

TR 26-34

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
MANIFESTATIONS OF ONTIC CONSCIENCE AS DERIVED
FROM HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF THAT
PHENOMENON

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A thesis submitted in
fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts
in Psychology, Rhodes University

Grahamstown

February 1985

...In order to arrive there,
To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not,
 You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy.
In order to arrive at what you do not know
 You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance.
In order to possess what you do not possess
 You must go by the way of dispossession.
In order to arrive at what you are not
 You must go through the way in which you are not.
And what you do not know is the only thing you know
And what you own is what you do not own
And where you are is where you are not.

T. S. Eliot*

*"East Coker" (lines
135-146) of Four Quartets

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank:

Professor Dreyer Kruger for acting as my supervisor and more especially for introducing me to phenomenology.

The people who willingly took part as subjects in this research.

Dave Taylor, Cally Parker and Jenni Allen for their assistance in proof-reading.

Pam McKenzie for typing this thesis.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study was to investigate ontic conscience, as derived from Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience, as it is lived in concrete experience. Having established, through a close examination of Heidegger's writings on conscience, a question which would elicit actual experience of this phenomenon, the researcher collected sixty-four written accounts of these experiences. Of these he chose the four psychologically richest accounts and, having interviewed each of these four subjects on his situated experience, analysed in detail (using the phenomenological method) the resulting protocols comprising the written accounts and interviews. He then explicated the structure of conscience within its context of authenticity and inauthenticity. The context of conscience was discovered to be such that the person, having surrendered himself to others' experience and expectations of him, lives a pretence in the service of (inauthentically) being-for-others. He loses his sense of (bodily) self in the process, and it is at this point of his living at the extremes of inauthenticity, that he is forced to realise his own (authentic) reality which he has hitherto been concealing both from himself and from others. His primary attunement is reflected in feelings of betrayal, guilt, shame, dread and ambivalence. Through openly and resolutely living his authentic experience, he heals the rupture in his existence between what is revealed (his being-for-others) and what is concealed (his authentic experience), and feels liberated in so doing. This structure of conscience was dialogued with the writings of existential and psychoanalytic philosophers and psychologists in the context of discussing particular areas of psychological significance such as self, others, meaning, awareness and psychotherapy.

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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aims

In the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the most consistent goal of which was to establish a fundamental ontology, the ontological is inextricably bound to the ontic; every ontological notion is rooted in corresponding ontic experience. As Mehta (1976) says:

"In Being and Time, Heidegger proceeds from the phenomenal and the 'existenziell' to the phenomenological and the 'existenzial', from the facts of experience to the disclosure of the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, from the 'ontic' to the 'ontological'" (p. 40).

Accordingly, Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience must have as its basis certain corresponding ontic experiences. It is the primary aim of this study to arrive at these concrete experiences that might reveal ontically the implicit presence of conscience as ontological, and to analyse these experiences phenomenologically from a psychological perspective so as to bring to light their basic structure. It is hoped that through this exercise, the psychological meaning of this particular phenomenon of conscience will become manifest.

It should be stressed that this is not a study of conscience in general, but explicitly of Heidegger's particular view of conscience. This is an important point since Heidegger's definitions of conscience, as he himself admits "...cannot be brought into harmony at once with the ordinary interpretation. Indeed, they seem to be in direct conflict

with it" (Heidegger, 1980, p.289)¹. Furthermore, the present study should in no way be regarded as an empirical "testing" of the validity of Heidegger's claims concerning conscience at the ontic level: his philosophy has brought this phenomenon to light in a most original way, and will be taken as the point of departure for a psychological investigation of the phenomenon. What emerges from the present empirical analysis of conscience² will be dialogued with Heidegger's ontological claims concerning conscience, but there is no intention to prove or disprove his claims.

It is believed that a study of conscience as the phenomenon that appears at the interface between being-inauthentic and being-authentic (as will be clarified later), would be a valuable undertaking, especially in view of the fact that this area has received very little, if any, attention in psychological research. In the current edition of the Thesaurus of Psychological Index Terms (1977) of Psychological Abstracts, the terms "authentic"/"inauthentic" do not even appear, and under the heading "Conscience" one finds "Psychoanalytic Personality Factors" and "Superego", which suggests that this extremely complex phenomenon has been reduced to the limited interpretation provided by a particular paradigm (viz. that of psychoanalysis). It is hoped that this study might elucidate (more primordial and fundamental) dimensions of conscience

¹Page references to Being and Time indicate the pagination of the later German editions, as shown in the outer margins of the text cited.

²Henceforth "conscience" should be understood to mean Heidegger's view of conscience specifically, unless otherwise stated or implied by the context in which it appears.

which have thus far largely been neglected by contemporary psychology.

1.2 Rationale

What follows might appear to be too condensed and not immediately clear, but will become more comprehensible when seen in the light of the section on Heidegger appearing in the literature review. Much detail has been omitted here so as to avoid undue overlap between this section and the next.

As has already been noted, Heidegger's (ontological) interpretation of conscience does not coincide with the ordinary everyday interpretation of it. He considers the ordinary interpretation to be "ontologically suspect" in principle, since, insofar as everyday Dasein is inauthentic, its understanding of conscience is bound also to be inauthentic; its characterisation of conscience will adhere to what "they" know as the conscience. As Heidegger (1980) puts it:

"If indeed Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of that with which it concerns itself, and if it interprets all its ways of behaving as concern, then will not there be falling and concealment in its interpretation of that very way of its Being which, as a call, seeks to bring it back from its lostness in the concerns of the 'they'?" (p.289).

Although on page 281 of the same work, he concedes that "whatever the ways in which conscience is experienced or interpreted, all our experiences 'agree' on this 'Guilty!'" (i.e. all experiences of conscience point to one's being-guilty), the existential (as distinct from existentiell) conception of this Being-guilty differs from the everyday conception.

Whereas in the everyday conception, which is regarded as being derived from the existential sense of "Being-guilty", guilt is regarded as "an indebtedness which has 'arisen' through some deed done or left undone" (ibid., p.287), existentially (ontologically) speaking, Dasein is guilty regardless of its acts and/or omissions; "Dasein as such is guilty" (ibid., p.285). Dasein is guilty in the very basis of its being in that it is the basis of a lack or nullity (and hence is indebted) both in its thrownness and in its projection¹. This might be understood in existentiell (ontic) terms as follows: in my thrownness, as a male born in South Africa, I am the basis of a lack insofar as I cannot simultaneously be a female born in France; in my projection, in choosing to become a psychologist I am the basis of a lack in that I thereby exclude the possibility of being something which is incompatible with being a psychologist.

This primordial Being-guilty "remains proximally and for the most part undisclosed", it is "kept closed off by Dasein's falling Being", and "Being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about it" (ibid., p.286, original emphasis). Indeed, conscience, insofar as it is that which calls Dasein back from its lostness in the "they" to its fundamental Being-guilty, is possible only because Dasein closes itself off from itself as Being-guilty in the first place.

It is not only the case that Dasein, in its everydayness, is shut off

¹ Guilt as referring to a lack or owing is better reflected in the German, where Schuld means "indebtedness" among other things (see footnote 1 in Heidegger, 1980, p.280).

from the ontological level of Being, but also that "to Dasein the primordially appropriate ontological way of formulating questions remains alien" (ibid., p. 281). If our goal is to understand guilt (and hence conscience) at the ontological level, then

"...the idea of 'Guilty!' must be sufficiently formalised so that those ordinary phenomena of 'guilt' which are related to our concernful Being with Others, will drop out. The idea of guilt must not only be raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must also be detached from relationship to any law or ought such that by failing to comply to it one loads himself with guilt" (ibid., p. 283).

Since it is the explicit aim of this study to disclose conscience as it is ontologically understood, it is necessary to formulate a research question which bypasses the everyday "fallen" interpretation of conscience, and which yields descriptions of conscience (and guilt) which are ontologically more revealing. It is here that the present study differs significantly from that of Brooke (1983) on being-guilty. His research question asked subjects to describe ordinary, everyday experiences of guilt (Brooke, 1983, p. 80). Hence at the level of the naive description (raw data) in his research, he had access only to the fallen, non-ontological interpretation of guilt. Consequently, any claims he makes about ontological guilt (and he does make such claims), are unlikely to have emerged too readily from the protocols themselves. Ontological themes of guilt, if in evidence at all, are likely to be only deeply implicit in such descriptions, and claims concerning such themes are likely to be informed more by existential/phenomenological literature than by the protocols themselves. The intent of the above is not to criticise

Brooke's findings per se, but merely to point out that, owing to his point of departure (his research question), he has not fully addressed the ontological interpretation of guilt and conscience.

What follows is the rationale in support of the particular research question to be implemented in this study.

For Heidegger, conscience is the call back to its own self of the authentic self to the inauthentic self, or the "they" self, that is caught up in the world. It follows, therefore, that no call of conscience can be experienced unless one is being inauthentic, for without one's being inauthentic there would be no "lostness in the 'they'" (Heidegger, 1980, p.307) from which one might call oneself back to being oneself authentically. Heidegger acknowledges this when he says: "The 'good' conscience is neither a self-subsistent form of conscience, nor a founded form of conscience; in short, it is not a conscience-phenomenon at all" (ibid., p. 292). Although we might talk about "good" conscience¹, it is never experienced as such; "good" conscience is not a phenomenon. So long as one is being authentic (and thus, presumably, living in "good" conscience), one does not experience conscience at all; the experience of conscience is reserved for those moments when one is steeped most deeply in being inauthentic. It should be noted that the terms "authentic" and "inauthentic" are not used in a loose sense by Heidegger:

¹It should be noted that in everyday terms we might speak of "good conscience" but not in Heidegger's (ontological) terms. Man (Dasein) is guilty as such, even when he is being authentic; he simply owns his guilt in authenticity.

"...these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense" (ibid., p. 43). The term "authentic" is a translation of the German eigentlich which contains the root eigen meaning "own", as in "my own" (Gelven, 1970, p. 161). So when we speak of "authentic" selfhood or "authentic" existence, we mean that self or existence which is uniquely my own. So if one wants a description of a person's in-authentic-being (in which conscience is most likely to be experienced), one needs to ask him to describe a situation in which he failed to appropriate or live out that experience or self which was uniquely his own. Experience, self and world (situation) are inseparable: experience is always grounded in a particular situation (i.e. in-the-world), and the self which experiences is always in-the-world. As Heidegger (1980) says, "in saying 'I' Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world" (p. 321). Furthermore, the self does not understand itself in terms of an isolated subjectivity which needs to be introspected for there to be self-understanding, but rather "has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the 'world' with which it is concerned" (ibid., p. 321). As Van den Berg (presumably following Heidegger's thought) has observed, the psychologist "...gains knowledge of the subject by inquiring about his objects, about the solid, real things of the world" (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 39). So if we wish to understand a person (the person's self) either in his being-authentic or being-inauthentic, we need to look to his world, how the world appears to him. "Our world is our home, a realisation of subjectivity" (ibid., p. 40). We do not ask him to describe himself.

Taking the above into account, then, the following was formulated as the question which might best elicit experiences of conscience:

"Describe as concretely and accurately as possible, a situation in which you felt you were not being true to yourself."

The subject is asked to describe a situation (not himself) since pre-reflectively one lives situations, and is never directly present to oneself but only silently present to oneself in one's presence to the world. The request for concreteness in the description emphasises this point. This way of phrasing the question might then yield a description which is suitably naive for phenomenological analysis.

The specific meaning intended by Heidegger in his use of the term "inauthentic" is translated into everyday language in terms of "not being true to oneself".

The present study, then, in view of the meaning and context of the conscience in the philosophy of Heidegger, will have more to say about inauthentic existence and its modification into authentic existence, than about guilt as it is experienced and interpreted in everyday life.

CHAPTER 2

2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In that this thesis is a study of conscience explicitly in relation to Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience, the review which follows will be of literature which has bearing on this particular conception. Some of the authors represented here (e.g. Laing) may not refer to "conscience" as such in their writings, as "conscience" as commonly conceived in contemporary psychology approximates more closely the Freudian conception of "superego" than it does Heidegger's view. However, once the meaning of Heidegger's conception of this phenomenon has been grasped, it should become clear how the writings of these other authors have a bearing on conscience at the level of structure.

2.1 Historical origins

"Conscience", as "a fundamental anthropological fact transcending all empirical psychology" (Zwi Werblowsky, 1970, p. 83), appears in our linguistic usage as a translation of the classical terms syneidēsis, conscientia. The original meaning of "conscience" is primarily a "knowing-with": the Greek syneidēsis literally means "the self knowing with or observing itself" (Bromley, 1979, p. 762); the Latin conscientia is derived from con meaning "with", and "scire", meaning "to know". Hence "conscience" and "consciousness" ("con-scious-ness") both derive from the same root. So what is basic and fundamental to conscience is not morality but self-awareness. Consciousness has been defined in terms of an awareness of being aware: animals are aware, but only man, being conscious (knowing-with), is aware that he is aware. Whatever

man knows or experiences, it is always "with": his "naturalness" and "immediacy" are destroyed through his being conscious. Man is aware of that awareness which he is, and he is never more aware of this awareness than in conscience. As Smith (1934) has it, "if consciousness normally represents a cleavage of nature, then conscience represents a further crack in what is cleft" (p.20).

Since Heidegger's task was to establish a fundamental ontology, it should not be surprising to find that his interpretation of conscience should hail back to conscience as it originally came into being. And, indeed, his interpretation reflects conscience as originally understood in at least two important respects:

1. conscience is not concerned primarily with the moral evaluation of particular actions; it is more concerned with life/existence as it is lived as a whole;
2. conscience is concerned with the relationship of the self to itself: in the original conception conscience (syneidēsis) is the self knowing with or observing itself; for Heidegger conscience is the call of the authentic self to the inauthentic ("they") self.

So although Heidegger's conception of conscience might seem idiosyncratic in view of contemporary understanding (of conscience as superego), it is not cut off from the roots of conscience as such.

The following quotation from Jaspers reflects points 1 and 2 above and hints at Heidegger's view of conscience:

"Conscience gives me detachment from myself. I am not subjected to myself as to a being-in-the-world that is given and merely enacted. I act upon myself and out of my being-in-the-world produce what I am, so far as lies within my power. Between my being-in-the-world and my being authentically myself, not yet revealed to me, is interposed the reality of conscience, through which I must acknowledge or reject what for me should become being" (cited in Zwi Werblowsky, 1970, p.86).

2.2 Heidegger

Heidegger's view of the nature of conscience cannot be considered apart from his descriptions of inauthentic and authentic modes of being and the distinction he draws between the two. What also needs to be considered is resoluteness, as used by Heidegger to describe that authentic existence which is attested to by the will to have a conscience.

What follows, then, will be an explication of:

- a) the inauthentic and authentic modes of being, each in terms of its corresponding existentiell (ontic) variations of the fundamental existential (ontological) constitution of the "there" of Dasein ("Being-there"). The inauthentic mode will be described in some detail: firstly, because it is out of this mode of being that conscience arises, and secondly, since Heidegger's observations in this area at the ontic level, are a source of rich psychological insight;

- b) the conscience as a call from the authentic self to the inauthentic self immersed in the "they";
- c) resoluteness as a description of authentic existence.

It seems appropriate, however, to begin with a brief note on the existential constitution of the "there", as the background against which inauthentic and authentic being will be seen.

The explication which follows stems primarily from Heidegger's Being and Time (1980), in dialogue with an extensive consultation of the following secondary sources: Gelven (1970), Langan (1959), le Fevre (1962), Macquarrie (1968) and Mehta (1976).

2.2.1 The existential constitution of the "there"

Human existence, or Dasein, is essentially an openness to the world, the "there" of Being. Man is not an encapsulated subjectivity but a being-in-the-world. It is through Dasein that the world is disclosed, and "Dasein is its disclosedness" (Heidegger, 1980, p.133). If Dasein is its openness, its "there", then it is important to clarify the way in which this "there" is constituted existentially.

Dasein is its "there" (also referred to as "being-in", "standing-in" and "openness") in three constituent ways, each of these ways being equally primary. These are state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen) and discourse (Rede).

The ontological term Befindlichkeit (which, when translated more literally and accurately, means "the state in which one may be found"), refers to something which is ontically a matter of common experience: our current moods, feelings and the various ways in which we are attuned to our environment. State-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) refers to the fact that Dasein is always already-in-a-world (Macquarrie, 1968, p. 27). We are always in a particular mood, in one mood or another; the world always appears to us in one way or another. Although my mood might change from being joyful to being fearful, that I am in a mood cannot be denied. The world always appears to me in a certain way, and no matter how my life might unfold, it can do so only on the basis of how I find myself at present. Associated with state-of-mind are thrownness and facticity, which will not be dealt with separately here.

Equally original with state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) in Dasein's disclosedness is understanding (Verstehen). In this existential sense, understanding does not refer to the mind's cognitive activities. Understanding cannot be restricted to a specific function of the mind, a function among other functions; it reveals the manner in which Dasein exists (ex-sistere - "to stand out"). If a man understands in Heidegger's sense, this means that he comprehends his being in terms of possibilities; he realises that he is what he can be, and how he actualises his possibilities. Man is not closed in on himself and so defined once and for all. We are what we are not (viz. our possibilities - as Heidegger (1980, p. 145) says "... (Dasein) is existentially that

which, in its potentiality-for-being, it is not yet"), and we are not what we are (i.e. insofar as we are always open to the future, our being cannot be restricted to and defined in terms of how we are in the present exclusively, as this disregards how we will be). As Heidegger (1980) has it, "...Dasein is constantly 'more' than it factually is, supposing that one might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its Being, and supposing that one were able to do so" (p. 145). This is so because understanding, as a fundamental mode of Being of Dasein, has the structure of what Heidegger calls a "project" (Entwurf). Understanding always presses forward into possibilities because of its structure as projection. However, the projective character of understanding is not such that the possibilities, in view of which Dasein does the projecting, are grasped thematically as so many already thought out plans of action towards which Dasein comports itself. This would deny these possibilities as possibilities, turning them into something given. On the contrary, as projecting "...understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities" (Heidegger, 1980, p. 145). Moreover, having possibilities or potentiality-for-being is an essential characteristic of Dasein, inescapable as part of its facticity. So although Dasein is more than what it factually is (as its ontical present-at-hand existence), it is never more than what it factically is (as its ontological existence). Expressed more simply, this means that I am more in terms of my possibilities than I am in terms of my actuality.

In Verstehen Dasein is revealed as constantly becoming and never being

fixed (cf Marcel's (1951) concept, in his book by the same name, of homo viator, "man on the way"). In this sense, Dasein is always ahead-of-itself in that it has always already projected itself into some possibility of its Being (cf Sartre's view of man as being condemned to be free and to choose, and as being nothing else but that which he makes of himself. See Kaufmann, 1956, p. 291).

Equiprimordial, once again, with state-of-mind and understanding, is discourse (Rede) as the third existentials that is fundamental to the openness of Dasein's being-in-the-world. State-of-mind and understanding are brought together in discourse in that the attuned comprehension of being-in-the-world expresses itself as discourse or speech. In Heidegger's (1980) words: "The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world - an intelligibility that goes with a state-of-mind - expresses itself as discourse" (p. 161). In being-in we are engaged in a spelling-out. Discursing or talking must be understood in terms of our being-with-one-another. Furthermore, as Heidegger (1980) puts it,

"communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated" (p. 162).

Although discourse has expression in language, hearing and keeping silent are also possibilities belonging to discursive speech. Human

communication is the give-and-take of actual talking (discourse), and this give-and-take entails both listening and keeping silent. We never first hear pure sounds or words as such; if someone speaks to us we hear his message, and not his words as such. The message is phenomenally more primary than the words. What we hear is "...the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling" (ibid., p.164); to hear the pure noise produced here would require an extremely artificial frame of mind. There is always an understanding to our hearing, and Heidegger refers to this hearing with understanding as "hearkening". "Being-with develops in listening to one another..." (ibid., p.163); if I listen to you I begin to share your world. Silence as a possibility of speech also has its basis in understanding: "In talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can 'make one understand'...more authentically than the person who is never short of words" (ibid., p.164). More will be said about keeping silent later in the section on conscience.

The above does not pretend to be an exhaustive exposition of the modes of Dasein's being-in, but merely highlights those aspects of these modes which will feature most prominently in the explication of inauthentic and authentic being associated with conscience.

2.2.2 Inauthentic being

Heidegger is concerned with ascertaining the self of everyday Dasein. After stating that the "assertion that it is I who in each case Dasein is, is ontically obvious" (ibid., p.115), he goes on to question this: "it could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein just is not the 'I myself'"

(ibid., p.115). It may transpire that in the very constitution of man, as being-in-the-world, there is some basis for the fact that he is first and foremost not his own self. There is no such thing as a pure subject without a world, and "...an isolated 'I' without others is just as far from being proximally given" (ibid., p.116). The "I" is always worlded, and it is always in-the-world along with others. To understand the self, then, we need to look to the self as worlded-with-others.

Being an essential characteristic of Dasein, the "I" or self must be interpreted existentially: the self cannot be seen as some-thing given or present-at-hand, as the traditional view would have it; "...man's 'substance' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence" (ibid., p.117).

If the self is defined as a way of existing, then what is the "way of existing" of everyday Dasein? This way of existing is to be caught up in the world with (and as interpreted by) others, and hence the self or "who" of everyday Dasein is not "I myself", but the anonymous "they-self", or to use Mehta's term, "oneself" (Mehta, 1976, p.221). In losing itself in the "they" (das Man), Dasein relieves itself of the burden of authentically choosing the possibilities and potentialities of its own being, and gives itself over to the already understood and interpreted world of the "they". So, for example, if at the beginning of this century a woman with an aptitude for medicine wished to become a doctor, she might not do so, since in terms of the "they", as a woman "one" does not aspire to "male professions". As a result of its

lostness, then, "...Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity" (Heidegger, 1980, p. 268). One should bear in mind once again that, throughout, "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" are used in a terminologically strict sense: "authentic" refers to that which I have appropriated as my own; "inauthentic" refers to that which I have failed to appropriate, or that which I have surrendered. It is clear, then, that the self of everyday Dasein, in giving itself over to the "they", is the inauthentic self, the they-self. Dasein, for for most part, exists inauthentically.

We now turn to the three constituent modes of Dasein's openness in being inauthentic. These are described as idle talk, or chatter (Gerede), corresponding to the existentials of discourse; curiosity (Neugier), corresponding to the existentials of understanding; and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit), corresponding to the existentials of state-of-mind. It should be noted that Heidegger's interpretation of everyday (inauthentic) being "...is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations of a 'philosophy of culture'" (ibid., p. 167).

The terms "idle talk" or "chatter" are used by Heidegger in a neutral, nonderogatory sense, and denote the mode of interpreting and understanding characterising Dasein in everyday life. Man's average (everyday) talk (discourse) is expressed by being spoken out, and hence is language. Language, furthermore, as an already established (though constantly developing) system of meanings, always implies a certain understanding and interpretation of existence: the Chinese language

embodies an ontology and interpretation of existence which differs from that embodied by the English language. So there is implicit in language a way in which the understanding of Dasein has already been interpreted, and for the most part, "...Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of state-of-mind belonging to it" (ibid., p.167). Mehta (1976) reflects Heidegger's understanding of language well when he writes:

"Language as a repository of understandings (that is, meanings) contains within it the deposit of the already attained disclosure of essents and comprehension of Being which we inherit and thus also the possibilities available and the horizons open for further interpretation and conceptual articulation" (p.169).

However, it is precisely because there resides in language this "average intelligibility", that the hearer can have some (second-hand and closed-off) understanding of what is talked about without attaining the primordial understanding which attends participating in a basic relationship to the being of the things talked about. In chatter, as Heidegger (1980) puts it, we "...do not so much understand the entities which are talked about; we already are listening to what is said-in-the-talk as such" (p.168). So, with the shift of emphasis from what is spoken about to the language as such, speech becomes an end in itself, and diction, pronunciation and speaking style become the criteria relevant to determining its genuineness. What is said-in-the-talk gains a broad exposure through gossiping and "passing the word along", and assumes an authoritative character. Ultimately, "things are so

because one says so" (ibid., p.168), and idle talk ends up lacking entirely any ground or basis. Idle talk is "...the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own", and "...serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up the entities within-the-world" (ibid., p.169). Thus idle talk serves to conceal possibilities rather than to reveal them. In his everyday living man cannot help but be influenced by the world-as-already-interpreted that is reflected in idle talk. The possibilities of his attuned disposition, the way he "sees" things, are prescribed by the "they" in idle talk. The average ways in which things have been interpreted by the "they" are characterised by obviousness and self-assurance. So although one might expect "...the particular Dasein, (which) drifts along towards an ever-increasing groundlessness, as it floats..." (ibid., p. 170) in its uprooted understanding imparted by idle talk to experience a certain uncanniness, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it, so long as it remains under the "protecting shelter" of the "they".

The second characteristic of Dasein's everyday (inauthentic) mode of being is curiosity (Neugier), which corresponds to the existentials of understanding. Heidegger describes curiosity in terms of the phenomenon of "sight" which is intimately linked with Dasein's openness. "Seeing" or "sight" are used here not in the narrow sense of referring exclusively to visual perception, but in the broader sense to denote knowing or understanding. This usage has its roots in Greek philosophy (as evidenced in the epistemology of Parmenides and in Aristotle's

Metaphysics) and is still evident in our everyday discourse when we might say "I see" to mean "I understand". As being-in-the-world, man is absorbed in the world of concern, and this concern is guided by circumspection which discovers the ready-to-hand as man is involved in his work or whatever else he might be attending to. When he takes a break from his work, his preoccupation with the ready-to-hand may come to rest such that his circumspection is set free. His circumspect look is free to wander from that which is closest to him (his work) to the distant and unknown world, and so to explore the possibilities of seeing just what the world looks like. However, in curiosity or inquisitiveness, when circumspection has been set free in this manner, there is no concern for truly understanding what is seen; in this mode man concerns himself only with seeing as such. In curiosity there is very little commitment to or involvement in what is encountered; one is concerned only with the superficial "look" of things. Curiosity flits from one novelty to the next, and, in Heidegger's words,

"...curiosity is characterised by a specific way of not tarrying alongside what is closest. Consequently it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness, and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction" (ibid., p. 172).

Finally, founded on the not tarrying in the environment of one's concern and being constantly distracted by new possibilities, which are properties constitutive of curiosity, is the third essential characteristic of curiosity, viz. the character of "never dwelling anywhere". Curiosity is abodeless. As Heidegger puts it, curiosity "...is everywhere and

nowhere" and, as a mode of being-in-the-world, "...reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein - a kind in which Dasein is constantly up-rooting itself" (ibid., p. 173). Idle talk and curiosity, the two everyday modes of discourse and sight respectively, function together. Idle talk encourages curiosity, and curiosity promotes idle talk, so each drags the other along with itself. Neither idle talk nor curiosity is limited in its scope, and together they give to Dasein the impression of a "full life". In Heidegger's words:

"Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves (that is, the Dasein which is in this manner) with the guarantee of a 'life' which, supposedly, is genuinely 'lively'" (ibid., p. 173).

This brings us to the final characteristic of Dasein's openness in inauthenticity, namely ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit), which corresponds to the existentials of state-of-mind. In our everyday being-with-one-another where everyone has access to all things (through curiosity) and can say what he likes about them (in idle talk), it becomes impossible to distinguish between what is disclosed in genuine comprehension and what is not. Consequently, the way in which one finds oneself (Befindlichkeit) is in a state of ambiguity. This ambiguity does not merely apply to the world, but extends also to our being-together-with others and envelops the way each of us understands himself. Dasein is always ambiguously "there" in the openness of public togetherness, "...where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 'things moving', where, in an everyday manner, everything (and at

bottom nothing) is happening" (ibid., p. 174). Heidegger provides a masterful description of this ambiguity as it pervades man's relationships with others when he writes:

"Everyone keeps his eye on the Other first and next, watching how he will comport himself and what he will say in reply. Being-with-one-another in the 'they' is by no means an indifferent side-by-side-ness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of 'for-one-another', an 'against-one-another' is in play" (ibid., p. 175).

This description seems to typify, if in an exaggerated way, the sort of ambiguous spying on each other and furtive mutual overhearing which characterises everyday relating in which each person is concerned with not stepping out of line with the others.

When taken together, the three characteristics of the openness of everyday Dasein described above constitute what Heidegger calls the "falling" or "fallenness" of Dasein. As he puts it, "'fallenness' into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity" (ibid., p. 175). This mode of being (i.e. inauthenticity), should not be seen in negative terms as a being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to "...a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world - the kind which is completely fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein-with of Others in the 'they'" (ibid., p. 176). Not-being-its-self functions as a positive possibility of Dasein which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. Dasein has fallen for the world which belongs to Dasein's being as being-

in-the-world. Fallenness is characterised by the phenomena of temptation, tranquillizing, alienation and self-entangling. Through idle talk and the way things have been publicly interpreted, man offers to himself the possibility of losing himself in the "they", and thus constantly brings upon himself the temptation of falling. Fallenness is a kind of tranquillizing for it takes away from Dasein responsibility and the anxiety that goes with it. The reality sustained by the self-assuredness of the "they" gives Dasein the impression conducive to tranquillity that there is no need for authentic understanding and the state-of-mind (anxiety) that goes with it, since it is supposed that one is leading a full and genuine "life" in which "...everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open" (ibid., p. 177). However, far from bringing stillness, this tranquillity aggravates one's fallenness through driving one into restless activity in which one becomes increasingly estranged from oneself. As Kruger (1981) points out, "the polar opposite of a serene letting-be-ness...is neither anguish nor suffering, but rather an attempt to avoid the genuine possibilities of Dasein" (p. 70). In this state man's own innermost potentiality of being becomes concealed from him, and he fails to understand that "...understanding itself is a potentiality-for-Being which must be made free in one's ownmost Dasein alone" (ibid., p. 178). Fallenness, then, in diverting Dasein from its authentic selfhood and authentic community, is alienating. However, this alienation does not mean that man is torn away from himself; on the contrary, this alienation "...drives it (Dasein) into a kind of Being which borders on the most exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that the very 'characterologies' and 'typologies' which it has brought about are themselves

already becoming something that cannot be surveyed at a glance" (ibid., p. 178). Man, being thus caught up with himself, can no longer see beyond himself. This mode of being represents the fourth characteristic of fallenness, a characteristic with which most psychologists are familiar, namely man's entanglement with himself.

Having exhibited in its full complexity the total structure of Dasein in its average everydayness, Heidegger seeks a way of grasping this structure in its unity and wholeness. The comprehensive concept which he uses to achieve this unified understanding is that of "care" (Sorge): "...it is as care that Dasein's totality of Being has been defined" (ibid., p. 323). Care consists in a threefold structure of existentiality, facticity and fallenness, these being the fundamental ontological characteristics of Dasein (see Heidegger, 1980, p. 191). Existentiality, or Dasein's being ahead-of-itself, is associated with possibility, projecting, understanding; facticity, or Dasein's being already-in-a-world is associated with thrownness, state-of-mind; fallenness, or Dasein's being close-to-its-world to the point of being absorbed in it, is associated with the "they" and "scattering", whereby the Dasein's possibilities are dictated by factors outside of itself, the cohesion and unity that belong to authentic selfhood being lacking (see Macquarrie, 1968, p. 27). "Care" must be understood in a purely ontological and existential sense, excluding ontic suggestions such as "the cares and anxieties of life" and others. The foregoing may be concisely summed up in Heidegger's (1980) words:

"The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological

structural whole must...be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the significance of the term "care" (*Sorge*), which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner" (p. 192).

2.2.3 Conscience and guilt

Now, if man is for the most part living inauthentically, when does he become aware of this? Heidegger provides the answer to this question: "When the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the 'they' is revealed" (ibid., p. 307). To understand the call of conscience is to become aware that one is not being true to one's (ownmost) self, and that one has forfeited¹ one's being through surrendering to the "they" one's choice of a potentiality of one's being.

In order for Dasein to be itself authentically it is necessary that it should bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the "they". This pulling itself out of its forfeiture to the "they" and back to its own self must concern the very point of which the omission caused Dasein to lose itself in inauthenticity. This means that Dasein must once again choose for itself, the neglect of which choosing has led to inauthenticity. But in order to choose it is necessary for Dasein to choose to make this choice (of choosing), and "in choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being" (ibid., p. 268). However, in order for Dasein

¹In this connection it is interesting to note that Mehta refers to "fallenness" as "forfeiture" (Mehta, 1976, p. 172).

authentically to be itself (i.e. to be its authentic potentiality-for-Being), it must first find itself, since it is for the most part lost in the "they". In order to find itself, it must be made transparent to itself in its possible authenticity. Furthermore, as Mehta (1976) says, "the possibility that man can find his way back to himself is to be found within his own self as an ability to be something that, in a sense, he already is" (p. 222). Hence authentic selfhood is not something which is revealed or attained only in some special kind of experience such as in mysticism; it is available to everyday Dasein, and so lies within the range of what is already (if vaguely) understood. As Heidegger (1980) puts it, "...authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon" (p. 179), and "authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an essential existentiale" (p. 130).

