

Civil Society's Quest for Democracy in Zimbabwe: Origins, Barriers and Prospects, 1900-2008

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the

requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of

RHODES UNIVERSITY

by

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July 2009

ABSTRACT

Civil Society's Quest for Democracy in Zimbabwe: Origins, Barriers and Prospects, 1900-2008

This thesis is a critical examination of the origins, barriers and prospects for a working class-led civil society as it sought to democratise Zimbabwe's post-colonial state. It is an interdisciplinary but historically informed analysis of how advanced capitalist development promoted the emergence of social movement unionism with a potentiality to advance democracy in Zimbabwe. Despite occurring on a much smaller and thinner scale, the evolution of civil society in colonial Zimbabwe was akin to what happened in 19th century Britain where capitalist expansion presented a foundation for democratisation. However, big underlying barriers exist in Zimbabwe, resulting from various forms of authoritarian structures and forcible mobilisation strategies emanating from colonialism and the protracted war of liberation. ZANU PF's violent reaction to memory contests by non-participants in the war of liberation seeking an alternative political agenda attest to the controversial and polemical nature of struggles over memory and forgetting in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. These structural impediments forestalled the organic growth of civil society in Zimbabwe, thereby explaining its inchoate status and the failure to significantly determine the course of public policy. While recognising the democratic aspirations and capacities of the working class in precipitating political change, this thesis takes into consideration the impact of other factors on state-society relations. These include deepening state barbarism, globalisation, and technological advances in communication, transnational civil society, a dysfunctional economy, migration and remittances. Finally this thesis presents an optimistic scenario about the prospects for civil society and democratisation in Zimbabwe. I argue that the revival of the productive sectors of the economy can possibly strengthen the labour movement and revive its capacities for ushering in a democracy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First I would like to thank God for guiding me throughout the PhD process. My study at Rhodes University was partially funded by Andrew Mellon Foundation, my family and friends. Much of the thesis was written in the excellent facilities of Humanities Post Graduate Computer Lab. Special thanks to Professor Fred Hendricks for sourcing the equipment for us. I'm highly indebted to my Zimbabwean friends, exiled and non-exiled, for supporting me during my field work and many other facets. I won't mention your names and you know why! To Professor Kenneth Good, my mentor and friend, I say your commitment to our project from the onset to the end is amazing. I hero-worship you for your consistent support and inspiration. You encouraged and challenged me in a patient and helpful manner. To Professor Louise Vincent, Acting Head of Department 2008-2009, I can only say words fail me but special thanks for your unwavering support. May the good Lord bless you abundantly. This thesis is dedicated to my late dad, Naison Munjai Magure, whose love for hardworking children was unparalleled. To my son Elijah Mazvita Magure, I say this thesis is also for you. I have shown you the way. Please follow my footprints nekuti tsimba itsoka. (A footprint is a foot, because when something walks, it leaves footprints. You can use the footprints to trace its path – says Oliver Mtukudzi on his 2007 album, Tsimba itsoka).

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List of Acronyms

AI	Amnesty International
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
ANC	African National Congress
ANZ	Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe
ATUC	African Trade Union Congress
AU	African Union
BAZ	Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe
BIPAs	Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements
BSA	Broadcasting Services Act
CA	Christian Alliance
CAZ	Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CCP	Communist Party of China
CDE	Centre for Development and Enterprise
CFUZ	Commercial Farmer Union of Zimbabwe
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
COHRE	Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CRC	Constitutional Review Commission
CZI	Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
G & D	Giesecke and Devrient
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GZF	Global Zimbabwe Forum
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund

ITF	International Transport Workers' Federation
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
JAG	Justice for Agriculture
JOC	Joint Operations Command
LOMA	Law and Order Maintenance Act
LSZ	Law Society of Zimbabwe
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai.
MIC	Media and Information Commission
NANGO	National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATUC	National African Trade Union Congress
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NUSPOTTECH	National Union of Students in Polytechnic Colleges
PAC	Partnership Africa Canada
PCC	People's Constitutional Convention
PCC	People's Caretaker Council
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
PVO	Private Voluntary Organisations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RF	Rhodesian Front
RICU	Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
RYMZ	Revolutionary Youth Movement of Zimbabwe
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAHRIT	Southern African Human Rights Trust
SALC	Southern African Litigation Centre
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programs
SAPPHO	Southern African Printing and Publishing House
SAQA	South African Qualifications Authority
SATAWU	South African Transport and Allied Workers Union
SRC	Students Representative Council

TNF	Tripartite Negotiating Forum
TUCZ	Trade Union Congress of Zimbabwe
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UDP	United Democratic Party
UN	United Nations
UTUZ	United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe
UZ	University of Zimbabwe
UZ SEC	University of Zimbabwe Student Executive Council
WOZA	Women of Zimbabwe Arise
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZCIEA	Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZFL	Zimbabwe Federation of Labour
ZFTU	Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions
ZICOSU	Zimbabwe Congress of Student Unions
ZIDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIMDEF	Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund
ZINASU	Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZIPA	Zimbabwe's People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean People's Revolutionary Army
ZLHR	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNP	Zimbabwe National Party
ZOU	Zimbabwe Open University
ZTUC	Zimbabwe Trade Union Congress
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.¹

¹ President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address, 20 January 2009.

1.1 The Context of Studying Civil Society and Democratisation in Zimbabwe

Shortly after gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was considered to be one of the most promising countries in Africa economically and politically because it inherited the second most advanced and diversified economy on the continent after South Africa. Ordinarily such advanced capitalist development could have created structural conditions conducive for democratisation through the development of popular organisations. However, that did not happen because many civic organisations during that period were predominantly under state tutelage.² With time, civil society made significant strides in acquiring some consciousness of its externality and opposition to ZANU (PF) policies and was relatively successful in challenging the state in a number of policy areas.³

Nonetheless, Zimbabwe is contemporarily experiencing serious political, economic and social problems and is gradually sliding towards authoritarianism despite having made significant progress towards democratisation in the late 1990s. According to a 2007 Freedom House report for a ten-year timeline since 1997, Zimbabwe regressed towards authoritarianism. The country changed its status from being “partly free” to the current “not free” since 2000.⁴ Freedom House is a Washington-based independent nongovernmental organisation that supports expansion of freedom by monitoring political rights and civil liberties world-wide. When US President Obama made reference to despotic leaders who are on the “wrong side of history” in his inaugural speech, it was probably a thinly veiled attack on Mugabe whose violent party slogans are chanted with a clenched fist. The fact that Zimbabwe falls in the “not free” category even in 2009 possibly suggests that the observation was correct

This research is informed by a number of ideas that will be explored later in the thesis including Samuel Huntington’s ideas on global democratic development where democratisation is experienced metaphorically through “waves.”⁵ A wave of democratisation is experienced when a significant group of countries undergo transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes.⁶ This development is in line with Huntington’s observation that each democratic wave is followed by a period of democratic regression. Hence there is talk of two steps forward and one step

² See Jonathan N. Moyo, “Civil Society in Zimbabwe.” *Zambezia* vol. 20, no. 1 (1993):1-13.

³ See Jonathan N. Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*. (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992), 31-32.

⁴ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/zimbabwe_FIW_07.pdf> Accessed 4 October 2008.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, ‘How Countries Democratise,’ *Political Science Quarterly*, 106 (4), (1991):579.

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 11.

backward pattern.⁷ Huntington recognises a number of variables essential for the emergence of democracy.⁸ This thesis selected capitalist economic development, high levels of literacy, urbanisation and the development of working class and organisation as relevant to the study of Zimbabwe's political economy. These are some of the variables central to Rueschemeyer et al.'s theory on the relationship of capitalist development to democracy and the shift in the balance of class power in a society.⁹ The framework of analysis for this thesis also borrows heavily from the aforementioned theory.

The country's gradual decline into an undemocratic order can be understood to be occurring within the context of a general regression into authoritarianism after the "third wave" as asserted by Huntington. Implicit to the process of democratisation is the understanding that civil society plays a key role in fostering and consolidating democracy. This research aims to engage this hypothesis in understanding the role of civil society in Zimbabwe's democratic transition as it has had a limited role in contributing positively to the process. Based on Charles Taylor's contribution on the description of what constitutes civil society, Jonathan Moyo's 1993 article on civil society in Zimbabwe also partly inspired this study.¹⁰ Civil society is said to exist in three senses:

(1) In a minimal sense, civil society exists where there are free associations that are not under the tutelage of state power. (2) In a stronger sense, civil society exists only where society as a whole can structure itself and coordinate its actions through such associations free from state tutelage. (3.) As an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can speak of civil society wherever the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course of state policy.¹¹

Moyo identifies two historically related factors to explain the "chronic underdevelopment" of civil society during the colonial era and post-independent Zimbabwe.¹² The two factors have to do with the negative attitude of Smith's Rhodesian Front and Mugabe's ZANU PF governments towards civil society and political activity. What makes Moyo's ambivalent piece interesting and relevant to this study is the fact that he argues that to an extent prospects for civil society in Zimbabwe appeared gloomy in the near future. He singles out three factors to justify his position: prejudices of colonialism, African traditional values that restrict political space and

⁷ Huntington, *Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, 25.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 37-38.

⁹ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

¹⁰ Moyo, "Civil Society in Zimbabwe."

¹¹ Charles Taylor, "Modes of Civil Society," *Public Culture*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 1990):98.

¹² Moyo, *ibid.*, 5.

values of the liberation war.¹³ Interestingly, these factors were also identified in this thesis as forming the hallmark of barriers to the emergence of a civil society that can play a proper watchdog role as defined by Taylor in a maximalist sense of the term.

However, despite his ambivalence, Moyo is prophetic about two things in his conclusion about civil society in Zimbabwe. He argues that an issue-oriented mass movement to be ignited by economic reforms was forming at the grassroots and that its leader did not need liberation war credentials to take over power from the nationalist leadership.¹⁴ At that stage Moyo was arguing that civil society in Zimbabwe existed in the minimalist sense and that it was futile to speculate on the prospects for civil society in the other two stronger senses as espoused by Taylor.¹⁵ Developments in the late 1990s however proved otherwise. This thesis argues that because of that ambivalence, Moyo underestimated the potentiality of the working class in leading a broad-based social movement that could significantly impact on public policy. More importantly, that was so despite Moyo's correct speculation on the possibility of the grassroots movement to produce a leader with post-independence credentials based on mass disenchantment.

The monopolisation of the public sphere by the settler colonialists explains why the embryonic working class-based civil society movement that originated during the colonial period remained underdeveloped. This was so notwithstanding its efforts to carve out a foundation for participatory democracy in post independent Zimbabwe. Upon independence, the new ZANU PF government also made it a point that civil society in the strict sense of the term becomes nonexistent with respect to size and influence. As a result, it took time before civil society could become autonomous and for participatory democracy to be broadened and relatively deepened over time after independence. Indeed, state corporatism became the norm but an incipient active and vibrant civil society later came into existence in the 1990s. Two interrelated factors explain the emergence of a civil society that was not under state tutelage.

The first explanation is that the working class felt short-changed because union leaders handpicked by the government shortly after the creation of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) invariably failed to fight for their cause. Therefore workers decided to bring on board an autonomous leadership that could possibly make a difference. The revitalisation of the labour movement after the change of leadership coincided with the eve of the adoption of

¹³ Ibid.,9-10.

¹⁴ Ibid.,13.

¹⁵ Ibid.

economic reforms. That development had far-reaching consequences on the nature of working class-led civil society that later took root in Zimbabwe. Another reason was the end of the Cold War that saw the triumph of neo-liberalism and the restructuring of the economy along the same lines. The restructuring of the economy negatively affected the working and living conditions of the working class particularly in developmental states. They responded by organising beyond the workplace and allying with other social movements to fight against the loss of their citizenship rights. However, the consequence of the aspiration for the development of a civil society with the political and organisational capacity to influence public policy was not only met with hostility but with violence too by the ZANU PF government.

There is a gap in existing literature on civil society and democratisation in Zimbabwe that this thesis seeks to bridge. Many scholars are correct to give considerable attention to the role of the state in impeding the organic growth of civil society in Zimbabwe. However they tend to underplay the significant role played by the working class in leading the ensemble of other civics in fighting authoritarianism.¹⁶ The point is that while these scholars recognise the centrality of civil society in democratisation, they do not specifically attribute the shift in the balance of power to the leading role played by the working class. In addition, they tend to downplay the role of globalisation of economies, regional social movements, migration, remittances, global civil society and information technology in democratisation. This is so despite the fact that the aforementioned factors are redefining state-civil society relations in an unprecedented manner.

Norbert Tengende's 1994 PhD dissertation stands out as one of the few academic efforts that recognise that the urban working class is the strongest proponent for political inclusion.¹⁷ Besides Tengende's work and a few others identified, many scholars on Zimbabwean politics are either ambivalent or prone to underestimate the democratic aspirations, credentials and

¹⁶ See S. R. Dorman, "Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe" (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2001); Masipula Sithole "Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 12, no. 1 (January 2001):160-169; Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimister, "Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion," *Historical Materialism*, vol. 12, no. 4 (2004):355-382; Sam Moyo, John Makumbe and Brian Raftopoulos, *NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: SAPES, 2000); Jonathan N. Moyo, "Civil Society in Zimbabwe," *Zambezia*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1993):1-13 and David Moore, "When I am a Century Old: Why Robert Mugabe Won't Go," in *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in Africa*, ed. Roger Southall and Henning Melber (Cape Town and Uppsala: HSRC Press and Nordic Africa Institute, 2005): 120-150.

¹⁷ See N. Tengende, "Workers, Students and the Struggles for Democracy: State-Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe" (PhD diss., Roskilde University, 1994). However other scholars also did some impressive work on the subject, for example Brian Raftopoulos, "Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in Zimbabwe," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 55 (November 1999):57-66; Suzanne Dansereau, "Zimbabwe: Labour's Options Within the Movement For Democratic Change," *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 28, no. 89 (September 2001):90-122; Lucien van der Walt, "Trade Unions in Zimbabwe: For Democracy, Against Neo-Liberalism," *Capital and Class*, Issue 66 (Autumn 1998):85-117 and Peter Alexander, "Zimbabwean Workers, the MDC & the 2000 Election," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 85(2000):385-406.

capacities actually possessed by the working class in precipitating political change. This thesis makes a modest attempt at gap-filling through an empirical examination of the leading role played by a working class-led civil society in attempting to establish and possibly consolidate Zimbabwe's nascent democracy. It describes the socio-economic process that led to the origin of civil society in Zimbabwe, barriers encountered and prospects between 1900 and 2008.

The above is to be achieved by also taking into consideration the impact of other factors that have received relatively less or no consideration in mainstream scholarly literature. These are globalisation, technological advances in communication and transnational civil society, a dysfunctional economy (due to economic mismanagement and unavailability of international credit lines), migration and remittances. Although Tengende's work recognised the centrality of the working class in democratisation, it failed to look at some of the above-cited factors. For example he overlooked the impact of international structures of power on domestic politics.¹⁸ There is also no explicit recognition of the real possibility of ZCTU making significant strides towards social movement unionism. This is so despite indications of embryonic sectoral civic organisations that were developing in the early 1990s. Despite those unfolding realities, Tengende only made scant reference to social movement unionism in two sentences and nothing more.¹⁹

However the second criticism must be taken into account with a caveat that not so many active civil society organisations existed that time compared to the late 1990s. In some instances, factors such as massive emigration of Zimbabweans destined for the diaspora and the concomitant impact of remittances on state-society relations were not in existence. As such, to an extent Tengende can be forgiven for what appears to be an error of omission whilst in actual fact it is not. This thesis recognises the importance of the sectoral civic organisations that emerged and coalesced around the labour movement to form the NCA, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, and the Save Zimbabwe among other social movement unions. In short this research seeks to recognise and reclaim the status of the working class in leading the fight against ZANU PF's predominance and precipitating political change through the establishment of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

¹⁸ In cases where international factors are considered within the discourse on civil society, scholars like Sam Moyo view them in a pejorative sense of imperialism. See Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, "The Zimbabwe Question and the Two Lefts," *Historical Materialism*, vol. 14, no. 4 (2007b):171-204.

¹⁹ Tengende, 341.

1.2 Aims of the Thesis

This thesis is anchored on the questions: how did the civil society's drive for democracy originate, and what are the impediments that stand in the way for civil society to make a significant contribution to Zimbabwe's democratization? The prospects of the working class-led civil society are also examined at the end. Other questions to be addressed are:

- What are the effects of increased levels of poverty on political participation? Do high levels of impoverishment affect political participation?
- What explains the absence of challenges to a social relationship that involves domination?
- Is the idea of civil society relevant to Zimbabwe?
- What are the sources of obstacles or impediments encountered by civil society?
- What was the impact of the internet and other forms of advanced information technology on the ability of civil society to mobilise?
- To what extent has the international context played a role in influencing domestic politics in general and civil society in particular?.
- What factors influenced ZANU PF to craft repressive legislation that governs the operations of civil society movements?
- On what discourse is the ruling elite justifying staying in power at whatever cost and behaving uncompromisingly towards civil society and opposition?
- What are the constraints and opportunities on transnational civil society as they negotiate the multiple international public spheres?
- What explains the love-hate relationship that now exists between the MDC and its civil society partners?

1.3 Central Postulates

This thesis's first postulate is that the urban working class is the strongest proponent of the emergence of a broad-based, participatory and inclusionary political regime. This is so because an urban working class continuously demands the betterment of their living and working conditions, as well as seeking, as Rueschemeyer et al. noted, the furthest extension of their

democratic rights.²⁰ As already stated, contemporary literature on Zimbabwe civil society tends to underestimate the leading role played by the working class within the auspices of social movement unionism in shifting the balance of class power. It therefore also logically follows that the existence of a diversified and advanced capitalist economy is the *sine qua non* for the development of popular working class-led organisations. The strength of the working class is tied to the performance, integration and diversification of the economy. Any disruption to the economy necessarily negatively impacts on the symbiotic relationship between the economy and the working-class led civil society.

The second postulate is that the cardinal political issue to be problematised in order to understand Zimbabwe contemporary regression into an undemocratic order is the abuse of power. In addition, the authoritarian culture in Zimbabwe's ruling elite and the attendant impediments on civil society need to be understood within the context of settler colonialism. Colonialism informs regimes of truth propagated by domestic ruling elites that shape the production of meanings and identities and consequently how the "other" is seen and represented in relation to the "self". Indeed, the philosophical, cultural and historical evolution of the human rights discourse makes civil society illegitimate in the eyes of the ZANU PF nationalist party. The party erroneously view the charting of an alternative political agenda as a smokescreen for neo-colonialism.

In terms of the domestic ruling elite, representational practices associated with collective memory relating to the dislodgement of colonialism are instructive. These form the basis of a binary narrative consisting of a positive portrayal of the collective self "we" (ZANU PF) and the negative representative and demonisation of the "other" (MDC and civil society). Thus collective memory plays a role in the construction and protection of identities as well as justifying claims to power and exercise of power. As a way to manufacture consent, ZANU PF perpetuate moral panic around the supposed role of civil society in eroding the gains of the liberation struggle. ZANU PF accuses dissenting voices of being used as fronts of the British government's machinations to re-colonise Zimbabwe.

Factors such as advances in information technology, hidden forms of political resistance, transnational civil society, migration and remittances received relatively less or no consideration in mainstream scholarly literature on Zimbabwean politics. Nonetheless, they actually impact on

²⁰ This argument is the major preoccupation of their book, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* cited earlier .

the nature, sources and context of the impediments that stand in the way for civil society to establish democracy. Lack of movement towards a settlement of an economic and political crisis forces people to redraw their priorities as they seek to cope with life amidst deteriorating material conditions. A dysfunctional economy breeds a parochial political culture.

1.4 Contributions of the Thesis to Academic Inquiry

This thesis makes a modest contribution to knowledge claims in the following areas relating to the Zimbabwean academic inquiry.

1.4.1 The Centrality of Social Movement Unionism in Democratisation

This thesis offers a general rethinking of who initiated and led the efforts towards fighting for the emergence of a broad-based, participatory and inclusionary political dispensation in Zimbabwe. This is in light of the achievements of a working class-led civil society within the auspices of social movement unionism in shifting the balance of class power. Mainstream literature appears ambivalent about who brings about democratisation, thereby explaining why scholars underestimate the importance of the working class's ongoing and unending demands on the political system. Flowing from above, this thesis seeks to contribute towards the revival and entrenchment of the view that social movement unionism opened potentialities for democratisation in an unprecedented manner. Social movement unionism entailed the coalescing of various civic groups around the working class to fight for democratic change. As already stated, the above can only occur out of an advanced capitalist economy.

1.4.2 Comparative Democratisation and Transnational Public Spheres

A comprehensive understanding of the impediments and prospects for civil society requires scholars and policy makers to broaden the scope of the discussion and include the interactions between the state and non-state actors spanning national boundaries. The existence of transnational public spheres calls into question the arbitrary sub-disciplinary boundaries between international relations and comparative politics given the link between domestic and transnational politics. The growing importance of the internet and other forms of advanced information technology in creating and expanding both the domestic and global public spheres is also given prominence thereby filling a lacuna in the existing literature. This thesis contributes

towards a progressive research agenda anchored on understanding the importance of civil society activities that transcend domestic contexts. That objective is achieved by attempting to locate the nature and status of civil society's leverage in relation to the state in a globalising world through acting transnationally.

1.4.3 The Political Economy of Migration, Remittances and Sanctions

The political importance of remittances is not well documented and many studies focus primarily on the positive contribution of remittances to the national economy. This thesis argues that this view is inadequate as it fails to capture other dimensions associated with migration and remittances. This study examines the dynamic and complex role of migration, sanctions, remittances and civil society in the academic inquiry on democratisation. Accordingly, the idea of remittances and democratisation nexus challenges scholars to rethink about the conventional economic understanding of remittances. This is important given that this study demonstrates they may be used to stifle political reforms. In the case of Zimbabwe remittances in hard currencies were used by the Mugabe regime to defeat sanctions. Remittances accessed from the black market were used to buy luxuries for judges, top military personnel and other parties central to the regime's continued hold on power.

The dysfunctional economy characterised by run-away inflation negatively affected political culture by transforming a participant political culture into a parochial one. Thus civil society found it difficult to play a central role in the establishment of democracy amidst glaring levels of poverty. This was so because poor material conditions hindered people from participating in political processes. Many Zimbabwean people living below the poverty datum line became less interested in participating in politics. As impoverished people, they could not afford to lose any slight opportunity to generate income through participating in the burgeoning informal economy.

1.4.4 Hidden Forms of Political Resistance

The thesis critically examines the various ways civil society in Zimbabwe contested the dominant political discourses and structures of power and the impediments encountered. A theme that emerged from the Zimbabwean political crisis but received limited attention in scholarly work is the hidden forms of political resistance. This thesis examines the clandestine political conduct of

subordinate groups who were trying to respond to the closure of avenues for self-expression by ZANU PF. Musicians and theatre artists expressed dissent and tried to censure authorities indirectly. In contrast, an underground syndicate of artist-activists used visual signs of resistance or graffiti in marking the public space to directly express their anger over deepening ruling elite barbarism.

1.5 Research Methods and Positioning of the Research

1.5.1 Critical Theory/Frankfurt School

This thesis is inspired by the critical theoretical perspective in general and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science and methodology of social research in particular. Critical theory has its origins in classical sociological theory and seeks to understand the genesis of the existing social order and how it can be transformed. Critical theorists seek to emancipate and enlighten social agents from unsuspected acts and institutions of domination.²¹ Ideas from Pierre Bourdieu, Antonio Gramsci and other critical social theorists who belong to the "Frankfurt School"²² will be utilised in the thesis. Critical theory is informed by an interdisciplinary research approach aimed at confronting contemporary social and political problems head-on.²³ In fact critical theory is an emancipatory project that aims to respond to challenges brought about by modernity. Given that critical theory is both emancipatory and enlightening, its primary focus is on a close examination of structures limiting human potential and how they can be transcended.²⁴ In other words, it looks at the possibilities and barriers to the emancipatory project by unmasking and contesting the prevailing social and political power arrangements. This thesis (especially in Chapters 3 and 4) is an inquiry in relation to how the socio economic and political status quo came into existence and how it impeded the organic growth of civil society. Finally, the critical approach employed in this study enables scholars to be alive to the different "spheres of economic, political, social and cultural life"²⁵ shaping contemporary state-society relations in Zimbabwe.

1.5.2 Research Methodology

²¹ Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt school*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 55.

²² Douglas Kellner, *Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 1.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ David D. Brown and Raymond A. Morrow, *Critical Theory and Methodology* (London: Sage, 1994), 9.

²⁵ Kellner, 4.

This research is qualitative and is located within Pierre Bourdieu's multi-paradigmatic approach of methodological relationalism.²⁶ It is important to point out from the onset that qualitative researchers are often criticised for lacking a detailed methodological description of how they carried out their research.²⁷ This study is a modest attempt to address that identified shortcoming. The social world is viewed as consisting of relational, emergent, dynamic and fluid properties and therefore is not static.²⁸ Given the need to transcend the Cartesian dualisms, the core of Bourdieu's methodological relationalism is the idea that "the stuff of social reality...lies in relations."²⁹ Accordingly, every difference or distinction is "a relational property existing only in and through its relation with other properties."³⁰ In the process of research, a relationship exists between the researcher and the objects of inquiry and this brings in issues of subjectivity. Thus there is a need for the researcher to come to an understanding of how she or he may have impacted on the research, research context and the objects of inquiry (participants). Bourdieu calls for a reflexive orientation or critical reflexivity in order to deal with the distorting influence of a researcher's organisation and analysis of empirical data and other value positions that stand in the way of an objective understanding of the world.³¹

In light of the fact that critical theory employs a multi-paradigmatic approach of methodological relationalism, this thesis relies on a wide array of research methods. In order to answer the research question, the study made an extensive review of literature from a number of disciplines and sub-disciplines, such as political sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, criminology, international law, international relations and history. Such an interdisciplinary approach to political inquiry stems from the intellectual influences of Pierre Bourdieu whose sociological inquiry had a firm epistemological foundation drawn from different philosophical schools.³² This study extensively uses content analysis as a research technique for "making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use."³³ The idea of selectively synthesising the different philosophical schools was to build on

²⁶ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 15.

²⁷ Tracy Farmer et al., "Developing and Implementing a Triangulation Protocol for Qualitative Health Research," *Qualitative Health Research*, 16, no. 3 (March 2006):377.

²⁸ Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piironen, "Toward Pragmatist Methodological Relationalism from Philosophizing Sociology to Sociologizing Philosophy," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 36, no. 3 (September 2006):303-305.

²⁹ Bourdieu and Wacquant, 15.

³⁰ Kivinen and Piironen, 315.

³¹ David Swartz, *Culture and Power – The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997):293-294.

³² *Ibid.*, 29.

³³ Klaus Krippendorff. *Content Analysis: an Introduction to Its Methodology* (London: Sage Publications, 2004),18.

their respective strength to improve analytical rigour. Secondly, this study relies on primary data gathered in the field (Zimbabwe and South Africa) over a period of five months from August to December 2007. In some cases, follow-up interviews were made in 2008 and 2009. The qualitative data gathered from the field work highlighted the different ways the civil society actors contested or reproduced the existing socio, political and economic order. Finally it also provided an insight relating to the impediments that stand in the way for civil society to live up to its liberal advocates' expectations.

Furthermore, in terms of positioning the study, this study draws from hermeneutics philosophical line of thought throughout the research process. Hermeneutics is defined as the interpretation of texts with a view to gain a valid and common understanding of a text.³⁴ The research interview entails the transformation of conversation into text and interpretation thereof. To come to an understanding of how people experience and understand the world and find meanings of things not obviously clear is the hallmark of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics includes not only the interpretation of written texts, but also “the whole sphere of symbolic expression.”³⁵ Texts are studied with a view to interpreting them to understand the intended or expressed meaning through a hermeneutic cycle.³⁶ Consideration must be given to going beyond the actual words and author's intentions to include context as well. However, such a process is not possible because of what Herbert Simon terms bounded rationality – that the rationality of individuals is limited.³⁷ The research process in general and hermeneutics can not be done at a single goal, neither is it a step-by-step or linear process. In practice, hermeneutics involves “a continual oscillation between text and context, comparing one with the other, indeed more like a spiral than a circle, a process with no definitive beginning and no definitive end.”³⁸ This points to the plurality of interpretations or the fluid nature of meanings that can be derived from text defined in a composite fashion. In sum, this thesis synthesised secondary and primary sources to offer a sympathetic but critical portrayal of the civil society movement in Zimbabwe.

1.5.3 Sampling

Purposive sampling was the main sampling strategy used in this study. With purposive sampling, the process takes place with a specific goal in mind and it usually happen that specific pre-

³⁴ Steinar Kvale, *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), 46.

³⁵ John James Clarke, *In Search of Jung*. (London: Routledge, 1992), 43.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁷ See Bryan D. Jones “Bounded Rationality,” *Annul Review of Political Science* 2 (1999):297-321.

³⁸ Clarke, 45.

determined groups are targeted in advance.³⁹ This study also relies heavily on a snowball sample, defined as “the population of interest [that] cannot be identified other than by someone who knows that a certain person has the necessary experience or characteristics to be included.”⁴⁰ Snowball sampling in this particular instance was based on this researcher’s social networks. In the case of interviews conducted in Durban; the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal assisted this researcher in getting respondents they felt could assist in answering this author’s research questions. The same applies to this author’s field work in Johannesburg, where the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civil Society Organisations Forum assisted this writer in getting some respondents.

Furthermore, snowballed respondents came to the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civil society Organisations Forum offices in Braamfontein where this writer interviewed them. They generally trusted this author since the Zimbabwe Diaspora office vouched that the researcher was a graduate student conducting genuine academic research and not a government of Zimbabwe intelligence operative. The Zimbabwe field work also immensely benefited from snowballed respondents who also helped this writer to secure interviews with key civil society leaders, some of which were conducted in the confinements of the respondents’ homes. No formal confidentiality contracts were drawn between this researcher and the respondents because everything was based on mutual trust. To this end, 31 of the 34 respondents agreed to be identified with the views they expressed in this study.

Firstly it is important to point out that this author could not get respondents from ZANU PF in light of the political crisis in the country that was characterised by serious polarisation across the political divide. Despite concerted efforts to bring them on board and have their voice in the thesis, this was unsuccessful. This researcher’s mission to interview the ZANU PF leadership was not accomplished primarily due to personal security reasons. This writer was advised by his colleague, Oswell Nyathi, a former liberation fighter and member of ZANU PF, not to risk his life. In cases where this author tried, they refused to cooperate. Thus the societal environment in which the researcher is operating becomes very central, especially in a closed authoritarian political system.⁴¹

³⁹ Michael Quinn Patton, *Quantitative Research and Evaluation Methods* (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 243.

⁴⁰ Mary Sue MacNealy, *Strategies for Empirical Research in Writing* (New York: Longman, 1999), 157.

⁴¹ See John D. Martz, “The Conduct of Social Research in Latin America: A Personal View of Problems in Open and Closed Societies,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 24, no. 1 (Spring 1989):47-64.

Accordingly, this study had to rely on archival material from the Zimbabwe parliament (parliamentary debates) and the state-controlled daily newspaper *The Herald*. Several attempts were made to solicit interviews from some seemingly liberals from ZANU PF but this author was told that his “topic was too political and leaning towards effecting regime change in Zimbabwe.”⁴² Some even asked this writer questions along these lines: “Where was the civil society and its Western allies when we were fighting colonialism?”⁴³ Eventually this researcher managed to contact one of his former students now working for ZANU PF who assisted by providing archived copies of ZANU PF party’s mouthpiece, *The Voice*. This author also used his contacts in the Ministry of Information and Publicity to get a collection of some of President Robert Mugabe’s speeches called *Inside the Third Chimurenga*, and other relevant literature.

The first category of interviews targeted officials of Zimbabwean civil society groups that fall under the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. These include the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), the Christian Alliance and the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA). The basis for selecting the groups was the varied interests they represented in Zimbabwe and their practical and visible involvement in the civil society arena. The second category consisted of officials of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its breakaway faction that works alongside civil society organisations. Views of opposition parties are critical because, for example, the MDC which is the main opposition party in Zimbabwe was born out of a working class organisation, the ZCTU. In the case of Zimbabwe, some civil society activists wear two hats given that some also hold positions in the opposition movement. The third category consisted of academics identified and selected on the basis of their contribution and expertise in the field of civil society and democratisation.

The last category of respondents was drawn from officials from the Zimbabwean diaspora pressure groups. The identified civil society groups are affiliated to the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civil Society Organisations Forum. These include the Concerned Zimbabweans Abroad and the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, and the Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement of Zimbabwe which are all based in Johannesburg. The basis for selecting the groups was their practical involvement in championing the cause for the civil society despite operating from outside Zimbabwe. The total number of interviews conducted was 36 including the pilot interviews, and

⁴² Remarks by Jairos Mhlanga, a war veteran and a family friend in an informal interview, 3 January 2008, Chegutu, Zimbabwe.

⁴³ Informal interview with Owell Nyathi, 5 September 2007, Johannesburg.

attempts were made to have the figure balanced within the categories. The study did not attempt to balance the gender composition of respondents: the sampling procedure within the identified categories was random, although the scales were tilted in favour of males. This can be explained by the patriarchy nature of the Zimbabwean society where women tend to be less active in political discourses. It was generally feasible to contact and secure interviews in each category of respondents. This researcher had interfaced with some of them while studying at the University of Zimbabwe and when working for the Government of Zimbabwe.

1.5.4 Data Collection and Processing

In light of the fact that this study utilised qualitative in-depth interviews as one of the major sources of primary data, field work was conducted over a period of five months. Interviews were chosen as a data collection technique primarily because it allowed the possibility of getting rich primary data.⁴⁴ Though interviews were the backbone of this thesis, they were complemented by other secondary sources of data. These included parliamentary debates (Hansard), archival material from ZANU PF headquarters, relevant Acts of Parliament and bills. Newspaper articles, television interviews, magazines, peer-reviewed journal articles, civil society organisations bulletins and artistic visual signs of political resistance were also used. Two pilot interviews were conducted before the first interview schedule that took place in Durban. This improved the quality of interview questions and the way the interviews were subsequently conducted. The process of refining the interview process was an ongoing process given the fluidity of interpretations that sometimes surfaced during the field work.

Six interviews were conducted in Durban, ten in Johannesburg, two in Grahamstown, South Africa. In addition, 16 more in-depth interviews were conducted in Harare to give a combined total of 34 interviews in both countries. A total of 32 interviews were recorded using a voice recording mp3 player, and each lasted an average of 45 minutes. Given its semi-structured nature, the interviews sometimes took more than 45 minutes and some digressions yielded fairly rich primary data. The other two respondents in South Africa did not give the researcher consent to have the interviews audio-recorded. Furthermore these two respondents requested that their views be treated as anonymous. In terms of storage, the interviews were all transferred from the mp3 voice recorder and stored on a compact disc.

⁴⁴ For detailed reasons, see Kvale, 1996.

Interview questions were sent in advance by email or hand-delivered to the respondents during the time this author was soliciting interviews. Given the reliance on snowball sampling, some respondents also assisted this writer to send questions to would-be interviewees in advance. The reason for conducting transnational interviews was out of a growing realisation that a number of Zimbabweans, whether from civil society or ordinary people, are now resident in South Africa due to either voluntary or forced migration. Interestingly, the data collected in both Zimbabwe and South Africa converged and yielded the same results. In fact there are a number of activists who fled the repression in Zimbabwe and are now agitating from outside the borders of Zimbabwe. Civil society organisations resident in Zimbabwe also established transnational chapters operating from countries like the United Kingdom and South Africa. Finally, the list and profile of respondents who participated in the study are provided in the appendix.

1.5.6 Data Analysis, Interpretation and the Write-Up Process

The process of making meaning out of the primary data collected over the five-month period was based on Strauss and Corbin's grounded theory. The methodology was selected in light of its close relationship with hermeneutics philosophical line referred to earlier and the continuous interplay between data collection and analysis.⁴⁵ It should, however, be noted that grounded theory is a method in transition to the extent that its flexibility and metamorphosis permit it to be "used to extend existing knowledge but from a different perspective."⁴⁶ This researcher carried out the verbatim transcription process on his own as part of making sense of the data. In the process of transcription there were a few cases where this writer could not make sense of what some interviewees implied and where possible he emailed or called them for clarification. Notes taken during the field work were also made part and parcel of the transcripts. In line with methodological relationalism, this researcher sought to find a way of saturating himself with the data from the recorded interviews after the transcription process. Thus the data analysis stage involved what is called "data immersion"⁴⁷ and it entails thorough reading of the interview transcripts several times in order to be fully conversant with the interview data.

When looking back at the research process, it is safe to say that the whole exercise did not occur in a linear fashion as described in this thesis. Rather the stages were closely interlinked and did

⁴⁵ Christina Goulding, *Grounded Theory* (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 42.

⁴⁶ S. Musengi, *Passing the Spear: A Grounded Theory Study of the Influence of Family Business Value Sets on Succession Planning in Black Family Owned Businesses* (PhD diss., Rhodes University, 2006), 15.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

not occur in a sequential fashion. The way the three grounded theory stages were conducted in this study will illustrate the argument about non-linearity. During the first phase of the analysis called open coding, data was broken down into parts, examined, compared, conceptualised and categorised.⁴⁸ Tied to this initial process, different themes were broadly identified and classes discovered when concepts were compared against one another and appeared to pertain to a similar phenomenon. Constant comparative analysis formed the basis of the three-phase coding process.⁴⁹ With the research question in mind and coupled with the themes this author was looking for (identity, power, domination and public sphere), this writer found it relatively easy to identify categories. The researcher used highlighters of different colours as part of the coding process and each broad theme was allocated a colour code. Data that could not be put in a neat category was left unmarked at first, though it sometimes happened that it would eventually fit into a particular cluster, especially during phase two of the analysis. When this happened the relevant colour code would be used.

The next stage of analysis was referred to as axial coding of the data: this involved specifying inter-relationships or connections between the categories⁵⁰ and formed the basis of story-telling or a narrative. The procedure involved making connections between categories already identified in stage one and literature reviewed earlier on. It was also imperative to develop categories that specified the conditions and context in which it is implanted or derived.⁵¹ The questioning technique suggested by Strauss and Corbin addresses: Who? When? What? How? How much? Why?⁵² For example, when examining the SADC-led mediation process in Zimbabwe, this researcher asked: Who brought it about? When did it start? What explains its success or failure? Why was there no participation of civil society? And how did civil society react to the process?

The third and final phase that followed axial coding was called selective coding and it involved identifying one major theme or category from which other sub-themes were assimilated.⁵³ In the case of this thesis, categories (themes) developed based on inter-relationships were made into chapters and each chapter finally had the colour code of the primary data relevant to it. The whole process involved close examination and reference to the transcripts a number of times. Due to thematic colour coding, it was possible to just pick on an interview transcript and go

⁴⁸ Anselm C. Strauss & Juliet Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), 61 .

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁵⁰ Goulding, 78.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Strauss & Corbin, 77.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 116.

straight to the relevant colour code, ignoring other colour codes not relevant at that point in time. One would then look for a particular coding theme in all the transcripts and work on them, cluster them in sub-themes and see how they carry forward the development of the story line or narrative. In all these stages, this author's interpretation of the transcribed material was mainly influenced by Pierre Bourdieu's sociological project of looking for issues of power and domination. Next, folders with secondary sources were created for each thematic area and these were then woven together with coded data from interviews to get the thesis chapters. Lastly findings from the interview inquiries were presented through selected quotes.⁵⁴

1.5.7 Research Validity

In general qualitative research is criticised for lack of objectivity given the latitude the researcher has in interpreting the data.⁵⁵ Accordingly, the question to be asked is, is one measuring what one thinks is trying to measure or “the extent to which our observations indeed reflect the phenomena or variables that are of interest to us.”⁵⁶ The idea of validity is anchored on methodological reflexivity primarily because, as Pierre Bourdieu argues, “every aspect of research is both empirical and theoretical.”⁵⁷ Validity also entails ensuring quality control throughout the knowledge production process as opposed to emphasising the inspection of the end product.⁵⁸ The overarching aim of checking validity of research is to have “defensible knowledge claims” that stand competition from other claims.⁵⁹ Following this brief discussion on validity, the importance of having this study subjected to validity test becomes self-evident.

It was stated earlier that this study utilised Bourdieu's multi-paradigmatic approach of methodological relationalism, and the process of triangulation was extensively used throughout the research process as a quality control measure. The findings of a study are made robust by combining research techniques, and this study employed three basic types of triangulation: Methodological Triangulation, Data Triangulation and Theoretical Triangulation. Methodological Triangulation involves the use of more than one research method or data collection technique.⁶⁰ This study employed several types of qualitative approaches, for example interviews, document analysis and participant observation. Data Triangulation involves the use

⁵⁴ Kvale, 265.

⁵⁵ Musengi, 9.

⁵⁶ Kvale, 238.

⁵⁷ Bourdieu & Wacquant, 35.

⁵⁸ Kvale, 236.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 240.

⁶⁰ Farmer et al., 379.

of multiple data sources and respondent groups,⁶¹ and this writer interviewed both civil society leaders and activists in general. Theoretical Triangulation involves the use of alternative disciplinary or substantive theoretical lenses to view research findings.⁶² This study drew insights from international relations, international law and economics among other disciplines. The aim of using triangulation was to “produce convergent findings about the same empirical domain.”⁶³ In other words this thesis is likely to “survive” tests⁶⁴ conducted with different methods. The major weakness of this thesis is the lack of credible statistics to back some claims made in the thesis, especially on issues related to migration statistics and value of remittances. Another weakness may have come as a result of the unstable political situation in Zimbabwe that may have made some respondents to resort to self-censorship. However, given that there was a convergence of findings after triangulation, this concern may be ignored.

1.6 Thesis Outline

In order to answer the research question: Civil society has a significant role to play in democratisation, how did it originate in Zimbabwe and what are the impediments and prospects, this researcher identified a number of themes that talk to and complement each other. This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 first outlines the research context, central postulates/hypotheses, broad aims of the research and the contribution of the thesis to academic inquiry. Thereafter the chapter details the research methodology in order to answer the “how” question related to the collection and analysis of data.

Chapter 2 is the theory chapter and provides a framework or founding knowledge of what was to be studied. This chapter critically examines some topics and ideas that have a bearing on the whole thesis by reviewing the literature on civil society and democratisation in general and in some instances specifically on Zimbabwe.

Chapter 3 builds on the path-dependent perspective despite its over-exaggerated emphasis on the impact of the past on the present. It details the centrality of the colonial context in relation to the understanding and shaping of contemporary political trajectories. By exploring the colonial antecedents to authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, this chapter argues that nationalists and the settler

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Christian Erzerberger & Gerald Prein, “Triangulation: Validity and Empirically Based Hypothesis Construction,” *Quality and Quantity* 31, (1997):144.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

state created an essentially authoritarian template. The post-independent transformation project suffered a stillbirth because it was never seriously attempted due to narrowly defined security reasons. The new creation remained authoritarian due to the wholesale importation of routines, practices and mentalities of the colonial state and liberation war into post-independent Zimbabwe. Many of the legacies of the exclusionary colonial state and commandist liberation movement remain in place and manifest themselves as barriers to civil society as it attempts to bring about social change.

Chapter 4 illustrates how violence and collective memory associated with the liberation war interwoven with colonially inherited repressive structures acted in concert to ensure ZANU PF's predominance. The hegemonic project led to specific state society relations within which the major impediments faced by civil society are located. The chapter demonstrates how collective memory plays a role in the construction and protection of identities as well as justifying the claim to and exercise of power. Collective memory associated with the participation of ZANU (PF) in the war of liberation where land was the major grievance ensured the domination of the nationalist narrative, especially after the year 2000. As such collective memory helped to create a master or grand narrative that is at the disposal of the ruling elite to bifurcate the country as comprising of external and internal enemies as well as external and internal sympathisers.

Building on Karl Polanyi's ideas of double movement, Chapter 5 specifically focuses on social movement unionism and the drive for democracy that was an outcome of working class contestation of market hegemony. This chapter demonstrates that social movements emerge as an antithesis of a self-regulating market. Their broad objective is essentially to contest the destructive and disruptive tendencies associated with the excessive commodification of life. A number of overlapping themes are examined in this chapter, including education and class formation, context and impact of economic reforms in Zimbabwe. An overview is given of the role and contribution of various prominent civic groups in the fight against authoritarianism. The dysfunctional economy in Zimbabwe due to a myriad of factors, especially as a result of ZANU PF's backlash politics, saw many people voting with their feet in search of greener pastures, and this reduced the number people available for collective action. This chapter also interrogates the impact of the continued downward economic spiral in terms of the ability of the resident and diaspora-based civil society to mobilise.

Chapter 6 critically analyses the involvement of transnational structures of power in the

Zimbabwean crisis. It also gives an overview of Zimbabwe's diaspora-based civil society and the nature of the challenges they faced in their endeavour to complement the democratisation efforts of their counterparts based in Zimbabwe. To a varying degree, transnational state and non-state actors found in the international economy modified the balance of power and constrained political decision-making in a manner that affected state-society relations in Zimbabwe. The chapter attempts to understand the significance of SADC leaders' protection of Mugabe despite his woeful human rights record. This chapter concludes that SADC significantly undermined the efforts by both domestic and transnational civil society to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 7 details how the civil society in Zimbabwe resisted state corporatism and concomitant attempts towards reintroducing a one-party state in Zimbabwe through the promulgation of the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill. ZANU PF attempted to control the church following the latter's involvement in politics within the auspices of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. The chapter also explains why the Save Zimbabwe Campaign could not survive after successfully forcing ZANU PF to negotiate with the political opposition following the intervention of SADC. Notwithstanding the fact that the church successfully brought together important groups which were previously in conflict, sharp tactical differences later emerged. The love-hate relationship between the former allies was mainly due to the failure of Zimbabwe's progressive forces to appreciate and respect the distinct but interrelated functional roles of civil society and political parties as espoused in liberal democratic theory.

Finally Chapter 8 summarises and amplifies the major themes presented in the different chapters on civil society and democratisation in Zimbabwe. Civil society in Zimbabwe remains embryonic, underdeveloped and overly constrained by the state. Nevertheless, factors such as migration, remittances, and improvements in information technology are also reshaping state society relations in that country. It is further argued that, notwithstanding ZANU PF's concerted efforts to use organised violence and other unconventional methods to maintain its predominance, prospects for civil society in Zimbabwe are bright. As such a number of structural reforms must be undertaken at both economic and political levels. The thesis identifies and recommends areas for further research at the end of the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

Civil Society's Quest for Participatory Democracy in Zimbabwe: Origins, Blockages and Re-Emergence, 1900-2008

Africans were able to avail themselves of scarce educational and social opportunities in order to achieve some degree of upward mobility in a society that was hostile to their ambitions...they challenged individual and social barriers imposed by colonialism to become the locus of protest against European domination.¹

¹ Michael Oliver West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

2.1 Introduction

A central theme in the study of comparative politics since the end of the cold war has been how countries democratise and more recently why many third world countries are failing to graduate into typical Western liberal democracies. The transition paradigm view civil society as an ideal vision of how society should be organised for democracy to take root. Defining what constitutes civil society is a big challenge for many scholars.² However, according to Cohen:

Civil society is construed both as a symbolic field and as a network of institutions and practices that is the locus for the formation of values, action-orienting norms, meanings, and collective identities ... Its associations and networks are a terrain to be struggled over and an arena wherein collective identities, ethical values, and alliances are forged. Indeed, competing conceptions of civil society are deployed in a continual struggle either to maintain cultural hegemony by dominant groups or to attain counter-hegemony on the part of subordinate collective actors. Accordingly, no conception of civil society is neutral; each is part of a project to shape the social relations, cultural forms, and modes of thought of a society.³

From the above quote, ideas of Antonio Gramsci espoused in the selections from *The Prison Notebooks*⁴ to be made reference to shortly can easily be discerned. A number of interlocking themes impinge on the way societal change can be best understood, and examples include domination, power and hegemony among others. The goal of this chapter is first to provide a theoretical framework that sheds light on how an embryonic working-class based civil society movement that developed during the colonial period carved out a foundation for participatory democracy in Zimbabwe. Secondly this chapter seeks to trace how that participatory democratic culture was subsequently broadened and relatively deepened over time. Finally the study will detail the impediments that that were encountered by the working-class based civil society movement and the possibility of a re-emergence of participatory democracy in post-independent Zimbabwe. Clearly, the impulse for participatory democracy arose during the colonial working class struggles though the broadening and relative deepening of the democratisation process that was to start after independence. Indeed, in both colonial and post-colonial eras, a number of blockages stood in the way for the broadening and deepening (consolidation) of democracy and these aspects are also interrogated in this thesis.

² For the different definitions and perspectives see, Rollin F. Tusalem, "A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-Wave Democracies," *International Political Science*, vol. 28, no. 3 (2007):361-386.

³ Jean Cohen, "Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable Democracy: the Contemporary American Discourse of Civil Society," in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999):214.

⁴ Antonio Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

Civil society is a source of counter hegemonic strategies meant reorient a society towards a democratic direction. The main purpose of counter hegemonic strategies in the struggle for democratisation is to shift the balance of power from the ruling elite to the subaltern classes. This can be achieved through decisively deconstructing laws, institutions from which the ruling class is drawing its hegemonic power in order to stifle democratic reforms. This thesis advances and defends the position that the impediments to Zimbabwean civil society need not to be seen and understood only in the context of relations of domination identifiable both to social agents and to the institutions of the modern state. Be that as it may, the state remains the “leading” source of impediments. This chapter is divided into three parts. Part one gives an overview of Gramsci’s theory of hegemonic power with a view to providing a basis for understanding internal and external factors that make it difficult for civil society to make a significant contribution to Zimbabwe’s democratisation process. The second part is a discussion about civil society, its relevance and limitations in non-Western settings and how it emerged within a capitalist setup in general and Zimbabwe in particular. Finally part three examines salient features of authoritarian regimes that civil society has to grapple with in order for democracy to take root.

2.2 Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Hegemony

Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony seeks to explain the futility of changing past and present capitalist societies.⁵ Accordingly, the engagement of the impediments to the Zimbabwean civil society needs to be located within the broad spectrum of state hegemonic power. The Gramscian framework of analysis addresses the question about how ruling classes are able to obtain consent of the populace (subordinate class) to continue with asymmetrical relations of power.⁶ According to Gramsci, all regimes require a positive construction of ideological hegemony in order for them to function and stabilise. Furthermore his conceptualisation of a dialectical relationship between agency and structure understood in terms of hegemony provides a firm basis for the understanding of social change.

The state impacts on a society through the Gramscian “super structural form” consisting of the political, economic and cultural spheres, thereby shaping human behaviour and expectations in line with the hegemonic social order.⁷ Hegemony is an active process that involves the

⁵ George Lipsitz, “The Struggle for Hegemony,” *The Journal of American History*, vol. 75, no. 1 (June 1988):146.

⁶ This is the cross cutting theme in Antonio Gramsci’s *The Prison Notebooks*.

⁷ Gramsci, 12. See also Andrea Fehr Hampton, “Unlocking the Hegemonic Power of ‘The People’s Democratic

production, reproduction and mobilisation of popular will in order to secure ‘leadership’ and “direction” by the dominant group.⁸ It should however be noted that the ruling classes do not only articulate and defend the interests of their members. Instead, a process called “incorporative hegemony” is put in motion and is achieved by attempting to address (or window dress) and identifying with the aspirations, interests, ideology, norms and values of the subordinate groups.⁹ Essentially over and above the material basis of consent, hegemony as a dynamic and ongoing process also consists of repressive or coercive elements.¹⁰

Hampton quoting Cox (1981) further argues that

a concept of hegemony that is based on a coherent or conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality ... In this formulation, state power ceases to be the sole explanatory factor and becomes part of what is to be explained.¹¹

Similarly Hearn describes hegemony as being

about the winning and holding of power and the formation (and destruction) of social groups in that process. It is about the ways in which the ruling class establishes and maintains its domination. The ability to impose a definition of the situation, to set the terms in which events are understood and issues discussed, to formulate ideals and define morality is an essential part of the process. Hegemony involves persuasion of the greater part of the population, particularly through the media, and the organization of social institutions in ways that appear ‘natural’, ‘ordinary’, ‘normal’. The state, through punishment for non-conformity, is crucially involved in this negotiation and enforcement.¹²

With the above reality in mind one is compelled to look at the whole gamut of state society relations in order to have a firm understanding of hegemonic power. A dialectic relationship exists between culture and power due to the political functions of cultural symbols in reinforcing or undermining existing social order and structures.¹³ Dominant groups create a way of life that the general populace may unquestioningly accept as legitimate because of the historically derived

Dictatorship’: An Analysis of Civil Society and the State in the PRC,” *China Report* (2005):253-254.

⁸ Alan Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies,” *Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 17, no. 3 (Autumn, 1990): 311.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ John Arena, “Race and Hegemony: The Neo-Liberal Transformation of the Black Urban Regime and Working-Class Resistance,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, 47 (2003):356.

¹¹ Hampton, 258.

¹² Jeff Hearn, “From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men,” *Feminist Theory*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2004):54.

¹³ T. J. Jackson Lears, “The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,” *American Historical Review*, 90 (June 1985):568.

prestige and confidence the former enjoys by virtue of its position and function in a societal production.¹⁴ It is worth noting that the concept of hegemony is of little analytical utility unless it is twinned with the notion of domination given that consent and force coexist although one or the other will be dominating at any given stage.¹⁵

Closely related to the theory of hegemony is the idea of counter hegemony which basically has been poorly explored in literature according to Hunt.¹⁶ Counter hegemony involves the ‘reworking’ or ‘refashioning’ of the elements which are constitutive of the prevailing hegemony.¹⁷ When working on a counter hegemonic project there is no need to reinvent the wheel. In other words the project should not be based on the clean slate principle but should start from “where people are” i.e. the status quo.¹⁸ Thereafter efforts are directed towards reversing and negating the dominant elements until they wither away. Thus a counter hegemonic strategy “involves the idea of a special role for social agents that sustain a commitment to a self-conscious reflexivity about the conditions and possibilities of transformative politics.”¹⁹ The idea is to instil a sense of hope - that another world free from suppression and domination is possible.

2.3 Understanding the Genesis of Civil Society: Philosophical Considerations.

The literature on civil society and related concepts of social capital evolved when ideas of democracy were propounded by the enlightenment thinkers in the 18th Century. Quoting Immanuel Kant, Schmidt asserts that enlightenment is defined as practical reasoning, and its advancement is measured in terms of the elimination of constraints on mankind in relation to the “public use of reason.”²⁰ Though the enlightenment project is generally united by its conception and use of reason as a source of authority, it must be viewed as “as a capsule containing sets of debates, stresses and concerns, which however differently formulated or responded to, do appear to be characteristic of the way in which ideas, opinions and social and political structures interacted and changed in the 18th century.”²¹

The above mentioned aspect is generally neglected by cogent critics of the ideas associated with

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Hunt, 309.

¹⁷ Ibid., 313.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 315.

²⁰ James Schmidt, “Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 92, no. 2 (June 1998):424.

²¹ Ibid., 421.

the enlightenment project. Though some critics argue that the enlightenment project is loosely defined, and too carelessly lumped together to be of a heuristic value,²² this thesis takes the position that the various themes that it consists of must be critically examined with a view to benefit from its various constituent parts. Accordingly, the basis of judging the utility of the enlightenment project or otherwise should not be whether or not the “variety of different commitments and intentions”²³ are reconcilable. Rather the preoccupation should be on the beneficial aspect of the project. In the final analysis, the enlightenment project should neither be uncritically accepted nor rejected in totality.

Furthermore a number of scholars share the view that the idea of civil society emerged in Europe as philosophers and historians alike “sought to come to terms with” the rapid expansion of capitalism.²⁴ In a sense civil society can also be traced back to Aristotelian tradition, and its broad appeal to scholars and policy makers is a result of many levels and layers of meanings “deposited by successive generations of thinkers.”²⁵ For Schmidt “the nature and promise of civil society were important concerns in the Enlightenment.”²⁶ Accordingly, the concept of civil society, its relationship and relevance to democracy was developed from Western political thought, especially in the works of John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill.²⁷ Other enlightenment thinkers who contributed toward the birth of the concept of civil society include Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Montesquieu and Immanuel Kant. However it was Immanuel Kant who mainly contributed towards an understanding of the relationship among “civility, enlightenment, and society.”²⁸ The aforementioned triad points towards the possibility of the establishment of democratic institutions.

It is worth noting that the concept emerged at a distinctive moment in European history, prompting scholars to reflect on its relevance within different cultural and political settings. However, the idea of civil society was to become one of the most vague, stretched and essentially contested concepts in comparative politics, especially in the post Cold War era. Accordingly, this

²² Ibid., 426.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Michael Ignatieff, “On Civil Society: Why Eastern Europe’s Revolutions Could Succeed,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1995):129. See also Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977).

²⁵ Krishan Kumar, “Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term,” *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 44, no. 3 (September 1993):376.

²⁶ Schmidt, 419.

²⁷ Dwayne Woods, “Civil Society in Europe and Africa Limiting State Power Through a Public Sphere,” *African Studies Review*, vol. 35, no. 2 (September 1992):78.

²⁸ James Schmidt, “Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 92, no. 2 (June 1998):424.

sometimes led to the romanticisation of the concept and a corresponding uncritical celebration of a consensual concept.²⁹ The vast literature on civil society bears testimony to the idea that civil society is a growth industry. There is no denying that civil society is a futuristic project with features and tenets that are still to be applied in a manner consistent with purposes and intents espoused during the enlightenment period. Accordingly, civil society still remains a utopia and promise that is yet to be realised *in toto* despite the fact that present day Europe corresponds much more close to the futuristic project.³⁰ In other words civil society does mirror real existing societies but a distinction is being made between different societies based on “the degree and manner in which they have implemented principles of civil society.”³¹

Marxism and liberalism are the two antithetical traditions that exist with regard to the notion of civil society, though both see property relations and market economy as the basis for civil society.³² From the two competing traditions, there are four principal schools of thought that contribute to the debate on civil society: the associational, regime, neoliberal and the Post-Marxist schools.³³ In their relatively optimistic view of civil society, the first two stress the importance of human agency, while the last two offer a more cautious approach to civil society that is basically structurally driven.³⁴ Inspired by Tocqueville, the associational school is mainly dominant in the US and emphasises the centrality of autonomous civil society in strengthening democracy.³⁵ In a sense, civil society promotes the development of a stable and effective democratic polity through the creation of social capital defined in terms of norms of reciprocity and trust among individuals and between the citizens and the state. There is also greater emphasis on how social capital associated with civil society provides a firm basis for the “emergence of a civic culture.”³⁶ Though the associational school has a very high expectation for the role civil society can play in consolidating democracy, at the same time it is cognisant of the attendant limitations in that regard. However in the final analysis civil society is said to play an indispensable function in promoting democracy and development.³⁷

Secondly, the regime school is mainly inspired by John Locke and it focuses on how to institute

²⁹ Neera Chandhoke, “The ‘Civil’ and ‘Political’ in the Civil Society,” *Democratisation*, vol. 8, no. 2 (Summer 2001):1.

³⁰ Jurgen Korka, “Civil Society from a Historical Perspective,” *European Review*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2004):69.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Agnes S. Ku, “Beyond the Paradoxical Conception of Civil Society without Citizenship,” *International Sociology*, vol. 1, no. 4 (December 2002):530.

³³ Goran Hyden, “Civil Society, Social Capital, and Development: Dissection of a Complex Discourse,” *Studies in Comparative Development*, vol. 32, no. 1 (Spring 1997):8-11.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

constitutional and legal arrangements for the purposes of providing checks and balances in a political system.³⁸ The term civil society has evolved over time given that John Locke's liberalism did not make a distinction between state and civil society but between civil society and the state of nature. For the liberals the separation of civil society from the state is a given and this serves to understand the modern form of civil society that plays a pivotal role in checking the state's despotic tendencies.³⁹ The separation of state and civil society became pronounced with the development of capitalist Western Europe, and so also did the distinction between the public state and private (non-state) market that has its roots in Scottish Enlightenment liberalism, as in the works of Smith, Hume, and Paine.⁴⁰ A leading theme in the liberal tradition is that the state must roll back and just be there as a referee who provide a framework for the protection of private property, life and liberty. The hallmark of this argument is mainly attributed to Thomas Jefferson's idea of limited government – "that government is best which governs least."⁴¹ In other words, state control and intervention, whether in the market, social or political sphere, is viewed as anathema to people seeking liberty. Civil society then becomes a means of counteracting despotism.

Another school of thought that contributes to the debate about civil society is the Neoliberal school, which recognises the historical association between capitalism and democracy.⁴² In a sense, the neoliberal school shares certain liberal elements with the regime school, except that the regime school understands liberalism in political terms whilst the neoliberal school view is premised in economic terms. According to Goran Hyden, "Neoliberals believe that a liberal economy creates the conditions under which a civil society of associations autonomous from the state can flourish."⁴³ However scholars emanating from this school are quick to point out that economic freedoms alone are insufficient to support and nurture a democracy. Consequently, political freedoms are then required to play a complementary role to the economic ones.

Finally there is the Post Marxist School, which is mainly influenced by Hegel and Marx, and which understands civil society as characterised by the "explicit principle of particularistic individualism and an implicit principle of communitarianism."⁴⁴ In other words civil society is

³⁸ Ibid., 10.

³⁹ S. Ku, 530.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ R Kent Newmyer, "Thomas Jefferson and the Rise of the Supreme Court," *Journal of Supreme Court History*, vol. 31, issue 2 (July 2006):130 -131.

⁴² Hyden, 11.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴S. Ku, 531.

made up of self-seeking individuals, inequality and class conflict. The Marxist school predominantly associates the separation between the state and civil society with the “growth of capitalism and the development of the science of political economy.”⁴⁵ Thus emphasis is on the significance of the economy in influencing social structures, which perpetuate “social stratification and thus enhance elite interests.”⁴⁶ Antonio Gramsci’s conception of civil society is particularly novel given that it transcended and modified Marx’s schema of base and superstructure.⁴⁷ Gramsci argues that the civil society as opposed to the state is the arena for conflict and that societal domination can be overcome through the development of counter hegemonic associations representing alternative norms and values.⁴⁸ This thesis delves deeper into the ideas of the post Marxist school and neo liberal school, where greater emphasis is placed on how capitalism transforms society. To that end this thesis engages Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens as well as Karl Polanyi’s ideas on the genesis of civil society. Indeed, what unites the aforementioned scholars is the idea that civil society is a product of capitalist development.

2.4 The Civil Society, Public Sphere and Democratisation Debate

Despite the fact that civil society is often regarded as a romanticised concept, many scholars share the view that a vibrant civil society is a necessary, although not sufficient condition for the entrenchment and consolidation of democracy.⁴⁹ However, democratic consolidation is a later stage that may or may not be reached. Indeed, Goran Hyden, Linz & Stepan, Putnam and Alexis de Tocqueville all view civil society as an analytical tool and as a normative ideal central for the entrenchment of democracy. It should however be noted from the onset that there are three levels of analysing civil society. According to Goran Hyden, analysis of civil society is done at country, associational or organisational and global levels.⁵⁰ Furthermore civic groups are related to democratisation via both internal and external ways. Internally civil society engenders cooperation, solidarity, public spiritedness and trust (develops social capital) while externally it calls for a limited government that is responsive and accountable to its citizenry. Civil society works for the common good of individuals “even if different actors in civil society might have

⁴⁵ Kumar, 377.

⁴⁶ Hyden, 12.

⁴⁷ Sunil Khilnani, “The Development of Civil Society,” in *Civil Society-History and Possibilities*, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16.

⁴⁸ Hyden, 7.

⁴⁹ Sarah Henderson, “Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Non-Governmental Organization Sector in Russia,” *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, no. 2 (March 2002):139-14.

⁵⁰ Hyden, 13-17.

very different conceptions of what constitutes the common good.”⁵¹ Thus within the civil society it is common to find associations with myopic agendas that do not augur well with the idea of balancing the different versions of public interest or good. In other words, participant associational groups may not necessarily share the same interests and values.

However many scholars have questioned the utility of the concept of civil society as an analytical construct to understand democratisation and as a policy tool in non-Western contexts given its history and evolution.⁵² The important question relates to the extent to which the concept can “travel” and still retain its analytical utility free from distortions associated with conceptual stretching. There is no easy answer to the question but the point to be noted is that in general, the concept manages to capture phenomena associated with voluntary associations in various parts of the world. From this standpoint, there can be either a broad or a narrow view of civil society, with the former treating all forms of association as a different manifestation of the same phenomenon while the latter posits that civil society can only be found in Western societies with a distinct historical experience.⁵³

With respect to the question whether the idea civil society is relevant to Africa and other third world contexts, four possible competing answers come to the fore and are all attributed to David Lewis.⁵⁴ The first one is an unequivocal yes, based on the universal necessity for a political project geared towards building and strengthening democracy. The second answer is a clear “no”, primarily because the concept emerged from a Western tradition characterised by different political and cultural settings thereby making it one of the many misguided policy transfers from the West. Coming to the third answer, the argument here is that civil society is relevant only if it is adapted to the unique local conditions, hence the need for taking a “middle of the road” approach to its use. Indeed, such an approach accepts the utility of civil society it within reasonable or average limits and is not extreme in nature. The final answer about the relevance of the concept in non-Western settings is based on the argument that the question is irrelevant because civil society has been a part of Third world countries’ colonial histories of both domination and resistance. In other words the relevancy of the concept of civil society is self-evident.

⁵¹ Korka, 69.

⁵² David Lewis, “Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the Usefulness of a Concept,” *Development and Change*, vol. 33, no. 4 (2002):569-586.

⁵³ Marc Morjé Howard, “Conceptual and Methodological Suggestions For Improving Cross-National Measures of Civil Society: Commentary on Heinrich,” *Journal of Civil Society*, vol. 1, no. 3 (December 2005):229-230.

⁵⁴ Lewis, 574-582.

In light of the above, it is clear that the concept is of universal relevance and therefore cannot be discarded altogether primarily because it originates from West. It is worth noting that many of the principles governing civil society as seen and understood in Western eyes and terms are not yet fully evident and developed in the African settings. An example relates to the neo-patrimonial nature of African political economies that do not recognise the importance of the autonomy of society from state. Essentially the ruling elite do not endeavour to separate the public and private spheres of interest. What is imperative therefore is to take the middle of the road approach that rejects “a crudely normative view of civil society” by way of “accepting that civil society contains a range of diverse values and intentions.”⁵⁵

By insisting that civil society can produce democratic transitions, optimists fail to distinguish conjunctural and structural phenomena, thereby sometimes setting very high expectations for African civil society. Instead scholars must focus on collective activity and norms, be they democratic or not, that make up the actual existing civil society in Africa.⁵⁶ Such an approach implicitly claims that the African society is inherently undemocratic and less likely to support liberal democracy. In sum, regardless of the essentially contested nature of the term, civil society is now part and parcel of the “political and social discourse of a wide range of groups and individuals in Africa and elsewhere.”⁵⁷

Moreover closely related to the concept of civil society but analytically distinct is the idea of a public sphere as developed and popularised by Jurgen Habermas writing about the 18th century European public sphere. The former refers to social institutions whilst the latter is all about public discourses, and therefore collapsing them into a single entity makes them lose their analytical utility. A public sphere develops within a civil society when a group of people unite for the purposes of debating political issues that involve the nature and constitution of political authority.⁵⁸ The public sphere nurtures and engenders a sense of public participation and debate on key issues in polity thereby promoting participatory democracy.

In his original formulation Habermas makes reference to a bourgeois public sphere that was

⁵⁵ Ibid., 583.

⁵⁶ Stephen Orvis, “Civil Society in Africa or African Civil Society,” *African and Asian Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1 (2001):18.

⁵⁷ Lewis, 583.

⁵⁸ John A. Guidry, “The Struggle to Be Seen: Social Movements and the Public Sphere in Brazil,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol. 16, no. 4 (Summer 2003):499.

established in different social institutions in 18th Century Europe.⁵⁹ For example, in the United Kingdom debates took place in coffee houses and journals while in Germany the public sphere was in the form of reading clubs.⁶⁰ Indeed, the public sphere evolved over the years to take a more overt political shape in contrast to the original formulation. However Habermas's theory of the public sphere has been subject to a number of criticisms and modifications by various scholars.⁶¹ This is because Habermas makes a number of very questionable assumptions. For example, he fails to recognise the existence of multiple public spheres that are in conflict with each other, while at the same time in conflict with the mainstream bourgeoisie public sphere.⁶² Accordingly, the mere reference to other public spheres attests to the fact that the bourgeois public sphere is exclusionary in character. Indeed just like what is noted when discussing civil society, a public sphere is a contested, dynamic and complex participatory arena.

In light of the exclusionary character of the bourgeois public sphere, subordinated social groups (women, workers, peoples of colour, and gays and lesbians⁶³) establish their own publics. Nancy Fraser coined the term subaltern counter publics to “parallel discursive arenas” where disadvantaged social groups come up with competing discourses that allow them to “formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.”⁶⁴ The idea of establishing voluntary associations was to acquire greater political power on part of the subaltern groups. For example in his book *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Class*, Jonathan Rose looks at how an autodidact culture of the British working class eliminated the justification for discrimination by the educated elite.⁶⁵ This was achieved through mutual improvement societies established to acquire and share diverse knowledge ranging from philosophy to algebra. Since economic inequality was premised on inequality of education, “monopolies on knowledge had to be broken by any means necessary.”⁶⁶ Consequently, the autodidact culture of the British working class produced “a deeper political consciousness and a more fervent desire to transform society.”⁶⁷ All these concerns of seeking to transform the status quo were a result of a myriad of challenges associated with expansion of an urban industrial society.

⁵⁹ Harold Mah, “Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians,” *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 72, no. 1 (March 2000):157.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ See, for example, John S. Brady, “No Contest? Assessing the Agonistic Critiques of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere,” *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, vol. 30, no. 3(2004):331-354.

⁶² Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” *Social Text*, no. 25/26 (1990):61.

⁶³ Ibid., 67.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Jonathan Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Class* (London: Yale University Press, 2002), 20-21.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 24.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 50.

Similarly, with respect to colonial Zimbabwe the impact of industrialisation and education on political consciousness is apparent. In line with Jonathan Rose's observations, it is self-evident that industrialisation and advances in education had a huge impact on the political consciousness of African people. Acts of student resistance to colonial (missionary) education in the form of strikes were an inherent feature of education in Southern Rhodesia. For example, in 1947, students at Mount Selinda Institute in Chipinge went on strike protesting against being required to work during school breaks for very little pay, and during the same year, female students at Dadaya Mission initiated a strike against a narrow paternalistic discipline by the school authorities.⁶⁸ Given that education produces a critical mind and perspective, it is therefore easy to explain why educated Africans became the vanguard of the liberation movement. Thus Yeakey is correct to conclude that:

From the modern educational system emerged an indigenous elite which demanded the transfer of political power to itself on the basis of the political values of the Western liberal tradition or the ethical imperatives of Christianity, both of which had been learned in the schools ... Designed essentially to serve only evangelising or imperial purposes, Western education became a prime contributor to the emergence of new independent nations. Intended not to be a structure for political recruitment, it in fact called forth and activated some of the most upward[ly] mobile and aggressively ambitious elements of the population – elements most determined to acquire political power, most confident in the rightness of their claim, and most convinced of their capacity to govern.⁶⁹

In Southern Rhodesia missionaries from various denominations ran 90% of the schools. However there was a ploy by the colonial state to slightly expand primary education while at the same time deliberately and persistently suppressing secondary education for political and economic reasons.⁷⁰ All this attests to the manner in which the ruling class was inimical to democracy. Given the failure by the colonial government to meet the demand for formal education, a considerable number of people in general, including the working class, resorted to correspondence education. The privately owned Central African Correspondence College was given permission by the colonial government to offer education by correspondence.⁷¹ Actually the Native Education Department observed that, for Africans education was a never ending process without an age limit and therefore it was normal to find men over forty years of age

⁶⁸ Michael O. West, "Ndabaningi Sithole, Garfield Todd and the Dadaya School Strike of 1947," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2 (June 1992):298-300.

⁶⁹ Carol Camp Yeakey, "Schooling: A Political Analysis of the Distribution of Power and Privilege," *Oxford Review of Education*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1981):183.

⁷⁰ Nathan Shamuyarira, "Education and Social Transformation in Zimbabwe," *Development Dialogue*, 2 (1978):61.

⁷¹ Kedmon Hungwe, "Educational Policy in African Colonial Contexts: The Case of Instructional Media in Southern Rhodesia (1930-1980)," *African Study Monographs*, vol. 15, no. 1 (June 1994):19.

studying through correspondence.⁷² It may be for the foregoing reason (the autodidact culture) that the black majority in Southern Rhodesia were more educated than were other Africans in former colonies in East and Central Africa.⁷³

A number of blacks studying through correspondence also formed study groups to help each other so as to deal with the high failure rate that often characterised distance education. Many trade unionists and nationalists who were incarcerated by the colonial regime continued to study through distance education with colleges such as University of South Africa whilst in prison. The multi-racial Capricorn Society also established study groups that further engendered an autodidact culture among the black community in Southern Rhodesia. Given the determination for Africans to get educated, the enrolment figures for the correspondence college from primary to tertiary level reached 20 000 by 1962. However the situation changed slightly in 1954 when a missionary, Garfield Todd, became the Premier of Southern Rhodesia. Todd rolled out a five-year education plan whose main thrust was to provide a minimum of five years of education to African children as well as expanding and improving secondary, technical and commercial education.⁷⁴ However, after taking over from Todd in 1961, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front reversed the programme, thereby eroding the gains that were made earlier on.

It is interesting to note that in 1901 there were three African schools and 265 students in Southern Rhodesia.⁷⁵ However by 1950, a rapid (though inadequate) expansion in the education sector saw the number of schools reaching 2 232 and with a combined enrolment of 232 689.⁷⁶ Ironically the colonial government's policies aimed at reducing the "irresponsible" demand for education inadvertently created even greater demand for education because the benefits that would accrue later were abundantly clear.⁷⁷ West concluded that by "courting Miss Education" Africans were assured of eliminating barriers to their social mobility.⁷⁸ For example by getting educated a man would change his class position and even end up meeting the qualifications to vote. However the limited and blocked education opportunities available to Africans in Southern Rhodesia frustrated and angered many people who reacted by becoming more resentful of the colonial government, prompting some of them to even leave school to join the liberation

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Regina Austin, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa* (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1975), 44.

⁷⁴ Shamuyarira, 64.

⁷⁵ Michael Oliver West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 49

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Tichatonga J. Nhundu, "A Decade of Educational Expansion in Zimbabwe: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Contradictions," *The Journal of Negro Education*, vol. 61, no. 1 (Winter, 1992):79.

⁷⁸ West, *ibid.*, 37.

movement. Similarly the educated and relatively better-off Africans were to become the locus of protest against colonial domination given the impact of education on “fledgling national consciousness.”⁷⁹ In a sense, the growing number of educated Africans prompted the transition from racial non-competition to racial partnership that was endorsed by “like-minded white liberals”⁸⁰ during the years of Federation.

