XHOSA NARRATIVE:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCTION AND LINGUISTIC PROPERTIES OF DISCOURSE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO IINTSOMI TEXTS

THESIS

Submitted in Fulfilment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of Rhodes University

BY

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January 1986

To my father, Dr K.A. Gough, to
my mother, Mrs D.H. Gough, to
all my family and to Gail.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following people:

Professor D. Fivaz for his advice and encouragement. Without Professor Fivaz's patient assistance I would not have been able to complete this thesis.

Mrs Helen Murdoch for the many personal sacrifices she made in order for this thesis to be printed and completed. Mrs Murdoch offered an endless source of support and encouragement and I shall always appreciate her kindness and friendship.

Mr John Claughton for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of the final draft of this thesis. I have had the honour of having Mr Claughton as both a great teacher and as a friend.

Mr Stanley Bentele for assisting in the transcription of the narratives included. Mr Bentele's remarkable knowledge of Xhosa tone was also of considerable assistance.

The Reverend T. Matikinca and his family for their hospitality during the period that I collected material in the Transkei.

Mr Kevin Goddard for his friendship. Mr Goddard kindly helped in the typing of a part of this thesis.

Mr Russell Brown for his friendship and 'long distance' support.

Miss Marianna Visser for her friendship.

I would also like to thank Professor A.P. Hendrikse for the role he played in introducing me to linguistics.

Any errors and shortcomings in the work, remain my own.

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INTRODUCTION

0.1. Philosophical orientation

The view of scientific (including linguistic) inquiry taken in this thesis is that it does not tell us objective truths about an 'external world'. We hold that its subject matter is rather the relationship between man and his world - that bond that constitutes and defines his existence, presenting him with his 'raw' experiential data. The 'facts' that such data represent are not 'out there', separate from man, but nor are they 'all in the mind', separate from the world. Given the intimate relationship between man and his world we might agree with an eminent philosopher of science that 'facts' in themselves are 'theory laden'.[1]

We hold further that man is driven by an urge for coherence when confronted by the huge and chaotic array of such facts. The formulation of complex hypotheses to bring order to this chaos forms part of his everyday life. Such hypotheses require the full utilisation of the imaginative ingenuity that man is endowed with for their successful operation and they are thus all subject to some degree of arbitrariness and doubt.

The hypotheses created may be private, but they may also be shared so that, ultimately, whole communities may share the same view in order to explain some area of their experience. From this perspective, the individual attempting to understand his everyday world as well as entire cultures mapping out a particular world view, have in common a desire for order and coherence.

We need also note that having attained a particular frame of reference

individuals or communities may be reluctant to release it. So strong is the desire to bring a meaning and unity to experience that man, it appears, will hold onto a particular framework of interpretation even though all else may point otherwise.

It is in the context we have been outlining that scientific inquiry takes place. In terms of the traditional framework of logical positivism, such inquiry has, however, been thought to be based on 'empirical' facts, open to criticism and change as well as being free of values.[2] Furthermore, the construction of scientific theories has been seen to involve 'induction' and 'deduction', processes claimed to be governed by 'logical rules' alone. However, this traditional view denies the very imaginative creativity of man that enables him to construct the most basic of theories; it also denies that science is the ultimate celebration of such human ingenuity. Too long has scientific inquiry been judged in terms of 'truth' and 'falsity' where, surely, the judgement of such inquiry as a human enterprise should be in terms of the meaning and coherence it gives to domains of human beings' lived experience.

In the light of these arguments, the spirit under which this thesis is undertaken is that those involved in any form of academic inquiry should not adopt the rigid constraints imposed by logical positivism nor the epistemological anarchy proposed by Feyerarbend's 'anything goes', the ultimate reaction to such constraints.[3] Rather, those involved in such inquiry should attempt to objectify themselves from the constraints necessarily imposed on them by their approaches and theories, while maintaining a sense of wonder at the powers of creation in which they are involved. Furthermore, as the bounded framework of one theory is only one

of the many possible, we advocate a **multi**theoretical approach. This approach, unlike the rigid demarcations of a **mono**theoretical one, allows a shifting of perspective of the issues involved and thus a more holistic frame of reference.

0.2. Theoretical orientation

Our study of Xhosa narrative is mainly based on **iintsomi**[4] or folktale texts. Previous studies of Xhosa narrative have also concentrated on **iintsomi** - the exclusive domain of this inquiry being **folklore.** Before going on to review these studies we need first to examine the general concerns that folklore study has with regard to folktales and how they contrast with our own.

Folklore as a discipline consists of a wide range of different approaches and theories. Kriel (1980:28) mentions twelve including the historical-geographical, functional, oral formulaic, structural and contextual schools. What unites these different approaches, however, is a specific orientation to certain aspects of the folktale (amongst other recognised folklore genres) that distinguish folktales from other types of verbal interaction - as a manifestation of 'traditional', 'oral art' or 'oral literature'. Although the precise definition of 'tradition' and its general utility has proved problematic to current approaches to folklore, there is a consistent concentration on beliefs and practices that are, in some sense, "handed down". (See Opland, 1984:234-239 for a review of the relevant literature and defense of the relevance of 'tradition' for folklore). We may, in short, summarise the approach of folklore studies to the folktale as being in terms of the properties that characterise it as, specifically a **folk**tale.

Our approach is, in contrast, not in terms of the Xhosa folktale as a folktale as such, but rather as a **type of narrative**, and beyond this, as a **type of discourse.** In this respect, our concern with folktales is both wider and narrower than folklore studies. It is wider in that it examines general linguistic and discourse properties of folktales over and above their 'traditional' and 'artistic' qualities, and it is narrower in the very fact that it ignores such definitive properties. The general domain in terms of which we undertake our examination is **discourse analysis.**

As introductory texts on the subject tell us, discourse analysis has as its general concern an examination of various issues above the level of the sentence, which is the traditional domain of linguistic inquiry (see Stubbs, 1983:1-12, Hoey, 1984:1-34, for an overview). Given this broad domain of inquiry, discourse analysis, like the study of folklore, displays a variety of different approaches. Underlying this variety, however, four basic and interrelated areas of concern appear to be involved. These areas are:

1) the surface linguistic properties of discourse;
2) the conceptual basis of discourse from which the surface discourse ultimately derives;
3) the nature of the relationship between the surface discourse and its conceptual basis;
4) the relationship of the discourse in general to the context in which it occurs.

The last area mentioned above, the relationship between a discourse and its context, has as its domain of research such areas as sociolinguistics and the ethnography of speaking, which examine the social and cultural aspects of discourse (see Saville-Troike, 1983 for a review). Also included in this

area is linguistic pragmatics, the general study of the use of language.

Studies of the **surface** of discourse concentrate solely on the level of the linguistic manifestation of a discourse. These studies include examinations of linguistic 'cohesion' (see Halliday and Hasan, 1976), formal grammars of surface discourse regularities (see Hobbs, 1983 for a review) and taxonomies of information found in varieties of discourse (see Grimes, 1975, Polanyi, 1981).

Studies of the **conceptual basis** of discourse - the knowledge structures and processes underlying discourse - have traditionally been the domain of artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. Schank and Abelson (1977), Abelson (1981) and Wilensky (1983), in this regard, describe knowledge structures (termed frames, scripts and goals) which they claim are fundamental to the comprehension and production of discourse. Also relevant is the study of discourse memory. Chafe, a linguist, has stressed the importance of investigation into this area for a full understanding of discourse phenomena (see Chafe, 1974, 1979, 1980). Research into cognitive psychology has come to similar conclusions (see, for example, Thorndyke and Yekovitch, 1980, Yekovitch and Thorndyke 1981).

Recent research on discourse has emphasised that for a true understanding of discourse besides its **individual** properties, the **relationship** between the last two areas discussed - the surface and conceptual basis of discourse - needs thorough examination (see, for example, Lindemann, 1983). We distinguish two aspects to this relationship. The first is in terms of the relationship between the linguistic categories manifest in the surface discourse and the conceptual categories they encode. This inherently

concerns the nature of the connection between the linguistic sign ('that which represents') and its signatum ('that which is represented') as has been investigated in much of Jacobson's work (for a review, see Waugh, 1976, Sangster, 1982).

The second aspect mentioned above is in terms of the psychological factors involved in the comprehension and production of discourse - the cognitive processes that relate the conceptual and memorial basis of discourse to its surface manifestation. Research into this area is extensive, and a number of divergent theories have been postulated (see, for example Chafe, 1980, unpublished, de Beaugrande, 1980, 1984, van Dijk and Kintsch 1983).

Although we shall necessarily be discussing the surface and conceptual basis of discourse, the central concern in this dissertation is with the two areas discussed above as well as the general domain of discourse inquiry they represent.

Our first concern can be described as "linguistic" in nature. We utilize descriptive approaches to narrative in order to characterise the linguistic categories apparent in Xhosa narrative in terms of their discourse functions. In this regard we shall be drawing heavily on Jacobson's notion of the non-arbitrary or **iconic** relationship between the linguistic sign and its signatum. The notion of iconicity - defined in terms of an isomorphic relationship between a sign and what it encodes - has recently enjoyed an upsurge of interest (see, for example, Haiman, 1980, 1983, Hopper and Thompson, 1984).

We hope, in this area of our discussion, to redefine traditional assumptions

and methods of linguistic inquiry. Firstly, we base our arguments on naturally occurring data. Much of modern linguistics is, in contrast, based on contrived data, which, while not necessarily without its own value, tends to limit the type of phenomena described. Secondly, in our examination of iconicity, we shall be investigating linguistic phenomena in terms of underlying conceptual properties. Many current linguistic theories are based on the premise that knowledge of language is divorced from other types of knowledge - that it forms an encapsulated and separate domain which is independently describable apart from other areas of man's psychological being. While much of language may merit such a view, we hope to demonstrate that, carried to its extremes, it disguises rather than explains many linguistic phenomena. Our approach, we hope, describes an alternate view which may serve to correct the balance.

Our second concern in terms of the relationship between discourse surface properties and their conceptual foundation is with the processes and structures involved in the comprehension and, specifically, production of discourse with particular reference to the Xhosa **intsomi.** We shall, in this section, criticise a previous model dealing specifically with the production of **iintsomi.** This has been postulated by Scheub (e.g. 1975) within the domain of folklore studies. We shall also examine a more general model of folktale production claimed to be of universal significance, as described by cognitive psychologists. After noting shortcomings of this model we go on to present our own model based on general principles which, as we shall see are derived from, and have implications for phenomena beyond our immediate data.

0.3. A review of previous research

Having reviewed our general orientation and how it contrasts with that of folklore studies we now go on to an examination of recent literature concerning the **intsomi** within the latter domain.

Nkonki (1968) presents a thesis entitled "The traditional prose literature of the Ngqika" which is largely a taxonomy of traditional narrative genres of the Ngqika (a Xhosa group). Nkonki makes it clear from the start that his classification is somewhat arbitrary. He states that however convenient the grouping of traditional literature "may be to the educated man" it is "probably meaningless to the narrators" (ibid:20). His is thus "an interpretive analysis of the narrations" and "is not and cannot be a law binding to the narrators whose inspiration knows no such confines" (ibid).

With this qualification in mind, Nkonki goes on to distinguish myths, legends, fables, folktales and foreign tales, giving characteristics of each of these genres (ibid:20-22). (In his classification, it may be noted, Nkonki relegates folktales to a "subtype" of fables). Nkonki then goes on to illustrate his classification with various Ngqika texts.

In this illustration, however, Nkonki's original classification is not consistently applied; his definitions are loose, and his terminology is vague. In the original classification, for example, fables form a separate genre. We learn later that there is "the type of myth which assumes full story form such as the fables" (ibid:40). In general the relationship between Nkonki's categories and the illustrations themselves is far from clear cut. Even given his earlier warnings as to the arbitrariness of his classification, such inconsistencies tend to undermine what is otherwise a

valuable piece of work (see Neethling, 1979:20-22 for related criticism).

Nkonki also includes an analysis of the 'linguistic and literary nature' of the various genres he distinguishes. Each genre is examined in terms of such categories as narrator's style, language and manner of narration. As no other research has specifically examined the style of various Xhosa narratives, this aspect of his work is of immense value. Nkonki's linguistic analysis, however, is rather superficial and repetitive.

The greatest contribution of Nkonki's work is in terms of the variety of data presented. In giving an overview of other types of narrative besides the type of **iintsomi** examined in other works dealing with Xhosa narrative in one way or another, Nkonki's work leads to a wider perspective on Xhosa narrative discourse in general. The texts that are included in Nkonki's work should be valuable to further research in this area.

Neethling (1979) presents a comprehensive analysis of the **iintsomi** within a broad and multifaceted structuralist framework. After a review of the relevant literature in Chapter 1, he goes on to the first of his structuralist concerns in chapter 2 in the form of a Proppian analysis of a number of personally collected Xhosa tales. (45 tales are, in fact, analysed and they are included in an appendix. The included tales form part of larger collection).

According to Proppian structural analysis the basic component of the tale is the **function** which Propp (1971, org. 1928) in his original study of Russian tales defined as "an act of character defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action" (ibid:21). Each such function is

described, given a name, symbol and a number. Examples of functions include **departure**, **interdiction**, **violation** and **return**. What is crucial to Propp's insights is that **what** is done in the tale remains constant (as functions) while **who** specifically is involved, and **how** it is specifically done varies. It is the task of the researcher to abstract functions from his data. This task Neethling duly undertakes and presents his findings as to the manifestations of functions in his **Xhosa** data.

Neethling then goes on to an examination of Propp's now well known postulates concerning tale structure. Based on his abstraction of functions, Propp (1968:21-22) makes the following four proposals:

1) "Functions of characters serve as stable constant elements in the tale independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental components of the tale."
2) "The number of functions known to the fairy tale is limited." (Propp finds 31 functions in his data).
3) "The sequence of functions is always identical."
4) "All fairy tales are of one type with regard to structure."

Neethling finds that the first two postulates are indeed applicable to his Xhosa data. Propp's model thus appears to work cross culturally as is, in fact, suggested by Dundes in his introduction to Propp's work. Neethling finds, however, that the last two postulates do **not** apply to his data. Instead of an identical sequence of functions he finds "a rich variety of combinations of functions" ("'n ryke verskeidenheid van kombinasies van funksies" ibid:157). Due to the diversity of his Xhosa material with regard to theme, character and plot ('intrigebou') Neethling (ibid:159) also rejects the notion that Xhosa tales are of "one type with regard to

structure", an implication of Propp's last postulate. Propp's view that Russian tales could be derived from one basic form via transformations thus cannot be applied to Xhosa tales.

The lack of an examination of the full ramifications of these findings represents one of the few weaknesses of Neethling's otherwise meticulous research. There are far-reaching implications for the utility of the Proppian framework if functions as manifest in the Xhosa **iintsomi** do not occur in a particular order - similar ramifications in linguistic morphology would hold, surely, if it were found that although morphemes were found in language, they do not occur in any particular sequence. Grammars of folktales based on the very linearity Propp proposes have indeed been formulated (see Colby, 1973). In Oosthuizen's examination of Zulu tales (Oosthuizen, 1977) the ordering of functions is, in fact, vital to the model she develops. Sequenced functions form the structural dimension of the Zulu tales. They operate over the 'semantic' or content dimension so that there is a "logical pattern or sequence within a definable framework" (ibid:122). By basing her analysis on smaller units than the tale as a whole the linearity of functions is maintained. Neethling, however, appears unacquainted with Oosthuizen's research as he does not offer any discussion of it.

For an adequate structural model, many approaches are necessary (ibid:166). For this reason Neethling goes on to an examination of the formal structural features ("formele strukturele kenmerke") of **iintsomi** which lie beyond the scope of Proppian analysis. In his discussion of the importance of repeated elements - songs ("refreine"), magic formulas and dialogues - he reaches similar conclusions to Scheub, whose views will be discussed later.

Neethling includes an examination of the functions of the opening formulas - usually **kwathi ke kaloku ngantsomi** ('and now for an **intsomi**') - and closing formulas - usually **phela phela ngantsomi** ('the **intsomi** has ended') - which frame the **intsomi**. Their main function, Neethling notes (ibid:171), is to place boundaries between the world of the tale and the world of the every day.

Neethling's final chapter is devoted to various socio-cultural aspects related to the **iintsomi**. Neethling is thus not only concerned with the text but with the context of performance. The chapter contains valuable ethnographic data for anyone interested in this aspect of the **intsomi**.

Neethling's first concern is with the immediate context of performance. The **iintsomi** are usually, but not necessarily, told in the evening after the day's work is done. Performers, who are usually women, assume a prominent position amongst their audience (usually in the middle) which has an important shaping effect on the tale (ibid:244-260).

Xhosa **iintsomi** are manifestations of Xhosa culture and thus reflect the norms and values of the people. Aspects of Xhosa culture which Neethling investigates include the nature of fertility and marriage, growing up, family relationships and the Xhosa economic system (ibid:260-276).

Iintsomi also reflect the moral and ethical expectations of the Xhosa. In their movement from conflict (usually in terms of the disruption of social order) to resolution (usually in terms of the restoration of social balance) **iintsomi** reflect the striving for an ideal society which is constantly being threatened by evil forces (ibid:276-283).

Neethling concludes his work with a discussion of the functions of the **iintsomi**. Besides an aesthetic and entertainment function, **iintsomi** are didactic, although never moralising. As Xhosa values and norms are implicit in the tales, they serve a valuable pedagogical role. The tales demonstrate to the children involved in a performance that, for example, disobedience and the breaking of interdictions may have serious consequences (ibid:289-294).

Scheub's extensive literature on the **intsomi** is based on research conducted in the Transkei and KwaZulu between 1967 and 1968. This research originally formed the basis of his doctoral dissertation (Scheub,1969) which includes a volume of selected tales from his reported collection of 3,946 tales in all. Our discussion is based on Scheub (1975), a published and revised version of his dissertation. Scheub's views are presented in a more concentrated form in his articles (Scheub, 1970, 1974 for example).

Scheub's consistent concentration throughout his work on the **intsomi** (which he terms **ntsomi** in the singular and **ntsomis** in the plural) is on its properties as an **artistic** performance. He emphasises throughout that the accomplished narrator is an **artist** who, in rendering one particular performance, produces a work of art which is unique. In this regard Scheub's work is much in keeping with a popular view in folklore studies which emphasises folklore performances as **events** which cannot be defined in terms of the verbal text alone (see Ben-Amos, 1971).

Scheub's main interest appears to be a theory of **intsomi composition.** As we shall be concerned with such a theory, we shall hold our criticisms of Scheub's approach over to a later stage. Here we shall only concentrate on

giving an outline of his views on this area.

According to Scheub, one of the main materials of composition of **iintsomi** is what he terms the **core-image** stored in the performer's memory. This is a "discontinuous" or "abstract" "mental picture (Scheub, 1975:46,47) which the narrator has "distilled" from previous performances she has witnessed (ibid: 46). The image is "not in itself complete at the mental stage" (ibid) and, at this stage, represents only a "distillation of the full performance" (ibid). Performers have a (individually determined) "repertoire" of such images (ibid). At the 'mental stage' they have no "plot form" . The images making up one particular performance are only put together in a linear order during the performance itself (ibid).

At the "centre" or "nucleus" of each image is the **core-cliche** (ibid:46) - "an easily remembered" song, chant or saying forming the most stable and unchanging part of the tradition (ibid:90). When "recalled" the core-cliche "evokes a cluster of details or suggests the original details [of the core-image] which can be objectified i.e. performed" (ibid:46). The core-images clustering around the core-cliche are not memorised and the narrator is free to adapt them to her particular performance through, for example, adding her own details or adding details selected from another image (ibid:92).

The core-images, representing the performer's "inherited tradition", form part of the materials of composition "external" to her (ibid:45). Another such external factor is the **audience** involved in any performance (ibid:58-61). As the audience all knows the traditional images, the performer is forced to "create works of special merit" (ibid:58).

Materials which are "**personal**", as opposed to "external", to the narrator, such as the poetic use of language as well as gesture have an important shaping effect on the performance (ibid:61-72). Language is only part of the performance as a whole:

> Gesticulation, body movement, and vocal dramatics are clearly and consistently related to the narrative in process and directly tied to the verbal element of the **ntsomi**.
> (ibid:72).

Another important personal material is the narrator's imagination. According to Scheub:

> ... it is the imagination that directs and controls the process of cueing and scanning [to be discussed], that relates the core image to the theme; imagination determines the choice of words and allied gestures, vocal dramatics and musical rhythmic framework.
> (ibid:73-74).

Scheub goes on to describe the process of composition itself. He postulates that initially in a performance the performer has already a "broad theme", namely that her performance will include an initial conflict and a move to resolution (ibid:90). Given this framework, the performer selects a core-image appropriate to her performance through a "complex process of cueing and scanning" (ibid). It is through this process that images are "recalled and objectified" (ibid). The process must be seen in the light that "nothing is memorised" and that the performer is free to make changes (ibid).

The **cues** involved in the cueing process are mostly manifest in the core-cliche around which the image is structured. Once recalled the cue provides

the performer "with an immediate and conscious suggestion which will, in turn, call up spontaneously many details and episodes that cluster about the cue to form the image" (ibid:93). The process, according to Scheub, "occurs at great speed, no doubt" (ibid).

Associated with the cueing process is a **scanning** process. Through this process the performer selects images and details which are appropriate to her performance. This process, according to Scheub, "probably occurs below the level of consciousness" (ibid:95).

To "lock" the images together and "provide their unity" the performer uses (inter alia) what Scheub terms **interlocking images.** Interlocking images do not form part of the main body of the performance but rather serve a supporting function to the images that do (ibid:128). A further, more sophisticated, process is the technique of using **interlocking** details - "hints, clues, echoes planted in earlier images that are realised or developed in later images" (ibid:132). A more common and less sophisticated technique is the use of **transitional details** - details that form "bridges" between images. They are most commonly details concerning travelling which describe characters moving from one situation (embodied in one image) to another situation (embodied in a subsequent image) (ibid:134).

Scheub also presents a discussion on **repetition** - "the most obvious and aesthetic characteristic of the **ntsomi** performance" (ibid:3). The image, in this regard is an "expansible" one in that it can be (optionally) "expanded" or repeated "as often as the performer desires" (ibid:104). Subtle changes in each of the repetitions allows an incremental development of plot, and this gradual development, in turn, is used by accomplished performers to

increase tension in their tales. (To illustrate what Scheub means by the "expansible" image, consider the repetition involved in the dog-girl interaction in text 5 in appendix 2). More complex repetition is to be found in the occurrence of **patterned image sets** and **parallel image sets.** Patterned image sets refers to "the joining and contrasting of almost identical sets of images" (ibid:156). An example of the latter which Scheub gives is a tale in which there are two similar image-sets concerning the contrasting behaviour of two sisters. The details of each of these parts of the narrative are similar - both sisters meet the same characters who request them to do the same tasks. The contrast arises through the fact that in the first image the first sister complies with the requests and is rewarded while in the second image the second sister does not and is punished. According to Scheub:

> The pattern for the narrative is set up in the first set of images (that detailing the first sister's activities) and it is on the way that the second sister deviates from that model that the point of the narrative is made. (ibid:156).

Scheub's notion of parallel image-sets - "a natural development of expansible images and patterned sets" - is a complex and central one and deserves the following lengthy quotation:

> Sets of parallel images are a complex structural device utilized in the oral narrative traditions for the purpose of binding diverse narrative plots into a dialectic relationship. The performer brings a number of narrative plots together, diverse plots which could be externalised singly or in, a variety of arrangements; she seeks to bind these plots together, giving them an illusion of union. But it is not simply a single narrative plot - or the illusion of a single narrative plot - that she seeks to create; she also attempts to bring the various plots into a single **thematic** focus. (ibid:159).

An example of parallel image-sets offered by Scheub is a tale that concerns the disobedience of a girl. In the first image set the girl disobeys her parents. In the subsequent parallel image she is given another task, herding sheep, in which she shows disobedience in treating the sheep in a disrespectful manner.

In the first image-set, according to Scheub,

> The girl disobeys her parents, thus defying the custom whereby the child strictly obeys the word of her elders. The second, parallel image reflects the first: the girl's arrogance in disobeying her parents is mirrored in her arrogance to the sheep. The customs of human society thus find their **thematic** counterpart in the natural world, and the performer is emphasising the metaphorical parallel between the natural world and the human. (ibid:161)

Recent research into other Southern Bantu folktales within the domain of folklore includes Oosthuizen's partially Proppian analysis of Zulu folktales which we have read above (Oosthuizen, 1977). Outside of the Nguni group, Swanepoel (1983) presents an analysis of Tswana tales inspired in many ways by Oosthuizen's (see esp. p32). Swanepoel includes an examination of 'qualitative elements' involved in the tales including various literary features such as the use of time and space and perspective (ibid:128-139) He also discusses certain linguistic aspects of the tales (as part of their 'quantitative elements') such as the types of sentences manifest in them (ibid:86-94). Guma (1967), dealing with another Sotho dialect presents a classification and discussion of various Southern Sotho folklore genres, including the folktale (see esp. pp 4-38).

Of a more general nature is Kriel's "The Southern Bantu folktale: a value

reflection approach" (1980). This is an important work in that it offers a general perspective on the principles and concerns of folklore with specific regard to the folktale (see esp. pp 14-28). In this work Kriel also gives a review and criticism of previous approaches to the folktale in general and the Southern Bantu folktale in particular (ibid:28-82). Kriel's main concern is how folktales reflect the values of those who tell and participate in them (see esp. pp 93-115). The domain of his discussion is wide, and includes tales drawn from the Nguni, Sotho, Tsonga and Shona language groups.

We need also mention Finnegan's by now classical work entitled "Oral literature in Africa" (Finnegan, 1970). Finnegan (a world-renowned folklorist) gives an overall discussion as to the nature of African 'oral literature' with a consistent concentration on their literary and artistic qualities. (For her review of 'prose genres' including the folktale, ibid:315-380.)

0.4. A note on the data

The **iintsomi** that form the bulk of our discussion were collected in Toko (Butterworth district) and Taleni (Idutywa district) in the Transkei between 18th and 25th of June 1984. All in all 74 **iintsomi** by 47 narrators were recorded. A selection of five of these **iintsomi** is included in an appendix and most of the examples in the body of this work are drawn from them. The five tales included were selected largely in terms of their fluency and representativeness of our general collection. The majority of the collected tales were narrated by adolescent girls between the ages of twelve and nineteen years, and we include two tales told by a member of this group (texts 2 and 3). There is a greater proportion of female than

male narrators and hence we include two tales by adult women (texts 1 and 5) and only one tale by an adult male (text 4). More particulars concerning these narrators are presented in the appendix.

The tales were also selected in terms of their content. The five **iintsomi** display a variety of plots and themes which are present in the tradition. Two of the tales show partial overlap, however, and were selected for comparative purposes (texts 3 and 5).

The method of transcription followed is in terms of numbering certain sections of the tales. The utility of this numbering, besides facilitating the reading of the translations which display parallel numbering, will become clearer in the body of this work.

It may be argued that **iintsomi** are unsuitable for the rather general nature of the analysis we present. The **iintsomi** may involve oral formulas (as investigated by Lord, 1965, for example,) which might influence their production. Furthermore, their inherently 'artistic' or 'literary' qualities may undermine our general conclusions which ignore such qualities. However, such features, it needs to be stressed, are not necessarily exclusive to the folktale. Research has shown that formulas similar to the type mentioned above are involved to a very large extent in everyday conversational narratives (see Pawley and Sydner, 1984 for example). Artistic features commonly associated with more 'literary' genres are also highly prevalent in such narratives. In a discussion entitled 'Literary complexity in everyday story telling', Polanyi (1982:155) notes, that even everyday narratives "present much of the complexity and ambiguity to the analyst which is often associated with verbal art".

Despite these points, and to ensure that our conclusions are not based on too limited a data we include an example of a further type of narrative in the appendix. This narrative was one of four collected under experimental conditions.[5] Our 'subjects', who were four mother-tongue Xhosa speaking undergraduate students of Rhodes university, were shown a cartoon without sound track but with English subtitles. The cartoon (of approximately two minutes duration) concerned various events involving a wolf (dressed as a game warden) a rabbit and a clown. The subjects were then asked individually to describe 'what happened' in the cartoon. The subsequent narratives were recorded simultaneously by two Xhosa and two non-Xhosa speakers who acted individually as audience to each of the individual narrators. The narratives, to be referred to the body of this work the **cartoon narratives**, were then transcribed with the help of a Xhosa speaker. English narratives, narrated by English speaking students, were collected the following day as a control measure.

We found that our general views and conclusions concerning narrative were equally applicable to the cartoon narrative. Examples from the cartoon narrative included in the appendix are thus treated in the same way as those from the included **iintsomi**. We do note at this point, however, that research into everyday conversational narratives occurring in natural contexts, despite difficulties in their appropriate collection, would prove of immense value to the future of Xhosa narrative research.

0.5. **Purpose and organisation of this study**

Although the areas I intend to investigate are rather diverse, what unites them is a concern for the ancient and fascinating question of the relationship between language and thought. Assumptions concerning the

latter are surely latent as the basis for any inquiry into language. One of my general purposes is to give some overt orientation to this problem which is all too often simply glossed over.

More particularly, I am also concerned with shaping a new approach to Bantu linguistic inquiry in terms of an emphasis on discourse analysis. In the context of the burgeoning of discourse analysis internationally, the field has been seriously neglected in Southern Africa. Studies of discourse are, we believe, vital to advancing our knowledge of inter-ethnic communication and understanding, an area that cannot be ignored in Southern Africa.

In more general terms, I hope that this thesis represents a challenge to linguistic inquiry in ways that we have already outlined above. Most importantly, is that while it appears that most South African linguists are satisfied with adopting a rigid monotheoretical approach, I differ, advocating a multitheoretical perspective. This, I believe, allows a greater and more holistic view not only of the 'data' in question but also in terms of the general nature of inquiry, as well as the 'world' it attempts to describe.

The body of this thesis is divided into two sections which reflect the two central concerns we have outlined above. Section A, divided into three chapters, is chiefly concerned with the conceptual basis of Xhosa narrative and its linguistic manifestation. In this section we shall find cause to query and to redefine traditional approaches to the linguistic categories manifest in Xhosa narrative.

In section B, also divided into three chapters, we shall be concerned with

the development of a theory of narrative production with specific reference to **intsomi** production. In this section we include an in depth criticism of previous approaches to this problem before developing and applying our own theory.

There are two appendices attached to this thesis. The first presents certain tables and figures relevant to chapter 4, while the second includes the narrative texts from which we draw our examples.

Footnotes to Introduction

1) T. Kuhn in his "The structure of scientific revolutions" (1962)

2) Logical Positivism (also known as Empirical Positivism) is a school of philosophy that views scientific theories as deductive algorithms controlled by logical and mathematical principles alone. Logic is seen as the basis for all scientific knowledge and anything regarded as 'metaphysical' is rejected. A major tenet of Logical Positivism is **verificationism** - the notion that theories may be directly confirmed or refuted by experience. Modern Logical Positivism has its roots in the early 1930s. Some of its early proponents were Carnap, Friegl and Hempel. 'Positivistic' ideas are also manifest in the work of Popper. For a historical review of the different schools of the philosophy of science, including Logical Positivism, see Losee (1972). For a review of recent thought, see Mannoia (1980).

3) Feyerabend (1975:23) - "The only principle that does not inhibit progress is **anything goes**". Feyerabend's radically relativist views are encapsulated in the following qoutation (ibid: 17):

> Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives.

4) In Xhosa the plural for folktales is **iintsomi** while the singular is **intsomi** (with one 'i'). We shall use these Xhosa singular and plural forms throughout this thesis, unlike others, notably Scheub, who make the anglicised distinction between **ntsomi** and **ntsomis**.

5) The procedures and methodology followed here are largely inspired by the similar way in which narratives (termed 'the pear stories') were collected in Chafe (1980).

Section A

Linguistic categories in Xhosa narrative

> The very life of language lies in the continual interplay of form and meaning, which two planes are not only intimately connected, but frequently present us with striking similarities.
> (Sangster, 1982:45)

Theoretical orientation

From Aristotle to Chomsky, as Haiman (1983:781) points out, the relationship between form and meaning has been regarded as an arbitrary one. One outstanding exception to this view has been Jakobson who emphasised that "meanings are necessarily and essentially tied to forms" and that, in terms of the notion of the linguistic sign, the relationship between signans (that which is signified) and the signatum (that which signifies) is an intimate one (Waugh, 1976:48). One type of such a relationship that Jakobson explored extensively is **iconicity**, defined by Waugh as "a factual similarity between signans and signatum" (ibid:47). (For a review of Jakobson's research into iconicity, see Waugh, 1976:47-48 and Sangster, 1982:42-46. For recent research, see Haiman, 1980, 1983 and Enkvist, 1981.)

In this section we shall largely be concerned with a specific type of iconic relationship - that between various conceptual categories and linguistic categories manifest in Xhosa narrative. Our general orientation is inspired by the following quotation from Haiman (1983:816):

> I would like to suggest that linguistic categories may be derived from, and ultimately may be similar to, conceptual categories, in much the same way that phonemes are derived from, and similar to the actual sounds of speech.

We shall also be emphasising Jakobson's view that language is a system, forming a network of relations in terms of which individual signs take their significance from their relationship to the whole system. Our view, like Jakobson's is that:

> Language is a structural entity in which everything is in some way and by some means, related to everything else, in a paradigmatic hierarchical structure...Each item has a place in the overall pattern, especially with respect to the communicative function, and this place determines its inherent nature as well as its relationship to everything else. At the same time, its inherent nature and relationship to everything else determines its place in the pattern; there is an overall dependency of mutual implication.
> (Waugh, 1976:55).

This section is divided into three chapters. In chapter 1 we find that the cognitive distinction between figure and ground forms the basis of certain linguistic categories manifest in Xhosa narrative, and we go on to reassess traditional approaches to such categories in this light. In chapter 2 we explore the encoding of narrative cohesion in terms of certain aspects of the Xhosa verbal system. We also investigate other types of cohesive devices in Xhosa, such as intonation and lexical markers.

In chapter 3 we turn our attention to the encoding of the 'things' or discourse entities involved in Xhosa narrative. We develop various pragmatic rules controlling agreement and related phenomena. We also include a discussion of certain features of the nominal encoding of discourse entities.

CHAPTER 1

Background and Foreground in Narrative

1.1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall initially give an introductory outline to the types of information that constitute narrative in general. We shall claim that these information types reflect a basic property of human cognition, namely the distinction between figure and ground. We then go on to reassess the traditional treatment of the various linguistic categories manifest in Xhosa narrative in terms of this distinction. The nature of cohesion, another issue introduced in this chapter, will be developed to a greater length in the next chapter.

1.2. Background and foreground

In narrating a narrator recounts a series of events. He describes "what happens" in the real or imaginary story world he is creating. Linguistically such events encode in **event clauses** which form the **event structure** in the narrative as a whole (Labov, 1981:225; Polanyi 1979:208).

The events which make up the narrative do not, however, occur in a vacuum; they need to be situated in the context which necessarily forms their setting. The narrator thus offers orientational and situational information describing where and when and under what circumstances the events occur. The latter forms the **durative descriptive** (d/d) structure (Polanyi, 1976:65-66). The durative descriptive structure forms the background in terms of which the foregrounded events are comprehended.

The binary distinction between background and foreground information is one of the most basic made in discourse analysis. According to Hopper and Thomson (1980:280):

> Users of language are constantly required to design their utterances in accord with their own communicative goals and with their perception of their listener's needs. Yet, in any speaking situation, some parts of what is said are more relevant than others. That part of a discourse which does not immediately and critically contribute to the speaker's goal but which merely assists, amplifies or comments on it, is referred to as BACKGROUND. By contrast, the material which supplies the main points of the discourse is known as the FOREGROUND.

In metaphorical terms, the foreground event clauses of a narrative form its skeleton - its basic structure comprising the most salient information which advances the story itself. The background adds flesh to this skeleton - not advancing the story but characterising the backdrop against which the story develops. (See Callow, 1974; Grimes (ed), 1978; Longacre and Woods (eds), 1976 for discussion and application to various languages.)

Besides being the more **salient** information in a narrative, foreground event clauses are arranged in terms of temporal sequence forming an **event** or **time** line. The order of the event clauses thus represents (i.e. is **iconic** to) the chronological order of the events they encode. Consider the following example, an extract taken from text 6 in the appendix:[1]

1 a) yahamba lahamba

b) lithe lisahamba njalo
ladibana nomvundla

c) umvundla **e-**
lafika ijoni labuza kumvundla ukuba
khange liwubone umvundla

d) umvundla lo nawo wayenxiba **in**-indevu
apha-apha **in e-m-** apha phezu komlomo

e) wathi-wabuza umvundla
unjani lo mvundla uwufunayo

f) lathi-lathi-**l-la**-lathi eli joni ukuphendula
ufana nawe

g) wathi umvundla
hayi zange ndilibone
zange ndiwubone umvundla oneendevu

h) wathi le nto umvundla
hayi hamba
mhlawumbi uphazamile

i) hayi ke nejoni laqonda okokuba mhlawumbi limele ukuba
liphazamile

j) lahamba labuyela umva

k) lithe lisahamba njalo
lafika laqonda ukuba **no**

a) He travelled and travelled.

b) While he was so travelling
he met a rabbit.

c) The rabbit-
the soldier arrived and asked the rabbit whether
it had seen a rabbit at all.

d) (The rabbit was wearing a beard
here above his mouth)

e) The rabbit asked,
"What's this rabbit like that you're looking for?"

f) The soldier answered,
"He looks like you."

g) The rabbit said,
"I've never seen a rabbit with a beard."

h) The rabbit said again
"No, go, maybe you're mistaken."

i) Anyway the soldier too thought that he was perhaps mistaken.

j) He travelled and returned back.

k) While he was so travelling for a while,

l) he suddenly thought, "No."

Here we may note that each successive event clause advances the story-line and that each is either temporally or causally consequential to the event clause that precedes it. Changing the order of any of these clauses would thus change our interpretation of the order of the events they encode. In this regard the clauses are related through what Labov (1981:225) terms **temporal juncture.**[2]

The d/d information, however, is off the event line, and does not advance the story-line. We may note that (d), for example, is not temporally or causally related to the events that precede or follow it. Rather, it represents parenthetical background information necessary for the comprehension of the events. We shall see that the overt marking of information which forms part of the background is far more regular in Xhosa than in English.

