

A SOCIAL CAPITAL ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
DELIVERY IN METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN ZIMBABWE:
THE CASE OF GLENVIEW, HARARE SINCE 2013

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ABSTRACT

Significant challenges exist in contemporary Zimbabwe with regard to urban government, including with specific reference to citizenship participation and service delivery capacities. One of the crucial factors considered in the existing literature when examining urban government is the extent to which the central government intrudes in the affairs of urban government. This is particularly important given that, in recent years, many urban governments have been controlled by the main opposition party in the country. In this context, the thesis offers a critical examination of urban government in contemporary Zimbabwe by focusing on urban government in Harare (the capital) and, even more specifically, on the high-density, low-income area of Glenview. Harare is one of two metropolitan urban areas in Zimbabwe, along with Bulawayo, and is governed by the Harare City Council. While the central state's relationship with urban governments (including Harare) in Zimbabwe is important, and is examined in this thesis, the primary concern is how this and other factors affect citizenship participation and service delivery in Harare. In pursuing this, the thesis draws upon social capital theory (including questions around trust and networks) to facilitate a critical analysis of urban government, citizenship participation and service delivery in Harare and Glenview specifically. The fieldwork for this thesis involved a qualitative research methodology, including informal interviews with relevant local stakeholders in Harare and associated documents. The thesis concludes that localised political, social and other contextual factors in Harare undercut the prospects for meaningful citizenship participation (with forms of social exclusion existing) and that this has negative implications for effective and efficient service delivery mechanisms.

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ACRONYMS

AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection to Privacy Act
CBD	Central Business District
CHRA	Combined Harare Residents Association
CLGF	Commonwealth Local Government Forum
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
EU	European Union
FTLRP	Fast-Track Land Reform Programme
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HCC	Harare City Council
HRT	Harare Residents Trust
KII	Key Informant Interview
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MLGPWNH	Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing
MLGRUD	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
POSA	Public Order Security Act
PoZ	Parliament of Zimbabwe
RDCA	Rural District Council Act
UCA	Urban Councils Act
USA	United States of America
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZESA	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Democracies have been established across the globe including in Africa in the last two decades. Major emphasis has been directed towards the involvement of people in governance affairs that affect their livelihoods both nationally and locally (Krishna, 2000: 437). This entails countries adopting the decentralisation system of administration in place of centralisation. Presumably, the involvement of people in governance processes allows the sharing of developmental ideas, prevention of costly delays and encourages sustainable relations between the governed and the governors. Democracy is highly esteemed for its potential of minimizing government encroachment and authoritarianism.

Amongst the democratised states is Zimbabwe, a former colony of the British Crown which attained its independence in 1980. Since then, “Zimbabwe has embarked on the process of decentralization through legislative and institutional initiatives in a bid to strengthen and democratize local government, as well as to improve service delivery” (Chigwata, 2010: 8). In Zimbabwe, decentralisation of state functions and decision making powers down to grass root levels was a means of bringing about fairness in governance and service delivery especially to the previously deprived black majority.

The state-introduced reforms included the de-racialisation, liberalisation and democratisation of urban governance which forms the vast focus of this study (Sivalo, 2017: 1). Efforts of democratisation by the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) have resulted in the emergence and also continuation of the local government system and universal suffrage. These are meant to allow for the participation of citizens (both direct and indirect participation) in the matters that concern their livelihoods in their respective areas of residence both urban and rural. However, Sivalo (2017: 1) remarks that in relation to urban governance in Zimbabwe, “an uninterrupted and linear trajectory of decentralisation and democratisation has not occurred, despite clear signs of the dismantling of the racialized character of national and local governance”. Several reasons surround the non-accomplishment of effectual and concurrent de-racialisation and decentralisation in Zimbabwe since the 1990s.

Central government control of local authorities in Zimbabwe has been inevitable since the “central agency is responsible for everything in the organisation ... and delegation of discretionary authority to the lower tiers” (Felser cited in Marume & Jubenkanda, 2016: 109). Forces and tenets of centralisation and decentralisation have been clashing consistently over

the decades. During the early years of independence, decentralisation could not flourish as it posed strong threats to the one-party regime that existed then and the conservatives that advocated for it. The central state's grip of local governments took a clear and noticeable image in the fall of 1999 with the emergence of the first major opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the Harare Metropolitan. This was also accompanied by the formation of liberal trade unions and civic organisations with several of them being funded externally by international donors. This presented a huge threat to the legitimacy of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. The ruling party used its central government domination advantage to keep track of urban local authorities' activities.

This over the years has harnessed conflicts and struggles amongst the central government and local authorities and between citizens and the government especially in urban areas namely Harare and Bulawayo. The central state's struggle to maintain power and hegemony from opposition seizure in the urban spheres has deterred decentralisation and favoured recentralisation with the use of coercion, violence, restrictive laws and overriding democratic principles, right and laws.

Most amendments to legislative frameworks guiding urban councils and jurisdictions have come about through the advocacy of civil societies and contestations from the opposition parties over the years to improve and increase civic freedoms and rights. Over the past decade, a mostly hostile relationship has existed between the central government and civic societies in Zimbabwe with the central government imposing restrictive laws to monitor the flow of information amongst the latter and citizens in general. On the other hand, civic societies have mostly rebuked the activities of the state especially in Harare and Bulawayo. As a result, citizen participation in urban governance has gradually shifted and at times brought to a halt.

In this context, this thesis provides analysis of citizen participation and service delivery in metropolitan government in Harare, Zimbabwe since 2013 with particular reference to the high-density, low-income area of Glenview.

1.2 Background of the Study

Local government in Zimbabwe legislatively and lawfully, stands on a devolution-based decentralisation which “means placing effective powers closer to the citizens” (Mandondo & Mapedza, 2003: 2). Local government is considered a key development agency that is “largely responsible for infrastructural improvement, housing, health and water reticulation” (Fourie, 2001: 217) in collaboration with citizens as recipients of services. Citizen participation is an integral component of local service delivery and democracy (Masango, 2001). Hence, besides

considering Harare City Council (HCC) itself (both elected councillors and appointed state officials), the study will consider community-based formal and informal social networks which pursue citizen participation and service delivery (International Institute of Labour Studies, 2005; ActionAid, 2014).

The post-1980 independence era in Zimbabwe, is characterised by numerous local government legislative frameworks, including the Urban Councils Act (UCA) of 1996 and, only later in 2013, a constitutional basis for local government. Combined, the shifting official frameworks have sought, officially at least, to end colonial disparities and bring about inclusive and practical civil participation (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016). The national government created the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH) now Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), which has control over urban and rural councils (Chatiza, 2010). The 1996 UCA, with amendments, remains as the key legislation for all urban councils, including the two metropolitan provinces, namely, Bulawayo and Harare (Chikerema, 2013), as it sets out the legal mandate of urban councils.

In the context of government devolution, local governance is meant to “bring communities close to the [urban government] decision making process, on local development initiatives, thereby inducing the indispensable sense of ownership and hence sustainability of such development endeavours” (de Visser *et al.*, 2010:x) by communities. Local communities are thus expected to participate in the design, programming and implementation of urban government programmes. However, under the UCA, metropolitan councils remain as subservient subsidiaries of the Ministry of Local Government. In this light, Chatiza (2010) highlights that urban councils operate under delegated functions conferred on them by the central government through the Ministry, with the latter subjected to the power of the ruling party, currently ZANU-PF. Hence, urban councils are not independent entities, such that any absence of citizen participation and service delivery characterising council jurisdictions may be due to the Minister of Local Government’s abuse of centralised power and consistent intrusions into the urban local government domain (Dewa *et al.*, 2014; Jonga, 2013).

Prior to the revised constitution in 2013, local government was not enshrined constitutionally. Due to incessant requests by urban government bodies and mobilisation by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), which were concerned about central government interference in urban politics, urban government was given constitutional legitimacy five years ago (Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF), 2016). The 2013 Constitution “speaks to and guides local government” in Zimbabwe (Chatiza, 2016: 5). It highlights the

rights of citizens, which includes socio-political and economic rights, and the obligations of the state together with its lower-tier institutions (in this case urban authorities) to provide services (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20, (2013). Of course, as Makanza and Banga (2016) note, all local governments in Zimbabwe always have had this statutory obligation, such that the constitutional revisions simply align with existing statues and confirm what exists in practice. This means that the Minister continues to remain all-powerful. Nevertheless, Mapuva (2015: 183) claims that, “for the first time..., citizen participation and empowerment are the major elements of the devolutionary discourse’. For this reason, the study focused on the post-2013 period.

Both before and after 2013, national politics has dominated the shape and outcomes of urban local authorities, particularly after the formation of the opposition MDC party in 1999, and this has resulted in “high levels of patronage and clientelism” (Bland, 2010: 5). Since its beginning, the MDC has had significant political support in urban areas, especially in Harare. This led to the MLGRUD closely monitoring and controlling the activities of urban councils in particular which includes the strategic placement of some MDC-controlled authorities under ZANU-PF administration (Ranger, 2007:161). In some instances, it is alleged that the inefficiencies especially of MDC dominated urban councils are due to sabotage by the ruling party in order to gain local support, including the cancellation of water debts of urban citizens (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016). This has undercut local forms of urban electoral democracy and has also weakened citizen participation in urban government more widely (Mandondo & Mapedza, 2003).

Furthermore, councillors are supposed to meet citizens and give them feedback at least once a month and also required to collaborate with urban state apparatus officials who are appointed by the Minister. These councillors are “victims of party whips” (ActionAid, 2014: 16) meaning they are expected to be loyal to the party, which results in the party-politicisation of civic issues and at times leads to citizen apathy. Service delivery as a result is jeopardized due to the deeply politicised character of urban councils as well as mismanagement and nepotism (Dewa *et al.*, 2014). Mvumvuma (2016) avers that the factors leading to poor service delivery in the Harare urban are intertwined and they include rapid population growth, lack of technical skills and poor economic performance resulting in sheer absence of local financial resources. Nevertheless, as Chatiza (2010: 21) argues, the “debate rages on whether the constraints to the transformative potential of local government resides within individual councils, the whole sector or in society”. This study examined the contribution of citizen participation to service delivery in the Harare Metropolitan.

There are different channels established to foster active and effective citizen participation in urban spaces of Zimbabwe. According to Chikerema (2013: 88-89), these include “local government elections, local authorities participatory budgeting, consultative forums, public hearings, open meetings of councils and legislative bodies, joining associations like the Civil Society organisations as well as the development committees within local communities”. The extent to which these participation platforms exist in practice varies considerably across urban areas and time. Overall, the literature that exists on urban governance and citizen participation in Zimbabwe broadly focuses on the contestations and struggles within the urban councils and also on central-local government struggles (Chakaipa, 2010; Dewa *et al.*, 2014; Jonga, 2013). Though these are important, this study aimed to go beyond “a top-down reading of urban governance processes” (Sivalo 2017: 6) by looking particularly at citizen participation in relation to urban governance.

There has been considerable literature recently, as cited, on urban government in Zimbabwe, including on Harare. However, the focus of this literature is urban councils and their relationship to the central state. While citizenship participation has been studied, this has been from an urban authority perspective. This thesis hopes to contribute to addressing these lacunae. This thesis analyses citizen participation in metropolitan governance particularly from the period 2013, with specific reference to the Harare Metropolitan. It focuses on the channels of participation and the forms and levels of participation and the lack there of in Harare. It examines the relational behaviour of the formal and informal mechanisms of citizen participation specifically at ward level. In so doing, the study answers questions around the trust that citizens have with administrators in council positions, the role of civic organisations in mobilising participation of residents in metropolitan governance issues, and the view of citizen participation by local administrators.

1.3 Theoretical Underpinnings

The study used social capital theory to analyse the formation of mechanisms and processes facilitating and blocking citizen participation in Harare. According to Maan (2001: 5), social capital is “the value of the social elements like networks, trusts and norms which inhere in a certain society or community. The interconnectedness of these norms is supposed to have several positive consequences”. Citizen participation, whether initiated through urban authority’s ‘invited spaces’ (ActionAid, 2014) such as consultative forums, or the autonomous practices of resident associations, entails diverse kinds of social capital networks. The actions of urban authorities and citizen groups, as they network, are determined in part by the norms

and levels of trust, which enable or disable relationships of reciprocity across the government-citizen interface (Gaventa, 2002; Maan, 2001; Portes, 1998).

Importantly, social capital might entail bonding and bridging relationships, but it also involves mechanisms of exclusion, either formally or informally. In this regard, at times, the literature refers to political capital as a form of social capital which motivates participation in local affairs. La De Lake & Huckfeldt (1998: 570-571) claim that citizen participation cannot be understood from the availability of social capital per se but by “politically relevant social capital” (see also McClurg, 2003). Political capital becomes important in accessing and influencing urban authorities, but also in receiving service delivery benefits. While political capital is structured by party-political affiliations, there are other variables of citizens, which need to be taken into consideration, such as income, education and gender (Rosenberg, 1988; Downs, 1957).

1.4 Research Objectives

The main objective of the study is the *analysis of citizen participation and service delivery in metropolitan government in Harare, Zimbabwe since 2013 with specific reference to Glenview.*

With the Glenview case study in mind, the subsidiary objectives are:

- a) Examine central local relations in Zimbabwe and the major actors in metropolitan governance;
- b) Examine the official frameworks guiding urban government in Zimbabwe;
- c) Examine the main institutions, structures, mechanisms for facilitating citizen participation and service delivery in Harare;
- d) Identify the forms of citizen participation which exist in Harare, the ways in which citizens interact with Harare metropolitan government, and the factors enabling and disabling citizenship participation; and
- e) Investigate the status of service delivery in Harare, and the relationship between this and the forms of citizenship participation in existence.

1.5 Research Design

The research utilised the qualitative research methodology in the quest of exploring and understanding the experiences and practices of urban ward-councillors, civil society groups and citizens in governance issues. According to Yin (2016: 251), qualitative research leads to “information about the actions and voices of the individual participant”, with people usually disclosing the ways in which they interpret their experiences through their stories (Tracy,

2013). Young (2017: 3) also claims that “qualitative methods generate comprehensive description of processes, mechanisms or settings, as well as characterize participants’ perspectives and experiences”. It therefore focuses more on meaning derived from values than statistical representativeness as is the case with quantitative methods.

The research used a case study research design (Riazi, 2000) focusing on Harare and selected wards within it. A case study method has been adopted “because it provides the opportunity to look through different eyes at a familiar situation” (Matthews & Ross, 2010: 131). The focus on wards facilitated an understanding of the same phenomenon but from different geographic demographic sites with different histories. Glenview is a low-income high density suburb constituting of three wards (ward 30, 31 and 32) under three ward Councillors. Under the Constituency Profile, the suburb is divided into two constituencies namely Glen View North and Glenview South Constituencies. According to the Election Resource Centre (ERC) (2018: 13), Glenview is characterised by “vocational and small scale entrepreneurship, informal businesses, old dilapidated infrastructure, high youth unemployment rates and opposition party stronghold”. These sites were purposively sampled to capture diversity in levels and forms of both citizenship participation and service delivery.

Glenview as a case study was not selected based on statistical representation of the whole population of Harare but on the grounds that it could provide an easier and understandable way of analysing civic associations, perspectives and processes in the Harare Metropolitan and the country at large. The wards 30 and 31 were sub-cases. Glenview is an old suburb with a high political profile and was recently affected by the cholera bacteria outbreak. As a case study, it provides strong “insights into the political and social processes embodying urban governance more broadly in the country” (Sivalo, 2017: 10). The fieldwork for this study was conducted in October and November, a few months after national elections of 2018.

1.5.1 Research Techniques

The study utilised three qualitative data collection approaches which include interviews, focus group discussions, observation and textual data. Triangulation of the data collection methods was adopted. Olsen (2004: 3) defines triangulation, “as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic and also ...to help in validating the claims that might arise from an initial pilot study”. This helped mitigating the biases that arise from using a single data collection method. Qualitative research according to Young (2017), “typically involves purposeful sampling which determines key informants (who are individuals who have knowledge of or experience with the phenomenon of interest)”.

The intended key informants were the ward councillors for wards 30 and 31 together with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of CHRA. During the time of data collection, the ward councillors in office had just been sworn in such that they did not have the adequate experience and information with regards to the research and its questions. The researcher had to visit an old directory to contact the previous councillors with a success of two out of the three. The other one was the secretary and personal assistant of the councillor for ward 31. Key informants were also drawn from the CHRA who gave their insights and narratives of the CSOs' work in Glenview in relation to the ward councils and the residents. A total of four key informants were interviewed two from the ward councils and two from CHRA. In this study, the key informants were regarded as those who are closely and directly involved in facilitating urban governance and citizen involvement initiatives which is central to the thesis.

Semi-informal interviews (Tracy, 2013) were carried out with residents in both wards, using snowball non-probability sampling. The snowball sampling method “yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest” (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981: 141). Snowball sampling was adopted because of the tense post-election atmosphere that existed which made the subject of the research a very sensitive one. The number of residents interviewed amounted to 15. The number of research participants was not an “attempt to create a sample that is statistically representative of the population but rather to enable the researcher to explore the research questions” (Matthews & Ross, 2010: 167). Interviews were conducted in both English and Shona. A few recordings of the interviews were done depending on the participants' concerns. Semi-structured interviews were conducted which were 15-35 minutes long. Some interviews were longer due to the unpopularity of the subject to the interviewees, which saw the researcher giving lengthy explanations of the research and finding common examples that were familiar to the participant. Translation of the research questions and discussion from English to Shona occurred whilst interviewing one of the four key informants.

Focus group discussions (FGDs) were also a research method that the researcher used. Two group discussions were carried out with each having a maximum of five people. According to Mishra (2016: 2), “a focus group discussion (FGD) is a good way to gather together people from similar backgrounds or experiences to discuss a specific topic of interest”. Similar backgrounds and sense of security may presuppose why some of the participants in Glenview preferred group discussions to individual interviews. The groups were different in that the one comprised of youth both girls and boys whilst the other one comprised of older men and youth. However, different thoughts on citizen participation and urban governance

emerged though the participants share “identical demographic and life stage characteristics” (Mishra, 2016: 2).