2.5 A Brief History of the British Working Class Self-Help Organisations

Before engaging the ideas of Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al. and Karl Polanyi, it is necessary to go back to the history of the British urban industrial society, given the centrality of Industrial Revolution in bringing about profound social changes in England during the 19th century.⁸¹ The Industrial Revolution brought sweeping changes in the lives of the people as the working class followed the transition from agricultural employment to industry, commerce and service industries. This may have prompted Karl Polanyi to write about the Great Transformation, a transformation in terms of the social, economic and political life of the English people.

In the emergent urban industrial society the working people were faced with challenges associated with the vagaries of industrial capitalism. The challenges emanated from the employment relationship, poor health standards and absence of social services of a modern kind.⁸² Consequently people had to help one another or perish, leading to the establishment of working class self-help organisations or voluntary associations. According to Hopkins, the development of working class self-help organisations took place in three stages.⁸³ The first stage was from 1800-1830, when there was informal development of small local organs of self-help consisting of sick clubs and savings clubs, while the second stage saw the multiplication and diversification of self-help agencies into cooperatives, building societies, institutes and trade unions that assumed a national character. The third and final stage was a continuation and extension of the sphere of trade union activities culminating in the formation of the Labour party, the growth of consumer cooperatives and parliamentary representation of labour.⁸⁴ However in light of the far-reaching impact of globalisation or a very advanced stage of capitalism, it may be important to add a fourth stage, where voluntary associations or civil society

⁷⁹ West, “Ndabaningi Sithole”297.

⁸⁰ West, *Middle Class*, 66.

⁸¹ Eric Hopkins, *Working Class Self Help in Nineteenth Century England* (New York: St Martin Press, 1995), 1.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸⁴See Kenneth Good, “The Drive for Participatory Democracy in 19th Century Britain,” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 47, no. 3 (July 2009) (forthcoming).

is taking a transnational or global outlook.

However it is probably incorrect to argue that industrialisation and concomitant urbanisation set the stage for class mobilisation.⁸⁵ In fact the pre-existing community shaped the transition trajectories that followed the industrial revolution in England. Drawing on the ideas of Margaret Somers, Burawoy argues that the 19th century English working class depended on a pre-existing public sphere and civil society that was controlled by subaltern classes.⁸⁶ Thus English working class consciousness did not start with industrial revolution per se, rather in places where there was pastoral agriculture, village governance encouraged popular participation.⁸⁷ In the final analysis Burawoy concludes that though the expansion of the market and industrialisation led to class mobilisation, “it did not create it de novo.”⁸⁸ A similar situation will be noted when discussing the evolution of civil society and public sphere in Africa.

2.6 Civil Society, Democracy and Capitalist Development

Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens’s ideas on democracy and capitalist development to a certain extent share some aspects of Barrington Moore’s famous dictum “no bourgeois, no democracy.”⁸⁹ However, contrary to Moore’s thesis, Rueschemeyer et al. assert that the bourgeoisie is generally inimical to democracy. But this is not to say that they negate the role played by the bourgeoisie in the movement “towards democracy” when it insisted on its share of political power.⁹⁰ Indeed the bourgeoisie is hostile to further democratisation in cases where such a move threatens their entrenched interests. Instead the trio argue that class-based organisations contribute towards democratisation by generating and sustaining pressures for socio-economic and political inclusion.⁹¹ Thus the organised working class is “the most consistently pro-democratic force” but can only succeed in pushing for democratisation with the assistance of urban middle class and small farmers.⁹² In fact urbanisation, industrialisation and

⁸⁵ Michael Burawoy, “For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi,” *Politics & Society*, vol. 31, no. 2 (June 2003):222.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Margaret R. Somers, “Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy,” *American Sociological Review*, vol. 58, no. 5 (October 1993):587-620.

⁸⁸ Burawoy, 222.

⁸⁹ Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Regime Change: Structure and Process Driven Explanations?” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 86, no. 4 (December 1992):1030. See also Barrington Moore Jr, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 418.

⁹⁰ Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, “The Bourgeoisie and Democracy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,” *Social Research*, vol. 66, no. 3 (Fall 1999):761.

⁹¹ Jenny Pearce, “Civil Society, the Market and Democracy in Latin America,” *Democratization*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1997):65.

⁹² Huber and Stephens, 1999, 763.

new forms of communication and transport play a pivotal role in enhancing the ability of the working and the middle classes to organise collectively with a view to defend their rights.⁹³ Thus the ability to organise collectively represents a “major power resource of the many, who lack power based on property, coercion, social status, or cultural hegemony.”⁹⁴

Indeed Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al. in their book entitled *Capitalist Development and Democracy* represent a structuralist approach that seeks to explain the relationship between capitalist development and democracy.⁹⁵ However there is no simple answer to the nature of the relationship between democracy and development given that there are cases where capitalist development took place without concomitant democratisation.⁹⁶ Examples given by Rueschemeyer include South Korea, Taiwan and Nazi Germany. Accordingly, the impact of capitalist development on the likelihood of democratisation is a much contested issue. However the cross-cutting theme in *Capitalist Development and Democracy* is that development of democracy is a result of three inter-related clusters of power, namely:

First, the balance of class power is the most important aspect of the balance of power in civil society. Second, the structure of the state and state-society relations shapes the balance of power between state and civil society and also influences the balance of power within society. Third, transnational structures of power are grounded in the international economy and the system of states; they modify the balance of power within society, affect state-society relations, and constrain political decision making.⁹⁷

With respect to the shifts in the balance of class power, what happens is that capitalist development relatively emasculates the propertied classes while at the same time empowering the subaltern classes.⁹⁸ As indicated earlier on, rapid industrialisation, urbanisation and improvements in communication enhance the capacity of the working and the middle classes to organise collectively, thereby explaining the shift in the balance of power. This shift then explains how and why the subordinate classes manage to successfully press for political inclusion unlike before. Secondly, the societal impact of the balance of power between state and civil society is connected to the ability of the state to maintain law and order while at the same time

⁹³ Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, John D. Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 29, no. 3 (April 1997):325.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁹⁶ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Different Methods – Contradictory Results? Research on Development and Democracy,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. XXXII, no. 1-2 (1991):10.

⁹⁷ Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens, “The Paradoxes,” 325.

⁹⁸ Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, John D. Stephens “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Summer, 1993):73.

being counter-balanced by the organisational strength of civil society.⁹⁹ In the final analysis democracy becomes a reality when the state is not immune from social forces, but rules with accountability. With respect to the role of transnational structures of power vis-à-vis modifying state-society relations, it is worth noting that the international market and multilateral institutions are of critical importance.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, changes in the global economic and political system have brought about new incentives and constraints on the “balance of power and state society relationships.”¹⁰¹ Thus, it is on the basis of this objective reality that the relevance of the ideas of a global civil society and the attendant transnational public spheres come to the fore.

2.7 The Aspiration for Democracy in Colonial Zimbabwe.

A number of civic groups existed in African societies prior to colonialism though “this is not to say African tradition included or supported civil society as currently defined in the modern world.”¹⁰² Not so much has been written about pre-colonial civil society in Zimbabwe but indeed there were elements of broad-based popular participation in governance and decision making.¹⁰³ However this thesis argues that there were a number of local village-based voluntary associations in pre-colonial times. These were kinship-based, and were instrumental in mobilising labour for weeding, harvesting and land clearance, and were operated on a rotational basis. These voluntary associations operated through a process called *nhimbe* or cooperative work/work parties. A family would invite fellow villagers to assist in weeding or harvesting and thereafter provide food and drinks for the community that would have heeded the call for help. The next day or week another family would also organise a *nhimbe* and so it went on. Indeed, voluntary associations of this genre continued even after the European occupation of Rhodesia in 1890.

The rapid industrialisation and the concomitant urbanisation led to the formation of various voluntary associations like trade unions, burial societies, tenant associations, sports clubs and hometown associations in line with what was witnessed in 19th century Britain. There are a number of similarities that can be drawn between conditions of work experienced by British and the then Rhodesian factory wage labour force. For example the context in which the civil society drive for democratisation in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe share a number of similarities

⁹⁹ Ibid., 74.

¹⁰⁰ Huber, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, “The Paradoxes,” 329.

¹⁰¹ Karen L. Remmer “Review: New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization,” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 28, no. 1 (October 1995):118.

¹⁰² John Makumbe, “Is there a Civil Society in Africa?” *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2 (1998):306

¹⁰³ Ibid.

to what transpired in 19th century Britain. Thus the drive for democratisation in Zimbabwe did not take a different trajectory from the British setup where subaltern struggles democratised the latter's body politic.

West asserts that the period 1914-1933 was the “formative period for the development of middle class political consciousness.”¹⁰⁴ The first protest movement in Southern Rhodesia was a group of black South Africans who were part of the Pioneer column that colonised Zimbabwe in the early 1890s.¹⁰⁵ In fact the emphasis of this group, hereinafter called the Union Native Vigilance Organisation, was to engineer political organisation of a protest variety.¹⁰⁶ The organisation lobbied for exemption from pass laws for its members as well as for equality with the white settlers among other concessions.¹⁰⁷ However during this period, the first indigenous elite Ndebele pressure group emerged in Bulawayo. It was called the Ililo Lomuzi Society and it gave birth to another association called the Patriotic Society.¹⁰⁸ These two were instrumental in protesting against police raids in municipal beer halls conducted to nab Tax and Pass law defaulters. With time the Patriotic society and Ililo Lomuzi joined forces with the Union Native Vigilance organisation to try and exert some measure of control on the women's sexuality.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore the proliferation of mutual aid societies or voluntary associations bears testimony to the fact that the defence of the integrity of “life strategies was not restricted to workplace protest alone.”¹¹⁰ Clearly, Africans in colonial Zimbabwe responded in a variety of ways to the harsh realities of the urban industrial environment within which they found themselves as constituent parts. Voluntary associations, especially of a home town variety, also helped new migrants to adapt to the new urban environment. Indeed, some of the voluntary associations were geared towards shifting the political and economic balance of power, although others were solely for recreational purposes. They all constituted a subaltern public sphere in a hostile nascent urban industrial society. It is interesting to note that there was a conjoined relationship between mutual aid societies and the industrial protests because:

The thrust of the protests was characterised by determination, commitment, self-sacrifice, and worker solidarity, whereas that of the societies by a sense of pragmatism, an ability to adapt to realities, and a loyalty towards the

¹⁰⁴ West, *Middle Class*, 121.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 122.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 123.

¹¹⁰ Tsuneo Yoshikuni “Strike Action and Self-Help Associations: Zimbabwean Worker Protest and Culture after World War I,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 3 (April 1989):455.

culture of a homeland. Nonetheless, these phenomena did grow, at the deepest level, from one and the same root primarily because out of necessity workers [had to help one another, or die]. At the heart of the industrial protests existed a struggle to defend the integrity of the migrant workers' world, as was the case with the mutual aid societies.¹¹¹

For example the proliferation of mutual aid societies in Salisbury during the period 1918-19 was a result of the influenza epidemic that ravaged the country's emerging industrial centres. During the period under review, African inhabitants of the town were "twice ravaged by influenza epidemic[s] (the second one being less severe), besides other infectious diseases."¹¹² The first influenza attack, which took place in between October and November 1918, saw over 300 people dying and 2 000 quarantined at a treatment camp.¹¹³ In fact the mutual aid societies charged membership fees and assisted members who fell sick. Burial societies that assisted with the burial arrangements of the affected urbanites were formed in Salisbury and other urban areas. However the so-called burial society's activities "in truth were not restricted to funeral activity alone."¹¹⁴ Indeed with time some mutual aid societies even paid fines or bail in cases where a member was arrested by police and this was achieved through the pooling of resources for the common good. In the final analysis the activities of the "societies were geared towards needs of men in wage employment, and the movement, whatever its styles, symbols and rituals were taken from, developed in response to the industrial situation."¹¹⁵

Following the conferment of responsible government on Southern Rhodesia in 1923 a voluntary association called the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association was born out of the Union Native Vigilance Organisation.¹¹⁶ The Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association was mainly concerned with seeking to secure and preserve franchise and other rights for an elite section of Africans. The Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association also pressed for lowering of franchise qualifications and the standardisation of schools.¹¹⁷ In Rhodesia, all males 21 years of age or older were given the right to vote in 1898 subject to meeting certain qualifications – ownership of immovable property worth £75, annual income of £50, and being able to read and write in English.¹¹⁸ Interestingly, West notes that women were also given qualified voting rights in 1919, well before many

¹¹¹ Ibid., 466.

¹¹² Ibid., 458.

¹¹³ Ibid., 458.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 459.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 463.

¹¹⁶ James R. Hooker "Welfare Associations and Other Instruments of Accommodation in the Rhodesias between the World Wars," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 9, no. 1 (October 1966):58.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ West, *Middle Class*, 126-127.

Western industrial countries did the same.¹¹⁹ Notwithstanding the non-racial franchise, as late as 1948, only 258 blacks compared to 48 000 whites were on the voters roll, prompting the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association to agitate for the inclusion of livestock in determining electoral qualification.¹²⁰ Sadly, the demands of the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association were only taken on board by the colonial regime many years later – most of them following the attainment of independence in 1980.

According to Msindo “expanded Western education, the African press and informal political forums at beer drinking sessions” raised awareness in Africans in Southern Rhodesia about the injustices perpetrated by the colonial regime.¹²¹ Such awareness was central to the spreading of an emergent nationalist ideology. A subaltern public sphere was then established in urban areas and expanded through publications such the “*Bantu Mirror* and the *African Daily News*.”¹²² The *Bantu Mirror* was once edited by Jasper Savanhu, a trade unionist-cum-journalist who later became a legislator in the Federal parliament of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.¹²³ Another former *Bantu Mirror* editor, Michael Hove, was also a member of the Federal Parliament.¹²⁴ The improvement in African literacy rates laid the foundation for demands for broad-based democratisation in Rhodesia because people were able read newspapers that carried views and political debates among educated blacks who had a sound appreciation of their society’s problems and the way forward.¹²⁵ Ethnic associations, newspapers and other voluntary associations became the vehicle for political participation and mobilisation. In the final analysis, education and the attendant political consciousness played a pivotal role in the struggle for shifting the balance of power in colonial Zimbabwe.

There were profound changes brought about by the First World War that saw a sharp increase in the prices of basic commodities and rentals together with a stagnation in wages.¹²⁶ As a result of the stagnation in wages, there was an unprecedented drastic drop in the real value of wages – “real wages declined to less than half of the pre war level.”¹²⁷ So serious was the situation that Yoshikuni quotes the Native Commissioner who observed that: “Natives can no longer afford to

¹¹⁹ Ibid., see endnote 21 on page 268.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 127

¹²¹ Enocent Msindo, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950 to 1963,” *Journal of African History*, 48 (2007):274.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ West, *Middle Class*, 185-189.

¹²⁴ Alison K. Shutt & Tony King, “Imperial Rhodesians: The 1953 Rhodes Centenary Exhibition in Southern Rhodesia,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 2 (June 2005):357-379.

¹²⁵ Msindo, 274.

¹²⁶ Yoshikuni, 442.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

buy blankets and clothing as they used to, and are resorting to the wearing of skins and other primitive garments and the majority of boys working on mines and farms are clad in sacks.”¹²⁸ As a result of the measures put in place to force them to join the money economy, Africans continued to respond to employment opportunities regardless of whether real wages were falling, rising or stagnating during the post-World War 1 period.¹²⁹

There was not so much activity with respect to African trade unionism and collective job action during the period under review (1900-1918). The reason advanced by historians is that workers feared the wrath of the colonial state – criminal sanctions and extra judicial punishment – and as a result African strikes in Southern Rhodesia were “generally isolated and sporadic in expression.”¹³⁰ However on July 1919, African railways workers defied tradition and engaged in a three-day collective job action that resulted in the employer agreeing to review their wages.¹³¹ Indeed, the outcome of the Bulawayo African Railway workers strike had a “snowballing effect” across the country given that many towns like Umtali, Gwelo and Que Que experienced a series of strike action.¹³² In the final analysis Yoshikuni concluded that African labour protest in the country’s history reached its peak during 1919 and 1920 and thereafter the incidence of strikes became less frequent due to improvements in wages.¹³³

It is worth noting that during the first three decades of colonial rule, private capital and the state were all faced with the labour problem.¹³⁴ Consequently child labour was the order of the day given the conjoined nature of the relationship between children’s labour and capital accumulation during the colonial era. Penalties for “piccanins” or juveniles who breached the Master and Servant Act of 1899 and the Native Juveniles Employment Act of 1926 included fines, imprisonment and whipping of ten strokes in case of boys.¹³⁵ There was a low rate of participation of Africans in the money economy, primarily because participation in the money economy was discretionary as opposed to being a necessary part of human survival.¹³⁶

At the heart of the genesis of an incipient civil society in colonial Zimbabwe was the centrality of

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Giovanni Arrighi, “Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia,” *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3 (April 1970):221.

¹³⁰ Yoshikuni, 443-446.

¹³¹ Ibid., 443.

¹³² Ibid., 444.

¹³³ Ibid., 445.

¹³⁴ Beverly Grier “Invisible Hands: The Political Economy of Child Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1930,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1994):34.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 46-47.

¹³⁶ Arrighi, 206.

the land question, industrialisation and advances in African education. Thus a number of historical events and conjunctures shaped the nature and emergence of civil society in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. With respect to land, European settlers used a skewed land tenure system to entrench their economic and political domination.¹³⁷ Accordingly, a number of measures were then put in place to force Africans to join the money economy. These measures included forced labour or *chibbaro*, imposition of various forms of taxes (for example hut and dog taxes), and the expropriation of land and subsequent unworkable land-related policies. As a result of such discriminatory land policies as the Land Apportionment Act and Native Land Husbandry Act, it became increasingly difficult for the African peasantry to participate in the produce market.¹³⁸ The overarching objective was to accelerate rural urban migration so as to satisfy the demand of the rapidly expanding import substitution industrial sector especially during the Second World War.¹³⁹ Arrighi in his paper “Labour supplies in historical perspective: A study of the proletarianisation of the African peasantry in Rhodesia” gave a very detailed account of how the overall process worked.¹⁴⁰

Over time significant changes were witnessed in the demographic profile of Rhodesia, although it is often argued that the size of the African population was based on estimates until the first African census in 1962. In 1901 a census revealed that there were 11 032 Europeans in Rhodesia and by 1961 the figure had shot up to 221 504.¹⁴¹ On the other hand the African population was estimated to be 500 000 in 1901 and the 1962 census revealed a size of 3 616 600.¹⁴² From the period 1926 to 1974, the total urban population grew exponentially from less than 100 000 to above 1.2 million by 1974.¹⁴³ For example in Salisbury, the African population was estimated to be around 22 126 in 1936, 28 119 in 1941, rising to 45 993 in 1946 and to 75 249 in 1951.¹⁴⁴ Thus the demographic structure of the urban areas changed quite significantly as the process of industrialisation gathered momentum in Southern Rhodesia.

The colonial state and private capital all sought to keep housing expenditures at a bare minimum despite the increase in the number of people who were migrating to urban areas. For example a

¹³⁷ Robin Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (California: University of California Press, 1977).

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹³⁹ Robert E Mazur, “Reversal of Migration in the Labour Reserves of Zimbabwe? Prospects for Change,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 21, no. 4 (Winter 1986):55-87.

¹⁴⁰ For a detailed account, see Arrighi, 1970.

¹⁴¹ Ravai Marindo, “Death Colonised: Historical Adult Mortality in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe),” *Zambezia*, vol. XXVI, no. ii (1999):148.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ M.A.H. Smout, “Urbanisation of the Rhodesian Population,” *Zambezia*, vol. 4, no. ii, (1975-76):90.

¹⁴⁴ Brian Raftopoulos, “Nationalism and Labour in Salisbury 1953-1965,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1 (March 1995):81.

Sanitary inspector in the then Salisbury observed that shacks in compounds were “badly lighted and ventilated, smoke begrimed, dirty, and so crowded as to make proper cleaning almost impossible, and inhabitants slept on old packing cases and iron bunks.”¹⁴⁵ Municipal compounds in Salisbury could not accommodate the ever increasing labour force to the extent that “some municipal workers were forced to sleep in the open.”¹⁴⁶ The situation was no different in other urban areas, and in the case of the Bulawayo Railway compound it was learnt that between 1938 and 1939 the following four scenarios were common: in a room there could be two men and their wives and three bachelors, one man and his wife and 11 bachelors, three men and their wives and nine bachelors, or two men and their wives and four bachelors.¹⁴⁷ Clearly, there is evidence that seem to suggest a link between such squalid living conditions, work-related grievances and the workers’ “willingness to strike.”¹⁴⁸

Indeed the processes meant to satisfy the demands of industrialisation resulted in rapid urbanisation. On the other hand manufacturing establishments in the whole of Southern Rhodesia grew from 299 in 1939 to 724 by 1952.¹⁴⁹ According to the Monthly Digest of Statistics of February 1966, the number of Africans in wage employment was as follows: 550 000 (in 1954), 602 000 (in 1956), 628 000 (in 1958), 640 000 (in 1960), declining to 612 000 in 1962.¹⁵⁰ However it is worth noting that a 1956 census revealed a slightly different figure of a total of 609 953 Africans employed in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁵¹ The discrepancy notwithstanding, it is evident that the number of Africans joining wage employment was generally increasing over the period under review.

Among the first black trade union movements to emerge in colonial Zimbabwe was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) that was formed around 1920 to deal with stagnation in wages among other grievances. It also sought to give black workers a “clearer insight into the nature of power and class structure in a colonial economy.”¹⁵² With time there was a proliferation of number of trade unions that were geared towards upsetting the nature of

¹⁴⁵ Yoshikuni, 452.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 455.

¹⁴⁷ Teresa Barnes “So That a Labourer Could Live with His Family: Overlooked Factors in Social and Economic Strife in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe, 1945-1952,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1 (March 1995):101.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 98.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Arrighi, 224.

¹⁵¹ T. H. Mothibe, “Zimbabwe: African Working Class Nationalism, 1957-1963,” *Zambezia*, vol. XXIII, no. ii (1996):163.

¹⁵² Ian Phimister and Charles van Onselen, “The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe 1900-1945,” in *Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe 1900-97*, ed. Brian Raftopolous and Ian Phimister (Harare: Baobab Books, 1997), 20.

the balance of power that existed between the working class and the owners of the means of production. The Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICU) was formed in 1946 under the leadership of Charles Mzingeli and was instrumental in fighting against state controls on Africans in urban areas.¹⁵³ What is interesting about the proliferation of trade unions is that they were formed from various voluntary associations that were born earlier on. The labour unions and civic groups like the City Youth League managed to exploit rural-urban connections as they fought the 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act that sought to turn Africans into cheap labour following the expropriation of their land. Between 1950 and 1952 RICU unsuccessfully lobbied the Commonwealth Secretary to “use his veto on legislation relating to the Reserves.”¹⁵⁴ With the advent of Federation, a few Africans accepted the principles of “separate but equal” and racial partnership, but the majority resisted because desegregation was only symbolic. Consequently blacks tried to petition the United Federal Party but it “demonstrated to the same voters that black petitions for equality should be dealt with by gagging the petitioners.”¹⁵⁵ Thus at the end of the day nothing materialised.

Popular protest action by the working class movement gained momentum during the period 1945 to 1963 when the nationalist movement took over following the wide scale detention and harassment of trade unionists, especially after the Rhodesia Front took over the reins of power. Two strike actions by the working class in 1945 and 1948 and a bus boycott in 1956 deserve some attention. These developments had far reaching implications on the struggle for political inclusion. When United Transport Africa increased its fares in Salisbury, the development was followed by a bus boycott and rioting organised by the City Youth League.¹⁵⁶ Eventually the fares were reduced, as a result of the City Youth League openly challenging the colonial government. With respect to the 1945 strike organised by all railway workers in Rhodesia, the workers had grievances relating to poor housing, low wages, food and “desperate assertion of basic human dignity.”¹⁵⁷ For Vickery the significance of this was that the strike symbolised “sheer courage of right-less colonial subjects confronting the paragon of colonial capital.”¹⁵⁸ The outcome of the 1948 strike inspired other African workers thereby giving credence to the argument that it may have laid the foundation for the 1948 strike. Finally the 1948 general strike

¹⁵³ Brian Raftopolous, “The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe 1945-1965,” in *Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe 1900-97*, ed. Brian Raftopolous and Ian Phimister (Baobab Books: Harare 1997), 55.

¹⁵⁴ Victor E.M. Machingaidze, “Agrarian Change from Above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act and African Response,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3 (1991):577.

¹⁵⁵ Regina Austin, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa* (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1975), 74.

¹⁵⁶ J.D. Jordan, “Public Transport in Harare,” *Zambezia*, vol. XI, no. ii,(1996):134.

¹⁵⁷ Kenneth P. Vickery, “The Rhodesia Railways African Strike of 1945, Part II: Cause, Consequence, Significance,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1 (March 1999):64.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 70.

was a colony-wide phenomenon that was precipitated by the high cost of living and poor housing among other grievances. Indeed, the Rhodesia industrial revolution had created a huge working class that was united by similar grievances relating to poor wages, housing and lack of basic human dignity.

The National Democratic Party (NDP) emerged in 1960 at the height of African discontent in most urban areas and its leadership consisted of two labour representatives, Michael Mawema and Joshua Nkomo.¹⁵⁹ There were elements of participatory democracy in the National Democratic Party, given that it held a referendum in 1961 so that people could decide whether or not they should accept the 1961 constitution. People overwhelmingly rejected the constitution that would have seen Africans having 15 seats out of the 65-member legislature.¹⁶⁰ However in reality getting the 15 seats and other minor concessions from the colonialists was a milestone given that previously only a handful of Africans could vote. Thus in essence Africans could not influence government because they were excluded from participating in the legislature. 1962 saw Africans boycotting the elections that were held under a defective constitution that offered far less than the NDP had anticipated.¹⁶¹ Clearly, what infuriated the NDP and its working class constituency was the fact that franchise was still based on qualifications of education, property and income. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the colonial state as an organ of capital ensured that the European bourgeoisie remained inimical to democracy by refusing to accede to demands for majority rule.

Indeed, the National Democratic Party continued to clamour for one-man-one-vote, a situation that led to the arrest of the party's leadership six months later. The detention of the NDP leadership sparked rioting in Salisbury as supporters across the broad spectrum of the society demanded their unconditional release.¹⁶² The colonial state responded by massively deploying the military and police in a number of Salisbury townships. According to Mothibe the disturbances left ten people dead, hundreds were injured and arrested while property worth thousands of pounds was also damaged.¹⁶³ Similar demonstrations erupted in Bulawayo a day later following the banning of the National Democratic Party by the colonial authorities. Nehwati observes that

¹⁵⁹ Mothibe, 170.

¹⁶⁰ Austin, 76.

¹⁶¹ James P. Barber, "Rhodesia: The Constitutional Conflict," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 4, no. 4. (December 1966):462.

¹⁶² Mothibe, 171.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

“Monday 25 July [1961] witnessed the worst waves of violence and disturbances.”¹⁶⁴ Business came to a grinding halt in the industrial area and the industrial workers were joined by commercial workers a few hours later in attacking commercial enterprises.¹⁶⁵ Property owned by central and local government was the prime targets for the rioters. Police later reported that 12 people were killed during the skirmishes and hundreds injured, while property worth over £200 000 was destroyed.¹⁶⁶

It is worth noting that the significance of the strikes (that later spilled over to other urban areas) is that they represented “worker militancy closely allied to the political struggles for one-man-one-vote in colonial Zimbabwe.”¹⁶⁷ The situation was no different in a number of schools and colleges around the colony where there was serious student unrest and insubordination. From the 1960s onwards black students at the University of Rhodesia held a number of peaceful political protests against the supremacist policies of the government. The political protests took the form of peaceful demonstrations, class boycotts, picketing, and protests through diplomatic channels to the British government as well as pamphleteering.¹⁶⁸ Demonstrations were also held against right-wing politicians who would have visited the university. Some churches in Rhodesia also joined the growing number of voices protesting against the settler government. As a voluntary association, the church refused to recognise the so-called Rhodesian independence, demanding that there be a broad-based adult suffrage.¹⁶⁹ In 1961 the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia wrote a letter to the government condemning the disadvantages suffered by blacks that took the form of low wages and squalid living conditions among other injustices.¹⁷⁰

Trade unions in conjunction with emerging nationalist parties successfully mobilised African support country wide given the unwillingness of the settler state to deal with former’s grievances. By 1962 the close working relationship between trade unions and the nationalist movement saw the former playing second fiddle to the latter. In fact trade unionists were shuttling between union activities and the nationalist movement.¹⁷¹ Consequently, concluded Raftopoulos, the “mobility reflected the continued instability of leadership in both the trade unions and the

¹⁶⁴ Francis Nehwati, “The Social and Communal Background to “Zhi”: The African Riots in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia in 1960,” *African Affairs*, 69 (July 1970):252.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Mothibe, 172.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 173.

¹⁶⁸ Rudo Gaidzanwa, “The Politics of the Body and the Politics of Control: An Analysis of Class, Gender and Cultural Issues in Student Politics at the University of Zimbabwe,” *Zambezia*, vol. 20, no.1 (1993):17.

¹⁶⁹ W. R. Peadar, “Aspects of the Church and its Political Involvement in Southern Rhodesia, 1959-1972,” *Zambezia*, vol. vii, no. ii (1979):191-210.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁷¹ Raftopoulos, “Nationalism,” 91.

nationalist parties, who were continually caught between the aspirations of the new elite and the obstacles to their fulfilment.¹⁷² Thus both trade unionists and the nationalists became targets for incarceration and elimination by the colonial government as a result of their close working relationship. It is instructive to note that from 1963 the nationalist movement absorbed a number of trade unionists into its structures before the onset of the armed struggle initiated by the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Given the shift of the anti-colonial struggle from the cities to the countryside, the nationalist movement then took over the role of seeking to democratise the Rhodesian body politic culminating in independence in 1980. In a sense the shifting of the terrain of the struggle from urban to rural led to a certain extent to the marginalisation of labour in relation to fighting for political inclusion.

2.8 Post-Independent Political Economy of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985

In general the post-colonial state – especially in Africa, just like its colonial predecessor – is mainly concerned with the maintenance of law and order. However there are exceptions, although when countries like Mauritius and South Africa are considered, economic development is their major preoccupation. Those falling in the first category seek to decisively deal with any competing centre of power hence the suppression of any form of organised groups that can potentially challenge its domination and legitimacy. Thus there is a historical confrontation between the state and society, giving credence to the argument that political change rose out of civil society successfully challenging state control and doing away with authoritarianism.¹⁷³ With respect to Zimbabwe, this chapter has so far shown how the genesis or drive for participatory democracy arose, although a small scale broadening and deepening of democratisation was to start after independence. How this occurred will be the subject of inquiry in chapters that follow. As indicated in the beginning, this chapter is mainly concerned with setting the stage central to the understanding of how the drive for participatory democracy arose, the role of the working class in sparking or igniting the process, stumbling blocks, current status and possible re-emergence of a participatory democratic culture.

It is noteworthy that after independence the government took a leaf from its colonial predecessor by continuously seeking to emasculate civil society. On the other hand the church, trade unions and various other interest groups sought to tread very carefully in their relations

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Stephen Ndegwa, "Civil Society and Political Change in Southern Africa: The Case for Non Governmental Organisations in Kenya," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. 35 (1994):21.

with the new ZANU (PF) government. None of the civic groups wanted to be misconstrued as a rabble-rouser, a condition that gave ZANU PF an upper hand. The party's position was very clear; ZANU (PF) was "the sole legitimate representative of the people."¹⁷⁴ Clearly, all "legitimate organisations" were challenged to join ZANU PF to prove their revolutionary and patriotic commitment.¹⁷⁵ Students at the University of Zimbabwe perceived a commonality of interests between themselves and the government and they even went to the extent of adopting ZANU (PF) language of the liberation war to silence those who were critical about that party.¹⁷⁶ What appears to have been the philosophy on part of the civil society vis-à-vis its relations with the government was to appear apolitical, while engaging and cooperating with it in private as opposed to publicly challenging it.¹⁷⁷ By not openly challenging ZANU PF's exercise of power and allowing itself to be denied political space for independent political action, civil society in post-independent Zimbabwe began on shaky foundations.

Finally, in order to prove ZANU PF's corporatist intent and opportunism, it is imperative to inquire into the politics behind the formation of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in 1980. ZCTU was the result of a forced merger of six national labour centres, namely, the African Trade Union Congress (ATUC), the National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC), the Trade Union Congress of Zimbabwe (TUCZ), the United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ), the Zimbabwe Federation of Labour (ZFL) and the Zimbabwe Trade Union Congress (ZTUC). The leadership that emerged from the inaugural congress consisted of unionists handpicked by ZANU PF to ensure state domination of the labour movement.

Indeed ZANU PF prevailed at the inaugural congress, but at the second congress in 1985, there was a decisive defeat and subsequent ousting of the unionists who were sympathetic to ZANU PF. The change of leadership took place at the 1985 congress, and the leaders were subsequently replaced by a "more dynamic and articulate executive drawn from some of the best organised unions in the country."¹⁷⁸ This was a watershed in the history of Zimbabwe given that the new leadership ushered in a new era relatively free from government intervention and interference in union matters. In subsequent chapters, this thesis will show how the change in the leadership of ZCTU reverberated across the Zimbabwean political economy till this day. However what needs

¹⁷⁴ Jonathan Moyo, "Civil society in Zimbabwe," *Zambezia*, vol. 20, no. 1(1993):7.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Gaidzanwa, 18.

¹⁷⁷ Moyo, 9.

¹⁷⁸ Lloyd Sachikonye, "State, Capital and Trade Unions," in *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986*, ed. Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1986), 265.

to be pointed out from the onset is that it is from the new 1985 leadership that the current labour-backed MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai emerged.

2.8.1 Educational Expansion

Another aspect that deserves attention in the post-independence political economy of Zimbabwe is the educational expansion. According to the 2008 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, post independence educational expansion in Zimbabwe has seen the country attaining a literacy rate of 90.7% in 2003, the highest after Seychelles.¹⁷⁹ This shows that Zimbabweans benefited from strong educational programmes over time. But how did this come about and what were the implications for the country's political economy in general and democratisation in particular? This section will answer the first part of the question while other chapters in the thesis will deal with the second part. The unparalleled commitment of Zimbabweans to education was noted earlier in the chapter and this also partly explains the how the figure of 90,7% was reached. Following independence, the political leadership sought to redress inequities and imbalances of the past in relation to access to basic needs, especially health and education – hence the policies of health and education for all. Indeed, the Mugabe government equally needed to build social resources after colonialism. Accordingly, the idea was to have a growth with equity framework to redress the skewed distribution of resources which was a legacy of colonialism.

A decision was then made to make primary education free and compulsory, and this resulted in primary school enrolments rising from 819 000 in 1979 to 2.2 million in 1985.¹⁸⁰ There was a concomitant increase in the number of secondary school enrolments, rising from 66 000 in 1979 to 480 000 in 1985.¹⁸¹ Indeed the policy of education for all was a success given that by 1990 Zimbabwe had achieved universal primary education. The government also decreed that the basic educational attainment for every Zimbabwean should be at least 5 Ordinary level subjects including English and sometimes Maths. In light of the hunger for education noted during the colonial period, night schools and government backed distance education programmes were also established as part of an adult literacy programme. Tertiary education also increased phenomenally because Agricultural, Technical and Teachers' colleges plus the University of

¹⁷⁹ <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index-2008/pdf/final%20papers/Final%20SSC%20Files%20pdf/V%20Final%20Human%20Development%20pdf/education/Adult%20Literacy.pdf>. Accessed 4 October 2008.

¹⁸⁰ Educational Expansion in Zimbabwe (1979-1989): Primary and Secondary Enrolment. Central Statistical Office. *Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics* (June 1989).

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

Zimbabwe had a combined enrolment of 8 400 in 1980 but this rose to 24 000 by 1985.¹⁸² Interestingly, the enrolment figures continued to grow phenomenally over the years resulting in the country attaining the highest literacy rate in Africa. However a downward trend in both quality and quantity was witnessed when the country began to experience economic problems.

2.9 Karl Polanyi's Double Movement

In light of the fact that Zimbabwe embarked on economic reforms in the early 1990s, there is a compelling need to construct a framework of analysis that helps to understand how and why the working class reacted in the manner it did. It is against that background that Karl Polanyi's ideas on the relationship between markets and society were found to be central to this study. Karl Polanyi emerged as a cogent critic of neo-liberal ideology in light of the concerns he enunciated in his book, *The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origin of Our Times*. Just like Rueschemeyer and his colleagues, Polanyi interrogates the socio-economic and political implications of the industrial revolution. Polanyi's central thesis is that there is a major backlash against excessive commoditisation of life characteristic of free market capitalism.¹⁸³ Polanyi's ideas were revived and vindicated following the deteriorating economic and social conditions that followed the "growth of neo-liberal economic policies advocated by International Financial Institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and by national political elites."¹⁸⁴ Karl Polanyi's notion of embeddedness is central in order to gain an understanding of the socially disruptive nature of market forces and the "logics underlying the formation and transformation of social institutions in contexts of market exchange."¹⁸⁵ The concept of embeddedness indicates how economic life can only be analysed through an examination of how it forms a part of social relations and institutions.¹⁸⁶

However "In market-based relations immediate self-interest prevails over other relationships, causing diversified processes of disembeddedness – as economic relations bring about social disruption – and concomitant processes of re-embeddedness (i.e. new forms of regulation)."¹⁸⁷ For Polanyi these concomitant and ongoing processes occur within the ambit of a "double

¹⁸² University Enrolment in Zimbabwe: Agricultural, Technical and Teachers Colleges (1980-1988) Central Statistical Office. *Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics*, (December 1989).

¹⁸³ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origin of Our Times* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954).

¹⁸⁴ Harry E. Vanden, "Globalization in a Time of Neo-Liberalism: Politicized Social Movements and the Latin American Response," *Journal of Developing Societies*, vol. 19, no. 2-3 (2003):308.

¹⁸⁵ Simone Ghezzi and Enzo Mingione "Embeddedness, Path Dependency and Social Institutions: An Economic Sociology Approach," *Current Sociology*, vol. 55, no. 1 (January 2007):16.

¹⁸⁶ Kurtulus Gemicci, "Karl Polanyi and the Antinomies of Embeddedness," *Socio-Economic Review* 6 (2008):3.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

movement” based on self-regulating market and protectionist counter movements. Polanyi furthers asserts that:

Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma which forced the development of the market system into a definite groove and finally disrupted the social organization based upon it.¹⁸⁸

Similarly Mridula Udayagiri and John Walton argue that a double movement of marketisation and protectionist counter-movements occurs when:

Actors are confronted abruptly with threats to their well-being; not only economic threats but also environmental, political, and symbolic threats. The threatened value in each case is a former entitlement, typically a form of protection ensured by the state. Thus, even in the presence of counter-movements, neo-liberalism mediates a divergence of state and civil society relationships creating uncertain futures for democratic possibilities.¹⁸⁹

From the above standpoint it is evident that when there is a continuous expansion of the neo-liberal market; a counter movement emerges for the sole purpose of protecting society. In other words the social movements that emerge are an antithesis of a self-regulating market whose broad objective is essentially to contest the destructive and disruptive tendencies associated with the excessive commodification of life. As already noted, in England these included trade unions, cooperatives, factory workers committees to deal with working hours, the Chartist movement that was demanding political reform, and finally embryonic labour based political parties.¹⁹⁰

With the advent of economic reforms, there is removal of subsidies and the introduction of user charges, triggering price increases on basic foods, public transport, education and health. Consequently, the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies leads to declining living standards of the middle and lower classes given the fall in the real value of wages associated with principles of wage restraint. Consumers are urged to “tighten up their belts” to quote the words of Tito Mboweni the South African Reserve Bank governor.¹⁹¹ As a result there are different

¹⁸⁸ Polanyi, 3-4.

¹⁸⁹ Mridula Udayagiri and John Walton, “Global Transformation and Local Countermovement: The Prospects for Democracy Under Neo-Liberalism,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 44, no. 4 (2003):309.

¹⁹⁰ Burawoy, 198.

¹⁹¹ South African Reserve Bank Governor, Tito Mboweni’s Address to Students at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 25 September 2007.

forms of popular protests waged against governments and international representatives of global capital for them to halt austerity programmes. In a nutshell, with economic reforms, the social contract that undergirds political stability and legitimacy falls like the proverbial deck of cards leading to social unrest.

To conclude this section, “the movement away from the developmentalist state to a neo-liberal regime creates a countermovement of social forces that mobilize to protect groups whose safety nets are threatened and contest the pace and logic of the transition process”¹⁹² The transition process brings threats or unwanted changes that must be mobilised against by any means necessary given that failure to do so will make the victims worse off. The idea of creating a defensive mobilisation movement of social forces explains the revival and reinvigoration of civil society as the “new locus of conflict and contention.”¹⁹³ Therefore, there is a sense in which the middle and lower strata of society seek alternative structures to help them protect their safety nets as well as to articulate and channel their demands to the status quo that is now perceived as irrelevant, if not downright illegitimate. With respect to Zimbabwe, the period following the removal of hand-picked unions and their replacement by a “more dynamic and articulate executive” signalled the genesis of a major backlash against excessive commoditisation of life characteristic of free market capitalism. This chapter will not go into greater detail about how this process unfolded as this will be the concern of chapter five. However what needs to be pointed out is that there was a sustained response of the Zimbabwe working class hardest hit by economic reforms and ruling elite’s policies of plunder that sank the country deeper into economic abyss.

2.10 Core Structural Features of Various Authoritarian Regimes

Having outlined what civil society is, its evolution, usefulness in a non-western context and other related matters, it is necessary next to detail the salient features of authoritarian regimes that civil society has to deal with. Essentially civil society has to grapple with a mix of antidemocratic tendencies found in genres of authoritarian regimes such as exclusionary, inclusionary, dominant and neo-patrimonial regimes among others. In a sense civil society has been found wanting especially as it relates to its teleological democratisation role, a situation that then explains the persistence of authoritarianism. In other words, the transition that followed partial liberalisation

¹⁹² Paul D. Almeida, “Defensive Mobilization: Popular Movements against Economic Adjustment Policies in Latin America,” *Latin American Perspectives*, issue 154, vol. 34, no. 3, May (2007):127.

¹⁹³ Vanden, 310.

in the post cold war era did not see “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”¹⁹⁴ as was predicted by Fukuyama. Indeed, illiberal democracy is said to be a growth industry given that the very few regimes have graduated into a liberal democracies, “if anything they are moving toward heightened illiberalism.”¹⁹⁵ Zimbabwe is a telling case in point where the country is degenerating into totalitarianism.

It is in light of the above that Thomas Carothers, a leading scholar, pronounced the end of the “transition paradigm” because a universal paradigm for understanding democratisation is a fallacy because reality is no longer conforming to the model.¹⁹⁶ It is upon this realisation that the epistemological usefulness of the “transition paradigm” is of late being questioned. Levitsky and Way succinctly argue that:

Scholars often treated these regimes as incomplete or transitional forms of democracy. Yet in many cases these expectations (or hopes) proved overly optimistic. Particularly in Africa and the former Soviet Union, many regimes have either remained hybrid or moved in an authoritarian direction. It may therefore be time to stop thinking of these cases in terms of transitions to democracy and to begin thinking about the specific types of regimes they actually are.¹⁹⁷

The classification of regimes enables scholars to adequately and comprehensively get to the bottom of the core issues related to political regimes. In other words, “classifying regimes is a necessary step to asking important questions about the causes and consequences of different regimes and of transitions from one kind of regime to another.”¹⁹⁸ In transition literature, there seems to be consensus on the view that there is a relationship between regime type and the likelihood, nature, and extent of political transition.¹⁹⁹ It is against this background that this chapter will devote some space and delve into the nature and core structural features of a number of authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian regimes one can find exclusionary and inclusionary elements, neopatrimonialism, and dominant party setups. Many authoritarian regimes maintain their domination on the society through:

(i) the institutional emasculation of society, to the point that society loses the ability or the resolve to challenge the

¹⁹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest*, (Summer 1989):2.

¹⁹⁵ Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs*,76, (November-December 1997): 24.

¹⁹⁶ Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2002):5-21.

¹⁹⁷ Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 2 (April 2002):53.

¹⁹⁸ Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 2001):39.

¹⁹⁹ See Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” *World Politics*, vol. 46, no. 4 (July 1994):455.

state; (ii) the creation and perpetuation of subjective and ideological bonds with society, through which a majority of social actors actively or passively support the state and its agendas; or, (iii) more commonly, a combination of the two.²⁰⁰

It is in light of the above that political liberalisation becomes very difficult if not impossible to set in motion, a situation that tends to perpetuate the political status quo favouring the dominant ruling classes. Moreover, in a number of totalitarian regimes, there is a tendency to rely on manufacturing consent of the population through the creation of certain regimes of truth as well as the creation of folk devils and moral panic. According to Foucault:

each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instance which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded values in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.²⁰¹

From the above quotation it is evident that the idea that knowledge is power can not be over-emphasised. Once again domination becomes an over arching issue to be problematised when it comes to the manufacturing of consent in totalitarian regimes. Indeed Foucault is correct when he asserts that a 'regime of truth' is a meaningful expression for the state of the way things are, a "thing of the world ... produced by virtue of multiple forms of constraint"²⁰² Furthermore regimes of truth "create a moral framework within which to locate ... Practice"²⁰³ The site for the production of truth and the attendant narratives are much contested aspects of human life. The contested nature of regimes of truth is indicative of power relations inherent in the knowledge production process. In sum, regimes of truth, transmitted under the tutelage of dominant groups in any society, structure the functioning of the public sphere despite some degree of resistance by the subaltern groups.

Furthermore, to understand "social structure, social processes and social change"²⁰⁴ in authoritarian regimes it is important to interrogate the creation of moral panic and folk devils by the dominant groups. Identity formation at the root of moral panic:

²⁰⁰ Mehran Kamrava, "Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1998):64.

²⁰¹ Michel Foucault, "Truth and power," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Collin Gordon (London: Tavistock, 1980):131.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Dean Garratt, "Regime of Truth as a Serendipitous Event: An Essay Concerning the Relationship between Research Data and the Generation of Ideas," *British Educational Research Journal*, vol. 24, no. 2 (April 1998): 232.

²⁰⁴ Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance* (Oxford: Blackwell N. 1994):29.

is about instilling fear in people and, in so doing, encouraging them to try to turn away from the complexity and the visible social problems of everyday life and either to retreat into a 'fortress mentality' – a feeling of hopelessness, political powerlessness and paralysis – or to adopt a gung-ho 'something must be done about it' attitude.²⁰⁵

Allied to moral panic is the social construction of a group or class of people as folk devils. According to Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda a folk devil is "the personification of evil."²⁰⁶ Similarly Cohen in defining a folk devil said that a "person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests."²⁰⁷ This perceived threat by folk devils demands that "something should be done"²⁰⁸ so as to rectify the situation. By and large a threat may be manufactured or the actual threat may be exaggerated with a view to engineering social control. Indeed, moral panics and the attendant folk devils arise when there is a threat to the dominant group's entrenched positions and interests. The idea then is to "deflect attention from this very real problem"²⁰⁹ by instilling a sense of fear and hostility towards folk devils among the general public. In the final analysis the demonisation and labelling of a group as folk devils gives the ruling elite a convenient excuse to come up with particular policy positions and legislation.

2.10.1 Inclusionary Regimes

Inclusionary regimes rely heavily on populism, creating and perpetuating and then relying on a myth of popular participation as some of their nation-building and survival strategies.²¹⁰ Political myths invoked may relate to the creation of enemies that the population alongside its leadership must resist and defeat. An inclusionary regime designs its institutions with a view to undermining democratic values while the conduct of the government appears to support democratic values.²¹¹ There is a superficial sense of mass political participation in "neighbourhood committees, youth groups, councils, and other similar organs"²¹² The idea is "to give the larger population a sense of political inclusiveness"²¹³ whilst in reality there is none. Authoritarian and populist institutions of

²⁰⁵ Angela McRobbie, *Postmodernism and Popular Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994):199.

²⁰⁶ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 28.

²⁰⁷ Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1972):9.

²⁰⁸ Goode and Ben-Yehuda,30.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 32.

²¹⁰ Kamrava, 64.

²¹¹ Abu Bakarr bah, "Approaches to Nation Building in Post-Colonial Nigeria," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 32, no. 1 (Summer 2004):48.

²¹² Kamrava, 71

²¹³ Ibid.

inclusionary regimes guarantee that the masses are co-opted into the political process either by hook or crook. Accordingly, when faced with a crisis closely related to the economy or to legitimacy; inclusionary regimes often resort to repression as an alternative to political liberalisation.²¹⁴ Furthermore, there is an over-reliance on intelligence (secret) services, the personality cult of a leader, the endeavour to recreate the individual and society at large, and indoctrination. It is fairly common for the regime to “actively propagates its self-ascribed mission of safeguarding the nation’s revolutionary heritage, even if that heritage has to be constructed overnight.”²¹⁵

2.10.2 Exclusionary Regimes

In exclusionary regimes social actors who do not have a formal connection with the ruling party are excluded from the political process through repression and heavy reliance on a pervasive network of secret police or spies.²¹⁶ An exclusionary regime designs its institutions with a view to undermining democratic values, and so does the conduct of the government which is geared towards cowing any dissenting voice into submission. In general many post-independent African leaders engage in politics of inclusion (in their own terms) and related populist tendencies before becoming exclusionary in nature. There is pervasive state intervention in the economy, and citizens are often mobilised to participate in state-led projects such as land reform with a nationalisation bias. In order to foster a sense of democracy with the country, the government allows an official opposition to exist, and largely meaningless parliamentary and presidential elections are held according to the terms set in the constitution.²¹⁷ Furthermore the state tends to be very paranoid towards the populace, hence the pervasive network of state operatives whose main duty is to sniff out those socio-political actors who may disrupt the country’s forced political peace.²¹⁸ Just like their inclusionary counterparts, exclusionary regimes resort to more repression when faced with crisis situations instead of liberalising their political systems.

2.10.3 Predominant Parties

In general scholars do not agree on the yardstick to be used to measure the dominance of a party although there is consensus that the third wave of democratisation gave birth to multi-party

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 74.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 66.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 69.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 69-70.

systems which have dominant party features. Party predominance takes three dimensions: electoral (the acquisition of votes and related electoral support), parliamentary (votes won and their translation into seats) and executive dominance (entering and maintaining coalitions).²¹⁹ It should however be noted that patron client relations acts as a glue that keeps the factions in a dominant party intact, a subject to be discussed under neopatrimonialism in section 2.1.9.4 below. Below are the characteristics of a predominant party that wields a lot of power and influence over the population of a given territory.

First, it...must be dominant in number: it must regularly win more seats in parliamentary or congressional elections than its opponents ... Secondly; this party must enjoy a dominant bargaining position. It must be able to stay in government on a regular basis. If it must share power with smaller parties...it is nevertheless the key agent in the political system, with privileged access to the key executive and legislative posts. Thirdly...a dominant party must be chronologically pre-eminent. It must govern continuously for a long time, [regardless of whether] three or four general election victories [or one decade or more in power] are the crucial benchmarks of dominance. Finally a dominant party must be ideologically dominant: it must be capable of using government to shape public policy so that the nature of the state and the society over which it presides is fundamentally changed.²²⁰

In light of the above, a genre of predominant party system that has attracted the attention of many scholars is the predominant authoritarian type. A dominant authoritarian party maintains its hegemony and dominance over the political system via extra democratic means that do not allow for the creation of a level playing field, a requirement for a ruling party to be voted out of power.²²¹ In other words the opposition exists in theory and so is the possibility of power changing hands – an aspect that remains a distant reality. Flowing from the above, single party predominance is a threat to democratic consolidation given that fascist bills can easily be passed into law given the majority of seats they hold in the legislature.

2.10.4 Neopatrimonialism / Personal rule

Scholars do not agree on a working definition of neopatrimonialism, rendering it another stretched and essentially contested concept which over the years has become a “catch all” word.²²² Suffice to say like politics itself, personal rule is ubiquitous and found in every society

²¹⁹ Patrick Köllner, “The Liberal Democratic Party at 50: Sources of Dominance and Changes in the Koizumi Era,” *Social Science Japan Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 19, 2006):244.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 244-245.

²²¹ Matthijs Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa,” *European Journal of Political Research*, 43 (2004):178.

²²² For the detailed argument see Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, vol. 45, no. 1 (February 2007): 95-119.

and polity. The competing interpretations of neopatrimonialism will not be treated here, rather critical elements associated with that form of rule will take centre stage. Simply put, under neopatrimonialism, access to office and spoils depend on the discretion of the party leader who also controls all centres of power, be they military or the party.²²³ Personalist regimes are formed from a network of friends, relatives and allies recruited and sustained by material inducements dangled by the incumbent political leader.²²⁴ The participation of non-connected members is kept at a bare minimum. Clearly, non-participants usually languish in abject poverty while the ruling class have unfettered access to state income and other benefits. The income may come from the export of minerals such diamonds and crude oil. In other words, personal networks based on kinship, ethnicity and religion are used as conduits for exchanging favours for loyalty to the incumbent leader. However it is noteworthy that “with ever fewer resources to distribute, political elites faced a growing problem of how to maintain control of clientelist networks.”²²⁵ In other words, economic crises and other exogenous shocks on the source of rent abused by the ruling elite are bound to shake the foundations of the regime.

In an African society “nepotism, corruption, tribalism (or ethnicity), and clientelism were said to be constitutive elements of the underdeveloped state, or, as we would prefer to say, of politics in a neo patrimonial state.”²²⁶ Many contemporary Africans leaders attempt to transform the state from a soft to a hard state with a view to supplementing the political and economic power of the state. A soft state, be it authoritarian or democratic, uses persuasion and incentives, while a hard state uses regulations backed by compulsion (a deliberate and socially necessary form of coercion designed to achieve egalitarian ends which were set out in a body of regulation).²²⁷ Accordingly, state hardness specifically refers to

(1) structural autonomy, whereby state institutions, leaders, and officials effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences and are thereby able to act and make decisions independently of social forces; (2) the political penetration of society, by which national leaders and governmental institutions secure clear-cut hegemony over intermediary and ground-level political actors and social units; (3) the extraction of resources from the most productive economic sectors, which in the African case usually refers to peasant agriculture; and (4) ideological legitimation, that is, the promulgation of official doctrines to defend and justify the achievement of

²²³ Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999):121-122.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 130.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 139.

²²⁶ Erdmann and Engel, 101.

²²⁷ Marika Vicziany, “Coercion in a Soft State: The Family-Planning Program of India: Part I: The Myth of Voluntarism,” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 55, no. 3 (Autumn, 1982):377-378.

autonomy, penetration, and extraction.²²⁸

Personal rule can therefore be seen as an endeavour to achieve state hardness in order to stay in power. It should however be noted that the goal of achieving state hardness at the expense of softness has remained elusive so much that that a combination of the two reigns supreme. In sum, it is correct to state that hybrid regimes exhibit both hard and soft state tendencies.

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter sought to provide the theoretical framework that is needed to understand how a nascent working class-based civil society movement that evolved during the colonial era laid a foundation for participatory democracy in Zimbabwe. Secondly the chapter traced how that participatory democratic culture was subsequently broadened and relatively deepened over time. The chapter also provided a foundation to understand the impediments that are being encountered by the working class-based civil society movement and the possibility of a re-emergence of participatory democracy in post-independent Zimbabwe. An overview of Gramsci's theory of hegemony was given because implications drawn from the theory are used to contribute to an understanding of the Zimbabwe's stalled transition to democracy.

This chapter explored the conceptual history of civil society through an engagement of Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens, Stephens and Polanyi's ideas on the genesis of civil society. Clearly, the context in which civil society drives for democratisation, both in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, occurred share a number of similarities to what transpired in 19th century Britain. Thus the drive for democratisation in Zimbabwe did not take a different trajectory from the British setup where subaltern struggles democratised the latter's body politic. However, the development of civil society in Zimbabwe needs to taken into account with a caveat that it occurred on a much smaller and thinner scale compared to 19th Century Britain. Attention was also given to the relevance of civil society in non-Western contexts and its evolution in Africa as well as the limitations of the concept.

With respect to the evolution of civil society in general and Zimbabwe in particular there is a general link between capitalist development and democracy. Akin to what happened in 19th century Britain, education in Zimbabwe improved literacy rates, thereby strengthening the

²²⁸ Joshua B. Forrest, "The Quest for State 'Hardness' in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 20, no. 4 (July 1988):423.

foundation for a democratic culture in Zimbabwe. What also emerged from the discussion on civil society is that, despite its essentially contested nature, the concept can serve as a heuristic device for the study of political and social discourses of a wide range of groups the world over. The civil society therefore provides an arena for coming up with counter hegemonic strategies in the struggle for democratisation so as to decisively deconstruct the laws, institutions and role of actors from which the ruling class is drawing its hegemonic power in order to stifle democratic reforms. Finally this chapter gave an overview of the core structural features of various authoritarian regimes. It is these authoritarian regimes that civil society is geared towards transforming with the ultimate objective of realising the teleological virtue of democracy.

CHAPTER THREE

The Colonial Contribution to Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.¹

¹ Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 15.

3.1 Introduction

Over the past decade a number of scholars, analysts and a burgeoning number of think tanks have been questioning why civil society in Zimbabwe is failing to contain Zimbabwe's regression from democracy. Maybe to put it more bluntly, as David Moore would want to say it, "why Robert Mugabe won't go."² In this sense the crisis in Zimbabwe is then viewed either erroneously or correctly in the context of President Robert Mugabe's personality. The goal of this chapter is to trace the colonial and liberation war antecedents (preceding conditions, events, phenomenon, characteristics or setup) of the current authoritarian practices in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, it is necessary to investigate the various dimensions of colonial (Rhodesia) Zimbabwe at two closely inter-related levels. One relates to the settler oligarchy while the other dimension relates to the nationalist movement itself. By and large the nationalist movement was not a monolithic progressive entity – a coherent, unified group of people advocating and standing for progress, constructive engagement, reform and protection of civil liberties.

The above reality was aptly summed up in Masipula Sithole's book, *Struggles within the Struggles*, where he argues that the infighting within the nationalist movement was primarily driven by ethnicity.³ Masipula Sithole was a young brother to the veteran nationalist Ndabaningi Sithole, one of the founding fathers of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963. On the other hand the settler component was also not necessarily homogenous, as proved by cases of some white liberals fighting against the settler constituency alongside the black nationalists. To this end, David Moore observes that "within the colonial state, you could see also some liberals – Garfield Todd was a member of multi racial societies like the Capricorn society and the Inter racial society. Clearly, there were also communists within the white community."⁴ Similarly Good asserts that white Rhodesians were relatively monolithic primarily because of a lack of alternatives in the settler colonial system.⁵ Though this study will not delve much into the struggles amongst the colonialists or their lack of internal diversity, there is a sense in which both warring factions had

² David B. Moore, "When I am a Century Old:" Why Robert Mugabe Won't Go" in *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in Africa*, ed. Roger Southall and Henning Melber (Cape Town and Uppsala: HSRC Press and Nordic Africa Institute, 2005): 120

³ Masipula Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the struggle* (Harare: Rujeko Publishers, 1999).

⁴ Interview with David Moore, 22 August 2007, Durban, South Africa. See also Michael O. West. "Ndabaningi Sithole, Garfield Todd and the Dadaya School Strike of 1947," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2 (June 1992):297-316.

⁵ Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia," *African Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 290 (1974):22.

internal problems. In the final analysis Good concluded that “to the limited extent that they [white Rhodesians] differ it is in a latent sense in terms of their underlying interests.”⁶

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the centrality of history and ideas drawn from the path dependency theory in shaping and understanding state society relations. Part two brings in the colonial and post-colonial debate and a brief template of British colonialism in Africa. Part three details the authoritarian nature of the settler regime and developments during the war that broke out as a reaction of the nationalist movement to settler autocracy. Finally reference is also made to the developments that took place after the end of the war that makes it safe to conclude that the end of colonialism did not mean a break with the past in any significant respects. Rather the new political dispensation was one more of continuity than change, because the pursuit of exclusionary politics by the post-independent government led to a marked deterioration in democratic practice characterised by ruling elite barbarism.

3.2 Tracing the Colonial Antecedence of Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe.

Flowing from Marx’s admonition that opens this chapter, it is imperative to understand the historical development of the social structure, especially patterns of organisation (domination, power and identities) as informed by the country’s unique historical past. In essence, this points to the loose idea that history matters in determining political choices and direction. The changing or continuing, nature of colonial features in post-independent Zimbabwe concretely reveal many of the underlying reasons why civil society in Zimbabwe is failing to forestall the continued degeneration of the country into an undemocratic order. Thus there are colonial and liberation war ties binding present-day Zimbabwe state-society relations in an authoritarian fashion. Indeed Young is correct when he succinctly argues that a:

close scrutiny of the post-colonial state suggests that a number of its pathologies trace to its predecessor...many of the practices which over time undermined both performance and credibility find their origin in the embedded legacy of the colonial state: its autocratic habits, its command mentality, its extractive relationship with the peasant sector. The collapse nearly everywhere of the democratic structures precariously erected in the last days of the colonial state, in retrospect, is a natural resurrection of the more enduring state tradition. Single parties or military regimes were new vessels, but the authoritarian content was unchanged.⁷

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Crawford Young, “The African Colonial State Revisited,” *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, vol. 11, no. 1 (January 1998):111.

Allied to the above, this chapter seeks to engage the institutional architecture of pre-colonial and colonial epochs of Zimbabwe's history in order to understand how they have replicated themselves in contemporary Zimbabwe. The failure to break with the past is a prime source of problems that have militated against the flourishing of civil society in Zimbabwe, thereby contributing towards the entrenchment of an undemocratic order. Indeed, this chapter first situates the development of an authoritarian culture in Zimbabwe ruling elite and the weak embryonic civil society within the context of settler colonialism. In other words, history is central to the understanding of Zimbabwe today, despite the fact that Zimbabwe's history is a political minefield that is much contested and overly biased.⁸ Therefore it is more objective to talk of a "balanced history" rather than a "definitive history" of a country, given the struggles over the past in any given polity. For example the war of liberation was started by ZIPRA in 1965, contrary to claims that it was started by ZANLA in 1966.⁹ In line with this thesis, a former Zimbabwean African People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) head of intelligence who was one of the founding members of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) asserts that "the liberation war has had and will continue to have profound consequences for the future of Zimbabwe and other countries in the Southern African region."¹⁰ This is particularly so primarily because many political discourses and interpretations of the Southern African region tend to be influenced or shaped by a shared history of colonialism.

Be that as it may, that the past can be subject to different interpretations, but if people take the position that the past is not important, the consequences are dire.¹¹ What it means is that "we did not remove an ulcer that was poisoning the whole system. The ulcer kept festering and producing new toxins."¹² This metaphor of an ulcer if understood in relation to Zimbabwe means that colonial repressive machinery was the source of problems for the nationalists. The toxins that ulcer produced relate to the art of refining and perfecting the colonially inherited authoritarian structures by the post-independent state, thereby constraining the civil society as obtaining today. The same applies to the other ulcer (violence) inadvertently produced by the nationalist movement by virtue of them fighting to dislodge the settler oligarchy. The associated toxins relate to the continued use

⁸ Ibbo Mandaza alludes to this problem of history in the introduction to Edgar Tekere's autobiography, *A Lifetime of Struggle* (Harare: SAPES Books 2007), 1-3. See also Terence Ranger, "Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2 (June 2004):216-234.

⁹ Dumiso Dabengwa, "ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation," in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe & Terence Ranger (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications 1995), 27.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Geoffrey Pridham, "Confining Conditions and Break with the Past: Historical Legacies and Political Learning in Transitions to Democracy," *Democratisation*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000):24.

¹² Ibid.

of violence in post-independent Zimbabwe to deal with social issues. Clearly, such a state of affairs is certainly constraining and shaping the emergence and viability of civil society and the associated democratisation discourse.

The current Zimbabwean crisis can be understood through the lens of path dependency primarily because the negative impact of the country's colonial past is unmistakable. This school of thought demonstrates the idea that historically constructed institutions, structures and vested interests are the major determinants of political behaviour. Due to conceptual travelling, the term structure is essentially contested. Social structures are "durable systems, patterned by more or less flexible inner logics that transcend individuals."¹³ Thus actors are not necessarily coerced, neither do they willingly operate within social structures given that they (structures) can be both constraining or enabling particular courses of action. Social structures are both the medium and outcome of human social action and have a simultaneously dialectical and mutually dependent relationship.¹⁴ In other words, people make structures and they are in turn shaped by the very structures that would have been created at a point in time. For example laws are promulgated by legislators and they dispose people to act in a certain way that they would otherwise not if the said laws were not there.

The path dependency theory seeks to demonstrate that "large consequences may result from relatively "small" or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is often punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life."¹⁵ Explicit to the definition is the suggestion that a particular path is difficult to exit and that "the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice."¹⁶ But such an understanding is too simplistic as it portrays societal and political actors as not being rational and capable of taking alternative courses of action other than the status quo. However a counter argument to the idea of an overly deterministic path dependency is succinctly captured by the quest of seeking to increase returns – where "relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time."¹⁷ It is against this background of increasing returns that political actors are implicitly captured as rational and have room to digress, challenge or maintain the status quo. Thus they are capable of making informed choices.

¹³ Sharon Hays, "Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture," *Sociological Theory*, 12, (1 March 1994):65.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, no. 2 (June 2000):251.

¹⁶ Ibid., 252.

¹⁷ Ibid.

In light of the need to increase returns by fending off pressure (real or imagined) on the newly established regime, it is not surprising that post independence political actors in Zimbabwe had to contend and defend the status quo, the status quo defined in terms of the repressive institutional mechanisms of its colonial predecessor. Colonial rule and the liberation war had attested to the supremacy of legal, extra-legal and violent means of fostering and entrenching societal domination. These means were tried and tested and had worked against nationalists and masses seeking to dismantle settler oligarchy.¹⁸ Similarly, the liberators turned political leaders would “suspend civil liberties and use preventive detention (a colonial practice) to eliminate political opponents and suppress criticism.”¹⁹ Consequently, constraints on the post-independent civil society movement need to be located within the broad framework of a new creation seemingly locked in an authoritarian path. However the statement need to be qualified given that a number of factors to be explored in greater detail in the thesis acted in concert to continue leading the country towards an undemocratic political order.

Finally, in order to understand the historical sources of the entrenchment of authoritarianism in post-independent Zimbabwe it is important to recognise the centrality of a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices.²⁰ The habitus shapes the way people act in and react to the world around them. State-society relations in modern day Zimbabwe are a function of autocratic habits and command mentality derived from colonial Zimbabwe. In other words, state-society relations in Zimbabwe are products of the primitive accumulation of both economic capital in Marxist terms and symbolic capital according to Weber and Pierre Bourdieu respectively. However Loveman argues that unfortunately “not much consideration has been given to how states acquired this (symbolic) power in the first place.”²¹ In order to understand how the modern post-colonial African state acquired and accumulated its symbolic power over time, there is a need to understand the colonial and post-colonial debate. The processes associated with colonialism are central to the understanding of how and why state-society relations are organised and understood as such, a section this study now turn to.

¹⁸ Interview with David Moore, 22 August 2007, Durban, South Africa.

¹⁹ Gita Subramanyam, “Ruling Continuities: Colonial Rule, Social Forces and Path Dependency in British India and Africa,” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol.44, no. 1 (March 2006):109-110.

²⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” *Sociological Theory*, vol. 7, no. 1. (Spring, 1989):19.

²¹ Mara Loveman, “The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power,” *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 110, no. 6 (May 2005):1654.

3.3 The Colonial and Post-Colonial Debate

Having outlined the framework of analysis, it is necessary to go a step further and deal with the question of colonial and post-colonial Africa. The debate on post-colonialism is very intense and still raging, with scholars dismissing the whole notion of post-colonialism as irrelevant if not downright dangerous.²² The argument advanced by these scholars is that the “post” in post-colonialism appears to signal a chronologically defined periodisation and linear progression from pre-colonialism through colonialism to post-colonialism.²³ However in reality the colonial and post-colonial periods / epochs are not in any way watertight compartments but rather there is a nexus between the past and present and therefore should be recognised as such. Indeed an inquiry into post-colonialism reveals continuity, fluidity and interconnectedness (not rupture) of the triad - pre-colonialism, colonialism and post-colonialism. It is upon the recognition of the “embeddedness” of the present in the past, that the idea of hybrid regimes in the post-colonial era derives its sound footing. As pointed out in the previous chapter, hybrid regimes exhibit a mix of both democratic and authoritarian tendencies, although they are often erroneously viewed as incomplete or transitional forms of democracy.

On the other hand protagonists of the post-colonial theory maintain that it has a heuristic and redeeming value in relation to understanding economic and political development globally. Equally interesting and intellectually stimulating is post-colonialism’s conception of power. It recognises the relationship between power, discourses, political institutions and practices, thereby helping us to understand how past and present relations of inequality and identities are constructed, deconstructed and maintained over time and space.²⁴ Abrahamsen (2003) further maintains that “In terms of continuity, identities and subjectivities were profoundly reshaped by the colonial experience and accordingly colonialism finds continued expression through multiplicity of practices, philosophies, and culture imparted to and adopted by the colonized in more or less hybrid forms.”²⁵ In other words there is an implicit appeal to the Foucauldian understanding of power as being capable of shaping and producing identities in people.

In the same vein Young contends that despite independence in many African countries, it soon

²² For a detailed argument, see Arif Dirlik, “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 20, no. 2 (Winter, 1994):328-356.

²³ Rita Abrahamsen, “African Studies and the Post Colonial Challenge,” *African Affairs*, 102 (2003):190. While acknowledging that post-colonial theory is not necessarily uniform, Abrahamsen makes a very balanced argument for and against it based on a number of secondary sources of data.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 190.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 204.

became evident that there was a “wholesale importation of routines, practices and mentalities of the African colonial state into its postcolonial successor.”²⁶ What is particularly salient about the above post-colonial theorists is that they recognise the centrality of history in explaining and understanding contemporary African politics and society. However, implicit to the thread of their argument is the importance of anti-colonial struggles in shaping the form and content of the post-independent African state, a position to be made more explicit in this thesis. In sum the present should be regarded “as a complex mix and continuation of different cultures and temporalities.”²⁷ However a radical view would see the present as nothing but old wine in new bottles.

3.3.1 A Brief Template of British Colonialism in Africa

The political economy of Zimbabwe needs to be located within the broad framework of British imperialism. There are generally similar trends and characteristics that can be deciphered in a number of former British colonies the world over. However in the final analysis it was the different structures of African societies that influenced the nature and character of the colonial state.²⁸ According to Mamdani colonisation, especially by Britain, entailed the classification of people into citizens and subjects, where the settlers were citizens while the indigenous people were relegated to the status of subjects.²⁹ Citizens were accorded certain rights while the subjects were denied the same rights, culminating in the formation of a bifurcated state that differentiated the civilised from the uncivilised.³⁰ Consequently the organisation of the British colonial rule was mainly influenced by the compelling need to deal with the “native question,”³¹ which had to do with the relationship between white people and black people and among the black people themselves.

Tied to the above, direct and indirect rule were the vehicles for ensuring the minority ruled the indigenous population. The British colonial system of indirect rule involved leaving intact indigenous local elites (chiefs and headman) who were then co-opted or coerced into “serving as agents of British rule.”³² There was also the prevalence of divide and rule, whereby British

²⁶ Crawford Young, “The End of the Post Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Africa’s Changing Political Dynamics,” *African Affairs*, vol. 103, no. 410 (2004):23-24.

²⁷ Abrahamsen, 196.

²⁸ Young, 110.

²⁹ See Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 16.

³² Robert T. Blanton, David Mason and Brian Athow, “Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 4 (2001):479.

colonialism deliberately “maintained opposing traditional structures of control in order to keep the different ethnic populations within a colony from forming a coalition to challenge British hegemony.”³³ The fact that the mode of power that buttressed colonialism remained intact in the post-colonial era explains why democracy is failing to take root in Africa, according to Mamdani.³⁴

Having stated that, the next stage is to identify other tenets or characteristics of British imperialism in general as posited by Subramanyam.³⁵ One of the characteristics of British rule is that it was not directed towards moral or material progress of the (African) people but towards maintaining control of the colonies for the economic benefit of the metropole and other international commercial concerns. So it was basically concerned with maintaining law and order as evidenced by the composition of colonial public expenditures and the proclivity towards encouraging social tensions between ethnic groups. Indeed the primary function of the British colonial army was to maintain internal security.³⁶

It is instructive to note that Southern Rhodesia was an exception to general British colonialism in the sense that it was a settler colony despite sharing a number of similar features with non-settler colonies.³⁷ Settler colonialism involves the acquisition of land by the metropole and the subsequent attraction of immigrants or settlers with a view to shaping the demographics of the colony in line with what is obtaining at the metropole.³⁸ Another feature of settler colonies is their “capacity for independent capitalist development, built upon the heavy exploitation of African land and labour, and policies of economic nationalism externally.”³⁹ Thus, instead of being economically and politically subordinate to the metropole, a settler colony by its very nature a dynamic and autonomous entity.

Furthermore British rule was also not geared towards preparing settler colonies for self-government and independence. Indeed Good is correct when he cogently asserts that settler colonialism was not a mere adjunct of British imperialism, nor was “it in general independent of,

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Mamdani, 8.

³⁵ Gita Subramanyam, “Ruling Continuities: Colonial Rule, Social Forces and Path Dependency in British India and Africa,” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 44, no. 1 (March 2006):109-110.

³⁶ David Killingray, “The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa,” *African Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 340 (July 1986):411-437.

³⁷ Kenneth Good, “Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 14, no. 4 (December 1976):597-598.

³⁸ Alois S. Mlambo, “Building a White Man’s Country: Aspects of White Immigration into Rhodesia up to World War II,” *Zambezia*, vol. XXV, no. ii (1998):123-125.

³⁹ Good, “Settler Colonialism and Class Formation,” 597.

or in conflict with it.”⁴⁰ Rather an ambivalent relationship existed between the two centres of power because of a “constitutional mystification over the location of ultimate political power.”⁴¹ Clearly, in the final analysis the settler colony was in permanent control, while the “British Government was kept in the background as a support.”⁴² Combinations of methods ranging from socio-economic deprivation and restricted political participation (through repressive laws) were used to contain nationalism. At the end of the day “countries post independence trajectories were shaped largely by the interaction of the structure of government handed down by the British and the agency of the political elites who generally steered their politics away from democracy.”⁴³ The nationalists grew up in a commandist set-up or habitus, hence their inclination to the use of violence to settle socio-economic and political issues.

Notwithstanding the above idea of a commandist habitus, Subramanyam asserts that:

The newly created states were not, as it were, ‘locked in’ to this ‘path’, but several interlinked factors combined to make a detour towards democratic governance extremely unlikely. These included vested interests (parties wishing to maintain state power), a fear of change (groups’ lack of experience [of] operating within even partly democratic institutions) and the perceived costs of change (concerns over potentially declining social stability and/or state effectiveness).⁴⁴

Therefore, Subramanyam’s conclusion that the British legacy to former African colonies was a strong inclination towards undemocratic tendencies should not be overstated.⁴⁵ In the final analysis British legacy cannot be the primary and sole reason why post-colonial states became undemocratic. The point is that they did not inherit a viable state geared towards democratic societies. Post-colonial rulers inherited oppressive machinery which they did not turn around for narrowly defined security reasons.

