CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
AND
THE CONCEPT OF WORSHIP

by

James Moulder

A Thesis Submitted to Rhodes University
For The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 1976

CONTENTS

Preface page i

PART ONE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1

Chapter 1 South African Legislation on Conscientious Objection 2

1 What does service in a noncombatant capacity involve? 3
2 Who qualifies for exemption? 6
3 What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? 11

PART TWO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO COMBAT TRAINING 13

Chapter 2 Conscientious Noncombatants 14

1 Why are conscientious noncombatants not conscientious non-militarists? 15
2 Why are conscientious noncombatants not pacifists? 23
3 Who are conscientious noncombatants? 32

Chapter 3 Selective and Absolute Conscientious Noncombatants 34

1 No government has adopted the theory 36
2 There are too many conflicting versions of the theory 37
3 The theory raises too many conceptual questions 41
4 The theory cannot be applied because of insufficient information 44

PART THREE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS 46

Chapter 4 Conscientious Noncombatant's and Christ's Example 47

1 The conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis 49
2 The conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis 53
3 A defence of the conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis 60

Chapter 5 Worship and the Imitation of Christ 65

1 The origins of appeals to Christ's example 66
2 Some formal features of an appeal to Christ's example 68

AN INTERLUDE THREE PROBLEMS FOR CHRISTIAN CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS 72

PART FOUR CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS WHO WORSHIP CHRIST 74

Chapter 6 The Concept of Deity and the Worship of Christ 75

1 Are there any god? 77
2 Is 'god' a monadic or a dyadic predicate? 83
3 What is involved when one believes in and worships a god? 88
4 Are there any non-idiosyncratic reasons for belief in and worship of a particular god? 90
5 Is it ever appropriate to worship anyone? 92

PART FIVE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMPLIANCE AND ROMANS 13 100

Chapter 7 Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Noncompliance 102

1 In defence of a distinction 103
2 Why are some conscientious objectors not civil disobedients? 110

Chapter 8 Romans 13 and Conscientious Noncompliance 116

1 The context of the problem passage 117
2 What does hupotassesthai mean? 122
3 What does hupotassesthai not mean? 125
4 Christ's slaves and Rome's subjects 128

PART SIX CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMPLIANCE AND THE WORSHIP OF CHRIST 131

Chapter 9 Servile Compliance 133

1 Obedience to authority and conscientious objection in South Africa 133
2 The basic obedience experiment 135

Chapter 10 The Obedience Experiments 140

1 Some unsuccessful attempts to reduce obedience 141
2 The proximity of aggressors and victims 143
3 The proximity of authority and its subjects 144
4 Servile compliance and aggression 146
5 The myth of conscientious refusal 148

Chapter 11 A Prescription for Servile Compliance 151

1 Why is conscientious noncompliance so difficult? 152
2 Is there a prescription for servile compliance? 155
3 Another prescription for servile compliance 156

CONCLUSION AN INCONCLUSIVE CATECHISM ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 160

1 What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? 161
2 Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? 162
3 Why are some conscientious objectors not selective conscientious noncombatants? 164
4 Why do some conscientious noncombatants appeal to Christ's example? 166
5 Does Christ's example support or undermine a refusal to submit to combat training 168
6 Why do some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ? 171
7 Does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance that is supported by Christ's example? 172
8 Is there a prescription for servile compliance? 175
9 Should South African legislation on conscientious objection be amended? 176
10 Is this a catechism on conscientious objection? 181

APPENDIX THE SACC'S STATEMENT ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 183

1 The preamble 183
2 The resolution 185

BIBLIOGRAPHY 186

PREFACE

On 2 August 1974 the South African Council of Churches called on its member Churches to challenge all their members to consider becoming conscientious objectors. (Appendix.) This statement generated a great deal of controversy and hostility. The three South African political parties who were represented in parliament were extremely critical of the statement. And on 13 August 1974 the government began to amend section 121 of the Defence Act so that it prohibits statements of this kind. The final version of the amendment was published on 20 November 1974. The relevant clause reads as follows:

> Any person who uses any language or does any act or thing with intent to recommend, to encourage, aid, incite, instigate, suggest to or otherwise cause any other person or any category of persons or persons in general to refuse or fail to render any such service to which such person or a person of such category or persons in general is or are liable or may become liable in terms of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction of a fine not exceeding five thousand rand or to impri-

> sonment for a period not exceeding six years or to both such fine and imprisonment. (Government Gazette, 20 November 1974.)

Parliament debated both the amendment and the South African Council of Churches' statement at some length. (Hansard, 1974: columns 798-828; 1450-1486; 6749-6766; and 6809-6886. Senate Debates, 1974: columns 3972-4012.) But I will not attempt to rehearse the details of what was said. In general, the debate generated more heat than light. And it tended to obscure the position of those conscientious objectors who hold convictions which allow them to be exempted from combat training in the South African Defence Force.

South Africans are, of course, neither the first nor the only people who have had to wrestle with questions about war and religious beliefs. But the focus of this inquiry is limited to some of the connections between conscientious objection in South Africa and the worship and imitation of Christ. More specifically, at the most general level this essay is an attempt to explore six questions: What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? Why are some Christians conscientious noncombatants? Is it appropriate to worship Christ? Does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance? And is there a prescription for servile compliance?

These are, however, not the only questions which are raised in this essay. Nor are they the only questions which can and need to be asked. But they are the questions which interest me. In addition, they have not received as much attention as they deserve.

The questions I have listed only hint at the ground I have covered. Anyone who wishes to look at the wood before he examines the trees, should read the conclusion. There I give a summary account of where I have tried to go and how I have tried to get there. On the other hand, those who prefer to explore a wood by exploring the trees need to begin at the beginning.

This essay has grown out of a number of earlier attempts to grapple with some of the questions which arise in the Church's debate about conscientious objection and war. More specifically, in the following papers I have discussed some of the topics which are explored at greater length in this essay:

Conscientious Objection, Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 10 (March, 1975) 7-16. (Chapters 1, 2 and 10)

Are Some Wars Just?, Pro Veritate, 14 (May, 1975) 4-5. (Chapter 3)

Conscientious Objection and the Imitation of Christ, Pro Veritate, 14 (April, 1975) 12-13. (Chapters 4 and 5)

What counts as a god?, Sophia, 13 (1974) 5-18. (Chapter 6)

In addition, material which I used in the following papers have helped me to shape various arguments in this essay:

A Canon on the Cross: a critique of Canon Burgess Carr's theology of violence, South African Outlook, 104 (1974) 97-98.

Kafka's Courier's: further reflections on Burgess Carr's theology of violence, South African Outlook, 104 (1974) 165-168.

Where do we go from Hammanskraal?: an evaluation of the SACC's resolution on conscientious objection, Pro Veritate, 13 (September, 1974) 11-14.

PART ONE

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Conscientious objector can be used either as a descriptive phrase or as a legal phrase. When it is used as a descriptive phrase, it is possible to specify a completely general criterion for its application. It designates anyone who, because of his moral, political or religious convictions, refuses to comply with a more or less direct administrative order to submit to combat training in his country's defence force. In this sense, therefore, a conscientious objector is merely a special kind of conscientious noncompliant. (Rawls, 1973: 364 and 368.)

Sometimes, however, conscientious objector is used as a legal phrase. And then it designates someone who has been granted legal exemption from combat training. Unfortunately, when conscientious objector is used as a legal phrase it is not possible to specify completely general criteria for its application. And this is impossible because who does and who does not qualify for legal exemption from combat training varies from country to country. It all depends on the provisions which are embodied in a particular country's defence act. (Prasad and Smythe, 1968, is a useful world survey of legislation which exempts people from combat training in their country's defence force. Sibley and Jacob, 1952: 2-17, compares the legislation which regulated conscientious objection in Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand and the United States of America during World Wars I and II.)

For convenience, I will use conscientious objector and conscientious objection as descriptive phrases. And I will use these phrases as descriptive labels because I will sometimes place the South African discussion of conscientious objection in a larger framework. For the same reason, therefore, I will use conscientious noncombatant and conscientious noncombatancy for my discussion of those people who hold convictions which allow them to qualify for exemption from combat training in the South African Defence Force because of their conscientious objections to war.

The position of those conscientious objectors who are conscientious noncombatants has not received the attention it deserves. I will, therefore, concentrate on conscientious objectors of this kind and try to clarify and defend some of their beliefs. More specifically, in this part of my essay I want to discuss the legislation which governs conscientious objection in South Africa.

CHAPTER 1

SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

The Defence Act of 1957 is the Principal Act which regulates the system of selective conscription into the South African Defence Force or the South African Police. According to section 5 of this Act, the South African Defence Force consists of the Permanent Force, the Citizen Force and the Commandos. Section 3 of the Act (as amended by section 2 of Act No. 77 of 1963 and section 3 of Act No. 85 of 1967) stipulates what this form of compulsory national service involves. Firstly,

> every citizen between his seventeenth and his sixty-fifth year, both included, shall be liable to render service in the South African Defence Force.

Secondly, the South African Defence Force or any portion or member thereof may be employed

(a) on service in defence of the Republic;

(b) on service in the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Republic;

(c) on service in the preservation of life, health or property or the maintenance of essential services; and

(d) on such police duties as may be prescribed.

Section 67(3) deals with those people who have conscientious objections to war. It stipulates that an officer who has to allot people to the Citizen Force, the Commandos or the South African Police

> shall as far as may be practicable allot any person, who to his knowledge bona fide belongs and adheres to a recognised religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war, to a unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity. (Act No. 44 of 1957 as amended by section 40 of Act No. 85 of 1967.)

This section of the Act contains two phrases which are problematic: How does one establish that a denomination is a 'denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war'? And what is involved when someone is alloted to 'a unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity'? These questions are worth some discussion because they help to clarify the official interpretation of section 67(3). And so they help to clarify the present government's policy on conscientious objection. I will, therefore, devote some time to each of these problems and especially to the way in which these phrases are interpreted by the Minister of Defence on behalf of his Department.

1. What does service in a noncombatant capacity involve?

What is involved when section 67(3) of the Defence Act is employed to allot someone to 'a unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity'? At one level the phrase in question is clear enough: someone who is exempted from combat training in terms of this section of the Act has 'to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity'. On the other hand, and from a conscientious objector's point of view, these words are open either to a strong or to a weak interpretation. On the strong interpretation, someone who is exempted

from combat training in the South African Defence Force in terms of section 67(3) must be posted to a noncombatant unit such as the medical corps or a military hospital. On the weak interpretation, however, he may be posted to a noncombatant unit; but he need not be. What may happen instead is that he is attached to a combatant unit in a noncombatant capacity. For example, he may be required to be a clerk in an infantry battalion or in a fighter squadron. (Hansard, 1957: columns 1884-1885.)

These two interpretations of what is involved in an allotment to 'a unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity' surfaced in the parliamentary debate about the Bill which subsequently became the Defence Act of 1957. The members of the Select Committee were in favour of the strong interpretation. Their version of this phrase stipulated that a bona fide member of a religious denomination of the kind envisaged in this section should be alloted to a noncombatant unit of the South African Defence Force. And some of the people who participated in the debate during the Committee Stage of the Bill continued to speak about noncombatant units. (Hansard, 1957: columns 1877 and 1880 contain some examples.)

On the other hand, F.C. Erasmus, who was then the Minister of Defence, preferred to speak about service in a noncombatant capacity. In addition, he even refused to guarantee that someone who was posted to a combatant unit in a noncombatant capacity would not have 'to handle a rifle in taking part in exercises'. (Hansard, 1957: columns 1883-1884.) At the end of the debate the Minister's argument prevailed and noncombatant capacity rather than noncombatant unit was employed in this section of the Act.

But although this phrase was introduced into the Defence Act on the basis of arguments which placed the weak interpretation on the words in question, the present Minister of Defence favours the strong interpretation. In the 1970 parliamentary debate on the Defence Budget he reported that he had discussed the question with the leaders of 'a number of religious denominations whose tenets forbid participation in war'. They had informed him that their members were opposed to being posted to combat units and to training with arms. In the light

of this discussion the Minister gave his Department's interpretation of this section of the Act:

> It is the duty of the Department of Defence to give effect to the provisions of the Defence Act and in the implementation of section 67(3) of the Act the following policy has been formulated, viz. -
>
> (a) Conscientious objectors are alloted to noncombatant units.
>
> (b) They are trained without weapons. (Hansard, 1970: column 2851. Compare Hansard 1972: columns 2254-2255 and 1974: column 6848.)

This discussion of a question which is raised by section 67(3) of the Defence Act does not generate an exhaustive description of the kind of conscientious objection which is allowed by South African legislation and by the present government's policy on those who refuse to submit to combat training. On the other hand, the Minister's statement does clarify one aspect of the matter.

The Minister's statement that it is his Department's policy to allot conscientious objectors to noncombatant units and to exempt them from training with arms is a compromise between those conscientious objectors who request a total exemption from national service and those members of parliament who tend to equate national service and service in a combatant capacity. Many Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, refuse to submit to any form of national service. In an interview which took place towards the end of 1969 a prominent leader of the denomination was asked this question:

> Would you personally have any objection to performing service as, for example, an agricultural officer, a fireman, a hospital aide or a traffic officer during the nine months or year in which you would have to do your compulsory national service, on the explicit condition that it would have nothing whatsoever to do with the Defence Force and that you would not have to handle weapons at all?

His reply to this question was brief and unqualified:

> I would have objections, because I would regard it as an alternative to military service. (Hansard, 1972: columns 2253-2254.)

At the other extreme, some members of parliament tend to equate national service and service in a combatant capacity. For example, in the 1967 parliamentary debate on section 67(3), H.J. Bronkhorst recorded his objection to this clause:

> I personally do not like the proposed section 67(3)..... In this clause certain persons who belong to certain religious denominations are exempted from military service. Supposing we all join those churches, who is going to do the fighting? Are we all going to sit back peeling potatoes and cleaning camps? (Hansard, 1967: column 7497.)

The Minister's interpretation of what is involved when someone is alloted to 'a unit where such person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity' is an attempt to find a compromise between these two extremes. On the one hand, his interpretation recognises that the essence of the position held by many, and perhaps the majority, of South African conscientious objectors is a refusal to submit to combat training. (Hansard, 1970: column 2851 and 1972: columns 2254-2255.) And so, when section 67(3) is applied to a conscientious objector, the person concerned is alloted to a noncombatant unit and exempted from having to train with weapons. On the other hand, the Minister's interpretation does not conflict with the government's policy that although a person's national service must be performed 'within a military context', it may be performed within a noncombatant unit and in a noncombatant capacity. (Hansard, 1972: column 7977. Compare Hansard, 1972: columns 7971-7972.) In other words: in terms of section 67(3) an officer who has to register people for their compulsory national service, is allowed to exempt a conscientious objector from service in a combatant unit and from all forms of combat training. But he is not allowed to exempt him from national service as such; nor is he allowed to allot him an alternative form of service in a State Department which is not controlled by the Department of Defence.

2. Who qualifies for exemption?

How does one establish that a denomination is a 'denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war'?

This question is generated by the fact that section 67(3) of the Defence Act seems to apply to conscientious objectors who belong to a denomination which has expressed its opposition to war in a credal or doctrinal statement. And so the phrase suggests that an officer who has to decide whether or not an application for exemption from combat training is covered by section 67(3) simply has to consult the credal or doctrinal statements made by the denomination to which the applicant belongs. Unfortunately, the task of an officer who has to register people for training in the Defence Force is not as simple as this procedure suggests. For example, it is obvious that it applies to a member of the Mennonite Church. But it is not at all obvious whether it does or does not apply, say, to a member of the Anglican or the Roman Catholic Church.

It is obvious that the Mennonite Church is a 'denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war'. Official statements which record the opposition of Mennonites to all forms of military training can be traced back to the Confession of Faith which they adopted at Dortrecht, Holland, in 1632. (Hershberger, 1969: 319-320.) Similarly, the Declaration of Christian Faith and Commitment with Respect to Peace, War and Nonresistance which was adopted by the Mennonite General Conference at Goshen, Indiana, on 23 August 1951 contains a forthright and unequivocal statement of the Mennonite position:

> we can have no part in carnal warfare or conflict between nations, nor in strife between classes, groups, or individuals, and ... we can therefore not accept military service, either combatant or noncombatant or preparation or training therefor in any form. (Hershberger, 1969:336.)

Things are much more complicated, however, when one turns to the official statements of the Anglican Church. On the one hand, the Thirty-nine Articles which the Church adopted in 1571 declare that

> Christian men may wear weapons and serve in lawful wars (justa bella), if they are required to do so by the law of the land. (Moss, 1961: 37. Gibson, 1928: 759-760 contains a more literal translation of the original Latin version of Article 37.)

On the other hand, in 1938 and 1948 the Lambeth Conference, speaking for the whole Anglican Communion, declared that

> war as a method of settling international disputes is incompatible with the teaching and example of Our Lord Jesus Christ, (Garbett, 1952: 291.)

Although the Lambeth Resolution on War is more forthright than the statement in the Thirty-nine articles, neither of these pronouncements help an officer who has to register people for their compulsory national service to decide whether or not the Anglican Church is a 'denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war'. Article 37 of the Thirty-nine articles is complicated because it refers to lawful wars (justa bella). And the Archbishop of York first quotes the Lambeth Resolution on War and then observes that

> the great body of Churchmen, both clergy and laity, hold that the position and the arguments of the pacifist are unsound. Carried away by hatred of war, he refuses to see that peace need not be the greatest good nor war the greatest of all evils. (Garbett, 1952: 292-295.)

The position of conscientious objectors who belong to the Roman Catholic Church is not equivalent either to the position of Mennonite or to the position of Anglican objectors to war. On the one hand, by no stretch of the imagination or of the historical data can the Roman Catholic Church be classified with the historic peace churches such as the Church of the Brethren, the Mennonites and the Society of Friends. On the other hand, Roman Catholic moral philosophers have developed a theory of a just war which, like most of the Church's other moral and doctrinal teaching, has its roots in the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). And, unlike the Archbishop of York's rejection of the Lambeth Resolution on War, the Roman Catholic hierarchy has never rejected the theory of a just war. On the contrary, they have encouraged their members both to fight in those wars which are just and to refuse to fight in those which are not. (Sibley and Jacob, 1952: 31.)

According to this strand of Roman Catholic moral teaching, only some wars are just. Somewhat roughly, a just war is a war

> which was declared by a public authority, which was waged by methods capable of making distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, which gave reasonable promise of creating a situation morally better after the war than before the war, and which promised success at a cost not disproportionate to the results expected. (Sibley and Jacob, 1952: 30. Chapter 3 of this essay contains a detailed discussion of questions generated by this kind of attempt to specify which wars are just.)

In addition, Roman Catholic moral teaching emphasises that the individual member of the Church has to decide whether a particular war does or does not satisfy these conditions; and, therefore, whether or not it is a war in which he should serve as a combatant.

Although there are not many Roman Catholics who are conscientious objectors because of their Church's theory of a just war, some of them do appeal to this strand in their tradition to explain why they refuse to submit to combat training. And they refuse to submit to combat training because they are convinced that no modern war could be just. More specifically, they argue that modern methods of waging war; the tendency of states not to declare war; and the great uncertainty about the possibility of creating an improved social situation once the war has ended, make it impossible for a modern war to satisfy the criteria of a just war.

This way of applying the theory of a just war is not widespread among Roman Catholics. But the Church's hierarchy has never condemned this appeal to and application of its offical teaching on war. In fact, Archbishop Denis Hurley has argued that the guerrilla type civil war in which some South African Catholics are involved does not satisfy the criteria of a just war. In particular, therefore, he has challenged Roman Catholics to consider whether or not their Church's teaching about war does not require them to refuse to submit to combat training in the South African Defence Force. (Sunday Tribune, 15 September 1974; Southern Cross, 22 September 1974.)

In spite of all this, however, it is not at all obvious that section 67(3) may be employed to allot a conscientious objector who is a Roman Catholic to a noncombatant unit of the South African Defence Force. And so, in the face of all this uncertainty about which denominations

are, and which denominations are not, denominations 'by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war', the Minister of Defence has announced that it is his Department's policy to grant all applications under section 67(3) of the Defence Act. And in the first six months of 1974 at least two people who do not belong to churches which have adopted official statements about war of the kind exemplified by the Mennonites were exempted from combat training under this section of the Act. (Hansard, 1974: question 20. Compare the Minister's statement in Hansard, 1972: columns 7969-7970.)

Although the Minister's interpretation of section 67(3) is more liberal than the letter of the law, it does not seem to have altered the fact that someone may be assigned to a noncombatant unit under this section of the Act only if his religious convictions require him to refuse to submit to combat training. And this fact does not seem to have altered because in 1974 each of the 27 persons who were exempted from combat training in terms of section 67(3) belonged to a religious denomination. One of them belonged to the Apostolic Faith Mission; one to the Assembly of God; one to the Free Churches; one to the Gurumaghara; two to the Jehovah's Witnesses; one to the Plymouth Brethren; and eighteen were members of the Seventh Day Adventists.

This limitation on the grounds for exemption from combat training in the South African Defence Force has always been recognised and maintained by members of parliament. For example, during the first debate on conscientious objection in a South African parliament, G.A. Louw observed that, if the proposed clause 58(6) (d) applied to anyone at all, then it applied not because of 'conscientious objection, but of religious conviction'. (Hansard, 1912: column 2212.) Similarly, in the parliamentary debate on the Bill which subsequently became the Defence Act of 1957, L. Lovell regretted the fact that parliament was not prepared to exempt someone from combat training except on religious grounds. (Hansard, 1957: column 1876. Compare Hansard, 1957: column 1882.)

In other word: it is something of a misnomer to use <u>conscientious objector</u>, and even <u>conscientious noncombatant</u>, when one is talking

about someone who may be alloted to a noncombatant unit under section 67(3) of the Defence Act. And these phrases are misnomers because the Minister's interpretation of this section of the Act does not seem to permit an officer who has to register people for their compulsory national service to assign someone to a noncombatant unit because of his conscientious moral or political convictions about war.

On the other hand, the Minister's liberal interpretation of the letter of this law is not insignificant. Many denominations which are obviously denominations 'by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war' do not confine their opposition to combat training and service. They also encourage their members to be pacifists; that is, to renounce every form of physical violence and force. But some conscientious objectors are not pacifists. (Sibley and Jacob, 1952: 5-6 and 12.) Nevertheless, because of the Minister's interpretation of section 67(3) of the Defence Act, they may be exempted from combat training provided they are prepared to be alloted to a noncombatant unit.

3. What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow?

This discussion of what service in a noncombatant capacity involves and who qualifies for exemption provides us with a bald characterisation of the kind of conscientious objection which South African law allows. More specifically, the discussion of what service in a noncombatant capacity involves, underlines the fact that section 67(3) of the Defence Act allows someone to be exempted from combat training only if he does not refuse to be alloted to a noncombatant unit of the South African Defence Force. The discussion of who qualifies for exemption is more complicated. At one level the Minister's interpretation of section 67(3) is clear enough: someone may be exempted under this section of the Act even if he does not belong to a denomination that has adopted credal or doctrinal statements which encourage its members to be pacifists and, therefore, to refuse to submit to combat training. At another level, however, it is not obvious that the Minister's liberal interpretation of section 67(3) extends to those conscientious objectors who do not have religious convictions which

encourage them to refuse to submit to combat training. For convenience, therefore, I will simply assume that the Minister's interpretation is not this wide. In other words: I will simply assume that this section of the Act may be employed to allot someone to a noncombatant unit of the South African Defence Force only if he has religious convictions which encourage him to be a conscientious objector.

These are, of course, fairly stark statements about the law and the policy which governs conscientious objection in South Africa. But they are sufficient to establish two things. Firstly, these statements are sufficient for a definition of a conscientious noncombatant; that is, for a definition of the kind of conscientious objector who qualifies for exemption from combat training in the South African Defence Force. In other words and quite explicitly: a conscientious objector who is a South African citizen may be classified as a conscientious noncombatant even if he is not a pacifist. But he may be classified as a conscientious noncombatant only if he satisfies two conditions. He is not someone who refuses to do any military service whatsoever. And he is someone who has religious convictions which require him to refuse to submit to combat training in the South African Defence Force.

Secondly, this somewhat stark characterisation of a conscientious noncombatant raises two interesting and complex questions: Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? And why are some Christians conscientious noncombatants? These are not merely academic questions. And it is impossible to keep them in absolutely watertight compartments. But before I consider why some Christians are conscientious noncombatants I want to explain why some conscientious objectors are only conscientious noncombatants.

PART TWO

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO COMBAT TRAINING

In this part of my essay I want to explain why some conscientious objectors are only conscientious noncombatants. And the easiest way to do so is to explain why some conscientious objectors are neither pacifists nor conscientious nonmilitarists. (Chapter 2 of this essay.)

Although these explanations help to clarify the conscientious noncombatant's position, they do not illuminate the difference between an absolute and a selective refusal to submit to combat training. Absolute conscientious noncombatants refuse to submit to combat training for any war whatsoever. But selective conscientious noncombatants refuse to submit to combat training only if they are convinced that the war for which they are being conscripted is unjust. And so, becuase I am interested in the absolute conscientious noncombatant's position, I want to explain why they do not appeal to a theory of a just war to defend their refusal to submit to combat training. (Chapter 3 of this essay.)

CHAPTER 2

CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS

The question, Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants?, generates at least two others: Why are conscientious noncombatants prepared to serve in a noncombatant unit of the South African Defence Force? And why are conscientious noncombatants not pacifists? The first question arises because some conscientious objectors are not prepared to submit to any kind of military service whatsoever. And so they fail to qualify for exemption from combat training under section 67(3) of the Defence Act. The second question arises because conscientious noncombatants are sometimes bombarded with criticisms which operate on the assumption that anyone who refuses to submit to combat training is a pacifist. I will, therefore, try to clarify this misunderstanding of the conscientious noncombatant's position. More specifically, I will first explain why conscientious noncombatants are not conscientious nonmilitarists. And then I will explain why conscientious noncombatants are not pacifist.

1. Why are conscientious noncombatants not conscientious nonmilitarists?

In general, a conscientious objector is someone who refuses to submit to combat training in his country's defence force. But conscientious objectors do not agree on what this refusal involves. Some are convinced that it requires them to refuse to submit only to every kind of combat training. In addition and more positively, many of them are convinced that the medical corps is the only noncombatant unit of their country's defence force in which they should be prepared to train and to serve in time of war. This represents my own position on military service. For this reason, and because their position has not received as much philosophical scrutiny as it deserves, I will concentrate on conscientious noncombatants of this kind. And so, in all that follows I will reserve the term for someone who refuses to submit to combat training but who, if it is required of him, is prepared to train and to serve in the medical corps of his country's defence force.

On the other hand, some conscientious objectors are convinced that their refusal to submit to combat training requires them to refuse to submit to every kind of military service whatsoever. For example, in Peace, War and Military Service the Mennonite General Conference which assembled on 25 and 26 August 1937 adopted the following statement:

> We believe...that we cannot bear arms personally nor aid in any way those who do so, and that as a consequence we cannot accept service under the military arm of the government, whether direct or indirect, combatant or noncombatant, which ultimately involves participation in any operation aiding or abetting war and thus causes us to be responsible for the destruction of the life, health and property of our fellow men. (Hershberger, 1969: 323.)

For convenience, I will call conscientious objectors who share the convictions which are expressed in this Mennonite statement conscientious nonmilitarists.

Why is no conscientious noncombatant a conscientious nonmilitarist? A short, straightforward answer is that a conscientious noncombatant is able to answer a familiar and important criticism of conscientious ob-

jectors. Although these criticisms are often advanced as though they apply to all conscientious objectors, as a matter of fact they apply only to conscientious nonmilitarists. On the other hand, the latter often accuse conscientious noncombatants of being inconsistent. But this answer to the question is too brief to be helpful. And so I will elaborate on what I am driving at in some detail.

Those who are critical of conscientious objectors claim that they enjoy all the advantages and privileges of citizenship but refuse to accept the burden of training to defend, or actually defending, their country in a time of war. In the words of Archbishop Randall Davidson when he was asked whether conscientious objection was incompatible with membership of the Church of England:

> they claim for themselves and their property the protection of a civilised order of society while repudiating its corresponding claim upon their services. (Bell, 1938: 818.)

In addition, it is often suggested that conscientious objectors are cowards; or that it is unfair of them to expect other people to provide them with the security for which they are not prepared to fight.

Although this line of argument crops up with monotonous regularity in discussions of conscientious objection, I will illustrate the claim with three extracts from various South African parliamentary debates on the subject. (There are nonparliamentary examples in Garbett, 1952: 292-295; Thielicke, 1969: 519-538; and Hershberger, 1969: 313-314.) For example, in the first parliamentary debate on conscientious objection, E.H. Walton argued that a conscientious objector

> was neglecting his first duty as a citizen, which was to defend his country in time of danger, and he had no right to call upon his countrymen to fight his battles. (Hansard, 1912: column 2211.)

More than half a century later, H.J. Bronkhorst used a rhetorical question to make very much the same point as Walton had made:

> Why should my son be obliged to go forward and face the

> enemy when other young men stay at home? (Hansard, 1967: column 7497.)

Finally, in 1972 a passionate echo of Archbishop Davidson's point occurred in a speech by G. de V. Morrison:

> We cannot allow those who do not want to serve the country to hide behind such smoke screens as conscientious objection....People who want to enjoy the privileges, and above all the security of a state, also naturally have specific responsibilities, and one of these concerns the defence of that particular country against the forces of the aggressor and the terrorist. (Hansard, 1972: column 2246.)

Conscientious noncombatants need not be browbeaten by criticisms of this kind. There are at least three replies which they can make to these objections. But two of these are not available to the conscientious nonmilitarist.

Firstly, all conscientious objectors can reply that these objections proceed on the assumption that a nation only has a choice between military defence and capitulation. But it is not at all obvious that this is the only alternative which is available to a nation. A modest but increasing number of scholars have investigated the potential of large-scale, well-organized resistance and non-cooperation by a civilian population as a means of national defence. For example, Jerome D. Frank (1967), Adam Roberts (1969) and Gene Sharp (1970) have all argued that civilian or non-military defence is a realistic, hard-headed option. And Martin Benjamin has argued that a survey of small-scale, often spontaneous instances of nonmilitary resistance of the kind which occurred during the German occupation of Norway suggests that

> the choice before us, then, need not be between resistance and capitulation; rather it may well be between continued reliance on traditional military means of defense and reliance on nonmilitary means of defense. (1972-73: 197.)

The 'pragmatic pacifism' which Benjamin and others have advocated may strike the conscientious objector's critics as an ineffective means of national self-defence. On the other hand, military means of defence also do not guarantee success. As a matter of fact, in his monumental

study of war, Quincy Wright has concluded that on a significant number of occasions, including the American Civil War and World Wars I and II,

> the side best prepared when the war began lost the war. (1965: 1519-1520.)

But be all this as it may. This is not the best place to become involved in the rival merits of military and nonmilitary means of national defence. The important point is simply that the usual objections to the conscientious objector's position proceed on a controversial assumption. And so, the accusation that someone who refuses to submit to combat training is not prepared to defend his country becomes untenable. At best, these accusations may be reduced to the objection that a conscientious objector is sufficiently naive or utopian, or even ignorant enough, to believe that there is a viable alternative to a military and overtly combatant system of national self-defence.

Secondly, even if they grant the equation of military service and service in defence of one's country, conscientious noncombatants can argue that it is wrong to equate military service with service in a combatant unit. And they can quote the Minister of Defence on this point:

> We have introduced a system of national service; it is not only military service; it is more than military service. National service, as we are implementing it in this country today, with all the activities related to it, is much more than just military service. (Hansard, 1972: column 7971. Compare Hansard, 1972: column 5829 and M. Alexander, Hansard, 1912: column 2210.)

In other words: a medical corps and other noncombatant units are essential ingredients of any contemporary defence force. And so it is simply not true that someone who is only prepared to train and to serve in the medical corps of his country's defence force has refused to accept the burden and the responsibility of contributing towards his country's defence. But if this point is not obvious, conscientious noncombatants need not rely on their own evaluation of the significance of service in a medical corps. For example, during the 1976 parliamentary debate on the Defence Budget, J.J. Vilonel drew attention to

the fact that the South African Medical Corps had a shortage of medical orderlies amongst the national servicemen. Some of his observations are an effective rebuttal of the claim that conscientious noncombatants shirk the burdens of citizenship even though they claim its advantages and privileges:

> It would be ridiculous to argue about which division of the Defence Force is really the most important. The fact is that they are all important and that they are all essential. One important and essential division of the Defence Force is the Medical Corps. Not only does this corps play a vital role with regard to the health and physical preparedness of our men, but also with regard to the services it provides to the dependants, its welfare work and its role in regard to the wounded in wartime. (Hansard, 1976: column 6243 and 6245.)

Thirdly, when conscientious objectors are being criticised there is often the suggestion that it is cowardice or fear which motivates their refusal to submit to combat training. (For example, Hershberger, 1969: 313-314.) The best response to this suggestion is a reminder. A member of the medical corps and a member of a combatant unit run the same risks of finding themselves in a dangerous and potentially fatal situation on the battlefield. In other words: a conscientious noncombatant does not refuse to enter any battlefield on which his country's defence force is involved. He simply refuses to go there bearing arms. And so he runs as much risk as anyone who is a combatant. For example, during the Nigerian Civil War fourteen members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were killed while on duty. (Bailey, 1972: 71.)

These three arguments are sufficient to rebut the standard criticisms of conscientious objection and especially of those conscientious objectors who are conscientious noncombatants. At the same time, however, conscientious nonmilitarists employ the conscientious noncombatant's observations about the important place which a medical corps has in a country's defence force to accuse him of inconsistency. For example, Guy Hershberger has levelled this kind of criticism at the conscientious noncombatant:

> there is ultimately no such thing as noncombatant military service. Every man in the army is essential for the opera-

> tion of the machine of destruction. Therefore, every man in the army is for practical purposes, a combatant. To attempt a distinction between combatant and noncombatant military service is to attempt a distinction without a difference. (1969: 267. Compare 1969: 315-316. The emphasis is Hershberger's.)

