

**THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS' FOREIGN POLICY  
IN TRANSITION: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY, 1989 - 1994.**

**THESIS**

**Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of  
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**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.**

**JANUARY, 1997.**

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I DO CONCEDE TO THE FACT THAT THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT A ONE DIMENSIONAL DISCIPLINE BUT A MULTIFACETED ONE AND EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN FOREIGN POLICY ARE THUS SELDOM SATISFACTORY .BUT ORDER MUST HAVE ITS PLÆC EVEN IN THE POLITICAL UNKNOWN . HENCE , I BEG AND ADJURE ALL THOSE WHOSE HANDS THIS WORK SHALL PASS, THAT THEY ASSUME TOWARDS ME THE SAME LIBERTY WHICH I HAVE ASSUME IN PASSING UPON OPINIONS , AND WRITINGS OF OTHERS .THOSE WHO WOULD FIND ME IN ERROR SHOULD BE MORE QUICK TO  
ADVISE ME THAN TO AVAIL OF THEIR ADVICE.

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To my supervisor, Dr. ROK AJULU, I say "... the mind is a veiled light, neglect it, and it will dim and die. Fuel it with the sacred oil of intellectual direction and it will burn with an immortal flame". I thank you for the fellowship you have installed in me.

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PAX VABISCUM (PEACE BE WITH YOU)

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## 1.Introduction.

This study attempts to examine and to offer an analysis of the transition of the foreign policy approaches of the African National Congress (ANC) between the period 1989 - 1994. Such a transition in policy approaches emerged against a background of prolonged political stagnation and deadlock for over three decades with the South African white minority regime.

But in the light of global, regional and domestic political developments that occurred, the organization's external political policy was confronted by " ... a veritable blizzard of change which challenged its basic assumptions on international foreign relations (Alden ,1993:63)".

At a global level these developments include, inter alia, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), the unification of the two Germanys, at a regional level, the implementation of the **United Nations Resolution 435** and the independence of Namibia followed domestically by the unbanning of political organization and the initiation of constitutional negotiations in South Africa.

In the debates about the transition of the foreign policy of the ANC, many scholars (**Alden, 1993; Johnston and Shezi, 1993; Geldenhuys, 1990**) tend to view the transition as a direct result of the international and regional political factors and pay scant attention to domestic political developments. It can then be argued that it is not correct to relegate domestic political developments to the background as their profound impact is felt at all politico strata, that is, at regional, international levels and in foreign policy making and approach.

Thus , inter alia , it will be argued that the political struggles and changes that occurred within the

country, indirectly or directly led the ANC to redefine its foreign policy orientation, especially towards the developed industrial economies of the 'West'. Such developments encouraged the ANC to take up a series of positions representing a new foreign policy outlook. One which was bound to take cognizance of both the changing international, regional and domestic political environment.

The ANC's foreign policy in its years of exile was premised on the existence of a substantial body of states in the international system (Lodge, 1988; Ellis, 1991) and adherence to the politics of liberation and international socialism (Johnston and Shezi, 1993) which constituted a formidable pressure group challenging the 'West' on questions like a new international economic order and apartheid itself. It is reasonable, therefore, to assert that the ANC now faces the problem of matching its ideological heritage, its domestic priorities and its natural sympathies (Lodge, 1992; Thomas, 1994), to a set of political and economic circumstances in which there is no real alternative to coming to terms with the industrialised capitalist 'West'.

It is these circumstances perhaps, even more than the transformation of friends into, at best, distant and impotent observers, and enemies into potential partners and benefactors, that will condition the foreign policy of a new post-apartheid South Africa (Johnston and Shezi, 1993).

Against this backdrop, this study will investigate the transition of the foreign policy orientation of the ANC between the period 1989 and 1994. Thus, it will analyse the overarching objective of the factors that might have influence a transition in the foreign policy conduct of the organization. And as such, to establish the inner connection between an envisaged new post-apartheid foreign policy and to what Murray (1994:viii) referred as the "... dead-weight of

**embedded structural political continuities left overs of the apartheid era".**

The genre enlisted by this study here is not original but owes its existence, ideas, insight to the writing and thinking of leading intellectuals, experts and academicians of the study of foreign policy orientation. Whose immediate concerns are with the shaping of an envisaged foreign policy orientation of a 'new' South Africa, blended with carefully researched scholarship and committed partisanship on the subject.

Such scholarly partisanship, will enable this study to piece together a coherent logically consistent argument out of a puzzling melange of their political accounts, foreign policy scholarly commentaries and academic research that have produced a rather large and generous body of accumulated empirical knowledge on the ANC foreign policy orientation and conduct.

This study is organized primarily as an empirical derived text where " **... theory and history coexist indiscriminately (Murray, 1994:viii)**" with the hope to induce some insight for an envisaged future foreign policy contours. Even though the study is infused by theoretical ideas, no concerted efforts have been made to contribute to a foreign policy '**theory-building**' exercise.

However, the study tries to maintain a delicate balance between a consistent account of foreign policy political events of the ANC, their repercussions on the one side and a critical assessments of key ideas on the other. Thus, in reality this is a piece of work on foreign policy navigation, a political exploration into the uncharted waters (Murray, 1994) of what will become of the present ANC led government foreign policy conjuncture. Where unfortunately, the whirlwind of the current conduct of foreign policy provides a few stable landmarks which are to fix one's

scholarly bearing.

Throughout its text the study will be guided by a logical distinct overlapping antinomy: **change or continuity** of the ANC's foreign policy orientation and conduct. Hence, the central principle of the study will be operated by these dialectical pairs, thus, providing us with a broad framework of analysis. In this study, change or continuity affirm to underscore the commonalities of the old foreign policy conducts and the emerging one, in contrast to laying stress on the decisive rupture and qualitative breaks with the past.

Such a distinction constructs a context for understanding the extent to what has evolved out of the transition of the ANC's foreign policy. Whether its policy orientation have either formed part of an ongoing, uninterrupted, evolutionary transformation from a socialist-marxist orientated approach (**Ellis and Sechaba, 1992**) to a liberal/capitalist inclined Western policy conduct (**Alden, 1993; Murray, 1994**) or constitute an original situation that will fundamentally and uniquely altered the trajectory of South African foreign policy history (**Mills and Baynham, 1994**).

In general, the study will examine the broad foreign policy outline of the ANC during the liberation struggle era, explore the nature and effects of the crisis induced by the demise of the Cold War, unification of Germany, the implementation of the **United Nations Resolution 435** and the independence of Namibia.

But the central focus will be to explore the foreign policy transition by reflecting the theory that even though international and regional political developments had an impact on the foreign policy

transition of the ANC, the internal and domestic political struggles that had evolved during the same time-frame as both the international and regional political developments also had major contributions to the foreign policy transition of the movement. Within this context, the study will also explore the preliminary contours of a post-apartheid foreign policy as perceived by the ANC as to how the country will be reintegrated into the political and economic world order.

### **1.1 Structure of the Dissertation.**

The study is divided into **five chapters**. **Chapter one** reviews current literature on the foreign policy orientation of the South African liberation movement, with special focus on the African National Congress. The purpose of this chapter will not only be to situate the theoretical paradigm and foundation but also tries to open a niche for the thesis presented here.

**Chapter two** attempts to examine briefly the ANC historical developments. The objective of this undertaking is to explore the ANC's foreign policy orientation, conduct and diplomatic approaches during the liberation struggle period.

**Chapter three** examines the nature and effects of the crisis induced by political developments that evolved within the international, regional and domestic political system between the period **1989 and 1994**, on the policy orientation of the ANC. But, the central focus to be emphasised in this **chapter** will be to explore the paradigm as to how the internal political dimensions that evolved during the same-time frame as both the international and regional political developments contributed to the transformation of the foreign policy orientation of the ANC.

On the basis of the above, **chapter four** will explore the preliminary contours of a post-apartheid foreign policy orientation as perceived by the ANC as far as South Africa reintegration into the world economic and political order.

**Chapter five** constitutes the concluding section of the thesis and attempt to draw together various threads of arguments advanced in the study to provide a convincing logical conclusion to support the thesis presented here.

## CHAPTER ONE

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

#### Introduction

This chapter proposes to look briefly at the salient aspects of the debate on the ANC's foreign policy transition, by reviewing current literature on issues and factors believed to have transformed the organization's external policy approaches and engage itself in the basic assumptions of the main theoretical approaches employed in the study of foreign policy orientation, with a view to explore a theoretical framework that will inform the thesis presented here.

The African National Congress (ANC) was, in 1960, legislated illegal and forced into exile by the racist National Party regime. As time matured, the organization developed into the most powerful exponent of the political aspirations and democratic ambitions of the majority of the African masses in South Africa. Thus, with considerable success, the organization promoted a pariah image of the South African regime abroad.

These international and diplomatic achievements ensured its ability to internationalize the struggle in South Africa to unprecedented magnitude (Lodge,1988) in the political history of national liberation struggles. For instance, Phillips and Coleman (1985:12) inferred that "... the broad support from most member countries of the United Nations for sanctions and other

forms of punitive pressure against apartheid eclipse even the internationalization of the national liberation struggle in Vietnam achieved through 30 years of war and negotiations from the 1940's to early 1970's."

Though its international achievements were not ephemeral for over three decades the organization's external policy, which was once characterized by international socialism (Alden, 1993), was between the period 1989 and 1994, confronted by a veritable blizzard of changes both domestically and internationally. Such dramatic changes challenged many of the organization's central assumptions on international relations. Thus, these political changes that manifested themselves between the period 1989 and 1994 could be perceived as being crucial in the transformation of the organization's foreign policy orientation. And, the centrality of this period has provoked a sizeable but growing body of literature on the subject.

However, in most debates about the ANC's foreign policy transition, most scholars tend to view the transition as a direct result of the international political changes (Johnston and Shezi, 1993; Alden, 1993; Geldenhuys, 1990), particularly the collapse of global socialism and pay scant attention to the domestic struggles within South Africa. It can be contended that it is not correct to relegate domestic issues to the background as their impact is felt at all strata of the international political system, especially in the sphere of foreign policy.

## **2.2. Literature Review and Theoretical Perspectives.**

By the end of P W Botha's presidency in 1989, the Republic of South Africa was undoubtedly one of the most isolated countries in the world. Apartheid gave South Africa a pariah image second

to none. Apartheid was one of the world's principal moral issues, uniting the international community as few other questions could. Beginning from February 1990, South Africa experienced a major political transformation involving the entire political order of the country, and also in the domain of foreign policy. A process of gradual international reintegration was experienced which ultimately meant the restoration of links severed as a result of apartheid. A detailed analysis of this is not necessary here as this has been done altogether elsewhere.<sup>1</sup>

Fourie (1992) acknowledges that there are few comprehensive works available on the foreign policy orientation of Republic of South Africa, with the notable exception of **Barber and Barrat (1983; 1990)**, **Geldenhuis (1984; 1990a, 1990b)**, **Frankel (1984)**, **Price (1984)**, **Metz (1986)**, **Lugar (1986)**, **Davies and O'Meara (1984; 1985)**, **Selfe (1989)**, **Swilling and Phillip (1989)**, **Evans (1991)**, **Vale (1991; 1992)**, **Dietrichsen (1994)**, **Wellmer (1994)**. But even these studies, according to Fourie are, however, inadequate in explaining the probable future foreign policy orientation, because they have largely ignored the foreign policy of liberation movements which are expected and perceived to contribute to the formulation and orientation of a future foreign policy of the Republic of South Africa.

It has been observed that, in their critique on South African foreign policy analysis, Barber and Barrat (1990) "**...focuses attention on the government, in particular the executive as a policy-making institution**". It is probably understandable that foreign policy analysts have traditionally excluded non-state actors from their analysis and studies. For them foreign policy actors must possess the legal quality of sovereignty. Consequently, only states qualify for this role.

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<sup>1</sup> See. D Geldenhuis (1990), "South Africa: From International Isolation to Reintegration" in *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol. 13 (1), pp. 62-99.

However, new realities of international politics have led a growing number of foreign policy analysts to shift the emphasis from this state-centre paradigm. Thus, Holsti (1977:107) viewed the international system as the "... environment in which the units (state and non-state actors) of international politics operates, where their goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitudes of choice and action are significantly influenced by the overall distribution of power in the system, by its scope and by its prevailing rules". In this view, therefore, the defining characteristic of a foreign policy actor within the international system is the behavioural attribute of autonomy. Selim (1991:260) refers to autonomy as the "... ability to behave in ways that have consequences in international politics and cannot be predicted entirely by reference to other actors". Thus, within the international political system an important development that emerged has been the ability of non-state actors such as liberation movements to obtain recognition as foreign policy actors.

Selim (1991) further observed that when non-state actors formulate foreign policy and operate in the international system, they are confronted by problems that state actors do not usually experience. Non-state actors, especially when they take the form of a revolutionary movement aspiring to alter the territorial *status quo*, lack territorial symbols to draw upon as a basis for defining foreign policy. Haas (1964) on the other hand, contends that problems such as control and legitimacy, visibility, durability and manoeuvrability are also confronting non-state actors. Lacking a territorial base and the conventional means of conferring legitimacy, made these actors to find the legitimacy of their representation to be always in question.

They must be concerned with the issue of being heard, perceived and recognized by nation-states

and international organizations. Visibility of non-state actors bring to the forefront the issue of durability and manoeuvrability, for the more they become visible and draw more international support. Haas (1964) argued that they run the risk of being portrayed by their adversaries as mavericks threatening international legitimacy. Selim (1991) observed that allies may also become a source of threat and thus supporters of non-state actors expect a higher level of compliance from them than they expect from their state clients.

Consequently, by virtue of its undeniable impact upon the international politics of South Africa, its international status, its elaborate linkages with the plight of the African masses and its internal dynamics, the ANC, though not a state, has thus become a major foreign policy actor, and it undoubtedly deserves analysis.

Against this backdrop, the ANC possessed an external policy orientation. One whose principal objective had been to isolate and de-legitimise the racist white-minority regime in South Africa. In the words of Joseph Frankel (1963:1) foreign policy is a "**... decision and action which involves to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others**". On a similar note, Holsti (1983:98) perceive foreign policy orientation as a "**... state's general attitudes and commitments towards the external environment and its fundamental strategy to accomplish its domestic and external objectives**". In analysing such definitions it could then be asserted that foreign policy can thus refer to perception of the ideal level and nature of involvement in the international system, and preferred level of international participation.

But, while it is true to assert that the ANC has a foreign policy, Alden (1993) in his

pronouncements argued that this has been a central part of the movement's existence and meaning. Johnston and Shezi (1993) in analysing the organisation policy approaches, inferred that it would be misleading to assume that it has a foreign policy in the same way and to the same effect as a government would have. However, aspirant groups like the ANC do not control the resources of even a weak state, and they are able to have a foreign policy only by courtesy of other states and international agencies (Johnston and Shezi, 1993), in the same way as the weakest states need resources of the international support to have foreign policy (Selim, 1991). On the other hand, Lodge (1992) points out that the ANC has not had the responsibilities and dilemmas that go with being a government, has not had to choose between conflicting domestic and international interracial interest which may conflict with party ideology, and it has not had to match resources to interest in the pursuit of policy goals.