The d/d clauses occurring at b) and k) above represent background information of a different order. Rather than encoding independent background situations, they offer temporal orientational information to the events encoded in the event clauses that follow them. This information is again off the event line, and does not encode any advancement of time typical of event clauses.

Before examining the nature of the background/foreground encoding in Xhosa narrative, we shall examine certain features of the temporal structuring of the information they encode.

1.3. Temporal relations - events and their settings in narrative

A definitive feature of the foregrounded events and their background situations we have been examining is, obviously, in terms of their respective temporal structuring. Events on the event line refer to sequential **points** of time, while d/d information refers to undifferentiated **spans** of time (Dry, 1984:20). While narrative events are punctive and hold only at their moment of occurrence in the narration, the background d/d information which forms the events context is durative and holds generally for the narrative (Polanyi, 1976:66 ff). Momentary sequential events are thus grounded within the backdrop of continuing situations.

This temporal grounding of events in narrative parallels, in many interesting ways, the organisation of visual information of spatial scenes as investigated by cognitive psychologists. According to Eysenck (1984:33):

> One of the most obvious facts of visual perception is that it is nearly always organised. An important part of that organisation is the segregation of the visual field into one part called the "figure" and another part called the "ground". The figure and ground are separated by a contour that appears to belong to the figure.

Furthermore, the figure has:

> "thing like" qualities, unlike the ground which is relatively uniform. In addition, the figure seems to be nearer, and the ground extends unbroken beyond the figure.

In general the figure, besides being "thing like", is discreet, well defined and bounded, while the ground in which the figure is perceived, is, in contrast, continuous, less definite and boundless (Wallace, 1982:214).

An example of this is the figure of a sky-scraper perceived against the ground of the sky.

It is well known that the perception of temporal relations, as reflected in language, is largely based on the perception of spatial relations. It is in this light that we would like to suggest that events in narrative discourse are **temporal** figures perceived as **temporally** bounded and discreet, due to their momentary nature, against the **temporal** ground of continuous and durative situations. According to Talmy (1975:71):

> What the categories FIGURE and GROUND pertain to can be generalized from the relative location of objects in space to the relative location of events in time.

He proposes that (ibid):

> The temporal site of the FIGURE event is considered a variable whose particular value receives characterisation with respect to a GROUND event, considered as a reference point set in a temporal reference frame (usually the one dimensional time line).

We hope to demonstrate that such temporal grounding in discourse is not only cognitive or perceptual, but that it forms an important organisational basis for language itself. According to Wallace (1982:214) it would appear strange if figure-ground organisation, fundamental to perception, "had no relevance to how human beings use language to communicate experience". He goes on to present the hypothesis that certain linguistic categories "function to differentiate **linguistic** figure from **linguistic** ground: the speaker uses such categories to structure an utterance (of one or more sentences) into its more or less salient portions, and the listener uses such categories as

clues to interpreting the speaker's visual picture" (ibid). Just as the figure-ground distinction is deeply embedded in visual organisation, so too is it embedded in linguistic organisation. Just as the figure and ground are in necessary opposition in visual perception, so too their respective encodings form a necessary opposition in linguistic organisation, opposition, in general, forming the structural pivot of language as Jakobson demonstrated (see Waugh, 1976:62-68 in this regard). The background/foreground categories in narrative discourse, once distinguished by discourse analysts (e.g. Grimes, 1975) on a semantic basis are thus "more and more seen to correlate with the morphosyntactics of the world's languages" (Longacre, 1981:329).

In terms of such 'morphosyntactic correlations', various observations have been put forward as to how background and foreground are indeed realised as linguistic oppositions. Townsend and Bever (1977) discuss the generally held view that the distinction is encoded in the difference between main and subordinate clauses. Subordinate clauses are held to encode the 'ground' in terms of which the main clause forms the 'figure'. A main clause contains the more important information seen against the background of the less important and presupposed background information encoded in an associated subordinate clause (see also Talmy, 1975).

We shall argue that subordination as a discourse phenomenon in Xhosa narrative does not inherently encode grounding. While background information usually involves subordination, not all subordinate clauses, as we shall see, represent background information. Rather than grounding itself, subordination encodes clausal connexity and thus the connexity of ideas in narrative.

1.4. 'Subordination' and grounding in Xhosa narrative

1.4.1. Introduction

Xhosa narrative has as one of its major features syntactic phenomena which have been traditionally classified as 'subordinate'. The 'subordinate' clause types correlate in many cases with various verbal constructions defined in traditional grammars as 'mood' types (see for example Doke, 1955). The most commonly occurring of these 'moods' in Xhosa narrative have been labelled the 'consecutive mood' and the 'participial', or more recently, the 'situative' mood. According to traditional descriptions the 'participial' and 'consecutive' moods are restricted to occurring in subordinate clauses.

In the light of the role subordination is held to play in grounding, we need now to discuss the traditional treatment of the 'mood' types mentioned above in terms of their 'subordinate' status.

In the traditional framework of Bantu linguistic inquiry the notion of grammatical subordination has implicitly involved the notion of a 'subordination of ideas'. A subordinate clause is held to express an idea of a lesser or 'subordinate' nature than the one encoded in the 'main' clause. We may see that this view is, in fact, very similar to the one discussed above which views a subordinate clause as encoding background or less important information.

In her discussion on the subject, Davison (1979) points out that subordination is a "combination of often very conflicting factors" and that

the syntactic relations implicit in subordination "can be reinforced or overridden by semantic and pragmatic factors" (ibid:105). Due to such factors Davison demonstrates in her discussion that in many cases language users may, indeed, ignore surface features of subordination. With specific reference to grounding she states that:

> Subordinate structure is compatible with lack of salience, given or presupposed information and shared material. If these factors are present, subordination is reinforced, but they need not be present. If they are not especially apparent, the construction in question may bear some overt markers of subordination, but by contrast with other re-enforced subordinate structures it will seem quite different, perhaps so different that it is indistinguishable from a co-ordinate structure.
> (ibid:123)

In the light of Davison's comments we hope to show that grounding is not inherently a feature of the mood types mentioned above. Rather, we propose that two other features implicit in their traditional classification as subordinate forms are central to their understanding. These two features are a) inter-clausal relatedness or syntactic connection and b) the lack of prototypical verbal features. We shall now discuss each of these in turn.

a) **Syntactic connectedness**

In discourse, clauses may be related to other clauses in two main ways. They may, firstly, not be connected at all except as adjacent units in the discourse (cf. Davison, 1979:105). We saw, for example, that two adjacent event clauses are connected through temporal juncture - they are, in other words, related through the second clause being temporarily subsequent and thus connected to the one that it follows. Consider the following example:

2 a) Ricky is going to town.

b) He will buy chocolate at the sweet shop.

Here the clause encoded at b) is related to the first in that it is temporarily subsequent to it. The interpretation of this connection is not dependent on syntactic signs of connexity but rather on a discourse principle that states, as we saw, that the order of mention of events reflects the order of occurrence of those events.

Clauses may, however, be connected through explicit syntactic means. In these cases there is 'nexus' or connexity between the two clauses involved above and beyond the temporal connection discussed above. Thus example 2 may be rendered as:

3 Ricky is going to town and will buy chocolate at the sweet shop.

Here, besides the relatedness expressed through the order of the clauses itself, the clauses in question are overtly connected through the 'conjunction' **and.**

We believe that such connexity is an inherent feature of the consecutive and participial moods. Clauses encoded in these 'moods' will, in other words, imply a connexity of these clauses to the ones preceding them. The implications of this view will be discussed at length in the next chapter on cohesion.

b) **Lack of prototypical verbal features**

Certain morpho-syntactic oppositions, such as tense and aspect for example, are prototypically associated with the category 'verb'. Hopper and Thompson (1984) present an in depth review of prototypes and language in this regard. We will present a detailed criticism of their conclusions later in this chapter. Here we shall only present some general observations of the issues involved.

Certain constructions within a language may be organised on a cline from those exhibiting a large range of prototypical verbal oppositions to those constructions involving a smaller range of such oppositions or in which only **some** of such oppositions are manifest. The former constructions could, in that language, be seen as more prototypically verbal or 'verb-like' than the latter constructions. Those constructions on the cline occurring between these two extremes would exhibit a greater or lesser degree of being prototypically verbal. (Although his framework does not overtly exploit the notions outlined above, Longacre, 1981 gives similarly based clines for various languages).

As we shall see in this chapter, the participial and especially the consecutive reveal few of the morpho-syntactic oppositions associated with other constructions classified as 'verbal'. We will argue that the oppositions they do encode (as well as those they do **not** encode) stand in contrast to other verbal constructions and are crucial to their respective grounding functions.

Rather than being manifest in the 'main - subordinate' clause distinction, we shall argue that the locus of grounding in Xhosa is in terms of those verbal categories which encode the temporal structuring of situations -

through, that is, the categories of **tense** and **aspect.** In this regard Hopper (1979) argues that such categories exist as devices to guide the language user through a narrative, picking out the main route of events and thus allowing him to choose those events which are important (see esp. p. 234). We shall hope to demonstrate, in terms of this framework, that in Xhosa the encoding of the foreground is unmarked with respect to the encoding of the background.

We further hope to demonstrate that, rather than seeing the 'participial' and the 'consecutive' in terms of the category 'mood', defined either in traditional morphological (e.g. Doke, 1963:149ff) or semantic terms (van Rooyen, 1984), they may best be seen as organised in terms of the discourse signalling of grounding.

The treatment of certain aspects of Xhosa verbal morpho-syntactic phenomena in discourse terms which is to follow, is largely inspired by Jakobson's view of language as deriving from a network of oppositions. Opposition, as Jakobson clearly demonstrated, forms the basis of language and is ultimately motivated by distinguishing meanings. We hope to show that a good deal of the opposition underlying much of the Xhosa morpho-syntactic system has its motivation in discourse and that the meanings distinguished on this basis are in terms of grounding as well as connexity to be discussed in the next chapter.

1.4.2. Narrative foregrounding and the 'consecutive' mood

The consecutive marker is **-a-** (to be referred to as CONS). In the following description of the form of the consecutive, the abbreviation SC refers to 'subject concord', and the abbreviation VR refers to 'verb root'. The form

of the consecutive is:

pos: SC-a-VR-a

e.g. **ixhego li-a-theth-a**
old-man he-CONS-speak

ixhego lathetha

'...the old man spoke'

neg: a-SC-a-VR-a

e.g. **ixhego a-li-a-theth-a**
old-man NEG-he-CONS-speak

ixhego alathetha

'...the old man didn't speak'

The verbal category of the form above has, as we saw, been traditionally treated as a subordinate mood form encoding past consecutive actions. Consider the following example:

2 **uThemba uye evenkeleni wathenga ukutya wagoduka**
Themba he-go-IND PERF to-shop he-CONS-buy food
he-CONS-go-home

Themba went to the shop, bought food and went home.

Here the first (non-consecutive) clause forms the main clause of the sentence and is in the ('independent') indicative perfect mood. The following consecutive actions are encoded in the consecutive mood. Connection is thus not expressed through an overt conjunction such as 'and' in English but rather through a verbal construction which implies such connexity. Doke, (1955:105) notes that "however difficult it is to understand the construction this implies a subordination of all subsequent

predicates to the first." In the next chapter we will examine traditional ideas concerning the nature of the consecutive as a subordinate clause form. We will restrict ourselves here to the grounding function of this verb form.

As a verb form the consecutive has remarkably few of the prototypical morpho-syntactic features characteristic of independent main clause verb forms, specifically the indicative mood. It is, firstly, unmarked for **tense** this being indicated by the main clause of the sentence. It is, however apparently restricted to encoding past time, although this is not typical of Bantu generally where the equivalent of the consecutive is not restricted to past time reference and may encode both present, past and future consecutive actions.[3] Secondly, the consecutive is also characterised by the lack of any of the aspectual formatives associated specifically with the indicative mood. These formatives are shown below with illustrative examples in the present indicative mood:

-sa- (progressive aspect)	**ndisacula** I-PROG-sing 'I'm still singing'
-nga- (potential form)	**ndingacula** I-POT-sing 'I can sing'
-ka- (negative exclusive form)	**andikaculi** NEG-I-EXC-sing 'I have not yet sung'

The consecutive is thus unmarked for tense and aspectual distinctions, such distinctions otherwise being prototypical features of verbs.

Given the absence of these distinctions we hope to demonstrate that the information the consecutive does indeed convey is specifically derivative from its function as encoding foreground event information. Consider the following textual example:

3 a) **wabetha kuyo ephondweni**
he-CONS-hit to-it on-horn

b) **kwasuka kwaphuma ukutya**
it-CONS-go it-CONS-come-out food

c) **watya**
he-CONS-eat

d) **wahlutha**
he-CONS-full

e) **wagoduka**
he-CONS-go-home
(text 2:21-25)

a) He hit it on the horn,

b) some food came out,

c) he ate,

d) and was satisfied,

e) and went home.

We saw that the foreground in narrative encodes **events** in **temporal sequence.** Both these features, we may now see, are those very ones that, in the absence of any others, form the definitive basis of the consecutive. As opposed to the independent indicative, we demonstrated that the consecutive is marked for connexity to the clause that precedes it. Furthermore, as opposed to the participial mood also encoding such connexity, it does not involve, as we shall see, a concentration on the internal structure of the situation it encodes ('aspect'). All the consecutive clauses in 3), for

example, refer to temporally bounded situations that move the time of the story forward, and all can be answers to the question 'what happened then?'. With no focus on either the internal structure of situation (aspect) or its temporal orientation (tense), the focus of the consecutive is the **occurrence** of the event itself. With regard to the consecutive's restriction to encoding events, we note that whereas certain English past tense clauses are ambiguous to background-durative and foreground-event interpretations out of context, this is not so in Xhosa. Thus the English 'He preached' may, in narrative, encode an event on the event line as in 'He stood up and preached' or a durative background situation as in 'He preached at the church for many years' (with the interpretation 'He used to preach'). In Xhosa, however, the consecutive form **washumayela** could only have the event interpretation, the background interpretation encoding as **wayeshumayela ecaweni**, a form to which we shall return below.

Xhosa thus appears to have a narrative tense (as some Bantuists have called the form) which has as its motivation the encoding of foreground events. Naturally, such encoding may only be interpreted in terms of that to which it contrasts, to which we shall now turn.

1.4.3. **The participial - narrative backgrounding**

The form of the participial is:

pos: SC-VR-a

e.g. **ixhego li-cul-a**
old-man he-PART-sing

ixhego licula

'...the old man singing'

neg: SC-nga-VR-i

e.g. ixhego li-nga-cul-i
old-man he-NEG-PART-sing

ixhego lingaculi

'... the old man not singing'

The participial is also characterised by a specific tonal contour (cf. footnote 4).

Consider the following textual examples with their associated discourse contexts:

4 a) **baya emdanisweni elila njalo lo mntwana**
they-CONS-go to-dance she-PART-cry like-this this child
(text 1:211)

They went to the dance, the child weeping so.

b) **wahamba ethwala umthwalo**
she-CONS-travel she-PART-carry load
(text 5:30)

She travelled, bearing the load.

c) **wafika engekho**
he-CONS-arrive she-NEG-PART-there
(text 4:53)

He arrived, she not being there.

Participial clauses of the type above have been traditionally described as a mood type occurring only in subordinate clauses and encoding 'actions' simultaneous to those in the main clauses (e.g. du Plessis, 1978:135). If this were an adequate description then we would expect that the information

encoded in the participial would have the same status as that encoded in consecutive clauses - encoding foregrounded events. However, we will argue that the information is of a different status, encoding specifically background information in terms of the nature of temporal organisation discussed above.

The participial clauses above, as well as participial clauses in general, do not, we claim, encode events as we have described them, and do not thus form part of the event line advancing the story. They, like the consecutive mood, encode syntactic connexity to the clause they follow. Unlike the consecutive, however, they are marked for durative aspect and thus, rather than representing 'actions' or, in our terms, events, they encode unbounded, temporally continuous situations.[4] It is in terms of these situations that the associated consecutive clauses, representing bounded events, are foregrounded. The situation is thus not 'simultaneous' to the event but forms, rather, its durative background. The bounded and momentary event in the consecutive clauses is thus located within the temporally durative framework established by the participial. Thus in 4a) above, for example, the event of the girls' going to the dance is given the temporal backdrop of the girl's crying. In 4b), similarly, the man's travelling is located within the durative backdrop of his carrying a load. Neither of these clauses contributes to the movement of narrative time or the advancement of the story.

Research into the participial in other Bantu languages supports this view. Wald (1973) and Poulos (1982) argue, that in Swahili and Zulu respectively, the participial is, in both form and function, a temporal relative clause. Poulos, (1982:210) states that the participial, like other relative clause

forms "has a restrictive force"; what participial clauses restrict as relative clauses is the "dimension of time" (ibid:219). The antecedent this type of relative clause qualifies is thus not an entity but the abstract category of time. With regard to this view, we may note that the participial clauses in 4) can be seen to indicate the specific temporal framework of the events associated with them. We may add that if such clauses are to be treated as temporal relative clauses, they need necessarily be durative rather than event-like, indicating as they do the temporal framework the conditions under which the event occurs.

The view that the participial mood encodes temporal relative clauses is thus supportive of our view concerning its backgrounding function. The situations encoded in such participial clauses do not encode discourse events moving the narrative forward. Rather, they contribute information which grounds the events in terms of the ongoing situation they describe. Such information is not crucial to the story line as such but is rather supportive.

We have been concentrating on the participial as it occurs 'sentence finally' as shown in the examples in 4) above. However an important occurrence is 'sentence initially' as revealed in the following examples, where its occurrence is underlined:

5 a) **yahamba lahamba**
he-CONS-travel he-CONS-travel

b) **lithe lisahamba njalo**
he-did-PERF he-PROG-PART-travel like-so

c) **ladibana nomvundla**
he-CONS-meet with-rabbit
(text 6:10-12)

a) He (the soldier) travelled and travelled.

b) While he was so travelling

c) he met a rabbit.

6 a) **lahamba labuyela umva**
he-CONS-travel he-CONS-return back

b) **lithe lisahamba njalo esithubeni**
he-did-PERF he-PROG-PART-travel like-this in-while

c) **lafika laqonda no**
he-CONS-arrive he-CONS-think no
(text 6:29-31)

a) He (the soldier) travelled and returned back

b) While he was so travelling after a while,

c) he suddenly thought "No."

7 a) **yavubisa le nja**
it-CONS-made-porridge this dog

b) **xa iqgiba ukuvubisa**
when it-PART-finish to-make-porridge

c) **yathi hawu hawu yiza uze kutya**
it-CONS-say woof woof come you-go to-eat
(text 5:49-50)

a) The dog made porridge.

b) When it finished making porridge

c) it said, "Woof, woof, you must come and eat!"

8 a) **waya kufika**
she-CONS-go to-arrive

b) **xa efika**
when she-PART-arrive

c) **wankqonkqoza kulo mzi**
she-CONS-knock to-this house
(text 5:37-38)

a) She (the woman) went to arrive.

b) When she arrived

c) she knocked at the house.

In this position the participial is obligatorily preceded by the 'conjunction' **xa** (when) or the verbal auxiliary **-thi**.

Like the sentence final examples discussed above the initial participial encodes a durative situation rather than an event. The difference between the two positions is that the initial participial as illustrated in 5)-8) acts as **theme** or 'point of departure' for the sentence. Here the point of departure is not an entity, as it is usually described as being, but the temporal backdrop of the following event(s). In 5), for example, the point of departure, b), orientating the event of the soldier meeting the rabbit, c), is the durative context of his travelling. Such thematic participial clauses are important in terms of overall narrative organisation in Xhosa.

A central function of this participial is to mark points of thematic orientation or conceptual orientation. Such transitions involve, in many cases, temporal reorientation and this is indeed encoded by the thematic participial. An example of this can be seen in 8b) above. Here the dog's making porridge ends a sequence of actions making up a common thematic orientation. The completing of the porridge-making forms the temporal background of a new thematic orientation beginning at c).

A function dependent on this is the encoding of connexity between such changes of thematic orientation through **repetitive clausal linkage** as can be seen in examples 5b) and 6b) above. Such linkage involves the repetition, encoded in the thematic participial, of information supplied in the previous (event) clause which then provides the durational context of the events to follow. In other words, these clauses perform a cohesive function in the sense that "they refer to things that have been said earlier in the text ... but at the same time they provide the point of departure of the sentence or paragraph they begin" (Strahm, 1978:342). The hearer is thus provided with old information (encoded as durative background), the backdrop against which he is provided with new (event) information. This information, as cohesive, does not advance the story line or add content but rather indicates how the content is held together.

We have argued above that background information in narrative represents temporally continuous information which forms the background of the temporally bounded foreground events. We have also argued that such temporal grounding is encoded in language through certain tense-aspect distinctions. We may see that the so called participial mood encodes background information in that it is marked for durative aspect. In contrast, what has been labelled as the 'consecutive mood' lacks any aspect markings and indicates a punctive event. Before we elaborate on these claims any further we shall turn to other backgrounding forms based on the participial mood.

1.4.4. Scene setting - the continuous 'tense'

Form (pos) SC-a-(ye/be) participial

e.g. **si-a-(ye/be) sihamba**
we-PAST CONTINUOUS TENSE we-PART-travel

saye sihamba / sabe sihamba
sasihamba

'We were travelling.'

(neg) SC-a-(ye/be) negative participial

e.g. si-a-(ye/be) singahambi
we-PAST CONTINUOUS TENSE we-NEG-PART-travel

saye singahambi / sabe singahambi
sasingahambi

'We were not travelling.'

The form given above has been traditionally labelled the (remote) **past continuous tense** (PCT) which has been described as indicating "an action which was in progress, or, in the negative, not in progress, at some time in the past" (Davey, 1973:87). We will outline below the background scene-setting function of this form. The PCT is a compound form utilising an auxiliary verb **-be** (also realised as **-ye**) which encodes the notion of general 'being'. As complement to this auxiliary, the participial indicates the temporal domain or durational situation of this being. In the illustration above, for example, the 'being' encoded in this auxiliary is restricted to the temporal domain of travelling. The PCT encodes, in terms of this durational basis, an unbounded situation as opposed to an event. In this regard Van Rooyen, (1977:203ff) notes that the **be/ye** auxiliary may be treated as a marker of 'imperfective' aspect. As such it indicates an action that was in progress without indicating where it began or ended (ibid:205). It is important to note that the PCT does not form the durative background of a contingent event as does the participial on its own.

Rather, the PCT indicates an independent 'scene'. PCTs usually cluster together to form the initial **settings** of the tale which functions as an orientation to the body of the story events. They may, however, occur at relevant parts in the body. Such durative situations encoded in PCTs are fairly rare in the oral narratives collected. This may be the result of an assumed knowledge of background settings of what are well known tales as well as an orientation on narrative events as opposed to their durative contexts. To augment our examples below, we shall be using further examples from **iintsomi** texts orientated to school children (taken from du Plessis et al, 1983). Consider the following examples which form the setting of tales.

9 a) **kwakukho umntwana ekwakusithiwa nguJon nabanye abantwana bakokwabo**
it-PCT-there child he-PCT-say-PASS by-John with-other children of-home

b) **ke ngoku ke lo mntana wayengathandwa kokwabo**
then now then this child he-TPC-NEG-liked-PASS by-home

c) **enikwa iinkonzo zombona**
he-PART-give-PASS cobs of-maize

d) **ngoku lo mntana wasuka wayokulusa inkomo yakowabo**
now this child he-CONS-went-to-herd cow of-theirs
(text 3:1-4)

a) There was a child called John and other children of home.

b) Now then, this child was not liked at home,

c) being given maize cobs.

d) Now, this child went to herd the household cow.

10 a) **kule lali la mawele ayehlala kuyo**
to-this settlement these twins they-PCT-stay to-it

b) **amadoda ayezingela iinyamakazi ehlathini**
men they-PCT-hunt game in-forest

c) **amakhwenkwe ayesalusa iimpahla emadlalweni**
boys they-PCT-herd stock in-grazing-lands

d) **abafazi namantombazana babepheka emakhaya**
women with-girls they-PCT-cook at-homes
(du Plessis et al:159)

a) At the settlement where these twins stayed,

b) the men hunted game in the forest,

c) the boys herded the stock in the grazing lands

d) and the women and girls cooked at their homes.

In these settings there is no orientation on the movement of narrative time as such. Rather, the durative setting orientating the audience to the story world is described before the events occurring in this backdrop are described. The following examples illustrate the use of PCTs, not in the initial setting, but in the body of the events:

11 a) **lafika ijoni labuza kumvundla ukuba**
he-CONS-arrive soldier he-CONS-ask to-rabbit whether

khange liwubone na umvundla
never he-it-see QUES rabbit

b) **umvundla nawo wayenxiba indevu apha phezu komlomo**
rabbit with-him he-PCT-wear beard here top of-mouth

c) **wabuza umvundla unjani lo mvundla uwufunayo**
it-CONS-ask rabbit it-how this rabbit you-it-want
(text 6:13-18)

a) The soldier arrived and asked the rabbit whether
he had seen a rabbit at all.

b) The rabbit was wearing a beard here above the mouth.

c) The rabbit asked, "What's this rabbit like that you want?"

12 a) **amadoda amakhulu ahamba ecaleni kancinci kuye**
men who-big they-CONS-travel at-side little to-him

b) **bema bambonisa indlu amakaye kuyo**
they-CONS-stand they-CONS-him-show house he-must-go to-it

c) **le yayindlu endala eyenziwe ngamatye**
this it-PCT-house which-old which-made-PASS with-stones

d) **wacinga ndifunwa ngubani phaya**
he-CONS-think I-want-PASS it-who there
(du Plessis et al:177)

a) The big men travelled a little at his side

b) They stood and showed him the house to which he should go

c) This was an old house made of stone

d) He thought "By whom am I wanted there?"

13 a) **ngenye intsasa wahamba uNomvume**
with-one day she-CONS-travel Nomvume

b) **wahamba wahamba**
she-CONS-travel she-CONS-travel

c) **wala akuba phiphiphi**
she-did she-when far

d) **wabona ixhegwazana**
she-CONS-see old-lady

lihleli phantsi komthi
she-PART-sit beneath of-tree

e) **kwakubonakala ukuba lagqibela kudala ukuhlamba**
it-PCT-visible that she-finish long-ago to-wash

f) **lathi**
she-CONS-say

akusondela uNomvume
she-when-approach Nomvume

hina mntanomntanam
come-here child-of-child-of-mine
(du Plessis et al:133)

a) The next day Nomvume travelled.

b) She travelled and travelled.

c) When she was far off,

d) she saw an old lady sitting beneath a tree.

e) It was clear that she had stopped washing long ago.

f) She said, when Nomvume approached, "Come here, child of my child".

In these examples we may see that the PCT clauses are clearly off the event line, representing background information. In 13), specifically, we see how the event clauses move the narrative forward and contain the basic development of the story represented by the entire extract. The PCT clauses encode only the descriptive detail of the backdrop of these events.

The PCT forms are thus backgrounding in function. They encode, not the bounded events holding only for the moment of their occurrence, but temporally unbounded situations which hold for the narrative world in general. We may note that such marking of backgrounding is far more regularly encoded in Xhosa than in English. In example 10), for example, we may note that in the English translations there is no overt encoding of the temporally background nature of the information. Each is in the simple past which is only **contextually** interpreted as temporally non-specific. In contrast the Xhosa text overtly indicates the durative nature of the information. We turn now to some more detailed aspects of its morphosyntactic features.

1.4.4.1. Verbs as background and non-events as foreground - some traditional concepts revisited

Traditionally grammarians have described the continuous tense forms of verbs

as "past progressive actions" within the framework of verb tense forms. Non-verbal or copular predicates showing an identical morphological structure have been described as the simple (remote) past tense form. Consider the following illustrative examples:

with verbal predicate:

14 a) **wayethandwa**
'he was liked'

with non-verbal predicates:

b) **waye emhle**
'she was beautiful'(**-hle** - adjective)

c) **yaye inabafazi**
'he had wives' (**-nabafazi** - associative)

d) **yaye indlu**
'it was a house' (**-indlu** - noun).

The only morphological difference between these examples then is that in the one case a verb is taken as participial complement and a non-verbal predicate in the other. It appears that it is on this basis that the traditional distinction between them is made. We believe, however, this distinction to be an erroneous view from the point of view of their discourse function which we shall now outline.

We saw previously that the PCT indicates a durative temporally unbounded situation which encodes setting information. This is opposed to consecutive clauses encoding temporally bounded situations which occur with such settings as their backdrop. In this regard we have restricted our examples above to PCTs encoding verbs as complements. This enabled us to contrast such forms as **wayethetha** ('he was speaking'), a durative situation, with

wathetha ('he spoke'), an event. We may now note that what has been traditionally described as a separate category - the simple past of copular predicates - has the same durative backgrounding function as the PCT. Both should therefore be treated similarly as encoding such information. Rather than distinguishing between two separate categories, we advocate the view that there is a single durative tense structure forming a central part of the grounding devices in Xhosa which operate over both verbal and non-verbal predications.

Just as both verbs and non-verbal predicates function similarly as background information given the appropriate grounding marking, so too both these categories may be marked as foregrounded event information. In our discussion we have limited ourselves to verbs as encoding events in the consecutive. However, non-verbal predicates may equally function as events encoded in the event associated consecutive mood. Consider the following examples in this regard, where they are underlined:

15 a) **wamkhulula zonke ezo mpahla zimdaka ebezinxibile**
she-CONS-undress all those clothes which-dirty which-she-PCT-had worn

b) **wamvasa wamhle**
she-CONS-her-wash she-CONS-beautiful
(text 1:31)

a) She removed all those dirty clothes which she was wearing

b) and washed her and she was beautiful.

16 a) **kwahanjwa kwabhekwa emdanisweni**
it-CONS-travel-PASS it-CONS-go-to-PASS to-dance

b) **wanomnqweno ke lo mntana ukuba angaya naye emdanisweni**
she-CONS-with-wish then this child that she-may-go with-her to-dance
(text 1:17-18)

a) There was travelled and gone to the dance.

b) The girl child wished that she could go to the dance as well.

In these examples the non-verbal predicates, which encode as consecutive clauses, indicate events moving the story forward as opposed to background situations. In 15), for example, the girl becoming beautiful is, in all its features, a discourse event, temporally bounded and on the event line. This is in contrast to the corresponding durative form **wayemhle** which would encode a non-event background situation. To illustrate further the event nature of similar non-verbal predicates consider the following examples:

17 a) **ndihambe ndasekhaya**
I-travel-PERF I-CONS-at-home
I travelled and got home.

b) **usebenze wanemali**
he-work-PERF he-CONS-with-money
He worked and got money.

Each of the underlined non-verbal predicates is non-durative and temporally bounded.

1.4.5. The locus of grounding in Xhosa

We hope to have demonstrated by the previous discussion that the grounding devices in Xhosa act independently of predicate type. The notion of discourse event is thus not restricted to encoding in 'verbal' predicates and background situations are not restricted to non-verbal predicates. Rather there exist independent morphosyntactic devices which operate over all types of predication to indicate their role in discourse. The reason for emphasizing this point is that it runs counter to a latently held view that verbs typically encode discourse events, while discourse states are

encoded in non-verbal or non-verblike predicates. Recently this view has been formalised by Hopper and Thompson (1984).

According to Hopper and Thompson's hypothesis (to be referred to as the HT hypothesis) the traditionally recognised category 'verb' ('V') can best be defined as a universal category in that it prototypically encodes discourse events, or 'what happens' in discourse.[5] This approach gives the definition of the category 'verb' a discourse basis. Such a definition is in contrast to the traditional semantic definition of verbs as representing 'actions' or 'processes'. Based on this orientation, HT make the observation that, as the prototypical nature of V's is to encode discourse events, those V's in discourse which do **not** report events will "fail to show the range of oppositions to those that do" (ibid:726). In other words, the less a verb represents a discourse event (the prototypical function of verbs) the less that verb will 'behave' morphosyntactically like a prototypical verb. Non-prototypical verbs in a particular language in this regard will tend "not to manifest the morphosyntactical trappings of prototypical V's in that language" (ibid:726). With specific reference to grounding HT, hold that it would be expected that the background signaling forms in language would encode less like prototypical V's in that they encode non-event information, while, in contrast, foregrounded events would be more prototypically verbal and therefore exhibit a greater deal of morphosyntactic contrasts. In Xhosa, however, exactly the opposite situation is found. While both foregound and background are, as we saw, unmarked for tense, the background non-event form (the participial) reveals a rich variety of oppositions in the prototypical verbal category of aspect. The latter category does not, as we saw, feature in any way in the event encoding consecutive. We also

saw, in this regard, that distinctly **non**-verbal predicates could equally function as discourse events.

This indicates that the locus of grounding in Xhosa (and perhaps language in general) should not be seen in terms of any division into word categories as such. Rather, grounding in Xhosa is manifest in the general morphosyntactic encoding of tense-aspect distinctions, and these distinctions function independently of predicate type. Once this is realised we may understand why it is that background encoding tends to be more complex and reveal more oppositions than does the encoding of foreground events. Events have only one time reference - to their point of occurrence in the story - and they are inherently momentary in that they hold only for their moment of occurrence. Background situations, however, may exhibit a great deal more internal temporal complexity in that they do not refer to a simple point on the event line and encode internally more temporally complex situations than do the event clauses. It is for this reason that we find that background encoding is more morphosyntactically marked than foregrounded events which have relatively simple encodings. Such encodings could have an iconic motivation in that the more salient an item is in language, the less complex it will tend to be.

1.5. Conclusion

We are now in a position to see how the distinction between background and foreground - between what is salient and what is not salient - is indeed deeply encoded in Xhosa. We have seen that the basis of this distinction is in terms of temporal structuring and that its linguistic encoding is accordingly in terms of tense and aspect. In Xhosa the traditional notion of mood has been used to describe what we claim are structures in language

based on grounding distinctions. At this point we have not, however, investigated the full range of foreground and background encoding and cannot yet offer a formalised alternative to the notion of moods. We need firstly to investigate certain issues which will be discussed in the following chapter. These issues concern the nature of the syntactic connexity encoded in the consecutive mood within the general framework of the phenomena of discourse connexity in general.

Footnotes to Chapter 1

1) This example exhibits a number of stumbles and restarts which we have indicated through dashes and underlining. We have not edited out such features in the majority of our examples as we believe that they have important implications for certain issues raised in section B.

2) We discuss this aspect of discourse planning more extensively in section B.

3) In the Nguni and Sotho language groups present and future consecutive actions are encoded in what is termed the 'present subjunctive mood' which has the form:

SC-VR-e
e.g. **ba-hamb-e**
'and they travel'

The latter form has a more restricted occurrence in other Bantu languages.

4) Most Bantu languages, it appears, have an overt durative formative in this regard which appears to be derivative from the proto-Bantu copular verb ***ki**.

This is realised as **-chi-** in **Shona**, as in:

va-chi-tenga
they-PART-buy
'they buying',

in **Venda** as **-tshi-**, as in:

a-tshi-fhatha
he-PART-build
'he building',

and in **Swahili** as **-ki-**, as in:

a-ki-enda
he-PART-go
'he going'.

In Xhosa a similar formative **-si-** occurs overtly only with monosyllabic verbal stems, as in:

e-si-tya
he-PART-eat
'he eating'

In other cases the historical presence of **-si-** is manifest through certain tonal perturbations and phonological changes of certain SC's. Thus, for example, disyllabic stems which have underlying low tones on

each tone (ie LL) are realised as having a high tone on the first syllable of the participial e.g.

ukuvuza (LL) 'to leak' **evúza** (HL) 'he leaking'

ukuphupha (LL) 'to dream' **bephúpha** (HL) 'they dreaming'

This could be explained by the fact that, while the formative **-si-** has dropped, the effect of its high tone is still realised on the verbal stem.

The SC's from (inter alia) classes 2 and 6, usually **ba-** and **a-** respectively, are realised as **be-** and **e-** in the participial. These changes could be explained through the historical assimilation of the '**a**' involved in both SC's to the high vowel originally manifest in **-si-**.

(I have drawn my data from the following sources: Shona - Fivaz, 1970; Venda - Poulos, 1972; Swahili - Wald, 1973; Xhosa - Davey, 1973. I wish to thank Prof. D. Fivaz and Mr J.S. Claughton of the Department of African languages, Rhodes University for their discussion on this matter, although I stress the conclusions are my own).

5) The notion of prototypes in general has enjoyed much interest in recent research into discourse and cognition. For a review, see Langacker, 1983:10-11.

CHAPTER 2

Cohesion and the organisation of Xhosa narrative

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter we investigate the organisation of information in Xhosa narrative. In essence this involves the notion of **discourse cohesion.** We shall take the view that cohesion represents the **linguistic** signalling or encoding of conceptual relatedness. Cohesion is, in this regard, contrasted with **coherence** which refers to the organisation of the **conceptual** basis of the discourse itself (on the distinction between cohesion vs. coherence, see for example, de Beaugrande, 1984; for pioneering work on cohesion see Halliday and Hasan, 1976). Before investigating cohesion itself we need to discuss briefly some aspects of the memorial organisation of narrative information. This discussion will be based on Chafe's work in this field (see, for example, Chafe, 1979, 1980, 1982).

2.2. Aspects of the memorial organisation of narrative

Chafe (1980) makes a distinction between the self, consciousness and information (in our case, information in memory). The **self** has goals and interests and makes use of **consciousness** "as a mechanism by which available potentially relevant **information** is activated" (ibid:48, emphasis added). Consciousness, inter alia, has a limited capacity and, whereas "the total amount of information available is enormous, the amount that can be activated at any one time is small in comparison" (ibid:9). Thus in narrative production, all the information of a narrative in memory is not simultaneously available for expression. Instead, units of information in memory are progressively focused on by consciousness, not unlike a spot-

light moving across a darkened scene. The contents of such 'foci of consciousness' represent, Chafe claims, idea units, the basic information units in narrative. In their linguistic encoding such idea units are separated by pausing, end with clause-final intonation and usually encode, syntactically, a single clause (ibid:14). Chafe also identifies a level of organisation intermediate between idea units and the memory of a narrative as a whole. These he terms **centres of interest.** Centres of interest represent conceptually related chunks of information which encode what Chafe terms a 'mental image' (ibid:50). Such information is "too great to be taken in at once in a single focus" (ibid:26) and a series of foci of consciousness are needed to 'scan' them. Such a series of foci will naturally be more conceptually related to each other than to similar foci in other centres of interest, in that they they will all share the similar orientation of an image. Transitions between centres of interest, as they involve different mental images, involve a conceptual re-orientation. Centres of interest are linguistically characterised, in English, by terminating in sentence final intonation and what Chafe terms extended sentences (ibid:58).