Dasein needs that potentiality-for-being-its-self (which it is) attested to, and it is in the phenomenon popularly called the "voice of conscience" that Heidegger finds testimony of this potentiality.

Conscience and guilt are the human existentials that expose authentic selfhood and the basis of freedom. If I have acted in a way which has made me feel guilty and I confront my guilt, then I am (and become aware of) my authentic self; I am guilty insofar as I become aware of myself as being responsible for the action, and so see my-self as being

the source of the action. At the same time, had I not been free to act otherwise, I would not have been authentically guilty. Guilt thus attests both to authentic selfhood and freedom. On the other hand, if I avoid the significance of my guilt (having freely committed an act for which I am guilty), I also avoid an awareness of my-self. As Gelven (1970) has observed, "by avoiding guilt you become a non-self (in-authentic) self; whereas if you confront the guilt you are a self (authentic) self" (p. 163). However, what is distinctive of authentic being is not the experience of guilt for a particular act as such, but rather wanting to have a conscience, that is, wanting to own one's guilt if there are grounds for one's being-guilty. One's being-guilty is not a contingent matter, since man as such is guilty in his very being, regardless of his particular actions; Dasein as such is guilty both in its thrownness and in its projection (see Section 1.2). Consequently, grounds for one's being-guilty are not even necessary since one is guilty in one's very ground (merely by being one is guilty) and so by wanting to have a conscience and hence wanting to own one's guilt, one acknowledges how one fundamentally is. In Heidegger's (1980) words, "Dasein need not first load a 'guilt' upon itself through its failures and omissions; it must only be 'guilty' authentically - 'guilty' in the way in which it is" (p. 287). It is because conscience is thus intimately linked to the way one actually is (and self and world are inseparable), that Steiner refers to Heidegger's concept of conscience as the "reality principle" (Steiner, 1978, p. 73). As Langan (1959) has noted, "conscience suggests a note of awareness, the kind of awareness that is born of a steady gaze directed at things as they are" (p. 35). The will to have conscience, further, is what

Mehta (1976) calls "...the most fundamental existenziell presupposition for the possibility of factual guilt...", since "...only thus does Dasein let its innermost self act in itself, out of its chosen potentiality of being, and be responsible" (p. 230). So the ontological interpretation of conscience (and guilt) is prior to and is presupposed by morality in general, as well as any psychological or theological description and classification of conscience (and guilt).

Being lost in the publicness and the idle talk of the "they", Dasein fails to hear its own self in listening away to the they-self. It is by way of conscience as a call that this listening-away is interrupted. Calling is seen as a mode of discourse which gives one something to understand. The voice of conscience is precisely this giving-to-understand and not a literal voice, since vocal utterance is not essential for discourse, the latter being presupposed by any expressing or proclaiming. The disclosure belonging to the call causes an abrupt arousal. The call is from afar (i.e. from the authentic self that is far removed from the they-self) to afar (i.e. to the they-self), and it reaches him who wants to be retrieved (from the "they"). The unsettling, jolting nature of the call of conscience is poetically described by Langan (1959) when he writes:

"A soul that retains deep down a modicum of sensitivity, driven so far in (the) pursuit of happiness that the unrealness of the chase after an always just-escaping security begins to manifest itself, can suddenly, when least expected, be forced to throw the whole quest of the average man into serious doubt. It is then, as all dissolves into the nothingness that waits at its base to engulf the flimsy structures of a fabricated life, that

Dasein is forced to question radically where he is from, and where he is going" (p. 30).

2.2.4 The nature of conscience as a call

As Gelven (1970) has pointed out, treating conscience as a kind of calling exposes four dimensions to the nature of conscience, these dimensions being true of any form of calling. When there is a calling, there must be (1) someone who calls, the "caller"; (2) someone who is called; (3) something that is called about; and (4) that to which someone is called. The last point distinguishes calling from other forms of discourse, in that when one calls someone rather than merely speaks to him, an action or direction of attention is expected.

In terms of Heidegger's understanding of conscience, all of these dimensions refer to the self, each dimension referring to a different mode of the self (i.e. each to a different way of existing). (1) It is the self which does the calling, this self being the authentic self which has lost the comfortable feeling of being with the crowd. This self is in a state of anxiety or dread (Angst) and is "uncanny" (unheimlich: "not at home"). It is, as Heidegger (1980) puts it, "...this Dasein, which finds itself in the very depths of its uncanniness (that is) the caller of the call of conscience" (p. 276). (2) The one that is called is the self of the they-self, the calling being an attempt to bring this self, that is lost in the company of others, back to its own self, "and because only the self of the they-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the 'they' collapses" (ibid., p. 273). Precisely in "passing over" the "they" which is keen on appearances and

public repute, the call pushes it into insignificance. (3) It is the self that the calling is about in that conscience awakens the self to the mode of existing in which it finds itself; the call is "...an occasion for Dasein to pay attention to itself" (ibid., p. 272).

(4) The calling is to the self in that it directs the self (that is immersed in the "they") back to its (ownmost) self. The call is an appeal to the self to be authentic.

The (authentic) self to which the they-self is called is not the self which can become an "object" for itself and which might examine and judge its "inner life" with fussy curiosity; "the appeal to the self in the they-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the 'external world'" (ibid., p. 273). The call is rather such that it appeals "solely to that self which...is in no other way than Being-in-the-world" (ibid., p. 273).

Although in the call of conscience it is Dasein who calls its own self, the call has a peculiar, impersonal character in that it is quite independent of our own agency and wishes. "It" calls unexpectedly and even against our will, though it certainly does not come from anybody else; "the call comes from me and yet from beyond me" (ibid., p. 275).

Being an existentiale of Dasein, conscience possesses a mode of being which is appropriate to Dasein's existential constitution, namely that of care. Having its source in Dasein's thrownness or its being already-in-a-world (facticity), conscience recalls Dasein from its falling into

the "they" or its being close-to-its-world (fallenness), and appeals to Dasein in its ownmost potentiality-for-being, or its being ahead-of-itself (existentiality). It is Dasein's being as care that is the basis for the possibility of conscience.

With its source in the uncanniness or homelessness of man's thrown solitude and recalling him to his own self, conscience as a call summons him to his ability to be. The call of conscience "...calls us back in calling us forth" (ibid., p. 280); in the words of Mehta (1976) conscience is a "calling forward recall" (p. 226). The latter notion may be better understood if we look at Van den Berg's understanding of lived time (see Van den Berg, 1972, pp. 74-101). This understanding is typified in his statement that "the present is an invitation from out of the future to gain mastery over bygone times" (ibid., p. 91). My future (my potentiality for being) is inextricably bound to my past, or the course my life has followed thus far (my facticity). My authentic future, seen in terms of my possibilities, opens up in terms of my particular past, and in each particular future a particular past is implicated. This point is covered by Heidegger (1980) when he says:

"When the call gives us a potentiality-for-Being to understand, it does not give us one which is ideal and universal; it discloses it as that which has been currently individualised and which belongs to that particular Dasein" (p. 280).

So in calling man forth (to his ownmost possibilities), conscience calls him back (to his thrownness as the basis of these possibilities). In that he is the basis of a lack or nullity both in his thrownness and

his projection (see Section 1.2), man is guilty (in the ontological sense). Hence the call of conscience, in summoning man to the nullity of his thrownness and projection, appeals to him to be guilty, i.e. to be what he is.

2.2.5 Authentic being

The authentic understanding of the call of conscience has been characterised as "wanting to have a conscience". This will to have conscience, as an understanding of oneself in one's authentic potentiality, is a way in which Dasein is disclosed, a mode of Dasein's openness. As such it is characterised by understanding, state-of-mind (mood), and discourse. What follows is a description of the mode of openness (the mode of the "there" of Dasein-"being-there") characteristic of Dasein's authentic being.

The understanding characteristic of authentic being involves projecting oneself upon one's ownmost possibilities, one's ownmost being-guilty. This projecting of one's ownmost possibilities might be contrasted with the inauthentic mode of understanding (viz. curiosity) which is abodeless and constantly uprooted, being unlimited in its range of possibilities. When the call of conscience is understood existentially, such understanding "... is more authentic the more non-relationally Dasein hears and understands its own Being-appealed-to, and the less the meaning of the call gets perverted by what one says or by what is fitting and accepted" (ibid., p. 280).

The state-of-mind or mood associated with this understanding is anxiety (dread). In inauthentic being in which Dasein is absorbed in the "they", Dasein's openness is characterised by a tranquillised, self-assured attitude of feeling familiar with and at home in the world. However, as Dasein becomes increasingly inauthentic (i.e. as Dasein falls),

"...anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualised, but individualised as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential 'mode' of the 'not-at-home'" (ibid., p. 189).

The "not-at-home-ness" referred to above is the uncanniness¹ which one feels in anxiety. That in the face of which one experiences anxiety is being-in-the-world as such, insofar as the latter, once authentically understood, calls us forth to choose our ownmost possibilities. In our everyday (inauthentic) being, we flee "...in the face of the uncanniness which is basically determinative for individualised Being-in-the-world" (ibid., p. 276). We seek for and try to lose ourselves in distractions to fill up that no-thing-ness which we are and in the face of which we feel anxious (uncanny). However, uncanniness "...is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up. Out of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein itself, as conscience, calls" (ibid., p. 277). Uncanniness pursues Dasein and threatens the lostness in which it has forgotten

¹ The German term for "uncanny", viz. "unheimlich", when translated more literally means "unhomelike".

itself. Hence wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which is definitive of authentic being, becomes a readiness for anxiety.

The mode of discourse of authentic being (wanting to have a conscience) is one of reticence (keeping silent): "conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent" (ibid., p. 273). Although we expect to be told "...something currently useful about assured possibilities of 'taking action' which are available and calculable" (ibid., p. 294), we miss such positive content in that which is called. Our expectation is based on that way of interpreting our existence which belongs to common-sense concern - a way of interpreting "...which forces Dasein's existence to be subsumed under the idea of a business procedure that can be regulated" (ibid., p. 294). However, the call of conscience fails to give practical injunctions as to how the "business" of life is to be "run" precisely because it summons Dasein to existence, to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-its-self. If the call were to have any positive content (e.g. in the form of an injunction or a prohibition), it would both limit the very openness of existence and forestall Dasein's possibility of authentically choosing itself (as something that is still to become) from the wealth of its own possibilities. In its lostness in the "they" Dasein is fascinated with "...the 'hubbub' of the manifold ambiguity which idle talk possesses in its everyday 'newness'" (ibid., p. 271). Hence the call must do its calling "...without any hubbub and unambiguously leaving no foothold for curiosity" (ibid., p. 271). In being uncannily reticent, the call "...does not call him into the public idle talk of the 'they', but calls him back from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being" (ibid.,

p. 277). In the light of Dasein's authentic mode of discourse being silence, Gelven (1970) points out that "...one of the chief modes of inauthentic discourse is loudness, for when one is 'loud' one cannot listen" (p. 169). If we are to hear the call back to our authentic selves, it is necessary that we be quiet enough to listen to it. It should be noted that being one's self authentically does not imply an egocentric preoccupation with oneself. The (authentic) self does not become an object of concern for itself, but rather is: "as something that keeps silent, authentic Being-one's-Self is just the sort of thing that does not keep on saying 'I'; but in its reticence it is that thrown entity as which it can authentically be" (ibid., p. 323).

Dasein's disclosure (openness) in conscience, then, may be summed up in the following description: it is a "...reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety" (ibid., p. 297). Heidegger refers to this disclosure as "resoluteness" ("Entschlossenheit"¹).

2.2.6 Resoluteness

Resoluteness is seen in existentiell terms by Heidegger as "...the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one's-Self..." (ibid., p. 270). The connection between resoluteness and choice and freedom ought not to be overlooked: "resoluteness" is a translation of "Entschlossenheit", which also means "decision", "resolve", "having made up one's mind", etc. This connection seems to make sense intuitively, in that it does

¹The etymological connection between "Entschlossenheit" ("resoluteness") and "Erschlossenheit" ("disclosedness") should be noted.

appear to be the case that, in order to live one's own life and to be one's "own person", one needs to be free to choose one's mode of existing.

Resoluteness focuses upon the particular Dasein's unique assertion of its own existence, freely grounded in responsibility and guilt. In the call of conscience, and through resoluteness, Dasein is recalled to an authentic openness, such that its awareness of the world and of others is transformed. Although the world that is ready-to-hand does not change in content, and although Dasein's "circle of others" is not changed for a different one, now Dasein's "...comprehending and preoccupied being-toward handy essents and its solicitous being-with the others is determined from (the depths of) its innermost potentiality of being itself" (Mehta, 1976, p. 234). So, for example, the person will attend symphony concerts not so as to be seen to be doing the "done" thing, but because he has a deeply felt love of classical music; he will relate to others not because they are the "right" people to be seen to be associating with, but because he has a certain feeling for them or resolutely chosen commitment to them.

Nor does resoluteness, as being-one's self, mean that Dasein becomes detached from its world, such that it becomes an isolated and free-floating "I". On the contrary, authentic openness consists in being-in-the-world authentically with-others; after all, by its very nature, the self (Dasein) is in a world with others. In appropriating its own existence in resoluteness, Dasein becomes free for its world and can allow others to be themselves authentically. Dasein's resoluteness makes it possible to co-disclose the authentic possibilities of others

(their "ownmost potentiality for being") in "...the solicitude that leaps forth and liberates" (Heidegger, 1980, p. 298); when Dasein is resolute, it can become the conscience of others. Furthermore, it is

"only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness (that) people can authentically be with one another - not by ambiguous jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the 'they' and in what 'they' want to undertake" (ibid., p. 298).

In resoluteness, Dasein does not withdraw from "actuality"; it first discovers what is factually possible and then projects itself upon definite factual possibilities. Resolute Dasein does not float in the realm of limitless possibilities, but is always situated. However, the situation of resolute Dasein does not occur independently of that Dasein; it only comes into being as that situation which it is through the existence of Dasein in it: "the situation is the 'there' as which the existent entity is there" (ibid., p. 299, emphasis added). The situation is not an objectively existing setting in which Dasein happens to exist or into which it puts itself; it is "...far removed from any present-at-hand mixture of circumstances and accidents which we encounter" (ibid., p. 300). As Gelven (1970) points out, in Heidegger's use of the notion of a situation, situations exist only in terms of Dasein's projection of possibilities. We say that a particular situation is "fraught with tension" or "comfortable", and this is because of our understanding of the situation through the projection¹ of "tense" or

¹ "Projection" is used here in the Heideggerian sense, in keeping with the notions of "project" and "existentiality", and is not to be confused with the Freudian notion of projection.

"comfortable" possibilities. Gelven (1970) points out that the meaning of the situation cannot be represented by a simple listing of the facts or circumstances that actually occur, but rather "...it is the amount and intensity of human caring and concern that establish what we call a 'situation'" (p. 171).

The inauthentic they-self, on the other hand, is blind to the situation as described above. For the they-self, the situation is something which has been "closed off". Being unable to understand the situation via the projection of its own possibilities (which are thematically unavailable to it), the they-self is aware only of the "general situation". Hence, in a sense the situation is something which is already established prior to Dasein's being in it.

We shall now briefly examine the place of death in authenticity. Dasein, in its very existence, is always ahead-of-itself in living towards the future. The ultimate horizon and possibility of this existence is inevitably death, of which Dasein is aware. Hence Dasein is always being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode), and Heidegger (1980) refers to this being as "anticipating" or "anticipation" (p. 262). Furthermore, "death is Dasein's ownmost possibility", and "Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (ibid., p. 263). So, in this distinctive possibility of Dasein's own self, as in the state-of-mind of anxiety (dread), Dasein is "wrenched away from" the "they". If I realise in the depths of my being that my death is uniquely my own (nobody else can die in

place of me), I then become aware of the fact that this life is uniquely my own. Such awareness liberates me in and for my being, and lends an intensity to my existence, inviting me to appropriate it authentically as my own. The nature of authentic being-towards-death may be summed up as follows:

"Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death - a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the 'they', and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious" (ibid., p. 266).

The resoluteness accompanying this anticipation ("anticipatory resoluteness") is not something which is attained once and for all. As Heidegger puts it "Dasein is already in irresoluteness and soon, perhaps, will be in it again" (ibid., p. 299). "Irresoluteness" here refers to inauthentic being in which Dasein has surrendered itself to and is in a sense "lived" by the "they".

2.2.7 Concluding comments

Interpreting conscience as a call from the self to the self avoids the usual interpretations of conscience in terms of mental faculties, intellect, will or feeling, or of "acts" of a person. Such interpretations fail to do justice to man as a being that exists. They are fragmentary and fragmenting in their understanding of man, treating him as a present-at-hand "system" which might be dissected into component parts. As Heidegger notes, "when one is confronted with such a phenomenon

as conscience, one is struck by the ontologico-anthropological inadequacy of a free-floating framework of psychical faculties or personal actions all duly classified" (ibid., pp. 271-2).

As construed by Heidegger, conscience is prior to any moral guilt and so surpasses and transcends any particular moral code. Although conscience lies at the very basis of moral guilt and morality in general, it cannot be regarded as the voice of society or parents; nor does it provide a kind of moral tribunal that judges past or contemplated actions. Such phenomena are secondary to conscience as a fundamental existentielle of existence.

Rather than being concerned with particular acts, infringements or omissions, conscience involves an awareness of one's mode of being-in-the-world in general. It is concerned specifically with the distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of being, which, as Steiner (1978) has noted, "...is one of the most decisive (distinctions) in Heideggerian thought and in the impact of that thought on modern feeling" (p. 91).

2.3 Existential philosophers' views on conscience and/or conscience-related themes

2.3.1 Kierkegaard

For Kierkegaard, the lowest form of despair, in that it is the most directly dependent upon external social circumstances, is spiritlessness,

which most closely approximates Heidegger's view of inauthentic being.

Kierkegaard (1944) states that "man is spirit" and that "spirit is the self" (p. 17). It would follow, therefore, that a spiritless man would be a man who lacked a self. This is the case for Kierkegaard: a spiritless person is someone who has been tricked out of his self by "the others". He knows himself only by what he presents outwardly to others, by "externality", being identified with his social role. It is by means of social categories and seeing where he stands in the system of social differences (in terms of class, status, etc.) that he understands and identifies himself. Kierkegaard sees social identity as "the outer garments of differentiation" (Nordentoft, 1978, p. 244). The spiritless person "...does not dare to believe in himself, finds it too venturesome a thing to be himself, far easier and safer to be like the others, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher in the crowd" (Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 57). He is scarcely noticed in his despair, since he has attained perfection and success in all that he does. His being normally adjusted to the world adds to his inconspicuousness. Indeed, the despair attending such a way of being is not generally regarded as despair, because it makes one's life easy and comfortable. One is shrewd in the eyes of the world if one does not venture oneself; it is dangerous to be venturesome since one might lose. However, by not venturing, "...it is so dreadfully easy to lose that which it would be difficult to lose in even the most venturesome venture...one's self" (ibid., p. 52). In not venturing, I gain all worldly advantages and yet lose my self.

Kierkegaard (1969) claims that the present age (which, though he obviously refers to the period in which he wrote these words, viz. circa 1846, seems not to be unlike our own), which is one of spiritlessness, boasts much reflective understanding, yet is lacking in passion (p. 77). A passionless age gains in scope what it loses in intensity. It has abolished the "principle of contradiction", such that the dynamic tension between opposites is reduced to lukewarm compromise. Hence, among other things, we have superficiality, which results from doing away with the vital distinction between concealment and manifestation; flirtation, which results from doing away with the vital distinction between real love and real debauchery; and talkativeness, resulting from doing away with the vital distinction between talking and keeping silent. The latter phenomenon is the same as Heidegger's Gerede (idle talk). Kierkegaard, like Heidegger, regards keeping silent as a positive phenomenon and not merely as a privation of talking. Hence, "only one who knows how to remain essentially silent can really talk - and act essentially" (ibid., p. 78). Spiritlessness is capable neither of genuinely talking nor of genuinely keeping silent. It takes no risks in its talkativeness, sticking to "completely reliable" information about what so and so has done and said, and dreads the moment of silence in which its emptiness becomes apparent. Talkativeness occurs "...when nothing important ever happens to gather the threads of life together: with the finality of a catastrophe" (ibid., p. 78). It would seem that precisely in the call of conscience (as conceived by Heidegger), in view of its jolting nature, the "threads of life" are gathered together in this manner.

It is important to realise, as Kierkegaard observes, that

"spiritlessness can say exactly the same thing that the richest spirit says, except that it does not say it by virtue of spirit. Spiritlessly determined, man has become a talking machine, and there is nothing to prevent him from learning a philosophical jingle by heart just as well as a confession of faith and a political recitation" (cited in Nordentoft, 1978, pp. 240-1).

This suggests that the spiritless or selfless man lives second-hand, and reflects what Heidegger says about authentic being, namely that it is an existentiell modification of inauthentic being. Upon superficial inspection, spiritless and spirited (inauthentic and authentic) modes of being seem alike; it requires a more penetrating and authentic perception to distinguish between the two.

According to Kierkegaard's psychological writings, spiritlessness is characterised by the need for self-protection, security and the exclusion of the consciousness of conflict. Spiritlessness is anxiety, but this anxiety is concealed and disguised such that it is not directly observable. It is precisely the safeguarding of the self, both socially and existentially, that is the symptom of anxiety. This spiritless safeguarding, by avoiding risks in its not being venturesome, belies anxiety at the taking of these risks which is necessary for the spirited self. Even though the self has in a sense anaesthetised itself in its spiritlessness, such that anxiety is excluded just as the spirit is, "...anxiety is nevertheless present; it is merely waiting" (cited in Nordentoft, 1978, p. 255). This view of the spirited self as being essentially transparently anxious (as distinct from being characterised

by concealed and disguised anxiety, as is the spiritless self), has its parallel in Heidegger's view of authentic being, which consists in a wordless, anxious self-projection.

2.3.2 Sartre

Sartre describes inauthentic being as "bad faith" ("mauvaise foi") or living in bad faith, which essentially involves some or other form of self-deception. However, although he devotes an entire chapter (Part One, Chapter 2) to bad faith in his major work Being and Nothingness, his account will be examined only briefly here, since it has its origin in, and so is in a sense overshadowed by, Heidegger's analysis of authentic and inauthentic existence.

Generally speaking, self deception is an attempt to escape from the anguish which we suffer when we are brought face to face with our own freedom; as Sartre says, "anguish is the reflective apprehension of freedom itself" (cited in Warnock, 1965, p. 55). Self-deception consists in pretending to ourselves and others that things could not be otherwise; we are not responsible for the way we are and cannot change, even if we want to. Sartre vehemently opposes this notion, claiming that we most definitely are responsible for the way we are, even for the way we feel. Man is free and chooses himself. In authenticity one responsibly appropriates this freedom. Sartre has been criticised by Heidegger and others for overestimating the extent of man's freedom, through not adequately situating this freedom in the context of particular facticities. Sartre, on the other hand, has

criticised Heidegger for identifying man with the world (through his immersion in it) at the expense of giving full weight to his freedom and "subjective" reality (see Fell, 1979, pp. 1 f.). Sartre's criticism seems to hold, however, only if and once we have made a radical distinction between subjective (self) and objective (world); in his terms between Being-for-itself (être-pour-soi) and Being-in-itself (être-en-soi). It is only after this distinction that the world (with which man is in cohesion, in Heidegger's view), through being divorced from the subjective, is robbed of its freedom. To argue this point more thoroughly, however, seems to be beyond the scope (and relevance) of this thesis.

Sartre distinguishes two main types of self-deception, namely becoming thing-like and playing a part.

(a) Becoming thing-like

In this kind of self-deception, the person, to protect himself from recognising his own freedom, pretends to be a thing, that is, he pretends to have no choice; to be managed by other people; to be inert. Sartre illustrates this kind of self-deception by his well-known example in which a girl is taken to a restaurant by a man. In order to preserve the excitement of the moment and to delay the moment when she has to make a definite decision, she pretends to herself that she does not notice his sexual intentions towards her. So when he holds her hand, she (it) becomes thing-like; she neither resists by withdrawing it, nor consents by responding positively. She allows her hand to rest passively in his

hot hands. She is no longer embedded in her situation since her body has become what Van den Berg (1972) refers to as "the body one has", which "...has been left, more or less, by its owner" (p. 50). This mode of being thing-like is hinted at in Heidegger's analysis of the situation of inauthentic Dasein, in which the situation is seen as a present-at-hand mixture of circumstances which is not co-constituted by Dasein. Accordingly, even the self (Dasein) becomes present-at-hand in such a situation, as if it were a thing.

(b) Playing a part

In this kind of self-deception one pretends that one is nothing other than what others think one is. One acts out the role which others have assigned to one and sees oneself in terms of how others want one to be. We also expect certain repertoires of behaviours from certain people, and should they depart from these behaviours, we become offended; "a grocer who indulges in day-dreams is offensive to the customer because he is no longer wholly a grocer" (Sartre, 1957, p. 59). As Sartre observes:

"We take ample precautions to confine a man to what he is; it is as if we lived in continual fear that he would get out, overflow and suddenly elude his position" (cited in Warnock, op. cit., p. 58).

Sartre regards man to be such that his existence precedes his essence. It is only through his becoming (in existence) that man is what he is (in his essence). In his existence, man is constantly projecting himself into future possibilities so that his essence right until his

death, is open-ended, not fixed. We can observe in both of these forms of inauthenticity (self-deception), the person's attempt to establish his essence prematurely (through becoming identified either with a thing or with a role) at the expense of his existence. By thus giving priority to his essence in being inauthentic, he is denying the very nature of his being as man.

2.3.3 Buber

Buber distinguishes two basic forms of conscience: the surface, common conscience which is in effect comparable to the Freudian superego and to Heidegger's false "worldly" or "public" conscience (see Section 2.4.1), and a greater or higher conscience which plumbs the depths of existential guilt. It is only with the latter, higher form that we will be concerned here.

Like Heidegger's (authentic) conscience, Buber's higher conscience is related to existential guilt and has the positive function of calling man to authentic existence. Buber also agrees with Heidegger that all understanding of guilty acts (indebtedness) must go back to a primal or original guilt. However, for Buber this guilt is not synonymous with human finitude; "original guilt consists in remaining with oneself" (Buber, 1938, p. 203). Accordingly, the authentic life is the life of dialogue, in which one responds to the other with one's whole being now, entering into an "I-Thou" relationship with the other. Buber (1929) proposes that the idea of responsibility should be retrieved from the sphere of specialised ethics in which it becomes a free-floating

"ought". Responsibility must re-enter the sphere of lived life, since "genuine responsibility exists only when there is real responding" (p. 34). That to which one responds is simply what happens to one, what is to be seen and heard and felt. Buber adds that "each concrete hour allotted to the person, with its content drawn from the world and from destiny, is speech for the man who is attentive" (ibid., p. 34). Attentiveness is required for one to respond genuinely and so to live an authentic life, and the "whole apparatus of our civilization" opposes the realisation of this attentiveness. When we fail in our attentive responsiveness, we experience the call of conscience:

"If a form and appearance of present being move past me, and I was not really there, then out of the distance, out of its disappearance, comes a second cry, as soft and secret as though it came from myself: 'Where are you?' That is the cry of conscience. It is not my existence which calls to me, but the being which is not I" (Buber, 1938, p. 203).

From the above quotation, we can see that for Buber, conscience is not the voice of the self calling to the self, or at least not exclusively. Although conscience is my conscience, "...in it and through it there sounds the voice of the other" (Le Fevre, 1962, p. 29). Buber understands the structure of human life as man with man. The individual does not contain the essence of man within himself; man's essence is contained only in community, in the unity of man with man. It follows that if we are to arrive at our essence (authentic being) through conscience, conscience must necessarily include the other.

As can be seen from the above, with regard to both conscience and guilt,

the views of Buber are more emphatically and explicitly interpersonal than those of Heidegger.

2.3.4 Morano

Morano's work, Existential Guilt (1973), is a study of existential (ontological) guilt as such, which is not the primary focus of the present study. Accordingly, his study will be reviewed here only insofar as it relates more directly to conscience.

For the individual who experiences conscience (in his being guilty), there is a discrepancy between his actual situation and his situation as he would like it to be. He never enjoys complete mastery of his situation (p. 37). There is a denial or lack of awareness, especially of self-awareness; the individual denies that awareness of the situation which is his. In Morano's words, "there seems to be both ontological and psychological barriers to total self-lucidity" (p.38). Total self-transparency is unattainable, in that

"each one's view is necessarily perspectival, bound by his past experiences and his specific vantage point in space and time and therefore necessarily precluding any total transcendence of one's one perspective" (p. 38).

In one's moments of "most profound self-discovery" (in conscience) one experiences "agonising isolation", and one only avoids the agony of conscience to the detriment of one's self-awareness and human sensibilities (pp. 40-41).

Unlike Heidegger, Morano sees guilt not as residing in man's finitude per se, "...but in the discrepancy between this finitude and his aspiration to transcend it and his regrets for having been dominated by it" (p. 47). Nevertheless, the individual gains access to his guilt only by some apprehension of his specific finitude. The recognition of this finitude is evoked most dramatically for him in the experience of Angst, a "spiritual reeling and dizziness", in which there is no specific danger "...but my very existence, my whole being is in doubt, and I don't know where I can turn" (p. 47). The individual experiences a sense of being lost which is prolonged indefinitely, as if he were in a "labyrinthine world" (p. 58). He has deviated from his correct path and is alienated from himself. In ontological guilt (in which conscience is experienced) "we are outcasts to our true selves", and "we are not at home with ourselves" (p. 56). This is clearly reminiscent of Heidegger when he writes that the self in the call of conscience is anxious and not-at-home (unheimlich).

2.4 Psychoanalytic and existential-psychological views of conscience and/or conscience-related themes

2.4.1 Freud

In his structural theory Freud used the term "superego" to refer to what is commonly regarded as conscience. However, the meaning which he attributed to "superego" is too narrow to do justice to the complex phenomenon of conscience, especially in its more fundamental and primordial aspects. As Buber (1957) has observed,

"...the primeval concept of conscience (to which Heidegger's conception is akin), if only it is understood as a dynamic one rather than as a static, judging one, is more realistic than the modern structural concept of the superego" (p. 122, parenthesis added).

Freud conceived of the superego as a moral agency, a structural component of the psyche, which consists of the precipitate of all prohibitions, inhibitions and rules of conduct that society impresses upon children through their parents and others significant to their development. It is what Scheler (1960) referred to as "...an interiorization of yesterday's policeman" (p. 38). Jung (1958) has criticised Freud's view for precisely this reason, saying that the superego, by definition, is "...not even a genuine conscience but merely human convention and tradition" (p. 446). Heidegger (1980) implicitly regards the superego not to be a genuine or authentic conscience, but to be a false or fallen one. This is reflected when he writes, "...this 'public conscience' - what else is it than the voice of the 'they'?" (p. 278). "Conscience" and "superego" are in no way coterminous; indeed, one might conceive of situations in which one might have to oppose one's superego (as the voice of the "they") in order to act in accordance with one's conscience (as the call to one's ownmost possibilities), and vice versa. As Belaief (1969) points out, if one repudiates the internalised rules of the superego but nonetheless enacts one's apparent acceptance from fear of social (parental) rejection, "...the felt sense of self-betrayal here results in bad conscience" (p. 74). Whereas establishing the superego "...expresses the wish to preserve as much as possible the tender and erotic ties to both parents" (Schafer, 1960, p. 168), and serves to counteract the dread of the loss of the love

itself by keeping in check primarily aggressive but also sexual impulses, conscience requires one to risk losing bonds of affection with others through being true to oneself.

Although Freud's fully developed conception of conscience as superego bears little relation to conscience, the early stages of his theorising establishes the roots of the superego as being firmly grounded in the ego. Freud saw the superego as "a differentiating grade in the ego" (1921, pp. 101-109), a "precipitate in the ego" (1923, p. 44) and a "function" of the ego (1923, p. 73; 1932, pp. 85-86). It was only in his monograph The Ego and the Id (1923), that he combined these various components of the ego within a single (though derivative) entity which he called the "superego". The superego, then, is a differentiated portion of the ego which observes the ego, and it shares this characteristic at least with the conscience in Heidegger (1980), which always remains "...an occasion for Dasein to pay attention to itself" (p. 272).

2.4.2 Jung

Jung attributes considerable importance to the conscience, believing that "...the chief causes of neurosis are conflicts of conscience and difficult moral problems that require an answer" (1949, p. 616). His view of conscience will be considered together with that of the development of personality, since the two views are closely related and both have bearing on Heidegger's conception of conscience.