Johnston and Shezi (1993) contend that the pattern of power and conflict which shaped international relations for many decades have shown signs of change since the mid-1980s. They further argued that these changes had direct and indirect impact on the ANC's approach to foreign policy. To them the central feature of this new phase was a substantial easing of Cold War tension. In supporting this proposition they infer that the pattern of global politics would no longer be interpreted in terms of bipolar rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which one superpower's gain means the others loss.

This paradigm is as true for the Third World as they were in direct relationships between the major powers, and the changes were felt sharply in southern Africa. The cases of Angola and Mozambique, for example, are instructive. Thus, these suggests that the world which the ANC

has to confront as a government has changed from that which it confronted as a banned and exiled movement (Lodge, 1992). Alden (1993) echo similar arguments but stress that the transformation of the international environment which accompanied by the demise of the Cold War, removing familiar ideological signpost which had come to characterize that era, sent shock waves through the liberation movements and socialist countries alike.

Johnston and Shezi (1993) point out that the Soviet Union in the mid-eighties was beginning to be burdened by exorbitant financial costs of simultaneously maintaining a modern military deterrent to the United States and supporting client regimes in the Third World, all underpinned by a stagnant economy and sterile political system. Hence, by the end of the decade a state of profound crises was experienced. The depth of the crisis, according to Prozege (1991), was acknowledged by the country's leadership since 1986. The year Gorbachev's reformist regime initiated a significant re-working of the Soviet Union's approach towards the Third world (Chakaodza, 1990).

This dramatic policy re-orientation could be summarized by Gorbachev's official statement when he addressed the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution on 2 November 1987 (Alden, 1993:70):

**"... we are in favour of stepping up collective searches for ways of defusing conflict situations in the Middle East, in Central America, in Southern Africa, in all the planet's hot spots".**

In analysing this statement it could be deduced that the Soviet Union previously a supporter of

revolutionary means in Southern Africa, began to urge compromise with the South African regime as the best avenue to power rather than military insurgence (Alden, 1993). In the wake of these events, talks with the South African government officials were secretly broached by the ANC in 1988 (Fourie, 1992; Alden, 1993; Mills and Baynham, 1994) and such preparations eventually led to direct negotiations in May 1990. However, in his analogy Thomas (1994) critique that the sudden collapse of the communist states in Eastern Europe in 1989, the unification of the two Germanys followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, indicated that the economic, military, political and ideological support which had sustained the ANC and its allies since the onset of the armed struggle were removed.

Thus, Alden (1993) points out that such international political changes altered greatly the parameters of the ANC foreign policy orientation. On the regional political level, Mills and Baynham (1994) contend that events in Angola around 1987-88 effected profound impact upon the conduct of the movement's foreign policy activities. By the mid-1980s, with substantial South African backing, UNITA's operations had grown to the point where it posed a considerable threat to the security of the Angolan MPLA's government.

As a result, in 1987, after intensive training and careful logistical preparations which included massive Soviet arms shipments (Stiff, 1991), the MPLA government launched their largest assault ever. The MPLA government advance was stopped by a combined South African Defence Force/UNITA force short of its objectives (Alden, 1993). This was the first time since the 1975-1976 military conflict that Pretoria admitted to intervening to prevent a UNITA defeat (Mills and Baynham, 1994; Alden, 1993), and such an acknowledgement had major international and

regional implications for South Africa.

Thus, faced with an increasingly sophisticated air force and an enlarged Cuban garrison in Angola (Stiff, 1991), and mounting economic and political disquiet at home (Vale, 1991; Johnston and Shezi, 1993), particularly after the Cuito Cuanavale stalemate, there was an awareness of limits to Pretoria's ability to project its power in the region (Tjonneland, 1992; Crocker, 1992; Saul, 1991a).

Mills and Baynham (1994) inferred that the South African regime utilized the framework of negotiations set up by USA Assistant Secretary, Chester Crocker, to reach a settlement in the Namibian conflict. Thus, for the ANC, as Alden (1993) pointed out, the full magnitude of these changes taking place internationally came with the signing of the **New York Accord in December 1988**, an agreement endorsed to implement the **United Nations Resolution 435** concerning the Namibian independence and linked to withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola.

The New York Accord brought to an end, decades of debilitating conflict in both these countries and set specific parameters for a peaceful settlement in the region. And, one of the provisions of the Accord which Pretoria was able to tie to the agreement with the termination of its support to UNITA (Mills and Baynham, 1994), was the closure of the ANC military bases which were situated in central and northern Angola (Alden, 1993; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). Such a provision according to Alden (1993) had a profound impact on the liberation movement's foreign policy strategies.

On the same note, Fourie (1992) viewed the foreign policy transition of the ANC from a non-alignment perspective. According to Narayanan (1981), non-alignment is a "... **foreign policy orientation of international actors which attempt to assert their independence from the major powers in the system, and to demonstrate their ability to formulate policies independently from these powers**". This strategy is employed as a precaution against becoming involved in the military conflicts of the bigger states and it also mirrors the impression of a country regarding its own national and international interest. Singham and Hune (1986), further provide an analysis of non-alignment by proposing that it displays a commitment to the right of self-determination, which implies the ability and opportunity to develop its foreign policy independently of others and it strives to destroy the idea of alliance politics, or the '**bloc theory**' (Fourie, 1992) of international relations. It is argued that non-alignment is an attempt by a state to have its foreign policy reflecting its own view of the world politics. The development of non-alignment happened against the background of the Cold War.

It can be stated that the ANC attended the founding conferences of non-alignment in **Bandung, 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade, 1961**, and has regularly attended subsequent meetings. Were it have vigorously supported the first of the founding aims of the Non-Aligned Movement "**... enhancing the security and development of the less developed states**" (Fourie, 1992: 96). It also adhered to all five principles of the Non-Aligned Movement by consistently supporting moves for "**... international peace and disarmament, champions the rights of those fighting for independence, racial equality and to the principles of economic-cultural equality and universalism**" (Narayanan, 1981).

But in promoting liberation struggles, including its own, Fourie (1992) argued that the ANC compromised on the second founding aim of the Non-Aligned Movement **independence from the super-powers and their power struggle**. He further proposed that due to this compromise it was unable to destroy the idea of **'bloc theory'**. It can then be suggested that such an inability to destroy the idea of **'bloc theory'** tarnished its non-aligned image. This could be attributed to its political alignment to the Soviet Union [its overt alliance with the South African Communist Party] in order to receive military and ideological resources for its cause. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the ideological re-orientation of its successors, as Fourie (1992) suggested, meant a partial end of a close relationship between the Soviet Union and the ANC. But, in addition to the trend suggested above, such a sudden pattern of change in global politics resulted in a semi-transformation of the organization's foreign policy approaches and strategies.

As is evident from the discussion outlined above, most scholars tend to perceive the transition as being solely effected by international and regional political events. Such arguments are, however, deficient in that they neglect to highlight the role played, either directly or indirectly, by the political, social and economic determinants that constitute the system in which the domestic political environment exists and operates.

It could be argued that these international political events coupled with the rapidly changing domestic political conditions greatly altered the parameters of the foreign policy approaches of the ANC. Such dramatic changes ultimately led the organization to shift its external policy approaches from a liberation rhetoric stance to a more pragmatic conciliatory position.

With its capacity to pursue a military solution to the conflict partially limited by changes within the international and regional political environment, especially in its persuasion of the armed struggle, a negotiated settlement with Pretoria assumed a central position in the ANC's evolving strategy (Ellis, 1991; Evans, 1991; Hamill, 1990). Concurrently, the South African regime, on the other hand, recognized that the pursuit of an "internal solution" without the involvement of the ANC was a non-starter (Alden, 1993; Johnston and Shezi, 1993; Hayson, 1992). Direct contact between the two parties was made in London in 1989 (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Hayson, 1992), complementing the opening of serious talks with Mandela and Botha in South Africa itself as to the terms of his release.

Subsequently, the ANC issued its pre-conditions for engaging in direct negotiation<sup>(2)</sup>. Conscious of the opportunity afforded by the collapse of communism and bolstered by the ANC's increasingly conciliatory attitude towards a negotiated settlement, as Hayson (1992) reiterated, the regime undertook to transform the domestic stalemate confronting South Africa.

Thus, on February 1990, the government announced the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and the PAC, as well as the release of Nelson Mandela (Chakaodza, 1990). In doing so, the de Klerk government shattered the die which had moulded the foreign policy orientation of the ANC for over three decades (Alden, 1993). In balancing these radical developments of South African internal politics, Lodge (1992) inferred that its foreign policy approaches attempted to

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<sup>2</sup> Known as the Harare Declaration, these included the release of political prisoners; the removal of restrictions on political organizations; the repeal of security legislation, and removal of troops from the townships and an end to political trials and executions.

conceptualize events in terms familiar to the organization and to retain support from their established constituencies at home and abroad during the transition.

Hence, the political, military and diplomatic components of the movement's existing approach to foreign policy retained a role and, seemingly, a direct relevance to the new situation confronting the organization. However, **Hayson (1992)**, points out that the domestic circumstances demonstrated that contradictions between the residual imperatives of liberation politics and those of the dynamics of the transition [**negotiations**] process within the larger context of the internal environment proved to be problematic.

Consequently, **Carrim (1993)** proclaimed that due to a range of domestic conflicts such as the inability to reduce violence in strife-torn areas, to contain massive consumer protest, to reduce industrial mass actions, to diffuse tribal and intergroup conflicts, to stop school boycotts, and many other conflict phenomenons, the organization's political credibility was damaged. Against this backdrop, it can be asserted that such domestic conflicts and issues, either directly or indirectly, affected the organization's foreign policy.

Equally significant other domestic factors such as the strength of the political forces on the ground, the organized trade and labour union movements, the massive strength of the mass democratic movement, and political awareness among the majority of South Africans can be said to have contributed to a dramatic transition of the ANC foreign policy approaches.

In order to concern our discussion with issues involved in analysing foreign policy, and in

evaluating the theoretical paradigms that can be useful in providing a framework of analysis to inform the thesis presented here, our analysis will adopt two approaches: **the traditional and the linkage paradigms.**

The traditional approach tends to elicit a distinction between the international and domestic political system (Calvert, 1986) in which foreign policy is a boundary problem in at least two aspects. **Firstly**, foreign policy is that "... area of politics which bridges the all-important boundary between the nation-state and its international environment" (Wallace, 1974:12). The boundary which defines the nation-state, within the limits of which national governments claim supreme authority (sovereign). **Secondly**, the study of foreign policy analysis also "... straddle the boundary between two academic disciplines" (Farrands, 1989:39), that is, the study of domestic government and politics (**Political Science**), and the largely separate study of international politics and diplomacy (**International Relations**). Both these aspects of the problem have given a certain distinctiveness, and a peculiar difficulty, to the study as well as the analysis of foreign policy.

Farrands (1989) contends that the separation of foreign policy analysis from domestic policy issue is a fundamental concept to the traditional approach. Here, traditional foreign policy analysts perceive domestic politics as having influence within the secure boundaries provided by the sovereign authority (Wallace, 1974). Thus, in analysing political developments, there has been a tendency among traditional analysts to treat the objective process of the domestic environment as given factors or even to ignore it altogether.

Wallace (1974) criticizes the study of foreign policy, as a continuous process that bridges the analytical barrier between the international and domestic political systems has suffered from a poverty of theoretical concepts and a relative neglect of detailed research. One of the areas of disagreement concerns the relationship between foreign policy and the domestic political process. In the traditional conception, Kissinger (1969) postulates that the domestic structure is taken as given. To them foreign policy begins where domestic issues ends. The importance traditional analysts place on the role of domestic political developments in the formation/change of foreign policy depends partly on how they approach their analysis.

And this emanates from its role within the domestic political system or within the international politics tenet, thus, they employ such an analysis in order to contain the spread of what they must cover (Kissinger, 1969). According to Wallace (1974) they limit their attention to governments and foreign offices and regard the domestic context as one of the background factors.

The **linkage approach**, according to Rosenau (1980), was not developed in response to either normative pressures or sheer intellectual curiosity. Rather, its initial formulation arose out of conviction that the student and the analyst of comparative and international politics were needlessly and harmfully ignoring other issue areas of the study of Foreign Policy (Rosenau, 1980; Calvert, 1989).

Scholars of linkage approach observed that the world system had become so small and complex, thus, their analysis in comparative (i.e. **national and sub-national**) politics could no longer

afford to treat domestic variables as constant features of the world scene (Rosenau, 1974;1980). They propose that the concept 'linkage' serves as a basic unit of analysis (Rosenau, 1974; 1980; Calvert, 1989; Hogan, 1987) in order to can critique foreign policy issues existing within the world system. To them, 'linkage approach' is define as "... any sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another" (Rosenau, 1980:180).

Perhaps most of the analysis into the linkage phenomena, according to Calvert (1989), have been nation-state centred, with one or another external environment as the source of outputs and the national society as the locus of inputs. On the basis of the trend outlined above, it can be suggested that the linkage framework provided a new rhetoric with which to analyse old problems.

Although it is often assumed that politics stop at the **water edge**, Hogan (1987) argued that domestic and foreign policy are typically interwoven. Rosenau (1974) on a similar tone, echoes that although foreign policy overlaps both domestic and international politics, it can be distinguished as there is a form of 'linkage' [a bridge], between the two. Hence, the theoretical propositions that are unique to the field of foreign policy, according to Rosenau (1980), are those that analyze the occasion between the two sets of variations rather than only the behaviour of the national actor or only the events in its environment. Thus, it can be proposed that foreign policy undertakings cannot be completely divorced from either the society out of which they emanate or the circumstances abroad towards which they are directed.

Against this background, it can then be suggested that for the purpose of critiquing the content

of the thesis presented in this study, the linkage approach be employed as an analytical tool to understand foreign policy analysis of the ANC. While studying domestic politics, it is convenient to take the external environment as given, and conversely in studying international relations to regard each state as a '**black box**'.

But in the study of foreign policy neither of these convenient assumptions can be made. It can then be asserted that foreign policy involves an understanding of both the domestic and external environment and how they relate to one another.

### **2.3. Conclusion.**

In summation, it could be stated that this chapter set out to review current literature on the debates believed to have transformed the foreign policy orientation and conduct of the African National Congress. It also explores the theoretical frameworks that informed the thesis presented here.

As observed in the text, it could be deduced that the field of foreign policy analysis is seen to cover a vast range of phenomena. It has been affirmed in this chapter that circumstances arise whereby virtually every aspect of local, national and international politics may be part of foreign policy processes. Hence, scholars and analysts who approach foreign policy analysis by eliciting a traditional conception tend to make distinction between domestic and international politics in which social determinants, sources, behaviour, attitudes, opinions and civil defiance co-exist and prevails, have provided a certain peculiar difficulty to the study of foreign policy and its analysis.