Between the level of the centre of interest and the memory of the narrative as a whole the organisation of narrative thought is less clear. There appear to be areas between centres of interest which involve greater re-orientation than there are between others. Other researchers into narrative (predominantly the Tagmemic school, but see also van Dijk, 1981) have described such phenomena in terms of 'paragraphs'. Chafe is reluctant to formally identify paragraphs (see, for example, Chafe, 1979). He emphasises instead that certain parts of a narrative may be less related to each other in terms of such factors as common participants, location and time than

others are. As this appears to be a matter of degree, the identification of definite paragraph boundaries proves difficult.

Given Chafe's views on the cognitive organisation of narrative, we shall now turn to an examination of how this organisation is reflected and signalled in its linguistic manifestation. In our discussion we shall be focusing specifically on the prosodic, lexical and syntactic means that are used by narrators to signal to their audiences 'what goes together' and 'what does not go together' in their narrations. Syntactic cohesion signals will form the bulk of this chapter.

2.3. Cohesion in Xhosa narrative

2.3.1. Prosody and cohesion

According to Gumperz et al (1984) intonation is the most fundamental device for signalling cohesion in oral discourse, allowing hearers to comprehend the internal informational relationships of what is said to them (see also Brazil, 1981). Little research into Xhosa discourse intonation has been undertaken and the personal observations that follow should be seen in this light.[1]

Xhosa is a tone language - a language with "lexically significant, contrastive but relative pitch on each syllable" (Pike, 1948:3). Three such pitches occur in Xhosa - a high (H) tone symbolised by ´, a low tone (L) symbolised by ` and a falling tone (F) symbolised by ˆ. The intonational system in Xhosa is largely realised through a pattern of perturbation of these tones. While intonation does indeed influence the tones, it does not affect their relative contrast and significance.

In our examination of the cohesive function of Xhosa intonation we shall concentrate initially on pause-defined units - stretches of continuous speech bounded by pauses - rather than on the more traditionally accepted unit of the tone group. In the Hallidayan system of intonational analysis, for example, (cf. Halliday, 1968, 1970) tone groups are taken as reflecting information structure; they are meant to correspond directly to, and encode 'information units' (with regard to Bantu languages, see Maw and Kelly, 1975 for an analysis of Swahili intonation within this paradigm). The demarcation of such well defined tone-groups has, however, proven to be notoriously difficult with data such as spontaneous oral discourse. For this reason Brown et al (1980) in their examination of English discourse intonation, reject the Hallidayan notion of a tone group as an adequate means of assessing information structure. Instead, they base their analysis on pause-defined units. They show that pauses occur at significant points in the information chunking of discourse, a feature which Chafe (1979:162) claims is the result of speakers' forward planning time. (For further examination of the problems with the Hallidayan paradigm see Brown and Yule, 1983. Pawly and Sydner, 1977, in an independent study, also encounter similar problems). With regard to Xhosa we shall see that, not only do pause-defined units reflect the structure of information, but also that other intonational features cluster around them. (Pause-defined units are to be referred to as p-units below).[2]

In the following two extended examples on which we shall base our analysis we adopt Brown et al's convention of marking long pauses with ++ and short but perceptible pauses with +. For purposes of clarity p-units are also separated by spacing. The occurrence of other symbols in these examples will be explained below. We will present our analysis of the cohesive

1 a)	↑ aphinda ayaluzel amanzi ↘ ++	a) Again the water swirled.
b)	→ waphum uni:na ↘ ++	b) The mother came out.
c)	→ waphinda wamtha:tha fu:thi	c) She took her again
d)	wamnxibisa ezinye iimpahla namhla:nje ↘ ++	d) and dressed her in different clothes today
e)	→ wahamba	e) She travelled.
f)	yaphinda yaphuma inqwelo	f) and again the carriage came out
g)	yahamba na:ye ↘ ++	g) and travelled with her.
h)	↑ iphind' intombazana yawofika emdaniswe:ni ↘ ++	h) The girl again went to arrive at the dance.
i)	↑ ithe ukufika kwayo intombazana emdanisweni	i) On the girl's arrival at the dance
j)	yabe se isithi inkosi nanko kwakhona umfazi wa:m ↘ ++	j) the chief said. "There's my wife again."
k)	↑ yadanisa inkosi nale ntombazana	k) The chief danced with the girl-
l)	laphinda lafika elaa xesha lokuba	l) and again that time came for
m)	iyokulali:swa ↘ ++	m) the girl to be put to sleep.
n)	→ yayitha:tha inkosi	n) The chief took her
o)	yayilalisa	o) and put her to sleep,
p)	kanti:inkosi ngelo xesha ingene phantsi kwebhedi	p) but this time he went below the bed
q)	izifihli:le ↘ ++	q) hiding himself -
r)	ifuna ukuyibona le ntombazana xa iphuma:yo ↘ ++	r) wanting to see the girl when she went out.
s)	↑ iphindile intombazana yaqonda ukuba	s) The girl again thought that
t)	inokuba inkosi imkile ↘ ++ (text 1:70-85)	t) perhaps the chief was gone.

2 a) ↑ xa ehlala egumbini +
b) le nja isuka ithi hawu hawu ndiphotule:le ↘ ++

c) → athi yena zange ndiyiphothulele inja nasekha:ya ↘ ++

d) → ithi hawu hawu ndaku:tya ↘ ++

e) → wahamba
f) wancama
g) waphothu:la ↘ ++

h) ↑ yavubisa le:nja ↘ ++

i) ↑ xa igqib- xa igqiba ukuvubisa +
j) yathi hawu hawu yiz' uze ku:tya ↘ ++

k) → wathi zange nditye nanja nasekha:ya ↘ ++

l) → wathi ndaku:tya ↘ ++

m) → wancama
n) waza ku:tya ↘ ++

o) ↑ xa begqib' ukutya +
p) yathi inja yizola:la ↘ ++

q) → wathi zange ndilale nanja nasekha:ya ↘ ++

r) → yathi hawu hawu ndaku:tya ↘ ++

s) → wahamba
t) waya kumbatha enje:ni ↘ ++

u) ↑ kwaku:sa - ngom:so - inja ivulel' iinko:mo ↘ ++
(text 5:43-60)

a) While she was sitting in the room,
b) the dog said, "Woof, woof, grind for me!"

c) She said, "I've never ground for a dog, even at home."

d) It said, "Woof, woof I'll eat you!"

e) She travelled
f) and despaired
g) and ground.

h) The dog made porridge

i) When it was finished making porridge,
j) it said, "Woof, woof, come, you must eat!"

k) She said, "I've never eaten with a dog, even at home."

l) It said, "I will eat you!"

m) She gave up
n) and came to eat.

o) When they had finished eating
p) the dog said, "Woof, woof, come and sleep!"

q) She said, "I've never slept with a dog, even at home!"

r) It said, "Woof, woof, I'll eat you!"

s) She travelled
t) and went to sleep with the dog.

u) Early- the next morning- the dog released his cattle.

Across p-units we find the occurrence of tonal downdrift - the progressive lowering of H tones in a sequence of H and L tones. (For an introduction to downdrift and a review of the literature see Hombert, 1974; for its relevance and manifestation in Nguni see Lanham, 1960:90-91). A p-unit is thus characterised by a continuous downward shift of pitch towards its termination. Consider the following example:[3]

3 áphinda áyálúzel' ámânzi

Again the water swirled.
(cf. 1a above)

The onset level of the beginning of p-units is characterised by upstep, the reverse of downdrift, where the pitch level returns to a level either similar to, or higher than the onset level of a preceding p-unit.[4] At such points the downstep process is renewed. Successive p-units are thus characterised by distinctive downdrift patterns. (See Lanham, 1960:96 for downdrift as indicating 'juncture'). Consider the following example:

4 a) áphinda áyálúzel' ámânzi

b) wáphúm' únina

a) Again the water swirled.

b) The mother came out.
(cf 1a-b above)

We distinguished two types of updrift in our data - one which raises the pitch to a level similar to (or perhaps slightly lower than) the onset level of the immediately preceding p-unit - and one that raises the onset pitch to a level noticeably higher than the immediately previous onset level. The former is represented by ⟶ while the latter is represented by ↑. While ⟶ indicates an onset level that is high in the speaker's normal pitch range, ↑ represents a level higher than normal. It is important to note that both these symbols indicate both the end of one downstep pattern and the commencement of another.

In their examination of Hausa intonation, Miller and Tench (1980a and 1980b) present a rare analysis of the discourse function of downdrift. Unlike our analysis, Miller and Tench claim that downdrift is the property of tone groups rather than p-units. They note a particular type of downdrift not discussed above which they term 'narrative downdrift' (1980b:83). Narrative downdrift characterises closely related information units and occurs over tone groups which have no pause, or very little pause between them. The onset levels of consecutive tone groups in such contexts are slightly lower than the ones that precede them. Three such progressively lower onset levels are distinguished. These are symbolised by ↓, ↓↓, and ↓↓↓. Within each of the tone groups with progressively lower onset levels, downdrift of the type we have described with regard to Xhosa is still maintained.

Such an analysis is tempting with regard to our Xhosa data. 2e)-g), which shows no pauses and which has been analysed as having continuous downdrift, could, for example, be represented as:

5 a) ⟶ wahamba

b) ↓ wancama

c) ↓ ↓ waphothu:la ++

a) She travelled

b) and gave up

c) and ground.
(cf also 2i-j, 2s-t, 1c-d and 1e-g for example)

In at least one case (1k-m) we did indeed find some evidence of upstep within a p-unit rather than at its initiation which may be taken as evidence for narrative downdrift. This is repeated at 6) where there is a rise in pitch at b) without a preceding pause. This rise is lower than that occurring at a) and indicates a break in the pattern of downdrift across the p-unit:

6 a) ↑ yadanisa inkosi nale ntombazana

b) → laphinda lafika elaa xesha lokuba intombazana iyokulalis:wa

a) The chief danced with the girl -

b) and again that time arrived for the girl to be put to sleep.

In general, however, the distinctions that are involved are very fine. In our analysis we could not always fully determine whether the downdrift involved across p-units such as that represented at 5) was in terms of narrative downdrift or simply in terms of a continuous lowering of pitch (i.e. continuous downdrift). We have preferred the latter alternative as the former one presupposes certain contrasts we cannot pretend to have noted. While this does result in a certain imprecision in our analysis, we

have determined with certainty that downdrift of some form (whether it be continuous or not) occurs consistently over extended p-units such as those noted at 5).

A further feature of p-units is the distinct lengthening of the penultimate syllables at their termination.[5] We have used the conventional symbol ':' to mark this lengthening,[6] for example:

7 iphind' intombazana yakufika emdaniswe:ni

'The girl again went to arrive at the dance.'
(cf 1h)

The general downward movement of pitch towards the end of the p-unit is concentrated on this lengthened syllable. The substantial lowering effect of this concentration is commonly realised as a falling pitch on the penultimate which we have symbolised with ↘.[7] The exact degree and nature of this fall varies according to the inherent tone of the penultimate and ultimate syllables and tonal contrasts are thus still maintained. The final sequence HL, for example, shows a greater degree of falling pitch than the sequence LL. (See de Clercq 1968:202-203 for a summary of the various realisations possible.) As a result of these factors the pitch level towards the very end of p-units tends to drop to lowest level in the normal pitch range of the speaker (cf de Clercq 1968:176 for discussion).

Such falling intonation does not occur over lengthened penultimates which occur within p-units rather than at their end (see 1n) and 1q) for example). Such lengthening is not, however, intonationally meaningful and appears to

be a dis-fluency feature occurring, for example, at places where the narrator is having difficulty in articulation.[8] In this regard, it is notable that such lengthening tends to occur towards the beginning of p-units - at points, that is, where we may expect a narrator to experience difficulties before 'getting into his stride'.

We believe that the intonational features discussed above play a fundamental role in the signalling of the connectedness of information. Specifically, we claim that the features :, ++, $\longrightarrow$, and $\uparrow$ cluster at points marking transitions of information chunks - of what Chafe terms 'centres of interest'. Such centres of interest may correspond to what could be termed extended sentences involving a number of related 'idea units' (e.g. 5 above) or, less commonly, smaller units such as single clauses encoding a single idea unit (e.g. 3 above).

In general, we hold that centres of interest are separated by pauses. The end of a centre of interest is signalled by $\searrow$. This, together with the feature ':' and downdrift, results in a terminal pitch low on the speaker's pitch range. The commencement of a new centre of interest is signalled by a significant increase of pitch level and a renewal of the downdrift pattern. Boundaries between centres of interest are thus characterised by low pitch endings and high pitch beginnings. Internally, centres of interest are generally characterised by a lack of any other intonational feature but downdrift. Together with Chafe (1979) we hold that paragraphs or rather, **paratones**, (intonational paragraphs) cannot be distinguished as distinct organisational patterns in discourse. We believe, rather, that certain centres of interest are less connected (i.e. involve more re-orientation) in terms of informational content than are others. We have found, however,

that a centre of interest involving a substantial change of orientation from the one that precedes it tends to be signalled by ↑ or else a version of ↑ that is higher than is otherwise normal. This is particularly demonstrated in our textual example 2) above where we find that ↑ occurs at points which show distinct transitions of information. Each unit dealing with the different stages of the girl-dog interaction (2a-g vs 2i-n for example) commences with ↑ in contrast to → which occurs within these units.

In terms of the cohesive function of Xhosa intonation (and, as we shall see, in other domains of cohesion) there tends to be what one might call an **iconic principle of cohesion.** This can be informally stated as 'what goes together is said together'. The converse of this principle also seems to apply and has the sense that what is **not** said together does not go together. Thus, for example, pauses separate chunks of information which are characterised by intonational features operating only within those chunks of information.

We now turn from this necessarily brief discussion of prosodic cohesion markers to one concerning their lexical counterparts.

2.3.2. Lexical markers - discourse particles

We have concentrated on those features associated with signalling of conceptual re-orientation - that is how Xhosa signals breaks in cohesion. There are, in this regard, certain lexical items and phrases whose function in discourse is not to add content as such, but to indicate a change in conceptual re-orientation - hence the name 'discourse particles' (see Schourip, 1983 for discussion). Most commonly these are clause-initial adverbials occurring with the enclitic **ke** such as **ngoku ke** (now then) and

ngokwenene ke (in truth then). Perhaps the most common discourse particle is **hayi ke** (no then), from the interjection **hayi**. Consider the following example where the discourse particle has been underlined:

8 a) wawalola wawaginya wawaginya

b) aphumelele

c) **ngoku ke** lafika phaya

d) lathi

Demazana Demazana
yhoo ndivulele
mnta kamama mnta katata
litye nantunjana zimbini

e) lavuleka ilitye
(text 4:28-32)

a) He heated them and swallowed them

b) They came out.

c) Now then he arrived there

d) and said,

"Demazana Demazana,
Oh open for me,
Child of mother, child of father,
Oh stone with two small cracks."

e) The stone opened.

Here the transition from one centre of interest - the **zim**'s attempt to get a higher voice - to another - dealing with his attempt to get into the stone - is marked by the discourse particle signalling a change of informational orientation.

We have only given a cursory outline of discourse particles and they shall

be dealt with further in chapter 6. We shall now turn to our central concern which develops certain issues dealt with in the previous chapter - notably cohesion as it is expressed in terms of syntactic connexity.

2.3.3. Syntactic connexity - the consecutive mood

In the previous chapter we only briefly examined the notion of syntactic connexity as expressed by the consecutive mood. We shall now offer a detailed investigation of this particular feature of the consecutive.

2.3.3.1. The traditional treatment - the Dokean model

In the previous chapter we touched on the traditional treatment of the consecutive mood. In the following discussion we shall restrict ourselves specifically to Doke's early, but apparently still widely held views on this 'mood' form (Doke, 1955:105-107).

According to Doke (1955:105):

> The rule for the normal sequencing of verb tenses in consecutive constructions is that each tense after the first is expressed in the subjunctive mood. However difficult it is to understand this construction, this implies a subordination of all subsequent predicates to the first.[9]

He goes on to say:

> The subordination of the succeeding subjunctive mood verb seems to be that of time, with possibly a suggestion of purpose: the first verb, that in the main predicate, indicates the action that takes place first.
> (ibid)

However, in certain cases the subordination is not of "subsequence of time"

but rather of "decrease in importance" (ibid). In yet other cases, "where one might argue that each of several consecutive verbs is of equal importance", it is the speaker "who gives priority of importance to the one which comes first in speech; the one which comes to the speaker's mind or tongue first must of necessity be the most important to him at the time" (1955:105-106).

We cite Doke's work at length for we believe it contains a generally held view of the consecutive. This view is that the narrative consecutive encodes, in itself, the idea of 'subsequence' in terms of such concepts as 'time', 'purpose', 'importance' and so on. We shall advocate that the consecutive encodes only the feature 'connexity', while the relationship between the 'predicates' it so connects forms part of extra-linguistic pragmatic interpretation procedures. In order to demonstrate this, we shall briefly outline some aspects of parallel English phenomena.

2.3.3.2. **Connecting ideas and English 'and'**

In English, inter-clausal 'and' functions to connect the ideas in the conjoined clauses. Consider the following examples of 'and' used interclausally:

9 a) The old man fell off his chair and died.
  b) Tom fell down and hit his head.
  c) Lightning struck the tree and it burnt all night.
  d) Peter got up and went to the dressing table.
  e) John went to the shop and bought a sweet.

In each of these cases the relationship between the ideas encoded in the conjoined clauses is peculiar to the specific nature of these ideas. At a), for example, we assume that it is **because** the old man fell off his chair that he died. The events concerned are thus interpreted in terms of a causal relationship; here 'and' could be paraphrased as 'and therefore'. A similar causal relationship occurs in b) and c). We could assume at b) that if Tom had **not** fallen down he would not have hurt his head and at c) we could similarly assume that if lightning had not struck the tree it would not have burnt all night. A **temporal** rather than a causal relationship, however, is involved at d) and e). At d) we do not assume that it is because Peter got up that he went to the dressing table and 'and' here could not be paraphrased as 'and therefore'. We assume rather that the events concerned are only temporally connected; 'and' here is thus paraphrasable as 'and then'. Example d) in this regard not only involves this temporal relationship, but also a spatial one. First John goes to town and, in this location, buys a sweet. The 'and' that is involved here can thus, unlike d), be paraphrased as 'and there'.

It is critical to note that the precise nature of the inter-event relationships are not reducible to the word 'and' itself - these relationships would remain the same if 'and' were not to occur as a connector. Consider examples 9a) and e) repeated as 10a) and b) but without 'and':

10 a) The old man fell off his chair. He died.

b) John went to the shop. He bought a sweet.

Rather than being intrinsic to the word 'and', the nature of the

relationships between such ideas is, we claim, determined by the order of the clauses which encode them, an issue we shall explore in greater detail in chapter 4, but which we shall now briefly examine.

2.3.3.3. Discourse ordering and cohesion

According to Levelt (1981) one of the problems speakers have to face is what he terms the "linearisation problem". Speakers, due to the linearity of language, have to order any information they wish to express in a linear way. If what needs to be expressed has itself a linear order - as do sequential events - then it is this order that speakers follow in their expression. The latter forms what we will term the **iconic principle of narrative production**, and consequently, of **narrative interpretation.** This principle states that, all other things being equal, the order of mention of events represents the order of occurrence of those events (see also Enkvist, 1981; Leech, 1983:68).

Returning to examples in 9) and 10) above, we may note that the order of mention does indeed follow the order of occurrence. The exact relationship involved between the ideas mentioned is derived from our knowledge of the world. Such world knowledge concerns exactly how events may indeed be connected - through cause and effect, purpose, time and space, for example (see Schank and Abelson, 1977 for details of this knowledge).

In this light, what does 'and' therefore encode? We believe that 'and' is a cohesive device which simply encodes that the ideas in the conjoined clauses 'belong' to each other or are closely connected. The exact nature of this connection depends on the specific information encoded in the connected clauses. As van Dijk (1977:60) notes, the "connection is not expressed by

the conjunction 'and' itself but follows from the principle that 'and' establishes the closest possible link (temporal, local, causal) between facts ... apparently 'and' has both a GENERAL and a NEUTRAL character with respect to other connectors."[10]

This discussion on English 'and' allows us to make the crucial distinction between two areas of narrative production - the ordering of narrative information and the indication of the connexity of that information. Following from the iconic principle of narrative production and interpretation, narrators order the information they wish to express in terms of the order of the occurrence of these events. They may also indicate how that information is connected (cf the iconic principle of connexity discussed above). These, however, form radically different strategies, and each operates in a different domain. It is in this light that we turn to an investigation of the nature of the cohesive function of the Xhosa consecutive.

2.3.3.4. **The Xhosa consecutive and narrative cohesion**

Just as English 'and' does not encode the exact nature of interclausal relationships, so too, we claim, the Xhosa consecutive is independent of this function. This is opposed to the Dokean view described above, which, as we saw, holds that the consecutive encodes, in itself, consecutiveness in terms of time, purpose and salience. Consider, in this regard, the following examples which are translations of the English sentences 9a) to 9e) above:

11 a) **Ixhego liwe esitulweni salo lafa.**
old-man he-fall- IND-PERF from-chair his he-CONS-die

b) **UTom uwe phantsi wazibetha**
Tom he-fall-IND-PERF he-CONS-self-hit

c) **Umbane ubethe umthi watsha ngobusuku bonke.**
lightning it-hit tree it-CONS-burn with-night all

d) **UPeter uphakame waya etafileni.**
Peter he-stand-up-IND-PERF he-CONS-go to-table

e) **UJon uye evenkileni wathenga ilekese.**
John he-go-IND-PERF to-shop he-CONS-buy sweet

The first (main) clause in each case is in the non-connecting indicative mood, while the second clause is encoded in the connecting consecutive mood.

The relationships between the above clauses vary just as as they did in the English examples and include causal relationships such as in b) and c), plain temporal relationships such as in d) and spatio-temporal relationships such as in e). From this variety it is clear that the consecutive does not encode any specific relationship between the clauses. In terms of our discussion above, what it does indicate, however, is the connexity of these clauses.

The central difference between English and Xhosa is that, while in English such connexity is expressed in terms of an overt co-ordinator, in Xhosa it is expressed through the morphosyntaxis of the connected clauses. In terms of the connexity implied by the consecutive, an idea encoded in one clause is connected to the one preceding it insofar as the two ideas are connected with regard to the situation they commonly describe.

As opposed to the traditional view that the encoding of a clause in the consecutive implies a 'subordination of ideas', we are claiming that it implies a greater degree of relatedness of that clause to the one that

precedes it than would be the case if it was encoded in a non-connected way. We hold the thesis, in other words, that conceptual relatedness encodes, in Xhosa, in terms of syntactic relatedness. Conceptual connexity is thus encoded iconically by syntactic connexity. Similarly, **breaks** in the pattern of connexity through the independent indicative, would be expected to indicate breaks in informational or conceptual relatedness. This forms part of the iconic principle of cohesion described earlier - that that which is said together goes (conceptually) together.[11]

We shall now attempt to substantiate this claim by investigating specific extracts of Xhosa narratives.

2.3.4. The salience of syntactic connectedness in Xhosa narrative

2.3.4.1. Introduction

We saw that Chafe claims that centres of interest - chunks of related idea units - form the basis of what he terms extended sentences. In Xhosa narrative, accordingly, we would expect that the syntactic connexity of the consecutive would encode connected ideas within a centre of interest. Breaks in such connexity, signalled by the non-connecting or independent indicative, would, from this perspective, coincide with breaks in conceptual relatedness and the commencement of a new centre of interest. The cohesion signalled by the consecutive would thus reflect the connexity of idea units sharing a common context, this context being a centre of interest which the idea units jointly describe.

In the following extended extracts this hypothesis seems to be supported. In these extracts centres of interest are indicated by different letters.

The start of a new syntactic unit is indicated by underlining the first predicate of that unit. As usual IND-PERF indicates the the non-dependent indicative perfect while CONS indicates the consecutive. We exclude, for purposes of economy, an analysis of those parts of the extracts that are not relevant to our present discussion:

12 a) (i) **hayi ke uhambile ke umntana nenqwelo yakhe**
no then she-travelled-IND-PERF then child with carriage hers

(ii) **wayifihla ke lo mntana inqwelo etyholweni**
she-CONS-it-hide then this child carriage in-bush

(iii) **wafika apha emdanisweni ungene ngamandla**
she-CONS-arrive here at-dance she-SUBJ-enters with- force

(iv) **yaye inkosi idanisa nezaa ntombi zimbini**
he-PCT chief he-PART-dance with-those girls which two

b) (i) **hayi okunene uyithathile le ntombi isangena emnyango**
no truly he-her-take-IND-PERF this girl she-PROG-PART-enter in-door

(ii) **wayixhwila ngoko**
he-CONS-her-seized then

(iii) **wathi nanku umfazi ungenile**
he-CONS-say -

(iv) **udanise naye ngobusuku bonke**
he-SUBJ-dance with-her with-night all
(text 1:37-43)

a) (i) So then the child travelled with her carriage.

(ii) Then the child hid the carriage in some bushes.

(iii) She arrived at the dance and entered openly.

(iv) The chief was dancing with those two girls.

b) (i) So then truly, he took the girl as she entered the door.

(ii) He seized her then,

(iii) and said, "This is my wife she has entered".

(iv) He danced with her the whole night.

13 a) (i) **ithe inkosi yaphinda yaya ekameleni**
he-did-IND-PERF he-CONS-repeat he-CONS-go to-room

(ii) **yaya intombazana sele imkile**
he-CONS-go girl already she-left

(iii) **yabuya**
he-CONS-return

(iv) **yaza kuxela ukuba umfazi wam uzimele**
he-CONS-go to tell -

(v) **ke ndiza kuphinda ndifake omnye umdaniso ngeveki elandelayo**

(vi) **ke lo mdaniso ndiza kuwufaka ngumdaniso wokugqibela ukuba ndithe le ntombazana**

(vii) **ndaba andiyifumananga andikuphinda ndibe naye umfazi**

(viii) **ndiya kukhetha nguwuphi na**

b) (i) **hayi ke kuphindile wavela umdaniso**
no then it-repeat-IND-PERF it-CONS-come dance

(ii) **abuya la mantombazana**
they-CONS-return these girls

(iii) **aza kuxela into yokuba hayi ubumnandi umdaniso phaya**
they-CONS-come to-tell thing that
(text 1:50-57)

a) (i) When the chief went to the room again,

(ii) he went, the girl having already departed.

(iii) He returned

(iv) and went to tell, "My wife has hidden herself

(v) so I'm going to put another dance on next week.

(vi) This dance which I am going to put on is the last dance that I will try to get this girl.

(vii) If I do not get her I will not try to make her my wife again.

(viii) I will choose anyone."

b) (i) So then the other dance came.

(ii) The girls returned

(iii) and went to say "No, the dance there was wonderful!"

In each of these examples the a) and b) sections deal with centres of interest which are distinct from each other. Between the a) and b) sections, in other words, there is a conceptual discontinuity. We turn now to a brief examination of the examples above in this light.

In 12a) the common orientation of the idea units is the events leading up to the girl's arrival at the chief's party. The idea units in 12b) are distinct from those in 12a) as the orientation now turns to focus on the chief's actions. In the second example, 13), the distinction between a) and b) as centres of interest is even clearer. In 13a) the idea units have as their common context the actions of the chief on the discovery of the girls' escape. 13b) is completely distinct, involving the coming of the dance and the girl's reaction. Both these cases, in accordance with our hypothesis, are indeed encoded in 'independent' sentences. Just as there is a break in the conceptual connexity between the respective centres of interest, there is a matching break in syntactic connexity with the commencement of a new sentence beginning in the indicative mood. At three of such breaks, furthermore, we find the co-occurrence of discourse particles which, as we saw, also function as markers of informational re-orientation. The narrator is thus clearly grouping chunks of information together and signalling how they relate, both internally and externally, to each other.

As an explanation of the dominant occurrence of the consecutive mood in Xhosa narrative, our hypothesis concerning syntactic connexity encoding conceptual connexity seems, at this point, to be well illustrated. Within chunks of connected information clauses are connected, while breaks between such centres of interest are marked by syntactic breaks.

We have, however, restricted our discussion of this phenomenon to certain sections of only one narrative from those in the appendix. When applied to other narratives, however, the strict rigidity implied by our hypothesis cannot be maintained. Often what are treated as centres of interest like those in 12) and 13), are indeed **not** marked as syntactically distinct, but are connected through the use of the consecutive. Many tales, while naturally consisting of more than one informational orientation signalled by other cohesion markers discussed above, have, indeed, few (if any) indications of intermediate syntactic closure. Some tales, in fact, appear to be one continuously right branching sentence - all the event clauses being connected through the consecutive without any in the indicative which would indicate a break of connexity. Consider the following examples:

14 a) (i) **kwakusa waphinda waya**
next-day he-CONS-again he-CONS-go

b) (i) **lafik' izim**
he-CONS-arrive zim

(ii) **lathi**
he-CONS-say -

Demazana Demazana
yhoo ndivulele
mnta kamama mnta katata
litye nantunjana zimbini

(iii) **wathi ndiyakwazi ulizim andizi kuvula**
she-CONS-say -

c) (i) **lemka izim lacaphuka**
he-CONS-depart zim he-CONS-upset

(ii) **laya egqirheni**
he-CONS-go to-doctor

(iii) **lathi ndingenza njani zendibe nelizwi elincinci**
he-CONS-say -
(text 4:19-23)

a) (i) The next morning he went again.

b) (i) A **zim** arrived,

(ii) and said,

"Demazana, Demazana,
Oh, open for me,
Child of mother, child of father,
Oh, stone of two small cracks."

(iii) She said, "I know you, you're a zim. I won't open!"

c) (i) The **zim** departed, annoyed.

(ii) He went to the doctor.

(iii) He said, "Doctor, how may I make my voice small?"

15 a) (i) **yajika**
it-CONS-turn

(ii) **yagoduka**
it-CONS-go-home

b) (i) **wemka**
she-CONS-depart

(ii) **waya kungena kowabo**
she-CONS-go to-enter to-her-people

(iii) **wafika**
she-CONS-arrive
(text 3:37-42)

a) (i) It turned

(ii) and went home.

b) (i) She departed

(ii) and went to her family's place

(iii) and arrived.

In 14), a) and b) share the same setting, but are distinct centres of interest in that b) has an orientation on a new series of action focusing on

a different participant. In turn, c) is distinct from b) in that it involves a completely different setting and a new pattern of interaction. Similarly, in 15), a) and b) form distinct chunks of information in terms of orientation on different participants with their own associated event sequences.

These chunks of information, unlike 12) and 13), while **prosodically** cohesive, do **not** encode in distinct sentences although each involves a re-orientation from the ones that precede. This pattern is, apparently, a common one in Xhosa oral narrative. To explain its prevalence we need to extend our argument as outlined above by exploring some definitive aspects of oral narrative strategies.

2.3.4.2. **Planning and narrative strategy**

In examples 12) and 13) we find the occurrence of a tightly organised and well-planned chunking of information. The centres of interest are signalled as distinct informational units through encoding in complex syntactic units as well as lexical and prosodic markings. However, such distinctly marked organisation in oral narrative is rare given its usually spontaneous and unplanned nature. Marking distinct sentences as self-contained units takes a type of forethought which is not generally available under the conditions of spontaneous narration. Under such conditions, narrators, to maintain continuity, need to select, express and organise information almost simultaneously. To this end a simpler narrative strategy of connecting idea units syntactically is to be found. Instead of the complex process of beginning a new sentence for each centre of interest, this strategy involves connecting **all** the idea units syntactically as they are expressed. (For more on 'unplanned' vs 'planned' discourse see Keenan and Bennet (eds), 1977;

Chafe 1982; Tannen (ed) 1984).

The issues discussed above form the basis of what we shall term the **context levels effect.** Earlier we stated that idea units are connected in that they describe a common context. We may now note that this context need not be, and generally is not confined to a centre of interest as such. Idea units may, and generally are, connected to a broader context - the context of the narrative as a whole. Syntactically, the idea units are seen as connected, not to the lower level of a centre of interest, but to the higher level context of the whole narrative. At this level, the conceptual unity of the idea units, as expressed in the consecutive, is their connexity as part of the same narration. This way of connecting idea units syntactically, that is, to the broader context of the whole narrative, represents an organisational pattern simpler than the one which encodes discrete centres of interest as independent sentences. In the absence of discrete syntactic marking, prosodic and, to a lesser extent, lexical markers, remain the most consistent signals in the marking of changes of orientation between the lower levels of informational organisation such as centres of interest.

By extending our argument through the context levels effect we can show that the syntactic connexity so characteristic of Xhosa oral narrative encodes conceptual connexity at potentially different levels. While syntactic discontinuity is rare, when it does occur as in 12) and 13) it encodes conceptual discontinuity in terms of changes in centres of interest. The more prevalent pattern of marked syntactic connexity encodes conceptual connexity in terms of the narrative itself.

2.3.5. **Narrative patterns and grammatical organisation**

The arguments above suggest that the notion of 'sentence' in discourse is not a very useful one. The traditional identification of sentences through syntactic closure is, as we have seen, highly problematical. As Crystal (1983) demonstrates with English conversational data, this is due to inter-clausal connection (through, in English, 'and', 'but' and 'so' for example). So prevalent is the latter phenomenon that Crystal proposes the following alternative 'grammar' for the description of oral discourse:

Utterance ⟶ Clause (+ connectivity + clause)
(Crystal, 1983:156)

Pawley and Sydner (1977) give some independent corroborating evidence for Crystal's findings. In the introduction to an unpublished draft entitled 'The one clause at a time hypothesis', they state that:

> There is strong evidence that in encoding novel discourse, speakers operate under the one clause at a time constraint, such that it is difficult or impossible to formulate the full content of a novel sequence longer than a single clause in a single encoding stage.

We agree with these observations. It is the clause that is the most obvious unit in Xhosa narrative organisation, generally encoding a single idea unit. We have seen, furthermore, that it is the **absence** of connectivity rather than its presence that is a marked feature. In this regard, Crystal claims further (ibid:166) that "the linguistic organisation [of conversational English] has been fundamentally misconstrued, due partly to the absence of data, and partly to the uncritical application of traditional paradigms of inquiry". We would think that Crystal's remarks apply equally as well to

Xhosa. We believe that grammatical inquiry into Xhosa, a domain resting outside our central interest, has relied too much on contrived data. By taking more cognizance of naturally occurring data we believe that the domain of Xhosa grammatical inquiry will be much enriched.

2.4. Conclusion

We have investigated certain aspects of cohesion in Xhosa narrative. We have taken cohesion to be the linguistic signalling of conceptual relatedness. The bulk of our discussion has concerned the notion of such relatedness expressed in terms of syntactic connexity through the Xhosa consecutive. We found that prosody is a far more consistent indicator of breaks in conceptual connexity than similar syntactic indicators, although when these do, in fact, occur, they indicate breaks in connexity. We attributed the latter to the spontaneous, unplanned nature of oral narratives which results in what we termed the "context levels effect". Accordingly, we dispensed with the notion of a syntactically defined sentence as a useful notion for analysing discourse and discourse cohesion.

We may now return to our argument in the previous chapter concerning the organisation of certain verbal morpho-syntactics in terms of 'moods'. The notion of discourse grounding, discussed in the previous chapter, augmented with the notion of discourse cohesion, discussed in this chapter, presents a view of the moods as represented in the figure below.

Diagram 1


GROUNDING
Foreground event
Background non-event
COHESION
Connected
Non-connected
Consecutive mood
Participial mood
Indicative mood
Past Continuous aspect

Footnotes to Chapter 2

1) Some of my preliminary research is utilised in Lanham (1984).

2) For an in depth review and critical discussion of the research into, and methodology of what the authors term 'pausology', see O'Connel and Sabine (1983). O'Connel and Sabine are highly critical of research which does not acknowledge the variety of factors which may result in pause phenomena. Breaks in the flow of speech, however, cannot be treated as a unitary phenomena. With specific regard to Bantu languages, this is demonstrated by Maw and Kelly (1975) in their monograph on Swahili intonation. In their discussion on what they term 'breaks' (ibid:47 ff) they make the distinction between 'pauses' (breaks around which other intonational features cluster), and 'hesitations' (breaks **not** associated with other intonational features). Our examples were chosen for their relative lack of hesitations. When they do occur, however, they are marked by '-'.

   O'Connel and Sabine are also highly critical of auditory as opposed to acoustic measurements of pauses, auditory measurement being used in our research. While such auditory measurements cannot give the exact measurements of pauses, we claim that such exact measurements are not entirely relevant to the pause factors about which we are concerned. Our focus has been on the occurrence of perceptible pauses and their role in language rather than on their acoustic qualities and precise duration.

3) In the examples in this section we ignore certain influences of tones which are not relevant to us here. For an overview see Lanham (1960:89-98).

4) We found one case in our example texts - 1q)-r) - where there is no upstep after a pause. Here r) begins at a low pitch similar to that in which q) ends. It appears here that r) represents an afterthought which the narrator tacked on to what was otherwise signaled as a complete unit.

5) Penultimate lengthening is a much discussed feature of Bantu languages. For a review of some of the literature see de Clercq (1968:110-113).

6) Other types of penultimate length have been described. de Clercq (1968:137-140) for instance, notes a penultimate length marked [•] which, while longer than other syllables is shorter than full lengthening marked [:]. The shorter penultimate length is described as characterising sentence medial position while full length characterises sentence final position. de Clercq in fact postulates that both [•] and [:] are conditioned variants of an 'open phoneme' ('ope foneem') /+/ which is in contrast to a 'closed phoneme' ('geslote foneem') /-/ (ibid:137).

7) de Clercq (1968:175ff) associates this falling pattern with 'statements' ('stellingsinne') and distinguishes a different pattern for questions ('vraesinne'). With regard to statements he further distinguishes between a full fall which occurs over sentence final [:] (ibid:185-195) and a shorter fall occurring over [•] in sentence medial position (ibid:196-202).

8) In many cases where such penultimate lengthening occurs the final syllable is either elided or negligibly apparent. This seems particularly so when the final tone is L. We have, however, not shown such elision as in many cases the final vowel does, in fact, seem to occur, all be it in a much reduced form.