Being guided by the etymology of the word "conscience", Jung points out

that the phenomenon is a special form of "knowing" or "consciousness" concerning the value of our actions. However, that which knows is not the "empirical subject" or ego, "...but rather an unconscious personality who, to all appearances, behaves like a conscious subject" (Jung, 1958, p. 439). It is this unconscious personality which, having replaced the ego, performs the act of conscience. Though Jung does not identify this "unconscious personality" explicitly, it is probable that it is the self (as distinct from the ego), which, as our life's goal, is "...the completest expression of that fateful combination we call individuality" (Jung, 1928, p. 238). Conscience, as "an autonomous psychic factor", is "...a demand that asserts itself in spite of the subject or at any rate causes him considerable difficulties" (ibid., p. 446). This is reminiscent of the call of conscience in Heidegger which is uncanny (connoting unconsciousness), impersonal (and so not identified with the ego), and disregards our wishes, even opposing our will. As Heidegger (1980) says "the call comes from me and yet from beyond me" (p. 275).

When Jung uses the word "personality", he has a very specific meaning in mind, and it is with his sense of the word that Heidegger's conception of the unique, authentic existence is most compatible. Jung (1934) describes personality as follows:

"Personality is the supreme realisation of the innate idiosyncrasy of a living being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination" (p. 171).

For Jung, personality is not a given but an exceptional achievement. That which induces a man to realise his personality through going his own way and rising above the "unconscious identity with the mass" (cf. the "they-self" in Heidegger) is what is commonly called "vocation". The original meaning of "to have a vocation" is "to be addressed by a voice". Herein lies the connection between the development of personality and conscience, insofar as conscience also involves being addressed by a voice. In both cases the voice is conceived as an inner voice, as the voice of the inner man. It is a voice which commands; the individual "...must obey his own law" (ibid., p. 176). The developing personality obeys only "brute necessity", and "...needs the motivating force of inner or outer fatalities" (ibid., p. 173). Development which was not motivated by such necessity would be tantamount to individualism. This element of necessity is not sufficient, however; personality will not develop unless the individual chooses his own way consciously and with moral deliberation. In the absence of necessity, the alleged development is "a mere acrobatics of the will"; if conscious decision is lacking, the development will get stuck in "unconscious automatism" (ibid., p. 174).

In order to obey the inner voice, we need to overcome conventions. Although conventions are collective necessities, in themselves they are "...soulless mechanisms that can never understand more than the mere routine of life", and the "creative life always stands outside convention" (ibid., p. 178). The overcoming of conventions and the law (in its broadest, non-legalistic sense) "...falls only to the man who knows how to put his soul in the place of conscience", and the few who are

capable of treading this path do so "...only from inner necessity, not to say suffering, for it is sharp as the edge of a razor" (Jung, 1928, p. 237). The development of personality, as fidelity to the law of one's own being, is both a charisma and a curse, since it involves the conscious and unavoidable segregation of the individual from the "undifferentiated and unconscious herd", and the devastating isolation which this entails. Nevertheless, for Jung (1934), the only meaningful life is a life "...that strives for the individual realisation - absolute and unconditional - of its own particular law" (p. 181).

2.4.3 Fromm

Fromm distinguishes two forms of conscience: the authoritarian conscience and the humanistic conscience.

(a) Authoritarian conscience

This form of conscience is "...the voice of an internalized external authority, the parents, the state, or whoever the authorities in a culture happen to be" (Fromm, 1949, pp. 143-4). Fromm regards the authoritarian conscience to be synonymous with the Freudian superego, and believes that it is possibly a preliminary stage in the development of true (humanistic) conscience. That the authoritarian conscience, taken on its own, cannot be the basis for a productive and creative life, becomes evident when he writes:

"Paradoxically, the authoritarian guilty conscience is a result of the feeling of strength, independence, productiveness and pride (which attends asserting oneself in the face of the authority), while the authoritarian good

conscience springs from the feeling of obedience, dependence, powerlessness, and sinfulness (which attends submitting to this authority)" (ibid., p. 150, parenthesis added).

(b) Humanistic conscience

Humanistic conscience, as man's recall to himself, is our own voice, independent of external sanctions and rewards, which judges our functioning as human beings. Being derived from con-scientia, conscience, as Fromm (1949) points out, is "...knowledge within oneself, knowledge of our respective success or failure in the art of living" (p. 158). This "knowledge" is not merely cognitive, but has an affective quality, since it involves the reaction of the total personality and not only the reaction of the mind. Similarities between the views of conscience of Fromm and Heidegger become apparent when Fromm writes:

"Conscience is thus a reaction of ourselves to ourselves. It is the voice of our true selves which summons us back to ourselves, to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously - that is, to become what we potentially are" (ibid., p. 159).

Heidegger, however, would not necessarily go along with the specific content imputed to the summons by Fromm (i.e. "to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously"). Nor would his view of the self be in agreement with that of Fromm who would conceive of the self in more traditionally dualistic terms as an entity which exists over and against the world, rather than as being-in-the-world.

Fromm (1959) contends that (humanistic) conscience is, by its very nature,

nonconforming; "...it must be able to say no, when everybody else says yes" and "to the degree to which a person conforms he cannot hear the voice of his conscience, much less act upon it" (p. 173). This conscience clearly opposes the notion of the conscience as superego, which in principle advocates conformity.

One opposes the demands of one's conscience to the extent that one violates the integrity and proper functioning of one's personality. Such violation would include crippling oneself through becoming a tool for others, and being "selfless", unhappy, resigned or discouraged. However, it is extremely difficult to understand the communications of one's conscience, for two main reasons:

1. in order to hear the voice of our conscience, we must be able to listen to ourselves, and most people in our culture have difficulty doing this, since we "...listen to every voice and to everybody but not to ourselves" (ibid., p. 161);
2. listening to oneself entails one's being alone with oneself, and to be alone is difficult for modern man who has developed a phobia of being alone; we prefer "...the most trivial and even obnoxious company, the most meaningless activities to being alone with ourselves" (ibid., p. 161).

Our conscience, in not speaking to us directly, has difficulty in being heard, and perhaps the most frequent indirect reaction of our conscience to being neglected is "...a vague and unspecific feeling of guilt and uneasiness, or simply a feeling of tiredness or listlessness" (ibid., p. 162). Such feelings might be rationalised as guilt feelings for not having done one thing or another, whereas these omissions about which one feels guilty do not constitute genuine moral problems. However, if the genuine though unconscious feeling of guilt becomes too strong to be silenced by superficial rationalisations, "...it finds expression in deeper and more intense anxieties and even in physical or mental sickness" (ibid., p. 162). One form of this anxiety, which is an expression of unconscious guilt, is the fear of disapproval. Though man "naturally" wants to be accepted by his fellows, this normal attitude has become distorted such that modern man wants to be accepted by everybody, and so is afraid to deviate in his being from cultural and societal norms. The unconscious guilt feeling underlying this fear resides in the fact that the individual does not approve of himself in his failure to live productively, and so has to substitute approval by others for approval by himself. If others disapprove of him, he can no longer hide from his own disapproval of the way he is living, and so is forced to become conscious of his own genuine guilt. So he seeks in the shelter of the approval of others, protection from his conscience and the responsibility of living his own unique life.

2.4.4 Laing

Being inauthentic, in Heidegger's terms, implies that one has failed to

appropriate one's own existence; one has forfeited oneself to the "they" (others). This way of being would seem to suggest that one is insecure in one's very own being. It is for this reason that we will now examine Laing's work on ontological¹ insecurity.

Laing describes ontological insecurity as it characterises the severely schizoid and schizophrenic person. The characteristics of this way of being are likely to be less severe and less chronic in the case of individuals in their experience of conscience, and what follows should be seen in this light.

The ontologically secure individual may experience his own being as real, alive, substantial and whole. He is for the most part clearly differentiated from others and the rest of the world, such that his identity and autonomy are never in question. By contrast, the ontologically insecure individual may feel more unreal than real, more dead than alive, more insubstantial than substantial, lacking in personal consistency or cohesiveness. He is precariously differentiated from others and the rest of the world, and so his identity and autonomy are always in question. He may also feel his self as being partially divorced from his body.

The ontologically insecure person fears losing his identity and autonomy.

¹ Despite the philosophical use of "ontology" by Heidegger et al., Laing uses the term in its empirical sense here since it appears to be the best adjective or adverbial derivative of "being".

However, as Laing (1965) observes, "it seems to be a general law that at some point those very dangers most dreaded can themselves be encompassed to forestall their actual occurrence" (p. 51). So to forgo one's autonomy (by turning oneself into a lifeless thing such as a stone or automaton, a process which Laing calls "petrification") becomes the means of secretly safeguarding it; "...to play possum, to feign death, becomes a means of preserving one's aliveness" (ibid., p. 51). This strategy is what Sartre refers to as "becoming thing-like". In like fashion, the individual tries to preserve his identity by never revealing his self (through being himself and owning his experience). The self becomes detached and disembodied¹, such that it is never revealed directly in the individual's expressions and actions, and it never experiences anything immediately or spontaneously. "The self's relationship to the other is always at one remove" (ibid., p. 80), and transactions between the individual and others (and the world) become meaningless, futile and false. The self, thus isolated and "shut-up", cannot be enriched by outer experience, and so "...the whole inner world comes to be more and more impoverished, until the individual may come to feel he is merely a vacuum" (ibid., p. 75). This relates to Kierkegaard, who claims that the self is lost when it no longer participates in venturesome interaction with the world (see Section 2.3.1).

The unembodied self, engaging in nothing directly, becomes an onlooker

¹ It should be noted that, as Laing (1965) points out, "...the split in the experience of one's own being into unembodied and embodied parts is no more an index of latent psychosis than is total embodiment any guarantee of sanity" (p. 68).

and observes, controls and criticises what the body does and experiences. The unembodied self becomes hyper-conscious, developing a relationship with itself and with the body which can become very complex. In his observation of himself, the individual "...turns the living spontaneity of his being into something dead and lifeless by inspecting it" (ibid., p. 112). The individual is self-conscious not only in the above sense (i.e. of being conscious of himself) but also in the sense of being aware of himself as an object of others' observation. It is necessary for him to be self-conscious in the latter sense to ensure that his way of being conforms to what he perceives to be others' expectations of him, and so to maintain his "false-self system" (see Laing, 1965, p. 73).

The "emptiness, sense of inner lack of richness, substantiality and value" which the individual experiences in this condition "...is a powerful prompter to make 'contact' with reality" (ibid., p. 91). This lends support to Heidegger's view that the call of conscience, which appeals to one to be one's authentic self (and so to be more real), receives its impetus from the (inauthentic) condition in which one has surrendered oneself to the "they".

2.5 Concluding comments

It can be seen, from the above review, that in whatever form inauthenticity (as the source of the experience of conscience) appears, it involves the denial or opposition of one's essential being and the dis-ease which follows from this. The "essential being" referred to here is not

intended to imply any pre-determined or fixed nature or essence, as suggested by the notion "human nature" (in this regard it would appear that man is better understood in terms of "the human condition" than in terms of "human nature"); "essential being" encompasses the various ways in which our authentic being is characterised by the different authors, whether this be in terms of "existence" (Sartre) or the development of "personality" (Jung). As Tillich (1959) has noted,

"...however the norm (of what man potentially is) is formulated man has the power of acting against it, of contradicting his essential being, of losing his destiny" (p. 59, parenthesis added).

It is out of the state of estrangement resulting from this contradiction of one's essential being that conscience calls one to reaffirm this essential being.

The focus of the present study is on the psychological manifestations of (ontic) conscience as derived from Heidegger's (ontological) conception of conscience. Accordingly, the aim of this literature-review has been to explore, from a psychological perspective, the nature of this particular phenomenon within its appropriate context (viz. of inauthenticity and authenticity) and not to enter into a philosophical critique of individual authors. Philosophers have had more to say about conscience than have psychologists, who have either neglected this area of human experience or narrowly redefined it (see Section 2.4.1). Consequently, this review has concentrated more on philosophical than on psychological works. Nevertheless, the following (mostly psychological)

literature was consulted in compiling this review, but yielded little of significance which could not be subsumed under the literature presented above: Blum, 1970; Boss, 1962; Bugental et al., 1965, 1984; Ching, 1978; Cremer, 1975; Keogh, 1979; Knight, 1964; Loevinger, 1976; Maddi, 1967; Rogers, 1967; Schrag, 1963; Underwood, 1974; Weyerhaeuser, 1975; Zbinden, 1970.

CHAPTER 3

3. METHOD

In this chapter, no attempt will be made to provide a rationale for the phenomenological method of research as it is used in psychology; by now this method has been sufficiently well established to render such a rationale unnecessary. Suffice it to say that without such a method, one would scarcely be able to gain meaningful access to such a diffuse and pervasive phenomenon as conscience within its context of authenticity and inauthenticity.

What follows, then, is a description of the procedure which was followed in order to arrive at the structure of conscience.

3.1 Collection of data

3.1.1 Research question

Phenomenology deals with phenomena as they are experienced by people (subjects) in the everyday lived-world (Lebenswelt). Accordingly, the question which one poses in phenomenological research must be aimed at the everyday understanding of subjects such that they might describe as immediately and spontaneously as possible the world (situation) as it is lived by them. As Wertz (1983) observes, what in part makes research psychological is "...a study of man's participation in the immanent significations of lived situations" (p. 206).

The present study poses a problem in this regard, in that we do not

have a name, in our everyday language, for the phenomenon being studied. It would clearly be most inappropriate to ask an uninformed subject to describe an experience of ontic conscience as derived from Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience. It was, therefore, necessary to establish through a close examination of the meaning of conscience in Heidegger, the types of concrete, everyday experiences which might implicitly reveal the structure of this phenomenon of conscience. A question was then formulated to elicit descriptions of these experiences from subjects. The rationale underlying this step has already been presented (see Section 1.2).

Subjects were asked to:

"Describe as concretely and accurately as possible, a situation in which you felt you were not being true to yourself".

Subjects were required to write a description in response to the above request.

3.1.2 Subjects

Descriptions were collected from sixty-four potential subjects. Of these descriptions, the four which were psychologically richest were chosen for analysis. The four subjects who had written these descriptions were all adults, two men and two women, in their thirties:

Protocol A : Kristen 33
Protocol B : Burt 36
Protocol C : Janet 31
Protocol D : Leonard 38

That the most suitable descriptions came from more mature subjects is not surprising; to respond meaningfully to the research question required a certain degree of self-awareness and self-transparency which, judging from their protocols, was not readily available to less mature subjects.

3.1.3 Interviews

After reading each protocol thoroughly, the researcher interviewed each subject individually on his particular protocol, having in the interim pin-pointed areas in the description which were either of particular interest or, lacking in clarity, required further elaboration. A non-directive procedure was adopted in the interviews: subjects were prompted either through the researcher's reflecting back to them what they had written, or through asking them to tell him more about what they had said, without guiding them in any particular direction. Such an interview is referred to as the "inquiry", and appears in transcribed form after each written protocol.

It was decided to adopt this procedure of both asking subjects to write a description and interviewing them on this description for two reasons:

1. it was believed that, conscience being such a diffuse

phenomenon, its structure would be made more accessible in a few lengthier, in-depth protocols than in many more shorter, superficial descriptions (this belief being confirmed in a personal communication with Professor A Giorgi, 1982);

2. whereas the written protocol allows for a more integrated and ordered description of the phenomenon while (possibly) having the drawback of being too reflective, the interview, which tends to elicit the phenomenon in a more haphazard way, allows the subject, to a certain extent, spontaneously to re-live the situation as it was originally experienced; hence each approach compensates for the shortcomings of the other.

3.2 Analysis of the data

3.2.1 Method of explication

The protocols were analysed through implementing a modified version of the well-known psychological-phenomenological method developed by Giorgi (1975, 1982). Similar methods of analysis have been employed by Fischer (1971, 1974) and Stevick (1971). In the present study, Giorgi's method was modified by including an extra step, as implemented by de Koning (1979).

The method of explication adopted in respect of each protocol in turn may be described in terms of the following steps:

1. The entire description (i.e. both the written section and the inquiry) was read as many times as was necessary to grasp a sense of the whole statement.
2. Having grasped the sense of the whole, the researcher returned to the beginning of the text and read through it once more with the specific aim of discriminating "natural meaning units" (N.M.U.'s). These N.M.U.'s are discriminations within the subject's description that are perceived by the researcher when he assumes a psychological attitude towards the concrete description, and within this attitude, the set that the text is an example of conscience. At this point, these N.M.U.'s were expressed in the third person (whereas the original description is in the first person), such that wherever "I" occurred, it was transformed into "S" (for "subject"). Otherwise the subject's language was left unchanged. The reason for effecting this transformation is that it serves to remind the researcher that it is from the perspective of the subject that he ought to understand the description and not from his own perspective. As Wertz (1983) remarks, "the researcher is interested in the way the situation appears to the

subject, the meanings of the objects and events for him, and the participation in terms of which such meanings arise" (p. 206 emphasis added). The N.M.U.'s resulting from carrying out this step appear in the left-hand column of Table 1 of the protocols presented in the Results chapter.

3. The researcher then reflected on the subject's everyday expressions, now demarcated in terms of natural meaning units, and came up with the essence of that situation for the subject with respect to the phenomenon of conscience. Each N.M.U. was systematically interrogated, through a process of reflection and imaginative variation (see Giorgi, 1982a, pp. 12 f; Wertz, 1983, pp. 209-210), for what it revealed about conscience for each subject in his particular situation. The ultimate object of reflection was not the description itself (despite its necessity for this reflection), but the subject's actual situation as lived by him. As Wertz (1983) has noted, "...reflection ultimately addresses the subject's participation in the network of immanent significations which make up his lived reality" (p. 207). Hence it was necessary for the researcher to enter the world of the subject.

The results of this step appear in the right-hand column

of Table 1 of the protocols presented in the Results chapter. The aim of this step is to arrive at description which is psychologically revelatory. This phase of the research is crucial. As Wertz (1983) has observed:

"The transformation into psychological language is not a mere translation into or replacement with the abstract, sedimented terms of psychology. What is involved here is original speaking on the part of the researcher, for this phase is psychology in the making" (p. 210).

4. Next the researcher expressed the transformed meaning units (occurring in the right-hand column of Table 1), more directly in terms of conscience. The results of this step appear in Table 2 of the protocols presented in the Results chapter. These central themes (each of which expresses more generally the essence of a number of transformed N.M.U.'s) were arrived at with a view to formulating the General Description. Consequently, it was necessary in places to include in the Specific Description of the situated structure, constituents of the original protocol which, though necessary to make sense of the Specific Description, were not included in Table 2 because of their being too specific. This is the step which was derived from the method of de Koning (1979).

5. Finally, the researcher synthesised and integrated the insights achieved in the above steps (especially as expressed in the central themes of Table 2 referred to in step 4) into a consistent description of the structure of conscience. This description is referred to as the Specific Description of the situated structure of conscience, and appears in Table 3 of the protocols presented in the Results chapter. The structure is described as being "situated" in that the Specific Description remains faithful to the concrete, individual subject and his specific situation. The extent to which this Specific Description actually did remain true to the situation as lived by the subject was checked by discussing it with the subject. Where discrepancies arose between his actual experience and the researcher's description, the description was modified accordingly. The term "situated" is dropped when we move to the General Description in which more than one subject (and hence situation) is involved.

3.2.2 Extended Description of the structure of conscience

The Specific Descriptions of the situated structures of conscience were then integrated into an Extended Description. The researcher read and re-read the Specific Description and central themes of each protocol until

common themes emerged. It should be noted, however, that the Extended Description contains not only common themes, but also themes which are not necessarily common to two or more protocols, but which, although they might appear in only one protocol, serve to illuminate interesting possibilities in the experience of conscience.

3.2.3 General Description of the structure of conscience

Finally, the researcher formulated a General Description, which, as distinct from the Extended Description, contains only those themes which occur at least implicitly in the protocols generally. Taken as a whole, the General Description embodies the necessary and sufficient conditions, constituents and structural relations which constitute the phenomenon of conscience in general. In order to carry out this step it was necessary to make a deeply reflective penetration into each situated structure, in the light of the others, in order to find common features that were sometimes highly implicit. It should be noted at this point that, in order for an insight or theme to be generally valid, "...it is not required that it must have already been made explicit in all cases but that it can be found in the other cases upon further reflection" (Wertz, 1983, p. 230). Our aim here is to establish what is typical of the phenomenon (viz. conscience) rather than what is universal (Professor D Kruger, personal communication, 1984).

CHAPTER 4

4. RESULTS

This chapter will take the following form:

4.1 Protocol A : Kristen

Table 1 : Qualitative Analysis

Table 2 : Central themes expressed more directly in
terms of conscience

Table 3 : Specific Description of the situated structure
of conscience

4.2 Protocol B : Burt

Table 1 : Qualitative Analysis

Table 2 : Central themes expressed more directly in
terms of conscience

Table 3 : Specific Description of the situated structure
of conscience

4.3 Protocol C : Janet

Table 1 : Qualitative Analysis

Table 2 : Central themes expressed more directly in
terms of conscience

Table 3 : Specific Description of the situated structure
of conscience

4.4 Protocol D : Leonard

Table 1 : Qualitative Analysis

Table 2 : Central themes expressed more directly in
terms of conscience

Table 3 : Specific Description of the situated structure
of conscience

4.5 Extended Description of the structure of conscience

4.6 General Description of the structure of conscience

In the left-hand column of Table 1, wherever the researcher's words appear (either in the form of a question or a clarifying remark) they have been demarcated by the use of brackets. The acronym "NROC", occurring in the right-hand column of this table, stands for "not revelatory of conscience".

In order to avoid making this chapter (and thesis) disproportionately lengthy, the qualitative analysis of only the first two protocols has been presented here. The remaining two protocols (C and D) may be found in their original form, though demarcated in terms of meaning units, in the Appendix. Should the qualitative analyses of these protocols be required, they may be obtained from the researcher.

4.1 PROTOCOL A : KRISTEN

Table 1: Qualitative Analysis

<u>Discriminated meaning units expressed as much as possible in S's language and based upon the perspective that the description was an example of conscience.</u>	<u>Discriminated meaning units expressed more directly in psychological language and with respect to rele- vancy for the phenomenon of con- science.</u>
1 As S advanced in her position, was promoted, drove a company car, getting an above average salary, there was no reason for her to leave. She was told she was apparently respected by the staff.	In view of the status, material security and respect from colleagues which S was granted in her job, she saw no reason to leave it.
2 The decision (to leave) came when, in one of S's regular disagree- ments with her boss, she heard herself uttering a sentence which meant nothing.	She decided to leave when she found herself saying something meaningless which she had not consciously in- tended to say.
3 S realised she hadn't even been really listening to what was being said, nor had she bothered to construct a sentence making sense.	S realised that she had not been involved meaningfully in the situation in which she found herself.

4 S was bored with the set-up, she didn't really want to be there and she wasn't suited to the work she was doing.

S experienced her situation as boring and uninviting, and felt unsuited to her work.

5 But because of the above (being promoted, driving a company car, getting an above average salary, being respected by the staff) S had stayed, thinking it was the "right" thing to do.

S remained in the situation in which she did not feel at home through implicitly accepting what she perceived to be the general view that it was the right thing to do.

6. S decided to leave, but not to go into a similar job in another company, but find what she knew was more her type of work, even if it meant dropping in salary, and losing the car.

S decided to find work to which she would be more suited, even though this might have entailed sacrificing the material benefits associated with her current job.

7 (You mention that you were bored with the set-up in your job and you didn't really want to be there. Can you tell me a bit more about that?)

S found that although she was doing work that was important,

Despite the occasional sense of achievement, S constantly experienced

- and although she sometimes came away feeling at the end of the day... "Oh I've achieved something, I've done something that was good," she had the constant underlying feeling that she was not actually satisfied.
- 8 (S felt that) she was doing things which she was thinking and not feeling. She was thinking it was good and thinking it had potential and it probably had potential, and for that reason she stayed, because it had potential she was sure, and therefore she must get that potential.
- 9 But S wasn't really interested whether they (the company) made one million profit that year and forty million the next year, and basically that was what her objectives were. She wasn't interested in setting the objectives which you had to set every three months, that she would conduct an interview
- an underlying feeling of dissatisfaction.
- S's behaviour was prompted by her thinking, and she was not committed to her behaviour at the affective level. It was her faith in the potential which she saw in the situation, which led her to remain in it.
- S was not interested in the dictated objectives which she was expected to strive for, and saw them as unimportant.

on such and such a day and she would get the statistics by such and such a time. She really couldn't see any importance in it.

- 10 In terms of the whole she could see why it was important. But where she was concerned, it just held no relevance for her at all. S could see the importance of the objectives in terms of the entire organisation, but they lacked relevance for her personally.
- 11 Basically it ended up that S was working for a salary and for a rise at the end of the year and the objectives that were set during the year would go to determine whether she got an increase or not. The objectives that were being set for her were so inane in her opinion, that she thought how could she get a salary increase on such rubbish. Ultimately, S experienced herself as working for long-term, impersonal goals, the basis of which she found inane and degrading.
- 12 Though S was getting paid well, she wasn't getting the salary that other personnel managers...or she could have got if she had gone to another company, because the change would have increased the salary a few S felt that she did not deserve the good salary she was being paid in view of the work she was doing.

hundred, simply by changing jobs, so although S wasn't getting as much as she could have got in another company, she at the same time felt that her work didn't justify what she was getting.

13 And yet S didn't feel that she was prepared to go through all the rubbish that she had to go through, like this one not liking the meals downstairs, and in the canteen the manager speaking badly to the Blacks, and having to sort that problem out. She just thought, why couldn't they get on and sort their own problems out, why must she go in there. She almost justified her salary, not by the thinking she was having to do, but with the endurance and the tolerance she was having to undertake. She just thinks she was there for the wrong reasons.

S endured and tolerated much that was unpleasant to her in order to stay in her position and obtain her salary. She thinks she was there for the wrong reasons.

14 (You didn't really identify with the goals that were being set for you?)

S did identify with the goals that were being set for her. She used to get quite excited really when a planned objective had been reached and she had contributed to that in selecting the right people because they could not have done it without the right people.

S would get excited when an objective, to the attainment of which she had contributed, was reached.

15 But at the same time there were so many factors that apparently seemed beyond (her realm of influence), that it seemed almost irrelevant whether S chose the right people or not. If the economic situation went down, then those people were fired, and although they had proved themselves to be the right people, they had got what they were meant to get, the other factor is beyond anybody's control, they were sent off. Then they found themselves having to look for another group of people, but the calibre they had to look for was not the same, and they had to produce the same results.

S would doubt the relevance of her contributions in the face of the uncontrollable factors which could randomly rob these contributions of their value, rendering them futile.

16 There were certain procedures that were taking place there that S couldn't agree with, and she felt that other practices could have been used that were perhaps more humane. S disagreed with the inhumane practices carried out at her work, and felt that better alternatives were possible.

17 S has a conflict about business. She doesn't know that business needs to be a cut-throat thing, yet it seems (to her) to be the only way that people are able to operate in business. She thinks that one can combine a humane approach to business and still meet objectives, but one will meet them in a pleasanter environment. NROC

18 What was happening in S's situation was that the economic state was becoming very tight and people were becoming very angry and goals were having to be met, but the manager was looking at things in (terms of) short-term aims and not long-term effects. So if they could make sure that they could get rid of NROC

everybody who was perhaps a little bit superfluous, then make those (remaining) others work harder, which in itself is okay that the others work harder but then when it is time to get more people to come in, they are not seeing the effect that it is having on the morale of the people who have had to stay, as are the new people who are going to come in. Because they (the new employees) are going to know what the company does in the hard times, and in a hard time that company just gets rid of people, so they come in with an insecurity immediately that people who have stayed and worked hard are resentful and also insecure, because they actually have got nothing more except that they have kept their jobs, which is perhaps a big thing, but they have had to work double and the company has given them nothing else. And should that economic situation arise again, they may be the next to go, and what have they got from it? And so it seemd to S that while they

were on the one hand achieving something, on the other hand - which S thinks might have been greater than what they were achieving - they were creating an atmosphere amongst these people who were being forced to do something and not really doing it willingly, and not with the will to do it.

- 19 (They were just parts in a big organisation without being given their due as people?)

S assents to the question. And then there would be all those various training courses, to motivate and to consider and to respect and to negotiate, but when it came down to the crunch, there was no such thing as negotiation and no such thing as consideration, it was a case of the manager saying, "These are your objectives, and I don't really care how you feel about them, you just do them." Yet in the training and in the

S perceived a discrepancy between the policies the company advocated to be adopted (humane policies emphasising consideration and negotiation) and the policies actually adopted by the company in practice (policies involving coercion). S saw no way of assenting to objectives that were dictated in a manner which precluded her own personal involvement in them.

interactions, they were saying,
"You have to agree on your objectives, you must agree on them, otherwise you are not going to achieve them, if you don't agree." But the way it was put across, there was no chance of agreeing.

20 S takes herself as an example.
"What are your objectives, Kristen?" (her boss would ask), and S would say, "I would like to see more industrial relations being done, how I plan this and that to do it."
"Oh, that is an excellent idea Kristen", and then (she would) write it down. "I want you to do this Kristen, I want you to do the stats for this and this."

While explicitly acknowledging and praising S's objectives, S's boss would tacitly and in effect ignore them.

21 But S would say, "What are we getting from these stats?" "Well its going to prove to England or to whoever that we have achieved this and done that", and S would say, "But we did this last year and nothing came out of it so why must

S was forced to give precedence to the objectives that were dictated to her, even though these were, to her, pointless objectives. As a result, her own objectives were sometimes eliminated entirely.

I do it this year?"

"No, we have got to do it." So that would take precedence over industrial relations, and, in fact, certain things just eliminated all of S's own objectives.

22 So S would be doing her own objectives only when she could. But they weren't becoming the issue. Now that S is out of it, it has distanced itself, but while she was there, it was like it wasn't real. S's own objectives acquired a mere peripheral status and her situation seemed unreal to her.

23 S had a new chap come and work with her, and she thought, well, she couldn't tell him what was going on because she didn't want to influence (him) - maybe it was just her own perceptions of the whole thing. She didn't want to influence (him) - he was terribly excited about coming (into the company), and doing his work, what he had been told (to do), and he was there for three months and he said, he started to express what S When a new employee joined the company, S was at first reluctant to influence him with her perception of the work situation, since she suspected that her view might not have been shared by others. However, when he began to express feelings similar to her own regarding the work situation, she felt that she could openly share her reality with him.

was feeling or had been feeling, and S thought, okay, now they could talk. Because prior to that S was not, she did not feel in a position that she could tell him what was getting on her nerves and what wasn't right and what shouldn't have been done.

24 While S was trying to (work productively in her situation) and not achieving (this), she thought it (her failure) must just be part of herself. And he (the new employee) said it was just nothing (compared) to what he had expected, the whole thing was just a game, which was not even a nice game.

The new employee confirmed the reality of S's perception of the situation as an artificial and unpleasant one, whereas before she had doubted this reality and saw her difficulties as being part of herself.

25 One would be rated at the end of the year, like A, B, C, D, E, and a C would be the good average which most of them would get, and to be a B or A one had to be absolutely like a six to ten worker. Doing all sorts of things after work. When he (the new employee) approached

The symbols by which the employees were rated each year were fairly arbitrarily assigned and lacked meaning.

somebody and said: "What must I do because I want to get the 120% bonus", they couldn't answer. So these things were just symbols. They had no meaning attached to them.

26 So this is what the whole job was. A lot of words with no real significance.

S saw her job as being devoid of all real meaning, while attempting to sustain the facade of meaningfulness.

27 (You mentioned that you thought it was the right thing to do, to stay in your job, although you didn't enjoy it and you were bored, you felt it was the right thing to do. Just tell me a bit more about that?)

S had felt that perhaps she had got into the syndrome of "What is adult?" (In terms of this syndrome) you don't go chopping and changing jobs - S had been to university, had a decent job - and not many people have a decent job - and you don't just throw up everything and

S remained in her unpleasant situation since, to have left it, she would have had to go against what she believed to be generally expected of a woman of her age and background.

start again at something new, and definitely not at S's age. That really would be a bit irresponsible and perhaps not in the so-called adult way.

28 Every time that S wanted to change or do something different, she did it and had continued opposition from those around her, that she shouldn't have done it, that she should be this and should be that.

Whenever S wanted to break away from her previous ways of being, she did so, despite opposition from those around her, who prescribed how she should be.

29 S had got into a position which she recognised as being a very good position and recognised herself as having a responsibility. She wasn't doing a job that perhaps she could have done ten years ago. She had moved. She hadn't dropped in her (salary)...she had progressed, and therefore she believed because she thought that that job had potential and that she could progress further in it, and thought, well, stop chasing rainbows and thinking that something is better somewhere

S was reluctant to leave her situation since she held a good, responsible position which she regarded as an achievement to have attained. This position carried with it the trimmings, securities and status which people in general regarded as valuable. She doubted the realisability of her own aspirations, which she felt might merely be fantastic, and was tempted to accept the received reality, in terms of which she had fulfilled her status

else. Just get together and stay. as an adult.

