

Understanding the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa:  
The case of Makhanda

By Tariro Henrietta Musiyandaka  
G15M5335

Department of Sociology  
Rhodes University

Supervisor: Professor Kirk Helliker

A thesis to be submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Development Studies

December 2019

## **Abstract**

Increasingly, Zimbabweans are migrating from their country for both economic and political reasons, with South Africa being the primary destination. In seeking employment in South Africa, Zimbabweans face numerous initial problems, including the high unemployment rate in the country alongside restrictions on their employment in the formal economy. In this context, Zimbabweans often turn to work in the informal economy, including as informal traders. This thesis seeks to understand the lives and livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. Drawing upon the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, and in the light of existing literature on Zimbabweans more broadly in South Africa, the thesis examines the livelihoods of a purposeful sampled grouping of six informal traders from Zimbabwe in Makhanda. It discusses their reasons for leaving Zimbabwe, their journey from Zimbabwe to Makhanda, relationships amongst themselves and their ongoing relationships with family back home, as well as their hopes and plans for the future. It also examines more specifically their livelihood activities, the daily challenges they face in pursuing their livelihoods and concerns about their livelihood status in South Africa. Despite the many deep-rooted systemic obstacles confronting these Zimbabwean informal traders, the thesis concludes that they demonstrate significant micro-level ingenuity in pursuing their livelihoods in South Africa.

## **Acknowledgements**

*Vanofanira kutendwa ngavatendwe.* I lost count of the number of times I almost gave up but kept going regardless. This thesis took shape in a way I would have never imagined. To my supervisor, Professor Kirk Helliker, thank you for your patience, your genuine interest and belief in my work. Thank you for all the time and effort you put into making this thesis what it is today. To Sisi Vuvu and Juanita, thank you for making the department feel like home and being so kind, understanding and helpful always. This research would not have been possible without the participants. Thank you to the Zimbabwean informal traders who took time out of their busy schedules to provide as much information as possible. I would like to give a special mention to my mentees who were one of the main reasons why I did not give up and made the journey absolutely worthwhile. Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents who have believed and supported me in every way possible since the beginning. I dedicate this thesis to them for all the sacrifices they have made. Above all, I thank God for absolutely everything including each and every person I have encountered throughout my academic journey.

## Contents

Abstract .....	2
Acknowledgements .....	3
List of Figures .....	6
List of Tables .....	6
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>1.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>1.2 Context of the Research</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>1.3 Thesis Objectives</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>1.4 Research Methods</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>1.5 Thesis Outline</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>Chapter 2: Contextualising the Case Study</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>2.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>2.2 Theoretical Framework – Sustainable Livelihoods Approach</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<i>2.2.1 Livelihood Diversification, Migration and the Informal Economy</i> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>2.3 The Informal Economy and Foreign Traders in South Africa</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>2.4 Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<i>2.4.1 Zimbabwean Informal Traders in South Africa</i> .....	<b>28</b>
<b>2.5 Informal Trading in Makhanda</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>2.6 Conclusion</b> .....	<b>31</b>
<b>Chapter 3: Zimbabwean Informal Traders in Makhanda</b> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>3.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>3.2 Profile of Zimbabwean Informal Traders in Makhanda</b> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>3.3 From Zimbabwe, through Beitbridge, to Makhanda</b> .....	<b>34</b>
<b>3.4 Owners of Informal Trading Businesses</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<i>3.4.1 An Informal Trading Business Employee</i> .....	<b>41</b>
<b>3.5 Zimbabwean Togetherness: Cash Inflows (Credit) and Outflows (Remittances)</b> .....	<b>42</b>
<b>3.6 South Africa from a Zimbabwean Informal Traders' Perspective</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<i>3.6.1 Xenophobia</i> .....	<b>46</b>
<b>3.7 A Life of Uncertainty</b> .....	<b>48</b>
<b>3.8 Stories of Zimbabwean Informal Traders</b> .....	<b>51</b>
<i>3.8.1 Lucky's Story</i> .....	<b>51</b>
<i>3.8.2 Mr Chidhakwa's Story</i> .....	<b>53</b>
<i>3.8.3 Rosemary's Story</i> .....	<b>55</b>
<b>3.9 Conclusion</b> .....	<b>57</b>
<b>Chapter 4: Conclusion</b> .....	<b>58</b>

<b>4.1 Introduction</b> .....	58
<b>4.2 Addressing the Subsidiary Objectives</b> .....	58
<b>4.3 Addressing the Main Objective</b> .....	61
<b>4.4 Limitations of Research and Areas for Further Research</b> .....	63
<b>References</b> .....	64
<b>Appendix A: Interview Schedule</b> .....	71
<b>Appendix B: Observation Guide</b> .....	73
<b>Appendix C: Participant Consent Form</b> .....	75
<b>Appendix D: List of Interviews</b> .....	77

## **List of Figures**

Figure 1: Sustainable Livelihoods Approach.....	16
Figure 2: Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (Urban Space).....	16

## **List of Tables**

Table 1: Profiles of the Zimbabwean Informal Traders.....	34
---	----

# Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology

## 1.1 Introduction

This thesis seeks to understand the livelihoods of Zimbabwean nationals who are involved in informal trading in Makhanda (South Africa), including a focus on their day-to-day experiences, livelihood practices and challenges, as well as their journey from Zimbabwe to Makhanda and their ongoing links with family back in Zimbabwe. The purpose of the chapter is to set the context for this study (section 1.2) along with the thesis objectives (section 1.3) and the research methodology (section 1.4) used in seeking to address the objectives. The chapter ends, in section 1.5, with a short outline of the following chapters.

## 1.2 Context of the Research

Zimbabwe's economy has undergone considerable economic decline over the past two decades and, today, Zimbabweans are the largest group of migrants in South Africa (Mawadza, 2008: 3). The adoption of an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s (Pauw & Petrus, 2003: 172) resulted in rising unemployment (over 80 percent), high inflation, and hardships for urban and rural households (Crush, Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2015: 370). As well, state-driven programmes from the year 2000 such as Fast Track land reform and Operation *Murambatsvina* left hundreds of thousands of people homeless and compromised the livelihoods of formal economy workers and informal traders (Peberdy & Rogerson, 2000: 22). Thus, migration out of the country, mainly to South Africa, has grown exponentially over a number of years. This initially took place at a time when South Africa was dismantling Apartheid, which led to an opening up of the country socially, politically and economically to the rest of continent. At times, Zimbabweans have entered South Africa on a temporary basis only but, increasingly, many are extending their stay in search of permanence. Often, they are met by draconian and contradictory migration policies (Hunter & Skinner, 2003: 307; Tengeh & Lapah, 2013: 109), such that they might opt for extra-legal ways of entering and staying in the country (Mawadza, 2008: 4; Peberdy & Rogerson, 2000). Zimbabweans in South Africa engage in a diverse range of occupations, including in the informal economy as traders, and they face a range of challenges including xenophobia.

The informal sector in South Africa is thriving and is important even for South African nationals due to high unemployment, with the national unemployment rate fluctuating in recent years between 25 and 30 percent (ECSECC, 2017: 44). Most scholars argue that unemployed South Africans participate in the informal sector as a survivalist strategy (Horn, 2011: 1;

Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 376; Pauw & Petrus, 2003: 172; Willemse, 2013: 166). Likewise, based on a study on informal traders in Johannesburg, it seems that self-employment is an important income-earning option for foreign nationals (Peberdy and Rogerson, 2000: 32). Because it is identified with a survivalist mode of existence, informal trading may be a mere stop-gap measure for the unemployed (both South African and foreign nationals) (Rogerson, 1995: 169). But, because of the difficulties which might arise for foreign nationals in accessing formal employment because of their possible illegal status in the country, informal activities are typically long-term ventures. In fact, various foreign nationals have come into South Africa as asylum seekers. The Refugee Act of 2000 forbids them from supporting themselves while awaiting approval, so they often resort to the informal economy because it has lower barriers to entry (Hunter & Skinner, 2003: 307).

There is a range of themes discussed in the literature on foreign, including Zimbabwean, traders in South Africa. This includes their journey to South Africa, their specific trading activities, their relationship with South African nationals and the many challenges they face. In the context of nagging problems in their place of origin, Zimbabweans may embark on the difficult journey to South Africa. The journey takes time and involves saving up money including borrowing from relatives (Howden, 2010). The journey itself is by foot, goods trucks and other modes of transport, as conditioned by the migrant's economic status. Illegal migrants 'jump' the Beitbridge border post which poses risks of robbery and rape for women by *GumaGumas* (thieves) (Nkala, 2009: 15-19). Once in South Africa, they face new problems of making a living while staying in an unfamiliar space.

The informal economic activities of foreigners include cross-border trading, street trading and operating micro-enterprises, and they provide goods and services such as clothes, shoes, 'traditional' food and hand-made crafts (Hunter & Skinner, 2003: 307; Mutopo, 2010: 465). Many foreign nationals, including Zimbabweans, learned their informal economic trades (such as electrical wiring) in paid employment in Zimbabwe (Peberdy & Rogerson, 2000: 32). Cape Town in particular is a popular tourist destination and African crafts and curios are readily available, courtesy of migrant traders from across Africa. Besides earning their own living, Zimbabwean foreign traders seek to send remittances to any family members remaining in Zimbabwe. Whether or not foreign traders are in direct competition with South African traders and entrepreneurs is open to debate (Hunter & Skinner, 2003: 307; Matshaka, 2009: 65; Mawadza, 2008: 5).

Informal trading by foreigners in the past was a predominantly female occupation but, with increasing hardships (because of, for instance, the decline in the Zimbabwean economy),

male migrants in informal trading is increasingly prevalent (Crush *et al.*, 2015: 372). At the same time, the increase in (male and female) migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa has made it difficult for the South African government to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants. In the case of Zimbabweans, this prompted the introduction in 2018 of Zimbabwean Exemption Permits (formerly known as Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permits as introduced in 2009) in a bid to unclog the refugee system (Crush *et al.*, 2015: 377). The majority of Zimbabweans are in Cape Town and Johannesburg, with both sexes and all ages migrating for a wide variety of motives using irregular and legal channels (Willemse, 2013: 665).

The prevailing literature also highlights the many obstacles faced by foreign traders in South Africa. There is a lack of recognition in terms of their entrepreneurial contribution to the national economy; instead, they are often regarded by South Africans as unwanted nuisances (Hunter & Skinner, 2003: 311). Police harassment is rife, and, in some instances, illegal or undocumented migrants are made to pay bribes, making it difficult to sustain themselves and send money back home (Bloch, 2010: 246). Accessing financial services as a foreign trader has proven to be a challenge (Gebre *et al.*, 2010; Pauw & Petrus, 2003: 174). But particularly troubling for foreign nationals are the common perceptions held against migrants in South Africa, which often amounts to xenophobia or Afro-phobia (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014: 657).

Mawadza (2008: 1) thus reports that, in 1997, the Human Sciences Research Council concluded that an open border policy would put South Africans at risk and such views create hostility amongst many South Africans who claim that migrants are ‘swamping’ the country and ‘taking their jobs’ and using up resources to which they are not entitled (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Willemse, 2013: 665). Murray (2003: 440-442) shows how hostility and violence against migrants (or xenophobic attacks) have resulted from moral panics. Indeed, xenophobic attacks in 2008 led to the death of 62 foreigners and almost 200,000 displaced people (Bloch, 2010: 235). Attacks on refugees and migrants have continued with at least one significant instance of xenophobia annually. For example, attacks in KwaZulu-Natal in April 2015 saw at least 5 people dead and around 5,000 displaced, including loss of livelihoods and severe damage to property (Bruce, 2017). Given this, many foreign traders (at least in larger cities such as Johannesburg and Durban) are disinclined to stay in the country permanently.

Makhanda has a high rate of unemployment and a large informal economy. In 2016, 6,980 people (25.64 percent of total employment) were employed in the informal sector which was an increase from 6,220 in 2006 (ECSECC, 2017: 44). Though there are no accurate figures, a significant proportion of the informal traders in Makhanda are foreign nationals, including

Zimbabweans. Like elsewhere, foreign traders in Makhanda have been subjected to xenophobic attacks, including in 2015 (Motala, 2002; O'Halloran, 2018: 27). Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda are involved in a range of activities, such as the local growing and selling of Zimbabwean leafy vegetables, and transport services.

This thesis is informed by the Livelihoods Approach which initially focused on rural livelihoods but later became useful for urban-based studies (Scoones, 2009: 178; Farrington *et al.*, 2002). In analyzing livelihoods, the approach considers the all-encompassing economic and political context within which households (or individuals) are embedded, the livelihood resources (or capitals) at the disposal of households, the livelihood strategies pursued, and the many risks, shocks and vulnerabilities possibly faced by people in achieving livelihood aims. In this regard, Scoones (1998: 5) notes that “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living.” The livelihoods approach allows for micro-sociological studies and has a strong emphasis on the agency and ingenuity of households (or individuals) in seeking to establish some level of household viability. However, the failure to provide temporal analyses, by not focusing significantly on the historical emergence and development of livelihood activities, has been raised as a key criticism of the approach (Helliker *et al.*, 2018). This thesis aims to address this criticism by considering the journey of current Makhanda traders from Zimbabwe. Overall, the approach allows for an understanding and analysis of the livelihoods of Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda.

Significant research has been undertaken on foreigners and informal trading particularly street trading in South Africa broadly. This thesis will contribute to the existing body of literature by looking particularly at Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda and their livelihood strategies, including their many challenges.

### **1.3 Thesis Objectives**

The main objective of this thesis is to understand the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda, South Africa. In relation to Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda, the subsidiary objectives include:

- a) To examine the journey of the Zimbabwean informal traders to South Africa, as well as their ongoing relationships with Zimbabwe;
- b) To investigate the reasons for resorting to informal trading and the character of the informal trading activities of the Zimbabwean traders;

- c) To investigate the relationship amongst the Zimbabwean informal traders and between them, other traders and the local community;
- d) To examine the challenges faced by Zimbabwean informal traders including xenophobia and their capacity to earn an income through trading; and
- e) To investigate the future prospects of the Zimbabwean informal traders.

#### **1.4 Research Methods**

In facilitating an understanding of the livelihoods of Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda, it is necessary to access their experiences, perspectives and practices. For this reason, a qualitative research methodology, involving a case study, was used to frame the research. Qualitative research allows for the identification and examination of people's interpretations of their lived experiences as well as their activities in a 'natural' setting (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003: 3). For this study, the research methods used entailed a combination of semi-structured in-depth interviews and informal observation.

Non-random purposive sampling as well as snowball sampling were used to identify suitable research participants from Facebook, which is the platform that most foreign informal traders use for advertising their services (Alvis, 2016: 11). Initially, only three informal traders were contacted via Facebook, and they subsequently suggested more Zimbabwean informal traders as possible interviewees. In total, six Zimbabwean informal traders were interviewed and observed. Though the thesis does not seek to provide a gendered analysis, there was an attempt to incorporate both male and female traders in order to capture any diversity in trading experiences along gender lines. However, only one female was in the research sample. Because the sampling was non-random, there is no attempt to claim that the study is statistically representative of all Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda let alone in South Africa generally (Matthews & Ross, 2010: 167). Nevertheless, the evidence collected seems to highlight experiences and perspectives which are quite common to Zimbabwean informal traders in the country (as demonstrated in chapter 2).

Due to time constraints and the limited character of this thesis project, only six Zimbabwean informal traders participated in the study. All six traders were interviewed, and four of the six traders were observed informally – in their work space – for one day. A standard interview guide (Appendix A) was constructed and used for purposes of the informal interviews, to ensure consistency across the themes covered. The main themes addressed in the interviews relate to the subsidiary objectives and included their journey from Zimbabwe, the activities they are involved in, the relationships they have with other informal traders and the

local community, and their prospects of staying in South Africa in the face of a range of difficulties. At the same time, the interview guide allowed for flexibility and for follow-up questions, as well as for the possibility of interviewees elaborating on points central to their experiences and practices. In the case of the informal traders who were observed informally, a standardised guide was constructed in order to note down any additional information about the lives of traders that was useful to the study (Appendix B), including relationships with their customers or clientele. The interviews and observation took place from the 9<sup>th</sup> of September 2019 to the 27<sup>th</sup> of September 2019 in the central business district (CBD) of Makhanda. All interviews took place at a time and location convenient to the Zimbabwean informal traders.

The first interview took place at a salon where Rosemary (a nail technician) rents some space at the back of a huge room which is separated by a dry wall and door. The second interview was with James (a loctician) who rented space in the same salon as Rosemary and his interview was conducted there as well. The third and fourth interviews, with Tinashe (salon owner) and his employee (Lee), were conducted in their natural hair salon. For these four participants, the interviews took place while the informal traders attended to their customers. After the participants were satisfied that they had addressed the interview questions as fully as possible, the informal observation began and entailed such matters as their interaction with customers and with other informal traders in the shared spaces. With their verbal consent, the informal traders allowed the interviewer to listen in on phone calls especially with relatives in Zimbabwe and potential customers. The fifth interview was with Lucky (a taxi driver) at a Rhodes University campus café and there was no informal observation because of the nature of his trade. Lastly, the participation by Mr Chidhakwa (a crafts street trader) was unique in that the interview doubled as an informal observation as it happened in the open street while the interviewer helped to unpack his curios for display.

All interviews were conducted in a mix of Shona and English and so were the responses from the informal traders, but Shona was the most dominant language used. I am fluent in Shona. Attempts to record the interviews were unsuccessful, for five out of the six participants worked spaces that were loud. The data was hand-written during the interview and later typed out in English. The one interview (with Lucky the taxi driver) that was recorded was later deleted after completion of the data analysis chapter as per the participant's request. The data collected was thematically analysed which is a common form of analysis within qualitative research. Thematic analysis entails identifying, coding, describing and interpreting the main themes which arise from the evidence collected (Elo & Kyngas, 2007: 107). In the end, the

data collected from the research process was thematically analysed based primarily on the subsidiary objectives that were outlined in section 1.3.

