from the far right's Aksie Christelike Nasionaal to the left's SWAPO of Namibia.

For many, the problems are only starting. The new South African government of FW De Klerk had been party to the final stages

after his election in 1989. He has yet to prove his support of the new Namibian government. What still remains under discussion, however, is the ownership of Walvis Bay. During the Botha era it had been a non-negotiable issue which had caused many set-backs in the independence process.

Peter Vale recognises the fact that the

"interaction between domestic, regional and international goals is the key to understading of the emergence - for the first time since the Boer War - of an integrated military-cum-political strategy in Southern Africa" (Chan:1990:171).

This paper attempted to expose the relationships that existed between these three areas. The revised diagram in Chapter Two formed the basis of this study. There were substantive and procedural decision-making regimes in South Africa, specifically during the Botha era. The objectives of the policies were never under consideration. South Africa wanted to remain a regional power and wanted to maintain a white dominated, capitalist system. It did not anticipate the effects of pressure groups on its policies. Reforms occurred, not because the Botha regime wished to implement them, but because it was forced to do so.

The procedural blocs are different entities in the foreign policy-making process. Evidence of this was the fact that South Africa simultaneously deployed forces in the Southern African region and extended diplomatic accords to the nations of Swaziland (1982) and Mozambique (1984). Zimbabwe did not come under formal attack but was subject to 'transport diplomacy' based on the willingness of South Africa to thrust a relationship of dependency upon the strongest Frontline State.

Pressure politics therefore was the main advocate of change in Southern Africa. The South African government's lack of

legitimacy was the cause of its increased vulnerability and ultimately the change in the leadership of the regime in 1989.

This leadership change brought with it a new coalition of forces in the decision-making regimes. The Botha years of the securocrats gave way to the technocrats under FW De Klerk. Once again, diplomacy was the order of the day. Negotiations started between the liberation forces in South Africa and the regime.

Regime theory applies to the Botha era and the policies espoused by that government. The theories of regime vulnerability and fragmentation also apply to a certain extent. This paper exposes the great influence that a state leader's character has on the policy-making process. Botha's history as a military man emerged in his policies in Namibia and the region. His belief system and realist policies created major problems for the South African state. This was evident in the international opposition to South African actions. FW De Klerk, previous Minister of the Interior, brought with him the conciliatory politics that guided his portfolio in the National Party. His character, however, became dominant and proved that even diplomats have double agendas.

The independence of Namibia marked the end of a colonial period for that country. The irony of the situation is that contrary to South African beliefs, a SWAPO dominated government did not produce policies which were communist in orientation. Namibia has a long road ahead of it in a region and continent that is becoming marginalised from the world economic system. The

changing policies of the Soviet Union and the US, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War have created a more attractive European Economic Community. Aid will be channelled into the EEC region because there is a greater chance of profit realisation there than in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Future research should take cognisance of these developments in the world. The chance that regional blocs will replace the North-South and East-West divides is very great. Policy analysts will need to reformulate their frameworks to include these blocs and possibly replace international pressure inputs with inputs from various regional coalitions. What is obvious, however, is that the impact of internal opposition will remain the strongest input for the policy decision-making process. No amount of military strength and political repression will stop the process at play in a society. If the people of a country demand change, they can bring about change if they organise themselves adequately and harness the less influential inputs of foreign policy.

APPENDIX

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO.435

ADOPTED 29 SEPTEMBER 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976 and 431 (1978) and 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978,

Having considered the report of the Secretary General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution 431 (1978) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa to the Secretary General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West People's Organisation (SWAPO) to the Secretary General,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia:

1. Approves the report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation and his explanatory statement;
2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 385 (1976);
3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary General for a period of up to twelve months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its Resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;
4. Welcomes the preparedness of the South West Africa People's Organisation to cooperate in the implementation of the Secretary General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from its President of 8 September 1978;
5. Calls upon South Africa forthwith to cooperate with the Secretary General in the implementation of the present Resolution;

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including the unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Resolution 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and the present Resolution, are null and void;
7. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council not later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of the present Resolution.

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