(She thought to herself that) she had all the benefits everyone seemed to strive for and she had the security everyone seemed to think one must have and she had status and reputation and she had the job. She had a job, and that is what you do when you are grown up, is to have a job.

30 So S also in her own mind thought maybe she was just thinking things that weren't there, maybe she just fantasised in that she had illusions about things that were better. Maybe she must come to terms with reality and that was what life was all about, dull and monotonous, and get on with it.

S doubted the reality of her own possibilities, and thought she might have to come to terms with the everyday reality which she found dull and monotonous.

31 So actually all the time, S was actually pushing away from her feelings, her own gut feeling, she supposes, she was ignoring what she was really feeling and she was rationalising it with all the out-

S was actively avoiding her own gut feelings in her attempt to sustain and live in terms of reality as socially defined.

side arguments, that she had been told and taught and recognised that that was how it happened to people as they went from one stage to the next.

32 S was continually saying to herself, "Now stop thinking (that there's a better job)". She recognised that there wasn't a better job, and she recognised that changing her company and going into the field that she knew she had experience in, she didn't think for one moment that she was going to find contentment there (in a new job). Because people said to S, "If you are not happy here, go and get another job, you can get it", and S recognised that she could get it. She had qualifications, she had experience and she had the necessary experience, but she realised - she at least listened to herself there, and said "That is not different to what this is because it's not so much the job that is the issue, but

S realised that what made her unhappy was not so much the particular company itself that she worked for, but the general approach and policies of this company, which were shared by most other companies she knew, and on this point she did not allow herself to be persuaded otherwise by the people around her.

the content is going to be the same; the approach is going to be the same, because this is what business is."

S had visited other companies on business, and she had seen how they were working, and their approach wasn't much different to the company she was working for.

33 So S wasn't, she thinks that when things started falling into place, she realised she wasn't actually thinking things were greener somewhere else, she realised they were as bleak everywhere else, but in that bleakness you can have satisfaction, whereas what S was doing, she was having that bleakness without satisfaction. Even if she moved to another company, not another pharmaceutical company, but just engineering or something, she would initially have had that "Ah, this is more satisfying", but only because she was mixing with a different thinking person. But once the acquaintances and relation-

S found no fulfillment in her work situation, and saw the work as being intrinsically unfulfilling.

ships had been established, the essence of the work, the content of the work was going to be the same, and therefore her feeling about it was going to be the same. Her attitude towards it, her satisfaction that it wasn't fulfilling, (were going to be the same).

34 The right thing to do then, S supposes, to answer R's question ("Why did you stay?"), was because of outside, it wasn't right for S, but it was right for what she had been led to believe was right. It was right in that context. It was not right for S.

35 (You said that eventually you decided, the decision came when you had one of your usual disagreements with your boss, and you heard yourself uttering a sentence which meant nothing. Could you say a bit more about that?)

S wishes she could remember

S stayed in her situation not because it was the right thing to do for her personally, but because it was right within the context of socially approved values.

S prereflectively uttered a non-

the sentence. She just knows it was nonsense, absolutely nonsensical, she doesn't even think the words linked. She only realised she had been talking nonsense when she recognised the look on her (boss') face. Her face told S that what she had said was, she couldn't fathom out what S was saying.

36 S then reflected, and thought, "My God, now I have obviously come to the limit. If I am able to stand here in front of her and be somewhere else while an apparently important issue is being discussed." S really doesn't remember what the issue was.

On reflection, S was shocked at being ambiguously present (she was simultaneously there and also not there) to her boss while a seemingly important issue was being discussed, and this incident constituted a turning point for her.

37 S had got to the point where nothing was important, and that is probably why she doesn't remember it (the issue) because everything was just going into the other, everything was as unimportant and as insignificant and the issues were being made about those insignificant

S fails to remember the particular issue as at this stage everything seemed undifferentiated to her, all things being equally unimportant and insignificant, and issues were being made of these matters which were of no consequence to S.

things and S was responding to something like - she can perhaps give an example.

38 The riots...and they (the workers) were commemorating it, and she (S's boss) said, "Have you checked that they are all at work?", so S said, "Yes, that area is and that area is and Ben's checking up on the other two, but this one isn't. It was the 16th of June, it was ten o'clock in the morning, and they had not arrived at work. "What are you going to do Kristen?" (asked S's boss). So S knows that on this occasion, which she doesn't think was the one that she mentioned (S apparently thinks she mentioned an occasion in her written protocol), S said, "Well what do you want me to do?" because what can you do when you are fifty miles from Soweto and its ten o'clock in the morning and you haven't a clue where to find the people anyway. S found the

What had once been S's work-project had lost all significance for her, such that what arose as issues for her boss in the work situation, were non-issues for S, since they were devoid of significance for her and failed to move her.

question inane and therefore the answer was appropriate. But this was what S was continually having to deal with. Situations and questions, expecting answers, which didn't have any...there was not significance in them. Maybe S had got to the point where those things did have significance but she just wasn't seeing it.

39 There was another example where S had not been able to find a Vet. Rep. They had advertised and they had advertised, and they had gone to colleges and they had gone to universities. They had gone into the Farmer's Weekly, the Landbou, the works, and the manager downstairs was getting into an absolute tizz. He was obviously going back to her (S's boss) and saying, "What is going on?" And every week S would be reporting on the progress that had or hadn't been made and the new ideas that had been implemented, but she wasn't getting into a frenzy, S begins to get annoyed with the set-up at work, wants to throw it up, and no longer cares about it.

and she wasn't getting excited, she wasn't screaming and she wasn't crying and she wasn't throwing her hands up in alarm, and she (S's boss) came to S one morning and S - maybe this was also a point where she thought, "Dammit, forget the rest of this, I don't care."

40 She (S's boss) went to S and she said, "What have you done?" in a very aggressive, accusing tone, and she said, "I am so upset (and she banged her hands on the desk) I am so upset with you Kristen, because it is your responsibility to make sure that Ben does his work, and he's not doing his work, and you haven't got your Vet. Rep." S said, "Well, can you give me any idea of what more could be done in this instance?" "It doesn't matter what could have been done and not been done Kristen, but you don't seem to be perturbed about it." So S said, "Because I am not throwing my arms up and I'm not having a

S's boss expressed her anger to S concerning S's apparent lack of involvement in and concern for her work. S justified herself by saying that she need not show her anxiety and concern in order to feel it. S was exasperated with her boss' demands which she believed to be unreasonable.

tantrum and because I'm not screaming, doesn't mean that I am not perturbed. It means that I'm aware of the situation and that I am not going to let it get out of hand."

She said, "But you just don't seem anxious." So S said, "Well I don't have to show my anxiety, I am as concerned as you are, I'm doing perhaps more than what you are doing, and I am just not showing it. But you cannot come to me and tell me that I am not doing anything and I am not anxious because I am not letting everyone know where I am." S said, "Anyway what do you want me to do?" S asked her at that stage. She said, "I don't know, I don't know", and S just walked out.

41 She (S's boss) called S back afterwards and said that she apologised but she was so worried she didn't know what to do. S said they could think of something to do, but what got S was the fact that she was getting or supposed to be

S was annoyed by her boss' wanting her to control things beyond her realm of influence, since S saw this to be futile.

getting agitated over issues that were being controlled by other people to the point that they could be, and she (S's boss) was asking S now to control environmental factors, which she found unreasonable and which she found totally pointless.

42 She (S's boss) wasn't using the fact that the environmental factors were creating a situation, and in that, they could combine and find a resolution. She (S's boss) was wanting to change the environmental factors and S was constantly being confronted with why she had not changed the environmental factors and economy and this nonsense in her mind.

S's view of the set-up at work differed from that of her boss, since she wanted to work constructively with the givens of the situation whereas her boss wanted to change these givens.

43 (It was completely out of your...)

S thinks people can control the environment up to a point, you can control what is happening up to a point, but you can't (control it

S was affected by her boss' response of agitation to the work situation with which she could not identify herself.

completely). S was getting the feeling she (S's boss) was almost asking S that sort of thing, (like to) change night and day. She (S's boss) wasn't letting things ride their course, because things had to move and they would change, and in that moving and changing, as long as you are doing perhaps more than you might have done in easier times, when the change comes, you are ready for it, and you can cope with it. She (S's boss) just wasn't allowing that motion to take place, it was a case of push push, get nowhere, know she was getting nowhere, but because of the anxiety of the economy and the pressures that were coming down on her, nothing seemed to be in perspective, and S was getting the effect of this agitation.

- 44 While S could see it (the situation involving the anxiety-provoking problem), she just didn't want to bear it, she couldn't see the need S no longer saw the need to tolerate the demanding situation at work, but initially rationalised her remaining in it by blaming her

that she had to tolerate it for ten hours a day. There were factors in her own personal life that were aggravating the situation at work. If S had had a different personal life at that time, she perhaps would not have reacted in the same way at work, but she rationalised it in that way, that maybe that was another reason why she stayed, because she kept thinking, "Well, don't blame work for everything." But in discussions with people working with her, and with her own feelings becoming stronger and stronger...she knew it was not only her personal life and not only the work situation, she was in the wrong place.

personal life for her unhappiness. However, through discussions with other people, and her feelings becoming increasingly stronger, she realised that she was intrinsically in the wrong place.

- 45 If the objectives were right for S, she could tolerate the work position - if she was working towards something - but she had nothing to work towards and she was not having to tolerate those inanities as far as she was concerned for nothing. S was not happy about the goals which were set for her, and not being committed to these goals, she felt she had nothing to work towards in the future. Consequently, she was unable to view the meaninglessness of her present situation as being in the service

of a desired future, and hence found it intolerable.

46 (You mentioned earlier on that you thought you weren't in the right place, and that you could be somewhere else without being there. You said that when you were talking to her (your boss) and the sentence didn't make sense, you said that it was a shock to you that you were there, but you weren't really there)

Physically, S was standing in front of her (boss), but emotionally and mentally she was not there at all. She was not applying herself, she was not getting involved.

S was ambiguously present to her situation: her presence lacked engagement and involvement.

47 (Could you tell me how you felt once you did give up your job and get out of that situation? Did things change at all, did you feel any different when you gave up your job and so on?)

S definitely felt different.

Having resolved to leave her

Nothing changed in the environment, nothing was different (in the environment). The same issues arose, but within herself - and she didn't even feel that she didn't have to worry about it (work in general) because she actually was concerned about everything that was going on till the moment she left. But what she did feel was that she actually now could face anything that she had to face. She had the strength.

situation at work, S felt strong and confident that she would be able to cope with whatever the situation demanded of her, even though the situation itself had not changed.

48 (S felt that) she actually didn't need all those things that she was convincing herself that she did need. Like the motor car, like the salary, like the flat, that sort of thing.

S felt that she did not actually need the material benefits accruing from her job which had contributed to her remaining in that job.

49 It was an incredible sense of relief...an incredible sense of... there is something in the future, whereas before S had got to the point where there was nothing. That she was going to wake up and do that for the rest of her life -

S felt great relief in that the future now held some promise for her, and no longer seemed like a repetition of the routine and vacuous past.

wake up, go to work, go home and
go to sleep.

50 S just thought, there is light and S felt hopeful about the future
there is hope and there is something and could see that there was
positive in her life and she can see something positive in her life
it and she is going to experience it. which she could look forward to
experiencing.

51 There was a sense of relief and at Repetitious of NMU's 48 and 49.
the same time knowledge that she
could get through without those
things which she thought were so
important.

52 S thinks she also felt very good S felt good within herself at
within herself. She actually had having risked doing something
risked it (resigning from her job), which stemmed entirely and ex-
she hadn't...she had done it on her clusively from her own resolve,
own. No-one had said "Do it", no- and which was discouraged by others.
one had said...she just had en- However, judging from the response
couragement the other way - she of surprise of those around her,
she shouldn't do it and yet she knew she knew she had done the right
that with all the surprise around thing.
her, that it was the right thing.

53 (They were actually surprised...)

(S's colleagues were surprised) that she could give up (her job). S had one chap come to her and he walked into her office and said, "I don't believe you are going", and S said, "Well, why not?" He said, "I just don't believe you are going to really give up everything." He said, "I would have thought that a woman in your position and at your age would be happy to be where they were and would stick to it."

A colleague of S's expressed disbelief and astonishment at S's abandoning her well-established and desirable position at her stage in life.

54 (S's colleague) said, "Do you know what, I actually admire you..." S thought, "Well hell, I didn't expect it from him." He said, "I don't think I would have the courage to do it." And S said to him, "It's got nothing to do with courage, it's got something to do with need. I have to do it because I am not going to die here."

When S's colleague expressed his admiration of her courage in resigning, she told him that she acted out of need and not courage. She resigned since she experienced herself as dying in her work situation.

55 He said, "Yes I know, I'm dying

When S's colleague confessed that

but I've got responsibilities that I have to keep." S said, "Well you don't have to make that as an excuse to stay in a place that is going to kill you, or in any job that is going to kill you. I mean, take it into consideration, but don't let it be your deciding factor."

56 S had others come to her and say, "No, you can't really be leaving. It's not fair, you belong here", and she had that loyalty to them. She had a loyalty, for all her dislike of the work, she had a loyalty to the company. She said, "Ja, I had the same feeling of loss on one hand and I am going to be losing contact with people I like, but at the same time, it's right for me, that's why I am doing it."

57 People would come to S and say, "Why are you leaving? Don't you like the work here?" But it was only after S had made her decision. Before that decision nothing like

he also felt that he was dying in his work, S pointed out to him that he need not succumb entirely to his situation, even though he had responsibilities to fulfill via his work.

Colleagues expressed their disappointment at S's leaving them and the company. Even though S felt she would be losing contact with people she liked and the company to which she felt loyal, S was going to leave because it was right for her to do so.

S's decision to leave threw into question the taken for granted assumption of others that she enjoyed her work.

that had been mentioned or even approached.

58 (S believes that) there are so many people in many positions when they don't actually want to be there. They are scared and they also try thinking, "I've got to stay here because that is what it is all about", and thinking, "Well, life's got to be like that."

S believes that many people remain in undesirable positions as they do not see any other alternatives in life.

59 S felt good, she felt good within herself that she had actually come to a decision and that she would actually leave and not do what she thought was "right".

S felt good within herself that she had decided to do what was right for her, and not what seemed right in terms of the received reality.

60 (You decided in terms of your own feelings or...)

S decided in terms of her own feelings and her own beliefs. Perhaps her own inner knowledge that - her inner knowledge that she wasn't where she wanted to be, and she was pretending that she was. Perhaps

S decided in terms of her own personal knowledge and beliefs. She realised that she was not where she wanted to be, though she had been pretending that she was, and in confronting her self-

she confronted her knowledge of herself and tried to do something about it.

knowledge (that her situation was not right for her), she tried to act on it.

61 Across the way there was another instance (of S's stance clashing with that of her colleagues/the company). They had an open day at work to celebrate their 75 years, S thinks it was, and the man who was supposed to be doing it had been going to S - one of the managers - he had been going to S to organise various personnel matters, but he had been doing all the arranging and it had been his absolute pride and joy, that he had got that far, and he then got terribly ill and had to go to hospital for a heart operation. He was near to retirement. He was going to retire within two years and S was then called in and told that she would have to take over the whole project and do it, but she would have to work in conjunction with this Mr X (sic) and she was told to go and visit him in the

NROC

hospital and find out what he had done and to carry on from there.

62 S did this but she also realised that this was the thing that was keeping this man going. He had planned almost a year beforehand what he was going to do and how he was going to do it, because it was quite a big celebration within the company, and S thought well okay fine, she'd do all the odd jobs for him and do all the organizing and so the strain could be taken off him, but he could still call it his own project and call it his own success or non-success as he wished to. And when he came out of hospital S let him take over almost from where he had left off, she having done up to that point, and the day went off quite well.

63 After the day (of the celebration) S was called in and she was asked, "Why didn't you do this and why didn't you do that?" and she said,

S helped her sick colleague to execute his project, without overriding his decisions or robbing him of his responsibility for it.

S was reprimanded by her superiors for realising her colleague's project in terms of his directives rather than in terms of more

"Well, talking to Mr X we decided that we wouldn't." At the same time S had decided that it was his decision, it was his work as he was involved with it, and S wasn't going to go in and change everything that he had planned for a year.

desirable (to her superiors) alternatives, which she might have contributed.

64 S was then told, "Well you did realise that you were being tested, didn't you?" And S said yes, she realised she had been tested but that didn't mean to say that she had to walk over the man. She was told, "Oh, how do you think you are ever going to get ahead if you don't walk over him?" And that was the idea then, that you just took over and you did everything your own way and you ignored him, and you ignored everything that he had done.

S's humane values clashed with the more ruthless ones of her superiors.

65 S said, "Well, if that is the way you work in business then you must carry on, but I'm not working that way. I'm not prepared to walk over people to get myself satis-

S refused to be involved in a situation in which it was necessary to violate others in order to promote her own satisfaction, since she would not feel

faction. Because I will get there and I won't be satisfied so there won't be much point." satisfied under these conditions.

66 But then S went down to the head of the company and he almost told her the same thing, and he said that she had to be more demanding, she had to be more prepared to walk over people, because that is what the game was. How did S ever think that anyone else got into the positions they got into? When S spoke to the head of the company, he confirmed the views of her other superiors, saying that that was how things were.

67 And S said, "Well, my feeling was that the man's life was important, and I thought his morale was important and I didn't think that after the heart op, that I came in and he was almost made redundant. I didn't think that was going to do him any good and I wasn't prepared to do it." S expressed her concern for and consideration of her colleague in doing her job. She was not prepared to lay this aside in the service of greater efficiency or having herself promoted.

68 But it (S's taking the well-being of her colleague into consideration) definitely worked against her. S remained firm in her stance, even though others were against her because of it.

They held it against her and they didn't like what she had done and she just thought that she was not going to sit there and walk over people because she wanted to get ahead.

69 (S thought that) she could get there Repetitious of NMU 65.

(ahead). If she couldn't get there on her own qualifications and on her own work then she was not going to get there. And she was not going to get there by stamping all over people.

70 And S thinks that after that there arose that feeling of just going to work; just going to work because that was what her job was, not because she really wanted to be (going to work) - her whole being wasn't there. After S's disillusionment with her bosses, she felt that she was just going to work out of sheer habit without feeling any enthusiasm. Her whole being was not involved; her involvement was partial.

71 S was walking there (to work) as an empty shell - she was just presenting herself, getting on with the work, and becoming like an auto- S experienced herself at work as being empty and insubstantial, routinely getting on with her work and becoming lifelessly

maton.

automatic.

- 72 There was nothing, there was no joy in it (her work), there was no pleasure in it, there was no feeling in it. It was more of a case of this must be done, therefore they did it. S would do this and S would do that but nothing more and almost nothing less.
- S experienced no enthusiasm or joy in doing her work, which lacked feeling and was experienced as being dictated to S.
- 73 Perhaps S spent a lot more time (at work), but she didn't spend it feeling. She didn't spend herself; she wasn't there.
- S spent time at work without feeling anything. She withheld herself from her work situation and experienced herself as being absent.
- 74 It was almost an uncanny sensation sitting in that office and walking up and down the stairs, because S felt that her body was there but her mind and everything else, or she, was somewhere else, thinking of better things.
- S felt uncanny at work: she experienced her body as being there, but she and her concerns were somewhere else.
- 75 S knows that the feeling that that incident (covered in NMU's
- S lost respect for the people with whom she worked, and this

61-69) invoked in her at the time played a part in her questioning
was utter disgust for those people why she stayed in her situation.
and they went down in her estimation
so dramatically that after that she
couldn't respond to them or respect
them as she had in the past. And
she thinks that probably also added
to her feeling of, well, what was
she doing there because she was
working with people that she had no
regard for and yet she stayed
because it was the right thing.
It was a crazy situation. She
thinks that was all.

Protocol A : Table 2

Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscience

1. S felt out of place in the situation in which she found herself.
2. S experienced a lack of meaningful involvement and commitment in her situation which was intrinsically unfulfilling. She perceived the situation as precluding her own personal involvement and initiative, and experienced her behaviour as being dictated by others and the situation.
3. S was not living towards a desired future; the future was experienced as being uninviting.

4. There was disagreement between S's own values and those of others.
5. S experienced an emptiness and lack of genuineness in others and in their communal practices/behaviour.
6. S was unmoved, no longer cared, and inhibited the expression of her feelings.
7. S behaved in an empty, lifelessly automatic manner, not being committed to her behaviour at the affective level. She experienced herself as dying.
8. In withholding herself from her situation, S experienced herself as being absent, and felt uncanny and disembodied. She was ambiguously present to her situation.
9. S experienced feelings of unreality through ignoring her own gut feelings and neglecting her own project in favour of realising the objectives of others.
10. S lived in terms of the received reality (thereby sacrificing her own reality/self) for the sake of the material and emotional security which accrued from this.
11. S felt uncertain about her own reality, which opposed the received reality.

12. A new colleague, in responding in a manner which was overtly congruent with S's own reality (as distinct from the received reality), lent substance to this reality and enabled her to share it with him.
13. A crucial incident occurred when S behaved prereflectively in a manner which was totally out of keeping with the usual, expected response in her situation.
14. S began to assert her reality over and against that of others. She confronted her experience and self-knowledge and began to act on it.
15. Having acted in terms of her own experience, S felt strong and the future held promise for her. She felt good within herself at having acted in terms of her own reality, though her action had stemmed not from courage but from grave need.
16. S's acting in terms of her own reality (in leaving her job) threw into question the taken-for-granted reality of others.

Protocol A : Table 3

Specific Description of the situated structure of conscience.

S was not meaningfully involved in her situation at work. She felt out of place there and experienced the situation as uninviting, boring, dissatisfying and intrinsically unfulfilling. The future for her held nothing towards which she wanted to work: she was not committed to the goals which were set for her to the exclusion of her own parti-

icipation, finding them inane, degrading and lacking in personal relevance. She experienced her work as being dictated to her. Hence she was unable to view the endurance of her unpleasant current situation as being in the service of a desired future, and found her own contributions futile.

S disagreed with the inhumane practices carried out at work and experienced a lack of genuineness in her colleagues and the work in general, there being a discrepancy between professed values and behaviour which contradicted these values. The situation was devoid of all real meaning for her, and she was unmoved, no longer cared and did not express her feelings. She worked out of sheer habit, without feeling or enthusiasm, and experienced herself as being empty, insubstantial and lifelessly automatic. She withheld herself from her situation and experienced herself as being absent. She felt uncanny: she was not in the situation, though her body was, according to her experience. In that S pretended that she was where she wanted to be, although she felt that she was intrinsically in the wrong place, her presence lacked engagement and involvement.

She was not committed to her behaviour at the affective level, her actions being prompted by what she thought she ought to do. She neglected her own project in favour of realising the objectives of others, and in ignoring her own gut feelings, she experienced a feeling of unreality. She thought it right to continue to live within the context of socially approved values and she endured her most unpleasant situation for the sake of the material and emotional security that

followed from it. She was influenced by what she perceived to be the received reality, to feel that life by its very nature was dull and monotonous, and she feared opposing this received reality.

When a new colleague started work with S and expressed an affective response to the work situation that was similar to her own covert response, she was able to share her reality with him. She had previously felt uncertain about her reality, and had lacked faith in her aspirations and possibilities. However, he confirmed and lent substance to her reality, and through discussions with others she realised she was intrinsically in the wrong place, and began to feel more and more strongly about this.

A turning point came for S when she found herself prereflectively uttering a nonsensical sentence to her boss. An important issue was being discussed, and yet the entire state of affairs was undifferentiatedly unimportant to S. She was ambiguously present to her situation, being simultaneously there and not there.

Following the above experience S began to assert her own reality over and against that of others, and to take herself seriously. She began to confront her self-knowledge and to act on it; she resigned from her job. She felt strong and confident and realised that she did not really need the securities she had felt she needed. The future held promise for S, and she felt hopeful about it.

S felt good within herself at having risked doing something which was

based entirely and exclusively on her own resolve and which was discouraged by others. She had acted in terms of her own reality and not the received reality. However, she felt that she acted not out of courage but out of need, since she experienced herself as dying in her work situation.

S's leaving her job threw into question the taken for granted assumptions of her colleagues, disturbing the status quo. She was able to point out to a colleague that he was not a total victim of his situation in which he felt trapped, but that he could do something to transform it.

4.2 PROTOCOL B : BURT

Table 1: Qualitative Analysis

Discriminated meaning units expressed as much as possible in S's language and based upon the perspective that the description was an example of conscience.

Discriminated meaning units expressed more directly in psychological language and with respect to relevancy for the phenomenon of conscience.

1 When S was about 15, he went through a stage of tremendous religious turmoil.

At the age of about 15, S went through a stage of tremendous inner turmoil.

2 S was brought up Dutch Reformed. His grandfather was not only a DRC minister, but also editor of the official DRC magazine. His father was nominally a member of the DRC but did not agree with the church on most issues, and barely went to church. His mother, on the other hand, was devoutly DRC, went to all the services, and was a member of all the women's societies of the church. The rest of his family is also devoutly DRC, many of his

S was raised in terms of the predominant religious values of his culture and society, many of the members of his family being devoutly supportive of and actively involved in the religious institution associated with those values.

father's uncles and cousins being ministers.

3 S felt confused about all the different brands of Christianity, never really doubting that Christianity in its broadest sense was the true religion, though.

Though being assured of the truth of the predominant religion in its broadest sense, S felt confused about the different subclasses of that religion.

4 S once heard a story about a man in China who prayed to the true God to reveal which religion was the true religion. He came to accept Christianity. So S, too, prayed to God, asking Him to reveal the true Church to him.

Basing his approach on the example of another about which he had heard, S appealed to God for the truth to allay his confusion.

5 Through a lot of reading, talking to people and literally agonising nights of wrestling with the issue, S became convinced that the Catholic Church was the true Church.

Through much dialogue with others both in person and via literature, and having spent time agonisingly wrestling with his confusion, S became convinced of the truth.

6 This (being convinced that the Catholic Church was the true Church) put S in a tremendous predicament. S came from a thoroughly Afrikaans

S's conviction put him in a conflictual position in which the truth implicit in his conviction was in direct opposition to the

- community who were all at least nominally DRC. There was also the thought of his whole DRC-committed family. Yet he was convinced of the truth that the Catholic Church was the only true Church.
- 7 S felt absolutely compelled to do something about it (his conviction).
- 8 S started withdrawing from his friends and family, because he felt like a traitor to the cause.
- 9 S eventually plucked up the courage to tell his mother that he felt he had to become a Catholic.
- 10 S's mother begged him to wait until he was 21. S couldn't promise her that. He started going to the Catholic Church.
- standpoint of his family, community and culture.
- S felt absolutely compelled to act on his conviction.
- S began to withdraw from significant others since he felt that in holding to his conviction he was betraying their cause.
- S eventually plucked up the courage to share with his mother the necessity which he felt to act on his conviction.
- When this significant other begged S to delay any living out of his conviction until he reached an age commonly considered to be the age of discretion, S could not promise to do this, and

immediately began to act in accordance with his conviction.

11 S's grandmother came to visit once, and his mother begged him not to go to the Catholic Church that Sunday. He was so upset by the conflict of her request and honesty to his own convictions that he compromised by getting 'flu.

When S found himself in a position in which he felt torn between either appeasing a significant other by complying with her insistent desire that he go against his conviction, or being true to his conviction, he was so upset by this conflict that he compromised by falling ill.

12 S's mother told his grandmother about the whole issue anyway, and his grandmother came into his room, shut the door, and just said, "Your mother told me. And I just want you to know that I am bitterly disappointed in you," and left. S felt unbelievably hurt. Yet he could not do anything about it.

After hearing from S's mother of his failure to meet her (his grandmother's) expectations of him, S's grandmother expressed to him her bitter disappointment in him. S felt incredibly hurt at being thus rejected and yet could not change the situation.

13 S's father also talked to him about it (his wanting to become a Catholic) almost every day, telling him how unhappy he was making his mother,

S's father repeatedly brought to his awareness the fact that, in standing by his conviction, he was the source of great unhappiness

that she was crying herself to sleep every night.

to his mother.

14 S's father thought he was just being a fool. A church is a church for him (S's father) and he just couldn't see that it was an issue for S. He lost his temper with S time and again.

S's father being unable to share S's determination to act on his resolve repeatedly became angry with him.

15 Despite it all, S eventually became a Catholic as soon as he left school at the age of 17.

In spite of the strong opposition from significant others, and specifically his parents, S acted in accordance with his convictions.

16 In a sense S feels he did not have a choice. He had to become a Catholic. If he had not, he would not have been able to live with himself.

To the extent that he would not have been able to live with himself had he not done so, S felt compelled to act in accordance with his conviction which, in a sense, precluded choice on his part.

17 Much has happened to S since. He is now 36 and no longer a Catholic. He doesn't know if he is even a Christian. Yet he has never

Although S no longer lives in accordance with this conviction, he feels that at the time it was not a mistake to have acted in

- thought it a mistake to have become a Catholic.
- 18 S had to do it (to become a Catholic). He was compelled to do it, in a sense, despite tremendous pressure from his parents and the society in which he lived.
- 19 One thing that will always remain with S is the feeling of total isolation and loneliness he experienced at the time. He had nobody close to him who understood or encouraged him. He had to do it on his own.
- 20 (Becoming a Catholic) was probably the most difficult thing S has ever done in his life, yet he knows he had to do it. If he hadn't (become a Catholic), he doesn't know if he would have been able to live with himself.
- 21 To S this experience was the most profound experience of emerging
- accordance with his conviction.
- Despite tremendous pressure from his parents and society to the contrary, S felt compelled to act in accordance with his conviction.
- In his conviction S experienced a feeling of total isolation and loneliness, having nobody close to him who understood him or offered him support. He had to act on his own.
- Though acting in accordance with his conviction was probably the most difficult thing S has ever done, he had to do it, since, failing that, he is uncertain as to whether he would have been able to live with himself.
- NROC

from being untrue to himself.

- 22 (When did you begin to experience the turmoil and conflict you speak of here?)

S has difficulty in ascertaining when he first experienced the turmoil and conflict, which was a long time ago.

S has difficulty in pinpointing when the experience of turmoil and conflict began for him.

- 23 There was a long period of searching and thinking and reading and talking to people and finding out. But then there was a time - S can't remember when it was - when S realised that this was what he was looking for, or that this was the truth.

After a long period of exposing himself to the field of his concern through dialogue with others and with literature, there came a time when S realised that he had found what he had been looking for, or the truth.

- 24 The moment S got to that point (of having found what he was looking for, or the truth) he felt obliged in a way to do something about it. But it was only when the conviction of the truth of the matter was there - that he had this conviction in

When S became convinced of the truth or the answer to his questioning, he felt obliged to act on it.

his mind that this was the truth,
that he had to act on it.

25 It was when he was convinced of the truth and felt obliged to act on it, but was not yet doing so, that S experienced being untrue to himself.

It was when he was convinced of the truth and felt obliged to act on it but was not yet doing so, that S experienced being untrue to himself.

26 The experience of not being true to himself wasn't a clear thing - that S could say it was exactly at this point or that point.

For S the experience of being untrue to himself could not be explicitly located in time.

27 For a long time S felt that (the Catholic Church was the true Church), but it wasn't that convincing. But there was a point where S was absolutely convinced, and he thinks that that was when it (the experience of being untrue to himself) started.

For a long time S was aware of what he was ultimately to accept as the truth, but not very convincingly. But when S reached the point of being absolutely convinced of this truth, he began to experience being untrue to himself.

28 (Could you just tell me a bit more about what came before your being convinced that the Catholic Church was the Church?)

S thinks that what led to his being NROC
convinced that the Catholic Church
was the Church was that none of the
other Churches could guarantee
things - they couldn't guarantee
what they said was true and each
Church had something else to say.

29 The Catholic Church said, "We have NROC
an infallible Pope - what the Pope
says is infallible and we can
guarantee that it is true."
That and the fact that it was - it
had a long tradition of having been
around for two thousand years as
compared with the other Churches.
Up to 1600 or so there was only
one Church. These sort of things
S read about in books.

30 And S spoke to people who were NROC
Catholics. He spoke to a Catholic
priest. S entered into communication with
people who were members of a
religious group other than his
own (Catholics).

31 One of the things that put S off NROC
most was the Dutch Reformed Sunday
One of the things which put S
off his own Church was that he

school he was in - the prejudice of the Sunday school teacher. He was so blatantly prejudiced that S couldn't believe a word of what he said.

could not believe in his Sunday school teacher and what he stood for.

32 (S's inability to believe his Sunday school teacher) just made him ask more and more and more and more - he read more, and - he can't say much more than that.

S's inability to receive answers from his Sunday school teacher (to believe him) led him to question more and read more.

33 S doesn't know if this is relevant at all, but one of the things that attracted him (to the Catholic Church) was the music - the Gregorian Chant. S liked the discipline and the organised way of doing things and the difference in attitude the Catholics had compared to Protestants. Generally, the God of the Catholic Church was far jollier.