9) Doke's 'subjunctive mood' includes here the 'past subjunctive mood' - what we have termed the 'consecutive'. See also chapter 1, footnote 3.

10) See Lakoff (1973) and Posner (1980) for similar findings and conclusions concerning 'and'.

11) In this regard Haiman (1983:799) notes that in many cases in language "the grammatical separateness of a clause corresponds to the conceptual independence of the proposition expressed by the clause."

CHAPTER 3

Discourse Entities

3.1. Introduction

In the last two chapters we have been primarily concerned with the events and states that make up narrative. In this chapter we shall be concerned with the 'things' (human or non-human) involved in these events and states. These we shall refer to as **discourse entities.**

3.2. Nature of discourse entities

Discourse entities fall into two types: **discourse participants** and **props.** Discourse participants (to be referred to as DPs) are the usually animate, human or human-like 'actors' in the narrative around whom the focus of the narrative occurs. Props, on the other hand, are inanimate things not forming the focus of narration but rather associated with and supportive of the discourse participants. As DPs form the focus of the narration, we shall be concentrating on them rather than on props. (For a similar classification as described here, see Grimes, 1975:33).

Discourse participants themselves divide into two categories - **agentative discourse participants** (ADPs) and **undergoer discourse participants** (UDPs). ADPs are those DPs which can be seen as 'carrying out' actions while UDPs are those DPs 'affected' by such actions. In syntactic terms the ADP usually corresponds to subject position while the UDP corresponds to the object position. (Our classification of DPs is rather general. For a more detailed classification in terms of 'case roles', see Longacre, 1983:151 ff).

We now go on to a discussion of certain conceptual properties of discourse entities.

3.3. **Discourse entity activation**

The following discussion is based largely on Chafe's theory of conceptual activation which links up with his notion of consciousness discussed earlier (Chafe, to appear).

Two types of conceptual units Chafe distinguishes within the memory of a narrative are those concerning events and objects (ibid:9). Our central interest here involves the conceptual units concerning objects - in our terms discourse entities. Specifically, we shall be concentrating on the most salient types of DEs, the discourse participants. As our concern in what follows is in terms of such DPs as conceptual units we shall refer to them as 'DPs' and not, redundantly, to 'DPs as conceptual units'.

A DP, following Chafe (ibid:9), has potentially three **states of activation**: it may be **active, semi-active** or **inactive.** An **active** DP is one which is currently being focused on in consciousness. It is one that is thus fully in the awareness of the narrator and one that he is currently processing. A **semi-active** DP, in contrast, is one which is in the background, or peripheral awareness - a DP that may have been processed earlier but is now no longer focused on. An **inactive** DP is one neither in central or peripheral awareness. It is rather in long-term memory and as such has not achieved any state of activation.

We shall now explore these distinctions with extracts taken from spontaneous English narrative before we go on to their relevance to Xhosa data. This

narrative was produced after the 'subject' had been shown the cartoon narrative. Consider the following example:

1 a) it is all about a soldier with a gun

b) who walks up to a clown and a rabbit
(GI:2-3)

Here the DPs **a soldier** in a) and **a clown** and **a rabbit** in b) are introduced into the narrative. They represent what has been traditionally termed 'new information'. Up to this point these DPs have not been mentioned and have thus not been activated from their inactive status (Chafe, to appear:15). Once so activated - or drawn into consciousness - these DPs become active. Brown and Yule (1983), whose framework is similar to Chafe's, call such active DPs 'current entities' (ibid:173). In this regard 1) continues:

c) and he obviously has intentions of eating the rabbit.
(GI:4)

Here **he** and **the rabbit** have already been activated and represent active DPs. They are in this regard 'old information'.

If a DP is not continuously focused on and thus not active over a stretch of narration, it loses its active status through a process of **deactivation** and so becomes a **semi-active** DP. To bring it from its position as only in peripheral awareness it has to undergo a process of **reactivation** (cf Chafe, to appear:14ff). In Brown and Yule's terminology such a DP represents a 'displaced entity' - displaced as there is a break in its involvement over a stretch of activity (Brown and Yule, 1983:173). Consider the following example occurring at a later point in GI's narrative. Here the DPs **the clown**

and **the wolf** form the focus of narration. The DE **the gun** has been previously introduced at this point:

2 a) then the clown walks up to him with the gun
  b) and says how do I know this gun is loaded
  c) and the wolf says well I've loaded it myself
  d) and the clown pulls the trigger
  e) and shoots the wolf
  f) so then they run off -
  g) the clown and the rabbit run off
  (GI:28-35).

Here the DP **the rabbit** is not involved in the series of events a)-e). At f) the narrator uses **they** in reference to both clown and rabbit. However, this does not contain sufficient information to include the DE **the rabbit** as this DE has been de-activated through its non-participation and thus needs to be re-activated for appropriate reference. To this end the narrator corrects himself and in g) the rabbit DE is appropriately re-activated.

Some DPs thus form a different type of **old information** from active ones. In this regard the strict division between 'old' and 'new' information which goes as far back as the Prague functionalists is not quite appropriate. Different shades of old information, it appears, need to be distinguished. It is only recently that reclassifications of this 'old' vs 'new' dichotomy have come to reflect such shades (see esp. Prince, 1981(a) and Brown and Yule, 1983:182-189).

3.4. **The general informational constraint**

The bulk of our discussion below will be in terms of the appropriate linguistic encodings of DPs according to various states of activation as discussed above. To this end we propose the **general informational constraint.** In its basic form this constraint reads:

> The linguistic encoding of a DP must be appropriate to the state of activation of that DP.

This constraint is largely in the spirit of Grice's maxim of quantity (Grice, 1974:45). This maxim states that a contribution in discourse must be made as informative as required but, at the same time, it must not be more informative than required. In this regard the informational constraint is ultimately derivative of Grice's notion that speakers try to co-operate with their hearers and that they do not try to confuse them. The informational constraint is, from this point of view, independent on syntactico-semantic constraints on modes of reference. In terms of these constraints, which we shall later review, certain modes of reference, rather than being determined by the status of activation of a DP, are associated with its semantic or syntactic properties.

3.5. **Modes of reference - English and Xhosa**

The system of reference in English involves, primarily, pronouns and the indefinite and definite articles. The use of the definite and indefinite articles together with their associated nouns is demonstrated in extracts 1a)-c) above. **Pronouns** such as **he**, **she**, **it** and **they** encode very little information in contrast to the latter two modes of reference which include overt mentions of nouns. The information they do encode, is in terms of

number (singular vs. plural), gender (masculine vs. feminine, human vs. non-human) and 'case' (for example, nominative vs. accusative).

The situation in Xhosa is rather different. Xhosa has no system of articles or pronouns similar to those in English. Xhosa nouns are divided into "classes" according to common prefix. Number (singular vs. plural et al) is also indicated by these prefixes.

A central aspect of the Xhosa mode of reference is subject-verb agreement. Verbs show agreement with their subject nominals through a prefixal element known as the subject concord. Each noun class has its own associated subject concord. As an example of their usage consider the following where the common verb is **-pheka** 'cook'. Class prefixes and their associated subject concords (SCs) have been underlined. The **-ya-** is a verbal formative which is of no direct relevance here:

class 1 **umpheki uyapheka** (SC = **u-**)
'the cook cooks'

2 **abapheki bayapheka** (SC = **ba-**)
'the cooks cook'

5 **ixhego liyapheka** (SC = **li-**)
'the old man cooks'

6 **amaxhego ayapheka** (SC = **a-**)
'the old men cook'

9 **intombi iyapheka** (SC = **i-**)
'the girl cooks'

10 **iintombi ziyapheka** (SC = **zi-**)
'the girls cook'

The SC on the verb in each case thus encodes information concerning the class of the subject of that verb. This class information suffices for the

SC to be used as appropriate reference without mention of the noun. Consider for example:[1]

3 a) **wayifihla ke lo mntana inqwelo etyholweni**
SHE-IT-hid then this child carriage of-her in-bush

b) **wafika**
SHE-arrived
(text 1:38-39)

a) Then the child hid the carriage in some bushes.

b) She arrived.

In a) we find the occurrence of the noun (**lo mntana**) together with the SC. In b), however, there is no such occurrence. Below, in terms of discourse, we shall refer to the first case as the mention-agreement strategy (MAG) and to the second as the agreement-only strategy (AGO).

As with the subject, Xhosa also shows objectival agreement on the verb through the object concord (OC). The use of the OC is not, however, similar to that of the SC. In contexts such as 3a) the SC is obligatory. The OC is not, however, obligatory in the same way. In this light, consider the following example, where a sentential object is also present:

4 a) **umpheki wapheka ipapa**
cook HE-cooked porridge

b) **umpheki wayipheka ipapa**
cook HE-IT-cooked porridge

Both of these may be translated as 'the cook cooked the porridge'. In a) there is no OC but in b) there is an OC. Here b) is as equally acceptable

as a). This is unlike the use of the SC in this example - if the SC **w-** were not to occur here the sentences would not be grammatical.

The difference between 4a) and b) has been put down to various extra-grammatical factors. Louwrens (1979), for example, argues that the OC is only possible when that object is 'old information' (ibid:92ff). Bosch (1981) comes to a similar conclusion with a more historio-typological approach. Allan (1983), using Swahili data, points out that as objects without agreement may also be old information, the function of the OC cannot be described solely in these terms (ibid:325). He argues rather that the object concord "co-occurs with the ONP (object noun phrase) when the latter - or rather its designation - is the topic of discourse" (ibid:326). According to Allan (ibid:331) the OC "is used concomitantly with an ONP when there is focus on the NP designatum as topic".

Although we shall have recourse to a notion similar to that of 'topic' in our discussion we shall not concentrate on the case when the OC is used "concomitantly" with the object noun phrase. This area lies outside of those which we wish to explore. We shall, rather, be concentrating on the cases where the OC occurs without its associated object noun phrase. Like the SC, the OC encodes information concerning the class of the verbal object and may be used as sufficient reference to this object. Consider the following example in this regard:

5 a) **umpheki wapheka ipapa**
cook HE-cooked -porridge

b) **wayitya**
HE-IT-ate

Here at b) both the SC and the OC encode, respectively, the class of the subject and object of the verb and are appropriately used to refer to **umpheki** and **ipapa**.

3.6. Mentions, non-mentions and oppositions

It is useful at this point to review the modes of mention in Xhosa and English in terms of **oppositions**. The parameters of these oppositions are for Xhosa, **agreement** (through either the SC or OC) and **mention** (the overt occurrence of a noun phrase). At this stage of our argument we have discussed the oppositions a) +Mention +Agreement [+M +AG] - realised as a noun phrase occurring with its agreement marker, and b) -Mention +agreement [-M +AG] - realised as the OC or SC occurring without their relevant noun phrases. As we have stated above, we refer to the use of the [-M +AG] pattern in narrative as the agreement only strategy (AGO strategy), while the [+M +AG] pattern, in turn, is referred to as the mention agreement strategy (MAG strategy). These two strategies correspond respectively to what may be termed the **pronominal** vs. the **mention** strategy in English.

Before we turn to an in-depth discussion of these two strategies we need to discuss two other oppositions logically implied by the parameters of 'M' (mention) and 'AG' (agreement). These are [+M -AG] (where a mention occurs but exhibits no agreement on the verb) and [-M -AG] (where there is neither a mention nor an agreement marker on the verb). We shall discuss these in turn.

With regard to the [+M -AG] pattern consider the following examples:

6 a) **kwafika omnye umntu**
THERE-arrive another person.
(cf text 6:39)

b) **kudlala abantwana endlini**
THERE-play children in-house

a) Another person arrived.

b) Some children are playing in the house.

In both of these cases there is no subjectival agreement although the subjects are indeed mentioned. Instead the so called indefinite concord **ku-** (equivalent to English existential 'there'), is prefixed to the verb.

The strategy associated with this pattern that shows a mention but no agreement is to **introduce** a discourse entity to the hearer (see Louwrens, 1979:88-95 for an in-depth discussion). The subject in each case represents 'new information' - a discourse entity that has not been introduced before. In this regard, it appears that it is only after a discourse entity encoding as subject has been introduced that the speaker may use the agreement strategy with or without a mention. Thus example 6a) could continue with:

7 a) **wahlala phantsi umntu**
HE-sat down person
The person sat down.

or

b) **wahlala phantsi**
HE-sat down
He sat down,

where both a) and b) exhibit agreement. Example 6a) could **not**, however, continue similarly with:

c) **kwahlala phantsi umntu**
THERE-sat down person

A person sat down.

as it would imply that another DP was being introduced.

Importantly, the [+M -AG] strategy is thus used to activate discourse entities, while the AGO and MAG strategies are intrinsically associated with entities which have, in some way, already been activated. In traditional terms the MAG and AGO strategies are thus anaphorical.

The [+M -AG] strategy is, in general, a rare way of introducing discourse entities and its occurrence is usually associated with a major shift in the narrative (as in text 6 from which 1a above is extracted). This rarity can be explained in terms of the fact that a speaker usually introduces a new concept in terms of some concept the hearer already has in mind. His 'starting point' in an utterance, in other words, is usually in terms of a concept that is accessible to the hearer. In this way, as subjects usually form the starting points of utterances, they usually encode a discourse, entity that is already activated, while the activation or introduction of new discourse entities typically encodes in the object position. Given this pattern, hearers may link the new discourse entity (encoded in object position) with some already known entity (encoded in the subject position). Chafe (to appear: 31) terms the fact that starting points are usually 'old information' **the light starting point constraint.**

In terms of the parameters of 'AG' and 'M' we have now discussed the oppositions [+M +AG], [-M +AG] and [+M -AG]. We may note that the final

opposition, [-M -AG], also, in fact, occurs in Xhosa. By its nature this opposition in relation to the others does not involve reference to a discourse entity at all in that it implies no mention and no agreement. Consider the following examples where the relevant parts have been underlined:

8 a) **kwathiwa umfana wenkosi uyafrisha**
THERE-said-PASS boy of chief HE-courting

b) **wathi ke uza kufrishela emdanisweni**
HE-said then HE-go to-court at-dance

c) **okunene ke yafika imini yomdaniso**
truly then IT-arrived day of-dance

d) **kwahanjwa kwabhekwa emdanisweni**
THERE-travelled-PASS THERE-gone-PASS to-dance
(text 1:14-17)

a) It was said that the son of the chief was looking for a wife.

b) He said that he was to look for one at a dance.

c) In truth, the day of the dance arrived.

d) People travelled and went to the dance.
(cf 'There was travelled and gone to the dance')

9 a) **abanye naba phandle**
some here-they-are outside

b) **kusesilapha isithungu**
THERE-already-here torch

c) **kuzatshiswa le ndlu**
THERE-go-burn-PASS this house

d) **ngokuba iboniwe yinja ayingomntu**
as IT-was-seen it-dog not-it-person

e) **wasuka waphuma le ntombazana ngathi iyokuchama**
SHE-then SHE-went out this girl as-if SHE-go-to-urinate

f) **kwalayithwa esi sithungu**
THERE-lit-PASS this torch
(text 5:113-116)

a) Here are the others (girls) outside (the house).

b) A torch was already there.

c) The house was to be burnt,

d) as it was seen that it was a dog, not a person.

e) The girl then went out, as if she was going to urinate.

f) This torch was lit.

The construction exhibiting the [-M -AG] pattern is invariably of the form:

ku-a-Verb-w-a

where **ku** is the indefinite concord and **-w-** the passive marker. In each of the contexts where this construction occurs, information concerning the participant involved in the event it encodes, is in some sense irrelevant. In 8a), for example, it is not relevant who said the chief was to get married, and at 8d) it is not relevant who precisely went to the dance but rather the fact that it was attended. At 9c) who is to burn the house can be inferred from context and a mention is thus not necessary. This also holds for 9f) where the agents of the lighting of the torch are again directly inferrable. In general, it appears that, in terms of the fact that it makes no reference to participants, the [-M -AG] focuses on the discourse event itself.

In what follows we shall be concentrating on the AGO and MAG strategies to the exclusion of the other two discussed above. Before we explore the informational constraints operation over these forms we need to present the semantico-syntactic constraints on agreement.

3.7. Semantico-syntactic constraints on agreement

The information encoded in English pronouns is, as we have seen, small in comparison to full nouns. In the absence of any other cues (pragmatic or otherwise) this can lead to **semantic anomaly.** Consider the following examples:

10 a) **The old man** and the old woman were sitting in the lounge.
   b) **He** got up.

11 a) **The old woman** and **the young girl** were sitting in the lounge.
   b) **She** got up.

In 10b) the pronoun **he** is appropriate as there is only one possible antecedent, **the old man.** In 11b), however, the pronoun **she** is anomalous as there are two possible female antecedents, **the old lady** and **the young girl.** Here the occurrence of the pronoun does not contain sufficient information. For disambiguation a full mention is needed i.e. '**the old lady** got up'. A constraint on pronouns is obviously needed to avoid such anomaly. We shall call this the **ambiguity constraint.** As this constraint is relevant to Xhosa we shall state it formally. It reads:

> In the absence of any other disambiguating factor a pronoun should not be used where there is more than one possible noun phrase as its antecedent.

The emphasis given to the absence of disambiguating factors is important. Normally there are certain non-grammatical cues which result in a pronoun, or, in Xhosa, an agreement marker, being unambiguous. Consider the

following examples:

12 a) **Ian** hit Kevin and then

b) **he** hit Jenny.

13 a) Stephen twisted the knob on **the fan.**

b) **It** began to hum

c) **It** broke off in his hand

Here in 12), all other things being equal, **he** in b) is unambiguously interpreted as being coreferential with **Ian** in a). In 13) the pronoun in b) refers to **the fan,** while in c) it refers to **the knob.** The type of knowledge used in these examples will form a central part of our discussion.

In Xhosa the situation is rather different, due to the class agreement system. However, the same principles of the ambiguity constraint as set out for English seem to apply. Consider following two examples, translations, respectively, of the English 10) and 11) above. (In these examples and those which follow, we co-index nouns with their relevant agreement markers in the English analyses):

14 a) **Ixhego nexhegokazi bebehleli egumbini lokuphumla.**

old-man[1] and-old woman[2] they[1,2]-were-sitting in-room of-resting

b) **laphakama**

HE[1]-got-up

15 a) **Ixhegokazi nentombazana bebehleli egumbini**

old-lady[1] with-young-girl[2] THEY[1,2]-were-sitting
lokuphumla
in-room of-resting.

b) **laphakama**

SHE[1]-got-up

In 14), unambiguous in English, **ixhego** and **ixhegokazi** belong to the same class (class 5). The information encoded in the class 5 SC in b) is thus ambiguous as to either these two referents. Instead of the agreement only (AGO) strategy the mention-agreement (MAG) strategy is thus needed for appropriate reference. In contrast 15), which is ambiguous in the English translation, **ixhegokazi** and **intombi** belong to different classes - 5 and 9 respectively. The class information encoded in the class 5 SC in b) is not ambiguous as its only possible antecedent is the class 5 noun **ixhegokazi.** The ambiguity constraint operating over such phenomena reads, for Xhosa:

> In the absence of any other disambiguating factors agreement-only should not be used if there is more than one possible antecedent for that agreement marker. In such contexts agreement and noun phrase mention must occur.

Given the description of these factors, we now turn to an examination of the informational constraint itself.[2]

3.8. The informational constraint and the MAG and AGO strategies

3.8.1. Introduction

The issues that we shall discuss are illustrated in the following example:

16 a) **kwafika <u>inkosi</u>**
INDEF-arrive king[1]

b) **yahlala phantsi**
HE[1]-sat down

c) **<u>y</u>ahlala phantsi <u>inkosi</u>**
HE[1]-sat down chief[1]

a) A chief arrived.

b) He sat down.

c) The chief sat down.

In isolation the alternative modes of reference in b) and c) - AGO vs. MAG (and pronoun vs. mention in the English translation) - seem only to be stylistic. Much of the research into the nature of English pronouns and similar forms in other languages has concentrated on fabricated examples such as 16). In extended naturally occurring discourse, however, we find a number of constraints operating over choices such as those found in b) and c) which are largely independent of style per se. The AGO, in this regard, seems particularly constrained.

One context where this strategy cannot occur is where a semi-active DE needs to be re-activated. This context demands the MAG strategy. Consider the following example, where our focus is on f):

17 a) **kuthe ekuhambeni kwethuba**
THERE-happened in-travelling of-time

b) **kwathiwa umfana wenkosi uyafrisha**
THERE-said-PASS boy of-chief HE-courting

c) **wathi ke uza kufrishela emdanisweni**
HE-said then HE-go to-court at-dance

d) **okunene ke yafika imini yomdaniso**
truly then IT-arrived day of-dance

e) **kwahanjwa kwabhekwa emdanisweni**
THERE-travelled-PASS THERE-gone-to-PASS to dance

f) **wanomnqweno ke lo mntwana**

SHE[1]-was-with-wish then this child[1]
(text 1:13-18)

a) After a while,

b) it was said that a chief's son was courting.

c) He said he would look for a wife at a dance.

d) Truly, the day of the dance arrived.

e) People travelled and went to the dance.

f) This child wished ...

Here at f) the DP **lo mntwana** has not participated in a stretch of preceding discourse. Until e) where she again participates, **lo mntwana** is thus a semi-active DP and thus needs to be re-activated. The AGO strategy would not encode sufficient information concerning which DP, in fact, is involved. To re-activate this DE a re-mention is necessary - i.e. only the MAG strategy suffices.

In terms of the informational constraint, the AGO strategy cannot thus apply to semi-active DPs. What is further suggested is that the MAG strategy is intrinsically associated with the re-activation of DPs. While our statement

concerning the AGO strategy will be maintained, we will see that modifications of the latter statement concerning the MAG strategy will be necessary.

3.8.2. **The reactivation constraint**

At this point we may thus state our first sub-constraint of the informational constraint. This we shall term the **reactivation constraint** which reads:

> Re-activation is not accessible to the AGO strategy and this strategy cannot be used in such contexts that demand re-activation. Such re-activation of DPs is only accessible to the MAG strategy.

The implications of a strong reading of this constraint would be that no AGO strategy in narrative involves re-activation. While we hold this to be true, a similar reading, as we shall demonstrate, cannot be applied to the second part of this constraint. This would read that all the MAG strategies in a narrative would be associated with re-activation of a DP. We shall explore certain areas which disallow this implication, one which is strongly suggested in the models of Chafe (to appear) and Brown and Yule (1983).

3.8.3. **The continuity constraint**

3.8.3.1. **Introduction**

We have noted under what conditions the AGO strategy is **not** realised. Now we turn our attention to those conditions under which it **is** realised. Consider the following extract in this regard where the AGO strategy predominates:

18 a) **wavela unina**

SHE[1]-came-from her-mother[1]

b) **wamthatha lo mntana**

SHE[1]-HER[2]-took this child[2]

c) **wamngenisa emanzini**

SHE[1]-HER[2]-entered into-water

d) **wathi akuba samanzini wamkhulula zonke ezo mpahla zimdaka**

SHE[1]-did SHE[1]-when SHE[1]-HER[2]-undressed all those clothes which-dirty
(text 1:29-31).

a) The girl's mother appeared.

b) She took the child

c) and made her come into the water.

d) When she was in the water, she removed all those dirty clothes.

In this extract there are, we claim, certain definable regularities or **continuities.** These continuities are over and above the one described by Chafe and Brown and Yule in terms of a continuity of DP participation throughout the events described. In terms of their models such continuity allows the DPs to remain 'active' or 'current entities' and thus accessible to the AGO strategy.

There are, however, other continuities not described either by Chafe or Yule and Brown but, we claim, extremely important in the selection of either the AGO stratey or the MAG strategy. There is, for example, continuity of **discourse role.** Throughout the extract above the relevant DPs consistently maintain their roles as agentative (**unina**) or undergoer (**lo mntwana**).

Similarly there is a continuity of **starting point** or **theme.** The DP **unina** forms the starting point throughout the whole extract. Lastly, the DPs are involved in a series of events which are continuous in the sense that they form a centre of interest - the events are globally coherent and no informational transitions in the extract are present. We shall see that it is when continuities like these are all present the AGO strategy occurs, it seems, to the exclusion of the MAG strategy. We shall term these continuities collectively the **continuity constraint.** Before we investigate this constraint in terms of the AGO and MAG strategies we need, firstly, to examine certain differences between their respective basic functions in discourse.

3.8.3.2. Differences between the MAG and AGO strategies

We have seen that in contexts where re-activation of a semi-active DP is necessary only the information heavy MAG strategy is appropriate, the AGO strategy being informationally inadequate (**vide** the reactivation constraint). In contexts of continuity such as 18) above where the AGO strategy is used in place of its MAG counterpart the situation is rather different. The information encoded in the AGO strategy is, in this example, as well as others like it, completely sufficient. Indeed in such contexts the AGO strategy occurs to the exclusion of the MAG strategy. However **were** the MAG strategy to be used it would **not** be insufficient as the AGO strategy would be in contexts which need re-activation of a DP. If it were 'inappropriate' in any way, such inappropriateness would be of a different order - it would stem from its encoding an unnecessary amount of information. In such a case the MAG strategy would be, unlike its AGO counterpart occurring in re-activation contexts, informationally sufficient - its only inappropriateness would stem from its encoding more than

sufficient information - i.e. it would be redundant.

3.8.3.3. **AGO strategy - potential and preference**

Given the fact that the MAG strategy is adequate reference in contexts of continuity, we need to explore some principles to explain the preference of the AGO strategy in such contexts. To this end we shall speak of the AGO strategy **potential** and **preference.** In certain contexts, we may now see, such as those in which the DPs are semi-active, this potential does not arise. In other contexts, such as the contexts of continuity, the potential **does** arise and is, indeed, **preferred.** What we hope to show is that the AGO strategy potential and preference is a matter of degree. In some contexts there is a strong degree of this potential and consequently, a preference for agreement only as reference. In these contexts the MAG strategy is, apparently, excluded. Other contexts have a lesser degree of potential and in these contexts the MAG strategy is not excluded and may, indeed, occur.

We now turn to an examination of the realisation of AGO potential in terms of the various types of continuity making up the continuity constraint. In the examination of each type of continuity we shall be concentrating on examples which reveal breaks in **only** the type involved.

a) **Discontinuity of theme and discourse role**

The most obvious cases of changes in discourse role and thematic connexity occur in dialogue. Here the discourse roles of ADP ('speaker') and UDP ('hearer') change systematically. Furthermore, each DPs respective contribution in the dialogue indicates a change of thematic orientation.

In the following example we exclude analysis of material which is not relevant to our argument:[3]

19 a) **wabuza umvundla unjani lo mvundla uwufunayo**

HE[1]-asked rabbit[1] -

b) **lathi eli joni ukuphendula ufana nawe**

HE[2] this soldier[2] to-answer -

c) **wathi umvundla he zange ndiwubone umvundla**

HE[1]-said rabbit[1] -
(text 6:16-25)

a) The rabbit asked, "What's this rabbit like that you're looking for?"

b) This soldier said in answering, "He looks like you."

c) The rabbit said, "I've never seen a rabbit ..."

Another type of break of connexity is seen in the following example:

20 a) **wafrisha le ndoda omnye umfazi**

HE[1]-wooed this man another woman[2]

b) **wazala lo mfazi abantwana ababini abangamantombazana**

SHE[2]-gave-birth this woman[2] children[3] who-two who-girls

c) **bakhula abantwana**

THEY[3]-grow children[3]
(text 1:8-10)

a) The man wooed another woman.

b) This woman gave birth to two children who were girls.

c) The children grew up.

Breaks in the continuity of starting point thus seem to lead to a marked breakdown in the consistency of the AGO strategy as distinct from examples which are continuous in this regard. This decrease in the AGO potential is, however, not sufficient to block the AGO strategy completely in preference for the MAG strategy. Consider the following example where the DPs are **inja** ('dog') and **umfazi** ('woman'):

21 a) **yathi hawu hawu yiza uze kutya**

IT[1]-said -

b) **wathi zange nditye nanja nasekhaya**

SHE[2]-said -

c) **yathi ndakutya**

HE[1]-said -

d) **wancama waza kutya**

SHE[2]-gave-up SHE[2]-went to-eat
(text 5:51-54)

a) It said, "Woof, woof, come, you must eat!"

b) She said, "I've never eaten with a dog, even at home."

c) It said, "I will eat you!"

d) She gave up and came to eat.

Here the DP roles and thematic orientation change consistently, but no mentions are made at such breaks of connexity. The following non-dialogue passage also includes the AGO strategy at points of thematic and discourse role discontinuities. Here the DPs are **uJon** ('John') and **inkomo** ('cow'):

22 a) **wayibamba**

HE[1]-IT[2]-caught

b) **yasuka yazidlikidla**

IT[2]-went IT[2]-itself-shook

c) **wakhela ngaphezulu**

HE[1]-climbed above

d) **yabaleka**

IT[2]-ran
(text 2:42-45)

a) He caught it,

b) it shook itself,

c) he climbed above,

d) it ran.

Here there is a regular change of starting point with only the AGO strategy being present.

It appears that breaks in thematic and discourse role continuity lead to a decrease in the degree to which the AGO strategy can be realised. Although the AGO strategy can and does occur in such contexts, the occurrence of the MAG strategy suggests that these discontinuities decrease the preference for the AGO strategy.

b) **Discontinuity of events**

The examples above showed a continuity of events while there was a break in thematic and discourse role continuities. We now discuss contexts which exhibit a continuity of DPs in terms of theme and DP role but in which there

is a discontinuity in terms of the events in which they are participants. Consider the following example:

23 a) **ke ngoku ke lo mntana wayengathandwa kokwabo**

then now then this child[1] HE[1]-was-not-liked-PASS those-of-home

b) **enikwa inkonzo zombona**

HE[1]-given-PASS cob of-maize

c) **ngoku lo mntana wasuka wayokwalusa inkomo yakokwabo**

now this child[1] HE[1]-went HE[1]-go-to-herd cow of-those-of-home
(text 2:3-4)

a) So then this child was not liked at home,

b) being given maize cobs.

c) Now, the child went to herd the household cow.

24 a) **wamlalisa ekamileni**

HE[1]-HER[2]-made-sleep in-room

b) **wathi inkosi imke iphindile emdanisweni iyokudanisa yona**

HE[1]-did chief[1] he[1]-left HE[1]-again to-dance HE[1]-go-to-dance him

c) **yaphuma intombazana ngefestire**

SHE[2]-went-out girl[2] by-window.
(text 1:46-49)

a) He put her to sleep in the room.

b) Just when the chief had left to return to the dance to go and dance,

c) the girl went out through the window.

Here 23c) begins a series of events forming the tale proper after certain

d/d information. 24a) ends a series of events and 24b) begins a new one. At each of these points where there is a maintenance of starting point but a change of event continuity, the MAG strategy instead of the AGO one occurs.

Similar to changes only in terms of starting point and role, this context is not restricted to the MAG strategy alone as the following examples illustrate:

25 a) **wazimela wemka**
SHE-herself-hid SHE-departed

b) **kwahla wala endleleni**
THERE-dark SHE-while on-road

c) **wabona umlilo**
SHE-saw fire
(text 3:9-11)

a) She hid herself and departed.

b) It became evening while she was on the road.

c) She saw a fire.

26 a) **lahamba labuyela umva**
HE-travelled HE-returned back

b) **lithe lisahamba njalo esithubeni**
HE-did HE-still-travelling like-so for-while

c) **lafika laqonda no**
HE-arrived HE-thought no
(text 6:27-30)

a) He travelled and returned back.

b) While he was so travelling for a while,

c) he thought, "No".

Here, in both examples, b) begins a new sequence of events distinct from those at a). Mentions do not, however, arise.

It appears, then, that like the contexts of discontinuity of theme and role, breaks in event continuity are not sufficient to prevent the AGO strategy. Rather, judging from the occurrence of the MAG strategy in some of these contexts, it appears that the AGO potential is weakened.

c) **Breaks in theme/role and event continuity**

If not only one but all three types of discontinuity described above occur, we find that, although the DP is 'active' and thus presumably amenable to the AGO strategy, the MAG strategy appears exclusively. On the basis of the texts examined, there appears to be no potential for the AGO strategy even though the relevant DP need not be 'de-activated' in Chafe's sense. Consider the following examples:

27 a) **baya emdanisweni elila njalo lo mntana**

THEY^{1}-went to-dance SHE^{2}-crying like-this this child^{2}

b) **kuthe ekuhambeni kwethuba**

THERE-happen in-travel of-period

c) **wahamba lo mntana wabheka emlanjeni**

SHE^{2}-travelled this child^{2} SHE^{2}-went to-river
(text 1:21-23)

a) They went to the dance, the child weeping so.

b) After a while,

c) the child travelled and went to the river.

28 a) **wahamba waya kumbatha enjeni**

SHE[1]-travelled SHE[1]-went to-lie at-dog[2]

b) **kwakusa ngomso inja ivulele iinkomo**

early tomorrow dog[2] IT[2]-opened-for cows.
(text 5:59-60)

a) She travelled and went to sleep with the dog.

b) Early the next morning the dog released his cattle.

At b) in both examples there is a change of discourse role and starting point and a new event sequence begins. Although the DPs are active in that they participate over these discontinuities, the MAG instead of the AGO strategy occurs. Unlike the previous examples, no exceptions could be found to this pattern - all similar contexts displayed the MAG strategy. It seems then that when there is a substantial break in continuity along all the parameters outlined above, the potential for the less informative AGO is minimal, if not non-existent.

We have now investigated the continuity constraint as part of the informative constraint. We found that this constraint effectively controls the utilisation of the AGO strategy as appropriate reference above and beyond the state of activation of the relevant DP.

Continuity, it appears, is a matter of degree. At the one end of the scale, where there is a discontinuity of participant participation, the AGO strategy is completely blocked. In such contexts only the MAG strategy is appropriate. The latter is formalised in terms of the re-activation constraint. At the other end of the scale, if there is continuity in all

the parameters discussed, the potential for the AGO strategy is greatly enhanced and exclusively preferred to its MAG counterpart. Between these two points a break in any one of the relevant continuities leads to a decrease in the AGO potential - and unlike the previous situation, the MAG strategy may occur in the place of AGO. We now go on to explore some of the reasons behind the need for the MAG strategy besides for the re-activation of 'semi-active' DPs.

3.8.4. **Orientation and mentions**

Our discussion suggests that factors determining modes of reference to a DP cannot be explained only as a result of its state of activation as we have described it. It now appears that the utilisation of the MAG strategy to refer to a DP is not solely the result of that DP being, to use Brown and Yule's notion, a 'displaced entity' - an 'entity', in Chafe's terms, which has become 'semi-active' due to its non-involvement over a stretch of narrative. In this regard we found that the MAG strategy occurs in a predictable way in contexts where the the relevant DP would be seen by Chafe as 'fully active' and by Brown and Yule as a 'current entity'. Due to this current or active status in these two frameworks, it would be predicted that such DPs would be encoded in the AGO strategy. The noticeable and largely regular occurrence of MAG in its place is thus left unexplained.

In order to explain this phenomenon we propose that part of the active status of a DP determining the choice between the AGO or MAG strategies is in terms of **orientation** on that DP. The notion of orientation forms, we claim, the basis of the continuity constraint described above in that each of the continuities involves a common orientation on a DP. In order to clarify this idea we shall discuss each of the continuities in terms of

orientation:

a) **Role**

Given a DP's continuity of role there is a common orientation. If this role were to change and the DP assume a new role, the role the DP assumes involves a re-orientation from its previous one.

b) **Theme**

A DP may be commonly oriented upon as a starting point or theme. If another DP is chosen as a starting point a change of orientation in terms of starting point is necessary.

c) **Events**

A DP may involve a common orientation in that it is involved in a globally coherent sequence of events. If a new series of events begins, a new orientation on the involvement of that DP in that series of events is needed.

In the terms described above, it appears that it is with regard to each of the re-orientations that determines the degree of potential and preference for the AGO instead of the MAG strategy. If there is a common orientation in terms of a)-c) above, then the AGO strategy is preferred and consistently used as there is no need for DP re-orientation. If, on the other hand, a change of orientation occurs in each of these areas, the potential for the AGO strategy is greatly reduced and the MAG strategy is consistently used in its place. If there is only a change of orientation in any one of a)-c), the AGO strategy may occur but does not consistently and predictably occur.

This discussion suggests that in the contexts described the MAG strategy correlates with the **re-orientation** on a DP and not only with its 're-activation' as such. In terms of the active status of DPs this implies that the AGO strategy is not consistent with such re-orientation but rather with a common orientation. The implications are that by mentioning the DP the narrator indicates that that DP has a different status from the one it had before. By using agreement only the narrator indicates that the status of the DP is maintained or only minimally changed. We would expect this to operate as a constraint in that the narrator would use mentions only in those contexts where re-orientation of the type discussed above is indeed involved.

3.8.5. **Interim summary - the informational constraint**

We found above that the informational constraint could not be satisfactorily restricted to the state of activation of a disourse entity (as dealt with under the re-activation constraint). We claim that the informational constraint may be adequately characterised only if the notion of orientation is included as an inherent part of it.

Given this inclusion we may summarise the general informational constraint (GIC) and the two sub-constraints that constitute it in Xhosa as follows:



3.9. Aspects of the encoding of mentions

3.9.1. Introduction

We now turn to some preliminary remarks concerning the nature of the linguistic formulations of mentions. These involve word order and the use of demonstratives in mentions. Our suggestions will be tentative and exploratory in nature.

3.9.2. Demonstratives

3.9.2.1. Introduction

In the Xhosa narratives investigated, the number of activated discourse entities encoded through the proximate demonstrative ('this') together with a noun, rather than in terms of a noun alone, is substantially higher than

in English where this phenomenon is, in fact, rare. In the Xhosa cartoon narratives, for instance, 70% of the mentions included the proximate demonstrative, while in the English equivalents not one mention was encoded in this way. In literal translations the abundant usage of such demonstratives, sounds peculiar. In the examples that follow we have maintained literal translations of the demonstratives. Parts of the Xhosa examples have not been analysed as they are not of direct relevance here. In these examples the demonstrative and its associated noun are underlined:

29 a) **uthe ke usabaleka njalo kwafika omnye umntu**
HE-while then HE-still-run so THERE-arrived another person

b) **lo mvundla wakhwela apha entloko kulo mntu**
this rabbit HE-climbed here on-head to-this person

c) **wahamba nalo mntu lo**
HE-travelled with this person this

d) **lamlandela eli joni**
He-HIM-followed this soldier
(cf text 6:38-43)

a) While he was so running another person arrived.

b) This rabbit climbed on the head of ('on') this person.

c) He travelled with this person.

d) This soldier followed him.