Hershberger's remarks suggest that it is inconsistent to refuse to submit to combat training but to be prepared to train and to serve in the medical corp or some other noncombatant unit of the South African Defence Force. But what does this suggestion involve? And how does the inconsistency arise? If Hershberger's accusation has any force, then it is because of the suggestion that someone who serves in a military hospital or in a medical corps contributes to the physical well-being and to the morale of the combatant members of his country's defence force. And so he contributes to the efficiency of that force and especially to its effectiveness as a fighting unit. (Compare Hansard, 1976: column 6243 and Hershberger, 1969: 315.)

This fact must be granted. On the other hand, conscientious noncombatants can argue that Hershberger has failed to notice that a modern state is a corporate and totalitarian entity in the sense that, to a greater or lesser extent, there is a tendency towards centralised control and governmental management of the economy and of the country's economic military preparation. (Wright, 1969: 1008.) In addition, the economy of any technologically sophisticated nation is both extremely diversified and highly intergrated:

> Under centralized direction whole populations tend to be involved in preparation and support for modern wars. Entire economies may be mobilized, and the distinction between military and civilian increasingly breaks down. (Seifert, 1967: 249.)

But once this state of affairs is recognised for what it is, it is difficult for a conscientious nonmilitarist to guarantee that he is not, at least in some degree, indirectly involved in work which contributes to the efficiency of his country's defence force. In fact, a conscientious noncombatant can argue that his position is superior to the one which the conscientious nonmilitarist has adopted in the sense that he has a better idea of what his work in a medical corps involves. But

be this as it may. The important point is that, national and international economic arrangements being what they are, it is difficult for anyone to guarantee that he is not indirectly involved in work which contributes to some nation's military efficiency. And since this is so, conscientious nonmilitarists and conscientious noncombatants are in the same kind of boat. In addition, it is difficult to appreciate some of the distinctions which conscientious nonmilitarists draw.

For example, Hershberger advises conscientious nonmilitarists 'to produce nothing which is war material'. On the other hand, he defends conscientious nonmilitarists who are farmers; or who are prepared to work as farmer labourers on civilian controlled agricultural projects. He rests his case on the fact that the army uses only a small percentage of the food which a nation produces. Furthermore,

> food is not war material; its only purpose is to sustain human life.

And so he concludes that if a portion of food grown by a conscientious nonmilitarist is used by persons who are in the combatant units of an army, 'the responsibility is with them and not with the farmer'. (Hershberger, 1969: 317.)

Similarly, Hershberger applauds the consistency of some conscientious nonmilitarists who, during World War I, refused to serve in military hospitals which were devoted exclusively to the care of sick and wounded soldiers who would not be returned to military duties. (1969: 118-119.) At the same time, however, he is not opposed to conscientious nonmilitarists who are prepared to serve in a civilian hospital as an alternative to military service. (1969: 316.)

These two cases illustrate very clearly why conscientious noncombatants prefer to accept the clean compromise which service in a medical corps provides. They are simply not impressed by the casuistry that surrounds the attempts to find a form of employment which guarantees them immunity from the charge that they are being inconsistent when they both refuse to submit to combat training but agree to

submit to training and service in the medical corps of their country's defence force. More specifically, if anything is a distinction without a difference, then the distinction between a farmer and a noncombatant cook is. Both of them can argue that 'food is not war material; its only purpose is to sustain life'. In other words: it is difficult to understand why Hershberger attaches so much importance to the fact that a farmer's contribution to the efficiency of his country's defence force is less certain and less direct than a noncombatant cook's contribution.

When it comes to the discussion of service in a hospital, things are actually the reverse of Hershberger's evaluation of them. The people who passed through the military hospital in question did not return to any form of military service once they were discharged. On the other hand, there was no guarantee that a conscientious nonmilitarist who worked in a civilian hospital as a male nurse, or as a medical orderly, was not nursing people who subsequently became liable, or even volunteered, for some form of combatant service. In any case, both civilian hospitals and military hospitals try to save people's lives and to restore them to good health. And therefore conscientious noncombatants can redeploy one of Hershberger's arguments to make the point that when they are employed on medical work their only aim is to sustain human life. In addition, they can argue that neither the personnel of a civilian nor the personnel of a military medical unit can be held responsible for the fact that someone whom they have nursed decides to continue, or to submit to, training in a combatant unit.

These comments on Hershberger's suggestion that conscientious noncombatants are inconsistent have an <u>ad hominem</u> air about them. Firstly, they do nothing to remove the claim that conscientious noncombatants have arrived at a compromise between total renunciation of military service and an acceptance of combat training and service. In fact, this kind of reply to his accusation underlines the fact that the conscientious noncombatant's position rests on a compromise. Secondly, these comments do not demonstrate that conscientious noncombatants do not contribute anything at all to the efficiency of their country's defence force. What they demonstrate instead is that conscientious nonmili-

tarists cannot easily guarantee, if they can do so at all, that the work in which they are employed does not raise similiar questions and criticisms. Thirdly, this discussion of Hershberger's criticism of conscientious noncombatants suggest that they are not opposed to war and to violence for the same reasons and to the same extent as he is. In other words: the ad hominem air of my comments on behalf of conscientious noncombatants suggests that it is necessary to explain why they do not share Hershberger's general opposition to every form of conflict and coercion. And this suggestion can best be implemented by trying to explain why no conscientious noncombatant.is a pacifist.

2. Why are conscientious noncombatants not pacifists?

It is easier to ask this question than to answer it because there is no established definition of a pacifist. (Yoder, 1971 identifies 25 types of religious pacifism.) In addition, even if one adopts a particular account of what pacifism is as a working definition, then one still has a problem. The problem one has to face is that some of the key words which are used in the definition one has adopted are themselves in need of a great deal of discussion and clarification. But because I am anxious to use this essay to defend and to clarify the conscientious noncombatant's position there is not a great deal to be gained from a lengthy search for an adequate definition of what he is not.

I will, therefore, do four other things instead. I will first simply list some attempts to say what a pacifist is. I will then discuss and dismiss the least satisfactory of these definitions. When this has been done, I will employ what seems to be the most satisfactory definition to develop my own characterisation of a pacifist. And finally, I will use my definition to explain why no conscientious noncombatant is a pacifist in this sense of the word.

Here are four attempts to provide a definition of a pacifist:

A. Someone who is convinced that it is possible for nations to

settle all their disputes without waging war. (Hershberger, 1969: 174. Compare the Oxford English Dictionary's entry under pacifism.)

B. Someone who believes that one ought not to kill or to wage war. (Holmes, 1971: 117.)

C. Someone who confines himself to those methods of pressure which are coercive in a non-injurious way or which are wholly non-coercive. (Cadoux, 1940: 65-66.)

D. Someone who renounces all coercion, even nonviolent coercion. (Hershberger, 1969: 173. Compare Narveson, 1964-65: 260.)

The first of these four definitions of a pacifist is the least satisfactory. And so it does not need to be discussed at great length. Anyone who is convinced that nations can be persuaded to reduce their armaments, to establish an international police force, and to settle all their disputes by arbitration, exposes himself to the criticism that he has an over optimistic view of human nature. A conscientious noncombatant, however, need not expose himself to this line of attack. His refusal to submit to any kind of combat training does not entail the conviction that it is possible to eliminate the occurrence of wars. And so it does not entail the conviction that it is possible to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

In other words: a conscientious noncombatant may share the optimistic view of human nature which is entailed by the first of these four definitions of a pacifist. But he need not do so. More specifically, a conscientious noncombatant does not lay himself open to a charge of inconsistency if he happens to share the pessimistic convictions about human nature and sin which the Epistle of James employs to explain why men are violent and wage war:

> What causes war, and what causes fighting among you? Is it not your passions which are at war in your members? You desire and do not have; so you kill. And you covet and cannot obtain; so you fight and wage war. (4: 1-2-.)

Although definition A has an excellent pedigree and can be traced to the roots of contemporary opposition to war, it is not usually what people

have in mind when they are discussing pacifism and pacifists. More often than not, pacifists are characterised in the way in which definitions B to D describe them. Amongst these, Holmes' definition of a pacifist as someone who believes that he ought not to kill or to wage war is still too weak. In fact, I will argue that this is an admirable start towards a definition of a conscientious noncombatant.

This leaves us with Cadoux's and Hershberger's definitions. Both of these capture some of the things which are commonly attributed to the pacifist. In other words: definition C and D underline the fact that pacifists do not merely renounce homicide and war (Holmes' definition). They go much further and renounce all forms of coercion. I will therefore employ Cadoux's and Hershberger's definitions to develop my own account of what pacifism involves.

Although Cadoux's definition captures the pacifist's point of view, it is less satisfactory then Hershberger's because it is too wide. More specifically, the trouble with his definition is that it tends to conflate the idea of a pacifist and the idea of a conscientious noncombatant. The first leg of Cadoux's definition covers much of the same ground as Holmes' does: someone who confines himself to those methods of pressure which are coercive in a non-injurious way and someone who believes that one ought not to kill or to wage war have both renounced homicide and violence. On the other hand, the second leg of Cadoux's definition covers exactly the same ground as Hershberger's does: someone who confines himself to those methods of pressure which are wholly non-coercive (Cadoux) is someone who renounces all coercion, even nonviolent coercion (Hershberger). I will, therefore, employ the second leg of Cadoux's definition as a preliminary characterisation of a pacifist.

E. A pacifist is someone who confines himself to those methods of pressure which are wholly non-coercive.

This definition of a pacifist is a start in the right direction. Unfortunately, however, it does not take us very far towards an understanding of the difference between a pacifist and a conscientious non-

combatant. And this is because it generates the other problem which is a perennial source of difficultry in discussions of what pacifism involves: Where can we find adequate definitions of words like coercion, pressure, homicide and violence? This family of words generates endless discussion. But we do not yet have an established and satisfactory account of what they mean or of how they are related to each other. And since I have decided to avoid a detailed discussion of pacifism, I will stick to my guns and not try to provide an exhaustive, or even a precise, account of how they are commonly used.

What I will do instead is to develop a suggestion which arsies from Cadoux's definition of pressure. This line of inquiry will provide me with definitions of homicide, violence and coercion which, although they do not exhaust the meaning of these words, draw attention to those aspects of their use which are crucial for an understanding of the difference between a pacifist and a conscientious noncombatant. (There are useful discussions of homicide, violence and coercion and other members of the same family in Narveson, 1964-65: 266-267; Audi, 1971: 47-74; Holmes, 1971: 107-115; Miller, 1971: 11-38; and Garver, 1975: 410-423.)

Cadoux informs us that he has reserved the word pressure

> to cover all methods whereby we endeavour to cause our neighbour to act or to refrain in a certain way. (1940: 15. The emphasis is his.)

We are all familiar with what Cadoux is driving at. And this familiarity springs from the fact that we have all found ourselves in situations where we wish to stop one or more individuals from doing something which they want to do, or are actually doing, and which we do not want them to do.

The essence of the debate about what pacifism is revolves around situations of this kind. More specifically, the essence of the difference between a pacifist and a conscientious noncombatant lies in the answers that they give to the question of which coercive actions we should not employ to stop someone from doing something which he wants to do or which he is actually doing. In general, there are three levels

of renunciation available: some people renounce all coercive actions whatsoever; some renounce all violent actions; and some people renounce all homicidal actions.

These three renunciations are not equivalent. Neither do they entail each other. At this stage, therefore, I want to provide some definitions which help to clarify and substantiate these points. And then I want to argue that conscientious noncombatants confine themselves to the renunciation of homicidal and violent actions, but that pacifists go further and renounce coercive actions as well.

F. Homicidal actions = actions which A knows are capable of killing someone and whereby A intends to kill B.

This definition does not require a great deal of comment. Killing someone is the most blatant way of stopping him from doing something which he wants to do or which he is actually doing. Nevertheless four comments are in order. Firstly, although violence, vehemence, passion and rage are often associated with acts of homicide, they are not essential to acts of this kind. A killer may just as well be cool and detached about what he is doing. Secondly, it is not necessary for someone who commits an act of homicide to bear a grudge or to hate his victim. These emotions may very well be absent on most occasions when, say, a policeman or a soldier kills someone in the course of 'simply doing his duty'. Thirdly, everyone who submits to training in a combatant unit of his country's defence force is trained to kill people. This is the essential aim of combat training; and this is why some people are conscientious noncombatants. Finally, this definition only covers intentional homicidal acts because these are the only kind which are relevant to the debate about whether or not someone's refusal to submit to combat training is justified.

G. Violent actions = actions which A knows are capable of killing or seriously injuring someone and whereby A intends to kill or to seriously injure B.

With the relevant modifications, the four comments on homicidal actions could be appended to this definition as well. In addition, violent actions have been defined in such a way that all homicidal actions

are violent actions. But the reverse is not true. Once again, this has been done to focus on the problems raised by combat training and to avoid having to say how much injury is serious. The latter is an impossible task; and so is the attempt to specify the kinds of things which cause death or serious injury. On the other hand, it is obvious that combatants are trained to do various things which they and their teachers know are capable of killing or seriously injuring people. And when they are called upon to put their training into practice, they intend, and are expected, to kill or to seriously injure the people against whom they are waging war.

H. Coercive actions = actions which A knows are capable of physically overpowering someone and whereby A intends to physically overpower B in order that B should stop doing something which B wants to do or which he is actually doiong.

All homicidal and all violent actions are coercive actions. In fact, the most blatant way to physically overpower someone in order to stop him from doing what he wants to do or what he is actually doing is either to kill him or to seriously injure him. On the other hand, it only requires a little reflection to recognise that not all coercive actions are either homicidal or violent actions. It is sometimes possible to overpower people in the sense of making them physically incapable of acting without killing or seriously injurying them. In fact, the literature on homicide, violence and coercion is full of examples. Ronald Miller illustrates the point with a story about five men who prevent a sixth from jumping off a building by merely picking him up and carrying him away from the ledge. (1971: 27. Compare Garver's example: 1975: 411-412.) Jan Narveson's example is a story about somebody who attacks me: I pin his arms to his body with wrestling holds which restrict him but cause him no pain. (1964-65: 159.) Both these stories establish that some coercive actions are neither violent nor homicidal.

The points I have made about the basic features of homicide, violence and coercion, and about the ways in which they are related, are probably obvious. Why then do they need to be made? There are at least two reasons. They are sometimes forgotten or overlooked. And

they are not merely academic points. Conscientious noncombatants are often confronted with questions about what they would do in a situation in which they can prevent A from injurying B only by themselves injurying A. When this occurs it is important to remember that conscientious noncombatants are not pacifists because they do not renounce all coercive actions of the kind covered by definition H. In addition, it is important to remember that not all coercive actions are either homicidal or violent in the sense covered by definitions F and G. And finally, it is important to remember that there are degrees of violence and that definition G does not cover the whole spectrum of violent acts.

The relevance of these reminders can be illustrated by Donald Swann's account of what happened during and after the tribunal before which he had to appear because of his refusal to submit to combat training during World War II:

> In a tribunal statement I told them: "Christ would never sanction war, and I wish to try and follow him". What would you do if someone raped your sister, they said? I would not go and kill his relatives, I said. But later I worried that I had not answered the question. Would I kick the raper? I think I would, so this seemed violence again, this time from me. Later I thought through that one: it is one thing to kick or to stun a raper, yet another to go on and kill him. Yet another to kill his relatives. Yes, my answer was logical. (1968: 96.)

Swann's reflections were not only logical; they were very much to the point. They demonstrate why it is important to recognise that there are degrees of violence. More specifically, Swann's answer as well as his reflections underline the fact that there is a difference between injurying someone and seriously injurying or even killing him. And this difference is there in spite of the fact that we cannot specify precisely where the dividing line is. In addition, it is obvious that combat training is designed to enable men to kill or to seriously injure other human beings.

Swann's reflections also demonstrate that the pacifist's position is more difficult to defend than the conscientious noncombatant's. In general, a pacifist has to explain why he has decided to renounce all coercive actions of the kind covered by definition H. If he is an ab-

solutist - that is, if he holds that there are no conceivable circumstances in which he ought not to renounce a coercive action - then his position is clearly untenable. It is simply too easy to imagine a set of circumstances, which are not far-fetched, and in which it would hardly be rational to insist that it is wrong to physically overpower someone in order to stop him from doing something which he wants to do or which he is actually doing. For example, one only has to imagine a coercive action which is neither homicidal nor violent but which is sufficiently forceful to physically overwhelm a child and, by doing so, to rescue him from a fatal collision with a car.

If a conscientious noncombatant is an absolutist, then his position is equally untenable. For example, it would hardly be rational to insist that it is wrong to take a particular person's life if, and only if by so doing, one could secure for all mankind (including that person) an eternal existence of creative and happy life as against one of eternal suffering. (Holmes, 1971: 119.) On the other hand, if neither the pacifist nor the conscientious noncombatant in question are absolutists, then the latter's position is less problematic than the former's. And this is so because it is difficult to find a moral or a religious principle which supports the pacifist's conviction that it is always wrong to coerce people in the sense covered by definition H. For example, it is impossible to argue that coercive actions which are neither homicidal nor violent always have worse consequences then non-coercive actions. And when I discuss the position of those conscientious objectors who support their refusal to submit to combat training with an appeal to Christ's example, I will demonstrate that the cleansing of the Temple undermines the pacifist's position but not the conscientious noncombatant's. In other words: I will use chapter 4 of this essay to demonstrate that this incident in Christ's life was probably coercive even though it was neither homicidal nor violent in the sense covered by definition F and G.

But the relevance of these reminders about homicide, violence and coercion is not confined to questions of the kind which were generated by Donald Swann's appearance before a tribunal. They also help to undermine Hershberger's claim that it is inconsistent for someone to re-

fuse to submit to combat training but to agree to serve in a medical corps of his country's defence force. The basis of this charge lies in his pacifism and in his understanding of war. According to Hershberger,

> war is a social conflict in which one party endeavours, with the use of force, to compel the submission of the other. (1969: 1.)

In other words: war consists of a complex series of coercive actions which involve nations or groups of people rather than individuals. This definition of war is in order because war does not only involve homicidal and violent activities. (Wright, 1969: 8-13 and 699-700.) But Hershberger's accusation that conscientious objectors who are prepared to serve in a medical corps of their country's defence force are being inconsistent is not in order. And this accusation is not in order because it conflates the idea of a pacifist and the idea of a conscientious noncombatant. More specifically, a pacifist - that is, someone who renounces all coercive actions - is being inconsistent if he agrees to serve in a noncombatant unit of his country's defence force. And this is inconsistent because war is a complex series of coercive actions. On the other hand, a conscientious noncombatant is not someone who has renounced all forms of coercion. He has renounced homicidal and violent actions. This is why he refuses to submit to combat training. But it is not inconsistent for him to serve in a medical corps of his country's defence force.

The bulk of this discussion has been devoted to drawing a distinction between pacifists and conscientious noncombatants. But in the course of drawing this distinction, the reason why no conscientious noncombatant is a pacifist has also emerged. The heart of the matter is simply that pacifism generates too many questions which the conscientious noncombatant cannot answer satisfactorily. More specifically, the pacifist's renunciation of all forms of coercion seems to be too extreme a response to the basic problem which war generates; namely, that it kills and seriously injures people. But since this is the basic problem, conscientious noncombatants can see no point in renouncing more than they are required to renounce in order to lodge their objection to war.

3. Who are conscientious noncombatants?

When I began this discussion of the kind of conscientious objection which South African legislation allows, I earmarked conscientious objection and conscientious objector for use as descriptive phrases. More explicitly, I decided to call someone who refuses to submit to combat training in his country's defence force a conscientious objector even if he has not been granted legal exemption from such training. At the same time, I reserved conscientious noncombatant for those conscientious objectors who qualify for exemption from combat training under section 67(3) of the Defence Act.

Armed with these general descriptions of a conscientious objector and a conscientious noncombatant, I explained what service in a noncombatant capacity involves and who qualifies for exemption. And I also explained why those conscientious objectors who are noncombatants are neither pacifists nor conscientious nonmilitarists. In addition, I restricted my attention to those conscientious noncombatants who are prepared to be trained and to serve only in a medical corps of their country's defence force. Finally, in this part of my essay I demonstrated that someone who is convinced that this is what conscientious objection involves may be exempted from combat training in the South African Defence Force, but not necessarily in any other country's defence force.

In all that follows I will concentrate on some questions which are raised by conscientious noncombatants. And I will use conscientious noncombatant in such a way that it conforms to section 67(3) of the Defence Act as interpreted by the present Minister of Defence. More specifically, I will call someone a conscientious noncombatant if, and only if, he satisfies each of the following four conditions:

> He is not a conscientious nonmilitarist; that is, he does not refuse to submit to every kind of military service whatsoever.
>
> He is not a pacifist; that is, he does not renounce all forms of coercion, even nonviolent coercion.

He is prepared to train and serve only in a medical corps of his country's defence force.

He refuses to submit to combat training because of his church's teaching about war or because of his religious convictions.

Although there are people who satisfy each of these four conditions, it should be obvious that a critical scrutiny and defence of their position is a long way from a comprehensive evaluation of even the Church's debate on conscientious objection and war. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that even this mild opposition to combat training generates more than enough difficult questions. For example, in spite of its apparent simplicity, this kind of conscientious objection has already raised questions about what pacifism and conscientious nonmilitarism involve. And it has generated questions about how to interpret some of the key phrases in the law which governs conscientious objection in South Africa.

But these are not the only questions which conscientious noncombatants raise. The official interpretation of section 67(3) of the Defence Act suggests that someone may be exempted from combat training only if his religious convictions require him to do so. Conscientious noncombatants who appeal to Christ's example because they worship him satisfy this condition. And so I want to explore some of the questions which are generated by this way of defending a decision to refuse to submit to combat training. But before I do so I want to explore the distinction between absolute and selective conscientious noncombatants.

CHAPTER 3

SELECTIVE AND ABSOLUTE CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS

Conscientious objectors do not only divide into those who are conscientious nonmilitarists and those who are conscientious noncombatants. Conscientious noncombatants (as well as conscientious nonmilitarists) divide into absolute and selective opponents of combat training. An absolute conscientious noncombatant is someone who refuses to submit to combat training for every kind of war. On the other hand, a selective conscientious noncombatant is someone who refuses to submit to combat training only if he is convinced that the war in which he is required to fight is unjust.

Selective conscientious noncombatants argue that their position is superior to that of the absolutists because it allows them to participate in wars which are just. More specifically, selective conscientious noncombatants rest their case on the axiom that justice is a prerequisite of stability and peace. They therefore agree with John Rawls that

> Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth

> is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust....The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. (1971: 3-4.)

Armed with this axiom, selective conscientious noncombatants argue that everyone has an obligation to employ just methods to make situations more just. And so they conclude that the more apparent it is that the war in which he is being asked to participate is just, the less convincing is an absolute conscientious noncombatant's refusal to participate in it.

This kind of argument has a long history which has often been told. (For example, by von Elbe, 1939; by Nussbaum, 1943; by Kunz, 1951; by Tooke, 1965; by Bailey, 1972: 1-57; and by Russell, 1975.) The axiom and the argument are presupposed by Aquinas' theory of a just war and by Augustine's influential reflections on the moral problems which are raised by war. And it is this tradition which lies behind an argument which can be extracted from the South African Council of Churches' statement on conscientious objection (Appendix):

1. Both Catholic and Reformation theology has regarded the taking up of arms as justifiable, if at all, only in order to fight a "just war".

2. The theological definition of a "just war" excludes war in in defence of a basically unjust and discriminatory society.

3. The Republic of South Africa is at present a fundamentally unjust and discriminatory society.

4. Therefore, the South African Council of Churches calls on its member Churches to challenge all their members to consider becoming conscientious objectors.

This is a valid argument. And because everyone does have an obligation to employ just methods to make a situation more just, it threatens to undermine arguments for an absolute refusal to submit to

combat training. Unfortunately, however, it is not at all clear that the South African Council of Churches' argument is sound. It assumes that we have an adequate theory of a just war; that is, a set of general and impartial tests that can be used to discover whether or not a war is just. It is possible, therefore, for an absolute conscientious noncombatant to counter this argument. All he has to do is to demonstrate that we do not have an adequate theory of this kind.

I will therefore parade four kinds of objections to theories of a just war: as a matter of fact no government has adopted a theory of a just war as a basis for its decisions about war. There are too many conflicting versions of the theory. The theory raises too many conceptual questions which have not yet been satisfactorily answered. And even if one could obtain a rigorous version of the theory, one would not be able to apply it.

1. No government has adopted the theory

No government has ever announced that it has assessed the situation in which it finds itself and come to the conclusion that the war which it is waging, or about to wage, is unjust. On the contrary, during a war a government is always convinced that it has justice on its side. Similarly, Christians are tempted to believe that God approves wholeheartedly of the side which they most want to win. And so a government and the Church often co-operate to suggest that the war in which they are involved is just.

For example, during the First World War German soldiers had Gott mit uns inscribed on their belt buckles. And early on the morning of 6 August 1945, the Air Force Chaplain of the 509th Composite Group asked God to bless the men who were about to fly a specially equipped plane to Hiroshima:

> We pray Thee that the end of the war may come soon and that once again we may know peace on earth. May the men who fly this night be kept safe in Thy care and returned safely to us. We shall go forward trusting in Thee, knowing that we

> are in Thy care now and forever. In the name of Jesus Christ, Amen.

The chaplains of the South African Defence Force, presumably, pray the same kind of prayer. And according to Revelation Ntoula, a representative of one of the Southern African guerilla movements, who participated in a workshop of the Third Assembly of the All African Conference of Churches, was sent on his way with the singing of 'Onward Christian soldiers, marching as to war'. (1974: 14.)

And I mention all this for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates that those who wage war are anxious to convince themselves that they have a just cause. Secondly, it helps to explain why governments have not, and probably cannot, adopt a theory of a just war as a basis for their decisions about war. During a time of war, or preparation for war, the atmosphere is simply too charged with emotion for a government to encourage a dispassionate examination of the justice or injustice of its cause.

These are, of course, not the most serious objections to a theory of a just war. But these observations do underline one problem very clearly. In the absence of an international tribunal and police force, who could determine the justice of the various national claims which are at stake in a war? Apart from the factors which have been mentioned, there is no reason to believe that national leaders have moral insights and an ability to arrive at dispassionate evaluations of a conflict situation which are greater than average. In addition, national leaders tend to defend the concept of state sovereignty. But all the restrictions which a just war theory places on and in war involve some limitation of state sovereignty. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that no government recognises the theory of a just war. (Wells, 1969: 820-822.)

2. <u>There are too many conflicting versions of the theory</u>

Conscientious noncombatants who appeal to a theory of a just war

to support their convictions need to explain why they have adopted one version of the theory rather than another. And they owe us this explanation because there are so many variations in the criteria employed. This fact soon emerged in the controversy which was generated by the South African Council of Churches' statement on conscientious objection. For example, Francis Wilson argued that a war is just if, and only if, each of the following six conditions hold:

> The war must be waged by a legitimate authority; and for a just cause. The war must be as limited as possible; and all other methods of resolving the dispute must have already been tried. There must be reason to believe that the war will not be unduly prolonged; and that after the war conditions will be better than before it began. (1974b: 122.)

But very little reflection is required for it to be obvious that these six tests do not justify any of the parties to the guerilla war which is being waged in Southern Africa. And so these six tests would seem to support a conscientious refusal to submit to combat training because, however much dispute there may be about who satisfies the first four conditions, it is apparent that nobody has any reason to believe that this war will not be unduly prolonged. Nor does anybody have any reason to believe that after the war conditions will be better than before it began.

On the other hand, this attempt to justify conscientious objection in South Africa would not impress Willem de Klerk because his theory of a just war excludes the two conditions to which I have referred. (Die Transvaler, 6 September, 1974.) In other words: a conscientious non-combatant who employed Wilson's criteria for what counts as a just war could justify his refusal to submit to combat training in the South African Defence Force. But someone who chose de Klerk's criteria may not be able to do so. How, then, does one decide which version of the theory to adopt? And how does one defend oneself against the charge that one has simply chosen that version of the theory which justifies one's convictions about conscientious objection and war?

Unfortunately, it does not seem to be possible to answer these

questions satisfactorily. And this kind of disagreement is not confined to people who, like Wilson and de Klerk, are embroiled in the controversy which still surrounds the South African Council of Churches' statement on conscientious objection and war. This disagreement also exists between versions of the theory which were not formulated with an eye on the situation in Southern Africa.

For example, according to Thomas Aquinas only three things are required for a war to be just:

> The first is the authority of the sovereign on whose authority war is waged....Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked are attacked because they deserve it on account of some wrong they have done... Thirdly, the right intention of those waging war is required, that is, they must intend to promote the good and to avoid evil. (Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, question 40.)

Other versions of the theory, however, either provide different formulations of Aquinas' criteria (Rawls); or provide additional criteria (Calvin); or ignore some of his criteria (Ellul). And these alterations are important because they yield more stringent or more liberal conditions under which a war is just.

John Rawls, for example, first distinguishes between the principles which control the occasion and initiation of war (jus ad bellum) and the principles which regulate the means that a government may employ to wage war (jus in bello). He then argues that a government has a jus ad bellum only if its aim is

> to preserve its just institutions and the conditions which make them possible. It is not moved by the desire for world power or national glory; nor does it wage war for purposes of economic gain or the acquisition of territory.

And a government has a jus in bello only if

> the aim of the war is a just peace, and therefore the means employed (do) not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy. (Rawls, 1973: 379.)

Rawls' criteria, therefore, are more stringent than Aquinas'. They do not allow a government to have a jus ad bellum unless it has a jus in bello. And, in addition, it must have just institutions which are threatened by the war in question.

On the other hand, John Calvin's theory of a just war is both more stringent than Aquinas' and more liberal than Rawls' theory. Calvin's criteria are more liberal than those advanced by Rawls because governments may have a jus ad bellum not only when they wage war 'to preserve the tranquility of their dominion'. They may also have a jus ad bellum when they seek 'to help those forcibly oppressed'. At the same time, Calvin's criteria are more stringent than Aquinas' because he stipulates an additional condition for a just war. The war must be a last resort: 'surely everything else ought to be tried before recourse is had to arms'. (Institutes of the Christian Religion, iv, 22: 11-12.)

But things are actually more complicated than this comparision of Aquinas, Calvin and Rawls suggests. There are versions of the theory that do not employ all the criteria which they have advocated. For example, Jacques Ellul argues that seven conditions must coincide to make a war just. But he does not require that the war must be fought by a legitimate authority. In this respect, therefore, Ellul's theory is less stringent than the other three because he makes it possible for a civil war to be just. In other respects, however, Ellul's theory is more stringent than the other three. He argues that 'victory must be assured' and

> the benefits the war can reasonably be expected to bring for humanity must be greater than the evils provoked by the war itself. (Ellul, 1970: 6.)

And so one could continue. For example, by comparing Ralph Potter's eight criteria for a just war (1970: 43-46.) with the six which John Macquarrie has advocated. (1973: 55-61.) But enough has been said to make it obvious that any conscientious noncombatant who appeals to a theory of a just war to support his convictions will

find it difficult to defend himself against the charge that he has simply chosen that version of the theory which supports his convictions. And it is difficult to find objective criteria to defend a particular version of the theory because each set of criteria I have examined already reflects a more liberal or a more stringent attitude to war, or to a particular kind of war. For example, Aquinas, Calvin and Rawls have advanced criteria which rule out the possibility that a civil war may be just. But Ellul allows this possibility. On the other hand, Aquinas, Calvin and Ellul do not rule out the possibility that an offensive war may be just. But Rawls does. Calvin and Ellul, but not Aquinas and Rawls, insist that a war can be just only if every other method of resolving the dispute has already been tried. And Ellul, but not Aquinas, Calvin and Rawls, argues that a war can be just only if there is reason to believe that the war will not be unduly prolonged and that after the war conditions will be better than before it began.

3. The theory raises too many conceptual questions

These disagreements about what counts as a just war are sufficient to undermine any attempt to rest one's refusal to submit to combat training on a theory of this kind. And they are equally inefficient to defend a particular government's military activities. At the same time, however, it can be argued that all the versions of the theory raise too many conceptual questions which have not been satisfactorily answered. More specifically, all the theories which have been discussed employ a great many concepts which are too 'open-textured' (Waismann, 1968: 41-44 and 95-97.) and which are, therefore, 'essentially contestable'. (MacIntyre, 1973: 1-9.) And so they raise conceptual questions instead of providing us with a set of rigorous, general and impartial tests which can be applied to discover whether or not a war is just.

Donald Wells has argued this point at some length and with great insight. (1969: 819-829.) But I will not attempt to rehearse his arguments because they cannot be stated both briefly and adequately.

What I will do instead is to illustrate this point about the opacity of so many of the concepts which appear in theories of a just war with the help of a question which he does not raise. What does the concept of self-defence involve when it appears in a theory of a just war? And I will concentrate on this question because even the most primitive theories of a just war appeal to the idea of self-defence.

Richard Wasserstrom has argued that those who readily invoke the idea of self-defence seldom address themselves to the questions which this concept generates when it appears in a theory of a just war. (1970: 89-90.) When the concept of self-defence functions in the context of the criminal law it can be understood either as a justification (that is, one is entitled to defend oneself from a serious and imminent attack upon life and limb) or as an excuse (that is, it is a natural, almost unavoidable - and hence excusable - reaction to defend oneself when attacked). On the other hand, when the concept of self-defence is employed in the context of a theory of a just war, its status and function is obscure.

Firstly, it is dubious whether the idea of self-defence excuses a country's decision to go to war:

> While it may make sense to regard self-defence of one's person as a natural, instinctive response to an attack, ...countries do not respond "instinctively" in the way in which persons sometimes do, and, hence, the excuse rationale is just not appropriate.

Secondly, it seems just as doubtful that the concept of self-defence justifies a country's decision to wage war. Before it is obvious that this is so it will be necessary to make out a case for the claim that countries die in the same way, or in a relevantly similar way, in which persons do. Wasserstrom doubts whether this case can be made. He asks us to imagine an attack in which a country, as a separate political entity, might disappear but in which none of its inhabitants will be killed or even physically harmed unless they fight back:

> Would we say that this should be regarded as the equivalent

of human death? That it is less harmful? More harmful?

