

# **EVALUATING LIBERAL AND HYBRID APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING: THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE**

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Political and International Studies.

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## **Abstract**

This thesis explores liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding and their decisiveness in building sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. Contemporary peacebuilding interventions have been dominated by liberal peacebuilding, also known as liberal state-building. Post-conflict states have been transforming to replicate liberal states due to assumptions of liberal states being more peaceful and less likely to fall into conflict again than non-liberal states. There is growing criticism regarding the effectiveness of this approach as its initiatives have not always translated to sustainable peace. This failure is attributed to its minimal inclusion or exclusion of local actors in the peacebuilding process as well as its application of standardised approaches in complex contexts. In response to these shortfalls, international peacebuilding scholars propose an alternative approach that would combine the liberal and the local to produce a hybrid peace, which is inclusive and context-specific. This thesis tests the decisiveness of these approaches by examining the successful peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone. It then concludes that the peacebuilding interventions of Sierra Leone demonstrate how liberal peacebuilding initiatives have little or limited success when conducted without the inclusion of local actors. However, when local actors are included in the peace-building process to make meaningful contributions (hybrid peacebuilding), peacebuilding initiatives can have a much larger impact on society.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACRM	Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement
APC	All People's Congress
CACD	Community Arms Collection and Destruction
CDF	Civil Defence Force
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DWP	Defence White Paper
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IBL	Institutionalisation before Liberalisation
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IMATT	International Military Assistance Training Team
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
NCSL	National Council of Sierra Leone
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPF	National Patriotic Front
NPL	National People's Party

NRC	National Reformation Council
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRIO	Peace Research Institute of Oslo
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SCSL	Special Court of Sierra Leone
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

*“One of the biggest issues facing the world today is the increasingly pervasive problem of civil conflict. As a result, developing strategies to resolve this violence has been a matter of considerable debate among policymakers, students and scholars” (Paris, 1997:54).*

Indeed, the resolution of violent conflicts has been one of the biggest challenges to Africa and the rest of the world. Although there have been several peace operations, there are still several African states riddled with conflict. The first major peacekeeping mission was launched in 1956 by the United Nations (UN) after Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal (Hanhimaki, 2008:4). Britain, France and Israel responded to the action by invading Egypt and the United Nations Emergency Forces deployed to keep the peace and oversee the exit of these states from Egypt (Hanhimaki, 2008:4; Paris, 2004:13).

During this period, it was more common to encounter wars between states than within the state, thus UN peace operations were highly state-centric and ignored non-state actor issues. This was known as the first generation of peacekeeping missions (Hanhimaki, 2008:4). Over the years however, the nature of wars and violent conflict has changed for example, there are now more wars within the state than wars between states. These wars are not just fought over territory as in the past but also over things such as governance, information technology or economic reasons (Kaldor, 2012:205). Moreover, later UN peacekeeping missions in places such as Rwanda and Somalia made it apparent to the UN that securing sustainable peace required more than deploying peacekeepers between conflicting parties (Hirschmann, 2012:170). A conducive environment to ensure the state does not relapse into conflict was necessary.

The solution to this challenge was to introduce peacebuilding operations to support UN peacekeeping efforts. Peacebuilding today is defined by the UN as “efforts used to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace and to reduce a country’s risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (United Nations, 2023). Although only officially mentioned and defined differently by the UN in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace Report*, peacebuilding had existed long before this (United Nations, 1992).

The concept first emerged in the works of Johan Galtung (1976) and there is proof of peacebuilding shortly after the Second World War when the Western Allies engaged in peacebuilding (McKoy, 2021:32). Since both Germany and Japan War had been defeated, The Allies built peace by constructing democratic institutions, demobilising the military and providing economic and humanitarian assistance to both states (McKoy, 2021:32). Today, both countries are politically stable nations with strong economies and hailed as successful peacebuilding projects (Dobbins, 2003:xiii).

The approach used here was a top-down approach which assumes that building effective liberal political, security and economic institutions, will lead to sustainable peace (Eriksen, 2009:653). Top-down approaches are centred around Doyle's (1983) liberal peace doctrine, which means the underlying assumption of implementing these reforms is due to the argument that liberal states do not go to war that often as they are stable within and economically interdependent with other liberal states. It is for this reason that the approach has come to be known as liberal peacebuilding and has dominated contemporary peacebuilding approaches (Anam, 2018:38).

However, with the consistent rise in intrastate conflicts over the years, the effectiveness of this approach to peacebuilding has been called into question (Hirschmann, 2012:170). One side contends for the abovementioned state-centred approach and argues that it is still the best way to achieve sustainable peace (Eriksen, 2009:653). Furthermore, liberal peacebuilding elements such as security, democratic governance and marketisation led to the improvement of people's lives (Mac Ginty, 2010:394).

Critics of the liberal approach argue that although constructing or strengthening state institutions is important, peacebuilding must also include community-based conflict resolution strategies - something which the liberal approach is criticised for lacking (Philipsen, 2014:45). Mac Ginty (2010:395) contends that liberal peacebuilding uses state building as its primary vehicle of implementing reforms which promote an artificial western-style governance and election processes. As a result, it produces artificial norms and institutions which are completely disconnected from the local populations.

Secondly, due to the liberal peacebuilding process having often excluded the voices of local actors, the legitimacy of the approach has also come into question with scholars like Chandler (2006) contending liberal peacebuilding is an imposition of foreign norms, institutions and standards upon a non-Western people. This critique is reinforced by Belloni (2012) who contends that the local actors in post-conflict states experience liberal peacebuilding as illegitimate, coercive and accountable only to national actors. Therefore, despite dominating contemporary peacebuilding initiatives, liberal peacebuilding has not been effective in building sustainable peace in some post-conflict societies.

However, an alternative approach which rectifies some of the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding for example, the exclusion of local actors from the peace-building process, an artificial peace that lacks legitimacy and does not always translate to sustainable peace and the centralisation of power has been identified by critics of liberal interventions (Anam, 2018:38; Mac Ginty 2010:395). This new approach is known as hybrid peacebuilding, and it is carried out through an interaction between the top-down approach actors or strategies and indigenous/bottom-up strategies. The result of this hybrid approach is a hybrid peace that is inclusive of the voices of the local actors- resulting in a deeper understanding of the context of the conflict, legitimatise the peacebuilding process and allowing the local community to shape their peace in a way in which they prefer (Philipsen, 2014:45; Richmond, 2009:331).

This thesis will evaluate the impact of the liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding implemented in Sierra Leone after the 1991-2002 civil war. It contends that the liberal approach, although successful in reshaping the country's political, economic, justice and security sectors towards peace, this success was limited. These limitations can be attributed to its state-centric nature, standardised approaches and the lack of substantial involvement of local actors in the peacebuilding process. In contrast, hybrid interventions which acknowledge the diversity of actors, draw from local values and leaders and aim to provide context-specific solutions for sustainable peace, achieved greater success. This will be demonstrated by examining the liberal and hybrid interventions implemented in the above-mentioned sectors after the 1991-2002 civil war.

## **2. RESEARCH QUESTION**

It is against this background that this thesis asks: Which approach provides the conditions necessary for sustainable peace? This research project intends to answer this question by evaluating the successful peacebuilding project of Sierra Leone. It will evaluate the interventions in Sierra Leone's successful peacebuilding experience to investigate whether liberal or hybrid interventions were decisive. This will be done by first exploring the liberal reforms implemented in Sierra Leone. These are reforms implemented in the political, economic, justice and security sectors and their respective impact on building sustainable peace. Lastly, I will explore the interactions between the formal and informal institutions in these sectors and their impact on building a sustainable hybrid peace.

## **3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY**

Conflict remains a big problem in Africa for example, in 2022, the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) recorded more than 30 intrastate conflicts in Africa with fifteen of them being over territories (PRIO, 2022:1). In addition, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) recorded over 216 000 incidents of violent conflict in 2019, which was a 38% increase from 2018 (ISS, 2020:1). In Burkina Faso alone, over 750 000 people were displaced due to violent conflicts in 2019. Globally, civil wars with over 1,000 battle deaths declined by 72% from the period of 1990-2003 but this soon changed as we saw over 90 000 deaths due to violent conflict between 2011 and 2017 (von Einsiedel, 2017:2). Consequentially, the continent has been subject to several peace operations for example, between 2000 and 2013, there were over 50 peace operations deployed in Africa (Hirschmann, 2012:170). Studying which conditions are conducive to building sustainable peace makes this study a valuable resource to African policymakers responsible for such reforms, especially in states plagued by intrastate wars.

Sierra Leone is a unique case study because after having undergone several liberal reforms in its political, economic and security sectors, which Tom (2017:192) terms an 'impersonal' system, we begin to see an interaction between the indigenous actors and institutions and the liberal institutions. This leads to a process in which these liberal processes begin to intertwine with the indigenous peacebuilding processes and end up producing a hybrid peace. Since this thesis seeks to evaluate both liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding, this makes Sierra

Leone an ideal case study in examining both the liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding.

Secondly, sustainability is an important part in determining the efficiency of a peacebuilding approach and Sierra Leone offers us a period of more than 2 decades to explore and analyse the impact of the liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding. This is because Sierra Leone has been at peace since 2002, which is more than 21 years (Hirsch, 2001:158). Among African countries such as Mozambique, Namibia and Liberia, Sierra Leone is one of the few states to have undergone successful peacebuilding therefore, Sierra Leone is a useful case to fully explore and analyse the impact of the liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding.

Thirdly, this thesis contributes to the existing debates about contemporary peacebuilding approaches and their effectiveness amidst the rise of wars and intrastate conflicts in Africa (von Einsiedel, 2017:2; Tadjbakhsh, 2010:116). In the thesis, I evaluate the liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and their implications. In doing so, the study also explores the current critique levelled against the liberal approach as well as alternative approaches to building peace (Richmond, 2009:325). Lastly, this study contributes to the limited literature on hybrid approaches and hybrid peace which will prove useful for future studies on hybrid approaches to peacebuilding.

#### **4. RESEARCH DESIGN**

This thesis uses a single case study and process tracing methods to investigate the research question. The study will evaluate the liberal and hybrid peacebuilding processes implemented in Sierra Leone to assess which approach was decisive in sustainable peace.

Creswell (2003) defines case study research methods as ' a researcher exploring a program, event, activity, process or one or more individuals, in a manner which is in-depth'. This is because case studies enable the researcher to zoom in on specific cases thus you can obtain detailed and relevant information from the specific context which improves the chances for the researcher to produce a more detailed analysis (Cronin, 2014:21). Case studies can also either be a single case or multiple cases and its data can consist of interviews, participant observations, books, journal articles, archival records, physical artefacts or audio-visual

materials among other data (Williams, 2007:68). Therefore, case study research methods are legitimate for both qualitative and quantitative research.

As previously mentioned, this study will be using a single case study. Single case studies research is the more appropriate method when a study seeks to confirm a theory (Gustafsson, 2017:11). It enables the researcher to have a far deeper understanding of the subject that they are studying, which is not always the case with multiple case-study research. As a result, the researcher can describe the theory or social phenomenon in greater detail.

As this thesis seeks to confirm which approach to peacebuilding better explains the successful peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, a single case study is very useful. It will assist in explaining and evaluating the peacebuilding approaches in Sierra Leone in greater detail. In doing so the reader will be provided with a holistic view of the peacebuilding project in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, because hybrid peacebuilding is not a common approach to peacebuilding in the world, the single case study allows us to investigate the approach more closely and thus be able to describe it (Gustafsson, 2017:11). This will enable the reader to have a deeper understanding of peacebuilding and approaches to peacebuilding.

Lastly, Yin (2009:4) contends that case study research methods enable us to understand a variety of complex social phenomena in the world. The researcher can study units which consist of several variables which are equally important. This allows the researcher to acquire a holistic view of the phenomena. A peacebuilding process can also be seen as such a phenomenon as it consists of various variables. Each of these plays a very important role in determining the success of the peacebuilding process, for example, international organisations, local governments, indigenous institutions and civil society among others (Haugerudbraaten, 1998:19).

The thesis also makes use of process tracing which is defined as the 'tracing of causal mechanisms' (Beach and Pedersen, 2012:1). Causal mechanisms are complex systems which produce a certain outcome as a result of the interaction between several parts for example, in this thesis a causal mechanism is sustainable peace and this is the result of an interaction between several parts in the peace process (Beach and Pedersen, 2012:1).

There are three research situations where process-tracing methods can be used and this results in three different variants of process-tracing - theory testing, theory building and explaining outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2012:11). This study makes use of the theory-testing process method which operates through hypothesizing a causal mechanism to be present in the case study. This thesis hypothesises that the hybrid approach is a more appropriate explanation for Sierra Leone's successful peacebuilding process than the liberal approach. To test the validity of this hypothesis, I will evaluate the peacebuilding reforms implemented in Sierra Leone and their impact. From this, I will know which approach led to a successful peacebuilding process (Beach and Pedersen, 2012:11).

Lastly, the thesis utilises secondary data- books, journal articles, reports, newspaper articles and national policies. There are three important areas of literature for this study: (1) the major theorists of liberal and hybrid peacebuilding (Doyle, 2005; Paris, 2004, 2010; Tom, 2017, Wallis, 2018; Richmond, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016 and Mac Ginty, 2010, 2013); (2) the history, politics, economics, society of Sierra Leone, with an emphasis on the civil war and peacebuilding periods (Karbo, 2011); (3) the wider literature on, and case studies of, peacebuilding in Africa.

## **5. THESIS OVERVIEW**

This thesis consists of four chapters. The introductory chapter has provided a brief explanation of the historical background of peacebuilding and the research design of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and debates around peacebuilding approaches. Chapter 3 provides a historical background of the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2001). The chapter also discusses the several attempts at building peace during this period as well as their outcomes. Chapter 4 analyses the empirical evidence of the peacebuilding approaches used in Sierra Leone and their effectiveness. Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. This will entail a summary of the findings of the study as well as recommendations for future studies.

# CHAPTER 2: FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING

## Introduction

Peacekeeping operations have become a vital part of the functioning of international society, to the point where they have now become one of the main regulating institutions of international relations (Hatto, 2013:495). The United Nations (UN) has always been a key actor in these operations. Over the years we have witnessed significant transformation in UN peacekeeping operations for example, the UN has gone from strict peacekeeping to including peace-making and peacebuilding in its repertoire (Paris, 2004:13; Hatto, 2013:495). This chapter will provide an overview of the literature on peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding approaches. Regarding the former, it will demonstrate the abovementioned transformation in greater detail and reveal how peacebuilding came to be included in UN peacekeeping operations.