30 a) **aphinda la mantombazana aphinda aza kuxela ukuba siyahamba kule veki sibheka emdanisweni**
THEY-repeat these girls THEY-repeat THEY-go to-tell that -

b) **yaphinda le ntombazana yathi aninakundinika nokuba ngunondrokwe na oku kokuba ndibone emdanisweni**
SHE-repeated this girl SHE-said -

c) **athi la mantombazana yhoo asinakuhamba nento efana nawe thina**
THEY-said these girls -

d) **hayi ke ngokunene ahamba la mantombazana ashiya le ntombazana kwakhona**
No then truly THEY-travelled these girls THEY-left this girl again

e) **iphindile le ntombazana yahamba yaphindela emlanjeni**
SHE-repeated this girl SHE-travel SHE-go to-river
(text 1:63-67)

a) These girls said again, "We're going to the dance this week."

b) This girl said again, "Can't you give me just any old dress so that I can see the dance?"

c) These girls said, "My, we cannot go with someone like you!"

d) So then truly these girls left and left this girl behind again.

e) This girl went to the river again.

In what follows we shall attempt to explain why Xhosa narrative displays the marked occurrence of this form.

3.9.2.2. Space and the domain of discourse demonstratives

In terms of spatial deixis, proximate demonstrative reference locates an object as close to the speaker. Thus, in English, the proximate 'this boy' means 'the boy closest to me'. The implication for discourse is that a discourse entity referred to by means of the proximate demonstrative is also close to the speaker, not in terms of physical space, but in terms of discourse space - the area mapped out by the discourse.[4] Thus **le ntombazana** 'this girl' in 30e), for instance, means 'the girl I've just spoken about'. This seems to be borne out by the following example as well:

31 a) **kwakukho umfazi nendoda**
there-was woman with-man

b) **lo mfazi wazala umntana**
this woman SHE-gave birth child
(text 1:2-3)

a) There was a woman and a man.

b) This woman gave birth to a child.

Here the DP encoded as **lo mfazi** 'this woman'at b) has just been introduced into the narrative at a) and is thus close to the narrator in terms of discourse space. Like 30e), 31b) could thus be paraphrased as 'the woman I've just referred to'.

The spatial implications of the discourse use of the demonstrative, however, do not seem to apply to the following examples. Note particularly 32f) and 33e):

32 a) **kuthe ekuhambeni kwethuba**

b) **kwathiwa umfana wenkosi uyafrisha**

c) **wathi ke uza kufrishela emdanisweni**

d) **okunene ke yafika imini yomdaniso**

e) **kwahanjwa kwabhekwa emdanisweni**

f) **wanomnqweno ke lo mntana uyintombazana ukuba angaya naye emdanisweni**
SHE-had-wish then this child who-is-girl that SHE-may-go with-HER to-dance
(text 1:13-18).

a) After a while

b) it was said that the son of the chief was looking for a wife.

c) He said he would look for one at the dance.

d) In truth the day of the dance arrived.

e) There was travelled and gone to the dance.

f) The girl child wished that she could go to the dance as well.

33 a) **uthe ke usabaleka njalo**

b) **kwafika omnye umntu**

c) **lo mvundla wakhwela apha entloko kulo mntu**

d) **wahamba nalo mntu lo**

e) **lamlandela eli joni**
HE-HIM-followed this soldier
(text 6:38-42)

a) While he was so running

b) another person arrived.

c) This rabbit climbed here on the head of this person

d) and travelled with this person.

e) This soldier followed him.

Here the use of the proximate demonstrative encodes DPs that are not, indeed, close to the narrators in terms of discourse space. At both 32f) and 33e), the DPs **lo mntana** 'this child' and **eli joni** 'this soldier', referred to through the proximate demonstrative, have been involved only at some distant point in the narrative. Unlike the examples discussed above, 32f) may not be paraphrased as 'the child I am talking about' and 33e) as 'the soldier I am talking about'.

On the basis of these examples, rather than our notion of discourse space, what appears to be involved with the use of demonstrative reference in Xhosa narrative is another type of 'space' which we might term 'thematic space'. Like the use of demonstrative reference as outlined for discourse space, some notion of proximity is involved in terms of thematic space. In terms of thematic space the discourse entity is proximate, not in the sense that it has just been mentioned, but rather that it is close to the speaker's

concern or centre of attention. The demonstratives in 32) and 33) rather than meaning 'the girl/soldier I've just spoken about', mean 'the girl/soldier that I am concentrating on, the specific girl/soldier involved in the story'.[5]

The same appears to apply to the examples of proximate demonstrative reference discussed above with specific regard to discourse space. The proximate demonstrative, in all these cases, rather than specifically locating the relevant entity in terms of the area of discourse, locates that entity in the area of the narrator's thematic concern. In this way it appears that the proximate demonstrative acts as a focus marker in Xhosa.

3.9.2.3 **The evolution of demonstratives**

In Indo-European languages definite articles have evolved from a demonstrative element (see Lyons, 1977:648ff). A similar evolution has been postulated for Bantu languages. According to Givón (1976:157) given the absence of "articles" as such in Bantu languages, in many of them demonstratives lose their pointing function and act rather as definitisers. In many Bantu languages the pre-prefixal element of nouns has derived from such functionally reduced demonstratives which have become cliticised onto the noun itself (see also Greenberg, 1978).

The regular occurrence of demonstratives in Xhosa, particularly the proximate forms, indicates to us that it too is in the process of losing its demonstrative significance. The thematic function of demonstratives discussed above can arguably represent a weakening of its locating function. If the proximate demonstrative is used in contexts where it encodes thematic prominence rather than spacial proximity, then its basic pointing function

is in the process of remodification, if not being lost altogether. The demonstratives used in this way would then indicate an intermediate stage of their evolution where their pointing function, although rather different, still has some significance. At some later stage this function itself could be lost where the demonstrative (perhaps cliticised onto the noun) could have only the significance of a definitiser.

3.9.3. **Word order**

3.9.3.1. **Introduction**

Although Xhosa is regarded as an SV language in the narratives consulted, VS order appears to be far more common. In this regard Louwrens (1980) presents an in-depth discussion of pragmatic factors associated with VS order in Xhosa. He discusses, and rejects Givón's 'afterthought' notion as a possible candidate. According to this notion, the speaker begins with what we have termed the AGO strategy for discourse reference, but then finds that more information is necessary and mentions the subject as an afterthought (see Givón, 1976:154). Louwrens holds that Givón's view may be true of oral discourse but not of written discourse on which he bases his discussion. Written discourse involves planning and forethought, and, unlike its oral counterpart, it is unlikely that subject mentions are simply 'tacked on' for disambiguation (ibid:88).

Instead of the 'afterthought' theory, Louwrens explains the occurrence of VS order in terms of 'presentative movement'. This involves the notion that a subject is moved to the right of the verb when its referent is to form the entity spoken about at some point in the discourse that follows. With specific regard to Xhosa, Louwrens states that a noun is moved to the right

when:

> ... dit of in die onmiddelike konteks of later in die verhaal as gespreks onderwerp 'n besondere plek inneem en by gevolg deur middel van "presentative movement" op die voorgrond gestel word.
> (Louwrens, 1980:102).

Based on this approach, Louwrens' second argument is typological. Louwrens expresses the view (together with Givón, for example) that such pragmatic factors lead to typological change. Although Xhosa is still basically an SVO language, VS order can, in the future, lose its present functionality and become re-interpreted as the normal Xhosa word order (ibid:103). Louwrens places this point in the context of the notion that Bantu languages at some previous stage of their development had a basic SOV word order before its present SVO order (see Givón, 1976). The development of Xhosa word order would therefore seem to be SOV $\longrightarrow$ SVO $\longrightarrow$ VSO.

The notion of 'presentative movement' in terms of our data seems to be demonstrated in the following extract where the post-verbal subject is in bold print:

34 a) wavela **unina**

b) wamthatha lo mntana

c) wamngenisa emanzini
(text 1:29-30)

a) The girl's mother appeared.

b) She took the child

c) and entered her into the water.

Here, indeed, the post verbal subject mention at 34a) forms the topic of the discourse that follows.

We do, however, have certain doubts as to the value of 'presentative movement' in explaining VS order in general. Firstly, we have seen that it claims that a right shifted subject is 'presented' as **either** the immediate **or** the 'non-immediate' topic - a topic at some later stage of the discourse. Giving it such a wide scope substantially weakens its explanatory power and it therefore seems an unlikely account of its function. Secondly, Louwrens does not discuss how the 'presentative' VS order contrasts with SV order. Does SV order, for example, imply that the subject is not specifically marked as being the topic in (some part of) the following discourse? If this is not the case (as, we shall see, our data suggests) and a similar topic indicating function can be attributed to SV order as well, then the notion of 'presentative movement' is substantially weakened.

Rather than 'presentative movement' we believe that what determines SV or VS order in Xhosa is derivative of certain pragmatic factors associated with sentence initial position. We now go on to describe these factors.

3.9.3.2. **Word order iconicity and SV order**

Research has indicated that sentence initial position is associated with 'focus' in many languages (see Louwrens, 1979 for extensive bibliography and critical commentary). The term 'focus' as used in this research is in terms of the prominence the speaker gives to a particular discourse referent, or the referent that forms the narrators centre of attention. In our discussion we will not restrict such prominence to 'referents' but to other elements that might enjoy such prominence such as discourse events.

In terms of Bantu languages the salience of sentence initial position has long been recognised. According to Doke and Mofokeng (1971:385), it is a noticeable factor "of most Bantu languages ... that initial position in the sentence confers particular emphasis and prominence". (Louwrens 1979 presents a recent investigation of this phenomenon as well as other pragmatic features associated with word-order in Bantu).

In terms of this notion of discourse focus, we propose that in Xhosa there is an iconic principle of word order in that what is said first in a utterance is what is most immediate to the narrator; in other words what is said first is what the narrator focuses on or finds most prominent. In what follows we shall explain this principle in terms of the occurrence of VS and SV orders.

3.9.3.3. SV and VS - icons of prominence?

Consider the following examples where all occurrences of subject mentions are in bold print:

35 a) watshaba **umfazi**

b) washiya lo mntana wamnye uyintombazana

c) hayi ke wahlala wahlala

d) wafrisha **le ndoda** omnye umfazi

e) wazala **lo mfazi** abantwana ababini abangamantombazana

f) bakhula **abantwana** bade babedala
(cf text 1:5-10)

a) The woman lost her temper

b) and left the child who was a girl.

c) So then she stayed and stayed.

d) The man wooed another woman

e) This woman gave birth to two children who were girls.

f) The children grew up until they were old.

36 a) lavuleka **ilitye**

b) wathi **uDemazana** uyinto yaphi

c) utsho ngamehlo amakhulu- amehlo abomvu

d) kutheni ungahlambi nje

e) wathi sukundibuza mntanam

f) wasuka wathi ndiphe ukutya

g) ngoku umane elila **uDemazana**

h) wathatha ingxowa

i) wagalela uthuthu

j) lathi **izim** so uzilungisela
(text 4:32-40)

a) The stone opened.

b) Demazana said, "Where do you come from?"

c) she said with big eyes, red eyes,

d) "Why don't you wash?"

e) He said, "Don't ask me my child".

f) He said, "Give me food."

g) Now Demazana wept.

h) She took a sack

i) and poured ash into it.

j) The **zim** said, "Good, so you're preparing for yourself."

In these examples the verb is consistently in the iconically salient initial position. We find here a continuity or **flow** of event prominence. Such a flow, at least in **iintsomi** texts, is the typical pattern and is, we claim, the result of the fact that narratives deal primarily with events rather than the DEs involved in the events. The order VS thus appears to be the 'neutral' one in narrative (although it may **not** be neutral in other discourse types).

The post-verbal mention in the context of event flow can be seen to function as a reminder mention - a mention where the discourse entity itself is not particularly salient and serves only a disambiguating function. In this regard we thus agree with Givón's 'afterthought' view of VS order.

From the perspective that we are creating when the SV pattern (i.e., a pre-verbal mention) occurs it presents a break in the event-focus flow. In the following examples subject mentions are again in bold print (37 is a direct continuation of 35 above):

37 a) ngoku **lo mfazi** akamthanda lo mntana uyintombazana
   b) wathi wabengamthandi lo mntana uyintombazana
   c) wathanda ukuba makahlale neehagu
   d) angahlali nabantu ngenxa yokuba umdaka
      (text 1:11-12)

   a) Now this woman did not like this child who was a girl
   b) As she did not like this child who was a girl
   c) she liked her to stay with the pigs
   d) and not with people on account of her being dirty.

38 a) ngoku bayanqena ukuya kwamalume wabo

b) basuka bahlala pha

c) **uDema** yena wayohamba wayohamba

d) waya kuzingela

e) ashiye uDemazana endlwini
(text 4:13-15)

a) Now they felt too lazy to go to their uncle.

b) They just stayed there.

c) As for Dema, he went to travel

d) and went to hunt

e) and left Demazana in the house.

39 a) hayi ke balala

b) ngoku na ke **inja** kuyasa kusasa iyahamba

c) iya kuzingela

d) **umfazi** ke ngoku kwewu kumele ukuba ndizimele apha

e) wazimela kwakhona
(text 3:23-27)

a) So then they slept.

b) Now then the next morning the dog travelled

c) and went to hunt.

d) The woman, now then, "Oh my, it's necessary that I hide myself here."

e) She hid herself again.

Such breaks of event flow occur at breaks of the informational flow itself - breaks, that is, in informational orientation. At 37a), for example, this break is represented by a shift of orientation from general setting

information to the specific events concerning the woman's cruelty towards the child. Similarly, at 38c) there is a shift in informational orientation from a series of events concerning Dema and Demazana acting together, to a new series of events concerning Dema in particular. Example 39) has two such reorientations: at b) the orientation shifts to the dog's actions and at c) to the woman's actions.

From these examples we conclude that by focusing on a participant, the narrator signals that the information to follow concerning that participant represents a new series of events not directly connected to the ones that precede. In this way SV order in narrative acts in a similar way to the cohesive devices discussed earlier in that this order shows breaks in informational connectedness. This claim seems to be substantiated by the co-occurrence of the discourse particle **ngoku** with SV order at three points in the examples above (see 37a, 39b,d). Discourse particles, as we have seen, are inherently associated with the signalling of such informational re-orientation.

In the cartoon narratives we found a far higher occurrence of SV order than in the **iintsomi** texts. This, we believe, can be explained in terms of the notion of event focus flow. As opposed to **iintsomi** the cartoon narratives are not well known and the narrators consequently struggle to find and orientate themselves to the flow of events. Consider the following extended example from the cartoon narrative included in the appendix:

40 a) **umvundla** uthe wakubona ukuba uza kuqondwa
   b) wabaleka
   c) uthe ke usabaleka njalo

d) kwafika omnnye umntu

e) **lo mvundla** wakhwela apha entloko kulo mntu

f) wahamba nalo mntu lo

g) lamlandela **eli joni**

h) liphethe umpu

i) lilandela lo mntu

j) **umvundla** wakhwela apha ngaphezu

k) phezu kwamagxa kulo mntu

l) eli joni ngoku lathatha intambo ende
(text 6:34-47)

a) When the rabbit saw that he was to be caught

b) he ran.

c) While he was so running

d) another person arrived.

e) The rabbit climbed here on the head of this person

f) and travelled with this person

g) The soldier followed him-

h) carrying a gun,

i) following this person.

j) The rabbit climbed here above-

k) above this person's shoulders.

l) Now the soldier took a long rope.

Event focus flow also predicts that a high proportion of VS order will be found in written narrative. Writing allows a forethought not apparent in spontaneous oral discourse and, consequently, there would be a higher degree of narrative flow.

3.9.3.4. VS order and typology

The question can now be asked whether Xhosa shows indications of word order change. Is the neutral word order pattern becoming VS? We have hoped to show that pragmatic functions are still associated with both VS and SV patterns. Although VS order appears to be neutral in narrative with SV order being associated with a rather exceptional function, the neutrality of the VS order we examined is determined largely by the nature of narrative itself. In general it is perhaps safest to say that, at this stage of its historical development, Xhosa has a free word order rather than any fixed word order. From this perspective the determination of any one type of word order will be through various pragmatic factors such as those discussed above. Research into other Xhosa discourse genres, however, is obviously necessary to substantiate this claim.

3.10. Conclusion

In this chapter we have investigated discourse participants and, more generally, discourse entities in Xhosa narrative. We saw that, above and beyond syntactico-semantic constraints, there are certain pragmatic constraints - the re-activation constraint and the continuity constraint - which we claim constitute the general informational constraint. In terms of these constraints we saw that, besides the state of activity of a discourse entity, the general orientation on that entity needs to be taken into account for its appropriate encoding. We alo offered an examination of how mentions encode in Xhosa narrative. We found that mentions occurring with demonstratives have a thematic function, while their position as either in the pre- or post- verbal position can be explained in terms of certain iconic features associated with word order.

Parenthetically, the approach we have taken to the contoversial issue of the nature of agreement does not presuppose that it is purely grammatical, purely pragmatic, or, indeed, a mixture of both. The question raised here is not what the basis of agreement is, but what factors are associated with it when it occurs with or without a nominal mention. Hopefully this approach will allow a new perspective on an old problem.

Footnotes to Chapter 3

1) An interesting agreement feature exhibited in spontaneous Xhosa discourse, including the narrative texts included, is that it may, in some cases, be controlled by semantic criteria rather than the class of the noun involved. The concords for class 1 (with the class prefix **um-** and class 2 (with the class prefix **aba-**) which are restricted to encoding human nouns, are often used as agreement markers for humans encoded in other classes. In text 5, for example, **intombi** ('girl'), a class 9 noun, is often associated with the class 1 agreement marker **u-** rather than the class 9 agreement marker **i-** (see, for example, text 5:15 and 29-30). Similarly, the class 10 noun **iintombi** ('girls') which is usually associated with the subject corcord **zi-** is associated with the class 2 agreement marker **ba-** in this text (see text 5:108-109). In this regard it appears that the narrator may sometimes 'forget' the class of the noun involved, simply 'remembering' that it is a human noun, in which case the 'human' agreement marker is used. We may note here that in Swahili nouns denoting humans and animals, no matter what noun class, utilise the Swahili class 1 agreement marker (see Gregerson, 1967).

2) For a comprehensive syntactic analysis within an early model of the transformational generative paradigm, see Gregerson (1967).

3) In this example and certain other examples in this chapter, we have not given the complete English analysis. The parts that have been excluded from our analyses are those which are not directly relevant to our present purposes. We have indicated the places where we have excluded material by means of '-' as we did in the previous chapter.

4) In English the proximate 'this' also has a thematic significance in certain contexts. Thus in colloquial speech narratives may begin, 'I saw **this** guy in town today ...' where 'this' indicates that the 'guy' is going to form the topic of the discourse that follows. It is important to note that such uses of 'this' in English are, unlike its other uses, non-anaphoric and indefinite. Xhosa, it appears, does not have a similar idiomatic usage. (For an in-depth discussion of indefinite 'this' in English, see Prince, 1981(b).)

5) In his discussion on deixis, Levinson (1983:54-96) points out that a distinction has to be made between the deictic and the non-deictic uses of demonstratives. Deictic uses of 'this', for example, are interpreted relative to the spatial situation of their utterance. In their non-deictic usages, however, their interpretation is in terms of their textual context rather than their situational context. Thus a speaker stating:

    'I saw a boy. **This** boy was crying ...'

    is not saying that the boy in question is near to him physically.

Section B

Intsomi production

Theoretical orientation

In the previous section we were chiefly interested in the relationship between what we termed in the introduction "narrative thought" and "narrative language". In this section we turn our attention to a rather different domain - the cognitive processes involved in the production of narrative, and in particular **iintsomi**.

The areas we investigate in this section appear (superficially) wide and unrelated. We include, for example, a discussion of cognitive psychology, discourse analysis, pragmatics, and conversational analysis. The question may well be asked, 'Is this linguistics?'. We may only cite Green and Morgan's response to this very question, in an article entitled 'Pragmatics, grammar and discourse' (1981:180):

> Most often the question betrays a parochial concern for professional, rather than intellectual matters. But it may be charitably interpreted as questioning whether linguists can safely IGNORE the "non-linguistic" part of the picture. We think they cannot. Nature does not provide an a priori classification of language-related phenomena into those that are to be explained by theories of linguistic competence and those to be explained by more general theories.

We believe that the issues raised in this section - traditionally treated as the wastepaper basket or Cinderella of linguistics - need detailed research if linguists are to know with any depth of insight what 'language' is.

This section is divided into three chapters. In the first we offer a criticism of two previous approaches to **intsomi** production. In chapter 5 we develop a theory of discourse production, in the final chapter extending it and applying it to **intsomi** production in particular.

CHAPTER 4

Narrative production - previous approaches

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter we offer a critical examination of two models of **intsomi** production. We first review Scheub's model which, as we have seen in the introduction, is specifically oriented to **iintsomi**. We then go on to an examination of the model of **intsomi** composition as implied by recent research into **story grammars**. The latter research has not specifically been based on **iintsomi** but has rather made claims as to universals of folktale production and is thus relevant to our data.

4.2. Scheub - a critical evaluation

In the general introduction to this thesis we gave an uncritical outline of Scheub's ideas of **intsomi** composition. We now turn to a critical examination of these ideas.

4.2.1. Stylistic and methodological problems

Scheub's theory of **intsomi** composition is not an easily accessible one. With specific regard to his 1975 work he has been severely criticised for his highly confusing terminology and tendency to equivocate (see Opland, 1976:45ff). The reader is indeed presented with a bewildering array of such highly idiosyncratic terms as 'core-image', 'plot-core', 'core- cliche', 'thematic image' and 'expansible image'. Although definitions are given for these terms we may agree with Opland's criticism that they become "qualified and extended until they lose any precision they might have had" (ibid:45). The latter, in fact, makes it particularly difficult to give a precise and

objective summary of Scheub's views. Scheub is also highly repetitive; in fact his basic ideas are repeated so often that, as Opland states, "the reader gains the impression that he is being browbeaten into acquiescence in lieu of a reasoned argument" (ibid).

Another weakness in Scheub's work that has been noted concerns the **iintsomi** he presents as his data base (see Opland, 1975:57, Neethling, 1979:42-43). In his 1975 work Scheub includes a selection of 40 tales from the hundreds he reports to have collected throughout the Transkei. A total of 34 of these tales are from one district (Matatiele) and 26 of these tales are from one township (Nyaniso) within this district. Furthermore, 33 of these 34 tales are in Hlubi - a dialect which has not been unquestionably established as being Xhosa (see Neethling, 1979:43). As Opland (1976:57) notes, no tales from the Mpondomise, Ngqika or Thembu dialect areas are included. A similar concentration on Hlubi **iintsomi** is to be found in Scheub's dissertation (Scheub, 1969) which includes a selection of 114 tales. In his 1975 work Scheub does not explain the reason for this imbalance although in his dissertation he writes:

> Most of the 114 performances are Hlubi productions taped in the Matatiele district. I chose the majority of performances from a single area, so that variants and styles from a certain area could be analysed in some detail, then compared with the large collection. Some performances from elsewhere in the Transkei have been added for purposes of comparison. Generally, however, it is a fact that productions throughout the Transkei are quite similar stylistically and thematically.
> (Scheub, 1969:100)

The scholarly reader, however, as Opland (1976:57) notes, "wants as far as possible to see the evidence on the basis of which the author has arrived at

his conclusions."

Given this cursory discussion on stylistic and empirical issues, we may turn to Scheub's theory of **intsomi** composition itself.

4.2.2. Intsomi composition - the image

A theory of **intsomi** composition has to confront two basic properties of the **intsomi** tradition as a whole. Firstly, although two **iintsomi** may exhibit the same basic plot and characters there may be substantial variation in the details in each of the tales. Certain details in one tale may be different from those in a similar tale. Furthermore, one tale may show a greater development of plot than another.

The second property that has to be confronted is that what may be presented as one complete tale on one occasion may be adapted on another occasion to form only a section of another tale. Furthermore, while two tales may exhibit a similarity in one or more of such sections, the other parts selected to make up each of the tales as a whole may be different. Unlike the western tradition - where we do not, for example, find Goldilocks tacked onto Little Red Riding Hood - there is thus no single fixed tale in the Xhosa tradition.

Scheub accounts for these two properties through the mentalistic notion of the 'image'. An image, as we saw Scheub describe it, is an "abstract mental picture" which the narrator has "distilled" from previous performances and which is "objectified" or "externalised" during performance. From her "repertoire" of such images, the narrator selects those which are to form part of performance through a process of "cueing and scanning". The images

are not memorised and the narrator is free to change and adapt them according to her imagination and the particular context of performance.

By using the notion of mental images Scheub is, in fact, appealing to a long tradition of psychological inquiry that goes as far back as Aristotle who claimed that images form the basic elements of thought in general (see Horowitz, 1972:55). With the growth of psychology in the nineteenth century, early psychologists also believed that images play a necessary and essential role in thought, the process of which were, in fact, viewed as a train of images (see Neisser, 1972:244). After a long lull, due mainly to the Behaviourists' avoidance of mental matters, there has been a resurgence of psychological interest in the role of mental imagery mainly since the late 1960s. (See Kosslyn, 1982 for recent research; for the history of psychological research into imagery, see Horowitz, 1972:55ff.)

Throughout his work, however, Scheub does not relate his ideas of the mental imagery involved in the production of **iintsomi** to this broader framework. He may be possibly excused for this basic lack as the period of his initial work was contemporaneous with the fairly recent upsurge of interest in imagery. His later work, published during a period characterised by a great number of articles and books on the subject, cannot, however, be similarly excused. By not considering such research, Scheub does not allow himself the position to judge the full psychological implications of his views. He seems to be unaware that by using the notion of mental imagery he is making a particular psychological claim as to the nature of human thought and memory processes that have concerned scholars for ages.

The most precise definition that Scheub gives of the mental image used as a

mnemonic device in **intsomi** production is as an 'abstract mental picture'. A more exact definition is surely needed if we are to understand the ramifications of what is, in effect, a psychological claim. In his investigation into imagery Richardson, a psychologist, offers the following definition:

> Mental imagery refers to (1) all those quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual experiences of which (2) we are self consciously aware, and which (3) exist for us in the absence of those stimulus conditions known to produce their genuine sensory or perceptual counterparts; and which (4) may be expected to have different consequences from their sensory or perceptual counterparts.
> (Richardson, 1969:2)

Consider too Neisser's definition:

> A subject is imaging whenever he employs some of the cognitive processes that he would use in perceiving but when the stimulus input that would normally give rise to such properties is absent.
> (Neisser, 1972:245).

These definitions imply that mental imagery refers to specific psychological phenomena which cannot thus be adequately defined as merely 'abstract mental pictures'.

The definitions given above also imply that imagery has applications to a number of domains. It is claimed, in fact, that the use of images is apparent (at least for some) in everyday activities as varied as day-dreaming, describing a person's face, the layout of a house or an accident (see Horowitz, 1972:22-23). In the absence of any other indication, Scheub gives the impression that images are restricted to the production of

iintsomi alone. How the use of images in **intsomi** productions would relate to the use of images as general mental phenomena is not assessed in any way.

Recent research into mental imagery, including that discussed above, is far less strong in its claims as to the universality of mental images than earlier research was. The most general conclusion that is now reached is that it seems some people use mental imagery some of the time, while others never appear to do so (see Kosslyn, 1982 for recent experimental evidence; see Chafe, 1977a:235 for implications of this conclusion for discourse). Given this point, the universality of the operation of mental images Scheub attributes to **intsomi** production is surely questionable.

Despite these shortcomings Scheub's general contribution and insights should not be underestimated. His notion of the cueing and scanning process, for instance, shows remarkable correlations with the spreading activation process proposed in recent research into discourse memory. This process involves the notion that an "activated concept spreads its status to whatever is closely related in memory storage" (de Beaugrande, 1984:38). In a similar light, we saw that Chafe (1980) speaks of related information coming to mind through successive 'foci of consciousness', a process not unlike a spotlight moving over a 'darkened' area of conceptual information. Seen in this way, memory search involves a process of **reminding**, where one idea acts as a 'cue' to another (see Schank, 1984 for remembering as reminding).

Given the fact that some parts of tales - what Scheub terms 'core-cliches' - are particularly well remembered, it is quite probable, as Scheub indeed

holds, that these are highly accessible to the hearer during recall. Once indeed recalled, such parts can be seen to remind the narrator of the details that surround it through the spreading activation process. In a similar fashion what Scheub terms an 'image' (we introduce our own term later) may remind the narrator of another image which he will then include in the performance. In text 5 in appendix 2, for example, at the end of an image concerning the girl's adventure at the river, the detail concerning her resulting travelling away from the river reminds the narrator of a detail concerning an arrival at a homestead. This, in turn, reminds her of the image concerning a dog that lives at the homestead (see text 5:129ff). We need to note here that the narrator could have been reminded of another, associated, image. For example, the homestead at which the girl arrives could have been an **izim's** (ogre), and an image concerning the girl's adventures with the **izim** could have been selected. Once the girl escapes (as in text 5:175ff) the narrator could have been reminded of the image concerning her pursuit, concluding in her climbing a tree and being rescued by an **intengu** (a magical bird).

Scheub's view of the cueing and scanning process of memory search in **intsomi** composition thus appears to be quite compatible with modern approaches to memory processes in general. The only drawback concerning Scheub's conclusions in this regard is the fact that, as with his discussion of mental imagery, he fails to locate his work within a framework any more general than his immediate concern.

In general, the most serious defect of his work is the fact that Scheub does not offer a systematic and well researched framework on the basis of which his conclusions can be adequately assessed and measured. Without them being

related to a broader scholarly domain, Scheub's views on the memorial processes involved in **intsomi** production, while highly imaginative and suggestive, cannot be thoroughly convincing.

We now go on to outline the second theory of **intsomi** composition mentioned above.

4.3. Story grammars

4.3.1. Introduction

The foundation of the notion of story grammars comes from the observation of perceived regularities across a variety of narratives from what its researchers claim to be the 'oral tradition'. The discovery of regularities in the 'oral tradition' in general is, of course, not new. As we have seen, Propp (1969) postulated structural invariants for Russian fairy tales - his well known functions - which have been found in oral tales world-wide (for Nguni see Neethling 1979 (Xhosa), Oosthuizen 1977, (Zulu)). Unlike Propp's structural approach, however, modern story grammars have been inspired by a (model of) transformational generative grammar. The research on story grammars (to be abbreviated SGs) to which we will restrict our attention, has been carried out in the framework of cognitive psychology and memory research.[1,2]

The story grammarians claim that individuals develop a **story schema** - a mental model of story structure - which is, in a way which becomes clearer below, represented by the postulated story grammars. This claim, we hold, must be seen in the context of recent research concerning the nature of oral memory in so called 'oral societies'. This varies from Lord's

formulaic theories of oral narrative composition (Lord, 1965) to Ong's claims of profound psychological and cognitive differences - differences in the nature of consciousness - between purely oral societies and societies in which the 'written word' predominates (Ong, 1982; see also Luria, 1976; Goody, 1977 for claimed cognitive differences, and Tannen, 1982, for general review of the research).

4.3.2. Story grammar rules

The basic unit of the story grammar is the **episode** (see tables 1 and 2, and figure 1 in Appendix 1 for application) which is defined in terms of a protagonist and a goal - a change in either leading to a change in episode. The episode is divided structurally into various basic nodes which subsume terminal nodes subsuming, in turn, the actual propositions of the tale. Groups of propositions, in other words, can be seen to belong to different nodes at various levels. As can be seen, episodes may be embedded - i.e. occur within a first higher order superordinate episode. In figure 1 **outcome** embedding is illustrated. Beginning embedding and ending embedding - formalised in the grammar but not illustrated - also occur. The grammar also formalises the relationship between parts of the tale at different levels - causal and temporal relationships for example.

4.3.3. Story grammars and story schemata

The grammar in table 1 is meant to model a story schema - what could be called the mental map of story structure. This schema, it is claimed, is learned inductively over numerous experiences of stories. The latent structure of stories is thus internalised over time. (See esp. Thorndyke and Yekovitch, 1980:28, and Stein and Glenn 1979, for developmental aspects of schemata).[3] Once acquired the schema is meant to be used in both the

comprehension and recall of tales.

In the comprehension of tales, incoming information of a specific story is meant to be matched against the structural slots of the internalised mental schema. The schema, in other words, 'parses' the incoming story as it is received (Thorndyke and Yekovitch, 1980:34-35). This enables the comprehender to connect parts of the incoming story information and relate them to each other, to know when one part of a story is complete and thus ready for memorial storage, and to indicate which parts of the story are the most salient (see Mandler and Johnson, 1977 for more details). Once comprehended, the completed story is then represented hierarchically in memory, as indicated by the grammar (Yekovitch and Thorndyke, 1981).

In recalling the story stored in this way, the schema acts as a general **'retrieval mechanism'** (Thorndyke and Yekovitch, 1980). The 'retrieval' of a story is seen as a top down traversal of the schematic structure in which the recaller recalls the tale beginning at "the highest or most general node of the representation", then proceeding down through the representation of the story as stored in memory (Thorndyke and Yekovitch, 1980:35; see also Yekovitch and Thorndyke, 1981).[4]

The latter hypothesis predicts the general observation that, while there may be no verbatim recall of the individual propositions, or even the recall of all the propositions of the original tale, the general gist of the tale will be accurately recalled. This, it is claimed, is because the tale in memory is best recalled at the higher, more abstract levels of the memorial representation than at the lower ones (Yekovitch and Thorndyke, 1981). The schema concept, as presented by the story grammarians, thus predicts and

explains variation in the recall of a single tale across individual performances. Furthermore, if any specific part of the original tale is forgotten, the representation of the story as a whole as parsed by the schema, will enable the individual to infer what that part could be according to the general representation.

Experimental evidence supporting the above and other conclusions is extensive (see for example Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Black and Bower, 1980; Mandler and Goodman, 1982; Yekovitch and Thorndyke, 1981). One experiment frequently quoted and one which we will find cause to return to below, is that a story presented to experimental subjects in random order is remembered in the correct order. This, it is claimed, is the result of the schema ordering the unstructured information according to its structural dictates.

4.3.4. **Narrative creativity**

We might pause here and consider a central feature of oral narrative which the schema outlined above potentially explains but which lies outside of the schema researchers' interests. A basic observation of a 'recalled' tale in both the laboratorial conditions of the story grammar and of the oral tales rendered in the 'field', is that the 'same tale', or what appears to be the same tale, is realised differently by different tellers. This variation - a variation which is central to the oral tradition - is the result of what we shall now call **narrative creativity.** This is, ultimately, a creativity of individual tellers, and may be explained in different ways. We saw that Scheub uses the notion of the mental image for this purpose. Story schemata, on the other hand, would explain this, partially, through the hierarchical nature of memorial storage of tales - the lower we go in the

'representation' the more variation in recall we would expect. We will be presenting an alternative account of narrative creativity in chapter 6.

4.3.5. **Modifications of story grammar rules for the intsomi**

Table 4 in Appendix 1 demonstrates certain adaptations of the story grammars to allow for the peculiarities of the Xhosa **intsomi.** These adaptations have largely been necessary because of the centrality of repetition in Xhosa tales. To denote the structural 'episodic' equivalent of what Scheub terms the expansible image we use the figures D^{*r} and E^{*r}, indicating, respectively, a **Repeated Development Complex** and a **Repeated Episode Complex** (illustrated in figures 2, 3, 4).[5] As can be seen by the rules in table 4 both Episode and Development rewrite optionally either as 'simple' units ('non-expanded') or as their repeated complex versions ('expanded'). The differences between 'simple' units and their associated complex versions can be seen by comparing the similar tales in figures 2 (expanded) and 3 (non-expanded). This rule is meant, of course, to formalise the centrality of optional repetition ('expansion' vs 'non-expansion') in Xhosa tales.

The close 'semantic' relationships between these repeated units where, as can be seen, very little change in content occurs, militates against their representation as units which are not subordinate to a higher order category. In general, the overall episodic information contained in either the expanded Episode or Development Complexes is similar to their non-expanded versions, which, as alternatives, can be seen to have similar information in a more compact way. The asterisk shown on both Developments and Episodes occurring in their respective complexes indicates their distinction from simple episodes.

4.3.6. Criticism of the SG framework and the intsomi

Although we have made only slight modifications to the SG rules, the implications of these revisions for the concept of SG based Xhosa story schema (the mental structure, as postulated by the story grammarians, for the processing of **Xhosa** tales) are vast. The proposed schema's usefulness lies in the fixed representation it offers for the 'oral memory' of a tale. But we may now see that it is far too rigid and inflexible to allow for and explain adequately, the optional repetition which is characteristic of Xhosa tales. It is entirely unsatisfactory, surely, to hold that each repeated unit be stored separately in memory as the grammar would imply, and, as is shown in the included figures, be optionally available for recall. Repetition of this sort is simply not a matter of recall. Much of it, as we have discussed, has an aesthetic basis. A formalism, like a grammar, which is mechanical in its statement of rules, and thus blind to communicative function and speaker intent, is an inadequate representation of Xhosa tales in this regard.

A second feature of the **intsomi** which undermines the version of the story schema we are concerned with is Scheub's theory of the cueing and scanning process of composition outlined above. This process ensures, ultimately, that there is no one tale or consistently similar tale in the tradition, and thus, surely, no one schema to 'store', 'retrieve' or 'comprehend' it. The western tradition of tales on which the story grammar is based thus proves limiting in this regard.[6]

It is ultimately, we claim, the SG researcher's emphasis on 'recall' to the exclusion of anything else that leads to these, and other inadequacies. Tales told in the context of the Xhosa oral tradition at any rate are not

simply 'recalled' - they are performed. Surely it is only in artificial contexts such as those established by recordings made under laboratory conditions (or even by recordings made in the field) that recall becomes the central concern of any 'teller'. There is, in other words, some purpose in the recall of tales besides the recall itself. Too often the grammars give the impression that the remembering of a tale is simply an end to itself without discussing the reasons why a teller remembers the tale, as well as ignoring the many contextual factors that inevitably affect story structure. While we might agree with Thorndyke (1982) that the reasons for a story being told need not be to entertain, it is certainly not only to demonstrate the teller's mnemonic ability, as he and other story grammarians' seem to imply. Public utilisation of memory (if such a description can be used) such as **iintsomi** are surely intentional and not bland externalisations of previously 'internalised' tales. Although memory research is naturally beyond the scope of this work, we have to agree with Neisser's criticism of story grammars and memory research in general - that they are far too removed from real-life situations of memory utilisation, and that the real issue in memory research - how the past is made use of in and for the present - is ignored (Neisser, 1982).