Wasserstrom's doubts and questions are to the point. And the point is not that everyone shares his doubts or puzzles about these questions. The point is that the concept of national self-defence is an extremely open-textured one and that it generates questions which have essentially contestable answers. For example, it seems as though the concept of national self-defence is rooted in a very anthropomorphic view of countries. And this view breeds further open-textured concepts such as national pride, national honour, and the concept of an insult to one's country. In addition, both the most sophisticated and the most naive people disagree when they ask themselves whether or not this way of thinking about one's country should be exorcised.

And so one could continue. But it is not only the concept of self-defence which is problematic in the context of a theory of a just war. For example, how do we distinguish between combatants and noncombatants? When are we in a position from which it is clear that all other means of resolving a warlike dispute have already been tried? Is it lawful to engage in a military operation in which the death of innocent people could be <u>expected</u>, even though it was not <u>intended</u>?

Questions of this kind are not new. They can be traced through the casuistry which surrounds the theory of a just war. This casuistry goes as far back as 314 when, at the Council of Arles, the Church recognised that to deny any state the right ever to go to war was to condemn it to extinction. But although these questions are not new, they have not yet been satisfactorily answered. In fact, it is not at all obvious that they can be satisfactorily answered. And so it is difficult to see in what sense a conscientious noncombatant can employ a theory of a just war to decide whether or not he ought to refuse to submit to combat training.

4. The theory cannot be applied because of insufficient information

On the other hand, let us suppose that everyone who has tried to formulate a theory of a just war has been persuaded to adopt the same criteria. And let us suppose that all the conceptual questions which are responsible for the vagueness and controversy that infects and surrounds these criteria have been answered to everyone's satisfaction. Even under these conditions it is impossible to apply the theory concerned to a war which is either about to be waged or actually being waged. And this is impossible because any theory of a just war can be applied only if both sides disclose a fairly substantial set of facts about the whole situation both before and during the war. But since no government allows the required amount of information to be disclosed to the public, no conscientious noncombatant is ever likely to find himself in a position from which he can establish whether or not a particular set of criteria actually apply.

It is not surprising, therefore, that no government has ever adopted a theory of a just war to regulate its decisions about war. Even if it did, it could not disclose the information on which it based its decision. And so there could not be an informed and dispassionate public ratification of its decision. Consequently, the information which comes from hindsight may contradict my earlier claim that nobody has any reason to believe that the guerilla war which is being waged sporadically in Southern Africa will not be unduly prolonged. But only information which is not now available can decide whether or not this is an accurate evaluation of the situation. And so it is obvious that even if one could obtain a more rigorous theory of a just war, one would not be able to apply it; except, perhaps, in retrospect.

In fact, Quincy Wright has emphasised the fact that the problem is not simply that governments to not disclose the amount of information which a just war theory requires. In addition, governments are aware that both the initiation and the conduct of a war requires them to indulge in propaganda. Wright defines propaganda as the process of manipulating symbols so that

> Our unity is prompted by identifying the enemy as the source of all grievances of our people, by repeating and displaying symbols which represent the ideals which we share, by associating the enemy with hostility to those ideals, and by insisting on our own nobility and certainty of victory and on the enemies' diabolism and certainty of defeat. (Wright, 1965: 1095.)

None of these activities are intended to foster a dispassionate examination and evaluation of a war situation. And so a country's war propaganda and its government's refusal to disclose what is happening inside and outside the war zone provide reasonable grounds for the claim that nobody is likely to have sufficient information to apply the kind of criteria which a theory of a just war provides.

In the light of the four kinds of objection which I have considered it seems that we do not have, and are unlikely ever to have, an adequate theory of a just war. In fact, the best we may be able to hope for is a theory which supports the absolute conscientious noncombatant's hunch that we are never in a position to say that a war is just. But be that as it may. The important point is that enough has been said to explain why some conscientious noncombatants are absolute rather than selective conscientious noncombatants. They are simply not convinced that we have a theory which enables us to tell which wars are just. What still needs to be done, however, is to explain why some people refuse to submit to combat training. But there are so many different reasons why this is so that I will simply limit myself to one strand in the Church's debate on conscientious objection and war. More specifically, I will concentrate on those conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ and who are convinced that his example encourages them to refuse to submit to combat training.

PART THREE

CHRISTIAN CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS

Only some Christians are conscientious objectors. (Bainton, 1960, is an excellent survey of Christian attitudes to war and peace.) And only some Christians are conscientious noncombatants. In other words: there is a great deal of variety even amongst those Christians who are opposed to war. More specifically, John Howard Yoder has isolated and evaluated twenty-five varieties of religious pacifism. But even Yoder's complex taxonomy is oversimplified. For example, he discusses those conscientious objectors who are conscientious noncombatants and those who appeal to Christ's example under two different headings. (Yoder, 1971: 95-97 and 120.) But some Christians are conscientious noncombatants only because they are convinced that they ought to allow Christ's example to regulate their behaviour.

In the face of so much variety and complexity I want to limit my inquiry to a discussion of those Christians who refuse to submit to combat training in their country's defence force because they appeal to Christ's example within the Church's debate about war and peace. More specifically, I want to use this part of my essay to do two things. I first want to defend the position of those conscientious noncombatants who are convinced that Christ's example supports their refusal to submit to combat training. And then I want to explain why they appeal to his example.

CHAPTER 4

CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS AND CHRIST'S EXAMPLE

Some conscientious noncombatant are convinced that their primary obligation is to worship Christ and to try to follow his example. And they are convinced that this is their primary obligation because they value their relationship to Christ more highly than they value their society's approval. But although this much is clear, it is nothing more than a comment on some of the more formal features of an appeal to Christ's example. In particular, this kind of attempt to clarify what is involved in an appeal to his example does not establish that Christ would not have submitted to combat training if he had been conscripted. What is required to establish this is some evidence for both a positive and a negative thesis about Christ's attitude to combat training for war.

The positive thesis is that the Gospels contain narratives about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would not have submitted to combat training. The negative thesis is that the Gospels do not contain narratives about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would have submitted to combat training.

Both these theses are required to support the conscientious noncombatant's conviction that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would not have submitted to combat training. And both are important. In fact, if either or both of these two theses are false, then the position of those conscientious noncombatants who are convinced that they ought not to submit to combat training because Christ would not have done so is seriously undermined. More specifically, if their positive thesis is false, then it is difficult to understand in what sense an appeal to Christ's example supports their refusal to submit to combat training. And if their negative thesis is false, then conscientious noncombatants are simply not entitled to appeal to Christ's example to support their convictions.

Arguments have been advanced for and against both these theses. But none of those which I have encountered are as decisive as conscientious noncombatants would like them to be. For example, according to G.H.C. Macgregor, Christ

> never belittled or condoned the stark reality of evil: but He never met it with its own methods and weapons. He overcame evil with good. Nowhere, with the very doubtful exception of the Cleansing of the Temple, do we find him using force to constrain men to desist from evil or to do good; nor, with the exception of one very ambiguous passage (Luke 22: 35-38.), countenancing the use of force even in self-defence. (1936: 47-48.)

I have quoted Macgregor at some length because he is aware that a conscientious noncombatant who appeals to Christ's example must defend both a positive and a negative thesis. In addition, he mentions two narratives which create problems for the conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis. But he does not mention which narratives, if any, support the positive thesis. On other occasions, however, he does supply such examples.

I will, therefore, first examine two narratives which conscientious noncombatants tend to employ to support their positive thesis. And then I will examine the two narratives which Macgregor regards as the most serious threat to their negative thesis. Unfortunately, their

best weapon against the argument that the cleansing of the Temple undermines their negative thesis, also destroys a basic assumption on which their positive thesis rests. I will, therefore, evaluate their general position and argue that the narratives about Christ's healing ministry support their positive thesis without being open to the previous objection. And throughout this discussion I will draw heavily on the kind of information which someone who is not himself a New Testament scholar can obtain from what the established commentaries have to say about the passages in question.

1. The conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis

Do the Gospels record any incidents about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would not have submitted to combat training? Amongst the many examples which are advanced on behalf of an affirmative answer to this question, I will consider Luke's account of an encounter which Christ's disciples had with an inhospitable Samaritan village (9: 51-56.); and Matthew's account of his arrest in Gethsemane. (26: 47-56.)

An inhospitable Samaritan village

According to Josephus, Galilean pilgrims to the festivals usually passed through Samaria on their way to Jerusalem. And he reports a serious collision between pilgrims and a hostile Samaritan village which occurred during the procuratorship of Ventidius Cumanus (48-52 A.D.). The trouble started when some Galileans, who were on their way to Jerusalem, were killed in a battle with the inhabitants of a Samaritan village. The whole affair soon got out of hand because the Galileans enlisted the help of Eleazar, an experienced guerilla leader. And under his leadership they fired and sacked various Samaritan villages in reprisal. Eventually Umnidius Quadratus, the legate of Syria, intervened and brought the procuratorship of Cumanus to an abrupt end. (Jewish Antiquities, xx, 118-136.)

Luke 9: 51-56 records an incident which contained the germ of a similar kind of conflict. When an inhospitable Samaritan village refused to receive Christ and his disciples, James and John wanted 'to bid fire come down from heaven and consume them'. Christ rebuked them. And they went to another village instead. Some conscientious noncombatants therefore appeal to this incident to support their conviction that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would not have submitted to combat training. (For example, Macgregor, 1936: 36 and 153; Hengel, 1975: 75; and Ferguson, no date: 22-23 and 85. Strictly speaking, none of these people are conscientious noncombatants because they are not South African citizens. But here and elsewhere none of my arguments turn on this misdescription. And therefore, because it is convenient to do so, I will continue to use this misdescription instead of a more accurate circumlocution like 'conscientious noncombatants may therefore appropriate the appeals of those conscientious objectors who employ this incident to support their convictions'.)

The existence of important variant readings which occur in some ancient manuscripts of Luke's Gospel strengthens the argument of those conscientious noncombatants who appeal to this passage. For example, Marcion and codices Bezae and Alexandrinus add 'as Elijah did' to the question which James and John asked. This suggests that they had Elijah's punitive miracle in mind, and that this is why they were rebuked. (Most commentators discuss these variant readings. See, for example, Creed, 1930: 141-142; Manson, 1930: 121; Gilmour, 1952: 182; and Leaney, 1966: 173.)

Two other variant readings reveal what some sections of the early Church believed was the reason for Christ's rebuke of James and John. Stories of this kind usually reach their climax in a pronouncement of Christ, and many manuscripts supply the deficiency in this case. (Debelius, 1934: 37-69; Bultmann, 1963: 11-69; and Taylor, 1935: 63-87.)

Marcion and Codex Bezae, for example, add

> and he said, 'You do not know what manner of spirit you are of'.

In other words: James and John should not be as hot-tempered as Elijah was but should try to follow Christ's teaching about non-retaliation and non-resistance to evil. (Compare 2 Kings 1: 9-16 and Luke 6: 27-36.)

Marcion and many other authorities also added these words:

> For the Son of Man came not to destroy men's lives but to save them.

This reading is particularly instructive. Even if these words cannot be attributed to Christ, they do indicate that the early Church believed that he did not come to destroy men's lives. But combat training is designed to teach one how to destroy the bodies and minds of those against whom one is required to wage war. And so conscientious noncombatants use these words to argue that the Gospels do contain narratives about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would not have submitted to combat training.

The arrest in Gethsemane

According to Matthew, one of those who were with Christ when he was arrested drew his sword and struck the high priest's slave, and cut off his ear. (26: 51-54.) John's Gospel claims that it was Peter who was responsible for this. (18:10-11.) In any case, Matthew and John agree that Christ commanded the person concerned to sheath his sword. John follows the command with a question: 'shall I not drink the cup which the Father has given me?'. Matthew adds a maxim: 'for all who take the sword will perish by the sword'.

S.G.F. Brandon has claimed that this maxim cannot be attributed to Christ, and that even if it can

> the saying cannot be regarded as a proverbial condemnation of the profession of arms, since it is manifestly untrue that all soldiers die in armed combat. (1967: 306-307; and 1968: 77-78, 109 and 184, footnote 111.)

RHODES UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Brandon's claims have not received much support and his objection is certainly due to an over-literal interpretation of the maxim. For example, John Ferguson is nearer the mark when he claims that the saying expresses the conviction that

> violence tends to provoke counter-violence...And the violence provoked often exceeds the original violence; violence in other words tends to escalate. (no date: 25. Compare Allen, 1907: 281; McNeile, 1915: 395; Robinson, 1928: 220; Filson, 1960: 280 and de Diétrich, 1962: 141. Dibelius, 1934: 197-198; Johnson, 1951: 583; and Bultmann, 1963: 282-283, are more guarded about whether or not this is a genuine saying of Christ.)

These disagreements among the commentators indicate that it is not always that clear what can and what cannot be attributed to Christ. In addition, they underline the fact that maxims of the kind which one finds in the Gospels are not always easy to interpret. Nevertheless, most commentators are on Ferguson's side rather than on Brandon's. And conscientious noncombatants have not hesitated to appeal to this incident to support their claim that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would not have submitted to combat training. For example, Tertullian argued that Christ 'in disarming Peter unbuckled every soldier'. (Ferguson, no date: 25-26.)

Conscientious noncombatants also appeal to various sayings of Christ to support their convictions. But commentators tend to agree that these sayings refer not to war, but to violent situations of a more or less personal kind. (See, for example, what Allen, 1907; McNeile, 1915; Robinson, 1928; Johnson, 1951; Barclay, 1958; Filson, 1960; and de Diétrich, 1962, have to say about Matthew 5: 38-48.)

I will, therefore, focus on those arguments which appeal to Christ's example; which appeal to what he did rather than to what he said. And in this context it seems as though the conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis is supported by the way in which he responded to the events which surrounded his arrest in Gethsemane and his rejection by the Samaritan village. More specifically, these two examples illustrate his refusal to sanction violence as a means towards the achieve-

ment of his ministry. And therefore conscientious noncombatants want to argue that the Gospels do record incidents about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would not have submitted to combat training.

2. The conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis

The conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis is not sufficient to support his conviction that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would not have submitted to combat training. What is still required is a demonstration that the Gospels do not record any incident about Christ which suggests that, if he had been conscripted, he would have submitted to combat training. This is the negative thesis which conscientious noncombatants have to establish. And it is threatened by the instruction to buy a sword and by the cleansing of the Temple. In addition, these incidents raise a question which I chose to ignore when I discussed the conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis. How relevant are these narratives about Christ for a discussion of conscientious objection and war? This question has to be faced. But I will not do so until I am in a better position to evaluate the conscientious noncombatant's two theses and to make a suggestion of my own.

Let him who has no sword sell his mantle and buy one

The Sicarii were members of the Jewish guerilla movement which was opposed to the Roman occupation of Palestine. Brandon has used Luke 22: 35-38 to argue for a similarity between Jesus and the Sicarii:

> The fact that Jesus had to make sure that the disciples were armed on this occasion (see vv. 36,38.) indicates that their weapons were concealed in their garments in Sicarii fashion....The fact that some, at least, of the disciples were accustomed to go about with concealed weapons, after the manner of the Sicarii, is attested by Luke xxii. 38, and all four Gospels record that armed resistance was offered in Gethsemane to the arrest of

> Jesus. (1967: 203, footnote 3; compare 16, 317 and 340-341; and Brandon, 1968: 85 and 148.)

Brandon's interpretation of this passage is far too definite. But it must be admitted that the saying of Christ which is attached to this incident poses a very serious threat to the conscientious non-combatant's negative thesis. And it even troubles scholars who have no axe to grind in the debate about whether or not Christ's example supports a refusal to submit to combat training. For example, J.M. Creed has argued that

> it is unlikely that Jesus seriously entertained the thought of armed resistance, which indeed would be in conflict with the whole tenor of His life and teaching. (1930: 270.)

On the other hand, the fact that there is so much about this passage which perplexes scholars, calls into question the firm conclusion to which Brandon believes he is entitled. And so I will simply provide a brief survey of what various commentators have had to say about it, and especially about Luke 22: 36 and 38. And then I will make a comment of my own.

Some commentators want to maintain that the incident is not authentic. They argue that this passage is simply Luke's awkward attempt to prepare the way for the sequel in Gethsemane, and so to justify the disciples attempt at armed resistance. In spite of Macgregor's argument that this is consistent with Luke's general tendency 'to slur over the shortcomings of the Twelve', this solution does not carry much conviction. (1936: 28. Compare Leaney, 1966: 271; Bultmann, 1963: 179-180; and Ferguson, no date: 32.)

Those commentators who regard the incident as authentic do not agree on whether Christ's words should be taken literally or metaphorically. For example, S. Maclean Gilmour favours a literal interpretation:

> it is possible (despite Matthew 26: 52-54.) that Jesus contemplated the emergence of a situation in which his follow-

> ers would have to resist aggression by the use of force. (1952: 386.)

On the other hand, Gilmour suggests that the situation which Christ had in mind was not the conflict which led to his arrest. He therefore joins all those commentators who maintain that, whatever Christ was driving at, he was not taking the precaution of seeing that the disciples were armed before going to Gethsemane. This conclusion seems to be justified. If Christ's conversation is taken literally and regarded as being about his forthcoming arrest, then one is driven to the absurd conclusion that he thought two swords were enough for twelve men to use. (Plummer, 1901: 506-507; Macgregor, 1936: 29; Gilmour, 1952: 387; Miller, 1960: 154-155; and Ferguson, no date: 32.) In addition, all the Gospels record that, far from encouraging armed resistance to his arrest, Christ both identified himself to those who had come for him and put a stop to an attempt by one of his disciples to use his sword in his defence. (Mark 14: 43-50; Matthew 26: 47-56; Luke 22: 47-53; and John 18: 1-11.)

Many commentators, however, believe that Christ's words should not be taken literally. For example, Alfred Plummer observes that as early as Cyril of Alexander some commentators have argued that his words are ironic:

> they are spoken with a sad irony....meaning not that two swords will be sufficient, but that none at all are required: they have grievously misunderstood him. (1901: 507. Compare Creed, 1930: 270; Macgregor, 1936: 29; and Bultmann, 1963: 340-341.)

Similarly, William Barclay believes that Christ issued a general warning of an approaching crisis and that his instruction to buy a sword is 'a vivid eastern way of telling the disciples that their very lives are at stake'. (1975: 268-270.) This whole line of approach is well put by George Caird (1963: 241.):

> The instruction to sell their coats and buy swords is an example of Jesus' fondness for violent metaphor (cf. Matt. 23,27; Mark 10,25.), but the disciples take it literally,

> as pedants have continued to do ever since. The words 'It is enough' indicate, not satisfaction with the disciples' military preparedness, but a sad dismissal of the subject (cf. 1 Kings 19,4; Mark 14,41.)

And so one could continue. But in the face of so much disagreement and variation of emphasis it is not at all clear how a conscientious noncombatant should interpret this passage. I therefore want to suggest that even if the words are taken as literally as some commentators do, conscientious noncombatants should note that we are still a long way either from any of Brandon's conclusions or from the claim that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would have submitted to combat training. More specifically, this passage can perhaps be used to undermine the claim that Christ was a pacifist in the sense that he always renounced the use of every kind of force. But I have already argued that a conscientious noncombatant need not be a pacifist; he may simply be opposed to war and to being trained as a combatant in his country's defence force. (Chapter 2 of this essay.) It follows, therefore, that those conscientious noncombatants who are not pacifists are entitled to claim that this passage does not undermine their negative thesis about Christ's example.

The cleansing of the Temple

Macgregor regards the cleansing of the Temple, and especially John's version of the incident, as a serious threat to the conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis. (1936: 17-19.) According to John,

> in the Temple he found those who were selling oxen and sheep and pigeons, and the money changers at their business. And making a whip of cords, he drove them all, with the sheep and oxen, out of the Temple; and he poured out the coins of the money-changers and he overturned their tables. And he told those who sold the pigeons, 'Take these things away; you shall not make my Father's house a house of trade'. (John 2: 13-17. Compare Mark 11: 15-17; Matthew 21: 12-13; and Luke 19: 45-46.)

Macgregor observes that this incident is sometimes advanced as evidence that Christ was not opposed to war. Those who do so argue that he was

> a man capable of righteous anger, which expressed itself in an act of aggressive personal violence against the desecrators of the Temple. What better justification does a Christian need even for aggressive warfare in a just cause?

Macgregor finds this claim uncomfortable. And in reply he advances three arguments which attempt to establish that Christ had not resorted to violence:

> much more probably it was the compelling 'authority' of his words which overawed his opponents; their conscience condemned them and they withdrew in disgrace.

This kind of comment on the incident is at least as old as Jerome. (Barclay, 1956: 97-98; and Bernard, 1928: 91.) But two of the arguments which Macgregor and others have advanced on its behalf do not carry very much weight.

ekbe Firstly, Macgregor wants to maintain that 'a correct rendering of the Greek makes it clear that the whip was used only on the animals'. And Ferguson claims that the New English Bible's translation - 'Jesus made a whip of cords and drove them out of the Temple, sheep, cattle and all' - is ambiguous. He believes that a clumsy but literal translation of the Greek yields 'he drove them all, i.e. the sheep and cattle, out of the temple'. (no date: 29.) Unfortunately, these firm statements have been contested. For example Wilbert F. Howard is convinced that the cattle traders as well as the oxen and sheep were driven out. (1952: 298.)

Secondly, Macgregor wants to maintain that the whip should be regarded 'as an emblem of authority rather than as a weapon of offence'. He advances this claim because he believes that the whole significance of the scene is Messianic:

> Jewish tradition held that the Messiah at his coming would bear a lash for the chastisement of evil-doers.

This is a strange argument. Even if the whip is mentioned by John because he wants his readers to understand that Christ was the Messiah, it does not follow that it was not used to drive both the traders and their animals out of the Temple. On the contrary, if John believed that Christ behaved in the way tradition said the Messiah would, then presumably he used the whip 'for the chastisement' of this particular group of 'evil-doers'. Incidentally and against Macgregor's claim: if John's account of the incident is taken as a complete and literal account of this incident, then Christ spoke only to those who sold the pigeons. And he did so only after he had driven the other traders and their animals out of the Temple! Consequently, Macgregor's second argument does not establish that it was the compelling authority of Christ's words which overawed his opponents.

Thirdly, Macgregor claims that if Christ had attacked the traders with his whip, he 'must inevitably have provoked retaliation and been overpowered by superior numbers'. And he seems to rest this claim on the fact that, although English versions of this passage which translate ekballō as 'cast out' (RV) or 'drove out' (KJV, RSV and NEB) give an impression of extreme violence, the word may be used without these connotations of force and violence. Ferguson is of the same opinion. He suggests that 'he told them to go' or 'he sent them away' are better translations than 'he drove them out'. (no date: 29.) On the other hand, Arndt and Gingrich (1957: 236-237.) give various examples of how ekballō is used in the New Testament. Three translations are possible: (1) drive out, expel, literally throw out more or less violently; (2) without the connotation of force: send out, send away, release, lead out; and (3) take out, remove something. Unfortunately for Macgregor and Ferguson they give John 2: 13-17 as an example under the first of their three headings.

Taken by itself, Macgregor's appeal to language does not carry much conviction. But his suggestion becomes very much more plausible if one takes into account that the Antonia overlooked the Temple court-

yard. (Ferguson, no date: 28.) Some members of the Roman garrison were always stationed in the fortress and they would probably have observed the incident. For example, the riot which occurred at one of the Passover festivals during the procuratorship of Ventidius Cumanus (48-52 A.D.) began when the Jews observed the obscene gesture of one of the Roman soldiers who was on guard-duty. (Jewish War, ii, 223-227 and v, 238-247. Jewish Antiquities, xx, 105-112.) And the Roman troops stationed in the Antonia soon heard about the assault on Paul in the Temple courts and intervened. (Act 21: 30-32.)

If therefore the cleansing of the Temple was as violent an incident as authorised English translations of ekballō suggest it was, then it is difficult to understand why the Roman soldiers did not intervene on this occasion. And if they did, then it is difficult to understand how Christ and all his disciples managed to avoid being arrested. (Brandon, 1967: 8-9 argues that John 2: 13-17 conceals Christ's involvement in a substantial guerilla operation which was designed to seize the Temple and launch a violent revolt against Roman rule. But unless the Gospels have completely distorted the events which occurred between the cleansing of the Temple and Christ's arrest (see, for example, Mark 11: 15-14: 50.), then Brandon's account fails to explain how Christ and all his disciples managed to avoid being arrested.)

But be all this as it may. As in the case of Luke 22: 35-38, it is not obvious that the cleansing of the Temple is at all relevant to the Church's discussion of conscientious objection and war. If Christ did whip the traders as well as the oxen and sheep, then John 2: 13-17 merely establishes that Christ was not a pacifist in the sense that he always renounced the use of every kind of force. (Chapter 2, section 1.) It follows, therefore, that conscientious noncombatants who are not pacifists are entitled to claim that neither of the passages which are most often employed in attempts to undermine their negative thesis in fact do so.

3. A defence of the conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis

When I discussed Christ's instruction to buy a sword (Luke 22: 35-38.) and his cleansing of the Temple (John 2: 13-17.) I argued that it is not obvious what these passages have to do with the Church's debate on conscientious objection and war. In particular, I argued that, if these passages undermine anyone's position, they do not undermine those conscientious noncombatants who are not pacifists. And they do not undermine these conscientious noncombatants because the most that these passages establish is that Christ was not a pacifist in the sense that he always renounced the use of every kind of force.

Macgregor, however, goes further and defends the conscientious noncombatant's thesis in a way which creates as large a problem as it solves. In his discussion of the cleansing of the Temple he argues that this incident 'has no relevance whatever to war'. (1936: 17-19.) This point must be granted and even emphasised. A single individual armed with a whip of cords which he uses to drive some traders and their animals out of the Temple, is a long way from the kind of violence which is a typical and essential feature of war. For example, one only has to compare John's record of this incident with Josephus' account of the various activities of the Zealots and the Sicarii to notice how different they are. (Brandon, 1967, and Hengel, 1975, contain useful discussions of typical Zealot and Sicarii guerilla activities.)

But if Macgregor's point must be granted here, then, in fairness, it must also be granted in discussions of Matthew's account of Christ's arrest (26: 51-54.) and Luke's account of how he rebuked James and John when they wished to inflict a punitive miracle on a hostile Samaritan village (9: 51-56.) In other words and more explicitly: if someone who is opposed to the conscientious noncombatant's position may not appeal to John's account of the cleansing of the Temple because 'the passage has no relevance whatever to war', then the same must be said to someone who is sympathetic to the conscientious noncombatant's position and supports his case with an appeal to Matthew's account of Christ's arrest or Luke's account of how he rebuked James and John.

And although Christ's refusal to inflict a punitive miracle on the Samaritan village is certainly a lot more relevant to the conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis than the incidents which surround his arrest, it is not general enough. In addition, this incident is reported only by Luke and this portion of his text is extremely corrupt. I therefore want to accept Macgregor's point as an adequate defence of the conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis. But I want to provide a more secure foundation for the conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis; that is, for the claim that the Gospels contain narratives about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would not have submitted to combat training.

The scholars who produced the Revised Standard Version of Matthew's Gospel treated 4: 23-7: 28 as a single unit. This suggests that what has become known as the Sermon on the Mount actually begins a little earlier than chapter 5 (Bowman and Tapp, 1957: 19-20; and Filson, 1960: 74.):

> And he went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues and preaching the gospel of the kingdom and <u>healing</u> every disease and every infirmity among the people. So his fame spread throughout all Syria, and they brought him all the sick, those afflicted with various diseases and pains, demoniacs, epileptics, and paralytics, and he <u>healed</u> them. (Matthew 4: 23-24; my emphasis.)

This summary of Christ's ministry emphasises his healing ministry. And this aspect of his life is illustrated at various points in Matthew's Gospel. (8: 1-17; 8: 28-9: 8; 9: 18-35; 14: 34-36; 15: 21-31; 17: 14-20; and 20: 29-34.) And when he comes to the end of the series of healing narratives which follows the Sermon on the Mount he comments on this aspect of Christ's ministry with the help of a quotation from Isaiah's description of the Servant:

> This was to fulfil what was spoken by the prophet Isaiah, 'He took our infirmities and bore our diseases'. (Matthew 8: 17. There are usesful comments on Isaiah 53: 1-4 in Robinson, 1928: 72; in Andrews, 1962: 547; and in the RSV marginal notes.)

Christians have not hesitated to interpret the crucifixtion of Christ in terms of Isaiah's Servant. But some commentators seem overanxious to avoid the implications of Matthew's interpretation of his healing ministry. (For example, Filson, 1960: 112.) On the other hand, Suzanne de Diétrich draws the implications:

> Matthew shows us not only the Messiah victorious over sin and death, but also the Suffering Servant who conquers only by taking upon himself the weight of our misery as well as the burden of our faults. Each healing is a battle of the one whom Peter called "the Author of life" (Acts 3: 15.) against the forces of death. (1962: 53. Compare Revelation 21: 4.)

In the light of these few comments and quotations it is possible to argue that the Gospels do contain narratives which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would not have submitted to combat training. And this argument on behalf of the conscientious noncombatant's thesis is certainly relevant to the Church's discussions of war and the imitation of Christ. Healing people and waging war on them are about as incompatible as any two activities can ever be. The understatement which appears on posters and keyrings produced by Mothers' Action for Peace makes this point about the incompatibility of health and war in its own way: War is not healthy for children and other living things. In other words: if one allows oneself to be trained as a combatant, then by no stretch of the imagination is one allowing oneself to be trained to preserve or to restore the physical and mental health of people.

Furthermore, it seems perverse to doubt that the healing of people's bodies and minds was an essential ingredient of Christ's ministry. And it is equally perverse to underesmphasise the significance of his healing ministry. Geza Vermes has argued that if we asked how the authors of the Gospels wished Christ to be known, then we would have to conclude that, for them, 'he was the healer, the physician <u>par excellence</u>'. (1973: 19 and 58.) Some simple statistics support this conclusion. There are 3779 verses in the four Gospels; and 758 of them relate specifically to the healing of physical and mental illness. This is about one-fifth of the Gospel material. Similarly, when one

considers a single Gospel. Nearly 18 per cent of Mark's Gospel is devoted to Christ's healing ministry and the discussions occasioned by it. (Kelsey, 1973: 54.)

But the significance of the healing narratives is not exhausted by this kind of quantitative analysis. Morton T. Kelsey has argued that a careful reading of these incidents reveals that Christ was 'hostile to what made people sick'. (1973: 83.) And James Kallas is anxious to emphasise that most people value mental and physical health. And so he insists that these incidents in Christ's life

> are not to be spiritualized and internalized and considered as outward pictorials of inner events. A healed leper is not a sign of a restored inward tranquility. (1961: 83.)

In other words: there is a sense in which Christ is the most materialistic of any of the important religious leaders because of the interest he showed in the physical and mental health of people. And so it is inconsistent to appeal to Christ's example and to allow oneself to be trained as a combatant; that is, to be trained as someone who is taught how to kill and to seriously injure people.

There is something else to be said for an appeal to Christ's healing ministry to defend the claim that his example supports a refusal to submit to combat training. Conscientious noncombatants who appeal to his example run the risk of being accused of attaching too much significance to isolated incidents in his life, such as the arrest in Gethsemane. But this accusation has no force when it comes to an appeal to Christ's healing ministry. Not only the Gospels, but also the worship and teaching of the Church have always emphasised this aspect of Christ's life. For example, on the Eight Sunday before Easter those who use Liturgy 1975 are reminded that the healing of people's bodies and minds was an essential ingredient of Christ's ministry:

> Almighty and everliving God
> whose Son Jesus Christ healed the sick
> and restored your people to fulness of life:

Look with mercy on the anguish of this world
and by your healing power
make whole both men and nations.

It is obvious, therefore, that both the Gospels and the Collects of the Church attach a great deal of importance to Christ's healing ministry. And so conscientious noncombatants who are armed with this reminder are able to defend their conviction that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would not have submitted to combat training. More specifically, they may argue that even if John's account of the cleansing of the Temple and Luke's record of Christ's instruction to buy a sword are construed as literally as some commentators wish to construe them, then this only establishes that he was not a pacifist. In addition, they may appropriate Macgregor's argument that these passages have 'no relevance whatever to war'. Consequently, those conscientious noncombatants who are not pacifists may defend their negative thesis: the Gospels do not contain narratives about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would have submitted to combat training. And then they may appeal to Christ's healing ministry to defend their positive thesis that the Gospels do contain narratives which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would not have submitted to combat training.

CHAPTER 5

WORSHIP AND THE IMITATION OF CHRIST

When Donald Swann was asked why he refused to submit to combat training, he replied: 'Christ would never sanction war, and I wish to try and follow him'. (1968: 96.) Swann's reply is, of course, an example of only one strand in the Church's long debate about conscientious objection and war. But it is an important strand. On the one hand, it illustrates Lindsay Dewar's conviction that the imitation of Christ is embedded in the very heart of Christian ethics. (1949: 269-272. Compare Osborn, 1940: 138-142 and Robinson, 1971: 100-121.) On the other hand, it is important because someone may be granted exemption from combat training under section 67(3) of the Defence Act only if his religious convictions require him to apply for this exemption. And people who appeal to Christ's example because they worship him satisfy this condition.

But why do some conscientious noncombatants appeal to Christ's example? This question has a straightforward answer: they appeal to his example because they worship him. But this answer is too short

to do justice to the complex connections between conscientious non-combatants and the worship and imitation of Christ. And so I will first demonstrate that the liturgical prayers of the Church as well as the teaching of the New Testament encourage them to appeal to his example. And then I will discuss some formal features of this kind of appeal.

1. The origin of appeals to Christ's example

The imitation of Christ is rooted in the Church's worship and in the devotional life of her members. For example, Thomas á Kempis' The Imitation of Christ has had an immense influence in the Church. And the Revised Service of the Holy Eucharist and Morning and Evening Prayer of the Church of the Province of South Africa contains a Eucharistic Prayer which ends with this petition:

> Grant that as we await the coming of Christ our Saviour in the glory and triumph of his kingdom, we may daily grow into his likeness....(Liturgy 1975: 130. All references are to the Minister's Book.)