3.4 The Pre-Independence Political Economy of Zimbabwe

A reflection on the genesis of specific colonial antecedents of Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism needs to be drawn from the Marxist notion of primitive accumulation of economic and symbolic power. Primitive accumulation is the multi-dimensional way in which capitalism comes into

⁴⁰ Kenneth Good, “Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia,” 10.

⁴¹ Ibid., 20.

⁴² Kenneth Good “Settler Colonialism and Class Formation,” 610-611.

⁴³ Subramanyam, 110.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 111.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 111.

existence and it involves the acts of violence where “the landlords grant themselves the people’s land as private property.”⁴⁶ To illustrate the violent nature of expropriation, Marx argues that capitalism was born, “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”⁴⁷ One can easily trace the origins of oligarchy using the Marxist conception of the transformation of society through the violent appropriation of land belonging to the majority into the hands of a few. However, in reality the processes of primitive accumulation of economic capital and symbolic capital take place concomitantly.

The chronology of historical-political periods⁴⁸ that are central to the understanding of the building of post-independence authoritarian tendencies that explains the “weakness”⁴⁹ of the civil society in Zimbabwe is as follows.

- 1890 The occupation of Southern Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company operating under Royal Charter
- 1923 The assumption of Responsible Government
- 1931 The promulgation of the Land Apportionment Act
- 1953 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
- 1961 The new Constitution for Southern Rhodesia
- 1965 The Unilateral Declaration of Independence
- 1978 The Smith-Muzorewa Government of National Unity
- 1980 The year of the establishment of the Republic of Zimbabwe Government

Notwithstanding the above chronology, this chapter proceeds with a caveat that it is difficult to separate themes into neat categories, so the discussion and relevance of an issue under more than one heading is not only unavoidable but necessary. The occupation of Southern Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company operating under Royal Charter was a very violent process that sought to contain the Shona and Ndebele uprising (chimurenga) in 1896. Makumbe asserts that “This period signalled the institutionalisation of violence given that both Shona and Ndebele warriors wanted to fight colonisation, which was geared towards expropriating their land and

⁴⁶ Jim Glassman, “Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by ‘Extra-Economic’ Means,” *Progress in Human Geography* 30, 5 (2006):610.

⁴⁷ Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 760.

⁴⁸ The historical periods are adapted from George P. Kahari, “The History of the Shona Protest Song: A Preliminary Study,” *Zambezia*, vol. IX, no. ii (1981):79-80.

⁴⁹ During my field work almost all the respondents didn’t agree with the characterisation that post-1990 civil society in Zimbabwe is weak.

cattle.”⁵⁰ In its broadest sense and motive, colonialism used land to secure economic and political domination and these grievances related to land had a huge impact on political consciousness of African people.⁵¹ The Cecil Rhodes driven process of colonisation set the stage for the primitive accumulation of both symbolic and economic capital alluded to earlier on. However, despite the defeat of indigenous people, the land question remains a very emotive and delicate issue in Zimbabwe till this day.

Following the end of company rule in 1923 the white settler electorate refused to join South Africa and voted in favour of responsible government under British tutelage.⁵² However it is worth recognising that Rhodesian settler governments from 1920 onwards were of an economic nationalist type. By and large the executive arm of the settler government in Southern Rhodesia comprised farmers “with a stake in the economy who pushed for national agricultural development.”⁵³ Under responsible government the settlers stepped up the process of lawmaking that was biased against the black majority. The idea of having a constitution was a way of legitimising their power symbolically through statutes. According to Herbst, the “main motivation for strengthening the colonial state was the insecurity of the settlers in face of a hostile environment.”⁵⁴ Shortly after attaining self-rule, the settlers sought to strengthen their state apparatus with a view to protecting themselves from economic competition from Africans. The promulgation of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act led to a further forced removal of Africans from their land into the so-called Tribal Trust Lands. This period also heralded the beginning of an interventionist state in the commanding heights of the economy, a situation that continues to the present day Zimbabwe. Molokele observes that “It was during this period that a number of state owned enterprises were formed and the process was stepped up during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period as a sanction busting measure.”⁵⁵

Faced with the shortage of labour, the colonial government enacted the 1942 Compulsory Native Labour Act, which legalised state coercion to secure cheap labour for the settlers.⁵⁶ Under this act, unemployed able-bodied African males aged between 18 and 45 years would be

⁵⁰ Interview with Professor John Makumbe, Harare, 20 December 2007.

⁵¹ Robin Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (California: University of California Press, 1977), cover introduction.

⁵² James P. Barber, “Rhodesia: The Constitutional Conflict,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 4, no. 4. (December 1966):458.

⁵³ Personal email correspondence with Kenneth Good, 3 March 2009.

⁵⁴ See Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1990), 18.

⁵⁵ Interview with Daniel Fortune Molokele, Johannesburg, 16 September 2007.

⁵⁶ David Johnson, “Settler Farmers and Coerced African Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1936-46,” *The Journal of African History*, vol. 33, no. 1 (1992):121.

conscripted, though in reality conscription was already under way long before the promulgation of this statute.⁵⁷ Indeed, this serves to show the importance of conferring legitimacy in the processes of maintaining and enhancing a particular social order. In Southern Rhodesia, African males were not prepared to work for the colonialists because of the slave-like working conditions, and this led the minority government to enlist the services of local chiefs and headmen. To this end, chiefs were maintained as the traditional rulers of Africans in the reserves, but in reality their position had very little to do with local legitimacy. “They were de facto government policemen in the countryside.”⁵⁸ As a result they were no longer legitimate in the eyes of the indigenous people, primarily because they served the selfish interests of the settler oligarchy despite the fact that their subjects previously held them in high esteem and respect during pre-colonial times. The colonial government was aware that chiefs were highly respected and that “rebellion against traditional leaders by Africans”⁵⁹ was a rare occurrence. However, with time the tide changed and for example during the mid-nineteen sixties, Chief Chirawu and Chief Zvimba were assaulted by members of the public for supporting the colonial administration.⁶⁰

3.4.1 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was created in 1953 when Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were amalgamated. The overarching objective was to advance economic and social economic progress as well as to experiment with race relations based on partnership and cooperation.⁶¹ It is on the basis of this idea of racial partnership that such leaders as Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa later participated in the internal settlement of Zimbabwe / Rhodesia in 1978-79. Missionary schools that were established in Zimbabwe shortly after colonial conquest socialised nationalists Sithole and Muzorewa into moderates. Their disposition towards racial cooperation was further engrained during the formative years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Commenting on the impact of missionary controlled education on the nationalist movement and cleavages that later bedevilled the same movement, Schutz succinctly argues that:

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 26 August 1964, column 1285.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ H.E. Mr. A. E. P. Robinson “1961: the Year of Decision in Rhodesia and Nyasaland”

The High Commissioner for Rhodesia and Nyasaland Address to a joint meeting of the Royal African Society and the Royal Commonwealth Society on 4 May 1961. <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/60/240/400.pdf>

The primary systemic culprit in generating these cleavages has been the major colonial socializing structure, the educational system. The most striking aspect of this structure has been the paramount role played by the missionaries. Whether their specific motives have been good, bad, or indifferent, they have transmitted to young Africans the values and structures of the missionaries' own social and political condition.⁶²

However, politically conscious Africans opposed the existence of the Federation for a decade given that the Federal government was against the granting of political rights to black people. For the Africans, the Federation was a Trojan horse for settler control and domination and therefore was to be resisted by any means necessary. Essentially, Africans resisted the federation for fear of “white domination and for fear that social and political progress would be denied.”⁶³ In a way this resistance to continued and accentuated domination led to an increase in mass nationalism that needs to be understood within the context of urbanisation. As alluded to in the previous chapter, rapid rural-urban migration was a result of the need to have a source of livelihood in light of the colonial agrarian policies (biased against Africans) and accompanying nascent industrialisation. Many people fought certain repressive pieces of colonial legislation under the banner of the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICU). For example the 1946 Natives (urban area) Registration and Accommodation Act, which was to be the “bedrock of the most sustained anti colonial campaign before the onset of the full blown nationalist struggle”,⁶⁴ was vehemently opposed by RICU.

It was during the federation years that a number of migrant workers moved from the then Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) into Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The fact that the then Southern Rhodesia was the economic hub of the Federation made it very attractive to the migrants, thereby explaining the high number of the so-called aliens in present day Zimbabwe. Given this historical setup, the migrant population is of significant political importance in contemporary Zimbabwe as this study reveals in Chapter 4. The Federation came to an end in 1963 following the election into power of anti-federal parties in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia, where in the latter case the Rhodesian Front (RF) was led by Winston Field.⁶⁵ Field was replaced by Ian Douglas Smith who then led the party. Smith unilaterally declared independence a year later given that politics in Southern Rhodesia was dominated by

⁶² Barry M. Schutz, “The Colonial Heritage of Strife: Sources of Cleavage in the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement,” *Africa Today*, vol. 25, no. 1 (January -March 1978):8.

⁶³ Carl G. Rosberg, Jr, “The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Problems of Democratic Government,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 306, Africa and the Western World (July 1956):99.

⁶⁴ Teresa Barnes, “So that a Labourer Could Live with His Family: Overlooked Factors in Social and Economic Strife in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe, 1945-1952,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1 (March 1995):108.

⁶⁵ Philip Murphy, “An Intricate and Distasteful Subject: British Planning for the Use of Force against the European Settlers of Central Africa, 1952-65,” *English Historical Review*, vol. CXXI, no. 492 (2006):764.

race and therefore there was a compelling need to “assert unquestioned and unfettered white control.”⁶⁶ The continued existence of Southern Rhodesia under British tutelage was likely to compromise the Rhodesian Front’s endeavour. As a matter of fact, Britain was not prepared to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia unless there were some constitutional amendments that would advance the cause of Africans: Britain was saying “No independence before majority African rule.” Realistically, however, “The precise degree to which Rhodesia has been constitutionally independent of, or dependent upon, Britain, always remained uncertain. From 1923 to 1961 Britain retained the right to veto racist legislation in the country, but in practice did not do so.”⁶⁷

Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 is another milestone in the history of Zimbabwe that is central in shaping contemporary political transition trajectories. Having overall and total control of the state’s political power was a major principle governing UDI, and this was expressed in the 1965 constitution and other legislative measures.⁶⁸ Here the role of personalities and egos comes to the fore, given that Ian Douglas Smith was a conservative. Essentially the RF adopted Smith’s hardened attitude of being against political and economic advancement of the black majority. Smith’s attitude was a departure from his predecessors – Huggins, Todd and Whitehead – who all felt that the future of Rhodesia was anchored on cooperation between blacks and whites on the principle of “separate but equal.” However in reality the idea of “separate but equal” was a half-hearted measure that was not acceptable to the majority of the nationalists.

Furthermore, the settler state stepped up its authoritarian efforts towards the final years of the Federation, the early years of UDI and beyond. This can be understood in light of the fact that the settler state was trying by all means to contain growing African nationalism. Meanwhile the nationalists were divided over the 1961 constitution that was put forward by the then Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead. The black nationalists were so divided about embracing the 1961 constitution given that the militant ones were for ‘majority rule now’ while the less militant ones were for racial cooperation based on the principle of “separate but equal.” This led black militants to lump together all whites as “rivals, irrespective of whether they were racists,

⁶⁶ Robert C. Good, *UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 42. This book gives a detailed account of the UDI politics.

⁶⁷ Kenneth Good, “Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia,” 20.

⁶⁸ R Hodder-Williams, “Rhodesia’s Search for a Constitution or Whatever Happened to Whaley,” *African Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 276 (July 1970):233.

reactionaries, moderates or progressives.”⁶⁹ This in fact signalled the division in nationalist movement as well as the birth of infighting within the movement. What happened during the formative years of the nationalist movement was that some United Democratic Party (UDP) members were suspended for expressing divergent opinions without following the so-called proper channels.⁷⁰ Moreover the nationalist movement proved that it could not amicably deal with its internal conflicts,⁷¹ a situation which eventually led to the ZAPU-ZANU split in 1964. Similarly Raftopoulos observed that there was a “tendency of the nationalist leadership to curtail debates and suppress opposing views,”⁷² a feature also prevalent in contemporary Zimbabwe.

Essentially the nationalists made a tactical blunder because by boycotting and not negotiating electoral politics, black militants took a step destructive of their own unity. This was so because by 1964 they confronted each other over the best means to their goal: neither Nkomo nor Sithole could achieve: “majority rule now.” The point is that, given the repressive nature of the regime and that there were some white liberals fighting for their cause, the 1961 constitution was a good starting point. Some disgruntled elements from the NDP mooted a breakaway party called the Zimbabwe National Party but this party did not see the light of day, partly because of intimidation from the NDP.⁷³ This kind of intimidation attests to the fact that the nationalist movement – NDP – did not want any competing centre of power. The NDP was banned in 1961 and was succeeded by ZAPU in 1962, still under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. However, much more damaging was the ZAPU split in 1963 into warring factions because of disagreements relating to how to proceed with the struggle following the banning of the party. The resulting frustration led to bloody township rivalries, pitting Nkomo’s ZAPU against Sithole’s ZANU.⁷⁴

ZANU and ZAPU fiercely attacked each other through physical violence and words before they were both banned, a scenario that diverted their energies from fighting a common enemy.⁷⁵ However they never came out in the open to admit that all was not well but apportioned the

⁶⁹ John David Leaver, “Multiracialism and Nationalisms: A Political Retrospective on 1950s Southern Rhodesia (‘Colonial Zimbabwe’),” *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol. XXIII, no. 2 (2006):169.

⁷⁰ John Day, “Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists and the 1961 Constitution,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (July 1969):231.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 246

⁷² Brian Raftopoulos, “Nationalism and Labour in Salisbury 1953-1965,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol 21, no. 1 (March 1995):93.

⁷³ John Day, “The Creation of Political Myths: African Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Oct. 1975):60.

⁷⁴ Leaver, 172.

⁷⁵ Day, “The Creation of Political Myths,” 60.

blame to power-hungry individuals bent on fanning dissent within an otherwise united front. What caused this intra-nationalist bloody rivalry is disputed but the ethnic factor is the most plausible factor that explains the split. Despite the fact that some analysts say the split had to do with disenchantment with Nkomo's leadership, the rival parties accused each other of tribalism. Rupiya argues that "the nationalist movement was inherently regional as opposed to being national because the grievances they had against the settler regime had to do with cattle on the part of the Ndebele and land on the part of the Shona people"⁷⁶. In other words from the outset, the nationalist movement never took a national character and that explains the ethnic struggles within the liberation struggle. Even in present day Zimbabwe there is a tendency by the political leadership to try and achieve an ethnic balance in a number of political structures.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the nationalist split on 9 August 1963 into ZAPU and ZANU culminated in bloody fights in October 1963 in African townships of Salisbury and Bulawayo.⁷⁷ On the other hand exiled members of ZAPU and ZANU were also fighting each other in Zambia, prompting President Kaunda to tell them to leave his country.⁷⁸ ZANU supporters were on the receiving end of the orgy of violence that was being perpetrated by ZAPU. So serious and strong were the acts of intimidation and violence that "ZANU supporters were disclaiming that they ever had anything to do with Sithole, or if they had, then they had changed their minds and wanted to rejoin the people."⁷⁹ There were also cases of petrol bombings that prompted a number of ZANU supporters to defect to ZAPU and this was communicated in the *African Daily News*.⁸⁰ Indeed part of a sample letter that appeared in the *African Daily News* from a former ZANU supporter read: "I drifted away from ZANU in November. At this juncture in our national struggle, I want to be in line with others under one national tested leader."⁸¹

It is instructive to note that the bloody inter-nationalist party violence led to the Minister of Law and Order making a statement about the development in the legislative assembly on 26 August 1964. The Minister indicated to the house that, as a result of the violence, the Governor had declared a state of emergency in the Salisbury African township of Highfields.⁸² Furthermore the

⁷⁶ Interview with Dr Martin Rupiya in Grahamstown, 18 October 2007.

⁷⁷ Eugene Wason, *Banned: The Story of the African Daily News, Southern Rhodesia, 1964* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976):57.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 64.

⁸¹ Ibid., 65.

⁸² *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 26 August 1964, column 1257.

government went on to declare ZANU and ZAPU unlawful organisations. The reason for taking such a course of action was to deal with the anarchy that was fast engulfing the country. The Minister further pointed out that the government would not “allow subversion, violence and treasonable acts to take place with impunity in our midst.”⁸³ As a result there was a compelling reason to “stamp out all the lawlessness, violence and intimidation which have recently been a feature of life in this township.”⁸⁴ In the final analysis the colonial government took advantage of an untenable political situation to declare a state of emergency and to ban the two political organisations.

Similarly, writing about the ZANU-ZAPU split Raftopoulos observes that:

The split in the Nationalist Movement in 1963 resulted in a division between the ZAPU and the new Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Ndabaningi Sithole. Just as the ambivalent intellectual leadership in Salisbury was beginning to develop more substantive connections between urban and rural politics, they became involved in a bloody intra elite conflict which was in part based on the fragile basis of the emerging middle class and its shifting allegiances. Ethnicity, which had played a contradictory role in the life of the city's workers, was henceforth increasingly harnessed by the intellectual elite and deployed in the destructive form of ‘political tribalism’ in the battles within the Zimbabwean elite which were to plague the nationalist movement throughout the anti colonial struggle.⁸⁵

Following the declaration of the emergency in Highfield on 26 August 1964, the Minister of Law and Order indicated in parliament that an operation was being considered to deal with gross overcrowding in the Salisbury township.⁸⁶ The township was initially built to accommodate 45 000 inhabitants but the figure had since risen to 80 000 and it was now impossible to adequately control the settlement.⁸⁷ A number of laws were put in place to push unemployed black people to the rural areas and by late 1964 the population had been reduced from 100 000 to 70 000.⁸⁸ One legal expert concluded that these measures were meant to pre-empt “possible explosion against the regime and force them to the rural areas.”⁸⁹ A similar strategy was employed by the ZANU PF government in 2005 when it embarked on Operation Murambatsvina, an issue to be tackled later in Chapter 4 this thesis. Strategic resettlement was

⁸³ Ibid., column 1259.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 1260.

⁸⁵ Raftopoulos, 92.

⁸⁶ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 26 August 1964, 1263.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Claire Palley, “Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front From 1963 to 1969 (Part 1),” *Race & Class*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1970):40. For more details see Claire Palley, “Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front from 1963 to 1969 (Part 2),” *Race & Class*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1970):139-167.

⁸⁹ Palley, Part 1:40.

another oppressive strategy employed by the colonial government to deal with its failure to use rewards to deter people from supporting the liberation struggle after 1975.⁹⁰ Colonial government strategists suggested the protected village policy or “keeps” in order to counter the influence of guerrillas on local communities. Under this scheme many people were forcibly evicted from their rural homes into protected villages that had no proper housing or sanitation facilities.

3.4.2 State Politics in Rhodesia 1960-1972

One central feature of colonial Rhodesia towards the end of the Federation was the promulgation of a battery of laws and regulations to contain growing nationalism. At the same time other ideology shaping structures like the media “served to provide a justification to Africans for the structures of politics and society.”⁹¹ The legal devices were designed to preserve and perpetuate “European political, economic and social domination at all levels of society.”⁹² There was a carefully orchestrated move to erode the gains made towards majority rule during federation. Clearly, the overarching objective was to reintroduce apartheid or separate development between races.⁹³ A number of developments took place, such as the promulgation of the Law and Order Maintenance Act 1960 (LOMA), Emergency Powers (maintenance of law and order) regulations of 1966, Preventative Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act 1959, Unlawful Organisations Act 1959,⁹⁴ and Vagrancy Act 1960. The period also witnessed the creation of the dreaded Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), cooptation of chiefs as alluded to earlier on, state control of the print and electronic media among other vices. These security structures and other measures acted in concert to contain African nationalism and further buttressed the Rhodesian Front white supremacist policies, much to the detriment of the masses and the nationalists.

Content analysis of legislative assembly debates during the colonial era gives a detailed and lucid account of the use of law as an instrument of inequality. It is worth noting that there are a number of amendment bills based on existing security laws that were fast-tracked through the

⁹⁰ A. K. H. Weinrich, “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (April 1977):207.

⁹¹ Alan Cousins, “State, Ideology, and Power in Rhodesia, 1958-1972,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1991):63.

⁹² Palley, Part 1, 19.

⁹³ *Ibid.*,21.

⁹⁴ Amnesty International, “Briefing: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe,” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter, 1976):34.

legislative assembly. Even the Minister of Law and Order acknowledged that the curtailment of individual human rights was taking place rapidly over a very short period of time.⁹⁵ However he was quick to point out this was justifiable for the purposes of maintaining law and order. On the other hand the opposition found the tendency by the Minister of Law and Order to clamour for excessive powers distasteful.⁹⁶ A case in point was the 1964 Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill that sought to empower the Minister and the Attorney General to detain without option to apply for bail, anyone who threatens national interests. As a result the opposition concluded that the reasons given by the minister to justify blanket prohibition of bail were “both inadequate and inaccurate.”⁹⁷ One opposition legislator who opposed the Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill categorically stated that: “Any bill that detracts from the discretion of the courts that puts arbitrary power into the hands of the Minister, that attacks the rule of law in any way, will not have my support.”⁹⁸

It is the contention of this thesis that the successive colonial administration in Rhodesia (particularly the Rhodesian Front) and ZANU PF followed similar paths to protect their oligarchic rule. Clearly, they also resorted to similar undemocratic measures and tactics to crush dissenting voices. Furthermore both the Rhodesian Front and ZANU PF had white and black siege cultures respectively. A siege culture develops when a group perceives that its culture is under threat and therefore it “mobilizes its resources, articulates its beliefs and organizes its followers to assure its cultural survival.”⁹⁹ In addition, a siege culture makes a distinction between ‘us’ (the siege culture) and ‘them’ (the threatening group).¹⁰⁰ By virtue of controlling societal structures, the minority colonial government used its power to isolate, dominate and discriminate against the less powerful and privileged black majority. In sum, “Where a group sees itself as a culture under siege, the fear of its possible cultural extinction prompts reactive, defensive or even aggressive group mobilization efforts.”¹⁰¹ Indeed, the aforementioned aspect represents a striking feature of the ruling elite group in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe.

Consequently organisations like Amnesty International (AI), established in 1961 as a worldwide movement of people campaigning for internationally recognised human rights for everyone,

⁹⁵ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 56, 1 April 1964, column 1560.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1565.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1567.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1570.

⁹⁹ Donald G. Baker, “Race, Power and White Siege Cultures,” *Social Dynamics*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1975):143.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 145.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 144.

played a pivotal role is exposing human rights violations in the then Rhodesia. According to Amnesty International, LOMA introduced in 1960 was the foundation of the Rhodesian security legislation and was amended and perfected several times and was all-encompassing because it “imposed strict limitations on all forms of African political activity and organization.”¹⁰² The act also gave the powers that be sweeping powers to ban publications, prohibit meetings and to restrict anyone considered to be a threat to public order.¹⁰³ During the entire UDI period the constitution was changed several times, as were the various repressive pieces of legislation, which were amended to provide a tighter grip on power. Unfortunately the law was selectively applied because there were cases where the Europeans violated LOMA but were not prosecuted.¹⁰⁴ It therefore became very difficult for the black population to enjoy inalienable rights such as freedom of speech, expression and the right to assemble, given that the colonial administration felt they were not inalienable.

The Rhodesian judges “consciously used the machinery of justice to serve personal or group ends”, for example by delaying proceedings that challenged actions of the regime.¹⁰⁵ Clearly, opponents of the regime were “denied any possibility of challenging illegalities through the court machinery.”¹⁰⁶ Indeed, Palley is correct to conclude that “law and order” were verbally treated as synonymous although analysis reveals that the court was favouring order “at the expense of legality.”¹⁰⁷ So obnoxious was Whitehead’s catch-all legislation that the Federal Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold, condemned and refused to administer the laws. Sir Robert Tredgold eventually resigned in protest against what he called “an unwarranted invasion by the executive in the sphere of the courts.”¹⁰⁸ So dire was the situation in Rhodesia that the following sentiments were expressed in the British House of Commons on 22 June 1961:

Unfortunately, however, 'the due process of law' and arbitrary action by the Government are not necessarily incompatible under the statute law of Southern Rhodesia, Certain statutes permit the government in effect arbitrarily, to curtail the fundamental liberties of the individual to a considerable degree, not by taking extraordinary or emergency powers for the purpose, but 'in the ordinary course of law'.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Law and Order Maintenance Act, 1960, Section 51a.

¹⁰⁴ Christopher H. Zimmerli, “Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Southern Rhodesia,” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1971):270.

¹⁰⁵ Claire Palley “The Judicial Process: U.D.I. and the Southern Rhodesian Judiciary,” *The Modern Law Review*, vol. 30, no. 3 (May 1967):264.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 287.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 283.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in J.R.T. Wood, “*So Far and No Further!*” *Rhodesia’s Bid for Independence during the Retreat from Empire 1959-1965* (Johannesburg: 30° South Publishers, 2005), 59.

¹⁰⁹ “Southern Rhodesia” House of Common Debates, 22 June 1961.

Another piece of legislation was the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act of 1967 that gave the colonial government wide-ranging powers to control theatrical performance and public entertainment in general. The act was administered by the Ministry of Law and Order and the restrictive provisions enshrined in the act impinged on freedom of expression and *ipso facto* violated the juristic conception of freedom.¹¹⁰ The Rhodesian and Zimbabwean experiences cogently illustrate that the whole notion of censorship is primarily informed by very subjective considerations.¹¹¹ Thomas Mapfumo's political protest music of the Chimurenga genre was officially banned by the Rhodesian Censorship Board.

Emergency powers (Maintenance of law and order) regulations of 1966, was another piece of repressive legislation that was used given that Rhodesia was under a continuous state of emergency for a long time. Individual judges' and other law enforcement agents' subjective opinions took precedence in determining whether or not to apply the law. Rhodesia effectively became a police state in 1960 after enacting LOMA¹¹² given that the police and army were used more often than not to quell disturbances in the urban-industrial and rural societies. Under the state of emergency people were arbitrarily arrested and detained without trial for significant periods of time without any recourse to the legal route. The state of emergency was constantly renewed for periods ranging from three to twelve months and in the rural areas curfew periods were introduced as a security measure.

The 1948 general strike referred to in the previous chapter led to a Commission of Inquiry that prompted the colonial government to moot the idea of a strategy to "control [the growing] African working class militancy."¹¹³ As a result the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 was promulgated. This Act empowered the government to ban strikes and trade unionism, and violators were dealt through fines, deportation and imprisonment.¹¹⁴ Under the act it was illegal for trade unions to have fraternal relations with other trade unions that were perceived to be anti-colonialism. With respect to the Immigration Act, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Governor could declare someone a prohibited person. The aforementioned person would be deported following such a declaration. Other legislative measures that were at the disposal of the

<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1961/jun/22/southern-rhodesia-1> <Accessed 20 February 2009>.

¹¹⁰ Bharat Patel, "Freedom of Literary Expression and Censorship in Zimbabwe," *Zambezia* XXIV (I).(1997):58 -59.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹¹² Zimmerli, 270.

¹¹³ Michael Oliver West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 177.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Rhodesian Front included the Miscellaneous Offences Act, the Vagrancy Act, and the Natives (urban area) Registration and Accommodation Act. It is worth noting that many of the Acts provided that the responsible Minister could make subsidiary legislation as he deemed fit without having to go through the normal legislative process.

While the Preventive Detention Act gave the minister the power to detain without trial, for a period up to five years, a person considered a national security threat, the Amendment sought to actually increase the duration. It is under the Preventive Detention Act that a number of nationalists were detained at Wha Wha and Gonakudzingwa among other colonial prisons. Examples include Robert Mugabe, Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo and Michael Mawema. It is important at this stage to state that in present day Zimbabwe, although the Preventive Detention Act is no longer in the statutes, its barbaric legacy lives on. There have been several of circumstances, especially since 2000, where a number of opposition and civil society activists were denied bail under very unclear circumstances. Furthermore it is now customary in Zimbabwe to find state opponents being held in detention for considerable periods of time without being formally charged.¹¹⁵ Consequently this thesis unequivocally takes the position that there is *de facto* enforcement of the letter and spirit of various colonial security measures in present day Zimbabwe. Though some colonial Acts of parliament were repealed, it is an objective reality that they were recast and fortified in various forms as this thesis reveals in the next chapters. Consequently, a number of fundamental rights and freedoms remain restricted in practice.

The Unlawful Organisations Act 1959 had a schedule that enumerated prohibited organisations that were banned because their activities endanger arbitrarily defined “public order.” Under section 3 of the said Act, an organisation would be declared unlawful if “the activities of such an organisation or of any members of that organisation are likely to have certain results; that is to say either to endanger public safety, or disturb or interfere with public order, or to prejudice the tranquillity of security of Southern Rhodesia.”¹¹⁶ Amnesty International further notes that the Act was “used to ban each of the main African nationalist parties – the African National Congress (ANC) in 1959, the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in 1962, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1964, the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) in 1964, and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe

¹¹⁵ “Zim Human Rights Activists Abducted,” *Mmegi* (Gaborone), 10 December 2008.

¹¹⁶ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 3 September 1964, column 1747.

(FROLIZI) in 1971.”¹¹⁷ In light of this, Christopher H. Zimmerli, a lawyer sympathetic to the nationalist cause, concluded that “the principles of the rule of law and of fundamental rights are being violated in Rhodesia.”¹¹⁸ This position was reached after noting the systematic violation of human rights that characterised Rhodesia and the blatantly partisan interpretation of the law by a judiciary that was being extensively controlled by the executive.

Over and above the use of the police and army to deal with the nationalists, Smith’s Rhodesian Front inherited the secret police otherwise known as the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) from Winston Field. The head (Director General) of the CIO was Ken Flower, and the CIO was involved in a number of clandestine activities earmarked for reporting and destabilising the operations of ZAPU and ZANU.¹¹⁹ Many acts of torture, disappearances and destabilisation activities were undertaken by the CIO, which also gathered information about people to be put on a hit list through surveillance, technical means and clandestine searches of homes and offices.¹²⁰ There is also evidence pointing to the fact that the CIO Terrorist desk was instrumental in the biological warfare that left many guerrillas dead after wearing poisoned clothes. According to Martinez, the Rhodesian Front “used biological and chemical weapons against the guerrillas, against rural blacks to prevent their support of the guerrillas and against cattle to reduce rural food stock.”¹²¹

Furthermore the colonial government resorted to the creation of moral panic and folk devils as another power retention strategy. At the heart, this strategy

was with the fabrication of scapegoats which could be held responsible for a worldwide conspiracy against Rhodesia and these were found among the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the World Council of Churches, the BBC, the State Department, the communists, the ‘seedy liberals’, the ‘left-wing press’.¹²²

Since political developments in Rhodesia were taking place during the Cold War, Communism became the source of personification of evil and moral panic. The Rhodesian Front also enlisted

¹¹⁷ Amnesty International, 35.

¹¹⁸ Zimmerli, 297.

¹¹⁹ Henrick Ellert, “The Rhodesian Security and Intelligence Community 1960-1980: A Brief Overview of the Structure and Operational Role of the Military, Civilian, Police Security and Intelligence Organizations which Served the Rhodesian Government during the Zimbabwean Liberation War” in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe & Terence Ranger (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), 93.

¹²⁰ Ibid 91

¹²¹ Ian Martinez “The History of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Agents during Zimbabwe’s Liberation War of 1965-80 by Rhodesian Forces,” *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 6 (2002):1159. See also Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981* (John Murray, London, 1987).

¹²² Elaine Windrich, “Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State,” *African Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 313 (October 1979):526.

the services of right-wing South African propagandists to control the media.¹²³ The overarching objective was to create moral panic and “folk devils” in order to engineer social control. Hatred was preached against “folk devils”, for example African nationalists and liberal whites. Those who disagreed with the opinions of the government were labeled as quislings, traitors and renegades.¹²⁴ Opposition political parties and African nationalists were accused of being on the enemy’s payroll or were simply labelled terrorists. The measures meant to protect white rule went on to form the basis of a racialised binary narrative consisting of a positive portrayal of the collective self “we” and the negative representation and demonisation of the “other”. Thus any move towards challenging the system was said to be backed by “outside influences”¹²⁵ who sought to achieve their objectives “without a shot fired.”¹²⁶ For example, in the legislative assembly the Minister of Law and Order indicated to the settler parliament that:

Steps will be taken by our enemies to smear our name overseas and I foresee an outburst from Pan African countries...once more I would like to remind this house that this country is fighting a war on two fronts. One of these fronts is represented by the pressure and psychological warfare from abroad and the other is the internal campaign of subversion, destruction and sabotage, much of it is inspired and directed from beyond our borders.¹²⁷

Smith’s Rhodesian Front party also waged an attack on the media and serious ideological and propaganda war that were somewhat akin to the “Nazis during the declining years of the Weimar Republic.”¹²⁸ In other words the regime used the media to generate and maintain symbolical capital that was meant to paint a rosy picture about the status quo while vilifying the white liberal elements and the African nationalists. There was also systematic packing of the media houses with Rhodesian Front loyalists and apologists whose role was to create mythical enemies of the state.¹²⁹ Newspapers were banned while journalists were attacked left, right and centre so as to silence their voices, critical of the Rhodesian Front policies. For example the 1964 banning of the *Daily News*, a newspaper that had a wide readership given its appeal to Africans, was politically motivated. The paper dealt with issues that were relevant to African on a day-to-day basis. However the colonial state banned it based on a technicality or anomaly that was related to the status of its registration.¹³⁰ The banning was said to be done in the interests of national

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Wason, 57.

¹²⁵ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 6 August 1964, column 386.

¹²⁶ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 56, 2 April 1964, column 1594.

¹²⁷ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 26 August 1964, column 1270.

¹²⁸ Windrich, 525.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 529.

¹³⁰ See Motion to Ban the *Daily News*, *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 26 August 1964.

security because the paper was accused of being a mouthpiece of the nationalist movement.¹³¹ Interestingly, the newspaper was a major proponent of majority rule.

At one point it was even suggested that there should be a form of control such as a system of licences (accreditation) for individual journalists and editors.¹³² Such widely cherished ideals relating to press freedom and an independent press were constantly violated with impunity by the Smith regime. Journalists were routinely trailed by special branch officials and their offices and correspondences illegally opened and searched, and this state of affairs led to many of them leaving Rhodesia given that they could not freely carry out their duties without fear of harassment by the Rhodesian Front.¹³³ One aspect that should be noted out at this stage is how the post-independent Zimbabwe media industry is experiencing the same challenges as those of the colonial era. For example, a newspaper called the *Daily News* was banned in Zimbabwe in 2005 based on a technicality relating to its registration.

The banning of Nationalist parties by the colonial regime was meant to build a one-party political system in Southern Rhodesia.¹³⁴ Indeed the media censorship played a pivotal role in the making of a one-party state in Rhodesia. It is disheartening to note that the Rhodesian Front employed a two-pronged strategy to attack press freedom. The first strategy was to completely dominate the airwaves through complete control of both television and radio, while the second one was meant to intimidate and destroy the credibility of the independent press.¹³⁵ As a result wild allegations of “committing treason against Rhodesia” were levelled against a number of journalists from the independent press.¹³⁶ It soon became common practice for the Rhodesian Front to pack the “Letters to the Editor” columns with their contributions. Indeed a number of the letters containing “vicious attacks on the press or individuals opposed to the government” bore fictitious names and addresses.¹³⁷

Opposition to the political status quo was also viewed as the work of communists and like-minded white liberals amongst settler population. The white liberals critical of the Rhodesian Front were accused of allowing themselves “wittingly or unwittingly” to be used by

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Windrich, 524.

¹³³ Ibid., 533

¹³⁴ *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 57, 26 August 1964, column 1317.

¹³⁵ Windrich, 523.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 524.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 527.

communists.¹³⁸ It is worth noting that present day Zimbabwe had an acerbic column on Saturdays in the state-controlled Herald that was written by one George Charamba (Mugabe's spokesperson) under the pseudonym Nathaniel Manheru. The column and the letters to the editor were used by ZANU PF to lambast the opposition MDC and civil society, accusing the two as being used by imperialist powers. However George Charamba penned the last instalment of his column on 21 February 2009 following the conclusion of a government of national unity.¹³⁹

3.4.3 The Struggle for a Free Zimbabwe

In light of the fact that the RF was committed to violence to stop any form of African nationalism, the nationalists had no option but to go into exile following the banning of their respective organisations. It was during this period (beginning early 1970) that many Zimbabweans left Southern Rhodesia to get military training in friendly countries such as China and the former Soviet Union. However the real armed struggle /guerrilla war began in December 1972, given that clashes preceding this were predominantly negative clashes between African National Congress units and settler forces.¹⁴⁰ Both ZANU and ZAPU established military wings – Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwean African People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA).¹⁴¹ To prove that there was an ethnic dimension to the split in 1963, the two military wings mainly recruited their cadres based on ethnic grounds – ZAPU from Ndebeles and ZANLA from Shonas.¹⁴²

From the early seventies, ZANLA adopted Mao Zedong's strategy of mobilising and politicising the rural population before attacking the enemy.¹⁴³ Their earlier efforts to initiate war in the 1960s were a disaster given that "the guerrillas they had sent to infiltrate Rhodesia had been easily picked off, their organizations having been thoroughly penetrated by Rhodesian intelligence."¹⁴⁴ Mao Zedong was a Chinese military and political leader who led the Communist Party of China (CCP) to victory in the Chinese civil war and was the leader of the People's Republic of China from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976. In line with Mao's

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ See *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 21 February 2009.

¹⁴⁰ Personal email correspondence with Kenneth Good, 3 March 2009.

¹⁴¹ Herbert M. Howe, "The Rhodesian Conflict: 1966-79," in *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*, ed. K P. Magyar & C P. Danopoulos (Washington DC: USA Department of Defense, 1994), 197.

¹⁴² Ibid., 198.

¹⁴³ Jakkie Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia* (Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985), 12.

¹⁴⁴ Matthew Preston, "Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 1 (2004):69.

strategy ZANLA waged a battle to win the hearts and minds of the population by way of establishing grassroots structures that would help to make people understand why the war was being waged. ZANLA's new tactic was premised on "the classic guerrilla tactics of 'people's war', establishing first a basis of support among local people so as to effectively hide among them."¹⁴⁵ The politicisation and mobilisation project took place during night meetings called pungwes. Youths were recruited into the ZANLA structures as mujibha (male errand boy) and chimbwido (female errand girl) whose main role was to help organise meetings, among other tasks. They were in a sense militia of the ZANLA combatants and they had a policing function (eyes and ears of the struggle), although some respected ones used to carry some weapons like grenades.¹⁴⁶

Accordingly, the new strategy also brought in symbolic power and even hard power given that there was a felt need to carry on with the struggle. Combatants and their assistants therefore wielded power by virtue of being at the forefront of the struggle and in the name of the struggle for independence. For example Reynolds gave the following war-time account from a Binga schoolboy:

As time dragged on, the guerrillas increased in number; more and more of them were young and not fully experienced, undisciplined in manner. Their attitude towards civilians was abominable. Now they could not do as they used to do in the early days, and act with restraint. They turned Mr Mudimba's home into a centre for their enjoyment and corruption. This was when I truly saw corruption. The guerrillas could come to Mr Mudimba's home in their numbers and order goats, chickens or an ox to be slaughtered. More than this, they sent for girls to prepare their meals; at night these girls turned into their wives. The elders knew this; they hated the whole concept but they were powerless to do anything to correct the situation. But now, remember, above all the guerrillas had put civilians in a very precarious position. It was obvious that they could not keep the Rhodesian forces from knowing about this; it would leak somehow.¹⁴⁷

The process of politicising and mobilising the masses was another struggle within the struggle given that the other struggle was between the two liberation movements. Accordingly, there was also systematic use of intimidation, force and violence by ZANLA guerrillas against the people because the underlying philosophy was that 'in every guerrilla war there is a need to demonstrate power.'¹⁴⁸ Similarly one ZIPRA ex-combatant maintains that "One of the most common methods was killing traditional leaders and suspected 'sell-outs'. Those chiefs, headmen and

¹⁴⁵ Lionel Cliffe, Joshua Mpfu and Barry Munslow, "Nationalist Politics in Zimbabwe: The 1980 Elections and Beyond," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 18 (May -August 1980):49.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁴⁷ Pamela Reynolds, "Children of Tribulation: The Need to Heal and the Means to Heal War Trauma," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. 60, no. 1 (1990):24.

¹⁴⁸ Preston,71.

village heads who survived, quickly severed their links to the Rhodesian district administration and stopped going to the district commissioner's office to collect their monthly allowances."¹⁴⁹

In Nyanga district in the Eastern Highlands, the guerrillas replaced the prevailing political structure by killing colonially imposed headmen and kraal heads.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, Ranger argues that chiefs were caught between security forces and guerillas – “The death rate was high: during the war chiefs Chipunza and Chikore were killed; so also were headmen Maparura, Makumbe, Rugoyi, Chikunguru, Ngirazi, Changadzo, Masvosva, Rukweza, Nyangombe, and acting headman Gandanzara.”¹⁵¹ According to a 1982 statistical report compiled by the Ministry of Local government, 10% of all national chiefs and headmen were killed in the war of liberation.¹⁵² Clearly, though Ranger and the aforementioned report do not give exact figures at a national level, one can decipher the probability of very high figures at that level. The politicisation and mobilisation of the masses was another struggle within a struggle because “Locals who were hostile to the ‘traditional leaders’ took advantage of the security situation to label them informers and draw a response from the guerrillas.”¹⁵³ In other words the war also provided a way for locals to settle personal scores against each other or with their traditional leaders. Many locals knew that there would be either no or little investigation before action was taken by the guerrillas.

Songs were also composed warning people not to betray the struggle because “comrades slit throats”¹⁵⁴ and they would burn the bodies of “traitors” whilst everyone was watching. The masses ended up in a quandary whereby they had to choose between the two warring parties but having to grapple with the associated negative consequences of either decision. This was because the Rhodesia Front government forces also went on a rampage killing (or arresting) people who did not report the presence of guerrillas within a specified period of time or those working alongside them. These aspects were contained in subsequent amendments to the Law

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. See also Tony Kirk, “Politics and Violence in Rhodesia,” *African Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 294 (January 1975):3-38.

¹⁵⁰ David J. Maxwell “Local Politics and the War of Liberation in North-East Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 19, no. 3 (September 1993):365.

¹⁵¹ Terence Ranger, “Tradition and Travesty: Chiefs and the Administration in Makoni District, Zimbabwe, 1960-1980,” *Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. 52, no. 3 (1982):36.

¹⁵² See footnote 52 in Andrew Ladley “Changing the Courts in Zimbabwe: The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act,” *Journal of African Law*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Autumn 1982):101.

¹⁵³ Norma Kriger, “The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles within the Struggle,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 14, no. 2 (January 1988):318.

¹⁵⁴ Joseph P. Mutisi, “The Liberation War, Independence, and Disillusionment: Aspects of the Plantation Labour Relations with Special Reference to Jersey Tea Estate in Chipinge District since the Mid 1970s,” in *The Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe*, Vol. 1: *Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights*, ed. Terence Ranger (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2003), 137.

and Order Maintenance Act. As a result many people lost their lives given that the Rhodesian security forces would beat and torture people to extract information¹⁵⁵ while the comrades would also act likewise to those who “sell out.” A number of people “were killed for breaking curfew and for ‘running with’ the ‘terrorists’.”¹⁵⁶ In an interview account one former soldier indicated that:

I left home after I had seen the terrible killing of the people by the regime. People were shot dead in public places, in front of their children and wives. A certain man who lived near us was shot dead at a beer gathering. His dead body was then carried uncovered on the back of a pick-up. The dead man’s mother and wife were shown the corpse, and it was taken to the police station. It was then put on a table outside the police yard for some days. This touched me so much that I left straightaway to cross the Botswana border.¹⁵⁷

Notwithstanding the aforementioned accounts, the vicious violence of the colonial government to suppress guerrilla movements and the one used by liberation movements cannot be put on the same moral scale. Indeed atrocities were committed by the liberation movement but these were in a way excesses and spillover effects found within the context of waging an undisputed just war on the part of the nationalists.

However there is a tendency to overstate the position that the war of liberation was a predominantly coercive affair pitting the guerrillas and the Rhodesian soldiers on the one hand and the peasants on the other. It is in light of the above objective reality that Robins in a review of Norma J. Kriger’s *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* concurs that there is “a legacy of coercive guerrilla peasant relation forged during the war”¹⁵⁸ However Robins cogently argues that Kriger’s account ended up as an “over zealous and excessive concentration on guerrilla coercion and violence.”¹⁵⁹ This thesis adopts the position that there was indeed coercion and authoritarianism during the war but it is incorrect to state that there was lack of support for the guerrillas, and that explained the use of coercion and violence. In the final analysis there is a need to recognise “the variety and complexity of the responses of rural African during the war.”¹⁶⁰ Thus as indicated in the excerpt from footnote 158, people responded to terror tactics of the colonial government by willingly participating in the war of liberation in various capacities as opposed to doing so under duress as some scholars seem to suggest.

¹⁵⁵ Kriger, 31.

¹⁵⁶ Reynolds, 2.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵⁸ S. Robins, “Heroes, Heretics and Historians of the Zimbabwe Revolution: a Review Article of Norma Kriger’s ‘Peasant Voices’,” *Zambezia*, vol. XXIII, no. 1 (1996):79.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 79

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 77.

As the war raged on, so did the infighting within the movement that had started in the early sixties. In November 1974, there was the Nhari rebellion which was violently repressed by the then Defence Chief, Josiah Tongogara, within ZANU. The Nhari mutiny was a result of young and educated guerrillas' grievances against the ZANU High Command that was accused of corruption, tribalism, and abuse of freedom fighter girls, among other vices. Shortly after the Nhari incident, anyone who opposed his commander could be executed.¹⁶¹ In fact repression within ZANLA was not random or capricious but was agreed upon by the military cum political leadership.¹⁶² It is speculated that the Nhari rebellion later had serious consequences as it culminated in the assassination of High Command chairperson, Herbert Chitepo.¹⁶³ A commission of inquiry into Chitepos' death concluded that he was murdered by his fellow Karanga tribesmen in ZANU, and another nationalist Chikerema also "blamed the internecine warfare among members of ZANU."¹⁶⁴ What should however be noted is that the regimes of truth surrounding the assassination of Chitepo are much contested. In sum, during the liberation struggle power-based internecine rivalry was the norm. Power struggles amongst the Shona sub-ethnic groups led to assassinations, massacres and imprisonment of ZANU party members.¹⁶⁵ Interestingly, however, internecine rivalry was said to be less pronounced and frequent in Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU,¹⁶⁶ perhaps due to the limited number of ethnic subgroups.

The fact that the old guard or the founding fathers of the liberation war were not tolerant to divergent views was also witnessed and buttressed when the Zimbabwe's People's army (ZIPA) or Vashandi was formed in 1975. According to David Moore "The ZIPA soldiers were on the receiving end of the old guard's authoritarianism and they were accused of trying to take over the leadership of the war and the nationalist movement."¹⁶⁷ ZIPA cadres were subject to torture by their fellow comrades and the brains behind the Wampoa College of Ideology "were beaten and told not to continue."¹⁶⁸ All these incidents attest to a long history of repression within ZANU ranks.

Finally the short-lived internal settlement between Smith, Muzorewa and Sithole is another

¹⁶¹ Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 44.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Cilliers, 22.

¹⁶⁴ Wason, 56.

¹⁶⁵ Elizabeth Fink, "Ethnic Scale and Intensity: the Zimbabwean Experience," *Social Forces*, vol. 59, no. 3 (1981):617.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with David Moore, 22 August 2007, Durban, South Africa.

¹⁶⁸ David B. Moore, "Democracy, Violence, and Identity in the Zimbabwean War of National Liberation: Reflections from the Realms of Dissent," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 29, no. 3. (1995):391.

historical period that deserves attention given that it signals the institutionalisation of private armies or militias in Zimbabwe's political history. Given that during internal settlement the security situation remained overly precarious, a decision was made by the government to recruit young supporters of Muzorewa and Sithole into an auxiliary force. Despite being initially meant to be an apolitical force, the militia effectively degenerated into private armies of Muzorewa and Sithole.¹⁶⁹ Though Muzorewa's militia were later implicated in the killing of Sithole's forces, as auxiliaries they both "added one more structure of repression to the lot of the peasants. Recruited mainly from unemployed youth, often far away in towns, they only related to the people of the Tribal Trust Lands in a bullying, commandist way."¹⁷⁰ The two clerics failed to stop the war, which actually escalated during the internal settlement culminating in the Lancaster House constitutional conference. Similar developments took place in present day Zimbabwe, where ZANU PF recruited militiamen under the guise of the national youth service: this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. After the conference, transitional mechanisms were put in place that led to elections and independence under the leadership of ZANU (PF)'s Robert Mugabe.

3.4.4 Aftermath of the War and the Road to Zimbabwe

From the above account it can be concluded that there has been a long history of violence and repression on the part of both the colonialists and the nationalists, starting with the colonial conquest in 1890 till 1980. Violence was engrained and institutionalised as a way to enforce compliance be it among the nationalists themselves or the settlers against the nationalists and the masses. Violence became the norm, a way of life or a culture of some sort that was oriented towards the maximisation of material and symbolic capital. This *ipso facto* means that both the nationalists and the colonialists were cultural producers of both symbolic and hard power. Did the lowering of the Union Jack entailed continuity or discontinuity in the way state-society relations were organised in all former British colonies? The answer to that question is that there was some continuity in some important respects while there was also some discontinuity in other important respects. Young cogently asserts that "racial supremacy over the African subject which permeated the colonial system was removed, but the vocation of domination remained."¹⁷¹ Indeed, the new African rulers who took over the reins of power from the colonialists ruled with

¹⁶⁹ Preston, 74.

¹⁷⁰ Cliffe, Mpofo & Munslow, 47.

¹⁷¹ Young, "Colonial State Revisited," 108.

an aura of “an unspoken entitlement to command.”¹⁷² Commenting on the reproduction of British state legacy, Crowder forcefully argues that:

the colonial rulers set the example of dealing with its opponents by jailing or exiling them, as not a few of those who eventually inherited power knew from personal experience. Indeed if the colonial state provided a model for its inheritors it was that government rested not on consent but force.¹⁷³

With the advent of independence, the new Zimbabwe government granted amnesty to the Rhodesian security forces, but it did not have a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As a matter of fact, many of them were retained in similar positions of authority. Zimbabwe inherited the repressive apparatus of the Rhodesian state: emergency laws, intelligence personnel, specialised military units and counter-insurgency tactics within which human rights violations took place during the war.¹⁷⁴ Accordingly, “The consequences were clear and predictable: first, respect of the rule of law was weakened and the security forces continued to operate within a culture which saw human rights violations as part of an acceptable method of working; and secondly, specific methods of human rights abuses were passed on from the Rhodesian to the Zimbabwean forces, often practised by the very same individuals.”¹⁷⁵ The point is that amnesty did not ‘cause’ the continuation of abuses per se, rather “it did provide the environment, and the means, for new human rights violations”¹⁷⁶ in post-independent Zimbabwe. So in a sense there was the normalising of the abnormal given that the culture of abuse (of power) and impunity was engendered in the securocrats and this had serious implications in the direction Zimbabwe took after independence.

Finally a checklist of institutions, routines, practices and mentalities of the war time period that are found in contemporary Zimbabwe includes: villains claiming to be victims, use of private armies or militia to terrorise people, abuse of power by former combatants, use of propaganda by ZANU PF, silencing dissent through force and legislation (many of these laws were promulgated during the colonial era), and forcing opposition supporters to defect to the ruling party. Furthermore the chiefs are under the service of the ruling party, opposition supporters’ houses are petrol-bombed and newspapers are banned. There is also hostility to civil society (especially trade unions), use of

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Michael Crowder, “Whose Dream Was It Anyway? Twenty-Five Years of African Independence,” *African Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 342 (January 1987):13.

¹⁷⁴ Richard Carver, “Zimbabwe: Drawing a Line through the Past,” *Journal of African Law*, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring, 1993):79

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 73.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 79.

inflammatory language and hate speech to intimidate opponents, extorting money and food from people as well as abusing women during resuscitated *pungwes* especially during a run-up to an election. From Chapter 4 onwards it will become evident how the colonial authoritarian architecture replicated itself in contemporary Zimbabwe.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the colonial antecedents within which the study of state democracy in Zimbabwe and the associated limitation of civil society in democratic consolidation can be situated. Insights were drawn from inter-related theories of path dependency and post-coloniality in order to have an understanding of the reasons behind Zimbabwe's continued degeneration into an undemocratic political order. Indeed, the ruling elite can be said to be worse than the settler colonialists they replaced because they failed dismally to ensure that democratic practice took root in post-independent Zimbabwe. Consequently it can safely be concluded that there was no transition to democracy *per se*, rather there was a mere transition to majority rule without any meaningful progress towards participatory democracy. The chapter gave an overview of Zimbabwe's colonial conquest, the vast armoury of repressive legislation used by the minority settler state to detain, restrict and imprison nationalists and the masses. Reference was also made to the inherently undemocratic way of mobilising the masses, resolving conflicts within the liberation movement, and intolerance of divergent views culminating in bloody violence and splits within the nationalist movement. Though the violence committed by the two parties cannot be put on the same moral plane, what emerged from the study is that there has been a culture of using violence to achieve goals on the part of both the nationalists and the settler government. Symbolic and other forms of capital power were acquired and maintained through the use of violence. Thus current authoritarian practices are a result of the arbitrary use of symbolic capital acquired during the colonial era and liberation war. Upon independence there was a wholesale inheritance of the repressive colonial structure. In essence the repressive nature of post-independent Zimbabwe is a result of a past that was violent, repressive and brutal. Both the nationalists and the settler state created essentially an authoritarian template, and the failure of the post-independent transformation project (which was never attempted anyway for narrowly defined security reasons) predisposed the new creation to an authoritarian path by way of a contagion effect.

CHAPTER FOUR

Violence and a Hegemonic Political Order

The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.¹

¹ Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 4.

4.1 Introduction

Post-independence politics of many African countries generally revolve around the yawning gap between expectations and reality vis-à-vis state society relations. Certainly, wars of liberation were fought in order to gain access to land, jobs and other material advantages as well as general freedom from colonialism. Therefore Amilcar Cabral is correct when he cogently argues that “National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, the construction of peace, progress and independence are nothing but hollow words devoid of any significance unless they can be translated into a real improvement of living conditions.”² However, due to various factors, not all the post-independence expectations were met in social, political and economic realms to epitomise independence. In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated how ZANU and ZAPU used violence against each other as they competed for political supremacy and legitimacy to lead the nationalist movement. The infighting within the liberation movement became a struggle within a struggle as was witnessed during the bloody 1963 ZAPU and ZANU split. What should be pointed out from the onset is the fact that, in terms of the ZAPU and ZANU conflict, the balance of power was tilted initially in favour of ZAPU. It was for that reason that a number of ZANU supporters were forced to defect to ZAPU in order to save their lives. After independence, ZANU PF possibly sought revenge for what ZAPU did to its supporters in 1963 during the bloody township rivalries. Thus the historical relationship between ZAPU and ZANU during the war of liberation “formed the basis of the ZANU-PF’s policy and attitude towards political opposition.”³ As suggested earlier on, ZANU PF used terror to consolidate its power base and to nip in the bud any potential political opposition’s ability to challenge and change the status quo. Violence and collective memory associated with the liberation war, interwoven with colonially inherited repressive structures, acted in concert to make a unique hegemonic socio-economic and political order in post-independent Zimbabwe.

Symbolic violence and collective memory worked very well to win the support of the Zimbabwean rural constituencies and in drumming up regional and international support for ZANU PF’s anti-imperialist project. The anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, nationalist and pro-social justice rhetoric churned out by ZANU PF resonates very well with many African leaders and

² Amilcar Cabral cited in footnote 60, Patrick Chabal, “National Liberation in Portuguese Guinea, 1956-1974,” *African Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 318 (January 1981):88.

³ Anna Tibaijuka, *Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe* (United Nations, 2005):15.

peasants. Thus Chiadzwa argues that “ZANU PF is basically a rural party, many of its domination tactics work wonders especially in the rural areas which were the battle ground of the protracted war of liberation.”⁴ On the other hand ZANU PF uses brute force and intimidation as the major instruments to cow the urban population into submission.⁵ However, notwithstanding the manipulation of the nationalist historiography and the provision of inducements to the rural constituencies, the ruling elite also resort to the use of brute force and intimidation in cases where the former fails to achieve the intended objectives.

This chapter is organised in a semi-chronological fashion, starting from independence in 1980 to 2008 with a view to indicating patterns in domination and coercive practices associated with the ZANU PF and how these changed over the years in response to the internal dynamics of the political environment. It consists of two broad sections and their respective subsections. The first section discusses collective memory and the construction of political discourses and identities within the context of ZANU PF’s attempts to destroy political alternatives when it sought to eliminate ZAPU. In the same section political developments that followed the Unity Accord (between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU), particularly the formation of ZUM, are also discussed. The second broad section examines the changes in state-society relations that followed the emergence of the opposition MDC and contemporary evidence of the manipulation of collective memory. The chapter ends with an interim assessment of the state’s hegemonic project. However, this chapter proceeds with a caveat that it is difficult to separate themes into neat categories, so the discussion and relevance of an issue under more than one heading is not only unavoidable but necessary.

4.2 Collective Memory and the Construction of Political Discourses

The symbolic dimension of state power is closely associated with collective memory relating to particular societal events. Accordingly, the architecture of societal domination is often legitimately and correctly understood within the context of lopsided power relations associated with the interpretation and abuse of collective memory by the ruling elite. A domination project that is anchored on collective memory uses symbolism to legitimate and drum up support for a particular political dispensation. More often than not, memory is invoked by the elite in

⁴ Interview with Godfrey Chiadzwa, 11 September 2007, Johannesburg.

⁵ See “Zanu PF Accused of Tribalism,” *Daily News* (Harare) 14 October 2002. President Mugabe is on record demonising the urbanites for supporting the opposition and its civil society allies and pejoratively calling them “undisciplined, totem-less elements of alien origin”.

contemporary power struggles to elicit political support.⁶ Collective memory is always selective and shaped by the socio-political needs of those in power. In other words, memory is a past narrative adapted to the peculiar needs of the present that acts as a source of symbolic capital and political legitimacy. Markovits and Reich observe that “Akin to myth, only tangentially related to the empirical truth, collective memory plays a key role in the symbolic discourse of politics, in the legitimation of political structures and action and in the justification of collective behaviour.”⁷ In essence the act of remembering the past is a tool that is used by the ruling elite to pursue narrowly defined and selective interests with a view to constructing, deconstructing and justifying a particular societal order. In the final analysis group memory conjoined with Gramscian cultural hegemony makes scholars aware of how historiography can promote or undermine certain social-political actors in a particular society.

In other words in the process of constructing a hegemonic order, the

recurring theme here is that the past is constructed and that a particular version of it is imposed by one group in order to maintain the existing order and legitimize its rule over other, less powerful groups. It is often implicitly suggested that a memory can be created almost out of nothing and that the population can relatively easily be coerced or misled into making it its own and thus into acquiescing to power. The past is thus intentionally manipulated by elites: memories are myths qua false consciousness.⁸

From the above standpoint the politics governing collective memory as well as the construction (sometimes deconstruction) of a society is a cultural struggle pitting the elite and the marginalised over the imposition of a certain version of the national past.⁹ Therefore, history is a very powerful socially constructed instrument of exercising power that is at the disposal of the ruling class. As such, authority represented and reinforced through group memory informs knowledge and discourses that are central to social engineering. As a result one cannot “understand how collective memories gain currency or, *a contrario*, slip into oblivion, without understanding the dynamics of power within the societies in which they circulate.”¹⁰ Victors in certain power struggles win the battle of ideas and history over and above the political one.

⁶ Jenny Edkins, “The Rush to Memory and the Rhetoric of War,” *Journal of Military and Political Sociology*, vol. 31, no. 2 (Winter 2003):246.

⁷ Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1997), 14-15.

⁸ Vincent Druliolle, “Discourses of Constitutionalism in Spain Democracy Captured by Its Imaginary: the Transition as Memory and Discourses of Constitutionalism in Spain,” *Social Legal Studies*, vol. VI, 17, no. 1 (2008):78.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Aimee Boutin, Alec G. Hargreaves, Reinier Leushuis, & Lori J. Walters, “Introduction,” *Journal of European Studies*, vol. 35, no. 1 (March 2005):5-9.

For example the massacre of thousands of Aragonese people by the rebel rearguard during and after the Spanish civil war was “silenced throughout four decades of dictatorship and during the transition to democracy.”¹¹ As a result emergent Spanish scholars and civil society are currently working on numerous research projects that seek to break the silence in relation to the country’s dark political past under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Furthermore Zapatero’s socialist government today argues that assorted emblems of Franco’s regime have no place in modern Spain. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, Spain “is on a controversial mission to expunge the many emblems of its painful past that are still on public display.”¹² Spain is a former right-wing authoritarian state where symbols of the previous political order are still surviving, while Nazi symbols are illegal in Germany. In fact denying the holocaust is an offence in both Germany and Austria. Although no statues of Mussolini are still on display in Italy¹³, fascism lives on in the country’s politics. All these examples attest to the controversial and polemical nature of struggles over memory and forgetting in contemporary politics.

Similarly, with respect to Germany, Hitler also manipulated group memory but things only began to change after the country was defeated in World War two. Thus both Hitler and Franco sought to rewrite history to celebrate their victories and obliterate the defeated socialists and democrats. In contemporary Germany, the struggle over history, memory, meaning and justice is even more pronounced and it takes both generational and class forms. There is a generation of educated younger men and women who are deeply ashamed of the acceptance of Nazism by their parents. This group can be called anti-Germany Germans. From Fulbrook’s 1999 account, the guilt relating to Nazism is widely shared among older Germans who knew of “people being shipped on overcrowded trains to the east” but never questioned why the trains came back empty.¹⁴ It is an objective reality that many Germans knew what the euphemism “final solution” meant.¹⁵ As result, children of perpetrators (broadly defined as those people who participated in mass murder) are deeply ashamed of their parents’ role in activities of the past.¹⁶ The most extreme expression of this anger and shame was the Red Army Faction or the Baader Meinhof Group, who bombed and killed leading capitalists in the 1960s.¹⁷ It is against this background that Fuchs

¹¹ Ángela Cenarro, “Memory Beyond the Public Sphere: The Francoist Repression Remembered in Aragon,” *History & Memory*, vol. 14, issue 1/2 (Fall 2002):166.

¹² Thomas Catan, “Generalísimo Francisco Franco is Still Dead – and his Statues are Next,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 March 2009.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Mary Fulbrook, *Germany National Identity after the Holocaust*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 67.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 153-154.

¹⁷ See Kate Connolly, “Terrorist Chic or Debunking of a Myth?” *The Guardian* (London) 25 September 2008 and Neal Ascherson, “A Terror Campaign of Love and Hate,” *The Guardian* (London) 28 September 2008.

suggests that the idea of memory contest is a more productive approach in studying Germany's public memory debates or the legacy of the Nazi past.¹⁸ Accordingly, Fuchs succinctly argues that:

the notion of memory contests recasts this as an open-ended process through which the post-war generations negotiate alternative versions of identity. Memory contests involve retrospective imaginings that simultaneously articulate, question and investigate the normative self-image of previous generations. Or, to put it another way, memory contests edit and advance competing narratives of identity with reference to an historical event perceived as a massive disturbance of a group's self-image. A memory contest is a form of intergenerational interaction which is neither entirely controlled by conscious motives nor governed by the latency of trauma. The idea of memory contests allows us to account both for the return of the repressed and to acknowledge the achievements of the pedagogy of remembering. Memory contests can of course take place between the members of the same generation; they seem, however, to gain momentum and force through the succession of generations.¹⁹

In colonial Zimbabwe the Rhodesian Front also manipulated history and other aspects of chieftaincy traditions as a means of exerting political control. Settler colonialism sought to deny the evidence that the Great Zimbabwe ruins "were of Bantu origin and medieval date" and not of Biblical origins.²⁰ The whole propaganda scheme was meant to paint a gloomy picture of a Zimbabwean history devoid of any remarkable record of achievement so as to justify an essentialist idea that Great Zimbabwe was non-Bantu. As a result, the settler government was hostile to archaeologists who ignored the "fact" that whites "knew the natives and consequently 'knew' they could not have built Great Zimbabwe."²¹ The overarching objective was to claim that settler colonialism brought civilisation and development to Zimbabwe. Similarly, Ranger (1983) examines the ideological use of tradition by the Rhodesian Front in the administration of Makoni District of Zimbabwe. The colonial administration appealed to the pre-colonial past as they imagined and understood it.²² Smith's government knew perfectly well that chiefs possess traditional legitimacy but the two parties' understanding and use of tradition and history was miles apart. Chiefs understood tradition as practical strategies to enhance their own power, not as a fixed set of limitations to power or political control – a position or understanding held by the settler government.²³ In the process of seeking to reinvent or revive tradition, chiefs,

¹⁸ Anne Fuchs, "From 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' to Generational Memory Contests in Günter Grass, Monika Maron and Uwe Timm," *German Life and Letters*, vol. 59, no. 2 (April 2006):179.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Peter S Garlake "Prehistory and Ideology in Zimbabwe," in *Past and Present in Zimbabwe*, ed. J.D.Y Peel and Terence Ranger (Manchester: Manchester University press, 1983):2

²¹ Ibid., 4.

²² Terence Ranger, "Tradition and Travesty: Chiefs and the Administration in Makoni District, Zimbabwe, 1960-1980," *Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. 52, no. 3 (1982):21.

²³ Ibid., 24.

nationalists and the colonial administration brought the past into the present as a way to legitimise the status quo but the results were costly for the chiefs as many lost their lives as the liberation war intensified in the late 1970s.

Clearly, what ZANU PF has done also has precedence in colonial Zimbabwe, Germany, Spain, Kenya and South Africa, where actors who had won certain power struggles politically and ideologically, sought to re-write history to this end. Mugabe once said “I am still the Hitler of the time. This Hitler has only one objective, justice for his own people, sovereignty for his people, recognition of the independence of his people, and their right to their resources. If that is Hitler, then let me be a Hitler tenfold. Ten times, that is what we stand for.”²⁴ However with the fall of an *ancien régime*, significant changes can be witnessed in relation to a country’s historiography as currently being witnessed in Zapatero’s Spain. Indeed, it is then imperative to underscore the fact that opposition to ruling elite barbarism and their attempts to erase people’s history is not a futile exercise. Indeed in all the cases cited, it is evident that ideological domination will always remain in a state of flux. Thus, ideological domination will remain a work-in-progress because once there is change in political leadership, history is rewritten. Certainly, previously silenced history will eventually reappear as a result of concerted efforts by civil society and scholars to come to terms with a society’s dark past so as to avoid a repeat of similar events in future.

Nearer home in South Africa, there was a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in Zimbabwe the Gukurahundi has one report while Murambatsvina already has three to four very solid records. The truth of Gukurahundi began to be exposed by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and was slowly taken further in the media. Peter Godwin’s *Mukiva: A White Boy in Africa* and Yvonne Vera’s *The Stone Virgins* also look at the issue of the Matebeleland genocide. Thus, though speaking truth to power or “telling it like it is” is difficult, takes time and demands sacrifice; it is not a distant reality. The point is that “telling it like it is” is possible and is under way, for example Liberia’s Charles Taylor is being tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for committing crimes against humanity. It might also be a question of time before Mugabe and or his cronies appear before the ICC in The Hague for similar charges of crimes against humanity. Indeed, it is this fear of prosecution that might explain why Mugabe and his ZANU PF party are reluctant to relinquish power. From the foregoing, it can safely be concluded that the twin concepts of collective memory and memory contests can serve as heuristic devices for the study of political and social discourses.

²⁴ Peta Thornycroft, “Hitler Mugabe Launches Revenge Terror Attacks,” *The Telegraph* (London) 26 March 2003.

4.3 Transition from a Liberation Movement to a Government

In *The Wretched of the Earth* Frantz Fanon gives a prophetic account of the pitfalls of post-independent African state-society relations. Fanon's ideas about the possible abuse of power by post-independent governments remain relevant in many countries despite having been written almost half a century ago.²⁵ According to Fanon, mass mobilisation when it arises out of a war of liberation evokes ideas of common cause and collective history.²⁶ Each time the post-colonial leadership reminds the masses of the struggle they led in the name of the people for the people, thereby "intimating clearly to the masses that they ought to go on putting confidence in them."²⁷ The history of independence is reassessed, and so is the sanctity of the struggle for liberation. Failure to comply with the dictates of the ruling party leads to serious consequences given that the army and the police constitute the central pillars of the newly established regime. The idea is to ensure that governance issues remain the prerogative of the ruling elite whilst the idea behind the control of the masses is "to remind them constantly that the government expects from them obedience and discipline."²⁸

Furthermore nascent opposition groups are silenced and suppressed before being condemned into a clandestine existence while the opposition candidates' houses are set on fire.²⁹ There is a carefully orchestrated move by the ruling party to cow the opposition into submission whilst at the same time conferring upon itself a dominant party status whether by hook or by crook. The party discourages the expression of divergent ideas and, "instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the people up to the government, forms a screen and forbids such ideas."³⁰ Tribalism usually rears its ugly head as the self-proclaimed national party covertly or overtly "organises an authentic ethnic dictatorship or tribal dictatorship."³¹ Fanon's political prophesy is revealing in the sense that he foresaw the development of an oligarchy which was premised on neopatrimonialism and attendant patron-client relations. Notwithstanding the practical reliance on both soft and hard power by post-independent governments, the limitation of Fanon's oeuvre is that it tends to put more emphasis on state coercion as opposed to recognising the other subtle forms of power.

²⁵ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1966).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 136.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 146-147.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 147.

With respect to post-independent Zimbabwe, a number of interviewees alluded to the structural problems that are associated with many armed struggle movements once they get into power. According to Rupiya there is a tendency within former liberation movements to gravitate towards centralisation of power. Thus he argues that,

Post liberation politics has one clear constraint relating to the transformation of a liberation movement into a national institution. Given that the Zimbabwean liberation armed forces were predominantly recruited based on ethnicity, at independence the challenge was for an ethnic faction to have a national character. With respect to Zimbabwe, none of them managed to do that – ZAPU, ZIPRA and FROLIZI all failed to make that transition. Once you fail to do that, by implication you then threaten the other faction or group that is not part of the “national” group. That is why we saw the civil war in Matabeleland in 1983.³²

Commenting on post-liberation war politics as they relate to Zimbabwe in general and ZANU PF in particular, Makumbe asserts that:

The Mugabe regime has not democratised itself. ZANU PF has failed to make the transition from a militant and militaristic liberation movement to a democratic political party. It has failed that transition, so the style of management, its style of governance is fashioned along the socialist authoritarian system, which is largely commandist and does not tolerate both internal and external criticism. Dissension is also viewed as anathema. Civic formations must accept that ZANU PF liberated the country from colonial domination and therefore ZANU PF is not only invincible but also infallible.³³

Similarly, Matibenga observes that:

ZANU PF never turned itself into an administration, it continues to behave like a liberation movement, it never transformed. Being a liberation movement means you still continue with your tactics of cowing and beating people into submission. My summary is that when we got independence we relaxed. We used to sing songs like “*Mukoma wanyu, mukoma wanyu wabve Moza. Mukoma wanyu, tongai zvakose*.” [The liberation fighter has come back home from the bush (Mozambique). The liberation fighter must rule for ever.] Those songs were very symbolic and they had a very deep meaning and now they are ruling for ever with an iron fist, we are crying. We didn’t create a culture of checks and balances. We are the ones that created the kind of leadership we now have. We got the kind of leadership we deserved because of our complacency.³⁴

Simon Mudekwa, an exiled political activist and founding member of the Zimbabwe

³² Interview with Dr Martin Rupiya, 3 October 2007, Grahamstown.

³³ Interview with Professor John Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

³⁴ Interview with Lucia Matibenga, 19 December 2007, Harare.

Revolutionary Youth Movement based in Johannesburg, lamented that:

There was a big mistake after independence, the masses allowed Robert Mugabe to cultivate a culture of believing that he is the one who should rule as the first secretary and president of ZANU PF. That is the reason why shortly after independence he proposed a one party state in Zimbabwe. They call themselves revolutionaries who participated in the liberation struggle and therefore must rule forever.³⁵

From the excerpts of the interviews conducted in 2007, it can be observed that there are formidable problems associated with the process of decolonisation. On part of the population, they will not have any reasons to distrust their new leaders although the latter tend to take advantage of this culture of trust. While at the same time it is not an easy task to make a decision to chart a specific political path, especially one leading towards an inclusive government. This is so primarily because of the high level of mistrust that is usually prevalent in the early stages of the post-independent period, especially in an ethnically divided society. Coming from a background of a protracted war of liberation, it is realistic and natural to jealously guard the new creation primarily because a cloud of uncertainty would be hovering around it.

4.4 Nascent Stages of the Establishment of a Hegemonic Order in Zimbabwe

To reiterate, the hypothesis of this chapter is that the manipulation of national collective memory relating to the participation of ZANU PF in the war of liberation and the attendant liberation war credentials exhibited by the former freedom fighters plays a critical role in delegitimising any political opposition. Coupled with colonially inherited repressive machinery and use of organised violence, this informs the structural and conjunctural aspects of the Zimbabwe crisis. In post-independence Zimbabwe, the sustained terror campaign against the Ndebele people was a way of dealing with a competing centre of power that would dare oppose ZANU PF.

According to Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, violence powerfully shaped history and the memory of the past in Matabeleland.³⁶ However this thesis argues that contrary to their conclusion, violence did not shape the history and the memory of the past in Matabeleland only but instead shaped the overall nature and conduct of Zimbabwe's public sphere. Indeed, there is a very close relationship between collective memory and identity formation. As a result, the construction of collective memory is a political process that privileges some narratives of the past

³⁵ Interview Simon Mudekwa, 12 September 2007, Johannesburg.

³⁶ Jocelyn Alexander, Joann McGregor and Terence Ranger, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2000):1.

while omitting or marginalising others in the process. According to Werbner, the myth of the political origin of a nation-state in Africa and other former colonies elsewhere comes from fighting colonialism.³⁷ Consequently the post-colonial leadership “explicitly build their legitimacy on their nationalist and liberation war credentials.”³⁸ As such, the post-colonial public sphere in Zimbabwe logically becomes an arena for contested identities at the national level. This is so primarily because ZANU PF sought to monopolise and appropriate the nationalist historiography for its supremacist political agenda. As it stands, the commemoration of the birth of nation-state through the barrel of a gun suggests why violence is an endemic feature of Zimbabwe’s politics.