In terms of the latter, the chapter will demonstrate that contemporary peacebuilding has been dominated by a liberal approach centred around liberal values such as democratisation, marketisation and security. The approach has not always translated into sustainable peacebuilding, and this has been attributed to a lack of inclusiveness, failed policies and standardised approaches to very complex post-conflict contexts (Richmond, 2009:26). In response to the failures of the liberal approach, a new hybrid approach has been introduced which is centred around combining the liberal values with local values to provide a hybrid peace which is inclusive and context-specific. However, the hybrid approach has been critiqued for being too unpredictable and not maintaining human rights standards at times.

Ultimately, there is a deadlock between the two approaches. This study seeks to evaluate this dispute by analysing Sierra Leone's successful peacebuilding process after its 1991-2002 civil war.

### 2.1.1 History of Peacekeeping Operations:

Peacekeeping operations were developed in the 1950s as part of what is known as preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping (Hatto, 2013:502). During this period, peacekeeping was defined

on strategic and tactical levels. On the strategic level, peacekeeping referred to the maintenance and restoration of dignity to those who were facing external threats or internal collapse (Hatto, 2013:498). On the tactical level, peacekeeping refers to the deployment of uniformed staff such as soldiers and police officers by the United Nations to assist in preventing, containment and resolving conflict between disputing states or parties (Hatto, 2013:498).

UN peacekeeping operations have evolved a great deal in their purpose and complexity over the years and as previously mentioned, these operations now include peace making and peacebuilding (Hanhimaki, 2008:6). To assist in explaining this evolution, United Nations analysts have divided the organisation's operations over the years into three categories, which are also known as generations. This is not to imply however, that there has been a clear chronological progression of operations, as there has been a parallel existence of several types of operations and several generations of peacekeeping at certain times, however, it will assist in answering the question of how peacebuilding came to be involved in UN peacekeeping operations (Hanhimaki, 2008:6).

For this study, I will only be discussing the first and second generations to demonstrate how peacebuilding came to be included in UN peacekeeping operations.

### **2.1.2. First Generation Approaches**

The first generation of approaches to peacekeeping was common throughout the Cold War. The UN kept the peace through the intervention of a neutral third party (usually the United Nations), who acted as a barrier between the two disputing parties (Richmond, 2010:17). This party, with the consent of the disputing parties, monitored the ceasefire agreements agreed upon by the disputing parties (Richmond, 2002:45). The peacekeeper was not allowed to use force except for self-defence and as a last resort. A commonly used example of this generation of approaches is the Suez-Canal crisis when Egypt was invaded by Britain, France and Israel. With the consent of all involved parties, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed officers along the Egypt-Israel border and oversaw the departure of all the foreign armed forces from Egypt (Paris, 2004:14).

### **2.1.3. Second Generation Approaches**

When the Cold War ended there was a dramatic shift from the previous or classic approaches to peacekeeping (Richmond, 2002:45). During this period, the world underwent a significant transition and the same can be said of UN peacekeeping operations. There was now an emphasis on establishing peace at a communal level and in spaces where the central authority might perhaps not be functioning properly, or its legitimacy and authority are under question (Jeong, 2002:62).

The lines between police, civilian and military operations were significantly blurred, and it was evident that the UN was now operating in a different environment (Jeong, 2002:62). This called for a change of strategies. Whereas the previous approach monitored ceasefires, the new approach also focused on expanding the capacity of national governments through assistance with economic, political and security reconstruction (Richmond, 2002:45). Therefore, it was about building the necessary conditions needed to maintain peace and it is for this reason that it is called peacebuilding.

### **2.1.4. Peacebuilding**

In 1992, ‘peacebuilding’ entered the UN lexicon. The Secretary-General of the time, Boutros-Ghali in the *Agenda for Peace* Report (1992), argued that for peace-making and peacekeeping operations to be successful, they needed to include efforts that identify and support structures that foster peace and a feeling of confidence and well-being between people. This practice came to be known as peacebuilding and was formally defined as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” (United Nations, 1992:15). The United Nations in the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* Report (1995:12) declared that the implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding was a complex and challenging endeavour. As a result, the Report expanded on several of the peacebuilding tasks mentioned in the 1992 Report (United Nations, 1995:12).

The first are military tasks which include the supervision of ceasefires, disarmament and the destruction of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons (Karns, 2012:63; United Nations, 1995:13). The purpose of the military tasks is to support the peacekeeping structures that were put in place before peacebuilding. The second task includes humanitarian relief efforts such as assisting with the return and resettlement of refugees and persons displaced by conflict by providing them with things such as food, water, shelter and other forms of humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 1995:17).

Thirdly, there are administrative tasks, and these involve the peacebuilders supervising the existing government structures or facilitating the creation of a transitional governing administration. This can also involve the establishment of a new police force or the strengthening of the current one (United Nations, 1995:6; Karns, 2012:63). Lastly, there are tasks related to the democratization of the state. This dimension involves the building and supervision of new branches of the state, for example, legislature, executive and judiciary. In rebuilding these institutions, peacebuilders prioritise the promotion and protection of human rights (United Nations, 1995:6).

Contemporary peacebuilding operations are therefore very complex, and multidimensional and are further complicated by things such as the nature of the conflict situation, the local context and variation in dynamics as well as the consensus and political will of those leading and authorising the operation (Eriksen, 2009:661; Karns, 2012:62).

### **2.1.5 Peacebuilding Debates**

Although the term entered the UN's lexicon in 1992, peacebuilding is not new in both scholarship and practice. Peacebuilding originated from the scholarly works of Johan Galtung (1976). Galtung (1976:2) argued that peace was not simply the absence of war. That is simply a negative peace for example, when a ceasefire has been established, there is usually a decline in violence between disputing parties. This reduction of violence is good however, this form of peace has its shortcomings; It has a short-term perspective that views the elimination of physical violence as a display of successful peacebuilding. Therefore, it undermines efforts to

bring about a broader form of peace and can potentially lead to a continuation of structural violence (Bah and Emmanuel 2020:300).

Peacebuilding must involve the pursuit of social justice through addressing non-war related social issues such as the provision of services, equal opportunity, development, fair distribution of resources and other issues (Bereketeab, 2021:37; Chentail and Jutersonka, 2014:1). This is known as positive peace and goes a step further than negative peace because whereas the former emphasises absence of war, positive peace involves creating the sufficient and necessary conditions for functional and sustainable peace and peacebuilding (Bereketeab, 2001:37). Galtung (1976) described peacebuilding as a method of preventing violence through addressing socio-economic issues such as poverty, political repression and the uneven distribution of resources. Due to this perspective, the objective of peacebuilding was assumed to be the transformation of a population from a condition of extreme vulnerability or dependency to being self-sufficient or put differently, positive peace (Sheperd, 2017:3).

Regarding its practical function, from the 48 peacekeeping operations that the United Nations carried out between 1988 and 2008, 29 of these operations are now deemed to have been peacebuilding operations (Karns, 2012:62). The reconstruction of the German and Japanese states after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War are some of the noteworthy examples of early attempts at peacebuilding (Dobbins, 2003:xiii). It is simply because the term 'peacebuilding' had not yet been coined at the time, that these operations were labelled peacekeeping operations. Moreover, it was not until the United Nations Transition Assistance Group's (UNTAG) operation in Namibia, the conflicts in Central America and the United Nations' ambitious role in Cambodia that the concept of peacebuilding emerged as a recognised concept by the United Nations (Bah and Emmanuel, 2020:302; Karns, 2012:64-71).

However, in reading the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace Report* by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Ryan (2013:27) contends that the Report has very little to say regarding what peacebuilding is exactly. Only five paragraphs in the report have been dedicated to the concept which is vaguely defined as 'actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict'. The Report goes on further to identify peacebuilding scenarios such as civil strife, in which it proposes solutions such as

the disarmament of the previously disputing parties as well as the restoration of law and order to name a few (Ryan, 2013:27). Additionally, the international conflict between states scenario in which the report suggests the establishment of 'concrete cooperative projects' which assist in placing warring states in a mutually beneficial position to make war less attractive or viable.

A result of this shortfall has been the emergence of several definitions of what peacebuilding is or ought to be. For Barnett (2007:36) peacebuilding is defined as “external interventions to prevent the eruption of or the return to armed conflict”. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1997) however, argues that peacebuilding focuses on providing long-term support as well as the establishment of viable political and socioeconomic cultural institutions that can address the core reasons for conflicts and other initiatives that seek to create a peaceful and stable environment (OECD, 1997:10). Such activities also have the objective of promoting the integration of previously competing or marginalised groups within the society and this is to be done through providing them with the necessary access to political decision-making, the state's economic resources, information and its social networks.

Murithi (2009) on the other hand, explains peacebuilding as the process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society which has just emerged from conflict. Therefore, at a most basic level, peacebuilding involves addressing the main causes of conflict as well as creating an environment for the disputing parties to find the necessary solutions through non-violent methods such as negotiation and mediation. Additionally, the process is also based on overseeing the process of demobilisation, disarmament and the reintegration of former combatants and needs the promotion of social and economic justice within the state accompanied by legislative and executive reforms (Murithi, 2009:3).

Scholars like Mac Ginty (2014:553) who favour community-based conflict resolution strategies, argue that peace is built through practices and norms that are used by individuals or communities in divided societies as a means of avoiding and minimising conflict. The methods are universal as they are present in every human community. They are especially significant in deeply divided societies that are on the verge of conflict as they can assist in

creating a more peaceful environment, for example disputing parties reporting their dispute to the locals (Mac Ginty, 2014:553).

Others emphasise the promotion of a just civil society toward building peace (Verkoren and van Leeuwen, 2013:161). In other words, there must be an appropriate social environment that will allow identity groups to be able to express their needs and grievances in a more constructive manner (Barnes, 2009:133). Unless this can be guaranteed, then sustainable peace will not be possible. Peacebuilding, therefore, is a long-term preventive strategy which seeks to address the primary causes of conflict.

What is clear is that there are several ways of defining peacebuilding and because of this, there are even further divisions and debates regarding the appropriate approach to peacebuilding (Barnett and Kim et al, 2007:36). Therefore, while peacebuilding might include rebuilding and mending of broken relationships between disputing communities and groups, the promotion of access to institutions of government, the building of strong institutions and looking for peaceful resolutions to issues, there are still debates regarding which approach to take in implementing these objectives (Bau, 2016:349). These approaches can be organised under top-down and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding.

### **2.1.6. Top-Down Approaches: Liberal Peacebuilding**

The top-down approach has dominated contemporary peacebuilding approaches since after the Cold War. It is concerned with state building, specifically, the construction of a liberal state through building and empowering liberal institutions in post-conflict states (Eriksen, 2009:653). This is expected to create liberal peace and stability at the national level of society, which will trickle down to the local population. It is for this reason that this approach has often been termed top-down and ‘liberal peacebuilding’ (Tom, 2017:3). The main areas of building and empowering are the political, economic and security sectors and it is based on the liberal peace doctrine.

This section will discuss the liberal peace doctrine, how it was infused into peacebuilding and what liberal peacebuilding is practically speaking.

### **2.1.6.1 Liberal Peace Doctrine**

The term 'liberal peace' was coined by Michael Doyle in 1983. Doyle (1983), upon analysing interstate wars that dated back to 1816, concluded that no liberal democracy had ever waged war against another liberal democracy. This finding was very significant to academics and Western policymakers as they later contended that democratic rule leads to a more peaceful state and world.

The liberal peace theory was based on several assumptions. Firstly, Doyle (2005) argues that democratic governments can create accountable relationships between the state and its citizens through democratic representation. This is different from monarchs and dictatorships which will often infuse their interests into public policy and the cost of this being paid by the public. Democratic representation provides republican caution or as Kant (1970) termed it, 'hesitation instead of autocratic caprice'. This is because it allows for a rotation of elites and as a result, there is always an opportunity to reverse unsuccessful policies because ineffective administrations could be voted out by the public (Buchan, 2002:408).

The legislature and public opinion also restrain the legislative branch of government from creating policies that can violate the fundamental interests of the democratic society. Moreover, effectively representing the interests of the voters and being transparent enables these governments to attract foreign direct investments as it displays a commitment to the democratic project and therefore, these states are less likely to find themselves in wars (Doyle, 2005:464).

Secondly, the adoption of liberal principles brings respect and influence to the international system (Doyle, 2005: 464). These norms emphasise freedom and the attribution of other rights and liberties to all individuals. Linking these principles and norms requires transparency. On the domestic level, this will assist in making sure that the government or state acts in line with these principles, for example, representing the interests of the people and not their own. On the international level, the principle of free speech as well as effective communication regarding accurately conceptualising the political lives of foreign peoples is important in establishing and preserving the foundation on which respect is built (Doyle, 2005:464).

These principles guide the policies of liberal states when they deal with other liberal states as well as non-liberal states for example, there are often good and friendly relations between liberal states whereas dealings with non-liberal states are often marred by elements of distrust on both sides (Owen, 1994:87; Doyle, 2012:59). Liberal states believe non-liberal states, are not righteous or just states and because of this, these states are viewed as being in a constant state of aggression with their population and that their foreign relations are highly questionable.

Lastly, material incentives can sustain commitments between liberal states for example, economic opportunities, which often rely on interdependence between states, are widespread and every country wants to benefit. As a result, liberal states pursue peace and try to avoid war (Doyle, 2012:59). Liberal states believe they are better off working together than having to fend for themselves in the international systems and as a result, relationships are held in high regard and states try to avoid creating policies or pursuing interests which could make their economic state-partner sever their relationship (Copeland, 1996:5).

Overall, Doyle (2012) contends that because of their structure and nature, liberal states can maintain sustainable peace within the state and in their relations with other liberal states.

#### **2.1.6.2. How Does Liberal Peace Theory Become Infused into Peacebuilding?**

The question of how the liberal peace theory was infused into peacebuilding, can be traced to the period after the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, proponents of liberalism as a conflict resolution technique, such as Michael Doyle (1990) argued that liberal peace was an appropriate method to transform the domestic conditions of states into something which resembles liberal values so that they may avoid civil wars and other conflicts. This idea was reinforced by the 'liberal moment' that occurred after the Cold War when the Soviet Union fell and liberal democracy became the main form of governance (Ryan, 2013:26).

The period after the Cold War was also a period where the world was regularly confronted with images and reports detailing the horrors of war such as the famines in Ethiopia to the genocide in Rwanda (Howard, 2007:28). It was clear that something needed to be done to end the violence and despite the causes of the wars being as a result of several factors, there was

an attempt by liberal policymakers to apply the foundational principles of the 'liberal peace' doctrine to peacebuilding (Miklian, 2014:494). There was a hope that mass democratisation of states could lead to a more peaceful international system as democracies do not go to war against each other.