An array of documentation was used and it comprised of secondary literature and primary documents of central government reports, Harare City Council minutes, Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) documents (online) and local newspapers. Some of the data was also gathered through informal questioning and observation. This was mainly done to collect data from the resident participants especially women who during the time of the research were committed to the certain work and also because they were not part of the two group discussions.

1.5.2 Data Analysis

Data was thematically analysed which according to Mills *et al.*, (2010) involves coding, which entails deriving major themes from research questions and generating meaning through the detection of commonalities in data and themes, therefore offering a basis for interpretation and understanding. Thus, content analysis was used to analyse data gathered for the purposes of this research. Due to the research being qualitative in nature, inductive content analysis was used “to organize the qualitative data which includes open coding, creating categories and abstraction. Open coding means that notes and headings are written in the text while reading it” (Sato & Kyngas, 2007: 107). Through open coding, data was grouped to reduce the number of categories with some similar themes being collapsed into each other and highlighting the different themes clearly. The data collected was analysed on a manual basis.

1.5.3 Ethics and Challenges

The research followed the research ethical principles and protocols of Rhodes University to reduce the risks associated with this type of research which include emotional or social unrest and insecurity of the human participants in the study. The researcher ensured that pseudo names were used throughout the thesis in order maintain anonymity and confidentiality bearing in mind the research topic still stands as one of the most sensitive subjects in Zimbabwe.

Challenges encountered were that ordinary resident participants feared to take part in the research due to the post-election violation of civilians in the previous month by the military. The participants feared victimisation. Considering also that, over the years, electoral results continue to indicate Glenview as one of the opposition party’ stronghold, some participants felt as though the study was a way in which the ruling party intended to pick out those contrary with political views. The political environment to some extent affected the genuineness and

truthfulness of the data collected from the participants. Key informants were provided with the proposal and interview guides before the interviews, and some tended to be more theoretical and avoided detailing the practical and existing in their interviews.

1.6 Thesis Outline

This thesis is organised in the following manner. Chapter one is the introductory chapter which encompasses the background to the study, the research objectives and brief discussions of the research methodology adopted as well as the challenges faced. Though a brief summary of the theory adopted is given in Chapter one, Chapter two offers a lengthy discussion of social capital as a theoretical framework and its relation to the study. The chapter also offers explanations of concepts mainly driving the study, notably citizen participation and urban governance.

Chapter three gives the historical overview of urban governance in Zimbabwe from early 1980, highlighting continuities and discontinuities in governance practices. This also provided historical and contextual insight into Harare in particular. Chapter four is the main empirical chapter that analyses the social political and economic factors characterising urban governance in Harare. It focuses on how central-local relations shape urban governance and the relations and capacity of state and non-state institutions in the processes of citizen participation. Chapter five analyses citizen perspectives on participation. The sixth chapter summarizes the main discussions of the study by way of addressing the thesis objectives.

CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL CAPITAL, URBAN GOVERNANCE AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on social capital as a theoretical framework to analyse citizen participation in metropolitan governance. Social capital as a theory is surrounded by a lot of complexities in terms of its exact meaning and contextual applicability. Over the century, the theory has been adopted in various disciplines with its major proponents being social and political science together with the field of economics. Social capital has been adopted for this study because it offers a way of explaining how and why people can decide to cooperate or not for a common good and goal in a shared community. It is a “useful concept in explaining democratic practices, economic development and personal wellbeing (feelings of security and self-esteem)” (Mou & Lin, 2017: 564).

This chapter will mainly utilise Robert Putnam’s work and conceptualisation of social capital as a general theory and move on to show how it can specifically explain citizen participation and service delivery in urban spheres. The theory does not only have the possible ability of indicating the main actors that stir civic participation in a community, but it can also aid in the identification of individual factors that affect and guide their choices and styles of participation. This is of value as the researcher aimed at gaining the perceptions of residents and the theory helped generate some variables that were utilised during data collection. The chapter has sections explaining the main concepts driving this particular thesis which encompass urban governance, citizen participation and service delivery.

2.2 Background and Definition of the Theoretical Framework

Social capital as a theoretical tool is used to analyse citizen participation, its mechanisms and service delivery in Harare urban governance. It is used to explain and examine the factors that advance or retard association between civic societies, citizens and state urban officials and how service delivery in the urban spheres is affected. Social capital as a theory has faced a large number of debates stemming first from its meaning and definition (Barnes, 2012:8; Portes, 1998; Sato, 2013). It is a concept that has “substantial pedigree in the social sciences and due to its complexity it has escaped easy definition” (Smith *et al.*, 2009).

Social capital has various definitions at different societal levels starting from individual, institutional and community at large (Erdogan, 2010:82). Due to the endless discussions on the

actual definition of social capital, Sato (2013) in his study of social capital suggests that ‘it is important to define which aspects of social capital are being focused on in a particular analysis’. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, I focused and utilised social capital at a macro-level which was strongly influenced by Robert Putnam (1993, 1996) amongst others. This was to clearly identify the organisations and groups facilitating or disabling civic engagement in the Harare Metropolitan. Notably, the study did not intend to dwell on the theory of social capital but it focuses on the main concepts of the theory which include social networks, social norms and trust.

This study used Robert Putnam’s definition of social capital. Putnam is one of the major proponents of social capital (though not the first to mastermind the concept) through his seminal works of civic engagements in Northern and Southern Italy and America (Putnam, 1993; 1995). He defines social capital as “connections among individuals- social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000: 19). Putnam (1995:65) argues that governance especially in democracies is determined by the existence (or absence) of civic engagements therefore the need to examine the existing social networks and how they coordinate for development or growth. According to the definition of social capital given by Narayan (1999: 6), norms and social relations are embedded in the social structures of society and these can encompass religious groups, trade unions and civil societies in a particular community (Putnam, 1995).

Through his seminal works, Putnam “relates social capital to meso (collective) level units, such as associations, communities, and regions, and applies it to the study of the performance of institutions, such as regional government” (Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRI), 2008: 3). This thesis thereby examines how urban councils and civic groups relate in order for them to facilitate and motivate civic participation in politics or local issues by looking at the structures of these institutions, the frameworks that guide them and the context in which they exist and operate in. These social networks should foster participation in local activities which in turn results in the effectiveness and efficiency of the urban governments.

In the midst of Putnam’s social capital definition, other scholars have aligning and diverging definitions of the same phenomenon. Coleman (1988, cited in Ponthieux, 2004: 4) defines social capital as a ‘function’ and an externality of other activities within a social structure. Ponthieux (2004) dismisses this definition by Coleman (1988) on the basis that if social capital is an externality or something that just happens it therefore cannot be regarded as a capital. Bandari and Yasunobu (2009:488) expounded that social capital as, broadly defined,

encompasses “norms, values, beliefs, trusts, obligations, relationships, networks, friends, memberships, civic engagement, information flows, and institutions that foster cooperation and collective actions” for socioeconomic benefits and development.

On the other hand, Portes (1998:7) claims that “social capital is intangible in nature and it inheres in the structure of people’s relationships” which, as a result, create norms and actions. From this definition, the nature, form and flow of civic groupings is thus shaped by the political, social and economic environment specific to a certain community. Ponthieux (2004: 3), noting from the majority of definitions for social capital, explains that social capital is “an expression that has in it several ideas but with a major recurring theme that group participation has positive impacts” at macro and micro levels. Social capital thus becomes challenging to measure because of its intangibility and contested definition. However, this research adopted the use of certain variables to indicate the presence of social capital, which are discussed below.

2.3 Theorising Social Capital

Though authors of social capital have not yet come to agree on a singular definition of the concept, there exists the agreement that, overall, social capital is about the association of individuals and the benefits inherent in collective action. Social elements in a community or society such as networks, trusts and norms if interconnected can bring about several positive and profitable outcomes (Maan, 2011:5). Putnam (1993) (cited in Portes, 1998) notes that social capital is stock such that “in practice, this stock is equated with the level of associational involvement and participatory behaviour in a community and is measured by such indicators as newspaper reading, voluntary association membership and political expression”. Putnam’s (1993) view here raises questions on whether the presence of these always results in high civic participation or active involvement especially in political and social matters. The thesis will focus on three concepts of social capital raised in the definition given by Robert Putnam (1993) which are social networks, norms (of reciprocity) and trust. Trust, reciprocity, and information exchange are considered indicators and facilitators of social capital (Harrison *et al.*, 2016:527).

2.3.1 Social Trust

In line with the definition of social capital given by Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995) purports that social capital does allow people to associate and work with each other but this depends on the trust that is shared within a specific context. Trust creates the basis for reciprocity, trustworthiness, solidarity, social relations, social networks and familiarity (Siisiainen, 2000;

Welch *et al.*, 2005). Trust is “the actor's belief that, at worst, others will not knowingly or willingly do him harm, and at best, that they will act in his interests” (Newton, 2001: 202).

Fukuyama (1995) explains that the trust that individuals hold of each other determines the actions or work they are willing to do with other people such that he goes on to distinguish between ‘high trust’ and ‘low trust’. If there is low trust, there is the probability that people are not going to cooperate with each other leading to individualism (or lack of civic organisations) and overall the decline in socioeconomic development. Low trust generates from a number of factors that are both within and without the individual. On the other hand, high trust in a society can depend on two different variables. One individual can decide to participate or associate with others in his or her community because of his own learned beliefs and moral tastes of trust whilst someone else’s trust can be built on the trustworthiness of others surrounding them (Hardin, 2002; Rose, 2007). This also suggests that a person with moral trust can cease to trust if (s)he meets those who are not trustworthy and one without trust can develop it based on being surrounded by trustworthy people.

Trust in citizens transcends interpersonal trust because trust may be formed through various sources such as encounters with citizens, professional education, media reports, family members, friends, art, and movies (Yang, 2006:). Trust in citizens should also be complemented with the administrators’ trust in the citizens. Yang (2005) (cited in Yang, 2006: 574) states that attitudes and behaviours that public officials or administrators have towards public participation is crucial such that when administrators have great trust in citizens there is “greater willingness to involve citizens”. Yang (2003) also claims that trust need not only be found within the citizens to join CSOs but also in the administrators.

Rose (2007) claims that social networks (actors or groups) can grow and increase in value when they create environments of compatible trustworthiness. There are however arguments that the presence of social trust amongst citizens is not a guarantee of political trust that can lead people to participate in politics particularly. Newton (2001) is one of the scholars who argues that social capital cannot be equated to political trust that can lead to citizen participation in local democratic activities. Lest this thesis becomes an argument about social capital and conceptual meanings, the researcher will adopt Putnam’s definition of trust which in general refers to the trust and distrust that are held by individuals which motivates them to associate with others in groups.

In relation to the above, the thesis reviewed the historical context of urban governance in Zimbabwe specifically how social, economic, legislative and political reforms since 1980 have shaped urban dwellers association with each other. Do Harare residents have trust

amongst themselves and in the council and CSOs to be able to participate in local government initiatives which on a day to day basis affect and influence their livelihoods?

2.3.2 Social Norms

Using the definitions given by Maan (2011) and Portes (1998), people's actions are determined by the type of norms which are present in certain structures and rules thereby establishing different forms of trust which then determines the level and type of reciprocity among individuals of the same community. In this regard, social capital engenders the exploration of civil society infrastructure and the suggestion that, with it, may be found the explanation of why in some communities, political activity appears to be more effective and of greater vitality (Maloney *et al.*, 2000:803). Furthermore, social capital prospects such as free press, citizen education and civil rights can be hugely affected by government legislation, policies, infrastructure and hierarchy which can be top-down in nature (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001; Newton, 1999). However bad institutional frameworks and design can also result in retarded civic mobility or action. Consequently, social capital is context shaped and driven. In turn the context can also be affected by the same social capital, hence the need to find out the relational behaviour between civic groups and state or government invited spaces (Maloney *et al.*, 2000)

According to Gavac *et al.* (2014: 34), norms “define the boundaries of what is appropriate and expected in a situation or a group”. The set of standards govern the lives of the individuals in the group or situation and can either be written or not written. Written norms can be in the form of laws whilst the other ones are not written but individuals just find themselves conforming to them. Gavac *et al.* (2014) further claim that in group dynamics people in a group have common interests and they conform to the norms of the group to which they belong, such that if the group increases or becomes the strongest it can therefore set the standard norms for a community.

Dominant groups have the tendencies of imposing ‘standard norms’ in societies; divergent views or perspectives to the group are regarded as threats to the group's existence which can birth frictions and conflicts as the dominant group tries to maintain its power and usurp the emerging smaller groups. This can suggest that norms of a community (for instance the way of life, solving conflicts and collective action) can be largely shaped by the set standards and culture of the present dominant groups. Conflicts occur if it so happens that minor groups feel choked by the stronger group and decide to resist.

Other smaller groups then lose their influence and effectiveness, and some may come to a halt. This can suggest that if an individual had belonged to a small group (a) because he or

she did not want to join the strong group (A) due to his or her preferable tastes and affiliations, he or she can decide to not be active in any of the groups. In a similar vein, Buress-Jordan (2015: 5) claims that “the public good aspect of social capital is that those who invest in social capital ordinarily capture only part of the return and individuals who do not invest at all may benefit by simply being part of the group”. So, individuals can deliberately decide not to participate actively or not at all in social and political groups because of the ‘spill over effect’ of collective action.

Norms result in collective action through the establishment of ‘brave reciprocity’ (Siisiainen, 2000). According to Portes (1998), in a community there are different groupings due to the reason that one identifies with other individuals of common interests and they form a group which then acts as a ‘motivational force’. These groups and associations are formed out of reciprocity, trust and norms. Welch *et al.* (2005) thus notes that the amount of trust inherent in actors of the same society such as trustworthy, solidarity and familiarity leads to moral obligation and reciprocity which then ultimately result in norms and networks whether weak, strong, formal or informal.

2.3.3 Social Networks

Young (2014: 39) states that social networks just like “social connections are a necessary precursor to the generation of trust, norms of reciprocity, and collective action”. Social networks hence work as channels and tools through which norms generated from the trust levels in a society are shared. These networks “can include family ties, friends, informal associations, and formal group memberships” (Young, 2014; 39). For the purposes of this research, examination was done on a civil society organization, CHRA and local government formal groups and invited spaces.

While several scholars of social capital (Erdogan, 2010; Lowndes & Wilson, 2001; Maan, 2011 Maloney *et al.*, 2000; Portes, 1998; Siisiainen, 2000) agree on the positive benefits of social capital, Downs (1957), La Due Lake & Huckfeldt (1998) and Rosenberg (1988) amongst other scholars argue that the availability of social capital per se is not enough to explain or identify the processes of citizen involvement and engagement especially in political and community affairs. It is not all network interactions and relationships that can influence participation in government issues but politically relevant social capital (McClurg, 2003). According to La Due Lake & Huckfeldt (1998:572), politically relevant social capital encompasses the frequency of political discussions and information in an individual’s recurrent

social interactions and networks. This type of social network necessitates political participation by enabling the individual with better political information for participation.

This tallies well with the type of social capital suggested by some scholars (Grafton, 2005; Woolcock, 2001) called 'linking social capital' for effective democracies: "Linking social capital refers to linkages across incongruent groups or networks at varying hierarchical levels, such as connections between resource users and management officials" (Grafton 2005). Woolcock (2001: 26) suggest that, "linking social capital pertains to connections with people in power, whether they are in politically or financially influential positions". Linking social capital encompasses the relevant information for individuals to politically engage.

Linking social capital has both direct and indirect community benefits "such as connecting government officials with the people who provide knowledge and skills to perform their jobs" (Bures-Jordan, 2015: ii). In this way, linking social capital can be based more on the acquisition, flow and transfer of information leading to community development. Mayors, councillors and CSOs fall in this category of social capital since their major role is facilitating and creating better communication and collaboration between the residents and local authorities of an area with the major obligation being to pass on reliable information.

Regarding this research, the existence of both formal and informal groups in the Harare Metropolitan is not adequate enough to stir civic engagement in local government affairs; as it requires the presence of resident groups and government platforms that encourage citizens to be involved in the issues of the government.

Moreover, for this politically relevant social capital to be effective, there are also variables to be considered more specifically from the citizens. These factors include income, education, age, working for pay and gender (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998: 578). Lues (2014: 802) claims that paying taxes and voting is not in itself sufficient for democracy, but citizens should be kept informed and educated with the relevant information in order for them to participate and contribute in local issues successfully. Kimutai and Aluvi (2018: 60) also concur that a "sustainable democracy therefore depends on a knowledgeable citizenry whose access to a range of information enables it to participate more fully in public life, helps to determine priorities for public spending and holds its public officials accountable". Therefore, there is need for individuals to be in consistent communication with the intermediary agencies in order for them to be well informed of the affairs of their communities. The issue of information sharing also entails possession of good literacy skills especially on the part of the citizens so as to be able to disseminate information.

However, there are disadvantages associated with social capital that must be noted. Sato (2013:3) states that social capital, which are established associations or relationships, have the tendencies of restricting individual freedoms by their nature of not tolerating individualistic preferences in pursuit of group consented norms and also that social capital allows free riding. Buress-Jordan (2015: 16) purports that there are negative consequences associated with having powerfully bonded groups because this can result in exclusion of others hence creating inequalities. This ultimately opens the society to “situations of sectarianism, ethnocentrism, and corruption where influence and relationships are used for narrow self-interests sometimes opposite to the public good” (Buress-Jordan, 2015: 16).

The effects (negative or positive) of social capital can affect even those that are outside the networks or relationships because there is no specific authority (OECD, 2001). Putnam (1995) highlights that there are certainly factors that impinge on the social networks which can ultimately lead to the malfunctioning of a democracy. Lack of residential stability (house ownership), public policy and the rise of electronic services also “undermines the physical basis for civic engagements” (Putnam, 1995).

Furthermore, Galabuzi & Teelucksingh (2010) purport that social capital has two dimensions namely heterogeneous and homogenous. Heterogeneous dimensions are the ties or networks that cut across boundaries such as ethnicity, race or status thereby acting as bridging social capital whilst homogeneous dimensions are the ties and partnerships amongst those of similar background, i.e. bonding social capital. Hence, in this capacity, social capital can either enhance positive outcomes through bonding and bridging or negative outcomes such as social exclusion through its absence or the existence of non-inclusive social networks.