Furthermore in post-independent Zimbabwe, it is of utmost importance to locate the role of quasi-nationalism in shaping the country’s contemporary political discourses. Protagonists of quasi-nationalism use violence against the marginalised antagonists in the public sphere who are brutalised for the simple reason that they are perceived as stumbling blocks in the creation of a nation under one charismatic leader and political party.³⁹ The brutalised “other” is demonised for allegedly working in cahoots with foreign or other negative forces in seeking to erode the gains of hard-won independence. In the case of Zimbabwe, “dissidents” from ZIPRA, “imperial dogs” from ZUM and MDC stooges were said to be colluding with foreign enemies⁴⁰ to effect a regime change in Zimbabwe. Indeed, ZANU PF’s quasi-nationalist campaign of terror⁴¹ targeting any form of political opposition in general and “ZIPRA dissidents” in the 1980s, and contemporarily the MDC in particular, attests the extent to which political opposition is viewed as anathema. Thus Alexander, McGregor and Ranger correctly situate post-colonial conflict in political rivalry,

in the ZANU PF government’s desire to efface ZAPU as a significant political counterweight, and in the securities of the first years of independence in which a legitimate and ‘majoritarian’ ZANU PF government sought to consolidate its power. Violence in post colonial Zimbabwe was the product not of a disintegrating state nor of ethnic antagonism – it was no way the result of a ‘retraditionalization’ of politics. Rather it was the consequence of the excesses of a strong state, itself in many ways a direct Rhodesian inheritance and a particular interpretation of nationalism.⁴²

An appreciation of the politics of exclusion in the Zimbabwe nationalist movement is central to

³⁷ Richard Werbner, “Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post Wars of the Dead, Memory and Re-Inscription in Zimbabwe,” in *Memory and the Post Colony*, ed. Richard Werbner (London: Zed Books, 1998), 75.

³⁸ Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 1.

³⁹ Werbner, 92-93

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 6.

understanding post-independent politics in Zimbabwe as it relates to the emergence of tribal dictatorship. The infighting and splits within the nationalist movement and non-acceptance of any competing centre of power on the part of the two liberation movements was carried over in post-independent Zimbabwe. The kind of messages that ZANLA was putting across to the war-weary electorate in the run-up to the 1980 elections gives a firm basis for the study to unequivocally assert that ZANU PF failed to transform itself from a liberation movement into a political party. As a matter of fact, the war of liberation was a very painful and arduous process. Garfield Todd, a reformist former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, correctly observed that “people had such a rough time for so many years...from a background of naked racism, hatred and brutalities of war...and therefore the great majority of our people are still united in their desire for peace.”⁴³ During the cease-fire and the run-up to the 1980 elections, a senior ZANU PF official (Enos Nkala) was quoted as having threatened that his party would go back to war if it lost the election.⁴⁴ In the same vein, Matibenga, a trade unionist, attested to the way in which the mere reference to the war of liberation evokes sad memories in many people, when she asserts that:

We have a history of violence in Zimbabwe. ZANU took over this country by violence. So the moment that there is a threat of violence or likelihood that it is coming – people will duck. People would say why should I risk myself, the war of liberation was no picnic, Rhodesian Front soldiers would beat up the whole village and the nationalists doing the same if there is a problem. Oh we want war no more, let those threatening violence have their way so long as we are secure from beatings and killings. Let them rule for ever, so long as we are safe.⁴⁵

Threats of going back to war, unleashing of violence and even death has been a recurrent mobilisation strategy employed by ZANU PF ever since 1980. This thesis will further provide evidence of the prevalence of similar patterns of threats in all almost elections held in Zimbabwe. However it was to intensify following the incorporation of the war veterans as an effective wing of ZANU PF after the party decided to compensate them for their participation in the war. After being embraced politically by ZANU PF, the once-critical Veterans’ Association became a potent ally of the party.⁴⁶ This study shall turn to the impact of this changed relationship in section 4.5.1 of this chapter. However there is no doubt that the former freedom fighters played a significant role in precipitating the conjunctural aspects of the current Zimbabwean crisis.

⁴³Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates (26 August 1982):632.

⁴⁴ Martyn Gregory, “Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilisation,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1981):86.

⁴⁵ Interview with Lucia Matibenga, 19 December 2007, Harare.

⁴⁶ Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, “War Stories: Guerrilla Narratives of Zimbabwe’s Liberation War,” *History Workshop Journal* 57, 1 (2004):96.

Essentially the militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military was a result of the former freedom fighters becoming a wing of ZANU PF. This culminated in a “veto coup” where the army was invited to participate and have a stake in politics by the political leadership.⁴⁷

Be that as it may, ZANLA’s mass mobilisation strategies⁴⁸ are well documented and indeed played a pivotal role in eliciting the much needed peasant support for ZANU PF. This partly explains the party’s victory in the 1980, 1985, 1990 elections and even beyond. ZAPU’s military strategy was basically anchored on conventional tactics whilst ZANLA’s guerrilla warfare was premised on mass mobilisation in the countryside.⁴⁹ Contemporarily, this partly explains ZANU PF’s resounding victory in the rural constituencies. In other words, the predominant party position of ZANU PF can not be totally attributed to the use of force. Nevertheless, violence remained a ZANU PF fixation as indicated by a statement made by Robert Mugabe in 1979: he declared that 1979 is “The year of the people’s storm, in which a revolutionary storm will engulf and sweep the enemy completely from our land.”⁵⁰ This was called “Gore reGukurahundi” in Shona and it means an unusual tsunami like storm that “destroys everything, weeds, crops, the good and the bad.”⁵¹ Essentially it was a policy of annihilation of three enemies – the Smith regime, “puppet” nationalist parties that previously associated with Smith, and capitalism.⁵² It is within the spirit of the Gukurahundi proclaimed in 1979 that another Gukurahundi emerged in the Matebeleland region shortly after independence, a subject to be dealt with in greater detail in section 4.4.1.

It is worth pointing out that a liberation war fighter could have a nom de guerre like Comrade Tichatonga (We shall rule), Comrade Mabhunumuchapera (Whites you are going to perish – a very clearly racist and violent name), and Comrade Bazooka. ZANU PF’s choice of a cockerel as a party symbol in 1979 was an effective sign that provided an unparalleled identification with the party.⁵³ In Shona culture and folktales, a cockerel is very emblematic in the sense that it signifies male domination, power and the ability to fight and win battles. At any given home, only one cockerel crows, not two, so ZANU PF’s was the one cockerel that was to make a sound in the whole country. This understanding can be the firm basis for ZANU PF’s desire for a one-party

⁴⁷ I am highly indebted to Dr Rupiya for this construction.

⁴⁸ For a detailed account see, Gregory, 1981.

⁴⁹ Masipula Sithole, “Is Zimbabwe Poised on a Liberal Path? The State and Prospects of the Parties,” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 21, no. 1/2 (1993):36.

⁵⁰ Gregory, 82.

⁵¹ Sithole, 37.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Gregory, 70 -71.

state, as well as the subsequent “swallowing” of ZAPU through the 1987 Unity Accord following the Matabeleland disturbances in the early eighties. In essence, symbolism is an integral part of Zimbabwean politics primarily because it helps construct political identities and discourses.

In relation to Zimbabwe, the two military wings (ZANLA and ZIPRA) never saw eye to eye given the violent nature of their competition against each other for popular support. The rivalry arose during the formative years of the nationalist movement, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Turf wars were also fought when the two formations competed for recruits in exile bases that were dotted in friendly African countries. Following efforts by Frontline states to unite ZANLA and ZIPRA to form the Zimbabwe’s People’s Army (ZIPA), freedom fighters from both military wings were brought together in two Tanzanian camps, Morogoro and Mgagao.⁵⁴ The fact that ZANLA soldiers chanted slogans that were hostile and derogatory to the ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, bred high tensions that led to the massacre of about fifty ZIPRA freedom fighters in the Tanzanian camps.⁵⁵ After that, ZAPU withdrew its remaining soldiers from the Zimbabwe’s People’s Army.

From the foregoing it can be concluded that ZANU was not only fighting the Rhodesian Front during the war of liberation, but was also fighting ZAPU.⁵⁶ Both ZAPU and ZANU have a longstanding tradition of using violence and intimidation to establish and maintain power. After independence, this predisposed the new ZANU PF government to be overly preoccupied with issues of security, law and order at the expense of engendering democratic norms and values. As a result, the post-independent violent campaign against ZAPU and other opposition political parties, their supporters and civilians, can be best understood as a continuation of a barbaric tradition that was ingrained during the war of liberation. Regime security issues went on to inform and justify the need for the new government in 1980 to totally inherit repressive structures left by the previous colonial regime. Coincidentally, that preoccupation with issues of security was the major component of the colonial regime. Thus in the case of Zimbabwe one interviewee contends that:

Apparently when you look the system set up by Smith and the Mugabe regime, there are striking similarities. Both systems are threatened; they feel that their power base is being threatened. Therefore, there has been a retention and resurrection of the same institutions and laws that were meant to safeguard Smith’s power, this time to safeguard

⁵⁴ Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2006), 147.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Pierre du Toit, *State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: HSRC Press 2003), 261.

It is worth noting that threats to political power can be real or imagined. With respect to Zimbabwe, perceived threats to its power base led ZANU PF to moot the idea of having a legislated one party state shortly after independence. In fact it is even suspected that at Lancaster House, Mugabe and his delegation reluctantly agreed have a clause that enshrined multipartyism given that they were under pressure to end the war.⁵⁸ Being a compromise document, the Lancaster House constitution eventually enshrined the principles of multipartyism. The “sunset” clauses on multipartyism provided that the constitution could only be amended after seven years. However ZANU PF perceived multiparty politics as an anathema and inherently divisive to any polity, especially emerging from a war waged by different ethnic based military wings. But the question is, what was to be done in the interim period in order to fulfil the endeavour to have a one party state?

Before answering the above question, it is important to provide some evidence that might explain ZANU PF's overzealous military and political responses to post-independence “security” threats that were ostensibly caused by ZIPRA forces. Given the longstanding and deep mistrust between ZIPRA and ZANLA, the latter believed that “Nkomo's long-term plan aided and encouraged by the Soviet Union was to watch while the white settler bull-elephant and ZANLA rhinoceros fought almost to a standstill and then move in his more conventional forces to establish a victorious position of both the other.”⁵⁹ The reason for this viewpoint stems from the fact that ZIPRA never deployed more than 2 000 soldiers in Rhodesia while keeping eight to ten thousand troops in its Zambian and Angolan camps.⁶⁰ Thus ZANU accused Nkomo of refusing to commit ZIPRA “wholeheartedly to the war”⁶¹ and ZIPRA's reticence on the battleground was an act of “holding back in order to unleash his full military capabilities against ZANLA after the defeat of the Salisbury administration.”⁶²

Moreover, it was even suggested that by 1979 Nkomo had a regular army consisting of nearly twenty thousand troops in Zambia.⁶³ It is also believed that ZIPRA had two thousand nine

⁵⁷ Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁵⁸ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, “Review of *Zimbabwe: Wages of War* by Bill Berkeley,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Feb. 1987):116.

⁵⁹ R Hodder-Williams, “Conflict in Zimbabwe: The Matabeleland Problem,” *Conflict Studies* vol. 151, no.1 (1983) quoted in Pierre du Toit, *State Building*, 261.

⁶⁰ Norma Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post War Zimbabwe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23.

⁶¹ Gregory, 72.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans*, 23.

hundred soldiers in Rhodesia while another six thousand were either under training in Angola and Zambia or attending specialist courses in Russia.⁶⁴ To make matters worse, it is also suggested that Russia increased its military assistance to ZAPU during the transition period and indeed after the 1980 election.⁶⁵ Accordingly, there were also fears that “if Nkomo did not play a significant role in the new government, a Soviet backed [ZAPU] invasion by well armed conventional forces would be imminent.”⁶⁶ It is also possible that Nkomo’s strategy became the linchpin of ZANLA’s spurious argument that ZIPRA made a less significant contribution to the war of liberation. Secondly, the fact that during the war of liberation, ZIPRA forces were predominantly outside Rhodesia and that Soviet aid to ZAPU increased during the transition period could have made ZANLA more sceptical of ZIPRA’s real motives.

Furthermore, the readily available inherited repressive structures can be said to have predisposed ZANU PF to continue abusing state power with impunity. Certainly, there was a commonality of interests between the Rhodesian Front and ZANU PF because the rulers of both movements were geared towards creating predominant ethnic states.⁶⁷ It is worth noting that ethnic-based politics is characterised by unrealistic fears about the other, a condition that explains the exaggerated nature of security threats posed by ZAPU.⁶⁸ Similarly the Rhodesian state had a siege mentality, and by extension ZANU PF as an ethnic party also “shared the psychological predispositions of the previous regime.”⁶⁹ In the final analysis it can safely be concluded that “the unrealistically perceived threats...resulted in the subsequent [Gukurahundi] policy that undermined democracy in Zimbabwe.”⁷⁰

As alluded to in the preceding chapter and paragraph, the new ZANU PF government inherited a whole gamut of colonial repressive machinery. As early as 1980 the new government of Zimbabwe re-enacted the Smith-initiated state of emergency, and it was constantly renewed every six months until 1990.⁷¹ Under the state of emergency any “reasonable“ action by the government was deemed constitutional even if it violated basic human rights relating to freedom of association, expression and movement. Furthermore the state of emergency allowed the executive to circumvent the legislature and then proceed to make laws – a clear violation of the

⁶⁴ Ibid., 24.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 53.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Pierre du Toit, 276.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 277.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Review of *Zimbabwe: Wages of War*, 116.

separation of powers. From this standpoint, it is imperative to seek to understand how and why hard-won independence fought by both ZAPU and ZANU alongside the masses could be maintained and protected by colonial legislation. Joshua Nkomo, in a letter to the then Prime Minister Mugabe, cogently argued that:

Now I understand why you have maintained legislation such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act, the Unlawful Organisations Act and the State of Emergency Powers Act, which were enacted by former regimes specifically for the oppression and suppression of the black population of Zimbabwe, and for use against their effort to struggle for independence, social justice, enjoyment of freedom and human rights. You now seem to enjoy and justify the use of these notorious laws to deny your own people that which they fought and died to achieve. One of the most disgraceful and shaming aspects of our independence which is difficult to defend is that we have taken the methods and men used to oppress, torture and kill our people and tried to use them to consolidate our “independence”. You cannot take weapons, methods and people designed to defend colonial fascism and try to use them defend people. It is just not possible.⁷²

Notwithstanding the above sentiments, there are two main reasons that were advanced to justify the retention of repressive pieces of legislation in the post-independent period, especially the state of emergency. Officially, the position was that there was a need to deal with the destabilisation efforts of the then apartheid South Africa that was increasingly becoming isolated due to the wave of independence in Southern Africa. Indeed former Rhodesian Front operatives had joined the apartheid South African government and were responsible for the 1981 military attack on ZANU PF headquarters and Inkomo Barracks, to name but a few.⁷³ Thus the security argument was valid but in a sense it was over-exaggerated primarily because the government “seized upon the manifest disruptions of order and used them as a convenient pretext for ulterior motives.”⁷⁴ The ulterior motive was aptly summed up in the statement by Robert Mugabe that “as clear as day follows night...ZANU-PF will rule in Zimbabwe forever. There is no other party besides ours that will rule this country.”⁷⁵

Flowing from the above statement, it is clear that ZAPU stood in the way of ZANU PF’s grand plan to have a one party state, and as political opposition they had to be eliminated by any means

⁷² Informative Letter to Prime Minister Mugabe, 7 June 1983.

http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/Nkomo_letter.htm Accessed 28 April 2008. The letter was originally published in Nkomo’s autobiography, *The Story of My Life*.

⁷³ *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988*, (Compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace & Legal Resources Foundation Zimbabwe, April 1999), 11.

⁷⁴ Ronald Weitzer, “In Search of Regime Security: Zimbabwe since Independence,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4 (December 1984):539.

⁷⁵ William H. Shaw, “Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: A Study in African Political Thought,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3 (September 1986): 376.

necessary. The strategy involved denigrating ZAPU's contribution to the liberation war. However despite denigrating their contribution to the war, it was next to impossible for ZANU PF to reject it outright. ZANU and ZAPU's participation in the war of liberation was later used as a convenient excuse for denying the opposition MDC the right to form a government despite its popularity amongst the majority of Zimbabweans. The argument advanced by ZANU PF to justify its violent crackdown and lack of respect for the official opposition is that its leadership did not participate in the war of liberation. However with respect to ZAPU, that argument was without substance and that is why ZANU PF went out of its way to denigrate the former's contribution to the struggle for independence. Though not rejecting ZAPU's contribution to the war *in toto*, the ZANU PF strategy also involved falsifying the nationalist historiography before eliminating ZAPU as a political opposition. For example, it was ZAPU that started the war of liberation but ZANU PF distorted that objective reality by peddling falsehoods in history books and the state-controlled media.

Another senior party member of ZANU (PF) gave an account of the party's grand plan which eventually became a self-fulfilling prophesy. Flowing from the party's grand strategy as espoused by Robert Mugabe, in 1981 the then Legal Secretary Edison Zvobgo said, "we are aiming at a situation where there is no separation between party and state...we are convinced that before the middle or end of next year it will be impossible for any other party to operate on the ground."⁷⁶ In light of this aforementioned statement, one is left with no option but to ask how ZANU PF was going to ensure that its vision of seeing that no other party would operate on the ground was to be achieved. Clearly, that is where the whole idea of a one party state came from. The mere reference to the desirability of a one party state attests to the mentality that there should be no political opposition, a feature that happened to be the seedbed of an alternative government. Accordingly, the two quotations by leading ZANU PF stalwarts are indicative of how structural conditions of political repression and exclusion were deliberately reconstructed and fortified during the early years following independence. This was all done in the name of seeking to have a hegemonic political order that would make ZANU PF a dominant party without any formidable political opposition.

It is instructive to note that as late as March to June 2008 the ZANU PF sought to portray itself as the custodian of the gains of political independence. Indeed, Mugabe did not mince his words while campaigning in the 2008 harmonised parliamentary, presidential and later on presidential

⁷⁶ "Unity of Party and State Our Objective – Zvobgo," *The Herald* (Harare) 2 November 1981.

runoff elections. He said “The war veterans came to me and said, President we can never accept that our country, which we won through the barrel of the gun, be taken merely by an X made by a ballpoint pen. Is there going to be a struggle between the two?”⁷⁷ So there is strong evidence to the effect that ZANU PF saw itself as the beginning and the ending of Zimbabwean politics, which gives scholars a firm basis for asserting that ZANU PF never tolerated any kind of opposition or criticism. Presently ZANU PF always threatens that “we will go back to war if we lose elections.” For example at a star rally in June 2008, Mugabe was quoted as having said: “There is no way Zanu-PF will let the country go back to the colonialists. You decide for yourselves to vote for war or vote for people who work for the development of the country.”⁷⁸

Another aspect that deserves attention in the run-up to the Zimbabwean independence was the constitutional talks that culminated in a Westminster style constitution. The constitution was imposed upon the nationalists and hence Mugabe was quoted as having said “Yes even as I signed the document I was not a happy man at all. I felt we have been cheated to some extent...that we had agreed to a deal which would to some extent rob us of the victory that we had hoped to achieve in the field.”⁷⁹ This was in line with ZANLA’s philosophy that power had to be acquired and defended through the barrel of a gun. In other words, ZANU felt that there was no need for talks or a negotiated settlement, despite eventually acquiescing to such a setup. However, almost three decades later President Mugabe’s selective amnesia is revealed when he said: “We fought for it (the constitution), our people died for it. There could never be another constitution so dear, so sacrosanct.”⁸⁰ Essentially the Zimbabwean president was arguing that there was no need for a home-grown constitution despite having earlier expressed concern over the negotiated settlement constitution.

Commenting on the Lancaster House Constitution, Chirimambombowa a former student leader and activist, had this to say:

One unfortunate thing that happened but was inevitable and a necessity was the Lancaster House constitution. It was very restrictive and it spelt out that aspects like the land question would be dealt with after 10 years. Accordingly, a number of salient national questions were not dealt with there and then and to a certain extent undermined democracy and certainly contributed quite a lot to the current situation.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Dumisani Sibanda, “I Will Only Retire After Returning Stolen Land,” *Chronicle* (Bulawayo) June 20, 2008

⁷⁸ “MDC-T Warned Over Violence,” *Chronicle* (Bulawayo) 17 June 2008.

⁷⁹ Ibbo Mandaza, “The State and Politics in the Post White Settler Colonial Situation,” in *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986*, ed. Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1986), 38.

⁸⁰ Vincent Kahiya, “Bigoted Criticism,” *Zimbabwe Independent* (Harare) 3 November 2006.

⁸¹ Interview with Tamuka Chirimambowa, 22 August 2007, Durban.

The above observation carries a lot of weight given the events that followed thirty years later. Essentially, the constitution was only relevant for transitional purposes from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe but not for the long term needs of Zimbabwe. For example, as indicated in Chapter 2, the colonial agrarian economy was racialised with respect to land acquisition and use as a result of the Land Apportionment Act. However, come independence, “the willing buyer, willing seller” basis for land reform entrenched in the Lancaster House constitution led to a slow pace of land redistribution. A number of these constitutional issues will be dealt with later in the thesis especially when examining the majority of the 18 amendments that were made to the Lancaster House constitution from 1980 to 2007. Due to the inadequacy of the Lancaster House constitution there have been repeated calls for a new constitution by civil society since 1999.

4.4.1 Matabeleland Disturbances and the Construction of a Hegemonic Political Order

Most ethnic conflicts emanate from collective “social uncertainty, history of conflict and fear of what the future might bring.”⁸² Consequently, strategic security dilemmas result in violence as groups engage in defensive measures to deal with their insecurity. Thus if the future is threatening one way or the other, the political strategy employed by the affected group could be to take pre-emptive action. To this end, “non-rational” factors such as emotions, historical memories and myths⁸³ are evoked, thereby heightening tensions that increase the likelihood of violence amongst ethnic groups. This is so primarily because the competition for scarce resources (jobs, positions and political power) is the source of ethnic conflict. Since politics is central to the authoritative allocation of scarce resources, fight for possession of political capital becomes the major preoccupation of ethnic groups. In sum, the state becomes an object of group struggle primarily because it sets the terms and conditions for competition among groups.⁸⁴

According to Sithole and Makumbe (1997), the Matabeleland disturbances under the auspices of Gukurahundi policy account for the domination of ZANU PF and weak opposition.⁸⁵ The policy was essentially an “undisguised, intolerant, commandist, and deliberately violent policy

⁸² David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Autumn 1996):43.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁸⁵ Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe, “Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU (PF) Hegemony and its Incipient Decline,” *African Association of Political Science*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1997):133.

towards the opposition.”⁸⁶ The events surrounding the security issue in Matabeleland are well documented, especially by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation of Zimbabwe. Other useful archival sources of evidence relating to the Matabeleland disturbances are the Zimbabwe Parliamentary debates between 1980 and 1987 when the Unity Accord was signed. There is also a full text letter written by the Vice President at the time, Dr Joshua Nkomo, to Prime Minister Robert Mugabe whilst in exile in London on 7 June 1983, published in his autobiography, *The Story of My Life*.⁸⁷ Indeed there is need for scholars to treat materials published by those involved in the events under consideration with extreme caution given that autobiographies tend to be littered with deliberate biases.⁸⁸ However in the case of this study, parliamentary debates during the Matabeleland disturbances also provided evidence that showed the mood within ZANU PF vis-à-vis ZAPU as political opposition. Accordingly, some of the issues raised in *The Story of My Life* and other literature relating to the Matabeleland disturbances can be cross-checked from the Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates of 1981-1987 when the Unity Accord was signed.

Despite being allied as the Patriotic Front during the Lancaster House negotiations, PF ZAPU and ZANU PF contested the elections on separate tickets. Following the overwhelming victory of ZANU PF in the 1980 election, Robert Mugabe went on to form a government of national unity with PF ZAPU. However it did not last following allegations by ZANU PF that PF ZAPU was sponsoring and fanning a dissident problem in Matabeleland culminating in a very serious security issue. Mugabe alleged that “Dr Nkomo is trying to overthrow my government. ZAPU and its leader, Dr Joshua Nkomo was like a cobra in a house...to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head.”⁸⁹ ZANU PF has a philosophy that is borrowed from a Shona idiom that says “You don’t desert or burn your house simply because a snake has occupied your house; you kill the snake and continue occupying your house.” Accordingly, the fact that Dr Nkomo and ZAPU were metaphorically seen as snakes in the eyes of the Prime Minister by and large explains the tragedy that befell Matabeleland from 1982-1987. It is evident from the parliamentary response given by the then Minister of State Security, Emmerson Mnangagwa, to a motion raised in relation to the country’s security position in 1982 that the government was convinced that Nkomo was “behind the making of banditry and dissidents.”⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Informative letter.

⁸⁸ Martin Revai Rupiya, “Review of *The Story of My Life*, by Joshua Nkomo,” *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review*, vol. 18, no. 2 (June 2002):83-8.

⁸⁹ Informative letter.

⁹⁰ Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates (26 August 1982):659.

At this stage, it is imperative to underscore the salience of earlier statements relating to a revolutionary storm in 1979 and the subsequent deployment of the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade ostensibly to deal with dissidents. In other words, there was use of organised physical violence in Matebeleland for the purposes of strengthening political dominance and maintaining control over the state.⁹¹ There is evidence from the Parliamentary Debates of 26 August 1982 pertaining to the security situation in Zimbabwe. Senator Makunde of ZANU (PF) was quoted as having said “if ZIPRA are fighting because they want Mr Joshua Nkomo to become Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, from this day I must say Mr Joshua Nkomo, for another one thousand years could never rule this country.”⁹² Furthermore the Parliamentary debates shortly after the dismissal of ZAPU leadership from the government attest to the fact that ZANU PF perceived ZAPU as a dissident organisation and, according to the then Security Minister, Mnangagwa, “our concern as a Government is to eradicate them.”⁹³

Briefly, civil war theorists argue that in many negotiated settlements, there is often a breakdown in relations between former allies, not former foes.⁹⁴ From this standpoint there are also reasonable grounds to relate the dissident problem to the doctrine of legitimate expectation on the part of the former ZIPRA combatants. In other words, it could possibly have been a question of ZAPU being a bad loser. But the fact that the desertions and defections from the National Army were not only restricted to ZIPRA ex-combatants, but to ZANLA as well further complicates the matter. In their 1999 commentary about ZAPU, Pierre M. Atlas and Roy Licklider argue that “with ZANU PF’s increasing hegemony, their role in the struggle, and thus their very legitimacy, was increasingly marginalized. They resented their exclusion.”⁹⁵ In other words, ZAPU wanted ZANU to acknowledge their legitimate participation in the war of liberation which was contrary to what the latter espoused in 1979. Thus ZAPU wanted to be seen as being at *par* with ZANU PF in every aspect pertaining to the war of liberation and associated discourses. However, hindsight reveals that, during the run-up to the 1980 elections, ZANU PF had a slogan that stated “ZANU PF started the war of liberation, only ZANU PF can end the war.”⁹⁶ Such a position was an implicit denigration of ZAPU’s military contribution,

⁹¹ Henning Melber, “From Liberation Movements to Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa,” *African Sociological Review*, vol. 6, no.1 (2002):162.

⁹² Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates (26 August 1982):638.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 657.

⁹⁴ Pierre M. Atlas and Roy Licklider, “Conflict Among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1999):36.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Gregory, 75.

despite the fact that Nkomo is said to be the father of Zimbabwean independence or simply 'Father Zimbabwe' – a title he regained following the signing of the Unity Accord.

Similarly, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation of Zimbabwe points out that the defection of a number of ZIPRA ex-combatants was:

mainly because they were afraid of staying in the army as they felt some of their colleagues were disappearing mysteriously. They were also annoyed because they felt ZANLA cadres were being favoured for promotion. It was these issues rather than any clear political policy which caused them to leave the army, taking their guns.⁹⁷

In the same vein, Kriger asserts that there was a perception that the Ndebele people in general and the ZIPRA ex-combatants in particular were being marginalised, discriminated against and excluded from power.⁹⁸ In other words there was a psychological and material basis for the clashes and subsequent defections that took place as the two military wings waited to be reintegrated into the Zimbabwe National Army. It is against this background that the theory centred on ZANU conspiring to eliminate ZAPU is to be treated with caution though not necessarily denying it in entirety. As a result the most plausible argument would be that the three factors (ZAPU's disenchantment, ZANU PF conspiracy and South Africa's destabilisation policy) acted in concert to create the Matebeleland problem. However there is overwhelming evidence to support the contention that the whole Matebeleland issue was centred on ZANU PF's grand project of creating a one party state and consolidating its political power.

4.4.2 ZANU PF's Subsequent Consolidation of Power

Just like the Smith regime, in 1982 the ZANU PF government passed the Emergency Powers (Security Forces Regulations) which provided the security forces with immunity if their actions were done in "good faith."⁹⁹ In other words, "good faith" meant actions undertaken "for the purposes of or in connection with the preservation of the security of Zimbabwe."¹⁰⁰ Gukurahundi was executed under Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order Regulations) which in fact was a recast and fortified version of the 1975 Rhodesian Indemnity

⁹⁷ Nkomo, *Breaking the Silence*, 12.

⁹⁸ Norma J. Kriger, "The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search For Political Legitimacy and National Identity," in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe & Terence Ranger (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), 149.

⁹⁹ Weitzer, 532-533.

¹⁰⁰ Report on the 1980s Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, March 1997:38.

and Compensation Act. It was also during the same year (1982) that arms caches were “discovered” on ZAPU-owned properties. According to a paper written by Jocelyn Alexander about the dissident perspectives on the Zimbabwe civil war, “The evidence for a conspiracy was shaky: the existence of arms caches on both sides had been well known for some time, and both ZIPRA and ZANLA had cached weapons after the Entumbane and other disturbances as insurance.”¹⁰¹ The revelations about the arms caches culminated in the dismissal and subsequent detention of PF ZAPU leadership for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government. They were charged and detained under the colonial Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA). The ZAPU-owned properties were then confiscated by the government under the discredited colonial Unlawful Organisations Act, which remained in statutes despite being previously earmarked to ban all nationalist parties.¹⁰² The High Court acquitted Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku (ZAPU military personnel) but the two were kept in detention under the state of emergency regulations.¹⁰³ The fact that the government saw it proper to ignore several High Court orders compelling their release attests to the flagrant violation of the rule of law under the state of emergency.

The souring relations between the two parties reached boiling point and worked in favour of ZANU PF. As a result an ethnic conflict laced with security rhetoric gave Mugabe’s ZANU PF a golden opportunity to widen its hegemonic tentacles country wide. As this chapter reveals, the success of the strategy is vindicated in the 1987 Unity Accord which effectively eliminated ZAPU as a political opposition. Clearly, subsequent efforts to delegitimise, destroy and criminalise any opposition or civil society movement that challenged the new creation brought by the Unity Accord are instructive.

1981 saw the creation of the Fifth Brigade (with assistance from North Korea) from predominantly ZANLA/Shona ex-combatants and ex-Rhodesian security personnel, ostensibly to combat a dissident problem in Matebeleland. The operation was to be code-named Gukurahundi in the same line and spirit that ZANU had declared its endeavour to annihilate perceived enemies three years earlier, in 1979. The fact that the Fifth Brigade had some ex-Rhodesian security personnel partly explains why there was a reversion to the human rights abuses that characterised the Rhodesian Front government. In a letter, Nkomo had this to say to

¹⁰¹ Jocelyn Alexander, “Dissident Perspectives on Zimbabwe's Post-Independence War,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. 68, no. 2 (1998):155.

¹⁰² Informative letter.

¹⁰³ Jonathan N. Moyo, *Voting for Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992), 25.

the then Prime Minister Mugabe.

It is obvious to me that you decided to form the Fifth Brigade outside the structure and command of the National army, so that you may use it as a party Tribal brigade for eliminating or liquidating, as you have many times said, those you chose to destroy. As a matter of fact, when I questioned the formation of the Firth Brigade outside the Zimbabwe National Army without consultation, you angrily replied and said, “Who are you to be consulted?” “This Brigade,” you said, “has been formed to crush those who try to subvert my government and if you attempt that, they will crush you.”¹⁰⁴

It is worth noting that there were two sets of dissidents, one was called Super ZAPU and was created and financed by the apartheid government.¹⁰⁵ Its main objective was to destabilise the African National Congress (ANC) operations that were being coordinated from Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁶ The other set of dissidents were of a regular or general nature and comprised disgruntled ex-ZIPRA combatants and other criminal elements who were cashing in on the poor security situation. However to date there is no conclusive evidence to support the government’s claim that ZAPU was the force behind the dissident problem.¹⁰⁷ Their operations were for personal gain and survival as well as destabilising the government and therefore lacked local support. However from the government point of view ZAPU was a Ndebele party, therefore Ndebele people were dissidents who should be whipped into line.

As a result of the security situation, early 1982 saw the government deploying a Security Task Force comprising ex-Rhodesian military personnel who frequently tortured and detained civilians.¹⁰⁸ A year later the Fifth Brigade was deployed and shortly thereafter they started to “carry out systematic killing of civilians in Matabeleland.”¹⁰⁹ It is estimated that the total number of civilians who perished during Gukurahundi was about twenty thousand. In 1984 the army then revived colonial security measures such as curfews and even the Rhodesian Front “Operation Turkey” in an endeavour to deal with civilians suspected of supporting dissidents.¹¹⁰ This counter-insurgency measure was meant to eliminate food supplies so as to starve the dissidents as well as to “demoralize the civilians in the rural areas by a policy of starvation.”¹¹¹ During the same period there was serious drought; people were forced to buy ZANU PF

¹⁰⁴ Informative Letter.

¹⁰⁵ Disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands, 46.

¹⁰⁶ Alexander, “Dissident Perspectives,” 164-171.

¹⁰⁷ *Breaking the Silence*, 12. See also Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*, 25-26 for further details.

¹⁰⁸ Richard Carver, “Zimbabwe: Drawing a Line through the Past,” *Journal of African Law*, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring, 1993):74.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

membership cards to get food as well as for security purposes.

Villagers were required under LOMA to report to the police or army if they knew about the presence of dissidents. If they failed to do so, they were to face the full wrath of the law, just as in colonial times. The idea was to destroy ZAPU's political base in light of the fact that the only likely source of opposition politics in Zimbabwe was from Matabeleland. Accordingly, the severe military and political repression in that region and parts of Midlands needs to be understood within the context of ZANU PF seeking to break ZAPU's support base. Essentially the kind of force that the government used to combat the dissident problem was not commensurate with any security threat there.

The massacres went on unreported in both domestic and international media partly because the West wanted to endear itself to Mugabe. This study takes the position that, due to Cold War politics, the West deliberately turned a blind eye to the crimes against humanity that were being perpetrated by Mugabe. The government's strategy was to have control over the dissemination of information by way of establishing road blocks and movement curfews.¹¹² Furthermore both print media and electronic elements were under government control and "no unauthorized people were allowed into and out of the curfew areas."¹¹³ As a result, not many people who were living in the unaffected areas were privy to what was happening in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands. According to Geoffrey Nyarota, a veteran journalist who was the editor of the state-controlled regional paper (covering the affected region) called *Chronicle*; newsmen were allowed in the affected areas only if accompanied by military personnel. However, Nyarota cannot explain further in his memoirs except to say "in principle, the *Chronicle*...supported the deployment of security forces against dissidents."¹¹⁴ But he is quick to point out that "but the *Chronicle* did not shy away from voicing concerns about atrocities perpetrated against civilians." However it is the contention of this study that, besides the extent to which the media was hamstrung, both foreign and domestic journalists are guilty of errors of omission.

In addition, what is worrisome is the fact that the civil society was virtually under state tutelage when all such excesses were being committed in Matabeleland. The only voice that was audible in the Zimbabwean civil society during the 1980s was the Catholic Commission for Justice and

¹¹² Shari Eppel, "Gukurahundi – The Need for Truth and Reparation" in *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*, ed. Brian Raftopolous and Tyrone Savage (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), 49.

¹¹³ *Breaking the Silence*, 12.

¹¹⁴ Geoffrey Nyarota, *Against the Grain – Memoirs of a Zimbabwean Newsmen* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006), 135.

Peace, an affiliate of the Catholic Bishops' Conference. However it was accused of taking a “piecemeal approach and has rarely pressed for changes in the agencies responsible for repression or in the arsenal of security legislation.”¹¹⁵ Other church organisations like the Methodist church could not agitate given the participation of their Bishop, Abel Muzorewa, in the Internal Settlement. Muzorewa presided over the killing of many innocent people in Chimoi and Nyadzonya camps during his term of office as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe / Rhodesia. There are indeed other factors over and above the inherited security structures that led to the passivity of civil society and thus contributed to the entrenchment of authoritarian practices in Zimbabwe from 1980. By and large the civil society during the first eight years of independence were simply co-opted and contained to toe the government line. Weitzer, commenting on how the government managed to keep the civil society at bay, notes that:

One...discerns in Zimbabwe a “robustly pluralistic” civic order, which is rooted in the past: In the event of a one-party state in Zimbabwe, other forms of pluralism would assume degrees of political importance reminiscent of intellectual, religious, and trade union opposition to white supremacy in Rhodesia...*none* of these institutions sustained active resistance to white supremacy in Rhodesia. Now their posture is “reminiscent” of Rhodesia’s tradition of acquiescence. The government-controlled media practice self censorship, have rarely taken a critical stand on security issues, and are pro-ZANU in their news coverage and editorials; labour is strictly controlled by the regime; the intelligentsia has taken a low profile; the business community and white commercial farmers have generally supported the regime’s security policy; and the handful of voluntary associations with an abiding interest in human rights have had little impact.¹¹⁶

4.4.3 The 1985 Elections and the Road to the Unity Accord

Prior to the 1985 elections, killings and violence escalated in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands.¹¹⁷ ZANU PF youth brigades in conjunction with the CIO and the Police Internal Security Intelligence worked in conjunction with the Fifth Brigade in terrorising civilians and many ZAPU leaders.¹¹⁸ ZAPU applications to hold rallies were denied and this, coupled with years of ZANU PF repression, meant an inability to effectively campaign in the 1985 elections.¹¹⁹ The Law and Order Maintenance Act and the State of Emergency further weakened the position of the political opposition. Despite these challenges, ZAPU went on to win all 15 seats in Matabeleland and it then became clear to ZANU PF that the military strategy had failed to

¹¹⁵ Ronald Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 156-157.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 158.

¹¹⁷ Eppel, 45.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*, 174.

eliminate ZAPU.¹²⁰ On the other hand the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) also won all the reserved white seats in parliament, a situation that angered ZANU PF which interpreted that development as spurning the hand of reconciliation. These 20 reserved white seats were abolished in 1987. In the case of ZAPU, the military route had failed; accordingly the only strategy to be explored was to be political in nature now that ZAPU was weaker. As a result, from late 1985 ZANU PF made overtures towards unity talks with ZAPU.

Thus confronted by these failures to physically and psychologically eliminate ZAPU, ZANU PF decided to go the negotiation route.¹²¹ Eventually ZAPU relented and for some it was a “good idea to save the Ndebele people from genocide but it was a grave mistake for ZANU PF to head the new creation.”¹²² The Unity Accord was eventually signed on 22 December 1987 and it gave ZANU PF the upper hand especially in relation to the creation of a *de facto* one party state.¹²³ In other words the government of national unity that was formed following the Unity Accord was as good as a one party state – one of ZANU PF’s longstanding and cherished ideals. It should however be noted that the road to unity was a very rough one given that:

The combination of mob violence, police arrests, and mass defections gave ZAPU little choice but to agree to unity talks with ZANU in late 1985. After the talks broke down in April 1987, all ZAPU meetings were banned and all its offices ordered closed. Now in complete disarray, the party was forced either to accept a merger with ZANU on the latter’s terms or to vanish altogether from the political scene.¹²⁴

4.4.4 Aftermath of the Unity Accord and the One Party Project

Following the merger of ZANU PF and PF ZAPU to form ZANU PF, amnesty was granted to all the dissidents and the army that had committed crimes against humanity earlier. This led to stability in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands after almost a decade of civil strife. But it remains difficult to understand how such a small group of the so-called dissidents would wreak such havoc, suggesting that “there was more to it than met the eye.”¹²⁵ Essentially the Unity Accord was “basically an elite pact that didn’t trickle down to the grassroots.”¹²⁶ Evidence of lack of

¹²⁰ Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*, 28.

¹²¹ Dominique Darbon “Fluctuat Nec Nergitur: Keeping Floating,” in *Zimbabwe in Transition*, ed. Simon Baynham, (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1992), 10.

¹²² Interview with Maidei Ngano, 14 September 2007, Johannesburg.

¹²³ Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*, 29.

¹²⁴ Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*, 174.

¹²⁵ Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*, 27.

¹²⁶ Interview with Dr Rupiya, 3 October 2007, Grahamstown.

support from the grassroots is based on the voting behaviour in Matabeleland where the electorate generally vote for the opposition. As a result in a number of national discourses, whether in mainstream politics or civil society, the “Matabeleland issue always crops up.”¹²⁷

After the merger of ZANU PF and PF ZAPU, constitutional amendment number 7 introduced the Executive Presidency with an unlimited term in office. The Executive Presidency gave Mugabe sweeping powers that enabled him to pursue patron client politics and destroy any political alternative including civil society. A Ministry of Political Affairs funded by taxpayers was established after the signing of the Unity Accord to eventually prepare the country for a legislated one party state, where ZANU PF was to be the only legitimate and legal political party in Zimbabwe.¹²⁸ The debate on whether to introduce a *de jure* one party state was a very fierce one that resulted in an edited book: *The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate*¹²⁹ among other publications. Over and above the end of the Cold War, the one party agenda also failed following the expulsion of Edgar Tekere from ZANU PF in 1988. Tekere went on to form his own political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) the following year.¹³⁰ Jonathan Moyo notes that:

Corruption became a rallying issue for outspoken individuals such as Edgar Tekere. Groups which had tended to support ZANU PF almost as a ritualistic routine, such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and the University of Zimbabwe Students, became critical of the authorities whom they held responsible for public ills such as inflation, unemployment, shortage of transport and housing which had become ubiquitous.¹³¹

What is telling about the above observations by Moyo is that in a sense the corrupt tendencies among the ZANU PF party chiefs, combined with economic ills, led to the resurrection of civil society in Zimbabwe. From this period onwards civil society made several concerted efforts to support ZUM in order to defeat the one party agenda. ZUM was also fighting for a limited term of office for the president (two terms) as well as the abolition of the Executive Presidency with sweeping powers. Another aspect that makes the early 1990s a milestone in Zimbabwean politics is the fact that it signalled the decline of the state’s domination project considering the way it had uncompromisingly dealt with PF ZAPU. Furthermore, the lack of internal democracy

¹²⁷ Interview with Maidei Ngano, 14 September 2007, Johannesburg.

¹²⁸ Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*, 31.

¹²⁹ See Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye, “The Zimbabwe Debate on the One Party State and Democracy” in *The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate*, eds. Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (Harare, SAPES Books), also William H. Shaw, “Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: A Study in African Political Thought,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3. (September 1986):373-394.

¹³⁰ Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*, 31-32.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

led to a gradual decline in party unity, possibly due to the inherent weakness of democratic centralism that forms the bedrock of ZANU PF's decision making process.¹³² This played into the hands of disgruntled party members like Edgar Tekere who then mobilised alongside a revived civil society to thwart the attempts to legislate for a one party state. In short there was democratisation led by the working class

In line with the central thesis of this study, it is arguable that by rejecting the one party project the working class played a significant role in the process of democratisation.¹³³ The fact that the working class resisted ZANU PF's attempts to impose a one party state in Zimbabwe goes a long way in answering the question – Who brings about democratisation? Thus a shift in the balance of class power led ZANU PF to drop the one state project. However in practice, ZANU PF continued to behave as if Zimbabwe was a one party state, if its attitude towards the official opposition and civil society was anything to go by.

As a result of these developments, from 1990 onwards, ZANU PF reverted to the 1979 -1980 tactics of using collective memory and symbolic capital associated with the war of liberation to bolster its legitimacy against a background of waning political fortunes. It also soon became evident that ZANU PF was fragmenting given the number of senior members expelled or suspended from the party for various reasons since 1989. Examples include Margaret Dongo, Edgar Tekere, Lazarus Nzarayebani, Dzikamai Mavhaire among others. After 1990 ZANU PF could not justify the use of the colonial state of emergency and was eventually lifted that year. The state of emergency was then replaced by the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures Act). However legislation like LOMA was kept intact but in 1999 they were repealed and recast as The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) respectively. However the letter and spirit of the two pieces of legislation did not in any way change what the colonial LOMA espoused.

4.5 ZUM and Civil Society Alliance: Lessons from the 1990 Elections

What made the 1990 election significant was the political context within which it was conducted, where ZUM was formed specifically to oppose a one party state – and consequently the elections

¹³² See Edgar Tekere, *A life Time of a Struggle*, (Harare: Sapes Books, 2007):156.

¹³³ N. Tengende. "Worker, Students and the Struggles for Democracy: State-Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe,"(PhD diss, Roskilde University, 1994), 323-332.

became a matter of *Voting for Democracy*.¹³⁴ It is generally accepted that “wise leaders are those who demonstrate a capacity to respond to yearnings and promptings of the civil society.”¹³⁵ In addition, there was also no consensus on the one-party state within ZANU PF itself as proved by the fact that the party’s Central Committee rejected it. Accordingly, ZANU PF shelved Mugabe’s one-party project. Thus civil society (the trade union and student movement) alongside ZUM strongly resisted the ZANU PF’s machinations however defined. However ZANU PF kept its options open by “deciding to leave things as they are” primarily because, in their view, Zimbabwe “was already a *de facto* one party state.”¹³⁶ ZANU PF’s mindset was hardly surprising given its history of viewing any competing centre of power as anathema. ZANU PF continued to dominate the country’s body politic thereby “making it difficult to envisage any hope for change outside the frame imposed by the elite in power.”¹³⁷ The situation was worsened by the fact that evidence from official speeches in the eighties and the nineties suggested that political opposition was “factious and unpatriotic.”¹³⁸ So the vilification of political opposition did not start with the birth of MDC, rather it is a longstanding tradition within ZANU that is targeted at any competing centre of power.

The 1990 campaigning process revealed the salience of the liberation struggle as well as the sacrifices made by both ZANLA and ZIPRA in liberating the country. To use Sylvester’s terminology, ZANU PF “could not tolerate other harvesters in its peach orchards.”¹³⁹ The Zimbabwean masses are “peaches in an orchard” that was developed by ZANU PF by virtue of them liberating the country and therefore no one was supposed to question that. Unfortunately it has been a recurrent theme that predisposes ZANU PF to perceive any civil society organisation or opposition party as fundamentally illegitimate and unpatriotic. The election period serves a very important purpose in this study given that the vitriolic attacks that were used from 1990 against ZUM and civil society have continued. What changed was the number of constituencies against which they are directed following the revival of civil society. For instance in its 1990 manifesto, ZANU PF warned the electorate of the “dangers” associated with the alliance between Smith’s CAZ and ZUM. According to the ZANU PF manifesto:

¹³⁴ Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*, back cover.

¹³⁵ Mandaza and Sachikonye, *The One Party*, 2.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Patrick Quantin, “The 1990 General Elections in Zimbabwe: Towards a One Party State?” in *Zimbabwe in Transition*, ed. Simon Baynham (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1992), 24.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 28.

¹³⁹ Christine Sylvester, “Unities and Disunities in Zimbabwe’s 1990 Election,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 28, no. 3 (September 1990):386 citing ZANU PF Election Manifesto 1990, 1.

The forces of reaction, racism, division and retrogression which were soundly defeated retreated into the background, but they continue to regroup with new tactics, and new faces. They seize on disgruntled elements of the ruling party who have lost positions in which they totally failed to perform, or unemployed youths, or diehard racists, and try to recover lost ground. These reactionary and inimical forces keep changing tactics but never the objectives of oppressing, exploiting, and dominating our people. Although some of them have wormed their way into important positions in the private sector and elsewhere, the people shall continue to seek and identify them so that they can be totally uprooted and destroyed.¹⁴⁰

Indeed Sachikonye was correct when he concluded that the conduct of the 1990 election campaign was “robust, vitriolic and revealing.”¹⁴¹ It is instructive to note that ZANU PF flouted misleading, mischievous and intimidatory political advertisements on national television that were meant to discredit ZUM. Moyo writes:

ZANU PF election advertisements played on radio and shown on television depicted voting ZUM as tantamount to death. One advertisement featured the screech of tyres and the crushing of glass and metal in a motor accident, followed by a voice warning coldly: “This is one way to die. Another is to vote ZUM. Don’t commit suicide, vote ZANU PF.” Another advertisement showed a coffin being lowered into a grave followed by the stern warning: “AIDS kills. So does ZUM. Vote ZANU PF.”¹⁴²

From the outset, one can see the racial and class dimension of the so-called enemies who were perceived as seeking to reverse the gains of independence. The kind of attacks fashioned along the above lines took a pronounced and brutal form shortly after 1999 as this chapter reveals. They were to be the bedrock of the justification for the attack – legal, verbal and physical – on the opposition and civil society from 1999 to 2008. It explains the promulgation, recasting and fortification of repressive pieces of legislation as civil society and the opposition became a serious thorn in the flesh of ZANU PF. The race card – colonialism and neo-colonialism – were used to justify the violent construction of a hegemonic order. The ruling elite utilised a historical discourse anchored on national liberation in order to “capture a broader Pan-Africanist and anti imperialist audience.”¹⁴³ Pan-Africanism in this particular instance refers to solidarity arrangements between African countries, or simply the act of “taking my brother’s struggle as my own struggle.”

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 388.

¹⁴¹ Lloyd Sachikonye “The 1990 Zimbabwe Elections: A Post-Mortem,” *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 48 (Autumn 1990):95.

¹⁴² Moyo, *Voting for Democracy*,75.

¹⁴³ Brian Raftopolous, “Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics,” in *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*, ed. Brian Raftopolous and Tyrone Savage (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), 2.

What is salient about the 1990 ZANU PF manifesto was the deliberate move to downplay the reasons why there were disgruntled elements in the party. Similarly almost twenty years later, in 2008, Simba Makoni, a former Finance Minister, and Dumiso Dabengwa, an ex-head of intelligence in ZIPRA, were vilified just like the opposition MDC and civil society. The two former ZANU PF stalwarts were demonised following their decision to break away from ZANU PF to form the Mavambo-Kusile-Dawn Movement. As a result they were labelled as Western stooges bent on effecting regime change in Zimbabwe akin to their counterparts in opposition and civil society. At a rally Vice President Joseph Msika attacked the two for being rebels and puppets of imperialists who wanted to destroy ZANU PF from within.¹⁴⁴

In addition, there were two extremely violent statements also made by ZANU PF during the 1990 election campaign: the first one was, “if whites rear their ugly terrorist and racist heads by collaborating with ZUM, we will chop that head off, and people must not listen to small, petty little ants which we can crush”¹⁴⁵ While the second one was “if you do not vote for ZANU (PF) it means you want us to go back to war – ZANU (PF) is prepared to go to war if it loses in the general election.”¹⁴⁶ These two assertions became hallmarks of the ways in which civil society and opposition were subsequently intimidated as they sought to champion an alternative political agenda a decade later. This kind of language is meant to intimidate both black and white electorate to rally behind ZANU PF in order to avoid brutal death and war respectively.

The worst incident during the run-up to the 1990 election was the shooting of Patrick Kombayi, a ZUM organiser in the Midland province. Kombayi was badly injured and had to be sent to the United Kingdom for treatment.¹⁴⁷ According to Sachikonye several ZUM candidates withdrew their candidature before the election due to “escalating intimidation and violence.”¹⁴⁸ However the same candidates were also subject to harassment even after the election for daring to oppose ZANU PF. The ZUM challenge notwithstanding, ZANU PF won the election and got 117 out of 120 seats in the unicameral legislature (the third parliament). ZUM won only two seats and later died a natural death but it is to be commended for providing the impetus for civil society to challenge ZANU PF’s political dominance.

¹⁴⁴ “Makoni, Dabengwa Betrayed Revolution,” *The Herald* (Harare), 21 March 2008.

¹⁴⁵ Sylvester, 395.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Tekere, 164.

¹⁴⁸ Sachikonye, “The 1990 Zimbabwe,” 96

Finally, reference needs to be made to the 1995 general election and 1996 presidential elections. Though the general elections of 1995 were generally conducted in a relatively more peaceful atmosphere than before, they were the least democratic since independence.¹⁴⁹ As a result the opposition parties (ZUM included) decided to boycott the elections. ZUM was disintegrating whilst a number of smaller opposition parties were mushrooming. Important civil society organisations “were reluctant to play any role in the elections and literally avoided direct involvement with political parties.”¹⁵⁰ It is worth noting that despite playing a central role in resisting the one party project in 1990, civil society sometimes adopted a hesitant position. For example both the then Secretary General of ZCTU Morgan Tsvangirai and President Gibson Sibanda claimed that the 1995 election was a non-event. The two unionists accused political parties of “opportunistically trying to get the support of the labour movement just before the elections without any deeper interest in workers’ problems.”¹⁵¹

A voter education project by human rights based organisations (Zimbabwe Human Rights Association and Zimbabwe Council of Churches) was allowed by the government to take place. Predicted voter apathy may have influenced the Government to allow voter education to go ahead. This was suggested by the fact that ZANU PF claimed that: “The holding of the elections is a constitutional necessity but in reality it is just a formality under present political realities.”¹⁵² Consequently, the voter turnout was 54% of the registered electorate. According to Kriger, ZANU PF’s violence against the opposition resulted “in the leaders of ZUM, ZANU (Ndonga), and FORUM calling on their supporters to arm themselves to retaliate against ZANU PF youth violence.”¹⁵³ The 1996 presidential election also ended up as a one man show following a boycott by two opposition presidential candidates. The opposition’s reason for boycotting the election was that the electoral playing field was uneven.¹⁵⁴ As expected, the voter turnout was poor – 32% of the registered electorate,¹⁵⁵ and Mugabe was returned unopposed due to the last minute withdrawal of opposition candidates.

It is the contention of this study that the above developments played a crucial role in the

¹⁴⁹ Liisa. Laakso, ‘Relationship between the State and Civil Society in the Zimbabwean Elections, 1995,’ *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 34, no. 3 (1996):218. See also John Mw Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, *Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s 1995 General Elections* (University of Zimbabwe Publications: Harare, 2000).

¹⁵⁰ Laakso, 218.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 219-220.

¹⁵² This was a ZANU PF position quoted in Ibid., 229.

¹⁵³ Norma Kriger “ZANU (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980-2000: Discourse and Coercion,” *African Affairs*, vol. 104, no. 414 (2005):22.

¹⁵⁴ Sithole and Makumbe, 131.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

reawakening of civil society. The groups that were active in 1995 and 1996 in voter education were at the forefront championing the constitutional reform agenda. What should be pointed out, however, is the fact that the gains made by civil society when it was allowed to conduct voter education in 1996 were later central in the NO VOTE to a government-sponsored constitution in a referendum in 2000. It should be noted that there was low intensity political violence in both elections primarily because opposition political parties were in serious disarray. ZANU PF's organised violence occurs relative to the strength of the political opposition and civil society. But political violence and coercion have been an endemic feature of Zimbabwe's political culture since the 1960s.

4.6 Restructuring of State - Civil Society Relations after 1999

This thesis posits that access to and seizure of land played an important role in influencing Zimbabwe's political discourses, especially after 1999. Accordingly, there is a compelling need to make brief reference to it given that violence is a major theme in Zimbabwe's land question. This is particularly so considering that the so-called Third Chimurenga was a political trick meant to ensure state survival in the face of a strong political opposition. By way of hindsight both the first and second Chimurengas (wars of liberation) were fought mainly against the violent appropriation and skewed distribution of land. In the post-independence Third Chimurenga, there was also a deliberate move by ZANU PF to revive second Chimurenga political language, for example stooges, sell-outs, traitors, puppets and running dogs of imperialism when referring to the political opposition and civil society.¹⁵⁶ Chitiyo (2003) observes that "coercive language framed coercive reality. The violent language was both cause and effect of violent deeds."¹⁵⁷ Tied to the above, the brutality that was taking place during the Third Chimurenga was referred to as *jambanja*. According to the *Daily News*:

For new words to get accepted into a language, they must reflect the mood of the time, fill in a vacuum in the standard lexicon and be accepted as an appropriate form of expression. Thus, the word *jambanja*, which became part of our vocabulary in the past two years, helped people to accept their confusion with an executive order directing the police to ignore crimes classified as political. *Jambanja* means state-sponsored lawlessness. The police are not expected to intervene or arrest anyone in a *jambanja* scene because those taking part will have prior state blessing and approval. But, only one interest group, war veterans and ZANU (PF) supporters, is allowed to engage

¹⁵⁶ Knox Chitiyo "The Harvest of Tongues: Zimbabwe's 'Third Chimurenga' and the Making of an Agrarian Revolution" in *Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa*, ed. Margaret C. Lee and Karen Colvard (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2003), 180.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

in a jambanja.¹⁵⁸

It is instructive to note that three actors are said to be blamed for poorly handling the land question in the 1980s. The first one is the British government, for delaying land reform by imposing the restrictive provision in the Lancaster House Constitution and failing to timeously fund the land reform programme in an orderly fashion.¹⁵⁹ Second there is the government of Zimbabwe, which lacked commitment to address the land question and used it to gain political mileage during every election. Once elections were over, the ruling elite failed to deliver on their promises while corruptly distributing acquired land to ZANU PF cronies and not to the peasants who needed it most.¹⁶⁰ Third, some scholars, such as Mlambo, Sadomba and Selby, assert that the Zimbabwean white commercial farmers can be blamed for their reluctance to play a central role in addressing the land question.¹⁶¹ The three seem to suggest that white commercial farmers did not have the foresight to appreciate the fact that their future, security and prosperity depended on an equitable land regime. White commercial farmers also started to participate in politics when their interests became threatened. Previously, the white electorate took a back seat in political affairs because their interests were not threatened in any substantial way. Certainly, it was the continued skewed landholding pattern that ZANU PF exploited “to mobilise support in an anti-white campaign under the pretext of fighting to regain stolen lands.”¹⁶² Clearly, had these three parties taken bold steps towards addressing the land question, with nothing to use for political expedience, ZANU PF could have ended up in a cul-de-sac.

In addition, from 1999 two structures (war veterans and chiefs) were to become the effective instruments to contain the dissemination of information bordering on human rights and democracy in rural areas, especially after the NO VOTE. The NO VOTE was a result of intense campaigning by the Movement for Democratic change (MDC) and its allies in civil society where it was born. Issues relating to the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Shortly after the referendum, the government in conjunction with the war veterans stepped up its efforts towards seizing a considerable number of farms. ZANU PF’s guiding principle was that Zimbabweans were reclaiming land that was

¹⁵⁸ *Daily News*, (Harare) 27 December 2001.

¹⁵⁹ Alois Mlambo, “The Ambiguities of Independence, Zimbabwe 1980-1990” in *Unfinished Business, The Land Crisis in Southern Africa*, ed. Margaret C. Lee and Karen Colvard (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2003), 87.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ See W. Z. Sadomba, “War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Land Occupations: Complexities of a Liberation Movement in an African Post Colonial State” (PhD diss., Wageningen University, 2008) and A. Selby, “Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (PhD diss., Oxford University, 2006).

¹⁶² Mlambo, 87-88.

violently expropriated from the masses by colonialism. In other words, ownership of land was equated with sovereignty over what was once stolen from the masses. The slogan was “Economy is land and land is the economy” and therefore land was be reclaimed violently because it had been appropriated violently.

Notwithstanding the colonial appropriation of land, it should however be recognised that many farms seized by Mugabe and his cronies had been bought on the open market in recent decades and some were supposed to be protected under Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPAs). Though to a certain extent the empowerment argument does hold water, the actual motivation for the increased land grab had to do with the NO VOTE and ZANU PF’s narrow win in the 2000 parliamentary election. The presidential election that was due in 2002 also gave the party the impetus to violently use the land question as a campaign tool. This study documents the nature of impediments that civil society faced thereafter in its quest to limit the state’s concentrated power. The impediments relate to the promulgation of and fortification of authoritarian pieces of legislation, politicisation and militarisation of state institutions and the continued shrinking of democratic space.

4.6.1 Legislative Measures

A number of draconian legislative measures were put in place shortly before the 2002 Presidential elections and by this “ZANU PF effectively legislated against democracy.”¹⁶³ There is irrefutable evidence to the effect that the majority of the 18 amendments to the Zimbabwean constitution “involves and revolves around curtailing civil liberties.”¹⁶⁴ Accordingly, the erosion of civil liberties necessarily results in the party dominating every facet of Zimbabwean life. The state-owned media generally portrays civil society in very negative light. As a result civil society and opposition rely on media broadcasting from foreign bases, for example Studio 7 broadcasting from Washington DC. But the government also brought Chinese jamming equipment that made it difficult for foreign based stations to broadcast as before. The idea was to ensure that only ZANU PF’s voice was accessed by the masses through the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC).

Examples of authoritarian pieces of legislation passed after 2002 include the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), Public Order and Security Act (POSA),

¹⁶³ Interview with Professor Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Political Parties (Finance) Act, Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), Non-Governmental Organisations Bill (2004) and Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act among others. Generally there was an almost complete overhaul of a number of pieces of legislation, as shown by the unprecedented number of amendments in many laws. For example under the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill of 2003, dual citizenship was prohibited and the Act electorally disenfranchised a number of people who were defined as aliens. They are aliens in the sense that their parents are of a foreign origin as a result of migration under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as discussed in the previous chapter.

The year 2000 saw AIPPA and POSA effectively replacing LOMA and included other more repressive measures. AIPPA effectively muzzles the free press and provides that non-Zimbabweans cannot hold majority shares in media houses. The act also established a Media and Information Commission (MIC) which registered media houses and was also responsible for the accreditation of journalists. In terms of its constitution, the MIC board was appointed by the Minister of Information and Publicity. The MIC refused to grant a licence to a private newspaper, the *Daily News* which was owned by the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ). Established in 1999, the *Daily News* was one of the best selling newspapers that surpassed all the state-controlled newspapers combined in terms of sales and readership. By 2000, the *Daily News* was commanding 31% of the total readership while the state-controlled Herald was controlling 29%.¹⁶⁵ Just like the Smith regime, the ZANU PF government sought to curtail the operations of independent newspapers and those “currently operating does not have the freedom expected of a newspaper.”¹⁶⁶ Essentially, the newspaper publishing industry became highly restricted and controlled primarily because it was putting a lot of pressure on the ZANU PF government. It was against this background that the government perceived the independent media as being driven by political and imperialist agendas.

With respect to the Political Parties (Finances) Act, the idea behind the amendments to the principal act was to criminalise foreign funding of any political party in Zimbabwe. Any foreign donation to a political party was to be forfeited to the state in the event that the party was found guilty of accepting a foreign donation. The act also aimed to ensure that no political party could be assisted by foreigners to solicit for donations. On the other hand the Broadcasting Services Act established the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) which is responsible for

¹⁶⁵ Dumisani Moyo, “The ‘Independent’ Press and the Fight for Democracy in Zimbabwe: A Critical Analysis of the Banned *Daily News*,” *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* (November 2005):113.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Lovemore Matombo, 17 December 2007, Harare.

granting broadcasting licences. However to date no other broadcaster has been issued with a licence thereby explaining the tight control of the airwaves by the powers that be. There is also a 75% local content requirement that provides that three-quarters of the content broadcast must be from Zimbabwe or Africa. It was under this act that the British Broadcasting Corporation was banned on Zimbabwean television, effectively securing the monopoly of the state controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation.

Furthermore the amended Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act provides for punitive measures on anyone deemed as threatening national interests. The act details several classes of crimes ranging from those against the state and public order to those against the administration of justice. In a way, the other classes of crimes are meant to bolster AIPPA and POSA in repressive terms. Finally the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill enacted to replace the colonial Private Voluntary Organisations Act, No. 63 of 1966 (the 'PVO Act') was passed by parliament but never signed into law. What makes the bill unique is its objective of seeking to ban the operation of any foreign Non-Governmental organisation, especially those dealing with democracy and human rights issues. The letter and spirit of the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. The bill deserves to be examined on a stand-alone basis given its far-reaching implications for civil society. The draconian legislation and amendments heavily undermined and inhibited the organic growth of civil society. An organic growth of voluntary associations could have seen the various civil society organisations expanding their sphere of influence across the broad spectrum of society.

4.6.2 Institutional Measures

In addition to the legislative aspects, the ZANU PF government introduced a number of structural impediments meant to eventually annihilate civil society. A number of developments took place at an institutional level that saw the state attempting to permeate all aspects of societal life, especially after the year 2000. Increasing militarisation of the state was witnessed shortly after the 2000 parliamentary elections. This took place within the auspices of "Operation Tsuru", based on military coercion, and the idea was to ensure that all rural areas in Mashonaland provinces became "liberated" pro-ZANU PF constituencies.¹⁶⁷ The first step was the revival of the colonially initiated Joint Operations Command (JOC) which is a "shadowy group consisting of the leaders of the army, air force, police, intelligence agency and prison service – a group

¹⁶⁷ Chitiyo, 181

Zimbabweans call the securocrats.”¹⁶⁸ The role of JOC was to advise the President on any issue having security implications, narrowly defined as anything that threatened ZANU PF’s tight grip on power. Closely related to this strategy was the move to ensure that a number of state institutions are under the control of former freedom fighters or military personnel. A case in point is the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) that is headed by George Chiweshe, a former military lawyer who served the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) as a court marshal judge.

In 2001 the government decided to establish the National Youth Service scheme with a view to teaching patriotic history.¹⁶⁹ The youth were then recruited by ZANU PF ostensibly to defend the gains of the liberation struggle and contain the opposition and civil society. The nationalist ideological project aimed to legitimise the use of organised violence by the state under the guise of self defence.¹⁷⁰ Students at the National Youth Service programme were trained in para-military tactics and other army drills. Graduates from the National Youth Service were deployed in rural areas to work alongside war veterans. However they were also given first preference in the civil service and, as one interviewee observed, “You can only be a teacher, police officer, or nurse if you pass through the National Youth Service.”¹⁷¹

As a result of the National Youth Service, the police, army and other institutions became blatantly partisan. The law was selectively applied with the opposition and civil society being indiscriminately harassed by the police and the army. Demonstrations by the civil society were usually ruthlessly quelled by riot police, as were opposition political rallies. The 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections¹⁷² were all marred by extensive political violence and a number of opposition and civil society activists lost their lives. On 9 January 2002, a few weeks before the presidential election, the chief of the armed forces and other heads of various services announced that they would not accept or salute anyone without liberation war

¹⁶⁸ Craig Timburg & Shakeman Mugari, “Military Leaders Making the Decisions in Zimbabwe,” *Washington Post Foreign Service* (April 16, 2008):12.

¹⁶⁹ Terence Ranger, “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 30, no 2 (June 2004):219.

¹⁷⁰ Timothy Scarnecchia, “The ‘Fascist Cycle’ in Zimbabwe, 2000-2005,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 2006):224.

¹⁷¹ Interview with John Chikware, 13 September 2007, Johannesburg.

¹⁷² For a detailed account of the 2002 presidential elections, see John Makumbe, “Zimbabwe’s Hijacked Election,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 4 (October 2002):87-101, John Makumbe, “The Stolen Presidential Election,” in *Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa*, ed. Margaret C. Lee and Karen Colvard (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2003), 223-253, and Henning Melber, “Zimbabwe and the Pitfalls of National Consciousness,” in *Zimbabwe’s Presidential Elections 2002: Evidence, Lessons and Implication*, ed. Henning Melber (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Paper 14 (2002), 59-67.

credentials.¹⁷³ Similar utterances were repeated during the run-up to the 2008 harmonised presidential and parliamentary elections.¹⁷⁴ This was a very clear message to the electorate to understand the implications of voting for the opposition. Essentially the army was invited into politics by ZANU PF with a view to dealing with the unprecedented and persistent influence of the opposition and its civil society on the electorate.¹⁷⁵ With respect to the 2005 parliamentary elections, Amnesty International observed that “there have been significantly fewer reports of politically motivated violence in the run-up to the March elections than was the case with the elections in 2000 and 2002.”¹⁷⁶ The decline in reports of politically motivated violence can be best explained by the fact that a number of legislative and institutional measures were put in place by ZANU PF to deal with the opposition. As a result there was no challenge from opposition that would warrant the use of force to cow the electorate into submission.

A minor detour is necessary before examining other gross human rights violation by the Mugabe regime. This researcher suggests that ZANU PF in general and Mugabe in particular are disciples of Machiavelli, a reality that explains state barbarism in Zimbabwe. The late Masipula Sithole used to call Mugabe, the Prince who used deceit and force in a very cruel manner to maintain, strengthen and extend his power. In the Discourses Machiavelli advised the prince to be aware that when making a decision, “no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious.”¹⁷⁷ This is where Machiavelli’s ferocious morality meets barbarism because, for instance, he advocates for the total annihilation of political enemies. Barbarism refers to the deliberate and systematic harm of non-combatants / unarmed civilians for a specific strategic political purpose.¹⁷⁸ The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights Preamble is very clear when it observed that “Disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.”¹⁷⁹ Barbarism can effectively destroy the target or victim’s ability to rebel or the will

¹⁷³ Martin Rupiya, “Contextualising the Military in Zimbabwe Between 1999 and 2004 and Beyond,” in *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*, ed. Brian Raftopolous and Tyrone Savage (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation 2004), 81.

¹⁷⁴ ‘I’ll Not Salute Tsvangirai, Makoni – Defence Chief,” *The Herald* (Harare), 29 February 2008.

¹⁷⁵ Rupiya “Contextualising the Military,” 82.

¹⁷⁶ See *Zimbabwe An Assessment of Human Rights Violations in the Run-Up to the March 2005 Parliamentary Elections*, Amnesty International, 15 March 2000. For legislative based measures that could have reduced political violence see *Statement on the 2005 Parliamentary Elections*, compiled by Dr R. Matchaba-Hove, Chairperson, Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 3 April 2005. See also Norma Kriger, “Zimbabwe’s Parliamentary Election of 2005: The Myth of New Electoral Laws,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 2, June (2008):359-378.

¹⁷⁷ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (London: Penguin, 1970), 514-515.

¹⁷⁸ Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “The Futility of Barbarism: Assessing the Impact of the Systematic Harm of Non-Combatants in War,” (paper presented at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 2003).

¹⁷⁹ UN’s *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948).

to resist.

It should however be noted that acts of barbarism do not only take place in war situations as the definition seems to suggest. Non-combatants should not simply be defined as unarmed people but also their personal and collective property.¹⁸⁰ Ivan Arreguín-Toft's conclusion is instructive: If barbarism increases the chances of achieving military and political objectives, then actors "resorting to barbarism may be immoral but rational," while on the other hand, if barbarism decreases the chances of success, then "actors resorting to it are not only immoral but stupid."¹⁸¹ ZANU PF's unbridled desire for power gave rise to gratuitous acts of barbarity that did not have anything to do with, for example, dealing with dissidents with respect to Matebeleland, preserving the gains of independence in relation to violence against opposition and civil society particularly during elections, keeping cities clean if one considers Operation Murambatsvina and flushing-out illegal diamond panners in Chiadzwa under Operation Hukudzokwi.

In order to have an in-depth understanding of barbarism it is important to link the phenomenon with backlash politics. Backlash politics refers to "efforts of groups who sense a diminishing of their importance, influence and power, or who feel threatened economically or politically, to reverse or stem the direction of change through political means."¹⁸² The nature of the reaction against the groups working to change the status quo depends on the quality of challenge exerted by the subaltern groups. Thus structures and tactics involved in backlash politics change in response to changing socio-economic and political contexts.¹⁸³ The backlash against the opposition MDC and civil society stems from the economic and political legacies of colonialism and the war of liberation. Civil society and opposition that organise for social and political change are the major targets of dominant social groups "determined to restore the status quo or to undo social change."¹⁸⁴ Furthermore the politics of backlash are shaped and conjoined to global processes linked to production, development aid, or transnational social movements.¹⁸⁵ In the case of Zimbabwe, backlash politics were wrought by "broader social, economic, and

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Seymour Martin Lipset, *Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), 254-256.

¹⁸³ Sita Ranchod-Nilsson, "Gender Politics and Gender Backlash in Zimbabwe," *Politics & Gender*, vol. 4, no. 4 (2008):648.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

political transformations that accompanied the demise of colonial or settler political authority”,¹⁸⁶ particularly after the end of the Cold War.

Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out the Filth) was launched in May 2005 following the continued poor showing of ZANU PF in urban constituencies. Clearly, the operation was a classic case of organised violence. Organised violence refers to “violence which deliberately inflicts pain and suffering to achieve a political objective.”¹⁸⁷ Following this act of state barbarism, a number of reports were prepared by various world bodies, chief among them being the United Nations.¹⁸⁸ It is worth noting that the three reports cited in this chapter speak to each other in relation to the great speed and extreme brutality that characterised the operation. The government of Zimbabwe carried out the operation in a “military style” and executed it in a “militaristic manner”,¹⁸⁹ just like its colonial predecessor when it forcibly evicted people from their home into the so-called “keeps”.

Though there is no consensus on the motive behind the operation, one cross-cutting theme that many observers agree on is that the operation was meant to effectively deal with the strong urban base of the opposition MDC and civil society.¹⁹⁰ In May 2005, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) comprising the police, CIO and the army released an intelligence report warning that the ZANU PF government could be overthrown. The reason for the possibility of a popular uprising was due to the fact that urbanites were particularly angry over the stolen March election and worsening economic conditions. Therefore Murambatsvina was designed as a swift pre-emptive measure to forestall a popular uprising, particularly in the urban areas where it started. The overall strategy was to ensure that the number of people in urban areas was reduced whilst those in the rural areas increased. The police and army went on to destroy people’s dwellings and informal sector stalls while the government insisted that people displaced by the campaign must “return” to the rural areas.¹⁹¹ In many instances police instructed people

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 649.

¹⁸⁷ *Breaking the Silence*, 28.

¹⁸⁸ Tibaijuka, “Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime Against Humanity” (An Independent Legal Opinion on Whether the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina Forced Evictions Constituted a Crime Against Humanity Under the Rome Statute), compiled by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, May 2007. See also Human Rights Watch, “Zimbabwe: Evicted and Forsaken Internally Displaced Persons in the Aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina,” *Human Rights Watch* vol. 17, no. 16(A) (December 2005).

¹⁸⁹ “Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime Against Humanity,” 9.