4.3.7. The story grammars and the oral tradition

Underlying the shortcomings we have been discussing are, we believe, common but misconstrued notions of the nature of the 'oral tradition'. We must firstly note that it is certainly not the 'oral tradition' in any form that is indeed consulted for the grammars. Although the tales used as examples and experimental data reflect the plots of traditional European tales, they are greatly simplified and highly artificial and it is hard to conclude, especially after many frustrating attempts to apply the grammars to

unfabricated Xhosa tales that the stories utilised by the grammarians have not been largely adapted and modified for the purposes of analysis and felicitous parsing. It remains a moot point that no unmodified tale from a collection of extant oral tales is at all consulted for the purposes of the story grammars. While noting the methodological necessity of idealisation, we must also take into account how far this idealisation takes us from our data base - how far it takes us from what we are trying to explain. In the case of story grammars the relation between what is used as the empirical basis and what is ultimately meant to be explained is, at best, indirect (for the restriction of SGs to the 'oral tradition' alone, see Mandler, 1982; for criticism of the data used see de Beaugrande, 1982).

The conclusions that Brown and Yule (1983:120-121) draw, that the grammarians' "decisions regarding the content of the tales they analyse are arbitrary and subjective" and that the "illusion that [their decisions] are non-subjective is mainly fostered by the extreme simplicity of the texts investigated" are hard to avoid. The parsing of tales not actually constructed by the analyst is a highly arbitrary affair, and the analysis given in the figures is largely tongue in cheek. Given a complex, orally rendered tale the grammar becomes far more difficult to apply consistently, and the impression of precise boundaries and units given by the grammarians breaks down. Ultimately, it would appear, the stories contrived by the grammarians seem to be the only ones that the grammars 'explain'.

It appears to us, in short, premature to shift from the largely artificial data-base utilised in the laboratorial conditions of the story grammarians, to something as rich and varied as the oral tradition itself.

This disparity - between experimental conditions and the oral tradition - leads to further problems. For example, and of central concern, the experimental conditions of having one original tale from which deviations can be measured (central evidence for the SG story schema) can simply not be paralleled in the 'oral tradition'. The influences that go up to make just one production of an intsomi are vast and complex. A 'tale' that an individual knows, for example, may have been heard many times from many different tellers - and indeed such a process of 'tale transmission' has naturally always been manifest in the tradition (see Scheub 1975: Introduction). It would prove impossible for this reason to verify the experimental conclusions, specifically as to variations in recall.

Current research in the oral tradition and especially oral narrative has moved radically away from a restrictive analysis of the 'text' alone and thus away from archaic questions of original form, 'authorship' and origins.[7] The present emphasis is to approach an oral narrative, not as an isolated transcribed text - an artifact - but as a living **performance**; as a communicative event involving the dynamic interaction of individuals in context. The 'text' of the performance alone, in this view, cannot be divorced from the context which gave rise to it and it is in this light that the solely textual approach of the story grammar paradigm must be viewed. When, for example, Mandler and Johnson (1977:113) state that they "assume that an orally transmitted story will survive only if it conforms to an ideal schema in the first place or has gradually attained such a structure through repeated retellings" they have, surely, far too static and restrictive a view of what really needs to be seen in a dynamic and holistic way.

4.3.8. General Criticisms of SGs

Before we outline our alternative approach to the **intsomi** in the next chapter, we will summarise and criticise certain of the general assumptions of SGs and explore the viability of the concept of a grammar for discourse phenomena in general.

Firstly we must note that the story grammar outlined above models story **content.** In other words, story grammars model what a story is about, rather than specifying any other type of discourse structure. A story is ultimately an idea, as Wilensky (1982) points out, and thus is not restricted to a linguistic medium as the story grammarians seem to imply. Bagget (1979) shows, for example, that the grammar applies equally well to 'movies', and concludes that "story processing is not specific to language but is medium independent" (Bagget, 1979:354; see also Meehan, 1982 and Brewer and Lichtenstein, 1982 in this regard.)

The grammarian's definition of an 'episode'- the structural basis of SGs - is in terms of the pursuit and attainment/non-attainment of goals, surely an entirely content-based experiential definition. Such goal-based episodes are thus naturally not unique to their occurrence in narrative discourse - they are an integral part of our everyday lived interaction, of which, indeed, an oral narrative could tell the story. Events leading towards goals in our everyday lives cluster together as distinct from other goal-directed clusters, just as the propositions we might use to report these events will cluster together as distinct from other propositional clusters. If we wished to we could 'parse' not only the oral recounting of any episode according to the grammar, but the episode as experienced itself, for, in effect, we would be doing exactly the same thing.

Although Mandler (1982:426) argues that "linguistics doesn't own the notion of a grammar" and that "it is a type of formalism that can be adapted to many uses", we must now ask whether the type of 'grammar' utilised by the story grammarians is, in general, a worthy and appropriate formalism with sufficient explanatory power.

The type of 'grammar' that the story grammarians utilise can surely be applied to any phenomenon to formalise perceived (deep) regularities underlying superficial variation. From this perspective, however, the notion of a 'grammar' is very general and has rather unfortunate consequences. As Wilensky (1982:429) points out, "if one wants to talk about grammars for stories, one might as well talk about grammars for meanings, or grammars for eating at a restaurant, or grammars for screwdrivers". We might add that, underlying much superficial variety, human lives have, as their 'deep structure', very similar 'beginnings', 'developments' and 'endings'. But surely imposing a grammar cannot constitute their explanation.

With specific regard to stories, given this general criticism, we may now return to certain consequences of uncritically applying the principles of, specifically, generative grammar outside of sentential linguistics. These are the notions of a) rules and well-formedness b) autonomy and c) introspection. We will now discuss each of these, as applied to stories, in turn.

a) **Rules and Well-formedness**

Viewing the structure of the story in terms of 'rules' gives the impression that the 'components' of an episode are arbitrary - that what

goes up to make a story episode is there for no particular reason and can have no explanation but the 'rules' alone. This is strongly reminiscent of a similar impression sentential transformational generative (TG) grammars give - that the rules of syntax (why a sentence is structured as it is) have no explanation but the presence of the rules itself. We need, however, to note here certain fundamental differences between syntax and story structure which the grammar tends to ignore. Whereas the rules of syntax may, in some sense, be regarded as arbitrary or unmotivated (the generative explanation generally being they are what they are because they are, or, perhaps, because they are 'innate') an episode can only be 'constructed' out of a fixed and causally related order of events and states. Certain events and states, for example, must precede other events and states for them to occur, and this is surely not because of 'rules' but because of how we perceive the nature of events - how things happen - in our (real or imagined) phenomenal world. Before we rescue a princess a princess must be in a state to be rescued, before a boy enters a rock (as in text 4 included in the appendix) he must make an attempt to do so or else he wouldn't get in. To account for such phenomena in terms of rules as the story grammarians do is surely unrealistic.

In this regard, the by now well-known sentential rewrite rule S $\rightarrow$ NP + VP can hardly be said to parallel the 'rules' E(pisode) $\rightarrow$ B(eginning) + D(development) + E(nding). 'Subjects' presented with tales in which the 'constituents' have been randomly ordered, an experiment to which we have alluded to earlier, are surely not being presented with ungrammatical or ill-formed tales, but simply nonsensical ones. Simply because a story may be linguistically encoded as in an

oral tale does not imply that the notions of well-formedness and rules apply, a story being, as we have pointed out, a non-linguistic concept in the first place.

What is fundamental to the linguistic encoding of the **intsomi** and, it appears, to oral tellings of stories as a universal phenomenon is that the order in which the events are recounted in the discourse parallels the order in which they occur in the real world. This mimetic parallel between text and experience is surely amply demonstrated in the tree diagrams included, where we clearly see how the order of the propositions of a tale 'copies' the order in which the events they encode occur. Unfortunately the grammarians choose to overlook this fact and its consequences which we will now outline.

Language being a linear mode has to impose, in some way, a linear order on any piece of information that is to be expressed. If what needs to be expressed has, or can be thought to have a linear arrangement itself - as stories have a linear order of events - then it is usual that this linear order is followed for linguistic encoding. This will result in an isomorphic relationship between textual order and the order of the universe of discourse, as we saw in chapter 1. This textual strategy, given the old rhetorical term 'ordo naturalis' (natural order), has the purpose of making the text mimetic to experience and thus facilitates comprehension. It occurs "wherever the linear relations in a text stand for temporal, causal, or social relations between referents in the world described by the text." (Enkvist, 1981. Enkvist, 1981 and Levelt, 1981 present an in-depth review of the issues discussed here.)

This iconic ordering of textual information, although apparent in the tree diagrams of the grammar, is not investigated by its researchers. Instead the SG schema dictates a mechanical concept of informational ordering, which has as its only motivation the principles of the grammar themselves. Such principles give an unnecessarily static and surely misleading view of the ordering strategy we have just outlined (see Brewer and Lichtenstein, 1982 for a detailed criticism of SG presuppositions in this regard).

b) **Introspection**

Another TG concept which one finds evident in SG methodology is the utilization of introspection. While introspective methods of data collection may be rightly or wrongly practiced and advocated within the context of sentential linguistics,[8] the type of introspective judgments which are evident in the fabrication of stories by the grammarians is surely inappropriate to the data they are trying to explain. The difference is that story grammars make claims to the empirical object of investigation - the oral tradition - not to 'intuitions' of stories, or what the grammarians intuitively judge to be the oral tradition. As we have said before, surely the oral tradition itself needs to be consulted if empirically motivated claims are to be made of it?

c) **Autonomy**

The "autonomy of grammar" thesis, finally, is the most unfortunate TG influence noticeable within the SG framework. This central, almost defining tenet of TG claims that a grammar functions separately and independently from 'non-linguistic' knowledge. This claim, that there ultimately is something definable in terms of 'linguistic' and

'linguistic' terms alone, has been, and still is subject to much controversy and debate.[9]

The impression given by story grammarians is that stories (or at least the stories the grammarians use) are 'processed' by individuals in the same way as they are analysed by researchers, that is, independently from general knowledge structures - i.e. knowledge of how the world works. Story grammarians seem to imply, in this regard, that there is, in the oral tradition at any rate, a unique oral story processing device.[10]

This latter impression, and the general TG sentential influences we have reviewed, may not have formed part of the original intentions of its researchers, but they are, we claim, the inevitable consequences of uncritically exploiting the concepts of TG. While a grammar in the generative mould will give a precise and formal description of whatever regularities are perceived in a story, we must ask whether such a description conceals more than it reveals. The following remarks of two leading discourse researchers are highly pertinent in this regard:

> It is clear, we believe, that the mind imposes structure on a text, but it is a mistake to conclude that this structure is an extension of sentence syntax or anything like it. Insofar as a text is understood, the mind imposes structure on the events or concepts related by the text, just as the mind imposes structure on events directly observable and thoughts directly experienced.
> (Green and Morgan, 1981:168)

We must add that we are **not** attacking TG **per se.** We hold that our discourse explanations are entirely inappropriate for issues investigated by TG

sentential linguistics - just as, however, we hold that TG sentential linguistic explanations are equally inappropriate for issues investigated in discourse analysis (see Morgan, 1981 for an excellent explication of the non-applicability of discourse explanations to sentence grammars).

4.4. The alternative - a procedural approach

As an alternative to both the SG framework and Scheub's approach we suggest a radical shift in perspective to avoid the problems we have outlined above. We advocate, instead, a view inspired by the **procedural** approach to discourse phenomena as presented by, for example, de Beaugrande (1984). This approach emphasises discourse as a **process** or **event** as opposed to the analysis of discourse as a static artifact described in our discussion of SGs. Here, as opposed to analysing the surface text as an end in itself, we will be stressing that we need to view discourse as an ongoing activity involving decisions and strategies that speakers and hearers make within the context of dynamic communicative situations. We will, in fact, be arguing that knowledge of language as we know and traditionally define it plays, as Green (1982:45) puts it, "only a small primarily enabling part in peoples' ability to communicate effectively". In effect, we will be arguing for a move away from seeing connected texts as isolated, abstract entities that need to be analysed in terms inspired by sentential linguistics, to, perhaps, a broader perspective, viewing the production and comprehension of discourse in the context of the processes of human activity in general. We will outline this approach in the following chapter and a partial application of the approach to the **intsomi** is attempted in chapter 6.

Footnotes to Chapter 4

1) Story grammars or, more generally, narrative grammars have been proposed in other paradigms as well, e.g. in poetics (Prince, 1983) and in sociolinguistics (Labov, 1981).

2) For a general survey of cognitive psychology see Lachman et al (1979).

3) We may note here that the schema concept is not new. Bartlett (1932), from whose work inspiration for much of current story-grammar research is derived, proposed the schema as an 'organised mass' of past experience which operates over our general comprehension of the world.

4) Top-down processing is contrasted with bottom-up processing. The former parallels **deduction** through superordinate knowledge, while the latter parallels **induction** through a concentration on the 'data' itself.

5) The 'image' is not, however, consistently formalisable in these terms.

6) This point might be objected to. The schema, from a weaker perspective, could be regarded as simply the **structural** framework guiding the selection of **content** to form a 'well-formed' tale. However this weakens considerably any claims the schema concept could hold for memory. It is interesting to note that Oosthuizen (1977) proposes a framework of content selection for Zulu tales similar to the one just outlined but using Propp's functions.

7) For some definitive work see Abrahams (1976), Dundes (1980), Finnegan (1970). For an application to narrative see Falaisi (1980).

8) See Newmeyer (1983) for a general review and criticism of the relevant literature

9) For an extensive review see Newmeyer (1983).

10) Echoing Chomsky's LAD - Language Acquisition Device.

CHAPTER 5

Goals, plans and relevance

5.1. Introduction

We argue in this chapter that the teller, in producing an **intsomi**, is involved as he would be in any other activity, in a **goal-based** activity of attempting to achieve some intended effect or effects. Together with, for example, de Beaugrande (1984) and Wilensky (1983), we argue that mundane every day human activities, including the production of narrative discourse, are directed toward the achievement of **goals** and that **plans** or **strategies** are implemented in their achievement. We will now briefly outline the theory of goals basing our argument mainly on Wilensky (1983).

To achieve any goals which we might have we need a means to do so - in other words we need a **plan** or **strategy.** A strategy consists of a series of actions which ultimately lead up to a goal. Consider the following situation:

1 a) The professor was hungry.
  b) He went to the restaurant.

Here the professor's goal is obviously to satisfy his hunger. He thus formulates the plan of going to the restaurant which constitutes an action in that plan. We need to bear in mind here that this goal, and goals in general, may be achieved through a number of different plans. Thus **plan choice** is an important aspect of goal achievement. Example 1) above could have been realised alternatively as:

2 a) The professor was hungry.

b) He went to the fish and chips shop.

We need also bear in mind here the various **interrelationships** that may exist between various goals that we have, as well as the fact that **sub-goals** may develop in our chosen plans to achieve our main goal. Consider the following:

3 a) The professor was hungry,

b) but he found that his car was stuck

c) He called for a taxi.

d) When he arrived at the restaurant,

e) he found that there was someone there

f) whom he did not wish to meet.

g) He went to the fish and chips shop instead.

Here we see the development of a subgoal at c) - the professor has the goal of getting some alternative means of transport to take him to the restaurant to satisfy his appease-hunger goal. We then have an example of **inter-goal relationships** in the rest of the described situation. We have, specifically, a conflict between the satisfy-hunger goal and the goal of the professor avoiding a particular person. The **goal-conflict** is resolved, however, with the selection of another plan to achieve his satisfy-hunger goal - going to the fish and chips shop.

In this regard the planner also needs necessarily to reason about the planning process itself. To this end he has knowledge of certain principles which control, inter alia, which plan of a variety to select, how this plan

may be optimally utilised and how to avoid his goals conflicting. According to Wilensky (1983:16) such principles "are, in fact, goals of the planning process itself. Since they describe what the planner itself [sic] wants to accomplish rather than particular goals and plans, we refer to this body of facts as meta-planning knowledge". The types of metaplanning knowledge Wilensky distinguishes are organised under four main principles (ibid:31):

a) **Don't waste any resources.**

This principle "embodies the desire to produce efficient plans". Given our professor's hunger goal, if the restaurant was right next door to his office he would not drive his car to get there.

b) **Achieve as many goals as possible.**

Given the situation that it is raining and the professor had both the goal of satisfying his hunger and staying dry he would use his umbrella to get to the restaurant and satisfy both goals.

c) **Maximise the values of the goals achieved.**

Given the situation that it is raining and that the professor will get slightly wet in walking to the restaurant, he will not abandon his, presumably, more important goal of satisfying his hunger. According to Wilensky this principle "sets up the goal of arriving at a scenario in which the less valuable goals are abandoned in order to fulfill the most valuable ones."

d) **Avoid impossible goals.**

No matter how he desires it the professor could not, in his lunch break, satisfy his hunger goal in a restaurant in a distant country.

All these principles can, in fact, be merged into one principle which we shall term the **economy principle** (what Wilensky terms the **Maximise overall outcome principle**). This is because:

> One need only consider preserving a resource as a goal, note than fulfilling one's goal will always maximise the value of those achieved, and recognise that entertaining an impossible goal will at best waste some planning resources.
> (ibid:32)

Besides the actual personal activity of achieving goals we, in comprehending a person's goal-based actions, have the necessary assumption that their individual acts are carried out in the pursuit of some intended effect or goal. Given the complete discourse 3) above, or our direct observation of the professor, we understand the individual events and connect them up through our own stored knowledge of goals and the choice of plans to achieve them.

In that we assume that individuals are following the economy principle, it is fundamental in this regard that we assume that those individual's acts are **relevant** to their goals, that their acts are coherent to and intended to achieve their goals. If, for example, we were presented with the following discourse:

4 a) The professor was hungry
  b) so he stood on his head

we would find it difficult to see b) as relevant to the professor's satisfy-hunger goal. However, if we were supplied with the following

background information:

c) His hunger always abated when he did so.

then the professor could be seen as following the economy principle and his action would thus be relevant. This crucial aspect of goal-based behaviour which we will be developing extensively below in our discussion of **iintsomi** is concisely summarised by Charolles (1981:73):

> Understanding that a series of actions forms a coherent whole is the same as realizing that there is a global intention which explains why each of the constituent actions has been accomplished at a particular moment.

and that

> in order to understand that a series of actions forms a coherent entity, we merely need to associate some global intention to it, that explains it as a unit [footnote excluded].

5.2. Goals, relevance and discourse comprehension

5.2.1. Introduction

Certain goals which humans have are achieved in the context of interaction with other humans through the medium of **language.** Here the roles involved are given the general terms **speaker** and **hearer.** In other words, discourse (like other types of activity) is a goal-directed activity. What is peculiar about a goal achieved through discourse is that it, unlike other forms of goal-directed activity as in 3) above, always implies, in the words of Charolles (1981:75), "the public manifestation of intention, a conscious

desire to signify something to someone else." In other words, unlike our professor privately planning to satisfy his hunger-goal, a speaker will want his hearer to realise his goal. In the context of communication it follows from our discussion of goals that the hearer will assume, in attempting to formulate this goal, that all the discourse is coherent to it. That is, the hearer will assume that the speaker will include in his discourse, only that which is relevant to his goal. This **pragmatic principle of relevance** which the speaker is meant to follow has been claimed by Sperber and Wilson in recent research to be "the single principle governing every aspect of comprehension" (Sperber and Wilson, 1982:74; see also Sperber and Wilson, 1984[1]).[2] We now turn to an in depth investigation of this principle.

5.2.2. The relevance of relevance

5.2.2.1. Introduction

We have claimed above that hearers assume that their speakers, in pursuing a particular goal, remain relevant to that goal. We may now turn to the way particular utterance by the speaker is, in fact, judged to be relevant.

According to Sperber and Wilson an utterance is relevant if the hearer can infer new information from the content of that utterance when combined with available contextual information (such as any previous utterances or the hearer's encyclopaedic knowledge). This information is derivable "not from the content of the utterance alone, nor its context alone, but only from context and content combined" (Sperber and Wilson, 1982:73). Sperber and Wilson term this type of new information the **contextual implications** of an utterance, the process through which these are inferred involving the formation of complex hypotheses with the utterance and associated context as

their data.[3] In this regard Sperber and Wilson (1982:73) offer the following example:

5 a) Flagseller: Would you like to buy a flag for the Royal National Lifeboat Institution?

b) Passer-by: No thanks, I always spend my holidays with my sister in Birmingham.

According to Sperber and Wilson (ibid), not everyone "finds the response in [5b)] immediately comprehensible. In order to understand it fully, the hearer has to supply (at least) the premises in [6)], and derive the conclusion in [7)]."

6 a) Birmingham is inland.

b) The Royal National Lifeboat Institution is a charity.

c) Buying a flag is one way of subscribing to a charity.

d) Someone who spends his holidays inland has no need of the services of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution.

e) Someone who has no need of the services of a charity cannot be expected to subscribe to that charity.

7 The speaker of [5b)] cannot be expected to subscribe to the Royal National Lifeboat Institution.

In Sperber and Wilson's terms, 7) is a contextual implication of 5b) in a context which contains 6). 7) thus follows from 5b) and 6) together, but not from either 5b) or 6) in isolation from each other.

According to Sperber and Wilson (1982:73) having contextual implications in a given context is, in itself, a "necessary and sufficient condition for

relevance", and their definition of relevance is thus in these terms. An informal rendition of this definition reads: An utterance is relevant in a particular context if that utterance has contextual implications in that context. (For a more formal definition see Sperber and Wilson, 1984, Chapter 2:5).

To clarify these ideas we how present some examples which display irrelevance. As answers to the question by A:

8 a) Where is Dylan?

consider the following replies by B,

b) You don't know where he is.

c) He is on Ursa Major.

d) He is a very good boy.

e) He is in the kitchen.

By uttering b), B is being irrelevant as b) is already in A's context and therefore does not have any contextual implications. B's utterance at c) has no contextual implications and is therefore irrelevant in that it is **inconsistent** with the context available to B Dylan cannot, according to A's knowledge of both Dylan and space travel, be on Ursa Major. B's reply at d), in turn, is irrelevant in that it does not **connect** up with A's context. A asked a question and B offered a statement which does not tie up with this question in any direct way. Finally, at e) B's reply is relevant in that it forms an appropriate answer, and A is thus supplied with the contextual implication of knowing where Dylan is (see Sperber and Wilson, 1984, Chapter 2:1-4).

5.2.2.2. Degrees of relevance

A central property of relevance, according to Sperber and Wilson (1982:74), is that it is not an absolute property but rather a matter of degree - in our terms, not all of what is said by a speaker is equally relevant to his goal. By analogy, relevance involves the "cost of production" in terms of the "value of the goods produced", where the cost of production is the amount of processing needed to deduce contextual implications and the value of the goods is the number of contextual implications. As would be the case with greater efficiency of a factory which had similar costs of production to another but produced a greater amount of goods, given two utterances with the same amount of contextual implications it would be the one with the most contextual implications that would be the most relevant.

Similarly, as a factory would be more efficient were it to produce the same amount of goods to another but involved a smaller cost of production, given two utterances with the same amount of contextual implications, the one with the smaller amount of processing would be the most relevant. In general, relevance thus increases with the number of contextual implications but decreases with the amount of processing. To exemplify these notions, consider the following replies to A's question to 8a) above, repeated here as 9a):

9 a) A: Where is Dylan?
  b) B: He is in the kitchen.
  c) He is in the kitchen and the day consists of 24 hours.
  d) He is in the house.

B's reply in c) has the same contextual implications as his reply in b), but involves more processing. It is thus less relevant than b). At d), all other things being equal, B's utterance involves the same processing as b) does, but has less contextual implications and is thus less relevant. Given the reply at b), A knows specifically where Dylan is, as opposed to the situation that would hold for d).

5.2.2.3. **Relevance and context**

We saw previously that the contextual implications of an utterance are assessed through the combination of that utterance with its associated context. Given the fact that the hearer assumes a priori that an utterance **has** contextual implications - i.e. that it is relevant - we must now ask how he will then determine the context for these contextual implications to be assessed. To begin with, according to Sperber and Wilson (1982:76), the initial context the hearer consults to assess the relevance of an utterance is the immediately preceding utterance in the conversation or text. If no contextual implications of this utterance can be derived from this area of context, the context is:

> "expanded several times in different directions. The hearer can add to the context what he remembers further back in the conversation (or even previous exchanges with the speaker). He can add encyclopaedic knowledge which is attached on his memory to the concepts present in the utterance or context ... Or he can add to the context information about the situation he is attending to at the same time as the conversation is taking place"
> (ibid).

Each of these expansions, however, involves "an ever-increasing cost in the amount of processing, and in this respect, diminishes relevance" (ibid).

To clarify these notions consider the following adaptations of our standard example 8a) repeated below as 10a):

10 a) A: Where is Dylan?

b) B: He is in the kitchen.

c) He is in the place where Cinderella was forced to work by her cruel stepmother.

Here B's reply at c), unlike the more direct one at b), involves A's consulting his world knowledge to deduce where Dylan in fact is. All other things being equal, in that c) involves more processing, it is less directly relevant given b) as an alternative.

5.3. Goals, relevance and discourse production

5.3.1. Introduction

Throughout their work Sperber and Wilson concentrate on the importance of relevance in the **comprehension** of utterances. They do not, however, offer a discussion with regard to the **production** of utterances. Since the principle of relevance tells us that the hearer assumes that the **speaker** is trying to be relevant in his production of discourse, relevance must intrinsically operate as a pragmatic constraint over such production. From the speaker's perspective, the principle of relevance would read that he must try to be relevant and that he assumes that the hearer knows that he is, in fact, trying to do so. Considerations of relevance, in this regard, form the controlling factor in the production of utterances.

Recent research, while emphasising the importance of goals in discourse

production, has not examined the notion of relevance at any depth. Green and Morgan (1981:177), for example, suggest that the "organisation of a text" is "best viewed as the formation of hypothesis about the author's goal structures - the relation of goal to sub-goal, and so on - in constructing the text". In this regard Green (1982:46) holds that:

> A large share of communicative competence is the ability (a) to infer a speaker's plans, goals and intentions and purposes from his utterances and interpret the speaker's utterances in the light of these, and (b) to plan and execute speech in such a way that such inferences are most efficiently made.

Similar notions are utilised by Leech (1983) in his analysis of pragmatic interpretation, as well as by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) in their extensive research on 'discourse strategies'.

The principle of relevance as a factor in the production of discourse appears to be latent in some of the literature discussed . Green, we saw, holds that the speaker needs "to plan and execute speech" in such a way that the hearer is able to make the necessary "inferences". If we were to change the more general term "inference" to Sperber and Wilson's more specific notion of "contextual implication", then Green's statement directly involves relevance. Given this change, it would read a speaker must "plan and execute his speech in such a way that his hearers can make the necessary contextual implications", in other words, in the execution of his speech the speaker must be relevant.

The notion of relevance is not, however, directly utilised by the approaches mentioned above to any great extent. While we necessarily agree that

production of discourse is best understood as a goal-based process, we hold further that relevance acts as the central controlling factor over this process.

In the production of discourse as well as in its comprehension, relevance inherently involves the "cost of production" versus the "value of the goods produced". Assuming the speaker has, say, D in mind and the goal of creating a model of D in the hearer's mind, he will attain this goal if he communicates only that which is relevant to this model. If he communicated D, and T, for example, with the goal of achieving only a model of D the cost of production (D and T) far outweighs the value of the goods desired to be produced (a model of D). In general, therefore, in order for the speaker to attain his goal of achieving a particular effect on his hearer, he must have a (cost efficient) plan to do so.

5.3.2. **Discourse production and the domain of discourse plans**

We claim that speakers' plans chosen in order to achieve their goals operate necessarily, but not exclusively, over the following domains (derived from Levelt, 1981:91):

a) The selection of information.
b) The ordering of this information.
c) The linguistic encoding of this information.

In attempting to achieve their goals, speakers must choose particular plans to operate over each of these areas. What controls these choices is, we claim, relevance. To illustrate this we may consider the iconic principle of narrative production discussed briefly in the previous chapter and in

2.1. This principle, we saw, states that, all other things being equal, the order in which the narrator chooses to recount events of a narrative parallels the order in which those events occur in the narrative world. We may now see that this involves domain b) above. In order to achieve his goal, say for the audience to have a model of the story, the narrator has to order the narrative information in a particular way. If the narrator selects the order event clause A, event clause B, encoding respectively event A and event B, for his audience to infer that this ordering is mimetic to the order of occurrence of these events, the ordering selected must be relevant and not an arbitrary collection of clauses. Given that encoding is relevant, the audience is supplied with the appropriate implication that event A precedes event B, which surely forms part of the narrator's overall goal. In this way we may see that the plan operating over domain b) is controlled by the principle of relevance. As we shall see in our investigation of the production of **intsomi** in the next chapter, this principle also operates over domains a) and c).

5.4. Summary

Following Wilensky's general discussion, we have argued that in producing a discourse a speaker is involved in a goal-based activity of attempting to achieve a particular effect of his hearer. In order to achieve his goal(s), the speaker needs to choose a plan or course of action, and we have listed some of the domains over which such plans must operate. The choice of a plan, however, needs some controlling factor if the intended goal is to be adequately accomplished. Basing our argument on Sperber and Wilson's research, we have found that this factor is the principle of relevance. We have seen that the latter may be defined in terms of contextual implications - the information a hearer infers from an utterance and its associated

context. By following the principle of relevance, i.e. by making his plan relevant to his goal, the speaker will allow the hearer to make those contextual implications that form part of his overall goal.

In the chapter that follows we shall extend these general principles to form a theory of **intsomi** production in particular. By adopting and revising these principles we hope to overcome the shortcomings of previous approaches to **intsomi** production.

Footnotes to Chapter 5

1) Sperber and Wilson (1984) is a working draft. Each chapter has its own discrete page numbering, and we thus give both the chapter and the page numbers in our references to the work. As the work is a working draft, we make no direct quotation from it.

2) The importance of relevance in discourse comprehension was originally researched by Grice in terms of his 'conversational maxims' (Grice, 1975; for a review, see Leech, 1983:30-34).

3) Sperber and Wilson's ideas concerning the nature of the 'deductive system' involved here are largely inspired by Fodor's work on cognition (Fodor, 1983).

CHAPTER 6

Towards a theory of intsomi production

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall develop a theory of **intsomi** production based on certain extensions of the arguments presented in the previous chapter. In developing this theory we shall initially discuss certain features of conversational discourse. We shall then go on to apply certain principles derived from this discussion to the processes involved in **intsomi** production in particular. In this application we shall show that relevance operates over the two areas discussed in the previous chapter - the selection of information and the encoding of this information. Although our focus falls on the **intsomi** in particular, we hope to make it clear that our theory has implications for the production of all types of discourse. Before developing our theory of **intsomi** production itself, we need to present our own view of the organisation of **iintsomi** in the memories of the narrators.

6.2. Tale-chunks and memory

We shall term the basic units involved in the production of **iintsomi tale-chunks.** These are coherent stretches of information in a narrator's memory which may potentially occur individually, or in combination with other tale-chunks as the basis of a single **intsomi.** (For 'chunks' as units in memory, see Black and Bower, 1980.)

The organisation of tale-chunks has to be abstract enough to account for the phenomenon of narrative creativity discussed in chapter 4. Besides the 'core-clichés', such creativity demands that there is nothing like a

verbatim storage of narrative information within these chunks. In this regard, van Dijk (1977:156) points out that for reasons of economy, not all the propositions of a comprehended discourse can be stored verbatim in an individual's memory. Rather, what **is** stored is the 'gist' or governing ideas of the discourse, its specific propositions being reduced to their semantic core, or what van Dijk terms **macropropositions.** In recalling the discourse, an individual may simply present these macropropositions, his discourse thus representing a summary of the original. An individual may, however, infer more detailed information with the macroproposition acting as the general domain in his memory in terms of which such inference is restricted. With regard to the latter situation, the resultant discourse, while revealing an overall similarity with the original, will, potentially, show a number of differences in specific details.

If something similar to the macroproposition forms the basis of the storage of tale-chunks, then much of the variation revealed in the **intsomi** tradition is explained. While the semantic core of narrative information as stored in tale-chunks may be similar across narrators as a whole, individual narrators are free to adapt these chunks to their specific performances through the addition of details which the narrators, themselves, infer. Furthermore, in their performances narrators may choose to simply offer the gist as stored in the tale-chunk without any elaboration. The latter situation is, in fact, typical of **iintsomi** performed by poor or immature narrators. Good narrators with a mature audience, however, may greatly elaborate the basic skeleton as outlined by the tale-chunk, adding their own personal details and creating, ultimately, a coherent, complex, and aesthetically pleasing work of art. This view of memorial organisation has important implications for our theory of **intsomi** production which we develop below.

6.3. Relevance, context and the selection of information

In our discussion of Sperber and Wilson's research we saw that the hearer needs access to certain contextual information - information in his immediate environment or memory - in order to deduce the implications of an utterance. We shall see that such contextual information is also vital to the production of discourse. In the following sections we shall attempt to substantiate this claim by investigating certain features of conversational discourse.[1] We shall then go on to apply certain principles that we deduce from this discussion to the production of **iintsomi** itself.

6.4. Relevance and conversation

6.4.1. Introduction - conversation and context

Interlocutors involved in an everyday conversation are involved in the activity of discussing a certain **topic** or certain **topics.** Conversations have, in this regard, a **topic framework** - the area or areas discussed by the interlocutors involved (see Brown and Yule, 1983:75-79 for an in-depth discussion of topic frameworks). Discussing a particular topic within this overall framework - such as 'old age' or 'marriage' - intrinsically involves the activation of and access to a particular body of contextual information. We shall term such active contextual information - which may involve, inter alia, some domain of the knowledge, experience and beliefs of the interlocutors, and/or some part of their environment - a **contextual domain.** Once one contextual domain has been determined at a certain point of a conversation, it makes accessible to each of the interlocutors involved certain personal experiences or knowledge which would otherwise not be accessible. Such personal experiences or knowledge then form the basis of a contribution they may make to the conversation. We should note here that as

conversations may cover more than one topic, any number of contextual domains may be involved.

To illustrate these introductory points, consider the following list which summarises successive contributions made in an attested conversation. The interlocutors involved in this conversation were, inter alia, E, P, M and D.

1 E: Eating of horses
P: Eating of monkeys
M: Eating of worms
D (the writer): Eating of dogs.

The contextual domain here - i.e. that part of the interlocutors knowledge that is made active at this point - can be seen to involve 'the strange things people eat'. Each of the interlocutors in the example above related some personally experienced episode made accessible through this domain, and their contributions are thus consistent with this domain. Importantly, if D, for example, had to make a contribution concerning the robbing of a bank without any other indication, his contribution would not be so consistent. Such a contribution is, however, unlikely to occur, and in this way the contextual domain operating at any point naturally acts as a constraint on the potential selection of information for expression.

6.4.2. Reminding and the contextual domain in conversation

How individuals select information in terms of the constraints set by a contextual domain is, we believe, through a process of **reminding**. The type of reminding relevant at this point of our discussion involves a speaker's perception of shared features between some previous contribution (i.e. his

'input') and some information stored in his memory which then becomes amenable for expression. In that D (the writer), for example, was reminded by previous contributions of an episode concerning the eating of dogs, there are obvious similarities between the previous contributions and that episode that make it accessible. In that such similarities are **not** apparent between the contributions and, say, an episode concerning the robbing of a bank, it would be unlikely that this episode would become accessible to D i.e. he would not be reminded of it. We shall call this type of reminding **inter-contextual** reminding. (For an extensive discussion of the importance of reminding, see Schank, 1984).

The shared features between some information in memory and some input are, we may now see, based on the contextual domain that is established at a certain point in the conversation. In the conversation at 1), for example, the interlocutors involved heard contributions concerning the eating of horses, monkeys and worms. The contextual domain established in order to understand the implications of these contributions was, as we have seen, in terms of 'the strange things people eat'. Given this delimited domain in memory, certain experiences of the interlocutors stored in terms of this domain become accessible. Once such information becomes so accessible reminding can be said to have occurred. This situation is illustrated in the following diagram:



6.4.3. The flow of conversation

Conversations do not always revolve around one particular topic and may thus involve more than one contextual domain. Conversations in this regard may exhibit a 'conversational flow', so that what possibly forms the topic of discussion at the end of a conversation appears quite unlike the one discussed at its beginning. To account for one type of this drift of topics and the accompanying change of contextual domains, we shall examine another contribution made in the conversation listed at 1) above.

H, another interlocutor in the conversation, was reminded by M's contribution concerning the eating of worms of some personal experience of coming across a very large earth-worm while on holiday. This episode that H was reminded of did not directly relate, as we may see, to the contextual domain of 'the strange things people eat' which was operative at the time, as she made no reference to eating whatsoever. Instead of this overall domain, it appears, in fact, that it was part of M's contribution that formed the contextual domain in terms of which H's reminding experience occurred. In that M's contribution was about worms, it defined a particular domain of information in H's memory concerning worms, thus making accessible the episode that she finally contributed. This episode was thus not consistent with the contextual domain of 'the strange things people eat', but it **was** consistent with the contextual domain established by the previous contribution. It is important to note that in this way features of contributions (such contributions being offered in terms of the overall econtextual domain) may, in themselves, potentially form the contextual domain for later contributions. We shall term the reminding that is involved here **sub-contextual** reminding.[2]

Sub-contextual reminding, as well as inter-contextual reminding, may and do occur **within** one contribution as well as across contributions. When sub-contextual reminding occurs to a great extent in an interlocutor's contribution, he will be seen to be 'rambling'. Rambling occurs when an incident the interlocutor recounts forms the contextual domain for another incident which immediately forms the contextual domain for another, and so on.

6.4.4. Reminding and relevance in conversation

Reminding intrinsically involves relevance. Given that a contextual domain operating at a particular point defines a certain area in the interlocutor's memory, the information made accessible through this domain must necessarily have implications for this domain. In this regard, the selection of **ir**relevant information - information that would have no particular implications for the domain at hand - is effectively prevented as such information could not be made accessible through that domain. Reminding, as it were, acts as the process which ensures the selection of information, and ensures that the principle of relevance is maintained.