Later, lawmakers also jumped on the bandwagon and supported the validity of infusing liberal values and principles into peacebuilding and having a peace-building process that seeks to change the domestic conditions and structure of the post-conflict state in a liberal manner (Randazzo, 2017:24). The most prominent of lawmakers to accept the challenge were Bill Clinton in the United States of America and Tony Blair in the United Kingdom (Miklian, 2014:495). This was around the same time that the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, presented to the world, the beginning of a new peacebuilding paradigm with the *An Agenda for Peace Report* (United Nations, 1992).

Ultimately, it became easy for policymakers to make use of the liberal peace doctrine as a firm foundation for how they respond to conflict as well as post-conflict situations in the international system. How this looked in terms of policy, was that liberal peace policies were based on three important assumptions: firstly, there was the assumption that democratic states always engaged peacefully with one another (Miklian, 2014:495). Secondly, that economic as well as trade liberalisation encouraged democratic norms and because democracies do not wage war against one another, this meant it would translate to peace. Lastly, it was the responsibility of developed states to assist the less developed or vulnerable states to achieve these goals. It is the last assumption that was most prominent as it was the primary motivation behind why some of the great powers, as well as international actors such as the UN, International Non-Governmental Organisations and single states, conducted peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s (Miklian, 2014:494).

A question that remained, however, was what were the necessary elements in the construction of this liberal state that could lead to liberal peace? The scholarship of Roland Paris (2004) becomes extremely helpful in answering this question.

### **2.1.6.3. Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation**

Paris (2004) proposed *Institutionalisation before Liberalisation* (IBL). The central argument here is that peacebuilders ought to concentrate on the construction of frameworks for effective

institutions before promoting political and economic competition in the post-war state (Paris, 2004:187). What is necessary in the post-conflict society is not a democratic frenzy or political upheaval. Instead, what is needed is political stability and the establishment of an effective administration over the given territory. It is only when a working government authority has been re-established, that peacebuilders should facilitate a variety of gradual democratic and market-oriented reforms (Paris, 2004:188). In other words, peacebuilders are to delay liberalisation and limit the political and economic reforms in the short term to create the necessary conditions for a smooth and peaceful transition to market democracy and sustainable peace in the long term (Paris, 2004:188).

Paris (2004:205) goes further to describe several institutional elements that peacebuilders could construct before the launching of comprehensive political and economic liberalisation programmes in post-conflict states. These elements can be organised in terms of political economic and security reforms. They are presented as being systematic and working together in harmony toward achieving peace when the state becomes a liberal democracy (Paris, 2004:205).

#### **2.1.6.4. Security Sector Reforms**

In terms of security sector reform, Jackson (2011:1804) defines the security sector as being “all the organisations which have the authority to use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures which are responsible for their management and oversight”. What this means is that part of the reasons for reforming the state’s security sector is to enable it to protect the state from future conflicts and threats. The state security sector can be reformed in several ways.

Firstly, such reforms can include a strengthening of the military and police’s peacetime capacity and creating clear mechanisms for justice and accountability within the society (Andersen, 2011:12; Paris, 2004:187; Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005:7; Sedra, 2017:60). Practically, this consists of the deployment of law enforcement officers such as soldiers and police and several other efforts which seek to restore the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Additionally, the re-establishment of the rule of law, strengthening of respect for human rights, and fostering the establishment and strengthening of legitimate and effective institutions of governance (Andersen, 2011:12). Other strategies also included demobilising

and reintegrating former combatants into civilian life or the new defence forces (Ottaway, 2002:1006).

Lastly, there are Disarmament, demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. These programmes have three unique yet overlapping components for example, the objective of disarmament is to collect and dispose of a variety of weapons through its development of arms management programmes (Dyck, 2011:398). Demobilisation on the other hand, attempts to discharge combatants from their roles and this is often supported by aid to assist in reinserting them into their various communities for example, housing them in DDR camps (Dyck, 2011: 399). Lastly, integration involves the transformation from military to civilian whereby former combatants become active participants in the economic and social lives of their respective communities.

#### **2.1.6.5. Political Sector Reforms**

On the political front, peacebuilders have in the past sponsored elections in post-conflict states to facilitate the peaceful management of conflict through competition at the ballot box instead of more violence (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1161). However, these elections are not always successful in building peace as the competition is not always peaceful nor does the process produce governments which can resolve disputes through mediation or negotiation or preserving the democratic system. If the elected parties end up undermining the institutions that brought them into power, the elections may not be able to provide a stable democracy. Furthermore, should the election campaigns consist of hateful and divisive rhetoric to gain support, the elections could end up renewing the very conflicts they were supposed to have reduced (Paris: 2004:189). Therefore, the engineers of electoral systems need to encourage moderate centrist types of political competition, instead of the polarizing extremes which often lead to further divisions (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1163).

Secondly, the political dimension of liberal peacebuilding emphasises the role that needs to be played by civil society in the security functions of the state (Sedra, 2017:60). Entities and organisations such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private entities, the independent media and advocacy groups among others, play a key role in monitoring the government and holding it accountable to the citizens. The development of civil society organisations can lead to several outcomes, depending on the nature of that organisation

(Ottaway, 2002:1007). Overall, Ottaway (2002) contends that civil society organisations help assist with the breaking down of social barriers between the former disputing parties and communities in the post-conflict state.

Lastly, there is free media and accountability. This is vital to a well-functioning democracy (United Nations, 2018:1). Peacebuilders ought to promote the development of free media and it must be one of the main goals of the peacebuilding process. This can be done through pursuing a two-track media policy. The first track of this policy included the development of responsible media houses as well as making provisions to ensure the spreading of accurate and reliable news and information to the population (Paris, 2004:196). The second track includes the regulation of the activities of media houses which do the opposite of those in track 1 for example, incite violence and hatred against specific groups or communities within the society. In the past, the United Nations has been able to actively pursue the first track for example, with the establishment of Radio UNTAC in Cambodia (United Nations, 1993:1). Radio UNTAC was responsible for transmitting a mixed format of news and entertainment content to the population and became central in providing a platform for contesting political parties to explain and defend their policies.

#### **2.1.6.6. Economic Reforms**

Regarding economic institutions, this will entail economic relief (Ottaway, 2002:1007). Once stability has been established, peacebuilders can initiate economic reforms. These can include initiatives such as currency stabilisation, encouragement of a bigger role for the private sector, less expenditure, and improved tax revenue collection. This is done to resume the provision of basic goods and services and to address economic imbalances in society (Haughton, 2002:241; Ottaway, 2002:1006). It is also important to adopt conflict-reducing economic policies. Paris (2004) argued that despite structural adjustment programs being able to create economic growth in the long term, their short-term impacts are not beneficial. This is because these policies will often lead to certain groups having to lower their standard of living and impact the overall distribution of wealth in a negative manner (Thompson, 2017:3).

Overall, what the scholars are arguing is that the promotion of democratisation and marketisation in environments that are institutionally weak and at risk of conflict is a risky

and unreliable approach to peacebuilding (Paris, 2004:199). This is because democracy and free-market systems will not organise the society into a liberal state on its own. There is a need for strong public institutions first as they will be able to uphold the rules, maintain order in the state, resolve disputes fairly and eliminate behaviour which is not in line with liberalisation.

Liberal peacebuilding, therefore, is viewed as a very broad solution that addresses the causes of war as well as development through the re-engineering of the post-conflict society into a liberal society (Mac Ginty, 2008:146). However, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that neoliberal peacebuilding is not effective in building sustainable peace (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019:699; Mac Ginty, 2010:404). The evidence comes from feminists (Hudson, 2012; O'Reilly, 2012; Pankhurst, 2003), post-colonial (Sabaratnam, 2013; Tadjbakhsh, 2010) and hybrid peace scholars (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). Moreover, hybrid peacebuilding scholars have taken the critique a step further by suggesting an alternative approach to liberal peacebuilding.

## **2.2. Feminist Arguments Against Liberal Peacebuilding**

Hudson (2012:445) contends that the common features of peacebuilding such as the rule of law, top-down approaches and so forth, hide the fact that liberal peacebuilding disempowers the population of post-conflict societies, especially women. International peacebuilding actors will often frame post-conflict states as weak and failed societies and the women living in them as a weak, feminised “other” that needs a saviour that is male and usually white (O'Reilly, 2012:535). Therefore, this discourse depicts the peacebuilding actor in strong and masculine terms and gives him qualities such as power, agency and control which are essential in conducting peacebuilding interventions successfully. In contrast, the women are weak and in need of assistance from the peacebuilding actor. As a result, women are often not included in the peacebuilding process and there is a failure to address the issue of gender equality in societies (Pankhurst, 2003:160).

### **2.3. Decolonial Arguments Against Liberal Peacebuilding**

Another sector of critique against liberal peacebuilding has been from post-colonial scholars. Sabaratnam (2013:259) contends that Eurocentrism has many shapes and forms, and because of this, it can continuously reinvent itself. This is illustrated by continuing Eurocentric assumptions of Europe being the principal subject or main actor in world history and other parts of the world as being ‘others. The liberal approach to peacebuilding reflects Eurocentric or Western assumptions and values about what a functioning state should look like (Tadjbakhsh, 2010:116).

Moreover, scholars such as Jahn (2007) argued that liberal peace was simply an extension of the same liberal modernisation ethic practised during the Cold War as an attempt to try and control post-colonial states on the periphery of the international community and in doing so, contain the expansion of communism. As a result, the intervention is presented as a “good project” that will aid and be beneficial to its recipients when in fact, it is for the benefit of the West.

Duffield (2007) argues that liberal peacebuilding is a strategy by the West to expand its influence on the rest of the world, whereas Liden (2009) argues that the introduction of institutions from above or outside and the dependence on political and economic liberalisation has adverse effects on the post-conflict society. It makes society dependent on the international presence, and these strategies often disrupt traditional ways of living. Instead of bringing peace, the international actors subject the local people to foreign norms and rules of leadership and regulations.

### **2.4. Hybrid Peacebuilding Arguments Against Liberal Peacebuilding**

Richmond (2009) and Mac Ginty (2011) have criticised liberal peacebuilding for its “illiberal practices” for example, the top-down approach is the imposition of internationally designed institutional remedies to suspected causes of conflict and other social issues. They contend that these strategies are centred around the values and interests of those intervening rather than the local populations (Mac Ginty, 2011:395; Richmond, 2009:26). This is a direct contradiction of the 2009 UN Secretary-General Report titled *Peacebuilding in the Aftermath*

*of Conflict*, which contends that a context-specific approach is vital in the process of building sustainable peace in a post-conflict society (Tom, 2017:108; United Nations, 2009).

The same is argued regarding its civil society initiatives. Richmond contends that the civil society organisations promoted by liberal peacebuilders often do not represent the interests of the ordinary individual on the street but represent the interests of international actors (Richmond, 2009:325). Instead of playing an active part in the peace-building process and influencing its outcomes, the locals become passive recipients of the liberal solutions to their problems (Richmond, 2009:26).

### **3. Hybrid Peace/Hybrid Peacebuilding**

In response to the shortcomings of liberal peace, specifically the lack of local agency and context-specific approaches, Richmond (2009) and Mac Ginty (2011) have discovered an alternative to the liberal peace approach to peacebuilding. This approach is called the hybrid peace or hybrid peacebuilding and has also been termed the “fourth generation of peacekeeping” (Richmond, 2011:85). Fourth-generation practitioners are not just concerned with the shortfalls of liberal peacebuilding, but also with the idea that peace must be shaped and reflect the interests of those who make it or are subjected to it (Richmond, 2011:85). Whereas liberalism shaped peace according to the priorities and principles of liberalism, Richmond (2011) argues that this new generation reflected the needs, identities and interests of all actors, both state and non-state actors. Before we carry on any further, it is essential to discuss what exactly is meant by hybridity to enrich our understanding of this new approach to peacebuilding.

#### **3.1.1. Conceptualising Hybridity**

The terms "hybrid" and "hybridity" have their roots in 19th century Botanical studies (Tom, 2017:97). During this period, the concept was used to describe the engineering of hybrid plants by combining cells from different plants, to enable them to survive and produce crops in challenging environmental conditions (Mac Ginty, 2011:70). As a social phenomenon, the term was very popular during colonialism as it was often used to describe the melding together of two unique strains of human life for example, the coloniser and the colonised producing an "impure" hybrid (Mac Ginty, 2011:70).

What this illustrates is that the discovery of hybridity is not necessarily something new. What is new has been the popularity that the concept has come to acquire across several other academic disciplines over the years (Mac Ginty, 2011:71). Hybridity is now present in sociology, anthropology, literature studies, media studies, economics, postcolonial studies, political sciences and several other academic disciplines.

In Peace and Conflict Studies the concept of hybridity is now used to describe a process whereby the 'local' or indigenous peoples, subvert, modify or adapt to the liberal peace (Tom, 2017:110). In doing so, the local ends up producing new forms of peace and politics (Mac Ginty, 2010:397). In other words, a hybrid of peace and politics. This 'hybrid peace' however, not just be viewed as a package which includes liberal and 'illiberal elements' adapting to each other (Belloni, 2012:24). Instead, it can also be a condition of tension and sometimes antagonism between the different actors involved, including those who may want to remove themselves from the idea of governance promoted by the state (Belloni, 2012:24). This means the hybrid peace can also be produced because of a challenge to the purity and hegemony of the liberal peace by the local populations, and in doing so introduces a new kind of peace.

As a result, Mac Ginty (2011) contends that the hybrid peace theory possesses the power to break down the dominance of liberal peace because it advocates for more local agency and participation in peacebuilding processes - a feature that liberal peacebuilding is argued to lack. Therefore, the once 'pure' liberal peace is combined with indigenous practices, norms and institutions. This melding together of both the international and the local will then result in a local-liberal hybrid peace.

Whilst Richmond (2009) and Mac Ginty (2011) discovered and advocated for hybrid peace, there were still questions about how hybrid peacebuilding can be carried out practically. How do we meld the international and local to produce a hybrid peace? According to Belloni (2012) and Boege (2009), the melding together of the international and the local occurs in several ways. Belloni created a framework to explain how this melding might occur, whereas Boege (2009) identified the creation of hybrid political orders in several post-conflict societies (Belloni, 2012:25; Boege, 2009:599). In doing so, we are provided with an idea of how hybrid peacebuilding can occur practically in a post-conflict society.