Public policy influences the quality and existence of social capital in societies. Putnam (1995) argues that governmental policies impinge on social capital formation by determining how social networks are established and where they should exist. This correlates with Lowndes & Wilson’s (2001: 4) assertion that “governments (particularly at the local level) shape the conditions in which voluntary associations and social networks more generally thrive (or do not)”. Government constitutions, legal frameworks, structures and culture can affect the ‘prospects of social capital’ by way of suppressing civil rights, press freedoms and civic education (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001). This also raises the fact that social networks are framed depending on a specific time and political will.

The rise of electronic activities and services also puts a strain on the physical gathering of individuals. According to Putnam (1995:77), television has eroded the virtue of association because “we are now provided with 'virtual reality' helmets in order to be entertained and

edified in isolation”. Technological advancements have therefore meant the neglect of gatherings which can therefore undermine the channels of participation that are both privately and publicly invited, for example debates and meetings. Putnam (2000) in his study also highlighted that middle aged and older American citizens engaged themselves more into politics than the younger ones who spend most of their time watching television. In relation to this study, an investigation of the population divide according to age was made to realise the impact that age has on determining civic participation in local politics.

Information and knowledge exchange through social networks is important for effective social capital. Social capital “reduces the cost of information acquisition, through information diffusion in networks” (Katungi et al., 2006: 7). In recent years, this has been enhanced by the use of media which has greatly impacted people’s choices and tastes of association. The flow of information especially on social media has acted as a push and pull factor such that individuals are well equipped to associate with other people into groups whereas others have withdrawn from any form of association. The major reason is that media can be easily monopolised by those in power hence leaving the ordinary man prone to perpetuated violence.

Though this thesis agrees with the definition and advantages given by Robert Putnam of social capital, it examined the applicability or authenticity of it in explaining citizen participation and metropolitan governance specifically in Zimbabwe. Putnam’s study in 1993 is an argument that “social capital accrues through history, and its qualities and quantity depend upon the historical development path taken” (Harrison *et al.*, 2016: 527). This means that people can decide to gather together or collaborate using their knowledge of what happened in the past and also the contextual changes that happen overtime shape people’s relations and the importance thereof.

Cleaver’s (2005) analysis of social capital in Tanzania discovered that the presence of social capital led to the exclusion of the poor people hence the failure to reduce poverty. Taking note of this can build a hypothesis that it is not always the obvious case that the absence of social networks (in this case, civic society) leads to poor social development or poor service delivery but also the presence of social networking and association can result in the exclusion of another part of people in the same community that can lead to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.

2.3.4 Measuring Social Capital

From the above discussion, social capital differs from the other forms of capital (for example, natural capital) because it is intangible and inheres in the society. There still remains some

contestation pertaining to a single definition. However, there are several benefits that authors agree to stem from social capital which include economic development, poverty alleviation, transparency and equality. Buress-Jordan (2015) suggests that social capital can be measured by general speculations on issues such as levels of trust, group memberships, contributions and benefits from group associations, information flows and how people work together in response to community problems.

2.4 Understanding Citizen Participation

Citizen participation is considered as an old and ancient concept with valuable benefits such that over the years there has been growing calls for governments around the globe to involve citizens in a variety of governance issues (Nabatchi, 2011: 6). According to Nabatchi (2011: 9), “citizen participation is an accepted foundation of democracy”. Citizen participation allows citizens to influence and discuss issues that are affecting their lives especially day to day and these include the provision of services such as water, housing, education and employment. Citizen participation in the twentieth century has been a product of democracy through the principle of decentralisation. Fourie (2010) claims that if there is to be democracy, there is a need to promote citizen participation. Many countries have and are still implementing decentralisation in order to incorporate their citizens in governance issues. Humanitarian movements have also advocated for the involvement of all citizens in political issues so as to increase transparency and accountability especially in decision making processes in most local government systems (Holdar & Zakharchenko, 2002).

In government processes, citizen participation encompasses “direct involvement or indirect involvement through representatives of concerned stakeholders in the decision making policies, plans and programs” especially at local levels (Quick & Bryson, 2016: 1). Holdar and Zakharchenko (2002: 12) also purport that it involves “a community based process, where citizens organize themselves and their goals at the grassroots level and work together through non-governmental community organizations to influence the decision making process”. Direct involvement “occurs when citizens are personally and actively engaged in decision-making” (Nabatchi, 2011: 8). These two forms of citizen participation can exist in a single system of government.

In relation specifically to local government, citizen participation is meant to “enhance the transparency of interaction in the public domain” in such a way as to enhance service delivery, in Zimbabwe and elsewhere (Madumo, 2014:131; see also ActionAid, 2014; Chakaipa, 2010; Chikerema, 2013; DETR, 1998; Fourie, 2001; Kimutai & Aluvi, 2018; Lues,

2014; Mapuva & Mayengwa-Mapuva, 2015). Citizen participation is not a panacea but a process which involves the generation of ideas, feedback, problem identification, capacity building and development in order to promote education about government policies and improvement of civic dispositions and skills (Nabatchi, 2011). It allows collaboration between citizens and their governments on the basis that, in order for policies to be effective and efficient. There is need for collaboration between the recipients and administrators of the various government policies, reforms and initiatives. In democracies, citizen participation is a discretion and obligation to the government and a right and responsibility to the citizens which in some areas is referred to as a social contract (McNeil, 2017: 2).

There are different methods of engaging with citizens which include “citizen advisory groups, city strategic planning, coalition building, community organizing, participatory (action) research, participatory budgeting, public education, public hearings, report cards and social monitoring” (Holdar & Zakharchenko, 2002:9). However, there is not one major method which authors have agreed to work in all democracies.

Holdar and Zakharchenko (2002) highlight that citizen participation can be met with a number of challenges which include lack of commitment, fear of backfire, focusing on minor issues, lack of information (particularly political information) and lack of interest. However, they then suggest that these challenges can be avoided through improvement of engagement skills, public education and free flow of information. Fourie’s (2001) study of local government and citizen participation in South Africa concluded that literacy levels of citizens and officials is one of the leading factors negatively affecting active and effective citizen participation in democracies. Citizens are often reluctant to participate because they are not sure of themselves, they are not used to it and they are not able to understand the political process and the decision making issues, whilst the government officials may not be skilful enough to facilitate participatory initiatives (Fourie, 2001: 222).

According to Rueschemeyer (2009: 168), “collective action may not lead to the results expected and hoped for”. This is because individuals possess different interests and priorities and at times it can be hard to address and combine all those different interests. So people usually weigh the probabilities of their individual benefits being met and at what costs, then decide whether or not to participate. Challenges may arise in the implementation of the process. Holzer and Kloby (2005: 2) point out that at times citizens can be distrustful, cynical and discomfort with collaborating with the government at a distant level. Distrust as discussed earlier can stem when an individual is caught in an environment that consists of untrustworthy people or an individual not possessing trust as a virtue. Carreira (2016) however notes that high citizen

participation especially in political issues is not a guarantee for a healthy democracy because there are three different types of citizens when it comes to participation, namely active, standby/monitors and passive: “Active citizens promote healthy communities and generate communal empowerment, passive citizens are disempowered, alienated from public life and disappointed with politicians and standby citizens are not active, but are well informed about public policy and ready to participate if needed” (Carreira *et al*, 2016). This can explain why some regions have more effective democracies than others and the need to realise the participation culture that is specific to the area under study.

2.4.1 Urban Governance and citizen participation

McNeil (2017: 3) emphasises that “citizen engagement is highly embedded in the nature of the political and governance context and in existing power relations, or the local context”, hence the need to evaluate the contextual settings of the governance systems at play. Following the view by Maloney *et al* (2000: 804) that social capital is context specific, it is worth discussing the formation and impact that social networks make in the urban jurisdiction for the purposes of this study. There are variables that characterise urban spaces which act as major drivers of what happens in them, therefore the need to determine the course of urban civic engagement and association. This section reviews house ownership, political hegemony, urbanisation, education, age and poverty as the major macro-level contextual factors and their effect on associational life in urban spaces and the Harare metropolitan specifically (Young, 2014).

Muchadenyika (2014) defines urban governance as a system made up of ‘institutional and legislative frameworks (both state and non-state) and actors that determine the production and delivery of urban functions and services’. Urban governance involves city or metropolitan bound relationships and interactions between the governors and the governed, who are the elites and the public masses respectively (Kamete, 2009: 62). According to UN HABITAT (2002: 140), urban governance “is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens”.

The local authorities provide the formal institutions for participation (Chikerema, 2013: 89). Lues (2014: 803) thus claims that “local government especially is obliged to construct mechanisms to ensure citizen’ participation in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation as well as in decision making”. Holdar and Zakharchenko (2002: 15) additionally purport that citizens can also organise themselves into groups for cooperation through non-governmental organisations to affect governance. Therefore, both state

institutions (local authorities) and civil societies operate in urban spheres to facilitate civic engagement.

Young (2014:43) asserts that “urban environments are, by definition, more densely populated, presenting a greater likelihood of social contact with a larger number and broader variety of people than rural environments”. In this case, urban areas are governed and managed differently from rural areas due to the factors that are particularly specific to them. Population density is a factor that makes association in urban jurisdictions peculiar. Urbanisation, which “represents the urban population as a percent of the country’s total population” (Yange, 2010), highly characterise the running of most urban towns and cities.

Urbanisation has however affected the outcomes of many towns and cities in democracies worldwide, including how people coordinate and also participate effectively in their local communities. The influx into urban areas puts pressure on existing governmental structures with a large number of people competing for a few resources and opportunities which then results in urban poverty and the high demand for services (Mapuva, 2010: 7). Accordingly, “citizen participation formations should be demographically representative and socially inclusive of all stakeholders and should thus cut across youth, women, retired professionals, marginalised groups and faith based organisations” (Kimutai & Aluvi, 2018: 60). Due to the growing urban population, direct democracy becomes difficult to facilitate hence the emergence of interest groups, non-governmental organisations and political parties (Madumo, 2012:62)

As a result of urbanisation and urban poverty, local citizen participation becomes an activity for a few. More specifically, “public service may once have been the duty of an elite, but today it is the responsibility of all who have time or money to spare and 'we are now witnessing the democratization of civil citizenship to be heavily qualified” (Kearns 1992: 31).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted and outlined the theoretical and conceptual frameworks guiding the study of citizen participation and urban governance. Firstly, the theory of social capital was discussed and how its major concepts explain civic association and gatherings in the same communities. Deducing from the theory, there are aspects and factors that determine the quality and quantity of association amongst people specifically of the same community and these include reciprocity, trustworthiness, facilitators of association, age, historical continuation and technology, social norms and trust. Trust determines whether an individual joins other people or not. People share information and collectively act together if the trust amongst them is high.

However, others can decide not to participate in community initiatives because they can always inevitably benefit from the groups' outcomes. The chapter also discussed the factors that are peculiar to urban spaces that have direct bearing on formations of participatory levels and mechanisms. Some urban areas are highly populated because of urbanisation which inevitably results in shortage of resources leading to urban poverty. These areas then become contested areas such that the participation of citizens in community affairs is left in the hands of a few.

CHAPTER THREE: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN ZIMBABWE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on urban governance in Zimbabwe through a historical and contextual overview of metropolitan governance since the period 1980 and then moves on to the conceptualisation of urban governance, citizen participation and service delivery in Zimbabwe and specifically Harare. The focus of the chapter is also to seek the relational behaviour between citizen participation, urban governance and service delivery in the context of Zimbabwe through examining Harare City Council, civil society organizations (CSOs) and citizens, and their perceptions and practices.

3.2 Urban Governance in Post-Independence Zimbabwe

Post Independent Zimbabwe can be categorised into five different periods due to the difference in the initiatives adopted by the government since 1980 in an attempt to better the performance of urban councils and local government overall. The first category is the period 1980-1990 characterised by the decentralization System of government; the second category is the 1990-2000 period characterised by Local Government Reform; the third category is the period 2000-2008; the fourth category is 2008-2013; and the fifth is 2013-2018. The historical overview of urban governance in Zimbabwe reveals the role played by the state institutions and CSOs in upholding and (or) hindering civic participation and the use of relevant legislative frameworks at different stages of history.

3.2.1 Decentralisation period 1980-1990

The government of Zimbabwe in 1980 inherited a local government system that had its origins from the colonial regime of the bifurcated state (Mamdani, 2001). Pre-independence, local government systems were created to solve the Native question in which the white (minority) settlers tried to keep the black natives away from urban spaces mainly Harare. Chatiza (2010: 5) claims that “pre-independence developments of local government were intricately linked to the land and race questions” such that the urban areas became the ‘white-economic sector’ with the rural economy secondary and subsidiary to it. The institutional and legislative frameworks guiding local government during the colonial era were racially biased such that the majority of the population who were blacks racially and geographically could not

influence the outcomes and processes of urban governance including the services delivered. This includes the setting up of the Gwai and Shangani reserves under the Matabeleland Order in Council in 1894 and the customary law (Chatiza, 2010:3; Mamdani, 2001).

The 1980s and the 1990s saw the shifting of reforms in the local government systems in Zimbabwe. These reforms sought to bring about political decentralisation through introducing democratic and responsive local government systems by abolishing colonial disparities that the new government had inherited from the former colonial regime (Schou, 2000; Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016). Local government then was mainly guided legislatively by the Urban Councils Act (UCA) (1996), Rural Districts Act and the Regional Town and Country Planning Act which were administered and facilitated by the Minister of Local Government (Mushamba, 2010: 105). The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 “though crafted to solve social and racial disparities, ... resulted in a lopsided and dependent growth model of local government” (Chatiza, 2010). Subsequently, local government in Zimbabwe had no constitutional guarantee or security because it was purely founded on Acts of Parliament which could easily be amended by a simple majority (Mushamba, 2010).

The UCA of 1980 was amended in 1986 and it became the major legislative framework driving urban governance in Zimbabwe by prescribing the provision of “greater accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the management of urban areas” by urban councils (Ndhlovu, 1997). Urban Councils have since operated within this framework which “gives the Minister of Local Government ultra-vires powers to limit the urban local authority functions” (Tawengwa, 1997: 26). Urban governance from the time of independence was legislative thereby making it dependent upon the central government through the Minister of Local Government. Mushamba (2010: 116) highlights that through the UCA (1986), the Minister of Local Government has power to approve or reject by-laws. This manner in which legislation is couched has resulted in the Minister playing a controlling and directive role instead of a facilitative role in local government affairs.

Muchadenyika and Williams (2016) purport that the period 1980-1990 in Zimbabwe was a period of decentralisation in which urban governance pursued the one city concept that aimed at deracialising cities. The concept was a single service delivery system that aimed at eliminating social disparities amongst the urban dwellers. Two forms of administration had existed in the urban local authorities during the pre-colonial period which saw low density suburbs (where colonial masters lived) being provided with the best services whilst the majority blacks languished in overcrowded townships (high-density suburbs) (Tawengwa, 1997). The one-city concept combined with the Prime Minister’s directive of 1985 saw the establishment

of development committees at ward, district, village and national level to encourage grassroots planning (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016).

Several scholars however argue that this period was met with many challenges such that the process of decentralisation was rather less effective. Urban cities especially Harare and Bulawayo experienced overpopulation due to rural-urban migration as a result of the removal of the influx control legislation (Patel, 1988). Urban cities which pre-colonially accommodated 8.5% of the whole population found themselves unable to accommodate the massive and ever-growing urban population.

Citizen participation in the 1980s was shaped by the political atmosphere that existed then. The Unity Accord which was signed in 1987 through the absorption of the PF ZAPU into ZANU “signalled the creation of a one-party state” (Mapuva, 2010:2). According to Helliker (2012: 5) “the ruling ZANU PF party inhibited the growth of autonomous trade union and social movements and effectively took them under its organisational wing”. All participative platforms that existed in this period were only invited by the state such that there “was some sort of marriage between government and trade unions” (Makage & Munhande, 2013). This move towards a one party state signalled the disapproval of divergent and contrary moves and views to the central government, such that citizen participation was indirectly neglected.

Muchadenyika and Williams (2016) further claim that due to the lack of skills, financial resources and central government’s reluctance to relinquish power, some of the state created agencies for participation became insignificant and fruitless. Hence the early years of independence in Zimbabwe can be considered as years of attempted colonial redresses and implementation of decentralisation process which was met with a lot of barriers. However, there were also some noticeable successive objectives such as the amendment of the UCA and the amalgamation of the Rural and Districts Councils to make local government in Zimbabwe divided between Rural District Councils and Urban Councils (Jonga, 2014).

3.2.2 Urban Governance 1990-2000

Due to the different pressures exerted on the government, the period 1990-2000 saw a lot of drastic changes happening nationally and more clearly in the local government system. The government during this period was the determinant of opportunities and constraints for associational activities through its policies, conventions, structures and traditions (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001: 7). The government during the 1990s adopted certain policies which were mainly economic in an attempt to solve the inflationary crisis and some of these policies include the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and the privatisation of public enterprises

(Dzimiri, 2017: 51). Sivalo (2017) notes that during the 1990s the government also decided to join the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and also gave payments to liberation war veterans without any citizen consultation. These proved to be miscalculated endeavours due to the worsening of the living standards of ordinary citizens which was an outcome of job losses due to public and private sector redundancies and retrenchments (Parsons, 2007).

The UCA was also revised in 1993 such that “residents were empowered to form residents’ associations through which citizens would make representations to the local authority” (Mapuva, 2010: 15). However, Makumbe (1998) states that the local government system remained a creature of the ruling ZANU PF party with most of the elected and appointed officials especially councillors belonging to the ruling party. Though budgetary making processes were offered to the residents, the government was still reluctant to relinquish power and took advantage of the situation that not many residents dared to participate in the budgeting process (Coyers, 2003; Mapuva, 2010)

This marked the end of the welfarist state which had prevailed in the 1980s with the government introducing user fees and billing on services such as health and education (Dzimiri, 2017). The state by this time had been overburdened financially with Britain’s withdrawal to fund the Land Reform programme hence it cut down on financing local governments. Urban authorities were now mobilising resources through citizen rates and bills which turned out to be ineffective because of the inability of the unemployed residents to pay for the services provided (Sivalo, 2017: 64). Onslow (2011) claims that these reforms by the government resulted in national distress that was expressed in food riots and disruption of economic activities through strikes. This period was therefore characterised by national unrest and the decline in quality and quantity of the services provided or offered by the urban authorities. National politics and decisions thus had a great impact on local activities and outcomes.