The research took measures to ensure the safety, privacy and dignity of participants by adhering to the Rhodes University's ethics and protocol. Before the interviews were conducted, the purpose of the study was openly discussed with the informal traders and the nature and importance of informed consent was explained to them. After this, they then signed the consent form (Appendix C). Pseudo-names were used throughout the thesis in order to respect the confidentiality and anonymity of the informal traders as they provided personal information which was sometimes sensitive. The voice recording, with the one trader, was deleted after completing the data analysis chapter.

The most significant challenge encountered during the research was the initial hesitancy from participants to review their migration and residential status in fear of incriminating themselves. The informal traders feared the possibility of deportation to Zimbabwe which would put their livelihoods at risk. Some participants expressed their opinions of the ruling party's President (ZANU-PF's Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangangwa), stating fear of being tracked down by secret services once back in Zimbabwe.

### **1.5 Thesis Outline**

The next chapter (chapter 2) sets the context for the case study of Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda. It presents the theoretical framing for the thesis, and it provides a literature review of broad themes pertinent to the case study, including about Zimbabweans in general in South Africa, foreign traders in South Africa and Zimbabweans as foreign traders in South Africa. The following chapter (chapter 3) focuses on the case study of Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda, addressing specific themes about their lives and livelihoods which arise from the fieldwork. The final chapter (chapter 4) seeks to show how the case study addresses the main and subsidiary objectives of the thesis, with reference to the theoretical framing for the thesis.

## **Chapter 2: Contextualising the Case Study**

### **2.1 Introduction**

With political unrest and ailing economies in many African countries, there has been a trend towards migrating to countries that have – comparatively – a more conducive political, economic and social environment for pursuing livelihoods. Particularly in a context where the formal economy in African countries is unable to absorb large numbers of workers, migrants often turn to the informal economy as the foundation for livelihoods. This is certainly the case with regard to the situation in contemporary Zimbabwe, and hence the massive number of Zimbabweans who cross into South Africa and normally turn to the informal economy as a survival strategy. In this light, this chapter contextualises the case study of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda, both analytically and with reference to a literature review on themes pertinent to the case study.

The first section (section 2.2) outlines the theoretical framework, which is the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), with a particular focus as well on livelihood diversification in relation to migration and the informal economy. In section 2.3, I discuss literature about the informal economy in South Africa with specific reference to foreign informal traders in the country. The following section (section 2.4) then discusses Zimbabweans broadly in South Africa, as well as Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa. The penultimate section (section 2.5) then narrows the discussion even further, with a consideration of informal traders in Makhanda.

### **2.2 Theoretical Framework – Sustainable Livelihoods Approach**

In terms of theory, this thesis is informed by the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) which initially focused on rural livelihoods but later involved urban-based studies as well (Scoones, 2009; Farrington *et al.*, 2002 & Ali & Rouse, 2000). The reason why this approach is important for this study is because, overall, it allows for an understanding and analysis of the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda. In particular, the livelihoods approach allows for micro-sociological studies and it has a strong emphasis on the agency and ingenuity of households (or individuals) in seeking to establish some level of household viability or sustainability.

Many years ago, Chambers and Conway (1991:6) set out the broad parameters of the SLA in arguing the following:

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access), and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the long and short term.

Beyond its analytical dimension, the SLA has also been used programmatically within the worldwide development system when it comes to poverty alleviation strategies, including by the Department for International Development (DfID), CARE, Oxfam and the United Nations Development Programme (Carney *et al.*, 1999). Literature pertaining to the programmatic effects of the SLA are not considered here but many debates exist in this regard (Kretzmann & McKnight, 1993; Nel, 2015; Alderson & Jordaan, 2009; Rogerson, 1999). Whether analytically or programmatically, though, the framework focuses on the variety of livelihood strategies that rural (and urban) households pursue and these include – in the case of rural livelihoods for instance – farming, off-farm employment, non-agricultural activities and the use of natural resources such as fishing and hunting (de Sherbinin *et al.*, 2008; Scoones, 1998; Scoones, 2009; GLOPP, 2008).


Central to the framework are the following dimensions: capitals, resources or assets; context-specific conditions and trends (or vulnerability context); institutional processes and organisational structures; livelihood strategies; and livelihood outcomes. Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic depiction of the SLA; Figure 2 is also a diagrammatic depiction, but one which is applied specifically to urban spaces.

Households possess capitals or assets and these shape the possibility and character of livelihood options available to households; and these include financial, physical, human, social, and natural capital (Carney *et al.*, 1999; Pedersen & Petersen, 2010; Krantz, 2011). Financial capital entails the financial resources to which individuals or households have access (or possess), such as savings, remittances, employment or self-employment income, and credit. Physical capital embodies basic infrastructure including shelter, water, power and transport as well as household-based equipment and technologies which facilitate productive activity. Human capital refers to the skills and knowledge (and overall capacity to labour) which exists amongst members of a household. Social capital includes the social relationships within which households are embedded, including trust-based relationships, kinship relationships, and other forms of social networks. Lastly there is natural capital – this entails access to land, water or

wildlife in terms of which households partake in agricultural projects and/or collect resources for income generation and household sustenance (Dickinson *et al.*, 2012: 664).


This study is an urban-based one. In urban contexts, natural capital is less significant than in rural contexts, though urban agriculture and other land-based activities do exist. (Farrington *et al.*, 2002). Urban settings are more commodified and monetarized spaces compared to rural areas, which means that financial capital is particularly pertinent for urban livelihoods.

**Figure 1: Sustainable Livelihoods Approach**



Source: Scoones (1998: 4).

**Figure 2: Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (Urban Spaces)**



Source: Farrington *et al.* (2002: 2).

Combined, the vulnerability context, as well as the institutional processes and organisational structures, set the broad social context within which households pursue livelihood strategies, and in which they draw upon their available capital to bring about specific livelihood outcomes. Vulnerability is characterised as “insecurity in the well-being of individuals, households, and communities in the face of changes in their external environment” (Serrat, 2017: 23). In the case of vulnerabilities, households are subject to contingent and conjunctural crises, shocks and trends – such as the death of a household head, or climate change and variability over time. In relation to institutions and organisations, these include structural macro-level factors such as the socio-political context, economic conditions and cultural arrangements (Mahdi *et al.*, 2009; de Sherbinin *et al.*, 2008). On the basis of an examination of the social context, the SLA seeks to understand the livelihood strategies (and activities) and outcomes for specific households. The SLA literature often speaks about household-based livelihood portfolios involving a shifting combination of two or more livelihood strategies.

Though the SLA is concerned primarily with micro-level household activities, and the agency of households in pursuing livelihoods, there is clearly a general recognition of the relevance of structures in conditioning household agency. Admittedly, at times, in specific studies, the structural conditioning (particularly at national and global levels) is not brought to the fore in any comprehensive manner (Serrat, 2017: 22). This study is sensitive to the need to incorporate different spatial scales in framing the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa. Further, the SLA has been criticised for not providing a temporal (diachronic) analysis of household livelihoods, in examining the historical emergence, development and reconfiguration of livelihoods (Mahdi *et al.*, 2009; Henry *et al.*, 2004; Pedersen & Petersen, 2010; Riosmena, 2009; Entwisle, 2007). In other words, synchronic analyses (livelihoods at a particular moment in time) tend to predominate in the SLA literature (Dickinson *et al.*, 2012; Helliker *et al.*, 2018). This study takes into consideration the historical lives of the Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda.

From a sociological perspective, it is notable that the SLA is concerned about investigating social relationships across households, as exemplified in the notion of social capital (Krantz, 2001; Kiwanuka & Monson, 2009; Manik, 2014; Nel, 2015; Serumage-Zake, 2017). And, as indicated, it does also consider the broader social context within which households exist. However, sociologically, the SLA has been criticized for underplaying the existence of social inequality and conflict and ignoring the power-infused character of social relationships. Often, in the SLA, social networks are interpreted as mainly inclusionary rather

than as entailing forms of exclusion. Also, it is not always fully recognized how the household-based livelihoods of some groups in society (mainly, wealthier elite groups) are made possible at the expense of the livelihood possibilities of households amongst (poverty-stricken) non-elite groups. The viability of household livelihoods within the latter group is invariably constrained by forms of deeply-entrenched forms of inequality and subordination such that, certainly, any notion of a gradual expansion in the asset base of poor households over time is problematic. In this context, it becomes important – even when focusing only on poor households at one site – to examine the different livelihood pathways of specific households over time (Murray, 2017).

Overall, the SLA is rightly commended for being in touch with the reality of people's everyday lives and for managing to put emphasis on how people survive despite facing numerous shortages, shocks and constraints. This shows that all communities, no matter how poor they might be perceived, have strengths and assets that can possibly contribute to an improved quality of life (Nel, 2015: 512; Serrat, 2017: 21).

### ***2.2.1 Livelihood Diversification, Migration and the Informal Economy***

One of the key characteristics of livelihoods today is diversification or the multiplicity of livelihood activities (the livelihood portfolio) of households. As well, this diversification may cut across spatial sites such that livelihood portfolios are often multi-sited livelihood strategies (Helliker *et al.*, 2018). Of course, why particular households engage in diversification varies. For wealthy households, or even relatively well-off poor households, this may entail the sheer capacity to invest in multiple activities. For poor and very poor households, this may entail desperation and a sheer survivalist strategy. Therefore, in the face of stress and shocks, the poor may diversify their livelihood portfolio in order to enhance or just maintain household viability, alongside hoarding, protecting or depleting their household-based assets (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 2002: 6; Scoones, 1998). Two key ways in which poorer households pursue diversification is migration and involvement in the informal economy, either as the main livelihood strategy or as a secondary strategy. As the study of Makhanda shows, these two diversification strategies are often part and parcel of one process.

In the context of the restructuring of the global economy, and high unemployment rates across much of Africa (including South Africa and Zimbabwe), the informal economy, as often entailing precarious forms of livelihoods (Majale, 2002; Lyons and Snoxell, 2005), has grown dramatically over the past two or more decades. In terms of poverty, the widespread condition of economic crisis and declined has entailed the feminisation of poverty, the urbanisation of

poverty and the Africanisation of poverty, all of which entails insecurity and vulnerability at household levels (Riddell, 1997; Tokman, 1992; Cross, 2000; Fadeeva *et al.*, 2010). According to Cohen (2004), the rapid growth of informal employment is pervasive in cities and towns across Africa. One of the key forms of informal economy work is informal trading, including street trading. In the case of street traders, trends that affect them and their livelihoods include high levels of competition amongst traders, challenges with customers in terms of the latter often limited disposable income, and police harassment.

Migration has been recognised as a significant means for diversifying livelihoods. This is notable in particular amongst rural households, such that out-migration is a livelihood strategy where agricultural activities become a source of insecurity and unpredictability which leads farmers or their family members to leave seasonally or even permanently to earn additional income (Chambers & Conway 1991; Kull *et al.*, 2007; Mahdi *et al.*, 2009). This is certainly the case of rural and urban households in the context of Zimbabwe and the economic contraction which has taken place there, notably since the year 2000 (Sarimana, 2005). This migration out of urban and rural areas at times involves moving across international borders, as in the case of Zimbabweans in South Africa, and – for various reasons – it entails working in the informal economy.

There is significant literature, from within the SLA, about migration as a diversification strategy, and why some households have out-migrants while others do not (Dickinson *et al.*, 2012; Carney *et al.*, 1999; Abrego, 2009; Bastia, 2007; Qin, 2010; Lindstrom & Ramirez, 2010). One issue considered of significance is the asset profile of households, with migrant households having a more solid asset base (notably financial capital) (Curran 2002; White & Lindstrom, 2005). In addition, migration is “often facilitated by an extended social network” (Dickinson *et al.*, 2012: 678), and hence extended family members already in the intended site of a migrant’s destination enhance the prospects of further migration. There is also a gendered dimension to migration. In the case of southern Africa, in the past, it was men who often migrated as part of the migrant labour system. In a survey undertaken in Durban, in 1999, seventy-four percent (74%) of migrants were men, showing a stark case of gender imbalance (Landau & Segatti, 2009: 60). This gendered tendency could be explained by the traditional notion of the ‘male breadwinner’, and also by the many challenges which are encountered upon travelling borders, which are more prevalent amongst women, including rape and physical abuse. Women migrants to South Africa though are increasingly prevalent, as are unaccompanied minors (Landau & Segatti, 2009: 60).

The reasons for migration are numerous, and they often entail civil war, intense political conflict and grinding poverty (Moorhouse, 2010: 51). In their study of foreign nationals in South Africa, Landau and Segatti (2009: 59) speak of ‘the three P’s of migration’, namely, ‘Profit’, ‘Protection’ and ‘Passing through.’ Most migrants to South Africa (and not just Zimbabweans) are seeking to make ‘Profit’ while others need ‘Protection’ from violence, disasters and persecution. The rest of the migrating group to South Africa comprises of temporary visitors who were in transit to other destinations such as Europe, North America and Australia, and thus were ‘Passing through’ (Landau & Segatti, 2009: 59). In the case of the ‘Profit’ option, this means that individuals and families choose to migrate to South Africa for the purpose of income-generation and sustaining livelihoods, including by way of participating in cross-border trade, street trading and vending.

It is notable that migration affects those individuals that choose to migrate as well as the family left behind. In relation to the latter issue, it is normally the case that migrants remit money back to their household of origin. Further, migration may affect the entire community from which the individual is migrating (particularly if there are numerous individuals departing) and the community to which the individual chooses to migrate (again, if there are many in-migrants) (Epps, 2001, in Moorhouse, 2010). In the case of the eventual place of destination, if the migrants are seen as ‘strangers’, there needs to be some form of co-existence, otherwise tensions and conflicts may arise. This raises questions about belonging and identity amongst foreign nationals in South Africa. It also puts foreign nationals (including Zimbabweans) at risk of emotional and physical trauma (Idemudia *et al.*, 2013).

Finally, cross-border trading by foreign nationals from other African countries into South Africa, including by Zimbabweans, is a well-documented phenomenon (Kachere, 2011; Nethengwe, 1999). In fact, informal sector cross-border trade is a significant feature of trade flows across Southern Africa which, however, has been demonized and linked to sub-legal activities such as tax evasion and smuggling (Campbell *et al.*, 2015: 206). According to Njiwa (2013: 9), this notion is further fueled by organizations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) which defines informal cross border trading as “unrecorded trade that characteristically involves bypassing border posts, concealment of goods, under-reporting, false classification, under-invoicing and other similar tricks” (cited in Campbell *et al.*, 2015: 207). Nevertheless, research has shown the significance of cross border trading across the South African border in terms of poverty alleviation, food security and livelihoods for foreign nationals from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in particular.

Cross-border traders typically remain in South Africa for as long as required for the purchasing of commodities to take back; in the case of the Beitbridge border post, to Zimbabwe. They typically do not stay for lengthy periods, which is different to the foreign nationals who enter the country legally or illegally and seek to generate income on a more permanent basis, including informal trading – which is the central focus of this thesis.

### **2.3 The Informal Economy and Foreign Traders in South Africa**

The South African government has faced rising unemployment, persistent poverty and vast inequality particularly in urban areas. The urban informal economy has become of central importance to the larger metropolitan areas as well as to small cities and towns, in particular as a survivalist strategy for unemployed South Africans (Geyer, 2009; Hyde-Clarke, 2013; Skinner, 2014; Ballard & Popke, 2003; Charman & Petersen, 2015: 97; Wills, 2009). Besides South African nationals, foreign nationals often work within the informal economy, including informal traders and spaza shop entrepreneurs in the infamous Soweto low-income suburb of Johannesburg (Gumbo, 2015: 101). Despite the small-scale of individual informal economy enterprises (including those operated by foreign nationals), combined they make a significant contribution to the South African economy by, for example, generating employment and ensuring access to a wide variety of cheap goods and services which might otherwise not be available (Kalithanyi, 2007; Grant & Thompson, 2015: 197). Nevertheless, at a national level, to limit migrant businesses in South Africa, the 2013 Licensing of Businesses Bill was drafted (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 163; Bloor, 2013; Republic of South Africa, 2013); as of 2019, it remained unpassed as legislation.

Rogerson (2015) gave a very detailed timeline of the informal economy in South Africa including the challenges and merits. A prevalent trend is that the measures taken by South Africa's national government towards the informal economy (in particular by the Department of Trade and Industry – DTI) are followed by various controversial regulations (including by the DTI) which threaten to undermine the livelihoods of migrant entrepreneurs substantively (Rogerson, 2015; Skinner, 2014; Chikanda *et al.*, 2015; Grant and Thompson, 2015). According to Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), and beyond the foreign nationals who also involved, approximately 1,101,000 South Africans were involved in informal trade, making it a significant component of the economy that is expected to create between 1.2 million to 2 million new jobs by the year 2030 (Clark, 2018: 1). However, at local levels, government officials do not necessarily provide a supportive and facilitating environment for the informal

economy; and, at times, they might be outright hostile to foreign nationals in the informal economy, including as traders (Clark & Hodgson, 2018).

This hostility at times from different levels of government does not distract foreign nationals from displaying high levels of motivation and commitment to their informal economy ventures. A study conducted on five hundred (500) small and medium sized enterprises in the retail sector in Gauteng found no significant differences between South Africans and foreign migrants when it came to the motivation to start a business (Chikanda *et al.*, 2015), with income-generation in the context of poverty being significant for both. According to Callaghan (2009), South Africans showed lower levels of entrepreneurship qualities of “proactiveness” and “competitive aggression” and, overall, South African nationals were “negatively and significantly associated with total entrepreneurship” (cited in Chikanda *et al.*, 2015: 5). A third study conducted in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, on spaza shops showed that migrants scored higher than South Africans on achievement, innovation, personal initiative, and autonomy, painting the picture that they had better entrepreneurial orientation (Chikanda *et al.*, 2015: 5). These studies covered a diverse array of informal economic activities amongst foreign nationals, including trading.

While South Africa’s informal economy has usually been perceived as linked almost entirely to trade and only manufacturing at a very minute scale, informal manufacturing is quite significant in certain areas (Charman & Petersen, 2015: 94; Charman *et al.*, 2014). In the low-income area of Ivory Park east of Johannesburg, foreign nationals (alongside South Africans) work in what is known as ‘open-air micro manufacturing’ which takes place in small open public spaces. The informal manufacturers work in teams and their manufactured items include speaker boxes, furniture, mattresses, bricks, assorted house frames and gates, amongst other things. Overall, though, foreign nationals (who may have refugee status or are asylum-seeker permits) are typically involved with trade, including street trading and spaza shops.