### **3.1.2. Belloni's Framework of Hybrid Governance**

Firstly, it is through informal interactions between informal and formal institutions (Belloni, 2012:25). Here, Belloni (2012) explores how informal institution and illiberal norms, and practices influence the functioning of formal liberal institutions. The informal institutions and other indigenous social networks and norms will often infiltrate formal institutions and rulership (Belloni, 2012:25). This type of hybridity can result in two ways. Firstly, it may result in patron-client practices for example, political elites using their positions to distribute favours, public goods and other services to patrons, friends and relatives in exchange for political support. It can also result in informal economic practices influencing formal practices at the societal level (Tom, 2017:113). Whilst this may at times hinder the functioning of market economies, it also has the potential of improving the livelihoods of those who are poor and marginalised in the post-conflict society.

The second form of hybridity relates to the formal recognition and incorporation of indigenous institutions and practices into the state (Belloni, 2012:25). Non-state or customary institutions such as clan chiefs, village elders, religious elders and so forth determine the local experience of the state can be instrumental in the effectiveness of state institutions (Boege, 2009:76). This is because customary non-state institutions of governance which existed prior conflict have adapted and survived over time. These customary authorities determine the everyday social reality of large parts of the population in developing countries, especially in remote areas. On several occasions, therefore, state institutions can only be effective through utilising these traditional networks (Brown and Boege et al, 2009:603).

This is illustrated when post-conflict states incorporate traditional leaders and institutions into formal state institutions such as the legislature or local government (Tom, 2017:113). The result of this hybridity can be the emergence of hybrid legal systems in certain communities for example, the recognition of the Gacaca community courts of Rwanda after the genocide was due to the inclusion of customary practices and institutions being incorporated into the state apparatus (Tom, 2017:113). These actions play a significant role in providing processes that are more inclusive of the local population in the post-conflict society.

Lastly, is the capturing or domination of liberal state institutions by violent state actors and institutions. Here Belloni (2012:26) suggests that violent actors such as militias, warlords or

rebels could be included in the post-conflict government. The unfortunate result of this type of hybridity could be that criminal networks capture the state institutions and then use these institutions for their benefit (Tom, 2017:114).

### **3.1.3. Boege's Hybrid Political Order**

Boege (2009) contends that the main objective of peacebuilding is to support the emergence of a stable political community or political order within a state or region that has just emerged from conflict (Boege, 2009:599). A question that arises from this argument is what constitutes a viable political community or political order within the state. The common response to this question often suggests a state or political order that is in line with a liberal state as it is assumed to provide peace and stability in such contexts. Overall, fragility within the state is perceived as a gateway for violent conflict which can lead to the state collapsing, which is why it must be eliminated as soon as possible.

However, Boege (2009:600) holds a different view. Instead of advocating for a liberal peace solution, Boege (2009) contends that fragile states can be conceptualised as hybrid political orders. This is because post-conflict states usually have several entities competing for power within them and there are also different views regarding the social order. Some want the formal state, whereas others might idealise traditional institutions and processes. In such conditions, the state or government is usually unable to provide security, welfare or representation to the people and it is in such instances that Boege (2009), has identified authority to be shared between the state and non-state actors. It is this system of sharing authority and existence of different orders which is known as the hybrid political order (Boege, 2009:600).

Hybrid political orders can be described as the coexistence of vastly different orders of governance and government. In areas with hybrid political orders, there will be an interaction, whether through pulling against or combining, of elements of Western models of governance as well as elements that originate from the local communities and other outside influences. It is under these conditions then in which new hybrid institutions and political orders emerge (Brown and Boege et al, 2011:100).

Brown and Boege (2010:101) contend that the concept of hybrid political orders is not to suggest an alternative to the state, it seeks to challenge ideas about what is regarded as a political community and create more transparency regarding governance mechanisms that may be operating in the state. There is a significant need to transform political orders because the over-reliance on Western models of political governance in addressing peacebuilding and conflict prevention has its shortcomings. The imposition of Western models compels customary orders to be deconstructed and often significantly changed so that they can be assimilated into the state structures and processes (Brown and Boege et al, 2010:103). A coexistence of different orders provides the necessary flexibility and diversity as it can recognise the strength of the society's social order and the resilience often embedded in communities' lives.

Boege (2009) illustrates security under a hybrid political order to demonstrate this. Boege (2009:18) argues that the maintenance of internal security and order should not be based on the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force. Instead, state institutions need to share responsibilities with non-state actors for instance, in Pacific Island states the effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies is largely determined by their working relationships with the indigenous institutions (Boege, 2009:18). This is because order and peace in communities is usually the responsibility of traditional leaders through application of cultural law and not the common law because the liberal judicial system is sometimes difficult to access and understand. The security field therefore is made up of a coexistence and cooperation of liberal and local institutions, also known as hybrid security reform (Boege, 2009:18).

### **3.4. Arguments Against Hybrid Peacebuilding**

However, hybrid peacebuilding has not existed without critique as well. Schroeder and Chappuis (2014) argue that there is ambiguity regarding the concepts of local and international. As a result, it becomes difficult to speak of or measure local ownership when it is not clear who or what the local is. This is further complicated by the fact that hybrid peace is context-specific, which means that the 'local' in Kosovo might be very different from the local in South Africa (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014:78). Additionally, the two build on Richmond's (2011) warning against romanticizing the local and contend against the

romanticisation of local agency to the point where legitimacy is bestowed on indigenous institutions or leaders who do not have authority or legitimacy within the society (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014:137).

The Indigenous social institutions follow their agendas and practices which are often for the benefit of the groups or the leaders, regardless of the needs of the nation (Brown and Boege et al, 2010:604). African states have incorporated traditional leaders into state institutions in recognition of their influence as local players (Brown and Boege et al, 2010:604).

Hameiri and Lee Jones (2018) contend that hybridity is riddled with issues. Although its proponents contend that the concept does not seek to draw binaries and that everything is hybrid in a sense, one still finds themselves having to draw these binaries between the “hybrid local” and the “hybrid international”, What is even more difficult task is measuring or specifying where or what the local is and what can be considered the international (Hameiri and Lee Jones, 2018:105). Lastly, the activities of the informal economy are not always legal for instance, locals in places such as Kosovo have been observed engaging in tax evasion and even defying the local authorities. This has adverse effects on the state's economy and cooperation which Mac Ginty (2011) argues is possible in hybrid orders.

### **3.5. Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview of the literature on peacebuilding and peace approaches. As the chapter has shown, UN peacekeeping operations have been consistently developing since the organisation's first peace operation. Whereas the main goal was peacekeeping at first, the organisation evolved to also include peacemaking and peacebuilding in its operations. The latter (peacebuilding) has been dominated by strategies centred around liberal values of democratisation, marketisation and security since its formal addition to peacekeeping operations (Paris, 2004:205). As a result, it has been subject to critique, for example, its interventions have not always translated into sustainable peace. Its critics attribute these failures to several reasons, for example, failed economic policies, standardised approaches to peacebuilding, lack of local participation in the peacebuilding process and imposing a Western state in non-Western contexts.

Considering these shortcomings, several international peacebuilding scholars have discovered and argued for an alternative approach to liberal peacebuilding, called hybrid peacebuilding (Richmond, 2009; Mac Ginty; 2011). Hybrid peacebuilding seeks to combine both international institutions and values with those of local or traditional institutions. The result of this process is the production of a hybrid peace which is inclusive and context-specific. However, this approach has also been subject to criticism for example, its indigenous aspects may contradict human rights standards, it may produce the conditions that existed before the conflict and there has not been sufficient evidence to determine that it will always produce sustainable peace.

The debate about which approach is more decisive between the liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding is still deadlocked (Roberts, 2011:2535). To answer this question, this thesis examines the liberal and hybrid reforms implemented in Sierra Leone after the 1991-2002 civil war. Before I can do that, however, a discussion on the history of the Civil War as well as its actors is critical in providing a better understanding of the peacebuilding process.

# **CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF THE SIERRA LEONE 1991-2002 CIVIL WAR**

## **3.1. Introduction**

After gaining independence in 1961, Sierra Leone had all the necessary elements of a functioning state (Zack-Williams, 2012:3). The country had a democratically elected parliament, an independent judiciary, an executive that consisted of elected members from the legislature and a relatively effective civil society. However, six years later all this hope withered away as Siaka Stevens, an army Commander, illegally stepped into power after an election which was won by the country's opposition party. It is during this period that Collier (1970) contends that the democratic experiment in Sierra Leone ended abruptly. What followed was a series of failed administrations, political violence, thuggery and abuse of power. By the time the war broke out Sierra Leone had been declared a failed state because its political institutions had completely collapsed and its economy was bankrupt (Zack-Williams, 2012:3).

This chapter will provide an overview of the Sierra Leone administration post-independence from 1967 until 2002. In this overview, I will contend that the political leadership post-independence set the stage for the 1991-2002 civil war. Following this, the chapter will provide an overview of the 1991-2002 civil war.

### **Milton Margai Administration (1962-1964)**

As previously mentioned, Sierra Leone was under British rule for many years. In 1961 the British decided to introduce a new constitution in Sierra Leone. The constitution would signal the beginning of a new democratic dispensation. Political parties were quickly formed to contest the elections of the new democratic dispensation (Fyle, 2006:xxxix). Some of these parties included the National Council of Sierra Leone, which was formed by the Krio, who

opposed the new constitution and the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), which was a merger of several entities.

The SLPP won the elections and formed a new government led by Dr. Milton Margai (Fyle, 2006:x1). Margai was appointed Chief minister in the government with several other SLPP members serving in the different ministries of government.

### **Albert Margai Administration (1964-1967)**

After Milton Margai died in 1964, his brother Albert Margai was appointed as his successor. This move was highly opposed by members of the SLPP cabinet however, Albert released his detractors from their duties (Zack-Williams, 1999:144). This was to his detriment because the cabinet members were prominent and as a result, Margai ended up alienating their constituencies. Margai's second error was trying to transform Sierra Leone into a one-party republic. Although approved by the legislature, this idea was highly opposed by citizens which led to them opposing his rule.

### **Siaka Stevens Administration (1968-1975)**

In 1967 Siaka Stevens of the All-People's Congress won the Sierra Leone general election and was elected President of Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams, 1999:144). This was a historic moment, as this was the first time that an incumbent government (SLPP) was voted out of office in Sub-Saharan Africa. This victory was short-lived as Stevens and the Governor General were placed under house arrest by the Commander of the Armed Forces, Brigadier Lansana.

However, Lansana was also soon removed from his position by a group of young officers who were led by another military leader, Major Juxon-Smith (Zack-Williams, 1999:144). Juxon Smith and his junta were known as the National Reformation Council (NRC) and ruled Sierra Leone until they too were ousted by the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM).

The ACRM was led by non-commissioned officers and later invited Stevens to be their leader and essentially, the leader of Sierra Leone.

Stevens' rule marked the beginning of thuggery in the political processes of Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams, 2012:3). This was illustrated in 1971 when Sierra Leone became a one-party state with Stevens and his henchmen at the helm. Stevens used violence and political intimidation to suppress SLPP members who might threaten his authority (Zack-Williams, 1999:144). Moreover, he attempted to establish a network of informal markets to control the country's diamond industry. Stevens' loyalists were rewarded via this network, whereas his detractors were fired and threatened with violence. However, the network was not sustainable as the economy was declining for example, the country was spending more money than what it was receiving back and therefore Stevens could not maintain these informal networks.

Stevens' solution to the widespread economic decline was to borrow money from the International Financial Institutions (Zack Williams, 1999:145). This resulted in Sierra Leone being subjected to several structural adjustment programmes which worsened the country's economic condition because there was now widespread inflation and high levels of unemployment. On the other hand, Stevens was able to maintain his shadow economy and despite the economic instability, the country was politically stable at the time. This was illustrated by the successful power transition of 1985 between Stevens and Brigadier, Joseph Momoh (Zack Williams, 1999:145).

### **Joseph Momoh Administration (1986-1992)**

When Stevens retired from the presidency due to illness and old age, he amended Sierra Leone's constitution which allowed him to appoint a successor or presidential candidate (Fyle, 2006:xliv). This candidate was force commander, Brigadier J.S. Momoh and in the rigged elections of October 1985, Momoh was elected President of Sierra Leone (Reno, 1997:228).

In the years (1986-1992) when Momoh was head of state, the country experienced further political and economic decline that it was appropriately categorised as a failed state. There was rampant corruption, the political institutions collapsed, and the economy was essentially bankrupt (Zack-Williams, 2012:3). Furthermore, the years of thuggery and political violence had been entrenched into the political realm. Therefore, Sierra Leone was a ticking time bomb waiting to explode. Eventually, it did, and a civil war broke out in 1991.

### **1991: Sierra Leone Invaded from Liberia**

In March of 1991, a small group of guerrilla fighters invaded the eastern frontier of Sierra Leone from Liberia (Peters, 2011:62). These fighters had been deployed by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front (NPF) of Liberia and were led by former Sierra Leone Corporal, Foday Sankoh. The group referred to itself as the *Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone* (RUF) and their ultimate objective was to overthrow the administration of President Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh (Peters, 2011:62).

The country's army was not capable of confronting the rebels at the time due to a lack of soldiers and appropriate weaponry for example, Sierra Leone had approximately 3000 soldiers and their weapons were outdated (Peters, 2011:63; Fyle, 2006:xliv). As a result, the invasion intensified and Momoh began to lose ground both militarily and politically.

From the political front, Momoh's leadership was heavily criticised, even by those in his party. To mitigate the loss, Momoh reshuffled his cabinet and fired all ministers suspected of being disloyal, and the APC released 10 senior members of the party as well (Fyle, 2006). Consequentially, some of these ministers formed political parties and severely criticised Momoh's handling of the RUF invasion. Therefore, by the end of 1991, Momoh and the APC's capabilities of leading Sierra Leone were under immense scrutiny.

On the military front, (1) more than ten thousand civilians had died by early 1992, (2) over 300 000 had been displaced and (3), 200 000 were seeking refuge in Guinea with several others being stuck in enemy territories (Zack-Williams, 1999:149). The APC's solution was to invest more in the country's military so that soldiers may be able to acquire appropriate weaponry to defend the country against the RUF forces. However, because of corruption within the armed forces, only the top officials benefitted from the investment whilst the junior staff did not. The result of this was the formation of anti-Momoh factions within the armed forces.

Moreover, President Momoh attempted to use the crisis as a justification to delay the holding of general elections a decision which was highly opposed by both civilians and opposition parties. This, as well as the emerging factionalism, was the proverbial 'tip of the iceberg' for the Momoh regime (Zack-Williams, 199:149).