¹⁹⁰ See Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe,” *African Affairs*, vol. 106, no. 422 (2006):21-45; Scarnecchia, 235 and Deborah Potts, “Restoring Order? Operation Murambatsvina and the Urban Crisis in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 2006):273-291.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 279.

to destroy their own homes or risk being beaten. After that many affected families had to endure sleeping in the open, surrounded by their belongings despite the fact that it was winter. Property worth billions of dollars was either lost or damaged during the operation. According to Human Rights Watch:

Zimbabwean authorities also engaged in a concerted effort to coerce the people displaced by the evictions to leave the cities and move to the rural areas. In different areas across the country Zimbabwe Republic Police threatened, harassed, or beat the IDPs, forcing them to relocate to the rural areas where many have no homes or family and where social service provisions and economic opportunities are minimal. Fearing further displacement, many have resorted to hiding during the day and only returning to the places of their temporary residence at night, to avoid detection and harassment by the police. In addition, the government tried to compel the relocation by ensuring that international assistance is not provided to those who choose to stay in the urban areas, meanwhile using the food packages as an incentive for families to move to the villages.¹⁹²

As a result of the operation, the United Nations report estimated that over 700 000 people were internally displaced.¹⁹³ According to Human Rights Watch, thousands of internally displaced men, women and children were denied basic protection and assistance following the government's deliberate obstruction of the delivery of international humanitarian aid.¹⁹⁴ From the UN Special Envoy's findings, Operation Murambatsvina was *ultra vires* national and international human rights law. As a result there was a compelling need for the perpetrators to be held to account and that reparations be made to those affected.¹⁹⁵ Secondly, for the UN Special Envoy, the principle of having order anywhere in the world is not in dispute, but nonetheless Murambatsvina turned out to be a brutal exercise "based on a set of colonial-era laws and policies that were used as a tool of segregation and social exclusion."¹⁹⁶ As a result, he said it was imperative to suspend outdated laws and to review them within the briefest time possible.¹⁹⁷ Finally, a legal opinion from the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights concluded:

For reasons that are developed more fully below we conclude that the available evidence does disclose grounds to believe that a crime against humanity may have been committed under both of the following Articles of the Rome Statute: Article 7(1) (d) – deportation or the forcible transfer of population. Article 7(1)(k) – Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.

¹⁹² Human Rights Watch, "Zimbabwe: Evicted and Forsaken," 3.

¹⁹³ See Tibaijuka, 7.

¹⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Zimbabwe: Evicted and Forsaken," 1.

¹⁹⁵ Tibaijuka, 7.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

...The result is that a prosecution could be commenced before the International Criminal Court subject to a reference being made by the United Nations Security Council.

In other words Mugabe could be tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for committing crimes against humanity just like what happened to Liberia's Charles Taylor. As a face-saving measure following international condemnation for destroying people's homes, the government launched Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle (For a better life). The operation was ostensibly launched to provide dwellings for victims of the exercise but to date nothing tangible has been done. Many people country-wide are still without proper housing following the destruction of their dwellings. In light of the fact that chiefs and headmen were given enormous powers over their subjects in rural areas as well as material benefits under the Traditional Leaders Act, it was intended to have an increased rural base without any problems in terms of control. Furthermore, with the increased presence of war veterans, soldiers and the youth militia in the resettlement areas under the various operations, victory in terms of civilian control was certain. In one resettlement area, it was observed that the community:

deferred to the orders of the base commander; followed a strict timetable involving morning and evening roll-calls; attended numerous meetings, briefings and *pungwes*; were forbidden to talk to outsiders; and were deployed as sentries to guard against 'infiltrators'. Youths even received military-style drills. Only the state-owned newspaper was allowed in the camps – this was delivered to the base commander for free.¹⁹⁸

Rural areas were cordoned off by the youth militia and war veterans and effectively became no-go areas for the opposition and civil society. As already noted, rural people are not allowed to talk to outsiders and strict protocols must be followed. The councillor "vets" activity to be undertaken, thereafter the war veterans, headmen, and sometimes the paramount chief, are all involved. As a result the opposition and civil society cannot penetrate the local structures to disseminate information because talking to people without the permission of the "local authority" exposes them to danger. In many cases "the moment you leave that person is attacked or killed."¹⁹⁹ There are many cases of people who were told to leave their homes given that they were accused of compromising the security of the whole village by virtue of having links with civil society or the MDC.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Joseph Chaumba, Ian Scones & William Wolmer, "New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe," *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 30, no. 98 (2003):587.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Sox Chikohwero, 13 September 2007, Johannesburg.

²⁰⁰ Interview with Lucia Matibenga, 19 December 2007, Harare.

In the face of growing militarisation of the state and politicisation of the military, Zimbabwe became an “operations” driven country just like the colonial Smith regime. All the operations involve the war veterans, army, police, intelligence and the youth militia. Operation Mavhoterapapi (Who did you vote for) 2008 was a retributive exercise directed at the rural inhabitants after the harmonised March 29 parliamentary and presidential elections, in which the ZANU-PF government lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since independence in 1980. However some urban and peri-urban areas were also subjected to the post-election orgy of violence. The operation was being carried out by war veterans and the youth militia and was meant to intimidate rural people during the run-up to the 2008 presidential run-off. Innocent children were not spared from the terror and a number of opposition offices and supporters’ houses were petrol-bombed. As a result the internet was awash with gruesome photographs of activists who were subjected to terror attacks following their abduction by ZANU PF militia men.

Furthermore Operation Mavhoterapapi was conducted back-to-back with yet another action code-named Operation Dzikisai Madish (Remove Satellite Dishes) that was meant to stop people from accessing alternative sources of news on Zimbabwe. A number of people who refused to heed the call had their houses petrol-bombed, themselves beaten or their decoders seized by ZANU PF youths. Clearly, the two back-to-back operations were so callous to the extent that even ZANU PF’s traditional ally the African National Congress (ANC) issued an unprecedented bold and factual statement condemning the state-sponsored orgy of violence. The *ANC Today* categorically stated that:

It was the people of Zimbabwe, under the leadership of the Patriotic Front, who waged a struggle to win these rights and freedoms. The right to govern themselves and regularly to choose their own government was earned through sacrifices and struggles often eliciting the loss of life. No one, no government, no political party, no political leader has the right to abridge or subvert these rights. We are, consequently, deeply dismayed by the actions of the government of Zimbabwe which is riding roughshod over the hard won democratic rights of the people of that country...However, compelling evidence of violence, intimidation and outright terror; the studied harassment of the leadership of the MDC, including its Presidential candidate, by the security organs of the Zimbabwean government; the arrest and detention of the Secretary-General of the MDC; the banning of MDC public meetings; and denial of access to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, all have convinced us that free and fair elections are not possible in the political environment prevalent in Zimbabwe today.²⁰¹

Furthermore the brutal suppression of illegal diamond miners in November 2008 in Operation

²⁰¹ “Finding a Workable Solution to the Crisis,” *ANC Today*, vol. 8, no. 25 (27 June -3 July 2008).

Hukudzokwi Kumunda (Operation You Would Never Go Back to the Diamond Fields) also attests to deepening state barbarisms in Zimbabwe. In March 2009 a Canadian NGO, Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), which is involved in stopping the trade of conflict diamonds, released a damning report entitled “*Zimbabwe, Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History.*” The report documents the “role of diamonds in the Zimbabwean economy and their place in the country’s increasingly repressive governance....growing evidence of smuggling, the militarization of diamond resources and the killing of dozens of unarmed diamond diggers by the police and armed forces of Zimbabwe.”²⁰² Similarly the British *Telegraph* reported that Operation Hukudzokwi was:

Planned and carried out by the Joint Operational Command, the country’s top military commanders, tanks, bulldozers and helicopters were sent into Marange in October. Soldiers opened fire on *gwejas* in daylight. *Gwejas* were mauled by dogs. Some had their stomachs cut open by soldiers searching for stones. By December, between 200 and 400 panners had been killed, many of them teenagers. A favoured method was to mow them down with machine guns from helicopters as they ran for the hills. The Marange field is now controlled by the Mugabe regime. Military tents dot its moonscape and villagers are forced by soldiers to dig for stones.²⁰³

As a result of the illegal diamond rush, over 40 000 diamond dealers and other downstream industrialists were later flushed out of Marange under the violent operation.²⁰⁴ An estimated 1 200 arrests were made in the operation that involved soldiers, police and the intelligence. Suspected diamond dealers arrested were subjected to severe torture before being taken back to Chiadzwa diamond fields to reclaim the gullied topography using their bare hands. Mugabe’s spokesperson, George Charamba bragged: “Those accused of damaging it [the landscape] may not use shovels, hoes or some such implements. They shall use their fingers, and accomplish the job in record time, these *gwejas* and *gwejesses*.”²⁰⁵ *Gwejas* and *gwejesses* are street names for male and female diamond panners / dealers respectively. Contrary to the norm, Charamba did not deny but glorified the gross human violations that took place when he gave a vivid and lucid account of what the Chiadzwa “shock therapy”²⁰⁶ entailed. The presidential spokesperson further boasted: “Government had to reassert its authority in this wild, wild East. The Untouchables of Chiadzwa are slaving, wounded or dead. It is painful payback time.”²⁰⁷ In the end, the vitriolic Charamba gleefully predicted that “Whichever way, the uninvited patrons of Chiadzwa will not

²⁰² Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), “Zimbabwe, Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History,” March 2009.

²⁰³ Douglas Rogers, “Zimbabwe’s Great Diamond Rush Brutally Suppressed by Robert Mugabe’s Regime,” *Telegraph* (UK), 26 March 2009.

²⁰⁴ Peter Matambanadzo, “Blitz Flushes Out 35,000,” *The Herald* (Harare), 11 December 2008.

²⁰⁵ Nathaniel Manheru “Tsvangirai: Breaking the Hymen of Sanctions”, *The Herald* (Harare), 22 November 2008.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

come back.”²⁰⁸ That was spot on, how could the so-called illegal diamond panners and dealers dealt with “ruthlessly and speedily”²⁰⁹ come back?

It is still not clear how many people perished in the operation, but clearly many were either killed or severely tortured and maimed for life. Some analysts gave a conservative figure of about 500 people but that could be an understatement because the official figure of dealers and panners thought to have flooded Chiadzwa diamond fields is around 36 000. Given that official figures tend to be littered with inaccuracies for political reasons; it is likely that the exact figure will never be known. This reality suggests that more people could possibly have died in light of the brutal nature of the operation that also involved firing teargas in the mining tunnels. Considering the chilling account given by the Mugabe’s spindoctor and the government’s long-standing tradition of denying human rights violations, it is probably correct to assert that thousands of miners died in the diamond killing fields. A police officer was quoted as having said that “There were a lot of bodies. They were piled up. I don’t know what happened to them. Some of the dead are just buried secretly.”²¹⁰ Finally the Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) report also made reference to a mass grave for about 80 victims of Operation Hukudzokwi kumunda that was conducted after the City of Mutare donated some burial space.

Another institution that is at the disposal of ZANU PF for the purposes of containing and constraining the civil society is the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) inherited from the Smith regime. Just like during the colonial era, the CIO is involved in several clandestine activities meant to destabilise the civil society. The major pre-occupation of the CIO is to deal with the state’s domestic “enemies”, broadly defined as any organisation that ostensibly seeks to effect regime change under the instigation of Britain and its Western allies. The CIO ensures that whenever a new civil society organisation is formed, they will have an operative who uses money to enter the group’s structures. More often than not, “it usually takes some time before anyone can suspect that there is an infiltration.”²¹¹

The civil society organisation is made impotent right from its inception, further influencing the lack of unity among the progressive forces. The labour movement has been a target of infiltration and this led to the formation of splinter unions and general destabilisation of the

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Matambanadzo.

²¹⁰ Partnership Africa Canada (PAC).

²¹¹ Interview with Roberts Chirikure, 14 September 2007, Johannesburg.

ZCTU.²¹² Thus the infiltration of the labour movement reduced the effectiveness of the organised working class as a key factor in democratisation. The CIO is also said to have bought shares in a number of media houses with a view to influencing the editorial policy. An example was in the Southern African Printing and Publishing House (SAPPHO) or the Mirror Group that was owned by Ibbo Mandaza, who was subsequently elbowed out by the CIO. Mandaza was forced out “despite a number of court rulings”²¹³ in his favour.

Finally the restructuring of the judiciary was an institutional factor that explains the change in state-civil society relations after 1999. From that period the independence of the judiciary became a cause of concern. Since year 2000, war veterans who occupied some farms expressed concern over what they termed ‘judicial impediments’ meant to frustrate land reform. This followed the December 2000 ruling by five Supreme Court judges that the fast-track land reform was unconstitutional.²¹⁴ In the same vein the government consistently attacked the judiciary each time it was not happy about a particular court judgement.²¹⁵ As a result, a number of former white judges were pressured into resigning and the bench was packed with ZANU PF loyalists. A case in point is when the president overlooked seniority and appointed Chief Justice Chidyausiku to head the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.²¹⁶ It cannot be disputed that the judiciary made several questionable judgements in relation to cases brought about by the civil society and the opposition against the state.²¹⁷ Whenever ZANU PF’s interests were at stake, the resulting judgement was almost a foregone conclusion. In some instances, the government simply refused to uphold a court ruling. The then Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and President Mugabe fiercely attacked white judges, with the former describing the Supreme Court as “the main opposition to the ruling party.”²¹⁸ Chinamasa was also quoted as having said:

We must begin to exorcise from our institutions the racist ghost of Ian Smith and we do so by phasing out his disciples and sympathisers and travellers. The elements on the present bench and associated with the Smith regime must know and must be told their continued stay on the bench is no longer at our invitation. Their continued stay is now an albatross around the necks of our population.²¹⁹

²¹² Booker Magure, “The State, Labour and the Politics of Social Dialogue in Zimbabwe 1996-2007: Issues Resolved or Matters Arising?” *African and Asian Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1 (March 2008):37.

²¹³ Interview with Dr Rupiya, 3 October 2007, Grahamstown.

²¹⁴ Kriger, *Guerrilla veterans*, 202.

²¹⁵ Charles Goredema, “Whither Judicial Independence in Zimbabwe?” in *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*, ed. Brian Raftopolous and Tyrone Savage (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation 2004), 105.

²¹⁶ Goredema, 106.

²¹⁷ Interview with Dr Lovemore Madhuku, 14 December 2007, Harare.

²¹⁸ Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans*, 202.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

The implications of packing the bench with party loyalists were far-reaching. What it essentially meant was that the state sought loyalty from the judges who had considerable symbolic capital. For example in August 2008 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) “donated a fleet of new vehicles, generators, sets of televisions, and full sets of satellite dishes for the sitting judges to improve their conditions of service.”²²⁰ Accordingly, Bourdieu’s observation that with respect to the exercise of symbolic violence “oppressors are also the final practicable, or actual, arbiters of appeal”²²¹ is instructive in the case of Zimbabwe. The failure by the judiciary to deliver justice resulted in people continuously losing their rights and confidence in public institutions and processes like elections.

4.6.3 Contemporary Evidence of the Manipulation of Collective Memory

In order to see the continued use of collective memory associated with nationalist discourse, this thesis draws on data collected from *The Herald*, a state-controlled newspaper, during the run-up to the 2008 elections. The opposition and civil society were vilified in the majority of the ZANU campaign rallies and the demonisation drew a lot from the war of liberation and how the opposition was bent on reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. A few weeks from the polls one of the Defence Chiefs reiterated that he would not support any of the presidential aspirants – Simba Makoni and Morgan Tsvangirai – whom he accused of being Western puppets and stooges. According to *The Herald* the Army general stated that:

We still remember the blood and graves of our gallant sons and daughters who died for this country and we shall not sell them out to imperialist’s forces. Land reform would never be reversed and he would do everything to safeguard it. He said the two opposition presidential aspirants would give back land to former colonial masters if they won the elections and warned this would provoke war.²²²

Similarly President Mugabe had this to say at a star rally:

Tsvangirai and Makoni were sponsored British stooge reactionaries seeking to return land back into the hands of imperialist forces and people should not be fooled by them. People should resist Britain and its allies’ machinations for regime change. People should vote in their numbers to ensure a resounding victory for the ruling party and its

²²⁰ Fidelis Munyoro, “Judges Get Vehicles, Goods,” *The Herald* (Harare), 1 August 2008.

²²¹ Michael Gunder and Clare Mouat, “Symbolic Violence and Victimisation in Planning Processes: Reconnoitre of the New Zealand Resource Management Act,” *Planning Theory*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2002):125.

²²² “I’ll Not Salute Tsvangirai, Makoni - Defence Chief,” *The Herald* (Harare), 29 February 2008.

presidential candidate to send a chorus that will reverberate to the capitals of Zimbabwe's erstwhile detractors that Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.²²³

Further more *The Herald* further reported that President Mugabe:

Chronicled the history behind the MDC, which was formed when the three British parties – Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats – pooled their resources under the aegis of the Westminster Fund for Democracy to launch the MDC on a ZCTU platform. This, he said, was done in the hope that the MDC would safeguard the interests of white commercial farmers and British concerns in Zimbabwe at the expense of the black majority. Zanu-PF, he said, was a party grounded in the revolution, which resolutely defends the interests of all Zimbabweans, which is why the British had marked it for extermination. This, he said, was why people should vote overwhelmingly for Zanu-PF to stop the British in their tricks.²²⁴

As pointed out earlier on, whenever there is a national debate and ZANU PF wants to mobilise support for its position no matter how flawed it may be, collective memory associated with the liberation war and why it was fought is evoked. There is a carefully orchestrated move to destroy any alternative, be it in the civil society or the opposition, by labelling them as puppets who are betraying the revolution for the love of dirty money from imperialists. The manipulation of collective memory and the sanctions debate along the aforementioned lines reveals the problems associated with a civil society funded by donors. As a matter of fact, it is recognised that Zimbabwe's lack of financial resources pushes civil society towards seeking foreign funding.

4.7 An Interim Assessment of the Impact of the State's Hegemonic Project

The state's endeavour to control almost every aspect of people's daily lives has been a failure. What emerged out of ZANU PF's efforts to delegitimise, criminalise and destroy any form of opposition was initially a form of political protest that could erroneously be defined as acquiescence or apathy.²²⁵ People were "deciding to collectively disengage from politics as a way of indicating withdrawal from pre-determined electoral processes."²²⁶ What explained the fall in the voter turnout since 1980 is not apathy *per se*, but a considered decision of registering protest over the state of affairs. As a result, a combination of coercive and legislative measures created a political culture of fear. In fact "people fear being arrested, being locked up, having their houses

²²³ "President Warns Business Against Profiteering," *The Herald* (Harare), 20 March 2008.

²²⁴ "Presidential Hopefuls Must Have a Party," *The Herald* (Harare), 21 March 2008.

²²⁵ James Satterwhite, "Review of *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives* by Eric D. Gordy," *The Slavic and East European Journal*, vol. 44, no. 3, (Autumn, 2000):510.

²²⁶ Interview with Tapera Kapuya, 26 August 2007, Durban.

petrol-bombed or property confiscated.”²²⁷

The lack of movement towards the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis and the accompanying dire consequences of expressing discontent with the status quo led to a defeatist mentality and dampened spirits of people and activists alike. The March 2005 parliamentary elections recorded a voter turnout of 46 %²²⁸ and the opposition won only 41 seats, thus effectively losing 16 seats gained in the 2000 elections. In the November 2005 Senate elections, the voter turnout fell to 19.48%, which was the lowest in the history of post-independence Zimbabwe.²²⁹ However, things changed in 2008 where turnout for the presidential (first round) and House of Assembly elections were 43% and 41% respectively. What is interesting about the 2008 harmonised elections is that, despite showing a decline in voter turnout, the opposition managed to get a two-thirds majority. This represented a great triumph for Zimbabwean civil society, a development that must be duly recognised as such.

As already stated, for the first time since 1980, ZANU PF lost its two-thirds majority in March 2008. The argument being put forward here is that the people who were driven to the rural areas by the government under operation Murambatsvina probably played a central role in drumming up support for the opposition in the rural areas, demystifying certain myths about voting to rural people as well as delivering the actual vote. Thus Operation Murambatsvina is said to have inadvertently assisted the political opposition in making significant inroads in a number of former ZANU PF strongholds if one considers the results of the three polls held in Zimbabwe in 2008. Evidence seems to suggest that the people in the countryside now have more critical minds than before. Certainly they are in a better position than before when it comes to dealing with ZANU PF’s political machinations and without necessarily risking their lives. Indeed civil society and opposition were also instrumental in pushing for reforms to the Electoral Act during the Mbeki-led interparty talks. The result was that the electoral laws were amended to stipulate that after the close of a poll, counting of ballot papers takes place at every polling station. Thereafter results are displayed outside the polling station where they are visible to the public before being forwarded to the constituency electoral officer. Clearly, these reforms went a long way in dealing with the previous problem of electoral fraud, and as a result the electorate regained a semblance of faith in the electoral process. In the final analysis it can be concluded

²²⁷ Interview with Professor Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

²²⁸ Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Published in *The Sunday Mail* (Harare), 3 April, 2005.

²²⁹ Bertha Chiroro “Apathy, Fatigue, or Boycott? An analysis of the 2005 Zimbabwe Senate Elections,” *EISA Occasional Paper* no. 38 (November 2005):1.

that an embryonic decline of the state's hegemonic project was witnessed from 2008.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter sought to demonstrate how symbolic capital, violence and collective memory associated with the liberation war interwoven with colonially inherited repressive structures acted together ensure ZANU PF's predominance in Zimbabwean politics and society. The hegemonic project began in 1980 when ZANU PF sought to eliminate ZAPU, the failure of which led to a merger. The fact that former ZAPU members ceased to be viewed as dissidents after the Unity Accord suggests that identities are fluid and respond to changing political circumstances. As such since 1987, ex-ZIPRA combatants also took part in the brutal construction and maintenance of a predominant political order.²³⁰ After 1999 ZANU PF embarked on a more fundamental onslaught in legislative, judicial, and administrative spheres whose objective was to set in motion the hegemonic restructuring of state society relations through the establishment of a political discourse anchored on the history of the independence struggle, imperialism, land and racism. Essentially, the ZANU PF leadership managed to manipulate the content of identities associated with their participation in the war of liberation to justify their continued stay in power. It is arguable that impediments faced by the Zimbabwean civil society and opposition as they tried to deliver in relation to a post-nationalist liberation discourse of democratisation should be located within the context of a legacy of violence bequeathed upon Zimbabwe by both the colonial government and the nationalist movement. Thus the relative success of ZANU PF's domination was due to its ability to elicit compliance through brutality. Finally, the outcome of the 2008 election and the compromises that ZANU PF made within the auspices of the so called *Global Political Agreement*²³¹ seem to suggest that there is an incipient decline of state's hegemonic project.

²³⁰ JoAnn McGregor "The Politics of Disruption: War Veterans and the Local State in Zimbabwe," *African Affairs*, vol. 101, no. 402, (2002):29

²³¹ See Appendix.

CHAPTER FIVE

Social Movement Unionism and the Drive for Democracy

She had been arrested by Zimbabwean police after taking part in a peaceful protest outside a government complex. The marchers were asking for food aid, in a population where three-quarters of the population is starving under Robert Mugabe's oppressive regime. Bundled into a police van, Williams and a colleague were taken to prison and denied bail.¹

¹ Elizabeth Day, "The Woman who took on Mugabe," *The Guardian* (UK), 10 May 2009.

5.1 Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War and the concomitant collapse of the Soviet Union, the world economy began to restructure along neo-liberal lines. The war that pitted capitalist West and communist East was not only fought militarily, but also ideologically. Accordingly, economic policy positions enunciated by countries like the United States of America and Britain were inspired by the ideological leanings of a number of economists cum social philosophers of that time. This chapter seeks to describe and explain the phenomenal growth in civil society within the auspices of social movement unionism and the attendant impulse for participatory democracy that came into existence following the adoption of economic reforms in Zimbabwe. Thus there is a relationship between the extraordinary wave of political protest that gripped the country and the process of economic and social transformation that took place as a result of the implementation of the IMF-backed Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). As a result, this chapter's main theoretical inspiration is derived from Karl Polanyi's book, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origin of Our Times*, whose central thesis is that there is a major backlash against excessive commoditisation of life characteristic of free market capitalism.² In other words, the neoliberal discourse of globalisation or market ideology is inherently antithetical to democratic principles³ given that many countries tend to step up authoritarian measures when faced with a crisis of economic legitimacy. At the same time, the failure by the state to provide for the economic wellbeing of the population conjoined with repression forces many people to take an exit option – whereby people “vote with their feet” and end up in the diaspora. Consequently, the socio-economic and political dislocation that ensues is an epitome of “the effect of domination linked to integration within inequality”⁴ associated with a neoliberal economic order.

This chapter consists of four major sections. The first part is an overview of the concept of social movement unionism and contemporary perspectives on class and identity, while the second part discusses the relationship between educational expansion and working class formation in Zimbabwe. Thereafter the chapter is organised chronologically and first examines the context and impact of economic reforms and the concomitant changing relations between state and civil society, particularly with respect to the working class and the student movement.

² Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origin of Our Times* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954).

³ Vicki Birchfield, “Contesting the Hegemony of Market Ideology: Gramsci's ‘Good Sense’ and Polanyi's ‘Double Movement,’” *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1999):29.

⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Social Structures of the Economy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 228.

The process that led to the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) is discussed in the third section with the contribution of other sectoral civil society organisations such as theatre and arts, women and human rights lawyers towards democracy. The status of social movement mobilisation in a dysfunctional economy characterised by massive emigration is examined in the final section.

5.2 Social Movement Unionism and Contemporary Perspectives on Class and Class Identity

Class analysis is a “structural account of relationships of power, inequality and exploitation and simultaneously an account of consciousness, group formation and social movements as emancipatory social change.”⁵ It is worth noting that class analysis is said to be on the decline and perhaps redundant in academic circles because of its Marxist origin as well as its primary emphasis on conflict, exploitation and privilege.⁶ The middle class-working class distinction is increasingly being challenged in academic circles in light of the economic losses wrought by neoliberal globalisation to the working and middle classes. This explains why there is debate among scholars in relation to what constitute a working or middle class. However, discarding class analysis “obscures significant aspects of contemporary social dynamics and deprives us of a valuable analytical tool”⁷ that is significant in the study of state-society relations. Thus “Class was always only one source of political identity and action alongside race, religion, nationality, gender and others. To say class matters less now than it used to requires that one exaggerate its importance in the past and understate its importance at present.”⁸ Indeed, class analysis is still as relevant as ever if the contemporary national solidarity and identities forged by both working and middle classes under social movement unionism are anything to go by.

Current perspectives on class and identity slightly differ from orthodox Marxist theories though both are preoccupied with causes of inequality. Unlike the orthodox Marxist theories, contemporary perspectives on class are more flexible and all-encompassing in terms of their

⁵ Robert Holton, “Has Class Analysis a Future: Max Weber and the Challenge of Liberalism to Gemeinschaftlich Accounts of Class,” in *Conflicts About Class: Debating Inequality in Late Industrialism*, ed. David Lee and Bryan Turner (Harlow: Longman 1996), 27.

⁶ Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman “Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change During the Neo-Liberal Era,” *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 38, no. 1 (February 2003):42.

See also Vivek Chibber, “On the Decline of Class Analysis in South Asian Studies,” *Critical Asian Studies* vol. 38, no. 4 (2006):357-387.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Mike Hout, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, “The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Society,” in *Conflicts About Class: Debating Inequality in Late Industrialism*, ed. David Lee and Bryan Turner (Harlow: Longman, 1996), 56.

understanding of strategic relations of power and conflict among social groups.⁹ For the purposes of this thesis, the working class is broadly defined as a group comprising wage earners composed of unskilled, semi skilled and skilled sectors. In some countries, for example Zimbabwe and South Africa, the working class has close ties to the labour movement. However this is not to say the middle class (highly skilled workers in possession of a reasonable amount of discretionary income who do not live from hand to mouth¹⁰) is irrelevant to the discourse on democratisation. According to a recent report by *The Economist*, “the middle class can, and sometimes do, play an important role in creating and sustaining democracy, though on their own they are not sufficient to create it, nor do they make it inevitable.”¹¹ Though this discussion will constantly make reference to the working class, it does not imply that the role of the middle class is being relegated to the periphery. As pointed out earlier on, there is a lot of fluidity in terms of these classes and this makes a strong case for treating the middle and working classes as closely related.

Flowing from class analysis, social movement unionism is a distinct form of unionism premised on a different understanding of the role of the working class movement in qualitatively transforming society through fighting against injustices perpetrated by the state alongside national and global capital. However, it is instructive to note that the term social movement unionism is very ambiguous and lacks clarity in many respects due to its broad application and therefore must be understood as a “reassertion of the movement dimension of trade unionism under varying conditions.”¹² Trade unions in Brazil, the Philippines, South Africa and South Korea have metamorphosed from “merely” organising workers to being major actors (alongside a range of allied social movements) in the struggle for democracy, human rights and social justice and other facets of radical transformative politics.¹³ In a sense, social movement unionism signifies a significant shift in working class based social movements’ demands predominantly from the employer to the state. Thus social movement unionism sees alliances between different segments of civil society to deal with challenges associated with authoritarian regimes and global power of transnational capital.

⁹ Portes & Hoffman, 43.

¹⁰ Burgeoning Bourgeoisie: A Special Report on the New Middle Class in Emerging Markets, *Economist*, 14 February 2009.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Karl von Holdt, “Social Movement Unionism: The Case of South Africa,” *Work, Employment and Society*, vol. 16, no. 2 (June 2002):297.

¹³ Kim Scipes “Understanding the New Labor Movements in the “Third World”: The Emergence of Social Movement Unionism,” *Critical Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 2 (1992):81.

In social-movement unionism neither the unions nor their members are passive in any sense. Unions take an active lead in the streets, as well as in politics. They ally with other social movements, but provide a class vision and content that make for stronger glue than that which usually holds electoral or temporary coalitions together. That content is not simply the demands of the movements, but the activation of the mass of union members as the leaders of the charge – those who in most cases have the greatest social and economic leverage in capitalist society. Social-movement unionism implies an active strategic orientation that uses the strongest of society's oppressed and exploited, generally organised workers, to mobilise those who are less able to sustain self-mobilisation: the poor, the unemployed, the casualised workers, the neighborhood organisations.¹⁴

Clearly, working class based social movements seek to come up with counter hegemonic strategies that are geared towards protecting society from the vagaries of market forces. Social movement unionism is a response by unions to neo-liberal globalisation. The Danish General Workers union aptly summed it all by arguing that: “As trade unions we must be more open to enter into strategic alliances not only with our political allies, but with NGOs such as women's and youth organisations, social welfare, development and human rights, and environment and consumer organisations who share our general objectives.”¹⁵ It is a way through which the working class-based social movements adapt to new conditions and challenges brought about by globalisation with a view to remaining relevant to its constituency. Thus in a generic sense social movement unionism is part and parcel of “new” social movement representing a different and embryonic form of transformative politics¹⁶ but not necessarily different to what the Congress of South African Trade Unions was doing in the mid-1980s.

In South Africa, the period 1994-1997 was characterised by mass public sector political strikes across the country.¹⁷ The working class contested against austerity measures associated with neo-liberalism, privatisation of public utilities and the general “slashing of their nation's most basic services.”¹⁸ As previously highlighted, the free market gospel being preached by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund predispose society to take measures to protect itself against the excessive commoditisation of life. IMF and World Bank policies that allow for free reign of market forces led to worsening levels of poverty. In sum, with the advent of globalisation, the

¹⁴ Kim Moody, *Workers in a Lean World* (London: Verso, 1997), 276.

¹⁵ Ronald Munk, *Globalisation and Labour: The New “Great Transformation”*, (Zed Books: London, 2002), 16.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁷ Moody, 10.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

working class also fights against the dislocation of society through trade unions that in turn partner with like-minded organisations to provide democratic alternatives.

Flowing from above, it is therefore compelling to deal analytically and comprehensively with labour / working class responses to neoliberal globalisation in general and structural adjustment in particular. The transformation wrought by capitalism globally actually strengthened and provided a foundation for effective working class mobilisation and organised class struggle. The transformation process involves “a growing social movement of contestation” and its “potential to construct a democratic alternative”.¹⁹ This thesis posits that the transformation being discussed here takes place with the understanding that the urban working class have the greatest interest and capacity to generate and sustain pressures for socio-economic and political inclusion, thereby making a substantial contribution towards democratisation. In the final analysis, changes in structures of production “necessarily redefine class structures, class relations, and class interests” thereby explaining the “current forms of political activity among the majority of the world’s workers.”²⁰ A dynamic understanding of class explains why social movement unionism is on the rise.

5.3 Educational Expansion and Working-Class Formation in Zimbabwe

A substantial body of academic inquiry on the determinants of political participation singles out education as one of the most important factors in democracy and citizenship. Formal education also inculcates unintended attitudes, values and behaviour that predispose people to have an open and critical mind. Educational attainment of an individual acts as a sorting or selection mechanism that puts people into classes based on occupations and income.²¹ According to the social mobilisation theory, high income levels and educational attainment also allow for one’s greater involvement in voluntary associations and other networks where mobilisation for political purposes is easier and highly possible.²² The higher the educational attainment or literacy level of an individual, the greater the chances that one would want to influence public policy by engaging in politics. Thus an educated person tends to have more information about government and politics and therefore most likely to engage in politics. Converse is correct when

¹⁹ Munk, xi.

²⁰ Rina Agarwala, “From Work to Welfare: A New Class Movement in India,” *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 38, no. 4 (2006):439.

²¹ Cindy D. Kam and Carl L. Palmer, “Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political Participation,” *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 70, no. 3 (July 2008):613.

²² *Ibid.*, 613-14.

he eloquently argues that:

There is probably no single variable in the survey repertoire that generates as substantial correlations in such a variety of directions in political behaviour material as [the] level of formal education....But the domain of education as a predictor has to do with a large class of indicators of popular involvement and participation in politics. Whether one is dealing with cognitive matters such as level of factual information about politics and emotional involvement in political affairs; or questions of actual behaviour, such as engagement in any of a variety of political activities from party work to voter turnout itself: education is everywhere the universal solvent, and the relationship is always in the same direction.²³

However, results from the Power Inquiry in Britain suggest that in some countries, high literacy levels do not necessarily lead to political participation. The Power Inquiry revealed that British citizens are no longer actively participating in political matters despite the country's high literacy levels and educational attainment. So the idea that there is always a strong association between education and political participation must be treated with caution. The political significance of the process of class formation brought about by a rapid expansion in the field of education within a capitalist economy is profound. Zimbabwe's relatively well-developed capitalist economy with good infrastructure in tandem with improved educational levels produced a class formation with a potentiality for political action, qualitatively different from other third world countries.²⁴ As already indicated in Chapter 1, the political leadership in post-independence Zimbabwe sought to redress inequities and imbalances of the past in relation to access to basic needs, especially health and education – hence the policies of health and education for all. For an indication of the unparalleled growth in the education sector, consider Table 1 below.

Table 1: University Enrolments

Year	Public Universities	Private Universities	Total
1995	11 784	568	12 352
1996	16 166	933	17 099
1997	22 911	9266	23 917
1998	17 586	1 485	19 071
1999	26 122	1 706	28 192
2000	29 390	1 534	31 339
2001	33 334	1 419	34 753

²³ Phillip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, ed. A. Campbell and Phillip E. Converse (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 324.

²⁴ For this construction, I borrowed from Kenneth Good "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 14, no. 4 (December 1976):597-620.

Source: Ministry of Higher Education (2003), Zimbabwe²⁵

In 1991, there were 12 023 students who were enrolled at technical and vocational training colleges and by 1995 the figure had gone up to 14 436. On the other hand, there were 16 231 students at teacher training colleges in 1991 and the figure dropped slightly to 15 891 by 1995.²⁶ By 2007, an estimated 40 000 students were studying at universities in Zimbabwe, not to mention thousands studying abroad.²⁷ It is also estimated that yearly, despite meeting the entry requirements over 8 000 students fail to enter university due to stiff competition.²⁸ With respect to distance learning, the Zimbabwe Open University (ZOU) has a total of 24 000 part-time students, a figure that is not included in the list of institutions offering full time programmes.²⁹ Flowing from the big growth in the education sector after independence, the question that must be addressed is: “What were the implications of Zimbabwe’s unusual success story in educational expansion and improvement for the country’s political economy in general and democratisation in particular?”

It is worth noting that evidence from Zimbabwe demonstrates that education became a major social force influencing the balance of state and society in post-independent Zimbabwe. The improvements in literacy levels and rising levels of formal education, along with rapid urbanisation moulded many people’s expectations and aspirations. Educated Zimbabweans confidently expected that after having successfully “courted Miss Education” nothing was going to impede them in their quest for the good life. However, by 1987 the working class, middle class and students began to see the possibility that their hopes could be dashed given the socio-political and economic realities that prevailed at that time. Students decided to take a proactive role by seeking to deal with the challenges that the working class and middle class were grappling with in light of the economic recession the country was going through. Thus the student movement as a working and middle class in the making developed an embryonic class consciousness that predisposed them to see the difficult road that lay ahead of them once they entered the world of work. It is in good part for this reason that students initiated a fierce fight against corruption and a legislated one-party state as well as demonstrating against the general

²⁵ Cited in Michael Tonderai Kariwo, “Widening Access in Higher Education in Zimbabwe,” *Higher Education Policy*, vol.20, no. 1 (March 2007):55.

²⁶ Compiled from “*Development of Education National Report of Zimbabwe by Ministries of Education and Higher Education*” (national report presented to the 45th Session of the International Conference on Education, Geneva, 30 September -5 October 1996.)

²⁷ Kariwo, 55

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

decrease in the standard of living.

Accordingly, the objective reality above explains why workers and students became allies and collectively decided to reassert their autonomy from the state. These developments also partly explain when and how the early foundation of social movement unionism that was to flower a decade later through the formation of the NCA came about. Certainly, rapid expansion in education brought about profound changes in the country's social, economic and political structure. The number of post-independent tertiary institutions in Zimbabwe, their enrolment figures and the literacy levels are instructive. The formation of an urban, better-educated working class with rising demands on the state led to a change in the balance of power between the state and society. The nature of the civil society that is currently playing a central role in democratic struggles in Zimbabwe emerged from Mugabe's success story in improving literacy levels and formal education. Clearly, notwithstanding the hurdles, it is the country's highly educated population that is generating and sustaining pressures for democratic change in an unprecedented manner.

5. 4 Situating the Context of Economic Reforms in Zimbabwe

Despite the salience of the arguments raised by the World Bank in the so-called Berg Report and the 1989 World Bank report *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth* about Africa's economic problems,³⁰ the story is much more complex than the West propounds. To this end, the present day economic crisis needs to be viewed "as a product of the evolution of a complex system of historical relationships and the way these reacted to shocks to the world economy."³¹ The World Bank team believed that the root cause of Africa's economic problems was bad governance, and this understanding informs the kind of policy prescriptions that it advocated within the auspices of the Washington Consensus.³² However, from an earlier dependency perspective, Africa's economic problems emanate from colonialism and the subsequent integration of Africa into the global economy.³³ The integration of Africa into areas of international trade and finance is much more of a historical process that saw Africa being an

³⁰ See World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1989).

³¹ Christopher G. Locke and Fredoun Z. Ahmadi-esfahani, "The Origin of the International Debt Crisis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 40, no. 2 (April 1998):224.

³² Ibid.

³³ Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 9, no. 2 (1972):105-120.

exporter of primary products whilst importing finished products,³⁴ an objective reality that is conveniently ignored by the international financial institutions. The debt crisis that precipitated economic reforms needs to be located and understood within the context of the rise and fall of the developmental state. The idea of a developmental or interventionist state came into being as a result of the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917 as well as the vagaries of the 1930 Great Depression and the aftermath of the two World Wars.³⁵ The concept of a developmental state was coined by Chalmers Johnson, referring to the East Asian industrialisation of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, where the state was the major driver in development. Notwithstanding the fact that developmental states are fairly rare in Africa, Zimbabwe was a typical example up to the late 1990s. A developmental state can be defined in political, ideological and institutional terms as:

a state which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships that can support sustained industrialisation and which takes the goals of long-term growth and structural changes seriously, politically manages the economy to ease conflicts inevitable during the process of such change (but with a firm eye on the long term goals), and engages in institutional adaptability and innovation to achieve those goals.³⁶

A developmental state is controlled by people who have a stake in the economy, for example commercial farmers and leading industrialists who are conscious of the need for capacity building in an economy. It also entails advanced research in agriculture and industry followed by planning, implementation and manipulation of change towards the desired direction. For instance, the state had to intervene in the economic sphere because indigenous capital was weak while some projects had long gestation periods demanding huge capital outlays, and these were not attractive to private investors. To this end, a developmental state was to play an active and leading role in the economy through the establishment of state-owned enterprises. As a result, during periods of economic growth and generous international lending, developing countries successfully maintained the developmental state apparatus. This partly explains the prevalence of patron-client relations or the economy of affection in African politics where loyalty to a sitting government is rewarded by inducements from the state. A developmental state had a social contract with low and middle income urban groups that were supported by subsidised food, education, health public sector employment and other social welfare programmes.³⁷ Thus

³⁴ Alemayehu Geda Fole, "The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis," *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2003):73.

³⁵ Kehinde Olayode, "Reinventing the African State: Issues and Challenges for Building a Developmental State," *African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 8, nos 1&2 (2005):24.

³⁶ Meredith Woo-Cumings, "Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development," in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 27.

³⁷ Mridula Udayagiri and John Walton, "Global Transformation and Local Countermovement: The Prospects For

everything was based on norms of reciprocity among the population and the rulers.

However, it is the dismantlement of the developmental state by the IMF and World Bank neo-liberal policies that reinvigorates civil society and provides the impetus for democratisation. In general neo-liberal policies are meant to deal with the debt burden that arose in the process of building developmental states. However, with respect to non-developmental states like Zambia, much of the borrowed funds were “directed into immediate consumption or used as a cloak for incompetence,”³⁸ and not necessarily for well-thought-out economic programmes. In other words the debt crisis affected both developmental and non-developmental states in a similar way. In fact, the debt crisis was also a result of reckless lending by Western governments as they sought to deal with the Cold War security imperatives.³⁹ The period of the 1960s to 1970s witnessed a surge in primary commodity prices exported by developing countries, followed by a sharp bust in the 1970s.⁴⁰ When the price of primary commodities fell due to over-production and coupled with the first oil shock, third world countries resorted to more borrowing to deal with balance of payments problems.⁴¹ The understanding was that the fall of commodities prices was a temporary setback that would come to an end sooner rather than later.⁴²

However with time, interest rates skyrocketed and this inadvertently led to more debt as borrowing continued unabated to finance government expenditure. This condition became the harbinger of painful structural adjustment policies meant to ease balance of payments problems. In some cases part of the money borrowed from Northern banks was embezzled by the ruling elites. For example in the non-developmental states of Zaire and Nigeria, the sitting presidents looted the state coffers and deposited the monies in Swiss banks.⁴³ Considerable sums of money ostensibly borrowed to build developmental states or other economic programmes in non-developmental states were also spent on weaponry which essentially benefited both Eastern and Western arms manufacturers.

The developmental state and its social pact with low and moderate income urban groups collapsed with debt crises and austerity programs beginning in the early 1980s. On one hand, states lost the financial capacity to support

Democracy Under Neo-Liberalism,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 44, no. 4 (2003):314.

³⁸ Kenneth Good “Debt and the One-Party State in Zambia,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2 (June 1989):313.

³⁹ Locke and Ahmadi-esfahani, 231.

⁴⁰ Geda Fole, 74-75.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Alois Mlambo, “The Rich Shall Inherit the Earth” Towards an Analysis of the Role and Impact of IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Sahara Africa,” *Zambezia*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1993):57 -58.

extensive social welfare programs and public employment. On the other, IMF-designed and internationally sponsored structural adjustment programs (SAPs) required, as a condition of loan renegotiations, that states dismantle precisely the apparatus that made them developmental states.⁴⁴

The rest of this chapter seeks to test the relevance of global economic development theory and Karl Polanyi's double movement in relation to Zimbabwe. To what extent did it apply to Zimbabwe and what are its implications for the civil society and democratisation debate? Zimbabwe also experienced the Polanyian double movement notwithstanding the smaller and thinner scale.⁴⁵ Brief reference will be made to the historical factors that were central to the genesis of economic reforms that culminated in the fall of a colonially constructed developmental state in Zimbabwe.

As previously noted in Chapter 1, Zimbabwe experienced its own great transformation during the settler colonial era. That transformation continued in the post-independence era but the structural components of the economy were laid by the settler government, especially after UDI. In contemporary times, the great transformation entails the changes in structures of production during the transition from a welfare economy to a market driven economy alongside increased global economic integration. Essentially, the legacy of Rhodesian capitalism is the *sine qua non* for understanding post-independence socio-economic and political trajectories. The Rhodesian state was highly interventionist and the situation was aggravated by the need to defeat sanctions that were imposed following Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. As a matter of fact, Rhodesia's active and interventionist state "contributed to the evolution of a capitalist economy and carried far-reaching [political] implications."⁴⁶ The country inherited a massive foreign debt from the colonial government⁴⁷ that probably pushed Zimbabwe into the arms of the International Financial Institutions as it sought to repay the debt. Moreover, the ruling elite also experimented with capitalism that was laced with socialist rhetoric from independence to 2008. But according to Mandaza, in the final analysis, the government found itself religiously following the broad guidelines of international finance capital.⁴⁸

The evolution of economic policy making in post-independent Zimbabwe was a very

⁴⁴ Udayagiri and Walton, 314.

⁴⁵ For detailed accounts, see Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice* (Durban: University of Natal Press/Weaver Press, 2003) and Patrick Bond, *Uneven Zimbabwe: A Study of Finance, Development and Underdevelopment* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press, 1997).

⁴⁶ Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation," 605.

⁴⁷ Bond and Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge*, 9-15.

⁴⁸ Ibbo Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post White Settler Colonial Situation," in *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986*, ed. Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1986), 61.

contradictory endeavour given the need to “balance things out” as enshrined in the Lancaster House constitution. From 1980 to 1981 the economy experienced growth but due to the negative effects of drought, things began to change between 1982 and 1983.⁴⁹ The need to import drought relief food, coupled with massive social spending in education, health and agriculture, further strained the national economy. Consequently, as early as 1983, the government announced that austerity measures were needed to kick-start the economy.⁵⁰ To give an indication of the magnitude of social spending, primary education was free for the first 11 years after independence and as a result enrolment figures rose significantly at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The policy of equity in health, based on a primary care approach, led to a reduction in infant mortality rates. A welfare state improved the lives of many Zimbabweans, but entailed increased government spending against a backdrop of dwindling national resources. Ironically, it is the IMF team that encouraged the country to continue borrowing from its coffers despite prior existing debt inherited from the settler governments.⁵¹ Notwithstanding the colonial debt, international financial institutions did not have leverage to exert considerable policy influence on the country at that stage.

With time, the massive social welfare policies significantly increased government expenditure that resulted in failure by the government to live within its means. Budget deficits became a perennial problem due to cumulative losses that were incurred by various state-owned enterprises, primarily because the government was reluctant to pass on the exact costs to the consumer. There was a huge subsidy element in food, transport, electricity, education, health and other social services. During the first eight year after independence civil society was denied political space to articulate their views and those allowed to do so were forced to toe the ZANU PF party line.⁵² Such a corporatist strategy succeeded because both working and middle classes enjoyed a better standard of living since the economy was doing relatively well following the lifting of sanctions. Consequently, there were not so many demands on both the state and employers. On the other hand the IMF encouraged Zimbabwean technocrats to incrementally adopt economic reforms, a development that reached full throttle with the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990. Consequently:

The financing of budget deficits, which averaged 10 per cent of GDP during the 1980, contributed to the macro

⁴⁹ Jonathan N. Moyo, “State Politics and Social Domination in Zimbabwe,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2 (June 1992):313.

⁵⁰ Mandaza, 61-62.

⁵¹ Bond, *Uneven Zimbabwe*, 263.

⁵² Jonathan N. Moyo, “Civil Society in Zimbabwe,” *Zambezia* vol. 20, no. 1 (1993): 7-8.

economic difficulties during the decade. Financing the equivalent of 10 per cent of GDP each year not only has damaging effects on investment and consumption, but the debt servicing problems increased cumulatively. This was an important factor in pushing the government towards adopting ESAP in 1990.⁵³

Pressures for economic liberalisation, the rolling back of the state and the eventual adoption of ESAP came from the private sector and a pro-structural adjustment coalition of government technocrats, not necessarily from the IMF.⁵⁴ Effective lobbying by the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) led to the government embracing economic reforms.⁵⁵ Some scholars assert that Zimbabwe actually adopted economic reforms “at a time of economic improvement rather than immediate crisis, as illustrated by the achievement in the late 1980s of moderate growth, a positive balance of payments and a rapidly declining debt-service ratio.”⁵⁶ Moreover, Zimbabwe was said to have been better off than many African countries in terms of its account balance and the comparatively lower debt burden.⁵⁷ The drought of 1992 and the government’s reluctance to cut back on its expenditure led to more indebtedness and aid dependency⁵⁸ that was to be instrumental in effectively mortgaging the country’s economic policy making to the IMF.

5.4.1 Impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

Following the adoption of ESAP, a question that arises is how Zimbabwe fared under a neo-liberal order and its overall impact on the society at large? In light of the fact that the student movement and ZCTU worked closely together to oppose the socially disruptive consequences of the economic reforms, it can be inferred that the two civil society organisations were representative of those negatively affected by these economic reforms. Amendments to the 1987 Education Act led to the government charging for primary education which was previously free. Kanyongo (2005) aptly summed up the impact of economic reforms by arguing that ESAP:

helped in the liberalisation of the economy with the consequence that many people lost their jobs as local industrial companies closed down because of high competition from outside. The introduction of this program required the government to cut expenditure in social services sectors including education. The government therefore had to

⁵³ Carolyn Jenkins, “The Politics of Economic Policy-Making in Zimbabwe,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4 (December 1997):593.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 597.

⁵⁵ Tor Skålnes, “The State, Interest Groups and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe,” *The Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 29, no. 3 (April 1993):401-28.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 402.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 408.

⁵⁸ Jenkins, 593.

make the most of meagre resources to meet the educational and training needs of a growing young population...Poverty has become more acute and widespread, leading to many parents finding it difficult to afford school fees for their children. The period 1990-96 witnessed the introduction of cost-recovery policies with regard to education and health. The government scrapped a lot of subsidies in some basic services and commodities. The cumulative effects of these measures on the well-being of ordinary families have been devastating particularly concerning education of children and care of the sick.⁵⁹

It is arguable that the impact of economic reforms reverberated across all sectors of the economy. However, it was mostly felt by the urbanites and tertiary education students who had to contend with spiralling costs of living against a background of a significant drop in the real value of their wages and student grants respectively. As Mlambo notes, in 1991 there was a dramatic increase in the consumer prices index for low income urban families with food and transport going up by 64,7 % and 55, 4% respectively.⁶⁰ The substantial increase in the cost of living ignited political protests against the political establishment which was quick to respond by stepping up authoritarianism and violent measures against dissenting voices. The early period of resistance against economic reforms became the harbinger of state sponsored violence against dissenters as the state sought to protect itself from political turbulence. Consequently, urban areas and institutions of higher learning became sites of political activism as the two constituencies (labour and students) sought to protect themselves from the vagaries of economic structural adjustment.

There was no peace either for the workers, especially the civil servants who embarked on wild cat strikes that further hurt the already crippled economy in 1996. Eventually in 1997 the Zimbabwe government effectively dumped the IMF and World Bank supported economic reforms, prompting the two international institutions to turn their backs on Zimbabwe in 1997. Following the acrimonious separation with the IMF and the World Bank, the government ruined the economy when it committed very scarce financial resources towards compensating war veterans for their participation in the war of liberation, a military adventure in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and violently seized productive white-owned commercial farms.⁶¹

The next section describes and explains the impact of economic reforms on the working class,

⁵⁹ Gibbs Y. Kanyongo, "Zimbabwe's Public Education System Reforms: Successes and Challenges," *International Education Journal*, vol. 6, no. 1 (2005):71.

⁶⁰ Mlambo, "The Rich Shall Inherit the Earth," 68.

⁶¹ See Bond and Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge* and Booker Magure, "The State, Labour and the Politics of Social Dialogue in Zimbabwe 1996-2007: Issues Resolved or Matters Arising?" *African and Asian Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1 (2008):26.

students and other civil society organisations during the same period. Attention will also be given to the impediments that were encountered by these progressive social formations as they attempted to democratise Zimbabwe.

5.4.2 The Labour Movement (ZCTU)

ZCTU laid down a firm basis for social movement unionism at a Special Congress in 1988 when it pledged “To protect and advance full social and economic rights and development of all workers within and beyond trade unions.”⁶² Thus the relationship between the state and labour changed from corporatism to confrontation shortly after the Special Congress. In addition, from 1988 ZCTU refused to be incorporated into any political party structures but indicated that it was prepared to support policies of any political party that advanced the cause of the working class.⁶³ As a result of the sharp differences that followed between two former allies, ZANU PF went on to accuse ZCTU of harbouring political ambitions. It is worth noting that solidarity arrangements between ZCTU and the student movement began in 1989. When the government closed the University of Zimbabwe following student unrest in October 1989, ZCTU issued a press statement condemning the move as well as police campus raids and the “unleashing of hundreds of heavily armed riot police details onto young, unarmed students.”⁶⁴ The government went on to detain the then Secretary General of the ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai, under the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) for releasing an allegedly highly subversive press statement.⁶⁵ However, the High Court ordered that Tsvangirai be released but his freedom was short-lived because he was re-detained under the emergency powers. Later in 1992, ZCTU managed to successfully challenge provisions of LOMA that outlawed demonstrations. This was after a group of unionists was arrested following a demonstration against economic reforms and the government’s unilateral amendment of the Labour Relations Act.⁶⁶

In April 1990 the ZCTU General Council resolved to fully support political pluralism and to strongly resist any move towards a legislated one-party state.⁶⁷ At the 1990 May Day celebrations,

⁶² N. Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for Democracy: State-Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe” (PhD diss., Roskilde University, 1994), 341.

⁶³ Albert Musarurwa, “The Labour Movement and the One Party Debate,” in *The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate*, eds. Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (Harare: SAPES Books, 1991):153.

⁶⁴ Welshman Ncube, “Constitutionalism, Democracy and Political Practice in Zimbabwe,” in *The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate*, eds. Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (Harare, SAPES Books, 1991), 167.

⁶⁵ Tengende, 347.

⁶⁶ Lucien van der Walt, “Trade Unions in Zimbabwe: For Democracy, Against Neo-Liberalism,” *Capital and Class*, Issue 66 (Autumn 1998):105.

⁶⁷ Tengende, 152.

ZCTU displayed banners denouncing the one-party state and the state of emergency while some demanded harmonised labour laws and the right to engage in collective job action.⁶⁸ Students also joined the Workers' Day celebrations and equally denounced the continued retention of emergency powers and their use on oppositional elements and trade unionists.⁶⁹ In the final analysis, 1988-1990 was a watershed in Zimbabwean politics given that the period saw "the emergence of a deep-rooted urban political alienation from nationalist discourse, and the rapid maturing of political consciousness."⁷⁰ Following government adoption of economic reforms, ZCTU led a concerted campaign against the ZANU PF led government for embracing an economic blueprint that was increasing levels of abject poverty. According to Mlambo (1993), the relaxation of price controls led to an unprecedented increase in basic commodities between 1991 and 1993.⁷¹ Furthermore, at a political level ZCTU criticised the government's response to the student movement's struggle against corruption and the one-party state.⁷² This set the stage for embryonic links between the student and labour movements that were to remain tenuous until 1996-1997 when the NCA was formed. In an interview with Patrick Bond, Tsvangirai, the then Secretary General of the ZCTU, was prophetic when he predicted that:

What we are looking for in Zimbabwe is a democratic space. Because what is going to be sacrificed in this programme [ESAP] is democracy. When people go to the streets, complaining about these things, the state will be forced to use power to quell these riots, and in fact one of the ironies is that we are arming our own people—the police and the army—to turn against our people....At the end of the day we become the marginalised group, because the government has put itself in a position so that it cannot take a stand against the IMF. The only way to defend against international capital marginalising further the indigenous businessman, the worker, the peasant, is to have all these groups together.⁷³

In addition, the deterioration in the real value of wages reached its peak in 1994 and prompted the government to continuously urge the working class to tighten their belts for the good of the country. There was a decline in real wages from an index of "122 in 1982 to 88 in 1997 and a drop in the share of real wages in the gross national income from 54 per cent in 1987 to 39 per cent in 1997."⁷⁴ Ironically, top government officials were awarded hefty salary increases, a

⁶⁸ Ibid., 354.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Patrick Bond, "Radical Rhetoric and the Working Class during Zimbabwean Nationalism's Dying Days," *Journal of World-Systems Research*, vol. vii, no. 1 (Spring 2001):63-64

⁷¹ Mlambo, "The Rich Shall Inherit the Earth," 68.

⁷² Brian Raftopoulos, "Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in Zimbabwe," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 55 (November 1999):59.

⁷³ Bond, "Radical Rhetoric," 64.

⁷⁴ Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimister, "Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion," *Historical Materialism*, vol. 12, no. 4 (2004):358.

development that sparked widespread worker unrest in banking, telecommunications, construction, insurance and health.⁷⁵ It increasingly became difficult to engage in collective job action in light of the fact that the government increased the scope of “essential services”. In 1996, ZCTU came up with a document entitled *Beyond ESAP* which was both a critique and a desire for corporatist technical solutions⁷⁶ (or social dialogue) to deal with socio-economic and political problems. The policy document was an attempt by ZCTU to engage the IMF and the state in a constructive debate on ESAP but its major weakness was the vast “neo liberal policy concessions”.⁷⁷ As a result of ZCTU’s endeavour to engage the International Financial Institutions and the state, the frosty relations between labour and government relatively improved. However this was short-lived given that workers could not cope with the high cost of living precipitated by the rolling back of the state. There were wildcat strikes in the public sector comprising 160 000 workers⁷⁸ beginning in August 1996, followed by an unsuccessful two-day solidarity strike by ZCTU in November the same year. The public sector union (Apex Council) was formally incorporated into the ZCTU general council in 1996 though it formally started to pay union dues to ZCTU in 1998.⁷⁹ For an indication of the trends in strike action from 1991 to 2000, statistics from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare show there were a total of 5 strike actions in 1991, 65 in 1995, 232 in 1997, 119 in 1998, 148 in 1999 and 130 in 2000.⁸⁰ This suggests that worsening employment situations predisposed workers to engage in collective job action.

These developments in the workplace from 1997 onwards were taking place in tandem with what was also taking place within NCA and the student movement. The year 1997 saw workers in both private and public sectors engaging in more collective job actions, while on the other hand the former freedom fighters started to demand compensation for participating in the war of liberation. As a result of the 1997 rioting and other disturbances, the government used the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act to ban all strikes and demonstrations, and this further widened the rift between ZCTU and the government. What shocked a considerable number of Zimbabweans, particularly the middle and working classes, was the fact that the government sought to pay former freedom fighters through imposing a 2,5% hike in sales tax

⁷⁵ Suzanne Dansereau, “Zimbabwe: Labour’s Options Within the Movement for Democratic Change,” *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 28, no. 89 (September 2001):405.

⁷⁶ Bond, “Radical rhetoric,” 64.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁷⁸ Lucien van der Walt, 87.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 87-88.

⁸⁰ Data was supplied by Mr Mafuratidze, Chief Labour Officer – Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, December 2007.

and a 5% levy on wages. On 9 December 1997, ZCTU organised a general strike against the levy and sales tax but riot police descended heavily on the striking workers.⁸¹ The government relented and agreed to scrap the levy but two days later Tsvangirai was savagely beaten in his office and almost left for dead by unidentified assailants.⁸²

High taxation, low wages and the high cost of living further triggered workers' militancy. In many countries political demonstrations or food riots are a response to austerity measures. During the 18th century food riots in England, the working class was the major participant in the disturbances.⁸³ One clear proposition about food riots is that they are purposefully organised political actions targeting institutions and individuals who are held "responsible for unjust practices."⁸⁴ On 19 January 1998 spontaneous food riots or "IMF riots" broke out in a number of town and cities in Zimbabwe, and police and the army with their armoured cars and helicopters were deployed country-wide.⁸⁵ More than 3 000 people were arrested and an unknown number of people shot dead by security forces, though some conservative estimates put the figure at 20 people. In March 1998 ZCTU organised a two-day mass stay-away to protest against a development levy and an increase in sales tax, and the government again reacted by unleashing violence and threatening to deregister the ZCTU.⁸⁶

As a result of the 1998 impasse between labour and government, business representatives persuaded the two parties to discuss their issues in a tripartite negotiating chamber called the Tripartite Negotiating Forum.⁸⁷ Labour agreed to social dialogue given that it was an arrangement it had always wanted, a position clearly stated in the *Beyond ESAP* policy document. During the same period, ZCTU also demonstrated alongside the NCA against worsening poverty and the government's military intervention in Kabila's Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. Kabila rewarded Mugabe and his cronies, particularly in the military, with lucrative contracts in the mining sector, while the financial cost of the war was borne by ordinary Zimbabweans whose economy was destroyed in the process. In 1999 ZCTU withdrew from the TNF and convened the People's Constitutional Convention (PCC), discussed under section 5.5 on the NCA. It is worth noting that in June 1999 ZCTU was mandated by a Special General

⁸¹ Lucien van der Walt, 89.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ John Walton & David Seddon, *Free markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment* (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1994), 28.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 29.

⁸⁵ Lucien van der Walt, 90.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ The author was the head of the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) Secretariat from 2003 to March 2006.

Council meeting to form a worker-led political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which was launched in September 1999. In an interview with Patrick Bond, Tsvangirai indicated that MDC's post-nationalist and post-neo-liberal project entailed:

In many ways...moving from the nationalist paradigm to politics grounded in civic society and social movements. It's like the role and influence that in South Africa, the labour movement and civil society organisations had over the African National Congress in the early 1990s. MDC politics are not nationalist inspired, because they focus more on empowerment and participation of the people. ZANU PF's nationalist thinking has always been top-down, centralised, always trapped in a time warp. Nationalism was an end in itself instead of a means to an end. One of ZANU PF's constant claims is that everyone in Zimbabwe owes the nationalist movement our freedom. It's therefore also become a nationalism based on patronage and cronyism.⁸⁸

The MDC, a worker-led party won 57 seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections whilst ZANU PF won 62, despite the fact that the former party was only a few month old. Consequently a number of developments took place after this landmark poll. The first development relates to the government's creation of the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) after it failed to neutralise or take over the most representative and powerful labour centre.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the ZFTU worked hand-in-glove with the government. ZFTU expressed solidarity with the ZANU PF government with respect to sanctions, alleged Western interference in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe, and in vilifying the opposition MDC and civil society allies as unpatriotic. The leaders of the ZFTU were never on the wrong side of the law, as proved by the fact that its leaders were never subject to harassment by state security agents. On the other hand, the ZCTU leadership and members had to endure harassment, wanton arrests and physical assaults. For example, on 13 September 2006, the ZCTU organised a demonstration against excessive taxation in line with international labour standards governing freedom of association and the right to organise. The ZFTU organised a counter-demonstration and mobilised its own people to go into town but only the ZCTU leaders were arrested and subjected to brutal assaults.⁹⁰ It is against this background that, in September 2006, the opposition MDC moved a motion in Parliament condemning "the savage and brutal physical attacks on ZCTU leaders, workers and other peace loving Zimbabweans"⁹¹ who exercise their democratic right to express themselves.

In another example the ZFTU made headlines in the government-controlled newspaper, *The*

⁸⁸ Bond, "Radical rhetoric," 67-68.

⁸⁹ See Amin Y. Kamete, "The Return of the Jettisoned: ZANU-PF's Crack at 'Re-Urbanising' in Harare," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 2006):269.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Innocent Gonese, "Motion – Physical Assaults on ZCTU Leaders," House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 27 September 2006, vol. 33, no. 12.

Herald, where it condemned the fraternal relations between ZCTU, Congress of South African Trade Unions and the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions.⁹² Coincidentally, ZFTU members are addressed as comrades, just like ZANU PF cadres address each other. In line with the government's position, *The Herald* quoted ZFTU's Secretary General, Kennias Shamuyarira, who charged that:

Cosatu and the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions planned a series of demonstrations in their countries to protest against alleged violations of human rights by the Zimbabwean Government. The two labour unions are being used by British imperialists and their allies to demonise Zimbabwe and this cannot be accepted from a labour centre. It is not sincere and correct. If Cosatu were so sincere they should have also called for the lifting of the illegally imposed sanctions which have caused untold suffering to the ordinary worker.

The government also attempted to infiltrate and control the ZCTU through divide-and-rule tactics. The objective was to unseat the current ZCTU leadership and to replace it with ZANU PF sympathisers. The CIO assisted a clique within the ZCTU to try and unseat the incumbent leadership. This was done in exchange for leadership positions relinquished by those pressurised to resign and other pecuniary benefits.⁹³ In terms of the legislation governing labour relations in Zimbabwe, the Labour Act also assists the state to carve out a model and structure of a Labour Centre acceptable to it. Despite benefiting from the labour law reforms sponsored by the ILO/SWISS Project on Social Dialogue and Conflict Transformation, the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) remains biased against trade unions. According to ZCTU President Lovemore Matombo, in terms of provisions of the act:

Trade unions are not allowed to strike or to assemble in any way because there is always a clause that says (a) can be done subject to...In Zimbabwe, there has never been any collective job action that has been legitimated by the Government through the Ministry of Labour. The only legitimised strikes are those which relate to a Labour court judgement. In other words only the Labour court can determine whether the strike is legal or not.

Finally, Operation Murambatsvina, which saw millions of people being driven out of urban areas, was meant to undermine civil society and opposition as previously indicated. Thus urban areas became a contested space where "Symbolic oppositions of 'us' and 'them' are central to the construction of an identity within the representation of space."⁹⁴ Just to reiterate, Operation Murambatsvina that saw the government presiding over the destruction of people's homes was a

⁹² "ZFTU Blasts SA, Zambian Trade Union Groups," *The Herald* (Harare), 16 May 2008.

⁹³ For a detailed account, see Magure, 37-41.

⁹⁴ Gareth A. Jones, "The Latin American City as Contested Space: A Manifesto," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 1994):7-8.

strategic pre-emptive measure against urban areas that happen to be premier sites of political activism. Indeed it was the urbanites that had voted consistently for the opposition since its formation. Clearly, the urban dwellers were either ZCTU members or former members before joining the informal sector following retrenchments that came as a result of economic reforms. Informal traders were accused of sabotaging the economy through black-market activities

The informal sector is an important source of employment and livelihood for many people in a number of developing countries. In Zimbabwe, formal employment shrunk due to economic reforms, declines in foreign direct investment, and reduced productivity in both agriculture and manufacturing industries due to capacity underutilisation, developments that led to companies retrenching their workers. Some retrenched workers used their severance packages to start small businesses in the informal sector. ZCTU assisted in the formation of the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA) and also created an informal sector desk within its structures. This was after a growing realisation that a number of former union members were now eking out a living through earnings from the informal economy. However the major challenge encountered relates to the difficulties associated with organising workers in the informal economy.

Notwithstanding the fact that not all informal traders were affiliated to the ZCTU, almost the entire sector was targeted in the retributive exercise because of suspected links with the ZCTU during the time they were involved in the formal sector. From a ZANU PF point of view “A leopard doesn’t change its spots – once ZCTU always ZCTU.”⁹⁵ In light of the fall in the real value of wages, a considerable number of working class people supplemented their meagre incomes through participating in the informal economy. For example, some cross-border traders who bought goods for resale in neighbouring countries were formally employed people, and they were also not spared from the brutal operation.

Operation Murambatsvina negatively affected people involved in the informal economy given that their working premises were destroyed; it became increasingly difficult for traders to sell their wares, and in some cases demand for their goods and services declined as most people relocated to the rural areas. In some instances, the supply side of goods for resale was also adversely affected. Following these developments that saw people even losing a totality of their investments, levels of poverty increased sharply. However the impact of the operation was felt

⁹⁵ Informal discussion with General Secretary of Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA), Elijah Mutemeri, 19 December 2007, Harare.

when the situation relatively stabilised, because it made it even more difficult for ZCTU to organise and get support from people in the informal sector, a subject discussed later in section 5.8 of this chapter.

Accordingly, it was in the interests of the state to drive the people away to the rural areas which are no-go areas for civil society but are under the control of the youth militias, war veterans and traditional leaders. This development evokes Mamdani's thesis of the citizens and subjects. However this study is alive to the fact that the operation was conducted in a non-partisan manner and people from across the political divide were affected. With fewer people available in the urban areas (as sites of activism or fields of protest) it became easy to control the remaining people if they decided to demonstrate against the government. However, as already noted, the excellent showing by the opposition in the March 2008 parliamentary elections in former ZANU PF strongholds in the rural areas could be attributed to the forced urban rural migration that resulted in change of political inclination. The change can be explained by the dissemination of political information by the former urbanites affected by Operation Murambatsvina, now domiciled in the rural areas. However more research needs to be done around the long term impact of the operation.

5. 4.3 The Student Movement (ZINASU)

This thesis will draw its examples mainly from the University of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) because they were two main targets of government repression given their historical militant background and numerical strength. In addition, the author was a former student at two tertiary institutions and therefore has first-hand information as a participant observer. The Zimbabwe student movement in general and the University of Zimbabwe in particular has a long and "honourable history of protest against state politics",⁹⁶ This was so despite the fact that the settler state had warned students and lecturers not to participate in national politics in 1966.⁹⁷ Students and some lecturers went against the directive, resulting in the expulsion of students and deportation of academics such as Terence Ranger and Kenneth Good in the early 1970s. The African student population rose from 74 in 1962 to 468

⁹⁶ Angela P. Cheater, "The University of Zimbabwe: University, National University, State University or Party University?" *African Affairs*, 90 (1991):194. See also Alois Mlambo, "Student Protest and State Reaction in Colonial Rhodesia: The 1973 Chimukwembe Student Demonstration at the University of Rhodesia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3. (September 1995):473-490; and Rudo Gaidzanwa "The Politics of the Body and the Politics of Control: An Analysis of Class, Gender and Cultural Issues in Student Politics at the University of Zimbabwe, *Zambezia*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1993):15-33.

⁹⁷ Tengende, 135.

by 1973,⁹⁸ but these black students did not contribute much with respect to fighting settler oligarchy because of their small population and disunity. Notwithstanding the divisions within the African section of the student body, a number of them played a supportive role towards the liberation movement. Most spectacular was the 1973 Chimukwembe⁹⁹ or Pots and Pans demonstration¹⁰⁰ that followed racist statements by Bob Simmonds who was a Rhodesian Front legislator for Mutoko. Simmonds lamented the “deplorable decline in civilised standards” in Manfred Hudson male hall of residence caused by African students.¹⁰¹ After the demonstration a number of students were arrested and expelled and the ruthless response scaled down student activism until the eve of independence.¹⁰²

It is worth reiterating that during the first few years after independence, labour and the student movement were like extensions of ZANU PF. It was common practice for students to demonstrate in solidarity with government on a number of policy positions. However with time, the student movement’s stance towards government changed from active and sometimes passive support to serious confrontation. Many scholars agree that the student movement in Zimbabwe was the first to break ranks with ZANU PF due to the latter’s failure to deal with elite corruption and to turn the economy around.¹⁰³ As noted earlier, there were calls for economic reform to deal with an under-performing economy as early as 1983 and indeed the government believed that the neo-liberal path was the way to go, as proved by incremental adoption of economic reforms without prior consultation.

Cheater detailed legislative measures taken by the government from independence to 1991 to control the operations of the University of Zimbabwe. For example, the 1982 University of Zimbabwe Act and the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 1990 seriously undermined the autonomy of the University.¹⁰⁴ The laws removed the administrative and academic autonomy, thereby contravening the University the World University Service’s 1988 Lima Declaration.¹⁰⁵ There was a sense in which the promulgated laws and amendments fell short of being “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society”.¹⁰⁶ Prior to 1988, successive student representative councils avoided contentious national politics. The 1986-1987 SRC mirrored the

⁹⁸ Ibid., 138.

⁹⁹ Mlambo, “Student Protest,” 476.

¹⁰⁰ Tengende, 139-140.

¹⁰¹ Mlambo, “Student Protest,” 475.

¹⁰² Tengende, 143.

¹⁰³ Cheater, 195.

¹⁰⁴ Cheater, 203.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Fortune Chamba, 14 December 2007, Harare.

character of the national leadership in political affairs when it banned *Focus*, a students' magazine, for allegedly being inflammatory and defamatory in character.¹⁰⁷ However, the student movement was the first to break ranks with the government under the leadership of Arthur Mutambara in 1988. Mutambara's SRC came to power "amidst a political demobilisation" of student activism by the previous student union.¹⁰⁸ Naturally the new leadership was under immense pressure to change the image of the student body. According to Cheater:

At the beginning of the 1988 academic year, in late March, the University of Zimbabwe Students' Representative Council (SRC) issued a 'Nine-Point Ultimatum', complaining about the inadequacy of student grants and loans (which had been badly eroded, like workers' wages, by inflation), together with accommodation and other campus facilities stressed by the five-fold increase in the student body since Independence and the consequent ever-falling standards of living and studying.¹⁰⁹

For Tengende the "Nine-Point Ultimatum" was a watershed in student politics in the sense that it recognised the conjoined nature of University problems and national problems.¹¹⁰ As a result, student politics assumed a much broader and national character despite the refusal of the government to accede to the students' demands enunciated in the 'Nine-Point Ultimatum'. From July 1988 students began to identify themselves with Edgar Tekere, an outspoken and maverick politician who was against the establishment of a one-party state and pervasive corruption amongst the ruling elite. Students later held an on-campus demonstration denouncing ZANU PF for seeking to censure Tekere for his stance against corruption.¹¹¹ When the 1988-1989 SRC came into office in September 1988 it unanimously agreed to stage an anti-corruption demonstration. On 29 September 1988, the Arthur Mutambara-led student representative council distributed an Anti-Corruption Document that denounced corruption by government ministers and party officials.¹¹² The document deplored the demonisation of ZCTU, intolerance of divergent views, the lack of movement in relation to land reform and lack of accountability and press freedom.¹¹³ Finally the document also "challenged the monopoly of the ruling party [ZANU PF] leadership of the legacy of the liberation struggle."¹¹⁴

The students applied for permission from the police to hold the anti-corruption demonstration

¹⁰⁷ Tengende, 296.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 297.

¹⁰⁹ Cheater, 195.

¹¹⁰ Tengende, 99.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 306.

¹¹² Ibid., 315

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

and permission was granted on condition that the demonstration was confined to the University of Zimbabwe campus. However, students refused to bow down to the state pressure to hold the demonstration on campus. There were serious disturbances that resulted in a number of students being injured and arrested. In the aftermath of the demonstration, five lecturers were arraigned before the courts for allegedly masterminding the demonstration, while a Kenyan Law lecturer, Shadreck Gutto, was deported under the Immigration Act.¹¹⁵ However, hardly two months later, President Mugabe was forced to constitute a commission of enquiry, hereinafter called the Sandura Commission, to deal with ruling elite corruption. The corruption saga, which later became known as the Willowgate scandal, was exposed by Geoffrey Nyarota in the *Chronicle* newspaper. The ZANU PF party cadres were allegedly using their positions to corruptly acquire vehicles at a low price and then selling them at an obscenely huge profit. For Cheater the students'

sharpest weapon was their symbolic rejection of the politicians' claim to legitimacy on the basis of having fought the liberation war: what good was the struggle, they asked, when Zimbabweans were starving? When inflation had eroded wage increases? When the economy was mismanaged? When only those in power were enjoying the material things of a decent lifestyle and were corrupt?¹¹⁶

In light of their achievements the previous year, the student body decided to hold an Anti-Corruption Commemorative Gala in 1989 with a view to "intensify the struggle until final victory."¹¹⁷ ZCTU was invited to the gala, a development that signalled the nascent stages of the relevance of social movement unionism in Zimbabwe. More evidence of an incipient social movement unionism can be gathered from the fact that the student movement alongside ZCTU and Tekere's Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) all converged on their general critique of government performance. There was serious rioting when the police thwarted the gala and the SRC issued a document entitled "*In Defence of Academic Freedom*, couched in the rhetorical style of a Zimbabwean political rally."¹¹⁸ The document voiced students' opposition to the one party state and demanded that the opposition party ZUM be granted permission to hold its rallies.¹¹⁹ The document on academic freedom also stated that:

More significantly as we fight to sustain and maintain the democracy of the union, we see the essence of extending this to the national framework. This position is intended to ensure the existence of national democracy in the

¹¹⁵ Ncube, 166.