Many of the Collects which are used in this Liturgy strike the same note. For example, the Collect for the Eigth Sunday before Christmas invites us to pray that 'we may grow in grace until we are like him'. (Liturgy 1975: 13.) And on the Second Sunday after Christmas we pray that 'we may have the pattern of his life always before our eyes'. (Liturgy 1975: 30.) The Collects for Palm Sunday and for the Fourth Sunday after Pentecost are even more explicit:

> Mercifully grant
> that following the example of his great humility
> we may share with him
> in the glory of his resurrection;
> through Jesus Christ our Lord. (Liturgy 1975: 46.)

> Almighty God
> who gave your only Son
> to be for us both a sacrifice for sin
> and also an example of godly life;

Give us grace
    always to receive him with thankfulness
    as our Saviour and Lord
and in the freedom of your Spirit
    to follow the pattern of his most holy life;
through Jesus Christ our Lord. (Liturgy 1975: 64.)

This emphasis on the imitation of Christ and the importance attached to 'the pattern of his life' does not have its origin in Liturgy 1975. It is an emphasis which is at least as old as the New Testament. In fact, W.D. Davies (1962: 173.) has argued that 'the life of Jesus is the paradigm of the Christian life'; and that much of the ethic in the early Church is 'the imitation of God in Christ'. Similarly, R.W. Hepburn (1966) and Iris Murdoch (1966) have reminded us that some of the ethical teaching of the New Testament does not fit the 'rule-obedience' model which has dominated contemporary British moral philosophy. Instead, a number of passages in the New Testament see our moral endeavour as an attempt to realise a pattern of life or to follow out a pilgrimage.

In any case, for Paul morality is certainly inseparable from the imitation of Christ. And the imitation of Christ is the imitation of God's act in redemption. The act by which someone acknowledged his faith, and began to live a new life, was baptism. (Romans 6:1-14; 1 Corinthians 12: 12-12; Galatian 3: 23-29; and Colossians 2: 9-15.) For example, when Paul wrote to the Romans he saw the whole Christian life as the progressive appropriation of what was done once for all for a Christian at his baptism. And so when he deals with the suggestion that his exposition of the conflict between law and grace implies that we may 'continue in sin that grace may abound', he simply reminds his readers of the significance of their baptism. When they were baptised they went down into the water, from which they subsequently emerged. This, Paul argues, represents dying, being buried and rising again with Christ. The 'dying' he claims is a death to sin; and the 'rising again' is a resurrection to a new way of life. It is absurd, therefore, even to suggest that someone who has been baptised should be indifferent to the moral demands of the Gospel.

But Paul did not only urge the imitation of Christ in baptismal contexts. He urged his readers to imitate certain qualities which are apparent in the life of Christ. For example, he reminds the Christians at Rome that 'Christ did not please himself'. (Romans 15: 3.) He appeals to the Christians at Corinth by reminding them of 'the meekness and gentleness of Christ'; and he urges them to be more generous because, although Christ was rich, he became poor, so that by his poverty they might become rich. (2 Corinthians 10: 1 and 8: 8-9.) In the light of all this, Davies argues that

> the figure of the historical Jesus, as such, played a real part in the moral development of the early church. There can be little doubt that part of the reason for the preservation of stories about the life of Jesus, such as we have in the gospels, was the desire to imitate Jesus... There can be little question that for Paul every Christian is pledged to an attempted ethical conformity to Christ. So also is it with John (John 13) and 1 Peter (2: 21). Thus both as an act of God and as "human", the life of Jesus is the paradigm of the Christian life. (Davies, 1962: 173. Compare Hoskyns, 1947: 440: The behaviour of the disciples of Jesus must be conditioned by His behaviour.)

2. Some formal features of an appeal to Christ's example

This brief survey of one aspect of a contemporary church's liturgy and of some of the most fundamental and characteristic features of Paul's moral and ethical teaching is sufficient to establish the origin of appeals to Christ's example. At the same time, both these surveys explain why some conscientious noncombatants appeal to his example. They worship him. And therefore his example has a more substantial claim on their moral endeavour, and their attempts to realize what they regard as an adequate pattern of life, than any other person or any moral principle. The fact that some conscientious noncombatants do not merely appeal to Christ's example but also worship him is important because it helps to clarify the formal status of such appeals. More specifically, I want to argue that some formal features of appeals to Christ's example are distorted when we ignore the fact that people who make such an appeal also worship him.

A good example of such a distortion is Graeme de Graaff's claim that people who appeal to Christ's example believe that

> to be moral is to live as near as is humanly possible to the way in which Jesus lived, or - since circumstances will keep changing - to live as nearly as we can to the way in which we imaginatively believe that Jesus would act if he were in our shoes now. To fail to try to do this is to be immoral. (1966: 40-42.)

Once he has argued that Christ's example is 'the model for what is good, right and obligatory', de Graaff has no difficulty in raising objections to this position. And his main objection is that this way of connecting Christ's example and morality entails that 'the majority of the world's population is immoral'. But this is an absurd conclusion. And so de Graaff wants to maintain that Christ's example cannot be 'the model for what is good, right and obligatory'.

I think de Graaf's argument and conclusion is correct. At the same time, however, I want to argue that he has misconstrued the reason people appeal to Christ's example. And he has misconstrued some of the formal features of appeals to Christ's example because he has overlooked two important aspects of this kind of appeal. On the one hand, people usually appeal to Christ's example because they worship him. And this is why they want to be more like him. In other words: people who try to imitate Christ do so in the first place, not because they believe that he is 'the model for what is good, right and obligatory, but because worship involves personal abasement before the focus of one's worship. And it is not possible to abase oneself in the required way unless, amongst other things, one tries to be like whatever it is one believes the focus of one's worship is.

On the other hand, de Graaff has overlooked the fact that our moral endeavour does not consist only of more or less rigorous attempts to formulate and to adhere to universalizable moral maxims of the kind which R.M. Hare has discussed in so much detail. (1952 and 1963.) In addition to moral maxims of this kind, our moral endeavour is exemplified by our fascination with, and by our attempts to conform more ad-

equately to, what we regard as an ideal form of life. This point has been well argued by P.F. Strawson. (1974: 26-44; especially 26 and 38.) And the main thrust of his argument is that it is important not to sever the tension between our social morality and our individual ideals. More specifically, he argues that we should confine our social morality to certain general virtues and obligations which are

> a logically or humanly necessary feature of almost any conceivable moral system: these will include the abstract virtue of justice, some form of obligation to mutual aid and to mutual abstention from injury and, in some form and in some degree, the virtue of honesty.

Strawson argues for this minimal amount of social morality because he wants to leave room for, and give due weight to, the fact that 'men make for themselves pictures of ideal forms of life'. And although he does not give any examples to illustrate his general thesis, the conscientious noncombatant's position seems to be an instance of what he has in mind.

Firstly, a conscientious noncombatant is prepared to admit that he has some, very general, obligation to the other members of his society. And he is prepared to accept that he has these obligations even when the other members of his society have decided to go to war to obtain a particular political goal to which they are attached. And so, although he is opposed to war, and is, therefore, not prepared to serve his society as a combatant, he is still willing to train and to serve in a medical corps of his country's defence force.

Secondly, a conscientious noncombatant who appeals to Christ's example to support his convictions is someone who is captivated by a picture of an ideal form of life. This is a form of life in which people refuse to settle their political conflicts and disagreements by waging war on each other. Consequently, although he is not prepared to renounce his general obligations to the other members of his society, he is also not prepared to abandon his ideal. And because his ideal is yoked to his worship of Christ, he is much less inclined to abandon his

refusal to submit to combat training and service than he is to renounce his general obligations to his society. And he is less inclined to abandon his ideal than to renounce his obligations because he believes that the occasions on which he worships Christ are the occasions on which he has an opportunity to appropriate all those things he regards as most essential to his existence. More specifically, the worship of Christ demands his personal abasement before Christ. And this abasement is necessary to vouch for his willingness to have his life transformed by Christ's example. It follows therefore that anyone who worships Christ and is convinced that his example supports the conscientious noncombatant's position will be very loath indeed to abandon his ideal about how he should respond to a war in which his society has embroiled itself.

AN INTERLUDE

THREE PROBLEMS FOR CHRISTIAN CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS

In the first three parts of this essay I explored some of the connections between conscientious objection in South Africa and the worship and imitation of Christ. More specifically, I tried to answer five very general questions: What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? Why are some conscientious noncombatants not selective conscientious noncombatants? Why are some Christians conscientious noncombatants? And why do some conscientious noncombatants appeal to Christ's example?

I have, of course, failed to exhaust these five questions. And I have simply concentrated on those aspects of the matter which interest me most. But there are three other questions which are generated by the Christian conscientious noncombatant's position which I do not want to ignore. I will, therefore, first state these three questions in a summary form; and then I will devote the next three parts of this essay to a more detailed discussion of the problems that I have raised.

Firstly, the question, Why do some conscientious noncombatants appeal to Christ's example?, has a straightfoward answer. They worship him and many of the liturgical prayers which they use encourage them to try to follow his example. But this straightforward answer generates a more complex question in which I am interested. Why do some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ? And this question is much more complex because one is tempted to say that they worship him because he is a god. Unfortunately, this answer is not as innocent as it may seem to be because it assumes that we know what counts as a god. And so I will oppose this innocent answer by trying to defend two theses. Firstly, I will argue that a traditional answer to the question, What counts as a god?, generates a paradox which can be construed as a proof that there are no gods. Secondly, I will argue that, just as there is no general, non-idiosyncratic answer to the question, Why does x love y?, so there is no general, non-idiosyncratic answer to the question, Why does x worship y? In other words: I will argue that people do not worship Christ because he is a god. On the contrary, he is a god because they worship him.

Secondly, does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance? This question arises because Romans 13: 1 - Let every person be subject to the governing authorities - is often used to argue that a conscientious noncombatant who is refused exemption from combat training in his country's defence force ought to comply with his government's demands. I will reply to this line of attack and argue that it fails to distinguish civil disobedience and conscientious noncompliance. In addition, it rests on a misunderstanding of what the Greek word hupotassesthō means.

Thirdly, is there a prescription for servile compliance? A conscientious noncombatant ought to face this question because he usually assumes that if he is refused exemption from combat training in his country's defence force, he will be able to resist his government's demand that he comply with his conscription orders. Unfortunately, Stanley Milgram's experimental work on obedience to authority suggests that people find it extremely difficult to resist authoritarian orders which conflict with their conscientious convictions. (1974.) I will therefore rehearse Milgram's experiments in some detail; and then I will argue that those conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ have an effective prescription for servile compliance.

PART FOUR

CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMBATANTS WHO WORSHIP CHRIST

Most conscientious noncombatants who appeal to Christ's example do not have a detached interest in what he said and did. On the contrary, they worship him. And therefore his example has a more substantial claim on their moral endeavour, and on their attempt to realize what they regard as an adequate pattern of life, than any other person or any moral principle. This line of defence for the legitimacy of a conscientious noncombatant's appeal to Christ's example is to the point. In particular, this line of argument helps to illuminate some of the formal features of an appeal to his example. But it does not explain why some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ. It simply notes that they do; and then it employs this fact to correct some distorted evaluations of an appeal to his example. I therefore want to explore the question which this line of argument ignores.

CHAPTER 6

THE CONCEPT OF DEITY AND THE WORSHIP OF CHRIST

Why do some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ? I will argue that there is no general, non-idiosyncratic answer to this question. And I will do so in opposition to Ninian Smart's conviction that some people worship Christ because he is a god. (1972: 3 and 31-34.) This suggests that people worship him because he has some properties which are independent of the fact that he is the focus of their worship. In reply to Smart I will argue that Christ is a god simply because of the sentiments and ritual attitudes of those who believe in and worship him.

In other words: Smart and I agree that Christ counts as a god. But we do not agree why he does. Smart believes that he is a god because he has sufficient divine properties to count as a god. On the other hand, I want to argue that he is a god because some people worship him. But if my argument is more successful than Smart's, then it would be circular to say that some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ because he is a god. What we should say instead is that

Christ is a god because some people worship him. In addition, we should say that there is no general, non-idiosyncratic answer to the question, Why do they worship him?

Smart is prepared to admit that there is a sense in which the concept of a god, like the concept of an uncle, is a relational one. But at the same time he wants to claim that a god, like an uncle, 'exists in his own right, however much he may be defined by the relationship'. At the same time and in a similar vein, he argues that we should resist the temptation to say that

> if all human beings and other worshipping creatures were to be wiped out there would be no....gods, just as if all my nephews get killed I am no longer an uncle.

Smart therefore wants to know what properties a god has other than being the focus of some people's worship. And he suggests that a god is an incorporeal person who, apart from being invisible, is omnipresent and, in general, vastly more superior than corporeal persons or human beings.

But Smart's objection to the view that, for example, Jesus Christ is a god because of his followers' sentiments and ritual attitudes towards him turns on a questionable assumption. This is the assumption that the concept of a god is more like the concept of a woman than like the concept of a wife. I however want to advocate the converse of Smart's assumption; namely that the concept of a god is more like the concept of a wife than like the concept of a woman. And I want to advocate this approach to the problem of what counts as a god even though I do not command an argument which compels anyone to adopt the same stance. In any case, Smart seems to be in the same boat because he has not advanced an argument which compels anyone to adopt his stance. In addition, while his approach to the question about what counts as a god generates a proof that there are no gods, mine does not. In fact, one of the advantages of the view which I want to advocate is that it helps us to avoid this proof.

I will, therefore, first deal with this aspect of the matter, and

then I will present the rest of my case as an attempt to answer four questions: Is 'god' a monadic or a dyadic predicate? What is involved when one worships and believes in a god? Are there any non-idiosyncratic reasons for belief in and worship of a particular god? Is it ever appropriate to worship anyone?

1. Are there any gods?

According to Smart, a god is an incorporeal person who, apart from being invisible, is omnipresent and vastly more superior than corporeal persons or human beings. This suggests that he would approve of the concept of a god which is embedded in the first of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England:

> There is but one living and true God, eternal, without body, parts, or passions, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the maker and preserver of all things both visible and invisible. (Moss, 1961: 7.)

Unfortunately, the belief that someone is a god only if he is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and perfectly good may be used to generate a formal proof that there are no gods. And it is possible to generate a proof of this kind because it is reasonable to suppose

(a) that there is at least one person who suffers from leukemia, or from some other incurable disease for which neither her nor anyone else is responsible; and

(b) that anyone who has access to this person, and who knows that he has leukemia and who is able to cure him will do so; unless, of course, he is extremely unconcerned about the suffering of others and therefore not at all benevolent. (The qualification in (a) is important because it rules out the Free-will Defence against the paradox of evil.)

This concrete description of an instance of suffering is formidable enough. For many a would-be believer this kind of suffering constitutes an insuperable psychological barrier to belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and perfectly good god. But

there is another way in which all this information can be presented; namely, as a purely logical proof that there are no gods. The argument draws on Smart's characterisation of a god and proceeds in five stages to the conclusion that there are no gods of this kind:

Premise 1: Someone is a god only if he is omniscient and omnipresent and perfectly good and omnipotent.

Premise 2: Someone has leukemia.

Premise 3: If someone has leukemia, then anyone who is able to cure leukemia and is omniscient and omnipresent is not perfectly good.

Premise 4: Anyone who is not able to cure leukemia is not omnipotent.

Premise 5: Anyone is either able to cure leukemia or he is not.

Therefore: Nobody is a god.

Smart is under a logical compulsion to accept this conclusion unless, of course, he can demonstrate that the argument is invalid or that at least one of the premises is false. But it does not seem that either of these demonstrations can be provided.

Is the argument valid?

This question need not delay us. The first step is to correlate the predicates which occur in the argument with predicate symbols:

c = is able to cure leukemia
d = is a god
g = is perfectly good
l = has leukemia

o = is omnipotent
p = is omnipresent
s = is omniscient

The second step towards a demonstration that the argument is valid is a proof in elementary formal logic:

1.	VxCdxKKKsxpxgxox	Premise 1
2.	Eyly	Premise 2
3.	CEylyVxCKKcxsxpxNgx	Premise 3
4.	VxCNcxNox	Premise 4
5.	VxAcxNcx	Premise 5
6.	VxCKKcxsxpxNgx	MP 2 + 3
7.	CKKcxsxpxNgx	UI 6
8.	CcxCKsxpxNgx	Export 7
9.	CNcxNox	UI 4
10.	AcxNcx	UI 5
11.	KCcxCKsxpxNgxCNcxNox	Conj. 8 + 9
12.	ACKsxpxNgxNox	CD 10 + 11
13.	AAANsxNpxNgxNox	Imp. + DeM 12
14.	NKKKsxpxgxox	DeM 13
15.	CdxKKKsxpxgxox	UI 1

16.	Ndx	MT 14 + 15
17.	VxNdx	UG 16
18.	NExdx	QNeg. 17

This proof is sufficient to demonstrate that if one accepts Smart's claim that someone is a god only if he is vastly more superior than human beings in the sense that he is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and perfectly good, then it follows that there is a valid argument for the conclusion that there are no gods. But a valid argument is not necessarily sound. What is required, therefore, is a demonstration that none of this argument's premises are false.

Are all the premises true?

This question is no more difficult to answer than the previous one. Premise 1 is simply the whole or part of Smart's characterisation of a god; and therefore he, at least, cannot dispute its truth. Premise 2 is an empirical claim; but unless one is prepared to invoke an extreme form of scepticism, it is true that there is at least one person who has leukemia. Premise 4 trades on the fact that someone is omnipotent if, and only if, he can do anything whatsoever. And premise 5 embodies the principle of the excluded middle. Apart from premise 2, therefore, the four premises which have been considered are not only true, but necessarily true. And they are necessarily true in the sense that they appeal either to a principle of logic (premise 5.); or to the conventional meaning of the word 'omnipotent' (premise 4.); or to the necessary condition which, according to Smart, must be satisfied by anyone who counts as a god (premise 1.). And although premise 2 is not necessarily true, it would be extremely silly to claim that it may be false.

What, then, about premise 3? Is it true that if someone has leukemia, then anyone who is able to cure leukemia and is omniscient

and omnipresent is not perfectly good? I will draw on Nelson Pike's list of morally sufficient reasons for not helping someone to argue that premise 3 is also true. (1964: 90-93.) In addition, I will assume that part of what we mean by saying that someone is good is that he is not indifferent to the illness and suffering of others and that he tries to relieve their suffering and cure their illness whenever he can. Armed with this assumption, it is easy to list all the circumstances in which someone could be said to have a morally sufficient reason for not curing someone who has leukemia:

1. Someone who is not able to cure leukemia has a morally sufficient reason for not curing it.

2. Someone who is able to cure leukemia, but who does not have the means of knowing about a particular case of leukemia, has a morally sufficient reason for not curing it.

3. Someone who is able to cure leukemia and who has the means of knowing about a particular case of leukemia, but who as a matter of fact does not know about it, has a morally sufficient reason for not curing it.

4. Someone who knows of an instance of leukemia and who has the ability to cure it, but who does not know that he has this ability, has a morally sufficient reason for not curing it.

5. Someone who knows of an instance of leukemia and who knows that he has the ability to cure it, but who does not have access to the person in question, has a morally sufficient reason for not curing it.

These are certainly circumstances in which someone who fails to cure an instance of leukemia could be said to have a morally sufficient reason for his failure to cure it. But is someone who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent ever in any of these positions? An omnipotent being is never in the first and second of these positions because someone who cannot cure leukemia or who does not have the means

of knowing about a particular case of leukemia is not someone who can do anything whatsoever. In addition, it is difficult to see how someone who is omnipresent and omniscient is ever in a position where he does not have the means of knowing about a particular case of leukemia. Similarly, someone who is omniscient is never in the third and fourth position because someone who does not know about a particular case of leukemia or who does not know that he has the ability to cure it is not someone who knows everything which can be known. Finally, someone who is omnipresent is never in the fifth position because someone who does not have access to everyone who has leukemia is not someone who is everywhere.

In the face of all these considerations it seems as though someone who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent does not have a morally sufficient reason for not curing someone who has leukemia. Consequently, it seems as though we must either deny that anyone is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent or conclude that, if there is someone who has all these characteristics, he is not perfectly good. But neither of these alternatives is able to block the conclusion that there are no gods of the kind Smart has described because, according to him, someone is a god only if he is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and perfectly good.

Smart may, however, maintain that there is another reason which is a morally sufficient ground for not curing someone's leukemia. He may argue that someone who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and perfectly good may nevertheless not cure someone's leukemia because to do so would be to fail to bring about some greater good; a good which is brough about only by that person having leukemia and which far outweighs its negative value. This argument has some merit. If an ordinary human being, or a god who was less than vastly superior to human beings in the sense of not being omnipotent, were in such a position, then he would certainly have a morally sufficient reason for not curing someone's leukemia. But it is not at all clear that these circumstances provide an omnipotent god with morally sufficient reasons for not curing someone's leukemia. And this is not clear because it

is hard to believe that an omnipotent god cannot find some other way in which he can bring about whatever good is brought about by someone's suffering from leukemia.

These reasons seem to be sufficient to demonstrate that if someone has leukemia, then anyone who is able to cure leukemia and is omniscient and omnipresent is not perfectly good. And if this is accepted, then all the premises of the valid argument for the conclusion that there are no gods are true. But if this is the case, then that argument is not only valid, it is sound. And so it follows that there are no gods of the kind which Smart has in mind. Unfortunately, this argument does not refute his more general claim that a god has properties other than being the focus of some believers worship. It only demonstrates that a god cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and perfectly good. Alternatively and more guardedly, this argument demonstrates that if one claims that someone counts as a god only if he has all these characteristics, then one unleashes an extremely complex debate which is at least as old as Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) (Pike, 1964, contains a number of important contributions to this debate.) In either case, therefore, it is worth exploring the suggestion which Smart has rejected; namely, that a god can be defined exclusively by the sentiments and ritual attitudes of those who worship him. And it is worth exploring this suggestion because it does not generate the paradox of evil which can be construed as a proof that there are no gods.

2. Is 'god' a monadic or a dyadic predicate?

Smart's case rests on the assumption that the concept of a god is more like the concept of a woman than like the concept of a wife. But the question, Is the word 'god' more like the word 'woman' or more like the word 'wife'?, may not be all that clear. I therefore want to make some preliminary observations about some of the differences between our grounds for an application of 'woman' and those for an application of 'wife'. And I will begin with some of the problems which arise when we have to answer questions like 'Is x a woman?' and 'Is x a wife?',

where x stands for a gap which needs to be completed by a uniquely referring expression such as a proper name or a definite description.

The question, Is x a woman?, has often been asked about various competitors in women's athletic events. It was asked, for example about some of the competitors in the 1966 European and the 1968 and 1972 Olympic Games. And in 1966 the fact that a number of athletes who were entered for the women's events refused to appear before a panel of doctors created considerable controversy. But even with a panel of doctors and a medical examination it is not as easy to decide which human beings are women as dedicated readers of Playboy may imagine.

Although human beings, like most other animals, divide into male and female on the basis of different anatomical and physiological characteristics, it may take more than a glance or two to tell the difference. In Bali, for example, men and women lack the differentiation of physique which is a visible sex difference in Western countries. They have been described as a 'hermaphroditic' people because they have little sex differential in height, and both sexes have broad shoulders and narrow hips. They do not run to curves and muscles, to body hair or to breasts of any size. Apparently, it is extremely difficult for a Westerner to tell men and women apart, even from the front. (Oakley, 1972: 30. The whole of chapter 1 deals with the problem of telling the girls from the boys.)

It is clear from all this that there is no simple criterion or set of criteria which we can use to decide which human beings are women. And even within a single culture there are borderline cases in which a particular person does not have all or the most characteristic features of one of the two sexes. Within a single culture, however, the question as to who are men and who are women is, in general, not a matter for dispute. This is because the borderline cases are the exception and not the rule; consequently, we do not need to harp on them. And, in general, the question whether a particular person is a man or a woman is settled on any given occasion by fairly straightforward observational procedures. In other words and in Western countries: we

usually only have to look to see that a particular person's anatomical features are those which we have decided belong to men or to women, as the case may be.

So much for questions about who count as women. What about those questions about who count as wives? How, for example, do we proceed if we want to discover how many wives competed in the 1972 Olympic Games? If for the moment we ignore borderline cases and sophistical moves like the postulation of a lesbian or homosexual marriage with its specialized use of the word 'wife', then it is no more difficult to discover how many wives competed in the 1972 Olympic Games than it is to discover how many women did. And this is because, in general and at any given time, every woman is either married or not married.

But while it is in principle and in general no more difficult to decide who count as wives than it is to decide who count as women, the former decision or discovery is based on a very different set of procedures. More precisely, one simply cannot discover whether a woman is married, and therefore counts as a wife, on the basis of anatomical and physiological considerations. And part of the reason for this is that the word 'wife' is a dyadic predicate whereas 'woman' is a monadic one. In other words and perhaps more clearly: in general, a woman is a wife if, and only if, she stands in the complex relationship of marriage to at least one man. On the other hand, a person is a woman simply because she has a certain set of anatomical and physiological characteristics.

Another important difference between a word like 'wife' and one like 'woman' is that the rules for the application of the former are based on cultural considerations whereas the rules for the application of the latter are determined by physical and biological ones. Furthermore and in general: the word 'woman' applies to someone in a fixed and permanent way in which the word 'wife' does not. In other words: while a woman may cease to be a spinister but never return to that status, she may at various other periods of her life be a wife, a divorcee or a widow. But if she is not a spinister, a woman is always someone's wife, ex-wife or widow. On the other hand and in general: a woman

only ceases to be a woman when she dies and is buried.

A great deal more could, of course, be said about my two examples about the general difference between dyadic predicates like 'wife' and monadic ones like 'woman'. But I think enough has been said to indicate what I am driving at with the question: Is the word 'god' a monadic predicate and therefore more like the word 'woman'; or is it a dyadic predicate and therefore more like the word 'wife'?

This question raises a number of substantial issues. But I am more interested in a number of formal points which it brings to mind. The most important consequence of a decision to construe the word 'god' as a monadic predicate is that the question, Is x a god? resolves itself into a question about whether or not x has divine characteristics. And the question, Has x divine characteristics?, is on all fours with the question, Has x female characteristics? But to answer a question about whether or not x has divine characteristics we require criteria of the same kind as doctors and zoologists employ for telling the girls from the boys. If, therefore, we decide that the word 'god' is a monadic predicate like 'woman', then we are forced to decide upon a set of criteria which are formally similar to those by means of which we usually tell the girls from the boys. At the same time we will have committed ourselves to the view that a god is a peculiar kind of person in the way in which a woman is a peculiar kind of person. (According to the Oxford English Dictionary, peculiar = particular, special, unlike others, singular.) And finally, if we adopt this view of the matter, then we will have to say something about how one discovers that a particular person has or does not have the kind of characteristics which we have decided upon as the necessary qualifications for being counted as a god.

Smart, for example, has adopted this option. According to him gods are incorporeal persons who are omnipresent and, in general, vastly more powerful than and superior to corporeal persons or human beings. But one soon encounters two sets of problems if one adopts the view that a god is this kind of person. On the one hand, one is forced to explain how one discovers whether or not a particular person is invisi-

ble, omnipresent and vastly more superior and powerful than human beings. And near the bottom of this well ploughed field one encounters the paradox of evil as well as Antony Flew's question: Just how does what you call an invisible, intanglible, eternally elusive person differ from an imaginary person or even from no person at all? (Flew and Macintyre, 1955: 96-99.) On the other hand, even if one does manage to provide an adequate answer to Flew's question; and, more strongly, even if one manages to demonstrate that there are incorporeal persons of the kind Smart has in mind, a question like the one with which we began still remains: Which of these incorporeal persons, if any, are gods?

I do not know how to demonstrate that these two questions and the problems which they raise are insuperable objections to Smart's position. But it seems that a demonstration that there are persons of the kind Smart has in mind does not settle the question of what, if anything, counts as a god. Being an incorporeal person of this kind could, at best, count as a necessary condition of being a god. In any case, I will leave the matter here, because I am more interested in an exploration of the possibility which Smart has rejected; namely, the possibility that gods can be defined exclusively by the sentiments and ritual attitudes of those who worship and believe in them.

If one decides that the word 'god' is a dyadic predicate, and therefore more like the word 'wife' than like the word 'woman', then the question of whether or not a particular person is a god must be handled very differently from the way in which Smart has handled it. In particular, if my earlier remarks about the word 'wife' are accurate and may serve as an exploration of what counts as a god, then there are two sets of questions which must first be distinguished from and then related to each other. If we use 'wife' as an example, then these two sets of questions are as follows:

(a) Since 'wife' is a dyadic predicate, questions about the nature of the relation which holds between a husband and a wife need to be explored.

(b) Since 'wife' is a dyadic predicate, we need to ask ques-

tions about the kind of persons who can enter into the relationship of marriage.

And if questions about which persons count as gods are equally complex and formally similar to questions about which persons count as wives, then we need to ask both about the nature of the relation which holds between a believer and his god and about the kind of persons who can enter this relationship. I therefore want to explore these two sets of questions in some detail.

3. What is involved when one believes in and worships a god?

I want to suggest that just as being married is a necessary and sufficient condition of being a wife, so being worshipped is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of being a god. A person is a god, in other words, if and only if he has been or is being worshipped. And a person is a wife if and only if she has a husband who loves her or, less romantically, has participated with her in a marriage ceremony or contract.

The qualification in this account of what it is to be a wife is important because it points to the fact that it is by no means easy to characterise the complex relationship of marriage and therefore the terms of this relationship. Here are only two of the questions which come to mind when one begins to explore the concept of marriage:

(a) Are the concepts of marriage, of a husband and of a wife, characterised adequately by a completely formal, legal, contractual and ceremonial definition; or is it necessary to include references to the behaviour or what we usually call the 'feelings' of the two parties towards each other?

No short answer to this question is an adequate one. People simply disagree on the relative importance of the legal-ceremonial as opposed to the emotional-behavioural elements which are involved in the marriage relationship. And there is no good reason for the total ex-

clusion of one of the two sets of elements. But the importance we attach to each may, and in fact should, vary from context to context. Formal contexts such as court proceedings require formal emphases. Other contexts such as courtship, ethical discussions, marriage counselling and literature require emotional and behavioural emphases.

(b) Are there any inappropriate emotional and behavioural expressions of a husband's love and affection for his wife?

Once again the question opens up a complex and controversial field. In particular, it is important not to confuse two kinds of answer which can be given to the question; namely, ethical and factual ones. The factual answers to the question tabulate how husbands in fact express their affections for the person or persons to whom they are married. Here it is possible to observe differences between the habits and customs of various societies or social classes. At the same time it is possible to observe personal eccentricities. And when one adopts an ethical perspective on this question it is important to remember that whether or not a particular emotion or piece of behaviour counts as an appropriate expression of affection cannot be settled without reference to the views of the people most intimately involved. What may strike an outsider as perverse, if not perverted, behaviour may well be not only acceptable but even desired by both the husband and the wife in question. But when these distinctions have been drawn and these observations made we have by no means avoided all the controversial issues. For example, does a husband have obligations and responsibilities to his wife or wives, and conversely? If so, what are they? And how, if at all, do they conflict with other obligations and responsibilities?

The notion of belief in and worship of one or more gods is neither less complex nor less controversial. Here too it is important to distinguish formal-ceremonial and emotional-behavioural elements in the relationship between a believer and his god or gods. Although the point was too obvious to make in connection with the relationship between a husband and a wife, there is an inescapable cognitive element in a believer's belief in and worship of his god or gods. In

other words: a believer cannot avoid, and should not try to avoid, having to make and to substantiate factual claims about whom he believes in and worships. And the same need exists both to isolate and to relate factual and ethical questions and answers about how a believer expresses or ought to express his love for and loyalty to his god or gods. As in the case of a husband, this love and loyalty are expressed in emotional, behavioural and ritual terms; and therefore the same questions about their propriety and about mutual responsibilities and obligations arise.

All this, of course, requires much more discussion than I have allowed. I will, however, leave the matter more or less where it is; because all that I set out to do was to establish that a detailed exploration of the analogy between the concept of marriage and the concept of worship sheds some light on what counts as a god. And I have said enough to support two contentions. The first is that a stipulative definition of what is involved either in marriage or in worship is of little or no help to anyone because both these relational activities are highly personal affairs. The second contention is that there is no good reason to object to the suggestion that just as the complex relationship of being married is a necessary and sufficient condition of someone's being a wife, so the complex relationship of being believed in and worshipped is a necessary and sufficient condition of being a god.

4. Are there any non-idiosyncratic reasons for belief in and worship of a particular god?

But although all this is probably enough to make the two points I want to make, one more question is in order. If the concept of a god is more like the concept of a wife than like the concept of a woman, then a question which comes to mind is this: Are there any non-idiosyncratic reasons for one's belief in and worship of a particular god? For example, are there any non-idiosyncratic reasons for one's belief in and worship of Jesus Christ?

And, if the analogy between the concept of a wife and that of a god

holds, then this question must be answered in the negative. After all, there is nothing either self-contradictory or non-idiosyncratic about a decision to remain a bachelor or to be a misogamist. And there is no non-idiosyncratic reason for asking one woman rather than another to be one's wife. Similarly, there is nothing self-contradictory about a decision not to worship and believe in a god; and no non-idiosyncratic reason for belief in and worship of one god rather than another.

This analogy therefore suggests that to be an atheist it is not necessary to deny that there are any gods. One can be an atheist simply by one's decision not to believe in and worship anyone. And this account of what it is to be an atheist sheds some light on the strange fact that some claim that there are no gods even when they would not want to claim that, say Jesus Christ does not exist. ('There are no gods' and 'Jesus Christ does not exist' have to be interpreted as tenseless or timeless sentences in this context. Alternatively, they have to be replaced, respectively, by 'There have never been any gods' and 'Jesus Christ never existed'.)