6.4.5. Interim summary - relevance, reminding and the selection of information

In the previous chapter we saw that a speaker, in producing a discourse, is involved in a goal-based activity of attempting to achieve some affect on his hearer(s). In order to achieve his goal the speaker, we noted, has to formulate a plan which determines, inter alia, what information to select. As a constraint operating over this plan is, we saw, the principle of relevance.

In terms of what we have discussed in this chapter we may now see that the contextual domain (or domains) active in the speaker's production of discourse forms the principle way in which the relevance of the information selected is assured. Given the activation of a contextual domain, the information that is made accessible to the speaker must be in terms of this domain. Reminding, we saw, characterises the process through which such relevant information becomes so accessible.[3]

6.5. Relevance, reminding and the intsomi

6.5.1. Introduction

We now go on to apply the principles we have been discussing to the production of **iintsomi** in particular. Our discussion will be limited to those features of **intsomi** production which we regard to be the most basic. We do not explore, in this regard, the aesthetic use of 'parallel images' and repetition. We do feel, however, that such aesthetic features are amenable to our approach and that further research within our framework is necessary.

6.5.2. The context of intsomi production

Although no particular contextual domain is established at the commencement of an **intsomi** or at the commencement of a conversation, there are, however, certain general features of context that may be said to be active. In conversation such features include the relationship between the interlocutors involved (whether close or distant, for example) and the occasion of the conversation (whether formal or informal, for example). In general, these features constitute a type of contextual domain themselves in that they set up constraints (and open up avenues) in terms of which the

selection of information for the conversation occurs. To distinguish this general contextual domain from the more specific one we have discussed above, we shall refer to it as the **situational domain.**[4]

With regard to the situational domain that typifies **intsomi** production, we may see that it naturally determines that part of the information the narrator has in memory which has implications for, or is relevant to that domain - i.e. the **intsomi** tale-chunks. Another determining feature of the contextual domain is the nature of the audience involved in the production. On any specific occasion, those tale-chunks which have particular relevance to the narrator's audience will be the ones which will be the most accessible. Furthermore, the level to which a tale-chunk may be developed - whether greatly detailed or simply outlined - may also be affected by the audience. The more appreciative an audience is, for example, the more a narrator would achieve a greater amount of implications by developing the tale to great length and detail. In this regard, the situational domain involving field recordings often induces, rather unfortunately, only sketchy performances as the narrators have little incentive to develop their tales to an aesthetic completeness.

6.5.3. Reminding and the production of iintsomi

6.5.3.1. Introduction

In our examination of the production of **iintsomi** we shall restrict our attention to an in depth analysis of one tale in the appendix (text 5) rather than giving a superficial outline of all of them. In this story a tale-chunk concerning a girl forgetting her skirt at the river (to be termed the girl-river tale-chunk) and a tale-chunk concerning a dog that makes

various requests to a girl (to be termed the dog tale-chunk) are presented as forming one **intsomi**.[5] Each of these chunks may be present in various manifestations in other tales, with or without other tale-chunks. They may form potentially independent **iintsomi** productions in their own right, and, indeed, in text 3 in the appendix, for instance, the dog tale-chunk forms a more or less independent whole in itself. The girl-river tale-chunk need thus not occur with the dog tale-chunk, as this tale demonstrates.[6]

6.5.3.2. **The initial tale-chunk**

The problem of initially selecting a tale-chunk from the many the narrator has in memory is apparently one of the most arduous and conscious tasks he has. This is especially apparent in the various surface cues of planning as discussed by Chafe (1980) such as stumbling, self-correction and pausing. These often characterise the openings of tales, and are more prevalent here than anywhere else. In many cases this results, it seems, from the narrator selecting a tale-chunk she does not initially recall very well. This is manifest, to a certain extent, in text 5 lines 1-3 where the narrator has to backtrack to include the fact that there were, specifically, **four** girls. This is relevant information as later on in the tale one of the girls (the hero of the tale) asks three others individually to accompany her to the river.

Once a teller is in her stride and the tale-chunk is fully available, the narrator's telling is characterised by a far greater smoothness, as we can see in text 5. Occasionally, however, an inexperienced narrator may simply drop a tale-chunk he might be experiencing difficulty remembering, and proceed to select another one. In this regard the process of **goal-abandonment** will be discussed later.

6.5.3.3. **Sub-contextual reminding and the production of iintsomi**

Once a tale-chunk has been selected and expressed, the initial tale-chunk in our example being the girl-river tale chunk, it becomes pertinent to ask how the narrator selects the next one in his performance. We believe that the answer to this question is in terms of **sub-contextual reminding.** As we have seen, sub-contextual reminding describes the process where some part of the preceding discourse determines, in itself, a contextual domain in the mind of the speaker in terms of which a particular body of information is made accessible to him. We also noted that such reminding may occur both as the result of a discourse contributed by a previous speaker or as the result of the discourse a current speaker is himself constructing. It is naturally the latter situation that would be applicable to the production of **iintsomi.**

In text 5, the process of sub-contextual reminding appears to occur initially between lines 30-40. Here the girl's travelling at line 30 can be seen to determine the contextual domain in the narrator's memory through which the following arrival at a house incident is made accessible. This incident, in turn, determines another contextual domain through which the dog tale-chunk is similarly made accessible. Both these cases are examples of sub-contextual reminding in that what the narrator selects to express appears to be determined by some previous detail.

It is important to note that other tale-chunks may have also been made accessible through the contextual domains made operative at this point of the tale. Thus, for example, the homestead at which the girl arrives could have been that of an **izim** (an ogre), and a tale-chunk concerning the adventures with the **izim** could have been told, as indeed a number of similar

tales demonstrate. Other tale-chunks which do not fall under the contextual domains operative could not, however, be made so accessible. In this regard, the contextual domain determined by some previous detail acts as a general constraint in terms of which tale-chunks may be selected. As more than one tale-chunk can be made accessible through one contextual domain there need be, however, no fixed pattern of selection. Indeed the variety of tale-chunks selected in this way contributes to the fact there is no fixed tale as such in the **intsomi** tradition.

6.5.3.4. Inter-contextual reminding and the production of iintsomi

In our discussion of conversational discourse we saw that an episode that is made accessible to a speaker by a particular contextual domain necessarily has implications and is relevant to that domain. The latter holds true for the selection of tale-chunks outlined above where the tale-chunks of which the narrator is reminded are indeed relevant to their contextual domains. Thus, in text 5, for example, the girl's arrival is quite consistent with her travelling and, furthermore, that it is the house of a dog at which she arrives is similarly consistent with the fact that she arrives at a house at all. There is, however, an inherent danger at such points. This danger is that the process of sub-contextual reminding as the method of tale chunk selection could, in fact, lead to irrelevance in terms of the tale as a whole. As we have seen in our discussion of conversation, the sub-contextual reminding process ignores any contextual domain broader than the one determined by some preceding detail. In the production of **iintsomi**, however, there is, in fact, such a broad contextual domain - the contextual domain that involves the tale as it is as a whole, beyond the individual tale-chunks. If the sub-contextual reminding process (which, as we have noted, would ignore such a broad contextual domain) occurs without check,

there is no guarantee that anything in particular would unite the selected tale-chunks as having implications for the tale they constitute as a whole. While subsequent tale-chunks would have implications to some preceding detail, they would not necessarily have implications for the broader contextual domain of the overall tale. The extreme result of unchecked sub-contextual reminding are **iintsomi** that appear to be simple exercises in remembering tale-chunks, each successive one not relating in any global way to the one that precedes.

From a broader perspective, the narrator, we need to remember, has the goal of producing one story. Accordingly, there must be some higher order goal to unite the two or more tale-chunks he selects. If such a goal is **not** formulated, however, the tale-chunks selected could not be seen as coherent to one story. Instead, in narrating two tale-chunks which do not relate to one overall goal, the narrator would be seen to be pursuing two different goals where it would be necessarily assumed that he is meant to be pursuing only one. Such situations are, in fact, examples of what we have seen Wilensky term **goal-conflict.** In certain tales this situation does not appear to be that prominent. However, even in these cases, one is still left with the feeling that the beginning of the tale (where the narrator 'started out') does not relate to the end. Complete **goal abandonment**, again using Wilensky's term, does occur however. This is a feature which occurs at especially the beginnings of tales where tellers begin with one tale-chunk, but then abandon it for a tale-chunk perhaps more well-known or better remembered. The completed tales of these productions will, therefore, show the abandoned opening chunk as irrelevant.

It is obvious that competent narrators, like the narrator of text 5 under

examination, begin tales by selecting a tale-chunk without these narrators knowing their final destination. They do not necessarily know, in other words, due to the nature of the sub-contexual reminding process, what other tale-chunks they will select (if any) and thus how their tales will end. What is needed and what is learnt by the more competent and experienced narrators are certain basic constraints operating over the sub-contextual reminding process. Such constraints are, we believe, in terms of inter-contextual reminding.

Intercontextual reminding, as we have seen, involves the selection of information in terms of a single overall contextual domain. In the production of **iintsomi** sub-contextual reminding may lead to creativity and variety, but it is potentially counterproductive to overall coherence. In order to preserve such coherence and to maintain a single story goal the narrator needs to take account of the context of the tale he is creating as a whole. He needs to be also aware of the fact that the first tale-chunk he selects necessarily limits the number of choices he can make to continue the story in a relevant way. In this regard tale-chunks subsequently selected must be modified by the inclusion or exclusion of certain information to fit the total production. Such information allows the tale-chunks to have implications and be relevant to the contextual domain determined by the tale as a whole. Inter-contextual reminding thus intrinsically involves improvisation and the exploitation of the individual imagination.

In text 5 the largely improvised final section of the tale can be seen largely to be the result of inter-contextual reminding. The dog's demise at the end of the tale, for example, constitutes an effective resolution to the tale as a whole. Furthermore, the re-introduction of the girls who were

initially involved at the beginning of the tale (now given the role of agents in the resolution) gives the tale an overall unity. Such information, we may note, could only be accessible to the narrator in question if she was aware of the broad contextual domain set by the tale she was creating. Given such an awareness, she is in the position to select certain information which rounds off her tale in a coherent way and which has implications for the tale as a whole.

Given the fact that **intsomi** productions involve a number of tale-chunks, successful inter-contextual reminding is not a trivial accomplishment. Inexperienced or poor narrators do not seem to be in the position to maintain a consistent orientation to one overall contextual domain and their tales thus generally lack the cohesiveness that characterises the productions of more competent narrators.

6.5.4. **Interim summary - reminding, relevance and narrative creativity**

Acting over the production of an **intsomi** as a goal directed activity, complex processes of reminding and the associated principle of relevance explain a central property of the tradition alluded to earlier - the notion of narrative creativity through personal improvisation. Our discussion represents an alternative to the theory of narrative creativity we attributed to story grammarians and to Scheub (see Chapter 4). It is obvious that the principle of relevance associated with reminding of various degrees of complexity forms part of a narrator's **narrative competence** with which he is born or with which he is particularly gifted. It is best demonstrated, thus, in tales told by good narrators and is the hallmark of narrative excellence.

6.6. Relevance and the encoding of information

6.6.1. Introduction

Up to this point we have restricted our discussion of the production of **iintsomi** to the operation of relevance in the selection of information. We now go on to another of our concerns mentioned in the previous chapter - how relevance affects the encoding of the information that is selected. Our discussion of this area will largely be a reinterpretation of the cohesion markers we discussed in chapter 2. These, we saw, indicated changes of orientation between globally coherent sequences of events which we termed, following Chafe, 'centres of interest'. We shall now see that the principle of relevance as the controlling factor in the encoding of information offers an alternative account.

6.6.2. Relevance and re-orientation

In his selection of the information making up the tale, the narrator will find that certain parts of that information relate differently or more distantly than other parts. For example, within a tale a certain stretch of activity may end and a new one begin. Although both necessarily have implications for the broad domain of the tale as a whole, these two sections of information will relate differently to each other than the elements within these sections.

Given the fact that events cluster together to form such coherent and distinct sequences, such sequences can be seen to represent low-level contextual domains in terms of which the individual events that constitute them have implications. If a new series of events begins distinct from the one that precedes it, a new contextual domain needs to be established in

terms of which those events are to be interpreted. At the interface of such distinct sequences of events there is naturally a break of relevance as these sequences involve different contextual domains. Thus in text 5, the sequence of events concerning the girl's travelling to the river at lines 25-30 needs to interpreted in terms of a different contextual domain from the one involving her interaction with the three other girls that immediately precedes it. Here the girl's travelling does not immediately relate to the context of her interaction with the other girls. Similarly, the series of events concerning the girl's interaction with the dog at lines 41-59 involves a different contextual domain from the following sequence of events concerning the dog's herding of the cows from line 60 onward. The dog's actions at this point are distinct from the ones that precede.

At the interface of such distinct event-sequences the narrator necessarily needs to signal that there is a change of relevance with regard to the information that follows. The hearers need to re-orientate themselves to prevent them from understanding in terms of one contextual domain what, in fact, needs to be interpreted in terms of a new contextual domain distinct from the one that precedes it. Such re-orientation is signalled through the use of certain surface cues. We have previously discussed such cues - including intonation and lexical markers - in terms of 'cohesion' markers. We may now see that such features may be viewed as signalling changes or breaks of relevance within discourse. They signal to the hearer that the implications of what is to follow at a particular point in the discourse needs to be interpreted in terms of a different contextual domain from the one that has been operative to that point. With specific regard to text 5, we may note that the intonational features at the interface at line 59 and line 60, for example, indicate that what is to follow is a stretch of

information that the hearers need to understand in terms of a new contextual domain. (For a detailed intonational analysis of this part of the text, see 2.3.1.) Similarly, after the sequence of events concerning the dog's interaction with the talking hair the discourse particle **hayi ke** ('no then') signals that the information to follow forms a separate unit from what precedes and should be comprehended as such. We may note that in general, discourse particles in Xhosa (such as **ngoku ke** 'now then' and **ngokunene ke** 'in truth then') can be seen to have the sole function of indicating breaks of relevance in a stretch of discourse.

The signals we have discussed above form part of a larger set of surface features which Gumperz terms **contextualisation cues** (see Gumperz, 1977, 1982:162ff; for commentary see Levinson 1983:374). Contextualisation cues are surface features of utterances that are designed to invoke in the mind of the hearer a particular frame of interpretation, or, in our terms, a particular contextual domain. Such cues are, in fact, fundamental to much every day linguistic understanding. In joking, being ironic or sarcastic, for example, a speaker may exploit specific intonational contours which signal the contextual domain in terms of which his utterance is to be understood. On being supplied with such signals the hearer will be in a position to infer the intended implications of the speaker's utterance without ambiguity.

Contextualisation cues, including markers of breaks of relevance, are, in our framework, manifestations of the principle of relevance operating during the processing of the encoding of information. To achieve his discourse goal a speaker must ensure that the context in terms of which the intended implications of his discourse may be deduced is accessible to his hearers.

Such accessibility is assured by using appropriate surface signals in the encoding of the information he has selected for expression.

6.7. Conclusion

We hope that the approach we have taken to the production of **iintsomi** in this chapter overcomes the shortcomings we have attributed to previous approaches to **intsomi** production. Unlike Scheub's approach, we have attempted to locate our views of **intsomi** production in terms of a general theory of discourse production. In this regard we have hoped to show that the processes involved in the production of **iintsomi** have a universal basis. We do concede, however, that Scheub describes a greater number of the features of the **intsomi** tradition than our own, and in this regard it may be seen as having a greater scope. We hope that further research within the framework we have developed may yet offer an alternate explanation of such features.

The theory of narrative production attributable to story grammars, although making universal claims, does not, as we have seen, offer a viable account of **intsomi** production in particular. This is largely because of their inspiration from sentential linguistics, their lack of concentration on empirical data as well as their description of narrative discourse as a static artefact. By concentrating on an attested tale as well as viewing the production of **iintsomi** as goal-directed events we believe that our approach offers a more realistic alternative.

More generally, we believe that the processes we have outlined in this chapter have a number of implications for further research in the fields of pragmatics and discourse analysis. Both these disciplines have concentrated

on the principles underlying the **comprehension** of discourse rather than on its **production.** We hope that through our concentration on the speaker and his production of discourse a fundamental domain of inquiry may have been made accessible for further research.

Footnotes to Chapter 6

1) Investigation into conversation in terms of **conversational analysis** (CA) is presently a burgeoning domain of inquiry. For an introduction, see Levinson (1983:284-369). With specific regard to the type of conversation analysed in this chapter, see Tannen (1984). See also Psathas (ed) (1979) and Schenkin (ed) (1978) for examples of the interests of CA.

2) Another type of reminding that appears to occur in conversation may be termed **cross-contextual** reminding. Cross-contextual reminding occurs when similarities are perceived between the current contextual domain as a whole, and another contextual domain within an interlocutor's memory. When such similarities are perceived, the domain in memory becomes accessible. Thus, in an attested conversation with P., D., and M., as interlocutors, the contextual domain operating was 'conservative religious groups in America'. Each of the interlocutors involved made contributions in terms of this domain. At one stage, however, M. was reminded of 'conservative political groups in South Africa'. The reminding process involved here is thus not in terms of **one** contextual domain, but occurs through the perception of similarities between the domains themselves.

3) We should note that individuals may, of course, make contributions which do not relate directly to what has just been discussed. However, such contributions (which, in fact, initiate new contextual domains) are marked by certain conventionalised cues such as intonation and lexical markers (for example, 'by the way' in English). These cues signal to the other interlocutors involved that a new contextual domain has been initiated. We discuss such cues at a later stage in this chapter (see 6.5.)

4) For an in-depth description of the 'context of communication' which includes a review of the relevant literature, see Brown and Yule (1983:35-46).

5) In Scheub (1969, vol 2) these are listed respectively as 'core-image' no. 65 (ibid:10) and 'core-image' no. 21 (ibid:28). Scheub gives a synopsis of these images, as well as noting their respective 'core-cliches'.

6) In Scheub (1969, vol 2) his included tales, 'performances' numbers 8, 9, and 10, for example, include what we have termed the 'girl-river' tale-chunk occurring in various contexts. The 'dog' tale-chunk occurs in 'performances' 99 and 101 with other 'tale-chunks'.

CONCLUSION

Linguists have traditionally investigated language as a discrete domain, separate from man's experience and being. If it is related to the human mind at all, it is as a separate and innate **faculte de langue** only peripherally connected to other aspects of human cognition. It appears that a compartmentalised view of inquiry has become a compartmentalised view of the human mind. In this regard, Langacker (1983:7) states:

> There is of course no question that people have the capacity to learn a language and that this involves innate structures and abilities. The controversial issue is whether some of these structures and abilities are unique to language, possibly constituting a separate modular package with special properties not reflective or derivative of other, more general cognitive functions.

Langacker (ibid), in fact, assumes the contrary:

> Even if such a faculty is posited, it must be embedded in the overall psychological matrix, as it represents the evolution and function of structures having a less specialized origin. Even if the blueprints for language are wired genetically into the human organism, their elaboration into a fully specified language system during language acquisition, and their implementation in everyday language use, are clearly dependent on experiential factors and inextricably bound up with numerous psychological phenomena that are not specifically linguistic in character. **There is no a priori reason whatever to anticipate any sharp qualitative distinction between linguistic ability and cognitive abilities more generally.**
> (my emphasis)

With reference to on Langacker's comments, we believe that linguistics has set boundaries which, while being convenient, are highly artificial. Langacker (ibid) states further:

> To put it rather contentiously, language has appeared special and unassimilable to broader psychological phenomena mainly because linguists have insisted on analyzing it in an inappropriate and highly unnatural fashion; once the many layers of artifact are removed, language starts to look more natural and learnable in terms of what we know of other facets of human cognitive ability.

To increase the viability of linguistics as a domain of inquiry, I believe it has to extend its boundaries to the 'facets of human cognitive ability' that Langacker refers to. In this study I hope to have achieved such an extension in two main ways.

Firstly, by taking the perspective of discourse analysis in section A, I hope to have demonstrated that certain linguistic categories may reveal correlations with, and be structured around universal cognitive categories. I believe that my findings in this section are a contribution to the view that much of linguistic phenomena may be motivated by general cognitive capacities rather than representing part of a discrete and separate domain.

I also hope to have contributed to the study of the cognitive processes involved in the production of discourse as described in section B. When concerned with discourse at all, linguists have traditionally examined the 'end product' - the discourse as a static, linguistic artifact. What is ignored is the fact that the 'end product' is the result of cognitive processes involving general cognitive abilities in terms of which the completed discourse itself is but a shadow. In my discussion I hope to have demonstrated that the cognitive processes involved in discourse are systematic and derivative of general cognitive principles, and that they are fundamental to our understanding of discourse in general.

With specific regard to Bantu linguistics, I believe this thesis has both theoretical and practical ramifications. Theoretically, I hope to have contributed to a reassessment of the traditional approach to Bantu linguistic categories. In this regard I believe that my approach to, for example, 'mood' and agreement in terms of conceptual factors, may form the basis of inquiry into other traditionally described features of Bantu languages.

I also believe that my approach to **iintsomi** avoids the shortcomings of previous approaches in that it makes universal claims while being based on naturally occurring data. I believe that similar research into other Xhosa discourse types will prove to be fruitful.

From a practical perspective, I believe that a theoretical study of Xhosa discourse such as this one may be fruitfully utilised to examine the dynamics of inter-ethnic communication within southern Africa. Studies of the problems involved within inter-ethnic communication are, I believe, vital to mutual understanding, which, in the end, is what discourse should be all about.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 - Tables and Figures for Chapter 4

Table 1

Rewrite rules for the base structures of simple stories. (After Johnson & Mandler, 1980:59)

Nonterminal nodes are written in upper case; nodes which are not rewritten are written in lower case.

STORY	→	Setting And EPISODE
EPISODE	→	{ BEGINNING Cause DEVELOPMENT Cause ENDING EPISODE ({ And / Then } EPISODE)^{n} }
BEGINNING	→	{ Beginning Event / EPISODE }
DEVELOPMENT	→	{ COMPLEX REACTION Cause GOAL PATH Simple Reaction Cause Action DEVELOPMENT (Cause DEVELOPMENT)^{n} }
COMPLEX REACTION	→	Simple Reaction Cause Goal
GOAL PATH	→	Attempt Cause OUTCOME
OUTCOME	→	{ Outcome Event / EPISODE }
ENDING	→	{ Ending Event / EPISODE }

Table 2

Definitions of simple story categories (after Johnson and Mandler, 1980:60)

Setting	-	introduces protagonist of the first episode, and may include general spatio-temporal information
Beginning event	-	which causes the protagonist to react
Simple reaction	-	which represents the protagonist's emotional response to the beginning
Goal	-	representing what the protagonist intends to do about the beginning
Attempt	-	representing the act the protagonist carries out to achieve his/her goal
Outcome event	-	represents either the success or failure of the attempt
Ending event	-	which represents the long range consequences of the development, or a response by the character to it



Key

a) St = Story
Se = Setting
Ep = Episode
Be = Beginning
De = Developments
E = Ending
CR = Complex Reaction
SR = Simple Reaction
Go = Goal
GP = Goal Parts
At = Attempt
Out = Outcome

b) Connections:
A = and (non-temporal)
T = then connection (subsequence in time)
C = causal connection

c) / / indicates constituent 'deleted' form constituent structure. Only certain constituents may be so deleted - generally if they are predictable from the rest of the tale.

Figure 1: A representation of the "Hen Story" (cf Table 3) (after Johnson and Mandler, 1980:66)

Table 3

Text of the "Hen Story" (after Johnson and Mandler, 1980:66)

1 Once there was a hen and a cock who lived together in a barnyard.
2 One day, while they were eating their breakfast, the cock began to choke on a bean.
3 The hen was alarmed
4 And decided to try to help him out.
5 So first she patted him on the back.
6 But he just kept on choking.
7 So then she pounded him on the back.
8 But still the cock sputtered and coughed.
9 So she decided perhaps she could get him a drink of water.
10 She ran to the river and asked for some water to give to the poor cock.
11 The river said, "I will give you water if you bring me a leaf from the lime tree."
12 So the hen ran to the lime tree and asked for a leaf.
13 The lime tree said, "I will give you a leaf if you bring me some thread from the dairymaid."
14 So the hen ran to the dairymaid and asked for some thread.
15 The dairymaid gave the hen some thread.
16 The hen gave the thread to the lime tree who gave her a leaf.
17 Then she gave the leaf to the river, who gave her some water.
18 But when she got back with the water the cock was lying there quite still.
19 He had choked to death on a bean!

Table 4

Rewrite rules adapted for the structure of iintsomi

STORY	→	Setting and EPISODE BEGINNING cause DEVELOPMENT cause ENDING
EPISODE	→	EPISODE (and / then EPISODE)^{n} EPISODE^{*r}
EPISODE*	→	BEGINNING cause DEVELOPMENT cause ENDING
BEGINNING	→	Beginning event Episode
DEVELOPMENT	→	COMPLEX REACTION cause GOAL PATH DEVELOPMENT$_{*r}$(cause DEVELOPMENT)^{n} DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOPMENT^{*r}	→	DEVELOPMENT* (cause DEVELOPMENT*)^{n}
DEVELOPMENT*	→	COMPLEX REACTION cause GOAL PATH
COMPLEX REACTION	→	Simple Reaction cause Goal
GOAL PATH	→	Attempt cause OUTCOME
OUTCOME	→	Outcome Event EPISODE

Table 5

Intsomi 1 Baboons steal a sleeping child (Scheub, 1969:305)

1	Kwakukhona umfazi ehlagula emasimini	1	There was once a woman hoeing in the fields.
2	ethathe umtwan'	2	She had taken a child along
3	ngoku lo mntwan wamane emlalisa edongeni	3	which she always put to sleep at the bank of a river.
4	kuthe ngenye imini njalo ehlagula	4	It happened one day as she was hoeing as usual
5	uyaya edongeni	5	she went to the river-bank
6	wafika usana solungekho	6	and when she arrived, the child was not there.
7	waba ngalufune wancama emasimini	7	She searched for it in the fields and despaired.
8	wagoduka elila	8	She went home crying.
9	wafika ekhaya	9	She arrived home
10	wenza umphako	10	and prepared provisions for a journey.
11	wahamba ehlabela efuna lo mntwana	11	She set out singing and searching for this child
12	emana egqitha ezimfeneni	12	continually passing baboons.
13	ebuza	13	She asked (them if they knew about the location of her child),
14	zimane zimlandula	14	but they always put her off.
15	waza wawofika kwezo kugqibela	15	Finally, she arrived at some baboons
16	Zabuza u'ba umkhupha uthwele na	16	who asked her if she was carrying porridge.
17	wathi ke oyena ewe ndiwuthwel'	17	She said "Yes", she was carrying some.
18	zathi khawuphose silambile	18	They asked her to throw them some because they were hungry.
19	waman' ukuphosa	19	She did so again and again.
20	zamxelea usana olu zilufihlile	20	Then they told her, that this child of hers, they had hidden it.
21	zamnika	21	They gave it to her.
22	wahamba evuya ehlabela	22	She travelled on joyfully singing.
23	wagoduka.	23	She went home.



Figure 2: Representation of intsomi 1 (cf. Table 5)

Table 6

Intsomi 2 (segment) (after Scheub, 1969:334-336)

1	wafik'untloyile abantwana bakhe bengekho	The kite returned, and her children were not there.
2	wahamba untloyile elandela	The kite travelled, following them.
3	wafika emakhwenkweni ebumba idongwe	She came to some boys who were moulding clay.
4	wathi (sings)	She said,
	makwhenkwe abumbayo	Boys who are moulding!
	makhwenkwe abumbayo	Boys who are moulding!
	ndiboniseleni ngabantwana bam	Have you seen my children?
	benjengamawele	They look like twins,
	ehleli ndawonye	Living together.
	nguma mna o o m	I'm the mother, oh oh m!
	nguma mna o o m	I'm the mother, oh oh m!
5	athi la makhwenkwe dlulela phambili	These boys said, "Pass on ahead!
6	uza ibon' intab' ende kamalingana	You'll see a tall mountain.
7	uya kufika kungqungqwa phantsi kwayo	You'll arrive, there'll be dancing beneath it."
8	wahamba wahamba	She travelled, she travelled.
9	wahamba wafika iinkomo zisidla	She travelled, and she arrived and found some cattle grazing.
10	wathi (sings)	She said,
	nkomo zidlayo	Oxen who are grazing!
	nkomo zidlayo	Oxen who are grazing!
	ndiboniseleni ngabantwana bam	Have you seen my children?
	benjengamawele	They look like twins,
	ehleli ndawonye	Living together!
	nguma mna o o m	I'm their mother, oh oh m!
	nguma mna o o m	I'm their mother, oh oh m!
11	zathi ezi nkomo hamba uza ibona intaba ende kamalingana	These oxen said, "Pass on! You'll see a tall mountain.
12	uyafika kungqungqwa phantsi kwayo	You'll arrive, and there'll be dancing beneath it."
13	wahamba wahamba	She travelled and travelled.
14	wayibona intab' ende	She saw a tall mountain.
15	wathi nxa seseduze efika kunomdidikazi omkhulu wamarhwababa kwenzelwe aba bantwana	When she was in the vicinity, she came to a huge party of ravens that was being held for these children.
16	wathi	She said,
	bantu bangqungqayo	People who are dancing!
	bantu bangqungqayo	People who are dancing!
	ndiboniseleni ngabantwa' bam	Have you seen my children?
	benjengamawele	They look like twins,
	ehleli ndawonye	Living together!
	nguma mna o o m	I'm the mother, oh oh m!
	nguma mna o o m	I'm the mother, oh oh m!
17	hawu bath' asiva ngumoya	Oh! They said, "We didn't hear because of the wind!"
18	abantwana bamva unina	But the children heard their mother
19	bavakala abantwana bekhala endlini besithi (sings)	and they were heard crying in the house, saying,
	anga ngumama lo latsh' ihlobohlobo	This seems to be out mother's voice, it has a pleasant sound
	anga ngumama lo latsh' ihlobohlobo	This seems to be our mother's voice, it has a pleasant sound
	anga ngumama lo latsh' ihlobohlobo	This seems to be our mother's voice, it has a pleasant sound
20	wath' untloyile naba bantwana bam bekhala endlin'	The kite said, "Here are my children crying in this house."
21	wahamba untloyile waphosek' endleni	The kite travelled, she plunged into the house.
22	wafik' urwababa ehleli naba bantwana ethe fofonono	She arrived, the raven was comfortably sitting with the children.
23	wathath' abantwana bakhe untloyile	The kite took her children, and she travelled.
24	wahamba waphel' umgidi	The party was over.



Figure 3: Representation of intsomi 2 (cf. Table 6)

Table 7

Intsomi 3 (segment) (after Scheub, 1975:273-275)

1	yaphinda futhi ngemini yesithathu	The man returned three days later
2	yathi nakanjani namhlanje ndiya kubeth'	and said, "There's no way out today! I'll beat you!"
3	umntwana ke wathi ke kulungile k'	The child said, "All right, then."
4	yathi ke le ndoda yitsho k' iinkomo zihambe kwedin	The man said, "Well, speak, Boy, so that these cattle move!"
5	wathi yena umntana (sings) Dubulihasa Dubulihasa nokuhamb' ungahambayo ke Dubulihasa ngob' uyabon' uba ndiyabulawa ke Dubulihasa	The child sang Dubulihasa! Dubulihasa! You must go, Dubulihasa! Because you can see That I'll be killed, Dubilihasa!
6	yahamba inkomo	The ox travelled on,
7	yahamba yahamba yahamba inkomo	it travelled and travelled, the ox travelled.
8	waphinda futhi wathi	Again the man said
9	yitsho kwedin' inkomo ihambe	"Speak, Boy, so that this ox travels!"
10	imile	It stood there.
11	(sings) wathi Dubulihasa Dubulihasa nokuhamba ungahambayo ke Dubulihasa ngob' uyabon' uba ndiyabulawa ke Dubilihasa	The child said, Dubulihasa! Dubulihasa! You must go, Dubulihasa! Because you can see That I'll be killed, Dubulihasa!
12	yasuk' inkomo yakhala	The ox bellowed,
13	yathi mpooo ... pooo	"Mpoo!"
14	wathi yitsho kwedin' inkomo ihambe	The man said, "Speak, Boy, so that this ox moves!"
15	(sings) wathi Dubulihasa Dubulihsa nokuwel' ungawelayo ke Dubulihasa ngob' uyabon' uba ndiyabulawa ke Dubulihasa	The boy said, Dubulihasa! Dubulihasa! You must cross, Dubulihasa! Because you can see That I'll be killed, Dubulihasa!
16	emfuleni yawela inkomo	At a river. The ox crossed over.
17	yaphinda yakhal' inkomo yathi mpooo	Again, the ox bellowed, "Mpooo!"
18	wath' yitsho kwedin' inkomo ihambe	The man said, "Speak, Boy, so that this ox moves!"
19	sek' ekude kufuphi nomzi wakhe lo mntu	They were now fairly close to the home of this man.
20	yaphind' inkwenkwe yathi (sings) Dubulihasa Dubulihasa nokuhamb' ungahambayo ke Dubulihasa ngob' uyabon' uba ndivabulawa ke Dubulihasa	Again the boy said, Dubulihasa! Dubulihasa! You must go, Dubulihasa! Because you can see That I'll be killed, Dubulihasa!
21	yahamb' inkomo yahamb' inkomo	The ox travelled, it travelled.
22	yathi na iza kungena enkundlen' yema	Then, when it entered the courtyard, it stopped.
23	yakhal' inkomo yathi mpooo mpooo	The ox bellowed, "Mpooo! Mpooo!"



Figure 4: Representation of intsomi 3 (cf. Table 7)

Appendix 2 - Iintsomi texts, cartoon narrative text, and English translations

Personal details of narrators (names, sex, age):

Text 1

Nomphumzile Gomomo (F)

35 years

Texts 2 and 4

Nogolide Phangwa (F)

11 years

Text 3

Kanene Ndandikane (M)

70 years

Text 5

Nohambile Qonya (F)

43 years

Text 6

Bongani Buso (M)

20 years

Text 1

1 kwathi ke kaloku ngantsomi

2 kwakukho umfazi nendoda

3 lo mfazi wazala umntana wamnye oyintombazana

4 hayi ke kuthe ekuhambeni kwethuba

5 watshaba umfazi

6 washiya lo mntana uyintombazana

7 hayi ke wahlala wahlala

8 wafrisha le ndoda omnye umfazi

9 wazala lo mfazi abantwana ababini abangamantombazana

10 bakhula abantwana bade babadala

11 ngoku lo mfazi akamthanda lo mntana uyintombazana

12 wathi wabengamthandi lo mntana uyintombazana
wathanda ukuba makahlale neehagu
angahlali nabantu ngenxa yokuba umdaka nokungathengelwa mpahla

13 kuthe ekuhambeni kwethuba

14 kwathiwa um- umfana wenkosi uyafrisha

15 wathi ke uza kufrishela emdanisweni

16 okunene ke yafika imini yomdaniso

17 kwahanjwa kwabhekwa emdanisweni

18 wanomnqweno ke lo mntana ukuba angaya naye emdanisweni

19 zathi ezi ntombi zimbini azinakuhamba zona nomntana omdaka apha phakathi kwabanye

20 hayi ke bahambile ke

21 baya emdanisweni elila njalo lo mntana

22 kuthe ekuhambeni kwethuba

23 wahamba lo mntana wabheka emalanjeni

24 wathi akufika emlanjeni

Text 1 translation

1 Now for an intsomi

2 There was a woman and a man.

3 This woman gave birth to one child who was a girl

4 So then after a while

5 The woman lost her temper

6 and left the child who was a girl.

7 So then she stayed and stayed.

8 The man wooed another woman.

9 This woman gave birth to two children who were girls.

10 The children grew up until they were old.

11 Now the woman did not like the child who was a girl.

12 As she did not like this girl, she liked her to stay with the pigs and not with people on account of her being dirty through not being bought clothes.

13 After a while,

14 It was said that the son of a chief was looking for a wife.

15 He said he would look for one at a dance.

16 In truth the day of the dance arrived.

17 There was travelled and gone to the dance.

18 The girl child wished that she could go to the dance as well.

19 The two girls said they could not go with a dirty child amongst other people.

20 So then they travelled

21 and went to the dance, the child weeping so.

22 After a while,

23 the child travelled and went to a river.

24 When she arrived at the river,

25 wafika walila

26 yathi ingoma yakhe
walila walila
umntana wethu sobabini
walila walila
umntana wethu sobabini

27 yabuya impendulo isithi
uthi mandimthini na
Ziba Ziba wam
uthi mandimthini na
Ziba Ziba wam
mse kuyise mkhulu
Ziba Ziba wam

28 ayaluzela amanzi ngoku

29 wavela unina

30 wamthatha lo mntana wamngenisa emanzini

31 wathi akuba samanzini wamkhulula zonke ezo mpahla zimdaka ebezinxibile wamvasa wamhle

32 wamkhupha emanzini

33 wamnika inqwelo ehamba kunye nenkwenkwana

34 wathi ke mntana uzuncede uthi wakufika kulo mdaniso

35 ungakhe ulinge ubuye emini

36 ubuye kuseb- kuseb- kusebusuku
okwenza into yokuba ungabonwa xa uphinda usiza apha emlanjeni

37 hayi ke uhambile ke umntana nenqwelo yakhe

38 wayifihla ke lo mntana inqwelo etyholweni

39 wafika apha umdaniso ungene ngamandla

40 yaye inkosi idanisa nezaa ntombi zimbini

41 hayi ke okunene uyithathile le ntombi isangena emnyango

42 wayixhwila ngoko wathi nanku umfazi wam ungenile

43 udanise naye ubusuku bonke

44 kwala ngezithuba zabo three

45 wamthatha umfazi wakhe wathi uyozela

46 wamlalisa ekamileni

25 she arrived and cried.

26 Her song went (sings)
She cried, she cried
Our child both of us
She cried she cried
Our child both of us

27 The answer came (sings)
What do you think I should do for her,
Ziba, my Ziba?
What do you think I should do for her,
Ziba, my Ziba
Take her to her grandfather
Ziba, my Ziba

28 The water swirled.

29 The girl's mother appeared.

30 She took the child and entered her into the water.

31 When she was in the water, she removed all those dirty clothes which she was wearing and washed her and she was beautiful.

32 She took her from the water.

33 She gave her a carriage to travel with a small boy.

34 She said then, "My child, please, when you arrive at the dance,

35 Don't try to return during the day-

36 return while it is still night,
so that you are not seen when you come again here to the river."