A spaza shop is defined as “informal grocery stores operated from private residential properties in low-income neighbourhoods and sell a wide variety of products including basics” (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 163). Some spaza shops though are found outside residential sites as well. Thus, some of the business strategies, amongst many, adopted by migrant spaza shop entrepreneurs include choosing a strategic location such as street corners to the benefit of potential customers. This is followed by vigorously marketing their variety of goods, which are bought in bulk to enjoy economy of scales and therefore be able to charge lower, competitive prices. Additionally, migrant spaza shop owners offer credit to customers which ensures loyalty (Gumbo, 2015: 107; Magubane, 2015). Amit and Gastrow (2015: 167),

however, note that Somali respondents stated that they did not do bulk purchases, nor did they know anyone who did in Cape Town and that it is just a commonly-held perception.

In recent times, foreign migrant traders have been subjected to attacks and rising tensions with South African local spaza owners and South Africans opposed to their presence in the country. Violence towards foreign traders tend to follow two main narratives; first, that migrant entrepreneurs disadvantage South Africans through their 'unfair' practices and second, that migrant-owned businesses are illegitimate and therefore South African are entitled to push them out (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 162; Skinner & Crush, 2015). In certain provinces in South Africa, there has been informal agreements drawn up to limit the operations of migrant traders, their prices and prohibiting them from setting up shop in a number of townships in the Western and Eastern Cape (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 162; Skinner, 2000).

In one study, an important discovery was that Somali-owned spaza shops contributed to the decline of South African-owned spaza shops but only to a small extent (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 169; Johns, 2011). Significant reasons highlighted owing to their decline included the increase in food prices coupled with the expansion of supermarket chains and a lack of basic business skills (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 169). Essentially, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that migrant traders are involved in unfair trade practices or should be considered as illegitimate; in fact, they provide economic benefits to the locals including employment (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 175; Mtyala, 2011). In addition to that, Somali spaza shops are testimony that in the midst of an increasingly powerful corporate retail, small businesses are still able to compete, survive and still grow regardless (Amit & Gastrow, 2015: 175).

Some of the other challenges highlighted by migrant spaza shop entrepreneurs include the difficulties in starting and growing their business because of the resistance to competition from local spaza shop owners and the lack of support from local municipalities (Gumbo, 2015: 101). Most migrant traders more broadly operate with no bank accounts because of lack of proper documentation. But, despite the adversities, migrant spaza shops have recorded high levels of success and their owners believe that the treatment they receive may be due to jealousy by locals (Fatoki & Patswawairi, 2012; Crush, 2008; Maharaj, 2009). Most have invested significantly in their business and other aspects of their lives, showing that participation in the informal economy is not limited necessarily to survivalist activities (Gumbo, 2015: 105). Migrant spaza shop entrepreneurs, including Somalian and Ethiopians, tend to support each other, an advantage they enjoyed over South Africans; and they had strict saving behaviors and lead simple lifestyles (Gumbo, 2015: 105; Hikam, 2011). This in part arises because part of their profits is remitted back to their countries of origin.

## 2.4 Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa

There is significant literature on Zimbabweans in South Africa, including in relation to their involvement in the informal economy. Some of the themes in this literature are the existence of undocumented migration, the South African government's policy on Zimbabwean migration, the brain drain from Zimbabwe, diaspora engagement, abuse of migrants' human rights, migrant identities, migrants' working conditions and livelihood strategies (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016). At the same time, migrancy has become attached to Zimbabwean cultural and historical identity. This is because its citizens and residents have been involved in international migration for a century now (Tevera & Zinyama, 2002: 7), including to the mines in South Africa.

Overall, South Africa is known for its "self-settlement" approach to economic and political refugees which entails not imposing any restrictions on their freedom of movement or the geographical locations that refugees can choose to reside (Crush *et al.*, 2017). While this is certainly 'humane' in that refugees are not confined to camps or kept in isolation from South African citizens, the state does not provide any significant assistance to refugees, which emphasises the need for self-sufficiency on the part of refugees (Crush *et al.*, 2017). However, self-sufficiency is difficult to achieve, as there are many barriers in terms of entry into formal employment, so Zimbabwean refugees (and migrants broadly) often resort to activities in the informal economy as a means of sustaining their livelihoods.

For various reasons, migrants from all over Africa have been making their way to South Africa since the 1990s. Gauteng's inner-city areas such as Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville are some of the popular destinations with, Johannesburg in particular sometimes referred to as the 'New York of Africa' (Grant & Thompson, 2015: 182). Trends over the years have shown that Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces host the most Zimbabweans (and Mozambicans), but other cities such as Cape Town and Durban also have a large population of Zimbabweans as well as Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, Angolans and Congolese migrants (Crush *et al.*, 2017). Somalians tend to be scattered all over South Africa, particularly the major cities but in smaller numbers (Landau & Segatti, 2009).

It is hard to give an accurate number of Zimbabweans who are living and working in South Africa. Cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe and South Africa has increased significantly from the mid-1980s when records showed less than 200 000 people per year entered compared to over 1.6 million in 2010. However, the majority of Zimbabweans simply visit temporarily as cross-border traders, to visit family or to seek medical care (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 4). In 2005, at least fifty percent (50%) returned home at least once a month

and the other fifty percent, at least once every few months (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 4). However, migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is now taking on a more permanent form given the worsening economic conditions in Zimbabwe and despite the South African government's best efforts to stop or limit this movement. In 2010, two-thirds of Zimbabweans who had come to South Africa after 2005 desired to stay in South Africa on a long-term basis (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 5).

As of 2018, estimates of Zimbabweans in South Africa were sitting between two to three million and some even spoke about five million Africa (Nyoni, 2018: 412; Sachikonye *et al.*, 2018: 30). Seventy-two percent were reported as under forty age making the majority relatively young and active (Sachikonye *et al.*, 2018: 31). One of the main reasons why it is hard to keep track of the actual number of Zimbabweans migrants is because the Beitbridge border post is a busy point of entry all year round and the flow of Zimbabweans through this border post is steady (Nyoni, 2018: 412). Many Zimbabweans cross into South Africa on temporary visas but remain in the country, while tens of thousands of others across the border illegally because of the strict visa requirements often in place.

Though information pertaining to the presence of legal migrants in South Africa is collected at various ports of entry and published by Statistics South Africa on a monthly basis, this evidence is not necessarily reliable. For some time now, even ten years ago, trends have shown an upward shift in the numbers of migrants entering the country, with Zimbabweans tending to dominate since the early 1990s. For instance, in 2002, 35,725 Zimbabwe migrants entered the country, constituting twenty-nine percent (29%) of total migration to South Africa (with a large proportion of the Zimbabweans in fact being students) (Crush, 2011). Upon entry at the border posts, migrants are expected to indicate the reason for their visit. Often foreign nationals (including Zimbabweans) list 'holiday' as their reason for entry, despite the intention to stay indefinitely. In large part, these are economic migrants who are not captured in the official statistics and, upon arrival at their destination, they often take up work (either in the formal or informal economy) illegally and thus without work permits.

The vast majority of Zimbabweans entering and staying in South Africa are in effect economic migrants or refugees (Tevera & Zinyama, 2002). In the case of Zimbabwean migrants who have moved to South Africa, 44% reported moving because of food shortages and hunger (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 9), with political persecution also being a factor. The years between 2000 and 2019 have been characterised with significant de-industrialisation and de-proletarianisation caused by the country's economic crisis – high hyperinflationary trends, complete economic reversal, and downsizing of the public sector, along with all the uncertainty

and anxiety that this causes for Zimbabweans (Sachikonye *et al.*, 2018: 30). But the contested Zimbabwean general elections of 2013 and, more recently, the effects of the 2018 election have further contributed to the country's uncertain future in the hands of the ruling party – Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Nyoni, 2018: 412). Given this, and the violence associated with the rule of ZANU-PF, it is highly likely that an increased movement into South Africa by Zimbabweans will be maintained. These economic and political factors condition the lives of Zimbabweans and shape decisions around migration. In this regard, there is great diversity in the social and economic background of Zimbabweans moving to South Africa.

Noticeably, though, there has been a significant outmigration of skilled professionals particularly in the health sector (but also teaching and finance) and by 2003 it was estimated that Zimbabwe was losing an average of twenty percent (20%) of its healthcare professionals every year (Sachikonye *et al.*, 2018: 30; Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). Generally, trends in the past showed that documented, permanent migration out of Zimbabwe was undertaken by people who are better-educated and generally more skilled (Tevera & Zinyama, 2002: 7), but this does seem to be the case anymore. In this regard, most literature shows that Zimbabweans in South Africa generally have high levels of education and skills ranging from post-secondary diploma, undergraduate and post-graduate degrees (Sachikonye *et al.*, 2018: 31, Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 12). However, once in South Africa, even these professional migrants were employed in a wide variety of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Of note, then, is the deskilling process which occurs when migrants undertake jobs below their qualifications and experiences.

Interestingly, Zimbabwean migrants in the mid-2000s constituted the vast majority of farmworkers in northern South Africa (particularly Limpopo Province). These migrants had diverse educational and work backgrounds, were paid below the minimal national wage on the farms, and they often envisaged farm work in northern South Africa as simply a stage in their venture further south to Johannesburg. In general, the settling into South Africa by Zimbabwean migrants often entails a journey in stages. Further, an outcome of deskilling is the resort to informal sector activities like street vending in South Africa (and Botswana) by Zimbabwean migrants. For some, though, it is not 'resorting to' but their first choice for purposes of being independent and flexible (Sachikonye *et al.*, 2018: 32).

Male migration still dominates in terms of the gender profile of migrants, though cross-border trading is prevalent amongst women. In the past, many married men left their partners and children in Zimbabwe, which sometimes led to the establishment of new households in

South Africa. However, increasingly, Zimbabweans are choosing to settle as nuclear families in South Africa because they claim that their socio-economic conditions are noticeably better than in Zimbabwe, making migration an important survival strategy for the entire household (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 11).

Migration brings about various effects on individuals and families, both in South Africa and back in Zimbabwe. For instance, new livelihood strategies of survival have to be formulated in Zimbabwe for those left behind, which usually entails the receiving of remittances for the family member in South Africa (Nyoni, 2018: 415). Sending remittances back home is indeed central to the lives of Zimbabweans in South Africa, as is a key reason for working in the country in the first place. Because of massive food insecurity in Zimbabwe, a significant proportion of remittances is in-kind, including the purchasing of food parcels by Zimbabweans in South Africa for relatives in Zimbabwe, with 82% of Zimbabweans providing remittances in this form (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 2).

As well, the families left behind are sometimes viewed through a particular lens by those households without any out-migrants. In a study, Muchatuta (2018) highlighted how hard it was for one of his participants (remaining in Zimbabwe) to ask for help from people she had known all her life (cited in Nyoni, 2018: 415). The exact words were, “why should we take care of her while her son is busy enjoying life in South Africa?” (Nyoni, 2018: 415). This implies, of course, that Zimbabwe migrants in South Africa are living the ‘high life’, which is rarely the case. Meanwhile, the xenophobic perspectives of a certain segment of South Africa society asserts that Zimbabweans are ‘taking our jobs’ (Mpondi & Mupakati, 2018; Idemudia *et al.*, 2013).

In this context, it is noticeable that one of the pull factors for Zimbabweans entering South Africa, as well as for their particular location of residence, is the assistance offered by relatives already in South Africa which increases the migrants’ prospect of employment (Crush *et al.*, 2017: 1). Over time, this may lead to Zimbabweans clustering in particular geographical locations, in a kind of snowballing effect. This is part of a broader tendency amongst migrants. For Bauer *et al.*, (2002) and Epstein (2008), migrant clustering arises because of the existence of beneficial ‘network externalities’, which means that migrants are most likely to go where they have the highest chance of receiving assistance because of well-established relatives or friends who migrated in the past (cited in Tengeh, 2015; Epstein & Gang, 2010). The unintended consequence of this migrant clustering is the possibility of resentment on the part of, in this case, South African nationals who display at times xenophobic attitudes.

#### **2.4.1 Zimbabwean Informal Traders in South Africa**

According to a study conducted in 2017, evidence showed that between 20 to 30 percent of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa were involved in the informal economy, with the importance of the informal sector employment increasing overtime for Zimbabweans, as well as for South Africans (Crush *et al.*, 2017: 1, Crush & Tawodzera, 2015). In 2006, 14.7% of Zimbabwean migrants were in informal trading in the form of trading, hawking or vending (Crush, 2011: 6). For the year 2017, the informal economy was dominated by relatively young Zimbabweans and mainly males, such that 50% to 75% were under the age of 35, and 60% to 70% were men. Increasingly, more and more Zimbabwean women are entering South Africa to stay on a permanent basis, though they still tend to focus on cross-border trade as a way of supplementing their families' income (Landau & Segatti, 2009: 59; Muzvidziwa, 1998; Chivani, 2008). While Zimbabwean women may engage in domestic work and even agricultural work, others are engaged in informal trading in seeking to establish themselves in South Africa (Landau & Segatti, 2009: 60; Jamela, 2013).

In relation to the 2017 study, forty-two percent (42%) of the total Zimbabwe migrant entrepreneurs indicated that they had come to South Africa during Zimbabwe's worst economic years between 2000 and 2010 while thirty-two percent (32%) travelled after 2010 (Crush *et al.*, 2017: 1). Less than two percent (2%) had migrated to South Africa before the end of Apartheid which suggests a correlation between Zimbabwe's economic decline and the end of South Africa's international isolation after 1994. The main push factors of migration to South Africa for these Zimbabweans in the informal economy were political persecution, high unemployment and economic hardship more broadly.

Increasing unemployment levels in South Africa's major cities have led to many Zimbabweans moving to smaller cities and towns in the country (including Makhanda). Additionally, the large number of migrant traders (including Zimbabweans) in the large cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban were pushing profits down due to massive competition in the informal economy (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 11), and hence movement away from these cities has been pursued by some Zimbabwean informal traders. This, again, shows the fact that Zimbabwean migrants often journey through South Africa prior to their current location. At the same time, for those Zimbabweans who do find work in the formal economy, their urban livelihoods are challenging, such that they often supplement their income by engaging in informal work as well (Crush & Tawodzera, 2016: 14). The informal or casual employment for these formally employed Zimbabweans ranged from laundry, car-washing, gardening or selling various household items and hand-made goods.

Zimbabwean traders tend to be focused in the retail, trade and wholesale sector as well as services and manufacturing sectors. Just as with location clustering amongst Zimbabweans, there may be employment/informal economy clustering as well – particularly if local social networks of Zimbabweans facilitate the entry of individual Zimbabweans into the informal (or even formal) economic sector. This does not, though, necessarily offer Zimbabwean informal trader entrepreneurs any comparative advantage over their South African counterparts (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; Radipere, 2012). However, an advantage to the Zimbabwean traders (as with other Zimbabweans in South Africa) is that many of them had previously been employed in the formal economy (in Zimbabwe), and hence thus had relied on their personal savings to start their businesses (Crush *et al.*, 2017: 1).

Overall, it appears that South Africa is a conducive environment for Zimbabwean informal entrepreneurs, who admit to having been able to expand their business operations despite having to support the family that was back home in Zimbabwe. They do, however, note that if they did not have to remit a portion of their profits, then their businesses would have grown by an even higher percentage over time (Crush *et al.*, 2017: 1). In the study by Crush *et al.*, (2017), only twelve percent of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs indicated that they did not send remittances back home, compared to over one-third who sent remittances at least once a month (Crush *et al.*, 2017: 1; see also Thebe, 2015).

However, as with other foreign national traders, Zimbabwean traders are subject to unwelcome gestures by South Africans as well as outright violence. For instance, a significant number of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs have been a victim, or know someone who has been a victim, of crimes such as robbery, looting, police misconduct and xenophobic attacks (Crush *et al.*, 2017; Sandrey, 2012; Chikanda *et al.*, 2015). To order to sustain their informal livelihoods, Zimbabwean traders are sometimes compelled to adopt a number of strategies in order to reduce risk, and these include operating in relatively safer areas (which is not an option for all, due to various reasons) and paying for protection when xenophobic attacks arise. Despite such serious risks as well as having to spend money on personal security, the return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the dire economic situation. With the November 2017 coup in Zimbabwe, most Zimbabweans in South Africa have been sceptical of returning home as they see the same people who supported the Mugabe regime taking over power (Mpondi & Mupakati, 2018: 216). In this sense, the Zimbabwean traders are caught between a rock and a hard place.

## **2.5 Informal Trading in Makhanda**

The last known extensive study on street trading in Makhanda was done in February 2000 by the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University (Mnguni *et al.*, 2001). Information collected was based on 122 street traders, 15 representatives of formal businesses and 139 shoppers in the Central Business District and the Pepper Grove shopping mall. Results showed that street traders were mainly women, and that they breadwinners in their households who had been trading for up to five years. Foreign traders made up just 11% of the sampled traders; almost twenty years later, there is no accurate information on this matter. The majority of trade was in foodstuffs followed by clothes and various accessories. Of note, informal traders indicated that their largest and most important customer base consisted of locals from Makhanda. Although traders are on the street throughout the year, business is at its best during pay-days and holiday season.

The National Arts Festival (NAF) has been running for forty-five years in Makhanda and its origins can be traced back to back to 1974 when the 1820 Settlers National Monument was officially opened. This festival, which attracts thousands of visitors over a two-week period, has remained an important time in informal traders' calendar in Makhanda (National Arts Festival, 2019). The year 2010 was also of significance because the football World Cup was held in South Africa in that year, and its schedule overlapped with the NAF. Traders had high expectations of trading more than usual during the 2010 NAF since Port Elizabeth, where some world cup games were held, is only ninety minutes away from Makhanda (MacGregor, 2010). Regular traders such as Zimbabwean Blessing Nyakutira, who specialises in wire products and traded below the Drostdy Arch (at the front of Rhodes University), exclaimed though that sales during the NAF in 2010 were slow as compared to previous years. This was probably because people were spending more on the World Cup and this was impacting most traders negatively, even though the NAF had been extended for an extra five days (MacGregor, 2010). However, most traders continue to look forward to the annual NAF event.