What attracted S to the Catholic Church were aspects such as their attitudes and approach which were different, in ways which S liked, from those of his own Church.

34 (How did you experience the being convinced - the actual knowing that this was the truth? Could

you just tell me a bit more about how you felt?)

S just knew it - with absolute certainty. It was a fact.

S experienced his conviction with absolute certainty, as a fact.

35 And then S eventually told his mother (that he felt he had to become a Catholic). And she tried to persuade him to become an Anglican. She said, "Please, just not a Catholic - become an Anglican. I mean, basically they're just the same - they have the same ceremonies, the same things, but just not a Catholic."

When S eventually told his mother about his feeling of having to act on his conviction, she tried to persuade him not to do so but to pursue another course which was more acceptable to her and which was just the same according to her judgement, which was in terms of superficial criteria.

36 And there was no way S could (become an Anglican). It was not the outward show, or what (the Church) presented itself like - as ceremonies or anything (that concerned S). (Whether or not) the Catholic Church had an altar or candles or music or anything like that - that had nothing to do with the point. It was the teaching

S could definitely not comply with his mother's wishes since for him the external, superficial trappings, upon the similarity of which her judgement was based, were of no consequence; what mattered to him was at a more fundamental level (the teaching itself).

itself (that mattered). The externals could have been anything.

- 37 It's difficult for S to say what he felt. He was totally convinced, but (his conviction) filled him with a feeling of absolute dread as well, because he knew that he had to do something about it. (He experienced) that feeling of real, real dread, once he knew that that was the truth for him. He knew he had to act on it. Though he stood firm in his conviction, S was filled with a feeling of absolute dread, because he knew he had to act on his conviction.
- 38 (Knowing he had to act on his conviction) really filled S with dread because he knew what he had to do. He knew it meant having to go against everything and everybody who at that stage was meaningful to him - like his parents and his background and his language group. Knowing he had to act on his conviction filled S with dread because he knew that it meant opposing all of his meaningful supports - his parents, his background and his culture.
- 39 S would stick out like a sore thumb, he knew that, and he was very scared. In acting in accordance with his conviction S would no longer be an inconspicuous, taken-for-granted member of his group; he

would stick out as being different and separate from the group, and he was very scared.

40 (You mention that you felt compelled to do something about it - could you tell me more about that?)

S felt he had to (become a Catholic). S felt he had to act on his conviction; nothing could come in the way of his doing so.

41 S doesn't think he's ever had such sleepless nights - he's never had problems with sleeping - but he had night after night of just rolling around, thinking about what he had to do, because he knew he had to do it. It was just that sort of conviction. He had to do it, there was no stopping it at all.

At the daunting prospect of having to act on his firm and compelling conviction, S spent night after night in a state of troubled restlessness, the extent of which he has not experienced before or since.

42 Technically, S supposes he needn't have (become a Catholic), because one is free, but that conviction was so strong that he would have been false if he hadn't listened

Though he realises that in some sense he was free to have acted differently, S's conviction was so strong that he feels he would have been inauthentic had he not

to it.

acted in accordance with it.

43 S didn't hear a voice, but it was like an inner thing - it was an inner conviction - something telling him that that was right and that is what he's got to do.

S experienced an inner conviction which told him what was right and what he had to do.

44 (The conviction was) not just something separate from S. It was really something deep down basic in him, that was telling him that that is what he's got to do.

S experienced his conviction as a basic, essential and integral part of himself which was telling him what to do.

45 (You mention that you felt you should withdraw from your friends and your family. Could you tell me more about that?)

(S withdrew) just to protect himself. S just accepted that he would be rejected. And (he withdrew) to save himself that extra hurt because he was so sore as it was.

withdrew from significant others to shield himself from the further hurtful effects of their rejection of him which he expected and accepted.

46 Before they could do something

Before significant others could

about it, S started cutting himself loose so that it wouldn't be so bad, so that it wouldn't really matter so much.

react to his position, S began to distance himself from them so as to soften the blow of their reaction (which he expected to be one of rejection of him).

47 Because S knew what people thought generally, about the Catholic Church, in the sort of circles that he moved in. He knew what they felt - a lot of prejudice, a lot of ridicule and, a lot of things like that. And he didn't want them to ridicule him. So it was like removing himself from them to save himself the pain.

S knew that people reacted negatively to the stance which he was about to adopt. So he withdrew from people to protect himself against the painful experience of being ridiculed by them.

48 (You also say you couldn't promise your mother that you would wait until you were 21 to become a Catholic. Could you elaborate on that?)

S just couldn't (promise his mother that he would wait until he was 21 to become a Catholic). He would have been too disloyal to himself

S could not comply with his mother's wishes for him since in so doing he would have been too disloyal to himself.

(to have done so).

- 49 S thinks he was disloyal to himself in a sense because more than a year before he became a Catholic he was already convinced and knew that that was what he had to do. But the pressure in the town was tremendous. S thinks he was disloyal to himself in that, for a considerable period after he had experienced his conviction, he failed to act on it, in the face of tremendous social pressure in opposition to his course of action.
- 50 S thought of every sort of way of trying to get out of becoming a Catholic. He thought, "Isn't there some sort of loop-hole?", but there wasn't a loop-hole. There was nothing. He had to do it. S explored all the possibilities of being able to avoid acting out his conviction, but, there being no feasible out, he had to act.
- 51 What made it easier was that S's parents were transferred to another town. So he went to a completely new environment, and he thinks that made it much easier. Changing his environment made it much easier for S to act on his conviction.
- 52 S could go and see the priest and he just saw to it that he stayed away from the sort of people his friends mixed with, and so on. It Repetitious of NMU 51.

made it easier.

53 But even if they had stayed in the same town S knows he would still have done it.

S knows that even if circumstances had not changed to make it easier for him, he would still have acted on his conviction.

54 For S, becoming a Catholic was being loyal to himself.

For S, acting in accordance with his conviction was being loyal to himself.

55 And S still feels proud of it when he thinks back on it (his becoming a Catholic) - he still thinks it's the most courageous thing he ever did. It's a lot for a bloody sixteen year-old.

S experiences a sense of pride when he reflects on how he acted in accordance with his own convictions, and the courage this required.

56 In those days (of the incident described by S) S was very close to his mother. He shared basically everything with her.

At the time of the event being described, S was very close to his mother and shared his life's experiences with her.

57 S's mother had a tremendous emotional hold over him.

S experienced his mother as having a tremendous emotional hold over him.

- 58 There was this tremendous conflict of wanting to do what she (S's mother) wanted S to do, and having to do what he felt he himself had to do. Of knowing he had to do what he was absolutely convinced of. And it caused him real, real agony to try to decide. S experienced real agony in trying to resolve the conflict between wanting to appease his mother on the one hand, and on the other hand knowing he had to act on the absolute conviction stemming from himself, which action, though it would render him true to himself, would alienate him from his mother.
- 59 This was a request where S's mother's whole way of asking him was begging him, absolutely begging him with tears in her eyes, and he knew that if he went to the (Catholic) Church that Sunday (on which his mother had asked him not to go on account of his grandmother's visit) it would really have upset her - it would really have worried her tremendously. S's mother's request of him was so intense, insistent and emotionally loaded that he knew that if he had failed to comply with it, he would have greatly upset and worried her.
- 60 S didn't know what to do. The pull was so strong from his mother that now (in retrospect) he thinks that he compromised in some unconscious way by getting sick, because The conflict (between the "strong pull" exerted by his mother in her request and the opposing "pull" in the direction of what he himself felt he had to do) was so great

he wasn't really very sick at all, but he thought, "Well, I'm sick enough to stay in bed", to solve that one (his conflict).

for S that the only means of solving it available to him was to make a neurotic compromise by falling ill.

61 S couldn't just not go to the Church that Sunday, that would have been going against his own convictions too blatantly. But if he could say he was sick, that wasn't so bad.

For S to go against his own convictions deliberately (blatantly) was unacceptable to him; to do so seemingly without his compliance (through being ill) was more acceptable.

62 (Could you tell me a bit more about the incident with your grandmother - when your grandmother came in to speak to you?)

S was lying in bed and it was on the Monday. He couldn't just be sick for the Sunday, so he had to be sick for a few days. So he started getting sick on Friday and he was still sick on Monday. He thinks he was up on Tuesday, he's not sure, but he was in bed for a few days. And he didn't know his mother had spoken to his grandmother

NROC

at all, because she was terrified that his grandmother would find out (that S wanted to become a Catholic). But she (S's mother) apparently did tell his grandmother, because she just came into S's room quite unexpectedly, shut the door, and came to the bed.

63 She (S's grandmother) just stood there (at S's bed) and looked at S with her twisted face, and just said, "Your mother told me", and he went ice cold and got increasingly anxious.

When S's grandmother confronted him with her knowledge of his project, he became very anxious and was transformed bodily to a state of being "ice cold".

64 She (S's grandmother) said, "Your mother told me, and I just want to tell you that I'm bitterly disappointed in you," and just walked out again. And S felt like an absolute criminal.

S felt like a criminal after being confronted by his grandmother's bitter disappointment in him in his opposition of, and failure to fulfill, her expectations of him.

65 S felt so bad. He really felt that the feeling was bad. He felt bad, he felt intrinsically bad.

S experienced a bad feeling and felt intrinsically bad himself.

66 (Though he felt intrinsically bad) there was nothing S could do about it. Although that is what she (his grandmother) said and everybody else said, there was no way he could do anything else (other than become a Catholic).

Though he felt intrinsically bad in the face of his grandmother and significant others expressing their disappointment in him, S could do no other than act in the very way (namely in accordance with his conviction) that gave rise to their negative reaction.

67 (S's conviction was one) that was bigger than being bad in their eyes - and his own eyes, perhaps.

S's conviction was of such great import that the negative appraisal of himself by others, and perhaps even by himself, seemed less significant in comparison.

68 (You say your grandmother said to you, "Your mother told me", and you immediately felt cold. How was this?)

(Becoming a Catholic) was the only thing that he was thinking about at the time and it was such a big issue in the family as well. S's father talked to him about it every day and his mother tried to convince him (that he should not

S was preoccupied with his conviction at the time of the incident with his grandmother, and it was also an issue in his family, with both his parents trying to dissuade him from acting on it.

become a Catholic) as well.

69 What made S go cold was that feeling of rejection, because he thinks we all want warmth and acceptance, and (his grandmother's reaction) was such a blatant rejection that he felt incredibly alone. He felt totally abandoned. S was bodily transformed in becoming cold from a feeling of blatant rejection in which he experienced extreme aloneness and total abandonment.

70 Then S started thinking what an evil old woman his grandmother was, just to make it not so sore. S then began to devalue the extrinsic source of his pain in order to lessen its intensity.

71 (Could you go into the part your parents played a bit more?)

For S's mother (the issue surrounding S's conviction) was a question of religious faith, for her it was something serious. For his father it was not such a serious thing, it was basically just a social issue, of acceptance by others and that sort of thing. For S's mother the issue of his conviction was a serious matter of religious significance, whereas for his father it was less serious - a matter of social acceptance.

72 S thinks that in her own way his S thinks his mother wanted to

mother wanted to understand. She couldn't understand at all which made it extremely difficult - S tried to explain it to her - how he got to things and so on, but he could see by the look on her face that she didn't understand.

understand the issue, but despite his attempts at explaining it to her, she failed to understand, as was evidenced by her facial expression, which made things extremely difficult for S.

73 S was really close to her (his mother), which made him feel so frustrated. That he couldn't get her to see his way at all.

Being really close to his mother, S felt very frustrated at his complete inability to bring her around to seeing the issue from his perspective.

74 S's father tried to talk to him about it as well, argued with him night after night and initially S tried to talk to him a bit, and then he thought, "No, this is getting me nowhere", so he just said nothing.

At first, S tried to sustain argumentative conversations, initiated by his father, about the issue, but then, thinking they were achieving nothing, remained silent.

75 When S said nothing his father got all irritable and angry and it would always end up with him shouting that S was just being difficult and just headstrong and wouldn't listen

S's father reacted to his silence with irritation and anger, seeing S as just being difficult, headstrong and unreasonable.

to reason.

76 (How did you feel when you eventually did become a Catholic?)

S felt a tremendous sense of relief - and happiness as well. It was a tremendous sense of relief - just knowing that he had done what he had to do. There was none of the conflict anymore, knowing "I've got to, I've got to."

After he had acted on his conviction, S felt a tremendous sense of relief and happiness, and experienced the absence of the former conflict, knowing that he had done what he had felt compelled to do.

77 S had done it (become a Catholic), and that was it. A feeling of real satisfaction.

S experienced a feeling of real satisfaction at having acted on his conviction.

78 (You say you did not have a choice, you had to become a Catholic. Could you go into that a bit more?)

S supposes he had a choice (in the matter of becoming a Catholic or not) - there was nothing forcing him - he couldn't be thrown into jail or anything like that, there was no physical reason stopping

S supposes that he was free (he had a choice) not to act on his conviction insofar as there was no physical reality which forced him to act in accordance with it.

him from not becoming a Catholic.

79 There was just that inner conviction, that feeling of having to do it (become a Catholic) was so strong that S couldn't do anything else but do it. It was a compelling thing. It compelled S to do it. S couldn't have lived with himself if he hadn't done it.

S's inner conviction, which he experienced as demanding action on his part, was so strong that he felt compelled to act. Had he not acted, S would not have been able to live with himself.

80 (S feels that) it's quite strange to say that even now, when he's not a practising Catholic, he still knows after sixteen, seventeen years, that it was the right decision.

Even now, with hindsight, S still knows, after a considerable period of time, that when he decided to act on his conviction he made the right decision even though his present being no longer accords with that conviction.

81 S still thinks back, and when he thinks of what he did, he has a feeling of satisfaction knowing he did what he had to do.

When S reflects on what he did, he feels satisfied in the knowledge that he actually did what he felt compelled to do.

82 (You say you couldn't have lived with yourself if you hadn't become a Catholic. Could you say anything

more about that?)

S would have hated himself. And he thinks it would have nagged him all the time. He would have had this feeling of wanting to punish himself. There would have been this nagging thing that he was untrue to himself, not true to himself.

Had S not acted on his conviction, he would have felt self-punitive and, in not being true to himself, would have felt constantly troubled.

83 It wasn't an issue really - S had to do it, that's all there is to it. If he hadn't done it - it's even difficult for him to think of - because he just knew he had to do it. Even if he was killed in the effort, even if he died in the effort, he would have had to do it.

Whether or not to act on his conviction was not an issue for S: he knew he had to do it. Not even fatal consequences would have prevented him from doing it. It is difficult for him even to conceive of not having done it.

84 (You say that you didn't think it was a mistake to become a Catholic, although you are no longer one now ...)

S sees his whole religious development as a (development)- like from

S sees his whole religious history as a development from one sphere

- being Dutch Reformed to becoming a Catholic was a development.
- 85 Since then (becoming a Catholic) S has grown some more, and in a sense, he feels he's outgrown the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is not enough anymore. They're too limiting.
- 86 But that (S's outgrowing the Catholic Church) was not so much a matter of being true to himself, that was just a question of development. S went on and then slowly started changing over the years.
- 87 So for S there's no contradiction whatsoever, none whatsoever.
- 88 Just the fact of having done it made S so much more a mature person, he thinks. It gave him a sense of worth. He never thought very much of himself, but that's the one thing
- to the next.
- Since his commitment to his conviction, S has outgrown that commitment, which he experiences as restrictive.
- S's outgrowing his commitment was more a matter of gradual development than of being true to himself as such.
- S sees no contradiction between his former commitment to his conviction and his present departure from it.
- Having acted on his conviction matured S, who had low self-esteem. Being able to commit himself to what he perceived to be valuable gave him a sense of worth.

he could do, he could stand up for something - he could stand up for what is valuable.

89 It gave S dignity and self-respect. S's commitment to his conviction gave him dignity and self-respect. For himself - he still found it difficult to look people in the eyes, in the face, and say, "I'm a Catholic"; he couldn't do that. At this point he was unable to sustain these feelings openly in the presence of others, being unable to confront them with his commitment.

90 But inside himself, S knew that he was strong, that he had done something that took tremendous courage. S had a private, inner knowledge of his strength and courage at committing himself to his conviction. And so inside somewhere, although it was difficult for him to handle it with people outside, S knew on the inside - under his skin - that that was right. However, as yet he found it difficult to share his commitment with others.

91 (As time went on, did you feel any different about knowing on the inside?)

It just also became on the outside as well. At the beginning S was Initially S felt too vulnerable to live his commitment openly in

so terrified of getting hurt more and more, because he felt he'd had enough.

relating to others, but later on he was able to do this.

92 As S felt better on the inside, he started being more open about things as well to other people and eventually he even took a bit of delight, he thinks, in - people would ask him, "Are you going to church today?", and he'd say, "Yes", and then they'd say, "Well come with us." And he'd say, "No, I'm going to the Catholic Church", and the sort of look of horror on their faces - he'd quite enjoy that. To be a bit shocking and outrageous.

As he began to feel more secure within himself, S began to be more open with others about his commitment, even taking delight in disclosing it to them.

93 It was an enormously big issue for S at first. But eventually it didn't matter at all what people thought - he really didn't care.

Initially the evaluations of himself by others concerned S greatly, but eventually they did not matter to him at all.

94 A major thing was with S's family too. Once he'd done it (become a Catholic), they accepted it completely, even his mother who

Once S had openly acted on his conviction, his family, including his mother who had been so upset at this prospect, accepted it

was so - cried herself to sleep completely.
every night - today she couldn't
care a damn - she really couldn't
care a damn.

95 And S's father respected him for S's acting on his conviction
the first time in his life. The gained his father's warmth and
day S became a Catholic, he (S's respect.
father) came into S's room and gave
him a hug, which is something he
hardly ever did, and said he hoped
he'd be happy now.

96 And the look of admiration - it was S perceived a change in his
the first time S saw that in his father's attitude toward him
(father's) eyes. He always ridi- from ridicule to admiration, and
culed S. That was the first time S felt worthy for the first time.
S felt he was worth anything.

97 (Could you tell me more about the
feeling of loneliness and isolation
that you experienced at the time?)

It was just that feeling that S In grappling with his conviction,
was in this (the issue concerning S felt completely on his own.
his religious commitment) completely
on his own.

98 Even the Catholic priest S went to see. S eventually, after a lot of real agonising about it, went to see a priest. The local Catholic priest. And S told him how he felt. And, even at that time - this is not just thinking about it now when S says this - but he remembers at the time feeling, "This guy feels I'm a bit cuckoo." It's not the sort of thing people get upset about at that age. S knew he didn't understand. He couldn't understand that it was such a big issue for S. He said, ja, he'd help S. S said he wanted to become a Catholic and he (the priest) said okay, but then he must get his parents' permission, for example. It was, like, S could see he thought S was a bit funny.

When S, after much agonising on his own, consulted another whom he expected would be able to understand his situation, he experienced the other as being unable to understand him.

99 Lots of people thought S was a bit weird, a bit strange, that he was not like other people, he didn't take things the way they were. It made S feel incredibly alone,

S felt estranged from others in that, unlike them, he did not accept things as they were. Lacking their support, he felt incredibly alone.

because he didn't get any support from anybody.

100 And the friends S had at school Since S's friends ridiculed that who he started withdrawing from, to which he felt committed, he they just ridiculed the withdrew from them, and felt Catholic Church generally. extremely lonely. They made fun about the Catholic ceremonies and things like that. So S just felt very, very alone.

Protocol B : Table 2

Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscience

1. S questioned the prevailing views of his community and wished to depart from their taken-for-granted values, lacking faith in the people who embodied these values.
2. S appealed to God and spent time dialoguing with others to try to ascertain what was right for him.
3. S experienced what was to be the truth for him only vaguely at first, and then gradually more certainly.
4. S's truth was experienced as coming from deep within himself, as a basic, essential and integral part of himself, over and against

the truth of his community, with which he could not identify.

5. S experienced dread at the prospect of confronting his truth, since living this truth would entail opposing others and risking their rejection of him, and he feared being exposed in no longer being a taken-for-granted member of the group.
6. S withdrew from others, feeling that he was betraying them in privately not sharing their values.
7. S felt torn between the conflicting alternatives of being-for-others and authentically being himself (being true to his own experience). This situation of conflict was so overwhelming that he prereflectively compromised himself by falling ill, thereby abdicating his responsibility for openly choosing either alternative.
8. In experiencing his truth, S felt alone and isolated from his community.
9. Through others' negative evaluation of him, S felt bad and withdrew to shield himself from further rejection anticipated from them.
10. S felt absolutely compelled to live his truth, since, failing this, he would not have been able to live with himself.
11. S's truth (his reality) was initially experienced tentatively and

privately; only later was it lived openly and responsibly.

12. So long as S's truth (reality) was known but not yet lived openly, he felt false and untrue to himself.
13. When S lived his own truth (reality), he felt liberated (especially from the emotional hold of significant others), and, contrary to his expectations, was accepted by others.
14. Having lived his truth, S experienced satisfaction and relief, as well as increased self-worth, self-respect and dignity.

Protocol B : Table 3

Specific Description of the situated structure of conscience

S was experiencing tremendous turmoil and conflict concerning religious commitment. He began to question the prevailing views of his community in this area, and to depart from their taken-for-granted values. Being unable to believe in the people who embodied these values, he opened himself up to other possibilities. S appealed to God to allay his confusion and spent much time in dialogue with others and agonisingly wrestling with the issue. The truth for him then progressively emerged as follows:

Initially he was vaguely aware of what was later to become the truth for him. Later this truth appeared to him with certainty, as a fact. He experienced it as coming from deep within him, as a basic, essential and integral part of himself. S felt a closer affinity, and could more

easily identify with this truth than with that prevailing in his community.

S was filled with absolute dread at the prospect of having to act on his conviction, since he realised it meant opposing all significant others in his life. He was afraid of being exposed, of no longer being a taken-for-granted member of the group through living his truth. Troubled and restless at this daunting prospect, S began to withdraw from others, as he felt he was betraying their cause. S first expressed his conviction to his mother who implored him not to actualise it immediately. He felt torn between the conflicting alternatives of being-for-others (through failing to live out his conviction) and being for himself by being true to his own experience (and living out this conviction). This conflict was so overwhelming that he at one point prereflectively compromised himself by falling ill, thereby abdicating his responsibility for openly choosing either alternative. S felt totally isolated in his conviction, since he perceived nobody else in his community as being able to share his truth/reality. Through others' evaluation of him, especially that of his grandmother, he felt intrinsically bad, and withdrew further to shield himself from the pain of their anticipated rejection of him. However, despite continuing opposition from his family (his mother's being upset with him; his father, unable to understand him, being angry with him; his grandmother's rejection of him which he experienced in going icy-cold in his body), S ultimately felt compelled to live his own truth since, failing that, he would not have been able to live with himself. Hence the truth for S was at first experienced tentatively and privately and only later lived openly

and responsibly. When it was known but not yet lived, S felt false and untrue to himself. S, in acting on his conviction, loosened his mother's strong emotional hold over him. Once he had lived his truth, contrary to his expectations, he was accepted by others. He experienced feelings of satisfaction, relief and happiness, having accomplished what he felt compelled to do. He matured as a person, increasing in self-worth, dignity and self-respect.

4.3 PROTOCOL C : JANET

Protocol C : Table 1

See the Appendix for the original protocol demarcated in terms of meaning units.

Protocol C : Table 2

Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscience

1. Having lived openly with others in terms of her own reality, it became more difficult for S to ignore this reality in a situation in which it had previously been ignored.
2. S felt it necessary to remove herself from the situation in which she was unable to live truly in terms of her own experience.
3. S felt ill at ease in her situation, as if she were in the wrong place.
4. The reality of S's self-congruent experience was called into question by others and the passage of time seemed to be denied since nothing seemed to have changed and they refused to allow for changes in S.
5. S felt pressurised by others to be in a way which was congruent with their expectations of her, and so to deny her own experience.
6. S believed her own experiences (world) to be inaccessible to others

and so was unable to share them with others.

7. S could not become actively involved in her situation.
8. S's situation and relationships seemed to be superficial, empty and alienating.
9. S felt vulnerable and exposed in that she was no longer able to adopt the role or social facade with which she would previously have coped in her situation.
10. With full awareness, in being-for-others S played a role which was incongruent with her own experience, and became increasingly detached and estranged from herself in the process.
11. S felt totally alone and isolated, since that which she presented to others and was shared by them had nothing to do with herself.
12. As a compromise between relating to others authentically (which she felt unable to do) and not relating to them at all (by leaving their company), S related bodily in a less explicitly articulate manner (by dancing in their company).
13. S became extremely anxious at experiencing a loss of self and at feeling disembodied.
14. S felt she had to withdraw and distance herself from others (to

whom she was giving herself over) in order once more to get in touch with what she was experiencing personally, and so to re-gather her fragmented self. Her withdrawal was also supported by her feeling of utter exhaustion at having constantly to maintain a facade.

15. On her own, S's perceptual (and particularly tactile) experience became extremely intense and distinct, and, through tending to her body and acting physically, she felt more embodied and more fully present to her situation.
16. After a period of recuperative and self-integrative withdrawal from others, S was able to relate to others from her own perspective on the world, her sense of self being restored.
17. S was careful to take heed of her own experience, it being preferable to be a stranger to others (in being true to herself) than, through abandoning herself to others, to be estranged from herself.

Protocol C : Table 3

Specific Description of the situated structure of conscience.

S returned to her home environment, having previously left it because she had felt unable truly to be herself there. In the intervening period (away from home), she had moved towards coming to terms with her own reality and with herself: she had established a new network of relationships within which she found it possible to be more truly

herself, and had severed relationships with those whom she experienced as having expectations of her to be in ways which were incongruent with herself. However, when confronted once again by the social and cultural context of the well-established environment of her past, she felt ill-at-ease, and the very reality of her more recent and self-congruent experience away from home was called into question for her. Contributing to the sense of unreality, was the way in which the entire situation at home had remained so unchanged since S's departure that it seemed to her as if time stood still. S felt pressurised by the others to continue to be at home as if she had never been away, and so to deny the experiences of her recent past and the changes she had undergone. She was unable to share the latter experiences with these people, as they seemed to be so far removed from their world; and she believed her new-found reality to be inaccessible to them. She initially was true to herself in this situation, and felt strange and in the wrong place at the wrong time. Her situation was experienced as being incongruous with her present way of being, and she did not want to be there, being unable to become actively involved. The others had difficulty in relating to her, implying that she was not being herself, and wanting her to revert back to being the way they had come to know her. S found the situation and the personal relationships therein to be superficial, empty and alienating. She felt vulnerable, being less able to adopt the role and social facade with which she would previously have got by in this situation. Being too tired to resist the social pressure on her to be in a way which met the others' expectations of her, and not wanting to spoil the convivial atmosphere, S reverted to her former way of being, though this felt foreign to her. Accordingly,

she experienced a disjunction between the way she had been away from home and what she now presented to these people at home. She was giving herself over to the way she had always been with the others, and now, in being-for-others, as distinct from feeling strange in relation to the others, she fitted in with them but began to feel increasingly estranged from herself, and this estrangement increased the more she departed from her own experience. She felt totally alone and isolated, and though the others accepted her in her being-for-them, this acceptance meant nothing to S, since she knew that what they accepted was not truly herself. S felt that that which she presented to others and which was shared by them had nothing to do with herself. She was ambiguously present to her situation; in being-for-others she felt as if she stood detached from herself, playing a role of which she was constantly aware. S did not want to leave the company of the others, thereby risking offending them, and yet was unable to relate to them in an explicitly articulate manner; so she danced in their company as a compromised way of being-with-them. S experienced a loss of self, and felt disembodied, as if her body were disappearing. Her extreme anxiety was experienced bodily via her heart beating painfully. At this point she felt she had to withdraw and distance herself from others; it no longer made sense to communicate with them. She did not know who she was, having lost her sense of self, and she needed to be on her own to get in touch with what she personally was experiencing, and to regather her fragmented self. She needed a period of transition in which she could stop being-for-others and get in touch with herself. Her withdrawal was also supported by her feeling of utter exhaustion at having to maintain a facade. Once she

was on her own, her perceptual experience of her situation was extremely intense and distinct, her tactile perception being particularly acute. She tended to her body, and in acting physically, she once again felt more embodied and more fully present to her situation. Having restored her integrity and mustered up her resources in her period of absence from the others, she was able to relate to them once more - this time from her own perspective on the world. Her sense of self was restored as was her sense of time; she could view her experiences at home and away from home as having occurred chronologically. S was now careful to take heed of her own experience so as not to abandon herself to others and so lose herself again. It was preferable for her to be a stranger to them than to be a stranger to herself.

4.4 PROTOCOL D : LEONARD

Protocol D : Table 1

See the Appendix for the original protocol demarcated in terms of meaning units.

Protocol D : Table 2

Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscience

1. S knew that the situation in which he found himself was not right for him, and yet he remained in it owing partially to reasons of material security.
2. S felt unable to exercise his own initiative in this situation, since what he did was dictated by others, with whose values he disagreed.
3. S experienced a radical difference between his way of being in this situation and how he was in more familiar situations, and to continue in this situation required a forced effort of will on his part.
4. As S's tasks became increasingly meaningless, he eventually felt such revulsion for what he was doing that he experienced a compulsion to discontinue which was so great that it seemed to preclude freedom of choice or decision on his part.
5. S's acting in terms of his own experience of the situation was seen

- by others as being extremely odd.
6. S was not fully involved in what he was doing, and so acted superficially and with reservation, experiencing his situation and the goals set in it as being unreal, untrue, empty and worthless. He relied on the worth accorded to these goals by others to sustain his motivation.
 7. S was living against (in conflict with) himself in behaving in accordance with the expectations of others and his situation, which were in direct conflict with his own feelings and experienced reality.
 8. S expended much energy in concealing his genuine feelings from himself and others, fabricating expressions and behaviour which in no way reflected his true experience.
 9. S revealed to others only what he thought they wanted to see and so isolated himself from them; they could not understand or get to know him since he concealed himself from them. Neither did he get to know others: in relating to them as people-to-be-deceived (of his true feelings, intentions, etc.), he was not genuinely open to their responses to him.
 10. At the prospect of being confronted publicly with his inauthentic behaviour, S was filled with dread, although at the time he was unaware of the source of this dread in that he was for the most

part successfully concealing from himself his own inauthenticity.

11. S felt trapped in being forced to confront and own up to his being in a way which was not in keeping with how he actually was.
12. At the height of S's inauthenticity (when he could not, in the presence of others, avoid the recognition that he was not being true to himself) he felt exposed and transparent to the gaze of others to the point that he felt that he was disappearing.
13. S sought confirmation of his existence and worth in the gaze of others, but all he perceived therein was hostility, which was interpreted by him as proof of his being transparent in his betrayal of them and of himself. He felt shame at being thus exposed, and guilty about his betrayal of others.
14. S experienced a loss of his bodily self when he became identified with his pretence and with others' experience of him. He lost his solidness and centredness. He also lost his freedom (he was at the mercy of others in their experience of them) as well as his limits (his feelings were located in others).
15. S realised that he knew neither himself nor others, and longed for being (and feeling) at home with familiar others.
16. S experienced inauthenticity as a ravaging of his self, and saw this experience as a comment on his way of being (his life) in general, rather than as an isolated event.

Protocol D : Table 3

Specific Description of the situated structure of conscience

S experienced his present situation against the backdrop of his previous pleasant work situation in which he had felt free to be himself more fully. He had been given the freedom to exercise his own initiative, within broad limits, and found the values of others to be roughly congruent with his own. The work environment had been experienced as being inviting, and there had been no discontinuity between S's way of being at work and his way of being outside of the work situation. However, owing to financial considerations, S had left this situation and found himself in his present one.

S knew at the outset that his present situation would not be right for him, it being reminiscent of a previous work situation in which he had compromised himself drastically. This former situation had become increasingly meaningless for S; his work was dictated strictly by others, and its quality was deemed irrelevant by them. Eventually he experienced such revulsion for his work that, despite the conventionally desirable benefits which accrued from it (and he had willfully continued in view of these benefits), he had a compulsion to discontinue which was so great that it seemed to preclude freedom of choice or decision on his part. His resignation had been regarded by his bosses to be so inconceivable as to be regarded as indicative of emotional disturbance on S's part, yet S viewed his act as reflecting an emerging integrity.

Consequently S felt that he was betraying himself in his present

situation, which was essentially a repetition of the earlier one. He felt ill at ease, that he did not belong here; he disliked the materialistic philosophy underlying the work, concern for the well-being of others being made subordinate to production and efficiency. Being only partially committed to his work, he worked superficially and with reservation. He experienced the situation as being unreal and untrue and was unable to maintain a sense of integrity there. He found the goals set at work to be empty, and relied on the worth accorded them by others to sustain his motivation in achieving them. It was only through an effort of will that he could work, since he was living against himself and experienced conflict between what he regarded as his inner feelings and reality and the outer expectations of him. He expended much energy in concealing from himself and others his true feelings (such as those of revulsion), pretending enthusiasm and fabricating expressions and behaviour which in no way reflected his true experience. He revealed to others only what he thought they wanted to see, and so related to them not as people in their own right, but as people-to-be-deceived as to his real feelings and values. Accordingly, he was not genuinely open to their responses to him, interpreting them in terms of his hidden agenda (of deceiving them).