It could then be concluded that since foreign policy is a constantly unfolding process, its analysis should not afford to treat domestic variables as static and constant features of international political scenes and events. Because their impact is felt at all strata of the international political environment. Thus, in employing an approach which is more adaptive to both domestic and international political settings, such as linkage paradigm, one will be in a position and be able to situate the thesis presented in this study to can provide the basic analytic frameworks for subsequent chapters in assessing both the international and domestic political factors in order to have a clear-cut perception about issues that have affected the dramatic transition of the ANC foreign policy approaches.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE ANC IN EXILE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.

#### 3.1. Introduction.

In analysing the development and subsequent transition of the organisation's foreign policy conduct and orientation, it will be essential in this chapter to sketch out briefly the historical conceptions of the ANC, especially the development of its international activities from the time of its banning in 1960 until its unbanning in 1990. But it will perhaps be useful for this chapter before discussing brief accounts of the organisation main external policy development, to outline in short the formation and its character before 1960.

#### 3.2.The Formation and Development of the ANC: An Overview.

Throughout the entire international political-system, no sovereign state has been more consistently and soundly condemned for its institutionalized racial behavioral character than the Republic of South Africa (Karis and Carter, 1972; Gerhart, 1978; Walshe, 1971; Meli, 1988; Lodge, 1988). Such condemnations were influenced by an entrenched white-minority perception and belief that for the retention and extension of their political, social and economic power over black South Africans,<sup>3</sup> legislations instituting systematic segregation and discrimination were required.

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<sup>3</sup> "The term "black South Africans" in these context connotes the following races: the "Indigenous" Black societies of African descent, "Coloured" people of mixed origins, and "Asians" populations of Indian or Pakistani origin.

With such peculiar objectives in mind and in blatant contrast to the rest of the world, white South African regime imposed a series of rigid laws and legislations making race and colour the sole criterion for authorized behaviour (Lauren, 1988). It is hardly surprising that such kind of repressive behaviour and blatant racism provoked substantial serious reactions and defiance from the leading black organization, the African National Congress (ANC), which since its formation in 1912 (Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) had been the outspoken voice of the oppressed black South Africans. But such reactions by the organization were met with retaliatory repressive and brutal legislation by the South African regime (Gibson, 1972; Leach, 1986; Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). Such state legislations ultimately led to the banning of the organization and imprisonment of most of its leadership.

Thus, in continuing with the struggle for the emancipation of the black people in South Africa, the organization had no alternative but to continue its activities from exile (Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). A decision that was to see the organization continuing the struggle for liberation for over three decades from exile. Lodge (1988) postulated that as an exile movement, the organization not only survived exile but it has been strengthened by that experience, especially in the domain of its activities in conducting foreign relations and establishing international diplomatic links.

At its foundation in 1912, the South African Natives National Congress (SANNC), later renamed the African National Congress (ANC) betrayed few signs of becoming a formidable opposition to white minority rule (Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). According to Meli

(1988) it was rather a genteel organisation, established by what were then the pillars of black South African society, that included individuals with some western education as well as traditional chiefs. But its chief distinction was the claim to being the first modern-non-tribal organization (Davis, 1987) of blacks formed to discuss the socio-economic and political plight of black South Africans.

Its political platform reflected resignation to the reality of white-rule, though not to all its consequences. Hence, its tactic was to lobby and petition on behalf of black people. Ellis (1991) contends that in its early years of development, the organization was not a mass organization, that it made no attempt to apply pressure toward the state by such tactics as strikes or demonstrations and that it appears to have engaged in little formal activity beyond its annual general meetings. Furthermore, he argues that it did not represent the views of whites, Indian or coloured South Africans, nor was membership open to them, and beyond a moderate professed nationalism, the organization had no ideology.

It could be stated that the administrative seeds of apartheid and separate development were sown in the century's first decades by the new government of the Union of South Africa<sup>4</sup>, which started to deny black South African economic and political power (Lauren, 1988). It was to these laws,

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<sup>4</sup> For a detailed study of South African History, see for example: C W de Kiewiet (1966) *A History of South Africa: Social and Economic*. University Press Oxford. T R H Davenport (1978) *South Africa: A Modern History*. University Press, Toronto. J D Omar-Cooper (1966) *The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa*. Longmans, London. R. Lacour-Gayet (1977) *A History of South Africa*. Cassell and Company, London; and J Selby (1973) *A Short History of South Africa*. Allen and Unwin Publishers, London.

which included legislations such as the 1913 Land Act and racial segregation acts, that the early ANC addressed itself to (Davis, 1987).

Though conservative in tactics and approach to political issues of that time, Meli (1988) asserted that the organization nevertheless played a critical role in initiating modern black protest in South Africa. The organization first developed a relationship with the Communist Party of South Africa in the 1940's (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992), a relationship that was to last for over several decades. These were to play a crucial role in influencing the direction of the ANC foreign policy orientation (Alden, 1993). One dimension that made the ANC/SACP a natural alliance was the belief held by both organizations that it was their duty to work in the first instance for majority rule in South Africa (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Lodge, 1988).

An era that led the organization to embark on mass demonstrations, strikes and defiance campaigns was ushered by the aftermath of the 1948 white general elections which saw the Afrikaner dominated National Party swept into power (Gerhart, 1972; Lacour-Gayet, 1977; Nelson, 1975; Meli, 1988). Thus, Nelson (1975) inferred that to consolidate its new acquired status, it moved quickly to solidify, formalize and entrench the racial segregation system, and its apartheid doctrine of white supremacy.

As Gibson (1972) observed, by the time the new mass of legislation were promulgated in parliament, black South Africans were already facing tight control by the government over their schools, a ban on unionisation, racial segregation by residential and commercial zones, under the draconian Group Areas Act, further restriction on opposition politics under the broadly worded

suppression of Communism Act, prohibitions on all interracial, sexual and marital relations. Such reverberations, from the National Party's apartheid earthquake, as Davis (1987) pointed out, reached the organization inner circle in the form of bitter political infighting.

But a new generation of impatient activists, such as **Anton Lembede [who died tragically young]**, **Nelson Mandela**, **Oliver Tambo**, **Walter Sisulu**, **Robert Sobukwe** and others, gathered under the banner of the Congress Youth League. They campaigned to transform the ANC from the small and somewhat toothless organization it had previously been into a more militant organisation (Ellis, 1991). Through concerted efforts and political inputs by these the new leadership the organisation in the 1950's launched a series of mass protests and demonstrations that were to reach a climax through the **1952 Defiance Campaign**. The 1950's also saw a noticeable shift and a further radicalization in the field of ideas and programme of action. The organisation leadership articulated in 1953, the idea of drawing up a people's charter rights, the **Freedom Charter**, a statement of aims. This was adopted on the **25th -26th March 1955** by the **Congress of the People** which took place in **Kliptown**, near **Johannesburg** (Polley, 1989; Meli,1988). Thus the Freedom Charter became the common programme enshrining the hopes and aspirations of all the progressive people of South Africa (Meli, 1988:124).

The method of achieving these aims, the forces of change, the strategy and tactics to be followed is not spelt out clearly in the Freedom Charter itself, but in the **1969 Strategy and Tactics documents of the ANC** (Kotze, 1989). By adopting the Charter, the ANC committed itself in precise terms to what it stood for. Thus, this envisaged new society was conceived not in vague terms, but specifically on the principle of common access to, and benefits from the wealth of the

country (Meli,1988).

Though, the paramount question in South Africa was the advocacy of equality of different ethnic groups and the impermissibility of all privileges in this respect it could be stated that the **Freedom Charter** was not unmindful of the organisations internationalist commitments. The essence of the organisations foreign policy orientation as embodied in the Freedom Charter will be reviewed in **Chapter Four**. It could be asserted that it was only in the 1950's that the ANC began in earnest to sharpen the weapon for mass direct action and formulating a statement of aims that was to become the cornerstone of the movement. Thus, by the time it was banned in 1960, the organisation had taken on a look that would remain largely constant for the coming decades.

### **3.3. ANC in Exile, 1960-1990.**

The Sharpeville incidents of 1960, heightened in a significant way international concern for the situation in South Africa. This heightened concern was reflected in increased activities by various international groups and organisations (Nelson, 1975). Thus, building upon a series of earlier resolutions, the United Nations Organisation, voted to condemn South Africa universally and requested all member-states to take both separate and collective action to force South Africa to abandon its racial policies (Lauren, 1988).

Although shaken by this strong international reaction to the Sharpeville killings, Ellis and Sechaba (1992) stated that the minority regime defiantly refused to modify its policies. A state of emergency was declared, censorship on the media was imposed, blacks were arrested without

warrant and the ANC and PAC were declared unlawful organizations. By contrast, the ANC had developed some important tools that helped it to survive the 1960 crackdown, the **Mandela's M-Plan (Meli, 1988)**, implemented only on a patchwork scale in the 1950's, represented the blueprint for transition to underground operations (Davis, 1987). Therefore, the ANC programme between 1960 and 1964 moved from an initial position of continued non-violence to an acceptance of the need for selective violence (Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) and this was accepted by the Congress only after it experienced failures to its non-violent methods.

Hence, a reciprocal "violence" by the black people had become inevitable. In order to channel the feeling of the people into organised resistance, the Congress established a semi-independent body to organise acts of sabotage against government installations. Such a decision led to the formation of **Umkhonto we Sizwe**, which later became the armed-wing of the ANC (see: Davis, 1987:15; Nelson, 1975:158; Meli, 1988:145-148). Two days before the organisation was banned, **Oliver Tambo, Secretary-General of the ANC**, slipped out of the country to set up an external mission, under orders from the National Executive, and his task was to canvass international support (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). It was through the formation of the external mission that the international efforts by the organisation began to achieve a higher priority within their programme of action.

The general objectives pursued during this period by the external mission were intended to complement the strategy being followed by the internal organisation. The primary activities of the external mission can be categorised as follows "... **diplomatic relations, fund raising, information activities, and supportive service to the combatants**" (Nelson, 1975:174).

On both the political and military fronts the ANC was almost wiped out inside South Africa in the early 1960's, **Nelson Mandela** was arrested in 1962, and the cream of its leadership, including **Sisulu, Mbeki, Mhlaba, Kathrada, Motsoaledi, Mlangeni** and others, in a police raid on **Lilliesleaf farm in Rivonia**, in 1963 (**Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Meli, 1988; Lodge, 1988**). The ANC underground structures inside South Africa according to **Ellis and Sechaba (1988)** were smashed, its members or sympathizers were either banned, detained, kept under police surveillance, harassed or otherwise neutralized. After 1963 the ANC was huddled in exile, its main leaders gone, only **Oliver Tambo** being considered paramount by virtue of having designated three years earlier as leader of the ANC External Mission.

It could be propounded that this pre-Rivonia period demonstrated to ANC officials the difficulties of establishing an underground structure and implementing a campaign of violence within South Africa. But through their international activities the organisation achieved some success in Africa, and at the United Nations, however, there was little evidence that these efforts had had any meaningful impact on the South African Government's willingness to meet the desires of their non-white population.

The third stage of opposition in South Africa commenced with the aftermath of Rivonia. The strategy of the ANC during the post-Rivonia period moved its transitional phase into an open acceptance of violence (**Nelson, 1975**). The move into exile had other effects on the leadership of the ANC which became apparent over the passage of time. The organisation was cut off from its base of support inside South Africa and inevitably became more orientated towards international opinion (**Ellis, 1991; Lodge, 1988**). **Ellis and Sechaba (1992)** points out that

without diplomatic and financial support from abroad, it would have ceased to exist at all other than as a fading memory.

Thus, during this period, ANC diplomacy and international activities concentrated on publicising the injustice wrought by apartheid and effecting the isolation of South Africa (Nelson, 1975). Hence, the establishment of a **Special Committee on Apartheid by the United Nations Organisation** augured a new era of activism on behalf of the ANC interests by the international community (Lauren, 1988), and resolutions condemning apartheid were on regular basis drafted by the world organisation, including a voluntary ban on arms sales passed in 1963 by the **United Nations Security Council**. But despite the ANC's initial expectations, the United Nations Security Council categorically refused to take further substantive steps against South Africa (Alden, 1993).

One recurring problem of the ANC whilst in exile, according to Lodge (1988) was to make itself manifest, particularly in the early 1960's. Thus, in an effort to re-launch the armed struggle against South Africa, the best course available was to assist in the liberation of South Africa's neighbours as a prelude to an attack at close quarters and opening supply lines to South Africa (Ellis, 1991). Such an opportunity to establish military camps and offices in relative proximity was brought about by the decolonisation of **Tanzania and Zambia**.

Thus, from their bases in **Zambia**, a series of military expeditions were launched into **Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe]** with combined **Umkhonto we Sizwe** cadres and **Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)** forces. But these expeditions encountered disaster at the hands of the Rhodesia

troops (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Meli, 1988). Alden (1993) pointed out that the **Wankie campaign**, as the events became known, underlined the shortcoming of the ANC's ill conceived military campaign to date. Ellis and Sechaba (1992) also concurs with this point by reflecting that there is a puzzle about the exact conception of this campaign by the ANC. In the wake of twin disappointments with the United Nations and Western powers as well as the failure to restart the armed struggle, the ANC embarked on a major strategic and organisational reassessment at its **1969 Third Consultative Conference in Morogoro, Tanzania** (Meli, 1988; Davis, 1987; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Kotze, 1989).

At this conference major organisational changes were introduced. The most important moments of the Conference were the adoption of the ANC's Policy Document, called **Strategy and Tactics of the South African Revolution** (Meli, 1988), which precisely formulated and articulated the military theory and doctrine, and also provided a more refined explanation of the Freedom Charter (Kotze, 1989). Again the conference legislated that non-African members could join the organisation (Meli, 1988, Ellis and Sechaba, 1992), and the result was that members of the SACP, while previously were important partners in their coalition against the apartheid government, achieved virtually co-equal stature in the de-facto alliance.

These overt alignments of the ANC with the SACP brought with it, three important changes in the following dimension : **strategic, logistical, and ideological terms** (Alden, 1993; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) in regard to the conduct of the organisations foreign policy. In strategic terms, the formulation of the **Revolutionary Council [the joint ANC-SACP executive body for administering the armed struggle]** and the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist principle of

democratic centralism sharpened the decision-making powers of the organisation, in **logistical terms**, the resources of the Soviet Union[given to the SACP initially] were marshalled behind the ANC giving it unprecedented access to training and material, and in **ideological terms**, the alignments ushered an era of greater ideological cohesion between the Soviet Union and the ANC.

Thus, the organization was able to analyse historical and political events through contextual frameworks and chronological interpretations to reflect the prism of marxist-leninism as proclaimed by Soviet Union ideology (Alden, 1993). Taken together, all these changes marked a significant transformation of ANC outlook to international politics and, thus, enabling the organisation to integrate itself fully within the framework of global ideological struggle of the Cold War era.