Overall, informal and formal traders (and shoppers) in the study in 2000 agreed to a great extent that street trading was beneficial to Makhanda because it created employment opportunities. However, one of the main issues raised involved complaints from the formal traders who were facing direct and sometimes stiff competition from informal traders who were selling the same products as theirs (Mnguni *et al.*, 2001: i). Another issue was whether or not a central marketplace for informal traders should be established, rather than these traders being dispersed throughout the town. Interestingly, the presence of migrant informal traders or the sale of counterfeit goods were not considered as important issues.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has set out the analytical and thematic context for the case study chapter (chapter 3). It highlighted how the SLA is an appropriate analytical framework for understanding the lives and livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda. It then went on to offer literature reviews on a thematic basis, namely, in relation to foreign informal traders in South Africa, Zimbabwean nationals in South Africa and, finally, Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa. Key issues arose about foreign (including Zimbabwean) traders in South Africa. These include push and pull factors for migrating in the first place, journeying to South Africa, ongoing relationships with family left in the country of origin, relationships with South African nationals in the place of destination, as well as the day to day experiences and practices of pursuing a livelihood as a foreign trader in South Africa. Many of these issues will re-appear in the following chapter.

## **Chapter 3: Zimbabwean Informal Traders in Makhanda**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Makhanda has a significant number of informal traders from various parts of Africa, including from Zimbabwe. The motivations of Zimbabweans for coming to South Africa (and specifically Makhanda) vary, as do the reasons for Zimbabweans resorting to informal trading once in South Africa – these include the difficulties in finding formal employment once in South Africa and, yet, the necessity of pursuing some form of livelihoods. As the literature review demonstrates (see chapter 2), Zimbabwe’s polity and economy has not been conducive for sustainable livelihoods and significant outward migration has taken place, particularly since the late 1990s. Currently, South Africa has anywhere between one and two million Zimbabweans, making them the largest group of migrants in the country. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the livelihood strategies of the Zimbabwean informal traders (in Makhanda) and to examine, based on their experiences, practices and aspirations, if they are able to pursue meaningful livelihoods.

The chapter begins (in section 3.2) with a profile of the informal Zimbabwean traders interviewed for this study. Section 3.3 focuses on the journey to South Africa and specifically Makhanda, while section 3.4 considers their status in the informal economy as traders. Then, section 3.5 discusses Zimbabwean togetherness in relation to credit facilities for the traders and remittances to Zimbabwe. Importantly, section 3.6 highlights the relationship of the informal Zimbabwean traders to South Africa and South Africans, including the issue of xenophobia. In section 3.7, the life of uncertainty (in relation to the present and future) experienced by the traders is brought to the fore. The penultimate section (section 3.8) then offers three short live histories from amongst the six Zimbabwean informal traders.

### **3.2 Profile of Zimbabwean Informal Traders in Makhanda**

Makhanda, which was known formerly as Grahamstown until recently, is located in the Eastern Cape Province, which is one of the poorest provinces in South Africa and yet is the birth place of one of the most influential figures in the world, *Tata* Nelson ‘Madiba’ Mandela. Among other things, the town is also known for hosting the annual National Arts Festival which has been running for forty-five years (since 1974). This is a significant event for the arts industry in South Africa, and it draws informal (often foreign) traders from across the country in seeking to sell their wares to festival visitors. For informal traders based in Makhanda, it is one event

during which they aim to maximise their sales and profits, given the large number of visitors including from outside the country.

Due to time constraints and the limited character of the thesis project, the evidence used for this research was collected from 6 informal traders through interviews as well as by way of informal observations of their day-to-day operations. While men made up eighty-three percent (five out of six) of the participants, this is not necessarily a reflection of the demographics of the Zimbabweans involved in informal trading in Makhanda. Rather, it reflects my use of non-random convenience sampling for the fieldwork.

The current number of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda could not be determined during the research, but estimates show that it is quite a significant number. A study conducted in 2000 in (then) Grahamstown (Mnguni *et al.*, 2001) entailed the collection of data from one hundred and twenty-two (122) informal street traders, of which 80 per cent were women. Of these 122 traders, 14 (or 11 percent) were foreign, though the country of origins of these foreign traders is not provided. Though the extent to which Zimbabwean informal traders existed in Grahamstown in the past is unclear, it is likely that the absolute number of Zimbabwean traders in (now) Makhanda has increased significantly in recent years, particularly given the economic crisis which emerged in Zimbabwe during the post-2000 period. While the hair and beauty industry seems to have the most foreign traders, Zimbabweans in Makhanda have shown versatility by exploring almost all avenues of business including retail, food, repair and maintenance, upholstery, delivery services and taxi and shuttle services. As well, some informal traders have more than one informal trading activity.

The table below (Table 1) provides the profiles of the six Zimbabwean informal traders who participated in the research (see also Appendix D). Pseudonyms were used to ensure privacy. The six informal traders, in terms of their profiles, are not necessarily representative of all informal Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda. Five of the six participants were male, and they were aged between 24 and their early forties. Three of the six participants came from Harare, two from Mutare and one from Bulawayo. Significantly, the informal traders are relatively new arrivals in South Africa, as they left Zimbabwe from 2013 onwards (except for one who arrived in 2004). Only two moved straight to Makhanda from Zimbabwe. Lastly, all the participants had dependents, either in Makhanda or Zimbabwe, or both.

**Table 1: Profiles of the Zimbabwean Informal Traders**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Place of Origin</b>	<b>Arrival Date</b>	<b>Trading Activities</b>	<b>Household Members</b>
Lucky	Male	24	Bulawayo	2016 Johannesburg, 2017 Makhanda	Taxi Driver	Extended in Zimbabwe
Lee	Male	24	Harare	2017, Port Alfred, 2018 Makhanda	Employee in Tinashe's Salon	Extended in Zimbabwe
James	Male	33	Harare	2013 Port Alfred, 2014 Makhanda	Loctician	1 Wife, 1 Baby in Makhanda
Rosemary	Female	31	Mutare	2016 Makhanda	Nail Technician	1 Child in Zimbabwe
Tinashe	Male	33	Harare	2013 Port Alfred, 2014 Makhanda	Natural Hair Salon Owner	1 Wife, 2 Children in Makhanda
Mr Chidhakwa	Male	40's	Mutare	2004 Makhanda	Arts and Craft Street Trader	1 Wife, 1 Child in Makhanda, 1 Child in Zimbabwe

### **3.3 From Zimbabwe, through Beitbridge, to Makhanda**

The six Zimbabwean informal traders interviewed all noted that the decision to come to South Africa (and Makhanda more specifically) had been motivated by an invitation, or encouragement, from existing networks such as family and friends. Though the notion of “herd behaviour” (Tengeh, 2015) is sometimes used to describe such migration patterns, this notion tends to undercut the significance of reflexivity on the part of migrants in choosing why and where to migrate.

Undoubtedly, established social networks made it more readily possible for these six Zimbabweans to travel and secure places of residence in South Africa, as well as informal employment in a reasonably short space of time – which were already almost guaranteed beforehand. Once an opportunity to leave Zimbabwe arose, most did not have to think twice when the invitation came, especially for those who arrived in Makhanda subsequent to the major economic crisis which hit Zimbabwe in the late 2000s. Before this, people would think twice before embarking on the journey, as they held on to the hope that Zimbabwe’s polity and economy would be restored somehow. However, this has not been the case for many years now, and there is now significant dependence on migrants outside the country to provide for any family left in Zimbabwe. This is why generating and maintaining a social network system is valued amongst Zimbabwean migrants in Makhanda as well as Zimbabwean relatives back home, as the relationship between migrants and family in Zimbabwe is mutually beneficial. Indeed, there is a strong moral code and expectation that those who have been assisted by others, will likewise assist even others.

All the participants interviewed came to South Africa legally through the Beitbridge border post by bus. Mr Chidhakwa and Rosemary came straight to Makhanda and started their trading activities. Lee, Tinashe and James all began trading informally in the hair industry in Port Alfred before moving to Makhanda. Lucky was in Johannesburg upon his arrival in South Africa before becoming a taxi driver in Makhanda. The journeys were described as an opportunity for a better life, especially because the informal traders had connections prior to embarking on the journey from Zimbabwe.

Noticeably, there seems to be a trend towards younger people coming to South Africa in more recent times. This is attributed to higher levels of school-dropouts in Zimbabwe, mostly due to the unaffordability of fees and the general lack of trust in government to ensure the availability of employment for graduates. As James, a loctician (hairstylist specialising in dreads), indicated:

*Growing up, we knew from being told that education was the key to success; well, clearly someone changed the locks [to the door to success]. (James, Interview, 10 September 2019)*

James is technically a dropout, as he did not bother to collect his ‘O’ (ordinary) level results in 2007. He decided in desperation to go to Botswana soon after his exams in order to participate in any kind of informal work activities, as his parents were not able to afford ‘A’ (advanced) level school fees. A few years later, upon invitation from his cousin, James eventually found himself in Port Alfred (near Makhanda) in 2013 where he learnt the skills of a loctician through

observation and practice. This was a skill completely different from what he was specialising in while in Botswana, which was landscaping. It was in 2014 that James then decided to move to Makhanda after numerous invitations from customers who would commute to Port Alfred to get their hair done by him. Incredibly, the customers took it upon themselves to find a suitable and affordable space for James to set up his workplace, and this left him with no choice but to recollect after such support:

*Imagine not being able to do the same for someone else from home after God has been this good to you? I am forever grateful to this day. (James, Interview, 10 September 2019)*

This quotation indicates clearly the deep sense of moral obligation to help others.

Amongst the interviewees, none indicated that they had gained illegal access into South Africa. They all had valid passports upon arrival. However, most of the informal traders had indicated to South African immigration officials, on arrival, that they would be in the country for a temporary visit, as this does not require a visa. This is despite the fact that they knew they would be working and earning an income or were at least seeking to find work. The challenge is that obtaining a work visa is a strenuous and time-consuming process. As well, applying for a work visa requires producing an employment offer letter from an employer to the Home Affairs office, which was not feasible as the planned or expected work would be informal.

Beyond invitations from family and friends in South Africa, the importance of personal savings also came to the fore. Personal savings seemed to be a crucial part of the story of the Zimbabwean informal traders, as savings came in handy when the opportunity to migrate to South Africa arose. Prior to leaving Zimbabwe, each of the six Zimbabweans had been involved in some form of formal or informal work, and this enabled them to afford to purchase Zimbabwean passports and to buy a ticket on a comfortable bus. Fortunately, none of them were involved in 'border jumping' or encountered the dreaded *GumaGumas* (gangs harassing border-crossers, specifically at the Beitbridge border post) when travelling into South Africa.

Beitbridge border post is the main entry point that most Zimbabweans use when entering South Africa. Across the African continent, it is easily one of the busiest border-posts all year around. Rosemary was coming to South Africa for the very first time because the salon owner she worked for had partnered up with a South African friend to open a salon in Makhanda. She spoke about her reason for travelling by bus and using the Beitbridge border crossing:

*Although it would be nice, air travel is an unnecessary luxury and increases the risk of exposure of persons with inappropriate visas. (Rosemary, Interview, 9 September 2019)*

Compared to immigration officials and procedures at international airports in South Africa, buses travelling into South Africa are more accommodative of foreigners with passport and visa issues. The foreign travellers often work with border officials by paying them off, provided that there has been prior communication between the bus drivers and the immigration officials. Thus, international buses have become the norm for Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda. These buses not only save them money, as they also reduce the unnecessary risk of exposure should their 'papers' be in arrears or not in order. In fact, Zimbabweans can 'buy days' outside of the legal 90 day stays typically allowed in South Africa.

For the Zimbabwean informal traders, the initial trip and journey into South Africa by bus was described as long and anxiety-inducing but also exciting, as they noticed significant differences between infrastructural conditions in South Africa (compared to Zimbabwe) including roads without potholes and unexposed sewage systems. A bright future seemed to await them.

### **3.4 Owners of Informal Trading Businesses**

With the unemployment rate in South Africa at a significant level, self-employment in the informal economy is an alternative (amongst both South Africans and foreigners) as a basis for pursuing household-based livelihoods. Not everyone though is inclined to, or capable of, owning an informal business, with some people even preferring to work for others for various reasons. The Zimbabwean informal traders are aware of the importance at times of first working for others, before seeking to run their own operation, as five of the six interviewees experienced the transition from employee to owners.

For households, an informal business may be the lone household livelihood strategy. If it is the lone venture, then profit-making is essential for household survival. If part of a diversified household livelihood portfolio, or even a 'side business', pressure for profit may be less significant. In Makhanda, the Zimbabwean's informal businesses were all fundamental to household survival, though their capacity to generate sustainable profits varied.

Out of the six informal traders, five were self-employed and, out of those five, four had employees of their own. Tinashe rented a spacious area for his salon and employees. Mr Chidhakwa had a stall just outside the Rhodes University campus known as 'Under the Arch.' Brian used his personal car (a Honda Fit) as a taxi. Rosemary was a nail technician who rented space in a salon with James along with their respective employees. At the time of the interview, Rosemary had one employee with whom she shared her space in the salon. She indicated how it had become increasingly difficult to travel between Port Elizabeth (a major city 130

kilometres away) and Makhanda to purchase supplies, because of the prevalence of police along the highway and random checks asking for identification documents and passports. Upon observation, it was clear that she did not have a wide range of colours and styles to choose from, and she indicated how this was causing frustration with regular customers or new clients who had heard about her from referrals. Yet, some customers who chipped in during the interview with Rosemary claimed that they did not wish to go to South African nail technicians because of poor customer service. The customers said that Zimbabweans were their first choice in terms of informal services (because of their work ethic and dedication) followed by other foreign nationals and then local South Africans.

James, the loctician, did not only dread hair as he was also involved in cutting, trimming, styling, washing and colouring hair. He explained that his aim was to make his services as hands-on and personal as possible vis-à-vis customers. Thus, when possible, instead of passing the customer from one employee to another employee, he would undertake all the steps in the process (from start to finish) even though he specialised in dreadlocks. Therefore, his employees mostly cut hair, made sure they did not run out of products and kept the salon tidy for customers. Apart from the salon, James had a section in the back of the store that had various products that were not easily available in local stores. He explained that it was a new venture for expanding his business activities, in case one venture alone does not sustain him. Most of the products were from online stores that some people were sceptical about, so James would purchase samples and thereby make it easier for customers to view and try them before purchase. Lastly, James also had a taxi and local delivery service making him quite a versatile business man in Makhanda. Social media was credited as a cheap yet effective form of advertising for James' goods and services, something that Tinashe, the founder of a popular natural hair salon, also confirmed.

Tinashe's specialist hair salon has been around for a while in Makhanda but was said to have taken off significantly since the use of social media in 2016. As he put it:

*It is all about keeping up with the times, knowing our target market and giving people exactly what they want. (Tinashe, Interview, 27 September 2019)*

Tinashe's salon uses a team of seemingly brand ambassadors, including university students, to represent his hair enterprise to as many people as possible in Makhanda. These people advertise and promote the hair salon's brand via social media – they have a significant following either on Facebook, Twitter or Instagram, and therefore they attract diverse traffic to their social media pages on behalf of Tinashe. With the focus being on natural hair, the message has to be

clear to the target audience, particularly in terms of attracting new customers who would like to embark on a natural hair journey, which Tinashe referred to as a ‘crown’.

Being self-employed and your own boss had its perks as well as disadvantages as highlighted by the Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda. Some of the perks included flexibility in working hours to a certain extent, especially if there was more money to be made. Also, not being involved in a company with a hierarchical arrangement (as an employee) was seen as a refreshing factor, as decisions about their enterprises could be made swiftly (by them). Likewise, having a close and personal relationship with customers meant that grievances were relayed faster and so were the changes made to maintain and improve client loyalty. To illustrate, Lucky highlighted that he made the ultimate sacrifice of buying his own car as opposed to driving someone else’s and only receive a commission. His independence is significantly greater than those that do not own their taxis because, during slow days, the owner of the car may still want the same amount weekly or daily from the driver. Another perk that informal traders enjoy in Makhanda, according to Mr Chidhakwa, include using their talents to make an honest living. Also, when new local businesses open around town, they tend to buy some of Mr Chidhakwa’s curios for decoration, and he admitted that it was satisfying for him even though it was mostly for only once-off purchases. Overall, the informal traders indicated that interacting with multiple people had taught them about diversity and different styles and tastes, which they then incorporate into their businesses.

In relation to disadvantages, it was indicated by all owners that it was hard to take off-days or even sick days because time was directly related to the money they made. On the day of the interview, Rosemary claimed to not have eaten anything despite the time being two o’clock in the afternoon already. She reported having constant headaches which painkillers were not able to overcome, but she still insisted on not being able to afford to take time off. This was a reality for the informal traders more broadly, including working long hours with little or no breaks and even coming to work with ill-health just so they could make as much money as possible and sustain their livelihoods, as well as those that depended on them for survival. James also highlighted the general problem of trying to make a living through arduous informal work, and the minimal profit margins that often prevail:

*Some people think that having a business automatically means being rich and unfortunately that is not the case, at least not yet. There are people that will try to negotiate for cheaper prices which we cannot allow to happen so the solution is to let our work do the talking. There are bills to be paid and this line of work is by no means easy, it is all about one’s blood, sweat and tears, something that some customers and*

*dependents should also understand before making demands* (James, Interview, 10 November 2019).

The five owners employed some South Africans in their businesses. For example, Tinashe had six permanent employees (three women and three men) of which only two of those were Zimbabwean, a man and a woman, and the rest were South Africans. However, during busy times of the month, such as pay day or graduations, temporary employees would be hired, but mostly family members to reduce costs. James had one permanent female South African employee, a Tanzanian man and two Zimbabwean temporary employees, also relatives. Drawing on family members seemed to be an important aspect of informal trading especially when extra hands were needed on deck.

