THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC): PART OF A WHOLE OR A COVER?

THESIS

Submitted in Fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
of Rhodes University

INGRID LISA LUBBE
November 1989

This research was made possible by a research grant from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).

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ABSTRACT

The object of this analysis of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was to examine the interaction between the states which comprise the organisation in terms of regional and international factors which either facilitated or constrained the pursuit of the organisation's economic goals. To this end a theoretical orientation which would place the organisation in context of regional and international political and economic interaction was necessary. International regime theory was used to place the organisation in an international context, and at the same time provided a theoretical dimension which could be used to analyse empirical evidence on the SADCC organisation's functioning.

The application of regime theory clearly highlighted the fact that SADCC's economic goals are constrained by the degree to which all of the SADCC states are integrated on the economic level with western market economy and furthermore , by the fact that these links are reinforced for seven of the nine SADCC states by their economic dependence on South Africa.

The above conclusion showed that in terms of the perpetuation of the SADCC organisation as an economic regime, according to the regime theory outlined in Chapter One, the goals of SADCC did not create a firm basis for economic cooperation in the long term. The future of the SADCC organisation in it's present form will depend on how long the racial policies of South Africa continue, for the analysis makes clear that the organisation has much more political than economic coherency. The use of a regime framework showed that in terms of the SADCC states individual economic positions, the historical and structural links between South Africa, the majority of the SADCC states and the West will continue indefinitely due to the strength of the structural economic links between the Southern African region and the western market economy.

Thus the analysis proves, within the parameters of international regime theory, the lack of economic coherency within the SADCC organisation's goals, and the strength of the economic ties between the Southern African region and the West.

INTRODUCTION

The Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) was officially set in motion in April 1980 at a meeting of the individual states of Southern Africa in Lusaka. They signed the declaration, Southern Africa: towards Economic Liberation (Amin:1987). The participating countries, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania have overcome ideological, political and economic divergences sufficiently to maintain the cooperative framework and the goals towards which, with varying degrees of effort, they strive. These goals will be set out and analysed in relation to the economic situations within the SADCC countries before and after the organisation was formed. It is however necessary, for the purposes of examining SADCC within the Southern African, African and international contexts, to outline the theoretical approach and the concept of a regime framework which will be used in this analysis.

Chapter One concentrates on the concept of a regime and how regime theory will be applied to SADCC. The methodological approach will also be outlined. For the purposes of analysing SADCC, not only according to empirical writings on the organisation's failings and successes, this theoretical dimension is essential. This approach will enable the organisation to be analysed as a structure shaped by the domestic, regional and international political, social and economic forces which interact and give rise to fixed patterns of behaviour around convergent interests.

Chapter Two deals with the socio-economic environment in which the SADCC countries must function. The necessity for outlining the forces of the western market economy is to place the SADCC regime's goals and orientation in context of the international socio-economic reality of which it is part.

Chapter Three outlines the domestic economic positions of the individual SADCC states to place them in the context of the socio-economic environment. This enables the analysis of SADCC as a regime to include domestic socio-economic realities into the analysis of interaction between regime participants. It furthermore enables other actors to be identified. This compensates for the fact that regime theory often does not emphasise enough that regime functioning involves the interplay of governments, private interest groups, both governmental and non-governmental, and, furthermore, is influenced by each country's domestic socio-economic position. As a result it is essential to analyse the interplay of these forces both within and between the SADCC countries to obtain a clearer picture of the historical socio-economic reality in which the regime must function.

Chapters Four and Five concentrate on the analysis of SADCC's goals and the interaction between SADCC states to achieve these goals, as well as the constraints placed on the regime's functioning, for example, ideology, government policy, destabilisation and entrenched economic links with Western capitalist markets. It will be argued that the degree to which these goals have succeeded or failed to give rise to fixed patterns of behaviour will be a decisive factor in determining the strength or weakness of the SADCC regime.

Chapter Six will draw together the conclusions derived from the analysis of the SADCC countries and their interaction within the regime, in the region and with the international western market economy. The benefits or drawbacks of the methodological approach and the use of a regime framework will be examined in the context of the perspective this framework throws on the functioning of SADCC as an economic organisation in the context of domestic, regional and international socio-economic reality.

The effectiveness of the SADCC regional grouping as an economic organisation with specific goals binding the states together to interact economically can therefore be tested in, it is hoped, a more comprehensive manner than simply an empirical analysis of SADCC's aims, failures and successes since the organisation's inception.

CHAPTER ONE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

1.1. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

The aim of using the concept of a regime as the framework for analysis, using the structural methodological approach, is to avoid a simple empirical analysis of SADCC's progress thus far. Instead it is hoped that by defining SADCC as a regime within the international system of regimes that it's viability and future may be theoretically tested.

The concept of SADCC as a regime is to be examined from the structural methodological approach (Varshney:1981:359). This approach is distinguished by two dimensions; the substantive and the technical. The substantive dimension entails analysing a part of reality, in this case SADCC as a regime, in the sense of a paradigm or framework. Thus SADCC is seen as a part of a totality and assumptions can then be made between the aspect and the totality of which it is part. The technical dimension entails examining the theoretical structure, in this case the theory on regimes, it is then possible to test assumptions on the theory of regimes to see how closely they fit the historical reality of SADCC and the individual countries which comprise it. The aim of such an approach is to avoid any biases in initial assumptions. As Varshney put it, a purely empirical study of any given aspect of reality may be biased in it's initial assumptions (Varshney:1981:360). However, by using the structural methodological approach, international theory on regime structures and functioning and empirical evidence on SADCC are combined. Thus SADCC as a regime is placed in the context of the socio-economic totality of which it is part. The theory is placed in the context of historical reality.

In this context the socio-economic totality, that is the international politico-economic system, is seen as the underlying structure above which the SADCC regime must function (1). The regime framework is seen as the overarching structure tying the Southern African states together in a regional economic cooperative framework.

1.2 DEFINING A REGIME

Regime theory, although diverging on some aspects of how to conceive this concept as an aspect or part of reality, (Strange, Krasner, Puchala and Hopkins:1982) agree on certain defining characteristics of a regime. It is within this definitional framework that SADCC must be placed to examine it as an aspect of the totality of the world socio-economic setting.

Young defines the concept of a regime as follows:

" The distinguishing feature of all social institutions, including international regimes, is the conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behaviour in practise" (Young :1982 :278). Puchala and Hopkins take this definition one step further in their analysis of the defining characteristics of regimes. Because regimes are composed of individual societal actors they are attitudinal phenomena. They exist as participants understandings, expectations or convictions about legitimate or moral behaviour exist (Puchala and Hopkins:1982:246). These understandings or expectations are bound to the rules, principles, norms and decision making procedures which are followed by any particular regime. Krasner defines the above as follows: 'Rules are specific prescriptions for action. Decision making procedures are prevailing practises for making and implementing collective choice. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights abstracted from power and the self interest of the individual actors. This is particularly relevant to SADCC, as shared knowledge about the need for greater self-reliance and economic independence may not necessarily square with the ways in which individual countries wish to pursue these goals for their maximum self-interest, nor may the countries have the necessary power (tangible or intangible resources) to pursue changes which they have become aware of by increased knowledge and experience. Therefore, it may be that the SADCC states may share the same initial ideological goals, but there may be conflict due to the differences in power and self interests of the states (Haggard and Simmons:1983:510).

Thus regimes as aspects of reality combine all four approaches. Because, as Young points out, they are dynamic, that is they cannot be abstracted from the impact of time and social change, they cannot be analysed in anything other than loose conceptual terms which comprise a view of the overall reality. Within this reality they function as unique structures with no regime sharing the identical characteristics of another. As such they fit into the international economic and political setting, each making up a part of the whole. In this sense they may combine some, or all of the different approaches to regimes. The SADCC regime may change because of the changes in interests of the individual state actors, or as a result of the interrelationship between acquired knowledge and self-interest functioning within the regime framework, depending on the situational constraints that the regime encounters over time. This in turn is dependent upon the norms, values, principles and decision making procedures which shape the regime framework and the extent to which these can withstand changes to domestic or interstate interests.

1.3. A DEFINED REGIME FRAMEWORK

Oran Young uses regime typologies to narrow down the conceptualisation of a regime (Young:1982). For the purposes of this analysis his regime typologies will be used to loosely classify SADCC. Because all the theorists agree to varying degrees on the loose definition of a regime as given by Young i.e. as a pattern of behaviour around which interests converge, this will be used as a starting point in which to conceptualise regimes as overarching structures which form an aspect or part (according to Varshney's substantive dimension) of the socio-economic totality. Young's typologies will provide the technical or theoretical dimension in which to perceive the SADCC organisation and it's interaction in the Southern African and international contexts.

Before explaining Young's regime typologies, it must be mentioned that the concept of a regime as a method of analysis has been criticised by many international political theorists. However the use of the regime framework and concept thereof in examining the SADCC organisation is used as a method of analysis in the same way that Keohane uses it to draw conclusions on the role of the U.S. in the energy, trade and monetary regimes which functioned internationally between 1967 and 1977. Thus he states,

" Rather than an explanation of particular events, in which idiosyncratic and frequently random factors have played a role, the focus is on a pattern of events - not on particular bargaining outcomes but on what a pattern of bargaining outcomes reveals about implicit norms and rules in world politics. Fragments of political behaviour take on additional meaning when thought of in terms of regimes: they are part of a larger mosaic, a context within which they become intelligible" (2)(Keohane:1980: 134).

Young cautions the use of his typologies as absolutes stating that the three types of regimes, spontaneous, negotiated and imposed, are not mutually exclusive. Because regimes are dynamic, "... any attempt to classify international regimes rigidly in terms of my three categories is apt to distort reality and produce confusion rather than increase understanding " (Young: 1982:286). Thus his regime typologies are as the regime concept itself, a way of perceiving a given aspect of reality in order to make assumptions between that aspect and the totality of which it is part. It can be postulated that every international regime is part of the totality of the international socio-economic setting. By using Young's typologies as a theoretical base SADCC may be fitted into a defined regime framework and then assumptions may be made between the regime as an aspect of reality, and how it fits into the international socio-economic totality.

SADCC fits loosely into Young's typology of a negotiated regime. This order is characterised by it's conscious design, and the explicit consent on the part of the participants who make a formal expression of expected results. Although some negotiated orders may be comprehensive, that is the result of careful and orderly negotiation, conflict or the fear thereof may cause some orders to rely on piecemeal negotiation, that is, problems are worked out empirically according to practise and precedent. This defining characteristic of the typology would seem to square it with the organisation of SADCC. It's loose organisational structure and piecemeal design allow it to be classified as a negotiated order of the piecemeal variety. This classification is broad but will be applied to the SADCC organisation in order to analyse SADCC as an economic regime within the international economic system.

Young defines two other typologies. Spontaneous regimes, he states, are as Hayek put it, "... the product of the actions of many men but ...not the result of human design" (Young :1982:282). He states further that spontaneous regimes do not even necessarily involve conscious coordination amongst members, nor do they require explicit consent on the part of subjects or prospective subjects. Many balance of power situations at international level are said to be distinguished by the absence of formal design.

The third typology that Young outlines is that of an imposed regime. The dynamics of such orders are to be understood in terms of power. Coercion and incentives by the dominant power are used to obtain the cooperation of the other actors. However coercion, in successful imposed regimes, is not used on a continuous basis. This typology shares common ground with the structuralist hegemonic stability theory. Analyses such as Keohane's and Krasner's on the United States and the international economic order attempt to explain the relationship between the tangible (economic) resources and the intangible (psychological) resources of the hegemon and the subordinate actors in the regime. While Keohane did not decisively conclude that tangible power resources are essential for dominance of the regime, he showed that hegemonic actors use their tangible and intangible power resources to manipulate the other lesser endowed actors in the regime framework (Keohane: 1982).

Regime theory has particular relevance to the Southern African situation, where two regimes can be seen to be in operation. The first is SADCC, seen as a negotiated order of the piecemeal variety. The second may be defined loosely as an imposed regime, comprising South Africa as the hegemon and the SADCC countries as the subordinate actors. This regime has, however, many of the characteristics of a spontaneous regime typology, in that many of the interactions on the economic and political level are not organised or comprehensive, nor do they have the explicit consent of the subordinate actors. The relations between South Africa and SADCC can thus be seen in the context of a spontaneous order which has arisen out of convergent economic interests amalgamating around a pattern of behaviour. However these interests are not necessarily formally articulated. The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) idea of former South African President PW Botha will be discussed in Chapter Four in the light of his attempts to formalise and institutionalise the existing order of relations between South Africa and SADCC. However for the purposes of analysing the situation in Southern Africa within the broad parameters of Young's definitions, it may be stated that the existing pattern of relations which exist between SADCC and South Africa combine Young's definition of spontaneous and imposed regimes in terms of present economic and political ties.

1.4. REGIME CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION

Young, Puchala and Hopkins, and Krasner approach the idea of regime change and transformation from two basic viewpoints. Because of the dynamic nature of regimes the way in which they may change is particularly salient. Young states that contradictions within the regime framework (which as Keohane pointed out earlier can weaken a regime) may lead to serious pressure for alterations. These contradictions may be seen from a dynamic point of view, that is the elements may be pushed until they fall apart, (regime disintegration) or a dialectical point of view which looks holistically at social entities searching for dialectical laws pertaining to change. Thus from the holistic or dialectical point of view the regime may evolve and transform itself without disintegration (3) (Young:1982: 292). Puchala and Hopkins mention the same two approaches but label the concept of regime disintegration revolutionary change, and the concept of regime adaptation, evolutionary change. Evolutionary, or Young's idea of holistic change, may involve a regime changing substantively by preserving norms and changing principles. This would usually occur because of shifts in knowledge and information. To avoid this narrow (cognitivist) approach one could also conclude that such change could, as Krasner (a structuralist) puts it, be viewed from the mechanistic angle. Krasner uses the example of tectonic plates to illustrate this view. The plates, representing the regime pattern of convergence of interests, would under great pressure, such as conflict and/or power shifts between actors, explode. Small amounts of pressure may however cause the plates to simply realign. Therefore evolution or revolution would depend on the intensity of pressure under which the regime finds itself (Krasner:1986:509).

Predictions on the evolution or revolution of the SADCC regime will therefore use theoretical or technical explanations to explore the extent to which the regime is, or could be, under pressure. One further point also needs mentioning here. According to Young and Krasner established regimes with fixed patterns of customs and usage may find revolutionary change an unviable option. Stable regimes which are likely to be based on consensual knowledge, says Krasner, may be dysfunctional, yet it may be difficult to change the regime because of the consensual knowledge which created it (Krasner:1982: 509). Notwithstanding the effects that power may have on a regime, Krasner states that the original consensual knowledge that gave rise to the regime may serve to perpetuate it, even though there is a 'lag' between the interests of the individual actors at present and those interests which caused the patterns of behaviour to arise originally. This approach will be applied when analysing the continuance of relations between South Africa and SADCC. Krasner states further that 'feedbacks' to basic causal variables may also perpetuate the regime. Regimes, once established, may alter actors calculations of how to maximise their interests. The regime may also alter the interests themselves. Further regimes may become a source of power to which actors may appeal, for example the lobbying capacity of the Group of 77 in the United Nations Assembly. This, in a sense, alters the power capabilities of the individual states. The concept of feedback in the regime framework may be relevant to the perpetuation of the SADCC regime itself in the light of it's lobbying capacity for aid which has been one of its major strengths. This will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Five.

The regime framework thus far outlined relates specifically to the relations between the individual SADCC members within Young's framework, that is a negotiated regime of the piecemeal variety. It relates further to the relationship between South Africa and SADCC where the pattern of relations is loosely classified as a spontaneous imposed regime. The implications of these definitions and the relevance of the theory outlined should be to clarify the interactions of these states within the given regime frameworks. Furthermore it gives the analysis a technical or theoretical dimension according to Varshney's structural methodological approach.

1.5. NARROWING DOWN 'CONVERGENT INTERESTS.'

The theory of Cantori and Spiegel sheds further light on the convergence of interests in the spontaneous imposed order as opposed to the negotiated regime framework. A pattern variable is used to show the nature of interaction expected. Venter and Geldenhuys use this variable to analyse the CONSAS vision in terms of a convergence of interests in the Southern African region. The pattern variable applied to SADCC will highlight the strength or weakness of the SADCC regime in terms of a convergence of interests around the goal of greater economic independence from South Africa. The four pattern variables are: the nature and level of cohesion, (politically, socially and economically); the nature of communications; the level of power and the structure of relations (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:60). These will be discussed in Chapter Four to determine the different levels of convergent interest in the SADCC regime contrasted to the spontaneous imposed order. The pattern variables will serve to outline the interests which may cause the spontaneous imposed regime to continue functioning in the context of the theoretical approach outlined above. The strength of convergent interests in the areas mentioned will substantiate or disprove the extent to which the SADCC regime provides an effective economic alternative to interaction within the spontaneous imposed regime.

CHAPTER TWO:THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING.

2.1. THE 'SOCIO-ECONOMIC TOTALITY'.

Thus far much mention has been made of the 'socio-economic totality ' of which the SADCC countries are part. It is therefore necessary, before beginning the analyses of the goals of SADCC in relation to the economic positions of the individual SADCC countries to briefly outline this 'totality'. The term relates to the world economic system, it's current trends, and the extent to which it predominates and influences SADCC development.

The world economic system, or order, is characterised by the interplay of politics and economics. Gilpin states that the parallel interaction between the state and the market create political economy (Gilpin: 1987:11). This is particularly relevant to the SADCC states, because in spite of the political rhetoric advocating closer regional integration they are, as a region, more firmly integrated into the world economic order through trade links with the international market economy, than with each other. The state, particularly in the Southern African region, is fundamentally integrated into this economic interplay, making the SADCC countries ties with the international market economy very explicitly both political and economic.

However Tordoff points out that African political economy is divided on two axes, the first is ideological and the second is performance. Ideology is important in the way that it affects economic performance (Tordoff:1984:261). The SADCC countries can be more clearly analysed in context of their socio-economic ties with the international economy vis a' vis their ideological preference for economic independence and equitable regional integration, i.e. the ideological axis. This relates directly to axis of performance which shows clearly the ideological reason for their choice of economic development. The SADCC countries are structurally bound to the international trade system which is founded on the concept of a market economy (1). Although no state interacting within the world trading system can be classified as purely capitalist by definition, especially with the increasing role of the state in western economies in the 1980's, the pursuit of profit still remains the prime motivational factor (Gilpin: 1987:21). This affects all enterprises interacting within the market economy framework. As Gilpin states, "...even socialist or nationalised firms must strive to become profitable and competitive" (Gilpin: 1987: 16). This pursuit of profit has been, to a large extent, exploitative. The African states have stressed the fact that they have often been at the receiving end of this exploitation. However political economists such as Bell (1986), Tordoff (1984), and Shaw (1985) show that both historical and environmental factors have caused the economic crises of the African states. The legacy of colonialism , combined with an inability (caused by natural and self-created crises) to develop and diversify their resource bases has placed the majority of African countries on a very unequal footing within the world market system, thus their ideological stance which often contradicts their ties with the socio-economic totality.

It is now known that economic theory, such as Ricardo's concept of comparative advantage, has been somewhat annulled by the complexities of trade in the international system. Thus the premise that "... a country will export (import) those commodities which are intensive to it's abundant (scarce) factor" (El-Agraa, quoted by Gilpin:1987: 175) has been overwhelmed by the advent of 'New Protectionism' of the 1980's. This includes the advent of non tariff barriers, the role that advanced technology plays, and inter, as well as extra firm trade between countries. Furthermore, Gilpin states that the trend towards government intervention, which "...expanded government discretionary powers that influence trade patterns and global location of economic activities..." (Gilpin:1987: 204) characterises a shift away from the economic liberalisation period which occurred after the Second World War, and shows the shift back towards economic nationalism. This is evident from the changes to the international trading system, as well as the decline of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and U.S. economic hegemony.

The implications of the above changes for SADCC are obvious. Their role in the international market economy is an asymmetrical one, with a heavy reliance on primary products. Western protectionism can only make it more difficult for them to rely on these primary products, especially in areas where they compete with western and newly industrialised country production. Thus, for example in coffee, where both Tanzania and Zimbabwe have held part of the export market, the increase in coffee production after the recovery of Brazil has led to a decline of the coffee price and a stabilising of export quotas, both constraints hampering these two economies from fully exploiting this resource. Further agriculture in general is subject to governmental manipulation, for example U.S. and European Economic Community (EEC) subsidies on agricultural exports (Sandbrook: 1985). The performance of the SADCC states on the economic front demands a diversification of their individual resource bases. If this were to happen in a coordinated fashion, then trade would be possible between the SADCC states as well as with the international market, thus decreasing the ratio of dependence on the advanced industrialised countries and alleviating some of the difficulties caused by 'New Protectionism'. This point will be discussed in greater detail when examining the individual countries economic commitment to the goals of SADCC in the following sections.

It is quite evident that the SADCC regime envisages increased economic interdependence within the framework of the international trading system. As will be discussed in the following sections, the concentration on improving road and raillinks to ports which link them to the West are clear indicators of this. Although SADCC's steps towards boosting economic interaction and increasing profits through export to the western world appear to contradict the ideological rhetoric surrounding the goals of SADCC, it does however remain true that foreign exchange needs press the SADCC countries into continuing exports. Regional trade would enable the SADCC countries to preserve their foreign exchange, particularly with the development of a common currency. This however may not be feasible without further development of economic coordination between the SADCC states. These points will be discussed in detail in relation to the domestic and regional economic situation of the SADCC states as they interact around the goals, principles, norms and values which give structure to the regime. However it is important to note that regional economic interaction would be complementary to the ties which already exist between Southern Africa and the West (2).

2.2.CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TOTALITY.

Ideology and the role of the state play a large role in development strategy and in the effective economic cooperation between states. On this point it is necessary to stress that economic coordination will entail a reconciliation of the various ideological orientations of the SADCC countries. At present the ideological unity over the issue of apartheid appears to block off the differences which exist between the SADCC states in terms of how the individual states envisage their national economic development. The extent to which the SADCC states proport to be founded upon different ideological patterns of development poses, furthermore, problems for economic integration between the SADCC states within their economic regime framework. Moreover, within the context of the socio-economic totality of which they are part, where the dynamic of capitalism still operates (that is the pursuit of profit through competition) the SADCC states place themselves ideologically at odds with one another and are, therefore, unable to develop coherent and coordinated development strategies. This is because although operating practically within this dynamic, five of the states proport to following socialist or Marxist-Leninist patterns, which are acknowledged internationally as a rejection of the market economy dynamic of the western world. Furthermore, when socialist orientated policies fail there has been a lack of clear direction and detail in domestic policy formation. This point will be discussed in greater depth in the following sections as it spells difficulty for economic interaction within the Southern African region.

Shaw's analysis of the African economic situation substantiates the fact that the ideologies of states determine their orientation towards development (Shaw: 1985). However Bell succinctly points out that "... the gulf between ideology, policy and practise...lies at the base of many contemporary problems within African countries..." (Bell: 1986: 20). The role of the

state in the present economic system has, as mentioned, become one of ensuring profit for national interests as trade liberalisation becomes steadily eroded. In this context clear policy direction and a sound awareness of the realities of the international market economy have become vital to state participation in both the domestic and international market systems.
The goals that SADCC proports to uphold must be placed in context of the economic totality of which they are part. Gilpin states that the market economy tends to lead to unequal development (Gilpin: 1987:23). Thus SADCC's goal of equitable regional integration appears to be purely ideological. Gilpin states further that "...individuals, groups or states are differently endowed and situated to take advantage of market oppurtunities, therefore the growth of wealth and the spread of economic activities in a market system tends to be uneven favoring one state or another" (Gilpin :1987: 23). The reality of the western market economy must be taken into account when analysing the role of the individual countries governments within the SADCC regime. It appears that in terms of the international socio-economic setting within which the SADCC countries must act for economic and political survival that they are structurally bound to develop along lines which are compatible with the international market system.
Thus the substantive or theoretical dimension within which the SADCC regime functions, that is, the goals which determine the convergence of interests of the SADCC states should show an awareness of the dimensions and realities of this socio-economic setting. Goals reflecting an awareness of the totality within which they must interact would logically bind them in terms of economic self-interest. Within the discussion of the goals of SADCC and the individual economic situations of the SADCC states vis a' vis their interaction with the SADCC framework it will be considered whether individual ideologies of states contribute to the goals of SADCC preventing a convergence of interests around realistic economic development coordination. The role of South Africa as the economic hegemon must also be taken into account here. It has both present and future relevance to the functioning of an effective and functional economic regime within the Southern African region.

CHAPTER THREE: THE INDIVIDUAL SADCC STATES, PARTS OF A WHOLE.

3.1.SADCC'S GOALS: AN OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK.

The goals of SADCC are, briefly:

1) Reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only on South Africa.

2) Forging links to create genuine equitable regional integration.

3) Effective mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies (that is economic relations between SADCC states and also to foreign overseas markets).

