

***DEFINING GOVERNANCE IN UGANDA IN
A CHANGING WORLD ORDER:***

1962 - 94

**THESIS SUBMITTED TO RHODES
UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS:**

[INTERNATIONAL/POLITICAL STUDIES]

CRISPIN KINTU-NYAGO

February 1996

THIS STUDY IS DEDICATED TO ALL THOSE WHO HAVE STRUGGLED FOR [AND ARE USUALLY FORGOTTEN] , OR EFFECTED LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE ON THIS CONTINENT .

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THE FRUITION OF THIS EXERCISE WAS ENABLED THROUGH THE UNDERSTANDING AND GUIDANCE OF MY SUPERVISOR, PROF. R. SOUTHALL. MY APPRECIATION ALSO GOES TO THE ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, ALONGSIDE THE STUDENTS OF RHODES INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIT AND POLITICS DEPARTMENT, WHOSE INTERACTION ENRICHED MY KNOWLEDGE. I AM ALSO THANKFUL TO THE RHODES LIBRARY, IN ADDITION TO THE OFFICIALS, IN KAMPALA, OF THE FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION, THE FOUNDATION FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, IN ADDITION TO THE UGANDA THINK TANK FOR HAVING PROVIDED ME WITH VALUABLE RESEARCH MATERIAL. SIMILAR SENTIMENTS ARE EXTENDED TO THOSE FRIENDS WHO GENEROUSLY ACCESSED ME TO THEIR COPIES OF THE UGANDAN PRESS WITHOUT WHICH MY RESEARCH WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS MANAGEABLE. I AM ALSO GRATEFUL TO THE NUMEROUS PEOPLE I INTERACTED WITH IN THE EASTERN CAPE, WHOSE HOSPITALITY LIVENED MY STAY.

ABSTRACT

This study argues that much of early post colonial Uganda's political developments, had its roots in the colonial patterns of governance. It was ,however, the imperative of Uganda's early post colonial rulers to have formulated and maintained conditions for legitimate and orderly governance. Largely, this required a coherent political class with a mass based and mobilising political movement, that moreover had a political programme that catered for the interests of its support base. Indeed, their opting to negate these very prerequisite conditions, contributed greatly to Uganda's subsequent political disorder, and it's further marginalisation in the International Political Economy.

This study suggests that since the impact of colonialism in Uganda, its governance policies have closely been linked to the broader dictates of the International Political Economy. A reality that the policy makers in post colonial Uganda should have realised, and in the process attempted to advantageously adapt to the Ugandan situation.

There was a qualitative improvement in Uganda's governance from 1986. This study illustrates that this was a result of the emerging into power of a political class, whose policies deliberately and strenuously attempted to fulfil the above mentioned criteria.

There is need to link Uganda's foreign and governance policies. Consequently a conscious and deliberate effort has to be made by its policy makers, to ensure that the two are amicably adapted to each other, so as to derive the best possible benefits. For instance what Uganda needs in the existing New World Order are development, domestic and foreign investments and export markets for its produce. All of which can only be obtained if political order through a legitimate political system and government exists. With a leadership, that moreover, deliberately attracts foreign investments and creates the enabling conditions for competitive economic production.

The onus is upon Ugandans to ensure that they institutionalise conditions for their appropriate governance and foreign policies. For this thesis argues that the International Political Economy is dynamic, and Uganda was never predestined to be at its margins.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction	1
2. The Pre-Colonial and Colonial Patterns of Governance in Uganda	11
3. From Post Colonial Modernisation to Disintergration:1962-79	29
4. The Post Amin attempt to recreate Democratic Governance	54
5. The Recreation of Political Order and Legitimate Governance:1986-94	75
6. Conclusion	99
7. Appendices	107
8. Bibliography	120

CHAPTER ONE Introduction

Uganda obtained its independence on October 9th 1962. In order to define its subsequent governance policies, two points should be appreciated; [i] the need to study the country's class relationships and; [ii] because Uganda emerged in a marginal position in the International Political Economy [IPE], its foreign policy enormously influenced its governance policies.

The liberal and dependency paradigms presented differing views on what was required to acquire sustainable political and economic development in Third World countries. Liberalism argued that the panacea lay with the "modernisation" of the "traditional" sector [Rostow, 1960]. Yet it failed to resolve some crucial issues, for instance is all "tradition" unsuited for society's development? Or would the wholesale adoption without suitable adaption of Northern modernisation models create political and social harmony and sustainable development? In contrast the dependency school articulated the view that Uganda's economic salvation lay in its de-linking from the IPE [Tandon, 1990]. For the siphoning of its social surplus by the core, only created its underdevelopment, whilst it also argued that at best its elites could only transform into a comprador class.

I am critical of both paradigms, whilst I argue that opportunities existed for Uganda to transform for the better within the IPE, and that much of this country's post independence further marginalisation resulted from its governance policies or more appropriately, the lack of them. Furthermore, a formative national bourgeoisie did emerge in Uganda [Brett, 1991a], a situation more manifest in regional countries that evolved more appropriate governance policies [Black, Mugenyi and Swatuk, 1988]. In view of the global technological revolutions what was required was not autarky or the "modernising" of all "tradition" but rather properly tailored governance policies that enabled the access to suited skills, appropriate technology and seed capital. As Brett [1991a:ii], argues : "The problem is not to eliminate external 'interference', but to devise a more effective institutional interference between 'modern' external structures ... This ... [requires] major changes in the regulatory framework and more especially in the relations between the state, private enterprise and 'civil society'."

This necessitated appropriate governance, as the fruition of the above exercise required; [i] a coherent ruling class; [ii] which had a legitimate and suited political programme; [iii] whose implementation had to involve, the nurturing and respecting of appropriate institutional mechanisms that enabled social cohesion and economical reproduction. The failure to obtain these conditions in the 1962-86 period was the primary cause of the political instability that came to characterise Uganda, and its further marginalisation within the IPE.

Governance can not be defined without referring to governments and states. Kabwegyere [1993:1-2], observes that "A government refers to individuals, however selected, who make rules and regulations, controls and guide society in the maintenance of social order." This is based on the assumption "that an unguided and uncontrolled society is disorderly and uncomfortable for man." Governments use states to meet most of their objectives, a state being an impersonal "set of institutions which have a monopoly of coercive power [Kabwegyere, 1993:1-2]." States are supposed to represent the will of the ruling classes. A good government should be the one that uses its state to solve society's problems [Hawthorn, 1993:25]. Part of the Ugandan political predicament lay with the fact that at its independence, its political class was disunited, while it had inherited a untransparent and subjugating colonial state [Kabwegyere, 1974], which could easily be applied against society. Moreover, its local governance institutions nurtured ethnic exclusivity and religious sectarianism [Burke, 1964. And Karugire, 1980:157-165].

When defining governance in Uganda, this study refers to the rational redistribution of political and economic resources within society. Although this may not be equated to egalitarianism, the argument is, the broader this redistribution within society in a developmental context, the better the prospects for political harmony. This requires the leadership's transformation into a class for itself, and its formulating policies that expand Uganda's economic base, a development which would broaden and consolidate the national bourgeoisie and the stabilising middle class. The fruition of this process would depend on an agreeable institutional frame work that spells out the roles of government [central and regional], the state and civil society.

Good governance is linked to political legitimacy. This thesis agrees with David Beetham's [1991:15-19] views on political legitimacy. He argues that it comprises three distinct elements; [i] the conforming to recognised rules; [ii] these rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate social groups; and [iii] evidence of consent of the subordinate to the existing power relations should exist. This implies that although legality is a crucial part of legitimacy, the mere adherence to laws and constitutional principles would not accord a government popular legitimacy [as was the case in Uganda between 1966 and 1971]. In other words, rules need to be justified in terms of people's shared beliefs, where they cannot be so justified, there is a legitimacy deficit. Consequently the legitimisation of governance should have an explicit linkage between legality and the shared beliefs that underpin it. For this to exist, the subordinate social groups should be in the position to express their consent through actions which are understood as demonstrating consent within the conventions of the particular society. The ability to harmonise the resultant obligations between dominant and subordinate groups is crucial in this process [Beetham, 1991:12].

With the ending of the Cold War, the West linked good governance to the implementation of liberal democracy [Lancaster, 1993. And Moore, 1993:7-8]. However, it is crucial to bear in mind the specificity of any society in such situations. This brings into question the utility of the West and the International Financial Institutions [IFIs] imposition of external governance models in Sub Saharan Africa [SSA], without considering the related homegrown peculiarities.

Uganda's political struggles illustrate how the failure to legitimately redistribute its political and economic resources always led to political crises. The colonialists had the capacity to formulate appropriate reforms that attempted to satisfy the demands of the discontented social groups in crises. In contrast, their brutal and predatory inheritors simply lacked the capacity to govern. Hence through commission and omission an avalanche of unresolved crises emerged which led to political disorder. Not surprisingly, their reign was characterised as: "intermittent, catastrophic and unforgettable [Kabwegyere, 1993:3]." The state retained its colonially tailored subjugating role, and was also transformed into an instrument for plunder. Furthermore, a legitimate constitution was abrogated and replaced with an illegitimate one that

centralised all governance powers, with civil society being dislocated and suffocated.

This decadence was only reversed in 1986, when a broad political coalition under the aegis of the National Resistance Movement [NRM] organised and defeated these brutal, unproductive but kleptocratic formations, and instituted governance based on integrity, rational principles and a democratic transformation. In turn administrative and institutional measures were introduced to entrench this popular revolution.

Six governance patterns can be described as having emerged in Uganda; [i] The pre colonial; [ii] colonial indirect rule [IR] [iii] colonial good government [CGG]; in addition to; [iv] post colonial modernisation and decay; the IFT's [v] economic conditionalities; and [vi] Good Governance agenda.

Pre-colonial governance: Societies that were to constitute Uganda had varying levels of development. Those that existed around the Lakes region had thriving polities that effected orderly governance. This was best manifested in Buganda [see Appendix i]. Colonial rule distorted many of these developments [Mamdani, 1976:34-35].

This study links the political disorder that characterised Uganda's early post colonial development to the fact that it was those social formations dominated by non hierarchial societies, which, moreover, were less economically developed historically that monopolised state power in the 1966-86 period. A situation that has to be appreciated in light of the colonial inheritance. Likewise the political stability that followed from 1986 relates to the emergence into power of social formations that had centuries old traditions of hierarchial legitimate order, and also dominated the economic processes.

Indirect rule: Colonial IR entailed; [i] the expansion of the economic base of the colonial ruling class; and [ii] the co-option of sections of the indigenous ruling class. These enforced compliance within Uganda's disparate regions. [iv] Also, a subjugating and unaccountable [to the colonised] state was formed to enable the attaining of the colonial objectives; while, [iv] a structurally remote and untransparent colonial

administration was created. Furthermore no democratic and unifying institutions were formed, which negatively impacted upon the post colonial era.

In terms of economic redistribution; [i] These policies favoured metropolitan capital. Internally a; [ii] deliberate pattern of unequal development emerged; [iii] while the indigenous capitalist class was constrained; for [iii] these policies buttressed an Asian dominated expatriate capitalist class. [It is this factor rather than the romanticisation of the "legendary agency, [of] the dukawallah [petty Asian capital]", by Himbara and Sultan [1995:87], which explained their domination of Uganda's economy. See a discerning analysis by Mamdani [1976:80-1 and Chapter 3].

Colonial good government: The narrow redistributive confines of IR led to popular agitations. This coincided with a change in the needs of the British economy leading to the introduction of CGG [Lee, 1967. And Mamdani, 1976]. Henceforth, political and economic redistribution was broadened. This contributed to the disintegration of the nationalist movement. Concurrently, based on the weakness of the indigenous capitalist class, the state was used to initiate industrialisation and other main forms of economic expansion mainly through the newly formed Uganda Development Corporation [UDC]. This created avenues for post colonial statism.

Post colonial modernisation and decay: Domestic and international factors conditioned Britain's granting independence to Uganda. This occurred when the nationalist movement had been rendered incoherent, out of commission and convenient omission, by CGG, at a time when Creech-Jones and Cohen's "responsible Africans" [see Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of African Territories, 25.9.47] had consolidated politically [as this study will illustrate, it is erroneous to suggest that the political parties that emerged after the collapse of the Uganda National Congress [UNC] struggled for independence]. Logically, the departure of the colonial power in a country with disparate local governance units, lacking in unifying national institutions and identity, moreover with an inept but power hungry leadership, led to the subsequent political crisis [Karugire, 1980 and 1986. Mamdani 1976. And Mudoola, 1993]. This study argues that, given this colonial inheritance, it was an historical imperative for the new

political class to formulate governance policies that created a viable Ugandan nation.

The initial post colonial ruling coalition was composed of what Apter [1961] referred to as the "Modernising autocracy" and the "nationalists". In the period 1962-66, they pursued a modified version of CGG, under the new guise of "Modernisation". These policies had the backing of Northern donors [Brett, 1991b]. The relative political stability of the 1962-66 era related to the legitimacy and wider political and economic redistributions that existed within the polity. The collapse of this coalition in 1966, led to coercion supplanting legitimacy as the main management device, and the entrenching of "modernisation" governance, that enabled state capitalism which primarily benefited a narrow governing bureaucracy. Soon the "nationalists" transferred their intolerance to the market, moulded in a statism that nurtured rent seeking, commissions and other public corruption. An alliance was struck with the Asian business class and measures were concurrently effected to marginalise their better developed rivals within the petty bourgeoisie [Mamdani, 1976]. This compounded the political crisis.

Huntington's [1972:196] study on political disintegration in the Third World and Mudoola's [1993] Ugandan case study are of use here. They argue that within developing societies, possibilities exist for the emergence of institutional normlessness, which may result from the failure of the political class to agree upon what form of legitimate institutions should exist to mediate their differences in addition to the allocating of resources. Consequently, Obote's UPC's instituting policies that led Uganda to become an "institutionless arena" led to Maj Gen. Amin's coup in 1971 [Mudoola, 1989:118 and 1993]. External support for this intervention, sealed the regime's fate [Avirgan and Honey, 1982. Martin, 1974. And Ingham, 1994].

The junta applied the inherited statist structures to expropriate and oppress the population. Of importance at this stage was civil society's ability to devise a capacity to formulate alternative means for survival, mainly within the informal economy [Brett, 1991a, and 1994. Jamal, 1991. And Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1992b and 1992c]. These micro level changes, laid the basis for the subsequent political transformations that were to emerge during the 1980's. At the time of writing, it was mainly Brett [1991a,

1991b. 1994 and 1995], who had clearly related these economic and political revolutions.

Economic conditionality: The period between 1979-86, centres around the controversial re-emergence and demise of the Uganda Peoples Congress [UPC] regime, in collaboration with various external actors. The UPC readily imposed the International Monetary Fund's [IMF] Structural Adjustment Programmes [SAPs] on the population. The SAPs were intended [i] to curb the predatory state and liberalise the market [ii] remove the urban bias of earlier policies which benefited the politically powerful, and re-allocate these resources to the marginalised but economically more productive rural societies [Jamal, 1989:176. And Toye, 1994:22-26]. As these policies were bound to be opposed by these vested interests, the IFIs were willing to accommodate "A courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government", with the required political will [Lal, D, 1983:33]. The UPC's second coming should be appreciated from this dimension.

However the IFIs theoretical framework, lacked an understanding of the Ugandan specificity, as; it was [i] based on a wrong idiosyncratic assumption that Dr. Obote, was the "experienced strong man" who "would put things right" [Tandon, 1990. And Nabudere, 1988]. Indeed; [ii] they failed to question which class interests the UPC elites represented; and [iii] the UPC's organisational incapacities; [iv] also, the IFI's did not consider as relevant the fact that the UPC lacked political legitimacy, nor the role of the Ugandan civil society.

Ugandans had from the late 1960's politically organised against brutal and predatory statism [Avirgan and Honey, 1982. Brett, 1995. And Mudoola, 1988]. This pattern intensified with the UPC's 1980 illegitimate return to power, mainly under the banner of the NRM [Lanser, 1982. Mutibwa, 1992. And NRM 1985]. These popular forces also formulated and established democratically elected legitimate and accountable Resistance Councils [RCs] [see appendix ii] to effect governance in the areas they controlled [Brett, 1995. Lanser, 1982. And Sathymurthy, 1986]. In 1986, with a most minimum of external assistance, they defeated the forces of brutal state predation, despite the latter's immense international support.

The NRM and WB's good governance: The analysis of the NRM's governance policies must take into account that; [i] it was dominated by hitherto marginalised but economically productive social formations, that regarded it to be in their primary interests to eradicate brutal kleptocracy and create a state that enables the thriving of private capital. [ii] They had centuries old traditions of effecting hierarchial legitimate political order; and [iii] they had developed an homegrown ideology and a socially heterogenous political movement to achieve these objectives; moreover [iv] their political agenda aimed towards effecting a democratic transformation and the nurturing and maintenance of legitimacy [Brett, 1995. Mudoola, 1991. And NRM 1985].

Furthermore, the NRM's political programme [NRM, 1985], coincided broadly with the WB's 1989 Good Governance agenda. Hence in Uganda's specificity, this foreign policy interaction merely reinforced an already underway domestic process. This accorded the NRM, enormous leverage in determining the pace of the WB's conditionalities.

More broadly, the WB's good governance agenda, resulted from two factors; [i] the deepening of the economic crisis in SSA despite the application of the SAPs; and [ii] the ending of the Cold War, which left in its wake a broad disillusionment of the Soviet model of governance. Moreover the newly emerged unipolar IPE enhanced the West's capacity to infringe on the sovereignty of Third World countries, at a time when domestic Western pressure made it untenable to prop right wing despots [Clapham, 1995. And Lancaster, 1993].

The WB linked the deepening economic crisis in SSA to its declining levels and efficiency in investments, within a context of its rapid economic and technological marginalisation [WB, 1989:3-4]. The identified cause was bad governance, which led to the inefficient allocation of resources, infrastructural decay and price distortions, in an environment that was characterised by "bureaucratic obstruction, pervasive rent seeking, weak judicial systems, and arbitrary decision making". This, moreover, in societies that lacked effective countervailing power [WB, 1989:3-4 and 61].

Good governance was the proposed solution, with governance being "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs [WB, 1989:60]." This was linked to political integrity and legitimacy, and the existence of civil liberties, as these were viewed as necessary in the creation of a leaner and more efficient state. The latter's role at the macro and micro levels was identified as one of creating an enabling environment for private economic development and capacity building respectively [WB, 1989:4]. The WB criticised "Modernisation" policies, which it noted were adopted but not adapted in SSA, and praised the African informal sector which had hitherto been viewed as "backward". Because: "While the modern sector has been in malaise, the informal sector, strongly rooted in the community, has been vibrant. In particular it has shown a capacity to respond flexibly to changing circumstances [WB, 1989:60]." Furthermore a gender sensitive participatory approach was called for, in addition to political decentralisation, the respecting of African cultural institutions and the promotion of Non government Organisations [NGOs] [WB, 1989:1].

Controversies of good governance: Many scholars have criticised the IFI's conditionalities in SSA [Adedeji, 1991. Mamdani, 1989. And Onimonde, 1989]. In the Ugandan specificity, this study argues that the failure of the SAPs under the UPC resulted mainly from the latter's inability to negotiate a suitable SAP, their illegality, moreover, a situation compounded by their leadership's possessing a class character with a "dog eat dog" morality [Brett, 1991a. Mugenyi, 1991. And NRM, 1985:46]. Uganda's change of fortunes, from 1986, is explained in terms of the class relations that henceforth emerged, which related to the nature of coalitions that composed the NRM. In addition to the latter's organisational capacity, and their possession of an internally and externally agreeable homegrown political programme [NRM, 1985].

Consequently, Himbara and Sultan's [1995] perceptions, on contemporary Uganda, are regarded here as rather mechanistic, if not nefarious. For their fixation on the role of the foreign dimension, ignores the crucial internal dynamics. This relates to the definition of governance. A task that should examine Uganda's class relationships within the context of its political economy.

A further issue of contention, concerned with the WB agenda, related to the NRM's reluctance and ability

to constrain the adoption of fully fledged liberal multipartiyism. The NRM, viewed itself as a broad based political Movement, to which all Ugandans were entitled to join, subject to their subscribing to its democratic principles and politics of inclusion, that were modeled to eliminate brutal, and dictatorial statist kleptocracy [NRM, 1985]. In the process the NRM formed a consensus amongst Uganda's political class, including with the political party gurus, that suspended the latter's activities in their interim rule. Its argued in this study that what contributed to this consensus relates to the fact that within Uganda's specificity, political parties had transformed into cabals of self seeking and perpetuating political careerists, who moreover failed to represent the interests of their supporters [Mamdani, 1990:368-9]. This situation has characterised the UPC from the mid 1960's [and lesser so the Democratic Party [DP]]. A factor that should be appreciated with the understanding that in the process, more than half a million Ugandans were killed [AI, 1982 and 1985. Lule, 1982. And Munger, 1982]. Kabwegyere [1993:2-3] pin pointed the primarily cause of this scenario, when he argued that given Uganda's colonial inheritance, liberal democracy was difficult to sustain in the early post colonial period, as they existed "the near total absence of democratic values". Hence their was a need "to create conditions, to create institutions, to create values for a democratic transformation." However, a process which the UPC led coalitions failed to facilitate [they were in power for close to thirteen years]. Moreover, in the 1980's, they applied liberal democracy not as a medium to facilitate legitimate governance, but rather as a cynical foreign policy mechanism, to influence East-West tensions in their favour [see Appendix vi].

Based on their struggles, Ugandans had painfully created a viable pro-people government and state, and initiated a democratic transformation of their society, and a popularly involved constitutional making process that was set to determine and respect the roles of their civil society, state and government. The right to form political parties was highlighted [The Draft Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. [DCU], 1993:36]. Subject to their not being sectarian, and having "internal organisation ... [that] conform[s] to democratic principles." Also the DCU recommended that the electorate should have the right to recall its legislators, whenever the need arose [DCU, 1993:57]. This was bound to hinder the future repetition of the UPC and its allies cynical ploys of "crossing the floor" at the expense of the electorate. In itself, this should be the appropriate starting point to retrace the events that lead to the main discussion.

CHAPTER TWO THE PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE IN UGANDA.

Introduction: It was observed in chapter one that those with political power justify its use in society on the premise that it is being done in the interest of the governed. The sustainability of this situation is usually based on the ability to effect governance policies that satisfy the political and economic requirements of a broad array of social formations, in order to ensure social order. The nurturing of political legitimacy is a necessary requirement for ensuring orderly governance. This is partly manifested through the respecting of society's normative values, in addition to devising means that enable the subordinate classes to offer their consent to the existing hegemonic order. Many of these conditions existed within some polities in pre-colonial Uganda. Relating to colonial governance, its main constraint was based on its quest to expand the economic base of the metropolitan bourgeoisie [Brett, 1973. Mamdani, 1976. And Nabudere, 1980]. This situation led to conflict. However the colonialist ability to formulate reforms whenever required, and their possession of a coherent set of institutional and administrative mechanisms to enforce compliance, ensured the then survival of this system.

1-Pre-colonial governance:

Two broad patterns of governance emerged in this era, one being of stateless societies, mostly in the north and eastern parts of the country, while state rule characterised most of the interlacustrine region. Political organisation in the stateless societies depended on whether they engaged in pastoralism or agricultural production for their subsistence. For the nomadic Karamojong, the family was their main unit for social organisation [Mamdani, 1976 :20]. On the other hand, agricultural stateless societies in northern Uganda, centred their governance on the clan system. These were essentially poor, egalitarian and classless societies, with no organised social appropriation. A minimum level of social cohesion was maintained through various cultural rites enhanced through the institution of gift giving [Mamdani, 1976:26]. Their political organisation relied on generational lines, with power being exercised through a council of elders, while their clan heads and chiefs, were elected by their fellow elders [Burke, 1964. And Mamdani, 1976].

In the state governed societies, it was the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda that dominated. Historical and environmental factors had led to their having evolved differing governance systems. Bunyoro had a long historical tradition [Southall, R, 1972a]. However it suffices to note here that it was the migrating Chwezi pastoralists that created its state system. They enforced their hegemony over their more numerous agricultural subjects due to better social cohesion and military organisation, while the ability to implant their religious values amongst these people ensured their legitimacy. Their main weakness resulted from the social gap that existed between them and their subjects. This led to the development of a caste system. A weakness, inter alia, that facilitated their being supplanted by a Luo invasion from the north around 550 years ago.

The Luo's established the Babiito dynasty. Their numerical inferiority, and having established their rule through coercion, conditioned their legitimizing their rule through socially integrating with both the Chwezi [Huuma] and their agricultural subjects. They also adopted their subjects cultural, language and religious beliefs. The efficacy of these policies led to their King [Omukama] being accepted as the religious head of this kingdom. This narrowed but did not eradicate the social gap based on the caste system they had inherited.

Apart from the caste system, two domestic and foreign factors, led to the sapping of Bunyoro's energies. It had extensive extra-territorial responsibilities, as many satellite states sought its protection. Also its local governance system accorded its territorial chiefs, many of whom were from the nobility, extensive powers. This led to insubordination to the central authorities and regional infighting which contained "all the elements of institutionalised chaos [Karugire :1980:21]."

Attempts were made to reverse this pattern under the reign of Omukama Chwa Kabarega [1869-99]. His succession symbolised a radical shift in Bunyoro's governance. This in part resulted from the manner Kabarega assumed the throne, not through the traditional means of having the consent of the nobility, but through forming coalitions with commoners, neighbouring chiefs [Kabalega's mother was from Bulega now in Zaire] and Arab merchants. Once in power, he established a standing army [Abasurura] whose

membership was open to all [including Egyptian deserters] and whose promotion was based on merit [Steinhart, 1977. And Uzoigwe, 1970]. It was the abasurura that Kabarega employed to ensure compliance from the opposing nobility, and the rebellious territorial chiefs. Also his governance policies, further narrowed the social gap between the nobility and the commoners, which broadened his legitimacy and created the social basis to pursue radicalised domestic and foreign policies, which consolidated the centre, and attempted to regain lost territory [Steinhart, 1977. And Uzoigwe, 1970].

The evolution of Buganda's governance patterns was determined by three factors. [i] The emergence of a settled agricultural society, whose leaders evolved policies that attempted to mediate the disputes that characterise such societies. [ii] Its initial heads were territorially scattered hierarchically ordered clan heads [Bataka] [see Appendix ii] who served a dual political and religious function within their specific clans. [iii] These were later subjugated by the hegemonic institution of the Kingship [Kabaka], about 550 years ago, which had to formulate policies that consolidated its role, and contained and accommodated the contesting power interests of the numerous Bataka and society at large [Low, 1971a:13-20].

The Kabaka, unlike the Bataka, opted to govern over the whole, and not single differentiated clan entities, and for this function to be legitimised a number of institutional and administrative mechanisms were evolved. To begin with, in this patriarchal society, the reigning Kabaka was made to identify with the clan of his mother. This factor, in a polygamous situation, in addition to the fact that he did not chose his successor [this was a role fulfilled by leading chiefs], ensured that in theory all clans could obtain a Kabaka. Hence broadly legitimising this institution. Secondly, the Kabakas made themselves the overall clan heads [Sabataka] and hence became the final arbiters in intra and inter clan disputes. Non the less, the Bataka still had a lot of political and religious muscle, within their clans. Consequently, a system of hierarchically ordered appointed chiefs [Bakungu] [see appendix ii], selected primarily on merit and loyalty to the throne, were created to contain the Bataka and to effect local governance [see Appendix ii]. Their tenure of office depended on the Kabaka's discretion and they emerged from any social background [including many capable non Baganda] so long as they fulfilled the required criteria. This created a highly competitive and socially dynamic system, geared towards gaining public office. Members of the royal clan

were usually marginalised in these selections, this was nominally justified on the grounds that it was beneath their status. The real reason being that due to their symbolic value, they could easily create their own autonomous political entities. Societies that failed to evolve this mechanism either completely disintegrated as the kingdom of Mpororo, or experienced succession as did Bunyoro [Karugire, 1980 .And Southall, R, 1972a].

At the head of these Bakungu was an appointed Chief Minister [Katikiro], who administered Buganda's day to day governance, alongside an elaborate bureaucracy at the royal court which facilitated this process [Kaggwa, 1953]. To hinder the Bakungu's breaking away from the centre, they were conditioned to attend regular meetings at the kingdom's consultative body [Lukiiko]. The Lukiiko served a key purpose of mediating the disputes of this ruling class. To further check the Bakungu and Bataka, a standing army [Ekitongole ekijasi] headed by a general [Mujaasi] was created, under Walugembe Mutesa 1 [1859-84], with a parallel power structure of captains [Batongole] appointed regionally alongside the Bakungu. However, the Bataka retained the privileged right to see the Kabaka at short notice, and to second young men who were to receive training for public office, which in essence meant that their views were accommodated at the centre [Apter, 1961].