At the time of the interview, Rosemary admitted that she had recently gotten out of a partnership with a South African nail technician because of differences. When asked to elaborate, she explained that her strong work ethic was very different from the South African, and this was affecting her business because her brand became associated with her partner as well. Rosemary had one temporary employee who happened to also be her cousin, but she was looking for a South African to be a permanent employee. Rosemary said:

*It is my way of giving back to the community because of the support I have received over the years. It is only fair that I do this even though it will not be easy.* (Rosemary, Interview, 9 September 2019).

The reason why it was not easy to hire South Africans, according to James as well, was that when they got paid, they would not report to work for the next three days or so, and these happened to be the busiest times of the month sometimes. In some cases, the employees would call in sick on the busiest days or resign after getting their pay check. The turnover was high and did not look good for the business, because customers preferred being assisted by the same faces in order to establish trust and loyalty.

When it came to the links and connections established by the Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda, a majority expressed how their work environments were generally healthy and enabling for sustaining livelihoods. The participants were in large part aware of the different services offered by other Zimbabwean informal traders. However, in the case of hairstylists and nail technicians, there has been a rise in the number operating locally, and this led to increased competition, which would usually be a cause for worry. However, those involved in these trades indicated that the competition was conducive, because there were times in the past when the influx of customers was too much to handle, but that was not the case anymore. All indicated that competition did not necessarily reduce their income because of the

significant local supply (in terms of customers) for their services. In particular, month end and pay days was particularly busy because of more disposable income and the overabundance of customers is not ideal for business as they will have to wait for long periods of time before being attended to, which may lead to customer dissatisfaction. Therefore, competition in this respect is welcomed with open arms because there will be less frustrated potential customers and faster service as well.

All the informal traders highlighted that they understand that others were in informal trading because of the need to make a living for themselves and their dependents. Therefore, they realized the importance of supporting each other's businesses and did so in various ways. Where possible, the Zimbabwean traders would obtain and purchase goods and services from other informal traders whether they were South African, Zimbabwean or other foreign nationals. The goods and services ranged from taxi services, hair and beauty, food items and clothes and shoes, amongst other things. The informal traders indicated that this was almost like an informal ethical code that they had chosen to live by for as long as they had been in Makhanda.

#### ***3.4.1 An Informal Trading Business Employee***

All of the six participants interviewed and observed for this research indicated that they had worked for someone else at some point in their life, and how doing so was a humbling experience while also paving the way for generating services to save up for a future informal business. Only one of the six interviewees though was currently simply an employee within the informal sector. In this regard, getting the accounts of employees of informal traders was not easy, as their work schedules were not as flexible as those of the owners of informal trading businesses.

However, Lee (who works for Tinashe's natural hair salon) agreed to give as much detail as possible about how he sustained his livelihood while working for another Zimbabwean. Having come to South Africa initially in 2017 to work in Port Alfred, Lee moved to Makhanda in 2018, making him a late entry compared to the rest of the interviewed Zimbabweans. Notably, he claimed that his skills had been self-taught, a trait that was common amongst the other Zimbabwean informal traders. In the past, Lee had been involved in various informal activities and he took up hairdressing in desperation for income, as the other activities were not sustainable. Lee was the youngest of those interviewed (24 years old), though just a few months younger than Lucky. Lee's hairdressing job included various tasks such as cutting, trimming, colouring and washing hair, and maintaining dreadlocks.

Overall, it seemed as though working for someone was the norm before owning a business, as it ensured raising capital and acquiring experience of working with people. In their younger years, the experience of being an employee in the informal sector often involved being taken under the wing of an established informal trader and being mentored by the latter. This is the case of Lee under Tinashe; and likewise, Lucky started off with a mentor, a fellow Zimbabwean taxi driver, who helped him and his business to where it is today.

In general, the informal traders claimed that they knew the importance of having a good relationship with their employees, whether temporary or permanent, as well as with customers and the community at large. The profile of customers of all the informal traders was quite diverse in terms of nationalities and that be, in part, because of Rhodes University students. For hair and beauty services, South Africans tended to be the main customer base followed by other nationalities. For Mr Chidhakwa, his customer base had been largely tourists who needed curios to take back home. But this has increasingly shifted to some university students and interested art collectors in Makhanda and surrounding areas. For Lucky, he highlighted that his customer base was significantly stable as he dealt with students throughout the year. The festive season tended to be slow as most students were away, but there would often be conferences taking place at the university which meant that there were always potential customers for all the informal traders.

### **3.5 Zimbabwean Togetherness: Cash Inflows (Credit) and Outflows (Remittances)**

The interviewees all highlighted that it was difficult to obtain credit from formal institutions such as banks because of their foreign status in the country. Having to resort to informal lenders such as loan sharks posed a high risk especially when it was time to collect their debt. Even South African locals had serious issues with loan sharks (including exorbitant interest), and foreign national traders often feared for their lives if repayment of loans on time was not forthcoming. Instead, as Tengeh (2015) notes, Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa often borrowed money from each other when they really needed to, emphasising the importance of networks. Running a business with no formal line of credit appeared to be quite a challenge but the Zimbabwean informal traders had found a way around, managing to run their businesses fairly smoothly by banding together.

The reasons given for wanting credit were usually because of ‘slow business’ or emergencies back in Zimbabwe that needed sudden remittances. Unexpected expenses had a knock-on effect on fixed costs such as rent and rates which had to be paid and were non-negotiable. Sometimes and increasingly so, some informal traders had to commit more money

towards remittances due to the rising inflation rate and cost of living in Zimbabwe. Such occurrences also put a strain on personal savings for some informal traders and this made it difficult to expand business operations, which meant working just for basic needs and day-to-day expenses,

Related to this was the question of having access to banks at all, including access to bank card machines. None of the six informal traders in fact had bank accounts because they lacked the necessary documentation; in addition, even if possible, this would leave a paper trail about their presence and activities in the country which they wished to avoid. This, however, is a hurdle for the traders because some of their South African counterparts had card machines. Carrying cash, especially amongst students, is getting less and less popular and this is because of fear of theft; and so, it becomes an inconvenience if they have to withdraw money instead of swiping with their cards. For instance, Rosemary reported to have lost a couple of customers because she did not have a card machine, with these customers telling her that they did not have the time to wait in long queues for withdrawals. In Rosemary's word, such customers would say:

*Why is it that you do not have a card machine in this day and age and yet [competitor's name] has one? These are things you should mention before you approve our appointments because now, I have wasted my time.* (Rosemary, Interview, 9 September 2019)

She highlighted that this happens sometimes only, and the customers usually come back because she lets her work speak for itself. However, she wishes that it would be easier to surpass these hurdles with banks and still be safe to trade without facing deportation.

Similarly, Tinashe mentioned that some dreadlock hairstyles can cost as much as seven hundred rand (R700) and customers have mentioned that paying by card would be more preferable instead of carrying such an amount and risk dropping it or getting pick-pocketed:

*Sometimes the cashbox does not have enough cash [change] and I have to send Lee or another employee to Checkers and this means that the customer has to wait. If there was a way of overcoming this problem, business for all of us would run smoother.* (Tinashe, Interview, 27 September 2019)

The six Zimbabwean informal traders indicated that they sent remittances to Zimbabwe, usually once a month but sometimes up to three times a month depending upon the situation back in Zimbabwe. Even those informal traders with family members in Makhanda sent money to extended families back in Zimbabwe, which shows the cross-border moral economy which prevails amongst many Zimbabweans. Tinashe, James and Rosemary all referred to a popular

Shona saying – ‘*chirere, mangwana chigokurerawo*’ – which, when translated, means that ‘when someone receives help, they eventually reciprocate the action’, a point raised earlier.

Sending money has become a significant challenge in recent times because of the scrapping of the multi-currency system in Zimbabwe and the banning of the US dollar and South African Rand in the country. As well, problems exist due to the fact that the Zimbabweans do not have bank accounts in South Africa and the exorbitant charges for money transfers by way of for instance the Eco-Cash and Mukuru transfer systems. Further, as noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), hyper-inflation has re-emerged in Zimbabwe, and it stood at three hundred percent (300%) in August 2019 (Muronzi, 2019). This means that the informal traders have had to increase the amount of money they send monthly or remit more frequently. The amounts remitted each time range from five hundred rand (R500) to two thousand rand (R2000), with the amount dependent on the financial status and profit-margin of the informal business at the time. Usually, these regular remittances are not inclusive of other intermittent expenses such as annual school fees or emergency (for example, medicine or ‘bail money’). Lee mentioned that before, coming to South Africa, he had been harassed by the police on a number of occasions and some of his friends would be arrested for petty reasons if they failed to pay the bribe. These are some of the costs encountered by the informal traders as they have to send bail money for their nephews and brothers in Zimbabwe when something so unfortunate happens.

The option of undertaking in-kind remittances (such as sending groceries) was considered as risky because border officials at Beitbridge frequently dictate what is or is not allowed at short notice, with the possibility of goods being confiscated and the scarce money used for initially purchasing the groceries being wasted. Also, though foodstuffs are significantly cheaper in South Africa than in Zimbabwe, the amount charged by bus drivers or ‘*malaicha*’ to carry goods across the border sometimes ends up exceeding the cost of the groceries in Zimbabwe, so that the in-kind remittance ends up making no economic sense. To counter this issue, there has been a growing trend towards relatives and friends from Zimbabwe travelling by bus across the border, meeting with the Makhanda trader in Johannesburg to receive money, and then doing their shopping there before boarding the overnight bus back to Zimbabwe. The type of buses usually used are found outside of Park Station bus terminus – they do not need to be booked in advance and booking does not require the provision of passport details. In this sense, they are ‘user-friendly’ for those without proper documentation, as well as being significantly cheaper than the ‘fancier’ Greyhound or InterCape buses. What also makes the ‘other’ buses preferable is that they travel with large trailers for luggage,

compared to the fancier buses which at times ask their customers to carry just one bag per person, which is not practical for in-kind remittances.

The majority of the Zimbabwean traders indicated that they went back to Zimbabwe once a year, usually during the festive season. This was also an opportunity to bring foodstuffs and items to family back home. But they were away for not more than two weeks, because of the demand for their services from customers who would not have travelled out of Makhandanda during the festive season. There are also bills to be paid, with payment completely dependent upon on the hours that the informal traders work and earn income.

### **3.6 South Africa from a Zimbabwean Informal Traders' Perspective**

All the Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhandanda indicated that they had managed to sustain their livelihoods through the various activities in which they were involved. However, Mr Chidhakwa said that he had been making way more money for himself and his family when he was still in Zimbabwe. The rest of the informal traders reported that their livelihoods in South Africa were unmatched to those they had sustained in Zimbabwe, which barely satisfied their basic needs.

South Africa and Zimbabwe are different in more ways than one; for example, the citizens in South Africa have more freedom of speech than those in Zimbabwe, a point emphasised by the Zimbabwean traders. Further, despite the existence of state corruption in South Africa, they pointed out that there was a level of accountability by the local Makana municipality. Makana municipality has been experiencing significant problems for quite a number of years relating to service delivery such as water shortages. This has local people, schools and the university on edge and yet the informal traders are less troubled by this, given their experiences in Zimbabwe. As Rosemary put it:

*The problems in Grahamstown [Makhandanda] are in no way close to those in Zimbabwe and that is why water shortages are not a big deal. Potholes are the norm in Zimbabwe and electricity can go for up to eighteen hours every day. In some areas, the transformer oil is usually stolen, and it can take several months until it is replaced because of the high cost coupled with corruption. All we do is simply complain in the confines of our homes in fear of getting into trouble with officials. Just imagine how hard it is to run a business under such conditions. (Rosemary, Interview, 9 September 2019).*

When asked if they had received some form of support from the government directed towards their small businesses, the informal traders indicated that had not happened in a direct way.

This meant that they were not harassed by the police for their informal trading or asked for bribes in the process.

On various occasions, Zimbabwe's ruling party under the new president (Mnangagwa), has mentioned that Zimbabwe is no 'open for business', an issue that the informal traders pointed out as contradictory because the economic and political environment is not conducive for local businesses, let alone for foreign businesses. Basic infrastructure such as good roads, clean water, safe housing and business spaces are all ways of alleviating livelihoods because they allow people to work for themselves without worrying about public goods (Matthews *et al.*, 2008; Kohler *et al.*, 2010). Though the infrastructure in Makhanda is experiencing deterioration, the informal traders view the situation as more conducive than the situation in Zimbabwe. They had relatively clean water and almost always knew when a power outage might occur, so that they could plan in advance.

Overall, Zimbabwean informal traders had managed to make the most out of an unfortunate situation. While the locals were rightfully disgruntled by the municipality, Zimbabweans were not affected much because they had come from a place where most public services and infrastructure (such as health care, public transport and school systems) were not functioning well if at all. As Lee put it:

*Some people may say that South Africans are entitled and always expecting handouts from the government, but it is their right in a way. It is a pity that ZANU-PF has instilled so much fear in its citizens that we cannot even ask for streetlights and when South Africans exercise their right to protest, is it labelled as laziness. That is what democracy should look like in Zimbabwe, something that remains a hope for now. (Lee, Interview, 18 November 2019).*

### **3.6.1 Xenophobia**

Although not a recent phenomenon, xenophobia has become widespread in South Africa over the past years with its ugly head showing up periodically. The last known significant case of xenophobic attacks in Makhanda occurred in 2015 which resulted in a number of businesses and homes belonging to foreign nationals being lost and families being displaced. At the time when this study was being conducted, xenophobic attacks were allegedly underway in Gauteng's major cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria following an encounter between a local taxi driver who was allegedly shot by a foreign national who was accused of being a drug dealer. In the past few years, xenophobic attacks have tended to spread to other parts of South

Africa and 2019 was no exception with cases reported in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape.

Surprisingly enough, upon reflection of the xenophobic attacks that occurred in 2015 in Makhanda, five out of the six participants indicated that their businesses or activities had not been affected directly. It would seem that there was a concentration in the 'location' (with 'spaza' shops being the biggest targets), while they ran their operations from outside the 'location', mostly in the central business district of Makhanda. Overall, xenophobia seemed to target the most vulnerable foreigners (in the location), where police would often not act forcefully to protect and help out foreign nationals. Thus, unlike in town or the central business district where informal traders had not experienced any direct cases of xenophobia, the same could not be said about foreign-owned informal businesses in the location in 2015. However, the fear is still very much alive currently amongst the Zimbabwean informal traders, because the political atmosphere and the emergence of xenophobia was unpredictable, with it spreading at times almost like wildfire.

Most of informal traders had confidence that the attacks would not spread to the Eastern Cape as it was 'the quietest province'; and, even if it did, businesses in the centre of town would not be affected. Precautionary measures were put into place at the time of xenophobic attacks elsewhere, including later opening times and earlier closing times. Though they considered this as bad for business, it was essential as life was more valuable than money, and it made more economic sense to preserve life now to be able to make money in the future. During observation (9 September 2019) in the salon from which two of the informal traders (the loctician and the nail technician operate, customers that walked in showed remorse towards the situation that foreigners were facing in Gauteng and enquired about relatives and friends in the affected areas. There was a discussion about how social media might have contributed to the panic (because of, for instance, the use of old footage from other countries on some social media platforms), almost as if there was an anti-foreigner agenda being pursued. In this context, the informal traders had to be more vigilant and not risk losing business over such 'fake news'.

South Africa was described by the informal traders as being politically unpredictable from time to time and examples of femicide, xenophobia and tribalism were mentioned in passing by all interviewees. However, the Zimbabwean informal traders interviewed and observed expressed that it would take more than xenophobic attacks to make them relocate back to Zimbabwe and that shows the dire conditions in their home country.

### 3.7 A Life of Uncertainty

While all of the six Zimbabwean informal traders indicated that they had come into South Africa legally with valid passports, they had reported at Beitbridge border post that their stay would be temporary. Those that came before the introduction of the special Zimbabwean permits known as the Dispensation of Zimbabwean Project (ZDP) in 2010, managed to get their stay legitimatised, enabling them to work and enrol in school and colleges (Van den Heever, 2017). However, these were not renewable after 2014. This created uncertainty and the Home Affairs department had to come up with another solution. Thus, the Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) was introduced and would be valid from 2014 to 2017 under the same conditions as the ZDP.

However, this visa had to be applied for in Zimbabwe and would take processing time of two months, and the informal traders indicated that they could not afford to take that much time off from their work. It also created confusion for people that had decided to start families in South Africa, sometimes even described as a nightmare. The ZSP would be replaced by the Zimbabwean Exemption permit which would be valid from 2017 to 2021 and the system goes into a frenzy again. Those are some of the cracks in the system that make people resort to illegally staying and working in the country. While children can enrol in school, they would require study visas and the application process demands the personal information of parents or guardians such as bank statements. As informal traders it is not easy to open an account because of the requirements and paperwork. That means then that their children and other relatives that come to Makhanda to stay with them do so illegally in the long-run.

The process of renewal for the special permit holders has become undesirable as it was said that the permits take very long to come out and sometimes the outcome is unsuccessful, so it becomes more convenient to stay off the radar and hope to not have a run in with the police. Mr Chidhakwa said:

*I am tired of these visa renewals, every few years there is something special being added. There is nothing special, just that we [Zimbabweans] are not wanted here anymore. I gave up in 2017 because there is no point, I will never qualify for permanent residence.*

(Mr Chidhakwa, Interview, 19 September 2019)

The decision made by the Zimbabwean informal traders to remain below the radar was in order to be able to continue sustaining their livelihoods in South Africa because, if and once deported, this would mean going back to square one, especially if there were insufficient funds to keep paying their rent until their return to South Africa. As indicated, the process of getting through

the Beitbridge border post was described as fairly easy, especially without any documentation. To illustrate this point, Rosemary had this to say:

*Since 2017 I have not had a Zimbabwean Special Permit because it is a tiring and never-ending process. Instead, I send my passport to Zimbabwe with a trustworthy bus driver who gets it stamped for a reasonable fee. That way I will be 'in Zimbabwe' and not overstay my ninety days in South Africa. When I need to travel, the same driver repeats the process. It is not illegal, just smart because I cannot afford to be deported, what will my daughter eat? (Rosemary, Interview, 9 September 2019)*

Overall, the visa system has not been enough to deter Zimbabweans who are trying to make a living in South Africa and sustain their livelihoods and support their families back in Zimbabwe.