In reaction to the activities of the distressed public, the state rather resorted to brutal imposition of order. The government inclined itself to the use of torture, beating and arrest of the protesting crowds and this subsequently led to the formation and emergence of independent civil societies and trade unions and the first major opposition party Movement for Democratic Change mostly in urban Zimbabwe (Helliker, 2012; Reeler, 2009; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 1998). According to Helliker (2012), these trade unions and civic organisations during the 1990s “were increasingly met with a degree of repression by the ruling party”. Masunungure (2014: 9) highlights that these CSOs and non-governmental organisations later on played midwife roles which significantly led to the formation of the MDC, Mass Public Opinion Institute and the Combine Harare Residents Association all in the year 1999.

Furthermore, the government during the 1990s was faced with heated issues that needed serious redress and attention. On top of the formation of the opposition – which had the potential to undermine the powers and legitimacy of the ruling party due to its external and international donor support – the government was faced with a bereaved war veterans’ protest in the rural parts of Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2011). The year 2000 saw the ‘first-ever referendum’ in post-independent Zimbabwe which was a sign that ZANU PF was losing grip and political support and also the rampant increase in civic organisations (Mapuva, 2010: 2). Kamete (2006) and Sivalo (2017) conclude that the period 1990-2000 was characterised by the decline in the Zimbabwean economy and increased urban poverty due to unemployment and poor service delivery and the genesis of public resentment against the government on accounts of incompetence.

3.2.3 Contestation, Confusion and Change 2000-2012

For the period 2000 to 2012, drastic changes began to negatively take place in Zimbabwe which further affected public service delivery and from this time it ceased to be the “hope of Africa’s future” (Clemens & Moss, 2005). According to Mukuhlani (2014: 171), “Zimbabwe plunged into severe economic doldrums”. The country was facing cash crises due to the government’s ambitious moves which included the land acquisition from commercial farmers, and corrupt practices. Internally and externally (through the media), central government was facing criticism from CSOs, trade unions and Western countries mainly because of Fast Track Land Reform Programme (Jonga, 2014). Support for the ruling party was fading drastically such that government adopted further restrictive measures to regain or boost support especially electoral support. The USA and EU convened sanctions against the Zimbabwean government on the grounds that there was the breaching of human rights and property rights (Worldnews, 2007; Mukuhlani, 2014: 171)

A number of CSOs in Zimbabwe were emerging with funding coming from the international donors and the central government saw it as a threat to its legitimacy hence it adopted a number of stringent measures to control and regulate civic movements. The government imposed the Public Order Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy (AIPPA). These legislative statutes restricted people to meet without any formal police permission and also they censored broadcasted information such that the state approved of what was to be published or communicated to the public. The government also resorted to these measures because of the electoral outcome in 2000 (parliamentary elections) which showed the growth of political polarisation in the country and threatening the ruling

party's position. Sivalo (2017: 67) states that "overall, the two laws combined were enacted to curb the growing opposition party and to ensure more restrictive laws in independent and government media". The police, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), was the main tool for this cohesion and brutality.

Post-2000 saw the frequent involvement of the MLGRUD especially in the Harare and Bulawayo Metropolitan local authorities as a way of the central government (ruling party) seeking to retain its power (Jonga, 2014). The central state manipulated every piece of legislation and its accorded powers, whilst the living standards of the masses were tremendously degrading resulting in informal settlements and trading and urban spaces. Also, "on the regional front, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe's membership in 2002 and Zimbabwe formally withdrew from the organization after a divided meeting of Heads of Government in Abuja in 2003" (Tabajuka, 2005: 19). The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) therefore could only cling to its internal power since regionally and internationally it was losing support (democratically and financially).

In 2005, the government passed a directive and the City of Harare "issued a notice, indicating to the people in the Greater Harare area that persons who had erected illegal structures should demolish them by 20 June 2005" (Tibajuka, 2005: 12). This initiation popularly known as Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) left many families homeless and some with no source of income. Tabajuka (2005) states that Zimbabwean churches and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), as well as the United Nations, voiced their concern for government to bring the operation to a halt and this further fractured relations between the state and civic/non-governmental societies. As well, "local authorities and residents alike did not object strongly to the operation as the coercive apparatus of the state (army and police) was responsible for ensuring compliance by citizens" (Sivalo: 2017: 68). This resulted in tensions between urban dwellers, CSOs and the local governments.

As the rift between the state, civic organisations and ordinary citizens continued, 2008 marked the most brutal elections in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2008: 2) from January 2008 to December 2008 recorded "6 politically-motivated rape cases, 107 murders, 137 abductions/kidnappings; 1 913 cases of assault; 19 cases of disappearance; 629 of displacements". These cases stand among the numerous overt violent acts perpetrated by the ZANU PF party against (its unwavering nemesis) MDC. The year 2008 saw the utter violation of human and civil rights such as freedoms of speech and expression, and citizen hope ordinary hope and reliance on CSOs and the opposition political party dwindling, as they

proved helpless in face of the state and the ruling party. The opposition party though retained significant support in many wards in Harare (EISA, 2008). This made the electoral results more contestable with the ruling party refusing defeat and opposition clamouring triumph.

The Government of National Unity (GNU) known as the Inclusive Government was adopted as a means to pacify the political mood and tension by way of power-sharing amongst the three main political parties – including ZANU PF and MDC. However, Makoni (2012) and Mukuhlani (2014: 174) argue that the GNU was not oriented on the interests of the people, and the country continued, to succumb to the economic and social meltdown. *Sunday Opinion* (2011) purported that throughout its tenure, the GNU failed to accomplish anything significant, as those who were in the political posts were entirely focused on their political positions instead of improving the economy and the lives of the general public.

3.2.4 Reform, change and military invasion 2013-2018

The June elections of 2013 marked the end of the GNU with ZANU PF dominating the majority of parliamentary seats. The outcome resuscitated the partially culminated contestation between the ruling party and the opposition party. Sivalo (2017:71) remarks that “the post GNU period re-ignited the contestation between the state and urban locales, rejuvenated CSO interest in transparency and accountability advocacy, witnessed an increase in economic hardships, .. as well as continued confrontation between the state and opposition on the political front”. Government platforms drew far from serving the interests of the people such that council chambers and the parliament became the breeding ground for politicking, bickering and polarisation as politicians were failing to embrace each other’s ideas because of political party differences (Muchadenyika, 2014: 1378). Masunungure (2013) argues that the political tensions during this period were redefined as the political parties went back to the original adversarial trenches.

In this regard, ZANU PF’s victory meant “the return to the partisan and clientism nature of the state that existed before the GNU era. High level manipulation of political loyalties through the partisan allocation of essential resources such as housing, market stalls and urban land was reported amongst ZANU PF accolades with MDC councillors and their urban public supporters being deprived” (McGregor & Alexander, 2013: 754). Urban Councils hence became bases for ZANU PF to siphon public resources for self-enrichment, which is what Muchadenyika & Williams (2015) refer to as rent-taking. Partisan allocation of land to party loyalists around the urban spheres continued and it strained the relations between the state,

urban authorities and the citizens (who were already bereaved and overburdened by council rates and taxes) (Sivalo, 2017: 73).

The year 2013 saw local government systems in Zimbabwe gaining constitutional backing by being included in Chapter 14 of the supreme law. Prior to that, local governments had been guided by acts of parliaments mainly the UCA and the RDCA. The legal frameworks could easily be manipulated by any contestations by members of parliament and they left local authorities at the mercies of the Minister. Before 2013, local government decisions and plans could be easily revoked by the minister. Under the 2013 Constitution, local and provincial councils are mandated to and obliged to raise their own funds through rates, deliver services and include local residents in decision making. Their powers are from a type of decentralisation called devolution which gives them autonomy to manage their activities in their areas of jurisdiction.

With the coming of the 2013 Constitution, there has not been the amendment of the UCA which gives excessive power to the minister. In the reign of the 2013 Constitution, the Minister continues to have power to appoint ‘special councillors’ and local government board members with no formal electoral process (Chakunda, 2015). The town clerk is also appointed by the local government board under the ultimate control of the minister and he also ‘overrides councillors and runs a council’ (Muchadenyika, 2014). This therefore means that there is limited voice of the residents in the appointment and electoral processes that happen especially at the Town House, in Zimbabwe.

However, the 2013 Constitution clearly provides citizens the right to participate in the affairs of their local councils and areas as well as hold the duty bearers accountable (Zivira, 2017). In this light, urban councils are accountable to those whom they serve at the same time people are also endowed with the right and responsibility to participate and engage with the respective local councils. However, the interference and involvement of the military since 2017 in public spaces and issues has further threatened this constitutional right. According to *DailynewsLive* (2018),

Since November 2017, there has been unwarranted ubiquitous presence of the military in all spheres of the state, including public spaces and a glaring interference with the day to day duties of other entities such as local authorities resulting in the shooting of unarmed civilians.

Most citizens have decided to let go of their right and responsibility for fear of being hurt and embarrassed.

3.3 Actors in Urban governance

Using an illustration from a study of Ceara State in Northeast Brazil carried out by Tandler (1997 cited in Clayton et.al 2000), a good local government is as a result of the interrelationship between the central government, the local (municipal) government and civil society together with the citizens. Tandler (1997) argues that it is over-romanticism of the role played by civil societies in improving democracies by claiming that they provide better services and facilities than the state and the local government. It is the state that gives civil societies the capacity to demand and advocate for better facilities from the local governments (Clayton *et.al*, 2000:11). For the purposes of this study, analysis is carried out on the relationship between the central government and the local government and between the state institutions and civil societies with much focus on how they do (or do not) cooperate and facilitate civic participation for better service delivery.

3.3.1 State and Local governments in Zimbabwe

Local government is defined by the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) as “participatory and democratically elected structures that can identify with the needs of the people at grassroots level” (Chakaipa, 2010: 32). These structures are said to offer a platform for people to effectively realise and enact their rights and responsibilities (Chakaipa, 2010: 32). De Visser *et al.* (2010) note that this decentralised mode of governance rests local government on ‘the virtue of the principle of subsidiarity’. This therefore means that local authorities in Zimbabwe have partial autonomous power legislatively. Meyers (1999) in his definition of local government argues that these are local units vested with prescribed authority and power and controlled by the government (central government) in implementing or carrying out their grassroots activities. It can therefore be argued that it is inevitable for local governments not to be fully autonomous since the central government plays the most significant role in their creation or existence.

Initially in 1980, local government in Zimbabwe, was founded on legislative frameworks with Urban Councils guided by the Urban Councils Act which was “administered by the Ministry responsible for local government” (Chatiza, 2010: 9). All urban councils pre-2013 operated under the legislative statutes of the UCA which was amended periodically in 1984, 1993 and 1996 without any constitutional basis. Chatiza (2010) therefore argued that the functions of urban local authorities were “open to central government variation and re-assignment to other state agencies”.

Muramahoko (2011: 18) in his study of Urban Council fiscal autonomy in Zimbabwe remarks that the relationship between the central government and local authorities was fractured in the early years because “the Constitution (then Lancaster House Agreement) did not recognise local government such that there was no constitutional instruction for dispensing grants from the central government to local government”. Chatiza (2010: 7) also denotes that “the Lancaster House Agreement though crafted to solve social and racial disparities, it resulted in a lopsided and dependent growth model for local government”. This means that local governments, though they existed as decentralised institutions, still lived at the ‘mercy’ of the central government hence creating the platform for central government ‘intrusions’ in their affairs.

Central government since 2000 has resorted to the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) as a strategic position to control and manipulate urban areas especially Harare which ZANU-PF lost to MDC councillors (Jonga 2013: 26). Mapuva (2013) argues that the loss of ZANU-PF support in urban areas led to the “enactment of section 4A of the Urban Councils’ Act which enabled the MLGRUD to make additional appointments in all local councils, both in urban and rural areas”. The central government which is mostly made up of the ruling party has to make sure that it manoeuvres support in urban areas because without urban hegemony it is like ruling a country without a capital city; and the vote in urban areas is “used as a barometer to determine a political party’s popularity” (Jonga, 2013: 26; Mapuva, 2014: 1). Hence the emergence and dominance of the MDC party in urban spheres, “which conveyed local government’ susceptibility to be captured by oppositional forces”, further made the central government reluctant in relinquishing power to local levels (Chatiza, 2010: 3; Coyers, 2003: 115).

This interference by the central government in local authorities’ activities has undermined the effectiveness of the state-invited civic engagement platforms. Local authorities, in particular the HCC, are supposed to engage the citizens through platforms which include “local government elections, local participatory budget making, consultative forums, public hearings, open meetings of councils and legislative bodies and development committees within local communities” (Chikerema, 2013: 88-89). These platforms however have not been utilised over the years mainly because of the restrictive laws that have since been adopted in full swing which are the AIPPA and POSA. These laws prohibit social gatherings without police permissions and the flow of information freely amongst citizens through rigorous press and media censorship.

The UCA (1973), which operated on a racial and colonial basis, was amended in 1996 to accommodate black citizens of Zimbabwe, and it has become the central government's strongest weapon to exercise power and control over local governments. The amendments to the Act led to the unification of the Urban Councils, Rural Councils and District Councils to form local governments. This meant there was no separation as was there in the colonial period where urban councils were guided by favourable frameworks more than the rural and district councils.

However, according to a report by MLGRUD (2016) (cited in Mapuva & Muyengwa, 2012:132), "the relatively stronger hand from central government ... gives the Minister of Local Government and Urban Development the right and powers to remove an elected Urban Council where it is felt that the elected officials are not in line with people's wishes". According to Chakaipa (2012: 33) the UCA "vests powers in the Minister to give directions on matter of policy and to reverse, suspend or rescind resolutions of council in terms of section 303 and section 314, respectively". The Minister has excessive power over everything that happens inside the council. This has created problems in terms of central government's decentralisation of power to local tiers especially in Harare. Authors such as Jonga (2013) argue that the way the Minister (by then Ignatius Chombo) was intruding in the Harare City Council's activities and functioning made it hard to distinguish who really had the powers or who was boss at Harare town house and all municipal councils.

Mapuva and Muyengwa (2012), in their analysis of the UCA, claim that the UCA is both a platform for citizens to exercise their rights especially of budget process making, at the same time it is an instrument which government uses to retain most of its power in the urban councils through the veto power vested upon the responsible minister. In this regard, the central government has stripped the local governments of their powers and this resulted in local authorities that are irresponsible to the needs and interests of their communities of jurisdiction. Because of this, "the challenge facing decision-makers has been to develop models of local governance that can best facilitate the involvement of civil society and how much civil society can contribute to the establishment of good governance in a sustainable way" (Mapuva, 2010: 5).

Councillors also play a vital role when it comes to citizen participation and urban governance. The Electoral Act (chapter 2:13) prescribes that anyone who is a registered voter, a resident of the area (in which they are campaigning) and a citizen of Zimbabwe is capable of becoming a councillor. No educational qualifications are required. The UCA states that the MLGRUD determines the number of councillors. These councillors are supposed to meet

regularly to discuss issues and (after three months) consult and engage with the residents of their respective wards.

As Mupingo (2013) notes, a councillor should be honest, knowledgeable and approachable amongst other qualities and he or she must attend council meetings, get opinions from constituencies and take news back to their ward. However, Tose-Majome (2018) argues that some of the qualities cannot be achieved because most of the candidates holding the position of a councillor do not have the adequate skills and qualifications to go through the vast information documents that they are supposed to read. Furthermore, the electorate is not well informed and educated on the skills and qualifications of the councillors that they elect, such that the position ends up being occupied by the wrong or incompetent candidate.

The UCA (section 4A) has also given the MLGRUD the power to appoint special interest councillors. According to de Visser & Mapuva (2013), and in some reports from the media, the sole reason “for the appointment of the special interest councillors is their utility as spies for the central government”. This seems quite likely, given the MLGRUD’s recurring intrusion in local government activities. De Visser and Mapuva (2010) further argue that the issue of appointed councillors remains uncertain as the 2013 Constitution does not give the Minister the same powers in section 265(2) as given in the UCA section 4A.

3.3.2 CSOs and Urban Governance

Civil society is the platform through which citizens voluntarily associate based on their community needs and aspirations. The realm of civil society is mainly made up of a variety of associational forms such as trade unions; professional associations; organisations based on kinship, ethnicity, culture or region; formal and informal social networks based on patrimonial or clientelistic allegiances; and pressure or advocacy groups (London School of Economics, 2004). Jenkins and Smith (2001: 8) argue that in modern urban societies in particular “the capacity of the state to represent all community interests is limited and hence needs increasingly to be balanced by direct community action”. Forming organisations of civil society is also regarded as fundamental to the realisation of citizenship and for building a strong democracy

King *et al.* (1998) argue that trust in the government has since diminished due to the unclear effectiveness of participating through the state’s institutional channels of engagement such as elections, hence the emergence and citizen preference of civil society. The emergence of independent trade unions and CSOs especially in the urban spheres of Zimbabwe have intervened in the relations between the central government and the local authorities. Thus,

existing are “IDAZIM, Dialogue of Shelter, Harare Residents Trust (HRT) only to name but a few. These organisations advocate for good urban local governance. But they have often been faced with serious resistance” (Chirisa & Kawadza, 2011).

The NGO sector and CSOs in most developing countries is formally organised and often subject to certain government regulations, and has developed considerable capacity and experience in the delivery of development projects. However, there are many other countries, notably in Africa, where CSOs appear to have taken over from the state as the main provider in certain sectors. In some cases, there is co-ordination with government policies and programmes, but often they operate with little reference to state providers (Clayton *et al.*, 2000).