¹¹⁶ Cheater, 196.

¹¹⁷ Tengende, 340.

¹¹⁸ Cheater, 197.

¹¹⁹ Tengende, 344.

country, a necessary precondition for the mobilisation of the working class. Thus any condemnation of police prevention of ZUM rallies is from the principled grounds of sustaining national democratic rights and not our allegiance to ZUM.¹²⁰

After the press statement police raided, brutally assaulted and charged student leaders for printing and circulating a subversive document. The new-look ZCTU led by Morgan Tsvangirai was also on the receiving end of the government security apparatus for daring to support the students' position and calling for their unconditional release. Tsvangirai was arrested for exercising an act of solidarity with the "voice of the voiceless". Be that as it may, it is evident that the student movement was to "become a seed bed for an emergent civil society."¹²¹ The Soviet Union had disintegrated following the momentous changes that took place under Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*. The implications were far-reaching and therefore academics like the late University of Zimbabwe's Professor of Politics, Masipula Sithole, chided the government for seeking "to go where others are coming from!"¹²² This was in reference to the ZANU PF's idea of seeking to establish a one party socialist state when conditions on the ground had changed.

From 1990 onwards there was no semblance of peace at the University of Zimbabwe and other institutions of higher learning. It is essential to note that the student magazine, the *UZ Informer*, was banned under AIPPA while student meetings were also prohibited under POSA, a development that made the mobilisation of students extremely difficult.¹²³ Student leaders were generally suspended or expelled from tertiary institutions while court rulings in their favour were ignored.¹²⁴ When student leaders were suspended and barred from entering any state-owned educational institution, fellow students withdrew from politics because they knew the serious consequences associated with political participation. As a result of the prevalence of a repressive legislation and overzealous university security guards, it became very difficult to mobilise students for any form of collective action.

The ZINASU was formed in 1986 and is the mother body of all tertiary institutions in Zimbabwe. In general, it consists of Students Representative Councils (SRCs) from all institutions of higher learning in Zimbabwe. However, it was defunct for many years after its

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Leo Zeilig, "Increasing My Value Proposition to the Struggle: Arthur Mutambara and Student Politics in Zimbabwe," *African Sociological Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2006):96.

¹²² Masipula Sithole, "Should Zimbabwe Go Where Others are Coming From?" in *The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate*, eds. Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (Harare: SAPES Books),73.

¹²³ Zeilig, 96.

¹²⁴See "'It's Politics, Stupid'" A Report on Mass Evictions of Resident Students at the University of Zimbabwe, July 2007." Report by the Zimbabwe Student Union (ZINASU), July 2007.

formation because other tertiary institutions were not happy about the predominance of the University of Zimbabwe Student Representative Council in its structures.¹²⁵ Essentially other Student Representative Councils from other tertiary institutions decided not to support ZINASU primarily because of the dominant status of the University of Zimbabwe student leaders in the organisation. However, ZINASU was revived in 1997 under the leadership of the late MDC legislator, Learnmore Judah Jongwe. The new-look ZINASU got support from other tertiary institutions and student unions, for example the National Union of Students in Polytechnic Colleges (NUSPOTTECH). From that time, ZINASU became a powerful and important ally of many progressive voices in Zimbabwe, notably the NCA. In light of this development, ZANU PF sought to forestall the growth of a social movement opposed to its rule. This was achieved through the University of Zimbabwe Ordinance 30, an oppressive legal instrument at the disposal of the government to discipline students. Ordinance 30 details what constitute transgressions that are in violation of the University's rules of conduct and discipline and is mainly used to suspend student leaders. In the final analysis, Ordinance 30 infringes on students' rights, particularly the freedom of assembly and the right to organise.

Furthermore, the government sought to destabilise ZINASU and created a splinter student movement just like what was witnessed in the labour movement. For instance, the state sponsored a rival student union called the Zimbabwe Congress of Student Unions (ZICOSU). The government weeded out progressive student leaders through expulsions and suspensions and also created splinter student unions to contain student activism. Just like the situation that obtained in the trade unions sector with respect to ZFTU, ZICOSU worked closely with government spies and strongly condemned the relationship between ZINASU, NCA and MDC. The leadership of the government-sponsored student movements were usually former graduates of the National Youth Service training centres infamously known as "Green Bombers." From 2000 the government waived the merit principle when it enrolled Green Bombers who did not meet the entry requirements into colleges and universities. That development gave "political spies a chance to get education at the expense of deserving citizens."¹²⁶ State security agents arrested student leaders and their followers who assembled for meetings and demonstrations so as to forestall student union activism.¹²⁷

From 1996-1998 the government embarked on full scale privatisation in relation to catering and

¹²⁵ Interview with Daniel Molokele, 16 September 2007, Johannesburg.

¹²⁶ "ZINASU Raps Enrolment Policy," *Daily News* (Harare), 29 April 2003.

¹²⁷ Interview with Tamuka Chirimambowa, 22 August 2007, Durban.

accommodation services at colleges and universities country-wide and retrenched thousands of workers in the process. Under the new dispensation, universities and colleges were to preoccupy themselves with their core business of teaching. For the greater part of 1997 students at the University of Zimbabwe fought running battles with the riot police as they made last ditch attempts to halt the privatisation of the Department of Accommodation and Catering services. However nothing materialised, a situation that led to violent agitation on the part of the students at institutions of higher learning across Zimbabwe. On the other hand, over time the previous free education policy started to positively impact on the student numbers enrolling at the University of Zimbabwe as they increased from 2 240 in 1980 to 10 139 in 2001.¹²⁸ The number of students that enrolled at UZ was closely related to the increased access to education since independence. As already noted, a similar trend was witnessed in a number of other tertiary institutions across the country. While this development numerically strengthened the student movement, it also put a strain on resources such as student grants and on-campus accommodation. Meanwhile, the continued economic malaise prompted the government to introduce a Fifty Percent Fee Policy for tertiary institutions, which irked students because their grants were cut by half. This prompted the Zimbabwe Student Union (ZINASU) and the ZCTU to scale up their explicit political demands for the government to scrap ESAP, which they dubbed the “Extended Suffering of African People”. From 1996 onwards, students at tertiary institutions in general and the UZ in particular fought running battles with the police as they demonstrated against the new fee structure and the attendant high cost of living.

In addition, it is essential to detail a number of measures that were taken by the government in conjunction with the university authorities to make it difficult for the University of Zimbabwe Students Executive Council (UZ SEC) to operate. The objective was to prevent students from freely associating and organising together. Firstly, the “veil of unionism that was supposed to protect student leaders was virtually torn apart because student leaders were victimised, harassed, tortured and detained by the regime.”¹²⁹ Secondly, since 1999 tertiary institutions were disallowed from having a check-off system for student union membership fees. For example, at the University of Zimbabwe “the administration put up notices to the effect that during orientation week no student leader was allowed to collect student union fees from first year students since it would disrupt the smooth running of the registration process.”¹³⁰ However, the truth of the matter was that the University of Zimbabwe administration wanted to frustrate the activities of

¹²⁸ Zeilig, 108.

¹²⁹ Interview with Fortune Chamba, 14 December 2007, Harare.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

the Student Executive Council by denying the organisation its source of operational funds. In addition, the Student Union building that used to be the Student Executive Council's main source of funds was closed in 2005 after the University of Zimbabwe administration lost the legal battle to take over the SU building. Clearly, without any source of funding, the student movement was weakened.

Finally, the student movement was dealt a heavy blow following the politically motivated mass eviction of resident students in July 2007.¹³¹ The official reason for the eviction was that the students had vandalised university property when they demonstrated against increased fees. However, the main reason for the eviction was to strike at the epicentre of students' political protest. The economic problems that bedevilled the country meant many students were not in a position to commute to campus daily for lectures and tutorials, let alone for student demonstrations that are coordinated from campus. It became very difficult for the student movement to organise when students were scattered all over Harare. Problems were compounded when students forced out of university halls of residence could not find alternative accommodation in the nearby suburbs of Avondale, Mt Pleasant and Borrowdale because of the exorbitant rentals demanded by home owners there.

5. 5 The Emergence and Contribution of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) towards Democratisation in Zimbabwe

As already noted, from 1991 Zimbabwe witnessed an increase in industrial unrest following the introduction of economic reforms as the workers tried to "make up for the losses in real wages stemming from inflation."¹³² Trade unions began to broaden their jurisdiction beyond the shop floor and this ultimately led to the flowering of social movement unionism in Zimbabwe within the auspices of the National Constitutional Assembly. In light of the fact that workers were no longer earning a living wage coupled with poor working conditions, the only option left was to bring these issues "onto the national stage, thus politicizing the issues."¹³³ On the other hand, the government's decision to ignore labour's legitimate demands (in order to ensure the success of the economic reforms) predisposed the working class to use the political route to protect themselves from the vagaries of market forces. Initially, the process involved industrial action,

¹³¹ Zimbabwe National Students Union Report.

¹³² Suzanne Dansereau, "Rebirth of Resistance: Labour and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe," *Labour, Capital and Society*, vol. 30, no. 1 (April 1997):120.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 121.

while the next phase involved direct political action in tandem with “other groups also dissatisfied with their exclusion from the national political process.”¹³⁴ But economic hardships continued unabated for the greater part of 1997, and civil society organisations decided to close ranks with a view to capitalising on their numerical strength. The increasing economic problems contributed to the erosion of the government’s legitimacy, providing a fertile ground for civil society to link constitutional issues to the broader problems of the economy. To this end, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) process was initiated in May 1997 but only formally launched in January 1998 as a broad alliance of civic organisations.¹³⁵ Thus it is safe to conclude that the NCA came into existence as a result of the radicalisation of the ZCTU.

Labour allied itself with other formations that were also radically opposed to ZANU PF’s policies. The widespread radicalisation and opposition to the government was also fuelled by the outcome of the 1995 elections that were neither free nor fair. Many people saw the impossibility of bringing about change in the political system¹³⁶ if the Lancaster House constitution remained in force. Though many prominent figures from civil society helped to establish the NCA, Kagoro (1999) argues that Tawanda Mutasa, who was working for the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, was the founder of the organisation.¹³⁷ Mutasa is said to have conceived the idea and further discussed it with Brian Kagoro, Dr Lovemore Madhuku, Depros Muchena, Tendai Biti, Kudakwashe Marazanye, Professor Welshman Ncube, David Chimhini, Everjoice Win, Priscilla Misihairambwi, Dr John Makumbe, Morgan Tsvangirai, Mike Auret (Snr), ZCC political leadership and many others.¹³⁸ What is striking about the composition of the people who founded the NCA is that they represented a broad range of academics, lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, former student leaders, church leaders and political scientists. As a result, the role of education in seeking to influence the balance of political power in Zimbabwe cannot be over-emphasised.

The NCA became a broad alliance of civic organisations involving labour, students, youth groups, political parties, women’s groups, churches, business groups and human rights organisations. They believed that the political, social and economic problems affecting the country could be resolved only through a new democratic constitution. The then president of ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai, became the inaugural president of the NCA whose major objective

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Brian Raftopoulos, “Whither the NCA?” *NCA Agenda*, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 2000):8.

¹³⁶ Dansereau, “Movement for Democratic Change,” 406.

¹³⁷ Brian Kagoro, “The Evolution of the NCA,” *NCA Agenda*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1999).

¹³⁸ Ibid.

was to push for a new people-driven constitution that would level the political playing field in general and clip presidential powers in particular.¹³⁹ Intensive awareness campaigns and several regional workshops were held in Mutare, Bulawayo, Harare and Masvingo between May 1999 and February 1998.¹⁴⁰ It is worth pointing out that in its intensive awareness campaigns, the NCA benefited from organisational structures of the labour movement, the church and many other grassroots organisations. These organisations ignited and sustained the momentum for the organised campaign for a new popular constitutional reform.

The NCA's sustained clamour for a new constitution could not be ignored and the government relented, resulting in talks about the constitutional process. One of NCA's major submissions to the government was that there was a compelling need for the constitution-making process to be free from state control and domination.¹⁴¹ Meanwhile the country's economy continued on a free-fall and this was compounded by the payment of unbudgeted millions of Zimbabwe dollars to former freedom fighters and the country's military adventure in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In light of the developments, on 31 October 1998, the NCA organised peaceful marches across the country to protest against Zimbabwe's participation in Congo and the need for constitutional reform. Riot police used tear gas to disperse the NCA marchers and this soured relations between the social movement union and government. Consequently, the question of the modalities that were to be followed in relation to constitutional reform remained unresolved.¹⁴² In April 1999 the government hijacked the constitution-making process when President Mugabe set up a constitutional commission ostensibly to "accommodate NCA demands *but* without *necessarily* addressing questions of representation, composition and ownership of the process"¹⁴³ (emphasis added). For the NCA, the government's process was fundamentally flawed because it negated the ethos of democratic governance. To support the NCA's position Masipula Sithole quotes Tendai Biti who cogently argues that: "It is not the democratic content that makes a constitution democratic, but rather it is a democratic process that makes it democratic; otherwise we should have borrowed a democratic constitution from the library!"¹⁴⁴

June 1999 saw the NCA convening an all People's Constitutional Convention (PCC) at Chitungwiza Aquatic complex. The event further cemented the strategic objectives of the broad

¹³⁹ Interview with Dr Lovemore Madhuku, 14 December 2007, Harare.

¹⁴⁰ Kagoro, "The Evolution of the NCA."

¹⁴¹ Brian Kagoro "Constitutional Reform as a Social Movement," in *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*, ed. Brian Raftopolous and Tyrone Savage (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), 244.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 245.

¹⁴³ Masipula Sithole, "Well Done NCA! It was Good for the Country," *NCA Agenda* vol. 3, no. 1 (February 2000):4.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

alliance, one of which was to maintain a confrontational stance against the state. Over 7 000 people attended the convention whose major objectives were to map the way forward in relation to the constitutional reform process and to demand that the new constitution be subject to a referendum process before it could be adopted into law.¹⁴⁵ The PCC also mandated the NCA to mobilise people to reject the constitution that was to be produced by the government's Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) on the basis that the process was inherently defective.¹⁴⁶ NCA was further mandated by the PCC to go around the country to gather people's views and then produce a parallel working draft constitution. However, a number of NCA task force members resigned following their decision to join the ZCTU-backed political party, MDC that was launched in September 1999. These included former NCA chairman Morgan Tsvangirai, Tendai Biti, Gibson Sibanda, Trudy Stevenson and Welshman Ncube who all (except Tsvangirai) later contested and won parliamentary seats on an MDC ticket. The reason for their resignation was in the spirit of trying to keep the NCA away from partisan political interests. From November 1999, the NCA started to campaign against the CRC Draft Constitution which was eventually rejected in a referendum in February 2000. NCA used the draft constitution produced by the government to effectively campaign for a No Vote given that there was a big difference between what people said they wanted to see in the constitution and what was actually in the government draft constitution.

Finally, it is important to enumerate the major achievements of the NCA as a social movement union. For the first time in Zimbabwe the NCA effectively mobilised the population to chart a democratic political process that was independent of the state. Thus the major achievement of social movement unionism within the auspices of the NCA was the ability to effectively pressure the state to accede to demands for a new people-driven constitution. The NCA also played a central role in engendering a sense of participatory democracy in Zimbabwe, and as a result people became in charge of their own destiny. For Kagoro, the NCA "built a functional coalition that demonstrated the value of team work"¹⁴⁷ culminating in the defeat of the state in the February 2000 constitutional referendum. The fact that the first ever strong political opposition came from the NCA is something worth noting as well. In the final analysis, "if the NCA did not already exist, it would have been necessary to invent it."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Kagoro, "Constitutional Reform," 246.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 249.

¹⁴⁸ Sithole, "Well done NCA," 4.

5.6 Understanding the Role and Contribution of Other Civil Society Movements Fighting State Barbarism

5.6.1 Theatre and Arts Movement

When regular channels of free expression are closed or suppressed, civil society tends to be assisted by musicians and theatre artists to express dissent and to censure authorities.¹⁴⁹ This thesis does not go into greater detail in terms of the songs and plays that came up as a result of dissatisfaction with the political status quo but makes reference to them in passing to give a general insight into the phenomenon. What is critical is to see how an attempt to provide a critique of the state is thwarted by various tactics ranging from unofficial censorship, and arrests to sponsoring of parallel artists who toe the government line. Censorship in Zimbabwe is a colonial legacy that continues in post-independent Zimbabwe. Despite being in clear violation of the Zimbabwe constitution, the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act, 1967, is still intact in the statutes¹⁵⁰ just like other colonial pieces of legislation. The censorship legislation has been buttressed by the Broadcasting Services Act of 2001 that empowers the state to maintain a tight grip on the airwaves, effectively barring the emergence of private players.

However, the official position as stated in the preamble of the Broadcasting Services Act of 2000 is that it seeks “to create a sense of national identity through broadcasting services” among other regulatory functions.¹⁵¹ Thus the two pieces of legislation curtail and deny musicians and theatre artists their freedom of artistic expressions under the guise of public and national interest. With respect to the Broadcasting Services Act, part VII section 30 (h) states that the objective of the broadcasting funding is “to provide grants to encourage the growth of the Zimbabwean creative arts industry for the purpose of enabling the film and music industry to supply material to meet the local content obligations of broadcasting licensees.” There is a 75% quota for local content and state-aligned musicians are the major beneficiaries. It is against the backdrop of this clause that the government co-opted and funded musicians such as the late Simon Chimbetu, Andy Brown, Dickson Chingaira, the late Elliot Manyika and Last Chiyangwa (Tambaoga) to compose songs and jingles that praised the government. These so-called patriotic musicians had unfettered access to the airwaves and performed live at state functions and national galas introduced by the

¹⁴⁹ Ayo Olukotun, “Traditional Protest Media and Anti Military Struggle in Nigeria 1988-1999.” *African Affairs*, vol. 101, no. 403 (2002):193.

¹⁵⁰ Bharat Patel, “Freedom of Literary Expression and Censorship in Zimbabwe,” *Zambezia*, vol. XXIV, no. I (1997):51-67.

¹⁵¹ See the Broadcasting Services Act of 2001.

former information minister, Jonathan Moyo.¹⁵²

On the other hand, music that was deemed to be politically incorrect and critical of the state was simply not played at all by the national broadcaster. Consequently the voices of musical icons like Leonard Zhakata, Oliver Mtukudzi and Thomas Mapfumo were no longer heard on national electronic media as before. It should be noted that the musicians were not necessarily specialists in protest music *per se* but they recorded a song or two which the ruling elite misconstrued as being directed at them. For that reason, they paid heavily because their music was taken off the airwaves. Fellow musicians realised the dangers associated with including politically charged themes in their songs and therefore took precautionary measures by coming up with songs that did not censure the political establishment.

In 2007 Cont Mhlanga of the Bulawayo based Amakhosi Theatre Productions was arrested and told not to continue performing political satires such as *The Good President*. The implication of this kind of harassment of artists was far-reaching in light of the fact that many official channels of free expression were already closed. Amakhosi Theatre Productions was formed by an ex-factory foreman, Cont Mhlanga, in the early 1980s.¹⁵³ Thus Mhlanga has a working class background and is a product of the urban township of Makokoba and this in itself explains the source and his level of political consciousness. In 1987, Amakhosi Theatre Productions produced a play called *Workshop Negative* that soured the group's relationship with the government. *Workshop Negative* examined the tensions and contradictions of Zimbabwe's post-independence era particularly on issues of race, ruling elite corruption and exploitation at the workplace. Amakhosi was denied permission to showcase its talent in Europe because the government felt that there were "serious flaws" in *Workshop Negative's* portrayal of the state of the nation.¹⁵⁴ Since 1987, Cont Mhlanga has produced a number of plays highly critical of the government and these were swiftly banned on both television and radio. In 2006, the Amakhosi Director was arrested for allegedly "mobilising illegal protest against the government through theatre."¹⁵⁵ However, Mhlanga could not be cowed into submission and therefore continued to play his role as a social commentator with much vigour and passion. The playwright wrote *The*

¹⁵² For a detailed account see Diane Thrall, "Zvakwana! – Enough! Media Control and Unofficial Censorship of Music in Zimbabwe," in *Popular Music Censorship in Africa*, eds. Michael Drewett and Martin Cloonan (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 71-89.

¹⁵³ Jane Plastow, *African Theatre and Politics: The Evolution of Theatre in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe* (Radopi: Amsterdam, 1996), 175.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 243

¹⁵⁵ Tracy McVeigh. "Now Zimbabwe Can See End of the Road for its Old Brutal Man," *The Guardian* (UK), 12 April 2007.

Good President two days after the opposition and civil society members were beaten on 11 March 2007.¹⁵⁶

In November 2008, Cont Mhlanga won the Artventure Freedom to Create Prize for his 2007 politically-charged satirical play *The Good President*. Mhlanga won the first prize of US \$50 000 in recognition of his outstanding contribution towards defending freedom of expression at great personal sacrifice. The British Broadcasting Corporation quoted Artventure as having said Mhlanga won the much-coveted prize for “challenging and questioning state ideologies, policies, corruption, nepotism and leadership for more than 25 years.”¹⁵⁷ *The Good President* is an hour-long play that is packed with satire and humour but very indicative of the prevailing political situation in Zimbabwe. The play summarises the key events during the war of liberation and political developments in the country since then. The first scene is set in a police station where two police officers severely attack a leader of an opposition political party leaving him for dead. One of the police officers is later visited by his paternal grandmother who revealed that the officer’s father was killed by the Fifth Brigade during operation Gukurahundi. The revelation deeply angers the police officer to the extent that he decides to resign from the police force. Further into the plot, the rural grandmother commits suicide in protest after her police officer grandson refused to give her transport money to return to the rural areas on time to vote for the incumbent president. Mhlanga’s play also touches on the Unity Accord and a number of contemporary political issues in Zimbabwe, for example, the elections in 2008, curfew in parts of Harare, the banning of political rallies, and the general brutalisation of civilians.

The play was banned by the government because it was said to be politically incorrect.¹⁵⁸ It is worth noting that Cont Mhlanga contested the 2008 election as an independent candidate and comfortably won a council seat in rural Lupane in Matabeleland North.¹⁵⁹ Mhlanga’s decision to contest the council elections came after he heard that people in his village were complaining about the politicisation of food aid. According to Mhlanga, “My decision to stand was based on the other crucial factor, that Zimbabwean politics needs fresh blood. Those who were in the war are sick from its effects, hence what’s happening now. Look at those politicians beating up people. Look at them closely, and tell me if they are not sick!”¹⁶⁰ Mhlanga’s long-term vision is to improve service delivery in his ward so that people know what responsible politicians can do for

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts_and_culture/7751151.stm (Accessed 2 April 2009).

¹⁵⁸ John Mokwetsi, “Zimbabwe: Cont Could Aim to Be the Good President” *The Standard* (Harare), 17 May 2008.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

the electorate.¹⁶¹

To conclude this section on the contribution of artists in democratisation, it is important to recognise the role played by visual signs of resistance or graffiti in marking the public space through renewed cultural activism.¹⁶² It is important to point out that the term graffiti is not only deviant and pejorative but also criminal. As such this thesis adopts the term ‘visual signs of resistance’ given the legitimacy of artistic expressions in politics.¹⁶³ Visual resistance strategies involve artist-activists transforming “the street space into an alternative cultural space for political dissent and engage in conversation on the street with other activists and also with structures of power and authority.”¹⁶⁴ Indeed visual signs of resistance are an “innovative and radical pursuit of democratic participation,”¹⁶⁵ or put another way they represent the emergence of a voice of the voiceless in a society. In Zimbabwe visual signs of resistance as a form of protest against the political status quo gained prominence around the year 2000 when many people felt that normal avenues for political expression were increasingly being subjected to state control.

Some Zimbabweans have resorted to graffiti and other hidden forms of resistance to express their frustration and anger with the political system. As a result, messages are plastered on the tarmac, bus shelters, toilets, road signs, billboards, and other public spaces. In Harare, Bulawayo, Chegutu, Mutare and other urban areas one could find political graffiti declaring: “Mugabe, please go”, “MDC ndizvo” [MDC is the best], “Never trust ZANU PF,” “MDC beware of being swallowed”, “MDC - ZANU PF is a python”, “ZANU PF a leopard that never changes its spots”, “Free Bennet now”, “No to Unity Government”, “Grace stop shopping”, “Gono is a thief”, “Mugabe is a killer”, “At 80, it’s time to go”, “Mugabe is a dictator” and many others. The graffiti messages epitomise an exchange of ideas within the subaltern public sphere given that certain messages were in response to earlier ones. One defining feature of the messages was that they were usually brief and to the point. It was normal to see posters from both MDC and ZANU PF defaced with the former being either labelled “puppet” or stooge” whilst with the latter, a red marker was used to colour Mugabe’s lips with signs of blood. The political party fought hard to rub off these messages that unequivocally denigrated the person of the president

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Emmanuel A. David, “Signs of Resistance: Marking the Public Space Through a Renewed Cultural Activism,” in *Visual Research Methods: Image Society and Representation*, ed. Gregory C. Stanczak (London: Sage Publications, 2007), 225.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 232-233.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 228.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 233.

especially in major highways. However the measure could not keep pace with new graffiti messages plastered almost everywhere. Thus the continued shrinkage of democratic space led to a new genre of protest coordinated by an underground syndicate of activists that produced political messages that censured the ruling elites.

5.6.2 Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA)

WOZA means “come forward” in Zulu and is a non-violent civil disobedience pressure group formed to give Zimbabwean women an audible voice within the framework of the current socio-economic and political crisis.¹⁶⁶ Around 70 000 women and men were said to be members of the civic organisation.¹⁶⁷ According to the National Coordinator, Jenny Williams, “In the consultative process leading to the formation of WOZA, women expressed the view that it is upon the shoulders of the mothers that the macro socio-economic problems finally land...so they should take the lead in taking the nation back to a state of sanity.”¹⁶⁸ WOZA sought to convince women that they should exercise their rights enshrined in the constitution instead of just suffering in silence. A People’s Charter was drafted by the civic organisation and it spells out the vision that they have for a socially just Zimbabwe. It is a set of aspirations and demands of Zimbabwe’s subaltern publics. Clearly, the organisation speaks out despite the dire consequences of taking such a bold political move. WOZA is ready to take to the streets to protest against poor governance, non-accountable political leadership, the collapse in service delivery and other acts of injustices perpetrated by the state against the poor. What is striking about WOZA is the organisation’s political relevance attested by the ability to add a voice in each and every socio-economic and political issue that enters the public sphere. In certain instances, community chapters of WOZA congregated and demonstrated against problems unique to their areas such as water, persistent power cuts or unaffordable school fees.

One of WOZA’s yearly trademark demonstrations involved the handing out of roses on Valentine’s Day as a symbol of love to counteract the government’s hate-filled propaganda.¹⁶⁹ Since 2003, WOZA has protested against the high cost of living, education and health care. Furthermore, it has consistently defied provisions of POSA that stipulate that the police must

¹⁶⁶ Jenny Williams, National Coordinator, Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) “*The Role and Activities of Zimbabwean Women, their Impact, Challenges and Way Forward in the Pursuit of a Solution to the Current Crisis Faced by the Country.*” Speech delivered at the Peace and Democracy Project Symposium Johannesburg - Resolution of the Crisis in Zimbabwe, 27 March 2004.

¹⁶⁷ Day, 10 May 2009.

¹⁶⁸ Speech delivered at the Peace and Democracy Project Symposium, Johannesburg.

¹⁶⁹ *Defending Women – Defending the Rights of a Nation* A Preliminary Report on Political Violence against Members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) September 2007,3

notified prior any public political gathering or demonstration. One of WOZA's unique tactics is its ability to stage surprise and swift demonstrations without notifying the police. A number of their demonstrations were successful because women peacefully protested at a time and place where the security agents least expected them. Indeed, by the time riot police eventually arrived to deal with WOZA women, their powerful message would have been delivered to the intended audience. More often than not, WOZA joined forces with other progressive pro-democracy formations such as the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Save Zimbabwe campaign and the NCA to keep piling pressure on the Mugabe's regime.

WOZA women drew their inspiration from Martin Luther King, Jnr who said "One who breaks an unjust law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law."¹⁷⁰ Consequently, Amnesty International designated WOZA members as prisoners of conscience when they were jailed for the expression of their beliefs. Another feature of WOZA's action was that during protests, it was customary to find women with babies strapped to their backs demonstrating alongside elderly women well above sixty-five years old. When police confronted them, the group stopped their song and dance, sat down and surrendered to be arrested in a non-violent fashion. WOZA women were sometimes detained for weeks or months in filthy police cells across Zimbabwe. Children too have been detained in the company of their mothers while women have given birth in detention. During remand hearings in the courts, one easily noticed the "level of embarrassment from the magistrates and 'slaves of POSA' when Gogo Majola and the others took off their scarves and showed their white heads,"¹⁷¹ notes Jenny Williams.

WOZA's official website indicates that the organisation has been one of the most consistent in its political activism. Each and every month there were demonstrations, arrests and court appearances that involved WOZA. On 19 September 2004, 35 members aged between 20 and 60 embarked on a 440 kilometre journey on foot from Bulawayo to Harare. WOZA was engaged in a sponsored walk to raise money for the welfare of activists as well as to protest against a pending NGO legislation that was due to be passed in parliament in October the same year. In a press statement WOZA argued that if the NGO Bill was passed without any amendments, it would strike at the lives and the "very survival of women and their families."¹⁷² Most of the women are beneficiaries of donor food and some have HIV/AIDS orphans that

¹⁷⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Press statement by Women of Zimbabwe Arise, 20 September 2004.

they care for. This walk symbolised a strong acknowledgement of the kindness of the donor community and was a way of saying how much their help meant to Zimbabweans.

It is worth noting that WOZA was the only group which protested visibly against the barbaric Operation Murambatsvina on 18 June 2005, coincidentally World Refugee Day.¹⁷³ Members were detained for demonstrating and distributing fliers against the operation which made many people become ‘refugees with no refuge’. Consequently, the majority of the population was now “living like birds in the trees”.¹⁷⁴ The group was also savagely beaten and arrested in November 2006 on International Human Rights Defenders Day when they wanted to peacefully launch the People’s Charter. During 2007, 174 members of WOZA were arrested as they commemorated their fifth Valentines Day campaign, while 100 were arrested that June for staging a peaceful protest against worsening economic conditions.¹⁷⁵ In 2008, WOZA protested against escalating state-sponsored violence that was meant to intimidate civic activists and MDC supporters so that ZANU PF could win the presidential run-off election.

The year 2008 was a very remarkable one for WOZA primarily because the organisation won two awards, one national and one international, for their sterling contribution towards democratisation in Zimbabwe. During the Zimbabwe Human Rights Festival held in December 2008, WOZA won the civic society award while the organisation’s National Coordinator; Jenny Williams, scooped the Woman Activist of the Year award at the same function.¹⁷⁶ Internationally, WOZA was also awarded the fifth Human Rights Award by the German section of Amnesty International and the award was presented to Jenny Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu on behalf of the pressure group at a ceremony held on 22 November 2008 in Berlin.¹⁷⁷ What makes the Amnesty International (Germany) Human Rights Award to WOZA significant is that it is awarded every two years to people who fearlessly defend and fight for human rights, especially under harsh circumstances.

5.6.3 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)

Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) is an affiliate of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and works closely with a number of other pro-democracy movements in

¹⁷³ Mary E. Ndlovu, “Mass Violence in Zimbabwe 2005 – Murambatsvina,” *Development Dialogue*, no. 50 (December 2008):230.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ “Timeline Zimbabwe 2007: Democracy and Human Rights under Siege,” *Zimbabwe Independent* (Harare), 7 December 2007.

¹⁷⁶ “Dhiziri Satire Earns Majongwe Award,” *The Standard* (Harare), 14 December 2008

¹⁷⁷ “WOZA, ZLHR Receive International Awards,” *The Standard* (Harare), 23 November 2008

Zimbabwe within the auspices of social movement unionism that is fast taking root in Zimbabwe. ZLHR was formed in 2003 by Brian Kagoro, Tendai Biti and Lovemore Madhuku as a non-profit human rights organisation whose core objective is to foster a culture of human rights in Zimbabwe through observance of the rule of law. If one looks at the mission statement of ZLHR, it is an objective reality that the organisation sought to complement the role of the Law Society of Zimbabwe. In a statement, ZLHR notes that they were “committed to upholding respect for the rule of law and the unimpeded administration of justice, free and fair elections, the free flow of information and the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms in Zimbabwe and the surrounding region.”¹⁷⁸ The Law Society of Zimbabwe notes with concern that the year 2000 saw Zimbabwe sharply regressing into an undemocratic order manifested by the absence of the rule of law, non-adherence to the separation of powers, “interference with the judiciary, the legal profession, and human rights defenders; enactment and selective application of repressive laws and preventing Zimbabweans from enjoying universally recognized human rights.”¹⁷⁹ According to the Law Society of Zimbabwe the persecution of lawyers in Zimbabwe includes:

sustained media bashing, arbitrary arrests and detention, organized violence and torture, impeding access to clients, non-compliance with court orders, arbitrary searches of legal offices and seizures of documents including clients’ files, uncooperative disposition from police, threats, false prosecutions, surveillance and setting up of a possible hit squad involving military intelligence to abduct and eliminate certain lawyers.¹⁸⁰

The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights consists of a Rapid Reaction Unit whose main function is to make urgent High Court applications to access political detainees and to secure their release. From its inception in 2003 to 2007, in any given year ZLHR provided free emergency legal aid to over 1 000 activists who were prosecuted for demanding freedom and justice.¹⁸¹ Organisations that have benefited from the services of the ZLHR are affiliates of the National Constitutional Assembly and Save Zimbabwe campaign. These include ZINASU, ZCTU, WOZA, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and the two MDC formations. As a result, ZLHR has a proven track record in defending human rights through a number of interventions including sharply reacting to acts of injustices that are perpetrated by the state against the citizenry. “Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights is concerned at growing incidences of police

¹⁷⁸ Acceptance statement on inaugural US Secretary of State Freedom Award, *Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)* December 10, 2007.

¹⁷⁹ Arnold Tsunga & Otto Saki, “Persecution of Lawyers in Zimbabwe: Self regulation at a Cross Roads,” (Law Society of Zimbabwe: Harare, 2007), 6.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸¹ Acceptance Statement, 10 December 2007.

re-arresting suspects after the courts have ordered their release,”¹⁸² said the ZLHR in a 2004 press statement.

In the interests of time and space this section specifically enumerates some of the roles and achievements of ZLHR in defending democracy in Zimbabwe, but it is beyond the scope of this study to detail all their relevant activities. In 2005, ZLHR appealed to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to urge the government of Zimbabwe to stop ill-treating jailed opposition activists and former opposition legislator Roy Bennet. The same year ZLHR strongly condemned Operation Murambatsvina and also co-authored (with the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, COHRE) a report entitled: *Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime against Humanity*. Their joint report noted that:

ZLHR and Human Rights Trust of South Africa also filed an application for provisional measures with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on behalf of those who had been evicted. In November 2005, the Commission responded with a resolution that urged the Government of Zimbabwe to “cease the practice of forced evictions throughout the country, and to adhere to its obligations under the *African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights*” and “implement without further delay the recommendations...in the July 2005 Report of the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues”.¹⁸³

Furthermore, from 2006 onwards lawyers representing Zimbabwe’s premier human rights law group (ZLHR) were subject to increased intimidation and harassment. Arnold Tsunga, who was the Executive Director for ZLHR, became the main target of death threats given the organisation’s internationally acclaimed courage and its relentless opposition to state oppression.¹⁸⁴ Irene Petras from ZLHR asserted that “At the ZANU-PF Annual Party Congress in December of 2005, a resolution was adopted urging the party to take increased action against human rights defenders. ZLHR was one of the organizations specifically named.”¹⁸⁵ Consequently, from 2006 it became common practice that lawyers from ZLHR representing political activists were either threatened with arrest or even detained alongside their clients for allegedly obstructing the course of justice.¹⁸⁶ Clearly, some lawyers in Zimbabwe were not

¹⁸² Quoted in Itai Dzamara “Lawyers Slam Use of Media to Attack Judiciary,” *Zimbabwe Independent* (Harare), 20 March 2004.

¹⁸³ “Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime Against Humanity” (An Independent Legal Opinion on whether the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina Forced Evictions Constituted a Crime against Humanity under the Rome Statute, compiled by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), May 2007.

¹⁸⁴ “*Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) Under Threat*,” News Release From the Southern Africa Litigation Centre, 15 February 2006.

¹⁸⁵ Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

prepared to represent human rights defenders fearing the wrath of the state security agents. The High Court of Zimbabwe worsened the situation for both ZLHR and their clients given that urgent chamber applications were either thrown out or unduly prolonged. However despite these challenges, ZLHR worked tirelessly to eloquently defend human rights in Zimbabwe. For example on 17 May 2006 Dr John Makumbe from the University of Zimbabwe, Alice Siame, from the Norwegian Federation of Trade Union's Zambian Office, and civic leaders including church leaders were arrested for allegedly planning to commemorate Operation Murambatsvina.¹⁸⁷ The ZLHR Rapid Reaction Unit made an urgent chamber application to stop Ms Siame's deportation and also successfully assisted scores of activists who were detained country-wide, including Dr Makumbe.¹⁸⁸

Other achievements of the ZLHR were noted in 2007 especially after 27 March, when Alec Muchadehama, Tafadzwa Mugabe and Andrew Makoni represented Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC officials and many other Save Zimbabwe activists after they were savagely beaten by police for allegedly defying a ban on political rallies. A report by the Law Society of Zimbabwe (LSZ) noted with grave concern that:

Since the events of 11 March 2007, when several opposition and civil society leaders and members were unlawfully arrested, detained, tortured and denied access to their lawyers, medical treatment and food, the vilification, intimidation and threats against lawyers, especially those representing these human rights defenders, have assumed physical proportions. Members of the legal profession have been physically assaulted, manhandled, chased out of police stations, threatened with arrest, intimidated and generally harassed whilst executing their lawful mandates as provided for under the law.¹⁸⁹

The attack and detention of lawyers in general and human rights lawyers in particular reached alarming levels in May 2007 and prompted members of the LSZ to organise a peaceful solidarity protest outside the High Court of Zimbabwe in Harare. The lawyers wanted to present a petition to the Justice Minister, the Attorney General and the Police Commissioner "urging full and immediate protection for lawyers and prosecutors in the execution of their professional duties as stipulated in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa."¹⁹⁰ About 60 lawyers who

¹⁸⁷ Dr Makumbe, Civic Leaders and Norwegian Unionist Arrested in Zimbabwe
<http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=409&cat=1> Accessed 8 April 2009.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Tsunga and Saki, 11

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 14.

were in attendance were ordered to swiftly disperse or face the consequences.¹⁹¹ The President of the Law Society of Zimbabwe, Beatrice Mtetwa, and three other lawyers were thrown into a police truck and dumped in Eastlea, about three kilometres from the city centre.¹⁹² Before that, the four lawyers were severely beaten with batons while members of the public helplessly watched with disgust and anger. A similar demonstration by lawyers was also thwarted by police a day later in the eastern border town of Mutare.¹⁹³

Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights also played a central role in highlighting to the international community the orgy of political violence unleashed by ZANU PF in the run-up to the 2008 presidential run-off elections. It also released a number of press statements denouncing the government for failing to adhere to the rule of law and flagrantly abusing human rights with impunity. It is worth pointing out that as the government stepped up the use of repressive machinery, the number of human rights defenders requiring legal assistance shot up to about 1 500 per year. One major case handled by the president of the Law Society of Zimbabwe, Mrs. Beatrice Mtetwa, on behalf of ZLHR was the case of human rights activist Jestina Mukoko and others who were abducted in December 2008 by security details. ZLHR made an urgent High Court application seeking the immediate and unconditional release of the 32 activists arrested on spurious allegations of seeking to topple President Robert Mugabe's government through banditry.¹⁹⁴ In addition, ZLHR won the Canadian Rights & Democracy's 2008 John Humphrey Freedom Award "in recognition of its courageous pursuit of justice for victims of human rights abuses inside Zimbabwe".¹⁹⁵ Receiving the award on behalf of her organisation in Canada, the Executive Director, Irene Petras, concluded that in Zimbabwe "Prosecution is used as a tool of persecution,"¹⁹⁶

5.7 Aftermath of Economic Reforms: Exit-Voice Dynamics in Civil Society

Enforced emigration reached a peak in 2002 with the departure of a considerable number of Zimbabweans into the diaspora. Two crucial questions demand answers: Firstly, what was the impact of the continued downward economic spiral in terms of the ability of the "residual civil

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid., 15.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 16.

¹⁹⁴ See *Jestina Mukoko & 31 Others v Commissioner-General of Police and Chief Superintendent Magwenzi HC 7166/2008*.

¹⁹⁵ Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights win Rights & Democracy's 2008 John Humphrey Freedom Award.

< <http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/media/index.php?id=2332&subsection=news>>> Accessed 8 April 2009.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

society” that remained in Zimbabwe to mobilise? Secondly, did the residual civil society and actors that remained behind in Zimbabwe manage to retain their voice or did the massive emigration of members and the general population weaken the civil society further, much to the detriment of democratisation efforts? In order to understand the dynamics of political participation and the nature of civil society that come to exist as a result of a contestation of market hegemony, this section builds on the analytical concepts of “exit and voice” as propounded by Hirschman.¹⁹⁷

Voice and exit represent the two options available to social actors to express their grievances. The two concepts have the capacity to bring a fresh perspective in relation to the development of civil society in an integrated global economy in general and the attendant non-performing economy in particular. Exit can be defined as “disengagement or retreat from the state by disaffected segments of the citizenry into alternative and parallel social, cultural, economic and political systems which are constructed in civil society and which compete with those of the state”.¹⁹⁸ By and large, exit is a political strategy and a coping mechanism employed by the excluded, and it can also be taken to mean emigrating from a country. It also represents a strategy employed by segments of society to deal with exclusionary politics in relation to the authoritative allocation of scarce resources.

On the other hand voice connotes “various types of actions and protests, including those meant to mobilize public opinion”.¹⁹⁹ Under the voice people are essentially optimistic that by “hanging on” or staying within the political system and participating within it despite the hurdles, they will be able to change things for the better. Thus voice is the act of “complaining or of organizing to complain or to protest, with the intent of achieving directly a recuperation of the quality that has been impaired.”²⁰⁰ Voice and Exit are two sides of the same coin but they often work at cross purposes and undermine each other,²⁰¹ thereby producing suboptimal results in the process. For example exit tends to undermine voice when the latter results in the loss of the most influential and most talented people found in a movement. In other words, a pendulum model of exit-voice tends to be created. Thus, when exit is an easier option, it tends to undermine voice given that the latter requires collective effort and therefore suffers from organisational, representational and

¹⁹⁷ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970) and Albert O. Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History,” *World Politics*, vol. 45, no. 2 (January 1993):173-202.

¹⁹⁸ Eghosa E Osaghae, “Exiting from the State in Nigeria,” *African Journal of Political Science*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1999):83.

¹⁹⁹ Hirschman, *Responses to Decline in Firms*, 30.

²⁰⁰ Hirschman, “An Essay in Conceptual History,” 176.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

free rider problems.²⁰² On the other hand, an exit option requires less or no coordination and therefore in the end the two aspects form a “basic see-saw pattern of exit and voice.”²⁰³

Allied to the developments in the civic sector, by 1999 part of the population began to think of emigrating from Zimbabwe²⁰⁴ to countries that then had visa-free entry requirements. This transpired because Zimbabwe’s colonially inherited developmental state had died a premature death following economic reforms sponsored by IFIs, thereby exposing the state to a hostile population whose socio-economic rights were being threatened. The middle class that saw it coming were destined for South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, United Kingdom, Germany, USA, Canada and Australia. However, this was a small-scale exercise that eventually set the stage for a massive exodus of doctors, nurses, radiographers, physiotherapists, pharmacists, engineers, accountants, production managers, designers, quality controllers, electricians, diverse technicians, marketers, and many other professions. Zimbabwe had managed to build a very strong and formidable human resource base because the developmental state had a strong emphasis on education and manpower development. A fund called the Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund (ZIMDEF) and vocational training centres were created with a view to help build a strong human resource base. Subsequent events that followed relating to a chaotic land reform, disputed and bloody elections of 2000, 2002, 2005 and more recently 2008, also contributed to more Zimbabweans voting with their feet.

In sum, the reasons for both voluntary and involuntary emigration are related to push and pull factors in the sending and receiving countries. Firstly there is economic decline and the related hyper-inflationary environment that came as a result of economic mismanagement, unintended effects of the IMF-supported structural adjustment programme and targeted sanctions imposed on the Zimbabwean ruling elites by the American government and its Western allies. This economically induced form of exit accounts for the considerable number of Zimbabweans in the diaspora. A racial dimension is discernible to the Zimbabwean emigration dynamics given that the fast track land seizures led to a significant number of former white commercial farmers leaving Zimbabwe. These people represent former members of such organisations as the Commercial Farmer Union of Zimbabwe (CFUZ) and Justice for Agriculture (JAG). However, members of pressure groups like Justice for Agriculture- left Zimbabwe and are now based in

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ See Rudo Gaidzanwa, “Voting with their Feet: Zimbabwean Nurses and Doctors in the Era of Structural Adjustment,” Research Report no. 111 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999).

South Africa, Nigeria and Zambia and recently approached the SADC Tribunal Court challenging the compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement.

The second reason that precipitated exit was governmental repression. As a result, a considerable number of activists fled this repression including journalists, human rights lawyers and other vocal people. The state also violently suppressed people who were organising around civil society to protect their rights, a development that led many people to go into exile. Some activists migrated mainly for economic reasons while others did so in fear of their lives. As result it can be safely concluded that the two factors acted together to precipitate emigration.²⁰⁵

It is necessary to interrogate the factors that made it easier for people to “vote with their feet” (push and pull factors). The first reason relates to the relative availability of jobs in the receiving countries that are usually shunned or viewed as menial by locals. Examples that come into mind are working for old people’s homes in United Kingdom and farm employment in South Africa. In South Africa there are sectors (for example in the hospitality industry) where the employers favour employing foreigners either because they want to underpay them or for their presumed work ethic. Allied to the above is the fact that the highly sought after skills alluded to earlier on were also instrumental in making emigration a favourable option especially considering the lucrative nature of some employment contracts. For example South Africa attracted a number of Zimbabwean teachers, academics, geologists, and other professionals when it introduced the Scarce Skills Quota Work Permit in 2006. With time, networks were also developed between those who left earlier and managed to settle well and those who were left behind. The former group would then assist the newcomers running away from repression and economic hardships to settle in the new environment once they arrived. Essentially the number of people voting with their feet wax and wane in response to the political developments in Zimbabwe as well as immigration policies in the receiving countries.

What also made the exit option favourable is the defeatist mentality that engulfed the Zimbabwean society following the disputed and bloody elections of 2000, 2002, 2005 and more recently 2008. People’s hope for political change that would usher in a new socio-economic dispensation was dashed following repeated off the cuff remarks by the army generals that they would refuse to salute a candidate without liberation war credentials. A sense of despair and

²⁰⁵ See also Centre for Development and Enterprise, “Migration from Zimbabwe: Numbers, Needs, and Policy Options,” April 2008.

hopelessness overwhelmed a number of people who were pinning their hopes on a new Zimbabwe under the labour-backed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Rupiya asserted that “People are seriously frustrated and exhausted by the 8 year crisis and sceptical of the capacity of the political opposition in providing an alternative or perhaps to bring about change.”²⁰⁶ This objective reality then influenced a number of people to consider leaving the country in search for greener pastures.

Another aspect that deserves attention is the demographic profile of the segment of the society who took the exit option. Generally, those groups that “suffer discrimination, marginalisation or exclusion, or whose members feel most aggrieved” are more likely to go into exile.²⁰⁷ Demographic evidence from the Chetsanga Report shows that the younger and most college educated males with at least a Bachelor’s degree emigrated²⁰⁸ as they expected immediate improvement in their labour market position. In other words greater symbolic and social capital played a pivotal role in influencing people to emigrate. The exit option is less costly for the young because they have not invested much in the home country and leaving for greener pastures will be the only way to be able to buy a house or to live a decent life.

But with time the trend was reversed to the extent that everyone from the sweeper to the chief executive officer wanted to emigrate. It is difficult to give an exact figure of Zimbabwean in the diaspora because a number of people cross into South Africa illegally for example. In report the South Africa based Centre for Development and Enterprise quoted the International Organisation for Migration as having claimed that South Africa “deported a total of 102 413 illegal migrants to Zimbabwe between January and June 2007, a monthly average of 17 000.”²⁰⁹ Some even fraudulently acquired foreign passports in response to Zimbabwe’s continued deterioration of the socio-economic and political situation. A study conducted by the Centre for Development and Enterprise revealed that:

In the second half of 2007 the figure of 3 million Zimbabweans in South Africa was widely circulated in the media and by government spokesmen, but when pressed none of those quoted would admit to knowing the original source for this number...the best available research suggests that a figure of eight hundred thousand to a million could be more accurate than the larger figure of 3 million...Zimbabwean applications for asylum are the second largest component in a backlog which by 2007 had reached 144 000...According to the South African Qualifications

²⁰⁶ Interview with Dr Martin Rupiya, 3 October 2007.

²⁰⁷ Osaghae, 94.

²⁰⁸ See C. J. Chetsanga, *An Analysis of the Cause and Effect of the Brain Drain in Zimbabwe*, (Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre SIRDC), 2003.

²⁰⁹ Centre for Development and Enterprise, 1.

Authority (SAQA) of the 17 086 evaluations of qualifications it performed between January and September 2007, 9 756 (57%) were for the purpose of processing Zimbabweans' work permit applications. This suggests quite a high level of skills among the migrants.²¹⁰

5.8 National Social Movement Mobilisation in a Dysfunctional Economy 1999 – 2008

Zimbabwe is different from Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and other Southern African countries in two crucial aspects that can be attributed to settler capital. According to Hawkins (2004) Zimbabwe “had a robust, diversified economy with one of the strongest private sectors in Africa, after South Africa...Its large-scale commercial farming sector, the dynamo of the economy, was the envy not just of all African states, including South Africa, where crop yields were lower and operating costs higher, but also of emerging economies in other developing regions.”²¹¹ It is therefore worth noting that Zimbabwe's robust and substantially diversified economy conjoined with the urban sector is of significant political relevance. The political significance of an industrially diversified economy lies in its potentiality to advance democracy as a result of the centrality of the working class in democratisation given its ability to generate and sustain pressures for socio-economic and political inclusion. This points towards the centrality of a capitalist economy and urbanisation for workers to be able to organise collectively, primarily because ZCTU and NCA can be traced back to the emergence of an urban industrial society.

As already noted, MDC emerged in Zimbabwe partially as a working class reaction against the hardships wrought by economic reforms and the failure of the state's corporatist approach towards the labour movement. As a result, MDC's primary support base was in the urban areas, though over the years its popular support now extends to the countryside. The notion of fish and water aptly sums up the symbiotic nature of the relationship between industries (primary, secondary and tertiary): ZCTU, MDC and the working class. The working class and the various industrial sectors were the “water” where the “fish” MDC and civil society derived their life and strength. Thus, the strong civil society and opposition that emerged in the late 1990s were conjoined to the robust and diversified economy.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 2.

²¹¹ Tony Hawkins, “The Zimbabwe Economy: Domestic and Regional Implications.”
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-9168962_ITM> Accessed 21 April 2009.

Since the MDC and civil society represented a spectre of the potentiality of real democratic political change, Mugabe's ZANU PF sought to undermine the process by destroying structures that would lead to that state of affairs. Given that agriculture was the engine of the economy, the destruction of that sector necessarily meant the destruction of the manufacturing industry. Though economic reforms undermined the manufacturing sector as a result of competition that emanated from the liberalisation of the economy, ZANU PF's populist policies worsened the situation. The chaotic land reform finished the job because: "Commercial agriculture and manufacturing industry were highly integrated with industry drawing on agriculture for upwards of 50 per cent of its inputs as well as marketing a substantial portion of its output to the commercial farming sector and its employees."²¹² Zimbabwe's potential to become one of Africa's most successful economies was also tied to the possibility of the country being a success story in democratic terms. Cognisant of these overlaps or embeddedness of politics in capitalist development, Mugabe's ZANU PF decided to drain the "water" so that the fish could die.

While Zimbabwe's exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP averaged around 33.5% between 1997 and 2000, by 2007 they had declined to 9.9%.²¹³ The decline can be attributed to the disruptions that took place in productive sectors of the economy. According to the IMF, Zimbabwe's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by an estimated 14% in 2008 on top of a 40% cumulative decline during the period 2000-2007.²¹⁴ The cost of Zimbabwe's land invasions is yet to be fully documented with precision. According to estimates provided by MDC's Policy Coordinator, Eddie Cross:

no estimate has yet been made of just what the disruption of commercial farms has cost us....In 2000 the total output of the agricultural industry in Zimbabwe was 4,3 million tonnes of agricultural products worth at today's prices US\$3,347 billion. This has declined to just over 1,348 million tonnes of products in 2009 worth US\$1 billion – a decline of 69 per cent in volume and a decline of 70 per cent in value...smallholder farmers have been just as badly affected by the collapse of the industry as the large scale commercial farmers. Their production in the past season is estimated to have declined by 73 per cent over that achieved in the year 2000. This is on top of the forced displacement and loss of employment for 250 000 people and their 1,3 million dependents on commercial farms.²¹⁵

Although the deliberate wrecking of the economy is irrational in economic terms, it should be understood within the context of the twin concepts of barbarous political logic and backlash

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ <http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USL295874920080330> Accessed 1 May 2009.

²¹⁴ <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2009/pn0953.htm>

²¹⁵ Eddie Cross, "Counting the Cost of Zimbabwe's Land Invasions," <<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639?oid=127036&sn=Detail>> Accessed 1 May 2009.

politics. Backlash politics is often associated with extreme tactics and policies employed by established groups that feel that their values or positions are threatened.²¹⁶ Two points are worth noting, firstly the seizure of productive commercial farms and the attendant wilful destruction of Zimbabwe's once robust and diversified manufacturing economy were carefully orchestrated moves meant to undermine the financial and popular support for the opposition and civil society. The second point is that the state barbarism that was vindicated during Gukurahundi, Operation Murambatsvina and the savage beating of Save Zimbabwe activists on 11 March 2007 attested the ZANU PF's ploy to weaken opposition and civil society.

A second development relates to the nature of the civil society that resulted from a large proportion of the population "voting with their feet". The question that should be addressed is the extent to which the "residual" civil society in Zimbabwe managed to keep on piling pressure on the government to institute political reforms, and if not why not? It is the contention of this study that the overall impact of people "voting with their feet" was negative as the exit option essentially undermined "the relational foundation of protest movements by siphoning away prospective movement participants,"²¹⁷ giving the Mugabe regime a new lease of life and in the process eroding the gains that had been previously made. In short, emigration negatively impacted on the ability of civil society to contribute towards democratic consolidation.

Further building on Hirschman's ideas of voice and exit, the following argument is instructive: "Voice will depend also on the willingness to take the chances of the voice option as against the certainty of the exit option and on the probability with which a consumer expects improvements to occur as a result of actions."²¹⁸ The brain drain associated with the exit option needs to be understood not only in relation to the manufacturing sector or other service sectors in general but also to the civil society movement. In actual fact "the brain drain adversely affected the civil society movement because a lot of talented and brilliant young men and women were no longer available to fight for democracy."²¹⁹ Similarly Rupiya notes that "Civil society depends on passionate leaders to organise for change and once they are unavailable, the situation changes." In other words the exit option spells doom for civil society if one considers the number of people or activists who have emigrated from Zimbabwe.

²¹⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), 254-256.

²¹⁷ Steven Pfaff and Hyojoung Kim, "Exit-Voice Dynamics in Collective Action: An Analysis of Emigration and Protest in the East German Revolution," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 109, no. 2 (September 2003):438.

²¹⁸ Hirschman, *Responses to Decline in Firms*, 39.

²¹⁹ Interview with Professor Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

In contrast Mukonoweshuro, although implicitly denying that civil society is now significantly weakened by the brain drain, asserts that:

What is happening now is that as people leave the country, in the NCA for instance it is only the core activists who are remaining. As for the number, they are indeed getting reduced not because the civil society is getting weaker, but because the numbers are getting depleted as people move on. If you look at labour, the trade union movement is not getting weaker and weaker but instead it is trade union membership that is being reduced due to the collapse of the productive economy. So in the final analysis, there are fewer people, nevertheless dedicated people because of the factors that are affecting the numerical superiority of these big organizations.²²⁰

A number of developments tied to the downward economic spiral came to the fore and chief among them is the phenomenal growth of the informal sector and the attendant vices, such as the prevalence of a second economy or black market. The continued informalisation of the economy against a backdrop of galloping inflation, increased poverty and robust state repression had very serious and far-reaching implications for civil society actors and the attendant democratisation efforts. ZCTU's major challenge was to come up with organisational strategies that were not only relevant but appropriate to the workers in the informal economy. Political participation became a very secondary exercise since people were preoccupied with bread and butter issues. In the case of Zimbabwe, the "residual" civil society faced an uphill task in order to continue to be relevant to peoples' lives and assuming its watchdog role. What accounts for this condition is a myriad of factors that are acting in a conjunctural or complex fashion as alluded to earlier on.

If one looked at the survival of the people in Zimbabwe, one was left wondering if another beginning is ever possible. There were perennial shortages of cash, basic food and non-food items, and Zimbabwe effectively became a "queue country" where one must join a queue to access almost everything. Radical unionist Lovemore Matombo did not rule out conspiracy and he asserted that "These strategies put forward by the government of deliberately impoverishing people are meant to delay the democratisation process."²²¹ Consequently, with glaring levels of poverty, "people may not necessarily act in a manner that creates the necessary mass for transformation."²²² This is so because people are busy trying to eke out a living and "they have no time to assemble and discuss about most of these things."²²³ An example of a government policy that has worsened the plight of ordinary Zimbabwean was the 2007 directive to reduce

²²⁰ Interview with Professor Mukonoweshuro, 20 December 2007, Harare.

²²¹ Interview with Lovemore Matombo, 17 December 2007, Harare.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

prices that led to empty shops as businesses failed to restock. As a result, this also led to an unprecedented industrial under utilisation of capacity and retrenchments. In addition, Kasiyano of the Student Christian Movement observed that:

What is happening in Zimbabwe is shocking but an “at least syndrome” is keeping people going. You hear someone saying I didn’t get rice when I joined the long commodities queue at OK shop but “at least” I got mealie-meal or I was retrenched but *at least* I’m now buying and selling for survival. It’s *at least* I have managed to do a b c -*at least this or at least that*. The point is that I’m not contented but it’s better in light of the prevailing harsh economic realities. People are too preoccupied with the challenges of survival instead of seeking to address the totality of the situation in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe it is the survival of the fittest – those who happen to be the most innovative in face of the economic quagmire.²²⁴

From the above account it is evident that the harsh economic realities have an impact on the way society is organised. According to David Moore “if you have a working class that is not at work because there are no jobs, the ruling class becomes more powerful.”²²⁵ In the case of Zimbabwe unconfirmed reports put the unemployment rate at around 85%. These statistics are shocking, especially if one considers their impact on the civil society movement in relation to labour (ZCTU). Commenting on Zimbabwe’s dysfunctional economy and negative populist government policies, the ZCTU president had this to say:

After the slashing of prices, companies in the manufacturing sector retrenched heavily despite the fact that no statistics are currently available to us as ZCTU. Some companies even closed shop and the continued economic decline has an effect in that the membership of our affiliates have also declined making it difficult for the trade unions to operate because we rely on subscriptions from the worker. Once the membership declines, our income also declines and coupled with inflation and rising operating costs, this has a negative effect on trade unionisms. We are basically weakened at two fronts – numerically and financially.²²⁶

Furthermore, the devastating impact of the non-performing economy needs further elaboration. For Makumbe the under-performing economy affects democratisation in the following manner:

It created and increased the levels of abject poverty. It has also resulted in the redrawing of priorities for the majority of Zimbabweans, who instead of waking up to go and fight against a dictatorship, they have to wake up and run to the nearest supermarket that may get deliveries of (not that there are any, but just expecting that it will happen) food. Then face and join other 300 or 400 people in the queue but due to this cash crunch, people do not have money, so the first port of call is the bank. You wait to get the money for the whole day (which may not be

²²⁴ Interview with Innocent Kasiyano, 13 December 2007, Harare.

²²⁵ Interview with Professor David Moore, 22 August 2007, Durban.

²²⁶ Interview with Lovemore Matombo 17 December 2007, Harare.

enough for one's needs due to withdrawal restrictions) and then the next day or that other day, you go to the supermarket and queue again. As a result it's no longer a question of rights but it's now a question of survival. People are barely surviving.²²⁷

Indeed, when retrenched people vote with their feet or join the informal sector a different habitus emerges – one premised on the need to survive at all costs. Thus the environment has changed, when Morgan Tsvangirai was a ZCTU secretary general, a lot of people participated in the strikes and other demonstrations. Contemporarily when labour called for a stay-away or demonstration, it meant a lost opportunity to contribute towards family income by those in the informal sector. In the civil service, workers could not legally strike and the high unemployment rate meant that many workers avoided confrontation with employers who could easily hire and fire.²²⁸ Thus economic hardships made people shy away from politics. Therefore people no longer felt that they needed to be part and parcel of civil society and processes that are associated with it. Consequently, ZCTU reviewed its strategies in light of the harsh economic environment. With the continued growth of the informal sector, Matibenga argues that what seems to be apathy in the face of declining living standards is a rational choice. Almost similar to Makumbe's observation she argues that:

If I look at the survival of the people in this country for example the life of a street vendor (who is not allowed to sell in the streets in the first place!) the moment he or she is away for two minutes or so, it means lost income. One is faced with a choice, whether to vote, attend a demonstration or to go buy tomatoes for resell. The choice is automatic – to go to Mbare market to buy cheaper tomatoes for resale because the idea is to make a living. The point is all things being equal and the economy doing well, people would actually have better choices. For instance one would say “I have mealie meal, sugar and other basic food items, therefore let me participate in a ZCTU or NCA demonstration. But now if there are two queues, one for sugar and mealie meal and the other one for voter registration, which one would you join? Obviously you will join the mealie meal queue!”²²⁹

On the part of the trade union movement the remaining workforce that would have survived the retrenchment axe is difficult to mobilise. They are essentially so afraid of losing their jobs that they may not necessarily pay them a living wage but provide some form of security that they can fall back on. So suppose the ZCTU and NCA calls for a mass stay-away, it is difficult for people to take part because of the reasons cited earlier. Though the state-owned media would be carrying headlines like “Stay-away flops, Workers ignore ZCTU-UK machinations” and attribute the “flop” to the amount of support workers have for the sitting government, the picture is more

²²⁷ Interview with Professor Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

²²⁸ Interview with Reverend Magaya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

²²⁹ Interview with Lucia Matibenga, 19 December 2007, Harare.

complex. In addition, the nature of Zimbabwe's "licensed economy" makes it difficult for business to support labour in its quest to hold the government accountable for its actions. A licensed economy is one that has extensive government control and whereby one needs a licence to do either an economic or non-economic activity.²³⁰ The government simply threatens to withdraw licences for business that do not open during a stay-away, and some business people who did not toe the government line had their businesses nationalised.

Examples include SMM Holdings, which belongs to exiled businessman Mutumwa Mawere. Any support of a policy or activity that is not in line with ZANU PF's ideology is viewed as anathema because it is misconstrued as being meant to effect regime change. Consequently business cannot fund civil society, neither can it support it in any way. When indigenous business cannot play any role in fostering and entrenching democracies, then civil society solicits for donor funds to fund its operations. As a result donors continue to have a stake in Zimbabwe's politics, a position that predisposes the state to act uncompromisingly towards civil society and opposition. From the above accounts it is evident that a non-performing economy made it difficult for Zimbabwe to attain a democratic political order. It is expensive on many fronts because people take a back stage in the quest to fight for democracy due to the above-cited realities.

Still on the operations of organisations and Government policy, the malfunctioning economy made civil society vulnerable because of the way the banking industry operated. For example, all foreign currency accounts for both corporate and individuals were transferred from the different banks to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. However it later emerged in 2009 that the RBZ raided these private foreign currency accounts. One had to make an application to the central bank in order to access one's money. There was need for supporting documentation to the effect that foreign currency was genuinely needed for legitimate use outside the country, otherwise one could not get one's funds. The problem with this set-up was the existence of multiple exchange rates. The black market rate was higher than the two government exchange rates. Therefore when a civil society organisation wanted to pay salaries or other operational costs, it had to make an application to the Reserve Bank that would disburse the equivalent in local currency. But the major problem was that the exchange rate used by the RBZ overvalued the local currency²³¹ and that meant that an organisation would get less than it would if it had used the black market rate. As a result an interviewee from a civil society organisation lamented that: "The non-performing economy and RBZ restrictions have negatively affected operations of civil society, we are thrown

²³⁰ Interview with Dr Rupiya, 3 October 2007, Grahamstown.

²³¹ Interview with Innocent Kasiyano 13 December 2007, Harare.

off budget and as a result some of programmes have to be abandoned despite having been budgeted for earlier on.”²³² Thus a cross-cutting problem with all foreign sponsored organisations was the inability to broaden the scope of their work due to unfavourable RBZ policies. Essentially “due to galloping inflation, we now have very little resources at our disposal. Planning is not easy because a few weeks after drawing a year’s budget, it would be irrelevant.”²³³

In light of the vagaries wrought by a dysfunctional economy and emigration, remittances became a very significant issue. Many people in exile had left their families back home and they were morally obliged to send some money back home. Remittances were said to have also negatively impacted on the ability of the “residual” civil society in Zimbabwe to mobilise. The galloping inflation led to the dollarisation of the Zimbabwean economy whereby people demanded to be paid in American dollars or South African rand. Fragmentation ensued in Zimbabwe because society failed to close ranks since some segments of the population were living in a comfort zone. Matombo asserts that “because currently some families have got some relatives in the diaspora and they are still getting a bit out of that. That in itself results in fragmentation”.²³⁴ In other words, the remittances sent back home by those in exile negatively affected the number of people available for collective action and political participation in general. However this needs to be understood within the overarching problem of robust authoritarianism that characterises Zimbabwe’s body polity.

Furthermore, the malfunctioning economy made it possible for ZANU PF to behave ruthlessly towards civil society actors, especially in the media circles. An example that is well documented is how the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) bought shares in the Southern African Printing and Publishing House (SAPPHO) or the Mirror Group that was owned by Ibbo Mandaza who was subsequently elbowed out of the organisation. The CIO bought shares in the media house with a view to influencing the paper’s editorial policy and all this happened because the economy was not doing well and Mandaza did not want to see his empire collapsing. So what started as a normal business transaction ended up with the Zimbabwe civil society losing yet another voice – the *Daily Mirror* and the *Sunday Mirror*. In fact it is also suspected that the *Financial Gazette* was being financed by the Security Ministry, a position that is not healthy for information dissemination.

²³² Interview with Tafadzwa Mukanya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

²³³ Interview with Kelvin Hazangwi, 13 December 2007, Harare.

²³⁴ Interview with Lovemore Matombo, 17 December 2007, Harare.

More so, the ill-performing economy made it easy for ZANU PF to create a pool of foot soldiers that were easily used against civil society actors and the opposition. Indeed this was possible because “had the economy been in a sound state and everybody had a job, no rational young men would join ZANU-PF militia units.”²³⁵ One of the militias lamented that after failing to get a job, he was being used by ZANU-PF in order to survive. He was quoted as having said “I don’t like killing people or throwing people into the Pond. But this is my only source of income, so I have to do it. I will do anything that ZANU-PF asks me to do.” “Yeah, I’m not a ZANU-PF person. But I need the money to support my family.”²³⁶ This was not an isolated case because a number of youths worked for ZANU PF during the bloody presidential run-off election of June 2008 which the opposition MDC subsequently boycotted.

Finally, “normal mobilisation is not possible outside a functioning economy”²³⁷ primarily because many people from rural constituencies accepted the propaganda that the economy was not doing well because the civil society and opposition called for sanctions. ZANU PF attributed the collapse of the economy to sanctions and the bilateral dispute between Britain and Zimbabwe over land. The mantra went further and said the two constituencies were working in cahoots with the British government in order to reverse the land reform. To that end, after 27 March 2008, the government-controlled newspapers carried headlines that alleged that former commercial farmers were on the verge of coming back because they thought that the MDC had won the presidential election. For ZANU PF, an MDC win meant land being returned to the former white commercial farmers, and the idea of losing land sent shivers down the spines of the rural people who rely on land as a source of livelihood. This confused rural constituencies who felt that “taking part in any collective democratic processes like a demonstration against a government that gave them land is tantamount to treachery, lack of patriotism or betrayal of one own country.”²³⁸

5.9 Conclusion

In conclusion Polanyi’s ideas in the book, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origin of Our Times* has special resonance in contemporary Zimbabwean politics because society generated a movement for social protection from free market principles. The Zimbabwean movements for social protection coalesced within the auspices of the concept of social

²³⁵ “A Day Embedded with a ZANU-PF Militia Unit” < <http://www.hararetribune.com> > Accessed 17 July 2008.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Interview with Dr Lovemore Madhuku, 14 December 2007, Harare.

²³⁸ Interview with Fortune Chamba, 14 December 2007, Harare.

movement unionism to form the amorphous NCA where the MDC was subsequently born. The MDC was to play a midwifery role in bringing about real political change in Zimbabwe where participatory democracy was to be the order of the day. The impulse towards participatory democracy was evident in the rise of the ZCTU after 1988, the birth of NCA as a social movement union and the subsequent formation of a worker-driven party, the MDC. Given the potentiality of civil society and the MDC to bring about real political change, ZANU PF sought to block the process, a development that explains the current democratic struggles in Zimbabwe. Impediments such as the wilful destruction of the economy and general state barbarism significantly undermined the MDC and civil society after many people who lost their jobs either joined the informal sector or voted with their feet. These factors and state organised violence made it very difficult for the opposition and civil society to bring about peaceful democratic change. The end result was the long and arduous journey towards democratisation that opposition, civil society and their respective constituencies are currently grappling with.

CHAPTER SIX

Transnational Democratisation and Advocacy

Mugabe has had no mandate to rule since losing the elections on 29 March 2008, and is now more discredited than ever. He is presiding over a ruthless military dictatorship. COSATU calls upon the AU and SADC to disown him and recognise only an interim, transitional administration whose sole task will be to hold new, free and fair elections, with sufficient AU and SADC monitors to ensure that there is no state-sponsored violence and that the will of the people prevails.¹

¹ Africa Must Disown Mugabe, Statement issued by Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 29 June 2008.

6.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of self-organised advocacy civil society organisations have been undertaking voluntary collective action across many state boundaries in pursuit of social justice. Globalisation and the attendant improvements in communication technology have also fundamentally transformed the structure of the public sphere. National problems are now being debated transnationally and not necessarily within a Westphalian space or resolved by a Westphalian state.² The mobilisation of public opinion no longer stops at the borders of territorial states and this reality explains the emergence of what Nancy Fraser terms ‘transnational public spheres’, ‘diasporic public spheres’ and the emerging ‘global public sphere’.³ Accordingly, the arbitrary sub-disciplinary boundaries between international relations and comparative politics need to be re-examined because international process does impact on domestic politics.⁴ This chapter advances the position that transnational structures of power found in the international economy modify the balance of power within a political system and constrain political decision making in a manner that affects state-society relations.⁵ The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the significance of transnational civil society in Zimbabwe’s democratic struggles and the challenges encountered in the process of seeking to alter the balance of power in the country. The chapter also attempts to explain the significance of SADC leaders’ protection of President Mugabe despite his terrible human rights record. The shielding of Mugabe significantly undermined the efforts by both domestic and transnational civil society to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe. For the purpose of this thesis, transnational civil society includes both diaspora-based civil society organisations formed by Zimbabweans who emigrated from that country and also what is often referred to as global civil society.

The chapter consists of three major sections. The first one interrogates the idea of a transnational or global civil society and its relevance to Zimbabwe by looking at the role of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch among others in seeking to modify the balance of power in the country. In the second section, an attempt is made towards understanding the

² Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 24, no.4 (2007): 14.

³ *Ibid.*,7.

⁴ See for example, Hans Peter Schmitz, “Domestic and Transnational perspectives on Democratisation,” *International Studies Review*, vol. 6, no. 3 (2004):403.

⁵ Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, John D. Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 29, no. 3, (April1997):325.

history, role, achievements and the challenges faced by Zimbabwe's diaspora-based civil society. The final section looks at the political dynamics surrounding the continental and regional responses to the Zimbabwean crisis.

6.2 Transnational Civil Society

Transnational or global civil society refers to “the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies.”⁶ For some scholars, the term global civil society is a catch-all phrase for different NGOs and social movements operating in the international arena that is yet to be firmly grounded in social scientific inquiry.⁷ In short the idea of a global civil society is not only contested but ambiguous as well. It is worth pointing out from the onset that a growing number of international non-governmental organisations are mobilising around labour standards, international trade, corruption, human rights and the environment.

Transnational civil society organisations do not necessarily operate within the confines of the UN; rather they are grounded in domestic civil societies. For example Transparency International deals with issue of corruption world-wide. Global civil society has made it difficult for dictators to claim “interference in internal affairs” when confronted with gross human rights violations.⁸ The trial of Liberia's Charles Taylor for crimes against humanity in The Hague could not have taken place without the transnational mobilisation of human rights activists world-wide. International non-governmental organisations, trade unions and churches across the world linked to domestic civil society in countries that violate human rights, generally brought profound changes in states' human rights behaviour.⁹ For example, what was witnessed in Zimbabwe can be termed a boomerang pattern of influence. Such a development takes place when civil society elements in an authoritarian state sidestep their government and appeal to international allies to put pressure on the regime from outside.¹⁰

⁶ Rupert Taylor, “Interpreting Global Civil Society,” *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Non-Profit Organizations*, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 2002):341.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 339-341. See also Louise Amoore and Paul Langley, “Ambiguities of Global Civil Society,” *Review of International Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2004):89-110 and Jens Bartelson, “Making Sense of Global Civil Society,” *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2006):371-395.

⁸ Thomas Risse, “The Power of Norms versus the Norms of Power: Transnational Civil Society and Human Rights,” in *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, ed. Ann M. Florini (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 178.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 178-179.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 189.