S found it necessary to conceal his genuine experience from others since, if they were aware of his experience, he would have to have left this situation as he would no longer have been able to live this lie which would have become exposed.

S had abandoned himself completely to a pretence; he lived this pretence.

As he had never revealed himself to others, they were unable to see who he was. They did not understand or know him, nor he them.

As an event approached in which S was to be confronted publicly with his behaviour and way of being (which had not been in keeping with himself), he experienced apprehension and dread of an unknown source. Whereas, in his day to day work situation S was able to avoid confronting his thoughts and feelings through pretending to himself and others, he was unable to avoid this confrontation in this event in which his past behaviour was being recognised publicly. He felt trapped in being forced to confront that which he most wanted to avoid, and wanted to flee and to be at home.

When S became the focus of attention in this crucial event, he felt that he was disappearing. He sought in the gaze of others, reassurance, confirmation of his existence and a hoped for reflection of something good in himself. However, all he found in their gaze (and he acknowledges that they might not in fact have experienced him in this way) was hostility and confusion, which he interpreted as being proof of their being able to see through to what he had done to them (viz. betrayed them). He felt shame at being exposed, and transparent in his betrayal of them, as well as guilty. They saw through his mask (pretence) as being false, and, since the self which he knew was completely hidden from them, there remained of S nothing substantial which they might perceive (they saw right through him). All they saw was someone capable of deceit.

S experienced a loss of bodily self. In contrast to his everyday experience, in which S is aware of himself as a body through which he is centred in the world and which he knows in its solidness and weight, his present experience was that of his body being a complex of unspecified feelings, which moved without substance or weight. He became identified with what he perceived to be the others' experience of him, with their dislike of him. In so becoming, he lost his sense of self as well as his freedom. He was at the mercy of others (what they felt, he became). He had lost his limits; what he felt was no longer restricted to his own body, but was located in others. He could no longer sustain his pretence, and this was frightening for him, as he changed and perceived others as changing. He realised that he knew neither them nor himself, since he had never seen their response to his genuine self. After this experience/event, S longed to return to the known reality of being (and feeling) at home with familiar others.

S only understood his experience as it is described much after the event, with distance from it. The inauthentic experience for him is dramatic, ravaging and obliterating, and entails living a pretence without having access to the self underlying the pretence. This experience was seen by S as a comment on the way he was living in general, on what was going wrong in his life, consistently, and not as an isolated event.

4.5 Extended Description of the structure of conscience*

The situation in which conscience is experienced is one in which the person feels ill-at-ease, and, while being reflectively fully aware of this¹, fails either to remove himself from the situation or, through exercising his own initiative, to transform it, for fear of losing emotional and/or material security. He longs for a feeling of at-homeness but, in feeling that he does not belong and that others will not be able to share his world², he protects this world by concealing it from their (potentially) harmful gaze, thereby preventing others from getting to know him and him them³, and so confirms and compounds his feelings, becoming increasingly detached, lonely and isolated. Others (in whom he lacks faith) and his relationships with them are perceived as being superficial, and lacking in genuineness. The situation, already experienced as meaningless, unreal and empty, becomes more so for him through his lack of care, engagement and involvement in it. In that he ignores his own gut feelings and fails to take any initiative, his way of being is experienced by him as being dictated by others and by the situation. Insofar as he is thus uncommitted to his behaviour⁴ at the affective level, his actions and general mode of being are monitored reflectively and sustained through an effort of will⁵ which becomes exhausting. In the hopes of rendering the situation more bearable, he tries (though in vain) to see it through the eyes of

* Footnote numbers in this section refer to clarifying points which are to be found at the end of this description. They are included here rather than in the following chapter since they are directly amplificatory of the Extended Description rather than generally discursive. Acknowledgement is due to Brooke (1983) for this procedure.

others who (ostensibly) find it worthwhile. There is a tear in the texture of his existence, a disharmony between inner and outer insofar as he lives a pretence constituted in the process of his being-for-others; his genuine experience is neither reflected nor given expression in this pretence. He is ambiguously present to his situation, both being there as well as not being there⁶; being with others and yet not being with them and so feeling alone. His primary attunement is reflected in feelings of:

1. ambivalence, in being torn between the conflicting alternatives of being-for-others and authentically being himself;
2. betrayal, both of himself (in being in a way which is untrue to himself) and of others (in not sharing their way of being and of seeing things while associating with them as if he did);
3. guilt, arising from his betrayal of others and of himself;
4. shame, at the prospect, both real and imagined, of being exposed in his pretence and hence exposed as someone who stands out as a no longer inconspicuous, taken-for-granted member of the group;
5. dread, at the prospect or actualisation of breaking

with the received reality and the security this reality affords, and standing entirely on his own; the latter source of this dread is initially unknown since he is for the most part successfully concealing from himself his inauthenticity (and hence his authentic experience which isolates him from others)⁷.

In giving himself over so fully to his pretence and to others' experience of him (he becomes how they experience him), the person uncannily loses his sense of bodily self in that (a) his body seems to disappear, (b) he ignores and begins to lose touch with his feelings, (c) he feels that he lacks substance and (d) he lacks centredness and boundaries. He also becomes transparent to the (hostile) gaze of others in two senses, firstly, in the sense that they can "see through" his pretence and so are aware of (aspects of) his authentic experience which he is trying to conceal from them; secondly, in the sense that in being completely identified with their experience of him, he lacks substance of his own and so, there being nothing of him to see, he becomes completely transparent (i.e. invisible). Concomitant with this loss of self is a loss of freedom; the person is at the mercy of others' experience of him.

Temporality (lived time) is such for the person that time appears to stand still insofar as others are seen as denying change or the possibility of change in him, and the future is seen as a repetition of the past. He does not live towards a desired future, his own project being neglected

in favour of his realising the objectives of others.

The person's own (authentic) experience is initially vague, uncertain and extremely fragile. However, as time passes and he continues to interact inauthentically with others and his situation, his authentic experience gains substance and becomes more real. His reality is experienced as coming from deep within himself, as a basic, essential and integral part of himself. The more he withholds himself from the situation while remaining in it, the more forcibly his own reality thrusts itself upon him, demanding a response. Eventually being in this (inauthentic) mode becomes so ravaging and obliterating of the person's integrity/self, that he feels a compulsion, so strong as to preclude freedom of choice to the contrary, to live his authentic experience. Initially he might not own the living of this experience in that it might be lived quite prereflectively in the form of parapraxes⁸. However, in order for him to progress from experiencing his reality only tentatively and privately to living it openly and responsibly, it is necessary that he temporarily withdraw from the influence of others. Furthermore, as his own experience becomes more real and pressing, he begins to feel vulnerable and exposed in the eyes of others since he is no longer able to adopt the roles and facades in which he had previously taken refuge. After this self-integrative withdrawal, in which the person has more securely and reflectively appropriated his own reality, he is able to relate to others from his own perspective on the world, being restored to his bodily self. Through the person's openly living out his own experience, the everyday, taken-for-granted reality of others is called into question. His behaviour brings to light the fact that

the situation in which they find themselves is not an absolute given of their existence, and can be understood and lived in a manner other than that which they have taken as given. His behaviour thus allows others a glimpse of freedom.

Following his resolution (through living and hence revealing his previously concealed authentic experience), the person feels both liberated (especially from the emotional hold of others) and a renewed sense of self-respect and strength. The future once again holds promise for him. The inauthentic experience is lived before it is fully understood, and is seen not as an isolated happening, but as a comment on the way the person is living his life in general.

Comments on the Extended Description

1. It should be noted that the person's experience of conscience dawns as feeling ill-at-ease in the situation ("the" situation rather than "his" situation since by definition he has not made it his own). Initially he is not yet fully aware of not living the situation in terms of his authentic experience of it.
2. As has already been shown (see Section 1.2), world, self and experience are inseparable and so each implies and is implied by the others in this description.
3. The person also fails truly to get to know others since, in relating to them as people-to-be-deceived (as becomes evident later in this

description), he is not genuinely open to their responses to him, interpreting them in terms of his hidden agenda (of deceiving them).

4. The term "behaviour" is used here not in a narrow behaviouristic sense, but in the broadest possible sense to include not only actions but also speech, facial expressions and other non-verbal behaviour, and other modes of being which are comparatively easily accessible to others in the person's environment.
5. The term "will" is used here in the sense reflected in "will power" where the person's will does not function co-operatively in the service of his wishes, desires or needs, but constitutes an attempt to oppose them instead (see May, 1977, p.205).
6. This state of ambiguous presence is conventionally described by people in dualistic terms: "I was there in body but not in spirit." However, phenomenally speaking, the person has withdrawn from the environment, both social (Mitwelt) and physical (Umwelt), and this environment assumes a certain backgroundedness. Straus (1969) describes this withdrawal from his social and physical environment and finally his corporeal being as man's performing an "ekbasis". He sees this "ekbasis" or "excarnation" as a prerequisite for conceptual thinking.
7. Inauthenticity and authenticity are inextricably linked in that the person can realise that he is being inauthentic only to the extent

that he is in touch with his own authentic experience. He cannot be aware of not being true to himself unless he has a sense of his (own) self. This does not preclude the possibility of his pre-reflectively being untrue to himself without yet being aware of it, insofar as his sense of (his own) self is as yet relatively undeveloped.

8. The clearest example of this occurs in Protocol A, when Kristen utters a nonsensical sentence to her boss (N.M.U. 35). For para-praxes as disclaimed action, see Schafer (1976, pp.131f.).

4.6 General Description of the structure of conscience

The situation in which conscience is experienced is one in which the person feels ill-at-ease and, while being reflectively fully aware of this, fails either to remove himself from the situation or, through exercising his own initiative, to transform it, for fear of losing emotional and/or material security. In feeling that he does not belong and that others will not be able to share his world, he protects this world by concealing it from their (potentially) harmful gaze, thereby preventing others from getting to know him and him them, and so confirms and compounds his feelings, becoming increasingly detached, lonely and isolated. The situation, already experienced as meaningless, unreal and empty, becomes more so for him through his lack of care, engagement and involvement in it. He is uncommitted to his behaviour at the affective level; his actions and general mode of being are monitored reflectively and sustained through an effort of will which becomes exhausting. There is a rupture in his existence between inner and outer, insofar as he lives a pretence constituted in the process of

his being-for-others; his genuine experience is neither reflected nor given expression in this pretence. His primary attunement is reflected in feelings of betrayal (of self and others), guilt (arising from this betrayal), shame (at the prospect, both real and imagined, of being exposed in his pretence), dread (at the prospect or actualisation of breaking with the received reality and the security this reality affords) and ambivalence (in being torn between the conflicting alternatives of being-for-others and authentically being himself). In giving himself over so fully to his pretence and to others' experience of him (he becomes how they experience him), the person uncannily loses his sense of bodily self, lacking substance, centredness and boundaries, and becoming transparent to the (hostile) gaze of others. Concomitant with this loss of self is a loss of freedom; the person is at the mercy of others' experience of him. Being inauthentic is so ravaging and obliterating of the person's integrity/self, that he feels a compulsion, so strong as to preclude freedom of choice to the contrary, to live his authentic experience, which thrusts itself upon him, demanding a response. In order to take this step it is necessary that he withdraw from the influence of others in order more securely to appropriate his own reality. He is then able to relate to others from his own perspective on the world, being restored to his bodily self. Following this resolution (through revealing what is concealed)¹, he feels liberated and a renewed sense of self-respect and strength. The inauthentic experience is lived

¹ It should be noted that this particular resolution, while it seems to be the most complete and fulfilling (judging from the protocols), need not necessarily occur. It may be side-stepped through the person's leaving the situation in which he could not be true to himself without first revealing himself in it. An example of this occurs in Protocol D.

before it is fully understood, and is seen not as an isolated happening but as a comment on the way the person is living his life in general.

CHAPTER 5

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Examination of psychologically significant areas related to
conscience

When we examine the results of the present study, we find that they shed light on certain significant areas of psychological concern and interest, namely the self, the other, the body, inner and outer, temporality and meaning, and awareness. These areas will be discussed separately here, although to make any clear-cut distinctions between them (such as between self and body; meaning and awareness etc.) would clearly be artificial. It is not intended to imply such distinctions here (as will become obvious in what follows); these subjects will be dealt with separately purely for the sake of achieving a degree of focus and conceptual clarity. Each subject (phenomenon) will be seen in terms of how it appears in conscience. The way in which the phenomenon emerges in the context of the experience of conscience will be seen in terms of the psychological-phenomenological world-view, and the implications it has for this world-view. In the course of the discussion of these areas, where appropriate, a dialogue will be entered into with the writings of authors presented in the literature review (Chapter 2).

5.1.1 Conscience and the self

In this study, what is of particular interest as regards the self is the fact that self, world and others are so intimately related, this being in keeping with the view of Heidegger (and phenomenology in general)

that self and world (and hence others in that there is no world without others) are inseparable. Heidegger sees man as being-in-the-world-with-others. In inauthenticity the person's situation (world) is perceived by him as being unreal and empty as if it were a facade. Likewise, he begins to experience himself as unreal, insubstantial ("as an empty shell" - Protocol A, N.M.U. 71¹), and as a false front adopted to appease others. From a Freudian perspective, the subject's perception of the world in terms of how he is himself would be regarded as projection on his part of his inner psychic reality onto the external world. From our perspective, however, the person is seen as "realizing his self" only in terms of the world; the world is "...our home, a realization of subjectivity" (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 40). The self is inseparable from others, and this is borne out when the person sees himself in the glance of others; he sees his disapproval of himself (in his being inauthentic) in the gaze of others (see D, 62-63). When he feels confused about himself he sees this confusion in others (D, 11), even though he later acknowledges that they were not feeling confused. This suggests that when the person lacks clarity as regards himself (he is confused), he lacks a clear understanding of others.

It seems that how one feels and being aware of how one is feeling are of particular importance in one's sense of self and in one's being one-self authentically (A, 72-73; C, 66). How one feels might be loosely associated with one's mood or state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) in Heidegger

¹ Hereafter a capital letter followed by a number will refer to, respectively, a protocol and a particular N.M.U. within that protocol.

(although Boss (1979, pp. 109-114) distinguishes between feelings and moods) since how one feels does reflect how one finds oneself in-the-world. This suggests that, in order to know and be ourselves authentically, we have to take into consideration, at the outset, how we already find ourselves (Befindlichkeit) in-the-world. That our state-of-mind is of particular importance in our being ourselves (i.e. in each of us being his ownmost self) is suggested by Merleau-Ponty (1962) when he observes that "that sector of our experience which manifestly has no sense and no reality except for us", is "our affective milieu" (p. 180). In inauthenticity we suppress our feelings and become detached from our "affective milieu".

The phenomenon of conscience alerts us to the fact that, except under certain circumstances such as in the experience of conscience, we are for the most part not aware of ourselves. We are too caught up in our engagement in the world to be aware that it is our selves that are thus engaged. As Heidegger noted, we are mostly inauthentic (i.e. we have not owned our existence). It is most appropriate in this context to examine Ricoeur's notion of the self.

Ricoeur (1978) claims that the first truth, "I am, I think",

"...remains as abstract and empty as it is invincible; it has to be mediated by the ideas, actions, works, institutions, and monuments that objectify it. It is in these objects, in the widest sense of the word, that the Ego must lose and find itself" (p. 43).

So the self, then, is mostly lost in "objects" in the course of one's engagement in life. It is only through the act of reflecting, which

is "...the effort to recapture the Ego of the Ego Cogito in the mirror of its objects, its works, its acts" (ibid., p. 43), that the self can once again be appropriated. In the act of reflection, "...we have to recover the act of existing, the positing of the self, in all the density of its works" (ibid., p. 45). The self as being at first lost and then reappropriated through the act of reflection is best described in the words of Ricoeur himself:

"I must recover something which has first been lost; I make 'proper to me' what has ceased being mine. I make 'mine' what I am separated from by space or time, by distraction or 'diversion', or because of some culpable 'forgetfulness'. I am lost, 'led astray' among objects and separated from the centre of my existence, just as I am separated from others and as an enemy is separated from all men. Whatever the secret of this 'diaspora', of this separation, it signifies that I do not at first possess what I am" (ibid., p. 45).

The importance of reflection in establishing the sense of self is evidenced in the present study (C, 70). More generally, reflection might (though not necessarily) be implied in the very structure of conscience, insofar as withdrawal is characteristic of this structure, and withdrawal is conducive to reflection.

One's sense of self is not a given of one's existence, but rather a personal task to be fulfilled (C, 57). This is echoed in the words of Ricoeur when he writes "...the positing of self is not given, it is a task, it is not gegeben, but aufgegeben" (ibid., p. 45). This implies that the self is not a static, unchanging entity, but rather stems from continuous reappropriation, through reflection, of oneself from the ever-changing engagements with "objects" (in the widest sense of the

word) in which one is for the most part immersed.

5.1.2 Conscience and the other

The other (or others) is (are) of crucial importance in the experience of conscience. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an experience of conscience which does not involve others, insofar as it is only in the context of one's relationships with others (even though they might be "internalised" others) that one experiences not being true to oneself. In Heidegger's terms, without the "they" we could scarcely develop a "they-self" and so could in principle not be inauthentic, and, by implication, would not experience conscience (as a call away from this "they-self" to the authentic self). Quite possibly one first becomes aware of one's inauthentic behaviour through its consequences and its perceived effect on others, before becoming aware of the behaviour itself (D, 66). It is through one's feeling ill-at-ease in the company of others that one becomes aware of the (authentic) self which feels ill-at-ease. It is only through losing myself (in the "they") that I find myself (in conscience). Just as in terms of our ontogenesis we are aware of others before we acquire any form of self-awareness, so throughout life we become aware of ourselves (no more so than in the experience of conscience) through our first becoming aware of others in our interaction with them. Being inauthentic is thus a precondition for being authentic; as Steiner (1978) has it:

"There must be inauthenticity and 'theyness', 'talk' and Neugier, so that Dasein, thus made aware of its loss of self, can strive to return to authentic being... Verfall (fallenness) becomes the absolutely necessary pre-condition for that struggle towards true Dasein,

towards possession or, rather, re-possession of self, which defines man's exposure to the challenge of the ontological" (p. 96, parenthesis added).

One experiences conscience only to the extent that one is called away from others in their immersion in the received reality. In all of the protocols, the non-conforming nature of conscience is clearly evident. The incompatibility of conscience and superego emerges here, especially in the cases of Burt (Protocol B) and Janet (Protocol C), both of whom actually had to oppose their parents' wishes in order to respond to conscience. That conscience is non-conforming is made quite clear in the views of Heidegger, Jung and Fromm (see Sections 2.2.4, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 respectively).

When one responds to one's conscience (as the call to be authentic) by living out one's own experience, one lends substance through one's actions to what was initially seen by others as something too non-conformist to be regarded even as a possibility. One might then find that others actually share one's perspective but did not have the courage to express their viewpoint, or to live it out (A, 52-55). In this way, through one's resolutely acting in terms of one's conscience, one is able to co-disclose the authentic possibilities of others, as Heidegger has pointed out (see Section 2.2.6).

5.1.3 Conscience and the body

As used here, the term "body" does not refer to a purely physical organism completely detached from a "mind" or meaning, but refers rather to the phenomenological understanding of the body as exemplified by the

view of Merleau-Ponty:

"The body itself precisely as a body, is an existence and therefore of a subjective nature. The body itself is a subject and therefore does not derive its subjective character from a principle distinct from itself" (Kwant, 1963, pp. 14-15).

Insofar as we are our bodies, the self is always situated since the body is always situated. To be authentic is to be-in-the-world from one's own standpoint. It is precisely as a body that I have a particular standpoint, or point of view on the world. As de Waelhens (1967) has it:

"By this mode of facticity (viz. bodily situatedness) each of us draws in the world, for himself and for others, an appropriate perspective at the same time he acquires a point of view, or more exactly a mode of participation sui generis in existing reality" (p. 161, parenthesis added).

When one is inauthentic, however, one is not fully present to one's situation from one's own perspective; one is ambiguously present to this situation (A, 35-36). This ambiguity is reflected in the work of Heidegger where he sees it as the inauthentic state-of-mind (Zweideutigkeit) (see Section 2.2.2).

In being inauthentic, one experiences oneself as being hollow, empty and insubstantial. These characteristics are shared by the ontologically insecure person described by Laing and may be regarded as ontic manifestations of Heidegger's ontological notion that man is the basis of a lack or nullity (see Section 1.2).

If one is able to be fully present to one's situation, and so to live fully and engagedly in the world, one is then also fully embodied. In the words of Jager (1985), "a fully inhabited world is at the same time also a fully embodied world", and "bodily existence floods over into things, appropriates them, infuses them with the breath of life, draws them into the sphere of its projects and concerns" (p. 55). In contrast to this authentic mode of being, inauthentic being involves alienation, which "...is ultimately the failure of inhabitation and embodiment" (ibid., p. 55). The other also plays a part in one's relationship to one's body: "He can make the relationship closer. He can enlarge the distance" (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 69). When one feels ill-at-ease with the people in one's company and with one's situation in general, one becomes detached from one's body/self (A, 70-74; C, 36, 55, 62).

In inauthenticity, though one attains a certain degree of freedom through one's not being fully situated (one sees the world in a manifold way through the eyes of others), this freedom is without substance since one is disembodied and so one lacks a spontaneous and vital lived freedom (D, 12, 85). As Heidegger says, in inauthenticity Dasein is "everywhere and nowhere" (see Section 2.2.2). This suggests that, in order truly to be free, we need to accept our situatedness. The only freedom available to us is a situated freedom. It is when subjects act in terms of their own (and hence situated) experience that they experience a renewed sense of freedom.

An interesting similarity emerges between being inauthentic and being envious, in that both these ways of being share the characteristic of

excarnation. As in inauthenticity, in envy one experiences "...being excarnated, constituted by a sense of bodily absence or detachment from one's body, a radical ekbasis¹" (Titelman, 1981, p. 197). This being self-detached from one's body which occurs in envy serves to facilitate one's attempt to merge or fuse with the envied other. Implicit in both inauthenticity and envy is a devaluing of one's own perspective in adopting that of the other (another). One's own standpoint is abandoned for that of the other; this might suggest that in both inauthenticity and envy, one lacks self-esteem. Envy seems to be a type of inauthenticity, such that to be envious would entail being inauthentic, although being inauthentic would not necessarily imply being envious.

Initially, the researcher was surprised to discover excarnation to be a constituent of inauthenticity (and hence of conscience). However, on reflection this is not so surprising. In being a body I am clearly a human being that is separate from other human beings; if I am hurt physically, there is no doubting that it is I who feels pain. Hence the body individualises, and as Merleau-Ponty has noted, that sector of our experience which is distinctly our own is our "affective milieu", which is inseparable from our bodies (see Section 5.1.1). Now in inauthenticity we are trying to escape precisely that which is our own, namely our own existence. It therefore makes sense that we should abandon our bodies in becoming inauthentic.

¹ See point 6 of Comments on the Extended Description, Section 4.5.

5.1.4 Inner and outer

In the experience of conscience, the distinction between the surface of things (outer) and what lies beyond this surface (inner), emerges significantly. As one becomes increasingly inauthentic, the discrepancy between inner (one's own experience) and outer (what one reveals to others) becomes greater, such that eventually one believes that one's experience is inaccessible to others (C, 38). One keeps one's reality hidden from others, pretending to oneself that this reality is not really important, and one plays a role which is familiar to others and accepted by them as being oneself (C, 30). This is reminiscent of Sartre when he speaks of self-deception through playing a part (see Section 2.3.2).

In inauthenticity, things (in the broadest sense of the word, including oneself) are not how they seem to be; there is a discrepancy between appearance and what is regarded as reality. What is real, furthermore, is identified not with externals, but with what is inner; one's authentic experience/self is experienced as coming from deep within oneself (B, 36; D, 25). What comes from within is regarded as one's own and authentic, and in inauthenticity it is as if one lacked anything inside, since one feels empty.

Though, on face value, it might seem incongruous to speak of "inner" and "outer" or "inside" and "outside" in the context of phenomenology insofar as these terms might be regarded as implying Cartesian dualism (where "inner" refers to mind or pure subjectivity; "outer" to matter/body and pure objectivity), this is in fact not the case. Van den

Berg (1972) argues that "...the pure subject, the completely unsubstantial inner man, does not exist" (p. 40, emphasis added).

It is important to note that what he denies existence is not inner man as such, but an inner man that is not substantial, that is, inner man that is not connected with the world (and hence others). That Van den Berg vouches for the existence of inner man as such was confirmed in a personal communication with him (1984). We all have experience of private thoughts, secrets, hidden feelings and so on, and these experiences are phenomenal evidence of inner man.

5.1.5 Conscience, temporality and meaning

In being inauthentic, one experiences one's situation as being meaningless; one feels empty and is unmoved by one's situation. The future becomes uninviting, and concomitant with this, the present loses its meaning (A, 38, 45). What is meaningful calls one forth into the future; when one lives a meaningful life one has things to look forward to. In inauthenticity one does not have one's own future; in giving oneself over to others, one sees the future as others (the "they") see it, and feels that one's life should unfold in a manner which is in keeping with how "one" lives one's life (A, 29, 30). One is irresponsible in the sense that one fails to respond genuinely to one's situation in terms of one's own understanding and possibilities (see Buber, Section 2.3.3). In extreme inauthenticity one becomes depressed and experiences oneself as dying (A, 54, 55).

In the experience of conscience, one is called forward to one's ownmost possibilities. Authentic existence is always directed towards

the future, while taking the past into account as the basis of future possibilities. Conscience "...calls us back in calling us forth" (Heidegger, 1980, p. 280).

There seems to be a conflict between being secure in one's habitual mode of being (for-others) and venturously risking oneself (in being true to oneself) (see Kierkegaard, Section 2.3.1). However, there comes a point where the price one pays in being inauthentic (feeling lifeless, unfree, lacking in substance) becomes so great that one is prepared to risk losing one's security in favour of once again feeling alive. When one then resolutely acts in terms of one's own experience, the future becomes inviting once more, and "there is light and there is hope and there is something positive in (one's) life" (A, 50).

5.1.6 Conscience and awareness

My self, like my body, is for the most part lived prior to any knowledge or awareness of mine concerning it. One of those instances in which I do become most explicitly aware of my-self, however, is in the experience of conscience (see Laing on self-consciousness, Section 2.4.4). That one becomes aware of oneself in the experience of conscience should not be surprising in view of the fact that both "conscience" and "consciousness" share the same root, namely conscientia (see Section 2.1). Furthermore, this self-awareness comes to the fore when one experiences discomfort in being ill-at-ease in one's situation. The relationship between discomfort and awareness (particularly self-awareness) is described well by Harding (1973) when she writes:

"As has been truly said, consciousness arises only at the point of discomfort. Just as, in common parlance, 'necessity is the mother of invention', so conflict might be called the mother of awareness. When all goes well for us, we swim with the current; it is only when things do not go well that we become aware of the conditions of our lives and arouse ourselves to play an active role in regard to our own fate" (p. 201).

That consciousness arises only through suffering is echoed by Dostoevsky when he states that "...suffering is the sole origin of consciousness" (cited in Kaplan, 1964, p. 465). It is through being aware of the way we are being ("the conditions of our lives") that we arouse ourselves to play an active role in our existence. This point is reiterated by May (1977):

"My argument is that self-consciousness itself - the person's potential awareness that the vast, complex, protean flow of experience is his experience, a fact that often takes him by surprise - unavoidably brings in the element of decision at every point" (p. 204).

In one's awareness of one's existence, one is faced with having to choose, and one becomes anxious at this prospect. In this context one thinks of Sartre's view of man as having to choose himself (see Section 2.3.2), and Heidegger's view of authentic Dasein as being anxious (see Section 2.2.5). The need for one to choose consciously in one's authentic development is recognised, not only by all the existential philosophers presented here (see Section 2.3), but also by Jung (see Section 2.4.2).

Although in ontological terms, Dasein as such is guilty (see Section 1.2),

at the ontic level of concrete experience this guilt only becomes an issue to the extent that one is both aware of certain possibilities of one's existence which are calling one, and yet fails to realise these possibilities (B, 24, 25). In the present study, in the case of each of the subjects, the experience of conscience arises at the point of conflict where the subject becomes aware of certain definite possibilities of his existence (in the case of Kristen and Leonard, to resign from their current places of employment; in the case of Burt, to become a Catholic; in the case of Kristen, to abandon her "old self" role), and yet has not resolved either to realise or abandon these possibilities. It is only when a decision is made responsibly (i.e. through responding to these possibilities - see Buber, Section 2.3.3), that the situation is resolved. It is in principle impossible to be free of ontological guilt. However, in order to be authentic, one has to be resolutely guilty, i.e. to be guilty in a way which one has responsibly chosen. It is only when, in authenticity, one does not resolutely appropriate one's existence as one's own that one might actually experience¹ the pangs of ontological guilt.

It can be seen from the above that awareness (being aware of how one is living one's life) is intrinsic to conscience. Authentic being is characterised by Heidegger as "wanting to have a conscience" (see

¹The experiences referred to in "experiences of ontological guilt" are those experiences which might reveal the implicit presence of conscience and guilt as ontological (see Section 1.1 and 1.2). What is ontological cannot in principle be experienced directly as such since it would then be referred to as "ontic".

Section 2.2.5). It follows that being authentic would then entail wanting to be aware of how one is living one's life. In that awareness only dawns at the point of discomfort or conflict, we might conclude that being authentic, therefore, entails a readiness for discomfort or conflict (cf. Heidegger's view of authentic being as being characterised by a readiness for anxiety, Section 2.2.5). In this regard it is appropriate to quote Van den Berg (1966): "An existence devoid of sickness lacks the stimulus to live just as an existence devoid of mental problems degenerates into complete insignificance" (pp. 73-74, emphasis added).

5.2 Biographical context

I should like to suggest here that a certain life-history is likely to predispose certain people (namely those who have lived this particular history) to be more susceptible to experiencing conscience than others, or conversely, that people who are particularly susceptible to experiencing conscience are more likely than not to have experienced the essential features of the life-history presented here. It should be stressed that no causal connection or relationship is being implied between this life-history and the experience of conscience. It is simply due to the striking structural similarities between the experience of conscience and this biographical context that the two are brought together here.

The particular biographical context with which we are concerned here is that presented by the Swiss psychoanalyst, Alice Miller, in her

book entitled The Drama of the Gifted Child (1981), the original and more apt title of which was Prisoners of Childhood (1979).

Miller (1981) claims that "for the majority of sensitive people, the true self remains deeply and thoroughly hidden" such that "...many a gifted person lives without any notion of his or her true self" (p. ix). In the structure of conscience arrived at in the present study, the uncertainty with which the person experiences his own reality ("true self"), at least initially, appears quite clearly (see also point 7 of the Comments on the Extended Description, Section 4.5). People whose true selves are hidden from themselves and others, live out an "idealised, conforming, false" self, such that the true self is in "'solitary confinement' within the prison of the false self" (ibid., p. ix). These people are said to suffer from narcissistic disorders. Miller describes two extreme forms of these disorders, and considers the one to be the reverse of the other. She refers to these forms, namely depression and grandiosity, as "...the two sides of the medal that could be described as the 'false self', a medal that was actually once given for achievements" (ibid., p. 43). Neither the grandiose nor the depressive individual is free in his being; both are compelled to fulfill the "introjected mother's" expectations: "...whereas the grandiose person is her successful child the depressive sees himself as a failure" (ibid., p. 45). Depression is seen as a loss or giving up of one's "real self" and consists of a denial of one's own emotional reactions and feelings; grandiosity is a defence against depression. The grandiose person can forget the loss of his "real" or "true" self so long as he is able, through his outstanding achievements, to be the

object of admiration of others. However, the self-respect he gains in this manner is fragile and tenuous, since he is excessively dependent on admiration from others, and this admiration is contingent upon qualities, functions and achievements of his which might at any point fail him, forcing him to confront his emptiness. In the present study, denial of their emotional reactions and feelings is evident in the subjects' not being committed to their behaviour at the affective level; the importance which Kristen and Leonard attach to succeeding in their occupations hints at the possibility of a grandiose defence on their part against their basic feelings of lifelessness (depression). The latter interpretation, however, lacks sufficient ground to be definite.

Narcissistic disorders are seen by Miller as having their origins in the early emotional adaptation of the individual. In the course of healthy development, the infant (and later child) has available to him a parent (care-giver) who regards and respects him as the person he is at any given time, especially as regards his emotions and sensations and his expression of these. Ideally, the child is "mirrored" by the mother such that he finds himself "in his mother's face" (ibid., p. 32).