The study Clayton *et al.* (2000) of civil societies concluded that “there are a number of common deficiencies with services provided by CSOs which include limited coverage, variable quality, amateurism approach, high staff turnover, lack of effective management system, lack of coordination and poor sustainability due to dependence on external assistance. Most CSOs do not have the power to establish a framework for operation nationally and locally and they live at the boundaries and regulations established by the state which at times limit their effectiveness especially in facilitating citizen participation in local communities” (Clayton, *et.al* 2000). In his study of civic participation in Harare, Kamete (2009: 64) highlights that, amongst the CSOs and political parties, “there is very little faith in public institutions. With key ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development, and the Zimbabwe Republic Police being viewed as extensions of the ruling party, ZANU–PF”.

Some scholars argue that local resident associations are dominated by groups of people who are strongly partisan and also those who are economically well-off to attend meetings regularly, whilst the poor cannot afford to attend as they will be striving to provide for their families (Weber, 2000; Irvin & Stansbury, 2005). However, Mapuva (2010: 21) argues that the CHRA in particular “is populated by the grieved poverty-stricken citizen in urban areas whose interest is not confined to improved service delivery, but the restoration of democratic institutions in the country, hence their involvement in national programmes”.

Amongst the civil society groups in Zimbabwe, the most prominent residents’ association is the CHRA. In the words of Kamete (2009: 59), “it is a social movement organization which seeks to represent the needs and priorities of all residents. Nationally, it tussles with a state that is repressive and locally, it questions the legitimacy of the municipal authority”. With reference to the previous discuss on social capital, it falls in the category of

the linking social capital in the sense that it necessitates the flow of information from the council to the residents through facilitating different initiatives to allow association. Since its establishment, it has been vocal is issues of local budgeting, service delivery and civic rights.

However, it has faced a number of challenges both internally and externally which threaten its influential capacity as a channel for citizen participation.

3.4 Urban Governance and service delivery

Urban councils (pre- and post-independence) have had the mandate to provide services to residents in the areas of their jurisdiction. According to Fourie (2001: 217) “local government is the main delivery agent for improvement in housing, healthcare and infrastructural development (such as electricity and water reticulation)’. This is also the mandate that the Zimbabwean local government system inherited in 1980 especially urban councils. Patel (1998: 21) highlights that, under colonialism, urban areas in Zimbabwe were considered white population residential spheres who at that time constituted 8.5 % of the population, such that the services provided by the urban councils were of quality and effective. Even amongst the urban areas, two forms of administration existed in which exerted the best services to low density white suburbs (high income areas) whilst the high density black suburbs languished in overcrowding and poor service provision (Tawengwa, 1997: 26)

Since 1980, service delivery has been affected in so many different ways hence qualifying the assertion by Masunungure (2014: 2) that “Zimbabwe undergoes seismic political and economic shifts that leaves no facet of society untouched”. Schou (2000) notes that there was a wide range of reforms politically in Zimbabwe during the 1980s and the 1990s which sought to increase democracy and local government responsiveness by removing the racial biases and disparities that were inherent in the local government system. The UCA, as noted, is the leading and only powerful framework guiding urban governance and it followed on from “massive rural-urban migration” (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016). In this light, Patel (1988: 23) argues that the “movement of black population into urban areas increased due to the removal of the influx control legislation”. Mapuva (2010: 7) also shows that the “influx into urban areas has equally put pressure on existing infrastructure most of which has been in existence since colonial times”.

Local governments beginning in 1990 started to face noticeable challenges in delivery basic services to their residents also due to lack of financial resources, lack of skilled labour and proper governance. Muramahoko (2011:18) also claims that the absence of local government in the Constitution (prior 2013) meant that ‘there was no constitutional instruction

for dispensing grants from the central government to local level'. Local governments, specifically urban councils, had no guaranteed source of income to carry out their service delivery obligation amongst others (Mushamba, 2010:120). Since urban councils remain 'creatures' of the central government, they also succumb to national challenges, in this case the crisis which Zimbabwe started facing in the 1990s which included a cash crisis and high employment rates.

The post 2000 period "exposed the intensity of the outcome of decentralisation as the opposition MDC controlled urban councils" which resulted in the "recentralisation of power by the government" (Muchadenyika and William, 2016). This resulted in the contestation for power and hegemony mostly between the ruling party ZANU PF and MDC and this "contest for control of the urban constituency between the MDC and ZANU PF has been sustained at the expense of service delivery" according to Muchadenyika (2014).

Local governance (urban and rural) has in the early 1980s up until 2013 been largely regulated by Acts of parliament namely the Rural District Councils Act and the Urban Councils Act. These have determined their existence by prescribing their obligations inclusive of financial, legal, economic and social mandates. The Urban Councils Act, BIPPA, POSA and Constitution (with amendments) will be analysed on the basis of how they shaped Harare urban areas and ultimately affected the forms and levels of citizen participation over the years.

It is important to understand the historical context of urban governance in Zimbabwe and how it has developed over the years, in order to understand the current state of service delivery and citizen participation. Major drifts and shifts have happened and continue to happen nationally and inevitably local governments have succumbed to almost all of them. National agendas and politics have been at the forefront in determining the flow and direction of local authorities and local authorities have found themselves incapacitated to function autonomously and effectively. The abilities and extent to which any local government (in this case urban councils) is able to render services to the citizens under its jurisdiction depends highly on the mechanisms (political and administrative) at work (Ikhide, 1999).

Local governance specifically urban governance in Zimbabwe had largely depended on Acts of Parliament for its existence since 1980 (Chakaipa, 2012: 32). It should be noted that in the early years of independence the government adopted its vast majority of reforms as a way to address the colonial anomalies that had been perpetuated by the British colonialist upon the black majority; these reforms, theoretically, promised a racially biased free Zimbabwe and also solidarity. However, it has been noted that "rampant corruption, the taking of arbitrary decisions by the ruling party, ZANU PF, and the commission of gross human rights violations

resulted in a gradual disconnection between the ruling elite and the general citizenry” (Mapuva & Muyengwa, 2012: 125).

These factors caused significant tension resulting in the emergence of civic societies and ultimately the MDC which gained much urban support since it resisted and struggled against the government’s deficits. Nevertheless, the ruling party continued to engage in “the enactment of new legislation and/or the amendment of existing legislation in order to facilitate the militarisation and politicisation of public institutions to the detriment of the civilian population of the country’ (Mapuva, 2010 cited in Mapuva & Muyengwa, 2012: 127). In this way, the MDC reflected the extent of citizens’ participation and the new political formation enjoyed broad support (Mapuva & Muyengwa, 2012: 129)

The growth of CSOs especially in Harare has caused the central government to intrude in local councils. Local authorities as the main facilitators of citizen participation have found themselves yielding to the directives of the central government instead of the interests and needs of the community people. This is because of the local authorities’ dependency on central government financially. Local authorities have in many instances, such as through water cuts and Operation Murambatsvina, overlooked civic rights such that residents regarded them as enemies and no longer their service providers.

Citizen participation was at its peak in the 1980s but ceased as civic issues became more politicised. At local level “residents began to view the political establishment of the 1980s and 1990 as not only inconsiderate, but one which had shifted from the ideals of the liberation struggle which were to establish a participatory democracy and people-driven country characterised by equitable allocation of resources” (Mapuva, 2010: 3). The forces against the central government and ZANU PF continued to mount up such that civic rights continued to be violated by the state. This is inclusive of the violation of the UCA (1996) which “empowers citizens to form residents’ associations, through which they would influence policy making and other local governance processes” (Mapuva, 2010: 19).

3.5 Conclusion

The chapter has given a historical and current overview of metropolitan governance in Zimbabwe and Harare, specifically. It provided a narration of notable events that have a bearing on both national and local governance from 1980 up to 2018. This is vital as it helps in the understanding and identification of the contextual factors characterising urban local governance and ultimately affecting the course of citizen participation and the delivery of service. The chapter indicated the continuities and discontinuities of practices in Zimbabwe

and Harare urban councils and these include central government domination in local governance activities, national economic meltdown, party politics and violence, intimidation and decline in service delivery. It provided some of the reforms that happened nationally and in turn shaped and promoted the demise in metropolitan governance which include the ESAP, FTLRP, emergence of a multi-party state, GNU and adoption of the 2013 Constitution. Post-independence, the GoZ inherited a colonial local government system and made amendments to the racially biased practices and prescriptions. However, not much has since been achieved in terms of full local government autonomy (decentralisation). This is because of the central government's continuous centralisation of power and intrusion on local authorities' activities. There has been growing tensions between the central government, local governments, CSOs and the ratepayers which has hindered free exercise of civic rights and neglect of good service delivery as a state obligation.

CHAPTER FOUR: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN HARARE FROM 2013

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the Harare Metropolitan in relation to citizen participation and governance in the city since 2013. It will look at how the city's governance processes have evolved since the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, including the practice of partisanship, military involvement in public issues ahead of the 2018 elections. Evidence drawn from key informants from the fieldwork provide the description of the contextual environment of the city and how this has shaped the flow of urban governance. The chapter will present a relational analysis of the central government, HCC and CHRA as the major actors involved in facilitating and motivating citizen participation and service delivery. This is in relation to the literature review of urban governance and the social capital theory selected in the previous two chapters.

Firstly, section 4.2 discusses Harare and Glenview demographically and socially. Section 4.3 discusses the specific themes around citizen participation in present-day Harare. In this regard, I will analyse the dominant contextual themes which emerged when interviewing both key informants and ordinary citizens: central-local Relations, politics of patronage, urbanisation, party politics and violence, and constitutional amendments.

4.2 Background of the case site (Harare & Glenview)

Harare is “Zimbabwe’s largest city and its administrative, commercial, and communicative centre” (Muronda, 2008: 034). It is formerly known as Salisbury, “a capital of the federation of Rhodesia and also Nyasaland” (Muronda, 2008:35) and which was dominated by the white settlers. Major governmental administrative offices are found in Harare and it is better developed than all the other cities (Parliament of Zimbabwe (PoZ), 2011: 4). Open spaces around the area were left pre-colonially as buffer zones for separation between the whites and the blacks. Furthermore, white people lived in the northern areas (low density) with blacks in the southern areas (high density), and this structure has not changed since 1980 (PoZ, 2011: 12). Harare has always been the best platform for central state authority and control, with the opposition party gradually and consistently acquiring large political support. Civic organisations have also mushroomed around the capital and this has raised questions over harmonious platforms of resident participation in civic matters.

Harare pre-colonially known as Salisbury, is Zimbabwe’s capital city. It can be regarded as the heart of the country. It is home to almost half of the population with large numbers of

people continuously flocking into the city every day to look for better work and living conditions. According to USAID (2006), it has an estimate population of 2,800,000 with 1,600,000 living in the metropolitan area. With rampant urbanisation since 1980, the HCC has been faced with a number of problems especially of delivering services to the people. Over the years the city has been characterised by water shortages, lack of housing, disease outbreaks, high unemployment and illegal settlements, which has given rise to the establishment of civil society organisations and also political party rivalry. Harare is now the den or the breeding ground for political contestation especially between the ruling ZANU PF and its opposition MDC together with other civic organisations. The city can be regarded as highly polarised with suburbs divided according to different political affiliations. However, with the ruling party having lost majority electoral support in the city, it has desperately and by all means turned to the use of central government as a tool to monitor and tame the activities of the HCC.

According to ACAPS (2018, Briefing note, para.2), “a state of emergency was declared in Harare on 11 September 2018 following an outbreak of cholera. Budiro and Glenview were the most affected areas due to water shortages and bursts of sewage pipes which then contaminated the unprotected water sources highly used by a number of people in the areas.

Glenview which is the core site for the study is a high-density suburb in Harare. It is characterised popularly by furniture entrepreneurship with the electricity corporation ZESA Harare Southern Region HQ located in Glen View 1. The informal sector plays a large part in livelihoods in the community. It is slowly encroaching towards wetlands because of the lack of good governance by local authorities and land barons. As a populous suburb with a politically heterogeneous population, there are expectations of land disputes.

Glenview is “one of the politically volatile areas in the country’ (*Newsday*, 2018). The suburb is divided into two constituencies namely Glenview North and Glenview South. Glenview South constituency “has been an MDC-T strong hold with Paul Madzore winning it three times in a row with a wide margin since 2005” (Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, 2015). At the same time, “Glen View North is a highly-populated constituency, and is one of the residential areas in Harare where most people are engaged in self-help projects like carpentry and welding due to high unemployment” (*Newsday*, 2018)

In 2018, cholera outbreaks were witnessed in Glenview which called for the state together with donor funders and private institutions to deal with the matter. Vaccines and preventative teachings and information were offered to the residents to deal with the matter and the contaminated wells and boreholes have since been under monitoring to cure the water. Furthermore, due to the unexpected fire outbreaks around the country, one of the furniture

malls in Glenview 8 was burnt to ashes leaving thousands of people dependent on the small scale profits of the mall stranded. Council promised to help resuscitate the businesses and put in more measures to protect and manage the activities of the furniture traders there. Organisations like Econet, World Vision, UNICEF and WHO have played a major role in the process of dealing with the outbreak of cholera in partnership with the government and specifically the HCC.

4.3 Central-Local Relations in Harare

The relationship between the central government and the local government continue to be central to the issue of urban governance in Zimbabwe. This relationship determines the type of activities that emerge in the running of urban spaces. From the data collected, the MLGRUD continues to dominate the Harare City Council leaving no room for autonomy. This justifies the assertion made by Mhlahlo (2007: 107) that “in Zimbabwe urban governance is not totally autonomous; ... the issue is less about autonomy and more about inter-dependence and balance”. The central government continues to withhold full power from the Harare City Council.

The key executive government positions are occupied by ZANU PF incumbents including the MLGRUD whilst the MDC dominates most of HCC ward seats. This has continued to create strife amongst councillors and the minister in relation to the HCC. One key informant highlighted the Minister’s infringement of HCC’s duties and abilities to deal with certain issues around the city. He remarked that:

The sequence and protocol of how the council should operate has long been lost. The City Council is not sure of its duty to address certain issues around here. Sometimes you just find press statements from the mother-ministry addressing situations that the council is responsible for. For example, vending remains problematic because the Minister does not really know how to talk to the public. He just goes on to give orders and directives without thorough consultations. Why not send the councillors who are close to the people to talk to their people?. (KII on 21/11/2018).

The overriding of HCC’s duties by the MLGRUD extends even to land issues whereby people gain residential stands because of political affiliation. This continue to distract from HCC’s coherence and transparency in its operations and initiatives because of the Minister’s constant interferences. In addition, another informant argued that the Ministry at times gives directives that are contrary and at the disadvantage of the HCC and this is a course of non-compliance within the Council itself and amongst the citizens. The issue of removal of vendors

from the Central Business District (CBD) using the uniformed police forces continues to further the division amongst the councillors. One respondent from a CSO posited that:

The council is divided on solving the vendors and illegal settlement issues in Harare. MDC affiliated councillors view the use of the ZRP as inhumane whilst ZANU PF officials think it is legal and vital. Since the latter have the backing of the MLGRUD, whatever they choose goes. This also happened years back when a councillor from MDC proposed unidirectional traffic in the CBD to solve traffic congestion. His proposal was paused later on to be resumed as a ministerial directive. (KII from a CSO, 18/10/2018).

Given such situations and Harare as the capital city, complicated relations persist between the central government, Harare City Council and the society at large. The incessant intrusion of the Minister in HCC's activities indicates the HCCs' limited capacity for effective and positive citizen participation processes. This inhibits the latter from fully realising citizen rights.

Ever since its creation, HCC has been relying more on government provision in order for it to produce services for mass consumption. These funds are to be disbursed to local councils through the MLGRUD and they are to be used according to the allocated processes. However, these funds to the local authorities have not been consistent because of the enormous national budget deficit such that HCC in particular has relied on rate payers' money to continue running. Nevertheless, this has not barred the MLGRUD from manoeuvring over HCC's activities and operations. On numerous accounts, HCC has failed to account for its financial transactions therefore creating discontent amongst the rate payers. One councillor claimed that:

For years, HCC has not been receiving money from the central government. So most of the money it uses comes from the people through user fees and rates which also have not been constant due to a number of political and economic issues. But whether we get money from donations, central government or user fees, the responsible Ministry continues to determine how that money is used". (KII with a councillor, 21/11/2018).

This statement indicates the presence of institutional dysfunction and the incoherent exercise of power. Though legally the MLGRUD is endowed with the powers to overlook the activities of the HCC, there is no clear line of when these powers must end and when HCC must make its own decisions.

One key informant for HCC further shared his thoughts on why central-local relations matter and their current state. He explained that:

Harare City Council falls under the MLGRUD because it was created by the central government. Even though on the legal basis of the law, it must be people centric; you find though that most of the decisive powers remain in the minister and the mother-

ministry. That is why you find the Council implementing programmes without consulting or discussing with the people because the instructions will be coming from the top. Therefore, they cannot bite the hand that feeds them". (KII on 23/11/2018).

This has contributed to the demise of citizen participation and its processes in Harare over the years. Administrators therefore find themselves neglecting civil rights in honour of ministerial directives. This can also explain some ordinary citizens' lack of entitlement to participate as they deem themselves powerless to influence council decisions. This shall be explained in the following chapter.

Relations between the central government and HCC have not only affected Harare council administratively but they have attributed to other factors which in turn have further crippled the process of citizen participation. These factors are thematically presented in the following subsections.

4.3.1 Political Clientelism

Political clientelism according to Hopkin (2006:2) basically "describes the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support". This has been a major feature of the central-local relations in Harare and Zimbabwe at large. National and local resources are continuously mutated into party resources by the ruling party in order for it to cope with its gradual loss of political-electoral support. From the year 2000, ZANU PF has suffered gradual electoral defeats in Harare to the extent that municipal and council seats have been filled by MDC incumbents. Executive positions of the central government are largely ZANU PF candidates but, without control in the council, they are more like a toothless bulldog for the central government.

As such, the central government's priority sublimely has become that of regaining control over the metropolitan and this has resulted in the sour state-local relations. The ministers of local government over the years have been alleged to have disbursed council resources especially land and money to ZANU PF affiliates. On top of that the ministry together with other council in-house ZANU PF supporters have pushed forward directives such as debt cancellations and the appointment of special councillors. This has cost the council a fortune bearing in mind that the large part of Council activities is funded from the user fees, and of late the council has not been getting financial assistance from the national purse. This has clearly proved the unrealistic autonomy of the Harare City Council.