Beyond the legal uncertainties in South Africa, there are uncertainties about the very future of Zimbabwe. The informal traders highlighted that they tried to keep up to date with current affairs in Zimbabwe and around Africa so that they could be aware of what their families and friends were going through. Keeping up to date with current affairs seemed to be an important issue for the informal traders. James said:

*I guess I will be hoping to hear that Mnangagwa has stepped down and all Zimbabweans are free to go back with guaranteed jobs on arrival. (James, Interview, 10 September 2019)*

Although not in the same words, Lucky, Rosemary and Lee shared the same sentiments about holding on to the hope that Zimbabwe's fortune might change overnight.

The other reason why there is an interest in current affairs, particularly by watching South African news channels, is because Zimbabwe only has one broadcasting channel which some people believe to be captured by the state and therefore does not report the news properly and sufficiently. There is also the use of social media to spread news, but it is not always considered reliable by the traders, as certain people might have particular agendas.

When asked about the prospects of staying in South Africa, all participants indicated that the stay was on a long-term basis. With the exception of Mr Chidhakwa, the rest of the informal traders indicated that they would be staying in South Africa, Makhanda more specifically, indefinitely. This was not the initial plan, but now they felt as though there was no other choice if they wanted to continue sustaining their livelihoods and supporting their dependents back in Zimbabwe. In this regard, James declared:

*In November 2017, the people took to the streets to march in celebration of the 'coup not coup' against then reigning president Mugabe. Most people were happy with this move*

*while others were sceptical of the event and even describing it as ‘jumping from the pan into the fire’, given Mnangagwa’s controversial political background and [vice-president] Chiwenga’s military career. A coup is never good for democracy, but we believed that we would be the exception. I mean, how could anyone be worse than Mugabe? (James, Interview, 10 September 2019)*

For this reason, James had no intention of returning to Zimbabwe in the near future. Other informal traders shared the same sentiment, namely, that the change that Zimbabwe needed had finally come. It did not take long before the dream was shattered and the celebrations that took place in November 2017 had turned into tears.

Fast forward to eight months after the coup, on the 30th of July 2018, the people of Zimbabwe exercised their right to vote in the general election. The results were controversial but eventually ZANU-PF was declared the ruling party under Mnangagwa and Chiwenga as president and vice president, respectively. Lucky reflected upon this:

*For the first time in years, it really felt like Zimbabwe was going to get the change we had only dreamt about, not the joke that took place in November 2017. Chamisa Chete Chete! Honestly, supporting ZANU-PF in this day and age especially as a young person is the same as terrorism. MDC [the opposition, Movement for Democratic Change] had this in the bag and yet somehow, they still managed to rig us. (Lucky, Interview, 18 September 2019)*

Lucky showed deep emotion in expressing why going back to Zimbabwe was no longer an option for him. For the young people, the youth, which was five out of the six participants, there was hope for real difference and belief that (MDC president, Nelson) Chamisa was their beacon of hope. They also indicated that, if MDC had won the election as hoped for, relocating to Zimbabwe would have been an option making their stay in South Africa short-term. Mr Chidhakwa expressed his sadness in the ZANU-PF win in the following way:

*I will die before I see change in that country; my children will not be able to witness the Zimbabwe we lived in the 90s, all because of greedy and power-hungry thugs. (Mr Chidhakwa, Interview, 19 September 2019)*

Overall, there was consensus in the disappointment shown towards the ruling party, ZANU-PF because so much hope had been placed in the general election: ‘2030 ndinenge ndichipo’ (meaning ‘in 2030 I will still be here’) became a popular chant which were the words said by current president Mnangagwa. The statement was described as a ‘stab in the heart’ and a drain of the last piece of hope of going back to Zimbabwe in the near future to sustain livelihoods.

### 3.8 Stories of Zimbabwean Informal Traders

While all the participants provided informative and interesting details about their lives and livelihoods, some accounts stood out, notably those of Lucky, Rosemary and Mr Chidhakwa. Their stories speak to both the common experiences and the diversity of experiences of the Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda. For instance, Mr Chidhakwa had arrived in South Africa much earlier than the other five traders, and Rosemary was the only female trader.

#### 3.8.1 *Lucky's Story*

Lucky was born in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe on the 10<sup>th</sup> of March 1995 and is now only 24 years old. This makes him to be quite a young man for running his own business, when most of his age peers back in Zimbabwe are either attending university, working in the formal sector or, more than likely, unemployed without any viable livelihood activities. Due to family reasons, he was raised by his grandparents from a very young age, and it was by no means easy for him to get all the basic necessities as his grandparents were on 'pension'. This motivated him to pursue self-sufficiency by getting odd jobs during holidays and after school so that he could afford extras such as school trips and clothes for 'civvies day'. However, Lucky eventually dropped out of school after the place at which he was working closed down. But he was optimistic about the future and hoped to make something of himself despite not getting a high school qualification.

Lucky had family in Johannesburg and Makhanda and he considered that these relatives could be his first port of call in figuring out what he would do to sustain his livelihood and also support his grandparents to whom he was deeply grateful. Fortunate for him, he had made substantial savings while working, which he then used to get a passport and travel legally and comfortably through the Beitbridge border post to Johannesburg in March of 2016. A job had been organised for Lucky by his aunt on arrival, and it was at a warehouse with various goods which entailed packing orders for delivery to customers, mostly small-scale shops. He worked alongside sixty other young workers, of which only two were foreigners.

Lucky's first taste of xenophobia was in Johannesburg at his workplace where there was only one other foreigner out of sixty young workers. He reflected upon this experience:

*It was not nice at all. I knew I was not at home but did not expect to feel like I was in London or something. I knew that I wouldn't survive here, I had to go and do my own thing.* (Lucky, Interview, 18 November 2019).

Since Lucky also had relatives in Makhanda, he decided to quit his job in Johannesburg even after being discouraged not to do so because of the high unemployment rate in the country.

However, his aunt also managed to get a job for him at Steers in Makhanda as a delivery man, a job which quite a few Zimbabwean men seem to be involved in. As well, Zimbabweans who participate in fast food delivery tend to have side businesses as well. Lucky worked for Steers for three months, from October to December 2017 until he was fired. From there, he was mentored by a Zimbabwean taxi driver who had been in Makhanda for an extended period. Lucky exclaimed his gratitude towards his mentor, and indicated that, while other taxi drivers hold back on how to achieve success, he took it upon himself to learn in detail about this type of work including simply through observations.

In 2018, Lucky almost lost his life due to a xenophobic attack, after he received a call from a girl who was in the 'location' for a pickup by taxi to Rhodes University. A few minutes subsequent to picking up the girl, he realised that he had been ambushed as two men proceeded to enter the car and hit him relentlessly with Black Label one litre beer bottles. They mentioned that they had been sent by a local taxi driver to end his life because he was stealing their business. The criminals took his phones, rent money and all the money he had made that day, bringing the total up to four thousand rand (R4000). Lucky was thrown out of the car, and the men proceeded to drive off. Fortunately for Lucky, the model of car he was driving at the time had a start button and the keys were still with him, which meant that the men would not be able to drive for a long distance before the car switched off. Lucky ran for his life before meeting some good Samaritans who called the police and an ambulance for him. The services did not take long to arrive, and the police managed to recover his car and the stolen items and money.

Lucky has a distinctive scar on his face from the incident, but he indicated that he had no regrets; if anything, he had become stronger and had a more positive outlook on life. He has since made changes and does not drive to the location anymore and drives students mostly. He spoke positively about the current state of his taxi business, and how he is able to send money back to his grandparents in Zimbabwe.

*In such a short space of time, I am amazed by the popularity that my business has gained, especially after the xenophobic attack, almost as if it was a blessing in disguise. So far, it has been worth it, as I make quite a decent amount of money because I drive my own car as opposed to driving someone else's and only receiving a commission. I will not be going back to Zimbabwe in the near future since I have relatives here [Makhanda] and in Johannesburg. But I do send money to my grandparents every month. They would be proud to know that I will be going back to school next year [2020] through the money I have saved. (Lucky, Interview, 18 September 2019)*

### 3.8.2 Mr Chidhakwa's Story

Mr Chidhakwa came to South Africa in 2004 and, according to him, this was one of the most painful decisions he has ever had to make in his life. Together with his wife, they hoped that this would be a temporary arrangement while ZANU-PF sought to revive the economy subsequent to its decline after fast track land reform in the year 2000. But the Zimbabwean government launched Operation *Murambatsvina* in May 2005 which directly affected at least seven hundred thousand (700 000) people through the loss of homes and their livelihoods. Indirectly, over two million people were impacted by the Operation, which the ruling party had undertaken to supposedly get rid of illegal housing structures and various unauthorised business activities as the areas in question were riddled with infectious diseases. Because of the Operation, Mr Chidhakwa and his wife felt that their fate had been sealed and South Africa would have to become their new home indefinitely. Having left their teenage daughter behind, it was a matter of sustaining their livelihood in Makhanda while also making sure their daughter would be taken good care of by relatives back home.

On the day of the interview, it was a whopping thirty-eight degrees Celsius (38°C) in Makhanda and yet Mr Chidhakwa was seated at his stall with no shade whatsoever. There were two other women beside him, who were selling some Xhosa beadwork and other curios. They had known each other since his arrival in Makhanda and had maintained a good and supportive relationship throughout. Mr Chidhakwa exclaimed how humbling the experience of being a street trader had been to him, given his history of being a farm owner prior to leaving Zimbabwe. He used to grow and supply various vegetables including potatoes, butternut and tomatoes to big supermarket chains such as OK Bazaars in Mutare, along the Mozambican border. He spoke highly of this:

*Life was beautiful, there is simply no other way to put it and yet look at me, tarisa mwanangu [look my child]. Thanks to that bloody ZANU-PF, every one of them!* (Mr Chidhakwa, Interview, 19 September 2019)

These were the sentiments now expressed by Mr Chidhakwa, now in his early forties, having arrived in Makhanda as a young man fifteen years ago. He indicated that he belonged to the original youth group (the 'born frees') born in the early years of post-independence and was originally most optimistic about enjoying the fruits of a new Zimbabwe. This dream had now been broken.

Mr Chidhakwa felt robbed by the people he had trusted the most (the nationalist movement which liberated the country from colonialism), and this is because his farm was taken away from him, which was his one and only source of income and means of sustaining a

livelihood for him and his family. A White farmer had divided his farm land amongst his previous workers and that is how Mr Chidhakwa ended up with a significant piece of land that was highly productive. Fast forward to 2002, when fast track land reform was already underway, the farm was seized, and the White farmer was sent packing together with his family (Sarimana, 2005). The previous workers also lost out; indeed, they were labelled as sell-outs by the ruling party for acquiring land through the actions of a white farmer.

Without any real options to choose from, Mr Chidhakwa and his family moved to the capital city, Harare, to try to make ends meet. Life would not be the same though, and it became increasingly difficult to sustain a livelihood from the odd jobs he and his wife would get. This is when the idea of trading in crafts and curios came along, as his savings were fast depleting. Once he moved to South Africa, and specifically Makhanda, life once again returned to some form of normalcy. As he highlighted:

*South Africa has been extremely good to me, I won't lie. I managed to put my eldest daughter in school [in Zimbabwe], and she is a policewoman now and hopefully one day they will be paid what they deserve.* (Mr Chidhakwa, Interview, 19 September 2019)

Mr Chidhakwa has a second daughter who is currently in primary school in Makhanda.

When asked, however, if he would be staying in the country until the youngest grew up, Mr Chidhakwa expressed that he had reached the end of the road and this would probably be his last year in Makhanda. He expressed with deep hurt how he had made just three thousand rand at the National Arts Festival, an amount that kept getting less and less every year. Initially, Mr Chidhakwa would be able to make enough money during 'Fest' to pay for at least three months of rent but, since the World Cup in 2010, things have just been going downhill. That is why he felt that it was time to move elsewhere in South Africa. To quote him:

*Ndonogara hangu kumusha ndichirima. I can hardly afford to pay for rent most months saka zvinobatsirei kugara kuno? Varungu vaiwanzotenga zvinhu zvangu vakapera kutiza nenyaya dzecorruption yeMakana, ikozvino ndinongotengesawo pano nepapo, zvakaoma.*" [I will go and stay in the (former) homelands (in South Africa), I can hardly afford to pay for rent most months so how does staying here help me? The White people that used to buy my goods have long gone; they ran away because of the corruption by the Makana municipality. Now I only make a sale here and there]. (Mr Chidhakwa, Interview, 19 September 2019)

### 3.8.3 Rosemary's Story

Rosemary was only one woman who was interviewed and observed at her workplace. As a nail technician, she gave a detailed account of the differences that men and women in informal trading experience. While her account is in no way a representation of all women informal traders in Makhanda, she helped paint a picture of their typical experiences in sustaining livelihoods. During the time of the research, South Africa was fighting the 'war on women's bodies' following the unaccounted-for disappearances, rapes and murders of women, amongst other offences that had become so normalized in South African society. It was a difficult time to be a woman and, in addition to that, there was no amount of precaution that could be practiced to feel fully safe in any area, whether public or private.

Rosemary, who is a single mother, expressed how fear had taken over her life during those days, worrying about her daughter in Zimbabwe who she could not necessarily protect. However, she was somewhat grateful that she was in Zimbabwe and not here in South Africa with her. She felt strongly that men had to be more proactive in making women feel safe since it was mostly males that were the perpetrators, as the literature also shows (Baker *et al.*, 2007; Berkowitz, 2004).

Surprisingly, the men involved in informal trading in Makhanda took a stand against gender-based violence in one way or another and, in particular, in the salon where Rosemary works. She was given a work station right in the back of the salon, in a room with a door. This was a safety measure in case criminal elements came into the salon, such that she would not be the first target. In fact, this kind of set-up existed in most of the salons visited during the research. Some salons also ran promotions including free haircuts and styling for women in support of the movement against gender-based violence. One of Rosemary's customers said the following, as she was getting her nails done:

*Maybe if the other men, especially those that are killing and raping us every day, see what these wonderful men are doing for women, they will realize that there is no need to be monsters and change their behaviors.* (Rosemary, Interview, 9 September 2019)

Rosemary shared the same perspective, adding that there was still a long way to go, but such actions, indirect as they may be, were appreciated efforts for a safer future for all women.

When it came to starting informal business, there seemed to be similar barriers to entry for both men and women, such as start-up capital and connections for working space and affordable yet secure accommodation. However, there were some limitations to the type of businesses that women could take part in, which reflected the gendered character of the informal sector more broadly. Therefore, most women were in the hair and beauty industry or

in food services. Rosemary indicated how people were generally more willing to use services offered by women which gave women an advantage in the beauty and food industries. In relation to the delivery services, and for driving in the taxi or shuttle industry, women tended not to get involved because of the aggressive and indeed violent character of the sector particularly when it came to competition with other men. Lucky confirmed this, stating his male-ness was an advantage in the taxi industry.

Rosemary's account detailed how she had moved out of three different salons since her arrival in Makhanda because of misunderstandings with other females, something she was yet to experience at her current workplace where she is the only female informal trader. While initially some women might have started off together (like Rosemary) as partners for in combining their initial capital and their diverse skill-sets, eventually they split and went their separate ways and started their own stand-alone businesses. This is not to say that Rosemary did not get along with other female informal traders of different nationalities. She seemed to imply, as well, that men tended to work more smoothly together, but women became embroiled in work politics and power dynamics. Some of the interviewed male traders also insinuated this, though this requires further research.

Besides Rosemary, other women had initially shown interest in participating in the research, but they had to pull out at the last minute due to commitments and responsibilities they could not excuse themselves from. Men's time was flexible, as they were able to participate in the research on most days and times of the week, while women's time was inflexible. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that this arose because most Zimbabwean women informal traders had families here with them in Makhanda and therefore had more responsibilities than men given the patriarchal assumption which locates women in the domestic sphere. Rosemary was, therefore, both a business person in the public sphere and care-giver in the private, domestic sphere.

A number of the men interviewed (three out of five) indicated that their partners were involved in informal work as well, but they tended to specialize in different trades and spaces so as to 'put their eggs in more than one basket'. The necessity for married women to earn income for the household has been a long-term trend given the precariousness of household livelihoods in recent decades, such that economic conditions take precedence over maintaining a strict division of labour between husband and wife based on patriarchal discourses (Kandiyoti, 1988).

### **3.9 Conclusion**

This chapter of the thesis focused on understating the lives and livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda, focusing on their pasts, their presents and their possible futures. Stories about leaving Zimbabwe were explored and these showed, in general, that the dire economic conditions and a suppressive political regime were the main reasons for seeking economic refuge in South Africa. Sustaining livelihoods in Zimbabwe has been compromised for many years now and South Africa has been a cushion on which to fall back. Despite the immense difficulties they experience in building their lives anew in South Africa, their stay in Makhanda is on a long-term basis until Zimbabwe gets its affairs in order.

The concluding chapter to this thesis (chapter 4) demonstrates how this chapter was able to address the subsidiary objectives and the main objective of the thesis, and how the SLA offers a solid basis for understanding the lives and livelihoods of the Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda.

## Chapter 4: Conclusion

### 4.1 Introduction

This last chapter of the thesis seeks to show how the empirical case study, as set out in chapter 3, addresses the main and subsidiary objectives of the thesis. The next section (4.2) focuses on the five subsidiary objectives and considers the manner in which the case study speaks to these objectives, and in the context of the broader literature about Zimbabweans in South Africa. Following this, section 4.3 details how the main objective was addressed. In doing so, it also shows how the theoretical framing for the thesis (the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach) aptly facilitates an understanding of the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda. The last section of the chapter (section 4.4) highlights the limitations of this study as well as suggesting areas for future research in this field.

### 4.2 Addressing the Subsidiary Objectives

The thesis had five subsidiary objectives, all of which are interrelated and overlap. In addressing these subsidiary objectives, the main objective is – at least – indirectly also addressed. In discussing the subsidiary objectives and the case study, each subsidiary objective will be set out, as a reminder to the reader.