In his mother's being sensitive to and reflecting his needs and feelings, the child develops a sense of who he actually is, relatively free from expectations on the part of the mother as to how he should be. In the case of the child who is later to suffer from a narcissistic disturbance, however, such relatively uncluttered and uncontaminated mirroring is unavailable. His mother is unable to tolerate the expressing of certain feelings, such as anger, frustration, sadness, and vital spontaneity. The reason for the mother's inability to tolerate

the expression of certain feelings lies in the fact that, as a child, she could only express these feelings at the risk of being rejected by her own parents. So, without realising why (i.e. prereflectively), she inhibits these same feelings in her own child so as to avoid the restimulation of the old anxieties associated with their expression. If the child must risk losing his mother's love, then he cannot experience these "forbidden" feelings, even secretly, "just for himself" (ibid., p. 10). He then accommodates himself to parental needs, reflecting only those aspects of himself (and themselves) which they wish to see. Instead of the parent mirroring him, he comes to mirror the parent, and both denies and loses access to himself in the process. He remains without a mirror, and for the rest of his life might seek this mirror in vain (ibid., p. 32). A clear example of one's seeking a reflection of oneself (in vain) in the other, appears in the present study in the case of Leonard (Protocol D).

Accommodation to parental needs often (though not always) leads to the development of the "as-if personality", or what Winnicott refers to as the "false self" (ibid., p. 12). When Miller describes this personality, she might just as well be referring to the structure of inauthenticity as it emerges in the present study:

"This person develops in such a way that he reveals only what is expected of him, and fuses so completely with what he reveals that...one could scarcely have guessed how much more there is to him, behind this 'masked view of himself' (Habermas, 1970). He cannot develop and differentiate his 'true self', because he is unable to live it. It remains in a 'state of non-communication', as Winnicott has expressed it. Understandably, these (people) complain of a sense of

emptiness, futility, or homelessness, for the emptiness is real. A process of emptying, impoverishment, and partial killing of his potential actually took place when all that was alive and spontaneous in him was cut off" (ibid., pp. 12-13, latter parenthesis added).

There are at least two important structural similarities between conscience as researched in the present study and the biographical context presented above:

1. both involve a rupture in one's existence between inner and outer, such that one becomes a being-for-others which opposes one's authentic experience;
2. both involve a sacrifice of one's freedom, individuality and vitality in the service of being secure in others' acceptance of one.

Fromm (1949) makes an explicit connection between an inhibited childhood and (guilty) conscience when he writes:

"The scars left from the child's defeat in the fight (for freedom) against irrational authority are to be found at the bottom of every neurosis. They form a syndrome the most important features of which are the weakening or paralysis of the person's originality and spontaneity; the weakening of the self and the substitution of a pseudo self in which the feeling of 'I am' is dulled and replaced by the experience of self as the sum total of others' expectations; the substitution of autonomy by heteronomy; the foginess or, to use H.S. Sullivan's term, the parataxic quality of all interpersonal experiences. The most

important symptom of the defeat in the fight for oneself is the guilty conscience" (pp. 157-158, parenthesis added).

5.3 Conscience and psychotherapy

In the present study it becomes evident that the authentic self is always ready for anxiety. Not only is this fact borne out by the structure of conscience (and hence authenticity/inauthenticity) as discovered in this study; it is also supported by the literature: for Heidegger, conscience (and hence authenticity) emerges from the depths of anxiety (Section 2.2.5); for Kierkegaard, the spirited (authentic) self is transparently anxious (Section 2.3.1); and Jung (1934) points out that "...the growth of personality (which coincides with authenticity in Jung's use of the term "personality" - see Section 2.4.2) is synonymous with an increase of self-consciousness" (p. 184, parenthesis added), and self-consciousness entails conflict, which is associated with anxiety (see Section 5.1.6). Tillich (1959) makes the point that "...anxiety is existential in the sense that it belongs to existence as such and not to an abnormal state of mind as in neurotic (and psychotic) anxiety" (p. 49).

If anxiety is intrinsic to existence, and authenticity involves appropriating one's existence as that which it is, it follows that if one values authenticity one must be prepared to be anxious without regarding anxiety as an extraordinary or undesirable state. This implies that if the psychotherapist and his client hold store in being authentic¹,

¹ In this regard, Bugental (1965) regards authenticity as "the central concern of psychotherapy" (pp. 31 f.).

the psychotherapist should not see anxiety, in all cases at least, as a "symptom" of some or other disorder which ought to be alleviated, but rather as the point at which authenticity might emerge. Clearly the psychotherapist's judgement of the nature of the anxiety experienced by his client will be informed in each particular case by the breadth of his experience and the depth of his psychological insight. In any event, his task cannot be seen as that of guiding his client towards "normality" in an attempt to avoid this anxiety: to value authenticity on the one hand and to regard "normality" as a way-of-being to be strived for involves a contradiction, since the notion of "normality" is loaded with the "they" and how "they" say "one" ought to live one's life. This does not suggest, however, that the task of the psychotherapist is to encourage the client not to conform so as to assert his own individuality (authenticity) over and against others and society in general. The aim of the psychotherapist is rather to be an uncluttered presence for the client, and so to provide an atmosphere which is conducive to the client's discovering his own (authentic) experience, thereby facilitating him in living that life which is uniquely his own. In the words of Bugental (1965), psychotherapy "...is not the treatment of an illness. It is a daring to confront self-and-world. It is not a learning to adjust; it is a facing of infinitive un-adjustability" (p. 42).

To the client who is particularly susceptible to experiences of conscience, the uncluttered presence referred to above is unlikely to have been available in the past. In Miller's terms, the psychotherapist would do well to facilitate such a client's regression to his past as

the source of his loss of self. Lomas (1963) refers to this regression as a "hopeful return to the past" (p. 90). Now, in re-living his past in psychotherapy, the client can experience for the first time the sadness, pain and narcissistic rage that attended his loss of self. It is only when the client can experience these painful feelings at the loss of his self which were denied not only expression, but also awareness in childhood, that he can properly mourn this loss, without defending against it through becoming, for example, depressed or grandiose. Referring to such a client in psychotherapy, Miller (1981) writes:

"He will discover in himself a need to live according to his 'true self' and no longer be forced to earn love, a love that at root, still leaves him empty-handed since it is given to the 'false self', which he has begun to relinquish" (p. 57).

The client's return to his past in order to live more fully towards his future makes sense in terms of the point Van den Berg (1972) makes when he claims that "...an accessible future means a well-ordered past" (p. 92). The client has lost his "true self" in the past. In order for the future to become more accessible to him he needs to return to the past in an attempt to salvage his self. This is reminiscent of Heidegger's description of conscience as a call that "...calls us back in calling us forth" (see Section 2.2.4), and the following statement made by Scheler (1960) is appropriate here: "History comprehended frees us from the power of the history we live" (p. 41). In returning to our past and making sense of it, we are freed for the future.

In genuinely experiencing and being himself, the client might experience anxiety that is so intense that he might fear that he is becoming psychotic. May (1969) is not surprised by this, since

"...consciousness of one's own desires and affirming them invokes accepting one's originality and uniqueness. It implies that one must be prepared not only to be isolated from those parental figures upon whom one has been dependent, but at that instant to stand alone in the entire psychic universe as well (p. 81).

Clearly the psychotherapist must be able to "hold" the client and contain his anxiety in his exploration of his hidden world of feelings. Any rejection experienced by the client as coming from the psychotherapist might dispose him (the client) to lapse once again into his inauthentic, "false self" mode of being.

5.4 Conscience compared with being-guilty

What follows will be a brief comparison between the structures of being-guilty as researched by Brooke (1983) and of conscience as it came to light in the present study.

What emerges most strikingly is the fact that conscience is a far more diffuse phenomenon than is being-guilty. In the mode of being inauthentic out of which conscience calls one to "come into existence" (Rogers' (1967) expression for becoming authentic), the person has abandoned the very basis of his being: he no longer owns his own experience as such, and feels insubstantial and uprooted, lacking a centre. By contrast being-guilty, while also being a pervasive

phenomenon, takes as its starting point and presupposes the person's having a basic standpoint in the world within a network of established world-relationships. Guilt arises through the damaging of precisely these world-relationships which are presupposed by the person in being-guilty, and yet are not appropriated by the person in conscience, until such time as he actually lives his authentic experience. The very basis of the self is in question in conscience, whereas in being-guilty it is only certain world relations (specific acts and/or omissions) which become the issue. The person in being-guilty is more in possession of himself than the person in conscience, whose sense of self is fragile in that he is scattered in his being-for-others.

Nevertheless, what is perhaps the most significant structural similarity between conscience and being-guilty is the fact that the person experiences a rupture in his existence between what is revealed and what is concealed, between inner and outer, in both cases. In conscience, the person hides his authentic experience from others (and, to a degree, himself), while presenting to them what they expect of him. In being-guilty, the rupture exists between the person as he was prior to his guilt-provoking act and/or omission, and how he is now, after the act. He presents to others the former harmonious way of being, while hiding from them his mode of being which is culpable. Other less striking similarities are as follows: in both conscience and being-guilty, others are experienced negatively, either as lacking in understanding and hostile (conscience) or as accusatory (being-guilty); in both modes of being the person feels isolated from others (this follows from the rupture in his existence); the most satisfying resolution of both conscience

and being-guilty involves the closing of the rupture between what is revealed and what is concealed.

The relationship between the structures of conscience and being-guilty, as these structures appear in the present study and that of Brooke (1983) respectively, may be seen most meaningfully in terms of inauthenticity. Both modes of being involve being inauthentic. However, whereas conscience entails a failure to appropriate and openly live one's experience (existence) in general terms, being-guilty involves concealing and failing to appropriate specific constituents of one's existence, namely those of one's acts/omissions which damage world-relationships.

5.5 Limitations of the present study and suggestions for further research

Although within the scope of the present study this would not have been possible, it would have been desirable to analyse the protocols of more subjects. This study is a step towards uncovering the structure of conscience and authenticity and inauthenticity related to this phenomenon. The essence of structure or meaning is that it is the unity in diversity. We arrive at the structure of a particular phenomenon by tracing the common thread or invariant theme which runs through the many different instances of that phenomenon. It is through one's examining many varied examples of a particular phenomenon (conscience in this case) that what is typical of the phenomenon emerges. In the case of the present study in which only four instances of conscience were analysed in detail, it was at times difficult to discern

whether or not a particular theme formed part of the invariant meaning (structure) of conscience. To rectify this limitation, it would not be advisable to obtain much shorter protocols from many more subjects. In that conscience (within its context of authenticity and inauthenticity) is such a diffuse and pervasive phenomenon, one requires more than brief, superficial descriptions from the life-world of one's subjects. Further research, tapping the experience of more subjects, is required in the area of conscience.

Although a more adequate question fails to spring to mind, the research question asked in the present study tended to bias subjects' responses in the direction of descriptions of inauthenticity. As a result, the emergence out of the inauthentic mode of being through each subject's living out his own experience has not always been described adequately, in the researcher's opinion. A case in point is the description provided by Leonard (see Protocol D in the Appendix). More thought and research in this area might yield a question which rights this bias.

Phenomena in which one explicitly or implicitly denies the reality of one's own existence might all be regarded as instances of inauthenticity. An obvious example of such a phenomenon would be envy, in which the person tries to live vicariously through the envied other, denying his own facticity and possibilities in the process (see Titelman, 1981). It would be a worthwhile undertaking to study these phenomena and, at the level of structure, to explore the relationship between each phenomenon and the others, as well as its relationship to inauthenticity as such.

Despite the limitations of the present study, it is hoped that it has at least revealed that conscience, when understood in its broader and more original sense, is a phenomenon worthy of serious consideration and further research, insofar as it plays a significant role in the destiny of each individual.

APPENDIX

PROTOCOLS C AND D

PROTOCOL C : JANET

1/ After I'd been away from home for 18 months, I went back to visit. Many things in my life had changed in that 18 months (among other things, we moved to another province, I got divorced, and began working full-time again).

2/ My children and I left for Johannesburg on a Thursday morning - 13 hours by car. That evening I attended a typical Afrikaans meeting and felt very strange and ill at ease after 18 months in Grahamstown.

3/ On Friday we spent the whole day in the busy city, and on Friday evening we drove the further 120km to my home-town.

4/ I was very tired when we arrived home. At home my father was there together with all his friends. They were waiting to hear how things were going with me and all that had happened to me. It was pleasant to see everyone, ^{5/} but for a moment it felt as if time was standing still. It was as if I had never been away from them.

I couldn't even begin to tell them everything that had happened to me in the year and a half. It felt like a lifetime in which they had had no part. ^{6/} I also didn't want to spoil the convivial atmosphere, and so semi-consciously decided to be my "old self", as they knew me.

7/ Every now and then I felt strange, as if I were in the wrong place at the wrong time.

8/ Later that evening I was simply emotionally too tired to sustain the role which I'd been playing, and I began to dance with the young people until late in the evening. 9/ I was still tired the next morning, but I got up and began to dance again as if I was driven to it by anxiety. It was easier to dance than to stay with the relatives that stayed over.

However, it did not relieve the anxiety. 10/ I became more anxious and the feeling of strangeness and isolation was even stronger than it had been the previous night. I could not sustain my role for the others any more; I was also physically too tired. I went and lay on my bed.

11/ At that stage I was so anxious that I was aware of my heart which was beating almost painfully. I felt totally strange and lost, and I simply could not get rid of the feeling. It was as if I had lost myself completely. I was so anxious that it felt as if even my body was disappearing. 12/ I tried desperately to relax and to find myself. My brother came and sat with me and I tried to speak to him. However, this made the anxiety worse, because I could not tell him what was happening with me. 13/ I asked him to take my children out and to leave me alone for a while. I had to do this because it felt to me as if something was saying to me that whatever I did now, I would have to do for myself. I had to find myself on my own. 14/ I could not present some other self to the people for a moment longer. I was alone, and I had to find myself, find my real self, on my own.

15/ My anxiety at that stage was so overwhelming that I could scarcely control my movements, but I had to do something for myself. With difficulty I managed to go and bath and to get dressed - this made me feel myself a bit more, and also gave me the opportunity to be with myself, totally on my own. 16/ I realised that I needed help, and went to ask a General Practitioner in the town for some medication to relieve my anxiety.

17/ After that, I went and lay in my room and asked my relatives to keep my children busy and to give me a chance to find myself. 18/ I said that I would speak to them again later but I first needed time for myself. I slept for the rest of the day and also that evening.

19/ I began to feel my real self again only the next day, and from then on was very careful to take note of something within me that was me, and not to let myself down.

20/ Although the others were disappointed in my "serious" attitude, I preferred their disappointment to the feeling of losing myself, and at all costs I had to remain true to myself.

Inquiry:

R: 21/ You said that the evening you arrived in Johannesburg, you attended a typical Afrikaans meeting, and you felt strange and ill at ease. Could you say more about that?

S: Um, well, the meeting - that's now the Academy of Arts and Sciences - so all the staunch Broederbond Afrikaners were there. And that, in Afrikaans society, is the in-thing to attend. It's a big thing to attend this thing, 22/ and it was an absolutely ridiculous feeling. It felt as if everyone was playing games, to fit in. And I just decided I wouldn't play games to fit in. So that's why I felt so strange in that situation. Because I tried to be just as I am there without participating in social games. That's why I felt strange and ill at ease, because I didn't adhere to the rules of the game at that stage.

R: 23/ How did you feel about the games?

S: Basically, they're the sort of games that I'd played earlier in my life, to adapt to the society I was in all my life. But I think in the meantime I have sorted myself out a bit more, and become myself a bit more. And that sort of game has become totally unacceptable to me. 24/ So basically I was disgusted with these sort of superficial tricks and things, and with this sort of empty, alienating conversation. And I just couldn't manage to play along.

R: 25/ When you arrived at your dad's place, all of his friends were

there and so on, and you said it was pleasant to see everyone, but for a moment it felt as if time had stopped. Could you tell me more about that?

S: Yes. Everyone used to gather at my father's house on a Friday night - in summer for a braai and in winter to eat soup and so on. And the three years that we spent in X (S's home town), before we came here, was a time that I played these games a lot. Every Friday night we would be there with the whole crowd, and in the year and a half that I spent away from them in Grahamstown, X was no longer an important place in my life. At that time (when S was in X) Friday nights with the same crowd were an important part of my life. So when I returned after a year and a half, it was the same place with the same food and drinks that everyone drank and the same sort of jokes and all. And it felt as if the year and a half that I was away from X, the time that I lived here did not exist. Almost as if it had been something I thought up. Because everything there remained as it had been,^{26/} and I had basically changed a lot in the year and a half. And it was as if nothing had happened - as if my being was just a dream. As if that scene had just continued and I'd just woken up from a sleep.

R: ^{27/}You say you changed. Can you go into that a bit more?

S: Well, basically, many things had happened in my life. I had moved here, where I met my sort of people and didn't need to play these games anymore. I could be myself more, and actually worked on

being myself more. I got divorced, which also helped me to be myself more - I found it less necessary to play all the games that suited my husband. So in everything I did I began to be myself more - doing things that I thought were right for myself. So this is, generally speaking, how I changed. I basically stopped playing the games and began to do my own thing more.

R: ^{28/}You say you semi-consciously decided to be your "old self".
Could you tell me more about this?

S: This crowd of people were all so excited to see me after the year and a half. We always used to have fun together on Friday nights. And they sort of expected - I could see it when I arrived there - they sat there and waited for me to have fun again as they still have fun every Friday night - what they think is fun, which was never really much fun for me, but - I could see that they were sitting and waiting for me to fall in line and have fun together with them. ^{29/}And at that stage I was so tired after driving there, and the previous night's shit meeting, and the shopping in town and so on, that I basically had no more energy to decide to be myself and stick to that decision. It was easier to play the old role and to speak nonsense and please them with my behaviour. ^{30/}In a way, then, I was pretending that the year and a half that I was away did not exist, and to fall back into the pattern as I remembered it. In this way, I decided, "Ag, forget about that year and a half - it actually had nothing to do with them and it will take me years to try to explain to them where I am now". So all I could

do now was once again to be as they knew me - that would be the easiest for everyone. It would please them, make the evening fun for them, and that would be the easiest. I didn't have the energy to fight the system.

R: ^{31/}You say you felt strange, as if you were in the wrong place at the wrong time...

S: Yes - it's the same thing of how I'd changed in the year and a half. Not so much how I changed, actually, but how I had become myself more in that year and a half, and abandoned all the roles, which was very important for me. ^{32/}And I was quite vulnerable in a way. I lacked the defences, social games and tricks with which I would easily have fitted in in that situation. ^{33/}So when I walked in, it...(pause)...ja, when I kept quiet and was myself, when I didn't play the games, these people were so surprised with me, and didn't know how to handle me - "Ag no man, you aren't as nice as you used to be anymore. You must come back here so that you can be yourself again", and such like. And that's precisely what I didn't want to do. ^{34/}That's why I left there, because I just felt I wasn't myself. So when I did feel I was being myself, when I didn't play along and so on, they moaned about it. They wanted me to be as they had got to know me. ^{35/}So the times that I felt I was being myself the most, I felt most strongly that I was in the wrong place at the wrong time. It felt as if I - the time was wrong, because they denied the year and a half of my life, and the place was wrong because I couldn't be myself there - I had

to play a game to be accepted. So the more I felt myself, the more I felt it was the wrong place and the wrong time, in that specific situation.

R: ^{36/} You say that later that night you were simply too tired emotionally to sustain the role which you'd been playing...

S: Yes. I tried hard to be my "old self", as they like me, to please them, basically, and to feel accepted in their company. But it was so damn exhausting - it was as if I stood detached from myself while I performed for them to please them. So it was terribly exhausting for me, because I was literally playing a role, in a way, of which I was constantly aware. I wanted to please them and because I was physically so tired, as well as emotionally tired from my divorce and my job, and what had recently happened, that I just simply couldn't sustain it. ^{37/} I just couldn't go on socialising and that's why I started dancing with the younger people, because I thought, if I dance, then I at least won't have to do anything else but dance. I won't have to speak, and we can still have fun in that way. Then at least I won't have to speak too much or try to explain myself, or continuously try to justify things that they don't like - to explain why I said such and such - because how I was there initially and how I operate here were so far removed from each other, that it really was an emotional strain to please them, so that I could be accepted.

R: ^{38/} You say it was easier to dance than to speak with the family...

S: Ja - speaking was difficult because I couldn't answer their questions without explaining. They wanted to know about my life, what has happening in my life, because you must have fun there, you must sit and speak nonsense and gossip about the people in X and bitch about the people in X and such like, something in which I have lost interest entirely. It was just not important in my world. And they wanted to know what had been happening with me and what had been happening with Mark (S's ex-husband) and so on. And I just couldn't tell them - it was hopelessly too much.

39/ The other thing which one could have done was to sit and speak absolute nonsense which I was basically too tired to be able to do. But I didn't want to go to sleep early and have them feel that I was not interested in their party. So I felt, well, I'll take part in the party, but I'll dance rather. Then I wouldn't have to tell long stories and try to make sense, while I felt as if I was sitting and trying to speak with people from another planet. Or as if I at least had come from another planet.

R: 40/ You say the dancing made you more anxious, it didn't relieve the anxiety...

S: Yes. (Laughs) I became more anxious when I danced because basically everyone came to dance then. And now there were other games, once again, sexual games with the dancing, which I also did not feel like playing. It was so clear to me what was happening - the games and so on - and I just didn't have the energy for it. So I became more anxious because I didn't want to be there. I

wanted to go and sleep rather or be back here where I could be myself and do my own thing. I didn't want to be there, whatever I did, whether I spoke, or danced or whatever, it didn't work. Because I couldn't just be myself and be left alone and be accepted as I was. So whatever I did made me more anxious, because I was busy doing the wrong things, for myself and for them.

R: ^{41/}You say the feeling of strangeness was strong. Could you go into that a bit more?

S: It was the same strangeness that I didn't belong there, and that what I was doing was wrong, for me, anyway, hopelessly wrong. Um, so it was as if I became more and more estranged from myself, in my attempt to be through continuing to do the things which I really didn't want to do but which I did to please them. The more I tried to please them, the stranger I felt, and the more estranged I felt from myself.

R: ^{42/}You talk of isolation...

S: Yes, that was almost as if I was almost two people in that situation. Because it was almost as if I distanced myself from myself when I was playing the role for them. When I decided to be my "old self". It was as if I distanced myself from myself - almost like acting in a play. ^{43/}And they were pleased, but I felt incredibly alone, because the things I was doing to please them, thereby trying to be accepted, didn't work at all. ^{44/}And I almost lost myself in the

process. I constantly felt that I was letting myself down terribly, because they were now liking me for something that I was not at all. I was pleasing them through being something that I'm not. So that they accepted me did not help because it wasn't actually me. ^{45/}So then I felt incredibly isolated and alone, because when I tried to be the genuine me they said, "Ag no, that's not nice. You're not nice now. You've changed and now you're funny", and things like that. So in that way I felt terribly isolated. ^{46/}There's a difference between the strangeness I felt at the Academy meeting and that which I felt now. At the meeting I felt strange but it was in the crowd. But now, as I'm telling you this, it occurs to me that I felt more and more estranged from myself in X. ^{47/}The first evening I felt strange among the people, and the more I tried to please them, the more I felt estranged from myself, and the more anxious it made me. Because I could still handle the strangeness among the people, but the more I became estranged from myself, the less I could handle it. ^{48/}So through trying to please the people through trying to be accepted by them, I let myself down all the more, and the more I tried to relieve the anxiety through not being myself, the worse I made the anxiety because I estranged myself from myself all the more. The more I departed from myself, the worse the anxiety became.

R: ^{49/}"I felt lost and I simply could not get rid of the feeling..."

S: I think I've just explained that when I said I became more and more estranged from myself, basically. And how futile my attempt to

relieve my anxiety was. The more anxious I became, the more I tried to win the acceptance of the others, and the more I became estranged from myself. So the attempt that I made was the wrong attempt, basically. I let myself down more and more and sort of almost lost control of myself, in a certain sense. ^{50/}The attempts to be myself failed completely, and then I was so strange - estranged from myself. Because I gave myself over so completely and tried to go along with how it had always been.

R: ^{51/}You say you tried to relax and to find yourself...

S: Yes. The next day I continued with the same bizarre attempt to be part of things and to be fun and not to upset anyone with my changed state or whatever. And then I sort of collapsed - I just couldn't carry on. I was neither physically nor emotionally capable of carrying one. ^{52/}Then I went to lie on the bed, and then I got the feeling that I was totally alone, because it really felt as if - on the one hand, here I lie on the bed, and on the other, there I perform for the people, and they see what I'm doing, but it's got nothing to do with me. And then I became terribly anxious. ^{53/}And then I felt, now I'd better do something. And I thought, no, no, I can't go on like this, it's laughable, physically, to perform like that. And then I danced again, and it became totally ridiculous and I had to go and lie on the bed and come to a stop, and get my pieces together. I must come to myself and get back to myself in a way. And I must relax - relax physically, and I must relax in all ways, and stop performing, so that I can

get back to myself again - find myself. ^{54/}I just felt I must leave the people alone now and be myself again, because now I didn't really know who I was, whether I was that performing idiot or the person that I have been in Grahamstown for the last year and a half. Who the devil am I really now? I wasn't sure who I was and I had to find out who I was. And it was extremely anxiety provoking. There once again I had the feeling that I was in the wrong place and at the wrong time. I didn't know if I was wrong or if the time and place were wrong, or whatever. ^{55/}And it was as if I'd disappeared, as if my body had disappeared in the situation. As if I no longer owned my body or my body me. That's how bad it was getting. And I just felt that I'd better get back into my body, I'd better gather my pieces together. ^{56/}Later on I sort of - as I lay on the bed (pause) I couldn't relax, I was too anxious at that stage. But it was as if I was speaking to myself almost, as if a part of me was saying, it was as if I was listening to myself, you know, um - it wasn't like a voice or anything like that, it was as if I was speaking to myself and was listening to my own voice. Because it didn't make sense anymore that other people should talk to me at that stage. I didn't want to speak to other people either, they must just go away. ^{57/}And I also couldn't seek help for myself or anything like that. Whatever happened-at that stage whatever I had to do, I had to do for myself. I myself had to gather my pieces together. And I lay on my stomach on my bed and, as I say, sort of spoke to myself. It was as if something in me, of myself, was speaking to me, and said, basically, that I (pause) the only way to get rid of my anxiety is just simply to be myself. And

whatever I do I must do for myself. I must do it for myself - in other words, I must sort of do my own thing - and if I want to relieve myself of the anxiety, then I must do something about it. Nobody is going to do it for me. The people aren't going to help with that. I had to sort of establish once again who I am, to find myself.

R: ^{58/}Tell me more about the incident with your brother.

S: Um, (pause) as I tell you about it, I think I'm almost back in that situation. My brother sat with me and he saw that I was very anxious - I think I'd told him, but I'm not really sure, as at that stage I wasn't having much to do with people - but I could see that he himself began to look frightened. I think he could see that there was something wrong with me. And he sort of tried to speak to me, and so on. He said to me, "What's going on?", and he tried to be nice and gentle with me, but it didn't make sense anymore. It actually made me more scared, that he could see something was wrong. ^{59/}I can recall the whole scene - with my bed that I lay on, and the cushion with the blue flowers, and it was intense, the whole thing. And my brother's anxiety which freaked me out even more. ^{60/}And my children who came in and (pause) who I just wanted to keep away from me, because I didn't want them to see what was happening to me. I don't know if I thought they'd be able to see, but I was afraid my anxiety might freak them out as well. So - and I couldn't at that stage consider anyone. I just had to take care of myself. It was urgently necessary that people just leave me alone.

Children - I couldn't be anything for anyone at that stage, except for myself. So the people who were there - it was terribly important that they should go away. So that I could come to myself on my own, gather my pieces together. And the intensity of that whole thing - I remember how I covered myself with the bedspread, um, how I felt it. Everything was so - very intense.

R: ^{61/}You say you managed to take a bath and this made you feel more yourself...

S: Yes. I told my brother to take the children and said they had to go away. They had to just leave me because I had to find myself urgently. I was still very anxious, but I could relax to a certain extent because there was at least nobody with whom I had to be anything. So I thought (pause) - I couldn't relax properly. So I thought I must do something. And then once again I had to, as I told you, I was lying on my arms, as if I had to speak to myself, as if one part of me was saying, almost prompting, it was as if I literally had to listen to myself. It was very important to get in touch with myself, in a sense. It was as if I lay and really listened to myself. ^{62/}Because, you know, I sort of, knew, I had to do something physically as it still felt - probably from the anxiety - that my body was disappearing. I thought I had to do something physical, like take a bath, where I would feel cold or warm water or whatever, or knock my head against the wall or something, just to feel that I was there, and that my pieces were together. ^{63/}And then with great difficulty I got myself together

enough to get up and, like an ordinary person - not like a bloody circus clown or something - get up and find my clothes and go to the bathroom and let the water run in - to do ordinary things for myself. ^{64/}It had nothing to do with anyone else. I chose the clothes for myself, that I would wear that day, and the bathing was just for me and it had nothing to do with anyone else. I had to be good to myself and just do my own thing so that I could become more together again. So in that way the bathing helped to make me feel a little more real. A bit more - as if I was myself.

R: ^{65/}Having seen your G P you asked your family to keep your kids busy to give you a chance to find yourself. You needed time for yourself and would be able to speak to them later...

S: Yes. It's the same as what I said about my brother and the kids who were there and so on. I didn't want to have anything to do with anyone. Because pieces of me were spread all over the place. So after I'd been to the G P - he injected me with tranquillisers which sort of made me relax more so that I could make more sense of myself at that stage, and handle the anxiety. So, um, I needed time to, to - almost as if I had to get myself back from, that I had to stop doing the stupid things that I was doing for the crowd that was there. ^{66/}And I had to be on my own, as I have been for the past year and a half, so that I could know who I actually was, and what was happening with me, and get in touch with myself and my own feelings, so that I, um (pause) - ja, so that I could just be myself. I was wasting all my time with the blessed people.

R: ^{67/}Yes. You said that you would speak to them later...

S: Yes. Then I would speak to them again as I was, myself. ^{68/}At that stage I realised that it was useless to put on this act, because it was just going to freak me out completely. ^{69/}They would just have to - I should have done this long ago the previous night, just remain myself. But it was as if I needed a period of transition in which they were leaving me alone and I could gather my pieces together. And then later, when I felt more safe and secure and under my own skin, altogether whole within myself, then I would once again see fit to speak to them and possibly say to them, "Look, this is ridiculous. It doesn't help me to go on in this way. I am me. And you must take me as I am or leave me." But I found it necessary first to build up energy for that.

R: ^{70/}You say it was only the next day that you felt your real self - your real self?

S: Yes. I think that's when I felt genuine. Okay, I'm in touch with myself and with my own feelings and I know who I am once more. I could sort of gather the pieces together of the time when we lived there at X, and how I had changed. The things that had happened to me, my experiences, became more chronological. I could think about it and fit the whole thing together chronologically, so that the time and everything was okay. I sort of stopped spinning and it was okay. I had stayed there for three years and I was away from there for a year and a half, and now I was visiting there and

it was okay. ^{71/}And they would have to accept me as I was, even though they couldn't understand and I couldn't explain to them everything that had happened to me. It was okay that I knew. That things made sense for me, and they would have to get used to me as I really was with time - and not as they would like me to be. ^{72/}And I sort of had the strength and the energy, now that I'd also slept well, to sort of present myself to them, as I really was. It didn't matter whether I would fit in with them or not.

R: ^{73/}You say you were careful to notice within yourself what was yourself...

S: Yes. I had to take notice of something - I had to pay attention to - (pause) when I was with the others and I half wanted to get involved in the games again, and try to please them, I was terribly aware that I couldn't do it. ^{74/}I had to listen to that little voice of mine. My own voice - that voice that I lay and listened to on my bed - I had to sort of listen to, to pay attention to what I was. And I had to stop myself from just rolling on like a tumbleweed together with the others. I had to keep a check on myself and say "No", because it didn't fit, it wasn't me, it was for the others, but this was me and this was for myself. And it was terribly important for me to maintain that sort of control over myself so that I wouldn't let myself down again.

R: ^{75/}You say the people were disappointed...

S: Yes. I fitted in well - the three years I stayed there I fitted in well. I took care to fit in, because I wanted to be accepted. So I fitted in well with their games and the same sorts of things. I played the little games with greater ease at that stage, because I didn't have the guts really to be myself as I thought I was, as I felt I was, you know, as I felt comfortable with myself. Um, (pause) so when I was basically as I was, and was almost true to myself, this wasn't very nice for them. They probably felt a bit disappointed in the whole scene. I wasn't as much fun for them as I had been.

R: ^{76/}You preferred their disappointment to your...

S: Oh yes! Because playing those games freaked me out. I lost myself with the whole scene, as I said. And I felt I would much rather have them write me off, or let them get to know me from the beginning or whatever, and then accept me like that or reject me, whatever they wanted to do. Rather than get that totally strange, spinning feeling about myself again, that I didn't know who the hell I actually was. It was better that they didn't know who I was, and learnt to know me from the beginning.