4) Action to ensure international cooperation within the framework of their strategy for economic liberation (Kongwa:1987:2).

In addition to these goals Kongwa states that there are four theoretical assumptions which gave rise to and support SADCC , namely:

a) Hostility and war are due to the distance between nations, bridges of cooperation prevent conflict.

b) The resultant subsystem will provide the mechanisms for resolution and regulation of violence and conflict.

c) Cooperation in small non-control issues leads to cooperation in other spheres.

d) Nations joining together have unifying characteristics and become an identifiable subsystem (Kongwa:1987:1).

In the light of the above it may be concluded that the SADCC regime was formed, in principle, for both economic and political reasons. The convergence of interests around a mutual desire to reduce economic dependence was motivated by both the political and economic self-interest of the individual countries concerned. This is in line with the functionalist approach to regime theory as outlined earlier. The strength or weakness of the SADCC regime may therefore be judged by examining how vigorously these goals have been pursued as this will indicate the extent towards which theoretical convergence of interests translates into practice within the regime framework. Norms, principles, values and decision making procedures can, as mentioned in Chapter One, negatively or positively affect a regime, according to the extent to which they are obeyed and enforced (Krasner:1982:189). Thus they must also be taken into account to observe their impact on regime functioning. Furthermore Rood states,

"Reliable expectations with regard to behaviour are the second defining element of rule behaviour, as such expectations, to the extent that they are shared (convergence of expectations) and therefore have become objective, enable participants to anticipate upon, and to criticise and evaluate each others behaviour" (Rood:1988:7). Thus it is important to see how expectations of the SADCC regime have developed into patterns of behaviour since the inception of the regime.

However, to fully understand economic interaction in the Southern African region it is necessary to give a brief outline of the individual SADCC countries economic positions and how they interact economically in the region and internationally. The object of providing a brief account of the countries economic positions is to place them in context of historical socio-economic reality. From an international regime theory point of view one may thus avoid a purely structuralist interpretation of the SADCC regime functioning as mentioned in Chapter One. The analyses are to provide an empirical link to the historical convergence of interests in the Southern African region and thus to place them in context of the goals of the present negotiated regime framework. No attempt is made to provide a detailed economic analysis of each of the states economies due to the constraints of space. However the outline concentrates on placing the SADCC countries domestic political and economic positions in context of the socio-economic totality of which they are part. Varshney's methodological approach in relation to the SADCC regime and it's goals can then be more rigorously applied. As pointed out earlier, the goals of SADCC form the overarching structure of the regime framework, and in this sense they regulate it's functioning. But the individual states must be placed in context of the socio-economic totality of which they are part in order to perceive the interaction between the socio-economic relationships governing relations between actors in the region and internationally (this does not relate solely to government actors). To this end the analyses will focus on three main aspects:

1)The political and economic orientation of the state and how it has developed since independence.

2)Relations with South Africa and the western market economy, as well as any other international relations.

3)Political and economic relations with other SADCC states.

To highlight any differences between ideological orientation and socio-economic development, domestically regionally and internationally, the supposed 'socialist' countries will be discussed in Section One and the 'capitalist' countries in Section Two.

It is hoped, that by placing these states in historical socio-economic context, although very simply, that the self interests of the individual SADCC governments and the predominant interest groups within them will be placed in context of the SADCC framework's goals. This will enable the discussion on the goals of SADCC, in Chapter's Four and Five, to be placed within a broader political, economic and social dimension.

SECTION ONE

3.2. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIENTATION OF THE 'SOCIALIST' COUNTRIES.

1.2.1. TANZANIA.

Tanzania's role in the international market system is that of a commercial agriculture producer. This position was determined from the colonial period, when capitalist agricultural development patterns were begun in Tanzania, linking the country to the international market. Since independence the ideology of African socialism has been ascribed to. This was outlined by the Arusha Declaration, the ideological cornerstone for development (1). Julius Nyerere, President until 1985, stressed that 'socialism' in Tanzania was to be based on the egalitarian principles of traditional African society (Edie:1987:143).

Socialism was translated into practice in the Tanzanian context by the nationalisation of foreign banks and key industries. The policy of collective rural development finally rooted itself in the attempt to create Ujamaa villages (2) (Edie :1987:143).

The ideological rhetoric of the Tanzanian government has remained the same since independence. When Nyerere stepped down as President in 1985, he stated that the new President Mwinyi would " ...carry out Party policies...style might change, emphasis might change, but the policy will remain the same" (Nyerere quoted by Horne:1987: 89). Furthermore, Nyerere, who retains his influence even though he is no longer President, maintains a hostile stance towards capitalist influence. In 1987 he expressed his dissatisfaction with having to accept IMF funds and regulations which necessitated a move away from the principles of the Arusha Declaration, and stated that involvement with the IMF is a temporary economic measure (Africa Confidential:18 March 1987:4). The political stance then, of the Party and Government remains socialist. However the functioning of the state and the shifts in economic policies since 1967 clearly show a different reality.

Nyerere, at the time of the Arusha Declaration, stated that "...the goal of socialism is the achievement of a classless and egalitarian society, free from the exploitation of man by man, not via a proleterian revolution but via peasant communities" (Nyerere, quoted by Obichere:1987:84). However, the Ujamaa villages did not produce the expected result of harmonious living and working together that Nyerere had conceptualised (Obichere: 1987). The policy had to be speeded up in 1974 by the use of coercion, as the peasants were reluctant to adopt a communal lifestyle urged by the village scheme. Although the villages did benefit those who moved to them in terms of health and educational facilities, they did not produce a viable economic alternative to individual cash crop production. The food shortages in the period 1973-74 were exacerbated by the creation of the Ujamaa villages, as was the need for increased imports of food crops over the years that followed. Edie states,

"...drought was thought to be the major reason that grain had to be imported, but later analyses indicated that, for seven years (after the creation of the villages) demand had surpassed supply" (Edie : 1987:149).

The type of socialism attempted was a ' top down approach' which did not have the support of the masses. Mittelman states "... a key conjuncture to the transition to socialism is the conquest of the state by an alliance of peasants and workers - a political act, and a takeover of the main branches of the economy so that immediate producers dominate the order" (Mittelman: 1981: 231). Although this theoretical approach has never been proven correct, for nowhere in the world has socialism been consistently controlled by a mass movement of workers and peasants, it remains a fact that in Tanzania, as in all the SADCC countries (Angola, Mozambique; Zimbabwe and Zambia to a lesser extent) the implementation of communal farming projects and national takeovers of industry and commerce, to push out 'capitalist' private enterprise has always been enforced from government level, with very little feedback or initial impetus from the majority of the population. The transition to socialism in Tanzania was hampered by the fact that the peasantry had been integrated since colonial times into the capitalist mode of cash crop production, thus the lack of popular support for the village scheme. This factor played a role in the failure of communal village schemes in Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique.

Since 1978 there has been a steady decline in agricultural production which was mitigated only partially by the adoption of IMF policies in 1985-86 (Horne :1987). Part of the problem with agricultural decline lay in the resettlement of 11 million peasants during the Ujamaa village era. A core of private production remained in agriculture, and this the government allowed to operate because of the necessity of foreign revenue. Even so there was a decline in cash crop production, as the government tried to keep agricultural product prices low, causing many farmers to return to subsistence farming (3)(Simmons:1987:108)

The effects of the slump in agriculture , which was caused not only by internal factors but also drought, declining terms of trade and the oil shocks of the 1970's, were felt more acutely because of the decline in cash crop production.

The shortage of foreign capital, caused by the factors outlined above, made importing for the maintenance of industrial production , which was based on import substitution and did not concentrate on producing the means of production, extremely difficult. Biermann states that post 1980 trends indicate a sharp decline and dilapidation in industry (Biermann:

1987:127). Operation thus remains below 50% of capacity. This problem has been encountered by Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique (Bagachwa: 1983).

It has been shown that the nationalisation of the banks, in spite of the Arusha Declaration, changed very little. Because they were 'born from colonial entities ' they retained the same ideological biases towards development as before and loans favoured wealthy cash crop production rather than providing substantial amounts for the Ujamaa villages. Money was therefore channelled into the rich areas for the extraction of surplus and the achievement of profit (Mittelman: 1987:242). Thus nationalisation of the banks, like the attempt to create communal villages, did not break down the ties between Tanzania and the western market economy.

3.2.2. ZIMBABWE.

Zimbabwe's position in the international economic system shows a high level of economic integration due to it's advanced and diversified market resource base. Bratton and Burgess state,

" Zimbabwe, with the exception of South Africa, has the most advanced market economy on the African subcontinent in terms of infrastructure, farms and factories and financial institutions. Economic activity is commercialised in urban and rural areas" (Bratton and Burgess:1987: 200). Like most of the SADCC countries, however, Zimbabwe relies on commercial agriculture for 40% of it's export earnings (Thompson:1987:247). Furthermore, like Tanzania, Zimbabwe also pursued a policy of import substitution (4). The ideological stance put forward by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and the leading party ZANU-PF is allegedly for a socialist path of development along Marxist-Leninist lines (5). However Sithole states that ZANU-PF has "... little to distinguish it from other nationalist and populist African parties who are overseeing the capitalist programme in Africa using the rhetoric of socialism to retain a populist base" (Sithole:1987:21). This is evident from the ties which the government has maintained with South Africa and the West which have changed very little since independence.

At independence ZANU-PF's 'socialist' stance was translated into redistributive welfare policies (6). Nationalisation of the banks and control of key manufacturing enterprises was undertaken. Communal agriculture was eventually pursued only to a limited degree, and a policy of 'reconciliation' with the white commercial farmers was followed (7). Since independence economic policy has changed considerably, due to political and economic factors. However Zimbabwe, like Tanzania, still confirms it's ideological orientation, in spite of the fact that the economy runs along chiefly capitalist lines.

Zimbabwe has, because of a combination of external and economic pressures, been forced to abandon the welfarist economic policies originally pursued (8). The redistributive policies had to be restricted because of the exigencies of the fiscal deficit (Kadhani:1986:108). By 1985 the fiscal deficit figure was quoted as $ 533 million dollars (Kadhani:1986:114). Since then the position has not improved, Finance Minister Chidzero's 1989/1990 budget showing a further trimming of state expenditure. Farai states that this is a result of the fact that welfare policies have been far in excess of the rate of economic growth (Farai:1989:55).

Because of these economic difficulties there has been a thrust towards trade liberalisation. In May 1989 the new long awaited investment code was announced. The code reduced the restrictions on foreign companies remittances of profits and Mugabe endorsed the need for supply and demand to determine wages and prices which were previously controlled by the government (E.P Herald: 20 April 1989). Thus in spite of the ideological rhetoric Zimbabwe has moved closer to the principle of the market economy in policy formulation. Foreign investment has, however, been discouraged by conflicting development strategies. The Zimbabwean investment code before 1989 shows the restrictions which the government placed on foreign investment (SADCC Conference Papers:Vol 1 : 1987).

3.2.3.ANGOLA

Angola, like all the SADCC States, interacts with and is linked structurally to the western market economy with a high level of dependence on loans and aid. U.S. oil companies have been in Angola since before independence, and the West still remains Angola's chief export and import market. In spite of the fact that it's primary exports have before and after independence linked Angola to the structure of the western market economy, the leading party, the MPLA, like Mozambique, embarked on a radical Marxist-Leninist development strategy on coming to power (9).

Since independence domestic economic development policy concentrated on "...domestically orientated economic development and a just distribution of wealth" (Maximino:1983:1). Industry and manufacturing were nationalised. The legacy of Portuguese colonialism, which had barred Angolan Nationals from intermediate posts in industry had left a dearth of trained officials, managers, operators and technicians (Maximino:1983). This spelt considerable difficulty for the manufacturing and industry sectors especially because of the exodus of 300 000 whites at independence. However the MPLA did not nationalise oil production completely. The American company, Gulf Oil, remained in Angola, entering into joint ownership with Sonangol, the state run enterprise who took 51% of Gulf's shares, management and production (Gunn:1987:185). Oil later became the sole reliable source of income. In the 1980's oil, the only relatively untouched link with the western market, kept the otherwise bankrupt state run economy from total collapse (10).

The period between 1975 and 1980 was fairly stable economically (Maximino:1983). During this period state farming was attempted, as was peasant collectivisation and the establishment of cooperatives. The MPLA also transformed itself into a vanguard party in 1977, to lead the state and people to 'socialism'. The 1980's however emphasised Angola's sensitivity to the international economy as well as it's fragile political security. The revamping of UNITA with the aid of South Africa under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi in 1979 led to increasingly effective insurgence in Angola (Marcum: 1987: 5-7). Furthermore UNITA managed to gain support amongst those who were disaffected with the MPLA's radical ideological stance. With the aid of direct South African military intervention this insurgency provided the MPLA with a very real political and economic security threat as the rural areas remained beyond their influence and prevented restoring and maintaining transport infrastructure (Maximino: 1983). Furthermore this security threat was given added impetus by South African military incursions into the territory (Maximino: 1983) (Marcum:1987:11). However the Soviet and Cuban ideological commitment prompted their military assistance to the MPLA. The situation was made more complex by the growing involvement of the US, who supplied military aid to UNITA forces to fight the spread of 'communism' in Southern Africa. This situation continues to the present day.

3.2.4.MOZAMBIQUE.

At independence the Portuguese colonial legacy left the Mozambican economy structurally linked to the western market economy, with a dependence on primary product export for foreign exchange. Moreover, as in the Angolan situation, FRELIMO had to take on an economy severely damaged by the liberation struggle and the sabotage of the departed white settlers. Furthermore the structural ties to the Western market system, states Egero, have not lent themselves to rapid change, since there remains a reliance on imports for production in agriculture, industry and transport. He concludes,
" Strains of historical trade relations continue within the framework of western trade, which apart from a few years in the late 1970's, has kept a majority share of all Mozambican trade" (Egero:1987:89). Mozambique has had a balance of payments deficit since the 1960's, and apart from agricultural exports, chiefly cotton, sugar and tobacco, it depended on tourism, port and rail facilities and migrant labour for foreign exchange. Furthermore the industrial modernisation boom of the late colonial period indicated that this pattern of growth was linked to and interacted with the South African economy (11) (Egero: 1987).

At independence FRELIMO adopted socialism as the ideological impetus for political and economic development. The initial focus was on coopting mass support to encourage self-reliance and collective working. State control was seen as essential to the restructuring of the economy, as the departure of some 200 000 whites left industry and agriculture in much the same sort of chaos as that which was experienced by Angola (12)(Saul:1985). This centralisation of authority later caused economic difficulties, because it lost FRELIMO the support of the rural population, which had been their traditional support group from liberation struggle times. The East European model of development, that is a concentration on rural development along the lines of communal villages, cooperatives and state farms, was also attempted in Mozambique. This was coupled with a strategy of industrial development which would concentrate on producing the means of production: iron, steel, machinery and chemicals. The dynamism of industry was stressed as a factor which would enable Mozambique to "...break from it's integration with the imperialist system" (Fair:1984:182). This did not take into account that, given Mozambique's structural ties to the West for imports, this development strategy would require greater economic interdependence (Fair:1984).

The concentration on centralising the economy and state control encorporated an emphasis on the state farms . This in view of the fact that at independence 93% of the population were rurally based led to an alienation of the smaller farmers. The importance of peasant agriculture at independence highlights the severity of this neglect, as the peasants at that time supplied about a third of the marketed crops and staple foods for the plantations (run by settlers) and urban workers. Further, the subsistence farmers fed themselves thus effectively accounting for 2/3's of production (Macgregor:1987). This problem still besets the economy. According to the 1987 SADCC Conference Papers, 85% of the population remain rurally based (SADCC Conference Papers:1987:116) Collectivisation, or ' socialisation of the countryside' was based on the same lines as that of the Tanzanian ujamaa villages, the rural population were, at first, expected to voluntarily form collective villages and live and work together (Ottoway and Howe: 1987). However as in the Tanzanian case this did not occur.

In 1977 FRELIMO began to orientate their policies more firmly on the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, adopting the role of a vanguard party at the Third Party Congress (Saul:1985:81). The Marxist-Leninist orientation of the party, influenced by Soviet and Eastern European advice, became more centralised and authoritarian. The emphasis remained on large projects in both industry and agriculture, with the state not only controlling these aspects of the economy but also those that had been nationalised at independence (Saul:1985).

The steady decline of the economy was closely related to the above factors, but also very strongly to external political and economic pressures; the first, declining terms of trade, being common to all the SADCC countries. The drain of foreign exchange was not only because of adverse external economic conditions but also because of the drop in the amount of produce exported (Saul:1985|106). Coupled with this was South Africa's decrease in demand for mineworkers and the reduction of its use of the Maputo port. In the early independence years, 1975- 1980, there was also the Rhodesian border closure, sanctions undertaken by Mozambique in support of the liberation struggle against Rhodesia, and destabilisation by Rhodesian security forces and the Mozambican National Resistence movement, known as the MNR or RENAMO. These were closely linked to FRELIMO's ideological and political orientation, however they had economic repercussions. By 1980 Zimbabwean independence signalled the beginning of RENAMO resistence in Mozambique backed by South Africa. The escalating war between co-opted Mozambican geurilla's and FAPLA (the FRELIMO army) exacerbated the economic decline in much the same way as in Angola. The stimulation of the more remote rural areas towards agricultural production was almost entirely prevented and the Mozambican railway network, a precious source of economic revenue, was a continual target for RENAMO destruction. This situation was worsened by natural forces such as droughts and floods.

By 1983 it was evident that changes had to be implemented. The Fourth National Congress heralded this turning point. FRELIMO became more flexible ideologically, especially on economic issues, and this is evident from the pragmatic approach adopted at the Congress (Ottoway and Howe:1987:47). Efforts were made to decentralise and to include more mass participation as the alienation of the peasantry had become critical to FRELIMO's security in power. Further there was a shift of policy to encourage individual smallholders in agriculture as well as encouraging more private enterprise. Another substantial ideological deviation was evident from the Central Committee paper from the Congress which read,

"Prices should be conceived (of) as a factor to stimulate commercial exchange and to reestablish the market economy" (Saul : 1985| 120). Furthermore foreign investment was also actively encouraged from 1983 onwards (13). The culmination of these ideological shifts away from Marxist-Leninism occurred in 1989, when Mozambique officially dropped this ideological adherence (Crews:1989:14).At the Fifth Party Congress, held in July 1989, it was decided that although FRELIMO would retain the title of a vanguard Party, their task would now be to guide 'all Mozambican people' in an effort to normalise society in Mozambique by embracing all sectors of society (Fauvet:1989:22).

3.2.5.ZAMBIA

Zambia's political and economic interaction with the western market economy has been dominated by the country's dependence on one primary export, copper. Zambia's economic development has been regulated by it's reliance on this export (Burdette:1988:116).

President Kenneth Kaunda, has, since independence, given voice to Zambia's ideological stance (14). The ideology of Humanism has been declared the shaping force behind the policies which are put forward by the state. Kuanda has stated "... a humanist in Zambian terms has to be a socialist, for us socialism is a tool with which to create a society based on social justice" (Richards: 1987: 173). It is evident that the stance reflects some of the principles of egalitarianism and justice which is to be found in the ideologies of the said socialist countries already examined, particularly Tanzania. However, as in Tanzania, political rhetoric and the reality of the Zambian socio-economic situation have been widely divergent.

Zambia's economic policy since independence has revolved around the production and export of copper for foreign exchange. Manufacturing was based on import substitution, with a high degree of luxury goods produced and a heavy reliance on raw materials and equipment from western markets. Agriculture played a minor role, as the relative affluence of the Zambian economy did not necessitate a high degree of production because food could always be imported. Although agriculture, according to President Kaunda, was to be the mainstay of the economy, the government put relatively little investment and other production incentives into this sector overall (Woldring:1984). The scope for agricultural projects is still clearly underutilised with only one sixth of arable land under cultivation in 1987 (SADCC Conference 39 Papers:1987).

Zambia's translation of ideology into economic practice since independence revolved around a takeover of key industries, for example mining, manufacturing, commerce and finance. The Mulungushi Reforms of 1968 were formulated by the President in order to takeover as many of the key economic sectors of the state previously in foreign hands. 'Zambianisation' became a development catch phrase. This included the encouragement of local entrepreneurs to start enterprises, which would be taken over by the state when large enough (Burdette: 1988). Furthermore, mining was, because of the envisaged higher profits, taken over fully by the state in 1973 (15)(Good: 1987:114).

In 1974 the copper mines supplied 53% of the government's revenue (Burdette: 1988). However from 1974 onwards the copper price began to fluctuate erratically leading to a steady economic decline in Zambia. However the crisis of the Zambian economy cannot be blamed solely on the declining terms of trade for copper. The inexperience of the Zambian government to the complexities of the copper multinational monopoly functioning for price control and stabilisation, combined with an overall fall in the price of copper made it impossible for the nationalised mines to influence the copper prices in their favour (Shafer:1983:110-112). The fall in revenue from copper led to a stagnation in industry, which as mentioned was import dependent. There has been a stagnation in manufacturing ever since.

The government's neglect of agriculture stems largely from the dominance of copper in the economic structure. A lack of services, infrastructure and basic agricultural implements to the smaller peasant farmers has retarded the development of agriculture especially in the 60's and 70's. The need to further emphasise agriculture, especially the role of the small peasant farmers has now assumed critical dimensions in the light of the steady decline in the performance of the copper mines (Fair:1986).

The economic situation is at present dismal. Gross domestic product has been stagnant since 1985. This is coupled with a per capita economic decline since the 1970's. Investment in the domestic economy fell from 22% in 1980 to 11% in 1985. Government expenditure channels more than 50% of revenue towards civil service wages and emoluments for state employees (16)(Good:1987:531). Expenditure in this area makes a mockery of Zambia's 'Humanist ' ideology. Chipasa points out that according to the consumer price index inflation continues to affect the low-income groups the most (17)(Chipasa:1989:19). There is widespread unemployment due to the stagnation of the economy. Imported goods are still too much in the luxury item category. Basic items have, since the devaluation of the Kwacha, risen to levels that the average consumer cannot afford. Zambia in addition has a huge foreign debt, one of the largest in Africa. Debt service repayments took 43.3% of export earnings in 1985 (Good:1987:531).

3.2.6.DEDUCTIONS MADE ON THE 'SOCIALIST' METHOD OF DEVELOPMENT.

It is evident from the brief outlines given above that socialist ideology does not feature prominently in the present policy choices of the 'socialist states'. There are many reasons for this of which four are the most prominent. Firstly the translation of 'socialist' policy into practise proved to be economically unviable. The low level of industrialisation, amongst other factors, prevented the continuance of social welfarist 'redistributive' policies. Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania serve to substantiate this observation. In the case of Angola and Mozambique, where national liberation parties succeeded in taking control of the state, there was also the extremely high cost of South African coercion, directed at the threat of violence eminating from these states. Furthermore there was support from the West for South Africa against these so called 'communist forces'. Linked to the above factors was the failure of policies which nationalised industry and manufacturing extensively. The situation in Angola and Mozambique underline the problems faced by the lack of local expertise and the high degree of dependence on the western market economy due to previous import substitution policies. Thus policies aimed at deviating from the socio-economic totality of which these states are part served to increase economic difficulties and policy incoherency.

Secondly the attempts at changing the patterns of agricultural production, as well as the overall neglect of agriculture proved to be extremely detrimental to the all five of the states. Their previous reliance on agriculture (with the exception of Angola) as a primary source of foreign revenue, meant that the neglect of this area prevented the stimulation of their economies overall. However the agricultural potential of Angola and Mozambique was also severely affected by civil war and South African direct and indirect destabilisation.(18)

Thirdly the type of socialism attempted, that is as mentioned when discussing Tanzania, a 'top down' approach, precluded the generating 'socialist' consciousness at grass roots level, where capitalist modes of development were already familiar.

Fourthly the failure of the socialist policies to generate economic benefits has caused a crisis in policy making for all of the 'socialist' countries. The gap between ideological rhetoric and economic policy has prevented the formulation of clear long term economic policies. This is linked to the goals of SADCC where ideas of equality in economic development and self reliance are generated from 'socialist' thought, but which clearly do not create a convergence of economic interest as patterns of behaviour continue to revolve around economic involvement with South Africa and the West.

It can be deduced that the spontaneous imposed regime contributes to undermining socialist policies as it reinforces links with the western market economy and is also a generator of private business which has interests in the Southern African region. This will become clearer in Chapters Four and Five. Furthermore the spontaneous imposed regime effectively undermines the SADCC regime, as it is more consistent with the socio-economic totality of which the Southern African region is part. Just as the failure of 'socialism' in the states discussed shows that attempts at made at development without bearing in mind the full constraints of the socio-economic totality of the western market economy are doomed, so too does this reflect on SADCC goals. As such patterns of behaviour within the SADCC regime framework will not emerge.

3.3. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE 'SOCIALIST' SADCC STATES.