### **1992: *Na pikin' de rule contri* (It is children ruling the country)**

By April of 1992, the Momoh administration was removed from office by a group of junior military officers who were led by Captain Valentine Strasser (Fyle and Foray, 2006:24). As an army captain who shared the same disdain for the corruption, wasteful spending and lack of accountability in the Momoh regime, Strasser was labelled a 'redeemer' as his administration promised the coming of a 'new dawn' (Fyle and Foray, 2006:24). As a result, Strasser led an administration that used populist rhetoric and notions to acquire support from citizens moving forward.

This title was not without merit as the Strasser regime finalised agreements with International Financial Institutions, which saw Sierra Leone receiving loans as a means of reviving the country's economy (Zack-Williams, 1999:149). At the time, the country had little to no economic growth as its inflation rate was over 120% and the value of the currency was very weak (Zack-Williams, 199:150). Strasser's programmes managed to lower inflation from 120% to just below 50% by 1994 and were able to stabilise the value of the currency. The success of these programmes led to Sierra Leone being a recipient of other grants and loans from a variety of donors such as the European Union and the African Development Bank.

Amid the abovementioned economic improvements, there was still a rise in conflicts between the government and rebel groups. For example, rebel groups launched an onslaught on the interior and took over some of the country's diamond fields in the Kono District (Zack-Williams, 1999:149). As a result, the government took drastic measures to increase its army size, one of which was the conscription of street children.

### **1994: Sierra Leoneans Want Change**

However, by 1994 the disdain towards the Strasser regime had reached new heights and citizens grew weary of its inability to end the war (Zack-Williams, 1999:149). Many started to assume that civilian rule should be the first step towards ending the war, but these ideas were met with fierce opposition from Strasser's regime. They argued that it was important that peace first be negotiated before the holding of presidential elections as it would not be possible to hold free and fair elections under conditions of conflict. However, by 1995, it was clear that despite its best efforts, the Sierra Leonean army could not win the fight against the rebel fighters (Zack-Williams, 1999:149).

### **1996: Kabbah Elected President**

Finally, in 1996, the country held its democratic elections and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP emerged victorious by attaining over 60% of the votes and 27 of the 80 parliamentary seats (Kandeh 1998:102). As the new leader of Sierra Leone, Kabbah and the SLPP were faced with three major challenges, the biggest one being ending the civil war. As a result, Kabbah set in motion several processes toward achieving that goal.

The first process was forming a National Coalition Government with the state's major parties and meeting with the leader of the rebel forces, Foday Sankoh. In addition to what has been stated, Kabbah, inspired by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission at the time, established a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Zack-Williams, 1999:151). The role of the Commission was to investigate and identify the causes of injustices against people

and communities by the government. In the same breath, Kabbah emphasised the government's determination to eliminate corruption among public servants.

However, amid all of this, the country's economy was undergoing difficulties. The agricultural and mining sectors came to a complete standstill as mines were attacked and miners held hostage by rebel forces. By September 1996, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also demanded further cost-cutting measures from Sierra Leone before providing further financial aid. As a result, the government decided to cut the subsidy provided to the army, police and correctional services for the purchasing of rice and this led to ill-discipline becoming rife within the army ranks (Zack-Williams, 1999:152).

### **1997: Second Coup D'état**

In May of 1997, there was another coup. The first indication of trouble brewing was an ominous radio announcement on the state Broadcasting Service by a military officer named Corporal Tamba Gborie, that the Kabbah regime had been overthrown and that a dawn-to-dusk curfew had been imposed on all civilians (Zack-Williams, 1999:150). However, despite the announcement, it was not immediately apparent what this meant until more than two dozen heavily armed soldiers drove to Pademba Road Prison (Sierra Leone's main prison), and blew it open with grenades. More than 600 prisoners were released, armed with weapons and then directed to attack the State House and radio stations. By midday, Kabbah had to be evacuated from the country to Guinea and the armed forces declared that Koroma oversaw Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams, 1999:150).

The May coup was not a first of its kind, and the same could be said for the reasons behind it. Instead, it was the bloodiest and most destructive which the country had ever seen (Riley, 1997:287). Over days, hundreds of lives were lost, and several of the government's buildings were destroyed by grenades, rockets and missiles. Most importantly, the coup brought an abrupt end to the country's democratic experiment.

The coup was not met with acceptance by everyone because there were high levels of anger and condemnation from both domestic and international entities regarding what had happened. In Sierra Leone, one of the country's leading Women's Movements organised a protest in Freetown, and several public servants and general workers launched 'stay-away' campaigns (Riley, 1997:290). Moreover, there were several other anti-AFRC demonstrations in the provinces of Bo and Kenema, the most notable being the clashes between the Kamajors and the army. The army attempted to carry out Koroma's orders of banning the Kamajors, however, the Kamajors threatened a march to Freetown unless Kabbah was restored to his original position (Riley, 1997:291).

From that point on, widespread civil disobedience erupted, and its actors were known as the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) (Gberie, 1997:158). The movement consisted of all the anti-coup groups and civil society organisations as well as local militia. The local militia acted as the Movements' armed wing and was called the Civil Defence Force (CDF) (Gberie, 1997:158). Furthermore, internationally, several West African governments as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) condemned the coup and called for an end to military rule.

The foreign ministers of ECOWAS met in Conakry on 27 June 1997 and agreed to implement a three-pronged strategy to address the violence in Sierra Leone. This was highlighted in a fourteen-point communique and included possible actions such as dialogue, economic sanctions, an embargo as well as the use of force should all other strategies fail. It was clear that no country wanted to recognise the junta in Sierra Leone, and to improve their chances of success, the ministers recommended consultations among member states before taking any action (Gberie, 1997:164).

After several setbacks in the negotiations between ECOWAS and the junta, with the junta declaring that it had planned to remain in power until 2001, the parties finally signed a Peace Plan on the 23rd of October 1997 (Gberie, 1997: 167). This was not a voluntary action on the part of the junta as several sanctions, embargoes, as well as domestic and international pressures, compelled it to enter the agreement which was known as the Conakry Accord.

According to the Accord, the junta would hand over all power in May 1998 (Gberie, 1997:167).

### **1998: Operation 'No Living Thing'**

However, in 1998 the RUF declared Operation 'No Living Thing', and by mid-December, the rebel forces had managed to capture Koidu Town, which was Sierra Leone's main diamond district (Hirsch, 2001:150). Nigerian soldiers had been mining diamonds in the district when they were suddenly ambushed by the rebels. There were several casualties during the attack and those that managed to survive fled to the nearby town of Makeni. The rebel army was able to capture a significant amount of ammunition and weapons from the Nigerian soldiers and the effects of this were dire as it reduced the capacity of the ECOMOG force.

However, the rebel forces were aware of the power of Nigerian troops and tried to avoid a confrontation with them, because, unlike the surprise attacks, their chances of success were not that good. As a result, they withdrew into the forests of the Kailahun district and because the Nigerians had little experience in counter-insurgency training, their attempts at pursuing the rebels in these forests were not successful (Osakwe and Audu, 2017:113). Instead, they preferred conventional attacks against the towns which the rebels had taken over from them for instance, Makeni and Kabala. It was, therefore not long before Freetown and the other areas fell into the hands of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) again.

### **1999: Second Attack on Freetown**

In January 1999, the ECOMOG announced that its forces had managed to kill over one hundred rebel soldiers who had attacked their base in Hastings. However, the rebel forces launched another vicious attack on Freetown (Harris, 2014:88). This time they went straight to Pademba Road Prison again, where several of their comrades and the leader of the RUF, Sankoh, had been detained. Similar to the previous attack, they overpowered the guards and

Nigerian troops and then blasted the gates open to free and arm the escapees. Unfortunately, Sankoh had been moved to a secret location two weeks prior as the Nigerian troops had been anticipating a fresh attack from the rebels (Harris, 2014:88). Despite this, the rebels were still relentless, and Freetown was still being invaded by armed groups. By 7 a.m. the State House had been taken over once more and a Rebel could be heard announcing the overthrow of the Kabbah regime once more.

This time it was not to be as the radio station was soon blasted by a fighter Jet and Kabbah instead went on the state radio to announce that he was still President of Sierra Leone and urged citizens to resist the rebel's antics. What followed, however, was one of the biggest human rights abuses that the country had ever seen for example, the RUF went on a complete rampage by killing and amputating anyone they deemed threatening in Freetown (Harris, 2014:88). Three weeks later, the Nigerian troops, with the assistance of the CDF finally pushed the rebels out of Freetown (Osakwe and Audu, 2017:113). It was a hollow victory however as the damage was already done. More than six thousand civilians and homes had perished during the invasion as well as the novel concept of regional peacekeeping on the continent.

After the horrific Freetown attacks, the government became aware of the shortfalls of its war strategy against the rebels (Sola-Martin, 2009:295). There was still no clear winner of the war, and people were still dying. As a result, it attempted to adopt a twin-track policy which consisted of political negotiation and military engagement because it became apparent that the only way to end the violence would be a negotiated political settlement.

To reach a popular consensus on how they can achieve peace in Sierra Leone; the National Consultative Conference was organised by the country's National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy (Sola-Martin, 2009:295). In attendance were civil society organisations, government representatives, international organisations as well as local district representatives. After several unsuccessful attempts at brokering a new peace accord, the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone finally signed a Peace Agreement in Lomé in 1999 and this would be known as the Lomé Peace Agreement.

Some of the recommendations made by the Conference included the establishment of a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace which consisted of political parties and civil society organisations (Sola-Martin, 2009:295). In addition to what has been stated, amnesty would be provided with certain conditions for those guilty of war crimes. A civil defence force would be established to support the military and there would be several programmes to raise awareness regarding civil-military relations. There was also no sharing of power with the RUF, and Sankoh was charged with treason. Lastly, the country launched a nationwide Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme.

### **2000: UNAMSIL Disarmament Programme**

By May 2000, the UNAMSIL Disarmament programme was underway (Fyle and Foray, 2006:25). UNAMSIL later announced that it had successfully disarmed over 24402 combatants out of 45000 and that these combatants had only handed over 10840 weapons during the disarmament process. In the same month, the Nigerian ECOMOG troops completed their withdrawal from Sierra Leone, however, this set off one of the biggest peacekeeping crises in the history of UN peacekeeping. The RUF, which was cooperative with the UN in the disarmament and reintegration process, kidnapped 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers and shot several protestors outside the Freetown home of Sankoh, leading to a complete collapse of the agreement (Binningsbo and Dupuy, 2009:91).

### **2002: Civil War Declared Over**

Eventually, UNAMSIL regained control of the situation and by January 16, 2002, the war was declared over. The UN, alongside the Sierra Leone government, signed agreements to establish war crimes tribunals in Sierra Leone (Fyle and Foray, 2006:25). The international community showered the country with praise and its disarmament programme was deemed a blueprint for other disarmament programmes moving forward (Solomon and Ginifer, 2008:5). This was important as the civil war was often confusing and plagued by elements of state

weakness and significant violence toward civilians in the form of amputations, death, and displacements (Millar, 2016:571).

### **3.2. Conclusion**

In conclusion, in 2002 the government of Sierra Leone declared that its 11-year-long civil war was over. Before the civil war, the country was riddled with years of poor leadership from both the political and traditional landscape which provided the conditions for the eruption of a civil war. The civil war claimed over 70 000 lives and more than 2.6 million people were displaced (Kanyako, 2016:27). Some of those not killed, were victims of brutal amputations and other gross human rights abuses committed during the war (Bellows and Miguel, 2009:1146). Over 160 000 refugees in Liberia and Guinea needed to be repatriated and resettled into the country and Sierra Leone owed close to \$1.6 billion in external debt (Kanyako, 2016:27). By the time the war ended, Sierra Leone was in a very vulnerable position politically, physically and economically. Its infrastructure was damaged, and public institutions could barely function. Therefore, although the war was declared over, the country was far from being stable and there was a need for an intervention to achieve this stability.

# **CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS**

## **Introduction**

This chapter analyses the liberal and hybrid peacebuilding approaches used in Sierra Leone. Specifically, it asks; which of the two approaches was more effective in building sustainable peace. The chapter will demonstrate that the overall liberal peacebuilding reforms implemented by the government and external actors had limited success on their own. It is only through hybrid peacebuilding reforms, that is: through a combination of liberal and indigenous interventions, that Sierra Leone's reforms led to sustainable peace. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the main areas of focus for liberal peacebuilders are the political, economic security and justice sectors of the state. Whereas hybrid peacebuilding occurs through the interaction of the indigenous actors and institutions with those of the liberal peace (Mac Ginty, 2009; Belloni, 2012). For this reason, this chapter will be divided into four sections. Each of these sections will focus on a sector, the liberal and hybrid reforms implemented in those sectors and their respective impact on building sustainable peace.

### **4.1. Political Reforms**

The first area of analysis will be the country's political sector. The specific area of focus will be the state's capability to hold free and fair elections, as it is often a good indicator for successful liberal peacebuilding (Casey and Glennerster, 2012:9). This section will analyse the reforms implemented to achieve these objectives and their outcome. Following that, I will analyse the hybrid interventions in the political sector and their outcomes in contrast to the liberal outcomes. I contend that the liberal political reforms had limited success until the sector was hybridised. This reinforces the thesis argument of hybrid peacebuilding being more effective in Sierra Leone.

#### **4.1.1. Holding General Elections**

Similar to other states emerging from violent conflict, Sierra Leone was not stable enough to hold post-conflict elections on its own at first. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) provided electoral assistance during the state's 2002 and 2007 elections, and it

was cautious in providing Sierra Leone's institutions the platform to oversee the elections (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1161). Two institutions oversaw the administration and management of the elections: the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Registration Commission (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1162). Both institutions were established after the Civil War to achieve the country's objective of multiparty elections.

In 2002 it was announced that Sierra Leone would hold its first democratic elections after the 11-year civil war. The date for the elections was 14 May 2002 and the opportunity was provided to all entities to form political parties, including the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1162). In response, the RUF and the People's Liberation Party formed political parties to contest in the general elections. This was significant because as demonstrated in Chapter 2, RUF had played a very antagonistic role during the civil war having been responsible for several coups and destabilising the country's political, economic and security systems. Therefore, its participation in the democratic process evoked a sense of hope that it would not become militant again.

The Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP) emerged victorious and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected for a second term in office in May 2002 (Casey and Glennerster, 2012:9). This was important for several reasons; elections are viewed as a tool to facilitate conflict management for example, conflict is managed and resolved through the ballot box instead of entities or parties using violence. In the case of Sierra Leone, the elections were a peaceful process as neither party used the hateful and divisive rhetoric that liberal peacebuilders urge post-conflict states to stay away from. The RUF also accepted the results of the election process, therefore there were not any renewed tensions between the RUF and the SLPP. In light of this from a liberal peace perspective, the decision to hold elections was successful.