The major roles of transnational civil society include lobbying key Western governments and international institutions to toughen their stances towards a norm-violating government, providing financial assistance and training to domestic civic organisations and alerting the world about human rights violation in a particular country.¹¹ Close interaction between transnational civil society and domestic civil society and political opposition led to the establishment of the power of norms against the norms of power.¹² For example from 2000, the US government became highly critical of the Mugabe regime. In 2001 the Bush administration responded to the deteriorating human rights situation in Zimbabwe and slapped the ZANU PF leadership with targeted sanctions contained in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZIDERA).

The international awards received by civil society organisations in Zimbabwe were a manifestation of the close cooperation between domestic and transnational civil society. For example Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights won the Canadian Rights & Democracy 2008 John Humphrey Freedom Award, while in the same year the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) also won the fifth Human Rights Award from the German section of Amnesty International. The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) in Geneva and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights jointly authored a substantive report that concluded that Operation Murambatsvina was a crime against humanity. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch regularly reported on torture, disappearances and other atrocities committed by the government against the opposition and civil society. A number of European and US think tanks and NGOs are increasingly being involved in fundraising, research and advocacy on behalf of Third World civil society organisations pursuing democratisation, human rights and conflict resolution projects.¹³ For example International Crisis Group, a leading source of analysis and advice to governments about conflict prevention and resolution, produced around twenty reports and briefings on Zimbabwe between 2002 and 2008.

From 2000 Amnesty International, Southern African Human Rights Trust (SAHRIT), Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group collected and disseminated detailed information about the political situation in Zimbabwe. The various meticulously researched reports and

¹¹ Ibid., 198

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Chetan Kumar, "Campaigns for Democracy," in *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, ed. Ann M. Florini (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 118.

publications were widely disseminated. Reports done by the UN and by NGOs include *Zimbabwe: An Assessment of Human Rights Violations in the Run-Up to the March 2005 Parliamentary Elections*, Amnesty International, 15 March 2000; *Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina* by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe (United Nations, 2005); *“Operation Murambatsvina: A crime Against Humanity”* compiled by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, May 2007; and *“Zimbabwe, Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History,”* commissioned by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) in March 2009. Both world-wide and regional networks mobilised to support Zimbabwe’s civil society. As a result, Mugabe’s human rights abuses came under increasing international criticism and scrutiny.

In addition, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) worked closely with the ZCTU and condemned the arrest and harassment of trade unionists by the government of Zimbabwe. Between 2004 and 2007, ICFTU lobbied the Director General of the ILO, Juan Somavia, to intervene each time police brutally repressed ZCTU protest marches. ICFTU also reported the Government of Zimbabwe to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association for violating Conventions on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. The Ministry of Labour in Zimbabwe was regularly inundated with hundreds of letters and phone calls from the ICFTU and other international labour federations demanding “the immediate and unconditional release” of their labour colleagues.¹⁴

The ILO’s specialised supervisory bodies seek to promote a “Decent Work Agenda” world-wide by protecting trade unionists’ rights. Any continued serious violation of trade union rights leads to a country being listed in the ILO’s “Special Paragraph”. When a country is listed in the Special Paragraph, it means that serious deficiencies exist in the application of Labour standards contained in conventions ratified by it. Zimbabwe has been on the ILO “Special Paragraph” since 2006 for breaching the Conventions on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining. From 2007 representatives of the Zimbabwe Government to the annual International Labour Conference held in Geneva have been refusing to appear before the Committee on the application of standards, suggesting the government’s disrespect for the ILO and its fundamental principles.

¹⁴ The author worked for The Ministry of Labour in Zimbabwe, in the International Relations Division, responsible for coordinating the international affairs of the ministry in relation to employment and labour issues between 2003 and 2006.

Various initiatives have been undertaken by regional civil society organisations in solidarity with their counterparts in Zimbabwe. One of the most critical voices about the situation in Zimbabwe was COSATU. One of its founding principles was to act in solidarity with workers under attack wherever they might be. In 2004 a COSATU delegation was deported from Zimbabwe when it had gone there for a five-day fact finding mission about the political and economic situation in that country. In 2007 and 2008, the labour body demonstrated in solidarity with the workers in Zimbabwe at the Beitbridge border post. COSATU also joined organisations from Zimbabwe and Swaziland who were opposed to the participation of President Mugabe and King Mswati of Swaziland at a SADC summit held in Sandton, Johannesburg in August 2008. They came up with a declaration that condemned the behaviour of the two leaders and took it upon themselves to expose “their unacceptable behaviour before the eyes of the world.”¹⁵

More substantively, COSATU’s drive for social movement unionism regionally was demonstrated in April 2008 when it blocked a Chinese-owned ship, *An Yue Jiana*, carrying an arms shipment destined for Zimbabwe, from docking and offloading its consignment in Durban. The development followed protest action by COSATU and a number of civil society organisations across Southern Africa that also lobbied their governments not to allow the “ship of shame”¹⁶ to dock at their ports. The various regional and transnational civil society organisations feared that Mugabe was going to use the arms to suppress civil society and the opposition in wake of the disputed March 2008 elections. The fact that the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) won a court bid to impound the arms cargo was also a victory for worker solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe.¹⁷ The Legal Assistance Centre of Namibia pledged to support SALC to get a court order to stop *An Yue Jiang* from offloading the cargo in that country.¹⁸ The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Namibia also supported the interventions by the two legal bodies.

Chinese embassies in the region were also forced to make press statements while demonstrations against *An Yue Jiana* were held at the Chinese Embassy in South Africa. The historic victory for regional trade unions and civil society came about following the refusal by dock workers from the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU), to unload or transport the weapons. SATAWU is an affiliate of both COSATU and the London-based International

¹⁵ “Protesters oppose Mugabe, Mswati at SADC summit,” *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 16 August 2008.

¹⁶ Christof Maletsky, “Zimbabwe: Ship of Shame ‘Recalled,’” *The Namibian* (Windhoek), 25 April 2008.

¹⁷ Chantelle Benjamin, “South Africa: Unions Bid to Halt Zimbabwe Arms Ship,” *Business Day* (South Africa), 22 April 2008.

¹⁸ Maletsky, “Ship of Shame.”

Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) and International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in Brussels. They successfully mobilised trade unions in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia to stop the ship from offloading its cargo of weapons.¹⁹ The ITF consists of more than 650 unions, representing 4,5 million workers in 148 countries, and it was instrumental in Mozambique's refusal allow the ship to dock in Maputo. The development followed SATAWU's request for such an intervention.²⁰ ITUC has 312 union affiliates in 157 countries and represents 170 million trade union members.²¹ In sum, transnational civil society maintained international pressure on the Mugabe regime.

6.3 Zimbabwe's Diaspora-Based Civil Society

Zimbabwe's diaspora-based civil society was a product of rising emigration from the country. The diaspora-based civil society takes two forms based on the class position of its members and their concomitant impact on public policy. The position this researcher is advancing here is that the ability of the two types of civil society organisations found in the diaspora to influence state policy in conjunction with other civil society organisations found in Zimbabwe and those operating transnationally is based on class and education. The diaspora civil society found in South Africa and Botswana can be defined as an embryonic minimalist or inchoate civil society not under state tutelage.²² In other words these organisations cannot wholly be described as civil society organisations in the strict sense of the term, primarily because the majority of the people concerned are economic refugees struggling to survive, the desperately poor.

Some people from Zimbabwe found in the region today are unskilled labourers with little or no access to the internet and newspapers where they could be part of a cyber or general public sphere. Their concern is with issues of survival, which explains why they are peripheral to what goes on in subaltern counter publics found in Zimbabwe, despite their earlier concerns with democratisation at home. Notwithstanding the fact that most Zimbabweans found in South Africa and Botswana are struggling to survive, some nonetheless possess skills that are in demand in the two host countries. For example figures from the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) indicate that, of the 17 086 evaluations of qualifications it performed between

¹⁹ Benjamin, *Business Day*.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ International Trade Union Confederation List of Affiliated Organisations (4th General Council, 16-18 December 2008, Brussels).

²² The definition is based on Charles Taylor, "Modes of Civil Society," *Public Culture*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 1990):98.

January and September 2007, 9 756 or 57% were for qualifications held by Zimbabweans who wanted to obtain work permits.²³ It is against this complex background that the contribution of poor exiled Zimbabweans to democratisation should be assessed.

The majority of activists that fled government repression, be they journalists or human rights lawyers, provided impetus for change through cyber activism where they provided evidence that implicated ZANU PF in human rights abuses. The internet is a terrain of contested ideas that can be harnessed for counter hegemonic (anti-establishment) political ends.²⁴ Exiled journalists and human rights activists established blogs, radio stations and online news sites where people could share information and debate about Zimbabwe's current affairs. This issue is discussed in detail later in this chapter. Such initiatives played a role in ensuring that Zimbabwe remained high on the international agenda.

MDC and civil society organisations based in Zimbabwe used digital cameras and cell phones to capture images of human rights violations. Files were swiftly transmitted to the diaspora-based civil society which in turn published them on the internet. Global civil society organisations and governments could call on the ZANU PF government to respect human rights. The internet and other forms of advanced information technology acted as a deterrent to acts of violence by the government, making it difficult for the government to practise the kind of mass repression that characterised Zimbabwe earlier.²⁵

6.3.1 The Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organisations Forum²⁶

Any discussion about the Zimbabwean community and the attendant socio-economic and political associational life in the diaspora generally and South Africa in particular is incomplete if the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organisations Forum is not mentioned. A leading group of scholars argued that "A clear indication of the increased presence of Zimbabweans in South Africa is the plethora of organisations that have emerged in the past 5 years..."²⁷ The process

²³ Ann Bernstein & Sandy Johnston, "South Africa: Government Not Facing Up to the Realities of an Exodus," *Business Day* (South Africa), 27 March 2008.

²⁴ Barney Warf & John Grimes, "Counter-Hegemonic Discourses and the Internet," *Geographical Review*, vol. 87, no. 2 (April 1997):259.

²⁵ Duncan Campbell & Paul Lewis, "Zimbabwe: How An Angry Prison Officer with a Secret Camera Shamed a Tyrant," *The Guardian* (UK), 5 July 2008.

²⁶ Unless otherwise stated, the information contained in this section was provided by Daniel Molokele in an interview with the author in September 2007 and through email correspondence between 2008 and 2009.

²⁷ Elinor Sisulu, Bhhekinkosi Moyo & Nkosinathi Tshuma, "The Zimbabwean Community in South Africa," in *State of the Nation*, eds. Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall & Jessica Lutchman (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007):559.

started with the establishment of South African chapter of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, in late 2003. The social movement was mandated by its membership to develop a sustained advocacy programme internationally and regionally. The intention was to shift the debate away from Mugabe's propaganda on the land question to "the disastrous economic and political programmes pursued by the government."²⁸

In 2004, the South African chapter of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition organised a meeting with 22 other civil society groups based in that country.²⁹ A resolution was passed at the meeting requiring the diaspora-based civil society groups to work more closely together and complement each other's efforts.³⁰ Pursuant to that vision of close cooperation, the various groups jointly held a mock election at the Zimbabwean Embassy in Pretoria in March 2005. Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organisations Forum emerged from this initiative under the leadership of a former student leader and human rights lawyer, Fortune Daniel Molokele-Mguni. A number of budding civil society groups, particularly in Johannesburg, received assistance from the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organisations Forum. A case in point was the Revolutionary Youth Movement of Zimbabwe (RYMZ), to be discussed shortly. The assistance given to fellow civil society organisations ranged from use of office space, computer facilities and internet access to printing and photocopying facilities. As a result, a number of dedicated civil society groups complemented the democratisation efforts of well-established organisations both in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organisations Forum is a coalition of about 40 diaspora-based Zimbabwean civil society organisations in South Africa. The Forum was formed in 2005 with a mission to bring together all the South African-based Zimbabwe groups lobbying for a democratic Zimbabwe. The objective of the umbrella body was to promote the interests of Zimbabweans in the diaspora while at the same time complementing the efforts of civil society organisations that operate in Zimbabwe. In 2007 this Forum petitioned the Southern African Development Community (SADC) secretariat in Gaborone to grant temporary residence permits to displaced Zimbabweans until the political crisis was over. The Forum urged SADC countries to treat exiled Zimbabweans with dignity because many of them complained bitterly of harassment by the police and immigration officials. This followed media reports of wanton arrests, detention and deportation of a considerable number of displaced Zimbabweans.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Interview with Daniel Molokele, 16 September 2007, Johannesburg.

³⁰ "The Zimbabwean Community in South Africa," 561.

Under the Fair Deal Campaign, Zimbabwean diaspora civil society organisations world-wide called for the deportation of students linked to the Mugabe regime from universities abroad. The campaign was initiated by a diaspora-based online newspaper *ZimDaily*, and was meant to secure the deportation of children of the ruling elite studying abroad. The online newspaper indicated that some Western governments had agreed to deport students with links to ZANU PF but wanted necessary information for them to be deported.³¹ In short, under the Fair Deal Campaign some Western countries were ready to extend sanctions to those who were part and parcel of the ZANU PF party system. In August 2007, Australia heeded the call and deported Zimbabwean students whose parents were from ZANU PF. Police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, Ministers Emerson Mnangagwa, Sylvester Nguni, David Karimanzira, Ignatius Chombo and Olivia Muchena all had their children expelled from Australia. The diaspora civil society organisations suggested that money used to educate the ZANU PF politicians' children abroad could be put to better use to improve Zimbabwe's collapsing education and health delivery systems.

An affiliate of the forum called the Revolutionary Youth Movement of Zimbabwe (RYMZ) also supported the fair deal campaign. This group was formed in 2006 by young Zimbabweans in South Africa dedicated to bring about a democratic dispensation at home.³² RYMZ sought to democratise Zimbabwe by mobilising its membership through protests, rallies and conferences to raise international awareness about Mugabe's barbarism. In April 2008 some of its members were arrested by the South African police for violating the Public Gatherings Act when they held an unsanctioned demonstration at the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria against the docking of the *An Yue Jiang* mentioned earlier.³³ They also demanded that China stop propping up the cash-strapped Mugabe regime and halt the supply of radio jamming equipment to Zimbabwe. However the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Zhong Jianhua, refused to accept the formal appeal.

In December 2007, the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organisations Forum launched another institution called the Global Zimbabwe Forum (GZF) that sought to be the most authoritative international voice for all the representative organisations and networks of the Zimbabwean diaspora community. An international secretariat office headed by the GZF Global

³¹ "Fair Deal Relaunch" <http://www.zimdaily.com/news/fairdeal27.6090.html> Accessed 27 April 2009.

³² Unless otherwise stated, information about the Revolutionary Youth Movement of Zimbabwe (RYMZ) was from an interview conducted by the author with the organisation's president, Simon Mudekwa, in September 2007 and another follow-up telephonic interview on 27 April 2009.

³³ Jacques Breytenbach, "Protesters held at Chinese Embassy," *Pretoria News* (Tshwane), 26 April 2008.

Co-ordinator, Daniel Molohele, was opened in 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland.

6.3.2 Challenges Facing Diaspora-Based Civil Society

Notwithstanding the achievements by the diaspora-based civil society and its international allies, a number of problems are associated with the presence of Zimbabweans abroad. Due to the mass exodus of people what was left as civil society in Zimbabwe is a shell or pale shadow of its former self.³⁴ This worsened the situation because when the MDC was formed, a number of civic actors resigned from civil society positions and assumed new roles in the labour-backed opposition political party. Zimbabweans essentially followed an international trend and tactic when they took the exit option and subsequently established pressure groups in foreign countries. For contemporary Zimbabwe, there are advantages and disadvantages for civil society to being in exile. For some internally-based scholars, disadvantages tend to outweigh the advantages primarily because once one is outside the country, one's relevance to the crisis diminishes.³⁵

Similarly Mukonoweshuro noted that it was not easy for exiled activists to make a significant contribution when they can neither apply direct pressure on the regime nor have firsthand information about what is happening in Zimbabwe.³⁶ Therefore their relevance and significance is at the level of lobbying the host country to apply pressure on the regime and heightening the profile of the crisis.³⁷ Consider for example, the Zimbabwe Virgil that have been protesting against Mugabe's human rights violations outside the Zimbabwe Embassy in London every Saturday since 2002.³⁸ Despite the difficulties, there was consensus amongst activists that a multi-sectoral approach was the way only forward.³⁹

Regional diaspora-based civil society organisations were beset by problems of personalities, duplication of roles, tribalism and inter-organisational competition.⁴⁰ Another impediment that stood in the way of diaspora civil society was that non-resident Zimbabweans could not vote. A number of amendments were made to the Electoral and Citizenship Acts to disenfranchise exiled Zimbabweans. They were erroneously viewed as predominantly opposition elements who

³⁴ Interview with Dr Rupiya, 3 October 2007, Grahamstown.

³⁵ Interview with Professor Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

³⁶ Interview with Professor Elphas Mukonoweshuro, 20 December 2007, Harare.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Interview with Motipashe Dube, 12 December 2007, Harare.

³⁹ Interview with Jacob Mafume, 12 December 2007, Harare.

⁴⁰ Interview with Anna-Maria Mudzingiranwa, 12 September 2007, Johannesburg.

want to tilt the political scales in favour of the MDC. The reality was that many people had voted with their feet because Mugabe had deliberately ruined the economy when he sought to undercut the trade union base of the MDC. Quite reasonably they became a natural seedbed of civil society and opposition. Campaigns for a diaspora vote relied heavily on exiled Zimbabweans who maintained strong links with their motherland. For example, during the run-up to the 2008 elections, exiled businessmen in conjunction with some NGOs organised transport for people who wanted to go home and vote.

The civil society movement in the diaspora was accused by its Zimbabwe-based counterpart of forgetting why it was in exile in the first place. For some analysts some exiled activists had other agendas such as job creation and providing for their own material needs.⁴¹ Exiled activists were preoccupied with looking for money to send back home.⁴² A civil society activist resident in Zimbabwe lamented that some activists were out there to make money in the name of the struggle instead of complementing the democratisation efforts of those on the ground.⁴³ However it should be pointed out that such criticism was rather harsh given the economic problems of Zimbabwe. People in the diaspora were being realistic and behaving as rational economic human beings who naturally want to maximise utility.

Many people did not leave Zimbabwe with a view to fight for democracy *per se*; rather they were in search of better living conditions. The researcher's random survey of the refugees at the Methodist church centre run by Bishop Paul Verryn in central Johannesburg, revealed that there were schoolteachers, accountants and many other professionals in search of better living conditions in South Africa. Accordingly, it did not logically follow that everyone in exile would engage in processes that would result in the democratisation of Zimbabwe. Exiled Zimbabweans were aware of the continued downward economic spiral in their country and tried as much as possible to put bread and butter on both tables – South Africa and Zimbabwe. This reality was the source of tension and dissonance between civil society in exile and at home. Mudekwa conceded that when people arrive in South Africa, they “tend to be preoccupied with chasing after the rand.”⁴⁴

Allied to the above it was also very difficult for the various civil society groups resident in South

⁴¹ Interview with Fortune Chamba, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁴² Interview with Mai Ngano, 14 September 2007, Johannesburg.

⁴³ Interview with Fortune Chamba, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁴⁴ Interview with Simon Mudekwa, 12 September 2007, Johannesburg.

Africa to mobilise people, say for a demonstration at the Zimbabwe Embassy or Consulate or similar activities. Reasons advanced to explain why that situation prevailed ranged from fear to poverty. Some were afraid to participate in civic activities because they did not have proper immigration papers and were afraid of being caught by the police and deported. This authors visit to the Methodist church centre in central Johannesburg revealed the foregoing aspect. The church authorities provided shelter, food, clothing, child care, employment assistance and counselling to refugees, particularly from Zimbabwe.

Exigencies of being a refugee also warrant attention. Exiled Zimbabweans in Southern Africa especially in Botswana and South Africa experienced xenophobia or anti-migrant violence. They are derogatorily referred to as “makwerekwere” and are often ill-treated by locals who resent their presence in their country. For example the xenophobic violence that broke out in many parts of South Africa in 2008 was mainly due to competition over scarce resources. As a result it is not possible for exiled Zimbabweans to play a significant political role given their preoccupation with basic survival and security.

Evidence from informal discussions with exiled Zimbabweans suggests that they are fearful of the Mugabe regime even beyond the Zimbabwean borders. I was only able to secure interviews with exiled Zimbabweans after a church official vouched for the purity of my intentions – that I was not a spy. Sometimes “the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) operatives follow activists in South Africa and then either kidnap, torture, suppress or even kill them.”⁴⁵ As a result many people tend to keep a very low profile in order to avoid getting caught by the CIO.

Emigration creates a rentier economy that survives on remittances sent by foreign-based nationals through both official and unofficial means. Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic had an adaptive and mafia-style political economy akin to Zimbabwe’s under Robert Mugabe. Between 1993 and 1994 Serbia experienced hyperinflationary pressures that reached 313 million per cent per month because “40 percent of the supply of dinars was being used to sop up hard currency on the currency black market.”⁴⁶ Thus, the large-scale printing of dinars by Milosevic’s regime “generated one of the most extreme episodes of hyperinflation”⁴⁷ in the history of Serbia. The operation of the Serbian system entailed:

⁴⁵ Interview with Gift Nhidza Muisa, 14 September 2007, Johannesburg.

⁴⁶ Peter Andreas, “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and its Legacy,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 49 (2005):343.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

a large diaspora, sending cash to relatives, or coming on visits in Serbia, exchanging foreign currency for Dinars or buying things in Serbia (including food during the stay). These sources created a necessary level of cash flow inside Serbia that could be either sucked into the inflation and thereby transferred, or that could provide the necessary basis for a market in the grey and black sectors of the economy. Inflation was a chief instrument in the economy for extracting cash money from the population and transferring it, through the banks, to the state and government. From these resources payouts could be made to loyal associates as well as finance activities (police, special forces etc).⁴⁸

Following Mugabe's deliberate destruction of the productive sectors of the economy, a number of respected economists agreed that remittances from the diaspora kept Zimbabwe afloat. Without any production taking place in the main sectors of the economy, hard currency became very scarce. As a result the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe established a money transfer system called Homelink in 2004 that endeavoured to attract remittances from Zimbabweans in the diaspora. The system operated along the same lines as such agencies like Western Union Money Transfer. Zimbabweans in the diaspora could deposit money with Homelink institutions worldwide and recipients in Zimbabwe would then receive the equivalent in local currency based on the prevailing rate. Proceeds from the system would partly be used to sustain the economy. The Homelink scheme suggested two realities: firstly the government acknowledged the importance of migrant remittances to the comatose economy, and secondly it was an indication that many Zimbabweans, both professionals and non-professionals, had voted with their feet. However Homelink failed to increase the flow of foreign currency into the Zimbabwean economy because a number of civil society organisations in the diaspora appealed to people not to use the facility.⁴⁹

The argument advanced by both diaspora and domestic civil society was that transferring money through the Homelink facility would prop up the Mugabe regime and weaken the sanctions imposed by Western countries. There was neither a shared vision nor a social contract in Zimbabwe that bound the state and societal groups because the latter felt that resources made available through taxes and export earnings were put to no good use by the ruling elite. In consequence, foreign-based Zimbabweans opted not to use the formal banking system because they did not want the regime to benefit from their money even while it denied them the right to vote. Another reason was that informal foreign currency dealers offered more lucrative rates for foreign currency compared to what Reserve Bank scheme offered.

⁴⁸ Jens Støilhoff Sørensen, "War as Social Transformation: Wealth, Class, Power and an Illiberal Economy in Serbia," *Journal of Civil Wars*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 2003):63.

⁴⁹ Organisations affiliated to the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organisations Forum in South Africa were part of this initiative.

However the regime found a way round the problem and resorted to what the Central Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, called “Extra-ordinary Measures for Extra-ordinary Challenges.”⁵⁰ Gono argued that the central bank responded to challenges posed by a “Casino Economy” whose major feature was a gambling or casino ethic. The extra-ordinary measures for extra-ordinary challenges were built around a massive printing of the local currency among other unorthodox macroeconomic management practices. The measures fuelled hyper-inflation that reached 100 000% by March 2008⁵¹ to the extent that Fidelity Printers failed to cope with the demand for cash in the economy. A German company, Giesecke and Devrient (G & D), that is the world’s second largest printer of banknotes supplied Mugabe’s regime with the special paper for printing bank notes.⁵²

Ironically the foreign currency used to pay G & D was sourced on the black market that flourished due to the high number of Zimbabweans working abroad. By March 2008 G & D was delivering 432 000 sheets of banknotes weekly to Fidelity Printers.⁵³ The sextillions of dollars in local currency churned out weekly were used to purchase foreign currency remittances on the informal market. The foreign currency sourced on the black market was used to buy luxuries for judges and top military personnel central to the regime’s continued hold on power.⁵⁴ The huge sums of money printed by the Reserve Bank were also used to award huge pay increases to the security apparatus, as well as to pay war veterans and youth militia to attack civil society activists. This was how Zimbabwe’s “Casino Economy”, characterised by the central bank’s quasi-fiscal activities, came into existence.

In other words the millions of people who have left the country unintentionally offered the regime a new lease of life because their remittances in the form of fuel and hard currencies literally ran the economy. As a result the people in the diaspora eroded the gains they had previously made alongside their counterparts resident in Zimbabwe. Essentially, if there was no other source of foreign currency to support the regime everything might have collapsed earlier and might have forced ZANU PF to institute political reforms. ZANU PF members managed to weaken sanctions by buying foreign currency on the informal market and used the proceeds to

⁵⁰ Gideon Gono, *Zimbabwe’s Casino Economy: Extra-ordinary Measures for Extra-ordinary Challenges* (Harare: ZPH Publishers, 2008).

⁵¹ Christina Lamb, “Planeloads of Cash Prop Up Mugabe,” *The Sunday Times* (UK), 2 March 2008.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Fidelis Munyoro, “Judges Get Vehicles, Goods,” *The Herald* (Harare), 1 August 2008.

buy luxuries for the leadership from countries like South Africa.

In July 2008, Giesecke and Devrient, the suppliers of the vital paper to Fidelity Printers, terminated its business relationship with the Zimbabwean central bank. This step followed intense international lobbying by civic groups, and especially those in Germany, for the company to cut ties with the Zimbabwean government. Some German human rights organisations staged a protest at Giesecke and Devrient's offices in June 2008 and handed a letter that read in part: "In your code of conduct you stress the respect for human rights and the responsibility for social and technical progress in society [and these must be followed]."⁵⁵ The decision came in response to a request by the German government and the European Union.⁵⁶ This suggests that global civil society and key Western governments had an influence on the political economy of Zimbabwe.

In assessing the utility of the information technology that the foreign-based Zimbabweans used to access the audience back home, it is imperative to appreciate the limitations resulting from a "digital divide". There is also an aspect of technological sophistication that needs to be taken in to account. On 24 June 2008, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported that in Zimbabwe, "Only about 2.4% of the population has a personal computer and around 11% have access to the internet (usually through internet cafes)."⁵⁷ This objective reality presented a big barrier to the online community of Zimbabwean activists.

Possibilities for collective action through technological advancement were also limited due to information warfare waged against online newspapers and other pro-civil society websites. There was "hacktivism", an electronic equivalent of graffiti intended to incapacitate an adversary's website.⁵⁸ Unconfirmed reports suggest that China was the brains behind the hacking of online sites supportive of civil society and it was done on the instigation of the Government of Zimbabwe. In 2008 there was online warfare that pitted the government of Zimbabwe against its civil society critics. Some activists retaliated and hacked the government controlled *Herald* newspaper. Despite the hacking problem, cyber activism indeed played a role in providing the world with up-to-date information about Zimbabwe. Victims of state sponsored violence shown online impacted negatively on Mugabe's international support base. The government used to

⁵⁵ Paul Nyakazeya, "Cash Shortage Looms," *Zimbabwe Independent* (Harare), 4 July 2008.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ "Zimbabwe Media Evades Censors," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7471262.stm>, Accessed 1 August 2008.

⁵⁸ Seth F. Kreimer, "Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, vol. 150, no. 1 (November 2001):156.

earlier deny allegation human rights abuses, but with improvements in technology many websites had evidence that the regime found very difficult to contest. It was against this background that the government of Zimbabwe and China stepped up their hacking campaign.

Another blow to the diaspora-based civil society was the jamming of radio stations by the Mugabe government. Jamming equipment was obtained from China to deal with stations that disseminated news on Zimbabwe from abroad, for example, Studio 7 and Short Wave Radio Africa. Exiled Zimbabwean journalists on these stations broadcasted in English, Shona and Ndebele. However the jamming equipment also affected frequencies of local radio stations, and wind-up radios donated by the Radio Communication project were confiscated from villagers across the country by ZANU PF militia and the CIO operatives.⁵⁹ The Radio Communication project was sponsored by some NGOs to help remote rural community's access independent radio broadcasts from the diaspora. Due to erratic power supply and the high cost of batteries, the solar-powered or wind-up radios ensured that Zimbabweans received news from radio stations abroad.

Many Zimbabweans dislike the state-owned broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), because of its biased reporting and used pirated digital satellite decoders to access foreign TV stations, especially South Africa's SABC and e-TV, and France24. It was from these stations that resident Zimbabweans got news about what was happening in their own backyard. However in the run-up to the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off, an operation code-named "Operation Dzikisai MaDish" (Pull Down Satellite Dishes) was launched by ZANU PF youth militia. A number of households in major urban areas were forced to dismantle their satellite dishes or face unspecified action.

Newspapers published in the diaspora to counter government propaganda and a media blackout at home was not spared. Stringent media laws made it impossible for independent newspapers to get licences and some media houses published in exile and shipped their papers to Zimbabwe. However in May 2008, a truckload carrying 60 000 copies of a paper called *The Zimbabwean* coming from South Africa was intercepted and burnt by suspected CIO agents, leaving the crew almost for dead.⁶⁰ Two weeks later, the Government of Zimbabwe gazetted regulations that compelled foreign newspapers sold in Zimbabwe to pay for import duty in foreign currency. According to *The Herald*, "The amendments follow concern raised by the Government recently

⁵⁹ Interview with Gift Nhidza Muisa, 14 September 2007, Johannesburg.

⁶⁰ "Copies of a Popular Zim Newspaper burned," *The Mercury* (Durban), 27 May 2008.

at the flood of hostile foreign newspapers coming into Zimbabwe without paying anything or very little.”⁶¹ The Director General in the Ministry of Information and Publicity who doubled as the presidential spokesperson went further and argued that “We lose the politics, we lose money. Changes will be coming very soon on this front. As the ministry responsible, it is our duty to protect and defend the national media space.”⁶² In sum the diaspora-based civil society organisations ceased to be a force to reckon with in light of the prohibitive newspaper import costs and arson attacks from the state security agents.

Finally there was serious discord between civil society activists based in exile and those resident in Zimbabwe where the latter group derogatorily referred to those in exile as “desktop or electronic activists.”⁶³ Exiled activists were accused of being out of touch with reality as previously noted and being merely “arm chair critics who chide resident gallant sons and daughters of the soil for not doing much to bring about political transition.”⁶⁴ A cursory look at the online debates (for example on www.zimdaily.com) about Zimbabwe revealed the lack of unity between the diaspora civil society and their internal counterparts. Commenting on the discord between the two civil society groups, Matibenga asserted that civil society in the diaspora was not doing enough because the civil society groups in Zimbabwe were silent on the role they expect their counterparts to play. For example, during the war of liberation, cadres in exile were expected to mobilise material resources but currently there is “no clear instruction, direction and agenda as to what they are expected to do.”⁶⁵ In other words the discord is a result of loose coordination and lack of clearly defined roles expected of each constituency. Indeed all this shows the dilemma that diaspora-based civil society organisations face as they try to influence the political dynamics back home.

6.4 The Political Dynamics of the Continental and Regional Response to the Zimbabwean Crisis

At the international level what explains the failure of most African leaders to censure ZANU PF over its woeful human rights record? The position advanced here is that it is important to understand the significance of their failure to take a tough stance against President Mugabe and not necessarily to speculate about why they did not act. Any attempts to understand their

⁶¹ Zvamaida Murwira, “Foreign Newspapers to Pay Import Duty,” *The Herald* (Harare), 7 June 2008.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Interview with Kelvin Hazangwi, 13 December 2007, Harare.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Interview with Lucia Matibenga, 19 December 2007, Harare.

inaction remain speculative. SADC, and specifically former president Mbeki, played a negative role from the outset of the Zimbabwean crisis since the 1990s. Their choice was to side with Mugabe and shield him from international pressure while criticising civil society and the MDC acting largely on propaganda disseminated by ZANU PF.

Neither the Zimbabwean civil society, transnational civil society, the UN, Western governments nor a variety of eminent individuals were able to get support from SADC and South Africa for direct action against Mugabe under provisions of the Responsibility to Protect. The notion of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) was for example endorsed by leaders at the UN’S 2005 World Summit and recognized the importance of protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.⁶⁶ R2P is an emergent international legal norm that seeks to protect vulnerable populations through preventive interventionist responses. According to António Guterres, a UN High Commissioner for Refugees:

The R2P doctrine maintains that a state’s sovereignty is inseparable from its responsibility to protect the people living in its territory and cannot be merely a form of control, and that the international community has a duty to take appropriate action when this responsibility is neglected or violated. This is not an open invitation to military intervention, which must always be an option of last resort, exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Rather, it is an urgent call to states to assume their rightful role in recognizing, respecting, and protecting the rights of their people.⁶⁷

It should however be noted that R2P is neither a policy nor a reality but a growing aspiration that should a state fail to protect those within its borders for whatever reason, then “the responsibility to protect shifts to the wider international community.”⁶⁸ The international community of states intervenes desirably through the UN, or perhaps also through the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The prominent recent example of R2P in action was the United States under the administration of Bill Clinton and NATO’s use of air power against Serbia. The objective of this intervention was to force Slobodan Milosevic to stop oppressing the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The action was sophisticated high tech and low risk warfare. A sustained bombing campaign of some 80 days in 1999 forced Serbia out and led to elections in Belgrade. Milosevic lost the battle and was subsequently extradited to the ICC in The

⁶⁶ Brian Barbour and Brian Gorlick, “Embracing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims,” *International Journal of Refugee Law*, vol. 20, no. 4 (2008):533-566.

⁶⁷ António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Millions uprooted: Saving Refugees and the Displaced,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 5 (September-October 2008):90.

⁶⁸ Barbour and Gorlick, 539.

Hague where he was tried for crimes against humanity.

Notwithstanding ZANU PF's deepening barbarism characterised by the flagrant abuse of power and brute force, SADC and South Africa did not change their stance over the past decade. Instead what was witnessed was nothing but piecemeal change among the SADC leadership. For example the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa became highly critical of Mugabe, while elements in the Tanzanian government occasionally told Mugabe that he was illegitimate and must go. President Ian Khama of Botswana also strongly criticised Mugabe but that was not backed by action at SADC forums. In the AU, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal spoke strongly against ZANU PF's excesses while dictators like Yaya Jammeh, President of Gambia, expressed admiration and support for Mugabe's reign of terror. In short, the number of democratic leaders in the AU and SADC are very few, and most are unrepresentative elites concentrating on mutual support.

The significance of AU, SADC and South African support for Mugabe was that it put MDC and civil society in a serious dilemma not to mention the continued suffering of Zimbabweans. The MDC leadership and in part the civil society ended up in a quandary with no obvious best choice. When Morgan Tsvangirai appealed for support from the SADC and South Africa they simply ignored him. As a result the MDC and civil society too sidestepped the regional parties and appealed to their international allies to put pressure on the Mugabe regime. However when MDC took that international route, seeking assistance from powerful Western countries, SADC in general and Thabo Mbeki were hostile. Mbeki lambasted Tsvangirai for ignoring proposals coming from the presidents of the region.

In 2008, Mbeki wrote a letter to the MDC leader that read in part: "It may be that, for whatever reason, you consider our region and continent as being of little consequence to the future of Zimbabwe, believing that others further away, in Western Europe and North America, are of greater importance."⁶⁹ The letter was in response to an earlier communication to SADC by the MDC expressing their opposition to the sharing the Home Affairs Ministry. Nonetheless, in 2007 Mugabe had indicated that Zimbabwe did not live in isolation and that it was not "not an extension of Europe, we are part of Africa and so really our stand, as a fight, we should be seen as an African cause."⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Wilson Johwa and Dumisani Muleya, "Mbeki Letter 'Angers' Tsvangirai," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 26 November 2008.

⁷⁰ "Mugabe: Our cause is Africa's Cause," *New African* (Summer 2007):4. NB: This issue was sponsored by the government of Zimbabwe.

Despite the difficult choices SADC gave to the MDC, the regional grouping was ready to lecture Tsvangirai about what was good for Zimbabwe and to declare that he must follow its proposals. In short the regional grouping sided with Mugabe throughout the SADC-led mediation process. It seems that Mugabe and SADC leaders were advocating for “African solutions to African problems” and portrayed non-African intervention as anathema and racist. The President of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, accused Europe and America of telling African leaders what to do about Mugabe. He argued that “The US and Europeans tell us what we need to do and tell Mugabe. That undermines our efforts, and the issue contains an element of racism.”⁷¹ The suspicion that African leaders have about latent Western racism emanates from their colonial past.

While armed liberation struggles were experienced in Angola, Algeria, Mozambique, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, with the rest of the continent gaining independence through constitutional negotiations, most African countries have a shared history of colonialism. Mugabe uses propaganda effectively based on United State’s disproportionate power in the IMF and World Bank and interlinks this with Western-sponsored sanctions against Zimbabwe. From this standpoint Britain and other former colonial powers were held to blame for attempting to pursue a neo-colonialist agenda. For example ZANU PF spent US\$1 million on a 70-page supplement in the 2007 summer issue of the *New African* magazine putting President Mugabe’s battered image in a better light while exonerating itself from the political violence of 11 March 2007. In the supplement, ZANU PF claimed that Britain and the USA wanted to recolonise the rest of Africa.

African leaders supported and listened to Mugabe and not the opposition and civil society. For some, like Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, it was un-African to rebuke an elder statesman of Mugabe’s calibre.⁷² However President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania noted that “in the discussions inside the closed door sessions we are very frank on the things that we think the Zimbabwean government is not doing right and our view on what could be done right.”⁷³ It is worth remembering that Mbeki had warned Mugabe in 2001 in a 37-page “Discussion document” where he urged Mugabe to avoid taking a confrontational stance on Britain, and to try and revive the ailing economy and tone down his anti-imperialist rhetoric.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Floyd Nkomo, “Zimbabwe: Tsvangirai and Zuma Discuss,” *The Zimbabwe Guardian* (London), 8 April 2008.

⁷² Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁷³ Kikwete, *New African*, 12.

⁷⁴ David Blair, “Robert Mugabe warned By Thabo Mbeki at African Union Summit,” *The Telegraph* (UK), 30 June 2008. The document was leaked to the media and widely circulated over the internet.

The continental and regional response to the Zimbabwean crisis could possibly be informed by the fact that a number of African leaders are dictators themselves and that problems of inequality and skewed land-ownership exist in countries like Angola and Swaziland. They have difficulties in being interested in Zimbabweans when they are not seriously interested in their own people. Mugabe made it clear that he wanted to deal with those who want to criticise him when their own hands were dirty. Shortly before the 2008 presidential election Mugabe threatened his African peers with exposure and accused some of them of being worse dictators than him. At a rally in Chitungwiza, Harare, Mugabe said:

I will be going there to Egypt and I understand that the people are gearing themselves for an attack on Zimbabwe. I would want to see a country that will point a finger at us and say we have done wrong. I would want to see that finger and see whether it is clean or dirty. I want to see it in Africa, in the African Union. I want to see that finger. Let it be pointed at me... There have been elections conducted in a worse way in Africa here whose Presidents today still preside on their countries. We have never interfered in their domestic affairs, never ever.⁷⁵

Possibilities of an alliance or social movement union of South African civic groups coalescing to form a leftist political party deeply unsettled former President Mbeki. Mbeki also disliked MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai's trade unionist background in light of his frosty relations with COSATU. The outcome of the ANC Polokwane conference in 2008 proved to be a victory for left forces within the tripartite alliance. The subsequent ousting of Mbeki as president after he was recalled by the party's leftist forces is instructive. A victory of a workers' party in Zimbabwe after defeating a liberation-born political party could possibly encourage COSATU to also form a workers' party should the ANC fail to defend the gains already made by the working class. In other words, the MDC and ZCTU constitute a spectre, a dangerous new development in the region of a radical political movement backed by the working class. The chances are that COSATU can easily use its structures to mobilise the working class to form a very strong opposition political party and that is why Mbeki viewed its leadership with deep suspicion.

6.5 Conclusion

From the foregoing it is evident that global civil society played a big role in seeking to alter the balance of power in Zimbabwe. The transnational civil society that operated in Zimbabwe took two forms. The first type was one that was formed by exiled Zimbabweans in the diaspora,

⁷⁵ Raymond Maingire, "Mugabe Threatens African leaders," *The Zimbabwe Times*, 27 June 2008. <<http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=648>> Accessed 21 May 2009.

particularly in South Africa, while the second consisted of international non-governmental organisations that worked closely with domestic civil society organisations whose mission intermeshed with their own. The chapter also examined the nature of the challenges faced by Zimbabwe's diaspora-based civil society in their endeavour to complement the democratisation efforts of their counterparts based in Zimbabwe. Transnational structures of power involved in the Zimbabwean crisis were not only international non-governmental organisations, but also the international community of states. Western countries were involved, and so were African countries, particularly members of SADC who to varying degrees and reasons piled pressure on the Mugabe regime. However many SADC leaders blocked efforts by Western countries, domestic and transnational civil society. As a result it was not possible for the international community to apply direct pressure on Mugabe using the provisions of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) despite clear cases of crimes against humanity being perpetrated by the Mugabe regime. A close examination of the developments that took place in Zimbabwe since the emergence of the MDC in 1999 to 2008 suggests that international factors complemented domestic efforts in influencing Zimbabwe's political trajectories. The role of the international community broadly defined as comprising state and non-state actors heavily influenced state society relations in a number of ways ranging from the researching and reporting on Mugabe's human rights abuses to pressuring ZANU PF to institute political reforms. The presence of Zimbabweans in the diaspora and their utilisation of information technology helped keep the country's crisis high on the international agenda.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The NGO Bill, Save Zimbabwe Campaign and Deepening State Barbarism

If my people who are called by my name humble themselves, pray and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and forgive their sin and heal their land (2 Chronicles 7:14).¹

¹ *The Zimbabwe We Want: "Towards a National Vision for Zimbabwe"* Prepared by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop's Conference, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, Harare (October 2006):12.

7.1 Introduction

A philosophy of social control either by inclusionary or exclusionary measures is the hallmark of a number of authoritarian political systems in general and third world countries in particular. Combinations of both exclusionary and inclusionary measures are at the disposal of the ruling elite in order to defend the existing state of affairs. When co-optation fails to deal with social forces opposing the ruling elites, then a combination of legal and extra-legal measures are considered and effected. Their aim would be to maintain the political status quo and not to shift the balance of power in any significant way. Pursuant to that vision, there is preferential treatment towards constituencies who support the existing political order while those in opposition are not only demonised but marginalised too. The goal of this chapter is to detail how the state attempted and failed to contain revived segments of civil society through the use of legislation (the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill) and to control the role of the church in politics within the auspices of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. The chapter also explains why the Save Zimbabwe Campaign could not survive after successfully forcing ZANU PF to negotiate with the political opposition following the intervention of SADC. There is strong evidence that suggests that the stepping-up of legal and extra-legal measures meant to either control or annihilate civil society explains why civil society in Zimbabwe remained embryonic, underdeveloped and overly constrained by the state.

The chapter consists of four sections. Section one gives an overview of the twin concepts of political and civic culture and their relevance in relation to Zimbabwe. The second discusses the concept of corporatism and how legitimacy is conferred to just laws. The next section details the politics that surrounded the defunct Non-Governmental Organisations Bill, how it came into existence and why it was not eventually signed into law. Finally the chapter examines the role of the clergy in politics and the genesis of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign that was instrumental in forcing SADC to recognise that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe. Akin to the NCA, the Save Zimbabwe Campaign as a social movement played a significant role in bringing about the incipient decline of ZANU PF domination project especially in 2008.

7.2 Political and Civic Culture: An Overview

In authoritarian regimes, the ruling elites always face an uphill task about how to deal with

supposedly undesirable elements of the political culture. Once a decision is reached, the next task is to assess the kind of strategy that would yield the best results in so far as the preservation of power is concerned. Thereafter measures to socialise or reorient the citizenry towards a desired cultural template are then put in place. The concept of political culture is central to the understanding of the “normative dimensions of the relationship between the state and its citizenry (such as apathy or a sense of political efficacy).”²

Political culture refers specifically to political orientations or “attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.”³ Participant, subject and parochial are the three ideal typologies of political culture and it is important to understand the conditions under which they are nurtured. A participant political culture is one where citizens feel that they have influence, confidence and competence to deal with the demands of the political system. A subject political culture is one where citizens assume a “passive or obedient relationship to the political system, perceiving themselves hardly affecting the system, though they are affected by it.”⁴ Finally, a parochial political culture is one in which the citizens are completely disengaged from the political system because they are neither interested nor have knowledge about their political system. In the final analysis the relationship between political culture and political structures is interactive and therefore the two mutually affect each other.

On the other hand, civic culture is a manifestation of political culture and it connotes a “dualistic orientation to political authority, a balance of directive and acquiescent, participant and passive attitudes.”⁵ Furthermore, it is a “mixed political culture in which the subject orientations allow the elites the necessary initiative and freedom to make decisions and are countered by the participant orientations which make the elites sensitive to popular preferences.”⁶ Though there are serious questions vis-à-vis the precision and predictive power of the twin concepts of political and civic culture, their heuristic and interpretive power can not be over-emphasised.⁷ Culture consists of many elements, but it can simply be defined as a way of life and states do play a leading role in the creation of cultural norms and political identities. Accordingly, political

² Lowell Dittmer, “Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” *World Politics*, vol. 29, no. 4 (July 1977):552.

³ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), 12.

⁴ Dennis Kavanagh, *Political Culture: Studies in Comparative Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 11.

⁵Ibid., 14.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Russell J. Dalton, “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behaviour,” *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 33, no. 6/7 (August/September 2000): 914.

socialisation and the idea of engineering the “public’s level of knowledge, understanding, and interest in political matters”⁸ are central to the creation of political norms and identities.

From mid-1995 onwards, Zimbabweans started to actively participate in politics as members of a growing and vibrant civil society. ZANU PF realised that development and sought to harness that participatory impulse for the benefit of the status quo. However, in cases where it was impossible to do so, attempts were made to inculcate the other two political cultures (parochial and subject) through the use of organised violence and legal means. But when the state interferes with the organic growth of civil society, the latter then ceases to be “distinct from the body politic and with moral claims independent of, and sometimes opposed to, the state’s authority.”⁹ In other words, the end product falls short of the defining characteristics of a civil society organisation expected to hold the state accountable and responsive to the needs of the citizenry. ZANU PF did not want a pluralistic civil society; instead it preferred a compliant and monolithic civil society.¹⁰ Such a civil society praised ZANU PF and raised issues that are in line with the development framework championed by the state, whether right or wrong.¹¹

ZANU PF held a very narrow view of human political contestation and wanted a culture formation which did not delve into political matters.¹² Otherwise political participation was to take place only in support of the prevailing political order. During a debate in parliament, Tapiwa Mashakada, an opposition legislator and former a trade unionist, asserted that the emergence of the MDC came from a challenge from President Mugabe in 1998.¹³ Mugabe had indicated to the labour movement that if they were interested in politics, they must form a political party and contest an election. However, when the MDC was formed, the new creation was immediately subject to vilification and physical attacks for criticising the government and ZANU PF.

Later, presidential hopeful and former ZANU PF member Dr Simba Makoni’s campaign messages for the March 2008 elections gave an insight into what ZANU PF expected of the citizenry. According to Makoni, the command and control culture that characterised Zimbabwean politics was intolerant of opposing views, and *ipso facto* did not view opposition as a

⁸ Ibid., 919.

⁹ Ellen Meiksins Wood, “The Uses and Abuses of ‘Civil Society’,” in *The Socialist Register*, ed. Ralph Milliband and Leo Panitch (London: Merlin Press, 1990), 61.

¹⁰ Interview with Ernest Mudzengi, 12 December 2007, Harare.

¹¹ Interview with Tapera Kapuya, 26 August 2007, Durban.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Mashakada, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 30 June 2004, vol. 30, no. 66.

fundamental societal ingredient.¹⁴ By implication, Makoni indicated the kind of society that should flourish in Zimbabwe, but was currently not in place. It is worth noting that Makoni's observations in relation to the nature of civic culture tolerated by ZANU PF were similar to what my field work revealed. The salience about Makoni's campaign message was that it came from someone who left ZANU PF ostensibly on the failure of its leadership to respect diversity.

In 2000 the then Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, attempted to control the citizenry's participatory impulse by introducing a patriotic element in Zimbabwe's civic culture. The ZANU PF-driven patriotic civic culture was supported through patriotic history, patriotic journalism, patriotic opposition and other genres of patriotism. Patriotic history consisted of four themes, namely: "land, no external interference based on 'western ideals' such as human rights, race and a 'patriots' versus 'sell-outs' distinction."¹⁵ Patriotic history also rejected academic historiography that questioned ZANU PF's grand narratives.¹⁶ Pursuant to the endeavour to inculcate patriotism narrowly defined as uncritical acceptance of ZANU PF's rule, drastic measures were adopted to deal with what ZANU PF pejoratively called unpatriotic civil society and opposition. Evidence drawn from parliamentary debates suggests that a binary view of political discourses was adopted by ZANU PF to delegitimise civil society actors and opposition as folk devils. Essentially, the sophistry nature of ZANU PF, especially in 2000, mirrors George Orwell's political satire, *Animal Farm*. When civil society actors and the opposition failed to pass ZANU PF's litmus test on acceptable civic culture, both legal and extra-legal measures were put in place to forcefully inculcate a patriotic civic culture and related political narratives.

7.3 Corporatism and the Conferment of Legitimacy

It is noteworthy that in authoritarian regimes, the ruling elites make concerted efforts to control citizens' active participation in a growing civil society. Parochial and subject political cultures do not exert much pressure on the political system primarily because those in power either dictate what the citizens can do or the citizens are just not interested in political participation. Inasmuch as the ruling elites want to benefit from a participant political culture, they see a danger associated with leaving it to go unchecked especially if it is practised by social agents who are not

¹⁴ Simba Makoni's Election Manifesto 2008.

¹⁵ Blessing-Miles Tendi, "Patriotic History and Public Intellectuals Critical of Power," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol 34, no. 2 (June 2008):379-380.

¹⁶ Terence Ranger, "Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle Over the Past in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2 (June 2004):219.

pro-status quo. In light of that concern, mechanisms are put in place to control the subaltern public sphere. The battle to control the psyche of the population actively involved in the public sphere becomes a very fierce encounter, pitting those in power and the civil society alongside opposition political parties, if such exist. However rulers controlling the state machinery have the upper hand over the civil society and the political opposition, primarily because the state controls physical instruments of coercion, legal institutions and other resources whether economic or symbolic.¹⁷

In light of the above, the state is in a position to employ various measures that will result in either an inclusionary or exclusionary political system. In general, inclusion is only permissible if it is on the grounds that the ruling elite insist upon. One popular strategy used by ruling classes to achieve political domination is corporatism. While acknowledging the potential of the term to be a catch-all type, Schmitter argues that a defining characteristic of corporatism is government control, however defined.¹⁸ State corporatism is a containment strategy of authoritarian regimes to deal with labour and other revived segments of civil society.¹⁹ With respect to labour corporatism, the state may create a union using public funds, make membership compulsory, and strictly delimit the sectors the union can cover.²⁰ The union leadership can either be appointed by the state or elected by workers and thereafter thoroughly vetted for political reliability.²¹ Essentially the state creates parallel or splinter structures within civil society to deprive opposition political parties of potent allies.²²

State corporatism is a defining feature of Zimbabwean politics where, if civil society criticises those in power, then it is demonised as representing imperialist forces. Corporatism was a further expansion of ZANU PF's hegemonic or predominance project. ZANU PF was no longer satisfied with simply winning every election or in such steps as forcing ZAPU to merge with it, but also endeavoured to dominate the entire civil society. As a result:

If you point out that you support the ruling party, ZANU PF and Robert Mugabe, even if you venture into politics, there is no problem. You are then defined as patriotic and that is why for every independent civil society organisation formed, ZANU PF also creates its own formation. For example they formed the Zimbabwe Federation

¹⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, Loic J. D. Wacquant and Samar Farage, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," *Sociological Theory*, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1994):4.

¹⁸ Philippe C. Schmitter "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *The Review of Politics*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1974):93-94.

¹⁹ J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 21, no. 4 (July 1989):445-472.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 446.

of Trade Unions (ZFTU) that speaks what ZANU PF wants to hear. The state also sponsored the so-called concerned affiliates that wanted to unseat the current ZCTU leadership as you might be aware.²³

With respect to Zimbabwe and some other African countries, state corporatism sought to usher in a new era of political stability through radical interventions and controls in the political system. The grand plan was to bring about major structural changes in the political system that is predicated on an ideologically inspired understanding of public good.²⁴ Colonialism played a central role in setting the stage for a corporatist political framework as understood earlier when colonialists collaborated with local chiefs to dominate local social groups.²⁵ In other words, the prevalence of state corporatism in African politics is usually a legacy of colonialism and at the same time a kind of state response to a dual crisis in the economy and politics. As such, state corporatism should be understood as a quest to manage the economy through the control of labour unions and to secure a political legitimacy that was in fact questionable from the beginning.²⁶ Inasmuch as the state makes a concerted effort to maintain and spread its hegemonic tentacles, the whole exercise eventually leads to self-destruction.²⁷ This is so primarily because in the end, “state corporatism will degenerate into openly conflictual, multifaceted and uncontrolled interest politics.”²⁸

However the exercise of power by the ruling elite as they seek to control how society functions requires some form of legitimacy. Symbolic power plays a central role in state-society relations, firstly by ensuring that the dominated accept as legitimate their condition of domination, and secondly by “eliciting the consent of both the dominant and dominated.”²⁹ Legitimacy is then used to mask or conceal the fact that certain actions emanate from the pursuit of self-interest. The act of legitimising a particular course of action is usually done by way of legislation or appeals to collective memory. There is a shift from reliance on overt coercion and threat of physical violence to symbolic manipulation.³⁰ Thus the legitimacy conferred by legal instruments conceal the self-interested nature of a particular standpoint, thereby minimising the “criticism that would have arisen had other, extra-legal methods of control been employed.”³¹ However the

²³ Interview with Lucia Matibenga, 19 December 2007, Harare.

²⁴ Julius E. Nyang'oro, “The State of Politics of Africa: The Corporatist Factor,” *Studies in Comparative Development*, vol. 24, no.1 (Spring 1989):6.

²⁵ See Terence Ranger, “Tradition and Travesty: Chiefs and the Administration in Makoni District, Zimbabwe, 1960- 1980,” *Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. 52, no. 3 (1982):21-41.

²⁶ Nyang'oro, 11.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁸ Schmitter, 127.

²⁹ David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 89.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 82.

³¹ Steven E. Barkan, “Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement,” *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, no.

point remains – legal methods are symbolic in nature and “serve as instruments of domination and therefore fulfil a political function.”³² Symbolic systems by their very nature are essentially human constructions that are a result of activities and interests of particular groups whose function is to legitimise lopsided power relations among social groups.³³

In light of the above, sometimes society tends to uncritically accept the dictates of the law without necessarily thinking that it is arbitrary and socially constructed. What comes to mind is that someone says, “It is legal because the law passed by parliament says so,” but there could be a hidden political function that is performed by some laws. When there is a transgression, the judiciary interprets what the law says and passes a judgement as part of the due process. However no consideration is given to the role of power and domination in enacting the laws in the first place and everything is taken as given. In Zimbabwe there is the “frightening trend whereby law is being used as a political weapon to deal with perceived opponents as opposed to facilitating freedom.”³⁴ In fact the idea of judicial neutrality has been a thorny issue in both general philosophical and jurisprudential critiques.³⁵ From a philosophical point of view, objectivity is a myth, while from a jurisprudential angle, it is impossible for judges to be objective in their interpretation of the law.³⁶

What is compelling about the discourse on power and domination is how they “persist and reproduce inter-generationally [at times] without powerful resistance and without the conscious recognition of members.”³⁷ There could be legal repression that connotes a situation whereby the entire legal machinery serves as an effective tool for social control of civil rights protest. It is therefore important to investigate the role of laws in the “constitution and maintenance of power relations”³⁸ instead of uncritically accepting the sanctity of any law enacted in any given polity. The prerogative to enact laws can be subject to abuse by the ruling elite who use it to enact unjust laws meant to settle political scores with opponents. The unjust laws are then enforced through repressive power.

4, (August 1984):554.

³² Swartz, 83.

³³ *Ibid.*, 86.

³⁴ Brian Kagoro, “Another One Party State Effort: Zimbabwe’s Anticipated NGO legislation, July 28, 2004.

<<http://www.crisis.org.zw/Opinions/Proposed%20NGO%20legislation.htm>> Accessed 2 May 2009. Kagoro was then the Chairperson for Crisis Coalition Zimbabwe.

³⁵ See Herbert Wechsler “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 73, no. 1 (November 1959):1-35.

³⁶ Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, “The Rhetoric of Human Rights in Malawi: Individualisation and Judicialization,” in *Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa*, ed. Harri Englund and Francis Nyamnjoh (London, Zed Books, 2004),77.

³⁷ Swartz, 6.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

7.4 The Non-Governmental Organisations Bill

It is arguable that ZANU PF resembles its Rhodesian Front predecessor vis-à-vis a number of authoritarian practices. For instance a battery of legal measures were put in place to curb growing African nationalism from the late 1950s, and the same applies to what the ruling ZANU PF did when faced with a revived civil society and opposition in recent years. The two constituencies struggled against state authoritarianism over the years especially after 1999. Having promulgated legislative acts like POSA and AIPPA, in 2004 the state also created the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill to further constrain the existence and operating environment of civil society organisations. Stated briefly, the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill sought to repeal the colonial Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Act No. 63 of 1966 *in toto*. The (PVO) Act came into force at a time when African nationalism was growing while coincidentally the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill was drafted in response to a vigorously revived civil society. The unjust law-making process was justified to deal with what ZANU PF erroneously viewed as threats to state security. Jonathan Moyo argued that, “I do not believe that it is part of the liberation gains to allow people to be unlawful and to operate illegally. If that was the case, this House would not be here to make laws. The laws that we make here, we expect everyone to observe them.”³⁹

With time the legislature became a site of contestation between ZANU PF and MDC for the control of the citizenry’s participatory aspirations within an active and growing civil society movement referred to in the previous section. It was in parliament that the opposition and the then ruling party had fierce debates in relation to how the latter sought to restructure state-society relations. This understanding of the nature of parliamentary debates in conjunction with the kind of civic culture tolerated by ZANU PF, gives some insight into the social political context surrounding the promulgation of the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill. The overarching aim of the NGO bill was to have a systematic assault on Zimbabweans’ civil and political rights.

Previously, on 23 June 2004, a ZANU PF legislator, Philipp Chiyangwa seconded by Saviour Kasukuwere, moved a motion on “Actions by the MDC.”⁴⁰ According to Chiyangwa he

³⁹ Jonathan Moyo, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 23 June 2004, vol. 30, no. 21.

⁴⁰ Philip Chiyangwa, “Motion - Actions by MDC,” House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 29 June 2004, vol. 30, no. 65.

“condemns in the strongest terms actions by a purportedly loyal opposition party which receives constitutional funding for its official activities from the public vote for conspiring with Western powers, Britain in particular, to overthrow the Zimbabwe government.”⁴¹ After seconding the motion, Kasukuwere said, “We cannot ignore these issues more so when Tony Blair is in the forefront demonising our country because of the land issue.”⁴² Chiyangwa went on to say:

I call for the MDC, and or members of the MDC, to be investigated and if possible to be charged with treason and conspiracy for the reasons I have given above. I call for the MDC to be immediately suspended from our Parliament and their party to be the subject of a banned order. I call for the finances of the MDC to be investigated and I call for their relationship with Britain, various Rhodesians, Batswanas, Americas and South Africa [to be subject to scrutiny].⁴³

Another ZANU PF legislator, Eleck Mkandla, asserted that:

Mr. Speaker, can two people move together while they differ in policy? Can the MDC move together with Blair while they differ in policy? No, that means there is somewhere where they come together. I denounce Blair and he is unacceptable to this country.⁴⁴

The MDC hit back and argued that “the attempts to redefine, sovereignty and the Zimbabwean so that if you do not agree with ZANU PF you are not a Zimbabwean are wrong.”⁴⁵ Another opposition parliamentarian asserted that:

Madam Speaker...many contributors from ZANU PF also demanded to know if MDC was a loyal party. That word was used over and over again and the question that comes from the MDC is loyal to who? We are loyal to the electorate and that is why the electorate has so much trust in us. We will never be forced to be loyal to a particular person. Not at all. Madam Speaker, talking about stooges, Hon. Mashakada has amply put it across — we are not stooges of anybody but if you want to find stooges — in this House, you look over that side...These are the people who have failed to reason independently and have fallen to be stooges of only one person. These are the people who have never been able to exercise their minds freely, they are stooges of one man and one man only and that is Robert Mugabe. That is what these people are and they must never refer to ourselves as stooges.⁴⁶

The debates in the House of Assembly suggest that the lack of consensus on part of the two political parties on a number of issues influenced ZANU PF to fast-track the drafting of the

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., Kasukuwere.

⁴³ Ibid., Chiyangwa.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Mkandla.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Tendai Biti.

⁴⁶ Giles Mutsekwa, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 30 June 2004, vol. 30, no. 66.

Non-Governmental Organisation Bill. The NGO Bill's primary objective was to control, intimidate and weaken civil society because it was critical of the government and ZANU PF while being supportive of the MDC. ZANU PF became hostile to commercial farmers, civil society and opposition groups that were instrumental to the rejection of the Government's draft constitution in the 1999 referendum. There is strong evidence to support this label if one considers the tone of the debates during the Committee stage of the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill on 16 and 23 November 2004 respectively.

Despite the fact that the above-cited exchanges were between political parties, the letter and spirit of the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill supports the conclusion that opposition and the civil society were treated interchangeably. Indeed, a ZANU PF legislator's contribution in parliament cited earlier on is instructive. The fact that the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill was modelled along the same lines as the Political Parties (Finance) Act of 1992 as amended suggests that ZANU PF viewed civil society and opposition as one formation. Before discussing the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill in greater detail, Makumbe's observations are instructive:

I can give you a classic example of the legislation that was used to virtually curtail civil society organisations. The NGO Bill, though it was never actually signed into law by the president, its very formulation and passing through parliament was so devastating to civil society organisations. [Thus] although the bill was not signed into law, it had already caused civil society to run into hiding and to form safe havens. Such NGOs would not be involved in democracy, governance and human rights areas, but were really to become social welfarist.⁴⁷

When presenting the NGO bill, the then Minister of Labour and Social Welfare indicated that it sought to bring sanity and rationality in the sector after the Government realised a lot of mischief in a number of NGOs.⁴⁸ The preamble of the bill stated that it was "for the registration of non-governmental organisations, to provide for an enabling environment for the operations monitoring and regulation of all nongovernmental organisations."⁴⁹ However, an analysis of the bill revealed that it was intended to achieve the exact opposite of what it purported to do. The letter and spirit of the bill was in actual fact draconian. But an impression was being created that the bill was the outcome of a four-year extensive consultative process with relevant stakeholders ostensibly in the name of public interest. The bill further widened the definitions of foreign funding, or donations, foreign non-governmental organisations, issues of governance and local

⁴⁷ Interview with Professor John Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

⁴⁸ Paul Mangwana, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 16 November 2004, vol. 31, no. 20.

⁴⁹ See the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill, 2004.

non-governmental organisations.⁵⁰ Thus the scope of organisations that required registration was broadened to include those dealing with advocacy, environment and governance issues.⁵¹

While denying that it was government policy to bar non-governmental organisations, the Minister went to say that “direct threats have been made by certain known imperial powers that they are working in cohorts with Non-Governmental Organisations to effect regime change in Zimbabwe.”⁵² The ZANU PF legislators had raised similar concerns six months earlier as already noted. What is imperative to understand is that the vindictive bill was a culmination of the heated parliamentary debates on what ZANU PF claimed were questionable patriotic credentials of the opposition and civil society. The party then decided to settle its political scores with the opposition and civil society through legislative measures – the NGO Bill. The then Labour Minister further stated that it was not mere speculation that “some local international – donor funded organisations have taken it upon themselves to achieve the same [regime change].”⁵³ The understanding of the then ruling party was that Britain and America were using civil society and the MDC to “have a reversal of the land reform so that their kith and kin restore the status quo prior to the programme.”⁵⁴ Similarly, in a televised address, President Mugabe aptly summed up the position as follows:

Others who align themselves with the enemy, those who seek to interfere in our domestic affairs. I made reference a while ago to the fact that our erstwhile coloniser Britain still wants to govern us, albeit by remote control, but remote control, as you are aware, will operate when the power, or the force or the energy is directed at that which it is meant to drive, but in our particular case, the front runners, those who are ready to give up or shall I say to sell their birthright and become stooges to others. Those who think we are an inferior race to the whites and let the whites continue to have a dominant stake in our lives they align with the Blairs, they align with whites, the white community here and they oppose the policies of the nationalist movement – that is ZANU-PF – and they oppose us in every way possible and they do so, not just for themselves, but indeed for those who they have made their masters.⁵⁵

It is evident that ZANU PF was under the impression that it was under siege from Western powers and their local partners, purportedly local civil society organisations. At the same time, it became very difficult for anyone to believe that that NGO bill was meant to promote public

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Mangwana, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 16 November 2004, vol. 31, no. 20.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s interview with Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, Newsnet aired on 19 February 2006.

good. The whole issue was further complicated by the targeted sanctions on the ruling elites contained in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). Section 5a (3) of the Act clearly states that there shall be provision for “democracy and governance programs in Zimbabwe.”⁵⁶ Accordingly, there is a sense in which the NGO bill was a retaliatory measure meant to deal with the beneficiaries of Western funding. Section 9(4) of the bill confirms this position and it provides that “No foreign Non-Governmental organisation shall be registered if its sole or principal objects involve or include issues of governance.”⁵⁷

Furthermore Minister Mangwana asserted that:

In the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill foreign Non-Governmental Organisations have been barred from pursuing governance issues as much as local Non-Governmental Organisations have been barred from foreign funding as long as they pursue governance issues. The Amendment is in context and has a historical background. These are organisations that are being used as conduits to infiltrate the country in order to achieve the infamous regime change.⁵⁸

Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to detail how the debate surrounding the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill unfolded in parliament and across the social and political divide, a number of points need to be noted. Firstly the Parliamentary Legal Committee concluded that the bill was in clear violation of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.⁵⁹ Thus it was *ultra vires* section 21 of the constitution on freedom of association and the right to organise. According to the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO), the Parliamentary Legal Committee noted that the bill “does not seek to regulate but seeks to control, to silence, to render ineffective and ultimately to shut down NGOs.”⁶⁰ Secondly, the supposedly neutral Non-Governmental Organisation council that was to be established in terms of Section 3 (2) of the Bill, empowered the Minister to control organisations that would at least get registered. The Minister was entitled to select representatives to the NGO Council. By refusing to amend the relevant section that deals with the composition of the NGO Council, the Minister was “going to be left with a mirror image of ZANU PF.”⁶¹ This again was an indication that the state wanted to control the whole architecture of everything that falls within the purview of a civil society.

⁵⁶ See section 5a (3) of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act.

⁵⁷ See section 9 of the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill.

⁵⁸ Mangwana, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 16 November 2004, vol. 31, no. 20.

⁵⁹ Edwin Mushoriwa, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 23 November 2004, vol. 31, no. 20.

⁶⁰ The NGO Process as a Matter of Public Record, *National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO)* 16 December 2004.

⁶¹ David Coltart, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 23 November 2004, vol. 31, no. 20.

Thirdly, Section 3 (5) of the bill on foreign funding and human rights, if read in conjunction with the definition of foreign funding, effectively meant that an organisation became a foreign NGO if one of its members was not domiciled in Zimbabwe. With that in mind, it meant that donations by Zimbabweans resident in other countries were to be classified as foreign funding and therefore illegal. What was striking about that provision was that it outlawed donations or funding from Zimbabweans in the diaspora. A number of indigenous businessmen were in exile after being accused by the Reserve Bank Governor of committing economic crimes, for example externalisation of foreign currency. It is possible that some exiled businessmen could have been willing to fund some civil society programmes and also to play a significant role in Zimbabwean politics. But according to the then Minister of Labour, neither foreigners nor citizens not domiciled in Zimbabwe were to be allowed to influence the country's politics.⁶²

The 16 November 2005 parliamentary debate on the Bill was historic in the sense that it was the first bill in Zimbabwe to be debated for a record 16 hours, from 14:15hrs to 05:45hrs the following morning. On 23 November 2004, the Minister of Labour backtracked and refused to incorporate any amendments to the Bill despite having agreed to do so as was suggested in the adverse report prepared by the Parliamentary Legal committee. However, the bill was eventually passed on 9 December 2004 because the opposition failed to block it given its numerical inferiority. It can be argued that “the NGO bill was a clear example of the fact that Legislature in Zimbabwe has always been weak compared to the Executive.”⁶³

7.4.1 Post 2004 Developments

From the time it was passed through parliament, Zimbabwe's NGO Bill “hovered like the sword of Damocles over the heads of civic organisations.”⁶⁴ In view of the uncertainty surrounding the operating environment, a number of donors, especially from America and the United Kingdom, froze financial assistance to civil society shortly after the bill was passed.⁶⁵ Many civil society organisations continued to operate despite the passing of the bill through parliament as they waited for the President to sign it into law. Mugabe did not sign the bill within the statutory 21 days. As a result, the bill lapsed in line with the provisions of the Zimbabwean constitution. No official explanation was given as to why the bill was not signed into law and as such the reasons why that did not happen are speculative. The first reason advanced was the victory thesis – that

⁶² Mangwana, House of Assembly Debates (HAD), 23 November 2004, vol. 31, no. 20.

⁶³ Email to author by a constitutional expert, Daniel Molokele, 20 August 2008.

⁶⁴ Tawanda Mutasa, “Don't Cramp the NGO Style.” *Mail & Guardian*, (Johannesburg), August 2007.

⁶⁵ Itai Dzamara, “NGOs Vows to Continue Despite Bill,” *The Zimbabwe Independent* (Harare), 7 January 2005.

NANGO successfully petitioned President Mugabe not to sign the bill.⁶⁶ A second reason was that Mugabe refused to sign the bill and referred it back to parliament for further consultations because it would have portrayed the government in a bad light internationally.⁶⁷ Finally, it is further alleged that Mugabe refused to sign the Bill arguing that it was too lenient with civil society.

It must be noted that the government operates within the letter and spirit of the NGO bill despite the fact that it was not signed into law. In reality, the government continued to act in a vindictive and uncompromising manner towards civil society. For example on 6 June 2008 the Government of Zimbabwe suspended NGO operations country-wide. NGOs were ordered to reapply for registration ostensibly “as part of measures to clamp down on the incidences of civil society meddling in the country’s politics ahead of the June 27 presidential run-off.”⁶⁸ The Deputy Minister of Information and Publicity indicated that the decision was reached after it emerged that NGOs were behaving like opposition political parties and used food aid to buy votes for MDC-T.⁶⁹ The aforementioned statement must be understood within the context of ZANU PF’s narrow view of political contestation and the role of civil society pointed out earlier. In light of the foregoing, the Minister further asserted that the role of NGOs was to supplement government efforts, but:

For a long time now, some of these NGOs have been operating like political parties rather than civil society. So we have asked all of them to reapply for operating permits so that we can vet them and determine which ones are genuine and which ones are fronts for political interests seeking to influence the outcome of elections. If they want to act like political parties, then they shall be duly registered as such. We have evidence that several of them were beneficiaries of a US\$6 million injection from the United States government. Those that have nothing to hide will not see any problems with the requirement that they reapply.⁷⁰

The Minister’s assertions also need to be interpreted within the context of ZANU PF’s quest to have a one-party state in Zimbabwe. The constricted environment for civil society made it inevitable for NGOs to deal with fundamental issues of human and constitutional rights. Increased levels of political violence, polarisation and poverty caused rapid changes in the needs of communities that NGOs serve. This state of affairs required consistent “reorientation of [NGO] programmes in order to make them more responsive and relevant to the needs of their

⁶⁶ Foster Dongozi, “Mugabe Urged to Ditch NGOs Bill,” *The Standard* (Harare), 5 April, 2005.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Mabasa Sasa, “NGOs Operations Suspended, All to Apply for Registration,” *The Herald* (Harare), 7 June 2008.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

target groups.”⁷¹ Consequently, it became difficult to run away from politics because the problems that confronted the country were overwhelmingly political in nature. For example if a narrow definition of what civil society must do was adopted, it logically followed that voter education and constitutional advocacy were to fall outside the purview of NGOs. The heavy politicisation of basic human rights issues meant that civil society was to ignore human rights abuses if they were to complement government efforts.

7.5 The Church in Zimbabwean Politics

Debate occurs in academic circles about the relationship between church and state. While some scholars believe that religion should stay out of politics, another school is of the view that there should be no separation between church and politics. The latter argues that religious institutions and convictions be allowed to influence political processes while the former defend a distinct separation. Zimbabwe is no exception to this debate and it was even more pronounced given the nature of the church’s reaction to the socio-economic and political crisis that bedevilled the country. In light of the piecemeal and fragmented nature of civil society’s response to the Zimbabwean crisis, the year 2006 saw progressive political formations mooting the idea of a coalition that would go a long way in ushering in a new political dispensation.

The Save Zimbabwe campaign was a coalition of political parties and civil society organisations geared towards resolving the country’s crisis through prayer and dialogue. One of Save Zimbabwe’s major resolutions was to bring ZANU PF to the negotiating table. It should be pointed out from the onset that the Save Zimbabwe campaign was modelled along the same lines as the NCA and was another example of social movement unionism. The centrality of the Save Zimbabwe initiative stemmed from the fact that it was the first church-led initiative and it culminated with the African Union and SADC accepting the reality that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe. Previously, the continental and regional leaders were in a state of denial but the Save Zimbabwe campaign prompted them to appoint a mediator (President Mbeki) to try and deal with the crisis.