3.3.1. TANZANIA

The reason for the gap between ideology and reality is clearly put by Edie, in his analysis of

Tanzania's economic crisis. He points out that Tanzania became an independent nation with an economy "...structurally tied to the advanced capitalist economies of Europe" (Edie: 1987:142). The economy still centers around cash crops for export, underlining the fact that the above statement still holds true.

The divergence between ideology and practise has become more apparent in the 1980's, as the Tanzanian financial position worsened. The country has accepted IMF regulations, including a devaluing of the shilling and concentrating once more on cash crop production for the international market. Thus production has been boosted during the 1986-1987 period. However Africa Confidential states

" The Party Programme 1987-2002 shows new CCM realism , wading through the jargon, it is possible to discern that it's calls for raising productivity and export volumes conceal some thinly veiled support for a mixed economy" (Africa Confidential: 31 March 1987: 5). It is thus evident that, in spite of the rhetoric on socialist development, Tanzania has to interact with the western, capitalist orientated market economy.

For Tanzania the goal of independence especially but not only from South Africa is, because of lack of formal economic ties, obsolete. Although economic ties of a low key level do exist, for example diamonds from Williamstown are marketed through the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) a subsidiary of de Beers, Tanzania's structural ties to the West enforce the fact that Tanzania's immediate economic self-interests tie the country very firmly to the western socio-economic totality of which they are part (Davids :1986:13). Thus the squaring of Tanzania's domestic economic goals with SADCC's goal of greater independence from South Africa and the West does not seem to indicate an even moderate level of convergent economic interests around which a fixed pattern of behaviour might emerge.

3.3.2. ZIMBABWE

Even though the Zimbabwean government allegedly follows a socialist path of development along Marxist-Leninist lines, the government of Zimbabwe has relied heavily on Western aid and trade since independence.On average, over half of all aid comes from the West (Davies:1984:29). This remains a structural link between the West and Zimbabwe (Farai: 1989:55). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has the largest bilateral aid scheme in Zimbabwe, "... a commodity import scheme that provides foreign exchange to commercial agriculture and manufacturing enterprises" (Bratton and Burgess: 1987:216). Furthermore Zimbabawe's two development plans, Transnational Development Plan (TNDP, 1980-1985) and the Five Year Development Plan, (FYDP, 1986-1990) both included foreign aid into government development strategy. The second plan, FYDP, planned to use 40% of total expected expenditure from aid for Zimbabwean resource programmes (19). Zimbabwe is also a member of the IMF for balance of payments adjustments, as well as the World Bank for infrastructural development (Chimombe:1987). Chimombe elucidates the thrust of these aid programmes,

" Their logic is evidently to support the socio-economic groups which control capital, property and finance, and which are therefore in a position to take advantage of the market" (Chimombe: 1987: 114). This can be seen in the stress that both the IMF and the World Bank lay on the role of the private sector and the attention they pay to "... short run adjustments to world market conditions" (Stoneman:1987: 57). Thus Davies states correctly that Zimbabwe's "...international economic links are very much with the West" (Davies:1984: 23).

Zimbabwe, moreover, still has close economic links with South Africa, especially in terms of trade, which are a consequence of the UDI sanctions period (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979). This point is further substantiated by Table Four in the appendix. South African capital controls up to 90% of the mining sector and 60% of the manufacturing sector. Chitala points out that South African investment in Zimbabwe is more than in any other Southern African economy. Some of Zimbabwe's top industries are controlled by or associated with South African companies: Zimbabwe breweries, Hippo Valley, Premier Portland Cement and Plate Glass (Chitala :1987:26). Anglo American is furthermore responsible for steel, coal and nickel production (Chitala:1987:26). In the light of the economic difficulties being experienced by Zimbabwe at present it is unlikely that the government will attempt to break off existing economic ties with South Africa.

3.3.3. ANGOLA

Economic sensitivity to Western market viscetudes was emphasised by a slump in oil prices in the 1980's leading to domestic unrest and a whittling away of resources with which to pursue 'socialist' policies. Angola's socialist development policies began to undergo a process of revision. The system of dictated wages and prices fell away out of necessity, the government had previously held them stable by simply printing more money. This eventually led to a fall in the Kwanza, and at the same time encouraged a thriving black market (Cornwall:1989:3). The government legalised private trade, seeing that this sector was in fact necessary to survival in the urban areas. The decentralisation of the economy became policy in 1983 with the formation of the New Orientation of Economic Policy. President Eduardo Dos Santos showed the movement back to an ideological reconciliation with western capital by encouraging foreign investment in the areas of agriculture and mining. The new policy was a practical move away from the MPLA's ideological commitment. At the same time it emphasised the structural economic interdependence of the Angolan economy within the framework of the western market system, which it could not disengage from.Thus the economic totality of which the Angolan economy is part regulated the movement of interests in the political sphere.

In 1988 the Minister of State for the productive sector, de Castro Van Dunem, stated,

" Direct investment will permit increased foreign trade, since it will make it possible to equip the Angolan economy technically and in terms of materials, without the current pressure of external capital indebtedness" (Cornwall:1989:4). Among measures taken to liberalise trade, autonomy was given to managers of industrial enterprises and agriculture was once again allowed to be undertaken by private individuals. Further a new foreign investment code was drawn up to encourage foreign investors in crucial sectors.

Africa Confidential writes, that in spite of the Angolan government's efforts to decentralise, it remains elitist. This has profound political implications in terms of the civil war, for although the MPLA "... presents the war with UNITA in crude caricatures ... a more realistic approach is taking shape as Angolans beyond the tiny world of the political elite recognise that the conflict between town and country bears a distressing resemblance to the colonial confrontation of twenty years ago" (Africa Confidential: 13 May 1987: 5). Gaining support from the rural areas therefore is a political and economic necessity. In terms of the MPLA's ideological commitment, which they still hold to exist, this appears to be problematic. Illiteracy in Angola is still high (80%) and 70% of the population still live in rural areas (Africa Institute Bulletin:No 1 : 1984) (SADCC Conference Papers:Vol 1 :1987). Furthermore the continuing civil war makes it difficult to achieve political cohesion. Africa Confidential points out that the MPLA has to retain the support which it has in the urban areas, and this means using scarce resources to maintain the standard of living of the metropolitan middle classes to prevent a coup or urban revolutionary movement (Africa Confidential: 13 May 1987:5).

Ideologically therefore, the MPLA do not stand much of a chance of achieving equitable distribution of wealth or leading the way to socialism through heightened class consciousness, as in Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. As already mentioned, economic power in the western market economy necessitates moving closer to a western sources of aid and the encouragement of foreign investment. The government appears to be aware of this. Thus Angola's more laissez-faire policies have caused the West to reconsider granting loans and further credits. There has been an investment boom, following the loosening of government control. Africa Confidential states,

" In the next century Angola looks set to emerge as a major diamond producer - ahead of South Africa. Current investment in Angola's resources of oil, agriculture and diamonds should be producing healthy dividends by the year 2000" (Africa Confidential: 17 Feb 1989:

1).
In the light of the above the ideological commitment of the MPLA seems inappropriate in terms of the economic realities which face that country. Furthermore the Angolan government's military affiliation with the Soviets appears to undermine it's economic development, not only because of it's concentration on military power but also because their affiliation is used by UNITA and South Africa to coopt support from the West, particularly the U.S.

3.3.4. MOZAMBIQUE
It is factually evident that RENAMO is supported by South Africa, and unlike UNITA in Angola, does not have strong leadership, nor does it effectively shape it's actions, taking it's cue of political and economic destabilisation from South African military influence (20)(Saul:1985:135) (Hanlon:1984). The Mozambican economic crisis of the 1980's is heightened considerably by RENAMO. In particular peasant cultivation and transport links have deliberately been sabotaged to attain the neutrality of the Mozambican government. This, states Metz, was part of the South African government's 'Total Strategy Plan' which originated in the 1970's, and which has had as it's fundamental starting point a conviction that South Africa "...was the target of a massive geo-political attack by the Soviet Union" (21) (Metz: 1986: 502). This viewpoint is shared by Vale (1983) and Davies and O'Meara (1982). This view of South Africa's regional strategy will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Four. However there is sufficient evidence to prove that South Africa directs and supports economic and military destabilisation of Mozambique through RENAMO to ensure the political neutrality and economic dependence in the region so that South Africa's political status quo remains intact (22)(Metz:1986:264). Africa Confidential points out that the 'anti-communist ' drive also musters considerable U.S. support for South Africa's actions in Mozambique, even in late 1988 and 1989 (Africa Confidential :2 Dec 1988, and Africa Confidential: 3 Feb 1989).

However it remains a sad reality for the stability of Mozambique that FRELIMO's political and economic mistakes have been well used to RENAMO's advantage. Disaffected elements of the population, notably those deported back to the rural areas from the congested cities by FRELIMO in 1983, as well as those of the rural population which have been neglected and alienated by the government, have been recruited by RENAMO (23) (Ottoway and Howe:1987:47).

In 1987 and 1988 the Mozambican government steadily loosened it's grip on the economy. The 1987/ 1988 Mozambican budget showed reform that was "...equivalent to a revolution in the principles of the FRELIMO Party" (Africa Institute Bulletin:Vol 27: No 6 :1987:109). Two new concepts, that of profits for state owned businesses and material incentives to workers and peasants for productivity as well as a streamlining of state owned companies showed the fundamental shift in policy (Africa Institute Bulletin:Vol 27 :No 6:1987). Furthermore the negotiation for funding from the IMF and World Bank show that adjustment along liberal market economy lines has been accepted by the Mozambican government.

It is still too early to see what difference the official rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology will make. However thus far there has been a major initiative to get tourism started in Mozambique's former coastal pleasure spots for South African tourists (Crews :Aug 1989:14).

3.3.5.ZAMBIA

Zambia's political rhetoric directed towards the West, through Kaunda, stresses imminent violence in Southern Africa, because of South Africa's racist policies, that may be averted either by sanctions from the West and/or diplomatic intervention. In this sense Mugabe and Kuanda's rhetoric are very similar. However because of the reliance of both Zambia and Zimbabwe on South African transport and trade links which also link them indirectly with the western market economy, they are unable to implement any drastic political measures against South Africa. South Africa restricted trade flows to Zambia in 1986 when Kaunda joined with Australia, Canada and India in an attempt to implement sanctions and within a few weeks any attempts at implementing sanctions were forgotten (Good: 1987:517). It is evident, because about 60% of Zambian imports come through or from South Africa, that it is not in Zambian economic self interest to challenge the regional economic hegemon too overtly (Africa Confidential:Vol 27:No 17:1986:3).

Zambia's recent moves to encourage foreign investment shows an explicit knowledge of the role that Western capital can and must play in the Southern African region. An indication of this is the new investment code drawn up in 1986, which provided generous incentives to foreign investors (SADCC Conference Papers :1987). Furthermore Zambia's economic self interests have precluded a breaking off of ties with the spontaneous imposed order showing a higher correlation of economic interests with the spontaneous imposed regime than with the negotiated regime.

From the outlines of relations between the 'socialist' SADCC states and the western socio-economic totality, given above, the deductions made earlier in this section when examining the ideological orientations of the 'socialist' SADCC states are substantiated. The ties between three of the five states and South Africa are extensive, and there is evidence to prove that economic ties do exist to some extent between South African private business and Tanzania and Angola. Table Four in the appendix gives a more overall view of official trade ties. Further, the influence of western aid and trade shows how socialist policies are constrained, especially with South Africa as the dominant capitalist market force in the region.

The maintenance of ties between the 'socialist' countries, the West and South Africa show that a high convergence of interests exist around the patterns of behaviour which cause the functioning of the spontaneous imposed regime. These preclude an effective convergence of interests around the goals of SADCC and serve to subordinate it on the economic level to the spontaneous imposed regime framework.

3.4.THE SOCIALIST STATES TIES TO THE SADCC STATES

3.4.1.TANZANIA

As already mentioned Tanzania's economic ties are almost exclusively with the western market economy, trade and aid links have remained entrenched despite the ideology of socialism. Table Two and Three in the appendix show the amount of trade entered into between Tanzania and the rest of the region. As can be seen there is a low level of economic integration in terms of trade. Further, as Tanzania is an agriculturally orientated economy there is the problem of coordination of production and the almost certain domination of the more resource endowed and diversified economies such as Angola and Zimbabwe. The rail links in the country will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Four, however at this point it suffices to say that there have been administrative, financial and technical problems preventing the effective utilisation of Tanzania's rail and port facilities. These, in any case, serve to strengthen economic ties along western market economy lines, in contrast to the goals of SADCC.

3.4.2. ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe has at present the strongest position of the SADCC countries. Thompson outlines Zimbabwe's weight in SADCC; it has a growing share of the manufacturing value added of the regional total and furthermore "...Zimbabwe is a partner to almost 80% of the total intra-SADCC trade" (Thompson: 1987: 247). Thus because of Zimbabwe's diversified market economy it has interests in expanding it's trade regionally. Zimbabwe already dominates in food processing and other production sectors. However in terms of SADCC's goals, where coordination of marketing, lower tariffs and open markets were specifically avoided as these would "...help the strongest the most" (Thompson:1987: 243) it is clear that although the SADCC countries interests do converge around economic trade links, which are unequally beneficial in terms of profit, for the same reason these interests do not square with the goal of economic independence from the West and South Africa, because the need for foreign aid, trade and revenue is the only way in which they may diversify their economies to stimulate trade in the region. Zimbabwe's expansion economically in the region is a logical one in terms of economic self-interest. Zimbabwe continues to function economically along western market economy lines, with a high rate of economic interaction with South Africa and the West. This convergence of interests runs contrary to the convergence of the interests of SADCC as envisaged by it's goal of greater economic independence through regional economic cooperation. The case of Zimbabwe shows that economic self-interest is followed in spite of both domestic and regional ideological commitments which form part of the SADCC regime framework. The fact that Zimbabwe is following a market orientated growth pattern, concentrating on export-led development, must not be seen as negative, as self interest is the motivational political and economic factor of any government. However the divergence in practise from SADCC's goals of 'independence ' and equitable economic integration must be stressed to emphasise the degree to which interests diverge within the SADCC regime framework as defined by it's goals and converge economically between individual countries in the SADCC region and their interaction with the world market economy.

3.4.3. ANGOLA

In relation to the SADCC regime it is evident that Angola is linked more firmly to the West and to the western market economy than to the SADCC members with regard to the SADCC regime's goals. An exception would be upgrading existing transport links, which would facilitate the regions trade with the West, in contradiction to the commitment of greater independence. Furthermore Angola (like Tanzania) has very few ties with South Africa economically, thus the goal of reducing dependence on the hegemon of the region is largely obsolete. The only economic ties which exist at present are through Anglo American, who has a management contract for the diamond mines, and these are marketed through the CSO, as in Tanzania (Chitala:1987:28). There is a certain amount of trade between Zimbabwe and Angola but for the most part Angola's economy is bound to the western market. Thus Angola's convergence of interests with the SADCC regime and it's goals are undermined by the necessity of it's convergence of interests with the socio-economic totality of which it is part.

3.4.4. MOZAMBIQUE

Economic interaction with the other SADCC states remains minimal (24). There is, however, Mozambique's military cooperation with Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and small amounts of trade, primarily with Zimbabwe (see Tables Two and Three in the appendix). However 80% of Mozambique's trade is with the West (Saul:1985:128). Furthermore the economic links which bind Mozambique to South Africa are structural and long term. Mozambique relies on income from migrant labour to South Africa, which approximates about 86 000 Mozambican citizens each year (Chitala: 1987:25). Mozambique's present economic crisis precludes cutting off these ties. Diplomatic initiatives between the two states have also been reaffirmed after the lapse of the Nkomati peace accord in 1984. In 1988 P.W. Botha visited Mozambique and renewed the agreement (Pollok:1988:1). Furthermore the current economic initiatives by South African tourism since the official dropping of Marxist-Leninist ideology indicates a substantial level of economic cooperation between the two states in the forseeable future.

The main form of cooperation with the SADCC countries is around improving the transport links to Mozambique's ports, a goal which has been consistently thwarted by RENAMO forces. However as mentioned in the cases of Tanzania and Angola these links do not promote regional trade, they reaffirm SADCC's links with the western market economy. Thus the main form of economic interaction between Mozambique and SADCC (as in Angola and Tanzania) is thus directly opposed to the greater economic independence goal.

3.4.5. ZAMBIA

Since independence Zambia's foreign policy has been shaped by President Kenneth Kaunda's humanist stance. The OAU Charter, with it's principles of non-alignment, and the destruction of racism in Africa have also been a consistently evident influence in Kaunda's speeches. However Zambia supported the FNLA and UNITA in the Angolan Liberation struggle, and ZAPU in the Zimbabwean struggle. There is also evidence to prove that Kaunda negotiated with South African and Rhodesian government officials in both the Angolan and Rhodesian Liberation wars, without informing all parties actively engaged in the liberation struggles (Burdette:1988:525). Relations with the MPLA and ZANU-PF have therefore been somewhat constrained as a result of this. Some political coherency has been achieved in the common interest in abolishing apartheid in South Africa and fighting the South African racist regime through support of the liberation struggle. Zambia's commitment is emphasised by their support of the ANC, who have their headquarters in Lusaka.

Economic relations towards other states in the region are tempered by the internal economic confusion in Zambia and the related political unrest (Kapepula:1989:28) (Good:1987:514). In September 1985 Zambia attempted to deregulate food prices according to the IMF structural adjustment programme. It appears that these policies were abandoned in 1987 because of the unrest but have been reinstituted in 1989 (Kapepula:1989:28) (Sano:1988). Furthermore the issue of new Kwacha notes in July 1989 has led to rampant inflation, exacerbated by deregulation of staple food prices. Chipasa states that inflation is running at more than 60% (Chipasa:1989:19). Smuggling between Zaire and Zambia has become rife as Zambia's foreign reserves for food imports decrease (Chipasa:1989).

Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique exemplify the problems which are attached to a lack of coherency between ideological rhetoric and economic reality. This weakens the regime structure because it fails to draw a distinction between politically idealistic self-interest and economic self-interest of the SADCC states. As such patterns of behaviour cannot evolve. The 'socialist' states have all had to move closer to the western market economy dynamic in economic policy making when the effects of political and economic insecurity have taken their toll. Because of the structural ties which bind the internal economies of these states to the western market economy, this is a logical and pragmatic move. This tends to make the convergence of interests in the region that much more difficult for the SADCC regime in the light of the goals that the regime is pursuing especially in terms of greater independence and equitable integration. However to achieve a complete perspective on the link between ideological incoherency, related political inconsistencies and the weakness of the SADCC regime the so called 'capitalist' SADCC states must be examined.

SECTION TWO: THE 'CAPITALIST' STATES IN SADCC.

3.5. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIENTATION OF THE 'CAPITALIST' SADCC STATES

3.5.1. BOTSWANA

Botswana, like Lesotho and Swaziland, has by virtue of it's size and proximity to South Africa, been economically linked with South Africa economy long before independence. Bechuanaland, as the territory was called before independence, served as a labour reserve for South African mines from 1895 onwards. However the reluctance of the Tswana people to become incorporated politically into South Africa led to their requesting, like Lesotho and Swaziland, to become a British Protectorate in 1885. Bechuanaland became the Republic of Botswana in 1966. Since 1966 the country has been led by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the state ideology is said to be a multiparty liberal democracy. Although there are opposition parties, these do not have the significant rural base of support that the BDP has. Seventy five percent of the population live in the rural areas, and the BDP, by following a policy of improving services and infrastructure even to rural areas, has mustered considerable support by creating an alliance with the peasants on the basis of these improved services (Holm:1984).

Botswana's politics have been conditioned by the formation of a ruling elite which stems from tribal days when the Royal family and chiefs had the majority of cattle (signifying wealth and elevated societal position). This unequal distribution of wealth, land and cattle has become more and more pronounced as Botswana's political and economic internal relations between peasantry and the ruling elite have developed. Sir Seretse Khama, the first President, himself a wealthy cattleowner and former chief, set the country on the path of economic growth via capitalist developmental ideology and practise. To this end the pursuit of modernising agriculture along private entrepreneur lines, as well as encouraging mineral exploitation and strengthening the country's infrastructure have been main developmental pursuits (SADCC Conference Papers: 1987).

Since independence the role played by cattle and agricultural farming has declined, cattle used to be the main export product. The discovery of diamonds and the continued operation of the Selebwe-Phikwe copper mine have, however, caused the change to a mineral led economy. Diamond production has caused the economy to boom in recent years, with diamond production surpassing South Africa in 1983 (Picard: 1987:234). In addition Lewis states that Botswana has the highest per capita flow of official development aid of any African country (Lewis:1985:3). This, it is said, is a result of Botswana's free advertising for democracy and capitalism (Lewis:1985). However the situation in the rural areas is much the same as in all the SADCC states. Cattle, one of the primary sources of material wealth in the rural areas, is mainly in the hands of a few. Five percent of the population hold 45% of the country's cattle (Picard:1987:233). Mining has benefited the country in terms of social services but has not improved the number of job oppurtunities available for the increased number of school leavers. Nor have sufficient funds and clear development policies been linked to the development of agriculture (25).

Nevertheless the economic position of Botswana in the 1987-88 period is the most optimistic of all the countries discussed thus far. After an economic slump in 1981-82 when the diamond price dropped (and which Botswana dealt with in classic IMF structural adjustment terms) Botswana's economy has boomed (26). Furthermore in 1986-87 there was a trade surplus of $ 293,000 million (Africa Institute Bulletin : 1987:109). In foreign reserves Botswana has enough to pay for imports for the next two years.

The economic boom is in part because of the discovery of diamonds , and the stable nature of the state, together with it's steadily improving infrastructure. The government has since 1986 aimed at constructing 100 km of road per year to open up mining and tourism further. In addition, since the Sir Seretse Khama international airport has opened Botswana is linked more directly on a commercial level to the region and to intercontinental tourism that does not have to be directed through South Africa (Africa Contemporary Record:1988:B652).

3.5.2. LESOTHO

Lesotho's present economic orientation is, like Botswana and Swaziland, the result of it's proximity to South Africa in conjunction with it's size, narrow resource base and links with the South African economy since colonial times. However Lesotho has followed a unique political and economic path of development since independence. South Africa has influenced Lesotho politically in a far more overtly coercive manner than Swaziland and Botswana, emphasising the effects of an overtly hostile political attitude towards the hegemon that is not substantiated with tangible power resources.

At independence in 1966, Lesotho's ideology was supposedly that of a constitutional monarchy, power was vested to the ruling party along Westminster parliamentary system lines (27). However in 1970 the country effectively became a one party state, under the authoritarian rule of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, head of the Basotholand National Party (BNP). The BNP won the independence elections by a narrow majority in 1966, but in the 1970 elections lost to the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP). Jonathan refused to accept the outcome of the election, suspending the Westminster system and detaining or arresting the leaders of the BCP (Bordill and Cobbe:1985:133).

Jonathan's outspoken hostility towards South Africa from 1970 onwards, it was argued, afforded Lesotho international support and sympathy and, like Botswana, showed the international community that Lesotho was not a puppet of Pretoria. However this outspokenness led to a real political alienation between South Africa and Lesotho in the 1970's and early 1980's, with tensions rising steadily as Lesotho offered refuge to ANC refugees from South Africa and began to foster closer ties with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China (Bordill and Cobbe:1985:165). Furthermore, the staunch popular opposition of the BCP and the Catholic church caused the BNP to lose domestic support. The fact that the BNP retained power illegally from 1970 onwards made the internal political situation even more volatile. The BNP did not attempt to defuse this situation by trying to co-opt the opposition into an alliance, nor did it temper it's stance towards the Eastern bloc to appease it's former ally, the Catholic Church. Instead the BNP clung to power using, when necessary, force and coercion (Bordill and Cobbe:1985:166).

The situation became particularly volatile after 9 December 1982 when South Africa raided Maseru for ANC refugees, killing 28 and a further 12 Lesotho citizens. These raids, to eliminate ANC presence in Lesotho, increased in intensity and were combined with attacks by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), a breakaway of the BCP, proportedly both aided and directed by South Africa (28). Internally the general population were becoming increasingly uneasy about BNP hostility towards South Africa and it's often brutal retaliation (Bordill and Cobbe: 1985:167).

In January 1986 the situation came to a head, South Africa's economic pressure, in the form of go slows on the flow of goods and people to and from the region, a direct violation of the SACU agreement between the two countries which is to facilitate such flows, precipitated the takeover by the more conservative Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF), led by Major General Lekhanya (Esterhuysen:1986). The country has been under military rule ever since.

From 1979 onwards Acts such as the Land Act and Country Planning Act aimed at changing the Land Tenure system to one which would be more commercially viable, i.e land would become inherited and not reallocated as in the past. It was hoped that these Acts would allow for the consolidation of land so that larger farms could be formed by the renting of small unviable pieces to larger, more commercially orientated and modern farming families (29). However population growth and drought has had serious effects on agriculture in the 1980's (Bordill and Cobbe:1985:53).