37 So then the child travelled with her carriage.

38 Then the child hid the carriage in some bushes.

39 She arrived at the dance and entered openly.

40 The chief was dancing with those two girls.

41 So then truly, he took the girl she as entered the door.

42 He seized her then and said, "This is my wife, she has entered."

43 He danced with her the whole night.

44 At about three

45 He took his wife

46 He put her asleep in the room.

47	uthi neth ayokulala ekamileni	47 Just when he was to put her to sleep,
48	wathi neth inkosi imke iphindile emdanisweni iyokudanisa yona	48 Just when the chief had left to return to the dance to go and dance,
49	yaphuma intombazana ngefestire	49 the girl went out through the window
50	yabaleka	50 and ran away.
51	ithe inkosi yaphinda iya ekamileni	51 When the chief went to the room again,
52	yaya intombazana sele imkile	52 he went, the girl already having departed.
53	yabuya yaza kuxela ukuba umfazi wam uzimele ke ndiza kuphinda ndifake omnye umdaniso kwiveki elandelayo	53 He returned and went to tell "My wife has hidden herself so I'm going to put another dance next week.
54	ke lo mdaniso ndiza kuwufaka ngumdaniso wokugqibela ukuba ngaba ndithe le ntombazana ndaba andiyifumananga andikuphinda ndibe naye umfazi ndiya kukhetha nokuba ngowuphi na	54 This dance which I'm going to put on is the last dance that I will try to get this girl. If I do not get her I will not try to make her my wife again. I will choose anyone.
55	hayi ke kuphindile wavela umdaniso	55 So then the other dance came.
56	abuya la mantombazana aza kuxela into yokuba	56 The girls returned and went to say
57	hayi ubumnandi umdaniso phaya	57 "No, the dance there was wonderful.
58	intombazana ibiphaya ibingentle ngako	58 A girl there was so very beautiful."
59	okunene ke yalila le ntombazana athi ke nina niyavuya niyibonileyo loo nto	59 Truly then the girl wept and said, "You are lucky because you saw her."
60	athi la mantombazana kwiveki elandelayo kuza kuphinda kubekho umdaniso	60 The girs said, "Next week another dance is going to be put on."
61	yathi le ntombazana inge nindiboleka nam iimpahla ndiya kuyibona le ntombazana niyincomayo	61 The girl said, "If you could lend me some clothes, I will go and see this girl who you are praising."
62	hayi ke ifikile imini yomdaniso	62 So then the day of the dance arrived.
63	aphinda la mantombazana aphinda axela ukuba siyahamba kule veki sibheka emdanisweni	63 The girls said again, "We are going to the dance this week."
64	yaphinda le ntombazana yathi aninakundinika nokuba ngunondrokwe na oku kokuba ndibone emdanisweni	64 The girl said again, "Can't you give me just any old dress so that I can see the dance?"
65	athi la mantombazana yhoo asinakuhamba nento efana nawe thina	65 The girls said "My!, we cannot go with someone like you!"
66	hayi ke ngokunene ahamba la mantombazana ayishiya le ntombazana kwakhona	66 So then truly the girls went and left the girl behind again.
67	iphindile le ntombazana yahamba yaphindela emlanjeni	67 The girl went to the river again.

68 yaphinda yalila phaya isombela ingoma yayo
walila walila
umntana wethu sobabini
walila walila
umntana wethu sobabini

69 yaphinda yabuya impendulo
uthi mandimthini na
Ziba Ziba wam
uthi mandimthini na
Ziba Ziba wam
mse kuyise mkhulu
Ziba Ziba wam

70 aphinda ayaluzela amanzi

71 waphum' unina

72 waphinda wamthatha futhi wamnxibisa ezinye iimpahla namhlanje

73 wahamba yaphinda yaphuma inqwelo yahamba naye

74 iphind' intombazana yakufika emdanisweni

75 ithe ukufika kwayo intombazana emdanisweni yabe se isithi inkosi

76 nanko kwakhona umfazi wam

77 yadanisa inkosi nale ntombazana

78 laphinda lafika elaa xesha lokuba mayiphinde intombazana iyokulaliswa

79 yayithatha inkosi yayilalisa kanti inkosi ngelo xesha ingene phantsi kwebhedi izifihlile

80 ifuna ukuyibona le ntombazana xa iphumayo

81 iphindile intombazana yaqonda ukuba inokuba inkosi imkile

82 yatsiba ngefestile kanti inkosi iye yamtsibela yafumana isihlangu

83 yathi yakuba ifumene esi sihlangu le nkosi yabe intombazana se itsibile imkile sashiyeka isihlangu

84 ixelile ke inkosi emdanisweni ukuba hayi intombazana iphinde yatsiba kwakhona ndifumene isihlangu

85 ke kule veki esi sihlangu intombazana ethe salunga kuyo nokuba yeyiphi na iya kuba umfazi wam

86 okunene ke kuthe ekuhambeni kwethuba yafika la mini yayixelwe yinkosi

87 ihamba ilinganisa esi sihlangu

68 Again she cried, singing her song,(sings)
"We cried, we cried
Our child both of us
We cried, we cried
Our child both of us."

69 Again the reply came, (sings)
What do you think I should do for her,
Ziba, my Ziba?
What do you think I should do for her,
Ziba, my Ziba
Take her to her grandfather
Ziba, my Ziba

70 Again the water swirled.

71 The mother came out.

72 She took her again and dressed her in different clothes today.

73 She travelled, and again the carraige came out and travelled with her.

74 The girl again went to arrive at the dance.

75 On the girls arrival at the dance, the chief said,

76 "There is my wife again."

77 The chief danced with the girl,

78 and again that time came for girl to be put to sleep.

79 The chief took her and put her to sleep, but this time he went below the bed, hiding himself -

80 wanting to see the girl when she went out.

81 The girl again thought that perhaps the chief was gone.

82 She jumped from the window, but the chief jumped after her and found a shoe.

83 When the chief had found this shoe,
the girl had already departed, leaving the shoe behind.

84 The chief again spoke to the dance, "The girl has jumped again but I found her shoe,

85 so this week whichever girl this shoe fits
will be my wife

86 Truly then, after a while, that day told by the chief arrived,

87 he travelling and fitting the shoe.

89 wathathwa lo mntana wafihlwa

90 wafakwa phantsi kwefatyi ukuba angabonwa yile nkosi ngenxa yokuba umdaka

91 hayi ke okunene ke uthe akuba efihlwe

92 yafika le nkosi

93 yathi ukufika kwayo yathi wonke umntu makanxibe esi sihlangu esithe salunga kuye iya kuba ngumfazi wam

94 hayi ke saba ngafakwa kulo asalungwa saba ngafakwa kulo asalunga

95 yagungquza intombazana phantsi kwefatyi

96 yapha- yathi le nkosi
le nto ingathi igungquzayo phantsi kwefatyi yintoni na

97 kwathiwa hayi yikati

98 yathi hayi khaniyikhupeni bethu niyifaka esi sihlangu nayo mhlawumbi sakulunga

99 hayi okunene ke bathi hayi nkosi siyoyika ukukuxelela ngumntu lowo qha umdaka

100 wathi mkhupheni naye ulungile

101 hayi okunene bayivula ifatyi bamkupha

102 uthe akuba ephumile wathi sapha sisihlangu sam eso

103 wasifaka samlingana isihlangu

104 kwathiwa ke makakhe ahambe aphinde akunxibe eza mpahla wayezinxibile abuya nesihlangu sinye

105 wahamba ke waya kusinxiba esi sihlangu sinye

106 wabuya

107 uthe ke akuba efikile ke wabona tyhini nyani siso esi

108 adana amantombazana yiloo nto

109 yabe ke loo ntombazana ingumfazi wenkosi

110 phela ngantsomi

89 The child was taken and hidden.

90 She was put below a vat so that she would not be seen by the chief because she was dirty.

91 So then truly when she had been hidden,

92 the chief arrived.

93 On his arrival he said, "Everyone should try on this shoe and whoever it fits will be my wife."

94 So then it was tried on this one, but it didn't fit, and it was tried on the other, but it did not fit.

95 The girl turned below the vat.

96 The chief said, "What is this thing that appears to be turning below the vat?"

97 It was said, "No, it's a cat."

98 He said, "No, please take it out people, and try the shoe on it, perhaps it will fit."

99 So truly then they said, "No chief, we are frightened to say it's only a dirty person in there."

100 He said, "Take her out too. She is suitable."

101 So truly they opened the vat and took her out."

102 When she had come out she said, "Give here, that's my shoe."

103 She put it on and the shoe fitted her.

104 It was said that she should go and put on the clothes she was wearing again, and return with the other shoe.

105 She went to put on this other shoe.

106 She returned.

107 When she arrived he saw, "Goodness, truly that's the shoe!"

108 The girls were ashamed by this.

109 The girl then became the wife of the chief.

110 The **intsomi** is ended.

Text 2

1 kwathi ke kaloku ngantsomi

2 kwakukho umntwana ekwakusithiwa nguJon
nabanye abantwana bakokwabo

3 ke ngoku ke lo mntana wayengathandwa kokwabo
enikwa inkonzo zombona

4 ngoku lo mntana wasuka wayokulusa inkomo yakowabo

5 ithi le nkomo yakowabo ithi

6 Jon betha apha kum ephondweni

7 abethe

8 kuphume ukutya

9 atye

10 ahluthe

11 agoduke

12 anikwe ingqweqwe zesonka

13 angazifuni

14 kwathiwa makaye kujonga unomehlo-mane
ukuba utya ntoni phaya

15 wathi maze ndimtyobe

16 wamtyoba

17 alala la alala la angaphambili

18 avuka la ngemva

19 yath' inkomo

20 Jon betha apha kum ephondweni

21 wabetha kuye ephondweni

22 kwasuka kwaphum' ukutya

23 watya

24 wahlutha

25 wagoduka

Text 2-translation

1 Now for an intsomi.

2 There was a child called John,
And other children at his house.

3 So then this child was not liked at home,
being given maize cobs.

4 Now the child went to herd the household cow.

5 The household cow said,

6 "John, hit me here on my horn."

7 He hit,

8 some food came out,

9 he ate,

10 and was satisfied,

11 and went home.

12 He was given some bread crusts,

13 but he didn't want them.

14 It was said that Four-eyes should go and see
what he was eating there.

15 He said "Let me search for fleas."

16 He searched for his fleas.

17 His front eyes were asleep,

18 his back ones were awake.

19 The cow said,

20 "John, hit me here on the horn."

21 He hit it on the horn,

22 some food came out,

23 he ate,

24 and was satisfied,

25 and went home.

26 kwathi utya ntoni

27 wathi ndimbonile ubetha kuye ephondweni

28 ubetha inkomo- iphondo lenkomo

29 watya wahlutha

30 wathi la mama waphaya ndiyagula ndingathi ze ndiphilile

31 ndity' isibindi salaa nkomo

32 waphinda uJon waya kulusa

33 yathi le nkomo

34 Jon ndiza kubulawa uze uthi ke xa ndiza kuxhelwa ubambele apha ephondweni ndizakudlikidla ukhwele ngaphezulu ubaleke

35 wathi- wathi o

36 hayi ke bagoduka

37 kwathi iza kuxhelwa ngomhla othile

38 zafika bafika bezekuyixhela

39 bayibamba inkomo

40 ayabambeka

41 kwathiwa Jon mntana kowayo hamba oyibamba

42 wayibamba

43 yasuka yazidlikidla

44 wakhwela ngaphezulu

45 yabaleka

46 yemka

47 ayaphinda ibonwe

48 wayeka la mama ukugula

49 waphila akagula

50 ngoku ke wakha ivenkile kuloo mzi- kuloo ndawo akuyo

51 ngoku abantu bamane ukuya kuthenga kuyo

52 phela phela ngantsomi

26 It was said, "What is he eating?"

27 He said, "I saw him hitting it on the horn-

28 He hits the cow - the horn of the cow,

29 and eats and is satisfied.

30 The mother that was over there said, "I am ill. Perhaps to make me better.

31 I should eat the liver of that cow."

32 John went to herd again.

33 The cow said,

34 "John I am going to be killed. When I am to be slaughtered you must grab here on my horn and I will shake, you must climb above and run."

35 He said - He said, "Oh."

36 So then they went home.

37 When the cow was to be slaughtered on a certain day,

38 They arrived to slaughter it.

39 They caught the cow,

40 but it was not catchable.

41 It was said then, "John, child of home, go and catch it."

42 He caught it,

43 it shook itself,

44 he climbed above,

45 it ran,

46 and left,

47 and was never seen again.

48 That mother stopped being ill,

49 she became well and not sick.

50 So then she built a shop at that house, at the place where she was.

51 Now people always went to buy there.

52 The **intsomi** is ended.

Text 3

1 wathi umfazi ezimela

2 ngoku na ke udyakalashe wadibana naye esithubeni

3 uya phi mfazindini

4 hayi ndizimela indoda yam indibethile

5 wathi udyakalashe ubungamele kuzimela umele kukuhlala
kuba siza kuthethela

6 wahlala umfazi

7 ee wabona udyakalashe- udyakalashe- uHlanganyana lo uyandimosha

8 mandizimele kwakhona

9 wazimela wemka

10 kwahlwa wala endleleni

11 wabona umlilo

12 wawutsho emlilweni

13 wafika wa- wavula

14 wathi akuthi tyhini yinja le ilapha

15 wangena wotha

16 yathi inja ya ungene mfazi wam ngowam

17 hawu hawu phothula

18 wahamba umfazi waphothula

19 kuba uphothulela inja

20 ithe ungumfazi wam akusoze umke ekhaya apha

21 hawu hawu ndiphe amanzi

22 wasukuma wakha amanzi

23 hayi ke balala

24 ngoku na ke inja kuyasa kusasa iyahamba
iya kuzingela

25 umfazi ke ngoku kwewu kumele ukuba ndizimele apha

26 wazimela kwakhona

Text 3 translation

1 It happened that a woman was hiding herself.

2 Now then after a while Jackal met her,

3 "Where are you going, woman?"

4 "No, I'm hiding myself, my husband hit me."

5 Jackal said, "You should not have hidden youself, you should stay
because we will talk it out."

6 The woman stayed.

7 Oh she saw, "Jackal - Hlanganyana is messing me around.

8 I should hide myself again."

9 She hid herself and departed.

10 It became evening while she was on the road.

11 She saw a fire.

12 She went to the fire.

13 She arrived and opened the door.

14 She said, "My, it's a dog that's here."

15 She went in and warmed herself.

16 The dog said, "Yes, you have entered, my wife, you are mine.

17 Woof, woof go and grind."

18 The woman went to grind

19 Because she was grinding for a dog.

20 It said,"You're my wife. You will never leave from the house here.

21 Woof, woof, give me some water."

22 She stood up and drew water.

23 So then they slept.

24 Now then the next morning the dog travelled
and went to hunt.

25 The woman, now then, "Oh my, it's necessary that I hide myself here."

26 She hid herself again.

27 wemka

28 wala nxa esithubeni gqi

29 wabona ithuli eliza phaya kude

30 ithuli liqhumisa

31 wathi khwewu yiyo laa nja

32 wabaleka wephemphe wangena komnye umzi

33 yazula yazula yazula yazula

34 yaza kungena kulo mzi

35 hayi bo ayambona

36 yajika yagoduka

37 wemka waya kungena kowabo

38 wafika -okok- kwathiwa yintoni

39 hayi ndibethwe yindoda yam

40 hayi ke ibindibetha nje kuba andiyiphekelanga

41 into kuyo ke ngoku ndathi xa ndizimeleyo ndakudibana nenja

42 yathi ndingumfazi wayo

43 wathi ke ngoku na ke o

44 wafika umyeni ngaloo mini

45 wathi asakufika umyeni wathi

46 hayi hlawula

47 wayikhupha inkomo

48 umfazi akavuma ukugoduka

49 wathi into ebhethere enye kusuka ndibe ndakufrishwa yinja

50 wabaleka wazimela kowabo

51 kanti uya kulaa nja kuba laa nja iyasenga

52 inamasi

53 iinkomo zininzi apha

54 wapheka lo mfazi apha

27 She departed.

28 After a while, it appeared!

29 She saw a dust cloud that was over there

30 far away, a dust cloud swirling.

31 She said, "Oh my, that's that dog!"

32 She ran, and entered a house.

33 It peered around and around and around and around,

34 and came to enter this house,

35 but,no, it did not see her.

36 It turned and went home.

37 She departed, going to her family's place,

38 and she arrived, and it was said, "What happened?"

39 "No, I was beaten by my husband.

40 So then, he beat me just because I didn't cook for him.

41 It's only that now, while I was hiding, when I met a dog,

42 it said I was its wife."

43 They said then, "Oh."

44 Her husband arrived that day.

45 When her husband arrived he said,

46 "No, pay!"

47 He took out his cow.

48 The woman refused to go home.

49 She said, "It was a better thing when I was wooed by the dog."

50 She ran and hid from home.

51 Yet she went to the dog as the dog milked cows.

52 It had maas,

53 and many cows.

54 The woman cooked here,

55 kwala ukwahlukana kwabo

56 kanti uza kuzala izinja

57 ngoku na asakube ezele ezi zinja

58 aba bantwana bezinja ngoku baphingale kuye bekhale

59 ithi inja hawu hawu hawu ncancisa

60 wancancisa

61 wazimela wazishiya apho ezi zinja.

55 until their separation.

56 Yet she was to give birth to dogs.

57 Now having given birth to dogs,

58 The dog-children now surrounded her, crying.

59 The dog said, "Woof, woof, suckle!"

60 She suckled.

61 She hid herself and left the dogs there.

Text 4

1 kwathi ke kaloku ngantsomi

2 kwakukho omnye umama owayenamawele amabini

3 igama lakhe- yayintombi nenkwenkwe

4 igama lala mawele nguDema noDemazana

5 ngoku bathi bafuna ukuya kumalume wabo

6 bahamba

7 badibana ilitye elineentunjana ezimbini

8 lasuka lavuleka bangena kulo

9 bafika kukho itafile nebhedi

10 bafika kukho itafile nebhedi nengubo

11 kukho inyama -e- kukho inyama pha etafileni

12 bayithatha bayitya

13 ngoku banqena ukuya kwamalume wabo

14 basuka bahlala pha

15 uDema yena wayohamba aye kuzingela ashiye uDemazana endlini

16 athi xa ebuya
Demazana Demazana
yhoo ndivulele
mnta kamama mnta katata
litye nantunjana zimbini

17 livulele ilitye

18 angena

19 kwakusa waphinda waya

20 lafik' izim

21 lathi
Demazana Demazana
yhoo ndivulele
mnta kamama mnta katata
litye nantunjana zimbini

22 wathi ndiyakwazi ulizim andizi kuvula

Text 4 translation

1 Now for an intsomi.

2 There was a woman who had two twins.

3 Her name - they were a girl and a boy.

4 The names of these twins were Dema and Demazana.

5 Now they said they wanted to go to their uncle.

6 They travelled.

7 They came across a stone with two cracks.

8 It opened and they went inside.

9 They arrived, there being a table and a bed -

10 they arrived, there being a table, a bed and a blanket,

11 there being meat on the table.

12 They took it and ate it.

13 Now they felt too lazy to go to their uncle.

14 They just sat there.

15 As for Dema, he went to travel and went to hunt, and left Demazana in the house.

16 When he returned, (sings)
"Demazana, Demazana
Oh, open for me
Child of mother, child of father
Oh, stone of two small cracks."

17 The stone opened

18 and he went in.

19 The next morning he went again.

20 A **zim** arrived,

21 and said (sings in low gruff voice)
"Demazana, Demazana
Oh, open for me
Child of mother, child of father
Oh, stone of two small cracks."

22 She said, "I know you, you're a **zim**, I won't open!"

23 wa- lemka izim lacaphuka

24 laya egqirheni

25 lathi gqirha ndingenza njani zendibe nelizwi elincinci

26 lathi ke lona lola amazembe abe sixhenxe

27 uwoje abe bomvu

28 wawalola wawaginya wawaginya

29 aphumelele

30 ngoku ke lafika phaya

31 wathi
Demazana Demazana
yhoo ndivulele
mnta kamama mnta katata
litye nantunjana zimbini

32 lavuleka ilitye

33 wathi uDemazana uyinto yaphi

34 utsho ngamehlo amakhulu - amehlo abomvu

35 kutheni ungahlambi nje

36 wathi sukundibuza mntanam

37 wasuka wathi ndiphe ukutya

38 wa- ngoku umane elila uDemazana

39 wathatha ingxowa wagalela uthuthu

40 lathi izim heke so uzilungiselela

41 wa- wathi so ungena

42 wangena elila

43 le ngxowa kanti inemigrobo

44 wahamba wafika

45 ihamba ivuza ihamba ivuza

46 yafika emzini walo

47 wayibeka ngaphaya kwegayiti ingxowa

48 wafika uDemazana -uDema

23 The zim departed, annoyed.

24 He went to the doctor.

25 He said, "Doctor, how may I make my voice small?"

26 He said, "Sharpen seven axes,

27 and heat them till they are red."

28 He heated them and swallowed them and swallowed them and swallowed them and swallowed them.

29 They came out.

30 Now then he arrived there,

31 and said (sings now in normal pitch)
"Demazana, Demazana
Oh open for me
Child of mother, child of father
Oh, stone of two small cracks."

32 The stone opened.

33 Demazana said, "Where do you come from?"

34 She said with big eyes- red eyes.

35 "Why don't you wash?"

36 He said, "Don't ask me, my child."

37 He said, "Give me food."

38 Now Demazana wept.

39 She took a sack and poured ash into it.

40 The zim said, "Good, so you're preparing for yourself."

41 He said, "So, get in."

42 She went in, weeping.

43 However, this bag had little holes.

44 He went and arrived,

45 the bag travelling and leaking, travelling and leaking.

46 He arrived at his house.

47 He put the sack over at the gate.

48 Dema arrived.

49	wa- wacula	He sang,
50	akavulwa	but was not opened for.
51	wakhaba ucango	He kicked the door.
52	lavuleka	It opened.
53	wafika engekho	He arrived, she not being there.
54	wathatha induku yakhe	He took his stick
55	walandisela endlwini enomthuthu	and followed to the house which had the ash.
56	wahamba wafika	He travelled and arrived.
57	wathi Dema	He said, "Dema?"-
58	wathi Demazana	He said, "Demazana?"
59	wathi ke yena he	She said then, "Yes?"
60	wathi yiza ndikukhuphe	He said, "Come here, I will get you out."
61	wamkhupha	He got her out.
62	baya kuthatha ingxowa amazim	The zims went to take their sack,
63	acinga ukuba kukho umntu	thinking there was a person in it.
64	agalela embizeni	They poured it into a pot,
65	kanti embizeni akukho mntu	but in the pot there wasn't anyone.
66	aluthatha uthuthu ayakuluchitha	They took the ash and went to throw it away.
67	abantwana bona bayahamba	As for the children, they travelled,
68	baya kumalume wabo	going to their uncle.
69	umalume wabo wababiza	Their uncle called them.
70	phela phela ngantsomi	The intsomi is ended.

Text 5

1 kwathi ke kaloku ngantsomi
2 yaziintombi
3 zaya kukha imbola
4 yaziintombi zane
5 zahamba
6 xa zifikileyo ekukheni imbola
7 zafika zayikha zayikha
8 xa zibopha le mbola zahamba zagoduka
9 enye esithubeni
10 kanti ilebele umbhaco wayo
11 yathi kwenye intombazana ndikhaphe
12 ndiyothatha umbhaco wam ndiwulibele phezu komngxuma
13 ndincede mntakadadobawo
14 wathi ndakuba ndingumntakadadoboyihlo noba andiyanga
15 waphinda kwenye
16 wathi ndincede ndikhaphe
17 ndilibele umbhacho wam phezu komngxuma
18 ndincede mnt- ndincede mtana womnakwethu
19 wathi ndakuba ndingumntana womnakwethu-
20 ndakuba ndingumtana womnakwethu noba andiyanga
21 wathi ndincede mntakamama wamagqibilo ndikhaphe
22 ndiyothatha umbhaco wam
23 ndiwushiye phezu komngxuma
24 wathi ndakuba ndingumtana kamama noba andiyanga
25 wahamba wajika
26 xa efika phezu komngxuma

Text 5 translation

1 Now for an intsomi
2 There were some girls.
3 They went to collect clay.
4 There were four girls.
5 They travelled.
6 When they had arrived at the place of collecting clay,
7 they arrived and collected and collected.
8 When they had secured the clay, they travelled and went home.
9 One, after a while,
10 yet she had forgotten her skirt.
11 She said to one of the girls, "Accompany me.
12 I'm going to go and get my skirt. I forgot it above the hole.
13 Please, child of my father's sister."
14 She said, "Even though I'm the child of your father's sister, I'm not going."
15 She went to another
16 and said, "Please accompany me.
17 I forgot my skirt at the top of the hole.
18 Please, child of my brother."
19 She said, "Even though I'm your brother's child-
20 Even though I'm your brother's child, I'm not going."
21 She said, "Please, mother's last born child, accompany me.
22 I'm going to fetch my skirt.
23 I left it above the hole."
24 She said, "Even though I'm mother's child, I'm not going."
25 She travelled and turned.
26 When she arrived above the hole,

27 yafika kukho isilwanyana
28 sathi sondela
29 hayi wayoyika wancama washiya
30 waphinda wahamba ethwela umthwalo
31 kwahlwa esendleleni
32 kwala kumnyama
33 kwala xa -kwanti-
34 wabona umzi -okanyi-
35 unomlilwana omncinci
36 othi kanyi kanyi
37 wayofika
38 xa efika wankqonkqoza kulo mzi
39 wathi nkqo
40 kanti ngumzi wenja
41 yathi hawu hawu ngaphakathi
42 wangena
43 xa ehlala egumbini
44 le nja isuka ithi
45 hawu hawu ndiphothulele
46 athi yena zange ndiyiphothulele nja nasekhaya
47 ithi hawu hawu ndakutya
48 wahamba wancama waphotula
49 yavubisa inja
50 xa igqiba -i- xa igqiba ukuvubisa
51 yathi hawu hawu yiza uze kutya
52 wathi zange nditye nanja nasekhaya
53 yathi ndakutya
54 wancama waza kutya

27 she arrived and there was an animal.
28 It said, "Approach!"
29 No, she was scared, and gave up and left.
30 Again she travelled carrying a load.
31 It became dark while she was on the road.
32 While it was dark-
33 While-
34 She saw a house which-
35 which had a tiny little fire
36 flickering 'kanyi, kanyi'.
37 She went to arrive.
38 When she arrived, she knocked at the house,
39 she went 'knock'.
40 But it was the homestead of a dog.
41 It said, "Woof, woof come in!"
42 She went in.
43 While she was sitting in the room,
44 the dog said,
45 "Woof, woof, grind for me!"
46 She said, "I have never ground for a dog, even at home."
47 It said, "Woof, woof, I'll eat you!"
48 She travelled and despaired and ground.
49 The dog made porridge.
50 When it was finished making porridge,
51 it said, "Woof, woof, come, you must eat!"
52 She said, "I have never eaten with a dog, even at home."
53 It said, "I will eat you!"
54 She gave up and came to eat.

xa begqib'ukutya
yathi inja hawu hawu yizolala
wathi zange ndilale nanja nasekhaya
yathi hawu hawu ndakutya
wahamba waya kumbatha enjeni
kwakusa ngomso inja ivulele iinkomo
iyahamba iya kwalusa
uma ijonga le ntombazana
ezi nkomo ziihagu
yaziqhuba ke
yahamba yayokwalusa
yathi ke uzoph- uzopheka iinkobe uphothule
wavuma le ntombazana
kwaba mzuzu se iziphekile iinkobe apha eziko
yaxhwitha unwele
yalu- yalombela apha embundwini weziko
yathatha elinye inwele
yalibeka emva kwecango
yathatha elinye inwele
yalembela phantsi kweenkuni egoqhweni
ngoku yath- yathatha impahla yahamba yagoduka
nxa ibuya inja isiza neenkomo
ithi hawu hawu yiza nethunga
lithi eli nwele liseziko
ndisakhwezela
hawu hawu yiza nethunga
lithi eliya lisegoqhweni

When they had finished eating
the dog said, " Woof, woof, come and sleep!"
She said, "I've never slept with a dog, even at home."
It said, "Woof, woof, I'll eat you!"
She travelled and went to sleep with the dog.
Early next morning the dog released his cattle.
He was going to go and herd.
When the girl looked,
these cattle were pigs.
It drove them then.
It went to go and herd.
It said, "You must cook the maize you ground."
The girl agreed.
After a while, having cooked the maize here at the fire-place,
she pulled out a hair,
and hid it here in the hearth.
She took another hair,
and put it behind the door.
She took another hair,
and buried it under the wood-pile.
Now she took her possessions and travelled and went home.
When the dog came back with the cows,
it said, "Woof, woof, bring the pail!"
The hair at the fire-place said,
"I'm busy making a fire!"
"Woof, woof, bring the pail!"
The one at the wood-pile said,

82 ndisachola-chola
83 hawu hawu yiza nethunga
84 liyathetha inwele elisemva kwecango
85 lithi ndisaya emlanjeni
86 hayi ke akude kuphume mntu
87 wavalela iinkomo
88 wabheka endlini
89 uyathetha ke hawu hawu yiza nethunga
90 ndisachola-chola
91 kuthetha unwele oluphandle ezikweni
92 hawu hawu yiza nethunga
93 ndisakhwezela
94 kuthetha inwele liseziko
95 hawu hawu yiza nethunga
96 ndisemlanjeni
97 hayi wancama
98 wakufika pha akukho mntu
99 ngoku ulanda ekhondweni
100 ahambe ayilande intombazana
101 nxa efika ebukhweni
102 ufika ahlale phandle
103 xa ehleli phandle
104 athi ndifuna umkam
105 kweziwa neentombi zane zalapha zonke zone
106 kwathiwa ngowuphi
107 wathi ngulo
108 bathathwa ke basiwa kulaa ndlu
109 bancokola bancokola

82 I'm busy gathering!"
83 "Woof, woof, bring the pail!"
84 The hair behind the door spoke,
85 saying, "I'm busy going to the river."
86 So then at length, with no-one coming out,
87 it closed up the cattle
88 and went to the house.
89 It spoke then, "Woof, woof, bring the pail!"
90 "I'm busy gathering!"
91 spoke the hair outside, at the fire-place.
92 "Woof, woof, bring the pail!"
93 "I'm busy making a fire!"
94 Spoke the hair at the fire-place.
95 "Woof, woof, bring the pail!"
96 "I'm at that the river!"
97 Well, it gave up.
98 When it arrived there, there was no-one.
99 Now it followed the trail.
100 It travelled and followed the girl.
101 When it arrived at his in-laws,
102 It arrived and sat outside.
103 While it sat outside
104 it said, "I want my wife"
105 All those four girls here came.
106 It was said, "Which one is it?"
107 It said, "It's this one."
108 They were taken and taken to that house.
109 They chatted and chatted.

110 abanye bahamba baphuma washiywa nomkakhe

111 nxa ehleli umkakhe kanti

112 abanye naba phandle

113 kuse- kusesilapha isithunga

114 ku- kuzatshiswa le ndlu

115 ngokuba iboniwe yinja ayingomntu

116 kwasuka waphuma le ntombazana ngathi iyokuchama

117 kwalayithwa esi sithungu

118 yakhal' inja

119 yathi
hawu hawu ndatsha ebukhweni
hawu hawu ndatsha ebukhweni
hawu hawu ndatsha ebukhweni
hawu hawu ndatsha ebukhweni

120 phela phela ngantsomi

110 Some moved and went out and it was left with it's wife.

111 While his wife was staying yet

112 here are the others outside.

113 A torch was already there.

114 This house was to be burnt.

115 As it was seen that it was a dog, not a person.

116 The girl went out as if she was going to urinate.

117 The torch was lit.

118 The dog cried out

119 and said,
"Woof, woof, I'm burnt amongst the in-laws!
Woof, woof, I'm burnt amongst the in-laws!
Woof, woof, I'm burnt amongst the in-laws!
Woof, woof, I'm burnt amongst the in-laws!"

120 The **intsomi** is ended.

Text 6

1 M khandixelele ngefilm
2 B nge-
3 M ngefilm- ngebayiskopo
4 B phaya-
5 M ubonile ntoni phaya
6 B phay' ebe ibayiskopo
7 ndibona - e- ijoni liphethe umpu
8 yahamba lahamba
9 lithe lisahamba njalo
10 ladibana nomvundla
11 umvundla e-
12 lafika ijoni labuza kumvundla ukuba
13 khange liwubona na umvundla
14 umvundla lo nawo wayenxiba in- indevu
15 apha- apha in- e -m - apha phezu komlomo
16 wathi wabuza umvundla
17 unjani lo mvundla uwufunayo
18 lathi- lathi- k- la- lathi eli joni ukuphendula
19 ufana nawe
20 wathi umvundla
21 hayi zange ndilibone-
22 zange ndiwubone umvundla o- oneendevu
23 wathi le nto- umvundla kwakhona
24 hayi hamba
25 mhlawumbi uphazamile
26 hayi ke nejoni laqonda okokuba mhlawumbi limele ukuba liphazamile

Text 6 translation

1 M Please tell me about the film.
2 B About?
3 M About the film, about the bioscope.
4 B There-
5 M What did you see there?
6 B Over there there was a bioscope.
7 I saw a soldier carrying a gun.
8 He travelled and travelled.
9 While he was so travelling
10 he met a rabbit.
11 The rabbit-
12 The soldier arrived and asked the rabbit whether
13 he had seen a rabbit at all.
14 (The rabbit was wearing a beard
15 here above the mouth.)
16 The rabbit asked,
17 "What's this rabbit like that you're looking for?"
18 This soldier answered,
19 "He looks like you".
20 The rabbit said,
21 "No, I've never seen-
22 I've never seen a rabbit with a beard".
23 The rabbit said,
24 "No, go,
25 maybe you're confused".
26 So anyway even the soldier thought that maybe he was confused.

27		lahamba labuyela umva
28		lithe lisahamba njalo esithubeni
29		lafika laqonda no
30		laqonda hayi khona
31		ikhona into- ikhona into engahambanga kakuhle
32		laphinda labuyela pha kula mvundla
33		umvundla uthe wakubona ukuba o-
34		uza kuqondwa wabaleka e-
35	M	mm
36	B	e- (swallows)
37		uthe ke usabaleka njalo kwaf- kwafika omnye umntu
38		i- u- umvolufu u- u- kwafika omnye umntu
39		lo mntu lona
40		lo mvundla wakhwela apha entloko kulo mntu
41		wahamba nalo mntu lo
42		la- lamlandela eli joni
43		liphethe umpu
44		lilandela lo mntu
45		umvundla ukhwela apha entloko kulo mntu
46		phezu kwamagxa kulo mntu lo e-
47		eli joni ngoku lathatha intambo ende
48		laye- layenz-
49		lenza isangqa okokuba liza kukwazi ukurhintyela um- umvundla entanyeni
50		-lo mntu
51		hayi ke lalandela
52		lijiwuze lajiwuza ng- ngesandla (laughs)
53		layirhintyela entanyeni umvundla

27		He travelled, returning back.
28		While he so travelled for a while,
29		he suddenly thought that
30		"No", he thought, "Oh no,
31		There's something fishy here".
32		He again returned there to that rabbit.
33		When the rabbit saw that
34		he was to be recognized, he ran away.
35	M	mm
36	B	um- (swallows)
37		While he was so running another person arrived-
38		the wolf- another person arrived.
39		This person-
40		The rabbit climbed here on the head of this person.
41		He travelled with this person.
42		This soldier followed them
43		carrying a gun,
44		following this person.
45		The rabbit climbed here above-
46		above the shoulders of this person.
47		This soldier now took a long rope
48		and made-
49		and made a noose so that he would be able to lassoo the rabbit at the neck
50		did this person.
51		Anyway he followed.
52		He swung with his hand.
53		He caught the rabbit at the neck

ephezu kwaso amagxa alo mntu lambamba
ngoku ke into eyenzekeleyo
lo mntu lo uthe akubona ukuba umvundla ukuba uya-
uyatsalwa yile ntambo
wambamba umvundla apha e- e- em- ezinyaweni
kuba engafuni ukuphuncukana nawo umvundla
labe ela joni liwufuna umvundla
latsala ngapha eli joni wabe
nalo mntu etsala ngapha umvundla
ngoku ke kucaca ukuba ngoku umvundla uza kufa
wakhala umvundla
wathi he niyandibulala
hayi ke bagqiba into yokuba
mamenz- mabenze- i- maba- mabatshintshisane
omnye anike i- umpu
omnye anike umpu omnye uza kufumana umvundla
hayi ke u- u- le nto umvolofu wafumana umpu
u- u- umvundla wafu- u- u- om- ijoni eli lafumana-
ijoni eli lafumana umvundla lo
lo mvundla beliwufumana
um- um- umntu lo wafumana o umpu
emva koko ke ngoku a-
uthe wakuba efumene umpu la mntu abuza okukuba i-
umpu u- unazo na iimbumbulu
lathi ijoni bendikuxelele ukuba unazo iimbumbulu
lazama ukudubula
wawudubula umpu
wathi bendixelele ukuba unazo iimbumbulu

who was above the shoulders of this person.
now then, what was done,
this person, when he saw that the rabbit
was pulled by this rope,
he caught the rabbit here on the feet,
because he didn't want to part with the rabbit,
and the soldier wanted the rabbit.
He pulled there did that soldier,
and that person pulled there on the rabbit.
Anyway, it was clear now that the rabbit was going to die.
The rabbit cried out.
He said, "Hey, you're killing me!"
Anyway, they decided that
they should swop-
the one getting the gun-
the one getting the gun, the other going to get the rabbit.
Anyway, this thing, the wolf, got the gun-
the rabbit- the soldier got-
the soldier got the rabbit,
he got the rabbit,
this person got the gun.
So then afterwards,
when he got the gun the person asked whether
the gun had any bullets.
The soldier said, "I told you that it had bullets".
He tried to shoot.
The gun shot.
He said, "I told you it had bullets".

82 emva koko badubulana e-

83 M kwenzeke ntoni

84 B emva koko umvundla wabaleka

85 wathi zange abone umvolofu aqhathiwe ngumvundla

82 Afterwards they shot each other-

83 M What happened?

84 B Afterwards the rabbit ran away.

85 He said never had he seen a wolf fooled by a rabbit.

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