I contend, however, that this view is debatable for several reasons. Firstly, several of the country's ethnic groups did not take part in the general elections (Kieh, 2005:171). The reason for this was the effect of centralised power during the 1991-2002 civil war. During this period, political power was centred around Freetown and whoever oversaw the state at that time. This meant that the areas outside of Freetown were often excluded and marginalised and because of this, they viewed the state as an artificial and distant entity which is completely distant from the ordinary citizen.

Secondly, is because of legitimacy, and this relates to the abovementioned point. Political participation is very important for the establishment of liberal peace because it empowers the citizen to voluntarily choose a political party or leader who will lead the state and it also adds legitimacy to the authority of the elected person or party (Doyle, 2005:464). Therefore, in a situation where several of the country's ethnic groups do not participate in the political process, it does cast some form of doubt over the legitimacy of the elected party and subsequently over the democratic process.

Lastly, I contend that it was only when the country instituted hybrid reforms, that it was able to be fully successful in its political reforms. Two reforms are particularly important to mention- the Chieftaincy Act and the Local Government Act.

In 2009 the country's formal institutions recognised the indigenous institution of the Paramount Chief through the enactment of the Chieftaincy Act (Chieftaincy Act, 2009). A Paramount Chief is the executive of traditional governance as well as the customary institutions of justice in their district for example, they preside over customary and civil courts and adjudicate over land, ownership and matrimonial disputes (Acemoglu and Reed et al, 2014:328). The Act stipulated that the Sierra Leone legislature would include 14 of these Paramount Chiefs and that each should belong to each of the country's provincial districts (Parliament of Sierra Leone, 2023:1). As this reform essentially meant that the Paramount Chief, a traditional or indigenous institution, was placed in a liberal setting, I contend that the reform was hybrid was in nature (Chieftaincy Act, 2009; Tom, 2017:194).

Another key reform was the decentralisation of political power in 2004 through the enactment of the Local Government Act in March 2004 (Local Government Act, 2004). This act decentralised power which meant that power was distributed to several entities to avoid a concentration of power into one entity or position (Edwards and Yilmaz, 2015:47). The Act called for the establishment of 19 local councils. These councils were divided into wards. Each ward was required to have a Ward Development Committee which linked local government and grassroots planning and needs (Edwards and Yilmaz, 2015:47). The Act also mandated that all chairpersons of local councils be elected and voted for by the local population.

The Local Government Act was equally important because it meant that power was no longer concentrated into one organisation or position but rather distributed to several organisations and institutions both liberal and local (Edwards and Yilmaz, 2015:47). It enables more ordinary people to participate in the democratic processes of the state whether as voters or local councillor candidates. This is a key feature of hybrid peacebuilding advocates for more citizens to be included and allowed to make meaningful contributions to the peacebuilding project. Lastly, with each district having its local leaders, the state was able to avoid marginalising and excluding certain parts of the population again, and ultimately bring the government to the people again.

These interactions between the formal and the local or indigenous institutions have produced mixed results in certain aspects, however. Although they have led to a government that is inclusive and allows for meaningful participation from indigenous or local actors, this inclusion has also paved the way for colluding between some political elites and Paramount Chiefs which leads to Paramount Chiefs squandering of state resources. Furthermore, Paramount Chiefs have been bribed in return for supporting the political leaders of Sierra Leone (Tom, 2017:193). Therefore, the hybridisation of government has presented challenges to reforming Sierra Leone's political sector.

In conclusion, the liberal reforms in Sierra Leone have had limited success in reforming the country's political sector to achieve a liberal peace. Although Sierra Leone held successful elections in 2002, this success was limited as several ethnic groups did not participate in the process. These groups viewed the state as distant and artificial, casting doubt over the legitimacy of the democratic process. It was only through a process of successful integration of the liberal and the local (hybrid peacebuilding) in Sierra Leone's political sector that the country was able to successfully reform its political sector. The recognition of traditional institutions of leadership such as the Paramount Chiefs and their inclusion into the legislature assisted in bridging the gap between the state and the people and provided a platform for people to make meaningful contributions to the governance of the country (Chieftaincy Act, 2009; Tom, 2017:194). The decentralisation of power through the Local Government Act assisted in breaking down the notions of the state being distant and artificial. Having political leaders and participation at every level of society, for example, local councillors, brought the

government to the people and enabled the people to play a part in governance as well (Kieh, 2005:171).

## **4.2. Economic Reform**

After the civil war ended, Sierra Leone's economy was in dire condition. Sierra Leone had high poverty rates for example, almost 70% of its population was living in poverty and it was one of the lowest-scoring countries on the United Nations Development Programme

(Kargbo, 2012:2). Aware that one of the leading causes of the civil war was economic decline, the Sierra Leone government adopted neo-liberal policies which were designed in line with the framework of liberal peace to resuscitate the economy (Tom, 2017:146). These policies included the acquisition of aid from international actors, and governance over its natural and poverty reduction strategies (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1166; Sola-Martin, 2009:301). In this section, I contend that these reforms have had limited success because although Sierra Leone has demonstrated economic growth, this has not translated to improved lives for the majority of Sierra Leoneans. Instead, it has confirmed several critiques levelled against liberal peacebuilding by proponents of hybrid peacebuilding.

### **4.2.1. International Aid**

Sierra Leone received a significant amount of aid from international entities. Some of the donors, which included the European Union and the United Kingdom, contributed approximately \$800 million to assist the newly elected government of 2002 (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1166). The World Bank launched an Assistance Strategy Program in Sierra Leone which contributed \$244.6 million towards building sustainable peace. Bilateral donor assistance was also able to significantly improve the government's fiscal revenues and this security led to an increase in domestic trade, more diamond exports as well as agricultural outputs (Sola-Martin, 2009:300). Lastly, by the end of 2006, more than 90% of the country's debt was cancelled due to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) by the end of 2006 (Sola-Martin, 2009:300).

### **4.2.2. Natural Resource Governance**

In terms of natural resource governance reforms, this reform was inspired by the Lomé Peace Agreement. It called for the government of Sierra Leone to establish full control and power over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources in the country (Sola-Martin, 2009:301). As a result, all sales and transactions of gold and other resources were outlawed except those sanctioned by the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (Sola-Martin, 2009:301). Furthermore, all proceeds and profits were to be deposited in a special Treasury account and these could only be spent towards the development of the country's population for instance, education, public healthcare, and housing among other things (Sola-Martin, 2009:301).

The natural resource governance measures had limited success (Sola-Martin, 2009:301). By 2009, only a small portion of the funds gathered from the gold and diamond transactions had been used towards human development or social programmes. Although several precautions had been implemented to prevent illegal mining, there were still elevated levels of illegal diamond mining in the country (Sola-Martin, 2009:301). The result of this is further wealth gaps in the country and this is detrimental to the poor (Forgét, 2013:1).

### **4.2.3. Poverty Reduction Strategies**

Regarding poverty reduction, the government of Sierra Leone produced Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which provided strategies on how the country was going to resolve its poverty crisis (Tom, 2017:146). The papers emphasised economic growth, human rights, modernising the private sector, improving agriculture, transportation, and human development among other things. These papers were argued to be the products of several consultations with the population and as a result, provided strategies which the population had either played a part in producing or endorsed (Tom, 2017:147). The question that remains to be answered then is have these strategies have managed to improve the economy of Sierra Leone.

To a certain extent, one can answer the abovementioned question in the affirmative. Reports from the African Development Bank Group (2022) suggest that the Sierra Leone economy grew by 3.2% in 2021 which was a 1.2% increase from the previous year. This growth was attributed to the high exports from the mining and agricultural sectors. Moreover, the country experienced a decline in inflation rates between 2020 and 2021. In 2020 inflation stood at 13.49% but in 2021 it declined to 11% (African Development Bank Group, 2022:1). Moreover, the efforts aimed at rebuilding public infrastructure had managed to restore some of Sierra Leone's public infrastructure and were able to restore the flow of basic services in certain areas (Casey and Glennerster et al, 2012:12). Access to public services improved between 2005 and 2007 with a higher number of citizens reporting access to services such as clinics, roads, schools and drinking water.

However, despite the participatory consultative processes for the Poverty Reduction Papers, it was evident that this was merely a facade to attempt to hide the imposition of reforms on the locals of the country (Tom, 2017:147). Cubitt (2012) contends that the true purpose of the consultations was to conclude what would be the best way to carry out economic liberalisation in the country, not to hear and gather the views of the locals regarding economic reform. A template or plan of economic reform, which was in line with liberal peace had already been designed, outside of the state and was imposed on the locals. As a result, these economic benefits have not been enjoyed by all sections of society, and this threatens the sustainability of the reforms (Karbo, 2012:4).

Lastly, the economic growth suggested by the African Development Bank Group (2022) has not translated to improved welfare for the everyday Sierra Leoneans. Poverty remains a very challenging issue for Sierra Leone. In 2018, 57% of the population was living in poverty, however, when one examines poverty from a town perspective, we see that the situation is much worse (Kargbo, 2022:1). Whereas poverty stands at 23% in Greater Freetown, rural Northern Province has poverty rates as high as 77% (Kargbo, 2022:1).

I contend that the failure of these neoliberal policies reinforces the argument against liberal standardised solutions to complex issues. Proponents of hybrid peacebuilding argue that liberal peacebuilding initiatives rely on standardised approaches that are not suitable for every

context (Richmond and Pogodda, 2016:4; Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009:12). Its tenets for example, free market, integrating states into globalisation are designed and with a particular context and state in mind.

Instead, peacebuilding initiatives will be more effective when they are hybrid because enable the local actors to interact with the initiatives and institutions involved and produce a context-specific solution. Sierra Leone's poverty reduction strategy was standardised and because of this, it was unable to respond to the complexities of the Sierra Leone poverty crisis (Tom, 2017:147). The proposed standardised strategy was to liberalise the economy as it is often expected that the success of the free market will have a trickle-down effect and improve the lives of the impoverished (Karbo, 2012:4). Whilst these reforms may improve the economy, the wealth does not trickle down, which means that those living in poverty before the reforms will continue to live in poverty.

In conclusion, the civil war left the Sierra Leonean economy in a dire position after the 1991-2002 civil war. Most of the population was living in poverty and the country was in financial ruin. Aware that one of the leading causes of the civil war was economic decline reforms, the government of Sierra Leone initiated several neo-liberal policies to improve the economy. The policies pertained to the use of international aid, control over mining resources to boost the economy as well and strategies on how to overcome the poverty crisis. The reforms were successful in growing the Sierra Leone economy for example, the inflation rate declined and there was economic growth (African Development Bank Group, 2022:1). In addition, the government was able to acquire control over some of its mineral resources. However, these improvements have not improved the lives of the general population whose majority still lives in poverty (Kargbo, 2022:1). That is to say, the benefits have not trickled down as expected (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018:1166). Instead, there are still high rates of inequality in the country, high rates of unemployment and the country is still in debt. These are some of the same catalysts which led to the Civil War.

### **4.3. Justice Reforms**

In terms of justice reforms, the country's weak legal institutions were a major contributor to the 11-year civil war. During the war, Sierra Leone saw a spike in the crime rate as courthouses and police stations were burnt down (Varvalous and Koroma et al, 2012:496). Moreover, studies reported that more than 68% of Sierra Leoneans claimed to have either lost a fellow community member or that someone they knew had been injured during the war. Almost all these cases had yet to receive justice at the time. It was, therefore, clear that the country's justice sector had been left in shambles and there was a need for reform. Sierra Leone, alongside the international community, decided to establish two judicial bodies to assist in processing the crimes committed during the civil war namely, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Sierra Leone Special Court (Varvalous and Koroma et al, 2012:499). I contend that these state-led initiatives had limited success when compared to the hybrid Fambul Tok initiative therefore reinforcing the argument of hybrid peacebuilding having been more decisive in building peace in Sierra Leone.

#### **4.3.1. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)**

The TRC had no jurisdiction or authority to prosecute, instead, it was used as a mechanism to foster unity, forgiveness and reconciliation and to find out what were the causes of the civil war (Mahony and Sooka, 2015:38). It did this through travelling around the 12 districts of Sierra Leone recording public as well as written testimonials of the victims and perpetrators of war crimes. In the end, the TRC was expected to produce a report of what the causes of the war were and provide recommendations on how to not repeat the same mistakes in the present and future (Cole, 2012:3).

After its first year, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was able to reach 8,000 people and more than 13% of its statements and testimonies came from perpetrators of violence during the conflict (Cole, 2012:3). This was an incredible achievement because, unlike the South African TRC, this Commission did not promise amnesty to perpetrators. Therefore, the Commission was able to show, to a certain extent, that perpetrators do not always need the promise of amnesty to participate in such Commissions (Schabas, 2004:153). Moreover, the

promise of amnesty does not always mean that there will be a high number of perpetrators coming forward to testify, as illustrated by the South African TRC statistics.

The TRC Report was able to highlight several factors which led to the civil war. Some of them included bad governance, unfair justice systems, human rights violations and unaddressed grievances from the country's population. There was a clear need to reform the justice sector because its corruption and unfair procedures were a big cause of contributor to the war (Varvalous, Koroma et al, 2012:500).

#### **4.3.2. Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL)**

The Special Court of Sierra Leone, on the other hand, was a hybrid international court established by both the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations. Its core objective was to bring to trial those officials responsible for gross human rights violations during the civil war (Danish, 2015:102). It is viewed as a promoter of the rule of law and an outlet through which justice can be served for the crimes committed during the civil war. It was not surprising then that one of the Court's first actions was to indict 13 men who were believed to have been responsible for the violence in Sierra Leone. One of these men is the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor (Varvalous and Koroma et al, 2012:99).

The question that remains then is: how effective these institutions were in reforming the justice sector and building sustainable peace?

In terms of justice, it can be argued that the Court did achieve its core mandate to a certain extent. The Special Court managed to indict members of the RUF as well as some of their collaborators and bring them to justice via independent prosecutions (Jalloh, 2011:444). In addition, the court also prosecuted crimes connected to trafficking and over six military officers who had been found guilty of war crimes were convicted and jailed. This was unprecedented as some of these convictions had been carried out for the first time in the history of international criminal law and the same could be said when it comes to matters about the overall fairness of the process. Jalloh (2011:446) asserts that the Court succeeded in holding fair trials that were in line with international laws and standards of justice fairness and the due process of law.