Industry and modern sector growth has not been significant during the 70's and 80's even though the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) encouraged foreign investment, and provided incentives such as tax holidays as well as promising no nationalisation (SADCC Conference Papers:1987). However South African incentives to private enterprise to decentralise within South Africa have been more attractive to foreign and domestic business. Pre-1986 hostility towards South Africa also discouraged South African investment in the country (Wellings: 1984). Other economic shortcomings have included Lesotho's only exploited mineral, diamonds, proving to be financially unviable, thus de Beers closed their mining operations in 1982, shrinking Lesotho's small revenue base even further. The unemployment problem has escalated, concomitant with the above harsh economic realities. This points to a long term dependence on migrant labour as an alternative source of employment (Wellings:1984).

Since the 1986 coup it appears that Lesotho's economic future is somewhat brighter in terms of the development of the modern sector and industrial development. However this development is linked structurally to South Africa. The Lesotho Highlands Water project, although it does not afford many employment oppurtunities (and those which it does are only for a limited length of time), has, however, encouraged the LNDC to channel money into more than 30 projects connected to the scheme. The only reason that the scheme was eventually given the 'go ahead' was because of the takeover of a more pro-South African government. Further, $100 million (US) has been injected into capital investment programmes to boost manufacturing production and exports.A further R13 million has been channelled into a wool and mohair processing plant in 1987 (Africa Institute Bulletin : 1987:198).

3.5.3. SWAZILAND

Swaziland's economic orientation is similiar to that of Lesotho and Botswana. Since independence in 1968 Swaziland has embarked ideologically and practically upon the capitalist path of development, enforcing it's strong ties with the West and with South Africa.

Politically, the system of rule in Swaziland has been dominated by the traditional system of monarchic rule. A constitutional monarchy was set in motion in 1968, with British influence, but by 1973 King Sobhuza II, leader before independence, had taken effective control of government once again. He dissolved Parliament and banned all political parties, declaring that the Westminster parliamentary system was not for Swaziland (Isaacs: 1982).

King Sobhuza's illness and death in 1982 was followed by a period of 'regency interregnum' which showed that the traditional ruling figure was essential to the political stability of Swaziland (30) (Africa Contemporary Record:1988). During this period the Liqoqo (traditional advisory council to the king) took control after deposing the Queen mother, Dzeliwe, in 1983. Corruption and political rivalry abounded, with royal factions vying for power. In 1984 alone there were four attempted coups. This led to the premature return of

King Mswati III from school in Britain, to be appointed to the throne at the age of 18. Since his appointment, in April 1986, the political chaos of the interregnum years subsided rapidly (Falle and Goppers:1988:61).

Swaziland's relative stability, bar the interregnum period, has attracted both foreign and South African investment. However, Swaziland's economic position is not without it's structural difficulties. Control of the country's assets presents a problem because of the degree to which foreign capital dominates. Furthermore Swaziland's Land Tenure System causes a division of land between Swazi Nation Areas (58%) which are controlled by the chiefs, and the Freehold Title Land (SADCC Conference Papers:1987). Money accrued in the nation areas is answerable to the King and not the government, this makes control of the country's assets even more problematic (Falle and Goppers:1988:63).

3.5.4. MALAWI

Malawi's economy is dependent on agriculture for 90% of it's foreign exchange (SADCC Conference Papers:1987). It is thus highly susceptable to changes in the international market economy, for example the 'New Protectionism' and declining terms of trade spoken of in Chapter Two. Malawi has, like the BLS, embarked upon the 'capitalist' path of development since independence. under the authoritarian leadership of President Hastings Banda (31).

The economic situation in Malawi is, similar to the BLS states, constrained by geographical realities. Malawi has a small land surface and a high population density, calculated in 1985 to be 64 people per square kilometre (Kadyampakeni: 1985). It is landlocked and furthermore, Malawi has to date no commercial minerals, thus creating little incentive for foreign investment. Nevertheless Malawi's development record, using standard indicators of growth, such as GNP, showed significant progress in the 1970's. Between 1970 and 1979 it had a positive growth rate of 3%, which in terms of consistency, was higher than Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in that period (32) (Kadyampakeni: 1985:89).

Malawi has pursued economic development according to the prescription most often put forward by multilateral aid organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. The currency has remained favourable to international trade, and Malawi has until recent years managed to keep it's foreign debts relatively low. The government civil service has been kept small and public expenditure for government posts is very low (Kadyampakeni:1985:90). Furthermore urban wages have also been kept low, stimulating the growth of the manufacturing sector and keeping the balance between urban and rural populations fairly static, preventing the influx of people to the cities for better jobs (33)(Kadyampakeni: 1985). Furthermore Malawi's modest growth in manufacturing, (8.3% per year between 1970 and

1982) has been stable, cost efficient and makes use of local products. Malawi has also made use of it's investment funds to stimulate agriculture, mainly large estate farming, resulting in a growth of production for export of 39% between 1970 and 1980 and in food production a growth of 30% in the same period (Kadyampakeni : 1985:91).

However Malawi has been classified as one of the least developed countries in the Third World (34). Yet Kadyampakeni points out that, except in the years of severe drought, there is an ample supply of goods, because of the stimulation given to agriculture and the fact that goods prices have been kept low. Thus the standard of living for the overall population is more even, given that urban salaries remain low, and there is sufficient food available for the population (Kadyampakeni:1985).

However Malawian economic policy has not escaped mistakes simply by virtue of espousing capitalism as it's development strategy. Criticism that has been leveled at Malawian development policy, which was also undertaken in Tanzania, was the squeezing of the peasant population to obtain finance for investment in other areas. In Malawi, the Agricultural Development and Marketing Board (ADMARC), controlled the selling of peasant produce so that low prices were paid to the sellers and the produce was then sold at inflated prices by the Board. In this way ADMARC made a substantial profit (Winter: 1984:112). The profits made by ADMARC were channelled into estate agriculture. The peasant sector, who recieved 3.2% of the investments and loans from ADMARC, were not taken into account sufficiently, given their role in the economy (about 92% of the population live in the rural areas, thus peasant agriculture plays a vital role in the Malawian economy) (Africa Institute Bulletin:1986). The decline of peasant production combined with drought and a decline in the prices of export products between 1977 and 1981 led to a decline in export earnings and a greater dependency on loans and aid from the West (35)(Winter: 1984:114).

In 1981 Malawi's debt servicing difficulties forced them to apply for debt rescheduling and structural adjustment loans. These however did not rectify the share of investment expenditure in the agricultural sector as the conditionalities attached to the funding called for cuts to public expenditure and currency devaluations, further hampering peasant sector growth. However in the 1983-84 period higher prices for peasant produce were instituted (Christianson:1984:409). Thus the primary development mistake that the Malawian government made was, as in Tanzania, to extract surplus from the peasants without providing them with sufficient stimulation. Although agriculture did grow in the 1970's, had the investment been channelled more evenly, agricultural development would have been founded on a much more solid base, this applies to all the SADCC countries in the light of their agricultural policies examined thus far.

Economic difficulties in recent years have been the 1986 drought and the influx of 200 000 refugees, placing Malawi under pressure in terms of providing food and shelter for these people (Africa Contemporary Record: 1988). Further the war in Mozambique has caused difficulty with exporting produce via Mozambican ports. It has been estimated that the 'circuitous' routes which Malawi has to use for exports, through South African or Tanzanian ports, cost them a third of their export earnings each year. (Africa Contemporary Record:1988:B677) This, coupled with debt servicing responsibilities of between 38-40% of total recurrent expenditure causes a strain on the economy which is not a result of Malawi's domestic investment spending misdirection.

3.5.5. 'CAPITALISM' OR 'SOCIALISM?'

The economic policies and development of the 'capitalist' orientated SADCC states show that such policies definitely do promote economic benefits, however it is clear that these benefits are very substantially improved by the low level of economic destabilisation from the economic hegemon. With the exception of Lesotho up until 1986 all four of the states retained much more cordial relations with South Africa than the 'socialist' states studied earlier. Although the BLS states are still subject to raids by South African military and police forces in search of ANC terrorists, the absence of liberation struggles and the relatively untouched structural and historic links have served to preserve and perpetuate economic relations more firmly. The capitalist ideological persuasion, further, enabled clearer development plans to be pursued as it did not challenge the historical links between the western socio-economic totality and these countries economies. A further consequence was private investment was not discouraged. Further evidence of the benefits of this ideological stance was the availability of revenue to concentrate on infrastructure and education. While it must be reaffirmed that Angola and Mozambique are severely hampered in this respect because of destabilisation, it remains a fact that the 'capitalist' countries have had more revenue with which to pursue their development policies, because of aid, especially in the case of Botswana, and uninterrupted trade links.

However as mentioned when discussing Malawi, the proported 'capitalist' ideology has not prevented these states from making economic mistakes nor has 'capitalist' influence always positively aided their development, as the restrictions attached to IMF funds in Malawi point out. Further agricultural development has been hampered in spite of capitalist ideology as in the case of Malawi. The BLS, fortunate in the fact that their transition to independence were the most unproblematic in the region, are hampered by the existence of traditional tenure systems and wide disparities between income groups. Capitalism as an ideology has also not prevented them feeling the effects of destabilisation, Lesotho's case shows how the government of a country may be threatened by an economic hegemon, while Malawi's situation illustrates the effects of the indirect costs of destabilisation. Lesotho (after 1986) and Swaziland illustrate the degree to which the economic hegemon may obtain political and economic aquiescence through indirect coercion and incentives.

Thus capitalism as an ideology cannot be said to be definitely a more superior ideological vehicle for development in the SADCC region than socialism. However the prominent effects of the capitalist ideological adherence are threefold. First traditional forms of interaction with the western market economy are maintained and enforced. This prevents a situation as in Mozambique, where the effects of adopting a radical socialist stance had severe economic repercussions because traditional forms of revenue accumulation were damaged. Second, extensive capitalist orientated interaction with South Africa economically has had medium term economic benefits. Although these have not always been to the benefit of long term economic diversification economic structures such as SACU have benefited the BLS, as has the Labour and Tourist agreements between Malawi and South Africa. Third , and most important, the links between the socio-economic totality of the western market economy have remained strong. This spells difficulty for SADCC's goals and precludes a convergence of interests around fixed patterns of behaviour, as the goals do not square with the type of economic interaction being pursued by these states. The dynamic of capitalism, as mentioned, in Chapter Two, does not include 'equitable' regional development. Furthermore the close ties between these states, the West and South Africa show that their economic interests do not converge around the goals of SADCC ideologically or in practise. In this sense these four states are even more estranged from the SADCC regime framework than the so called 'socialist' countries. This illustrates a fundamental weakness in the SADCC regime framework which will become clearer when analysing the goals of SADCC, and furthermore shows the structural strength of the spontaneous imposed regime. In this sense the 'capitalist' states have the more beneficial orientation in terms of an awareness of the constraints and benefits of capitalist development.

3.6. TIES BETWEEN THE 'CAPITALIST' STATES, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WEST.

3.6.1. BOTSWANA

Botswana has allied itself strongly with black Africa and has vociferously condemned apartheid, however it retains cordial economic relations with South Africa, and, unlike Lesotho before 1986, has not openly provoked the apartheid state. Further, Botswana has diversified it's political and economic ties to give it more freedom of choice in decision making (Dale, cited by Picard:1987:109). The EEC and North and South America have close economic links, and in addition Botswana also has low key diplomatic links with the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China.

However the economic ties between South Africa and Botswana, namely the Southern

African Customs Union (SACU), and Botswana's reliance on South Africa for imports tie the two countries together very firmly on the economic level (36).Sixty percent of Botswana's mining sector is controlled by South African interests and there is about sixty percent of South African investment capital in their mining (Chitala:1987:22). Furthermore, Botswana's chief source of revenue at the moment, the Orapa and Jwaneng diamond mines are half owned by De Beers (SADCC Conference Papers:1987). Botswana has however managed to retain political legitimacy by it's mediated stance towards South Africa. An example of this are the claims made by Bophuthatswana in April 1987 for Botswana's citizens to produce passports when entering the 'independent homeland.' Botswana managed to deal with pressure from Bophuthatswana and South Africa without compromising it's commitment to the OAU's non-recognition of these homelands, and at the same time without causing overt South African interference (37) (Africa Confidential:18 Feb 1987).

The success of the BDP's reign has evidently been tied to the economic and political policy which they have followed. The development of social services and infrastructure has been paramount. Schools, health, welfare and other services as well as roads and water supply have been focal points which have received much attention.

3.6.2. LESOTHO

Since the takeover the internal political legitimacy of the new government is, to a large extent, derived from it's co-opting of King Mosheshoe II who shares executive and legislative powers with the Military Council. The King has also helped to maintain the country's international legitimacy, as he is fairly outspoken in terms of his stance against apartheid. Lekhanya, however, is on the other end of the scale and has moved the country much closer to South Africa both diplomatically and, more overtly, economically. Evidence of this is the signing of the agreement between the two countries in 1986 for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Africa Institute Bulletin: 1987:34).

It is important to note that Lekhanya has verbally and physically demonstrated Lesotho's changed attitude towards the ANC by expelling refugees and by taking a much less friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union which appears to have decisively influenced South Africa's attitude towards that country, although this does not by any means reduce Lesotho's asymetrical dependence on South Africa. Previously unstable migrant labour links have been stabilised, an element of economic interaction which is vital to Lesotho given it's narrow resource base, and the Highlands Water Project (38) is now in progress, promising cash revenue to Lesotho on a monthly basis from 1990 onwards. In addition, Lesotho will derive hydroelectric energy from the scheme. Further the project will enhance Lesotho's already improving tourist potential (given that the relations between South Africa and Lesotho have improved and insurgency from the LLA has ceased) by further opening up the mountainous regions with an extensive road network (Africa Contemporary Record: 1988:669).

Half of Lesotho's GDP comes from net factor income in the form of SACU revenue and migrant remittances, the other half is generated by the state's production of goods and services (SADCC Conference Papers:1987). Because of the constraints on land availability, coupled with a growing population and a system of Land Tenure much of the rurally based population living off the land cannot in fact subsist without the cash remittances of the migrant labourers. Lesotho has only one million acres of arable land, the remaining 5 million is too mountainous to be used for agriculture. Migrant earnings remain in excess of what can be made on the land (Bordill and Cobbe:1985:45). Thus migrant labour has become an entrenched method of supplementing rural family income. This continues to tie Lesotho firmly to South Africa's economy, as is substantiated by Table Five in the appendix. Bordill and Cobbe further point out that the migrants' remittances have made the otherwise economically undeveloped Lesotho an extremely monetised economy (Bordill and Cobbe:1985:45). The result of this has been that Lesotho imports large amounts of consumer goods from South Africa, who remains the closest, most convenient and cheapest source (39).

3.6.3. SWAZILAND

Swazi economic development is, of the three former Protectorates, unique because of the degree to which the Swazi economy is penetrated by foreign and South African investment capital. This has created structural long term links between South Africa and Swaziland and has at the same time linked Swaziland to the western market economy. In Swaziland 30% of direct foreign investment is by South African firms, in diamond, coal and asbestos's mining and also in brewery and most other manufacturing concerns. Furthermore, 90% percent of Swaziland's manufactured goods and 60% of Swaziland revenue is from South Africa, the latter in revenue from SACU (Chitala:1987:22). Swaziland has more of a national economy than Lesotho as the country is not as reliant on migrant labour, as Table Five in the appendix illustrates, however both commercial agriculture and industry are largely beyond the control of government. The development of agriculture and industry has been chiefly through South African and British capital. Anglo American control 90% of citrus production, one of Swaziland's main exports. Similarily industry and commerce are dominated by South African capital especially since the tightening of sanctions against South Africa in 1986 (40). This has led to the relocation of some South African companies in Swaziland to avoid sanctions and to take advantage of the preferential terms available to Swaziland as a signatory of Lome (41) (Africa Contemporary Record: 1988:683). The fact that Swaziland has kept close and favourable diplomatic ties with the West has also aided the stimulation of the economy (42). Aid from the United States has been more noticeably forthcoming, as

Swaziland has supported U.S. diplomatic policy on several occasions (Bischoff: 1986).

The level of dependence on South Africa for import trade, a route for exports, energy needs, tourism, water and revenue from SACU means that the goal of independence, is for Swaziland, unrealistic. Ninety percent of Swaziland's imports come from South Africa, 100% of her oil and 60% of her electricity. Since the Maputo railway line is unsafe Swaziland has also taken to using the new railink between Komatipoort and Richards Bay which runs through Swazi territory. This provides a safer and economically viable alternative to Maputo. Sixty seven percent of Swaziland's exports now go through South Africa (1985) whereas up until 1981-82 only 30% of her exports went through South Africa (Falle and Goppers: 1988:28).

3.6.4. MALAWI

Malawi has been the only SADCC state to maintain official diplomatic links with South Africa. From independence Banda embarked upon a 'Dialogue' policy which entailed trading with South Africa and retaining the extensive migrant labour links which existed between the two countries. This was formalised in 1967 with a trade and labour pact. South Africa also initially gave Malawi development assistance which was used to extend urban development in Malawi (43) (Chitala :1987). Notwithstanding Green's evidence showing "...a new commitment to disengagement from South Africa's transport network...i.e. Malawi's renewed interest in reopening the Nacala line, rerouting cargo via Beira and also negotiating for increased facilities at Dar-es-Salaam..." it nevertheless appears that economic and diplomatic ties stand firm (Green:1986:82) (Africa Institute Bulletin : 1984). Tables Four and Five in the appendix, showing trade and migrant labour ties between the two countries, underline this conclusion. The continuance of ties was emphasised once again by P.W. Botha's visit to Malawi and subsequent gift of grain to the country in 1988 (E.P. Herald:1988:1). Although the relationship with South Africa, Banda maintains, is economically expedient and does not im $,4apartheid, it has nevertheless caused a certain amount of alienation from the other Southern African and African states, particularly Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania, who are politically vociferous in their condemnation of South Africa although maintaining unofficial trade links (44).

3.6.5. THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION

From the overall picture emerging in relation to the capitalist states interaction with South Africa and the West, there seems to be a high convergence of interest around fixed patterns of behaviour. Although it is evident that these ties have been cultivated out of necessity due to the size and geographical location of these states as well as, to an extent, out of a desire for government security, it is also evident that the ties are structurally entrenched and preclude a breakdown of the links which bind these four states to South Africa and the

West. Ideologically therefore their orientation is in line with their economic reality. However the question which emerges from this conclusion is what binds these states to the SADCC regime, and further, are there possibilities of economic patterns of behaviour evolving around the regimes goals?. This question will now be addressed.

3.7. THE CAPITALIST SADCC STATES AND THEIR INTERACTION WITHIN THE SADCC REGIME FRAMEWORK

3.7.1. BOTSWANA

In addition to trading with South Africa, Zimbabwe is Botswana's second largest trading partner for both imports and exports. However trade with the other countries remains minimal (see Tables Two and Three in the appendix). In terms of energy there has been some cooperation between Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with the linking of power grids between these countries at present under discussion (SADCC Conference Papers:1987).

Botswana's further economic diversification as a member of SADCC may serve to complement and extend the role which her economy plays in the market system, however it remains a fact that Botswana will, if only because of proximity, always have ties with South Africa. It's economic orientation thus seems to take cognisance of the socio-economic totality of which the country is part, in terms of it's links with the western market economy and with South Africa, because of the country's size and geographical proximity. The BDP government's relationship with the SADCC countries is moulded to fit this perception. Thus the government acts according to it's interests, both political and economic and these are not always consistent with the goals laid down by the SADCC regime as they stand at present, particularly that of economic independence from South Africa.

3.7.2. LESOTHO

Since the coup, Lesotho has been at pains to stress it's continued support for SADCC (Africa Contemporary Record: 1988). The King, as mentioned, has helped foster international legitimacy by playing an independent role in foreign affairs and in maintaining Lesotho's more moderate anti-apartheid stance. The SADCC countries appear to have tacitly accepted the new relationship between South Africa and Lesotho. This may be a result of the long term implicit understanding in the region that, as Bordill and Cobbe state "... reducing their dependence is neither feasible nor consistent with other objectives and clearly has not been achieved" (Bordill and Cobbe:1985: 70).

It is evident that given the socio-economic reality of which Lesotho is part it's ties are much more firmly linked to the South African spontaneous imposed regime than with the SADCC regime framework. Thus Lesotho, like Swaziland and Botswana, may have more to lose from taking a political and economic stance against South Africa, implicit in the SADCC goal of economic independence and equitable regional integration. The political and economic security of the Lesotho government depends on their relations with South Africa and these may be hampered by overtly rebellious forms of economic and political cooperation in the region. Thus the goal of greater independence for Lesotho, is now and in the future clearly impossible.

3.7.3. SWAZILAND

The discussion of the BLS thus far proves that breaking links with South Africa is an unrealistic goal for Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. Swaziland has however, like Lesotho, in fact moved closer to South Africa economically since the formation of SADCC and negotiated the infamous 'Land Deal' with South Africa, even after SADCC was formed, showing a greater convergence of political interests with South Africa than with SADCC (45). Although this situation was contrived by South Africa using tangible resource incentives (land) it shows South Africa's ability to manipulate the highly dependent subordinate actors in the spontaneous imposed regime. This is particularly relevant to the BLS countries. Although it is impossible for them to compete with the South African economy, even in specialised areas, as SACU allows for the free flow of goods and services and thus does not encourage the protection of infant competitive industry, it remains the most beneficial economic relationship of which they are part in Southern Africa. At the same time tourism and trade with South Africa has remained fairly untroubled. Swaziland's ties economically at least, have weakened her links with SADCC and shown that the convergence of interests of the SADCC regime do not extend to the economic self interest of Swaziland (or Lesotho and Botswana) and therefore have not led to a pattern of behaviour around SADCC regime goals. Instead Swaziland continues to function within the Western market economy framework in close association with South Africa (46).

3.7.4. MALAWI

Banda's ties with South Africa and the proported support of Malawi for the MNR until 1986, has, as mentioned, caused hostility among the SADCC countries (47). However from 1986 onwards Malawi has been overtly supporting FRELIMO by sending in troops to Mozambique and by expelling all suspected MNR guerilla's in the country (Africa Confidential:18 Nov:1987). This appears to indicate that Malawi does exercise some degree of opposition to South Africa's apartheid government.

The stable production and quality of Malawian manufactured goods as well as their usual surplus of grain means that Malawi's economy is to some extent able to enter trade relations with other SADCC states. If a free trade area were to be established within the SADCC regime framework, Malawi's goods would be competitive with Zimbabwe's in the areas in which it specialises. It could also could undercut Zambia and Mozambique in the manufacturing market (Kadyampakeni: 1985). However because of it's size and resource base Malawi will always be asymmetrically interdependent. Malawi's prospects for an expanded economic regime along market economy lines are thus good, relative to the country's resource base. However the structural ties between South Africa and Malawi outlined previously show a high degree of convergent economic interests at present and in the forseeable future between Malawi and South Africa.

3.7.5. THE SADCC REGIME IN PERSPECTIVE.

It is clear that the development methods in the region are not neatly related to ideology. Both capitalism and socialism have had their shortcomings as ideological vehicles for the formulation and implementation of policy. There is however a clear correlation between radical socialist stances taken by the SADCC states especially those involved in liberation struggles and overt and aggressive destabilisation by the economic hegemon, South Africa. Furthermore there is a greater political and economic consistency between the 'capitalist' orientated states and the socio-economic totality of which they are part. This precludes the development of alternative patterns of behaviour within the SADCC regime framework. As such the goals of SADCC serve relatively little purpose, as they do not promote greater regional integration on the economic level. As the outlines of the SADCC states domestic economies highlight, the underlying structure, spoken of in Chapter One and Two, that is the socio-economic reality which regulates political and economic activity within states, also regulates their relationships in the region and internationally. The underlying structure, therefore, regulates the functioning of both the spontaneous imposed regime and the negotiated regime. Because the framework of the SADCC negotiated regime is not tied firmly to the underlying socio-economic structure in terms of its goals, the convergence of interests on economic matters are weak because the domestic self-interest of the SADCC states square more firmly with the regime structure which is structurally rooted in the socio-economic reality of the western market system.Thusthe spontaneous imposed regime framework predominates.

To enable this conclusion to hold greater factual weight it is necessary to analyse the goals of the SADCC regime, now that the individual countries have been placed in historical context in terms of the socio-economic reality of which they are part, and in which the SADCC regime must function.

CHAPTER FOUR: ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE, EQUITABLE REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE 'SOCIO-ECONOMIC TOTALITY'.

4.1. THE PURPOSE OF EXAMINING SADCC'S GOALS.

To further examine the strength of the SADCC regime framework it is necessary to analyse how closely the regime has followed the goals it set out to achieve. The goals outline the original and continuing convergence of interests which formed the basis for the creation of the regime.