Overtime, local council resources and services are now associated with ZANU PF resources. Many illegal settlements through what are known as "co-operatives have

mushroomed around the city, with youth leaders from the ruling party in the fore-front of pegging and giving out land only to those of the same political taste” (Sivalo, 2017: 138). In his study of social accountability and metropolitan governance, Sivalo (2017) found that land is not only a reward to party affiliates as “urban land has become a basis for forming new/emerging urban settlements to neutralise forces opposed to ZANU PF’s continued rule, especially the MDC, which has previously capitalised on the rising disenchantment amongst urbanities against the state” (Sivalo, 2017:138). This aims to create a social base that is demographically and spatially associated with the ruling party. This seems to work around the city of Harare with one interviewee purporting that:

Around here, if you want to have things such as residential stands and use water for free, you have to join the party otherwise you will not have through following the written stipulations [Munomu, kana uchida kuwana zvinhu zvakaita sema stands nekushandisa mvura mahara, unotoita zvemusangano otherwise hauzwiwane pafeya feya] (CCB in ward 30, 02/11/2018).

This shows the powerlessness of the council over the areas of its jurisdiction. Contestations have been inevitable as councillors from both dominant parties have disagreed on how things are being run especially at the Town House. This state of affairs can point to the assumption that even council meetings are prone to be turned into ZANU PF party meetings, hence reducing attendance or side-lining those of contrary political beliefs.

The Minister has been the face of central government when it comes to state-local relations. The central government has confided in the ministry for all its political missions of regaining control of the Harare jurisdiction. The minister derives all his overall powers over all local authorities from the UCA of 1996. The UCA gives him veto powers over crucial matters of the council such that it undermines councillors and legislators’ roles and powers in the city. The minister together with the state president has powers to dismiss council employees, appoint special councillors and local board members and even pass council decisions (UCA, 1996). These obligations have been manipulated and are being used as tools of central government to influence the HCC.

Local Government ministers, namely Chombo and Kasukuwere, are alleged to have siphoned council resources especially residential stands to themselves and party affiliates at that cost of many homeless multitudes in Harare. Yet, the minister’s decisions and activities due to the UCA are hardly scrutinized. The interviews in fact indicated that patronage and corruption in Harare have become the norm and even the citizens not only know that it exists

but they themselves are actually tapping into it in order to get what they want. A citizen admitted that:

There are some people here in Glenview whom we know have links. If you want let's say your water metre to be calibrated, you can give them some money and they will sort out everything in a few days, rather than for you to wait for the proper procedures which takes forever. It's no longer scary since most people are doing it". (CCA in ward 31, 22/10/2018)

Thus patronage stemming from state institutions has degenerated into the lack of trust between the state and the HCC and also the citizens. Patronage and corruption are no longer unique to ZANU PF but are also in the general public and the CSOs, as most people seem to have adopted it as the way to survive and gain materially. At ward level, two respondents stated that those who benefit the most by way of resources and services are those affiliated to the councillors and their political party. This continuity of central government control of HCC and the existence of patronage and clientism continues to weaken citizen participation and diminishes is potential of curbing corruption and inefficiency through accountability. Both the citizens and institutions are now in the habit of contestation and competition which has become a win-win situation such that accountability is hard to come by.

4.3.2 Economic Crisis, Urbanisation and Citizen Participation

As the economy of the country continues to dwindle so do the structures, processes and impacts of urban councils and Harare specifically standing out as the most affected. The economy which has failed to resuscitate itself for years now has resulted in a number of areas in the HCC being unregulated. Central government as the source of HCC finance has stopped abiding to its constitutional obligation (Sec 301 (3)) which states that local governments receive money from national revenue. This has further been worsened by the abuse of user fees that it generates from its local revenue sources. A key participant noted that:

City of Harare continues to crumble due to political maladministration mostly. They say they have not been receiving money from the national budget and also people have not been paying their bills in time such that some owe them thousands of dollars. However, if you trace the reports produced by the office of the Auditor General over the years, large sums of money have been squandered and you wonder where all that money has been coming from. For instance, we heard how the council fathers diverted money meant for the refurbishment of Morton Jeffrey and used it to buy staff cars. (KII with a CSO official, 18/10/2018).

Due to the prevalence of high corruption and political monopolies, it then becomes difficult to distinguish whether the inefficiencies of HCC are coming from lack of finances or the corrupt practices around the accumulated funds.

Lack of funding from the central government however continues to strangle HCC's abilities. It emerged from the interviews that the politics that exists between the central government and the local authorities determined the amount of funds that would be directed to the local authorities. It emerged that national budget allocations depend upon proposals made by sector ministries which will then distribute them accordingly. The office of MLGRUD has been accused of disbursing local government funds depending on the political populace of the council. The HCC, which is in opposition to ZANU PF, has been sabotaged over the years as a way of the central government to regain lost political support. One respondent highlighted this plight by the following statement:

Our council has a large number of ward councillors and MPs from the opposition, who are always threatening the government itself and strongly criticising the Minister responsible. That is why it is not allocated adequate funds for its operations because how can those in the executive continue to feed people who are always on their throat. (CCB in ward 30, 2/11/2018).

This lack of financial support for HCC because of central government sabotage suggests that, the more the opposition party conquers in the HCC, the lesser the central government grants which could also lead to the recentralisation of the lower tier. This has fuelled a lot of social grumbling from the public because of HCC's failure to meet its targets and objectives.

The HCC has now become known for its failure to own up to the majority of its obligations such that conducting civic participatory activities is now viewed as a luxury at its fullest. Also population growth cannot be ignored, a CSO official highlighted that:

Harare City Council is not in the position of performing any of its duties effectively. This can be due to the down economy and also overpopulation of the city. At this stage I suggest that Harare City Council should close the waiting list for residential stands and focus on how to provide good services to the current residents. (KII on 10/18/2018).

The data collected suggests that central-local relations dictate to a large extent the flow and accumulation of financial funds in the HCC which has a strong bearing on the type of services that are produced by the HCC. Central government through the MLGRUD continues to run the operations of the HCC leaving the latter without enough power or responsibilities to devolve down to the people. In turn, citizens have disengaged with HCC because it has proved to be heteronomous to the central government.

4.3.3 Elected and appointed Councillors

Data showed that the office of councillors in HCC is continuously being undermined. For this research, councillors are considered as key coordinators and state-capacity determinants of citizen participation. Harare is divided into 46 wards and each ward is represented by a councillor. These are elected by the people and must reside within the ward that they are elected for. The councillor's duties are to attend council meetings, organise ward meetings with the people and raising awareness about particular issues. Their main task is to convey interests and needs from the residents who form the demand side to the government officials. They use channels that include participatory budgeting, meetings, hearings, elections, development committees and debates as stipulated by the UCA.

In practice, ward councillors have faced challenges in effectively conducting their roles in Harare. Central-local contestations in the HCC seem to also affect the posts of these councillors and also their efficiency. Since councillors are elected along political party lines, the capacity to carry out their duties thus depend in part on the party to which the councillor belongs. Partisanship thus defines the financial and administrative resources that they receive from the central government through the council board. One councillor abhorred this system of partisanship especially in the resourcing of ward councils. He argued that there is no end to politics even after elections. For instance, he pointed out that he himself and those whom he works with were not adequately resourced such that they hardly if ever carry out public meetings because they are of the opposition party.

However, apart from the lack of financial support from the council board or central government, questions arose concerning the capabilities of individual councillors to conduct their roles. All the citizen participants interviewed expressed no knowledge of their ward councillors. Councillors have the obligation of analysing and reviewing statutes and budgets according to the interests and needs of the constituency they represent. From the interviews, some council officials admitted to not possess the competent skills for such a post and one admitted that he contested for the position because of opportunity and that it is not even his full time job. Additionally, all the councillors and their subordinates do not reside in the wards that they preside over. The authenticity of their role in this case becomes debatable. Whose interests are they representing if they are do not reside in their respective wards and how do they create social networks with the people that they represent?

Some respondents indicated some disjuncture between themselves and the councillors. Some expressed that they only saw their councillor the day they elected him and never after that day. One respondent remarked that:

I have no idea who the Council is! I only saw his name when I went to vote. I ticked his name because he belonged to my political party; otherwise, I have no information of what he does and where he stays. We will see him after 5 years from now". (CCB in ward 30. 2/11/2018).

The resident's expression shows a gap that exists between the councillor and the people. Others admitted that there are no meetings that have been convened initially by the current councillor and even the one who was in office before. This contravenes the UCA that obliges the councillor to meet ward residents at least after three months. This also suggests a fragmentation in the flow of relevant political information that makes the citizens keen to take part in local governance processes.

Furthermore, the MLGRUD's privilege of appointing special interest councillors not more than a quarter of the overall number of councillors continues to be a debatable issue. These councillors are not elected by the people but they take part in matters that concern the people. One councillor claimed that this has been a well-planned idea by central government to make sure that they have control even down to the grass root levels of Harare as a society. He stated that:

These powers given to the minister to appoint his own councillors is a way of outnumbering opposition party councillors' votes and ideas in meetings and forums. The powers also do not tally with the Constitution that states that the people must elect their own councillors to represent them therefore questioning the legality of the UCA to date. (KII, 20/11/2018).

Representative approach to citizen participation (indirect participation) in Harare is problematic as it continues to succumb to incapacity and political partisanship.


4.4 State Capacity in Citizen Participation

From the literature reviewed, citizens or people associate and collectively act towards a common goal in groups (Ponthieux, 2004: 3). These groups, because they have sets of standards that are they bound to, guide the lives of the group members. In this case, groups whether formal or informal are the major drivers of citizen participation because they offer social networks due to their trustworthiness which then motivates individual citizens to take the initiative of engaging or not in collective action towards community problems. The HCC and CSO proponents of politically relevant social capital have overtime set the norms of the Harare community especially how people interact (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998: 572)

From the interviews, participants admitted to be involved either with the HCC or CSO and some expressed knowledge of both but they are not members. The key informant interviewees however admitted that, though their respective institutions were invested with the obligation of promoting participation of citizens and engaging them, they faced a number of challenges. The HCC, in this case as a government subsidiary, is supposed to drive citizen participation and its processes in the city. One key respondent from ward 31 explained the council's obligation and influence and its impact on citizen participation. She explained that:

The council is responsible for livelihoods and welfare of all the citizens around Harare. This comes as a constitutional mandate and also according to the Urban Councils Act. Not only are we mandated to see to it that we supply services to the people but we should also sit down and consult the people on various occasions. However, the major challenge is that we are dismally financed and currently have nothing to offer the people basically. (Key informant, ward 31, 21/11.2018).

The issue raised by this elected official speaks to the ill-funding of HCC and ward councils which then deters the chances of civic engagement. Adding on to this, a photograph showing the ward council office appears below.



It clearly shows that ward councillors are not capacitated in terms of infrastructure. From the enquiries made, the ward councillor was actually financing himself and using an old farm house as offices.

The above key informant further conversed that:

The Councillor does not call for meetings himself but attends those that would have organised by other local groups (Key informant, ward 31, 21/11.2018).

From the literature reviewed, councillors are also part of the linking social capital in that they take the demands of the people who elected them to the Harare Town Council, and they are supposed to acquire information which they are then supposed to give to the people. But the lack of reciprocity and information transfer then results in an ineffective social capital hence inconsistent community development. Councillors are the indirect mechanism through which residents can participate. It has been highlighted here that a gap already exists between the citizens and the elected councillors. This can explain why some resident respondents professed lack of knowledge in terms of council and community affairs and activities.

The interviews also disclosed that besides infrastructural and financial constraints in the council, intellectual deficiency amongst council workers affected citizen participation. From the initial demographic and occupational information requested from the key informants in the interviews, ward councillors and their colleagues had no background qualifications related to community engagement and political science. Literature suggests that the lack of public skills can result in administrators not trusting the citizens, and citizens finding no ground to converse with administrators such that participation is not prioritised.

Party politics continue to bedevil local authorities in Harare down to their sub-lower tiers. Five respondents indicated that party politics continue and this involves the MLGRUD and its sabotage of opposition led areas. One respondent revealed how party politics deters the flow, level and form of citizen participation and development. She portrayed how political affiliations of an individual directs and shapes their actions and acceptance in society. She said that:

We continue to talk about political parties even after elections. You can find that some people around associate based on which party they support; maybe it's because during election campaigns things can turn out to be nasty. A few years ago a councillor belonging to MDC donated a generator to a clinic in Glenview 1 since electricity was scarce but up to this day that generator has not been used just because it came from the opposition party. (CCG, 27/10/2018)

This shows that the council is ill structured, lacks finances and is prone to domination on apolitical party basis. One councillor also claimed that:

"It is hard for citizens to be active especially here in Harare just because Harare is the heart of Zimbabwe and most of our moves are monitored. Come to think of it, if the whole Harare City Council and the Town House's decisions can and are overlooked by the MLGRUD, ward councils and we councillors are left rather insignificant and left with no significant power to give to residents.

The councillor's and other respondents' claims in this section interrelates with literature in chapter three that central-local relations predominantly drive and define governance issues in the Harare City Council and that the local authorities are incapacitated by the central government and party politics.

In observations derived from the analysis of the data collected, the researcher noticed that adequate legal frameworks for local authorities and ward councils to govern themselves exists on paper, but it cannot be implemented entirely without the local authorities being capacitated in the above stated areas. The data also showed lack of political will with regards to participation of citizens.

Interviews conducted amongst CSO leaders indicated the HCC overlooks citizen participation in governance issues. It is an area that does not receive proper attention, monitoring and financial assistance and that is why it continues to decline into an ineffective principle of democracy. One key respondent claimed that:

Know that [citizen] participation is an expanse. So we see that the Council does not budget for that. Citizen participation presupposes access to information. You cannot actively participate if you don't know what is happening in your city, if you can't get access to a budget and critical documents. So provision of adequate information about operations and activities of local authorities in cities is key in terms of participation so that people know why and how they are supposed to participate and debate. (KII with CSO official, 18/10/2018).

Interviews with key informants from the council also indicated that local governments especially the HCC has at some point neglected its duty of engaging with the citizens in its operations, with the issue being overly advocated for by CSOs and political parties. Hence the 'city-fathers' still regard it as a channel through which the opposition and those against the state want to manoeuvre their way into the Council. A council official restated that in the following statement:

"The reason why the Council is not moved to regularly consult the public is because opposition parties and a number of NGOs are on the forefront of advocating for it. This has given City Council the suspicion of whether they do it from a good cause or they have their own given agendas of trying to force their own people in, in order to expose the government's inefficiencies then ultimately gain total votes. (KII from ward 31/21/2019).

Such rejection and neglect of mandatory and crucial responsibilities brings to the fore that local governance in Harare has become more of a political contestation and competition and less

about the improvement of grass root livelihoods through good relations between the council, CSOs and the people.

However, another respondent argued that HCC at times considers the inputs of the residents. He claimed that:

We cannot totally say that Council is completely silent on its duty of partnering and communicating with the citizens. Nowadays they are trying their best; we can see that they are fairly updating their official website, conducting radio and television adverts and notices as well as in newspaper columns. (CCB ward 30, 2/11/2018).

If the above is true, it requires cooperation on the part of the citizens to regularly engage with these channels of information. The majority of the citizens interviewed confessed no contact with these platforms through which the HCC uploads some of the community information. This brings us to the previous discussion in the literature that individual capabilities of participation also matter. People can know, belong or be surrounded by the relevant political networks but, without possession of the proper information dissemination tools, collective action is disturbed and effective participation is retarded.

Nonetheless, citizen respondents indisputably admitted of the efforts by HCC to educate and consult them but coincidentally most of these efforts are carried out at the peak of political contestation such they appear as one of the government's political gimmicks. For example, in 2016 the HCC promised to solve the land issue by mapping the areas in Kambuzuma for sale as residential stands; however, it is alleged that the land had already been parcelled out to ZANU PF youth by the then former Minister of Local Government, Kasukuwere.

4.5 CSO Capacity in Citizen Participation

Advocacy and petition for observation and preservation of civic rights in Zimbabwe can be traced to its roots from the civil society movements in the urban areas inclusive of Harare. Since their inception, CSOs in Zimbabwe have sought to redress major loopholes and negligence in the observation of democracy and human rights especially by enquiries into state activities and the transparency thereof. They have been the main linking passage between citizens and the state and constantly asking the state together with its lower tier institutions (local authorities) to account for their actions.

A large number of civil society groups in Harare derive their financial resources from donors, and most of them are international organisations. In so doing, they are guided by the principles and priorities as prescribed by the donors which at times do not coincide with the

host country's context setup. From the interviews with the citizens, one respondent raised some suspicion over CSOs' authenticity and capacity to represent pure citizen interests when carrying out civic participatory programs and schemes. His concerns are in the following statement:

You know what! I always wonder where these other organisations get all this stuff that they give us for free. The situation in Zimbabwe has been hard since time immemorial [laughs] and for these guys to gather such huge crowds, give them flyers is just unbelievable. Personally, organisations such as these cannot be treated as different from the Council because they have been coming here, gathering information concerning our needs but nothing has really changed here. The question I pose then is are they coming here for us or for their own unknown interests?. (CCG in ward 31, 27/10/2018).

This can rationalise the common stance adopted by the state and CSOs and opposition political parties. Both are not state funded and criticise the programmes of the central state.

In the midst of a strong and stiff environment of political adversary, CSOs have strived to pursue their mission. Amongst these is the CHRA, whose work has been demonstrated in the capital Harare. Over the years it has been involved in organising public protests, public hearing and debates around the city. Noticeable cooperation seemed to exist amongst the different CSOs in Harare. A key informant from CHRA highlighted that the organisation is in constant coalitions which include the Harare Resident Trust (HRT), World Vision, Crisis Coalition and IDAZIM. They coordinate ways and platforms to engage with the residents. However, challenges emanate from the source of their finances who are the donors. One key informant posited that:

We are not state funded here. We rely on external donors, well-wishers and membership subscriptions. This therefore results in our services and programmes being limited in scope and impact. Looking at the growing population in Harare and the further expansion of Harare geographically and the economic depression, we are currently in a state of not reaching the larger part of the population (KII with CHRA official, 18/10/2018).