In other words: this analogy enables us to distinguish a number of questions which are often conflated when the rival claims of atheism and theism are under debate; questions like; Does or did x exist? Is x a god? Is x your god? Ought one to have a god? These questions, I want to maintain, are on all fours with and illuminated by questions like: Does or did y exist? Is y your wife? Ought one to have a wife?

At this point, however, someone may want to argue that any plausibility my claim may have is due to the plausibility or otherwise of the analogy which I have pursued. In fact, someone may want to object that this is one of the points at which the analogy between the concept of a god and the concept of a wife drives one in Smart's direction; that is, towards the claim that a god exists in his own right and has properties other than those of being an object of worship. At the same time the analogy raises the propriety of belief in and worship of anyone. I therefore want to shift my emphasis from questions about the

nature of the relationship between a god and a believer to questions about the kind of persons whom a believer can believe in and worship.

5. Is it ever appropriate to worship anyone?

It seems to be inconsistent to claim that

A. x is y's wife but x is not a woman.

And if A is inconsistent, then this would explain why some would contend that my analogy could be used to support Smart's conviction that a god exists in his own right and has properties other than those of being an object of worship. Smart wants to maintain

B. x is y's god but x is not an incorporeal person who...

is inconsistent. On the other hand, although I am as convinced as Smart is that gods are persons, I am not convinced that being an incorporeal or any other kind of person is a necessary condition of being a god.

The basic difference therefore between Smart's position and mine is this: Smart is convinced that

C. x is a god, if and only if, x is a person and x is incorporeal and x is omnipresent and x is ...

I however want to advocate that we adopt the following set of necessary and sufficient conditions of someone's being a god:

D. x is a god, if and only if, x is a person and there is someone who worships x.

And the trouble is that I command neither an argument which compels anyone to adopt C nor an argument which compels them to adopt D. How,

then, can this disagreement be resolved? The only suggestion which I have is to explore further the analogy between the concept of a god and that of a wife. I therefore want to consider the two sentence frames

E. x is y's wife

F. x is y's god

and the questions: What, if anything, satisfies these two sentence frames? And is it ever appropriate to worship anyone?

A number of philosophers would want to maintain that it is inappropriate to complete the x berth in sentence frame F with the name of an incorporeal person. Jonathan Barnes, for example, has argued that a god cannot be an incorporeal person: if gods are persons and persons are essentially corporeal, then, if gods are incorporeal

> it follows that any God is both corporeal and incorporeal; so that it is a necessary truth that there are no Gods. (1972:84.)

Barnes admits that his argument turns on the controversial assumption that persons are essentially corporeal. Nevertheless he wants to maintain that

> it is...becoming clear that persons are essentially corporeal: the principle of identification which the sortal term "person" supplies rests ultimately on bodily continuity.

I am by no means as convinced as Barnes is that persons are essentially corporeal. This assumption has its roots in that concept of a person which P.F. Strawson calls 'ours', even though it is not mine. And Strawson and other have conflated the concept of a person and that of a human being, in the technical sense of homo sapiens. (Moulder, 1972 and 1973, advances arguments on behalf of this claim.)

Be that as it may. At this stage of the argument I have other fish to fry. For the moment, therefore, I will simply grant Barnes his controversial assumption that persons are essentially corporeal. This of course amounts to granting that it is a necessary truth that there are no gods of the kind which Smart has in mind. And therefore it amounts to granting that it is inappropriate to complete the x berth in sentence frame F with the name of an incorporeal person.

This is however not the end of the matter; and partly because of the vagueness of the word 'inappropriate'. It could be maintained that even if we grant someone like Barnes the controversial assumption that persons are essentially corporeal, then we have simply cottoned on to one of the ways in which it is inappropriate to complete sentence frame F. This is a fair charge and therefore I want to note some of the ways in which the word 'inappropriate' and its close relations are used. The basic word seems to be 'proper' and is used with four more or less distinct emphases:

(1) It is sometimes used to demarcate that which is distinctive, special, peculiar, individual, intrinsic or inherent about something or other from that which is unessential, peripheral and incidental. For example, the proper field of architecture is the design of buildings and perhaps also the supervision of their construction; as distinct from such subsidiary concerns as sculpture and plumbing. It would therefore be inappropriate under normal conditions to regard sculpture or plumbers as architects.

(2) The word 'proper' is also used to indicate that something or other is apt, fit, suitable or adapted to some purpose or requirement. In this sense it is used with a certain pragmatic emphasis. The 'proper man for the job' is the one who is best suited to undertake the work in question. And it is important that such strategies as generals engage in be planned for the proper time and in the proper way.

(3) This pragmatic emphasis is not far removed from an emphasis in terms of which something or other is regarded as decent, decorous, con-

forming to etiquette or the demands and usages of society. In this sense 'proper' has the same force as 'respectable' and things like books, behaviour at parties and what have you, are judged in good or in bad taste.

(4) The emphasis on good manners shades off into a stronger use of the word in which 'proper' has the same force as 'moral' and 'improper' that of 'immoral'.

These four emphases which are tied to the use of 'proper', and therefore of 'inappropriate', are not easily disentangled. But before I demonstrate how difficult it is to control an argument about the propriety or otherwise of belief in and worship of a particular god, I want to consider some problems which arise from particular completions of sentence frame E; that is, from particular completions of '_x_ is _y_'s wife'.

In the vast majority of cases _x_ would, of course, be replaced by a uniquely referring expression which refers to a woman and _y_ by one which refers to a man. Would it be inappropriate however to complete the sentence frame with two uniquely referring expressions which refer either to two men or to two women? The answer to this question must be a qualified one: someone who objected either to homosexual marriage or to one or both of the parties being a hermaphrodite would regard such a completion of this sentence frame as inappropriate. But someone who had no such objection would not. And the important point is that the reasons each would advance would no longer be the kind of metaphysical arguments which ruled out uniquely referring expressions which, if they do so at all, refer to incorporeal persons. Instead, the ground covered by this debate would be ethical as well as that covered by social customs and habits.

Someone who regarded homosexual marriage as improper could, for example, advance any of these reasons for his view. He could argue that there is something distinctive, intrinsic or inherent about a woman which makes her an appropriate object of a man's love, respect and

loyalty; and therefore that these female characteristics are absent in the case of a male. He could however also advance pragmatic reasons for his objections and claim, for example, that one man cannot satisfy another's sexual and other personal needs. Such a marriage could, of course, be construed as indecent and in bad taste. And finally, some would argue that such a marriage conflicted with a certain set of ethical principles.

These observations are sufficient to indicate that questions about the propriety or otherwise of whom one marries are extremely complex. But there are other contexts in which there could be disagreement over the appropriateness of particular completions of the sentence frame '_x_ is _y_'s wife'. Consider, for example, some problems which are created by the fact that the concept of marriage has both a legal-ceremonial and an emotional-behavioural background. Some people would, for instance, argue that a marriage must be legally contracted and would therefore draw a distinction between what could be called a _de facto_ and _de jure_ wife. Another complication is that some societies and groups refuse to recognise the legality of another society's or another group's marriage contract or ceremony. And then there are those who want to remove the discussion from the legal to the emotional-behavioural sphere. And they want to insist that unless a particular person behaves like a wife she is not one, even though she may be legally married. At the extreme end of this discussion are the views of misogamists who regard any and every form of marriage as inappropriate because they disapprove of marriage as such. And not far removed from this position are the views of those anxious bachelors who regard the whole concept as problematic.

Problems and disputes which arise from various completions of the sentence frame '_x_ is _y_'s god', are no less controversial and complex. Here too it is impossible to control arguments about the propriety or otherwise of one's attitudes and ritual behaviour. If, for example, someone is convinced that incorporeality, omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence are the distinctive, intrinsic and inherent characteristics of a god, then a necessary condition of anyone's being worshipped

is that he or she have these characteristics. Insistence on this point however would raise two sets of problems. Firstly, who is incorporeal, omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent as well as the actual referent of a uniquely referring expression? Secondly, incorporeality, omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence are, at best, only necessary conditions of being a god. And therefore, even if there are such persons, there is no reason why all or any of them should be believed in and worshipped. In other words: just as an encounter with a woman who has certain female characteristics, say, f_1, f_2 and f_3, does not entail an ipso facto response in terms of love and marriage, so an encounter with a person who has certain divine characteristics, say, d_1, d_2 and d_3, does not entail an ipso facto response in terms of belief and worship. But without such worship the person in question could hardly count as a god.

A particular completion of 'x is y's god' would also be regarded as inappropriate if the x in question did not seem to have the ability to fulfill the claims made on his or her behalf by y. Objections of this kind would therefore be based on pragmatic considerations. For example, if y claimed that x loved him and yet there was no evidence of x's love for y, then this particular completion of the sentence frame would be problematic and could become inappropriate. Similarly, if x were merely an ordinary human being, then it would be problematic and perhaps inappropriate to talk about x in the present tense after x has died.

Objections to a particular completion of 'x is y's god' on the grounds of good taste or because of ethical considerations are too complex to be handled briefly to any useful purpose. The only observation I want to make is that here it is important to distinguish between personal and impersonal completions of this sentence frame. But this raises questions which have already been heard; questions about the idiosycracy or otherwise of one's belief in and worship of a particular person. And these questions drive one towards the whole question of whether it is rational to believe in and worship anyone. This question however is not only as complex and controversial as the question of

whether it is rational to love and marry anyone. It is also a question which is more appropriate at the beginning rather than at the end of an investigation.

I therefore want to stop this exploration of what counts as a god. But I want to conclude with the observation that belief in and worship of one's god is not something one does because one has been convinced by an indestructible argument that one must do so. In particular, it is important to note that to believe is a tendency or attitude. As Ryle has observed:

> 'Belief' can be qualified by such adjectives as 'obstinate', 'wavering', 'unswerving', 'unconquerable', 'stupid', 'fanatical', 'whole-hearted', 'intermittent', 'passionate', and 'childlike', adjectives some or all of which are appropriate to such nouns as 'trust', 'loyalty', 'bent', 'aversion', 'hope', 'habit', 'zeal' and 'addiction'. Beliefs, like habits, can be inveterate, slipped into and given up; like partisanships, devotions and hopes they can be blind and obsessing; like aversions and phobias they can be unacknowledged; like fashions and tastes they can be contagious; like loyalties and animosities they can be induced by tricks. A person can be urged or entreated not to believe things, and he may try, with or without success, to cease to do so. Sometimes a person says truly, 'I cannot help believing so and so'. (Ryle, 1949: 133-134.)

I have not quoted this passage to bolster my argument by an appeal to authority. I have quoted it to remind myself and others that the relationship which exists between Christ and those conscientious noncombatants who appeal to his example because they worship him is even more complex than my inquiry suggests. And so my arguments do not exhaust what is involved in someone's worship of and belief in a particular god. Nevertheless, they do demonstrate that there is no general, non-idiosyncratic answer to the question, Why do some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ?

We are, therefore, back to where we started. We know why some conscientious noncombatants appeal to Christ's example. They worship him. And the liturgy of the Church encourages them to try to follow his example. On the other hand, it is not at all obvious why, in the

first place, they worship him. In particular, it is not at all obvious that they do so because he is a god. And this is not obvious because it is possible to argue that he is a god only because some people worship him.

But although there is no cut and dried explanation of why some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ, this inquiry has established and emphasised that they only appeal to his example because they worship him. In addition, this inquiry has reminded us that they worship him for highly personal and idiosyncratic reasons. And so they do not have a detached interest in what he said and did. On the contrary, their convictions about him are largely determined by what the Church's liturgy has to say about him. In other words: conscientious noncombatants who appeal to Christ's example may be exempted from combat training under section 67(3) of the Defence Act because they have religious grounds for their refusal to be trained as combatants.

PART FIVE

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMPLIANCE AND ROMANS 13

> Let every person be subordinate (hupotassethō) to the governing authorities.
> For there is no authority except from God.
> And the authorities that exist have been instituted by God.
> Therefore, he who is in rebellion against (ho antitassomenos) authority has rebelled against (anthestēken) a divine institution. (Romans 13: 1-2a; my translation.)

These four sentence have an importance which is out of all proportion to their length. They have exerted an immense influence on the Church's debate about the extent to which a Christian ought to comply with the government under which he finds himself. In particular, this passage invariably arises in discussions about what a conscientious noncombatant who appeals to Christ's example should do if and when his government does not grant his request to be assigned to a noncombatant unit. In these circumstances, should he obey or disobey an administrative order to submit to combat training?

At the moment this is a theoretical question for conscientious noncombatants who are South African citizens. The Minister of Defence has declared that it is his Department's policy to grant all requests for noncombatant training under section 67(3) of the Defence Act. (Hansard, 1974: question 20.) But because this is only his Department's policy, there is no legal guarantee that a particular request to be assigned to a noncombatant unit will be granted. And, in any case, both in South Africa and elsewhere, it is possible to change the laws and regulations which allow people to do their military service in noncombatant units. And so it is possible that someone may find himself in a position where he has to face the question about whether he should obey or disobey an administrative order to submit to combat training.

I therefore want to consider whether Romans 13: 1-2a may be used to undermine those conscientious noncombatants who are convinced that they ought to refuse to submit to combat training even when it is illegal to do so. At the same time I want to challenge the more general thesis that in this passage Paul recommends unqualified obedience to one's

government. But before I do this I want to draw a distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious noncompliance. And I want to draw this distinction because a case could, perhaps, be made for the claim that Romans 13 undermines civil disobedience. On the other hand, I will argue that Romans 13 does not undermine conscientious noncompliance.

CHAPTER 7

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMPLIANCE

Although a conscientious objector may be a civil disobedient, he need not be. And a conscientious objector need not be a civil disobedient because he may be a conscientious noncompliant or someone who has been granted legal exemption from combat training and service. But this answer to the question is too stark to be useful; so let me try to explain.

In the first place and relative to South African law: a conscientious objector need not be a civil disobedient because he may be a conscientious noncombatant. In other words: he may be someone who has been granted legal exemption, not from all military service whatsoever, but from all combat training. This much is clear from a careful reading of section 67(3) of the Defence Act and from the Minister's liberal interpretation of some of its clauses. It is obvious, therefore, that at the moment a conscientious objector who is not a conscientious nonmilitarist is unlikely to come into conflict with the law because of his refusal to submit to combat training. And this much is obvious

because, whatever else civil disobedience is, it is an illegal act. But someone who has been granted legal exemption from combat training has not thereby contravened the law.

On the other hand, it is just as obvious that this liberal state of affairs is not guaranteed by law; and that the Department of Defence is not required to grant any application under section 67(3) of the Act. And it is just as obvious that parliament may amend the Act so that it does not allow anyone to apply for and to be granted legal exemption from combat training. But in neither case does it follow that, because a conscientious objector is refused exemption from combat training, he is ipso facto a civil disobedient. And this does not follow because a conscientious objector who finds himself in a position where he does not qualify for legal exemption from combat training may prefer to be a conscientious noncompliant rather than a civil disobedient. Unfortunately, this distinction is often ignored and sometimes questioned. And so it needs to be defended.

1. In defence of a distinction

Although Robert Hall (1971: 13-17.) would deny the utility of drawing a distinction between conscientious noncompliance and civil disobedience, I will try to demonstrate that it is both possible and useful to do so. According to John Rawls (1973: 364 and 368.), conscientious noncompliance is simply a refusal to comply with a more or less direct injunction or adminstrative order because of one's moral, political or religious convictions. On the other hand, civil disobedience is a public, nonviolent, conscientious and political act which is contrary to law and usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or in the policies of a particular government. Rawls does not give examples; but there are many classic cases. The campaigns associated with people like Mahatma Gandhi, Albert Luthuli and Martin Luther King are good examples of what civil disobedience involves. All these cases, however, differ from the conscientious noncompliance of those Jehovah's Witnesses who are conscientious nonmilitarists and who, therefore, do

not qualify under South African law for exemption from combat training.

Maximilianus is another classic example of someone who is a conscientious noncompliant rather than a civil disobedient. (Mayer, 1966: 328-329.) Here is an extract from his trial before a conscription meeting which was held on 12 March 295, in the town of Thevesta in North Africa under the chairmanship of the proconsul Dion:

The Proconsul: The conscript Maximilianus is fit for military service. Consequently he has to be put under the foot rule. (To Maxilimianus) What is your name?

Maximilianus: Why do you want to know my name? I am forbidden to become a soldier, as I am a Christian.

The Proconsul: All right. Officer, put this man under the foot rule.

Maximilianus: As you please. (He places himself under the foot rule.) But I cannot become a soldier, I cannot do evil. I am a Christian.

The Proconsul: Measure him!

An Officer: He is five feet ten.

The Proconsul: Let him have the badge.

Maximilianus: I do not want the badge. I cannot be a soldier.

The Proconsul: You will be a soldier or you will be killed.

Maximilianus: I will not be a soldier. You may cut off my head if you like. I cannot be a soldier for the world, I am a soldier for my god.

The similiarities and differences between the Maximilianus case

and the Gandhi-Luthuli-King cases are instructive and deserve to be emphasised. Although all four cases are nonviolent, conscientious and contrary to law, this is where the resemblance ends. All the civil disobedience campaigns were public and were launched with the aim of educating the public and bringing about a change in the law and policies of a particular government. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that Maximilianus had any such aim in mind. On the contrary, he did not demand that the Roman Empire's conscription laws be changed for everybody. He simply demanded exemption from a legal obligation which, he was convinced, conflicted with his religious beliefs.

These comparisons help to illuminate Rawls' definitions. And they help to clarify the difference between conscientious noncompliance and civil disobedience. But they do not bring us to the root of the matter. Fortunately, it is not difficult to isolate the basic difference which Rawls is driving at. Although civil disobedients usually disobey the laws which they find repugnant, they need not confine their disobedience to the laws or policies which they wish to change. For example, people who have launched a civil disobedience campaign to try to abolish or to amend their country's conscription laws may decide to disobey traffic or trespassing laws. In fact, people who are not eligible for military service, but who nevertheless wish to participate in a civil disobedience campaign to abolish or to amend their country's conscription laws, have no other alternative: because they cannot disobey the laws to which they are opposed, they cannot confine their disobedience to the laws which they wish to change.

On the other hand, conscientious noncompliants not only <u>do</u> confine their disobedience to the laws to which they are opposed; they <u>must</u> do so if they wish to avoid being regarded as civil disobedients. In addition, a conscientious noncompliant only refuses to submit to a law to which he is opposed when one of his country's administrative officials attempts to apply that law directly to him in the form of a more or less direct injunction or administrative order. For example, those Jehovah's Witnesses who are conscientious nonmilitarists and who, therefore, do not qualify for exemption from combat training under South African law do not

organise direct or indirect civil disobedience campaigns to try to amend section 67(3) of the Defence Act. And similarly, there is no evidence that Maximilianus came into conflict with the military authorities of the Roman Empire until they tried to apply its conscription laws to him. And then he simply refused to comply with the proconsul's order to take the soldier's badge.

This, of course, is by no means the last word on the similarities and differences between conscientious noncompliance and civil disobedience. But enough has been said to distinguish those conscientious objectors who are and those who are not civil disobedients. More specifically, enough has been said to supply us with three questions which we can employ to discover whether or not a conscientious objector who has not been granted legal exemption from combat training is a civil disobedient.

Firstly, does he disobey his country's conscription laws only when they are applied to him directly? only when the exemption on which he insists has not been granted? and only because he is determined to remain faithful to the religious or moral convictions which have brought him into conflict with these laws?

Secondly, does he disobey his country's conscription laws because he is determined to change those laws or some other laws or policies of his government?

Thirdly, does he advise or urge people to disobey his country's conscription laws?

In the light of Rawls' definition, Maximilianus' example, and the discussion which has been provided, it should be obvious that a conscientious objector for whom the first question has a negative answer and the remaining two questions an affirmative answer is a civil disobedient. On the other hand, a conscientious objector for whom the first question has an affirmative answer and the remaining two questions a negative answer is a conscientious noncompliant. In other words: a

conscientious objector for whom the second set of answers are the correct ones is not engaged in a civil disobedience comapaign. He is simply someone who has refused to comply with a more or less direct legal injunction or administrative order which he believes conflicts with some of his most basic religious or moral convictions about combat training.

Once again some examples may help to clarify and to underline the distinction which is captured by the different ways in which these three questions may be answered. For example, even when members of the historic peace churches such as the Mennonites and the Society of Friends have not been granted legal exemption because of their refusal to submit to combat training, they have not resorted to civil disobedience campaigns of the kind which one associates with Mahatma Gandhi, Albert Luthuli or Martin Luther King. And the members of these churches have not resorted to civil disobedience campaigns because the primary reason for their noncompliance with their country's conscription laws has not been to change these or any other laws. The primary reason for their noncompliance has been to remain faithful to some of their most basic religious convictions. For example, the 1661 Declaration from the harmless and innocent people of God called Quakers has this to say about their decision to refuse to submit to combat training and service:

> ...we do certainly know, and so testify to the World, that the Spirit of Christ which leads us into all Truth, will never move us to fight and war against any man with outward Weapons, neither for the Kingdom of Christ, nor for the Kingdom of this World. (Hubbard, 1974: 128.)

And the same note was struck when Philip Ford appeared before Sir Thomas Davies in 1679 because he had refused to answer a summons which had instructed him to appear with his arms at the Lieutenancy at Guildhall in London. (Mayer, 1966: 329-330.)

> Davies: Complaint is made that you appeared not with your arms according to summons.
>
> Ford: Here's a summons dated the 7th of February last which I received.

Davies: Received you not one before?

Ford: Yes.

Davies: Wherefore did you not then appear?

Ford: Before the first summons came I received a summons from the Prince of Peace to march under his banner, which is love, who came not to destroy men's lives but to save them. And being enlisted under this banner I dare not desert my colours to march under the banner-shop of the kings of the earth.

Ford's case exemplifies all the characteristics which distinguish a conscientious noncompliant from a civil disobedient. More specifically, his refusal to submit to combat training brought him into conflict with the law only when his country's conscription laws were applied to him directly; only when the exemption on which he insisted was not granted; and only because he was determined to remain faithful to his religious convictions - 'being enlisted under this banner I dare not desert my colours to march under the banner-shop of the kings of the earth'.

On the other hand, when one considers examples of the opposition which arose in the United States because of its war against North Vietnam, it is soon obvious that some conscientious objectors who did not qualify for legal exemption from combat training and service were also civil disobedients. (Bedau, 1969: especially 119-209, has a useful collection of examples and an instructive set of comments on this topic.) Of course, some of those who did not qualify for exemption were conscientious noncompliants. But others, perhaps the majority, launched or participated in various civil disobedience campaigns which they hoped would change their government's policy and force it to withdraw from the war.

These campaigns took many forms: draft cards were burned; Selective Service offices were burgled and their records were either destroyed or defaced; for example by having blood poured over them. Alterna-

tively, such offices were disrupted by sit-ins. In addition, various statements were issued which encouraged, advised or urged people to disobey the United States' conscription laws. Some of these statements portrayed the acts of civil disobedience which accompanied them as symbolic. For example, after nine people had entered the Selective Service office in Catonsville on 17 May 1968 and burned some of the files, they declared that their action was symbolic:

> We use napalm on these draft cards because napalm has burned people to death in Vietnam...Our protest attempts to illustrate why our country is torn at home and is harrassed abroad by enemies of its own creation.

On the other hand, the fourteen people who burned Selective Service files in Milwaukee on September 24 of the same year believed that their action was exemplary:

> In destroying with napalm part of our nation's bureaucratic machinery of conscription we declare that the service of life no longer provides any options other than positive, concrete action...To make visible another community of resistance and to better explain our action, we have chosen to act publicly and to accept the consequences. (Hall, 1971: 43-49.)

The people who issued these statements were not simply registering their conscientious noncompliance with their country's conscription laws. Like all other civil disobedients they at least hoped that their illegal actions would contribute to a change in some of their government's policies. And although their disobedience was visibly related to the laws and policies which they hoped to change, they were not guilty of failing to comply with their country's conscription laws but of trespassing and vandalism.

Another statement was even more forthright and urged people to disobey the conscription laws. A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority was issued in August 1967 over the signatures of Noam Chomsky, William Sloan Coffin, Jnr., Dwight Macdonald and Benjamin Spock. (Bedau, 1969: 162-164.) Within a few months this statement was a key item in the indictment against Coffin, Spock and three others for conspiracy to violate

the Selective Service Act. And in June 1968 they were convicted.

And so one could continue. But enough has been said to illustrate the difference between conscientious noncompliance and civil disobedience. Firstly, civil disobedients break the law as a way of "getting at" a particular law or policy of their government. They wish to frustrate their government in order to get it to change its laws or policies. (Martin, 1969-70: 126.) On the other hand, conscientious noncompliants disobey a legal administrative order because they wish to remain true to a particular moral, religious or political conviction which they value more highly than whatever it is their government hopes to achieve by that law. Secondly, when civil disobedients break the law, the connection between the law which is violated and the law or policy which is protested may be remote, and so the act of protest or defiance may be symbolic. Conscientious noncompliants, however, are embroiled with authority and disobey legal administrative orders which are more or less directly applied to them.

It should be obvious, therefore, that although some conscientious objectors are civil disobedients, there is no need for someone who has not been granted legal exemption from combat training in his country's defence force to adopt this position. He may prefer his opposition to his country's conscription laws to amount to no more than an act of conscientious noncompliance. But why do some conscientious objectors prefer conscientious noncompliance to civil disobedience?

2. Why are some conscientious objectors not civil disobedients?

Life in a society is unavoidably multi-dimensional or pluralistic. People incur many different commitments and obligations. And they incur these commitments and obligations in many different ways. More specifically, people are not only citizens of a particular nation or state. They also belong to churches, clubs, movements, political parties, sects, welfare organizations and so on. Political theorists commonly call groups of this kind secondary associations. But this is something of

a misnomer because, for some people, membership of one of these groups - for example, of a particular church - is a more basic and primary commitment than membership of their nation. In fact, for some people the obligations which they incur in these so-called secondary associations are their primary commitments. And when the obligations which they have incurred in these groups come into conflict with obligations incurred in a larger, more inclusive group (which is often the state), they at least try to remain loyal to their primary commitments. (Walzer, 1970. Anyone who is familiar with pages 3-23, 120-145 and 203-228 will recognise the extent to which Walzer's discussion of pluralism has influenced this section of my essay.)

In other words: people for whom such secondary associations are in fact primary do not admit without qualification the political sovereignty, or even the moral supremacy, of the larger society of which they are members. And at the same time, none of them absolutely denies that sovereignty and supremacy. But some examples, and a consideration of two very different ways in which someone may be opposed to his society, may help to clarify this point about the multi-dimensional nature of life in a society. And these examples also clarify the point about the different values people attach to the various obligations which they incur because of their membership of the various communities which exist, quite legally, within the total fabric of a nation or state.

Some examples

Conflicts between one's obligations to one's family or friends and one's obligations to one's nation provide good examples of the multi-dimensional nature of life and the way in which people disagree about which of their obligations are primary. E.M. Forster's statement that

> if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friends, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country

is an extreme statement of how some people value their personal obliga-

tions and commitments more highly than those which they owe to their nation or society. (Forster, 1951: 78.)

Forster's case, however, is an extreme statement of how he hopes he will be able to deal with a conflict between his personal and his civic obligations because it refers to an act of treason. More often the conflict, and therefore the choice, is between betraying one's family or friends and merely disobeying the laws of one's country. For example, Antigone's refusal to obey Creon's order not to bury her brother Polyneices is not treason in any usual interpretation of that tricky term:

> ...if I had let my mother's son
> Lie there unburied, then I could not have borne it.
> ...we have a duty to the dead.

All those conscientious objectors who are conscientious noncompliants rather than civil disobedients resemble Antigone in the sense that their opposition to their society - and, more specifically, to the government of the day - is not total. They merely refuse to serve their society as combatants in its defence force. For example, the 1661 Declaration from the harmless and innocent people of God called Quakers simply states their refusal 'to fight and war against any man with outward Weapons'. And Philip Ford refused to answer a summons which had instructed him to appear with his arms. But he did not refuse to answer the summons which charged him with this refusal to submit to combat training. And he did not refuse to pay his taxes to the king or to the city of London. (Mayer, 1966: 329-332.) Similarly and quite explicitly, in 1777 the Schwenkfelders, a Protestant group who lived in Pennsylvania, issued a declaration which emphasises the limits of their opposition to their government:

> We can not...take part in the existing military arrangements, though we would not withdraw ourselves from any other demands of the government. (Walzer, 1970: 126.)

Refusal to obey and refusal to serve

These examples illustrate that life in a society, and therefore the the processes through which people incur commitments and obligations, are unavoidably multi-dimensional or pluralistic. And on the basis of these examples it is possible to give a more adequate explanation of why some conscientious objectors refuse to become civil disobedients. (Walzer, 1970: 136.)

Someone may want to use his refusal to submit to combat (or, for that matter, any other military) training in order to bring about a change in the laws or policies of a particular government. He therefore refuses to obey his government. And, in cases such as Gandhi's, his refusal to obey may amount to a non-violent revolution or rebellion against his government. On the other hand, someone may refuse to submit to combat training without any intention to bring about a change in the laws or policies of his government. He too may have to refuse to obey his government; for example, if it is not prepared to exempt him from combat training. But in this case he refuses to obey simply because he refuses to serve his society in a particular way. And it does not follow that, because he refuses to serve his country as a combatant, he therefore refuses to serve his society or its defence force in any capacity whatsoever. Nor does it follow that he is trying to bring about a change in the laws or policies of a particular government; or that he is trying to prevent his government from implementing its policies.

In other words: a conscientious objector who refuses both to submit to combat training and to become a civil disobedient is someone who does not accept that he has a primary obligation to serve his society as a combatant. He therefore resembles Maximilianus, Philip Ford, the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Society of Friends, the Schwenkfelders and many others. In addition, such a person is convinced that he has an obligation and commitment not to serve his society as a combatant because of some other obligation or commitment which he has. For example, because of his commitment to try to obey the Biblical commandment: You shall not kill. (Exodus 20: 13.)

It is, of course, an obvious point that people have different primary obligation. It is also obvious that when they have to decide about a public issue like conscientious objection it makes a difference whether they are dedicated to a nation, an ideology, an ideal community, or to some other focus of loyalty. But although these are obvious points, it is not easy to do justice to them because so many variables are involved. For example, Max Weber has observed that social action in terms of primary obligations are often 'determined by the specific affects and states of feeling of the actor'. In addition,

> examples of pure rational orientation to absolute values would be the actions of people who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some "cause" no matter in what it consists. (Weber, 1974: 115-117.)

A person's decision to refuse to submit to combat training is influenced by his convictions about what his primary obligations are. But Weber's quotation suggests that it is impossible to provide a brief, useful account of how people incur their primary obligations and of how these convictions influence their decisions about a public issue like conscientious objection. I will, therefore, not even try to give a comprehensive account of this strand in the Church's debate about conscientious objection and war. What I have done instead is to concentrate on the position of those conscientious objectors who hold two convictions. They are convinced that their primary obligation is to worship Christ and to try to follow his example. And they are convinced that his example - and especially his healing ministry - supports their refusal to submit to combat training. (I have explored these two convictions in chapters 4 to 6 of this essay.)

By now it should be obvious that not all conscientious objectors who hold these two convictions and who are refused exemption from combat training in their country's defence force are civil disobedients. Some of them are conscientious noncompliants. But this distinction does not amount to a justification of conscientious noncompliance. And so I

want to continue to explore this strand in the Church's debate about conscientious objection and war. More specifically, I want to inquire whether or not Romans 13 undermines conscientious noncompliance; and, in particular, conscientious noncompliance with a more or less direct administrative order to submit to combat training.

CHAPTER 8

ROMANS 13 AND CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMPLIANCE

South African debates on conscientious noncompliance with the provisions which the Defence Act of 1957 makes for those who refuse to submit to combat training invariably involve a discussion of Romans 13: 1-2a. And more often than not Paul's words are quoted in an attempt to undermine conscientious noncompliance. This is done by claiming that Romans 13: 1-2a uses hupotassesthai to exhort its readers to obey the government. For example, during the 1970 Parliamentary debate on conscientious objection, Louis le Grange argued that 'the clerical authority must obey the secular authority'. (Hansard, 1970: column 2876.) Similarly, the Minister of Defence thanked le Grange for this argument and insisted that

> the honour and duty to defend one's country should not be made subservient to one's religious convictions. (Hansard, 1970: columns 2851 and 2886.)

But parliamentarians are not the only people who appeal to Romans 13: 1-2a to undermine conscientious noncompliance. A handbook prepared

by the South African Corp of Chaplains argues that

> Paul teaches us that the Christian's attitude to the State must be submission and obedience. (no date: 12.)

All these examples, therefore, suggest that hupotassesthai is a word which counsels conformity and compliance with one's government's decrees. And so do the various ways in which the word has been translated by scholars. For example, the KJV and the RSV use 'be subject to' in their translations; J.B. Phillips and the Jerusalem Bible use 'obey'; and the NEB uses 'submit'. In fact, even my translation is open to misconstruction because, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, subordination has overtones of being submissive and subservient. One of the entries under this heading reads as though my translation counsels servile compliance with the orders and injunctions of one's government:

> Subordination: The condition of being duly submissive to authority or discipline; submission or subjection to the rule of a superior officer or the government of a higher power.

I therefore want to clarify and amend my translation by tackling three questions about Romans 13. What is the context of Romans 13: 1-2a? What does hupotassesthai mean? What does hupotassesthai not mean? And I will argue that Paul is not insisting on servile compliance with authority but that he is urging his readers to discharge their obligations to the governing authorities. In addition, I will argue that conscientious noncompliance is not undermined by Paul's exhortation.

1. The context of the problem passage

A glaring weakness of many discussions of Romans 13: 1-2a is the failure to relate this passage to the rest of the epistle or to the rest of Paul's theology of subordination. I therefore want to correct both of these defects.

Amongst the many connections which exist between Romans 13: 1-2a and the rest of Paul's epistle, two are especially important. (Cranfield, 1965, is an excellent discussion of the many other ways in which this passage is related to what comes before and after it.)