Before examining evidence on SADCC's performance it is necessary to make one point clear. Much of the empirical analyses on SADCC's performance, is in terms of Varshney's criticism, tainted by biased initial assumptions. Thus writers such as Leistner (1987), who is pro-South African hegemony in the region, tend to downplay the negative influence of South Africa's dominance in the region and to discount the alleged destabilisation efforts of the National Party government. Instead South Africa's positive role, as the regional economic hegemon who allows considerable trickle down benefits from her modern, industrialised and diversified economy to those who have economic ties with her, are stressed. On the other side of the political spectrum liberals, such as Green (1988), Hill (1983) and Thompson (1986), and marxists, such as Amin (1987), Kadyampakeni (1986), and Ndedla (1987) pose that South Africa's role in Southern Africa is profoundly destabilising and to all extents and purposes cripples effective manoeuvres on the part of SADCC to become any less economically dependent. Both views represent a part of the aspect of regime interaction in Southern Africa, although neither present the complete picture. They differ on their theoretical assumptions about the totality, that is, their perceptions of the socio-economic world setting. Conservatives such as Leistner are of the opinion that capitalism, as it functions in the Southern African context, is beneficial, whereas the liberal and marxist schools see capitalism in Southern Africa as an extension of colonialism, imperialism and worst of all, in the context of South Africa, racism. These observations square in some respects with Davies and O'Meara's analyses of different perspectives taken in the literature on South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' or 'Total Onslaught' regional policy which began in the late 1970's (Davies and O'Meara:1982). From this essentially marxist perspective, total onslaught is portrayed as the response of the South African government and Afrikaner monopoly capital in the late 1970's to the changing domestic and Southern African situation. The shift of reformist monopoly capital towards an alliance with the military, formalised when PW Botha , previously Minister of Defence, became Prime Minister in 1979 after the Muldergate scandal, indicated that there was a realisation in government and business circles that certain reforms had to be made in South and Southern Africa (Davies and O' Meara:1982:7). This, it is said, was sparked off by the effects of economic depression which were being felt by South Africa during that period. Total Strategy was seen as South Africa's attempt to form an alliance based on economic ties with the 'capitalist' countries in the region to route out the ANC who were seen not only as a threat to South Africa's internal security, but to her domination of the region both politically and economically. Vale (1983) substantiates the view that total national strategy was heavily orientated towards combating the ANC, who was seen to be "...the eye of the total onslaught storm..." (Vale: 1983). The failure of South Africa to coopt the states in the region into an economic alliance is seen to have indicated the move towards direct military intervention and destabilisation via insurgent forces and also encouraged South Africa to use her economic links in order to attain regional political acquiescence for apartheid. For the purposes of the application of regime theory it is important to observe the perspective that these approaches give to South Africa's regional policy, as they highlight different aspects and interpretations of South Africa's coercive and incentive measures whereby the structure of the spontaneous imposed regime is regulated.

For the purposes of this analysis the strength of the regime ties between the individual SADCC countries or between SADCC and South Africa in terms of fixed patterns of behaviour around convergent interests will be used to determine which of the two frameworks holds the greater structural long term strength. Thus the interaction between the regime frameworks and the totality of which they are part will be concentrated on, that is how effectively can SADCC or the South Africa-SADCC convergence of interests integrate the interests of the individual countries into the world economic setting. However where political factors intervene which affect the functioning of the two economic regimes, such as the proported ideological leanings of the individual SADCC governments or South Africa's military activities in the region, these will be assessed in terms of how they affect or facilitate the optimum functioning of two regime frameworks. Thus socio-economic reality remains the prime focus, guided by the theoretical orientation of regime theory using the structural methodological approach. It is hoped that this will provide a more objective view of the socio-economic relations of the SADCC states. As in the analyses of the domestic situations of the SADCC states, the benefits and drawbacks of ideology as it is translated into practise can be made clear. The conclusions reached thus far on the interaction of individual states in the region vis a vis South Africa and the rest of the world can then be either substantiated or disproved in terms of the functioning of the overarching structure, that is the regime framework as defined by the goals towards which the economic organisation is working.

However, because the two groupings present evidence on the SADCC regime differently, it is necessary to examine both viewpoints to see how closely they fit the socio-economic reality within which the SADCC regime functions.

4.2.GOAL ONE: In pursuit of economic independence.

In terms of the first goal of SADCC, that is the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only on South Africa, there are a number of definitional and conceptual problems to be dealt with first. Economic dependence is held by the structuralist marxist school to be a historically orientated, structural problem. Chitala states that South Africa is historically a product of capitalist imperialism and is the sub-imperial power in the region. " South Africa is not simply an agent of finance capital... but is itself deeply involved in the criss cross of imperialist relations which give it it's position" (Chitala:1987: 15). In this light South Africa is seen as the perpetuator of the dominance and dependence relations which exist between North and South. The links between western capital and South Africa, states Chitala, are mainly in the form of monopoly corporations. The Anglo American Corporation (AAC) for example, is intertwined with British and U.S. capital but it also owns 56% of domestic capital shares in South Africa. "Altogether the group either controlled or held an important stake in 31 of the country's top 50 market leaders" (Chitala :1987:16). He concludes that South Africa has developed from a semi-colonial economy to an independent capitalill be used to determine which of the two frameworks holds the greater structural long term strength. Thus the interaction between the regime frameworks and the totality of which they are part will be concentrated on, that is how effectively can SADCC or the South Africa-SADCC convergence of interests integrate the interests of the individual countries into the world economic setting. However where political factors intervene which affect the functioning of the two economic regimes, such as the proported ideological leanings of the individual SADCC governments or South Africa's military activities in the region, these will be assessed in terms of how they affect or facilitate the optimum functioning of two regime frameworks. Thus socio-economic reality remains the prime focus, guided by the theoretical orientation of regime theory using the structural methodological approach. It is hoped that this will provide a more objective view of the socio-economic relations of the SADCC states. As in the analyses of the domestic situations of the SADCC states, the benefits and drawbacks of ideology as it is translated into practise can be made clear. The conclusions reached thus far on the interaction of individual states in the region vis a vis South Africa and the rest of the world can then be either substantiated or disproved in terms of the functioning of the overarching structure, that is the regime framework as defined by the goals towards which the economic organisation is working.

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Although this approach is guilty of using value laden terminology to define the dependence of the Southern African countries on South Africa (imperialism has become a term used among radical liberal and marxist writers to denote exploitation in a pejorative sense) it is nevertheless true that "...since 1900 the South African white population have controlled economic policies which treat the entire South Central African region as one economic entity" (Kadyampakeni:1986 :418).This conclusion is substantiated by the visions held by the South African government since the era of General Smuts for economic and political cooperation in the region, as will be discussed later in this chapter. These links, and the fact that South African corporate investment in mining and other spheres dominates the Southern African region, point to extensive capital penetration of the Southern African region by South Africa. Thus South Africa is without doubt the dominant economic partner in the region, a fact that is substantiated by the evidence presented in Chapter Three.

For the purposes of analysing the strength of the SADCC regime framework, and the reason for the existence of the spontaneous imposed economic regime, definitions pertaining to economic cooperation and integration need clarification in the light of SADCC's attempts at achieving economic independence.

Economic cooperation, as defined by Geldenhuys and Venter, implies a cooperative, informal set of relations between states which relies on dialogue to resolve grievances. There are no formal structures governing this relationship except for a Secretariat. The British Commonwealth is a prime example of economic and political coordination (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:39). Economic integration on the other hand, implies specific action to abolish discriminatory measures, or an absence of discriminatory measures among national economies (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:37).

Venter and Geldenhuys grade the forms of economic integration common among states. The lowest level in terms of formal economic agreements is a free trade area. Here tariffs and quota's between member states are removed. A customs union usually entails a higher level of economic integration and necessitates the removal of discriminatory measures pertaining to commodity movements within the union, and the introduction of equal tariffs in trade with non-member countries. The highest form of economic integration is a common market, here restrictions on goods, services, capital and labour between member countries are removed, entailing a high level of economic and political cooperation. Furthermore the harmonising of economic policies relating to production and marketing and the consolidation of separate external tariffs applicable to imports from outside the common market have to be decided upon by the member countries (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:37-38). As will become clearer when discussing SADCC's goal of 'equitable regional integration, SADCC's loose organisational structure, which is purposefully maintained, precludes economic interaction along the above lines because, with the exception of the 'commonwealth' form of interaction, all the forms of closer economic integration entail a relinquishing of national sovereignty to a greater or lesser degree. This means that 'economic independence' in the region will be extremely difficult to achieve, in terms of cutting ties with South Africa and the West. SADCC refuses to relinquish present ties of economic interdependence for ties within the SADCC regime itself.

The question which emerges from the above conclusion is what steps have been made towards the goal of reduction of economic dependence? The outlines of the individual states domestic economic and political positions show a high level of economic interaction between the SADCC states and South Africa and a much lower level between the SADCC states themselves. Further, South Africa's economic dominance shows the weakness of convergent economic interests in terms of this goal. However the organisation's functioning in terms of this goal must be examined to substantiate or disprove this conclusion.

4.2.1. DEPENDENCE DESPITE 'INDEPENDENCE' RHETORIC.

SADCC's economic interaction with South Africa is economically asymmetrical. Seven of the SADCC countries have a greater proportional reliance on South Africa in terms of transport, trade, energy and investment (Davids: 1986: 10).

The long term nature of the Southern African regions economic links with South Africa are stressed by the degree to which infrastructure linked in the region. In terms of physical infrastructure, South African capital is tied to railway and hydroelectric plans and to railway construction, for example the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme in Mozambique and Cunene in Angola, as well as railway and construction schemes in Angola, Malawi and

Swaziland (Chitala:1987). Chitala outlines some of the difficulties involved in trying to break from South Africa's railway and port network. Besides rebel group interference the Tanzam railway route "...suffers from a low capacity of the harbor at Dar-es-Salaam and is also hampered by poor administration and maintenance" (Chitala :1987 :22). The Maputo and Beira raillinks in Mozambique also suffer from "... the problem of worn down tracks, manpower shortage, lack of locomotives and rolling stock, inefficiency and frequent sabotage attacks carried out by the MNR" (Chitala: 1987:22). Although transport and communications links have improved through SADCC's projects (implemented through the Southern African Transport and Communications Conference (SATCC) which is based in and controlled by the Mozambican government) the obstacles facing the improvement of both rail and port facilities are hampered by structural obstacles. This has meant that although project implementation in this sector continues, so too does the reliance on South Africa's rail and port links.

Those SADCC countries linked to South Africa infrastructurally and in terms of trade maintain these ties because the pattern of relations within which the economic interests of the countries converge remain more compatible economically within the spontaneous imposed regime framework than the politically based alternatives offered by the SADCC framework. Political and economic coercion from South Africa contributes to prevent alternative patterns of behaviour arising. These conclusions are well substantiated by the brief outlines in Chapter Three of the SADCC states domestic political and economic practises at present. This conclusion also puts paid to the idea that South Africa is maintaining economic hegemony in the region by force only. The convergence of economic interests perpetuates the spontaneous imposed regime in spite of SADCC's rhetoric.

4.2.2. TRADE RELATIONS

Although the level of dependence differs, Davids points out that dependence on trade with South Africa varies from about 12% of total Mozambican trade to 95 % of total trade for Lesotho, South Africa plays the role of leading trading partner with all of the SADCC countries, with the exception of Angola and Tanzania (see Table Four in the appendix). Political theorists differ on whether this trade is important to South Africa. Davids states "...it is likely that in the next few years the Southern African markets will become even more crucial to South Africa as protectionism and sanctions in the western industrial economies take hold" (Davids:1986: 13). Kiljunen, however, states that trade with SADCC is, for South Africa, not very important. Less than 7% of South Africa's total exports and 4% of her imports take place with African countries. However the importance of the ties in terms of the method of analysis used in this paper points to the conclusion that the interests of SADCC countries and South Africa have, through historical and geographical links, converged economically and have become fixed. The analyses of the SADCC states domestic economic situations substantiate this conclusion empirically. Thus the economic regime functions not only in terms of present interests but also because of the feedbacks mentioned by Keohane in Chapter One, that is the causal factors which gave rise to the regime perpetuate it. In the case of Southern Africa the trading ties developed during the colonial days have given rise to the economic regime which exists between South Africa and seven of the nine SADCC countries. These ties are developments from the colonial system to the extension of capitalism. As the analyses show, Southern Africa fits into the world system of capitalism through it's historic relations with South Africa and/or with the western market economy.

In the context of the functional approach of regime theory applied to the relationship between SADCC and South Africa it may be said that on the economic level they interact in individual self interest, or the relations would not take place. However the existence of military destabilisation and the moral stance that the SADCC states take against the South African apartheid system (as well as their reluctance to interact with South Africa because of her political policies) make these relations strained and economically dysfunctional. Economic interaction, although functional in the sense that it is in the interests of the SADCC countries in terms of their interaction with the world economy, is dysfunctional insofar as they remain recipients of the effects of South Africa's discriminatory form of government, including the very real economic and political costs of South African destabilisation, especially in the case of Mozambique and Angola. These conclusions substantiate Davies and O'Meara's viewpoint that capitalism in South Africa is intertwined with the country's apartheid policies (Davies and O'Meara: 1982). In this sense the functioning of capitalism in the region is dysfunctional, as it requires a tacit acquiescence to the racist policies of the South Africa. However it is not the relations with the international system through South Africa which are condemned by the SADCC countries. Their desire to break away from the spontaneous imposed regime is given as a desire for greater development through less 'dependence'. However the support of the Frontline States for the South African liberation struggle and their political stance against apartheid remains a constant political feature of both of the economic regimes interaction. However the strength of the spontaneous imposed regime would seem to lie in the fact the reasons for it's existence are historically based and are perpetuated by the fact that they are rooted in the socio-economic totality of capitalism. Hence the regime structure is tied to the socio-economic reality of which all the Southern African countries are part, even though political factors cause the regime to function dysfunctionally.

4.2.3. THE 'CONSTELLATION' VISION.

South Africa has, since General Smuts, voiced the idea of a 'mini League of Nations' in Africa, envisaging formalised economic and political cooperation in the Southern African region. Implicit in all the visions of economic and political cooperation in Southern Africa, from Smuts to Botha, has been the knowledge that such cooperation would help towards economic, political and social stability for the white dominated South African state (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:43). Thus the plans have included the black homelands of South Africa since Verwoerd's era in an attempt to create separate white and black states in South Africa, and have since the 1970's, when the situation in Southern Africa became more politically hostile towards South Africa, attempted to formalise economic relations to create institutionalised economic and political bonds. It is evident that the type of economic cooperation envisaged, from the idea of a 'commonwealth-cum-common market' (voiced by Dr Verwoerd) to Botha's 'constellation of states' that the type of economic relations would institutionalise economic cooperation and thus conflict in the region could be minimised. As is evident from the various types of economic integration mentioned earlier, political cooperation between states is necessary, as is political will (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979). Institutionalised economic integration for South Africa then, would imply a much higher level of political security. This, in the light of increasing hostility from the newly independent 'Marxist-Leninist' states in the region, was obviously seen as a very desirable goal.

Venter and Geldenhuys state that Botha's push to initiate regional integration, formally given voice in his 'Carlton' address in 1979,"...must be seen against the background of South Africa's and Southern Africa's international position. It is, as mentioned, clearly linked to the deterioration in the Republic's relations with the West" (1)(Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:51). This conclusion is substantiated by Davies and O'Meara (1982) and Vale (1983) who state that South Africa's new reform policy in the region, total strategy, was a result of economic and political disaffection with western attitudes to political events in the region, such as the 1976 Soweto riots in South Africa, as well as the arrival of Cuban forces in Angola. South Africa, who is tightly integrated into the western market economy, could, through CONSAS, build stronger links between it's economy and other states in the Southern African region by institutionalising economic relations, and thus would be more secure economically in terms of both direct and indirect links with the socio-economic totality (western capitalism).

Botha's constellation idea also envisaged military cooperation and included the 'independent ' homelands. Venter and Geldenhuys state that Botha "...realised that political will was the decisive factor in securing cooperation" (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:54). The constellation envisaged included the BLS, Zimbabwe (before Mugabe and ZANU-PF came to power) and the homelands (2). It is important to make clear that the formation of SADCC was therefore an economic alternative to the constellation vision on the part of the Southern African states, and was furthermore a politically provocative move because it specifically excluded political cooperation along with the economic ties which continued to take place between Southern and South Africa. The goal of economic independence 'particularly but not only from South Africa', in terms of the fact that economic ties exist and have been strengthened since the formation of SADCC show the deliberate political stance taken by SADCC. It is in this light that destabilisation must be seen. South Africa, denied political security through the failure of the constellation idea, and unable to enforce it's links on an institutionalised level with Southern Africa, resorted to keeping the political threat at bay by military and economic destabilisation. It was in this sense that the total strategy became directly coercive. Because military cooperation was a key element of CONSAS, to keep the 'communist threat at bay', it is not difficult to see why destabilisation centred mainly on Angola and Mozambique. The terrorist or communist threat has caused sporadic destabilisation in other SADCC countries, as mentioned in Chapter Three. However the destabilisation of Mozambique's transport network appears to be a direct attempt to prevent economic links with the West in the Southern African region that are created specifically to exclude South Africa.

4.2.4. THE STRENGTH OF THE NEGOTIATED REGIME.

Most of the motivational factors determining the existence of the SADCC regime, especially the goal of independence from South Africa, have already a fundamental weakness in that the socio-economic reality of which the SADCC countries are part is not firmly tied to the ideological values of SADCC. Because South Africa is the regional capitalist hegemon they are bound to remain tied to that economy. This is evident from the analyses undertaken earlier on. There is a further ideological anomaly in the goal of 'equitable regional integration' as this goal is impossible to square with the socio-economic totality of which SADCC is part. This makes it difficult for the SADCC regime to function economically within the socio-economic reality of which it is part because it's goals do not square with that reality. This will become clearer when discussing SADCC's second goal in this chapter. However the strength of the spontaneous imposed regime, in terms of the goal of 'economic independence' highlights the fragility of the SADCC regime framework.

4.2.5. THE STRENGTH OF THE SPONTANEOUS IMPOSED ECONOMIC REGIME.

Leistner, who as mentioned, is pro South African dominance in the region, illustrates how South Africa's economy dominates the Southern African region. It has a GNP that accounts for 79% of the regional total. Furthermore South Africa's income in 1985 was 13 times that of Mozambique, 4 times that of Zambia, and almost 3 times that of Zimbabwe (Leistner:1986:149). Leistner also outlines the extent to which South Africa and the Southern African countries interact, stating that the common features in the region, such as the common colonial background (with the exception of Angola and Mozambique) and similar physical features make it natural for close interaction. He states that "...experience has shown that the manifold interests that South Africa shares with it's neighbours that even vehement anti-South African sentiments are not readily allowed to disturb them" (Leistner: 1986: 149). In terms of the functionalist approach to regime analysis the self interest of the governments are reflected in patterns of behaviour which continue to exist in response to the socio-economic realities in the region. South Africa, as the dominant economic actor, can provide benefits for the SADCC countries and thus ties are maintained despite the rhetoric on moves to economic independence. This is substantiated by regime theory,

"Both hegemonic powers and the smaller states may have incentives to collaborate in maintaining a regime - the hegemonic power gains the ability to shape and dominate it's environment, while providing a sufficient flow of benefits to small and middle powers to persuade them to acquiesce" (Keohane: 1980:137). Further, in the light of the theory on regimes which puts forward the hypothesis that shared norms, values and principals are fundamental to the functioning of a regime it seems that in view of the relationship existing between SADCC and South Africa, that sufficient norms, values and principals exist for the functioning of the spontaneous imposed regime. The fact that in the South African context, threats to the regime framework from the subordinate actors are dealt with by varying degrees of political and economic manipulation, coercion and incentives is not inconsistent with this type of order. It does not necessarily require the explicit consent of the participants. Leistner, from his conservative viewpoint, states further that these relations are more beneficial than harmful to SADCC. Interruptions to trade particularly would be harmful to the BLS countries. Further, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique would only be able to substitute South African imports at a higher cost and this would seriously affect their already fragile economic situations. Rejecting the dependency paradigm and expounding upon the modernisation or diffusionist school of thought, Leistner states that the example of Zimbabwean goods being competitively marketed in South Africa shows that excessive polarisation is unlikely to occur if economic interdependence continues with sufficient development and diversification of the SADCC economies (3). He states further that tariffs and quantitative restrictions would make it very unlikely that trade will exacerbate inequalities between SADCC and South Africa (Leistner:1986:149).

Leistner generalises about the effects of polarisation, because the effects of South Africa's highly industrialised and diversified economy is least likely to be felt by Zimbabwe, who has itself a diversified industrial and agricultural base, but his viewpoint is indicative of the strong pull factors which bind SADCC to South Africa in context of the western capitalist economic totality of which the region is part. Furthermore, because of the region's isolation and South Africa's dominance in all economic sectors, it is difficult to envisage economic independence from South Africa. On this point Marxist theorists agree. Mandaza states,

"Logically a liberated South Africa would become the economic, political and strategic base for a future SADCC, regardless of the organisation's attitude to international capital" (Mandaza:1987:210). Given the links which bind South Africa and SADCC through mutual and independent links to the West, SADCC's goal of economic independence seems not only unrealistic but impossible.

However on the other side of this debate liberals such as Lewis believe that South Africa's hegemonic dominance is detrimental in both the long and the short run. " Even if South Africa is majority ruled, the other countries would need to diversify to avoid domination" (Lewis:1986:190). This is seen as essential for the SADCC countries to become absorbed in a more economically balanced way into the capitalist international market system. Lewis provides figures to show how dependent the SADCC organisation is on South Africa. According to the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) figures South Africa took 17% of total SADCC exports and provided about 22% of their imports in 1982. Intra-SADCC trade during this period was about 5% (Lewis: 1986:193). He concludes that South Africa dominates the region to the detriment of the SADCC countries and her strength of resources allows the government access to political manipulation. This is in line with the dysfunctional aspect of the relations between SADCC and South Africa. Hill agrees with Lewis, stating further that SADCC is a realistic cooperative framework because " ...there is a need to ensure that an eventually liberated South Africa does not become the overwhelming dominating metropolitan area in Southern Africa towards which economic activity in Southern Africa gravitates" (Hill:1983:226).

In this light SADCC's economic effort towards independence is realistic and necessary to escape reliance on the West and South Africa which is seen as the effect of colonial domination from which they cannot escape (Hill:1983:227). Hanlon substantiates the opinion that SADCC should reduce dependence on South Africa from a political perspective,

"South Africa uses military power to maintain economic dominance and also uses economic dominance as a weapon" (Hanlon:1986:2).

Edgren explains the relationship which exists in imposed orders in a more structural sense. He states that vulnerability and sensitivity are two effects of interdependence in the asymmetrical sense. Sensitivity, or the tactics of development of individual states may not be affected by foreign aid and direct investment, however vulnerability, from long term structural factors, i.e. natural resource endowments and geographical location may cause long standing and virtually indestructible effects with regard to asymmetrical interdependence. This is particularly relevant to SADCC and South Africa. All the SADCC countries are, to greater or lesser degrees, vulnerable to South Africa and the dominance and diversity of her economy (Edgren:1985:5). In order to strengthen their individual economic positions it therefore stands to reason that the SADCC countries need to reduce dependence by increasing the diversity of their economic production and trade lit. The patterns of behaviour which govern the functioning of the economic order between Southern Africa (including South Africa) and the rest of the world are sustained by their established nature, which make it difficult for them to be broken down.

However before the above statements are taken conclusively it is necessary to examine how successful SADCC has been at achieving the other goals outlined at it's inception.

4.3.GOAL TWO: "Inequitable equality", or "what is possible".

The second goal, forging links to create genuine equitable regional integration, is linked to and revolves around the success of the first goal. If economic reliance and integration with South Africa and the world economy are maintained, the links between the SADCC countries will remain secondary and subordinate to the links which already exist and perpetuate themselves. Cantori and Spiegel's pattern variables discussed in conjunction with SADCC's first goal substantiate this conclusion. Furthermore, given South Africa's resource base it would be impossible to achieve this goal if the first goal did not succeed, as integration with South Africa's much larger and more modern economy is synonymous with asymmetrical economic interdependence for the SADCC countries. However by analysing the moves made towards this goal a clearer picture may be presented.

Regional economic integration for SADCC has been pursued without any relinquishing of national sovereignty. This approach was deliberate, as Hill states, SADCC rejects the customs union approach to coordination (Hill :1983). Trade between the SADCC countries remains about 5% of the total. According to Hill's explanation this is not because of tariffs but because of inadequate infrastructure and low levels of production. However Kadyampakeni is of the opinion that SADCC's loose organisational structure is one of it's greatest weaknesses. Because of the absence of institutional structures to facilitate trade "...trade among the 9 states has steadily declined and is likely to continue to do so" (Kadyampakeni: 1986:19). However Anglin outlines SADCC's view of institutions,

"...as facilitating and consequential rather than causative forces or ends in themselves. Therefore it has consistently attempted to develop concrete areas of activity and to identify the actual servicing requirements first and then only to create institutional structures" (Anglin :1983:691). SADCC has insisted that it is a cooperative organisation only, the loose organisational structure and lean bureaucracy are motivated by historical experience. The insistence on the sanctity of sovereignty is seen as a result of the failure of economic organisations that attempted close integration, for example the East African Community

(Anglin: 1983) (SADCC Conference Papers:1987). Thus SADCC's unique character is said to be it's commitment to identifying projects of national interest. However in terms of convergent interests it would appear that national and regional interests may not always be compatible, especially in terms of the goal of "genuine equitable regional integration". Mandaza points out that "...sovereignty expresses itself in the fear of domination by regional influentials, the problem of sovereignty cannot be divorced from uneven and unequal development which was sparked off by colonialism and relates to present relations of dependence" (Mandaza:1987:216).

In the light of the SADCC countries verbalised determination with regard to retaining as much sovereignty as possible, plans for economic integration become less feasible as these entail a relinquishing of some political and economic sovereignty in order to facilitate the workings of economic institutions such as free trade areas and customs unions, as discussed earlier . Anglin states that the emphasis on national interest "...may be to keep ideological tensions between marxist and capitalist governing elites to manageable limits" (Anglin:1983:692). Given the evidence presented in Chapter Three it is clear that there have been marked differences of policy on regional matters between the individual SADCC states. This evidence substantiates Anglin's statement. Thus the interests of the SADCC countries converge rather amorphously around individual national development. Furthermore because SADCC allocates the responsibility for the implementation of projects to sectors which are managed by individual state governments the sectors must reflect economic involvement in the goals of the regime, which as mentioned, is not always forthcoming, as it does not always feature as a priority in the economic interests of the individual countries (Anglin:1983). This is substantiated by the slow rate of progress in sector development. As the 1987 Gabarone Conference made clear, transport featured as top priority, with aid being channelled chiefly into this sector. The only other sector to receive significant attention from both SADCC members and donors, was energy and food security, which had just reached the conclusion of it's planning stage (Africa Research Bulletin:Feb 28:1987:8540C) (SADCC Conference Papers :Gabarone:1987).

Sectoral responsibility is further constrained by the fact that the SADCC countries wish to keep the organisation of sectors subordinate to the SADCC framework itself. This has constrained the development of sectors, for example, the attempt by Angola to organise an Energy Commission similar to SATCC. SATCC was established by Mozambique before SADCC itself to deal with the improvement of transport and communications links and it is said to have a more organised Secretariat than SADCC itself (Anglin :1983). However Angola's attempt to do the same in the field of energy met with resistance. Anglin states "...SADCC is suspicious of the tendency to promote 'little empires' within sectors" (Anglin :1983 :696). Thus there is a very low level of formalised economic interaction in terms of the sector approach to regional economic development, as these are made the responsibility of one state only, and further the sectors organisational structures are kept small.

An overview of sectoral and trade cooperation must be given to see how the regime as a whole functions towards the goal of regional cooperation.

4.3.1. TRADE.

Trade, as mentioned, has not increased between the SADCC countries since the creation of the regime framework. It has featured in dialogue and idea development rather than through fixed proposals (Green: 1986:A92)(SADCC Conference Papers:1987:Vol 1). Wagao states that notwithstanding the dominance of South African and SADCC trade links there is a potential for regional integration. The danger however, lies within "...institutions of foreign origin controlling trade" (Wagao: 1987:165). Despite ideological rhetoric there is considerable amount of influence from transnational companies in Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, and to a lesser extent in Mozambique. The influence of foreign investment on Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland need hardly be repeated. However the 'socialist' states also have a significant portion of export trade controlled by parastatals. Tanzania is a prime case in point here (Wagao :1986). The degree to which the control of trade differs from country to country may explain why SADCC does not have a regional trade policy. Wagao states that this is in the interests of emphasising industrial and agricultural production with trade seen as a further consequential arrangement (Wagao:1987: 170). However as the case analyses point out the general pattern of trade is not with each other but with foreign markets and suppliers, as tables Two, Three and Four in the appendix make clear. Thus the individual countries are more integrated into the world economic regime than with each other. Ndedla states further that SADCC is "...characterised by a general lack of complementarities in production and industrial structures among member countries with a similar range of products in food textiles and beverages" (Ndedla:1986: 42). Thus the regional pattern of trade must logically remain vertical, that is between the metropolitan countries and SADCC, rather than horizontal, that is between SADCC countries themselves, at least until they have diversified their economies to an extent that integration amongst themselves in terms of trade is more feasible. The absence of a fixed trade policy may indicate an awareness of the constraint outlined above, and a concomitant desire to develop compatible economies by sharing and coordinating the diversification of agricultural and industrial production. This would indicate a convergence of interest around a desire for general diversification of trade ties. However coordination has not been forthcoming, perhaps because of the nature of the sector development approach, which makes development of coordinated policy in any given area the responsibility of one state only.

From Table One in the appendix it can be seen that the reasons for the low ratio of intraregional trade lies in the type of goods produced by the various countries, that is chiefly primary products, with a high degree of overlap. This is not the only reason for lack of trade, transport and raillinks which are inadequate between SADCC countries also play a role. However in the absence of a policy for the coordination of economic diversification in production it will take some time before the SADCC countries economies become more compatible. The present situation exacerbates the lack of shared economic interests in trade which in turn precludes the establishment of fixed patterns of trade behaviour. This undermines the SADCC regime in terms of the goals towards which it is working. There is evidently no possibility of achieving more regional integration without coordinating economic diversification. As mentioned earlier, free trade areas, customs unions and ultimately a common market are beneficial when the countries involved are competitive economically (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:38). This also implies that an acceptance of the role of private enterprise as part of the structure of the socio-economic totality is necessary on both ideological and practical levels for SADCC.

The SADCC regime is, however, not unaware of the need to coordinate regional trade. In 1986 SADCC launched a regional trade programme and began to attempt to integrate private enterprise into their regional development policies. This was made very clear at the 1986 and 1987 SADCC annual conference meetings. The business presence at the 1987 conference (where all the SADCC country delegations included private business representatives) emphasised this awareness (Africa Research Bulletin:28 Feb :1987). However the diversity of opinion and policy between the 9 countries, as well as their adherence to previously held import-export trade patterns has, to this point, precluded the development of new patterns of trade. It appears that the old patterns which exist between the SADCC states and South Africa overwhelm those which are being attempted by the negotiated regime (Africa Research Bulletin:Feb 29:1989).

4.3.2. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

Tanzania has the sectoral responsibility for industry and coordinates SADCC's manufacturing programmes through the Industrial Development Unit (IDU). Manufacturing is dominated by Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania. Furthermore Zimbabwe and Zambia have the highest potential for metal fabrication and machine building. Ndedla states that "... they could represent a crucial nucleus for long term regional development for self-reliance" (Ndedla :1987:44). Ndedla stresses the role of iron and steel as well as of metal products, machinery and subsidiary industries to produce capital goods. The distribution of iron and steel resources is ,however, uneven with Zimbabwe producing 94% of domestic requirement, Zambia 4% and Tanzania 1.5%. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland do not produce any steel products (Ndedla:1987). Thus industrialisation in terms of resource endowments is less possible for those that have few or underutilised iron and steel resources. The absence of a policy of industrialisation, says Ndedla, will propel SADCC to move purely in the interests of international monopoly capital as a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods (Ndedla:1987: 56). Alternatively Zimbabwe could dominate with it's more diversified economy. Kadyampakeni points out that, in terms of capitalist development, this would be more beneficial for the region."Industry can most readily succeed if it has access to the whole market of the 9 and is concentrated in a few industrial cores" (Kadyampakeni:1986: 19). The high probability of this occurring is emphasised by tables Six and Seven in the appendix. It appears, therefore, that the goal of 'genuine equitable regional integration' is unrealistic, in the light of the socio-economic totality and because not all the SADCC countries have the resources available to develop equally.

4.3.3. MINING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY.

In terms of regional integration the above two areas of development have met with little progress. Given the role they play in economic development this places a serious constraint on the individual and regional development of the SADCC countries. The data available on these two issues will be analysed in terms of the regime framework to see whether the lack of development is due to a lack of convergent interests which in turn prevents the establishment of fixed patterns of behaviour.

In the mining sector most of the minerals exploited by SADCC fall into the non-fuel or non-precious category. Furthermore they tend to be unprotected from attempts by developed countries to externalise economic hardships which are manifested in declining terms of trade. Coordination of the mining sector has been delegated to Zambia, however Kalyala and Mudenda state that until 1985 not much had been achieved towards greater regional integration in this sphere in spite of the fact that this sector has received considerable attention (Kalyala and Mudenda:1987:107). In 1985 the five year strategy 1986-1990 was worked out. It's three broad policies are :

1) the establishment of sovereignty over national resources (this policy is a result of the negative view of African governments towards the dominance of transnational companies in the exploitation of minerals). However the achievement of this goal seems unlikely given the financial difficulties faced by the SADCC countries. It is unlikely that a pattern of disengagement would be followed as it would, at this stage, be detrimental to the self interest of the governments in terms of their economic positions, as the outline of Zambia's present economic situation proves. Furthermore there is by no means unanimity on this point between the 9 countries. The SADCC conference in Gaberone (1987) stressed the role of multinationals, direct foreign investment and increasing international cooperation. Thus

the goal of disengagement would seem to run contrary to the interests voiced at the conference. These anomolies in the goals of the SADCC organisation are not sufficient to break down the regime. However they do weaken it by reducing the strength in which convergent interests converge around patterns of behaviour. If the interests are not clear, or are contradicted , as above, it is not possible for the regime to function optimally. Further, as Rood points out, reliable expectations are one of the fundamental features of rule behaviour (Rood:1988:7). Thus if expectations are consistently fallen short of, or altered, fixed patterns of behaviour, especially in a negotiated regime framework, will fail to emerge. Because of the explicit nature of the negotiated regime framework it must measure up to the expectations which gave rise to it. However if these changes are as a result of changes in knowledge, according to regime theory as presented by the cognitivists, it may be that the SADCC regime members are changing according to acquired knowledge.It must not be forgotten however,that as Haggard and Simmons point out, changes to any regime are constrained by the self-interest of the individual countries(Haggard and Simmons:1983:509). This could mean that SADCC member states are now aware that interaction with foreign capital cannot be avoided, thus tacitly strengthening the ties between themselves and the forces of the western market economy.

2) The development of mineral based industries. This goal must be weighed in the light of diversification of minerals between SADCC countries. If there is a significant overlap of mineral production these industries may duplicate goods, which will do nothing for regional integration.

3) The development of indigenous manpower capability.
To achieve these goals SADCC has to reduce the amount of foreign control in mining. In addition to the fact that this is contradictory to the stress of the Gabarone Conference in 1987, it may not be where the self-interest of the individual countries lie. As Shafer (1983) points out in an analysis of Zambia's and Zaire's copper nationalisation and the consequent downturn in revenue and market share, multinationals often provide insulation against adverse market conditions and are furthermore aware of the complexity of mineral market speculation. He concludes that multinational companies have more benefits than drawbacks to national economies especially those with fragile political bases. Thus the thrust of SADCC's mining policies may be ideologically acceptable but whether they will work in practise seems unlikely. At present little has been done in this sector which has been delegated to Zambia.

4.3.4. SADCC, TECHNOLOGICALLY DEPENDENT?

Technical capacity, which Mudenda defines as twofold, "...embodied (equipment, plant and processes technology) and disembodied (knowledge,skills and organisation) ... plays a vital role in greater self reliance for SADCC" (Mudenda :1986:132). Manpower development has been delegated to Swaziland . Mudenda points out that the projects that SADCC has drawn up require large amounts of technical resources. However "... only a few of the SADCC projects are aimed at developing physical technical systems" (Mudenda :1986:141). Instead there has been a heavy reliance on outside sources for finance, personnel and expertise. This, states Mudenda, has increased the region's dependence and benefits world capitalism. Notwithstanding the fact that this technological transfer would naturally benefit the SADCC countries too, it is evident that the goal of self reliance or increased economic independence, and an increase in indigenous manpower capability does not square with a reliance on foreign embodied and disembodied technology.

4.3.5. FISCAL POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION.

Monetary and fiscal policy, states Ngandwe, "...are the principal abstract institutional facilities that govern national and international mobility of goods and services" (Ngandwe:1987:182). This raises the question as to how SADCC hopes to attain regional economic integration without such policies. Without any form of monetary collaboration, for example fiscal exchange rates, guaranteed convertability of currencies, joint monetary policies based on group decisions of central banks, a common agency for external exchange rate policy and management capable of controlling a common pool of resources, there will be difficulty in promoting interregional trade (Ngandwe:1987:185-190). In terms of fiscal policies these should promote intraregional trade and protect industries from outside competition. In this sphere SADCC's institutionalised regime framework is inadequate, given the goals that they are proportedly working towards.

At the 1989 Summit Conference in Luanda Mr Moeen Qureshi, senior vice President of Operations for the World Bank said of the SADCC countries,

"Reforming countries have increased their competitiveness in world markets by bringing down real exchange rates by a third during this decade...and inflation rates are lower in the reforming countries- a reflection of tighter fiscal and monetary policies" (Africa Research Bulletin:Feb 28: 1989:9419). He added that for the first time in almost fifteen years economic growth had exceeded population growth. Thus, while this does not indicate the success of SADCC at achieving greater regional integration according to the conceptual definitions outlined by Venter and Geldenhuys earlier, it does show that the reform policies spoken of in Chapter Three has benefited the SADCC region as a whole. This illustrates to some extent how the region is constrained to develop along lines acceptable with the socio-economic totality, highlighting the lack of convergent interests around the goal of equitable regional integration. For integration along present development lines the SADCC countries economies will have to be competitive and dynamic. This will enable fiscal policy to be coordinated. Unequal development of resources and the necessity of specialisation for the smaller SADCC countries are implicit in these conclusions. Furthermore the power of private enterprise, that is, foreign and local manufacturing companies, to develop the competitiveness and specialisation in the SADCC region must be emphasised in the light of the power of these companies to contribute to those countries competitiveness in the regional and international sphere. The analysis of the Zimbabwean and Botswana's economic situation substantiates this point.

4.3.6.AGRICULTURE,' SADCC'S BACKBONE.'

In the development of agriculture to meet the needs of the domestic populations of the SADCC countries there has been, instead of progress, decline. Leistner states that the SADCC countries are progressively less able to feed themselves and have acknowledged that apart from drought and fluctuating overseas markets, domestic problems such as the urban development bias and rural neglect have exacerbated the extent of the food problem (Leistner:1987:150). In food and agricultural production the emphasis is on increasing agricultural productivity and there are seven subsectoral programme areas (Mumbengegwi:1987). However demand outstripped population growth in the region. This, states Mumbengegwi, implies that "...rising levels of income or changing patterns in it's distribution have had a considerable impact on food demand" (Mumbengegwi:1987 :64). Thus besides the technical problems which Leistner outlined and which SADCC also emphasises, as well as destabilisation, especially in Mozambique and Angola, there is also the problem of increased consumerist patterns of demand. This places additional pressure on the need for modernisation.

Agriculture was stated to be the backbone of the regional economy at the Gabarone Summit of SADCC in 1987. According to the conference data it is said that SADCC believes there is an important role for large scale agriculture (SADCC Conference papers:Gabarone:Vol 1:1987). At the same meeting Peter McPherson, Administrator for United States Aid for International Development (USAID) stated that SADCC needed to exercise more export related growth, that is further integration with the international economy. USAID is aimed at commercialising agriculture for export and intraregional trade (to a lesser extent) aims at consolidating land and forming large commercial holdings.This would increase grain availability. But, as Thompson points out, this does not necessarily make it more accessable within the countries themselves as there is marginalisation of the smaller farmers (Thompson:1986:63).

Thus SADCC's policies as far as agriculture is concerned may simply be to expand their export of primary products, which, given the adverse terms of trade, will leave them in much the same position as before. Furthermore the concentration of donor interest in this sector implies stronger ties with the West than with each other (Africa Research Bulletin:Feb 28:1987). It is evident from the case analyses that the neglect of the smaller farmer has led to their alienation, politically and economically, thus the need to concentrate on both small and large scale production seems vital. Furthermore economic diversification is essential to prevent the situation mentioned by Thompson. As the case outlines show, this precludes breaking ties with South Africa and the West, as foreign investment can play a considerable role in such diversification.

The food and agricultural sector is Zimbabwe's responsibility and here, as in many of the other sectors not much beyond feasibility studies has been done. Mumbengegwi states, "...the food security sector is based on coordination in general and information supply but not on actual production. SADCC sidesteps any issues on domestic economic policies" (Mumbengegwi:1987:79). Thus in this vital sector there has been little effort to develop regional ties or development policies. Coordination for equitable integration thus seems to conflict with the SADCC states' wish for political sovereignty. This undermines the potential development of convergent economic interests.

Subsectoral responsibilities such as the Agricultural research programme undertaken by Botswana, Livestock and animal disease (also under Botswana's control); Soil, Water conservation and Land utilisation(Lesotho); Fisheries, Wildlife and Forestry (Malawi) all feature projects that are mostly in the planning stages (SADCC Conference papers:1987:vol 1 and 2) (Mumbegegwi:1987:63-84). Most of these projects relate to how to overcome the technical difficulties outlined earlier and are not aimed at production. Furthermore all the projects in this sector are to be substantially funded by overseas donors and only 29% of the finance has been raised (Mumbengegwi :1987). Reliance on aid that has not yet been forthcoming could hamper implementation. Further most of the plans will only help SADCC if individual countries heed the advice of the feasibility and planning studies. There is as yet no regional allocation and planning of production responsibilities (Mumbengegwi:1987).

In sum the goal of equitable regional integration via the sector development method of coordination shows that integration has not progressed very far (6). It does however remain obvious that there is a certain amount of convergent interest aimed at regional economic development because the SADCC regime continues to further, or attempt to further, project planning and implementation, most of which integrates the regime more firmly with the West.As mentioned recent agricultural policy in the region will serve to integrate the SADCC countries along present lines, that is as primary export countries. Moreover, as pointed out, it is impossible for all the SADCC states to diversify their economies along industrial and manufacturing lines to the same extent. Thus the ties which exist within the spontaneous imposed regime and between SADCC and western capital markets appear to overwhelm the political convergence of interests in SADCC. Thus fixed patterns of behaviour relating to the longer standing regime framework undermines the regime structure which the SADCC countries are attempting to build.

CHAPTER FIVE: SADCC'S SUCCESSES, ACHIEVEMENT OF GOALS AND THE IMPLICATIONS THEREOF

5.1. GOAL THREE:

Infrastructural progress and it's implicationsThis goal is worded, "...the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies" (Kadyampakeni:1986:19). Transport and communications projects have received the most aid and effort since SADCC's inception. Because the mobilisation of resources of the SADCC countries takes place mostly through South Africa the aim has been to disengage from South Africa's transport network. This goal is seen in different lights by critics on the SADCC regime, according to their ideological bias. For example Green states "...there is no real economic case for, and a very strong political and human case against, Southern African dependence on South African transport links" (Green:1986:94). He continues to say that this goal has led to the acceptance of Southern Africa as a region separate from South Africa. However, as mentioned when discussing goal One, Southern Africa is still highly dependent on South African rail and port infrastructure. Nevertheless SATCC has made progress in this field. At the eighth summit meeting held in Arusha in 1988 most of the donor pledges were marked for the transport and communications sector. West Germany, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and the EEC pledged funds for this sector. The 1989 Luanda Conference reaffirmed the prioritisation of transport sector development to the SADCC organisation (Africa Research Bulletin :Feb 28 :1987:8538C) (Africa Research Bulletin:Feb 29 :1989:9420B).Kadyampakeni states that SADCC's first concern is with transport and communications as it may free them from dependence and integrate them with each other. However trade ties are primarily with the West. Thus the improvement of existing links (which is what is being attempted at present) might reduce dependence on South Africa but it may not significantly increase regional trade. As mentioned in the outlines of the SADCC countries domestic economies, the rail routes being upgraded at present are those reinforcing trade links with the West.

5.1.1.THE MAIN TARGET OF DESTABILISATION.

Kadyampakeni and Thompson stress the effect which destabilisation has on these projects. Thompson states that the lack of success with the two port system projects in Mozambique (Nacala and Maputo) and Lobito in Angola "...is totally due to South African sabotage" (Thompson: 1986:60). Kadyampakeni, however, states, "...No SADCC state has demonstrated that it can successfully operate a railway or port. Roadbeds and rolling stock require constant maintenance and honesty is necessary" (Kadyampakeni:1986:19). It is evident that destabilisation has a major effect on the transport and communications systems, especially in Mozambique and Angola (Metz:1986) (Saul:1985). However there is also an argument for increased technical and manpower modernisation. As mentioned earlier most of SADCC's technology is derived from external sources and this does not colour the picture of the future of project implementation very brightly in the long term. However Thompson does point out that SATCC has made significant progress in improving telecommunications links (there are now 60 direct telecom links as opposed to 14 in 1980) (Thompson:1986:60). SATCC, however, receives almost two thirds of the monetary allocation of SADCC. Merle Lipton states in criticism of this unequal allocation of aid resources that transport and communications links do not provide food or employment (Lipton quoted by Hill:1986:234). Furthermore Mandaza states "...SADCC has been designed to disengage economically from a country without whose economic, trade, transport and communications infrastructure most of the SADCC member states are unlikely to survive individually or jointly" (Mandaza :1986 :222). There are serious obstacles to interregional trade between SADCC countries based on transport and communications links. As Mongula and Ng'andwe (1987) point out that there are no direct railway links between Tanzania and Mozambique; or Tanzania and Malawi ; between Zambia and Mozambique or Zambia and Angola. Furthermore there are far from adequate road links and a shortage of vehicles. Mongula and Ng'andwe state that the high rate of urban growth in the SADCC region has caused a corresponding growth in the need for transport without a corresponding growth in infrastructural capacity (Mongula and Ng'andwe:1987:85).

5.1.2.INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SADCC STATES.

The position of the individual countries as far as transport, with respect to raillinks and roads, as well as ports, where applicable, is as follows:

Angola has four railways, of which only one is fully operational (Luanda-Malange), 2 lines link Zaire and Zambia to Angola's ports, however these are not fully operational. Although there is a fairly well developed road network , this is susceptible to attacks on the many bridges inside the country by UNITA forces.

Botswana is landlocked and transport is still at quite a basic level. There is one railway line which links Mafeking to Bulawayo via Gabarone and Francistown. The road system which is mostly untarred links Botswana to Zimbabwe and Zambia, and to South Africa in the North. South Africa transports nearly all it's extra-regional trade.

Lesotho has fairly good infrastructure in the western lowlands, but only one railway line which links Maseru with Marseilles in South Africa through the main Cape/Natal line. One hundred percent of Lesotho's trade goes through South Africa.

Malawi has few road and raillinks to other SADCC countries. There are three to the Mozambican ports of Nacala, Beira and Lilongwe. Despite the fact that these three ports are closer (as is Dar es Salaam in Tanzania) 95% of Malawi's trade goes through South Africa, because of the dangers of attacks on the line from RENAMO, as well as because of earlier inefficiencies at Mozambican ports.

Mozambique, too, does not have a well developed infrastructure, there are few tarred roads, one from Maputo to Beira and also one from Maputo to South Africa and Swaziland. There are five international railways, however because of destabilisation and technical problems these are seldom fully operational. There are three main ports, Maputo is the second largest in Africa and serves both South Africa and Swaziland. Beira handles export trade for Zambia, Malawi and Zaire. Nacala is now linked by rail to Blantyre in Malawi. However the amount of trade export which goes through these ports is not substantial, because of poor maintenance and the ongoing FRELIMO-RENAMO war.

Swaziland has mostly gravel or earth roads, only one fifth of the 2800km is tarred. There are two railway lines, one to Mozambique (Maputo and the other to South Africa (Durban and Richards Bay). Swaziland has attempted to use the Maputo line, but because of sabotage, is at present unable to do so.

Tanzania has 50 000 km of roads, of which 5% are tarred. There are three highways from Arusha to Dar es Salaam, and there is another highway to Zambia, which indirectly links the other Southern African countries via Harare (Zimbabwe). There are three sea ports, Dar es Salaam is the largest, and as mentioned earlier, has a low carrying capacity thus hampering the amount of export-import trade that it can handle. There is lake transport to a limited extent between Tanzania, Malawi, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya. There are also two state owned raillinks.

Zimbabwe has a well developed infrastructure linking the country primarily with Mozambique and South Africa for export and import trade. Although connected to Mozambique by the raillink to Beira, Zimbabwe still tends to use South African lines which are more reliable. In order to keep the line to Beira operational, Zimbabwean security forces have been deployed to guard the line. There are fairly good roads linking Zimbabwe to Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Swaziland.

Zambia, as can be seen from the above, is connected via road and rail to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, but is constrained, like Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, by being landlocked (SADCC Conference Papers:Vol 1 :1987) (Maasdorp: 1984).