By shifting away from the haphazard application of revolutionary means (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992), coupled with the unsuccessful petition-orientation approach (Nelson, 1975), the organisation introduced rigorous long-term strategic plans, coordinating, reviving and enhancing military campaigns with a reinvigorated international sanctions campaign (Lodge, 1988; Thomas, 1990). The faith in the efficacy of this approach to bring down the apartheid government was to guide the organisation into the next tumultuous decade of the 1970's through to that of the 1980's.

The collapse of the Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique in 1976 became a watershed event in the history of southern Africa (Meli, 1988). Thus with the establishment of avowedly marxist-leninist regimes in these countries, the cordon sanitaire of white settler states surrounding South Africa was irrevocably punctured (see: Meli, 1988:185; Ellis and Sechaba,

1992:76-77; Alden, 1993:66). For the ANC, the liberation of both these states meant that it can, for the first time since the early sixties, operate from a base of support contiguous with South Africa.

During the same time-frame, inside South Africa itself, the revolutionary fervour unleashed by these examples of black liberation exploded in the **Soweto uprising of 1976** (Davis, 1987; Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) sparking a spontaneous rebellion of school children that marked the first significant anti-apartheid protest in over a decade.

This is not the place to describe the Soweto uprising and the momentous effect it had on politics. Suffice to mention that thousands of young South Africans, very angry and very militant, left South Africa to join the liberation movement abroad. Thus, the ANC was faced with the task of converting these militant and radical youths into loyal cadres, and this it did through a system of political education (Ellis, 1991).

Imbued with a renewed sense of optimism, and bolstered by the overt commitment to activism in the Third World by the Soviet Union and its allies, Alden (1993) points out that the organisation recognised that these dramatic changes called for a re-evaluation of its strategy. Thus, according to Ellis (1991), a joint ANC/SACP mission was sent to the **Democratic Republic of Vietnam** to garner information from their experience in guerilla warfare and strategies.

Building on the changes brought in the ANC strategy during the Morogoro Conference and the

influence that was gained from the Vietnamese legendary **General Giap**, the mission formulated a strategic plan for revolutionary conduct on the white-minority rule in South African in all fronts, and this was carried out in accordance with the "**Four Pillars of Revolution**", that is,

**First, all-round vanguard activity of the underground structures; second, the united mass action of the people; third, armed offensive, spearheaded by Umkhonto-we-Sizwe; and fourth, the international drive to isolate the apartheid regime and win world-wide moral, political and material support for the struggle. (Quoted in Alden, 1993)**

The first three components of this structured approach to foreign policy were politico-military in nature, the latter focused specifically on diplomacy. These components were to be operationalized through the implementation of a long-term strategy planning which commenced with the promulgation of "**armed propaganda**" and "**political mobilization**" in 1979, culminated in a "**peoples war**" by 1982 (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992).

Thus, the systematic application of these strategic lessons, coupled with the development of renewed political activism within the country began to bear fruits. By 1983 an array of newly established civic organisations, trade unions and other groups formed a broad alliance of anti-apartheid organisations under the auspices of the **United Democratic Front (UDF)** (Lodge, 1988; Leach, 1986) to combat the proposed changes introduced by PW Botha's government. Opposition began to mount in the form of resistance to these proposed byzantine tricameral parliamentary schemes that tended to exclude black Africans.

While the liberation movement was engaged in channelling resources into the armed struggle, **Barrat (1993)** states that the South African regime took steps based on classical counter-revolutionary strategies to thwart what it characterised as the "**total onslaught**" levelled against the state. And, among the actions taken, Alden (1993) stated that the SADF policy of regional destabilisation utilizing surrogate forces in neighbouring states to bring pressure to bear on governments hosting or supporting the ANC insurgency was instituted.

Such a strategy, according to **Chakaodza (1990)**, began in earnest after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan to the USA presidency in the 1980's and was eventually to succeed partially in its aims to defeat the ANC guerilla strategies. The result, as **Lodge (1988)** observed, was the proliferation of a series of non-aggression pacts, most notably with Swaziland in 1982, Mozambique in 1984. Against this backdrop, it can be asserted that the loss of Mozambique as a staging area for ANC operatives was acutely felt by the organisation. However, the focus of the armed struggle shifted to Angola where training camps housed thousands of ANC guerillas (**Lodge, 1988; Ellis, 1991; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992**).

The outbreak of sustained protest within South Africa, especially in the Vaal Triangle in the mid-eighties, that rippled in quick succession re-invigorating the movement's political fortunes within the country. Thus, with the renewal of significant civil disobedience, **Leach (1986)** argued that the ANC's struggle against the regime entered a new phase as boycotts, protest marches and fiery funerals came to dominate the political landscape forcing the country to seethe with unrest.

Complimenting the rising pace of events within South Africa, was the hardening of international sentiments against the government. The ANC and the **Anti-Apartheid Movement**, according to Lodge (1988) gained strength in their efforts to isolate South Africa internationally by instigating for socio-economic sanctions. The continued failure by the government to introduce substantive reform, captured in Botha's "**Rubicon**" speech of August 1985 (Mills and Baynham, 1994) and sharpened by the deliberate scuttling of the **Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Groups (EPG)** mission in early 1986 by the SADF, pushed an increasingly impatient international community into action (Alden, 1993). Campaigns coupled with sit-in vigils at official South African offices in the United States, as Alden (1993) argued, culminated in the passage of the **Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act** by the **United States Congress** in 1986. With the failure of the Commonwealth's negotiations initiative, British reluctance was overcome and punitive measures were endorsed (Barber and Barrat, 1990). As was the case, various other states all followed in imposing substantial economic, political and cultural sanctions against South Africa.

Alden (1993) pointed out that the organisations high profile in international relations scored important victories during this period even though it was sustained ironically by the South African government's intransigence. The **Commonwealth EPG mission** shuttling between South African government officials, the ANC leadership in **Lusaka [Zambia]** and **Commonwealth member states** (Chakaodza, 1990), effectively put the organisation on the same diplomatic footing as the South Africa government.

In its report, the Commonwealth mission did much to legitimise the movement internationally

by suggesting that "... the organisation could emerge victorious in a non-restricted election" (Commonwealth EPG Report, 1986:135). Ministerial status accorded the organisations leader-in-exile, **Oliver Tambo**, in his visits to the **United States, European countries, Asian and African states** also enhanced the movements position internationally.

Again, this high profile international relations attainment by the organisation was demonstrated by the growth of its diplomatic mission during the period of exile, especially during the latter part of the 1980's. As compared to the small unit that was established in the early 1960's, Phillip (1989:16) observed that the ANC's Department of International Affairs managed to establish over forty missions and a corps of diplomats.

In addition to its permanent observer status at the **United Nations**, the organisation had representatives at the **Organisation of African Unity (OAU)** and at the **Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)** (Johnston and Shezi, 1993:170). This means that the ANC could claim better representation internationally than the South African regime (Alden, 1993), such claims reinforced the notion that the ANC was the legitimate heir-apparent to the government in Pretoria.

However, despite all these diplomatic successes, the organisation's expectations that the South African state would collapse with the onset of the township rebellion proved to be premature. The imposition of a nationwide state of emergency by mid-1980 and the introduction of counter-revolutionary strategies by "securocrats" (Price, 1991) in Pretoria, while certainly not eliminating opposition to the state, succeeded in stifling the effectiveness of an ANC's supported

internal uprising.

Concurrently, **Ellis and Sechaba (1992)** noted that the government continued with its policy of destabilization in Frontline states by trying to cripple or eliminate ANC's sources of support in the immediate region. The magnitude of these setbacks, as **Alden (1993)** reported, were reflected in the ANC's **Politico-Military Councils** sobering analysis notwithstanding, there were changes in international political environment in the offing which were to eclipse altogether these events. Also, before the end of the 1980's a radical transformation in regional politics of southern Africa, driven by a sea-change in static international politics of the post-war period occurred.

Thus, through the opportunity afforded by such radical transformations within the international and regional political setting and also bolstered by an increased ANC's conciliatory attitude towards a negotiated settlement, the South African government undertook to transform the domestic stalemate confronting the country. The sudden government's annulment of prohibition, shattered the historical die that have moulded the development of the organisations foreign policy orientation for over three decades in exile.

### **3.4. Conclusion.**

In conclusion we can argue that the conflict between the ANC and the South African government achieved some prominence within the international political system. Central to this issue area was the element of race. The emphasis on race in South Africa was to distinguish the government from virtually all other states because the most crucial decision in virtually every sphere of life

were governed by the requirement of maintaining white rule.

Thus, since its founding the ANC made this matter of racial discrimination its primary concern. But it was the re-invigoration of the organisation after 1960, that transformed the petition-oriented élitism of the previous four and half decades, into an exiled revolutionary movement, that signalled a new era in South African politics by internationalising the issue of race discrimination through a rigorous foreign policy and diplomatic programme.

Such a policy programme was premised on the existence of a substantial body of states in the international system which constituted a formidable pressure group challenging the legitimacy of the South African regimes authoritative rule. Subsequently, throughout its years of banning and exile, the organisation's foreign policy, with the support of the international community, was able to effect the elimination and isolation of the South African government from international activities of such acclaimed bodies such as the **Commonwealth, United Nations, OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement.**

Through its systematic efforts of its foreign policy conduct the organisation was able to command international support in instituting economic sanctions against the South African government. Therefore, the development of the ANC as an organisation and its foreign policy activities not only survived exile, but were strengthened by the experience that was to direct it into the post-apartheid era.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### EFFECTS INDUCED BY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

**"External causes are the conditions of change and internal factors are the basis of change, and that external causes became operative through internal ones"**

**Mao Tse Tung (1975).<sup>5</sup>**

#### 4.1. Introduction.

This chapter will attempt to examine the nature and effects of the crisis induced by political developments within the international, regional and domestic political systems between the period **1989 and 1994**. The chapter is divided into two sections, the first part will deal with the international and regional political perspectives while the latter part deals with the domestic perspective. And, an attempt will be made to explore the extent to which these political development perspectives led to the transformation of the foreign policy orientation of the ANC, especially its rapprochement towards the industrialised economies of the **'West'**.

It is truism that foreign policy of any given state or non-state actor is the product of both domestic and international political futures. The foreign policy orientation of the ANC

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<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Samuel, S. Kim (ed): (1984) *China and the World*. Boulder, Westview Press.

is no exception to this. It could be pointed out that, going beyond such a jejune statement to develop theories explaining and predicting whether domestic or international factors dominates foreign policy transition has proved to be a difficult task and exercise for students of foreign policy and international relations.

But such conceptual and theoretical quandary are relatively easy to explain. The domestic and international policies and politics of states and non-state actors are '**linked**' in a complex way. There is almost no aspect of a state's international policies that does not affect and reflect domestic interest based in societal and/or state apparatus.

Students of international politics and foreign policy studies argue that the international system has had a decisive impact on the transition of the ANC's foreign policy orientation in recent years, if not throughout its political history. Whether they adopt for analysis the **international systematic theory of Kenneth Waltz, the world-system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, or a theory of international political economy of the dependency school** <sup>6</sup> tend to view ANC's foreign policy transition as being fundamentally structured by international forces.

They further proposed that the international and regional systems transform and

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<sup>6</sup> See respectively the study of Kenneth Waltz (1979) *Theory of International Relations*. Reading, Addison-Wesley; Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge, University Press; Cardoso, F H and Fuleto, E (1979) *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley, University Press.

structured foreign policy orientation and behaviour through **two principle ways**, that is, through the operation of the **international balance of power** or more generally the **quest for security** and the operation of the **international political economy**.

#### 4.2. International and Regional Perspective.

The anti-colonial revolution which followed World War II, created a multitude of new states, mostly small in size, economically underdeveloped and politically weak (Narayanan, 1981). It was out of such common denominator that they adopted an international orientation of **non-alignment** politics (Singham and Hune, 1986).

These developments of non-aligned politics evolved against the backdrop of **Cold-War** era, a period in which strong pressure was put on these newly independent Third World countries to align themselves with either of the two superpowers in world politics. Thus, a meeting of about twenty-nine Third World states plus a host of liberation movements took place in **Bandung, Indonesia**, in 1955, however, a formal agreement was only constituted in **Belgrade**, in 1961 (Narayanan, 1981). A year after the ANC was forced into exile, and one of the first international meetings it attended as an exiled movement (Nelson, 1975). According to Thomas (1990:299) "... the ANC declared itself **non-aligned and committed**" at these non-aligned conference. Such a declaration was made because of the common and similar struggles against colonialism, against international peace, against racial equality and national independence remonstrated

by the non-aligned member-states.

Consequently, due to the overt-alliance that existed between the ANC and the **South African Communist Party (SACP)**, whilst in exile, **Fourie (1992)** argued that the ANC compromised one of the founding principles of the **Non-Aligned Movement**, that of, **independence from the superpowers and their power struggles**. Such an alliance brought two important dimensions with it: **logistical and ideological dimensions**. In **logistical terms**, **Ellis and Sechaba (1992)** contend that all the material and financial resources made available to the SACP by the Soviet Union were marshalled behind the ANC thus giving it unprecedented access to much needed military hardware and equipment. And, they further purported that in **ideological terms**, it ushered an era of greater ideological cohesion between the ANC and the USSR.

Such an ideological cohesion was clearly displayed by the ANC memorandum on **"What We Understand by Non-Alignment"** presented at the **Cairo Summit**, portraying a pro-Soviet Union view, opposing western imperialism as led by the USA and comparing the South African regime's aggressive policies in southern Africa to that of the interventionist tendencies of the USA in Third World states (**Fourie, 1992**), as both policies were justified as part of the fight against communism. Therefore, Thomas (**1990**) inferred that such a close alignment with the USSR tainted the ANC's commitment to peace, as it neglected to criticise the Soviet Union's invasion of **Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan**.

Although, there is little evidence of the commonly held idea that the ANC actually supported these invasions. But during the recent disputes in **Yugoslavia, Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Burundi**, however, the ANC stuck itself to the commitment of the permeable of the **Non-Aligned Movement** and that of its **Freedom Charter** to strive for world peace and the settling of international disputes by negotiation, not war.

The ascent to power of **Mikhail Gorbachev** in the **Soviet Union** in **March 1985** brought reformist attitude in policy conduct and application (**Alden, 1993**). Such a conducts was affirmed by the **27th Communist Party Congress** in **1986** which bluntly stated that the **Soviet Union** policy conduct was to be characterized by a 'new thinking' which will be more 'pragmatic, realistic and less ideological' (**Pörzgen, 1991**).

In an interview with **Novoe Vremja**, a Soviet Union foreign politics magazine, the Soviet Foreign minister, **Edvard Shevardnadze** lamented that "... our priority is to create the most suitable conditions for an economic transformation and political flexibility within our country" (**Pörzgen, 1991:165**). Similar sentiments were echoed by **Sergie Shatalov** of the **Moscow African Institute** who noted that "... an economic epoch of Soviet Union assistance to Africa and the liberation movements is drawing to a close" (**Friedman and Narsoo, 1989**).

Such policy sentiments were to become evident by the reluctance of the Soviet Union leadership to expel South Africa from the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**, as called by **Nigeria** and other Third World states, and as demanded by the ANC (**Pörzegen, 1991**). Actually, the Soviet Union voted together with socialist countries and the United States not to exclude South Africa. This was the first public and official signal of a disagreement between the ANC and the Soviet leadership.

**Boris Piljatskin** wrote in an article in the **Moscow News in 1988** that "... for years the Soviet Union have been looking at the situation in South Africa through the eyes of the ANC" (**Kühne, 1988**). However, such sentiments did not mean a break with the ANC. Hence, **Phillip (1989)** mention that close relationship were confirmed in official statements, and as a token of diplomatic recognition the **Soviet Union** allowed for the ANC to open a consular mission in **Moscow** at the beginning of 1989.

But there was new speculation about worsening relations with the ANC. According to **Porzegen (1991)** these became vivid, when **Oliver Tambo** visited Soviet Union in mid-1989 as head of the ANC delegation and was not welcomed by **General-Secretary Gorbachev** himself in contrast to his visit in 1986. But, it can be pointed out that Soviet Union policy remained ambivalent, following major political changes in South Africa since 1990. Such a steadfast approach could be attributed to the drastic alteration of the pattern of power and conflict which shaped international relations for many

decades.

The central feature of this new phase was a substantial easing of **Cold War** tensions. Johnston and Shezi (1993), points out that the pattern of global politics can no longer be interpreted in terms of bipolar rivalry between the USSR and the USA. Thus, the political events that evolved within the international political system became a threshold for a new era in world political affairs.

Evans (1991) mourned that a new tide was sweeping away the vestige of cold war politics based on East-West rhetoric. Such a radical transformation of the international environment which accompanied the ending of the Cold War, according to Johnston and Shezi (1993) sent shock waves through liberation movements and socialist countries alike. Lodge (1992) suggested that the world which the ANC would confront as a government had changed from that which it confronted as a banned and exiled movement.

Hence, Alden (1993) contend that the sudden collapse of the communist states in **Eastern Europe**, the reintegration of the two **Germanys**, followed by the breakup of the **Soviet Union** removed the economic, military and ideological support which had sustained the ANC and its allies since the onset of the armed struggle. Against such a backdrop, developments within the international political setting thus simultaneously forced the ANC's hand in its policy conduct.

Consequently, the politics of the southern Africa region that evolved during the same time frame as the events in global politics also proved decisive in determining the nature of the foreign policy conduct of the organization. Thus, the main attention in regional politics, however, was focused on conflicts in **Angola and Namibia**.

By the end of **1987**, the **Angolan MPLA-government**, with **Cuban** support and more strongly armed than in **1986** (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Stiff, 1991), renewed their offensive against **UNITA**. However, the offensive was repulsed with the help of South African military support (Alden, 1993), the SADF claimed that on this occasion its support was explicitly limited. The South African regime issued an official statement stating that the limited military action "... was taken against surrogate forces [Cubans and Russians] to prevent MPLA control of Cuando-Cubango Province [Angola] which could give SWAPO and the ANC greater freedom of movement, thus increasing terrorist threat to South West Africa territory [Namibia] and the Republic of South Africa" (Barber and Barrat, 1990:342).

Fighting in **Quando-Cubango** province continued in the early months of 1988 around the key town of **Cuito Cuanavale** (Stiff, 1991). But eventual military stalemate was followed by a new round of negotiations which began formally in a meeting in **London** between **South African, Angolan and Cuban** officials, with **Chester Crocker**, **Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in the United States government** (Alden

1993), as chairman and mediator. The **London** meeting was the first of a long series - held in **Cairo, Brazzaville, Geneva and New York** - which continued until the end of 1988.

These protracted negotiations, focused on the **Cuban** presence in **Angola** and **Namibian independence**. Barber and Barrat (1990) points out that the United States continued to play a prominent mediating role and was encouraged by the USSR with its new spirit of '**glasnost**' and its policy of disengagement from regional conflict. **Stiff (1991) inferred that Pretoria's** greater readiness to look for a settlement was influenced by new developments. This, includes military experiences in **Angola** where **UNITA**, assisted by the **SADF**, had been undefeated but unable to dislodge large **Cuban and Angolan** forces using sophisticated weapons and a major move by the **Cubans** into the **southern Cunene** province threatened the hydroelectric scheme on the **Cunene River bordering Namibian territory**, as well as the South African military's inability to counter **SWAPO activities in Namibia**. Vale (1991) also conceded to the fact that there was South African white concern over the escalating conflict, the costs of war, the occupation of Namibia, a weak economy and over imposed international economic sanctions.

In the negotiations, the linkage between withdrawal of **Cuban** troops in **Angola** and **Namibian independence** was accepted and the three governments agreed on a

'fourteen principles for a peaceful settlement in south-western Africa' (Stiff, 1991; Alden, 1993). These principles includes the full implementation of **United Nations Resolution 435** leading to Namibian independence and the withdrawal of foreign armies in Angola. The prospects for a settlement seemed much better than at any time in the past because it served the differing interests of the major parties involved - **USA, USSR, Angola, South Africa and Cuba**.

According to **Barber and Barrat (1990)** there was uncertainty about **Cuban's** willingness to agree to a withdrawal timetable acceptable to **Pretoria** and **Washington**. However, such a threat as pointed out by **Hamill (1990)**, was balanced by the positive international response to the prospects of peace in the region, especially due to the Soviet Union pragmatic policy toward southern Africa regional conflicts. Thus, towards the end of 1988, the three governments - **South Africa, Angola and Cuba** - signed a protocol in **Brazzaville, Republic of Congo**, which was formalised by a treaty signed at the **United Nations in New York in December 1988**.

The **New York Accord** set the start of the implementation of the **United Nations Resolution 435**, which embodied the parameters for the withdrawals of **Cuban troops** in **Angola** and **South African Defense Force** units in **Angola** and **Namibia** (**Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Stiffi, 1991**). And, the Accord also made provisions for a cease-fire leading to a general election between the **Angolan government and UNITA** as well as similar **United Nations** brokered undertaking in **Namibia** (**Croker, 1992**). Namibia was

moving towards a negotiated settlement and these have dramatically raised both hopes and fears in many liberation struggle quarters, including the ANC (**Phillips and Coleman, 1989**).

For the ANC, the really full magnitude of these changes came with the signing of the **New York Accord (Alden, 1993; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992)**. Because a key, if unwritten in the provision of the **New York Accord**, which Pretoria was able to tie to the agreement [**including termination of its support to UNITA**] was the closure of ANC military bases situated in central and northern Angola and the removal of its Umkhonto we Sizwe (**MK**) troops from Angola (**Mills and Baynham, 1994:32; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:191**). Such regional factors coupled with a change in international political terrain, greatly altered the parameters within which the ANC was to develop its foreign policy.

#### **4.3. Domestic Perspective.**

This section will attempt to show how domestic factors in South Africa has indirectly or directly influenced the transition of the foreign policy conduct of the ANC. I will try to develop an interpretation of the post-1990 domestic politics that might explain why domestic issues and factors have tended to equally dominate the shaping and transition of the ANC foreign policy conduct.

This has been particularly true since the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, especially in its talks with the South African regime, in trying to put pressure on the international community to maintain economic sanctions, its continuation to propagate the armed struggle, its rhetoric to nationalise the economic power structures in order to serve the socio-economic needs and interest of the majority of the South African populace as opposed to the military, security apparatus.

Thus, against this backdrop, the section will examine briefly the static political changes of the 1990's in South Africa, the evolving character of the ANC leadership in the post-1990, ANC's efforts to maintain sanctions and its efforts to re-address the socio-economic inequalities.

It is argued that a recurrent theme in analysing South African political situation has long been the claim that the **National Party** regime and the apartheid system were on the brink of imminent collapse (**Murray, 1994**). But, **Selfe (1989)** proposed that despite repeated prediction of such cataclysmic breakdowns by 'five-minutes-to-midnight' prophecies, the dominant political class continued to survive and, at times, even gain new strength in spite of its manifest weakness.

But, **Murray (1994)** contend that it was the combination of capital flight, the drying up of international loans that starved local enterprises of investment funds, coupled with internal mass activity, the strength of political forces on the ground, the organized trade

unions boycotts, the massive strength of the mass democratic movements, the political awareness among the majority of black South Africans and the mounting international and regional demands (**Chakaodza, 1990**) also put enormous pressure on the apartheid political elite to arrive at a workable solution to the long-standing political crisis of legitimacy, representation and rule.

Thus, in a landmark address, President F.W. de Klerk ended speculation about the willingness of the National Party leadership to steer a reformist course by announcing sweeping reform changes in the political landscape of the Republic of South Africa (**Chakaodza, 1990; Alden, 1993; Murray, 1994; Mills and Baynham, 1994; Thomas, 1994**). It be could reiterated that the immediate objective of De Klerk's announcement was to break the political impasse that had developed after months of semi-secret discussions with the ANC by removing the remaining political stumbling blocks to nascent negotiations over a proposed new constitution.

In analysing such political reforms, Thomas (**1994**) states that such a striking volte-face in the political direction of the ruling Nationalist Party caught nearly everyone off guard at the time. However, it can be pointed out that in breaking the political logjam, governments of the international community greeted with a degree of enthusiasm bordering on euphoria the opening of political dialogue on how to include the disenfranchised majority into the mainstream political process. The unbanning of the ANC by the South African regime, as **Alden (1993)** conceded shattered the die which

had moulded the foreign policy of the organization for over three decades.

According to Bachman (1984), individual political leaders bring many diverse concerns and attributes in making policy decisions on foreign relation matters. Such includes the conceptual equipment they carry with them that enables to perceive and comprehend political developments [**perceptual processes and ideological predispositions**], their previous political experience and personal goals [**such as power, prestige and more negatively political survival**]. Initially, the organization leadership in attempting to fix these radical developments in South African politics within the paradigm of the liberation struggle, according to Alden (1993) sought to conceptualize events in terms familiar to them and to retain support from their established constituencies during the transition period.

As circumstances demonstrated, Lodge (1992) argued that the contradictions between the residual imperatives of the liberation politics and those of the dynamics of the negotiation process within the larger context of the new international, regional and domestic environment proved to be problematic. And, the result, according to Hayson (1992) was the promulgation of an inconsistent approach to foreign diplomacy which echoed both the rhetoric and the tactics of the recent past. One which Alden (1993) perceived as been met with criticism from a formerly receptive international audience.

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of ANC leadership and efforts to develop coherent constitutional procedures, the evolving character of the organization leadership in the post-1990 period in regard to foreign policy conduct, as **Lodge (1992)** inferred, begins with one man, **Nelson Mandela**. His own intelligence, courage and honour, the moral authority his name commanded within the domestic, regional and international political setting (**Lodge, 1992**) became an instrument employed by the organization to pursue its objectives through the course of the negotiation (**Alden, 1993**), to restore its rapidly deteriorating influence on the international communities' sanctions policy and restore its foreign policy image (**Thomas, 1994; Johnston and Shezi, 1993**).

It could then be pointed out that the personal prestige of Nelson Mandela as an evolving character of the organization leadership coupled with his political concerns for black political legitimization, representation and rule (**Lodge, 1992**), all induced by democratic ideals that will help to inflict a pernicious system of iniquity (**Murray, 1994**) on South Africa, are believed to be clouded indirectly or directly in influencing the organization policy conduct and orientation.

As a process of dialogue between states, **Watson (1982)** critique that diplomacy is one of the main instruments of foreign policy conduct. But for liberation movements, diplomacy, as **Thomas (1994)** inferred, became the pursuit of the armed struggle by other means. This was clearly the case for the ANC. Thus, after its unbanning, the

organization waged a diplomatic campaign to publicise and inform the world community that '**apartheid is still in place**' in South Africa (Johnston and Shezi, 1993), and requesting the international community to maintain economic sanctions until the objective to attain a democratic South Africa are fulfilled (Tjonneland, 1992; Thomas, 1994).

As a prerequisite for engaging in direct negotiations, the ANC issued a set of pre-conditions embodied in the **Harare Declaration**, endorsed by the **OAU's ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa** and the **Frontline States** at a special meeting in Harare [Zimbabwe] in August 1989 (Thomas, 1994; Alden, 1993; South African Barometer, 1990; SAIIA Report, 1990). One of the preamble guidelines endorsed by these documents was the agreement that the international community would lift sanctions after the imposition of a new constitution in South Africa (**SA Barometer, 1990; SAIIA Report, 1990**). But the rate in which the debate on economic sanctions changed indicated how the release of Mandela and the unbanning of political organizations undermined the ANC's influence (Chakaodza, 1990). The debate within the international community shifted from the intensification of sanctions to conditions necessary for their removal.

Thus, sensing its increasing isolation, according to Thomas (1994) the ANC embarked on a diplomatic campaign by dispatching Nelson Mandela on a worldwide tour to

defend the restoration of economic sanctions policies. But Mandela's call for vigilance on sanctions to counter South African government pleas for their removal met with growing scepticism amongst Western and Asian leaders for whom economic issues had come to eclipse ethical considerations of the recent past (**Alden, 1993; Geldenhuys, 1990**).

In the case of international bodies such as the **United Nations** and the **Commonwealth**, ANC diplomacy on sanctions continued to maintain its effectiveness. Thus, following the ANC's lead, the **United Nations General Assembly** passed a resolution urging all countries to restore sporting, cultural, scientific and academic exchanges with South Africa in light of the progress achieved there (**see: Thomas, 1994:180; Alden, 1993:73**). And, at the Commonwealth summit meeting in October 1991, the member states agreed to lift academic and cultural prohibitions but elected to retain economic sanctions until a transitional government was in place (**Anyaoku, 1993**), all of this in line with the ANC's wishes. But, despite all these success with the multi-lateral organizations, ANC foreign policy and diplomatic conduct experienced some unexpected setback in the middle of 1990. According to Alden (**1993**), numerous Western and Asian governments publicly developed a cosy relationship with Pretoria justified their decision by indicating that the **de Klerk government** should be rewarded for embarking on change, in the same spirit as when sanctions were employed to punish South African apartheid actions.

In spite of ANC objection to such statements, the **European Community** unilaterally withdrew its obstacles to new investment in South Africa, and the **United States government** scrapped sanctions imposed by the **Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986** and indicated its unwillingness to end the prohibitions of **International Monetary Fund** loans to South Africa and **Japan** also followed suit (Thomas, 1994).

African states such as **Zambia and Tanzania, Nigeria**, at one time among the most vocal supporters of the ANC, had eagerly sought out contact with the South African government (Alden, 1993) and, perhaps, most disturbing of all, the former communist states in **Eastern Europe** and the former **Soviet Union** were openly denouncing many of the very measures which formed the backbone of traditional ANC policy and were themselves actively courting De Klerk's government (Johnston and Shezi, 1993; Alden, 1993). The mere fact that Mandela's proposed visit to the Soviet Union was twice cancelled, allegedly due to the fact that the **Kremlin** wished to meet with de Klerk first, underscored the radical changes in the ANC's relationship with what used to be referred to as the **'Soviet Bloc'** (Alden, 1993).

Underlying these setbacks was the failure of the ANC to recognize that both the **'new terrain of the struggle'** [negotiations] (Hayson, 1992) and the changed international environment (Johnston and Shezi, 1993) required a significant reappraisal of its overall approach to foreign policy conduct. But, at its **National Consultative**

**Conference, Durban, July 1991 (ANC, 1991b)**, the ANC began the difficult process of re-assessing its foreign policy approaches and content on a number of pressing national issues.

Regional commitments - a long staple feature of ANC foreign policy - received considerable attention. But for the first time, the task of domestic reconstruction assumed a larger place on the ANC agenda (**ANC, 1991**). Hence, Pahad (**1993**) pointed out that the patent inability of the organization to stem the erosion of sanctions and the concurrent proliferation of official contacts between the South African government and a growing number of states in the international community had stimulated fears that the sanctions weapon was in danger of being rendered obsolete. Thus, a new policy emphasizing the phased withdrawal of sanctions subject to ANC approval was promulgated. As a preliminary step, selective lifting of sanctions in the area of 'people-to-people' contacts were favoured (**ANC, 1991a; Mayibuye, 1991**). Such includes provisions for the lifting of all sanctions - except those on military equipment and oil - with the installation of an interim government of national unity (**Johnston and Shezi, 1993**). However, due to a deterioration in the economic index, a high increase in unemployment levels and a spread of violence, the ANC recognized a need to promote stability and economic growth.

However, in detecting that the connotation of sanction diplomacy as a policy conduct are becoming to be purported as obsolete, Nelson Mandela, as president of the ANC,

in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, blatantly informed the world community that sanctions should be "... **lifted to strengthen the forces of democratic change and to help create the necessary conditions for economic stability and social progress (Thomas, 1994:185)**".

It could be argued that the overriding focus of the struggle had remained steadfast to racial oppression, the apartheid system and exclusive white minority rule. But as the euphoria accompanying its legal existence, international victories and political gains quickly dissipated, as pointed out by Lodge (1994) the ANC was confronted with the world of Realpolitik.

Thus, the organization readily became aware that the achievement of political equality in an undivided South Africa was anterior to addressing socio-economic inequalities (Murray, 1994). The precise manner in which the ANC proposed to carry out the redistribution of socio-economic resources was never clearly spelled out, apart from a cluster of salient propositions contained in the **1955 Freedom Charter**.

More often than not, when pressed by outsiders regarding readdressing of the socio-economic imbalances, invoked these salient propositions, such as, the nationalization of the mines, banks and industries '**to the ownership of the people as a whole and wholesale land reform (Star, 1991)**'. In 1990 January, Mandela reaffirmed these

tenets when he proclaimed that the '**nationalization of the mines, banks, and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of this views is inconceivable (Sowetan, 1990)**'.

The most important and substantial pronouncement of ANC's economic thinking was contained in the **1990 Discussion Document on Economic Policy (Transformation, 1990)**. The main purpose of this policy statement was to provide a preliminary explanation for South Africa economic stagnation and to offer a tentative framework for economic recovery to address the socio-economic inequalities (**ANC, 1993**).

Such an ambitious plan for economic recovery was to be pivoted on the premise that economic choices could not be divorced from political ones. The **premium mobile** that anchored such an alternative economic recovery strategy was termed '**growth through redistribution**' where redistribution act as a spur to economic growth and in which the fruits of growth are to be redistributed to satisfy the basic social and economic needs of South Africans (**Nattras, 1992; Tjonneland, 1992**).

But, Terreblanche (**1992**) argued that these '**growth through redistribution**' concept has three slightly different variants: it demands '**redistribution to stimulate employment**', it will promote '**commandist-style state interventionism [macro-economic populism]**' grounded in selective nationalization and the dismantling of the

huge conglomerates, and encourage **'inward industrialization'** to act as the prime stimulus triggering sustained economic growth. Established economists and mainstream policy-makers also subjected this alternative economic strategy to blistering criticism. Suggesting that the untested formulas upon which the ANC's reformist initiatives rested would invariably be counterproductive, ineffectual and too expensive to sustain (**Saul, 1991b**). Furthermore, the ANC leadership came under relentless pressure from the **International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and the Consultative Business Movement (CBM)** to abandon its proposed inward industrialization programme in favour of a more **'realistic investment-led, export-oriented'** growth economic strategy (**Nattras, 1992**).

The relentless pressure of South Africa's free-enterprise lobby paid handsome dividends at the end for the proponents of **laissez faire** state policies (**Morris, 1991**). As one ANC economist acknowledged, that the **"...strengthened hand of the free market lobby in our own national economic debate forced the ANC to rethink its prior endorsement of state-managed solutions to long standing structural inequalities (Africa Confidential, 1994:4)"**. It could be pointed out such statements were visible signs that the ANC leadership had reached some sort of accommodation with the capitalist goals of rejuvenating economic profitability, and improving productivity.

Both at home and abroad, Nelson Mandela made a series of significant gestures towards big business (**Africa Business, 1993; Shepard, 1993**), and these strongly indicated that the ANC had embraced the market-governed logic of the free-enterprise system. Hence, the twin objectives of restoring business confidence and attracting foreign investment in order to address the socio-economic inequalities swamp all other directions (**Tjonneland, 1992**). Though it was not so easy for the organisation to abandon a foreign '**economic**' policy strategy espousing a '**commandist-style**' approach, international pressure and domestic socio-economic imbalances compelled the organisation to shift from such policy rhetoric and embrace a realistic investment led, export-oriented growth strategy comfortable for Western economic interest.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

In conclusion, this chapter set out to investigate how international, regional and domestic developments influenced transformations in the ANC foreign policy perspectives. We have in the process shown that internal domestic sources such as a change in static politics of South Africa, the evolving character of the organisation leadership, tireless campaigns to maintain economic sanctions and efforts to attend to socio-economic national issues, all had an impact on the ANC foreign policy conduct. Such internal political determinants coupled with external perspectives led the organisation to redefine its policy approaches and conduct to the dynamics of realpolitik.

It could be concluded that conditions active within the international systematic determinants re-affirm the primacy of the working of the domestic factors in policy change and conduct of any polity. Hence, a plausible approach that includes internal sources and factors as part of the determinants in analysing foreign policy transition should be an acceptable analysis because policy transition is **'linked'** in a complex way, for it is a product of both the internal and external political factors.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONTOURS FOR POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY

**"... we will build a system of international relations which is not only confined to professionals and governments, but also from people to people, and that ought to be one of the objectives of our foreign policy".**

**(Thabo Mbeki, November 1993)**

#### 5.1. Introduction.

In order to analyse the possible future direction and conduct of the 'new' South African foreign policy, it is imperative to explore the preliminary contours of the proposed ANC's post-apartheid policy options and orientation.

Thus, this chapter enunciates to determine the potential and probable disposition of the ANC by critiquing the organization post - apartheid policy orientations and priorities as contained in its **International Affairs document (Working Group: International Relations)** as far as South Africa reintegration into the world economic and political system.

Against this backdrop, it could be proposed that the central assumption in this chapter will be to attempt a discussion of what the 'new' South African foreign policy is likely to look like. It will straddle on some of the areas of policy priorities and controversy. However, the purpose here is not to formulate a fine - tuned foreign policy for a 'new' South Africa, neither formulating a comprehensive study on the complexities and the dimensions of foreign policy and South Africa's external relations.

But to provide an overview of the many components of its international relations, foreign policy objectives and priorities which will warrants future attention of policy dimensions. On which the 'new' South African government and all its extensions might need to consider, and possibly expand upon.

## **5.2. ANC's Post - Apartheid Foreign Policy Priorities.**

It can be conceded that foreign policy reflect underlying predispositions, fears and general attitude towards the international arena. Hence, it is specific and particular as it connote and lead to distinct behaviour (Wilkinson, 1969). In this regard it can be defined as "... the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state and of the functions their states should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings (Holsti, 1983:116)". It can also be summarised as "... perception of a nations positions in the international system (Wish, 1980:532)"

or a perception that "... **straddles two politico environments**" (Evans, 1991:715).

In effect, it refers to the perception and dispositions, and not the seemingly apparent explanation for policy behaviour. Hence, it can be held by a non-state actor of the status of an organization like the ANC, and can be expected to be representative of a certain intended domestic political behaviour and also of actual policy orientation and conduct.

The ANC maintained that "... **The Freedom Charter is the strategic foundation of its foreign policy**"(Mayibuye, 1991:39). Although the Charter was principally and basically a statement of an ideal domestic political aspirations (Fourie, 1992; Tjonneland, 1992) rather than a enumeration of priorities. The international orientations contained in this document have always been regarded as principles from which any deviation would be difficult. But, Tjonneland (1992) asserted that foreign policy is not always overtly defined and expressed, often it have to be deduced and inferred from the actual relations of the political actor.

Fourie (1993) propagated that foreign policy is formulated independent from outside interference because an active independent policy approach involves more than a mere asserting of independence, but demands also a more diplomatic activity. As Holsti (1970) pronounced, it includes an active programme aimed at establishing a wide

range of political and economic relations with diverse area of the world.

Thus, the ANC has long maintained that a democratic South Africa "... shall be a fully independent state which respects the right and sovereignty of nations (ANC, 1994)". And, that "diplomatic relations will be established with all countries regardless of their social and political systems on the principles of mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity (Sechaba, 1985:9)". One of the major aim of the ANC's struggle is to ensure that the people of South Africa can determine their own destiny, and believes that it is important that this right be maintained. Mbeki (1994a) stressed that the organization cannot compromise the country political independence in order to maintain friendly relations with other countries. But will maintain a non-aligned approach and establish relations with both the 'East' and the 'West' (Mbeki, 1991; 1994a).

In its document, **International Affairs (ANC, 1994)**, the ANC expressed its intention to engage in diplomatic relations with countries of the world. It states explicitly that a democratic South Africa will accept the importance of the world of peace in the **Middle East** and understand the importance of a sound mutually beneficial relationship with the **Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference** and, other important cultural and religious organizations. South Africa's economic relations will also seek to extend friendship with **Asian and Oceanic countries**, and regional organization. In

mapping relation with **European countries**, attention will focus on the **European Community (EC)** to negotiate mutually-beneficial trade and co-operation agreement with the **EC** and the nations of the **European Free Trade Association (EFTA)** in order to secure reasonable access to global markets. The organization will seek bilateral relations with the **North American countries (United States, Canada and Mexico)** and urge these countries as they move towards the establishment of the **North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA)**, to give special attention to the concerns of developing countries, like South Africa.

The ANC believe that a democratic South Africa will co-operate with **United States** in global fora and promote a multilateral role in defining the 'new' world order (**ANC, 1994**). And, it will work to promote political, economic and developmental links with **Latin American and Caribbean nations**. But, Fourie (**1993**) inferred that even though the organization values South Africa's political independence, it does not intend to play a pacifist role in international relations and diplomacy.

A proportionally large section of contemporary states mostly enunciate that their governments pursue to develop an adherence to the principle of self-determination and respect for independence (**Holsti, 1983**). Thus, in its belief of being in line to the agreed and accepted universal principles of independence and self-determination. The ANC Freedom Charter acknowledges the right of the people of Africa to independence

and self-government (**Polley, 1989**), and this is regarded as the basis of close-friendship and co-operation with the continent of Africa.

In this view, Mandela (**1993**) affirms that South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. For this reason, the ANC believes that the essence of foreign policy conduct is to promote and protect the interests and values of its citizens. But recognizes that the security and prosperity of South African people and their yearning for a stable non-racial, non-sexist democracy also lies close to its relation with the African continent (**ANC, 1994**).

Thus, the organization's goal for a 'new' democratic South Africa is to gain re-admission to the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** to augment in its goals to forge the unity of Africa's people (**ANC, 1994**). It will actively involve South Africa in the promotion of both co-operation and regional economic integration, the objectives of democracy, peace, stability, mutually beneficial co-operation among the people of Africa as well as a pan-African solidarity (**ANC, 1994; Mbeki, 1994b**).

Against this backdrop, Salim Ahmed Salim (**1994**) postulated that the OAU is looking forward to the 'new' South Africa as becoming a powerful addition to the African family of nations, and expects South Africa with its economic power, scientific and technological know-how and expertise to spearhead economic development in the

continent. Thus, strengthening Africa's hand in the international political and economic system. Legum (1993) affirms this position by stating that a democratic South Africa will make a major contribution in strengthening the role of the OAU in facing the multifarious challenges facing the continent.

By perceiving itself as a regional leader, Holsti (1987) postulates that, a state feels it has certain distinct obligations and responsibilities towards other states within a specific region within which it identifies. In his observation, Fourie (1993) asserts that many regions of the world have natural and clearly definable leaders, militarily or economically, most of whom perceive themselves also as such. Good examples of this tendency are the **United States in North America, Germany in Western Europe, Japan and Communist China in Asia, Russia (former Soviet Union) in Eastern Europe, India in the Indian Ocean littoral, Nigeria in West Africa, Egypt and Libya in the Maghreb, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America and South Africa in Southern Africa.**

Thus, Holsti (1983) postulates that, such tendencies often originate as a result of relatively superior capabilities and a traditionally powerful standing in the region. Consequently, the ANC acknowledges the fact that South Africa is the dominant power in **Southern Africa**. Hence, they believe that **'... the struggling people of Southern Africa occupy a unique position which places special responsibilities on our**

shoulder' (Sechaba, 1977) and that '... the movement have a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid' (ANC, 1994). But in its expression, the movement is more interested in regional peace, co-operation and friendship than in South Africa's strong regional position.

Mandela (1993) argued that Southern African will only prosper if the principle of equity would be a tenet to inform its future. Thus, regional co-operation has to be viewed as a connection to mutually beneficial development and security (ANC Report, 1991).

In forging links with its neighbours, the ANC believes that a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa as a member of the **Southern African Development Community (SADC)**, affiliate of the **Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area (PTA)**, will actively promote the objectives of democracy, peace, stability, development, mutually beneficial co-operation among the people of the southern African sub-continent (ANC, 1994; Mandela, 1993; Mbeki, 1994a).

Likewise, the movement intends to involve post-apartheid South Africa in the process of reforming the **Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)**, because the current **modus operandi** is far from satisfactory (ANC, 1994; Mandela, 1993). The organization will seek to democratize the institutions of **SACU**, within the framework of a broader regional program, and to remove barriers in the existing arrangement to a more balanced location of industries (Mandela, 1993).

According to Mandela (1993), a democratic South Africa will not adopt a narrow, chauvinistic approach to policy issues and will not make unilateral changes to the system, instead, it will seek acceptable regional solutions to such matters. Fourie (1993) argued that though a country's natural strong regional position becomes part of its foreign policy consciousness and assumes a leadership role which will determine its new conception regarding its international role. But in his visit to **Mozambique in July 1990**, Mandela articulated a cautious policy expression, saying "**... we do not want the political and economic superiority that South Africa has in relation to the countries of the region to become used as another form of destabilization (Vale, 1991:706)**".

Such a position was also reiterated by Mbeki (1994b) stating that the ANC is opposed to the notions and concepts of South Africa as a regional power and leader. In its own self-interest, it is inferred that the organization aims at a system of good relations governed by agreements arrived at, by regional countries meeting together as equals.

Against this backdrop, the ANC has accordingly shown reluctance to acknowledge South Africa's regional strength and leadership. It could be argued that a democratic South Africa should explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region, resist all pressure to become the '**regional power**' at the expense of the rest of the sub-continent. Thus, such policy expressions and statements merely illustrates the ANC's

lack of regional leadership ambitions in the formulation and conduct of a 'new' foreign policy contours, despite South Africa's intrinsically strong regional positions. Instead, it could be suggested that a new form of economic interaction in **Southern Africa** based on the principles of mutual benefit and interdependence should be pursued.

It could be noted that multilateral matters have become progressively more important in a world where superpowers rivalry has largely disappeared. For this reason, international organization and multilateral forums now play a prominent role than before in global politics and relations. Consequently, the ANC foresees that due to an increase in economic interdependency, fragility of the planet eco-system, rapid increase in technology, there is an underlying necessity to approach international questions and issue crisis from a common perspective (ANC, 1994). Thus, the ANC believes a judicious multilateral diplomacy and relations will enhance South Africa's international status. Such a trend seems to be firm. Hence, the organization has a priority list of international organizations, forums and summit in which a 'new' South Africa will actively be involved and request membership.

The ANC believes that a 'new' democratic South Africa as a full, active and enthusiastic member of the family of nations in concert will participate fully in the work and debates of the **United Nations Organisation (ANC, 1994)**. According to Mandela (1993), South Africa is anxious to ensure that the **United Nations** regains its pivotal and democratic role in furthering the interest of those at the margins of the global

economy. And, to achieve this, the ANC supports in extending the initiatives of the **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)** to help the **UN** to restore its integrity (**ANC, 1994**).

The political past meant that South Africans were unable to take advantage of the opportunities for membership of international forums that reflects South Africa's rich heritage links with many parts of the world. The ANC acknowledge to fortify this heritage links to the benefit of all South African citizens as **Commonwealth member**, participator in the **Non-Aligned Movement** and the **Group of 77**, as these forums are central institutions of the **South** in which agendas for the coming decades are going to be set (**ANC, 1994**).

Chief Emeka Anyaoku (1993) asserts that as a **Commonwealth** member, South Africa will be the **Commonwealth's** most effective argument against the forces of racial discrimination, '**ethnic-cleansing**' and all manner of intolerance. Thus, it could be proclaimed that a South Africa cleansed of apartheid can bring a true healing touch to the activities of the Commonwealth and other world organisation. As pointed out earlier, the ANC does not equate non-alignment with isolationism and impotence (**Fourie, 1992**), but believe South Africa will campaign actively for the rights for the states of the **South** and the **South-North** debates that are becoming prominent agendas within the **Non-Aligned Movement (ANC, 1994)**.

As a country of the **South**, the ANC views the advent of a democratic South Africa in developing and sustaining multilateral forums which address the interests of the **South** (ANC, 1994). Thus, a democratic South Africa will play an active and leading role in the development and strengthening of multilateral fora which empower the nations of the **South**. In seeking assurance from members of the major trading blocs on the issue of market access, Mandela (1993) proposed that a democratic South Africa should strive to strengthen the **South-South ties and South-North** relations in order to protect the **South** against economic marginalization.

In most instances, as Morgenthau (1973) pronounced security and defence issues fall within the realm of foreign policy orientation. Hence, approaches to security and defence are developed in the context of wider policies on regional and international relations. It could be noted that the security of the state is not only limited to military matters but has important political, social, economic and environmental dimensions. Against this background, enduring security can be achieved through national, regional and international efforts to promote democracy, respect for human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection.

Thus, the ANC proposed that regional security in **Southern Africa** be pursued through adherence to international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, common security arrangements and region-wide disarmament (ANC, 1994). Furthermore, the

organization intend to make a democratic South Africa to endorse the international resolutions elaborated on **Article 2(4)** of the **United Nations Charter - Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, Declaration on the Principles of International Law** concerning friendly relations and co-operations among states, and the **Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the domestic affairs of states.**

The ANC also believes to commit a 'new' South Africa in becoming a signatory to the **Geneva Convention and Protocols**, join the **Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament**, respect the **Kampala Declaration of 1991** on arms control in Africa, will honour South Africa's undertaking under the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)** and endorse the recognition by the OAU of the positive relationship that exists between security, development and disarmament (**ANC, 1994**).

The ANC proclaims that the rise of a non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa from the ashes of apartheid will not terminate its quest for human rights (**ANC, 1994**). It further asserts that it recognises the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights**, and abides by it. Accedes to the **Convention on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the Optional Protocol** which allows the **Commission on Human Rights** to receive individual application for violations of Human Rights, acceded to the signatory of the **1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights - the Banjul Charter.**

Although environmental politics are a new stem on the international agenda. The ANC in its foreign policy orientation believes that the 'new' South Africa as a responsible international citizen will not avoid grappling with the future of the environment (**ANC, 1994**). It promulgate to accept both the spirit and the recommendations of the **1987 Bruntland Report** issued by the **United Nations as World Commission on Environment and Development** and consequently abide by the outcome of the **Rio United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED)**.

As part of an effective environmental management system, the ANC believes that South Africa will sign the **OAU** backed **Bamako Convention on the Movement of Hazardous Waste** and as such it will not allow South Africa to become a dumping ground for toxic waste (**ANC, 1994**). Regarding its policy on global environment, the ANC asserts that South Africa will embrace a holistic approach to the issue in ensuring environmental protection in the public interest.

### **5.3. Defining Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy.**

As noted in the text, South Africa paid a heavy political and economical price for its apartheid policies. And, such a rejected domestic system, according to Geldenhuys (**1991**), gave it a 'pariah image second to none' within the community of nations. Hence, before 1994, its international interaction and relations were distinguished by

fragmented efforts to achieve divergent goals (Mills, 1996) which led to its exclusion and ostracism from the many functions of the international system and reduced the scope of its bilateral relations with other states.

But the post-1994 period, characterised by a process of democratisation which conforms to the international Zeitgeist, advanced South Africa's re-entry to the global fora. In line with ANC spell out foreign policy priorities mentioned in the text, South Africa was re-admitted as a member-state of the **United Nations Organization**, as the **53rd member of the Organization of African Unity**, as the **Commonwealth's 51st member-country**, a member of the **Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77 and SADC (Marx, 1995; Lynon, 1994)**. Became a signatory to a host of bilateral and multilateral conventions, forums and summits on different aspects ranging from social, political, economical, environmental and military issues (Marx, 1995; Pahad, 1995; Nzo, 1994a; 1994b; Lynon, 1994). Thus, the country's return to the community of nations made a significant contribution to the definition of the general direction to its foreign policy conduct.

Whilst in transition, it could be mentioned that the political structure of the world underwent a process of change. As Mills (1996) observed, the 'bipolar world' of the Cold War era made way for a 'multipolar world'. But, it could be noted that this 'New World Order', about which much has been written and said, has several dimensions.

While it relates to the international relation between sovereign countries or regions, its emergence reached into the domestic life of individual states (**Johnston and Shezi, 1993**). And, South Africa is no exception to that. Hence, as a small to medium-sized economic power, South Africa have to play a role in the constructive advancement of the 'new' world order towards a more equitable set of practices.

However, it have become hazardous to read more into the world's reaction than was intended: **support and admiration for its peaceful democratisation transition**. It could be noted that the world's reaction did not represent an indefinite continuation of the unique relationship which South Africa has experienced since 1994. Hence, a discussion of post- apartheid foreign policy and its practical aspects of international relations must be seen to take place against the background of the real world.

Against this background, the dominant issue among foreign policy scholars alike is "... **what and how would South Africa post-apartheid foreign policy look like?**" (**Vale, 1991; Geldenhuys, 1991; Evans, 1991; Mbeki, 1994; Mills, 1996**). Again, it is worth asking to what extent is the South African foreign policy establishment capable of taking its cue from theories of "**complex interdependence rather than political realism**" (**Keohane and Nye, 1977**) as guiding paradigms in confronting the new operational environment that have opened before them?

Since 1994, a restructuring of its foreign policy conduct transpired and much was expected. Indeed, such expectations were raised both in Africa and within the international community about South Africa's new role and capabilities. But as post-apartheid South Africa develops its foreign policy principles, objectives and priorities, it is impractical to discuss all the trends in detail, but an awareness of the phenomenon and of areas in which this occurs must be fostered in this discussion.

The need for a codified foreign policy and an assessment of current policy approaches has been the subject of deliberation for some time in post-apartheid South Africa. As we have observed in the preceding discussions that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of policies, objectives, principles, strategies and plans which cannot be easily be packaged into neatly described "**formula**". But, it is not always practical to distinguish between aspirations, general objectives and underlying philosophy. Nevertheless, it is important to consider here in this section the general orientation of post apartheid South Africa's policies.

In his speech to the **OAU Heads of Mission Conference, Pretoria in September 1995, Minister Alfred Nzo (DFA Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, 1996)** spelt out South Africa's foreign policy principles in the following terms by pronouncing that the underlying principles which serves as guidelines in the conduct of South Africa's foreign policy includes, a commitment to the promotion of human rights; to the promotion of democracy; to justice and international law in the conduct of relations

between nations; to international peace and resolutions to conflicts; to the interests of Africa in world affairs and a commitment to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent world. Consequently, Mandela (1995) further pronounced that foreign policy as an integrated part of the country policy should aimed at safeguarding security and promoting the welfare of South Africa's citizens. Such choices between available options in the international arena based on the country interest and means should be exercised as optimal preferences.

Thus, Mills (1996) critiqued that South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy postures be based on a consensus of its national interest in an increasingly multipolar system. Against this view, it could be argued that such undertakings must be in line with international practice, including the need for appropriate confidentiality. Hence, by its very nature, according to Kaufmann (1988) diplomacy is "**quite diplomacy**" and not diplomacy through media exposures.

In analysing South Africa policy principles, Pahad (1996) highlighted that, the government supports the global free trade system by striving to promotes **North-South and South-South** relations to attain equitable socio-economic developments within the country and the region. Furthermore, post-apartheid foreign policy architect proposed that the United Nations activities should be revitalized and strengthened to enable it to deal with matters that will bring sustainable changes and development to such global challenges as economical and environmental issues (**DFA Draft White**

**Paper on Foreign Policy, 1996**). They also believe that confidence - building and cooperation should be prominent trends of South Africa's African policy. Hence, efforts to alleviate the plight of refugees in Africa and elsewhere, particularly the activities of the **United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR)** be supported and encouraged as far as the country means allow.

In the preceding discussion mentioned was made about the demise of the bipolar world system. For South Africa, and indeed Africa as a whole, such an end brought both benefits and new responsibilities. Thus, the most notable trend of this “**new**” era is a move towards political and economic liberalisation (**Mills, 1996**) in which a body of ideas around free - trade and democratic governance are gradually emerging. Within this context, it could be argued that the South African government has to take into account the needs of its citizens in a continually evolving global order with cautiousness.

In their critique, post-apartheid policy makers do acknowledges the growing economic disparities between developed and developing nations. Hence, in his address to the **Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee of Parliament in March 1995, Minister Nzo** made the following observation that “... in terms of foreign policy, Africa is clearly to be a priority in the years ahead and the promotion of economic development of the Southern Africa region is of paramount importance as the economies of the

**countries of the continent are intertwined"** (DFA Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, 1996). In this view, it could be pointed out that economic relations are, clearly, a priority in South Africa's interaction with the international community in bilateral and multilateral relations. However, it should be noted that the global economic environment in which South Africa finds itself is a fiercely competitive and complex arena (Natrass, 1992). But it could be suggested that pursuing an integrated **"economic and trade foreign policy"** is pursued, then such global competitions can be contained.

In his studies, Ins Claude (1971) proclaimed that political and security priorities are inextricably linked. Thus, through the prism of such a dictum, **Deputy President Mbeki** in his speech to the **United Nations Security Council in May 1994** made the following observation **"... we are also committed to participate to full extent of our abilities in the efforts spearheaded by the OAU to address the related issues of peace, security and stability in our continent"** (DFA Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, 1996). To affirm such a position, **President Mandela at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1994**, proclaimed that **"... we will play our role to build a continent and a region that will help to create for themselves and all humanity a common world of peace and security"** (DFA, 1996). It could be noted that the two above statements summarise the awareness on the part of the government that the security and political priorities of South Africa are in Africa.

Earlier in this chapter, reference to the challenges of multilateralism was made mentioned. Within the area of multilateral relations, discernible socio-economic themes have become predominant (**Johnston and Shezi, 1993**). Linked to this, are issues such as the problem of refugees, children, gender, human rights and migration. And, within the African context, conflict prevention and peace-making process is viewed as a substantial concern (**Pahad, 1996**) by the government because once conflicts occurs, diplomacy is faced with a new challenge which is more difficult - traumatic and costly - both materially and in terms of human life.

Thus, Vale (**1990**) asserts that regional group to which a country belongs often plays a fundamental role in multilateral diplomacy. It could be stated that global issues have domestic relevance (**Obusango, 1990**) and, if South Africa seeks to play a role in the development of international thinking in this areas it must related not only to international objectives but also to domestic policies. On this view, according to Geldenhuys (**1991**), any state foreign policy is aimed at safeguarding a particular domestic value system.

For this chapter to ensure that biasness is not a factor when discussing the nature of South Africa's bilateral priorities, it is important to approach the discussion within the framework of the United Nations and other international resolution and initiatives.

It could be noted that post-apartheid foreign policy makers has adopted the view that

South Africa's relations with other countries should be a matter of bilateral concern between the particular country and South Africa. Hence, two related aspects are forwarded to support such a qualification : **(a)** By trading or concluding diplomatic relations, South Africa is not expressing approval to the domestic policies of that country's present government. They argue that the most basic reasons for establishing diplomatic relations is to create a channel of communication, which, in fact, is then used to convey to the government of that country the values which South Africa promotes and propagates. **(b)** The second aspect relates to the perceived implications of relations South Africa may have with other states. But in concrete terms they argued that South Africa is and should be free to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with any state which is not subject to a United Nations economic or trade embargo **(DFA, 1996)** and such relations should not pose a real threat to the interests of other states.

Against this backdrop, a number of characteristics and crucial elements of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy principles and objectives can then be summarised and deduced as follows. It could be suggested that post-apartheid South Africa should consistently endeavour to pursue a coherent policy posture which should include economic, security and political components. Preventive diplomacy and proactive initiatives should be the approach, rather than reaction to events.

South Africa should assume a leadership role in Africa and, in all those areas where a constructive contribution could be made without politically antagonising the country's

Africa partners. A diplomacy of bridge-building, sustainable development and cooperation between the " **North** " and the " **South** " should be pursued.

In multilateral forums, South Africa should strive to promote its interest towards major global issues, such as respect for human rights, democracy, global peace, security and the protection of the environment. It should constantly endeavour to positively influence and change the direction of events and developments internationally, to the extent that they affect South Africa. Diplomatic relations and all related aspects should be a means to an end, namely to promote the well - being of the country and its citizens.

But it may be questioned whether these principles are sufficient, whether they go far enough, whether they are achievable, or how far the South African government should and can go in imposing them on others? However, in answering such qualifications, it could be noted that in most public statements and media releases a number of additional cornerstones and main preoccupations of policy postures are propagated as they are viewed as a break with the past approaches of the apartheid era.

#### **5.5. Achievement reached and Dilemmas to overcome.**

As noted in the preceding discussions, it was observed that, through concerted endeavours to manifest its foreign policy and international relation status, efforts were made to attract large-scale foreign investment, not only to South Africa, but with

particular emphasis on Southern Africa. Within this context, South Africa desires for greater economic co-operation among countries bordering on, and within, the **Indian Ocean**, attended the first meeting of the **Indian Ocean Rim** countries in **March 1995** held in **Mauritius** and took an active part in the deliberation (**Marx, 1995**).

Following the **OAU** summit meeting in **Tunis in 1994**, President Mandela invited Heads of States of **Angola, Mozambique and Zaire** to a meeting in **Pretoria in July 1994** to facilitate contact between **Angola and Zaire** on the issue of alleged **Zairian** support for **UNITA (Pahad, 1996)**, and this meeting has positive practical results in the form of a subsequent follow-up meeting of a joint Security Commission revived between the two countries (**Marx, 1995**).

Similarly, South Africa acting in conjunction with **Botswana** and **Zimbabwe**, undertook mediation at a high level in solving the political crisis in **Lesotho (Sowetan, 1995)**. These crises prompted for the establishment of an **Association of Southern African States (ASAS)**, to be used as a mechanism to address security concerns, resolve and prevent conflict within SADC regional context (**Marx, 1995**). Again, South Africa made a substantial contribution to conflict prevention, especially in Africa. And, its involvement took place within the framework of the **United Nations, OAU, SADC** and other multilateral decisions and action, in particular **OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Pahad, 1996; DFA, 1996)**. Further afield,

South Africa has taken part in **OAU** efforts at bringing conflicts to an end in countries such as **Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia (Sowetan, 1995)**. It also participated in several diplomatic missions to **Burundi** and **Rwanda**, and was part of a special four-member ministerial mission elected by the OAU to help in resolving the genocide conflict in the Great Lake region (**McGreal, 1996**). In addition, the OAU's East African member states requested SADC, of which South Africa is a member, to assist with keeping the peace in East Africa. And, in return South Africa has been asked to provide '**logistical support**' to the OAU's team in Burundi (**Hartley, 1996**).

And, in bilateral context, it had endeavoured to encourage the return to democracy and respect to human rights in **sub-Saharan region**, especially in **Nigeria**. At the request of President Mandela, **Archbishop Desmond Tutu** visited **Nigeria in April 1995** to pursue Nigerian authorities to release both **Chief Abiola - presumed winner of the aborted Nigerian presidential election of 1993 - and General Obusango - Nigerian military ruler to cede power voluntarily to civilian rule - (Marx, 1995)**. Although, neither of these initiatives produced definite results, but underlined South Africa's commitment to the advancement of human rights, upholdment and preservation of democratic principles and system. Consequently, budgetary constraints limits South Africa's capacity to provide African countries with humanitarian aid, but it has, according to Pahad (**1996**), set up vocational training programmes in Mozambique and agricultural projects in Lesotho, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to

Rwanda and donated substantially to various facilities in Angola.

Though there has been a considerable achievement in the pursuit of its international relations and conduct, post-apartheid South Africa have been currently caught in a political **Catch 22 situation**.

Political analysts assumed that post-apartheid South Africa would terminate diplomatic ties with the **Republic of China [Taiwan]** in exchange for relations with the **People's Republic of China [Communist China]** (Breytenbach, 1994), whether it will recognize the existence of **Polisario led Sahrawi Republic** (Rossouw, 1995), whether South Africa has become a proxy battlefield for the **United States** foreign policy interests on **Cuba** (Brummer, 1995) and **Iran** (Bulbring, 1995). And, also its mishandling of the Nigerian crisis (Manga, 1995; Van Niekerk, 1995; Brummer, 1996; Davis, 1996). But, according to Mills (1994), it is not a matter of 'if' but of 'when' and 'how' **post-apartheid South Africa will deal with such diplomatic dilemmas**.

As stated, a crucial debate that faces post-apartheid foreign policy relations is the choice between diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. On this matter, Breytenbach (1994) argued that South Africa is faced with a 'win - lose situation than with a win - win one' as the stake now stand. In his reasoning, Blow (1994) proclaimed that what made this situation to be more difficult

and problematic is the imposition on South Africa by the two "**Chinas**" themselves. On this issue, policy analysts are eagerly awaiting South Africa's decision that would provide a clear indication of what is driving its foreign policy approaches "... **interest or human rights issues**" (Mills, 1996).

It could be noted that the dilemma facing South Africa is whether to retain ties with Taiwan, with which it has developed a close and particularly economically advantageous relation since 1990 (Breytenbach, 1994), should it abandon or downgrade this ally, which in the last decade has undergone a dramatic and far reaching democratisation process (Blow, 1996) or instead favour a government with a wretched human right record (Van Breda, 1996), but is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and home to one fifth of all humanity and therefore a market of immense proportions (Blow, 1996), made more so by the fact that its economy also happen to be the world's fastest growing. But, on the balance, policy analysts believe that there is a third way out, that of dual recognition (Breytenbach, 1994; Blow, 1996), which South Africa should follow even though it is suggested as been dismissed as a political non - starter by the People's Republic of China. On this view, it could be argued that, if such an approach is rejected by the PRC government, the offer be left on the table and the current status - quo be pursued.

It could be noted with despair that, South Africa is fast becoming a proxy battlefield for

United States foreign policy on Cuba (**Brummer, 1995**) and Iran (**Bulbring, 1995**). Diplomatic relations were formally established with Cuba a day after Mandela's inauguration and it sent its first ambassador to South Africa in late 1994. But, the prospect of South Africa actually opening a diplomatic mission in Cuba, became too much for the United States anti - Castro lobby (**Brummer, 1995**), to an extent that a formal protest was issued to the South African government by the chairman of the United States House of Representatives, Africa Subcommittee on Foreign Policy.

On the whole, Tsedu (**1995**) reiterated that the South African government, particularly most ANC parliamentarians who are deeply indebted to Cuba's selfless contribution to the anti - apartheid struggle, reject the notion that Cuba must be starved into ideological submission by the United States. Thus, as way of keeping with the non - ideological posture the government has set itself, Manga (**1995**) proposed that a process of democratisation through dialogue and non - confrontational diplomacy be fostered with Cuba. A similar protest by the United States government regarding South Africa's relations with Iran was lodged (**Bulbring, 1995**) and certainly, it could be inferred that South Africa might approach such a dilemma in the same way as the Cuban problem.

Consequently, Rossouw (**1995**) proclaimed that the post-apartheid government also finds itself in a similar controversy of backpedalling on a commitment for diplomatic recognition to Africa's last colony, the **Sahrawi Republic**, where the **Polisario Front**

has been leading its struggle for freedom from Moroccan occupation of its territory. It could be noted that South Africa is the only country in Southern Africa and one of the few OAU members that still has ties with Morocco but does not recognise the existence of the Sahrawi Republic as an independent state (Davis, 1995).

According to Davis (1995), one of the reasons why there is a delay on the part of South Africa is that it has been officially decided that diplomatic recognition ahead of the United Nations supervised referendum in the area is a non-starter. But, independent observers, including Human Rights Watch, reported extensively on Moroccan human rights abuses and manipulation of the referendum process which has been repeatedly delayed and now appears to be in danger of not taking place at all (Rossouw, 1995; Davis, 1995). Against this backdrop, the Sahrawi Republic representative in South Africa complained that the South African government made a commitment and it is unacceptable for the government to use the referendum and United Nations gestures as an excuse to delay recognition (Davis, 1995). However, the South African government, according to Rossouw (1995), promised to support the UN referendum so that the matter of Western Sahara (Sahrawi Republic) be resolved expeditiously and peacefully. And, Simon (1996) further stated that President Mandela has requested the Foreign ministry to take steps in establishing diplomatic ties with the Sahrawi Republic. But, so far only normal procedures for establishing diplomatic relations have been instituted by the Foreign ministry.

On the issue of cosying up to repressive governments of Nigeria, Sudan and Kenya, it has been suggested that in order to install respect for human rights and upholdment of democracy, South Africa have to promote democratisation through dialogue (**Weekly Mail, 1995**). Consequently, it could be noted that South Africa's belated determination to get tough on the Nigerian regime (**Van Niekerk, 1995**) recent acts of human rights abuses, including the hanging of **Ken Saro-Wiwa** and the other nine dissidents (**Brummer, 1996**) exposed the fact that if the country hopes to preserve its place as the champion of human rights and democracy in Africa and the world, it needs to bring its foreign policy into line with its moral standing in the international community (**Manga, 1995**).

To sum up, in dealing with these diplomatic dilemmas the ANC led government should not allow its foreign policy relations to be dictated by developed powers of the North nor any sovereign state. It has been shown in the text that one of the preambles of the Freedom Charter is that a democratic South Africa would establish diplomatic relations with all countries of the world regardless of their social and political systems. And such relations should be based on mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Hence, its diplomacy should be pursued in keeping with the non-ideological and non-confrontational postures it has set itself.

## **5.6. Conclusion.**

This chapter set out to explore the preliminary contours of the ANC post-apartheid policy options and priorities. And it also define a possible direction the 'new' South Africa might follow in the "new world order" by engaging in areas of interest and problem issues.

But, despite hopes that the end of superpower confrontation has brought a 'new world order', other developments are making the world a more complex place to live in. The bipolar world, with its shortcomings, clearly defined the major issues while the multipolar world of the 1990's is faced with more complex interdependency issues. Thus, matters of economic development, population growth, ethnic friction, trade disputes, hazardous industrial development, drug trafficking, AIDS and technological development, calls for international co-operation of a kind not experienced before in the past.

For this reason, the foreign policy of a post-apartheid South Africa as envisaged by the African National Congress should address a number of matters in all the levels of the regional, continental and global systems. It is these circumstances, perhaps even more than the transformation of friends into at best, distant and impotent observers, and enemies into potential partners and benefactors, that condition the preliminary contours of an envisaged new foreign policy orientation of a democratic South Africa.

It could then be concluded that the objective would be to help create the situation at all systems in which the new South Africa would exist and develop as a democratic, non-racial, non-aligned and prosperous country. Hence, the realities of ANC international policies previously led to continuity in foreign policy processes and its unique policy perspectives led to an envisaged change in ideological and pragmatic content, and specifics of future South African foreign policy conduct and orientation.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

#### 6.1. Introduction.

This study set out to examine the transition of the foreign policy orientation and conduct of the **African National Congress** between the period **1989 and 1994**. It has demonstrated that in its years of exile, the character of the ANC foreign policy reflected adherence to the politics of liberation and international socialism, challenging the **'West'** on question like the **'new'** world economic order and the morals of apartheid itself.

In the foregoing **chapters** it was shown how the ANC foreign policy was confronted by a veritable blizzard of global, regional and domestic political change that challenged its basic assumptions on foreign policy approach. And being faced with a problem of matching its ideological heritage, its domestic priorities and natural sympathies to a set of political and economic circumstances.

On such basis, this chapter will attempt to present a summary of arguments advanced in study in order to have a coherent and convincing conclusion.

## **6.2. Summary of arguments**

As noted in the study, a handful of arguments have been advanced in relation to the transition of the foreign policy orientation and conduct of the ANC.

**Chapter One** demonstrated the salient aspects of the debates as to the factors believed to have transformed the organization's external policy. It observed that some foreign policy scholars tend to view the policy transition as a direct result of the demise of bipolar politics and global socialism.

It propose that domestic perspectives have also inflicted the foreign policy conceptions of the ANC. Hence, it is has been reiterated in these chapter that since foreign policy analysis is a complex paradigm '**linked**' not to a one-dimensional but to multifaceted approach effected by both the external and internal political dimensions. Thus, it was argued in this chapter that it is not correct to relegate domestic determinants to the background as their impact is felt at all strata of the international and regional political system.

In **Chapter Two** it was shown how the development of the ANC as an exile revolutionary movement and the conduct of its foreign policy activities not only survive exile, but were strengthened by the experience that was to direct it into the post-apartheid era.

In **Chapter Three** it was observed that domestic and international politics of a polity is **'linked'** in a complex way. And, that the primacy of internal systematic determinants such as a change in static politics, evolving structure of the organization leadership, tireless campaign to maintain economic sanctions and efforts to re-address the socio-economic imbalance, re-affirmed the working for the domestic factors in foreign policy change and conduct of any political system.

Thus, the **chapter** concluded that due to both the global and regional political events coupled with the rapid changing domestic sources, the organization shed the bulk of the shibboleths of the past rhetoric such as international socialism foreign policy approach, and took up a series of a conciliatory pragmatic foreign policy outlook and position.

**Chapter Four** set out to explore the preliminary contours of the ANC post-apartheid policy options. And it was observed that the ANC premise a post-apartheid foreign policy based on several active policy priorities.

The chapter demonstrated that the ANC maintain that a democratic South Africa shall be a fully independent state which will respect the rights and sovereignty of nations. And will establish diplomatic relations with countries of the international community regardless of their social and political systems in order to obtain mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In summation, the chapter concluded that a post-apartheid foreign policy conducted has become '**pragmatic**' and '**interest-driven**', and its international priorities are to be dictated by the need to ensure economic co-operation and co-existence.

### **6.3. Conclusion.**

It could be concluded that it is evident from the discussion outlined that the ANC has moved considerably from the flourishes of liberation of the past. By discarding the internationalist orientation which was once seen as central to the liberation movement's foreign policy, the ANC has demonstrated flexibility and pragmatism in the face of changing circumstances.

The organization, instead, has elaborated a future foreign policy for a democratic South Africa which puts domestic concerns ahead of internationalist obligations. And on the world centre stage, the ANC foreign policy has found a niche within the post-Cold War order as articulated by the United States, the international financial institutions and the newly invigorated United Nations. The fiscal regime advocated by international financial institutions, the bane of ANC in power, has been accepted by the organization as witnessed by the evolution of its opinion on issue such as investments codes and economic co-operation. And, thus the realities of ANC foreign policy led to continuity in its external policy orientation and its unique policy perspective changed the ideological pragmatic content, and specifics of a democratic post-apartheid South African foreign policy conduct.

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