Firstly, Romans 13: 1-2a should not be separated from Romans 12: 1-2, and especially not from verse 2a:

> Adapt yourselves no longer to the pattern of this present world, but let your minds be remade and your whole nature thus transformed.

This is a clear call to nonconformity. And C.E.B. Cranfield's comment on these words draws the obvious conclusions:

> Christians still live in this age (ho aiōn houtos). But... there is only one possibility that is properly open to them, and that is to resist this process of being continually moulded and fashioned according to the pattern of this present age with its conventions and its standards of values. (1965: 17. Compare the rest of his discussion of Romans 12: 1-2.)

Secondly, Romans 13: 1-2a should not be divorced from Romans 13: 14, and especially not from verse 14a:

> Let Christ himself be the armour that you wear.

This injunction echoes Galatians 3: 27 - 'you have all put on Christ as a garment'. In addition, all this reminds Christians that their baptism enslaves them to Christ. (Romans 6: 1-11.) Once again, Cranfield's comment is instructive. He argues that Romans 13: 14a exhorts Christians

> to strive to let our lives be moulded according to the pattern of the humility of His earthly life. (1965: 97.)

Although Cranfield prefers to appeal to Chrysostom to support his argument, the point he has made has Paul's backing as well. When he wrote to the Colossians, he used the same metaphor:

> put on the garments that suit God's chosen people, his own, his beloved: compassion, kindness, humility, gentleness, patience. (Colossians 3: 12.)

Both these comments on the more or less immediate context of Romans 13: 1-2a are substantial counterweights to the suggestion that Paul used hupotassesthai to encourage an attitude of servility to the governing authorities. In fact, Romans 12: 2a and 13: 14a pose the problem which surrounds Romans 13: 1-2a. The one injunction is a call to nonconformity. The other gives content to that call: it is the kind of nonconformity which arises from trying to allow Christ's example to determine one's behaviour. And so the immediate context of Romans 13: 1-2a helps to explain why some Christians refuse to submit to combat training. They try to follow Christ's example because they worship him. And they are convinced that his healing ministry supports their conviction that, if he had been conscripted, he would have refused to submit to combat training. If, therefore, Romans 13: 1-2a is interpreted as a call to servile compliance with the demands of the governing authorities, one has a problem: When these demands clash with nonconformist behaviour which is supported by Christ's example, what must a Christian do? More specifically and on the assumption that hupotassesthai means 'to obey': Which injunction takes precedence? The injunction to obey the governing authorities? Or the injunction to refuse to conform to standards and values which are incompatible with Christ's example? But before I tackle these questions I want to do a number of other things. And the first is to place Romans 13: 1-2a in the context of Paul's theology of subordination.

The crucial passages are 1 Corinthians 15: 27-28 and Philippians 3: 21; but especially the former. Here Paul uses hupotassō (the active form of hupotassesthai) and its cognates to discuss the complex relationship which exists between God, Christ and everything else (ta panta). According to Gerhard Delling, hupotassō

> is a hierarchical term which stresses, the relation to superiors. But one should note that the subordination expressed may be either compulsory or voluntary. (1972: 41.)

In other words: when Paul uses hupotassō and its cognates to describe a certain hierarchical relationship it is to underline an acceptance (1 Corinthians 15: 27-28.) or a rejection (Romans 8: 7 and 10: 3.) of a condition of subordination to, and therefore of dependence on, the authority or power of another. For example, Christ accepts his subordination to God. But everything else either rebels, or is tempted to rebel, against dependence on God's authority or power.

More specifically, Paul's theology of subordination is rooted in 1 Corinthians 15: 27-28. And this passage has two strands which generate a tension that must not be relaxed. On the one hand, Paul uses a string of aorist forms of hupotassō to declare that all things have been subordinated to Christ; except God, who subordinated all things to Christ. On the other hand, he uses the future indicative passive (hupotagēsetai) to emphasise that some things and some people have not yet recognised their subordination; that is their dependence on the authority or power of Christ.

And these points cannot be overemphasised because they declare that all hierarchical arrangements - even the one by which God subordinated all things to Christ - are subordinate to God. But if Paul was anxious to underline Christ's subordination to God when he wrote to the Corinthians, then it is impossible to believe that he would not be even more anxious to underline the subordination of every other hierarchical arrangement to God. In particular, it is impossible to believe that he valued a hierarchical arrangement which is controlled by the governing authorities (exousias huperechousias) more highly than the basic hierarchical arrangement which God has instituted and which has Christ as its head. And this is impossible because the titles which occur in Revelation 1: 5, 17: 4 and 19: 6 are an excellent commentary on what 1 Corinthians 15: 27-28 has to say about Christ:

> Jesus Christ...the ruler of kings on earth...King of kings and Lord of lords.

The same point can be made from a different angle and by asking what exousias means in Paul's theology. Although the thesis has not

been conclusively proved, Oscar Cullman (1957), C.D. Morrison (1960) and C.E.B Cranfield (1965) have argued that it is highly probable that in Romans 13: 1 exousias has a double reference - to the state and to angelic powers. The argument for the double reference interpretation rests on five observations. (Cranfield, 1965: 67.)

(a) Early Christianity shared with late Judaism the belief that invisible powers were at work behind earthly phenomena.

(b) The conception of the angelic powers and of their subjection by Christ is of central importance in Paul's letters and in the thought of the early Church as a whole.

(c) 1 Corinthians 6: 3 suggests that Paul regarded the civil authorities as the executive agents of angelic powers.

(d) Exegetes tend to support the claim that in 1 Corinthians 2: 8 the expression ton archonton tou aionos toutou carries a double reference - to human rule and to invisible powers.

(e) In every other place in Paul's letters where exousia occurs in the plural or the plurally-used singular with pasa it clearly signifies invisible angelic powers. (1 Corinthians 15: 24; Ephesians 1: 21; 3: 10; 6: 12; and Colossians 1: 16; 2: 10 and 15.)

On the basis of these observations and the other evidence which he parades for the view that rulers were divinely appointed in relation to a cosmic system of spiritual powers, Morrison concluded that exousias in Romans 13: 1 also has a double reference:

> All the evidence so favours the wide acceptance of this world view that where Paul, Hellenistic Jews, or early Christians do not openly oppose it we should first of all assume that it was taken for granted until it is found incompatible in some particular. (1960: 99.)

Arguments of this kind are, of course, inconclusive. But if we accept that exousias does have this double reference in Romans 13: 1, then

this underlines the point that is central to Paul's theology of subordination. According to this theology all things have been subordinated to Christ; except God, who subordinated all things to Christ. And the best commentary on this theology is 1 Peter 3: 22

> Jesus Christ...has gone into heaven and is at the right hand of God, with angels, authorities (exousiōn) and powers subject (hupotagentōn) to him. (Compare 1 Corinthians 15: 24.)

For all these reasons, therefore, it is hard to believe that when Paul wrote Romans 13: 1-2a he used hupotassesthai to exhort them to adopt an attitude of servile compliance. On the contrary, his theology of subordination is anxious to stress that all things, except God, have been subordinated to Christ. In addition, Romans 13: 1-2a is flanked by a call to nonconformity and an exhortation to be guided by Christ's example. And so Cranfield's suspicion is to the point:

> If hupotassesthai is equivalent to the English 'obey' in its ordinary modern sense, then we must, of course, assume that Paul's injunction in verse 1a is not absolute, and that he would have agreed with Peter and the other apostles that, where there is a conflict of loyalties, 'We must obey God rather than men'. (Act 5. 29; cf. 4. 19f). (Cranfield, 1965: 69.)

Cranfield's comment is appropriate. But it does not exhaust the problem of how to translate or to understand hupotassesthai, especially as it occurs in Romans 13: 1a. And so I want to pursue two other questions. What does hupotassesthai mean? And what does it not mean?

2. What does hupotassesthai mean?

According to Gerhard Delling, when Paul uses hupotassō to exhort his readers he always uses it in the middle rather than in the active or in the passive voice. (1972: 41-45.) And the force of the middle voice is to indicate that the action which is being described is of special advantage or significance to the agent. It denotes that the agent per-

performs the action for himself. (Jay, 1958: 14 and 84.) Delling therefore concludes that in the New Testament hupotassesthai

> does not immediately carry with it the thought of obedience ...it denotes voluntary subordination. (1972: 41 and 42.)

In other words: Delling's observations and arguments suggest that when Paul used hupotassesthai to instruct his Roman readers how to behave towards the governing authorities he instructed them to subordinate themselves to the position of Rome's subjects; that is, to subordinate themselves voluntarily to this position.

This is an important grammatical point because there is a vast difference between someone who has been coerced into a subordinate position and someone who subordinates himself voluntarily. More specifically, someone who has subordinated himself voluntarily to another person or to his government is someone who has not surrendered his will to that person or government. And so he has lost neither his capacity for conscientious noncompliance; nor his capacity to refuse to obey the instructions of those to whom he is subordinate. On the other hand, anyone who has been coerced into a subordinate position has lost or seriously inhibited these capacities. And so he tends to see himself as a passive agent who is obliged to execute the wishes and instructions of those who have subordinated his will to their's. (Compare Milgram's account of the difference between someone who is in an autonomous state and someone who is in an agentic state. 1974: especially 132-134.)

Delling's understanding of Romans 13: 1a is not only supported by his comments on the grammar of hupotassesthai. It is strengthened by the way in which this word contrasts with four others which are used in Romans 13: 1-2a.

Firstly, hupotassesthai contrasts with exousias huperechousias. And this is precisely the contrast between a family of words which may be used to describe those who are ruled and a family of words which may be used to describe those who rule. In other words:

> hupotassomai is here a counterpart to huperechō which is the formal basis of the demand for subjection...In hupotassesthai the supremacy of the huperechon is acknowedged to be legitimate. (Delling, 1972: 43.)

Secondly, hupotassesthai contrasts with antitassomenos and anthestēken. Paul used these words to warn his readers not to rebel against Roman rule. According to C.H. Dodd, Paul

> is thinking of contumacious defiance of the Empire such as was advocated by Jewish fanatics...(this passage) is to be read, in the first instance, as a definite repudiation, on behalf of the Church, of the Zealot tendency in Judaism which was already gathering strength for the final outbreak, and might well have repercussions among Christians. (1932: 203-204.)

Delling's observations and the arguments which I have constructed on them support my translation of Romans 13: 1a.

> Let every person be subordinate to the governing authorities.

And this translation has two merits. On the one hand, it underlines the hierarchical nature of Paul's thinking. His theology of subordination declares that everything and everyone has been subordinated to Christ; except God, who subordinated all things to Christ. But Paul did not only employ the idea of subordination in a theological, and more specifically, in a Christological context. He also employed the idea to exhort his readers to subordinate themselves to others in such hierarchical arrangements as the Church (1 Corinthians 14: 32, 34 and 16: 16.); the family (Colossians 3: 18.); and the state (Romans 13: 1 and 5.). In particular, when Paul wrote to the Christians at Rome he used hupotassesthai to underline the fact that there are those who rule and those who are ruled. And he exhorted those who were ruled by Rome to acknowledge this fact and to voluntarily subordinate themselves to the governing authorities. Ernst Käsemann's comment on Paul's use of hupotassesthai draws together all these strands:

> Paul looks out on a world in which superiors and subordi-

> nates exist and intends his readers to come to terms with this reality. (1969: 207.)

3. What does hupotassesthai not mean?

The idea of subordination does help one to see what Paul was driving at when he wrote Romans 13: 1a. But the word does not only draw our attention to the idea of a voluntary acceptance of governing authorities. Because the idea of subordination includes the idea of obedience, it may conjure up the notion of subservient and submissive obedience. And so I want to amend my translation. And I will do so in three stages. I first want to illustrate the tendency to equate or to associate the idea of subordination with the idea of servile compliance. I then want to use C.E.B. Cranfield's commentary on Romans 13: 1a to question these equations and associations. Finally, I want to argue that Romans 13: 7 is the clue to a proper understanding of Romans 13: 1a.

Some contemporary commentators have declared that Romans 13: 1a teaches that 'Christians owe implicit obedience to the civil power' (Scott, 1934: 138.); that it 'demands ardent support of the state' (Kallas, 1964-65: 370.); and that it counsels 'absolute obedience to ruling authority in the State' (O'Neill, 1975: 211.). According to Emil Brunner,

> Without showing even the slightest vacillation Paul demands in the sharpest form of command, which otherwise is missing in his appeals, obedient submission to governmental authority - and that not merely external but inwardly conscientious: everyone - to be precise: every soul - must be subject to it. (1959: 108.)

In the face of this kind of emphasis it is hardly surprising that Cranfield wants to insist that hupotassesthai is not an obvious word to use if one means 'obey'. And he supports this comment with a survey of the way in which Paul uses the word in his other epistles and in other contexts. More specifically, he homes in on Ephesians 5: 21 where the word is used of a reciprocal obligation:

> Be subject to (hupotassomenoi) one another out of reverence for Christ.

He then compares Ephesians 5: 21, Romans 12: 10 and Philippians 2: 3. And he argues that the three phrases 'be subject to one another', 'give pride of place to one another' and 'humbly reckon others better than yourselves'

> would all seem to mean essentially the same thing.

Finally, Cranfield concludes that

> the Christian's hupotassesthai is limited to respecting the authorities, obeying them so far as such obedience does not conflict with God's laws, and seriously and responsibly disobeying them when it does, paying them direct and indirect taxes willingly...and praying persistently for them. (1965: 70-71.)

Cranfield's commentary on Romans 13: 1a is a vast improvement on the comments provided by Scott, Kallas, O'Neill and Brunner. In particular, he leaves us in no doubt that hupotassesthai 'does not by any means imply servility'. (Leenhardt, 1961: 326.) On the other hand, it is possible to have misgivings about Cranfield's commentary. More specifically, it can be argued that Brunner's interpretation of hupotassesthai is too strong; but that his is too weak.

Firstly, the whole tenor of Romans 13: 1-7, and especially the way in which Paul is anxious to discourage rebellion against the governing authorities, suggests that he wanted to do more than to encourage his readers to respect the authorities.

Secondly, Cranfield seems to believe that Romans 12: 10, Ephesians 5: 21 and Philippians 2: 3 hold the clue to Romans 13: 1a. These passages do help because they save us from the temptation to equate hupotassesthai with the idea of servile compliance. On the other hand, in all these passages Paul is counselling Christians about their relationship to one another; hence the emphasis on reciprocal obligations.

But in Romans 13: 1-7 he is counselling Christians about their relationship to people who are outside the Church. And so, although the idea of a reciprocal obligation is not entirely absent - 'they (that is, the governing authorities) are God's agents working for your good' (Romans 13: 4a.) - it does recede into the background.

Finally, Cranfield's commentary on Romans 13: 1a is designed for Christians. But Paul's injunction is completely general; it is addressed to everyone (pasa psuchē). And so, the second of these three misgivings is strengthened. What is needed is an interpretation of hupotassesthai that does not draw so strongly on its use in contexts where Paul is discussing the ways in which Christians ought to treat each other. In addition, we still need an adequate translation of Romans 13: 1a. 'Let every person respect the governing authorities' is too weak.

Although it is possible to have these misgivings about Cranfield's commentary, it is important to notice that they arise from concentrating on his use of the word 'respect'. And this is important because he also uses the word 'obligation'. This is a stronger word. It includes the idea of respect and of obedience; but it does not immediately conjure up the idea of submissive and servile compliance in the way in which 'subordination' does. In addition, Romans 13: 7 is an exhortation to meet one's obligations:

> Discharge your obligations (opheilas) to all men; pay tax and toll, reverence and respect, to those to whom they are due.

These words capture all that Cranfield wants as well as what is missing from his commentary. At the same time, Romans 13: 7 seems to be an excellent commentary on Romans 13: 1a. It does not encourage those who are ruled to comply with every demand of those who rule; it only insists that they be given their due. (Compare the NEB translation of 1 Corinthians 16: 16 - 'give their due positions (hupotassēsthe) to such persons'. The way in which Epesians 5: 33c is a commentary on 5: 22 is also instructive because of the way in which it parallels Romans 13:

7 and 13: 1a.)

For all these reasons, therefore, it is clear that hupotassesthai should neither be equated nor associated with the idea of servile compliance. And it seems as though this is the most adequate translation of Paul's injunction:

> Let everyone discharge their obligations to the governing authorities.

4. Christ's slaves and Rome's subjects

I have tried to explain how Paul did and did not use the word hupotassesthai and its cognates. I now want to pull the threads of this discussion together and answer the questions about conflicting obligations.

Firstly, Romans 13: 1-2a cannot be properly understood if it is separated from its context within the epistle and from the context created by Paul's theology of subordination. The immediate context of this passage is a call to nonconformity (Romans 12: 2.) and an exhortation to be guided by Christ's example (Romans 13: 14.). The pivot of Paul's theology of subordination is 1 Corinthians 15: 27-28: everything, except God, is subordinate to Christ. Once all this is recognised it is impossible to believe that Romans 13: 1a counsels servile compliance.

Secondly, Delling's discussion of what hupotassesthai means suggests that Romans 13: 1a counsels subordination to the governing authorities. Although this is not the best way of understanding Paul's injunction, it does underline the fact that he wanted to discourage rebellion and to encourage recognition of the fact that his readers were Rome's subjects.

Finally, Cranfield's discussion of what hupotassesthai means makes it impossible to accept that Romans 13: 1a is a plea for a submissive and servile attitude to the governing authorities. On the other hand, Paul asked his readers to do more than simply to respect the governing

authorities. In fact, Romans 13: 7 suggests that he exhorted everyone to discharge their civic obligations.

Unfortunately, even if my interpretation of Romans 13: 1a is correct, a problem remains. Obligations conflict. And so we still have to ask whether or not Romans 13 undermines conscientious noncompliance. More specifically, does Romans 13 undermine the position of those conscientious noncombatants who appeal to Christ's example and who refuse to submit to combat training even when their application for exemption is not granted? I want to answer this question with a reminder and a brief comment on the kind of obedience Paul did demand.

Paul did not hesitate to call himself and his companions the slaves of Jesus Christ. (Romans 1: 1; Galatians 1: 10; Philippians 1: 1; and Colossians 4: 12.) And he did not hesitate to use douleuō to describe the kind of service which Christians owe to Christ. (Romans 12:11, 14: 18 and 16: 18.) At the same time, he was anxious to emphasise that someone who is Christ's slave should not become anyone else's slave. (1 Corinthians 7: 23.) Nobody can be enslaved to two lords. (kurioi; Matthew 6: 24 and Luke 6: 13.) And Paul was emphatic that Jesus Christ was their lord. (Romans 10: 9 and 1 Corinthians 12: 3.) This conviction was rooted in the fact that he worshipped Christ. Furthermore, Romans 13: 1-2a is followed by the bold exhortation 'to put on the Lord Jesus Christ'. (13: 14.) This phrase reminds Christians that their baptism enslaved them to Christ. (Romans 6: 1-11.) And it challenges them to live in conformity with his mind (Philippians 2: 5.); that is, to pledge themselves to try to guide their moral endeavour by his example.

For all these reasons, therefore, Romans 13: 1-2a does not demand 'ardent support of the state'. (Kallas, 1964-65: 370.) Nor does it counsel 'absolute obedience to ruling authority in the State'. (O'Neill, 1975: 211.) What it does do is to encourage the Christians at Rome to recognise that they are Rome's subjects; to discharge their obligations to the governing authorities; and not to rebel against Roman rule.

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Paul's use of

hupotassesthai to describe the way in which Christians should regard themselves in relation to the state was quite deliberate. Firstly, he did not want to encourage Christians to regard themselves as the slaves of those who ruled over them; or to regard themselves as under an obligation to simply do everything they are told. Secondly, he did want to encourage them to regard themselves as the subjects of those who ruled over them; and to discharge their obligations to the governing authorities. And so it is not at all clear that Romans 13: 1-2a does not undermine at least some kinds of civil disobedience. This is because a civil disobedient is someone who intends to overthrow a particular government or to change the laws and policies of his government. (Rawls, 1973: 364.) On the other hand, it is important to remember that conscientious noncompliance is not equivalent to civil disobedience. (Chapter 10 of this essay.) More specifically, it is important to remember that a conscientious noncombatant is not somebody who refuses to acknowledge that he has obligations to his society. He is someone who refuses to acknowledge that he has an obligation to serve his society in a combatant capacity. For all these reasons, therefore, Romans 13: 1-2a does not undermine those conscientious noncompliants, and especially those conscientious noncombatants, who refuse to discharge an obligation to their society which conflicts with their primary obligation to try to follow Christ's example.

PART SIX

CONSCIENTIOUS NONCOMPLIANCE AND THE WORSHIP OF CHRIST

There is a sense in which I have completed my exploration of the connections between conscientious objection in South Africa and the worship and imitation of Christ. But a conscientious noncombatant is only one kind of conscientious objector. And a conscientious objector is only one species of conscientious noncompliant. In other words: people who refuse to submit to combat training in the South African Defence Force are not the only people who, because of their moral, political or religious convictions, refuse to comply with a more or less direct injunction or adminstrative order. And so I want to move this essay to a more general level and explore some questions about conscientious noncompliance and the worship of Christ.

More specifically, I will use this part of my essay to describe and discuss Stanley Milgram's experiments on obedience to authority (1974). These experiments demonstrate how difficult conscientious noncompliance is. They were performed because of Milgram's interest in the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Seven Nuremberg Principles which were adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950. (Bailey, 1972: 163-170.) The Fourth Principle reads as follows:

> The fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him of responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

These words are based on Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter and the judgement of the Tribunal. The idea behind the words is that superior orders are not a defence provided a moral choice was possible to the accused. And it was this idea that made the Tribunal reject the argument of the defence that there could not be any responsibility since most of the defendants acted under the orders of Hitler.

> That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war has never been recognized as a defence to such acts of brutality, though, ...the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible.

Milgram was fascinated by this aspect of the Nuremberg Tribunal's work because of the way in which the argument of the defence and of the Tribunal failed to correlate with each other. The argument of the defence proceeds on the assumption that it is extremely difficult not to comply with the orders and injunctions of those in authority. In fact, the argument proceeds on the assumption that an individual's conscience and sense of moral responsibility are ineffectual bulwarks against the orders and injunctions of an inhumane authority. On the other hand, the Tribunal's judgement and the Fourth Nuremberg Principle assumes that an individual is not only able to recognise an inhumane command; he is also able to refuse to comply with it.

Unfortunately, Milgram's experiments have placed a very big question mark on the Tribunal's assumption. Conscientious noncompliance with authority is more difficult than most of us believe it is. And so his work needs to be taken seriously by conscientious objectors of every kind because they do not know when they may find themselves in a situation where their government refuses their request for exemption and orders them to submit to combat training. I will, therefore, use chapters 9 and 10 to describe Milgram's experimental work in some detail. But he has also offered us a prescription for servile compliance. And so in chapter 11 I will first discuss his prescription and then employ a neglected aspect of his work to explain why conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ have another effective prescription for the problem which he has identified.

CHAPTER 9

SERVILE COMPLIANCE

Stanley Milgram (1974) has designed a remarkable set of experiments which suggest that few of us are able to refuse to obey laws and commands which run counter to our very elementary and uncontroversial convictions about not hurting the innocent. In addition, he has suggested a prescription for the servile compliance which he observed. Unfortunately, it is possible to have some misgivings about his prescription. I will, therefore, first describe Milgram's work on obedience to authority in some detail. And then I will argue that a neglected aspect of his work explains why conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ have another effective prescription for servile compliance. But before I tackle these tasks I want to explain why Milgram's work on obedience to authority deserves to be considered in an essay on conscientious objection in South Africa.

1. Obedience to authority and conscientious objection in South Africa

According to section 67(3) of the Defence Act, an officer who has to

register people for military service

> shall as far as may be practicable allot any person, who to his knowledge bona fide belongs and adheres to a recognised religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war, to a unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a non-combatant capacity.

In addition, the Minister of Defence has declared that it is his Department's policy to grant all applications under this section of the Act. (Hansard, 1974: question 20. Compare chapter 1 of this essay for a more detailed discussion of this point.) And in the first six months of 1974, 38 persons were granted exemption from combat training under this interpretation of the Act: one is a Gurumaghara; five are Jehovah's Witnesses; four are Plymouth Brethren; twenty-five are Seventh Day Adventists; one belongs to the Apostolic Faith Mission; one to the Assembly of God; and one to the Free Churches.

It is obvious, therefore, that at the moment a conscientious objector who is a conscientious noncombatant is unlikely to come into conflict with the law because of his refusal to submit to combat training. On the other hand, it is just as obvious that this state of affairs is not guaranteed by law. And so the Department of Defence is not required to grant any applications under section 67(3) of the Act. But if this did happen, then conscientious noncombatants would find themselves in the kind of situation Milgram studied. In other words: they would then have to decide whether they should obey or disobey the instruction to submit to combat training. Unfortunately, his experiments demonstrate that most people find conscientious noncompliance extremely difficult.

I therefore want to consider this aspect of what is now a hypothetical situation but which is one in which a conscientious noncombatant could find himself if the Department of Defence refused to allow him to perform his military service in a noncombatant capacity. More specifically, I will use Milgram's work on obedience to authority to argue that conscientious noncombatants who refuse to submit to combat training because they worship Christ support an effective alternative prescription

for servile compliance. But before I argue this point I want to describe the basic obedience experiment in some detail.

2. The basic obedience experiment

Milgram's nineteen experiments created concrete and measurable situations in which someone was ordered to inflict increasing pain on a protesting victim. The primary aim of each experiment was to discover at what point the subject would refuse to obey the experiment. At the same time his experiments challenged the validity of two assumptions which are important ingredients of the belief that we are able to refuse to obey laws and commands which run counter to our deepest convictions. One of these assumptions is that people are by and large decent and therefore do not readily hurt the innocent. The other is that unless a person is coerced by physical force or threat he always acts as an autonomous individual; that is, as someone who acts in a particular way because he has decided to do so. Unfortunately, neither of these assumptions survived Milgram's experiments. And because his experiments not only explode this assumption but help to illuminate some of the factors which operate in the kind of situation in which conscientious non-combatants could find themselves, I want to provide a fairly detailed account of the experimental work which he did.

A convenient way to begin is to describe the essential features of the fifth or most basic cycle of experiments. (Milgram, 1974: 1-26 and 55-58.) Two people came to a psychological laboratory at Yale University to take part in a study of memory and learning. One of them was an accomplice of the experimenter. The other was a genuinely naive subject who had agreed to participate in an experimental study of the effects of punishment on learning. The experimenter first explained why he was engaged in this study and then asked the two people to draw lots to decide who would be the "teacher" and who the "learner". The drawing was rigged so that the experimenter's accomplice became the learner. He was then strapped into what looked like an electric chair. And the experimenter told him that he would have to try to remember a




Figure 1




Figure 2

list of word pairs; that whenever he made a mistake he would receive an electric shock; and that each time this happened the shock level would be increased by 15 volts.

The experimenter seemed to be interested in the learner. But the naive subject or teacher was the real focus of the experiment. He was asked to assist the experimenter to strap the learner into the chair. And when this had been done the learner mentioned that he had a slight heart condition and asked whether any of the shocks he might receive were dangerous. The experimenter replied in a confident and somewhat dismissive tone that the shocks might be painful but that they would not cause any permanent tissue damage. At the same time the subject was given a sample shock of 45 volts before he began his run as a teacher. The shock was applied to the subject's wrist and gave him some idea of what the learner would feel if he made a mistake.

When these preliminaries had been performed the subject was taken into the main experimental room and seated in front of an impressive shock generator. (Figure 1.)

The shock generator contained a horizontal line of thirty switches which ranged from 15 to 450 volts in 15 volt increments. In addition, there were verbal designations above the switches: Slight Shock - Moderate Shock - Strong Shock - Very Strong Shock - Intense Shock - Extreme Intensity Shock - Danger: Severe Shock - XXX. The last label spanned the 435 and 450 volt switches. Each of the other labels spanned four switches; for example the one which read Intense Shock spanned the 255, 270, 285 and 300 volt switches. (Figure 2.)

Before the experiment began the teacher was told how to administer the learning test to the man in the next room. He first had to read a series of word pairs to the learner. And then he had to read the first word of one of the pairs as well as four other words. For example, the teacher would first read such pairs as blue box, nice day and wild duck. And then in the test sequence he could read blue, sky, ink, box and lamp. In reply, the learner had to indicate which of the words

had originally been paired with the word blue; in this case box. He had to communicate his answer by pressing one of four switches in front of him, and these would light up one of four numbered quadrants in an answer box on top of the shock generator. The experimenter told the teacher that each time the learner responded correctly he was to move on to the next list of words. On the other hand, whenever the other man gave an incorrect answer the teacher was to give him a shock. He was to start at the lowest shock level and to increase the level by 15 volts each time the learner made a mistake.

The teacher was a genuinely naive subject who was under the impression that he was participating in an experimental study of the effects of punishment on learning. But it was actually his behaviour that was being studied. The learner was an actor. He received no shocks at all. But from the 75 volt level he grunted each time he was shocked. At 120 volts he complained verbally. At 150 volts he complained that his heart was bothering him and he demanded to be released from the experiment. As the shocks escalated the learner's protests became more and more vehement and emotional. And from 285 to 330 volts his responses amounted to a number of agonized screams. These grunts and screams were recorded on tape and they were incorporated into the regular experimental procedure. The exact schedule of screams and protests for the last thirteen experiments was as follows:

075 volts Ugh!

090 volts Ugh!

105 volts Ugh! (louder)

120 volts Ugh! Hey, this really hurts.

135 volts Ugh!!

150 volts Ugh!!! Experimenter! That's all. Get me out of here. I told you I had heart trouble. My heart's starting to bother me now. Get me out of here,

please. My heart's starting to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out.

165 volts Ugh! Let me out! (shouting)

180 volts Ugh! I can't stand the pain. Let me out of here! (shouting)

195 volts Ugh! Let me out of here. My heart's bothering me. Let me out of here! You have no right to keep me here! Let me out! Let me out of here! Let me out! Let me out of here! My heart's bothering me! Let me out! Let me out!

210 volts Ugh!! Experimenter! Get me out of here. I've had enough. I won't be in the experiment any more.

225 volts Ugh!

240 volts Ugh!

255 volts Ugh! Get me out of here.

270 volts (Agonised scream)

300 volts (Agonised scream) I absolutely refuse to answer any more. Get me out of here. You can't hold me here. Get me out. Get me out of here.

315 volts (Intensely agonised scream) I told you I refuse to answer. I'm no longer part of this experiment.

330 volts (Intense and prolonged agonised scream) Let me out of here. Let me out of here. My heart's bothering me. Let me out, I tell you. (Hysterically) Let me out of here. Let me out of here. You have no right to hold me here. Let me out! Let me out! Let me out of here! Let me out! Let me out!

After 330 volts nothing more was heard from the room where the learner was. And no more answers appeared on the four-way signal box.

Even if they had not done so before, from the 330 volt mark onwards most subjects turned to the experimenter for guidance. He instructed them to treat the absence of a response as a wrong answer and therefore to increase the shock level one step each time the learner either failed to respond or failed to respond correctly.

If a subject indicated that he did not wish to go on, the experimenter responded with a sequence of "prods" which were delivered in a firm, but not impolite, tone of voice:

Prod 1: Please continue, or Please go on.

Prod 2: The experiment requires that you continue.

Prod 3: It is absolutely essential that you continue.

Prod 4: You have no other choice, you must go on.

The prods were always made in sequence. And if the subject refused to obey the experimenter after the fourth prod, the experiment was terminated.

If the subject asked whether the learner was liable to suffer permanent physical injury, the experimenter said: "Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please go on." And if the subject said that the learner did not want to go on, the experimenter replied: "Whether the learner likes it or not, you must go on until he has learned all the word pairs correctly. So please go on."

The experimenter also saw that the subject announced the voltage level before he administered a shock. This was done to try to remind the subject that each shock he administered was more intense than the previous one. If the subject reached the 450 volt shock level, he was instructed to continue the procedure at that voltage. But if the subject did not refuse to obey the experimenter after two further trials, the experimenter called a halt to the experiment.

CHAPTER 10

THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS

In general, Stanley Milgram's nineteen experiments demonstrated how far ordinary individuals will go in complying with the experimenter's instructions:

> Indeed, the results of the experiment were both surprising and dismaying. Despite the fact that many subjects experience stress, despite the fact that many protest to the experimenter, a substantial proportion continue to the last shock on the generator. (1974: 5.)

On the other hand, subjects were less compliant under some experimental conditions than under others. In this chapter, therefore, I want to sketch most of his experiments in some detail. But instead of presenting them in the order in which they were performed, I will use them to illustrate a number of propositions which Milgram seems to have established beyond reasonable doubt. In general, five propositions can be extracted from his work:

(1) Obedience is not significantly reduced when women are studied as subjects; when different kinds of people give the inhumane commands; when the experiment is conducted in an unprestigious building; when an element of betrayal is introduced into the experiment; and when subjects are relieved of immediate responsibility for the pain which is inflicted on the learner.

(2) Obedience is reduced when contact between the learner and the subject is increased.

(3) Obedience is reduced as authority becomes more remote.

(4) Obedience to authority and not aggression is the key to the behaviour which Milgram observed.

(5) Most people subscribe to what can only be described as the myth of conscientious refusal.

1. Some unsuccessful attempts to reduce compliance

An important aim in Milgram's work was to develop experimental conditions under which people would be more willing to disobey the experimenter. Six of these experiments failed. One of these was the experiment I described in some detail. Unlike the first four experiments it was conducted in a less elegant laboratory and the learner drew attention to his heart condition at 150, 195 and 330 volts. Neither of these factors led to greater noncompliance: 26 (65.0%) of the 40 subjects obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end. (Milgram, experiment 05, 55-58.) And the level of obedience was identical when women were subjects. On the other hand, the women who participated in the experiment experienced more conflict than the men did. (Milgram, experiment 08, 62-63.)