- a) The first subsidiary objective was: *To examine the journey of the Zimbabwean informal traders to South Africa, as well as their ongoing relationships with Zimbabwe.*

This objective was achieved by reviewing the existing literature on Zimbabwean migration, and by discussing the personal journeys of the six Zimbabwean informal traders. What became apparent was that the Beitbridge border post was the most popular port of entry, where the informal traders used valid passports to gain access into South Africa. The draconian visa restrictions were explored, and it was noted that these did not deter the Zimbabwean informal traders from entering and staying in the country to carry on their informal trading activities. Personal accounts of the journeys of a few of the Zimbabwean informal traders helped to highlight this matter more clearly. The case study also considered the existing familial, kinship and friendship-based networks which exist, and how these act as a travelling channel for Zimbabweans coming to South Africa (and specifically Makhanda) in the hope of pursuing their livelihoods. Besides these networks, savings from previous employment activities in Zimbabwe were also brought to the fore, including the ways in which savings condition the possibility of leaving Zimbabwe in the first place and, then, in setting up trading activities once

in South Africa. Since leaving Zimbabwe, relationships between the informal traders and family back in Zimbabwe were retained, notably in the form of frequent remittances to family. Furthermore, visits back to Zimbabwe were mostly limited to once a year during the festive season and the stay did not surpass two weeks.

- b) The second subsidiary objective was: *To investigate the reasons for resorting to informal trading and the character of the informal trading activities of the Zimbabwean traders.*

It became clear from the literature review, and more fully when considering the case study in Makhanda, that Zimbabweans find it difficult to enter the formal economic sector in South Africa because of the high unemployment rate, coupled with the visa and immigration barriers for foreign nationals (including Zimbabweans) in trying to access formal employment. For this reason, informal trading (of goods and services) became a usable option for the six Zimbabweans studied. The character of informal trading for the six Zimbabweans included self-taught skills especially in the hair and beauty industry, taxi and delivery services, and arts and crafts. The point was to provide goods and services that the community wanted and needed on a regular basis, to enhance the viability of their trading activities. As well, some of the informal traders were becoming engaged in more than one trading activity in order to put their eggs in more than one basket. Intriguingly, five of the six Zimbabweans had established their own informal enterprises, including with their own employees in certain cases. The other Zimbabwean had the status of an employee.

- c) The third subsidiary objective was: *To investigate the relationship amongst the Zimbabwean informal traders and between them, other traders and the local community.*

Relationships existing amongst Zimbabwean informal traders tends to be downplayed in the broader literature, but the case study of Makhanda demonstrates the significance of such relationships. In Makhanda, Zimbabwean informal traders provided support for each other through lending money to one another when in need. They also suggested the services and goods of other (even non-Zimbabwean) traders, despite being in the same industry (showing perhaps that there was healthy competition). At times, the Zimbabweans made use of each other's informal trading activities and also bought goods from other Zimbabweans wherever possible. The local (South African) community also enabled the livelihoods of the Zimbabwean traders by being supportive of the informal traders regardless of nationality, with some customers even highlighting that they preferred Zimbabwean informal traders to South Africans.

- d) The fourth subsidiary objective was: *To examine the challenges faced by Zimbabwean informal traders including xenophobia and their capacity to earn an income through trading.*

The thesis looked at the challenges and difficulties encountered by the six Zimbabweans while engaging in informal trading activities in South Africa, including given their status as foreign nationals. The broader literature highlights fears of deportation and police harassment, as well as xenophobic attitudes and practices on the part of South Africans. In the case study of Makhanda, the Zimbabwean informal traders were aware of the immigration challenges, and tried to circumvent them, but they did not speak of the prevalence of even xenophobic perspectives. Indeed, some of the Zimbabwean informal traders provided local South Africans with employment and they also had a significant South African customer base. With regards to their capacity to earn an income through trading, this was a perennial problem, which they sought to counteract through advertising and guaranteeing top-rate services (to ensure the development of a client base). Access to formal financial institutions was not possible, and this restricted their capacity to possess start-up capital or to grow their informal enterprise substantially. While the case study did not seek to quantify income generation and consumption expenditure, nor explore social differentiation amongst the six traders, it is clear that – as with informal trading more generally – they were at the best just ‘getting by’ in terms of the viability of their trading activities. Overall, their livelihoods were quite precarious.

- e) The fifth and last subsidiary objective was: *To investigate the future prospects of the Zimbabwean informal traders*

Finally, the case study set out to gauge if the informal trading of the Zimbabweans in Makhanda had a short or long-term basis. The literature review showed that the stay of Zimbabweans in South Africa had increasingly become more permanent. For the case study, it became clear that Zimbabweans in Makhanda planned to stay for an extended period in South Africa, in large part because of the economic and political turmoil in Zimbabwe. Though South Africa’s economy, and the informal economy in particular, did not provide a strong foundation for sustainable livelihoods, ‘staying put’ was seen as a better option. The new post-Mugabe dispensation in Zimbabwe did not offer any greater prospects. Therefore, the Zimbabwean informal traders indicated that they would continue to work in South Africa in order to keep supporting themselves and their dependents in South Africa and back in Zimbabwe.

Having demonstrated how the subsidiary objectives of the thesis were addressed, I now turn to the main objective.

### 4.3 Addressing the Main Objective

In detailing how the five subsidiary objectives were addressed, the main objective was also in effect addressed. The main thesis objective was:

*To understand the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda, South Africa.*

Understanding local livelihoods involves a recognition that the lives of the Zimbabwean traders entail a past, a present and a future. Because of this, the case study considered the journey of the Zimbabwean informal traders, their present livelihood activities and challenges, and their likely futures based on current aspirations. This temporal dimension needs to be complemented by a spatial dimension. In this study, it is clear that the lives and livelihoods of the Zimbabwean migrants are multi-spatial, if only because they have ongoing connections with family back in Zimbabwe. Thus, the study was able to identify the temporal and multi-spatial character of the livelihoods of the Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda. Questions of time and space are not always properly integrated into studies making use of the SLA.

The literature review set out to examine the migration trends that exist between Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the massive scale of migration into South Africa by Zimbabweans. In terms of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), migration is often seen as one of the options available to vulnerable people in seeking to diversify livelihoods. In the case of the Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda, migration involved more than simply diversification, as it involved seemingly permanent settlement and the pursuit of informal trading activities as the main if not only source of livelihoods.

The SLA more generally offers a solid basis for understanding livelihoods at local (household-based) levels. This perspective emphasises the possession of (or access to) *capitals*, which enable the construction and pursuance of livelihood activities. While natural capital is central to rural livelihoods, it is clear from the case study that financial capital was central to the lives of the Zimbabwean traders, given the monetised economy of Makhanda. For instance, the Zimbabwean informal traders highlighted that they had savings from their previous jobs (and trading activities) in Zimbabwe; and they recognised the significance of financial capital for trying to further build-up their informal enterprise. But the case study also brought to the fore the great significance of social capital in the form of social networks: connections with family and friends already in South Africa before entering the country; ongoing social relationships with family back home; networks amongst themselves in mutually supporting each other; and even the development of networks amongst their clients. Other types of capital

were also of importance: physical capital with regard to the spaces rented in town by the Zimbabweans was crucial and were relatively safe spaces with immediate access to all major facilities. There was a downside to this, as the Makana Municipality and the South African government more broadly was unable to prevent water shortages, potholes and load shedding, which at times detrimentally affected the trading activities of the Zimbabweans.

The Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda were clearly pursuing livelihoods in the face of a *vulnerability context* (a point raised in the SLA). These vulnerabilities include difficulties and misfortunes that pose a threat to pursuing and sustaining their livelihoods. Vulnerabilities for the informal traders in Makhanda relate to the uncertainties (economic, social and political) that exist in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, including pertaining to their immigration status in the country, the ongoing decline of Zimbabwe's political economy, and the possibility of xenophobic attacks suddenly flaring up unexpectedly.

In this context, the *institutional processes and organisational structures* (which the SLA speaks about) seem to be, in the main, disabling for the Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda. For example, the Makana Municipality has failed, over a number of years now, to ensure the proper provision of local infrastructure and services. As well, formal financial institutions refuse to provide cash injections (as investments) into their enterprises. Further, not having the required visas for engaging in income-generating activities puts the Zimbabwean traders in a very awkward and precarious situation, even though the legal status of Zimbabweans more broadly in South Africa seems to be characterised by some confusion. While they are operating their trading enterprises openly, they are also operating in the shadows, so to speak. It seems, then, that the social networking of the Zimbabwean traders complements or, even at times, replaces institutional processes and organisational structures which act against their lives and livelihoods.

Despite all the challenges and insecurities, and all the systemic structural arrangements and constraints in both Zimbabwe and South Africa that stare the Zimbabwean informal traders in the face, they have shown considerable ingenuity through the use of their hands and talents to make a living especially in the hair and beauty industry, the arts and crafts and taxi and delivery services. In large part, they have built livelihoods not because of the structural arrangements, but despite them. Even though, in the medium- and long-term, their futures are uncertain, in the present they are able to construct livelihoods in Makhanda to support themselves even if only on a survivalist basis.

#### **4.4 Limitations of Research and Areas for Further Research**

All research is with its limitations, and certainly this is true of my case study. A larger sample of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda would have added value to the thesis by likely facilitating an understanding of greater diversity amongst the traders. As well, a greater representation of women traders would allow for a fuller sensitivity to the gendered character of informal trading. Further, engaging with South African informal traders and the customer base of the Zimbabwean informal traders would have added greater complexity to the study.

Clearly, further research on Zimbabwean informal trading in Makhanda is necessary. In this regard, the last known research in Makhanda – which focused primarily on South African traders – was done many years ago. Of particular significance for further research on Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda would be the gendered dimension, as well as a more focused attention on the significance of visas and immigration statuses for the traders. Further, in Makhanda, Zimbabweans do not only work in the informal economy. There are also many who work in the formal economy, and a comparative analysis of the two groupings of Zimbabweans would likely contribute to a more refined understanding of the peculiarities of the livelihoods of Zimbabweans as informal traders.

## References

- Abrego, L. (2009). Economic well-being in Salvadoran transnational families: How gender affects remittance practices. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Vol. 71 (4), pp. 1070-1085.
- Alderson, M. & Jordaan, J.W. (2009). Scale, skill and sustainable livelihoods – participatory approaches to improving poultry production in peri-urban communities: Evidence from South Africa. *Outlook on Agriculture*, Vol. 38 (1), pp. 83-88.
- Ali, M. & Rouse, J.R. (2000). *Waste pickers: Using the sustainable livelihoods approach in Dhaka. Key findings and field notes*. Loughborough University: The Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC).
- Alvis, M. (2016). A manual for selecting sampling techniques in research. *Munich Personal RePEc Archive*. No. 70218, pp. 1-56.
- Amit, R. & Gastrow, V. (2015). The role of migrant traders in local economies: A case study of Somali spaza shops in Cape Town. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Baker, L., Crooks, C., Goodall, G., Hughes, R. & Jaffe, P. (2007). Engaging men and boys in preventing violence against women. *Violence Against Women*, Vol. 44 (3), pp. 217-239.
- Ballard, R. & Popke, E.J. (2004). Dislocating modernity: identity, space and representations of street trade in Durban, South Africa. *Geoforum*, Vol. 35 (1), pp. 99-110.
- Bastia, T. (2007). From mining to garment workshops: Bolivian migrants in Buenos Aires. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 33 (4), pp. 665-669.
- Berkowitz, A. (2004). Working with men to prevent violence against women: An overview. National Electronic Network on Violence Against Women. Available at: <http://alanberkowitz.com/articles/VAWNET.pdf> [Accessed 8 October 2019]
- Bloch, A. (2010). The Rights to rights? Undocumented migrants from Zimbabwe living in South Africa. *Sociology*, Vol. 44 (2), pp. 233-250.
- Bloor, G. (2013). Cape Town opposed to licensing of business bill. *Politicsweb*. 18 April.
- Bruce, L. (2017). Recurrence of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Centre for applied legal studies, University of the Witwatersrand. Available at: <https://www.wits.ac.za/news/sources/cals-news/2017/recurrence-of-xenophobic-attacks-in-south-africa.html> [Accessed 11 June 2019]
- Campbell, E., Chikanda, A., Crush, J., Green, T., Peberdy, S., Raimundo, I., Tawodzera, G., Tevera, D. & Zindela, N. (2015). Transnational entrepreneurship and informal cross-border trade with South Africa. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Carney, D., Drinkwater, M., Rusinow, T., Neefjes, K., Wanmali, S. & Singh, N. (1999). *Livelihoods approaches compared*. London, UK: Department for International Development (DFID).
- Chambers, R. & Conway G.R. (1991). *Sustainable rural livelihoods: Practical concepts for the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Discussion Paper no. 296.
- Charman, A. & Petersen, L. (2015). A transnational space of business: The informal economy of Ivory Park, Johannesburg. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Charman, A., Petersen, L. & Govender, T. (2014). *Street trade in Ivory Park, Gauteng Province, South Africa*. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers.

- Chikanda, A., Crush, J. & Skinner, C. (eds.) (2015). *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Chikanda, A., Crush, J. & Skinner, C. (2015). Migrant entrepreneurship and informality in South African cities. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Chivani, C. (2013). *Informal cross-border trade: A review of its impacts on household poverty reduction (Zimbabwe)*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Alice: University of Fort Hare.
- Clark, M. (2018). Towards recommendations on the regulations of informal trade at local government level: Discussion document. *Socio-economic rights institute of South Africa (SERI) & South African Local Government Association (SALGA)*.
- Clark, M. & Hodgson, T.F. (2018). Informal trade in South Africa: Legislation, case law and recommendations for local government. *Socio-economic rights institute of South Africa (SERI) & South African Local Government Association (SALGA)*.
- Cohen, B. (2004). Urban growth in developing countries: A review of current trends and a caution regarding existing forecasts. *World Development*, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 23-51.
- Cross, J. (2000). Street vendors, modernity and postmodernity: conflict and compromise in the global economy. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol. 20 (1), pp. 30-52.
- Crush, J. (2011). *Complex movements, confused responses: Labour migration in South Africa*. Canada: SAMP.
- Crush, J. (2008). *The perfect storm: The realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP Migration Policy Series.
- Crush, J. & Tawodzera, G. (2014). Medical xenophobia and Zimbabwean migrant access to public health services in South Africa. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 40 (4), pp. 655-670.
- Crush, J. & Tawodzera, G. (2016). Migration and food security: Zimbabwean migrants in urban South Africa. *African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) food security series*, Vol. 23 (1), pp. 1-37.
- Crush, J., Chikanda, A. & Tawodzera, G. (2015). The third wave: mixed migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 49 (2), pp. 363-382.
- Crush, J., Tawodzera, G., McCordic, C. & Ramachandran, S. (2017). *Refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban South Africa*. Waterloo: Southern African Migration Programme. (SAMP).
- Crush, J., Chikanda, A., Tawodzera, G., Ramachandran, S. & Tevera, D.S. (2018). *Migrants in countries in crisis: South Africa case study: The double crisis - Mass migration from Zimbabwe and xenophobic violence in South Africa*. Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project (SAMP).
- Curran, J. (2002). Smaller practices for in profile. *International Small Business Journal*, Vol. 20 (2), pp. 228-231.
- Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (2000). *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- De Sherbinin, A., VanWey, L.K., McSweeney, K., Aggarwal, R., Barbieri, A., Henry, S., Hunter, L.M., Twine, W. & Walker, R. (2008). Rural household demographics, livelihoods and the environment. *Global Environmental Change*, Vol. 18 (1), pp. 38-53.
- Dickinson, T.W., Hunter, L.M. & Nawrotzki, R.J. (2012). Rural livelihoods and access to natural capital: Differences between migrants and non-migrants in Madagascar. *Demographic Research*, Vol. 26 (24), pp. 661-700.

- Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council. (2017). *Makana local municipality socio economic review and outlook, 2017*. Port Elizabeth: ECSECC.
- Elfring, T. & Hulsink, W. (2003). Networks in entrepreneurship: The case of high technology firms. *Small Business Economy*, Vol. 21 (1), pp. 409-422.
- Elo, S. & Kyngas, H. (2007). The Qualitative Content Analysis Process. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, Vol. 62 (1), pp. 107-115.
- Entwisle, B. (2007). Putting people into place. *Demography*, Vol. 44 (4), pp. 687-703.
- Epstein, G. & Gang, I. (2010). *Migration and culture*. Discussion paper no. 5123, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Germany.
- Farrington, J., Ramasut, T. & Walker, J. (2002). *Sustainable livelihoods approaches in urban areas: General lessons, with illustrations from Indian cases*. Working Paper: 162. Overseas Development Institute. Available at: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2706.pdf> [Accessed 12 June 2019]
- Fadeeva, O., Fadeeva, Z., Hasslof, H., Hellstrom, A., Hermans, J., Mochizuki, Y., Petry, R.A. & Sonesson, K. (2010). Educating for sustainable production and consumption and sustainable livelihoods: Learning from multi-stakeholder networks. *Integrated Research System for Sustainability Science*, Vol. 6 (1), pp. 83-96.
- Fatoki, O. & Patswawairi, T. (2012). The motivations and obstacles to immigrant entrepreneurship. *Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 32 (1), pp. 133-142.
- Gebre, L.T., Maharaj, P. & Pillay, N.K. (2010). *The experiences of immigrants in South Africa: A case study of Ethiopians in Durban, South Africa*. Research Space: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal.
- Geyer, H. (2009). Notes on the spatial-structural change in urban South Africa: The 1990s. *Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis*, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 27-39.
- Globalization and Livelihood Options of People Living in Poverty. (2008). *DFID's Sustainable Livelihoods Approach and its Framework*. Available at: [http://www.glopp.ch/B7/en/multimedia/B7\\_1\\_pdf2.pdf](http://www.glopp.ch/B7/en/multimedia/B7_1_pdf2.pdf) [Accessed 15 July 2019]
- Grant, R. & Thompson, D. (2015). City on edge: immigrant businesses and the right to urban space in inner-city Johannesburg. *Urban Geography*, Vol. 36 (2), pp.181-200.
- Gumbo, T. (2015). Resilience and Innovation: Migrant spaza shop entrepreneurs in Soweto, Johannesburg. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Helliker, K., Chiweshe, M.K. & Bhatasara, S. (2018). *The political economy of livelihoods in Contemporary Zimbabwe*. London: Routledge.
- Henry, S., Schoumaker, B. & Beauchemin, C. (2004). The impact of rainfall on the first out-migration: A multi-level event-history analysis in Burkina Faso. *Population and Environment*, Vol. 25 (5), pp. 423-460.
- Hikam, A. (2011). *An exploratory study on the Somali immigrants' involvement in the informal economy of Nelson Mandela Bay*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Port Elizabeth: Nelson Mandela University.
- Horn, A. (2011). Who's out there? A profile of informal traders in four South African city central business districts. *Town and Regional Planning*, Vol. 59 (1), pp. 1-6.
- Howden, D. (2010). When life and death are more important than football: All roads lead to South Africa for fans – and for refugees trying to escape Zimbabwe's brutal regime. *The Independent*. 7 June.
- Hunter, N. & Skinner, C. (2003). Foreign street traders working in inner city Durban: Local government policy challenges. *Urban Forum*, Vol. 14 (4), pp. 301-319.