For a comprehensive update of infrastructure and transport in the region Kennedy (1988) in his report on transport in Southern Africa shows how projects funded through SADCC donors have progressed.Transport and infrastructural problems mentioned in chapter four do, however, continue to plague infrastructural development (Kennedy:1984).

5.1.3.ENERGY RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS.

Energy resources also pose a problem, with SADCC countries spending between 30 and 60% of foreign exchange earnings on oil imports (Mongula and Ng'andwe:1987 :85). However Mongula and Ng'andwe point out that there is oppurtunity for regional self sufficiency. But this would entail large scale upgrading of transport and distribution networks between SADCC states. Also institutional arrangements would have to be created to ensure mutual benefit for all SADCC countries. SADCC's reluctance to create formal institutions precludes a convergence of interests in this area at present. The existing transport and communications ties between South Africa and SADCC do however provide longstanding transport links, for export and imports, with South Africa and with the West. Thus notwithstanding destabilisation and technical and administrative problems causing the slow rate of success of SATCC, the fact remains that the interests of the SADCC countries continue to converge in a pattern of behaviour as far as transport and energy links are concerned, some of these being economically more viable than alternative links proposed by SADCC. The outlines of the individual countries infrastructural positions substantiates this argument.

Thus the pursuit of this goal, like the two discussed in Chapter Four, shows that fixed patterns of behaviour around convergent interests are economically orientated, and change may be unviable, because of 'feedback' to the original interests which gave rise to the fixed pattern of relations. The spontaneous imposed order has achieved longevity by it's historical rootedness which is structural and economic and outweighs the political fervour of the SADCC countries to disengage from South Africa. This is substantiated by empirical evidence showing the lack of convergent interests in relation to the goals discussed thus far. This is likely to continue on the economic level, given that the political reason for disengagement provides much of the impetus for SADCC's disengagement fervour at present. However in terms of this goal the role of destabilisation in the maintenance of the structural ties must be emphasised because of the degree to which these ties have been maintained through direct and indirect destabilisation by South Africa, particularly with relation to South African support of rebel groups in Mozambique and Angola.

5.2.GOAL FOUR: In pursuit of development aid.

This entails action to secure international cooperation within the framework of SADCC's strategy for economic liberation.

The attempt to achieve this goal has focused on trying to obtain as much economic aid as possible to develop socio-economically. This has led to criticisms especially from Marxist analysts. It is said that this will create added dependency on the West in an attempt to reduce dependence on South Africa. Mandaza states "...It is...a great pity...and a source of additional criticism of SADCC that success or failure should be associated more with the level of foreign aid than with local or regional efforts" (Mandaza:1987:220). Certainly aid from the West in terms of money, technology and research as well as food aid has been phenomenal. The role of the European Economic Community is particularly evident. Michael Foley (EEC deputy director) said at the SADCC's third summit meeting, "...our commitment to the region is total and real....This region of yours has a potential for buying and looking for equipment and services from the developed world for many years to come" (Anglin:1986:700). Thus the reason for involvement is motivated by the economic self-interest of the EEC as they fit into the capitalist economic totality. These summit meetings have had the effect of promoting aid and trade links between SADCC and the West on a more formal basis. However these ties are in contradiction to the goals of the SADCC regime framework, because they enforce the existing pattern of reliance on the West.

In this light Thompson points out that SADCC was the first of the African Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) to sign a region to region accord with the EEC. Further they also signed a region to region accord with the Nordic nations which includes increased trade, investment, technological transfers and cultural exchange (Thompson: 1986). The OAU called other members to consider the SADCC model as an option for their regions development at the Addis Ababa meeting in 1985. (Thompson:1986) Thus aid has definitely caused a relationship of greater integration with the West for SADCC along market economy lines. The maintenance of the SADCC regime framework (in spite of increasing dependence on South Africa on the part of seven of it's members) and it's increasingly vociferous condemnation of South Africa seems to have mobilized aid resources. Those who were initially apathetic to the organisation have now volunteered aid, for example West Germany who increased their pledge from $ 2 million (US) to $15 million (US) in 1981. (Hill:1986:234) The Ports Handbook compiled for distribution for the Luanda summit conference of 1989 states that aid has dwindled in Africa as a whole but SADCC has managed to raise 40.4% of the $ 2,818.3m (US) needed to revitalise the Ports of Beira, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Nacala and Lobito.(Africa Research Bulletin:Feb 28:1989:9420B)

Thus the SADCC regime has come to rely more on aid from the West without substantially decreasing trade and economic links with South Africa. Notwithstanding destabilisation's effects this points to a convergence of economic interests which do not necessarily coordinate with political interests, as the goal of reduction of independence clearly does not feature in the aid and trade ties which exist in the region at present.

The transfer of aid has become highly politicised because of the South African political situation. The U.S. in particular has been criticised for supplying aid to SADCC whilst continuing to support UNITA. Hill states "This now places the United States clearly in league with South Africa in fomenting instability in the region" (Hill:1986:63). Chitala develops this into a conspiracy theory "... The U.S. rightwing is aimed at thwarting the liberation upsurge threatening South Africa and bolstering South Africa as an ally in the imperialist plunder of the region" (Chitala: 1987:32). However there is the contradiction in these attacks on aid donors, because the donation of aid has been one of the primary features of all the SADCC annual summit meetings. As mentioned, aid, especially for transport and communications which is the highest funded sector, reinforces links with the West and not with each other. Thus the goal of aid for economic liberation in actual fact ties the SADCC countries closer to the socio-economic totality of which they are historically and structurally a part. This shows that the convergence of interests around economic independence and equitable regional integration are very tenuous. The politicisation of aid illustrates very clearly how political and economic aspects of foreign policy are almost impossible to disentangle, particularly in the Southern African region. The existence of apartheid tends to cause the economic relations with the hegemon to contain elements of political acquiescence to that country's political policies, or else features economic and/or political coercion in order to maintain the spontaneous imposed order. Thus SADCC's goal of aid for economic independence, particularly in the way in which campaigns for aid have been presented, show the political relation between aid as support against South Africa's racist policies. In this sense the goal assumes a more immediate political priority as apposed to a way of obtaining long term economic development, especially in view of the fact that developing alternative transport links obtains the most aid at present.

However, while the goals of SADCC have not been fulfilled to any great degree besides "...action to ensure international cooperation..." there has been, as mentioned by Kongwa earlier in this paper, a convergence around the theoretical assumptions which gave rise to SADCC. Cooperation has increased on the political, and to a certain extent, on the economic level, and conflict between SADCC states has been minimalised. However within the SADCC regime framework there is constant reference to the failure of their policies as a result of South Africa and not because of any intra-regional constraints. This is not consistently true. Aid may serve to further integrate them with the western capitalist economy in the same roles as before. Those who have wider resource bases will dominate by diversification of these bases, i.e Zimbabwe and, in the future, Angola. This will further shift the balance of unequal development. This is not necessarily a negative outcome, if capitalism's 'trickle down effects' are stressed. Moreover it fits the SADCC regime into the existing international economic order, which is characterised by the economic dominance of some countries, such as the United States and Japan (who have diversified resource bases) and the specialisation of others, for example the countries which make up the European Community. However the goals of SADCC run contrary to a picture of unequal regional integration, and this weakens the regime as it does not square with the socio-economic reality of which they are part. It is difficult to conceive the picture of a fixed pattern of behaviour around convergent interests, or in this case goals, which does not take into account the socio-economic totality of which the region is historically a part and within which it must function.

In sum the negotiated regime of SADCC may be seen to be subordinate to the spontaneous imposed order existing between South Africa and SADCC and the West, on the economic level. Previously most of SADCC's relations with the West (except for Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania) has been interrelated with economic interaction with South Africa. However the emergence of a pattern of behaviour around convergent interests through the SADCC framework may lead to greater economic interaction, without South Africa's involvement, between SADCC and the West. This is likely to continue to benefit the West more than SADCC unless there is sufficient diversification of their economies and protective measures are taken.

However, given the strength of the patterns of behaviour existing between South Africa and SADCC, the spontaneous imposed order will continue to dominate the SADCC negotiated regime and would be more feasible economically in terms of creating an economic power bloc in the Southern African region vis a' vis the western capitalist market economy. Thus the convergence of interests of all the SADCC countries around their present goals seems unlikely in the long term.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION: SADCC, REGIME TRANSFORMATION OR DISINTEGRATION?

In the light of the application of regime theory to the SADCC organisation using the structural methodological approach, it is evident that the underlying socio-economic structure in the region, that is the capitalist market economy, links the SADCC countries structurally to the West and, in seven out of nine cases, to South Africa.

In Chapter One Young's typologies were used to loosely classify the interaction between the SADCC countries and South Africa, and the SADCC regime itself. It was postulated that in addition to the negotiated order of SADCC that another spontaneous economic regime, characterised by it's continuance in spite of the lack of explicit consent of the subordinate participants, functioned in the Southern African region. South Africa's hegemonic position and the level of coercion used in the functioning of the regime also made it square with Young's imposed order typology, thus the economic convergence and interaction between South Africa and SADCC was loosely classified as a spontaneous imposed regime.

Chapter Two clarified the concept of the 'socio-economic totality' of which all the SADCC countries are part. Gilpin's discussion of the market economy brought to attention the fact that in the development of competitive market orientated economies, unequal development and/or specialisation was inevitable as not all countries have the same tangible and intangible resources available to develop equally. The difficulty of attaining a competitive national economy in view of the fact that the western countries have advanced and diversified national economies and a much higher level of regional integration was also pointed out. The advent of new protectionism and non-tariff barriers were cited as further hindrances to the development of a competitive coordinated economic development strategy for Southern Africa.

The framework for the analysis of the SADCC states and their interaction within the SADCC framework, as well as in the region and internationally, was then applied firstly to the SADCC states on a more individual basis and then in terms of their interaction towards the achieving the goals of SADCC to see which of the regimes had the greater structural, long term strength, and further to test what perspectives regime theory could throw on economic and political interaction in the region.

Chapter Three outlined the domestic economic situation of each of the SADCC countries briefly. Their historical ties to the western market economy and in most cases to South Africa were pointed out. Their relations to SADCC were briefly outlined in contrast to this. It was evident in these outlines that all of the SADCC countries are structurally tied to the West in a relationship of asymmetrical economic integration for the foreseeable future. Economic ties with South Africa and western markets, in the light of investment capital, trade, transport, migrant labour and energy ties, appear to be entrenched. Although the relationship between the SADCC countries and South Africa is dysfunctional in the sense that South Africa uses political and economic coercion to neutralise potential political threats to white South African hegemony, the strength of the economic ties in the spontaneous imposed regime precludes a breakdown of patterns of behaviour around convergent interests. This substantiates Keohane's theory that entrenched patterns of behaviour may not break down because of their longstanding nature, or because of ' lags' or 'feedbacks' to the original convergent interests which gave rise to that pattern of behaviour. In this sense the socio-economic totality has formed the underlying structure above which the two regimes have to function. The analyses of the interaction between the SADCC states domestic economies and this socio-economic totality, which regulates economic interaction within and between the SADCC states as well as with South Africa and the West, is fixed more firmly to the economic interaction which takes place within the spontaneous imposed regime framework than within the SADCC regime. Thus there are feedbacks to the consensual interests which gave rise to the economic interaction between the SADCC states, the West, and/or South Africa.

The outlines of the SADCC states domestic economies in Chapter Three showed the wide disparities of resource and land endowments, as well as the variances in the utilisation and diversification of tangible national resources between SADCC countries. This served to emphasise three major points: a) the SADCC countries cannot develop without western aid and trade, and from historical evidence this means abandoning attempts at economic 'socialism ' as it has translated into practise among the SADCC countries until there are sufficient resources to enable governments to embark on such programmes, b) that SADCC's goal of 'economic independence' especially but not only from South Africa is impossible for Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi; an obsolete goal for Angola and Tanzania; and economically impractical for Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia; and c) that the goal of equitable regional integration is impossible given the present economic situations of the SADCC states.

Socialist ideology has a drawback in that, as mentioned in the case studies, affiliation with 'communism' is taken by the West, particularly by the U.S. to be a rejection of western market economy forces. It discourages foreign capital and American aid, and furthermore leads to fuzzy development policies when the 'socialist' policies fail. Although this conclusion may be misconstrued as a justification for the positive forces of 'capitalism', the actual meaning is based on the evidence brought to light by the analysis of the SADCC states domestic economic positions vis a' vis their development direction at present, despite often contradictory ideological statements. The SADCC states are clearly not ideologically at odds with accepting western aid and trade. Thus 'socialist' policies have a negative effect on the actual development process envisaged by the SADCC states. Furthermore, ideological rhetoric aside, the economic links which exist and perpetuate themselves, between private enterprise and monopoly capital in the region as well as between governments, show a long term convergence of economic interests which exists in spite of ideology.

Chapter Four emphasised how important the goal of economic independence from South Africa was to the SADCC regime framework. However the theory of Cantori and Spiegel showed that the convergence of interests in the SADCC regime were mostly political. The spontaneous imposed regime in contrast had a very high level of convergent interests around economic cooperation but it's weaknesses were all politically based, i.e. the rejection of South Africa's racial policies.

Venter and Geldenhuys defined concepts of regional integration that show, in the light of the economic outlines, that equitable integration in terms of the capitalist market economy dynamic will be impossible in the near future for SADCC. The concepts of free trade areas and customs unions, are in the light of SADCC's progress towards 'independence' and 'equitable integration' impossible. The case outlines highlight how economic difficulties in most of the SADCC states obstruct such developments.

Chapter Five highlights the successes of the SADCC regime. In terms of aid and upgrading of infrastructure there has been considerable progress. Thus the SADCC regime has mobilised aid to the region and has created some economic alternatives to South African transport routes. The SADCC regime has therefore created a convergence of interests around the infrastructural self interest of the SADCC countries, which in view of their structural ties with the western market economy seems economically rational. Furthermore the regime has, through it's politicised stance, managed to muster more aid than any other Southern African economic organisation in the 1980's.

However it remains evident that South Africa is the key to economic prosperity and political stability in the region. This has been shown clearly by applying international theory on regimes, using the structural methodological approach as outlined by Varshney, to the political and economic interaction in the Southern African region. The success of using this theoretical approach appears to be a more objective view of the SADCC organisation and it's economic and political interaction with South Africa and the West. Regime theory, by concentrating on empirically based patterns of interaction, points to the actual economic pattern of behaviour in the region which is not consistent with the goals of the negotiated regime. In this context regime theory distinguishes between weak and strong patterns of behaviour according to historical socio-economic reality. Ideological interpretations of historical reality are thus largely avoided, although it would be arrogant to assume total objectivity by the simple application of a theoretical framework for analysis.

In the light of the undeniable evidence which shows that the majority of SADCC countries development depends on South Africa and on interaction with the western market economy it appears that a political resolution of conflict in South Africa would herald the era of a more functional imposed regime framework. The regime may, further, change from it's essentially spontaneous form at present (with the exception of ties between the BLS and South Africa) to a more negotiated form. It is evident, from the maintenance of economic ties with South Africa, even when dysfunctional and ideologically inconsistent, that a breakdown of the imposed economic regime is, in relation to most of the SADCC countries, unlikely.

The individual case studies also highlighted the harsh economic realities facing the SADCC countries notwithstanding the forces of destabilisation. Integration with the western market economy, as the socio-economic totality, is clearly a practical reality which must be taken into account in development policy.

According to the theory on regime change and transformation, mentioned in Chapter One, it would seem that, given the strength of the spontaneous imposed regime and the causal links, or 'feedback' to original converging interests mentioned by Keohane, that it is not in the interests of the state actors or foreign, South African and regional private business to allow the SADCC/South Africa economic framework to collapse. The weak convergence of interests around the two most important goals (One and Two) of SADCC, and the incompatibility of these two goals with the socio-economic reality of which the SADCC countries are part, appears to indicate that as soon as the inconsistencies reach a crisis degree, the regime will show 'revolutionary' characteristics and disintegrate. However South Africa's inclusion in the negotiated regime structure (in an official sense) will allow the SADCC regime to take on the structural convergence of interests that binds the actors of the imposed regime which exists at present (this by no means implies that the spontaneous imposed regime framework is at present politically legitimate). In that way SADCC may realign it's goals to present a true convergence of economic interests and not those based on political or ideological motivations which are abstracted from regional economic realities. However the imposed order, it appears, will always be asymmetrically integrated, as South Africa's resource base, geographical size and level of industrialisation preclude competition except in specialised areas. Thus less dependence on South Africa economically is certainly in the SADCC countries self-interest, even though at present this is more politically than economically motivated, but the cognisance of South Africa's economic role in the region is paramount. It would appear that the strength of a regional grouping in Southern Africa in a post apartheid era would be based on the specialisation of the SADCC countries and the formation of a regional bloc including South Africa to combine economic power resources in order to hold some economic and political strength and leverage in the western market economy, that is the totality which both constrains and facilitates their development.

In this sense the reality brought to light by regime theory shows that regimes may exist in spite of political differences. They may also exist in contrast to proported ideological leanings. As is clearly evident from the analysis of the interaction between SADCC states, their ties with the western market economy and South Africa take place in contrast to domestic and regional ideological orientations. In this light the SADCC regime is not only structurally very weak, it also has a clearly negative economic function in the region. The political convergence of interests around economically impossible goals means that future economic cooperation will be negatively affected. As pointed out, economic independence from South Africa and the West is impossible, and development is actually tied to greater dependence. Equitable regional integration is, as shown, not possible given the long term structural economic links which pervade the Southern African region. As such the regime functions to cover up ideological and economic differences by uniting the Southern African countries in a political effort to disengage from South Africa. The future of the SADCC countries economic development amongst themselves and with South Africa are thus placed in a dangerous position. Although the SADCC countries have no real political alternative but to oppose apartheid, it must be made clear that the links with western capitalism will extend far beyond the death of apartheid. It is clear that these links have survived the liberation struggles in even the most staunch of the 'socialist' SADCC countries.

Finally, it can be stated with conviction that regime theory, despite it's limitations, has functioned effectively to show that patterns of behaviour around convergent interests, when examined in socio-economic perspective, can highlight patterns of behaviour which shed a different light on that reality. In this sense the theory, in combination with Varshney's structural methodological approach, shows that there is a very low level of convergent patterns of behaviour around SADCC's most important economic goals, and a very high level of convergent interest and longstanding patterns of economic interaction between South Africa and Southern Africa even though these are not officially articulated. The SADCC regime, in this light, covers up the convergent patterns of behaviour which have perpetuated themselves between South Africa and the SADCC states since the organisation's inception nine years ago.

THE FOLLOWING TABLES ARE SOMEWHAT DATED.HOWEVER MORE RECENT RELEVANT FIGURES ARE , AT THE TIME OF WRITING NOT YET AVAILABLE .COUNTRY BY COUNTRY FIGURES OF THE 1989 EUROPA YEARBOOK ARE ALSO FAIRLY DATED (MOSTLY BETWEEN 1985-86) AND SHOW NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES TO THE TABLES USED HERE. WHILE I AM AWARE THAT THERE ARE PUBLICATIONS ON SADCC OVERSEAS, NOTABLY JOSEPH HANLONS COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON SADCC, THIS BOOK IS UNAVAILABLE AT BOTH STELLENBOSCH, UCT, AND THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND.THE LATEST SADCC CONFERENCE PAPERS CONTAIN NO RECENT FIGURES ON INTRAREGIONAL TRADE (THIS ASSERTION HAS BEEN MADE AFTER CONSULTATION WITH JAN SMUTS LIBRARY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, WHERE THE PAPERS ARE HELD).

ALTHOUGH THE ABOVE IS AN APOLOGIA FOR THE DATED FIGURES, I BELIEVE THAT MY ANALYSIS SHOWS CLEARLY THAT THE REGIME STRUCTURE HAS A PERPETUATING EFFECT AND THUS ANY RADICAL CHANGES TO INTRAREGIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. THE RELEVANCY OF THE TABLES IS, THEREFORE, BEYOND QUESTION.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS OF SADCC (1982)

Country	Main Export	Second and third Priority export
Angola	88% Oil	100% diamonds and coffee.
Botswana	52% Diamonds	84% meat and copper.
Lesotho	41% Diamonds(5)	59% wool, mohair.
Malawi	54% Tobacco	85% Tea, sugar.
Mozambique	19% cashew nuts	52% Prawns, petrol.
Swaziland	37% Sugar	64% chemicals and pulp.
Tanzania	30% coffee	48% cloves and cotton.
Zambia	87% copper	93% colbalt and zinc.
Zimbabwe	24% tobacco	51% Gold, ferro-alloys.

Hanlon, SADCC: Progress , Projects and Prospects, EIU, Special Report No 183 London 1984.

TABLE TWO

Intra-SADCC Flows by Individual Commodities, 1980–81

Exports from 1	*Products* 2	*Destination* 3
	ISIC 31: Food, Beverage, Tobacco	
Angola	processed fish production	Mo, Swa, Za, Zi
	palm oil	Ta, Za
	dried beans and peas	Swa
	coffee	Bo, Mo, Swa, Za
	tobacco and products	Bo, Mo
Botswana	meat and by-products	Ang, Mo
	edible oils	Ang, Ta, Za
Lesotho	processed fruit and vegetables	Mo, Swa, Za, Zi
Malawi	processed fruit and vegetables	Mo, Swa, Za, Zi
	groundnuts	Bo, Swa
	dried beans and peas	Ang
	sugar	Ang, Bo, Le, Ta
	tea	Ang, Bo, Za
	tobacco and products	Bo, Mo
Mozambique	milk	Ang, Ta
	processed fish production	Swa, Za, Zi
	tea	Ang, Bo, Swa
Swaziland	meat and by-products	Ang, Mo
	edible oils	Ang, Ta, Za
	sugar	Ang, Bo, Le, Ta
	beverages	Ang
Tanzania	meat and by-products	Ang
	edible oils	Ang, Za
	coffee	Ang, Bo, Mo, Swa, Za
	Sugar	Ang, Bo, Le
	spices	Swa
	tea	Ang, Bo, Swa, Za
	honey	Le
	beverages	Ang
	tobacco and products	Ang
Zambia	groundnuts	Ang
	sugar	Bo, Le
	tobacco and products	Bo, Mo
Zimbabwe	edible oils	Ang, Ta, Za
	coffee	Bo, Mo, Swa, Za
	sugar	Ang, Bo, Le, Ta
	ISIC 32: Textiles, Garments, Leather	
Angola	sisal products	Zi
	hides and skins	Le, Ta, Za
Botswana	hides and skins	Le, Ta, Za
Lesotho	garments	Ang, Bo, Mo, Ma
	footwear	Ang, Bo, Ma, Ta
Malawi	textiles	Ang, Bo, Mo
	cotton	Zi
	leather goods	Ang, Bo
Mozambique	garments	Ang, Bo, Ma
	footwear	Ang, Bo, Ma, Ta
Swaziland	garments	Ang, Bo, Ma, Mo
Tanzania	blankets	Bo
	sisal products	Zi
	garments	Ang, Bo, Ma, Mo
	leather goods	Ang, Bo, Ma
Zambia	textiles	Ang, Bo, Ma, Mo
Zimbabwe	garments	Ang, Bo, Ma, Mo
	hides and skins	Le, Ta, Za
	footwear	Ang, Bo, Ma, Ta
	ISIC 33: Wood and Wood Products	
Lesotho	furniture	Ang, Bo, Mo, Zi
	upholstery	Ang, Bo, Mo, Zi
Mozambique	wood and by-products	Ta, Za, Zi
	furniture	Bo, Za
Swaziland	furniture	Bo
Tanzania	wood and by-products	Za, Zi
Zambia	wood and by-products	Ang, Zi
	ISIC 34: Pulp and Paper	
Angola	wood and pulp	Za, Zi
Malawi	paper products	Ang, Bo, Mo, Ta, Za
Swaziland	wood and pulp	Ta, Za, Zi
	paper products	ang, Bo, Ma, Mo, Ta, Za
Tanzania	paper products	Ang, Za
	ISIC 35: Chemicals and Products	
Angola	PVC	Bo, Le, Ma, Swa, Ta, Za, Zi
	paint and varnish	Bo, Mo, Ta, Zi
	tyres and tubes	Swa
Botswana	soda ash	Za, Zi
	tallow and candles	Ma, Swa, Za, Zi
Lesotho	medicines	Ang, Bo, Ma, Swa, Ta, Zi
	tallow and candles	Ma, Swa, Za, Zi
Swaziland	soda ash	Ang, Ta
	paint and varnish	Bo, Mo, Ta, Zi
	tallow and candles	Zi
	explosives	Ta
Tanzania	fertilizer	Ang
	insecticides	Mo, Za
	soap and detergents	Ang, Bo
	tyres and tubes	Ang
Zambia	lime	Swa, Zi
Zimbabwe	chemicals	Swa, Ta

	ISIC 36: Non-metallic Mineral Products	
Angola	ceramic ware	Swa, Zi
	cement	Bo, Le, Swa, Ta, Za
Lesotho	ceramic ware	Swa, Zi
Mozambique	glass products	Ang, Zi
	cement	Swa, Ta, Za
Swaziland	ceramic ware	Ta, Zi
	glass products	Zi, Ang
Tanzania	ceramic ware	Swa, Zi
	glass products	Ang, Zi
Zambia	glass products	Zi
	cement	Bo, Le, Swa, Ta
Zimbabwe	cement	Bo, Le, Swa, Ta, Za
	ISIC 37: Basic Metal Industries	
Angola	reinforcing iron	Za
Mozambique	iron sheets	Bo, Zi
Tanzania	steel tubes and pipes	Ang, Bo
Zambia	copper and products, lead, zinc	Ang, Mo, Ta, Zi
Zimbabwe	steel ingots and bars, copper and products, lead, zinc	Ang, Ta
	ISIV 38: Metal Products and Machinery	
Lesotho	building materials	Bo, Ta, Zi
Malawi	structural fabrication	Ang, Bo, Zi
	industry machinery	Swa
Mozambique	building materials	Bo, Ta, Zi
	GLS lamps	Ta
	refrigerators	Ta
	agricultural pumps	Ang, Ma, Ta
	trailers	Ma, Ta
Swaziland	tractors	Ang
Tanzania	fabricated metal items	Ang, Bo, Zi
	agricultural implements	Ang, Ma
	building materials	Bo, Mo, Zi
Zambia	aluminium utensils	Ang, Zi
Zimbabwe	industrial machinery	Swa
	earthmoving equipment	Ang, Bo, Ma, Mo, Swa, Ta, Za
	car and parts	Ang, Bo, Ma, Swa
	ISIC 39: Others	
Lesotho	umbrellas	Ang, Mo, Swa
Tanzania	school materials	Ang, Ma

Key: Ang = Angola, Bo = Botswana, Le = Lesotho, Ma = Malawi, Mo = Mozambique, Swa = Swaziland, Ta = Tanzania, Za = Zambia and Zi = Zimbabwe.