However, what is of most importance to this study is the Court's contribution to sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. Before I analyse this, it is important to recall that the Court was created to prosecute war criminals as it was assumed that these prosecutions would provide justice for victims, establish the rule of law and build peace overall. Therefore, a question to be asked is whether these prosecutions did build peace in Sierra Leone (Jalloh, 2011:451).

Former rebels and combatants may have been a lot more hesitant than usual to engage in violent actions after the establishment of the Court. Kabbah (2000) is quoted as saying that the Special Court "would send the right signals to the perpetrators of the violations that they will not continue to commit atrocities with impunity". This suggests that the Court was a symbol of terror for some of the former rebels in Sierra Leone. Moreover, surveys about the national perceptions of the Court confirmed that citizens felt that the court helped in minimising further violence in the nation (Jalloh, 2011:452). Therefore, the Special Court can be said to have deterred violence in Sierra Leone to a certain extent and in this way assisted in the building and restoration of peace.

Although these institutions have been successful this success was limited as local communities still preferred to use alternative methods to resolve their disputes (Kaindaneh and Rigby, 2012:170). This was mainly because the indigenous traditions and institutions have, for a very long time, played a vital role in creating the necessary conditions for order, healing, reconciliations and unity within the different communities of the population (Tom, 2017:79). Lastly, the TRC and Special Court did not operate from a village level but rather held hearings in provincial towns which often meant that those in rural areas struggled to access these platforms.

Fambul Tok emerged against this background. The initiative, which means 'family talk' in Krio, was founded by John Caulker, the founder of the Forum of Conscience. It was based on Sierra Leone's longstanding traditions of discussing and resolving issues within the family circle (Graybill, 2010:44). Caulker envisioned Fambul Tok as a local-level programme which would build peace by organising events which provided platforms for truth-telling about the civil war and reconciliation through traditional cleansing ceremonies. Truth-telling included individuals acknowledging responsibility for their offences and apologising to their victims,

whereas cleansing included performing traditional ceremonies and offering monetary or animal sacrifices to atone for the war crimes (Graybill, 2010:44). This resulted in nationwide consultations which included victims, former combatants, women, youth, religious leaders, elders, cultural leaders and local officials coming forward to confess and share the truth about events of the civil war.

By 2010, Fambul Tok had conducted over 60 truth-telling and cleansing ceremonies across 6 of the 14 Districts. In places such as Mokaikono and Kailahun, there were visible signs of reconciliation in communities. Several former RUF combatants came forward to confess their crimes and received forgiveness from their victims (Graybill, 2010:45). In addition, there were establishments of communal gardens and an undertaking of group activities to cement the restored relationships. These were key in ensuring there was sustainable peace in the communities (Hoffman, 2008:134).

Overall, the TRC and Special Court were successful to a certain extent. The TRC went to the 12 districts of Sierra Leone collecting statements and testimonials from both victims and perpetrators of war crimes (Cole, 2012:3) Likewise, the Special Court managed to prosecute several perpetrators of war crimes including members of the RUF and Armed forces. This was important in building trust and demonstrating stability in the justice sector. However, both platforms were perceived as too formal and inaccessible by the majority of the population which stayed in rural areas and as a result, people turned to indigenous methods and procedures of resolving conflict and obtaining justice. Fambul Tok emerged to rectify this by providing a platform which is locally based and provides a platform for reconciliation and justice which drew from local values and practices. As a result, it became a vehicle for reconciliation across the country's 14 Districts.

#### **4.4. Security Sector Reform**

According to liberal peacebuilders, the establishment of a strong national security apparatus can function as an obstacle to a state relapsing into conflict and therefore, helps build sustainable peace (Zack-Williams, 2011:124). It is for this reason then that a high number of Sierra Leoneans argued that any post-war recovery programme needs to include the establishment of a strong and effective security sector. It would be able to protect the

population and prevent the re-emergence of conflict. This was especially important as Sierra Leone's oppressive and predatory military rule of the past harmed how the country's security sector was viewed.

Its security sector was viewed as violent and corrupt (Cbla, 2006:79). This perspective worsened during the civil war as it disrupted the command structures in both police and armed forces, leaving citizens unable to trust its armed forces (Zack-Williams, 2011:117). As a result, the Sierra Leone government sought to reform its security sector with the assistance of external actors such as the United Nations and the United Kingdom (Zack-Williams, 2011:118).

This section will analyse security sector reforms implemented in Sierra Leone to build sustainable peace. These reforms can be divided into the following categories: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Sierra Leone Police reforms and Armed Forces reforms.

#### **4.4.1. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**

Firstly, is the notorious Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme. This section will analyse the implementation of the DDR programme. I will contend that the DDR programme, which was a liberal peacebuilding initiative, can be considered a success and that its significantly high number of participants overrides criticism of the process not having engaged local communities before its implementation.

Disarmament involved the collection, registration, disabling and destruction of all weapons and ammunition. This was done at over forty-five reception centres across Sierra Leone (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:138). Demobilisation involved armed forces which are either from the government or any opposing forces, being downsized or completely disbanded. This is done to assist the transitions from war to peace. Lastly, is the reintegration process which sought to reintegrate former combatants into society using several economic and social training schemes. In turn, the schemes transform the former combatants into productive and law-abiding citizens (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:139).

In Sierra Leone, the DDR process was carried out in three phases; the first phase was carried out in February 1998, shortly after the reflection of President Kabbah (Dyck, 2011: 400). The objective of the phase was to dismantle over 32 000 of the different fighting forces between July 1998 and January 2000. The second phase of the programme commenced shortly after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in October 1999 and operated until May 2000. During this period, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) attempted to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate more than 45000 combatants to contribute to the larger peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone.

However, the process was soon disrupted by the resurgence of violence in the country and as a result, DDR was not able to be fully carried out until 2001 for example, there was still some disarmament taking place in Sierra Leone. It largely took place between May 2000 and May 2001, and it was during this period that over 2600 combatants were disarmed however, as previously mentioned, it was not until 2001 when the full and comprehensive disarmament programme resumed.

Phase 3 of the disarmament program took place between the 18th of May 2001 and January 2002. During this period, UNAMSIL attempted to recover from the setbacks it had experienced in the past because of the resurgence of violence in Sierra Leone. As a result, more support was offered to the programmes.

The DDR programme in Sierra Leone was considered an overall success by the UN and became a blueprint for how DDR programmes should be carried out in the future (Solomon and Ginifer, 2008:2). The Disarmament phase of the DDR programme was able to reach a significant amount of war combatants and victims. According to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2011), the programme disarmed approximately 72490 people and more than 30,000 weapons were collected from former combatants (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:138). Additionally, to close the gap between the people disarmed and the number of weapons collected: several other disarmament initiatives were launched. The UN Development Program initiated the launch of the Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) and Arms for Development (AFD) programs (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:138). All these programs were aimed at picking up from where the Disarmament phase left off and collecting more weapons.

The Demobilisation phase, which followed the disarmament phase was also able to achieve success for example, more than 71 043 former combatants went through the process, and this included approximately 4751 women and 6845 children (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:139). In terms of the reintegration of former combatants into society; the United Nations (2011) reported that 56700 former combatants were registered and part of the reintegration program by December 2002 (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:139). By January 2004, 51 122 former combatants were able to receive some form of support which assisted their reintegration into society for example, 12 182 received formal education to pursue agriculture, 28901 received vocational training and 444 were placed in employment. Furthermore, those who were not part of the programme received a once-off payment of \$150 (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:139).

The number of people that the programme was able to reach is no small feat and deserves to be acknowledged as an incredible achievement, however, the proclamation of the DDR process as an overall success by the United Nations is debatable. This is because although having achieved such high numbers, the Demobilisation process of DDR was riddled with issues. One of these was a failure to house the male and female combatants in separate spaces. This shortcoming led to the emergence of issues such as abuse, rape other forms of violence. Moreover, these camps were managed by men who often had a limited understanding of gender issues; therefore, issues were not efficiently addressed as they should be (Solomon and Ginifer, 2008:12).

Secondly, the introduction of criteria for eligibility in the disarmament process opened a can of worms as well. One of the regulations was that one had to have fought in the civil war and be able to present a service weapon or ammunition, to be eligible for disarmament (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:141). These strict rules were problematic for several reasons for example, some combatants, especially women and children, did not make use of the conventional weapons and were not in official service but were active in the civil war. Secondly, only certain weapons were accepted over others for instance, those usually associated with the RUF were often taken and destroyed whereas those of the CDF were not. This caused a weapons imbalance between the two sides and more hostility which eventually boiled over into the RUF violating a ceasefire by terrorising communities in certain parts of the

countryside and bringing the DDR programme to a standstill in 2000 (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:141).

The overall result of this was that a lot of the former combatants were excluded from the disarmament process which often led to some of them turning to criminal methods to be eligible for the title of 'former combatant' and thus be included in the process (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:141). It can thus be contended that the program was counter-productive in certain aspects.

The most notable critique of the program and its processes was that they were very top-down (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:148). The implementing agencies did not engage with Sierra Leoneans at a community level and some of them did not even know about the programme until the day of implementation. Community members thus had very little ownership over the program or its processes and instead were simply participants. Had the program entailed real bottom-up approaches to DDR, the community would have had more ownership of the processes, and this would have assisted the implementing agencies in acquiring a better understanding of the Sierra Leone context (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:148). The agencies would also have known the complexities regarding the identity of former combatants and how their criteria were not inclusive of all former combatants and assisted in building trust and ultimately reconciliation among people (Asiedu and Berghs, 2012:148).

Overall, Sierra Leone's DDR programme was successful to a certain extent as it managed to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate thousands of former combatants. However, it was not inclusive of the views of the local population. Instead, the local populations had no ownership and were simply participants in the programme. This exposed the Programme to several challenges as its criteria for weapons disarmament was also not cognisant of the complexities in Sierra Leone society. As a result, Asiedu and Berghs (2012) contend that if the programme had included bottom-up processes in its operations, it would have been aware of these realities.

#### **4.4.2. Police Reform**

This section will focus on the reformation of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). It will specifically be analysing the reforms aimed at improving the capabilities of the SLP and their impact on the relations between police and ordinary citizens of Sierra Leone. I contend that the United Kingdom and United Nations-led reforms were hybrid reforms that improved the overall policing in Sierra Leone.

The Kabbah regime sought to reform and reconstruct the Sierra Leone Police Force to ensure that it could be able to adequately respond to security issues in the post-conflict society (Gblah, 2006:86). Before these reforms, the police force was synonymous with rampant corruption, and poor services, being used as political tools and inefficiency. Moreover, the 1964 Police Act, which dictated how the force functioned was very limited in addressing mechanisms of accountability within the police force (Gblah, 2006:86). To address these shortcomings, the government and its international associates (United Nations and United Kingdom) launched and implemented a reform and restructuring programme which redefined not only the role of the Police Force but also its composition, training, budget allocation and services.

After the civil war, the SLP struggled with engaging the citizens due to the policing gaps that had existed in certain parts of Sierra Leone during the war and held perceptions regarding police. According to Furuzawa (2018:109), more than 70% of the population relies on informal justice structures. In response to these challenges, the SLP initiated Local Partnership Boards after having adopted the concept of 'local needs policing' during the three-phase reformation programme (Baker, 2005:371). Local needs policing was the SLP's objective of transforming from a police force which protects political regimes, to being a people-centred service provider (Albrecht, 2015:629). As a result, the SLP placed the community at the centre of policing in Sierra Leone.

The Partnership Boards are chaired by a civilian body that includes representatives from significant groups within the communities for example, the youth, Chiefs, religious leaders and leaders of business. The Boards act as additional support to the SLP and therefore provide intelligence, investigation, intervention, arrest and dispute resolution within the communities (Baker, 2008:560). In addition, the Chiefs within the boards have jurisdiction to

preside over certain minor crimes for example, theft, family disputes or matrimonial issues (Albrecht, 2015:615). Therefore, the Boards can combine formal policing methods with local or indigenous methods to improve policing in Sierra Leone. Put differently, this is a hybrid approach to policing.

The Local Policing Partnership Boards have also managed to change public perceptions about the SLP to a certain extent (Kabia, 2012:67). Citizens are now more accepting of the SLP due to their human rights record and engagement with local communities through the local needs policing programme. In addition, the increased visibility of the force as well as the establishment of human rights and family support units has improved the public perception of the force (Kabia, 2012:67). In a public survey conducted in 2008 by the International Alert and Conciliation Resources Organisation, the reputation of the police force had improved greatly as people no longer feared the police as they did before the war and there was more willingness among citizens to assist the police in fighting crime.

Local needs Policing has also led to the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) making significant progress in matters around human rights, professionalism, management as well and civilian police relations (Kabia, 2012:65). These improvements can be attributed to the improved working conditions for the police force for example, there are now better facilities, improved communication and support and improved training and recruitment processes (Kabia, 2012:65). It is now necessary to have a high school diploma to be part of the SLP. In addition, The SLP has been able to add more members to its regiment and as a result, has reached its pre-civil war strength of having 9500 officers. In turn, this has expanded its reach and visibility to areas outside of Freetown and the force has once again been able to be the main institution involved in the maintenance of security and order in Sierra Leone (Kabia, 2012:65). This can be illustrated by how the SLP was able to ensure a smooth and relatively peaceful election process in 2007, without the assistance of external actors such as the United Nations (Kabia, 2012:65). The Sierra Leone Police (SLP) was able to intervene timeously in disputes between political party supporters and maintained neutrality in the process of resolving such disputes.

Although the SLP has managed to improve, it is still confronted by several challenges. The first of these challenges relates to the sustainability of equipment and infrastructure in the

police force. Sierra Leone's security sector reforms are dependent on donor assistance, with the United Kingdom and other external actors providing significant economic and other material aid to improve the country's security sector (Horn and Olonisakin et al, 2006:112; Kabia, 2012:68). This has placed Sierra Leone in a state of dependence to these actors.

The acquisition of the hardware and building of the infrastructure is also dependent on donor assistance. Without it, the government cannot afford to carry the costs. In 2005 the SLP submitted a budget of \$27 million to the Treasury (Kabia, 2012:68). However, the Treasury was only able to provide \$12 million. These were much-needed funds which were going to assist in the day-to-day running of the SLP, therefore since they could not be provided, the SLP's efforts to maintain peace and order in Sierra Leone were hindered (Kabia, 2012:68).