Any discussion on the Save Zimbabwe campaign and a later parallel initiative called the Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe needs to be understood within the context of the role of the clergy in politics. The church in Zimbabwe has a history of political relevance backdating

⁷¹ Kagoro, “Another One Party State Effort.”

from the colonial era when a number of churches supported the war of liberation.⁷² However, for the purposes of this thesis, no finer details around this area will be provided as this has been done elsewhere.⁷³ Basically the church appeals to the scriptures to justify its role in politics. The following examples are instructive. The Christian Alliance issued a press statement after the 11 March 2007 savage attack of civil society and political opposition quoting Proverbs 2:29: “When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice: but when the wicked are in power, the people mourn.”⁷⁴ When one looks at *The Zimbabwe We Want* document prepared by a rival Christian movement called the Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe, led by the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe alongside the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop’s Conference and The Zimbabwe Council of Churches, it is evident that the bible is a weapon that can be relied upon to justify the churches’ role in politics.⁷⁵

The opening quote for this chapter is one of the numerous examples of how the churches appeal to the scriptures for the purposes of engendering political stability. An activist from the Student Christian Movement that was part of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign quotes the Bible in James 2:20 that says “Faith without works is dead.”⁷⁶ Similarly a Reverend from Christian Alliance asserted that it was impossible for the clergy to claim success in their ministry if it dissociates itself from the daily concerns of the people.⁷⁷ The point is that the Christian community must go beyond the issue of prayer and participate in national affairs.⁷⁸ In Zimbabwe the church was alive to the fact that it has been “repeatedly stated within the context of our situation in Zimbabwe that the Church should stay out of politics.”⁷⁹ However “some of the church leaders have been accomplices in some of the evils that have brought our nation to this condition.”⁸⁰

7.6 The Save Zimbabwe Campaign and the Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe

⁷² See *The Zimbabwe We Want: “Towards a National Vision for Zimbabwe”*; Canaan S. Banana, “The Role of the Church in the Struggle for Liberation in Zimbabwe,” in *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990*, ed. Canaan Banana (Harare: The College Press, 1989), 197-210; W. R. Peadar, “Aspects of the Church and its Political Involvement in Southern Rhodesia, 1959-1972,” *Zambezia* vol. VII, no. ii (1979):191-210; and Chengetai J. Zvobgo, “Church and State in Rhodesia: From the Unilateral Declaration of Independence to the Pearce Commission, 1965-72,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 2 (June 2005):381-402.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ The “Save Zimbabwe” Press Statement, 12 March 2006.

⁷⁵ See *The Zimbabwe We Want*.

⁷⁶ Interview with Tafadzwa Mukanya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

⁷⁷ Interview with Reverend Ancelimo Magaya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

⁷⁸ Interview with Tafadzwa Mukanya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

⁷⁹ *The Zimbabwe We Want*, 10.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 9.

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign was conceived on 29 July 2006 and the idea was mooted by the National Constitutional Assembly, Crisis Coalition, Christian Alliance of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions in consultation with political parties.⁸¹ This author's key informant about the Save Zimbabwe Campaign was its coordinator, Rashid Mahiya. Civil society believed that there were a lot of divisions between itself, the people and the political parties especially after the split of the Movement for Democratic Change into two factions – one initially against the reintroduction of a Senate and another pro-Senate. According to Reverend Magaya of the Christian Alliance (CA):

Our role in Save Zimbabwe was to effectively deal with the loose coordination that existed amongst Zimbabwe's progressive forces. There were fragmented efforts by the media, National Constitutional Assembly, Crisis Coalition, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and political parties – all were doing their own things. So we needed a collaborative approach because the challenges that confronted Zimbabwe could not be resolved if stakeholders worked in a fragmented manner. We needed to put our heads together. So as the CA, we were prepared to ensure that through the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, progressive formations would work together as a collective. So a broad alliance of civic organisations and opposition political parties then came together with a view to resolve Zimbabwe's crisis.⁸²

The Zimbabwe Christian Alliance was an organised network of Christian leaders from all denominations formed in February 2006. It came about as a result of pressure from Zimbabweans disillusioned by “corruption and human rights abuses by the government, the security forces and the militias.”⁸³ The Christian Alliance then called for an All Stakeholder's Convention with a view to set the tone for internal political dialogue which would lead to a viable solution to the deepening crisis.⁸⁴ Formal and informal invitations were sent to all stakeholders including ZANU PF but the latter snubbed the event. At the end of the said convention:

Leaders of all opposition parties, some of which had been locked in violent rivalry, stood together on the podium, shook hands, embraced and vowed to work together to achieve peaceful change in the country. The convention then passed a number of resolutions. The most significant resolution gave CA the mandate to form a broad alliance of all the organisations present which would map out the way forward.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁸² Interview with Reverend Ancelimo Magaya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

⁸³ Pius Wakatama, “Christian Alliance Leads the Save Zimbabwe Campaign,” *The Standard* (Harare), 10 September 2006.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

According to Reverend Magaya, the Christian Alliance was best placed to lead and coordinate the Save Zimbabwe Campaign primarily because it was non-partisan and was not interested in assuming political office.⁸⁶ Similarly, the coordinator of the campaign asserted that the Christian Alliance was neutral in the sense that people of different political persuasions could easily relate within it, unlike other civil society groups that represented people aligned to a particular political party.⁸⁷ Thus the CA was a group that could be trusted to be neutral enough to run the affairs of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. A distillation of factors that united all progressive forces went on to form the basis of a Freedom Charter that was tabled during the convention and adopted a few weeks thereafter. Mahiya notes that:

What united us was stronger than what divided us. What united us was the need to see a democratic Zimbabwe and the need to save our country from state barbarism. It was a campaign with a collective vision. For example, save our Zimbabwe — Save our Education for Students. Save labour – Save our economy for labour. Save Zimbabwe – Save our doctors for the hospitals. Hence the name, Save Zimbabwe was coined.⁸⁸

However the government was quick to claim that Save Zimbabwe Campaign was a political party in the making and as result some Christian Alliance leaders were arrested.⁸⁹ The Christian Alliance was perceived as anti-government and the government became very hostile towards it. In 2006 another initiative called the Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe was a launched by the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe alongside the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop's Conference and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches. The three groups came up with a document entitled *The Zimbabwe We Want* which was “an invitation to all Zimbabweans and all friends of Zimbabwe to dialogue with us so that we can together define a national vision of the Zimbabwe.”⁹⁰ What needs to be pointed out about the initiative is that it was a process that was ostensibly meant to achieve the same objectives as the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. However, what this researcher gathered from some members of the clergy was that the parallel process could have been a corporatist strategy masterminded by the government to steal the limelight from Save Zimbabwe. Explaining why the Christian Alliance was not part of the Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe, Reverend Magaya said that:

CA was not part of the initiative [Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe] because the process used to carry out the campaign was kind of defective. It was tainted because the government was heavily involved and civic groups were excluded. However, initially they came up with a very good document and they sent it to the government as part of

⁸⁶ Interview with Reverend Ancelimo Magaya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

⁸⁷ Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Wakatama.

⁹⁰ *The Zimbabwe We Want*, 2.

the consultative process. Unfortunately the government doctored or edited the document and sent it back to the three church mother bodies. It was strongly recommended that they should not use contentious phrases like draconian, authoritarian etc. Thereafter the doctored version was then adopted as the discussion document. From the Christian Alliance point, that was wrong because the government should not have prescribed what it wanted to the church.⁹¹

From the above statement it is evident that the Evangelical fellowship of Zimbabwe and its partners were not necessarily independent. Their Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe was in a sense a corporatist strategy of the government and did not have much to do with resolving the crisis in the country. Rather it was meant to buttress the political status quo. In same vein, the coordinator of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign asserted that:

Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe [Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe] thought of engaging the government and sidelined the civil society in order to curry favour with the political establishment. The sad reality was that the Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe gave the impression that it was independent and this confused people. In fact the Ecumenical Peace Initiative Zimbabwe got a lot of publicity at the expense of the Save Zimbabwe campaign because of its close working relationship with the Government. People were concerned that the document was doctored to appease President Mugabe whose government gave the impression that it was working with and had support of the church. In actual fact people did not own the content and the process of the initiative.⁹²

Comments made by Reverend Magaya and Rashid Mahiya indicated that there was a battle to control the church given that the church was a power base. The government battled to have a stake in the church and went further to come up with parallel church structures.⁹³ There was a sector within the church in Zimbabwe that was sponsored by the government and which parroted ZANU PF's standpoint. It was against this background that such churches complied with the dictates of the state and even ill-treated some church members in order to satisfy the state.⁹⁴ For example, excommunicated Anglican Bishop Norbert Kunonga violently blocked parishioners from worshipping in their parishes across Harare with the help of a partisan police force. In the final analysis, the umbrella church bodies worked at cross-purposes and the discord that ensued was not in line with what the church and other progressive formations originally stood for.

7.6.1 Save Zimbabwe Campaign's March 11 2007 Prayer Meeting

⁹¹ Interview with Reverend Ancelimo Magaya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

⁹² Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁹³ Interview with Reverend Ancelimo Magaya, 11 December 2007, Harare.

⁹⁴ Interview with Professor John Makumbe, 19 December 2007, Harare.

Following the successful launch of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign little activity took place during the greater part of 2006 and early 2007. There were small-scale activities like the Whistle Campaign or “Zimbabwe in the Sound of Freedom” which attracted some attention. Save Zimbabwe Campaign reached its peak on 11 March 2007, when hundreds of people gathered at the Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfields, Harare for a prayer meeting. However the police attempted to stop people from attending the prayer meeting and violently assaulted ordinary people, who had gathered alongside the opposition, church and civil society groups. One opposition activist, Gift Tandare, was killed, hundreds were brutalised, 50 activists were arrested and the MDC leader and other party and civil society leaders were severely assaulted.⁹⁵ The attacks were so savage that the Zimbabwe Government received world-wide condemnation, including African leaders who over the years had been turning a blind eye to President Mugabe’s human rights abuses. Despite the international condemnation the government went on a two-week activist crackdown that saw the imposition of informal curfews in high density suburbs of Harare.⁹⁶

The continued deterioration of the situation prompted SADC to convene an urgent summit in Dar es Salaam from 28-29 March 2007. The summit then appointed President Thabo Mbeki to mediate in the Zimbabwe crisis. It is evident that the Save Zimbabwe Campaign managed to put the Zimbabwean issue high on the regional agenda. The reaction by SADC was informed by the outcome of the Save Zimbabwe campaign. However there were some problems that bedevilled the Save Zimbabwe campaign resulting from the SADC mediation efforts. It is the contention of this study that the Save Zimbabwe campaign died a premature death due to the fragmentation amongst progressive forces that followed the SADC mediation process. However this is not to say SADC should not have intervened, but it was the conduct of the negotiations that inadvertently led to disharmony within the Save Zimbabwe Campaign.

7.6.2 Save Zimbabwe Campaign and SADC Mediation Efforts

The first part of this section details the position of civil society in relation to why Save Zimbabwe died a premature death following the SADC mediation process and the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 18) Act of 2007. The second part examines MDC’s position in

⁹⁵ Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

relation to the same issue. The 18th Amendment officially provided for the harmonisation of all elections from 2008 and increased constituencies of the legislature in the lower house from 120 to 210 as well as the number of senators in the upper house from 66 to 84. In addition the 18th Amendment provided that the two houses of parliament can jointly elect a new president if the office of President becomes vacant by reason of his death or his resignation or removal from office in terms of the Constitution. The 18th Amendment will be discussed further in the next section.

Following the talk about talks, President Mbeki began mediating between ZANU PF and MDC in line with his mandate from SADC. However this thesis posits that the continued adherence to the Founding Principles of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign by all parties following SADC mediation was bound to be impossible. It was almost impossible for the Save Zimbabwe parties to continue working as a collective without the full cooperation of the MDC. The setbacks that followed the SADC mediation efforts had serious implications in terms of the gains the Save Zimbabwe campaign made, as exemplified by the international reaction to the events that followed the March 11 prayer meeting. It is worth pointing out that one of the resolutions passed when Save Zimbabwe campaign was launched was that lobbying government for constitutional reform was to be given priority. According to Lovemore Madhuku:

There was a clear pact mapped under the Save Zimbabwe campaign that said we will only vote in 2008 under a new constitution. So it meant fighting for a new constitution as a broad coalition. We were released together after the March 11 barbaric attacks but the next day we heard that the opposition had agreed to talk to ZANU PF within the auspices of SADC talks. The opposition abandoned our earlier pact and the SADC process did not recognise what we had agreed upon as a broad front – that a people-driven constitution was to be priority number one.⁹⁷

Tied to the above, Mahiya contends that parties to the Save Zimbabwe campaign felt strongly that the MDC should at least have had the courtesy to brief the other partners in the campaign about what was taking place in the talks since they had worked together all along.⁹⁸ Civil society claims that it learnt through the press that the opposition had supported ZANU PF with respect to the 18th Constitutional Amendment. A request by civil society to be part and parcel of the talks was turned down in line with the mediator, Thabo Mbeki's recommendations. But the reality was that civil society wanted to be treated as an equal partner.⁹⁹ Notwithstanding their disagreement with MDC over supporting ZANU PF's proposal to have a new constitution after the elections, civil society was happy about other agenda items that were tabled during the

⁹⁷ Interview with Dr Lovemore Madhuku, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁹⁸ Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

negotiations. Civil society wanted the MDC to employ strategies and tactics that could have resulted in a sense of collective ownership of the SADC-led mediation process. Mukonoweshuro conceded that Save Zimbabwe as a broad united democratic front had agreed to move forward as an organic unit to confront a common hurdle to democracy, but cracks in the edifice of solidarity emerged because civil society was not happy about MDC's strategies and tactics.¹⁰⁰

The aforementioned position was supported by Madhuku and Mahiya, who argued that the confidentiality clause in the SADC mediation process was problematic and crippled the Save Zimbabwe campaign as a broad united front.¹⁰¹ Their argument was that since Save Zimbabwe campaign brought about the talks, it was unfair for the MDC to sideline the other coalition members in the resultant process.¹⁰² A considerable number of civil society organisations were of the view that the SADC mediation process was flawed for two reasons. The first reason was that the process excluded the input from ordinary Zimbabweans represented by civil society and other smaller political parties. Secondly, civil society argued that the secret talks between MDC and ZANU PF could not resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. In short, civil society was totally against the mediator's exclusion of civics and the imposition of a confidentiality clause. However the position of the two MDC factions was that the rules of engagement were set by Thabo Mbeki in consultation with SADC, a position that neither MDC nor ZANU PF could change. SADC believed that it was not possible to negotiate publicly considering the level of polarisation that existed in the country. So the content of negotiations were to remain confidential if they were to be successful – a condition that the two major political parties accepted.

According to Madhuku:

MDC and ZANU PF talks had a principle of secrecy and imposed a restriction on the participation of smaller political parties and civil society. That undermined or even offended the two excluded constituencies. The secrecy element was antithetical to the principles of transparency and open processes of engagement...However, MDC still wanted to be part of the Save Zimbabwe campaign despite doing things that were contrary to the letter and spirit of the Save Zimbabwe pact. MDC essentially undermined Save Zimbabwe when it negated the supremacy of a new constitution that was a priority area for the whole campaign. MDC became an impediment for the campaign and caused the confusion that ensued because it lacked clarity in terms of principle and direction.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Professor Elphas Mukonoweshuro, 20 December 2007, Harare.

¹⁰¹ Dr Lovemore Madhuku and Rashid Mahiya in separate interviews.

¹⁰² Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare. As already noted Mahiya was the coordinator for the Save Zimbabwe campaign.

¹⁰³ Interview with Dr Lovemore Madhuku, 14 December 2007, Harare.

From a civil society point of view, MDC could no longer actively and effectively participate in the Save Zimbabwe campaign because it feared jeopardising the SADC-led negotiations.¹⁰⁴ MDC realised that by actively participating in Save Zimbabwe, it could send a very different signal to the other negotiating partner (ZANU PF).¹⁰⁵ As a result MDC ended up doing some things that were in stark contrast to the letter and spirit of the Save Zimbabwe campaign in the name of confidence-building measures. That position explained the dissonance in relation to the strategies and tactics between MDC and its strategic partners in the Save Zimbabwe campaign. A case in point was when the MDC supported the 18th Amendment proposal by ZANU PF, yet it was another example of a piecemeal approach to the constitution-making process. Earlier on, the MDC as member of Save Zimbabwe had effectively spoken against any further amendments to the constitution and agreed that a new constitution must be given precedence. In short the talks became a harbinger of a weakened broad alliance.¹⁰⁶

Another factor that deserves attention in relation to the Save Zimbabwe was the impact of the violent crackdown that followed March 11 2007. Immediately after the event, Save Zimbabwe faced a major challenge in relation to the attacks on its activists. It was caught off guard without any alternative plan in place. Civil society had not anticipated a fresh wave of violence against them. It is against this background that civil society questioned ZANU PF's sincerity in the negotiations, considering that violence against the opposition and civil society activists actually increased during the SADC-led mediation process. The political environment in Zimbabwe remained overly repressive and:

Activists were being abducted in the dead of the night and about 30 people were affected. People were beaten and arrested and as a result a number of activists fled into exile. For a moment there was a paralysis and a vacuum was created after a spate of arrests and arbitrary jailing.¹⁰⁷

As already noted, the talks led to a lack of trust between the MDC and its strategic partners. Once there was no trust in a campaign that consisted of all progressive forces, there could not be any progress however defined.¹⁰⁸ In light of the talks, events that were lined up were cancelled because strategic partners within Save Zimbabwe were worried about the implication of continuing with the programmes when MDC-ZANU PF talks were in progress.¹⁰⁹ There was a

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Rashid Mahiya, 14 December 2007, Harare.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

lot of disillusionment and discord that led to the formation of coalition after coalition ostensibly in search of what could work. However, nothing concrete necessarily came out of the various initiatives that followed Save Zimbabwe.¹¹⁰ Save Zimbabwe became defunct due to fragmentation amongst progressive forces following commencement of the MDC-ZANU PF negotiations. The Christian Alliance failed to save Zimbabwe and the country slid deeper into anarchy.

7.6.3 MDC's Position on the Inter-Party Talks¹¹¹

SADC talks and the attendant problems that arose as a result of the MDC's support of the 18th constitutional amendment deserve further scrutiny. It is arguable that the MDC took a step in the right direction by supporting the 18th Amendment. Contrary to civil society's claim that the opposition negated the principles and resolutions of previous stakeholders' conventions that rejected further piecemeal constitutional amendments, two issues require clarification. Both MDC formations believed that the position about the centrality of a new people-driven constitution was never meant to be a fundamentalist position. The side agreement on the 18th Amendment would not, as it were, detract the opposition's commitment to a new constitution but instead be viewed as a confidence-building measure. The amendment was meant to set the stage for substantive negotiations where more fundamental issues were to be addressed – as contained in the *2008 Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement*. See Appendix.

Therefore, civil society misconstrued MDC compromise position to mean a total negation of the principle of open, transparent, inclusive and participatory processes of engagement. Though another piecemeal amendment to the constitution was not what the MDC wanted, the two formations compromised in order to significantly change the original 18th Amendment that was solely drafted by ZANU PF. In any case ZANU PF had a two-thirds parliamentary majority and therefore could have proceeded to amend the constitution with or without the support of the MDC. The MDC was clearly aware of these realities and therefore had to compromise, much to the chagrin of its civil society allies. In short it was better to have an amendment that at least reflected the opposition's will, than to have no input at all should they have opted not to negotiate with ZANU PF about the content of the 18th Amendment.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ This section immensely benefitted from the Transcript of the Hot Seat Interview between Professor Welshman Ncube and Violet Gonda – controversial Constitutional Amendment No. 18, Short Wave Radio Broadcast, 25 September 2007.

Though the MDC's concession violated the principle of totally rejecting amendment of the constitution, it was seen by that party as a step towards the realisation of a broader national vision. That grand vision was to have a constitutional dispensation that provided for an improved electoral process in 2008. MDC agreed to negotiate and support the 18th amendment provided that five key agenda items were to take centre stage. These five items concerned a new constitution for Zimbabwe, new electoral laws, reform to security and media legislation – POSA (Public Order and Security Act), the Broadcasting Services Act and AIPPA (Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act). The final item was on the political climate in Zimbabwe characterised by sanctions, youth militias and violence among other things. It is worth noting that the issues became the hallmark of the Zimbabwe Global *Political* Agreement signed by the two MDC formations and ZANU PF on 15 September 2008.

The reason why the MDC did not take the outcry from civil society seriously was from the former's understanding of the proper role of civil society. For the opposition, civil society should not to be an appendage of any political party. Rather civil society was entitled to hold and defend different positions from the opposition and therefore it was wrong for anyone to treat civil society as an extension of the MDC. The MDC's position was that:

The opposition is about politics. It is about competing for political office. Civil society is about advocacy, about specific certain issues, which fall within the areas of those civil society organisations...the most important thing is that civil society remains independent and plays that independent role and if they hold the opinions they hold and they have articulated them (sic) — that is very good, in fact that is how it should be.¹¹²

While from the civil society point of view, the opposition flouted one of the Save Zimbabwe campaign's founding principles by not rejecting piecemeal amendments to the constitution, not coming back to consult and explain developments surrounding their support of amendment to the civil society and not acting with sufficient openness, the MDC had its own reasons for what it did. MDC had a bigger responsibility and obligations than the Save Zimbabwe campaign. The MDC saw itself as a possible alternative government, in other words as a government in waiting. While in general the MDC upholds civic norms like openness and accountability, in practice it recognised norms and procedures different from those of civic organisations. Notwithstanding their involvement in the Save Zimbabwe campaign and agreeing to its founding principles, MDC as a possible alternative government was correct to consider some compromise and a possible new way forward offered by ZANU PF represented by the 18th Amendment. For the MDC it

¹¹² Ncube, Transcript of Hot Seat Interview.

was unreasonable for civil society to denounce them as having betrayed Save Zimbabwe by supporting the 18th Amendment. Welshmen Ncube one of the negotiators was correct when he argued that the MDC as a government in waiting had an obligation to act in a realistic and possibly compromising fashion which the civil society misconstrued as betrayal.

Clearly, MDC made headway when it supported and negotiated with ZANU PF on the 18th Amendment. The idea of having election results posted outside polling stations was an outcome of the 18th Amendment, a development that made it relatively difficult for ZANU PF to rig the 2008 elections. For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe, the opposition managed to flight its electoral material in state-controlled print and electronic media. Consequently, for the first time in history, ZANU PF lost its two-third parliamentary majority. In the final analysis there was nothing untoward about the civil society distrusting ZANU PF in relation to the negotiations in light of the latter's history of vilifying and seeking to neutralise or annihilate opposition and civil society. The problem was that civil society took a fundamentalist stance and did not approach the whole debate with an open but critical mind.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter detailed how the civil society in Zimbabwe resisted state corporatism and the concomitant attempts towards reintroducing a one-party state in Zimbabwe. As such, a patriotic civic culture was given prominence by the ZANU PF with a view to protecting its power base from supposedly unpatriotic civil society and opposition. State corporatism and the reintroduction of the one-party state structure were attempted through the promulgation of the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill. The Bill was meant to place the civil society movement under state tutelage and to eliminate any progressive forces that could critique the state in any significant way. In light of the growing demands for political change, the state also attempted to control the church. This transpired after some church elements successfully appealed to the scriptures to justify working with civil society to deal with the crisis in the country. Notwithstanding the fragmentation that later resurfaced amongst the progressive forces, the church played a big role in bringing together important groups which had previously been in conflict. Both domestic and international pressures for democratic change possibly explain the incipient decline of the state's hegemonic project witnessed particularly in 2008.

The tension and seemingly antagonistic relationship between MDC and civil society seem to emerge from the fact that the opposition was born out of a broad working class movement.

However being aware of one's roots is not synonymous with being an appendage of the same roots. Rather the relationship should be one of working together, bearing in mind the distinct but interrelated functional roles of civil society and political parties. As a result tension between the MDC and civil society are likely to continue as long as the latter fails to understand that the former is not like any other civic but an aspirant government in waiting. The MDC will continue to act within a broad framework of seeking to be an alternative government, a position that civil society should be able to eventually accept notwithstanding the fact that it helped to create the opposition in 1999.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: Saying It Like It Is

To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West: Know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy.¹

¹ President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address, 20 January 2009.

8.1 Introduction

This thesis sought to offer a critical examination of civil society's search for a democratic political dispensation in Zimbabwe, how it originated, barriers encountered and prospects, from 1900 to 2008. While the genesis and prospects for civil society were equally significant, the major theme that stands out was the nature of impediments faced by civil society in achieving its instrumental role of establishing democracy in Zimbabwe. When examining the different interests that underpin civil society, this researcher underscores that the public sphere is a very contested, complex and contradictory terrain. This thesis makes a modest contribution to the literature on civil society, comparative democratisation, political economy, theories of hegemony and Zimbabwe's historiography. While the state remains a leading source of constraints on civil society, this study maintains that a comprehensive understanding and robust analysis of Zimbabwean civil society and democratisation requires scholars and policy makers to broaden the discussion beyond the state. Such an approach entails recognising firstly the significant role played by the working class in leading the ensemble of other civics in fighting authoritarianism, and secondly, how other equally salient factors such as transnational structures of power, migration and a dysfunctional economy can also impinge on democratisation.

Industrialisation and the concomitant urbanisation led black people in colonial Zimbabwe to respond in a variety of ways to the harsh realities characteristic of an urban industrial environment. Chief among the coping mechanisms adopted was the formation of various voluntary associations like trade unions, burial societies, tenant associations, sports clubs and hometown associations such as those witnessed in 19th century Britain, as was described in Chapter 2. The black trade union movement that emerged in colonial Zimbabwe gave workers an understanding of the nature of power and class structure in the settler colonial economy. What is interesting about the proliferation of trade unions is that they were formed from the various voluntary associations cited earlier on. Worker militancy was conjoined with struggles for political reform, particularly for "one man one vote" and elimination of voting qualifications based on education and property ownership.

Concerns about transforming the socio-economic and political status quo was a result of a myriad of challenges associated with the expansion of a nascent urban industrial society. Discrimination and blocked opportunities frustrated and angered many Africans in Southern Rhodesia who reacted by becoming more resentful of the colonial government, prompting some

of them to join the liberation movement. It should however be noted that there are a number of similarities that can be drawn between appalling working conditions experienced by workers in 19th century Britain and the Rhodesian factory and mine wage labour force that eventually gave rise to an incremental expansion of the franchise.

Expanded Western education, African newspapers and informal political forums raised awareness among Africans in Southern Rhodesia about the injustices perpetrated by the colonial regime, laying the foundation for an inchoate nationalist ideology and a concomitant aspiration for democracy. Blacks studying through correspondence formed study groups to help each other deal with the high failure rate that characterised distance education. The improvements in African literacy rates laid the foundation for demands for broad-based democratisation in Rhodesia because people were able to read newspapers that carried views and political debates among educated blacks who had a sound appreciation of their society's problems and a possible way forward. Ethnic associations, newspapers and other voluntary associations became the vehicle for political participation and mobilisation in the embryonic public sphere.

With respect to the evolution of civil society in general and Zimbabwe in particular there is a general link between capitalist development and democracy. Akin to what happened in 19th century Britain, education conjoined with an autodidact culture in colonial Zimbabwe improved literacy rates thereby strengthening the foundation for a democratic culture in Zimbabwe. The nature and context in which civil society's drive for democratisation emerged in colonial Zimbabwe is not dissimilar to what transpired in 19th century Britain. However, the origins and development of civil society and democracy in Zimbabwe needs to be considered with a proviso that it occurred on a much smaller and thinner scale compared to what was witnessed in 19th century Britain as detailed in Chapter 2.

Findings from Chapter 3 of this thesis suggest that ZANU PF as an anti-colonial liberation movement was violent and failed to transform itself into a democratic political party from the outset of the independent state in 1980. It continued to pursue its politics in a violent fashion so as to ensure predominance through the elimination of political opposition and civil society. In other words, Zimbabwe presents a case study that defends the position that armed liberation struggles are inappropriate "breeding grounds for democracy"² in the post-colonial era. Insights

² Henning Melber, "Liberation without Democracy? Flaws of Post-Colonial Systems in Southern Africa," *Development and Cooperation*, no. 1 (January/February 2002).

drawn from the path dependency theory as described by Pierson in the beginning of Chapter 3 suggest that authoritarian structural legacies emanating from the anti-colonial struggles explain why there is a replication of the old order in contemporary times. This is so because post-colonialism does not signal a chronologically defined periodisation and linear progression from pre-colonialism, colonialism and post-colonialism, rather there is nexus or embeddedness of the past in the present. In short, ZANU PF as a political party originating from the colonial period brought with it wartime legacies that were invariably antithetical to democratic values. It is arguable that barriers to civil society in its attempt to deliver in relation to a post-nationalist liberation discourse of democratisation should be understood within the context of a legacy of violence and general authoritarianism. These two vices were bequeathed upon post-independent Zimbabwe by both the colonial government and the nationalist movement. The inherited repressive colonial machinery and institutions explain this reality.

Though ZANU PF prefers a perception of a Zimbabwean historiography that is uniform and fixed, memory contests emerged at the heart of the Zimbabwean political crisis. This thesis supports the proposition that the politicisation of memory in Zimbabwe reveals tensions between various ways of understanding and remembering the past that is invariably in a constant state of flux. The vilification and denigration of the people who did not participate in the war of liberation but want to champion an alternative political agenda attest to the controversial and polemical nature of struggles over memory and forgetting in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. ZANU PF's fundamental onslaught on the legislative, judicial and administrative spheres and the use of combative political discourses were justified and anchored on the ability to manipulate the content of identities associated with the party's participation in the war of liberation. However with time, ZANU PF's silenced brutal history is likely to reappear as a result of concerted efforts by civil society and scholars to come to terms with Zimbabwe's dark past with a view to avoid a recurrence of similar events in the future.

While identity politics is not *ipso facto* violent, it may leave little or no room for compromise or negotiation. As a result it can lead to backlash politics or state barbarism where violence is not only glorified but justified as a measure to contain enemies real or imaginary, as the Zimbabwean case demonstrates. ZANU PF justified its unacceptable actions that were in stark contrast to peremptory norms and values in the name of seeking to defend the gains of the liberation war.

Its appeal to collective memory associated with the war of liberation reveals the structural interconnectedness between state barbarism and authoritarian nationalist politics. ZANU PF's domination project, corporatism and state barbarism were mediated by collective memory based on the war of liberation. Organised violence was used as an instrument to suppress dissent and non-conformity by societal actors supporting alternative identities that embody democratic values. Violent identity assertion was the hallmark of ZANU PF rule over the years, a development that became a huge barrier to civil society's quest for democracy in Zimbabwe. Therefore violence, identity and power overlapped in a complex but interconnected manner that was inimical to democratisation.

This thesis also advances the position that deepening ruling elite barbarism entailed the militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military. The military abandoned the barracks in favour of politics following their invitation by ZANU PF's nationalist military leadership in response to diminishing popular support. The political survival of ZANU PF was understood in war terms and it therefore involved the systematic elimination, torture and intimidation of opposition supporters and civil society activists. The violent history of ZANU PF produced a distinct form of authoritarian rule. Binaries based on collective identities were created between the self and the other, justifying ZANU PF's pursuit of violent political strategies since independence.

Chapter 4 of this thesis critically examined the various ways that selected civil society groups in Zimbabwe contested the dominant political discourses and structures of power and the attendant impediments that were encountered. For example, as a way to manufacture consent, the state used propaganda about the supposed role of civil society in eroding the gains of the liberation struggle by being used as fronts for Britain's neo-colonialist agenda. Accordingly, legislation and violence were mobilised to deal with the supposedly unpatriotic civil society and opposition. ZANU PF's propaganda transcended the Zimbabwean borders and at a regional level it negatively influenced many African countries' reaction to the political crisis.

Another theme examined in Chapter 4 is how advanced capitalist development promoted the emergence of social movement unionism in Zimbabwe. As noted by Hawkins, Zimbabwe's robust and substantially diversified economy conjoined with the urban sector is of significant political relevance given its potentiality to advance democracy. The working class generated and sustained pressures for socio-economic and political inclusion on an ongoing and unending

fashion. The notion of fish and water describes the symbiotic relationship between productive sectors of the economy, ZCTU, MDC, and the working class. The working class and the productive sectors of the economy were the “water” where the “fish” MDC and civil society derived their life and strength. As result the vibrant civil society and opposition that emerged in the late 1990s were conjoined to the robust and diversified economy. Consequently, faced by a possibility of losing power, ZANU PF sought to drain the “water” so that the “fish” could die. The MDC and the working class-led civil society represented a spectre of the potentiality of real democratic political change that was undermined by ZANU PF backlash politics. The wilful destruction of the productive economic structures that sustained social forces that could possibly have brought about democracy in Zimbabwe is instructive.

The deliberate destruction of the agriculture sector that was the engine of the economy necessarily meant the destruction of the manufacturing industry. This was so primarily because commercial agriculture and manufacturing industry were highly integrated with industry drawing 50% of its inputs as well as marketing a substantial portion of its output to the commercial farming sector and its employees. While recognising the negative impact of the liberalisation of the economy on the manufacturing sector, ZANU PF’s populist policies worsened the situation. Upon closer examination, the deliberate wrecking of the economy could have been irrational in economic terms, but for ZANU PF, it made political sense given the embeddedness of politics in capitalist development.

In line with Polanyi’s ideas in his book *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origin of Our Times*, Zimbabwe’s society generated a movement for protection against the excessive commodification of life that followed the adoption of economic reforms under free market principles. The significant deterioration of the workers’ standards of living over a long period of time led the working class to organise beyond the work place and to conclude that the state’s policies were responsible for that decline. As a result, ZCTU revitalised and recreated itself as a powerful social movement that built alliances with other progressive social forces with a view to stem the steep decline in union membership and the concomitant loss of political influence. This thesis asserts that ZCTU revitalised and transformed itself into a social movement union in its quest for relevance in the 21st century. The labour movement endeavoured to build a long lasting political legacy by creating the MDC which was supposed to bring about a union-friendly environment once it gets into power.

Results from this research support the idea that socio-economic transformation is impossible without the broad participation of labour. An independent working class-led civil society is the *sine qua non* for the emergence of a democratic and egalitarian society because unions enhance citizenship rights during times of economic recession or hardship. Issues of rights were taken beyond the workplace as unions became integral components of a broad-based civil society movement. ZCTU experienced a decrease in its union membership base that translated to a decrease in union densities across the country. The decrease also led to a reduction in union dues and the numbers that could be mobilised for various working class-led campaigns. Notwithstanding the drastic fall in membership, ZCTU recovered its influence through social movement unionism where it successfully mobilised societal actors less able to sustain self-mobilisation: the poor, the unemployed, the self employed and other community-based organisations to fight for democracy, human rights and social justice.

Zimbabwe's case reveals that social movement unions rise, fall and rise once again. For example the NCA rose to prominence and created the MDC but during the period 2003-2007 there was a vacuum that was only filled by yet another social movement, the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. Strategies for trade union revitalisation took an international dimension where politically oriented organisations like COSATU worked together with ZCTU and other like-minded regional civic groups to institutionally change the prevailing political order. However, the future of the working class-led social movement union in Zimbabwe depends on the increased political power of unions and their ability to reverse membership decline through revitalisation and reorganising former members who joined the informal economy among other interventions.

Findings from Chapter 5 of this thesis suggest that migration and the attendant remittances came at a cost to democratisation. The political economy of sanctions evasion by the authoritarian nationalist leadership of Mugabe reveals that remittances by Zimbabweans in the diaspora assisted ZANU PF to strategically cope and adapt to the sanctions regime imposed by the US and its allies through ZIDERA. The "extra-ordinary measures" that ZANU PF resorted to were in essence a coping mechanism against "extra-ordinary challenges" caused by sanctions and the effects of their deliberate destruction of the economy that was meant to destroy the MDC. The regime imported huge amounts of banknote paper that was printed into sextillions of dollars in local currency and used to purchase foreign currency remittances on the informal market. Proceeds from the parallel market were used to buy luxuries for judges, top military personnel and other parties central to the regime's continued stranglehold on power. The negative and

unintended consequences of remittances helped to ensure the survival of the ZANU PF regime beyond the expectation of many people, not to mention how the dysfunctional economy characterised by severe distortions went a long way to benefit the ruling elite patrons and their clients.

The black market of foreign currency and basic commodities was controlled by a very powerful clique within ZANU PF. Such a development further impoverished people in a manner that made them lose interest in politics as they redrew their priorities to reflect the prevailing harsh economic realities and the need to ensure basic survival. The hypothesis that a dysfunctional economy breeds a parochial political culture is strongly supported by the Zimbabwean case study because glaring poverty levels impeded political participation. Targeted sanctions provided ZANU PF with a convenient excuse to deflect both national and domestic criticism. In the final analysis problematising migration and remittances also broadened the debate on transnational democratisation and advocacy discussed in this thesis. While migration and remittances assisted ZANU PF to defeat sanctions, the successful lobbying by transnational civil society for a German-based firm to cut supplies of banknotes to the regime probably contributed to the willingness of ZANU PF to negotiate with the MDC.

Another conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that globalisation and the attendant improvements in Information Technology played a role in challenging state's hegemony notwithstanding the fact that Zimbabwe's communication sector is generally underdeveloped. IT brought significant changes in the means of mobilisation and attendant counter hegemonic tactics available to activists to contest the dominant structures of power. The digital media consisting of internet and mobile phones vastly changed and expanded Zimbabwe's public sphere thereby contributing to democratisation. Tied to the above, the establishment of exile media like Studio 7 broadcasting from Washington DC provided uncensored news about Zimbabwe, a development that made it relatively difficult for ZANU PF to control the public sphere.

The fact that Mugabe knows that global civil society will possibly hold him accountable for his perpetration of gross human rights violations and send him to the International Criminal Court in The Hague may explain deepening state barbarism and ZANU PF's reluctance to relinquish power. Developments surrounding the ongoing trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor for crimes against humanity possibly explain Mugabe and his cronies' preoccupation with self-

preservation through continued violence and intransigence whilst negotiating with the MDC. Thus the possibility of transitional justice mechanisms driven by transnational structures of power may possibly explain why organised violence continues to wreak havoc in Zimbabwe's political system instead of abating.

The fact that civil society elements in Zimbabwe sidestepped their government and appealed to international allies to put pressure on the regime from outside brought about profound changes in the political system. Previously, ZANU PF had refused to negotiate with the opposition but bowed down to regional pressure, and negotiations were started in 2007. Advocacy networks used symbolic events to enlist the support of other powerful actors towards their cause, while meticulously researched human rights reports prepared by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and other bodies exposed Mugabe's gross human rights violations. As already highlighted, international lobbying for a Germany firm to stop supplying Zimbabwe with banknotes also influenced the political economy of Zimbabwe.

While transnational structures of power appear *prima facie* very powerful, the Zimbabwe example suggests that they can be limited in their ability to promote a democratic dispensation. Contrary to the positive role played by international allies of the MDC and civil society, AU, SADC and South Africa made an overly negative contribution to the Zimbabwe crisis by supporting Mugabe and shielding him from international pressure. While appreciating the centrality of "African solutions to African problems", SADC in general and former president Thabo Mbeki's implicit portrayal of non-African intervention in the Zimbabwean crisis as interference and racist is deeply regrettable. Had SADC worked together with other international forces to pressure Mugabe to institute political reforms, the continued suffering of Zimbabweans would have been averted. However the authoritarian nature of some African presidents possibly explains why they decided to support Mugabe and ignored his flagrant violation of human rights. Notwithstanding SADC's negative role, the thesis demonstrates that the efforts of activists, international organisations, global civil society and powerful Western governments and other players in the region and around the globe were neither futile nor in vain. Their efforts substantially contributed to the opening-up of Zimbabwe's political system.

Chapter 7 illustrates that from 2000 state corporatism became a central feature of Zimbabwean politics. This further expansion of ZANU PF's predominance project stemmed from the fact that the party was no longer satisfied with simply winning every election and therefore

endeavoured to dominate the entire revived civil society. The development led to the promulgation of the NGO bill that was meant to be yet another one-party state effort by ZANU PF. It is arguable that the fragmentation of progressive forces during the fight against the NGO bill was worsened by the MDC split in 2005. The split reverberated across the entire civil society movement, prompting the Christian Alliance to intervene with a view to assisting progressive formations to work together as a collective. Despite successfully leading the social movement called the Save Zimbabwe campaign, the church and other civil society organisations later differed sharply with the MDC over a number of issues following the SADC-led mediation process. As a result bridges between civil society and the MDC were burnt over tactical differences.

This thesis suggests that failure by Zimbabwe's progressive forces (excluding the MDC) to make that critical distinction between civil society and political parties as espoused in liberal democratic theory explains their fallout and current love-hate relationship. While civil society and political parties have complementary but distinct roles that overlap, as shown by the MDC and civil society working together, the civil society movement in Zimbabwe finds it difficult to make and accept that clear distinction. The distinction stems from the fact that the MDC is an aspirant government in waiting with a necessary obligation to make tactical policy changes to reach this end. Though it is understandable that the MDC was created by civil society through a social movement union, their distinct functional roles must continue to exist and be exercised in an autonomous though complementary fashion. This is so because the opposition has a bigger responsibility and obligation than the watchdog role of civil society. The tactical tug of war between the former strong allies explains why progressive forces in Zimbabwe are highly critical of the MDC and the political dispensation could probably unfold in the form of a government of national unity.

8.2 Prospects for Civil Society in Zimbabwe

This researcher's answer to the question of the prospects for civil society in Zimbabwe is a heavily qualified affirmative given the structural impediments detailed in this thesis. However this thesis presents an optimistic scenario about democratisation in Zimbabwe, arguing that social movement unionism and restoration of production on the farms will revitalise and save the labour movement from further decline and revive potentialities for democratisation. In order for Zimbabwe to reclaim its place as the second most diversified economy after South Africa

with a potentiality for democratisation, the economy must be revived through a number of structural reforms. Investment by Zimbabweans in the diaspora, restoration of the rule of law coupled with increased industrial capacity utilisation and reengagement with international financial institutions can possibly revive the economy. Given the integrated nature of the Zimbabwe economy, restoration of production on the farms after a proper land reform and audit will necessarily trigger the supply-side response in the manufacturing sector. A functional economy will strengthen the dignity of the working class who would in turn spur democratisation through the development of popular organisations.

Continued improvements in information computer technology and its accessibility to Zimbabwean activists will go a long way in educating, empowering, mobilising and connecting previously subordinated groups. The resuscitation of the education sector with a view to maintaining and improving the existing literacy levels and autodidact culture also hold key to a better Zimbabwe. The above optimistic scenario about what the future holds for Zimbabwe must be taken into consideration with the following analogy in mind: It is easy to destroy a 50-year-old tree in 10 minutes, but should one make up one's mind to say I want that tree to exist again, one has to wait for another 50 years. Inept political leadership can unmistakably reverse years of economic progress within a very short period of time and then leaders can blame their society's ills on Western countries, as US President Obama noted at the beginning of this chapter. Another source of optimism for the civil society in Zimbabwe will be when the diaspora community and other successful businessmen initiate a programme to fund civil society so as to complement and reduce the reliance on international donors. A precedent was set when the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civil Society Organisation Forum in South Africa was financed by Zimbabwean individuals and businessmen in the diaspora.

The elimination of the impediments cited in this thesis will make the civil society less embryonic but well developed and more powerful to “significantly determine or inflect the course of state policy.”³ Despite its inchoate status, the notion of civil society will remain of a heuristic and empirical utility in describing and explaining socio-economic and political change in contemporary Zimbabwe. Thus empirical evidence from Zimbabwe challenges the notion that civil society is a Eurocentric concept that has no value in non-Western contexts. Though civil society in Zimbabwe remains underdeveloped and overly constrained by the state in conjunction with other factors already mentioned, it is very promising in terms of holding the state

³ Charles Taylor, “Modes of Civil Society,” *Public Culture*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 1990):98.

accountable. Notwithstanding the government's political machinations, many observers are still pinning their hopes in the supremacy of a civil society that will eventually be able to define its own meaning and probably run its own race in stark contrast to what the state might want or determine it to be. As such civil society's quest for democracy in Zimbabwe can be said to be an ongoing and incomplete process and like in all countries it remains an unfinished business or work-in-progress.

8.3 Future Research

Zimbabwe's internal political dynamics are not evolving in a vacuum. Indeed, regional and international contexts are important variables to be taken into account considering that changes in the global economy impact on state-society relations. Accordingly, more research needs to be done in order to understand the extent to which international factors democratise body polities better than domestic forces or vice versa. Another question is; if the two are complementary, there should be an empirical study to demonstrate which of the two is more important in terms of effecting democratic regime change. An additional area for further research relates to the political use and impact of remittances in Zimbabwe – the relationship between political under development and remittances. What is the long term impact of migration and remittances on democratisation? How does migration affect internal political dynamics in the long run? Finally more research needs to be carried out on the nature and trends in hidden forms of political resistance that characterised both colonial and post-independent Zimbabwe.

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Appendix: 1

Interview List

Formal Interviews Conducted By Author

Badza, Simon. – Lecturer, University of Zimbabwe, 10 December 2007.

Bond, Patrick. – Professor of Political Science and Economic History, University of KwaZulu Natal, 25 August 2007.

Chamba, Fortune. – Legal and Academic Affairs Secretary, Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), Harare, 14 December 2007.

Chiadzwa, Godfrey. – Programme Officer, Zimbabwe Diaspora Civil Society Organisation Forum Johannesburg, 11 September 2007.

Chikohwero, Sox. – Vice-chairman of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civil Society Organisation Forum Johannesburg, 13 September 2007.

Chikware, John. – Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement, Johannesburg, 13 September 2007.

Chirikure, Roberts. – Volunteer, Methodist Church Centre, Johannesburg, 15 September 2007.

Chirimambowa, Tamuka. – Former Student Leader and Lecturer in Economic History, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, 22 August 2007.

Dube, Motipashe. - (Not her real name) – Researcher, Mass Public Opinion Institute, Harare, Zimbabwe, Harare, 12 December 2007.

Hazangwi, Kelvin. – Director, Padare Man’s Forum on Gender, Harare, 13 December 2007.

Kapuya, Tapera. – Coordinator, National Constitutional Assembly, South Africa chapter, Durban, 26 August 2007.

Kasiyano, Innocent. – National Coordinator, Student Christian Movement, Harare, 13 December 2007.

Madhuku, Lovemore. – Chairperson, National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Harare, 14 December 2007.

Mafume, Jacob. – Coordinator, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Harare, 12 December 2007.

Magaya, Ancelimo – Christian Alliance, Harare, 11 December 2007.

Mahiya, Rashid. – Coordinator, Save Zimbabwe Campaign, Harare, 14 December 2007.

Makumbe, John. – Professor of Political Science, University of Zimbabwe, 19 December 2007.

Mapundu, Kudakwashe. – Secretary General, University of Zimbabwe Student Executive Council, 14 December 2007.

Matibenga, Lucia. – 3rd Vice President, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Harare, 19 December 2007.

Matombo, Lovemore. – President, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Harare, 17 December 2007.

Molokele, Daniel Fortune. – Human Rights Lawyer and Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civic Society Organizations Forum, Johannesburg, 16 September 2007.

Moore, David B. – Professor of Political Economy, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, 22 August 2007.

Mudekwa, Simon. – President of the Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement, Johannesburg, 12 September 2007.

Mudzengeranwa, Anna-Mariah. – Volunteer, Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement, Johannesburg, 12 September 2007.

Mudzengi, Ernest. – National Director, 12 National Constitutional Assembly, Harare, 12 December 2007.

Muisa, Gift Nhidza. – Exiled MDC and National Constitutional Assembly activist, Johannesburg, 14 September 2007.

Mukanya, Tafadzwa. – Student Christian Movement, Harare, 11 December 2007.

Mukonoweshuro, Elphas. – Professor of Political Science, University of Zimbabwe, 20 December 2007.

Ncube, Alex. – Volunteer Methodist Church Centre, Johannesburg, 14 September 2007.

Ngano, Maidei – Programme Officer, Zimbabwe Torture Victims Project, Johannesburg, 14 September 2007.

Rupiya, Martin. – Senior Researcher Institute of Security Studies (Pretoria) and Visiting Lecturer Department of Political and International Studies, Rhodes University, 3 October 2007.

Sairosi, Emmanuel. – Exiled Former Student Leader, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, 26 August 2007.

Appendix 2

Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations, on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe

Preamble

We, the Parties to this Agreement;

CONCERNED about the recent challenges that we have faced as a country and the multiple threats to the well-being of our people and, therefore, determined to resolve these permanently.

CONSIDERING our shared determination to uphold, defend and sustain Zimbabwe's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity, as a respected member of the international community, a nation where all citizens respect and, therefore, enjoy equal protection of the law and have equal opportunity to compete and prosper in all spheres of life.

ACKNOWLEDGING the sacrifices made by thousands of Zimbabwe's gallant sons and daughters in the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination and determined to accept, cherish and recognise the significance of the Liberation Struggle as the foundation of our sovereign independence, freedoms and human rights.

DEDICATING ourselves to putting an end to the polarisation, divisions, conflict and intolerance that has characterised Zimbabwean politics and society in recent times.

COMMITTING ourselves to putting our people and our country first by arresting the fall in living standards and reversing the decline of our economy.

EMPHASISING our shared commitment to re-orient our attitudes towards respect for the Constitution and all national laws, the rule of law, observance of Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols and national events.

RESPECTING the rights of all Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events freely without let or hindrance.

RECOGNISING, accepting and acknowledging that the values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, non-discrimination and respect of all persons without regard to race, class, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, place of origin or birth are the bedrock of our democracy and good governance.

DETERMINED to build a society free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, dignity and equality.

RECOGNISING and accepting that the Land Question has been at the core of the contestation in Zimbabwe and acknowledging the centrality of issues relating to the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and governance.

COMMITTED to act in a manner that demonstrates loyalty to Zimbabwe, patriotism and commitment to Zimbabwe's national purpose, core values, interests and aspirations.

DETERMINED to act in a manner that demonstrates respect for the democratic values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, respect of all persons and human rights.

SUBMITTING ourselves to the mandate of the Extraordinary Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 29th March 2007 and endorsed in Lusaka on 12th April 2008 and in the AU Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt from 30th June to 1 July 2008.

RECOGNISING the centrality and importance of African institutions in dealing with African problems, we agreed to seek solutions to our differences, challenges and problems through dialogue.

ACKNOWLEDGING that pursuant to the Dar-es-Salaam SADC resolution, the Parties negotiated and agreed on a draft Constitution, initialed by the Parties on 30 September 2007, and further agreed and co-sponsored the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 18 Act, amendments to the Electoral Act, the

Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Broadcasting Services Act.

APPRECIATING the historical obligation and need to reach a solution that will allow us to put Zimbabwe first and give the people a genuine chance of rebuilding and reconstructing their livelihoods.

PURSUANT to the common desire of working together, the Parties agreed to and executed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21 July 2008, attached hereto as Annexure "A".

Now therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I - DEFINITIONS

1. Definitions The "Agreement" shall mean this written Agreement signed by the representatives of ZANU-PF and the MDC, in its two formations ("the Parties") in fulfillment of the material mandate handed down by the SADC Extraordinary Summit on 29th March 2007 and endorsed by SADC in Lusaka, Zambia and adopted by the African Union Summit in Sharm El- Sheikh, Egypt. The "Parties" shall mean ZANU-PF, the two MDC formations led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively. The "Government" or "New Government" means the new Government to be set up in terms of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT

2. Declaration of Commitment The Parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country.

ARTICLE III RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH

3. Economic recovery

3.1 The Parties agree:

- (a) to give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe. The Government will lead the process of developing and implementing an economic recovery strategy and plan. To that end, the parties are committed to working together on a full and comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe's economy, which will urgently address the issues of production, food security, poverty and unemployment and the challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate.
- (b) to create conditions that would ensure that the 2008/2009 agricultural season is productive.
- (c) to establish a National Economic Council, composed of representatives of the Parties and of the following sectors:
 - (i) Manufacturing
 - (ii) Agriculture
 - (iii) Mining
 - (iv) Tourism
 - (v) Commerce
 - (vi) Financial
 - (vii) Labour
 - (viii) Academia; and
 - (ix) Other relevant sectors
- (d) that the terms of reference of the Council shall include giving advice to Government, formulating economic plans and programmes for approval by government and such other functions as are assigned to the Council by the Government.
- (e) to endorse the SADC resolution on the economy.

ARTICLE IV SANCTIONS AND MEASURES

4. Sanctions and Measures

4.1 Recognising and acknowledging that some sections of the international community have since 2000 imposed various sanctions and measures against Zimbabwe, which have included targeted sanctions.

4.2 The Parties note the present economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by the United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America and other sections of the International Community over and around issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over the land reform programme.

4.3 Noting and acknowledging the following sanctions and measures imposed on Zimbabwe:-

- (a) enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act by the United States of America Congress which outlaws Zimbabwe's right to access credit from International Financial Institutions in which the United States Government is represented or has a stake;
- (b) suspension of Zimbabwe's voting and related rights, suspension of balance of payment support, declaration of ineligibility to borrow Fund resources and suspension of technical assistance to Zimbabwe by the International Monetary Fund;
- (c) suspension of grants and infrastructural development support to Zimbabwe by The World Bank; and
- (d) imposition of targeted travel bans against current Government and some business leaders.

4.4 Noting that this international isolation has over the years created a negative international perception of Zimbabwe and thereby resulting in the further isolation of the country by the non-availing of lines of credit to Zimbabwe by some sections of the international community.

4.5 Recognising the consequent contribution of this isolation to the further decline of the economy.

4.6 Desirous and committed to bringing to an end the fall in the standards of living of our people, the Parties hereby agree:-

- (a) to endorse the SADC resolution on sanctions concerning Zimbabwe;
- (b) that all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe; and
- (c) commit themselves to working together in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end the country's international isolation.

ARTICLE V LAND QUESTION

5. Land Question

5.1 Recognising that colonial racist land ownership patterns established during the colonial conquest of Zimbabwe and largely maintained in the post independence period were not only unsustainable, but against the national interest, equity and justice.

5.2 Noting that in addition to the primary objective of the liberation struggle to win one man one vote democracy and justice, the land question, namely the need for the re-distribution of land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe was at the core of the liberation struggle.

5.3 Accepting the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform programme in Zimbabwe that redresses the issues of historical imbalances and injustices in order to address the issues of equity, productivity, and justice.

5.4 While differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution the parties acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land has taken place under a land reform programme undertaken since 2000.

5.5 Accepting the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution.

5.6 Noting that in the current Constitution of Zimbabwe and further in the Draft Constitution agreed to by the parties the primary obligation of compensating former land owners for land acquired rests on the former colonial power.

5.7 Further recognising the need to ensure that all land is used productively in the interests of all the people of Zimbabwe.

5.8 Recognising the need for women's access and control over land in their own right as equal citizens.

5.9 The Parties hereby agree to:

- (a) conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, during the tenure of the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, for the purpose of establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships.
- (b) ensure that all Zimbabweans who are eligible to be allocated land and who apply for it shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of race, gender, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation;
- (c) ensure security of tenure to all land holders.
- (d) call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former land owners for resettlement;
- (e) work together to secure international support and finance for the land reform programme in terms of compensation for the former land owners and support for new farmers; and
- (f) work together for the restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land.

ARTICLE VI CONSTITUTION

6. Constitution

Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves; Aware that the process of making this constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and democratic; Recognising that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster House Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe; Acknowledging the draft Constitution that the Parties signed and agreed to in Kariba on the 30th of September 2007, annexed hereto as Annexure "B"; Determined to create conditions for our people to write a constitution for themselves; and Mindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic values and principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly the enhancement of full citizenship and equality of women.

6.1 The Parties hereby agree:

- (a) that they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives of the Parties whose terms of reference shall be as follows:
 - (i) to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament and composed of members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as may be necessary to assist the Select Committee in performing its mandate herein;
 - (ii) to hold such public hearings and such consultations as it may deem necessary in the process of public consultation over the making of a new constitution for Zimbabwe;
 - (iii) to convene an All Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders on their representation in the sub-committees referred to above and such related matters as may assist the committee in its work;
 - (iv) to table its draft Constitution to a 2nd All Stakeholders Conference; and
 - (v) to report to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of a New Constitution for Zimbabwe
- (b) That the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall be submitted to a referendum;
- (c) that, in implementing the above, the following time frames shall apply:
 - (i) the Select Committee shall be set up within two months of inception of a new government;
 - (ii) the convening of the first All Stakeholders Conference shall be within 3 months of the date of the appointment of the Select Committee;
 - (iii) the public consultation process shall be completed no later than 4 months of the date of the first All Stakeholders Conference;
 - (iv) the draft Constitution shall be tabled within 3 months of completion of the public consultation process to a second All Stakeholders Conference;

- (v) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled before Parliament within 1 month of the second All Stakeholders Conference;
- (vi) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be debated in Parliament and the debate concluded within one month;
- (vii) the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the holding of a referendum;
- (viii) a referendum on the new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of the conclusion of the debate;
- (ix) in the event of the draft Constitution being approved in the referendum it shall be gazetted within 1 month of the date of the referendum; and
- (x) the draft Constitution shall be introduced in Parliament no later than 1 month after the expiration of the period of 30 days from the date of its gazetting.

ARTICLE VII PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY

7. Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity

7.1 The Parties hereby agree that the new Government:

- a) will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all;
- b) will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of regions;
- c) shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post independence political conflicts; and
- d) will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation.
- e) will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel.

ARTICLE VIII RESPECT FOR NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EVENTS

8. Respect for National Institutions and Events

8.1 In the interests of forging a common vision for our country, the Parties hereby agree:-

- (a) on the necessity of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion to respect and observe Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols, national programmes and events; and
- (b) that all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion have the right to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events without let or hindrance.

ARTICLE IX EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

9. External Interference

9.1 The Parties reaffirm the principle of the United Nations Charter on non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries.

9.2 The Parties hereby agree:-

- (a) that the responsibility of effecting change of government in Zimbabwe vests exclusively on and is the sole prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe through peaceful, democratic and constitutional means;
- (b) to reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of changing governments; and
- (c) that no outsiders have a right to call or campaign for regime change in Zimbabwe.

ARTICLE X FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

10. Free political activity

Recognising that the right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is the cornerstone of any multi-party democratic system, the Parties have agreed that there should be free political activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit of the law in which all political parties are able to propagate their views and canvass for support, free of harassment and intimidation.

ARTICLE XI RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS

11. Rule of law, respect for the Constitution and other laws

11.1 The Parties hereby agree that it is the duty of all political parties and individuals to:

- (a) respect and uphold the Constitution and other laws of the land;
- (b) adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law.

ARTICLE XII FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

12. Freedoms of Assembly and Association

12.1 Recognising the importance of the freedoms of assembly and association in a multi-party democracy and noting that public meetings have to be conducted in a free, peaceful and democratic manner in accordance with the law, the Parties have agreed:-

- (a) to work together in a manner which guarantees the full implementation and realisation of the right to freedom of association and assembly; and
- (b) that the Government shall undertake training programmes, workshops and meetings for the police and other enforcement agencies directed at the appreciation of the right of freedom of assembly and association and the proper interpretation, understanding and application of the provisions of security legislation.

ARTICLE XIII STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS

13. State organs and institutions

13.1 State organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties.

13.2 For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions perform their duties ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and requirements of a multi-party democratic system in which all parties are treated equally, the Parties have agreed that the following steps be taken:-

- (a) that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law and statute law so that there is greater understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic system;
- (b) ensuring that all state organs and institutions strictly observe the principles of the Rule of Law and remain non-partisan and impartial;
- (c) laws and regulations governing state organs and institutions are strictly adhered to and those violating them be penalised without fear or favour; and
- (d) recruitment policies and practices be conducted in a manner that ensures that no political or other form of favouritism is practised.

ARTICLE XIV TRADITIONAL LEADERS

14. Traditional Leaders

14.1 Recognising and acknowledging that traditional leaders are community leaders with equal responsibilities and obligations to all members of their communities regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, race, religion and political affiliation, the Parties hereby agree to:-

- (a) commit themselves to ensuring the political neutrality of traditional leaders; and

(b) call upon traditional leaders not to engage in partisan political activities at national level as well as in their communities.

ARTICLE XV NATIONAL YOUTH TRAINING PROGRAMME

15. National Youth Training Programme

Recognising the desirability of a national youth training programme which inculcates the values of patriotism, discipline, tolerance, non- violence, openness, democracy, equality, justice and respect. Determined to ensure that the National Youth Training Programme raises awareness of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, engenders a spirit of community service, skills development and a commitment to the development of Zimbabwe

15.1 The Parties hereby agree that:-

- (a) all youths regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and political affiliation are eligible to participate in national youth training programmes;
- (b) the National Youth Training Programme must be run in a non- partisan manner and shall not include partisan political material advancing the cause of any political party; and
- (c) while recognising that youths undergoing training at national youth training centres have a right to hold political opinions, they shall not, during the period of their training, collectively and as part of a scheme of the training centre be used or deployed for partisan political work.

ARTICLE XVI HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD ASSISTANCE

16. Humanitarian and food assistance

16.1 In times of need, every Zimbabwean regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion is entitled to request and receive humanitarian and food assistance from the State.

16.2 It is the primary responsibility of the State to ensure that every Zimbabwean who needs humanitarian and food assistance receives it.

16.3 Non-Governmental Organisations involved in giving humanitarian and food assistance shall do so without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion and in doing so, shall not promote or advance the interests of any political party or cause.

16.4 In this regard the Parties hereby agree:

- (a) that in the fulfillment of its obligations above, the Government and all State Institutions and quasi State Institutions shall render humanitarian and food assistance without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation or religion;
- (b) that humanitarian interventions rendered by Non-Governmental Organisations, shall be provided without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion.
- (c) that all displaced persons shall be entitled to humanitarian and food assistance to enable them to return and settle in their original homes and that social welfare organisations shall be allowed to render such assistance as might be required.
- (d) that all NGO's rendering humanitarian and food assistance must operate within the confines of the laws of Zimbabwe.

ARTICLE XVII LEGISLATIVE AGENDA PRIORITIES

17. Legislative agenda

17.1 The Parties hereby agree that:

- (a) the legislative agenda will be prioritized in order to reflect the letter and spirit of this agreement;
- (b) the Government will discuss and agree on further legislative measures which may become necessary to implement the Government's agreed policies and in particular, with a view to entrenching democratic values and practices.

ARTICLE XVIII SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

18. Security of persons and prevention of violence

18.1 Noting the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors, Non-State actors and others in order to resolve political differences and achieve political ends.

18.2 Gravely concerned by the displacement of scores of people after the election of March 29, 2008 as a result of politically motivated violence.

18.3 Recognising that violence dehumanises and engenders feelings of hatred and polarisation within the country.

18.4 Further recognising that violence undermines our collective independence as a people and our capacity to exercise our free will in making political choices.

18.5 The Parties hereby agree:

- (a) to promote the values and practices of tolerance, respect, non- violence and dialogue as means of resolving political differences;
- (b) to renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under whatever name called, as a means of attaining political ends;
- (c) that the Government shall apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book;
- (d) that all political parties, other organisations and their leaders shall commit themselves to do everything to stop and prevent all forms of political violence, including by non-State actors and shall consistently appeal to their members to desist from violence;
- (e) to take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions they control are not engaged in the perpetration of violence.
- (f) that all civil society organisations of whatever description whether affiliated to a political party or not shall not promote or advocate for or use violence or any other form of intimidation or coercion to canvass or mobilise for or oppose any political party or to achieve any political end;
- (g) to work together to ensure the security of all persons and property;
- (h) to work together to ensure the safety of any displaced persons, their safe return home and their enjoyment of the full protection of the law.
- (i) to refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or unfairly undermine each other.
- (j) that while having due regard to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the principles of the rule of law, the prosecuting authorities will expedite the determination as to whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution or keeping on remand of all persons accused of politically related offences arising out of or connected with the March and June 2008 elections.

ARTICLE XIX FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION

19. Freedom of Expression and Communication

Recognising the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the role of the media in a multi-party democracy. Noting that while the provisions of the Broadcasting Services Act permit the issuance of licences, no licences other than to the public broadcaster have been issued. Aware of the emergence of foreign based radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe, some of which are funded by foreign governments. Concerned that the failure to issue licences under the Broadcasting Services Act to alternative broadcasters might have given rise to external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe. Further concerned that foreign government funded external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe are not in Zimbabwe's national interest. Desirous of ensuring the opening up of the air waves and ensuring the operation of as many media houses as possible.

19.1 The Parties hereby agree:-

- (a) that the government shall ensure the immediate processing by the appropriate authorities of all applications for re-registration and registration in terms of both the Broadcasting Services Act as well as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act;

(b) all Zimbabwean nationals including those currently working for or running external radio stations be encouraged to make applications for broadcasting licences, in Zimbabwe, in terms of the law;
(c) that in recognition of the open media environment anticipated by this Agreement, the Parties hereby:-

- (i) call upon the governments that are hosting and/or funding external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to cease such hosting and funding; and
 - (ii) encourage the Zimbabweans running or working for external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe; and
- (d) that steps be taken to ensure that the public media provides balanced and fair coverage to all political parties for their legitimate political activities.
(e) that the public and private media shall refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or that unfairly undermines political parties and other organisations. To this end, the inclusive government shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken to achieve this objective.

ARTICLE XX FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT

20. Framework for a new Government

Acknowledging that we have an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an inclusive government;

Accepting that the formation of such a government will have to be approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise;

Recognising that the formation of such a Government would demonstrate the respect of the Parties for the deeply-felt and immediate hopes and aspirations of the millions of our people.

Determined to carry out sustained work to create the conditions for returning our country to stability and prosperity;

Acknowledging the need for gender parity, particularly the need to appoint women to strategic Cabinet posts;

20.1 The Parties hereby agree that:

20.1.1 Executive Powers and Authority

The Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared among the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as provided for in this Constitution and legislation.

The President of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.

The Prime Minister of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.

The Cabinet of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.

In the exercise of executive authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers must have regard to the principles and spirit underlying the formation of the Inclusive Government and accordingly act in a manner that seeks to promote cohesion both inside and outside government.

20.1.2 The Cabinet

- (a) shall have the responsibility to evaluate and adopt all government policies and the consequential programmes;
- (b) shall, subject to approval by Parliament, allocate the financial resources for the implementation of such policies and programmes;
- (c) shall have the responsibility to prepare and present to Parliament, all such legislation and other instruments as may be necessary to implement the policies and programmes of the National Executive;

- (d) shall, except where the Constitution requires ratification by Parliament, or action by the President, approve all international agreements;
- (e) shall ensure that the state organs, including the Ministries and Departments, have sufficient financial and other resources and appropriate operational capacity to carry out their functions effectively; and
- (f) shall take decisions by consensus, and take collective responsibility for all Cabinet decisions, including those originally initiated individually by any member of Cabinet.
- (g) The President and the Prime Minister will agree on the allocation of Ministries between them for the purpose of day-to-day supervision.

20.1.3 The President

- (a) chairs Cabinet;
- (b) exercises executive authority;
- (c) shall exercise his/her powers subject to the provisions of the Constitution;
- (d) can, subject to the Constitution, declare war and make peace;
- (e) can, subject to the Constitution, proclaim and terminate martial law;
- (f) confers honours and precedence, on the advice of Cabinet;
- (g) grants pardons, respites, substitutes less severe punishment and suspends or remits sentences, on the advice of Cabinet;
- (h) chairs the National Security Council;
- (i) formally appoints the Vice Presidents;
- (j) shall, pursuant to this Agreement, appoint the Prime Minister pending the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no.19 as agreed by the Parties;
- (k) formally appoints Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers in accordance with this agreement;
- (l) after consultation with the Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers, allocates Ministerial portfolios in accordance with this Agreement;
- (m) accredits, receives and recognizes diplomatic agents and consular officers;
- (n) appoints independent Constitutional Commissions in terms of the Constitution;
- (o) appoints service/executive Commissions in terms of the Constitution and in consultation with the Prime Minister;
- (p) in consultation with the Prime Minister, makes key appointments the President is required to make under and in terms of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament;
- (q) may, acting in consultation with the Prime Minister, dissolve Parliament;
- (r) must be kept fully informed by the Prime Minister on the general conduct of the government business and;
- (s) shall be furnished with such information as he/she may request in respect of any particular matter relating to the government, and may advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet in this regard.

20.1.4 The Prime Minister

- (a) chairs the Council of Ministers and is the Deputy Chairperson of Cabinet;
- (b) exercises executive authority;
- (c) shall oversee the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet;
- (d) shall ensure that the policies so formulated are implemented by the entirety of government;
- (e) shall ensure that the Ministers develop appropriate implementation plans to give effect to the policies decided by Cabinet: in this regard, the Ministers will report to the Prime Minister on all issues relating to the implementation of such policies and plans;
- (f) shall ensure that the legislation necessary to enable the government to carry out its functions is in place: in this regard, he/ she shall have the responsibility to discharge the functions of the Leader of Government Business in Parliament;
- (g) shall be a member of the National Security Council;
- (h) may be assigned such additional functions as are necessary further to enhance the work of the Inclusive Government;
- (i) shall, to ensure the effective execution of these tasks, be assisted by Deputy Prime Ministers; and
- (j) shall report regularly to the President and Parliament.

20.1.5 Council of Ministers

To ensure that the Prime Minister properly discharges his responsibility to oversee the implementation of the work of government, there shall be a Council of Ministers consisting of all the Cabinet Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, whose functions shall be:

- (a) to assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions;
- (b) to assist the Prime Minister to attend to matters of coordination in the government;
- (c) to enable the Prime Minister to receive briefings from the Cabinet Committees;
- (d) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters of implementation of Cabinet decisions;
- (e) to receive and consider reports from the Committee responsible for the periodic review mechanism;
- and
- (f) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters related to the periodic review mechanism.

20.1.6 Composition of the Executive

- (1) There shall be a President, which Office shall continue to be occupied by President Robert Gabriel Mugabe.
- (2) There shall be two (2) Vice Presidents, who will be nominated by the President and/or Zanu-PF.
- (3) There shall be a Prime Minister, which Office shall be occupied by Mr Morgan Tsvangirai.
- (4) There shall be two (2) Deputy Prime Ministers, one (1) from MDC-T and one (1) from the MDC-M.
- (5) There shall be thirty-one (31) Ministers, with fifteen (15) nominated by ZANU PF, thirteen (13) by MDC-T and three (3) by MDC-M. Of the 31 Ministers, three (3) one each per Party, may be appointed from outside the members of Parliament. The three (3) Ministers so appointed shall become members of the House of Assembly and shall have the right to sit, speak and debate in Parliament, but shall not be entitled to vote.
- (6) There shall be fifteen (15) Deputy Ministers, with (eight) 8 nominated by ZANU PF, six (6) by MDC-T and one (1) by MDC-M.
- (7) Ministers and Deputy Ministers may be relieved of their duties only after consultation among the leaders of all the political parties participating in the Inclusive Government.

20.1.7 Senate

- (a) The President shall, in his discretion, appoint five (5) persons to the existing positions of Presidential senatorial appointments.
- (b) There shall be created an additional nine (9) appointed senatorial posts, which shall be filled by persons appointed by the President, of whom, 3 will be nominated by ZANU-PF, 3 by MDC-T and 3 by MDC-M.

20.1.8 Filling of vacancies

- (a) In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 and 20.1.7(b) above, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising.

ARTICLE XXI ELECTORAL VACANCIES

21. Electoral Vacancies

Aware of the divisive and often times confrontational nature of elections and by elections; Noting the need to allow this agreement to take root amongst the parties and people of Zimbabwe; and Cognisant of the need to give our people some breathing space and a healing period;

21.1 The Parties hereby agree that for a period of 12 months from the date of signing of this agreement, should any electoral vacancy arise in respect of a local authority or parliamentary seat, for whatever reason, only the party holding that seat prior to the vacancy occurring shall be entitled to nominate and field a candidate to fill the seat subject to that party complying with the rules governing its internal democracy.

ARTICLE XXII IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

22. Implementation mechanisms

22.1 To ensure full and proper implementation of the letter and spirit of this Agreement, the Parties hereby constitute a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee ("JOMIC") to be composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF and four senior members from each of the two MDC Formations. Gender consideration must be taken into account in relation to the composition of JOMIC.

22.2 The committee shall be co-chaired by persons from the Parties.

22.3 The committee shall have the following functions:-

- (a) to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this Agreement;
- (b) to assess the implementation of this Agreement from time to time and consider steps which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of this Agreement in its entirety;
- (c) to receive reports and complaints in respect of any issue related to the implementation, enforcement and execution of this Agreement;
- (d) to serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between the parties; and
- (e) to promote continuing dialogue between the Parties.

22.4 JOMIC shall be the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with this Agreement through JOMIC and to refrain from any conduct which might undermine the spirit of co-operation necessary for the fulfillment of this Agreement.

22.5 The new Government shall ensure that steps are taken to make the security forces conversant with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other laws of Zimbabwe including laws relating to public order and security.

22.6 The implementation of this agreement shall be guaranteed and underwritten by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU.

22.7 The Parties and the new Government shall seek the support and assistance of SADC and the AU in mobilizing the international community to support the new Government's economic recovery plans and programmes together with the lifting of sanctions taken against Zimbabwe and some of its leaders.

22.8 The Parties agree that they shall cause Parliament to amend any legislation to the extent necessary to bring this agreement into full force.

ARTICLE XXIII PERIODIC REVIEW MECHANISM

23. Periodic review mechanism

23.1 Having regard to the Objectives and Priorities of the New Government as set out in this Agreement, the Parties hereby agree that:

- (a) they shall constitute a committee composed of 2 representatives each to review on an annual basis progress on the implementation and achievement of the priorities and objectives set out in this Agreement, namely: Economic (restoration of economic stability and growth, sanctions, land question) Political (new constitution, promotion of equality, national healing and cohesion and unity, external interference, free political activity, rule of law, state organs and institutions, legislative agenda and priorities) Security (security of persons and prevention of violence) and Communication (media and external radio stations); and
- (b) the committee shall make recommendations to the Parties and the new government on any matters relating to this Agreement, more particularly on measures and programmes that may be necessary to take and make to realise full implementation of this Agreement.
- (c) this Agreement and the relationship agreed to hereunder will be reviewed at the conclusion of the constitution-making process.

23.2 The Parties will continually review the effectiveness and any other matter relating to the functioning of the Inclusive Government established by the Constitution in consultation with the Guarantors.

ARTICLE XXIV INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

24. Interim Constitutional amendments

The Parties hereby agree:

24.1 that the constitutional amendments which are necessary for the implementation of this agreement shall be passed by parliament and assented to by the President as Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 19. The

Parties undertake to unconditionally support the enactment of the said Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No 19;

24.2 to include in Constitutional Amendment No19 the provisions contained in Chapters 4 and 13, and section 121 of the draft Constitution that the Parties executed at Kariba on 30 September 2007 (Kariba draft).

ARTICLE XXV COMMENCEMENT

25. Commencement This Agreement shall enter into force upon its signature by the Parties.

In WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have signed this Agreement in the English language, in six identical copies, all texts being equally authentic:

Done at Harare on this 15 day of September, 2008

ROBERT G MUGABE PRESIDENT, ZANU-PF

MORGAN R TSVANGIRAI PRESIDENT, MDC

ARTHUR G 0 MUTAMBARA PRESIDENT, MDC

In WITNESS THEREOF the Facilitator: THABO MBEKI SADC FACILITATOR