Source: SADCC, *Industry*, Blantyre, 1)(.

Quoted in Amin S, Chitala D and Mandaza I (eds): 1987: 240-242.

TABLE THREE

Principal SADCC Commodity Exports and Regional Cooperation

Commodity	*Average value of regional exports 1976–78 ($US m)*	*Principal exporting countries*	*Share of export from developing SADCC countries World rank (per cent)*				*Share of national regional exports (per cent)*		*Other producing countries*	*Share of national exports (per cent)*
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*
Single exporter dominant										
Copper[a]	963	all	100	24.3	16	4th	94	30	Botswana	29
		Zambia	89			4th	94		Zimbabwe	5
Petroleum	341	all	100	0.2	0.2			9.8		
		Angola	100				35			
Chromium[a]	61	all	100		5.6					
		Zimbabwe	100			4th	7			
Asbestos[a]	110	all	100		5.3			3.4		
		Zimbabwe	85			4th	11		Swaziland	12
Sisal[a]	35	all	100	37.2	36.5			1.1	Angola	1
		Tanzania	75			2nd	5		Mozambique	2
Sub total	1483							46.2		
Major foreign exchange earner for several SADCC countries										
Meat	107	all	100	6.7	1.2			3.3	Swaziland	5
		Zimbabwe	54				6			
		Botswana	41				3			
Tobacco[a]	263	all	100	17.6	8.1			8.2	Zambia	1
		Zimbabwe	47			5th	14		Mozambique	4
		Malawi	35			6th	49		Angola	0
		Tanzania	11				6			
Diamonds[a]	171	all	100		18.5			5.3	Tanzania	6
		Botswana	37			4th	33		Lesotho	33
		Angola	41			5th	8			
Coffee	408	all	100	4.2	3.9			12.7	Zimbabwe	2
		Angola	51				24		Zambia	—
		Tanzania	45				35			
Tea	73	all	100	5.8	4.7					
		Malawi	51				20			
		Tanzania	26				4			
Sugar	123	all	100	4	1.6			3.8	Mozambique	8
		Swaziland	52				34			
		Zimbabwe	20				3		Tanzania	1
		Malawi	15				10			
Cashewnuts[a]	70	all	100					2.2		
		Mozambique	55				27			
		Tanzania	45				6			
Cotton	155	all	100	5.3	·2.7			4.8	Angola	2
		Tanzania	39				12		Mozambique	9
		Zimbabwe	38				7			
Timber/wood pulp	65	all	100					2.0	Angola	1
		Swaziland	68				23		Mozambique	3
									Zimbabwe	0

[a] The SADCC region has a significant share in total world exports.

Source: Compiled from UNIDO (1985), Table 8.1

Quoted in Amin S, Chitala D, and Mandaza I (eds): 1987:238-239.

TABLE FOUR

South African trade with Africa, 1980-1985

Country[1]	Million US$ Imports from South Africa 1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Exports to South Africa 1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Angola	..	206	..	..	..	..	33	..	..	..	..	..
Botswana[2]	..	..		..	530	447	..	..	..	..	61	44
Lesotho[2]	..	..	508	..	..	..	..	..	16	..	17	..
Malawi	163	116	106	120	109	104	9	14	14	18	23	22
Mauritius	83	53	41	38	38	45	3	6	4	3	3	1
Mozambique	..	..	..	..	63	76	..	..	..	..	..	8
Reunion	54	42	43	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Seychelles	10	10	9	8	7	4	..	..	..	..	..	..
Swaziland[2]	..	..		..	399	..		..	..	94	..	..
Zaire	42	38	30	..	..	..		..	..	..	..	..
Zambia	173	..	145	..	129	..	7	..	3	..	5	..
Zimbabwe	..	362	331	238	221	170	..	283	190	176	214	111
	Exports to Africa						Imports from Africa					
South Africa	1 412	1 186	834	717	616	710	371	362	305	290	284	207

TABLE FIVE

Foreign black workers legally employed in South Africa, according to countries of origin, 1975 and 1980-1986[1]

Country of origin	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Angola	623	304	69	120	68	48	44	22
Botswana	37 016	29 528	29 169	26 262	25 963	26 433	27 814	28 244
Lesotho	152 188	136 395	150 422	140 719	145 797	138 443	139 827	138 193
Malawi	39 308	31 772	30 602	27 558	29 612	29 268	30 144	31 411
Mozambique	150 738	60 490	59 391	59 323	61 218	60 407	68 665	73 186
Swaziland	16 390	11 [illegible]	13 418	13 659	16 773	16 823	22 255	21 914
Zambia	914	914	727	787	743	1 274	833	2 421
Zimbabwe	8 897	20 540	16 965	11 332	7 742	7 492	7 428	7 304
Other	8 512	3 102	995	2 512	70 105[2]	71 072[2]	73 998[2]	75 430[2]
TOTAL	414 586	295 026	301 758	282 272	358 021	351 260	371 008	378 125
% change over previous year			+2.3%	-6,5%	+26,8%	+1,9%	+5,6%	+1,9%

Quoted in Leistner E: 1987: 168.

TABLE SIX

Structure of Industrial Production 1983 ($US m)

	Mining	*Manufacturing*	*Electricity and water*	*Construction*
Angola	549	102	18	71
Botswana	181	60	18	46
Lesotho	2	20	2	34
Malawi	—	160	22	74
Mozambique	18	330	70	258
Swaziland	14	105	7	15
Tanzania	12	282	45	149
Zambia	517	419	65	74
Zimbabwe	254	1,249	98	201

Source: ECA, Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa 1983–84.

TABLE SEVEN

Basic Economic Indicators 1983

	Area km^2 000	*Population (million)*	*GDP per head ($US)*	*GDP ($US m)*	*Agriculture ($US m)*	*Industry ($US m)*	*Service ($US m)*
Angola	1,246.7	7.2	576	672	739	994	
Botswana	569.8	0.9	923	713	76	304	333
Lesotho	30.4	1.4	252	270	53	57	160
Malawi	118.5	6.5	208	1,234	505	256	473
Mozambique	771.1	11.0	407	4,204	1,654	616	1,875
Swaziland	17.4	0.5	1,064	432	156	141	135
Tanzania	945.1	19.1	221	3,825	2,107	488	1,231
Zambia	752.6	6.4	519	2,844	467	1,074	1,303
Zimbabwe	390.6	8.3	728	5,302	812	1,082	2,687

Source: ECA, Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, 1983–84.

Quoted in Amin S, Chitala D and Mandaza I (eds): 1987 :231-232.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAC: Anglo American Corporation.
ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
ADMARC: Agricultural Development and Marketing Board (Zambia).
AMAX: American Metal Climax.
BCP: Basotholand Congress Party (Lesotho).
BDP: Botswana Democratic Party.
BNP: Basotholand National Party (Lesotho).
CCM: Chama Cha Mapunduzi (Tanzania's leading party).
CONSAS: Constellation of Southern African States.
CSO: Central Selling Organisation (subsidiary of de Beers).
EAC: East African Community.
EEC: European Economic Community.
IDU: Industrial Development Unit (SADCC).
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
FNLA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
FRELIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.
LLA: Lesotho Liberation Army.
LPA: Lagos Plan of Action.
LNDC: Lesotho National Development Corporation.
MCP: Malawi Congress Party (sole legal party).
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola- Party of Labour (sole legal party).
NEIO: New Economic International Order.
SACU: Southern African Development Coordination Conference.
SADF: South African Defence Force.
SATCC: Southern African Transport Coordination Conference.
UNIDO: United Nations International Development Organisation.
UNIP: United National Independence Party (Zambia).
UNITA: Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
USAID: United States Aid for International Development.
ZAPU: Zimbabwe African Peoples Union.
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front.

NOTES:CHAPTER ONE.

1)The international politico-economic system will be identified and examined in the context of Southern Africa's interaction with it in Chapter Two of this paper.

2) In fact Keohane proves in his analysis of the U.S. and it's role in the international monetary regime, trade and energy between 1967 and 1977, that international or externally allocated shifts in power and resource allocation is not enough to substantiate the hegemonic stability theory. The regime concept enabled him to analyse empirical data in relation to a larger pattern of events and inter-relations in the socio-economic totality of post war economic relations. Analysing the patterns of behaviour in terms of regime theory gave the aspects he was studying greater meaning, in terms of their relation to other patterns of economic relations converging around the self interest of states. (Keohane: 1980:183)

3)Keohane's analysis of international trade between 1967 and 1977 showed the regime changed extensively but did not disintegrate.

CHAPTER TWO

1) It is important to note that the market economy is based on capitalist principles but does not function according to it's theoretical origins, just as socialism does not function according to it's theoretical beginnings either. Present day 'capitalist' and 'socialist' countries contain elements of both theoretical| orientations in practise. The pursuit of profit is nonetheless the guiding dynamic.

2)The obvious advantages of economic interaction in the SADCC region would be coordinated diversified national economies, and a position of greater economic strength, aiding their interaction with western markets.

NOTES: CHAPTER THREE.

1) The rhetoric which accompanied the Arusha declaration stated that it would ensure egaliterian distribution, full employment, participation in decision making and also outlined a leadership code for top ministers. Furthermore it was envisaged that agricultural collectives and public ownership would constitute the new means of production (Edie:1987).

2)The first policy on villagisation proved to be too adventurous and expensive, the Ujamaa villages where a compromise and did not entail communal working, peasants where given blocks of land to work individually.

3)A contributing factor here was the placement of villages which did not, states Fair, always bear in mind optimal agricultural placement, but was more concerned more with how to develop a link between these villages and decentralised industrialisation. Thus the sites where not always optimal to production in terms of natural resources (Fair:1984:80).

4) Sanctions had the effect of encouraging import substitution which has made the Zimbabwean economy reliant on imports to maintain the means of production. This has a negative cyclical effect when foreign revenue is scarce, the more the means of production deteriorates, i.e factory and machineproduction, making more imports necessary but without producing any revenue. This scenario is common among the SADCC states, however in the Zimbabwean case import substitution was pursued during the United Democratic Independence(UDI) period because of international economic and political ostracisation.

5) Mugabe's control of the Party is considerable, in 1984 the Presidential Commission was formed, with Mugabe as leader , this body chooses the Politburo, according to Africa Confidential this means that he effectively chooses the members. Furthermore Mugabe has apparently placed many of his tribe in the Politburo, strengthening ethnic ties (Africa Confidential : 15 Aug:1984).

6) In education, fixed wages and goods policies.

7) The expiry of the Lancaster House agreement in 1990, which makes it law that the white farmers' land has to be appropriated on a 'willing buyer willing seller' basis, has led to some concern. This has not been lessened by Mugabe's talk in August 1989, of 'making sellers willing' (Weekly Mail:Aug:1989).

8) In urban areas policies on fixed wages and completely free education have come under revision. Furthermore Zimbabwe's agricultural policies show that individual farmer resettlement was more successful than the communal type envisaged by socialist theory. Agriculture was organised to take on different forms, Model A was to settle farmers on an individual basis, Model B and C were more communal in orientation, and model D was a speeded up version of Model A, aimed primarily at settling the number of squatters. The commercial farms left by the white farms were to be used for this purpose. Of the four types, Model A has, according to Due, been the most successful. The more radical type, where living and working together was envisaged, have experienced difficulty and not many communes have been attempted. Due writes "...the people in this cooperative were desperately poor and now heavily in debt and did not know how to work together. Five

families had already left, disillusioned" (Due, writing about one of the B type of communal living arrangements: 1986:40).

9) Angola's exports are primarily oil, diamonds and coffee, although the production of coffee has declined considerably because of the war and the neglect of the coffee plantations.

10) This does not imply that oil could be consistently relied on to provide a set source of revenue, however it remained a consistent asset.

11) Mozambique, like all the other SADCC States bar Tanzania and Angola, cannot extricate itself from economic cooperation with South Africa to any marked degree in the long term, as this is part of the country's structural incorporation with the western market economy.

12)Nationalisation at independence included health, medical care, education banking and insurance (Saul:1985).

13)President Samora Machel went overseas in 1983 to try and woo foreign investors. Given the hostility of the FRELIMO government to foreign involvement in Mozambique's early independence years it is not surprising that he did receive much feedback (Africa Insight: Vol 14: No 3: 1984).

14) Kaunda has been the president of Zambia since independence, besides President Banda he is one of the longest standing Presidents in Africa, thus Zambia bears the stamp of his thinking and political and economic posturing very visibly. Zambia is a one party state, thus the political and economic control is centred very much in the hands of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The degree to which Kaunda controls the party is high, he appoints a large percentage of ministers to the Central Committee and has created many of the governmental positions which are often a cooption of opposition members. Some of these positions are without clear job description, indicating the very problematic tendency in Zambia towards having a large and inactive bureaucracy.

15) Zambia repealed it's contracts with AAC and AMAX before the legitimate date, necessitating the payment of a large penalty fine after the copper price had begun to fall. Thus the takeover of the copper mines affected the financial position of the government to it's detriment in more than one respect.

16) A classic example of the Zambian government's squandering of money occurred in 1985. The Zambian government bought 71 Mercedes Benz from the South Africa, for a SADCC Ministerial Conference (Good:1987).

17) Chipasa quotes the consumer price index for the high income group in Zambia to have risen from 1919.9 in December 1988 to 2308.4 in March 1989. Thus the increase here is only 20.2%. Because price deregulation has affected inflation, which has been running at 60%, it is obvious that the low income groups are feeling the pinch the most (Chipasa:1989:19).

18)This was, however, a result of their ideological position and the overt support for the ANC and the Soviet Union, illustrating that ideology, political policy and economic factors cannot be separated out when analysing the situations of the SADCC states.

19)The reason for the Zimbabwean belief in substantial foreign aid was the Zimcord aid conference in 1981 where substantial funds were pledged by foreign donors.

20)Saul shows convincing evidence of South Africa's involvement with RENAMO, self-evident in remarks made by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs , Pik Botha. Furthermore African Affairs outlines the content of the Gorongosa Papers captured from Renamo base quarters in Mozambique, clearly showing South African involvement. (Saul: Monthly Review Press: New York :1985 and African Affairs: Vol 85: No 341: Oct 1986)

21)This strategy does not exclude diplomatic negotiation, as the Nkomati Accord of 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique testifies. However the subsequent breakdown of this Accord shows that the South African government perceives the threat from Mozambique to be very real, hence continued support for RENAMO.

22) South African aggressive reaction extends to those countries who actively support and harbour the ANC and who muster an overtly anti-apartheid stance, for example Lesotho before the 1986 coup.

23)Operation Production as the deporting of citizens back to rural areas was called, did however not address the root cause of the problem, the increasing alienation of the rural population which was causing them to emigrate to the urban areas where goods and services were provided.

24) Hanlon shows that Zimbabwe and Mozambique have pursued self-interest in steel and energy development where it would have been more cost efficient for them to coordinate with each other (Hanlon: 1984).

25)Agricultural schemes such as the Tribal Lands Grazing Lands Policy, (1976) the Communal first Development Areas, the Village Areas Development Programme and the

Arable Lands Development Programme (all in the early 1980's) aimed overwhelmingly at infrastructural development. The imbalance between rich and poor in terms of lands and livestock received little or no attention, despite political rhetoric to the contrary (Picard:1987). The Tribal Grazing Lands Policy was chiefly directed at freeing land for commercial farming, communal farming lands were to be recognised first and the rest of the land would then be for individual tenure. However the situation worked in reverse, with the commercial lands being delineated first. Thus the majority of smaller farmers did not benefit at all (Picard, 1987). The Communal First Development Areas policy was to encourage integrated rural development, but both this policy and the Village Area Development Programme (ALDEP) concentrated too much on infrastructure and not enough on agricultural development schemes. The Arable Lands Development Programme was to subsidise farmers for equipment, water, marketing services, infrastructure and to raise output prices.

26) These measures entailed a wage freeze, devaluing the pula, decreased government spending in both the recurrent and development budget, and credit ceilings in commercial banks. These measures evidently endure Botswana to the western world, particularly the USA.

27) The influence of Britain obviously had an effect on the type of government chosen, both Lesotho and Botswana initially stuck quite closely to the British type of government, influenced by their years as British Protectorates.

28) There are arguments as to whether South Africa both aided and directed the LLA. This is, in retrospect, not really worthy of intense debate. The undoubtable certainty that South Africa was indeed closely linked to the destabilising force is made clear by the fact that while the LLA was still in operation some of it's members were seen in operation with South African military forces. Furthermore the LLA ceased to operate after the coup, when the more conservative and pro-South African Military Council came to power. Moreover, the head of the LLA, Mokhehle, has in fact returned to Lesotho. Africa Confidential points out that such a move could not be without Pretoria's tacit support (Africa Confidential:Vol 29: No 14: July 1988).

29) The land tenure system traditionally allocated land to the eldest son of every family. All land was owned by the king and could thus not be appropriated. However land was reallocated when the head of the family died. Thus, with a steady population growth the pieces of land decreased in size, eventually becoming too small to maintain even a subsistence standard of living in many cases (Bordill and Cobbe: 1985).

30)Hilda Kuper calls this period 'anarchic interregnum' because of the ensuing governmental chaos (Falle and Goppers:1988).

31)Banda has been called a dictator because of his tight control over government. However his role is legitimated by the support he derives from the population (Kadyampakeni:1985).

32) A comparison of Malawi's growth rate here is a little unfair, given that liberation wars were being fought in the other countries. However their possible economic development after the war years was dismal in comparison to Malawi. This was often related to ideological rhetoric, in the form of development plans, and/or continuing dissidence.

33) This situation is quite unique amongst the SADCC countries. Thus it appears that although this policy seems quite undemocratic, it has benefited Malawian political and economic security positively.

34) This is according to indicators of per capita GDP, adult literacy below 20% and contribution to manufacturing of less than 10% (Jennings:1985).

35) The price of tea decreased by 25%, tobacco by 11% and sugar 41 %. The price of groundnuts and cotton also declined (Africa Contemporary Record, 1985).

36) The Southern African Customs Union agreement allows Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana to get increased revenue in accordance with how much they import from South Africa.

37)South Africa has tried to reassert herself politically and economically vis a' vis Botswana, in May 1985 and June 1986 the SADF actually entered Botswana. Furthermore in April 1987 Bophuthatswana, one of the 'independent' homelands, recognised as such only by South Africa, demanded that Botswana and Zimbabwean citizens should have visas when entering the territory. The incident was resolved without Bophuthatswana attaining her demand, however the incident was ostensibly to force de facto recognition of the homeland on Southern Africa. Neither Botswana nor Zimbabwe bowed to this pressure, and South Africa had to intervene to get Bophuthatswana out of a situation which emphasised Botswana's diplomatic strength and finesse.

38)The project has been in the pipeline for some time, however South Africa kept backing off because of the security risk. The diplomatic and security moves which have been made towards Lesotho since the coup show South Africa's concern that the project goes hand in hand with secure political relations, as the water from the scheme will be sent to the industrial nerve centre of South Africa, the Vaal Triangle (Africa Confidential: Vol 28:No 2: Jan 1987).

39)Lesotho, like Botswana and Swaziland, is a member of SACU and also relies heavily on remittances from the agreement. Both Swaziland and Lesotho belong to the Common Monetary Area (CMA).

40)In July 1986 the Rand Monetary Area agreement was replaced by the Common Monetary Area agreement. This made the rand no longer legal tender in the BLS states, in case of a rapid depreciation, as in 1985 (Falle and Goppers: 1988).

41)Swaziland has traditionally been a safe option for foreign and South African investors because of it's relative political stability.

42) Swaziland lost international support, specifically from Sweden during the interregnum period. During this phase the liqoqo headed by Prince Bekhimpi collaborated closely with South Africa. However most western aid and trade has continued.

43) The city of Lilongwe was built in the north.

44) The irony of the situation is illustrated by the fact that Zambia closed it's borders to Malawi because of it's relationship with South Africa, however in 1980 Zambia bought more goods from South Africa than Malawi did, and in the same years Malawi bought more goods from South Africa than only one other South Central African country. (Kadyampakeni: 1985)

45)The so called Land Deal of 1982 is a case in point here. South Africa offered two black homelands to Swaziland; Ingwavuma and KaNgwane. These two territories were allegedly historically Swazi territory. This cessation of land would have given Swaziland access to the sea but little else, for the land is of little agricultural worth. Swaziland (under Sobhuza's guidance) was prepared to accept the deal. This would have led to the alienation of the country from the rest of Africa, as it would have been a violation of the OAU Charter which states that colonial boundaries must be adhered to. Furthermore it would have meant explicit acceptance of South Africa's independent homelands policy, as all those Swazi's in the two homelands mentioned, and those in the common areas of South Africa, would automatically have become Swazi citizens, regardless of whether they had ever lived in or visited Swaziland in their lives before. Although the deal fell through because of South African court rulings, the fact remains that Swaziland was prepared to endure international ostracisation in order to gain this land. This shows the degree of influence which South Africa is able to exercise over some states in the region (Falle and Goppers: 1988).

46)This does not imply that the spontaneous imposed regime framework operates consistently in Swaziland's long term interests.

47) An example here is the pressure put on Banda in 1986 by Machel and Mugabe, culminating in overt threats over Malawi's supposed support for RENAMO. The South African Minister of Foreign Affairs (Pik Botha) also claimed that South African security forces found papers in the wreckage of the plane in which President Machel of Mozambique died, plotting to get rid of Banda (Africa Contemporary Record: Vol 28 :No 4: 18 Feb 1987).

CHAPTERS FOUR AND FIVE

1)Botha's Carlton speech, delivered at the Carlton hotel in 1979, to an audience of businessmen and civil servants, was the first detailed governmental explanation of what the CONSAS vision entailed.

2)Venter and Geldenhuys point out that there was some confusion as to who would be included in CONSAS. Botha stated that all members would maintain their 'individual sovereign status' but at one stage announced that urban blacks could be accomodated in the Constellation. At the Carlton speech urban blacks were not referred to but the dependent homelands were. Thus exactly who would comprise the members of CONSAS was unclear. (Venter and Geldenhuys: 1979:55-56)

3)The diffusionist school maintains that economic growth via 'capitalist' development leads to benefits for all, i.e.trickle down benefits rather than the socialist theory of redistribution of unequally endowed wealth.

4)This does not imply that South Africa's destabilising effects on the states who are not subject to overt political destabilisation do not feel it's effects. Evidence in Chapter Three points out there are transferred effects, such as having to use circuitous transport routes.

5)In 1982 Lesotho's diamond mines were closed because they were not sufficiently profitable. Since then it has had to rely on migrant labour as one of it's main sources of government revenue.

6)Refer to SADCC Conference papers for detailed evidence of SADCC's feasibility studies and progress in sectors. It is evident from the 1987 SADCC Conference Papers (Vol 1 and 2) that much progress has been made in the area of feasibility studies. However at this stage there should be far more projects in past the planning stages. The sector development approach does not seem to be a very rapid or effective method of coordination (Maasdorp, SADCC: A Post Nkomati Evaluation,1984).

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