In conclusion, it was very difficult for the police to conduct policing after the Civil War. The police force was synonymous with corruption, inefficiency and being used as a political tool by the state (Gblah, 2006:86). There was a clear need for reformation and through the UN and UK-led initiative, the Sierra Leone Police would undergo a critical reform to transform from a police force which protects political regimes, to being a police force that is centred around the needs of the local population. I argue that this was not a pure liberal or top-down approach but that it was hybrid because it did not only focus on rebuilding the state institution (SLP) but also involved the community in policing and drawing from their methods. When the government of Sierra Leone focused on the former, they were found wanting as there was little local ownership and there was little SLP visibility in some spaces (Baker, 2005:371). The latter hybrid method was able to provide local ownership whilst simultaneously working with the SLP to reach its objective of making Sierra Leone a safer space. This is important as it reinforces the main argument that liberal peacebuilding approaches had limited success in Sierra Leone and that it is only when the liberal (top) merged with the local (bottom) and formed a hybrid approach, that reforms can be successful.

#### **4.4.3. Armed Forces Reform**

Lastly, are the reformations implemented in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). This section will analyse the liberal and hybrid reforms implemented in the Armed Forces. It will show that RSLAF was successfully reformed, and I contend that this was due

to the adoption of hybrid methods of reformation instead of the conventional liberal state-centred methods.

Before the reforms, the RSLAF was faced with several challenges such as a lack of skills, poor command structures, corruption, outdated weaponry, and an overall inability to protect the country against perceived threats (Gbla, 2006:89). As a result, in 1999 the United Kingdom pledged its support to reform the RSLAF. The main objectives of RSLAF reform were to reduce the size of the military, improve the skills and preparation of the military, update command structures as well as the personnel, introduce new and advanced equipment and have more accountability in the RSLAF (Wannawon, 2021:12). It was assumed that these reforms would assist in building sustainable peace in Sierra Leone and the UN and the United Kingdom would be able to assist in achieving them. These were liberal reforms. I contend, however, that Sierra Leone adopted hybrid methods of reformation instead of the conventional liberal/state-centred methods.

The first illustration was the 2003 Defence White Paper by the government of Sierra Leone which demonstrated that the reformation of the RSLAF was not left entirely in the hands of the United Kingdom or external actors, but rather included the locals (Wannawon, 2021:13). The Paper was a product of several meetings between government officials and local leaders to discuss the possible strategies on how to reform the country's armed forces. It described in detail the ministry's mission to formulate, implement, monitor, and then evaluate a strategic defence policy for the RSLAF (Gbla, 2006:85). Moreover, it illustrated a clear understanding of the issues facing Sierra Leone's national security and proclaimed the maintenance of peace in the country as a top priority. Therefore, it was apparent that reformation would not simply be an application of pre-established standards and procedures in a Sierra Leonean context, but that they would be specific to the context.

Secondly, in terms of increasing the skills and preparation of the military; the International Monitoring and Training Team (IMATT), a British team in charge of reforming the military, struggled with reforming the RSLAFs at first (Wannawon, 2021:12; Neads, 2019:437). The Sierra Leone Armed Forces did not want to retain the theoretical information they were being taught and therefore, they could not carry it out practically. A British officer is quoted as saying "We tried to teach them the manouverist approach, which they politely listened to, and

then come the day, they would just line up and do what they did" (Neads, 2019:437). As a result, the UK focused on improving the RSLAF's existing procedures instead of replacing everything. Therefore, they adopted an adaptive rather than transformational approach to improving the skills of the RSLAF (Neads, 2019:438).

As a result of the White Paper (2003) recommendations, the RSLAF command structure and bureaucracy have been significantly improved. One of the challenges faced by the armed forces was not being under democratic control, however the establishment of a Ministry of Defence which was led by civilians decreased the power and dominance which had been held by the military in the past (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2013:8). The military is thus no longer able to have absolute and unchecked power of the entire Armed Forces (White Paper, 2003). Instead, there are now available checks and balances to ensure it remains accountable to the population, which in turn, reinforces the argument of hybrid peacebuilding being more effective than liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

Furthermore, the operational capacity of Sierra Leone's armed forces has also improved significantly. Observers have contended that armed forces have the basic capacity to defend and protect Sierra Leone against security threats. This was illustrated when the United Nations peacekeepers officially handed over the responsibility of national security to the RSLAF in September 2004 (Gbla, 2006:85). RSLAF personnel are much more equipped and trained in comparison to its inception in 2002 (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2013:8). Lastly, this restructuring also improved the institution's recruitment process by ensuring it is more fair, open and competitive (Gbla, 2006:85). As a result, soldiers are compensated appropriately and have improved living conditions than before, which boosted the overall personnel moral and led to an overall increase in efficiency within the RSLAF.

Public perception regarding the country's armed forces has also improved significantly. Whereas the general population was quite fearful and sceptical of the armed forces in the past, public surveys indicate that the armed forces are no longer considered a security threat. Soldiers are trusted more and relations between civilians and the military have improved a great deal (Kovacs, 2010:19).

Regarding shortcomings, the reformation process failed to achieve the first objective, which was the reduction in the size of the military. The IMATT contends that the size of the RSLAF is a big problem for sustainability as it is not affordable for Sierra Leone (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2013:11). Whereas the country can only afford about 3000 personnel without donor assistance, it needs 5000 personnel to operate therefore, the current 8500 (2013) is too large and not affordable.

Overall, I contend that the significant involvement of local players in the reformation process of the RSLAF has contributed to its success. Local involvement and ownership resulted in reforms that were context-specific and thus spoke to the needs of the people of Sierra Leone. The 2003 White paper, which detailed strategies for the reformation of the Armed Forces and its defence policies, was a joint effort between the national government and local actors of Sierra Leone (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2013:8). The result of local actor involvement was a defence reformation programme which was inclusive and context-specific instead of adopting standardised approaches. Moreover, there is now more civilian involvement in Armed Force bureaucracy than ever before and local actors are playing an active part in holding the military accountable through the Ministry of Defence (Wannawon, 2021:13). The success of these processes was not simply dependent on the actions of international actors but also local actors, which reinforces the view that hybrid peacebuilding was effective in successfully reforming the RSLAF.

#### **4.4.4. Conclusion**

In conclusion, this chapter has provided an analysis of the liberal and hybrid approaches implemented in Sierra Leone's political, economic, justice and security sectors. As demonstrated in the chapter, liberal peacebuilding initiatives are efficient in building peace in each of the abovementioned sectors, however only to a certain extent. Due to its top-down approach, liberal peacebuilding can build liberal institutions and transform the state into a liberal state, however, its success is very limited as it often excludes local actors. As a result, its processes are often heavily criticised by local populations and perceived as artificial. In contrast, hybrid peacebuilding initiatives, which advocate for local ownership and participation in the peacebuilding process, can produce more effective peacebuilding

initiatives. These processes attempt to combine both liberal and indigenous interventions into one effective strategy. Citizens become fully active participants in the peacebuilding process and this leads to increased ownership and legitimises the peacebuilding process.

## CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND FUTURE DIRECTION OF RESEARCH

*“One of the biggest issues facing the world today is the increasingly pervasive problem of civil conflict. As a result, developing strategies to resolve this violence has been a matter of considerable debate among policymakers, students and scholars” (Paris, 1997:54).*

26 Years later the words of Roland Paris (1997) are still true today as they were back then. Civil conflict is a major issue facing the world today and this has prompted scholars, students and policymakers to conjure up solutions to solve this persistent problem (Paris, 1997:54). There has been growing criticism regarding the current approach to building peace in the world. Current approaches to peacebuilding are dominated by liberal peacebuilding, an approach that builds peace by building or transforming states into becoming liberal states. The assumption behind the process is centred around the liberal peace doctrine which claims that liberal states are more peaceful than non-liberal states due to constraints within and outside of the state.

Mac Ginty (2010) and Richmond (2009) propose an alternative solution called hybrid peacebuilding. This is an approach which is neither foreign-led nor does it exclude local communities from the peacebuilding processes. Instead, Mac Ginty (2010) argues that peace can be built through a process that integrates both the local and liberal or international elements of the society for example, formal or liberal peacebuilding institutions integrated with traditional or indigenous institutions and actors. Through this integration, the local actor can play a more meaningful role in the peacebuilding process and can contribute towards building a context-specific peacebuilding strategy.

It is against this background that this thesis asks: which approach is more effective in building sustainable peace? To answer this, the thesis investigated which approach, between liberal and hybrid interventions, provided the necessary conditions for building sustainable peace in Sierra Leone after the 1991-2002 civil war. This was done by analysing the liberal and hybrid

peacebuilding interventions implemented in Sierra Leone's political, justice, security and economic sectors, and their impact on building sustainable peace.

### **5.1.1. Findings**

The thesis found that hybrid peacebuilding initiatives were more effective and impactful in building peace in Sierra Leone. Does this mean that liberal initiatives were not effective? No. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, liberal peacebuilding initiatives were successful, however, this success was often limited due to their top-down and state-centred approach. In contrast, the hybrid peacebuilding approach, which is inclusive of both the liberal and the local peacebuilding initiatives, drew on local values and practices to implement initiatives which could be locally-owned and have a wider reach. This is illustrated when one examines some of the implemented reforms.

#### **Political Reforms:**

In terms of political interventions, after the civil war, Sierra Leone established the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Registration Commission. The establishment of these institutions formed part of liberal interventions to prepare Sierra Leone for multiparty elections and in March 2002, Sierra Leone was able to successfully hold multiparty general elections. This was a moment of restoration for multiparty democracy in Sierra Leone as there were elections on the local, district and national levels.

The success of these liberal interventions was limited, however, because several ethnic groups did not participate in the process as they viewed the state as a distant and artificial entity which was completely disconnected from the daily realities of the ordinary civilian. This was an issue from a liberal intervention perspective because voter participation adds to the legitimacy of the process and its outcomes.

To remedy this, the government carried out several hybrid reformations to bridge the gap between the government and the ordinary citizen. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the government formally recognised indigenous institutions through the Chieftaincy Act in 2009. Paramount Chiefs also formed part of the Sierra Leone legislature in order for the ordinary

citizen to feel represented in the government structure. Lastly, the government decentralised its power for example, power was now distributed at the local levels to Councillors and Paramount Chiefs instead of being concentrated at the top. This proved to be successful as citizens felt empowered and further emphasised the argument that hybrid interventions were more successful than liberal interventions in building sustainable peace in Sierra Leone.

### **Justice and Security Sector Reforms:**

The same can be argued about Justice and Security Reforms in Sierra Leone. The TRC and the Special Court, both top-down liberal interventions established to build peace in Sierra Leone, reached thousands of Sierra Leoneans, obtained testimonies and confessions and prosecuted perpetrators of war crimes. However, the majority of the population did not participate in these interventions as they were perceived as being too formal and illegitimate. For example, the TRC was criticised for being too formalised and inaccessible as hearings were only held in provincial towns, whereas a large number of Sierra Leoneans lived in rural areas. In addition, citizens argued that the war hurt households and communities and because of this, there was a need to heal communities instead of just the individual.

The Fambul Tok initiative, established after criticism of the TRC, engaged locals on a village level and provided a platform for reconciliation which drew on local practices and values. This made it easily accessible for those in rural areas. Secondly, unlike the TRC, it focussed on the reconciliation between individuals and the community, therefore expanding its reach and impact. In light of this, citizens were able to take ownership of the process and perceived it as a legitimate and more effective process of building reconciliation and peace than the TRC. By 2010, more than 60 Fambul Tok ceremonies had taken place and more than four Districts had managed to foster reconciliation through Fambul Tok initiatives.

Additionally, the hybrid interventions in Sierra Leone's security sector such as policing and armed forces were also successful. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, hybrid reforms such as the Local Policing Partnership Boards in the Sierra Leone Police Force demonstrate how a combination of liberal and indigenous initiatives can produce a peacebuilding initiative that is context-specific and effective. Before these reforms, the SLP struggled to engage citizens as

they were still perceived as protectors of political regimes instead of public servants. After the Local Policing Partnership Boards initiatives, which sought to include citizens and drew on indigenous values and practices to improve policing in Sierra Leone, the SLP became capable of maintaining law and order in Sierra Leone.

Likewise, before the Defense White Papers and their implementation, the Armed Forces were faced with issues of corruption, and lack of skills and were not trusted by the general public. However, after the establishment of institutions such as the Ministry of Defence, which was civilian-led and the Paper which was based on the views and recommendations of citizens, the Armed Forces underwent significant reforms. There is now improved efficiency, power has been decentralised and the Forces are capable of protecting the state against national threats.

It is for this reason that I contend that liberal interventions were successful, however their success was limited in comparison to hybrid interventions. The TRC and SLSC impacted thousands of lives and managed to prosecute several perpetrators of war crimes, however, the majority of the population did not take part in these proceedings as they could not access them and felt that the processes were too formalised and individual-centred, whereas Sierra Leone was very community-centred. However, the Fambul Tok initiative, which drew on local practices and values, and was implemented at the village level, reached more citizens and it was a process which they could take ownership of. Similarly, the SLP and Armed Forces struggled with efficiency and engaging with citizens after the war, however, after the implementation of interventions such as the Local Policing Partnership Board and Defense White Paper, the efficiency of these institutions improved significantly for example, the SLP is capable of maintaining law and order in the state and the Armed Forces are capable of protecting Sierra Leone against national threats.

This research is significant because liberal peacebuilding has for several decades been presented as the ultimate solution to solving conflict in the world. However, this study demonstrates that the liberal approach has had limited success in building peace. It also explores alternative approaches such as hybrid peacebuilding interventions, which are more people-centred instead of state-centred and contends that this approach is more effective in building sustainable peace.

The hybrid approach shifts power dynamics radically. Instead of the state being the main actor in peacebuilding interventions, hybrid interventions introduce us to local actors such as religious leaders, community members and traditional leaders as legitimate main actors in peacebuilding interventions as well. Local actors are no longer passive recipients of peace interventions instead, they are active drivers of peace in their communities. Therefore, power over peace interventions is no longer in the hands of the state only, but also in the hands of local actors. Secondly, there is no longer an imposition of a standardised liberal template to building peace, instead, peacebuilding interventions draw on and incorporate indigenous knowledge and practices to build a peace which is inclusive and context-specific. Ultimately, hybrid interventions challenge claims that liberal interventions are the sole answer to building sustainable peace in a post-conflict environment.

### **5.1.2 Directions for Future Research**

Future research on peacebuilding should explore the agency of non-state actors in hybrid peacebuilding considering the shift in power dynamics. Secondly, As hybrid peacebuilding advocates for local ownership, I am interested in knowing how the values, norms and identities of local actors influence the form of peace they wish to create. It should also explore the effectiveness of hybrid peacebuilding in other African states.

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