- Hyde-Clarke, N. (2013). The impact of mobile technology on economic growth among 'survivalists' in the informal sector in the Johannesburg CBD, South Africa. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, Vol. 4 (1), pp. 149- 156.
- Idemudia, E.S., Williams, J.K. & Wyatt, G.E. (2013). Migration challenges among Zimbabwean refugees before, during and post arrival in South Africa. *Injury and Violence*, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 17-27.
- Jamela, T. (2013). *Experiences and coping strategies of women informal cross-border traders in unstable political and economic conditions: The case of Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) traders*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg.
- Johns, L. (2011). Myarid laws on foreigners 'must change.' *Cape Argus*. 22 August.
- Kachere, W. (2011). *Informal Cross-border Trade and Poverty Reduction in Southern Africa Development Community: The Case of Zimbabwe*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Alice: University of Fort Hare
- Kalithanyi, V. (2007). *Evaluation of employment creation by African immigrant entrepreneurs for unemployed South Africans in Cape Town*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Cape Town: University of Western Cape.
- Kalithanyi, V. & Visser, K. (2010). African immigrants in South Africa: Job takers or job creators? *South African Journal of Economic and Management Science (SAJEMS)*, Vol. 13 (4), pp. 376-390.
- Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Bargaining with patriarchy. *Gender & society*, Vol. 2 (3), pp. 274-290.
- Kiwanuka, M. & Monson, T. (2009). *Zimbabwean migration into Southern Africa: New trends and responses*. Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP): Witwatersrand University.
- Kohler, M., Lakay, L., Parkin, M., Rhodes, B., Saayman, A., Schoer, V., Scholtz, F. & Thompson, K. (2010). *Economics: Global and Southern African perspectives*. Cape Town: Pearson.
- Krantz, L. (2001). *The sustainable livelihood approach to poverty reduction: An introduction*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).
- Kretzman, J.P. & McKnight, J.L. (1993). Introduction to "building communities from the inside out: A path toward finding and mobilizing a community's assets." *Institute for Policy Research*, Vol 1 (1), pp. 1-11.
- Kull, C.A., Ibrahim, C.K. & Meredith, T.C. (2007). Tropical forest transitions and globalization: Neo-liberalism, migration, tourism, and international conservation agendas. *Society & Natural Resources*, Vol. 20 (8), pp. 723-737.
- Landau, L.B. & Segatti, A.W. (2009) Human Development Impacts of Migration: South Africa Case Study. *Human Development Research Paper (HDRP)*, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 1-67.
- Lindstrom, D.P. & Ramirez, A. (2010). Pioneers and followers: Migrant selectivity and the development of U.S. migration streams in Latin America. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 630 (1), pp. 53-77.
- Lyons, M. & Snoxell, S. (2005). Sustainable Urban Livelihoods and Marketplace Social Capital: Crisis and Strategy in Petty Trade. *Urban Studies*, Vol. 42 (8), pp. 1301-1320.
- MacGregor, D. (2010). Fest punted in 'own goal' with extension, complain traders. *BizCommunity*. 5 July.
- Magubane, K. (2015). Reveal trade secrets, minister tells foreigners. *Business Day*, 28 January.
- Maharaj, B. (2009). Migrants and urban rights: Politics of xenophobia in South African cities. *L'Espace Politique*, Vol. 8 (1).
- Mahdi, S.G., Shivakoti, G.P. & Schmidt-Vogt, D. (2009). Livelihood change and livelihood sustainability in the uplands of Lembang sub watershed, West Sumatra, Indonesia, in a changing natural resource management context. *Environmental Management*, Vol. 43 (1), pp. 84-99.

- Majale, M. (2002). Towards pro-poor regulatory guidelines for urban upgrading: A review. Paper presented at the *International Workshop on Regulatory Guidelines for Urban Upgrading*. Bourton-On-Dunsmore, 17-18 May.
- Manik, S. (2014). "We are working hand to mouth": Zimbabwean teachers' experiences of vulnerability in South Africa. *Godina*, Vol. 30 (2), pp. 171-191.
- Matshaka, N.S. (2009). "Marobot neMawaya" – Traffic lights and wire: Crafting Zimbabwean migrant masculinities in Cape Town. *Feminist Africa*, Vol. 13 (1), pp. 65-86.
- Matthews, B. & Ross, L. (2010). *A practical guide for social sciences*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Matthews, K., Parkin, M. & Powell, M. (2008). *Economics* (seventh edition). Harlow, England: Addison-Wesley.
- Mawadza, A. (2008). *The nexus between migration and human security: Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa*. ISS Paper 162. Institute of Security Studies.
- Mnguni, M., Moller, V., Silo, Z. & Tobi, A. (2001). *Street trading in Grahamstown*. Rhodes University: Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER).
- Mpondi, D. & Mupakati, L. (2018). Migration Trajectories and Experiences of Zimbabwean Immigrants in the Limpopo Province of South Africa: Impediments and Possibilities. *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies*, Vol. 12 (1), pp. 215-235.
- Moorhouse, L. (2010). *An exploration of Zimbabwean migrant women's perceptions of their identity: Selected case studies in Gqebera, Port Elizabeth, South Africa*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Port Elizabeth: Nelson Mandela University.
- Motala, S. (2002). *Organizing in the informal economy: A case study of street trading in South Africa*. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
- Mtyala, Q. (2011). Cele's xenophobic outburst. *Cape Times*. 7 October.
- Muronzi, C. (2019). *IMF: Zimbabwe has the highest inflation rate in the world*. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/imf-zimbabwe-highest-inflation-rate-world-190927004536305.html> [Accessed 10 October 2019]
- Murray, E.V. (2017). Book review: *In search of Sustainable Livelihood Systems: Managing Resources and Change*. Edited by Ruedi Baumgartner and Ruedi Hogger, Sage Publications.
- Murray, M.T. (2003). Alien strangers in our midst: The dreaded foreign invasion and "Fortress South Africa". *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 37 (2), pp. 440-466.
- Mutopo, P. (2010). Women trading in food across the Zimbabwe-South Africa border: experiences and strategies. *Gender and Development*, Vol. 18 (3), pp. 465-477.
- National Arts Festival. (2019). *About the National Arts Festival: Welcome to Makhanda*. Available at: <https://www.nationalartsfestival.co.za/about/> [Accessed 15 July 2019].
- Nel, H. (2015). An integration of the livelihoods and asset-based community development approaches: A South African case study. *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 32 (4), pp. 511-525.
- Nethengwe, N. (1999). *Cross-border dynamic in Southern Africa: A study of informal cross-border trade between South Africa and Zimbabwe*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.
- Njiwa, N. (2013). Tracking informal cross-border trade in Southern Africa. *Bridges Africa*, Vol. 2 (1), pp. 9-11.
- Nkala, J.K. (2009). *The crossing and the bicycle thief*. Mowbray: Junkets.
- O'Halloram, P. (2018). Contested space and citizenship in Grahamstown, South Africa. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 53 (1), pp. 20-33.
- Pauw, H.C. & Petrus, T.S. (2003). Xenophobia and informal trading in Port Elizabeth. *Anthropology Southern Africa*, Vol. 26 (3&4), pp. 172-180.

- Peberdy, S. (2000). Mobile entrepreneurship: Informal sector cross-border trade and street trade in South Africa. *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 17 (2), pp. 201-219.
- Peberdy, S. & Rogerson, C. (2000). Transnationalism and non-South Africa entrepreneurship in South Africa's small, medium and micro-enterprise (SMME) economy. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 20-40.
- Pedersen, M.L. & Petersen, E.K. (2010). *The sustainable livelihoods approach from a psychological perspective: Approaches to development*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Denmark: University of Aarhus.
- Qin, H. (2010). Rural-to-urban labor migration, household livelihoods, and the rural environment in Chongqing municipality, Southwest China. *Human Ecology*, Vol. 38 (5), pp. 675-690.
- Radipere, N. (2012). *An analysis of local and immigrant entrepreneurship in the South African small enterprise sector (Gauteng Province)*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Rakodi, C. & Lloyd-Jones, T. (eds.) (2002). *Urban livelihoods: A people centred approach to reducing poverty*. London: Earthscan Publications Limited.
- Republic of South Africa (RSA). (2013). Licensing of Businesses Bill Notice 231 of 2013. *Government Gazette*. 18 March.
- Riddell, B. (1997). Structural adjustment programmes and the city in tropical Africa. *Urban Studies*, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 1297-1307.
- Riosmena, F. (2009). Socioeconomic context and the association between marriage and Mexico-US migration. *Social Science Research*, Vol. 38 (2), pp. 324-337.
- Rogerson, C.M. (1999). Local economic development and urban poverty alleviation: The experience of post-apartheid South Africa. *Habitat International*, Vol. 23 (1), pp. 511-534.
- Rogerson, C.M. (2015). Unpacking national policy towards the urban informal economy. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Rogerson, J. (1995). The changing face of retailing in the South African city: The case of inner-city Johannesburg. *Africa Insight*, Vol. 25 (3), pp. 163-171.
- Sachikonye, L., Raftopoulos, B. & Kanyeze, G. (2018). *Building from the rubble: The labour movement in Zimbabwe since 2000*. Zimbabwe: Weaver Press.
- Sandrey, R. (2012). *An analysis of the SADC free trade area*. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre.
- Sarimana, A. (2005). *A precarious balance: Consequences of Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Grahamstown: Rhodes University.
- Scoones, I. (1998). *Sustainable rural livelihoods. A framework for analysis*. IDS Working Paper 72. University of Sussex: Institute of Development Studies.
- Scoones, I. (2009). Livelihoods perspective and rural development. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 36 (1), pp. 171-196.
- Serrat, O. (2017). The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach. In O. Serrat (ed.) *Knowledge Solutions*, pp. 21-26. Singapore: Springer.
- Serumaga-Zake, P.A.E. (2017). Migration and tourism: The challenges of Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa. *African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure*, Vol. 6 (4), pp. 1-20.
- Skinner, C. (2000). Getting institutions right: Local government and street traders in four South African cities. *Urban Forum*, Vol. 11 (1), pp. 49-69.
- Skinner, C. (2006). Falling through the policy gaps? Evidence from the informal economy in Durban, South Africa. *Urban Forum*, Vol. 17 (1), pp. 125-148.

- Skinner, C. (2014). Setting the scene: The South African informal sector. Paper presented at the *Workshop on urban informality and migrant entrepreneurship in Southern Africa*. Cape Town.
- Skinner, C. & Crush, J. (2015). Forget the myths about foreigners. *Sunday Times: Business Times*. 1 March.
- Tengeh, R.K. (2015). The role of networks and herd behaviour in the entrepreneurial activity and success of African migrants to South Africa. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Tengeh, R. K. & Lapah, C.P. (2013). The socio-economic trajectories of migrant street vendors in urban South Africa. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 109-127.
- Tevera, D.S. & Zinyama, L. (2002). Lovemore. Zimbabweans who move: Perspectives on international migration in Zimbabwe. Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project (SAMP).
- Thebe, V. (2015). The Malaysian industry and the transnational movement of remittances to Zimbabwe. In: A. Chikanda., J. Crush. & C. Skinner (ed.) *Mean Streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa*. Cape Town: SAMP.
- Tokman, V.E. (1992). *Beyond requisition: The informal economy in Latin America*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Van den Heever, C. (2017). Zimbabweans get four-year grace. *Mail and Guardian*. 29 September.
- Nyoni, V.P.E. (2018). Diaspora in dialogue: Zimbabwean artists in South Africa. *South African Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 37 (4), pp. 410-422,
- Willemsse, L. (2013). Trading hope: Working conditions of sub-Saharan immigrant street traders in Johannesburg and Tshwane. *Africa Insight*, Vol. 42 (2), pp. 166-185.
- Wills, G. (2009). *South Africa's informal economy: A statistical profile*. Working Paper: 6. WIEGO, Urban Policies.
- White, M.J. & Lindstrom, D.P. (2005). *Handbook of population*. Boston: Springer.

## Appendix A: Interview Schedule

Tariro Henrietta Musiyandaka G15M5335      Professor Kirk Helliker (Supervisor)

Understanding the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa:

The case of Makhanda

The main objective of this thesis is to *understand the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa in the case of Makhanda*. In relation to Zimbabwean traders in Makhanda, the subsidiary objectives include;

**a) To examine the journey of Zimbabweans to South Africa and the reasons for resorting to informal trading**

- \*. What are your reasons for leaving Zimbabwe?
- \*. What made you choose South Africa, Makhanda specifically?
- \*. Can you describe the journey itself from Zimbabwe to Makhanda? What plans went into it? What mode was used to get across the border (or air)?
- \*. Why informal trading? What made you reach that decision?
- \*. How long have you been in South Africa, Makhanda more specifically?

**b) To investigate the character of the informal trading activities of Zimbabweans and how, or if, they relate to South African traders**

- \*. So what activities are you involved in, in detail? And what has that venture been like for you?
- \*. Were you previously involved in other activities? If yes, why did you decide on something different?
- \*. Is there a relationship with South African traders? How do you relate to them? And how do they relate to you?
- \*. Is there a difference between men and women in informal trading in your own experience? What are those differences and how do they contribute to your individual experience as a Zimbabwean informal trader in Makhanda?

**c) To examine the challenges faced by Zimbabwean informal traders including xenophobia and their capacity to earn an income through trading**

- \*. How has it been being a Zimbabwean informal trader in Makhanda?
- \*. What is the nature of challenges that comes with being a Zimbabwean informal trader?
- \*. What is your take on Xenophobia?
- \*. Judging on how much time you have been here, has informal trading been worth the stay?

**d) To investigate how the Zimbabwean informal traders have managed to sustain themselves.**

- \*. In terms of sustaining yourself, has there been a difference compared to Zimbabwe?
- \*. Is this a long- or short-term venture? Is this a long or short-term visit?
- \*. Is there any information you would like to add that you feel is important and have not touched on?

## Appendix B: Observation Guide

Tariro Henrietta Musiyandaka G15M5335    Professor Kirk Helliker (Supervisor)

### Understanding the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa: The case of Makhanda

#### Disclaimer:

Because this will be a follow-up on the semi-structured in-depth interview, the observation will be unstructured, and notes written down will be subject to interesting information provided during the informal interaction with the participant.

Notes to take down for *Unstructured Observation*:

- The participant's detailed activities


- Start and end time of working/trading

- Number of employees (if any)

- Interactions with customers and other people (locals, other migrants, fellow countrymen, etc.)



## Appendix C: Participant Consent Form



**Department of Sociology**  
Prince Alfred Street, Grahamstown, 6139, South Africa  
PO Box 94, Grahamstown, 6140, South Africa  
t: +27 (0) 46 603 8361  
f: +27 (0) 46 603 7549

[www.ru.ac.za](http://www.ru.ac.za)

Name of researcher: **Tariro Henrietta Musiyandaka.**

Dear Participant,

I am a Master of Arts in Development Studies student at Rhodes University undertaking an academic research titled **“Understanding the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa: The case of Makhanda.”**

The research focuses on the daily lives of Zimbabwean informal traders in Makhanda, including their trading activities, their relationship with customers and any challenges they face pursuing their livelihoods.

I kindly request for your participation in the interviews. It will take no longer than 45 minutes of your time. I have confidence that this research will contribute to the body of knowledge on how migrants sustain their livelihoods and also address commonly-held conceptions of Zimbabwean informal traders.

Participation is voluntary and information regarding the goals of the study will be provided. Participants are free to withdraw their consent at any given time and for any reasons and also withdraw previous information given.

The information you contribute is completely confidential and it will be treated with anonymity such as your name, age or specific mention of your migrant status if provided. Data will be safely stored and only accessed by myself as the researcher to ensure total confidentiality of participants.

### Declaration

1. I confirm that the purpose of the research and the nature of my participation have been explained to me verbally or in writing.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason - however I commit myself to full participation unless some unusual circumstances occur, or I have concerns about my participation which I did not originally anticipate.

3. I understand that data collected during the study, will be used by the researcher and that my personal details gathered during this research, especially my name or identity and migrant status, will be kept private.
4. I agree to be interviewed and to allow audio or video recordings and transcriptions to be made of the interview.
5. I have been informed by the researcher that the tape recordings will be erased once the report is written. OR
6. I give permission for the tape recordings to be retained after the study and for them to be utilized for academic purposes only.

**Name of Participant**

**Date**

**Signature**

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Researcher**

**Date**

**Signature**

## Appendix D: List of Interviews

Tariro Henrietta Musiyandaka G15M5335 \_\_\_\_\_ Professor Kirk Helliker (Supervisor)

### **Understanding the livelihoods of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa: The case of Makhanda**

Dates and Places of Interviews with Zimbabwean Informal Traders:

<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Date</u></b>	<b><u>Place</u></b>
Rosemary	9 September 2019	Salon on High Street
James	10 September 2019	Salon on High Street
Lucky	18 September 2019	Drama Department Café, Rhodes University
Mr Chidhakwa	19 September 2019	Drostdy 'Under the Arch'
Lee	27 September 2019	Salon on New Street
Tinashe	27 September 2019	Salon on New Street