R: ^{77/}You say you had to remain true to yourself...

S: Yes. That's right. I had to be what I was and feel comfortable with myself and feel at ease, sort of thing. And to hell with what they thought or said. It was just much less important. It also

didn't make me anxious at all, that they were sort of disappointed with me, because I sort of knew that they could rather write me off completely rather than that I should become so anxious that I didn't know who I was. So I just simply had to remain myself. I had to be true to myself.

PROTOCOL D : LEONARD

1/ Some years ago I was working in a job which I had taken on temporarily. I had, however, lied to my employers about my intentions and fabricated a career path to them. 2/ I didn't want to do that work and felt ill at ease in it most of the time. It did, however, provide me with quite a good income and I could keep going because I held the end in sight constantly. 3/ As I was only half committed to the job, I expended a lot of energy hiding my true motivations as well as having to exert myself more in order to continue doing the job to my employers' satisfaction. 4/ The company motivated its staff with a bonus scheme: if an employee reached his monthly target he was presented with a cheque and applause at a staff meeting especially arranged for the purpose. To achieve this reward was considered a prestigious achievement by the company. Through an enormous effort of "will" on my part, something which exhausted me, I not only reached my target but exceeded it one month. 5/ For some reason, I anticipated the presentation event with a mixture of vanity and dread. As the moment approached, my sense of vain achievement diminished and vanished and my sense of dread increased to almost intolerable levels. 6/ When my name was called out, there was a dramatic shift in the way my world appeared to me. 7/ The overriding feeling/experience I had was of betrayal. I sensed a strong hostility towards me in the company bosses. 8/ I felt shame and guilt and it seemed to me as though others would see through me, or literally into me, and they would see that part of me that I wanted to hide. 9/ I had in effect become the judgement of those others, there was nothing left of me. I was no longer me. I was "them" seeing in to me and judging me. 10/ I had a strong feeling of shame, but

betrayal was what I was. I must say there is a distinction for me between feeling something and the feelings I had during this event. During the time that I walked those few steps, received my "reward", and walked back to my seat, I didn't only feel these emotions, I had become them. ^{11/}People seemed to look away from me in confusion and dislike. ^{12/}It was as if I had left my body and the usual sense of permanence and solidness I have about myself and my body disappeared - I hadn't only become my own bad feelings, the me I know shifted its locus into others. They were solid and real and I was as evanescent as those feelings I describe. ^{13/}In a sense I had given myself up to others and at that moment fully experienced the ravages of inauthenticity.

Inquiry:

R: ^{14/}You mention that most of the time you felt ill at ease in the work you were doing. Could you go into the feeling of being ill at ease a bit more?

S: I felt I didn't belong there, and I felt I was deceiving them.
^{15/}And I wasn't committed to the work. I didn't like the work. I didn't like the whole philosophy or idea behind it. I didn't like the way that they went about doing their job. ^{16/}I didn't like the motivation of the work, and that relates to past things. A few years before that I had a selling job - this wasn't a selling job, but I had a selling job. And I actually gave it up, because I couldn't really go along with the profit motive. I think profit motives are fine, but not the way it's like implemented - you know, it becomes everything, and when it becomes everything, it pushes every other value out of sight. And so it becomes, like, for me anyway, the um, a new morality based on profit. And no other values have space to come into it. ^{17/}And then, when I went back to this sort of work I actually had almost a revulsion for it, and yet I did it. And that was in my mind all the time. ^{18/}And I didn't like the people very much. I didn't think they understood me, and I didn't make any effort to be understood. And so they didn't like me very much, and I didn't like them, you see. It was that sort of thing. ^{19/}And so it took a hang of a lot of effort just to keep going, because about half of me was fighting all the time, saying "Get out, go away, leave it, this is not where you belong. This is not something you can really work

with, something you can give yourself to." That's how it felt.

^{20/} I think that's more or less what my dis-ease was. My discomfort. I couldn't be involved in what I was doing. I was doing it inauthentically, I was doing it superficially. I was doing it with a lot of reservation. I don't know if I'm making myself clear.

R: ^{21/} Yes, that's fine. You say you were only half committed to the job. Could you tell me a bit more about that?

S: Well, I went to the job with a lot of sort of history behind me. I was working for the Government before that. I had a very worthwhile job, and it was something I really could do well. I could really go along and feel that the potential in the job for me to like live myself out - the Afrikaners have a good word for it, they say "jou uitleef" - you know, was there, but the salary was so hopelessly low that I actually couldn't survive on it, and I got married during that time and had a family so I couldn't survive on that sort of salary. Also the bureaucracy was unbelievably terrible. So I decided to change jobs, but I had then decided to come back to university while I was still working with them, but I couldn't do it until a period of 2 years had passed. So I needed a better job, more pay, and also it was too difficult working under those sort of conditions with the Government and low pay, so I found this job, you see. ^{22/} And actually, when they offered me the job I knew that it was wrong for me, and I knew that I was repeating the same sort of pattern that I'd experienced before exactly. ^{23/} I had a selling job once before, I was selling drugs

to doctors, which was actually a very well paid job, I had a motor car and there was enough money for me. But I actually - after being there for 3 years I also did well at it, like I was promoted and things. I couldn't bear the thought that all I was doing was pushing up somebody's, the sales of certain drugs, and it was like my vocational existence, it was like meaningless.

^{24/}And that meaninglessness developed as the years developed, as I got more and more into the job, you see, and it was very clear to me, I reached a crisis at one point where I couldn't carry on.

It wasn't something which I'd actually chosen, it wasn't a decision I'd made, it was a decision I'd made in spite of myself, you see.

^{25/}It was like an inner part of me was saying, "You can't go on like this, you just can't." And I kept saying, "Well, I must, I can and I will", you know. Because of all the acceptable things that were there, like it was a good job, it was well paid, it wasn't difficult, there were a lot of career prospects and things like that. ^{26/}And yet this revulsion, and I can only call it revulsion

because that's exactly what I experienced. For the whole philosophy, the whole value structure behind it. It became intolerable for me.

And so I resigned the job, ^{27/}and actually it was quite interesting because when I resigned my bosses were utterly flummoxed. And they said well, they won't accept my resignation and they want to talk to me, and so we like had a meeting and they said they thought I was like emotionally disturbed to make a decision like that.

And to me it was the opposite of that, it was like some integrity coming out, not emotional disturbance. And they had actually made an appointment with two psychiatrists in Johannesburg for me

to go and see them. (Laughs) So concerned they were for me. I actually appreciate it, it was actually quite a caring thing for them to have done, as people for another person. ^{28/}And, anyway, I gave up my job and then I joined the Department of Social Welfare and worked in the social welfare field, and that, as I say, was very valuable. The welfare job was, in a sense it was very task-oriented. The task was given, and what I made of it, for myself, was up to me. There was hardly any training and very few vital guidelines. There weren't really people around who could help me or show me what to do at the level at which I wanted to do it. ^{29/}I felt the job was vast in its implications, and it was potentially very challenging - it was like inviting me into it, and I could put what I wanted into it. And what I put into it was determined by my values. ^{30/}Whereas the other job, this personnel-type job, I couldn't put myself into that, because what was required of me was very explicitly and overtly stated. I had to follow a very strict set of rules to do that job. ^{31/}With the welfare job, to a large extent I was left to do the job the way I felt or believed I could do it. And as long as I didn't infringe on overt instructions - like give people too much money for a food parcel - I was more or less free to do what I felt I could do. It didn't clash in any way with my own value-system, that was the main thing about it. ^{32/}It was very compatible with my life-style outside the job. I didn't have to become another person when I went into that job. I didn't feel I had to change in any way - there was nothing to pretend about. And that was the goodness about it.

R: ^{33/}What was the nature of the work?

S: It was interviewing people and giving them advice about pensions - that was one section. The other section was interviewing people who had nothing, and finding them jobs and accommodation, and if they were destitute I would give them a food parcel, you see. That's mostly what it was. What I found terrible about it was that the quality of the work I did had no bearing on my advancement in the organisation. I also felt that there was nobody who could really tell whether I was doing good work or bad work, because they weren't qualified to know. Not necessarily academically, but they themselves didn't know what was good or bad. ^{34/}And so I felt very on my own, sort of thing, you see, there was no larger structure which could support me in what I was doing. I had to find those resources in myself, and so support myself. ^{35/}But as I say, the most important thing was that it didn't in any way clash with my belief system, it didn't need to, it didn't ask to. The nature of the job wasn't such that I had to be re-moulded to suit it, like this other job, where I felt they were perpetually trying to change me. And perpetually trying to change the people, not only me, but everybody, to suit what they wanted. People became like clay, you had to change, you had to give everything to that other organisation, irrespective of whether you agreed with it or not. ^{36/}In this one there was far more individuality for me, I could give as much as I wanted to or withhold as much as I wanted to. And that was the main thing, the main advantage, I was left to be myself, very largely. And nobody tried to really change my

attitudes or my belief-system or my value structure. That's what it was. ^{37/}But then I couldn't carry on there because the pay was so bad and the bureaucracy was intolerable. ^{38/}And when I went back to this job, which was like, it was actually recruiting staff for companies, you see, but the underlying motive was to recruit as many people as fast as possible. Whether you do it well or not is irrelevant. ^{39/}They couldn't care whether that person is happy in his job or not. All they cared about was how many people you managed to place into positions. And that was the overriding value, that was the motive behind it all. All the rest was actually just eye-wash, just kak. ^{40/}It wasn't true, it wasn't real. You can't do something like that with real integrity. You can't do it well, no matter how hard you try. You can place a lot of people, but you can never do the job well. If you're doing it well the way they want to do it, you see. ^{41/}The company got paid for every placement they made, you see. And so they obviously wanted as many placements made as possible. So what it actually boiled down to, was that to place a lot of people you had to interview a helluva lot of people. And the only way it actually worked was to send a lot of people to a lot of interviews, irrespective of whether they are actually suited to that job or not. Because just by the law of averages, the more people you send out, the more are going to be employed. So that's what it really boils down to. ^{42/}Your interviews, your insights, your abilities and all those sorts of things are irrelevant. All you really need to do is send a lot of people out to a lot of jobs as quickly as possible. And by doing that you need to know how to manipulate the applicant

and the personnel officer of the company, you see. That's the real backbone of what was going on. The rest, like you must know your people and know what they want, you must get to know them and all that, actually was irrelevant. That's what I call eye-wash. ^{43/}It was actually using people, like blatantly, and I couldn't - the same revulsion I had when I was selling tablets came back when I was doing this. And I said, "You're doing it again." ^{44/}Like when I gave up the job it was like a tremendous leap forward for me in my own (pause) like moral strength, I think. And when I went back to this job it was like a terrible regression. I perceived it and experienced it. It was a very great regression, I felt I'd betrayed myself. And I had. And so I was unhappy. I don't know if that answers your question.

R: ^{45/}Ja, sure. You say you expended a lot of energy hiding your true motivation. Could you tell me a bit more about that?

S: Ja. Perhaps it's not very clear. I spent a lot of energy hiding (pause) let me give you an example, perhaps that will make it clearer. You see, since there was a lot of work to be done, like we had to first of all interview the applicants, and you had to write ads, and the ads had to be appealing, you see. And it actually takes a lot of time to write a creative ad, an ad that someone will respond to. It takes a lot of time to go into the company and interview the personnel officer and go around and look at the job and see what it's like and things like that. It takes a lot of time to build up contacts and so on. ^{46/}But if I

actually felt that what I was doing was valuable, it wouldn't have - I wouldn't have used up energy. But part of me was saying, "This is rubbish, you're doing this - you don't want to do it." I was like battling myself, you see. ^{47/}And I couldn't let them know that I was thinking this is kak, this is rubbish, I can't go along with this. This is dishonest, it's deceitful, it's inferior work, you see. I had to pretend that I was enthusiastic. I had to pretend that I went along with it, I had to pretend that I also valued those sort of values. That I could give myself to those sort of values, could believe in them, could accept them and that they could become mine. And they weren't, you see. ^{48/}I had to put on a face. To say, "Ja, I like it", you see. Meanwhile inside me I was thinking this is rubbish, I can't go along with it, I hate it, I hate everybody here, you see, that's what I mean. So I had to expend energy to put a smile on my face whereas actually I was scowling, you see, or crying. That's what I mean by expending energy.

R: ^{49/}You say you exceeded your target through an enormous effort of will. Could you say a bit more about that effort of will?

S: What I mean is that because I was so conflicted about what I was doing, I felt very insecure. And I didn't - and since I - oh, another thing about hiding my true intentions, I went there knowing that I was only going to stay there for 18 months, you see. Because after 18 months I was going to resign. That was my plan, I'd worked that out. But I didn't tell them that - they would

never have employed me. And so I was also very insecure. I wanted it for 18 months, but I knew that if I like just became myself and said this was rubbish, they'd just kick me out. ^{50/}So I made an extra effort to reach target, and the only way I could do it, not because I wanted to do it, but because I had to do it, and I had to fight myself. The only way I could do it was to expend will power, to say to myself, "You must do this." Instead of going home at 5 o'clock, I'd say, "No, I will stay here until 6" and force myself to write good ads, and force myself to make an extra 5 'phone calls, instead of just going home, that's what I mean, you see. That's what I see as like will power.

R: ^{51/}You anticipated the presentation event with a mixture of vanity and dread. Could you go into those feelings a bit more?

S: Well, I sort of felt vainly proud, because I'd managed to reach target, and actually exceed target. That's what I mean by vanity. It was vanity because it was empty, ^{52/}because there was nothing to be proud about. It was actually something to be ashamed of, in reality. I should have been ashamed of expending so much effort, so much dishonesty, putting on such a mask, to reach such a valueless target. And yet I felt vain about it because I thought, I knew people would clap and say, "Well done" and things like that, you see. That's what I mean by vanity. ^{53/}And apprehension, I don't know about the apprehension. I just felt very apprehensive. I just felt there's something - and I wasn't like so in touch with what was happening to me, because I was trying to suppress it, you

see. So (pause) but there was apprehension. ^{54/}I was like dreading it. Where the dread came from I couldn't actually say, you know, this is what I'm dreading. I didn't sit down and say, "What am I actually dreading?" I tried to brush it off and say, "Ag, nonsense man." But I knew I was dreading. I didn't know what that dread was. ^{55/}But I think I must have anticipated that I would feel like, the way I did as I described it, and the dread was of that. That I would be showing up to myself for what I'd actually done. That was the dread. That I would get to a point where I would be absolutely confronted with what I'd done. With the results of what I'd done to myself. And I couldn't anticipate it, I couldn't work it out for myself. I could only experience it.

R: ^{56/}Your sense of dread increased to an almost intolerable level as the event arrived...

S: It's like a cliché isn't it? (Laughs) Ja, well what I mean by that is that it was as though something terrible was going to happen to me as the time sort of got closer. And all I wanted to do was run away. I actually wanted to go home. ^{57/}But I couldn't go home because I would have to come to work the next day and they would say, "Well, where the hell were you?" sort of thing, you see. So I was like trapped, you see. And that feeling of being trapped, there was actually no way out. I couldn't run away, I couldn't avoid it, I had to face it. And that became almost intolerable. ^{58/}Like I could avoid that confrontation in the daily living of the job, you see, because it was, like, I'm going and I

could always avoid my feelings and thoughts and what was going on inside me and keep pretending to them mostly and to myself a lot. But when, but the mechanics of the situation, I had to go for it, I couldn't avoid it. I couldn't say, "Look, I'm not coming." They would have said, "Why not?" and I wouldn't have been able to say I'm sick or something because I couldn't have lied, you know.

^{59/}I was like so fragile, I just had to go through with it. And so it was intolerable. It was like having to face something absolutely terrible and there was no alternative, I had to face it, and I didn't want to. I didn't want to face it. It was the last thing I wanted to do.

R: ^{60/}The overriding experience you had was of betrayal...

S: You know it's difficult for me to tell you how it felt, but I felt betrayal. I can't actually take betrayal apart and say, "This is what it's like." It was like (pause) I'd done something to somebody. I'd built up some sort of trust, and I don't know who it was, I don't know who I was betraying. All I know was there was this tremendous sense of, feeling that I'd betrayed somebody, you see. That I'd built up some sort of trust and that trust had - that I'd actually broken that trust, and like in a very despicable way. That's how I felt. In the most despicable way possible.

^{61/}Thinking back, I felt I'd betrayed them, those people, and I felt they'd sensed my betrayal, they knew I was betraying them. But I also felt terrible betrayal towards myself, you know. (Pause)

R: Betrayal towards yourself?

S: Ja. I'm not sure how that worked, but that's what I felt.

R: ^{62/}Ja. As you walked up to receive the reward, you sensed a feeling of hostility towards you from the company bosses. Could you say more about that?

S: Ja. Like, the whole event, the whole visual event for me was, I think, because I felt so unsure and shaky at that moment, I like looked at people's eyes, sort of almost to see, to perhaps gauge some response, some reaction. Perhaps some reassurance, I think that's what it was. Because I felt this sense of betrayal, I like looked towards them for reassurance, you see, ^{63/}and I didn't see that. What I saw was like, they were looking at me in a very hostile fashion. They seemed, instead of seeming pleased with my performance, they seemed helluva hostile. Like people would be when they feel betrayed. I think that's where it comes from. You see, I felt I'd betrayed them, and therefore they would be very hostile, very angry with me for betraying them. And that's what I saw. ^{64/}I don't think they were hostile, why should they have been? I hadn't done anything to them that they knew about. I can't believe that they experienced what I experienced or felt. Obviously they didn't. That's how my world changed for me. I saw them looking at me and saying "You betrayer", angrily and helluva hostile. It was a betrayal at a deep level. That's what I mean.

R: ^{65/}You experienced a sense of shame and guilt. Could you go into that a bit more?

S: I think once I looked at these people and I sensed sort of like hostility or what I thought was hostility in their eyes, because that's how it appeared to me. I felt very guilty about what I'd done. Helluva guilty. ^{66/}And as I say, I - at that moment I wasn't in touch with what I'd done, all I was in touch with was what it felt like, the consequences of it. And that was the guilt, the guilt of betraying people. ^{67/}And the shame. The shame was - ja, the shame came from (pause) ja, I felt that sort of guilt and the shame came from because I'd been caught out, you see. I'd been like stripped naked, so to speak, like they could see through me. That was the shame. ^{68/}Because they were hostile it meant they could see through me. Obviously they couldn't have been hostile if they didn't see what I'd done to them. So all that sort of fell into place for me, like all at one moment. You're guilty and they can see you're guilty. Aren't you ashamed of yourself? That's what it was like.

R: ^{69/}You mention that it was as if others could see through you, or literally into you...

S: Mm. I think that's what I mean when I felt they could see what I'd done. That's how I felt, you see. ^{70/}And I think because I'd so given myself over to this pretence (pause) ja, that's what it was. I'd so lived a pretence, a role, a mask, that they couldn't

see me. ^{71/}And when I said earlier I couldn't make myself clear to them, I felt they didn't understand me. How could they understand me if I was wearing a mask all the time? ^{72/}So what I was presenting to them wasn't me, and that must have also accounted for the shame in me. And that's what they saw through. ^{73/}And because I didn't present any other part of me to them, they didn't know me, Leonard Smith, that I know myself. They only knew the mask I put up, and they saw the mask was false. Therefore there was nothing else to see. That's why they could see right through me. You see what I'm getting at?

R: ^{74/}Ja. I think I get it. They only saw - they didn't see the genuine you...

S: No, because I never allowed them to. They never saw the authentic me because I was covering it up all the time. They never got to know me. That was part of the pain and discomfort of being there. ^{75/}Nobody knew me, because if I'd allowed myself to expose myself and be me, they would have seen this guy doesn't belong here, he must go. You see. ^{76/}And of course I would have done that myself, I would have had to confront myself and say, "Look, you're mad to be here." So I was putting the mask onto myself as well. And so they never saw me, they never saw anything of me, the real me. All they saw was what I thought they wanted to see. ^{77/}And therefore there was nothing else for them to see once they took that mask off. That's what they saw, that's how I felt they saw right through me. ^{78/}You see, if they'd seen me as somebody like me, and I'd exposed

some of that, and that event had happened, I would still have felt that shame, but not to that extent, because I'd feel they'd still see the genuine me still there, you see. The Leonard that they know, the real Leonard, is still there. But they never got to know that real Leonard, so how could they have seen anybody? That was that transference, the looking through that I experienced. There was like nothing there for them to see, because I'd never let them see it. And if I'd never let them see it, how could they ever see it? And I knew I'd never let them see it. And so I knew they couldn't see it, and so therefore if they saw the facade, through the facade, there was nothing to see.

R: ^{79/}Ja. You mention they could see that part of you wanted to hide...

S: Ja. That doesn't fit in so well with what I've just been telling you, but that part which I wanted to hide (pause) was the real me, you see. Ja, and it's more or less the answer I gave to you just now. And that's that part of me I wanted to hide which was the real me, they didn't actually see. ^{80/}So they actually saw (pause) they saw that part of me inside me, they saw behind the mask, in other words they must have seen the part of me which created the mask, that's what I mean. That part of me which is capable of deceit, you see. That's what they saw. But they didn't see anything else, because there was nothing else for them to see. And I knew that. The important part was that I knew that, that I'd never revealed any other thing about me to them. So all they

could have seen was the mask which had been ripped off, and they must have seen into the person who is capable of producing these sort of masks. And there was nothing else for them to see. It's the same sort of thing that I explained just now.

R: 81/ You mention that you had a strong feeling of shame, but betrayal was what you were...

S: Ja, um (pause) what I think I mean by that is that this mask that I put on would preserve the job, would keep me in the job, was (pause) was in actual fact a betrayal, you see, that's what they saw. It was a mask. What I presented was a mask, but what I - the motivation behind it was betrayal or deceit, you see. And perhaps that's what I mean, that that's what they saw. It's all they could see as well, a person who is full of deceit and nothing else. And that's how I experienced myself, as betraying or betrayal. That's what I mean by that.

R: 82/ Ja. You say there's a distinction for you between feeling something and the feelings you had during this event. Could you go into that a bit more?

S: In everyday life, that's what I mean. Like in everyday life if I feel a sense of betrayal or a sense of anger or whatever, whatever the feeling is, there's still me around, you see. And I'm likely to feel more intensely with people I know very well, you see, than with strangers. The people I know really well really

know me, that's how I feel. So that me never disappears, like it did on that occasion. So it's like me having a feeling. It can be strong, but there's always me here. ^{83/}Whereas there there wasn't a me, I'd actually disappeared. I actually did disappear, it's quite interesting that. So if I felt that betrayal with my wife or something I'd know that she'd still see parts of me which weren't just betrayal. Because she'd see those parts of me and I've revealed those parts of me. So although, if I betray, it may be painful, but I won't disappear. There'll still be me, which she can see and which I can see because I've let her see it. You see. That's what I mean.

R: ^{84/}When you walked the few steps to receive the reward, you had become these emotions...

S: Ja. That's more or less the same as what I mean when I say that I was betrayal. Like there wasn't a me, there wasn't a me that was still doing it. I was just a mask, the unmasking and the betrayal which came out. That was me. There was nothing else. It carries on from the other question, it's the same thing.

R: ^{85/}Ja. You mention it was as if you had left your body...

S: That's the same sort of thing. I couldn't - I didn't like feel myself, I didn't feel this is me walking. You know, these feelings were so strong, this whole sense of betrayal and shame and guilt

was so strong that I couldn't locate a centre from which - a centre that was feeling it, you see. It wasn't - as I was saying earlier, there wasn't me, the residue of me, from which I was feeling these things. There wasn't anything, there was just feeling.

R: ^{86/}When you were walking up to get your reward, you mention that people seemed to look away from you in confusion and dislike. Could you go into that a bit more?

S: Ja. (Pause) Because I felt myself, like, disappearing, I needed to (pause) I couldn't tolerate the disappearance of me, so I had to find an anchor, and where I thought I'd find an anchor was in looking at other people and seeing what their response was to me. Like finding myself in them. And - because I didn't know where I was, and all I had was this bad experience. And I wanted to like get away from it, so I looked at people. Perhaps I was looking for confirmation that I was still there. That they could see something good. ^{87/}And I didn't seem to see that in their look. They looked as if they didn't know what was going on. They were confused because what they saw was going on wasn't what they knew me as being. Because I imagined they could see through my mask, past my mask, they actually saw that there was just this betraying me. Leonard the betrayer. But they didn't know me as a betrayer before, and that was their confusion. And they disliked noticing how they'd been betrayed. That's the sense I make of it to myself. ^{88/}I don't think it happened to them. I

don't think they actually saw that. I think I saw it in them, but I don't think they were feeling that. Because how could they have? They didn't see that betrayal - they didn't know about it. And what was happening was a confirmation of the mask, not a betrayal, for them. ^{89/}And that was very frightening, because they changed too, you see. And then I didn't know where I stood with them. I had changed, and they had also changed. They weren't the people that I thought I knew. They were hostile people, they weren't people giving me awards, friendly people, they were suddenly very hostile. And so there was an element of fear, too, about it. Suddenly I knew I didn't know them. ^{90/}Of course I must have said to myself, "Of course you couldn't have known them, because you can only know them if you've revealed yourself. (Pause) You can only know the part of them which responded to your mask, you see. You couldn't know the part of them that would have responded to the authentic me." So I actually didn't know them. And that was the fear. I also realised that I didn't know myself, but I also didn't know them. ^{91/}And perhaps I interpreted in their look (pause) something which wasn't there. And I made out of something else, a look which could mean anything, I created or interpreted a look of confusion and dislike, which wasn't there. ^{92/}And possibly I couldn't have recognised that look, because I'd never actually looked at them as people, you see. I'd looked at them as people who I'd had to hoodwink. And so they would take on almost any possibility, and the possibility which they took on was a possibility which I'd created, in a sense. There was only one real possibility left for me to experience them,

and that was dislike and betrayal.

R: ^{93/}Ja. When you say it was as if you'd left your body you mention that your usual sense of solidness and permanence disappeared...

S: You know, in everyday living, I'm aware of me. As a person, a person I know, a body I know. I mean it's me, my body. I'm not just saying this because phenomenology says it, that's how I experience myself. My body is the centre of the world in which I operate - and other things as well, but primarily my solidness of me - like I'm thinking of going in a lift, I can experience the weight, the increased weight when the lift goes up. So I'm aware of myself as a body, I'm aware of myself walking on the floor with weight. Those sort of things. Now that disappeared.

^{94/}And once that had disappeared there was nothing to replace it either, except these feelings. I didn't feel myself walking up those steps and walking back. I can't tell you what actually happened in terms of me as a body. I could have done a somersault - I don't know what I did with my body. I've no idea what I did with my body. I assume it just went up there and came back, because people didn't laugh or get amazed or something, or start screaming because I was floating. But I don't know what happened to my body. ^{95/}I went out of it. But I didn't go out of it and look - there's my body - it disappeared. It was just this whole complex of feelings of betrayal and all those sort of things that was actually moving from where I was sitting to that little place where the boss was standing at the back. It wasn't me as though

I could walk there with weight. That's what I mean.

R: ^{96/}Ja. You say, "The me I know shifted its locus into others..."

S: Ja. It was as if - that was part of the experience of my body. That disappeared, and perhaps when I looked at people to see how they took me I was looking for me, the body that disappeared, you see. And (pause) it was as though - and I find this difficult to explain - it was as though I was - it wasn't them looking at me, with dislike, it was like I was in them, and I was the dislike in them. I was the experience of dislike in them. ^{97/}You see, if somebody looked at me with dislike in the ordinary course of events, I'd say, well, really, that's that person's feeling against me. I wouldn't disappear. I'm still here. They can't really do anything to me by their dislike. I mean, they can possibly scandal about me and things like that, but it doesn't like threaten me. It does threaten me, so I may get a bit frightened because I don't like being disliked, but I don't feel I'm going to disappear, you see. They don't have magical powers over me. ^{98/}But there, I had disappeared, and I was then - where was I if I'd disappeared? I was still feeling things, and I had actually - I was them, their experience of me. That's where I was. I was in them. I was their feeling, their unpleasant feeling about me, that was me. It's funny to say, but that's exactly what I experienced. I was like in their heads, or in them. I was their bad experience. That's what I was. I was no longer a person, an object, another person at whom they were looking and disliking. I was the bad

experience. And where was the bad experience if I'd disappeared - it no longer had a centre. So where was it? So it was in them.

R: 99/ You say, "I had given myself up to others..."

S: Well, by that I mean that I'd actually lived the life which I thought they wanted, you see. I thought they wanted a type of person who was enthusiastic, committed, energetic, and quite simplistic in a certain sense. A person who was like a machine that was working towards a certain aim. And there was nothing else about life. Because a lot of those people who are successful in those sort of jobs, that's their whole life. Anything else they do, any diversion or any pass-time or recreation is aimed at restoring themselves so that they can get back to the job and carry on. And that was the sort of person I was pretending to be. And so in actual fact I'd put on a mask which is what I'd felt they wanted. And in that way I was giving myself to them, I was becoming what they wanted me to become. That's what I mean by giving myself up to them.

R: 100/ You finally say, "In a sense I'd given myself up to others, and at that moment fully experienced the ravages of inauthenticity." Could you go into that a bit more?

S: It sounds a bit dramatic. You see, this is what I understand about inauthenticity. That's what happens to me when I'm so inauthentic. And that's a very dramatic happening, and it sticks

in my mind because it was so dramatic. ^{101/}And it took me some time to unravel it, to work out actually what was going on. Why did I have these peculiar sensations and feelings? There? And I can't remember having other feelings like that. Clearly.

^{102/}And so it said to me, this is what happens to you when you are inauthentic. You disappear and you feel betrayal. And it like ravaged me, it like broke me up. ^{103/}Instead of becoming me, becoming more solid, becoming - instead of me centering on myself, and operating in the world, I'd actually lost that ability completely. ^{104/}When I'd become their dislike, I was totally at their mercy, obviously. I didn't even have a body who could put margins on my feelings any longer. I was like their body, and I didn't know their body, so I was totally at their mercy. Whatever they felt, whatever depth of disgust they had towards me, or I imagined they had towards me, I would have become. And in that sense it was like being obliterated.

R: ^{105/}So you sort of lost your sense of yourself...

S: Completely. That going into them was losing me, I'd lost me completely. And why had I lost me completely? Because I'd given myself up to them, I'd lived the life they'd wanted - I pretended to live the life they wanted. But I'd done it to such an extent there there was nothing left, there was almost nothing in reserve for them, or for our relationship. ^{106/}And that wasn't a good feeling, that wasn't creative, that wasn't a me developing. It was the opposite. It was a destruction, it was a ravage. It

was like becoming a spirit without a body. And that is what happens when I'm inauthentic. ^{107/}And I experienced it very acutely, because somehow all the sense came together at that moment, you see. Like the day to day living of this inauthenticity - I could still hang onto other things, and I still had meaning outside my inauthenticity which I sort of hung onto, you see. Or perhaps not hung onto - ja, which was me. But at that moment there was nothing else but the moment. And because the moment was so totally inauthentic, I could only experience the fullness of the inauthenticity of me. ^{108/}I could only experience my inauthenticity then, I couldn't experience my authenticity, it wasn't available for me to experience. Because I'd left it behind. I'd left it somewhere else, in other parts of my life which I hadn't brought in there. I'd only brought inauthenticity into it. If I'd brought in authenticity there (pause) well I couldn't have, because I'd lived the inauthenticity so well up to that point. I'm not actually sure about that, you know, I can't really work it out at the moment. The situation was such which, it was contrived in a way which allowed only that part of me which I had actually shared with others and revealed to others to emerge. And therefore I experienced my mask completely. I didn't experience myself any longer. ^{109/}The ravages of inauthenticity was actually experiencing me as a mask completely, without the me behind it, to say, this is a mask.

R: ^{110/}Could you tell me what followed this experience?

S: Well, it actually upset me quite profoundly, because it was so

vivid and dramatic. It was a profoundly upsetting experience. It wasn't nice, but it wasn't unpleasant, it was more than that. 111/ It was like, there's something terribly wrong going on with me. It was like the experience was saying to me, this is what's going wrong with you, now you can fully experience it, but it's like happening to you all the time. You're doing something which is leading to this sort of experience. That's how I saw it, I didn't see it as an isolated event. I knew it was a comment on the way I was living. That I knew. Quite clearly.

R: 112/ How did you feel immediately after the experience?

S: I had a tremendous longing to go back to people that I knew, you know, to go home. To my wife and my family. And to have my friends around me. It was like I needed some reality that I knew. That was very strong for me. That was the immediate reaction. 113/ But then I settled down - there was like a party afterwards, and I could more or less handle it, it was alright. I felt a bit strange, you know, I still felt a little bit transparent and I still felt a little bit that people weren't trusting me. But then those were feelings, I was back in my body. But I was perhaps a little bit uncomfortable, after the shock.

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