These measures hindered the development of the caste system that characterised the other major kingdoms here, and made Buganda the most socially dynamic and powerful Kingdom in this region by the mid 18th century. However, although the Kabaka was the undisputed political head, he was never Buganda's religious leader [unlike for instance the Omukama in Bunyoro]. The resultant contest between this institution and that of the Bataka, to control the ideological terrain in Buganda, led to the politicisation of the Middle Eastern religions in Buganda, and later on Uganda. For the Kabaka allowed for the introduction of Islam and later on Christianity with the political intention of eroding the Bataka's religious hold on the population. In turn it was the Bakungu [who were highly competitive and astute political animals], whose duties revolved around their being at the royal palace [the Lubiri], that became the first converts. An international dimension was also manifest. This being that the introduction of Christianity in Buganda, coincided with the "Scramble for Africa". A situation that should best be

appreciated with the fact that whilst the Anglican missionaries of the Church Mission Society [CMS], emerged from Britain, The Roman Catholic White Fathers, were French. The main competing colonial powers that came to dominate Africa. Unfortunately the political-religious zeal of these particular missionaries, planted their national rivalries into Buganda's political class [Low, 1971a: 13-52. And Kiwanuka-Semakula, 1971].

The succession of both Kabarega and Mutesa 1 displayed the efficacy of their different kingdoms governance institutions at that time. A number of similarities and differences emerged, as both young men were viewed as underdogs in their contest for the throne, which led to their encountering stiff resistance, in as much as they both emerged as amongst the most outstanding leaders in their respective kingdoms. In a situation that Uzoigwe [1970], likens to a revolution, Kabarega employed charisma, determination, political and military skills to form coalitions amongst discontented social formations so as to beat the system [Steinhart, 1977. And Uzoigwe, 1970]. For the adolescent Mutesa, it was strategically placed people within the system, led by the guileful and ruthless Katikiro Kayiira, who placed him on the throne against all expectations. In the process they eliminated their political opponents whom they accused of treason for having opposed the enthronement of the new Kabaka [Kaggwa, 1953. And Kiwanuka-Semakula, 1971]. This background probably explained the further institutional restrictions which Mutesa subsequently added on his Bakungu.

Good governance involves the expansion of a society's economic base. Uzoigwe [1974], illustrated how Bunyoro had developed an elaborate state regulated local and regional [import and export] market system that created wealth for its inhabitants. Furthermore, Mamdani [1976] highlights the fact that within the context of the above mentioned social dynamism, Buganda had evolved the capacity to trigger off a mercantile revolution. An elaborate tax system existed alongside an urbanised society with skilled artisans and merchants. Moreover its well developed and maintained road system ensured the accumulation and appropriation of internal and external surplus [the latter refers to Buganda's various tributary states]. However with colonialism a pattern of under development became institutionalised.

2. COLONIAL GOVERNANCE

Indirect Rule: This governance policy was effected between 1900 and the late 1940's. IR involved the utilising of local traditional rulers and institutions and cultural norms to legitimise colonialism by linking it to the past. It depended on a de-centralised framework and created an alliance between the Colonial administration, British business and the traditional rulers. The emphasis was on maintaining these principles, while it was argued that their application "may and should vary with customs, the traditions, and the prejudices of each unit [Lugard,1893:195]."

Uganda was colonised to serve the strategic and economic interests of Britain [Apter:46-47]. Strategically this involved the hindering of French and German interests from gaining access to the River Nile, and the Indian Ocean. The fruition of the economic objective depended on the colonial administration ability to enforce compliance, and its building of the required physical infrastructure.

IR was the most expedient governance tool that existed at Britain's disposal, based on the paucity of human and financial resources. It was conditioned by Gladstone's financial policies aimed towards minimum spending while hastening self sufficiency in the colonies [Lwanga-Lunyiingo,1989:34].

IR relied on the cooption of legitimate indigenous elites and institutions for its efficacy. To enable this, the British employed coercion, exploited the differences between local competing elites, and marginalised those leaders who opposed colonial rule.

The pattern that emerged was for nearly all the leaders of the old order to resist colonialism, with the exception of Tooro [see below], as they stood to lose politically under the new dispensation. This resistance varied with the conditions that pertained in each locality. At the time, the leadership in Bunyoro was more united and consequently provided the most concerted resistance. With Mutesa's death in 1884, Buganda's ruling class became deeply divided, which led to most of the younger generation of Bakungus who had converted to Islam and Christianity rebelling against the new, and rather tactless, Kabaka Mwanga in 1888. The Christian Bakungu through the instigation of their missionary cum-political-leaders

and Lugard, were in principle agreed to the imposition of colonial rule due to the assured material promises they received [Kaggwa, Katikiro, to Euan-Smith, British Consul-General, Zanzibar, 1890. And Welbourn, 1965]. This similarity was shared by the royal house of Tooro, for this Kingdom which had seceded from Bunyoro in 1830, came to regard Britain as its protector against its resurgent and more powerful neighbour [Steinhart, 1977]. Also within the stateless societies with the exception of slave trade ridden Acholi, a pattern of resistance emerged, which was most intense in Lango [Kabwegyere, 1974. Karugire, 1980. Low, 1973]. Hence, colonialism marginalised the resisters.

Most of the collaborating elites, within the state led societies, had been men who had served in meritorious roles in the old order. That is, people who were accustomed to serve for the powers that be so long as they gained from their service [Low, 1973. Mukasa, 1925. And Steinhart, 1977]. In Buganda these happened to be Bakungu and military commanders, as for instance generals Semei Kakungulu and Apollo Kaggwa. In Bunyoro they were mainly members of the abasusura, headed by their overall commanders, Rwabudongo and Byabachwezi. In Nkore they were led by Nuwa Mbaguta, a person who did not originate from Nkore, but had managed to obtain high office due to his outstanding political and military skills [Steinhart, 1977:133-56].

The political skills of these people, and their linkage to the old order created a semblance of continuity, and conditioned a measure of legitimacy, or at least compliance. This was enhanced through the skilful manipulation by the colonialists of the local institutions while at the same time maintaining a low physical presence, to the effect that most people never interacted with British administrators during the governance process. It was through the co-opted elites that they received their rules of compliance. Consequently, when the marginalised sections in Buganda agitated in the 1920's, it was against these collaborators that they focused their anger, which accorded the British the leverage to act as arbiters. A similar pattern was manifested with the Nyangire and Muhumuza's rebellions in Bunyoro and Kigezi respectively.

With the segmentary societies of northern and eastern Uganda, problems did arise in finding indigenous

leaders with a large following. Hence a situation arose where by "any person who dared enough to meet the colonial official [Kabwegyere, 1974:43]" was made a leader. These people tended to lack legitimacy, as hierarchial governance had been unknown in these societies. A problem compounded when the hierarchial and centralised Buganda governance system was imposed in these areas, moreover initially, with Baganda chiefs to effect it. Burke [1964:34] described this pattern as "an indirect style of indirect rule." Inevitably, these new "traditional authorities", relied heavily on the colonial state to extract compliance [Kabwegyere, 1974. And Ingham, 1958:191].

Compliance was also enabled through the establishment of political order, Pax Britannica, a situation that was best appreciated in Acholi, as it stopped Arab slave trading [Otuunu, 1987]. The colonialists also introduced an elaborate value system that was based on Christianity and state regulated literacy skills and modern medical institutions. All of which conditioned compliance.

Enormous material benefits were bestowed upon the collaborators. In Buganda, the Bakungu chiefs were given large tracts of land and a near carte blanche in relation to the running of the Buganda state, the aim being to create a stabilising landed gentry [Low and Pratt, 1960:94]. Elsewhere, collaborators also gained politically and materially [Steinhart, 1977].

The political effects of indirect rule: As argued above, the political setting of pre-colonial Buganda politicised the middle eastern religions [also see Low, 1971a]. It was the Anglican faction of the Bakungu which eagerly collaborated with British imperialism [Low and Pratt, 1960. And Karugire, 1980]. This led to their political ascendancy with the assistance of the colonial state, a pattern that was replicated elsewhere. The signing of the Buganda Agreement formalised this redistribution. It led to the granting of freehold land to the chiefs, and the institutionalising of religious sectarianism in Buganda, and later on Uganda [Low and Pratt, 1960. And Karugire, 1980]. However the fact that similar agreements and the allocation of freehold land were not made with the co-opted elites in the other regions created a rift between them and Buganda.

Initially, the colonial plan had been to incorporate the surrounding territories that constitute Uganda into Buganda. From the 1920's, a change in policy occurred of instituting them as separate units [Mitchell, 1939]. However, no concerted effort was made to reverse Buganda's preferential status, nor to unite these rather disparate units. This negated prospects for national political integration as the other regions also aspired to obtain Buganda's benefits which, however, were denied them. This refusal mainly resulted from the fact that by the 1920's the colonial administration was of the view that similar arrangements would hinder the efficient growing of cash crops based on Buganda's experience. As the would be landlords, were bound to impose excessive land rents on the peasantry and siphon off part of the economic surplus to the detriment of British capital [Mamdani, 1976:127-8].

Meanwhile, bearing in mind its pre-colonial experience, the high level of autonomy accorded to Buganda, entrenched a state within a state situation. Moreover, both the administrative and commercial capitals, Kampala and Entebbe, and nearly all the main social, economic and educational institutions were located in Buganda. The animosity this caused was well illustrated in an article by the young Milton Obote [Uganda Herald 24.4.52 see Appendix iii].

The demarcation of the new administrative units in a manner in which ethnic and political boundaries coincided, led to the entrenching of parochial and ethnically centred political tendencies. Moreover, no countervailing and unifying central institutions existed to curb this trend. The colonial administration at Entebbe was inaccessible, untransparent, unaccountable and structurally remote from the indigenous population [Apter, 1961. Kabwegyere 1974. And Karugire, 1980]. The executive and legislature had similar characteristics. The former consisted of the governor and senior colonial administrators, while the latter represented British and Asian capital [Apter,1961:45 and 165]. Moreover, IR was against the democratising of its governance process [Lee, 1967]. Consequently, autocratic and sectarian disparate local governance units emerged within the Ugandan specificity. This hindered the evolving of a pan Ugandan national identity.

The governance of the other regions, was based on the 1919 Native Authority Ordinance, which further

marked Buganda's separateness. This legal instrument formalised the powers of the chiefs in the process of local governance. The complication that emerged was based on the British decision to superimpose the Buganda hierarchial pre-colonial system of local governance on these regions. It had taken centuries for the Baganda to evolve this system which was moulded to suit their own particular circumstances. As noted above, it was initially Baganda chiefs schooled in its operating, who were imposed on these areas to manage it. Most viewed it as Buganda's sub-imperialism, which led to ethnic hostility [Kabwegyere, 1974. And Steinhart, 1978]. One should add here that the perception of Buganda's sub-imperialism was unfounded, for in the final analysis all these chiefs were mere functionaries of the colonial state. Moreover they were in no position to appropriate any of the surplus, as it was intended for the colonial bourgeoisie. Also the 1919 Local Authority Ordinance gave the chiefs in the non Kingdom areas "powers of arrest and seizure, and control over the allocation and use of property [that] were nearly unlimited [Burke, 1964:34]." These new local chiefs, who were usually unskilled in governance, assumed fused executive, legislative and judicial powers, and were accountable to a structurally remote colonial administration. No wonder the Annual Report on Teso [1933] observed that: "A county chief is a complete tyrant and dictator. His court sentence is his court sentence. His Lukiiko recommendations are his recommendations. The court thus given is a loaded rifle in the hands of an uninhibited untrained and often malicious child."

In the kingdom areas, [Ankole, Bunyoro, and Tooro] the traditional rulers and institutions curbed these excesses [Burke, 1964]. However, it was during this period that the Bunyoro "Lost Counties" problem was created. This resulted from the portioning off of large tracts of Bunyoro land and offering them to Buganda due to its collaborators participation in the defeating of the Kabarega-Mwanga anti colonial alliance. This subsequently led to political instability [Southall, R, 1972a].

Economic consequences: The introduction of a cash crop growing economy in 1903 led to the creation of an uneven and underdeveloped economy within Uganda's disparate areas. However, it did create political stability in the short term, due to incomes accrued from selling ones cash crops or labour, and hence avoiding harassment from colonial authorities by being in the position to pay their various levies, in addition to the benefits of joining the broader monetary economy.

It was primarily in the interests of the British economy that cash crops were introduced. Early European visitors to Buganda, had pointed to the viability of expanding its then existing industries, [Roscoe, 1911. see Chapter Eleven]. This was not done. In 1902 the British Cotton Growing Association [BCGA] was formed, with the intention of encouraging the growing of cotton in the British Empire, based on the then global scarcity of lint [Mamdani, 1976:45]. By 1903, cotton growing had been introduced in Uganda by the CMS, in cooperation with the BCGA. This project was enabled through the linking of Uganda to the Indian Ocean by rail in 1902. By 1915 Uganda had become economically self sufficient which led to the stopping of the provision of British grants-in-aid [Lwanga-Lunyiigo, 1989:35-6].

Cash crop production led to the development of an uneven economy as mostly areas in the central and east of the country were turned into producers, while the rest were made labour reserves. For instance as late as the early 1960's, 90 per cent of Uganda's coffee acreage was in Buganda, 60 per cent of its cotton in the eastern districts, while western Uganda had 5 per cent of the coffee and 4 per cent of the cotton, with the north having no coffee and 25 per cent of the cotton [Statistical Abstract, 1965. Quoted from Leys, C, 1967:3]. Consequently, the northern and western parts of the country, became the most under developed areas, which fuelled future regional animosity and conflict [Lwanga-Lunyiigo, 1989:35-6].

Since IR aimed at securing sources for cheap raw materials and availing markets for British capital, Uganda's industrialisation was hindered [Wallis to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1.29.14]. A similar fate befell the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class. In the pre- colonial period a merchant class was unfolding. However their mercantile instincts were curbed through their becoming landlords-cum-colonial civil servants. Moreover the 1928 Busulu and Nvujjo Laws, [see below] hindered their transforming into viable capitalist farmers, as this would have constrained their effectiveness as colonial functionaries [Brett, 1991a]. Emerging indigenous capital was barred from the cash crop processing sector in 1934, hence this sector remained dominated by British and Asian capital, with the former also being state cushioned in the long distance transport industry [Apter, 1961]. The consequence of these policies was the creation of an indigenous economy based predominantly on small farming units, which moreover lacked access to credit, and were constrained by the state from viably engaging in commerce [Brett,

1991a:14-5. And Mamdani, 1976]. In more specific terms in Buganda, a more class differentiated society emerged [Wrigley, 1964]. Elsewhere, a rather egalitarian situation unfolded, dominated by peasant producers. The state became the main focus for employment for the elites, many of whom originated from the pre-colonial chiefly families that had acquired the resources to accord them literacy skills. In sum, no vibrant indigenous capitalist sector could have emerged in these circumstances. Politically, the Ugandan experience of IR became one in which perceptions that emerged were characterised by parochialism, embedded in the ideology of ethnicity.

The rationale of this policy was to keep Ugandans from activities that would have provided "them the skill, the vision, and the opportunity to organise the colonial masses [Mamdani, 1976:71]." Hence immigrant Indian traders were encouraged to take up commerce. Lugard [1893] best summed up the logic of this policy by noting that "...they would form an admirable connecting link ...their status being nearly at par with the natives, while their interests are entirely dependent on the Europeans." Also their links with external capital accessed them to extensive credit facilities that enabled them to out compete their state constrained African rivals [Mamdani,1976. And Chapter Three].

The political response: With time IR marginalised sufficient social forces to the point of threatening social order. From 1915 cash crop production fell in Buganda due to the existence of excessive land rents [Mamdani:1976. And Nabudere, 1980]. Also the marginalised Bataka, through their age old political skills, under Kate Mugema and Jemusi Miti, galvanised other concerned social groups, including the peasantry, and formed the Bataka Association in 1920. It was the Bataka Association that co-ordinated the struggle that led to the 1928 Busulu and Envujjo Laws, which offered security of tenure to land tenants at fixed rates in perpetuity [Mamdani, 1976. And Nabudere, 1980]. This redistributive device, rejuvenated the efficient production of cash crops by those social groups that had been marginalised under the 1900 Buganda agreement, but hindered Buganda's landed oligarchy from transforming into viable capitalist farmers.

This prompted a show down between the colonial state and the oligarchy, leading to the hastened

retirement of most of them including their leader, Sir Apolo Kaggwa. In their place, younger but strictly salaried public servants were appointed [Apter, 1961. Mamdani, 1976:124-6. And Low, 1973]. Furthermore, these reforms temporarily stemmed the popular agitations. However by the late 1930's cash crop growers were frustrated by their low prices and their not being allowed to process these crops, with the kulaks also demanding representation in the Lukiiko [Buganda's legislative assembly]. Meanwhile, civil servants demanded equitable terms of service and the traders more access to the British and Asian capital dominated market [Southall, A, 1988:56. And Mamdani 1976]. Hence the formation of Uganda's first political party and trade union movement, the Bana Ba Kintu [Descendants of Kintu] and the Uganda Motor Drivers Association, respectively in 1938. These were led, amongst others, by Ignitius Musazi and James Kivu, who organised further popular agitations. The colonial state banned the two organisations and had their leaders incarcerated. However by 1945 Musazi, Fr. Spartas Mukasa and Miti, formed the Bataka Party. Musazi also participated in the formation of the Uganda African Farmers Union [UAFU], in the late 1940's. It is these movements that led to the national "Uganda Disturbances" [Thompson, 1992] and the "Cotton Uprisings" of the period 1945-49. Their demands centred around democratising local governance structures, the ability to trade, better cash crop prices and the right to process their produce. The Bataka Party and the UAFU were banned, and their leaders incarcerated. However IR was no longer tenable, to the effect that Governor Dundas observed "It was not the Africans but ourselves [the British] who are backward [Lee, 1967:16]." This was the internal dimension that contributed to the introduction of CGG in Uganda.

3-COLONIAL GOOD GOVERNMENT:

The demise of indirect rule also had a foreign dimension. This related to the global decline in the competitiveness of the British economy [Mamdani, 1976:249]. A situation that coincided with the additional pressures for change and eventually de-colonise that emerged in Britain's colonies, the super powers and from within itself. This led to the formulation of CGG policies. Their overriding aim was to re-establish legitimate order through the creation of broader indigenous coalitions, and the expansion of Britain's economy.

The decline of British economic competitiveness was least felt in its empire, based on the preferential treatment that it had accorded itself [Mamdani, 1976:249]. Hence Britain shifted its international economic policy, from one which supported global free trade, to one that favoured protectionism in addition to imperial preferences and colonial aid, aimed at boosting its position [Lee, 1967:41. And Mamdani, 1976,:249-50]. International and domestic political pressure led to Lord Hailey's report, "Native Administration and Political Development in Tropical Africa", in the 1940's, that provided the basis for CGG. This report criticised indirect rule's authoritarian institutions and advocated the introduction of democratic reforms within local governance, the gradual absorption of Africans in all sectors of government in addition to the implementing of social and economic development [Lee, 1967:16]. In 1940 the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was enacted. This provided the legal basis for the proposed reforms.

Good government's implementation: This process was influenced by the devastating effect that World War [WW] 11 had on the British economy, as it had led to the further realisation within the British establishment that they could not sustain colonial rule in perpetuity. Hence CGG was also aimed at preparing Uganda for de-colonisation. Communications from Whitehall also stressed the need for the colonies to save and earn foreign exchange [Secretary of State to Officer Administering the Government of Uganda 27.9.45]. The economic policy that emerged had two dimensions. The first was to cut consumption patterns so as to reduce imports from hard currency areas, while concurrently obtaining essential supplies without involving the payment of dollars or gold [Colonial Office to the Governor of Uganda, 6.8.48]. Hence, various austerity measures were enforced [Mamdani, 1976:250]. The second aspect increased the export of raw material exports to hard currency markets, and through the system of bulk purchasing also sold these raw materials at subsidized rates to Britain. The additional economic dimension entailed the establishing of dollar saving and earning industries in Uganda. This was enabled through the amending of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 in 1945 to allow for the provision of foreign aid for the purpose of the industrialisation of the colonies [Lee, 1967 And Mamdani, 1976:253]. This led to the first industrialisation effort in colonial Uganda. The Governor of the day clearly stated the rationale of this policy change to Uganda's Chamber of Commerce in the following terms :

"Britain's need is Uganda's opportunity...[It is] a great opportunity so to develop the latent resources of Uganda so to benefit Britain and in so doing greatly benefit Uganda; and a great opportunity so to integrate our economy with that of Britain as to ensure greater prosperity and economic security for the people of their protectorate" [Uganda Herald 24.2.48].

Furthermore, the Worthington Plan was drawn up in 1947. This was the blueprint for the industrialisation process. Much of its funding came from surpluses accumulated within Uganda's Marketing Boards [Mamdani, 1976:253]. The plan had infrastructural and institutional dimensions, best reflected through the construction and establishment in 1952 of the Owen Falls Hydro electric power [HEP] project and the Uganda Development Corporation [UDC] respectively. The HEP project generated the power for industrialisation, while the UDC, as a public Corporation, assisted with the break evenness of local economic ventures that were in partnership with foreign capital [mainly British].

A broader redistribution of economic resources was enforced. This created and consolidated coalitions within the local petty bourgeoisie which were to inherit political power. The purpose being to re-create legitimate order. Hence in 1953 The Royal Commission called for the removal of the constraints that had deliberately hindered the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class. The formation of cooperatives [co-ops] was allowed albeit, under close supervision, in addition to the processing of cash crops, by indigenous capitalists, from 1953. The extension of the kulak class ie "progressive farmers", was enabled with the provision of free hold land in Kigezi, Ankole and Bugishu. Traders were provided with institutional support so as to cope against the historically advantaged Asians. For the first time credit was accessed to these farming and commercial formations through the creation of The Uganda Credit and Savings Bank in 1950 [Brett, 1991a:16. Mamdani, 1976:195-204]. Consequently, most within the petty bourgeoisie economically benefited from CGG, as even the civil servants were accessed to higher promotion with three of them being co-opted into the Executive Council.

So as to further stifle disquiet, attempts were made to promote a system of democratic local governance which was to be controlled by the "responsible ... growing class of educated men, ...[who] at the same

time command the respect and support of the masses of the people [Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the African Territories, 25.9.47]." Hence the Local Government Ordinances of 1949 and 1955 were enacted. These provided corporate powers and responsibilities to the District Councils [DCs] in all the areas of Uganda except Buganda. The Governor was empowered to create DCs as well as a tier of advisory lower councils.

It was Andrew Cohen [the head of the Tropical African desk in the Colonial Office], who in 1952 embarked on the task to implement these reforms. Uganda had been Britain's star model of IR, and the intention was to ensure a similar repetition under the new measures. It was in Buganda that these policies were first initiated. This was because it had a more autonomous form of governance based on the 1900 Buganda Agreement, and hence it was thought that it would act as an exemplary model for the rest. Also the conservative Buganda establishment [Mengo ie the seat of political power in Buganda], was seen as the main hindrance to this outcome. The liberally minded Cohen was here to reform the situation and in the process create a unitary Uganda [Cohen to Kabaka Mutesa 11, 27.10.53].

By March 1953, the Kabaka had agreed to the reforms that required the democratisation of the Lukiiko. However in June that year, a foreign relations incident set back the tide, when the Colonial Secretary, hinted upon the idea of creating an East African Federation. This was nationally a unpopular view, as it was felt that Kenya's White settlers were bound to dominate, in addition to the erosion of local administrative autonomy which the various local elites had enjoyed.

Mengo used this opportunity to channel popular apprehension against these reforms. This culminated into Mutesa's deportation, a situation that galvanised public's support behind the Kabaka [Karugire 1980:154]. CGG had led to the kulaks being elected into and dominating the Lukiiko. Given colonial Uganda's political economy, theirs was a parochial nationalist ideology [Mamdani, 1976. And Jorgensen, 1980]. [However, even at this stage many leading non Baganda political figures were highly placed within Mengo. For instance with J. T. Simpson, S. Visram, Duadi Ochieng in addition to the Uganda National Congress's Dr. Kunuka and John Kalekezi etc. Which should make one weary of referring to their ideology

as having been "insular"]. Hence this crisis led to the emergence of a neo traditional ideology in Buganda, which robbed it off its national platform, and was to further hinder pre-independence political integration [Apter, 1961. Low, 1962:24-5. And Karugire, 1980]. In response, Cohen abandoned the creation of a unitary Uganda. However the democratisation of the local and national governance structures was implemented. A ministerial system with five ministers selected from the public was instituted, three of whom were Africans, while by 1955 membership to the Legislative Council was enlarged to sixty, half of whom were Africans, most having been elected by their DCs or an electoral college as in the case of Buganda. Plans were also made to have direct elections for this body in 1958, which were Uganda's first ever such elections.

These reforms coincided with the formation of Uganda's first nationally oriented party, the Uganda National Congress [UNC] led by Musazi in 1952. However since CGG reforms were aimed at preparing "responsible Africans" for post colonial state power, many in the nationalist movement were viewed as too radical to fall into this category [eg some of the leaders of the Bataka Party, UAFU or UNC, as Semakula-Mulumba, Fr. Spartas Mukasa, and Musazi]. Equally significant is the reality that the UNC leadership failed to correctly assess the CGG reforms and in the process formulate policies that maintained its political initiative. Hence through commission and convenient omission, these reforms and the above discussed coercion, rendered incoherent the Ugandan nationalist movement. This best reflected through the fragmentation of the UNC in the late 1950's, the remnants of which were inherited by those elites who had undergone and satisfied the requirements of Cohen's tutelage mainly within the Legco and the DC's [Ingham, 1994:37]. Economically the petty bourgeoisie's demands were satisfied, while the political reforms led to many of these people in Buganda lending their support to Mengo, which by now had become a better medium to channel their interests [Southall, A, 1988:56].

Mengo's newly found neo-traditionalism nurtured political intolerance in Buganda from around 1955, after Mutesa's return. This led to the formation of the DP whose core aim was to counter the sectarian Anglican and colonial state bolstered status quo. Its leadership in Buganda consisted mainly of the politically marginalised Catholic elites, and a section of non Catholic nationally oriented intelligentsia [eg

Yusuf Lule and Senteza-Kajubi]. A similar pattern of gaining the acceptance of marginalised Catholics replicated itself elsewhere [Karugire, 1980].

Buganda's neo-traditionalists also become a stumbling block towards the integrating of an already structurally disunited country. As inter alia, they demanded for secession [Apter, 1961. And Low, 1962]. This further hindered the smooth implementation of CGG. For instance in 1958 Buganda boycotted the Legco elections, and was unreceptive to the constitutional talks that the colonial administration had instituted. This situation, in turn encouraged anti Buganda sentiments in the other areas.

As already noted, the DC's emerged as the training grounds for the post colonial leadership [eg Obote was the head of the Lango DC]. This study has highlighted their mainly autocratic, sectarian and parochial nationalist tendencies [Burke, 1964 :39. And Karugire, 1980]. In sum, the chickens had come home to roost, as the mind sets of these various elites, that had been shaped by IR [see Appendix iii] and were groomed for post colonial leadership under CGG, had not radically altered with the granting of independence.

CHAPTER THREE FROM POST COLONIAL MODERNISATION TO DISINTEGRATION: 1962-79

Introduction: This period, validates the theoretical arguments that were discussed in chapter one, namely that in order for a polity to sustain its governance based on legitimate order, the status quo has to reflect the interests of the governed. The leadership has to be coherent, create and respect institutional and administrative mechanisms that sustains this coherence, while at the same time transmits its values within society. Governance is linked to the redistribution of political and economic resources within society. To enable political order, these processes have to be legitimate, in addition to satisfying a broad array of social formations, within the context of development, that are necessary to maintain social cohesion. Since legitimacy is a necessary prerequisite for orderly governance, the ruling class has to respect societal values and to obtain the consent of the governed.

Given the nature and departure of colonial rule, at its independence Uganda inherited neither a democratic society nor a pro-people state [Kabwegyere, 1993:2-3]. Moreover, those controlling state power failed to respect Uganda's constitution and institutions and civil society, whilst they despised democratic values. Furthermore, these rulers lacked the capacity to govern, and yet paradoxically opted to stay in power at all costs. A legitimacy deficit emerged, and the resultant political normlessness and institutionless arena [Huntington, 1972. And Mudoola, 1989 and 1993], logically culminated into the 1971 coup. In the process Uganda was further marginalised within the IPE.