When experiment 05 was repeated but with different people as experimenter and as learner, there was only an insignificant reduction in compliance: 20 (50.0%) of the 40 subjects obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end. (Milgram, experiment 06, 58-59.) Similarly, when

this experiment was repeated in an unimpressive office building in an industrial city close to Yale University, the lack of any evidence that the experiment was part of a prestigious institution made very little difference to the level of compliance: 19 (47.5%) of the subjects obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end. (Milgram, experiment 10, 66-70.)

But the failure of experiments 09 and 18 is the most disturbing feature of this cycle of experiments. In experiment 18 (Milgram, 1974: 121-122.) the subject was given various subsidiary tasks which contributed to the progress of the experiment. But he was not asked to administer any of the shocks. This variation on Milgram's theme was extremely depressing: only 3 (7.5%) of the 40 subjects refused to participate in the experiment to the end.

In experiment 09 (Milgram, 63-66.) the learner not only mentioned his heart condition while he was being strapped into the chair. He insisted that, because his heart troubled him, he would agree to be in the experiment only on condition that the experiment was halted on his demand:

> I'll agree to be in it, but only on condition that you let me out when I say so; that's the only condition.

The experimenter replied with a mildly positive grunt. But when the learner protested at 150 volts and beyond he disregarded this condition and simply told the subject to proceed with the experiment. In spite of the fact that this element of betrayal and patent injustice was introduced into the experiment, 16 (40.0%) of the 40 subjects still obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end.

Fortunately, seven of Milgram's experiments did increase the willingness of subjects to disobey the experimenter. More specifically, as the contact between the learner and the subject was increased, so the number of people who were prepared to comply with the experimenter's orders decreased. Similarly, when the contact between the experimenter and the subject was decreased, so the number of people who disobeyed the

experimenter's instructions increased. But each of the experiments which support these two observations is interesting in its own way. And so I will provide a brief sketch of them all.

2. The proximity of aggressors and victims

Four of Milgram's experiments established that obedience is reduced as the contact between the learner (the victim) and the subject (the aggressor) is increased. (1974: 32-40.)

Experiment 01: Remote Feedback

In this experiment no vocal complaint was heard from the learner. At 300 volts, however, he pounded the wall which separated his room and the room in which the teacher was located. After 315 volts the pounding ceased and no further answers were received. 26 (65.0%) of the 40 subjects obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end.

Experiment 01: Voice Feedback

Although the learner was in an adjacent room, his complaints could be heard clearly though the walls of the laboratory. The schedule of protests in this and the next two experiments paralled those already described. The only exception was that no reference was made to the learner's heart condition at 150, 195 and 330 volts. 25 (62.5%) of the 40 subjects obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end.

Experiment 03: Proximity

This experiment was similar to the second. But the learner's chair was only a few feet away from the generator where the subject was seated. He was therefore visible as well as audible. Nevertheless,

16 (40.0%) of the 40 subjects obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end.

Experiment 04: Touch Proximity

This experiment was identical to the third, with one exception: the learner received a shock only when his hand rested on a shock plate. At the 150 volt level and beyond the learner not only demanded to be freed; he refused to place his hand on the shock plate. The experimenter therefore ordered the subject to force the learner's hand back onto the plate. Although there was a further reduction in the number of compliant subjects, 12 (30.0%) of the 40 still obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end.

All four experiments reveal a great deal of willingness to comply with an inhumane authority. At the same time, however, they do demonstrate that willingness to obey the inhumane commands were reduced as the contact between the learner and the subject was increased.

3. The proximity of authority and its subjects

Three of Milgram's experiments establish that obedience is also reduced as the distance between the authority (the experimenter) and its subjects becomes more remote.

Experiment 07: Closeness of Authority

In experiment 05 the experimenter sat just a few feet away from the subject. In this experiment, after giving his initial instructions, the experimenter left the laboratory and gave his orders by telephone. Subjects seemed to find it easier to disobey the experimenter when they did not have to confront him face to face: only 9 (20.5%) of the 40 subjects obeyed the experimenter's orders to the end. In addition,




Figure 3

although they continued with the experiment, several subjects administered lower shocks than were required and never informed the experimenter that they had deviated from the correct procedure. (Milgram, 1974: 59-62.)

Experiment 13: An Ordinary Man Gives Orders

In this experiment the experimenter had two accomplices. They arrived at the laboratory with the naive subject. The experimenter went through the usual instructions, strapped the learner into the "electric chair", and administered a sample shock. But at no point did he indicate which shock levels were to be administered. A rigged telephone call interrupted the proceedings and the experimenter announced that he had been called away. He asked his other accomplice - who, as far as the subject was concerned, was simply an ordinary man like himself - to continue with the experiment. (Figure 3.)

After the experimenter had left, the accomplice suggested that the subject increase the shock level one step each time the learner made a mistake. And throughout the experiment he insisted that this procedure be followed. The authority of the experimenter still hovered in the background because he had created the basic situation in which the participants found themselves. But there was a sharp drop in compliance: only 4 (20.0%) of the 20 subjects obeyed the orders of what appeared to be an ordinary man. (Milgram, 1974: 93-97.)

Experiment 13a: The Subject as Bystander

This experiment began like the previous one. But when the subject refused to comply with what seemed to be an ordinary man's instructions, the experimenter's accomplice took over the task of administering the shocks. The subject, therefore, did not have to administer any shocks to the learner. But he had to witness the harrowing scene in which the experimenter's accomplice single-mindedly pursued his plan of increasing

the shock level 15 volts at a time. Sixteen subjects were exposed to this experiment. Nearly everyone protested about what was happening. But only 5 (31.25%) took sufficiently strong physical action against him, or against the shock generator, to terminate the administration of shocks. (Milgram, 1974: 97-99.) Nevertheless, these three experiments do demonstrate that the closer the experimenter was to the subject the more difficult it was not to comply. In addition, these experiments support the next four experiments which suggest that unwillingness to disobey authority, and not aggression, is the key to an explanation of the behaviour which Milgram observed.

4. Servile compliance and aggression

Milgram designed four experiments which seem to rule out an appeal to aggression as an explanation of the subjects' willingness to comply with the experimenter's inhumane commands.

Experiment 11: Subject Free to Choose Shock Level

In this experiment the experimenter emphasised that the teacher was free to select any shock level on any one of the thirty critical trials. The learner's protests were coordinated to standard shock levels. For example, his first grunt came at 75 volts and his first vehement protest at 150 volts.

The overall result was that the great majority of subjects delivered very low shocks to the learner now that the choice was left to them. Three subjects limited their shocks to 15 volts; 28 went no higher than 75 volts - the level at which the learner first indicated that the shocks were painful; and 38 did not go beyond 150 volts - the level at which the learner first protested vehemently. Two subjects proved the exception. One administered a shock of 375 volts and the other a shock of 450 volts. (Milgram, 1974: 70-72.)

Experiment 11, therefore is a very important one. What happened




Figure 4

here is in sharp contrast with the transformation of behaviour that comes about when the subjects are confronted with an authority who does not leave them completely free to decide how large a shock to administer. And this point is underlined by three other experiments in each of which the subject behaves in the way he does because he sees himself as the experimenter's agent.

Experiment 16: Two Authorities with one as the Victim

Two experimenters took part in this experiment. One of them was the learner and the other instructed the subject in the normal way. (Figure 4.)

The results were quite unexpected. With one exception, every subject either stopped when the learner first demanded to be released, or else disregarded him completely and continued to the 450 volt shock level. Moreoever, 13 (65.0%) of the 20 subjects continued to the end of the experiment. This suggests that the subject tended to identify with the authority who gave the commands; and, perhaps, because of his greater proximity to them.

Experiment 12: Learner Demands to be Shocked

In all the experiments which have already been described, the experimenter told the subject to continue and the learner always protested. This time, however, the procedure was reversed: the experimenter called a halt to the study after the 150 volt shock had been administered. But the learner demanded to continue. The subject was therefore faced with a learner who demanded to be shocked and an experimenter who forbade it. Significantly enough, not a single subject complied with the learner's demands. Every subject stopped administering shocks as soon as the experimenter ordered them to do so. (Milgram, 1974: 90-92.) On the other hand, things were very different when the experimenter was strapped in the chair.




Figure 5

Experiment 14: Authority as the Victim

This experiment began in the usual way. But when the experimenter described the punishment the learner might receive, the latter expressed great reluctance to continue. The experimenter, therefore, allowed himself to be strapped in the chair and asked his accomplice to perform his tasks. (Figure 5.)

At 150 volts the experimenter demanded to be let out, but his accomplice insisted forcefully that he continue. All the subjects refused to comply. Furthermore, many of the subjects leapt to the aid of the experimenter and ran to the next room to unstrap him. In addition, they often expressed sympathy for the experimenter, but appeared to be alienated from the man who had ordered them to continue. (Milgram, 1974: 99-105.)

These four experiments, therefore, support Milgram's argument that aggression is not the key to an explanation of the extreme willingness of subjects to comply with the experimenter's commands. In addition, these four experiments help to explode the belief that only a pathological minority are capable of the kind of behaviour which the obedience experiments revealed. (Milgram, 1974: 165-168.)

5. The myth of conscientious refusal

Milgram employed an extremely straightforward procedure to unearth what I have called the myth of conscientious refusal. (1974: 27-31.) This myth is supported by two assumptions. One of these assumptions is that people are by and large decent and therefore do not readily hurt the innocent. The other is that unless a person is coerced by physical force or threat he always acts as an autonomous individual; that is, as someone who acts in a particular way because he has decided to do so.

Milgram invited three different groups of people to hear a lecture

on obedience to authority: a group of psychiatrists, a group of students and a group of middle-class adults of varied occupations. He described a standard version of the experiment in some detail but did not disclose any of the results. The audience was provided with a schematic diagram that showed the verbal voltage designations on the shock generator. (Chapter 7 of this essay: figure 2.) Each respondent was asked to reflect on the experiment, and then to record privately how he thought he himself would perform in it.

Each of the 110 respondents was convinced that he would have disobeyed the experimenter at some point in the series of commands. Only 25 (22.7%) of the respondents believed that they would have continued beyond the 150 volt level. And nobody believed that he would have been capable of going beyond the 300 volt level.

The respondents were also asked to explain why they would disobey the experimenter. In general, they believed that empathy, compassion and a sense of justice would have enabled them to disobey before they reached the 450 volt shock level. In other words: they stated what they believed to be desirable and assumed that the desirable action would follow. For example, here are two typical attempts to explain why they would have disobeyed the experimenter:

> ...since the subject volunteered, and I volunteered, and since the experimenter has no physical authority over me, the subject would be released when he is at such a point that he asks to be released, and I would release him. (Maximum: 150 volts.)

> The reason I would break off is because the person would scream with pain. Knowing how I would feel if I even scraped by knee, I would then feel compassion for the learner. (Maximum 180 volts.)

These replies suggest that people tend to see themselves in a favourable light. In an attempt to eliminate the bias induced by vanity, Milgram therefore asked various groups to predict how other people would perform. Psychiatrists, graduate students and lecturers in the behavioural science, under-graduates and middle-class adults responded to the

question. But there was a remarkable similarity in the predictions of the various groups. Almost everyone predicted that the overwhelming majority of the subjects would refuse to obey the experimenter to the end; and that only a pathological fringe would administer the highest shock on the board. Even the psychiatrists showed very little awareness of the web of forces that operate in an authority situation. For example, they predicted that most subjects would not go beyond the 150 volt level; that is beyond the level where the learner makes his first explicit demand to be freed. In addition, they predicted that about 4 per cent would go as far as the 300 volt level; and that only about one subject in a thousand would obey the experimenter to the end.

This is a startling discrepancy between what people believed would happen and what actually happened. It suggests that few of us are aware of how difficult it is to disobey laws and commands which run counter to our deepest moral convictions. And therefore Milgram's experiments suggest that few of us are equipped to deal with situations like those created by the obedience experiments. In addition, these experiments demonstrate that we are in urgent need of a prescription for servile compliance.

CHAPTER 11

A PRESCRIPTION FOR SERVILE COMPLIANCE

I have, of course, provided no more than a sketch of what happened in some of Milgram's experiments. In particular, I have omitted the accounts of what the subjects said and did while they administered the shocks. This blunts the gripping quality of his book as well as the significance of his work. But enough has been said to substantiate the fact that many subjects will obey the experimenter no matter how vehement the pleading of the person being shocked; no matter how painful the shocks seem to be; and no matter how much the victim pleads to be let out. And when one has digested all this, one can only hope that there is a prescription for the kind of servile compliance which Milgram observed.

In fact, Milgram offers us such a prescription. But it is not at all clear that it is as helpful as he believes it is. I therefore want to examine this aspect of his work. More specifically, I will first rehearse the outlines of his answer to the question, Why is conscientious noncompliance so difficult? And then I will consider his

prescription for servile compliance. Finally, I will argue that one of his experiments and one of his interviews are more significant than Milgram allows. In addition, they help to explain why conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ offer us a viable alternative to his prescription for the extremely problematic behaviour he observed.

1. Why is conscientious noncompliance so difficult?

This question is at least as old as Sophocles' Antigone. But we do not seem to be anywhere near the last word on the subject. On the other hand, it is a question which nobody can afford to ignore. And least of all any conscientious noncombatant who may not yet have had to declare his convictions to an unsymphathetic military tribunal. I therefore want to rehearse the outline of Milgram's answer to this question.

Milgram's attempt to explain why adults are so willing to comply with authority is a complex one. (1974: 123-164.) But his distinction between agentic and autonomous states is the basic ingredient in his attempt to account for the degree of servile compliance which he observed. He wants to maintain that both these states are brought about by alterations in the internal operations of the person concerned. When someone is in one of these states

> chemical inhibitors and disinhibitors alter the probability of certain neural pathways and sequences being used.

At the same time, this alteration at the chemoneurological level is reflected in an alteration of attitude and of self-awareness. When a person is in the autonomous state he sees himself as the source of his actions. And so he accepts responsibility for what he does or refuses to do. On the other hand, when someone is in the agentic state he

> no longer views himself as acting out of his own purpose

> but rather comes to see himself as an agent for executing the wishes of another person. (Milgram, 1974: 132-134.)

Whatever the merits and weaknesses of this way of drawing the distinction between agentic and autonomous states may be, when one considers some of Milgram's discussions with the people who participated in his experiments, it is easy to recognise those subjects who remained in an autonomous state and those who came to see themselves as the experimenter's agents. For example, Bruno Batta obeyed the experimenter to the end of the Touch Proximity Experiment and his behaviour is a good example of what happens when someone is in the agentic state. At the 330 volt level, the learner refused not only to touch the shock plate but also to provide any answers. Batta became annoyed:

> You better answer and get it over with. We can't stay here all night.

This was the only thing he said to the learner in the course of the hour. And when he had administered 450 volts, he turned to the experimenter and asked, "Where do we go from here, Professor?" His tone was deferential and expressed his willingness to comply with any further instructions. (Milgram, 1974: 45-47.)

Gretchen Brandt is a good example of someone who remained in the autonomous state. At the 210 volt level she was told that she had no choice but to continue. She replied:

> I think we are here on our own free will. I don't want to be responsible if he has a heart condition if anything happens to him. Please understand that.

Milgram emphasises her straightforward, courteous behaviour throughout the experiment and observes that her

> lack of tension, and total control of her own action seems to make disobedience a simple and rational deed. Her behaviour is the very embodiment of what I had initially envisioned would be true for almost all sub-

jects. (Milgram, 1974: 84-85.)

Armed with this distinction, Milgram's explanation of why conscientious noncompliance is so difficult revolves around two poles. The first pole of his explanation is an account of conscience. He regards conscience as a regulative power or capacity which, if it functions at all, only functions when an individual is in the autonomous state. Furthermore, he confines the effective operation of conscience to situations in which an individual is not caught up in his role within an hierarchical authority structure. In other words: Milgram is inclined to believe that conscience is a more or less adequate inhibitor of personal aggression, hatred and vindictiveness. But he is not at all convinced that it is an effective bulwark against authority.

This brings us to the second pole of Milgram's explanation. According to him, as soon as an individual enters and identifies with an hierarchical structure he moves from being in the autonomous state to being in the agentic state. The most important consequence of this change is that when an individual is in the agentic state his capacity for conscientious noncompliance is either seriously inhibited or completely idle. And this, Milgram argues, explains why people who are usually decent and courteous acted with such severity against the learner in the obedience experiments. They did so because conscience, which usually inhibits their impulsive aggressive action, was seriously diminished as soon as they entered the experimental situation and began to see themselves as agents for carrying out the experimenter's instructions. And because some system of authority is an essential ingredient of any kind of communal life, few people find conscientious noncompliance as simple and rational a deed as it seemed to be for Gretchen Brandt. In general, therefore, conscientious noncompliance is as difficult as it is because the authority structures in which the potential conscientious noncompliant finds himself makes it easier for an individual to be in an agentic rather than in an autonomous state.




Figure 6

2. Is there a prescription for servile compliance?

Milgram's theorectical tools may not be the last word on why conscientious noncompliance is so difficult. But his exposition of the ineffectiveness of consience in terms of the difference between autonomous and agentic states does illuminate most of the behaviour he encountered in his experiments. In addition, he has argued that moral support is the most effective guarantor of the kind of behaviour exemplified by Gretchen Brandt:

> When an individual wishes to stand in opposition to authority, he does best to find support for his position from others in his group. The mutual support provided by men for each other is the strongest bulwark we have against excesses of authority. (Milgram, 1974: 12.)

Milgram offers us this prescription because of what happened in experiment 17. (1974: 116-121.) Here the experimenter had three accomplices as well as a naive subject. (Figure 6.) One accomplice was assigned the usual position of being the teacher. One accomplice read the list of word pairs. And the other told the subject whether the answers which were received were correct or incorrect. The subject was told to administer the shocks. The experiment proceeded in the normal way up to the 150 volt level, when one of the accomplices refused to participate any further. And at the 210 volt level, the other accomplice also refused to continue. Although the experimenter urged the subject to continue on his own, only 4 (10.0%) of the 40 people who participated in experiment 17 continued to the 450 volt level.

This experiment does support Milgram's prescription for servile compliance. But this prescription does not seem to be a very effective one. He himself introduces an immediate qualification: lynch mobs and groups of predatory hoodlums remind us how vicious mobs may be. In addition and more significantly, as people like Antigone and Sir Thomas More knew only too well, 'the mutual support provided by men for each other' is often not available in situations where laws and commands run counter to our deepest moral convictions. These comments, of course, do not destroy Milgram's observation that the subjects in

experiment 17 benefited from the moral support they received. Nor do these comments destroy the more general point that this kind of sup-support makes it more difficult for someone to move into an agentic state. On the other hand, these comments do suggest that it is worth looking for other bulwarks against servile compliance with authority.

3. Another prescription for servile compliance

Conscientious noncombatants who refuse to submit to combat training because they worship Christ provide us with another effective prescription for servile compliance. These conscientious noncombatants refuse to submit to combat training, not because they have conscientious or moral objections to war, nor because they have repudiated the political authority of their society. On the contrary, they refuse to submit to combat training because they are convinced that their primary obligation is to worship Christ and to try to follow his example. In addition, they are convinced that his healing ministry is incompatible with combat training. And so, when they are in a situation where the authority of Christ's example conflicts with an order which requires them to submit to combat training they are able to refuse to comply. And they are able to do so because the Church's worship tends to keep them in an agentic state in which they are more willing to follow Christ's example than to obey a law or administrative order which conflicts with that example. In other words and in general: the worship of someone like Christ does not only have a theological significance. It is one way in which people may manage to avoid the kind of servile compliance which so deeply disturbed Milgram.

But why do conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ have an effective prescription for servile compliance? One of Milgram's interviews and one of his experiments are more significant than he allows. And when they are given their due, they provide an answer to this question.

Everyone who participated in the obedience experiments either




Figure 7

obeyed the experimenter to the end or arrived at a point where he or she refused to comply. But each individual brought his own particular attitude, emotions and values into the situation. Milgram has provided us with sketches of ten of these participants; seven of whom obeyed the experimenter to the end. One of the three who refused to comply was an anonymous professor of the Old Testament. He refused to continue beyond the 150 volt shock level in the Proximity Experiment.

Unfortunately, Milgram is somewhat dismissive of, and certainly unimpressed by, the reason the professor gave for his refusal to continue. More specifically, when the experimenter had explained the true purpose of the study, he asked the professor if he had any suggestions as to how people could strengthen their resistance to inhumane authority. The professor replied:

> If one has as one's ultimate authority God, then it trivializes human authority.

Milgram is quick to emphasise that

> the answer for this man lies not in the repudiation of authority but in the substitution of good - that is, divine - authority for bad. (1974: 47-49.)

Milgram is correct to emphasise the difference between the professor's reply and Gretchen Brandt's reason for refusing to comply with the experimenter's orders after the 210 volt level. On the other hand, it is not at all obvious that the professor's comment on the need for a prescription for servile compliance should be dismissed so quickly. In fact, if we give one of Milgram's experiments its due, then it is obvious that the professor's conviction explains why conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ have another effective prescription for the problem underlined by the obedience experiments.

In experiment 15 there were two experimenters. And so there were two sources of authority. (Figure 7.) The two experimenters cooperated

throughtout all the preliminaries and up to the 150 volt level. At this point one of them gave the usual command to proceed with the experiment. The other, however, ordered the subject not to continue. The contrast with the other experiments is extremely significant. Only one subject continued, and then only to the next level. (Milgram, 1974: 105-107.) But the most important point about this experiment is that these subjects disobeyed one authority because they had obeyed another. In Milgram's terminology: these subjects were not necessarily in the kind of autonomous state which Gretchen Brandt exemplified so well. Like the anonymous professor of the Old Testament, and those conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ, these subjects chose to obey one authority rather than another. And it is hardly surprising that they chose to obey the experimenter who exemplified their very basic convictions about not inflicting pain on an innocent victim. Similarly, it is hardly surprising that someone who is convinced that Christ's healing ministry exemplifies and ought to shape his attitude to combat training is able to refuse to comply with a law or administrative order which runs counter to these convictions.

There are, therefore, at least three ways in which conscientious objection in South Africa, the worship of Christ and Milgram's work on obedience to authority are related:

Firstly, the position of conscientious noncombatants is not guaranteed by section 67(3) of the Defence Act. Even if they belong to one of the historic peace churches, the Department of Defence may refuse to grant their application for exemption from combat training under this section of the Act. And so it is possible for conscientious noncombatants to find themselves in a situation where they have to choose between obedience to authority and their convictions about combat training.

Secondly, Milgram's work underlines in a very dramatic way that conscientious noncompliance is not easy. And so it acts as a warning to anyone who is convinced that he ought to refuse to submit to combat training: if his application for exemption is not granted, he may find

it difficult to disobey a law or adminstrative order which runs counter to his convictions.

Thirdly, Milgram has argued that the moral support of a group is one prescription for servile compliance. On the other hand, a neglected aspect of his work explains why conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ have another effective prescription for servile compliance. In addition, it suggests that the worship of Christ or of someone like him is an important but neglected ingredient in a general account of conscientious noncompliance.

CONCLUSION

AN INCONCLUSIVE CATECHISM ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

The Civil War in Angola and the statement which the South African Council of Churches made at Hammanskraal on 2 August 1974 have sparked off a number of political and ecclesiastical controversies about conscientious objection. Unfortunately, these exchanges have often generated more heat than light. I have, therefore, tried to raise and to answer some of the questions which have appeared in the Church's debate about conscientious objection and war. And although nothing I have said about the problems that have been raised counts as the last word on the subject, I want to draw this essay to a close. But instead of simply presenting a summary of what I have tried to achieve, I will return to the questions which have been raised in this essay; and I will now answer them more briefly.

Question 1: What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow?

Section 67(3) of the Defence Act of 1957 allows an officer who has to register people for military service to allot someone

> to a unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity.

In addition, this section of the Act restricts this privilege to someone who

> bona fide belongs and adheres to a recognised denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war.

Both these phrases are problematic. For example, and from a conscientious objector's point of view: the first phrase is open to a strong or a weak interpretation. On the strong interpretation, this phrase stipulates that a conscientious objector must be posted to a noncombatant unit such as the medical corps. On the weak interpretation, however, the phrase allows him to be posted to a noncombatant unit; but he need not be. What may happen instead is that he is posted to a combat unit in a noncombatant capacity. The second phrase is equally problematic: How does one establish that a denomination is a 'denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war'?

Fortunately, the Minister of Defence has resolved these problems. And he has done so by interpreting both phrases to the advantage of conscientious objectors. In other words: he has placed the strong interpretation on the first phrase. And so anyone who is exempted from combat training in terms of section 67(3) of the Defence Act is posted to the medical corps:

> This section of the Act is applied in practice by posting such citizens to a unit of the South African Medi-

> cal Corps. Medical units are, according to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, recognised as noncombatant units. (SADFO 42/70: paragraph 3. Compare Hansard, 1970: column 2851.)

The Minister of Defence has also placed a generous interpretation on the second phrase. He has declared that it is his Department's policy to grant all applications under section 67(3). And in the first six months of 1974 at least two persons who do not belong 'to a recognised religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war' were assigned to noncombatant units under this section of the Act. (Hansard, 1974: reply to question 20.)

South African law, therefore, allows a conscientious objector to be a conscientious noncombatant; that is, it allows him to be exempted from combat training in the South African Defence Force. But it does not allow him to be a conscientious nonmilitarist; that is, it does not allow him to be exempted from every kind of military service whatsoever.

Although the Minister's interpretation of section 67(3) is more liberal than the letter of the law, it does not seem to have altered the fact that someone may be assigned to a noncombatant unit under this section of the Act only if his religious convictions require him to refuse to submit to combat training. And this fact does not seem to have altered because in 1974 each of the 27 persons who were posted to noncombatant units in terms of section 67(3) belonged to a religious denomination. I will, therefore, confine this catechism to questions which are raised by those conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ, and who are convinced that their attempt to follow his example requires them to refuse to submit to combat training in the South African Defence Force.

Question 2: Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants?

In general, a conscientious objector is someone who refuses to sub-

mit to combat training and service in his country's defence force. On the other hand, conscientious objectors do not agree on what this refusal involves. Only some of them are conscientious noncombatants. And they are conscientious noncombatants because they are neither pacifists nor conscientious nonmilitarists.

Why are conscientious noncombatants not pacifists? A pacifist is someone who is convinced (a) that it is possible to settle international disputes by arbitration and without waging war; and (b) that he must renounce all forms of coercion, even nonviolent coercion. Conscientious noncombatants are not pacifists because they hold neither of these convictions. They do not believe that it is possible to persuade nations to reduce their armaments and to settle all their disputes by arbitration and without waging war. And they do not believe that this is possible because they share the pessimistic convictions about human nature and sin which are exemplified by Genesis 3: 1-4: 16 and by the Epistle of James 4: 1-2. In addition, they are not convinced that they must renounce all forms of coercion, even nonviolent coercion. More positively, conscientious noncombatants are not convinced that anything is to be gained by ignoring the difference between what happens in the combat zones of a war and what happens when an unarmed person is violent in defence of himself or of someone else. Conscientious noncombatants, therefore, refuse to submit to combat training, not because they have renounced all forms of coercion, but because they have renounced all those actions which are designed to enable people to kill or to mutilate each other.

Why are conscientious noncombatants not conscientious nonmilitarists? A conscientious nonmilitarist is someone who refuses to submit to every kind of military service whatsoever. Conscientious noncombatants are not nonmilitarists because they recognise that they pay taxes and make other, more or less direct, contributions to the strength of their country's economy. And so they are aware that they cannot avoid making a more or less direct contribution to the strength and efficiency of their country's defence force. More positively, conscientious noncombatants are not nonmilitarists because they are not convinced that

they ought to try to divorce themselves from all the anguish, ambiguity and suffering which arises from a war in which their country is embroiled. And so, although, their religious convictions require them to refuse to submit to combat training, they are still prepared to acknowledge that they have an obligation to serve in their country's defence force. But they do not believe that the only way in which one can discharge this obligation is by becoming a combatant. On the contrary, they are prepared to argue that their service in the medical corps of the defence force enables them to discharge both their military and their religious obligations. And this is an honest compromise because the medical corps is both an internationally recognised noncombatant unit and an essential component of a defence force.

Question 3: Why are some conscientious noncombatants not selective conscientious noncombatants?

Conscientious noncombatants divide into absolute and selective opponents of combat training. An absolute conscientious noncombatant is someone who refuses to submit to combat training for every kind of war. On the other hand, a selective conscientious noncombatant is someone who refuses to submit to combat training only if he is convinced that the war in which he is being required to fight is just.

Selective conscientious noncombatants argue that their position is superior to that of the absolutists because it allows them to participate in wars which are just. More specifically, they argue that everyone has an obligation to employ just means to make situations more just. And so they conclude that the more apparent it is that the war in which he is being asked to participate is just, the less convincing is an absolutist's refusal to participate in it.

This argument is to the point because everyone does have an obligation to employ just methods to make situations more just. On the other jand, it is not clear that this argument is sound because it assumes that we have a set of impartial tests which can be used to discover whether or not a war is just. But there are at least four reasons why this assump-

tion is problematic.

No government recognises the theory. No government has ever announced that it has assessed the situation in which it finds itself and come to the conclusion that the war it is waging - or about to wage - is unjust. On the contrary, during a war a government is always convinced that it has justice on its side.

There are too many conflicting versions of the theory. Amongst the many examples which could be given, the following two are sufficient to make the point:

(a) John Rawls insists that a war is just only if it is being waged in self-defence; and only if the nation concerned has just institutions which it wants to preserve. (1973: 379.) John Calvin, however, argues that nations may wage a just war not only 'to preserve the tranquility of their dominion' but also 'to help those forcibly oppressed'. (Institutes of the Christian Religion, iv, 22: 11-12.)

(b) Thomas Aquinas requires a war to be waged by a legitimate authority before it can count as a just war. (Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, question 40.) But Jacques Ellul does not insist on this test. (1970: 6.) And so he allows for the possibility that a civil war may be just.

And so one could continue. But enough has been said to demonstrate that conscientious noncombatants who appeal to a theory of a just war need to explain why they have adopted one version of the theory rather than another. And they owe us this explanation because there are so many conflicting versions of the theory.

The theory raises more questions than it answers. Anyone who examines the four theories of a just war that have been mentioned will soon discover how vague they are. And so they do not provide us with a set of impartial tests which can be applied to discover whether or not a war is just. What they do instead is to raise more questions than they answer. For example, who is to decide whether or not any of the parties

to the dispute satisfy all the conditions which the theory stipulates? Is it just to engage in a military operation in which the death of innocent people could be expected, even though it was not intended? And when are we in a position from which it is clear that all other means of resolving the dispute have already been tried?

None of these questions is new. But none of them has an incontestable answer. And so it is difficult to defend a refusal to submit to combat training if one appeals to a theory of this kind.

The theory cannot be applied. Even if all the parties to a particular conflict are prepared to adopt the same tests for a just war; and even if all the questions which the theory generates have been answered to everyone's satisfaction, it is still impossible to apply the theory to a war which is about to be waged or which is actually being waged. And this is impossible because the theory can be applied only if both sides disclose a fairly substantial set of facts about the whole situation both before and during the war. But no government allows this kind and amount of information to be disclosed to the public. And so nobody can ever in in a position to say whether or not a particular set of tests have been satisfied.

All these considerations add up to reasonable grounds for the claim that we do not have, and are unlikely ever to have, an adequate theory of a just war. In addition, these considerations help to explain why some conscientious noncombatants refuse to submit to combat training for every kind of war. They are not convinced that we have a set of impartial tests which can be used to discover whether or not a war is just. Furthermore, some of them are convinced that they ought to try to follow Christ's example and that his example supports a refusal to submit to combat training.

Question 4: Why do some conscientious noncombatants appeal to Christ's example?

This question has a straightforward answer. The imitation of Christ

is rooted in the Church's worship. For example, the Revised Services of the Holy Eucharist and Morning and Evening Prayer of the Church of the Province of South Africa contains a Eucharistic Prayer which ends with this petition:

> Grant that as we await the coming of Christ our Saviour in the glory and truimph of his kingdom, we may daily grow into his likeness.....

And many of the Collects which are used in this Liturgy strike the same note. For example, on the Second Sunday after Christmas we pray that 'we may have the pattern of his holy life always before our eyes'. And on the Fourth Sunday after Pentecost we pray for grace 'to follow the pattern of his most holy life'. The Collect for Palm Sunday is even more explicit:

> Mercifully grant
> that following the example of his great humility
> we may share with him
> in the glory of his resurrection;
> through Jesus Christ our Lord.

These prayers illustrate P.F. Strawson's discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein's point: 'men make for themselves pictures of ideal forms of life'. (1974: 26.) In addition, those conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ are not only encouraged to see their moral endeavour as an attempt to realise an ideal pattern of life. In addition, they are convinced that this is their primary obligation; that is, that their attempt to follow Christ's example is more important than all their other obligations. In particular, they are convinced that their obligation to serve in their country's defence force as combatants is not as important as their obligation to try to follow Christ's example. At the same time, however, conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ are prepared to admit that they do have some obligations to the other members of their society. And so, although they are opposed to war, they are prepared to discharge their military obligations by serving in a medical corps of their country's defence force.

Question 5: Does Christ's example support or undermine a refusal to submit to combat training?

I will try to demonstrate that Christ's example supports a refusal to submit to combat training. More specifically, I will first discuss both a positive and a negative thesis which are essential ingredients of this claim. I will then demonstrate that the classic arguments which are advanced for and against these theses fail because they cannot handle the question, How relevant are these incidents to war? Finally, I will appeal to the fact that Christ spent a great deal of time healing people to defend the claim that his example supports a refusal to submit to combat training.

The conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis is that the New Testament contains arratives about Christ which suggest that, if he had been conscripted, he would have refused to submit to combat training. Amongst many other examples which conscientious noncombatants employ to support this thesis, they place a great deal of emphasis on Matthew's account of Christ's arrest in Gethsemane. (26: 47-56.)

According to Matthew, one of those who were with Christ when he was arrested drew his sword and struck the high priest's slave, and cut off his ear. Christ commanded the person concerned to sheath his sword: 'for all who take the sword will perish by the sword'.