As the linking actors between the local council and the residents, CSOs specifically CHRA find themselves with a double task of interacting with the council (supply side) and the citizens (demand side). This calls for extensive meetings and consultation with both; at the same time, they are involved in information acquisition and sharing. The lack of finances has resulted in the CSO exerting much of its focus on the citizens, thus being one sided and in the end appealing to the local authority and the state as critics – yet affiliated to the MDC. This has

fractured state-civil society relationships through the lack of trust, such that there no longer exist a clear and reliable flow of information between the HCC and CHRA.

Additionally, relations between the CSOs and HCC continue to drift further away because of party politics. CSOs have been characterised more by critiquing the work of the HCC with one incident in 2018 in which CHRA and HRT were alleged to have encouraged Harare residents to dump their uncollected waste and garbage at the Town House. Ironically, CSO resentments of the HCC tally with those of the opposition parties subsequently leading to the HCC categorising them as opposition and not co-partners.

Over the years CHRA has challenged and questioned the legitimacy of the HCC especially some of the appointed councillors and city mayors, and further alleging that the Council is misusing rate payers' money and not owning up to its pledges and mandate. Political parties around the Harare especially MDC have also questioned the HCC around the same issues. One key informant from a CSO expressed the frail relationship that exists between the organisation and HCC in the following statement:

Politics is the major challenge in our role of facilitating collaboration between the HCC and the public. For organisations like ours, the council tends to see us as oppositional forces and not stakeholders in the social and economic process (KII with CSO official, 18/10/2018).

The capacity of CHRA to represent the interests of the Harare citizens has been subjected to stiff and inflexible laws. These laws have hampered effective flow of information in the engagement process. One of the key informant lamented that:

The laws sometimes can be limiting. We seek police clearances every time we want to engage with large groups and sometimes they delay. The POSA [Public Order Police Act] controls all our meetings of which when dealing with people it becomes a problem. (KII with CSO official, 18/10/2018).

In 2018, the MDC was prohibited on the grounds of the POSA to conduct its mega rally in the capital because of the risk of cholera spreading amongst its public members.

Further, the above quoted respondent argued that:

The law must be democratised so that the law can enhance the vast civic rights and so that people know and exercise them. We need to improve social accountability which is the process justifying the decisions made. Decisions have to be justified that is why we have budget monitoring. People don't come to the meetings as they are supposed to, because they do not see their lives in in those meetings and how they are going to benefit directly. (KII with CSO official, 18/10/2018).

The above sentiment raised by the civic leader indicates that statutes and the laws continue to contribute in weakening not only the work of CSO groups around Harare but the citizens too. Even though citizen participation has been enshrined in the Constitution, many people do not exercise their rights because it is not reflected in the attitude and practices of the HCC. The rights and obligations for citizen participation in Harare seem to be floundering.

Overall, the interviews revealed a chasm between the practices of the HCC and the lives and interests of the people.

4.6 Conclusion

The nature of state-local relations is known to be the major driver of urban governance elsewhere and Zimbabwe (Harare) particularly. These relations define the urban spheres of influence such that vertically they determine the outcome and relationship between citizens and their local council administrators. In Zimbabwe, local governance as a system has existed as a result of the central government's initial willingness to relinquish power. In the post-colonial era, it was only enshrined in legislative frameworks which have suffered enormous manipulation by political 'big men' over the years.

Decentralisation as a process has taken a 'tortoise' pace with by-elections being introduced later on in 1994 in urban centres. The 1990s saw the increase in corruption and inadequate service delivery on the part of the council which brewed internal opposition and critics of the government. Even with the adoption of one-city law and autonomous local authorities, Harare City Council has remained a central government appendage. Due to that, CSOs have emerged around the capital but they have not challenged forcefully the central government's control of the Harare City Council. State-local relations have also soured with local councils becoming MDC (opposition party) strongholds. Undeniably, the GoZ has faced criticism and resentment at home and even beyond the country's borders. In the next chapter, I will present the themes characterising state-local relations in the Harare metropolitan and how they have affected citizen participation in governance issues.

CHAPTER FIVE: CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES AND PARTICIPATION CHANNELS

5.1 Introduction

Citizen participation and service delivery form the greater part and focus of this thesis. This chapter mainly examines and highlights the socio-political and economic dynamics and constructs that are central in shaping citizens' attitudes and perceptions towards citizen participation, urban governance and service delivery. This chapter will focus on the factors that influence citizen participation as discussed in the literature and giving reference to the contextual factors raised in the previous chapter. Analysis of the two forms of participation, namely direct and in-direct participation, will also be done.

5.2 Residents knowledge of citizen participation

Citizen participation in Zimbabwe is enshrined in the 2013 Constitution as a right and responsibility to the citizens and as duty and obligation of state institutions. For it to be effectively implemented, there is need for the right information to be dispersed amongst the members of the public. However different responses were gathered concerning the knowledge of these rights. It emerged that historical and political experiences continue to have a bearing on the accumulation and exercise of civic rights. Interviews with ordinary citizens indicated that citizens' knowledge and exercise of their participatory rights largely depends upon the HCC and central government at large. Citizens only know their right if those in power are willing to educate them at the same time observe the right.

The HCC has been poorly resourced such that citizen participation as a process has been neglected and this in turn has resulted in some citizens being ignorant of their right. A key informant stated that:

Lack of financial resources at the Council [HCC] does not only hamper its administrative and internal operations. It also affects the citizens' awareness of the right as stakeholders of the council. The council must be able to educate the masses on several issues so that they know because, if people do not know, they will just continue leaving everything in the hands of the council which then results in the violation of human rights. (KII on 2/11/2018).

State capacity and political will contribute to the knowledge of citizen participation acquired by the citizen. However, another key informant argued that people are most times

ignorant in that they only want to know the law and their rights when it benefits them only. He expressed that:

People should know their right at the same time they should know that the right to participate has its own short-comings. It's not everything that they will discuss that will be done by the council. (KII on 20/11/2018).

This therefore suggests that it is not only the HCC and CSOs that are not well capacitated in citizen participation, but also the citizens too. Some respondents showed no knowledge especially of the laws guiding citizen participation and also their role in the whole process. Some admitted that it was out of deliberate ignorance whilst some claimed that they simply did not know.

This can suggest that in the HCC there is a low prioritisation of citizen participation which therefore makes the process difficult to facilitate and implement effectively and sustainably. Nonetheless, respondents admitted knowledge of the two forms of participation which will be discussed now.

5.3 Forms of citizen participation in Harare

This research adopts the definition of citizen participation given by Quick and Bryson (2016:1) that citizen participation in local government processes encompasses “direct involvement or indirect involvement through representatives of concerned stakeholders in the decision-making policies, programs and plans”; as well as the definition by Madumo (2014: 131) that citizen participation is meant to “enhance the transparency of interaction in the public domain”. These definitions propagate a few tentative assumptions and themes worthy of discussion which the researcher found from the data collected.

The definition by Quick and Bryson (2016) highlights that citizen participation in some democracies operates on two levels or in two forms, namely direct and indirect involvement. This indicates the involvement of different stakeholders or role players, with the direct involvement mainly occupied by the citizens or residents and most CSOs, whilst indirect involvement involves the elected and appointed council officials. After conducting interviews with the participants, it became clear that all 15 of the participants had both similar and different perceptions of citizen participation, its importance and usefulness in improving service delivery, its forms and the context in which it could exist.

5.3.1 Direct Involvement Channels

Citizens can be directly involved in the affairs of their localities. This allows residents to manage what happens and plan for issues in their specific communities by giving their opinions directly. Elections and public hearings emerged to be well known and used processes of direct involvement in the Glenview suburb. Elections as observed from the research are seasonally popular, which might be because they have visible direct outcomes and results. Eight residents of Glenview 1 and 8 admitted to have participated in both the 2018 national and by-elections. However, the data collected speculated that these elections as a form of direct citizen involvement seem to be associated with many mysteries and gradual disappointments which lead to citizens abandoning them as a tool for direct contact with council issues and activities.

Though literature suggests that elections help promote fairness and even equal expression of all citizens by not offering any room for tyranny of the majority, some of the respondents reasoned that direct participation is riskier due to high intimidation of one's electoral decisions and political party affiliations. One of the participants seemed to suggest that electoral voting poses a great risk to one's life though they are preferable:

Elections are able to change our country including our surrounding communities but the way they are carried out is unjust and tailor-made for corruption. Previously, we used to have pre-electoral intimidation and violence but now there is the fear that, with the introduction of the biometrics in this year's elections, people are likely to be hunted down. We entered most of our personal details when registering to vote now we just don't know what will happen to that information whether or not it will be used against some of us ... you can wake up one day not there [laughs] (CCD, ward 31 11/2018).

Another one on the same issue said that:

Why is it that they needed us to have those biometrics for one to be eligible to vote? It is not us the people who rig those elections, it's the candidates and those that help them count the votes who rig. If they disposed of the ballot papers and the v11s that we used last September, are they going to do the same with our information?

The evidence seems to suggest a drop in the level of trust between the voters and the voters' roll. The residents indicate limited trust and this might result in the lack of reciprocity whereby the residents might not take part in the next elections due to fear of the unknown. This supports the literature which suggests that people's participation is dependent on trust and reciprocity, such that the absence thereof will lead to non-participation (Fukuyana, 1995). Presumably to some extent, electoral polls as a mechanism for citizen participation in fact seem to be the demotivating factor for the potential of any active participation. The respondents can

be regarded as willing to some extent to participate but they are discouraged due to the uncertain safety and security of the electoral process especially in the pre-election and post-election periods.

The other two respondents who admitted to have deliberately missed the 2018 electoral voting referred to their past experiences in the past elections claiming they were associated with violence:

If some people were killed for not voting for the ruling party, why should I? Save [referring to Morgan Tsvangirai] was beaten and he is even dead because of these things, what more myself? –an ordinary person! In this country I don't think elections will ever change anything. They have failed. You see, two months ago people took themselves to town to protest only to be massacred. The whole world was watching but nothing has changed till now. (CCE 11/2018).

In the above instances, the electoral system of participation emerged as a popular platform with many residents able and willing to take part.

However, it seems that most of the residents after the 2018 elections are becoming discontent with this form of participation because of after election violence and intimidation of innocent civilians. Seven of the respondents seem to hold the viewpoint that election results are always rigged and they are not transparent. People of different political views are threatened and out-casted by those of a certain political party. In this case MDC supporters are threatened by ZANU PF supporters through violence and even death. This supports literature which stresses that social capital networks in the form of associations can lead to isolation of minor groups and ideas due to the tyranny of the majority.

Public hearings also were frequently mentioned by the respondents. These public hearings are initiated by the Council itself through their council community workers. These public hearings allow residents to assemble and get feedback from the council officials and at the same time acquire information on areas of concern. It emerged from the interviews that these hearings have been combined with debates and the budget making processes. Participants posed a number of differing and similar themes concerning the hearings. I will discuss four recurring themes that emerged which are inconsistency, council dominated, language barriers and unclear agenda, outcomes and impact.

Three residents admitted that they had no knowledge of the public hearings and they were not aware of any certain way in which the notices of the hearings are conveyed. One of the residents from Glenview 8 indicated that:

Council issues and activities are unpredictable and inconsistent. I don't know how they operate when it comes to consulting us, it is more like they wait for something like cholera to happen in order for them to call us or for donors to come. If it takes them a whole week to fix a blocked or burst sewage pipe, we can therefore forget about them calling for a meeting especially a consultative and informative one (CCG in ward 31, 27/10/2018).

The council then can be alleged to be neglecting its role of conducting and facilitating platforms of engagement with the citizens. However, as the literature on HCC seems to indicate, the council is said to be financially bankrupt and ill-resourced such that it cannot be blamed for failing to conduct consistent meetings and public hearings. A resident from ward 31 raised a claim that can nullify the above assumption. He claimed that:

Sometimes I wonder why it is hard for the council to conduct such a simple task yet they own all the high schools, primary schools and halls around here, even the wetlands and open spaces that you see. They can just use those places at zero expenses. Yet if people decide to settle on these spaces you see them in no time coming to displace them, then you wonder what's really happening (CCD in ward 31, 02/11/2018).

This then raises the question of whether the council is unable to hold these meetings because of financial constraints or because of neglecting their duties for fear of accounting for their actions.

Public hearings are also associated with language barriers mainly because they are dominated by the council officials. One resident stated when he once attended a budget making meeting, and the whole session was led by the person from the council and by others who were able to follow what was being said. He stated that:

I was surprised to see that the budget was already made and we had been called to rubberstamp things that we did not understand and that were already made (CCC ward 30, 2/11/2018).

This arguably supports the literature that there is need for literacy skills in order to disseminate information once an individual joins the relevant social network (Rose, 2007).

The issues discussed above therefore indicate that HCC as the main facilitator is currently unable to provide the different platforms of direct participation. The channels are not consistently used and this weakens citizen interests. In most cases, respondents admitted that they were unwilling to participate because of their distrust of the HHC and fear of being violated which supports literature which stresses that “citizens can be distrustful, cynical and uncomfortable with collaborating with the government at a distant” level (Holzer & Kloby;

2005: 522). Many of the respondents seemed not to be interested in the direct channels of participation because they believed that they were associated with high risks of violence and intimidation.

5.3.2 Indirect involvement

Indirect citizen participation involves representative democracy through which citizens elect for themselves individuals to represent their interests and needs in governance issues. In the study, this role is played by the ward councillor who is elected by the people. Respondents expressed mixed feelings with regards to the role and vitality of the ward councillor. One resident stated that:

The councillor is doing a fair job in that he understands our needs and does his best to help. For example, he liaised with people from World Vision and now we have a reliable source of drinking water (CCD ON 2/11/2018).

Similarly, another resident also acknowledged that it is easier and more effective to contact the councillor in terms of community issues because he understands since he stays in the vicinity.

However, as stated in the literature, that this channel is without its own challenges. Politics drastically weakens the effectiveness of the ward councillors. In a conversation, a certain woman exclaimed that:

I hardly come in contact with the councillor for two reasons. The first one is because the councillor belongs to another political party and secondly because I don't believe that these councillors even represent us adequately because things continue to worsen day after day. (CCA ON 22/10/2018).

This coincides with literature that states that councillors are open to political whips such that they end up fulfilling the political party interests over citizens' interests (ActionAid, 2014; Bland, 2010). With reference to the previous chapter on state-local relations, councillors are also operating under limited budgets and highly political environments such that they are not able to fulfil their duties properly.

5.4. Social and cultural factors that enable and disable participation

This section discusses variables that inhere in people's social and cultural settings which contribute variously to citizen participation by either motivating or demotivating individuals' interest in collective action.

5.4.1 Mobility and residential stability

It emerged in this study that one of the factors affecting and determining participation amongst citizens is the individual's residential stability in the specific area. This refers to the person's mobility in the place or area of stay whether they are lodgers living on a lease basis or they own a certain piece of property. Mixed responses were gathered around this issue. To some residents, owning land in Glenview is a motivation on its own because they regard it as a source of a sense of belonging, whilst for those who are living on leases it is also a reason to attend council activities. One of the citizens from ward 31 indicated that:

As a citizen and a landowner in Glenview 8, it is imperative for me to attend most of these gatherings [council invited meetings] because I have to stay informed of what is happening and the information regarding my property; for example, property valuations and upgrades on water rates. (CCG in ward 31, 27/10/2018).

This supports the literature reviewed by Putnam (1995: 74) that residential stability and homeownership are associated with greater civic engagement in issues of the specific communities. Those who own land seem to have a guaranteed tenancy and habitation from which emanates the strong sense of belonging, hence the confidence and commitment to engage and associate.

Nonetheless, lease holders and illegal settlers interviewed admitted that they also attend and some are keen to attend and participate in the council's initiatives in spite of their lack of land ownership. One key informant interviewed indicated a high turnout of those who are lodging and illegal settlers in most of the meetings and explained that:

In most of our meetings and hearings we meet house owners especially those who are in their old ages, I can say 50 years and above. But lately, quite a number of lease holders and people from the shanties have been coming. These people have the hopes of becoming landowners especially since the council has been issuing out infill lands for sale and most of the farmed open spaces are continuously becoming residential settlements (Council Official in ward 31, 20/11/2018).

The key informant also highlighted that CSOs and other NGOs such as Zichire also visit these illegal settlements when carrying out their campaigns or administering health related information and services, such that these people have developed connections and responsibilities in the same way as the legal residents.

However, some participants strongly emphasised that land ownership is the only 'reasonable' reason for them to be found mingling with council officials. One citizen said that:

“Why should I bother myself with participating when I have nothing to lose here? I am renting where I stay! So I think it is my landlord’s duty to attend those activities” (CCA in ward 30, 22/10/2018).

The above instances indicate that individuals might participate in local activities if they are able to trace benefits for themselves afterwards. The moment one realises the potential of benefiting from collectivism, and he or she has high trust in the group members, that person is willing to participate.

5.4.2 Occupation and educational stages of the population

From the reviewed literature, an individual can participate in local affairs if he or she is connected or becomes part of a network that is politically relevant (La De Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). This network will encompass the adequate information that will then motivate the person to participate. However, for one to join such a network, the occupational and educational levels become the determinants. This in turn also affects the age groups in terms of attendance especially of the budget making meetings.

Issues discussed in the Council invited meetings and debates are issues affecting the livelihoods of the specific dwellers, but how these meetings are conducted becomes challenging especially to the ordinary people. This is because a lot of discussions are presented in English and formats that are uncommon to everyday language. Participation hence becomes the game for those with the ability to apprehend and disseminate the information as discussed. One key informant claimed that:

Most of the people that normally attend council meetings are those who are employed because they have access to cheap information tools such as newspapers and internet websites which gives them regular HCC notices and advancements.

This advances the assertion purported by Kearns (1992) in literature that civil partnership nowadays has become an activity for those who have time and resources. Those who reported to participate in most council initiatives were either employed or they had developed some business interests which they want to follow up on council’s stance. As well, some participants were tertiary students, who through academic experience have been exposed to their right to participate and the council’s duty to account for its activity.