When defining governance in the era under discussion, five periods can be categorised, [i] 1962-66, when the coalition of the petty bourgeois proper and the salariat existed. [ii] A brief period between 1966-69 when the salariat and its coercive wing attempted to expand their political and economic base at the expense of other sections. [iii] Between 1969-71 when the salariat formed a coalition with Asian capital, [iv] 1971-73, when sections of the military, salariat and petty bourgeois proper formed coalitions, and [v] 1973-79, when a gradual collapse of the latter coalition emerged, and a core of the military and salariat and petty bourgeoisie attempted to aggrandise all the economic and political resources.

1. Attempts towards democratic governance, 1962-66:

The governance policies that characterised the 1962-66 period were a continuation of the CGG reforms and were based on "Modernisation" principles [Brett, 1991b and 1994. Doornbos, 1988:256]. Their aim was to eradicate "ignorance, poverty and disease", with state intervention, through the massive importation and adoption of Northern technology and development techniques with the latter's encouragement. This further enabled the emergence of statism [Brett, 1991b. And Oluwu, 1993]. Non the less, an attempt to respect societal values was made given the composition of the governing coalition.

Independence reduced the level of dominance of British capital in Uganda. This was due to a reduction of capital inflows from the former and an increase in investments from smaller advanced capitalist countries namely Japan, Italy and Switzerland. The main local investors were the state through the UDC and Asian capital, dominated by the Houses of Madhvani and Metha [Mamdani, 1976:258. And Sathymurthy, 1986:547].

In line with the inherited policies of CGG, the "responsible Africans" in state power, were intended to practice Westminster parliamentary democracy, and to continue with the democratisation of local governance structures while also respecting the role of their traditional heads.

The impact of global politics: The influence of foreign policy on the governance processes in Uganda had its roots in colonial rule. Relating to CGG, its proper implementation, inter alia, had been hindered by the crisis which had involved the Kabaka's deportation in 1953, its immediate cause being a foreign policy statement issued by the Colonial Secretary [Karugire, 1980. And Low, 1971]. This crisis was resolved through negotiations between the colonial administration and Mengo. The result was the 1955 Agreement which conditioned the return of the Kabaka on his becoming a constitutional monarch and Buganda's accepting to join a unitary Uganda. Paradoxically it had a third aspect that was to bedevil the subsequent events in Uganda. This was the allowing of the Kingdom of Buganda, within a unitary framework, to maintain a federal status. Hence this document has been referred to as a fudge that is, a device employed as "a way of buying time, usually the correct assumption being that problems eventually solve themselves

[Wrigley, 1988:31]."

This problem did not solve itself, and the Kabaka on his return did not accede to the idea of becoming a constitutional monarch. Meanwhile Buganda refused to join a unitary Uganda [Karugire, 1980, 144-168]. These issues together with the "Lost Counties", and the manner in which they were handled, acted as stumbling blocks towards the implementation of effective governance in the period under discussion.

The British lacked the resolve to diffuse this situation, due to a foreign policy incident that manifested in form of the 1956 Suez Crisis, a year after the Kabaka's return. After WW 11 Britain had hoped to remain a global power, and its Middle Eastern and East African colonies were to be maintained for this objective. However, the Suez fiasco changed Britain's foreign policy objectives. Henceforth it opted, to influence global events through the European Community and the Commonwealth of nations organisation. Accordingly, its East African dependencies began to be viewed as "costly liabilities to be discarded with all possible speed, hopefully being transformed into Commonwealth partners instead [Wrigley, 1988:32]."

The aim became to offer Uganda independence with a stable government, without being embroiled in solving its protracted domestic problems.

Independence: Apart from the DP, the other parties that emerged at independence were the Kabaka Yekka [Only The King [KY] and the UPC. KY was formed just months prior to independence in 1961. The motive was purely to ensure that Mengo had a controlling say in post colonial Uganda. The DP's winning the 1961 Self Government Elections triggered its formation, as this was tipped to tilt the colonially propped Anglican dominated sectarian status quo. Its class character should be seen from the context of two events, the CGG reforms, and the Kabaka's crisis. The culmination of these events led to the nationalist forces in Buganda closing ranks with Mengo, which from the early 1950's became dominated by the elected Baganda kulaks within the Lukiiko, although it had in its leadership ranks other sections of Buganda's petty bourgeoisie. Kulak domination of the KY contributed to its adopting a neo-traditional ideology, which called for either secession, or a strong federal arrangement which would enable them to appropriate Buganda's economic surplus [Mamdani, 1976. And Jorgensen, 1981:217]. The

Kabaka was the symbol through which political and social cohesion was achieved with the other social formations within Buganda.

The timing of the formation of the UPC in 1960 by non Baganda Anglican elites was also based on their wanting to inherit post colonial state power, in addition to the imminence of Mengo's neo-traditional ideology, within a context of a collapsed nationalist movement. Its coalition was composed of the Obote led loosely structured UNC's faction [dominated by traders and agricultural co-ops leaders in cash crop producing societies that had no hierarchial traditional leadership] and the Legco based Uganda People's Union [UPU] that represented non Baganda political notables. Four issues conditioned the shaping of its character. These were [i] competition from the better organised Asian traders, [ii] racial discrimination within the colonial bureaucracy, [iii] Buganda's neo traditional ideology, with its threat to secede, which would have hindered the redirecting of its surplus; and [iv] the threat the DP poised to the sectarian hegemony of the Anglican petty bourgeoisie who the UPC represented outside Buganda.

Consequently, Jorgensen [1981:221] accurately noted that: "From its founding in 1960 ... the UPC was largely a national confederation of locally powerful [Anglican] political notables competing for control over allocation of state patronage to enhance their local patron-client relationships and their personal business ventures..." This factor, in addition to its non hierarchial social origins, mitigated against the UPC's transforming itself into a mass party with a hierarchial structure. Furthermore, because of their weak economic basis on obtaining state power, its leadership located itself within the inherited colonial governing bureaucracy [Mamdani, 1976]. This explains precisely their subsequent governance policies that promoted state capitalism, which in reality expanded their own economic base.

The DP's winning the 1961 elections created the required political context for the emergence of the UPC-KY alliance [Low, 1971. And Sathyamurthy, 1986]. The logic of this move was based on the following reality. The DP had a national support base, and the only way these regionally based parties could defeat it in the 1962 independence elections was through combining their mixed fortunes. Based on opposed ideologies [ie one vaguely "nationalist" and the other neo traditional], and launched on a purely tactical

agenda, none of the coalition partners had illusions about its durability.

This opportunism was formalised through the Lancaster negotiated Independence Constitution of 1962. Its adoption resulted from the backing the UPC-KY coalition received from the British government and the Church of England [Nabudere, 1980:252. And Welbourn, 1965:28]. Since the British had wanted a quick withdrawal, in a manner that protected their regional interests, this would have been unlikely, given the KY's intolerant attitude, had the latter not been part of the new government. Consequently, Benedicto Kiwanuka and the DP's calling for a unitary constitution was rejected. In its place, a document was formulated that conferred different relationships upon the constituent disparate parts of Uganda and its central government. Buganda was offered a federal arrangement, the other Kingdom areas obtained a semi federal status, while the districts got a unitary arrangement. Given Buganda's dominant economic and social position, its autonomous status became the basis for political discord.

The other contentious constitutional issue was the provision that the Lukiiko was to be the electoral college which nominated Buganda's members into Parliament, while the Members of Parliament [MPs] of the other areas were to be directly elected. The aim was to ensure that the KY "won" all Buganda's seats to seal the DP's fate. For since 1956, a neo-traditional purge had led to their dominating Buganda's governance machinery. The UPC's acceptance of direct elections in the other regions stemmed from its having had the support of most regional notables, who ensured its good performance.

This constitution provided a shallow basis for Uganda's future governance. Moreover, no mechanism to consult those Ugandans who had remained behind was evoked. This emphasised the cynical "top-down-know-all" attitude of the ruling class.

The 1962 Lukiiko and General Elections were the devices that were applied to legitimate this constitution. The success of this exercise was achieved through its being linked to the granting of independence. Nearly all Ugandans had aspired to self determination and its facilitation was the main achievement of this exercise. Also the backing of the traditional and regional leaders to this project ensured its viability. This

explains why a semblance of calm was maintained inspite of the massive irregularities that characterised the electoral process [[Karugire, 1980:87-88. And Ibingira, 1973:239].

Apart from Buganda's autonomous position [Mamdani, 1976:242. And Nsibambi, 1993a:4-7], the other issues that contributed to political strife were the Bunyoro "Lost Counties" and the Bakonjo and Bamba regional problems [Southall, R, 1972a. And Sathymurthy, 1986:481-6].

Co-option, patronage and intrigue: Given their marginalisation in the colonial era, the elites used the state to expand their economic base. Based on the class composition of the KY and UPC, the governance policies that emerged at this stage were a modification of CGG. Put differently, they served in the interests of the of the entire petty bourgeoisie.

In order to cater for the interests of the kulaks ['progressive farmers'] the state instituted a three fold policy. This involved the extension of rights to free hold land; the subsidizing of costs of agricultural production; plus they were offered institutional support to accumulate private capital [Mamdani, 1976. Jorgensen, 1981].

The extending of kulak farming was most successful in Kigezi, where up to 7000 farmers where offered title deeds. This scheme became economically productive. Elsewhere group farms were introduced. These involved small groups of "progressive farmers" being pooled together. By 1966, 37 of these with 3,500 participants had been established [Sathymurthy, 1986:499 and 578]. Although these projects were composed of 3 per cent of the farming community, they took up 27 percent of the country's agricultural development budget by 1968. However, they were a dismal failure [Ryan, 1971:50-1. And Sathymurthy, 1986:500].

The state subsidised the kulaks' cost of production by the maintaining and expanding of the tractor hire scheme. Under colonialism, forty tractors had existed for this purpose, but by 1964 these had increased to 390 with another 215 on order [Mamdani, 1976:230]. This programme was uneconomical and elitist,

for the state subsidized each tractor to a tune of 150 per cent per hour, yet it assisted only large farmers, who constituted less than 1 per cent of the population in a country where up to 90 per cent of the population was rural based [Mamdani, 1976:230-1. And Sathymurthy:500].

Also, various measures enhanced the institutional capacity of the kulaks to privately accumulate capital. This was manifested through the co-ops, which they controlled [Brett, 1974]. These were allowed to increase their share in the processing of cotton and coffee. Hence while in 1951 these Co-ops ginned only 1.3 of the country's total cotton output, by 1966 the figure had risen to 75 per cent. The state further assisted the kulaks private capital accumulation, through its provision of below market interest rate loans for their construction of ginneries and coffee hullers [Mamdani, 1976:231-235]. In addition these co-ops were enabled to obtain financial autonomy through the Cooperative Society Act [1963]. Due to political coactivity, this led to gross financial irregularities [Brett, 1991a. And Mamdani, 1976].

These developments were extended to enable the traders to take over retail trading. While in 1963 Africans controlled only 27 percent of this sector, by 1969 the figure had risen to 47 percent [Ryan, 1971:55]. Also, on behalf of the WB, a UDC subsidiary, African Business Promotions [ABP Ltd], was created in 1963, to assist traders who wanted to join the Asian dominated wholesale sector. For political reasons [which will be explained latter], this body was suspended after 1966.

The inherited colonial governing bureaucracy [salarial], maintained its role, a situation compounded by the UPC's elites opting to locate themselves within it. This salariat's interests were catered for through the Africanisation programme that was effected by a newly created Ministry. Consequently, they inherited the jobs and perks of the departing colonialists, whose life style many adopted.

Non the less, despite this process of class consolidation, contradictory policies emerged in relation to which section of the petty bourgeoisie was to control the appropriation of surplus at the local and national levels. This was reflected in the 1962 constitutional arrangement.

Buganda's autonomous example prompted the other areas to emulate it. This led to the creation of traditional leaders in areas where no such institutions had ever existed, through the enacting of the Constitutional Heads [Elections] Act No 66 of 1963. [Some of the new titles created were the Kingoo, Won Nyaci, Umuinga, Rutakirwa, Ekaraban, and Laloya Maber, of Sebei, Lango, Bugishu, Kigezi, Teso and Acholi respectively]. This confused the situation in the local administrative structures even further. To begin with, they already existed two competing power structures at this level, the elected members and the central governments representatives. Little wonder that the DC's emerged as "bee-hives of local political activity in which pork-barrel politics thrive [Sathymurthy, 1986:472]." This led to local infighting and local-central conflicts, contributing to a polarity in political attitudes along numerous cleavages, that paralysed the effecting of local governance [Burke, 1964. Leys, 1967. Sathymurthy, 1986. And Southall, R, 1972a].

Moreover, the legitimacy of many local authorities was eroded when the UPC leadership opted to rig the 1964 Urban Authority elections in Kampala and Jinja, which the DP had won [Karugire, 1980:193]. Also, the central government failed to formulate appropriate policies that should have dealt with contentious regional issues. The most notable were those of the Bakonjo and Bamba, on one hand, and of Karamoja, on the other. With the latter, the concerned people felt politically subjugated under the Kingdom of Tooro, whose members were numerically inferior and whose economic base was narrower. Although a Commission of Inquiry was established to look into this issue [The Ssembeguya Commission], no practical steps were instituted to rectify the problem. This led to the creation of the armed Rwenzururu Movement in 1962, to oppose this perceived oppression. In contrast, Karamoja had been the most marginalised region under colonial rule. Another Commission of Inquiry [The Bataringaya Commission] was instituted to investigate how this situation could be rectified. It adopted an elitist and coercive approach, stating inter alia, that development in Karamoja "must be forced and hard". In practice this top down "Modernisation" approach came to nil [Sathymurthy, 1986:488].

Given the fragility of the ruling coalition, power struggles emerged which translated into the disruption of the very institutions that would have facilitated the effecting of legitimate and orderly governance.

Hence the Public Service Commission was made merely advisory to the Prime Minister. In turn, the state further politicised the salariat as it hired and fired its members on political grounds [Hansard: December 1965-February 1966:109].

The judicial process should have acted as an anchor of orderly governance. However, it was rendered into a mockery when in 1963 the government invalidated through a specially assembled Parliamentary sitting the High Court's decision to hinder a leading UPC member, from becoming Busoga's Kyabazinga [Paramount Chief]. Then in 1966, the government refused to accept an High Court ruling that the detaining of five cabinet members [see below] had been Ultra Vires [Kiapi, 1989:97].

2- Governance during crisis 1966-71:

The source of conflict between the central government and Buganda lay in the former's wanting to control the latter's surplus. This end the UPC enacted the Western Kingdoms and Busoga Act of 1963. This subordinated the semi-federal powers of the kingdom areas.

To compensate the traditional notables, the Kabaka and Kyabazinga were made the country's first titular President and Vice President respectively. These "royal republicans" had divided loyalties, between their national and local-traditional roles. Furthermore, the main parties concerned, Mengo and the central government, harboured conflicting motives. The central government's aim had been to increase its leverage over Buganda. Mengo on the other hand, had imagined that its new position was to reinforce its perceived role as first among equals. This intensified the power struggle between the central government and Buganda, the prize being the control of the latter's surplus.

This struggle took both a parliamentary and extra parliamentary character. The UPC through their ability to dispense with patronage and "nationalist" ideology [an in depth analysis is provided by Southall, R, 1972b] were able to entice into their ranks KY and DP members. This was achieved through the "...trivialisation of Britain's time-honoured but seldom used parliamentary technique of crossing the floor [Uzoigwe, 1983:216]." By late 1964, the UPC had a majority in parliament. Freed from the constraining

influence of the KY it resolved the Bunyoro "Lost Counties" problem through a referendum in which two of the concerned counties opted to rejoin Bunyoro [Southall, R, 1972a].

The control of these two cash crop producing counties, expanded the central government's coffers. Politically, it enhanced the latter's national legitimacy, as Buganda's occupation of the "Lost Counties" had been unpopular outside its confines. Crucially, the loss of the referendum, shook Mengo from its neo-traditional cocoon leading to its forming national coalitions. For Obote, this was a mixed fortune as although in the shorter term it had led to the formation of a more amenable Buganda government led by Mayanja-Nkanji [a KY dove and a former central government minister], Buganda's political strategists concurrently looked for allies within the UPC so as to check its more radical faction and also oust Obote. Consequently in 1965, the KY was disbanded and its members instructed to join the UPC. This swelled the ranks of its petty bourgeoisie wing.

Sinister extra parliamentary developments emerged at this stage that related to the Buganda and central governments' interpretation of the former's position within Uganda. These were the Nakulabye massacre, in which more than 46 people were shot by the military [Lule, 1982:3], the Kabaka's machine gunning 9 Banyoro residents in the "Lost Counties" during the referendum, and a dubious accident involving the military and a bus of St Mary's College Kisubi, which led to the death of 12 students. These incidents exposed the willingness of the concerned parties to use force so as to obtain their political aims. Moreover, no corrective legal measures were taken by the authorities.

Meanwhile, the crushing of the radical labour movement and the politicisation of the military on parochial grounds were the necessary conditions that set the conflict between the petty bourgeoisie and the salariat. The ruling class did not favour the existence of independent worker organisations. Two dominant trade unions existed at independence, the Uganda Trade Union Congress [TUC] and the Uganda Federation of Labour [UFL]. The TUC advocated an economist line of union activity, and its character had in part been moulded by the draconian colonial labour laws [Mudoola, 1993]. The formation of the more radical UFL in 1961, was influenced by the emergence of independence, hence its aligning with the UPC [Scott, 1966].

Together with the UPC Youth League [UPC-YL], they formed the nucleus of this party's radical wing, which was headed by the UPC's Secretary General, Kakonge. In the 1962-64 period, the UPC-YL and the UFL organised numerous industrial actions in central and eastern Uganda. The state responded through the 1964 Trades Disputes [Arbitration and Settlement] Act, which constrained the organising of independent industrial action, banned the UPC-YL and the UFL, and had their leaders located behind bars.

The mutual antagonism of the UPC's petty bourgeoisie and salariat factions towards its radical wing, led to a characteristically temporary alliance between the former two. It was formalised at the UPC's Annual General Conference at Gulu in 1964. Obote and his cronies, through gross electoral irregularities organised against Kakonge, and ensured the victory of their favoured candidate, Ibingira, as the new Secretary General [Nabudere, 1980:255-6]. Ibingira headed the UPC's petty bourgeoisie proper, and his election marked a new chapter in the infighting between the Ugandan ruling class.

What complicated this situation was the emergence to significance of the military. Four points will be pointed out in this regard. Namely [i] at independence, the Ugandan military was regional in its content, as it was predominately recruited from the north, particularly from Acholi. This resulted from the colonialists' need to ensure the compliance of the cash crop growing south. A similar policy was adopted by the northern dominated UPC elites who controlled the instruments of state. [ii] Also this military had a class character of mainly poorly educated peasants whose officer were still British. Indeed the first Queen's Commissions were awarded only a year before independence [Otuunu, 1987. And Southall, R, 1972b]. [iii] This force had played a leading role in the crushing of nationalist movements, as late as the 1940's in Uganda and the 1950's in Kenya. Consequently, it was suspicious of the nationalist movement and was easily manipulable. The fourth factor relates to the mutiny.

This occurred in early 1964. The military's demands were parochial, based on the need to speed up the Africanisation process. Obote's responses were equally narrow and purely tactical. He acceded to all their demands, hoping that coupled to their mainly northern origins, this was to enhance their political support

to him [Mudoola, 1989. And Southall, R, 1972b]. Maj. Idi Amin played a major role in the facilitating of this deal, and it was the realignment of this new balance of forces that contributed to Obote's political opponents' concentrating on ousting him constitutionally. [Both the Obote led and Mutesa-Ibingira factions had wanted to employ the military for their own political ends [see Nabudere, 1980. And Southall, R, 1972b]. However Obote's handling of the mutiny, inter alia, ensured his broader support in this institution].

The prelude to this event occurred in early 1966. By now the petty bourgeoisie led by Ibingira and Mutesa controlled the Secretary Generalship of the UPC, and the strategic Chairmanship of UPC Buganda, in addition to most eastern and western party posts [Karugire, 1986]. Their next move was to constitutionally ease Obote from the UPC Presidency, and in the process control state power. To abate their calculations, a foreign policy device was employed. This was manifest when the Prime Minister's covert support of the Gbenbye Congolese [now Zaire] rebels were exposed in Parliament. In this operation, Obote had once again used the services of Maj. Amin, who in the pursuance of his duties had banked enormous cash on his personal account. It was Daudi Ocheing, a key KY MP, who leaked this information, and it was used to galvanise national and parliamentary support as it pointed to foul play. When parliament was convened, the Daudi Ocheing Motion, which called for the suspension of Maj. Amin, pending a parliamentary investigation, and had amounted to a vote of no confidence in government, was supported by all assembled, apart from Kakonge.

Numerous options existed for the Prime Minister. These included, the dissolving of parliament and the search for a fresh mandate, or the calling of a UPC's delegate conference so as to explain his position and in the process constitutionally challenge any leadership contenders. However, Dr. Obote resorted to the easiest but most disastrous device at his disposal. He employed the security forces to arrest five of his opposing ministers, including the influential Ibingira, during a cabinet meeting ["the day of unlawful arrests"], that had been convened to discuss his fate. These arrests silenced the leadership structure of the petty bourgeoisie within the UPC.

Obote, went on to fire his President and Vice President [the latter was also imprisoned without trial] and arbitrarily suspended Uganda's constitution. Through his Attorney General [Godfrey Binaisa], they drafted the 1966 constitution. There after, they hastily convened parliament, surrounded it with security forces, with the airforce patrolling the skies, and Obote read to the cowed legislators its contents, who he ordered to promulgate it as the primary law of Uganda, without their reading through the fine print [they were instructed to find their copies in their pigeon holes]. This constitution removed Buganda's autonomy and ensured the salariat's control of its surplus.

The Lukiiko refused to accept this erratic arrangement and called for secession. In response, Amin was ordered to storm the Kabaka's palace [the Lubiri], leading to hundreds of dead. Miraculously, Mutesa II found his way into exile after a gallant struggle [Mutesa, 1967].

Where did this leave legitimate governance based on the Westminster model? In all certainty, with the crushing of the UPC's radical wing, in 1964, this party was deprived off the support of the bulk of the working class, radical youth and urban unemployed. After "the day of unlawful arrests" the UPC lost the support of the petty bourgeoisie proper. Moreover all these people were influential regional notables in central, eastern and western Uganda where the bulk of the country's population was located. Hence Obote's UPC lost this crucial grass root support. To add insult to injury, Dr. Obote banned the institutions of tradition alongside the roles of their leaders. It was in Buganda, where the worst excesses were manifest, for here vindictiveness became policy, and apart from the hundreds killed, its centuries old traditional shrines were converted into military installations. In addition, Buganda experienced a perpetual and draconian state of emergency, until Obote's overthrow, in 1971.

Possibly the only achievement of this debacle was the attempt to enforce a single state system in Uganda. However, the means employed, led to its having a shallow basis.

Before proceeding further, it is note worthy to observe that the Daudi Ocheing Motion had marked a radical realignment of political forces in Ugandan politics, as the petty bourgeoisie had formed a national

alliance within the constitutional framework to oust Obote. Had not the latter applied extra-parliamentary means to stay in power, Uganda would have experienced another phase in its nascent parliamentary democracy.

This crisis had primarily resulted from intra UPC manoeuvring for power. However, in their typical obscurantist style, the Obote faction, justified their deeds in the name of "safe guarding the African revolution" [which translated in Amin's billeting Buganda's traditional shrines, and the salariat's expropriating the surplus], and the fight against "feudalism". The Buganda bogey was made a convenient scapegoat, hence enhancing sectarianism. Of crucial significance, is the point that from the 1966 crisis until 1986 [see chapter five], legitimate governance, as defined in this study ceased to exist in Uganda, which had "turned into the devil's garden [Kisekka, 1985:1]."

3-. The salariat military coalition 1966-69:

Within a context of a legitimacy deficit, the regime logically opted to centralise all powers so as to maintain control. This became manifest through the over centralising 1967 constitution. It also allied more closely to the military, and its governance policies reflected the interests of the new status quo. Indeed, until its over throw in 1971, the regime attempted to undermine the economic base of the Buganda petty bourgeoisie, by implementing two major policies. First in the period 1966-69, the salariat pursued economic policies that negatively impacted on the Buganda petty bourgeois and the Asian commercial class as a whole; second from 1969 to 1971 it went into alliance with big Asian commercial and industrial capital against Buganda and dukawallah capital.

In the process, the 1967 elections were indefinitely postponed without a national consensus. To compound the regime's illegality, it was a parliament whose mandate had expired that promulgated the 1967 constitution. This constitution made Uganda a unitary republic, with all powers being centralised to enable a illegitimate regime to maintain control, while also properly appropriating the national surplus. To symbolise the new order, the post of executive president was created which gave its incumbent disproportionate powers. Meanwhile the passing of the Local Administration Act of 1967 created the basis

for a stronger relationship between the central government and the DC's. This Act "stifled and fossilised local level participation in decision making, and denied all councils any semblance of autonomy in action [Uganda Think Tank Report, 1993:2]." This created a culture of dependency and negatively impacted upon grassroots development [Karuhanga, 1993], as the powers of the DC's were reduced in favour of the central government, while their democratic content were emasculated. To compound this crisis, in Buganda, the state nominated all the local councillors, who were usually social misfits that however identified with the UPC. The same fate befell the appointed chief system [Karugire, 1986]. Moreover, the Act failed to eradicate the infighting that had characterised the DC's in the old order [Sathymurthy, 1986]. The end result was, illegitimacy and a lack of grassroots initiative.

Bearing in mind his tenuous support within the UPC, Obote also centralised all the powers within it. For instance from 1969, the UPC President was empowered to select this party's hitherto elective executive.

In turn, regime's survival became pegged to the support it received from the salariat and military. However, with an enormous legitimacy deficit, and having introduced the military in politics, Dr. Obote created the very conditions of his eventual ejection from power. In the meantime, enormous privileges were bestowed upon the army. Whilst maintaining its sectional content, between 1962 and 1967 it grew by 40 per cent per annum, while from independence up to 1971 it became one of the highest paid services in SSA [Lee, 1969:94-105. And Southall, R, 1972b: 26 and 58]. Also, rapid promotion was granted to loyal troops. The personification of this policy being Amin [barely literate], who boomeranged from being suspended by parliament as Major in 1966 to the rank of Major General by 1968, as well as being made Chief of Defence Staff, heading the army and airforce and "Principal Military Advisor to the Cabinet and The Minister of Defence." This was all due to the critical role he had played in the abrogating of Uganda's constitution, and the mutilating of its civil and cultural institutions beyond recognition, so as to save his and Obote's careers.

Under the supervision of inept and lax political rulers, and a illegitimate and emasculated legislature, this parallel centralisation of power within the military enabled Maj Gen. Amin enormous leverage. Indeed,

he even managed to recruit his cronies into the military. A foreign policy dimension became manifest, for given the regime's covert undertakings in Belgian Congo [now Zaire] and Sudan [see below], Amin recruited former rebels from these countries. He also, placed his supporters into strategic commands, without consulting the appropriate structures [Martin, 1974]. Moreover, with Israeli support he formed an elite mechanised unit under his personal command [Nabudere, 1980]. When coupled with Obote's competing recruitment and placement policies, in addition to the purging of "disloyal" troops, the military gradually lost its professionalism.

Meanwhile to pamper the salariat, the regime issued policies that attempted to transform it into a commercial class. Without the political will to check its excesses, rampant corruption unfolded amongst its membership [Jorgensen, 1981:243-4].

Concurrently, the state marginalised the kulaks through using the gross corruption that characterised the co-ops as the required ideological justification to stop its funding [Mamdani, 1976:260-61. And Jorgensen, 1981]. Consequently, parastatals were formed, whose aim was to subordinate the co-ops and supervise the economy directly. Their two fold objectives were [i] to apply state power to ease out Asian capital from the market, while [ii] creating space for the leading members of the salariat, but not for the most advanced section of the indigenous petty bourgeoisie [Buganda capital].

The first parastatals were the National Trading Corporation [NTC] and the Produce Marketing Board [PMB]. While the NTC was established to assist the members of the salariat to start businesses, even within the Asian controlled wholesale sector, the PMB was to assist them in forming wholesale ventures for the internal purchasing and marketing of food produce. Prior to this policy change, it had been the role the co-ops to purchase the crops and that of Asian capital to carry out the selling. The main losers were the producers, since more intermediaries were involved in the siphoning off their surplus, while moreover receiving below market value prices [Mamdani, 1976:264].

Both Asian wholesale capital and the co-ops organised against these policies, which translated into the

food shortages and the economic crisis of 1969. The crisis was exacerbated by the deteriorating terms of trade of Uganda's cash crops [Ugandan producer's had doubled the output of coffee, and increased by more than half that of cotton, between 1962 and 1969. Non the less in 1969 Uganda experienced its first post colonial budget deficit].

4. The Commanding Heights Strategy [1969-71]:

As these two sections of capital had organised differently, the state responded to each accordingly. Asian capital, though dominant, lacked a popular base. This reduced it to an opportunistic position of supporting whatever section of the petty bourgeoisie that controlled state power. Faced with this constraint, they had utilised the weaknesses of the system and embarked on economic sabotage, which translated into their buying in bulk from the salariat's members, who were sanctioned by the state to buy from the PMB, and hoarded their food stocks. On the other hand, the petty bourgeoisie proper, had a mass base and an interest to obtain state power. Hence, they were a threat to the salariat. They organised by refusing to purchase from the peasant producers. These dual actions resulted in the 1969 food shortages.

Similarly, politically instability emerged, as discontent mounted in the urban areas. This led to an assassination attempt on the life of Obote, in 1969, and the killing of Brig. Okoya, a pro-Obote army officer. At the same time a state sanctioned wave of armed robbery [kondoism], to cow the population became manifest [Martin, 1974].

The state further responded through two broad policies, one political and the other economic, both primarily aimed at further marginalising the petty bourgeois. In political terms, more repression was effected, for all political parties [apart from the UPC] were banned, and their leaders imprisoned without trial. Concurrently a national state of emergency was imposed.

The economic policies had two dimensions. One attempted to address the immediate budget deficit through borrowing from the IMF's standby facilities, and the other aimed at entrenching the emergence

of a nascent bourgeoisie salariat through state capitalism, while concurrently marginalising the petty bourgeoisie proper. As a result, the salariat allied with Asian commercial capital. Consequently individuals from the latter were appointed as PMB agents. The state also issued the 1969 Trade Licensing Act, which favoured big commercial capital as opposed to the interests of most petty bourgeoisie traders and the dukawallahs. This led to the gradual voluntary departure of the latter elements from this sector.

Due to these policies the state nationalised many of the leading corporations, in the name of the "common man". [Sathymurthy argues that the common man Obote had in mind was from the non hierarchial societies from where he originated]. In reality, this was only a formal arrangement as Western or Asian capital continued to control the management of their firms. Indeed, Mamdani [1976] notes that a number of them had initiated the nationalisation drive, as this would have enabled them to obtain liquid capital through compensation, and state protection. Prior to these developments, Dr. Obote had argued against any industrial action from the workers since they then "owned" the means of production [Uganda Argus 4.26.65].

The salariat benefitted from these policies through being made Board members with all the perks this entailed, while the "common man" only experienced slogans that did not march with his reality. Not only was the document that justified these policies "The Common Man's Charter" literally Obote's own formulation, but also its imposition occurred without involving any rigorous national debate.

The dislocation of civil society and the coup The state's constricting of political space for its opposition led to the latter's attempt to consolidate itself within civil society. However, their manoeuvrability within this terrain was suffocated, and in the absence of effective mechanisms to resolve these contradictions, they were transferred into the barracks. Hence the 1971 coup, whose success was enhanced not only through the regime's illegitimacy, but also the crucial external support that the plotters received. Indeed, Dr Obote and his cronies failed to appreciate the inter-relationship between their domestic and foreign policies.

The dislocation of civil society was most manifest in the labour and church movements. After banning the radical UFL, the UPC formed a compliant Federation of Uganda's Trade Unions [FUTU]. However, an effective labour leadership, keen for independent organisation dominated the labour movement through the Trade Union Congress [TUC]. Hence the state intervened and amalgamated both the FUTU and TUC to form the Uganda Labour Congress [ULC], and ensured that its supporters led it. To further curb the radicalism within the labour movement, an ethnic card was applied in the expelling of more than 30,000 Kenyan workers. This inevitably strained the regime's ties with the Nairobi leadership.

The state similarly encouraged discord within the Anglican and Muslim communities [Mamdani, 1976. And Mudoola, 1993]. With the Anglicans it nurtured the rift between its Buganda and other branches. While the Muslims who were previously headed by Prince Badru Kakungulu [Mutesa's uncle], under the Uganda Muslim Congress [UMC], were factionalised when it created and generously funded the National Association for the Advancement of Muslims [NAAM]. NAAM's leadership was composed of a senior cabinet Minister [Adoko Neykon], a UPC MP [A. Balinda], and crucially Maj Gen Amin.

Finally, Dr Obote hoped to maintain his control over the military by nurturing divisions, amongst its leading officers [Decalo, 1976. And Martin, 1974]. This factor, and the regime's cynical attempts to extend its social base, and hence lessen its dependency on the military, created tensions between Amin and Obote.

The 1967 Middle East conflict and the coming to power of a self proclaimed socialist Sudanese junta in 1969, which, more-over was willing to peacefully settle its civil war with the Southern Sudanese Any'a Any'a rebels [who had Ugandan and Israeli backing], led to a change in policy in Kampala. Consequently, Kampala reconciled with Khartoum, which led to its stopping its and Israeli support to the rebels. This antagonised the Israelis, Maj Gen. Amin, and the Any'a Any'a. All this moreover, at a time when Obote had also decided to launch a concerted attack upon Britain's support for Rhodesia and South Africa. All these aggrieved external forces were to partake in the coup [Avirgan and Honey, 1982. And Martin, 1974].

The aggrieved parties sought an alliance with Amin's faction in the military, who became the ultimate arbiter. Internally, the implications were mutual, for through the UMC Amin obtained the mass platform he required. By 1970 it had become apparent that it was only a matter of time before he was expelled from the army, if not worse. Amongst the measures Obote employed to further this objective was the enforcing of stricter control over the military's budget, and the propping of para military agencies [Decalo, 1976]. Hitherto, officers had misappropriated resources with impunity, a factor well documented by the country's Auditor General's Reports [Decalo, 1976. And Southall, R, 1972b]. Then in 1970, a German mercenary, captured by the Ugandan police revealed that the Israelis and Amin had continued supporting the Any'a Any'a. This revelation, the military's overspending, and Brig. Okoya's murder were the factors that Obote intended to employ in ousting Amin.

The timing of this event was to occur in early 1971. Through a combination of error and omission, the President opted to have Amin apprehended when he was attending a Commonwealth Conference in Singapore where he had intended to castigate Britain's Southern African dealings. During his absence British and Israeli intelligence backed Amin's mounting of a coup mainly through the aid of his loyal mechanised unit and the Anya'a Anya [Martin, 1974. And Decalo, 1976]. This factor was best facilitated through the office of the Defence Minister, Felix Onama, who sided with Amin [both were accountable for the misappropriation of funds and the former had presidential ambitions], and issued compulsory leave to most of Obote's trusted officers moments before this crucial moment.

The foreign dimension involved four main forces whose interests were threatened by the regime. The Israeli's calculations were triggered by geo-political motives, based on their wanting to destabilise Khartoum. The Ugandan state from 1969 had hindered this objective. Their influence was enabled through having had a strategically placed military and intelligence training team in Uganda. British motives were influenced by the regime's domestic and foreign policies, which were bound to negatively affect their regional and geo-strategic goals. Domestically, the regime had become illegitimate and unstable. This was huarmining British economic interests in East Africa, while Obote had also turned vocal on Britain's Southern African policy. For Kenya it was the regime's close association with Socialist

Tanzania. This made Nairobi's conservative leadership feel vulnerable within the East African Community [EAC], a factor that was further complicated with the mass expulsions of Kenyan workers. Many in the Anya' Anya had ethnic links with Amin, and their sympathies with him were consolidated with Kampala's decision to stop aiding their cause. What all four had in common was the need for a stable regime that accommodated their interests. It should be stressed that the primary factor that enabled this coup rested on the nature of the regime's governance that tore apart existing coalitions and institutions, and failed to replace them with viable alternatives. This led to its having an extremely narrow social base. The result was the converging of the internal and external contradictions, hence highlighting once again the centrality of foreign policy in defining governance in Uganda.

5. Consolidation, Terror and Disintegration 1971-79:

In order to consolidate its position, the junta opted to appease nearly all those forces that had been marginalised by the UPC regime. Hence opposition leaders were released, the state of emergency lifted, and a commitment made not to interfere in divisive political activities, with NAAM in the process being disbanded. Elections were promised within two years, although in the mean time political party activities were banned [ACR, 1971-72:228]. Meanwhile, to consolidate support in Buganda, the junta made arrangements to have their late Kabaka, Mutesa 11, reburied at the Kasubi Tombs. Given the illegality of the salariat's regime and the junta's initial policies of appeasement many welcomed the coup [see Appendix iv].

Externally the interests of Britain, Israel, Kenya, and the Anya' Anya were catered for. The junta opposed criticism of Britain's Southern Africa policy, and opted to open dialogue with South Africa. Israel was offered a free hand to destabilise Sudan, and in relation to Kenya, a cooling of relations with Tanzania [where Obote located himself in exile], took place.

However stability never materialised. This in part was because it had not been a corporatist coup [Southall, R, 1972b]. Amin had managed to take over state power due, the narrow social base of Obote's regime coupled with the centralisation of power within the military that had emerged in the 1966-69

period. To this he added a skilful manipulation of internal and external factors to his advantage. His primary motive had been purely to save his skin. Hence, he lacked a coherent political programme. This unsavoury situation enabled Amin to attempt to impose personal rule "relatively independent of his class base [Mamdani, 1976:293]." In so doing, terror became his main management device.

The latter policy has also to be appreciated from the regional animosity that the regime was faced with from all its neighbours and the OAU apart from Kenya, the junta in Ghana, and Banda's Malawi. Indeed, Tanzania, Sudan and Somalia had offered military assistance to the deposed ruler.

To this threat, the regime responded in two main ways, [i] it negotiated with its regional enemies, which led to the signing of the Mogandishu Accord, that normalised its relations with Sudan and Somalia and in the process abandoned its dialogue with South Africa. [ii] Also, the regime physically eliminated its opponents. The military had been dominated by Obote's supporters, mostly from the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups, those who did not flee were executed. In turn, Amin, whose support was mainly amongst NCO's from West Nile [his home district], had these rapidly promoted. The military was further swelled with peasants from West Nile, in addition to lumpens and additional Zairios and Sudanese mercenaries [all of whom he perpetually purged] the latter of whom had been arranged with the Sudan under the Mogandishu Agreement. Henceforth all professionalism ceased in the junta's army.

Further political repression was manifest through the banning of civil liberties, parliament and the DC's. Henceforth Amin ruled by decree, while mainly his former NCO's-turned -officers cronies were appointed to effect local governance. These literally turned these structures into fiefdoms for personal aggrandizement [Gertzel, 1980]. Gradually, the junta converted the state and the centralised statist structures it had inherited into agencies that terrorised and expropriated the population.

The expulsion of the Asians: By 1972, an economic crisis had emerged. The terms of trade of primary commodity exports had continued to deteriorate, and military expenditure had increased by 20 per cent, moreover during the formation of the first "Oil Shock". Hence Uganda experienced a budget deficit of

Ug Shs 43 million. The regime attempted to circumvent this situation by perpetually borrowing from the Central Bank. In the process money supply increased on average by thirty percent per annum under the junta's reign. This inevitably caused a runaway inflation. As always in such cases, it was the underprivileged classes that shouldered this burden [Kayizzi-Mugerwa and Bigsten, 1992a. And Mamdani, 1983]. Crucially, it was the emergence of this economic crisis that triggered off the expulsion of the Asians, who had hitherto dominated the economy.

The move to expel and expropriate the Asians also had a foreign dimension. This originated from the failure of Britain and Israel to adequately fund and arm this paranoid and predatory junta. In the process Libya, Saudi Arabia and the USSR became its main allies [Mamdani, 1983. And Mutibwa, 1992]. Freed from Britain's constraining influence [most of the Asians also had British passports], Amin launched his "Economic War" [as the policy to expel the Asian became known].

The initial main beneficiaries of this policy were, Amin's NCO's-turned-officers, and the salariat. With the latter through the Departed Asian Custodian Board and other newly created parastatals. Within the petty bourgeoisie it was mainly its UMC wing who were also accessed to property through the, newly created Uganda Muslim Supreme Council. With time it were the latter, in addition to the broader petty bourgeoisie, who benefited from this move, based on their earlier acquired business acumen, and the access to the market and capital that the expulsion had enabled [Jorgensen, 1981].

However, Amin's failure to represent class rule created a paradoxical situation, for although those with the acumen prospered, the regime through terror, and inept macro level management of the economy, hindered their consolidation into a viable commercial class. This in any case, would have threatened it politically. Accordingly, numerous prominent members of this class, including those within the salariat now "disappeared."

This situation led to the disintegration of the formal sector, as the economy had also been cut off external credit. Moreover this kleptocratic junta was incapable of formulating the required governance policies.

By the mid 1970's a political crisis had emerged and Amin literally survived through crisis management [ACR, 1976-77. Avirgan and Honey, 1982. And Mutibwa, 1992]. However, a global economic dimension elongated the junta's political lease. This being the "Coffee Boom" of 1976-77. A poor harvest in Brazil had led to the price of coffee rising by 350 per cent! Hence the junta was in position to sell this product at BPs 2,800 instead of BPs 800 per ton of the previous session. Given the junta's misrule, this offered a boon to internal and external smuggling rackets that involved the salariat and military, the population at large in addition to " [Kenyan] members of parliament, civil servants, and people from Somalia and all over Central Africa...If Uganda tried to export the normal way through Mombasa, the trucks were hijacked in Kenya and disappeared [Southall, A, 1980:632]." The Minister of Provincial Administration, Brig. Ali Fadhul, noted that coffee equivalent to US dollars [\$] 200 was being smuggled annually. Despite these trends, Uganda managed a budget surplus of \$ 250 million in 1976, much of which, however, the Minister of Finance Brig Moses Ali, failed to account for [Southall, A, 1980:632]!

6. Social and economic rejuvenation and re-adjustments:

Faced with a brutal predatory state which extracted their economic surplus and yet failed to deliver services, the social contract between state and society collapsed. "Taxes went unpaid, customs controls [were] ignored, [and] foreign exchange was sold at the black market." This drastically weakened the state's institutional capacity [Brett, 1994:62]. Moreover, the state's irrationality drove the population into the parallel market, which was "under the circumstances rational [Tandon, 1990:104]." In this way Ugandans created a vibrant informal civil society sector, whose activities depended on mutual interactions that encouraged democratic accountability, management and transparency. Hence a revolution based on the people's struggles against predatory dictatorship at the micro level resulted in their creation of a capacity to provide for themselves services that were nominally supposed to be offered by the state. This developed entrepreneurship which relied on "performance, and sales rather than monopolies, subsidies, or official contracts [Brett, 1994:63]." This background explains the growth of a vibrant informal small scale industrial sector mainly in the Kampala-Jinja-Mbarara and Mbale areas that catered for the needs of the population [Nkumbi, 1993:9]. Brett's extensive field work [1991a, 1991b, 1994], reveals that these struggles strengthened the role of voluntary groups in civil society. These sustained crucial social services

which the ruling kleptocracy had failed to cater for, hence for instance the mushrooming of Parent Teachers' Associations [PTAs], in the educational sector. These struggles enhanced the organisational capacity, self reliance, spirit of sacrifice and rejection of predatory statism by Ugandans. These were factors that contributed not only to the collapse of the junta, but also to the sustaining of the future struggle for democratic transformation.

By 1978, the "Coffee Boom" had ended. Meanwhile the regime's repressive policies had led to an embargo being placed upon it by the US, which had been its main trading partner. Moreover to heighten this crisis, the hitherto lax Saudi Arabia [the junta's leading financial sponsor], demanded for a more rigorous transparency in relation to the application of its donated funds [ACR, 1978-79:423-24]. Consistent in their predatory ways, Amin leading cronies had grossly misappropriated these funds with impunity. Inevitably this foreign relations dimension eased the split within the ruling lumpen soldierly. Moreover a declining economic base, intensified the internal struggles against the junta, which multiplied the contradictions within its state. This led to Amin's attempt to annihilate sections of his military that had mutinied. The mutineers fled into Tanzania. It was this that triggered off the 1978 war, led by Dar es Salaam and Ugandan exiles, culminating in "Life President" Amin and his cronies fleeing for dear life.

CHAPTER FOUR THE POST AMIN ATTEMPT TO RECREATE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE.

Introduction: The military's misrule and the 1978-79 war ruined Uganda's formal economy [Banugire, 1989. Edmonds, 1988. And Kayizzi-Mugerwa and Bigsten 1992a]. This occurred within the context of an overall economic crisis in SSA [Toye, 1994], and led to the survival of these countries being pegged to the intervention of the West through their IFI's, which linked their financial assistance to the implementation of the SAPs. These SAPs were aimed towards liberalising the economy, so as to create conditions that rewarded economically productive groups, whose efforts they believed, had been negated by policies that had favoured urban elites. Since the latter who had benefitted from the status quo, were politically powerful, and were bound to resist these changes, the IFIs accepted repressive regimes that would co-opt these measures within their governance policies [Lal, 1983. And Toye, 1994:26].

This study argues that the acceptance by the West of the UPC's controversial re-emergence into power in 1980 was related to these assumptions. An idiosyncratic approach was employed that viewed Dr. Obote as the "only experienced strong man" who could "put things rights" [Nabudere, 1988. Kanyeihamba, 1988. And Tandon, 1990] in a country that had become characterised with political disorder [Karugire, 1986. And Low, 1988]. The IFI's ignored the issue of political legitimacy, as they imagined that the UPC through its armed wing, The Uganda National Liberation Army [UNLA], and IFI funding, would extract the required compliance from the Ugandan population [Nabudere, 1988. And Tandon, 1990]. Also they failed to question the UPC's leadership's class interests characterised by a "dog eat dog" morality. Nor did they ponder upon whether this party had the required organisational capacity to ensure coherent governance. Through proxy, the UPC organised an electoral fraud, that formalised its second coming into power, with the approval of its regional allies, and the broader international community, including the West and its controlled IFI's [Appendix vi. Nabudere, 1988. And Tandon 1990].

Within the Ugandan specificity, the IFI's theoretical framework proved erroneous. From the late 1960's Ugandans had begun to politically organise against illegitimate and brutal statist predation. These struggles consolidated in the 1980's mainly under the aegis of the NRM. Indeed the political

disorganisation of the UPC, its illegitimacy and the class character of its elites, ensured that in the end it failed to impose its governance, or more appropriately misgovernance, alongside the SAPs on the Ugandan population.

1. The 1979 Moshi Conference and its consequences:

The Tanzanian state organised a "Unity Conference" at Moshi, to elicit the participation of Ugandan exiles, in a bid to overthrow Amin. Given the choice, the Nyerere regime would have preferred their close political allies, Obote and his UPC, returned as rulers. However, broader calculations were manifest. Intelligence reports indicated the crucial role of the Ugandan population in the winning the war. They also exposed the unacceptability of Obote within southern Uganda, where the bulk of the fighting took place. Whilst, Britain which had offered logistic support to this effort, categorically opposed Obote's return [Avirgan and Honey, 1982. Ingham, 1994].

Foreign policy factors played a leading role in prolonging the junta's stay in power and in the political instability that was to characterise its aftermath. Avirgan and Honey [1982] illustrate how the Kenyan government assisted the junta until its last days. The "Whisky runs" that boosted the morale of regimes coercive forces continued unimpeded [Furley, 1982], while Libya and the PLO intervened militarily on behalf of the junta. Furthermore, the timing of the Moshi conference saw Obote as a political liability domestically and abroad, and the decision had been made to marginalise him. This augured badly for Uganda's stability as Obote's UPC felt embittered [Africa Report January-February 1983:21], and yet they had been the most organised anti Amin coalition.

It was the Moshi "Unity Conference" that created the Uganda National Liberation Front [UNLF] which was to fill the political vacuum after Amin. However, this conference was beset with numerous deficiencies. For a start, by spending less than three days on deliberations that were to determine the future governance of Uganda, the delegates failed to articulate clearly the relevant rules. As its Tanzanian state backed convenors [led by Nabudere, Tandon, Rugumayo and Omony-Ojok] lacked a viable social base, they used this forum to invite 22, mainly obscure political groups [see Appendix v], most of whom

were formed just before, and never outlived Moshi. This created an incoherent UNLF. Also they attempted to marginalise the political-military formations that had been most consistent in the anti Amin struggle, namely the UPC, The Front for The National Salvation [FRONASA] and the Save Uganda Movement [SUM]. Indeed, the formation of the UNLF's at Moshi hindered the participation of most Ugandan's who had not gone into exile but had born the brunt of the junta's misrule. This further constrained the UNLF's transforming into a popular mass based movement. To compound its problems the UNLF did not command a coherent coercive organ. Those that claimed to constitute its armed wing, the UNLA, owed their ultimate loyalty to there mother organisations namely the UPC and FRONASA and SUM. Moreover when its key organs were under the control of conflicting political elements. Radical Marxist dominated its legislature, [the National Consultative Council [NCC]], whilst the UPC under Paulo Muwanga controlled the Military Commission [MC] which co-ordinated the war effort. Meanwhile Prof. Yusufu Lule, an independent minded former academic and international administrator, was elected as the compromise head of its executive.

Power struggles were manifest from the start, a situation that was complicated by Tanzania's partisan role. Hence Lule's first cabinet was rejected by the other UNLF leaders, on the grounds that it was "unrepresentative" with Dar es Salaam's backing. The new political proposals that emerged with Nyerere's participation enabled the UPC to secure five senior cabinet posts and retain their control over the military [Munger, 1982]. Within weeks Kampala fell and these struggles were transferred to Uganda.

Lule's administration, April-July 1979: Given the nature of Amin's misrule, the new civilian administration was viewed as legitimate by most Ugandans [Avirgan and Honey, 1982. And Nabudere, 1980]. This reception was augmented by their programme of action which indicated that they were to rule for an interim period of two years, before holding general elections. Within this period they intended to reconstruct the economy, create a pro-people state and draft a popularly mandated constitution. Lule also advocated a free market economy [see The Seers Commission, 1979]. Hence, he obtained the support of the mainly Buganda dominated petty bourgeoisie [Nabudere, 1980].

International recognition was prompt, hence Britain and the US, which had closed their embassies at the height of Amin's repression, had them re-opened and on May 1 st 1980, the US Congress lifted its trade embargo on Uganda.

The UNLF inherited a discredited, disjointed and demoralised state structure. This contributed to lawlessness, which was magnified by Amin's fugitive agents alongside convicts who managed to obtain freedom during the war. Paradoxically, it was Lule's attempt to restore legitimate orderly governance that led to his demise.

Lule offered a regional proportional representational framework for cabinet appointments, and the recreation of the provincial system of local governance. These were rejected by the NCC, which feared that the numerical superiority of the Baganda, [Lule,s nationality] would have led to their dominating at cabinet level. Moreover, the provincial system would have enabled them to have more control over the economic surplus of Buganda, the most productive and wealthiest region in the country. For this he was termed a "tribalist" [Tindigarukayo, 1988]. When Lule invited the WB sponsored Commonwealth economic team to assess the reconstruction needs of the country [The Seers Commission], he was referred to as "a lackey of British finance capital" [Nabudere, 1980]. Lule also aroused opposition by his proposal to create a national army based on two criteria, i- regional proportional representation and ii- high academic standards. Prior to this the colonial and post colonial armies had had a sectional and under educated representation, to whom Amin added a lumpen and mercenary component. However, the new policy threatened the partisan military formations that constituted the UNLA, many of whose members did not meet the required criteria.

The occasioning of Lule's departure from power, in July 1979, was triggered off by the differing interpretation of the rules of governance, which relates to the Moshi Conference's deficiencies. Lule's supporters viewed the 1967 Constitution as the required document, as it enhanced the powers of the executive [which they controlled]. However for the NCC's leadership, it were the yet unpublished Moshi minutes that they regarded as the governing legal documents [Ingham, 1994]. These made the NCC

sovereign. Failure to compromise on these issues forced Lule's removal.

Binaisa's regime July 1979- June 1980: Godfrey Binaisa, was another compromise leader. His past chequered political career enabled this! As Attorney General he had drafted the 1966 Constitution, yet he had fallen out with Obote in 1967. Moreover, like Lule he was a Muganda, a factor that was calculated to win the support of his nationality.

None the less Lule's removal from office by a cabal of returned exiles, backed by Tanzania, saw an erosion of the legitimacy of the UNLF amongst a wide cross section of the population. This should be seen from the perspective of the micro level revolution that had occurred within the population. Many thought that governance based on dictatorial statism was about to be re-imposed. Internationally the new regime failed to generate a warm reception. Britain, for instance, stated that it was "not clear whether the need arises for recognition [The Guardian 23.6.79]." This led to a drastic reduction in Western financial reconstruction assistance [Furley, 1989:282. And Sathyamurthy, 1986].

Internally, sections within civil society organised against the state. Hence, the formation of The Internal Uganda Joint Liberators [IJUL] headed by the petty bourgeoisie proper, alongside its aligned intelligentsia, [whose leadership included Gasta Nsubuga and Lameck Ntambi, of the commercial class in addition to Mayanja-Nkangi, Dr Lutaakome Kayiira, an hitherto US based academic, and playwright Robert Serumaga]. IJUL co-ordinated a clandestine civil disobedience campaign that paralysed economic activity in the main urban areas of southern Uganda for nearly two weeks. In the power struggles that came to characterise this regime, the most organised group, moreover located within the structures of state, emerged as being the UPC. It was internally led by Paulo Muwanga and Oyite Ojok. They physically eliminated their opponents and deliberately caused instability so as to discredit the UNLF, and in the process create the impression that it was only Obote's UPC that had the capacity to effect orderly governance in Uganda [a similar pattern to the South African Third Force] [Munger, 1982. And Lule, 1982].

The other main characteristics of the Binaisa regime were elitism and graft [Mutibwa, 1992. And Sathyamurthy, 1986]. However, the two main factors that precipitated his downfall were, first, his attempt to widen the social base of the UNLF through an election, and second his bid to restructure the army. In the process he made strategic blunders by removing the FRONASA leader Museveni from the Defence Ministry in response to UPC pressure, and also he antagonised Tanzania when he made a futile attempt to obtain a Western and Kenyan military presence to bolster his regime.

As the UNLF leadership lacked a viable social base, they opted to hold the elections under the banner of their movement, and in the process suspended the other political parties. This antagonised the UPC and DP who thought that they would perform better on their own. This failure to agree on the rules that were to govern the electoral process led to a crisis. By marginalising FRONASA, he allowed UPC elements to further consolidate their grip on the military [Lule, 1982]. Realising his blunder Binaisa made futile attempts to restructure the military, and to obtain Western and Kenyan military assistance. These moves triggered off a coup mounted by the UPC dominated MC in 1980, with Dar es Salaam's tacit support [Mudoola, 1988].

2. The Re-emergence of the UPC:

The primary objective of the MC led coup was to create conditions for the UPC's re-emergence into power. Tanzania and Britain conditioned their recognition of this regime on the basis that it organised democratic elections [Avirgan and Honey, 1982]. This the MC agreed to fulfil, and being UPC dominated, it in the process deliberately played the roles of player and referee [see Appendix vi]. These elections were intended to offer the UPC legitimacy based on a democratic veneer, which was calculated mainly for its international audience.

None the less, the MC's determination to remain in power at all costs reflected within their budget for that year, which increased security related expenditure from 27 to 31 percent, despite a famine in Karamoja. It led a concerned legislature to observe that "we do not lack money, only a shortage of common sense [Jorgensen, 1981]."

Less than two weeks after the coup, Obote returned, in a well calculated manner, amidst state sponsored pomp that usually begets visiting sovereigns. He landed in Bushenyi, a UPC stronghold in Ankole. This symbolised the repetition of his 1960's encirclement-of-Buganda strategy, the seat of his main protagonists. Whereas in 1979 Tanzania had hindered his attending the Moshi Conference and return to Uganda, in this instance they provided him a plane and a high powered entourage [Karugire, 1986. And Mudoola, 1988:297]. Through the MC, Obote imposed himself as the leader of the UPC without consulting this party's internal structures. In the process, by basing his return on the party's constitution which since 1969 proposed that it was its President who selected its executive, Obote rewarded his cronies, [eg Muwanga, became Vice President, Luwuliza-Kirunda, became Secretary General and Massete-Kuuya, became Treasurer].

Prior to this, the UPC leaders had indicated their governance policies, in case they assumed power. Their commonalities were to enhance their domestic and international manoeuvrability. Hence their opposition to the free market oriented policies of the UNLF leaders; and their attempt to influence East-West tensions in their favour. Whilst still in exile, Obote had requested Ugandan academics at Dar es Salaam University to "update" the "Common Man's Charter". Akena Adoko, a longstanding UPC ideologue, stated the intention to create "the most extreme socialist state in Africa [ARB, April 1-30 1979:5223]." After his return in May, Obote had hosted a function in which he only invited East Bloc countries. He used this occasion to castigate Britain and Israel for having assisted Amin's regime [Furley, 1988:283]. Britain had maintained cool relations with the cash strapped MC dictatorship. However, whilst organising the elections, its Chairman, Muwanga employed a foreign policy tool that was to change these relations for the better. This occurred when he visited Cuba, which led London's Daily Telegraph to observe that:"It seems clear that if the West does not take some action to ensure a fair Ugandan election, yet another portion of former British Africa will be lost to the influence of the Eastern bloc. Kenya will stand alone as the bastion of Western influence [7.10.80]."

The proposed action that was taken involved Britain's commitment to fund a third of the elections costs, and their contributing personnel to the Commonwealth Observer Group [COG] that certified the elections

results [Furley, 1989:283]. Another crucial reason that led to this change of heart will be presented below, in addition to the motive behind the Cuban visit.

The parties that contested these elections were the older established DP and UPC, the former being led by Paulo Ssemogerere. In addition to the newly created federalist, Conservative party [CP] and the Uganda Patriotic Movement [UPM]. These were led by Mayanja-Nkangi, the one time Katikiro of Buganda, and Yoweri Museveni, the FRONASA leader and radical intellectual, respectively. The UPM advocated a non sectarian culture in Uganda, with its support base mainly found amongst the urban intelligentsia, FRONASA members, and trade unionists. Of all these parties it was the DP which had broadest national representation.

The rigging of the elections: The UPC lacked a viable social base. In turn, its leaders formulated a coherent and ruthless programme to rig the electoral exercises, through the MC, moreover cushioned by a benevolent Tanzanian state. Their plan was well reflected in a secret memorandum that Obote dispatched to his party notables [see Appendix vi]. It had an external and internal dimension. The prior mentioned paper socialism that the UPC had yelped before the elections, had merely been a cynical ploy aimed at influencing Soviet Bloc countries, notably so Cuba, to offer it military assistance in its quest to usurp power. Consequently Obote cautioned the party faithful: "We have, therefore, to portray ourselves as revolutionaries and harp Fidel's [Castro] tune [Appendix vi]."

In addition, the registration of voters that was to begin on October 6th coincided with an attack by former Amin soldiers based in the Sudan on a UNLA detachment in West Nile, a DP stronghold. The MC sealed off the area, hindered people from registering and sent in troops that massacred thousands and sent up to 250,000 residents into exile in neighbouring Sudan and Zaire. In this way only UPC candidates managed to register in West Nile. Elsewhere security checks were also applied to intimidate or hinder other parties candidates from registering. [The examples of two very leading political figures will suffice in this regard. A former UPC stalwart-turned-DP, Adoko Neykon, Obote's cousin, was physically hindered from registering. Meanwhile, the UPM leader, Museveni, was harassed at a roadblock after

addressing a party rally] [Museveni, 1992]. Consequently, the UPC's obtained 17 "unopposed" seats before the casting of a single ballot. The MC, also ensured that the administrative machinery that was to conduct the elections was controlled by UPC sympathizers. The drawing of constituencies also favoured the UPC, to the effect that more constituencies were given to UPC strongholds. This triggered off a boycott of the cabinet and NCC by members of the other parties. Muwanga grabbed this opportunity to ensure that the UPC dominated both bodies in addition to the judiciary [Mutibwa, 1992:138-145]. Now in control of all the three key organs of state, Obote was by October 1980, Uganda's ruler in all but name, awaiting an election to formalise his status.

However, Ugandans voted overwhelmingly for the DP. This had led Nyerere and the COG to draft congratulatory messages for its leaders [Avirgan and Honey, 1982]. Consistent with their master plan [see Appendix vi], on December 11th, the UNLA feigned a mutiny to intimidate the DP's supporters. The undeterred Muwanga issued a decree, [Legal Notice No 10 of 1980] which forbade the public announcement of the elections results, the breach of which involved a jail sentence and paying a hefty sum, or both. His office took up this responsibility and there after, the results that were announced favoured the UPC. Another foreign policy dimension was manifest at this stage, as even before the completion of this grossly violated electoral exercise, the COG noted that: "they had been a valid electoral exercise which should broadly reflect the freely-expressed choice of the people of Uganda [Avirgan and Honey, 1982:229]." In this way, they legitimised this electoral fraud internationally. Yet even before the completion of this entire exercise, they packed their bags and jetted out. Moreover despite the fact that one of them had candidly stated that the decree "took the wind from our sails", and had referred to the entire exercise as "Uganda's Alice in the Wonderland elections [ARB,1-31 December, 1980:5898]." The reason for this inconsistency will be discussed below.

3. The international dimension:

International recognition of the UPC regime was not an impromptu occurrence. It was based on broader regional, geo-political and economic considerations [Furley, 1989. Lansner, 1982. Nabudere, 1988. And Tandon, 1990]. Whilst still exiled in Tanzania, Obote was contacted by the British, whereby a tacit

arrangement had been concluded in which it was stressed that the recognition of his reassuming power was to be based on his agreeing to return all British and Asian properties that had been expropriated under Amin, in addition to his adopting free market policies, based on the SAPs. Considering the political instability that was now occurring in Uganda, Whitehall came to the conclusion that Dr. Obote, was the "strongman" and "experienced" politician who could effect governance based on political order [Tandon, 1990:102]. Despite their paper socialism, on assuming power, the UPC rulers more than readily adopted these undertakings. In addition, they agreed to side with British foreign policies in international fora, especially so at the UN's Security Council, where Uganda had assumed a two year seat. In turn, Britain agreed to sponsor a donors conference for Uganda, and massive funds were provided to the UPC regime [Nabudere, 1980:302-303].

The linkage between Uganda's internal governance and its foreign policy was well illustrated when Obote appointed himself both as Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs. Remembering their own role of destabilising Amin's and the subsequent regimes from abroad, the UPC rulers cultivated close regional ties. This was easily achieved with Tanzania, based on their historical relations, whilst with Kenya and other countries, a similar arrangement was made even before the elections [UPC Manifesto, 1980:35]. Hence Moi's instant recognition of the regime. To highlight the security dimension in his congratulatory message Moi warned Ugandan exiles in Kenya to "desist from any attack or criticism of that [Ugandan] government [ARB, 1-31 December, 1980:5899]." Weeks later the two rulers met at Webuye eastern Kenya. Obote's further regional recognition was sealed with a conference of leaders from Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia that took place in Kampala shortly after, to congratulate the newly "elected" rulers.

A political perspective [1980-85]: Attention is to be addressed to the regime's attempt to portray itself as legitimate based on the 1980 elections, the economic dimension of its policies, the emergence of an armed opposition and its reaction to this situation.

To effect orderly governance the new regime required legitimacy and a mass mobilising political party with a broad following, which represented their class interests in its governance policies. In the 1960's and

during the anti Amin struggle, Obote's UPC had failed to form any viable coalitions. Secondly, they opted to assume state power through the MC rather than broader political organisation. Both factors hindered their developing a viable social base. This situation was compounded by their reluctance to formulate mutually acceptable political solutions with the aggrieved parties. This contributed to their subsequent failure to effect orderly governance.

The UPC in the period under discussion primarily represented the interests of its leading individuals whose control of strategically placed political bodies enabled them to wield disproportionate power, with the assistance of foreign forces. One of its strong points was its cadreship of young leaders who had been members of the state controlled National Union of Students in Uganda [NUSU] in the 1960's, and had fled to exile under Amin. These were its new notables. However they were all coopted into the state's structures after the elections. Leaving the UPC with no full time party activists at all levels, hence constraining its organisational capacity. But then, this party re-emerged purely as a pipeline for the dishing out of patronage [Mudoola, 1988]. Indeed, its rule characterised by corruption, the UPC did not even serve the interests of the broad class formations which it supposedly represented, and its class character scarcely differed from Amin's junta [Brett, 1991a. Mutibwa, 1992. And Sathymurthy, 1986:732]. Given this background, futile attempts were made to reconstruct the economy whilst simultaneously crushing their opponents. Both had an external dimension: the IMF funded the reconstruction, while foreign states armed and assisted the training of the UNLA in the regime's quest to quell the discontent of the Ugandan people.

The decision by the DP's top leadership to concede the election and become the parliamentary opposition was a boon to the regime, as this validated its claim that it was popularly mandated. Since sovereignty lay with the gun, the UPC saw no need to legislate the DP out of existence [Mudoola, 1988]. Literally, parliament then resembled what Marx had described as a "talk shop". An external dimension had influenced the DP's decision. Nabudere [1988:303] illustrates how Western, and critically so, its West German Christian Democratic [CDU] sponsors, persuaded it to accept the elections results, in the name of "stability". The fallacy of this entire exercise attained its climax in 1984, when the DP hosted a

conference in Kampala of various European Christian Democratic Parties, including the West German CDU, to mark Uganda's return to democracy! This occurred when the armed struggle for democratic transformation was at its height, and the regime's atrocities had been publicised [Amnesty International Report [AI], 1982].

In the process, the UPC had to pay a price for its allowing the DP in parliament, for the latter used this platform to effectively publicise the regimes notorious human rights record. A role it also performed through its mouthpieces The Citizen and Munnassi. Although the regime tolerated these papers, it harassed its journalists [AI, 1985]. Other critical papers were outrightly banned, for instance the UPM oriented The Weekly Topic. It is instructive to note that by 1985, the DP had only 35 of its original 51 MP's. Eight had been enticed to join the UPC, while two members in each category had fled to exile, been detained, or killed [Sathyamurthy, 1986:672].

Basing its local governance on the centralising 1967 Local Administration Act, the UPC depended on politically appointed councillors in the Urban areas and DCs. These were: "often incompetent, and venal" individuals, whose class character and illegality led to "a political and institutional vacuum [Brett, 1991a:14 and 25]." The political effect of this situation will be discussed more in detail below.

The economic dimension: When the UPC assumed power, Uganda was faced with an economy that was over administered, inflation ridden, export dependent and yet weak in foreign earnings [Mutibwa, 1992:152]. With its SAPs, the regime applied an economistic approach to remedy this situation, without relating this policy to the broader political realities. From the start, an authoritarian tendency was manifest. Mugenyi [1992:63] illustrates how when the Ugandan negotiating team questioned the IMF delegation on details relating to the SAPs assumptions and conditionalities, the latter sped off to Obote, who approved their version without question. The former only learnt of this decision through the mass media. More broadly, the regime did not conduct any public debates on issues that related to its economic policy.

These SAPs involved two devaluations, in 1981 with the Ug Shs depreciating from 8.4 to Ug Sh 78 per \$ ie Window 1, which was reserved to government import needs. And in 1982, with the creation of the auction based Window 11, which it was hoped would erode the informal economy and create revenue for the state. In addition, price controls were abandoned, and controls were imposed on employment into the public sector, and total domestic alongside public credit. Also, periodic increases in the prices of cash crops were made [Edmonds, 1988. Kayizzi-Mugewra and Bigsten, 1992a. Mugenyi, 1992:63. And Mutibwa, 1992:152].

Consequently, between 1981-83 GDP recovered at a rate of 5.4 per cent with per capita income registering an average growth rate of 2.6 per cent. Inflation fell from 100 in 1981 to 20 per cent by mid 1984. Smuggling was curbed and the production of coffee, tea and cotton increased [Edmonds, 1988. Kayizzi-Mugerwa and Bigsten, 1992a. And Mugenyi, 1992]. Against this background, the IFIs concluded that these policies were a success.

However, another side existed in relation to these economic governance policies. To begin with, the regime allowed for the emergence of institutionalised corruption and structural decay, while, moreover, no attempts were made to create an integrated economy. For instance, a member of the ruling triumvirate who also happened to be the Chief of Staff of the UNLA, Maj Gen. Oyite Ojok [the other two were Obote and Muwanga], was appointed as Chairman of the Coffee Marketing Board [CMB], which exported Uganda's main foreign exchange earning produce. Also Ministers used their influence to deliberately award fraudulent public tenders to their business cronies, and in turn shared the proceeds. By encouraging public corruption, a bad example was set by these rulers [WB, 1989], which compounded the regime's illegitimacy, and ineffectiveness.

Mugenyi [1991:64-5] illustrates the gross neglect of public infrastructure that occurred under this regime, to the effect that nearly all the roads became infested with potholes. He also notes that the industrial sector which depended on imported inputs "was starved of credit and foreign exchange". Hence, by 1985 this sector shrunk by 22 per cent! This was in a context where nearly 45 per cent of W 11 foreign

exchange, had been used to purchase luxurious consumer goods for the wealthy [20 per cent], and cheap consumables for the workers and peasants [25 per cent],[the latter for which idle capacity existed in the local industries] [Mamdani, 1989]. To most people, these goods were unaffordable. Since devaluations, and inflation had eroded real incomes, as also had the failure to promptly pay coffee producers, who moreover received only 15 per cent of the world price for their produce [Mutibwa, 1992. And Nabudere, 1988].

Furthermore, Uganda's W 11 foreign exchange ended up in the accounts of Kenyan elites, as it was the principle source of the more than \$ four billion these people had in foreign accounts [Mugenyi, 1991:64]. Hence, instead of benefiting the producers, these policies grossly extracted their surplus and expanded the economic base of the politicians, and their returned Asian and other commercial cronies [Mutibwa, 1992:154. Jamal, 1991:85 And Sathyamurthy, 1986:672], in addition to their foreign allies. This situation magnified the contradictions that existed within the political sphere. Consequently in the 1984-85 period, the seriousness of the political and economic crisis led to the suspension of the SAPs [Edmonds, 1988:108-10]. In turn, Tandon [1990:103] aptly observed that "The imperialist strategy was bound to fail,... For as long as the people's democratic rights were daily trampled upon, neither military coercion nor material inducements in form of commodities in the shops could placate them."

5.The struggle for democratic transformation [1980-86]:

Differing interpretations have been presented relating to Ugandans' struggles to transform their state and society and to create governance that was based on legitimate order. Himbara and Sultan [1995] adopted a perspective which emphasised the role played by foreign forces. While others, notably Legum [Africa-Report, January-February, 1983:16] and Ingham [1994], saw them from a narrow ethnic bias based on the "Buganda bogey". This thesis adopts the view that it is through studying the Ugandan class relationships based on their political economy and impacted upon by the international dimension, that one can best define governance in Uganda.

Three main political military groups were formed to conduct the armed struggle with the regime. These

were the Uganda National Rescue Front [UNRF], the Uganda Freedom Movement [UFM] and what came to constitute the NRM. Although the method of struggle of these groups differed, their main commonality was that armed action was an extension of politics, as a means to influence or change the existing governance policies.

The UNRF was dominated by Amin's former collaborators who had been marginalised with the collapse of that regime. It was headed by Brig Moses Ali [Amin's one time Finance Minister] and Felix Onama [a former Secretary General of the UPC and Minister of Defence in Obote first government]. It had a social base in West Nile where its activities were predominately confined, due to the massacres that the regime had instituted on this population since the MC days. Its guerrilla struggle was characterised by cross border raids from the Sudan where it was based.

It was the UFM and NRM that caused the most serious threat to the regime. They based their activities, mainly in what came to be known as the "Luweero Triangle", which was composed of the districts of Kampala, Mpigi, Mukono, and Luweero, in Buganda. These areas had a longstanding and strong resistance tradition, dating back from the colonial times, and indeed based on earlier UPC statist and anti-people policies, and the 1980 vote rigging, many in this area were more than ready to oppose the state. Put differently, the right objective and subjective conditions for an insurgency were in place.

The UFM was mainly composed of DP supporters who opted to resist the illegitimate UPC regime [eg the DP's Secretary General, F. Bwengye, and Ssemogerere's Personal Assistant James Kagimu]. The leader of its armed wing was Dr Lutaakoome Kayiira, while its Chairman was Balaki Kirya, [one of the five cabinet colleagues that Obote had arrested without warrant in 1966]. With the popularity of the DP, the UFM had a ready made social base. However it had a number of crucial deficiencies, not least the fact that the DP had never possessed an armed wing. Hence Kayiira and his team had to rely on their ingenuity to oppose an extremely vicious state [AI, 1982, 1985]. Secondly, it relied heavily on a disorganised and largely opportunist Nairobi based petty bourgeoisie leadership. These deficiencies led to its adopting a confrontational strategy based on wanting to overrun the state. The months' old UFM

lacked this capacity, and the subsequent strains this caused led to its disintegration [ACR, 1982-82. 1983-84].

The most successful political movement whose struggles came to symbolise the struggle for democratic transformation was the NRM. Even within the UPM, its leadership had conducted a debate based on what policy they should adopt after the electoral fraud. Bidandi-Ssali, its influential Secretary General, and a pacifist by orientation, had argued for passive resistance. Museveni, on the other hand, who had pointed to the futility of this move due to the fascist tendencies of the UPC leaders opted for the armed struggle. Weeks later Ssali, Bakulu Mpagi, [its Publicity Secretary] and many others were imprisoned without trial [Bakulu-Mpagi, 1982. And Munger, 1982]. By then Museveni had embarked on an armed struggle and subsequently the UPM boycotted parliament.

Faced with a murderous state [AI, 1992, and 1985. And Munger, 1982], and an hostile international environment, the armed struggle that was led by the political coalitions that came to constitute the NRM relied almost entirely on Ugandan capacity. A number of measures were evolved that enabled the leadership to achieve this objective. The expansion of the social base of the NRM resulted from its ability to form and sustain at times complex coalitions that were mutually benefitting. Indeed, it had been formed when Prof Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters [UFF] combined with Museveni's Popular Resistance Army [PRA], in 1981. Prof. Lule, who became its Chairman represented the right while Museveni its Vice Chairman, the left of Ugandan politics. This combination nurtured an ideology that focused on Uganda's centrality, with its people as sovereign, and propagated a political programme that based its governance principles on popular democracy, accountability and transparency [Njuba, 1992. And see the NRM's Ten Point Programme]. Consequently, a mass movement was created from within the depths of Uganda whose heterogenous ethnic, class, and ideological composition allowed it to be sensitive to the needs of the population. Hence for instance their ability to co-opt the symbolically important traditional leaders, whom Obote had referred to as being "feudal" during his "Revolution". This consolidated their support base in the country side.

The existence of former FRONASA members within this movement accorded it a set of mainly youthful political leaders with military skills, and organisational discipline that were required in this struggle. For Museveni, it had all begun with student radicalism that had led him to partake in the Mozambican anti colonial struggle in the late 1960's [Museveni, 1972. And Shamuyarira, 1972]. For some, it was through the anti-Amin crusade. But to most it was in their current struggle that they came to acquire these skills. Whatever, so as to further harmonise the relationship of the NRM with the population, it passed the National Resistance Army's [NRA] Code Of Conduct [COC], in 1982. This contained austere formulations that regulated the behaviour of NRM cadres, with their essence being the need to respect the civil rights of the civilian population, whose violation involved stiff punishment. This offered a sharp contrast to the state instigated violence that the UPC and Amin regimes had institutionalised [Lule, 1982].

Unlike with the other groups, the NRM opted to apply the strategy of a protracted peoples' war as its mode of struggle. Commenting on this strategy Eriya Kategaya, the NRM Diplomatic and Political Secretary, observed "Everyone thinks of a coup. They want us to chop the head off this regime. We will move slowly. We will strangle it. But in the end it will be just dead [Lansner, 1982:43-44]." The primary tenet of this strategy involved the mobilising and organising of the population in the armed political struggle [von Clausewitz, 1977. Guevara, 1977. Mao, 1977. And Museveni, 1981].

This involved the effecting of democratic governance in the liberated areas, through the hierarchically ordered Resistance Councils [RCSs] [see Appendix ii]. RCs were grassroots democratic participatory administrative structures in which all residents of a locality were allowed to participate and whose eight member executive they elected and assigned specific tasks [eg Chairman, Secretaries for Defence, Mobilisation, Gender, etc] [Brett, 1992A, Burkey, 1991. Kasfir, 1992. And Nsibambi, 1992]. This contrasted sharply with the UPC's local governance structures based on the highly centralised 1967 Local Administration Act, whose Urban Councils and DCs were dominated by the state's appointed Councillors and appointed grass roots chiefs, who existed in an institutional and political vacuum [Brett, 1991a. And Karugire, 1986].

At the pinnacle of the NRM's governance structures was the consultative National Resistance Council [NRC], which was headed by Alhaji Musa Kigongo, a member of the nascent national bourgeoisie turned insurgent. The NRC's membership represented the different coalitions that made up the NRM [Brett, 1995]. The legitimacy of this system [which was derived from the pre colonial Buganda local governance system, its main difference being its democratic content], was illustrated through its rapid mushrooming in the liberated areas, a factor Sathyamurthy, [1986:672] attributes to the illegality of the national and local government structures of the UPC. Relating the legitimacy of the governance in the NRMs liberated areas to the RCs and the struggle, one NRM commander explained: "They are our eyes and ears. When we have a problem it is because we are not close enough to the people [Lansner, 1982:43]." By early 1985, dual power existed in Uganda between the NRM and UPC, which leads to discussion of the policies that were adopted by the regime in its counter insurgency operations.

The regime's response: Basking under international recognition and support, the regime opted to adopt a policy of militarily annihilating their protagonists. This ignored the fact the struggle was primarily political. In this it had wide ranging international military assistance.

Having cultivated cordial external relations, the regime was assured of no foreign threats. By 1983, Museveni of the NRM had become persona non grata in Kenya and Britain, while Balaki Kirya, of the UFM, and Laurence Ssemakula of The Federal Democratic Movement [FEDEMU] through Kenyan assistance were hijacked by Ugandan security agents from their respective Nairobi hideouts. Kirya was imprisoned even though he had successfully applied for habeas corpus, while the latter was killed while in Ugandan military custody [AI, 1985:108].

To his political opponents who had taken to the armed struggle, Obote had pointed out at Soroti, Eastern Uganda, in February 1981, that it was the civilian population, amongst whom they were located, who would suffer the consequences [Mutibwa, 1992:159]. The state institutionalised a policy of ethnic cleansing, as the war was being conducted mainly in the Luweero Triangle, in Buganda. Hence between 1981-6 around 300,000 people were killed and many more displaced [compare this with the 20,000 in the

20 year Rhodesian war, whose regime was internationally ostracised [see Meredith, 1980:16].

Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, and the US assisted in the training of the UNLA, during this period. And Tanzanians also manned strategic posts in Entebbe peninsula, where the Executive resided [Museveni, 1985:32]. Furthermore, an eight nation Commonwealth military training team was sent to Uganda. It was stationed in Jinja and was headed by Col. Clavering of the British army who was deputised for by Maj. Kanu from Sierra Leone. Also, a private British military concern, Falcon Star, which was managed by former SAS men, assisted in the training of the crack counter insurgency Special Force Unit [Furley, 1989:285-6]. The regime tactically diversified its external sources for military assistance by getting Chinese and Soviets to train some of its officers, but more crucially through the obtaining of North Korean support. The North Koreans involved their men, headed by a General, in the struggle against the NRM. A number of them were killed in the process, including their second in command, a Lt Col Pak [Museveni, 1985:32].

Based on the high civilian casualties that emerged due to the regime's ethnic cleansing [AI, 1982 and 1985], internal and external pressure mounted on the regime. Members of the parliamentary opposition and civil society, headed by Cardinal Nsubuga, called for a dialogue between the warring parties through a Round Table Conference in a neutral venue. While visiting Uganda in 1984, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Runcie stated that "We must reverse the springs of violence which have beset this country ... In the dark years you have suffered the violation of every human right [The Daily Telegraph 30.1.84]." The US Assistant Secretary of State, Elliot Abrams, accused the regime of conducting "Large scale civilian massacres, forced starvation and impending humanitarian relief operations [The Economist 29.6.85]." The US Ambassador in Kampala confirmed Opposition and other accounts that the human rights record of the regime was worse than Amin's [Kanyehamba, 1988].

To such criticism the regime had responded defiantly and attempted to criminalise its opponents. Marking Uganda's independence in 1983, Dr Obote stated "If one Round Table Conference is held, the way would have been paved for any group to invent all kinds of imaginary disputes on electoral results to go to the

bush... then find leading citizens including Bishops, to demand a Round Table Conference ...[ACR, 1983:B292-3]." They also branded their opponents as desperadoes, and bandits.

Meanwhile, faced with growing condemnation of its human rights record, the regime acquired allies in the international media. Cuban media experts were recruited "to help improve Uganda's image [Furley, 1989:288]." Furthermore, Legum of the London's Observer [ARC, 1982-83:B306], argued "Few leaders in the Third World, or in the West for that matter, care as deeply about human rights as Obote; he has always been an admirer of Amnesty International..." [also see Africa-Report 1983:15-18]. Indeed Legum went on to refer to the negotiations that led to the formation of the NRM as having "remained only [as] a paper agreement [ACR, 1982-83:B306]," and claimed that the UPC regime had crushed the insurgents and that they were "...confined to three districts in Buganda [ACR,1983-84:B295]."

The concrete reality of the self reliant struggles by Ugandans to introduce democratic governance was more revealing. A non sectarian mass political movement had been formed [the NRM], and the numerous institutional reforms to effect democratic governance in the liberated areas had led to its establishing a solid and expanding social base. Moreover they had developed a highly disciplined self trained armed wing [the NRA]. Hence, within that same year when the prophets of doom had marked its demise, and when one of the numerous "grand offensives" by the regime and its foreign backers to obliterate the NRM and its social base had failed, the Chief of Staff of the UNLA, Maj Gen Oyite Ojok "the Eichmann of Luweero" [Mutibwa, 1992:163] died in a mid air explosion in the Triangle, alongside six senior General Staff officers. By late 1984 the NRM had extended its operations to Western Uganda, and after defeating the regime's forces at the battle of Ruboona in early 1985, at the footholds of Mountain Rwenzori, the writing was on the wall that Obote's militarist policies could not succeed.

By mid 1984, the failure to defeat the NRM had led to cracks emerging within the ruling dictatorial cabal. A faction led by Muwanga, Gen Tito Okello and many of the senior brass within the UNLA, who also happened to be mainly Acholi, favoured a negotiated settlement, as they had the foresight to realise that

the outright victory of the NRM was possible. This would have circumvented their gross plundering of the country's resources, if not worse. Obote's refusal to accede to this reality, in addition to his favouring his ethnic group in the UNLA's promotions, led to this struggle taking up an ethnic Acholi-Langi ideological dimension. Concurrently, Obote's clique aimed at eroding Muwanga's faction within the UPC. Amidst this anarchy, elections were due that year, and Muwanga, who was a nominated MP, was not likely to retain his cabinet seat [He was a Muganda, and based on his notorious political record he had no support base in Buganda].

Within the context of a consolidating NRM, and without institutional mechanisms to mediate the ruling cabal's differences, Muwanga alongside a clique of leading Acholi members of the UNLA, made coalitions with remnants of Amin's army that included the UNRF, and mounted a coup, in July 1985. Amidst this chaos, it is interesting to note that whilst the Army Commander, Gen. Tito Okello fled to Gulu, and the "experienced strongman" Dr Obote sped off to Kenya, Paulo Muwanga, who had remained in Kampala, once again emerged to form a "government of national unity" as the new Executive Prime Minister! History was turning full circle, and once again, Obote's led UPC's misrule had plunged Uganda, into political instability. Moreover, this disjointed ruling cabal's disdain of the Ugandan people meant that it avoided to involve them in the solving of its differences. In any case, many Ugandans were by then engaged in the shaping their history mainly through the NRM's led struggle.

CHAPTER FIVE THE RECREATION OF POLITICAL ORDER AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE
1986-94.

Introduction: Uganda's process of democratic transformation has depended primarily on the struggles of its people. The NRM captured state power in 1986, amidst international hostility, from a brutal predatory state whose leadership had been characterised either as "an usurping horde of semi-savage soldiery to which social cohesion, civilised political behaviour and economic prudence were totally alien concepts" or "politicians who had little contact with the masses and whose appetite for corruption and venality had been whetted by long years in exile abroad or underground [Sathyamurthy, 1986:727-8]."

The latter reigned when the IFIs accepted authoritarian states that effected SAPs based on narrow economism [Toye, 1994:22-6]. However, from 1989 legitimate governance became linked to SSA's economic recovery [WB, 1989]. By then, an appropriating NRM led coalition controlled state power in Uganda. Their political programme was based on the nurturing of legitimate order, through the democratising of society, and the dismantling of brutal kleptocratic statism.

This thesis argues that within the Ugandan specificity, the WB's 1989 agenda, merely complemented an already underway homegrown process. This provided the new but coherent Ugandan leadership the leverage to influence the West and the IFI's into adopting the WB's governance programme to Uganda's internal situation. Two other factors enabled this, Uganda's past political history, and the political disorder that characterised many countries in SSA and for that matter the former Eastern bloc.

Ideally a ruling class should be concerned to promote good government. Such a government should cater for the legitimate claims of all within the polity, and have legitimate mechanisms to mediate differences. This would necessitate effecting good governance, which has to be based on rational and legitimate methods in the appropriation of the social surplus within the polity. Sustainable and legitimate governance can be achieved through policies that represent broad class interests, and expand the national economic base in a manner that benefits those engaged in economic re-production. This can only succeed if

legitimate national and local governance structures are created to sustain these policies. In part, Uganda's problems resulted from over centralisation of political power [Barongo, 1989], moreover by a predatory and brutal political class, who, moreover, lacked the capacity to govern.

3. The military interlude:

This lasted from July 1985 to January 1986. It was a period characterised by a breakdown of coherent governance and the emergence of warlordism within the junta's controlled areas, and the consolidation of peace and stability in the NRM liberated areas. Also internal and external forces attempted to nip in the bud the NRM's led revolution.

The war weary junta called for a political settlement to the conflict by the formation of a government of national unity. In the process, they attracted into their administration a number of armed groups that represented the remnants of the colonial and early post colonial armies [including Amin's supporters], in addition to the UFM and FEDEMU, and all the political parties that had stood for the 1980 elections. Prominent amongst these was the DP, which the Generals intended to use to extend their social base. This further alienated the DP's leadership from its grassroots support. Its willingness to co-operate was based on their correct assessment of the extension of the NRM's support which would have deprived it of its traditional base. Moreover, the NRM had also acquired an effective pro-people military capacity. Hence all the country's problems were blamed on Obote and his exit was viewed as the required prerequisite to enable the country's reconciliation and reconstruction.

The NRM refused to join the junta and pointed to the fact that they were opposed to the system and not "obscurantist" individuals and "political quacks" as Obote and Muwanga [Museveni, 1992. And NRM, 1985]. Moreover, the junta failed to control its army which led to instability. For instance in Lango, Obote home district, these troops "Killed, pillaged and raped the Langi and reduced the provincial capital, Lira, to ruins [ACR, 1984-5:b465]." Furthermore a pattern of fragmentation emerged, similar to what later occurred in Liberia, Somalia and Yugoslavia, with the NRM controlling parts of western and central Uganda, and the junta's armed formations the rest. Moreover infighting amongst the junta's

coalitions further complicated the situation.

In contrast, legitimate political order, based on the RC system, existed in the NRM's liberated areas. So as to effect proper governance the NRC's Vice Chairman, Alhaji Kigongo, was appointed as the administrator of these areas. Moreover by October 1985, the head of the NRMs External Mission, Dr Kisseka [also a member of the national bourgeoisie], noted that his movement had captured the garrison towns of Masaka, Mbarara, Mubende and Fort Portal [ACR, 1984-85:B467]. These regions contained more than a half of the country population, and produced most of its economic surplus.

In the meantime, this junta without the barest capacity to effect any meaningful governance, continued to receive military assistance from Britain, Egypt, South Africa, Zaire, Israel, Sudan, amongst others [Mutibwa, 1992. And Sathyamurthy, 1986]. Of crucial importance was the role the West through Kenya played to stage a "peace conference" in Nairobi, under Moi's chairmanship. Uganda's mismanagement from the mid 1970's had tremendously benefitted the Kenyan economy [Southall, A, 1980], and its then balkanisation was hindering its profiteering from these "troubled waters". This was the required incentive for the "Nairobi Peace Talks".

To avoid being labelled "warmongers", coupled with the attempt to popularise its political programme, the NRM tactfully attended the "Nairobi Peace Talks". After their conclusion, in December 1985, Museveni, indicated why the NRM evolved into being and its designs for Uganda's future governance: "The people of Uganda, the population did not start the violence. I was not a soldier. I was an intellectual...I became a soldier to defend myself and my people against state inspired violence. People were killed in 1964 [the Nakulabye massacre]. Our people were killed in 1966 [at Mengo and Buganda generally]. Our people were killed in 1969 [after an assassination attempt on Obote]. Amin killed our people from 1971 to 1979. Milton Obote killed our people from 1981 to 1985. And the Military Council has been killing our people recently...The rights of the people are sovereign in the land. Anybody who does not recognise that ought not to be in power. This is our belief [The New Vision July 6, 1994]."

2. The NRM's capturing of state power:

Although the peace agreement had required the establishing of a power sharing arrangement between the warring factions, the failure by the junta to establish political order was used as a pretext by the NRM to refuse to be co-opted into its structures. Consequently on January 16th 1986, the NRM's High Command decided to capture Kampala so as to stop the "continued lawlessness by government troops and [the] harassment of civilians [ARB, February, 1986:7949]." This operation was led by Salim Saleh [a nom de guerre which actually supplanted his real name of Akandwanaho] Museveni's younger brother, and a distinguished veteran guerrilla and political leader. The junta crumbled when faced by the well motivated NRM liberators. However it unleashed a pattern of appalling atrocities as it retreated through eastern and northern Uganda.

By January 26th Kampala had fallen, and civil order was re-established for the first time in this city in more than a decade and a half. This was a pattern that was to re-occur in all the other areas that they liberated, for the highly disciplined NRM forces had been instilled with the ideology that they were the servants of the people. As if to highlight this point before the start of the northern campaign, Museveni cautioned his troops "to regard the people of northern Uganda as their parents, brothers and sisters [The [Kampala] Star 18th March 1986]." Soon after, Gulu, which was anticipated to be Gen. Bazilio Okello's "last stand" with close to 10,000 troops, fell in less than three hours. Those within the enemy ranks who did not surrender either fled with Okello into Sudan or hibernated amongst their relatives in the countryside [Mudoola, 1991, And Woodward, 1991]. The ability of the NRM to effect political order in a country that had become characterised by "every man [being] against every man" and life being "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short [Hobbes, 1981:185-6]", led London's The Guardian [30 th January, 1986] to conclude that its leaders had "exceptional organising ability".

3. Effecting governance in a fragmented polity:

The challenge that existed for the new leaders was that of effecting governance in a war ravaged, mismanaged country characterised by a fragmented polity. Since the NRM had waged its struggle in the name of uprooting a brutal predatory system, numerous administrative and institutional reforms were

introduced. An advantage that existed when the NRM assumed power was the overwhelming desire to reconstruct the country that existed within a wide spectrum of the population, mainly so within those social formations that constituted its coalitions, and also happened to be the most economically productive.

A day after Kampala's liberation, the NRM leadership elected a new executive at Lubiri barracks. Museveni was elected as its Chairman [Prof Lule had died in early 1985], with Dr. Kisseka and Alhaji Kigongo, becoming first and second Vice Chairmen respectively.

Unlike their predecessors, the NRM was a mass based movement which represented the interests of the social formations that constituted the majority in Uganda. Namely, the nascent national bourgeoisie and informal sector classes alongside an aligned intelligentsia and much more crucially the kulaks and rural peasantry who form the majority and produce the bulk of the country's economic surplus. As Low [1988:51] accurately observed, this "comprised as credible a composed majority as Uganda had ever seen."

In addition the NRM had evolved the political capacity to effect legitimate and orderly governance. The NRM's final arbiter was its High Command, composed of its senior political and military cadres. In existence also was [i] the NRC, whose membership represented the diverse political coalitions that constituted the NRM; [ii] the Army Council, whose membership was of senior NRA officers; its [iii] Secretariat, whose activities related mainly to popular mobilisation; and [iv] the National Executive Committee, this was formed latter, and it became part of the NRC. Membership in these organs tended to overlap and was composed of men and women whose political ideals had attained a broad commonality in the protracted people's war in as much as they had emerged from differing ethnic and class background [Njuba, 1991:210]. With the formation of a government of national unity [see below], the NRC was transformed into a national legislature and expanded to contain all the ministers in a national broad based cabinet. These represented all the legitimate diverse political interests in Uganda [Brett, 1995]. A further expansion occurred after democratic elections in 1989.

After his election, Museveni allayed the fears of internal and external political actors by refuting any suggestion of imposing a marxist political model or the exporting of Uganda's revolution to neighbouring countries. He also proposed the setting up of a government of national unity comprised of all legitimate political groups, on the basis that their leaders had no criminal record [ARB, February 15th, 1986:7949-51. And Watson, 1988:17]. Contacts were made or meetings held with all the main representatives of the political parties and groups, including the UPC, DP and CP's Muwanga, Ssewogerere and Mayanja-Nkanji respectively, which led to the forming of a "gentlemen's agreement" that suspended political party activities and laid the basis for the formation of a broad based government. This was to govern for an interim period of four years, in which a legitimate constitution was to be drafted and promulgated, after which elections were to be held. All the armed factions that had aligned themselves with the junta but had accepted the new order were also coopted into the NRA, after careful screening, and their leaders made part of government. In the process Uganda emerged with its largest ever cabinet.

The new leaders committed themselves to break with past political practices and effect fundamental changes in Uganda's governance. On this Museveni noted "it is our deliberate policy that we uplift the quality of politics in our country." At the same time he dismissed the view that Uganda's political problems were "insoluble" and argued that what had been missing was political integrity and effective organisation. Governance was to be guided by the NRM's highly debated and publicised Ten Point Programme [NRM, 1985], three of whose central tenets were [i] the restoration of democracy, [ii] the safeguarding of security of private property and person, and [iii] the building of a national and integrated self sustaining economy. The NRM viewed their role in effecting governance as one that had to lead to economic development, but for this to be achieved political order had to be restored, through democratic participation [Museveni, 1985:56].

A favourable international response emerged. For instance the US State Department indicated that it was "encouraged by the fact that the NRA appears to be disciplined and had restored order to those areas in Uganda that they controlled [ARB, 15 February, 1986:7951]." A similar view emerged from the IMF's representative in Uganda, Zia Ibrahim-Zadeh, who stated that "at last Western countries felt they could

put their money into Uganda with a sense of security [ARB 15 March, 1986:8117]."

To further ensure that social order was restored the government laid emphasis on assisting more than 300,000 Ugandan refugees who had fled to the Sudan and Zaire during the UPC 's reign of terror to return to their homes in West Nile. They were offered rehabilitation and developmental assistance. A similar policy was effected with around 500,000 internally displaced people mainly from the Luweero Triangle [Mugenyi, 1991:69].

So as to effect reconciliation and a means for securing justice from past misrule, a Human Rights Commission was established through Legal Notice No 5 of 1986. This was entrusted with the task of investigating the violations of human rights from the period ranging from Uganda's independence to the 25th of January 1986 when the NRM secured state power. Some of its main tasks involved the inquiring into these violations with the aim of recommending how their recurrence could be avoided. The Commission also had an educative function, as through the holding of country wide seminars it sensitized the population on human rights issues [Pirouet, 1991:202]. A further indication of the government's commitment to respect the human rights of its citizens was revealed with its signing the UN's Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in addition to the OAU's African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. This led AI [1986-89:2] to comment that "By its adherence to international treaties ... the [Ugandan] government has shown that it wishes to be judged by absolute standards."

However the Ugandan people also wanted the assurance that future human rights violations would be dealt with strictly by the law. To meet these expectations, the office of the Inspector General of Government [IGG] was established [Statute No 2 of 1988]. The IGG was accountable to the President, with functions that involved the continuous investigation of human rights abuses, and was empowered with the authority to issue search warrants and subpoena witnesses.

Because of the controversial manner in which the 1967 constitution had been introduced, the NRM opted

to draft a new and legitimate constitution for the country. Hence a Constitutional Commission headed by a High Court judge was created through the Uganda Constitutional Commission Statute. It was entrusted inter alia, with the task of sensitizing the public through country wide seminars on constitutional issues and ensuring that Ugandans were involved in the constitutional making process. This was to be achieved through the gathering of their views regarding the contents of the future constitution. Also, a Ministry of State for Constitutional Affairs was created to enhance this democratised, constitutional making process [Njuba, 1991, 214-15].

To ensure that the marginalised social formations that were behind the struggle for democratic transformation were empowered to effect their local governance, the RCs were given a legal basis with the passing of the Resistance Councils Statute of 1987. According to Brett, [1994:67], RCs provided "an almost ultra-democratic basis for local participation." These grassroots democratically elected and decentralised RCs replaced the highly centralised and collapsed local governance structures that the NRM inherited. Some of the functions of the RCs included the administration of justice, mobilising the population for developmental purposes, managing local revenue and maintaining law and order. In addition, they acted as crucial links between the grassroots and all levels of government. This in the process assisted with the curbing of corruption within local state structures, and the selecting of suited candidates for military service [Brett, 1991a. Burkey, 1991. Kasfir, 1991. And Nsibambi, 1991]. This cost effective, democratic local governance system strengthened the government's and state's capacity at every level within Uganda. The District Commissioner was replaced by a District Executive Secretary [DES], responsible for the local civil service, while above him was the District Administrator [DA] a political appointee, who represented the President within the district and was usually an NRM cadre.

Women constitute more than fifty percent of Uganda's population, produce sixty percent of its agricultural output and eighty percent of its food. Yet they had been historically marginalised. Based on this reality Museveni argued [1992:100] "we can not talk about democracy without involving women in the nation's governance." Hence at cabinet level a Ministry of Women in Development was created, with the aim of empowering and mobilising women socially and economically.

With the retirement of Dr Kisekka from active politics in 1994, a woman, Dr Specioza Kazibwe, was appointed as the country's Vice President. Given the fact that Uganda is predominately an agricultural country, moreover a sector dominated by women, a woman agricultural specialist was appointed as Minister for Agriculture. Within the NRC an elective seat in each district was reserved for women candidates. And at the NRM's Secretariat, a Directorate of Women's Affairs was set up headed by former magistrate and veteran guerrilla leader Janette Mukwaya. Its roles included community mobilisation and rehabilitation activities [Boyd, R, 1989:111]. At the local government level women were reserved an elective seat on the RCs with the position of Secretary for Gender emancipation. The extent of these institutional reforms in harmonising gender emancipation in the governance process made the Ugandan experience unique in Africa [Boyd, 1989:110].

In part Uganda's past instability had resulted from the failure to form a national consensus and identity, in addition to the monopolisation of the means of coercion by political cabals, who through a series of parochial or inept policies failed to domesticate the military [Brett, 1995. And Mudoola, 1988, 1989, and 1991. And Southall, R, 1972b]. The NRM leadership was determined to curb this trend. Consequently numerous administrative and legitimate institutional mechanisms were created.

On assuming power, the NRM enacted the ascetic and people centred NRA COC [Legal Notice No 1 of 1986]. This fundamentally changed Ugandan politics for the better [Khiddu-Makubuya, 1991:219]. The political will to enforce it was soon manifested when two NRA officers were arrested for armed robbery. In response, Museveni commented, "I am as happy as when we captured the Pakwach Bridge. The fact that we are arresting and punishing soldiers within our ranks is itself an healthy attitude. The past regimes never dared punish a soldier [The Star 18th March 1986]." In 1987 the Security Organisation Statute [Statute No. 10 of 1987], was passed. It placed the country's security agencies on a statutory basis for the first time in its history. This spelled out the extent of their powers. Further emphasis was placed on the creation of a professional army, this was manifest with the stressing of the respect for hierarchy, and the introduction of conventional ranks within the NRA in 1987 [hitherto it had been a guerrilla army]. An elaborate division of powers eliminated the prospects of a few individuals to mount a coup [The

Monitor September, 9-12, 1994]. Also the NRA, unlike its predecessors, had the institution of the Military Political Commissariat. This had an elaborate team of Military Political Commissars who provided the NRA's ideological basis. This situation was enabled by the legitimacy of its people-centred ideology within the NRM and in a broad cross section of society. Furthermore, countervailing mechanisms were created within civil society aimed at "dymstifying the gun" and democratising coercion. Hence political education programmes [mchaka-mchaka] that offered both the NRM's political ideology and basic military science were provided to all willing civilians. Bureaucrats were also targeted in these programmes, the aim being to cultivate a salariat, which could serve in the public's interests and desist from corrupt tendencies. In addition, a decentralised militia system, centred around Local Defence Units [LDUs], was established. This diffusion of the means of coercion also acted as a deterrence towards any would be bonapatists in the newly established military.

The restoration of most civil liberties led to the reemergence of a vibrant free print and electronic media. This played a crucial role in both exposing corruption in the civil service and amongst leading public figures, in addition to curbing the excesses of security personnel [Mudoola, 1991:237].

In addition a deliberate policy which encouraged members of the NRA to engage in political processes was effected. This manifested at two levels, first, the Army Council was empowered to elect ten of its members, into the NRC, and the Constituent Assembly [CA] respectively. The second level involved allowing serving NRA members to stand in the 1994 CA elections. Apart from enabling these freedom fighters the opportunity to partake in the making of their country's constitution, these policies also exposed them to the complexities involved in the managing of Uganda, which an illegitimate military regime would be in no position to fulfil. About 20 NRA officers and some NCO's stood for the CA, half of whom gained elective seats [The New Vision July 14, 1994]. Indeed most within the original NRA's ranks, including Museveni, regarded themselves as ordinary citizens who had been forced to take up arms to defend themselves from brutal predatory statism [The New Vision July 6, 1994].

4. Legitimising governance in a dislocated polity:

To legitimise the NRM governance programme, the people's mandate was sought through the 1989 local and NRC elections. However given Uganda's past historical experiences, a consensus between the contesting parties was reached which agreed to hold these elections within a context of political order.

The required rules of the game were openly discussed, and agreed upon prior to the elections [Kasfir, 1991. And Burkey, I, 1991]. In the process, the suspension of political parties was maintained, and willing candidates contested on their individual merit. Also the President was exempted from standing. The implication was that an NRM candidate was to be head of the executive regardless of the electoral outcome. Furthermore, a quarter of the new NRC legislators were to be automatic NRM members. These were the original 38 NRC members, while the President and the Army Council were to each appoint ten members [the latter members were elected by it]. In addition, a National Executive Committee which was dominated by NRM members was created within the NRC. In cases of national emergencies, it was deemed to be more powerful than the NRC. Also the Army Council was further empowered to have an equal say in the approving of the constitution, in addition to the removal and appointment of the President, and the declaration of a state of war. In sum regardless of the electoral outcome the NRM was to remain legally the dominant political force.

Once these measures had been agreed upon the government refrained from intervening in the electoral process, so as to allow it to be fair. The legitimacy of this exercise was indicated by the high voter turnout [Burkey, 1991. And Kasfir, N, 1991]. [The UPC leadership called for a boycott of these elections, however this was ignored by most of its notables. Many of whom won seats. The DP also did well [ARB 1989:9215]. However, up to 10 cabinet ministers and four deputy ministers in the broad based government lost their seats. The renewed mandate ensured that the NRM could look forward to tackling the delicate issues of Constitutional making and economic and political reform with added confidence.

5- The regional dimension:

The NRM had realised that the success of their governance programmes had to rely on the existence of cordial regional relations [NRM, 1985:70]. The new leadership indicated that they were willing to deal

with all countries, apart from Apartheid South Africa, so long as it served in Uganda's interests. Hence a meeting with four regional heads of states was held at Goma in Zaire, three days after they captured state power.

Uganda's political instability had a spill over potential [Mujaju, 1989:249]. However, the NRM's restoration of political order received a mixed regional reaction. Indeed it was Tanzania that more eagerly welcomed these changes, for none of its key interests were threatened, and moreover the new regime offered it peaceful regional and economic prospects.

The NRM's determination to stop the siphoning of Uganda's economic surplus by regional elites was the primary cause of its confrontations with Kenya's rulers. For instance the NRM decided to use railway transport to ferry Ugandan exports and imports to and from Mombasa. This saved Uganda \$ 55 million per annum, but denied the Kenyan political elites dominated road haulage business this lucrative trade [Watson, 1988:17]. Furthermore, Uganda's subsequent economic reforms [see below] ensured that most of its idle industrial capacity for basic consumables was utilised, which led to a drastic reduction in the importation of Kenyan goods. Similarly, the smuggling of Ugandan coffee, which between 1973-86 had involved Ugandan and Kenyan political elites and the CMB [Brett, 1994:72. And Southall, A, 1980], in addition to gold and other forms of wealth were curbed.

Faced with this grim reality, from mid 1986 the Kenyan political elites reacted by attempting to demonise and destabilise the NRM government. Hillary Ng'weno of the Nairobi's Weekly Review acted as a main ideologue in this campaign. He perpetually referred to the "communist" policies of the NRM and the failed "track record of Museveni's government [Throup, 1991:187 and 192]." Furthermore Nairobi arbitrarily closed their joint border in 1987, and stepped up its support of rebel movements opposed to the new administration.

Unlike their illegitimate predecessors, the NRM acted in a resolute and calculated manner towards these threats. Long and short term solutions were formulated to this situation. Hence from 1987 the Ugandan

state responded by diversifying its trade route through Tanzania. This involved the ferrying of its goods across Lake Victoria to the Tanzanian port of Musoma, from where they are transported to or from Tanga or Dar es Salaam [ARB, March 16th-April 15th 1993:11212. And Throup, 1991:189]. Also, its fuel storage capacity was expanded. However, at the height of this crisis, Kampala cut off its electricity supply to Kenya, which amounts to about 15 percent of its consumption, and politically mobilised the support of its population when faced with an armed threat from Nairobi and put the NRA on alert. Also it explored the prospects of external mediation to this conflict through the involving of Britain and an OAU initiative led by Zambia's Kaunda [ARB, December, 1986:8320].

In late 1987, Museveni and Moi met at their joint border to normalise their relations. After their talks the Ugandan leader used this opportunity to reiterate his domestic governance and regional policies: "I went to see...Moi to bring an end to the conflict...We have no problem on our side. Our job is to develop the country [ARB, 15 January, 1988:8720]."

Also the NRM sought for a solution with Rwanda in relation to the many Rwandese refugees and migrant labourers in Uganda, that the Kigali junta had refused re-entry. Some of these people, joined the NRM's struggle largely due to the victimisation they faced under Obote's regime [Nabudere, 1988:304-5. And Ingham, 1994]. With the NRM's coming to power, Kigali's intransigence led to their forming the Rwandese Patriotic Front [RPF], which jerked the French and Zairios backed ethnic cleansing junta from power, in 1994. However, this situation was far from being solved, indeed it had the potential to destabilise this region [BBC Monitor, August, 1995].

Relations with Sudan were also stormy, based, inter alia, on Khartoum's perception that the NRM was sympathetic to the insurgent Sudan's People Liberation Army [SPLA], led by Col. John Garang, and the example it had set of defeating an establishing state in the region [Woodward, 1991]. This situation was compounded by Sudan's Islamic fundamentalist regime's foreign policy of thriving on regional confrontation. Hence, Khartoum opted to pursue a concerted policy of supporting rebel movements opposed to the NRM. The latter's leaders in turn ostracised Sudan regionally and internationally.

However whenever the opportunity arose attempts were also made to iron out their differences [Woodward, 1991:182]. The policy of ostracisation was best manifest through Uganda's association with the Intergovernmental Agency for Drought and Development [IGADD], a regional body many of whose members were weary of Khartoum fundamentalist regime [ARB, February, 1st-28th 1995:11744-5]. This background offers a suited opportunity to discuss what proved to be the main stumbling block towards the NRM's attempts to effect legitimate and orderly governance, namely what was the rebel insurgency in eastern and northern Uganda.

The rebel insurgency: Any governance strategy involves winners and losers, more so if a radical reorientation is made with past policies. The contending forces in Uganda were on the one hand those forces that had thrived on brutal statist predation and on the other the democratic forces that were intent on creating an enabling state for the thriving of private capital within a decentralised democratic framework. Based on Uganda's past political economy, the political elites who controlled and benefitted from state predation were mostly from northern, and to a certain extent, the eastern parts of the country.

While mechanisms were being implemented to reconstruct the country's economic and political structures, based on the new order, an insurgency emerged in northern and eastern Uganda from August 1986. The groups that engaged in this armed confrontation had Kenyan and Sudanese support. They were mainly led by elites who had been part of the UPC and Amin's regimes [Watson, 1988:16. And Woodward, 1991:180-1].

The main groups to emerge at this stage were the Sudan and Kenya based Uganda Peoples Democratic Army [UPDA] and Uganda Peoples Army [UPA] respectively. The UPDA political head was Obote's former Prime Minister Ottema Allimadi, while with the UPA it was the his former Minister of State for Defence, Peter Otai. A number of other mainly Kenyan supported groups, led by similar elites, also came to the fore [Watson, 1988:16], as for instance, the bizarrely named Force Obote Back Again [FOBA]. It was the UPDA that emerged as the most organised of these groups, with more than 5000 men at its

disposal. Meanwhile the eastern based groups were characterised by leadership wrangles and factionalism. Based on their quest to hinder the introduction of democratic governance these groups targeted the democratically elected RC members. This alienated them from large sections of the population who had participated in the electoral processes.

The NRM responded to these threats in two broad ways, armed action and negotiations. To safeguard the stability of the country, the state's immediate response was one of confronting the rebels, and in December 1986, the UPDA which had infiltrated from Sudan, suffered heavy casualties at the battle of Corner Kilak, Gulu district [Museveni, 1992. And Woodward, 1991:181].

Concurrently, the NRM empowered two cabinet members from northern and eastern Uganda who were appointed as Ministers for the Pacification of the North, and East, Ms. Betty Bigombe, and Atteker Ejallu respectively, to initiate negotiations with the rebels. Bigombe was based in Gulu so as to effectively coordinate her efforts. In January 1987 the government issued an unilateral amnesty, based on a three month period, and extended it further in March. It forgave the rebels on condition that they surrendered voluntarily and if they had not themselves engaged in "murder, rape, genocide and kidnap[ping] with intent to murder [ARB, September, 1987:8608]." These calculated political moves led to the UPDA's splitting right up the middle. For while its political heads, cushioned in the comforts of London, Nairobi or Khartoum, rejected to negotiate, its military wing accepted the Olive branch. Indeed, when its military commander Brig Odong Latek opted to be loyal to his political superiors, he was fired by his officers. Consequently, Col. Angelo Okello was appointed as its new military chief. He subsequently stated: "We shall continue with peace negotiations. We see nothing to deter us from peace...[as] a man in the field... has better judgement than a person viewing the situation from a distance [ARB, 15 June 1987:8892]."

The NRM's seriousness in resolving this armed conflict through dialogue, was further revealed when one of its most respected military commanders, and the then head of Combat Operations, Maj Gen. Salim Saleh, became part of the negotiating team that included inter alia, Betty Bigombe and Col. Pecos Kutesa, the head of the 4th division based in Gulu. These negotiations culminated into the signing of the Gulu

Peace Accord, in mid 1988, by Museveni and Col. Okello. Up to 2000 of the insurgents surrendered, some of whom were integrated into the NRA after careful screening, while captured rebels were released. Also suitable UPDA leaders were integrated into the broad based government, with Charles Alai becoming a Deputy Minister [The New Vision September, 12, 1994]. That same year, the UPA's military commander, Jesus Ojirot, surrendered after a political settlement, at Wera in eastern Uganda along with 3000 men [ARB, 15 June:8893].

These gains aimed at national reconciliation, were negated by the emergence of a splinter group, The Holy Spirit Movement [HSM] controlled by UPC elites through a semi illiterate prophetess, Alice Lakwena. It mobilised the support of the peasantry in a bizarre form of Christian fundamentalism, on which it claimed it aimed to base the country's future governance [Behrend, 1991]. The HSM was defeated in early 1988, with local RC support in a battle near Jinja. Museveni co-ordinated the NRA forces in this operation.

Although the wounded Lakwena fled to Kenya, another foreign dimension assisted in prolonging the insurgency. This was manifest in the form of Sudanese support for another Christian fundamentalist group, The Lords Resistance Army [LRA], led by Joseph Kony, which curiously also engaged itself in slave trading, instigated by Sudanese Arab merchants.

However legitimate order had been restored in all parts of Uganda by 1991. Indeed RC and NRC elections which had been temporary postponed in Gulu district, were held a few months later in October 1989 [New Vision 14th and 17 th October. And Kasfir, 1991:260].

The civil war affected the NRM's attempts to effect legitimate governance. In terms of human resources alone, thousands were displaced, while more than 10,000 people were killed [Watson, 1988]. Social infrastructure was destroyed, while military expenditure for the year 1987/88 amounted to 36.6 of the budget [Throup, 1991 :188]. This resulted in a sharp budget deficit, and an increased accumulation of external payments. Inflation increased by 240 per cent, while public sector investment stagnated at best

[Mugenyi, 1991:60-70]. Also, the conflict led to the NRA's being expanded by five times to up to 100,000 soldiers. In the process, many of the NRM's most dedicated cadres were tied to the war effort, while the image of the NRA was affected when some of its members committing atrocities at Makura in eastern Uganda. However, the new government illustrated its worth when Maj Gen. Saleh, on behalf of the NRA, broadcasted a public apology on state radio. Measures to Court Martial the concerned troops were also publicised. These included the arresting of 14 soldiers, including a Major and Captain [Pirouet, 1991:205].

7.The economic dimension of the NRM's governance:

At independence, Uganda inherited a marginal position within the IPE. A situation that was compounded by its post colonial governance experience, moreover within a context of the broader SSA economic crisis. This led to the NRM's governance policies being subjected to the influence of IFIs conditionalities. By 1986, Ugandans had acquired through their own struggles, the ideological and organisational capacity to curb brutal statist predation. However donor intervention was still necessary, in as much as it actually complemented an already underway process.

Initially, the NRM had viewed the SAPs under Obote 11 and elsewhere in Africa as failures. This thinking had been influenced by their philosophy of self reliance which had evolved during the people's war. The left within the NRM was of the view that the predatory state could be reformed, through imposing controls on corrupt officials and the application of suited political supervision. This tendency misjudged the task at hand and the level of public outcry. Meanwhile, the upsurge of rebel activity in August 1986 and the negative multiplier effects it had on the economy made the political situation more precarious. Concurrently, the IMF's ability to effect cross conditionality ensured that Uganda could not be accessed to international finance without accepting the SAPs [Mugenyi, 1991:71].

This created a debate within the NRM, which was resolved with the formulation of a consensus that accepted the SAPs on condition that, unlike with Obote 11's unquestioning imposition, they were to be carefully negotiated, so as to maximise the benefits that were in accordance to their own governance policies. These aimed at expanding the country's economic base at sustaining levels, through the

rewarding of economic production, so as to consolidate the peace. Consequently, an undertaking to eliminate the predatory state machinery permeated government circles [see Tarehe Sita September-October 1988]. This view had the full backing of the urban entrepreneurial and rural agricultural producing classes who constituted a majority within the ruling coalition.

Whilst, the leadership of the UPC in the 1960's located itself within the governing bureaucracy, to in order to extract the country's surplus, Amin's brutal predatory soldierly plundered the country through the "economic war", which in essence is what again transpired under Obote II. However, within the NRM leadership, many identified with and engaged in economically productive activities, and a gradual pattern of some of these leaders emerged of their resigning either from active politics or the NRA to engage in private economic production. [see The Monitor 11- 15 March 1994]. Also many of the former guerrillas from the Luweero Triangle, opted to return to their farms]. Given the nature of Uganda's political economy, the predatory class character of their economically unproductive predecessors had led to inevitable brutality and disorder. In turn, the new political stability directly related to the new class relations fostered by the ruling class that promoted and rewarded economic production which could only thrive under stable conditions. Also the new leadership was determined to tame the predatory state, and create one that enabled the flourishing of private capital.

Following donor funding in 1987, policies were pursued that aimed at the curbing of the predatory state through the liberalisation of the public sector and relentless fight against corruption. Furthermore they rewarded the producing classes, namely the rural majority and the entrepreneurial and industrial classes. They also repaired and improved social infrastructure alongside stabilizing the economy at the macro level.

Furthermore, a deliberate attempt was made by the NRM to cultivate cordial relations with the main Western donors. The aim was to extract the most favourable terms from them. For instance after a visit to Britain in 1989, Museveni stated, "Relations between Uganda and Britain are very friendly...They have been very supportive in multilateral forums like the WB and the IMF [The New Vision July 12 1989]." However, in line with their foreign policy, Kampala diversified its international economic relations. This

also involved the maintaining of good relations with Libya [much to Kenya's and the West annoyance], which after a highly visible visit by Muammar Gaddafi in 1987, sold Uganda crude oil and offered it loans at extremely favourable rates [Throup, 1991:188 and 193].

At home numerous reforms were enforced. In 1987 new administrative teams were appointed at the Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning [these were later combined]; and a co-ordinated approach became the norm in the subsequent negotiations with the IFIs [Mugenyi, 1991:70].

In 1988 the government decided to privatise loss making parastatals and to liberalise the monopolistic and corrupt marketing boards. By 1986 coffee accounted for about 90 percent of the foreign exchange revenue. Prior these reforms, this industry was about to collapse, based on the CMB's suffocating hegemonic role, as well as continued smuggling by CMB officials, and local and Kenyan politicians. Other contributory factors were excessive costs being imposed by the bureaucratic CMB [it had more than 2000 employees and offices in Kenya, Tanzania, New York and London], irrational pricing, taxes on exports, as well as an overvalued Ug Shs. In response the farmers "neglected or uprooted their trees, and failed to harvest much of their crop [Brett, 1994:72]."

After numerous studies, the CMB was converted into an independent state owned company. Initially, four leading co-op unions were allowed to have exporting licences. With donor support they combined to form an exporting authority, Unex. Sustained domestic pressure led to the granting of similar licences to private processors, some of whom went into partnership with international importers. These measures were effected amidst stiff opposition from the CMB and NRC legislators who represented similar interests. Consequently, the CMB's coffee export share declined from more than 80 to around 30 percent, with Unex taking up 15 per cent and the private processors the rest [Uganda Coffee Authority, January-March 1993]. This should be viewed in light of the fact that while the more competitive Unex had a staff of 30, the CMB employed 500 at its head office. Consequently, Brett [1994:73] observed that: "competition has revolutionised services, leading to purchases being done every day of the week with immediate cash payments... The virtual elimination of export and foreign exchange taxes means that farmers are being

left with a larger share of the final price. Local output appears to be responding strongly to these incentives, and coffee produced in border areas of Zaire and Tanzania is now being smuggled into Uganda."

Moreover, this upsurge in rural economic activity took place under depressed world markets especially after the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989. For while in 1986 Uganda had earned around \$ 400 million from coffee, in 1990 it received only \$ 100 million, moreover at a time when the early 1990's Gulf War had drastically increased oil prices. All the same, the producers reacted positively to the reforms to the extent that in the 1994 season Uganda produced 3.01 million bags of coffee, up from the 2.36 million of the 1992 season [ARB, April 16th-May 15th 1993:11249. And March 16th-April 15th 1995:121100].

Without mechanisms for democratic accountability, the co-ops had turned into cabals for enriching a few controlling kulaks alongside their political and salariat patrons. Under the NRM this political support evaporated, and corrective measures were instituted. Brett [1991a:55], aptly captured the situation that followed: "the Manager of Masaka Union was jailed for theft in 1987, the East Mengo Union was suspended after a major investigation, the Busoga Union has been cut off by its bankers, rejected a restructuring proposal provided by the Co-operative Alliance and is attempting to sell off its assets to repay its debts." Also the Co-operative Act was amended to allow the co-ops to operate independently from the government. However, unlike in the 1960's when a similar policy had led to corruption with impunity, in the new dispensation a repetition of this pattern was bound to lead not only to legal action, but also to the liquidation of the concerned near bankrupt co-ops [ARB, February 16th- March 15th 1993].

The cotton growing industry and the Lint Marketing Board [LMB] had literally collapsed by 1986 due to gross mismanagement, civil disorder and low world prices. The LMB was accordingly privatised. In its place, a regulatory Uganda Lint Authority [ULA] was created, with the internal marketing of cotton being left to the private sector. As a result, production rose from 7,400 tonnes in the season 1986/87, to 11,000 tonnes in the season 1991/92 after the reforms. The problem identified by the concerned Minister,

was the absence of the required entrepreneurial capacity, in northern and eastern Uganda [where cotton is mainly grown] to fill the space vacated by the LMB [ARB, April 16th- May 15th 1993:11249].

The NRM leaders were aware that in part Uganda's past instability had resulted from the marginalisation of the north and eastern parts of the country by the colonial and their inept predecessors. Hence a deliberate effort was made to reverse this trend. This was manifested with the introduction of the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme [NURP], and the Karamoja Development Programme [KDP]. Donors were willing to fund these projects and a participatory approach was involved in their implementation. The efficacy of these measures were well illustrated when Minister Alai, a former UPDA leader, commented that the NURP "has been very successful [The Monitor January 8th to 15th 1993]."

The viability of all the above policies overwhelmingly depended on the utilisation of the legitimate local governance structures for the mobilisation of the people and the transmitting of the required information to and from the grassroots to the government, based on the RC system. More broadly, the curbing of the predatory salariat was in part enforced through mass dismissals of the culprits. Public debate in the NRC and other forums were initiated. This created the required consensus within the broad based government and the public at large. Indeed some of the key architects and implementors of these reforms were former prominent members of civil society such as the CP head and the newly appointed Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Mayanja-Nkanji and a prominent Kampala accountant turned Minister of Public Service Sam Sabagereka. After careful screening the dismissal exercise was effected so as to curb "gross mismanagement of public funds, embezzlements, negligence and incompetence" within the public service [The New Vision June 23 1989]. The aim of this exercise was to create a leaner and more efficient civil service. The IGG was also empowered to combat corruption in public office and the civil service, while Public Accounts Committees [PAC] in the NRC was formed for a similar function.

To enable economic growth at the micro level, the government rehabilitated and created social infrastructure. For instance, between 1986/9, 2,411 km of gravel and 850 Kms of tarmac roads respectively were repaired, while by 1993 a further 562 Kms of newly bitumized roads were created [ARB

January 16th- February 15th 1993:11130. And Museveni 1992:54]. Also a viable tele-communications system was established in all the main urban areas, and the Owen falls dam was restored to its full power generating capacity, with a further 60 MW being added. Moreover, with the building of a new HEP dam before 2000, Uganda's power generating capacity is to be more than doubled!

This situation, enabled the diversification of the country's economic base with, industrialisation growing by 15 per cent in 1994 [see below], and the exports of goods and services by 37 per cent [ARB, June 16th- July 15th, 1994:11757]. Furthermore, the production and export of cereals and horticultural produce drastically improved [Uganda Economic Association Publication 1993. And Museveni, 1992:84]. Political stability resulted in an upsurge in tourism, leading the concerned Minister to note that this sector was bound to become the main foreign exchange earner for the country by 2000 [ARB, March 16th- April 15th 1993:11222].

These trends were enabled by the NRM's ability to curb inflation from the tune of 240 percent in 1986, to 1.1 before rising to 8.8 per cent in 1993. This stabilised the economy, leading an economic observer to argue that as a result, peoples' expectations will also change and their income generating, consumption and investment behaviour will be revised [Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1994]. Meanwhile, the government also stressed the need to create a viable and sustaining economic base, and issued penalties and incentives which cajoled a dominant section of the commercial class that had thrived on scarcity and state contacts to engage in economic production. These incentives [Museveni, 1992], in addition, to the overall policies and political stability led the capitalist sector to invest more in manufacturing, the most prominent of these being the returned and older established wealthy Houses of Madhivani and Metha, in addition to the more recently emerged Mulwana, and Sembule Investments amongst others.

Based on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government the country's internal revenue collection rose from a mere 4 per cent of GDP in 1986 to 10 per cent in 1992 [Museveni, 1992 :119]. The WB's good governance report, blamed the persistence of the economic crisis in SSA, to bureaucratic perversion that

led to economic irrationalities in these countries, which in turn discouraged foreign investment. Based on the Ugandan experience, the NRM's policies took every effort to eradicate and hinder the reoccurrence of this situation in Uganda. In order to encourage foreign investment, rewarding investment laws were instituted, and the Uganda Investment Authority [UIA] was created for the former purpose in 1992. Indeed by 1994, the UIA had registered 970 new enterprises. While the Ugandan leadership, deliberately used every opportunity to encourage foreign investment into the country [The Monitor November, 18-21, 1994]. The marked improvements in the Ugandan economy also contributed to an upsurge in interest amongst Uganda's former East African Community [EAC] members [Kenya and Tanzania], to resuscitate this regional integrating body [Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1994:5]. A situation that was bound to augur well economically for all involved.

8. The creation of a legitimate constitutional order:

The main pillars along which the NRM had galvanised popular support were the need to stop state instigated violence, rehabilitate and create a self sustaining economy, and to introduce a legitimate and homegrown constitutional order [NRM Ten Point Programme]. Attempts had been made to facilitate the first two. However by 1989, the numerous constraints that had been encountered, hindered the effecting of the third issue. Political order was required to ensure that a new constitutional order was arranged, so that fresh Presidential and Legislative elections could be held. Consequently, the newly elected NRC voted to issue an extended mandate of another five years to the NRM led broad based government so as to enable the making of a new constitution.

In 1989 a Constitutional Commission was created, headed by a High Court Judge, Justice Ben Odoki. It comprised of 21 members representing the various political formations and interests groups in society. Through the RCs they visited every parish in Uganda where they held seminars sensitizing people on constitutional matters, prompting debate and collected their opinions. In the process, about 20,000 written memoranda were collected. On this process an observer commented "Arguably no other country, whether in Africa or elsewhere, has ever made such an ambitious attempt to consult its people about the form which their constitution should take [Cullimore , 1994:711]." The aim of this process was to create a

legitimate constitutional order based on national consensus so as to sustain the peace.

By December 1992 the Draft Constitution was completed. In March 1994 CA elections were held to elect the body that was to debate and pass the draft constitution. Although people stood again as individuals and not along party political lines, there were 1,122 candidates an average of five per constituency and the voters knew their various political inclinations. Voter turn out ranged from 70 to 80 per cent and the process was carried out in an even manner [Cullinmore, 1994:710. And Watson, 1994:24-6]. NRM supporters won 150 of the 214 elective seats, although 5 senior cabinet Ministers failed to secure seats. In addition 26 seats were reserved for special interest groups including political parties, the NRA and Trade Unions. An additional 38 elective seats were reserved for women [one per district], and the President was empowered to appoint 10 members with differing backgrounds and experiences. The new constitution was envisaged to be finalised in 1995 and this was to be followed by the holding of general elections.

One should add here that so as to consolidate social harmony and stability, the NRM amended the 1967 constitution to respect the right to culture [this did not exist since 1967]. Consequently traditional leaders were restored provided that they were legitimate and confined their activities to cultural matters. To consolidate the reconciliation process, the military vacated Buganda's cultural shrines that had been expropriated in 1966. The four traditional institutions that qualified under this status were of Buganda, Bunyoro, Tooro and Busoga. However due to the more delicate political situation amongst the Ankole people [their rulers were based on a rigidified caste system], a consensus amongst the concerned parties not to officially recognise the Omugabe was reached. Although this view was not well received in some quarters, the opinion of this thesis is that in line with the aim to promote social cohesion this was the best compromise, bearing in mind the Hutu-Tutsi strife in Burundi and Rwanda.

CONCLUSION.

It was argued at the beginning of this thesis that the reform of CGG met many of the demands that were required to enable orderly governance in Uganda at the time, as it fulfilled the main political and economic demands of the petty bourgeoisie and society in general. It was also argued that CGG undermined the nationalist movement that had been co-ordinated through the efforts of the Bataka Party, the UAFU and the UNC. Coupled with colonial state coercion, it eventually became incoherent even before independence [Mamdani, 1976. And Nabudere, 1980].

Given this reality, the timing of Uganda's independence was largely influenced by foreign policy dimensions [Wrigley, 1988]. At a time when Creech Jones's "responsible Africans" had consolidated politically. However, independence was granted to a disunited ruling class, shaped by unequal regional development, and with semi autonomous local governance structures that nurtured ethnic chauvinism. This study illustrates that the first post colonial government, under the UPC-KY coalition, was formed by political movements that had emerged mere months before this great event, for the simple purpose of assuming state power. This explains precisely why their political programme and coalition emerged as being oppor-tunistic and expedient and indeed mutually antagonistic.

The 1962 constitution was a reflection of the needs of the UPC-KY alliance, and the acquiescence of the departing colonial power. The DP [arguably then the party with the most popular support] was constitutionally made a loser. This precedent did not augur well for the future governance of Uganda.

The wide political and economic redistribution in the 1962-66 period enabled orderly governance. As the autonomous and broadly democratic local government structures fulfilled most of the aspirations of the local population and their elites [Barongo, 1989. Karugire, 1980. And Nsibambi, 1993]. A similar purpose was served through the economic governance policies which also benefitted the entire petty bourgeoisie [Mamdani, 1976]. Apart from the inherited political economy, the subsequent failure to create class unity may be ascribed to these rulers inability to respect and improvise upon the required institutional framework to mediate their differences, and in the process nurture a culture of toleration and mutually

reinforcing national identity. Consequently, in 1964 the radical youth and labour movement were banned. That same year, at the Gulu Conference, the UPC's radical section was also marginalised through gross electoral irregularities. This led to the consolidation of the petty bourgeoisie proper, within this party, under Ibingira and Mutesa. Their ability by the end of 1965 to form coalitions, that were tipped to oust Obote constitutionally from power in early 1966, led to the latter's applying coercion to remain in power.

From mid 1966, legitimate governance in Uganda, as defined in this study ceased. Moreover, Dr Obote also had a parochial vindictive agenda towards his mainly Baganda protagonists. This reflected in his subsequent policies, and compounded the governance crisis. Hence the regime's banning the people's right to culture alongside their traditional leaders, and its abrogating the country's constitution. In the process, the people's values and expectations were trampled upon, which led to what I referred to earlier as a legitimacy deficit.

The ruling clique's ability to stay in power was pegged on its dependence on the salariat and its coercive arm. In the process they became its prisoner. As their policies had to appease these unproductive formations, usually at the expense of the other more economically productive social groups. The effect was inherently destabilising. In addition this consolidated the emergence of brutal predatory statism.

Being a minority that lacked legitimacy, regime survival was henceforth tied to power centralisation. Hence the 1967 constitution vested most of the powers in government in the State President, while the Local Administration Act of 1967 centralised nearly all the residual powers of the local governance structures in the central government. Similarly, within the UPC, most powers were vested in its President. In all instances democratic mechanisms were eroded. Political intolerance became policy, with independent political organisation outside the UPC being banned and the opposing leadership imprisoned, and civil society being deliberately disrupted.

Of critical importance, is the fact that the regime's ineptness enabled Amin to effect a parallel centralisation of power within the military. This played a crucial factor in enabling the 1971 coup.

Without a viable social base and with the confidence of a sleep walker, these rulers went on to antagonise a series of foreign actors whose commonality became the quest to remove Obote from office. His incapacities made this easy work.

The 1971 coup can not be discussed without looking at the nature of the military that effected it. As a colonial creation it was permeated with a subjugating ideology in addition to being sectional. Moreover, the post colonial regime consolidated these policies to suit its objectives. Indeed the eroding the military's accountability to parliament alongside its professionalism enabled Amin to acquire the capacity to topple his mentor, given the illegality that the regime experienced.

This was not a corporatist coup [Southall, 1972b], and its success resulted from the narrow social base the regime enjoyed, coupled with Amin's disproportionate influence and powers within the military, and his ability to translate the regime's domestic and foreign unpopularity to his advantage. However the immediate cause of this event was his aim to save his skin [Martin, D, 1974]. The nature of this coup enabled Amin the capacity to institute personal rule [Mamdani, 1976 :293]. In the process Parliament and the DC's were banned. The military was purged of its leading officers, and in turn, pro Amin NCO's were rapidly promoted [these were also perpetually purged]. As it was argued, in chapter three, these policies suffocated whatever professionalism that had survived the UPC reign within the military. None the less, military cronies were appointed to run the local governance structures which they transformed into fiefdoms for instigating terror and personal aggrandizement. Hence broadening the inherited political crisis.

In the 1971-72 period, policies were instituted that attempted to appease those internal and domestic forces that were required to maintain the regime in power. Domestically this translated into an escalation of military expenditure and the expelling of the Asians in 1972. The main aim of the latter was to expand the economic base of Amin's core supporters who hitherto had mainly a lumpen or peasant class character [the numerous Nubian NCO-turned-officers for instance] many of whom were mercenaries from Sudan

and Zaire. The salariat and the petty bourgeoisie also benefited. The contradiction that arose was that Amin's intention to maintain personal rule hindered the consolidation of a viable commercial class, and in turn created political instability.

The junta's opponents obtaining sanctuary in neighbouring countries, inflated its paranoia and state instigated terror. Another crucial FP occurrence that coincided with the coup, was the first "Oil Shock". Given the ruling's cliques ineptness and predatory nature, Uganda was further marginalised within the IPE, which in turn broadened its political instability. The role of regional, most notably Kenyan, elites from the mid 1970's in the expropriation of Uganda's resources has also to be taken into account [Brett, 1991a. And Southall, A, 1980]. By 1975 the junta had squandered whatever claim to legitimacy it may have had. However, a global economic dimension, in form of the 1976 "Coffee boom" extended its lease on life [Southall, A,1980].

Under the junta, the state's centralised structures became instruments for subjugation and expropriation. This collapsed the social contract between it and civil society and led to the population's devising a capacity to survive through the informal economy [Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1992a and 1992b. Brett, 1991a, 1991b, 1994. And Tandon, 1990]. A micro level revolution occurred that in turn weakened this predatory state, and contributed to its demise through the contradictions that led to its invading Tanzania in 1978.

The attempt to define governance in the post junta era relates mainly to the UPC's controversial return to power. This study argues that for effective and sustainable governance to exist, the leadership should represent broad class interests, and should have the political capacity to achieve their governance objectives. However, the UPC rulers were a predatory cabal that represented narrow particularistic interests. Indeed, they lacked the required organisational capacity to effect any meaningful governance, moreover when the UPC was not organically linked to any broad social formations. At this crucial moment, it acted merely as an empty shell for the dishing out of patronage [Mudoola, 1988].

It was argued that for legitimate governance to exist the subordinate social groups should be in the position to express their consent for the political system [Beethem, 1991:12]. However, the UPC's rigged the 1980 elections which negated the legitimation of its reign. Moreover these rulers, cynical view of the management of Uganda [Appendix vi] contributed to their inability to formulate a widely acceptable political settle-ment, and this further compounded the governance crisis.

The UPC's economic policies were now influenced by the SAPs, which they readily imposed on the population. In practice this led to the ruling cabals's expropriating the country's resou-rces in concert with a small Asian dominated section of the Ugandan commercial class and Kenyan elites [Jamal, 1991. Mugenyi, 1991. And Sathyamurthy, 1986]. The state's function resembled that which had pertained under Amin's rule, leading to Uganda's further marginalisation in the IPE. The resultant misrule at both the local and central government levels, abated the political coalitions that rallied within the NRM to successfully resist this brutal predatory statism.

It should be added her that whilst, in their first reign the UPC elites lost political power for having untactfully antagonised both their internal opponents and an influential section within the IPE, in the 1980's their rule was terminated due to their having had further marginalised the former, while attempting to appease the latter.

In defining governance under the NRM, one should appreciate the class character of its core membership, which was sufficiently coherent and had a legitimate and carefully tailored political programme. It was dominated by economically productive social formations, including the nascent national bourgeoisie. These had been marginalised by the various post colonial regimes. In the struggle against state instigated violence and plunder, they evolved a political programme that laid a high premium on promoting political integrity and legitimacy. To achieve these objectives, the rational management of society, which would eradicate the state's terror and predatory instincts, was called for. This was in addition to its politically empowering its support base through the democratisation of society [NRM Ten Point Programme].

WB's good government agenda [WB,1989], complimented the NRM's homegrown domestic programme. This conditioned a cordial relationship between Kampala, the West and the IFIs. This, moreover, occurred when the needed political capacity had been painfully nurtured by Ugandans through their struggles, to effect the required governance.

Politically their policies led to the establishment of a broad based government. This included all political actors with legitimate claims, the creation of the democratic part-icipatory RC local governance structures, and the initiation of a homegrown constitution. This involved popular participation to secure its legitimacy, along with the establishment of a viable constitutional order which explicitly defined the role of government and the state in addition to respecting the rights of civil society. Meanwhile, the rule of law was meticulously enforced, and for the first time in Ugandan history, successful elections, [albeit being conducted on a limited non party basis], that were not tinted by controversy were held in 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1993, to legitimise the political processes.

Much of Uganda's post colonial instability had resulted from applying the military for parochial political objectives. In the process, it had run out of control. Under the NRM, successful attempts to create a professional army and to domesticate it were enforced. These included, enforcing the respect for hierarchy, within this institution and the "dymstification of the gun", that led to the democratising of coercion within the population.

The economic aspects of the NRM's governance programme encompassed radical macro level policies that were aimed at eradicating state predation. In turn, a state that enabled private economic activity, was created. This benefited a broad array of Ugandan productive forces, ranging from industrialists, bankers, the commercial and indeed the agricultural producing classes, who produced the bulk of the country's surplus value [Brett, 1991a, 1991b and 1994].

In sum, this study illustrates that Ugandans have the capacity to effect legitimate governance. Through their struggles they have managed to create a political movement that represents a broad based coalition.

They also created a viable state that enabled the private accumulation of capital. Indeed the efficacy of their government and state was illustrated through their ability to institute the rule of law and maintain law and order within the country's territorial confines. Of crucial importance, I illustrated that this state also effectively protected the interests of its ruling class from uncalled for foreign intrusions.

This study disassociates itself with the view that Uganda was predestined to be marginalised in the IPE. The argument is that it was through the inherited governance policies, or more appropriately the lack of them [as I illustrate with the early post colonial period], that one should trace the predicament that came to characterise this country.

Similarly, given the class character of the new leadership and its broader class relations with the population, it was not accidental that: "Uganda [gradually turned into] ... a haven of peace, democracy, and prosperity in a region where other countries might still be dominated by civil conflict and economic crisis [Brett, 1994]." The point is that it was the homegrown creation of the required internal mechanisms for legitimate governance that explained Uganda's steady climb from the very margins of the IPE. This was illustrated by the fact that, in the 1986- 1994 period, Uganda's GDP grew at an average of 5 percent, while in the fiscal year of 1994-95 it achieved a 10 per cent mark [ARB, 16 th July- August 13 th 1995].

Concerning the future, the issue at stake is of ensuring consolidation and sustainability. This study illustrates the close relationship that has existed between Uganda's foreign and governance policies. Hence its leadership should deliberately ensure that these two dimensions of their policies compliment each other. Politically there should be the institutionalisation of a democratic culture that nurtures toleration through the respecting of unity in diversity, in addition to the valuing of political integrity and the rational management of society. Economically this should minimise the plundering of Uganda's resources. And emphasis should be laid on the frugal management of its resources and the expanding it's economic base through rewarding economic production and the state's enhanced facilitation of capacity building within the population.

This should be the medium through which an integrated self sustaining economy would be created, based initially on agro based industrialisation. This would consolidate both the national bourgeoisie and middle classes, that are necessary for sustained political stability and economic growth. Policies that minimises the gross regional economic inequalities, which so threaten orderly governance should be encouraged. Also policies that facilitate broad political and economic redistribution [within a developmental context], should be institutionalised. For as this study illustrates, in Uganda, there has been a direct co-relation between the nature of its political and economic redistribution ie its governance, and political order. Consequently, a well managed growing and broad economic base should enable orderly and legitimate governance.

APPENDIX 1

But the Kingdom of [B]Uganda is a fairly tale, you climb up a railway instead of a beanstalk, and at the end there is a different new world. The scenery is different, the climate is different, the vegetation is different, and, most of all the people are different from anything from the whole range of Africa. Instead of the breezy uplands we enter a tropical garden. In the place of naked savages, clashing their spears in chorus to their tribal chief, a complete and elaborate polity is presented. Under a dynastic King, with a Parliament [the Lukiiko], and a powerful feudal system, an amiable, clothed, polite and intelligent race dwells together in an organised monarchy upon the rich domain between the Victoria and Albert Lakes. More than two hundred thousand natives are able to read and write... There is a Court, there are Regents and Ministers and nobles, there is a regular system of native laws and tribunals; there is discipline, there is industry, there is culture, there is peace. In fact I ask myself whether there is any other spot in the whole earth where the dreams and hopes of the negrophile, so often mocked by naked and stubborn facts, have ever attained such happy realisation.

Winston Churchill [1908]

APPENDIX II

The hierarchial order of the Bataka, Bakungu and the Resistance Committees [RCs]. The Kabaka was also the Sabataka.

Kabaka	Sabataka	NRC*
[The Bakungu]	[The Bataka]	
Katikiro	Omukulu we Ekiika	RC V And DRC
Owe Saza	Omukulu we Essiga	RC IV
Owe Gombolola	Omukulu we Omutuba	RC III
Owo Muluka	Omukulu we Olunyiriri	RC II
Omutongole	Omukulu we Enda	RC I

***The Bataka and Bakungu patterns of governance originated from pre-colonial Buganda. However the democratically Resistance Committees, were their adaptation that were moulded in the Luweero Triangle during the NRM's led Protracted Peoples War [1981-86].**

Abbreviations. National Resistance Council [NRC]

District Resistance Council [DRC]

Resistance Committee [RC].

APPENDIX III

"I shall be highly obliged if you allow me space... to express the feelings of young enlightened Semi-Hamites and Nilotes about some of the aims of the Congress. Not long ago, Mr. Fenner Brockway, M.P. came to Uganda and concentrated his activities in and around Kampala. He returned to England and gave his version of the "Unification of all Tribes in Uganda"... his version ... is a direct negation of the established traditions of the Semi-Hamites and the Norsemen [Nilotes] and ... we are worried about it. It will, therefore be of great interest to us if the Uganda National Congress will point out exactly what they mean by the "Unification of all Tribes in Uganda"... Cooperation with the Government is also recommended but we Semi-Hamites and Norsemen of Uganda who have had no educational opportunity as the rest of Uganda, feel that the Congress is aiming at "Self-Government in Uganda," is hastening and thereby leaving us behind. Because of our present inability to aim so high... it must be pointed out to the Congress here and now that with us, the question of questions lies in education and rapid development of African Local Governments ... the height of folly [on the Congress's part] is the apparent omission .. of a definite aim to the slogan of "immediate Local Self-Government in Uganda."

A letter from the Uganda Herald 24th April 1952, written by A. Milton Obote. Source [Karugire, 1980:150].

APPENDIX IV

Memorandum by the elders of Ankole to President Amin Dada, on the Restoration of the Kingdoms.

"We, the representatives of the elders of Ankole gathered in Mbarara on Monday 23rd August, 1971 wish to congratulate Your Excellency and men of the Uganda Armed Forces on the manner in which Your Excellency has conducted the affairs of this country since you assumed its leadership as President of the Second Republic of Uganda.

"The people of Ankole, and indeed the whole of Uganda look forward to your continued leadership so that this country may take its proper place among other progressive and peaceful nations of the world.

"Your Excellency, permit us also to take this opportunity on behalf of the people of Ankole to thank you for the honour you did us and the love you showed us by visiting our District only a few days ago. Your visit which had been long and anxiously awaited was hailed by thousands of people in Ankole, as it enabled you to see for yourself the undoubted support that your Excellency commands in the District.

'Your Excellency, may we thank you also for the good will you have shown towards the former rulers of this country since the Military take-over of Government- the return of the remains of the late Sir Edward Mutesa, the honour and respect which you and your Government paid at the funeral of the late Sir Tito Winy [Omukama of Bunyoro], the restoration of property to Prince Kaboyo [heir to the Tooro throne] and the assistance you have continued to render to Sir Charles Gasyonga [Omugabe of Ankole].

'Your Excellency, the Elders of Ankole feel this is the period when your Government is busily engaged in the programme of reconstruction and re-organisation of the affairs of the Nation; a period when no energies and efforts should be lost in building Uganda as a strong united country and also a period when all of us living in Uganda must look forward and not backwards.

'Your Excellency, the Elders of Ankole feel that while there may be merit in re-examining some of the

past deeds of the former President Milton Obote and his Government; your Government should not be rushed into taking decisions on matters which may distract your attention from, and frustrate your efforts in Nation building.

‘Your Excellency, in our view the question concerning the restoration of Kingdoms is one of those crucial matters which we feel should not be raised or even discussed in the Second Republic of Uganda, because of the following reasons:-

‘[a] It is your declared Policy that all political activities are suspended at the time. The restoration of Kingdoms would most likely revive political divisions and factionalism in the contrary to the declared policy of Government. It is our view that if Uganda is to develop as a strong United Sovereign Nation, any divisive tendencies must not be allowed to emerge.

‘[b] The country at the moment faces a very heavy deficit, the country’s financial position cannot therefore sustain any expenditure connected with the restoration of Kingdoms. In addition Kingship imposes all sorts of indirect taxation, all of which are undesirable.

‘[c] Present circumstances demand that all our efforts and resources in the Second Republic of Uganda should be concentrated on economic and social reforms of the country for the benefit of many, instead of being used to enhance the prestige of a few individuals.

‘[d] The people in Kingdom Districts have in the past shown a tendency of divided loyalty between their former Rulers and the Central Government. For the Military Government to consolidate its position and to carry out its programme of re-organisation unimpeded a situation which tends to create divided loyalty among people must be avoided at all costs.

‘[e] The 18 points declared by the soldiers on the take over of Government included the statement that Uganda will continue to be a Republic. This was further repeated at the State House, Entebbe, where the

representatives of the Royal families were present. It would be going back on the soldiers' word if we started talking about the restoration of Kingdoms. Government must not give in to pressure of this kind.

'Your Excellency, we say these things not out of malice, but we strongly feel that if we are to march forward to our stated goal of freedom and progress we must break with the past where this stands in our way and therefore our views must be accepted in this spirit.

'In conclusion Your Excellency, we reiterate on behalf of the people of Ankole our full support to you and your Government. The people of Ankole are behind you in what you are doing and have every confidence that you will successfully accomplish the great task that you have set out to do for God and our Country.'

The memorandum was signed by the following people:

Z. C. K. Mungonya [Chairman]; B. K. Bataringaya [Secretary]; Canon Y. Buningwire [Member]; P. K. Garubungo [Member]; E. C. Cook [Member]; C. B. Katiti [Member]; A. Mulumba [Member]; Y. Makuku [Member]; W. Mukaira [Member]; E. T. Kihika [Member]; T. K. Karuragire [Member]; N. K. Bananuka [Member]; Sheik A. Kadunyu [Member]; Haji Abbas Kayemba [Member]; E. Rutehenda [Member]; and J. B. K. Bweterere [Member].

Source: Doornbos, M, 1978, Not all the King's Men. [Appendix].

APPENDIX V

THE DELEGATES AND TWENTY TWO MAINLY OBSCURE UGANDAN EXILE POLITICAL GROUPS THAT WERE INVITED BY THE MOSHI "UNITY CONFERENCE" CONVENORS

Special Delegates: Yusuf Lule and Paulo Muwanga*

Organisation	Names
Uganda National Movement	Edward Rugumayo [leader] Fred Ssempebwa Eriya Kategaya James Mwebaze
Negotiating Committee for Democratic Unity, Dar es Salaam	Dani Wadada Nabudere [leader] Yash Tandon Omwony Ojok Jack Maumbe
Save Uganda Movement	Yonasani Kanyomozi [leader] Apollo Echeke William Okwero Atteker Ejalu

*Lule , a retired academic and international public administrator, was nominated by the other delegates due to his having lacked a chequered political past [an achievement indeed amongst the then Ugandan political class]. For Muwanga it was due to the intervention of the Tanzanian state. Benjamin Mkapa, its Foreign Minister, had correctly argued that he was a veteran politician, moreover to his credit, the timing of this Conference found Muwanga, in his capacity as a UPC leader, already in Uganda actively involved in the organising of the anti-Amin crusade.

Uganda Unity Group, Lusaka

Leander Komakec [leader]

Hilary Latigo

Moshi Group

Osinde Wangwor [leader]

Omara Aliro

Omara Atubo [Conference Organizer, Moshi]

Uganda Freedom Union

Andrew Lutakoome Kayiira [leader]

John Odongokara

Joshua Luyimbazzi Zaake

Olala Otuunu

Uganda Human Rights, UK

Kanyei Lamba [leader]

Otiti Omule

Sam Sabagereka

Paul Wangoola

Nairobi Discussion Group

Tarsis Kabwegyere [leader]

Oparia Ekwero

Aggrey Kwegyir

Sam Magara

Ephraim Kamuntu

Uganda's Peoples Congress

John Luwuliza Kirunda [leader]

William Obua

Ken Oteng

Onapa Wacha

Uganda Liberation Group,	Aldo Oteng [leader]
Zambia	Moses Apiliga
	Washington Anokbonggo
	Mwa Allimadi
Council for the Liberation and Reconstruction of Uganda	Bernard Buzabo [leader]
	John Magezi
Muthaiga Group	Mathias Ngobi [leader]
	Grace Ibingira
Uganda Nationalist Organisation	Peter Magezi Sinabulya [leader]
	Israel Mayengo
	Andrew Adimola
	Robert Serumaga
Organisation for Uganda Refugee Services	Semei Nyanzi [leader]
	Fr. Vincent Okot
Relief Educational Training Ugandan Refugees Now	Bishop Festo Kivengere [leader]
	Christopher Mubiru Musoke
Free Uganda	Martin Aliko [leader]
Freedom from Oppression	Arnold Bisase [leader]
	Paul Kibuka Musoke
Uganda National Unity and Reconciliation	Eric Ottema Allimadi [leader]
	Milton Bonima Makmot

	Ben Wacha
	Fabian Odongo
Front for National	Yoweri Museveni [leader]
Salvation	Fred Rubereeza
	Jackson Senene
Democratic Party	Paulo Ssemwogerere [leader]
	Anthony Ochaya
Uganda National Movement	Akena p'Ojok [leader]
Fund for Uganda	Rev Kefa Sempangi [leader]
Arusha Discussion	Stephen Ariko [leader]
Group for Diplomacy	Bill Nangai
	Richard Ejotu
	Ben Ogwang
Soldiers	Col Tito Okello, Col Zed Maruru
	Col Gad Toko, Lt-Col William Omaria,
	Maj Christopher Mudoola, Maj Sam
	Nanyumba, Cpt James Odongo, Sgt Tom Oyo,
	Samuel Okello, Oryema Odongokara

APPENDIX VI

SECRET

Proposal for Strategy Before, During and After Elections

Proposal One:

Elections Should be Stopped

Comrades, you will appreciate even the acceptance to hold elections under the present state in Uganda must at best be a farce. Our party is opposed to elections and will only accept the prospect of holding elections at the greatest of pains. I do not need to be reminded about the demonstrations that followed Lule's fall. All this means that it will be impossible for us to win a single seat in Buganda at this time of our history. We must do everything possible to see that elections are not held on the 30th of September as proposed. Even if it were not for lack of support in the country at the moment our party would simply not be ready for then [m] [sic].

How Can We Ensure That Elections Are Not Held?

[a] **Politically:** We have the majority in the NCC. We should frustrate the non-UPC elements in the Council so that they quit Council business altogether. The NCC minus anti-UPC elements will then be able to amend the electoral laws to suit us in case plans to hold elections succeeded.

[b] **Militarily:** We similarly have the majority in the armed forces. Anti-UPC elements in the Police force should be retired or dismissed. Only forces loyal to us should be armed at night within a radius of at least 10 miles of the City [Kampala]. Anti-UPC officers should be sent up country and kept under close surveillance. The Baganda especially should be intimidated. There is no way their co-operation can be solicited. It is very important that Julius [Nyerere] does not change his attitude towards us because the presence of his army here is still a deciding factor. In order to guard against the eventuality of Julius walking out on us we should keep in touch with Fidel [Castro] so that an alternative force is on standby

especially if we have to experience a situation similar to the Angolan one. Fidel has already shown anxiety to help us especially now that our neighbours have turned to the Americans for support. We have to therefore, to portray ourselves as revolutionaries and harp Fidel's tune.

[d] **Administratively:** In case elections have to be held, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission has to be a UPC sympathiser. I have in mind our old friend Kikira who would be suitable. Subsequently all returning officers should be our sympathisers. It would be necessary therefore, to find a way of eliminating these District Commissioners who stubbornly refuse to go with us. We must also dig in on the issue of drawing the electoral constituencies. More constituencies should be given to the North-East. Care should be taken not to over weigh West Nile and Acholi. Lango, Teso, Bugishu, and Karamoja are our best hopes. The West is still uncertain. A lot of ground work has to be done in the West and Busoga. They are likely to be persuaded by tribalism to run against us.

I am at pains to propose that if necessary leaders of other parties should be eliminated, UPC [M] [sic] can be a risk militarily.

Proposal Two: Line of Action If Elections Have to Be Held

[a] There has to be a separate elections for the President. This will give us the advantage of fighting one against three and we are likely to win. Nyerere is still against this idea but I differ strongly Tanzanian politics is not the same as Uganda's. That is why Cuba and one other African country, I would prefer Ethiopia to Angola, should be informed well in advance.

Semogerere is a man who could be easily dislodged. We need to infiltrate our men into the DP to study his character but his leadership of the party is only a compromise. It would be easy to cause tribal wrangle within the DP.

[b] Each candidate has to have a separate ballot box. Even if we were to compromise on the issue of the

Presidential elections the ballot boxes must be separate. The need for this is only too clear to you. We are in Government now and we have to be the ones to organise and supervise the elections. That is a golden chance and we must play our cards properly.

Proposal Three: The Elections

[a] If it appears just before, during or immediately after the elections that things are not working out as expected there should immediately be a mutiny by the Army. For this purpose the Chief of Staff has already ensured that all commanders of Brigades are loyal to us. Instantaneously the other parties will be banned and their leaders detained. This is why the Cubans must be on standby.

NB: These proposals have been circulated only by the Party President [Obote] and you are required not to divulge this information to anybody. Any suggestion regarding the same should be given to the Party President, The Chief of Staff [Oyite-Ojok], and the Chairman of the Military Commission [Muwanga].

A. M. O [Apolo Milton Obote]

12.8.80

Source: [Karugire, 1986:101-2].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Apter, D. E., 1961, The Political Kingdom of Uganda: A Study of Bureaucratic Nationalism, London.
- Avirgan, T. and Honey, M., 1982, War in Uganda, London.
- Bakulu-Mpagi, W., 1982, "Inside Obote's Jail: A Personal Account", in Munger, N. [ed]: Munger Africana Library Notes. 1982.
- Barongo, Y., 1989, "Ethnic Pluralism and Political Centralisation: The Basis of Political Conflict", in Rupesinghe, K. [ed]: Conflict Resolution in Uganda. London, 1989.
- Barya, J. J, 1993, "The New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent View from Africa", in Moore, M. [ed]: Good Government IDS bulletin. Vol 24 No, 1 January 1993 . Brighton. 1993.
- Beetham, D., 1991, The legitimation of Power.
- Behrend, H., 1991, "Is Alice Lakwena a witch? The holy Spirit Movement and its fight against evil in the north", in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]:Changing Uganda. London. 1991.
- Black, D, Mugenyi, J. And Swatuk, L., 1989, The Foreign Policy of Small States:Botswana ,Lesotho Swaziland and Southern Africa.
- Bigsten, A and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., 1992b, "Adaption and Distress in the Urban Economy: A Study of Kampala Households", in World Development, Vol. 20, No. 10 1992.
- 1992c, Rural Sector Responses to Economic Crisis: A Study of Masaka District in Uganda. Gothenburg.
- Boyd, R. E., 1989, "Empowerment of Women in Uganda: Real or Symbolic", in ROAPE No. 45/46 1989.
- Brett, E A., 1973, Colonialism and Under Development in East Africa: the politics of economic change, 1919-39. Aldershot.
- 1991a., Providing for the Poor:Institutional Decay and Transformation in Uganda. Brighton.
- 1991b, "Rebuilding survival structures for the poor:organisational options for reconstruction in the 1990's", in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. London. 1991.
- 1994, "Rebuilding Organisational Capacity Under The National Resistance Movement," in The Journal of Modern African Studies.
- 1995, "Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: the Role of the Military in Politics" in The Journal of Modern African Studies.
- Burke, G. F., 1964, Local Government and Politics in Uganda Syracuse.

- Burkey, I., 1991, Peoples Power in Theory and Practice: The Resistance Council System in Uganda. Yale.
- Churchill, W. S, 1908 My African Journey, London.
- Clapham, C., 1995, "Political conditionality and structures of the African state," in African Insight vol 25, No 2, 1995.
- Clausewitz, C [von],. 1977, "Peoples War" in Laqueur, W. [ed]: The Guerrilla Reader . New York. 1977.
- Cullimore, C., 1994, "Uganda: The Making of a Constitution", in The Journal of African Studies, 32,4 [1994].
- Decalo, S., 1976, Coups and Military Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style. Yale.
- Doornbos, M., 1978, Not All The Kingsmen: Inequality As a Political Instrument In Ankole, Uganda. The Hague.
- 1988,. "The Uganda Crisis and the Nationality Question", in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds] Uganda Now. 1988.
- Edmonds, K., 1988, "Crisis Management: the lessons for Africa from Obote's second term" in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Uganda Now 1988.
- Furley, O., 1989, "Britain and Uganda From Amin to Museveni: Blind Eye Diplomacy" in Rupensighe, K. [ed]. Conflict Resolution in Uganda. London. 1989.
- Gertzel, C, 1980. Uganda after Amin: continuing search for leadership and control. In African Affairs 317, October, 1980.
- Guevara, E., 1977, "Guerrilla Warfare-A Method", in Laqueur, W. [ed]: The Guerrilla Reader. New York. 1977.
- Gibbons, P and Bangura, Y And. Ofstad, A. 1992, Authoritarianism Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa. 1992.
- Moore, M., [ed]: Good Government? 1993.
- Hawthorn, G., 1993, "How to Ask for Good Government", in Moore, M [ed]: Good Government? IDS bulletin Vol 24, 1 January 1993.
- Hobbes, T, 1981, The Leviathan. Harmondsworth.
- Himbara, D and Sultan, D, 1995, "Reconstructing the Ugandan State and Economy: The Challenge of an International Bantustan" in Review Of African Political Economy [ROAPE]

- Huntington, S, 1972,. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale.
- Ibingira, G,. 1973, The Forging of the African Nation London.
- Ingham, K,. 1958, The Making of Modern Uganda. London.
- 1994, Obote A Political Biography. London.
- Jamal, V,. 1989, "The Demise of the Labour Aristocracy in Africa: Structural Adjustment in Tanzania. In Weeks J. F [eds.] Debt Disaster, Banks, Governments and Multinational Corporations Confront the Crisis. New York.
- 1991, "The agrarian context of the Ugandan crisis", in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]:Changing Uganda. 1991.
- Kabwegyere, T,. 1974, The Politics of State Formation, Nairobi.
- Kaggwa, A [Sir Apolo], 1953, Basekabaka be Buganda. London.
- Kanyehamba, G,. 1988, "Power that rode naked through the muzzle of the gun", in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]. London. 1988.
- Karugire, S,.1980, The Political History of Uganda, London.
- 1986, The roots of instability in Uganda.
- Kasfir, N,. 1991, "The Uganda Elections of 1989: power populism and democratisation" in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]:Changing Uganda London.1991.
- Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S,. 1994, "Uganda Stabilization at Last? Analysis of Aid-led Recovery. Gothenburg.
- Kayizzi-Mugerwa and Bigsten, A, 1992a,. "On Structural Adjustment in Uganda" in Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol xiii, No, 1, 1992.
- Khiddu-Makubuya,. 1989, "Paramilitarism and Human Rights", in Rupesinghe, K. [ed]:Conflict Resolution in Uganda. London. 1989.
- 1991, "The rule of law and human rights in Uganda:the missing link", in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. London. 1991.
- Kiapi, A, 1989, "The Constitution as a Mediator in internal Conflict" in Rupensighe, K. [ed]: Conflict Resolution In Uganda. London. 1989.
- Kisekka, S,. 1985, "Forward", in Yoweri Museveni: Selected Articles On The Uganda Resistance War.
- Kiwanuka-Semakula,. 1971, A History of Buganda From Foundation to 1900. London.

- Lal, B., 1983, The Poverty of 'Development Economics'. London.
- Lancaster, C., 1993, "Governance and Development: The Views from Washington", in Moore, M., [ed]: Good Government? IDS bulletin Vol 24 No 1 January 1993 .
- Lanser, T. R., 1982, "Can Obote Survive?", in Africa-Report January-February 1982.
- Lee, J. M., 1967, Colonial Development and Good Government. London.
- Leys, C., 1967, Politicians and Policies: an Essay on Politics in Acholi Uganda, 1962-65.
- Legum, C., 1983a, "After the Amin Nightmare", Africa-Report January-February 1983.
- 1983b, "Milton Obote President of Uganda", interviewed by Legum, C, Africa-Report January-February 1983.
- 1983c, " Inside A Ugandan Prison", in Africa-Report January-February 1983.
- Low, D. A., 1962, Political Parties in Uganda 1949-62. London.
- 1971a, Buganda in Modern History. London.
- 1971b, The Mind of Buganda. [ed]. London.
- 1973, Lion Rampant. London.
- 1988, "The Dislocated Polity", in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]:Uganda Now. 1988.
- Low, D. A and Pratt, R. C., 1960, Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955.
- Lugard, F. D [later Lord],. 1893, The Rise of Our East African Empire. Vol 2, Edinburgh.
- 1965, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London.
- Lule, Y., 1982, "Human Rights Violations in Uganda Under Obote", in Munger, N. [ed]: Munger Africana Library Notes. 1982.
- Lwanga-Lunyiingo, S., 1989, "The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflict" in Rupensighe, K. [ed]: Conflict Resolution in Uganda. London.
- Mamdani, M, 1976, Politics of Class Formation In Uganda London.
- 1983, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda. Nairobi.
- 1990, "The Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28, 3 [1990].
- 1989, "Uganda, Contradictions of the IMF Programme and Perspective," Working Paper, CBR Publications, 5, 1989.

- 1994, "The Politics of Democratic Reform in Uganda", Africa World Review Mat-September 1994.
- Mao, Tse Tung, 1977, "Three Stages of A Protracted War," in Laqueur, W. [ed]: Guerrilla Reader. New York. 1977.
- Martin, D., 1974, General Amin.
- Meredith, M., 1980, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia U.D.I To Zimbabwe. London.
- Moore, M., 1993, "The Emergence of the 'Good Government' Agenda: Some Milestones" in Moore, M., [ed] Good Government? IDS bulletin, Vol 24 no 1 1993.
- Mudoola, D, 1988, "Political transitions since Amin: a study in political pathology" in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Uganda Now. London. 1988.
- 1989, "Communal Conflicts in the Military and its Political Consequences", in Rupensighe, K. [ed]: Conflict Resolution In Uganda. London. 1989.
- 1991, "Institution building: the case of the NRM and the military 1986-9" in Hansen, B, and Twaddle, M., [eds], 1988.
- Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Uganda. 1993.
- Mukasa., S., 1925, "The Record of my Service to the Kingdom of Buganda and the important Government of Britain, the Protector of the Nation Buganda", in Low, D. A., [ed]: The Mind of Buganda. 1971b.
- Museveni, Y., 1972, Fanon's Theory of Violence: Its Verification in Liberated Mozambique. In Essays On The Liberation Of Southern Africa. Shamuyarira, N M, [ed], 1972. Dar es Salaam.
- 1981, The Progress of the Peoples War, in The Uganda Resistance News August 1981.
- 1992, What is Africa's Problem. Kampala.
- Mutibwa, P., 1992, Uganda since Independence. A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes. London.
- Mugenyi, J., 1991, "IMF conditionality and structural adjustment under the National Resistance Movement", in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. London. 1991
- Mujaju, A B., 1993, "Internal Conflict and its International Context", in Rupensighe, K., [ed]: Conflict Resolution in Uganda. London. 1993.
- Munger Ned, 1982, Munger African Library Notes.
- Nabudere, D, 1980, Imperialism and Revolution In Uganda .

- 1988, "External and internal factors in Uganda's continuing crisis" in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Uganda Now. London. 1988.
- National Resistance Movement,. 1985, Yoweri Museveni: Selected Articles On the Ugandan Resistance War.
- Novicki, M. A., 1988, "An interview with Yoweri Museveni", Africa-Report, January-February 1988.
- 1993, "An interview with President Yoweri Museveni", Africa-Report July-August 1993.
- Nsibambi, A., 1991, "Resistance councils and committees: a case study for Makerere 1988", in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. 1991.
- Njuba, S., 1991, "Legal adjustments to revolutionary change", in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. 1991.
- Onimonde, B., 1989, [ed]: The IMF the World Bank and Africa.
- Otuunu, A, 1987, Politics and The Military In Uganda 1900-1985. London.
- Pirouet, L. M., 1991, "Human rights in Museveni's Uganda", in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. 1991.
- Roscoe, J., 1911, The Baganda :An account of their native customs and beliefs. London.
- Rostow, W. W., 1960, The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge.
- Ryan, S. D., 1971, "Uganda: a Balance Sheet of the Revolution", in Mawazo, June 1971, Vol. 3, No 1.
- Saythyamurthy, T. V, 1986, The Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986. Alderstone.
- Scott, R., 1966, The Development of Trade Unions in Uganda . Nairobi.
- Shamuyarira, N. M., 1975, [ed] Essays on The Liberation War of Southern Africa. Dar es Salaam.
- Southall, A., 1980, "Social Disorganisation in Uganda, Before During and After Amin" Journal of Modern African Studies 13,1.
- 1988, "The Recent Political Economy of Uganda", Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Uganda Now. London. 1988.
- Southall, R., 1972, Political Parties in Bunyoro, Makerere.
- Steinhart, E., 1977, Conflict and Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda, 1890-1907.
- Tandon, Y., 1990, "Zimbabwe and Uganda: A Contrasting Record", in Mahjoub, A. [ed]: Adjusting or

Delinking? 1990.

Throup, D., 1991, "Kenya's relations with Museveni's Uganda", in Hasen, B, and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. 1991.

Tindigarukayo, J, 1988, "Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition", Journal of Modern African Studies 26,4.

Toye, J., 1994, "Structural Adjustment: Context, Assumptions, Origins and Diversity", in Van Der Hoeven, R. and Van Der Kraaij, F. [eds]: Structural Adjustment and Beyond. 1994.

Uganda Peoples Congress, 1980, Manifesto 1980: The Pearl of Africa Shall Rise and Shine Again.

Uzoigwe, G. N., 1970, Revolution and Revolt in Bunyuro-Kitara.

Makerere.

- 1972, "Pre-Colonial Markets in Bunyoro-Kitara", in Ogot, B., [ed] Economic and Social History of East Africa. 1979.

- 1983, "Uganda and Parliamentary Government" The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21.

Watson, C., 1988, "The ending of the gun rule", Africa-Report. January-February 1988.

- 1991, "Back to normal" Africa- Report July-August 1991.

- 1994, "No to multi-party", Africa-Report. May-June 1994.

Whyte, M., 1988, "Nyole economic transformation in eastern Uganda", in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Uganda Now. 1998.

Woodward, P., 1991, "Uganda and Southern Sudan 1986-9: new regimes and peripheral politics", in Hasen, B and Twaddle, M. [eds]: Changing Uganda. 1991.

Wrigley, C C., 1964, "The Changing Economic Structure of Buganda", in Fallers, L. A. [ed]: The Kingsmen: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence. 1964.

- 1988,. Four Steps towards disaster, in Uganda Now, Hasen, B and Twaddle, M.[eds].

World Bank, 1989, Sub Saharan Africa From Crisis To Sustainable Growth. Washington D.C.

Unpublished MA Thesis

Southall, R 1972b,. The Military Behaviour in Uganda in Light of Recent Theories About the Military in New States. Manchester.

REPORTS AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION.

Cohen, A [Sir Andrew],. 1953, "Sir Andrew Cohen to Kabaka Mutesa 11, 27 October 1953", in Low, D. A. [ed]:The Mind of Buganda. 1971b.

Mitchell, P., 1939, "Relations of the Protectorate Government in Uganda with the Native Government of Buganda, Note by the Governor, 15 April 1939", in Low, D. A. [ed]:The Mind of Buganda. 1971b.

Kaggwa, A [Sir Apolo], 1890, "Apolo Kaggwa, to Colonel Euan-Smith, British Counsel-General, Zanzibar, 25 April 1890", in Low, D. A., [ed]: The Mind of Buganda. 1971b.

Uganda Constitutional Commission, The Draft Constitution of The Republic of Uganda. Entebbe.

Wallis, 1914 "Wallis to the Secretary of State to the Colonies 1.29.14", in Nabudere, D. W: Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda.

Unpublished Seminar Papers

THESE WERE PRESENTED AT THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOCAL SELF GOVERNANCE CONFERENCE THAT WAS CONVENED BY MAKERERE'S INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH AND WAS HELD AT KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CENTRE 30th AUGUST TO 4th SEPTEMBER 1993.

Karuhanga, Elly, 1993, Local Self Government, Sovereignty and the Human Right of People to Development:Social, Political and Legal Aspects.

Nsibambi, A., 1993b, The Facilitators and Inhibitors of Decentralization of Power in Uganda, 1962-1993.

Oluwu, D., 1993, Beyond the failure of the Centralised State in Africa.

PRESENTED FOR THE UGANDA ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION LECTURE SERIES

Kabwegyere, T., 1993, The Birth Pangs of Democracy: Foundations For Development.

Nkumbi, S., 1993, "The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies on Small Scale Industries in Uganda."

Nsibambi, A., 1993a, Decentralisation of Power:Obstacles and Opportunities.

NEWSPAPERS

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH [London]

THE GUARDIAN [London]

THE MONITOR [Kampala]

The New Vision [Kampala]

The OBSERVER [London]

SEKANYOLYA [Kampala]

The Star [Kampala]

THE UGANDA ARGUS [Kampala]

THE UGANDA HERALD [KAMPALA]

MISCELLANEOUS

AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD.

AFRICA RESEARCH BUREAU.

Tarehe Sita [The Magazine of the National Resistance Army] September-October 1988.