S.G.F. Brandon has claimed that this maxim should not be attributed to Christ. Alternatively, and if it is attributed to him,

> the saying cannot be regarded as a proverbial condemnation of the profession of arms, since it is manifestly untrue that all soldiers die in armed combat. (1967: 306-307.)

Brandon's claims have not received much support. And his objection is certainly due to an over literal interpretation of what Christ said. More specifically, T.H. Robinson is nearer the mark when he claims that the saying expresses Christ's conviction that 'a kingdom founded on

force is always liable to be overthrown by superior force'. (1928: 220.)

These disagreements amongst the commentators indicate that it is not always that clear what can and what cannot be attributed to Christ. In addition, they underline the fact that Christ's words are not always easy to understand. Nevertheless, most commentators are on Robinson's side rather than on Brandon's. And conscientious noncombatants have not hesitated to appeal to this incident to support their claim that, if he had been conscripted, Christ would have refused to submit to combat training.

But the conscientious noncombatant's positive thesis is not sufficient to support his conviction that Christ's example supports a refusal to submit to combat training. What is still required is a negative thesis.

The conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis is that the New Testament does not record any incident which suggests that, if he had been conscripted Christ would have been prepared to submit to combat training. And he is prepared to make this claim in spite of the fact that John's account of the cleansing of the Temple (2: 13-17.) is often employed to undermine it.

At the same time it should be recognised that conscientious noncombatant's who appeal to Christ's example have found this passage uncomfortable. For example, G.H.C. Macgregor is obviously embarrassed by John's account of the cleansing of the Temple because it suggests that Christ was

> capable of righteous anger, with expressed itself in an act of aggressive personal violence against the desecration of the Temple. (1963: 17-19.)

Does the cleansing of the Temple undermine the conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis? I do not think it does. And it does not undermine this thesis because, if it establishes anything about conscientious objection, John 2: 13-17 merely establishes that Christ

was not a pacifist in the sense that he renounced every kind of coercive behaviour. But not all conscientious objectors are pacifists. Some of them are only conscientious noncombatants. And conscientious noncombatants refuse to submit to combat training, not because they have renounced all forms of coercion, but because they have renounced all those actions which are designed to enable people to kill or to mutilate each other.

Macgregor tries to make very much the same point. Unfortunately, however, his defence of the conscientious noncombatant's negative thesis undermines his positive thesis. In his discussion of the cleansing of the Temple he argues that this incident 'has no relevance whatsoever to war'.

This point must be granted. A single individual armed with a whip of cords which he uses to drive some traders and their animals out of the Temple, is a long way from the kind of violence which is such a typical and essential feature of war. But if Macgregor's point is granted here, then it must also be granted in discussions of Matthew's account of Christ's arrest. Violent resistance to arrest is also a long way from the kind of violence which is a typical and essential feature of war.

In other words and quite explicitly: if someone who is <u>opposed</u> to the claim that Christ's example supports a refusal to submit to combat training may not appeal to John's account of the cleansing of the Temple because this passage 'has no relevance to war', then the same must be said to someone who is <u>sympathetic</u> to this claim and supports his position with an appeal to Matthew's account of Christ's arrest.

<u>In defence of conscientious noncombatant's who appeal to Christ's example</u> I want to argue that an appeal to his healing ministry avoids the problem Macgregor has created. Firstly, it is perverse to doubt that the healing of men's bodies and minds was an essential ingredient of Christ's ministry. In fact, nearly 18 per cent of Mark's Gospel is devoted to this aspect of his life and the discussions occasioned by

it. Secondly, it is obvious that Christ's healing ministry is relevant to the discussion about whether or not he would have refused to submit to combat training. Healing people and waging war on them are about as incompatible as any two activities can ever be.

In the light of these considerations, it is reasonable to claim that Christ's example supports a refusal to submit to combat training. And so, if anyone who is pledged to the imitation of Christ allows himself to be trained and used as a soldier, then by no stretch of the imagination is he allowing himself to be used to preserve or to restore the health of those against whom he is waging was. In other words: anyone who is pledged to the imitation of Christ is required, amongst other things, to try to contribute to the healing of people's bodies and minds. But this is not something which combat training teaches one to do.

Question 6: Why do some conscientious noncombatants worship Christ?

A straightforward answer to this question is that they worship him because he is a god. Unfortunately, this straightforward answer assumes that we know what counts as a god. More specifically, it assumes that a god is a particular kind of being; for example, an incorporeal person who, apart from being invisible is omnipresent and, in general, vastly more superior than corporeal beings or persons.

This assumption about and conception of a god is an extremely venerable one. At the same time it generates the equally ancient and respectable paradox of evil. But this paradox can be construed as a proof that there are no gods. And so this suggests that a god is not a particular kind of being; but a being to whom some people have an attitude of deference, awe and worship

This is a helpful suggestion because it explains why love and marriage are often used to illuminate faith and worship. More specifically, this analogy enables one to answer the question, Why do some people wor-

ship Christ?, in a less straightforward but more satisfactory way. In fact there is no general, non-idiosyncratic answer to this question for the same reasons that there are no such answers to parallel questions about human love and marriage. In other words: people do not worship Christ because he is a god. On the contrary, he is a god because they worship him.

Question 7: Does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance that is supported by Christ's example?

A conscientious noncompliant is someone who refuses to obey a more or less direct injunction or administrative order because of his moral, political or religious convictions. As things stand at the moment, the questions which Romans 13 generates about conscientious noncompliance that is supported by Christ's example do not have to be faced by conscientious noncombatants. In other words: conscientious noncombatants who refuse to submit to combat training because they worship Christ and are convinced that they are pledged to try to imitate his example qualify for allotment to the medical corps of the South African Defence Force in terms of section 67(3) of the Defence Act. They therefore do not have to ask themselves whether Romans 13 undermines their refusal to submit to combat training. On the other hand, some of them occupy this fortunate position only because of the very generous interpretation which the Minister of Defence has placed on section 67(3) of the Act. In addition, there is no guarantee that parliament will not change the regulations which govern conscientious objection. And so it is not inappropriate to consider this question.

For convenience, therefore, I will reserve conscientious noncompliance and conscientious noncompliant for a conscientious noncombatant who, now or in the future, refuses to submit to combat training even though it is illegal to do so. And I will argue that Romans 13 does not undermine this kind of conscientious noncompliance that is supported by an appeal to Christ's example. More specifically, I will argue this point by trying to answer three questions very briefly: Why does Romans 13 generate

questions about conscientious noncompliance? Why is it problematic to interpret Romans 13 as a plea for a servile acceptance of one's government's injunctions? And how should Romans 13 be interpreted?

Why does Romans 13 generate questions about conscientious noncompliance?

There are at least three reasons. Firstly, the way in which Romans 13: 1 has been translated by various scholars suggests that it is a plea for servile acceptance of one's government's injunctions. For example, the RSV contains a translation which carries this suggestion:

> Let every person be subject to (hupotassesthō) the governing authorities.

J.B. Philipps and the Jerusalem Bible use 'obey' for hupoassesthō; the NEB uses 'submit to'; and C.K. Barrett uses 'be in subjection to'. All these translations, therefore, tend to conjure up the idea that Paul recommended a more or less servile acceptance of civic authority.

Secondly, scholars who have commented on Romans 13: 1 strengthen this idea. For example, some contemporary commentators have declared that this sentence teaches that 'Christians owe implicit obedience to the civil power' (Scott, 1934: 138.); and that it counsel's 'absolute obedience to ruling authority in the State'. (O'Neill, 1975: 211.)

Thirdly, when Romans 13: 1 is used to plead for a servile acceptance of civic authority, there is a tendency to equate conscientious noncompliance and civil disobedience. But these are different kinds of illegal actions. More specifically, a civil disobedient is someone who aims to overthrow his government, or at least to change some of its laws and policies, by public, nonviolent and conscientious acts. On the other hand, a conscientious noncompliant has other aims and motives. For example, the conscientious noncombatants who have been considered in this essay simply wish to remain faithful to Christ and to his example. And this distinction is important because Romans 13: 2 does, perhaps,

undermine civil disobedience. But it is not at all obvious that it undermines the kind of conscientious noncompliance that is supported by Christ's example.

Why is it problematic to interpret Romans 13 as a plea for a servile acceptance of one's government's injunctions?

There are at least two reasons why Romans 13 should not be interpreted as a plea for a servile acceptance of one's government's injunctions. Firstly, this interpretation conflicts with at least two other exhortations with which Paul surrounds Romans 13: 1. Romans 12: 2 is a plea for nonconformity: 'Adapt yourselves no longer to the pattern of this present world, but let your minds be remade and your whole nature thus transformed.' And Romans 13: 14 demands that his readers take Christ's example seriously. Secondly, this interpretation undermines Paul's theology of subordination. The crucial passage is 1 Corinthians 15: 27-28 in which he is anxious to underline Christ's subordination to God and the subordination of everything else to Christ. For both these reasons it is difficult to accept that Romans 13 undermines the kind of conscientious noncompliance that is supported by Christ's example.

How should Romans 13 be interpreted?

Romans 13: 1-7 is a unit. And Romans 13: 7 is the best commentary on Romans 13: 1.

> Discharge your obligations to all men; pay tax and toll, reverence and respect, to those to whom they are due.

These words seem to capture what Paul was driving at when he wrote Romans 13. On the one hand, he wanted to encourage the Christians at Rome to recognise that they were Rome's subjects and therefore that they should not rebel against Roman rule. (Romans 13: 2.) On the other hand, he did not want to encourage a servile acceptance of everything that the governing authorities commanded. He simply wanted Christians to give them their due (opheilas).

All these considerations, therefore, make it reasonable to conclude that Romans 13 does not undermine conscientious noncompliance that is supported by Christ's example. And there are two reasons why this conclusion is warranted in the case of those conscientious objectors who refuse to submit to combat training because they worship Christ. Firstly, conscientious noncombatants do not dispute the fact that they have military obligations. What they dispute is the demand that they discharge these obligations in a combatant capacity. Secondly, these conscientious noncombatants are convinced that their obligation to try to follow Christ's example is more important than all their other obligations. And it is impossible to believe that Paul would have questioned this conviction.

Question 8: Is there a prescription for servile compliance?

Stanley Milgram's experimental work on obedience to authority demonstrates that it is very difficult to refuse to comply with an administrative order which conflicts with one's deepest convictions. But a conscientious noncombatant may be refused exemption from combat training and so find himself in the kind of situation which Milgram studied. Conscientious noncombatants ought, therefore, to seek for a prescription for servile compliance.

Two of Milgram's experiment's provide us with a prescription of this kind. On the one hand, he has demonstrated that conscientious noncompliance is easier when people support each other. On the other hand, the significance of one of his experiments and one of his interviews seems to have escaped him. He demonstrated, but undervalued, the fact that it is easier to resist administrative orders when one receives conflicting commands and when one sees oneself as the agent of a superior authority.

Conscientious noncombatants who worship Christ have an authority who they regard as superior to every human authority. In addition, the liturgies which they use when they worship him encourage them to

prefer to follow his example when that example conflicts with other influences and commands. And so they have a prescription for servile compliance which deserves more recognition that it has received in most discussions of conscientious noncompliance and the related problem of servile compliance.

Question 9: Should South African legislation on conscientious objection be amended?

Chapter 1 of this essay discussed the kind of conscientious objection that is legal in South Africa. At that stage it would have been appropriate to ask whether or not this legislation should be amended. On the other hand, that question would have deflected me from my main task which was to clarify the regulations which actually govern conscientious objection in South Africa. But now that this has been done, I want to tackle that question. More specifically, I want to tackle two others: Should section 67(3) of the Defence Act be amended? And should section 121 of the Defence Act be amended?

Should section 67(3) of the Defence Act be amended?

Section 67(3) of the Defence Act stipulates that an officer who has to register people for their national service

> shall as far as may be practicable allot any person, who to his knowledge bona fide belongs and adheres to a recognised religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war, to a unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombat capacity.

The Minister of Defence has commented on two problematic phrases in this section of the Act. Firstly, he has ruled that 'service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity' means service in a noncombatant unit. And so people who qualify for exemption from combat training under this section of the Act are posted to a unit of the South African Medical Corps (SADFO 42/70: paragraph 3. Compare Hansard, 1970: column

2851.) Secondly, the Minister has stated that it is his Department's policy to grant all applications for exemption from combat training under this section of the Act. And in 1974 at least two people who are not members of 'a recognised religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war' were exempted from combat training under section 67(3). (Hansard, 1974: question 20.) Unfortunately, this statement does not seem to have altered the fact that someone may be assigned to a noncombatant unit under this section of the Act only if his religious convictions require him to refuse to submit to combat training. I therefore want to ask a question about this point and about some of the other ways in which this section of the Act should, perhaps, be amended.

Should the official interpretation of section 67(3) first be extended to cover moral objections to war and then legalised?

This question deserves an affirmative answer on both counts. As far as broadening the official interpretation is concerned, two comments are to the point. Firstly, section 95 of the Defence Act contains a territorial restriction on the employment of the South African Defence Force in a time of war. More specifically, a member of the Defence Force may be required to perform 'service against an enamy...outside South Africa' only if he has given his written consent. But this section of the Act does not attempt to confine this requirement to people who have religious grounds for a refusal to serve in a war outside South Africa. In fact, during the Second World War some members of the Defence Force appealed to an equivalent clause for political, rather than for moral or religious, reasons. And so an extension of section 67(3) to cover moral objections to war would not introduce a new principle into the Act.

Secondly, the same problem is generated by section 6(j) of the 1967 Military Selective Service Act of the United States of America. And Carl Cohen's comment on section 6(j) of that Act is just as relevant to section 67(3) of the Defence Act:

> no one denies that persons with theistic training and beliefs are often not conscientious and that is clearly evidenced by the fact that we do not treat the exhibition of those beliefs as conclusive evidence of conscientiousness...To suppose that the absence of theistic conviction is, ipso facto, proof of guile or unrealibility is to display the crudest form of religious bigotry. (1967-68: 275.)

The official interpretation of section 67(3) is a vast improvement on the letter of the law. And so, in the light of these observations, it seems reasonable to argue that the official interpretation should first be extended and then legalised. More specifically, section 67(3) of the Defence Act should at least be amended along the following lines:

> The registering officer shall as far as may be practicable allot any person who to his knowledge has bona fide moral and religious objections to war, to a noncombatant unit where such a person will be able to render service in the defence of the Republic in a noncombatant capacity.

The underlined words introduce the proposed amendment. But they do not introduce a new principle into the Act or into the official interpretation of this section. And they avoid the present suggestions of religious bigotry and bias.

Should conscientious nonmilitarism be legalised?

In other words: should section 67(3) be amended so as to allow someone to be exempted from every kind of military service whatsoever? My own misgivings about conscientious nonmilitarism prevent me from giving an affirmative answer to this question. But I think a case can be made for an amendment of this kind.

In fact, during the debate on section 1 of the Defence Further Amendment Bill of 1972 which was passed as Act No. 66 of 1972, W.V. Raw argued that this amendment made it possible for someone to be exempted from every kind of military service whatsoever. He based his argument on the fact that this amendment to the Defence Act of 1957 stipulates that

> nothing in this or any other section of this Act, shall be deemed to preclude the training of that Force (that is, the Citizen, not the Permanent Force) in any depot or establishment which is not a member of that Force. (Section 16(2) of the Defence Act of 1957 as amended by section 1 of Act No. 66 of 1972.)

Armed with this phrase, Raw argued that it would be 'more human and more just' not to imprison a conscientious nonmilitarist, but to allot him

> to a fire station or a hospital or a similar service for a period of two years in lieu of military service. (Hansard, 1972: column 2234.)

Similarly, Francis Wilson has argued for a more positive and comprehensive system of national service in South Africa. (1974a: 118-120.) And Bob Steyn and A. Paul Hare of the University of Cape Town have suggested that a special service corps should be created for conscientious nonmilitarists. (In a letter to Brigadier Cyrus Smith dated 23 October 1974.) As they see it, a special service corps of this kind could have the following characteristics:

(a) Model: United Nations force in Cyprus, Middle East, Congo, etc. when they have operated without arms.

(b) Size: 30 to 50 men.

(c) Length of service: Two years (or a period which was judged to be sufficiently longer than the normal period of military service to compensate for the additional hardship of military service).

(d) Organization: Similar to that of an infantry rifle platoon except that leaders would not hold formal military rank. While under government control the organization would be independent of the Army.

(e) Duty: Primary duty would be to supplement existing organizations at times of natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, floods, forest fires, storms) and act creatively in times of civil conflicts (e.g. riots, strikes, mass protests). Se-

condary duty would be to supplement existing staff in institutions which deal with violent or potentially violent persons (e.g. prisons, mental hospitals, homes for delinquent children). Service men would serve in the prisons and mental hospitals during the periods when they were not on crisis duty. Every three months they would gather for at least a week of further in-service training. Service men would have at least two different assignments during the years.

(f) Training: First aid, use of disaster relief equipment, fire fighting, orientation to the work of police, Red Cross, and other agencies which operate in disasters. Marshalling and third party services in time of civil conflicts. Para-medical skills. Orientation to procedures in mental hospitals, prisons, etc. Training in nonviolent response to direct physical violence. The initial training period would take approximately two months with further in-service training in the assigned institution.

Should selective conscientious objection be legalised?

Carl Cohen and others have argued for an affirmative answer to this question (1967-68: 276-279; and, for example Malamet, 1972.) But all these arguments turn on an explicit or implicit assumption that it is possible to construct an adequate theory of a just war. Unfortunately, I am not at all convinced that this assumption is warranted (See chapter 3 of this essay.) No government recognises a theory of this kind. There are too many conflicting versions of the theory. They all raise more questions than they answer. And, even if all these difficulties could be overcome, it would still be impossible to apply the theory because of insufficient empiricial information of the required kind. And so it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to construct a case for amending section 67(3) of the Defence Act so as to allow selective conscientious objection.

In the light of all these considerations I would say that section 67(3) should be amended. But only by first extending the official interpretation so that it includes moral as well as religious objections to war; and then by incorporating this interpretation as well as the statement about what service in a noncombatant capacity involves into the letter of the law.

Should section 121 of the Defence Act be amended?

According to section 121 of the Defence Act

> Any person who...uses any language or does any act or thing with intent to recommend, to encourage, aid incite, instigate, suggest to or otherwise cause any other person or any category of person or persons in general to refuse or fail to render any such service to which such other person or a person of such category or persons in general is or are liable or may become liable in terms of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

This clause was added to the Defence Act on 20 November 1974 in response to the SACC's statement on conscientious objection. At the time the amendment caused a great deal of controversy and a lengthy parliamentary debate. (Hansard, 1974: columns 798-828; 1450-1486; 6749-6766; and 6809-6886. Senate Debates, 1974: columns 3972-4012.)

Almost everyone who opposed or who was angered by this amendment missed the point. It is obvious that no government has legalised, or is ever likely to legalise, the activities of those conscientious objectors who are also civil disobedients. In general and quite explicitly: no government can reasonably be expected to legalise activities which are contrary to law. By the same token, no government can reasonably be expected to legalise any activity which encourages people to disobey the law. For all these reasons, therefore, it is impossible to see how anyone could muster a consistent argument for the abolition of, or even for a substantial amendment to, section 121 of the Defence Act.

Question 10: Is this a catechism on conscientious objection?

No. This is nothing more than my own answers to some of the questions which are generated by conscientious objection and war. On the other hand, I hope that my answers may be able to help the churches pre-

pare a catechism of this kind to help its members deal with Peter Shaffer's dilemma:

> Over and over I returned to the apparent truth that an absolute non-aggressive position seems unattainable by man without tangible loss of warmth and cherishable humanity - (what warm man will spare the Ruffian with a Pistol threatening his beloved?) - and yet a relative, 'human' attitude which permits retaliating under extreme provocation leads to horrors unenvisaged and unintended at the start of it: witness Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War. (1974: 9-10.)

APPENDIX

THE SACC'S STATEMENT ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

On 2 August 1974 the National Conference of the South African Council of Churches made a statement on conscientious objection. The statement consists of a preamble and a set of resolutions.

1. The preamble

The National Conference of the SACC acknowledges as the one and only God Him who mightily delivered the people of Israel from their bonadage in Egypt and who in Jesus Christ still proclaims that He will "set at liberty those who are oppressed". (Luke 4: 18.) He alone is supreme Lord and Saviour and to Him alone we owe ultimate obedience. Therefore "we must obey God rather than men" in those areas where the Government fails to fulfil its calling to be "God's servant for good" rather than for evil and oppression. (Acts 5: 29; Romans 13: 4.)

In the light of this the Conference

1. maintains that Christians are called to strive for justice and the true peace which can be founded only on justice;

2. does not accept that it is automatically the duty of those who follow Christ, the Prince of Peace, to engage in violence and war, or to prepare to engage in violence and war, whenever the State demands it;

3. reminds its member Churches that both Catholic and Reformation theology has regarded the taking up of arms as justifiable, if at all, only in order to fight a "just war";

4. points out that the theological definition of a "just war" excludes war in defence of a basically unjust and discriminatory society;

5. points out that the Republic of South Africa is at present a fundamentally unjust and discriminatory society and that this injustice and discrimination constitutes the primary, institutionalised violence which has provoked the counter-violence of the terrorists or freedom fighters;

6. points out that the military forces of our country are being prepared to defend this unjust and discriminatory society and that the threat of military force is in fact already used to defend the status quo against moves for radical change from outside the white electorate;

7. maintains that it is hypocritical to deplore the violence of terrorists or freedom fighters while we ourselves prepare to defend our society with its primary, institutionalised violence by means of yet more violence;

8. points out further that the injustice and oppression under which the black peoples of South Africa labour is far worse than that against which Afrikaners waged their First and Second Wars of Independence and that if we have justified the Afrikaners' resort to violence (or the violence of the imperialism of the English) or claimed that God was on their side, it is hypocritical to deny that the same applies to the black people in their struggle today;

9. questions the basis upon which chaplains are seconded to the military forces lest their presence indicate moral support for the defence of our unjust and discriminatory society.

2. The resolution

The Conference therefore

1. deplores violence as a means to solve problems;

2. calls on its member Churches to challenge all their members to consider in view of the above whether Christ's call to take up the Cross and follow Him in identifying with the oppressed does not, in our situation, involve becoming conscientious objectors;

3. calls on those of its member Churches who have chaplains in the military forces to reconsider the basis on which they are appointed and to investigate the state of pastoral care available to communicants at present in exile or under arms beyond our borders and to seek ways and means of ensuring that such pastoral care may be properly exercised;

4. commends the courage and witness of those who have been willing to go to jail in protest against unjust laws and policies in our land, and who challenge all of us by their example;

5. requests the SACC's task force on Violence and Non-violence to study methods of non-violent action for change which can be recommended to its member Churches;

6. prays for the Government and people of our land and urgently calls on them to make rapid strides towards radical and peaceful change in our society so that the violence and war to which our social, economic and political policies are leading us may be avoided.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reference

Allen, W.C.
1907 The Gospel According to St. Matthew. Second Edition. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Andrews, E.
1962 "Healing." Pp. 541-549 in The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible: Volume 2. New York: Abingdon Press.

Aquinas, T.
1972 Summa Theologiae: 2a2ae, 34-46. Tr. by T.R. Heath, O.P. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Arndt, W.F. and Gingrich, F.W.
1957 A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. Cambridge: The University Press.

Audi, R.
1971 "On the Meaning and Justification of Violence." Pp. 45-100 in Shaffer, 1971.

Bailey, S.D.
1972 Prohibitions and Restrictions in War. Oxford: The University Press.

Bainton, R.H.
1960 Christian Attitudes Towards War and Peace. New York: Abingdon Press.

Barclay, W.
1956 The Gospel of John. Second edition. Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press.

1958 The Gospel of Matthew. Second revised edition. Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press.

Barnes, J.
1972 The Ontological Argument. London: Macmillan.

Barrett, C.K.
1962 A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. London: Adam and Charles Black.

Bedau, H.A.
1969 Civil Disobedience. New York: Pegasus.

Bell, G.K.A.
1938 Randal Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury. Oxford: The University Press.

Benjamin, M.
1972-73 "Pacifism for Pragmatists." Ethics 83 196-213.

Bernard, J.H.
1928 The Gospel According to St. John. Ed. by A.H. McNeile. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Bowman, J.W. and Tapp, R.W.
1957 The Gospel from the Mount. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Brandon, S.G.F.
1967 Jesus and the Zealots. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

1968 The Trial of Jesus of Nazareth. London: Batsford.

Brunner, E.
1959 The Letter to the Romans. Tr. by H.A. Kennedy. London: Lutterworth Press.

Bultmann, R.
1963 The History of the Synoptic Tradition. Tr. by J. Marsh. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Cadoux, C.J.
1940 Christian Pacifism Re-examined. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Caird, G.B.
1963 The Gospel of St. Luke. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Calvin, J.
1960 Institutes of the Christian Religion: iv, 22, 11-12. Ed. by J.T. McNeill. Tr. by F.L. Battles. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Cohen, C.
1967-68 "Conscientious Objection." Ethics 78 269-279.

Cranfield, C.E.B.
1965 A Commentary on Romans 12-13. London: Oliver and Boyd.

Creed, J.M.
1930 The Gospel According to St. Luke. London: Macmillan.

Cullmann, O.
1957 The State in the New Testament. London: SCM Press.

Davies, W.D.
1962 "Ethics in the New Testament." Pp. 167-176 in The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible: Volume 2. New York: Abingdon Press.

De Diétrich, S.
1962 St. Matthew. London: SCM Press.

De Graaff, G.
1966 "God and Morality." Pp. 31-52 in Ramsey, 1966.

Delling, G.
1972 "hupotassō." Pp 39-46 in The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament: Volume 8. Ed. and tr. by G.W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Dewar, L.
1949 An Outline of New Testament Ethics. London: University of London Press.

Dibelius, M.
1934 From Tradition to Gospel. Tr. by B.L. Woolf. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson.

Dodd, C.H.
1932 The Epistle to the Romans. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Ellul, J.
1970 Violence. Tr. by C.G. King. London: SCM Press.

Ferguson, J.
no date The Politics of Love: the New Testament and Violent Revolution. Cambridge: James Clarke.

Filson, F.V.
1960 The Gospel According to St. Matthew. London: Adam and Charles Black.

Flew, A. and MacIntyre, A.
1955 New Essays in Philosophical Theology. London: SCM Press.

Forster, E.M.
1951 Two Cheers for Democracy. London: Arnold.

Frank, J.D.
1967 Sanity and Survival. New York: Vintage Books.

Garbett, C.
1952 In an Age of Revolution. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Garver, N.
1975 "What Violence Is." Pp. 410-422 in Wasserstrom, 1975.

Gibson, E.C.S.
1928 The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. London: Methuen.

Gilmour, S.M.
1952 "The Gospel According to St. Luke." Pp. 3-434 in the Interpreter's Bible, Volume 8. New York: Abingdon Press.

Government Gazette
1974 The Defence Further Amendment Act, Act No. 83, 20 November 1974. Pretoria: The Government Printer.

Hall, R.T.
1971 The Morality of Civil Disobedience. New York: Harper and Row.

Hansard
1912-1976 House of Assembly Debates. Pretoria: The Government Printer.

Hare, R.M.
1952 The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

1963 Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hengel, M.
1975 Victory Over Violence. Tr. by D.E. Green. London: SPCK

Hepburn, R.W.
1966 "Vision and Choice in Morality." Pp. 181-195 in Ramsey, 1966

Hershberger, G.F.
1969 War, Peace and Nonresistance. Scottdale: Herald Press.

Holmes, R.L.
1971 "Violence and Nonviolence." Pp. 101-136 in Shaffer, 1971.

Hoskyns, E.
1947 The Fourth Gospel. Second revised edition. Ed. by F.N. Davey. London: Faber and Faber.

Howard, W.F.
1952 "The Gospel According to St. John." Pp. 437-811 in the Interpreter's Bible, Volume 8. New York: Abingdon Press.

Hubbard, G.
1974 Quaker by Convincement. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Jay, E.G.
1958 New Testament Greek. London: SPCK

Johnson, S.E.
1951 "The Gospel According to St. Matthew." Pp. 231-625 in the Interpreter's Bible, Volume 7. New York: Abingdon Press.

Josephus
1927 The Jewish War. Tr. by H. St. John Thackeray. London: Loeb Classical Library.

1963 Jewish Antiquities. Tr. by L.H. Feldman, R. Marcus and A. Wikgren. London: Loeb Classical Library.

Kallas, J.
1961 The Significance of the Synoptic Miracles. London: SPCK

1964-65 "Romans 13. 1-7: An Interpolation." New Testament Studies 11 365-374.

Kässemann, E.
1969 New Testament Questions of Today. Tr. by W.J. Montague. London: SCM Press.

Kelsey, M.T.
1973 Healing and Christianity. London: SCM Press

Kunz, J.L.
1951 "The chaotic status of the laws of war and the urgent necessity for their revision." American Journal of International Law 45 37-61.

Leaney, A.R.C.
1966 The Gospel According to St. Luke. Second edition. London: Adam and Charles Black.

Leenhardt, F.J.
1961 The Epistle to the Romans. Tr. by H.Knight. London: Lutterworth Press.

Liturgy 1975
1975 Revised Service of the Holy Eucharist and Morning and Evening Prayer. The Minister's Book. Johannesburg: CPSA

Macgregor, G.H.C.
1936 The New Testament Basis of Pacifism. London: James Clarke.

MacIntyre, A.
1973 "The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts." Ethics 84 1-9.

Macquarrie, J.
1967 A Dictionary of Christian Ethics. London: SCM Press.

1973 The Concept of Peace. London: SCM Press.

Malamet, D.
1972 "Selective Conscientious Objection and the Gillete Decision." Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 363-386.

Manson, W.
1930 The Gospel of Luke. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Martin, R.
1969-70 "Civil Disobedience." Ethics 80 123-139.

Mayer, P. (editor)
1966 The Pacifist Conscience. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

McNeile, A.H.
1938 The Gospel According to St. Matthew. London: Macmillan.

Milgram, S.
1974 Obedience to Authority. London: Tavistock.

Miller, D.G.
1960 Saint Luke. London: SCM Press.

Miller, R.B.
1971 "Violence, Force and Coercion." Pp. 9-44 in Shaffer, 1977.

Morrison, C.D.
1960 The Powers That Be. London: SPCK.

Moss, C.B.
1961 The Thirty-Nine Articles Revised. London: A.R. Mowbray.

Moulder, J.E.
1972 "In Defence of Immaterial Persons." Philosophical Papers 1 38-55.

1973 "Flew, Strawson and Locke's Parrot." Philosophy 48 183-185.

Murdoch, I.
1966 "Vision and Choice in Morality." Pp. 195-218 in Ramsey, 1966.

Narveson, J.
1964-65 "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis." Ethics 75 259-271.

Ntoula, R.
1974 "Liberation Movements." Pro Veritate 13 14.

Nussbaum, A.
1943 "Just War - A Legal Concept?" Michigan Law Review 42 453-479

Oakley, A.
1972 Sex, Gender and Society. London: Temple Smith.

O'Neill, J.C.
1975 Paul's Letter to the Romans. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Osborn, A.R.
1940 Christian Ethics. London: Oxford University Press.

Pike, N. (editor)
1964 God and Evil. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Plummer, A.
1901 The Gospel According to St. Luke. Fourth Edition. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Potter, R.B.
1970 War and Moral Discourse. Richard: John Knox Press.

Prasad, D. and Smthye, T.
1968 Conscription: A World Survey. London: War Resisters International.

Ramsey, I.T. (editor)
1966 Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy. London: SCM Press.

Rawls, J.
1973 A Theory of Justice. Oxford: The University Press.

Roberts, A. (editor)
1969 Civilian Resistance as a National Defence. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Robinson, N.H.G.
1971 The Groundwork of Christian Ethics. London: Collins.

Robinson, T.H.
1928 The Gospel of Matthew. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Russell, F.H.
1975 The Just War in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: The University Press.

Ryle, G.
1949 The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.

Scott, C.A.A.
1934 New Testament Ethics. Cambridge: The University Press.

Seifert, H.
1967 "Peace and War." Pp. 247-249 in Macquarrie, 1967.

Senate of the Republic of South Africa.
1974 Debates. Pretoria: The Government Printer.

Shaffer, J.A. (editor)
1971 Violence. New York: David McKay.

Shaffer, P.
1974 Shrivings: A Play in Three Acts. London: Deutsch.

Sharp, G.
1970 Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives. Boston: Porter Sargent.

Sibley, M.Q. and Jacob, P.E.
1952 Conscription of Conscience. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Smart, N.
1972 The Concept of Worship. London: Macmillan.

Sophocles
1973 The Theban Plays. Tr. by E.F. Watling. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

South African Corps of Chaplains.
no date The Whole Armour of God. No publisher

Strawson, P.F.
1974 Freedom and Resentment. London: Methuen.

Swann, D.
1968 The Space Between the Bars. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Taylor, V.
1935 The Formation of the Gospel Tradition. London: Macmillan.

Thielicke, H.
1969 Theological Ethics: Politics. Ed. and Tr. by W.H. Lazareth. London: Adam and Charles Black.

Tooke, J.D.
1965 The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius. London: SPCK.

Vermes, G.
1973 Jesus the Jew. London: Collins.

Von Elbe, J.
1939 "The evolution of the concept of just war in international law." American Journal of International Law 33 665-688.

Waismann, F.
1968 How I See Philosophy? London: Macmillan.

Walzer, M.
1970 Obligation: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Wasserstrom, R.A. (editor)
1970 War and Morality. Belmont: Wadsworth.

1975 Today's Moral Problems. London: Collier Macmillan.

Weber, M.
1947 The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Tr. by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons. Glencoe: The Free Press.

Wells, D.A.
1969 "How much can 'the Just War' justify?" Journal of Philosophy 66 819-829.

Wilson, F.
1974a "War, Peace and Conscience." South African Outlook 104 118-120.

1974b "Violence in South Africa." South African Outlook 104 122-124.

Wright, Q.
1969 A Study of War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Yoder, J.H.
1971 Nevertheless: the varieties and shortcomings of religious pacifism. Scottdale: Herald Press.