The issue of occupation as a factor that influences participation interlinked with the issues of gender and age as significant variables driving citizen participation processes in Harare. It appeared from the interviews that the majority of women are not formally employed and some are housewives, such that they are not exposed to politically relevant social networks

hence they become passive participators. One woman propounded that politics remains male dominated because of the different jobs that men and women take on. She avowed that:

Women mostly are caught up in household and marital obligations whilst men occupy formal or industrious jobs which brings them in contact with political issues. Men mostly take part in protests and demonstrations and women stay at home minding the children (CCF on 2/11/2018).

Similarly, another woman highlighted that:

It is difficult for us to attend council meetings and hearings because of the time schedules and also because we fear being stereotyped as prostitutes since such political activities are still regarded as exceptional for women (KII on 20/11/2018).

Given the existence of patriarchy and gender inequality amongst the Harare dwellers, chances of women participating actively is limited. This is contrary to the recommendations of the literature reviewed that states that “citizen participation formations should be demographically representative and socially inclusive of all stakeholders and should thus cut across youth, women, retired professionals, marginalised groups” (Kimutai & Aluvi, 2018: 60). This can be the potential reason why the services delivered by the HCC are not inclusive of all the needs of the different groups in the community. It can be argued that the right to participate still falls short of equally incorporating all societal groups.

Furthermore, due to the economic upheavals that have shaped the country, people choose to participate in council activities depending on the particular agenda for the meeting. Though the variables including age, income and education were deduced as playing a part in citizens’ willingness to participate, it also emerged that some people were participating based on the type and agenda of the participatory process and mechanism and also their individual needs. One key informant claimed that:

Though the meetings are not held consistently, the number of attendance and age groups differs and it is not fixed. People attend according to their needs and concerns.

5.5 Culture of dependence and passivity

People can choose not to join a group with the mind-set that they will always reap the end results. From the interviews, three respondents claimed that participation was their last option because it was not part of their daily plans and they claimed that the council knows what they need and what is supposed to be done. One respondent had mixed perceptions on participation in which he said:

I don't think it is my job to go and tell those who work at the council what I need because they know already. However, I don't attend anything because what difference can I make as an individual in those hearings. I will just go along with what those who attend decide on. Anywhere the council never consults us anyhow. (CCE on 2/11/2018)

One of the key informant from the CSOs in an interview highlighted some reluctance on the part of the citizens:

You will discover as you engage with the public, that there are some people out there who know how to demand services but they do not want to participate. They still view the state as welfaristic and I believe that many of them are the ones that accumulated huge water bill debts because of that mentality. Most of them do not even realise when water rates go up. (KII with CSO official, 18/10/2018).

This indicates lack of reciprocity between providers and recipients of services which stems from a misinformed public together with an irresponsible local authority.

5.6 State Regulations and citizen participation

The study found that citizens deliberately withdraw from local government meetings and processes with reasons being the repressive nature of the state and its regulations. Interviewed residents revealed confusion over following constitution rights when it is uncertain if these laws are acknowledged as existing by the government. Some admitted that brutality and violence is inevitable since everything is now politicised. One woman said:

Right now everything is uncertain. We do not really know who rules this country and who has power. Recently the police were disarmed and the military came in. The same military that we all praised last year on 21 November killed innocent people in town. On the television we saw MDC being barred from carrying out a press conference. What more I an ordinary citizen. I wouldn't risk my life going under a tree to discuss issues that will never materialise (CCC, 2/11/2018)

However, exceptional from the other respondents, two youth respondents showed willingness to participate in any of the HCC invited platforms despite the problems. One of them purported that:

Council has been failing us for decades now. The only thing that they have managed to achieve is cholera. They have squandered people's money especially there at Town House. But if they are going to call people for meetings and stuff, I am going to attend. I want to hear what they are going to say because I think the reason why these guys continue eating people's money is because we decide to sit at home and not know what

is happening. As much as the council can be blamed for the decline of Harare, we also can be blamed for not participating and on top of that for not paying our debts (CCF, 20/10/2018).

This shows that some of the citizen apathy arises from the council's failures whilst another motivation to participate is derived from the council's flaws and shortcomings. This then raises the discussion of subjectivity surrounding the factors that motivate individuals to participate in local governance processes in Harare. In the end, this can suggest that one's decision to participate or to withdraw can depend on one's view of consequences and outcomes and the benefit that it can directly bring.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter provided an analysis of the variables and factors that influence citizens to participate in local government processes. It highlighted that citizen participation in the HCC is not only distracted by the incapacities of the state and non-state actors but also by individual incapacities which include the lack of literacy skills, limited citizen participation knowledge, culture of dependency, political affiliation and lack of trust.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

The potential of citizen participation to bring about improved service delivery and enhanced urban livelihood is undeniable with the worldwide adoption of democratic practices. Citizen participation enhances service delivery through the exercise of accountability, transparency and sharing of power and responsibility amongst the governed and the governors. The potential however has remained utopic in Zimbabwe generally and Harare specifically. Many questions have risen over its practicality because there are hardly any notable improvements in service delivery and urban welfare since the inception of the local government system in Zimbabwe through a number of institutional and legislative reforms and amendments.

In this research, previous chapters highlighted how institutional structures and contextual factors affected citizen participation and its processes in Zimbabwe and Harare. The chapters interrogated the major actors in urban spaces namely the central state, local government and the civic associations through tracings their cordial relations, power dynamics and capacity and how this has affected citizen participation. The previous chapters also indicated major historical events that have characterised urban governance in Zimbabwe and shaped the perceptions and practices of citizen participation.

This chapter will discuss the contribution of the sub-objectives in addressing the main objective of the thesis. The main objective also will be discussed in light of how the theory adopted in this research helped to address its focus of inquiry. I will outline how this thesis will contribute in the contemporary conceptual debates around citizen participation and urban governance. In describing the limitations of the study, I will also suggest areas for further research with regards to citizen participation and urban governance.

6.2 Thesis Objectives

In this section, I consider the ways in which the thesis addressed the main and secondary objectives.

Central local relations in Zimbabwe and the major actors in metropolitan governance

As a foundational basis to tackle the main objective of the thesis, the study first traced the urban governance practices in Zimbabwe through a historical overview of urban governance in Zimbabwe from the year 1980. The aim of this approach was to identify the major actors in the

Harare metropolitan and the patterns and trends in the Harare City Council. This was informed by the social capital theory which suggests that social networks and civic association is context-specific; hence, the need to understand contextual factors and actors particular to the case under study. Citizen participation in Zimbabwe is largely conveyed through the state's local tiers which are local governments. Local councils are subsidiary to the central state and for a long time have depended on the central state both financially and administratively. In this light, and guided by social capital theory, the study analysed central-local relations in Harare. The relations have affected citizen participation mechanisms and processes. Through a literature review, the study traced the historical experiences of urban governance in Zimbabwe in order to establish continuities and discontinuities.

The study established that ever since the emergence of the MDC and strong civil society groups in Harare, the central-local relations have been acrimonious with the central state attempting to recentralise power. The HCC consistently failed to own up to its obligations due to the lack of resources from the central government. This has further worsened with the unending economic crisis which has depleted the HCC's sources of income (user-fees and taxes) because the rate-payers are also impoverished. These sour relations between the state and local authority have not only resulted in an under-resourced council but also patronage and corruption in HCC's operations and activities. This can be due to the lack of civic responsibility and transparency.

The analysis of the central-local relations showed disjointed interrelations between the central government and the HCC, the HCC and the citizens as well as the CSOs and the HCC. Literature reviewed and the data collected indicate that there are many continuities in the patterns of interaction between the state, HCC and CSOs in Harare and also Zimbabwe generally. The central government continues to dominate local issues whilst the HCC continues to rely on the provision of the central state administratively and financially, hence neglecting the needs of the citizens. The political variance and heterogeneity currently prevailing at the central and local level in the Harare metropolitan will continue to further the longstanding tensions between the three main actors in urban governance who are the central state, the local council and the CSOs.

Literature indicated that the success of citizen participation depended on the cordial relationship of the central state, local state and the civil society. However, the study established that the tense relations between the three actors have made the processes and forms of citizen participation indistinct, and citizen participation an unnecessary expense and a tool of anti-statism. The study also demonstrated that, though there are forms and mechanisms currently at

play to foster citizen participation in Harare, such as public hearings and elections (direct and indirect involvement), these platforms on the contrary were exclusionary instead of inclusionary. Most of the literature and data collected pointed to the over-politicisation of urban governance whereby party-politics no longer has boundaries.

Literature reviewed pointed out that the MLGRUD represents the central government and exercises exclusive power over the Harare City Council. This was also confirmed through the data collected from the study participants who mentioned the minister's directives and decisions in a number of issues.

Official legislative frameworks guiding urban government in Zimbabwe

Post-independent Zimbabwe did not dismantle totally the colonial system of local governance and its malcontents. The legislative provisions that are being used have been going through several amendments. In terms of legal frameworks, the study discovered that the UCA, RDCA and 2013 Constitution form the major statutes guiding the HCC and urban government in Zimbabwe. These frameworks confer citizen participation upon the local tiers of government. Though the Constitution is regarded as the supreme law of the country, the research found that the UCA, which gives the MLGRUD unwavering control over the HCC, continues to undermine Constitutional obligations that local activities must be shared and determined largely by the people and their elected leaders. The frameworks meant to guide urban governments are still in themselves contradictory. This is further worsened by the negligence by those in power to bring these statutes to a concord.

However, it emerged that most of the frameworks are used for manipulation mostly by the administrators as a way of benefiting their own interests and they are weak in catering for civic needs. The study established that there are numerous inconsistencies characterising the statutes governing Harare urban governance, which in turn have hampered the progressive flow of citizen participation processes.

Institutions (structures) facilitating citizen participation and service delivery in Harare

Citizen participation draws its strength from cordial relations between the different groups in society. The study indicated (in chapter 3) that citizen participation is promoted and coordinated by the HCC as the local authority as well as CSOs. These two actors theoretically should be in constant contact with each, with the CSOs playing an intermediary role between the state and the people. However, from the scholarly reviews and analysed data, there exist no strong relationships between the HCC and CSO (with reference to CHRA) institutions in

Harare. It emerged that this is as result of excessive central state intrusion in local issues, and political patronage. The constructive flow of relevant information continues to be blurred as the HCC together with the central state continue to view CSOs as threats to state legitimacy.

Chapter four and five also indicated that the mechanisms for citizen participation that exist in Harare (including elections and meetings) were to some extent exclusionary and under-resourced. In chapter three (literature) and chapter five (empirical), the study interrogated the capacity and social and political willingness of both HCC and CHRA and established they both lack resources and structures to properly initiate citizen participation and deliver services.

Factors enabling and disabling citizen participation in Harare

In seeking to analyse the enabling and disabling factors for citizen participation, the study discovered and established unusual patterns in urban governance in Zimbabwe. Potentially, the legislative framework plays a pivotal role in the success of citizen participation. These frameworks guard citizen participation as a right from violations and infringement by the administrators. However, the study established that the presence of good or legal statutes such as the Constitution does not guarantee the betterment of citizen participation. The study unearthed that the legal frameworks guiding urban governance and Zimbabwe were being overridden by power dynamics. Those who possess power are above the law such that citizen participation in Harare requires political will amongst those in power and also requires a knowledgeable populace in terms of the law and information.

The study established that citizen participation in Harare is curtailed by non-coordination and contrast between the supply-side and the demand-side. The supply side are the state actors who displayed lack of will to initiate citizen participation because of not trusting the citizens and the impact they can make. Some of the administrators were also not well qualified to carry out community engagements. The demand-side are the citizens who showed that they desired the outcomes of participation but were not knowledgeable enough to utilise the various process of citizen engagement. Thus this study established that citizen participation was being hindered not only by the incapacities of the state and the CSOs but also by the incapacity of the general public.

Social Capital and citizen participation in Harare metropolitan government

Chapter two of the study, which is the theoretical chapter, highlighted that citizen participation is dependent upon the social norms, social trust and social networks inherent in a community. Social capital theory highlighted the factors that are a prerequisite for urban citizen

participation. The theory pointed out the importance of trust-based and cordial interrelations between the state actors, CSOs and the citizens. It pointed out that political will is required for effective citizen participation such that administrators are willing to share power and decision making with the communities they run. The theory also highlighted that social norms and networks peculiar to a community affects the formation of group partnerships and this led the research into an analysis of the contextual factors driving urban governance in Zimbabwe.

The theory highlighted that the presence of social capital in a society is not in itself a guarantee for community development; rather, there is a need for 'linking social capital' that is politically relevant. This thereby explains why service delivery in Harare continues to degenerate, yet there are a number of both social and political groupings such as political parties.

Citizen participation and service delivery in metropolitan government in Zimbabwe since 2013

Citizen participation and service delivery in Zimbabwe since 2013 have not changed drastically. The study shows that the sour central local relations continue to hamper urban governance which in turn curtails an active citizenry. Due to political contestation at national level down to local levels, civic matters have been degenerated into political issues which inevitably has resulted in violence and brutality towards members of the public. Though legislative frameworks have been amended to cater for progressive civic involvement in governance issues, political unwillingness continues to be the main hindering factor.

The state, which has both power and the resources, needs to be willing to initiate citizen participation without any irregularities. There is also a need to safeguard urban governance from party-politics domination. The study establishes that successful citizen participation and good service delivery in the Harare metropolitan since 2013 has been hampered by the incessant sour relations between the state, HCC and civil society. These relations have in various ways paved way to practices that are anti-democratic which have inevitably disrupted the delivery of services. Capacitation of citizens concerning citizen participation is needed as much as the capacitation of the state and the civil societies. A reconciliatory process between the state, CSOs and the citizens is therefore required for effective citizen participation.

The study also established that active citizenry and service delivery are dependent upon each other. Citizen participation enhances services through sharing of information for constructive purposes and, at same time, the type of participation is determined by the service

outputs. The central-local tensions in Harare and other factors, as seen from this study, continue to stand in the way of successive citizen participation.

6.3 Limitations of the Study and Areas for Further Research

As a small localised study, this thesis did not cover the full breadth of urban government in Harare in its analysis of social capital and power dynamics in relation to citizen participation and service delivery. The research only focused on only one spatial site (Glenview), such that the study was not able to capture the sheer depth of the challenges or the diversity of challenges with regard to citizenship participation in Harare. Certainly, the citizens covered in this study are not representative of a defined universe (of even Glenview residents) and they live exclusively in one high-density low-income area. The situation in low-density, high-income areas of Harare might be very different. Plus, even for the Glenview study, there was no attempt to understand diversity in relation to gender, age and other factors.

In terms of future research, and based on a consideration of the existing literature on urban government in Zimbabwe, it is crucially important to pursue an analysis of citizenship participation with specific reference to gender. This is fundamental given that men often tend to dominate the public sphere of societies, while women become confined to the private sphere. In this context, it is hoped that this thesis will stimulate other researchers to undertake research in urban government, citizenship participation and service delivery in Zimbabwe with a deep sensitivity to the question of gender.

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Appendix 1

Rhodes University

Department of Sociology

Key informants Semi- Structured Interview Guide (CSOs)

Date

Name of Organization

Organizational Position of interviewee

Sample Interview Questions

1. Can you give an overview of your organisation' main objectives and its foundations.
2. Do you have any institutional and legal frameworks that bind and guide your organisation in fostering citizen participation in local council affairs?
3. Are these frameworks effective enough to enhance your contribution to Citizen participation and the delivery of services?
4. What are the major channels that you use to engage with the citizens and the municipal council?
5. How best can you describe your relationship with the municipal council in terms of your role of facilitating and advocating for civic engagement?
6. What are the major observable values or impacts achieved from civic participation in urban governance processes?
7. What are the major challenges that you encounter in facilitating collaboration and partnership between the citizens and the municipal council.
8. How best can citizen participation in urban governance processes (specifically this ward) be improved in order to positively impact on the services provided by the council?

Appendix 2

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Citizen participants Semi- Structured Interview Guide

Date
Ward and Density area
Age
Occupation

Sample interview questions

1. Can you tell me a brief background about yourself including your current occupation and family set up?
2. What first comes to your mind when you think of Harare City Council?
3. Do you know some of its major obligations and mandates? If yes, can you list them and how did you get to know of them?
4. In what ways can you say the council has been effective and responsive?
5. What is your understanding of citizen participation?
6. What are the major processes and mechanisms of citizen participation that you have encountered or participated in?
7. How frequent do you interact with other citizens through these channels?
8. Do you think your contribution to council affairs through these channels is significant enough to improve the services that the council provides?
9. How best can you describe your participation in council invited spaces and civil society organizations platforms
10. What major barriers to participation can you identify?
11. Do you think the current national and local environment is conducive for citizen participation?

Appendix 3

Rhodes University

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
Key informants Semi-structured interview guide (Council Officials)

Date
Name of Ward area
Name of Councilor
Year of appointment or election

Sample Interview Questions

1. What are the major institutional and legislative frameworks that have impacted citizen participation and service delivery in the Harare urban area and wards in particular?
2. What are the facilities and mechanisms that are available for you to engage with the citizens in this area?
3. Are there benefits from the participation of citizens in council affairs, if yes what are some of the benefits experienced so far?
4. What has been the role of CSOs in citizen participation and how best can you describe the relationship between the municipal council and the CSOs in advancing citizen participation?
5. What are the observable improvements in service delivery that are directly linked to citizen participation mechanisms?
6. What are the major challenges or obstacles that you have encountered in using the available mechanisms for citizen participation?
7. Are there any arrangements so far to address these challenges? Can you list them?
8. What do you think is the best way to address these challenges and improve the relationship between the citizens and the council?

Appendix 4



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Participant Consent form (Interviews)

Name of researcher: Tafadzwa Sachikonye

Description of the research topic: The research focuses on citizen participation in Metropolitan governance in Zimbabwe: The case of Harare Since 2013.

Declaration

1. I confirm that the purpose of the research and the nature of my participation have been explained to me verbally or in writing.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason - however I commit myself to full participation unless some unusual circumstances occur, or I have concerns about my participation which I did not originally anticipate.
3. I understand that data collected during the study, will be used by the researcher and that my personal details gathered during this research, especially my name or identity, will be kept private.
4. I agree to be interviewed and to allow audio or video recordings and transcriptions to be made of the interview.
5. I have been informed by the researcher that the tape recordings will be erased once the report is written.

Signature of participant:

Signature of the researcher:

Date: